

Global Migration Issues 3

Rudolf Anich
Jonathan Crush
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John O. Oucho *Editors*

A New Perspective on Human Mobility in the South



International Organization for Migration (IOM)



Springer

A New Perspective on Human Mobility in the South

Global Migration Issues

Volume 3

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Foreword

South–South migration has slowly but surely emerged as a key cross-cutting issue for migration and development researchers and practitioners. In 2008, when the European Union and the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) Group of States called for the establishment of an observatory on migration, the idea of looking at migration from an exclusively “Southern” perspective was innovative and little explored. Reconsidering the issue in 2014, migration within the South of the world and its impact on development is accepted as a recognized topic by governments and institutions, supported by improved statistical evidence and socioeconomic data.

The global perception of migration and its dynamics have changed and will continue to change at a fast-growing speed, with the emergence of regional poles in the South playing increasingly important roles in shaping geopolitical, economic and social change, and as a consequence of the economic recession and slow or even reversed growth in the North.

Still, despite this backdrop, the quantity and quality of studies and analysis on South–South migration are scarce in number and limited in scope, with the recent research activities by the ACP Observatory on Migration aiming to fill part of this gap. The ACP Observatory was established in 2010 to produce data on South–South migration within ACP countries for migrants, civil society and policymakers; enhance research capacities and capabilities in ACP countries; and facilitate the creation of a network of research institutions and experts on migration research. Through a bottom-up approach, the ACP Observatory is linking research and data with a network of national stakeholders that includes representatives of governments, academia and civil society. These activities are supported by an academic consortium of research and university centers based in ACP countries and Europe.

Approaching migration analysis from this standpoint, it is with great pleasure that the ACP Observatory welcomes this contribution edited by Rudolf Anich, Jonathan Crush, Susanne Melde and John O. Oucho. This publication thoroughly investigates critical issues of the migration debate, spanning from the terminological and contextual meaning of “migration” and “development”, and carefully moving the lenses from South–North and North–North to South–South. In this way, the edited volume questions our traditional conception of the migration paradigm and shedding innovative insights on South–South mobility, on critical realities such as dias-

pora communities living in the South, and on environmental change and its impact on development or child migration. This critical contribution will help to expand the debate and stimulate further research on this topic and, hopefully, promote future activities aiming at the protection of migrants and their families living in the South.

ACP Observatory on Migration

Monika Peruffo

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This third book has benefited from the encouragement of Laurent de Boeck, former Director of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration, and Monika Peruffo, ad-interim Director of the ACP Observatory on Migration.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
AEC	African Economic Community
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DRCMGP	Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FOMP	Facilitation of Movement of Persons
FATF	Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GMG	Global Migration Group
HDI	Human Development Index
HLD	High-level Dialogue (on International Migration and Development)
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MFI	Microfinance Institution
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSG	Melanesian Spearhead Group
MTC	Money Transfer Company
MTO	Money Transfer Operator
NESMUWA	Network of Surveys on Migration and Urbanization in West Africa
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAC	Pacific Access Category
PICTA—TIS	Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement—Trade in Services
REC	Regional Economic Community
RSE	Recognized Seasonal Employer
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMP	Southern African Migration Project
SLA	Sustainable Livelihood Approach
SME	Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise
SMS	Skills Movement Scheme
SQ	Samoa Quota
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UN.GIFT	United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
THB	Thai Baht

Chapter 1

Introduction: The South–South Migration and Development Nexus

Susanne Melde, Rudolf Anich, Jonathan Crush and John O. Oucho

Introduction

The year 2013 was marked by the second United Nations High-level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development which took place in October in New York (UN 2012; Omelaniuk 2013). The HLD is the latest global event in what has been a remarkable decade for the migration policy and research community. Since 2000, there has been an avalanche of conferences, workshops, commissions and research examining the links between migration and development. None of this seemed likely in the late 1990s when international migration was far more likely to be a source of tension and conflict between states than an arena for dialogue and cooperation (Castles 1999). Key moments in the movement of migration and development up the global governance agenda since 2000 include the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005), the first UN HLD in 2006 (UN 2006), the establishment of the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) (Omelaniuk 2008, 2012), the formation of the multi-agency

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Global Migration Group (GMG 2010, 2013), the establishment of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration in 2010, and the production of key publications such as the 2009 UN Human Development Report on international migration (UNDP 2009), the 2010 GMG Handbook on Mainstreaming Migration into development planning and more than 50 Migration Profiles produced by developing countries.

The international policy dialogue on the migration–development nexus is based on a small number of core issues on which constructive debate has been possible. These include the benefits of financial transfers by migrants (impact of remittances, cf. Orozco and Ellis, this volume), the role of diasporas in development (cf. Chikanda and Crush, this volume), circular temporary migration and return migration. More politically sensitive issues—such as the brain drain, the protection of migrant rights and freedom of movement—are, by common consent, generally avoided (Crush 2013).

Most of the policy thinking and dialogue about the relationship between migration and development has also been dominated by a focus on international migration from developing to developed countries, from South to North. The basic question is whether South–North migration is harmful or beneficial to the development prospects of the South. The emerging consensus is that managed migration is a “triple win” for countries of origin and destination and for migrants themselves. As with the policy dialogue, the bulk of the contemporary research literature on migration and development focuses on South–North movements. A recent example is the June 2012 anniversary edition of the flagship journal *International Migration* entitled “Migration and Development Buzz? Rethinking the Migration Development Nexus and Policies” (Brønden 2012). While many of the contributors are relatively skeptical of the “buzz”, the papers focus almost exclusively on migration from South to North. No explanation is offered as to why South–North migration is the focus of a special issue on a global phenomenon. Castles and Delgado Wise’s (2008) edited volume *Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South* is the first to systematically examine the migration and development issue from the standpoint of the South. They persuasively argue that the migration relationship between South and North cannot be divorced from the broader set of interactions between the two regions: “Adopting ‘perspectives from the South’ ... means developing a comprehensive analysis, which examines each specific phenomenon (such as migration) in the broad context of the overall dynamics of North–South relationships, and the interactions of the various spatial levels (local, regional, transnational, etc.)” (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008, p. 9). For all its strengths in foregrounding a Southern perspective as corrective, the volume still focuses primarily on North–South relationships and the policy response to South–North migration.

The possibility that migration within the South has development consequences for countries of origin and destination was all but ignored until very recently. In 2007, two publications highlighted the need to pay much greater attention to South–South migration. Ratha and Shaw (2007) demonstrated that migration within the South was numerically as important as that from South to North. In some regions

(such as Africa) it was much more significant. Hujo and Piper (2007) suggested that it was time to consider whether migration between developing countries had development impacts and to expand the definition of those impacts to include social and economic development. Since 2007, the idea of South–South migration has gained greater traction, with an increasing number of publications adopting the terminology in a wide variety of contexts (Gindling 2009; Hujo and Piper 2010; Lee 2010; Schiff 2010; Bartlett 2012; Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras 2012; Fachhini et al. 2013; Mohan 2013). However, when analysing migration patterns within the South, attention was predominantly given to forced migration, such as the cases of internally displaced persons, asylum-seekers and refugees, although these movements only represent a minority of people migrating between developing countries. Conscious of the knowledge gaps about the relationship between South–South migration and development, the ACP Observatory on Migration began implementing a systematic program of research in 12 pilot countries in 2010 (de Boeck 2012, Melde 2012a; ACP 2013). This volume is one of the products of that endeavor. Drawing on the ACP Observatory-sponsored research, as well as other literature, the volume focuses on South–South migration patterns and how these subvert and challenge the dominant South–North migration and development paradigm. While recognizing that the majority of migrants in developing countries move within their countries, this publication focuses on cross-border movements within the South as they represent one of the most overlooked issues in the global migration debate.

Interpreting “Migration” and “Development”

Both “migration” and “development” are often seen as self-evident concepts that do not require detailed scrutiny or definition. “Development” itself has been subject to a vast array of interpretations over the years. As a result, it tends to be left largely undefined and unexamined in the migration and development debate. In development studies, the idea of “development” is generally dated to the 1940s and the attempts by colonial powers to move beyond the naked exploitation of their territorial possessions and to quell the growing tide of anti-colonial protest and disorder. However, the contemporary idea of development has a much longer historical pedigree, dating back to the Industrial Revolution in Europe. As Cowen and Shenton (1995, p. 29) argue, “it was in Europe that development was first meant to create order out of the social disorder of rapid urbanization, poverty and unemployment.” In post-World War II Europe, development was defined in a more narrow technocratic sense as denoting economic growth in gross domestic product (GDP) (absolute or per capita) and progression along a path which would see the “developing” countries of the South take on the attributes of the “developed” countries of the North. Whether this is possible, or even desirable, is the question at the heart of a vast literature on development theory (de Haas 2010).

More recently, measures of development have expanded to include human security, capabilities and freedoms, and individual autonomy—all under the rubric of “human development” (Castles 2009). United Nations Development Programme (2010), for example, defines human development as:

A process of enlarging people’s choices ... achieved by expanding human capabilities and functionings. At all levels of development, the three essential capabilities for human development are for people to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable and to have a decent standard of living. But the realm of human development goes further: essential areas of choice, highly valued by people, range from political, economic and social opportunities for being creative and productive to enjoying self-respect, empowerment and a sense of belonging to a community. The concept of human development is a holistic one putting people at the centre of all aspects of the development process.

United Nations Development Programme’s annual *Human Development Reports* all adopt this broader framing of development (UNDP 2009). The GFMD also claims to take a human development-based approach (Omelaniuk 2008). The real challenge is that in adopting a less economic and more holistic definition of development outcomes, the links between migration and development become that much harder to unravel. For example, the process of “expanding people’s choices” (which is seen as integral to human development), would mean enlarging their freedom to live where they choose. This, in turn, would mean relaxing border controls that dissuade and prevent people from exercising this freedom. As the Gallup World Poll found, about 16% of the world’s adults—which translates to roughly 700 million people worldwide—would like to move to another country permanently if they had the means (IOM 2011a).

On the migration side of the nexus, the main problem is not so much conceptual confusion as a lack of terminological consistency. The terms *migration* and *immigration* are often used interchangeably, for example. Some object to the use of the terms *migrant-sending countries* and *migrant-receiving countries*, preferring the more neutral terms like *migrant origins* and *migrant destinations*. Even this binary classification is problematic since many countries are origin and destination as well as transit points to other destinations. Most researchers seem to agree that talking of migrants’ countries of origin as their “home countries” undermines their standing and integration in their countries of destination, even though many migrants themselves make free use of the term. The term *international migrant* is defined differently in many countries and often also between ministries within the same countries. In many developed countries, the term *migrant* carries negative connotations, referring to someone from another, often developing, country who is unwanted (as in illegal “immigrant” or “illegal migrant”). Developed countries also shun the use of the word *migrant* to describe their own citizens who migrate abroad, preferring to use the term *expatriate* instead (Hugo 2012). Within the migration and development debate, the term *diaspora* is growing in currency. However, there is no agreement on what constitutes a diaspora, whether all migrants are members of diasporas, and whether an interest in development is a prerequisite for being a diaspora member. To bring greater clarity and uniformity to the lexicon of migration, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011b) has provided a basic set of working definitions for a range of migration concepts and terms.

An additional source of conceptual confusion is what Castles (2009, p. 2) calls the “fragmentation and narrowness of migration studies” and the fact that research “does not build on shared concepts and questions, and does not, on the whole, lead to an accumulation of knowledge”. One of the problems is an absence of interdisciplinary conversation and the proliferation of terms and concepts that only make sense to those within disciplinary walls. One exception to this generalization is the large and vibrant interdisciplinary field of transnational studies (Vertovec 2009). With some exceptions, ideas about transnationalism have not penetrated very far into discussions about the relationship between migration and development, however (Sorenson 2007; Glick Schiller and Faist 2010; Faist et al. 2013). One of the reasons for this is that transnationalism potentially undermines the centrality of the nation-state as the core unit of analysis and object of development (Amelina and Faist 2012). Going even further, Faist (2008) suggests that adopting a transnational approach would mean abandoning various binary distinctions that are central to the current migration and development debate: “sending versus receiving”, “origin versus destination”, “emigration versus immigration” and so on. The real challenge is actually not to dispense altogether with state-centered concepts but rather to integrate them with the understanding of migrant behavior, practices and attitudes.

Newland (2007) has observed that “the evidence base for the links between migration and development is still very weak”. Castles (2009), on the other hand, argues that migration research findings do exist on this issue but are not being listened to by policymakers. In the early stages of the current optimistic phase of the migration and development debate, there was a growing rapprochement between policymakers eager to learn more from researchers who themselves perceived an opportunity for influencing policy. This conversation has increasingly run aground. Governments and international organizations seem to feel that they know all there is to know about migration and development or they do not care for the critical arguments of researchers. Researchers, on the other hand, have become increasingly disenchanted with the whole migration and development debate, seeing the hidden hand of neoliberal ideology at every turn (Skeldon 2008; Raghuram 2009; de Haas 2012; Mullings 2012). Expert debates are increasingly confined to a narrowing circle of academic publications which policymakers neither read nor heed.

The idea that there is a migration and development “nexus” is designed to convey that the relationship between the two is reciprocal in nature (Crush and Frayne 2007; Faist 2008; Faist et al. 2013; Sørensen 2012; Geiger and Pécoud 2013). In practice, the migration policy debate has paid much more attention to the impact of the movement of people on development rather than vice versa (Castles 2009). When policymakers do turn to the influence of development on migration, they invariably get caught in the “root causes” trap. This is the argument that migration is undesirable and an expression of the “failure” of development. Only new development can act as an antidote to migration by addressing its root causes such as poverty, unemployment and food insecurity (Bakewell 2008). However, the research evidence does not generally support this view. For example, the concept of the “migration hump” (de Haas 2007) suggests that rising levels of economic development actually lead to increasing migration. Industrialization means fewer

employment opportunities in rural areas, comparatively low wages and more people leaving a country. If industrialization and economic development continue, workers can become in short supply, which leads to higher wages. This, in turn, affects emigration levels, which begin to decline.

A recent exception to the general disregard for the influence of development on migration is the GMG's (2010) *Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policy-makers and Practitioners*. The handbook discusses a broad range of economic, governance and public services factors, social and political freedoms, demographic imbalances, and conflict and transnational factors which can affect migration flows. The handbook also discusses environmental factors leading to major internal displacements and population movements within the Global South. Another exception is the policy-oriented work of one of the ACP Observatory partners, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). The Institute's Development on the Move project, conducted in partnership with the Global Development Network, mapped eight areas where development can affect migration and vice versa (Chappell and Sriskandarajah 2007). These areas include economics, education, health, gender, wider social impacts, governance, environmental sustainability and disaster relief. This matrix has been developed further to look at concrete impact indicators and also includes the impact of development on human rights (Melde 2012b).

Towards South–South Migration

Until recently, the global migration and development policy debate focused almost exclusively on migration from the South to the North and the potential contribution of migrants in the North to development in the South. There are a number of reasons for this. First, as Crush and Ramachandran (2010) suggest, the focus on South–North migration “is perfectly consistent with the idea that what matters most in development is how the South can become more like the North and whether South–North migration hinders or helps that process”. The global migration and development agenda therefore calls on countries in the South “to recognize the benefits that accrue to them from the migration of their citizens to the North”. Second, South–North migration has been a long-standing source of attention and grievance in the South where governments have complained about the negative consequences of the “creaming off” of their talent and skills. By viewing South–North migration through a migration and development lens, it has been possible to reframe migration as having a largely positive outcome for countries in the South and for migrants themselves. However, the focus still remains on South–North movement. Third, the countries of the North have a particular concern with unregulated South–North migration and how “development” in the South can stem the flow of unwanted migrants (Walters 2010). Furthermore, the media ensures that the “myth of invasion” (de Haas 2008) in the case of African migrants trying to “reach” Europe remains uppermost in the public mind. This concern, indeed obsession, has the effect of keeping the focus squarely on policies to control South–North movement.

Finally, most funders of migration and development research are European and North American. For example, the European Union plays a key role in funding of research (not just in the social sciences) and appears to prioritize only migration studies strategically relevant to its Member States. Berriane and de Haas (2012, p. 2) state that “[t]he high dependency on commissioned research is a more general problem of migration research, which is often guided by the short-term policy interests to ‘solve’ what are perceived as ‘migration problems’ or ‘migration challenges’, rather than trying to achieve a more profound understanding of the nature, causes and consequences of migration”. South–South Migration does not (at least not directly) affect societies in the North and is thus not of immediate concern to the general public or funding agencies.

Mapping the South

A key initial question when beginning to articulate a research and policy agenda for South–South migration is the usefulness of the concept of “the South” itself. Some have suggested that the term is too simplistic to be of much utility. Bakewell (2013), for example, argues that other categories are far more useful than “North” and “South” when it comes to international migration. He maintains that terms such as “intra-regional migration”, “regional and global labor hubs” (such as the Gulf countries, and cities in China, India, Brazil and South Africa) and “migration patterns based on historical ties” (such as in the Lusophone African countries) are of far greater utility. The suggestion is interesting, but it does not mean we should abandon the concept of South–South migration, which has both analytical and heuristic value as a way of distinguishing between what are often very different kinds of global migration flows.

The term “South” inevitably encompasses a very diverse group of countries and is generally used very loosely, almost metaphorically. What it dispenses with, though, is the hierarchical nature and connotations of inferiority inherent in terms such as “Third World” and “developing countries” (Chant and McIlwaine 2009). But there is certainly no unanimity on which countries should be considered part of the South. The World Bank, for example, distinguishes low- and middle-income countries of “the South” from high-income countries. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development refers to the category of “least developed countries”. UNDP uses the Human Development Index (HDI) to determine which countries belong in the South. The advantage of using the HDI is that it is not just based on income but also includes other variables such as life expectancy and education. All countries without a very high HDI are considered part of the South. Countries that fall within the HDI definition of the South are still very heterogeneous, however: at one end of the spectrum are countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), while at the other are extremely poor and deprived states like Haiti, Lesotho or Timor-Leste.

While the South–North dichotomy is a somewhat artificial divide, it does serve to highlight the importance of increasing mobility among countries within those regions that are largely ignored in the migration and development policy debate. While certain South–South migration systems, such as those in Southern Africa and West Africa, are well documented and studied, others tend to go unnoticed despite increasing evidence of their importance (Crush and Tevera 2010, Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras 2012). Malaysia, Thailand and India, for example, are all important regional attraction poles. Little information also exists on the Maghreb countries becoming de facto immigration destinations and how transit periods are lengthening, sometimes up to a few years duration (Brachet 2012; Cherti and Grant 2013). Similarly, much more needs to be known about transit regions in the Sahel states (Brachet 2012).

South–South Mobility

One of the aims of this volume is to highlight what is currently known about South–South migration and its relationship to development. At the aggregate level, there can be little doubt about its numerical significance. According to latest data from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2013), about 59% of the world’s 2013 migrant population of 232 million (defined as people who changed their country of usual residence) were living in the North and about 41% were living in the South. However, since these figures are projections from census data, it is likely that they underestimate the size of the migrant population in the South since they exclude many short-term, temporary (as well as undocumented) movements. Looking at origin and destination, the *World Migration Report 2013* (IOM 2013) highlights that—regardless of the definition used for “South” and “North”—movements between countries in the South (ranging between 34 and 41% of the global total) represent the major migration pathway together with South–North migration (35–45%). These figures are similar to estimates generated by the Gallup World Poll collecting information from 25,000 migrants in more than 150 countries (cf. IOM 2013).

The relative importance of South–North and South–South migration differs considerably from region to region (Table 1.1). For example, intraregional migration in Africa accounts for 15.5 out of 29.2 million (or 53% of the total) compared with 9.4 million African migrants in Europe and North America (UN DESA 2012) (cf. Lututala, this volume). Comparing various subregions of the continent, 76% of all West African migrants resided in a different country in West Africa in 2010. Intra-regional migration, as a proportion of the total, was 56% in Asia but only 14% in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mobility among countries in the South is likely to continue to increase, as the barriers to immigration in the North are raised higher and many countries part of the South represent emerging economies with greater job and employment opportunities (such as Brazil, India and China). New migration corridors have opened in the South–South context such as West Africans crossing the Atlantic to Argentina or

Table 1.1 International migrant stock by major area of origin and destination, 2010 (millions). (Source: UN DESA 2012)

		Destination						Total	Percent origin
		Africa	Asia	Europe	LAC	North America	Oceania		
Origin	Africa	15.5	4.0	7.7	0.0	1.7	0.4	29.2	53
	Asia	1.0	46.1	19.0	0.3	14.2	2.0	82.6	56
	Europe	0.8	7.8	37.3	1.5	9.0	2.4	58.7	63
	LAC	0.0	0.6	3.9	4.6	23.5	0.1	32.8	14
	North Am.	0.1	0.5	0.9	1.0	1.4	0.2	4.1	34
	Oreniia	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.9	1.6	57
	Various	1.8	2.1	0.9	0.2	0.0	0.1	5.1	
	Total	19.3	61.3	69.9	7.7	50.0	6.0	214.2	
	Percent destination	81	75	53	60	3	15		

Brazil (Marcelino and Cerrutti 2011), Trinidad and Tobago (Anatol et al. 2013), and to Asian destinations such as China (Li et al. 2009; Bodomo 2010, 2012). Another example concerns South Americans moving to African countries such as Mozambique and Angola. Older migration links are also being revived, such as East Asians and Chinese moving to Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009; Harrison et al. 2012; Anatol et al. 2013). In some cases, these destinations are used as a stepping stone on the way to destinations in the North. In others, immigration countries in the South are themselves the preferred destinations.

Comparing South–South and South–North Migration

Intra- and interregional migration within the Global South has important characteristics that distinguish it from patterns of South–North migration (cf. Lututala, this volume). First, wage differentials are often held by development economists to be the key economic factor driving South–North migration (Lim 2011). These differentials are generally much lower in the South and less important in South–South migration. Other factors, such as high unemployment at home and non-wage income-generating opportunities, may be relatively more important. Personal security considerations related to fleeing violent conflicts, political repression and deprivation figure particularly prominently as a motivation to migrate within the South (Koser and Martin 2011). Countries in the South host the largest global share of forced migrants, both refugees and internally displaced persons. In 2012, 81% of refugees worldwide were located in countries in the South (UNHCR 2013). The Asia-Pacific region was host to 34% of all refugees in 2012, sub-Saharan Africa to 25%, and North Africa and the Middle East to 15%. In comparison, Europe hosted only 17% of the world’s refugees (UNHCR 2013). According to UN DESA (2012), refugees represented 16% of all international migrants in developing regions in 2010, while for developed regions this share represented only 2%.

Second, in contrast to South–North migration flows, the vast majority of South–South migrants move between countries with a common border. Ratha and Shaw (2007) estimated that over 80% of South–South migration takes place between neighboring states. South–South migration movements also tend to be more informal than South–North movements, due to the proximity of origin and destination countries, the relative porosity of borders and the nature of labor markets in the South. Labor markets are characterized by high levels of informality, and many migrants also work in this shadow economy. Numerous studies have shown that, proportionally, migrants to the North tend to be more skilled than those moving within the South. This is consistent with the selective nature of South–North migration, which favors those with tertiary education. However, many countries in the South do attract tertiary educated migrants from other countries in the South. They include the Gulf countries, Malaysia, Taiwan Province of China, South Africa and the countries of the East African Community (EAC) (Oucho et al. 2013).

Third, in the South–South context, temporary circular movements play a more important role compared with South–North migration which still tends to be characterized more by permanent or semi-permanent immigration. Partly this is a function of the intentions and preferences of migrants, and partly because of government policies and regulatory mechanisms that discourage permanent immigration in the South. However, this gap is narrowing as countries in the North are increasingly utilizing temporary migration as a means to fill large gaps in the labor market. In Canada, for example, a country which has long been thought of as epitomizing a policy of permanent immigration, the number of temporary workers now exceeds the number of permanent immigrants. In relation to South–South movements, Hugo (2009) calculates that there are at least 15 million temporary migrants within Asia and the Middle East working outside their countries of origin. Some temporary South–South movements take place under formalized recruitment and contract systems (such as migration to the Middle East from countries such as India and Bangladesh and migration to the South African mines from countries such as Mozambique and Lesotho). However, much temporary, circular migration is informal (and oftentimes undocumented) in nature because of the absence of formal policies and channels. In both the Asia-Pacific and Southern Africa temporary migration takes a number of different forms but overall the trend is towards greater mobility and cross-border movement (Hugo 2009; Crush and Tevera 2010) (Table 1.2). The complexity of migration movements has led some to characterize the phenomenon as “mixed migration” (Van Hear et al. 2009). According to Van Hear (2011) “migration can be mixed in several senses, which to some degree relate to stages of the migratory process: motivations may be mixed at the point of making the decision to move; migrants may make use of the same agents and brokers; they may travel with others in mixed migratory flows; motivations may change en route and after arrival; and people may find themselves in mixed communities during their journeys or at their destination.” Hugo (2009) argues that the development potential of temporary migration is considerable but that to be truly effective policy reform is necessary. So, too, is knowledge and information. As Gibson et al. (2013) note, evidence about the impact of temporary South–South migration on development is scant.

Table 1.2 Typology of temporary migration in Asia and the Pacific. (Source: Hugo 2009)

Type	Status in destination	Potential to move to permanent residence	Ability to bring family	Rights
1. Low-skilled contract labour temporary migration	Documented and undocumented	Very low	Not possible	Very limited
2. High-skilled temporary labour migrants	Mostly documented	High	Allowed	Substantial
3. Low-skilled seasonal labour migration	Documented and undocumented	Low	Not possible	Very limited
4. Working holiday makers	Mostly documented	Moderate	Possible	Substantial
5. Student migration	Documented	High	Allowed	Substantial
6. Trainee migration	Initially documented although many become undocumented	Low	Not possible	Limited
7. Border Commuters/Circulators	Documented and undocumented	Low	Not necessary in many cases	Limited
8. Project tied labour migration	Documented	Low	Possible	Limited

Third, remitting patterns for South–South migration differ from transfers from migrants in the North (cf. Orozco and Ellis, this volume). Ratha and Shaw (2007) identify several differences between North–South and South–South remitting. The first difference concerns the total value of remittances in relation to the total number of migrants. Although the numbers of South–North and South–South migrants are similar, the remittance volumes are not. While South–North migrants represent about 35–45% of all migrants, between 43 and 62% of all remittances are sent by them. South–South migrants only send about 13–26%. This result is not surprising given the greater wage differential for migrations moving from the South towards the North and the larger unrecorded remittance flows between countries in the South (IOM 2013). However, the proportion of South–South remittances as a percentage of total remittances received varies from region to region and country to country (World Bank 2013). For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion is 28% compared with 19% in South Asia, 10% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 8% in East Asia and the Pacific. Country differences vary from a low of less than 1% to a high of almost 100% in the case of Lesotho. Another difference is that formal remitting costs are significantly higher for South–South migrants and “constitute a major drain on the incomes of poor migrants” (Ratha and Shaw 2007, p. 11). Reasons include a lack of market competition and currency exchange commissions at both ends of remittance corridors. At the same time, informal remitting channels are far more important in the case of South–South remitting. These remittances are not recorded in official data, which means that the real volume of South–South

remittances may actually be seriously underestimated. In the case of Lesotho, for example, 87% of remittances are either brought by migrants themselves or through a friend or colleague (Nalane et al. 2012). In the case of Zimbabwe, formal transfers and the informal organized money transfer system (*omalayisha*) have grown up to handle household-to-household transfers (Thebe 2011; Makina 2013). The proportion of remittances handled in this way increased from 5 to 30% between 2005 and 2010, even as the proportion flowing through formal channels (banks and money transfer companies fell from 41 to 29%) (Crush et al. 2012). Another important facet of South–South migration largely overlooked are money transfers from migrant households towards migrants living abroad to support when facing economic difficulties or to allow the continuation of their migration route (Zourkaleini et al. 2013).

Fourth, a great deal of attention is currently being given in the migration and development policy debate to diaspora engagement policies reaching out to nationals living abroad and groups of foreign background to get them more involved in the development of their countries of origin (Agunias and Newland 2012). There is certainly no unanimity on the definition of “diaspora” and which individuals are to be included in this category. At its most inclusive, diaspora includes anyone who has ever left a country and all their descendants. At its most restrictive, it includes only first-generation, permanent migrants who maintain strong social and political links with their countries of birth and who are actively involved, through these links, in the development of those countries. Despite the terminological confusion, one thing is certain: most governments in the South view their diasporas exclusively or primarily as migrants who have taken the South–North route and are living in the North. A classic example of this is the African Union that defines the African diaspora as “people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union.” As a result, argues Bakewell (2009), the African diaspora within Africa is “largely absent” from considerations of migration and development. This is an extremely unfortunate omission since it excludes a significant proportion of the migrant population from debates about the role of diasporas in development and from policy initiatives to reach out to those diasporas (Crush 2011). There is an implicit bias in much of the diasporas in development debate against lower-skilled, low-income migrants. Only better-educated, high-skilled migrants tend to be targeted in many diaspora engagement programs. This not only precludes the vast majority of South–South migrants from a development role but ignores the fact that there are also increasing numbers of skilled migrants in South–South migration. For example, Kenyans migrating to other countries within the EAC are mostly high-skilled workers (Oucho et al. 2013). The same is true for Kenyans in other African countries such as South Africa and Nigerians in Ghana and South Africa (Kinyanjui Kinuthia 2013; Olatuyi et al. 2013).

Fifth, “feminization” of migration has taken on a different trajectory in South–North and South–South migration movements. Generally, feminization of international migration is lower among countries in the South. According to UN DESA (2013a), in 2013 women were underrepresented among all international migrants in the South, except those 65 years and older. Nonetheless, important variations exist.

The share of female migrants in 2013 was lowest in Western Asia (34%) and Northern Africa (42%), which constitute the Middle East and Northern Africa region, and highest in South America and Central Asia (52% of the total number of migrants in both regions are female) (UN DESA 2013b). In some countries, feminization is even higher. In the case of the Philippines, for example, in the 1970s women constituted about 15% of the migrant labor force. In 2010, 55% of new hires of Filipino migrant workers were female (Cortes 2011). A significant proportion of these are South–South migrants. In Sri Lanka, more than 60% of migrants are women and in Indonesia 79% of registered overseas migrants are women (Cortes 2011, p. 2). In other countries, male migration still dominates. Men represent 63% of all emigrants from Cameroon, for example (Zourkaleini et al. 2013). In Southern Africa, the share of female migrants participating in international migration is less than 20% on average (Dodson et al. 2011). Yet, 44% of migrants from Zimbabwe are women. These cases show important country and regional differences in the level of feminization of migration in the South. Feminization of migration is not simply a matter of increasing numbers, however. For example, male migrants from Lesotho working as miners in South Africa earn significantly more than their female counterparts working in domestic service. Yet, per capita remittances are higher among female migrants.

Sixth, some South–South migration is characterized by forms of “intra-ethnic” and “inter-ethnic” migration. Oyeniyi (2013, p. 1) defines this as “movement of ... splintered sub-ethnic groups from their ‘new nation-states’ ... where their main ethnic group is found”. Oyeniyi (2013) notes that those moving 300 m across the border from another country into Nigeria are considered international migrants, although they may still live in a community speaking the same language, practising the same religion and following the same customs. On the other hand, those moving 1,000 km from Northern Nigeria to Southern Nigeria will find themselves in a region where different languages are spoken, a different religion is predominant and there is considerable ethnic diversity. These individuals are classified as internal migrants. Other examples of ethnic migration include the Maasai on the border between Kenya and Uganda, and the Somali on the border between Kenya and Somalia. “Ethnic migration” is particularly common in Africa where colonial borders often divided one ethnic group between two or more countries. While it is not realistic to drop the categories of internal and international migration, intra- and inter-ethnic mobility are important concepts that need to be factored into the analysis of South–South migration. A recent OECD, Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras (2011) report on integration in the South points to differences in Southern countries whose societies are characterized by diverse ethnicities and geographic, demographic and economic differences. Thus, “Northern models of assimilation and multiculturalism are not necessarily applicable” (OECD et al. 2011, p. 59). Integration approaches in the South therefore need to reflect the heterogeneity in terms of language, culture and ethnicity in those countries. The perception of migration as a problem is not an issue confined to destination countries in the North. Crush and Ramachandran (2010) draw attention to the contemporary resurgence of intolerance and xenophobia in migration countries in the South. The negative image of migrants is often linked to

increasing inequalities, lack of employment, poverty and poor service delivery, as well as stereotypes conveyed through the media and the feeling of mass influx of irregular migrants. In South Africa, for instance, the lack of policies and programs to counter anti-migrant sentiments contributed further to the nationwide xenophobic attacks in May 2008 (Crush and Ramachandran 2010).

Seventh, migrants moving between developing countries appear to gain the least in terms of their overall well-being. Following the growing interest in measuring development as an increase in happiness and well-being of the population (see, for instance, Stiglitz et al. 2009), IOM and Gallup looked at the well-being of more than 25,000 migrants and 400,000 native-born worldwide and found significant differences according to the origin and destination of a migrant. Those moving from a low-income country to a middle- or high-income country usually improve their economic situation and are more satisfied with personal health and health care (compared with if they had not migrated), although often at cost of emotional well-being and personal status. South–South migrants, instead, fare similarly or worse (than if they had not migrated): they record very little gains and often struggle for survival (e.g. adequate food and housing) in their destination countries, similar to some groups of the native-born living there (IOM 2013).

Finally, countries in the South are likely to be most affected by global environmental degradation and climate change (cf. Weber, this volume). This means that most of the migration influenced by environmental factors is likely to take place within the South. In fact, in 2012, the majority of the estimated 32 million displaced people by natural disasters are living in developing countries: about two thirds of global displacement occurred in Asia, while Africa had over four times more than in any of the previous 4 years (IDMC 2013). Slow-onset changes, such as desertification, droughts, sea-level rise and floods will have a twofold effect: some people, especially the poorest, will not be able to move and will be “trapped” in areas of environmental hazard. Others who move to the cities in the South are likely to move to areas with a high risk of environmental degradation, such as low-lying deltas. It should be noted that most migrants moving due to environmental factors do so internally rather than cross a national border. While these characteristics cannot be generalized to all countries in the “South”, it is important to highlight that mobility induced by environmental change may lead to different challenges for migrants in the South than those forced to leave home in developed countries (for a regional comparison on the changes in environment and migration, cf. Piquet and Laczko 2013).

Outline of Chapters

There are signs that the importance of South–South mobility could increasingly be recognized in policy debates on migration and development, going forward. For example, the UN DESA (2012) brochure explicitly includes data on South–South international migrants. IOM’s *World Migration Report 2013* analyzes the well-being

of migrants along four migration pathways, including South–South migration (IOM 2013). The topic was also discussed in the framework of the 2011 GFMD during a thematic event on South–South labor mobility held in Abuja. The 2012 GFMD also dedicated a roundtable sub-session specifically on South–South migration for the first time (GFMD 2013). While the roundtable was supposed to focus on policies on migration within the South, the lack of information on the subject and the dearth of existing policies meant that discussions centered on the phenomenon of changing mobility in the South and the lack of data.

Against this backdrop of the need for more information in order to mainstream South–South migration into development policy and vice versa, the current volume assesses what we already know, and need to know, about the nexus between South–South migration and development.

The following chapter (cf. Lututala, this volume) compares intra- and extraregional migration in the South, with a particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa. It examines how migrant key characteristics and reasons to migrate vary between movements within and between regions. Migration within the same region or to a neighboring region seems to predominate in the South, indicating that today many developing countries are not only origin but also destination of migrants.

Chapter 3 (cf. Oucho, this volume) discusses labor mobility as an essential means for regional integration among developing countries. It compares regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa with regard to their promotion of free movement of persons. It stresses the importance of social protection of migrant workers and illustrates the challenges in implementing protection schemes through the example of Southern Africa.

The role of diasporas in the South–South context is presented by Chikanda and Crush in Chap. 4. After providing an overview of major diaspora communities living in the South, the authors discuss the impact of diasporas on the development in both their countries of origin and destination. The contributions of skilled migration, public attitudes towards migration, formal and informal remittances patterns, and diaspora associations in the developing world are some of the aspects examined, while additional ways of diasporas' engagement in the South are analyzed with the help of two case studies.

The impact of remittances is further discussed by Orozco and Ellis in Chap. 5. It presents existing modalities governing the international transfer of migrant earnings, and describes major trends and characteristics of remittances' senders and receivers as well as the implications of these transfers on development. It concludes by indicating major challenges and possible ways forward to promote the positive impact of remittances, both at micro and macro levels.

Chapter 6 (cf. Weber, this volume) looks at the linkages between environment and human mobility by examining the situation arising in the Pacific Islands region. It presents key viewpoints in the current debate on this subject matter, and discusses the relevance of environmental migration with regard to livelihood security, social vulnerability and community resilience.

The last chapter (cf. Tiffoche, this volume) focuses on a specific group of migrants recently rising in numbers: migrant children. It looks at unaccompanied

minors, those migrating with their relatives and children of migrants staying behind and those born abroad, and tries to highlight differences in terms of vulnerability, protection needs and agency.

There are, of course, many other facets of South–South migration that would deserve to be analyzed in detail. Internal migration, for instance, appears to be of particular importance in developing countries and should probably be discussed in a dedicated publication. The purpose of this publication is to discuss some of the key features of South–South cross-border migration based on available evidence. This book aims to contribute to a better understanding of human mobility in the South by providing some fresh and innovative viewpoints to the current debate on this topic. The editors hope that it can raise the interest of policymakers, migration practitioners and academics in the topic of South–South migration. In fact, further research generating reliable, up-to-date data is urgently needed.

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Chapter 2

Intra- and Extraregional Migration in the South: The Case of Africa

Bernard Mumpasi Lututala

Introduction

It is estimated that just over a third¹ of the proportion of international migration throughout the world takes place in countries in the South. This proportion is almost the same as international South–North migration, and it represents approximately 73 million people (UN DESA 2012). In certain cases, South–South migration is even greater in terms of numbers, because the statistics published underestimate the phenomenon due to their lack of reliability, particularly in the countries of the South (Manente 2012)². However, politicization and strong media interest in South–North migration have led to South–South migration becoming “invisible” (Commission, E. E. 2010).

This fact alone should be sufficient for in-depth research to be carried out concerning this migration, with a view to gaining a better understanding of this phenomenon, which is at the heart of the social and economic transformation of the world in general and of the South in particular—an understanding different from that which only sees South–North migrants as “job stealers” or “benefits scroungers”.

Migration in the South raises multiple questions: What are the migratory networks that are emerging? Which immigration countries in the South are following in the footsteps of the immigration countries in the North? And what is the rationale underlying this migration? Is the rationale here different from that of South–North migration? This section focuses on these questions, trying to show: (1) the intra- and

¹ Almost 40% according to Souchaud (2009), 34% according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (UN DESA 2012).

² It is generally believed that data concerning migration in the South underestimate the scale of the phenomenon due to their lack of reliability.

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extraregional migratory processes in the South, and more particularly in Africa; (2) the reasons for this migration; (3) the role and place of this migration in the world's new geo-economic and geopolitical configuration; (4) the new migration trends; and (5) the links between intra- and extraregional migration in the South.

However, studying migration in the South is difficult because the South is multifaceted: it comprises countries that remain poor and others that are emerging from an economic point of view; countries that were formerly colonised and others that never have been; countries with different political and government systems; countries that are multicultural and multiracial; and, of course, countries with different migratory systems. This therefore requires a good understanding of the history and the demographic and migratory dynamics of countries in the South as a whole and in Africa in particular, which is not clear-cut. In addition, migration in general, and migration in the South in particular, remains a phenomenon studied by approximation due to the lack of relevance and reliability of data when it comes to recognizing the multidimensional, multipolar, multiple and reversible nature of the phenomenon, and also because of the different ways in which it is defined, depending on the countries and the times. It seems to us that many studies on African migration suffer from a problem with the representative nature of the samples used. Very often, generalizations are made based on a few migrants encountered during the few interviews that take place.

Despite the recognition of the role of migration in population dynamics, social transformations and political challenges, no global survey has been devoted to this phenomenon, whereas in the case of fertility, for example, the World Fertility Survey was carried out in the 1980s. In addition, no questions are asked concerning migration in periodic national surveys on demographics and health (e.g. Demographic and Health Surveys), or in UNICEF's Multiple Indicators Cluster Surveys monitoring the situation of children and women (see, for example, Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002). 1-2-3 surveys concerning employment, the informal sector and consumption have only been undertaken in certain countries³ and can only be used to estimate migratory flows and status, as is the case with censuses (see, for example, Democratic Republic of the Congo INS 2004–2005).

Two surveys that have provided subregional data on migration should, however, be noted, namely the Network of Surveys on Migration and Urbanization in West Africa (NESMUWA) carried out in the 1990s, and the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) carried out between 1997 and 2000. However, access to the raw data from these surveys remains difficult for researchers who do not belong to the institutions that conducted the surveys. We should also mention the Gallup surveys, although they are limited to opinion research concerning international migration, and much less concerning migratory flows and trends.

³ Since 1993, the following countries have carried out 1-2-3 surveys: Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, countries in Latin America, Madagascar, Morocco, Rwanda and seven countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Concepts, Data and Methods

Most studies on migration in the South start by resolving an essential methodological question: What is meant by the South? (Bakewell 2009; Ratha and Shaw 2007; Parsons et al. 2005; GFMD 2012; Manente 2012). There are, in effect, several approaches to defining the South, depending on whether we consider countries' levels of development (UNDESA approach), their average incomes (World Bank approach) or their human development indexes (UNDP approach) (Bakewell 2009; Manente 2012). Each of these three categories includes a certain number of countries that are sometimes considered as countries of the South and sometimes of the North. In this section, we use a geo-economic approach. By "the South" we mean the regions that the United Nations considers to be underdeveloped or developing. These include Africa, Asia (with the exception of Japan), the Caribbean, Central America, South America and Oceania (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand)⁴. This geo-economic approach takes the inequalities between countries, subregions and regions into account, which is of great importance for a better understanding of the migratory systems in the South. It also helps provide greater clarification concerning the concepts that are used. Consequently, intraregional migration is migration within the regions identified above, while extraregional migration is migration which, seen in relation to a reference region, occurs outside that region. The regions being divided into subregions, we use the term *intrasubregional migration* to refer to migration within the subregions (for example, within Central Africa), and *intersubregional migration* for migration between subregions (for example, between Central Africa and Southern Africa).⁵

To determine the migratory processes in the South, we used the estimate of the migration flow in different regions of the world published by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRCMGP) (Parsons et al. 2005). Based on data from different sources, in particular censuses and surveys carried out for other purposes, DRCMGP's researchers were able to build a matrix that gives the proportion of immigrants and emigrants in different regions of the world, as well as their regions of origin and destination (Tables 2.3 and 2.4 in the Appendix). Subject to the considerations mentioned above concerning the quality and limitations of such data, we can nevertheless discern a few indications concerning the migratory processes, and make assumptions on the reasons for intra- and extraregional migration, and on the links between these two types of migration. These assumptions are subsequently consolidated by demographic, anthropological, sociological and historical studies.⁶

⁴ See <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regnf.htm>.

⁵ To find out the different subregions in the South, see <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regnf.htm>.

⁶ We would like to thank Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Jocelyn Nappa Usatu, doctoral students at the Catholic University of Louvain, for their contribution to the bibliographical research.

Migratory Processes in the South: Intrasubregional and Extrasubregional Migration

Migration within certain subregions of the South (see the diagonal in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 in the Appendix) represents over half of all migratory movements in these subregions. This means that most migration in the South occurs within subregions. This is particularly true in East Asia, South-East Asia, South America and Central America, and especially in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. In the latter two subregions, almost all migration occurs within these subregions (81 and 80% of all immigrants, respectively). The Caribbean and especially the Middle East and North Africa are the two subregions in the South that retain their migrants in their respective subregions the least, only retaining 39 and 35%, respectively. Most migrants from the Caribbean go to other subregions in the South, particularly South America, followed, to a lesser extent, by Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, most of the migrants from Middle East and North Africa go to other distant subregions, such as South Asia and even to sub-Saharan Africa. Presumably, this would be Lebanese migration primarily, but may also include Moroccans, which are well known everywhere for the scale of their migration and dispersion throughout the world.

These results confirm what other researchers have already shown (Hujo and Piper 2007; Bakewell 2009; Ratha and Shaw 2007; GFMD 2012; Manente 2012). In the subregion of West Africa, for example, where international migration is more prevalent than anywhere else in Africa (Ndiaye and Robin 2010), the NESMUWA showed that there are clearly more migrants between the countries in the West Africa subregion than between the countries in other subregions in Africa. Furthermore, according to census data reported by Ndiaye and Robin (2010), there are 7.5 million migrants within West Africa, representing approximately 2.5% of the population of this subregion. By way of illustration, Côte d'Ivoire, which is one of West Africa's main immigration countries, mainly receives migrants from its bordering countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali (Ndiaye and Robin 2010), while Senegal mainly receives migrants from Guinea, and 44% of migrants leaving Dakar go to neighboring countries (Flahaux et al. 2010).

The same situation can be observed in other subregions of Africa. Consequently, in South Africa, another major immigration country in Africa, people from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia especially can be found. Studies that have recently been carried out in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo) have led to the same observation: 76% of migrants from Kinshasa went to bordering countries (i.e. Angola and Congo) (Flahaux et al. 2010). Furthermore, the national migratory profiles established by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have led to the same observation: between 1995 and 2005, 37% of Cameroonian migrants went to bordering countries such as the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria (Evina 2009); in the case of Mali, the proportion of its migrants observed in bordering countries of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal was 72.9% (Ballo 2009); and in the case of Niger,




Fig. 2.1 Share of emigrants moving within the same subregion, to subregions within the South and to subregions outside the South. (Source: Based on Parsons et al. 2005, Table 11)

42.7% of its migrants went to bordering countries of Burkina Faso, Benin and Nigeria (Issaka Maga 2009).

Migratory exchanges between the regions of the South are relatively low (see also GFMD 2012; Manente 2012) and, generally, they are even lower than South–North migrations (Fig. 2.1, and Table 2.4). For instance, only 19% of migrants originating from Southern Africa move to other subregion in the South (compared with 51% moving within the subregion and 31% moving towards a country in the North). Even lower shares for extra-subregional movements within the South are recorded for Central America (4% of all emigrants), the Caribbean (4%), and the Middle East and North Africa (7%). The only exception appears to be South Asia recording a similar number of migrants moving within their subregion as well as to other subregions in the South (43 and 40%, respectively).

Geographical, Economic and Historical Contexts as Determinants of Migratory Processes

The migratory processes in the South identified above seem to be part of three contexts—a geographical context where proximity favors migratory exchanges between two countries, subregions or regions; an economic context where the most developed countries and subregions are more attractive to populations from poor countries and subregions; and a political and historical context where wars and political insecurity favor forced and voluntary migration to countries, subregions and regions in the South that are more politically stable and better governed. These contexts give rise to several types or patterns of migration that other researchers have already mentioned. Souchard (2009) has identified the predominance of refugees

Table 2.1 Types of migration in the South and the factors and contexts that determine them

Factors involved in migration	Types of migration according to context		
	Geographical context	Economic context	Political and historical context
Cost of migration	Proximity migration Circular migration	Transit migration Irregular migration	Cross-border migration Irregular migration
Existence of social networks	Family migration Circular migration	Circular migration	Family migration
Mode of production	Seasonal migration	Labor migration	Forced migration
Poverty/income differences	Labor migration Irregular migration	Labor migration and brain drain	Labor migration and brain drain
Political crises/wars	Transit migration Irregular migration Forced migration	Irregular migration	Forced migration (e.g. displaced populations and refugees)

among migrants in the South, forced migration and transit migration, labor migration, and the feminization of migration in the South. Ratha and Shaw (2007) refer to proximity, social networks, income differences, seasonality, transit, petty trading, conflicts and distress as migration factors in the South. Bakewell (2009) mentions the influence of colonization (e.g. forced migration and slavery), the conflicts of the post-colonial period and the quest for better living standards. Lastly, Manente (2012) add the effect of emerging economies, South–South cooperation and the adoption of restrictive measures in the countries of the North. For our own part, in Table 2.1, we summarize the different types of migration in the South, the contexts of which they are part and the factors that determine them.

Geographical Context

Most migratory movements occur over a short distance, according to one of the “[traditional] laws of migration” (Ravenstein 1885). In fact, the migratory act entails costs, and the geographical proximity of two regions or two subregions permits migration at a relatively low cost. This is the case in sub-Saharan Africa, where levels of poverty do not permit high migration costs, especially transport costs (see also GFMD 2012), and where all that is often necessary to reach a neighboring country is to take a coach or train, or even cross the border on foot. The porous nature of the borders in this continent facilitates this proximity migration even more. This is particularly true during wars and other political troubles,⁷ and it is also the

⁷ For example, in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, just over 2 million people crossed the border and poured into the small town of Goma in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It should be said in passing that this large uncontrolled migration triggered the operations that are still destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo today, due to the presence, among the millions of migrants, of members of the Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda, the former soldiers of the Rwandan patriotic army which the Rwandan Government

case when border populations live in economic areas that extend over several different countries (Brachet 2007).

Social networks in a sense also reduce distances, and therefore contribute to proximity, circular and family migration. In fact, according to the network theory of migration (Zlotnik 2003), family networks promote the propensity to migrate and contribute to funding the costs of migration, including the cost of social and economic integration in the place of destination. Although they live in countries whose borders are inherited from the colonial period and were drawn at the Conference of Berlin (1885), the populations of some African countries, if not most of them, have the same origins and ancestors, and belong to the same ethnic groups as those of neighboring countries. This is particularly true of populations that formerly belonged to the Congo Empire and which now find themselves in Angola, Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as being true of the populations of West Africa (Adepoju 1984). As a consequence, these populations mix with each other, and therefore carry out circular or even permanent migration between the different countries in which they live. Members of families and clans who live in neighboring countries are considered extralocal members, who nevertheless remain attached to their base family residence. These extralocal members contribute to the arrival of other family members from the countries of origin or neighboring countries. In this way, family migratory chains are created (Lututala 1989).

Geographical proximity also promotes seasonal migration in areas where a mode of production predominates that is essentially based on agriculture, movement to summer pastures and cross-border trade. Finally, the geographical context determines forced migration when environmental or climatic crises occur. The West Africa subregion, in particular, has experienced significant rural–urban migration since the years of the drought that has gripped the region.

Economic Context

The migratory processes observed in the previous section suggest that the propensity to migrate is strongly linked to the economic context. Migrants go to countries that are economically wealthier because they are looking for better living and working conditions, in order to escape from poverty. This is what all the theories and models concerning migration suggest (Lututala 1995a). The predominance of intrasubregional migration, or migration towards neighboring subregions in Africa and South Asia, reflects a context of poverty because, as we have just seen, poor populations cannot afford higher migration costs or to migrate, or migrate directly, towards more distant regions, something that Bakewell also notes (2009). We also know that poor populations are relatively less educated and less connected to the global system, and therefore have fewer employment opportunities outside their continents.

continues to hunt down, carrying out military operations, or causing them to be carried out, even inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself. Read Kristine (2008) and Péan (2010), among others, on this subject.

In addition, the most economically powerful regions or subregions welcome migrants from other regions or subregions. This is the case in Central Africa, where countries like Angola, Congo and Gabon have welcomed many migrants from West Africa (from Mali, Nigeria and Senegal) (Lututala 2007; Ngoie Tshibambe 2010). This is also the case for South Africa, which—since the end of apartheid in the 1990s, has become the new El Dorado for Africans wanting to emigrate (Dika 2009).

As a result of these inequalities, and to overcome what appears to be an obstacle to their migration, poor populations sometimes, if not often, migrate through a transit country, or use irregular channels. Migrating through a transit country enables them to acquire the financial and other resources (in particular, visas) required for extraregional migration.

However, economic imbalances alone do not explain the existence of migration between two countries or subregions. In fact, two bordering countries may be economically distant if neither of them have any attractive factors to offer. Their migratory exchanges will be low as a consequence. For instance, the fact that Côte d'Ivoire mainly welcomes migrants from Burkina Faso is mainly because these two countries have close economic ties—Burkina Faso having served as a reservoir of labor to work in Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa plantations during the French colonial period (Coulibaly et al. 1980). Conversely, there are fewer people from Burkina Faso in neighboring Guinea than in France, which is more distant geographically but closer economically, because the economic interdependence between Burkina Faso and France is greater than that which exists between Burkina Faso and Guinea.

The same can be said with regard to migration from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The fact that, as Flahaux et al. (2010) have shown, the proportion of emigrants that have left Kinshasa for bordering countries is considerably higher (76%) than the proportion of emigrants who have left Dakar (44%) is probably because the precarious nature of the economic situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is such that neighboring countries are much more attractive economically, which is not the case for countries bordering Senegal. Angola and Congo have considerably higher living standards and more job opportunities than the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As a consequence, two countries attract many Congolese from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, engaging in circular and permanent migration, even if it is irregular.⁸

Political and Historical Context

Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced over 30 political conflicts, resulting in wars over the course of the past two decades. It has experienced other political turbulence linked, in particular, to the process of democratization, electoral issues and power

⁸ For example, we observe that Angola has become the main country of destination for migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed by South Africa, France and Belgium (see Mangalu 2011).

struggles. This context has an influence on migration in two ways. First, it forces people to leave their places of residence to protect themselves in the event of war or conflict. Thousands of people from Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, Sudan and Rwanda have fled these countries to run away from violence and seek shelter elsewhere. Some, referred to as displaced persons, head for locations in the interior of their countries. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, where crises have persisted since 1996, has seen up to 3.4 million displaced people from 1996 to 2003 (Zeender and Rothing 2010). Others have taken refuge in neighboring countries. As a result, it is in sub-Saharan Africa that we find the greatest number of refugees and displaced people in the world. Others still decide to return to their countries of origin when their new countries of residence experience a serious political crisis.

It seems, however, that these migrants do not travel far from their usual places of residence, and that their migration is only temporary, lasting the time required for calm to return before they head home (see also GFMD 2012).

Secondly, migration in the South seems to be part of a certain historically established tradition of mass migration of populations linked to: a mode of production based either on food cultivation, livestock farming or trade; environmental phenomena such as droughts and other natural disasters; the slave trade and colonization. Links have been established historically between the countries of origin and destination, which serve as a sort of foundation for current migratory trends.

New Interregional Migratory Trends in the South

This section discusses the new migratory trends observed in the South, or rather in Africa. The section focuses on a few cases of interregional migration in Africa and migration flows between China and Africa, between India and Africa, between Lebanon and Africa, and between Africa and South America, in particular Brazil and Argentina. These flows are those that characterize current migration trends between Africa and the other Southern regions the most.

New Intraregional Migratory Trends in Africa

Four new migratory trends can be observed in Africa—a reorientation of migratory flows for some countries, the appearance of new immigration countries, a rise in transit migration and an increase in return migration. As far as the reorientation of migration flows is concerned, we observe that those that were once immigration countries have become emigration countries, or vice versa, or both at the same time. Senegal, Gabon, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among those that are experiencing this phenomenon. In the case of Senegal, it was an immigration country for a long time, due to the importance of its economy based on

groundnuts and the political role it played in French West Africa. However, from the 1970s onwards, shaken by the groundnut crisis, among other things, and therefore by a reduction in its attractiveness to neighboring countries, Senegal experienced a relative fall in immigration. At the same time, and for the same reasons, Senegalese populations themselves started to leave their original environment. First, people living in the groundnut basin flooded to Senegal's towns, especially Dakar. Subsequently, emigration by town dwellers to other countries intensified (Ba 1994; Ndiaye and Robin 2010; Sall 2010; Ndiaye 2010).

Tightening of immigration laws in the Schengen territories in Europe has had two effects on African migration. One, it has forced many candidate migrants to emigrate to countries other than those in Europe, including some African countries like Angola, Gabon and South Africa, and also to the United States of America, Argentina and Brazil in South America, and China and India in Asia. The emergence of new immigration countries is also worthy to note. In Africa, South Africa is on top of the list, followed by Libya (de Haas 2007). Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has undoubtedly become the new economic and political power open to Africa and the world. It has shown its willingness to welcome migrants who can contribute to its reorganization and economic dynamism (Dika 2009). Consequently, thousands of migrants with a variety of professions and origins have added to the migrants of Indian origin who came to South Africa before the end of apartheid and to the migrants working in the mines originally from neighboring countries (Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, etc.). South African universities have welcomed thousands of students from other African countries, in particular for studies at the doctorate level. A considerable number of peddlers, mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Senegal, have come to South Africa's streets. Since the end of apartheid, the number of migrants in South Africa has increased. South Africa received approximately 350,000 migrants from Mozambique and close to 23,000 Congolese from the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the start of the 1990s (Dika 2009).

As for Libya, its emergence as an immigration country seems to be a result of political (Muammar Gaddafi's desire to play a more important role in Africa) and economic (oil boom and a need for labor in the mines) factors. It may also be a result of the role played by previous migrants in bringing other migrants to Libya, such as members of their families, people from their countries of origin and their friends (de Haas 2007).

Angola has also become a major immigration country. It has received a large number of migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and has even become the leading country of destination for them (Mangalu 2011). However, in South Africa—as in Angola and Libya—thousands of irregular migrants are constantly being expelled under conditions that are strongly criticized, which are very similar to those of the expulsions carried out in Europe, and which hinder African solidarity and integration (Lututala 2007).

As far as the rise in transit migration is concerned, we observe that, as a result of poverty and difficulties in obtaining entry visas to immigration countries, a large number of migrants experience difficulty going directly from their countries of origin to the countries of destination. Thus, they are forced to engage in transit

migration. Transit countries are those that migrants consider, rightly or wrongly, to be a little more relaxed with regard to granting visas, or which are close to the final destination country envisaged. Two cases in particular can be cited. The first is Senegal, and particularly Dakar, which receives hundreds and perhaps thousands of migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, swelling the number of candidates for migration to other regions of the South or countries of the North from Senegal, while at the same time, as we have seen, Senegalese migrants leave for other continents. The second case is that of countries in North Africa that receive multiple migrants from sub-Saharan Africa wanting to reach countries in the North, the Middle East or Asia by crossing the Mediterranean Sea or the River Nile (Brachet 2007; de Haas 2007).

It should be noted, however, that some intraregional migration that starts out as transit migration has a tendency to become permanent migration. Many migrants drop anchor in these countries of transit, to use Honerou's (2007) expression, and resign themselves to settling there, having failed to acquire or while waiting to acquire the necessary resources, or to continue their migratory journey because smugglers have robbed them of all the resources they had. They resign themselves to settling there, despite the risks they run of becoming illegal immigrants and falling foul of the law that punishes such irregular migration. In Libya, for example, thousands of African migrants are now in prison due to the irregular nature of their presence in this country, although their imprisonment is not due to that alone, because Libya is one of the African countries that has been forced to implement measures to outsource its border controls to prevent the illegal entry of migrants into the European countries (Brachet 2007; de Haas 2007).

The increase in return migration is one of the consequences of political crises in immigration countries. These crises have forced thousands of resident migrants to return to their countries of origin, quite reluctantly and often in disastrous circumstances. This is the case for migrants who had settled in Côte d'Ivoire; people from Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, to name just a few, returned to their countries of origin, following the successive electoral crises that Côte d'Ivoire had experienced since 2002. In Burkina Faso, for example, the 2006 general census of the population and housing environment recorded 610,805 Burkina Faso migrants who had returned to their country of origin between 1996 and 2006 (Ndiaye and Robin 2010, p. 27). In addition, the 2011 crisis in Libya, which led to the fall of Gaddafi, also forced thousands of African migrants to return to their countries of origin, often under inhuman conditions that have been criticized. Other return migrations are either chosen by the migrants themselves or generated by the host countries. Two case studies concerning Senegal and the Democratic Republic of the Congo clearly demonstrate this (Flahaux et al. 2010).

Migration Between Africa and China

Chinese migrants in Africa are considered by some authors to be "new invaders" (Curtis 2008; Bredeloup and Bertonecello 2006, p. 200; Gehrold and Tietze 2011). Yet, Chinese migration in Africa is not a recent phenomenon. The Chinese have, in

fact, been working in Africa since the start of the colonial period on various “colonial development” projects. For example, 540 Chinese were recruited in the 1890s to work on building the Matadi-Kinshasa railway in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The work lasted from 1891 to 1898 (Cornet 1947). In Congo, too, 600 Chinese were recruited to build the Congo–Ocean railway, while other Chinese also contributed to building the railway in Niger (Sautter 1967).

The second period of significant migration by the Chinese to Africa started with the Bandung Conference in 1955, which brought together the non-aligned countries wanting to free themselves from the influence of the Soviet Union and Western imperialism. At the time, China presented itself as the “third way”. However, it is since the 1970s that the number of Chinese people in Africa has started to increase. In fact, this new trend of Chinese immigration to Africa relates to China’s political and economic interest in Africa, in the context of a certain “Sino-African solidarity being built against imperialism” (Bredeloup and Bertoncetto 2006, p. 201). In fact, since the start of the 1970s, Chinese entrepreneurs have been involved in significant construction projects in many African countries. They have built Palais du Peuple [Palaces of the People] (in Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, etc.), sports facilities (the LS Senghor stadium in Senegal, the Martyrs stadium in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, etc.), roads and motorways (in Rwanda, etc.), railways (in Angola, etc.) and airports, among other projects.

Two contextual elements therefore explain this rise in Chinese immigration in Africa. From a political point of view, China is seeking to assert itself as an alternative political power, for instance, by supporting the nationalist movements and the fight against apartheid, not interfering in states’ internal affairs (Bredeloup and Bertoncetto 2006), forgiveness of African countries’ debts, granting interest-free loans or loans with flexible repayment terms, developing a new type of strategic partnership (...) characterized by equality and reciprocal trust at the political level, fostering win-win cooperation at the economic level, and strengthening cultural exchanges (China 2006). At the economic level, China is interested in raw materials, and in more recent years, it has also expressed interest in tracts of land that can be used for large agricultural–industrial production. It is interested in the African market as an outlet for its products and, according to Bredeloup and Bertoncetto (2006), there were approximately 600 Chinese companies in Africa in 2006.

African countries, for their part, are receptive to, and indeed satisfied with, this Chinese influence and presence. At the political level, they see China as a counterweight to the domination and conditionality to which they are subjected by the Western countries. The (Chinese) principle of non-interference is an advantage to the authorities in place. At the economic level, the Chinese presence provides a real boost to African economies searching for investors and new capital, while African consumers are delighted to have the opportunity to buy Chinese goods, the cost of which is in line with their wallets, even if the quality of these products is often criticized. This Sino–African cooperation has become institutionalised. Since 2000, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, the China–Africa Think-Tanks Forum and similar events have been held regularly (Gils and Tan-Mullins 2009).

This political and economic context of Sino-African solidarity has, in a manner of speaking, paved the way for new migratory trends for Chinese people in Africa.

Consequently, in addition to Chinese entrepreneurs and workers flocking to the continent to work on the many construction projects, some of whom, one may imagine, will not return to China at the end of the work, other Chinese people are coming of their own volition to work in shops, restaurants and other businesses. However, despite this obvious Chinese presence in Africa, we do not know the exact number of Chinese migrants there. Estimates that are published vary considerably, such that it is difficult to have confidence in them: 130,000 in 2006 (Bredeloup and Bertonecello 2006), 2 million in 2012 (Bodomo 2009), 270,000–510,000 (Ma Mung 2009, in Manente 2012, p. 7), among others.

The same uncertainty exists with regard to the immigration of Africans to China. According to Bodomo (2009), there are approximately 500,000 Africans in China, 20,000 of whom alone are students (12,000 have received bursaries while 8,000 have no bursaries). These figures are questioned by Brautigam (2009), who considers that there are no more than 5,500 Africans in China. Despite this “dispute over numbers,” it must be admitted that African immigrants to China have formed an increasingly large community since 1980, the year in which the first African traders arrived in the country (Coloma 2010). Since then, African immigrants to China have diversified to include traders, students, sportsmen and sportswomen, artists and teachers (Bodomo 2012). Teachers can be found at both secondary and university levels. As far as traders are concerned, they are presented as making the connection between Chinese companies and their countries of origin, and do more lucrative deals than in the West (Coloma 2010). In addition, the Bodomo study (2009) reports that African immigrants are not confined to the major cities such as Beijing and Hong Kong. They are also increasingly found in secondary cities such as Guangzhou, or even in the villages of China. The study also shows that these immigrants mainly come from Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and the United Republic of Tanzania.

African immigrants in China are already accused of invading China and find it difficult to integrate. The Chinese Government has introduced new regulations and a selective immigration policy to favor migrants with a high level of skills. The result is that many African immigrants have difficulty in renewing their visas and find themselves in an illegal position. Some do not hesitate to resort to mixed marriages in order to integrate into the Chinese economy, particularly when they want to start a business (Coloma 2010). Research shows a certain Chinese chauvinism with regard to African immigrants, and incidents between the Chinese police and these immigrants (Coloma 2010; Haugen 2012).

Migration Between Africa and India

The presence of Indian immigrants in Africa is not a new phenomenon either. Africa is actually one of their first destinations (Dennerly 1928). They started to arrive as early as 1834, in particular in Mauritius and in Natal, South Africa. These first waves of Indian migration included migrant workers contracted to work in the sug-

arcane fields which had been deserted by black slaves after slavery was abolished in the British colonies in 1834 (Singaravelou 2003).

The second wave of Indian migration (from the end of the nineteenth century up to Indian independence) comprised migrant workers recruited spontaneously in India to go and work as farm laborers, or as traders or petty artisans and lenders. They headed to the old migrant worker destinations (i.e. Mauritius and South Africa) and also to East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania (Dennerly 1928). The migrants in these first two waves made large fortunes which were the basis of suspicion, and even jealousy, and which led to restrictive measures, in particular a ban on them from owning land and limitations on their markets for selling their goods. As a result, these measures caused indignation and protests among Indian migrants, prompting them to forge a national identity, the feeling of being an Indian diaspora, according to the meaning that Singaravelou (2003, p. 21) gives to the concept of a diaspora, that is to say:

a social category that is the result of forced, or voluntary, migration; (...) consciously maintaining a collective identity with reference to a common origin, whether mythical or not, to an historic experience, and having a strong link to a place of origin, whether real or not; creating networks that transcend national territories and creating community structures in the host territories; maintaining more or less close relationships with the regions of origin; maintaining relationships of solidarity with fellow citizens in other immigration countries; nurturing feelings of exclusion, difference, superiority or antagonism with regard to the indigenous population.

Several other factors drove Indians to migrate and swell this diaspora, such as irregular rainfall, making harvests irregular and leading to unemployment; the disappearance of family agricultural industries; the decline in demand for labor due to the introduction of commercial crops; the decline in local industries as a result of the introduction of mechanization; a land tenure system based on the class system and excluding certain people from access to land, condemning them to be domestic or daily staff; debts contracted and bonded labor; and insecurity of labor and living conditions (Dennerly 1928).

The third wave of Indian migration is more recent, and started shortly before India's independence and gathered strength after it. It is characterized by free migration with the intention of permanent settlement in the host country, and included skilled and unskilled workers, as well as professionals. These migrants headed towards East Africa in particular (Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania) and South Africa, where they settled in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.⁹

Adam notes that Indian migrants in the main "broke their ties with their ancestors' homeland" (Adam 2010, p. 6). For them, India represented a foreign country and not a country for any sort of return migration. Yet, if the majority of Indian migrants have the nationality of their host countries (Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania), their African national identity is more composite. It is transnational, and is "greater than that of nation-states (...) the frequent dispersion of

⁹ It may be noted that Mahatma Gandhi spent 20 years in South Africa when preparing his political struggle (Gutmann 2008).

Table 2.2 Indian immigrants in various East African countries. (Source: High Level Commission on the Indian Diaspora, in Cathérine Wehtol de Wenden 2009; United Nations Population Fund 2012)

Country	Number	Population in 2011 (in millions)	Indian immigrants as a percentage of the 2011 population of the host countries
Uganda	12,000	35.6	0.03
Zimbabwe	16,700	13.0	0.13
South Africa	1,000,000	50.7	1.97
Mozambique	20,870	24.5	0.09
Zambia	13,000	13.1	0.10
Madagascar	29,000	21.1	0.14
United Republic of Tanzania	90,000	47.7	0.19
Kenya	102,500	42.7	0.24
Libya	12,400	6.5	0.19
Mauritius	715,800	1.3	55.1
Réunion	220,000	0.8	26.2

families maintains a permanent attachment to other parts of the world and the cosmopolitan nature of their points of reference” (Adam 2010, p. 6). This dispersion is the result of secondary migrations, or the migration of children for schooling. In addition, it promotes and maintains industrial, commercial and financial networks, such that one of the problems for Indian migrants in Africa “is to discover a means of making multiple components coexist while at the same time respecting their duties as citizens and the laws of the host country” (Adam 2010, p. 6). It therefore involves true diasporas, according to the meaning that Singaravelou (2003) gives to the concept, that is to say, they are both citizens of their country and citizens of the world.

The current migration of Indians to Africa is encouraged by new Indo–African relations. In fact, like China, India is also seeking greater presence in Africa, in particular for reasons to do with access to raw materials. African States, for their part, have joined forces with India, as is the case with China, to escape from partners that are too demanding, especially as far as respect for human rights is concerned. Since the India–Africa Forum held on 8 and 9 April 2008, India has clearly stated its concern to ensure presence in Africa, for the same reasons, but with a different policy, as China. India’s strategy focuses on capacity-building and strengthening human resources on site, the transfer of intermediate technologies, and support for agriculture and related industries. According to Gutmann (2008), it is a “counter-model to Chinese cooperation, which is more sustainable and more respectful of Africa’s specific features and expectations in terms of development”.

Table 2.2 shows the resulting numbers of surviving Indian immigrants recorded in various African countries.

What is known about African migration to India? Very little, other than that there are communities of African origin that are overlooked in some Asian countries, including in India. In a recent article, De Silva Jayasuriya (2011) cites the case of the

descendants of African former soldiers and slaves, mainly from Mozambique and Madagascar, living in Sri Lanka. They arrived in the Indian islands as a result of slavery, or were recruited as soldiers or as free migrants in the seventeenth century. De Silva Jayasuriya (2011) speaks of 12 million dispersed throughout the villages, where they live on the margins, whereas those living in the cities are integrated and dispersed in Asiatic cosmopolitanism. Their social mobility, marriages outside their group and religious conversion have favored their assimilation, even if they have retained certain elements of their culture, in particular dance, music and some elements of language. These Afro–Asiatic communities are mainly overlooked as such, and no statistics exist concerning them (De Silva Jayasuriya 2011).

Lebanese Migration to Africa

The Lebanese diaspora is one of the largest in the world. In 1930, there were approximately 1 million of them (Abdulkarim 1994). By 2007, the number of Lebanese immigrants dispersed throughout the world had reached between 5 and 8 million, including 1 million in Brazil, 650,000 in Argentina, 300,000 in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 120,000 in Colombia, 110,000 in Saudi Arabia and 100,000 in Ecuador, according to the Lebanese Emigration Research Centre. These numbers are higher than the sedentary (non-migrant) population in Lebanon (Abdulkarim 1994). In Africa, there are Lebanese migrants in several countries, the largest being in Côte d'Ivoire (130,000 in 2011), Senegal (30,000 in 2011), Sierra Leone (30,000 in 1990), Nigeria (16,000 in 1990), Guinea (8,000 in 1990) and Mali (1,000 in 2011) (Auregan 2012). A number of Lebanese migrants are also present in Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon and South Africa (Auregan 2012; El Chab 2011).

More recent trends in Lebanese migration can be explained by at least three elements. The first is the political context. In fact, Lebanon continues to face political, economic and social crises that drive Lebanese emigration. The civil war that started in 1975, and the subsequent invasion by Israel in 1982, forced millions of Lebanese to feed, if we can put it that way, the migrant communities dispersed throughout the world (Abdulkarim 1994). These new trends are part of a long history of political crises and wars that Lebanon has experienced (since the 1840s) and which have driven the Lebanese to migrate. Between 1840 and 1860, for example, clashes between religious communities destabilized and impoverished Lebanon's rural populations, and many rural people were forced to emigrate.

The second element is what we may refer to as the Lebanese migration system, which relies on a strong network of family, community, confessional and sociocultural solidarities which cover the costs of migration, providing contacts for migrants and helping them integrate into the host countries. This reliance on networks has enabled many Lebanese migrants to start with a small business in the form of a small shop and subsequently find themselves at the head of an economic and financial empire, thanks to the encouragement and multifaceted support of brothers and compatriots.

The third element is Lebanese migrants' extraordinary capacity to adapt to their new host environment, adaptation based mainly on economic activities. Amir Abdulkarim (1994), for example, refers to their capacity to form business relations or friendship with host populations¹⁰ and their ability to speak and their habit of speaking the language or languages of their host environment. The result of this particularly successful social and economic integration explains the fact that in certain countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Sierra Leone, the national economy and the trade in goods and services are controlled by Lebanese migrants who, as a consequence, are, from time to time, the subject of accusations and even jealousy of the locals.

Migration Between Africa and Two Latin American Countries (Brazil and Argentina)

African immigration to Brazil and Argentina has at least three similarities. The first is that it is generally carried out by illegal migrants who go to these countries almost by chance, sometimes on board cargo vessels, with the main goal, for some of them, of continuing their journey to the United States or Canada (CPOEA 2010). The second is that it seems to be facilitated or even tolerated by a series of historical or economic factors. Finally, the third is that it is either recent, or has recently intensified.

Immigration of Africans to Brazil developed in a context that might be considered a recognition and appreciation of Africa's contribution to the Brazilian economy. This contribution firstly came in the form of labor from Africa to work in coffee plantations in particular. As a result, Africans represented over half of the population of Brazil (1,930,000 out of 3,800,000) at the time of Brazil's independence (1817–1818) (Peixoto 1983). This contribution was subsequently characterized by the recognition of the cultural identity between Africa and Brazil. In the name of this identity, Brazil has supported Brazilian descendants living in Africa, singing the praises of racial integration and offering Africans the Brazilian model of development, that is, "a tropical civilisation that has industrialized successfully" (Peixoto 1983).

All these reasons have made Brazil a main destination for African migrants. Consequently, the current difficulties Africans face in immigrating to Europe (which are forcing them to find new destinations), a more flexible policy in Brazil for granting refugee status, the age-old presence of African migrant forebears in Brazil (as a result of slavery) which facilitates the integration of newcomers and, of course, Brazil's economic expansion and interest in Africa (Rico 2011) are factors that favor African immigration to Brazil. The presence of an increasing number of African migrants, especially from Angola, Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Nigeria, can also be observed. In 2011, for instance, there were 2,000 students in Brazilian universities from Cape Verde alone.

¹⁰ This includes relationships with the host country's political and military authorities, enabling them to protect their businesses from audits and even taxes, and making Lebanese merchants powerful because they are protected by their allies who hold power.

Apart from Brazil, Argentina is the other country in South America that receives a large number of African migrants, and also Asian migrants, in particular Chinese people (Manente 2012). It seems that the first African migrants arrived in Argentina at the end of the 1990s and at the start of 2000. According to Argentina's Comisión Nacional para los Refugiados (National Refugee Commission), these migrants came from Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and especially from Senegal. Minvielle (2010) describes them as people already having had a certain degree of migratory experience, and for some of whom Argentina was only a country of transit on their way to the United States. However, these new immigrants, who were intellectuals, footballers, artists, among others, found it difficult to integrate. Many of them needed professional retraining in order to integrate into Argentina (Minvielle 2010).

Since the mid-2000s, second-generation migrants have joined the initial migrants, thanks to family and religious migratory networks, in particular the Mouride brotherhood network. In fact, new Mouride migrants have been received and accommodated by the first migrants. They have benefited from loans of goods from them in order to start up as petty street traders. They could hope for no better, given their lack of professional qualifications, their ignorance of Argentine society and the hostility of the host environment.

These African migrants in Argentina are distinguished by their attachment to their culture, in particular their religion, and to their countries of origin through transfers of funds. They are also distinguished by their transnationalism (Minvielle 2010), as has been seen in the case of Indian migrants in Africa. It appears, therefore, that the difficulties of integration experienced by African and other migrants promote circular migration, transnationality and what we refer to in our works as "residential ubiquity", that is to say remaining present in one's place of origin while being physically absent (Lututala 1989).

Links Between Intra- and Extraregional Migration in the South

The links between intra- and extraregional migration can be analyzed through four aspects, namely migratory movements, the respective causes of these migrations, the characteristics of intra- and extraregional migrants and the migration route (Adepoju 1984; Sall 2010).

Intraregional Migration on the Way to Extraregional Migration

This involves checking whether some intraregional migration is a stage in extraregional (Sall 2010) or interregional migration. To do this, data concerning migrants' extraregional migratory journeys in the new immigration countries in the South must be analyzed.

Interregional migration appears to be the culmination of successive intraregional migrations that may occur over several years. These intraregional migrations are seen as being essential stages, when they enable migrants to acquire the resources required to continue their migratory journeys. This means financial resources to pay for travel, or the opportunity to obtain the visas required to enter the final country of destination. Bazonzi (2010) tells of the itinerary of a female Congolese migrant encountered in Lusaka and en route to South Africa:

I travelled as far as Luanda [from Kinshasa]. I lived there for a year, then I came here [to Lusaka]. My plan at the start was to leave for South Africa by road, but I didn't have enough money to pay for the journey, so I decided to transit through here. People said that Lusaka was a good town, so I came here to try my luck... (Djenny, Lusaka 2008, story reported by Bazonzi 2010).

The North African countries in their turn receive a large number of migrants whose final destination is the countries of the North or the emerging countries of the South, in particular China, India, Brazil and Argentina (Honerou 2007; Ndiaye and Robin 2010).

The country of transit seems to be chosen according to three reasons. The first is, once more, geographical proximity. In fact, most migrants first head to the countries or cities close to Kinshasa (e.g., Angola and Congo's Brazzaville). The second reason is one of sociological or historical proximity maintained by the social networks that exist between migrants already established in immigration countries and members of their families that have remained in the country. These migrants are a conduit for information about the opportunities that can be found in the destination, which fuels family migratory channels. To this should be added the call for African integration, of which migration comprises one part, a call expressed by measures taken to guarantee the free movement of people and goods, in particular in member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The third reason, also already referred to, is the hope of obtaining visas for countries of destination more easily (Ratha and Shaw 2007).

Similar Reasons for Inter- and Extraregional Migration

The links between intra- and extraregional migration in the South can also be observed through their respective causes. These causes are virtually the same, namely the social and economic imbalances that exist within countries, between countries and between continents. Imbalances within subregions direct migrants to countries in the subregion, or to other subregions in the continent where there are more employment opportunities, living conditions are relatively better than in the country of origin and immigration conditions are more flexible than in countries outside the continent. These intraregional immigration countries remain attractive as long as they offer better opportunities. They lose their attractiveness and even become emigration countries when the opposite is true.

However, inequalities between continents are such that intraregional migration does not allow migrants to satisfy their aspirations and achieve their objectives (Ba 1994) because the destination countries within the continents are less attractive.

They are on the periphery of other peripheral countries in the South, to quote Samir Amin's analysis (1974). It is, in effect, the fact of not finding the living conditions they were seeking in the main countries of immigration on the continent, prompting migrants to continue their migratory journeys to countries on other continents that offer the best opportunities.

Seen from this point of view, extraregional migration appears as an opportunity to achieve the objectives assigned to migration, whereas intraregional migration gives migrants the resources required to get there, in particular opportunities for jobs, even if they are temporary, and to earn the money to pay for onward travel, as well as the opportunity to obtain visas more easily, as we have already seen. This migration also serves as a "migration waiting room" whereby migrants enter the transit countries to wait for the tickets and visas that their smugglers or "guardians" send them to carry out extraregional migration and join them there. There is therefore a sort of hierarchy of causes of migration.

The complementary nature of the causes of intra- and extraregional migration has a direct link with the consequences and migration policies. In fact, as has been observed between internal and international migration (Adepoju 1984), we can suggest a negative relationship between intraregional migration and extraregional migration, that is, the more intraregional migration there is, the less extraregional migration there is. Conversely, we could think that the more extraregional migration there is, the less permanent intraregional migration there is, because the intraregional migration seen in this case would simply be transit migration. In fact, intraregional migration signifies the existence of sought-after opportunities in the continent's countries, and therefore a low propensity to leave them, which is not usually the case.

These considerations suggest elements of a migration policy. An improvement in the economic and political context of the African continent (an increase in employment opportunities, improvement in the business climate, peace and security, opportunities for intellectual, cultural and political development, etc.) must make the latter more attractive, and therefore reduce the amount of extraregional migration further still. It must, in addition, cause African migrants outside the continent, that is to say the African diaspora, to carry out return migrations, even if they are temporary and circular, in order to contribute from closer at hand to the reconstruction and/or development of their respective countries.

Are Intraregional Migrants Different from Extraregional Migrants?

In order to determine the links between internal¹¹ and international migration in Senegal, Sall (2010) made a comparison of international migrants' characteristics according to their migration routes, distinguishing migrants that had already carried out internal migrations before carrying out international migrations, including

¹¹ Internal migration can be considered intrasubregional migration, whereas international migration here encompasses extraregional migration in the South.

extraregional migrations, and who we might refer to as secondary migrants, from those that had never carried out an internal migration before finding themselves outside their subregions or regions, and who we might refer to as primary migrants. He observed that primary migrants were relatively younger and better educated, and that they were mostly young unmarried women. In addition, they often migrated to countries of the North. In contrast, secondary migrants mainly migrated to other subregions on the continent; they were older and less educated.

It is difficult to make assumptions about all intra- and extraregional migrations in Africa based on these results. Indeed, how can we accept that extraregional migrants are relatively better educated when studies speak more of irregular migrants with little or no education and few professional qualifications, as we have seen in the case of African migrants in Argentina for example? It is therefore necessary, once again, to carry out surveys in other countries to verify the truth of this assumption expressed by Sall (2010).

In addition, if extraregional migration mainly concerns educated young people, this is certainly because they cannot find jobs or schools or universities in their own countries or in the countries in their subregions or regions. This brings us back to the disturbing phenomenon of the brain drain from which Africa suffers and will continue to suffer (Lututala 2012). This also reflects this policy of chosen immigration which, as we have seen in the case of China, is no longer the preserve of immigration countries in the North but is also becoming a characteristic in immigration countries in the South.

Job creation must therefore be one of the highest priorities, as well as, and this is not often said, establishment of good schools and universities to change the propensity to emigrate outside the continent, as we will show elsewhere (Lututala 2012). Feminization of extraregional migrants, not to be confused with over-femininity that is observed in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa, requires appropriate policies to support this category of migrants, which is often exposed to all sorts of bullying and abuse in destination and transit countries. Finally, the relatively high age of intraregional migrants suggests that they leave their countries with some degree of professional experience, and a certain residential and social status. Doubtless they emigrate reluctantly, and perhaps prefer to go to neighboring countries so as not to distance themselves from their residence/base and so that they can return easily and as frequently as possible. This residential ubiquity should therefore be promoted on their behalf, by introducing or applying free movement of people and goods policies and effective reintegration policies for migrant returnees.

Conclusion

Migration in the South is mainly a matter of proximity migration performed within subregions or to neighboring subregions. It can mainly be explained by economic motivations, but it is also a result of the political crises and wars experienced by a number of countries in the South. Migration is maintained, among other things, by social networks that attest to a sociological proximity between migrants already

established in the immigration countries and members of their families that are in their respective countries (Zouiten 1995).

A small proportion of migration in the South is extraregional. It appears to be the culmination of a succession of intraregional migrations that may last several years, that is, migratory transits that become crucial in a context of poverty and political management of migration that makes obtaining visas difficult, even in the countries of the South. However, there is also a context of social and economic imbalance within countries, between countries and between continents in the South. These inequalities are such that intraregional migration does not permit migrants to satisfy all their aspirations and achieve their objectives. One of its roles, so to speak, is therefore to provide migrants with the resources necessary for extraregional migration, i.e. opportunities to find jobs in the transit countries, even temporary jobs, and to earn the money to pay for travel, as well as opportunities to obtain visas more easily in these transit countries.

The emergence of new immigration countries in the South, in particular BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), attests to “a new geo-economic equilibrium” in the world (Souchaud 2009; Portes 1999). However, these new immigration countries are imposing a new polarization of migration without, for all that, fundamentally modifying the political and economic context of its appearance. They are already developing a growing intolerance towards migrants from other countries in the South. They are taking measures to regulate immigration, and some of them, in particular South Africa, do not hesitate to expel irregular immigrants from other subregions on the African continent. In this sense, migration in the South also demonstrates this new paradigm of counter-globalization: while globalization is synonymous with the free movement of goods and people, “counter-globalization” prevents or regulates this movement. This contradiction between the migratory dimension of globalization and the political management of this phenomenon justifies the existence of so-called irregular migrants, these being the same people who drown in the sea or find themselves huddled in cargo ships wanting to leave their countries by any means possible.

Contrary to what is observed concerning South–North migration, where the reversibility of migration is fairly low (the volume of North–South migration being fairly low), many migrants from the emerging countries in the South can be observed in the poor countries of the South. This type of migration is instead to exploit “dormant raw materials” and a commercial market that is far from being saturated, despite a discourse concerning the common struggle against imperialism (the case of China and India) or the need to promote African solidarity and integration (the case of South Africa). Seen from this point of view, migration in the South is also part of a neoliberal economic system, which it reproduces.

Describing the reasons for migration in the South, the new trends that are emerging and the links between intra- and extraregional migration is a gigantic task that requires regional, if not subregional, research teams to be set up and vast data collection operations, in order to address them better. Such an enterprise requires more reliable databases, collected using comparable methods and definitions. Pending the availability of such data, this section has attempted to present a general picture while proposing avenues for research that further studies will need to explore in greater depth.

Table 2.4 Percentage of immigrants recorded according to their regions of destination. (Source: Parsons et al. 2005, Table 11)

To	From											Total			
	Oceania	East Asia	South-East Asia	South Asia	North America	South America	Central America	Caribbean	EU & EFTA	Rest of Europe	Ex-USSR and Africa		Middle East and North Africa	Southern Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
Oceania	46	2	4	2	22	0	0	0	18	1	1	2	1	1	100
East Asia	4	35	9	2	38	1	0	0	8	0	1	1	0	1	100
South-East Asia	6	7	25	3	36	0	0	0	12	0	1	10	0	1	100
South Asia	1	1	2	43	8	0	0	0	8	0	0	35	0	1	100
North America	1	1	1	2	81	1	0	3	7	0	1	2	0	1	100
South America	1	4	1	1	32	32	1	1	23	1	1	1	0	1	100
Central America	0	0	0	1	77	1	13	0	4	0	1	1	0	1	100
Caribbean	0	0	0	1	77	1	0	7	10	0	1	1	0	1	100
EU & EFTA	9	0	1	2	26	5	0	1	45	2	2	4	2	1	100
Rest of Europe	3	0	0	2	16	1	0	0	42	15	8	11	1	1	100
Ex-USSR	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	4	5	80	5	1	1	100
Middle East and North Africa	1	0	1	2	8	0	0	0	41	1	1	41	1	2	100
Southern Africa	4	0	1	1	5	0	0	0	25	1	0	1	51	12	100
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	13	0	0	5	12	62	100

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Chapter 3

Labor Mobility, Regional Integration and Social Protection in Southern Economies

John O. Oucho

Introduction

In Africa, labor migration has been a central feature of the population dynamics of both the colonial economic system and the evolution of new forms of mobility in the post-independence era. Of all the African subregions, Southern Africa has the longest history of regulated labor mobility. For decades, “black migration” to South African mines from the neighboring countries and as far north as Malawi, dominated the labor migration system of the subregion (Bohning 1981; Crush et al. 1992; James 1992). Contract labor migration to South Africa declined in the 1990s even as there was an increase in South–South skilled migration not only to South Africa but also to the other buoyant economies in the subregion, namely Botswana and Namibia. In 1997–2007, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) broadened the scope well beyond the mining industry and gave impetus to the study of cross-border and international migration in the entire region. SAMP’s research also raised important policy issues which commanded the attention of post-apartheid policymakers seeking to understand and respond to the significant increase in cross-border movement within the region. As a result, labor mobility in Southern Africa is now much better understood than it was before (see Crush 1997).¹

Indeed, Southern Africa is the center of labor migration in sub-Saharan Africa, whether viewed historically or in contemporary terms. The four major contemporary migration processes in the subregion consist of continued unskilled labor to South Africa, skilled labor migration including “brain circulation” to the subregion, undocumented migration within the subregion and highly skilled migration from some Southern African countries to the North. Southern Africa had the highest percentage

¹ <http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/>.

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of migrant stock as a proportion of the total subregional population in 2005–2010, when the annual net migration (in thousands) recorded was 134,400. All other African subregions recorded net emigration (United Nations 2010). South Africa had the highest average annual rate of change in 2005–2010, followed by Botswana; these are two of the subregion’s strongest economies and rely heavily on migrant labor. South Africa recorded the highest average annual net migration (Table 3.1).

This chapter focuses on intraregional labor mobility in general and social protection in particular, in the context of the opportunities and obstacles to regional integration in Southern Africa. The chapter begins with a contextual discussion of the geopolitical situation in the region, paying particular attention to the place of RECs insofar as they shape regional integration and labor migration. The second section of the paper turns to the question of labor mobility within the subregion, highlighting various case studies of migrant workers’ social protection, particularly in the SADC region. It then moves on to consider some of the obstacles to providing suitable and adequate social protection to migrant laborers, especially in their countries of destination. Finally, it proposes some policy recommendations for the attention of individual countries and the competing and complementary RECs to which the countries belong.

A previous review of the literature on regional integration in Africa drew two main conclusions: first, that “it dwells on the economics of the whole process, paying no attention to political, demographic and social conditions that may sustain or counter efforts at integration.” Second, “it shows that regional integration in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa was modelled along the lines of the European Economic Community...probably an irrelevant concept” (Oucho 1998, p. 273).²

Proliferation of Regional Bodies in Eastern and Southern Africa

The Southern African geopolitical region consists of South Africa, the dominant economy, Namibia (which, prior to its independence, was ruled by South Africa) and the three countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, better known as BLS, which are closely linked to South Africa culturally and economically (Oucho 1998, p. 264). Other countries often grouped in the subregion include Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) groups these other

² There are two aspects of convergence between the European Union and “African integration”: the one underscored the “idea of Europe” which aimed at a more egalitarian and more tolerant model than the free market orthodoxy reigning in the United States; the other, the “idea of Africa”, and European states integrated because they were apprehensive of the United States and the Soviet Union, while the newly independent African states wished to come together to cooperate as one fraternity. Divergence occurred whereby European leaders adopted a step-by-step process while African leaders failed to live up to unity which was the hallmark of “African unity” or “pan-Africanism” (Olivier 2008, p. 6).

Table 3.1 International migration in Southern Africa in key figures. (Source: United Nations 2010)

	International migration stock			Refugees		Net migration	
	Percentage of total population (2010)	Percentage of female migrants (2010)	Average annual rate of change (%) (2005–2010)	Net migration among foreign born ('000) (2005–2010)	Total ('000) (end 2008)	Average annual net migration ('000) (2005–2010)	Average annual net migration rate (per 1,000 pop.) (2005–2010)
Botswana	5.8	46.3	7.2	38.1	3.0	3.0	1.6
Lesotho	0.3	45.5	0.3	0.5	–	–7.2	–3.5
Namibia	6.3	47.6	1.1	11.4	6.8	–0.2	–0.1
South Africa	3.7	42.7	8.0	684.0	43.5	40.0	2.8
Swaziland	3.4	47.7	0.9	4.0	0.8	–1.2	–1.0
<i>Southern Africa</i>	3.7	43.3	7.3	738.1	54.1	134.4	2.4

Table 3.2 REC memberships in Eastern and Southern Africa

	EAC	COMESA	SADC	IGAD
<i>Eastern Africa</i>				
Burundi	X	X		
Comoros		X		
Djibouti ^d		X		X
Eritrea		X		
Ethiopia		X		X
Kenya	X	X		X
Madagascar		X	X	
Malawi		X	X	
Mauritius		X	X	
Mayotte				
Mozambique		X	X	
Reunion				
Rwanda	X	X		
Seychelles		X	X	
Somalia		X		X
Uganda	X	X		X
United Republic of Tanzania ^a	X		X	
Zambia ^b		X	X	
Zimbabwe		X	X	
<i>Southern Africa</i>				
Botswana ^c			X	
Lesotho			X	
Namibia			X	
South Africa			X	
Swaziland		X	X	

^a Hosts headquarters of EAC

^b Hosts headquarters of COMESA

^c Hosts headquarters of the SADC

^d Hosts headquarters of the IGAD

countries in the subregion as well as the Indian Ocean islands, and the countries of East Africa and the Horn of Africa as Eastern Africa (Table 3.2). The table shows which states in Eastern and Southern Africa belong to which REC. An interesting phenomenon is the multiple memberships of Eastern and Southern African countries in more than one REC: Kenya and Uganda, for example, belong to three RECs and three other EAC partner states belong to two. The majority of the countries are Member States of COMESA, which also hosts the two North African states of Egypt and Libya as well as Sudan and South Sudan. The SADC includes five Southern African and eight Eastern African states as well as the two Central African states of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kenya is the only Eastern African state in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). This complex distribution of states among RECs underlines the nature and extent of each country's variable commitment to regional integration and to the free movement of people, labor, goods, capital and services within their areas of jurisdiction. Some states also engaged in bilateral or tripartite arrangements to the same end.

The four RECs have various distinguishing features in terms of membership. The EAC partner states are all neighboring countries with a great deal in common. They all recognize the REC as the most logical initiative through which to widen their market and sustain their solidarity. IGAD includes the North African neighbors of Sudan and South Sudan with strong cultural ties. Somalia and Ethiopia are also members, but Eritrea, given its intransigence in the REC and disagreements with Ethiopia after assuming statehood in 1993, has been conveniently forced or has found it convenient to stay away from IGAD. COMESA has Member States from four subregions—Eastern, Central, Southern and Northern Africa. The United Republic of Tanzania pulled out of COMESA in October 2000. As one journalist quipped: “Some of the pro-COMESA lobbyists have accused the country of pandering to South African business interests” (Gabotlale 2006)—an accusation which Tanzanian authorities attribute to sheer jealousy on the part of the COMESA Member States. The SADC, of which the United Republic of Tanzania is the only Eastern African member, is dominated by South Africa which, since majority rule in 1994, perceives the REC as a tool for entrenching its economic might and expanding its power to all the other RECs through Tripartite Cooperation.

The recent emergence of the COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite Cooperation (an umbrella organization for the three RECs to harmonize trade, customs unions, monetary unions, common markets and infrastructure development in transport, ICT and energy) is further evidence of the wish of Member States both to entrench solidarity and regional harmonization and cooperation. The Tripartite Cooperation was initiated in 2005 by these RECs to strengthen and deepen cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa through harmonization of policies and programs relating to trade, infrastructure and free movement of business persons (see COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite Task Force 2011).

The confusing situation of multiple memberships in different RECs is further complicated by the fact that some are recognized by the African Union (AU) and some are not.

The overlap of membership between regional integration arrangements in the wider Southern and Eastern African region is without parallel anywhere else in the world. As noted, seven regional economic communities are effectively operating in parallel within this region (SADC, COMESA, EAC, Southern African Customs Union (SACU), IGAD, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Communauté économique des Pays des Grands Lacs). Six EAC Member States provide a good snapshot of this problem, as they are also members of all of these regional bodies except SACU (Stahl 2005, p. 21, quoted in Braude 2008, p. 7).

Africa has up to 14 regional bodies but the AU recognizes only eight.³ These are the regional blocs that the AU expects will coalesce into the African Economic Community (AEC) that would put the entire continent in one regional bloc. The eight recognized RECs are CEN-SAD, the EAC, ECCAS, COMESA, ECOWAS, IGAD, the SADC and the UMA.

³ The AU recognizes eight RECs: Union du Maghreb/Arab Maghreb Union; IGAD; the EAC; EC-CAS; CEN-SAD; ECOWAS; COMESA; and the SADC.

Obstacles to Free Movement Within RECs

Many of the RECs give lip service to the idea of free movement of persons between their Member States. The idea of “free movement of persons” derives logically from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which, among other things, states that anyone is free to leave his/her country of birth for another country and be accorded the kind of treatment that their hosts enjoy. Pécoud and Guchteneire (2007, p. 1) argue that Art. 13 Paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration provides for emigration but not immigration as a fundamental right. They further contend that “the right of emigration remains problematic as long as restrictions on immigration keep people from migration, or even travelling, to other countries” (2007, p. 2), citing Weiner’s (1996, p. 171) assertion that “there is a fundamental contradiction between the notion that emigration is essentially a matter of human rights while immigration is a matter of national sovereignty” (Pécoud and Guchteneire 2007, p. 8). On migration and inequality between people and countries, Pécoud and Guchteneire note that while citizens from developed countries travel and settle undeterred almost everywhere in the world, those from less developed countries face the uncertainties of obtaining visas and residence permits prior to migrating (2007, p. 9). This observation lies at the core of the free movement of people: less developed countries rarely discourage the emigration of their citizens, while more developed neighbors are keen to restrict their entry. This reality applies as much within the South as it does to migration from South to North.

RECs such as COMESA, the SADC and the EAC have all drafted protocols on the free movement of the Member States’ citizens as part of the treaties that created them. Yet their Member States have made little progress, as gridlock persists on the protocols in contrast to other aspects of regional integration which have not experienced any major setbacks. Protocols on the free movement of people benefit from the natural political and social propinquity of Member States with similar historical backgrounds. In practice, economically buoyant nations have stifled the free movement dream in order to fend off immigrants from their poorer, less vibrant neighbors (Oucho 2009a, 2009b).

In the SADC, for example, “facilitated” movement is complemented by the right of residence and establishment—two of the most contentious provisions in the Protocol on Facilitation of Movement in the Southern African Community. The SADC shifted the framework from “freedom” of movement when drafted in 1995, to “facilitation” of movement in 1996 (Oucho and Crush 2001). The Protocol was not formally signed by the Member States until August 2005, followed by ratification by some signatories in 2009. However, there are still insufficient signatories to bring the Protocol into force. Even then, the Protocol is by no means binding and will be easily ignored by the SADC Member States given that they favor only particular aspects of the Protocol, such as visa-free entry for 90 days.

One of the other difficulties in ensuring harmonization within RECs is the fact that international migration conventions and protocols, often generalized as “instruments”, are directed only at individual state parties. This would not be a problem

Table 3.3 Participation of African states in key instruments on international migration, 2012. (Source: United Nations 2010)

Instrument and adoption year	Eastern Africa (19 countries)	Central Africa (9 countries)	Southern Africa (5 countries)	Western Africa (17 countries)
Convention relating to the status of refugees (1951)	14	9	5	15
Protocol relating to the status of refugees (1967)	13	9	5	16
Convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (1990)	3	-	1	8
Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children (2000) ^a	10	5	5	14
Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air (2000)*	12	4	5	12

^a Falls within the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime

if all states within an REC ratified the instruments. However, African countries have been rather unconcerned about ratifying the key migration-related instruments (Table 3.3). The latest convention is the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, which supplements Recommendation No. 201 on this category of works and which recognizes domestic work to be “work like any other” that should also be treated as “work like no other” (Albin and Mantouvalou 2012, p. 67). It remains to be seen if there will be a similar lack of commitment to other international migration instruments.

Within the SADC, only Lesotho has ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990). All but South Africa have ratified the two protocols on human trafficking and migrant smuggling. The reluctance of South Africa to ratify the two protocols implies that these forms of migration cannot be contained. The situation is mixed in the wider SADC region: Seychelles is the only Member State which has ratified all five international instruments. Mauritius, Madagascar, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania have ratified only the two protocols on human trafficking and migrant smuggling; and Zimbabwe has ratified none of the international instruments (United Nations 2010). This mosaic of uneven ratification of international instruments suggests that the SADC Member States are not prepared to manage international migration harmoniously. Further, it suggests that strategies to promote the social protection of migrant workers may amount to little more than rhetoric in the SADC region.

Social Protection of Migrant Workers in Southern Africa

The concept of “social protection has been defined by different scholars to undermine particular perspectives. For example, Holzman and Jørgensen (2001, p. 2) interpret it simply as “public measures to provide income security for individuals.” Shepherd (2004, p. 8) provides a more detailed definition. He notes that: “Social protection is both an approach and a set of policies, as an approach it focuses on reducing risk and vulnerabilities...and includes all interventions from public, private and voluntary organizations and informal networks to support communities, households and individuals in their efforts to prevent, manage and overcome risks and vulnerabilities.” Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004, p. 1) argue that “social protection emerged as a critical response to the ‘social safety nets’ discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the World Bank’s third prong of a three-pronged approach to attacking poverty.” These definitions underline the point that social protection entails multiple interventions by different stakeholders to help prevent, manage and overcome risks and vulnerabilities and enhance the social status and rights of marginalized individuals, households and communities. These definitions encompass the provision of desirable services and a number of related issues. The ILO (1984, quoted in McGillivray 2010, p. 1) defines social security as “the protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public measures, against the economic and social distress that otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death; the provision of medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with children.” Social protection is more comprehensive than social security because it caters for a wide range of services, benefits and needs as forms of security. Social security provides several benefits, among them medical care, old-age benefits, invalid benefits, survivors’ benefits, sickness benefits, maternity benefits, employment injury benefits, unemployment benefits and family benefits (McGillivray 2010, p. 1; see also Holzman and Jørgensen (2000)).⁴ As can be imagined, most African countries are ill prepared to provide these services even though they form the basis of international migration instruments, perhaps explaining why the majority of the countries have not signed or ratified them.

Two ILO conventions underscore social security provisions for workers. Convention No. 17—or Workmen’s Compensation (Accidents) Convention, 1925—requires that compensation “be paid in the form of periodical payments, provided that

⁴ Specific conventions are: Employment Injury Benefits Convention, 1964 (No. 121); Invalidity, Old Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 1967 (No. 128); Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention, 1969 (No. 130); Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention, 1988 (No. 168); and the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000, (No. 183). Two ILO conventions concerning social security and migrant workers are: Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118); and Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157). Those dealing with social security for seafarers and fishermen are: the MLC Maritime Labour Convention, 2006; and the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188). The texts of these conventions and Convention No. 102 are available at: <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm>.

it may be wholly or partially paid in a lump sum, if the competent authority is satisfied that it will be properly utilised.” Convention No. 19 requires states to provide the same treatment in respect of workmen’s compensation for industrial accidents to nationals of other states which have ratified the convention as they do for their own nationals. Among Southern African countries, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland have only ratified Convention No. 19 (McGillivray 2010, p. 9). This implies that only these three can honor its provisions as the two other neighbors (Botswana and Namibia) are not bound by the Convention. A refinement of social security provisions is contained in Part XII of Convention No. 102, which deals with Equality of Treatment of Non-national Residents who have the same social security rights as nationals, with the possible exception of benefits payable from general government revenues.

The SADC Position

The SADC has concluded various social protection-related and legally binding instruments in the form of charters, protocols and codes to foster social protection and for implementation by its Member States. These include the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC (the SADC Treaty), the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in the SADC (the Social Charter), the Code on Social Security, the Protocol on Gender and Development, the Protocol on Health and the Protocol on Education. Of these, the Code on Social Security is non-binding (Nyenti and Mpedi 2012, p. 5). While it is one thing to adopt these instruments, it is quite another matter to implement them.

McGillivray’s (2010, pp. 30–31) provides a succinct statement of what is required of the SADC Member States. In 2007, the Ministers and Social Partners approved the SADC Code on Social Security, recommending it to the Integrated Committee of Ministers for adoption. Art. 17 Paragraph 2 of the Code states that Member States should ensure that all lawfully employed immigrants are protected through the promotion of various core principles. These should be included both in the national laws of Member States and in bilateral or multilateral arrangements between Member States:

- Migrant workers should be able to participate in the social security schemes of the host country.
- Migrant workers should enjoy equal treatment alongside citizens within the social security system of the host country.
- There should be an aggregation of insurance periods and the maintenance of acquired rights and benefits between similar schemes in different Member States.
- Member States should ensure the facilitation of exportability of benefits, including the payment of benefits in the host country.
- Member States should identify the applicable law for purposes of implementation of the above principles.
- Member States should ensure coverage of self-employed migrant workers on the same basis as employed migrants.

The SADC Code does not override national acts and policies, however. Three case studies illustrate this point.

Instructive Case Studies of Social Protection in Southern Africa

The World Bank (2007) commissioned four country studies (Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Zambia) on social services for non-citizens and the portability of social benefits in the SADC. The studies focused on six categories of immigrants: citizens; permanent residents; temporary residents; refugees; asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants. Each category was analyzed against access to eight social services or forms of social security, namely: social assistance; old-age (public, occupational-based and private) benefits; disability pension (public, occupational-based and private); unemployment benefits (public, occupational-based and private); healthcare (public, occupational-based and private); sickness benefits (public, occupational-based and private); public housing; and schooling (public and private).⁵

In Botswana, non-citizens normally do not have access to the specified forms of social security or services. Only in some cases do they have access to the services by fulfilling specified conditions, such as paying fees for treatment and providing proof of legitimate residency. However, refugees and asylum-seekers have access but only through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Ntseane and Solo 2007). These findings are corroborated by two studies on non-citizens' access to health services in Botswana (Ama and Oucho 2008; Oucho and Ama 2009).

In Malawi, a study conducted by the Institute of Policy Research and Social Empowerment (IPRSE) (2007) found a mixed package of non-citizen access to some social security services and benefits, with permanent residents and refugees enjoying most. However, information on other categories of non-citizens in the country was unavailable, while undocumented non-citizens were ineligible for the services and benefits. While public housing was unavailable for citizens and all categories of non-citizens, services such as healthcare, sickness benefits and schooling can be accessed by permanent residents. Once again, information on undocumented non-citizens was unavailable. Although permanent non-residents were eligible to (ex) portability of old age pensions, they, like all other categories, were ineligible for other services and benefits (IPRSE 2007). These findings might be attributed to the fact that Malawi, being a net emigration country, may not be keen to extend social security services and benefits to non-citizens despite their filling the gap left by Malawian emigrant labor.

In Namibia, both permanent and temporary residents access all services except public housing; refugees and asylum-seekers access all services save old-age pension, disability pension and sickness benefits; and undocumented non-citizens ac-

⁵ For country case studies, see Muyembe (2007), the IPRSE (2007) and Ntseane and Solo (2007) in the references.

cess only health and schooling (Adongo 2007). This is perhaps the most progressive and humane treatment of non-citizens in the entire SADC region. While both permanent residents and temporary non-citizens enjoy (ex)portability of social services or social security, other categories of non-citizens have no such right. Again, this is a situation very much at variance with all other SADC Member States.

Finally, the Zambian case study was the most detailed and delves into the nature and scope of social protection for non-citizens courtesy of the analyst's work in the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. The formal social security system in Zambia consists of three major elements: (1) social security schemes providing employment-related benefits; (2) supplementary benefit schemes usually provided by employers; and (3) a residual social assistance scheme that also makes provision for access to medical care (Muyembe 2007). The study found clear evidence of the differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens; the latter, with the exception of refugees and asylum-seekers who enjoy protection from UNHCR, have to pay for virtually all the services available. Moreover, there is no portability of all social benefits by non-citizens. This state of affairs is understandable in Zambia, which is a country of net emigration and where immigrants might not be seen as filling the gaps left by emigration.

The ILO's "Extending social security coverage to African migrant workers and their families project" (MIGSEC) aims to improve national and regional strategies for the extension of social security coverage to migrant workers and their families through social security agreements, and to strengthen subregional mechanisms to effectively prepare or reinforce the compliance with regional social security conventions to accompany the various subregional integration processes in Africa. The MIGSEC project covers Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia (McGillivray 2010). This project examines the extent to which countries abide by the ILO conventions on workers' social protection and provides analytical approaches worth adopting.

The situation in Southern Africa is best summarized by Olivier (2008, p. 4) as follows:

The social security position of different categories of non-citizens (permanent residents, temporary residents including migrant workers, asylum-seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants) in the SADC differs due to a range of conceptual and contextual factors relating to a narrow definitional framework predicated on an essentially formal labor market conception of social insurance and limited, discretion-based and embryonic social assistance frameworks; as well as poverty indicators and segmented labor markets in the SADC, which impact on their position both as migrants and within social security.

The study underscores the orientation and nature of social security where intra-SADC migrants are at the lower end of the labor market and where social security laws often draw distinctions based on nationality and/or residence, contradicting the essence of regional integration.

Protection of Refugees from Exploitation

Makhema's (2009) study portrays a subregion without a common approach to refugee protection (see also Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004). He found that Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been preoccupied with resettling and rehabilitating their former refugees who have returned home. Botswana's refugee protection system combines UNHCR and government-supported programs, among them camp-based settlement, encouragement of voluntary repatriation and the ad hoc option of citizenship for those who do not wish to be repatriated (resulting in complete integration of some refugees such as South Africans). Malawi, traditionally a refugee-hosting country, still protects non-returning refugees with the assistance of UNHCR. Mozambique has resettled its returned and allowed their self-resettlement. In Namibia, refugees are confined to Osire camp, but those attending school are granted residence outside the camp.

South Africa's preferred policy framework for refugee protection is urban self-settlement with extensive socioeconomic rights for asylum-seekers and refugees, including the right to work. The last option is unique but seems appropriate for the South African economy, which has been enjoying vibrant growth as well as expansion in the SADC region and beyond. Swaziland implements a tripartite agreement between the Government, UNHCR and Caritas, with the Political Asylum Committee being responsible for determining the refugee status of asylum-seekers and UNHCR having only an observer status.

The United Republic of Tanzania has adopted a multifaceted policy of placing refugees in camp-based settlement and thereby enforcing restrictions on movement, of granting refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi *prima facie* (group) status, and of empowering a National Eligibility Committee and the Minister of Home Affairs to screen refugees from other countries for integration in the country. Like the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia had hosted large numbers of refugees before several Eastern and Southern Africa countries became independent. The country had been practising an open reception policy for many years, later enacting more restrictive refugee legislation requiring refugees to live in rural camps in the western and northern regions of the country and forbidding them from acquiring Zambian citizenship or obtaining permanent residence status. In Zimbabwe, political unrest and economic collapse since 2002 forced the refugees it used to host to move elsewhere, especially to South Africa and Botswana.

The four case studies in the SADC underline one notable point: that there are no tangible social protection schemes for irregular migrants. This is because they are undocumented and might wish to perpetuate that status for as long as they are not detected by state authorities and deported back to their countries of residence. Moreover, the countries of destination are unwilling to give them social protection on account of their residential status, which is construed illegal.

The FOMP Fiasco

The stalled Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons (FOMP) in the SADC puts in abeyance any efforts towards enhancing future interlinkages of labor migration and social protection in the context of regional integration for the REC and its individual Member States. Without operation of the FOMP, the SADC should not expect the interlinkages to bear fruit. Even Art. 17 of the SADC Draft Code on Social Security, which encourages Member States to ensure that migrant workers participate in the social protection in the host nation, has little chance of success unless the Protocol on FOMP becomes fully operational.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In an opinion piece reflecting on the Protocol on FOMP in the SADC, a senior SADC officer suggests that all SADC Member States sign and ratify the Protocol by scrapping visa requirements for all short-term visits; that the SADC Secretariat challenge Member States to meet certain service and security standards; that the SADC Member States foster dialogue on harmonization of migration policies, procedures and systems; that the SADC Member States start confronting issues that result in undesirable migration (for instance, poor governance, human rights violations, political and economic instabilities, civil strife and resultant human insecurity) that trigger forced migration and thus constrain free movement; and that SADC consider suspending Member States that are a liability to it in terms of costs and nonconformity to regional integration ideals (Muchabaiwa 2010).

There is a raft of possibilities in charting the way forward. Dookhony and Cuttara (2009) underscore the need for fostering talent movement within the SADC and the wider Eastern and Southern African region. Issues considered include amendment of the SADC Protocol on FOMP, accreditation of qualifications attained in different countries, establishment of academic centers in an environment conducive to the training and retaining of highly educated and skilled SADC citizens, creation of viable institutions to oversee the welfare of workers and development of a variety of infrastructure. These recommendations echo the tenets of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which has lost steam after its emergence at the turn of the new millennium.

Nyenti and Mpedi (2012) provide what they consider to be a compelling recommendation for the SADC and its Member States. They call on the SADC and its individual Member States to build on the variety of social protection initiatives within their respective borders, focusing not only on improving social protection systems for compensating the persons affected but also on prevention of social risks and (re)integration of affected persons into the labor market and society in general. In addition, the minimum social protection floor ideal needs to be interlinked with mandatory and voluntary insurance schemes.

This chapter has shown that labor migration remains an important phenomenon in regional integration, but that disparate social protection provisions affect the livelihoods of migrant workers and members of their families. Unfortunately, the SADC and its Member States remain lukewarm on the instruments guiding intra-SADC migration and other elements of regional integration, among them workers' social protection rights. Previous SAMP research in Southern Africa unearthed a number of issues that should find a comfortable policy cushion in the SADC and both COMESA and the EAC, which it is engaged with under the auspices of the COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite Cooperation.⁶ The research base should catapult further research on labor migration–regional integration–social protection interlinkages. Most importantly, the research fraternity and policy barons should foster symbiotic working relations to let research inform policy and to seek further research where desired.

Adoption of instruments guiding social protection in the SADC, like most other instruments, has not given the Member States the impetus to implement them unequivocally. The case studies presented here verify the diversity in adhering to social protection provisions in different countries. Notable challenges that the SADC initiative on the social protection floor faces include the high costs of health which many Member States cannot afford; the low social security benefits for orphans and vulnerable children; limited social assistance to unemployed and poor persons; limited income security for the elderly and persons living with disability (which is only available in Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia, for instance); and limited mandatory social insurance (Nyenti and Mpedi 2012).

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⁶ These are contained in the SAMP *Migration Policy Series* covering the period 1997–2007.

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Chapter 4

Diasporas of the South

Abel Chikanda and Jonathan Crush

Introduction

Over the past two decades, governments of migrant-sending countries have embarked on a wide range of programs aimed at “courting the diaspora” (Panossian 2003). Most of these efforts are aimed at harnessing remittances for development, widely promoted by policymakers as the “new development mantra” (Kapur 2005). Migrants are increasingly seen as important agents of development in sending countries, an approach that differs markedly from earlier views that the large-scale departure of migrants, and especially skilled professionals, caused a damaging brain drain (Tanner 2005). In part, this shift is a result of the increasing realization that transnationally oriented individuals continue to engage with their countries of origin after departure, generating offsetting benefits for those countries (Chikanda 2010a). In an era of globalization, migrants are now viewed as an extension of the nation-state despite residing outside it (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996; Gamlen 2011; Mullings 2011).

Most of the current interest in the role of migrants as agents of development is rooted in transnationalism theory, which emerged in the 1990s to describe the linkages migrants maintain with their home countries (Basch et al. 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Vertovec 2009; Vertovec and Cohen 1999). The transnational approach recognizes the participation of migrants in activities that have the potential to promote development in both the home and host countries, including

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the flow of capital, goods and information (de Haas 2006; Kapur 2005; Taylor 1999). Glick Schiller et al. (1995, p. 48) define transnationalism as a “process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.” New technologies of transportation and communication now allow migrants to maintain frequent physical and virtual connections with their home countries. Hence, the term “diaspora” is now increasingly associated with migrant actors who maintain strong connections with their countries of origin. One fairly standard contemporary definition is that it includes “populations of migrant origin, who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries” (Van Hear et al. 2004, p. 3). The similarities between these definitions of transnationalism and diaspora are readily apparent.

The term “diaspora” was originally used to describe the forced dispersion of Jews in the ancient world (Cohen 2008) but is now widely applied to people anywhere who have taken up residence outside their country’s borders and still continue to identify with their homeland (Anthias 1998). Current readings of the term tend to emphasize the development dimension. The AU’s definition, for example, views the African diaspora as “people of African origin living outside the continent who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union” (African Union 2005, p. 7). This definition is problematic for at least four reasons.

First, it suggests that individuals living outside their country of birth who choose not to contribute to the development of that country are not members of a diaspora. However, there might be very good reasons why some migrants choose not to engage in development. For example, Zimbabwean migrants in the United Kingdom are deeply divided over whether they should engage with Zimbabwe while Robert Mugabe is in power (Pasura 2012). There is no logical reason why only those who are willing to engage right now should be members of the Zimbabwean diaspora while everyone else is not (McGregor and Pasura 2010). Second, just because diaspora members do not contribute overtly to development (for example, through remittances, philanthropy or investment) does not necessarily mean that they have cut all ties. Some migrants may be hindered from making financial contributions because of their poor economic standing in the destination country but may still maintain affective, cultural and social links with more subtle development-related implications. Third, there is an assumption that only skilled and professional migrants are “agents” of development and that it is they who, *de facto*, constitute a country’s diaspora. This, too, is unnecessarily limiting. The final problem with the AU definition is that it suggests that African diasporas are only found outside the continent (Crush 2011). This precludes any notion that there is an African diaspora *within* Africa with which governments could also engage (Bakewell 2008). This problematic and exclusionary definition was repeatedly articulated at the Global African Diaspora Summit in South Africa in May 2012.

The idea that the location of the African diaspora is external to Africa is consistent with development discourse more generally, which sees development as involving a transfer of resources and expertise to the continent from the North (Crush 1995). It is also consistent with the lack of attention given to South–South migration

in the migration and transnationalism literatures (Crush and McDonald 2002). Even the current euphoria over migrant remittances in development largely focuses on North–South transfers; for example, from the United States of America to Mexico (Cohen 2001; Goldring 2004; McKenzie 2006), from the United States to the Philippines (Bagasao 2005; Yang and Martínez 2005) and from the United Kingdom to Zimbabwe (Bloch 2008; Magunha et al. 2009; Pasura 2012).

A definition of diaspora that dispenses with the idea that diasporas can only be located in certain countries or regions of the world is needed. For the purposes of this chapter, we define diasporas as comprising migrants who have moved from and resettled outside their country of birth and who remain in the destination country for an extended period of time (at least 12 months or more), irrespective of whether or not they participate or are willing to participate in activities that are developmental in nature. The foreign-born children of these individuals can be considered second-generation members of the diaspora. Temporary, short-term migrants engaged in circular migration are not normally considered to be part of a diaspora.

Diaspora “engagement” refers to the whole range of economic, social, political and affective links maintained by migrants with their countries of origin. Global migration figures do not, unfortunately, always distinguish between short-term temporary migrants (non-diaspora) and those who remain in another country for more than 12 months (the diaspora). This is because the data for “migrant stocks” (the number of foreign-born in a country) are generally based on the census which, in turn, does not consistently distinguish between short- and long-term residents. In practice, this means that we cannot map the global distribution of diasporas with the same certainty that we can the global distribution of all migrants.

Mapping South–South Diasporas

Only recently has the issue of South–South migration begun to attract serious research attention (Crush 2011; Hujo and Piper 2010; Ratha and Shaw 2007). And there are very few examples of researchers explicitly examining the contribution of diasporas within the South to their countries of origin. In this chapter, we advance five main arguments why the South–South diaspora deserves special consideration.

First, available data suggests that international migrants within the South outnumber those in the North. The Global Migrant Origin Database Version 4, for example, calculates that there are over 175 million migrants globally. Of these, 100 million (or 57%) originate from countries that can be broadly defined as the “South”.¹ Africa itself is the most important destination for African migrants. About

¹ This chapter adopts the definition of the “South” used by UNDP because it allows for the identification of developing countries based on the quality of life or living standards, a useful measure of human development. UNDP uses the concept of the Human Development Index (HDI) to distinguish between developing and developed states. Using this definition, the countries ranked with a very high HDI (a total of 42 in 2010) are classified as “North” and the remainder as “South”. The classification used in this chapter is based on the 2010 UNDP HDI rankings.

53% of African migrants (or 13.2 million) live in Africa while 47% live outside the continent. Among those outside the African continent, 12% (or 3 million) live in other regions of the South such as the Middle East (10%), Asia (1.3%) and Latin America (0.2%). A combined 65% of African migrants are therefore located in the South while only 35% are located in the North.

Second, population movements within the South are primarily motivated by the search for better economic opportunity and the desire to build sustainable livelihoods at the household level. These economic migrants may maintain close ties with their home communities by sending remittances and engaging in home visits. This form of circular mobility has been observed in many regions in the South but can eventually lead to more permanent settlement in the country of destination. In Southern Africa, for example, temporary labor migration dates back many decades as migrants from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe went to work on the farms and mines and in the towns of South Africa (Paton 1995; Crush and Jeeves 1997). Over time, large communities from each of these countries established themselves in South Africa but continued to be involved with their countries of origin.

Third, diasporas within the South are important agents of co-development, contributing both to the development of origin and destination countries. The role of migrants as development partners in countries of origin has been widely acknowledged but their role as development partners in destination countries is usually ignored, at least within the South. Major countries of immigration in the North such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have benefited enormously from migrants who bring skills and capital, thereby making an important contribution to economic growth (Goldin and Katz 2008; Goldin et al. 2011; Peri 2012). This does not mean that the role of migrants is always acknowledged or that anti-migrant sentiment is not strong. However, diasporas in the South are often only seen in a negative light by local populations who perceive immigrants as taking away their jobs, depressing wages and consuming overstretched social services (Crush and Ramachandran 2009; Peri 2012). Failure to appreciate the role of migrants as development partners has led to negative stereotyping of foreigners, sometimes expressed as xenophobic violence (Crush 2000; Crush and Pendleton 2007).

Fourth, members of a diaspora within the South often form close personal and economic networks with other members in both the North and the South (Falzon 2004; Orozco 2005; Bhat and Narayan 2010; Baldassar and Pookong 2012). These networks have been instrumental in the development of trading networks globally by diasporas (Seagrave 1995). In Africa, these diaspora networks have been extensively studied, especially those formed by Somali (Campbell 2005; Kusow and Bjork 2007; UNDP 2011) and Senegalese migrants (Ebin 1995; Diouf 2000; Riccio 2003; Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012). The trade networks also connect diasporas within Africa to diasporas outside the continent for the selling and sourcing of goods and merchandise (Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012). Given these connections, it is surprising that those located on the continent are usually referred to by researchers and governments as “migrants” while those outside the continent are referred to as “diasporas”. So, for example, Zimbabweans living outside the continent are viewed

as a diaspora while those living in South Africa are not (Crush and Tevera 2010), despite the fact that both groups engage in similar transnational activities and may even send remittances to the same households in Zimbabwe.

Finally, standard conceptions of diaspora engagement focus on the development contributions of the highly skilled, educated and networked members of diasporas in the North. In the same way that the term “brain drain” is usually confined to the migration of skilled professionals from the South to the North, so too is the idea that these migrants can contribute to the development of their countries of origin (and destination). Skilled professionals who have migrated to other countries within the South are excluded from this conceptualization of diaspora engagement. African governments, for example, are enjoined by international agencies to reach out to their diasporas living in the North, but not to reach out to those within Africa itself.

Generally, South–South migration is most important in Africa (65% of the total migrant stock is located in the South), the Middle East (64%) and Asia (55%), and is least important in Oceania (23%) and Latin America and the Caribbean (19%) (Table 4.1). In Latin America and the Caribbean, migration to the United States and Canada dominates (70% of the total), with a further 10% moving to Europe, while migration within the region constitutes only 13% of the recorded movements. In the case of Africa, 53% of total migration occurs within the continent. This type of migration comprises 51% in the the Middle East region and 35% in Asia. In other words, intraregional migration is the dominant form of South–South migration, accounting for 81% of South–South movement from African countries, 80% from the countries in the Middle East, 71% from the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 63% from Asian countries.

Only four of the top 15 destinations of African migrants are in the North, while the remaining 11 are in the South (Table 4.2). Clearly, African migrants tend to favor destinations in the South more than those in the North. The same applies in Asia and in the Middle East, where nine of the top 15 destinations for migrants from the two regions are also in the South. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the majority of international movements are to countries in the North rather than the South. The United States is the top destination for migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, along with other important destinations in the North such as Spain, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom. Eight of the top 15 destinations for migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean are in the North, while seven are in the South (Table 4.3).

Hujo and Piper (2007) suggest several reasons for the greater importance of South–South migration in many developing countries. First, the costs of migration are lower because of the shorter distances between countries. Second, the migration process within regions is facilitated by networks that are based on ethnic, community and family ties. Third, middle-income countries in the South attract migrants from nearby low-income countries. Fourth, some countries in the South evolved as important transit countries for migrants who eventually aim at a northern destination. Finally, refugees from conflicts, wars and natural disasters often go to nearby developing countries (Hujo and Piper 2007, pp. 19–20).

Table 4.1 Total migrant stock by region. (Source: Calculated from Global Migrant Origin Database Version 4, updated March 2007; available at http://www.migrationdc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls)

	Africa		Asia		Middle East		Oceania		Latin America and the Caribbean		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
<i>South</i>												
Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand)	1,870	0.01	93,350	0.22	1,342	0.02	76,137	12.70	3,769	0.01	176,468	0.18
Asia (excluding countries with a very high HDI)	432,557	1.73	14,446,872	34.60	127,415	2.08	37,921	6.32	584,885	2.20	15,629,650	15.62
Eastern Europe	345,845	1.38	441,597	1.06	138,484	2.26	6,058	1.01	301,900	1.14	1,233,884	1.23
Latin America and the Caribbean	58,842	0.23	159,500	0.38	61,116	1.00	3,964	0.66	3,561,801	13.42	3,845,223	3.84
Middle East (excluding countries with a very high HDI)	2,166,985	8.64	7,168,104	17.17	3,122,192	51.06	6,167	1.03	269,464	1.02	12,732,912	12.72
<i>Africa</i>	13,181,759	52.57	471,669	1.13	437,314	7.15	4,999	0.83	282,686	1.06	14,378,427	14.37
<i>Total South</i>	16,187,858	64.56	22,781,092	54.56	3,887,863	63.57	135,246	22.55	5,004,505	18.83	47,996,564	47.96
<i>North</i>												
Asia (countries with a very high HDI)	6,457	0.03	4,027,789	9.65	43,977	0.72	4,493	0.75	264,851	1.00	4,347,567	4.34
Australia and New Zealand	221,225	0.88	992,872	2.38	141,184	2.31	217,483	36.27	82,613	0.31	1,655,377	1.65
Western Europe	6,991,697	27.88	3,702,847	8.87	843,432	13.79	18,283	3.05	2,530,959	9.53	14,087,218	14.07
North America	1,239,153	4.94	8,143,713	19.50	892,157	14.59	220,579	36.78	18,528,298	69.80	29,023,900	29.00
Middle East (countries with a very high HDI)	428,871	1.71	2,106,435	5.04	306,731	5.02	3,580	0.60	134,745	0.51	2,980,362	2.98
<i>Total North</i>	8,887,403	35.44	18,973,656	45.44	2,227,481	36.43	464,418	77.45	21,541,466	81.15	52,094,424	52.04
<i>Grand total</i>	25,075,261	100.00	41,754,748	100.00	6,115,344	100.00	599,664	100.00	26,545,971	100.00	100,090,988	100.00

Table 4.2 Top 15 destinations of African migrants. (Source: Calculated from Global Migrant Origin Database Version 4, updated March 2007; available at http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls)

Country	Total African migrants	Migrant destination location
France	3,048,721	North
Côte d'Ivoire	2,261,097	South
Saudi Arabia	1,341,232	South
Germany	1,086,997	North
Burkina Faso	1,003,450	South
United States	931,241	North
United Kingdom	842,246	North
United Republic of Tanzania	828,234	South
Sudan	774,350	South
South Africa	729,498	South
Guinea	669,052	South
Nigeria	643,234	South
Ethiopia	635,176	South
Uganda	511,907	South
Ghana	502,496	South
<i>Total top 15 in North</i>	<i>5,909,205</i>	
<i>Total top 15 in South</i>	<i>9,899,726</i>	

Table 4.3 Top 15 destinations of Latin American and Caribbean migrants. (Source: Calculated from Global Migrant Origin Database Version 4, updated March 2007; available at http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls)

Country	Total Latin American and Caribbean migrants	Migrant destination location
United States	17,943,034	North
Argentina	1,043,018	South
Spain	840,193	North
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	762,238	South
Canada	628,181	North
Germany	460,109	North
United Kingdom	335,094	North
Pakistan	316,755	South
Netherlands	315,445	North
Costa Rica	280,029	South
Japan	232,669	North
Italy	197,075	North
Paraguay	155,480	South
Kuwait	152,121	South
Chile	134,204	South
<i>Total top 15 in North</i>	<i>20,951,800</i>	
<i>Total top 15 in South</i>	<i>2,843,845</i>	

Table 4.4 Doctors' emigration to South Africa, 2000. (Source: Clemens and Pettersson 2006)

	Domestic	Total in South Africa	Percentage of total in South Africa
Lesotho	114	49	30.0
Malawi	200	48	19.3
Namibia	466	291	38.4
Swaziland	133	44	24.8
Zambia	670	203	23.2
Zimbabwe	1,530	643	29.6

Diasporas' Engagement Within the South

There is a pervasive, and mistaken, view that South–South migration primarily involves movement of the poor and unskilled. This idea works itself out in perverse ways. For example, the conventional view of South–North migration (at least within the South itself) is that the migration of skilled people, in particular, constitutes a serious and damaging brain drain (Singh et al. 2003; Snyder 2009). Interestingly, however, the concept of the brain drain is rarely used to describe the movement of skilled professionals within the South. Any consideration of a possible South–South brain drain is absent from Ratha and Shaw's (2007) otherwise seminal piece on South–South migration. This is perhaps not surprising given the new orthodoxy that the brain drain is more than compensated for by diaspora engagement (Plaza and Ratha 2011). Meyer (2010, p. 92), however, suggests that there is a “waterfall effect” in the South in which “outflows of human resources move downstream from the less developed, to developing, to middle-income countries.” Compensation effects accrue to some but “those at the bottom do not benefit from them.”

Empirical research on South–South migration in regional contexts such as Southern Africa shows that the brain drain not only exists in a South–South context but that it can have serious negative consequences for countries of origin. In the case of medical doctors, Clemens and Pettersson (2006) have shown that 1,459 of the 27,551 doctors practising in South Africa in 2000 were from other countries in Africa. Even though the proportion might seem small, its impact is great for some individual countries. In 2000, there were 643 Zimbabwean doctors practising in South Africa against a national supply of 1,530 (Clemens and Pettersson 2006). Namibia had the largest proportion of medical doctors working in South Africa, with 291 doctors working in that country compared with a national supply of only 466 (Table 4.4). In 1999, almost 80% of the doctors in South African rural hospitals were from other African countries (Martineau et al. 2002; Liese and Dussault 2004).

What the World Bank and others increasingly argue is that diasporas can and do have a positive development impact on their home countries (Ratha and Shaw 2007; Plaza and Ratha 2011). However, approaches to diaspora engagement were mainly developed in relation to South–North migration. In other words, the benefits of diaspora engagement tend to be viewed as a one-way flow of resources, remittances, knowledge and expertise from the North to the South. Since countries of the North are supposedly already “developed”, the contribution of diasporas to

Table 4.5 Citizens' attitudes towards policies on economic migration from other countries. (Source: World Values Survey; available at <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSanalyze.jsp>)

Which of the following do you think the government should do about people from other countries coming here to work?

	Prohibit people from coming (%)	Strict limits (%)	As long as jobs available (%)	Let anyone come (%)
South Africa	30	48	16	6
India	30	25	23	23
Egypt	27	43	25	5
Malaysia	18	72	8	2
Mexico	17	25	45	12
Zambia	15	44	30	11
Thailand	14	65	16	5
Indonesia	8	72	15	6
Ghana	7	36	39	18
Argentina	6	34	45	15
<i>Total</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>9</i>

countries of destination is marginalized. This approach clearly does not fit the reality of South–South migration. First, the UNDP (2009) has shown that many people in the South move to a country with a lower HDI which questions the whole idea that migrants only move to a country with a higher level of development. Second, when migration occurs between two countries in the South, the development of both will be affected in some manner. More often than not, however, the contribution of diasporas to countries of destination in the South is ignored by policymakers and the general public.

Results of the most recent World Values Survey in 2010–2012, for example, show that citizens in migrant-destination countries in the South generally hold negative views towards migrants. The survey contains data on 10 countries in the South where the majority of migrants come from other parts of the South (Table 4.5). On average, nearly 63% of those surveyed said that governments of destination countries should set strict limits or bar altogether migrants who come to work in their countries. A quarter felt that they could come as long as jobs were available but less than 10% favored an open-door policy. There was some variation among the countries, but over 70% of the citizens of Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa and Thailand felt that there should be strict limits or a total ban on in-migration. A minority in some countries felt that a jobs-based policy was acceptable (for example, Argentina, Ghana and Mexico), but there was almost universal opposition to the idea of free movement across borders for work (Ghana and India being partial exceptions). We can infer that there is little support across the South for the idea that in-migration has a positive impact on the receiving country. This observation is confirmed by other, less direct, measures. The vast majority of citizens (over 80% in most cases) feel that being born in and having ancestors from the country should be pre-conditions for citizenship (Table 4.6). Levels of distrust for people of different nationalities are also high. Finally, in all countries polled (with the exception of Argentina and Mexico) more than a quarter of the population is opposed to having

Table 4.6 Citizens' attitudes towards immigrants, foreign nationals and citizenship. (Source: World Values Survey; available at <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAanalyze.jsp>)

	Who would not like to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors (%)	Who distrust people of different nationality (%)	Who feel citizens should have ancestors from country (%)	Who feel citizens should be born in country (%)
South Africa	25	51	81	88
India	39	66	87	89
Egypt	–	79	87	80
Malaysia	57	81	88	96
Mexico	11	74	81	85
Zambia	28	77	76	95
Thailand	44	77	87	89
Indonesia	36	68	77	82
Ghana	26	64	79	87
Argentina	4	40	60	62

immigrants or foreign workers in their communities. This figure rises to over a third in India, Indonesia and Thailand, and to over a half in Malaysia. In many contexts, these kinds of attitude translate into overt hostility and xenophobic violence against migrants who are already in the country (Crush and Ramachandran 2009). Clearly, a great deal more research is needed on the impacts of South–South migration on countries of destination in the South in order to assess the real (as opposed to imagined) development benefits for those countries.

Diaspora Remittances

When it comes to the development impacts of South–South migration on countries of origin, there is more research available although these are rarely represented as the result of diaspora engagement (Crush 2011). Most attention, to date, has focused on the remitting behavior of diasporas in the South, which is often compared unfavorably with the remitting behavior of those in the North. A dataset produced by the World Bank has mapped the global flow of remittances in 2005. The dataset provides bilateral remittance estimates using migrant stocks, destination country incomes and source country incomes. A potential weakness of the dataset is that it uses per capita gross national income as a proxy for migrant income abroad, instead of household survey data which should yield more accurate data on migrant incomes (Ratha and Shaw 2007). In spite of this shortcoming, the dataset provides the most comprehensive information available on South–South remittances. Globally, the dataset shows that countries in the South received about US\$ 156 million out of the US\$ 257 million sent globally in 2005 (Table 4.7). South–South remittances accounted for about 23% of the total flows, while 77% were sent by migrants located in the North. The importance of South–South remittances varies by

Table 4.7 South–South and North–South remittances. (Source: World Bank; available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/T4RemittanceEstimatesMS_HC_SC_Incomes.xls)

	Africa		Asia		Middle East		Oceania		Latin America and the Caribbean		Total	
	Remittances (US\$ M)	Percentage of total	Remittances (US\$ M)	Percentage of total	Remittances (US\$ M)	Percentage of total	Remittances (US\$ M)	Percentage of total	Remittances (US\$ M)	Percentage of total	Remittances (US\$ M)	Percentage of total
<i>South–South remittances</i>												
Asia (excluding countries with a very high HDI)	4.05	0.0	8,364.88	10.6	1.87	0.0	0.05	0.0	13.61	0.0	8,384.46	5.4
Middle East	2,403.10	12.7	7,547.32	9.6	3,376.09	29.6	–	–	–	–	13,326.51	8.5
Africa	2,179.95	11.6	960.54	1.2	153.13	1.3	–	–	0.44	0.0	3,294.06	2.1
Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand)	–	–	96.79	0.1	–	–	4.11	3.5	13.23	0.0	114.13	0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	7.56	0.0	107.03	0.1	236.34	2.1	0.30	0.3	2,767.35	5.8	3,118.58	2.0
Eastern Europe	4.82	0.0	17.46	0.0	66.44	0.6	0.01	0.0	1.46	0.0	90.19	0.1
Others (South)	814.97	4.3	3,086.68	3.9	653.78	5.7	0.51	0.4	2,466.77	5.2	7,022.71	4.5
<i>Total South–South Remittances</i>	<i>5,414.45</i>	<i>28.7</i>	<i>20,180.70</i>	<i>25.7</i>	<i>4,487.65</i>	<i>39.4</i>	<i>4.98</i>	<i>4.3</i>	<i>5,262.86</i>	<i>11.1</i>	<i>35,350.64</i>	<i>22.6</i>
<i>North–South remittances</i>												
North America	2,248.95	11.9	25,343.09	32.3	3,151.36	27.7	44.53	38.1	36,345.52	76.6	67,133.45	42.9
Asia	18.27	0.1	13,590.94	17.3	9.95	0.1	0.24	0.2	1,178.87	2.5	14,798.27	9.5
Western Europe	10,299.02	54.6	10,012.39	12.7	2,682.71	23.5	8.69	7.4	4,355.77	9.2	27,358.58	17.5
Middle East	494.91	2.6	6,841.47	8.7	253.82	2.2	–	–	22.2	0.0	7,612.40	4.9
Australia and New Zealand	271.29	1.4	2,136.05	2.7	749.64	6.6	53.56	45.8	83.69	0.2	3,294.23	2.1
Others (North)	113.55	0.6	477.86	0.6	57.94	0.5	4.9	4.2	197.75	0.4	852.00	0.5
<i>Total North–South remittances</i>	<i>13,445.99</i>	<i>71.3</i>	<i>58,401.80</i>	<i>74.3</i>	<i>6,905.42</i>	<i>60.6</i>	<i>111.92</i>	<i>95.7</i>	<i>42,183.80</i>	<i>88.9</i>	<i>121,048.93</i>	<i>77.4</i>
<i>Total remittances</i>	<i>18,860.44</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>78,582.50</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>11,393.07</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>116.90</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>47,446.66</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>156,399.57</i>	<i>100.0</i>

region, reaching as high as 39% in the case of the Middle East and as low as 4% in Oceania. The Middle East and Asia are the most important sources of South–South remittances, while North–South remittances are dominated by North America and Western Europe.

There are various reasons why South–South remittances data produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank significantly underestimate the flow. First, these sources only report funds sent through formally recorded channels and therefore exclude remittances sent through informal means. Freund and Spatafora (2005) suggest that remittances sent via informal channels represent 35–75% of remittances sent through formal channels to developing countries. Second, a number of countries do not report data to the IMF and the World Bank. This is a particular problem in the South. As many as 13 African countries did not report remittance data in 2005, and the numbers are also high in other regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean (13), Oceania (10), the Middle East (10) and Asia (5). Third, problems arise in measuring remittances because of definitional variations. The IMF calculates flows using balance of payments statistics which are often less reliable: “Evidence of this includes the growing gap between global receipts and global payments over the last few years; estimates of receipts now far exceed estimates of payments” (World Bank 2009, p. 3). Finally, the World Bank data do not include remittances in kind, which comprise a significant proportion of transfers from migrants within the South.

Does the developmental impact of South–South remittances differ from that of North–South remittances? The evidence here is inconclusive. What seems certain is that individual recipient households tend to spend remittances on the same kinds of things, whether they come from the North or the South or both. There is some evidence that members of diasporas in the North may remit a higher total amount over the course of a year, since they often have higher earning potential. On the other hand, the economic costs of South–South migration are generally much lower, which means that poorer households are more likely to be able to send migrants and receive remittances. In other words, improved household earnings may have an impact on a broader range of households in South–South migration. Wouterse (2010), for example, found that in Burkina Faso the limited participation of poorer households in intercontinental migration led to an increase in societal inequality, while welfare gains from intra-African migration were much larger, which suggests that this form of migration is a more effective poverty reduction strategy.

Perhaps no country exhibits the importance of South–South remittances better than Lesotho. The South African population has historically shunned working in the mining industry because of the physical nature of the job, its long working hours and the associated dangers of working in mines. As Crush et al. (1991, p. 1) point out, without migrant miners from outside South Africa there would never have been a deep-level gold mining industry in the country. In turn, South Africa would not have experienced its modern urban-industrial revolution and emerged as one of the strongest economies on the African continent. Although the number of miners from Lesotho has declined from a peak of 127,000 in 1990 to fewer than 40,000 at the present time, these miners work continuously in South Africa for many years and

represent a critical source of income for rural and urban communities in Lesotho (Crush et al. 2010). In 2010, remittance inflows (almost exclusively from South Africa) made up 29% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), making Lesotho the second largest receiver of remittances after Tajikistan (World Bank 2011). A study by SAMP showed that migrant-sending households are virtually reliant on remittances, earning 8,400 Maloti (equal to about US\$ 924) from cash remittances and 2,488 Maloti (US\$ 274) in goods remittances annually against an annualized household income of 11,475 Maloti (US\$ 1,262) from all sources (Crush et al. 2010).²

The Malaysian case illustrates the importance of South–South migration as a form of co-development in another region of the South. The local population shuns jobs that have low pay and low status and fall into the “3D” category: dirty, difficult and dangerous (Hugo 2009). In sectors such as forestry, construction, plantations and domestic service, migrants made up a quarter of the workforce in 2007 (Hugo 2009). The migrants are not well paid, but they do send remittances home. Malaysia draws migrants from some of the poorest parts in the region, such as Java in Indonesia. This has major implications for regional development there (Spaan 1999).

Thailand is another country that illustrates the positive contribution of migrants to the economy of sending and receiving states. In 2007, the country's Ministry of Interior estimated that there were 2.8 million registered migrants in the country, of which an estimated 75% worked in the agricultural sector (Pholphirul and Rukumnuaykit 2010). Most of the migrants came from Myanmar (74%), the Lao People's Democratic Republic (13%) and Cambodia (13%). The migrants filled positions vacated by Thais who were taking up positions in the manufacturing sector, where conditions of service and salaries were much better. Pholphirul and Rukumnuaykit (2010) estimate that the net contribution of migrants is, on average, around THB 760 million (equal to about US\$ 25 million) per year.³ Kura et al.'s (2004) research on the shrimp production industry in Thailand shows that the low wages paid to migrants have given the shrimp industry in the country a competitive edge. The presence of foreign workers partly explains why Thailand is among the world's leading shrimp exporters with a market share of 16%, surpassing all other countries in the region (Pholphirul and Rukumnuaykit 2010). Deelen and Vasuprasat (2010) examine the impact of remittances from Thailand on the rural sending areas of Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar. Twenty per cent of all income earned is sent home, almost exclusively through informal channels. In the Lao People's Democratic Republic, average household income for migrant-sending households was THB 23,000 (US\$ 759) (including in-kind income) prior to migration. Remittances more than doubled annual household income and virtually all households reported that the money sent home by their family members had positively changed their livelihoods (Deelen and Vasuprasat 2010, p. 21).

Since South–South migration is generally cheaper and more accessible, it can also have important gender implications in the countries of origin of migrants.

² 1 Maloti = US\$ 0.11 (February 2013).

³ THB 1 = US\$ 0.033 (February 2013)

South–South migration can empower poor women who are usually underrepresented in South–North migration streams. The Philippines, for example, has sent approximately 1.5 million workers throughout the Asian region, many of whom are women who find employment as domestic workers (Kofman and Raghuram 2010). Even though women who migrate to neighboring countries frequently end up in low-paying jobs, this does not diminish their remitting potential. In fact, studies have shown that women often send home a larger proportion of their income compared to men. Bangladeshi women working in the Middle East, for example, send home 72% of their earnings on average and 56% of female remittances are used to cover daily needs, health care or education (IOM 2005). Men, on the other hand, tend to spend remittance income on consumer items and for investments, such as property and livestock (Flynn and Kofman 2004). Remittances therefore play an important role in gender equity and open up opportunities for women’s empowerment in the South.

Diasporas and Development

Given the paucity of research studies, it is impossible to provide a picture of diaspora engagement across the global South. This section therefore examines the case of two active South–South bilateral migration corridors within Africa: the Ghana–Nigeria and the South Africa–Zimbabwe corridors, about which much more is known, to illustrate the variety of diaspora linkages that occur within the regions of the South.

Ghana–Nigeria Migration Corridor

Migration between Ghana and Nigeria provides a clear illustration of the migration–development nexus within the South. Migration between the two countries has swung back and forth over time in response to changes in the economic and political climate in the two countries. Historical factors such as a common colonial heritage and long-standing trade and other commercial ties have promoted migration between Nigeria and Ghana (Antwi Bosiakoh 2009a). In the 1970s, political stability in Nigeria and the economic growth resulting from the oil industry boom created many jobs in the Nigerian economy. This attracted migrants from many countries in West Africa, particularly from Ghana (Adepoju 1984). Anarfi (1982) estimated that there were more than 150,000 Ghanaians living in Nigeria in December 1980. The Ghanaian population in Nigeria continued to grow at a rate of 300 per day during this period (Anarfi 1982). Faced with a large influx of foreigners and economic stagnation, the Nigerian Government revoked the ECOWAS protocol in 1983, leading to the deportation of between 900,000 and 1.2 million Ghanaians from the country (Brydon 1985). This was also partly a retaliation for the expulsion

from Ghana of around 250,000 West African migrants by the military regime of the time in 1969. Nonetheless, before the expulsions, remittances from Nigeria played a major role in supporting families in Ghana.

The failure of the Nigerian Government to properly govern and distribute the wealth from the oil boom resulted in Nigeria becoming a net emigration country. Democratic reforms in Ghana promoted economic growth, making the country attractive to migrants. Ghana has become a prime destination for Nigerian migrants since the 1990s. There are no reliable estimates of the number of Nigerians residing in Ghana, but the Nigerian High Commission in Ghana estimates the number at over 2 million (Antwi Bosiakoh 2009a). Skilled Nigerians have moved to Ghana in search of economic opportunities and a large number are involved in the Ghanaian banking and telecommunications sectors (Antwi Bosiakoh 2009a). Furthermore, many Nigerians operate formal and informal businesses in the country's urban centers. Ghana has also become a destination of choice for Nigerian students who made up 56% of the University of Ghana's international student component in 2004 (Antwi Bosiakoh 2010).

Given the long history of Nigerian settlement in Ghana, it is not surprising that many hometown associations have emerged. Eades (1994), for example, noted that Nigerians in Ghana have been forming migrant organizations since the 1960s. These associations offer an avenue for socialization especially for newcomers and provide a reliable job information source to new immigrants (Antwi Bosiakoh 2010). This study found three types of Nigerian hometown association in Ghana: the first is typified by the Nigerian Women Association which was founded in 2001, had 100 members in 2009 and focuses exclusively on issues that affect women. Second, there is the Nigerian Committee of Brothers Association, an all-male association founded in 2004 which had 200 members in 2009. Third, the Edo State Association, is an ethnic association bringing together Nigerians from the Edo State in Nigeria. It was founded in 2006 and had 75 members in 2009.

To date, the activities of Nigerian hometown associations in Ghana have been limited to supporting the welfare of their group members. So the Edo Association works to protect or defend members who have problems with the Ghanaian police or immigration officials and the Nigerian Committee of Brothers Association takes special interest in the initial settling problems that members encounter especially those related to accommodation (Antwi Bosiakoh 2009b). Furthermore, such associations provide other benefits to members such as health and medical benefits, funeral assistance in times of bereavement, and accommodation, financial and material assistance to newcomers (Antwi Bosiakoh 2012). According to the categorization provided by Kuznetsov (2006), the Nigerian diaspora in Ghana is still in the embryonic stage of engagement, as it is still occupied only with the social activities of members. With time, these diaspora-focused activities will assume a broader dimension and include their home country. At present, the Nigerian diaspora in Ghana is involved primarily in sending remittances to families in Nigeria individually rather than collectively. In this respect, the Nigerian diaspora in Ghana still lags behind diasporas in other regions where migrants have taken a more proactive role in developing their communities of origin (Orozco and Garcia-Zanello 2009).

South Africa–Zimbabwe migration corridor

Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis over the past two decades has led to mass emigration from the country (Crush and Tevera 2010; Crush et al. 2012). The majority of Zimbabwean migrants have moved to neighboring South Africa primarily because of the economic opportunities in the formal and informal sectors. The label "mixed migration" has recently been applied to Zimbabwean migration as it has become difficult to distinguish refugees and economic migrants in the migration stream (Crush et al. 2012). Although Zimbabweans experience extreme hostility and xenophobia in South Africa, their presence does have positive economic impacts on the country.

Zimbabwe's diaspora has played a crucial role in meeting the labor market needs of different sectors of the South African economy. South Africa's 2002 Immigration Act favors the employment of foreign nationals whose skills are in short supply in the country. South Africa's Department of Education has introduced initiatives to facilitate the employment of qualified Zimbabwean teachers (Polzer 2008). Zimbabweans have also contributed to the development of South Africa's agricultural sector by taking up positions that are shunned by locals because of the poor working conditions and low wages on offer. There are between 15,000 and 20,000 Zimbabwean farm workers in the northern Limpopo Province, making up as many as 70–85% of the farm workers in that part of the country (Lincoln and Mararike 2000; Rutherford and Addison 2007; Rutherford 2010).

Not all Zimbabwean professionals have been able to secure jobs in South Africa that are commensurate with their qualifications and experience, leading to underemployment and deskilling. Dodson (2010), for instance, found out that some skilled Zimbabweans who were trained as teachers were working as domestic servants in South Africa. Bloch (2006) clearly shows that there has been an increase in the number of Zimbabweans working in unskilled labor positions that are not in line with their professional skills (Table 4.8).

Remittances from South Africa are crucial to the survival of households in the face of rising inflation and food scarcity (Tevera and Chikanda 2009; Maphosa 2007). Styan (2007, p. 1173) observed that reliance on migrant remittances is a part of everyday life for many households: "Zimbabwe's economy limps along largely, thanks to remittances ... over half of the country's population is dependent on remittances." Bracking and Sachikonye (2006) found that over 50% of households in Harare and Bulawayo were dependent on migrant remittances for basic consumables. Maphosa (2007) shows that remittances from South Africa make a significant contribution to the welfare of many households in the southern districts of Zimbabwe, improving standards of living, ensuring better access to health care and education and, to a lesser extent, boosting investment in productive activities. Makina (2012) estimates that Zimbabweans in South Africa remit as much as US\$ 500 million per year, representing 10% of the country's GDP.

Remittances from South Africa mainly flow through informal channels (Bloch 2005; Makina 2012; Maphosa 2007; Mupedziswa 2009; Thebe 2011). Formal

Table 4.8 Main jobs before and after leaving Zimbabwe direction for South Africa. (Source: Adapted from Bloch 2006)

	Job title before emigrating to South Africa (number of migrants)	Current or most recent job title in South Africa (number of migrants)	Increase (+) or decrease (-)
Agricultural laborer	16	80	+64
Carer/care assistant	0	2	+2
Teacher	34	9	-25
All managerial, including managing director	44	45	+1
Nurse/sister	3	1	-2
Consultant/analyst	2	15	+13
Trades: builder, mechanic, electrician, carpenter	24	10	-14
Bartender/waiter	3	16	+13
Finance: clerk, cashier, other	21	11	-10
Administration and clerical	22	13	-9
Hawker/street vendor	13	25	+12
Lecturer	13	11	-2
Secretarial/PA	5	5	0
Technician/lab assistant	8	4	-4
Security guard	9	17	+8
Domestic/cleaning	6	10	+4

institutions such as banks and money transfer companies usually charge higher fees and are completely inaccessible in remote locations. In 2004, the Government of Zimbabwe tried to promote the use of formal channels by establishing the Homelink Scheme. The scheme had three components: a money transfer service, a foreign currency bond and a housing development scheme for diasporas (UNDP 2010). Homelink collapsed because of diaspora suspicion of the Government's motives and the policy of paying out remittances in local instead of foreign currency. The scheme represents a missed opportunity for the state to harness remittances for development and shows the need to study the diasporas' interests before introducing engagement initiatives. Until there is more use of formal channels and a real understanding of diaspora interests and profiles, concrete state-run programs to directly leverage remittances for development are unlikely to be successful.

The presence of a large Zimbabwean skilled diaspora within the continent presents opportunities to introduce programs aimed at tapping their professional expertise (Chikanda 2011). In areas such as the health sector, there is potential to engage South African-based medical doctors on short-term contracts to alleviate the crisis facing hospitals throughout the country. Chikanda (2012) demonstrates the willingness of Zimbabwean doctors to participate in short-term hospital visits and teach short courses at the medical school at no charge. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2010) is currently running a program called the Sequenced Short-term Return of Health Personnel, which targets medical professionals such as doctors, nurses and pharmacists. Geographical proximity makes the South African-based medical professionals a natural fit for such programs.

A large number of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa have been able to advance their professional qualifications since leaving Zimbabwe. Bloch (2005), for instance, showed that 24% of Zimbabweans in South Africa have been able to obtain new qualifications, with 43% of those earning postgraduate qualifications. This creates new potential opportunities for diaspora engagement both on short-term contracts and through permanent return. The latter is currently an unrealistic policy goal, however, given the uncertain political climate in Zimbabwe. Studies of skilled and unskilled Zimbabweans in South Africa indicate that two thirds would like to return to Zimbabwe in the future (Bloch 2005; Makina 2012). A study of Zimbabwean emigrant doctors found the likelihood of returning was much lower, at 29%. This suggests that the likelihood of return varies by profession (Chikanda 2010b). Current indications are that Zimbabweans are in no hurry to return, with many migrants opting to apply for permanent residence in South Africa (Crush et al. 2012).

Several diaspora organizations have been formed by Zimbabweans in South Africa with different objectives (Table 4.9). Some attend to the welfare of vulnerable groups such as refugees and others are cultural organizations that deal with the many social issues facing migrants. Still others are overtly political and oppose the current regime in Zimbabwe in various ways. A few have adopted a patently development focus. They include the Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber, which facilitates development projects in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the Global Zimbabwe Forum, which, among other functions, prepares the diaspora to plan and influence the future of Zimbabwe (UNDP 2010).

Bloch (2005) shows that Zimbabwean migrants would like to contribute to development in Zimbabwe in ways such as investment in business (53%), transfer of skills by working in Zimbabwe (31%) and offering training in Zimbabwe (31%), and investment in land development (22%). In sum, the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa shows great potential for developing their country of origin. In this respect, it is similar to its counterparts in countries in the North.

Conclusion

Until recently, the development impacts of international migration were associated mainly with South–North migration and transfers of remittances, information and knowledge from the North to the South. Migration within the South was seen as having much lower developmental value than South–North migration. The underestimation of the developmental value of South–South migration has meant that policymakers have ignored their own diasporas in the South and focused primarily on engaging those in the North. This chapter has argued that diasporas within the South deserve much more attention than hitherto. Various examples from selected countries in the South demonstrate that diasporas can play an important role in the development of their countries of origin and destination.

Policymakers have long considered that migrants who move to other countries in the South are unskilled and temporary workers, while those in the North are skilled

Table 4.9 Key objectives of major Zimbabwean diaspora organizations in South Africa. (Source: UNDP 2010)

Organization	Formation date	Mission/focus
<i>Refugee diaspora</i>		
Zimbabwe Refugee Association (Johannesburg)	2000s	Uphold human rights and welfare of Zimbabweans in Johannesburg
Zimbabwe Restoration (formerly Refugee) Association (Durban)	2000s	Originally, protect the rights of refugees; now it is currently engaged in empowering members to reconstruct or develop a future Zimbabwe through skills acquisition programs
Zimbabwe Political Victims Association	2003	Serve the full needs of Zimbabwean refugees as well as advocate the development of the Zimbabwean diaspora
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum	2003	Document the human rights violations visited upon Zimbabweans inside and outside the country
<i>Professional</i>		
Doctors in the diaspora	2005	Deal with the problems of registration to practise and lobbies for the free mobility of doctors within the SADC region
Zimbabwe Lawyers Association	2006	Lobby for the interests of Zimbabwean lawyers in South Africa and in addition assists members to learn models of democracy to bring back to Zimbabwe
Association of Zimbabwe Journalists	2005	Assist Zimbabwean journalists living abroad to gain skills and build independent media
<i>Cultural</i>		
Mthwakazi Forum	2005	Provide a debating forum for Zimbabweans on sociopolitical issues
<i>Umbrella</i>		
Zimbabwe Civil Society Organization Forum	2005	Promote civil society by uniting and strengthening the civil society organization sector to influence development policy and advocate for a new prosperous and democratic Zimbabwe
Global Zimbabwe Forum	2007	Create an international platform for all Zimbabweans in the diaspora Mobilize development funds Develop the human capital of the diaspora for the benefit of the development of a future Zimbabwe Prepare the diaspora to plan and influence the future of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber	2008	Facilitate development projects both in the diaspora and in Zimbabwe

emigrants. Given the increasing rates of literacy and access to education in most countries in the South, a larger proportion of migrants from these countries are now skilled and possess qualities that are comparable to migrants who move to destinations in the North. While they maintain close contact with their countries of origin, they are also spending extended periods living and working in other developing countries.

As some countries in the North continue to adopt protectionist measures that limit migration inflows, and new job opportunities open up in growing economies in the South, it is expected that South–South migration will continue to grow. This means that diasporas in the South can play an increasingly important role in the development of their countries of destination and origin.

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Chapter 5

Impact of Remittances in Developing Countries

Manuel Orozco and Caryn Gay Ellis

Introduction

Official remittance transfers by migrants to their families in developing countries were at roughly US\$ 414 billion in 2013, a 6.3% increase from 2012 levels (World Bank 2013a). This represents an important trend, reflecting the interplay between migration and globalization. These numbers are an aggregate component that overlooks the complex dynamics in labor mobility and family ties across different world regions, which have policy implications for development. Development is often associated with ensuring a better standard of living for people and is linked to education, health and material asset accumulation. According to UNDP, development is “about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests” (UNDP 2006). Economic development in particular refers to a condition by which individuals and the population at large enjoy a healthy quality of life, are free, have opportunities for upward mobility and are able to improve their material circumstances (Orozco 2007d).

Thus, the link between remittances and development lies at a point where the economic activities of migrants intersect in a way that transforms the material base of migrants, their relatives and their societies (Orozco 2005a). Remittance flows have several effects on the economic and financial system of a country. From a macroeconomic standpoint, these aggregate flows influence national reserves, foreign currency exchange, and saving and credit ratios. Remittances are a source of national income and can have a positive impact on a country’s economic growth. Remittances also play a role in providing financial access to both migrants and remittance recipients, and thus help lift people out of poverty and build financial

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assets. Research shows that remittance recipients are more likely to save and have bank accounts than non-recipients (Orozco et al. 2005).

Within this remittance and development framework, the main units of analysis are the sender and the recipient, followed by the intermediating agent facilitating outbound and inbound flows, and the regulatory environment that oversees the process. The aggregate volume of these flows and its interplay with the economy is another unit of analysis. From a policy perspective, these flows have an effect on keeping people out of poverty and offer important ingredients to further enhance development.

This chapter reviews the fundamentals of remittance transfers by identifying the characteristics and dynamics of its units of analysis, the policy solutions to problems, and opportunities to deepen or advance development through these flows, particularly in the global South. This analysis should serve as a basis for discussions on ways to enhance the positive impact of remittances on development, reaching beyond the sole recipient in the countries of origin.

Migration and Remittances in the Global Era

Migrants have become substantively and more directly involved in different economic and social activities in their countries of origin. This is due in part to the dynamics of globalization and to new opportunities resulting from political and economic openings in their home societies. An immigrant's economic linkage with his/her home country includes at least four practices that involve spending or investment: family remittance transfers; demand for services such as telecommunications, consumer goods or travel; capital investment; and charitable donations to philanthropic organizations raising funds for the migrant's home community.

The first of these, remittances, is the most widespread and important migrant economic activity. While the determinants of sending are roughly the same for all migrants, the frequencies and quantities of money sent fluctuate across groups. Second, migrants maintain links with their home countries by calling their families and visiting their homeland. Approximately 90% of migrants purchase and consume foodstuff from their home countries and spend money on phone cards to call their families. For example, 80% of Latinos buy phone cards and speak to their relatives by phone for an average of 2 h a month (Orozco 2008c).

The final two practices involve donations and investments. In the case of donations, migrants raise funds to help their hometown mainly through organized civil society groups. Belonging to a hometown association is an important migrant activity that can provide substantial economic resources for the communities of origin. Finally, migrants often have a desire to invest in a property or a small business, devoting between US\$ 5,000 and US\$ 10,000 to that activity (Orozco and Scaife Diaz 2011).

Table 5.1 Geographic distribution of remittances (as % of total flows received). (Source: Orozco 2007; IFAD 2007)

Destination	Origin					
	South-East Asia/ Oceania	North America	Western Europe	Russia/ Kazakhstan	Arab oil-exporting region	Africa
East Asia and the Pacific	37	41	12	0	1	0
Europe and Central Asia	5	18	46	11	1	0
Latin America and the Caribbean	2	77	15	0	0	0
Middle East and North Africa	2	14	44	0	8	0
North America	4	38	51	0	0	0
South Asia	4	30	18	0	11	0
Sub-Saharan Africa	3	19	45	0	3	5
<i>Total (87% of the world)</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>0</i>

These figures have shown a slight change. Because of the slow economic recovery, global flows showed little growth between 2008 and 2009. In 2010, remittances grew 10%; in 2011, it grew 9%; and in 2012, it grew 12%. In terms of the geographic distribution, change is still minimal

The estimated volume of remittances to developing countries may conservatively be around US\$ 400 billion in 2006.¹ By 2012, the World Bank estimated that global remittances were over US\$ 500 billion, of which 372 billion was sent to developing countries.² Looking at the regions in the world described in Table 5.1, we see that remittance flows go to all regions in the world; however, there are differences within some regions. One difference is that nearly 90% of all flows come from five major regions of the world, 35 and 31% of which originates from North America and Western Europe, respectively. Another, these regional corridors show variations in the dependency on remittances; Latin America mostly receives from North America, particularly the United States, whereas Africa mostly receives from Western Europe.

The practice of remittance transfers is not exclusively a North–South pattern; migrants' obligations to their families run across borders worldwide. More than a tenth of global flows occur outside the main regional economic centers; a much larger share of global migration flows, more than a third, takes place outside of those regional blocks. Most of this migration is intraregional and predominantly between developing countries. These migrants send less because, living in a devel-

¹ We used migration statistics applied to survey and money transfer data. We have estimated the global flows on a corridor-by-corridor basis for a total of 50,000 bilateral corridors worldwide, producing an estimated amount of US\$ 411 billion. Other sources cite lower volumes but acknowledge that their figures may be about 50% of what they should be.

² World Bank, Remittance Data Inflows 2012, available at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/0,,contentMDK:21924020~pagePK:5105988~piPK:360975~theSitePK:214971,00.html>.

oping country, they often earn lower salaries than migrants moving to high-income countries. Slooten (2012) estimates that South–South migrants, on average, earn between US\$ 150 and US\$ 500 a month. They do still have the same obligations and, perhaps, an even greater commitment to remitting. Migrants in developing countries often remit a higher percentage of their earnings than their counterparts do in developed countries.

Latin America is an interesting case study for intraregional remittance flows. Although the United States is the primary source of remittances to Latin America, other markets reflect a pattern of regional economic integration. In Latin America, intraregional remittances account for approximately 10% of total flows (World Bank 2013b). In the Caribbean, there are at least three major foreign labor markets: Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic; Dominicans in Puerto Rico; and English speakers from Guyana and Jamaica, among others, in Trinidad and Tobago. In Central America, there are two prominent foreign labor markets: Guatemalans in Mexico; and Nicaraguans and Colombians in Costa Rica. In South America, there are several markets: Colombians in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador; Paraguayans and Bolivians in Argentina; Paraguayans, Peruvians and other South Americans in Brazil; and Peruvians in Chile. Although intraregional migrant groups share some characteristics with workers in extraregional markets, there are significant differences: in particular, the amount of money remitted and, in some cases, the seasonality of cross-border flows.

West Africa is also a significant case of long-standing migration patterns. The four main destinations in the region have been Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, but recently Ghana and Nigeria have experienced both inflows and outflows. In the 1960s, Ghana hosted Nigerians, but by the 1970s the situation reversed, with thousands of Ghanaians looking for work in prosperous Nigeria. Today, people move back and forth between the two countries. People from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger and Togo have also been on the move to other countries in West Africa (Orozco 2006d).

Regulation and the Marketplace for Remittances

Migrants play a primary role in international money transfers and the money transfer industry. Although migrants throughout the world send money home, the percentage of migrants that remit varies by region. In most developed nations of the West, less than 70% of migrants remit back home via both formal and informal channels compared with those working in South-East Asia, the Russian Federation, or the Gulf countries, where the percentages can be as high as 90%.

The average amount sent also varies predominantly in relationship to their incomes and their family needs back home. In Canada, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, migrants remit an average of US\$ 5,000 a year to their relatives, whereas migrants in Russian Federation and the Gulf countries remit less than half that amount; migrants moving to subregions such as West Africa, South America

or Central Asia remit less than US\$ 1,000. In a survey of four West African countries, migrants reported sending money whenever they could afford to do so, but in general they remitted an average of three times a year. With two exceptions, where the amount sent was far greater than US\$ 2,000, the average amount sent each time was US\$ 157.³

The length of time of remitting also varies, usually averaging from 1 to 7 years depending on where the migrant is sending money from. Moreover, migrants are predominantly low-income earners and financially disenfranchised with little access to the banking system, including the lack of owning bank accounts. Bank account ownership varies from 10 to 50% depending on the region; for example, African migrants in Africa have the lowest percentage of account ownership.

The Marketplace

These remittances are sent through either official or licensed channels (e.g. money transfer operators, banks or post offices) or informal mechanisms (e.g. in person, a member of the family or same ethnic group, or a broker). In most developed countries, about 60% of migrants use licensed mechanisms (Orozco 2013). In Africa, intraregional remittance flows are predominantly, if not exclusively, informal because laws do not allow individual outbound international transfers except in extreme circumstances and through the ownership of bank accounts. This is in large part due to poor financial and telecommunications infrastructure, weak security systems, and stringent controls on foreign currency exchange across borders.

Whether formal or informal, either method employed by migrants carries a transaction cost. The cost of remitting ranges from 2 to 10%, depending on which part of the world a person is remitting from and to. Transfers from Spain to Latin America and the Caribbean cost 4% of the value of the amount sent, 5.5% from the United States to Latin America and the Caribbean, 8% from Japan, 6% from Singapore and Hong Kong to South-East Asia, and 10% to most African countries from Europe or the United States (Orozco 2007f; Orozco and Fedewa 2005; Orozco and Millis 2007).

In most cases, the cost of transferring money within the global South mirrors the worldwide average. Transfer costs from the Russian Federation to countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States are 2.5% the value of the amount sent. Transfers from Malaysia to the Philippines, Bangladesh and Indonesia cost 4.6% of the amount sent on average, while transfers from the Dominican Republic to Haiti is 8.7% of the money sent on average. In Africa, however, transfer costs tend to be much higher than the worldwide average. The cost of sending a remittance from South Africa to other African countries (including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia) ranges from 10 to 30% of the amount sent. Remittances from

³ The author conducted 500 interviews with remittance senders in Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal in 2005.

Ghana to Nigeria are just as high, with an average of 20.1 % of the money remitted (Remittance Prices Worldwide database 2012b).

The causes of informality and costs are often related to the infrastructure available to transfer flows to the home country, the regulatory environment in the home country restricting payments only to banking institutions (for example, excluding microfinance institutions (MFIs), credit unions or small savings banks), the economies of scale of the transfers, the extent of interdependence between the migrant's home and the host country, and the level of private sector competition across corridors. In Bangladesh, almost 54 % of remittances are transferred through informal channels, such as friends and relatives hand-carrying money. Overall, the cost of remitting has declined but continues to be expensive; excluding the commission on the exchange rate, the average cost of remitting US\$ 200 is around 6 % of this amount.⁴ Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the differences in transfer costs for remittances originating from the global North versus those originating from the global South.

Regulatory Issues

Money transmission by individuals is associated with or affected by various aspects of a country's economy and legal system. First, because in many instances this is an international transfer that involves dealing with foreign currency, regulation is involved over the legal process to handle and transfer cross-border payments; more specifically, controlling for the legal source of the transfer. Second, insofar as the intermediation of the payment pertains, rules have been established to authorize which entity is allowed to provide the international transaction and make the conversion into foreign or local currency. Third, both governments and end users of the transaction are faced with foreign exchange conversion issues that require regulation against possible foreign currency speculation, which can affect consumers and the economy at large. Fourth, because the origin or destination of these earnings is a foreign country, governments establish rules about how to capture and record these flows in their national account and balance of payment systems.

The two most important considerations for governments for cross-border payments (including remittances) are the tools that regulate foreign currency transfers and which institutions are authorized or licensed to transfer monies. In the first case, most governments have established regulations to ensure the transfer is legal in method and purpose. The main legal instruments adopted to ensure the legality of transactions are legislation and oversight controls to prevent money laundering and other criminal uses or activities (such as arms trafficking, terrorism or smuggling) of foreign currency transfers, limits in amounts sent or remitted, and methods to identify the sender and recipient of money transfers. Developed countries have generally been more proactive at controlling cross-border transfers for criminal activities, particularly after September 11, 2001. An example of this would be the

⁴ Commissions on the exchange rate usually range between 1 and 2 % of the value of the principal.




Fig. 5.1 Transfer costs of North–South corridors (Sending US\$ 200). (Source: Data compiled from the World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database; third quarter figures for 2012. Available at <http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/>)

recent “remittance rule” in the Dodd-Frank legislation, which was passed by the US Congress in 2010. The rule will, in part, include provisions relating to increased transparency and disclosure of money transfers.

In addition to formal fund transfers, there are many informal transfers of monies that may also be used for criminal activities. Informal practices such as *hawala* (honor transfers) may involve the transfer of funds using the regular banking system but without the supervision or reporting about the origin or purpose of the funds (Maimbo and Passas 2005; Passas 2006). These practices render transfers vulnerable to criminal activity.




Fig. 5.2 Transfer costs of South–South corridors (Sending US\$ 200). (Source: Data compiled from the World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database; third quarter figures for 2012. Available at <http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/>)

Increasingly, however, developing countries are stepping up efforts to pass legislation, train regulators and pay attention to mechanisms to stop criminal activities through money transfers.⁵ In Africa, for example, new and comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation was introduced in many countries after 2002,

⁵ Two important international principles that seek to provide guidance and clarity on regulatory issues are the General Principles for International Remittance Services and the Recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering. In particular, the FATF Recommendations and Special Recommendations establish that financial institutions providing money transfers should “undertake customer due diligence measures, including identifying and verifying the identity of their customers” (Rec. 5); gather information about the originating financial institution performing the transaction (Rec. 7); and pay “special attention to any money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies that might favor anonymity and take measures, if needed, to prevent their use in money laundering schemes” (Rec. 8).

most likely in response to a global climate that increased pressure on cutting off terrorist financing. Specialized anti-money laundering units or task forces have been established within central banks, finance ministries or other government agencies to oversee financial institutions and monitor suspicious transactions and other activities. While accountability and compliance may be difficult to determine based solely on legislation, the presence of such entities suggests a greater chance that financial activities can be effectively monitored for money laundering.

Among the important contributors to the regulatory environment are money transfer companies (MTCs). MTCs have implemented anti-money laundering and other compliance systems designed to prevent crimes. As these companies have set up their payment transfer platforms across the world and into banks and other financial institutions in most developing countries, they have brought technology, training and tips on how to prevent illicit activities using foreign money transfers. These companies' efforts and methods have in many cases become effective anti-money laundering systems in countries where legislation does not exist or is not enforced.

The Microeconomics of Remittances

Families receiving remittances represent up to 30% of all households in some countries, particularly where labor mobility is more fluid (such as in Central Asia, Central America and South Caucasus). But, in most cases, 15% of households on average are receiving remittances.⁶

Poverty and Social Effects

Studies have shown that remittances tend to reduce poverty. Adams and Page's (2005) pivotal work on remittances and poverty reduction analyzed remittance and poverty trends worldwide and found a statistical relationship between these two variables. His analysis showed that a 10% increase in international remittances from each individual will lead to a 3.5% decline in the share of people living in poverty. Another Adams' (2004) study on remittances and poverty in Guatemala (based on household survey data) found that remittances also reduced poverty in that country. His findings showed that the level of poverty was reduced by 1.6% and the depth of poverty by 12.6% for households that received remittances, when compared with the national average in Guatemala. In a study on the effect of remittances on distribution of wealth in Ecuador, Orbe (2006) found that the Gini coefficient dropped from 0.54 to 0.52 as a result of incorporating remittances into

⁶ Compare, for example, Armenia, Moldova, and Nicaragua, countries from different world regions in which the percent receiving is between 25 and 30%.

the income equation, indicating that remittances also reduce income inequality. In general, remittances make recipients wealthier across all income groups.

Gender

Gender considerations play a large role in the understanding and analysis of the impact of remittances. It is important to recognize that remittances both inform and are informed by gender. For example, a young Tajik construction worker in Moscow remitting to his mother in Dushanbe significantly influences the limits of expenditure his mother can afford. Similarly, a young man from Nicaragua working in the cleaning industry assesses both his needs in Costa Rica and those of his siblings in Nicaragua. Depending on his social condition and income, he then decides what expenditures to prioritize in the transnational household. A female Filipino, Indonesian or Paraguayan domestic worker and single mother in Milan will also consider certain priorities and conditions for remitting, including remitting to the person who takes care of her children.

The percentage of female remitters varies widely by region; in Africa and Central Asia, the majority of remitters are male, while the majority in South-East Asia are female (in the developed countries, the numbers are split). Based on data from rural Mexico, De La Cruz (1995) found that women remit to insure and assist their families or siblings, while men remit to invest. A 2008 survey indicates that women remit smaller amounts each time compared with their male counterparts: US\$ 234.65 compared with US\$ 273.87.⁷ The fact that women's remittances are smaller compared with men's is a function of income; the data shows that men typically have higher earnings and thus can afford to send more money. Another explanation for women's smaller remittances is the significantly higher percentage of women, than of men, with children in their new host countries: almost 6% points higher, in addition to the higher percentage of women who have children in their countries of origin. Women may have a greater commitment to family obligations overall compared with men. Moreover, the fact that women in general live more often with their families in their host countries may explain why they send less money back home, as they experience more immediate family obligations. Regardless of the sending country, approximately two thirds of recipients are women, with flows representing at least 70% of all household earnings.⁸

⁷ Surveys were conducted in eight Latin American and Caribbean countries including 250 remittance recipients in each country (except in Cuba where only 100 were interviewed) in 2003–2004. Data from Manuel Orozco's 2003–2004 survey of remittance recipients in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Guyana. The survey was administered by Borge y Asociados (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Invamer, S.A. (Colombia), PulsoEcuador (Ecuador), Katryn Hansing (Cuba), Protectora Holdings (Dominican Republic) and Laparkan Ltd. (Guyana). A total of 2,100 respondents participated in the survey.

⁸ Orozco and Fedewa 2005; UN DESA Population Division 2006. See References for bibliographic details.

The effect of remittances on women is considerable as it has the potential to lift them out of a lower income position from that of men. The money received gives them the means to improve their incomes and better manage their households; this is particularly important as at least one quarter of recipients are homemakers, having neither the ability nor the inclination to emigrate. But receiving money also allows for the possibility of addressing structural constraints, such as gender inequality: a gender approach to development focuses on improving women's position in society. Leveraging remittances for the development of women involves improving their access to credit, supporting greater personal independence and strengthening their social capital.

Remittances and Asset-building

Migrants and their families' financial activities not only impact national economies and financial systems, but they also demonstrate an active capacity to build assets in relation to remittances through money management and formal financial tools. The earnings received by households from migrants abroad allow them to stay out of poverty and contribute significantly to building their assets because the effect of remittances is to increase disposable income. Moreover, in most countries, remittance recipient families exhibit a positive relationship between remittance reception and financial activities. The more transfers received, the higher the number of families with bank accounts, savings and other financial obligations. Moreover, when the supply of financial services meets the demand, the local economy is better able to absorb these flows.

Remittance-receiving communities thus have significant potential to leverage their income for asset-building. Typically, people build savings informally over time as a result of substantial increases in their disposable income from remittance transfers. This is primarily the case with remittance transfers from developed to developing countries; however, the trend has also been observed with South–South transfers, particularly in countries that have more established banking systems. The sums received from remittances increase income above national average incomes and also affect the size of informal savings among remittance recipients. Thus, their savings are larger relative to those not receiving remittances. The propensity for informal savings and the amount of savings among remittance recipients make formalizing their demand for financial services an important strategy for development practitioners and financial institutions alike.

As Table 5.2 shows, between 32 and 81% of remittance recipients save (an average of 51%), mainly through informal, liquid assets. In general, as the amount of remittances increases, so does the amount of savings.

At the household level, remittances contribute to asset-building, both liquid and fixed. This impact is seen in the differences in financial practices among people who receive remittances and those who do not. In general, remittance senders tend to think and consider investment options and remit for savings or investment in

Table 5.2 Characteristics of remittance recipients: Remittance amounts and savings. (Source: Country surveys conducted by author, 2007–2012)

	Does not save			Save				
	Annual remittances (US\$)	Income (US\$)	Ratio	Annual remittances (US\$)	Income (US\$)	Ratio	Savings	Percentage of recipient's savings
Georgia	4,279	12,105	0.35349	4,004	11,472	0.349024	1,800	47.0
Azerbaijan	5,182	18,525	0.27973	6,355	15,793	0.402393	120	81.4
Paraguay	1,321	3,424	0.385806	1,642	4,587	0.357968	200	73.1
Guatemala	3,558	4,790	0.742797	4,553	5,363	0.848965	693	66.0
Nicaragua	2,920	5,086	0.574125	3,782	7,264	0.52065	1,701	42.4
Tajikistan	2,137	3,780	0.565344	2,876	6,683	0.430346	1,375	31.9
Kyrgyzstan	1,864	6,414	0.290614	2,517	9,475	0.265646	2,028	37.60
<i>Total</i>	<i>2,807</i>	<i>6,355</i>	<i>0.441699</i>	<i>3,673</i>	<i>7,578</i>	<i>0.484693</i>	<i>1,074</i>	<i>51.80</i>

the household. As a result, recipients tend to have a higher ability to save, invest and open bank accounts. In most remittance-receiving countries, the percentage of people holding bank accounts is higher among remittance recipients than non-recipients. A similar pattern is found among those who save, where the percent among recipients is also higher. Table 5.3 presents empirical evidence from selected countries. While these trends hold true in general, receivers in some countries in Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Kenya and Somalia, have a lower propensity to save than non-receivers.

In Guatemala and Nicaragua, the percentage of people with bank accounts is higher among those receiving remittances. But, more importantly, it was found that for every additional dollar received, savings increase by at least 30% (Orozco 2008a). A large majority of remittance recipients in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have savings accounts (Orozco and Fedewa 2005). Likewise, a slightly lower but still significant percentage of Filipinos, Indonesians and Malaysians working in Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore have savings accounts in their countries of origin. Between 30 and 50% of recipients surveyed in a 2005 study—except in the case of Malaysian recipients—indicated that some of their remittance money is allocated to savings in their countries of origin. Overall, recipients appear more inclined than senders to choose some form of savings mechanism for remittance funds. Moreover, when remittance recipients were asked about their main financial activities, a large majority of Filipinos and Malaysians, and almost a quarter of Indonesians, listed having a savings account at a local bank.⁹

Using household survey data exploring the relationship between finances and remittances for three CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova), the author found that remittances are positively and statistically associated with the ownership of a bank account and already existing asset ownership (Orozco 2007f). In Georgia,

⁹ Surveys were conducted by author in 2005; 1,509 remittance senders and 650 recipients were surveyed.

Table 5.3 Savings and bank account ownership of remittance recipients and non-recipients. (Source: Country surveys conducted by author, 2007–2010)

	Non-recipient	Recipient		Amount saved (US\$)
	Own an account (%)	Own an account (%)	With savings (%)	
Uganda	58	77	78	582
Burkina Faso	71	73	73	243
Honduras	33	57	59	1,880
Senegal	49	55	32	406
Paraguay	62	47	23	344
Guatemala	–	31	22	1,460
Nicaragua	21	26	37	500
Moldova	12	19	30	2,135

Table 5.4 Asset-building practices among Latin American migrants in the United States (Percentage of remittance senders and recipients living in the United States who...). (Source: Orozco et al. 2005)

	Sender	Recipient
Have a bank account	27	50
Mortgage loan	10	10
Have a small business	3	17
Have a small business loan	1	4
Have a student loan	1	3
Are paying insurance policies	2	6
Lend money to family to invest	2	2
Do not have financial obligations	n.a.	32

there is also a statistical relationship with interest in investing. That is, those owning accounts are more likely to express an interest in investing in some asset-building activity. Thus, to the extent that receiving remittances in larger amounts is associated with an interest in building assets, business and policy strategies are prime opportunities to leverage the flows. The challenge lies in finding a balance between the supply of and demand for financial services. When that balance is achieved, remittances have a positive effect on financial development. For example, in parts of Mexico with high concentrations of emigrants, microbanks play an important role in mobilizing savings of remittances (about 14% of clients receiving remittances in Microbanco Pahuatlán, in Puebla State). They create a sustainable financial basis that the microbank uses to finance the productive activities of its members. In turn, these activities generate income, jobs and some development leading to less migration and more capital in the community that the microbank can leverage for future lending (Orozco 2008b). This type of experience can occur when the economic infrastructure is not too deteriorated by depopulation and aging, and the productive base is relatively competitive.

Studies also show that some migrants may see a portion of remittance as an asset itself because the money is used to invest in their families' material circumstances to transform their lives (see, for instance, Pozo 2006). Table 5.4 shows the kind of

asset-building practices that were found among migrants living in the United States and their families from 12 Latin American countries.¹⁰

Remittance recipients in Central Asia, specifically in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, save almost double the amount of those who save among the general population. The reasons that justify the use of their savings are very similar among these groups, and similar to those in other remittance-receiving societies. Using savings for cases of emergency is the main reason most respondents gave, followed by home improvements and special events. Home improvements are a priority to most relatives of migrants and migrants who seek to repair their houses or make extensions to their homes. Ninety percent of these households own their homes; therefore, their interest is in making improvements or rebuilding their dwellings. This typical response is also a reflection of a lack of financial literacy and understanding of investment, whereby they focus on material, tangible and nearly instant return on their cash.

The characteristics of persons receiving money in some ways are similar to those who send money (at least between Latin America and the United States). Ownership of a banking or savings account is correlated with the amount of remittances received. For example, among Latin American recipients, those with a banking account receive 27% more than recipients without bank accounts. Those with a savings account receive about 11% more than those without an account. These findings suggest that account ownership is linked to better money management.

The most influential factors affecting the likelihood that a receiver runs a business, pays off a loan, or holds a savings account are gender, income, bank account ownership and purpose of remittance received. A 2005 survey of remittance recipients conducted in eight Latin American and Caribbean countries found that female recipients are substantially less likely than males to run a business. More importantly, having a bank account increases the likelihood of running a business by 1.3 times. Individuals who take or send nostalgic goods to the United States are 1.8 times more likely to run a business than those who do not. Nevertheless, the greatest likelihood of running a business occurs when a recipient reports that the sender's money has been budgeted for business expenditure: recipients who report getting money targeted towards business are seven times more likely to be running a business than those who do not report such targeted monies (Orozco et al. 2005).

It is important to acknowledge those perspectives that question whether higher levels of economic development, including asset-building and investment, actually reduce emigration from the global South. Research by de Haas (2007) suggests that economic and human development increase people's capabilities and aspirations, and thus tend to coincide with an increase rather than decrease in emigration. Nevertheless, this may only be the case in the short to medium term and under certain conditions (for example, if economic growth is accompanied by greater income inequality). More recently, de Haas (2012) has noted the demand-driven nature of migration, specifically, that there is a strong correlation between economic growth

¹⁰ Surveys were conducted among remittance senders from 12 countries in Latin America living in New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Washington, D.C. and Chicago between May 2003 and April 2004.

and immigration levels, particularly in the global North. In the long term, economic development generally leads to less migration as employment opportunities and living standards increase in the home country. However, the productive base of an economy's capacity to absorb remittances, as well as the realities of international labor market integration may induce the continuity of migration.

Financial Access and Development

Finance and access to financial resources are cornerstone components of material asset accumulation.¹¹ Together, they provide the means with which to strengthen or enhance a person's and/or society's material base, specifically by mobilizing existing assets in order to generate new resources and wealth, including education, health, real estate and business.¹² Financial access is a condition by which individuals are able to enjoy services without substantial restrictions. As Peachey and Roe (2006) show, greater financial access increases and strengthens the health of the financial system and the economy by making the system more competitive and capital more accessible for investment. An adequate stock of capital ensures the positive capital output ratio necessary to generate additional wealth. While a country's resources are critical for economic growth, they will only be effective if they are put to use, which means they must be available or accessible in the form of interest earnings or credit that can then be tapped for investment.

Worldwide, demand for financial services has yet to be met by the supply of these products by banking institutions. This mismatch between supply and demand is particularly prevalent in the global South, due to a combination of factors including misperceptions of behavioral spending among recipients and unwillingness to work with low-income or rural customers, lack of access to remittance-receiving locations in rural areas, business models geared towards high-income groups, and lack of financial literacy among remittance receivers and senders. For example, research has shown limited efforts to provide financial intermediation among remittance senders or recipients. Also, in most cases, financial services are more limited in rural than in urban areas (Orozco and Fedewa 2006).

When placing financial access in the context of gender, asset accumulation and the opportunity to build wealth can also have significant social implications related to the financial and social empowerment of women.

Nonetheless, recipients exhibit a demand for financial services, partly because of their ability to save and invest, thanks to these financial inflows. While this is an opportunity for building assets, the relatively low level of supply of financial services among banking and other depository institutions partly explains why people keep their savings informally (Orozco 2007h).

¹¹ Assets are defined as stocks of human and material resources that contribute to wealth creation. Assets are fixed (property) and liquid (cash).

¹² Research has shown that lower cash-to-deposit ratios and higher deposit-to-GDP ratios are linked to higher per-capita GDP levels (Peachey and Roe 2006).

Access to microfinance and banking institutions, particularly for migrants and remittance recipients in this context, is therefore critical for development. Savings and credit must go hand in hand in order first to stabilize the situations of vulnerable households and then provide them with opportunities for upward mobility. The World Savings Banks Institute recommends that approaches to improving access both strengthen non-bank alternatives for those without access as well as increase the role of savings banks in improving access for those who have been neglected by the formal banking system (Peachey and Roe 2006).

The Macroeconomics of Remittances

A few studies in the remittance literature have looked at remittances as one macroeconomic determinant. These studies have argued that remittances as a source of national income have a positive effect on economic growth, and generally analyze remittances as a factor influencing national income.

Economic Growth

One of the first studies on this relationship was conducted by Solimano (2003). He assessed the remittances in the Andean region and their effect on growth. Using remittances as an independent variable among other factors, such as exports and government expenditure, he found that they have a positive, statistically significant effect on GDP growth in Colombia and Ecuador.

A more recent World Bank report analyzing the effect of remittances on growth in Latin America and the Caribbean found that an increase in remittances from 0.7% of GDP in 1991 to 2.3% of GDP in 2001–2005 resulted in an increase of 0.27% in per-capita GDP growth per year (World Bank 2006). Looking at the intersection between production factors and macroeconomic indicators, they found that as remittances increase, exchange rates and interest rates appreciate. But at the level of the balance of payments, export growth may decrease while import growth increases with higher remittances flows, which may reverse the effects of remittances on exchange rate and interest rates (Loser et al. 2006). Overall, they also show the countercyclical nature of remittances, with remittances increasing during economic downturns. If the severity of an economic crisis is stronger in the migrant's place of work, the countercyclicality of the flows may not hold, as it will constrain immigrants' earnings and capacity to remit.

Remittances and Capital

Another strand in the literature analyzes the impact of remittances on specific production factors, rather than on the aggregate income equation. Specifically, economic analyses on the relationship between remittances and capital inflows are

conducted. The 2006 World Bank study on remittance flows to and within Latin America, for example, tested investment and aggregate volatility as other factors affected by remittances. Remittances were associated with increased rates of domestic investment and a reduction in growth volatility, both directly and by diminishing the impact of external and macroeconomic policy shocks on the economy. What is more, about one half of the impact of remittances on growth takes place through increased rates of domestic investment (World Bank 2006).

In a similar analysis, Buch and Kuckulenz (2004) show a positive correlation between remittances and official capital inflows, and between official capital inflows and private capital.¹³ This means that an increase in remittances supports an increase in official capital flows, making capital more accessible in the country. They also find that remittances, for the most part, behave differently than private and official capital flows over time and represent a more stable inflow of money.

Other analyses highlight the macroeconomic impact that remittances have through increases in deposits, with the caveat that such impacts are more pronounced in less developed financial systems. For example, using balance of payments data on remittance flows to 99 countries over a 28-year period, Aggarwal et al. (2006) found that remittances have a positive and significant impact on both bank deposits and bank credit to the private sector. Similarly, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz's (2005) study using a cross-country data series for 73 countries between 1975 and 2002 showed that, "by relaxing liquidity constraints, remittances have compensated for the lack (or the inefficiency) of the financial system and have helped to channel resources towards productive investments."¹⁴ Therefore, remittances function in lieu of other financial services, such as credit and insurance, to promote growth.

In more developed financial systems, growth from remittances is less important. In fact, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) show that in countries with well-developed financial sectors, the impact of remittances eventually turns negative. In these environments, demand for financial investments is met through other means such as credit and insurance, and remittances are therefore used on activities that do not foster growth.

Remittances and Foreign Exchange

Another strand in the literature on the macroeconomic impact of remittances deals with the relationship between remittances and foreign exchange. One of the original studies on this issue was by El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) who looked at the case

¹³ The authors employ a model that incorporates remittances into the macroeconomic flows of a country. Their equations integrate remittances into income as well as adding savings from remittances and subtracting remittance-related imports. In terms of expenditure, remittance-related consumption is included. The authors run cross-section regressions that use macroeconomic factors as explanatory variables; dependent variables are workers' remittances and private capital flows, both in logs and relative to GDP. Specifically, they resort to panel data to run regressions using remittances over GDP and remittances per capita as dependent variables.

¹⁴ They employ a system generalized method of moments approach that takes controls for the endogeneity of remittances and financial development.

of Egypt and the effect of remittances on parallel exchange rates. More recently, studies have analyzed the relationship between these flows and foreign exchange rates within the context of what is known as Dutch disease, defined as currency appreciation resulting from increased inflows, which makes the manufacturing sector less competitive and can even result in job losses.

According to the World Bank's (2006) study in Latin America, workers' remittances can be viewed as a capital inflow that can produce Dutch disease. Remittances have a positive impact on the incomes of receiving households and therefore tend to positively impact consumption. As a result, remittances may drive up the price of non-tradable goods relative to that of tradables, leading to exchange rate appreciation. In turn, there are some additional macroeconomic effects that can result from a real exchange rate appreciation associated with remittance flows:

- Possible negative impact on the tradable sector of the economy, including the loss of international competitiveness, especially if remittances also fuel inflation, or if the higher prices result in economywide increases in wages;
- Widening of current account deficits, resulting from an increase in demand for imports added to the loss of international competitiveness of domestic firms;
- Weaker monetary control, inflation and sectorial allocation of investment, particularly in real estate;
- Upward pressure on wages may result in job losses in the tradable sector, while in the non-tradable sector the increased cost of labor is passed on to consumers through increased prices.

The Transnational Context

The linkages that develop through networks of social capital and labor relations among migrants include a web of transnational economic relations beyond remittances, such as the demand for goods and services. The so-called "5Ts" of integration into the global economy through migration include transportation, telecommunications, tourism, trade, and transfers of capital (investment) and money (remittances). The impact of the 5Ts is significant in economic terms as they reflect a purchasing power in millions of dollars. Table 5.5 shows the level of engagement among countries in Latin America and Asia.

Whether staying for a couple of weeks or a couple of months, migrants engage in entertainment and tourism activities when they travel to their home countries. Figures of total tourism by nationals living abroad and the economic contributions in some countries are just as significant as those of remittances, providing opportunities for the tourism industry to market to this population. Visiting the home country entails more than staying with relatives. Migrants who return home to visit are also tourists who spend considerable amounts of money on entertainment with their families. These visits often take place on holidays such as Christmas, New Year, and Easter. Other migrants take special trips home for weddings, birthdays, deaths or emergencies. Immigrants typically spend at least US\$ 1,000 per stay (Oro-

Table 5.5 Transnational engagement with regard to 5Ts (%). (Source: Orozco 2008c)

	Remits money home	Travels once or more times a year	Calls once or more per week	Belongs to hometown association	Buys home country goods
Bolivia	74.0	19	54	6.0	86.0
Colombia	66.0	7	28	15.0	92.0
Dominican Republic	78.0	63	38	20.0	97.0
El Salvador	76.0	14	68	4.0	88.0
Ethiopia	68.8	14	46	39.0	78.0
Ghana	68.0	32	68	23.0	91.0
India	60.0	18	44	13.0	85.0
Mexico	83.5	5	50	15.5	99.0
Nigeria	55.0	47	55	22.0	93.0
Paraguay	66.0	10	58	38.0	92.0
Philippines	71.0	40	58	2.0	71.0
Honduras	91.0	25	85	8.0	90.0
<i>Average</i>	<i>73.9</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>17.0</i>	<i>89.3</i>

zco 2005a, c). Guyanese migrants visiting their home country spend on average US\$ 1,000 per stay, and with 25,000 visiting home each year, this adds up to at least US\$ 25 million left in the country. These contributions to the economy add to the importance of remittances, which are estimated at more than US\$ 100 million (Orozco 2004).

The telecommunications sector is another good illustration of the impact migrants have on the global economy. The frequency of home-country calls has increased tremendously with the growth in the telecommunications market, which has increased access and lowered mobile phone prices and call rates. Indeed, the growing number of telecommunications providers and the emergence of prepaid telephone cards have increased competition and greatly reduced tariffs. Aside from personal home visits, migrants maintain contact with their relatives through regular phone calls. Family members staying behind in developing countries have an increasing access to mobile phones. Since tariffs from the host country to the migrant's country of origin are often cheaper than the other way around, family members frequently send a text message to the migrant requesting a call back.

Nostalgia trade represents an illustration of how identity and material circumstances meet. A study by Orozco (2008c) on nostalgia goods in the United States showed that the demand and acquisition for nostalgia goods functions as a manifestation and expression of three realities that shape immigrant life: community, identity, and transnationalism, with very direct implications for economic development in both the United States and the homeland. First, these goods are instruments or components of global villages where migrants are living and forming communities of minority and/or ethnic neighborhoods, many of which include nearby convenience stores and commerce servicing migrant labor. Second, nostalgia goods are a material representation of cultural and national identity that affirms two fundamental realities: a national attachment and belonging, often manifesting in a diasporized definition of self, and a permanent reminder of forming the other-as-migrant in the

host society. Third, in the most material and practical sense, these goods are another component of transnational economic links formed by migrants that help integrate countries into the global economy. The large majority of migrants (90%) consume a variety of commodities, many of which are food products purchased near their communities. The significance of this consumption is not negligible. The annual expense of nearly US\$ 1,000 by 90% of migrants purchasing home-country goods is in billions of dollars.

Problems and Solutions to Enhance the Development Impact of Remittances

Transfer of remittances by migrants can cause different problems associated with the presence of informal transfers, the cost of remitting, the lack of access to financial institutions, incomplete knowledge about the total volumes received in some countries, lack of enabling environments that can further capitalize on these flows, and the adverse effects these flows can have on local currencies. Irregular migrants may further avoid formal challenges due to fear of legal action or deportation. Solutions to some of these problems are varied and depend on the conditions in each sending and receiving area.

Here, some initiatives are identified where innovative policies can be critically important to promote leveraging of remittances through funds and migrant capital management. The initiatives are not exhaustive but reflect the current public policy debate over these issues.

a. Reducing Informality, Improving Competition and Reducing Costs

First, policy must address the money transfer market by reducing informality, improving competition and reducing costs, as well as offering incentives to improve money transfer technology. Most migrant associations stress that cost reduction needs to be addressed and their solutions vary from sanctions or profit reinvestment schemes to enhanced competition to disclosure and information monitoring.

The existence of informal networks is often a result of the absence of a significant number of competitors that can pay transfers in the most remote areas. Because most developing country governments stipulate that only banks are allowed to pay remittances, many rural areas are neglected and in turn serviced by small informal entrepreneurs. This legal constraint restricts consumer access to other financial institutions that could offer that service. Reviewing legislation that allows non-banking financial institutions such as MFIs to pay remittances will help reduce informality and increase competition.

Cost reduction in recent years has stemmed largely from increased competition among money transfer operators (MTOs). In Latin America and the Caribbean, costs have dropped substantially, as well as in other areas of the world such as the Russian Federation to Central Asia and South Caucasus, and Europe to South-East Asia and West Africa. A major challenge to competition in many parts of the world

is MTC exclusive agreements. Exclusive agreements are legal contracts between MTCs and agents (in both origination and distribution), which restrict agents from negotiating or contracting with other MTCs for at least a 5-year period. The end result is that many MTOs are excluded from fairly competing; thus, informality often ensues. In Nigeria, for example, there are fewer than five major MTCs operating in the country, partly because only banks are allowed to operate. These banks then seek to secure an appropriate volume with a major MTC. In turn, the major MTC expects exclusivity, closing down any opportunity for other companies to enter the market. As a result, three quarters of payers are operating with only two MTOs.

More needs to be done in terms of reducing costs. In some cases, cheaper costs have come at the expense of the payment institution, which often receives 20% of the revenue per transaction. In rural areas where infrastructure is deficient and security is critical, paying institutions face higher costs than the revenues obtained; therefore, mitigation strategies are necessary to palliate the challenges in rural communities.

Further efforts to decrease costs involve greater transparency, improving the environment for MTC competition (including monitoring businesses on full pricing and service level) disclosure, supporting small money transfer businesses to participate in the market, and introducing alternative means to transfer money such as prepaid cards or mobile phone technology. An example of this is M-Pesa, a system that was initially created in Kenya as a way to make microfinance loan repayments. It has since been adapted to serve a variety of purposes, including as a way to transfer remittances. Recent regulatory complications in the remittance-originating countries have caused banks to grow wary of doing business with MTCs, and subsequently many banks have ended their banking relationships with MTCs. This obstacle has created a difficult operating environment for MTOs, the majority of which are minority-owned businesses.

Moreover, new technologies can allow for cheaper account-to-account transactions, but all players in the market must learn how to best use these technologies. In terms of recipients, this requires increased financial education in addition to adjustments in the way money is collected. Now nearly 30% of remittance recipients use debit or credit cards; this number is as high as 50% in some countries (Orozco 2007e).¹⁵ Policy incentives to reduce costs and improve competition and technology include reducing identification impediments on migrants, and offering

¹⁵ An important example of this is the experience of the Jamaica National Building Society (JNBS). Through its subsidiary, JN Money Services Ltd., JNBS serves Jamaicans living in the diaspora by facilitating remittance services in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. In partnership and cooperation with USAID, JNBS chose to automate the process of sending and receiving money transfers through swipe card technology. As a result, it now has over 70,000 cards users. Fifty percent of remittance recipients have been brought into the formal banking system, with 40% of those receiving their remittances through a card product which is then used to make purchases at small businesses that accept debit cards. On a related note, the majority of the bank's small business clients also benefit from making remittance payouts through increased access to both credit- and remittance-receiving customers. Rates of saving have increased considerably, not only through direct deposits to savings accounts but also by reducing the amount of cash in circulation and through the increased use of electronic transactions.

tax breaks or other incentives to those banks and MTCs that import technological devices for money transfers, such as point-of-sale (POS) devices. Technology plays an important role in the effective and efficient delivery of remittances. POS devices are an opportunity to enhance the effects of remittance spending by allowing for electronic payments and reducing the use of cash in the street as well as increasing savings and positively influencing revenue streams for banks and MFIs. However, access to technology can be expensive for financial institutions or vendors.

The experience of the United States and other countries in allowing migrants, regardless of their legal status, to choose what method to use to remit (whether through an MTC or a bank) is telling. Wells Fargo's initiative to recognize the Mexican consular identification as a means to allow migrants to open bank accounts increased banking access for more than half a million Mexicans. The experience of Indonesians remitting from Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea is similar: immigrants can open bank accounts regardless of their legal status and enjoy lower costs and access to other financial products. This issue is particularly important because governments draw a line between business and migration policy. Remittance service providers are not immigration and tax police.

Finally, issues of disclosure can be addressed through the implementation of low-cost technology initiatives. Introducing a remittance clearinghouse and switchboard is a mechanism to inform consumers about the costs of remitting among different competitors. The clearinghouse would function as a telecommunications switchboard. Through one free phone call, the caller can identify any remittance transfer provider with service to a particular country and obtain information about the fees and the foreign exchange rates offered. The consumer can thus decide before going to one particular outlet which service provider is the most appropriate for his/her needs. Similar mechanisms are already in place; for example, the World Bank currently has a database of remittance prices worldwide that is updated every quarter and covers over 200 country corridors.

b. Accelerating Financial Intermediation Projects with Credit Unions and MFIs

Another area for innovation is accelerating financial access through projects with MFIs, credit unions and small banks. These alternative financial institutions have demonstrated a key role in banking the traditionally unbanked and in transforming remittance clients into clients of other financial services. Support to these financial institutions from governments and donor countries has been low despite MFI efforts to reach out to remittance recipients. The financial assistance that has been granted has typically targeted financial product design, marketing and technology. In Moldova, for example, the majority of flows go to families in rural areas where bank presence is more restricted, but savings and credit associations, which have deeper reach, are not allowed to offer remittance services or supported in their efforts to reach out to recipients and migrants. Increasing support for and participation of these small financial institutions is of crucial importance to increasing access to financial services and improving financial literacy and assets. Types of assistance include financial product design and marketing, IT development, market research and regulatory compliance. Another area of assistance is in supporting savings

banks, MFIs and credit unions to build networks that can allow for positive negotiations with remittance transfer companies. A successful example of cooperation is found in Paraguay, where the microfinance institution El Comercio benefited from technical assistance provided by the Inter-American Development Bank. As a result, it increased the number of transfers to more than 40,000 in less than 2 years.

Linking banks in the originating countries to MFIs in the destination countries is also a winning proposition. For example, Caxia Catalunya, a savings bank in Spain, established agreements with other banks which help people send money at the lowest cost from 1,500 cash points to any of the 1,000 partners' branches in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Romania and Senegal.

c. Engaging Banking Institutions to Provide Broad Financial Services

In addition to offering incentives to non-banking financial institutions to reach out to remittance clients, larger banks that offer remittance services should be target for engagement. Access to banking service remains low despite the very high percentage of payments made by banks, and the revenues from their services: remittance transfer earnings represent 20% or more of their total net income. There should be efforts to increase opportunities for reinvestment in the community. Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, banks make nearly 50% of all formal remittance payments, and in Central Asia, Africa, South Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and parts of South-East Asia, it is nearly 100% (only to compete with postal services or some credit unions). However, banks have not taken advantage of this position to offer remittance recipients access to other financial services. Because of banks' roles in distributing remittances in the region, it is particularly important that they move beyond simple remittance payments and offer financial literacy programs aimed at remittance recipients, financial product design or marketing, and modernization of payment systems.

An important example of providing financial services to recipients is in Mexico. The government agency Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros (BANSEFI) established a network—*Red de la Gente*—of some 1,200 banks, MFIs and credit unions to serve as distribution centers for remittances. In 2007, BANSEFI had increased its payments to 120,000 transfers and was opening accounts for about one quarter of its payment recipients. Members of the network now provide various services to their clients, ranging from bills payment to micro-insurance.

d. Supporting Initiatives to Improve Investment Opportunities at Home and Among the Diaspora

Policy initiatives should also focus on improving opportunities for small-scale investment to create new businesses, thus responding to the demand by migrants and their families. This means, for example, linking investment opportunities to transform subsistence agriculture undertaken by remittance recipients into commercial farming and encouraging an environment favorable for investment on the part of migrants. These enterprises also relate to remittances and migration when promot-

ing investment by migrants in terms of tourism and nostalgia trade. One third to a half of all migrants visit their countries once a year while 8% import home-country goods, which contribute to the growth of small businesses.

Governments could offer travel opportunities aimed directly at members of the diaspora, who tend to travel frequently to their countries of origin. Moreover, governments could also partner with migrants abroad to package these travel services. In terms of nostalgia trade, many businesses succeed by meeting the high demand for goods from the home country. Governments in the host and home countries, development agencies and the private sector could benefit by offering products or services from the country of origin in these businesses abroad. In reaching out to the diaspora, governments target a unique yet important source of funds.

e. Designing Products Linked to Education and Health Services

Education and health expenses are typical investments by remittance-receiving families. Nonetheless, in many developing countries, adequate education and health services are often not well publicized or unavailable. One way to provide these services is through partnerships between MFIs and health and education providers that offer financing. In education, this means education funds (e.g. savings and loans), tutorials, extracurricular activities and Internet lessons. These types of investment on the part of recipient families will lead to higher educational achievement and also continued investment on the part of the person sending money from abroad. Health products include life insurance, medical insurance for temporary and seasonal periods, emergency care, body repatriation and child care. Opportunities for health-care investment will improve standards of living and understanding of health-care standards. Migrants should also benefit from these health insurance schemes that can remediate labor-related injuries.

f. Providing Technical Assistance on Financial and Remittance Literacy

Many central banks in developing countries lack resources and capacity to provide basic financial literacy to their populations. Educating people about the role of finances is a critical step towards development and is also becoming important among remittance recipients. Financial and remittance literacy and training on skills acquisition can be offered in cooperation with central banks and financial institutions in order to reach out to the millions of remittance recipients. This technical assistance should consider information about the financial value of the transfers as a mechanism to build credit, assets and use of alternative payments through electronic instruments such as debit and credit cards.

g. Engaging Governments and the Private Sector as Environment Enablers

A general policy recommendation—perhaps one which should be a priority as it affects the majority of these other issues—is that governments need to understand their role as environment enablers. This means promoting policies that lead to increased access to the financial system and financial intermediation for remittance recipients. It is also a prerequisite that governments and the private sector continue their work to create appropriate conditions for positive investment climate in coun-

tries of origin. Any effort to promote investment will not succeed if the business climate is not investor-friendly.

Moreover, an outreach policy to the community residing abroad is key to any migrant-sending country's economic strategy. In most countries, there is currently no such policy in place.

A first step in this direction is the creation of a national commission on remittances and development composed of civil society organizations, migrant-based groups, MTCs, financial institutions, government officials and donors. Experience in these types of exercises has been successful in the United States–Latin American and Caribbean context.

Conclusion

The role of remittances in the lives of so many families living in the global South is clearly very important. The policy implications are also extremely relevant. Opportunities include investing in small or large financial institutions to private businesses or public services, or teaming up to provide financial education to remittance recipients. Overall, the policy effort must aim at modernizing the productive base of local economies whilst leveraging resources from migrant foreign savings. This means linking investment opportunities, savings creation, local and central government enabling environments, and increased risk propensity among local, national and transnational entrepreneurs.

This issue is particularly important because at times the discussion on the development impact of remittances is often obscured by inaccurate assumptions. For example, some argue that remittances need a “productive use” because consumption expenditure is detrimental to growth. Yet there is no metric by which to measure what proportion of personal income should be productive. Moreover, there is no evidence that remittance recipients have a higher propensity to consume. In fact, remittance recipients save and invest more and have more bank accounts than non-recipients.

The social and productive base of an economy defines the ways in which remittances will effectively function. The extent to which the structure of the economy absorbs those remittances is the major policy issue for development practitioners. Thus, policy evaluation should focus on the productive forces in an economy and their efficiency, modernization and diversification/concentration levels across economic sectors. Also important are how entrepreneurship operates, what technology tools exist or are missing, and the extent to which governments provide an enabling environment to motivate an interaction between investment and production.

If an economy is unable to produce in a competitive context, its labor force will be depressed and eventually a portion will migrate to take care of their families. But even once they are away and send money, the families may only be able to do so much with that money in so far as the local economy provides an effective supply to the demand for services and products. Consumers have a demand for a range of

commodities and services (economic and financial). If the productive base of the local economy cannot provide for that demand, imports of goods will ensue. None of this is a situation created by remittances, but rather by the structure of the local economy, which is also connected to the global context.

The development challenge for practitioners consists of creating an enabling environment by which remittances can have a transformative role in a local economy. Practitioners must identify and implement policies that enable a leveraging effect of remittances to positively impact their absorption in the local economy and thus promote development, without telling migrants and their families what to do with their money.

Appendix

Table 5.6 Policy and research questions for the analysis of worker remittances

Policy issue	Policy problem	Policy question	Research question
<i>Marketplace for money transfers</i>			
Improving competition; reducing costs and informality	Cost of remitting and informality	How can players maximize their competitive advantages and reduce informality? What instruments exist to motivate cost reduction?	What is the relationship between MTCs, payers, informal networks, regulatory environment and affordable remittance transfers? Is remittance literacy an effective tool to mitigate costs? What indicators are appropriate to measure its impact?
Giving tax breaks or incentives to import devices for money transfers	High taxes on IT	Can tax incentives motivate competition and modernize payments?	What are the cost-benefit ratios in adopting new technologies?
<i>Asset-building</i>			
Using alternative payment instruments, such as debit cards or mobile banking	Outdated IT	What is the tradeoff between current and new payment instruments?	Can a development impact be measured from introducing mobile banking and card-based transfers?
Accelerating financial access through credit unions and MFIs	Poor participation	What can alternative financial institutions do to improve their intermediation goals and strategies?	What is the current performance of MFIs in remittance transfers? What challenges do they face? What salient factors and criteria exist to look at best practices?

Table 5.6 (continued)

Policy issue	Policy problem	Policy question	Research question
Engaging banking institutions to provide broad financial services (e.g. payments, savings, credit, risk mitigation)	Low banking access	What incentives are needed to bring banks to serve recipients? Should there be standards and goals of “bancarization”?	What are the factors preventing banks from offering services? What measures of financial access are needed? What conditions are needed for financial institutions to capitalize from remittance transfers?
Supporting investment projects related to remittances or remitters	Low investment	Can the private sector leverage remittances to promote investment? How can MFIs design investment projects leveraged from remittance transfers or earnings?	Is there a correspondence between the productive base of the local economy and migration? Is there a correspondence with remittance expenditures? What stimuli factors can foster entrepreneurialism among remittance senders and recipients? What would be the effect of supporting real estate investment among transnational families?
Designing products that include education and health services	Low education and health	What resources do financial institutions need to introduce alternative services?	What would the market be for health and education services provided by financial institutions? What indicators would suggest effective performance of such health and education products?
<i>Government policies</i>			
Engaging governments to review their role as environment enablers	No clear vision, no outlook	How can governments adopt a policy agenda associated to remittances and its diaspora?	—
<i>Macroeconomic policies: if there is time we could tackle these specific questions</i>			
Macroeconomics of remittances	Uncertain knowledge	What are the long-term projections on remittances? What is the remittance impact on growth?	What is the ratio of return migration, and duration living abroad? What is the appropriate methodology to measure impact on growth? In what manner (and what evidence supports it) remittances constitute a mitigating factor of growth?

Table 5.6 (continued)

Policy issue	Policy problem	Policy question	Research question
Poverty reduction, income distribution and gender	Unspecified	What is the effect of remittances on poverty reduction and income distribution? Do gender differences matter?	Are there predictors of poverty reduction and income distribution associated to remittances? What are the long term prospects? Are there gender differences associated to the development impact of remittances?
Financial system and remittances	Unclear policy linkages	In what way remittances influence the financial sector and the local economy? What policy tools can be adopted to interact with these flows?	What is the impact of remittance flows on job creation, productivity, local currency appreciation, prices? How can the multiplying effects of remittances be measured across small and large economies? Are gross domestic savings positively influenced by remittance flows?
Measuring diaspora economic flows	Neglect	What are the various impacts of migrants' economic links with the homeland?	Are there other flows than remittances? How can they be measured and what impact do they exhibit? What methodologies, if any, should central banks adopt to measure migrants' economic links?

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Chapter 6

Environmental Change and (Im)Mobility in the South

Eberhard Weber

Introduction

Next to hunger, poverty, war and violations of human rights, the degradation, pollution and destruction of the natural environment have attracted the attention of social scientists and decision makers as possible reasons for forced migration. It is assumed that environmental change (including climate change) has become a major reason for people leaving involuntarily the places they live in (Biermann 2001; Lonergan 1998). The decline of environmental quality, along with the impacts of natural hazards, is putting people's lives and livelihoods at risk.

While most social scientists agree that migration and the quality of the environment can be related somehow, most other considerations that fall into this context are heavily disputed. There is little agreement on what exactly constitutes migration that is occurring as a result of changing environments. In particular, it often remains unclear if in these cases migration is the only driver or the decision to move is the result of (more) complex processes and deliberations (UK Government Office for Science Foresight Report 2011). Social scientists, politicians and policymakers even have difficulties to name the phenomenon. Discussions about the adequate terminology have continued for quite some time and have not been resolved even today. The same applies to the question if people who leave their homes because of environmental and climate change or natural hazards can claim a particular legal status in their destinations.

In conventional usage, the term "environmental refugee" was coined in a report of UNDP in 1985 as "those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption [...] that jeopardize their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life" (El-Hinnawi 1985, S. 4). Other sources remark that the terminology had come up earlier and assign it to Lester Brown (Morrissey 2012).

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Despite the obvious fact that changes in the quality of the environment can play a role when people leave their home, the terminology “environmental refugee” is rejected by many authors. It is argued that legal frameworks about refugees do not accept environmental reasons to be granted the status of a refugee and the protection that comes along with it.¹

Migration and Environmental Change: Major Viewpoints and Arguments

Migration as a result of environmental change is as difficult to define as environmentally induced population displacements (Lohrmann 1996) or environmentally displaced people. Voluntary migration, an allegedly free decision to leave the place where one grew up or currently resides in, is always a complex process as is displacement, a form of mobility that is involuntary, at least at first sight. Both forms of migration however have elements of the other: how *free* or how *involuntary* a decision to migrate is (see Ellis 2003).

Push and pull factor models have a long tradition in migration studies. Social scientists usually analyze economic, ecological or social qualities of places (Dorigo and Tobler 1983; Lee 1966; Ravenstein 1885, 1889). The direction of migration is assumed from locations with lower quality to such with higher quality. “Push” refers to relative deficits of a place, its limitations (in job opportunities, in good wages, in health and educational facilities, and so on). “Pull” looks at the positive properties of the destination, its (relative) attractions. From such a perspective, it is not far to understand people as reactive, just responding to the positive and negative properties of space. This comes very close to what had become known as “environmental determinisms” at the beginning of the twentieth century (Peet 1985).

These models give few explanations why people living in the same area migrate while others do not. To explain such differences, we need to understand migrants (and non-migrants) as actors, who interpret space; people who act and while doing so make use of opportunities and are restricted by constraints. We need to understand how the decision to migrate is often embedded into wider purposes and objectives.

Fundamental to all the objections to the terms “environmental refugee” or “environmental migrant” is the idea that nature is being blamed for complex human events, such as violent conflicts, migration or famine, constituting a form of environmental determinism. Indeed, blaming nature does allow governments and development agencies an easy way out if they can explain such disasters as hunger and conflict in terms of overpopulation and environmental change (Oliver-Smith 2009, P. 29; see also Hartmann 2010; Judkins et al. 2008).

¹ On the terminology and underlying paradigms and constructs, see Morrissey (2012); Saunders (2010), who in Fig. 10.1 provides an overview of key documents and in Fig. 10.5 the major issues/constructs.

Actor-oriented approaches (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007; Long 2001) look less at the properties of space but at people and their actions (e.g. to migrate) and the underlying enabling and disabling factors (e.g. power relationships, opportunities and constraints, priorities and aspirations, capacities and capabilities). In such a context, mobility is an action to adapt to or cope with adverse situations, to secure livelihoods or strengthen resilience (de Haan 2000; McDowell and de Haan 1997).

The decision to migrate is a complex and diverse one (Gasper 2011). Although climate or environmental change might play a role, they are usually not the primary driver (UK Government Office for Science Foresight Report 2011; Raleigh and Jordan 2010). Migration is often based on free and involuntary aspects, on opportunities and constraints, on hope and desperation at the same time. Forced and voluntary, “economic” migration can be well interlinked, although de Haan (2000) remarks that both forms of migration are sufficiently different from each other. Bakewell (2010, S. 1690) adds an interesting thought, highlighting that “ascribing any agency to such people [refugees] may undermine their case for refugee status”.

The words “displacement” and “forced migration” describe a more passive process (one is/gets displaced by others or by an event). Reality, however, suggests that in most cases even displacement contains elements of action decided by the person or group that moves away, considering choices, being exposed to opportunities and constraints that influence decision and action. Without a doubt, displaced people are victims of (civil) war, ethnic cleansing, drought, floods and many other extremely adverse events that put enormous pressure on their lives, livelihoods and well-being. At the same time, they are actors, admittedly acting under very difficult circumstances. Even to flee is usually a complex action, the result of many factors (Wood 1994; see also Bates 2002; Truong and Gasper 2011); and being unable to flee often ends in destitution or death.

Human dimensions of environmental change and “natural” disasters (Mearns and Norton 2010; Steinberg 2000) are important issues, but it is sometimes difficult to clearly carve out the “natural” and the “human” causation and consequences in it. Human beings alter their environment with damaging effects. People also create social and economic conditions that make them less resilient, less able to adequately respond to all sorts of hazards, pressures and stresses. The question about responsibility and correct ethical action makes a big difference, when we are talking about natural events or human-made ones. In addition, those who cause such changes are not necessarily those who suffer most from them (Mearns and Norton 2010).

The Challenges: Potential Environmental Reasons for Migration

The concept of environmental refugee is rather imprecise and contested. The numbers of people leaving their homelands because of deteriorating environmental conditions is unknown (see Gemenne 2011) and their legal status unclear. There is little doubt that the degradation of the natural environment can lead to huge pressures

for individuals or whole communities. This even can result in people leaving their homes temporally or for good. However, environmental change is a rather broad category to deal with, that refers to many rather dissimilar processes and conditions. The challenge starts when reflecting on environmental change as a potential cause for migration.

UNHCR (1993) identifies four major root causes for people involuntarily leaving their homes as political, economic and environmental root causes as well as ethnic tensions. Black et al. (2011) settle for five drivers of migration: economic, political, demographic, social and environmental, including natural hazards. Concentrating on environmental backgrounds, Biermann (2001) highlights four reasons that link forced migration and environmental change: deposition, degradation, disaster and destabilization. Common to these views is that mobility is identified as a complex process where root causes are closely connected to each other. Environmental backgrounds in combination with other causes can induce mobility. Equally, “it can be difficult to make a clear distinction between refugees and non-refugees” (UNHCR 1993, no page numbers) and between voluntary and involuntary forms of mobility.

The term “deposition” in this context means when maximum pollution thresholds are exceeded, so that in a particular area people can no longer lead a healthy life. “Degradation” refers to a decline in the quality of the environment. It is usually a slow, “gradual” process caused by erosion, the loss of fertile top soil or salinization of the soil. Deforestation and desertification are forms of degradation as are the decline in the quality of fishing grounds due to overfishing, eutrophication or climate change. Soil erosion, deforestation, desertification, overfishing and other forms of environmental degradation are often human-made, a result of the political ecology of resource use and appropriation of resources (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Blaikie 1981; Brookfield 1999).

There are various definitions of disaster (Perry 2007), yet the consensus is that a disaster is a social phenomenon. There is nothing like a “natural” disaster. There are natural hazards, and whenever they hit societies that are not resilient, at people that are vulnerable, whenever such natural events cause damage to people’s property, to infrastructure or cause the loss of people’s lives, then such natural events turn into disasters. Disasters as societal events have the potential to make people move.

Reflections on the interrelationship between migration and environmental change often take a neo-Malthusian perspective (Black and Sessay 1998; O’Lear 1997). For example, they discuss how migration negatively impacts the carrying capacity of destination countries or areas, or how people change the environment in source countries, triggering migration. Reoccurring themes are declining carrying capacities as a result of deforestation, resource scarcity, overpopulation, wrong agricultural production systems challenging people’s livelihoods. Myers (1989, 1993a), one of the most distinguished and probably most influential authors, takes a similar stand identifying regions where food production is not keeping pace with population growth and where hunger and land scarcity lead to migration. He also considers global warming as such a factor, a discourse that began in the late 1980s. He predicted some 150 million environmental refugees if global warming continues (Myers 1993b). In the publication *Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis*, Chris-

tian Aid (2007) predicts 1 billion refugees by 2050, of which 250 million people are “permanently displaced by climate change-related phenomena such as floods, droughts, famines and hurricanes” (Christian Aid 2007, P. 6). Studies that predict *floods* or *waves* of environmental refugees are often empirically very weak (Black 2001).

Many authors argue in such neo-Malthusian fashion (Hartmann 2010). Some add discourses about societal destabilization, political instability, civil wars and war as a result of environmental change, and struggle over nature, meaning the appropriation of natural resources by warlords as a result of failed states or markets (Buhaug et al. 2010; Collier 2000; Homer-Dixon 1999). To an increasing extent also, climate change is seen as a factor that leads to the destabilization of societies, as source of violent conflict and insecurity (Breitmeier 2009).

Environmental Change, Livelihood Security and Migration

Migration and development are interrelated in several ways: the question of whether emigration leads to brain drain, harming the economies of countries or areas of origin; reflections about remittances and their benefits for the macroeconomic situation of the fund-receiving countries or areas; the question of positive economic impacts of labor migration in destination countries or areas; and the importance migration has in livelihood strategies of (poor) people. Migrants do not always leave their home countries for good, and those who return often bring with them new skills and ideas, technology and capital thereby creating jobs in the local labor market. The question to be asked is whether migration poses a challenge to development, for both the areas of origin and destination. De Haan (2000) stresses the role of migration in the livelihood systems and strategies of poor individuals and groups, arguing that an understanding of geographical differentiation (e.g. rural versus urban, national versus international) might disguise the real challenges and structures, as origin and destination can be seen as a single economic space “where people carry out livelihood activities” (de Haan 2000, P. 2). Linking villages and towns—both home and foreign—and creating hybrid communities either through circulation (being one day here and the other day there) or through transnational social units (such as households) require that old understandings of the aspect of the *spatial* in migration is newly reflected. Faist and Fauser (2011) provide a transnational perspective when discussing migrant networks and diasporas. They see migrants as new transnational actors whose functions and benefits are much bigger than often analyzed in economic models. Similar structures also exist within countries. Households increasingly constitute social units that operate across distances (see also Schiller et al. 1995).

Scoones (1998); Carney (1998); Ellis (2000) consider migration as a strategy rural people use to secure and strengthen their livelihoods. Their livelihoods might be insecure because of underemployment, seasonal employment, low wages, high dependence on primary production and high vulnerability to disturbances of

ecosystems, among others. They might live in environmentally disadvantaged places such as marginal lands, wetlands and urban squatter communities. While their exposure to external events is high, their internal capacities to cope, adapt or recover from adverse impacts are low. They might be susceptible to a particular hazard, but in many cases they are equally weak to withstand natural hazards, economic crisis and political instability likewise. Climate change and its various impacts enhance vulnerability often beyond a dimension where people's ability to cope is compromised. In their attempt in coping to prevent short-term losses, often long-term vulnerabilities are created.

Generally, environmental factors are mixed with other factors that may induce people or even the whole communities to leave (McLeman and Smit 2006). Hugo (1996) underlines that migration is a complex event and that environmental aspects can usually not be isolated from other factors. Migration is also not necessarily an expression of failed adaptation to environmental change, but often it is the best way to adapt (Tacoli 2011). It helps people to improve their overall economic or social situation. It has the potential to enhance people's well-being and reduce insecurity and prevent spreading of risk. The complex social organization of people and their complex livelihood strategies make it necessary that some stay back while others move. Trans-spatial communities often minimize risk by spreading to different places on their search for safety and security (Elwert et al. 1983; Neubert 1986). Some leave and provide those who stay back with remittances (Tacoli 2009), embedded in systems of reciprocity and mutual support (Frayne 2004; Meert 2000), with the purpose of reducing or spreading risk.

Chambers (1989) provided a concept of vulnerability. He emphasized that vulnerability has two sides: the external side of risk, stress and pressure individuals and groups are exposed to; and the internal side, which consists of the capabilities and abilities of people and groups to cope with external pressures. Vulnerability is more than poverty: it relates to the potentiality of being negatively affected by external factors and the inability to respond adequately. Such external events potentially cover a wide range of natural, economic, social, cultural and political aspects. Analysing these helps us to better understand who is most vulnerable and why, and ideally also where they live. Migration is an important action that helps people to respond to external threats: to move away and to avoid exposure. It also raises questions about the nature of coping and adaptation, if and how actions can help to avoid damaging harm.

Borrowing from Chambers' (1989) idea of vulnerability, Watts and Bohle (1993a, b) reflect on the structural dimension of vulnerability, which lasts over a long time and is rather stable. Coping can protect people in the short run (Fig. 6.1), but coping is neither adaptation nor is it development. Coping means to prevent the worst from happening. Yet, coping often weakens people, increases their vulnerability and makes them more susceptible to future adverse events. Coping increases what Watts and Bohle call people's "baseline vulnerability" (1993b, P. 59).

To cope, people might sell assets or convert their properties (e.g. land, cattle and valuables) into money. This might "buy" time, but at the same time it creates impoverishment. People might try to escape from exposure to stress by moving elsewhere,




Fig. 6.1 Structural dimension of vulnerability. (Source: Watts and Bohle 1993a)

damaging the social fabric and societal cohesion in the process. Once this happens, societies are weakened, as are the individuals. When things later get back to normal, once the crisis is overcome, people are more vulnerable than before the outbreak of the crisis. They might return to their villages or remain in or at the rim of the cities they migrated to (Ibrahim 1991; Lohnert 1994, 1995).

After a crisis people often become weaker: they lost assets, became impoverished and sickly; social networks were destroyed through migration and they had to deal with death of family members. When the acute crisis is over, people and communities are weaker than before. In the future, it requires less to trigger the next crisis. Cases of this are plenty: for example, many societies in Africa were weakened by constant famines in the 1970s and 1980s, and have never fully recovered from this. Poor people in Haiti still struggle as a result of the 2010 earthquake. Here, public intervention is urgently required to relocate people after a disaster struck to safeguard that they are able to withstand future pressures.

Sen (1981); Chambers (1989); Watts and Bohle (1993a, b) concur that it is not a singular event that matters, or that can trigger unwanted results. A single event—a drought, a cyclone, coastal erosion or any other adverse event—usually does not trigger a food crisis. When many adverse events fall together or come quickly after one another, people’s vulnerabilities increase. It then needs just a trigger, an event which in itself might be of relatively minor nature, to reach a situation when people are no longer suitable to withstand external stress. This then is when a catastrophe strikes; this is when a natural hazard like a cyclone turns into a disaster.




Fig. 6.2 Sustainable livelihoods approach

In considering migration as a coping mechanism, Watts and Bohle (1993a, b) cite extreme events. However, from the perspective of a livelihood strategy, migration can also be seen as an action that strengthens security and economic and social well-being both in the areas of origin and destination of migrants. People in their search for safety and security select strategies that help to reduce risk. Here lies the boundary between forced and voluntary migration: fleeing from situations that have only death and destitution as alternatives on the one extreme and diversifying the sources of livelihoods in a very rational and often amazing degree of creativity and innovation with the intention to secure and increase well-being.

From Social Vulnerability to Livelihood Security

The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) is an important tool to conceptualize people's exposure to risks, stresses and pressure. The approach focuses on vulnerability contexts and assigns major importance to assets and capitals people have (or not have) that help in their effort to secure a livelihood. Figure 6.2 presents the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework which Oxfam developed in the early 1990s (Carney et al. 1999; Hussein 2002). Five capitals are seen as crucial: first, natural capital, which denotes access to land, marine and other natural resources and changes in access and quality of these resources; second, physical capital, which is an asset arising from access to infrastructure, communication and information; third, human capital, which means skills, formal qualifications and health; fourth, financial capital, as incomes of all sorts, savings and assets that can be converted into money whenever a need arises; and fifth, social capital, which denotes belonging to formal and informal networks that provide support and security to overcome

difficult situations. The five capitals complement each other, which means deficits in one category can be compensated by other categories. Mobility is crucial to generate or strengthen each of these five capitals. Nomadism or pastoralism, for example, provides access to natural capital through mobility. Rural residents might move to a city to improve educational standards (i.e. human capital). The ability to diversify sources of income is often closely related to the ability to move and gain access to labor markets.

In addition, it might be appropriate to add to the five livelihood capitals legal capital which enables people to enforce claims and seek protection (Weber 2012). Such legal capital can be human rights, refugees' rights or social security entitlements in contrast to voluntary social welfare measures.

What role does migration have in people's efforts to secure livelihoods? Migration is one of the most powerful actions that help to diversify livelihood sources by creating trans-spatial households that pool resources and support each other. Much importance has been given to social capital (Evergeti and Zontini 2006; Garip 2008; Lesage and Ha 2012). Social networks often facilitate migration and support migrants. It entails the extension of migrants' social networks and support structures beyond the narrow reach of their areas of rural origins, into urban areas and possibly as emigrants outside the country. Such supportive structures include established migration flows that increase as risks surrounding migration either diminish or are better managed.

Climate Change–Environmental Change–Migration Interlinkages

The recent discourse on environmentally induced migration is closely connected to climate change. Once scientists put forward the claim of climate change in the 1980s, the discussion was on whether such change scientifically can be proven, and if so, what exactly causes it and when it would start. At the time, the terminology "global warming" was common.

The next phase of the discourse focused on mitigation: What can be done to prevent climate change? Policies tried to achieve changes in the developed and newly developed countries. In the latter group of countries, industrial production had expanded substantially in recent decades and contributed significantly to increasing greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) became the major policy instrument of the mitigation paradigm. Its aim is to contain global emissions of greenhouse gases beyond a level that would dangerously interfere with the climate system.

Today, mainstream science acknowledges that it is too late to stop climate change. Mitigation, even if successful, would not be able to prevent serious changes for at least another generation—possibly even much longer, or never. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its latest major report, observes that climate change is not likely to become a reality for future generations, but that the

current generation is right in the middle of it (IPCC 2014). The way forward, therefore, is to find ways to adapt to these changes.

In 2007, the IPCC forecast that until the year 2100, the sea-level rise would be up to 59 cm. More recent reports suggest that sea levels rise much faster than predicted, threatening to wipe out “the living space of 600 million people who live in deltas, low-lying areas and small island states” (McCarthy 2009).

Along with changes in global average temperature and sea levels, a large number of impacts are forecast—such as erosion of coastal lands, increasing intensity (and possibly frequency) of climate-related hazards (e.g. tropical cyclones, droughts, heatwaves), severe impacts on biodiversity and agricultural production, and the degradation of coral reefs. IPCC (2007) also notes that developing countries are most exposed to these challenges, but least prepared and able to adequately respond to them (see also Locke 2009; Weir and Virani 2011). In particular, exposure to extreme events will increase the vulnerability of many developing countries and thus will require adaptation capacities that they do not have (IPCC 2012).

A central question is how societies can adjust to, adapt to or at least cope with the impacts of climate change. Human action—in a changing environment—ranges from adaptation at home, individual migration, resettlement to displacement. With adaptation becoming the central climate change paradigm, places and people that are most exposed to impacts of climate change shift to the center stage of action.

Migration linked to climate change is predicted by many. Often, the most drastic and dramatic events that could possibly happen to affected people are pictured. Hardly anybody asks if there are other options than to leave. Also, nobody raises the question if people might have other (good) reasons than climate change to leave their tiny atolls.

Emigration has been the reality of Pacific Island Countries for decades, if not centuries. Today it is mainly seen from the perspective of climate change. In *A Citizen's Guide to Climate Refugees*, Friends of the Earth Australia (2007, S. 8) states that “nearly 3,000 Tuvaluan ‘climate refugees’ have already left their homelands”. Indeed, more than 3,000 Tuvaluans are living away from Tuvalu, mainly in Australia and New Zealand, while around 11,000 have remained in Tuvalu (Table 6.6). However, it is incorrect to assume that these people have left their home country because of climate change. Most of them migrated when the term “climate change” did not even exist (Mortreux and Barnett 2009). A study on Tuvaluan voices on migration reveals that “climate change was not the main motivator for families considering migration [...], in fact, climate change was the least cited factor” (Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010, P. 693).

Some atolls with population densities of more than 10,000 people per km² are among the most densely populated places and the harshest environments on this planet (Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010). Their idyllic blue-greenish lagoons often have coli bacteria counts so high that people better do not go into the water.

Migration to thousands of kilometres away from these atolls due to climate change is constructed as a threat to the free, developed world. In many publications, it is warned that climate change and its impacts have the potential to trigger migration flows in dimensions unknown so far. Predictions of millions that possibly could

flood developed societies and put pressures on the ailing social support systems create fears among people and politicians likewise. Climate change-induced migration is perceived by many a security threat, destabilizing societies and being a potential source of conflict (Böge 2009; Breitmeier 2009; Buhaug et al. 2010).

The precise physical impacts of and changes brought about by climate change are still under debate. Even if they are happening, it is not clear how people, societies and the world community would behave in the decades before these physical changes took place. Assuming only one possible choice of action (i.e. fleeing the rising seas and becoming *environmental refugees*) is too simplistic and deterministic, and ignores societal and political creativity and capability to innovate.

Natural Hazards, Environmental Change and Migration in Pacific Island Countries

Small Island Developing States are among those that, according to the IPCC, are most exposed to various impacts of climate change, as they have characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, sea-level rise and extreme events (IPCC 2007, 2012). Their high vulnerability is intensified by low adaptation capacities and capabilities (Table 6.1).

There are a number of natural hazards Pacific Island Countries and Territories are exposed to. As this region is situated in the center of the Pacific Ring of Fire, geological hazards like earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions play a significant role. With the discussion on climate change-related hazards, Pacific Island countries today are often seen especially exposed to hazards that are of meteorological background, such as flooding, tropical storms (e.g. cyclones and hurricanes) and drought (UNESCAP/UNISDR 2010). Sea-level rise is a slow-onset, low-intensity hazard that can make the whole atoll island states disappear within a couple of decades. Before this happens, it destroys freshwater lenses and scarce land resources on the islands.

Natural hazards and risks, environmental change, economic change, social change and climate change, and their impacts, are major threats to development achievements. Holland (2008, S. 1) highlights that, “it is a long accepted fact that the Pacific is one of the most natural disaster-prone regions on the world”. Disasters in the Pacific Islands are usually included in Asian disaster statistics. Compared with the subregions of Asia, the Pacific Islands have the lowest number of disaster events, the lowest number of victims and the lowest number of people affected. The number of people affected and properties damaged is also concentrated on Australia and New Zealand (Table 6.2).

However, there is another way of looking at disasters in small island states, including the Pacific Islands: disasters lead to very high economic and social shocks relative to the small physical size of countries, their populations and economies. The relative damages caused by individual events often are much higher than the damages brought about by the biggest disaster events in history.

Table 6.1 Pacific Island Countries and Territories. (Source: Population data is from SPC Population Data 2011, and Time Series from 1900; island size and island type are from *Pacific Islands Yearbook* 1989)

Country	Subregion	Population (2011)	Population (around 1960)	Increase since 1960s (%)	Land Area (km ²)	Population density (per/km ²)	Atolls/ Corals/ Islands	Raised islands	Volcanic islands	Total
Cook Islands	Polynesia	15,576	18,378 ^e	(15)	237	66	7	0	8	15
Niue	Polynesia	1,446	4,864 ^e	(70)	260	6	0	1	0	1
Samoa	Polynesia	183,617	114,427 ^e	60	2,930	62	0	0	2+8 islets	2
Tonga	Polynesia	103,682	56,383 ^a	84	650	159	a few	>100	a few	~170
Tuvalu	Polynesia	11,206	5,444 ^g	106	26	429	9	0	0	9
Federated states of Micronesia	Micronesia	102,360	39,284 ^b	161	702	159	~600	0	>10	607
Kiribati	Micronesia	102,697	43,336 ^g	115	810	124	32	1	0	33
Marshall Islands	Micronesia	54,999	13,928 ^b	295	181	301	34	0	0	34
Nauru	Micronesia	10,185	4,613 ^e	121	21	475	0	1	0	1
Palau	Micronesia	20,643	9,344 ^b	121	487	42	<300	>10	>5	340
Fiji Islands	Melanesia	851,745	345,737 ^a	146	18,300	46	2	a few	<100	~320
Papua New Guinea	Melanesia	6,888,297	2,184,986 ^b	215	462,000	15	a few	a few	>600	>600
Solomon Islands	Melanesia	553,254	124,076 ^c	346	28,000	20	a few	0	>900	>990
Vanuatu	Melanesia	251,784	78,088 ⁱ	222	12,190	20	0	0	82	82
<i>Territory</i>										
American Samoa	Polynesia	66,692	20,051 ^d	233	199	331	2	0	5	7
French Polynesia	Polynesia	271,831	84,551 ^f	221	3,660	73	~80	a few	~40	130
Tokelau	Polynesia	1,162	1,870 ^e	(38)	12	97	3	0	0	3
Wallis & Futuna	Polynesia	13,193	8,546 ^j	54	143	93	0	0	2	2
Guam	Micronesia	192,090	67,044 ^d	187	549	341	0	0	1	1
North Mariana Islands	Micronesia	63,517	8,290 ^b	666	457	138	0	0	15	15
New Caledonia	Melanesia	252,331	86,519 ^b	192	18,600	14	0	0	7	7

^a1956; ^b1958; ^c1959; ^d1960; ^e1961; ^f1962; ^g1963; ^h1966; ⁱ1967; ^j1969

Table 6.2 Disaster events in Asia-Pacific and impacts by subregion, 1980–2009. (Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, *The Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2010*)

	Events	Deaths	People affected (‘000)	Damages (USDM)
East and North-East Asia	908	162,804	2,567,214	578,602
North and Central Asia	297	34,644	17,231	15,636
South and South-West Asia	1,283	566,423	1,914,696	141,506
South-East Asia	1,069	394,687	272,777	48,220
Pacific (Oceania)	406	5,425	19,126	39,078
Australia and New Zealand	197	978	16,832	36,252
Pacific Islands	209	4,447	2,294	2,826

Damage and loss reported in USD millions at 2005 constant prices

Here it becomes very obvious that disasters can have consequences for countries that might threaten their very existence. The tiny island-nation Niue had transformed from a food-exporting country into a food-dependent country for more than 2 years after a cyclone in 1990. Another cyclone that hit the country in 2004 had an even bigger impact on its agriculture (Wade 2005). In Samoa, a cyclone in 1991 caused damages equivalent to 230 % of the country’s real 2004 GDP (World Bank 2006). Between 1950 and 2004, more than 10 % of Fiji’s population had been affected on average in a disaster year. The average damage was close to 8 % of Fiji’s GDP. Figures for Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu are even higher, where on average more than 40 % of the population were affected in a disaster year and damages took major shares of the respective countries’ GDP (Table 6.3).

Since 1980, disasters in the Pacific Islands have directly affected about 2.3 million people and led to about 4,500 deaths, which seems to be modest compared with the billions of people affected and the hundreds of thousands killed in such events in Asia (Table 6.2). One needs to consider the small population size of Pacific Island countries to get a better understanding of how a disaster can restrain the society and economy of a Pacific Island country for a long time. A tsunami in September 2009 killed 143 people in Samoa. This was a bigger share of the country’s population than in the case of most countries that had been affected by the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean (Table 6.4).

The most expensive disaster in human history had been the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan with an estimated damage of USD 210 billion (CRED/EM-DAT 2013). This was about 3.5 % of Japan’s GDP in 2011. Hurricane Katrina, which struck the southern states of the United States in 2005, caused damages in the dimension of USD 125 billion (CRED/EM-DAT 2013), which was around 1 % of the United States’ GDP in 2005. Hurricane Katrina affected some 500,000 people, or less than 0.2 % of the population of the United States.

Table 6.3 Estimated economic and social impact of disasters in selected Pacific Island countries, 1950–2004. (Source: EM-DAT, World Bank 2006)

Country	Number of disasters reported	Total reported losses in 2004 (USDM)	Average population affected (%)		Average impact on GDP (%)	
			In disaster years	In all years	In disaster years	In all years
Fiji	38	1,175	10.8	5.1	7.7	2.7
Samoa	123	743	42.2	6.1	45.6	6.6
Vanuatu	37	384	15.5	4.5	30	4.4
Tonga	16	171	42	5.3	14.2	1.8

GDP and population estimates from World Development Indicators; all economic data converted to 2004 values

Table 6.4 Casualties of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in comparison with the 2009 Samoa tsunami. (Source: EM-DAT, OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database 2013)

Country	People killed	Population	Ratio (People killed/'000)
India	16,389	1,140,000,000	0.014
Indonesia	165,708	227,300,000	0.729
Sri Lanka	35,399	19,800,000	1.788
Thailand	8,345	66,600,000	0.125
Samoa	143	183,000	0.781

Population data is from United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) database

In the Pacific Islands, villages or even the whole islands have been relocated, for instance, after tsunamis, as a result of drought or as a result of human degradation of the environment. Some of these relocations were conducted by colonial authorities.² There are also instances of community-driven relocation supported by colonial or state authorities.³ Finally, there are cases of relocation of villages which were disapproved by respective governments and where efforts of the respective governments were to relocate people back to their original places.⁴

² For instance, relocation of the people of Banaba Island in Kiribati to Rabi Island in Fiji in 1945, relocation of people from various atolls of the Marshall Islands by the United States in preparation of nuclear testing starting in the late 1940s, and relocation of Gilbertese people to the Phoenix Islands in the 1940s and then the relocation of the same people to various parts of the Solomon Islands in the 1950s by the British.

³ For example, relocation of people from Vaitupu Atoll, Tuvalu, to Kioa in Fiji starting in 1947, relocation of Samoan villages after the tsunami of September 2009, and relocation of villages in Kadavu, Fiji Islands, after a tsunami in the 1950s.

⁴ An example is relocation of a few villages on Ghizo Island, Solomon Islands, after a tsunami in April 2007.

Coping, Adapting and Recovering: Community Resilience and Migration

The impacts of climate and environmental change are first felt locally. People's actions are supported or constrained by factors external to their spheres of lives and decision-making. The conditions they are exposed to, the threats to their livelihoods and the shocks they experience when natural hazards turn into disasters are crucial for their willingness to move (or stay) (see IPCC 2012, pp. 291–338).

Aspects of risk management and risk reduction on community levels should be given highest priority when preparing societies for a more insecure future. Migration is one of many choices people have to adapt to these challenges. People have developed skills, knowledge and management systems that are important to master risks arising from the environment. In their economic activities, subsistence farmers, for example, give highest priority to reducing risk by diversifying production. Furthermore, networks that provide mutual assistance and support can help to mitigate adverse outcomes arising from environmental shocks, threats and risks (Yila and Weber 2013; Yila et al. 2013). Adaptation strategies can include actions that bring people away from the places they reside as well as technological innovations, traditional knowledge and practices of people, strengthening social capital and measures to enhance livelihood security without moving. Even if some Pacific Island countries in a few decades from now would need to be deserted by their inhabitants, strengthening local resilience and cohesion is crucial.

Societies in the Pacific Islands have undergone rapid changes in the past two centuries. Individualization, commercialization and urbanization have weakened coping mechanisms that were based on community solidarity, subsistence production and exchange in small rural communities. People were living in large family networks, and obligations that arose were not so much individual decisions as ritualistic, enforced network outcomes. However, already then as well as today people were agents of their destinies. People are neither victims of natural hazards nor victims of social structures. Social structure is both the medium and the outcome of social action, of group action. Pacific Islanders seem to be better equipped to take up challenges of the future as organized groups rather than individually.

Agrawal and Perrin (2008) highlight that poor and marginal groups have a wealth of experiences in coping with and adapting to changing environments. Adaptation to the impacts of climate change best builds upon such experiences. To achieve this, local institutions need to be strengthened. They structure the distribution of climate risks, organize effective community-level structures and initiatives, and mediate external interventions into local contexts. Impacts of climate change create major stresses for rural livelihoods; they reduce livelihood options, increase volatility and make streams of livelihood benefits predictable.

The most comprehensive attempt to bring such knowledge together in a systematic and conceptual way is Campbell's 2006 report on traditional disaster reduction in Pacific Island communities. The report is an excellent review of existing materials, bringing together a big number of relevant publications. More than that, it also

provides a structure for what to look at when investigating traditional ways to cope with and adapt to adverse events, such as natural hazards. What Campbell (2006, P. 15) calls “agricultural resilience” means increases in crop and location diversity to minimize or spread risk. This is a principle many subsistence economies and even small commercial agricultural systems know. Here livelihood security is more important than profit maximization (Jones 1983).

Mutual help had been a strong feature. Belonging to social as well as spatial networks was constantly reinforced through rituals that strengthened reciprocal relationships. Thaman (1982a, b; Thaman et al. 1979) stresses in this context the need to preserve the “time-tested, socially and environmentally suited Pacific Island food systems”. Societies were almost entirely self-sufficient and often described as being in a state of subsistence affluence (1982a, P. 109). Local communities are highly resilient to natural hazards. External intervention (such as in the form of inappropriate disaster relief) can weaken such resilience, leading to changes in nutritional preferences and undermining community solidarity (Thaman 1982b).

Traditional, pre- or semi-capitalist societies possess mechanisms that protect members of the community from shocks such as natural hazards, economic crisis or political instability. Scott (1976) refers to such mechanism as the moral economy of the poor, which are not only their weapons against exploitation but also effective means to provide mutual support, and enhance community-based resilience and adaptation based on reciprocity, trust and solidarity. In today’s development language we would call this important asset “social capital”.

Foreigners, Good Migrants and Bad Migrants: The Social Construction of the Migrant

Reflections in this chapter are about people’s mobility in Pacific Island countries before scenarios of environmental and climate change. However, people on these islands are not isolated from events elsewhere. Through media and their own experience, they learn that migrant does not equal migrant. There always had been asymmetries when it came to various forms of mobility. There are good reasons to assume that this will also be in the future. Many leading nations of the world are formed and shaped by immigration. Migration is seen as “an issue that raises high hopes and deep fears” (de Haas 2006, S. 3), including in the Pacific Islands. Faist and Fauser (2011, S. 1) see “migrants as agents of development,” disregarding discourses in which migration is constructed as challenge to societies.

On 4 July 2012, US President Barack Obama granted 25 foreigners US citizenship. He highlighted that “immigration makes America stronger” and more prosperous (Jackson 2012). Also former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard spoke clearly in favor of skilled labor migrants the Australian economy badly needs to prosper: an economy which year by years adds around 200,000 labor immigrants to its workforce. At the same time, Australia has one of the most rigid policies when it comes to refugees, asylum-seekers or the so-called “unwanted migrants”.

Labor immigration is vital to many countries. The public perception of migrants, however, is overshadowed by threats causing existential fears projected on people who enter countries “illegally,” “misuse” the social security and welfare provisions of these countries and “threaten” the well-being and even physical security of the law-abiding citizens of these countries (EUMC 2006, Whittaker 2006). Such negative perception and attitude against “illegal” immigrants exist not only in developed industrial societies as Thomas-Hope (2006) shows in her study on the nature of irregular migration in the Caribbean.

Pacific Islanders confronted with the challenge that in a few decades from now they might have to look for new places where they can live because their own countries have become hostile to human habitation have fears of a very particular kind: under no circumstances are they eager to become environmental refugees. Even if it would be possible to have international law extended that environmental deterioration one day would be a valid reason to obtain the status of a refugee, Pacific Islanders would not be eager to be granted such a status.

Migration in the Pacific Islands

Only in recent years have the Pacific Islands figured prominently in discourses about environmentally induced migration. Sea-level rise and other aspects of climate change are changes in the environment. At the same time, they are social events: they create spaces of consideration, of discourses, of fear and assumption about an unsure and (though rarely admitted) an unknown future. This is, in particular, true for the fate of those who live in places that might be submerged sometime in the future. Their “concerns” often have been hijacked by scientific, techno-centric, masculine, institutionalized and Western perspectives, which marginalize “oceanic perspectives and ways of being among inhabitants of small islands in the Pacific” (Farbotko 2000, P. 2; see also Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; Mortreux and Barnett 2009).

Before climate change and sea-level rise came into the picture, countless publications reflected on the benefits and disadvantages of “ordinary” migration from Pacific Island countries to (mainly) metropolitan countries at the rim of the Pacific Ocean.

Today New Zealand’s population consists of 6.5% Pacific Islanders, while Australia’s population has around 0.4% of people from the Pacific Islands. New Zealand issues around six times more work visas to Pacific Islanders compared with Australia. In 2010, a total of 850,000 people of Pacific Island ethnicity or ancestry were living in countries that are major emigration destinations of Pacific Islanders: in New Zealand, 350,000; Australia, 150,000; the United States, 300,000; and Canada, 50,000 (Bedford and Hugo 2012).

The majority of Pacific Island emigrants have left their countries not because of environmental concerns, not as refugees, but as free migrants trying to establish a

new and better life elsewhere. For Pacific Islanders, culture and cultural identity are very important aspects.

The search for well-being and security (Gasper 2011) is the major reason why people from the Pacific Islands migrate. It is their motivation and experience of migration that started long before the first Europeans landed on the shores of the Pacific Islands. "Migration is an aspect of island life and a part of island identity" (Lazrus 2009, P. 37). Hau'ofa (1993) described the pre-colonial Pacific "as a 'sea of islands' within which people moved freely and frequently, created social networks, traded and exchanged goods, and at times engaged in conflict and attempted to exert dominance over one another" (cited in Lee 2009, P. 1).

Today many citizens of the Pacific Islands no longer live in their home countries. There are countries where more than 80% of its citizens have permanently migrated, mainly to metropolitan countries at the rim of the Pacific Ocean. However, there always had been exchange of goods and people within the Pacific Islands region which created pluralistic, multicultural, transnational societies that actually benefited much from the mixing of people. An important economic feature of this outgoing characteristic of many Pacific Island societies is that some states draw considerable shares of their incomes from migrants' remittances (Ware 2005).

Pacific Islanders and countries and societies at the rim of the Pacific have close relationships that always included migration, including forced migration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, some 60,000 Pacific Islanders were taken to Australia by black-birding ships to work in Queensland's sugar plantations (Flanagan et al. 2003). Around 10,000 were still living in Australia when the country achieved independence in 1901. Most of them were repatriated by the Australian Government between 1906 and 1908 as a result of the White Australia Policy. Some 7,500 Pacific Islanders (called *Kanakas*) working on plantations in Queensland were deported, and entry into Australia after 1904 was prohibited for Pacific Islanders (Jupp 2007).

People of Banaba, a once phosphate-rich island that today belongs to Kiribati, were first resettled by the Japanese during the Second World War, and then brought to Rabi in Fiji by the British right after the war. They were forced to leave their home islands as its environment was slowly destroyed in the mining process. Another reason for leaving was the violence that was done to people in connection with nuclear testing in the Pacific. It started when the United States began nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands, which had been given to them as a trust territory by the United Nations. Similar forced relocations happened in French Polynesia and Kiritimati, where the French and the British respectively conducted nuclear tests, destroying the environments and societies of these islands.

Migration sometimes is blamed for destroying the cohesion of societies, and social networks for putting people's identity and culture at risk. Very few consider that Pacific Islanders have been among the most mobile peoples over centuries. They have strongholds around the Pacific Rim. Take the tiny country of Niue, which today has a population of not even 1,300 and where another 20,000 live mainly in New Zealand. People of Niue obtain the citizenship of New Zealand by birth. Or the people of the Cook Islands, also endowed with New Zealand citizenship.

Some 16,000 of them live at home, while more than 60,000 live around the Pacific Rim, mainly in New Zealand. Even countries that have not dual citizenship with one of the metropolitan countries in their vicinity have significant sections of their population outside their territories. Samoa, with a present population at home of around 190,000, has another 300,000 people living overseas, again with emphasis on New Zealand. Similarly, Tonga has a bit more than 100,000 people back home and roughly the same numbers outside the country. Even Fiji, a country that until recently was not perceived as an important source country of migrants, has experienced emigration of around 120,000 citizens since 1987. This is a huge number, considering that the country in 2014 had a population of slightly less than 900,000.

Ware (2005) suggests that emigration from Polynesian and Micronesian countries acted like a safety valve mitigating internal conflicts—conflicts in societies that have well-educated youths but not the jobs they are looking for. Conflicts that arise when expectations are not fulfilled, leading to frustration and violence.

Around 3 million people lived in the Pacific Islands (excluding Papua New Guinea) in 2011. Australia and New Zealand annually absorb more than 200,000 immigrants. The challenge to take those who cannot remain in their home countries because of environmental deterioration seems to be manageable. If necessary at all, there are still decades until “evacuation” needs to be completed. Challenges around immigration to Australia and New Zealand would become much smaller if migrants have skills they can contribute to their new host countries rather than becoming a burden to social support systems. Campbell (2009) estimates that within the next 40 years, between 665,000 and 1,725,000 people in Pacific Island countries will not be able to stay where they live. If we take the higher number, it would mean that every year some 43,000 people on average would get displaced, most of them towards the end of the period of 40 years from now. A fraction would require international resettlement, mainly those who live in atoll countries where no safe grounds within the country exist to resettle affected populations. According to Campbell, this would be 320,000 people, or 8,000 individuals on average per year for the next 40 years. The latter represent figures that look less frightening or unmanageable to achieve (Table 6.5).

Destination countries are hesitant to accept refugees or asylum-seekers. Similarly, migrants do not want to be seen and treated as refugees or asylum-seekers or as “irregular” migrants. Once the conditions of their environments make it essential to leave their home countries, they surely would love to be welcomed wherever they move to.

Leaders of Pacific Island countries that are threatened by sea-level rise emphasize again and again that they do not want their people to be seen as potential environmental refugees. Kiribati President Anote Tong, for example, does not let any doubt that he is aware that a time might come when the 32 atolls of his country are no more suitable to provide a home to the people of Kiribati. President Tong has started to find alternatives for the more than 100,000 I-Kiribati,⁵ but not as environmental refugees.

⁵ Inhabitants of Kiribati.

Table 6.5 Climate change and population displacement in the Pacific Islands. (Source: Campbell 2009)

	Population displacement 2009 estimates		Population displacement 2050 projections	
	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
Atolls	240,000	240,000	320,000	320,000
Coasts	95,000	350,000	180,000	580,000
Rivers	80,000	400,000	165,000	825,000
Total	415,000	990,000	665,000	1,725,000

When whole island states need evacuation, migration is less selective than it had been in the past. Back then, people who left their countries were mainly those with better skills, or those who were better integrated into societies or at least into labor markets of destination countries. People most exposed to adverse environmental conditions and processes live from primary, environmentally dependent and climate-sensitive activities like agriculture, forestry and fishing for their livelihoods. They often have the least capacities to adequately respond to adverse environmental changes. These people require rights that are enforceable to protect them against the impacts of climate change. And they need initiatives to enhance their capabilities that prepare them for a life in other countries. Especially, people who will not be able to easily integrate into societies and labor markets of host countries require mechanisms and institutions that provide protection. It would be ethically unacceptable to just leave them on the islands when these become uninhabitable.

Skilled and Unskilled Labor Mobility from Pacific Island Countries

Faist and Fauser (2011) see one of the important changes in migration paradigms in the “desirability of temporary labor migration based on the expectation that temporary migrants will constitute no loss in human capital and furthermore transmit a higher percentage of their income than permanent immigrants” (2011, P. 3). In the case of Pacific Island countries, such temporary labor migration can also help to spread the benefits of migration widely, create familiarities with destination countries, and make many ready to positively contribute to the economies of receiving countries, if need arises as the result of climate change.

Stahl and Appleyard (2007) highlight the development aspects of programs by New Zealand and Australia to grant permanent access to people from Pacific Island countries for work purposes. New Zealand has granted citizenship to the people of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. The country also has a quota for Samoan citizen, the Samoa Quota (SQ), under which since 1970 1,100 Samoan nationals can become permanent residents year by year. Finally, the Pacific Access Category

(PAC) of 2002 allows 250 persons from Fiji,⁶ 250 from Tonga, 75 from Kiribati and 75 from Tuvalu to become permanent citizens, if they meet particular requirements. Under the SQ and PAC, people from Pacific Island countries, who—under the general programs for skilled immigrants—would not qualify as their skill levels are often too low, can enter New Zealand. With regard to Tuvalu, Adger and Barnett (2005) remark that since the scheme started in 2002 less “than half the places available have been filled. This possibly suggests that even in Tuvalu, where there is widespread concern about climate change, people are not eager to leave their homeland” (Adger and Barnett 2005, P. 328) (Table 6.6).

These permanent migration schemes are supplemented by temporary unskilled labor schemes, such as the Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy New Zealand introduced in 2007 and a similar scheme Australia launched a year later. Such schemes had existed in the late 1960s for Fijian, Tongan and Samoans to work mainly in agriculture and forestry until the first coup in Fiji (1987) brought the scheme to an end (Lee 2009, P. 10). Under the RSE policy up to 8,000 persons from (in order of absolute importance) Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati can come to New Zealand for seasonal agricultural work. The Australian scheme allows people from Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu to enter Australia for seasonal unskilled employment mainly in the agricultural sector. Other economic sectors showed interest in employing temporary workers from the Pacific such as the New Zealand dairy and meat processing industries. Industries also expressed interest in allowing Pacific Island workers to immigrate for the rebuilding of Christchurch after the devastating earthquake in 2011, and in the Australian tourism and fishing industries (Bedford and Hugo 2012). Gibson and McKenzie (2011) suggest that the New Zealand RSE can make a “meaningful development contribution to Pacific Island nations” (2011, P. 19; see also McKenzie and Gibson 2011). Walmsley et al. (2009, P. 23) argue that “Australia and New Zealand would gain considerably from increasing quotas, particularly on unskilled labour” and also the Pacific Island economies gained a lot “from sending unskilled labour to Australia and New Zealand” (Walmsley et al. 2009, P. 23).

In Pacific Island Countries and Territories, initiatives to make labor mobility easier have come up recently. In connection with various free-trade initiatives, the issue of labor mobility has gathered much interest. So far, there is little experience how the liberalization of labor mobility will look like in detail. The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement–Trade in Services (PICTA–TIS), which has been signed by nine Pacific Island countries in August 2012, includes provisions on the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons scheme. In September 2012, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between the Member States of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)—which includes Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu—about a skills movement scheme. Under this scheme, 400

⁶ Fiji joined the scheme in 2003, and after the coup of 2006, Fiji’s participation in the scheme discontinued.

Table 6.6 Migration data and schemes for Pacific Island Countries and Territories (Source: Population data is from SPC Population Data 2011, and Time Series from 1900; migration rates and opportunities are from Ware 2005; information on emigrants are from World Bank 2012 (except*: Appleyard and Stahl 1995); n.a. (not available))

Country	Subregion	Population (2011)	Population (around 1960)	Net immigration rate (per 1000)	Stock of emigrants (in '000)	Stock of emigrants as % of population	Pacific Access Category (PAC)/ Samoa Quota (SQ) (annual quota)	Unskilled labor schemes	Migration opportunities
Cook Islands	Polynesia	15,576	18,378 ^e	(21.7)	28.4*	61.4*			Full access to NZ
Niue	Polynesia	1,446	4,864 ^e	(43.2)	9.2*	75.6*			Full access to NZ
Samoa	Polynesia	183,617	114,427 ^c	(17.6)	120.4	67.3	1100 (SQ)	RSE, PSWPS2	
Tonga	Polynesia	103,682	56,383 ^a	(15.1)	47.4	45.4	250	RSE, PSWPS1	
Tuvalu	Polynesia	11,206	5,444 ^g	(5.2)	n.a.	n.a.	75	RSE, PSWPS2	Special deal with German merchant marine
Federated States of Micronesia	Micronesia	102,360	39,284 ^b	(5.9)	21.9	19.7			Full access to USA
Kiribati	Micronesia	102,697	43,336 ^g	0.0	6.4	6.5	75	RSE, PSWPS1	Special deal with German/Japanese merchant marine
Marshall Islands	Micronesia	54,999	13,928 ^b	(20.0)	10.5	16.6			Full access to USA
Nauru	Micronesia	10,185	4,613 ^c	(0.2)	n.a.	n.a.		PSWPS2	
Palau	Micronesia	20,643	9,344 ^b	8.1	8.0	38.8			
Fiji Islands	Melanesia	851,745	345,737 ^a	(3.7)	182.2	21.3	**	RSE**	
Papua New Guinea	Melanesia	6,888,297	2,184,986 ^b	0.0	61.2	0.9		PSWPS1	
Solomon Islands	Melanesia	553,254	124,076 ^c	0.0	5.4	1.0		PSWPS2	
Vanuatu	Melanesia	251,784	78,088 ⁱ	0.0	3.9	1.6		RSE, PSWPS1	
Territory									
American Samoa	Polynesia	66,692	20,051 ^d	2.7	45.7	66.7			Full access to USA

Table 6.6 (continued)

Subregion	Population (2011)	Population (around 1960)	Net immigration rate (per 1000)	Stock of emigrants (in '000)	Stock of emigrants as % of population	Pacific Access Category (PAC)/ Samoa Quota (SQ) (annual quota)	Unskilled labor schemes	Migration opportunities
French Polynesia	271,831	84,551 ^f	0.0	4.2	1.5			Full access to France (incl. French Pacific territories)
Tokelau	1,162	1,870 ^e	(24.9)	2.9*	65.3*			Full access to NZ
Wallis & Futuna	13,193	8,546 ^j	(8.7)	n.a.	n.a.			Full access to France (incl. French Pacific territories)
Guam	192,090	67,044 ^d	(10.8)	48.7	27.1			Full access to USA
Northern Mariana Islands	63,517	8,290 ^b	33.5	8.9	10.1			Full access to USA
New Caledonia	252,331	86,519 ^b	2.4	2.9	0.9			Full access to France (incl. French Pacific territories)

The New Zealand Government announced the Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy in October 2006 and began implementing it in April 2007

Australia launched the Pacific Island Seasonal Workers Scheme (PSWPS1) in August 2008. In September 2011, more countries were added (PSWPS2)

The New Zealand/Tuvalu guest-worker scheme of 1986 allowed up to 80 workers from Tuvalu to be employed in New Zealand from 1 to 3 years (Simati 2009) In 2002, New Zealand started the PAC, which allowed 75 Tuvaluans each year to work and live permanently in New Zealand (Simati 2009, S. 44)

^a1956; ^b1958; ^c1959; ^d1960; ^e1961; ^f1962; ^g1963; ^h1966; ⁱ1967; ^j1969

*refers to Stock of emigrants: here figures for Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau are taken from Appleyard and Stahl 1995, while figures for all other countries are taken from World Bank 2012.

** refers to Fiji. After the coup of 2006 Fiji had been excluded from these schemes.

skilled persons per member country can move to other MSG countries annually, if they have skills that are listed in Annex 1 of the MOU.

Initiatives taken up by metropolitan countries or by Pacific Island countries are highly controversial. Some see in them a return to the nineteenth century when colonial labor trade was (mis)used to develop the Australian economy at the expense of Pacific Island societies. Others see them as a way to bring development to Pacific Island countries. Two issues in the discussion seem to be crucial: one is that the close interlinkages between trade liberalization and labor mobility might make Pacific Island countries more likely to accept agreements that can bring negative consequences to their own economic interests. Opening up their economies even more to imports from Australia and other countries to the disadvantage of their own, rather fragile and vulnerable economies might be easier to bear when labor mobility becomes a binding part of such agreements. However, it is very unlikely that Australia or New Zealand will give away the right to regulate labor movements considering benefits and potential threats to their own economies. The other issue seems to be more fundamental: overall, Pacific Island countries have shortages of skilled labor. Although in some economies it is more a mismatch of skills, many economies are restricted in their expansion from having not the right skills at the right time in the right place. Larger Pacific Island countries, in particular Fiji and Papua New Guinea, train big numbers of professionals and graduates year by year. Many leave, making their skills available to others. The skills movement scheme of the MSG tries to balance labor supply and demand within the four economies of the group. However, such a scheme would only be successful if a bigger number of skilled laborers that are willing and able to migrate chose to go to a Pacific Island country rather than migrate to a metropolitan country at the rim. To make this happen requires incentives—incentives in terms of attractive wages, working conditions and living qualities. It also requires the establishment of a Pacific identity, where it becomes a value in itself to live and work in a country that culturally is similar to where migrants come from.

Such considerations also become relevant when places for people need to be found that leave their homes because of climate change and other environmental reasons. Not only that it is now the time to equip themselves with skills that enable them to positively contribute to the societies that are receiving them. It is equally important that a Pacific Island identity is emerging that sees it natural to help out and welcome those who need support, who need new homes.

Today we do not even know the number of (additional) migrants in the decades ahead because of climate and environmental change. “In the face of slow environmental change, those who are able to move—those with money, social networks and alternative livelihoods—may tend to migrate independently. The vulnerable poor, those with no capacity to move when environments deteriorate, the very young and the elderly may be left behind or forced to resettle later” (Warner and Laczko 2008, P. 60). There is even the possibility of people being left behind in adverse environments. Such fear is not baseless: the majority of people in the so-called developed world bother little when people (already now) are living under extremely adverse environmental and/or social conditions. Evacuating (Kelman 2008) “sinking” is-

lands in the Pacific most likely will not happen. It is more likely that the last plane and ship leaves Kiribati and people are still there, not forgotten, but never intended to be brought to safety, neither socially nor environmentally.

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Chapter 7

Migration of Children in ACP Countries: Of Their Own Free Will or by Force?

Olivia Tiffoche

Based in part on Tiffoche (2013).

The question of child migration has been of interest to researchers and policy- and decision makers for many years. However, far from being new, the phenomenon is not, in general, studied in its entirety. Part of this vast subject is, in fact, a subject of discussion, namely the exploitation, abuse and trafficking of children; these being considered as vulnerable dependents and not as leading actors in their migratory journey.

However, migration is today an inevitable social factor that involves millions of individuals of all ages in a variety of ways. The one-sided representation of children as “dependents incapable of making rational choices” (Coleman 1990) therefore needs to be challenged. Child migration can also, in fact, be a “choice”. As a result of this, children must be considered separate social and economic actors. As in the case of adults, migration of children must be viewed as the result of a combination of factors, both individual and global, which, when taken together, make migration the most practical solution faced with the situations in which they are living. From this standpoint, the complexity of individual migratory journeys can only be understood by studying the social, economic and cultural contexts in migrants’ countries of origin and destination (Punch 2012; Bastia 2005; Hashim and Thorsen 2011).

Definition of *child* according to Article 1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child: A child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.

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However, lack of information concerning the characteristics of migrant children is a major gap in the understanding of the subject. Although no precise figures are known concerning child migration, UN DESA estimated in 2011 that 33 million international migrants were under 19 years of age, thus representing 15% of all international migrants (UN DESA 2012). When it comes to geographic distribution, young people represent a larger group of migrants in developing countries than in the countries of the North (MacKenzie 2006). In 2010, one quarter of migrants in the South were under 20 years of age, 10% higher than the world average (UN DESA 2012). The proportion of young migrants is particularly high in Africa (28%). These data tell us about the urgent need to increase the political attention that is paid to young migrants in countries in the South.

Lack of information concerning the general trends of child migration, as well as the impacts it can have on children, affects decision-making at all levels and endangers children's rights and futures. It is therefore becoming urgent to take the diversity of situations through which children can be affected by migration into consideration, in order to reflect, in a more comprehensive manner, on possible solutions.

This chapter thus considers the dynamics of child migration and the impacts it can have both on children migrating alone and with their families, as well as on those who remain in the country of origin, those born in the country of destination and those who return to their countries of origin.

Concepts and Observations

Key concepts should be first highlighted before going further within explanations.

Children/Minors

The definition used in this chapter is from Article 1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child,¹ which states that:

A child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.

This definition is used in most texts concerning the protection of children at the international level. However, such a definition remains open to discussion, given that the vision that emerges does not appear to match the view that many communities hold concerning childhood. As we will see later on, young boys and girls in the Caribbean are, for example, seen as active social actors from their early age, helping people in need in a society where the informal "care chain" is indispensable. A global definition based on a specific age deemed to represent the universal measure

¹ Convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989.

of biological and psychological maturity, and also political maturity in many countries, since it is linked to the right to vote and to be elected. This idea, however, rejects any cultural and social meaning that may cover age in many systems of local thought (Ensor and Gozdziaik 2010). It seems more plausible to maintain that the concept of childhood varies according to the social, cultural, historic, religious and rational norms that govern a given community, given that the place of children is not the same in each of them. Thus, a difference should be noted between the concept of a child and of a minor.

Categorization of Children Affected by Migration

Children may be affected by migration in a number of ways, and its impacts will be different depending on their particular situations. It is therefore important to give special recognition to these diverse situations. For ease of comprehension, this chapter deals more specifically with four categories of children affected by migration based on the categorization used at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD 2010):

- Children migrating with their parents, members of their family or relatives;
- Unaccompanied migrant children;
- Children of migrants remaining in their country of origin;
- Children born to migrant parents in their country of destination.

Concept of “Mobile Children”

The child welfare organization Terre des Hommes International Federation (TdHIF) refers to “mobile children” described by various situations in which a child may be affected by migration. This concept refers to the displacement of children between different geographic and social spaces, as well as these children’s experiences during their movements. It provides an understanding of how a migratory experience, of any type, may transform the children’s identity and living conditions (Fig. 7.1).

A Relevant Comment Made by TdHIF It is important not to objectify each profile. (...). The significance of this categorization is not on the variety of links between childhood and mobility, or on the need to work upstream and downstream of situations of mobility, in several places and times during a child’s life.




Fig. 7.1 Protection for children affected by mobility in West Africa. (Source: TdHIF 2012)

Main Factors of Migration: From Passive Children to Children at the Heart of the Migratory Process

If children can effectively be part of the migratory decision-making process conditioned by the environment they are growing up in, what are the main factors that can influence their choice? A multitude of factors can be cited. An economic and social opportunity envisaged by the child itself or by its family should be considered in the first instance. Work is, in fact, the main reason that leads them to migrate. However, more cultural rites, such as the transition into adulthood, must also be taken into account (Jeffrey and McDowell 2004). In some societies, such as in the Caribbean, children are even considered to be the most mobile actors—much freer to cross barriers and explore different social spheres than adults (Fog Olwig 2012). Their movements are then experienced as a real cultural tradition.

A significant factor that shapes the lives of migrant children is what Carola and Marcelo Suarez-Orozco (2001) call “the ethos of reception”. This includes the cultural and social climate that surrounds them, as well as the opportunities available to them and their families. Migration of children, as in the case of adult migration, is ultimately the product of an encounter between different global, local and individual factors. Given this, it becomes obvious that children, when they are in age of being aware of what can represent their departure, should be considered as actors in their migration and not just as passive agents. In this vein, we can assume that migration affects more children aged 10 years and over than 3-year-old babies. A clear example of this observation is the discourse maintained by certain parents concerning “children who flee” from rural zones in Ghana—a discourse emphasized in a survey carried out by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (2005). A farmer responding to the people conducting the survey said, among other things, that: “if a child is grown it is their responsibility to feed you. But you have to beg them because they can run away, but you cannot.”

In addition, there is a great difference between the way in which children see their own migratory experience and the way in which they are commonly represented as

being “vulnerable” (Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty 2005). This may then affect all the protection processes that governments and organizations attempt to introduce, as the children between 15 and 19 years of age, representing the largest group of child migrants (UNICEF 2011), are not receptive to established programs.

Regional differences must also be noted when talking about child migration due to specific cultural and social aspects. Consequently, children and adolescents form the largest group of migrants in Africa. In fact, they represent half of the international migrants in the region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, they represent 18% (Cortina and Hovy 2009).

Legal Framework for the Protection of Children

International Convention on the Rights of the Child

On 20 November 1989, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) before it was ratified by 193 States, excluding Somalia, South Sudan and the United States. This Convention has since become the central reference text for the rights of the child. All of the signatory governments in fact committed themselves to defending and guaranteeing all the rights of children proclaimed by the convention. As a result, the CRC is the first legally binding international text embodying children’s fundamental rights. These rights are composed of fundamental safeguards and essential human rights adapted to children’s particular circumstances, taking their vulnerability and the specific needs of their age into account. However, although achieving unanimity when it was adopted, its practical implementation by many signatories remains difficult.

Main Regional and International Agreements for the Protection of Children

- **Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, ILO, 1999**

The subject being a major priority in the 1990s, this convention received the highest ratification rate in the history of ILO conventions, but its practical applicability still remains difficult in the majority of signatory countries, especially in the area of the rights of *migrant children*, more easily categorized as *migrants* and not as *children*. Thereby, access to a certain degree of protection remains.

Child workers are also a category of concern in this convention, not taking sufficiently into account the fact that active participation in the labor force by young adolescents is sometimes essential to the economic survival of their family. For

this reason, certain stakeholders—including children’s associations—also say no to an outright ban on child labor (Bonnet et al. 2006).

- **African Charter on the Rights and Well-Being of the Child, 1990**

Shortly after the adoption of the CRC, the African Charter on the Rights and Well-Being of the Child was unanimously adopted by the African heads of government of the Organisation of African Unity. This enabled them to include an African perspective on the rights of the child, and thus nuance certain points of the CRC.²

- **Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in Minors,³ 1994**

Adopted at the fifth Inter-American Conference specializing in private international law in order to regulate civil and criminal aspects of the international trafficking in minors, it has now been ratified by 15 countries. It is a breakthrough for a region severely affected by trafficking in children but for which there is no regional implementation mechanism. This is problematic because of the common impunity in many OAS countries.

These three texts are only a sample of the many agreements made between countries in order to protect the rights of children. In general, these agreements take too little account of the specific needs of children in the context of migration. When they do so, most focus on the exploitation of children, which is considered to be one of the most serious violations of human rights in the world today by UNICEF. However, placing too much emphasis on this issue may lead to the idea that all forms of child migration are forced and lead to abuse. Under these conditions, it is difficult to develop legislation that is a clear response to the specific needs of all migrant children.

If we consider that child migration is not just limited to forced migration or akin to trafficking (O’Connell et al. 2007), other aspects of migration that influence the lives of the millions of children concerned need to be considered.

Children and Migration: A Future in Development

It is difficult to generalize about, or even categorize, the experiences of the millions of children affected, directly or indirectly, by migration. However, this is needed for an overall understanding of the phenomenon. The study of the impact of migration on children will therefore be divided into four distinct categories—children migrating alone, those remaining in the country of origin, those migrating with their

² For example, we can quote the child’s responsibilities (Article 31 of the Charter), according to which “Every child shall have responsibilities towards his family and society, the state and other legally recognized communities and the international community” or the notion of positive values (Articles 1, 11 and 21 of the Charter) which have an important place in the life of a child in Africa. In contrast, the CRC makes sure that “States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children”. (Article 24.3 of the CRC).

³ See <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-57.html>.

family, and those born to migrant parents in the country of destination or who return to their parents' country of origin after a long period of migration.

Unaccompanied Migrant Children: Exploitation or “Chosen” Migration?

ILO (2010) estimates that in 2009, 215 million boys and girls worldwide were subjected to child labor according to the definitions of the ILO's Convention 138 and the United Nations CR⁴. Given this observation, the international community is seeking to reduce this alarming figure by any means it can.

However, special situations are not so simple to identify. In many communities, it is considered normal for children to work and help their families meet their needs. The children themselves then see their work as contributing to family life. In general, they are entrusted with household (especially girls) or agricultural tasks, or selling in the streets and markets. When a family agrees by mutual consent, responsibilities assigned to children may lead them to migrate, usually from a rural area to the town, and sometimes also beyond borders.

Fostering or the de facto Migration of Children in West Africa

Child migration is a particularly widespread practice in West Africa, where the presence of similar ethnic groups in different countries facilitates migration (Bambara in Mali and Malinké in Guinea, for example) (HRW 2007). Migration of children is a tradition there, especially among children between the age of 13 and 17 (HRW 2007).

Fostering is a common custom there, whereby children, mainly girls, are sent to live with members of their family living some distance away. The fact that, in the vast majority of cases, this involves girls can be explained by the greater control parents have over them, and also by the image still conveyed in rural areas that girls must marry young and take responsibility for domestic work. Parents therefore see fostering as an opportunity for the girls, and it also comes as a relief, given that families are often too large for them to be successful in meeting their whole range of needs (HRW 2007). Children therefore migrate for the purpose of helping with tasks in the host family. This practice is seen as normal and socially acceptable, and is not considered child labor but as necessary support in countries where protection and insurance systems do not exist. However, this social norm leads to numerous situations of exploitation and abuse that parents often cannot imagine.

The same system exists in different parts of the world, such as in Haiti with the *restavek* culture—in which children are sent by their parents to live with relatives

⁴ According to Article 1 of this convention, “a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”.

or individuals having no family relationship who could provide their basic needs (such as education) in exchange for domestic work or other small services. While the international media represents these children as victims of society, marginalized and frequently abused, the *restavek* system meets a need in Haiti's society, where education is rare and poverty rampant. Hoffmann (2012) therefore considers that the *restavek* must be considered a culturally constructed form of childhood during which the experience of mobility is central. Sending children to work elsewhere is, in fact, considered an opportunity they would not have by staying at home (Sommerfelt 2002; Hoffmann 2012).

The Foundation of a Cultural Tradition of Migration: Example of Child Mobility in the Caribbean

As Fog Olwig (2012) stresses, child mobility in the Caribbean is an important foundation of the migratory tradition, itself being an integral aspect of most societies in this region. In fact, while the Caribbean children generally grow up in family homes, this does not necessarily mean that they live with their own parents. It is common to see children, for numerous reasons,⁵ spending part of their childhood with another family living some distance away, with their parents' neighbors, with acquaintances or even with strangers. Such an opportunity is given to them in a society where each social group has defined social spaces and roles. However, the Caribbean children can enter different social spheres more easily than their parents, due to their submission to adult authority.

“My mother sent me to look for tomatoes, and it started to rain so I couldn't get home. (This lady) told me that she loved me and gave me gifts. So I decided I wanted to stay there.”

Fog Olwig 2012, p. 938

Although traditional, each migration is individual and depends on different factors. Some may be temporary, while others are permanent; some may result in a deep friendship, while others may lead to disastrous relationships; finally, some are arranged by adults, while others result from the initial wishes of the children concerned (Fog Olwig 2012).

In all cases, migration of children is an integral component of the Caribbean societies, far from the Western clichés concerning the latter. Children are thus seen as real social actors contributing to the informal “care chain” prevalent in this region.

⁵ Reasons include, among others, their parents' inability to meet their needs, their desire to help a person in need of the assistance or company of a child, the parents' desire to offer their children better social and economic opportunities (Fog Olwig 2012).

Benefits of Child Migration

The extent to which migration is a positive or negative experience depends on a wide range of different factors according to the context, the people encountered and the various points on the journey (Punch 2009). Although situations of exploitation should not be underestimated, consideration should also be given to the benefits children may derive from migration, including better education or training, better economic and social opportunities, and better access to health services (Dottridge 2011). The Asociación Grupo de Trabajo Redes (2004a and b) surveyed migrant children that had become domestic servants in three Peruvian cities (Lima, Cajamarca and Pucallpa), and most of them referred to positive situations in which they were treated with “affection, patience and love” by their employers (Testimony of Milulka, age 15, in May 2004; AGTR 2004b, p. 27). What they had learned was particularly valued, and some even stressed the opportunities and amenities to which they had access due to living and working in an urban area, most of them being work related.

Although this kind of experience may be beneficial to children when they migrate to the town—a location often idealized as far as life and work opportunities are concerned—the situation is more complicated for children who migrate to another country, all the more so when they go through illegal migratory channels, often trafficked. Access to basic services, such as education and health care, is generally denied to them, and access to work becomes subject to the rules of the informal sector, with all the insecurity that this implies.

Unaccompanied children do not always migrate for economic reasons, although the majority of migration plans lead to working situations. Many also flee from difficult circumstances where their lives may be in danger, or perhaps leave to find their parents already engaged in a migratory process. Their departure therefore represents the end of a painful experience and is not viewed by them in a negative manner.

In the vast majority of cases where migration is a “choice”, it is therefore perceived as an opportunity for young children, both by them as well as by their families. However, even though it depends on each child’s special circumstances, the risks to which they are exposed during the journey (e.g. theft, trafficking, abuse) and at their destination (e.g. non-integration) are numerous and indisputable.

Migration of Unaccompanied Children: The Cases of Trafficking in Persons and Statelessness

Child Smuggling and Trafficking *Human smuggling and trafficking in persons* are two general terms that have to be distinguished, even though similar factors such as poverty or lack of economic opportunities often contribute in increasing such crimes.⁶ In short, what begins by a situation of smuggling (consent to be

⁶ US Department of State fact sheet, Distinctions between human smuggling and human trafficking 2006, available from <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/hstcenter/90434.htm>.

Table 7.1 Regional representation of child victims of trafficking. (Source: ILO, UNICEF, United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), Training manual on the fight against trafficking in children for labour, sexual and other forms of exploitation, Book 1 (translation by author), 2002)

Region (of origin)	Number of victims
Asia-Pacific	250,000
Latin America and the Caribbean	550,000
Africa	200,000
Developing economies	200,000
Developed, industrialised economies	Non available
<i>Total (estimate)</i>	<i>1,200,000</i>

smuggled into a country) may develop into a situation of trafficking (such as being forced into an exploitative low wages to pay for the transportation) (UNODC 2010).

Trafficking in children, in the same way as that in adults, is a subject that occupies international organizations, governments and numerous non-governmental organizations throughout the world, due to its magnitude and dramatic consequences. However, although of tremendous interest, official figures are very difficult to come by, due to the clandestine nature of human smuggling and trafficking in persons in general. In 2002, ILO estimated that 1.2 million children were subject to trafficking; with this figure including both internal trafficking and international trafficking (ILO 2002). In its report, ILO also set out a geographic representation that is useful in understanding the extent of the phenomenon in countries in the South (Table 7.1).

In the past few years, it is estimated that 2.5 million people are victims of trafficking, 22–50% of whom are children (ILO 2005). Beyond a general lack of figures due to the illegality of the phenomenon, studies published on the subject unfortunately only give an often all too vague overview of the situation, focusing as they do on one aspect or on one particular region (Bastia 2005). The *UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012* is one of the first global reports on the topic. While still no clear figures are given about trafficked persons (ILO only reported that 20.9 million were victims of forced labor), it is estimated in the key findings of the report that 27% of all victims detected globally are children, and that in every three children, two are girls (UNODC 2012).

For further information on this subject, *Background Note No. 1* published by the ACP Observatory on Migration is especially dedicated to human trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.⁷

Tools to fight child smuggling and trafficking are welcome, but they have often been accused of being too general due to the fact that they are more instruments for crime prevention than instruments for the protection of human rights (Chapkis 2003; Bastia 2005). Anti-trafficking programs, for example, always criminalize the victims, whether they be adults or children, due to their illegal migration (Doezema 2002; Macklin 2004; Bastia 2005).

The fact remains that child trafficking is considered to be one of the worst forms of child labor according to the ILO Convention No. 182 of 1999. However, this

⁷ See <http://www.acpmigration-obs.org/sites/default/files/EN-BN01-trafficking.pdf>.

struggle, once again based on a Western-centric definition, must not prevent the social and cultural aspects of child migration from being taken into account. In fact, child smuggling and trafficking are parts of the general context of population movements, often for economic reasons, and their boundaries are sometimes difficult to identify. Consequently, various forms of trafficking are not recognized as such because they are incorporated into traditional forms of patronage (Bastia 2005). This is very often true in the case of migration of young girls, for example, to carry out domestic work in homes other than their family home. Above and beyond the fact that parents who allow their children to leave do so in good faith, not suspecting the conditions in which their children will subsequently find themselves, migration seems to be the best option available to the people being trafficked (Bastia 2005). The majority of cases of child trafficking in fact take place for the purpose of economic exploitation and, for a time, offer victims the hope of a better life. A close relationship may thus be observed between the probability of trafficking to which children are exposed and the level of human development they enjoyed before their migration. A typical example of this type of trafficking given in the Bastia survey (2005) concerning young Bolivian victims of trafficking in Argentina is the case of two 16-year-old teenage girls whose parents entered into a contract with a woman looking for young girls to employ in her textile company in Buenos Aires. Due to the bonded nature of the debt, the girls had to work for 12 h a day, did not have sufficient time to rest or sufficient food, and were deprived of their liberty. However, labor exploitation is, in this case, perceived by the children and their families as a means of meeting their economic needs and also as a possible means of training for children with a low level of education.

The consequences of such treatment can only appear to be negative, both for the victim and at a more global level. As the International Labour Office describes (2001), low levels of education, in the same way as low levels of health and premature death, cause a loss of productivity that is often felt at both country and regional levels.

Statelessness A stateless person is considered to be “a person not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” according to Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,⁸ which is the main international legal instrument established for the protection of stateless persons.

However, the acquisition or non-acquisition of a nationality is essential for all human beings as it gives access to rights, as well as an identity. Schacher (2003) even contends that it “perhaps has the most dramatic consequences for children’s long-term prospects”. For example, children, in addition to not having access to basic services such as health care, may be confronted with discrimination or social exclusion due to their lack of nationality. However, the main problem is the fact that these children, without any official papers, have no proof of their status as minors. Therefore, they may more easily find themselves in situations of exploitation, with

⁸ UNHCR, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted on 28 September 1954, which came into force on 6 June 1960.

their tormentors not being troubled by the legislation in force. In addition, considered as adults in most cases, they do not benefit from the protection systems specific to minors, which is a dramatic situation for minor asylum-seekers in particular.

However, Article 7 of the CRC states that all children must be protected against statelessness and that it is the responsibility of states to implement this protection.⁹ It remains to be seen how this can actually be implemented, which is a sensitive political issue that many states have not yet resolved. Greater flexibility with regard to migrant children is, in fact, considered as opening the gates to a massive flow of young people that states feel they cannot accommodate. This is what is currently being observed in the Dominican Republic with the mass influx of Haitians whose job opportunities in their own country are all too scarce, all the more so since the earthquake in January 2010.

Children Remaining in Their Countries of Origin

In most cases of economic migration, only those capable of working are designated for migration by their families; the idea being to return most of the funds raised to the family that remains in the country, and therefore to spend as little as possible. For certain families, the underlying idea is therefore to obtain sufficient funds before returning and, for example, starting a local business in the country of origin. In these conditions, and due to the many restrictions on immigration that make any such attempt complex, migrant parents may decide not to take their children with them. The latter are then often entrusted to other members of the family. The consequences of such a situation, which differ according to personal circumstances, depend primarily on the duration of the parents' migration (Castañeda and Busk 2011).

Positive Impacts of Money Transfers

When a migratory plan actually leads to funds being sent, it is important to consider the positive impacts this has on the family remaining in the country. The most significant impacts that can be expected with regard to children are access to education and a reduction in the education gap between genders, a reduction in child labor and, above all, a general improvement in their health. Transfers of funds are, in fact, most often used to meet basic subsistence needs and improve living conditions (IOM 2006).

In Mexico, a study shows that children from families receiving transfers of funds complete between 0.7 and 1.6 more years of school than children from families that

⁹ Convention on the Rights of Children, Article 7: States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

do not have a family member living in a foreign country. It has also been found that an increase in the number of families receiving funds in a town leads to a better level of health and schooling (Duryea et al. 2005). However, this relationship is not always confirmed, and depends on the family's choices concerning the expenditure necessary to improve the living standards of all its members. In addition, although transfers of funds are supposed to mean better economic opportunities, we can easily assume that the cost paid by the whole family to make the journey possible and the difficulties that arise from it may lead to children having to work rather than go to school.

Variable Living Conditions According to the Situation of the People Responsible for the Children

As the children are away from their migrant parents, the role of the people looking after the children becomes fundamental to the children's development. However, these appointed "guardians" do not always have the resources to accommodate an extra person in their home, and remain social and economic actors who, for the most part, do not have the necessary time and resources to devote to them. Children are therefore often neglected, mistreated and even abused by the people supposed to be protecting them and looking after their development in the place of their parents. This is what some people call the *Cinderella syndrome* (Archambault and de Laat 2010). As Fog Olwig (2012) states, children can, in these circumstances, be considered as much a resource as a burden for the people responsible for their care. They are a resource because they provide company or even assistance for elderly people or people in need of labor. They are also a vital source of income, given that their parents send the funds required to meet their children's needs and the needs of the people looking after them. Conversely, they can rapidly become a burden if no money is received to bring them up. The experience of children left behind is therefore shaped by their position between these two extremes, and the type of relationship this generates with the people supposed to be looking after them.

"I miss my father, mother and sister. I wonder why they don't live with my grandparents and me. I want to grow up quickly so I can live with them."

Interview with a migrant child separated from her family when she returned to China, in Liu and Zhu (2011, p. 457)

Psychological Aspects: An Undeniable Loss of Reference Points and a Family Relationship Under Tension

While many studies look at the economic aspects of migration, it seems worthwhile to look at the issue of the psychological costs that family separation may cause. In this sense, the migratory experience may go as far as causing psychological trauma to children who, due to the lack of a stable family framework, often find themselves alone and isolated (Grinberg and Grinberg 1984).

While parents who migrate consider that the funds they send to their family are a means for them to remain in contact, children separated from their parents are more concerned about the lack of emotional resources they experience on a daily basis. From the child's point of view, separation is, in fact, perceived as abandonment, regardless of the reasons or circumstances that have led to it. A UNICEF report thus indicates that children separated from their parents due to migration are twice as likely as other children to experience psychological problems, even though their economic situation is more advantageous. The main psychological problems are a feeling of abandonment, sadness, discouragement and even despair, anger and lack of self-confidence, which can sometimes turn into violent behavior. Above all, this has an effect on children's education since they experience problems concentrating in school and find it difficult to submit to the authority of their "guardians". In addition, roles within the family are transformed; some children have to take on parenting tasks for their young brothers and sisters.

In considering all of these effects and depending on the duration of the migration project, the parents' return to their family does not appear to be simple. The parent-children relationship distorted by migration is often never restored; the parents not having been sufficiently present for their children when their children needed them most and the children being in the habit of relying only on themselves or on another person of trust (Castañeda and Busk 2011). As Grinberg and Grinberg (1984) summarize it, families often pay for the transfer of funds with the psychological trauma generated by migration and family separation.

Children Migrating with Their Families

This aspect of child migration is often studied in industrialized countries to understand whether and how children born in a foreign country and from a different culture integrate into the host society. Their situation is then compared with that of nationals of the same age. However, integration problems and other challenges that children following their family may encounter are also reflected in the context of South-South migration, as well as in cases of internal migration.

The first idea to bear in mind is that traveling and settling in the country of destination will be perceived as a shock by the child who does not perceive time in the same way as adults do, the same being true of the difficulties the child, older enough

to perceive the consequences of such a change, may experience. This observation is all the more true in cases of family reunification in a foreign country, often involving children of a young age. The child often does not understand the reasons that have delayed the reunion with his/her parents and only cares about the reunion. He/She has not been sufficiently prepared for the journey and the new experiences he/she will have to face. Many of these children will be traveling for the first time and often lack language skills,¹⁰ as is also often the case for migrant adults. In the same way as when children are left behind in the country of origin, the parent–children reunion will therefore be complicated due to resentment, successive disappointments and unfulfilled expectations (Crawford-Brown and Rattray 2002).

Migration of children with one or both of their parents is an interesting aspect which, nevertheless, has not been studied sufficiently, since the child is considered to be protected from the numerous risks that migration by his/her family may involve. However, although this type of migration is often idealized by a description of children in better health and working hard at school, this observation is not always verified and, once more, depends on the context surrounding the migratory process. The children of legal migrants and those of illegal migrants need to be differentiated. The former, although subject to many forms of discrimination, in principle have unrestricted access to basic services and therefore to better opportunities. The latter live a life that is more closed on themselves and their families, reproducing their parents' behavior due to their feeling of permanent insecurity. Two themes are emphasized in this chapter, namely the place given to education in the country of destination and the question of acculturation for children who have experienced two cultures before their adolescence.

Education: A Priority for the Family

Many studies focus on the academic success of migrant children. These refer to children who, in general, arrive with a strong will to succeed, but this view obscures the day-to-day lives of many of them in public schools that are often overcrowded, sometimes violent and where their integration takes place at the cost of numerous obstacles such as language barrier and segregation, among others.

Their success, however, is an ambition shared by most families who migrate primarily for a better future. In these cases, migration of children with their parents is considered in itself a family investment, through the opportunity of a better education, which is the main route to the future economic success of the second generation. This utilitarian image of school is reflected, for instance, in the type of courses pursued by migrant children, which are more technical or commercial qualifications rather than social or humanitarian studies (Tseng 2001). This idea is mostly associated with North–South migration. However, it should be noted that such scenarios may also be taken into account in the context of urban migration.

¹⁰ They lack language skills even if they come from a country where the official language is the same as that spoken in the country of destination but where local dialects are the only ones spoken in remote villages.

The attitude of parents with regard to their children's success therefore appears to be crucial. Regional variations need to be considered at this point. Several studies have, in fact, shown that parents of Asian origin attach more importance to educational outcomes than their counterparts in Latin America (Kao and Tienda 1995; Fuligni 1997). This difference can be explained by the families' socioeconomic backgrounds, with Asian families often being considered as having a higher level of education than those from Latin American countries (Fuligni 1997, 1998).

To these differences must be added the involvement or non-involvement of parents in their children's education. This is a key point, and one that is affected by the long hours the parents spend at work and during which children are left unsupervised. In addition, most of them have limited skills in the language of the host country. This limits their ability to monitor their children's progress at school or to involve themselves in their children's extracurricular activities (Cooper et al. 1999; Phelan et al. 1993; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001). Young immigrants may therefore find themselves left lonely, may feel neglected in facing the difficulties they encounter on a day-to-day basis, and may be easily influenced by external individuals considered trustworthy.

In addition, it should not be forgotten that migration must also benefit those remaining in the country. If the gains made by parents do not live up to expectations, children will find themselves required to participate in "family duties", thus becoming economic actors themselves.

Assimilation or Rejection: A Choice Between Several Contrasting Cultures

Acculturation is the process of cultural and psychological change that occurs following intercultural contact (Berry 2003). It is a phenomenon that has been subject to a great deal of study during migrations, given that it modifies a group's normal relationships, as well as the attitude of individuals in relation to their cultural identity (Phinney 2003). It is of even more significance for children, since it changes their individual behavior at an age when they are forming an integrated identity (Erikson 1980).

However, the long-term consequences of the process of acculturation are extremely diverse, and depend on social and personal variables that relate as much to the original society as they do to the host society (Berry 1997). Four acculturation strategies are used by any individual, depending on the desire they have to maintain their cultural heritage and identity and to become involved in the society as a whole (Berry et al. 2006); these are assimilation¹¹, separation¹², marginalization¹³

¹¹ Assimilation tallies with a low interest in maintaining a link with one's own culture, combined with a preference for interaction with the destination society.

¹² Separation is expressed by a desire to maintain one's own culture by limiting contact with others.

¹³ Marginalization exists when contact with the original culture is not maintained, nor is there any desire to interact with others.

and integration¹⁴. The results of the Berry, Phinney, Sam, Vedder study (2006) involving 7,997 adolescents aged between 13 and 18 (5,366 of whom were first- and second-generation immigrants) in 13 developed countries¹⁵ are interesting to analyze in terms of cultururation and acculturation, despite the fact that the study did not directly concern South–South migration. Integration is the strategy favored by young migrants (36.4%) who try to maintain a balance between their ethnic and national cultures. They use a variety of ways to engage in the different cultures, such as relationships with families in each of them or the use of different languages depending on the context. What should be learned from this study is that the ethnic environment in which a child finds itself plays a significant part in the way children master the cultures with which they are in contact. For example, the majority of adolescents with an integrated profile lived in mixed ethnic communities. Length of residence also needs to be considered. The younger the children are when they arrive, the easier they adapt to the different cultures with which they are in contact.

Children Returning to Their Countries of Origin: A Difficult Experience

The proportion of young adults who return to their countries of origin is difficult to quantify. However, the few studies that have been conducted on this subject indicate that the great majority of them return. The closer the countries of origin and destination are to each other, the more this observation is confirmed (McKenzie 2006). It is all the more important to stress this in relation to South–South migration, given that intraregional movements are widespread.

The problems encountered by children returning to their parents' country of origin is one of the least studied aspects of child migration. However, this is becoming a social phenomenon of great magnitude in many countries in the South, especially as a result of the economic crisis that began in 2007 and the general return of many economic migrants. In China, for example, a survey conducted by All-China Women's Federation estimated that 3.5 million migrant children returned to their towns of origin in 2009 (Liu and Zhu 2011). The information provided in this part mainly comes from two studies found on this subject: one describing the experience of Chinese children returning to rural areas (Liu and Zhu 2011) and the other focusing on the more specific case of refugee children repatriated to their country of origin (Malawi) after the conflicts ended (Cornish et al. 1999).

¹⁴ Integration can be summarized both by the two cultures being maintained and a desire to integrate into society as a whole.

¹⁵ Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Second-generation Migrants: Difficult Reintegration

Just as we have seen when a child migrates to a destination country, the key problem faced by the child returning to his/her country of origin (or that of his/her parents) is integration into society, the customs of which appear strange to the child, and even foreign if the child was born in another country or who does not remember anything about his/her family's country of origin because they left it when he/she was still very young. These children encounter a variety of circumstances involving re-adaptation depending on the length of their migration, the reasons that caused them to leave, the cultural and social differences between the areas of residence and whether or not they are accompanied by their parents (Donna and Berry 1994). Consequently, for example, children born in the country of destination or who have spent a large part of their childhood there show greater reluctance to adapt to their new environment. In addition, the survey conducted by Liu and Zhu (2011) shows that children surrounded by their parents during this experience have less difficulty adapting than those who return alone, implying the significant importance of parental support. What's more, the majority of children interviewed by Liu and Zhu (2011) who were "very or somewhat dissatisfied with their return" were not accompanied by their parents.

In addition, integration into the educational system and with other children of their age is also vital. However, the majority of returning children taking part in the interviews refer to their difficulty in making friends (Cornish et al. 1999, Liu and Zhu 2011). This may be explained partly by the hostility shown by young children to the "newly returned", especially if the returning child does not speak the language spoken by the other children, or speaks it with a different accent. This has a direct psychological impact on the child, who feels like an outsider in his/her own country and gradually becomes isolated. His/Her school results also decline due to lack of self-confidence. Yet, school is a crucial place of socialization, and must therefore take account of their specific needs so that their integration with other children is easier.¹⁶

Returning may be even more difficult for refugees repatriated to their countries of origin. Rogge (1994) also emphasizes the fact that repatriation is an experience that is as stressful as fleeing from this country, even for the second generation born in the country of refuge, who sometimes find that their new 'home' is a strange, even frightening, place. It is important to take this aspect into account in the context of South-South migration, since the vast majority of migratory journeys that take place there are forced.

Children born in the country of destination generally have more difficulty in integrating into a country that is completely new to them. For the most part, they have adopted ways and attitudes that are different from their compatriots.

¹⁶ This situation may also have security implications. This was the case in Central America, where the mass return of delinquent young adults from the United States coincided with the development of gangs in the 1970s. Most of the returnees, who often did not speak the language of the country (Spanish), gathered in structures similar to those with which they were familiar in the United States. This phenomenon has now become one of the main security problems in this region, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala (Dubreil et al. 2006).

However, it is important to note that returning to the country of origin may also be the result of the child having suffered a bad experience during its migration, or not having adapted to the promised life. In this case, returning is essential for their well-being. This is often also the case for unaccompanied migrant children, due to their feeling of security when they return to their family.

Representation of the Country of Birth at the Heart of the Identity Question

The results of the Cornish, Peltzer and MacLachlan survey (1999) show that the majority of the children who took refuge in Zambia and who returned to Malawi either changed their group identity, considering themselves to be Malawians once they arrived in the country, or were not sure of their own identity. As one of the children interviewed said: “I am a Malawian because I am here, but I still feel Zambian because I was born there” (Cornish et al. 1999, p. 274). The same is true of the Liu and Zhu survey, where a quarter of the children did not consider themselves “to be from the countryside or from the town” (Liu and Zhu 2011, p. 448). These results thus prove that children returning to their countries or villages of origin experience ambiguous and stressful acculturation with regard to their own identities. In addition, it is important to note that the image they create of this place from their parents’ stories has important consequences for them (Cornish et al. 1999). In fact, their place of origin may be idealized, and adapting to the reality of living conditions that are often more difficult becomes a major obstacle to their sense of national belonging. The receptiveness of the host culture therefore influences the way in which children integrate into a society (Berry 1997), this being true both for an emigrant and for a person returning to his/her place of origin. Above and beyond the family cocoon, the role of the reception and support structures once the child has returned to the country of origin must not therefore be underestimated.

Conclusion: The Impact of the Child Migration Study for a Better Understanding of Adult Migration

The purpose of this chapter was not only to demonstrate the scale of the impacts that child migration can have in countries in the South, but also to understand the main themes of this in order to provide a better response to the needs of this particular category of migrants. Paying attention to the reasons and factors driving migration thus becomes an essential issue in realizing that, putting aside Western-centric prejudices, this type of migration may be perceived as necessary, even socially recognized, in societies where intergenerational support, for example, plays a leading role. This chapter has also examined the beneficial effects of migration on

young children, as long as the phenomenon is supervised by protective legislation and takes place in an active family sphere.

Yet the one important question to be asked is: Why should we pay attention to child migration? We have to, because child migration is a social phenomenon of increasing magnitude that has impacts on human development on the one hand, and on the other hand, because the presuppositions concerning this issue do not describe the complexity of the situation. Therefore, it is difficult to track it well for everyone to profit from the many benefits it can deliver.

In addition, it is important to consider the issue from a longer-term viewpoint, bearing in mind that migrant children's experiences have an effect on their way of interacting with society throughout their lives. Consequently, it is not only because the children of today are the adults of tomorrow that it is important to consider them, but also because, in addition to being "beings in the making" (Holloway and Valentine 2000), they are active agents, inventing their culture and their relationship with society rather than learning those of others (Hirschfeld 2002).

Recommendations and Good Practices

Data Collection: Integrating Children as Actors in Their Own Situation

Generally speaking, there is a lack of data concerning the impact that migration can have on children according to the different circumstances they experience. It has been particularly difficult to find data about migrant children returning to their countries of origin, bearing in mind that existing data generally only focus on the "second-generation" migrants who return "to the country".

The active participation of migrant children is essential not only for collecting data but also for the legislation in place concerning them. In his research concerning unaccompanied migrant children, Nugent (2006) states that the voices and experiences of the children themselves are rarely consulted directly when preparing draft laws or in the context of other policy decisions by the American Congress or responsible authorities. He attributes this lack of consultation to "protective paternalism based on the assumption that children are incapable of making an effective and rational contribution to major policy issues" (Nugent 2006, p. 220). On the contrary, instead of seeing them as "adults in the making", it is time to consider them as full economic, social and cultural agents, with their own agenda and prospects (Anderson 1999; Harris 1998; Hirschfeld 2002).

International Protection Relating to the Well-being of the Child and the Family

Each responsible state needs to ratify all the international conventions that refer to the rights of children and the family, as well as those relating to migrants' rights, and to promote their effective implementation at national level.

Legislators must consider the special needs of migrant and returning children who, on the one hand, have the same rights as any other child according to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, and, on the other hand, are affected, directly or indirectly, by the migratory process, giving them special rights that need to be taken into account urgently (Dottridge 2011).

The fight against child smuggling and trafficking must, above all, be a national priority. This involves not only the specific implementation of national and international legislation but also prevention campaigns in order to educate parents concerning the risks their children take during a migratory journey. To achieve this, the media, researchers and activists from a variety of associations must cooperate, for example, by organizing training sessions or discussion forums.

Family unification must be ensured so as not to compromise the benefits of migration. When reunification is impossible due to migration, additional policies or transnational programs must be set up in order to overcome the constraints of separation.

For example, Israel has set up a program for Filipino social workers in order to reinforce links with their families that have remained in the country of origin.¹⁷

The authorities responsible for child protection must review the core of their system: the best interest of the child, and ethical, legal and social basis for all policies or decisions affecting children (Kopelman 1997). The main questions remain: Who determines the child's best interest and how? And, above all, how can this best interest interact with the child's right to express his/her wishes?

Education must be promoted for all: it is the first step towards social advancement and promises better opportunities. UNESCO, on numerous occasions, has recalled its role in children's development and is calling on the international community which, through Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 28 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, has recognized the importance of education as a right with a positive impact at both individual and society levels, to respect its commitments.

Promoting Regional Cooperation

Given the importance of South–South migration, in particular intraregional migration, it is urgent to regionalize policies linked to immigration. Agreements could, for example, be reached concerning the reception and training of foreign labor or insertion programs could be contemplated in towns and regions where there is a high level of immigration.

¹⁷ Global Forum on Migration and Development, Mexico 2010, round table no. 2: Human mobility and development. http://www.gfmd.org/documents/mexico/gfmd_mexico10_general_report_of_roundtable_2_en.pdf.

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