SIMONE RICCA

REINVENTING
JERUSALEM

ISRAEL'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
JEWISH QUARTER AFTER 1967

I.B.TAURIS

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Simone Ricca

To Little Leila

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BSAJ	British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem
CDC	Centre for Development Consultancy
CDRJQ	Company for the Development and Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter
DG	director-general
HRC	Hebron Rehabilitation Committee
ICCROM	International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
LWHD	List of World Heritage in Danger
NGO	non-governmental organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WA	Welfare Association
WHC	World Heritage Committee
WHL	World Heritage List

Acknowledgements

Preface

The driving force that pushed me to step out of my professional career as a conservation architect and to write this book has been the feeling that the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem represented a violent fracture in the long history and evolution of the city. It was the artificiality of this new neighbourhood within the Ottoman city walls that struck me most on my daily visits to the site. But 'artificial' literally means 'made with art', with skill, made according to an idea, to a design; the very perception of the existence of such a plan seemed to call for its analysis.

The Jewish Quarter embodies the 'artificiality' of Israel as a whole – a dream realized, built anew over a short span of time, a utopia made of square, stone-faced houses, of clean well-paved streets, of Western rationality amid eastern 'shapelessness'. The reconstructed neighbour-hood's rejection of the original built environment echoes the overall attitude of the new state to the existing Palestinian landscape; the renewed Jewish Quarter may be considered a condensed version of the entire Israeli experiment.

Built after 1967, following the Israeli conquest of the Old City, the new Jewish Quarter is intimately connected to the ideology that made the creation and development of Israel possible, and proved integral to the earlier state-making phase that had followed the 1948 war. In its formative period the new State of Israel had developed without – and partially in opposition to – the Old City. However, the Zionist call for a 'return to the fatherland' required the full appropriation of Jerusalem – as it represents the most important and powerful symbol of Judaism – and its subsequent transformation according to the plans put forth by the Israeli leadership. It appears then that the Jewish Quarter constitutes an essential and central element for the State of Israel, its special status being confirmed by the widespread support for its reconstruction coming from almost all Israeli political parties and personalities. Indeed,

the new Jewish Quarter is rarely associated with the other East Jerusalem settlements, or with those in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter is often portrayed as the Jewish symbol *par excellence*, the proof of the 'historic right' to the land, the core of the Jewish religious faith and at the same time the heart of the secular state. Israelis saw its destruction under the Jordanians as proof of the need to create the Jewish state, and the city's rebirth as bearing witness to the achievements and possibilities of a modern and rational country. From within this positivist framework, most commentators – foreigner and Israeli alike – would regard it as almost blasphemous to consider it as yet another settlement. Still, the neighbourhood communicated to me essentially the sense of being an artificial island, an inwardly turned *enclave*. It looked to me like the very proof of the 'otherness' at the centre of the Zionist enterprise, just the opposite of the much sought after idea of continuity and rebirth, of a bridge between ancient Israelites and modern Israelis. Its contemporary shapes and conscious use of ancient heritage and archaeological ruins conveyed a message of simplification, of fabrication or, at least, of misplaced rationality. Its small size, and the dramatic contrast between the rebuilt neighbourhood and the rest of the Old City, seemed to affirm the futility of the whole idea, the impossibility of shaping a living and dense city according to an abstract ideological design.

To most visitors walking through its lanes, however, the reconstructed neighbourhood is self-evident proof of the effectiveness of the Zionist project. The rewriting of the ancient and recent history of the site and the complete erasure of the previous reality are not visible, so the new version conveyed by the reconstructed neighbourhood is willingly endorsed.

To the Israelis, the Jewish Quarter is a lively, charming and emotional site; to north-American tourists it is an 'authentic' ancient city and an extraordinary archaeological park connected to the biblical myths that shape their own country and national consciousness; to Jews from all over the world it has come to represent the core of their identity; and finally, and even more surprisingly, to many Palestinians it is seen to be a successful model of urban reconstruction, to be eventually copied and imitated.

Realizing that my feelings and perceptions were not unanimously shared, that, on the contrary, most visitors saw the renewed quarter as a

happy island, a successful mix of modernity and tradition, as proof that modern Israel was not only made of concrete blocks and hilltop projects, but also of imposing stone buildings, forced me to question the whole concept of urban restoration and its inevitable and intimate connection with political ideologies.

This book confronts these contradicting perceptions and sets out to explain why and in what ways the Jewish Quarter reconstruction developed.

Introduction

This is not just another neighbourhood. This is the Jewish Quarter.

Y. Tamir[1]

For Jews, Jerusalem is a national focus and a spiritual religious and historical symbol and vindication. It did not matter if alien conquerors, building evanescent empires, governed it intermittently.

   The Jewish Quarter is the age-old testimony of that immemorial Jewish presence and purpose.

Tourist brochure[2]

We will never again look at a monument or exhibit without posing not only the 'Whose heritage is this?' question, but also the insistent 'Who is disinherited here and what are the consequences of such dispossession?'

J. E. Tunbridge and G. J. Ashworth[3]

In this book I address the interaction between heritage, national identity and the built fabric in the Old City of Jerusalem from the point of view of the impact of the Zionist reading of history on its townscape. By looking at the reconstruction plan for the Jewish Quarter I show that the aesthetic values embodied in the structures, patterns of land-ownership and changes in occupancy in what has become the Jewish Quarter are all the result of an exclusive ethno-nationalist ideology, and not the outcome of a simple urban restoration plan designed to conserve Jerusalem's unique heritage.

   The reconstruction plan the Israelis carried out between 1967 and the mid-1980s is commonly described as having aimed to restore Jerusalem's urban fabric, which, it was argued, had been heavily damaged by wars and Jordanian rule. In this book I examine the urban transformations brought about by the June 1967 war. I focus on the role the new Jewish Quarter played in shaping the national and international image of the

Israeli nation, and highlight the intimate relationship between what has often been considered a purely technical enterprise and the overall campaign to legitimize Israeli rule over the city. By detailing the techniques applied in the reconstruction and their underlying theoretical framework, I aim to demonstrate the predominance of political over technical elements and the relevance of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan within the overall transformation of Jerusalem into the Jewish people's capital and national symbol.

In examining the development of the project and its role in Israeli society, it seems as if its identity-stressing and nation-making aspects constitute the actual rationale of the entire enterprise. This is apparent in the modern architectural features of the buildings designed to represent both the new state and the timeless Jewish presence in the land, in the symbolic and political use of archaeology[4] and in the ongoing financial and political support the plan has received from the highest echelons of the Israeli state throughout the 15 years in which it developed.

I began the research and fieldwork for this book in 1999 during a political phase still dominated by the Oslo framework when it looked as if the future of Jerusalem could be resolved by negotiation; during the years of the Second Intifada, however, discussing the fate of the city looked more like an empty and futile exercise. It is my hope that a deeper understanding of the complexities of the southwestern corner of the Old City might offer new insights into how to find a solution to the issue of the Old City that is acceptable to all parties.

The subject matter of this book touches on many different areas of science and research. It encompasses architecture, restoration, town planning and heritage studies, as well as international relations, politics, history and cartography. Discussing any city is by definition a multidisciplinary task, even more so when discussing urban conservation, for all large-scale conservation plans call for a specific understanding of concepts such as 'national identity' and 'national heritage'. Although there is a rich literature on these issues both in general and in relation to Israel – with particular emphasis on the ideological use of archaeology – there is relatively little material relating more specifically to architecture and urban conservation.[5] Indeed, though it is likely that no other city has been studied as much as Jerusalem, and few cities can claim such a vast literature on every aspect of its life, history, past, present and even future, there is still little work devoted to its Old City from an

architectural and political perspective, and there is almost no published work on the subject of my research – the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem.[6] The Israeli and international architectural journals that covered the reconstruction invariably overlooked the political framework and concentrated only on design and technical matters; on the other hand, although the political use of planning has been meaningfully presented in many books and articles on Jerusalem,[7] these political analyses have failed to address either the architectural scale or the sensitive issue of conservation and urban renewal in the Jewish Quarter. Indeed, the classic texts on Jerusalem pay little attention to the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter. Although in her *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths*, Karen Armstrong pays attention to the 'consequence of 'urban renewal' – a renewal based on the dismantling of historic Arab Jerusalem – that would entirely transform the appearance and character of the city',[8] in focusing on the new extended city borders on the one hand and the demolition of the Moroccan quarter on the other, she gives little consideration to the delicate issue of the Jewish quarter, the complete reconstruction of which is being defined as 'restoration'. In a detailed study of post-1967 Jerusalem[9] Michael Dumper documents the evictions the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter occasioned and discusses the plan's physical limits and political implications. However, he falls short of recognizing the symbolic significance of the rebuilt neighbourhood and does not discuss its architecture. Israeli sources tend to portray the Jewish Quarter project as a successful example of urban restoration and a high achievement by the city's Israeli administration,[10] but avoid spelling out the political dimension of the reconstruction plan.

Issues related to Jerusalem's planning and conservation and their political implications have also been dealt with in a number of studies on UN and UNESCO policy. Most writings on UNESCO's cultural policy towards the Jerusalem issue, however, have addressed the subject from a broader political perspective and have focused on the 'politicization' of the international organization. They refer to Jerusalem mainly in the context of the often tense Israeli–UN relationship,[11] and do not analyse from a scientific and conservation perspective the technical content of the UNESCO reports on Jerusalem and the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan.[12]

However, even if most of the material presented in this study derives from primary research, this book has been greatly influenced by a

number of works that, though not detailing exactly the same subject, or discussing the same area, have actually addressed similar topics. Essential references include the many books and articles written by Meron Benvenisti,[13] who – probably better than anyone else – has been able to present both the physical city and its symbolic and political significance within Zionist and Israeli thought through a soul-searching attempt to analyse his own role in the complex Jerusalem context. The ideas he puts forward in *Sacred Landscape* constitute an important starting point for this book, even though he does not directly address the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter. His cogent description of the creation of the new Zionist map for the land, in fact, can be usefully applied to the Jewish Quarter: a 'townscape' shaped by the Israeli leadership along the same lines.[14] The symbolic value attributed to this site, however, is even higher because the mythical version of the city portrayed in Israeli literature and schoolbooks represents the most important link between modern Israel and its national and religious heritage. The Jewish Israeli identity, a mix of religion and peoplehood so central to Zionist thought yet so elusive to define, finds Jerusalem at its very hub. To question the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, therefore, is to question the whole Zionist enterprise.

Nadia Abu El Haj's research into the political use of archaeology in Israel and in the reconstructed Jewish Quarter relates closely to the subject of this book.[15] However, while her work focuses on archaeology and has an anthropological viewpoint, my research concentrates on the architecture of the reconstructed neighbourhood and on the relationship between heritage, restoration and architecture on the one hand and politics on the other.

'Heritage' scholars like Lowenthal, Tunbridge and Ashworth have also made an important contribution to the development of my research.[16] Their multidisciplinary approach and capacity to categorize abstract concepts that are often difficult even to define, have been a continual help. Indeed, their research questions actions that are generally taken for granted and considered politically neutral, and they challenge most of the choices made by practising architects involved in conservation projects. Recognizing the political significance of all restoration plans and conservation policies has actually been the starting point of this reflection, but the attempt to go beyond a first emotional reaction has greatly profited from the theories they have lucidly put forth. All the

features characterizing the reconstruction works in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, in fact, from the role attributed to archaeology to the final architectural image of the reconstructed houses could, and should, be analysed from a heritage perspective, identifying the modern symbolic values and meanings that have been attributed to the site. Ashworth and Tunbridge's studies have also introduced another provocative idea, namely the possibility of creating heritage as an economic good of utility to the market. Around this revolutionary concept, which reverses the traditional view that there is a given, limited amount of original past 'products' available to be conserved and exhibited, has developed a new discipline they have dubbed 'heritage planning'. The idea that all 'heritage is a product of the present', has been continuously pondered while analysing the Israeli plans for the Jewish Quarter, and the title of this book suggests that the reconstructed Jewish Quarter might be considered a large-scale example of heritage-planning.

At a political level, various analysts of Jerusalem and of Israeli–Palestinian affairs have offered useful insights into Jerusalem's unique situation. Ian Lustick, for instance, provides a cultural and political framework for some of the arguments put forth in the research.[17] Michael Dumper's books and articles,[18] particularly *The Politics of Jerusalem after 1967*, have been both a source of essential data for this study and a methodological guide. The attention he pays to apparently minor details and his capacity to draw conclusions from extensive fieldwork more than from the body of the political literature are impressive. I, in fact, do not deal with abstract political frameworks and philosophic systems. On the contrary, I consciously focus on a limited subject from a technical and practical perspective on the assumption that, from such a plain and clear analysis, which corresponds more to my background and capacity, these same elements appear more lucid. Indeed, even though the subject dealt with is extremely limited in space and time, the questions it implicitly addresses lie at the core of Israeli contradictions.

Given that numerous ancient photographs of the Old City of Jerusalem, which focus especially on the Jewish community and its living quarters, have been published since 1967, images – including drawings, pictures and even films[19] – have provided useful backdrops to the arguments put forth here. These sources should not, however, be naïvely regarded as neutral, objective representations of reality; they too need to be analysed according to the criteria approved for historical

research.[20] The political use made of images is particularly evident in the case of the photographs portraying the Moroccan quarter before its destruction: in Israeli books, rare are the images depicting this quarter and the few reproduced focus on emphasizing its relative decay. In fact, the ideological portrayal of the neighbourhood as a dilapidated hovel contrasts sharply with previously unpublished images I have been able to access in Jerusalem. These images give a more balanced representation of this ancient, inhabited and alive (though partially ruined) quarter of the city before its complete demolition by the Israelis in June 1967. Similarly, an architecturally-focused reading of the many published photographs of the Jewish quarter before 1948[21] shows that its buildings were very similar to the ones of the rest of the city, and that some of the late nineteenth-century Jewish institutions, like parts of the *Batei Mahse* complex, were poorly built and roughly planned.

Images of the reconstruction works after 1967 likewise confirm my central assumption that the plan was not conceived as a restoration *per se*, but rather as a selective reconstruction meant to 'create' a mythical, ancient Jewish Jerusalem. Indeed, the photographs detailing the ongoing reconstruction works are particularly telling: they show heavy machinery at work, extremely hard consolidation techniques and large-scale demolitions; all these elements were confirmed by the many interviews carried out with the architects in charge of the work and by the detailed analyses of the case studies. My own professional background allows me to refute the common perception that all the demolished buildings were ruined and beyond repair. Indeed, neither the planners nor the written sources present scientific evidence of the decay of the original structures: there are no documentary records to show that static analyses were ever carried out, that attempts to analyse the existing deformations were completed and that vault consolidations or foundation underpinnings were considered. It appears that the definition of 'ruin' adopted was based on a personal assessment more than on scientific study, thus paving the way to the selective demolitions and large-scale reconstructions that characterize the new Jewish Quarter.[22] The political implication of these technical remarks is obvious: the reconstruction plan was carried out along the familiar pattern of modern construction, and was never conceived as a restoration.

The architectural features of the reconstructed houses might too be viewed as a political statement and not as a simple design solution. The

conscious choice to create a 'modern' and essentially 'rationalist' architecture in the rebuilt quarter reflects a precise political will of separation and denial of the 'eastern' features of the city and the desire to replace it with a new Jewish city. In particular, the three case studies presented in Chapter 4 highlight the predominance of political and ideological over technical and conservation factors. Apart from the obvious and deliberate erasure of the original urban fabric, represented by the demolition of the Moroccan quarter and the creation of the Wailing Wall esplanade in its stead, the large-scale Cardo reconstruction and the Hurva memorial also reflect the same driving principles directing the overall reconstruction: the creation of a dense and lively new Jewish settlement in the Old City; a settlement whose justification and *raison d'être* was to be looked for in an ancient and mythical past 'created' by the many archaeological excavations dotting the area and by a small number of selected architectural monuments that have been 'restored' and enhanced.

The interviews carried out on site with Jerusalem residents and Israeli officials were an essential source of primary data on the reconstruction plan. They provided both precise references to actual events and the essential hints permitting an appreciation of the unfurling of the reconstruction plan. Among the interviewees were Palestinian and Armenian residents of the Old City directly touched by the expropriation, and the Israeli planners and architects who drew up the reconstruction plan for the Jewish Quarter. The absence of interviews with the Israeli political leaders who initiated the plan reflects a conscious decision to focus on technical matters, privileging the neighbourhood architects' opinions over the often rhetorical speeches of retired and aged politicians.

Finally, the Israeli media have been a last but important source for this research. The newspapers have faithfully reflected the centrality of the reconstruction plan within Israeli society and the attention politicians and public opinion have paid to the Jewish Quarter. The impressive amount of newspaper articles on the reconstruction plan is a direct result of its political and symbolic relevance. All articles on the Jewish Quarter reconstruction published between June 1967 and 1983 (when most of the work was completed) in the English-language Israeli newspaper the *Jerusalem Post* have been scrutinized. These articles offer the reader a lively glimpse at Jerusalem's cultural and political life over this period and make an essential contribution to the research. The information they

provide has been crosschecked, whenever possible, with other written sources and with the interviewees.

The discussion of UNESCO policy in Jerusalem presented in Chapter 5 is based entirely on primary sources. Both UNESCO headquarter archives in Paris and the private archives of the late Raymond Lemaire (special representative of the UNESCO director-general for Jerusalem) in Leuven, Belgium, have been thoroughly examined.[23]

However, this is not and could not have been a study based solely on historic and archival research. It is instead a political analysis of a reconstruction plan based on existing heterogeneous data more than on the 'discovery' of previously unknown material. Indeed, most of the arguments I put forth in this book derive from a different reading of previously published documents. The continuous use of references and quotations in the text explicitly shows that many data were already available, but the specific angle from which they are considered, and their framing into an architectural and heritage perspective, actually transforms them, as the use of heritage and architectural categories and theories is relatively uncommon in political literature.

To situate the research in the wider regional context and to verify specificities and similarities between Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter plan and other urban conservation plans, a comparative study has been conducted that focuses on the interactions between political and technical choices. An analysis of five other sites in mandatory Palestine has helped sharpen my interpretation of the Jerusalem Jewish Quarter plan, while substantiating the main assumption of the research. The discussion of the Palestinian heritage policy is based on my professional experience, while the presentation of the Israeli cities has profited both from the existing literature and from the site visits carried out in the period 1998–2000.

Urban studies is, by definition, a cross-border, complex discipline. In the book I try to cope with this complexity by constantly shifting from one field to another, from one theoretical framework to another. However, to root the research in its actual physical context and to avoid generalizations and over simplifications, I have consciously tried to limit the use of general theories.

The first part of the research was carried out during a prolonged stay in Jerusalem, so thus profited from continuous and direct contact with the site. Though archival material was unavailable, the actual fabric of the neighbourhood was observed intimately through daily contact.

Structure of the book

The argument in this book develops over six chapters, moving from a rapid presentation of the interaction of heritage, history and nationalism with planning and the Jewish Quarter reconstruction, through a discussion of the legal and technical framework that created the new neighbourhood, and ending with a presentation of its actual construction, seen both at the general level and in specific case studies. In the last two chapters I extend the perspective from the local to the international by presenting UNESCO's position on the reconstruction plan and then considering Jerusalem's case in the wider context of urban conservation in the region. A historic *excursus*, presented in the second part of this introduction, briefly recalls the history of the Jewish presence in the city, and sets the context of the research.

In Chapter 1, 'Planning, Nationalism, Heritage and the Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter', I introduce the cultural framework in which the reconstruction was made possible and briefly present the Zionist approach to the city in general and to Jerusalem in particular. I single out the continuous overlapping of the distinct concepts of history and heritage and discuss how the new symbolism of the reconstructed Jewish Quarter is utilized in the Zionist ethos. I focus on the Wailing Wall and its complete transformation after 1967, when archaeology, architecture and planning combined to reshape the physical environment to meet the new needs of the State of Israel. The significant discrepancies between the previous symbolisms connected with this site, and the new meanings the secular state wanted to stress, clearly demonstrate the strict and intimate relationship between politics and urban conservation.

In Chapter 2, 'Creating the Jewish Quarter', I examine the prerequisites that made the plan possible. The legal system that granted the takeover and reshaping of much of the Old City is detailed and the technical background and cultural framework of the architects and archaeologists who worked on the reconstruction plan is discussed. A review of architecture and archaeology in the country (before and after 1948) situates the Jewish Quarter plan within the evolution of these two disciplines, while the last section contains a brief description of the archaeological excavations that preceded and accompanied the reconstruction.

In Chapter 3, 'Building the Jewish Quarter', I address the architectural plans for the new neighbourhood and present both their technical

specifications and economic and social significance. Through an analysis of the architectural plans and regulations, the connection between site work and political ideology is investigated. The physical reconstruction was decided on by Israel's political leadership to create an ancient mythical and eternal Jewish capital. The translation of this political plan into stones and mortar, streets and squares, was made possible through the hegemonic status of Zionism in Israeli society after the 1967 war. The absence of critical questioning and internal opposition, and the complete commitment and wholehearted passion animating the planners made this complex enterprise possible and produced interesting architectural and planning solutions. Though the subsequent fading of Zionism's hold on Israeli society and the first cracks in this previously monolithic structure began to appear in the mid-1970s, the technical soundness and comprehensiveness of the overall design allowed the reconstruction of the neighbourhood to develop along the original plan even within the new political environment created by the victory of the right in the 1977 Israeli elections.

In Chapter 4, 'Building the Jewish Quarter: Case Studies', I detail three specific areas within the Jewish Quarter in order to verify the assumptions made in the previous chapter. The sites of the Wailing Wall, of the Hurva synagogue and of the Cardo, are examined from both technical and heritage perspectives. The analysis of apparently neutral planning choices and the presentation of alternative possibilities, underline the political nature and symbolic significance of the Jewish Quarter plan.

In Chapter 5, 'UNESCO and Jerusalem', I widen the focus from the internal Israeli scene to the international context. The undefined international legal status of Jerusalem, and the State of Israel's ability to alter the international perception of the city's status according to its design, created a complex and unique situation. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization has been involved, since the outbreak of the Six-Day War, in safeguarding the cultural heritage of the city. In this chapter I discuss the capacity and role of UNESCO in monitoring the Old City of Jerusalem and the reconstruction plan. Through a careful reading of official UNESCO documents, interviews with planners in Jerusalem and access to the private archives of the personal representative of UNESCO's director-general for Jerusalem, a complete picture of the often strained international debate that

developed around Jerusalem's cultural heritage and the Jewish Quarter's reconstruction emerges.

In Chapter 6, 'Urban Restoration and Ideology in Israel and Palestine: A Comparative Approach', I shift the focus from the Old City of Jerusalem to other major historic centres of the Holy Land. Comparisons between the Israeli handling of the Jewish Quarter, the Israeli approach to other predominantly Arab heritage sites and the Palestinian National Authority's (PNA's) management of heritage sites, serve to distil the unique characteristics and complexities attendant on the reconstruction of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter. Following a brief introduction in which I consider the fate of the emptied Jewish quarters in the Arab countries, I discuss the policy towards Arab heritage in Israel and the West Bank. In the first section I present Israeli plans for the ancient Arab urban centres – focusing on Jaffa, Safed and Acre – in both their technical and political dimensions; in the second section I discuss the role of Arab historic cities in the PNA's areas. A comparison between the different plans proposed and implemented in cities that originally presented a similar history and a comparable heritage enables one to verify the impact of political and ideological frameworks on the physical fabric of ancient urban centres.

Terminology

The terminology used in this book requires a preliminary commentary and explanation. While discussing the Jewish Quarter reconstruction project, terms belonging to the discipline of architectural conservation are often used. In the introduction it seems important for the clarity of the argument to stress the difference between the often misused terms 'restoration' and 'reconstruction'. A restoration project aims to 'reviv[e] the original concept or legibility of the object. Restoration … is based upon respect for original material, archaeological evidence, original design and authentic documents.'[24] A reconstruction project, on the contrary, entails creating entirely new buildings within historic centres, supposedly capable of better addressing modern living needs and standards. Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter plan, therefore, undoubtedly belongs to this second group. Consequently, the subtitle of the book reads *Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter*, which refutes the frequently used expression 'restoration of the Jewish Quarter'. This preliminary statement, however, does not impinge on the analysis of its political

significance and value. It does not imply, in fact, a moral and personal *a priori* criticism, but simply a technical statement, a starting point for the scientific presentation of the transformation of this large sector of Jerusalem's Old City where the large majority of the ancient structures – both ruined and still sound – have been demolished as a preliminary step for the Jewish Quarter reconstruction. It seems meaningful to notice that it is the expression 'restoration of the Jewish Quarter' that actually carries strong political implications and has an ideological flavour, as it has been consciously used to describe instead the construction of a new built environment for a new group of residents, and to imply 'restoration of the Jewish sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter' according to a partial reading of the diverse history of a multiethnic city. Though it should be unambiguously stated that what took place in the Old City after 1967 – the very subject of this research – cannot be defined as a restoration project according to internationally recognized technical standards and terminology, it is the reconstruction plan and its political significance that constitutes the subject of this book. The subject is not the technical discussion of eventual scientific errors in the implementation of a restoration project, but instead the attempt to clarify the underlying significance of these 'errors'. Though it might be unfortunate that a number of ancient historic structures have disappeared following the Jewish Quarter reconstruction, what concerns us the most is why these buildings have not been deemed worthy of conservation, and why, and how, new buildings have taken their place.

Besides the technical terms, it is important also to discuss the precise significance of other, apparently self-evident and neutral expressions that risk concealing complex and sensitive issues and might lead to serious misunderstandings. The apparently anodyne expression *Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem* requires a preliminary discussion concerning both the word 'quarter' itself, and the term 'Jewish quarter'. A first, linguistic, remark concerns the meaning of the word 'quarter'. According to the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*,[25] its first meaning is 'each of four equal or corresponding parts of something', while the urban meaning, 'district, part of a town', is listed only as its fourth signification. Though this meaning too, originally, referred to one of the four parts of the Roman military camps and cities formed by the Cardo and the Decumanus – the two main urban perpendicular axes of all Roman foundations – it has come to define an urban district without connection to its extension in relation to the

entire city. The actual ambiguity of the term in English,[26] however, creates the misleading impression that Jerusalem's 'Jewish Quarter' always roughly represented a quarter of the area of the Old City of Jerusalem.

A second preliminary remark concerns the use of the term in the scientific literature. The role and importance of 'quarters' in Middle Eastern cities has been the subject of a number of studies on the structure of what used to be defined as the 'Islamic city'.[27] According to this approach the subdivision of the city into separate 'quarters' – along with the irregular street network, the central courtyard houses and the *suq*s – was supposed to be one of the characteristics of the 'Islamic City'. This concept, rooted in the French orientalist tradition, has since been overcome by the researchers and the whole idea of an Islamic city as a defined, specific entity mainly refuted.[28] The evolution of the approach to Middle Eastern cities has led also to a revision of the actual definition of 'quarter', acknowledging the difficulties related to the precise delimitation of such urban areas.[29] Since the 1970s, new definitions have been put forth, like the one suggested by Ira Lapidus:

> The[se] quarters were often homogeneous communities and their solidarity, in some cases, was based on religious identity. Some quarters specialized in certain types of weaving, tanning and other manufactures, but there is no evidence that distinctions of class or wealth were a basis of social cohesion. … Basically they were whole communities made up of notables and commoners both, rich and poor.
>
> … In short the quarters were small, integrated communities. Their close family ties, ethnic or religious homogeneity, economic and administrative unity, quasi-physical isolation and their medi-ating elites, made them villages or village-like communities within the larger cities.[30]

Such a definition, however, cannot easily be applied to Jerusalem's Jewish quarter where, unlike in most Ottoman cities, the majority of Jewish residents had neither an economic activity nor an established presence. While it could be used to describe the original nucleus of the Jewish community in Jerusalem, it does not seem to reflect the situation that developed during the second half of the nineteenth century when Jerusalem's ever-growing Jewish population overfilled its traditional

residential area and expanded into neighbouring quarters, transforming their constituency from mixed or Muslim into Jewish or mixed Muslim–Jewish.

This observation suggests a different perception of what Jerusalem's 'Jewish quarter' consisted of in the second half of the nineteenth century. This confutes the common perception that portrays it as a clearly identifiable, exclusively Jewish space, distinct and set apart from the rest of the city, according to an interpretation that seems to reflect more contemporary political needs and the historic western European ghetto experience than the reality of the Old City. Jerusalem at this time, like most Ottoman cities, was characterized by the presence of a multitude of different religious and ethnic communities partially clustered within the walled city. The residential areas of these different communities were, however, generally not secluded quarters but allowed instead a certain degree of interaction between the communities. In particular, given that the Ottoman Empire was Muslim, it was common for Muslim residents to dwell in and for mosques to be built in mainly Christian or Jewish neighbourhoods. Thus, the term 'Jewish quarter' also may be seen to describe such an environment, a space in which the Jewish community developed while living in contact with other ethnic and religious groups of the city.

Finally, another important aspect cannot be over-emphasized: the area of the 'original' Jewish quarter of Jerusalem, though continuously shifting,[31] never coincided with the one set apart by the Israeli Expropriation Act that has created the new, extended, post-1967 Jewish Quarter. Thus, it appears that using the term 'Jewish Quarter' when discussing the whole southwestern part of the city, is correct only in so far as it describes the post-1967 position, but is misleading when referring to earlier phases of Jerusalem's long history. By putting a Jewish 'label' over the whole area – without temporal limitations – Israeli authorities, officials and researchers have often consciously nurtured this ambiguity and made use of the immediacy of the expression to gain 'historic' and 'moral' rights over this entire urban sector.

The term 'Jewish Quarter'[32] is used in this book to define the zone reconstructed after 1967 (whenever the accent is put on its new borders 'extended Jewish Quarter' is favoured), though its use has been avoided when referring to earlier historic periods. When discussing the pre-1967 Jewish quarter, terms like 'traditional Jewish quarter' or 'ancient Jewish

quarter' are utilized. Though imprecise, and not referring to a precise geographic area, they do clearly show that a different and smaller part of the city is being discussed.

The research focuses essentially on the period between June 1967 and the mid-1980s, when the construction works in the neighbourhood officially ended. However, not only because in certain areas architectural work is still going on but also because the seeds planted during the reconstruction continue to affect present-day Jerusalem, the analysis often extends through to the present. Thus, for instance, the attitude of Ariel Sharon's government to the Hurva design or the transformations of the social fabric of the quarter in the 1990s have also been taken into consideration.[33]

To understand the context in which the reconstruction plan developed after 1967, it is necessary to appreciate the history of the Old City and of its Jewish quarter. In the second part of the introduction, therefore, I briefly consider the Jewish presence and heritage in Jerusalem from the destruction of the Temple to the Six-Day War, suggesting that the minor impact of the original Jewish constructions on the existing urban fabric of the Old City of Jerusalem has 'imposed' the complete replanning of the area in order to adapt it to the new political reality and to Israeli rhetoric.

Historic context

Issues related to demography, and to the relative weight of the Jewish community in the city, have given rise to ideological debates that attempt either to demonstrate the existence of a Jewish majority from an early date, or to minimize the Jewish presence in the city. Rashid Khalidi rightly affirms that the history of Jerusalem may be the most fiercely contested of any city in the world, and that it has become 'one of the crucial arenas where differing modern political agendas for Palestine and Israel compete.'[34]

The aim of this historical introduction is simply to underline, from an architectural perspective, the changes that took place in the traditional Jewish presence in Jerusalem in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, the majority of Jerusalem's centres of Jewish learning and prayer postdate the mid-nineteenth century. As a result, Jerusalem's Jewish built heritage is composed mainly of late nineteenth-century synagogues and public buildings, with only rare construction from

earlier historic periods. The reasons for the absence of further ancient Jewish sites might be found in the limitations imposed by Ottoman rulers on the construction of synagogues, or in the traditionally dismissive attitude of Judaism towards architecture and art. However, this noticeable absence is undoubtedly also due to the limited size (and wealth) of Jerusalem's Jewish community in the past. Jerusalem has never had a Jewish monument comparable to the Christian or Muslim sites that dot the Old City landscape. Furthermore, not only do no such monuments exist but the houses Jerusalem's Jewish community inhabited or owned did not present any outstanding feature or a typical architectural style. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century, when a growing European influence began to challenge Ottoman authority and Great Britain took on the role of 'protector' of the Jews, did Jewish architectural landmarks begin to appear. Israeli sources have often tried to downplay this fact, insisting, for instance, that both the Christian and Jewish sites were constructed in the nineteenth century. Typical of such an attitude is Ben Arieh's *Jerusalem in the 19th century: the Old City*, where it is stated:

> Very few of the numerous public buildings, churches, mosques and synagogues found in the Old City today existed in the early 1800s; most of them were built during the remainder of the century. … Large synagogues were non-existent, except for the inconspicuous Sephardi synagogues in the Jewish quarter. … It should be noted that most of the large Christian monasteries and churches date from the nineteenth century.[35]

Ben Arieh's attempt to put the built heritage of the three religions at the same level is transparent, though unconvincing. Indeed, Muslim heritage (consisting of mosques, *madrasa*s, tombs, palaces and houses) is simply not considered;[36] in an effort to focus on the new religious constructions supported by the European powers the presence and relevance of the ancient Eastern Churches are 'forgotten'. The idea behind such statements, however, is clear: though religious buildings are an essential part of Jerusalem's landscape, they nearly all date from the last century and so all have similar meaning and value. This ideological reading of the city's built heritage is meant to place the scant Jewish constructions on the same level as the architectural masterpieces of Jerusalem.

Though it is obvious that the absence of Jewish monuments in the Old City neither implies the absence of a Jewish presence in the city nor diminishes the strength of Jewish symbolic and religious attachment to Jerusalem, it is noteworthy that the same Israelis have seen the relatively unimpressive and recently constructed synagogues, *yeshiva*s and Jewish-owned houses as an obstacle to their appropriation of the city. Indeed, to justify their control over the Old City, Israeli politicians and authors have often insisted on the age-old Jewish presence, looking for support in archaeological findings or sometimes even falsifying the construction dates of Jerusalem's synagogues, while at the same time insisting on their original splendour.[37]

This Israeli approach is also echoed in many Western descriptions of the city, depicting its unique landscape as characterized by the presence of the domes of mosques, churches and synagogues side by side for the sake of a misplaced will for religious balance and political correctness.[38] Western authors only rarely say that this townscape is but a late nineteenth-century creation and that for centuries there has been no visible architectural trace of the Jewish presence in Jerusalem.

Since the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE until the construction of the imposing dome of the Hurva in 1864, no Jewish building, apart from the striking mass of the Wailing Wall, characterized the city's skyline. This unique site, though, can hardly be regarded as an autonomous, independent Jewish monument, for it was originally built as a retaining wall for the Temple platform and acquired its present religious centrality for Judaism only during the Ottoman period. The absence of a substantial Jewish monumental heritage in the city might help in realizing the symbolic importance of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan – the first ever 'Jewish' building campaign in Jerusalem since Herod's time!

The Jews in Jerusalem before the nineteenth century
Although the symbolic centre of Judaism, Jerusalem was a city without an important Jewish community for many historic phases. Even before the destruction of the Temple part of the Jewish population had left Palestine and Jerusalem to settle in the main centres of the Roman Empire and along the Mediterranean coastline. Following its destruction, Jews were banned altogether from Jerusalem and over the ensuing centuries they only partially and slowly returned to the city. In the fourth century, following Constantine's Edict, the Roman Empire

became Christian and during this period the sites of the death and passion of Christ in Jerusalem were 'identified' and celebrated. Churches and monasteries replaced the pagan temples and dramatically transformed the Palestinian landscape.

During the Persian invasion of 614 CE, the Jews[39] made an alliance with the Sassanids who, after the capture of Jerusalem, left them in charge of the city. For the first three years after the Persian conquest, the Jews were favoured over the Christians, but then the Sassanids reversed their policy, permitted Christians to rebuild churches in Jerusalem and again expelled the Jews from the city. When the Byzantine Empire reconquered Palestine in 628 CE, the Jews were persecuted.

It was only after the Muslim conquest in 638 CE that Jews were freely able to return and settle in Jerusalem. The city was then predominantly Christian and remained so until the Crusades. In this period Jerusalem's Jews used to live in a neighbourhood in the northeastern part of the city, which was later known to Crusaders as *Juiverie*. The Crusaders massacred most of the city's Muslims and Jews, who were once more banished from the city. After Salah al-Din had reconquered the city, the Jews were again allowed to settle there and they began to reside in the area of the present-day Jewish Quarter.[40] In the ensuing centuries, under Mamluk rule, Jerusalem witnessed an intense building and cultural programme to Islamize the city and a large proportion of its residents converted to Islam. Notwithstanding the Mamluks' efforts, the city, the walls of which had been torn down in 1218 CE, remained a relatively small provincial centre, with its religious significance its sole claim to fame. Muslims from all over the world made pilgrimages to it and some, like the Moroccans and North Africans, settled in the Holy City. Even under the Mamluks, however, Jerusalem remained a religious pole for Christianity and many foreign Christian pilgrims visited the city; Jewish pilgrims too travelled to Jerusalem where they found only a small Jewish community. When Maimonides visited Jerusalem in 1267 CE, he could find only two Jewish families there. In the following centuries there was an uninterrupted Jewish presence in the city, but the Jewish community remained small[41] and we know that in 1522 Ramban's was the only synagogue in Jerusalem.[42] Following the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, many *Sephardi* (the Hebrew word for 'Spanish') Jews took refuge in the Ottoman Empire and a Sephardi community was present in Jerusalem. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Jerusalem's

Jewish community developed and grew to become the most important one in Palestine;[43] however, following a great plague at the end of the seventeenth century, it suffered a sharp decline. In 1699 the first group of Ashkenazi Jews arrived in Jerusalem, but 20 years later the whole Ashkenazi community was forced to leave the city by Muslims to whom they owed large debts.[44]

Throughout the eighteenth century, contacts with the centre of the Ottoman Empire remained strong and Jerusalem's Jewish community was often under the direct control of Istanbul. Most of Jerusalem's Jews were elderly and many Jewish pilgrims came there just to die soon after arrival. Only in the 1740s did affluent Jewish householders begin to settle in the city. Jerusalem's Sephardi Jews, who were Ottoman subjects, numbered about 2000 at the end of the eighteenth century and their religious life revolved around their four synagogues. Jacob Barnai has described the life of the Jewish community under Ottoman rule in the following terms:

> Jewish sources tend to emphasize the arbitrariness of the local authorities and the local population in Palestine, but Ottoman sources reveal that the Sublime Porte generally tried to prevent excessive arbitrariness towards the *dhimmis* (non-Moslems). … It would be desirable to compare the status of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire with their status in Christian countries. If this were done, a somewhat different picture would undoubtedly emerge. The Jews all over the empire enjoyed normal economic relations with their Moslem neighbours; moreover they were organized with them in guilds.[45]

The Jewish Quarter in the nineteenth century

In 1837, a strong earthquake severely affected the ancient and important Jewish communities of Safed and Tiberias, forcing many Jews from these cities to move to Jerusalem. According to Ben Arieh, at the end of the 1830s Jerusalem's Jewish population reached 3000–3200 with a large Sephardi majority.[46]

Jerusalem Jews used to live in the ancient Jewish quarter, a constantly shifting area with its boundaries expanding from continuous Jewish immigration and the activity of Jewish merchants in the Old City markets. This area, according to nineteenth-century sources, was among

the poorest and most neglected of the city. The Jewish population, in fact, lived mainly on *halakha* (international Jewish charity) funds, and only a small percentage engaged in manual labour. Most of the Jews in productive work were Sephardis; at the bottom of their community were the so-called *Morisco*s, native-born Jews who spoke Arabic and earned their livings as labourers.

Poor sanitary conditions in the traditional Jewish quarter caused frequent outbreaks of epidemics, notably in 1838, 1847, 1865/6 and still in 1900 and 1905. In the second half of the century, a changed political situation allowed for the creation of Jewish housing projects in the few empty areas left in the Old City. Thus, the *Batei Mahse* complex, capable of housing tens of Jewish families,[47] was founded south of the traditional Jewish quarter to upgrade the extremely difficult living conditions. In the following years most of the Jewish institutions in the Old City were also founded, including a hospital, schools and two monumental synagogues, the Hurva and Tiferet Yisra'el, whose imposing stone domes quickly became a characteristic feature of Jerusalem's skyline. This construction boom testifies to the new political and demographic situation that emerged in Jerusalem in the years following the Crimean War and the capitulations, when European powers began to rule over a larger and larger portion of the population through their consulates in the city. According to Ben Arieh, in 1870 there were approximately 11,000 Jews in Jerusalem (5500 Sephardis and 5500 Ashkenazis), mainly concentrated in an extremely small and crowded area of the city.[48] By the turn of the century this number had grown to as many as 35,000 (in the old and new cities). It should be pointed out, however, that the numbers many researchers put forth for the Jewish population of the Old City at the end of the century seem excessively high in relation to the size of its Jewish-inhabited areas. Some authors have estimated up to 20,000 Jews, which seems unlikely given the relatively small size of the houses. Though per room density in these years might have been extremely high, it should be considered that the present-day 'Moslem Quarter', extending over a much larger area, though overcrowded and overbuilt, is hosting fewer than 20,000 people. It seems, therefore, that the maximum capacity of the Jewish neighbourhood could hardly be estimated at more than 11,000–12,000 people at the end of the last century.[49]

After 1870, a new phase in the history of the city began, with the creation and rapid growth of the new city outside the Old City walls where

the majority of the new quarters were created by and for the Jews. After a first phase in which the Old City residents were reluctant to move, many Jewish residents of the Old City moved out to settle in the more comfortable and healthier new city. The traditional Jewish quarter then began to lose population and shrink in size. 'Thus the development of the Jewish *yishuv* in the Old City came a full circle: from a tiny group of Jews in the early nineteenth century to a flourishing community as time passed, and then back again to a group of dwindling proportions as the New City of Jerusalem grew.'[50]

The Jewish Quarter in the twentieth century
In the early years of the British Mandate, overcrowding in the Old City still constituted a problem and sanitary conditions in the Jewish quarter remained worse than in the rest of Jerusalem; in the following years, however, the Old City's Jewish population 'dropped from 5600 in 1922 to approximately 3000 in the 1940s'.[51] Those who remained there were predominantly the poorest and more religious of Jerusalem's Jews. The most important Jewish public structure built in this period was the *yeshiva* Porat Yosef, a Sephardi institution inaugurated in 1923. This imposing building on the eastern edge of the traditional Jewish quarter overlooking the Moroccan quarter was destroyed only 25 years later in the 1948 battle for the Old City. The British Mandate period saw the continuous growth of the new city outside the walls, where all the new administrative structures and main Jewish institutions were created, and the progressive transformation of the Old City into a periphery. In 1946 the Jewish population of Jerusalem reached 100,000, but only about 2 per cent resided in the Old City.

After the 1948 war a cease-fire was signed (November 1948) followed later (April 1949) by an armistice agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel. According to this, the control of the Old City and its Holy Sites remained in Jordanian hands, though most of the municipal area came under Israeli rule.

The period of Jordanian rule over Jerusalem (1948–67) is widely considered as a time of decadence and relative stagnation. Indeed, the recently created Jordanian state put most of its resources into establishing a national infrastructure on the East Bank and developing its capital Amman, while neglecting the development of the West Bank and Jerusalem. In addition, the years of Jordanian administration saw the

emigration of an important part of the city's Christian population,[52] leaving those remaining Christians to become a small minority. The killing of King Abdullah by a Palestinian nationalist in the *Haram al-Sharif*, and the growing opposition of Jerusalem's elite to Jordanian rule, acted as disincentives against favouring large governmental investments in Jerusalem; still, the city was officially made joint capital in 1959.[53] Since the separation of the city had left most of the modern infrastructure in the Israeli-controlled part, Jerusalem did not attain its pre-1948 level of economic activity until the early 1960s. Jordanian Jerusalem's economy began to develop again in the 1960s thanks mostly to the growth of the tourist industry. Masses of Christian pilgrims visited the city following the development of international tourism, but East Jerusalem also offered its services to thousands of Middle Eastern Arabs (both Christian and Muslim) who used to visit the Holy City or spend their vacations in the nearby Ramallah area, then a renowned upper-class summer resort. During these years, Henry Kendall, a British town planner responsible for the city under the British Mandate administration, prepared a new master plan for the development of Jordanian East Jerusalem, which allowed for rather intensive development just outside the city walls. As far as the cultural heritage of Jerusalem is concerned, the Jordanian government undertook to restore the Dome of the Rock and began to pave the Old City's narrow lanes.[54] In this period, however, the Jewish holy sites within the Old City were ignored or even voluntary desecrated[55] and the traditional Jewish quarter suffered an accelerated rate of decay. The Wailing Wall, from which Israeli Jews were forbidden access, was transformed into an exclusively Arab holy site commemorating Mohammed's magical steed al-Buraq.[56] Towards the end of the Jordanian period, the fate of the ruined Jewish quarter became an object of discussion and plans. According to Israeli sources, the Jordanian authorities contacted a private American planning company to draw up a plan for the demolition of the ruins[57] and the transformation of the area into a public garden. In 1966, some Palestinian refugees dwelling in the ruined houses of the Jewish quarter were evacuated and settled in a new refugee camp[58] created on the northern outskirts of the city in the village of Shu'afat.[59] Following the outbreak of the Six-Day War on 5 June 1967, and Jordan's entry into the conflict, the poorly defended Jordanian part of the city was rapidly conquered by Israeli forces, which occupied the Old City on 7 June. Though relatively

bloody, the conquest of Jerusalem did not cause severe damage to the historic buildings of the Old City.

Conclusion

What emerges from this brief description of the evolution of the Jewish presence in Jerusalem is that, over and above any attempt to define the precise size of the Jewish community, for large parts of the city's history over the past 2000 years the Jewish presence in the city has been relatively minor and discontinuous, a fact reflected in the rare presence of Jewish constructions before the nineteenth century.

It appears, therefore, that the very fabric of the city contradicts the Israeli nationalist vision of Jerusalem as the age-old centre of a vibrant Jewish community. It follows then that, to 'adapt' the city to its image in the dominant discourse of Zionism, the urban physical fabric had to be transformed. The hypothesis of this research is that the reconstruction plan for the Jewish Quarter embodies a will to appropriate this 'alien' Arab city and to reshape it both physically and symbolically to become the 'eternal Jewish capital'. The Israeli Zionist approach to history is in fact twofold: on the one hand, while celebrating antiquity as the period of Jewish national sovereignty it consciously downplays the post-Temple phase in exile,[60] while on the other it celebrates and amplifies the 'continuous' Jewish presence in Eretz Israel (in opposition to the Diaspora). These partially contradictory approaches find their material representation in the reconstructed neighbourhood and in its symbolism: archaeological sites dot the reconstructed neighbourhood, affirming its intimate connection with antiquity, while its rebuilt houses and 'restored' *Sephardi* synagogues (or any other ancient trace of the Jewish community's life in the city over the past 2000 years) are meant to convey a message of continuity and endurance. Seemingly ancient stone details and Mediterranean-inspired cubic blocks faced in 'Jerusalem stone' are meant to represent the continuity, while modern technology and rational planning are meant to depict the achievements of a Jewish state reborn. Thus, the Jewish Quarter attempts to be at the same time a traditional and a modern neighbourhood, witnessing both the rebirth of the state after 2000 years and the 'eternal' Jewish presence in the city. Such a contradictory goal proved extremely difficult for the planners to realize; nevertheless, the architecture of the Jewish Quarter manages to offer also creative and interesting solutions, notably in its

attempt to revitalize the traditional architectural concepts of the central courtyard and roof terrace. Where it fails, however, as we shall see throughout the book, is in its approach to 'restoration' and to the existing ancient structures.

The original buildings that have been demolished to make room for archaeological excavations and new houses were undoubtedly, in the large majority of instances, poorly built and poorly conceived, the results of endless additions and modifications more than of a precise design, yet they managed to convey – in their very chaotic appearance – an image of living continuity that is never obtained by the new structures. The new Jewish Quarter may or may not be considered an important architectural achievement, but it definitely stresses 'modernity' over 'continuity', 'rationality' over 'organic growth', 'planning' over 'natural evolution' and it represents therefore more a rupture than a simple additional layer in the age-old history of the city.

Chapter 1

Planning, Nationalism, Heritage and the Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter

If we ever get Jerusalem and if I am still able to do anything actively at that time, I would begin by cleaning it up. I would clear out everything that is not something sacred, set up workers' homes outside the city, empty the nests of filth and tear them down, burn the secular ruins, and transfer the bazaars elsewhere. Then, retaining the old architectural style as much as possible, I would build around the Holy Places a comfortable, airy new city with proper sanitation.

T. Herzl[1]

Not only does the past shape the sense of locality upon which rests the uniqueness of local place identities, but also the reverse process can now be conceived; namely that places can be structured or planned deliberately to create such associations with a past, for various purposes, and that possibility is the core of the link between heritage and physical planning and place management in what has been defined as the practice of 'heritage planning'.

J. E. Tunbridge and G. J. Ashworth[2]

Zionism, the city and Jerusalem

Jerusalem has always played a central role in Jewish religious tradition, irrespective of how its political and nation-building role in the nascent Jewish state evolved from the late nineteenth century to 1948, from an initial denial to a later centrality within the nationalist discourse. The victory in the Six-Day War and the conquest of the West Bank and East

Jerusalem modified the situation further and, since 1967, the Old City of Jerusalem has been transformed into the cohesive symbol of the modern State of Israel. The progressive adaptation of the city to the changing needs of the Zionist enterprise has underpinned these successive transformations with carefully planned political decisions that have shaped both the New and the Old City of Jerusalem according to the needs of the Israeli leadership. Such adaptations have taken place at both the symbolic and physical levels.

The early theoreticians of the Zionist movement had little empathy for the urban environment in general and for the city of Jerusalem in particular. Theodor Herzl expressed in his *Diaries* the negative impression the city made on him when he visited it on 31 October 1898: 'When I remember thee in days to come, O Jerusalem, it will not be with pleasure,'[3] and his dismay after his visit to the Wailing Wall.[4] Meaningfully, his utopian novel *Altneuland* – whose influence in shaping the future State of Israel should not be underestimated[5] – takes place in a modern and vibrant New Haifa, meant to represent the achievements of the 'New Society', and not in the city of Jerusalem that, cleaned, sanitized and with a rebuilt Third Temple, plays mainly a symbolic role. Similarly, another utopian novel published in 1925 by Boris Schatz, the founder of the Bezalel Academy of Art and Design, is titled *Jerusalem Rebuilt*. The utopian Israeli society of the year 2018 described in this text is an anti-industrial and anti-urban one, in the tradition of William Morris's Arts and Crafts movement and of Owen's socialism. Similarly, Ahad Ha'am (Asher Ginsberg), one of the most prestigious Zionist thinkers, expressed with harsh words his repudiation of Jerusalem and of its inescapable religious connotations.

Indeed, a country that was meant to be, in Herzl's words, a 'bulwark against Asia, serving as a guardian of culture against barbarism',[6] could not easily relate either to the 'oriental' image and essence of the city of Jerusalem, or to its traditional, conservative, religious Jewish community. Zionism centred on the concept of the 'redemption of the land' and on the transformation of Jewish immigrants into agricultural pioneers and there was not, at the beginning, a defined approach to the role, function and shape of the city in the new land. The official rhetoric celebrated the agricultural pioneer, the 'new man', in opposition to the industrial worker, the central figure of European capitalistic development and urban growth. As Ze'ev Sternhell demonstrated, this vision was

more in tune with contemporary nationalist movements than with the internationalist approach of socialism.[7] For most Zionist authors, the past was associated with the image and symbol of Jerusalem, while the future, the brave new world, is represented by the kibbutz or by Tel Aviv, the Jewish metropolis. Zionism's anti-urban ideological orientation, however, was particularly at odds with Jewish settlement in Palestine, for Jewish Palestine under the British Mandate, where eight out of ten Jews lived in cities, was one of the most urbanized 'countries' in the world. Still, the 'new Jew' was envisioned as a farmer and 'conqueror of the wilderness'. Since the beginning, therefore, there has been a fundamental discrepancy between the Zionist movement's ideological orientation and the actual development of the country.[8]

The dichotomy between theory and reality, between anti-urban conceptions and the growth of Jewish settlements in the Holy Land, was reflected in the parallel dichotomy between the two major urban centres: Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

Tel Aviv was not created by agricultural pioneers, but by a different kind of immigrant,[9] a *bourgeois* settler who was not necessarily keen on the Zionist/socialist approach. Despite the enormous efforts of the colonizing institutions, most Jewish immigrants arriving in Palestine settled in neither the countryside nor the kibbutz, but rather in the existing cities. This preference was reflected in the distribution of the Jewish population: in 1945 only about 26 per cent lived in rural settlements and by 1960 this percentage had declined to about 18 per cent.[10] Built on the seashore beside Jaffa,[11] Tel Aviv was established in 1909 and quickly became the centre of the Jewish presence in Palestine and its economic 'capital'; for decades it attracted the largest proportion of Jewish investments in Palestine.[12] For the thousands of new Jewish immigrants who moved to Palestine, thriving Tel Aviv, the 'first Jewish City', quickly became more attractive than old, traditional and poorer Jerusalem. Though these newcomers were not necessarily secular, they could not easily relate to the religious values of the conservative Jewish community then residing in Jerusalem. Moreover, they could not fulfil their needs and aspirations, derived predominantly from European experiences, in what was then an overwhelmingly 'eastern', economically stagnant and religiously and ethnically diverse city. Practical considerations also influenced this ideological preference, for it should be borne in mind that at the beginning of the century Jerusalem was not only traditional

and conservative but also lay 'at the geographical and political periphery'.[13] The absence of safe, modern roads made access to the central mountain region difficult. Thus, the settlement pattern of successive waves of immigration showed a preference for the coastal plain, greatly reducing Jerusalem's demographic weight in relation to the total Jewish population of Palestine. If in 1910 more than 50 per cent of the Palestinian Jews lived in Jerusalem, by 1944 this percentage had decreased to about 20 per cent.[14] Only later, in the period of the British Mandate, with the construction of a modern road and rail network that favoured the extraordinary development of the New City outside the Ottoman walls, did Jerusalem begin to become attractive. To be integrated into the narrative of Zionism, however, the city had to be transformed from a purely religious symbol into a national one.

Jerusalem played a minor role in pre-state Zionism, for all its official institutions were based in Tel Aviv[15] and, at least until 1937,[16] the secular elite of the *Mapai* did not consider it the self-evident political centre of the Jewish state. In the ensuing years, however, the importance of including the growing Jewish population of the city in the nascent state – and to connect it with the coastal Jewish settlements and cities – gained momentum within the Zionist leadership. Yet, in 1947, the Jewish Agency accepted the UN Partition Plan proposing the internationalization of the city, thereby *de facto* endorsing the creation of a Jewish state without Jerusalem. It appears then that the Zionist leadership was ready to give up control of the city in exchange for the creation of the state in a first phase, and to divide the city – leaving all the holy sites under Jordanian sovereignty – in a second stage,[17] when, according to Ian Lustick, though 'Jewish sovereignty over something that could be called 'Yerushalayim' was crucial to the Zionist movement', its actual physical limits were not defined.[18] In 1948, the Zionist leadership seemed more interested in conserving control over Mount Scopus (the symbolic seat of the first Hebrew University, which was meant to reproduce the state elite) than in controlling the Wailing Wall or Jewish quarter in the Old City.

Though for years the city did not represent a real target for the Zionists leaders, Jerusalem's symbolic appeal to the world Jewry was so strong that the secular Zionist leadership could not simply forgo the city. On the contrary, it had to enrol it for the cause. A new approach to religion was needed to consolidate the Zionist hold over the *yishuv*.

While traditional communities in Palestine generally refuted Zionism as an almost blasphemous doctrine, religious Zionists consolidated new ethical and traditional values. Religious Zionism had a positive attitude to modernity and affirmed 'the belief that the Zionist enterprise in general and the establishment of the State of Israel in particular … reflects in some special way the will of God. It signals … the beginning of the promised redemption for the Jewish people and ultimately the whole world. The State of Israel, in other words, has special religious significance.'[19] Following the whirlwind victory in the 1967 war, this new religious interpretation gained momentum, attracting also traditionally anti-Zionist religious groups into the Zionist sphere. In the process, these communities developed a new sensitivity capable of integrating the previously distinct nationalistic and religious thoughts.

A deep transformation of the ultra-orthodox (*haredi*) ideological approach on Jerusalem, and on Zionism in general, in the ensuing years led 'most *haredi* parties [to] favour continued Israeli control of the city',[20] while the few remaining anti-Zionist sects (like the *Neturei Karta*) have been more and more marginalized.

Urban planning and the creation of the Jewish capital

The first years after the creation of the State of Israel saw the rapid growth of its population from around 650,000 in May 1948 to about 1,015,000 at the end of 1949. This mass of new immigrants needed to be settled quickly. The first solution had been to relocate them in the houses the Palestinians were forced to leave in Jaffa, Haifa, Lod, Be'er Sheva, Ramla, Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias and Acre, as well as in some smaller villages.[21] During the 1950s, however, to accommodate the immigrants and build up the country Israel put large investments into new housing and new cities. 'Development towns', in fact new towns built mostly on previously Palestinian-owned land, were perceived of as the primary mechanism with which to achieve three national goals simultaneously – to disperse the population, absorb the immigrants and provide security and defence.[22] Since the early 1950s, 27 development towns and more than 100 *moshav*s, mainly for settling poor *Mizrahi* immigrants, have been built in the country. Architecturally, these new constructions and cities were unsatisfactory, mainly because of budgetary constraints, and, according to Amiran Harlap, 'the body of work produced in the first decade after the establishment of the state …

was by and large noted for its dearth of inspired solutions.'[23] At a political level, however, they followed a precise plan. The central state organized and directed the settlement strategy according to the interests of the dominant secular Ashkenazi elite. Oren Yiftachel notes that the decision to disperse the country's minorities to peripheral areas reflected, besides the simple accommodation of newcomers and security, the wish of the population's ruling class for segregation.[24] In these master plans the settlement tendencies of the first, mainly Ashkenazi, immigrants had to be reversed for the new, mainly *Mizrahi*, immigrants. Thus, newcomers were actually kept away from the fertile coastal plain and large cities, and forced to settle in the country's poorer, sparsely inhabited regions. According to Oren Yiftachel, the spatial segregation of minority groups, along with the separation of education systems, has been one of the mainstays in allowing the Ashkenazi elite to maintain control over the entire state.

In the 1950s Israeli master plans proposed transforming the country's polarized urban structure into a more even and 'rational' set of urban settlements that would include the whole range of urban concentrations from small villages to cities. This planning effort, however, was not based on a sound analysis of the real needs of the new country but rather on the simplistic application of a set of planning rules copied from European countries. The huge social problems the forced settlement of new immigrants in isolated and depressed 'development towns' created were neither recognized nor addressed until the Black Panthers' urban revolt forced the State of Israel to confront the urban issue in the 1970s.

Following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the central government played an ambiguous role *vis-à-vis* the development of Jerusalem. On the one hand, it attempted to demonstrate to the world its control over the city by building the institutional structures of govern-mental authority, but on the other, following the traditional Zionist approach, it privileged other priorities – especially the even distribution of the Jewish population and settlement in the Arab-inhabited Galilee and in the Negev desert[25] – over urban development in general and over the growth of the 'capital' in particular. After the 1948 war, Jerusalem was divided into two completely separate halves under control of two 'enemy' countries. Located at the very border of the State of Israel, the self-proclaimed capital of the new state proved unsuitable for the massive settlement of the immigrants, as reflected by the relatively slow

growth of its Jewish population between 1948 and 1967 that passed from approximately 100,000 to 197,000.[26]

However, in these years the new capital was built and its symbolic meaning and importance continuously stressed. A specific effort was made to create new secular symbols in the western part of the city where traditional religious landmarks were not to be found. To mark the city as the capital of the state,[27] the zone of Givat Ram, a hill in the centre of West Jerusalem, was selected as the site for public administration and institutional buildings, while Mount Herzl became a national memorial, a kind of alternative pilgrimage site, in the new Israeli city. Mount Herzl had a national secular character, while the sites that remained out of reach in the eastern section of the city, like the Temple Mount/*al-Haram al-Sharif* and Mount of Olives cemetery, were traditional religious sites. The process of symbol creation was completed in 1953 when the *Yad Vashem* memorial, commemorating the *shoah*, was inaugurated in 1959. With it, the State of Israel created for itself a 'holy place' of its own in West Jerusalem, a counterweight to the traditional sites that remained in the eastern, Jordanian-controlled part of the city.[28]

The Israeli victory in the June 1967 war and the conquest of the Old City and West Bank completely modified the situation. The totality of Jerusalem, including its traditional Jewish religious sites, passed into Israeli control.

The reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter has been but a part, though the most symbolic and emotional part, of an overall plan the Israeli government and the Municipality of Jerusalem enforced after the 1967 war. The deported mayor of Jordanian East Jerusalem, Ruhi al-Khatib, meaningfully described the political, economic and administrative steps that have transformed East Jerusalem's human and physical landscape as the 'Judaization' of the city.[29] The guidelines for the future development of the city were outlined in the first weeks after the war (and possibly even before the war).[30] At the city council session that took place on Sunday 13 August 1967, Mordechai Ish-Shalom, former mayor of West Jerusalem, said: 'We desire and wish … that Jerusalem will forever have a clear Jewish stamp on it. … That is to say: many Jews for this city – for the western part and the eastern part, and within the walls of the Old City.'[31] Since then, many new and gigantic quarters for Jews only, planned and built on expropriated East Jerusalem land, have transformed the image and demography of the city according to Israel's will and strategy.

The 18 April 1968 expropriation of 29 acres of the extended Jewish Quarter was one of the first in a series of Expropriation Acts culminating in the 20 August 1970 order whereby the state seized 4200 acres, an area almost three times larger than Arab East Jerusalem prior to 1967. The redefinition of the city boundaries and the creation of a system of densely built settlements forming concentric belts around the city were among the first priorities of the new regime. The area included in the new municipal boundaries stretched to the north to incorporate the Jerusalem airport. It comprised all the hilltops and most of the reserves of empty land owned by Palestinian villages in the vicinity of the city, while most of the villages to which the land belonged and their Palestinian populations were left outside the new city limits.[32] The criteria for the definition of the new city boundaries – possibly conceived of as likely future borders of the state – were unmistakably based on demographic and military concerns. As Michael Dumper noticed, however, this was not a new approach. Indeed, British Mandate city boundaries, which included all the Jewish settlements around the Old City but avoided taking in a number of Palestinian villages, were already drawn according to similar political/demographic concerns.[33] In this case, however, as Benvenisti observed, the new and arbitrary city boundaries have extended not only the surface area of Jerusalem, but also its religious significance for Jews, to far-away villages and fields that had never before had any symbolic association with Judaism.[34] Thus, the symbolic role Jerusalem was to play was in effect the issue at stake. Since the very first days following the conquest, the city was called on to play a 'national' and 'nation-making' role. During the same city council meeting quoted above, the very idea of 'adapting' the city's past and present to the new political situation – so that Jerusalem could better fulfil its new function – was already addressed by several speakers, who explicitly underlined the importance of 'education' to 'explain' the city according to the new cultural and symbolic framework.[35] The political role the 'unified' capital was called on to perform, imposed its extensive growth and the rapid settlement of thousands of new Jewish residents in far-away settlements, but these suburban settlements – spread over the hilltops surrounding the Old City – found their *raison d'être* only in relation to the symbolic sites of the Old City, the reconstructed Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall. Only its full appropriation could allow the extension of its significance to the new, remote, city boundaries. The

transformation of the suburbs, therefore, was accompanied by the transformation of the Old City itself.

In 1973 a new development plan for the 'Old City basin' was proposed; its main, though never explicitly stated, goal was to reduce the Arab population within and around the city walls. Arieh Sharon, Eliezar Brutkus and Eldar Sharon prepared it, in coordination with the 1968 master plan, not as a detailed plan but as the central authority's sectional master plan, which, as such, bypassed the municipality of Jerusalem.[36] According to this scientific and apparently neutral study, the population of the 'overcrowded' Muslim Quarter had to be thinned out. The maximum tolerable number of residents within the Old City was considered to be 20,000,[37] but the Jewish population immediately surrounding it was meant to be greatly augmented. Indeed, as Sarah Markovitz observes, 'Planning is not a mechanical, rational and independent process, but one that is intimately linked to politics. The goals and actions prepared by planners are not value-free; whether intentionally or not, each policy allocates public resources to the benefit of one group of people and at the expense of another.'[38]

In preparing the Old City plan particular attention was paid to defining and identifying the few remaining empty areas in its dense urban fabric. Three such zones were pinpointed: the Armenian garden, the Patriarch Pool and the Burj al Laqlaq area. Though the latter was reserved for public gardens and parks,[39] it seems possible to affirm – with the insight of what has subsequently happened elsewhere in the city – that it had already been identified as a zone suitable for the creation of new housing for Jewish settlers. Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s the Israelis defined areas as 'green' and then reversed their zoning destinations once a new development became possible to build both the religious settlement of Reches Shua'fat near the northern limits of the city and the Har Homa settlement in the vicinity of Bethlehem.[40] The crisis that arose between 1996 and 1998 when a group of settlers attempted to build a new neighbourhood in the Burj al Laqlaq area might actually confirm the long-term implications of Sharon's study.[41]

In addition to the expropriation of land and the reconstruction of almost one-fifth of the Old City to create the new Jewish Quarter, the architectural and political characteristics of which are discussed in this book, many semi-public initiatives to settle the Old City with new Jewish inhabitants have taken place since 1967.[42] The main aim of these

initiatives has been to adapt the city's character and identity to fit the national rhetoric portraying Jerusalem as a 'Jewish City'.[43]

Heritage, history and ideology

The 'adaptation' of the city to the new political situation, however, has been pursued not only through planning, expropriations and settlements, but also through transforming myths associated with Jerusalem and its symbolic significance. In their analysis of the role of myth in the nation-making process, Hosking and Schöpflin[44] remind us that a 'myth is a set of beliefs put forth as a narrative, held by a community about itself' and that 'members of a community may be aware that the myth they accept is not strictly accurate', but observe that:

> For a myth to be effective in organizing and mobilizing opinion, it must, however, resonate. A myth that fails to elicit a response is either alien to the community or inappropriate at the time when it is used. … It seems that there are clear and unavoidable limits to invention and imagination, and these are set by resonance. This is significant because it underpins the proposition that myth cannot be constructed purely out of false material; it has to have some relationship with the memory of the collectivity that has fashioned it.[45]

In the case of Jerusalem the presence of the traditional Jewish quarter in the Old City has been consciously used as 'resonating material'. On this historic basis, a whole set of myths has been pasted to stress its uniqueness and boast its importance. Indeed, most of the categories of myths Hosking and Schöpflin list in their myth taxonomy may be recognized in the case of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter. Notably, what they define as 'myths of territory', 'myths of unjust treatment', 'myths of rebirth and renewal', and 'myths of ethnogenesis and antiquity', have been used to create a new bond between the Old City and the modern state. Heritage studies further develop these concepts paying specific attention to the use of heritage in defining national identity. The starting point of these reflections lies in recognizing the fundamental opposition between 'history' and 'heritage'. According to David Lowenthal, 'history is the past that actually happened, heritage a partisan perversion, the past manipulated for some present aim.'[46] Though other authors push the debate further and question the very nature of 'history' by inserting a

three-level system separating the 'past' from both 'history' and 'heritage',[47] what appears evident is that:

> Charges that heritage perverts the past, even if true, are [therefore] pointless. Heritage and history are closely linked, but they serve quite different purposes. …
>
> Heritage links us with ancestors, bonds neighbours and patriots, certifies identities, but it is also oppressive, defective, decadent. … Breeding xenophobic hate, it becomes a byword for bellicose discord. … In domesticating the past we enlist it for present causes. Legends of origin and endurance, of victory or calamity, project the present back, the past forward.[48]

In recent studies focusing on the concept of heritage, another provocative element has been introduced: the possibility of creating heritage as an economic good of utility to the market through a carefully designed 'heritage planning' strategy. Indeed, as Tunbridge and Ashworth observe, 'heritage is a product of the present, purposefully developed in response to current needs or demands for it, and shaped by those requirements.'[49] This concept might usefully be applied to the analysis of the choices made by the Jewish Quarter planners. The demolition of most of the remaining houses in the Jewish Quarter,[50] for instance, might have been unnecessary on technical or economic grounds – it would have been cheaper to repair them – but was necessary in order to allow the Jewish state to appropriate the space symbolically. The ideological dimension of the reconstruction plan, based on the conscious 'use' of the urban heritage of the city, was what made the demolition of the previously existing structures necessary. It was because these houses, which were so similar to the 'Arab' houses in other parts of the city, did not fit in with the version of the past the planners wanted to create and show to the Israelis and the world. The will to 'create' Jewish heritage in the Old City of Jerusalem, to 'invent' a Jewish city, was what made the demolitions necessary; it was how the Jewish Quarter could be transformed into a townscape reflecting the nationalist discourse of Zionism. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that: 'The relationship between nationalism and national heritage is obviously intimate but whether as a cause or effect is much more difficult to disentangle. A national heritage depends upon the prior acceptance of a national history.'[51]

Even so, the planners needed and sought intellectual support and justification for their demolition/reconstruction plan. In this respect, archaeology was identified as key to obtaining national and international support. Archaeological excavations had to stress and produce the eternal link between the city and its Jewish identity. Archaeology therefore had to 'rearrange reality itself' to convey the ideological message of the return to the fatherland.[52] Such a message needed to stress the singularity of the city for the Jews and could not deal with a more prosaic reality. The architectural environment of the rebuilt quarter, therefore, had to deal with these principles and images, more than with the reality of a rundown, poor and modest urban fabric. The renewed quarter had to become the symbol of the nation; its new houses had to 'resurrect' from the ruins a faraway and mythical past to symbolize the future of the Jewish people and the rebirth of the national Jewish state. The effectiveness of this strategy, and its grip on the Israeli public, might be inferred by the widespread and continuous references to the supposed 'splendour' of the 'original' neighbourhood that was destroyed in 1948. Such references dot almost all publications about the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter as well as Israel's Supreme Court ruling that excluded Palestinians from the reconstructed area.[53]

To present the new Israeli-controlled Old City of Jerusalem to the world calls for some graphic representation of the city. Since 'maps are never value-free images and cartography has always been a "science of princes",'[54] new sets of plans were produced to justify and demonstrate Israel's historical rights to the site. While Israeli historians working on the evolution of the Jewish Quarter have always been careful to steer clear of plans, the general public are often shown simple and apparently rational maps that divide the Old City according to Roman perpendicular axes that show four roughly equivalent quarters labelled Christian, Armenian, Jewish and Muslim, a schematic but not politically-neutral definition essentially reflecting a twentieth-century creation.[55]

Most contemporary Israeli-made maps are designed to convey a simple message to visitors: Jews have always occupied a large part of the city and it therefore now rightfully belongs to the State of Israel. Indeed, through the visual images they portray maps are often influential in creating and sustaining notions of historical situations, and they tend to be taken for granted.[56] It is tempting in this regard to refer to a brief study on the impact of ideology on the ancient maps of Jerusalem[57] and

to apply its conclusions to contemporary Israeli representations of the Old City. In 'Ideology and landscape in early printed maps of Jerusalem', Rehav Rubin alerts the reader to the importance of ideology in the choice of terms and names written in maps. Notably, he points out how anachronistic it is to use terms like *Templum Domini* and *Templum Salomonis*, which date from the Crusades, to describe the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa mosque in the sixteenth or eighteenth centuries; at the same time he clarifies the implicit ideological stand of such a choice, which is to ignore the Muslim rule over these sites. It is almost too simple to compare these remarks with the universal substitution of the term *al-Haram al-Sharif* with the no less anachronistic 'Temple Mount' or 'Mount Moriah' on Israeli maps. Quoting from Rubin's conclusion, we might therefore say that 'these maps are an interesting series of cases of the preference of ideology over reality' and agree with him in considering that 'these maps serve as medium of communication which transfers mainly ideology, concepts and symbols of the Holy City as it is in the eyes of the [European Christian] Israeli map-makers.'[58]

Similarly, the numerous Israeli-published photographic books on the Old City depict only a selected and partial view of it.[59] This is particularly evident, for instance, in the almost complete absence of any representation of the Moroccan quarter, as if it really, as Teddy Kollek and the official propaganda implied, consisted of mud huts; or in the disproportionate attention paid to Jewish life and presence in the city.

The new symbolic meaning of the 'restored' Jewish Quarter

The superimposition of new myths and symbols on pre-existing traditions is particularly evident in the conscious attempt to transform the character of the Jewish connection with Jerusalem from a religious to a secular, nationalist and Zionist one. Such a transformation entails creating new symbols and modifying the existing poles of attraction that had to be integrated into the new cultural framework proposed by the State of Israel.

The fracture between the ruling Zionist elite and Jerusalem's traditional religious community was deep and apparently unsolvable. To many Jewish fighters defending the quarter during the 1948 siege, the attitude of a large part of its original inhabitants appeared incomprehensible and unacceptable. The non-Zionist stand of many religious Jews deeply hurt the men who fought in the city. Vague echoes of this

polemic surface periodically in articles and books, but the standard and commonly accepted version of events avoids reference to any fracture within Jewish society – inside or outside the city walls. Jerusalem's Jewish community is commonly portrayed as united and with a Zionist national consciousness. From a book review in the *Jerusalem Post*, however, we learn that in the Jewish Quarter under siege life:

> wasn't all heroics and the writer, honest, gives us an occasional glimpse of that [*sic*] old inhabitants, the cellar-dwellers, who had to be alternatively cajoled and threatened to send a few of their number to help transfer a [*sic*] wounded or bury the dead and who had sometimes to be forcibly prevented from raising the white flag. Because they were angry old men who, so they said, 'didn't even want this war', who, so they shouted, had 'always lived here in peace and quiet with our Arab neighbours. The Zionists are to blame for all this trouble. In whose name did they establish a Jewish State? What is the point of annoying the Arabs and the whole world?'[60]

In a recently submitted Ph.D. thesis on the Jewish quarter during the 1948 war, we even discover that 'some of the quarter's residents had considered remaining in the Jewish quarter under Arab rule'.[61] These scattered examples, showing that reality was more complex than the black and white Zionist description of events, help us understand why the 'restoration' of the original Jewish Quarter has never been either a priority for the planners or their ultimate goal. Rather, their efforts represent a sort of fig leaf covering up the profound rereading of both ancient and recent history represented by the creation of the new Jewish Quarter.

Within the overall plan, a minor detail, the change of some original street names in the reconstructed Jewish Quarter, offers further proof of the fracture between the pre-1948 neighbourhood and what came about after 1967. The renaming policy reflects the change in the population and the new symbolic value the new Jewish Quarter was to perform. The trend to simplify street names – as an elderly resident returning to the neighbourhood euphemistically explained[62] – was indeed a necessary complement to the planned alteration of the area's original religious significance in an attempt to transform it into a national symbol that

would appeal to all segments of the Israeli Jewish population. Thereby, renaming streets in the Jewish Quarter acquires its true meaning: *new* Hebrew names were needed to create a *new* bond between the *new* inhabitants and the *newly* built quarter. The Israeli citizens called to live in the area were meant to be as remote from the prestate religious community as from the Palestinian inhabitants of the rest of the city. Though the matter of renaming Palestinian cities, streets and natural sites, both before and after 1948, had been widely discussed,[63] the Jewish Quarter's pattern was somehow different and more subtle. In this case the substitution was done not only at the expense of traditional Arabic names, but also at the expense of historical Jewish names. This renaming campaign, however, adopted the same logic and was implemented by the same elite that ran the larger renaming campaign that has erased the memory of the Palestinian landscape. Actually, the names of the streets in the new Jewish Quarter were changed according to a double – sometimes conflicting – logic. On the one hand the goal was to soften its religious character, while on the other it was to extend the area's Jewish 'identity' from the edge of the ancient Jewish quarter to the new boundaries of the expropriated area by adopting Jewish names for all the streets. Thus, the names of lanes that used to cross 'Muslim' and 'Armenian' clusters acquired more 'acceptable' Jewish names. Critically, this renaming activity has sometimes been limited to the newly added Hebrew street signs, while the original English and Arabic street signs have continued to bear the previous names.[64]

A similar approach, deliberately downplaying the religious symbolism associated with an area while creating a new secular relationship with the site in question, has also been followed for the most important monument in the expropriated extended Jewish Quarter – the Wailing Wall. As Danielle Storper-Perez notes,[65] after the reconstruction the wall added traditional religious appeal to the militaristic symbolism previously attached to the Masada fortress. But how did its symbolism evolve?

The Wailing Wall area was set apart only during the reign of Sulayman the Magnificent in the sixteenth century. It used to be a small, stone-paved courtyard (of about 120 square metres) in front of the wall and enclaved within the fourteenth-century Muslim Moroccan quarter. Indeed, its importance to Judaism is less ancient than is commonly thought. We know, for instance, from ancient Jewish pilgrims and

travellers, that in 1481 the Mount of Olives (outside the Old City) and not the Wailing Wall was the place dedicated to the annual commemoration of the destruction of the Temple.[66] F. E. Peters, in his comprehensive collection of travellers' and pilgrims' documents on Jerusalem, observes that it was only from the early sixteenth century that Jewish visitors described the Western Wall and connected it with the earlier tradition of the 'Presence of God'.[67] Even the 'official' history of the wall by Ben-Dov et al. openly states that for hundreds of years there has been no mention at all of the wall in the written sources.[68] By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the Wailing Wall's importance to both the local Jewish community and the entire Jewish Diaspora was beyond question. However, it had an exclusively religious significance and leading Zionist personalities like Ahad Ha'am even considered the traditional image of Jews praying at the Wailing Wall a disturbing sight.[69] The Zionist movement has used the well-known and evocative image of Jews praying at the wall since its inception. Delegate cards for early Zionist congresses, for instance, had it on one side and a modern picture of a pioneer working the land on the other. As Rachel Arbel observed,[70] these two contrasting symbols were complementary, for the wall represented the old, religious and traditional world.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, what used to be a purely religious site was transformed into *the* central issue in the ongoing conflict and both orthodox and secular Zionists began to celebrate the wall.[71] During the period of the British Mandate, it gained increasing importance and became not only the traditional site of religious devotion but also acquired a distinguished place in the national political struggle. Tensions at the wall were already present in 1911 when the Ottoman administrative council passed a resolution that forbade Jews to bring chairs or screens with which to separate women from men in the narrow courtyard in front of the wall.[72] Jewish challenges to the status quo at the wall continued and intensified throughout the 1920s. The resulting tensions culminated in an outbreak of violence known as 'the Wailing Wall incident' in August 1929.[73] A demonstration at the wall by militant Zionist groups triggered rioting that resulted in the deaths of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs. Despite an official prohibition by the Mandate authorities, Jewish nationalist rallies continued to be held at the wall throughout the 1930s and 1940s.

With the 1948 war and expulsion of Jews from the Old City, the

significance of the wall changed once again when the Jordanian authorities tried to minimize the relevance of the site to Jews and stressed its uniquely Arab and Muslim dimension. A Jordanian postcard of this period,[74] for example, portrays a Palestinian woman in 'traditional' dress walking along the Wailing Wall.[75]

After 1967, the State of Israel wanted to present an image of Jerusalem that fitted its political aspirations and vision of history. Thereby, principles such as 'the unity of the Jewish people' and its 'realization in the Jewish state' could be boosted by an engineered use of the Wailing Wall symbol. A large propaganda effort was made to celebrate the wall and to stress its importance to Judaism: a number of pseudo-scientific books on the Jewish Quarter and the wall were published,[76] while new 'traditions' were developed and new meanings attributed to the wall. In a 1971 *Jerusalem Post* article, for instance, we might read:

> *Tisha B'Av* at the Western Wall is becoming ever more *an international Jewish Holiday* and ever less a day of mourning. To the tens of thousands of Israelis and tourists who swarmed to the Old City last night when the fast commenced, The Wall was obviously more of a reminder of the Israeli victory four years ago, than of the Jewish defeat and destruction of the Temple 1901 years ago.[77]

The Western Wall offered Israel an amazing opportunity to strengthen its link with the Jewish Diaspora and to forge a unity between all the different components of its society. It was possible to present it as a site to attract Israeli and Diaspora Jews, secular and religious, Ashkenazi and Sephardi, soldiers and *Hasidim* alike. In order to become the universal and eternal symbol of Judaism, however, alternative Jewish traditions and critical voices expressing perplexity about the 'worship of stone' or the gendered partition at the wall had to be silenced. Yeshayahou Leibowitz sharply criticized the new attitude towards the wall and the State of Israel's use of it as a symbol: 'Twenty years ago, neither those who practise the *mizvot* nor, obviously, those who do not, paid any attention to or thought about the Western Wall. Why, after 2000 years of Jewish life, on the seventh day after the Six-Day War, should a new Judaism suddenly appear with the Western Wall?'[78] Leibowitz sees the elevated status of the Wailing Wall in post-1967 Jerusalem essentially as a provocation against the Arabs, for the wall *per se* has no religious

meaning – a statement also endorsed by the Reform Judaism movement, which refuses to attach any religious significance to the wall.

To become universal and accepted by all, the symbolism of the wall had simply to be modified slightly. Linguistically, this was achieved in English by substituting the traditional term 'Wailing Wall', with its focus on what has been lost, with the more neutral 'Western Wall', while at a rhetorical level the accent had to shift from the evocation of the destruction of the Temple to national renaissance. This strategy, developed since the 1920s, has been highly successful and after the Six-Day War the Western Wall undoubtedly became the central altar of the Israeli state. Religious and non-religious Israelis attach extraordinary importance to the wall, which represents for them both a sanctuary and a monument.[79] This carefully planned double dimension is physically represented in the plaza.[80] The space in front of the wall is composed of two distinct zones – the praying area, which, under the aegis of the rabbinate is the focal point of traditional religious devotion, and the remaining government-controlled part of the plaza, now the centre of so-called Israeli 'civic religion' (military parades, swearing-in ceremonies, a place to commemorate soldiers fallen in war, Jerusalem Day and so forth).

Archaeology became the tool with which to create a consensus and to stress the new secular significance of the site. Through archaeology it has been possible to affirm the 'historic right' to the land and erase traces of its Arab past. In this extremely sensitive site, however, archaeological excavations have created tensions and opened a deep fracture between secular and religious Israelis, showing how delicate is the balance between the diverse elements with which the state was playing, and how fragile their coexistence in the celebration of the wall.

Fractures between the planned 'national' symbolism attributed to the wall and its actual use, already appeared in 1974, when the traditional character of the celebration re-emerged after a few years in which the commemoration of *Tisha B'Av* (the ninth day of the month of Av, the date that traditionally commemorates the destruction of both the First and Second Temples) had taken on a more secular dimension.[81]

With the progressive fading of 'civil religion' and of the entire Zionist narrative, new religious communities, often extremist and sometimes devoted to the dream of constructing the Third Temple, have reappropriated the Western Wall.[82] These groups do not represent a return to

traditional forms of religiosity, but represent entirely new political subjects whose ideology and symbolism greatly differ from any previous tradition. The new religious residents and students of the Jewish Quarter, including a significant presence of foreign, born-again Jews, are not ready to reopen discussion on the symbolic value of the new neighbourhood and do not acknowledge the difference between them and the original Jewish inhabitants of the Old City, some of whom were Arabic-speaking and relatively integrated into the social fabric of the city. The 'master commemorative narrative'[83] that created the new Jewish Quarter as the symbol of the continuity between the ancient past and the modern Jewish state, still holds on, though it is now shared by a different constituency.

In June 1969, two years after the demolition of the largest part of the Moroccan quarter – the neighbourhood that for centuries had stood in front of the Wailing Wall – the complex of buildings known as 'Abu Saud houses' was demolished. An interesting example of Mamluk architecture and a well-known element of the city landscape and history, was removed to enlarge the excavation area and to free the access to the *Haram al-Sharif* for the Israeli army in case of troubles.

The reason for this act should be examined for the use of heritage by the Israeli authorities. Once again, as with the destruction of the entire Moroccan quarter and with the partially ruined houses of the Jewish quarter, the architectural and historic value of the buildings was not recognized and even 'scientifically' negated.[84]

Indeed, the very definition of Israel as a Jewish state somehow implies that its national heritage has also to be Jewish. It can easily follow then that all that is not specifically Jewish might (or should) be removed. Urban landscape may be ignored and new 'facts on the ground' created to compete with the other facet of history we want to minimize, or simply demolished and replaced with a more suitable one, as in the case of the Abu Saud houses. With respect to the Wailing Wall, typically, we should ponder the questions Tunbridge and Ashworth ask in the preface to their *Dissonant Heritage*: 'We will never again look at a monument or exhibit without posing not only the "Whose heritage is this?" question, but also the insistent "Who is disinherited here and what are the consequences of such dispossession"?'[85] The answers are all too obvious: Palestinian heritage has been erased, both from the physical map and from the map of memory, and the consequences of this dispossession have buttressed the Israeli claims on the city. The transformation of the

wall area has managed to erase the complexity of history and the embarrassing presence of other people's heritage from centre stage.[86]

A similar strategy, consisting of purposefully denying the importance of the city's non-Jewish heritage, was applied with less success in another controversial case: the so-called 'Little Wall' courtyard in the Old City. When the ceiling of an underground tunnel (being dug by the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs along the *Haram al-Sharif* wall), following the natural bedrock gently sloping from north to south, intersected the modern level of the city, serious damage occurred to some of the finest examples of Mamluk architecture in Jerusalem and the digging was halted. In the debate that took place at the Knesset on Wednesday 16 February 1972 concerning the damage the tunnel had caused to the buildings above, most speakers regarded the Mamluk structure of Ribat Al Kurt as a 'slum' of no 'historical significance' 'that should be pulled down'.[87] In the same parliamentary session, Rabbi Kahane, leader of the extremist Jewish party *Ka'ch*, moved the debate to a theoretical level by questioning the authority of the archaeologists (consulted by the municipality on the consolidation project for the damaged houses) to assess the 'historicity' of the Arab houses in comparison with the Jewish 'historicity' of the wall.[88] What was at stake, obviously, was the role of heritage in shaping the city's future. The language, the rhetorical technique and the reference to dubious 'traditions' that were put forth in this case, might be usefully compared with the Israeli descriptions of the Moroccan quarter.

Following the demolition of the Moroccan quarter, a violent debate developed between the religious authority (represented by the Ministry for Religious Affairs) and the secular establishment. The present-day undefined plaza in front of the Wailing Wall is the result of a long and not yet concluded 'war' between two opposed components of Israeli society. The decision to consider the area facing the wall as a synagogue, for instance, has imposed a precise set of behavioural rules considered aggressive not only by a large stratum of Israeli secular citizens, but also by a large number of foreign Jews interpreting differently the religious precepts. '"You know," I said, "certain kinds of Jews think it's better for men and women to pray separately, so there's a fence at the Wall that divides the men's side from the women's side." "Well, if I can't be with you," she promptly responded while squeezing my hand tighter, "I don't want to go".'[89] The young girl's refusal symbolizes the secular elite's

attitude to the progressive transformation of the Jewish Quarter into an orthodox enclave. Turning their gaze from their very creation, secular Israelis avoid addressing the inescapable contradictions of their society.

It might be interesting to remember the words of Meron Benvenisti:

> By restoring Masada as a secular alternative to the Temple (which in any case was not then in our hands) we, as it turned out later, unleashed forces that would demand the restoration of the true symbol of religious and national unity – Mount Moriah – the Temple itself. …
>
> The genie we flirted with during our desert hikes came out of the bottle. Masada, the direct link we forged with our distant, heroic past, had been replaced by Mount Moriah.[90]

Conclusion

The rise of an Israeli perception of the city of Jerusalem and the mending of the fracture between secular Zionist attitudes and religious approaches to the Holy City have brought extraordinary and long-lasting changes to the built form of its Old City. While before 1967 Israel opted to create alternative 'holy' sites to commemorate its establishment, the conquest of the West Bank and of the Old City of Jerusalem gave Israel a chance to relate directly to the hard core of Judaism and its most celebrated symbols. A new interpretation of Jerusalem's actual physical townscape enabled the Israelis to turn a large part of the Old City into an Israeli stronghold shaped according to the will of the secular Ashkenazi elite. The transformation of the Jewish Quarter from a poor, run-down religious area to a showcase of the state's achievements took place during the ongoing creation of an Israeli landscape organized around the new cities and the creation of a nationalist narrative capable of including most of the old *yishuv* in the Zionist mainstream. The multifaceted bonds, discussed in this chapter, linking heritage to nationalism and ideology to the built environment, in fact represent the underlying framework of this research focusing on the reconstruction of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter. Issues like the 'historic right' to the country or, even more important, the very concept of the 'Jewish people' as portrayed in the Zionist discourse, found in the Old City of Jerusalem an obvious support and an extraordinary symbolic reference. The recover/creation of an 'ancient' Jewish Jerusalem has allowed for the unification of most

Jewish groups and communities, in Israel and in the diaspora, under the Zionist banner. The post-1967 euphoria that brought to Israel hundreds of thousands of new, privileged, immigrants, would not have been possible without the integration of Jerusalem, the Jewish symbol *par excellence*.

Chapter 2
Creating the Jewish Quarter

If we are speaking about how we are obliged, and this is crucial, to settle as many Jews as possible within the Old City … we come to formulate and plan old Jerusalem. … I understand that we must build beautiful flats and buildings, of course in the particular style of old Jerusalem, and with all modern cons, in order to attract settlers. But at the same time we must keep the old lines as they exist today.

M. Z. Druk[1]

I am not so certain about the wisdom of rebuilding the Jewish Quarter itself, as a Jewish Quarter. …

Wouldn't Jerusalem's universal humanism be better served by the tearing away of divisions between different groups rather than a reconstruction and glorification of these differences?

S. Tagore[2]

The legal framework and the land confiscation

The unique symbolic relevance of the Jewish Quarter to the State of Israel, and the fact that it has been shaped not only by technical criteria but also, or mainly, by ideological and political choices, can be inferred from the particularly favourable conditions created for the reconstruction plan since its inception. The expropriation of the whole area for 'public purpose', the creation of an *ad hoc* public body to manage the work, the freedom to select architects, the almost unlimited budget and the incorporation of archaeology into the project are all proof that the Jewish Quarter was not just an architectural and conservation plan, but something much more important and vital for Israel's ruling class. The government's decision to implement the reconstruction, and the complete public (namely Israeli Jewish) control over the plan, confirm its importance and make it representative of the state's own conception

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of history, national identity and aesthetics. The Jewish Quarter might thus be seen as an ideological statement meant to represent (and justify) the existence of the state and therefore, in turn, is essential to understanding the Israeli political approach to Jerusalem.

The significance of the apparently self-evident expression 'Jewish quarter' has already been discussed in the Introduction. In this section attention will be focused on the original boundaries of the traditional Jewish quarter. The preliminary survey of the expropriated area for which the new extended Jewish Quarter was planned was carried out by architect Ehud Netzer[3] for the Company for the Development and Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter (hereafter CDRJQ) in 1968.[4] This document formed the basis for the reconstruction master plan prepared, between 1968 and 1970, by the same Netzer in collaboration with two other architects, Joe Savitzky and Arie Sonino. In the report, the expropriated area was defined as 'close to the maximum extension of the Jewish quarter in the past', in voluntarily ambiguous terms.

According to most researchers, the boundaries of the area, which changed considerably in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are difficult to define.[5] The significant Jewish population that had lived in the Old City at the end of the nineteenth century started renting out houses in many other neighbourhoods and along the Al Wad road. These new Jewish residential areas, close to the core of the Jewish quarter, however, neither changed the ownership pattern nor managed to alter much the characteristics of these traditionally Muslim and Christian neighbourhoods. In addition, the penetration of new Jewish immigrants was not uniform: there were, for instance, almost no Jews living in the heart of the Christian quarters, or in the nearby but completely separated and exclusively Muslim-inhabited Moroccan quarter.[6] Nevertheless, the latter was not spared. On the contrary, ten months after its almost complete demolition in June 1967 it was officially expropriated and incorporated into the new extended Jewish Quarter.[7] The area set apart by the Israeli Expropriation Act included many small clusters and entire 'quarters' that had never belonged to the traditionally Jewish-inhabited part of the city. It mostly followed the simplified and alien subdivision that nineteenth-century Western cartographers had proposed for the city, namely dividing it into four clearly defined religiously and ethnically homogeneous quarters.[8] To this large area, Israeli planners added entire blocks lying west of Al-Husur Street (renamed Habad Street), in what they used to

call the Armenian quarter, applying in this case a different principle, more suitable to their goals.

The criteria utilized to define the precise geographic borders of the area have never been disclosed. According to an Israeli source, the zone set apart was essentially 'the area that had been damaged during the war because Jews inhabited there',[9] but this seems unlikely. According to interviews with residents of the Old City, contemporary historical sources and newspaper articles, it is apparent that entire compounds in the Armenian quarter like Ja'ouni, Bashiti and Anabousi, which once hosted tens of families and which Palestinian Arab families owned and inhabited, were expropriated.[10] What factors were taken into account in allocating an urban area to the Jewish Quarter?

The simplest solution would have been to base the decision on Jewish ownership of the land and of the houses, or on the original limits of exclusively Jewish precincts, or simply to have included the area that the Jewish forces defended during the siege of the Jewish quarter in the 1948 war. For obvious reasons, however, no such criteria were followed. Indeed, it is known that the large majority of houses in the present-day Jewish Quarter were Muslim *Waqf*s or private Arab properties. Furthermore, evidence of Muslim families living alongside Jews in Jerusalem is apparent from the existence of at least two mosques in addition to the religious sites of the destroyed Moroccan quarter, as well as from the tombs of Muslim holy men within the expropriated borders. Finally, the area in which the 1948 siege took place is much smaller than the one that has been expropriated. It seems as if the only criterion used to delineate the borders of the new extended Jewish Quarter has been to seize as much land as possible, taking care, as far as possible, not to interfere with Christian properties and Muslim shrines: a criterion based on the balance of power more than on cultural or historic arguments.[11]

The artificiality and ambiguity of the new boundaries of the Jewish Quarter are clearly evident even from the Israeli authorities' own maps of Jerusalem's Old City. In the many leaflets, tourist guides and books published by the CDRJQ and other official bodies, these borders differ substantially. Maps designed for the masses of tourists and pilgrims mainly show the classical and western partition of the Old City into four quarters (plus the *Haram al-Sharif* area) and do not include the new Jewish Quarter borders. Such maps, often in bright colours,[12] are the

most commonly available graphic documents about the city and it is interesting that their borders differ from those of the expropriated and reconstructed area.

Other, more technical, maps show the work carried out by the CDRJQ. They include, therefore, only the upper part of the extended Jewish Quarter and not the Wailing Wall esplanade and adjacent archaeological excavation area.[13] Indeed, notable by its absence is the lower part of the city, previously containing the Moroccan quarter and empty fields, which had never been identified as part of the traditional Jewish quarter prior to the CDRJQ project.

Finally, there are maps that define the Jewish Quarter according to the limits of the expropriated area and therefore include under the caption 'Jewish Quarter' both the Wailing Wall zone and the areas within the Armenian quarter.[14] Still, some use a two-colour presentation to differentiate the Wailing Wall esplanade and excavation area from the main bulk of the Jewish Quarter.[15] Furthermore, some borders common to all these Israeli maps actually conceal complex and unresolved issues. For instance, the maps quoted above all consider the straight line of Bab al-Silsileh Street as the northern boundary of the Jewish Quarter. The presence of buildings that were never expropriated along and near Bab al-Silsileh Street, such as the Moroccan Zawiya or the Khalidi Library, remains unaddressed on these maps.

This brief survey of the maps of the Jewish Quarter underlines the ambiguities related to the precise definition of the historic limits of the Jewish quarter. A recently published Palestinian map offers a sort of mirror interpretation of the same concept. To draw attention to the effects of Israeli expropriation, a Welfare Association map presents an extremely small 'traditional Jewish quarter', the surface area of which appears diminished for symmetrical political reasons.[16] The imprecision of this Palestinian map, and its ideological function, is confirmed by the way in which it erroneously identifies the Moroccan quarter with areas that did not belong to it.[17] Indeed, no plan can give an acceptable border to the traditional Jewish quarter; not only is the term elusive, but its borders shifted continuously, first with the massive Jewish immigration in the nineteenth century and later, from the beginning of the twentieth century, with outmigration from the Old City to new neighbourhoods outside the city walls.

Nevertheless, a map published by Amélie-Marie Goichon in 1973

offers a more balanced description of the situation in the southwest corner of the Old City.[18] Within the expropriated area, this map lists, in addition to the 'Jewish quarter', other 'quarters' that were traditionally Muslim, though during some historic periods had been, or predominantly were, Jewish-inhabited. An official Jordanian document, presented at UNESCO in 1978, offers a rather detailed index of the 'quarters' that have been incorporated into the new Jewish Quarter: 'In Jerusalem, there is a neighbourhood called "the Jewish Quarter", which, before 1967, consisted of five separate neighbourhoods: (a) the Moroccan (North African) quarter, (b) the Ash-Sharif quarter, (c) the Bab al Silsilah quarter, (d) the Darj al Tabouna quarter, (e) the Jewish quarter.'[19]

That Jews inhabited much of the city during the nineteenth century following the massive immigration of Jews from Europe and the Ottoman Empire does not imply that land and house ownership automatically shifted to the city's new Jewish residents. Most Jews in fact rented their houses from Muslim (seldom Christian) private owners or from the same Muslim *Waqf* administration that nominally owned the largest part of the city.[20] Though the limited number of Jewish-owned properties might also be explained by the restrictions the Ottoman Empire imposed on foreign citizens (in this case Ashkenazi Jews) who were not allowed to own property and had to pass through Ottoman middle-men to buy it until the 1860s, in reality the immigrants, mostly elderly and poor religious Jews, seldom had the economic means to access ownership. In *Jerusalem in the 19th century*, Yehoshua Ben Arieh, citing nineteenth-century Jewish sources, confirms that 'the Jewish Community as an entity owned almost no public buildings or institutions at the beginning of the nineteenth century.'[21] According to Benvenisti, only about 20 per cent of the houses in the quarter (albeit with unclearly defined boundaries) were Jewish-owned.[22] Moreover, the Jewish-owned properties were not necessarily clustered in a single contiguous space. Many were scattered among Muslim-owned and inhabited courtyards and quarters and, therefore, even knowing the precise location of Jewish-owned properties would not necessarily help one to define the size of the original Jewish quarter.[23] According to Tibawi, of the 700 buildings expropriated, only 105 were Jewish-owned on the eve of the 1948 war. Of the remaining 595, 111 were public and 354 private Islamic *Waqf*s, while the remaining 130 belonged to private owners.[24]

The CDRJQ forcibly expelled from their homes the thousands of Palestinian residents and owners who lived in what has become the Jewish Quarter. According to the Israeli architect Moshe Safdie,[25] this was the company's first task and Benvenisti confirms that the pace of the reconstruction depended on the rate at which the Arab population was moved out.[26] The eviction of residents and owners from their houses was often obtained by means of heavy pressure and harassment. This attracted the attention of the Israeli and foreign press, which covered many dramatic cases.[27] The extent to which these evictions from the Old City created new refugees is, however, less well covered. Israeli sources, attempting to minimize the impact of the press campaign condemning the forcible evictions, portrayed these Palestinian residents as squatters with no right whatsoever to the houses they occupied. Israeli government statements claimed that a large majority of them accepted the compensation Israel offered and willingly moved out of the area. To strengthen the correctness of their position, these sources[28] compared the Israeli action with the expulsion plan carried out by the Jordanians only a few years earlier in 1966, when about a thousand Palestinians who had taken residence among the ruins of the Jewish Quarter were relocated to the newly created Shu'afat refugee camp.[29] Palestinian sources, on the contrary, point out that there were many dramatic and documented cases of Palestinian owners who had been living in their houses for generations being forced to leave by the Israeli authorities. The issue is in fact rather complex. It should be considered that, as the limits imposed by the Expropriation Act were not based on historic evidence, different categories of Palestinian residents have been affected by the expropriation. The total number of evicted residents is generally estimated at more than 5500. Among this large group a rough subdivision is possible. The evictions concerned:

❑ the 650 residents of the Moroccan quarter;
❑ the owners and residents of traditionally Arab houses in Muslim clusters contiguous to Jewish areas;
❑ refugees expelled from West Jerusalem in 1948 who found shelter in the emptied Jewish properties of the old Jewish quarter;
❑ immigrants (mostly from the Hebron region) who moved to Jerusalem and settled in the poorest and less appealing areas of the city, often among the ruins of the Jewish quarter; and

❑ new squatters who moved into the houses left by the people the Jordanian authorities forcibly evicted from the quarter and settled in the newly created Shu'afat refugee camp.

Each group responded differently to the pressures the Israelis put on them to leave the area and, moreover, responses varied within each group. Some residents accepted a small amount of money to leave; others refused all compensation and fought legal battles in Israeli courts to keep their properties; still others were simply forcibly evicted without an opportunity to make a public statement. The case of the *mukhtar* of the Moroccan quarter whom the Israeli authorities evicted twice from two different houses was particularly dramatic.[30] The first time was in June 1967 when his house in the Moroccan quarter was razed, the second in 1977 when the CDRJQ confiscated and renovated his new house in the Armenian quarter. The official notification of the compensation the Israelis offered for his demolished house in the Moroccan quarter estimated its value to be only 200 Jordanian dinars, an obviously derisory sum.[31] Finally, to whatever group the residents belonged, they were all evicted with the official approval of the highest Israeli court.[32] In the (in)famous sentence against Mohammed Sa'id Burkan,[33] a member of one of the last families to be evicted, the three justices, Cohn, Shamgar and Bechor, confirmed the 'legality' of the whole endeavour in a document that captures the spirit of the reconstruction plan.[34] Pertinent paragraphs from the text of the sentence deserve to be quoted *in extenso*. Justice Cohn wrote:

> I have not been convinced that the respondent's requirement that the lessors of the apartments be Israeli citizens who served in the military or new *olim*, amounts to discrimination on grounds of religion or nationality, or any other kind of wrongful discrimination. … *The restriction to citizens who served in the army alone is reasonable in view of clear security considerations.*[35]

Justice Shamgar added: 'The issue before us is not a matter of equal rights to housing, as the petitioner endeavoured to present it, but rather *concerns the right of governmental authorities*, and the public corporations that assist them, *to restore the ruins of the Jewish Quarter* of the Old City of Jerusalem[36] and:

> When the Old City *was liberated* in the Six-Day War, the government decided *to revive its previous splendour*, that is *to restore the Quarter and raise it from its ruins, and to populate it with Jewish inhabitants* so that it again would become part of the mosaic of the other congregational quarters of the Old City, as it was *throughout the many centuries* before the expulsion of the Jewish population by the Jordanians in 1948.[37]

The Court concluded with a quotation from a previous sentence (High Court, 275/74, *Bass vs. the Minister of Finance*, not published): 'The Government decided to restore the Quarter and populate it with a Jewish community, so that it be a place fitting to its *historical, national and religious significance*, one which is unequalled in Israel and the entire world.'[38]

The 'splendour' of the poorest neighbourhood of the city, the houses and synagogues of which the same Israeli planners and architects did not deem worthy, could easily be dismissed as rhetoric; however, the question of the 'historic, national and religious significance' of the traditional Jewish quarter deserves further examination. Instead of describing the pre-1948 situation, the above expression effectively defines the objectives of the reconstruction project and could be considered a planning directive. The political and ideological logic behind the process of planning the Jewish Quarter became explicit when the last Arab inhabitants were expelled and banned from returning to the area because it was set apart for Jews. Ethnic cleansing was not new to Israel's approach to Palestinians, but the value of the acts in the Old City was higher and therefore these acts were justified with language proclaiming a higher set of values. Thus, a unique and 'historic' bond with the city was invoked jointly with the traditional argument of the 'historic rights' of the Jewish people to the property. 'This is the Jews' city and whenever they have the chance, they return and rebuild it. … *The Arabs were only subtenants* and did not care much about the property, *now the real tenants have come back and we take proper care of this city*.'[39]

Israeli commentators have often compared the evictions from the Jewish Quarter with the parallel expulsion of Jewish squatters from the nearby Yemin Moshe neighbourhood.[40] Though this other 'restoration' project had many points in common with the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, it misses the ethno-nationalistic component. It is not by

chance therefore that left-wing Israeli intellectuals compared the two and failed to recognize the differences. Admitting them would have had far-reaching consequences, whereas criticizing the relatively common pattern of gentrification in urban rehabilitation was considered to be a correct focus for their social concern.

Implementation of the reconstruction plan and execution of the entire renewal operation were entrusted to a special body (the CDRJQ) established by the Israeli government and reporting directly to the ministerial committee on Jerusalem. This quasi-governmental organization, actually a '*societé de droit privé commercial, mais à capital public émanant de la ville et de l'Etat*',[41] also took on the role of a police force to evict the residents. According to Palestinian sources, it was run and planned almost as a military organization and many of its officials had close ties with the Israeli security apparatus.[42] Founded in 1968, the CDRJQ was first directed by Yehuda Tamir, who organized the work and determined the overall strategy for the entire reconstruction project. According to architect Yochanan Minsker, Tamir, with his personal commitment, assertive personality and connections in the country's highest political circles, was the key figure in the success of the operation. Still, as we shall see in the next chapter, he was forced to resign following a scandal about the allocation of apartments that would erupt in 1974.[43] The company was meant to attract public funds for the reconstruction, thus moving away from a purely market economy approach; it used money from the Israeli government, like most of the other Kollek-created quasi-governmental organizations, but was able to bypass governmental restrictions and procedures.[44] These organizations facilitated quick and active action without cost to the taxpayer, but were not submitted to public scrutiny and control so permitted many administrative abuses and a high level of cronyism. After Tamir's forced resignation, various public figures were nominated to the role of chairman of the CDRJQ, but none ever achieved Tamir's status.[45]

The complex administrative structure responsible for Jerusalem, in which the Municipality of Jerusalem was just one actor and control of economic resources was almost exclusively in the hands of the central power, allowed the Israeli government to play a key role in developing the city and, notably, in reconstructing the Jewish Quarter.[46] In the mid-1970s, however, responsibility for the quarter passed from the Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem to the Ministry of Housing. This shift,

though confirming the 'settlement' nature of the reconstruction, also reduced the relevance of the Jewish Quarter project to the central authority.

The role of the CDRJQ should have ended with the completion of the reconstruction, but in fact the company continued to operate even after the end of the architectural work. Once the technical and constructive part of the project was over, the role of the company evolved and for years the CDRJQ officially managed the properties with a reduced budget and staff. During this period, though keeping a low profile and working in a climate of secrecy, it continued to play a political role as one of the tools the state used to purchase properties for Jewish settlers in other quarters of the city and in nearby Palestinian villages.[47] Under the government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu the entire structure was officially revitalized, and its deeds once again covered by the Israeli media.[48] Particularly controversial were the April 2000 sales of public properties to orthodox private institutions, which led to the removal of the CDRJQ offices and archives to a new location away from their original place in the Jewish Quarter's Rothschild House.[49]

In the following part of this chapter I shall step aside from the political process to take a closer look at architecture and archaeology in Israel, the two disciplines that contributed most to shaping the project. To get a better grasp of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction project, it is necessary to broaden the focus from the Old City of Jerusalem in the late 1960s to the wider question of the evolution of these disciplines. This perspective from afar helps situate the choices that were made in the Jewish Quarter in a cultural context and in the meantime to highlight the reconstruction plan's influence and long-lasting effects on these fields.

Israeli architecture: from prefabrication to restoration

A team of young Israeli architects carried out the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter with hardly any external international help.[50] The built environment they produced there is often considered to be one of Israeli architecture's highest achievements and a turning point in the country's architecture. But from where did its architects and planners come? What were their cultural references? What role has architecture played in the evolution and creation of the Jewish state since the early twentieth century? And, finally, what connection has there been between Israeli architecture and Zionist theory and practice?

The first Jewish settlers in Palestine looked to create a new 'Jewish' style in the arts. The artistic renaissance was considered a necessary complement to the establishment of a Jewish national home (and then a Jewish state). Boris Schatz, a Lithuanian Jew working as court sculptor for the King of Bulgaria, was among the active promoters of this cultural and aesthetic renaissance. Schatz apparently proposed his first idea of a 'Jewish Art Academy' to Theodor Herzl himself, then, influenced by the ideals of the Arts and Crafts Movement, moved to Jerusalem to realize his dream.[51] The result of his efforts was the inauguration in 1906 of the first Jewish art academy, the Bezalel Academy of Art and Design in Jerusalem. The name of the school derived from the name of the biblical craftsman Bezalel, creator of the *menora* in the Tabernacle, and its goal was to create an authentic Jewish artistic style, reconnecting the immigrants to their ancient Semitic roots while strengthening their national consciousness. In his novel *Jerusalem rebuilt*, published in 1925 in the tradition of Herzl's *Altneuland*, Schatz describes a utopian Israel of the year 2018, and imagines the city of Jerusalem with a Third Temple on Mount Moriah and its public buildings crowned with glass domes.[52] During the 1920s the school's style developed a new sensitivity to the landscape and its Arab residents were reinterpreted as the heirs of the people of the Bible. The mainstream Jewish approach, however, developed along the lines of Western Orientalism, and 'the Arabs and the Eastern Jews served as models for imitation for the creation of a "new" culture which continue[d] to define itself in European terms'.[53] In architecture this looking 'to the East'[54] was evident in a number of buildings from the 1910s and 1920s.[55] During the period of the British Mandate Jewish architects slowly abandoned this path – British architects were wanting instead to create a colonial style – and started to reject both decorative elements and oriental features.[56] In the 1920s, the arrival of a generation of German and European-trained architects[57] fascinated by the possibilities and aesthetics of modern architecture, had a huge impact on the small, provincial local artistic and architectural community. This new generation definitely shifted the attention of the Jewish architectural community from 'eclecticism' and 'Orientalism' towards the Modern Movement. An 'ideological' reference for such a development might be found in Theodor Herzl's *The Jewish State*, in which he foresaw the use of new constructive techniques for the buildings of the new country: 'If we wish to conduct building operation, we

shall not plant a mass of stakes and piles on the shore of a lake, but *we shall build as men build now*. Indeed, we shall build in a bolder and more stately style than was ever adopted before, *for we now possess means which men never yet possessed.*'[58]

The Bauhaus school's principles were introduced to the Jewish architectural community in Palestine in the 1930s by architects arriving from Europe[59] and especially by Arieh Sharon, a Palestinian Jew trained at the Bauhaus school. The influence of the international style on developing *yishuv* architecture is still strongly felt in present-day Israeli architecture. As Michael Levin remarked, 'consciously or not, contemporary architecture seems to revert to the catalogue of shapes and solutions of the 1920s and 1930s.'[60] Although there are some important works by Mendelsohn and Kaufmann in Jerusalem, the most striking examples of Modern Movement architecture in Israel are found in Tel Aviv.[61] Over the last 20 years there has been a systematic re-evaluation of this style throughout the world; Tel Aviv's most famous international style buildings have been restored and the city has acquired international recognition for its Mediterranean-flavoured Modern Movement monuments.[62]

Arieh Sharon's professional career, at first in direct and continuous contact with the Zionist establishment and later with Israeli governmental bodies, is a perfect example of the achievements of Israeli architecture. Indeed, it might be said that his personal conceptions became the 'Israeli approach' to building and architectural theory.[63] He played an important role in official planning and architecture, created the first architects' association in Israel (in association with Rechter and Karmi) and ran one of the most important and successful firms in the country. In his last years he collaborated with his son Eldar and elaborated the reviled plan for Jerusalem, which the Jerusalem Committee bluntly rejected.

The importance of architecture in shaping a society is widely recognized and architecture is often seen as a mirror of the society that has produced it, yet political analysts and architectural critics have generally paid little attention to Israeli architecture and only a few buildings in Israel have ever attracted international recognition.[64] One of the main features of Israeli architecture, from the first years after the creation of the state through to the early 1980s, was the need for standard, cheap, prefabricated houses capable of receiving the huge mass of immigrants arriving in the country; public housing projects are therefore one of the

most significant creations of Israeli architecture. Although many of these projects might be listed among the most unpleasant outcomes of Israeli designers, they at least led to the development of research into finding suitable construction materials and prefabrication techniques, and these have produced some interesting and unusual architecture.[65] Israeli planning developed along similar lines. Planners were responsible for the creation, in a short time and with limited budgets, of a large number of under-equipped urban settlements and dormitory suburbs. The ever-repeated blocks of these new settlements, evoking memories of the worst experiences of socialist countries, still characterize the urban landscape of most Israeli cities. These aesthetic/cultural conceptions, taught to generations of students of architecture in the prestigious Technion in Haifa, were reproduced long after their theoretical bases had been overcome in the rest of the world. Indeed, in the early 1970s, the Technion – then the only architectural school in the country and where most Israeli architects were trained – still taught these principles, even though their cultural limitations were well understood by its former dean, Professor Herbert who, interviewed by a *Jerusalem Post* journalist in 1975, commented: 'At the Technion we turn out rational – *perhaps too rational* – architects. … On the whole Israeli's buildings are not outstanding, but adequate.'[66]

In the 1960s, a new generation of Israeli-born architects followed the path of their predecessors with a new fascination for large-scale building complexes, generally opposing a direct dialogue with landscape and local architecture. Influenced by contemporary experiences in Brazil, they shaped the new country's built environment as if in a barren land.[67] Only at the end of the decade and during the 1970s did Israeli architects begin to relate to vernacular architecture and traditional building techniques. An earlier and interesting attempt in this direction is Al Mansfeld's design of the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, a highly symbolic structure built in the vicinity of the Knesset that may be considered a precursor of the new trend characterized by renewed attention to the local landscape as a creative reference.[68] In the 1960s, for the first time since the establishment of the state, some of the abandoned villages and cities, emptied of their original Palestinian population, were 'restored'. This new glance at ancient buildings was driven mainly by economic considerations stressing the tourist-attracting potential of these areas for the fast-growing Israeli tourism industry. Both the ideological

(gentrification) and technical (as far as restoration is concerned) sides of these first attempts were far from impressive. However, they can be regarded as the preliminary step along the path that led to the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem.[69] In Jerusalem's Old City the most important Israeli architectural firms confronted new challenges and had to look for new working methods. Two different approaches were considered: the modern, rational tradition of Israeli architecture on the one hand, and the new, more creative attempts to root Israeli architecture in history and geography on the other.

The first approach is best symbolized by David Amiran, an Israeli geographer, who wrote in 1973: 'Anyone coming to visit the Old City after twenty years will be very impressed by the renewal of many shops in the main business streets which *changed their façades and interiors to become modern* and pleasant, and *no longer reminiscent of the old "oriental" shops* of the past'[70] and by architect Eliezer Frenkel, who presented his work in the Jewish Quarter with these words:

> The *undemocratic building process* whereby each unit is constructed according to specific needs … is reflected in the adapting of existing buildings to modern habitation. Understanding this point indeed presented the major difficulty in the whole process. Thirty years of *shikun* [standard, mass-housing projects] have so thoroughly ingrained in us the concept of optimal, minimal inexpensive apartments of an ever-repeated type, that *individual care and adjustment of each unit seemed like a painstaking, frustrating labour*.[71]

The second trend, seen predominantly in the efforts of younger, recently-immigrated architects, marked the beginning of a new phase in Israeli architecture. Similar to the evolution in Europe (though with a certain delay), new architectural theories, from the role of *genius loci* to neo-regionalism and postmodernism, began to affect the previously monolithic Israeli architectural style. The Jewish Quarter project, for its importance and significance at the national level, may well be considered as a turning point in the evolution of Israeli architecture.

In the 1980s, Israeli architecture was still in search of its own identity, and this soul-searching phase has been deeply influenced by the Jewish Quarter project. In the editorial of the first issue of a new Israeli

architectural review – *Architecture of Israel* – created in 1988, its editor, Ami Ran, observed:

> Israeli architects who started to rehabilitate and restore the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, encountered for the first time well-established local traditional architecture. This encounter and the like gave increasing legitimacy to the appearance of Israeli built forms containing 'traditional' manifestations such as the arch, the vault and the arcade. These manifestations, once joined with motifs already perceived as 'Mediterranean', such as white-washed plastered low buildings in 'random' juxtaposition, create an accepted reservoir of formative elements, the use of which is interpreted as an attempt to achieve a local Israeli effect.[72]

The development of regionalism offered Israeli architects new tools in their search for an indigenous Jewish architecture. However, the development of this new architectural style, especially in Jerusalem, consisted mainly of the schematic and repetitive adoption of formal elements like the stone, the arch, the dome/vault, or protruding cantilevering, ideally evoking the traditional features of the Old City. According to the Israeli architectural critic David Kroyanker, the most evident effect of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction on Israeli architecture has been the development of a neo-Orientalist architecture.[73]

Israeli archaeology: an overview

> 'An archaeology closely identified with state policy all too readily becomes a distorted archaeology that bends and ignores rules of evidence to promote the glories of the ethnic group in command.'[74]

Apart from architecture, archaeology is the discipline that has contributed most to shaping the new Jewish Quarter. Architects and archaeologists often worked side by side and many design plans were modified to comply with the needs and wishes of the latter.[75] The political elite that decided to build the Jewish Quarter anew considered archaeology a priority because it was meant to prove the Jews' historic right to the land and the past glory of an ancient Jewish state. Zionism

has nurtured the 'special relationship' between modern Israel and its ancient past from a nationalist perspective. Archaeology was meant not only to prove the ancient Hebrew presence in the land but also to glorify its national/secular dimension, to celebrate its military achievements and to throw light on everyday life beyond the purely religious sphere. Indeed, archaeology has always been a secular passion (specifically among leftist Ashkenazis), and has developed according to the needs of the state's ruling class in a continuous and active interaction. What follows is a brief history of the discipline in the country, emphasizing the direct link between ideology and archaeology and between the state elite and the Jewish Quarter archaeologists.

Archaeology in Palestine developed around the biblical narrative. Western archaeologists searched for confirmation of the Old Testament stories in an attempt to match sites in the Holy Land to the script of the Bible. This particular sector of archaeological research has therefore been dubbed biblical archaeology. In the nineteenth century, 'scholars and explorers, in the articulated positivist tradition of Europe, visited Jerusalem in large scientific expeditions'.[76] Biblical scholarship shared the prevailing values of the time and mainly ignored and despised local cultures. As Michael Prior observed, it is possible to say that 'the conventional reading of the history of the region … has yielded a distorted picture, with the character of a scarcely known past filled in by details deriving from the present.'[77]

The relevance of archaeological interpretation and its subjective character were widely discussed in the 1980s and 1990s, and the idea that archaeologists' interpretations are influenced by the received wisdom of their times has become relatively obvious. Archaeology, in fact, as Ucko, Anderson and Whitelam[78] among others have stated, is a highly political practice. In a controversial study of Palestinian archaeology, Keith Whitelam convincingly revealed the specific ideological background of most biblical scholars, while a conclusive and critical definition of the whole concept of biblical archaeology is given by W. G. Dever: 'I shall argue that "Biblical archaeology" was a uniquely American phenomenon, a reactionary movement growing out of the theological climate of the 1930s and reaching its climax by the end of the 1960s in the work of Albright and Wright.'[79]

As Neil Silberman reminds us, archaeology has always played an important part in creating national identity and pride, both earlier in

nineteenth-century Europe and more recently in the Middle East.[80] Indeed, all over the world nationalism, heritage and archaeology are intimately related. 'Throughout the Middle East national parades and celebrations, postage stamps and banknote symbols, even the rhetoric of political slogans, memorialize and romanticize the various Golden Ages',[81] and 'each state, each people, employs a unique configuration of pasts in coping with its present.'[82] Many Middle Eastern countries have consistently played the archaeological–nationalist card. Among the most blatant cases we might consider are the symbolism and rhetoric of Iran's Shah, or the overtly stressed links between Mesopotamian *grandeur* and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Though Israel has not been alone in following this path, its politically-oriented use of archaeology, heritage and myth has, for many years, received a positive response in the West because of the sheer importance of the commonly shared biblical heritage. In Israel, unearthing the past has played a determining role in strengthening links between the modern state and the land it occupies.[83] It is symptomatic, in this regard, that the 'historic right' to the land is officially affirmed in the Israeli Declaration of Independence.[84]

One of the most striking features of Israeli archaeology prior to the 1980s was the presence of generals and high-ranking army officials engaged in archaeological excavations. Indeed, most of the Israeli military elite, and some officers (the best known being Moshe Dayan)[85] shared the passion for ancient history (co-opted to modern needs) and even profited from their official positions to create large private collections of archaeological artefacts. Professor Yigal Yadin, a former chief of staff of the Israeli army, was the most distinguished general cum archaeologist. His most important excavation was the site of the Roman fortress of Masada. Overlooking the Dead Sea and isolated in a desolate and fascinating landscape, Masada has played a pivotal role in shaping the conscience and ethos of generations of Zionists. Since its 'discovery' and glorification in the 1920s, it became the symbol of Jewish resistance and Israeli rebirth. A spectacular archaeological campaign took place at Masada from 1962 to 1965. With Israeli army support, and the participation of hundreds of foreign volunteers, the whole remote and deserted area was excavated and prepared for its transformation into a national sanctuary. The dramatic and highly rhetorical (as literary analysis later confirmed) description of the siege and mass suicide of the last defenders of Masada, written by Josephus Flavius, was taken at face value by Yadin,

who interpreted all the finds according to the text. It was possible then to discover the bones of the heroic defenders, the *ostraca* of the deadly draw and all the other elements of the story told by the Roman–Jewish historian.

Since the 1980s, however, the scientific data have been reconsidered and most of the story rewritten. In a poignant analysis of the characteristics of a nationalistically-driven archaeology, Trigger argues that: 'The main impact of nationalism has been to influence the questions about the past that archaeologists are prepared to ask or not to ask and the amount of evidence that is required to sustain a particular position.'[86] The number of tourists visiting the site,[87] however, continues to grow regularly and the discredited story continues to be told and believed.[88] Indeed, as Lowenthal reminds us, heritage does not need historic truth:

> Heritage is not like this at all. It is not a testable or even a reasonably plausible account of some past, but a declaration of faith in this past. Heritage is not history, it uses historical traces and tells historical tales, but these tales and traces are stitched into fables that are open neither to critical analysis nor to comparative scrutiny. … Heritage and history rely on antithetical modes of persuasion. History seeks to persuade by truth and succumbs to falsehood. Heritage exaggerates and omits, candidly invents and frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error.[89]

Though the origins of biblical archaeology are rooted in the Christian (mainly Protestant) West, Israeli archaeologists and Zionist ideology have added a new dimension to the field. The Israeli educational system has, in fact, transformed the Bible into the 'national history book'[90] for both religious and secular students. This non-critical exposition of the archaic world and moral categories of the Bible has had far-reaching effects on Israeli pupils.[91] The centrality of the Bible in forging Israeli national identity somehow automatically implied that the Jewish Quarter excavations would proceed along the solidly installed tradition of biblical archaeology and that, from the planning phase onwards, the focus would be on the biblical narrative. The Israeli-defined 'First Temple' and 'Second Temple' periods were the obvious centre of attention for the excavators.[92] Rediscovering biblical remains under present-day Jerusalem and showing them to the public confirmed the Israeli right to ownership

of the city. Archaeology's role was to emphasize and produce the eternal link of the Jewish people with the city of Jerusalem. Thus, the archaeologists 'discovered' precisely what they were looking for, evidence to buttress tradition and the biblical account.

The evolution of Israeli society during the 1980s and a weakening Zionist narrative produced a new generation of archaeologists who were more in touch with the world approach to the discipline and less nationalistic. Within the last 20 years the role of biblical archaeology has been reassessed and more attention is being paid to previously under-rated fields and periods. However, according to Mahmoud Hawari, an Israeli–Palestinian archaeologist, we are not yet ready to talk about a movement of 'New Archaeologists' along the same lines as one might refer to the 'New Historians'.[93]

In the meantime, joint research undertaken by archaeologists and biblical scholars since the 1990s has shaken most of the basic assumptions that underpinned the discipline of biblical archaeology. The results of the archaeological survey the Israelis carried out in the occupied West Bank (in particular the studies of Dr Israel Finkelstein)[94] have shown that the ancient Hebrews' descriptions, presented in the Bible, of both the conquest of the land and the creation of an empire led by David should be regarded as myths rather than accounts of historical events. The disruptive impact of these discoveries on the Israeli *Weltanschauung* may partially be grasped by the number of articles the Israeli media dedicated to the subject.[95] Indeed, if King David had never reigned (or at least not as previously imagined), then there was no 'David's City' and Jerusalem's past should be reconsidered.[96] The clash between a 'national' truth and historical research has been stressed by Fritz and Davies;[97] not surprisingly, the heritage and tourist industries are unaffected by the new scientific discoveries and the Palestinian village of Silwan continues to be altered to become the mythical City of David.[98] Once more, as David Lowenthal reminds us, it appears that 'the present is not the past's inheritance, but its active partner, reanimating the sleeping, excavating the buried and reworking a legacy in line with present needs.'[99]

In 1993 the Oslo accords gave the Palestinians control for the first time over a number of archaeological sites.[100] The creation of a modern 'Palestinian archaeology' opened up new opportunities to re-examine the basic tenets of the history of the land. The Israeli media and scholars have paid a lot of attention to the Palestinians' ideological

approach, expecting them to follow a parallel, though opposite, path to their own.[101] Indeed, it can be observed that Palestine's popular media and non-specialist intellectuals are heavily influenced by a Canaanite-centred mythical version of the ancient history of the land;[102] however, the official bodies dealing with archaeology in the Palestinian territories (Bir Zeit University's archaeology department and the PNA department of antiquities/ministry of culture) do not seem to support this approach.

Jewish Quarter archaeological excavations

The archaeological excavations in the Jewish Quarter were one of the high points of Israeli archaeological research and involved the most respected Israeli archaeologists. Three large-scale excavations were carried out in the Old City at more or less the same time. Though different in size and scope, they all influenced the final architectural environment of the quarter and contributed to the parallel shaping of the modern Israeli national identity.

The Israeli ministries of housing, education and culture supported and financed the excavations Professor Mazar of the Hebrew University planned and carried out between 1968 and 1978 on the southwest corner of the *Haram al-Sharif*. The State of Israel accorded them high priority status and they received significant media coverage, greatly contributing to the boom of archaeological passion in Israel. The reason for these excavations was to look for clues and remains of the Temple.[103] The most important results produced were the discovery of the foundations of a previously unknown large Omayyad palatial complex and the uncovering of a Roman road running along the Herodian temple enclosure.[104] Yigal Yadin's introductory words to his famous book *Jerusalem Revealed* give one some clue of the State of Israel's attitude to the works: 'the excavations revealed grim evidence of the tremendous destruction wrought by the Romans upon the second Jewish Common-wealth – a destruction *rectified historically in 1948 with the rebirth of the modern State of Israel*, 1900 years later.'[105]

The emotional and mythical appeal of the work and, according to Yadin, the 'spirit of dedication and zeal of a team aware of its historical mission'[106] are proof of the ideological passion surrounding the whole enterprise. However, while the higher official bodies of the state and the widespread public fascination with all things biblical supported the

excavations, they created considerable controversy within the religious communities, for both the Muslim and Jewish religious authorities were opposed to the dig. Indeed, a long 'war of attrition' started between the archaeologists and the Israeli minister of religious affairs over how far the excavations could go in the direction of the newly created plaza by the Wailing Wall. According to a peculiar and selective conception of cultural heritage, the last remaining buildings of the Moroccan quarter, the Mamluk structures of the Zawiya Fakhiriya and the complex known as the Abu Saud houses, were demolished in June 1969 to extend the area of the digs, creating a *de facto* division of the Western Wall into two parts under different administrations.[107] Although UNESCO's attitude on the issue of Jerusalem will be discussed in Chapter 5, it is important to note that these excavations, carried out on expropriated *Waqf* land, triggered UNESCO's decision to send a special envoy to monitor the Old City. The following statement by Raymond Lemaire (special representative of the UNESCO director general for Jerusalem from 1971 until his death in 1999) gives some idea of the political significance and impact of Mazar's digs: 'The clear implication of these comments is that no legal justification may be invoked for excavations undertaken solely in pursuit of archaeological research, such as those conducted by Professor Mazar to the South and West of the Haram al-Sharif.'[108]

The other large-scale archaeological excavations that took place in the same period developed in the heart of the renewed Jewish Quarter under the direction of Professor Nahman Avigad of the Hebrew University and covered a surface of about 20 dunums. Though generally perceived as less politically sensitive and strictly linked to the 'inevitable' reconstruction work that was taking place in the Jewish Quarter,[109] the same cultural/ideological assumptions that Professor Mazar held characterized these excavations. Carried out between 1969 and 1982, they revealed the history of the human settlement in the Upper City throughout the ages. In particular, they brought to light remains dating from the Herodian period (37 BCE–70 CE), which is the more extensively represented layer in the excavations of the Jewish Quarter.[110] Nadia Abu El Haj has discussed the archaeological choices that underpinned the entire campaign and the inherent limits of such an approach:

The history produced through this work of archaeology relies upon an already existing story which, in turn, is used to 'interpret'

the evidence 'found'. The key texts and the key evidence remain in a circular relationship of discovery, explanation and 'proof'. The Jerusalem digs recreated the very emphasis on impressive structures, ceremonial rituals, wars and the display of power typical of the Biblical texts as well as the other main historical source: Flavius Josephus's *The Jewish War*.[111]

Because their function was evidently to demonstrate and 'recover' the previous Jewish presence in the city, these excavations played an important symbolic role. Chief Israeli archaeologist Nahman Avigad's published comments betray his personal emotional involvement in and political commitment to the project.[112] Besides their evident political dimension, however, Avigad's excavations have contributed greatly to the scientific understanding of Jerusalem's past. Not only did they unearth ancient Israelite remains and Herodian houses, but they also recovered essential traces of the city's Byzantine past, uncovered the Cardo and identified the location and remains of the Nea church. The final scientific report on the excavations, in two volumes, was published only in 2000 and 2002, long after Professor Avigad's death.[113]

Alongside the two large official archaeological campaigns briefly outlined above, another important, even more controversial, archaeological operation was started in post-1967 Jerusalem. Immediately after the 'opening' of the Wailing Wall plaza, the Ministry of Religious Affairs began to 'clean' some underground rooms under the *Makhkame* building (adjacent to the plaza) and then to excavate a tunnel along the whole length of the *Haram al-Sharif*'s western wall. The digging continued for several years quite outside the umbrella of the Antiquities Authority and with no archaeological supervision. Initially, its openly stated goal was to 'free' the whole length of the wall, according to a religious-oriented programme and not to a planned archaeological campaign. Only in a later phase were professional archaeologists allowed to take part in the excavations, thereby giving the 'tunnel' the status of an almost normal archaeological exercise. The Israeli archaeologist Dan Bahat presented the findings of the tunnel excavations in *Ancient Jerusalem Revealed*.[114]

The issue of the tunnel highlights the strained relationship between the religious establishment and the rabbinate on the one hand and the secular Israeli government that launched the Jewish Quarter reconstruction on the other.[115] Archaeology has never been among the subjects

religious Jews studied,[116] and opposition from orthodox Jews to the excavations of Jewish tombs has often led to violent quarrels with the secular Israeli archaeologists conducting the digs.[117] In this case, however, the religious importance of the wall forced the religious authorities to initiate an 'archaeological' campaign without having any idea of what it really entailed, either on the technical or political level.

Much more important, however, has been the effect of these digs on the Palestinian community. The higher Muslim religious authorities – already hurt by Mazar's excavations taking place on expropriated *Waqf* lands on the southwest corner of the *Haram al-Sharif* – were particularly worried about the secret tunnel excavations. They feared that, in addition to the officially declared goal of uncovering the whole length of the Western Wall (therefore running outside the *Haram al-Sharif*), the dig was hiding attempts to break into underground passages beneath Muslim shrines. In September 1996, following Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's decision to open a northern exit for the tunnel on the *Via Dolorosa*, Palestinian riots and popular demonstrations over the entire West Bank erupted and 79 people died.[118] The tunnel excavations, more than any other archaeological project in Jerusalem, increased tension and augmented mistrust between the city's religious communities. Indeed, these digs not only affect symbolic issues and the creation of a national identity through a selective reading of the past, as in the Jewish Quarter, but they also touch the very centre of the two predominant religious systems vying for control of the *Haram al-Sharif* area.

Conclusion

The success of the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter has been achieved through the extraordinary convergence of political, economic, administrative and technical skills, on the one hand, and the dedication of a group sharing a specific vision of history and a full commitment to Zionist tenets on the other. Central government support and a decision to strengthen the city's Jewish identity and national significance to the country materialized through a special set of administrative rules that gave the authorities complete control of the large tract of urban land previously seized and set apart by an Expropriation Act. The political decision to settle Jerusalem's Old City with a strong Jewish community meant creating a special technical and administrative body capable of

implementing this political programme. The closeness of the architects and planners to the state elite has produced a design respectful more of the needs and wishes of the Ashkenazi ruling class – and of the vision of a generation of politicians committed to Zionism – than of the actual historic and architectural characteristics of the Old City.

The reconstruction plan that was drawn, though basically denying the site's existing state and history, has been capable of producing a 'Jewish' neighbourhood adapted to the higher symbolic function the state wanted the city to play. Its architecture inevitably reflects the achievements of the generation of technicians and architects that developed the country in the decades following the founding of the State of Israel. Finally, to this unique substratum were added the deeds of a generation of archaeologists who grew up in the tradition of 'heroic' Israeli and international biblical archaeology. Through continuous reference to the most powerful Zionist and Jewish symbols, their efforts created a sort of mythical 'aura' around the new settlement. From this unique mix of know-how and passion, of theory and *praxis*, of dream and rationale, was born the reconstructed Jewish Quarter.

In the next two chapters I present and discuss the technical solutions applied in the planning of the area, from the general layout of the new neighbourhood to the actual designs adopted for specific plots. It should be remembered, however, that the absolute priority of political and ideological considerations over technical solutions and needs, constitutes the main characteristic of the whole project and that, indeed, the final outcome is as much the result of the designers' creations as of the will of a politically homogeneous elite that had already proven capable of forging an entire state on the foundation of an alien land through the force of its ideological vision.

Chapter 3
Building the Jewish Quarter

'Imagination demands the real thing, and, to attain it, must fabricate the absolute fake.'

U. Eco[1]

'Determined that their world will last forever, the Israelis have built massively in Jerusalem since 1967. … Everything is massive. The restored Jewish Quarter in the Old City is no exception. In an introverted, walled-in, defensive setting, it is harsh and stony, with surprisingly few green spaces; its new colossal synagogues and religious seminaries tyrannize through sheer scale.'

A. Elon[2]

Guidelines for reconstruction

The role of archaeological excavations in the Jewish Quarter was to supply the project with the 'spirit' of the location's history and the new built environment grew out of a particular relationship with its excavated past, a past that was more created than discovered.[3] The archaeological remains that were uncovered in the area were meant to create a 'historic surrounding' for the quarter that would appear obvious to planners and new residents alike. The Israeli passion for archaeology, which the Old City excavations of the 1960s and 1970s boosted, influenced the perception of the space and provided a justification for the reconstruction.

Still, even within this positive and unusual frame in which architecture, planning and archaeology seemingly collaborated, the pressure and influence of the developers on the archaeological digs remained strong. Professor Avigad's excavations, which were focused primarily on the Jewish history of the site and on large built structures, continuously had to cope with builders' exigencies. In this regard, it is tempting to

affirm that the construction work provided the archaeologists with an alibi, for they were forced to work at a tremendous pace, which is necessarily incompatible with scientifically accurate archaeological research. The CDRJQ and the Israeli Antiquities Authority managed the continuous overlapping needs of builders and archaeologists without dramatic clashes. With their similar ideological backgrounds and total political commitment to the project, it became possible to overcome the everyday tensions of the work sites. According to one of the architects who worked for the CDRJQ, the designers followed the recommendations of the Antiquities Authority to the letter and worked in full cooperation with them. Indeed, to guarantee their conservation, the same Antiquities Authority preferred the findings to receive a roof, accepting therefore the principle of building new houses over the ruins.[4]

The influence of archaeological digs on planning new buildings has been particularly evident in the area above and around the 'Broad Wall' and in the Byzantine Cardo (see Chapter 4). The 'Broad Wall', a part of the city enclosure of Israelite Jerusalem, has been one of the most important archaeological discoveries to have resulted from the excavation and it has offered researchers new and important clues about the urban evolution of the city.[5] A 40-metre long section of the wall (about seven metres thick) was dug by Avigad's team. The discovery led to a complete redraft of the architectural plans already prepared for the area and to the creation of a large archaeological square, some metres below the present-day street level, around which new buildings were placed.

For the Israeli government, the CDRJQ and the architects involved, archaeology's central role in the overall project was self-evident and everyone agreed that, as far as possible, its exigencies had to be respected. It should be stressed, however, that opening up excavation sites and constructing new buildings entailed the wholesale demolition of structures previously existing in the area – buildings that, from the photographs in Avigad's book, seemed architecturally and historically significant and in relatively good condition.

Presenting the findings of the ten-year long excavations to visitors, who were expected to visit the Jewish Quarter in great numbers, was one of the project's priorities. Particular attention was paid to the display of a selected number of remains that could both enhance and justify the work done. Professor Avigad[6] and the company chose to present, whenever possible, a single, specific layer of the city's complex history, a layer

that could produce attractive and imposing remains and could, at the same time, stress once more the 'eternal' link between Jews and the city. The constructions in the 'Upper City' during the Herodian period were an obvious choice. The quality and size of the findings and the chance to relate them to well-known episodes in the Romans' destruction of the Temple in 70 CE suggested creating archaeological museums within, in fact under, the new neighbourhood. The 'story' told to visitors to these sites 'confirms' the traditional version of events with which all Israelis are familiar from their school and religious education. The excavated 'Herodian Quarter', over which the new quarter is built, offers powerful and evocative visual support for the State of Israel's claims to ownership. The archaeological site is now located in the basement of the 'Yeshivat haKotel – the Wohl Torah Centre', an imposing, oppressive and excessively tall stone-faced structure built by architect Eliezer Frenkel in 1974.[7] The political intention of the archaeological museums in the reconstructed Jewish Quarter should not be underestimated, for these sites convey powerful, long-lasting and effective images to the millions of foreign and Israeli tourists who visit the city.

One of the most striking characteristics of the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter is its total autonomy and detachment from the international debate taking place within the wider architectural and planning community.[8] The CDRJQ and the government deliberately decided to look for architects and designers inside the country, even though there was nobody in Israel with specialist knowledge or experience of restoration. This choice is reflected not only in the way the restoration was conceived, but also in the overall planning strategy, which was out of tune with the then current restoration practices in Europe.

During the 1950s and early 1960s the bourgeoisie abandoned most of Europe's war-damaged city centres and a poorer class of workers and immigrants rented or sometimes squatted in these areas. This phenomenon, and the property speculation that became associated with it, led to the rapid decay of the inner cores of many ancient cities, the very existences of which came under threat. In an attempt to counteract this trend, a number of political and theoretical approaches to urban restoration and renewal were developed and promoted in the 1970s. Most European central and local governments (notably a number of left oriented municipalities) put a lot of effort into safeguarding and revitalizing the historic cores of their cities. The residents' active involvement

in the planning process was considered essential for the success of such urban renewal projects. Direct, popular participation, it was thought, would democratize the society and help residents resist pressures from developers. In keeping with the idea of 'participative' planning, a number of plans were drawn up, discussed and implemented.[9] The most famous of these, a project that was widely presented and analysed across Europe, was the Bologna City Centre Revitalization Plan, which the Italian central government approved in 1973.[10] Its guidelines can be summarized as follows:

- ❑ restore and rehabilitate the historic built environment;
- ❑ create regulations capable of counterbalancing the economic forces that would inevitably lead to the total gentrification of the central urban areas;
- ❑ support the needs and rights of the residents of the city centre;
- ❑ create services and support structures (schools, kindergartens, hospitals and clinics) for the residents;
- ❑ adapt some city monuments for community use; and
- ❑ limit urban growth to the existing population.

The plan was based on 'a long and thorough survey of the city's buildings and open spaces'[11] and dealt with the historic centre as a whole, though concentrating on selected areas involving about 6000 residents. The ambitious goals set out in this and other analogous plans contained a social vision of the city and strong political commitment. Their successful implementation required the approval and participation of the residents called to take an active part in the planning process and in the physical transformation of their urban environment. Similar experiences spread across Europe. The Jewish Quarter renewal, however, did not belong to and cannot be compared with this form of urban restoration and renewal. Its political agenda was entirely different and quite contrary to what was happening in western Europe. The complete gentrification, effectively the ethnic cleansing of the area being rebuilt, was required and actively encouraged and the entire operation might be dubbed 'planning against the people'. The Palestinian residents – owners as well as tenants – were evicted and even the pre-1948 Jewish tenants and owners could not profit from the restoration, which was conceived for another social class – the divide being by class as well as 'ethnicity'.

The reconstruction goals might be summarized as follows:

❑ remove the Palestinian residents (ethnic cleansing);
❑ build an upper-class neighbourhood (gentrification); and
❑ create a symbolic national pole to stress Israel's right to the city (political agenda).

Such a programme is antithetical to the European experience; yet, with great ingenuity, the municipality attempted and often succeeded in presenting its ideas to the international community as an urban restoration plan. Technicians and politicians who visited the site, however, were generally able to recognize what strategy was being implemented in the Jewish Quarter reconstruction. For example, a technical team from the municipality of Florence that visited Jerusalem in 1974 had the following comments to make:

> The group spent an entire day in the Jewish Quarter. … Although they were impressed by the Israelis' energy and ability in restoring the Jewish Quarter, the Florentines have their own ideas of the ultimate aim of such reconstruction. 'In Jerusalem, I believe, you are concerned with the historical, rather than the socio-economic facts' said Mr Foti. '*In Florence, we want to avoid changing the character of old quarters as they are today. We want the same residents to move back in after restoration is completed.*'[12]

The project's political dimension was evident to all the parties involved in the reconstruction work. Within the CDRJQ, for instance, the team of young architects set up under Shalom Gardi's supervision, was well aware of what was taking place, though they generally avoided openly discussing the politics involved.

The plan for the reconstruction of the quarter was based on the architect Ehud Netzer's report (see Chapter 2). The master plan was 'overseen by Ehud Netzer, Joe Savitzky and Arie Sonino, joined at a later stage by architects Nehemia Bikson and Yoel Bar-Dor.'[13] The extended Jewish Quarter was subdivided into 28 zones,[14] the development of which was designed partly by the CDRJQ technical office and partly by external consultants. The company's architectural team was composed of a number varying between seven and twelve young and relatively

inexperienced architects working full time on the project. In the original team there were no architects who had specialized in restoration, though three of them – Mandel, Frenkel and Yaar – had previously worked on the 'restoration' of Jaffa's historic core. The architectural team planned and worked directly on about 50 per cent of the buildings. On the remaining plots, its role was to prepare the overall plan and layout of the project and oversee the plans carried out by external architects. The company team directed the running of this large and complex construction project and managed to minimize the difficulties for the first group of residents who would move into a neighbourhood-in-the-making. Reconstruction and archaeological digs continued for more than a decade, but, according to contemporary reports, 'the building operation was extraordinarily well ordered.'[15] The team director, Mr Shalom Gardi, first joined the company as an employee in 1970. In 1972 he became director of the architectural team and continued working with the company until 1980 when the architectural team was dissolved.

Almost 50 per cent of the projects were handed over to private offices, but the criteria for selecting architectural firms to take part in the Jewish Quarter project were not clearly defined. According to Gardi, the external architects involved in the project were often contracted on a personal basis.[16] It seems probable that a screening of the awarded architectural offices took place, but it is difficult to assess if the selection was made on the basis of professional qualifications, political affiliations or affinities, personal relations or budgetary considerations.[17] In only one open architectural competition has the criterion for selection been transparent. This was held in 1971 and was for the development of a central area of the city between the Street of the Jews and al-Husur Street. The winning design will be discussed in the next chapter.

Most of the consultants were from medium-sized well-established firms of architects, mostly from Tel Aviv (thus unfamiliar with the architectural characteristics of Jerusalem's Old City). The relationship between the company team and external consultants was not always smooth. The CDRJQ architectural team was often critical of their work and in many cases a consultant's design had to be altered to fit the requirements of the site. Indeed, the lack of experience in conservation and renewal work in the external offices shocked even the architects in the CDRJQ team who, though without specialist training, had become acquainted with some of the characteristics of the Old City architecture.

External architectural offices developed 12 main plots and the quality of their work differed greatly. One company architect recalls a conflict that arose in 1973/4 in which, despite upholding the company's regulations, Moshe Safdie's private firm was able to override the restrictions and impose its will.[18] The relationship with the team that won the architectural competition was, however, more positive, even though there were many delays and modifications to the original design before completion of the project.

In the preliminary phase of the project (1968–70) the CDRJQ drew up a series of technical guidelines to apply to the reconstruction, the attitude towards remaining structures, and the overall approach to design and restoration. The rigid set of regulations imposed the maximum precision and minimum unpermitted construction – a sound approach that unfortunately partially contributed to the sterility and lack of spontaneity of the new neighbourhood. A specific image, mixing traditional and modern architecture, was sought by the designers. While in the eyes of the Israeli architectural critic David Kroyanker, the result has been 'a striking architectural style in which a contemporary look managed to blend old and new. … The distinctive and homogeneous manner that evolved reflects the aspiration of the architects to rework the traditional world of forms by utilizing modern concepts of design, construction and technology. What came forth was a new architectural vocabulary, rooted in old tradition,'[19] other critics have expressed quite different opinions, considering the outcome as a kitsch *pastiche*. To preserve the 'character' of the area and in keeping with an already well-established Jerusalem tradition, the company imposed the use of stone on the external façades of all new constructions in the Jewish Quarter as well as on the original buildings that were restored.[20] However, as the UNESCO envoy Raymond Lemaire noticed:

> The renewal of the external stonework – that essential skin that bears the history and sensitivity of a monument – especially when dealing with minor architecture, is poorly done: the new stones do not respect either the size or the tooling of the ancient blocks, the renewal of the stonework is often unnecessary, the architectural details are imprecisely imitated, pointing mortars do not respect the original composition.[21]

Furthermore, the company selected a series of 'traditional' details (like windows and steps) that were copied and imposed on the designers to obtain the 'traditional language' of the Jewish Quarter.[22] The guidelines, therefore, suggest a sort of *ante-litteram* postmodern approach imposing the use of 'traditional' forms and details for the design of new buildings. Indeed, the combined effect of stone façades and predefined details has guaranteed uniformity to the rebuilt neighbourhood but has also seriously limited the designers' creativity. The excessively strict regulations might actually be the main reason why 'nothing so far built in the Jewish Quarter catches the imagination.'[23]

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, before the large-scale project in the Jewish Quarter, Israeli architects mainly designed mass-produced standard housing, and one should not underestimate the influence of this legacy on the planners and architects. Indeed, Shalom Gardi, though cognisant of the debate on the principles of restoration that were applied in the work, describes it as 'the restoration of a neighbourhood done in relation with the parallel experiences of large scale construction elsewhere in the country'.[24] One of his former employees, Uri Ponger, is even more direct, and simply defines the intervention as 'planning and building new constructions within historic areas using as many parts of ancient buildings as possible'.[25]

In the 1970s Israeli architecture developed expertise in prefabrication techniques and precast concrete panels. However, building methods requiring large cranes and truck accessibility to the sites were generally considered unsuitable for the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter and were avoided. Yet, when political pressure for a rapid conclusion to the reconstruction imposed an even faster building timetable on the company, heavier machinery was used in the Old City too. This has caused further damage to the original structures of the quarter and has resulted in the demolition of a number of ancient houses to create access roads for caterpillars and trucks, proving once more what the real priorities and concerns of the Jewish Quarter decision-makers and planners were.[26]

Contrary to more recent conceptions of restoration, modern materials, especially cement and reinforced concrete, were massively utilized in the reconstruction. A new thin wall in reinforced concrete doubled most of the existing walls of the houses to stabilize the structure and prevent bulging.[27] Other technical solutions were also applied, though they consisted mainly of simple metal reinforcing rods tying the ancient

masonry, like those used in the restoration of the Rothschild House. In fact, apart from Moshe Safdie's controversial design for the new Porat Yosef *yeshiva*, which was built with modern techniques, no sophisticated technology was used to consolidate the projects. However, even here, a thin stone veneer was used to cover his large prefabricated concrete arches.[28] Simpler building techniques, including the transport of building materials by donkey[29] and a large amount of hand finishing to the stone surfaces, were the most commonly applied solutions.

The entire construction process, therefore, ended up more expensive than the average Israeli construction, though the final product did not differ much from contemporary Israeli buildings in the other East Jerusalem settlements.[30] It would be misleading to think that 'traditional' building techniques were used in the reconstruction. The much praised 'golden Jerusalem stone' covering the new façades has only a decorative function, while the load-bearing structures of the buildings are in simple modern concrete. No stone vault or stone masonry was built. The architects' confidence in modern materials (mainly reinforced concrete), coupled with their relative ignorance of traditional local building methods, often imposed radical and 'hard' solutions where 'softer', more conservative methods would have been possible. Gordon and Achbert, the two engineers who collaborated with the architectural team, had little understanding of traditional structures or consolidation techniques, so mainly played it safe by encircling the original buildings with a new concrete structure they were able to calculate. In conclusion, as Claude Rosenkovitch stated, 'The building technique was the standard one with concrete walls and stone veneering. The details were more studied, but not always "traditional". Everything in the quarter was standard, including materials and internal divisions of the flats.'[31]

Analysis of the urban and architectural plans

The terminology commonly used to describe the transformation of the Jewish Quarter is often imprecise and vague. Words like 'conservation', 'preservation', 'restoration', 'reconstruction', 'renewal' and 'rehabilitation' are generally used indiscriminately. It might be useful, therefore, to clarify the differences between them while providing some commonly accepted definitions. 'Preservation' might be defined as 'the maintenance of an object, building or landscape in a condition defined by its historic context and in such a way that it can be studied with a view to revealing

its original meaning. The only rebuilding done is that necessary to preserve the stability of the structure.' It might be opposed to 'conservation', which may involve preservation but also restoration of the physical fabric.[32] 'Restoration', according to the *Oxford Dictionary*,[33] is 'the action or process of restoring something to an unimpaired condition', and 'the process of carrying out alterations and repairs with the idea of restoring a building, work of art, etc. to something like its original form'. In the specialist architectural literature, the definition is generally connected to the concepts expressed in the Venice Charter,[34] as in the definition Bernard Feilden, probably the most influential British conservation architect, proposed:

> The object of restoration is to revive the original concept or legibility of the object. Restoration … is based upon respect for original material, archaeological evidence, original design and authentic documents. Replacement of missing or decayed parts must integrate harmoniously with the whole, but must be distinguishable on close inspection from the original so that restoration does not falsify archaeological or historical evidence.[35]

In the *Oxford Dictionary*, the term 'reconstruction' is defined as 'the action or process of reconstructing, rebuilding or reorganizing something' and it is specifically used in relation to war-devastated areas. In Feilden's approach, 'reconstruction of historic buildings and historic centres using new materials may be necessitated by disasters such as fire, earthquake or war. Reconstruction cannot have the patina of age. As in restoration, reconstruction must be based upon accurate documentation and evidence, and never upon conjecture.'[36] The term 'renewal', originally simply related to the etymological concept of 'making new again', is generally used in the expression urban renewal, indicating 'slum clearance and development in a city or town'.[37] Finally, the term 'rehabilitation' is used to describe the adaptive reuse of historic buildings, an activity often perceived as the only possible way to synchronize aesthetic values and economic priorities, though it often entails important alterations of the original structures to adapt them to modern standards and needs.

The 1960s saw the complete transformation of the concept of monument. Before the promulgation of the Venice Charter (International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites of

May 1964)[38] only major, outstanding buildings were considered as such, but since the mid-1960s the definition of monument has been extended almost beyond recognition. Article 1 of the Venice Charter states:

> The concept of an historic monument embraces not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or an historic event. This applies not only to great works of art but also to more modest works of the past, which have acquired cultural significance with the passing of time.[39]

Therefore, at least since 1964, it can be said that international bodies dealing with conservation and restoration have recognized the meaning and importance of both vernacular architecture and the traditional urban fabric. This new sensitivity towards what used to be defined simply as 'minor architecture', however, was not shared by – or maybe not even known to – the planners and architects who worked on the restoration of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter. Indeed, architect Shalom Gardi still describes the area he renovated in pre-Venice Charter terms: 'The whole Jewish Quarter was but a poor neighbourhood built with poor materials and techniques and *there were no monuments* in the area asking for a full *reconstruction*.'[40] Developing the concept further, he compared the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter with the ongoing project in the Old City of Acre[41] and explained that he considered the latter more complex because 'the quality and importance of the *monuments* there required more qualified work'.[42]

However, the differences between the approaches of the Venice Charter and the Jewish Quarter project go much deeper than a simple definition. According to the basic principles of architectural conservation as defined in the Venice Charter,[43] the venture could hardly be defined as a restoration project; neither the company architects nor the external consultants had a restoration background (apart from Peter Bugod, the winner of the Cardo competition, who studied restoration in Belgium with Professor Raymond Lemaire). From the interviews it is apparent that at that time nobody saw the absence of technical expertise as particularly problematic because the reconstruction was essentially conceived of as a housing project. According to Claude Rosenkovitch, the main priority, both for the company and the designers, was 'to do the

work quickly and to settle as many people as possible'[44] and, though extremely reductive, this in fact correctly describes what took place in the Jewish Quarter. Here again the municipality of Jerusalem, and its mayor Teddy Kollek, managed to convey a more appealing message to the world at large. The reconstruction was never portrayed as a housing project; on the contrary it was promoted as an example of urban restoration committed to the conservation of the character of the site and carried out by a team of skilled professionals. While the international architectural journals endorsed such rhetoric, the Kollek-sponsored 'Jerusalem Committee', invited to discuss the planning of the city, failed to turn its attention to the ongoing transformation of the Old City.[45]

In effect, though it is difficult to assess precisely how many pre-existing buildings were conserved and restored, the reconstruction of the neighbourhood was intense.[46] In an article on the Jewish Quarter published in an Israeli architectural review in 1999, it is held that only 20 per cent of the buildings were actually conserved.[47] The UNESCO special representative of the director general for Jerusalem, Professor Raymond Lemaire, claiming that there were scientific shortcomings in the reconstruction work and that ancient houses that could have been restored were torn down, commented that the reconstructed area 'instead of presenting a genuinely ancient appearance, … gives an impression rather of "new made to look old".'[48]

The overall cultural and political framework of the forces driving the project may provide an explanation for these shortcomings. Indeed, if the original buildings were not identified as 'monuments', then they could eventually be replaced by a new project, a modern neighbourhood within the city walls, that would be unique and would better represent the State of Israel's achievements to the world. It appears, therefore, that an ideologically-driven reconstruction plan of the area 'required' the near complete demolition of the existing structures and the simultaneous exposition of the archaeological remains. This means that the value of the urban fabric was not acknowledged because the existing houses would not have allowed the symbolic appropriation of the space by the Jewish state.

The area expropriated to form the new extended Jewish Quarter used to be an integral part of the Old City of Jerusalem; its physical characteristics did not differ from the other neighbourhoods within the city walls because in Jerusalem there was no specific Jewish architectural

style. Rather, most of the houses there belonged to – and were often inhabited by – Arabs (Muslims or Christians) and Armenians. The street layout in the traditional Jewish quarter, as in the rest of the Old City, consisted of a network of small alleys and dead-end streets forming a complex maze, and the houses were traditionally developed around a central courtyard. An English traveller, George Robinson, described a typical courtyard of the Jewish quarter in 1830: 'The layout of these houses is standard. The main door leads to a square courtyard surrounded by the living areas of many different families. The courtyard is shared by all the inhabitants. A stone staircase, leaning on the inside wall, leads up to the apartments typically situated on the first floor.'[49] Unfortunately, 'No original pre-1948 courtyard complex remains in the Jewish Quarter. … Today, the basic physical structure of courtyard-neighbourhood architecture can best be seen in the Muslim Quarter.'[50]

One of the most important decisions of the team that drew up the master plan for the new Jewish Quarter was to retain the quarter's original street layout. Major modifications to the original street network have been the creation of an east–west axis to connect the quarter directly with the Wailing Wall area, and opening a few squares in areas previously containing ruined or demolished buildings. Even these relatively minor modifications have, however, considerably altered the topography of the area. A large urban stairway utilized to bridge the difference in levels between the renewed Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall area (in the former Moroccan quarter) has unfortunately masked the bedrock and erased its original dramatic presence so often portrayed in ancient photographs, while the decision to 'free' the area around the ruins of the Hurva synagogue has fundamentally altered the image of what used to be the heart of the original Jewish quarter. Still, the layout of the new Jewish Quarter mostly follows the original street pattern and this preliminary planning choice guaranteed the reconstructed quarter a compactness and urbanity usually lacking in new modern settlements. Moreover, it has favoured irregular alignments and asymmetrical effects evoking the characteristics of the ancient neighbourhood. Indeed, architectural critics have often praised the street layout of the new quarter for its subtlety and for the shadow/light contrasts it creates on the new façades.[51] However, apart from the historical and aesthetic concerns, the decision to keep the traditional cul-de-sac streets has also had political implications. On the one hand, it has facilitated the much sought after

separation of private residential areas – increasingly characterized by the needs of its religious and orthodox residents – from the main tourist paths in the Jewish Quarter, thereby avoiding the disturbances created by the masses of visitors whose mainly secular attitudes would offend most residents.[52] On the other hand, the layout of the rebuilt quarter has been designed to create a separate body turned inward and essentially independent of the rest of the Old City. The striking separation between the rebuilt area and the other quarters, so dramatically evident even in small details (like street cleaning, a different lighting system, flowerpots and the absence of aerial cables), is the product of precise planning choices. Contact with the rest of the Old City and the residents of the other quarters is rarely looked for and, as the Israeli writer Amos Elon acutely observed, 'today the quarter is an enclave within the larger enclave of the Arab city.'[53]

A further function of the planning strategy for the Jewish Quarter was the wish to create a high-density neighbourhood and to settle the largest possible number of residents and *yeshiva* students into the reconstructed area. Raymond Lemaire had already drawn attention to the high density of the new neighbourhood in a UNESCO report.[54] Claude Rosenkovitch, who shared his misgivings, claimed that the main principle driving the reconstruction plans has always been 'to have the maximum number of apartments and the maximum number of inhabitants as soon as possible'.[55] Indeed, even in the reconstructed Jewish Quarter, and perhaps there more than anywhere else, it is possible to discern the Israeli municipality's 'new approach' to planning that Arthur Kutcher identified in his famous study on Jerusalem – an approach that looks upon the city as a resource to be exploited, and its spiritual and visual qualities as commodities to be bought and sold.[56]

Indeed, such incentives seem to have played a greater part in driving the planning scheme than the desire to create a human-scale city centre. Although the new houses occupy roughly the same surface area as their predecessors, being mostly four storeys high they are considerably taller. As such, they can accommodate the large number of residents and religious students now found in the area – about 4100 people (2600 residents and approximately 1500 *yeshiva* students) – without creating unhealthy overcrowding in the new apartments.

The 'housing project' approach to the neighbourhood design was particularly apparent in the architectural details for the interiors. The

contractors submitting tenders had to comply with the company's fairly
rigid standards of quality for internal finishings, for the type and quality
of joinery and floor tiles selected for the new apartments obviously
affected the final cost of the houses. The company opted for standard
'medium' quality details and, in compliance with the tradition of *shikun*
architecture all the apartments received the same finishings. According
to architect Gardi, there were no different architectural standards in the
restored houses that could appeal to different social classes; on the
contrary, the houses were planned as if for an 'egalitarian' society,
without wide gaps between poor and rich. The apartments' interiors
resembled those of French Hill, according to the guidelines set by
government housing policy.[57]

Though the internal details might have been considered 'medium
quality' in the 1970s, when the economic situation in Israel was still
precarious and the myth of a settler society still held, they quickly
came to look poor in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, according to
architect Uri Ponger,[58] the company expected wealthy owners to
change most of the fixtures over time in an attempt to make their
houses look more prestigious. While no specific attention was given to
creating a range of standards to appeal to diverse classes, there was a
precise set of rules – established in a preliminary phase with the help of
religious experts – to adapt the plans to the specific needs of orthodox
religious clients. A number of regulations dealt with the religious
residents' needs: double sinks in the kitchen, selected position of the
toilet seats (not facing the Wailing Wall), and a basin for washing
hands in a space away from the toilet, according to the complex
religious prescriptions of orthodox Judaism. It appears, therefore, that
from the beginning the target group for the new apartments was
heavily religiously oriented.

The project was conceived for the middle and upper-middle classes
and – at least in a first phase – for a politically committed public willing
to accept the constraints imposed by living in the Old City (absence of
car accessibility and parking, continuous presence of working sites near
the houses, Muslim calls for prayer five times a day)[59] in exchange for the
'privilege' of residing in the Jewish Quarter. In the project's early years,
the shared ideological commitment and common social background of
both residents and architects/developers created a strong network of
personal relationships between the two groups, which allowed for

continuous feedback on the projects and eventually led to a sensible improvement in the technical quality of the work.

Public control of the area turned it into a highly homogeneous neighbourhood in which precise rules were established for the allocation of apartments. Two private houses, which remained outside the company's control, were, however, built in this carefully-planned area: these were the homes of the state comptroller, Yitzhak Nebenzahl, and of Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon.[60] The high status of these two people accorded them this exceptional privilege. In fact, Yehuda Tamir, the then company chairman, thought it essential for the sound development of the neighbourhood to have high-ranking personalities residing in the Jewish Quarter,[61] though others seemed perplexed by the unusual concession.[62] The British architectural firm Ahrens Burton & Koralek designed Nebenzahl's house between 1971 and 1973 on a plot of land facing the city walls. The house is accessible by car (a unique feature in the renewed Jewish Quarter) and has a private parking area. This highly prestigious stone-faced mansion, which veers away from imitating traditional architecture, is probably the most outstanding architectural achievement in the quarter. The house was particularly well reviewed in the specialist international journals,[63] though none of the commentators passed comment on its specificity within the overall Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan (there are only two private houses in the whole quarter), thus giving a misleading image of the reconstructed neighbourhood's architectural potential. Eliezer Frenkel designed Yigal Allon's residence, which officially belonged to the State of Israel, on a contiguous plot of land in 1968 with a nineteenth-century house incorporated into the new one. The interior design both catered to the needs of an official reception area and provided modern comforts for private family life.[64]

Small private houses made up the large majority of the original buildings in the area of the extended Jewish Quarter. The main public constructions were late-nineteenth-century Jewish institutions like the two domed Ashkenazi synagogues and the charitable housing complex of *Batei Mahse* (the shelters), the most spacious structure of which was the Rothschild House.[65] While the synagogues had been heavily damaged during the fighting of 1948 and then immediately demolished by the Jordanians, the housing complex was still standing and structurally sound when the reconstruction project was launched 20 years later. The two synagogues were left in ruins as memorials to the 1948 war,[66] while

the restoration of the *Batei Mahse* compound, a group of interconnected residential and religious buildings dating from the 1860s to the 1890s, became the first project of the reconstruction plan. The project was entrusted to a group of architects who had previously worked on the renovation of Old Jaffa – Eliezer Frankel, Yaacov Ya'ar and Sa'adia Mendel.[67] *Batei Mahse*'s small stone houses were restored not because of their architectural worth but because of their symbolic value as poles of Jerusalem's Jewish community. As living traces of the Jewish presence in the quarter, they both confirmed the Israeli version of the history of the site and affirmed Israel's 'right' of possession in the area. Most of the standard private houses were, however, demolished. Where they have been restored, they have often partially been rebuilt, thus erasing their original features and transforming them into 'new' and 'clean' buildings reserved solely for Jewish residents. Concrete walls with thin stone veneer coverings hide their original features and their 'Arab' character-istics, while reinforcing their weakened structures.[68] Finally, even though some of the *Batei Mahse* buildings were indeed restored and reused, the entire area has been completely transformed by the reconstruction, for new buildings (much taller than the original structures) have often been built on top of the surviving houses – an approach epitomized by the so-called 'Archways House' designed by Eliezer Frenkel.

The famous 'Rothschild House', originally part of the *Batei Mahse* com-plex, was comprehensively restored. This relatively prestigious example of late nineteenth-century stone architecture, completed in 1871, became for many years the CDRJQ's central office. The two-level stone house had not been badly damaged by either the 1948 or 1967 wars.[69] Com-pany engineers simply had to reinforce the structure by inserting metal rods in the masonry and to clean the external stonework. The restored Rothschild House building, and the newly designed square in front of it, became one of the main symbols of the rebuilt quarter. The CDRJQ recently sold the building to an ultra-orthodox institution, the Zilberman Yeshiva, which has converted it into a boys' religious school.[70] This highly symbolic change of ownership, which the director of the company apparently wanted, stirred strong opposition from the few secular residents remaining in the quarter, but they failed to block the deal.[71]

Among the other public Jewish spaces in the expropriated area, par-ticular attention has been devoted to the restoration and presentation of the complex of the four Sephardi synagogues. They constitute one of the

hallmarks of the restored Jewish Quarter and are often presented as an ageless symbol of the Jewish presence in the city. In reality, however, these four interrelated synagogues are of a more recent period than usually believed. The most ancient among them, the Ben Zakkai synagogue, was probably originally built in the first half of the seventeenth century, soon followed by the Elijah synagogue, while the two others, the 'Middle' and 'Stambouli' were first built in the eighteenth century. Moreover, they were all heavily restored and partially rebuilt in neo-Byzantine style in the nineteenth century (the Ben Zakkai in 1839, the Stambouli in 1835).[72] Though they were damaged by the 1948 war, and during the period of Jordanian rule (1948–67) all the furniture and religious appurtenances were removed and destroyed, their masonry structure had not been seriously affected. The company charged architect Dan Tanai with their restoration and the complex was reopened and officially inaugurated in 1973. An official issue of Israeli postage stamps commemorated the synagogues and the restoration effort.[73] From a technical perspective, however, the work that was carried out was not restoration but reflected the state project. Indeed, the present interior of the buildings does not respect the original: part of the plaster has been removed to show the stone voussoirs of the arches, the original windows of the domes have been 'replaced with small stone-framed windows similar to those of twelfth-century Spanish synagogues'[74] and the interior has been decorated with ancient Italian synagogue furniture, to make the site look both more 'ancient' and more architecturally impressive.[75] According to the same logic, new bronze doors – highly visible – have been designed by the winners of an artists' contest, even though the original entrance to the synagogues was concealed, and its door made of simple, undecorated wood.

Economic and social analysis

Economic and budgetary assessments always constitute an essential part of any building project. Considerations regarding the cost of construction, and even more so those related to the cost of restoring ancient structures, often have the power to forestall or launch already planned construction projects; ambitious urban plans have often been shelved because of the absence of funds, and 'pharaonic' projects have been downscaled to fit into governmental budgets. However, this has not been the case with the plan for Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter.

Because of its symbolic relevance to the state, the project has been regarded as an absolute priority and all budgetary restrictions have been eased by the political will to present the world with a renewed 'Jewish capital'. The pre-eminence of its symbolic and national role over any other consideration might be inferred by the continued – and substantial – financial support it received throughout the years.

Although it was an expensive venture, the reconstruction plan was able to produce important income through the sale of the new apartments. Providing a precise assessment of the economic dimension of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan and determining the incomes produced is, however, a difficult task. Still, even a schematic presentation of the economic and commercial aspects of the project offers some element of reflection and helps reinforce the overall argument of this research.

In addition to the comparison between the actual cost of the reconstruction work and the money obtained through the sale of restored apartments on the market, a serious economic assessment should include a cost/benefit analysis, taking into consideration factors such as tourism and sovereignty, the far-reaching economic effects of which may prove difficult to quantify. The economy of heritage constitutes a branch of economic studies that is still developing and its scientific basis is not universally recognized – even if everyone agrees that there are significant economic implications in all heritage decisions and policies.[76] The non-monetary benefits of the operation are potentially immense and their far-reaching effect on the overall economic development of the city and of the whole country so strong that a simple calculation, as proposed below, has only minimal significance. It is fair to assume, however, that in addition to the symbolic and political reasons for the Jewish Quarter project, there has also been a business-oriented one. In that the CDRJQ also played the role of estate agent, it is worth trying to document this aspect of the reconstruction, especially given the many allegations of mismanagement and favouritism over the sale of the apartments.

If the Jewish Quarter reconstruction were a standard construction the following elements should have been taken into consideration:

Expenses: the costs of land; removal of debris and ruins; archaeological excavations; design and planning; infrastructure works; restoration work; construction work; and maintenance.

Income: selling apartments; leasing commercial facilities; and indirect income from tourism.

Logically, an equal balance between expenses and income is expected, though the former generally exceeds the latter in publicly financed projects. To make this estimate even more complex, however, it should be assumed that such a balance was probably never undertaken by the planners. Indeed, the expenses of the reconstruction, which grew enormously with the development of the projects over the years, were shared by a number of partially competing and opposed administrative bodies (including, among others, the Ministry of Housing, the Antiquities Authority, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Municipality of Jerusalem), whose budgets were distinct and often non-related.

The Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan was an extremely costly operation financed directly by the central government and not linked to the municipality's budget. The review in the following pages of the main sectors in which public money has been spent shows a total disregard for the previous residents and for their economic rights. Planning policies often require the expropriation of large tracts of land for 'public utility', but the rights of the expropriated owners and residents are usually protected. In this case, however, the logic that has been followed betrays its military origin and can hardly be compared with traditional Western planning schemes.

The cost of the land and the value of the existing buildings
No search for the legitimate owners of the expropriated buildings was ever conducted. Though the ownership pattern of the expropriated area was complex (as everywhere in the Old City), it would have been possible to identify at least some of the original owners and to have compensated them. The Israeli authorities offered only extremely low compensations to the residents they evicted and expelled from the quarter; these were given against their right to possession and were never linked to the value of the houses. Even although not a single home owner asked for compensation on the grounds that they did not accept the legality of the Expropriation Act, it is doubtful that the Israeli government ever considered compensating the owners at the full market prices for the properties it confiscated. According to Benvenisti, a government assessor did carry out a complete evaluation of the

expropriated properties, including photographs and measurements.[77] However, searches for this important document have thus far proved unsuccessful. Indeed, the compensations offered were derisory and only a small number of recent squatters of half ruined dwellings accepted the deal that was offered. Under the Expropriation Act of 18 April 1968, the State of Israel was able to take control of 29 acres of land (including what had become the Western Wall esplanade) in the very heart of the city at virtually no cost; and this was a large urban estate that would obviously be almost inestimable if it were to be sold on the open market. This area, however, was not empty and a number of existing properties were built on it. According to the company estimate, almost one-third of the area was occupied by ruins. The other two-thirds, however, could have been the object of full compensation.

The cost of the demolitions and excavation

The cost of the archaeological excavations was borne entirely by the government and was not budgeted within the company's work.[78] Indeed, the excavations were both extremely important and very expensive. They involved thousands of archaeologists, workers, volunteers and students over a ten-year period.

The cost of the reconstruction

The CDRJQ most probably budgeted for the costs of removing debris and planning, as well as implementing and running the project. These budget documents, however, were not accessible to this research. In interview, the architect Gardi laid emphasis on the importance of economic planning (and implicitly its effectiveness) in the development of the construction work. His former employees, however, were less convinced by the overall budget-control policy. In fact, they pointed out that 'finally the projects were relatively expensive and no real budget constraint was active'[79] and that 'they were relatively free in the planning, the role of the general economic planning being not overwhelming'.[80] Indeed, political decisions and priorities (such as the rapid settlement of Jews in East Jerusalem) influenced the development of the project more than economic considerations and often led to previously agreed methods and programmes being altered. The impact of political considerations on the project can be inferred from the words of Meron Benvenisti: '[Following the proposal of the Rogers Plan in December

1969] *all budgetary restrictions were removed from construction work in the Jewish Quarter*, and an emergency programme was initiated to carry out two years' work in one. The custom of carrying out archaeological excavations before beginning the construction of new houses was discontinued.'[81]

According to architects Ponger and Rosenkovitch, the final cost per square metre of the new apartments was much higher than anywhere else in the city and, in developing specific plots in the quarter, many of the external consultants did not respect the budget envelope foreseen for their projects. From interviews with the people in charge of the reconstruction and from the brochures the CDRJQ published, it is only possible to get a rough idea of the costs related to the construction of the new buildings. It appears that the medium price for the reconstructed square metre was approximately US\$ 500 (1980) – compared with \$300–350 for new buildings in other areas[82] – for a total built surface in the quarter of 145,000 square metres. The total cost of the intervention, according to this estimate, has therefore been in excess of US\$ 72,500,000 (1980), to which should be added the cost of infrastructure. This sum, however, might just offer a vague idea of the overall cost and should not be regarded as an actual economic estimate of the work.

An early estimate for the whole project made by the director of the company in 1971 suggested the sum of 100 million Israeli liras as the possible cost of the project, though such a figure clearly demonstrates its abstract nature.[83] In 1975, the annual budget allocated for the Jewish Quarter reconstruction was 50 million Israeli liras, while 90 million were scheduled for the following year.[84] Even considering the impact of the strong devaluation of the Israeli currency in those years, it is obvious that the originally planned cost had proven largely insufficient.

One of the peculiarities of the Jewish Quarter project is that the body in charge of the work had full control over all of its phases, including the sale of the apartments. Architect Gardi describes the selling method adopted by the company:

> The apartments were sold by the company, without intermediate agents, as soon as completed. Not really one by one, but by small clusters together. They were on the market and subject to public auctions. Advertising appeared in the newspapers. In the first phase the price was fixed by the company and the buyers selected

according to a social/political criteria. One-third of the houses were meant for the original (pre-1948) inhabitants, one-third for 'artists' and personalities of culture, one-third for the religious public. Then a lottery was made among the people requesting the flats that were finally assigned to the new residents. In this first phase the flats were in high demand and sold very quickly. Later these criteria were put aside and the apartments were simply sold on the market for everybody.[85]

In an article published in the journal *Urbanisme*, French town planner Jacques Sicherman proposes an interesting analysis of this market strategy.[86] He notes how if a publicly-funded company acting like a private corporation has complete control of the market it can develop selling strategies to make the apartments more attractive to the public. To induce potential clients, the company pursued two parallel tracks. On the one hand, it sold the apartments at a promotional rate (as much as 50 per cent below the construction cost in a first phase), while on the other it set aside a large portion of the housing stock in order to create a wealthy, charming neighbourhood for the elite, which would have greater appeal to the property market. To avoid speculative investments that might disrupt the market and make it uncontrollable, the company imposed a proviso in the selling contracts that the new houses had to be owner occupied.

A disturbing feature of this operation, however, has been that it has transferred 'public' housing to the ruling class. The methods outlined above, while appearing understandable from a purely economic point of view, have produced important economic benefits for the ruling elite. The happy few 'tasteful desirable people',[87] who were invited to take up residence in the newly rebuilt Jewish Quarter, were encouraged in their patriotic choice by large governmental subsidies, drastically reducing the cost of their investment. However, once they decided to sell their heavily subsidized properties (or were 'compelled' to do so by the progressive 'orthodoxization' of the neighbourhood), they were able to sell at the full market price, netting large profits. This dynamic – the ruling elite offering itself a good business deal – is ignored in most analyses of the social modifications of the quarter. It is difficult to determine whether this was the result of external pressure forced on a politically-committed group or whether it was cynically conceived from the beginning. The

contemporary episode of the Yemin Moshe neighbourhood restoration, however, may serve as evidence that not everybody was unaware of the speculative dimension of the operation.

In the mid-1970s the company's property management policy changed radically when the price of apartments ceased to be decided *a priori* but instead became market-led and no longer subject to political control. However, until the end of the 1980s, the company retained the authority to control the fate of the properties insofar as it could stop apartments being resold and prohibit extensions and alterations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s all forms of control over the house owners apparently ceased. This dramatic change came about because of the opposition of more and more Israeli people who now saw the original apartment allotment policy as unscrupulous. A series of investigative reports and a number of newspaper articles drew the public's attention to this sensitive subject, which became a political scandal. An enquiry by *Ma'ariv* reporter Israel Harel (later cited in the *Jerusalem Post*) resulted in the dismissal of the powerful director of the CDRJQ, Yehuda Tamir:

> Many of the heavily subsidized apartments in the quarter went to Housing Ministry officials and other persons of influence. … Many of these apartments were more than 200 m^2 in size – some were even as large as 300 m^2 – while ordinary apartments measure about 100 m^2.
>
> … Although all persons buying apartments in the quarter are obliged by their contract to make it their permanent residence, Mr Harel revealed that a good number were not living there. Some apartments were rented out and some used as part-time residences. One large apartment, he reported, was sold to a Harry Zibenberg, who is not even an Israeli resident.[88]

Over the following months most of the detailed criticisms voiced against the company in the journalist's enquiry turned out to have been true. What is more interesting, however, is that this relatively minor political affair marked the end of an entire phase of Israeli politics. From this time, the government and the company were no longer able freely to impose their will, but were forced into more regular practices, reflecting the new political situation in the country after the Yom Kippur War and the widespread public perception of the immorality of the elite that had

run the country since 1948. More significant than the public distaste for the petty practice of allocating apartments to friends and relatives[89] was the fact that the Israeli people just no longer accepted that a planned model was superior to a liberal, market-oriented approach. Yehuda Tamir, Teddy Kollek and the company planners represented a generation of men who built the state out of ideological commitment and passion; they could not easily cope with the new direction in which Israel was moving, as their defence against the accusations revealed. Convinced of the superiority of their cultural and political conceptions, they candidly admitted that their choices were based on the superiority of 'national interest' over the rights of private citizens.[90] However, even though the Jewish Quarter was the product of just such a national ideological/political position, in the mid-1970s the Israeli public no longer saw itself in this way and called for radical changes. Critically, the higher 'morality' of this new approach has always been relative: if some apartments given to non-residents had to be returned to the CDRJQ,[91] the Arab owners and residents continued to be expulsed.[92]

The move of the apartments onto the free market took place between 1975 and 1977. In an initial phase, only those that were beyond the means of the original applicants were sold on the open market,[93] but in a second phase all the buyers had to pay current market prices[94] (even though the infrastructure was still subsidized and generous mortgages made available). This new policy led to an huge increase in the prices of the apartments, rocketing from around 35,000 Israeli liras in 1974 to more than 300,000 in 1976 and up to 750,000 in 1977.

The commercial and institutional buildings
The allocation procedures for commercial areas and institutions (mainly synagogues and *yeshiva*s) were different. The company never sold shops outright, but only leased them to maintain better control over their evolution (it must be noted that for many years commercial enterprises in the quarter were largely unsuccessful). Conversely, the plots on the very large surface area (55,000 square-metres) put aside for religious institutions were sold at politically determined prices, often unrelated to either the market or the company's overall approach. The most blatant example of this was the recent case of the *Yeshivat Ish haTora*. It occupies a particularly privileged spot on the edge of the Jewish Quarter on the last empty plot of land in front of the Wailing Wall and was obtained,

following Israeli government pressure, for the symbolic price of one shekel.[95] Indeed, as the Israeli press noted in newspaper articles during the year 2000,[96] the company, which Meir Porush of the *Agudat Yisra'el* party revived in the Netanyahu period, has become extremely religious and right-wing, hence its wish to transfer public property to ultra-orthodox groups.

The extra-monetary value of the project was already evident to Teddy Kollek, the mayor of 'unified' Jerusalem, only two months after the Six-Day War when, during a session of the municipal council, he stated: 'As far as I know, this [the preservation of historic sites and the preservation of the beauty of the city] will pay for itself many times over, for a beautiful capital attracts investments, raises the reputation of the state and its credit in a way that is difficult to describe.'[97]

In the preliminary planning phase, tourism was envisaged as one of the Jewish Quarter's potential assets. However, with the accent put more and more on the quarter's residential function and religious institutions, the development of tourism has been hindered,[98] for an ultra-orthodox community and masses of tourists were thought to be incompatible. As a result, residential areas and tourist paths have been clearly differentiated and the planned hotels and tourist accommodation (excluding those catering for a religious public) have not been implemented. The relatively small number of commercial outlets and cafés created to cater to tourists is further confirmation of the uneasy coexistence between the two groups. Visitors to the quarter, who are mainly escorted in organized tours, are shown the Wailing Wall and the archaeological remains, and then taken back to the new city outside the walls for accommodation, entertainment and dining. Still, the economic impact of tourism on the Jewish Quarter is enormous. The reconstructed neighbourhood, in fact, plays a central role in a more global strategy concerning Jerusalem and its Old City, evidencing the full Israeli appropriation of the city to millions of Western tourists. Most of them, uncomfortable with the Old City's 'oriental' and 'foreign' features – an obviously Arab environment often perceived as aggressive – look for a space to rest and relax, to eat and to buy souvenirs. The Jewish Quarter, as a reshaped, transformed, cleaned up and Judaized part of the Old City, offers them all they want: English-speaking shopkeepers, Jewish and Israeli souvenirs and clean and aseptic cuisine. In effect, tourism often depends on preconceived notions of both places and people,[99] and the message that sells Jerusalem

as the 'city of the Jews' has been so successful that reality had somehow to cope with the visitors' expectations.

In a first phase, the new apartments in the Jewish Quarter were extremely popular among the secular elite and religious public. Soon, however, the sale of the new flats slowed down. On the one hand this was due to the complex method of allocating the apartments, but on the other it depended on the actual quality of the flats. The planners' total ignorance of restoration techniques quickly became noticeable as the 'restored' houses developed dampness, cracks and falling plaster.[100] Consequently, in June 1976 only 253 apartments had been sold (of which 53 were unoccupied) and in November of the same year only 318 of the planned 700 flats had been completed. Prospects were even worse for the commercial facilities, with only a handful actually in business.[101]

Israeli sources often refer to the progressive 'orthodoxization' of the neighbourhood and the present percentage of secular residents in the Jewish Quarter is estimated at a mere 8 per cent.[102] Indeed, the shift from a Zionist-committed and Labour-dominated community to a predominantly religious one is evident in the use of the public space. As no *ad hoc* research has been carried out on the social fabric of the neighbourhood, only rather general statements about the quarter's residents are possible, based on the obvious perception that the area has slowly turned into an almost exclusively orthodox-inhabited area. According to Hattis-Rolef,[103] the primary reason for this transformation lies in how the planning scheme was implemented. Through time constraints, budget concerns and political strategies the quarter has developed as a poorly-serviced area. Few kindergartens, schools or social services were planned and built, causing the progressive disaffection of the secular public. Hattis-Rolef notes how the secular community's initial enthusiasm to settle in the quarter rapidly faded. Moreover, she notes that many secular Israelis who were authorized to settle in the quarter turned down the offer. The system for allocating flats, transport and parking restrictions, an absence of moral support from the establishment and, in particular, the growing limitations imposed by orthodox Jews are the main reasons for the very obvious difference between the quarter's planned and actual population composition.[104] According to her analysis 'The impossibility to achieve a pacific coexistence between secular and orthodox has been proved all over the country. The contradictory exigencies of these two social groups have proven too hard an obstacle for the creation of a community

as dreamed by the planners and the first residents.'[105] However, other elements should also be taken into consideration: first, the present-day situation – an orthodox neighbourhood – somehow mirrors the parallel evolution of Israeli society as a whole and of Jerusalem's population in particular; and second, as shown above, the planned identity of the quarter was ambiguous from the beginning.

On one hand, the conscious attempt to profit from the area's religious appeal, which was an essential part of the resettling plan from the beginning, paved the way for the religious takeover of the quarter after the Labour-dominated years; on the other hand, the very close links between successive right-wing governments and the religious and extremist groups devoted to the 'Judaization' of the Old City inevitably led to a new policy being introduced to favour the settlement of religious families in the Jewish Quarter. This trend, physically represented by the extraordinarily high number of religious schools and seminaries in the quarter, has greatly helped to distract attention away from the development of a 'normal' residential area. According to the official statistical data, in 1998 there were only 2306 Jewish residents in the quarter.[106] However, Hattis Rolef's numbers differ. According to her research, more than 600 religious families and *yeshiva* students were actually residing in the area, totalling in excess of 4000.[107] The data presented in the *Israel Yearbook*, in fact, are relatively ambiguous and partially misleading because the statistical area that corresponds to the Jewish Quarter (area 631) seems to refer to the subdivision of the Old City following the Roman axes and not the borders of the expropriated area.[108] Moreover, the census data apparently do not take into account the hundreds of Jewish students who reside temporarily in the *yeshiva*s. Nadav Shragai, the noted Jerusalem correspondent of the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, who is usually very well informed on Old City issues, presents altogether new data according to which, 'The number of Jews in the Jewish Quarter grew only by 22 people between 1983 and 1995, reaching 2900. … Some 70 per cent are *haredim*, 25 per cent religious-nationalist, and only 5 per cent are secular.'[109]

Conclusion

The analysis of the reconstruction presented in this chapter is primarily based on two types of sources: secondary sources reinterpreted in an architectural and political context, and primary architectural sources.

The latter consist of the buildings *per se* and of the interviews carried out with planners in Jerusalem. The rather technical discussion of the reconstruction plan should not be seen as distinct from the political analysis, but on the contrary as its necessary complement. The technical perspective is meant to be the tool through which the ideological framework that gave rise to the new Jewish Quarter might be grasped, thus circumventing the serious handicap presented by the absence of official documents and data from the CDRJQ and other official bodies.

An ancient/new neighbourhood, embodying Zionist conceptions of history and the new political landscape created by the 1967 war, has been superimposed over the ancient urban fabric of the Old City according to a design Israeli planners conceived without regard to the contemporary international debate on urban conservation. Following the forced expulsion of the Palestinian residents, the CDRJQ elaborated and implemented a reconstruction plan that mirrored the characteristics of Israeli architectural development. The plan was rationally organized and implemented, but without awareness of the basic and recognized rules of conservation. The reconstruction, carried out by a group of politically committed planners wishing to embody the modernity of the country, who had confidence in the potential of modern architectural, planning and construction methods, has produced a modern urban environment in which a few ancient restored buildings and a number of archaeological sites are meant to express the 'eternal' Jewish identity of the city and its national significance.

Foreign and Israeli architectural critics have often praised the overall layout of the reconstructed neighbourhood and considered the initial decision to create a dense and lively neighbourhood the key to its success. It should not be forgotten, however, that political considerations also played an important part in defining the plan for the quarter. The concept of urban density, in fact, provided the justification to settle thousands of new Israeli residents within the city walls. Similarly, the ideological will to 'recover' an ancient (largely mythical) past in order to 'justify' Israeli control of the city to world public opinion has determined the conservation strategy followed in the reconstruction – a selective restoration policy focusing on Jewish institutions. Thus, the *Batei Mahse* compound and the Sephardi synagogues have been restored and depicted as 'proof' of an ancient and continuous Jewish presence in the area. Standard Arab houses have either been demolished to make way for

archaeological excavations or 'restored' with their original features masked behind a neutral new 'skin' of 'Jerusalem stone'.

Full public control over the land and over what design to implement, and an uninterrupted flow of governmental funds, made it possible to adopt a comprehensive approach. Within this 'public' plan, a small number of independent constructions, to 'upgrade' the architectural image of the area, were permitted. In the long run, the ambiguity of such an approach and the overlapping of public and private interests, which characterized the whole reconstruction process, have shocked ordinary Israeli citizens who, since the mid-1970s, have come to reject the 'national interest' scheme and its accompanying rhetoric, which often hid privileges and public subsidies for the ruling class.

The political defeat of the Labour Party in 1977 reflected this new sensitivity and led, in the 1980s and 1990s, to the massive influx of new, religious residents into the neighbourhood. This new population, in turn, has altered the architectural environment of the quarter by adapting it to its specific needs.

Chapter 4
Building the Jewish Quarter: Case Studies

First of all, they began to look upon the landscape that was 'before their eyes' as a layer under which was hidden the real landscape – the landscape of their ancient homeland.

They searched the visible landscape for vestiges of their dream, and little by little they drew a new map for themselves, one that concealed the threatening, alien landscape. This was not, however, just a map of illusions; they had decided to reshape reality – the physical landscape – in accordance with their vision and their dream.

These young initiates excelled in archaeological excavation and research that removed the visible layer of landscape and exposed the 'real' landscape beneath it – that of their ancient homeland.

But in fact they had created its opposite: it was the landscape that was fashioned in the image of the committed spiritual worldview of the Israeli individual instead of the other way around, and in this image there was no space for true personal, intimate communion with the land.

M. Benvenisti[1]

Selection of the case studies

In Chapter 3 I described the 'making' of the Jewish Quarter in its general political, technical and economic aspects, identifying the strategy behind the operation and pointing out individual buildings as proof of the ideological nature of the project. Let us now examine how these assumptions were translated into architectural plans in three selected areas that are crucial for the reconstruction plan as a whole.

The three selected focal points are the Wailing Wall esplanade, the Hurva synagogue and the Cardo area. They represent, for different

reasons, the true focuses of the renewed Jewish Quarter and they have contributed greatly towards shaping the physical and symbolic image of the neighbourhood. It is in these three areas, more than anywhere else, that the state's efforts to forge a new image of the city and to stress the political meaning of the reconstructed Jewish Quarter acquire their full significance; their influence on the millions of Israeli and foreign tourists who have visited the city since 1967 has been immense.

The three case studies presented in this chapter represent an essential step in the symbolic Israeli takeover of the entire expropriated area. Their physical locations – on the eastern edge of the quarter (the Wailing Wall plaza), on its western border near the centre of the Old City (the Cardo) and in the heart of what used to be the historic Jewish quarter (the Hurva synagogue) respectively – contribute greatly towards intentionally stressing the city's Jewish identity. As we have seen, the erasure of the quarter's existing fabric and the complete removal of its Arab residents strengthened the takeover at the symbolic level. The analysis of these sites requires a more finely tuned interpretation than the one proposed for the rest of the quarter in the previous chapter.

These three sites embody diverse aspects of the reconstruction plan of the Jewish Quarter: the tourist cum economic (Cardo), the religious (Hurva synagogue), and the amalgam of ethno-religious nationalism represented by the Wailing Wall. However, though these three sites are undoubtedly the most representative of the reconstructed Jewish Quarter, they are not typical examples of CDRJQ planning. The original plans for two of the three areas in question were distinctly different. Indeed, had designs for the new Hurva (by Louis Kahn) and the Wailing Wall plaza (by Moshe Safdie) been implemented, it is likely that their appearance and the symbolic messages found within them would have better reflected the company's ideological approach discussed in the previous chapter. Likewise, had the company rather than the winner of an architectural competition planned the Cardo, it certainly would have looked quite different and its centrality within the overall scheme of the new quarter would not have been assured. It should be remembered that the present-day design of these spaces is the result of intense debates and of the continuous shifting in the balance of power between diverse components of Israeli society. As Kroyanker stated: 'The topics of planning the Western Wall piazza and the Hurva Synagogue site are typical of the tremendous emotional religious-national load involved in

the Jewish Quarter planning and construction. In both cases the planners did not succeed in bringing the various bodies to a consensus concerning a desirable planning form.[2]

We should also consider that, though intimately linked at both the planning and symbolic levels, the Wailing Wall plaza was not included in the CDRJQ planning area.[3] It could be argued, then, that the various proposals and actual implemented design should not be discussed within the same framework applied to the reconstructed Jewish Quarter. However, in order to grasp Israeli state policy on Jerusalem and the transformation of the Old City it is necessary to include the design of the plaza when discussing the implementation of the CDRJQ plans.

At first sight, the planning choices adopted for these three areas do not conform to the overall interpretation developed in the previous chapter. However, through a more in-depth study of their underlying political/ideological characteristics, it is possible to demonstrate that they are indeed a product of the same logic.

The imposing dome of the Hurva synagogue, which used to tower above the small houses of the traditional Jewish quarter, has not been reconstructed and the nearby minaret has not been demolished. This planning decision seems to contradict the general interpretation of the reconstruction plan, namely a selective restoration of Jewish public spaces and voluntary neglect or destruction of Arab heritage. Likewise, it might seem surprising that the Wailing Wall plaza has remained barren and desolate when it is such a central and essential part of the city's Jewish identity. Furthermore, selecting an example of Jerusalem's Roman and Byzantine heritage as the most visible archaeological site in the quarter and its main tourist attraction, challenges my interpretation of the reconstruction plan presented in this book because, in this instance, the selected site does not belong to the city's 'Jewish' heritage. I shall examine the apparent contradictions between the proposed ideological interpretation and the plans implemented for the three case studies and use the actual design for these areas, and the challenges these three points raise, to verify my assumption.

The Hurva synagogue restoration

The Hurva synagogue was the religious centre of the Old City's Ashkenazi community and, with its 24-metre high dome, one of the pre-

eminent landmarks of pre-1948 Jerusalem. The history of the building is complex, but well documented.

In 1700, Rabbi Yehuda haHasid arrived in Jerusalem from Poland with a small group of followers and began to build a small synagogue in the Jewish quarter. Following the sudden death of their leader, the newly established Ashkenazi community was forced to borrow increasingly large sums of money from the Muslim community without the means to repay the loans. Tensions soon developed between the communities, which ended with the destruction of the synagogue and the expulsion of the entire Ashkenazi group from the city in 1720. Thereafter, the site became known within the Jewish community as the *hurva* (ruin) of Rabbi haHasid's synagogue.

A century later, in 1812, a second group of Ashkenazi Jews, followers of the *Vilna Gaon* (known as the *Perushim*) arrived in Jerusalem. In 1836 they obtained from Mohammed Ali Pasha, the Egyptian ruler then in control of the city, permission to build a new synagogue. Thus, in 1837, the Menahem Zion synagogue was built in the Hurva compound.[4] In 1854 they built a second small synagogue in the same area and two years later, in 1856, they obtained a *firman* from the Turkish sultan authorizing the construction of a large house of prayer in Jerusalem.[5] The architect the sultan appointed to plan and supervise the renovation of the buildings on the *Haram al-Sharif* agreed to design and oversee the construction of the Hurva synagogue. The construction work, however, progressed slowly for lack of funds and the building was completed only in 1864.[6] It was named *Beit Ya'akov* in honour of the Baron James (Ya'akov) de Rothschild.[7]

The synagogue immediately became a landmark and symbol of the growing Jewish presence in Jerusalem, with its large dome rivalling the longstanding religious shrines of the city – the Dome of the Rock and the church of the Holy Sepulchre. It was, like the nearby Tiferet Yisra'el (built ten years later), located at the highest point of the Jewish quarter and its dome was clearly visible from outside the city walls. Its elevated position, however, may well have also played a role in its destruction. The fate of the synagogue in the 1948 battle for the Old City is a highly contested point. Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian sources generally present divergent versions of the events that led to the destruction of the building.

Israeli sources hold that the Jordanian army voluntarily demolished

the synagogue after the cessation of the fighting, and this destruction is often presented as evidence of what they saw as unacceptable practices by the Jordanian administration with regard to Jerusalem's Jewish heritage.[8] Jordanian and Palestinian sources, however, usually present the destruction of the synagogue as a direct result of the fighting that took place in the Old City. They affirm that the last defenders of the quarter used the high roofs of the synagogue as a defensive stronghold and that the Jordanian army was compelled to shell the building.[9] In a first-hand account of the 1948 battle for the Jewish quarter written by a Greek resident of the Old City, the author describes the events that led to the destruction of the synagogue in terms similar to those expressed by Palestinian author Henry Cattan:

> The Arab guerrilla fighters who later joined with the Legion of Transjordan were preoccupied with clearing the Jews from the Jewish Quarter inside the Old City, who even used their own synagogues as strongholds from where attacks were made. Qawukji and the Transjordanian army were continuously pounding the Jewish Quarter. The Tifereth Israel Synagogue was first destroyed, and was followed by the most famous and historic Hurva Synagogue, which was destroyed on May 27. But the Arab Headquarters had warned the Jewish Headquarters through the International Red Cross that unless the armed Jewish forces withdrew from the Synagogue within a certain time limit, they would be compelled to attack it. Since there was no reply from the Jewish side, as it was stated officially by the Red Cross, the Arabs bombed and destroyed it. Immediately after the destruction of the Synagogue the Jews began to waver. They started to show signs of surrender.[10]

From the few published photos depicting the battle in the Old City it appears that the domes of both the Hurva and Tiferet Yisra'el were badly damaged during the fighting. After the Six-Day War only part of the Hurva basement walls remained standing.

The Hurva synagogue has often been considered the most architecturally significant building of the pre-1948 Jewish quarter, and the CDRJQ's architectural team in particular and Israeli society in general extensively examined the fate of its ruins in the reconstruction of the neighbourhood. Three main options were pondered and their architec-

tural and political implications are presented below: (1) rebuilding the Hurva 'as it was, where it was'; (2) constructing a new building to stress the return of the Jews to the Old City; and (3) conserve the ruins as a symbolic monument to war and destruction.

Many religious and political figures supported the proposal to rebuild the original Hurva 'where it was, as it was' – in accordance with the successful formula utilized at the beginning of the century to reconstruct St Mark's bell tower in Venice.[11] Indeed, according to the criteria utilized in the rest of the quarter (conservation and restoration of the main Jewish public buildings to stress the neighbourhood's historic 'Jewish character'), the reconstruction option seemed to be the most logical. However, the CDRJQ planners strongly opposed it and their reasoning led to the shelving of this option. The planning team's objections are outlined below, where it is argued that such a reconstruction would prove incompatible with the overall urban reconstruction project and that there is a substantial convergence of the present-day Hurva layout with the approach followed in the Jewish Quarter.

(a) Rejection of the traditional religious character of the area
The planners and architects who developed the area all belonged to the Ashkenazi Zionist elite and none was a practising Jew, which has a bearing on their approach to planning in the Jewish Quarter. It is likely that their secular world-view partially explains their refusal to focus on synagogue-building projects.[12] The CDRJQ planning team 'used' the quarter's religious appeal to attract residents and justify the scheme, but always stressed the nationalist basis of the project along with its social/housing dimension. This outlook among the designers is confirmed by the fact that many of the architects in charge of planning the new Jewish Quarter no longer visit its environs following its transformation into an almost exclusively religious neighbourhood.[13]

(b) Political/religious background of the planners
The political orientation of the people in charge of the project also partly explains why they rejected the reconstruction option for the Hurva. As soon as 'reconstruction' became the official religious and right-wing position, it became unacceptable to them. According to Shalom Gardi, the reconstruction of the Hurva became a point of tension between the religious and secular and the right and left in Israel. Moreover, Israel's

Prime Minister Menahem Begin entered the debate in support of reconstruction *à l'identique*.[14]

(c) Internal divisions of the Jewish religious groups

The *Perushim* group, the followers of the *Vilna Gaon*, built the Hurva, while other Ashkenazi Jews, the *Hasidim*, built the Tiferet Yisra'el, the second monumental Old City synagogue. Other Jewish groups like the Karaite, Sephardi and even those derived from modern national states (German, Dutch or Hungarian immigrants) had all established separate praying halls. There never was a single centre around which the religious and social life of the entire Jewish community revolved in the original Jewish quarter. The Jews who settled in the Old City came from a number of different countries and, though sharing the same faith, had diverse habits, languages and traditions. Indeed their particularism was one of their most evident characteristics.[15] The Zionists opposed this situation, insisting rather on the 'unity' of the 'Jewish People'. The reconstruction of the house of prayer of one particular group would not have created a common centre for the quarter; on the contrary, it would probably have stirred opposition within the other communities. The Wailing Wall was to play the role of a central, unique focus; a rebuilt Hurva would only have exacerbated internal tensions and added an unwelcome 'oriental' symbol to the quarter. Indeed, the wall was the only symbol capable of overcoming the differences between the communities and of presenting a 'united' ethno-religious Jewish front.

(d) Creation of a new architectural style portraying the rebirth of Israel

The Oriental tradition predominant in the Ottoman Empire heavily influenced the architecture of the domed synagogue that towered over the traditional Jewish quarter. A Turkish architect designed the Hurva and its dome was meant to mingle with the city's Oriental/Arab land-scape. As Kroyanker noted,[16] the direct inspiration for the Hurva can be identified in the famous mosques of Istanbul, in particular the sixteenth-century Mihrimah mosque designed by Sulayman the Magnificent's court architect Mimar Sinan.[17] The architectural vision embodied in the main symbol of pre-1948 Jewish Jerusalem was thus at odds with the new conception the planners sought to create in the restored Jewish Quarter. Israeli architects and planners wanted to create a new style to reflect their modern Western identity. In a new neighbourhood made of

rationally connected, square concrete boxes, the reconstructed dome of the Hurva would have created a fracture between tradition and the modern living symbol of Israel.[18]

(e) Technical incapacity of the architectural team
Reconstruction *à l'identique* would not have been an impossible task. The original plans of the building were known, there was a wooden model of it, and photographs and paintings of the synagogue had been collected.[19] Moreover, most of the synagogue's original stones were available on site, buried under the rubble. Indeed, it would have been relatively easy for a qualified team of architects and builders to carry out such work. However, neither the architects nor the masons were sufficiently qualified: the architects belonged to a generation that only designed reinforced concrete structures and was uneasy with traditional masonry technology, while the Palestinian workers were mostly primarily unskilled labourers. It seems that the reconstruction option was not in fact a viable one at the time. To make the task harder, the rubble from the collapsed building was removed in an early phase of the neighbourhood's reconstruction without any attempt to screen the stones and surviving decorative elements for reuse. This last element is important because, at its preliminary phase, any restoration plan would have advocated collecting and storing all the original carved stones from the ruined buildings for use later in the reconstruction phase. The absence of such a basic step is further confirmation that the plan was in fact not a restoration but a housing project.

Swayed by the creative possibilities of contemporary architecture, the company and municipality of Jerusalem's architects supported the idea of a new Hurva being designed by a prominent architect. They saw the creation of a new monumental building as the best way of depicting the changed character of the quarter and looked upon a fresh creation as opposed to a reconstruction as more in tune with their philosophical approach to cultural heritage.

A number of contemporary designs for the new Hurva were proposed. Following a vibrant debate by the religious authorities and the Israeli public, Louis Kahn's highly interesting and innovative plan, of which there were three different versions, was rejected (even though it was the CDRJQ's 'official' design) on the grounds that it was excessive and

provocative.[20] The well-known British architect, Sir Denys Lasdun's more traditional proposal suffered a similar fate. In the absence of a consensus, all the proposals were shelved, but they nevertheless deserve an assessment for their architectural and symbolic value. Louis Kahn is considered to be among the most important and influential architects of the twentieth century. He designed important buildings all over the world characterized by a masterful use of concrete. His works include the 'Salk Institute' in La Jolla, California, the 'Art Museum' in Fort Worth, Texas and the 'National Assembly Building' in Dacca, all considered architectural masterpieces.[21] According to the Italian critics Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, 'Louis Kahn's architectural works are intent on bringing back a collective memory. … Kahn's work inveighs against the reduction of architecture to a negligible object.'[22]

His involvement in the Hurva project came at the end of his life, but it was particularly important for the American-born architect. His Jewish roots and the specificity and uniqueness of the site gave the project a special standing.[23] He drew up plans for a highly impressive architectural monument, deliberately out of scale with its surroundings and 'competing' with the major Muslim and Christian shrines in the city. Each of his three versions is based on a central plan. His design, which had no points of contact with the historic Hurva, has four massive stone-covered external pylons on each façade of the square plan, with four internal concrete pillars supporting four inverted pyramids forming the flat roof of the building. It is widely considered one of his highest achievements and is seen as the most impressive of his 'unbuilt' projects.[24] A superb computer-generated graphic reconstruction of the various versions of the project was exhibited at the New York Jewish Museum and at Jerusalem's Israel Museum in 1997.[25] According to the curator of the Jerusalem exhibition, 'The Hurva design stands alone as a poetic quest for spirit through sacred geometry, and it represents the culmination of Kahn's philosophy. … An eloquent example of Kahn's unique ability to integrate mass and void, and to manipulate light and shadow in order to infuse the physical experience of a building with spirituality.'[26]

The sense of monumentality, so evident in his design, was also a reflection of the Hurva's role in representing 'a spiritual centre for the whole of Jewry', as Ya'acov Solomon, who contacted him about the project, asked him to convey.[27] To connect the project to the site Kahn looked for inspiration in ancient architecture. An Egyptian temple

provided him with a reference for the composition of the façade and the Jewish Temple (or specifically a late nineteenth-century reconstruction of the plan for the Holy of Holies) most likely influenced the plan. The final result is the design of a building that 'appears heavily placed on the ground like an ancient temple – so that it becomes an almost immovable presence, forever rooted in Jerusalem's ground.'[28]

The project was categorically rejected in Jerusalem, in no small part because the religious establishment considered the reference to the Temple to be blasphemous. Nevertheless, many people, recognizing the enormous strength and symbolic charge the building yielded, supported his design. David Reznik, one of the fathers of Israeli architecture, described it as a 'powerful structure to support and strengthen the Jewish presence in the Old City', and Teddy Kollek, who had similar opinions, tried in vain to get Kahn's design adopted.[29] After Kahn's death, an Englishman, Sir Charles Clore, took up the reins and gave the commission to the eminent English architect, Sir Denys Lasdun, who, in partnership with local religious architect Yitzhak Schoenberger, presented a new proposal for the Hurva.[30] Once more, bowing to Prime Minister Begin's objections, the minister of interior rejected its modern design on the grounds that only an exact replica of the original would have been acceptable. Because of the irresolvable conflicts between the various authorities involved in planning the Jewish Quarter, and indeed within Israeli society as a whole, neither the reconstruction nor the creation of a new Hurva proved to be realistic options.

The third option, the conservation of the ruins, was finally imposed as a compromise solution acceptable to all parties involved. The plan, conceived and designed for the CDRJQ by Nehemia Bikson under the supervision of Shalom Gardi, transformed the ruins into a 'Memorial to the War', creating a small exhibition presenting the history of the building on the ground floor and an accessible terrace overlooking the remains of the central hall at the upper level. A slender, reconstructed stone arch crowns the site. This design, though initially conceived of as temporary,[31] proved to be extremely successful both visually and symbolically, and fully in touch with the overall philosophy of the quarter. The conservation of the ruins as they were, with the addition of a reconstructed stone arch that ideally recreates the outline of the synagogue, fully satisfies the ideological scheme of the work achieving three main goals: (1) to underline the destruction caused by the 'Arabs'

and their disrespect of Jewish holy places; (2) to stress the immemorial presence of Jews in the quarter (indeed a 2000 year-old wall is physically very similar to a nineteenth-century ruin as far as building materials and techniques are concerned); and (3) to dwarf the impact of the presence of a Muslim minaret on the same plot of land.

This solution is particularly convincing because it conveys a series of ideological messages (based on a questionable reading of history) without altering the present image of the site and even respecting the presence of the Muslim heritage (the minaret is protected by the Antiquity Law). The symbolism of this project was absolutely clear to all the planners, as Kroyanker rightly stressed in his classic *Jerusalem Architecture*.[32] Louis Akerman, however, longing for Kahn's 'American dream', can only see this 'minimalist' solution, as 'an absolutely objectionable substitute … a lonely architectural sign, standing as an insipid memorial to a nineteenth-century synagogue in ruins'.[33]

One might argue, however, that such criticism not only misses the whole symbolic dimension discussed above, but also fails to recognize that, as in other similar cases, the relative banality of the original architecture is enhanced and transfigured by its transformation into celebrative ruins.[34] Moreover, beyond commemorating the destruction, the Hurva memorial allows the entire Jewish community collectively to appropriate the site in an extremely powerful and profound manner, unrivalled by any architectural design. Indeed, the collective Jewish memory can, tragically, superimpose to the sight of yet another ruin, countless images of destroyed synagogues and pogroms. Through this emotional association, it is possible to strengthen the bonds among all the diverse groups that comprise Judaism and at the same time reinforce their commitment to the Jewish state and its values.

A new phase in the never-ending Hurva saga has begun with recent calls for its reconstruction,[35] and its fate is once again the object of much discussion and planning. In February 2002 a building site panel informed visitors that the 'CDRJQ is building here'. There is in fact a new approved plan, which Israeli architect Nahum Mitzer designed with the support of the Israeli Antiquities Authority, to reconstruct the original building. This new project, together with the Davidson Centre (a 'heritage centre' presenting Jerusalem as it was in the 'Second Temple Period' using high-tech virtual models to recreate the site), new arcades along the sides of the Wailing Wall plaza and a recently proposed fund

to 'revitalize' the wall area, has ushered in a new phase in the life of the reconstructed Jewish Quarter.[36] Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's right-wing government has focused its efforts on the Old City of Jerusalem in general and on the revitalization of the partially 'forgotten' Jewish Quarter in particular. If this proposal were to materialize, the reconstructed 24-metre high dome of the Hurva will transform the image of the Old City. Indeed, it is likely that a rebuilt synagogue will now become a new focal point for the religious community of the Jewish Quarter, eventually capable of competing with the wall and with the growing desire of extremists to see the reconstruction of the Third Temple on the site of the Muslim mosques.

From an architectural perspective, however, the reconstruction of the Hurva will not recreate the visual impact of the original building. Even if a faithful replica of the original synagogue were to be made, the building will never again be 'as it was, where it was' because the surroundings have been profoundly altered. A building with façades that were partially hidden by the densely built urban fabric of the Old City and that used to be visible only from the narrow lanes of the quarter will now stand free, visible from afar, in the large square that presently surrounds the ruins. Furthermore, not only has the setting changed, but the scale of the new buildings of the reconstructed Jewish Quarter has been enlarged. The imposing dome of the Hurva used to dominate a low and compactly built neighbourhood. Today, following the reconstruction of the quarter, what used to be single level or two-storey stone structures have been rebuilt as four-storey houses almost as tall as the dome of the old synagogue. Therefore, even if rebuilt faithfully, the Hurva would not acquire the architectural pre-eminence it possessed in the pre-1948 cityscape.

The decision to rebuild the Hurva in 2002, more than 50 years after its destruction and more than 20 years after the end of the Jewish Quarter project, creates unresolved aesthetic and planning problems. Indeed, even if reconstruction has become an increasingly popular response to destruction wrought by war over the last 20 to 25 years (there has even been a proposal to rebuild the Buddhas of Bamyan in Afghanistan), such a delayed reconstruction cannot fit harmoniously into a general plan that was conceived along different principles.

The decision to revive such a project needs to be seen in the context of the general political situation. It seems that the conscious use of heritage by Sharon's national unity government is meant to reassure and

consolidate the deeply shaken national identity of Israeli Jewish citizens, who are becoming more and more divided and distant from the Zionist founding mythology.

The main difference between these newly planned transformations and the 1970s' vision of the Jewish Quarter project seems to be in the openly-stated reference to Jewish religious symbols common to all the new proposals. The Sharon government tried to counter the growing anti-Zionist trend in Israel by appropriating most of the symbols of Labour Israel and by forging a new alliance between secular Zionist values and traditional religious symbols. What proved impossible for the Israeli governments of the 1970s to achieve now seems possible through promoting the Jewish religious heritage and partially playing down the more nationalistic historic elements.

The Wailing Wall area

When the Moroccan quarter was demolished, the empty square in front of the Wailing Wall became the focus of a national debate and sparked an internal power struggle between the various cabinet ministries involved in the reconstruction of the Old City. The controversy concerned both planning in the area and its status.[37] On looking at the Wailing Wall it is important to bear in mind that it is closely tied up with the yet unresolved question of the nature of the State of Israel. The respective weights of secular or religious bases of governance impact on the future political culture and aims of construction projects. Disputes between secular and religious bodies, which the petty everyday quarrels evident in Israeli governmental coalitions amplify, touch at the very heart of these inherent contradictions. Planning decisions for the area thus impinge on the highly sensitive relationship between religion and state, which was never properly resolved following the 1948 Israeli declaration of independence.

After a chaotic period immediately after the conquest of the Old City in June 1967, a situation developed in which the Ministry of Religious Affairs became responsible for the Western Wall area (north of the *Bab al-Magharib*), while the archaeologists retained control over the southern part of the wall. A buffer zone composed of the remnants of the *Harat al-Magharib* that had been spared in the demolition campaign of June 1967, namely the complex of buildings formed by the Madrasa Fakhriya and the Abu Saud houses, separated the two authorities. When excavations

were extended northwards and the decision to demolish the last Arab houses was taken in June 1969, the hostilities between archaeologists and religious authorities again erupted over control of the separation zone. The only way to resolve the struggle between these two groups was through the direct intervention of the minister of defence who, stressing the military importance of the rampart leading to *al-Haram al-Sharif*, took control of it.[38] By this arrangement, the three main pillars of the Israeli state – the religious, the secular/Zionist and the military – were now represented and controlled portions of the Wailing Wall area. It might therefore be affirmed that this site symbolizes the State of Israel in all its complexity and representative components. How did the state decide to represent itself? What has been the result of this forced cohabitation?

Nothing emerged from the new arrangement and the contradictions continued without the formation of a national consensus. The 'decision not to decide' on a design for the Western Wall mirrors similar, more meaningful, choices in which a day-by-day strategy is preferred to far reaching discussions about the nature of the state.[39] Today's empty square represents the failure of all compromise solutions. Concerned government ministries, foreign architects and planners have put forth many project proposals. I now introduce the most significant designs followed by an examination of their aesthetic and political implications.

The American master Louis Kahn prepared a schematic plan while working on the design for the Hurva synagogue in 1967. He proposed to link the two monuments, the Wailing Wall plaza and his new Hurva, by a new road called the 'Way of the Prophets' to stress the symbolism of the Jewish Quarter and to redefine the entire urban fabric of this part of the city along a central – and highly symbolic – axis. Though his plan never reached a detailed stage, its outline was clear. The square was to be divided into two parts, with the surviving houses of the Moroccan quarter playing the role of separator. The southern part was to be dedicated to archaeological excavations and the northern portion, dug to the Herodian level, dedicated to traditional worship at the wall.

In 1970 the celebrated Japanese–American sculptor and architect Isamu Noguchi, creator of the UNESCO garden in Paris and of the sculpture garden at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, proposed a poetic design for the square. His main concern was to recreate the scale of the praying area in front of the wall that characterized its original setting. To

achieve the necessary intimacy, an abstract monument, a lonely, large, massive block of black basalt, was placed in front of the wall. The sculpture, 'symbolizing the continuity of the people of Israel from time immemorial to the present day'[40] was meant to spring from the bedrock and the original Herodian level. The external soil was kept at its present level, but, under it, a large underground hall was dedicated to archaeology and to the presentation of the excavated ruins. Though this design never proceeded beyond the preliminary sketch stage, it tackled one of the main problems of the large square, namely that it was out of scale. Many still consider Noguchi's poetic, sculptural approach as the most interesting among the proposals, though his design has been attacked by Moshe Safdie[41] and a sector of Israeli public opinion that consider the scheme completely out of touch with Judaism and, in effect, contest the idea that a non-Jew could plan the site.

In 1972 the municipality commissioned the Canadian–Israeli architect Moshe Safdie,[42] who gained international fame from his revolutionary *Habitat '67* housing project presented at the 1967 World Expo in Canada, to elaborate a project for the Western Wall area. Habitat was an ensemble of 158 prefabricated cubic units assembled in an apparently spontaneous way, but in fact organized according to an extremely rational design in which Safdie's attention to creatively reinterpreted prefabrication and modularity was made evident. It was immediately recognized as a milestone in the evolution of contemporary architecture. Nevertheless, the risks of a Habitat-like environment appeared obvious to the famous Italian semiologist Umberto Eco, who commented: 'Naturally we must still ask whether Habitat was so impressive because, with its diverting forms, it was so different from everything else surrounding it. *Perhaps an area composed only of such Habitats would result in a monotonous and regimented landscape.*'[43]

Safdie's design has been by far the most detailed and advanced of the proposals put forth for the wall area. Presented in 1974,[44] it was backed by the secular establishment, represented continuity with the ongoing Jewish Quarter reconstruction, and might be considered as the official design of the CDRJQ and of the municipality. It was conceived according to a precise programme that required the designer 'not to add any major buildings to the site, but rather to enlarge, clarify and order the open space by the design of the ground plan'.[45]

Due to its symbolic importance, this design for the precinct has been

the subject of many public hearings and governmental reviews. A special committee reporting to the cabinet recommended the plan for implementation, but since 1984 no agreement has been reached in the coalition governments either about ministerial jurisdiction over the wall or about how it should be developed from an architectural point of view.[46] In his comprehensive and ambitious design:

> Safdie planned the plaza of the Western Wall to be a grand multi-level meeting place that could accommodate thousands of spectators, just like a theatre. …
>
> The concept of the sloped plane achieved by delicately stepped terraces … simultaneously provides the formal power of a shallow amphitheatre form, a mix of formality and informality in the arrangement of stepped terraces, (and) a contextual response to constituent site factors and cultural symbolism. The stepped terraces also solve a unique functional problem associated with this civic space, that of the provision for individual personal contemplation within a space that at other times must accommodate the sense of community.[47]

Safdie's design insists on the formal organization of the space, to be achieved through a rationally designed grid of stairs and plans, and it employs many of the conceptions he applied elsewhere in the reconstruction of the quarter. Indeed, his projects for the Porat Yosef *yeshiva*, the smaller house reconstructions in Block 38 of the Jewish Quarter and his controversial Mamilla project[48] form an ensemble reflecting the Canadian–Israeli architect's specific architectural style, whose aesthetic conceptions have more than anything else probably determined the final outcome of contemporary Jerusalem. Two main elements are recognizable in his design – the insertion of the archaeological discourse in the plan and the 'rational' use of materials and distribution of functions. Indeed, he applied to all these designs the results of his researches on prefabrication and modular elements, and utilized archaeology as an essential element for the valorization of the spaces.

Safdie's project for the Wailing Wall represented the complete Israeli appropriation of this part of the city, as clearly demonstrated by the separate circulation system for Arabs (connecting the nearby village of

Silwan with the covered *suq* of the Old City) and Jews (a net of streets and stairs linking the wall with the Jewish Quarter). This solution antici- pated the ethnically divided system of paths created on the Old City roofs and the double road network generated over the entire West Bank by the settlers' bypass roads. His insistence on the role and importance of archaeological excavations clearly situates his design within the 1970s' 'fever' for archaeology, while his proposal to build institutions and housing overlooking the Wailing Wall, betrays the economic and speculative aspects of his secular vision of the project. Indeed, many similarities may be identified with his later design for Mamilla, a large- scale housing scheme whose obvious goal is to maximize profits.

Through the demolition of the original houses of this neighbourhood (whose original ownership was mixed, but Arab in large part), and their replacement by a luxury hotel and a 'village-like' fancy neighbourhood (to attract wealthy North American Jews) the speculative and business- related side of Safdie's design becomes particularly evident.[49] Similarities between the two projects exist also on the architectural level, as both designs reproduce modernized versions of the traditional Old City houses – a fake 'antique' style characterized by stone veneers and the use of dome-shaped light structures (copper-covered in the case of David's Village, plastic and fibreglass in his Block 38 design and in his project for the Wailing Wall area). By using forms taken from the local vernacular architectural language, but emptied of their substance and meaning, Safdie tried to convey an impression of continuity with the past, but, by underlining the cheap modernity of the new structures, managed to obtain an opposite result. Critics have diverse views of Safdie's Wailing Wall plaza project. Many praised his design, but others saw rigidity in his formal outcome and considered his design a *pastiche*.[50]

There is another element, however, which is generally overlooked but should be taken into account – the *political meaning* of his plans. Safdie did help, with all his knowledge, skills and enthusiasm, to reshape Jerusalem as a Jewish City. His political engagement, voluntary service in the Israeli army, decision to move his office to the Old City and to acquire a house there are all part of his commitment to the strategy the CDRJQ put forth. It is correct therefore to assume that his design embodies the company's wishes and expectations. How does this com- mitment show in the plans?

When dealing with the Wailing Wall plaza a major basic assumption is

made – the site is of 'Jewish heritage'. This apparently neutral and universally shared affirmation simplifies the complex, multi-layered history of Jerusalem and removes the Muslim significance of the site from the picture. The Jewish Quarter reconstruction as a whole, and Moshe Safdie's plan for the wall area in particular, have managed to erase the complexity of history and embarrassing presence of other people's heritages from centre stage, while the large plaza in front of the Wailing Wall has given the State of Israel 'incontrovertible' proof of its historic right to the city. Safdie's personality and exalted reputation, combined with the generally positive attitude Western countries reserved for Israel and its politics in the 1970s, favoured the intellectual removal of the Palestinian presence from the city (especially their claims to it) within international public opinion. Indeed, the learned, academic discussion of the Jerusalem Committee, and the many articles found in the specialist architectural journals, never challenged the political dimension of the plan, but only concentrated on a formal analysis of its qualities and characteristics. The political aspects of the various plans proposed for the Wailing Wall area, however, seemed evident to the Jordanian authorities, which tried without success to alert UNESCO and international public opinion to the underlying logic contained in the Israeli architectural designs. In an official UNESCO document, Dr Abdallah Nsour, *chargé d'affaires* of the permanent delegation of Jordan at UNESCO, wrote: 'Notwithstanding their specificities, these projects … share the following main objectives: (1) trying to increase the visual impact of the Wall, (2) lowering the level of the square, (3) *ignoring the religious sensitivity and the historical and religious data*, as if the authorities had complete freedom to act according to the plans and wishes of these architects.'[51]

The Cardo project

Within the plan for the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, the so-called 'Cardo area' deserves particular attention. This long narrow strip of the city between Habad Street (Suq al-Husur before the reconstruction) and the Street of the Jews, where both a small mosque and a nineteenth-century synagogue were located, was densely built and characterized by a relatively well-preserved urban fabric similar to the rest of the Old City. The CDRJQ launched a national architectural competition for the complete replanning and transformation of this

strip of approximately 180-metres. The competition asked partici-
pants to build a new commercial area to connect the Old City's
traditional *suq*s to the new quarter. Critically, no preliminary archae-
ological or historical study was carried out beforehand and, apart
from the two religious sites and a Crusader façade, the entire area was
slated for demolition. It appears then that the celebrated Cardo
project, the design so often published in international architectural
reviews,[52] is actually the product of one of the most dramatic and
blunt erasures of the city's fabric carried out by the Israelis during the
entire reconstruction. Though this aspect of the Cardo has never been
emphasized in the specialist press, the dramatic effect of the plan was
evident to Raymond Lemaire, the UNESCO special representative for
Jerusalem, who, in 1971, wrote to the director-general of UNESCO
René Maheu:

> It would be well for Unesco to draw these authorities' attention to
> another exceptionally serious error which threatens the very exis-
> tence of part of the Old City and which has so far been remarked
> by almost nobody. The fact is that, the draft Master Plan provides
> for the installation of a special commercial zone in the middle of
> the town, on the site of the old Roman cardo … which links the
> Jewish Quarter, in the process of renovation, to the *souk* complex
> in the centre of the city. A competition has been organized for the
> reconstruction of this zone, to conform … to the Master Plan
> projections.[53]

In the original Mission Report,[54] Lemaire added:

> [This neighbourhood] does not differ from the other historic
> zones of the old city and is composed of an ensemble of buildings
> often in a poor state of conservation, but of the same exact kind
> and period as the other historic parts of the city. Two elements
> need to be emphasized: (1) Habad Street is partially vaulted;
> nevertheless, the conservation of these vaults, which play an
> essential role in the townscape of this part of the old city, is not
> foreseen in the architectural program. (2) The majority of the
> buildings built between these two streets have large halls, cross or
> barrel-vaulted, at the ground floor level; these robustly built vaults

undoubtedly belong to the monumental heritage of the city. How-
ever, with the only exception of the aforementioned mosque which
presents the same characteristics, their demolition is implicitly
foreseen in the architectural program's terms of reference.

The comparison between these remarks and the guidelines for the
reconstruction of the quarter presented by Arieh Sharon in *Planning
Jerusalem* – where he affirms that 'the preservation of existing domes and
arched structures and especially façades which are of architectonic value
is to be strictly observed'[55] – shows the discrepancies between the image
conveyed to the large international public on the one hand and the
actual policy implemented on the site on the other.

The decision to demolish a living and structurally sound part of the
city and to rebuild it according to new criteria and for new residents did
not originally stem from a conscious will to recover the Roman Cardo,
but from the overall ideological approach of the plan. Indeed, it seems
that the existence of the ancient axis on this site was not even considered
when the competition was launched. In a second phase, however, once it
appeared necessary to find a 'justification' for the plan that could
appear convincing to international public opinion, a rationale for the
political/symbolic will to erase part of the Old City was looked for. Then,
once more, archaeology provided the necessary scientific alibi for the
operation. The famous mosaic map of Jerusalem decorating the floor of
a church at Madaba, Jordan, depicts a large columned road leading from
present-day Damascus Gate to the south, bisecting the city.[56] Israeli
archaeologists decided to uncover this ancient street running below the
existing city: houses, vaults and shops were 'cleared' to recover some
flagstone and column bases of the ancient Byzantine street, the
existence and location of which were already known to the scientific
community. Under the direction of Professor Nahman Avigad,
archaeologists tore down entire blocks of Crusader, Mamluk and
Ottoman buildings to reveal the remains of the Cardo.[57] The cultural and
scientific value of an operation that, though increasing our knowledge
of the city in the late Roman and Byzantine periods, caused widespread
destruction and erased later phases of the city's long history,[58] was
never challenged by the public or international community, charmed
by Nahman Avigad's vivid account of the excavations. However, even
Avigad, in his book about the results of the archaeological campaigns

in the Jewish Quarter, stated: 'How could an archaeologist even dream of excavating in so crowded and bustling an area of oriental bazaars, narrow streets and densely built houses? Would it ever be possible to reveal the *cardo maximus* of Jerusalem?' and acknowledged that 'the entire area was built up, crowded with stores, workshops and houses, forming a mass of Crusader, Mameluk, Ottoman and recent structures'.[59]

The Cardo design and architectural competition, therefore, follows exactly the same logic that directed the overall plan – the removal of an unwelcome Arab past (and present) to be replaced by a new, ancient/modern[60] Israeli city. In this case, the Roman/Byzantine layer offered the planners a neutral archaeological finding that could easily be accommodated within the narrative of the new Jewish Quarter.

The specificity of the Cardo project within the overall Jewish Quarter reconstruction lies primarily in the different system used for tendering the work. While the CDRJQ assigned the other blocks that were rebuilt in the area to selected architectural firms, in this case a national architectural competition, open to all Israeli firms, was launched. The precise reasons for this choice are not fully clear: perhaps growing criticism of the company's management of the reconstruction and notably its absence of transparency played a role, but it is also likely that the competition was launched to comply with the recommendations of the first meeting of the Jerusalem Committee. Whatever the reasons, this apparently more democratic approach finally allowed the company a free hand in dealing with the city's heritage.

The aim of the competition was to connect the new Jewish Quarter to the network of the Old City's covered markets that make up its main commercial area. The design had to integrate, in addition to the commercial galleries, a small number of apartments and a small hotel.[61] The panel of judges awarded first prize to the design put forward by Shlomo Aronson, Esther Niv-Krendel and Peter Bugod. The winners' design – titled 'The Cardo' – proposed to extend the covered market as an arcaded pedestrian shopping street.[62] The design this team of young architects proposed was based on a typological analysis prepared by Yochanan Minsker. Minsker collaborated with the winning architectural team in a first phase (he later split and presented an alternative design for the competition that won third prize) and it appears that his study on the Cardo area inspired the design. During the interview, Mr Minsker

proudly affirmed: 'without the energy I invested in the study, and my analysis, simply the "*cardo*" would not have been there.'[63]

In the years following the 1971 competition, the situation in the Cardo area changed greatly and the architectural design had to be accommodated to it. The archaeological discoveries made in the area imposed alterations to the original design, as did other elements, all contributing to the fine tuning of the project to make it more compatible with minimal conservation standards. The winning team, especially Peter Bugod, were sensitive to the critical remarks of Professor Lemaire and began revising the entire issue with him. Indeed, from 1973, Lemaire attempted to influence the architectural team, skilfully mingling architectural and political considerations:

> Moreover, during a conversation with Peter and Slamo [*sic*] Aronson, I drew his attention to the heavy responsibility he has and reminded him that if this intervention is less than remarkable in all its aspects it could well raise large-scale complaints at the international level, an undesirable outcome for the architects as well as for Jerusalem and the State of Israel.[64]

The major controversy, once the idea of conserving a larger number of original structures had gained momentum, concerned the archaeologists' overall approach and Avigad's proposal to 'free' the whole length of the Byzantine axis to present a uniform historic phase without preserving earlier remains or successive evolutions. The final result differed greatly from the competition design: it abandoned the idea of a hotel, augmented the number of planned apartments, created a small internal square and two 'archaeological pits' (thereby connecting the site to ancient 'Jewish Heritage'), conserved a larger number of existing buildings and accepted the opening up and partial didactic reconstruction of the ancient Cardo at its southern end. A comparison between the competition plan and the implemented design shows that through Lemaire's intervention and Bugod's sensitivity, the number of preserved structures was greatly augmented. Indeed, the central part of the 180-metre strip is still primarily composed, at the ground level, of its original Crusader era structures, which were skilfully integrated into the plan. Lemaire, in his discussions with Avigad, stressed the importance of conserving as much as possible the different archaeological phases:

> I would have liked to share with you my observations concerning the layout of the Cardo, whose remarkable design was produced by our common friend Peter Bugod. I am aware that you are extremely attached to the idea that the site, once restored, should reflect its original architectural image dating back to the Byzantine period. However, because there have been many successive destructions and modifications whose remains, like the large cistern and four or five medieval columns, are not without interest, I consider it appropriate not to remove them, but on the contrary to integrate them into an archaeological presentation that does not neglect these interesting architectural vestiges.[65]

Still, in many parts of the project the predominance of Avigad's conception is evident. Finally, 'from the initial project that stretches over 180 metres in length, only the last parts, close to the centre of the bazaar and the Crusader building, are in the spirit of the first scheme, the remaining parts have been adapted to the findings or to the constraints of the site.'[66]

From many perspectives the Cardo design seems to represent the triumph of the archaeologists' approach over economic and architectural considerations. Indeed, the construction of the apartments was carried out at the same time as the excavations, thanks to the creation of an upper level, carried by concrete barrel vaults, on which the new constructions were conducted without interfering with the work taking place underneath.[67] The interplay of heritage and archaeology, of 'historic rights' versus the Arab presence in the city, constitutes the key element of the reconstruction, for archaeology has often been used to give planners evidential 'proof' of the Jewish ownership of the city for which they were looking. In this case, however, the archaeologists' interest focused on the Roman/Byzantine period and not, like elsewhere, on the periods of the First and Second Temples. This apparent contradiction might be explained through the following considerations:

- ❏ 'other people's' heritages are tolerated so long as their creators are presented as 'foreigners';
- ❏ this specific 'foreign' heritage is too ancient to be politically dangerous;

❑ the Cardo is just one of the quarter's many archaeological attractions and that it is non-Jewish is acceptable because the other sites mainly stress 'Jewish' heritage;

❑ modern Jewish houses on top and the preserved nineteenth-century synagogue at its southern end still convey the message of complete Jewish predominance over the city;

❑ the urban pattern and grid of the Roman subdivision of the city into four quarters serves the overall ideological approach in that it stresses the 'traditional' division of the city (though it is clear to all visitors that the Jewish Quarter extends westwards into the Armenian quarter, well beyond the actual border represented by the Cardo); and

❑ the functional commercial use of the Roman axis offers a perfect setting for Jewish antiquity shops and fancy restaurants.

Critically, one additional element needs to be considered:

❑ Even in the mainly Byzantine-centred presentation of the site, special attention has been devoted to the earlier remains that the archaeologists uncovered. These aesthetically insignificant findings have, in effect, been privileged in the final layout of the street.[68]

Notwithstanding all the debate and substantial effort put into creating the most suitable design for the area, to a tourist visiting the Jewish Quarter in the year 2000 the Cardo looks rather depressed. Indeed, like most of the reconstructed Jewish Quarter, it seems rather cold and lifeless. This is because, through modification of the neighbourhood's residents, the area has been emptied of much of its *raison d'être*.[69] To a tourist walking along the restored section of the Byzantine street, the most striking elements are no longer the wooden reconstructed roof or re-erected columns, or even the green concrete barrel vaults above; what strikes the visitor most is a newly built square glass box in which an imposing golden *menorah* stands.[70] The new Jewish society that has emerged in the quarter pays no attention to archaeology or to celebrating the heroism of the defenders of the quarter in 1948: the quarter's physical environment has been altered to adapt to new needs and values. What was envisaged as the principal tourist–commercial axis of the rebuilt quarter with a didactic reconstruction of the original wooden

pergola of the Byzantine-era street has instead been turned into an exhibition hall for the reconstructed vessel of the Third Temple!

This change is a blatant sign of the deep and far-reaching political and cultural transformation that has occurred in Israeli society since the 1980s. The religious appropriation of the Cardo is not just an example of the new role religious groups are playing in shaping the built environment of the Old City; it also draws attention to some of the internal shortcomings of the original planning of the 1970s and, notably, the incapacity of the secular planners to recognize the religious implications of the very symbol they were in the process of creating. Their incapacity to cooperate with the religious groups and parties has finally been the factor that has had the largest impact on altering the activities taking place in the Cardo area. The progressive takeover of the area by a different social group has imposed new and divergent priorities.

A second unforeseen change that has negatively affected the Cardo area project has been the evolution of the political situation in the city and the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifada in Jerusalem. The original assumption behind the design for the competition, namely to create continuity between the two contiguous halves of the city, has therefore proven unrealistic. The growing separation of Palestinians from Israelis in the Old City of Jerusalem has eventually led to the creation of a police barrier and checkpoint at the junction between the Crusader's *suqs* and the new Cardo commercial area. Today, the renewed Cardo is not an open gate linking the communities; on the contrary, it is the sealed borderline between two communities that are getting more and more distant.

Conclusion: what's in a name?

P: 'Then my father died and my mother moved to *Nablus*.'
I: 'Why did your mother move to *Shekem*?'
P: 'She likes *Nablus*.'
I: 'Why does she like *Shekem*?'
P: 'She's got relatives in *Nablus*.'
I: 'And why have you left the oil countries to return to *Shekem*?'
P: 'I'm returning to *Nablus* because my father died.'
I: '… and what are you going to do in *Shekem*?'
P: 'I am going to look for a job in *Nablus*.'[71]

The land expropriations, large-scale demolitions and urban reconstructions that took place in the southwest corner of the Old City of Jerusalem after June 1967 have been dubbed, with extraordinary ingenuity and an absolute disrespect of urban history, the Jewish Quarter restoration. The attribution of a Jewish label to the whole area has given the operation an apparent moral value and has permitted the Israelis to present themselves as the restorer of past legitimacy in the face of 'barbarians' who had, without any respect for the Jewish millennial presence and heritage, squatted in the area and desecrated its synagogues. Such a version of recent historical facts, which the Israeli authorities and Israel's supporters worldwide repeat like a *mantra*, has in the mainstream discourse managed to take over reality and impose itself as 'the' correct description of events.

Meron Benvenisti has discussed the extraordinary role associated with the act of naming a place. In *Conflicts and contradictions*, describing his father's role in the creation of the first Hebrew map of Palestine, he observed: 'A name creates order in the world. … Map drawing and naming of physical features is an act of possession, of creating a new reality. … We can organize a new grid of reference and by that we believe that we have re-created the country and gained symbolic ownership.'[72]

On a smaller scale we find the same tactic, not only in the name 'Jewish Quarter' being applied to areas that were never Jewish, but also in the choice of name for an ancient street in a large Roman/Byzantine section of the Old City. What was just an intuitive thought by the architects, and a suggestive title for an architectural competition, became a key element in providing a rationale for destroying an entire sector of Jerusalem's Old City. If the destruction affected only 'minor and recent' architecture while the reconstruction 'discovered' the Cardo, anything becomes legitimate and possible. The past is used as a tool to attract national and international sympathy and approval, and large parts of the original urban fabric now dubbed 'Cardo' might vanish without much complaint; it does not really matter if the evocative Latin name designates a contemporary architectural creation.[73]

Chapter 5
UNESCO and Jerusalem

As I already told you during the debates, it is physically impossible for the Director-General's personal representative to be aware of and see, during his missions on site, all that happens in the Old City of Jerusalem regarding the conservation of its cultural and monumental heritage.

R. Lemaire[1]

Introduction

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the reconstruction plan for the Jewish Quarter should not be looked upon as urban conservation but rather as a nationalistic attempt to transform the Old City of Jerusalem, *notwithstanding* its actual physical characteristics, into a showcase of the Israeli secular elite's ideology. The discrepancies between such a programme and a conservation plan have been stressed throughout this book and will be advanced in this chapter in examining the international scientific community's reactions to the Israeli plan. Here, from a political and technical perspective, I focus specifically on the activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in relation to Jerusalem's Old City.

What was UNESCO's answer to what was taking place in the Old City? Was the international community aware of the details of the plan and of its ideological nature? What role did the UN agency play in the whole issue? What weight have political consideration and international relations been given in handling the complex Jerusalem file? And finally, how effective has UNESCO's 30-year long monitoring of the Old City of Jerusalem been in protecting its unique cultural heritage?

Article I.2.c of the UNESCO constitution states that one of the purposes of the organization is 'to maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge *by assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of*

books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions'.[2]

Accordingly, since 1967 UNESCO has been heavily involved in safeguarding the cultural heritage of Jerusalem.[3] Israel, though a member of UNESCO and a state party to the 'Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Case of Armed Conflict', has always refused any form of international cooperation while planning and executing its plan for the transformation of the Old City. On the contrary, it has consciously followed an autarkic path to urban reconstruction. Israel's self-imposed isolation from the intellectual debate on urban conservation and the revitalization of old city centres that developed within the international architectural community and UNESCO during the 1970s has played a negative role in the reconstruction of the large area of the Old City that has been dubbed the Jewish Quarter.

In previous chapters I presented the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan within the national Israeli framework. I focused on the symbolic dimension of the project, and on its function as living proof of the new Jewish sovereignty over the city, by examining the respective roles of architecture, archaeology and planning in creating a new built environment that can evoke a mythical past, suggest a 'brave new world' and create the necessary link between them. In this chapter I shift the focus from the local to the international level, discussing the efforts of the international community to safeguard and monitor the cultural heritage of the Old City of Jerusalem. I put forward the UNESCO interpretation of and policies regarding the Holy City and dwell on the evident dissonance between the Israeli approach to urban restoration and the parallel evolution of the international theory of conservation. I conclude the chapter with an attempt to discern UNESCO's success in affecting Israeli political choices in the project, highlighting the dissonances between internationally accepted views on the subject and Israeli plans for the Old City of Jerusalem.

The legal system for the protection of cultural heritage

The idea of protecting cultural property from the effects of war slowly gained international attention during the last century. The principle was first recognized in the 1899 and 1907 Hague conventions and in the Washington Treaty of 1935. With the extensive damage to cultural property caused by the Second World War, however, the need for new

and more effective rules to protect cultural heritage became apparent in Western countries. An awareness of the risk that the entire cultural heritage of a nation could be wiped out by even more destructive wars called for a new legal approach to its protection, and therefore 'the protection of cultural property as a common heritage of mankind has become an important task of public international law.'[4] The 1954 Hague Convention, conceived within a framework of traditional wars fought by regular armies, was the first legal instrument to attempt to provide comprehensive legal protection from warfare for mankind's cultural heritage. In its preamble 'the concept of the common heritage of mankind as applied to cultural property finds expression for the first time.'[5]

As soon as the fighting started in the Middle East on 5 June 1967 the director-general of UNESCO, Mr René Maheu, sent telegrams to the ministers for foreign affairs of Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon drawing their attention to the obligations they had contracted in ratifying the Hague Convention.[6] On 12 June 1967 Mr Abba Eban, minister of foreign affairs of Israel, assured the director-general of UNESCO that Israel fully adhered and respected the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.[7] According to the regulations for the execution of the Hague Convention, Mr Reinink from The Netherlands and Mr Brunner from Switzerland were appointed as commissioner-generals on 24 October 1967. In his first report Mr Reinink declared that 'generally speaking, the monuments suffered very little damage as a result of the armed conflict', but cautioned that 'the arrangements to be applied in the centre of Jerusalem have a particular bearing on the conservation of the monuments [and] for this reason, the excavations that the Hebrew University is carrying out in this area must be followed very closely.'[8]

From the beginning certain questions arose between UNESCO and Israel over interpreting the convention on archaeological excavations in occupied territories. The subject was not explicitly dealt with in the 1954 convention, but only in the later 1956 New Delhi recommendation (which was not binding) stipulating that 'in the event of armed conflict, any Member State … should refrain from carrying out archaeological excavations in occupied territory.'[9] According to finds presented in the commissioner-general's reports, the UNESCO general conference called on Israel to desist from any archaeological excavations in the occupied territories and the director-general decided to appoint the Italian

professor Guglielmo De Angelis d'Ossat as his special consultant for Jerusalem.[10]

To grasp fully the distance between the UNESCO and Israeli positions on the Old City of Jerusalem it might be worth returning to the case of the demolition of the Abu Saud complex in June 1969. Dr Biran, then director of the Israel Ministry of Education's department of antiquity, informed Dr Reinink of the ongoing demolition in a telegram, assuring him that 'no cultural property' was involved. Dr Reinink reacted, formally protesting against the Israeli action, considering that 'the whole site is a monument, and it had suffered badly.'[11] In this case, as in many others, there was a clash between two opposed conceptions of heritage. According to the first, only national heritage is meaningful; according to the latter, based on the still vaguely defined concept of 'universal heritage', all the multiple cultural layers composing the heritage of the city are equally important. Though the Israeli approach to heritage has already been discussed earlier in this book, it should be emphasized here that the nationalistic perception of heritage, which the Israeli authorities support, is especially at odds with UNESCO's aspiration to operationalize the concept of 'world heritage'.

The ideas that were in the meantime developed in the 'World Heritage Convention', which UNESCO adopted on 16 November 1972, had already been expressed in the 1954 Hague Convention, which explicitly stated in its preamble that 'damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.'[12] Unfortunately, neither the 'Hague Convention' nor the 'World Heritage Convention' 'consider the possibility that the motivation for the occupation of a territory by a state may actually be to remove or adapt the very cultural heritage that the convention seeks to protect',[13] as the wars in former Yugoslavia have dramatically demonstrated.

The 1972 World Heritage Convention (ratified in 1975) is considered one of the major instruments of international cooperation and has proved to be one of UNESCO's most successful endeavours, for 167 states have ratified it.[14] It concerns the protection of cultural heritage, both in peace and wartime,[15] and is particularly innovative. Notably, the convention includes for the first time within a unique set of rules both natural and cultural heritage. Moreover, it shifts, in its manner of approaching the question of protection for cultural heritage 'from the

traditional focus on the rights … of a political sovereign over its national "property", to the sense of duty to preserve and protect a "heritage" inherited from the past whose values transcend national boundaries.'[16] The primary mission of the 1972 world convention 'is to define and conserve the world's heritage by drawing up a list of sites whose outstanding values should be preserved for all humanity and to ensure their protection through a closer cooperation among nations.'[17] Yet, the text of the convention has a number of political and scientific dysfunctions, and its limits are acknowledged even by UNESCO, which has charged Professor Léon Pressouyre to prepare an in-depth study of the convention, on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, with the aim of updating and enhancing it.[18] In addition to the legal loopholes, the most important criticism of the 1972 World Heritage Convention, from the perspective of this study, is that it fails to tackle issues related to the political meaning and uses of heritage. As David Myers, an architect restorer who has been working on the Islamic heritage of the Old City of Jerusalem, has noted:

> The convention[s] resulted from an attempt by their authors to encapsulate the value of cultural property into a programme of universally accepted norms. The problem of this approach is that it does not reflect reality. Perception of values, and thereby approaches to protection, vary from region to region and from civilization to civilization. Given the choice, nation states will nominate to the World Heritage List sites which *they* perceive to be of universal value. In the case of occupied territories, the occupier may deliberately set out to ignore the cultural heritage of previous sovereign peoples.[19]

Indeed, by recognizing that properties are located within the territories of sovereign states and stating that 'it is for each State Party to this Convention to identify and delineate the different properties situated on its territory,'[20] the implementation of the convention 'authorizes a reading which may be interpreted by either setting aside the cultural identity of an ethnic, linguistic, religious or political component, or by pressing a claim regarding cultural properties considered inseparable from national identity.'[21] As Sarah Titchen observed:

> The Convention does not … distinguish between the nation as repository and protector of the cultural heritage and the people, past and/or present, responsible for cultural production. Furthermore, it allows the nation's interpretation, reading and writing of history to speak for all cultural heritage physically located within that nation's territory – re-creation of history and alternative nationalism, colonialist and imperialist archaeologies … can be heard, and even recognized by World Heritage listing.[22]

A telling example of such risk is offered by the recent nomination of the site of Masada in Israel. In October 1999, after years of debate, Israel ratified the convention and in 2001, two sites located in Israel were inscribed on the World Heritage List (WHL) – the Old City of Acre and Masada.[23] As if the last 20 years did not alter the ideological version of the events portrayed by Zionist archaeologists,[24] the official 'justification for inscription' of Masada refers to the 'criterion vi' and reads: 'The tragic events during the last days of the Jewish refugees who occupied the fortress and palace of Masada make it a symbol both of Jewish cultural identity and, more universally, of the *continuing human struggle between oppression and liberty*.'[25]

Indeed, it seems odd to define the small and fanatic sect of the zealots, the last defenders of the stronghold of Masada, as fighters for freedom against oppression; even more incomprehensible, though, is that the rhetorical nature of Josephus Flavius's text has not been acknowledged in the description of the site, shamelessly presenting the traditional and outdated version of the mass suicide.[26] This case perfectly highlights the convention's limits and the excessive role of state parties in determining and presenting 'their' sites for the inscription on the WHL.[27]

Furthermore, the Masada example also shows how political considerations – in this case UNESCO's very evident attempt to 'soften' the Israeli position on Jerusalem by accepting whatever the State of Israel proposed elsewhere – can influence the World Heritage Committee (WHC)'s decisions and can somehow empty it of its *raison d'être*, namely to check and select the sites suggested for inscription on the WHL on a purely technical and scientific basis.

Cultural heritage, UNESCO politics and the case of Jerusalem

The application of international conventions and enforcement of sanctions on Israel by UNESCO have engendered a huge amount of

controversy that has shaken the foundations of the organization and created a debate about the role and policy of UN agencies in general. An international uproar also surfaced when the Old City of Jerusalem was nominated for two WHLs in the early 1980s. The extremely strong 'Western' reaction (notably from the USA) testifies to the powerful political and emotional feelings associated with the apparently anodyne discussion on the cultural heritage of the Holy City, underlining the significance of the changes to the urban fabric of the city carried out after the Israeli occupation of the city in 1967.

The issue of Jerusalem took on a universal dimension after 1974 when UNESCO adopted what became known as the 'Israel Resolutions', backed by the Arab block and underdeveloped countries and opposed by Western countries, especially the USA. The political debate shifted then from the single issue at stake – the Old City of Jerusalem – to a wider discussion on the role of post-colonial countries in the UN, the newly acquired importance of which was symbolically represented by the nomination of Mr Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow from Senegal to the post of director-general of UNESCO.

UNESCO passed three 'Israel Resolutions'.[28] Resolution 18 C/Res. 3 condemned Israeli archaeological excavations in East Jerusalem as they altered the historical and cultural nature of the occupied territories, and instructed the director-general to withhold assistance from Israel until it complies with earlier UNESCO resolutions on the subject. According to Richard Hoggart, 'What came to be known as the "Israel resolutions" of the 1974 General Conference marked a main moment in this accelerated, planned and strong politicization of the Organization at the expense of any serious attempt at objectivity.'[29]

The strong reactions provoked by the 1974 resolutions deeply shook the entire organization. These events showed both the cohesiveness of the Western states and the effectiveness of the Israeli-backed Zionist propaganda on the subject and were one of the main causes of the partial decline of UNESCO.[30] Many analysts and researchers have focused their attention on what has been dubbed the 'politicization' of UNESCO[31] – a non-neutral political expression[32] – but few have discussed the issue of Jerusalem from the perspective of the technical reports on Jerusalem.

Guglielmo De Angelis d'Ossat, the special consultant for Jerusalem, already wrote in 1969, that 'une condamnation ou une censure de l'action d'Israël paraît être inévitable si l'on tire les conséquences exactes des

prémices existantes; elle ne serait pas moins, certes, irritante pour un pays qui est conscient de sa vitalité culturelle.[33] Indeed, the resolution condemning Israel for the archaeological excavations actually comes as a logical and inevitable consequence of a long series of previous grievances and Executive Board decisions voted since 1967,[34] and seems undeniably justifiable from both the political and technical perspective.[35]

The continuing struggle over Jerusalem's status and UNESCO's stand against the Israeli occupation of the city reached a new peak in the early 1980s with the inscription of the Old City on the two UNESCO lists – the 'World Heritage List' (WHL) and the 'List of World Heritage in Danger' (LWHD). What follows is a systematic chronicle of the debate within the various international committees involved and an attempt to assess both the significance of these lists and their eventual impact on the urban fabric of the Old City of Jerusalem.

At the fourth session of the WHC (Paris, 1–5 September 1980) the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan proposed the 'Old City of Jerusalem and its Walls' for inscription on the World Heritage List. According to the procedure, the file was passed to ICOMOS,[36] whose recommendations were then submitted to the Bureau of the WHC at its fifth session.[37] ICOMOS gave its approval stating that 'the claims of Jerusalem to inclusion on the World Heritage List are so numerous and so evident that it is surprising that this cultural property has not been proposed before 1980.'[38]

However, it also expressed its criticism on two important subjects – the Jordanian attempt to negate the Jewish heritage of the city (requesting that more and more ancient monuments be added to the list of sites justifying the request for inclusion),[39] and the actual limits of the zone of protection (the Ottoman city walls). ICOMOS's purely technical recommendations suggested extending the protected perimeter around the Old City along the model followed for the inscription of the historic centre of Rome,[40] without taking into consideration the extremely sensitive political situation of the city.[41] The proposal to extend the limits of the protected perimeter across the 1948 'green line' that divided the city into two halves appears politically naïve and the World Heritage Bureau never discussed the topic. On the contrary, Jordan acknowledged the remarks about the selective nature of the list of monuments and opted instead to propose that the entire Old City of Jerusalem be nominated as a World Heritage Site. The bureau examined the proposal and noted 'the

inscription raised for some members problems of procedure and legality which were referred to the Committee for consideration.'[42]

The nomination by Jordan, in fact, was highly problematic and provoked an intense debate. The Hashemite kingdom was no longer ruling the Old City and the nomination of this site therefore had a clear political intent, despite Jordanian claims to the contrary.[43] An extraordinary session of the WHC was held on 10 and 11 September 1981 to discuss the issue. The chairman of the conference, Mr Slayter from Australia, refused to invite Israel to the session according to the rules of procedure and against the demand of the US delegate who requested that Israel be given the right to speak. The WHC was divided on the issue. While there was widespread support for the inscription of the Old City on the WHL because of its unique heritage, 'a few speakers expressed reservations about Jordan's legal right to present the nomination and about the possible implications of inscription related to the status of Jerusalem.'[44] The United States delegation explicitly objected to the nomination, arguing that Jordan was not conforming to the convention because Jerusalem was not situated in Jordanian territory. In the end, the committee approved the inscription of 'The Old City of Jerusalem and its Walls' with fourteen votes for, one against and five abstentions.

The importance and sensitivity of the case, and the political pressures put on the WHC in this debate, can be better appreciated by remembering the wording of an earlier UNESCO general conference resolution recommending 'that the World Heritage Committee speeds up the procedure for including the city of Jerusalem on the World Heritage List, and that it considers its inclusion on the List of the World Heritage in Danger.'[45] The inscription of the Old City of Jerusalem has been considered a 'victory' for the Arab states within the UN system and undoubtedly had political connotations.

At the World Heritage Bureau's sixth session on 17 December 1982,[46] the Old City of Jerusalem was also inscribed on the LWHD, following the nomination Jordan made at the WHC's 21–24 June 1982 session.[47] Once more the USA opposed the decision, not only stressing again that 'a property must be situated in the territory of the nominating state', which was not the case, but also considering that 'the urban transformations that had taken place in the Old City did not constitute "serious and specific danger".'[48] The favourable decision of the committee was then taken with exactly the same outcome as the previous decision for the

WHL – fourteen votes for, one against and five abstentions. It should be noted that at the time of the nomination of Jerusalem, the LWHD included only a single case[49] and that the procedures for assessing when a site should be included on the list were not quite clear. Indeed, at the same session in which Jordan nominated the Old City of Jerusalem, the World Heritage Bureau recommended that ICOMOS and IUCN 'work out draft "guidelines for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention with respect to the inclusion of properties in the List of World Heritage in Danger".'[50] In principle, the idea behind the establishment of the LWHD was to help collect funds for the conservation of threatened sites from sources other than UNESCO. This, however, has often been misunderstood, and many cases have shown that inscription on the LWHD has come to be regarded as a 'criticism' of the management of the sites from the governments in charge.[51]

Because of its specificity the case of Jerusalem is more complex. The issue concerns the right of the WHC to nominate sites to the LWHD without the approval of the country in charge of the site. According to Dr Cleere, the issue is particularly complex from a legal perspective and UN legal advisers studying the subject have not yet resolved it; however, the pre-eminence of the WHC over member states has also been affirmed in other cases. In December 1991 the inscription of Dubrovnik was done without the approval of the country officially in charge of the site (at the time still the Republic of Yugoslavia, whose Serbian delegates refused to list the city as a site in danger). ICOMOS, and subsequently the WHC, decided to overcome their refusal and to inscribe the city without Serbian assent.[52] The broader significance of the listing of the Old City of Jerusalem on both the WHL and the LWHD, was to reaffirm forthrightly the principle that its heritage belongs to all mankind, and that, therefore, it should be cared for by the international community.

Urban transformation: technical data (from official reports)

For more than 30 years, directors-general of UNESCO have paid an extraordinary amount of attention to the events taking place in Jeru-salem. They often visited the Old City and in 1973 appointed a special representative for Jerusalem charged with reporting on the evolution of the urban fabric of the city. For 26 years Belgian Professor Raymond Lemaire conducted this delicate task and the UNESCO resolutions are based largely on the findings contained in his reports. Indeed, this was

the main source of information for the directors-general of UNESCO[53] and the only qualified technical data available on which the executive board was to base its decisions and resolutions.

In 1969 the entire city of Jerusalem witnessed dramatic transformations and a series of important alterations also took place within the walls of the Old City. The question of Jerusalem at UNESCO, therefore, became a central issue for the organization. In August 1969 the director-general of UNESCO went to Jerusalem where he witnessed the effects of the fire in the al-Aqsa mosque. The official complaints from the government of Jordan about the ongoing transformation of the Old City of Jerusalem focused initially on the destruction of the houses of the Moroccan quarter and the expropriations made by Israel in the Old City.[54] It is interesting, within the context of this book, to consider the commentaries made by the commissioner-general, Dr Reinink:

> The Government of Jordan fears that the expropriation, by the State of Israel, of the old Jewish Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter may lead to the demolition of this part of the town, as has happened with the houses opposite the Wailing Wall. *I am convinced that this is not at all the intention of the Israel authorities.* On the contrary, *they wish to restore this part of the town, which has been greatly neglected in the past, and to make it look as it used to do.*[55]

In the comprehensive report the director-general presented to UNESCO's executive board in September 1969, Mr Maheu examined in detail both the application of the Hague Convention and the possible future action of UNESCO in Jerusalem. Basing his analysis on the conclusions of Professor De Angelis d'Ossat's report, the director-general details a number of points of the greatest interest for the comprehension of the ongoing reconstruction project of the Jewish Quarter, while lucidly pointing out the risks of the ongoing excavations and in general of the entire Israeli approach to the city. Having acknowledged that the excavations Professor Mazar carried out cannot endanger the stability of the *Haram*, he not only states that these excavations are an infringement of the international recommendation but also wonders how the site will look once the excavations had been concluded. While recognizing that maintenance, restoration and reconstruction are often necessary to ensure the survival of ancient structures, he remarks how, often,

restoration works involve alterations to the sites or the buildings, and concludes that:

> However valid may be the practical, technical and even artistic reasons advanced to justify one or another of these measures considered in isolation, their number and extent are bound to result in an alteration of the historical aspect of the urban scene presented by the Old City.
>
> And, apart from the legal and political question of the lawfulness of the initiatives from which these measures derive, there is the purely cultural question of the responsibility which they imply, as far as the international community is concerned, because of the changes thus being made to a priceless treasure of mankind's heritage.[56]

At the same session of UNESCO's executive board, to buttress his argument Mr Maheu quoted a passage from De Angelis d'Ossat's report discussing the ongoing activities in the extended Jewish Quarter:

> To my mind, the pulling down of a whole district, even if not among the most famous or the most striking, seriously damages the compact appearance of the Old City, which was huddled within its walls, forming a close fabric of small buildings in vivid and delightful contrast with the nearby open spaces and the monumental but untrammelled lines of the *Haram*. Now, with this dreary and formless artificial space before our eyes, and in the absence of any definite plans for its future lay-out, we can only echo the protests made.[57]

Thus, we may say that UNESCO's position has been clear since 1969 about Israeli actions in the city. Though diplomatically phrased, UNESCO's rejection of the Israeli plan was evident, as was its recognition of the Israeli objectives. The words of De Angelis d'Ossat, who after Mr Brunner's death became the commissioner-general for the Arab states, were even blunter. In his report, which the UNESCO director-general kept confidential, he informed Mr Maheu in detail about what had taken place in the city. His text, written immediately after the return from Jerusalem, constitutes a harsh criticism of the Israeli deeds. Because

of the international prestige and intellectual background of its author, this report constitutes an extremely important document through which to understand what happened within the city walls during the early phases of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction project:

> The Israeli intervention with the most visible and serious effect on the old city seems today to be *the demolition of all the old buildings in the southwest corner of the walled city*. These demolitions mainly affect the Jewish Quarter, the condition of which has severely declined over the last few decades.
>
> The first demolition took place in front of the Wailing Wall, immediately after the Israeli conquest: at first, they looked like the result of a spontaneous, unplanned intervention of the military administration; however, on the contrary, *the demolitions were not discontinued and more than a hundred houses were torn down west of this area*, *extending the cleared up zone to cover several hectares*.
>
> … It is my duty to report that, during my stay …, the Israeli authorities in the form of the Ministry of Religious Affairs quickly carried out the demolition of other buildings that were still picturesquely hugging the *Haram* enclosure in order to extend the excavation area. Thus, I personally saw some houses being torn down with my own eyes.[58]

The continuing occupation of the Old City and the unfurling of Israeli plans for Jerusalem generated stronger and stronger negative reactions from Arab states generally and from Jordan in particular. Indeed, the excavations near the *Haram al-Sharif* became a focal point for international attention in the early 1970s. In a report Jordan presented on the violation of the Hague convention,[59] attention was focused for the first time on Israeli attempts to open up new archaeological excavation sites along the western wall of the *Haram al-Sharif*. In addition, this report presented – with the documentary support of a map detailing the area expropriated for the new enlarged Jewish Quarter – a first assessment of the number of Arab residents compelled to leave their homes after 1967 (3000 from the Old City) and of the amount of housing units planned for the reconstruction (600). The progression of events convinced the director-general of UNESCO of the need to dispatch a special consultant

to Jerusalem who was more qualified than Dr Reinink in technical, architectural and archaeological matters. Mr Maheu appointed for this task a well-known personality in the field of architectural and urban conservation – Professor Raymond Lemaire from Belgium,[60] whose first report was submitted to Mr Maheu on 7 October 1971.[61]

A generally positive attitude to the ongoing transformations is evident throughout this report. Though acknowledging the damage the 1967 and 1969 demolitions caused, the overall tone of Lemaire's report is almost enthusiastic about the work being carried out, and the excavations near the *Haram al-Sharif* were resolved of all responsibility in the demolition of the Abu Saud houses.[62] Moreover, the excavations in the Jewish Quarter, under the supervision of Nahman Avigad, were praised for their 'exemplary method and attention to detail' and even the operations the Ministry of Religious Affairs carried out in the 'Tunnel' are considered in a relatively supportive way.[63] The general policy followed for the reconstruction plan of the Jewish Quarter was also ostensibly approved:

> This quarter, as we know, was the scene of long and bloody battles from 1947 to 1948, when it suffered severe damages since aggravated by twenty years of neglect and lack of repairs.
>
> Since the capture of Jerusalem in 1967, *the Israeli authorities have completely evacuated the old Jewish Quarter in order to clean it up and to restore it.* I made a detailed visit of this quarter and saw that *praiseworthy efforts are being made to preserve all the old buildings that have survived.*
>
> Indisputably the will of the team of architects responsible for rehabilitating the quarter is to preserve everything which can be preserved and their efforts in this respect are greater than at the beginning of the operation which would seem to have been marked by a degree of scepticism about the possibility of preserveing all the old remains and working them into housing reaching modern standards and comfort.[64]

Criticism seeps out from the lines of the report only when discussing the quality of the technical work of the CDRJQ (mistakenly considered a private company, while it was in fact a government-backed semi-public company):

The work is being directed by a private firm of architects which has, indisputably, set about it with enthusiasm and the will to do it well. There is, however, no doubt that, both in conception and as regards certain restoration techniques, the work is often below what one might have hoped. A fact emerging from discussions I had with some of those in charge was that they are not abreast of the principles and techniques of restoration generally accepted in the world. This state of affairs is all the more to be regretted in that neither expense nor effort is spared to preserve the old parts, and, if only the required technical props were there, there would be everything needed for doing a really sound job.[65]

In 1973 the Israeli minister of foreign affairs invited the director-general to Jerusalem and Mr Maheu came there on 29 and 30 April. To comply with Resolution 3.422 'inviting the DG to continue his efforts to establish the effective presence of UNESCO in Jerusalem',[66] he decided to appoint Professor Lemaire as his personal representative for Jerusalem[67] and in the following months the latter undertook two missions to the city.[68] In content and tone Lemaire's new reports confirmed the previous ones on all the main issues, differing only in the way the 'tunnel', the impact of which on the urban fabric was now becoming evident, was tackled. In his report the damage that appeared in 1974 to some Mamluk buildings situated above the underground tunnel were attributed to its excavation, though in an extremely 'tactful' way.[69]

Professor Lemaire synthesized the reports prepared during the 1980s into a comprehensive and detailed *Synoptic report on developments in the safeguarding of the monumental heritage of Jerusalem from 1971 to 1987*.[70] This document, unique for its scope and extent, requires a detailed presentation and a brief comparison with the reports analysed above. While discussing the evolution of the city over the previous 20 years Professor Lemaire unexpectedly notes that the starting point of the dramatic urban growth and alterations 'goes back much further' than the 1967 Israeli occupation of the city. Meanwhile, though at times critical of the Israeli administration's actions, he points out, almost with pride, the existence of citizen's movements (obviously comprised of only Israeli citizens) for the protection of the landscape from some of the reconstruction plans. In paragraph 5 of his report, the importance of the vernacular habitat of the city is officially recognized; still, there is no

mention of the living, social environment of the city, as if the city were not mainly comprised of its residents. As a former director of ICOMOS and an active member of all the international committees trying to establish universally accepted rules for urban restoration, this omission is inexplicable. It should be considered that at that same moment (October 1987) the general assembly of ICOMOS adopted a document on the conservation of historic towns known as 'The Washington Charter' that states in art. 3: 'The participation and involvement of the residents are essential for the success of the conservation programme and should be encouraged. The conservation of historic towns and urban areas concerns their residents first of all.'[71]

While presenting the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, among unexpected simplifications[72] he voices a pale criticism of the political background of the operation: 'the Israeli Government decided to evict its Arab inhabitants, expropriate the whole of the area and restore it. … Although the population was previously mixed, the present occupants are exclusively Jewish.' However, there is no discussion of the principles and policies that led to the 'exclusively Jewish' population of the restored area. Similarly, the stated opinion that 'the Jewish Quarter is being rebuilt so as to form a normal part of the urban fabric of the Old City' does not appear convincing. Professor Lemaire was fully aware that the rest of the Old City was left to its inevitable decay, that its monuments were more and more threatened and that, therefore, the differences between the rebuilt neighbourhood and the other quarters were increasing. His final stance that 'the overall appearance of the area today respects the traditional values of the Old City' is also difficult to accept. Indeed, there was never such a separate entity within the city walls, and never before had such a large-scale alteration of the urban landscape taken place in such a short span of time. What is more surprising in this report, however, is the apparent approval of the division of the heritage of the city according to its ethnic and national dimensions. The fact that the Arab leadership in the city called for the boycott of the Israeli administration is used as a pretext for a separate analysis of the needs of the city's unique heritage according to its religious and/or ethnic origin – an approach that contradicts the overall stance of a body like UNESCO.[73]

Nevertheless, in many parts of the report a new attitude surfaces, especially in the discussion of the archaeological excavations carried out after 1967. Though convinced of the soundness of the 'technical' teams

involved, for the first time 'political' considerations about the archae-ological excavations are articulated in his report. While discussing their status, Lemaire openly admits that 'no legal justification may be invoked for excavations undertaken solely in pursuit of archaeological research such as those conducted by Professor Mazar.' And his criticism of the whole 'tunnel' excavation is even stronger: 'the digging of the tunnel has nothing to do with any archaeological research programme and did not follow scientific excavation methods.' The 1987 report also pays a certain amount of attention to the Mamluk buildings of the Old City and to the Islamic heritage of the city beyond the *Haram al-Sharif*. With his well-trained eye, Professor Lemaire's had no difficulty detecting the dramatic decline in the condition of these structures. 'The state of Jerusalem's Islamic Heritage is bordering on disaster' and, given that 'the safe-guarding and restoration of the Islamic monuments is a long-term undertaking calling for considerable financial resources that are far beyond the means of the authorities who are the owners or are respon-sible for their management', he endorses the director-general's decision to launch an appeal for an international fund-raising campaign.

Political changes within Jerusalem, notably the election of right-wing Ehud Olmert as mayor of the city in 1993, along with the changing international situation and Oslo accords between Israel and the Pales-tinians, created new patterns and new tensions in the city. During the 1990s UNESCO tried to impose its presence in the city, while the State of Israel strengthened its hold on the Old City of Jerusalem by creating new facts on the ground that finally brought to an end the dream of a new placatory era in the city and in the Holy Land. Lemaire continued to produce reports throughout the 1990s. However, for the first time, after almost 20 years of absolute monopoly on the issue of Jerusalem, the 1990s saw the multiplication of missions by external consultants involved on specific projects, and therefore a diminution in the status of the special representative.

In response to an appeal in October 1987, UNESCO took on a more active role in dealing with the city's heritage, for which it created a 'Special Account for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage, focusing in particular on the Islamic Monuments of Jerusalem'. UNESCO's invigorated presence in the city initially took the form of newfound cooperation with the Islamic *Waqf* in charge of the *Haram al-Sharif* and was focused on the restoration of the Dome of the Rock. In the 1990s

most of Lemaire's attention was thus devoted to the ongoing restoration of its golden dome, its tiles, mosaics and stuccos and to the continuing dispute with the Christian religious communities in charge of the restoration work in the Holy Sepulchre. Neither of these subjects nor UNESCO's efforts to conserve and restore the Islamic manuscripts kept in the *Haram al-Sharif* and in the private Khalidi Library will be detailed in this examination. Instead, the analysis will be confined to subjects that more directly reflect the impact of UNESCO's action on the urban fabric and to Lemaire's scrutiny of the overall approach to the city from 1990 until his death in 1997.

The new attitude of the executive board and general conference of UNESCO *vis-à-vis* the special representative became evident in 1990 when the general conference invited the director-general to 'instruct Professor Lemaire … to report to him on the state of Jerusalem's cultural and religious heritage as a whole and on the action needed to preserve and restore it'.[74] This change was clearly expressed, for instance, in the executive board decision 5.4.1 that 'invited the Director-General, in view of the diversity of aspects presented by Jerusalem's cultural property, to send to Jerusalem *an interdisciplinary team of Personal Representatives*'.[75] The Israeli response to UNESCO's new approach to the city was wholly negative,[76] and the Israeli authorities only allowed Professor Lemaire's missions.

In compliance with the new tasks that were being entrusted to him, for the first time Lemaire's 1990 report tackled the issue of Jerusalem's heritage from a global perspective. This report presents a somewhat different picture of the city's conditions, even if most statements in the document confirm previously expressed remarks and concepts. While discussing the state of Jerusalem's cultural and religious heritage, for instance, Lemaire acknowledges that 'Jerusalem's first monument is the city itself, included in its entirety on the World Heritage List.'[77] However, he once more expresses an overall appreciation for the work carried out by the Israeli municipality after 1967. He considers that 'almost all this work has been properly and professionally carried out' and includes in his appreciation the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter.

> The facts oblige us to mention a large number of works which have contributed to improving the physical condition of the city as compared to 1967. These include the partial restoration and

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reconstruction of the 'Jewish Quarter' – almost totally ruined during the 1947–48 war – with a lower density than formerly, but, with a few exceptions (*yeshiva* Porat Yosef and the neighbouring block of flats), in keeping with the traditions of Jerusalem where its spirit, structures, architecture and building materials are concerned and fitting very well into the general townscape.[78]

Having approved the technical work, Lemaire recognizes that 'the question is whether it is for an occupying power to decide on and to carry out such work',[79] but from its context this question looks more like a hollow rhetorical expression than a real concern. Nevertheless, not everything the Israelis were doing met with his approval. In this report, and in those that followed until his sudden death in 1997, Professor Lemaire is particularly critical of the 'tunnel' enterprise,[80] of the ongoing large development project of Mamilla,[81] and of the new developments proposed for the 'Mazar excavations' area. In his 1991 report, for instance, Lemaire is highly critical of and pays much attention to the historically and scientifically biased arrangements visible in the tunnel and in his last report, in 1997, he notes that the Israeli authorities had built a metallic pergola in the middle of the courtyard of one of the Omayyad palaces that disfigured the site.[82]

The uncomfortable position of the special representative, and his limited independence *vis-à-vis* the Israeli authorities, became particularly evident during this period. Indeed, as soon as a more active role in the city was required, the limits imposed on Lemaire's action became apparent. In 1992, the general conference requested from the special representative a 'report on the state of the whole cultural heritage consisting of movable, museological, archival, artistic and other components, and on the requirements to be met for its preservation'. Lemaire first refrained from answering, and then tried to limit the objective to essential cultural properties.[83] Similarly, in 1995 he delayed his response to the executive board decision 5.5.1 asking for 'an inventory of the cultural and physical heritage of the Old City',[84] though he was then forced to admit, in his 1996 report, that the inventory 'can only be carried *with the collaboration of the authorities who are in charge* or the legal owners of the properties in question … at present none of these conditions has been met'.[85]

This dramatic admission of impotence might be considered as a

concise synthesis of the entire history of UNESCO's involvement in Jerusalem. In the 39 years that have elapsed since 1967, neither UNESCO nor any other international body has been able to impose its will on Israel. While Israel has been pursuing a carefully planned transformation of the city to adapt it to its needs and rhetoric, the international community has been watching, unable to interfere directly and to oppose its conduct.

Lemaire's reports and UNESCO policy for Jerusalem: an interpretation

An assessment of Lemaire's approach to the city is possible primarily because the apparently cold and neutral technical elements presented in the official reports do not always manage to hide the special representative's personal views on the events taking place. Lemaire's charisma and international standing allowed him throughout his 26-year mission to play an extraordinary role in shaping the international community's perception of the transformations taking place in the Old City. The difficulties he faced, the contradictions with which he dealt, the solutions he adopted and the subjects he avoided are all essential pieces of the complex diplomatic, technical and political game that developed around the fate of Jerusalem's cultural heritage. Because of his unique and unchallenged control over the Jerusalem issue for such a long time, his personality and political position form essential aspects of the overall analysis of UNESCO's action in Jerusalem.

When discussing the contents of Lemaire's reports, it should be borne in mind that the position of the special representative was particularly delicate, for his very presence in the city depended on Israeli approval. Therefore, it is evident that his carefully phrased reports are the outcome of a number of diplomatic and political considerations beyond their apparently neutral technical dimension.

Although on many occasions Lemaire expressed his appreciation of the work the Israelis carried out in the Old City, the stance of UNESCO's executive board, officially based on his findings, was negative for Israel. Thus, from 1972 the Israeli authorities complained[86] that the special consultant's reports were not being given due weight in the executive board's conclusions calling on Israel to 'desist from any archaeological excavations' and inviting the director-general to ensure a continuous presence of UNESCO in the city of Jerusalem.[87] Many commentators[88] pointed out that the political stake Jerusalem represented often

dominated the board's choices, and that strategic and geopolitical concerns more than technical analysis and scientific reservations were instrumental in the resolutions that were adopted. Though this analysis might be partially subscribed to, it should not be forgotten that the transformations of the Old City of Jerusalem taking place under Israeli rule were indeed dramatic and contrary to the spirit of the UNESCO founding charter and credo. It is surprising then to realize that similar concerns are not clearly expressed in Lemaire's reports. Indeed, his texts, which are carefully balanced both in the selection of words and in the technical assessments, apparently 'forget' to tackle some of the most important cultural issues raised by the ongoing reconstruction of the Old City. Professor Lemaire, whose culture, experience and know-how are beyond question, obviously recognized the implications of the ongoing plans. We must assume, therefore, that he consciously decided not to report them. Why did this happen? Was it a form of 'camouflage' to gain acceptance from the Israeli authorities? Or should it be considered a political position approving of the Israeli general strategy for the city?

Answering these questions is no simple matter and no straightforward conclusions may be drawn. However, it is important to attempt to assess – by interviewing the people he met in Jerusalem, carefully reading his reports and with the privilege of a personal acquaintance with the late Professor Lemaire[89] – his personal position on the issue and to consider the impact of his ideas on the executive board's decisions.

From discussing Raymond Lemaire's personality with Israeli and Palestinian officials who dealt with him during his missions, a complex and multifaceted portrait appears. The Palestinians, though acknowledging and respecting his technical knowledge, saw his political stance as clearly pro-Israeli. They felt particularly hurt that Professor Lemaire did not usually reside in East Jerusalem during his visits and often complained about the disproportion in the number of Israeli and Palestinian people he used to meet during his stays in the city. Israeli perceptions of his personality and actions are more nuanced. While state officials and diplomats often complained to UNESCO about the content and findings of his reports, Israeli architects, archaeologists and planners working in the Old City had a special and privileged relationship with him and many remember him with affection and respect. One of the architects collaborating with the CDRJQ had been a friend of Lemaire's and had worked in his office in Belgium on planning the new city of

Louvain-La-Neuve before moving to Israel. Yochanan Minsker had also, while in Rome, discussed his 1973 thesis on 'Methodology for the Restoration of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem' with Lemaire and Professor De Angelis d'Ossat, and had been flattered to have had the chance to profit from Lemaire's unique expertise on the site in the ensuing years.[90] It is plausible that his personal interest and passion for contemporary architecture, on the one hand, and his confidence in the Israeli team's planning abilities, on the other, influenced his perception of the reconstruction projects taking place within the city walls. Moreover, the cultural affinities he shared with his Israeli counterparts, their 'Western' 'rational' approach and their academic background affected his technical and political opinions.

Lemaire's decision to restrict his comments to select issues and so avoid articulating the fate of the minor fabric of the city is particularly telling. In 1964 Raymond Lemaire was among the intellectuals and architects who drafted the text of the Venice Charter, a pioneering and important document on conservation and restoration theory and practice in which, for the first time, considerable attention was devoted to what had previously been regarded simply as 'minor architecture'. The new definition of 'monument' contained in the charter, including both minor architecture and traditional urban centres within the concept of monument, was a milestone in the evolution of the discipline.[91] In Jerusalem, however, Lemaire consciously confined his attention to the main monuments on the *Haram al-Sharif*. This was clearly a political choice that enabled him not only to avoid discussing the effect of Israeli actions on the larger fabric of the Old City, but also to evade direct interaction with Palestinian personalities functioning outside the politically comfortable Jordanian umbrella.[92]

In a study about UNESCO in the Old City of Jerusalem,[93] David Myers rightly complains that UNESCO's actions (essentially Lemaire's missions and reports) are 're-active' and not 'pro-active' and concludes that, in the absence of a permanent UNESCO presence in the city, the temporary missions were unable to play an important role in protecting the heritage of the city. Undeniably, this fact, the exclusively reactive role of Lemaire's office, should be considered carefully when analysing his reports. It seems possible that many of the new positions expressed in his later reports merely reflected already approved UNESCO resolutions and/or international complaints, and that only in these cases did Lemaire

amend his previously stated views about the Israeli activities. In all other cases, a downplaying of their effect on the city is evident, though possibly less apparent than in his earlier documents. Lemaire's endorsement of what Israel was doing to the Old City had far-reaching consequences on the positive image of the Jewish quarter reconstruction project in the European architectural press of the 1970s. In May 1975, for instance, shortly after UNESCO resolutions were enacted against Israel, Lemaire organized an international conference in Bruges (Belgium) on the conservation of historic towns. The architectural team working in Jerusalem was invited to present its project. Thus, Lemaire offered the CDRJQ a precious opportunity to present its version of what was happening in the Old City and to counteract the growing doubts European public opinion had begun to express about Israeli policy in the city.[94]

For a quarter of a century Raymond Lemaire played the difficult role of link between UNESCO and the Israeli government. He was thereby attempting to correct the most evident technical shortcomings of the Israeli projects while being careful to avoid offending Israeli sensibilities. For the most part, he approved the plans of the Israeli architects, planners and archaeologists. However, since his personal approach did not reflect the official UNESCO position on the Holy City, he was always extremely cautious and generally tried to avoid expressing his personal views openly. He sometimes hid his political sympathies behind an apparently 'technical' or 'rational' façade. Overall, Lemaire's reports were generally too sensitive to the positions of the secular Israeli leadership yet too carefully phrased to convey an effective political message. They look more like an exercise in 'technical' diplomacy than an effective monitoring of the city's evolution and a form of international control over its cultural heritage. As far as the Jewish Quarter is concerned, apart from the repetitive descriptions of the archaeological excavations, only a few important data emerge from his reports:

❑ most of the ancient houses were demolished even if they could have been restored;
❑ the team was not technically qualified to carry out restoration work;
❑ Safdie's design for the Porat Yosef *yeshiva* stands out as a 'mistake' within the overall plan; and
❑ the tunnel has caused structural damage to important Mamluk buildings.

However, what does not emerge from his reports, what Lemaire consciously refrained from reporting to the UNESCO director-general, is much more important:

❑ the reconstruction project was achieved through large-scale forced land expropriation and expulsion of the residents;
❑ the project had clear political, ideological and symbolic dimensions;
❑ dubious criteria were used to select the quarter's new population;[95]
❑ the project within the city walls was merely part of a larger scheme to transform the entire surroundings of the Jewish Quarter and landscape of the Jerusalem area;
❑ the rest of the Old City was decaying dramatically because of the lack of a conservation strategy from the municipality and the absence of any agreed upon set of rules; and
❑ 'To a great extent, the discovery of the Byzantine *Cardo*, its partial *anastylosis* and its transformation into a shopping arcade which made it a tourist attraction known throughout the world, supplied the belated alibi for a renovation policy which was not in keeping with the spirit of the Venice Charter.'[96]

Contradictions between the ICOMOS and UNESCO attempts to define criteria for a good policy on revitalizing old city centres on the one hand and Lemaire's position on Jerusalem on the other are particularly striking. Indeed, 'for more than 30 years, UNESCO has endeavoured to put into practice [an] approach allying the restoration of monuments with the revitalization of historic town centres.'[97] Since 1980, for instance, the Moroccan authorities have, with the collaboration of UNESCO, launched a campaign to revitalize the Old City of Fez. A comprehensive plan, with socio-economic aspects and redefining the goals associated with the conservation of historic quarters, was drawn, linking the 'restoration of monuments and the stabilization of the infrastructures to the restructuring of the crafts quarter and the revival of traditional techniques'.[98]

Nothing similar was attempted in Jerusalem and Lemaire never officially compared its reconstruction plan with any other ongoing project the international community supported and in which UNESCO was involved.[99] Jerusalem was seen as a one-off, a completely different case in which political implications should always prevail over technical/scientific considerations. This peculiar attitude most likely stemmed

from Lemaire's fascination with the spirit of initiative and enthusiasm shown by the team of young Israeli architects in charge of the work, and from his 'patronizing' attitude towards the city's Palestinian elite in particular and towards the Palestinian community in general – an attitude confirmed through small clues like refusing to use the term 'Palestinian' in his reports or the repeated misuse of the terms 'Arab' and 'Muslim'; both telling details of his overall approach and sensitivity.

After Lemaire's death, relations between Israel and UNESCO deteriorated. Conscious of the growing difficulties in discussions with the Israeli authorities, UNESCO tried to strengthen its bonds with the Islamic *Waqf* administration, which was officially in charge of most of the heritage sites within the city. A new partner, capable of revitalizing the *Waqf*, was identified in the Welfare Association (WA), a Palestinian NGO financing and carrying out restoration projects in the Old City through its technical branch (CDC/Centre for Development Consultancy). In August 1997, a tripartite cooperation was established between UNESCO, Islamic *Waqf* and the WA.[100] This latter body was then charged with the 'elaboration of a global plan for an inventory of cultural heritage in the Old City',[101] *de facto* playing the role of UNESCO representative in the city. The general conference approved this new strategy and '*expressesd its satisfaction* at the cooperation contemplated between UNESCO, the Jerusalem *Waqf* and the WA with a view to the restoration of historic buildings in the Old City, and the training programme for heritage specialists'.[102]

The deep mistrust that developed between UNESCO and the government of Israel after Raymond Lemaire's death is best exemplified by the director-general's frustration in nominating a new special representative for Jerusalem who was acceptable to Israel. A first attempt was made with the nomination of Professor Léon Pressouyre,[103] who undertook a mission to Jerusalem in September 1999. However, Israel's permanent delegate to UNESCO repeatedly opposed this mission and never gave him an official list of eminent Israelis to contact during the mission.[104] Pressouyre's mission report, of which the Israeli authorities harshly disapproved,[105] differed greatly from those of Lemaire. The main substantial difference lies in Pressouyre's determination to tackle the question of the conservation of the Old City within the larger context of urban transformation at the level of the entire city and its metropolitan area. However, a different, though carefully phrased, political sensitivity also

became evident. In the report the continuous growth of the settlements around the city, and within the city walls, is noted. In particular, Pressouyre detailed the ongoing attempt by Israeli settlers to take over the *Burj al Laqlaq* area, one of the few empty areas left within the dense fabric of the Old City. It is difficult to know if the obstructive attitude of the Israeli authorities influenced the tone and content of the report, or if this text should be seen as a dispassionate presentation of what was taking place in Jerusalem at that time. However, it is obvious that Pressouyre's report reflects an attempt to convey a precise description of the situation more than an attempt to produce a 'diplomatic' document avoiding hurting Israeli political sensibilities. By contrast, therefore, it highlights both the qualities and the limits of Lemaire's reporting. Lemaire's 'small-steps' diplomatic policy in fact allowed him to continue reporting on the city for 26 years and to achieve some results without generating official rejections from the Israeli side, while all successive attempts to nominate a new expert mission to Jerusalem have failed because of the objections expressed by the Israeli authorities.

The first choice of director-general to carry out a new expert mission to Jerusalem was a well-known academic, Professor Oleg Grabar, from the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. However, the Israeli authorities twice (in June 2000 and in July 2001) blocked his mission, initially scheduled for June 2000.[106] Finally, acknowledging the Israeli veto, the director-general of UNESCO suggested that the role of expert for Jerusalem should be entrusted to the director of the World Heritage Centre, and consequently proposed the mission to its Italian director Mr Francesco Bandarin.

In the meantime, the ratification of the World Heritage Convention by Israel in 1999 radically altered the fragile equilibrium reached on the issue of the Old City of Jerusalem. An intense, and partially secret, series of talks between high UNESCO representatives and Israeli officials on the subject of Jerusalem was instigated. It focused predominantly on the possibility of extending the area inscribed on the WHL. Notably, the Israelis proposed the inscription of Mount Zion and other areas outside the city walls on the list, presumably in exchange for a more cooperative relationship with UNESCO.[107]

The issue, the political significance of which goes beyond the minor detail of the extension of the listed site, still remains unresolved, for the outbreak of the Second Intifada has, for the time being, postponed talks.

Conclusion

Since the Israeli occupation of the city in 1967, the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem has consisted of a large-scale urban transformation within an ancient, historic and densely inhabited urban environment. The authorities in charge of the project, notably the CDRJQ, carried out an ambitious plan of urban reconstruction with the full support of the highest office holders in the government of the State of Israel.

The reconstruction plans implemented in the southwestern part of the Old City have, notably, created a large new plaza in front of the Wailing Wall, opened up large tracts of land to archaeological excavations and tourist visits, and created a new living neighbourhood inhabited exclusively by Israeli Jews within the Ottoman city walls. These actions have all taken place not only against the backdrop of formal opposition from both the UN and UNESCO but also in full view of the special UNESCO envoy who for 26 years held the office of special representative of the director-general for Jerusalem.

Blame for the remarkable ineffectiveness of Lemaire's reporting on the city cannot, obviously, be placed exclusively on his shoulders; however, it appears, from careful reading of his reports, that his personal political perspective on the question of Jerusalem strongly influenced his perception of the events and his way of reporting them.

In summarizing the relationship between UNESCO and Israel over the Jerusalem question since the Israeli occupation of the city in June 1967 through to 1999, three distinct periods might be identified:[108]

- ❏ a first phase, 1967–71, which saw the UNESCO director-general's full involvement in trying at first to cooperate with the Israeli authorities over the management of the heritage of the city. In the face of Israeli hostility towards any international intervention, the director-general openly showed his dissent with regard to Israeli policies for the city;
- ❏ a second phase, 1971–90, saw the complete handover of the Jerusalem issue to Raymond Lemaire, whose pro-Israeli stand managed to soothe the tense relations between Israel and UNESCO following the 1974 crisis, but at the risk of jeopardizing the UNESCO mission, namely to protect and safeguard the Old City of Jerusalem; and
- ❏ a third phase, 1990–99, in which UNESCO again tried to play a more active role in the city, counteracting the nationalistically-biased Israeli

policy *vis-à-vis* the cultural heritage of the city, sometimes even bypassing the UNESCO special representative's opinion, whose ideological positions were no longer in tune with the executive board.

Even if the 1990s witnessed a more prolonged and fruitful UNESCO presence in the city, symbolized by the implementation of a number of conservation projects concerning Jerusalem's Islamic heritage, no in-depth work has yet been undertaken. No conservation master plan has been drawn up, no delineation of clear priorities set, no revitalization mechanisms created, and no attempt to solve the enormous problems related to the overcrowding and hygienic conditions of the Old City has ever been undertaken by UNESCO.

The political stand of the State of Israel in refusing to accept external intervention in the planning process or to allow the city's Palestinian residents any involvement has continued to prevent UNESCO from safe-guarding the multi-layered heritage of the Holy City. Whatever the special representative's personal sentiments, the political and diplomatic pressures from Arab states, or local efforts by UNESCO and the *Waqf* administration, no coherent and respectful policy for the conservation and development of the Old City of Jerusalem is possible without a continuous international presence in the city[109] and the acceptance by all parties of a defined set of legal rules.

It is my conviction, as well as the main assumption of this research, that what has been built within the Old City is the outcome of an ethno-nationalist policy passed off as a scientific/archaeological venture and an architectural plan of urban restoration, but not a restoration project at all. The new Jewish Quarter has often been presented as a positive result of Israeli rule over the city, a showcase of Israeli expertise and cultural superiority capable of concealing the contemporary and controversial large-scale housing projects that have blighted Jerusalem's landscape since 1967. In the previous chapters of this book it has been demon-strated that the reconstruction of this area has been but another element of this same campaign, and that similar techniques and methods were applied both to the Jewish Quarter and to the suburban settlements.

The analysis of UNESCO's attitude towards urban conservation, and towards the ongoing transformation of the Old City of Jerusalem since 1967, has highlighted the discrepancies between what took place there and what could have been done had the conditions been different,

thereby implicitly confirming the main assumption of the research. Indeed, had alternative political choices been made and the significance of the Old City for all humanity been acknowledged, there would have been room for a different reconstruction policy, more respectful of both the urban and social fabric of the city.

Though it is often futile, sometimes even dangerous, to discuss possible outcomes that failed to materialize, it is important to stress that it was the pre-eminence of political and ideological schemes over technical restoration and planning concerns that produced the present-day Jewish Quarter, which constitutes a completely new environment, the urban characteristics of which respect neither the traditional setting of the city nor the modern standards of conservation outlined by the international community. The newly created 'ghetto' in the Old City of Jerusalem is not just the embodiment of the political will to diminish the Palestinian presence in the city and to assert Jewish 'rights' over it. It is also a dramatic and long-lasting offence to a site whose very significance involves each and every person on the planet, a site that René Maheu, the then director-general of UNESCO, described in 1969 as 'a priceless treasure of mankind's heritage',[110] and whose importance goes far beyond the contingent Israeli/Palestinian struggle.

Chapter 6

Urban Restoration and Ideology in Israel and Palestine: A Comparative Approach

In our own days, two thousand years later, when the descendants of the slaughtered returned to the site, they uncovered the physical traces of the destruction and rebuilt their houses over the ruins. … History has repeated itself.

N. Avigad[1]

Today looks exactly like yesterday. After long periods of darkness that enveloped the land of Babylon and concealed its characteristics, Saddam Hussein emerges from Mesopotamia, as Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar had emerged at a time, to shake the century old dust off its face.

Iraqi Ministry of Culture[2]

Methodological introduction: criteria for the comparison

The comparative analysis examining the influence of political ideologies on the architectural and planning choices focuses upon six cities within mandatory Palestine and includes an alternative plan for the Old City of Jerusalem.

To establish an effective comparison between Jerusalem and other cities it is essential to have a full realization of its specificities. From many points of view, in fact, Jerusalem is unique, and this 'uniqueness' should not be underestimated before drawing any comparison. Within this research, Jerusalem is considered primarily in its historical and architectural dimensions. The focus has been on the reconstruction of a portion of its centre; consequently, a specific set of comparable cases has

been identified. Comparisons concentrate on cities where urban reconstruction projects of similar scale and importance have taken place, even though economic, symbolic and political considerations that cannot be found elsewhere have heavily influenced the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter. The main elements characterizing the reconstruction plan for Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter can be schematically classified into three categories that most urban renewal plans share: tourism, gentrification/real estate, and nation-making ideology. How do these aspects interact with the physical environment in other cities? How unique is the ideological approach of Jerusalem's reconstruction within Israeli planning and in the regional context?

To bypass the almost impossible task of identifying examples that include all the characteristics of Jerusalem, another step is necessary – to rationalize in a more abstract manner the Jewish Quarter reconstruction from a political/cultural perspective. To discuss the plan carried out in the Old City, a specific element has been taken into consideration – the relationship between the cultural and/or ethnic origin of the heritage to be restored and the cultural, political and ideological worldview of the body in charge of the restoration. Three different situations may occur:

❑ restoration of neutral heritage in a mainly homogeneous society (for example ancient Roman and Greek temples in an Islamic country, or Crusader heritage in the Jewish state);
❑ restoration of ethnic-related heritage in ethnically homogeneous conditions (for example Islamic heritage in a mainly Islamic country, or Jewish heritage in the Jewish state); and
❑ restoration of ethnic-related heritage in ethnically opposed conditions (for example Jewish heritage in Islamic countries or Arab–Islamic heritage in the Jewish state).

This approach obviously contradicts the philosophical and technical principles of restoration theory, for the very definition of 'cultural heritage of mankind' implies overcoming a nationalist perception of history and heritage. In reality, however, the ideological element – even if not directly invoked or even acknowledged – very often plays an important role in determining the sites to excavate, or in defining the national priorities for the tourist development of a region. This element acquires central importance when considering the modern Middle East

and its complex political environment. Both in Israel and in the neighbouring countries, ideology often acts as a catalyst to support scientific and archaeological research or urban conservation plans. The attempt to justify present-day regimes by evoking their connection with the past, the clear-cut separation between 'our' and 'their' heritage, and the idea of an ethnic/religious-related heritage have become predominant. Although no one would seriously consider the presence of Greek heritage in Sicily as a claim of ownership, or refuse to acknowledge the presence of pagan temples or Islamic monuments in an extremely Catholic region, Western researchers accept such attitudes when dealing with the Middle East; even the UNESCO envoy to Jerusalem has used 'nationalist' categories when discussing Jerusalem's heritage.

Following a brief introduction to review the fate of the Jewish quarters in Arab countries after 1948 and the successive emigration of large portions of their Jewish communities to the State of Israel, two distinct sets of examples have been chosen for the comparative analysis of the Jerusalem project.

In the first section the focus is on the State of Israel's urban conservation strategy in relation to the country's rich Arab heritage. Through a brief overview of the transformations that have taken place in Safed, Jaffa, and Acre, the plan for Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter is placed within a national perspective. These three cities were selected to represent the three categories identified above – tourism, gentrification/real estate, and nation-making ideology – as the driving elements behind Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter reconstruction.

In the second section, the Old City of Jerusalem and two cities that both Israel and the PNA have at one time or another controlled, are presented from a Palestinian perspective. The intimate relationship between ideology and urban conservation is exemplified by the different kinds of attention each of the two regimes devote to the architectural and urban heritage of its cities. The PNA's interest in its old cities, and the efforts it has invested in safeguarding and restoring them, constitute both a response to the Israeli discourse and a rather similar drive towards strengthening national identity through the use of its past grandeur. The recently developed Palestinian approach to the multi-layered heritage of the country might, therefore, be usefully compared with the Israeli approach towards Arab cities in Israel, and the comparison becomes even more telling and immediate in the case of the Old City of Jerusalem.

Although none of the examples presented in this chapter should be taken as fully reflecting the case of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter, the selected set of examples provides essential tools with which to analyse the Jewish Quarter plan. Through the comparisons it becomes possible to highlight the inescapable role of ideology in all urban plans. The intimate relationship between the ethnic and/or religious origin of the heritage and the conservation strategies applied, as well as the complex interplay of symbolic, economic and political/demographic needs are characteristics of all urban reconstruction plans. The comparison with Palestinian urban heritage strategies draws attention to the ways in which 'heritage planning' policies can glorify and adapt the urban fabric to serve particular political needs. Moreover, the discussion of an alternative plan for the old city of Jerusalem adds weight to the assumption that the Jewish Quarter plan was not conceived as urban restoration. Indeed, none of the elements the Palestinian architects took into consideration in structuring their restoration plan (conservation of the original population, restoration of the original structures and use of building techniques compatible with the ancient structures) has been considered a priority by the Jewish Quarter planners. Similarly, the brief discussion of Israeli urban conservation policies demonstrates that the symbolic relevance and centrality the Israeli political elite attaches to the Jewish Quarter plan differs from that of other cities. Although the 'restoration' plans for Jaffa, Safed and Acre have followed the 'standard' pattern based upon negating the Palestinian identity of the sites, only in Jerusalem has such a large-scale replanning of the urban fabric been undertaken. Indeed, while similar strategies have informed the prompt approach to specific buildings in Jaffa and Jerusalem, for instance, the very idea of 'creating' a living new/ancient Jewish city signifies a different pattern responding to unique and specific ideological and political needs.

The actual relevance of this comparative section lies in it being a 'test' for the analysis of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan put forth in the previous chapters. Reviews of other conservation projects, though essential for the fine tuning of the interpretation of the Jewish Quarter plan, also therefore serve as a 'negative' check, with the differences as important as the similarities. That none of the examples proposed fully reflect the strategy put forth in the Jewish Quarter might be considered further confirmation of the specificity of this plan. Indeed, though the Jewish Quarter reconstruction project may be 'subdivided' into segments

that can in turn be compared with other experiences, the whole 'package' seems to stand as a unique feature. Only in Jerusalem has a modern housing development been termed a restoration plan and only in Jerusalem has this term been so intimately linked to the very existence of a modern nation-state.

Jewish quarters in the Arab world: an assessment

The lack of homogeneity between the ethnic/religious origin of the heritage and the ruling power has undoubtedly played a major role in defining the conservation strategies that Arab governments put forth when dealing with the Jewish quarters of their cities, even though they have not automatically entailed the destruction or absolute rejection of the alternative group's heritage.

Inclusive narratives, which are capable of integrating multiple read-ings of national history and previously dismissed elements, have become increasingly commonplace and are often the favoured policy of the inter-national organization sponsoring the conservation plans. It seems likely that the international financing of urban revitalization has played a large part in developing this new inclusive approach in the restoration plans proposed, for example, for the Jewish quarters of the Yemeni capital Sana'a and the Moroccan city of Fez. In the latter case, there has also been a shift in how Moroccans view the Jewish components of their kingdom's national history. In Syria, however, the political situation has been too tense for contemporary Syrians to accept a reinterpretation of national history that integrated their important Jewish heritage. Syria's ancient history and rich heritage are commonly portrayed as earlier manifestations of the country's present Arab identity, with Syrian history seen as an uninterrupted continuity from remote antiquity to the present regime.[3] In Aleppo, Syria's second city and an important Ottoman centre, UNESCO's intervention has helped to safeguard the historic core and halt the controversial Bab al Faraj project on the area where the city's Jewish quarter once stood, but has been unable to stop its demolition or to impose a more sympathetic approach towards Syria's Jewish heritage.

Sana'a's ancient Jewish Quarter has acquired neither an increased symbolic role nor a negative one for being Jewish, though its evident architectural qualities have made it popular among Muslim Yemenites. The urban rehabilitation of Sana'a has taken place in a context in which

there are no alternative interpretations available with which to contest the present situation. This is a city from which centuries of Jewish history and culture, and thousands of Jewish citizens, have disappeared without recourse to reclaim the properties they left behind.

The city of Fez in Morocco is a more complex case because it introduces another important element, namely the tourist appeal of the Jewish heritage for Moroccan Jews living abroad, particularly in Israel. The opening of formal relations between the two countries has brought tens of thousands of Israeli tourists to Morocco – mostly relatives of the Moroccan Jews who left the country in the 1950s – who bring important revenue to the kingdom's economy and return to Israel with a different image of their ancestral home.

An interesting fact to emerge from the comparison between the different approaches to Jewish quarters in the Arab world and in the Jewish state is that the same international body that was not allowed to intervene in Jerusalem's reconstruction has actively promoted the conservation of the Jewish heritage in Arab countries. Indeed, UNESCO's avowal of a universal heritage of mankind has often been influential in overcoming local nationalistic interpretations and in achieving a better balance between contemporary political needs and the preservation of the remains of the past. Among the three countries taken into consideration, Morocco, Yemen and Syria, only the latter seems to mirror the Israeli experience, for in both cases ideological considerations have been predominant, all alternatives have been excluded and a more inclusive reading of heritage and history have been denied.

Urban restoration and Arab heritage in Israel

Adapting the entire Zionist enterprise to Herzl's vision, to create a new Jewish society in the Holy Land, required an extensive rereading of the landscape and of the urban fabric of Palestine. From Meron Benvenisti's vivid description of the challenge the first settlers faced when they arrived in Palestine and the ideological effort needed to transform an Arab land into a Jewish homeland awaiting redemption,[4] it is evident that this cultural and ideological framework contained little space in which to conserve the Arab architectural heritage. With the rare exception of the relics of the Crusader era (both real and 'invented'),[5] the physical traces of the Arab heritage had to disappear, or at least be 'minimized' and isolated from the context to which they belonged. The

post-1948 destruction of the Palestinians' traditional villages erased not only their houses and orchards, but also their history and heritage.

On the newly-created *tabula rasa*, the infrastructure of a new Jewish state was built, underpinning a new historiography that served Zionist needs and the Zionist credo. A few Arab/Palestinian monuments have been integrated into the Israeli discourse, presented as romantic elements of the landscape, or remnants of a past, which, so long as it is inscribed within an Israeli-oriented version of history,[6] is no longer felt to be politically significant or threatening. Susan Slyomovics has observed how the many ruins that dot the landscape in Israel do not suggest long-lasting occupancy, but are considered rather as anonymous creations from the past.[7] The complete rejection of the Arab presence and of its intimate connection to the land characterized the first years of the State of Israel; since, the situation has slowly evolved. As the Israeli 'layer' has become sufficiently strong and self-evident, new attention to the ruins of the past and to the remaining Palestinian villages has begun to surface within Israeli society. The overall approach to Palestinian heritage has shifted from a position of absolute denial in the first years to a recent move to consider it as a tourist attraction, commoditized as an economic resource.[8] Nevertheless, the surviving Palestinian heritage within Israeli cities, villages and kibbutzim is still threatened and at the administrative level the Israeli attitude has not changed: the Palestinian built heritage in Israel remains neglected and under threat. Palestinian attempts to restore this heritage, such as the restoration and conservation projects carried out by the al-Aqsa Association for the Restoration of Muslim Holy Sites in Israel (which is affiliated to the Israeli Islamic movement) are still perceived as dangerous political moves.[9]

The 'restoration' of Safed

The old city of Safed in northern Galilee is renowned for its fortunate climate and fresh summers. Safed's relatively isolated position – far from the country's main urban centres concentrated along the Mediterranean coast – has not been enough to preserve its rich heritage. The terror campaign Hagana carried out in Safed and its environs in 1948 resulted in the expulsion of the city's entire Arab population, numbering in excess of 12,000. The physical destruction of large portions of the city to deter returning refugees accompanied this dramatic social change and today there are 26,000 Israeli Jews in Safed but not a single Arab

resident. Alongside the physical erasure, as was often the case in Israel, a parallel process was pursued to remove altogether any memory of the Arab presence in the city. The new official history of the city, based on a selective reading of sources focusing exclusively on the Jewish settlement, tells the story of the 'capital' of 'mystical Judaism'. Safed is portrayed as the centre of *kabbala* studies, as, jointly with Jerusalem, the spiritual heartland for the Jews of the Holy Land in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while its existence as a Mamluk and Ottoman city inhabited mainly by Palestinian Arabs is not acknowledged. Safed did play an important role in the development of the Jewish *kabbala* and some of its ancient buildings are witness to this phase, but the official Zionist version of history consciously ignores the city's multi-religious past and its famous Jewish kabbalists' connection with their sufi Muslim neighbours with whom they shared the city. Israel's policy for the city has consciously denied the presence of all Arab or Islamic remains and overstressed the importance of its Jewish heritage.

Even before 1967 Safed was turned into a centre for the Israeli tourist industry, with hotels and tourist facilities built in the old city. No comprehensive restoration plan was ever developed and the traditional vernacular architecture of the old city has been predominantly 'restored' by new residents without any specific knowledge of or attention to its architectural value. Buildings have been renewed in an extremely rough and uncaring manner, without attention to choice of building materials or the preservation of monuments. Even the interior of one of the oldest synagogues – its stone façade is probably the most interesting architectural feature of Safed's Jewish quarter – is now seriously disrupted by the violent colours covering its columns and vaults. Moreover, the walls of the city's vernacular houses have been repointed with large cement joints, which disfigure their stone walls, and new colourful doors painted in blue or green, much like a Greek Mediterranean village, incongruously dot the rehabilitated houses. The result of this unplanned campaign is that the entire neighbourhood, including its Jewish residents' overt craving for spirituality and mysticism, has acquired a fake touch. Nothing seems to remain of the atmosphere of the ancient city in which generations of Jewish thinkers and rabbis lived. The whole operation is in fact anti-historical – the largest part of Safed's Jewish community moved to Jerusalem after the 1837 earthquake – and is geared more towards the political will to affirm an important historic

phase of the Jewish presence in Palestine, to justify contemporary claims of ownership, than towards any aesthetic or historic concerns.

In the 1960s the city's surviving Arab quarters were turned into an artists' colony that has now lost most of its painters;[10] the central Ottoman-era mosque has become an art gallery, while a black and white Mamluk-era mosque[11] lies abandoned and neglected, as does the beautiful nearby Mamluk *khan*. Indeed, even though briefly mentioned in Western tourist guides, the few surviving Islamic monuments are not even marked on the maps of the city distributed by the local tourist information desk (often reproduced within international tourist guidebooks)[12] and thus are difficult to identify and reach.[13] The political distortion of the city's history and the denial of Safed's Arab heritage appear grotesque when these monuments are compared with the actual insignificance of the 'restored' part of the city.

Compared with Jerusalem's Jewish quarter, Safed's old city looks unimpressive and poor. No specific attention has been paid to its architectural heritage and little money has been spent on the restoration of the area. Therefore, even though the similarities with the Old City of Jerusalem from the ideological perspective are striking – complete ethnic cleansing and the 'invention' of a mythical approach to the site as the centre of 'mystic Judaism' – the overall result is almost incomparable. The political/ideological plan behind this attempted revitalization was drawn in an early phase in the life of the State of Israel, within a strong ideological context, but in a country that was still relatively poor and yet to experience its modern economic development. In all probability, Safed was the forebear for the Jerusalem project, but the entire revitalization of the city now appears out of date. Unlike Jerusalem, after an initial phase of development Safed's old city became frozen and 'dead', scarcely inhabited and out of touch with the concepts along which tourism in Israel has developed since the 1980s.

The new 'old city' of Jaffa

Jaffa's origins lie in remote antiquity. Its modern history began with Napoleon's invasion in 1799[14] but from its foundation the city developed around its natural harbour, for centuries the most important along the Palestinian coastline. In the nineteenth century the city became the region's largest and most important urban centre. Though the small harbour could not accommodate large modern boats, Jaffa continued as

the gateway to the Mediterranean (until the larger Haifa port was built) and through it went the millions of famous Jaffa oranges that invaded the markets of Europe. Around the citrus and growing tourism industries (Jaffa was the closest port to Jerusalem and almost all pilgrims passed through it) grew a city that numbered 100,000 inhabitants before 1948. It was Palestine's economic and political hub and most modern city, and it was at the heart of the struggle between the two competing national movements. With a large Jewish community in Jaffa, there were tensions between the communities throughout the early twentieth century and rebellions against British domination during the Mandate period. During the 1936 rebellion, armed rebels used Jaffa's old city as a hideout, seeking protection in its narrow passages. The British response was particularly violent, for they dynamited the city centre, creating a link between the harbour and the Clock Square for the passage of military vehicles.[15] The destruction of a large part of the Old City was carried out 'to punish residents and clear out wide new roads through the densely built medina, which could more easily be patrolled by British troops', but was justified as a town planning project and an urban improvement.[16]

Under the 1947 UN partition plan, Jaffa was meant to be included in the territory of the Arab state, but Jewish troops conquered the city on 13 May 1948 and all but 3500 of its 70,000 Arab inhabitants were forced to leave. After the creation of the State of Israel, it officially became part of the municipality of Tel Aviv–Yafo when Tel Aviv annexed it on 24 April 1950. Following the 1948 war *Minhal*, the Israel land authority, took possession of most of Jaffa's land and *Amidar*, the public sector housing agency, took over most of the Palestinian refugees' houses. In the ensuing period the city's urban fabric decayed dramatically. In a first phase, the emptied houses were used to host newly arrived Jewish immigrants, but since the early 1960s most have instead been moved on to newly-built housing estates. Beginning in this period:

> The *Minhal* and *Amidar*, with the support of the Municipality, commenced an unofficial, but effective, destruction policy. Over 1000 buildings in Adjami and Givat Alia were pulled down. This has resulted in a direct confrontation between local Arab residents and the Israeli authorities. *Minhal* and *Amidar* refused Arab claims for tenancy, and in order to avoid having them moving into these houses, they have simply pulled them down.[17]

The demolitions were justified as slum clearance and as a normal part of urban planning policy. However, as Yuval Portugali notes, they were linked to the housing demolition policy Israel carried out after the 1967 war and should undoubtedly be seen as part of a national plan to prevent the return of the Palestinian owners and resident population and not as part of local urban planning policy.[18] At a symbolic level, the renaming of streets with the Hebrew names of fairly well-known Jewish personalities further advanced the erasure of the city's Arab identity.[19] Meanwhile, Tel Aviv municipality began to implement another semi-official plan known as *Midron Yafo* (Jaffa Slope), which aimed to extend the land area by filling in part of the sea with rubbish and debris from Tel Aviv. Buildings along the seashore, which often included prestigious modern Arab mansions, were pulled down and the area made available to developers. While the old city was 'restored' in accordance with Israeli guidelines and transformed into a cold and artificial artists' colony, other neighbourhoods were left to an accelerated decay. Jaffa, particularly the Ajami neighbourhood, was 'reconquered' in the 1970s by Palestinians who settled in the area and ousted most of its Jewish residents.[20]

The new residents – generally not the original inhabitants of Jaffa, but 'Israeli Arabs' or 'illegal' workers from the West Bank and Gaza attracted by the Tel Aviv job market – developed a strong political/national consciousness. Although the neighbourhood became renowned for its drug addicts and severe social problems, community organizations were set up to protect Palestinian land and planning interests. In the 1980s, the Israeli municipality stopped implementing the *Midron Yafo* project and, in 1987, even included Ajami in the neighbourhood rehabilitation programme known as 'Project Renewal', which the Jewish Agency sponsored.[21] Unfortunately, however, more than ten years later, the neighbourhood still looks quite neglected and many Jaffa residents perceive the decision to rehabilitate the area as aimed at turning them into an attraction for Jews.[22] Social tensions in Jaffa (the literature focuses mainly on the neighbourhood of Ajami immediately south of the old city but the data can safely be extrapolated to Jaffa as a whole) have risen dramatically and the area has become infamous for its high crime rate and for the political extremism of some of its residents who, during the First Intifada attacked and killed their Jewish neighbours. The resettlement of Palestinian collaborators in the city following the Oslo agreements, and the growing presence and role of Israeli developers have further exacerbated the tension.

Large elite residential estates were built in Jaffa during the 1990s, not only on state land (Palestinian land confiscated by Israel after 1948) but also on some central plots sold by some of the many Jaffa churches.[23] Developers' interest has focused on the port area and the hill nearby, offering spectacular views of the Mediterranean. The speculative investments in the area of Ajami have created a new and complex social environment in which very poor (Arabs) and very rich (Jews) live in close proximity, though obviously completely separated. Indeed, many new extremely expensive buildings designed to evoke 'oriental charm' and bearing evocative names like 'Andromeda Hill' or 'Ancient Jaffa Manor', have sprouted up in the city. The modern apartments in these buildings are often sold for more than US$ 350,000, yet are in one of the most depressed neighbourhoods in the entire Tel Aviv–Jaffa area.

However, what lies behind this phenomenon is more dramatic and complex than just another example of urban gentrification. The owners of most of the land and houses in Ajami, and in Jaffa, are 'absentee' landlords; most of the residents forced to move for 'natural' market-related economic reasons were protected tenants who for years had been denied the right to purchase their share of the properties from the state-controlled bodies in charge. Now, with most of the 'state land' being sold off to private investors, a new phase in the continuing struggle for the possession of the land in Jaffa (and in Israel as a whole) has begun to emerge, a phase in which private developers are called upon to play an increasing role in planning. According to Mark LeVine:

> What is new in this equation is the increasingly prominent role of private interests in planning and development in Israel, and in Jaffa in particular, and how this development is shifting the internal boundaries within the land and planning system while maintaining the traditional focus on permanent Jewish ownership of as much land as possible. … Fuelled by the larger discursive, even epistemological, shift towards privatization in Israeli society, the strategic shift towards privatization in city planning has led to a situation in which planners chart a course of development, focused on middle and upper class Israelis and implemented through private developers, that pits Jews against their Palestinian co-citizen.[24]

As further proof of the contiguity between the public and private sectors and their joint role in the area's development, we might bear in mind that some highly symbolic new public spaces, like the new Architects Association building or the planned seat of the Peres Centre for Peace, designed by Italian architect Massimiliano Fuksas, are, or will be, located in Ajami. For this research, Jaffa provides a unique opportunity to analyse the relationship between Israel and its Arab/Palestinian heritage, for its proximity to Tel Aviv has made it extremely attractive for large-scale property developments, while the presence of a large and increasingly politically-conscious Palestinian community has exacerbated the political dimension of urban economic dynamics.

The 'restoration' of Jaffa started in the early 1960s with the creation of an artists' colony in the old city, in the 'restored'[25] houses of which only 'artists' and their families were allowed to reside. The result was the creation of a tourist pole with expensive cafés and art galleries, designed for both foreign tourists and Tel Avivians, which completely erased the original character of the urban space. This first phase of Jaffa tourist development was based on the traditional Israeli approach, which refused to acknowledge the existence of an Arab presence or heritage in the city. Efforts were therefore made to celebrate the Jewish and Zionist presence in Jaffa and to remove any traces of the city's Arab past from municipal brochures and from the historical accounts contained in the city's museums.[26] Nevertheless, the location of the city, now but a suburb of the most attractive and economically prosperous Israeli city, and its notoriety as the centre of Tel Aviv's underworld, meant that only a small portion of the city would undergo recuperation, for the remaining parts, particularly the Ajami neighbourhood, would develop along distinctly different lines. The 'classical' pattern in this case proved incapable of counteracting the continuously growing Palestinian presence in the city.

The Israeli planners needed to address Jaffa's 'Arabness' and subtly integrate it into a new, modernized Zionist discourse. The parallel development of postmodern theory and sensitivity on the one hand, and of the new alliance between private capital and land authorities on the other, has led to a new policy: the 'use' of Arab heritage as a plus factor in the reconstruction of a sanitized, ancient environment that would sound attractive to rich Tel Avivians and foreign Jews ready to invest in the country. Arches, cobbled streets, picturesque views, even a skyline of churches and mosques have all turned into marketable commodities

(once their original, real and lively Palestinian dimension has been sanitized). 'As "picturesque" has become the architectural fashion, the Government realized that old dilapidated Arab neighbourhoods have an "oriental potential".[27] The passage from one approach to the other has not always been smooth, and within the Israeli Jewish community many voices have openly opposed the trend, though rarely out of concern for Jaffa's Palestinian residents.

The polemics surrounding the planned transformation of Jaffa port can be seen as an expression of resistance from those with more traditional perceptions about the function and nature of the Arab heritage in the country. Tel Aviv municipality has drawn up a plan to redevelop the entire port area as a tourist and recreation site and has earmarked some of its warehouses for demolition. As in most urban speculative developments, the first step taken by the municipality has been the forced 'decay' of the port through neglect and petty 'legal' devices.[28] Though Palestinian residents and dockworkers have generally been unable to counteract the official plans, the municipality's actions have touched on the sensibilities of bodies like the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel that still regard heritage as being intimately connected with the Zionist strategy that produced the 'restored' old city.

As a member of the society and Jaffa resident explained, tourists look not for five-star hotels but for the 'authentic Mediterranean Sea fisherman, complete with tattoos, repairing his nets on the dock. The Orientalism, the charm of working-class people, [this] is the definition of tourism'. Thus, according to this approach, the plan should be substituted with a different one that 'develop[s] the area in a way that preserves the port's character'.[29] I will avoid discussing the issue of 'orientalism' and its impact on the 'preservation of the original character of the port', and leave aside the fact that most of the 'authentic Mediterranean fishermen' are actually recent Jewish immigrants; what I want to underline instead is the idea of urban preservation the society supports and how it differs from contemporary trends. At another level, the architectural language of the planned buildings – its cheap, promotional-type postmodern style[30] – has stirred opposition among some of Israel's leading architects who have sharply criticized the design of the new buildings. In this case too the opposition is not only to bad taste and 'historical' architectural features that never existed, but also to the new power of the private market and its threat to traditional patterns of state control over land, heritage and urban development.

Jaffa's old city restoration plan provided a role model for the Jewish Quarter reconstruction, for it was in Jaffa that Israeli architects had to confront the 'local' vernacular architecture for the first time. However, the scale and complexity of the Jerusalem project forced it along its own path and in the end there has been relatively little similarity between the two projects. Technically, the different quality of the stone (limestone in Jerusalem, sandstone in Jaffa) has necessitated different solutions, while the different geographical position of the two sites, and the very nature of the proposed settlements (artists' colony in one case, living mixed neighbourhood in the other) have imposed radically different choices on the planners. Similarly, the 'second phase' of the Jaffa development did not happen in Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter, where symbolic and religious functions took priority over both tourists' needs and private developers' plans. Indeed, the pointed political significance of the Jewish Quarter suggests that the privatization process that took place in Jaffa is unlikely to be repeated in this neighbourhood where the state will continue to have the final say. The comparison with Jaffa, however, opens up interesting perspectives for the analysis of Jerusalem if the focus were to be shifted from the Jewish Quarter to the development plan for nearby Mamilla, where the similarities between David's Village and the Andromeda Hill project are striking.

Tourism, heritage and demography: the case of Acre's old city

To the million visitors who come to the old city of Acre each year,[31] the town is simply a beautiful tourist destination. Few among them are aware of the ideological battle that was fought over the tourist exploitation of the city following the creation of the State of Israel. Today Acre, a city still inhabited by Palestinians and marching to bygone rhythms and rules, seems to have stood aside while the rest of the country was being completely transformed. However, when the veil of its apparent 'normality', which in itself is unusual in Israel, is removed, the complexity of the issue becomes evident. Acre is the only historic Arab city in Israel that managed to keep a significant part of its population and to develop (or survive) in a partially autonomous and independent manner. Unlike Safed or Jaffa, Acre never became an artificial, empty shell hosting artists' colonies, or a 'ghost town' like the old city of Ramle. How did the State of Israel approach the city from 1948 onwards? How did its stance evolve, and what specific strategies and plans were drawn up (or sometimes implemented) for Acre's old town?

Up to 1948, Acre was an Arab city with a population of about 15,000. During the 1948 war most of the Arabs left the country. Only about 3500 remained in the city and of these, less than half were long-term inhabitants; the rest moved into the city during the disturbances of the war, mostly from Haifa and the surrounding villages. The Israeli Army, after taking the city, concentrated all the remaining Arabs in the old town.[32]

During its first years the State of Israel settled thousands of new immigrants in Acre; the city grew considerably (from 4000 inhabitants after the 1948 war to about 40,000 in the 1970s) becoming just another Israeli 'development town',[33] but it never acquired a central role in the Israeli planning system, which considered Acre a second rank town.[34] At the beginning of the 1960s, politicians began to recognize the city's extraordinary tourist potential at both local and national levels.[35] In 1962, Alex Kesten carried out the first scientific study, which identified the still existing structure of a Crusaders' city beneath the existing Ottoman one.[36] Because of the general political situation, however, no practical steps were taken in the ensuing years. In the early 1970s, a plan to relocate part of its Arab population began to be discussed at municipal and national levels.[37] The plan called for the Israeli authorities to build a new urban/rural settlement for the Palestinian residents of the old city just outside the city boundaries. The transparent rationale for this plan was to reduce the overall Arab population of Acre, and to empty parts of the old town that could then be developed along familiar lines. The plan was partially implemented and about 250 families (out of about 1000 living in the old city) were 'relocated' in the village of Maqar. According to the Palestinian Israeli planner Rasem Khamaisi, the plan was not implemented as expected and some families began to return to Acre in the early 1990s.[38]

The Old City of Acre Development Company was created to manage the transformation of the old city into a tourist destination. A traditional strategy favouring the forced decay of the old buildings – paving the way for the moral deterioration of the Arab residents – was then implemented. This policy, which consisted of avoiding renovating and maintaining the apartments, proved particularly effective, for most of the houses in the old city belonged to *Amidar*.[39] On the symbolic level the connections of the city with Zionist history were underlined and the Crusaders' heritage

privileged over the more recent Ottoman remains.[40] However, tourism development remained just one of the priorities, alongside the reinforcement of the Jewish character of the city. Indeed, fears over the 'excessive nationalist attitudes' of the 'Arab' residents of the old town were commonly expressed in the media. The Israeli authorities, worried by the stronger nationalist appeal of a local community enriched by tourist development, did not launch any large-scale tourism programme in the city, a policy that remained in place through the First Intifada years. Instead, social and economic conditions worsened and the old city turned into a drug market and underworld area that was unsafe at night. The population decreased before stabilizing at around 5000. In 1993, Alex Kesten carried out a revised version of the earlier study. In his proposals to develop tourism, the traditional approach predominated, and the final recommendations for the development of the city proposed 'a *systematic clearing and cleaning operation*, the removal of refuse, and the opening up of parts of sites, that are now closed off'.[41]

However, almost nothing occurred for several years and, significantly, in 1996 Acre's old city still had no tourist information desk.[42] Finally, in 1996, an Israeli architectural team directed by Arieh Rahamimoff prepared a new comprehensive plan to develop tourism in the old city. This plan, produced in the new political climate of the Oslo agreements, tackled the whole area in a relatively new manner. For the first time the needs of the remaining residents were taken into account and a Palestinian Israeli social scientist helped define the plan. The active involvement of the Israeli Antiquities Authority was sought to prepare technical guidelines for all new constructions and additions in the old city.[43]

The most recent episode in Acre's conservation planning saga was the listing of the city on the UNESCO World Heritage List – jointly with Masada – at the twenty-fifth World Heritage Convention in December 2001. Significantly, on this occasion 'the Committee recommended that the State Party incorporate into its management plan a coherent policy for the improvement of the economic and social condition of local residents of the old city of Acre and to ensure that it remains a living city,'[44] and the same Israeli observer stated that 'the inscription of the site recognizes the heritage of the people of this multicultural centre, representing the entire region.'[45]

The Old City of Acre constituted a challenge to the Zionist approach

to history and heritage, and a particularly difficult subject for Israeli planners and politicians. From 1948 to 1996, the State of Israel was unable to produce a coherent strategy for confronting these challenges. How to develop Acre's tourism and in the meantime not recognize its Arab character? How to remove its residents while keeping its 'oriental' charm?[46] How to invest in a peripheral site that never stood on the first rank of the national planning priorities and, even more difficult, how to justify the need to invest state money in Arab citizens? Finally, how to market the city to the world without giving it a Palestinian national significance? All these questions were too difficult for the state to tackle in its early development and for decades the old town of Acre, notwithstanding its tourist potential, remained an undeveloped backwater. The situation changed with the approval of the 1996 plan that appeared to formulate an effective, modern, politically neutral and purely technical answer to most of these questions. However, the experience of Jaffa – discussed above – and some worrying details challenge this assumption. Though, undoubtedly, the UNESCO listing and international recognition of the universal significance of the city's heritage may be considered as a measure of protection for the residents' rights, conflicting signals suggest that a new tactic for the dispossession of the Arab residents is now under way. Indeed, the creation of a positive economic dynamic will inevitably generate profound changes in the old city. As an Israeli Antiquities Authority official lucidly pointed out:

> The real question is, if Acre is restored, even just at an acceptable technical level, will the population change? According to my opinion, definitely, it will. Then, what will you do about the emptied old houses and the 'infill' that will be added? Would they [the Arab residents] be able to buy them? And would they be allowed to do so? What will be done about the criminal elements? Would you remove them along with their families? Could the contrast between the rich and the poor living nearby last for long? If you want my opinion, I really don't think so.
>
> We [the Israel Antiquities Authority] want to leave the existing population. And the residents are beginning to cooperate with us because they trust us, but the real issue is that about 90 per cent of the houses belong to *Amidar*.[47]

Though Acre's peripheral position and distance from the economic and political heart of the country partially invalidates the direct comparison with Jaffa, the risk of a market-led gentrification/ethnic cleansing of the area is still high. Eventually, even in Acre, what has not been possible for a traditional Zionist-oriented approach might be achieved by means of controlled economic dynamics – a technique that may appear more moral and less ideological, but with a no less dramatic impact on the residents' fate.

A comparison between Acre and Jerusalem is possible at many levels: political, administrative, technical and symbolic. However, the complete expulsion of the residents that paved the way for the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter has not taken place in Acre. A first possible explanation for this difference may be found in the differing legal statuses of the two communities: Jerusalem residents were not (and still are not) Israeli citizens and, therefore, were less protected by Israeli laws than Acre's inhabitants. Another consideration is that the Old City had been conquered in the 1967 war and the postwar euphoria gave the planners complete 'freedom'. Conversely, having failed to complete the expulsion of Acre's residents in 1948, it would have been much harder for the Israeli government to remove them in the 1960s without offering new residential quarters elsewhere in the new city (an option that would have created a precedent the state was unwilling to endorse). Finally, a third important consideration in explaining the different treatment applied to the two cities concerns the symbolic value attributed to the two historic cores: one meant to represent the heart of the Jewish people, the other traditionally constituting the 'least Jewish' city in Mandate Palestine.[48]

At another level, a different kind of parallel might be drawn between Jerusalem and Acre: both cities play an important symbolic and emotional role for Palestinians – whether in Israel or in the Occupied Territories (including PNA areas). Though missing the symbolic and religious dimension of *Al Quds*, Acre represents for many Palestinians an important element of 'their' geographic representation of the land that, in turn, makes it the most attractive Palestinian tourism destination in the region.[49] Palestinians show a huge attachment to the site, perceived – wrongly – as an unchanged Palestinian city that can reconnect them symbolically to the pre-1948 situation. Similarly, and probably for the same reasons, the number of Palestinians from within Israel visiting Acre as tourists is also conspicuous, though no official statistics are available.

Because the 'official' language in the old city is Arabic and the Israeli military presence is not very visible, Palestinian visitors feel safe, which strengthens their identification with the city. Acre's multi-religious heritage (Christian, Muslim and even Bahai Palestinians live in the city) is generally not consciously acknowledged, but this additional element could constitute yet another reason for this self reappropriation of the site and it turning into a Palestinian national tourist destination. Israeli counter moves to resist this 'Palestinization' of the city are to be expected, for it is unlikely that in the present political situation the State of Israel might encourage and accept the transformation of old Acre into a binational tourist pole. Israeli planned development focuses exclusively on Israeli (meaning Israeli Jews) and foreign visitors and highlights their common 'European' history, which dates back to the Crusades,[50] more than the city's Ottoman heritage. In the long term, it appears that Acre's old city could offer creative politicians, planners and conservationists an extraordinary opportunity to develop a new strategy, inclusive not only of the different heritages of the city, but even of the different communities that continue to share the same land.[51]

Urban conservation in Israel
A comparison between the plan for Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter and the projects that were developed in other historic cities in Israel shows similarities and differences. Though undoubtedly no other plan ever received the same governmental attention or acquired the symbolic status of that of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter, all the examples portrayed in this section have many features in common. Indeed, with the notable exception of the recent conservation plan for Acre's old city, all the Israeli projects have been carried out without any preliminary scientific or technical investigations into the causes of the decay in the architectural fabric and none have attempted to tackle social issues. This last element actually differentiates the Israeli experience from similar plans made elsewhere. Social and housing policies are normally given high priority in urban conservation plans, yet the Israelis based their policy on gentrification and/or ethnic cleansing and favoured tourists and non-residents over the people living in the decayed urban centres. This Israeli specificity is intimately related to the overall policy the state implemented when dealing with its internal Arab minority. In the Israeli context it would be unthinkable to put state money and effort into

promoting the well being of the Palestinian residents of the country's Arab cities.

As mentioned above, the Jerusalem plan was able to integrate three diverse aspects – the symbolic, economic and tourist. While these three elements are present in all three case studies, each is actually dominated by one or other aspect and a synthesis of these diverse components is not sought within the revitalization plans. Jerusalem, on the other hand, has been able to profit from its symbolic appeal, from speculative property deals and from tourism and each has played an important role in the overall plan. Although this multiplicity has probably made the Jewish Quarter plan more difficult to control, it has also made it more capable of developing autonomously, and of surviving and adapting to the continuously evolving political situation, while retaining most of its attractions and its centrality within the Israeli consciousness.

Urban conservation in Palestinian National Authority (PNA) cities[52]

Because the cities now under Palestinian control share many physical and architectural features with the Israeli cities discussed above, comparative attention should be given to the PNA's conservation policies even although the temporal frame of these plans does not coincide with the Jewish Quarter reconstruction. What makes Hebron, Nablus or Bethlehem different from Safed, Acre and Jaffa is in fact their recent history more than their built heritage. Had the outcome of twentieth-century history been different, it is likely that their city cores would have faced many of the same threats and been subjected to similar urban conservation plans. In other words, politics has been the key element in influencing the preservation and restoration of the cities of Mandate Palestine. The brief presentation of an alternative ideological framework and its impact on safeguarding and validating these cities reflects the essential role of ideology in the definition and conservation of urban built heritage.

The approach the PNA adopted between 1996 and 2000 towards Bethlehem, Hebron and Jerusalem, was developed along very different lines from that of the Israelis towards Acre, Jaffa and Safed or the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. Palestinian heritage policy focuses on international support, popular participation and political resistance. It constitutes both a political strategy meant to counteract Israel's handling of the past and a conscious attempt to reappropriate history in order to build a completely different narrative on the very same remains.

Brief geographical–historical introduction

In this section we briefly consider PNA heritage policy in the period between 1993 and 2000. For simplicity and clarity, only the cities of the West Bank will be examined and PNA-administrated cities will be referred to as Palestinian ones. This area, administered by Jordan between 1948 and 1967 and occupied by Israel since June 1967, contains a number of urban centres and extraordinary vestiges of the land's thousand-year-old history. Its main urban centres were socially and architecturally similar to the Arab cities incorporated into Israel in 1948, but their different political fates in Arab–Israeli wars has strongly influenced their recent evolution and, notably, the treatment of their originally comparable built heritage.

In the period between 1948 and 1967 the Jordanian administration prepared and implemented urban plans that greatly affected Palestinian historic centres. In an attempt to enhance the main monuments by selectively demolishing the surrounding buildings, whole blocks of ancient houses were torn down in front of the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and in front of the Nativity church in Bethlehem. The logic behind these plans was to give added value to the sites (among the most important religious/historic monuments in the region) by isolating the monuments from their urban context. This approach, which bears a resemblance to European planning in the nineteenth century and is believed to have come from British planners working in the Jordanian administration,[53] has not yet been scientifically analysed. Though apparently similar to the Israeli approach, notably the destruction of the Moroccan quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, the residents did not feel that these acts threatened the country's Arab identity and never stirred popular opposition in the West Bank. The demolitions in the centre of Bethlehem, however, also obscured a political/ideological design. In the past, the small city of Bethlehem (along with its neighbouring villages of Beit Sahour, Beit Jala and the Jerusalem area) had been the heart of the Christian presence in the region. Following the 1948 exodus of Palestinians from the areas that became Israel, thousands of mainly Muslim refugees settled in the region and thus altered the confessional balance.[54] As there was no mosque in Bethlehem, the Jordanians decided to build a monumental one in front of the Nativity church, on a large square opened up by demolishing part of the ancient urban fabric. Since the mosque was undoubtedly designed to play the visual and political role of

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an alternative focus to the Nativity church, the symbolic significance of the act is evident. The ideological dimension of the plan (and of the demolitions carried out to create Manger Square) was emphasized by constructing a new city hall and central police station[55] with façades opening onto the same square. This urban plan, therefore, shows an attempt under Jordanian rule to transform the political and religious character of the city. The sudden ending of the period of Jordanian rule over the West Bank following the Six-Day War in June 1967 probably put an end to other similar plans to 'improve' the Palestinian monuments.

For the next 30 years of Israeli military occupation, the economic and urban development of the Palestinian cities was completely obstructed. Paradoxically, however, the forced absence of development, which the Israelis imposed in the region, has protected the urban heritage of these cities from rapid and dramatic confrontations with modernity. The Israeli occupation administration has used planning as a key tool in shaping the West Bank according to its design.[56] Following 1967, a series of regional master plans profoundly altered Palestine's physical and human landscape. Region-wide Israeli settlement policies have been detailed in many studies on patterns of land ownership and expropriation. However, the effect of Israeli occupation policy on the urban fabric of West Bank cities, particularly their relation with the built heritage, has not yet been thoroughly researched. During the 30 years of Israeli military occupation, the conservation of ancient Palestinian cities and villages was not given priority, apart from specific cases, as in the old cities of Jerusalem and Hebron, in which the attested pre-1948 presence of Jewish communities was used as a pretext to develop urban settlements in the middle of Palestinian urban centres.

Israeli town and country planning policies were implemented all over the West Bank, against the interests and wishes of its Palestinian inhabitants, for the exclusive benefit of the occupiers and settlers who took control of a large part of the region. The Israeli approach to the West Bank did not include a conscious policy on traditional Palestinian urban heritage, the evident stagnation and decay of which was mainly a by-product of the general policy the occupation army applied to the West Bank, a policy concisely summarized by the words of Yitzhak Rabin: 'There will be no development [in the Occupied territories] initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture and industry [there], which may compete with the State

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of Israel.'[57] According to a study by a Palestinian architect and researcher, however, it was not only the absence of development policies that limited the economic growth of the West Bank economy and of its cities:

> The study found no officially declared or published development policies for the territories. … [C]areful examination of the Israeli Military Orders provides a more interesting explanation, as it becomes evident that it was not the policies, which the Israeli Administration failed to plan and implement, but rather *the policies it carefully planned and strictly implemented which had effectively obstructed development.*[58]

The situation drastically changed with the arrival of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which between 1993 and 1996 gradually assumed control of all the urban areas of the West Bank. Indeed, even though according to the Oslo agreements most of the West Bank land remained in Israeli hands,[59] the large majority of its residents and urban centres fell under Palestinian administrative control. The Oslo agreements therefore provoked a profound transformation of the urban scene. The funds that were poured into the autonomous areas (from Palestinian returnees, international cooperation, the World Bank, the European Union and private Arab investment banks) created the dynamics for rapid and uncontrolled urban growth. The new political situation generated a complex and contradictory situation.

On the one hand, the often chaotic development of cities since the PNA's arrival threatens the traditional cityscapes of Palestinian towns. High land and property prices, coupled with the difficulties faced in revitalizing the West Bank economy, have provoked a veritable construction fever and its perverse effects are visible all over the autonomous Palestinian territories. The reduced size of the PNA-controlled area[60] has considerably increased the price of land and thus encouraged a speculative property market, which has affected the Palestinian urban heritage. Hundreds of traditional houses have been demolished to make way for high-rise modern buildings, dramatically blighting the cityscape of the major urban centres. This is particularly true of the city of Ramallah, which has played the role of administrative capital. These uncontrolled private developments became possible through the absence of a legal system to protect the landscape and urban

heritage, for the PNA, anxious not to oppose any form of private investment that might boost its poor economic position, has never voted in a law for the protection of heritage.

On the other hand, however, since its inception the PNA has stressed the importance of Palestinian heritage as a specific national resource and unifying force for the Palestinian nation, so launched a number of conservation plans and restoration projects in the main urban centres of the West Bank.[61] The function of these plans is both symbolic and economic, for the driving force behind most of them has been the desire to develop tourism, perceived and described as Palestine's only 'natural resource'. Incidentally, it must also be noted that attempts to develop the tourism sector have received positive responses from the international donor community, which has financially supported joint Palestinian–Israeli tourism programmes in the hope that they might foster a 'culture of peace' between the two communities. Urban conservation plans, of different scope and importance, have been implemented in the old cities of Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus and, under even more difficult conditions, in the heart of Jerusalem's Old City. They bear testimony to the attention the PNA has paid to heritage and jointly constitute a Palestinian heritage revival. They are briefly presented below.

Hebron: revitalization under curfew

The city of Hebron is one of Palestine's most important urban centres and its history and heritage are intimately associated with the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The most outstanding and imposing monument in the city is the religious complex known as the Ibrahimi Mosque, which contains the Cave of the Patriarchs, the external wall of which is still mainly composed of the blocks of an imposing Herodian structure. It encloses an inner space (many times rebuilt since its initial construction), which in its time has been a Byzantine church, a mosque, a Crusader church and again a mosque under the Mamluks. Around this core, the urban fabric of the old city of Hebron has developed over the centuries. The old city is composed of a maze of stone buildings (some from the Crusader and Mamluk periods, but many from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) built close to one another to form an extremely dense urban fabric. Hebron has no city walls, but the houses form a complete enclosure and access to the city is possible only through five gates.

Although the old city and its traditional houses were partly abandoned in the 1950s, the city core decayed further during the years of Israeli occupation when most of its inhabitants moved out to new suburbs to secure better housing and to escape the dramatic confrontations with the Jewish settlers who took over part of the old city.[62] The Jewish presence in Hebron dates back to antiquity and Judaism considered it one of the four Holy Cities, along with Jerusalem, Safed and Tiberias. For centuries, coexistence was largely peaceful, though the Muslim rulers imposed a number of limitations on the Jewish inhabitants (who were forbidden to enter the Cave of the Patriarchs, but forced to pray from outside its walls). During the nineteenth century, with the development of Zionist immigration, the situation worsened and in 1929, following the events at the Wailing Wall, there was a major attack on the city's Jewish community. Some 67 Jewish residents were murdered, including women and children, and the remaining part of the community fled the city.

After the victory in the June 1967 war, Israel occupied the city and established a large settlement (Kyriat Arba) on the outskirts of the city, and a smaller one in part of what had been the Jewish quarter right in the heart of the old city. These settlements, led by ardent hardliners among the leadership of the settler movement, produced a pattern of continuous tension and violence in the city. The most dramatic incident caused by their presence has been the massacre, which Baruch Goldstein perpetuated, of 29 Palestinians who were praying in the Ibrahimi Mosque.[63] Following the massacre the Israeli occupation army tightened its grip on the lives of the more than 100,000 Palestinian residents of the city. After the signing of the Oslo accords, and the agreements concerning the city of Hebron on 17 January 1997, part of the city passed into Palestinian hands, though much of the old city remained under Israeli military control.

It was against this particularly dramatic and conflict-laden political background that the Palestinians launched a plan for the rehabilitation of the old city. The Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (hereafter HRC) was officially established on 24 August 1996 by the president of the PNA Yasser Arafat, under the direction of Ali al Qawasmeh, the then PNA minister of transport. The HRC established an engineering office, to act as a town-planning department, and Dr Khaled Qawasmeh,[64] son of the late mayor of the city and member of one of the city's most important families, was appointed director of the project. The engineering office

employs a staff of 37 people, including a sociologist, a lawyer, three engineers, two architects and seven site supervisors in addition to the administrative department.[65] The HRC based its work on some preliminary research a group of architectural and engineering graduates from the Hebron Polytechnic had conducted since the 1980s.[66] The entire rehabilitation project was planned and carried out by local engineers with in-depth knowledge of the old city, with the support of external experts who established the technical specifications and helped define the most appropriate restoration techniques. In a first phase, these external experts were mainly Palestinians with specialist experience of conservation issues from abroad, but when the project started to take off, additional international advice was sought,[67] though, not surprisingly, no contact with Israeli experts was ever considered.[68]

Although the whole ancient core of the city had been mapped, the work was concentrated initially on specific areas that were considered to be under particular threat. In defining priorities,[69] both technical matters and political considerations were taken into account. With respect to the latter, because it was considered important to prevent any expansion of the settlements, the rehabilitation efforts were focused on the buildings surrounding the houses Jewish settlers had taken over. Indeed, the rationale behind repopulating the old city lay mainly in stopping Israeli settlers moving into new buildings. The Israeli occupying forces were well aware of the political objectives underlying the conservation plan and on many occasions tried to stop the work.[70]

The old city of Hebron, like that of Jerusalem, is composed mainly of houses built without plans that have grown organically to accommodate the needs of the family or clan. They usually have three or four levels and are organized around a central courtyard, which, over the centuries, had often been built up to create additional rooms. The houses used to host extended families with each nuclear family occupying one room, while the kitchen, bath, storage and work areas were shared. With the gradual transformation of the social fabric, many of these houses in the old city were abandoned and left to decay. However, because the property rights remain within clans it is now common for a single house to belong to tens of different people. The HRC has developed a formula for tackling this complex pattern of ownership and has been able to force the owners to go along with the rehabilitation project.[71]

The owners are the first in line for the housing, but if they are not

interested the apartments are rented out to people on a housing list. Because of the large demand for apartments, families applying for housing are subjected to a selection process. Political considerations play a part in choosing the tenants, mostly PNA policemen or low-level administrators and their families. Applicants are subjected to a security check to obviate the risk of them subletting to Jewish settlers. According to Khaled Qawasmeh, however, the idea is to achieve a more balanced social mix as soon as the political situation improves.[72]

The aim of the plan is to revitalize the old city through intensive repopulation. In the first stage of the work therefore all the effort is concentrated on housing, with the social infrastructure (clinics, schools, kindergartens and public spaces) being partially overlooked.[73] At the technical and architectural level, the work consists mainly of strengthening the structures and reorganizing the interiors of the houses so that they can be modernized. Kitchens and bathrooms are created and new internal divisions inserted to create modern apartments within the compounds. In general, because of the overall conservation approach and limited funds, very few changes have been made to the exterior façades or to the structure of the buildings. One of the most important aspects of the technical work carried out by the HRC has been the resurrection of traditional building techniques and the rediscovery of traditional construction materials: slaked lime has become the main binder used on the working sites and, for the first time in more than 30 years, stone cross-vaults have been rebuilt much like the original. The traditional building methods are not only aesthetically and culturally satisfactory, but also viable from the economic point of view.

Within a short time Hebron became the model for restoration work in Palestine and its methods have been widely discussed and adapted to other Palestinian cities such as Bethlehem and Jerusalem. The overall cost of the urban revitalization project over its first three years was seven million US dollars.[74] By 1999, 365 apartments and 56 shops had been restored and, prior to the outbreak of the Second Intifada, work had started on 132 other buildings.[75] The project contributed greatly to the development of the local economy by employing about 400 workers and by creating the conditions for starting new commercial activities in the old city. Thanks to the HRC work, the traditional pattern of emigration from the old city was reversed and by the end of 1998 more than 2000 people were living in the restored buildings of the old city. The HRC

gained international recognition in 1998 when it was granted the prestigious Aga Khan Award for Architecture.

As is evident from this brief summary, in the dramatic context of the ongoing confrontation with the settlers and Israeli army the Hebron project carried strong political overtones. From many points of view, therefore, the experience was comparable with the Jerusalem Jewish Quarter reconstruction and indeed many similarities between the two projects exist. Architecturally, the two old cities are similar, with similar levels of decay and neglect. Politically, both plans were very nationalistic and the bodies in charge of planning and executing the work were strongly backed by their respective political leaderships. And the two teams that drew up the plans and carried out the works were similarly committed to the endeavour and wholeheartedly invested all their energies in the success of the projects.

However, because the overall political situation is completely different there are essential differences between the two cases. The PNA never had full political or administrative control over the old city and Palestinian planners had to face the opposition of the Israeli occupying administration and the harassing presence of the settlers and Israeli soldiers. Besides, the plan was conceived for the original residents and owners of the houses, who were involved in the planning process. Furthermore, although the plan originated at the local level, national and international support was sought and technical specifications were adopted that were consistent with international standards. Indeed, the appointment of a highly qualified technician as technical director was helpful in overcoming many of the restrictions that a relatively small budget imposed on the project without affecting the conservation policy. Apart from the dramatic situation in the city, which was often forced into curfews, and the Israeli authorities' obvious opposition to the ongoing work, the major difference between the two plans is in their overall approach to urban conservation. Though both plans can be dubbed political, the first was carried out by an occupying force that mainly derived its legitimacy from its military superiority and did not include among its goals the welfare of the actual residents of the city. The second, on the contrary, stemmed from the residents' desire for political and architectural answers to occupation, so it called for different technical choices and different solutions – in the first case the general substitution of the existing fabric with a new built environment, the prevalence of archaeology over

conservation and a stress on singular buildings; in the latter the careful conservation of most of the houses, the focus on the residents' needs and the use of low-cost traditional materials and techniques.

The similarities between the two projects lie more in the common heritage approach than in the actual solutions adopted. In Hebron, too, 'heritage' and not 'history' is the key word. The conservation of Hebron's existing heritage has a nationalist dimension and a political significance: conserving and revitalizing the old city means stressing the value and uniqueness of Palestinian heritage and culture. It is not surprising then that the project emphasized the Arab Islamic character of Hebron's heritage, and played down or even denied the existence of any other historic or mythical claims to the city. Nationalism, which Patricia Sellick[76] identified in 1993 as the dominant and totalizing ideology in Hebron, has led to unfortunate expressions and naïve, though meaningful, simplifications in presenting the history of the city. The brochure on the HRC's work, for instance, states: 'Al-Khalil [Hebron] is an historic Muslim Arab city, founded by the Arab Canaanites more than six thousand years ago.'[77] The term 'Arab Canaanites', meant to establish a direct link between ancient Canaanites and modern Arabs, obviously lacks historical evidence and is related to an ideological vision attempting to 'demonstrate' Arab historic rights to the city.[78]

Bethlehem 2000:
international cooperation, Christian heritage and the role of tourism
The idea of celebrating the year 2000 in Bethlehem was first thought of in the early phases of the establishment of PNA rule over parts of Gaza and the West Bank and, in August 1994, a UNESCO mission proposed a plan for developing the project. With its universal symbolic value, unique Christian heritage and ability to attract international support and funding (so long as Jerusalem's undefined political status ruled it out as a focus for the celebrations), Bethlehem seemed the ideal choice of a place from which to promote the revitalization of the Palestinian economy and to confirm the 'peace process'. The newly founded PNA saw in the project an extraordinary opportunity to present the new situation to the world and to affirm its international status as an 'independent country'. It began to plan for the celebrations.

At first, the project was entrusted to the internationally renowned personality of Hanan Ashrawi, but as it gained momentum a new

coordinator general was nominated. Dr Nabeel Kasssis, an economist, was appointed and elevated to the rank of minister in the PNA government. The 'Bethlehem 2000 project', having acquired a defined status, began to raise funds at international conferences where the commitment of the international community to the project became apparent. The total sum invested in the Bethlehem 2000 project approached US$ 150 million offered by a number of international organizations and donor countries. 'The Bethlehem 2000 project was privileged by the significant support of several international institutions, especially the World Bank, UNDP, UNESCO and the European Commission, in addition to many donor countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Britain, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the USA.'[79]

This support came not only in the form of financial aid but also in technical assistance and political statements, notably with the involve-ment of UNESCO in the preliminary planning and, later, with the vote of a highly symbolic 'Bethlehem 2000 Resolution' at UN headquarters in New York. According to its official website, the goals of the project were:

> to develop Bethlehem and its district and highlight its universal religious and cultural heritage, thus enabling it to attain the place it deserves on the map of world tourism, and restore its status as a universal centre for dialogue over issues of concern to the peoples of the world, in conformity with the message that emanated from Bethlehem 2000 years ago.[80]

The main function of the project, however, was to give international visibility to the PNA and to show the world that the Palestinians were able to administer their cities properly. It was a plan to capture goodwill, to change commonly-held opinions about Palestinians and to sell a new, more captivating image. A highly visible series of events designed to attract foreign visitors and, even more importantly, to represent the Palestinians as a religiously tolerant and peace-loving community, was organized in the city. At the local level, the plan was designed primarily to revitalize the suffocated economy of the city (and of the entire West Bank) by boosting tourism-related activities. Thus, the project aimed to involve diaspora Palestinians and to offer them investment opportunities

in the region. The project's clearly stated goals – business and public relations – were not always well received by Bethlehem's residents who complained of being bypassed by the planned developments. This was especially true of the less powerful and less politically connected communities, most notably the inhabitants of the refugee camps. Though the PNA paid special attention to transforming the Christian celebration of the year 2000 into a 'national' celebration, the mainly Muslim refugees living in the camps within or just outside the city's municipal boundaries felt left out of the celebrations.

The Bethlehem 2000 project developed a comprehensive approach towards revitalizing the city. The various departments of the ministry[81] – dealing with areas as diverse as preparing a calendar of events, relations with different Christian churches, upgrading infrastructures and urban rehabilitation, developing tourism, relations with the media and public security – prepared and implemented, within a very short span of time, an impressive number of projects and events. The Bethlehem 2000 technical department not only rehabilitated large parts of the inner cities of Bethlehem, Beit Sahour and Beit Jala, but, even more important, also thoroughly modernized the entire infrastructure that had been neglected during the 30 years of Israeli occupation. Tens of kilometres of roads were repaved, street lighting, sewerage, telephone and television cables laid and for the first time telephone booths and traffic lights made their appearance in the city.[82] Moreover, Manger Square in the city centre was completely replanned:[83] an architecturally appealing information and tourist centre replaced the police station and the actual square, which had been nothing more than a dirty parking lot for tourist buses, was turned into a pedestrian space with trees, fountains and a stone-tiled floor. Finally, streetlighting and a large temporary stage for evening concerts further transformed it into an urban space capable of receiving tens of thousands of visitors and citizens. What role was urban heritage to play in such a comprehensive plan, the impact of which was to be measured more at the international than local level? Which restoration projects did Bethlehem 2000 in fact plan and implement?

Out of the project's total budget, approximately US$ 21 million was set aside for urban restoration.[84] Managing the work was particularly complex because most of the restoration projects involved numerous Christian communities and churches, the two competing Palestinian ministries of tourism and culture – run by rival political groups – and

the municipality of Bethlehem, which had its own network of inter-
national supporters and local connections. Still, the Bethlehem 2000
cultural heritage unit managed to implement most of the planned
projects according to the guidelines the UNESCO action plan had set
when identifying priorities for the conservation and rehabilitation of the
Bethlehem area.

The driving force behind the conservation plan was clearly tourism,
which makes Bethlehem's plan very different from the other Palestinian
projects in Hebron or Jerusalem. Not only is Bethlehem different in
urban layout, size and history,[85] but the planners' objectives also cannot
be compared. Although some problems (like patterns of ownership)
were similar, the plan was designed not to provide housing in Bethlehem
but to promote tourism in a way that respected the traditional vernacular
architecture and focused on the reuse of some buildings as restaurants,
cafés, guesthouses and 'bed and breakfasts'. The large influx of capital
from diaspora Palestinians and international bodies, and its selection as a
venue for the millennium celebrations, gave the Bethlehem 2000 plan a
unique place in the revival of Palestinian heritage. The undoubtedly
impressive overall budget for the project and the PNA's improved
reputation clearly met the planners' hopes and expectations. For several
months the sleepy, depressed West Bank city became a 'hot spot' for the
international media. Television programmes, 'live' reports and special
features made it famous worldwide. In this regard it is interesting to note
that Israeli reactions, which varied from initial paternalism to harsh
criticism, did confirm the success of the plan. In fact, leading Israeli
commentators complained that Arafat had managed to 'steal' the lime-
light and improperly represented himself as the 'heir' of the Christian
tradition and the benevolent protector of the believers.[86]

Once more, in fact, the real issue at stake was the power of heritage
and symbols. The most obvious example in this respect is the
Palestinian 'appropriation' of the icon of Jesus Christ,[87] whom political
leaders and religious representatives began to portray as a 'Palestinian'
and the forebear of the peasants and villagers that in time became the
Palestinian people.[88] The PNA easily won the conflict between the
Palestinians and Israel over the symbolic possession of the Christian
heritage. The PNA profited from the internal difficulties the State of
Israel experienced in trying to manage the sensitivities of its Jewish
extremists and many of its mainstream religious authorities that felt

uncomfortable with the idea of celebrating Christianity and its message.[89] Indeed, the contemporarily-launched 'Nazareth 2000' plan, meant to counterbalance the support international institutions and Western countries were giving the PNA, failed because it never became a national priority for the State of Israel.

Quite apart from its dramatic ending under the fire of the renewed Israeli invasion of the city, the Bethlehem 2000 experience cannot be regarded as a wholly positive example of an urban conservation and revitalization plan.[90] The excessively short time imposed by the calendar in which to prepare and implement the action plan, its disproportionate focus on tourism and its lack of attention to the social fabric of the city (especially to refugees), undoubtedly generated mistakes that affected its overall success. One should remember, however, that the whole plan was carried out in record time under very difficult political conditions, and that it was unrealistic to expect the project to solve all the economic ills the region faced. The criticisms often heard of the Bethlehem 2000 plan are probably more due to the excessive hopes the PNA pinned on the possibility of jump-starting its economy through large-scale plans, than on any real mistakes made in implementing the project.

Bethlehem's revitalization plan cannot be directly compared with the reconstruction of Jerusalem's Old City. The main differences lie in the different roles attributed to tourism in the two cases. Though tourism was also considered an essential factor in Jerusalem, it was neither the only nor the dominant driving force of the work. Jerusalem was already well established on the world tourism map and the planners' brief was more to stress (and create) its Jewish character than simply to attract tourists to the city. In the case of Bethlehem, however, the area's economic revitalization was thought to depend on establishing modern tourist infrastructures and upgrading the city to transform it into a major tourist destination. The Christian character of its heritage and the specific nature of its tourists (mostly Christian pilgrims) was acknowledged and accepted[91] and did not require an ideological rewriting of its urban heritage.

Jerusalem: the ongoing struggle

The uncertain status of the Old City – a legal no man's land – has had a profound effect on the preservation of its unique and ancient heritage. Political considerations on both sides take precedence over cultural and

conservation matters, with dramatic results on the urban fabric. Palestinian attempts to control the Old City usually involve trying to maintain, or possibly increase, the Palestinian presence within the city walls. This approach, ironically aided by the 'identity card' policy the Israelis introduced in the 1990s,[92] has produced terrible overcrowding, which, in turn, has caused new and severe destruction to the urban fabric and Palestinian heritage. The squats and ugly makeshift extensions that inevitably followed are actually tolerated by the Palestinians who, seeing demographic pressure as their only weapon against the continuous 'Judaization' of the city, look upon the destruction of the city's built environment as a comparatively minor evil.

Palestinian answers to the continuing Israeli occupation of the Old City have consisted mainly of defensive, reactive attempts to restrict the settler occupation of houses and to stall and halt the slow taking over of the city through the activities of local associations, international medical centres and religious foundations trying to offer Palestinian residents basic social services. Since the creation of the PNA, however, the question of Jerusalem has become more pertinent. Palestinian intellectuals have begun to reconsider its role as a national symbol and have started to collect memories and rewrite its history, while religious figures, academic institutions and even some of the residents have become more aware of its archaeological and architectural treasures. Various political, social and religious institutions have come forward with suggestions for urban rehabilitation. The Pontifical Mission has set up a fund for the rehabilitation of old houses in the Christian quarter and Muslim bodies, like the Islamic *Waqf* administration, have begun to put money (mainly offered by Gulf countries) into urban rehabilitation programmes. The most important of these initiatives, both in size and quality, is the Welfare Association's Old City revitalization programme.

The WA, a Palestinian-funded NGO based in Switzerland, officially registered in Israel and devoted to the welfare of the Palestinian people, operates in refugee camps in Lebanon and elsewhere, within Israel's borders and in PNA-administered territories. In Jerusalem it has launched an ambitious urban revitalization plan designed and managed by the CDC (Centre for Development Consultancy) based in the East Jerusalem suburb of Beit Hanina. The CDC's director,[93] a Palestinian architect with extensive experience in international urban rehabilitation campaigns, has assembled a committed and qualified team of young

Palestinian architects and drawn up a comprehensive action strategy to tackle the extremely complex political and technical characteristics of the Old City. To guarantee the effectiveness of its work, the WA has sought to collaborate with the Islamic *Waqf* administration in Jerusalem, which owns and is theoretically responsible for the conservation and maintenance of most of the Old City's buildings and monuments. At UNESCO's suggestion, and with the tacit agreement of the State of Israel,[94] funds made available for the conservation of the Old City by Islamic countries (mainly Saudi Arabia) and by the Arab Fund would be channelled through the *Waqf* administration.[95]

The conservation of the Islamic heritage of the city is obviously not an anodyne, technical matter, but a highly sensitive political question. The interplay of heritage and ideology in the transformation of the Old City under Israeli administration has been discussed in the previous chapters; here the Palestinian political initiative behind the WA conservation plan for the Old City will be briefly explored.

There are many elements to the Palestinian approach to heritage in the Old City. Apart from a wish to stop the continuous, almost ineluctable Israeli infiltration (by giving economic and technical support to the families and houses threatened by the settlers) and to maintain the Palestinian population, there are symbolic and cultural reasons to back plans to revitalize the city they regard as the natural capital of a future Palestinian state. These two parallel tracks, the practical and the symbolic, have produced an interesting alternative plan for the conservation of the Old City. The WA and CDC office have prepared a comprehensive revitalization plan based on a fairly detailed survey of the social and physical conditions in the Old City,[96] including photographs of the prevailing situation, and through continuous fieldwork in the city have established a collaborative relationship with the residents.[97] The priorities set out in the Old City of Jerusalem revitalization plan are:[98]

❑ to preserve, record and document the Old City's cultural heritage;
❑ to renew housing, and to rehabilitate and adapt historic buildings for reuse;
❑ to restore important monuments for transformation, where possible, into public spaces;[99]
❑ to create and upgrade social facilities for the residents (kindergartens, medical centres and social centres);

❑ to regenerate the economy, including tourist activities; and
❑ to reinforce the residents' link with the city's history and heritage through awareness-building projects.

However, another essential priority actually constitutes the basis of the whole experience: 'resisting and confronting ethnic and cultural cleansing attempts by extremist Israeli groups through intensifying the Palestinian presence in the Old City and encouraging residents to stay in their homes and properties.'[100]

The chances of implementing such an ambitious plan depend more on the overall Palestinian–Israeli situation than they do on the soundness of the project. The Israelis never officially accepted this alternative planning department for the Palestinian residents of the Old City, and therefore the WA was obliged to follow a low-profile strategy and to coordinate its efforts with the *Waqf*. The outbreak of the Second Intifada deeply shook the fragile balance that had been reached between Palestinian bodies and Israeli administrators in the Old City and put an end (albeit temporarily one hopes) to many of the WA's planned activities. Though it must be stated that there has never been direct 'collaboration' between the two parties, it is clear that a certain amount of mutual 'acceptance' was needed to achieve some result for the conservation of the Old City. The reasons why the Israeli authorities partially accepted the WA plans are probably related to a number of considerations:

❑ a marked deterioration in the city's physical and social conditions;
❑ the weight of international criticism (including from UNESCO);
❑ a political decision not to invest Israeli money in Arab parts of the city;
❑ the feeling they could stop the 'game' if it risked becoming too serious (or successful); and, possibly,
❑ a sense (among some Israeli administrators) that the final status of these parts of the old city was not yet decided and that a different situation in which some sort of Palestinian control could be envisaged for these areas could not be ruled out.

On the symbolic level, the WA conservation plan stressed the national dimension and the Palestinian meaning of Jerusalem's heritage. An important effort was made not to forget the city's Christian heritage and

small-scale interventions have been carried out on Christian properties as well.[101] However, the strategic alliance with the Islamic *Waqf* and the continuous dwindling of the city's Palestinian Christian population necessarily implied a relative predominance of the Muslim narrative. On the technical level, the WA plan tried to adhere to all the modern standards required of an urban conservation plan. However, in the everyday worksite practice, many exceptions to the rules have been imposed upon the WA, which has had to adjust its plan to the terrible difficulties the political situation has imposed on the city.

In an initial phase, the WA began to work on two specific zones within the Old City – 'Area 21' (near the northern 'border' of the renewed Jewish Quarter) and the 'Bab Hutta' neighbourhood.[102] The choice of these two zones reflects the complexity and multiplicity of the whole operation. 'Area 21', much like Hebron, was selected to counter the expansion of Jewish settlements in the Old City, whereas Bab Hutta was chosen because of the serious physical and social decay of that part of the city. The area covered by the revitalization plan 'includes the whole of the Old City and the plan takes into consideration also the context of the "catchment area" immediately surrounding the Old City walls as well as the effect of urban development of the new expanded Jerusalem on the revitalization of the Old City.'[103]

If we try to compare the Israeli project for the Jewish Quarter with the WA plan it seems that the two plans, though focusing on the same city, deal with extremely different urban realities. Contradictory views of who should reside in the renewed neighbourhoods (full gentrification or old residents at the risk of damaging cultural properties) and conflicting political conditions (an Israeli national plan fully backed by senior members of the political hierarchy or an almost secret counterplan prepared by a non-official body)[104] make the two experiences antithetical and almost impossible to compare.

Conclusion: the role of ideology, similarities and differences

In this chapter we have seen the Jerusalem project from the viewpoint of a larger group of Middle Eastern urban restoration projects, and the comparisons have highlighted the inescapable role of political ideology in shaping our perceptions of both past and present-day urban forms. Their ethno-nationalistic nature, which is not exclusively Israeli, is closely tied up with the very idea of urban renovation. Indeed, it might

be said that all urban renovation programmes follow an ideological programme and involve rereading national history according to the needs of the ruling power. The description of Babylon in Iraq in the quotation at the start of this chapter is but the tip of an iceberg, and even more subtle projects in fact follow the same logic.[105] Urban conservation projects always need large investments, public funding (and increasingly private funding as well), political support and a specific set of rules and bylaws to make the plan viable and effective; and these can be obtained only if the aims of the plan are in touch with overall governmental policy. Urban planning – and even more so urban conservation – is therefore a product of centralized administrations and is intended to promote a message and a political/ideological approach to national history and heritage. Even so-called alternative plans, supported by minorities outside the control of state resources and policies (like the WA's revitalization plan for the Old City of Jerusalem) are integrated into a global political and social ideology that supports and justifies them. Such cases, however, are rare exceptions to the principle that planning is the product of a central power and the instrument with which it implements its policy and imposes its historical and spatial conceptions on a given territory, as shown in the case of the Israeli plan for the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem.

To sum up the comparisons put forth in this chapter and to make use of these examples for the discussion of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan, another concept should be introduced: the notion of 'dissonant heritage'.[106] According to the analysis by Tunbridge and Ashworth, 'the relationship between the conservation of the past and politics is … strong, permanent, intimate and quite unavoidable,'[107] and all heritage is an actual or potential political instrument, whether that was its intention or not. Indeed, it has been shown throughout this book that national heritage can be constructed and produced from a nationalistic perspective because:

a national heritage depends upon the prior acceptance of a national history. This is the writing and teaching of an historical narrative that explains the distinctiveness of a nation through time, stressing its long-standing and fundamentally different characteristics from other nations and most usually tracing an unbroken evolution from as far back in the past as possible to the present.[108]

Because the concept of heritage is culturally constructed, a large choice of possible heritages can therefore be selected. What happens in the case of Jerusalem, and what makes its situation so specific, is that competing interpretations and possible heritage associations that support different state ideas coexist in the same physical space of the Old City. While all the other examples discussed in this chapter have entailed an ideological selection of a specific version of 'their' heritages, there have been no organized alternative strategies able to counteract and challenge the proposed narrative. In the case of Jerusalem, however, the fight over what kind of heritage to celebrate is as open as the political future of the city is uncertain.

Tunbridge and Ashworth conclude that it is possible to develop inclusive formulas to overcome heritage dissonances and consider that the inevitable development of world tourism, which is becoming more and more multicultural, might produce new marketing strategies capable of such creative solutions. The confidence they demonstrate in the capacity of the free market and international tourism to find solutions is not that convincing in the case of Jerusalem where the political constructions behind the disparate readings of the city's heritage are based mainly on religious systems of belief, with their apparently limited capacity to accept alternative worldviews.

Although there is obviously room to invent a new version of the history of the city that stresses its multicultural and multi-religious heritage as part of its richness and dialogue, and for conservation and tourism strategies to sell the city as an open, interfaith, holy place, the overall political framework, characterized by an increasingly violent and confessional approach, makes the possible development of such an inclusive theory dramatically remote and unlikely. As long as zero-sum logics dominate, the city's heritage will continue to suffer from ideological and partial readings that refuse to acknowledge the other community's heritage and are unable to integrate it into an inclusive narrative irrespective of who the 'winner' will be. In fact, whether Israeli controlled or Palestinian controlled, in the near future Jerusalem will probably present a more uniform and one-sided face because even 'The empowerment of a former subservient group may [thus] lead to the destruction, decay or marginalization of the heritage from which they were hitherto excluded.'[109] Only a new political perspective that guaranteed all the communities the same dignity and an active role in planning the city could lead to urban heritage policies that were capable of incorporating multiple historical narratives.

Conclusion

What was formerly the Jewish Quarter has a place in modern Israel. Cleaned, cleared and restored – it will become a centre of national and spiritual unity.

Jerusalem Post[1]

However valid may be the practical, technical and even artistic reasons advanced to justify one or another of these measures considered in isolation, their number and extent are bound to result in an alteration of the historical aspect of the urban scene presented by the Old City.

And, apart from the legal and political question of the lawfulness of the initiatives from which these measures derive, there is the purely cultural question of the responsibility which they imply, as far as the international community is concerned, because of the changes thus being made to a priceless treasure of mankind's heritage.

R. Maheu[2]

The city of Jerusalem developed for centuries within its city walls, keeping almost immutable characteristics while continuously renewing its physical structure. Due to the continuity in building techniques and materials, the Old City has been able to conserve its traditional image until the present day, the only notable exception being the new Jewish Quarter. The alien features introduced to this neighbourhood constitute an evident fracture amid the traditional Old City urban fabric altered previously only by the nineteenth-century Christian buildings constructed in 'European' styles.

The post-1967 Jewish Quarter did not come about as the result of destruction wrought by war; rather, it is the embodiment of a national/religious programme aimed at underlining the eternal link of the Jewish people with the Holy City. This goal – achieved through large-scale destruction and land confiscation – was driven by the efforts of a generation

of politicians and architects who shared a common ideological vision. The Jewish Quarter plan has played an important role in promoting the claim to the land at the international level by conveying the message of Israel's 'right' to the city. The Israeli commitment to Jerusalem and the emotions stirred by the archaeological excavations in the Old City sent to the world an unequivocal message affirming Israel's right of possession to and its 'enlightened' rule over Jerusalem.

The reconstructed neighbourhood, however, was also planned to stress the cohesion of Israeli society and to promote the 'national' dimension of the Jewish people, using urban reconstruction to achieve a synthesis between religious and nationalist traditions. The interplay of tradition and modernity, of secular socialist Israel and traditional Judaism, however, proved to be beyond the capabilities of the state to manage, especially when its ideological basis was shaken following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The conscious use of religious symbolism, which the secular ruling class initially introduced, escaped their control, and the reconstructed Jewish Quarter increasingly developed along autonomous and partially unexpected lines, reflecting the wider transformation of Jerusalem's population and the evolution of Israeli society as a whole.

The area known today as the Jewish Quarter was designed to serve as a *manifesto* of the State of Israel and of its approach to history and heritage – not only a modern quarter or just another Jewish settlement in the city, but the actual incarnation of the ideology of the country. The Israeli elite has interpreted and recreated its own 'identity' through the physical reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, a neighbourhood that might be considered both a tangible example and a showcase of the Zionist representation of Judaism, heritage and identity. In his systematic introduction to *The Postzionism Debates*, Silberstein reminds us that:

> Framing Jewish history in spatial terms, Zionism places space and territory at the centre of Jewish discourse. Insofar as it maps territories and imbues spaces with transcendent meanings, Zionism produces boundaries, establishing what and who is included and excluded. … In representations, images, and symbols, Zionism produced a new map of the [Jewish] world, thereby redrawing the boundaries of [Jewish] material, spatial and cultural life. Thus the debates over Zionism and post-Zionism are struggles over cartography, representation, and mapping.[3]

Reversing the above statement, it might therefore be said that, by focusing on representation, mapping, cartography and architecture, through this book we have not only reflected on the aesthetic practices produced by Zionism but have also added to the debate on Zionism and post-Zionism. The impact of the Zionist ideological reading of history on the urban fabric of the Holy City has been detailed through the discussion of an apparently minor subject. By drawing attention to the incompatibility between modern multicultural and internationally-accepted conceptions of heritage and the Israeli planners' exclusively nationalistic definition of the same concept, I have demonstrated the relevance of conservation and heritage strategies, which are as important as the frequently-discussed urban planning policies, within the broader perspective of the Israeli takeover of the city following the Six-Day War, and underlined the importance of technical and architectural elements in the political debate over the city's future.

'Heritage' literature proved particularly influential both in defining the specificity of Jerusalem's plan and in understanding its mechanisms. By applying these concepts to the Jewish Quarter reconstruction for the first time, their political relevance in the Jerusalem context has now become evident. It has become clear how much the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan substantiates the concept of 'heritage' defined by Lowenthal and other authors, and how complex games develop around the revolutionary concept of heritage planning described by Ashworth and Tunbridge.

Throughout the book it is argued that the reasons that led to the establishment of the Jewish Quarter are intimately connected with the need for the symbolic appropriation of the city to underline its role as the 'Jewish' capital. Books, archaeological excavations and contemporary architecture all participated in the symbolic takeover of Jerusalem. The glorification of the city's recent and ancient past was accompanied by a complete 'rereading' of it in Zionist terms, for the target of the Jewish Quarter's appropriation was as much international public opinion as the Israelis themselves. The new neighbourhood, in fact, was planned not only as a Jewish symbol, but also as a symbol of the Zionist celebration of secular values and the modern state. It seems that the Jewish Quarter has been conceived as the embodiment of Israel's historic right to the city, as a grandiose propaganda campaign proudly affirming the rebirth of Israel and its cultural and political superiority. However, though

managing to convey the message of the eternal Jewish presence in the city and of Jerusalem's centrality to the Jewish people, the rebuilt neighbourhood has failed to convey a clear-cut definition of what the new Israeli Jewish identity consists. Indeed, its progressive trans-formation into a religious stronghold, though amplifying its 'Jewishness' against all other possible interpretations, contradicts most of the principles that accompanied its creation. In fact, the secular Ashkenazi elite originally planned the reconstructed neighbourhood for the sake of the state, that is (naïvely) for all the components of Israeli Jewish society. It was built to exclude the non-Jewish population (the Palestinians) and, under the banner of a triumphant post-1967 Zionism, to include all the diverse Israeli groups. This nationalist approach was reflected also in the architecture of the rebuilt neighbourhood, an architecture that attempted to create an original 'Jewish' style (rooted in tradition and unambiguously modern) meant to represent the continuous Jewish presence in the city on the one hand and its rebirth in the modern State of Israel on the other. In rejecting oriental features and creating a cold and abstract 'neo-orientalist' style – clearly betraying its rationalist origin – the Western identity of Israel was once more stated.

Paradoxically, it might be affirmed that the creation of this Israeli *enclave* within the city walls, emphasizing Israel's victory in the Six-Day War, actually highlights the overall weakness of Israel's claims. Indeed, full Israeli control over this part of the Old City draws attention to its incapacity to rule over all Jerusalem. Therefore, once the reconstruction plan was completed and the Israeli hold on the neighbourhood became indisputable, the role attributed to the Jewish Quarter had necessarily to evolve and the reconstructed neighbourhood was transformed into an advance base for the conquest of the rest of the city. Jewish Quarter funds and expansionist energies have thus been channelled into buying and occupying new courtyards and houses, which are then turned into Jewish strongholds in the other neighbourhoods of the Old City.

The uniqueness of the Jewish Quarter lies in it representing much more than a 'simple' settlement, in it being both a secluded settlers' stronghold and an open advertisement for the achievements of the Israeli state. Partially settlement, partially showcase, partially religious and inward-looking, partially secular and international symbol, the Jewish Quarter's unique characteristics make it a microcosm of Israeli society.

The two quotations that introduce this chapter synthesize the issues

discussed throughout the book and, notably, underline the significance and impact of the urban renewal plan the Israelis imposed on Jerusalem's architectural heritage. These profoundly different readings of the same plan stress the highly political dimension of the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, opposing a nationalist and ethnocentric approach to a universalistic and multicultural practice.

The direct connection between planning and architectural choices on the one hand and political strategies on the other has shaped the physical environment of the Jewish Quarter – a densely inhabited Jewish neighbourhood in the heart of the crowded Old City of Jerusalem, a Jewish 'island' in an Arab environment and living proof of the transformation brought about by the Six-Day War. However, the specificity of this urban transformation is such that the almost complete reconstruction of the area has been presented not as the result of the new political situation brought about by the military conquest, but rather as proof of the immutable and historic Jewish presence and of Israel's commitment to safeguard the historic heritage of the city. The State of Israel's unique characteristics and the way it continually refers to the ancient past in an effort to justify its contemporary existence is reflected in the attempt to build an architectural space to support these claims. Thus, the ancient/new country has tried to create an ancient/modern architecture capable not only of bridging the thousands of years separating the biblical Jewish kingdoms from the modern Jewish state, but also to stress the continuity of the Jewish presence in Jerusalem itself.

In the nineteenth century, the erosion of Ottoman authority and the increasing attention paid to the city by the European powers, which then perceived it as a pillar of Christian civilization and identity, altered the urban landscape of the Old City of Jerusalem when an impressive number of European architectural monuments (churches, convents and pilgrim guesthouses) were added to the original townscape. Though mainly concentrated in relatively small areas, predominantly in Christian neighbourhoods, these buildings did not consciously attempt to erase the existing structures, and therefore did not manage to alter deeply the overall image of the city.[4] Indeed, though entire compounds were rebuilt in alien styles (like the Protestant church or Suq Aftimos in the vicinity of the Holy Sepulchre), the nineteenth-century European architects did not repudiate the unique fabric of the city *in toto*.

Conversely, in the Jewish Quarter the Israelis have created something

more than new symbolic monuments, they have created an entirely new urban fabric, a new neighbourhood meant to substantiate the concept of the 'Jewish city' and to convey the message of the rightful 'return' of Jewish sovereignty over it. Though the expulsion of residents, widespread demolitions and even the creation of new neighbourhoods within historic cores are not an Israeli proclivity – on the contrary they constitute a relatively common, if regrettable, pattern worldwide – nowhere else are these actions portrayed as being part of a restoration plan. In the context of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter project this term should be understood as the 'restoration of Jewish sovereignty', and not be confused with the altogether different concept of urban restoration in its architectural significance, namely a plan meant to protect and reuse the existing urban fabric.

The opening quotation, written at the moment the plan was launched, also reflects on the actual impact and success of the endeavour. The purpose of the Jewish Quarter was to (re)populate the city with a strong and dominant Jewish community and to make it the symbolic 'centre of national and spiritual unity'. Some 37 years later, it is obvious that the second part of the programme was not realized and that Israeli society on the whole – and therefore also the Jewish Quarter – has grown more and more divided on both the political (national) and religious (spiritual) levels. How, then, should the outcome of the reconstruction plan be judged?

There are multiple possible criteria with which to evaluate such an ambitious project. If, like the director-general of UNESCO, we consider the ancient fabric of the city and its significance for all mankind, the judgement cannot but be negative; if, on the contrary, the plan is judged in relation to its original goals, the verdict should be more balanced. Indeed, as the planners envisaged, the Jewish Quarter today is undoubtedly a living and undeniably a Jewish neighbourhood, even though both its population and its symbolic references do not respect the original conceptions of the decision-makers who launched the project.

The essential role of heritage in formulating nation-building strategies and policies is increasingly being recognized and the idea of being able to shape it to fit contemporary needs is progressively acknowledged and accepted, though rarely considered at the urban scale. However, even though it is now widely agreed that 'heritage' can be planned and actually created according to specific needs, it should be remembered

that cities are complex and multifaceted entities that cannot be considered simply as a heritage commodity, for their growth is rarely linked to a single element. Instead, the development of a city relies on the complex interaction of multifarious factors that cannot all easily be controlled or defined *a priori*. Central authorities can plan new cities and restore ancient neighbourhoods to comply with certain political and/or planning objectives, but in time their creations almost inevitably develop along lines that might differ greatly from the original plan, and the large majority of the efforts devoted to direct their development are therefore doomed to failure.

Graham et al. argue that any attempt to exploit heritage as a particular manifestation of power is likely to be subverted by the contradictory messages transmitted and received, and, quoting Foucault, suggest that heritage is actually an 'assemblage of faults, fissures and heterogeneous layers that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or underneath.'[5]

Such has been the case with the Jewish Quarter plan, where the planned use of religious heritage as a unifying national symbol has substantially failed; however, the rereading of the city's history carried out by the reconstruction project has been so drastic that it has made it impossible to realize alternative versions. In the Old City of Jerusalem this has meant that the demolition of the Moroccan quarter, and the creation of the Wailing Wall plaza in its place, has greatly reduced the chance of developing an alternative reading of the site centred on its Islamic significance and history. This obstruction of an Islamic and Palestinian narrative on Jerusalem has occurred notwithstanding the fact that the planned symbolism for the wall area has not escaped the effects of the political evolution of Israeli society.

As discussed above, one of the goals of the Jewish Quarter plan was to justify historically the Israeli occupation of the city. Now, almost 40 years later, the Israeli presence in this part of the city seems so natural that the Jewish Quarter planners could even forgo the complex imaginary account they had originally proposed. A new generation of Israeli citizens, well acquainted with Israeli control over the Old City, has been born since the 1970s. Moreover, as the waning appeal of the archaeological sites for the residents of the quarter clearly demonstrates, the 58 years that have passed since the Israeli state came into existence and the 39 years of Israeli rule in Jerusalem have begun to matter more than any planned connections with the remote past. Even though this confidence

is neither universally shared nor equally felt by all the Jewish citizens of the state,[6] it is likely that the simple passage of time has been as much of a factor in normalizing the Israeli presence in the Old City as the ideological programme driving the Jewish Quarter reconstruction plan. The overall victory of Israel seems partially to have removed the *raison d'être* for such a neighbourhood: Israel has become an unquestioned and unassailable presence in the region (and in the city) and no longer looks for 'historic reasons' with which to justify its existence.

Nevertheless, the long-term effect of the renewed neighbourhood should not be underestimated. The version of history the Israeli and international media portray has largely profited from the existence of the Jewish Quarter and, in accordance with the original will of the planners, thousands of foreign commentators almost without exception refer to this neighbourhood when presenting the Old City of Jerusalem. Its buildings have featured in countless articles, television programmes and books and the image of a well-kept neighbourhood, especially when compared with the growing chaos, decay and overcrowding elsewhere in the city, conveys a powerful and immediate message of efficiency, and even suggests a higher degree of civic consciousness and emotional attachment to the city. The political impact of such impressions has been enormous.

The reconstructed Jewish Quarter may not have become the 'centre of national and spiritual unity' it was meant to be, but it has undoubtedly been utilized as an extremely effective public relations tool that provides continuous and effective support for the State of Israel's ownership claims. If a leading international newspaper can comment in 2000 that 'Jerusalem, was never really an Arab city',[7] this is due not only to the effect of Israeli propaganda but also to the visual impact the recon- structed Jewish Quarter makes on visiting dignitaries, journalists and tourists. It might be noted in this regard that its impact even on the Palestinian residents of the city is not negligible. As the Palestinian elite has long since moved out of the Old City and its younger members have no visual memories with which to oppose the existing townscape, many Palestinian Jerusalemites accept the reconstructed Jewish Quarter as a historic feature and the version of history it portrays as neutral.

The political impact and effectiveness of the Jewish Quarter plan was tested during the Camp David talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis. On this occasion, the Israeli demand to obtain sovereignty over

'the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter' was met by automatic acknowledgement not only from the American broker and the world media, but also from part of the Palestinian leadership. When Yasser Arafat dared to remind some Israeli journalists that his family home had been adjacent to the Wailing Wall, there were indignant reactions from both Israeli politicians and from the media against this 'ridiculous' attempt by the Palestinian leadership to appropriate the central Jewish symbol. In a country where so many citizens were actually born abroad, the role of personal memory often has to give way to a 'national' memory reflecting political needs more than historic reality. The memory of the Abu Saud houses, of the whole Moroccan quarter and of the pre-1948 Jewish quarter has faded; the self-evident and daunting presence of the rebuilt Jewish Quarter, on the contrary, has slowly imposed itself as the only possible reading of Jerusalem's urban history.

As this example shows, studying the reconstruction of the Jewish quarter is not merely an abstract, historical academic investigation, but a means of understanding recent political issues and international relations. By analysing the transformation witnessed in the southwest corner of the Old City since 1967, I hope I have provided all the concerned parties with a more rounded image of the city of Jerusalem and of its recent history. Only if we are able to attain a commonly agreed version of the long history of the city will it be possible to design a peaceful future for Jerusalem and its inhabitants.

Notes

Introduction

1. Director of the Company for the Development and Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, interviewed in Rabinovich 1974a.
2. Anonymous 1973a.
3. Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, p. xi.
4. Convincingly analysed by Nadia Abu El Haj (see Abu El Haj 1995).
5. The main sources on the architecture of the Old City are the extraordinary study of Mamluk Jerusalem by Michael Burgoyne (1987), a similar study focusing on Ottoman Jerusalem (Auld and Hillenbrand 2000) and the many books by the Israeli architect David Kroyanker (1975; 1982; 1985; 1993; 1994). A single book, minor and often technically misleading, deals specifically with the conservation of the Old City (Khatib 1993).
6. With the exception of the books published by the same 'Company for the Development and Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter', and notably, of Mordechai Naor's (1987) celebrative volume.
7. See, for instance, Ceshim 1998; Ceshim et al. 1999; Dumper 1997; Hodgkins 1996; Kaminker 1997; Kutcher 1973; Markovitz 1982; Rivière-Tencer 1997.
8. Armstrong 1996, p. 403.
9. Dumper 1997.
10. See Benvenisti 1996, p. 162: 'Those responsible for town planning in Jerusalem do acknowledge the heavy price the city has paid for bowing to the exigencies of political planning. However, they hasten to point out their achievements: *rehabilitation of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City*, renovation of the old market-places, establishment of a park around the walls of the Old City' (emphasis added).
11. Two opposing viewpoints are evident in the literature, one supporting the USA position backing Israel's policy, the other defending the UN stance and the technical and political criticism of the Israeli deeds. The first approach is found for instance in Hoggart 1978; and Dutt 1990; while the latter characterizes the works of Jote 1994; Titchen 1995 and Wells 1984.
12. With the exception of David Myers's MA thesis, which attempted a critical evaluation of UNESCO's cultural policy in the Old City (Myers 1995).
13. See Benvenisti 1976, 1986, 1989, 1996, 1999a, 1999b and 2000a and 2000b.
14. See quotation opening Chapter 4.
15. See Abu El Haj 1995 and 2001.
16. See notably Ashworth and Tunbridge 2000; Gathercole and Lowenthal 1990; Lowenthal 1985, 1992, 1998a and 1998b; and Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996.
17. See, for instance, Lustick 1988, 1999 and 2000.
18. Dumper 1992, 1994, 1997 and 2002.
19. See Minns 1974.

20. 'The twentieth century has criticized the notion of historical fact (which is not a given object, because it is constructed by the historian) and today it criticizes the notion of document. The document is not objective, innocent raw material, but expresses past societies' power over memory and over the future: the document is what remains' (Le Goff 1992, p. xviii).

21. Following the 1967 Israeli conquest, an impressive number of photographic books, containing ancient images of the Old City, has been published, mostly in Israel. These include the books by Ely Schiller (1978, 1980a and 1980b), the extraordinary photos made in the late 1850s by an American photographer (see Wahrman et al. 1993), and the many ancient pictures reproduced in Naor's book on the Jewish Quarter. Most of these collections of images focus on the Jewish presence in the city and therefore offer useful views of the Jewish residential areas within the Old City.

22. The published photos have provided strong confirmation of the central argument of the book even in the absence of the original plans and drawings. In this regard, it should be emphasized that no scientific survey of the original buildings – analysing not only their architectural and constructive features but also their actual conditions, decay and main causes of the deterioration – was ever carried out.

23. Raymond Lemaire's personal archives have not been previously made available to researchers.

24. Feilden 1982, p. 12.

25. Cowie 1989.

26. In other languages this ambiguity does not exist: in Italian and French, for example, the two meanings are represented by two distinct, though related, words: *quarto* and *quartiere*, *quart* and *quartier*, while in Arabic the term *hara* has no connection with the concept of one-quarter.

27. For a convincing and radical criticism of the concept, see Abu-Lughod 1987.

28. See Eldem et al. 1999, pp. 4–7; and Raymond 1994.

29. 'The term "quarter" … has been used rather loosely by academics and others as though a quarter is a readily identifiable unit. … In practice … even when quarters have been identified, there is often doubt about their limits or even about the number of quarters in a given situation' (Greenshields 1980, p. 120).

30. Lapidus 1967, pp. 195–205.

31. The issue of the limits of the Jewish Quarter is discussed in Chapter 2.

32. With capital letters to emphasize the distinction with the original 'Jewish quarter' (lower case).

33. See Chapters 2 and 4.

34. Khalidi 2000, p. xiv.

35. Khalidi 2000, pp. 30–1.

36. In the Epilogue of the same book (p. 392), Ben Arieh again discusses the subject of Jerusalem's urban heritage stating: 'The plan of Jerusalem's buildings and quarters, and its way of life, derived primarily from its being a city of religion: *Muslim influence was secondary*. … [A]side from the early years of the Umayyad dynasty and a few short-lived efforts of a later date, *the Muslim administration made no special contribution towards the city's development*. … Relatively speaking, Jerusalem lay dormant for over 500 years' (emphasis added).

37. While the two monumental synagogues of the Old City, the Hurva and the Tiferet Yisra'el, were inaugurated respectively in 1864 and 1872, they are often portrayed

as much older. Har-El (1977, p. 276), for instance, claims that: 'The Jews from Spain settled in the country after the Expulsion (1492). … The magnificent synagogues of the Sephardic Community were *built during this period*. The Ashkenazi Jews arrived in the country under the leadership of Rabbi Yehuda HaHasid in 1699. … *The foundations of the Hurvah Synagogue were laid at this time*' (emphasis added). And, in a 1998 speech at the UN Security Council, Dore Gold, Israeli ambassador at the UN, states: 'Fifty years ago the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem surrendered. Its Jewish inhabitants were expelled. Fifty-eight synagogues, *including the 700 year old Hurva Synagogue*, were destroyed and desecrated' (State of Israel 1998, emphasis added).

38. See, for instance, UNESCO's director-general's speech to launch an international fundraising campaign for the conservation of Jerusalem's Islamic heritage: '*Le riche patrimoine monumental crée par les fidèles des trois religions en témoigne encore aujourd'hui. Les mosquées, les églises et les synagogues, participent à tous les moments de la vie quotidienne, rappelant en permanence aux habitants de Jérusalem, ainsi qu'aux millions de pèlerins qui la visitent chaque année, les grands moments de ce passé trois fois irremplaçable*' (M'Bow 1987).

39. According to Robert Schick (1987), the Jews were 10–15 per cent of the population in sixth-century Palestine, mostly concentrated in Galilee, but also in Jerusalem.

40. '*Après les Croisades les Juifs fondèrent le nouveau quartier juif à l'intérieur des murs (à l'emplacement actuel)*' (Prawer 1983, pp. 10–15).

41. There were only about seventy Jewish families at the end of the fifteenth century (see Armstrong 1996, p. 320).

42. Rabbi Moses Basola described it in a letter in 1522 (Ben Zvi 1939, pp. 60–1, quoted in Har-El 1977, p. 282.).

43. Barnai 1992, p. 109; Cohen 1984 and 1994.

44. On the origin of the Hurva synagogue, see Chapter 4.

45. Barnai 1992, p. 140.

46. Ben Arieh 1984, p. 269.

47. See Chapter 3.

48. Ben Arieh 1984, p. 345.

49. A different criterion to assess the population of the Jewish Quarter at its peak might be based on the number of existing rooms. According to Benvenisti (1976, p. 239), in the area set apart by the expropriation act of April 1968, from which the present-day enlarged Jewish Quarter originated, there were 1740 rooms. To these, should be added those of the houses demolished during the war (usually estimated at 30 per cent, namely about 520 more). The total number of rooms in the area (and the expropriated area is considerably larger than the traditional Jewish Quarter) would then have been about 2250. Even applying a dramatic (and unlikely) five people per room ratio, the maximum possible number of residents would have not exceeded 11,250.

50. Ben Arieh 1984, p. 389.

51. Dumper 1997, p. 64, Tibawi 1978, p. 54.

52. According to Ira Sharansky (1996, p. 77), the Christian population of the city decreased by 49 per cent between 1948 and 1967.

53. See Hudson 2000, p. 267. Michael Dumper (1997, pp. 33–4), though, sees this administrative step as a mere cosmetic exercise, for it had not been followed by new investments or by the empowerment of the East Jerusalem municipality.

54. See Schleifer 1972, p. 46.
55. There has been a furious dispute between Israeli and Palestinian authors on the causes of the destruction of the Jewish Holy Sites in the city. According to Israeli sources, the Jordanians deliberately desecrated and destroyed the synagogues and Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. Palestinian sources dispute these allegations and, in turn, accuse the Israelis of destroying the Muslim heritage of West Jerusalem (notably Mamilla cemetery). On the destruction of the Hurva, see Chapter 4.
56. See Chapter 1.
57. The author has been unable to find any reference to this plan in the Jordanian sources, or a map showing the area concerned.
58. About 1000 people, comprising West Jerusalem refugees who took shelter in the ruined Jewish quarter after being evicted from the part of the New City that came under Israeli control in 1948, as well as recent squatters and Hebronite immigrants, were moved to the camp by military order. At a popular level, the 1966 expulsions are often regarded as 'proof' of a supposed pre-1967 agreement between King Hussein and the Israeli government over the future of the Jewish Quarter (Chilinghirian 2002). There is, however, no historic evidence of such an agreement (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the expulsion of the Palestinian residents from the quarter after 1967).
59. The village of Shu'afat was to be included in the new municipal borders of the city drawn by the Israelis after the Six-Day War, and Shu'afat camp has become the only Palestinian refugee camp located within Israel's self-proclaimed borders.
60. Zionism 'portrays Antiquity as a positive period, contrasted by a highly negative image of Exile. … Zionist collective memory thus constructs Exile as a long, dark period of suffering and persecution' (Zerubavel 1995, pp. 17–18). 'Followers of Zionism … regarded Jewish life in exile as inherently *regressive* and *repressive,* and believed in the need to promote some form of revival of Jewish national life as experienced in Antiquity (Zerubavel 1995, p. 14).

Chapter 1

1. Patai 1960
2. Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, p. 24.
3. Patai 1960*, p. 745.
4. Patai 1960, p. 746.
5. See Giniewsky 1980, p. 18.
6. Herzl 1956, quoted in Zalmona 1998, p. ix.
7. 'The condemnation of the city and the cult of a return to nature, to the simplicity, authenticity and rootedness of the village, was always one of the myths of radical nationalism, not of socialism' (Sternhell 1996, p. 25).
8. Cohen 1977, pp. 126–44.
9. See Troen 1991.
10. Cohen 1977, p. 129.
11. On the planning and symbolic interactions between the two cities, see LeVine 1999.
12. See Troen 1991, p. 13.
13. See Rempel 1999, p. 192.
14. Rempel 1999, p. 191.

15. See Laurens 2000, p. 227.
16. When the Zionist Organization established a 'Jerusalem Committee' to define the Jewish Agency's proposal for Jerusalem (see Lustick 2000, p. 7).
17. See Golani 1999, pp. 577–604.
18. See Lustick 2000, p. 8.
19. Liebman 1997, p. 39.
20. Fischer 1999, p. 293.
21. See Ministry of Construction and Housing 1977, p. 5. In the historic introduction, the Palestinian houses are defined as 'sub-standard' and essentially unsuitable for accommodating Jewish immigrants.
22. See Altman and Rosenbaum 1973, p. 316.
23. Harlap 1982, p. 50.
24. See Yiftachel 1997, p. 372.
25. See Altman and Rosenbaum 1973.
26. Hudson 2000, pp. 262–3.
27. The Knesset proclaimed West Jerusalem the capital of the State of Israel on 23 January 1950.
28. Golani 1999.
29. See al-Khatib 1980.
30. 'Although it is true that since Jerusalem was divided in 1949 Israel did not take any operative steps, military or political, to bring about the city reunification, it cannot be denied that operative plans existed on the shelves of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff for the occupation of the whole West Bank and all the territory east of Jerusalem' (Ceshim 1998, p. 5).
31. Jerusalem City Council 1967.
32. Ceshim 1998, p. 7.
33. Dumper 1997, pp. 61–2.
34. Benvenisti 1976, p. 114.
35. Jerusalem City Council 1967.
36. See Fischer 1999, p. 254.
37. 'Today's Old City has a population of 24,000. More than half are densely concentrated in the Moslem Quarter, living in overcrowded slums. Some of its residents should be moved to new housing quarters in the Special Zone proposed in our scheme and the vacated slums renovated' (Sharon 1973, p. 82).
38. Markovitz 1982, p. 88.
39. Sharon 1973, p. 117.
40. See Kaminker 1997, pp. 5–16.
41. See Pressouyre 1999, pp. 4–5.
42. See for instance Dumper 1992, pp. 32–53; and Abu Shamseyeh 1999.
43. An example of the official Israeli approach to Jerusalem's history may be found in Mordechai Naor's *City of Hope* (1996), which was published to correspond with the 'Jerusalem 3000' celebrations.
44. Hosking and Schöpflin 1997.
45. Hosking and Schöpflin 1997, pp. 25–6.
46. Lowenthal 1998a, p. 102.
47. 'The previous chapter drew distinctions between the past (what has happened), history (selective attempts to describe this), and heritage (a contemporary product shaped from history)' (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, p. 21).

48. Lowenthal 1998a, pp. 104, xiii, xiv, xv.
49. Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, p. 6.
50. See Chapter 3.
51. Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, p. 46.
52. See Abu el Haj 1992.
53. See Chapter 2.
54. See Harley 1988, pp. 277–309.
55. The question of the limits of the traditional Jewish quarter compared with the post-1967 one is discussed in Chapter 2.
56. See Preface in Black 1997.
57. Rubin 1992, pp. 15–30.
58. Rubin 1992, p. 28.
59. See, for instance, Schiller 1978, 1980a and 1980b.
60. Anonymous 1969.
61. Ehrnvald 1997, p. xix.
62. 'Sha'ar Hashamayin looked familiar to me, the only change was the street's name. Once called The Gate of Heaven, it had been renamed Galeed. Galeed is the Hebrew word for "small wave". This is part of a trend to simplify street names' (interview with a former resident of the Jewish Quarter in Phillips 1977, p. 71).
63. See, for instance, Abu El Haj 1995; Benvenisti 1986 and 2000a.
64. This is notably the case with the 'Arman Road', at the junction between the Armenian quarter and the renewed Jewish Quarter, the Hebrew street sign which bears instead the name 'Or haHayim' (Light of Life), derived from the Jewish religious institution located on that very street. Actually, beside the 'mistake', it might be noticed that the new name in this case refers to the 'religious' tradition and thus apparently contradicts the assumptions made above. The reason (somehow confirmed by the hasty and temporary, though still standing, street sign) has probably to be looked for in the temporal phase in which the renewal of this part of the Jewish Quarter took place. The western part of the Jewish Quarter, in effect, was the very last part to be built, well into the 1970s, when the political shift had brought a new emphasis on a reinterpreted religious tradition.
65. Storper-Perez 1989, p. 16.
66. See Meshulam da Volterra in Ramón 1987, p. 82.
67. Peters 1985, p. 528.
68. Ben-Dov et al. 1983, p. 65.
69. 'As I stand and look at them, a single thought fills my mind. These stones bear witness to the destruction of our land, and these men to the destruction of our people. Which of the two catastrophes is the worse? Which gives greater cause of mourning?' (quoted in Hertzberg 1996, p. 157).
70. 'The praying Jews represent the impotence of the Diaspora and a focus on the past. Yet these opposites are complementary and interdependent: the pioneer relies on tradition, on generations of Jews who yearned for Zion, and draws his strength from them, while the traditional Jew has no hope and future without the pioneer. … The use of emblematic images that were both contradictory and complementary reflects the attempt of Zionist propaganda to mitigate the revolutionary shock of national revival, to make room both for those eager to change the face of Jewish culture and society and for those who wished to preserve the old frameworks and traditions' (Arbel 1998, pp. 22–3).

71. However, as Akiva Orr (1983, pp. 193–4) noted, religious and secular Jews experienced the Wailing Wall very differently and these different attitudes were a source of conflict between Zionists and Orthodox Jews throughout the period of the British Mandate.
72. See Cust 1929, p. 46.
73. See Dumper 1997, p. 200.
74. The original colour postcard is reproduced in black and white in al 'Alami 1981, p. 263.
75. Dr Michael Dumper noticed that the dress portrayed in the postcard is in fact typical of the north of the West Bank and not of Jerusalem, but ethnographic accuracy was not necessary because foreign tourists were the 'target' of this highly symbolic image.
76. See Ben-Dov et al. 1983. As Abramovich (1974, p. 13) puts it: 'With the renovation, reconstruction and repopulation of the Jerusalem Old City's Jewish Quarter in the last five years, there has been a revived interest in the history of Jerusalem. … Many books have appeared describing people and periods of Jerusalem history. … Perhaps the greatest contribution of such works, as the late Ben Gurion wrote in an introduction to the book, is that they make it possible for our youth to "know that Israel's establishment did not begin with the declaration of the State". This book, and all the others of this genre, are a good reminder that there were always Jews living here.'
77. Landau 1971.
78. Interview with Professor Yeshayahou Leibovitz, in Storper-Perez 1989, p. 98 (my translation).
79. According to a survey (see Katz et al. 1997), 97 per cent of Israeli Jews regard Jerusalem, with the wall at its centre, as an important 'symbol of Israel'.
80. See the presentation of the architectural solutions proposed or implemented at the wall in Chapter 4.
81. The daily press had noticed this shift in perceptions about the site: 'Although *Tisha B'Av* has become almost festive since the reunification of Jerusalem, rabbis insist that the fast is still meaningful. "The notion that we have outgrown *Tisha B'Av* is part of the mistaken euphoria of 1967" Alexander Carlebach … told the *Post*' (Siegel 1974a, p. 3) or 'It seemed that, as daylight broke through, the traditional pattern of mourning that has marked *Tisha B'Av* through the ages had resurfaced again' (Siegel 1974b, p. 2).
82. For a brief, but comprehensive, presentation of the various Jewish institutions supporting the construction of the 'Third Temple', see Dumper 2002, pp. 54–8.
83. As defined by Zerubavel 1995.
84. In the previously quoted 1983 book on the Western Wall, we may read: 'Even the remaining houses on the outcropping are unimportant. Although some date from the Middle Ages, extensive reconstruction has been done in them in the 20th century. One of them has a concrete roof supported by iron railways tracks! The balconies of the buildings are also constructed of railways tracks which proves conclusively that they do not predate our century. The presence of these buildings in the area is purely accidental; a decision to remove them would be just as legitimate as one to leave them there' (Ben-Dov et al. 1983, p. 167). Though the book was published in 1983 it is evident that these lines predate the demolition of June 1969.

85. Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, p. xi.
86. The Wailing Wall, known as *al-Buraq* in Arabic, was considered a holy place by the Muslim too. This parallel tradition, dating at least from the fourteenth century, possibly even predates the Jewish tradition. It is first referred to in a manuscript by Ibn Furkah (d. 1328) stating that *al-Buraq* – the magical winged horse that carried the Prophet Mohammed in his nightly trip to Jerusalem – was tethered outside Bab al-Nab, an old name for a gate along the southwestern wall of the *Haram al-Sharif* at the very spot presently known as *al-Buraq* (see Khalidi 1997, p. 216 note 25). Other sources referring to the tradition of *al-Buraq* date from the nineteenth century and include the 1840 Deliberation refusing the Jews the right to pave the area in front of the wall (see Tibawi 1978, p. 20) and the map of Jerusalem by Wilson (1865) that names the area around the Wailing Wall 'Hosh al-Buraq'.
87. 'Dr Zerah Warhaftig, the Minister for Religious Affairs, said that "… the Arab families (living in the damaged house) were suffering in their homes along the Wall … (and) children could not grow properly under such conditions", while Mr Menahem Begin defined the building as "ramshakle houses to be cleared" while, according to Dr Yitzhak Raphael, the buildings there "… had no historical significance"' (Anonymous 1972a, p. 7).
88. Anonymous 1972a, p. 7. Rabbi Kahane proposed that 'the entire length (of the western wall of the Haram) must be cleared, so that future damage can be prevented.'
89. Charme 1999.
90. Benvenisti 1986, pp. 38 and 45.

Chapter 2

1. Speech by Mr S. Z. Druk to Jerusalem City Council (1967, p. 49).
2. Tagore cited in Jerusalem Committee 1969, p. 36.
3. Architect Netzer was in his thirties when charged with the preparation of the report and was qualified to carry out the mission; however, as Yochanan Minsker, for years the only 'conservation expert' working for the Israeli Antiquity Authority, remarked: 'Though Ehud Netzer studied architecture (he graduated in 1958) and then studied also archaeology and became an archaeologist, *he never studied conservation*' (Minsker 2002).
4. The original report is unavailable; however, a summary of its contents is presented in Netzer 1975, p. 118.
5. See Arnon 1992; and Dumper 1997, p. 174.
6. Indeed, the Moroccan quarter, though appearing contiguous on the maps, was in fact separated by a difference in level from the latter and was therefore distinct.
7. The expropriation was of 29 acres and was notified on 18 April 1968.
8. 'If today's Hebrew and European maps divide the city in four parts and not according to quarters that existed along centuries, it is because the foundations of its modern cartography were laid by people who came from outside and not from the city itself' (Arnon 1992, p. 62).
9. Minsker 2002.
10. 'I had also read in Ya'cov Yehoshua's informative and charming reminiscences of his childhood in old Jerusalem about the close neighbourly relationship between his Sephardi rabbinical ancestors and the Ja'ounis, going back to the Turkish era'

Stern 1977) And 'Habad Street was never a Jewish street. It was Arab. The CDRJQ confiscated 76 houses in the Armenian quarter' (Hintlian 2002).

11. Another proof of the arbitrary criteria applied to define its borders is the planners' desire to make Bab al-Silsilah Street the northern border of the extended Jewish Quarter. The absolute uniformity of the architectural and social fabric on the two sides of this important urban axis is so evident that the very idea of considering one side 'Jewish' and the other 'Muslim' betrays its abstract ideological nature.

12. See Dehan 1984; and Naor 1987, p. 13.

13. See Sharon 1973, p. 178; and Israel and Bar Dor 1984, p. 32.

14. See Anonymous n.d.

15. See Gardi 1977.

16. The Welfare Association is a Palestinian NGO carrying out research and conservation projects in the Old City of Jerusalem (see Chapter 6).

17. Welfare Association Technical Office 1999, p. 37.

18. Goichon 1973, p. 272.

19. UNESCO 1978a, Annex VIII (my translation).

20. See Dumper 1994, Chapter 5.

21. Ben Arieh 1984, p. 327.

22. Benvenisti 1976, p. 239.

23. Though not always easy because of the absence of a precise cadaster map of the late nineteenth-century Old City, locating Jewish properties in Jerusalem is made possible and greatly facilitated by records kept by the Jordanian Custodian of Enemy Property. Jordan never sold the Jewish properties in the West Bank and Jerusalem, but continued to administer them as 'absentee' properties. This fact has been exploited by settler groups able to trace back many Jewish properties through official Jordanian records.

24. Tibawi 1978, p. 47. These numbers include the demolished houses of the Moroccan Quarter; the same data are presented also in the above-mentioned UNESCO document (1978a).

25. Safdie 1989, p. 63.

26. Benvenisti 1976, p. 242.

27. See Dumper 1997, p. 306.

28. This is typically the approach of a brochure presenting copies of official Jordanian documents proving the expulsion of squatters from the Jewish Quarter (see Anonymous 1973a).

29. According to M. Chilinghirian (Abu Faris) (2002), a veteran Armenian resident of the Old City who used to work for UNRWA as a field officer in the Old City between 1948 and 1967, the Shu'afat camp consisted of 510 units, capable of hosting 1500–2000 refugees.

30. The interview with the former *mukhtar* of the Moroccan quarter (Al Haq 1999) was carried out jointly with an American researcher studying the fate of the inhabitants of the MQ after its demolition (see Abowd 2000).

31. Photocopy of the original document, private archives of Mohammed Al Haq, Jerusalem.

32. In fact, a few Palestinian families have managed to remain in houses located on the fringe of the expropriated area and there is even a Palestinian-owned bakery in one of the central streets of the new quarter.

33. Israel Supreme Court 1978.

34. A critical analysis of the sentence by an Israeli legal expert was published in the *Jerusalem Post*. It concludes that 'One reads the opinions in the Jewish Quarter case with a growing sense of dissatisfaction, rare in this writer's experience with decisions of our High Court of Justice. The tone seems over-emotional, the analysis needed somehow lacking' (Shapiro 1978). See also Meron Benvenisti's comments in Benvenisti 1986, pp. 105–6.
35. Israel Supreme Court 1978 (emphasis added).
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Kollek 1977.
40. The rehabilitation of the Yemin Moshe neighbourhood, the first Jewish settlement outside the city walls, was carried out in the same years. As a result of the plan, all the poor Jewish residents of the quarter, which for years was located on the border of East Jerusalem, were evicted to allow for the quarter to be replanned as a fancy upper-class area. On the Yemin Moshe project, see Jaffe 1988.
41. Sicherman 1983, p. 68.
42. See interviews with Mohammed Al Haq (1999), Jordan Chilinghirian (Abu Fares) (2002) and George/Kevork Hintlian (2002).
43. See Chapter 3.
44. See Sharansky 1993, p. 21.
45. Attorney Shimron replaced Tamir until October 1975 followed by Y. Geva, former military attaché in Washington's embassy.
46. See Sharansky 1996, p. 30.
47. Sharansky 1996, pp. 105–14.
48. See Torah Community Connections 2000.
49. See Lichtman 2000. Concerning the fate of the CDRJQ archives, to which the author has never been able to gain access, we learn that: 'Hundreds of files were carted off from the headquarters of the Company for the Rehabilitation and Development of the Jewish Quarter on Tuesday and Wednesday, according to Jewish Quarter residents. … "I came home from work at around 4.20 p.m. on Tuesday," stated veteran Jewish Quarter resident Peninah Seidel, "and I saw piles of files on the steps of Beit Rothschild next to the open door of the company archives. I asked other residents what was going on and was told that at least two wagon-loads of files had already been carted off. I picked up the files and saw some dated 1978, some with just file numbers, and others labelled cash receipts." Seidel was told by the workers moving the files that they were transferring them to a new storeroom on the other side of the Jewish Quarter, on Hamalach Street. However, another Jewish Quarter resident, who lives on Hamalach Street and asked to remain anonymous, told the *Jerusalem Post* that at 1.30 p.m. she saw a wagon loaded with files drive right past the new storeroom and continue on towards Jaffa Gate. … Gilad Baniel, company general manager, told the *Jerusalem Post* that the company was simply "making order".'
50. The exceptions being essentially the design of the Nebenzahl House by a British firm (see Chapter 3), the international plans proposed for the Wailing Wall area, and the continuous, but extremely limited, influence of Raymond Lemaire – the UNESCO representative responsible for the city – on the entire project (see Chapter 5).

51. See Zalmona 2000, pp. 22–5; and Levitt 1998.
52. Zalmona 2000, p. 25.
53. Chacham and Raz-Krakotzin 1998, p. 22.
54. This is also the title of an important and controversial exhibition on Israeli art that took place at the Israel Museum in 1998 within the framework of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the State of Israel (see Zalmona 1998).
55. Among the most important 'orientalist' buildings are Gimnasia Hertzliah, Tel Aviv (architect Barski, 1906), Technion, Haifa (architect Berwald, 1912), the Palm House, Tel Aviv (architect Tabachnik, 1920s).
56. See Harlap 1982, pp. 46–7.
57. 'Most prominent among those architects were Richard Kauffmann, Zeev Rechter, Leopold Krakauer, Dov Kutchinsky, Joseph Berlin and Yohanan Rattner' (Levin 1984, p. 18).
58. Herzl 1956, p. 29 (emphasis added).
59. The evolution brought in by the architects who fled Nazi Germany for Palestine, took place, for the same reason, also in other countries. Indeed, according to Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co (1979, p. 257): 'A non marginal role in the diffusion of the modern architectural language was played by the architects who, after the advent of Nazism, left Germany to establish in England or in the United States.'
60. Ahimer and Levin 1980, p. iii.
61. Like the Hadassah Medical Centre (1936–38) on Mount Scopus and the Schocken Library in Rehavia (1933–36) by Mendelsohn, or the Aghion House by Kaufmann (1938), in the same neighbourhood (see Kroyanker 1994).
62. Tel Aviv was included in UNESCO's World Heritage List in 2003.
63. 'Kibbutz + Bauhaus stands for Life + Language: the condition for a civilized, democratic, popular architecture, hostile to a double-faced formalism, Beaux-Arts and/or vernacular' (Sharon 1976, p. 7).
64. 'Israeli architecture is not routinely publicized abroad, even in comparison to neighboring countries. The architectural gap between Israel and the European side of the Mediterranean is much greater than the geographical distance, and … the creation of architecture of an international standard has been a rare event here for the last few dozen years' (Margalit 1999).
65. The best known examples are the provocative 'beehive-like' structures designed by Zvi Hecker in the Jerusalem settlement of Ramot – widely reproduced in the international architectural press.
66. Friedler 1975 (emphasis added).
67. Harlap 1982, p. 51.
68. The design competition took place in 1959.
69. See Chapter 6.
70. Amiran 1973, p. 50 (emphasis added).
71. Frenkel 1980, p. xi (emphasis added).
72. Ran 1988, p. 3.
73. See Kroyanker 1991, pp. 4–8.
74. Kohl and Fawcett 1995, p. 6.
75. See Chapter 3.
76. Peters 1993, p. 231.
77. Prior 1998, p. 3.

78. 'The conceptualization and representation of the past is fraught with difficulties, not only because of the ambiguity and paucity of data, but because *the construction of history*, written or oral, past or present, *is a political act*' (Whitelam 1996, p. 11, emphasis added). See Anderson 1991, p. 183; and Ucko 1990.
79. Quoted in Broshi 1987, p. 24.
80. See Silberman 1989.
81. Ibid., p. 8.
82. Lowenthal 1990.
83. Fritz and Davies 1996.
84. 'Accordingly we, members of the people's council, representatives of the Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British Mandate over Eretz-Israel and, *by virtue of our natural and historic right* and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel' (Government of Israel website: http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00hb0, emphasis added).
85. Whose private collection, including extraordinary Egyptian sarcophagi from Gaza, was later sold to the Israel Museum and exhibited in 1986 (see Silberman 1989, p. 133).
86. Trigger 1995, p. 272.
87. See Silberman 1989; and Hadas-Lebel 1995.
88. See Lowenthal 1998a, p. 164.
89. Ibid., p. 141.
90. To demonstrate the importance and impact of the Bible in contemporary Israeli life, at every level of the society, we might consider the existence and success of the yearly 'Bible Quiz Show' on Israeli TV.
91. 'The fruits of such an education are inevitably a tendency to xenophobia, intolerance and prejudice' (Tamarin 1973, p. 11).
92. 'An Israeli Antiquity Authority Chief retitled the Iron Age the Israelite Period, the Hellenistic the Hasmonean, the Roman the Mishnaic and the Byzantine the Talmudic epoch' (Lowenthal 1998a, p. 235).
93. 'Ideologically-driven archaeology is still common in Israel, in fact the same people are still excavating. Many "ideological" excavations are still taking place, like the ones in Megiddo, Beit Guvrin, Mount Gerizim, etc. Biblical Archaeology is still alive in international institutions working in the country. It is true, however, that there is a new generation of archaeologists interested in going beyond the standard Israeli approach and there is a growing interest in later periods, but we cannot say that there is a movement of "New Archaeologists" in the country' (Hawari 2000).
94. For a synthesis of the controversy based on the results of the Israeli survey of the West Bank, see Killebrew et al. 2001.
95. As a partial selection we might quote Gross 2000; Herzog 1999; Rabinovich 1999; and Shanks 1999.
96. 'Jerusalem is not known to have been occupied at all in Iron I, with the result that there is no room in history for a United Monarchy there. Only after … 700 BC Jerusalem became a regional town' (Prior 1998, Introduction).
97. See Fritz and Davies 1996, p.16.
98. See Yas 1999.

99. Lowenthal 1998a, p. 141.
100. Though, significantly, most of the archaeological sites of the West Bank remained under Israeli control in zone C.
101. See Silberman 1997 for a scholarly account, and Gross 2000 for a press one.
102. For examples of this trend, see Amiry 1978 and Hebron Rehabilitation Committee 1999, p. 5 (see also Chapter 6).
103. Particularly telling is the attitude of Moshe Dayan as presented in the press. 'The Minister, *who is an ardent archaeologist*, said that, in his opinion, finds dating from after the Second Temple should be photographed and removed from the site, but that *all finds from the Second Temple should be reconstructed.* "I want to see the Temple Wall the way it looked at the time of the Second Temple", he said' (Anonymous 1971b, emphasis added).
104. See Ben-Dov 1971.
105. Yadin 1975, Foreword (emphasis added).
106. Ibid. These words of Yadin's are commented on in Hawari 1994, p. 108.
107. See Goichon 1973 and 1976.
108. Lemaire 1987, paragraph 7.3.
109. The UNESCO envoy, Lemaire, justified them as 'rescue excavations' and considered that they did not contradict the Hague Convention (see Chapter 5).
110. See Avigad n.d..
111. Abu El Haj 1995, p. 11.
112. 'Ancient Jerusalem as the *home* of a people is coming to light and is again taking on tangible form' (Avigad n.d., p. 7, emphasis added) and the commentaries made on presenting the 'Burnt House': 'But although the house met its end, *the story itself is actually not yet complete*, for in our own days, two thousand years later, when the *descendants of the slaughtered returned to the site*, they uncovered the physical traces of the destruction *and rebuilt their houses over the ruins*. Now they too, like Bar Kathros, can look out through their windows and see the Temple Enclosure, where the "previous tenant" had apparently worshipped. *History has repeated itself*' (Avigad 1983, pp. 137–9, emphasis added).
113. See Geva 2000 and 2002.
114. Bahat 1994.
115. The international political and technical reactions to these excavations are covered in Chapter 5.
116. 'In sharp contradiction to Christian archaeologists, there is hardly a religious person with a Masters or Ph.D. in archaeology among the 200 practising Israeli archaeologists' (Broshi 1987, p. 26).
117. See, for instance, Einhorn 1997.
118. On the events at the opening of the northern exit of the tunnel, and on its political meaning, see Monk 2002, pp. 2–3.

Chapter 3

1. Eco 1986, p. 8, quoted in Lowenthal 1992, p. 97.
2. Elon 1995, p. 183.
3. See Abu El Haj 1995.
4. Ponger 2000.
5. See Avigad 1983, p. 49.

6. As in the 'Herodian Quarter' exhibition, Avigad (1983, p. 6) was also directly responsible for displaying the findings.
7. 'The Yeshiva Hakotel was established in an irregular manner, not only because of the decision to preserve the number of religious residents, but also in its physical planning. The Yeshiva was permitted to build above the originally determined height' (Hattis Rolef 1999, p. 3). The total area of the building is 14,000 square metres and it rises 32 metres above the Kotel Square (see Harlap 1982, p. 338).
8. See Chapter 5.
9. A criticism of the concept and practice of participative planning is found in Uzzel 1989, pp. 10–11.
10. For a critical presentation of the Bologna plan in English, see Cantacuzino and Brandt 1980, pp. 3–19.
11. Ibid., p. 9.
12. Rabinovich 1974c (emphasis added).
13. Hattis Rolef 1999, p. 3. (English version).
14. The plan of the Jewish Quarter subdivided into these 28 plots is presented in Gardi 1972, p. 33.
15. Rowntree 1978, p. 4.
16. Gardi 2000.
17. See Moshe Safdie's description of how he was contracted for the design of 'Block 38' by the chairman of the CDRJQ Yehuda Tamir, in Ran 1990, p. 4.
18. Ponger 2000.
19. Kroyanker 1994, p. 92.
20. Jerusalem urban regulations have imposed a stone facing on all buildings within the city limit since the period of the British Mandate. This principle was first introduced by the McLean Plan in 1918.
21. Lemaire 1971, p. 20 (my translation).
22. Gardi 2000.
23. Rowntree 1978, p. 67. Indeed, as the author, a former member of the Jerusalem Committee, remarked: 'The stone uniform designed to eliminate monstrosities is equally effective against masterpieces.'
24. Gardi 2000.
25. Ponger 2000.
26. 'Yehuda Tamir, chairman of the government company carrying out the reconstruction, said national interests dictated that the work be carried out as quickly as possible. "But I think we've begun to move too fast." … Mr Tamir said some buildings had to be demolished in order to permit tractors and other machinery to be brought into the heart of the Quarter' (Rabinovich 1970).
27. See photographs in Naor 1987, pp. 298, 302, 328–9.
28. Schmertz 1978, pp. 103–14.
29. Extraordinary filmed images of the reconstruction work, shot between 1969 and 1974, are presented in Martin Minns's controversial documentary film *Jerusalem? Never!* The presence of both donkeys and caterpillars as well as the widespread demolition of old houses was recorded in the footage.
30. For a brief architectural presentation of the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem after 1967, see Anonymous 1974b, pp. 898–905.
31. Rosenkovitch 2000.
32. Hewison 1987, quoted in Graham et al. 2000, p.16.

33. Brown 1993.
34. See the following paragraph.
35. Feilden 1982, pp. 9–10.
36. Ibid., p. 12.
37. Brown 1993.
38. The 'Venice Charter', a declaration of principle, was immediately recognized as a reference document by the international bodies concerned (UNESCO) and also by many administrative national departments responsible for the protection of cultural heritage. It was (and still is) constantly discussed in the academic world and in the schools of architecture all across Europe. It may therefore be admitted that since the mid-1960s it was known to Israeli architects as well.
39. ICOMOS 2001.
40. Gardi 2000 (emphasis added).
41. See Chapter 6.
42. Gardi 2000 (emphasis added).
43. To recognize this diversity in conception, compare articles 6, 7 and 11 of the Venice Charter: 'Art. 6: *The conservation of a monument implies preserving a setting* that is not out of scale. Wherever the traditional setting exists, it must be kept. *No new construction, demolition or modification* that would alter the relations of mass and colour *must be allowed.* Art. 7: *A monument is inseparable from the history to which it bears witness and from the setting in which it occurs.* The moving of all or part of a monument cannot be allowed except where the safeguarding of the monument demands it or where it is justified by national or international interests of paramount importance. Art. 11: *The valid contributions of all periods to the building of a monument must be respected*, since unity of style is not the aim of a restoration. When a building includes the superimposed work of different periods*, the revealing of the underlying state can only be justified in exceptional circumstances* and when what is removed is of little interest and the material which is brought to light is of great historical, archaeological or aesthetic value, and its state of preservation good enough to justify the action. Evaluation of the importance of the elements involved and the decision as to what may be destroyed cannot rest solely on the individual in charge of the work' (emphasis added).
44. Rosenkovitch 2000.
45. See Meier 1971, pp. 56–7.
46. It is difficult indeed to evaluate exactly, without having access to the original design plans, which buildings were 'restored' and which ones were built anew. A large number of original buildings have received new concrete façades, thus hiding their original appearance, or have been used as the base for a new, higher, building on top. Sometimes the opposite has occurred, with only the original façade of the building kept and the interior completely rebuilt.
47. See Hattis Rolef 1999.
48. 'As far back as 1971 attention was drawn to certain scientific shortcomings in the work in progress. [But] No attempt was made to remedy the situation.' And 'Instead of presenting a genuinely ancient appearance, this area [the reconstructed Jewish Quarter] gives an impression rather of "new made to look old". … It is regrettable that houses that could have been preserved and restored were destroyed and replaced by new buildings and that some houses in ruins that could have been restored were sacrificed in order to facilitate excavation work' (Lemaire 1987).

49. Robinson 1838, quoted in Meddeb 1996, p. 198.
50. Kroyanker 1994, p. 90.
51. See Kroyanker 1994, pp. 95–6; Pullan 1987, p. 35; and Sicherman 1983, p. 68.
52. See Gardi 1977.
53. Elon 1995, p. 184.
54 See Lemaire 1987.
55. Rosenkovitch 2000.
56. Kutcher 1973, p. 55.
57. Gardi 2000. This is another indication of the assimilation of the 'Jewish Quarter restoration' with other housing projects and indirect confirmation of the definition given by Rosenkovitch and quoted above.
58. Ponger 2000.
59. This last, surprising, but telling, element was pointed out by Yehuda Tamir, the chairman of the company who added: 'It is difficult to live here, *for a long while this will be a mixed neighbourhood with Arabs living among Jews*' (see Rabinovich 1974b, emphasis added).
60. Yigal Allon's house, which actually belonged directly to the government, was sold in the year 2000 to the *yeshivat Ish haTora*.
61. See Rabinovich 1974b.
62. 'Mr Elie Eliashar, head of the Sephardi community, criticized the construction of private apartments for Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and State Comptroller Dr I. E. Nebenzahl along the road leading from Zion Gate to the Western Wall, a route which, he said, should be lined by buildings housing national institutions' (Rabinovich 1970).
63. See Anonymous 1976, pp. 1055–8; Kroyanker 1993 (in Hebrew), pp. 209, 224; and Plesner 1975, pp. 109–15.
64. See Harlap 1982, pp. 322–3.
65. See Kroyanker 1994, p. 91.
66. See Chapter 4.
67. See Frenkel 1980, pp. x–xi; and Hattis Rolef 1999.
68. The CDRJQ architects I had the opportunity to interview, however, did not agree with this interpretation of a 'selective restoration' policy and generally dismissed this approach. According to them the engineers of the company were the ones who, on a purely technical basis, decided which houses could be fixed and which ones should be demolished. My personal experience as an architect/restorer, however, allows me to confute their arguments, as long as, from the evidence that could be gathered through the analysis of post-1967 photographs, many of the demolished houses still looked fit after the 1967 war. It seems that most of them, relatively simple from the technical and static point of view, were not beyond repair and could have been fixed if a little effort and research were devoted to that goal. If the houses of the quarter were not restored, but on the contrary were demolished, this is because ideological and not technical considerations were driving the company's engineers.
69. See photographs before and after the restoration in Ahimer and Levin 1980, pp. 42–3.
70. Hausman 2000.
71. See Reinfeld 1999.

72. For a description of the history, architecture and restoration of the Sephardi synagogues, see Ben Eliezer 1975, pp. 14–19; Cassuto 1975, pp. 122–3; Kroyanker 1994, pp. 85–9; Naor, 1987, pp. 120–8; and Tanai 1975, pp. 124–6.
73. Naor and 'Aner 1980.
74. Sharon 1973, p. 184.
75. Indeed, though representative of the traditional Old City constructive style and worthy of conservation, the four synagogues were generally perceived – before the launch of the Jewish Quarter project and their 'transformation' into symbols of the 'eternal' Jewish presence in the city – as a rather minor architectural ensemble comparable to their original surroundings, which were all so dramatically altered by the reconstruction plan. The Israeli urban historian Yehoshua Ben Arieh (1984, p. 30) defined them as 'inconspicuous', while a British Mandate period description portrays them as 'dilapidated little chapels with ancient rickety furniture and a musty smell' (Farmer 1944, pp. 54–9). Tanai's 'restoration' project too – 'enhancing' their original features – was grounded in a similar underestimation of their architectural significance.
76. For a brief presentation of the problematics of heritage economics, see Graham et al. 2000, pp. 129–76; and Klamer and Throsby 2000, pp. 130–45.
77. See Benvenisti 1976, p. 243.
78. Gardi 2000.
79. Rosenkovitch 2000.
80. Ponger 2000.
81. Benvenisti 1976, p. 243 (emphasis added).
82. Gardi 2000.
83. Anonymous 1971a, 18 July.
84. Rabinovich 1975c.
85. Gardi 2000. Actually, only Jews were allowed to buy flats in the reconstructed Quarter.
86. Sicherman 1983, p. 70.
87. The people with the right to apply for a flat in the restored Yemin Moshe neighbourhood were defined according to the criteria for selecting new inhabitants set by the East Jerusalem Development Company's regulations (Jaffe 1988, p. 146).
88. Anonymous 1974a.
89. 'Moshe Avnieli, former director of the Company for the Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, has been arrested on suspicion of criminal actions during his tenure in that job. … He is suspected, according to *Itim*, of having promised applicants for apartments in the Quarter a fixed price, in violation of Company directives and even though they had not yet been awarded apartments' (Rabinovich 1975b). 'Of 30 choice apartments in the Jewish Quarter allocated by the Company for the Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter, eight went to senior public officials, four to men who had work connections with the Company and two to officials of the Company itself. This finding in the Comptroller's report issued yesterday confirms allegations in the press last year that the heavily subsidized apartments went to people with "*protekzia*"' (Anonymous 1975b).
90. See Rabinovich 1974a and 1974b.
91. See Anonymous 1975c, p. 2; and Wallfish 1974.
92. See Anonymous 1975a; Smith 1975; and Stern 1977.
93. Abramowitz 1976b, p. 7.

94. Ronnen 1977, pp. 18–19.
95. Cohen 1999.
96. See Benvenisti 2000b; and Hausman 2000.
97. Jerusalem City Council 1967.
98. See Ronnen 1977.
99. See Hall 1994.
100. Abramowitz 1976a, p.7.
101. Abramowitz 1976a.
102. Hattis Rolef 1999.
103. Ibid., p. 3 (English version).
104. For a highly commemorative and rhetorical description of life in the Jewish Quarter and its evolution since the early 1970s, see Abramowitz 1998.
105. Hattis Rolef 1999.
106. The total Jewish population of the Old City is 2951 (including the settlers in the other quarters). See Choshen and Shahar 2000, p. 75 (data from 1998).
107. Hattis Rolef 1999.
108. Choshen and Shahar 2000.
109. Shragai 2002.

Chapter 4

1. Benvenisti 2000a, p. 103.
2. Kroyanker 1985, p. 26.
3. Though it was obviously included in the expropriated area, so therefore considered an integral part of the new extended Jewish Quarter.
4. See Ben Arieh 1984, pp. 300, 302.
5. There is a minor controversy over the precise date of the foundation of the house of prayer on the Hurva site. According to Ben Eliezer, the construction of the Hurva began in 1858; according to Har El it was built in 1866, while Kroyanker, Ben Arieh and Glass and Kark assert that it was dedicated in 1864.
6. See Glass and Kark 1991, pp. 89–91.
7. Ben Arieh 1984, p. 304.
8. As an example of the Israeli description of the events, see Teddy Kollek's casual remarks: 'It was once assumed that the Hurva had been destroyed in the fighting of the War of Independence, though we later learned from local off-the-record sources that it had been blown up by the Jordanians' (Kollek and Eisner 1990, p. 51).
9. On the Palestinian side, see Cattan 1981. A vivid account of the fighting in the Jewish Quarter and of the destruction of the Hurva has been published by Dr Ahmed Tell (n.d.).
10. See Mavrides 1999, pp. 265–6.
11. The famous bell-tower of St Mark's Square in Venice collapsed suddenly in 1905. The Italian authorities, with the support of the inhabitants, decided to rebuild this symbol of the city '*dov'era, com'era*' (where it was, as it was). This reconstruction has since become the classic example of 'scientific' reconstruction. It has often been used as a reference for plans contemplating the reconstruction *à l'identique* of some urban landmark. A policy applied, for instance, after the urban destructions of the First World War (to the City Hall of Ypres in Belgium) and the Second World War (to Warsaw's city centre).

12. As Amiran Harlap (1982, p. 67) notes, 'The limited number of synagogues built [since 1948, in Israel] is a commentary on the attitude of Israelis toward synagogue: the nonreligious are loath to divert resources to houses of prayer, while the religious Jews are traditionally not particularly interested in edifices.'

13. See Minsker 2002; Ponger 2000; and Rosenkovitch 2000.

14. See Kollek and Eisner 1990, p. 52.

15. 'The Ashkenazi community continued to split into *kolelim* during the early days of the British Mandate. Before the war, they numbered twenty-seven. … Each one had several trustees and vice-trustees, a scribe, an agent, a treasurer, a *gabbai,* a burial society, … a synagogue and cemetery' (Ben Arieh 1984, p. 359). 'In the course of the 19th century various groups broke away from the Sephardi community: … the North-African, the Georgians, the Bukharans, the Yemenites, the Jews of Kurdistan, Iraq, Aleppo, Damascus, Urfa' (Ben Arieh 1984, p. 361).

16. Kroyanker 1994, p. 85.

17. It must be stressed, however, that, even though there has been an attempt to reconnect the architecture of the Jerusalem synagogue with Istanbul's mosques, architectural critics have never considered the Hurva an outstanding architectural achievement comparable with Sinan's masterpieces (on Sinan's architecture, see Freely and Burelli 1996; Hoag 1978; and Vogt-Göknil 1995).

18. It is significant that even 25 years later architect Gardi is still adamantly opposed to the reconstruction option (See Gardi 2000).

19. Pictures of the Hurva synagogue model, built at the beginning of the century and displayed at the Israel Museum, are reproduced in Naor 1987, pp. 118, 418–19.

20. Kahn's new synagogue dominated the neighbourhood architectural model in Tamir's office (see scenes of the interview with Yehuda Tamir, in Martin Minns's 1974 documentary film *Jerusalem? Never!*).

21. For a comprehensive presentation and discussion of his work, see Brownlee and de Long 1991.

22. Tafuri and Dal Co 1979, p. 402.

23. Louis Kahn designed four synagogues in his career, but only one was realized.

24. See Larson 1993, pp. 80–7.

25. The impressive, photography-like images of this unbuilt structure, elaborated by Kent Larson, an American architect, are published in Larson 2000.

26. See Israel Museum website 2001.

27. Akerman 1998, p. 253.

28. Ibid.*,* p. 249.

29. Ibid.

30. Kroyanker 1985, pp. 25, 28, 29.

31. As Teddy Kollek, mayor of Jerusalem, says, 'We saw no end to the Hurva quagmire and thus decided on a temporary, *symbolic solution*: the recreation of one of the four arches which supported the dome of the original synagogue. We envisioned it as a temporary solution, but, as the years pass, *no plan seems as appropriate as the single arch*' (Kollek and Eisner 1990, p. 52, emphasis added). Still, as shown in the following paragraph, the proposal to rebuild a copy of the original Hurva has resurfaced and new architectural plans for its reconstruction have been approved.

32. 'The Hurvah synagogue is commemorated by a large arch, signifying the four arches that once supported the building's dome, while the remnants of the Tiferet

Israel were cast in rough plaster, *thereby emphasizing the destruction wrought by the Jordanians*' (Kroyanker 1994, p. 95).

33. Akerman 1998, p. 253.
34. It might be interesting to point out the similarity of this project with the presentation of the *Kaiser Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche* in the centre of Berlin. The church, built in 1891–95 and heavily bombed during the Second World War, has been restored as a ruin, a monument to the tragedy of war, and it has become one of the pre-eminent features of the German capital. As with the Hurva monument, the original building was less impressive than its present-day image. Indeed, the church's conventional neo-Romanesque architecture has acquired new aesthetic values as a result of its near destruction, and its ruins evoke the remains of greater and more impressive architectures from the Middle Ages. This project surely influenced the architects of the CDRJQ, as one of them, Uri Ponger, studied in Germany and was familiar with the solution adopted in Berlin by the German architect Egon Eiermann in the early 1960s.
35. Gardner 2002.
36. 'The government decided Sunday to allot NIS 23 million [more than five million US dollars] to finance improvements and renovations to the area surrounding the Western Wall, as well as allocate funds to a program sponsoring visits by soldiers and youths to the Wall and its surrounding areas' (Alon 2002).
37. See Benvenisti 1976, p. 308.
38. Benvenisti 1976, p. 309.
39. As an example we might quote the never-ending debate about the promulgation of a constitution.
40. Fisher 1978, p. 105. According to another source, however, the monument was meant to symbolize the Shoah (Ben-Dov et al. 1983, p. 168).
41. Safdie 1989, pp. 115–40.
42. According to Yochanan Minsker (2002), then chief conservator for the Antiquities Authority, 'He came with his renown he achieved abroad. He was supposed to be the "best" and he had great personal charm. He also got along especially well with Teddy Kollek. … If a politician decides he wants the best, how could you oppose him? The problem was that what criteria does a politician have with which to decide on the quality of the work?'
43. Eco 1986, pp. 291–307 (emphasis added).
44. A new version of his master plan, adapted to the results of the excavations and the new situation of the site, was developed in 1983.
45. Žantowska-Murray 1996, p. 30.
46. Ibid., p. 102.
47. Ibid., pp. 17, 30.
48. There is an extensive bibliography presenting and discussing Moshe Safdie's work. For an updated reference, see the website prepared by McGill University, Montreal, Canada, where Safdie graduated in architecture: http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/Safdie/Biography/default.asp. On the Mamilla development project, see Karasov 1988.
49. Another essential goal achieved by the Mamilla project is to create the continuity between the new Western city and the Old City. A large walking bridge crosses the heavy traffic road running along the walls and directly leads to the Jaffa Gate, the access route to the Old City usually taken by the Israelis and Western tourists, and the only vehicular access to the Jewish Quarter.

50. See Maguire 1979, p. 350. Also, 'The architecture in the background, with its great porticoes … resembles the waterfront of certain Mediterranean towns, like Capri, and does not complement Jerusalem's austere demeanour' (Fisher 1978, p. 108) and 'Prof. Bruno Zeevi [*sic*] of Rome … declared the plan "great" and architect Lawrence Halprin praised the plan's scale. However, sculptor Isamu Noguchi found the approach theatrical and Prof. Louis Kahn termed the plan "over-exuberant"' (Rabinovich 1974d, p. 3).
51. See UNESCO 1978b, Annex II (emphasis added).
52. See Anonymous 1972b, pp. 41–3; Anonymous 1973b, pp. 22–4; and Seelig and Seelig 1985.
53. See UNESCO 1971b, p. 6.
54. The director-general communicated to the UNESCO executive board only part of Lemaire's report. The complete original report – kept in Lemaire's private archives – is more direct in the analysis of the ongoing plans (Lemaire 1971, my translation).
55. Sharon 1973, p. 180.
56. See Piccirillo 1993.
57. See Avigad 1983.
58. The most interesting, and partially unexpected, finding of the whole archaeological campaign on the Cardo has been the scientific proof that the southern part of the Cardo had not just been 'renewed' in the Byzantine period, as previously thought, but created *ex novo,* during the reign of Justinian, on the continuation of the Roman axis, to form a processional way leading to the newly built Nea church (see Avigad 1983, p. 226).
59. Ibid., pp. 214–15.
60. According to Theodor Herzl's evocative expression.
61. See Sicherman 1983.
62. See Anonymous 1972b, p. 41.
63. Minsker 2002.
64. Lemaire 1973 (my translation).
65. Lemaire 1981 (my translation).
66. Kroyanker 1982, p. 29.
67. See Naor 1987, pp. 397–9, 441–5; and Seelig and Seelig 1985, p. 121.
68. 'Just inside [the Cardo] is a staircase leading down into the bowels of the earth for a close-up view of the floodlit remains of the northern *walls of Jerusalem during the Hasmonean Period in the second century* BCE *and the Israelite Period six centuries earlier*' (Rabinovitch 1983, quoted in Kroyanker 1985, p. 32, emphasis added).
69. As acutely observed in a British tourist guide to Israel and the Occupied Territories, the reconstructed Jewish Quarter looks 'rather sterile and anonymous. Craft boutiques, art galleries and studios have "ambience"; the rest of the city has life' (Eber and O'Sullivan 1989, p. 80).
70. This reconstructed *menorah* has been prepared by a relatively marginal group of religious Jews, 'The Temple Institute'. The panel presenting it reads: 'This Golden Menorah is fit to be kindled in the Holy Temple. It was constructed according to comprehensive Halachic research conducted by the Temple Institute.'
71. Khalifeh 2000, p. 13 (emphasis added).
72. Benvenisti 1986, p. 192.

73. The effectiveness of such a naming policy is exemplified, for instance, in the overall tone of a 1985 article published in the American review, *Architectural Record* (See Seelig and Seelig 1985, p. 122).

Chapter 5

1. Lemaire 1980.
2. Adopted at the London Conference in November 1945 and entered into effect on 4 November 1966 (UNESCO 1946, emphasis added).
3. The term 'Jerusalem' in this context stands for the 'Old City of Jerusalem', the central focus of UNESCO's conservation and protection efforts and the almost exclusive concern of Raymond Lemaire's reports.
4. See Jote 1994, p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 62.
6. Israel ratified the Hague Convention on 3 October 1957.
7. UNESCO 1967.
8. UNESCO 1968, 8 April, p. 5.
9. UNESCO 1956, art. 32.
10. UNESCO 1969a, p. 3.
11. UNESCO 1969b, Annex II, August, p. 2. 'On the subject of the demolition of a group of houses known as the Abu Saud Houses, Mr De Angelis d'Ossat, who witnessed this demolition last June, thought it regrettable' (UNESCO 1969b, p. 5).
12. UNESCO 1984.
13. Myers 1995, p. 3.
14. As of 24 January 2002.
15. 'Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of other States Parties to this Convention' (Article 6.3).
16. Titchen 1995, p. 94.
17. www.unesco.org/whc/nwhc/pages/doc/dc_f1.htm (last visited on April 2002).
18. Pressouyre 1996. The text was originally published in French in 1993, then in Japanese (1995), and finally in English in 1996.
19. Myers 1995, p. 13.
20. UNESCO 1972a, art. 3.
21. Pressouyre 1996, p. 36.
22. Titchen 1995, p. 5.
23. http://www.unesco.org/whc/nwhc/pages/doc/navdoc.htm (last consulted April 2002).
24. See Chapter 2.
25. See http://www.unesco.org/whc/sites/1040.htm (emphasis added).
26. Ibid. The brief description of the site reads: 'The *site of the self-immolation of approximately a thousand Jewish patriots* in the face of a large Roman army, Masada is a symbol of the ancient kingdom of Israel' (emphasis added).
27. In fact this text has been written by the ICOMOS coordinator, Dr Henry Cleere. Dr Cleere, who served in Palestine for the British Army in 1948, defined his political sensitivity as 'Zionist' and confirmed the content of his text, though acknowledging that 'some researchers have recently contested the validity of Josephus Flavius's account'(Cleere 2002).

28. 'The first [UNESCO 18 C/Res. 13] alleged that Israeli occupation adversely affected Palestinian rights in the spheres of education and culture, and called upon the Director-General to monitor the situation; while the third [UNESCO 18 C/Res. 46.1] rejected Israel's application to join the regional group designated "Europe" for the purpose of operational activities' (Wells 1984, p. 5).

29. Hoggart 1978, p. 75, quoted in Wells 1984, p. 29.

30. 'After adoption by Unesco's General Conference in 1974 of the decisions unfavorable to Israel, the USA withheld its assessed share of the Agency's budget (25 per cent) for two years, while France and Switzerland held back a percentage of theirs. Meanwhile, pro-Zionist and/or pro-Israeli bodies organized meetings in the USA and Europe on Unesco–Israeli relations' (Wells 1984, p. 29).

31. See Dutt 1990.

32. 'Those perceiving an Agency as "politicized" at any given point are likely to be those who feel that it fails to advance their interests adequately, or even that it actively damages those interests' (Wells 1984, p. 317).

33. De Angelis D'Ossat 1969, p. 13 (this report was never made public, but is conserved in Lemaire's private archives).

34. See UNESCO 1974b, p. 1, presenting the list of the previous resolutions calling upon Israel to desist from archaeological excavations and alteration of the features of Jerusalem (15 C/Res. 3.342 and 3.343, 82 EX/Dec. 4.4.2, 83 EX/Dec. 4.3.1, 88, EX/Dec. 4.3.1, 89 EX/Dec. 4.4.1, 90 EX/Dec. 4.3.1, and 17 C/Res. 3.422).

35. The technical and political significance of the excavations near the *Haram al-Sharif* has been discussed in Chapter 2. UNESCO commentaries and reactions to the digs are detailed in the next section of this chapter.

36. ICOMOS, an international, non-governmental organization of professionals dedicated to conserving the world's historic monuments and sites founded in 1965 in Warsaw, is, with the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), one of three advisory bodies cooperating with the World Heritage Committee. Its role is to provide the committee with evaluations of cultural sites proposed for inscription on the WHL (http://www.unesco.org/whc/nwhc/pages/doc/dc_f2.htm, last consulted April 2002).

37. UNESCO 1980, § 16.

38. ICOMOS 1980, p. 1.

39. Ibid., p. 3. The Jordanian list begins only in the year AD 335, with a Christian monument consecrated by the Emperor Constantine, but excludes all previous vestiges.

40. See ICOMOS 1980, p. 2.

41. Dr Henry Cleere, during an interview with the author, stressed the importance of the absolute separation between technical and political issues and strongly insisted that ICOMOS should only deal with the former. Hence, according to his perspective, the importance of the recommendation – notwithstanding its political 'naïveté' – lay in its role as a statement of principle (Cleere 2002).

42. UNESCO 1981a, § IV.

43. UNESCO 1981b, 10 and 11 September, World Heritage Committee, First Extraordinary Session, § 9: Jordan Representative Statement: 'I ask you to consider this nomination in the spirit of the unique value of Jerusalem. I ask you to stay within

your competence. Jordan is not using this committee or your deliberations as a vehicle for political claims.'

44. UNESCO 1981b, 30 September, § 13.
45. UNESCO 21 C/4/14, § 7.
46. See UNESCO 1982.
47. See UNESCO 1982.
48. UNESCO 1982, § 30.
49. There are now 18 sites listed in the LWHD, as of 24 January 2002.
50. UNESCO 1982, § 13.
51. For example, this has been the attitude of the Nepalese government that refused the inscription of the Katmandu Valley on the LWHD on this basis (Cleere 2002).
52. The inscription of Dubrovnik was perceived as a 'victory' by Professor Pressouyre – at the time the ICOMOS coordinator for the World Heritage Convention – who strongly pushed for it (Pressouyre 2002). The complex of Angkor, inscribed to the LWHD without the approval of the Cambodian government, could also be compared with Jerusalem (Cleere 2002).
53. The appointment of the Belgian expert by Mr Maheu was later confirmed by his successors – Mr M'Bow and Mr Mayor – and his reporting activity on Jerusalem continued through to the year of his death in 1997.
54. UNESCO 1968, p. 10.
55. UNESCO 1969a, Annex I, p. 2 (emphasis added).
56. UNESCO 1969b, p. 7.
57. Ibid., p. 5.
58. De Angelis D'Ossat 1969 (emphasis added, my translation).
59. UNESCO 1971a.
60. Professor Lemaire, an art historian by training, had already established an international reputation as a brilliant conservator of historic monuments. He had been director of ICOMOS and was among the authors of the 1964 'Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites'. His best-known restoration project was the transformation of the dilapidated *Grand Béguinage* of Leuven into a residential complex for university students. His professional experience as designer of the new university city of Louvain La-Neuve in Belgium also gave him deep insight into issues relating to modern architecture and planning.
61. UNESCO 1971b.
62. 'The excavations in question have not occasioned the demolition of any notable buildings. *It is the extension of the excavations to the north* which have caused the very regrettable demolition of the Madrasa Zawiya al Fakhriya group' (ibid., p. 3, emphasis added).
63. 'The present operation cannot be equated with archaeological excavation of the conventional type. … [it] is justifiable on the score of both the undoubted cultural interest of the structure and of the improvement in sanitation which it will effect when the work is finished and the polluted waters are evacuated by new conduits' (ibid., p. 4).
64. Ibid., p. 2 (emphasis added).
65. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
66. UNESCO 1973, §3.
67. See UNESCO 1973; and 1974b, 9 October.
68. See UNESCO 1974a, 17 May.

69. 'In conclusion, the subsidence of earth due to the tunnel is not unconnected with the movement of the buildings situated above' (UNESCO 1974a, Annex, p. 4).
70. UNESCO 1987. The other quotations in the following lines are from this document.
71. ICOMOS 2001, pp. 74–5.
72. Particularly vague is the proposed foundation date of the two large nineteenth-century synagogues that, according to the report 'were founded there many years ago'. Though such a statement might eventually be accepted for the Hurva, it appears absolutely unacceptable for the Tiferet Yisra'el (Nissan Bek) synagogue founded in 1876.
73. On this subject it might be meaningful to remember that in all his reports, when listing the people he met during the missions, Professor Lemaire used to divide them into three categories: Israelis, Arabs and Christians. The term 'Palestinian' is never used, the term 'Arab' mistakenly stands for 'Muslim', while the term 'Christian' always refers to foreign, predominantly Western, representatives of the churches, and not to Palestinian or Arab members of the clergy.
74. UNESCO 1991, Annex II, § I.2.5.
75. UNESCO n.d. (emphasis added).
76. See UNESCO 1991, Annex I; and UNESCO 1993, Annex I.
77. See UNESCO 1991, Annex I., p. 7.
78. Ibid., p. 8.
79. Ibid.
80. 'Apart from the fact that the tunnel runs all the way along the western wall, *which is of no cultural significance*, the visit [to the tunnel] is of no real interest to anyone other than the experts in the field' (ibid*.,* p. 5, emphasis added).
81. UNESCO 1995b, § 10.
82. UNESCO 1997a, § 6, p. 2.
83. UNESCO 1992, § 11, p. 8.
84. And to the general conference resolution (UNESCO 27 C/Res. 3.8, § 4b).
85. UNESCO 1996, § 12 (emphasis added).
86. See UNESCO 1972b.
87. See UNESCO 1972b.
88. See for instance Dutt 1990; and Hoggart 1978.
89. The author of this research was one of Professor Lemaire's students from 1992 to 1994 at the Centre for Conservation of Historic Towns and Buildings he founded at the Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium.
90. Minsker 2002.
91. See Chapter 3.
92. It is important to remember that responsibility for the *Haram* and its monuments fell directly on the king of Jordan. King Hussein officially renounced Jordanian sovereignty over the city following the Oslo II Agreements in 1996.
93. Myers 1995, pp. 122–4.
94. 'The impressive exhibition was on a brief display last night in Beit Ha'Am for invited guests before being packed for Bruges in Belgium, where it will be displayed May 12–15 at the Conference on Preservation of Historic Cities' (Rabinovich 1975a, p. 2).
95. See Chapter 3.
96. Pressouyre 1999, pp. 3–4.
97. UNESCO 1995a, p. 6, § 35.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 6, § 33.
99. It appears, however, that at an informal level, Lemaire presented the works taking place in Fez and elsewhere to Meron Benvenisti, then responsible for planning in the Jerusalem Municipality: '*Je lui ai fait part des études qui se font dans d'autres villes du monde entre autre à Sfax, à Tunis, à Marrakech et à Fès, exemples qui pourraient incontestablement influencer par les méthodes de conception ce qui devrait se faire à Jérusalem*' (Lemaire 1973).
100. UNESCO 1997a, § 2, p. 1.
101. UNESCO 1997b, p. 3.
102. UNESCO 1997c, p. 2 (emphasis in original document).
103. Former vice-rector of the University of Sorbonne, professor of medieval archaeology, and chairperson of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
104. Pressouyre 1999, § 1.
105. According to Professor Pressouyre (2002), the Israeli foreign ministry wrote a letter of complaint to the UNESCO director-general regarding the content of the report.
106. See UNESCO 2001, § 4 and 7.
107. It should be remembered that, though apparently similar, there is not a perfect symmetry with the previously discussed nomination of the Old City by Jordan. Indeed, the nomination to the WHL of sectors of the city that before 1967 were under Jordanian control by the State of Israel, would be an important political fact and a tacit admission by the international community of Israel's control over the entire city.
108. It seems plausible, though it is still too early to affirm, that a new phase (following the ratification of the 1972 convention by the State of Israel) is now taking shape, contemplating a certain degree of 'cooperation' between Israel and UNESCO for the sake of the increasingly threatened heritage of the Old City.
109. On this subject it is interesting to consider the implicit recognition of the inherent limitations of his mission that Raymond Lemaire expressed in his letter to Mr Taher Masri (Jordanian ambassador at UNESCO) presented on the chapter cover page of Lemaire 1980.
110. UNESCO 1969b, p. 7.

Chapter 6

1. Avigad 1983, pp. 137–9.
2. Iraqi Ministry of Culture n.d., p. 6.
3. 'Tel Beidar excavations have brought about new evidence that testifies to the *genuine nature of the Syrian Arab civilisation* and its deeply rooted history' (Azima 2002, p. 5, emphasis added).
4. See Benvenisti's quotation on the first page of Chapter 4.
5. On the significance and role of the crusaders' remains in Zionist historiography, see Benvenisti 1999a and 2000a.
6. See Benvenisti 2000a, pp. 299–300.
7. See Slyomovics 1998, pp. 52–3.
8. 'In 1994, under the Labour administration of Prime Minister Rabin, Israel's Ministry of Tourism expressed an unprecedented interest in developing the tourist infrastructure of Palestinian villages in the Galilee for an explicitly Jewish–Israeli tourist population' (Stein 2001).

9. See Algazy 2000a; and Nir 2001a.
10. See Ragen 2000.
11. The traditional '*ablaq*' masonry style of the Mamluk monuments, which in Jerusalem is typically made of strips of red and white limestone, is characterized in Safed and Tiberias by the presence of alternate rows of black (basalt from the area around the Sea of Galilee) and white stone blocks creating an extremely contrasted decorative element.
12. See for instance, the map reproduced in Humphreys and Tilbury 1997, p. 300.
13. 'A visitor to Safed today can easily locate Jewish historical sites. … But the same visitor will vainly search for mosques, Sufi places of worship (*zawyat*), and holy burial sites. Such places did not disappear under the ruins of the earthquakes that struck Safed during the 18th and 19th centuries, but rather after the 1948 war. For example, the mosques: Djame' Al Ahmar Al Daheri (the red mosque named after the Mamluk sultan El Daher Baybars, who built it during the 13th century), today hosts private events, like weddings. El Jukandari, in the Kurdish quarter on the hill opposite the central bus station, is now a public park. There was also Djame' Al Ghar (the Cave Mosque) in the centre of Safed. … Today, the site serves as a synagogue' (Algazy 2000b).
14. See Kark 1990.
15. See Tamari n.d.
16. LeVine 1999, p. 196.
17. Portugali 1991, p. 46.
18. Ibid., pp. 46–7.
19. The residents, however, have generally not accepted the new names and still refer to the streets by their ancient names. See Abu Lughod 2001; and Nir 2001b.
20. See Falah 1996, pp. 823–57.
21. 'This is the first time that the Project Renewal Programme has been applied to a non-Jewish neighbourhood using funds raised by Diaspora Jewish communities' (Portugali 1991, p. 49).
22. Galili and Nir 2000.
23. See Schechter 2001.
24. LeVine 1999, p. 434.
25. Actually, the old city buildings were only rehabilitated and more or less successfully 'adapted' to a modern life style, but no scientific restoration took place in Jaffa. A simplistic 'orientalist' approach determined the choices of the architects working there, among whom was Sa'adia Mandel who, a few years later, took part in Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter reconstruction where he followed similar guidelines.
26. 'The city of Jaffa was then re-imagined as a historically Jewish space, one that was "liberated from the Arab hands", as the Museums and tourist brochures inform visitors' (LeVine 1999, p. 426).
27. Ibid., p. 438.
28. See Coussin 1999.
29. Ibid.
30. See Anonymous 1999.
31. Data from Rahamimoff 1997, p. 14.
32. Cohen 1973, p. 5.
33. 'Acre's Old City was designated for Arab occupancy while new quarters were constructed beyond the Mandate new city for the Jews. In the early postwar years,

Jews were directed to housing in the Old City, but gradually they were relocated to the new neighborhoods' (Rubin 1974, p. 3).

34. Efrat 1984, pp. 106–7.
35. According to the first plans for the development of the city, Acre was meant to become a 'workers' city with heavy industries (Cohen 1973, p. 20 footnote 22).
36. Acre 1962, in Dichter 1973.
37. See Rubin 1974, p. 30.
38. 'On a trip to the village of Mekher [Maqar] on 12/8/88 it was found that only 200 housing units had been built, compared with the plan for 1400 by the year 1980, and today (1990) there is a tendency to move out of the neighborhood and back to Akko' (Khamaisi 1990, p. 106 footnote).
39. The original owners having been forced into exile, the semi-official housing company *Amidar* 'inherited' the houses from the Custodian of Absentee Properties in the early 1950s.
40. See Rubin 1974, p. 3.
41. Kesten 1993, p. 83 (emphasis added). 'To our mind a systematic investigation of the city is called for, whose goals should be – to trace the remains of the crusader city embedded in today's Old City, to classify single sites and urban schemes and, ultimately, to clear and clean them, restore them, and prepare them for public showing' (Kesten 1993, p. 9).
42. See Humphreys and Tilbury 1997, p. 256.
43. See Rahamimoff 1997.
44. See http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom01.htm#1042 (last visited 20 August 2002).
45. Ibid.
46. Already in 1973, Eric Cohen had warned that a certain number of Arab residents in the Old City had to be kept for tourism purposes (Cohen 1973, p. 9).
47. Schaeffer 2002 (the interview took place in Italian – my translation).
48. Efrat 1984, p. 101.
49. I, the author, have personally taken part in a number of trips to Acre with West Bank architects and students. These trips, at the edge of the 'legality' imposed by the Israelis, were organized jointly by Jerusalem residents and West Bank residents at a time when the political climate was still optimistic and Israeli police checkpoint controls were particularly loose.
50. The Israeli celebration of this historical phase, which saw the mass murder of thousands of Jews at the hands of Christian knights, should be underlined.
51. Such a strategy, for instance, could be developed within the framework put forth in a collective article on Acre and other heritage sites, published on the net by the Ename Centre for Public Archaeology and Heritage Preservation: 'The main challenge is finding a way to preserve the archaeological and heritage remains, encourage community pride and interest, improve the general living standards of the community, develop the presentation of Akko's past and still preserve the integrity of the community' (Killebrew et al. 2001).
52. This section has been published as an article. See Ricca 2005, pp. 47–61.
53. See Sellick 1993, p. 40.
54. Today the majority of the population of Bethlehem is Muslim, but the landowners and the political elite of the city, including the mayor, are Christian.
55. The police station was later used by the Israeli police and became one of the symbols of the Israeli occupation of the city. The PNA decided to demolish the

building and create in its place a 'Peace Centre', a cultural centre with conference halls and exhibition area – completed in the year 2000 – meant for both the local population and the large groups of tourists who daily visit the cradle of Christianity. The building, designed by a Swedish architect and financed by Swedish funds, represents one of the most interesting architectural designs in the West Bank. It has been heavily damaged by the Israelis in their reoccupation of the city during the Second Intifada.

56. See Coon 1992.
57. Rabin 1985, quoted in Shadid 1989, p. 149.
58. Touqan 1995 (emphasis added).
59. For a complete discussion of the text of the Oslo accords, see Watson 2000.
60. The PNA could only control land and issue building permits in the zones declared 'Area A' according to the Oslo agreements, and for many years this related only to about 3 per cent of the West Bank land area.
61. The situation regarding the urban heritage of Gaza City and the Gaza Strip has not been taken into consideration in this brief examination. It is important to stress, however, that even though the economic condition of Gaza, and the enormous problems caused by the absence of infrastructure and by overpopulation had priority in the plans of the administration, the often unknown and underestimated cultural heritage of the Strip has not been forgotten and restoration plans for Gaza's main mosque (originally a Crusader church) and other important monuments, were also put forth by the PNA.
62. See Davidson 1998, p. 41.
63. The massacre took place on 25 February 1994.
64. Dr Qawasmeh is a civil engineer specializing in traditional building materials. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Odessa in the former USSR.
65. Hebron Rehabilitation Committee 1999, p. 11.
66. See Sellick 1993, p. 53.
67. In 1998, for instance, the author of this research, in his capacity of conservation architect, held a three-month restoration course for the architects and engineers of the HRC, supported by UNDP and organized by Riwaq, a Palestinian NGO devoted to the conservation of vernacular Palestinian built heritage.
68. See Hecht 1998, p. 18.
69. 'On its establishment, the HRC defined its main goals and worked towards realizing them: (1) to preserve, enhance and safely transmit the cultural heritage of the old city to future generations; (2) to restore normal life to the old city and stop the emigration of its residents; (3) to bring in new residents to live in the old city; (4) to surround the settlements and prevent their expansion; (5) to confirm the Arab Islamic character of the old city and stop its 'Judaization'; and (6) to strengthen ties between the residents and "their" old city' (Hebron Rehabilitation Committee 1999, p. 5, my translation).
70. By Israeli military order (no. 197) the HRC was prevented from working on 20 houses. For a brief analysis of the HRC/settler relationship in the city and of the Israeli army's attempts to control the rehabilitation efforts, see Hecht 1998.
71. The complexity of the ownership issue explains the presence of a lawyer in the engineering office. According to the plan, for the first five years the investment in restoration is considered in lieu of rent, but after that initial phase rent would be charged at market rates (see Hecht 1998).

72. Qawasmeh 1999.
73. A large central plot has in fact been turned into a public playing area for children and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) has offered to provide the equipment for it.
74. 'The PA [PNA], the project's main sponsor at the outset, has put up $1 million, including the salaries of the committee members. The Arab Fund for Social and Economical Development, in Kuwait, has added US$ 1.6 million. And the Islamic Bank in Saudi Arabia has contributed 4.5 million in two instalments' (Hecht 1998).
75. Hebron Rehabilitation Committee 1999, p. 13.
76. See Sellick 1993.
77. See Hebron Rehabilitation Committee 1999, p. 5.
78. Thomas Thompson (1998, p. 28) has already commented on the use of the term 'Arab Canaanites'.
79. Bethlehem 2000.
80. Ibid.
81. The Bethlehem 2000 ministry was meant to last as long as the celebrations, namely until Easter 2001. In the June 2002 reorganization of the PNA government Dr Nabeel Kassis was appointed minister of tourism and, as planned, the Bethlehem 2000 ministry ceased to exist.
82. The symbolic and 'normalizing' effect of these urban fixtures was not lost on the Israeli army. One of the first actions it undertook during the reoccupation of the Palestinian cities – and especially in Bethlehem – has been their systematic destruction with tanks (See Levy 2002).
83. Actually, the Bethlehem municipality prepared the plans for Manger Square and the Peace Centre.
84. Al Hassan 2002.
85. Though, jointly with the nearby villages of Bayt Sahour and Bayt Jala, counting some 80,000 inhabitants, Bethlehem is actually more a village than an urban centre and its historic core is less dense than those of Jerusalem or Hebron, while large parts of its built heritage is composed of late nineteenth-century Christian religious structures built according to Western architectural models.
86. See for instance, Benvenisti 1999b.
87. See Arnold 2000.
88. A naïve painting in the Protestant Cultural Centre of Bethlehem depicts a Last Supper in which Christ wears a *keffyah,* the traditional black and white scarf that has become the symbol of Palestinian struggle.
89. A minor, but telling, example of this attitude was the ban imposed on Israeli hotels against holding parties on either Christmas 1999 or New Year's Eve 2000 (which occurred on Shabbat), if they wanted to keep the essential '*kosher*' label for their enterprises.
90. For a reflection on the overall Bethlehem 2000 project, see Welfare Association 2001.
91. As a minor proof of this fact we might consider the subjects portrayed on the PNA official stamps. The yearly set of Christmas stamps, with representations of Jesus and the Virgin Mary, or the Bethlehem 2000 issue are probably one-offs in the whole Arab world.
92. When the Israeli authorities imposed new rules on the Palestinian residents. To keep their Israeli identity card (Palestinian Jerusalemites, who are considered

'permanent residents' but not 'citizens', do not hold Israeli passports but have blue Israeli identity cards allowing them to move freely within Israel) the residents had to demonstrate that their 'centre of life' was indeed in Jerusalem. As many Jerusalemites used to live outside the Israeli-defined city borders, to comply with the regulation they began to rent out and exploit every available room in the old city that could serve as an official home address. The overall effect of this new policy, which was meant to reduce the number of Palestinian residents in Jerusalem, was the opposite in that it created an artificial and mainly administrative mass return to the old city, which contributed to the further deterioration of its already threatened traditional fabric.

93. Since 1997, Dr Shadia Touqan has been in charge of the programme. She holds a Ph.D. in urban planning and has worked with UNESCO in Yemen and in Bethlehem, where she contributed to the drawing up of the emergency action plan for the rehabilitation of the city.

94. The establishment of a fund to conserve the Islamic heritage of the old city was supported by UNESCO and by Professor Lemaire. Indeed, confidential documents from Lemaire's private archives show that the first contacts on this matter date from the early 1980s. The government of Israel approved in principle economic help from Arab countries for the conservation of Jerusalem's Islamic heritage so long as it was channelled through the *Waqf* and that no 'political' use, publicity or propaganda was made of the deal (see Lemaire 1984).

95. See Chapter 5.

96. This survey has been carried out for the Welfare Association by the Palestinian NGO 'Riwaq', under the direction of Dr Nazmi Al Jobeh (from Bir Zeit University on the West Bank), through a house-to-house enquiry made by Palestinian architectural and history students residing in the Old City. Although necessarily incomplete, it represents the first and only attempt to detail the physical and social situation of the Old City and its needs.

97. The Old City residents, like all inhabitants of impoverished and socially decaying neighbourhoods, are an extremely complex social group. The long-lasting absence of any form of control over the city has had a dramatic effect on the population and abuses and drug-related problems are common. As far as conservation is concerned, this means that the residents often try to profit from any possible grant – whether from Palestinian or Israeli sources – and often do not react as politically-committed Palestinian groups would expect or hope them to do. Acquiring the respect and the support of this community is an essential prerequisite for any planning activity in the Old City. Welfare Association social programmes and 'rescue' restoration projects carried out over the last five to six years have generally contributed towards giving them the necessary credibility among the residents.

98. See Welfare Association Technical Office 1999, p. 3.

99. Like the Hab Rummam House, in Bab Hutta neighbourhood, transformed into a computer department for Al Quds University.

100. Welfare Association Technical Office 1999, p. 11.

101. Notably, the renewal of a small room in the St Mark convent (belonging to the Syrian church) and a larger project for the Coptic church.

102. See Welfare Association Technical Office 2002, p. 178.

103. Welfare Association Technical Office 1999, p. 15.

104. Indeed, relations between the WA and the PNA are particularly complex. The unofficial 'agreement' with the Israelis was not to put the work carried out on Islamic heritage to political use, and that the agreement would collapse if the presence of the PLO and later the PNA became apparent. However, it is obvious that there was some 'informal' contact between the WA and PNA over the issue of Jerusalem's old city. The CDC has been very careful, however, to maintain its independence *vis-à-vis* the PNA administrative structure.

105. For a partially similar ideological use of history and heritage in Syria under Assad's regime, See Valter 2002, pp. 233–81.

106. 'Dissonance in heritage refers to the discordance or lack of agreement and consistency as to the meaning of heritage. …   [It] appears to be intrinsic to the very nature of heritage and should not be regarded as an unforeseen or unfortunate by-product' (Graham et al. 2000, p. 24).

107. Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, p. 46.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid., p. 32.

Conclusion

1. Mann 1968.
2. René Maheu in UNESCO 1969b, p. 7.
3. Silberstein 1999, p. 18.
4. Benvenisti (1996, p. 148) describes the impact of nineteenth-century European architecture on the Old City: 'It quickly became clear that these structures – massive, lofty, and impressive as they might be – could not make a significant imprint on the Old City. The crowding of the buildings, the enclosure of the courtyards within stone walls, and the limited perspectives caused the individual buildings to become lost in the landscape. What is the point of domes and towers if they merge in a uniform panorama? Perhaps the international competitors realized that, in the rivalry over the visual symbols of the Old City, they had lost before even beginning: the works of the "backward natives" would endure eternally as the symbols of the Old City. No individual or nation would ever succeed in obscuring the image of the Dome of the Rock, the walls and gates of the city, or David's Tower, even with the construction of higher domes and thicker walls'.
5. Graham et al. 2000, p. 39.
6. As the low-profile and soul-searching celebration of Israel's fiftieth anniversary have demonstrated.
7. Cohen 2000.

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The Wailing Wall
(Photo Pini 2006)

Structural Consolidation
(Photo Pini 2006)

Plan of the 'four quarters' of the Old City of Jerusalem (Source: Dehan, 1984)



Jewish Quarter street (Photo Pini 2006)

Facing page

Top: View of the Old City from the Jewish cemetery of the Mount of Olives with the dome of the Tiferet Israel synagogue – 1919 (© Musée Albert-Khan – Département des Hauts-de-Seine)

Bottom: The Abu Saud complex – 1919 (© Musée Albert-Khan – Département des Hauts-de-Seine)

These rare images, probably the first colour images of the Old City, were created with autochrome, the first viable colour photograph process. Introduced in France in 1907 by the Lumière brothers, it used a glass plate covered with tiny grains of starch, dyed to act as primary-colour filters.

Plan of the Old City of Jerusalem showing the expropriated area of the Jewish Quarter
(Source: Gardi, n.d.)

The 'Tunnel'
(Photo Pini 2006)

Example of Jewish
Quarter architecture
(Photo Pini 2006)

Jewish Quarter Square
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Nebenzahl House
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Orthodox children playing football
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The Cardo
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The ruins of the
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Sephardi Synagogue
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