TRANSNATIONAL AFRICA AND GLOBALIZATION
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Transnational Africa and Globalization

Edited by
Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome and Olufemi Vaughan
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Chapter 1

Transnational Africa and Globalization: Introduction

Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome and Olufemi Vaughan

This book grew out of many years of conversations between the coeditors, two Nigerian immigrant scholars, who stayed in the United States to pursue academic careers after their graduate studies in the United States and the United Kingdom. Incubated in the context of globalism, our dialogue crisscrossed layered spheres that intersect national and transnational spaces. These conversations always returned to how we as African scholars—navigate our way around the culture of Western academia where we have earned our living in the past two decades. As first generation African scholars in Western universities, our ambivalence toward the U.S. academic world hardly can be surprising. What is noteworthy for discussion is how we navigated pathways that crisscrossed temporal national and transnational spaces. With the benefit of hindsight, we now see how our conversations have been interlocking discourses that revolved around the Western academe (especially where we work), conditions in African universities where we expect to work—and were expected to work, and everyday lived experiences that underscore the relations between homeland and Diaspora. Spanning two decades, these private conversations, in varying degrees, reflected the experience of many African immigrant scholars. They even complemented the professional priorities of a new generation of our American-Africanist colleagues, who, through their research and teaching, seamlessly traverse African transnational and Diasporic experiences as intellectual spaces.
Conversations that started as junior faculty members in two New York City-area universities in the early 1990s followed a pattern of professional advancement often associated with the faculty at the initial stages of their careers. It led to the convening of symposia, presentation of scholarly papers in conferences, and seminar panels. Along the way, we were fortunate to benefit from the generosity of senior colleagues, and as we rose through the professional ranks, we hope we were able to lend support to some junior colleagues as well. Our recurring themes revolved around intersections of race, gender, class, and citizenship within national, and transnational, currents and crosscurrents. In those earlier years of our transnational sojourn, each time we took on a problematic issue, we would return to our Nigerian roots to make sense of the complicated social and political forces of the African postcolonial world, where the processes of decolonization and globalization shaped our national and transnational identities.

Following the initial euphoria of independence in the 1960s, many African nation-states were embroiled in economic and political crises. These crises, in part, were a product of the serious challenges to integrate “civil” society into the agencies of the nation-state through the formidable task of developing national processes, practices, and structures of accountable governance. This quickly resulted in a concentration of resources in the political class that emerged as the custodians of the postcolonial nation-state, generating intense struggles. At the core of this enduring crisis is the structural imbalance that resulted from a colonial order that incorporated African societies into a restructuring by modern political leaders responding to the unfolding political, situations created by national and global forces. This gave rise to new transnational dynamics that shape the content and structure of this book.

Transnational migration is defined by Glick, Basch, and Blanc as the forging and sustenance of social relationships that connect the immigrants’ home countries with their countries of settlement, and the participation of immigrants in cross-border social networks that straddle countries of origin and settlement and allow them to live dual lives. They differ from sojourners to the extent that they do not seek settlement and integration into the “institutions, localities and patterns of daily life in their country of settlement, but simultaneously remain connected, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national events in the countries from which they emigrated.”

Africa always has created powerful images in the popular imagination. Africa today for many is like a mother who has lost many of her offspring to far-flung Diasporas. For many thrown into these Diasporas, Mother Africa either is embraced warmly or regarded with trepidation. In our
era, transnational Africa means that Africa’s old and new Diasporas are thrown together in interesting combinations that challenge common understandings of identity.

Transnationalization is shaped by globalization, which should be seen as a historical process that has been with us for as long as individuals have acted upon the desire to expand the known world by moving from one geographical location to another. If globalization describes a relationship of interdependency between states, its presumed opportunities include the engendering of free trade through the establishment or strengthening of a market system. This leads to:

- Technological exchange
- Rapid diffusion of technology
- Rapid transmission of new ideas
- A communication revolution that transforms how we understand and represent time and space, because of an increased capacity to engage in real time communication
- Increased coordination and management of the world’s economy so that imbalances and wild vacillations are anticipated and prevented
- Diminution of the state
- Deterritorialization

Critics of globalization contend that its negative effects include the structural advantages it provides the industrial economies of the North to dominate the global economy. The North also packages embedded liberalism as a model for other countries to adopt, while not making the requisite commitment to guarantee success. Embedded liberalism, in this sense, means that liberal values did not guide the West’s engagement with the colonized peripheries. And the rights that are assumed to be standard in the West were not extended to the peoples of the colonized peripheries. Nationalism and independence struggles were expressions of the claims laid by the colonized on the rights of citizenship. Toward the end of the twentieth century, the South’s retreat in the face of the seeming triumph of untrammeled liberalism seemed to be an expression of confirmation that there exist no viable options to neoliberalism, and the presumption that political and economic liberalism are self-reinforcing. Given the grimness of the terrain, what have been the intellectual responses of Africanist scholars to globalization? What problems were encountered in the past? What are the prospects for the future?

What is needed are critical scholarly responses to globalization by Africanists. By this, we mean responses that systematically analyze processes globalization with a view to revealing the erroneous assumptions
of conventional theories. Given the straitjackets that guide disciplinary boundaries, most African Africanist scholars initially were caught up in the examination of esoteric matters that bear little relevance to the lived reality of the masses of the people. Furthermore, during earlier discussions of globalization, social scientists—notably economists and political scientists—monopolized the subject as natural experts to whom all others must defer. With the deepening global crisis of the last decade, this has changed significantly. Today, there is more interdisciplinary analyses of the process of globalization. The chapters in this book are a testament to this wider interdisciplinary exploration of globalization in African national and transnational contexts.

This inquiry necessarily considers past problems that bring into sharp relief the nature and extent of the crisis of postcolonial African states. For most African countries, 1975 was a watershed year. African states began to experience balance of payment problems that were difficult to resolve. These problems did not respond to conventional remedies recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In brief, the conventional approach was to consider balance of payments’ shortfalls as short-term imbalances that would respond to the right mix of policies.

In many ways, the debates of the 1970s and ‘80s still allowed for voices that identified the problem as not simply a lack of skill and will in the state, but the proliferation of venal elites and a lack of institutions to support the adjustments that were required as policy responses to the balance of payment shortfalls. By the late 1980s and the ‘90s, all debate was foreclosed because of the overwhelming influence of “The Washington Consensus,” forged by the ascendancy of the United States under President Ronald Reagan, its expressed interest in building “a new world order” under President George H. W. Bush, and the collaboration with the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This world order rejected Keynesian economics and embraced neoclassical economic principles. These major perspectives of the Washington Consensus were articulated by the IMF and the World Bank.

In this new order, progress is packaged in the form of a combination of Structural Adjustment Programs and democratization projects. Both processes are presented as positively linked one with the other. Pressured by the huge balance of payment deficits and collapsing economies, African political elites have abdicated the responsibilities of economic planning to the prescriptions of the international financial agencies.

Post–world economic meltdown reforms notwithstanding, multilateral organizations are in charge of the process of determining African economic policies. Their influence is obvious in situations where advice to African countries on managing their political economy has depended
on what the United States and its allies consider relevant lessons of history, the choice of appropriate policy options and the decisions on implementation timetables. As a consequence, many liberal analysts have embraced the prescription of the Washington Consensus. It is evident that the hallmark of the New World Order (until the Great recession) was to shun analysts with contrary perspectives on Africa’s economic crisis. The Washington Consensus is typified by annual global summits such as the annual Davos Conference.

The ascendancy of this conference on globalization is exemplified by the gathering of the gurus of this bright new age of globalization. Bill Gates, George Soros, and other mega-billionaires are in good company with pop icons, who have solid philanthropic credentials, who take center stage in these summits. Current and past leaders of the global South hover around to make pleas for help. The wealthy and famous make lofty claims about the inevitability of globalization, its promise, its incontrovertible logic—statements that are beamed around the world instantaneously and repeated ad infinitum until the next club meeting. African technocrats and heads of state succumb, to the seemingly incontrovertible logic of economic globalization. The only panacea for Africa’s economic recovery lies in the orthodoxy of neoliberal reforms, as expressed through SAP, which have been changed to Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs.

These dynamics have been reinforced and shaped by the hegemonic ideology and praise of globalization, especially in mainstream Western news media. Those who read The Economist or peruse Africa Confidential regularly see enlightened journalists’ assessments of how Africa refuses, or is unable, to measure up, purely because of a lack of skill and will, as well as the ineptitude of its leadership. Similarly, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Cable News Network, Voice of America, and others with global reach beam near-identical assessments across the world. The same ideas, like the proverbial “bad penny,” turn up in the news media and scholarly analyses in African countries.

Politically, leaders of authoritarian African regimes and movements are now the proponents of democratic transitions. Thus, former military rulers Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria were joined by leaders of successful guerilla movements like Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni as the new African democrats. Initially, it was assumed by liberal scholars that democracy was moving in a relentless series of waves (Huntington) throughout the world, but this optimism now is slightly modified by acknowledging what most Africans know—that there are illiberal democracies\(^4\) masking the real thing.

It is inevitable that such varied dimensions will complicate analyses of globalization and transnationalism. Consequently, it is useful to take
a diachronic approach in these analyses because this enduring economic crisis have deep roots in a prevailing colonial order that came to a head in the earlier years of independence. In the specific case of the editors’ native Nigeria, all this came a little bit later in the mid-1980s when the failures of the developmental state became apparent. As products of elite expectations, we very much were aware of the linear conversations on development and governance, and the frantic desire to catch up with the development of the West. This theme is discussed in Mora McLean’s chapter, which explores the problematic relations between Africa and its old Diaspora, as expressed by the desire of the African Union to harness the economic power of the Diaspora for African development, albeit with no thought of reciprocity or consideration of how Africa’s Diasporas came to be.

As African scholars and Western Africanists preoccupied with contemporary African problems, we steadily are drawn into some of the issues that have engaged the attention of African-American scholars in the post-civil rights era, especially those dealing with social alienation in academia and reactions to racism in the wider society. It is instructive to note here that most African scholars arrived in American universities in the late 1980s and early ’90s during the cultural wars of American multiculturalism. With a need for universities to correct the lack of black scholars in the American academia at that time, African scholars became beneficiaries of the opportunities that unfolded. In many quarters, African scholars might have been preferred, in part, because their priorities were focused on homeland concerns and removed from the exigencies of U.S. racial politics. Debutant African scholars had to ally with U.S.-Africanist scholars, most of them white, even as they strived to sustain the federally funded African Studies academic programs, notably at Northwestern, Wisconsin-Madison, Indiana-Bloomington, Howard, and others. Those centers that were incubated in the politics of the Cold War and African decolonization, had lost their importance to the U.S. foreign policy and national security establishment in the post–Cold War era, following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

The questions that traverse the complicated terrain of decolonization and globalism have important transnational African dimensions, as discussed eloquently in chapters by Mora McLean, Rod Bush, and Melanie Bush. These chapters construct durable historical, comparative, global, and Diasporic bridges that are now indispensable in intellectually serious and progressive dialog among African-American, African Diasporic, and Africanist scholars. More specifically, they speak to the pressing questions of how do we teach and research African Studies. Or African-American Studies? How about African Diaspora studies in the
global age? While this is not directly our mission here, these questions indirectly shape the bulk of the work in this volume.

In keeping with one of our major objectives, we start with personal narratives of our own experience as graduate students and professional academics in Western universities in the global era. We explore vexing questions cataloged above, including globalism, African state disintegration, national and transnational flows, and the relationships between homeland and Diaspora.

Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome came to the United States as a graduate student in the early 1980s and experienced the beginning of the SAP in Nigeria from afar. The phenomenon had such a profound impact on her that as a Ph.D. student at Columbia University, she focused her doctoral dissertation on the complex interaction between the economic liberalization intended by the architects of SAP and the political liberalization that accompanied it. Okome did not find Columbia's political science department welcoming, nurturing, or particularly interested in Africa. She struggled to stay focused on her studies and balance schoolwork with life’s challenging responsibilities as a young mother. But her upbringing in a Yorùbá family and the affirmation she received while growing up in southwestern Nigeria contributed tremendously to her resilience. Given the dearth of African expertise and interest in Columbia’s political science department, she also connected with African and Africanist scholars in other disciplines, particularly history, and outside Columbia for the same reasons. This led her to embrace an interdisciplinary approach to her work.

As a young scholar, first at Fordham University and then at Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Okome maintained her interest in Africa, but resisted the allure of becoming the African expert without borders and boundaries. She also developed an interest in Gender Studies, globalization, and African migration because of her observations of those phenomena and their effects on Africa and Africans, including herself, over the course of her stay in the United States.

As a graduate student at Oxford during the earlier years of SAP, Olufemi Vaughan recalls a different experience from Okome, revealing the multiple dimensions of African experiences during a period of significant change. This moment was a period of important Africanist teaching and research at the collegiate university, with well over a dozen distinguished Africanists who took as a given the centrality of African experiences in their work. This excitement made Oxford a good destination for graduate students throughout the United Kingdom and the commonwealth in African Studies. While Africa generally was marginalized in mainstream Oxford curriculum, Africanist research and teaching managed to sustain
a vibrant community of excellent scholars and students. In hindsight, for Vaughan, this encouraged a deep engagement with interdisciplinary Africanist research in the humanistic social sciences. It did not take too long for Vaughan, a political scientist and historian, to realize that you could not seriously study African nation-states without a distinctive interdisciplinary perspective.

As one of only two Africanists at Stony Brook University, a major State University of New York research center, Vaughan was appointed to a tenure-track position in 1990, where he soon realized the lure of this vibrant world of Africanist research and teaching. In his new environment, it was tempting to become the—“go-to guy” on all things Africa. This unsolicited attention was affirming because it revealed the need for Africanist teaching and research at Stony Brook during an era of American multiculturalism and globalism. More importantly, a joint appointment in Africana Studies and history encouraged a perspective that integrated African and African Diaspora studies as a worthwhile focus of teaching and research. Yet this narrow space of interdisciplinary study, in retrospect, provided an environment that allowed African studies to be approached in new and interesting ways, insisting on the interconnections between African and African Diaspora studies. With broad regional and global encounters at its core, this Africana Studies approach liberated Vaughan from the more tedious methodological requirements of some social science disciplines, and allowed him to explore more fluid analytical approaches and theoretical perspectives.

In offering our personal narratives, we have tried to be careful not to project our experiences as typical of what it means to be an African immigrant scholar in the United States. Clearly, the experiences of African scholars vary significantly along national, social, and gender lines, and the experiences of those African scholars who were students in the United States will differ from those who already were established scholars in African universities. The vast majority of African immigrant scholars that came to this country in the late 1980s and early 1990s were established male scholars at various African universities who, at least, initially, seemed to have transitioned to their new positions in American universities relatively smoothly. Conversely, many African female academics working in American universities experienced more difficult transitions because of their smaller numbers and the typical problems of race and gender at most universities.

In this volume, we consider transnationalism and globalization on different terms. As African scholars and western Africanists, we look at the relationships between homeland and Diaspora in complicated ways. Lacey Andrews Gale’s chapter analyzes how Darfurian refugees have
struggled to remake their life following the trauma of displacement, and Moha Ennaji’s chapter lays out the formidable challenges that await African undocumented migrants in their quest for a better life in western Europe. In her chapter, “Living the Good Life? Remittance-Sending Among Darfurian Refugees in Maine,” Gale contends that Darfurian immigrants and refugees in Portland, Maine, are building resilient and adaptive communities and shaping new moral orders for interlocking national and transnational social networks, through remittances and other support systems. Darfurian women juggle numerous family responsibilities on local and transnational levels, while actively navigating the demands of employment, education, activism, and advocacy for the political struggles of their homeland. Darfurian men, on the other hand, negotiate many formal and informal employment issues to generate income for their families. Ennaji’s chapter on the migration of young undocumented African immigrants exposes the profound dangers on the pathways to Europe. On arrival at their destination, African undocumented immigrants confront punitive conditions, with opportunities for upward mobility few and far between.

The end of the Cold War brought other harsh realities for Africa. Debts caused by the Arab-Israeli wars and Middle East oil crises of the 1970s gave more power to the IMF and the World Bank to dictate austerity measures imposed on African states. These came in the form of SAPs. These austerity measures contributed to the rending of the social fabric. One of the recommendations of the World Bank was that African states concentrate on primary education and cut subsidies to higher education. Budget rationalization also meant that the IMF encouraged more belt-tightening. Even primary education was subject to cost cutting, which imposed hardships on the poorest of the poor and restricted their access to educational opportunities. The African educational system suffered a precipitous decline. This situation coincided with a relaxation of immigration laws as applied to intellectuals and skilled labor, including Africans in many western countries. Consequently, there has been an intense flow of African academics and students to the West. Once in the West, African university teachers had to make radical mental, cultural, and pedagogical adjustments in their new teaching environment. For Numulundah Florence, a Kenyan scholar, a diverse New York City university setting can be difficult when teachers insist on uncompromising adherence to teaching pedagogies. African immigrant teachers face even more challenges. Applying critical feminist and multicultural theories, she calls for the democratization of classroom environments but emphasizes that there are complexities in social interactions that are especially problematic when there are few shared values. If teaching is to be effective
and learning is to occur in our globalized world, the challenges of conflicting values and sensibilities must be acknowledged and confronted in a manner that changes both teacher and student and contributes to new understandings of the consequences of globalization, transnationalization, migration, Diaspora, gender, and generation.

African Diasporic and transnational flows and waves, whether in terms of people, cultures, religions, ideas, or materials, go back and forth in many directions in and outside the African continent. For example, the most important receiver of transnational flows of African populations is not Europe or North America, but Southern Africa, particularly South Africa. Consequently, it would be misleading to present Africa’s Diasporic and transnational connections solely in terms of the West and Africa. These complicated processes are not unilinear that simply flow north and south. For example, to understand slavery in the United States, one must appreciate the history of the Atlantic world. Moreover, beyond our current preoccupation with disruptions that resulted from the crises of the African postcolony and twentieth-century notions of black internationalism, African societies have had much to say about what constitutes African-American and African Diaspora experiences, including vibrant Afro-Brazilian communities and Saro communities, as well as the founding of the West African states of Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Immigration and the demographics of the African Diaspora demonstrate that African brainpower is an essential part of the successful administration of many Western establishments. Many of these brains also are paradoxically invalidated as irrelevant in their own home countries. Many cannot find jobs that pay a living wage in their own countries of origin. Many leave for further education only to have the tides of globalization turn against their countries. With options foreclosed, some governments quibbled, officials muttered under their breaths, and some resisted in multiple ways. Eventually, all succumbed to international pressures to adjust to demands from the world economy. With varying levels of dedication and abilities, they devalued, slashed budgets, privatized, cut subsidies, and went to great lengths to attract foreign investment. Doing these demonstrable acts of visible commitment to the logic of the market was predicted to be tough, but eventually, they were told, there was light at the end of the tunnel—economic recovery. To grease the wheels, IMF and World Bank loans were used as carrots, and the threatened withdrawal of such loans—and worse still—restrictions of further access to any kind of future credit as sticks. Many African immigrants who had used immigration as a temporary survival measure for a limited time began to see their sojourn as a permanent condition. For others, their protests against neoliberal policies led to repression by the regime.
in power. For still others, protests and complaints against government policies are luxuries. Most Africans face the perpetual prospect of combining multiple livelihood strategies to eke out a living that is still grossly inadequate to sustain their families. If they are scholars, they actively seek any opportunity to secure consultancies with Western research agencies, international organizations, and universities. When they finally secure opportunities as consultants in their own countries, they often are paid considerably less than their Western counterparts and denied the most basic professional obligations. Soon, many embark on the prolonged process of seeking better economic opportunities, especially in Western countries.

Consequently, Vaughan in “Africa, Transnationalism, & Globalization: An Overview” contends that a major development of the impact of globalization in Africa lies in new national and transnational social networks within African regions and between Africa and other regions—especially the Western world. In the context of globalization, this dynamic process involves arenas of national and transnational population flows that have engendered ruptures and reconstitution of real and imagined African communities. Vaughan contends that, despite these challenges, African immigrants consistently have demonstrated profound creativity and imagination. The real story of transnational Africa and globalization is about how human ingenuity, adaptability, and resilience are shaping social movements and civic groups and wrestling with the transformative impact of globalization in national and transnational contexts. The formidable challenges confronting transnational Africa, regardless of the resourcefulness of African peoples, Vaughan concludes, are nevertheless rooted in the failed assumptions of the postcolony that was derived from the colonial state.

With similar discussions of predictable transitions and continuities between colonial and postcolonial systems, Anthonia Kalu in “Gendered Migrations: African Identities and Globalization,” examines the nature and scope of colonial and postindependence African practices that has led to self-negation among African men and women, with grim implications for the development of African societies in this age of globalization. Following the euphoria of imposed citizenship and constitutional democracy, after the attainment of political independence, African elites embraced superficial nationalism that negated local aspirations and advanced narrow individual and sectarian interests. Devoid of real rights and obligations of citizenship for local people, the priorities of the custodians of the nation-state lacked moral authority, with disastrous consequences for local aspirations, especially those of women, irrespective of social standing. With particular emphasis on the emergent African
Western-educated elite, Kalu concludes, straightforward transitions from the colonial to neocolonial order have had adverse consequences not only in African states, but also in their transnational formulations, since the neoliberal crisis of the 1980s. These entrenched gender hierarchies and distortions continue to undermine the potential of women in national and transnational spaces.

Because of the failure of Africa’s regimes, attention has often focused on the internal causes of economic and political crises. By contrast, several chapters in this volume are far-reaching in how they relate national and global forces and connect the past and present. Mora McLean, Melanie Bush, and Rod Bush’s chapters are cases in point. They remind us of the pitfalls of a rigid binary between Africa’s “old” and “new” Diasporas. The “new” African Diaspora is more closely connected to the old ones than most Africanists realize, especially since “new” Diasporas have been recurring since the catastrophe of Atlantic slavery beginning in the seventeenth century.

Rod Bush, in the chapter, “Black Internationalism and Transnational Africa,” contends that African transnationalization as a global social force developed out of the African-American experience from the period of enslavement and during the freedom struggles, to produce what he terms “the peculiar internationalism of African-American social thought and praxis.” He situates African-American thought within the Pan-African social stratum in the world system and argues that the twentieth and twenty-first centuries produced an increasingly stronger “dark world,” which, through political, intellectual, religious, aesthetic, and literary resistance and struggle, engineered social transformations. At the same time, he argues that Western hegemony has declined. Whether it is among Christianized Africans in America during its revolution against England, or during the heydays of the Pan-African movement, or even during the civil rights movement, Rod Bush argues that “the rising of the dark world” denotes conscious struggle and a “culture of resistance” that inspired Africans in America to push for freedom, equality, and justice.

Similarly, Melanie Bush in her “Africa: Un-Pledging Allegiance: The US Nation Must Make the African Connection,” argues that the origins of the United States as a nation and its identity reveals deep and problematic relationships with Africa and Africans. The colonial and imperial power asserted by Europe and rooted in notions of European supremacy is reflected in the social structure and institutions of the United States in relation to the rest of the world, particularly Africa. The notion of race and racial allegiance developed and built upon the distinction between Europeans and Africans to allow for not just an economic arrangement but also for a hierarchical organization of people. The rationale for
ordering of nations and people was orchestrated scientifically, legally, culturally, and politically throughout the world and particularly in the United States as an emerging world power. Melanie Bush contends that the U.S. empire, nation, and identity therefore have been constructed on a presumption of entitlement and righteousness with whiteness being the glue of inclusion through history to the present day.

Mora McLean’s chapter, “What About Reciprocity? Pan-Africanism and the Promise of Global Development,” explores the enduring theme of black internationalism since the turn of the previous century. She insists that the challenge at the beginning of this century is for African and African Diaspora intellectuals to draw inspiration from the progressive traditions of pioneering Pan-Africanists as they constructed political projects that were mutually beneficial across the Atlantic. McLean contends that while the history of slavery is a source of both connection and tension between Africans and African-Americans, confronting this legacy could inspire more enlightened approaches to psychological and material well-being and development. She examines the dynamics of the relationship between Africans and black Americans in the spheres of social interaction; policy and advocacy; and development theory and practice. McLean concludes that any new groundswell of interest in Africa among African-Americans, and effective and sustainable alliances between them and Diaspora Africans in the United States, will have to emerge from a mutual assessment of common interests, rather than heritage. Moreover, such alliances hold the promise of steering the focus of development theory and practice away from conventional notions of economic growth, and toward more favorable objectives of well-being.

As for the fundamental question, “What is Africa?” we find conventional perspectives of African studies too limited in space and time. From our perspective, the timescale and the geographical spread of the meaning of Africa must capture themes that crisscrossed the Atlantic over four centuries and the tragic consequences of Western modernity on Africa, African Diasporic experiences, slavery, colonialism, imperialism, Pan-Africanism, and postcolonialism, etc. In challenging conventional Africanist historical assumptions, we claim that there always have been multiple African Diasporas and multiple African transnationalisms. As with various “old” African Diasporas, Africa’s contemporary transnational processes include profound stories of human agency, and African Christianity, which is addressed in Jacob Olupona’s chapter, “The Changing Face of African Christianity: Reverse Mission in Transnational and Global Perspectives,” and African giving traditions, explained by Jackie Copeland-Carson.

Olupona demonstrates that Christianity has grown exponentially in the southern hemisphere. African Christianity, in particular, put a stamp
on global Christianity. This is the result of the phenomenal rise in the number of Christians on the continent and also Christian churches’ unprecedented role in the political and social transformation of Africa since the end of the Cold War. The world has taken note of African Christianity’s role in civil society and democratization efforts. But the most fascinating aspect of African Christianity, Olupona insists, is the shift he characterized as the reverse mission phenomenon as African missionaries venture to the cosmopolitan centers of the West, especially in Europe and North America, in order to reevangelize the West. Olupona analyzes the transnational dimensions of African immigrant and Diasporic Christian communities and their impact on many North American and European societies.

For Jackie Copeland-Carson in the chapter, “Pan-Africanizing Philanthropy: Toward a Social Theory of an Emerging Sector,” Africans migrating to the United States brought with them a range of cultural practices that they are actively adapting to their new home communities. Among these imports are traditional finance mechanisms, revolving credit, and saving pools that are adapted for a variety of purposes in the United States, including business development, personal income, and political campaign finance. These finance arrangements traditionally have been used to pool resources for community improvement and philanthropic projects. Copeland-Carson’s chapter analyzes the philanthropic uses of African revolving credit and saving pools in the United States. It places these contemporary forms of philanthropy in the context of the historical development of African Diaspora giving in the United States. These chapters indicate African resourcefulness, as well as serve as important signals of human agency in the shadow of globalism. Africa always has been and remains a fertile ground for ideas that have shaped human lives in a positive manner. This is no trivial glorification of the past, but a call to recover the best of the past in order to transform dismal aspects of the present.

The dynamics of globalization continue in ways that reinforce old tendencies in entirely new ways. What keeps these dynamics going? One could argue that the dynamics are propelled by the random tendency of history to repeat itself. While not in any way endorsing Hegel’s racist assessment of Africa and its history, we find relevant the pattern Marx described about history repeating itself: “Hegel remarks that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” It seems appropriate to attribute the ongoing dynamics, however, to the refusal of progressive African intellectuals and Western Africanists to analyze the world from a perspective that reifies Western liberal assumptions on Africa and globalization. The progressive option is the one that
challenges problematic dogmas and complicates straightforward assumptions on transnational Africa and globalization.

**Notes**

4. A term popularized by Fareed Zakaria.

**References**


This chapter takes as its point of departure the far-reaching impact of economic globalization on Africa’s fragile postcolonial states, especially since the global economic recession of the 1970s. It is divided into three interrelated parts: first, I will outline the rise of globalization and how this phenomenon dominated global relations since the economic downturn of the 1970s; second, in the context of the prevailing national and global environment in which Africa’s postcolonial states are constituted, I will explain the implications of economic globalization for state legitimacy in Africa; finally, drawing on several ongoing research projects, I will show how African social and political forces are responding to the forces of globalization at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Overall, I contend that a major impact of globalization in Africa is in new national and transnational social networks within African regions and between Africa and other regions—especially the West. These dynamic national and transnational flows will continue to play prominent roles in the recovery efforts of Africa’s fragile nation-states in the global era. Paradoxically, I am mindful that there are several actors on the African continent—not least the custodians of African nation-states—who are resistant to what we might call cosmopolitan migration, despite the national and transnational social networks that are developing. We need to ask what this might mean for the reconstitution of
Africa’s national and transnational communities—particularly in the critical areas of development and governance.

These questions, inevitably, engage structural arenas of national and transnational flows in the context of globalization, especially in the last several decades. Focusing on interactions between national and global forces, I will underscore how social movements, civic groups, and state actors are responding to the transformative impact of globalization. Africa’s recent transnational flows are rooted in the continent’s encounter with the modern world—starting with Atlantic slavery, colonialism, and imperialism—and shaped by the idea of Africa in the Western imagination. Consequently, we should ask, to what extent are the forces of globalization transforming our understanding of African local, national, and transnational identities, in the context of the prevailing ideas and structures of the African Diaspora. To what extent do the dialectical tensions between local and global forces, generated by the forces of globalization, complicate the meaning of African national and transnational processes, especially as diverse African populations strive to reconstitute themselves in socially and mentally alien locations?

Recent trends in African transnationalism are reflected by flows of various types and intensity and characterized by linkages between homelands and new diasporic locations. Africa’s transnational experiences are not linear or asymmetrical movements of people, ideas, cultures, and religions. Over the centuries, the ideas and structures of Africa and African diasporic formations have been linked in complicated ways, and have shaped social, political, and economic forces across the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Arabia. Talking specifically about these complicated transnational flows, the renowned African scholar, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, notes that these flows can be heavy or light, they can be continuous, interrupted, or change course, and can be beneficial or baneful to their patrons or recipients at either end. All along, they are subject to the unpredictable twists and turns of history. The flows are often simultaneously covert and overt, abstract and concrete, symbolic and real, and their effects may be sometimes disjunctive or conjunctive. The flows include people, cultural practices, productive resources, organizations and movements, ideologies and ideas, images and representations.

A caveat is important at this juncture. Although I believe national and transnational flows are integral to the age of globalism, I am by no means unaware of disruptions and ruptures that have defined this moment in Africa’s diverse regions. While it is true that people and objects appear to be in perpetual motion, it is evident that there are obstructions in a
world of unprecedented mobility. Along with the disruptions that have resulted from the vagaries of Africa's precarious nation-states, the freeze on the mobility of Africans through arbitrary visa rules instituted by various Western countries, for example, are a useful reminder of the contradictory treatment of capital on the one hand, and labor on the other. This idea challenges the assumption of unfettered movement, especially of migrants, as reflected in landmark scholarship on globalization.

In Africa, the crisis of the postcolony and the contradictions of global capitalism led to the triumph of neoliberalism and the challenges that globalization left in its wake. Following the euphoria of political independence in the 1960s, the optimism of nationalism evaporated within a decade. Appeals for nation-building projects in the newly independent African states became hollow because the nation, with its arbitrary colonial origins, was largely invented by “nationalist” modernizers with tenuous connection to the masses. In quick succession, the constitutional democratic models imposed by the outgoing colonial rulers were swiftly replaced by authoritarian regimes. Within a decade, African nation-states were engulfed by severe economic crises. The inability of African political classes to move fragile economies away from dependence on the export of primary commodities meant that when the world economy went into recession following the oil crisis of 1973, its impact on African countries was devastating. In short, the end of the postwar boom spelled the demise of Africa’s developing nation-states. Unable to meet the basic material needs of their rapidly growing populations, Africa’s fragile structures contracted significantly—and in some cases imploded—leaving local people to fend for themselves. It did not take too long, in many cases, before postcolonial African states reflected features of their colonial predecessors: being illegitimate, alien, rapacious, and predatory.

With fragile economies, the custodians of Africa’s states imposed policies based on calculus of Cold War politics. During the critical early decades of independence, African regimes were able to maximize foreign aid—and minimize constraints on its use—because of the geo-politics of the Cold War. As Letitia Lawson notes, “major powers bought surrogates with little attention for their financial and moral cost. Loyalty being an amorphous thing, it was continually renegotiated and repurchased. Under these conditions, foreign aid became a reliable resource stream, which the custodians of Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes utilized as sources of patronage and clientelist revenue.” As the Cold War receded in the late 1980s and structural adjustment programs took aim at Africa’s regimes, new democratic opportunities emerged in many African states. In the absence of viable civil society structures capable of mounting responses to rapacious regimes, and with negligible capital flow and weak industrial
bases to serve as the growth engines of economic production, waves of popular democracy that swept across the continent following the demise of the Cold War in the early 1990s were fleeting. These conditions made African states particularly vulnerable to the onslaught of economic globalization. Imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and sanctioned by major industrial powers, economic globalization did away with local import substitution industries, privatized public assets, and massively defunded essential goods and services, especially subsidies on food, education, housing, health care, and transportation. This severely deepened the crises in African states, leading to mass poverty and intensifying political conflicts and precipitating mass migration. This is the context in which economic globalization would dominate the affairs of African states in the global era.

It would be useful at this stage to outline the major features of globalization. Political sociologists David Held and Anthony McGrew point to a central feature of globalization as the multiple linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation-states and societies that make up the modern world system—“a process in which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe.” They perceptively defined globalization as a process, “which embodies a transformation of the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity.” From the above definition, globalization’s major features revolve around internationalization (the intensifying of cross-border interaction between countries); liberalization (the emphasis on deregulation of political and economic spaces); universalization (the capacity to spread experiences of one region to many corners of the world); and deterritorialization (the capacity to undermine the sanctity of borders of sovereign states). The eminent scholar Immanuel Wallerstein, however, contends that, regardless of its unique qualities, globalization is really another turning point of the crisis of global capitalism. As this crisis deepens, globalization provides a new infrastructure for capitalism to reinvent itself and subsequently reorder social relations at national and global levels. In this context, capitalism is prone to crises, but history has shown that it is adroit in managing them, although it is only a matter of time before these crises deepen because of the intrinsic contradictions in the capitalist system. Nevertheless, most historical sociologists agree that the phenomenon we call globalization is integral to the modern era. What we are concerned with here is simply the most recent manifestation of globalization—the postwar variant that led to the quadrupling of the
world economy before global capitalism succumbed to the recent global economic meltdown.

Thus, with the growing contradictions of global capitalism by the 1970s, economic globalization led to the privatization of public services, the search for cheap labor, the crises of overaccumulation and underconsumption, and the collapse of space and time by the 1990s. In short, as the distinguished political scientist, David Apter, notes, in the specific case of Africa “the market models of the custodians of economic globalization ignore the social costs of global neoliberal development policies and its impact in real terms: population displacement and dispersion, loss of patrimonies, marginalization of mass population, social polarization, mass pauperization, fragmenting institutions, political corruption, and criminality.” Economic globalization poses a host of serious problems for education, health care, modern professions, and the constructive use of social capital in African countries where the instrumentality of the modern nation-state, industrial base, and civil society are particularly weak.

Some economic and demographic trends highlight the impact of economic globalization on developments in African states. In 2003, the net total of official development assistance to African states south of the Sahara was about $24 billion. This is twice the level of worldwide official development assistance and second only to foreign direct investment in terms of financial flows to developing countries. In 2005, foreign direct investment to developing countries increased to the highest levels recorded, totaling $334 billion. Foreign development investment in Africa increased to $31 billion in 2005, although the region’s share remains low, at 3 percent of the global total. Unevenly distributed throughout the continent, with the major recipient being South Africa, with 21 percent of the total. South Africa and the continent’s six major oil-producing countries—Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and Sudan—had a total of $15 billion—or 48 percent of the total. In 2006, the African Union estimated that, of the 150 million migrants and refugees in the world, more than 50 million are Africans. Since the early 1980s, exports of developing countries have grown faster than the world average, although these exports “are still concentrated on products essentially from the exploitation of natural resources and the use of unskilled labor which have limited prospects for productivity growth and lack of dynamism in world markets. In short, developing countries are trading more but they are earning less. In fact, while Africa has enjoyed an increase in trade relative to its gross domestic product, the continent’s share in world exports fell from about 6% in 1980 to 2% in 2002.” This process is reinforced by neoliberal economic programs that
seek to establish Western political hegemony through finance, positioning multilateral financial organizations, especially Bretton Woods agencies, at the center of the affairs of African states.\textsuperscript{22}

Under difficult working conditions at home, Africa’s skilled labor has found new destinations in their former imperial metropolises, and other major industrial countries with a shared linguistic background. Thus, Francophone African professionals tend to head for France, Belgium, and Canada, while African professionals from former British colonies tended to migrate to the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada—as well as the Gulf states, South Africa, and Botswana. For most African states, the mass migration of trained professionals has led to a serious brain drain and daunting challenges in economic and social development. While the emigration of skilled labor has brought in a great volume of migrant financial remittances—bridging government shortfalls in the provision of essential goods and services—the overall cost has been a massive net loss of essential human capital for the development of Africa’s fragile nation-states.\textsuperscript{23}

The migration of Africans to the United States can complicate the raw figures of people and resources that the statistics of multilateral agencies tend to project. I will briefly underscore the complexities of Africa’s migrant patterns to Western countries by highlighting trends in Nigeria—Africa’s most influential migrant population—to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada since political independence in 1960. In the 1960s and 1970s, many southern Nigerians—benefitting from relatively strong elementary and secondary schooling rooted in Christian missionary training and the windfall of Nigeria’s petrodollars in the 1970s—arrived in relatively large numbers to pursue higher education in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Responding to the imperatives of development, the objective of this higher education enterprise was simple enough: obtain a university education in Western countries, and upon the completion, return to lucrative professions guaranteed by the Nigerian state. However, with a drastic fall in petroleum revenue, a growing debt burden and a deepening economic crisis in the 1980s, the option to return was foreclosed to many of these young Nigerians and their families. With the imposition of neoliberal structural adjustment policies in the 1990s, another wave of Nigerian professionals—like thousands of other West African skilled migrants, this time from Ghana and Senegal—joined Ethiopians and Eritreans who had fled the ruptures of post–Cold War conflicts in the Horn of Africa and emigrated to several Western countries, including the United States.

Today, Africans account for only about 6 percent of the number of immigrants who come to the United States each year. However, they
have the highest level of education among new immigrants in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 881,300 Africans lived in the United States, comprising about 3 percent of the foreign-born population. Now it is estimated that more than a million Africans reside in the United States, with half of them arriving between 1990 and 2000. However, these are official statistics for those who enter in categories such as refugees, relatives of U.S. citizens, and permanent residents and those receiving visas through diversity programs. These figures are further complicated by the high number of the children of African immigrants born in the United States since the 1960s—especially the children of former Nigerian students of the oil-boom era who are U.S. citizens by birth. Overall, the human capital generated by African immigrants and their descendants is complicating the meaning of race, class, and gender in contemporary U.S. society.

A critical area where these forces of globalization have had a lasting negative impact on African societies has been in the production of knowledge, making it difficult for African professionals to carry on their work and participate in the global exchange of ideas. This difficulty fundamentally challenged the basic assumptions of the early years of political independence, when the custodians of Africa’s postcolonial states saw education and modern professionalism as tools for nation-building, social transformation, and rapid economic development. Thus, “the terms in which this mandate was expressed—development, nation building, human capital—presumed that education would enable African states to overcome the legacy of colonialism, and stand in stark contrast with the ideology of neo-liberalism.”

In terms of human capital, the following statistics of the migration of Africa’s physicians further illustrate the devastating impact of globalization on African societies. From 1988 to 2002, 5,334 physicians trained in African states south of the Sahara have migrated to the United States. From this figure, 86 percent are from three African states with large populations and modernizing human capital—Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana. Nigeria, with more than twice the population of any other African country and 16 medical schools lost more than 2,160 physicians to the United States; South Africa, with eight medical schools, lost about 1,950 physicians; and Ghana, with three medical schools, lost about 480 physicians to the United States. Using data collected from the American Medical Association 2002 Master file, Global health specialist Amy Hagopian and her colleagues conclude: “More than 23% of America’s 771,491 physicians receive their medical training outside the USA, the majority (64%) in lower income or lower-middle income countries. A total of 5,334 physicians from Sub-Saharan Africa are in the group,
a number that represents more than 6% of the physicians practicing in sub-Saharan Africa now.”28 Significantly, these figures reflect African physicians working in the United States and do not include African-trained physicians that have emigrated to other Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, as well as the Gulf states, which also are favorite destinations for African physicians. Consequently, Hagopian and her colleagues observe: “including the USA, the UK, Canada, then, 10,936 physicians trained in sub-Saharan Africa are practicing in the three countries, a number that represent 12% of all African physician.”29 While this is a relatively small proportion of foreign-trained physicians practicing medicine in Western countries, the implications of this mass migration of physicians for health-care delivery and the training of the next generation of medical practitioners for many poor regions of Africa, with dire health conditions, cannot be overstated. Further, it is projected that there are many more African-trained physicians working in the United States and Western countries, although they are not licensed to practice medicine. World Bank and UNESCO estimates of African nurses and allied health professionals working in Western and Gulf states since 1990 can only be described as alarming, effectively decimating already vulnerable health-care delivery systems. Similarly, in a region in severe economic crisis, the implications of the loss of this vital profession class, and others in the modern professions is evident: “the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development has estimated that each professional leaving Africa cost the continent USD 184,000, or USD 4 billion a year—one third official development funds to Africa. The loss of trained health personnel also contributes to a general decline in average incomes as physicians generate skilled health system jobs beyond their own. Lost tax revenues from absent physicians represent significant losses as well.”30

In the reform precipitated by neoliberal adjustment programs, Africa’s education systems—including higher education—quickly were downgraded. Within a few years from the implementation of the adjustment programs, “subsidies to students were significantly reduced; academic wages were frozen at the very time when repeated currency devaluations sent the prices of consumer items sky high; academic grants for research and travel were eliminated; and investment in universities infrastructures were drastically reduced. African universities experienced faculty flight of unprecedented proportions, particularly because of the collapse of academics’ wages.”31 According to the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Africa, some 27,000 African academics emigrated to developed countries between 1960 and 1975. However, between 1985 and 1990, the beginning of the neoliberal era, the number jumped to 60,000 and has averaged 20,000 annually ever since.32
The economic difficulties have adversely affected publishing, libraries, and access to new technology. For example, Africa’s institutions of higher learning significantly lag behind in the digital divide in comparison to other countries in south Asia, East Asia, and South America. And despite some recent success in access to digital resources such as online newspapers, GIS maps, electronic journals, online archives, and government documents, vast inequalities persist, revealing massive social class divisions within African states.

This negative impact of globalization has forced many African states to implement policies to respond to the wave of mass migration of professionals to Western and Gulf states. For example, representing the concerns of its member states, the African Union embraced a new policy initiative that attempted to engage the masses of African Diasporas through several high-profile international conferences. Thus, in 2002 the African Union designated the African Diaspora as Africa’s sixth region. In 2004 and 2006, the African Union organized two major conferences of African and African Diaspora intellectuals in Dakar, Senegal, and Salvador, Brazil. Since then, there has been a series of high-level conferences between African and Caribbean governments and other Diaspora communities. In September 2007, the African Union held the Regional Consultative Conference for the African Diaspora in Paris, as well as the African Union-African Diaspora Summit in October 2008 for heads of state and government. Nevertheless, the newfound interest of the African Union in African Diasporas has its limits because of the complexities of African diasporic and transnational experiences in time and space. In the context of the consequences of globalization, the daunting challenges confronting African leaders’ efforts to effectively coordinate mutually beneficial ties with civic groups and religious movements across complicated local, national, transnational, and diasporic landscapes immediately were apparent: maintaining sustained, efficient, and effective linkages and networks was a severe challenge for the diasporic agendas of the custodians of Africa’s fragile nation-states.

Case Studies

I now will briefly highlight several ongoing research projects that show the imaginative responses of Africa’s resourceful populations to economic globalization at the turn of the twenty-first century. In a transnational context, gender is one of the most important media to explore the everyday experience of African migrant populations in the midst of globalization. As African migrant women of varying social conditions navigate public and private spheres as citizens, professionals, mothers and wives,
they negotiate new intersections of gender, race and class in Western countries, even as they retain connections to their homelands. In these transnational flows, women make critical contributions to the maintenance of their extended families in their homelands, while helping to build the lives of their families in Western countries where they reside. In a recent ethnographic study of African women professionals in several United States metropolitan areas, feminist scholar Mary Johnson Osirim observed that African migrant women tended to demonstrate a stronger commitment to building civil society organizations in the United States, while their male peers have been more concerned with development in their nations of origin . . . particularly when one considers the ways in which race, gender, and class intersected in their lives to limit their mobility. These immigrants engage in “transnational practices” that involve multi-stranded social relations along family, economic, and political lines that link together migrants societies of origin and settlement. In this way, migrants are said to build transnational social fields that crosses geographic, cultural, and political borders.

These “multi-stranded social relations” involve African immigrants sending money back to relatives in their home countries, which is often the critical means of support for many poor families in their homelands and a major contributor to the economies of these countries. These remittances are sources of “money for food, education for the young, and healthcare for families in their homelands.” Remittances are features of transnational relations that legitimate kinship networks that crisscross local, regional, and national domains. Along with strong utilitarian attributes, these networks embody moral orders that reinforce intersections of the homeland and the Diaspora. Thus, just as women migrants in the Diaspora define familiar ties through remittances, they also reconfigure connections to their homeland where family, community, and nation intersect in complicated ways. These transnational ties are maintained by the migrants’ “regular visit home, maintaining ties through telephone and internet, and by sponsoring relatives from abroad.”

Despite their remarkable resourcefulness, African migrant women confront institutionalized racism in Western countries, even as they contend with prevailing homeland gender hierarchies, which are reproduced in new transnational contexts. In response to these barriers, African migrant women engage in capacity-building by forging institutional networks of support that subvert gender, racial, and class hierarchies consolidated through intersections of homeland and Diaspora. Consequently, Osirim provides compelling evidence that shows the resourcefulness of these women as they struggle to improve the quality
of life for their families and advocate for social services in their communities through the creation of service-oriented organizations and the development of strong ties in the Diaspora. For example, a woman whose daughter was denied testing for the accelerated mathematics program formed the Concerned Parents for Equity in Education to help African-American and immigrant parents advocate for their children in Philadelphia. Another African woman mobilized fellow immigrants to form the Coalition of African Communities—an organization committed to assisting African immigrants access social services, especially health care and education. Similarly, African immigrant women in Boston established the African Family Health Organization to assist African and Caribbean immigrants, particularly those with language barriers, gain access to state health services. In Cambridge, Mass., an alliance of Ethiopian women’s groups eloquently advocates for African women’s rights and health. In short, these African immigrant women’s organizations are actively engaged in promoting the welfare of their communities on both sides of the Atlantic.41

Popular religious movements provide a second reference for the articulation of transnational African flows in the context of globalization. Religion has consistently played a central role in the lives of Africans and their descendants in various Diasporas over the centuries. As fundamental structures of society in most African-descended communities, religious movements are a critical medium through which people grapple with ethics and morality, the sacred and profane, the ultimate meaning of life and death, and the challenges of daily existence.42 In a transnational African context following the dispersal caused by economic globalization, I will explore the important role of West African Islamic and Christian religious institutions—especially a Senegalese Sufi order, the Tijaniyya, and new Pentecostal movements in Western communities with large Nigerian and Ghanaian immigrant populations. In this transnational context, these new religious movements are consistently engaged with rapidly changing conditions in a globalized world.43

The Senegalese Sufi order, the Tijaniyya order, is critical to defining the meaning of community for many Senegalese Muslims in major Western metropolitan areas—especially New York, Paris, and Marseilles—during a period of major transition. Reflecting the pattern of many African Islamic Diaspora movements in Western countries following labor migrations and the effort to retain religious and cultural traditions, the Senegalese adherents of Sufi orders—especially the Tijaniyya under the leadership of the Sufi Cheikh in France, the United States, and Morocco—see the Diaspora as their new home. They are obliged to fully participate in this Diaspora community without compromising their
religious beliefs. Consequently, the Diaspora serves as the major source of hard currency for financing Islamic ceremonies and festivals in the Senegalese homeland. Tijaniyya institutions and practices thus provide security mechanisms against the vicissitudes of life on both sides of the Atlantic. While the Senegalese Tijaniyyas in Western countries need religious beliefs to deal with their alienation—especially in predominantly Christian countries such as France and the United States—the Senegalese Tijaniyya clerics need the financial support and religious integrity of those in the Diaspora and encourage them to send their children to Senegal for a proper Koranic education and sound Islamic training. In the final analysis, religious continuity will depend on how well these Sufi orders can sustain the second generation in rapidly shifting national and transnational contexts.44

The vibrancy of Nigerian and Ghanaian Pentecostal and independent African churches in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada followed the thousands of Nigerian students who attended universities and professional schools after the oil-boom years of the 1970s, notably in the New York, London, Washington D.C., Houston, Chicago, Atlanta, and Toronto metropolitan areas. Following the imposition of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, many more Nigerians, Ghanaians, and their dependents have made their homes in these metropolitan areas. With deepening economic crises, especially in Nigeria by the late 1980s, many more Nigerian professionals, as physicians, engineers, nurses, and academics, integrated themselves into these cities. New Pentecostal and independent African Churches such as the Redeemed Christian Church of God, the Bethel World Ministry Church, and the Church of the Living God (Aladura), with strong ethnic and national bases, have emerged to serve these West African immigrant populations.45 These Pentecostal-charismatic church movements grew in popularity because they provide distinct structures for their West African adherents to operate on national and transnational scales, articulate the immigrants’ rationale for prosperity and challenge the perceived “backwardness” of indigenous religious traditions. By rejecting these indigenous religions, transnational Pentecostalism is seen as a viable alternative for the presumed atavism of traditional religious practices.46

As one of the most influential Pentecostal movement with extensive global networks, the Redeemed Christian Church of God needs special mention.47 This huge Pentecostal movement is an example of the transnational significance of African Pentecostalism in the new African Diaspora with particular emphasis on the achievements and challenges of the church. While the diasporic waves of the “reverse mission” have been grounded in claims of prophetic visions and declarations since the
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1950s, the inauguration of the model parish and the establishment of many churches in West African and Western countries reflect the waves of West African labor migration since the 1980s.48 This major church movement, like other West African Pentecostal and independent African churches, “emphasize the importance of focusing their spiritual energies on the achievement of power, wealth, and success and a direct mystical relationship with transcendence, thus individual voluntarism and enthusiasm are required from believers. The use of organization skill, administrative structure, and mass media to construct a framework to challenge anti-Christian social and political orders is also prevalent, as are innovations in liturgy, popular culture, music, and dance as tools of proselytizing. The church leaders play strong paternal [and maternal] roles as advisors and protectors, and the churches have significant effects on the political, social, and economic, even though most profess a disdain for formal participation in politics.”49

Indeed, as in many other independent churches, various Pentecostal branches often provide small business loans to enhance the financial conditions of their members. Thus, Pentecostalism provides new networks and a new sense of belonging in a transnational community, creating dialogues that encourage engagement with modernity, rather than a rejection of other identities, and provide a framework for negotiation between local and global forces.50 Consequently, Pentecostal movements use modern tools, strategies, ideas, values, and technologies to occupy the massive spaces left vacant by the eroding structures of a disintegrating state system. As globalization intensifies—especially with the growth of global media systems and increasing integration of global markets—the capabilities of fragile African states to shape the moral and political discourses of local communities further erodes, leaving Pentecostal movements ample space to extend and deepen their influence in national and transnational communities. Although the custodians of the state continue to strive to extend their influence over the structures of society, charismatic leaders of Pentecostal movements consistently mount an onslaught against the nation-state, undermining the moral authority of those who hold state power in a rapidly disintegrating postcolony. With significant access to external resources derived from global networks, leaders of these movements are not dependent on the custodians of the nation-state, allowing their followers to recreate their social conditions to overcome the economic hardship and anxiety of everyday life in an increasingly globalized world.51

The consequences of globalism were also profoundly expressed in the contradictions of race, class, and nation following the influx of African immigrants into South Africa after the collapse of apartheid in
1994. With the fall of apartheid, South Africa experienced a massive influx of African migrants from other southern African states, especially Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Zambia, and Malawi, and from other African regions, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Kenya. This is, of course, in keeping with the longstanding history of labor migration that was intensified by the discovery of gold and diamonds in the nineteenth century. Consequently, South Africa’s collective consciousness as a nation-state is deeply embedded in migratory processes from the southern African region, Europe, and beyond.

As the postapartheid South African labor migration crisis intensified, South Africa’s African National Congress, (ANC) government embraced some of the arbitrary measures of its apartheid predecessors, including new codes to define citizens and illegal aliens. Ironically, the instruments of the apartheid state were promptly deployed to define new migrant workers as “illegal immigrants,” complicating the role of the predominantly black labor unions in the emerging process of democratization. Despite the ANC’s African-centered foreign policy and rhetoric of the “rainbow nation,” prevailing forces of economic globalization reinforced new ideas of race, ethnicity, nation, and belonging in South Africa’s complex postapartheid state and society.

My last case study continues with South Africa and further underscores the impact of globalization on the postapartheid South African state and society. This time, we explore the grassroots resistance against neoliberal multilateralism on the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on South Africa’s poor. Significantly, HIV/AIDS activists succeeded in collaborating with the ANC government to resist global capitalism. As in the previous case, this illustration is offered in the context of the prevailing conditions of race, class, nation, and neoliberalism within the South African state and society.

The issues of globalization and HIV/AIDS are interwoven inextricably. In South Africa, like most African states, the national politics around the issue of HIV/AIDS, along with the social policies it generates, are integrated into key arenas in which the politics of globalism has been waged since the 1990s. Following the fall of apartheid, more than a decade of constitutional democracy was accompanied by a dramatic increase in national HIV-prevalence trends. With the rapid rise of HIV/AIDS, especially along labor migratory networks, discourses on HIV/AIDS exposed the contradictions of global capitalism by revealing the vast disparities in wealth and health in South African society and between advanced industrialized countries and poor African states. This was particularly evident as Western pharmaceutical corporations insisted on a status quo in which improved access to efficacious antiretroviral drugs had downgraded HIV in Western countries to a chronic
decease, while HIV/AIDS remained a death sentence in South Africa and other African countries. With most African states spending four times as much on debt servicing than they do on health or education, South Africa’s effective anti-AIDS movement confronted well-scripted Western propaganda on Africa’s unique HIV/AIDS conditions by the late 1990s.

As the crisis of HIV/AIDS intensified in South Africa, the country’s authorities, under intense pressure from the anti-AIDS movement, defined new terms of engagement between Africa and the West, challenging the structural injustice in the global economic system and insisting on African self-renewal and self-reliance. The insistence of popular South African movement on progressive HIV/AIDS program policies resulted in the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the South African ANC government’s ambitious domestic and foreign policies. Despite these laudable efforts, ANC government policies were fraught with inaction and confusion. For example, perspectives on the uniquely South African nature of HIV/AIDS as a disease of structural poverty and the need to find African solutions to Africa’s problems were undermined by the slow start of sex education campaigns, puzzling arguments over the efficacy of antiretroviral treatment, and insistence on traditional therapies to HIV/AIDS. The controversy over HIV/AIDS revealed the contradictions within South African society and between South Africa and neoliberal multilateralism, exposing the delicate position of the ANC government and its neoliberal reform policies.

**Conclusion**

When the editors of this volume (Okome and Vaughan) initially came up with the concept for this project, they encouraged prospective contributors to develop chapters integrating rigorous research on transnational Africa and globalization with creative personal reflections of their own African experiences. They asked their colleagues—African scholars and Western Africanists—to write chapters that encapsulated themes that shaped their private and public engagement with African transnational experiences in the context of globalization. As the project grew, however, this initial idea took on various dimensions, with some contributors relating the personal to the professional, while others were inclined to take the path of conventional analysis, with only minor references or reflections on how their personal experiences shaped their understanding of their research project. While I avoided directly engaging personal transnational experiences, the writing process, in retrospect, naturally is shaped by my personal experiences. As a Nigerian scholar, now a naturalized U.S. citizen working in American universities since 1990, the subjects covered in this chapter were milestones
that either directly shaped my experience or ones in which I had more than a passing professional research or teaching interest. As part of the generation that emerged from decolonization, the challenges and opportunities that resulted from the interconnections between postcoloniality and globalism since the early 1960s are integral to my own mental and temporal conditions as a scholar and a human being. While I consciously avoided a personal narrative format, this analysis of transnational Africa and globalization was shaped by my own unique Nigerian experience, from the Yorùbá region, in terms of gender, class, communal, national, and transnational identity.

Consequently, this chapter, despite its varied analyses and illustrative case studies, is somewhat of a scholarly retrospective. I hope to convey quiet reflections on personal milestones, touching on major issues that shaped the contours of transnational Africa and globalization, such as decolonization, postcoloniality, statism, neoliberalism, migration, globalism, Diaspora, and homeland. While not a subject of this chapter, the generational component of this exercise looms large because my own experience defied the script written by a preceding generation for its children. For me, the script that unfolded was far removed from the one anticipated by my parents’ generation as Christian-educated people—an emergent ethno-national elite that led vibrant Yorùbá communities into the interwar period, defying British colonial strictures.

Far removed from Nigeria, a brief professional biographical reference is in order: I am a scholar working at an elite liberal arts college in mid-coast Maine after 18 years in an American research university. I was raised in Ibadan, the great Yorùbá city in southern Nigeria, came of age in Nigeria’s oil-boom years in the 1970s, armed with a script written for a generation of Western-educated young Nigerians, who presumably were destined to lay the foundation for a modern nation-state.

In retrospect, my initial encounters with the tensions between national and transnational worlds were shaped by my mother’s pioneering work in elementary school education. She insisted that the thousands of students, spanning five decades, that she was privileged to lead must, as a matter of right, have access to a global universe of knowledge. Starting in 1961, this national and transnational world of knowledge production intensely engaged Nigerian youths from numerous social groups at a special space of teaching and learning in Ibadan. Nevertheless, what subsequently unfolded was radically different from the intentions of Nigerian modernists like my mother. The unanticipated script was one that my generation, drawing on its creative agency, instinctively fashioned in the context of the crisis of postcolonial Nigeria. This drama contained complicated twists and turns of local, national, and transnational flows, precipitated by the twin crises of postcoloniality and globalism. These trends transformed my generation’s world in
far-reaching ways, prompting a narrative that complicated the exigencies of nation-building, social advancement, and economic development.

The West African students, including myself, described above are now parents of young American, British, and Canadian adults, connected to their own forebears’ homelands in complex transnational ways. Their children complicate the meaning of race, class, and gender among Africa’s old Diasporas, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. With the lofty script written by nationalist modernizers derailed, the unfolding drama of this new, unanticipated script is complicating the dynamics of homeland and Diaspora, gender and generation.

Notes

2. Ibid., 145.
3. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 13–18.
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 10–14.
37. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 382.


49. Ibid.


51. Ibid.

52. Tricmicxinitis et al. 2008.

53. Ibid.


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57. Ibid., 326.
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Although I grew up in the Jim Crow South during the 1950s, for a variety of biographical reasons, I bypassed the civil rights movement—or it bypassed me. For this reason, Dr. King’s great testament to the true meaning of our American creed in his 1963 “I Have A Dream” speech did not resonate with me. Although I routinely said the Pledge of Allegiance at school and other public events, I did not feel a special allegiance to the United States. Although there was very little I understood about politics at the time, having been schooled intensively and daily in the outlook of Booker T. Washington, I knew that we Black folk were second-class citizens, or even barely citizens. I was not unusual in this regard: It seemed a general sentiment, and some were quite militant about it. I did not understand the larger ramifications of that position then, but I would soon come to understand that I, too, am Transnational Africa.

As a youth, I did not begin to think seriously about social and political issues until the Black Power movement became a hegemonic force among African-American youths during the late 1960s and after I had joined so many others in the migratory trek to the urban north. The patriotic sensitivity that developed within the civil rights movement was not a part of my experience. My intellectual development had been intimately entwined with the development of Black social thought during the Black Power period, and both my politics and almost all of my scholarly work stems from this fact.
Growing up in the Jim Crow South in the 1950s, the parameters of my aspirations stemmed from the religious views of my family and community and not from any idea about the so-called American Dream—even when I self-righteously rebelled against what I then felt to be the hypocrisy that I saw among some in my church and became something of an atheist. The idea of being my brother's keeper was the foundation of my value system, despite my disaffection with the church during my teenage years and early adulthood. It is ironic that this position is what made the Marxist-inflected Black radicalism make sense to me during the late 1960s, and later enabled me to return to an intellectual reengagement with the Black Church. The framework of the Black Power movement meant that I initially rejected those Blacks aligned with the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) during the 1960s, mostly because they seemed to reject the militancy I thought was necessary and in some sense seemed a variant of the timid liberalism that opposed the Black Power movement.

The specific form in which class analysis became part of my intellectual stance was influenced by the manner in which I came to understand race and class during my life. As a resident of Florida in the 1950s, the only thing that I knew about the white world was the smiling faces that I saw on TV, which contrasted starkly with the snarling arrogance of so much of my very few encounters with whites. For Black people living in this kind of environment required an ongoing series of humiliating and self-effacing interactions with whites. You were required to say “yes, sir” or “no, sir” to all white males of any age, and “yes, maam” or “no, maam” to all white females, for example. If you offended a white person, you or your family could be targeted for retribution with a range of activities that threatened your family’s livelihood and possibly someone’s life. This kind of survival strategy might at times be simply a prudent adaptation and sometimes an internalization of white supremacy. So while it seemed, on a daily level, simply a way of interacting that most people adjusted to, for some, the internalization of white supremacist ideology exacted psychic costs. This meant for me that white supremacy was a natural order that I did not question, and when I moved from Florida to Rochester, New York, at age 13, the de facto segregation that existed there and the idea that whites were superior seemed natural.

When I moved to Rochester in 1959, I attended an inner-city school composed almost entirely of the children of the working class, about 50/50 Black and white (with a handful of Puerto Ricans). The few middle-class students were all white. Rochester’s Black middle class was extremely tiny. I did not know any of them until some years later when, after leaving the city for college, I returned and began to get involved in
some of the networking programs, which brought the Rochester’s Black college students together. When I was in high school, there was little encouragement for us to go to college. I did not think seriously about going until a recruiter from the historically Black Howard University came to our school and asked for an interview because I had good grades.

So my idea that white supremacy was part of the natural order of things was reinforced by the almost perfect correlation of race and class in Rochester, so different from the South where a Black middle class had to be developed to operate the “separate but equal” institutions. In the South, I had known nothing about the civil rights struggle going on at the time. We were taught mainly about Booker T. Washington in the public schools. The education system in Rochester offered even less to its Black students. Education, except for a few exceptional teachers, seemed totally unrelated to how I understood the world and what I would do in the world. But I spent hours and hours in the public library and established something of an intellectual life outside of school.

In 1963, when I was about to graduate from high school, a close friend who was a leader of the Junior NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) in Rochester asked if I planned to attend the March on Washington. Why would I do such a thing, I asked. He said I should go because whites thought they were better than us and thus deserved more of the good things in life. I thought for a moment and replied, “Aren’t they better than us?” At that time, I ranked third in my senior class, above all but one of the 90 or so white students in the class of 150.

I saw Howard University as a place where I would get an education that would enable me to get a good job. I was a child of the working class at a university whose traditions were mainly those of the Black middle class, the aspiring Black bourgeoisie. I did not understand class as an analytic construct at that time, so I simply refrained from involvement in the many historic actions going on at the university at that time because I had to get myself together first.

But the Black Freedom struggle was rising to the center of public awareness, and Howard University was something of a center of the movement. Despite the fierce pursuit of my individual aspirations, these events and the public debate about them began to influence my thinking and forced me to think about what all of this meant for who I was. While at Howard, I observed as the militants of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) came to our campus and to my sociology class to inform us about the struggle in the South and recruit people to go to Mississippi to fight for civil rights and democracy. I was inspired by their
Rod Bush

courage, but I could not see myself making such a commitment. I was at Howard when the Dean of Students refused to crown the homecoming queen because she wore her hair in an Afro style. I was there when the university fired Dr. Nathan Hare for proselytizing among students and pushing a Black Power/Black Pride line. I was there when students chased Selective Service Director General Lewis B. Hershey from the stage of a university auditorium shouting “Hell no, we won’t go,” and “America is the Black man’s battleground.” I was there when the students increasingly called for Howard to become an exclusively Black university.

During my junior year at Howard University, I took a class with the great poet and literature critic Sterling Brown. He was the one who put me on the path toward becoming an intellectual. I only knew that I liked to read and I did not quite know what it meant to be an intellectual. One of my roommates at Howard was the son of the president of the NAACP. He often joked about how “culturally deprived” I was (a term that resembled the social-science language about the culture of poverty). I was deeply offended by his teasing but internalized it, until I met Sterling Brown. Since I believed fervently in the biblical injunction that “the last shall be first,” I was shocked by the condescending visions of the poor that I found in much of the social-science literature. Until my encounter with Brown, these ideas had shattered my self-esteem and, for a while, I felt totally off-balance among my middle-class classmates at Howard. The class with Brown enabled me to find my own voice and my self-confidence was restored, but I was still mostly focused on my own career goals.

After I graduated from Howard in 1967 and entered a doctoral program in clinical psychology at the University of Kansas, I entered the white world for the first time as an adult. Although I thought my status as a doctoral student would enable me to be viewed as an exception, and that I would be judged by the content of my credentials, while looking for an apartment I ran smack up against racism in housing. I was humiliated and outraged. At the same time, the student movement began to gather steam everywhere. There was a takeover of the administration building at my alma mater. The insurgents demanded that Howard University become a Black University rather than a Negro University turning out Black students who thought like whites. Black students at Columbia University took over an administration building in protest against the university’s expansionist activities in the neighboring Harlem community, and white students from Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) entered the strike in support of the Black students and in opposition to the university’s role in promoting the war against Vietnam.

A veteran of movement, Leonard Harrison had moved to Lawrence, Kansas while his wife pursued a Ph.D. in history. He had a job as the
director of a community center in Lawrence and since I was a doctoral student, I was asked to be on the board of the center along with Frances Horowitz (a professor of psychology at the University who later became president of the City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center).

Students at the University of Kansas were influenced by the stirring of the Black Power movement and demanded that the university select a Black student to be on the university’s Pom-Pom Squad (cheerleaders). This action was the basis for forming the Black Student Union at the University of Kansas (KU). Off campus, some of us joined with Leonard and Alferdteen Harrison and other members of the community in the Movement for Afro-American Unity (modeled after Malcolm X’s Organization of Afro-American Unity). These were heady times. I vividly remember sitting in Leonard and Alferdteen Harrison’s living room during a meeting of MAAU and solemnly dedicating my life to the liberation of my people. I was 23 years old, and felt that I had finally come home. (At the time, there was a saying among the youth that you could never trust anyone over 30. I really worried about turning 30, but by the time I was 30, there was no turning back. And I have never really looked back.) My intellectual itinerary can be understood best as a consequence of this peculiar biography, and thus much of my intellectual work has focused on the issue of Black nationalism, or, more precisely, “nationalist consciousness.” While this focus has drawn criticism because of imprecision in defining who is a nationalist and those who would like a more forceful criticism of the nationalists, this focus seemed appropriate to me given the pervasiveness of nationalist consciousness among African-Americans. Biographically, I come mostly out of the Left nationalist tradition (the Movement for Afro-American Unity), which was loosely affiliated with the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM); the Congress of African People; the Student Organization for Black Unity/Youth Organization for Black Unity, initiated by some SNCC cadre); and the Revolutionary Workers League, a Black Marxist organization that resulted from the merger of several prominent Left nationalist formations and no relation to a currently existing organization with that name.

My sense at the time was that there were tensions in the manner in which the Left nationalists sought to use third internationalist methods of work and ideological traditions to establish a workable guide to action. It should not have required that we discard so much of what our people had learned in their long travail in the wilderness of the American cauldron, so that our people could no longer recognize us. We needed an approach that maintained a revolutionary stance, but which used plain language and united with ordinary folk, learning from them the practicalities of
building a revolutionary movement. My response to this dilemma was to locate a tendency that had come out of the women’s movement, which had built a substantial presence among the Black and Latino working class in the San Francisco-Bay Area and among intellectuals and movements in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Theoretically, this tendency was associated with the dependency theorists and world-systems analysis that came out of intellectuals and militants working in Africa and Latin America.

In 1985, I traveled to Addis Ababa to attend a meeting of the African Association of Political Science as a representative of the journal *Contemporary Marxism*. When I got off the plane, I was so overwhelmed by my homecoming that I bent down and kissed the ground. I did this without forethought or self-consciousness, a curious gesture for a Marxist, indeed. I still did not identify at all with the United States of America. Despite my involvement in Marxist politics, I learned my nationalism from Malcolm X, and I guess I never unlearned his stance. Malcolm X was, most certainly, Transnational Africa.

The demise of the movements in the 1980s during the so-called crisis of Marxism sent me back to academia, specifically to State University of New York (SUNY) at Binghamton to deepen my study of the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and the body of work known as world-systems analysis. Although Wallerstein was certainly the most widely respected American social scientist outside of the United States, he addressed much of his work to the militants involved in the struggle for a just, democratic, and egalitarian world. In this vein, he argued that the strategy of the family of antisystemic movements (Communists, Social-Democrats, and national liberation movements) had failed, and this would lead to widespread disillusionment and the abandonment of the movements by many of their militants. The most important thing to do at this time, he argued, was to understand what had gone wrong so that we could engage in the process of rethinking strategy. While I had been skeptical of this position in the early 1980s, I came increasingly to share Wallerstein’s views by 1986–1987. SUNY Binghamton faculty also included Terence K. Hopkins and Giovanni Arrighi, whose work in the historical social sciences seemed at par with that of Wallerstein. Significantly, all three scholars developed the foundation of their outlook during the time that they spent in Africa learning from the national liberation movements and intellectuals there. That is why I returned to SUNY Binghamton in January 1988.

In my first book upon returning, I sought to revive and assess the analytic foundations of the Black radical intellectual tradition and to connect with other intellectual traditions. *We are Not What We Seem: Black*
Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century sought to establish that the appropriate unit of analysis was a historical social system larger than the United States, but that the hegemonic position of the United States exponentially magnified the potential social power of African-American social movements. The evolution of the racial order after the abolition of slavery was inextricably intertwined with processes of class formation. That is why Black activists and scholar activists were able to speak so clearly to the logic of a struggle for human rights over civil rights, a clearly universalistic position (often in nationalist clothing) that transcended the boundaries of race, class, and nation.

But the abandonment of global liberalism of the post-World War II period by the declining U.S. hegemony attempting to halt its decline, led to the revival of a mean-spirited and racist discourse, which disparaged the humanity of the inner-city poor and those middle-class youths who identified with them. When the liberal and Left liberal intellectuals attempted to adjust their presentations to the new orthodoxy, I was outraged by what seemed to me to be a sellout of the ground we had gained during the reform period of the 1960s and 1970s. The very angry tone of my work during this period was a response to this cultural warfare waged against the most disadvantaged section of our population. In the face of attack, I united with my community’s defiance and despaired that anyone would give an inch in this battle in the interest of purely intellectual fads, such as antiessentialism.

Both liberal and Marxist readers of that book viewed my defense of Black nationalism as a defense of essentialist racial categories. What I had intended to do was to show that the nationalisms of the oppressed often were much broader in vision than the false universalism of the liberal Left.

Following Immanuel Wallerstein, Anibal Quijano, and others, I argue that the overarching framework for our analysis should be the modern world system, a capitalist world economy that emerged in the sixteenth century with a Western European core and an American periphery. The peripheralization of the Americas involved the displacement, dispersion, and destruction of the indigenous people, and the formation of a coerced labor force consisting mainly of enslaved Africans. Racism is thus constitutive of our historical social system in providing a pattern of social distinctions between the conquering people and the conquered people, naturalized in the notion of race. This pattern of distinction was used to categorize people in the pan-European world as superior and those from the extra-European world as inferior, with Africans and indigenous people at the bottom of the social scale. After the colonization of America, Quijano argues, the expansion of European colonialism
to the rest of the world and the subsequent constitution of Europe as a new identity required the elaboration of a Eurocentric perspective of knowledge—what Quijano views as "a theoretical perspective on the idea of race as a naturalization of colonial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans."1

Blacks have long understood that Pan-European racism is the Achilles heel of the modern world system, and that the demographic situation of the United States, with its large, strategically located populations of color, is a key locus of struggle for a more democratic, egalitarian, and just world order, crosscutting the geographical division of labor between the pan-European and dark worlds. The revolutionary nationalism of the New Negro Movement's Race First activists was the ideology of a group that saw itself as outcasts in the land of their residence, both those who were descendents of native-born parents and those whose parents had emigrated from other parts of the African Diaspora. Radicals that came to the fore during and after the first Great Migration viewed themselves politically as part of world anticolonial and anticapitalist forces. They belonged to Pan-African social strata in world society, though some did not see themselves as a part of that emerging political tendency. They came to prominence in a preexisting political community dominated by the towering figure of Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, who nevertheless was viewed by the young radicals as part of the “Old Crowd Negroes” (due in part to his “Close Ranks” editorial in *The Crisis*).2

We might trace the development of institutionalized Black Power among African-Americans to the late eighteenth-century formation of the Free African Society and the African Methodist Episcopal Church, to be crystallized in the National Negro Convention Movement from 1830–1861. George Padmore describes Du Bois as the father of Pan-Africanism, who differed from Marcus Garvey in the sense that his Pan-Africanism was viewed as an aid in the promotion of national self-determination among Africans under African leadership, for the benefit of Africans. Garvey envisioned Africa as a place for colonization by Western Negroes who would be under his personal domination. However, Padmore readily saw, as did Du Bois, that the Garvey movement was a people’s movement rather than a movement of intellectuals.

When Leopold Senghor, Gatson Monnerville, and Aime Cesaire addressed the president of France and others on the 100th anniversary of the abolition of slavery on April 27, 1948, all three used the memory of slavery, revolution, and emancipation to oppose colonial practices, despite the official posture of French tolerance and benevolence. Monnerville and Senghor wanted the government to honor the tradition of abolition by using the same principles in the present. Cesaire, on the other hand,
viewed plantation slavery, colonial violence, and anti-Black racism as part and parcel of the modern French political order, and inscribed in its social relations. Racism was part of the rationality of the French social order, not an irrational aberration. Cesaire did not view 1848 as the victory of enlightened republicanism over colonial backwardness; instead the radical currents to the republican tradition had fallen victim to the revolution’s dominant bourgeois-colonial elements.

During the 1920s, a heterogeneous community of Antillean and African intellectuals, professionals, and labor organizers consolidated in Paris. They debated one another, produced journals, and out of the associations emerged the Negritude movement in the late 1930s. Aime Cesaire was a member of these groups, which sought to join demands for political equality with demands for cultural recognition. Cesaire sought to reconcile humanism and nativism. After the liberation of Martinique, Cesaire became an advocate of political assimilation and was one of the architects of the 1946 law transforming Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guiana, and Reunion into formal French Departments. Frantz Fanon, who worked on Cesaire’s successful campaign to become a member of the French National Assembly, later would become Cesaire’s student. Cesaire, paradoxically, was an unrelenting critic of the colonial order, and a French political official. A new generation of Antillean activists, therefore, both celebrated him and criticized him. This was, of course, not unlike the position of some members of the American Black Power generation after some of their political successes.

**Bandung and the Historical Grounding of Black Liberation in the Postwar Era**

Between 1947, when India won independence, and 1963, when Kenya and Zanzibar won independence, virtually the entire dark world was able to free itself from the bounds of colonialism. This is a time when one might say that the specter of national liberation haunted the imperialist powers. This process was facilitated by the weakening of the imperialist nations in Europe, which made resistance to imperialist power more feasible. Though the threat of a united front against the colonial and neocolonial powers bran-dished by the Bandung Conference of 1955 did not materialize, the decolonizing process that did materialize represented the rise of the dark world, which had been the coin in the trade of a number of African-American leaders from Du Bois to Garvey to Elijah Muhammad to Malcolm X.

In 1947, Du Bois argued before the newly formed United Nations Commission on Human Rights that prolonged policies of segregation and discrimination had involuntarily welded the mass of Black people...
into a nation within a nation with its own schools, churches, hospitals, newspapers, and many business enterprises. The United States, of course, denied the reality asserted by Du Bois, but with the location of the United Nations in New York City, the problem of the African-American people had become internationalized.

In the decade before the April 1955 meeting of 29 nations at Bandung, Indonesia, millions of people emerged from the shadow of European colonialism through the pursuit of anticolonial social struggles. India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, and China were among those countries that achieved independence during this period. The 29 countries meeting at Bandung represented more than half of the world’s population at that time—1.4 billion people.\(^5\)

Richard Wright (living in exile in Paris), Adam Clayton Powell, and Carl Rowan were prominent African-Americans who attended the conference. Neither Paul Robeson nor Du Bois were able to attend because of travel restrictions imposed on them by the U.S. State Department. Coverage of the conference in the United States was limited and negative in tone. *Newsweek* magazine characterized the conference as “an Afro-Asian combination turned by [C]ommunists against the West.” The U.S. Black media commentary on the conference was celebratory. The meeting at Bandung was deemed the most important international meeting in the history of the world with incalculable implications for Blacks in the United States and throughout the African Diaspora, and for colored people everywhere.\(^6\) The 1956 First World Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Paris was a watershed event in closing the gap that had existed between the various circuits of Pan-Africanism: the British colonial subject in Africa and the Caribbean, the French colonial subjects in Africa and the Caribbean, and the African descended subjects in the United States. Alioune Diop, editor of *Presence Africaine*, called for unity of those convened, whether they believed in God or were atheists, whether Christians, Moslems, or Communists.”\(^7\)

Aime Cesaire, a member of the French Communist Party from Martinique, added to Diop’s frame that “There are two ways to lose oneself: by segregation within the walls of the particular or by dilution in the ‘universal’”.\(^8\) For Cesaire the universal is one that is “rich with the particular, rich with all the particulars, a deepening and a coexistence of the particulars.”\(^9\)

This was a time when nationalist movements were taking root everywhere. Wallerstein points out that the independence of the Indian subcontinent had profound consequences for English-speaking Africa. For French-speaking Africa, the struggle in Indochina was a formative experience, which transformed the realm of the politically possible. The Bandung Conference was an assertion of strength and identity in reaction
to European colonialism. It transformed the sense of solidarity among the colonized into the Afro-Asia concept, which Wallerstein argues would play a role for ten years to come. In Africa, this new sense of solidarity brought together North African and Sub-Saharan African states, as well as French-speaking and English-speaking Africans.

Nikhil Singh points out that at the first Congress of Black Artists and Writers, Aime Cesaire generated considerable controversy among the African-American delegation when he argued that “even our American brothers, as a result of racial discrimination, find themselves within a great modern nation in an artificial situation that can only be understood in reference to colonialism.” Included in Cesaire’s definition of colonial were colonial, semi-colonial, and para-colonial situations, which encompassed independent nations like Haiti, racial minority populations such as U.S. Blacks, and people suffering under colonial rule.10

Du Bois and Robeson had been unable to attend the Congress because the State Department would not allow them to travel. Du Bois sent a letter to Congress, describing why he could not attend and cautioning, “Any Negro-American who travels abroad today must either not discuss race conditions in the United States or say the sort of thing which our State Department wishes the world to believe.”

So there was furious debate about the conditions of African-Americans, and the degree of racial progress in the United States, with the U.S. delegates pretty much taking up the positions Du Bois had predicted. Richard Wright was an exception. He was silent on the colonialism issue in the United States, but unleashed a ferocious attack on African culture as backward and primitive.

But Cesaire argued against the valorization of European culture and for a different idea of the universal, a universal that is rich with all that is particular that exists, and seeks to deepen those particulars, which will coexist with one another. The concept of a postcolonial era assumes that the dismantling of the official apparatus of colonialism is the same as the abolition of colonialism, or as others would say, the “coloniality of power.”11 Colonialism required a discourse in which everything that is good, advanced, and civilized is measured in European terms.

Magubane pointed out that during the post–World War II period, we saw the rise of a collision between the historical treatment of Blacks in the United States and the attitude that the United States had toward an independent Africa and the Black world as a whole. One cannot understand the relationship of African-Americans to Africans without understanding the historical development of that relationship.

Magubane argued that Blacks could not have a sense of security in a world that degraded and rejected them. Given the negative political psychology
that pervaded much of the upper strata of African-American society (such as it was), attitudes toward Africa reflected this degradation. Blacks initially expressed their interests in Africa in terms of their duty to regenerate Africa and Africans. For Magubane, Ethiopianism, Pan-Africanism, and Garveyism all include sentiments, which can only be explained in terms of the nature of white hegemony over African-Americans.

This, I would argue, is true of what Wilson Moses refers to as the classical age of Black Nationalism, which ends with the demise of the Garvey movement. However, the Race First radicals in the New Negro Movement eventually would set African America on a new course. By the 1920s, the impact of those intellectuals profoundly affected by Du Bois, had, in turn, transformed the doctor in ways that moved him far beyond the Fabian Socialism (social imperialism) of his turn-of-the-century persona.

By the 1960s, Black radicals represented ably by Malcolm X, had come quite a long way. Magubane explores how Malcolm X views two opposing strategies for African-American advancement and the implications for a changing sense of identity. Though Malcolm was the individual most capable of grabbing the spotlight, he was not alone on this issue.

In 1959, Hansberry told CBS News correspondent Mike Wallace, “that the sweep of national independence movements globally was inextricably linked to the political initiatives of Black Americans engaged in similar, and sometimes overlapping, struggles for freedom, full citizenship, and self-determination.” According to Fanon Che Wilkins, this stance dates from the early period of the civil rights movement. In this way, Wilkins shows that the Cold War did not obliterate the Black Left, but it fostered a split between them and centrist liberals within the NAACP. Wilkins does not accept the assertions of Horne, Plummer, and Von Eschen that the unanimity of anticolonial opinion among African-Americans during the early 1940s was shattered by the Cold War, resulting in cutting off 1960s activists in the SNCC and the Black Panther Party from an older generation of Black radicals who had been engaged in anticapitalist and anti-imperialist critiques of American and European imperialism. Wilkins argues, as do Ian Roxborough Smith and others, that a significant presence of Black Left figures from the 1940s facilitated an intergenerational exchange of ideas and practices, which built on the legacy of Black internationalism. Lorraine Hansberry was part of that contingent during the 1950s until her death in 1965. During this period—which preceded SNCC’s assumption of the Black Power stance—Hansberry “remained committed to an anti-colonial/ anti-imperialist political project that challenged the supremacy of American capitalism and advocated for some variant of socialist development at the height of McCarthyism and beyond.”
While Hansberry, like her contemporary Frantz Fanon, anticipated the dangers of neocolonialism, which would confront the newly decolonized states of Africa and Asia, their views were reflective of the radical spirit of the 1955 Bandung Conference. Malcolm X’s position was slightly different; however, since he anticipated that the decolonization of African-America would shatter the power of the U.S. hegemony, and bring about the end of white world supremacy.

**Blacks in the Belly of the Beast: The Chickens Coming Home to Roost**

The language of the “Belly of the Beast” has its modern origins during those halcyon days of the world revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, when oppressed people everywhere seemed to be on the march. The power of the people seemed to be on the rise everywhere and seemed invincible. The language of liberation passed from revolutionary centers in Ghana, Guinea, China, Cuba, Algeria, Indonesia, and Vietnam to young people in the imperialist countries, including the Pan-African social strata that overlapped with what some called a “Third World within” the imperialist countries, especially the United States.

Nkrumah, Mao, Lin Bao, Fanon, Rodney, Che, Cesaire, Cabral, Nyerere, and Toure all spoke eloquently about the forces within the “Belly of the Beast” who were implacable foes of imperialism, not simply as solidarity movements, but as part of the revolutionary wave sweeping the world system.

My point here is really about how we understand social time so that we can properly situate both the era of social struggle to which I refer, and the era of neoliberal globalization. We need to understand the plurality of social time, such that we do not fall prey to the misleading sense of the event, because such immediate judgments really constitute “dust in our eyes.” Following the same logic, it is also important that we understand the long historical trajectory of capitalism, as a system with a beginning, a long period of “normal” operation, and an ending. This logic also should be applied to the rise and fall of hegemonic imperialisms, and the trajectory of white world supremacy.

The wave of revolutionary struggle that started in the middle of the 1960s constituted a break from the geoculture of the period from 1848 to 1968. In response to the working-class struggles of the 1840s, when working-class movements that were implacable foes of capitalism came to the fore, the ruling classes evolved a strategy of compromise by making concessions designed to reintroduce these movements into the logic of the system. Such concessions were made only when movements obtained
significant strength such that simple repression would only deepen their footprint on history. The strategy of co-opting, or what some have called the social democratic compromise, has meant that movements that rose from an antisystemic logic, once in power, would continue the existing system rather than destroy this system as Jacques Depelchin argued at length in a presentation titled, “Thinking Through African History in the Spirit of 1957: Never Claiming Easy Victories (a la Cabral15),” presented at a conference at SUNY Binghamton titled, “Black Liberation in the Spirit of 1957.”

I fear that we are often so constrained by our focus on the nation-state and episodic time (the short term) that we have difficulty understanding the nature of transforming a world system of capitalism and not just taking political power in one country. As we all know, Marx and Engels argued that the transition to socialism would take place where capitalism was most developed (advanced) has not comported with our social reality. It seems to me that Lenin’s strategy of “the weak link” was a recognition that this is what could be achieved at the time. But we should be wary of turning Lenin’s insight about the vulnerability of the weak link into simply a tactic, while maintaining the idea that the culture of the “advanced capitalist countries” is the most fertile soil for the rise of proletarian socialism. This seems to me to miss what seems to be the clear lesson of the 1960s and 1970s. The break with the geoculture of historical capitalism was not a gift of the workers’ movement of the Pan-European world to dominated people and areas, but stemmed from a dramatic acceleration of the pace of the rise of the dark world, where a pushback had been under way since the nineteenth century against the 500-year history of white world supremacy. Can we visualize Transnational Africa as an analog to Lenin’s weak link, but as a key link to the transformation of historical capitalism toward a more just, democratic, and egalitarian world order?

While we have clearly been chastened by the political defeat of the national liberation movements that came to power since World War II, we need to maintain our tactical sensibility to understand what these defeats mean. It might be important to look at these defeats as part of the juncture of the collapse of European socialism and the national liberation movements, which I will argue is, in reality, the collapse of liberalism.

We also have tended to be so bamboozled by the Washington consensus or neoliberal globalization that we have lost sight of the clear decline of American power, and the drift of historical capitalism itself toward a structural crisis. Is this not what all of the macho bombast, shouting, and warmongering is about? We know that the Project for A New American Century was set up long before the September 11, 2001, attack on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We know, in fact, that they were looking for a pretext to justify the use of military intervention to intimidate anyone who would dare challenge U.S. power in the international arena.\textsuperscript{16}

The 1945–1970 surge in the rise of insurgent forces on a world scale exhausted the global liberalism that had been a product of U.S. hegemony. The increased power of the oppressed in the United States and other core states, and the increase in the power of oppressed people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, constituted a change in the social power of the oppressed and destabilized the entire world system, a state of unruliness that the system could not tolerate.

The reformist liberalism of global capitalism could no longer make concessions on the scale that was being demanded. One by one, the window of opportunity closed for oppressed people everywhere. The epoch of socio-democratic compromise had reached its limits. The national liberation component of this social compact at a global level lacked the leverage of a powerful state to enforce the compact. The intensification of Pan-European racism within the core states turned the white working classes of the imperialist countries against their internal minorities and cemented a conservative alliance whose leading political lights were Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.

The era of development that had marked U.S. hegemony was no more, and that meant the end of the road for both the European socialist states and the nationalist movements that had come to power in the periphery of the capitalist system and that, by the 1980s, had to succumb to the policies of structural adjustment. But it also began to close the options for the core states of the capitalist world, reflected in books such as Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward’s \textit{The Breaking of the American Social Compact}. The political logic in the core states was quite simple: a ratcheting up of Pan-European racism against both internal minorities and the bulk of the world’s lower strata, located in the extra-European world. This conservative wind also brought about a ratcheting up of racism’s favorite partner, the patriarchy.

Neoliberal globalization, or the Washington consensus, seemed invulnerable, but its feet of clay were obvious to some. Wallerstein, who had pointed out that U.S. hegemony had started to wane after 1970, began to argue—quite against the grain of much of the left—that capitalism was entering a structural crisis. He cautioned those who argued that the demise of the European socialist states was an indication of the strength of the United States and the capitalist system. He also argued that the twentieth century had witnessed a slow but significant growth in the pushback of the extra-European world against Pan-European hegemony.
All of these were elements in the demise of capitalism as a world system. These would be difficult times, but the world as we had known it was in irrevocable decline, and the hollow triumphalism of some sections of the ruling class, and the punditocracy constituted chasing an illusion.

This illusion has been fostered by the liberal and conservative interpretations of the 1980s victory of Thatcher and Reagan in the political domain, and the 1989–1991 collapse of the European socialist states. Despite whatever criticisms we had of those regimes, we did not wish to see their collapse contribute to what seemed to be the political fate of the left and left-of-center forces by the conservative juggernaut.

Though we were confronted by a significant change in world politics and in the pace of capital accumulation, we also were in the midst of an unprecedented demographic transformation that was changing the face of the earth right before our eyes. While the world revolution of 1968 indicates, for Wallerstein, the onset of the structural crisis of capitalism, the period 1967–1973 also represented a shift in the capitalist world economy, from the most dramatic expansion in the history of the capitalist system to stagnation. It also was the period that, for many, marked the limits of the social compact that had provided internal stability to the imperialist countries and the core states since 1945. In contrast to the reigning orthodoxy of the core left, it was the political force of the oppressed on the periphery of the capitalist system, including the internal peripheries within the core states, which clarified the dimensions of the struggle that must be waged against dominant capital. That demographic transformation was a consequence of what some scholars refer to as the restructuring of the international division of labor. This restructuring was a response to the increasing power of the working class in the core states, especially those sectors of the working class that were part of the internally colonized populations. The Hart-Celler Immigration Reform Act of 1965 abolished restrictions on immigration based on national origin. This act was designed to bring new, low-wage workers into the core states, and it opened immigration to colonial subjects of the Pan-European world in an unprecedented fashion, dramatically increasing the flow of these immigrants to the United States.

Between 1880 and 1920, 24.5 million immigrants were absorbed into the U.S. population, mostly from southern and eastern Europe. From 1965 to 2000, 25 million people migrated to the United States, primarily from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean. Europeans, who accounted for the majority of the immigrants before 1965, now account for less than 15 percent of immigrants to the United States. The concept of assimilation, which played such an important role in understanding European immigrants, does not necessarily apply to these new immigrants, who
hail from countries that had been colonies, neo-colonies, or semi-colonies of the Pan-European world. This demographic shift makes it all the more important to understand the nature of the populations who found themselves within the borders or political jurisdiction of the imperialist countries because they had no other choice if they wished to maximize their life chances and that of their community of origin. I want to move now to the argument for the continued relevance, or the central significance of a framework that emphasizes internal colonialism or a Third World within.

Let me set the stage for that argument by putting into context what I argued earlier about the manner in which the 1960s revolution shattered the liberal geoculture, which had dominated the movements against historical capitalism since 1848. This is an issue of accumulation of forces.

On August 8, 1963, Mao Zedong responded to a request made by Robert F. Williams, the exiled former president of the Monroe, N.C., NAACP, for support of the African-American struggle against racial discrimination. Williams had fled to exile in Cuba after calling for his followers to arm themselves against the Ku Klux Klan when the local police refused to protect them. Mao recounted that he had been asked for this statement twice and now spoke on behalf of the Chinese people. He called for the support of the people of the world to stand in solidarity with the Afro-American people. He argued that it is a “handful of imperialists, headed by the United States, and their supporters, the reactionaries in different countries, who are oppressing, committing aggression against, and menacing the overwhelming majority of the nations and peoples of the world.” He expressed confidence that the African-American people would prevail in their just struggle, and concluded: “The evil system of colonialism and imperialism arose and throve with the enslavement of Negroes and the trade in Negroes, and it will surely come to its end with the complete emancipation of the black people.”

Just four months later, on December 1, 1963, Malcolm X would give his last speech as a member of the Nation of Islam, focusing on the March on Washington, which had also been the context of Chairman Mao’s statement. This speech was titled, “God’s Judgment of White America,” though it is frequently referred to as “The Chickens Are Coming Home to Roost.” Malcolm X forcefully articulated the depths of the contradiction of that period—when the United States stood poised at the pinnacle of its might and prestige, but was facing a world in rebellion against white Western hegemony. And while the United States attempted to woo the nations of the dark world as a true friend who itself had fought a war of national liberation against Europeans, in truth it was
now in a position of being the police of the historical system dominated by western capitalism. So while the United States may have been basking in the public relations glow of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s testament to the American Dream, it was Malcolm X who had his finger on the pulse of the rebellion of the Third World against white Western hegemony, and on the pulse of many in the inner cities across the nation.

Malcolm X stripped away the veil of the liberals, who, he argued, only pretended to befriend Black people. For Malcolm, there was no doubt about where white conservatives stood. They did not pretend to be the friends of Black people. Of white conservatives, Malcolm X argued:

They are like wolves; they show their teeth in a snarl that keeps the Negro always aware of where they stand with them. But the white liberals are foxes who show their teeth to the Negro but pretend they are smiling.” And it is precisely this confusing signal from the white liberals that makes them in Malcolm’s view, more dangerous than white conservatives. “They lure the Negro, and as the Negro runs from the growling wolf, he flees into the open jaws of the ‘smiling’ fox.”

Malcolm X was a master of the word. He explained that the Negro “revolution” was controlled by those foxy liberals who, he pointed out, not only had manipulated the March on Washington, but had openly cautioned the white public that they had to respond to the moderate Negro leaders to enhance their image in the eyes of the Black masses and to keep them from turning to the Black “extremists.” Unlike the “Negro Revolution,” the Black revolution was not under the control of any section of the white population. Malcolm X pointed out that the “Black revolution is the struggle of the non-whites of this earth against their white oppressors. The black revolution has swept white supremacy out of Africa, out of Asia, and it is getting ready to sweep it out of Latin America.”

Malcolm X framed the situation of the Black people in a way that was quite different from the official position of the leaders of the civil rights mainstream, who only saw themselves as a minority on an “American stage.” In contrast to the Negro leadership, Black revolutionaries viewed themselves on the world stage, and when you looked around on the world stage, you saw that most people resembled you more than they did the white people of Europe and North America. For these revolutionaries and the masses of Black people who gave them their ear and their allegiance, there was no American Dream but an American nightmare. But the people of the United States, particularly white people, should heed the handwriting on the wall, for in 1963, Malcolm X articulated a
stunning but entirely convincing proposition that we had arrived at the end of white world supremacy. He argued:

The time is past when the white world can exercise unilateral authority and control over the dark world. The independence and power of the dark world is on the increase; the dark world is rising in wealth, power, prestige, and influence. It is the rise of the dark world that is causing the fall of the white world. As the white man loses his power to oppress and exploit the dark world, the white man’s own wealth power or “world”) decreases . . . You and I were born at this turning point in history; we are witnessing the fulfillment of prophecy. Our present generation is witnessing the end of colonialism, Europeanism, Westernism, or “Whiteism” . . . the end of white supremacy, the end of the evil white man’s unjust rule.24

Shortly after his declaration of independence from Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam in the aftermath of the controversy about his statement describing the assassination of President John F. Kennedy as a case of “the chickens coming home to roost,” Malcolm X gave the famous presentation on “The Ballot or the Bullet.” In this speech, he called for Blacks to do away with all illusions. How could we call ourselves American if we are not sharing in the benefits of citizenship?25 The 22 million Black people in this country, he said, “are victims of Americanism.” And, as one of the 22 million Black victims of the disguised hypocrisy, which is presented to the world as American democracy, Malcolm X said he did “not see an American Dream;” . . . but “an American nightmare.”

Malcolm X was the pivotal figure who linked the feelings of the earlier radicalism of the Race First New Negro radicals to the evolution of the United States and Pan-European power during the last half of the twentieth century, although some members of the Black Left (or Black Popular Front) of the 1940s played an important role in the civil rights movement. It was Malcolm X who established a revolutionary position against the reformism of both the civil rights mainstream and of the old left (social-democrats, socialists, and communists). He argued with absolute certainty and humility (quite a combination) that those who believe in civil rights spend most of their time trying to prove that they are Americans, confining themselves to domestic issues within the boundaries of the United States and viewed from the perspective of a minority. When these people look on the American stage, they see a white stage. This manner of framing African-American identity simply reinforces the minority perspective, which is the perspective of an underdog impelled toward a begging, hat in hand, compromising approach.26
Malcolm X and the Black Nationalists on the other hand, are more interested in human rights than civil rights. They do not look upon themselves as Americans. “They look upon themselves as a part of dark humankind. They see the whole struggle not within the confines of the American stage, but they look upon the struggle on the world stage. And in the world context, they see that the dark man outnumbers the white man. On the world stage the white man is just a microscopic minority.”

Magubane also cites Harold Isaacs, who argued:

The downfall of white supremacy system in the rest of the world made the survival of it in the United States suddenly and painfully complicated. It became our most exposed feature and in the swift unfolding of world affairs, our most vulnerable weakness. When hundreds of millions of people all around look in our direction it seemed to be all that they could see.

Finally, Magubane quotes Nehru speaking at a private meeting with Black and white civil rights leaders at the behest of Ralph Bunche and Walter White:

Whenever I warn against acceptance of Soviet promises of equality because they are so frequently broken, I am answered quite often by questions about America’s attitude toward dark skinned people. The people of Asia don’t like colonialism or racial prejudices. They resent condescension. When Americans talk to them about equality and freedom, they remember stories about lynchings. They are becoming increasingly aware that colonialism is largely based on color—and for the first time in the lives of many of them they realize that they are colored.

What Magubane has done is reframe our gaze on the impact of the U.S. system of white supremacy on African-Americans and their relations with the entire dark world. But he also points out that African-American espousal of Black nationalism is at the heart of the revolt against white world supremacy. Magubane then argues that “Ethiopianism, Garveyism, and Pan-Africanism of the early twentieth century may have been poor efforts, small fissures in the dry crust of white hegemony, but they revealed an abyss: Beneath the apparently solid surface of world domination by whites they showed oceans of liquid matter only needing expansion to rend into fragments the hold of white supremacy.”

Because the modern, colonial, capitalist world system formed in the sixteenth century had global ambitions from Day One, the logic of transnational resistance and of transnational social strata predated our current
era of so-called globalization by a few centuries. Pan-European racism, which functioned to incorporate the lower strata of the white population into an alliance with dominant capital, also constructed a veil that profoundly degraded the social intelligence of large sections of the white social strata, although, of course, not of individuals.

Enslaved Africans, unlike the indigenous populations, were a part of the newly formed United States of America, and were living contradictions to the “land of the free” rhetoric of the nation’s propagandists. Their incorporation into U.S. society—even if ultimately as second-class citizens—would remain not only the Achilles heel of U.S. pretensions of freedom and democracy, but was also the foundation of its internally colonized periphery (or third world within). This is a very unstable mix. Melanie Bush and I will explore this at length in our forthcoming “Tensions in the American Dream,” but I would like to demonstrate how these tensions are manifest in the trajectory that we have just traveled.

While there were constant appeals to an international audience against the barbarity of enslavement, it was Du Bois’s announcement at the Pan African Conference in 1900 that the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line that served notice of a rising arc of struggle against white world supremacy now joined by people of African descent within the United States.

Black solidarity in the United States has taken a variety of political forms. This includes the liberal nationalism and anticolonialism of the Pan African Conference and Dr. Du Bois at the turn of the century, the militant and assertive Black solidarity of the Niagara Movement of 1905, and the Race First nationalism of the New Negro radicals whose leaders included Marcus Garvey, Hubert Harrison, Cyril Briggs, Richard Moore, W. A. Domingo, and Claude McKay. Even the Class First radicals of the New Negro Movement (A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen) were firm practitioners of Black Solidarity. In the 1920s and 1930s, Du Bois forcefully challenged the false universalism of both the Center and the Left within the American and Pan-European body politic while building alliances with radical nationalist movements and independent governments in the Dark World, and beginning a dialogue with revolutionaries in the Soviet Union who were not quite white by the standards of that time. In the 1930s and 1940s, many of these forces (Du Bois, Paul Robeson, Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison, C. L. R. James, Angelo Herndon, Oliver Cromwell Cox, E. Franklin Frazier, Ralph Bunche, Abram Harris, George Padmore, Shirley Graham, Claude Lightfoot, John Henrik Clarke) constituted a Black Popular Front that stood in the forefront of the struggle for defining the Black Freedom Struggle as one against racism and imperialism, and for U.S. involvement in the
construction of Henry Wallace’s “Century of the Common Man” (as opposed to the imperialist project of an “American Century”). During the 1950s and early 1960s, the continuing influence of the race’s first radicals influenced the move to the Left within the Nation of Islam under the leadership of Malcolm X, Muhammad Ahmed, and others. During this same period, remnants of the Black Popular Front connected with Dr. King and the civil rights movement (including young militants in both the SNCC and the Nation of Islam).³¹

Black particularity has often been a specter haunting the imaginations of the dominant social strata within American society because of perceived volatility and among large segments of the Pan-European population because their privilege and their relatively higher status rested upon the racial foundation provided by the people of African descent and other people of color. Needless to say, this creates substantial social tension and a formidable sense of defensiveness whenever questions are raised about the naturalized system of meanings designed precisely to be invisible.³² Notwithstanding the racial tensions felt on all sides, Black particularity has more often than not been a search for a wider and broader definition of “we,” and an attempt to widen, instead of narrow, the circle of humanity. It has not, for the most part, been about simple integration into the mainstream of U.S. society. That is why the notorious exceptionality of the Black population has been the target not only of the colorblind discourse introduced by President Reagan in 1980, but of a much more antagonistic political strategy that we forget at our own peril. Black intellectuals and activists who have challenged the false universality of the U.S. intelligentsia and public discourse have suffered exile, repression, ostracism, and assassination.³³

President Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism was nominally anti-imperialist, but his eye was on the threat posed by the radical, left-wing anticolonialism of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Despite Wilson’s rhetoric, he failed to address colonial and minority questions in his own sphere and remained notoriously hostile to Blacks.³⁴ Wilson imposed rigid segregation in Washington, D.C., during his years in the White House. He regarded Black soldiers as an especially dangerous group, a fertile conduit for the spread of Bolshevism within the United States. This recalls the pronouncements about the threat of revolutionary internationalist politics and white racial degeneration by Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard in 1920s.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.³⁵ argues that race-conscious Blacks, “nourishing prejudice, magnifying difference and stirring up antagonism” have come to represent a significant threat to what he views as the defining ethos of American nationhood. If this sounds suspiciously like the post-Reconstruction era attacks upon Blacks to achieve national reconciliation, this is by no means accidental.
It has not escaped the attention of American elites that the Black population in the United States has constituted the most consistent base and leadership of the U.S. left since the time of the Great Migration (1910–1920). It should, therefore, not be a surprise that as the nation moved to the center left, an African-American politician would win the presidency.

When Barack Obama entered onto the national stage, he struck me as similar to Jesse Jackson during his Rainbow Coalition phase, though he was more careful than Jackson to avoid being labeled as simply a Black politician. He also moved strategically to capture a significant section of the political center, unlike the Rainbow Coalition, which was much more Leftist in its stance. To do so, he played the “race-neutral card” with deliberateness and consistency in an environment where accusation of playing the race card would be used by the “colorblind racists” of the Republican Party to neutralize one’s ability to appeal to the white electorate.

Interestingly, the fallback position of those who opposed Obama for racial reasons is that Obama’s success is an indication that the nation is overcoming its racial divisions. Despite the disingenuous pleas of the right, there is something happening. The Southern strategy that emerged in the midst of the conservative backlash of the 1960s is dead. It has been on life support since 2000, but voter suppression has been used effectively to give us a sense that it is still in power. People of color are becoming too large of a demographic force to simply dismiss by demonizing Blacks, especially when Huntington and like minded people complain about the Hispanic threat, the Muslim threat, and the Chinese threat. The pushback against white world supremacy has been integral to the rise of the oppressed throughout the twentieth century. It is not separate from the increased power of working people, women, and increased opposition to (or at least a relaxation of) hetero-normativity. The relations between the dominant forces and the subordinate forces in the world system have been altered in favor of subordinate forces over the longue durée of the world system. The accumulation of oppositional power among people of African descent at the political and social center of a “Third World within” the United States has had, and will continue to have, enormous consequences for the structuring of power in the country and the larger world system.

This power will continue to be used to press for the decolonization of the U.S. Empire both internally and externally.\textsuperscript{36} This thrust will continue, whatever Obama does. But his election is a consequence of the slow change in relations of force, both internally, as people of color increase their numbers and social power in U.S. society, and externally, as their strength grows in the world system.
In 1963, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover argued that the United States was in the midst of a social revolution, with the racial movement at its core. He decided that the trajectory of the civil rights movement had to be radically altered or simply stopped, to forestall the social revolution that was under way. Many riding the progressive wave that swept the country during those years felt that Hoover’s fear struck a discordant note at a time that the United States was at the top of its form, reaching for the best that was within the nation. But the flowering of liberal nationalism, undergirded by the most dramatic expansion of the economy in world history, not only was the basis of the postwar welfare state and an attempt to bring Blacks into the social democratic compromise, it also was the time when the policing function of the hegemonic power was passed to the United States. And this was at a time when the social power of the oppressed strata, anchored in a “Third World within” had come to the fore. While this process was similar to the manner in which the polyglot working class of the early twentieth century led to the rise of the Communist Party of the United States, colonial origins of the post-1965 accumulation of power is significant for the logic of the argument that I present here. The particular racial demography of the United States earlier used to legitimate this “nation of nations” as fitting for world leadership now undermined the new hegemonic power, as the dark world within American borders recalled the hesitancy of previous generations to play the role of imperial enforcer of white world supremacy. In addition, a radical critique of the white, middle-class nature of second-wave feminism led to the rise of an antiracist, antisexist political faction within the ’60s movement led by radical women, such as Fran Beal and Linda Burnham in the SNCC Women’s Liberation Commission; Angela Davis in the CPUSA and Black Panther Party; and Marlene Dixon at the University of Chicago. These forces ignited a cascading and unifying liberation force within the U.S. Black liberation, Puerto Rican liberation, Chicano and Mexican liberation, Native American liberation, women’s liberation, and lesbian and gay liberation movements. The vigorous questioning raised by those who were fighting for liberation within U.S. society broke the easy identification with the liberal nationalism of the U.S. ruling class, opening up a location to the left of the body politic for the children of the greatest generation.

The liberal Eurocentrism of the Enlightenment had been the cultural foundation of the social democratic compromise in the core states of the world system, and to some extent, of the radical semi-peripheral states of the Pan-European world as well. In hindsight, many now view this period as the golden age of capitalism. But it is also brought us to the limits of the system because this compromise could not be extended to the rest of
the world without exhausting the limits of the profit-maximizing logic of capitalism. The ruling classes of the hegemonic power in its twilight were searching for an alternative strategy, but knew that the preemptive warriors of the far right were not a plausible answer to this crisis of U.S. hegemony, which is accompanied by a crisis of white world supremacy, and finally, by a structural crisis of capitalism.

The golden age of capitalism enabled strata within the “belly of the beast” and its periphery to glimpse larger possibilities for social transformation and to attempt to realize them. In the meantime, the harsh rhetoric against those within the belly of the beast and its peripheries has been ratcheted up. Civil tension in the United States is at an unprecedented level, giving rise to a dramatic expansion of what Steve Martinot refers to as the para-state. But what is new in this period is that the strategy of neoliberal globalization has come undone. The oppressed strata no longer accept that there is no alternative. The dramatic demographic shift in the population of the core states includes large numbers of people forced to move from Africa, Asia, the Pacific Islands, Latin America, and the Caribbean to the Pan-European world. Though the 800,000 Africans who are a part of this migratory trek are not large in number, their educational levels (43.8 percent college educated) is higher than both Asian-Americans (42.5 percent), and the U.S. population as a whole (23.1 percent). Similarily Okome points out that 88 percent of adults who emigrate from Africa to the United States have a high school education or higher, compared with 77 percent of native-born Americans, 76 percent of Asian immigrants, and 46 percent of immigrants from Central America. Although I understand Okome’s reservations about the difficulties of integration into the United States, I think the more appropriate model would be that which created the New Negro movement in the United States during the period of the first great migration of people of African descent from the South and the Caribbean (e.g., Marcus Garvey, Amy Jacques Garvey, Hubert Harrison, Cyril Briggs, Richard Moore, W. A. Domingo, Claude McKay, Otto Huiswood, et cetera). In contrast to Cruse’s focus on the so-called integrationist wannabes in that group, most other accounts view the New Negro movement as a galvanizing and radicalizing force in American history. High levels of education of the African immigrant population, combined with their resistance to the Eurocentric-biased cultural brainwashing that American students have to combat, could be a significant component in the dramatic expansion of a leadership stratum that could assimilate into the existing African-American, Caribbean-American, and African-Latino communities to make the segment of transnational Africa residing in North America a formidable force in uniting the larger transnational circuit of Africans
and working with other transnational groups to change the power relations of the world system. The rise of the Obama phenomenon is only a part of the arrival of transnational Africa as a transformative force in the world system in the same way that other transnational social forces have been.

This brings us to a brief assessment of what Arrighi and Zhang (2009) hail as the New Bandung, based on supplanted the Washington consensus with what some call the Beijing consensus. This new trend is anchored by the four largest economic powers of the south: China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. J. C. Ramo holds that China, the largest economic power in the south, has entered into relationships with other states that stand in stark contrast to “U.S.-style power, bristling with arms and intolerant of other world views.” For Ramo, the Chinese offer a multilateral, rather than a unilateral, model of global alliances. Not every country can be a superpower, but each can be a power in its own right, not strong enough for domination, but strong enough for self-determination.

The rise of this New Bandung, the influence of transnational Africa at many levels of the American political and civil society and the demographic changes in the core states will alter worldwide political and economic relations of long standing. The rise of the power of the south and the demographic changes within the core states linking a segment of their populations to the countries of the south will unhinge the cultural foundation, which stabilizes the core states, freeing the working classes of the Pan-European world to focus finally on the class rule, which has long imprisoned them. But the key link in this process is breaking the chains of Pan-European racism or white world supremacy.

Notes

6. Ibid., 71.
9. Ibid.
11. The notion of the coloniality of power is associated with the Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano, the Puerto Rican sociologists Kelvin Santiago-Valles, Ramon Grosfoguel, and Agustin Lao-Montes, and the Argentine scholar Walter Mignolo.
13. Ibid.
14. My use of a framework developed by French historian Fernand Braudel does not indicate an agreement with his own lack of historical depth regarding the history of Africa. I stand with Jacques Depelchin’s (2005) critique of the academic violence encapsulated in the dominant historiography of the Pan-European world.
15. Many will recall Amilcar Cabral’s frequently invoked admonition that the forces of liberation should “Tell no lies, claim no easy victories.”
20. Ibid.
21. This was the occasion when Malcolm X, in response to a question from the audience, made the comment about the assassination of John F. Kennedy being a case of the “chickens coming home to roost.” For this statement, he was suspended from the Nation of Islam, initially for 90 days, and then indefinitely. We can see in this commentary that Malcolm X had moved beyond the limits of the Nation of Islam.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 130.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 188.
29. Ibid., 189; 1,059.
30. Ibid., 193.
34. Ibid., 31.


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Chapter 4

What About the Reciprocity? Pan-Africanism and the Promise of Global Development

Mora McLean

What About the Reciprocity?

Announced with great fanfare, the African Union’s (AU) 2003 declaration symbolically establishing the African Diaspora as its sixth region seemed to signal a major turning point, ushering in a new era of Pan-African cooperation. Thereafter, the AU hosted a series of regional consultative conferences to solicit input on a “realizable programme of action” from African Diaspora participants from around the world. In June 2007, the North American Regional Consultative Conference assembled in New York City, drawing activists, scholars, diplomats, business entrepreneurs, government officials, non-profit (NGO) practitioners, and civic and political leaders from the Caribbean, South America, the United States, and Canada. The gathering opened with a stirring address by Naledi Pandor, an erudite and charismatic member of parliament and, at the time, Minister of Education in South Africa. Echoing the words of Kwame Nkrumah and other Pan-Africanists from an earlier era, Pandor addressed audience members as “the sons and daughters of Africa,” drawn to the occasion for the lofty purpose of exploring “how best to make the twenty-first century an African century.”
During one of the conference breakout sessions, I sat next to an African-American historian renowned for his seminal research tracing the worldwide dispersal of peoples from the African continent. He is an educator credited with mentoring a generation of young African and African-American scholars, as well as with making a substantive contribution to the major disciplines, area studies, and the trajectory of Pan-Africanist philosophy. We listened intently as the conference organizers instructed us on our mandate: to produce a strategy for mobilizing the intellectual and material resources of members of the Diaspora in support of the AU’s agenda for Africa’s development. In the midst of this, and with a hint of indignation, the professor leaned toward me and whispered, “But what about the reciprocity?”

Startled by the question, I pondered its significance. Did it reflect a genuine sense of alarm at the prospect of unfulfilled mutual obligations and responsibilities, or was it a rhetorical expression of something hoped for, but not expected? After all, the AU’s definition of the African Diaspora as “peoples of African Origin living outside the continent, irrespective of citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and building of the African Union” (emphasis added) explicitly narrowed the geographic focus and purpose of our mission. Moreover, this restrictive definition had emerged from within the AU’s own internal deliberations.

No sooner had the resolution on the sixth region been proposed when debate ensued over “who really is a member of the [African] Diaspora.” Given the extent and increasing rate of contemporary global migrations from the African continent, it was determined at the outset that limiting the scope to the descendants of survivors of the Middle Passage made little sense in the twenty-first century. Then, having addressed the term’s spatial and temporal parameters, the AU raised the question of mutual expectations—“What, precisely, can the Diaspora bring to the AU, and what can the AU bring to the Diaspora?” To tackle this question, the AU Commission, which serves as the executing arm of the AU, convened a meeting of “experts” from AU member states. Drawing on the Commission’s report, the AU arrived at its new formulation by consensus, incorporating the operative clause requiring support for the development of the continent and the building of the African Union.

At the New York conference, I responded to the professor with a nod, signaling my concurrence with his dissent, which I recognized as tapping into my own ambivalence and unease with the one-way focus of the conference agenda. Why, indeed, should this twenty-first-century Pan-African initiative proceed on the unquestioned assumption that the Diaspora’s intellectual and material resources should be rallied in support of a campaign focused exclusively on the needs of Africans in Africa?
Judging from side comments overheard that day, the question of reciprocity was on the minds of many—and not only African-Americans. One conferee, a Ghanaian-American man who, beginning in the 1970s, had established long-term residence in the United States after completing a U.S. university scholarship—part of that wave of African immigrants whose relatives encouraged them to remain abroad to earn and send home the hard currencies needed to ease the brunt of structural adjustment—complained bitterly of feeling sidelined and taken for granted by the “Africans-for-Africans, but-only-those-in-Africa,” orientation of the AU campaign.

While conferees of the neo-Diaspora—Africans who had voluntarily emigrated from and settled outside the continent—protested their lack of influence on the ultimate direction of the AU’s Diaspora agenda—a variation on the theme of taxation without representation—it seemed that the demand for equal time was expressed most vehemently by the conferees of the New World Diaspora. One African-American woman demanded to know, “Where were you Africans when we needed you after Katrina?” During the uncomfortable silence that followed, it seemed that this stark reminder of the impoverishment and degradation of a large segment of black America and the omission of their concerns from the deliberations struck a resonant disquieting chord.

**Disunity of Sentiment and Action: Continental versus Diaspora Pan-Africanism**

I found a plausible historical explanation for this twenty-first-century constellation of Pan-African interlocutors, and the dynamics unfolding between us, in an essay authored almost three decades ago by the late sociologist and scholar, St. Claire Drake. Drake observed that for some 60 years into the twentieth century:

> Pan-African political activity developed as a series of local, highly specific struggles against discrimination based on race and color . . . and against material and psychological legacies of the slave trade.7

He identified this period of Pan-Africanism, initiated with some prominent exceptions (including Azikiwe, Nkrumah, and Senghor) by the descendants of sub-Saharan Africans dispersed to the Western hemisphere, as “an epoch in traditional Pan-Africanism” that ended with the 1966 First Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar. From that point onward:

> [cultural] Pan-Africanism would . . . provide a broader basis of identification and cooperative endeavor in the black world than political Pan-Africanism
and . . . the initiative for both aspects . . . passed completely from the diaspora to Africa.8

Explaining this major shift away from an earlier era characterized by “unity of sentiment and action between individuals in Africa and the diaspora,” Drake cited three variables: (1) by the mid-60s members of the Diaspora no longer had an “uncomplicated united struggle” against imperialism with which to identify because, by that time, all but a few African countries had gained their independence; (2) the military overthrow of independent Nigeria’s first civilian government, and the Ghanaian coup that followed soon after, caused unease within the New World Diaspora, and both events led to governments run by military strongmen unaccustomed to interacting with West Indians and African-Americans, and not drawn to “sentimental Pan-Africanism;” and (3) African-Americans who were wary of the trend toward armed struggle in southern Africa began distancing themselves.9

Reflecting on the evolution of Pan-Africanism in the period leading up to World War II and the emergence of African nationalism and an African-led Pan-Africanist discourse in the postwar years, Drake also cautioned that the two forms “are not always compatible.” He called on colleagues in the academy to examine in-depth “the full implications of the emergence of African states and of continental Pan-Africanism for the continued viability of racial [or Diaspora-driven] Pan-Africanism.”

The impetus for the AU’s twenty-first-century Diaspora Programme cannot be traced to a specific local incident of race-based injustice, and in its execution thus far, the initiative fails to live up to Drake’s definition of “what makes the activity Pan-African,” namely:

the conceptualization on the part of the participants in these local struggles of their being part of a larger worldwide activity involving black people everywhere, with the various segments having obligations and responsibilities to each other.10

On the contrary, at the North American Consultative conference, Minister Pandor tasked delegates with asking ourselves this “fundamental question:” “What can you do, as a collective of Africans in the North American Diaspora, to pave the way for prosperity and sustained development in Africa?”11 Reciprocity was nowhere mentioned as being part of this agenda.

Then later, at the October 2007 Regional Consultative Conference held in Addis Ababa, it appeared that the AU had absorbed some of the critique emerging from multiple, and at times competing, voices from
within the Diaspora constituency. The question “What can the AU bring to the Diaspora?” was addressed during the opening ceremony by Alpha Oumar Konaré, Mali’s former head of state and chair of the AU Commission. Konaré assured the assembled delegates that they were convening:

not just to reflect on the Diaspora Programme but also to receive and consider the views of our brothers and sisters in the Diaspora and to marry our hopes, objectives and aspirations. . . . As we reunite our African family, after a long period of enforced separation and others created by expedience, it is essential that we establish the element of reciprocity and the process of give and take as an important characteristic of the programme to reengineer and create a broader African identity.

But in the ensuing months it became evident that, despite this lofty exhortation, the AU Diaspora Programme would not easily depart from its original, exclusively Africa-focused, direction.12

In his treatise on “the possibilities and pitfalls of an African identity in the late twentieth century,” written more than a decade after the publication of St. Claire Drake’s essay, the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah also draws attention to the origins, overlap, intersection, and divergence of Continental and Diaspora Pan-Africanism. But Appiah goes even further. He asserts that it is in the exploration and pursuit of Diaspora Pan-Africanism and continental Pan-Africanism as distinct, albeit potentially complementary, projects that “the future of an intellectually reinvigorated Pan-Africanism lies.”13 I am persuaded by the strength of this argument—combined with evidence from my own experience.

Transnational Sojourner

I spent my childhood migrating between two sets of black cultures—Caribbean and African-American. My earliest memory of crossing transnational boundaries is from age four, when my family boarded a Pan American World Airways flight heading southward from New York City to St. Thomas in the United States Virgin Islands. My mother, Vera Colbert Garrison— the only child of Alyce and Alphonso Colbert, two Washington, D.C. natives who identified Colonial Beach, Virginia and Atlantic City, New Jersey as their ancestral homes—was a young divorcée when she met my father soon after his return from serving as a black regiment officer in the segregated U.S. Army of World War II. William Gordon McLean was a Brooklyn-bred West Indian, the eldest of two
sons born to Amina McLean (née Lufgrin, the surname she inherited from her Danish father) and William Joseph McLean, whose bloodline, as well as surname, are traceable to a Scottish sea captain. Fed up with, to paraphrase his description, beating his head up against the wall of white racism on the U.S. mainland, my father convinced my mother that they should pack the family up and relocate to his ancestral home in the Caribbean territories purchased by the U.S. government from Denmark in 1917.

One of my most vivid early childhood memories is of rising before daybreak, full of eager anticipation, to accompany my mother on the long downhill walk from the historic Villa Fairview to Market Square, the original slave trade and auction site at the west end of Main Street in our local “capital,” named for the seventeenth-century Danish queen, Charlotte Amalie. From my little-girl perspective, the bustling marketplace was the scene of multisensory pleasures: Men and women traveled from the countryside on donkeys loaded down with fresh produce and various local delicacies that children were allowed to sample. Women strode purposefully down the waterfront toward the marketplace with baskets of freshly caught, gleaming fish balanced on their regally erect heads.

These images were coupled with my father’s stories about the great hurricane in which much of his father’s extended family on the British Isle of Antigua perished, and the few survivors dispersed to Panama, Trinidad, the Virgin Islands, and New York City. I learned about the Marcus Garvey parades my grandfather had taken him to as a small boy, and on our weekly trips to the Main (and only) Post Office—with its majestic interior mural depicting the capture and 1848 emancipation of slaves throughout the Danish West Indies—we routinely passed the prominently displayed statue memorializing Edward Wilmott Blyden, the theologian, scholar, and proponent of black repatriation, widely regarded the “father of Pan-Africanism.”

The contrast between life at home on the island of St. Thomas and what I experienced during periodic summers spent with my mother’s extended family in Washington, D.C., was stark, providing distinctive backdrops for my growing awareness of connections to Africa. At home in St. Thomas, “African” images and sensibilities were pervasive and embraced, but in Washington—among my maternal relatives—Africa was more likely to be a topic of dispute, or one to be avoided altogether. With apparently no sense of irony, black D.C. residents referred with great pride to the black elite enclave in the northwest section of the city as “the Gold Coast”—a reference no doubt intended to evoke the area’s upper-class residents and exclusivity, and not the image of the nineteenth-century British Crown
What About the Reciprocity?

To my working-class relatives—none of whom lived in Washington’s exclusive neighborhoods—my father and we, his children, were somewhat exotic, providing further proof of their beloved Vera’s adventurous nature. The family matriarchs, including my widowed and remarried grandmother, Alyce Quander, and her two elder sisters, Ellene Bradic and Chesney Martin—the eldest of whom was born just 20 years after the Emancipation Declaration—could have passed for many things other than Negro or “colored.” They attributed their light complexions, sharp features, and naturally straight hair to Cherokee Indians who, according to family legend (but not based on available evidence), provided some of the roots in the family tree.

Inspired by the Black Power activism of the 1960s, my older siblings and cousins made earnest attempts to embrace their African past. But, at every opportunity, my usually sweet-tempered great aunts adamantly held forth about how blessed all of us were that our descendants had been captured and shipped from African shores so that we could enjoy the benefits of Christianity and American civilization. The family matriarchs remained firm in this conviction even when reminded that they, along with their forebears, had endured the humiliations of Jim Crow segregation, and still were being denied their full rights as citizens, right there in the nation’s capital. (This history provided the backdrop for my mother’s account of how, as young adults, the only way she and her friends could gain entry into D.C.’s “white-only” movie theaters was to dress up and disguise themselves as African diplomats.) Invariably, this intergenerational debate heated up, with neither side securing concessions from the other, until an elder pulled rank and ended it, a pattern that continued each time someone dared to mention “Africa.”

When I left St. Thomas to attend university on the U.S. mainland, I began to direct my attention to Africa as a concept and geographical space I wanted and needed to learn more about for my intellectual enrichment—and as an antidote to the growing, painful realization that the historical and enduring degradation of African-Americans was partially linked to Africa’s low position in the global hierarchy of power. Against the advice of my undergraduate faculty advisor, I chose to major in African studies. To my mind, the intellectual breadth and appeal of multi- and interdisciplinary area studies trumped concerns that the emergent field was regarded, at best, as less than rigorous and, at worst, disdainfully, by the major academic disciplines.

In her essay titled “Area Studies in Search of Africa,” Pearl Robinson provides a cogent and comprehensive review of the trajectory of African studies, reminding me that the fear of joining the ranks of the
unemployed swayed my decision to secure a law degree rather than a Ph.D. She observes that in the late 70s:

regional specialists faced a double bind: an increasingly tight job market, plus the control of most academic positions by disciplinary departments rather than area studies centers.16

The compromise to go to law school also seemed more attuned to my inclination to combine theory and practice. So, not long out of law school, I joined a private foundation to work on the design and implementation of grant programs to support civil rights advocacy activities on behalf of mainly poor and dispossessed African-Americans, Latino Americans, and Native Americans in the United States. It was then that I got my first real introduction to the Deep South—specifically the nation’s poorest region known as the “Black Belt,” the term allegedly coined by Booker T. Washington to describe the rich dark earth on which black slaves toiled, but which now refers to 11 states, stretching from Alabama to Virginia, in which a majority of the populations are poor and about third of the poor are black.17

I witnessed, firsthand—and through the eyes of black clergy and elected and appointed officials devoted to providing basic services otherwise denied to highly concentrated, mainly rural, black communities—the acute poverty, substandard housing, poor health care, lack of access to quality education, violent crime, high unemployment, and political disenfranchisement that characterized their condition. Knowing that these conditions, as bad as they were, were improvements over those from which my maternal ancestors sought escape in the mid-twentieth-century Great Migration north, tempered my condemnation of the less-than-progressive attitudes of my elder Washington, D.C. relatives. It also enlarged my understanding of the multidimensionality of the “Black Experience.”

Still, I held fast to the idea, planted during my upbringing in the Caribbean and later cultivated by my exposure to writings of W. E. B. Du Bois and other twentieth-century Pan-Africanists, that the well-being and ultimate liberation of black people everywhere was contingent on the liberation of Africans in Africa. I reasoned that improving conditions of life in and increasing the global stature of Africa would help overcome the taint and legacy of slavery on the Continent and within the African Diaspora, and redound to the collective psychological, and ultimately material, well-being of all people of African descent. With this mindset I leapt at the opportunity to relocate to Nigeria in order to take on the responsibility of overseeing the foundation’s West Africa human rights, women’s reproductive health, and community economic development programs.
My Nigeria sojourn was inspired by a Pan-Africanist vision of how best to pursue the collective well-being, rather than by any conscious desire to reestablish my “African roots.” I felt somewhat uncomfortable when my newly acquired Nigerian friends would introduce me as a recent arrival who was “really a Nigerian.” Although intended as a compliment, this felt suspiciously like an implicit rejection of my African-American and Caribbean heritage. If anything, while witnessing firsthand the cultural richness and depth within Nigeria, I marveled with renewed appreciation at how my own Caribbean and African-American forebears had managed to survive and recreate themselves—evolving new forms of identity and cultural expression that have global influence.

At the same time, I also nurtured the naive expectation that I would enjoy—and I was entitled to—a kind of family welcome. So it was more than a small shock to discover that my Nigerian brethren saw me as an oyinbo—a “white” person. While the drivers, “house help,” and legion of low-wage workers who cushioned my privileged existence found it difficult to imagine that we had much in common; at the other end of the spectrum, many of my bourgeois Nigerian acquaintances were inclined to draw comparisons between the American and British expatriates in their midst, noting their preference for the latter, whom they considered to be more attuned to Nigerian sensibilities. I equated this to the familiarity of blacks and whites in the American south.

But, like so many before me, I found that as far as my Nigerian brothers and sisters were concerned, I stood apart as a particularly distinctive foreigner—one who sought, with annoying persistence, to draw parallels between myself and the descendants of Calabar, the southeastern port city from which roughly a third of Africans transported to the New World as slaves departed the continent. In response to denials that the array of lighter-brown complexions predominant among Calabar’s inhabitants was in any way associated with the slave trade, my feelings alternated between frustration and bemusement: “You just don’t know your history,” I would insist, oblivious to the blinders impeding my own insight. It was only much later that I came to realize that their refusal to entertain my claims to a shared legacy might have stemmed from a form of denial rather than lack of knowledge.

The Rupture and the Connection

For many children of the black diaspora, the Middle Passage represents both an undeniable link and an inescapable rupture.

Kwame Anthony Appiah18
The discourse of Pan-Africanism, whether of a populist vein or emerging from within academic circles, is replete with the language and metaphor of family. But the real or imagined sense of connection—the yearning even, for connection—to Mother Africa belies the reality that members of the Diaspora are also estranged, separated by time, history, and experience and even a reservoir of mutual distrust and misunderstanding.

In *Lose Your Mother*, Saidiyah Hartman’s insightful meditation on the ways in which the slave trade figures in the minds of Africans and of members of the New World Diaspora, she provides this trenchant description of her rude awakening during a year spent in Ghana:

As I disembarked from the bus in Elmina, I heard it. It was sharp and clear, as it rang in the air, and clattered in my ear making me recoil. Obruni. A stranger. A foreigner across the sea.

I . . . was a wandering seed bereft of the possibility of taking root . . . Everyone avoided the word “slave,” but we all knew who was who. As a “slave baby,” I represented what most chose to avoid: the catastrophe that was our past, and the lives exchanged for India cloth, Venetian beads, cowrie shells, guns, and rum. And what was forbidden to discuss: the matter of someone’s origins.

In my company, the polite . . . made jokes about how I had found my way back home or teased me about searching for my roots. They were used to Americans with identity problems. . . . And even if I was indiscreet enough to mention my slave origins, most refused to follow me down this dangerous path and responded with studied indifference to all my talk of slavery.19

From the perspective of the New World Diaspora, Africans’ refusal to confront, and possibly help heal, the psychic wound inflicted by slavery is a source of unease and mistrust in what is otherwise presumed to be a relationship based on racial solidarity and the shared experience of racism. On the other hand, the failure of self-identified Pan-Africanists of the New World—so intent upon their own validation—to accept Africans on their own terms, and their inclination to instead project their own views of what ought to be, also produces friction. The alienation on all sides is compounded when the New World Diaspora illusion of a familial embrace awaiting them across the Atlantic butts up against the historical reality of “African” participation in the slave trade—and the necessity for all sides to acknowledge their historical roles as both perpetrators and victims.

Growing up in St. Thomas, one of my favorite family outings was taking the ferry boat to St. John, the smallest and least spoiled of the three U.S. Virgin Islands. On each leg of the trip, I anticipated the sighting of
Ram Head Point, the famed cliff off St. John’s eastern coast from which, according to local legend, African rebel slaves committed mass suicide, leaping to their death into the shark-infested waters rather than submit to domination by Danish slave masters. Through my childhood, and especially during the time that I lived and worked in West Africa and traveled extensively along the West African coast, I drew on this legend as an emblem of my connection to Africa and what I imagined to be an uncompromising African diasporic commitment to liberty. So I was stunned when, many years later, I came upon these passages in Saidiyah Hartman’s book:

Princes without kingdoms and generals without armies and big men without dependents headed the St. John rebellion. . . . When they first gained control of the island, the rebels didn’t burn the plantations or factories, because they intended to run them with slave laborers.

During the early months of the revolt, when faced with a shortage of ammunition, they traded the non-Amina slaves for a barrel of gunpowder (replicating in miniature the gun-slave cycle that helped to fuel the slave trade in Africa). This attitude might explain why the majority of the island’s slaves did not join the rebellion.20

Even if one fails to grasp that this early New World episode was not simply a matter of “Africans selling other Africans”—for one thing, in the seventeenth century Africans did not conceive of themselves as such: as Hartman observes, the St. John rebels were battling to replace St. John’s Danish-run plantations with an Akan, not “African” polity—the fact of “African” complicity in the slave trade undercuts the idea of indelible racial solidarity.

Increasingly, African and diasporic writers, intellectuals, and others are examining the basis for contemporary African reticence to probe the issue of slavery, and finding that it is as likely to be a reflection of unease, and even perhaps unresolved anguish, as it is to reflect “studied indifference.”21

In a 2007 interview, Ama Ata Aidoo, the author, playwright, and former education minister of Ghana, spoke directly to the lack of resolution on the African side of the Middle Passage:

I grew up in an area of Ghana where there are these slave forts, and it bothered me greatly that nobody talked about it, and I suspect [it was] a consequence of people not being willing to actually articulate what was on their minds or what they knew about these things. . . . I have a feeling, especially out there in Africa, [that part of what is stymieing] our development is also this unfinished business about slavery. . . . We don’t
want to face it. And if you don’t want to face up to what happened to you yesterday, how are you going to go forward into the future?  

The combination of personal background, cultural perspective, intellectual curiosity, and a desire to do something for the greater good, led me as one member of the New World Diaspora to attempt the pursuit of a Pan-Africanist vocation. Early on, I took it for granted that my work on domestic issues affecting African-Americans and a subsequent international focus on Africans represented two paths to contributing toward a singular goal: the collective material and psychological well-being of people bound together by the painful experience of oppression on the basis of race. But I have since come to regard the multiple variations on black identity, mutual ambivalence about the relationship of the Diaspora to Africa, and the absence of “family dialogue” on the causes and consequences of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade as but a few signs of the fragility of this premise if racial solidarity is its sole foundation.

The Importance of Shared Interests

The most distinctive characteristic of traditional Pan-Africanism has been its emphasis on fostering solidarity between all black people everywhere... The solidarity, in the final analysis, has to be based on common interests not common values. . . .

St. Clair Drake

Neither the fact of blackness nor shared experiences under racism nor the historical process of their dispersal makes for community or even a common identity.

Tiffany Ruby Patterson and Robin D.G. Kelley

Ever wonder why black elected officials spend so much time talking about purely symbolic “issues,” like an official apology for slavery?... It’s because symbolism, history, and old-fashioned racism are about the only things they can be sure their African American constituents still have in common.

Eugene Robinson

In the early part of the twentieth century, the compelling need to refute Hegel’s reverberant nineteenth-century dogma that cast the African as “natural man in his completely wild and untamed state,” and Africa as a place that “is no historical part of the World,” provided a basis for the shared commitment that joined Henry Sylvester Williams, the Trinidadian barrister who spearheaded the first Pan-African Conference
in 1900, Anna Julia Cooper, the African-American educator, activist, and feminist intellectual, and other towering figures, such as Kwame Nkrumah and W. E. B. Du Bois, who carried the baton of Pan-Africanism forward between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The lives of these pioneers were framed by the historically momentous Trans-Atlantic slave trade and its abolition; Reconstruction after the United States Civil War; the imperialist scramble for Africa; decolonization; and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. They rose to meet the challenges of their day, collectively asserting the humanity and claiming the rights of peoples of African descent, often situating these struggles in the larger context of suffering endured by poor and powerless people of all races, worldwide. Members of this vanguard persisted despite the relentless onslaught of powerful white supremacist doctrines and institutions weighing against their efforts. They displayed extraordinary fortitude and vision and, on the whole, an awe-inspiring ability to frame alternative ways of assessing and positing solutions to the predicament of people oppressed and exploited on the basis of race. Reflecting on this, I often ask myself what legacy will we, twenty-first-century Pan-Africanists, bequeath to subsequent generations.

Perhaps some answers lie in the evolution of African-American attitudes toward Africa. As Kwame Anthony Appiah observes, for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “black interest in Africa was inversely correlated with black faith in America.” Shedding more light on this dynamic during an earlier era when the sentiments and actions of Africans in Africa and in the Diaspora were explicitly united, scholars such as St. Claire Drake have chronicled how the period between the emancipation of slaves in the United States and World War II involved extensive relations between Africans and African-Americans, led mainly by historically black church denominations (such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church) and black colleges and universities (such as Lincoln University), and including major efforts to train young Africans in the professions and otherwise provide opportunities for education and skills training.

The founding of the Africa-America Institute (AAI) was inspired during this era of trans-Atlantic self-help. Prominent among AAI’s original founders was William Leo Hansberry, an African-American man who was born in 1894, in Jim Crow Mississippi—two years before the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its landmark “separate-but-equal” ruling in *Plessy v. Ferguson*—and who grew up during a period in which African Americans suffered some of the most extreme forms of overt racism, rigid segregation, and violence.

Hansberry “discovered” Africa through reading the works of W.E.B. Du Bois. Much as it had influenced Carter G. Woodson—one of
Hansberry’s best-known contemporaries—Du Bois’s thinking fueled Hansberry’s burning desire to understand the place where “black” Africa fit within world history. Hansberry challenged the conventional wisdom of his time by unveiling a rich “African” cultural and economic history that originated before the encounters with Europe. He pursued a lifetime of scholarship that inspired the creation of the field of African studies, and helped to provide the intellectual basis for early Pan-Africanist thought.

When they launched AAI in the early 1950s, Hansberry and AAI’s other cofounders, including Horace Mann Bond, Lincoln University’s first black president, set about to make a major contribution toward the success of the then newly emerging independent African states: opportunities for Africans to secure advanced degrees and training that would prepare them to teach in universities, effectively manage government bureaucracies and otherwise fulfill all the requirements of modern statehood. The emphasis on education mirrored the priority concerns of Africans and of African-American “race men” and women—and civil rights advocates: The 1954 Supreme Court decision to end segregation in public schools throughout the United States was handed down a year after AAI was founded.

Toward the end of the 1950s, as Kenya was on the verge of political independence, a trade unionist, politician, and statesman named Thomas Joseph Mboya determined that the foundation for that East African nation’s political and economic freedom would have to be built by women and men equipped with the skills to fortify and manage a new nation. Responding to his call, Major League Baseball legend Jackie Robinson, singer Harry Belafonte, actor Sidney Poitier, Martin Luther King Jr., and representatives of AAI were all somehow involved in supporting what became known as the Kenya Airlifts—the campaign launched by a small multiracial group of Americans who “fought the British colonial government, the U.S. State Department, and segregation” to enable 800 young East African students to study at U.S. universities.

During and after the Cold War, the most visible expression of African American concern for Africa occurred through advocacy to shape U.S. foreign policy. In 1995, AAI commissioned a study to, among other things, answer the question: “To what extent are Members [of Congress] interested in, and knowledgeable about, Africa?” The study found that while “four percent of respondents reported ‘a great deal of interest’ in Africa,” a large majority, “57 percent reported ‘very little interest,’” and that “Members [of Congress] who represent majority black districts [primarily the Congressional Black Caucus members] are profoundly more interested in Africa that those who do not.”
The study also found that the policymakers surveyed believed that, while including Africa on their legislative agendas might marginally improve their political standing with constituents, failing to do so would not cost them any votes. According to the study, 72 percent believed that Africa was important to “almost none” or “very few” of their constituents. These findings represented a startling departure from the era of black political activism that played a pivotal role in spurring the Free South Africa movement and financial boycotts of apartheid South Africa.

Based on media coverage and the politics surrounding current U.S. government policies pertaining to Africa (e.g., with respect to Sudan), the U.S. constituency for Africa today can fairly be described as multiracial and bipartisan. This is the nature of the constituency that helped to solidify Congressional support for a new era of two-way trade with African countries through the historic passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (or “AGOA”), and appointment of Rosa Whitaker, an African-American woman, to serve as the first Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa. But the range of issues of concern to, and overall commitment of, this multiracial, bipartisan constituency is relatively small, even among black voters. Surveying the level of African-American interest in U.S.-Africa policy during the lead-up to the 2008 presidential election, journalist—Charlayne Hunter-Gault observed that:

[un]doubtedly, the high point of [the political passions of African Americans for their motherland] was the leading role [they] played two decades ago in assembling a wide ranging coalition against apartheid in South Africa [but the] momentum was not sustained.

Speculating on the extent to which race would continue to serve as the main spark for black political action vis-à-vis Africa, Hunter-Gault asked whether the candidacy of Barack Obama would “ignite the political passions of African-Americans for their motherland?”

As events unfolded it became clear that the African origins of the candidate’s father, a Kenyan who emigrated to the United States in the late 1950s (around the time of the Kenya Airlifts) to take advantage of a university scholarship, would not serve as a sufficient basis for renewed interest in Africa—or for that matter, any other set of policy issues—on the part of all black voters. This was partially illustrated by the public “debate” sparked by the suggestion that Obama was not “black enough” because he is not a descendant of African slaves. Members of the African neo-Diaspora who supported Obama’s candidacy claimed him as an
exemplar of the African immigrant experience. As one naturalized U.S. citizen from Somalia stated in an interview by the Washington Post:

I have nothing against my brothers and sisters, black people who were born here, but [Obama’s] father is like me. His father was an immigrant. I can relate to him the way I can relate to my own children.34

More than perhaps any other event in recent history, the controversy surrounding Obama’s ethnic identity broadened the popular conception of the African Diaspora. The effects of globalization—including voluntary emigration from the African continent, the largest influx of black Africans to the United States since slavery—changing social mores, and the demographic effects of a generation of interracial coupling, are registering in the minds of many people of all races who have tended to have a relatively narrow concept of African-American identity. Analyzing the impact of these trends, Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Eugene Robinson argues that the changing composition and dynamics of the African Diaspora are undermining the idea of a “black America.” “There was a time,” he observes:

when there were agreed-upon “black leaders,” when there was a clear “black agenda,” and when we could talk confidently about “the state of black America,”—but not anymore.35

There is even a growing body of scholarship that challenges the efficacy of the term “diaspora,” characterizing it as being wholly inadequate to convey the variety of “international contexts for ‘black’ identities and political movements.”36

The question of identity aside, analysis of what drives the success of U.S.-based mobilization and advocacy efforts in support of Africa-related causes—the anti-apartheid movement being the most prominent example—shows that success turns on many factors. These include: a broad consensus on major aims and strategy; the personal and professional experiences and organizational skills of participants; and whether broader constituencies not actively involved in the effort are more or less sympathetic to the cause. William Minter’s summation of the evidence is as relevant today as it was in the late 1990s when he conducted this research:

Ancestral connection to Africa is an extremely important component for potential mobilization of individuals on African issues. But it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Whatever the racial or ethnic background, some people will be involved and others not.37
Given this backdrop, it is hard to imagine how any new groundswell of interest in Africa among African-Americans, progress toward effective and sustainable alliances with recent African and other black immigrants to the United States, and with Africans in Africa will emerge from anything other than a mutual assessment of concrete and shared interests.

At the conclusion of her article examining the mobilization potential of Obama’s first presidential bid, Hunter-Gault quotes Sandra Grymes, an African American professor at the New School for Social Research, who lamented: “Nobody seems to be helping African-Americans understand why Africa matters to them, how it affects our bottom line.” One would be even more hard-pressed to find advocates making the case for why Africans should engage in activism to advance causes on behalf of African-Americans. This raises a question: If, as I have so far maintained, race and identity are not enough, what bottom line considerations should inform our assessment of why and how Africans and members of the African Diaspora matter to each other?

**The Meaning and Relevance of Development**

The problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place.

Claude Ake

Bangladeshi men have a better chance of living to ages beyond forty years than African American men from the Harlem district of [prosperous New York City].

Amartya Sen

To measure a country’s wealth by its gross national product is to measure things, not satisfactions.

Julius Kambarage Nyerere

Considering St. Claire Drake’s concept of evolving forms of Pan-Africanism—from traditional or “racial,” to “political,” to “cultural”—the AU Diaspora Programme, along with the range of other more loosely organized, contemporary Pan-African initiatives, could be characterized as amounting to or leaning toward “development” Pan-Africanism. This is especially true of the AU Diaspora Programme, which was launched under the AU’s auspices by South Africa during the administration of former President Thabo Mbeki, who, following in the path of Nelson Mandela, was the lead revivalist of the concept of an African Renaissance. The idea of Africa’s twenty-first-century rebirth is connected to the history of attempts by post-independence African leaders to
systematically articulate a comprehensive vision of African development, dating back to the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the more recent New Partnership for Africa’s Development (or “NEPAD”). But what exactly do we mean by “development”?

The period of decolonization, the ideological Cold War, and the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions following World War II provide the historical context for the birth of development economics. Rooted in modernization theory, the field has always been driven by competing ideologies as well as empirical research; changes in the international environment and within institutions; and the “culture of the discipline” of economics. It has moved somewhat beyond the conceit of modernization theory, which employed “an evolutionary schema that regarded the ideal characteristics of the West as the end of social evolution.” However, it remains the branch of economic theory, policies, and practices reserved for low-income countries that do not exhibit certain economic development capabilities, such as capital accumulation, human capital formation, organization, and productivity associated with industrialized countries.

Economists tend to focus discussion and debate on the role of government in the economy, the nature of government-market interactions, and finding the right policy prescriptions. This characteristic of the culture of the discipline—combined with the historical fact that, for Africa since independence, the development paradigm has been supplied mainly by foreign patrons—has, as Claude Ake, the late Nigerian political economist cogently argues,

led to the conception of development as something to be achieved through changes in the vertical relations between Africa and the wealthy countries: a greater flow of technical assistance to Africa, more loans on better terms, more foreign investment in Africa, accelerated transfer of technology, better prices for primary commodities, greater access to Western markets, and so forth.

But my focus here is on ends rather than on means: I want to examine the concept of development—how it is defined and to whom it is deemed to be applicable as an aspiration and desirable goal.

Amartya Sen’s meticulous and elegant critique of the fixation on GNP growth and rising income as ends rather than means, and his argument in favor of focusing instead on direct indices of human welfare, proffers a compelling definition. “Development,” he says:

requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social
deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.49

In setting forth this argument he does what many development economists regard as heresy. Rather than limiting his analysis to inhabitants of the so-called “developing world,” he examines their conditions of life in relation to that of disadvantaged people who reside in the most wealthy and powerful nation on the face of the earth:

[A]frican Americans are decidedly poorer than American whites. . . . This is often seen as an example of relative depravation of African-Americans within the nation, but not compared with poorer people in the rest of their world. Indeed in comparison with the population of third world countries, African Americans may well be a great many times richer in terms of incomes. . . . Seen this way, the deprivation of American blacks seems to pale to insignificance in the international perspective.

But, he goes on to observe that analyses of income and mortality statistics reveal that:

[I]t is not only the case that American blacks suffer from relative deprivation in terms of income per head vis-à-vis American whites, they are absolutely more deprived than the low-income Indians in Kerala (for both women and men), and the Chinese (in the case of men), in terms of living to ripe old ages.50

In his book arguing that, in the United States today, there is nothing that can accurately be described as “the black community,” Eugene Robinson, argues convincingly that the U.S. black population has splintered into four sub-groups, one of which is “a large, Abandoned minority with less hope of escaping poverty and dysfunction than at any time since Reconstruction’s crushing end.”51 As Amartya Sen’s analysis suggests, this segment of the U.S. black population is in some respects, according to measurable indices, worse off than many Africans living on the Continent.

A Nigerian friend—a working professional who fits within the demographic population that Robinson identifies as “an Emergent black America”52—shared an anecdote that exposes the folly of assuming that the benefits of Pan-African collaboration can and should only flow in one direction. She related that when the African-American pastor of the small, predominantly working-class African-American church to which she belongs announced the need to take up a collection to benefit “poor Africans,” she resisted the urge to point out that the affluent mega-churches
frequented by her family and friends in Lagos, Nigeria, would be at least as well-equipped to underwrite programs aimed at overcoming poverty among African-Americans.

If, as I do, one accepts this compelling idea of development as freedom, it is hard to justify why the United States and other wealthy industrialized countries should be regarded as “developed” and as providing the model that other countries should follow—or even be the standard against which other countries are measured. Given the huge gaps in living standards within rich countries, most notably the United States, a more tenable position is that the entire world consists of “developing countries” that have achieved varying degrees of success in improving living standards and increasing human welfare.

An enlightened conception of development calls for us to avoid the blind pursuit of productivity and growth that, in any case, may yield higher incomes but not increased well-being. (Further underscoring this point is the research showing that middle-aged whites in the United States are far less healthy than their counterparts in England, despite higher levels of spending for health care in the United States.) It is an exhortation to see development “as a process of expanding the real freedoms [such as liberty of political participation and the opportunity to receive basic education and health] that people enjoy.”

This conception of development entails a set of conditions that all nations, rich and poor alike, must strive to achieve for their citizens to experience a state of well-being. So, rather than thinking in terms of what we in the West can do to help those poor countries “over there” in Africa—or anywhere else—we would envision and tackle poverty as a collective enterprise in which we all have something to learn from each other and have a stake in our collective success.

This approach, moreover, is consistent with how the Pioneers of Pan-Africanism viewed the ultimate task of eliminating global oppression on behalf of all victims, regardless of nationality, race, or ethnicity. The historian and scholar of Diaspora studies, Robin D. G. Kelley, illuminates how, often against great resistance, members of this intellectual vanguard influenced the disciplines by looking beyond the United States and adopting a global perspective for analyzing the position of Africans and their descendants in the global hierarchy of power. Kelley concludes that their enduring influence on history and other social sciences continues to guide our thinking about human problems and their solutions. He notes that their refusal “to allow national boundaries to define their field of vision offers important insights,” such as the connections they saw between the exploitation of Black indentured and slave labor and that of other poor, disenfranchised workers around the world.
Enlarging the theoretical framework of development is among the “bottom line” challenges around which African and African-American theorists and practitioners can forge alliances, within the Americas and across the Atlantic. In doing so, we play a major role in liberating development theory and practice from the “us versus them” straightjacket. In these circumstances, the views of a small group of World Bank-minted male economists of European origin will be less dominant, and human beings everywhere can benefit from lessons derived from the widest possible range of experiences.

But, of course, enlarging the theoretical framework is just one step in a complex and difficult process that requires the presence of motivating mutual interests and the capacity to move an agenda forward.

“We Must Run While They Walk”\textsuperscript{56}

That poor girl trudging through the dust, dreaming of an education for her children, do we think that we are better than she is—we, stuffed full of food, or cupboards full of clothes, stifling in our superfluities? I think it is that girl, and the women who are talking about books and an education when they had not eaten for three days, that may yet define us.

Doris Lessing\textsuperscript{57}

We act mystified on occasion when pervasive evidence of radical education inequality between and among rich and poor in access, achievement, attainment, and finance is adduced. But the fact is that inequality in inputs and outcomes is built into the very structures of public education delivery in America as we know it.

Lynn Huntley\textsuperscript{58}

In her 2007 Nobel acceptance speech, Doris Lessing, the Zimbabwean novelist, relates her attempt to describe conditions at a rural school in northwest Zimbabwe to an affluent audience at an exclusive boys’ school in North London. She recounts that the Zimbabwean school, surrounded by “clouds of blowing dust,” consists of four adjacent brick rooms “without books, without textbooks, or an atlas, or even a map pinned to the wall,” and that teachers at the school “beg to be sent books to tell them how to teach, they being only eighteen or nineteen themselves.” Unable to imagine the harsh realities of this other world, Lessing’s audience listens to her with blank expressions.

Lessing’s remarks capture a scene that is quite familiar to anyone who has been to a school attended by the children of poor people—meaning in effect, most children—in Africa. It reminded me of the schools
that I have visited across the continent where, due to grossly inadequate facilities, children are assembled outdoors to welcome foreigners and local dignitaries. They sit patiently in the blazing sun, on the dusty, hard ground in their threadbare uniforms, coughing, looking—and very likely feeling—tired and hungry, having trudged long distances to school on foot, probably without shoes.

This description of a rural African school setting is also reminiscent of the shotgun school built along the train tracks in South Carolina, that President Barack Obama cited in his 2009 State of the Union address to convey the plight of poor African-American children in that southern state and in other poor communities across the nation.59 I learned of similar conditions during my introduction to the southern Black Belt. Descriptions of the suffering of poor black school children in Mississippi afflicted with mosquito-borne encephalitis and other maladies usually associated with the so-called developing world are etched in my memory.

Contemporary experiences of educational depravation among peoples of African ancestry, within and outside, Africa have deep historical roots. In colonial Africa the imperial powers wielded absolute control to stifle indigenous education institutions and to gear formal instruction toward capabilities necessary to facilitate the smooth operation of colonial administration. Educational access and quality for black Africans were severely restricted. The relatively small number of Africans who did receive formal schooling ultimately comprised the “elites” who later forged nationalist struggles while, to a large extent, internalizing a sense of themselves as being superior to the majority African peasant population. This alienation from other Africans and even from the physicality of Africa was fostered through the content of the education that the colonial powers provided:

On a hot afternoon in the tropics, a class would be given a lesson on the seasons of the year: spring, summer, autumn, and winter. They would learn about the Alps and the Rhine, but nothing about the Atlas Mountains or the Zambezi. Students in British colonies would write essays on “how we defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588”; those in the French colonies would learn from their textbooks that “the Gauls, our ancestors, had blue eyes.” Bemba children, who could name fifty or sixty indigenous plant species by the age of six, were taught about European flowers—and roses at that.60

These multiple forms of alienation were reinforced by social categorization: Within each colonial system there developed a lexicon to distinguish the educated African elite from the African masses deemed
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to fall far below European standards of culture and civilization. The French and Portuguese coined the terms “assimiles” and “assimilados.” Africans who were fluent in Portuguese were further differentiated as “civilisados,” while educated Africans in the Belgian-ruled territories were called “evolues”—those who Belgian intervention had transformed “from savagery to civilization.” In apartheid South Africa, there was no pretense of affording educational opportunity as an avenue for evolution and social mobility: the Afrikaner National Party laid the foundation for a largely unskilled and undereducated Black population through a rigidly enforced system of “Bantu education,” reflecting the apartheid regime’s conviction that there was “no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour.”

The long-term impact of generations of Africans being barred from educational opportunities, as a result of discriminatory laws and practices or poverty, or some combination of both, is reflected in current statistics tracking global educational trends. Education indicators for sub-Saharan African lag behind every other world region: Global statistics on school quality, enrollment, and attainment show the region at the bottom in virtually every category from the preprimary through tertiary (post-secondary) levels. The disparity is especially acute at the top of the education pyramid:

With only 5 percent of the age cohort enrolled, sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest [higher education] participation rate in the world. Countries in the region struggle with limited capacity, overcrowding, limited infrastructure, inadequate management, poor student preparation, and high cost.

As a consequence of history, and the policy decisions of post-colonial African governments, educational depravation in Africa today variously manifests itself as institutional, pedagogical, and systemic dependency and the lack of capacity to provide full access and deliver quality. The state of dependency derives from the extent to which external support is relied upon to support most African education systems. However, even in South Africa, the continent’s wealthiest economy, lack of education access and quality for the majority black population remains among the greatest hurdles to overcoming apartheid’s legacy of structural inequality.

Denial of educational opportunity as a means of controlling African-Americans and guaranteeing their lower-caste status was also a feature of colonial and Ante Bellum, post-Civil War America. Largely in response to the Stono Rebellion, the largest slave uprising to take place before the American Revolution, eighteenth-century Southern slaveholders translated their informal opposition to slave literacy into laws strictly prohibiting the
education of African slaves. The impact of these laws was far-reaching and the mindset that created them held fast through the twentieth century. James K. Vardaman, the white supremacist who was elected governor of Mississippi in 1903 on a platform to eliminate state aid for black education and later won a seat in the United States Senate, echoed the views of his constituents when he infamously asserted that “The only effect of Negro education is to spoil a good field hand and make an insolent cook.”

Over the course of several centuries, the combined effect of legally enforced segregation and educational depravation, state laws making school financing dependant on local residential taxes, and discriminatory housing practices has been to ensure that quality education is the exception rather than the rule for significantly large numbers of African-Americans. Given the proven importance of a quality high-school academic experience in determining the likelihood of college success, it is not surprising for instance that, across the United States and especially in the deep South, African-Americans enroll and stay in college at a much lower rate than Asians or whites.

In educational settings in the United States, African-Americans regardless of class also continue to be confronted with the “premise of black inferiority.” This premise:

pervades some of our more prominent explanations of why [African American] blacks underperform in school. It is echoed in popular renderings (as captured in the media and via the perspective of public figures) of why blacks compete less favorably than whites on a variety of academic measures. It is articulated in the hearts and minds of the teachers charged with educating black youth.

Moreover, argues Carla O’Connor, the University of Michigan sociologist, this premise contributes to the pernicious tendency to focus on the black-white achievement gap in a way that undermines an accurate analysis of the causes of underachievement among black students and “situates whites as the normative referent” for black student achievement.

Systematic educational depravation is a common thread linking the colonial experience in Africa, slavery and the Post Civil War era in America, and their aftermath. The vast majority of Africans, along with members of the New World Diaspora—who also are among the most educationally and otherwise disadvantaged people in poor as well as rich countries (e.g., in the United States and in Latin America)—bear this burdensome and intentionally degrading legacy. The result is a mix of structural disadvantage and reproducing inequalities that routinely render disproportionate numbers of Africans and people of African descent around the world
African-Americans could learn from their experiences and benefit from what they have to offer.

A study conducted by sociologists Pamela Bennett of Johns Hopkins University and Amy Lutz of Syracuse University and published in 2009 showed that black high-school students who are new to the United States or born to immigrant parents, enrolled in prestigious elite colleges at the rate of 9.2 percent—that is, higher than either whites (7.3 percent) or native blacks (2.4 percent). The study also found that many of these high-performing black students come from middle and upper middle-class families with two highly educated parents, and had attended private high schools before entering college. Citing this research study, Eugene Robinson argues, and I agree, that although it is not a complete solution, poor, educationally deprived African-Americans would benefit from “true affirmative action”—policies and programs that, among other things, thoughtfully examine and appropriately draw lessons from the attitudes and behaviors of African and other black immigrant children who out-perform native-born black and white students.

Education is one of the critical capabilities required for human beings to have the capacity to claim, enlarge, and enjoy “real freedoms.” But as Julius Nyerere recognized when his government endeavored to overhaul Tanzania’s education system in the 1960s, we will never succeed in “catching up” by proceeding on familiar paths at a normal pace. Creatively inspired and concerted efforts to overcome the debilitating effects of historical educational depravation are urgently needed in Africa and within the African Diaspora. From a Pan-Africanist perspective, there is much to be gained from forming alliances based on the mutual interest in securing educational opportunity.

**Conclusion**

The demographics of the African Diaspora are constantly changing—becoming more diverse—and its global dimensions are rapidly expanding. Ease of travel and information technologies are affording more
opportunities, and a greater capacity, for interaction across cultural and geographical boundaries. The dynamics of the relationship between the African Diaspora and Africa are multifaceted and in a constant state of flux. Pan-African initiatives that focus exclusively on the uplift of Africans in Africa, and that are premised on notions of racial solidarity and the assumption that Africans have nothing of concrete value to offer the New World Diaspora, will, like the AU Diaspora Programme, lack the full participation and endorsement of significant segments of the African Diaspora and become increasingly difficult to sustain absent major donor support as the primary incentive.

One example of reciprocal Pan-Africanism at work is the collaboration between the twenty-first Century Youth Leadership Movement (21CYLM)\textsuperscript{72} based in Selma, Alabama, and the Institute of Popular Education (IEP)\textsuperscript{73} based in Mali, West Africa. For 15 years, the 21CYLM and IEP have embraced a partnership for mutual education and cultural development, targeting youth. The seeds for the collaboration were planted when Maria Keita, cofounder of IEP and staunch advocate of reinforcing Africa’s oral tradition in its education systems, invited a group of civil rights activists including Rose Sanders, cofounder of the 21CYLM, to visit the IEP in Mali. Keita was inspired by her conviction that, despite the historical legacy of involuntary separations, there is a bond between Africans on the continent and in America that remains intact. She set out to renew that bond through cultural sharing and personal friendships. Sanders accepted the invitation, to learn about IEP, and to share her own experiences as a civil rights lawyer, community organizer, and advocate of black youth in the southern United States and beyond.

While in Mali, Sanders discovered the history of Timbuktu; a rich history that is barely, if ever, mentioned in the history books in Alabama’s public schools. She was inspired to capture the essence of Timbuktu’s scholarly history, and did so by founding the Slavery and Civil War Museum in Selma, in affiliation with the National Voting Rights Museum, which she also founded. Through the years, both women and their organizations have encouraged youth to share their stories and talents with each other. Youth from the southern United States have spent time in Mali, and youth from Mali have spent time in various parts of the South, including Alabama.

Sharing of music cemented the bond of friendship and became the vehicle through which these African-American youth gained an appreciation for Africa, some for the first time. The negative images of the continent were replaced by a deep appreciation for Malian history, culture, and contributions to humankind. The 21CYLM participants were particularly impressed by the bilingual accomplishments of their African
peers. For the first time, they learned to sing and speak an African language—in this instance Bambara, the most widely spoken indigenous language in Mali—and French. The collaboration took on another dimension when Rose and her husband, Alabama state Senator Hank Sanders, began hosting exchange students from Mali, some of whom wound up teaching French classes at Selma High School.

Other examples of the potential for productive and reciprocal transnational alliances exist among organizations in the Pan-African Women’s Philanthropy Network (PAWP) based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Anyone who imagines that Minneapolis, a city in the middle of the midwestern heartland of the United States, is an unlikely location for such an initiative, should consider that, according to Census data, almost a third of the city’s black community is comprised of first or second-generation immigrants of African descent, from Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America.

In 2007, the PAWP hosted a one-day summit of women identified as being “at the forefront of community giving and caring” in Minnesota’s African-American and African immigrant communities. I had the privilege of attending the summit, where participants spoke candidly about the initial misconceptions they had of each other, and how they succeeded in overcoming them to tackle concrete problems, such as the need for housing, loans, and healthcare among African Diaspora residents of the city.

Founded by community activist and scholar, Jacqueline Copeland-Carson, the PAWP is a “coalition of activists, philanthropists, caregivers, and volunteers who provide each other with mutual support to develop their leadership and impact.” Through the online PAWP Network and other forums, the organization collects and disseminates information about the diverse giving practices of Africans, African-Americans, and people of Afro-Asian, Afro-Latin, Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Europeans, and other African ancestry communities worldwide, and provides hands-on technical support to women philanthropists from these communities in areas such as overseas contributions, managing finances to maximize giving, and funding education.

Summing up the philosophical underpinnings of her community organization’s giving philosophy, Zainab Hassan of Somalia, one of the PAWP summit participants, offered a quote she attributed to the black American tennis champion, Arthur Ashe:

“Start where you are. Use what you have. Do what you can.”

By facing up to and identifying concrete ways to address the impact of the legacy that both binds and separates Africans and members of
the African Diaspora, we can render ourselves better able to address our respective challenges and provide lessons from which others can also learn and develop.

**Notes**

1. See the African Union (AU), *Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union* (Maputo, Mozambique, 2003), III.q, which cites the need to “invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union.” This provision is widely interpreted to mean that, within the AU context, the Diaspora has been accorded a status tantamount to one of the five African subregions.

2. Consultative conferences were also held in Washington, D.C., Trinidad, Brazil, Barbados, England, France, and South Africa.

3. In 2009 she was appointed South Africa’s Minister of Science and Technology.


11. See note 4 above.


14. Alyce, Chesney, and Ellene were three of the five children born to Henrietta (nee Lewis) and Joseph Lawson.


21. See for example the proceedings of the Omohundro Institute, UNESCO, the Gilder Lehrman Center, the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute, the Reed Foundation, Inc., and the Wilberforce Institute “The Bloody Writing is Forever Torn: Domestic and International Consequences of the First Governmental Efforts to Abolish the Atlantic Slave Trade” (International Conference, Accra and Elmina, Ghana, August 8–12, 2007), http://oieahc.wm.edu/conferences/ghana/index.html.


31. At the time “AAI” stood for The African-American Institute. The current name, i.e., without the “n”s, was adopted in 1998.


36. Historians Tiffany Ruby Patterson and Robin D. G. Kelley make the case that “Africa—real or imagined—is not the only source of ‘black’ internationalism, even for those movements that embrace a nationalist or pan-African rhetoric.” Patterson and Kelley, “Unfinished Migrations,” 32 (see note 24 above).


38. Charlayne Hunter-Gault (see note 33 above).


42. “Cultural Pan Africanism” initiated from Africa continues along with this more recent trend, for instance, the December 2009 World Festival of Black Arts, FESMAN III.


44. See Ake, *Democracy and Development* (see note 39 above) and the NEPAD Website, http://www.nepad.org/history.


56. This is the oft-quoted exhortation of Tanzania’s first president, the late Julius Kambarage Nyerere while addressing the people of Tanzania, and also the title of the Nyerere biography authored by William Edgett Smith.
61. Reader. Africa, 633 (see note 60 above).
62. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, Statement to the Senate of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa, 7 June 1954, Senate Debates, Senate, second session, cols. 2595–2622; Verwoerd is known as the principal architect of Bantu education. He served as the South African Minister of Native Affairs from 1950 until 1958 and as the Prime Minister from 1958 until 1966 when he was assassinated.


75. “Recent immigrants bring new giving practices with them,” *Humphrey Institute News*, 3 (University of Minnesota, January/February 2007).

76. Zainab Hassan, quoted in “Recent Immigrants,” (see note 75 above).

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“Recent immigrants bring new giving practices with them,” Humphrey Institute News, 3 (University of Minnesota, January/February 2007).


Chapter 5

Transnational Africa Un-Pledging Allegiance: The US Nation Must Make the African Connection

Melanie E. L. Bush

Introduction

Implicit in the discussion of transnational Africa are the questions of how humanity has been and is currently organized, and what that configuration means for the experience of all peoples around the globe. What social forces have structured relationships between nations, groups and societies and which will provide the greatest influences in the twenty-first century? Where have people found community and where will they in the future? Where do we locate home in this very transnational world? This chapter explores these questions in the context of the global positioning of the U.S. nation at a time of increased labor migrations primarily from the global south to the north. The U.S. President himself is a product of this transnationalizing process; what does that mean for the future?

As a grandchild of Russian, Polish, and Romanian immigrants to the United States, one might wonder where I locate my personal connection to Africa. Some scholars have spoken of the collective amnesia of a U.S. nation that has forgotten its roots, from whose land it was founded, and whose labor created its infamous wealth. For me, national identity
has always been a matter of allegiances rather than a birth certificate or citizenship. When the origin myths of the creation and development of the U.S. nation are exposed, the centrality and relationship of the transnational peoples of Africa to my life circumstances become apparent. I have long felt that connection, as nothing I have known would exist were it not for that tie. The reality of the existence of Africa’s people “writ large” in the Americas is usually conveyed only in terms of exploitation and oppression, rather than in terms of survival, resistance, contribution, and leadership. However, for me, a discussion of transnational Africa points to the unresolved challenge of how humanity everywhere should be valued and treasured. Indeed, African people have provided the foundation for development within the modern world system, rather than underdevelopment, as the dominant ideology in the United States would portray.

U.S. national identity has primarily been based on lies, a presumption of entitlement and an attitude of superiority. To explore the meaning of U.S. nationalism in the context of transnational Africa is to reckon with an honest inquiry about the role that African people have played through history as the base of the social, political, and economic system that grew from a small nation to a global empire. This idea contradicts the logic and ignorance of white supremacy that forms the ideological foundation of U.S. nationalism. Collective amnesia and denial provide most U.S. Americans with little knowledge of the modern world system, the emergence of white supremacy or the circumstances surrounding the creation of their nation. This, of course, is purposeful, as an understanding of the centrality of African peoples would undermine the myths and narratives about the superiority of the Europeans and the justifications for their positions of power.

The discussion of transnational Africa in my work signifies a call for an honest historical record, interpreting current events in the context of legacies and centering our vision for tomorrow by listening and supporting those who have provided the basis for all that exists today. How do we put structures in place that meet human needs? How do we reckon with the tensions of universalism and, particularity, in communities—of rupture and connection? My investigation of the intertwining of U.S. Empire, white supremacy, and world capitalism begins with the recognition of the centrality of transnational Africa in the historical record of all three.

**Development of the U.S. Nation**

From inception, the U.S. national politic and identity were predicated on a profound relationship with the continent and peoples of Africa.
White supremacy provided a rationale for European colonial and imperial conquest and that ideology was embedded in the structure and institutions of the United States. This justification laid the foundation for what emerged and developed as the primary organizing mechanism of the capitalist world system, as it located nations, societies, and peoples at different places within a global hierarchy.

Europe, and later the United States, asserted that divine destiny (religious and otherwise) predetermined their position of power and control and justified the “right” of the global north to profit and rule through the exploitation of the rest of the world, particularly Africa. The wealth of the North was built on the extraction of land, labor, and resources from the South. Ideology laced together notions of U.S. exceptionalism, white supremacy, and capitalism as the only reasonable economic arrangement. This framework provided the logic and explanations needed to elicit complicity from ordinary Europeans to accept and adhere to a brutal, exploitative, and unjust system. While resistance to this pattern has been constant, violence of all sorts has sustained the system’s equilibrium.

As someone recently said in a focus group related to a project on the American Dream:

The Europeans brought the knowledge, the know-how and the technology. The Native people gave the land, the Africans provided the labor and people around the globe provided the resources that allowed the United States to grow as it has. But it was the European know-how that made it all come together, so it makes sense that they are in control and benefit the most.

This makes sense only according to the logic of white supremacy and world capitalism. The very idea of race was developed to articulate and justify precisely those relationships of power and distinctions drawn particularly—though not exclusively—between Europeans and Africans. This rationale not only allowed for the development of an economic system predicated on inequality, exploitation, and thievery; it also imposed a social and political hierarchy of nations and peoples on a global scale ultimately orchestrated and legitimated in scientific, legal, cultural, and structural terms.

The British settler colony of North America evolved into the United States, which then became the new center formed as a nation founded on “liberty and justice for all,” asserting that “all men are created equal,” and rooted in the concepts of democracy and equality. As such, an explanation was urgently needed for why the language of “all” was implemented as a reality only for “some,” and a small “some” at that. The boundaries
of inclusion were quite narrow from the very beginning and they have expanded and contracted a little, though not much, throughout the course of U.S. history.

How could that paradox be explained? Racial ideology in the form of white supremacy provided the answer, of course along with gender ideology, patriarchy, and the logic of capitalism. Many historical events have marked the evolution of this rationale for ordering the globe from inception to what we know today. At first, this racial arrangement was mostly economic—similar to the way that the institution of slavery had been structured into previous societies. However, with capitalism, there became a need for a permanent and rigid formation that legitimated European supremacy, pilfering, and violence. To maintain and rationalize their position and power a tale of destiny and divinity (again—religious and otherwise) was crafted. The system of capitalism is premised on the extraction of wealth from some and funneling to others, but how could that process be reconciled with burgeoning notions of democracy and enlightenment? Only through imposing, institutionalizing, and naturalizing the hierarchies as if they were a consequence of fate.

Early on, the strategy of racial allegiance functioned to consolidate a managerial sector from the ranks of ordinary Euro-descended peoples. This promising racial alliance undermined the possibility of a class alliance that might challenge the economic and political hierarchies established by the elite in the colonial and imperial conquest of Africa, the Americas, and Asia.

A vivid example of this process was Bacon’s Rebellion, which took place in 1676 in Virginia, establishing early boundaries distinguishing Africans, Europeans, and native peoples. This event is generally portrayed solely as a response to common exploitation and oppression, as African and European bond-laborers rebelled to demand an end to servitude. Another key component of this struggle was an orchestrated attempt by the dominant elites to drive a wedge between these groups and the native population. Any combination of these forces was a tremendous threat to the planter elite, whose wealth was great compared to that of the general population of Euro-descended people.

At that time, poor Europeans had much more in common with enslaved Africans, and a potential alliance could have been disastrous for those in power. “In the early years of slavery, especially, before racism as a way of thinking was firmly ingrained, while white indentured servants were often treated as badly as Black slaves, there was a possibility of cooperation.” The plantation bourgeoisie responded to the threat of a coalition by offering European laborers a variety of previously denied benefits, such as amnesty for those who had rebelled, corn, cash, and muskets for
those finishing their servitude, the right to bear arms, the opportunity to join slave patrol militias, and the chance to receive monetary awards.

They constituted the police patrol who could ride with planters, and now and then exercise unlimited force upon recalcitrant or runaway slaves; and then, too there was always a chance that they themselves might also become planters by saving money, by investment, by the power of good luck; the only heaven that attracted them was the life of the great Southern planter.7

These actions were taken to quell this potentially dangerous alliance and as a means of control. This may be viewed as the nation’s first “affirmative action” policy.8 Racism on the part of poor whites became a practical matter.9 The explicit use of race and white supremacy was implemented as a tool to divide and conquer, and it framed the development of the nation from the very beginning. Before this period, there was little advantage and therefore little motivation, for poor whites to align themselves with the ruling powers. At this time, though, they were accorded “social, psychological and political advantages” calculated to alienate them from their fellow African bondsmen.10 This is what Du Bois described as the public wage of whiteness.

Racism was hence implemented as a means of control to establish and then maintain the structure of social organization in the “new” world. Racial domination became encoded in the process of nation-state building for the United States as “Blacks were sold out to encourage white unity and nationalist loyalty to the state.”11 Slavery, therefore, played a critical role in providing a justification for the unification of whites racially as a nation,12 a pattern that continues to affect the national identity, notions of whiteness, and formulations of race in society today. Whites were told that their whiteness rendered them “superior,” and to maintain this status, they needed to place their allegiances with those in power who had the resources and could divvy up the benefits. If they “behaved,”—they too would gain power and prestige. Indeed, over time, most have certainly gained more than their African counterparts have, though certainly not to the level where they have become part of the ruling class.

During America’s colonial era the ideal of white identity was male, English, Protestant, and privileged. Over time this ideal evolved into free, white, male, Christian, propertied and franchised. These characteristics developed into a norm that subsequently became synonymous with American.13

This identity was also intertwined with notions of freedom, thereby reinforcing the relationship between whiteness and American-ness.
“There were perfectly strategic reasons to allow the identity of American to evolve in opposition to blackness—exploitation, appropriation and subordination of Blacks and Black labor.”

While particularly applied as a black-white polarization, this ideological formulation of race was also flexible. A stigma of racial inferiority could be invoked as needed to maintain divisions and enforce a social hierarchy. For example, during the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese workers were used as the primary labor force in building California’s railroads. Their subsequent brutalization, subjugation, and exclusion were framed overwhelmingly in racial terms. This stigma was similarly applied to native and Mexican peoples—who were characterized as savages, unfit to own and govern their land—“coincidentally” at the time that land was desired by the wealthy elite. The “Trail of Tears” and the annexation of one-third of Mexico’s land are brutal testaments to this history of internal colonization, land appropriation, and genocide. Andrew Jackson’s Indian Removal Act provided land for white settlers, and countless legislations in the nineteenth century furthered the organizing principles of white supremacy.

Demands were made of European immigrants to become like “us,”—like it or not, but for peoples from other parts of the globe, it was that “You will never be like us.” The case was built around who belonged and who did not, who was the “same” and who was “different,”—“civil” and “savage”—who could own land, who could read, who could be in charge of and exploit other people’s labor, and who could not. These questions were resolved in naturalized hierarchies of race, language, culture, gender, and through an ambiguous concept of national belonging, whereby core values such as “democracy,” “equality,”—“freedom” and “justice” were evoked on behalf of “all” and implemented on behalf of “some.”

The controversy over belonging and inclusion was embedded in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the institutions of the developing nation. When Frederick Douglass asked, “What to the Slave Is Your Fourth of July?” and in her famous work, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Harriet Jacobs described the annual practice of “muster,” when armed whites terrorized the enslaved population in anticipation of revolts, as an institution served to unite whites across class lines; they pointed out how the parameters of citizenship for Europeans was continuously defined in opposition to the dignity and recognition of the contributions of Africans to the US-nation’s development.

This mistaken centering and privileging of the European (and male) experience has been endemic—“not just a by-product of white supremacy but an imperative of racial domination,” both nationally and in positioning the peoples of the United States in relationship to the world’s
peoples. The new nation of the United States was built using the labor of Africans, Chinese, and a large number of immigrants, exploiting the land and natural resources of indigenous peoples and Mexican territories, simultaneously excluding most of these groups from citizenship and the benefits of “belonging,” and subjecting the nations and peoples around the globe to imperial rule.

In contrast, immigrants from Europe in the nineteenth century were integrated into the expanding industrial economy in positions where there was opportunity for upward mobility. Through this economic, social, and political assignment, policies and programs of the early twentieth century provided further opportunities for upward mobility, such as the G.I. bill and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans. Immigrants from Europe were thereby enlisted in a panethnic racial “club,” and “became party to strategies of social closure that maintained others’ exclusion.”20 Similar processes took place to propel the United States to global dominance through ideological framings of “us versus them” as a national mantra from the very beginning.

In the United States, the turn of the twentieth century marked a period of contestation about who was to be designated “white” and a “citizen” as a huge influx of immigrants from Europe and other parts of the globe tested the boundaries of citizenship and racial identity. European immigrants worked primarily within a modern industrial sector that strategically provided them with opportunities for upward mobility.21 This reality challenges the popular notion that “all Americans ‘start at the bottom’” and work their way up the ladder. The racial labor principle designated a different bottom for different groups.22 Even the slogan, “a nation of immigrants” most predominantly describes the European experience despite the fact that Jews, Italians, and Irish were not fully accepted as whites. Over time however, European Americans were transformed into a pan-ethnicity that represented the distancing of individuals from their national origin, heritage, and language, and instead being grouped as “white.”23 White classification was always clearly linked to national identity with clear implications in the global context.

By the mid-nineteenth century, this arbitrary ranking of peoples and racial ideology had diffused around much of the world.24 The legitimacy of the racial order was thereby validated and inscribed in “science” and social practice that reinforced the concepts of race, hierarchy, and nation. As the United States emerged as a world power in the twentieth century, this ideology was rearticulated continuously and re-entrenched through imperial rule.

Transnational Africa thereby played the leading role because the wealth and tales of U.S. exceptionalism are predicated entirely on the extraction
of labor, particularly that of Africans. The U.S. Empire, nation, and identity have historically been constructed using the presumption of white entitlement and righteousness as the glue of logic and inclusion. This assumption in turn applies the logic of exclusion, exploitation, and divestment to all other populations, especially African peoples largely because that was the original premise of the concept of race.

While in the recent era, questions have been posed about whether Latinos and/or Asians are Black or white, the evidence indicates that although each of these groups as well as the indigenous peoples of the Americas has a particular history, the United States has not been especially ambivalent. Narratives of the origin and development of the nation consistently attempt to justify white supremacy by treating these groups as inferior and at the service of the accumulation of wealth by Euro-descended elites. In doing so, transnational Africa is clearly central to the historical evolution of the world capitalist system and the development of the United States. This reality makes evident that the equation of nation (in political terms), capitalism (in economic terms), and white supremacy (in social terms) formed the foundational justification for trespass, genocide, domination, exploitation, and the presumed entitlements of land, labor, and wealth. It also clearly demonstrates how transnational Africa has played a central role in the development of the United States nation and its wealth. This discussion of transnational Africa is, therefore, especially relevant to any analysis of the U.S. Empire, nation, and identity, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

White supremacy is firmly embedded in every aspect of U.S. society—the economy, justice system, educational system, political system. In spite of the rhetoric of opportunity, the characterization of the nation as a city on a hill and the identity as a land of possibility, with upward mobility as an achievable goal for all has been a fantasy and not a dream whatsoever, for many. Just one example—that Black men comprise 41 of the more than 2 million men in custody, at a rate 6.5 times higher than the rate of white men—speaks harshly of that reality.25

The rhetoric of the United States as the land of plenty is in harsh contrast to the documented reality of inequality and overt discrimination evidenced throughout the twentieth century and today. Government legislation, such as the Federal Housing Act and G.I. bill expanded access to higher education and home buying for several generations of whites. Both are wealth-garnering activities that provide a foundation for upward mobility. All the while, several generations of African Americans were shut out of these opportunities, faced discrimination in employment, and were then measured against those who had received these privileges. Yes, land of plenty—but whose land; whose plenty? Yes, land
of opportunity and destiny—but whose opportunity and what destiny? If we do not answer those questions, it appears as if this rhetoric actually is a reality for all. Similarly, the twentieth-century looting of the globe and empire building, with 100 military interventions in as many years, precipitated the migrations to the United States from many parts of the globe, but especially central and Latin America.

The rhetoric of U.S. exceptionalism provides a simple, though false, notion of achievement and overcoming adversity. In fact, legacies of wealth, status, and education, entitlements and rights have been expanded only on behalf of some despite the rhetoric of “all.” Those “some” mostly have been people of European descent. In fact, as a group, Congress, corporate officers, and hedge fund managers now look quite similar (though not the same) as how they did at the country’s founding. Of the 2.7 million people earning an annual salary of more than $100,000, 89 percent are men and 91 percent are white. Relationships between poverty and wealth, land and landlessness, privilege and its lack thereof are denied. Segregation, a lack of global knowledge, a lack of knowledge about the structure of U.S. society and of social movements leaves most people in the United States uneducated about history and today’s realities.

So where does that leave us today, with a president of African descent? We need to return to the original analysis, locating transnational Africa in the long era of white supremacy and the emergence of U.S. hegemony, in the context of the developing capitalist world system. In We Are Not What We Seem (1999), Roderick Bush asserts that the struggles and movements of the twentieth century, both in the United States and elsewhere around the globe, of African peoples have, in fact articulated a vision for all humanity though they have been portrayed as narrow and nationalist or solely anticolonial or anti-imperial. He articulates the urgency of recognizing the leadership of African peoples in the historical struggle for a new and better world.

As discussed, processes of racial formation and domination have been central to the organization and expansion of the modern-capitalist world that unfolded over the last 500–700 years. Simultaneously, these developments have long been the focus of social movements organized against multiple forms of this global structure. In this way, transnational Africa has been positioned centrally within the modern world system—in the orchestration of the ideology and structures of white supremacy, but also in the leadership of historical and current movements for social transformation.

In recent writings, Rod Bush suggests that we assess the election of Barack Obama as president in the context of the long struggle for people of African descent for equality and social justice in the United States.
He urges us toward a thoughtful investigation that incorporates an analysis of the unity and diversity of the Black Freedom Struggle and its very conscious self-concept as a segment of oppressed strata in the United States and within the larger world system. The very foundation of the Obama coalition is the historical strength of Black solidarity against systemic racism in the United States and in the larger world system.28 Enslaved Africans, unlike the indigenous populations, were part of the newly formed United States of America, and were living contradictions to the “land of the free” rhetoric of the nation’s propagandists. This posed particular challenges and possibilities for each of these groups, but their experiences of marginalization, exploitation, and oppression are both distinct and similar.

This analysis provides evidence of the centrality of African people to the development of U.S. nationalism, white world supremacy, and the capitalist world system. This is not a casual or random position but one that has provided the very means for wealth to be produced around the globe throughout history. No doubt the ideologies and institutions of these three systems have created extraordinary inequality and brutal injustices that have particularly been levied against African peoples. This structural inequality and corresponding rationalizing ideology provides the mechanisms for the perpetuation of these systems, but also the basis for their systemic demise lies in the rise of Black internationalism. Given the positioning of transnational Africa historically and globally, that leadership has the potential for the best understanding of the meaning of human rights for all, and a vision of a very different future. If the wealth generated were put toward the benefit of humanity, we would never be facing the deaths of 24,000 daily from lack of food, water, and other essential items.

This discussion must be rooted in the 500-year history of racial capitalism that centers the question of transnational Africa in the cumulative impact of the social, historical, economic, and political transformations in the lives of ordinary people of all races, in all nations around the globe. This analysis asserts the potential for the development of a collective discourse that moves beyond the discourse of the powerful and the “universalism” of the elite toward a re-articulation of the parameters of both national belonging and the meaning of being part of a human community. We have arrived at an historical moment of transition in the midst of a structural crisis of capitalism when human agency will enable us to deal with what Wallerstein (2006) calls an “American Dilemma for the 21st century”: How to deal with the decline of U.S. hegemony, the vulnerability of white supremacy, and a crisis in capitalism. The American century has ended. The balance of power is shifting.
I close with three reflections on the characterization of Africa, African nations, and African people in the United States. First, there is a widely mentioned Sarah Palin comment about the country of Africa. Whether in fact she did say this, there is no doubt that people in the United States are enormously ignorant not just about anything outside their borders, but particularly about Africa. The fall 2008 edition of Teaching Tolerance reports on various studies of children’s books that include images of Africa. Vivian Yenika-Agbaw found that of 50 books published between 1960 and 1995, “represent West Africa as either primitive/barbaric or natural/romantic.” Another review of 30 books found “skewed and incomplete images. More than 90 percent . . . showed only rural or village life and jungles.” These convey the stereotypical representations of Africa, “feeding misconceptions used to justify enslavement and colonialism” as well as racism toward African immigrants and confusion about foreign policy. Students in my first-year seminar were given a project involving activism related to the course topic, “Historical Legacies, Current Realities, Dreams of Tomorrow.” One group decided to investigate global knowledge. They heard from fellow students that there are 140 billion people on earth and people, groups, or nations are poor because it’s just how it is and always has been. Social knowledge is generally ahistorical, astructural, and absent of any sense of systemic roots of institutional patterns.

Why this ignorance? That goes back to my central point—that because of the centrality of Africa to the development of the modern world system, the success story of the United States depends on suppressing the true nature of the positioning and role of transnational Africa in the modern world system. With truth, the potential destruction to the primary organizing mechanisms is just too great.

The challenge is—as Amiri Baraka says of jazz—that white supremacy, the U.S. Empire, and world capitalism are “a changing same.” While Roediger recently writes about changes throughout history—freedom movements, the advent of formal legal equality, mass immigration, and the Reconstruction era—he also speaks of the overarching continuities generated by deep connections of whiteness to property. It is difficult to sustain both hope and despair simultaneously. Roediger says in his new book, How Race Survived US History that the influence of African popular culture and the self-reporting of race in the census as a matter of “choice” vividly suggest that a changing same is still a changing same. Structural inequalities are rarely discussed.

We are at a horrific juncture of the possibilities of extinction or rejuvenation (the potential phoenix rising) but only history, way past our lifetimes will know the outcome. We must work toward rejuvenation—teaching about capitalism and its crisis with the hope that what emerges
is a new organizing system based on love and caring for the common
good. Alas you’ve heard that from me before.

And so goes the story of the centrality of transnational Africa to the
rise of the modern world system, white supremacy, and the U.S. nation.
Transnational Africa is also central to the demise of these systems. It is
apparent that we live in changing times. The global economic crisis,
Obama’s presidency, and the question of the future of the U.S. Empire
and what will happen to white supremacy with major global demo-
graphic shifts weigh heavily on both our possibilities and constraints.
I will briefly speak to these two issues in my concluding remarks.

As noted above, the election of Barack Obama demonstrates the his-
torical strength of Black solidarity against systemic racism in the United
States and in the larger world system. But it also stands symbolically as
a representation of Africa’s essential transnational nature. His politics,
though initially appearing rooted in concern for the dispossessed falls
prey to the constraints of world capitalism in decline. He is constrained
to playing within the rules and the boundaries established by the ruling
class over the last several decades. He is rendered relatively weak as the
figurehead of a declining power.

In some ways, his Presidency ends up reinforcing the very rhetoric
that blames Blacks and Latinos for their position in the social hierar-
chy. Having high-profile counter-images to the stereotypes of African
Americans provides alternatives to the negative cultural portraits.
However, most conversations revolve around race “relations” not equality
or justice. Materially, vast racial inequality remains along most all mea-
ures such as income, wealth, educational attainment, health care access,
mortality etc. In fact, in many cases these have been exacerbated in the
last decade such that gaps in income, wealth, employment rates, access to
health care, adequate food, and educational options have increased along
with the downward economic push on almost all in the United States.
Ideologically, little inroads have been made in attacking the underlying
presumptions of Euro-dominance and superiority. This applies in the
United States and globally. Civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan
for example receive little notice; a Nigerian planning to blow up a plane
becomes generalized as Nigerians whereas a British citizen doing the same
does not bring upon suspicion of all those British.30

For those of us who “had hope,” this feels to be an enormous disap-
pointment. But perhaps it was our understanding of the current juncture
that was at fault. Surely John McCain’s presidency would have been dif-
ferent but in the end, is it really about the President? Perhaps, the fact
that Obama was elected and has not had extraordinary success in ending
war or ending inequality of all sorts is really just emblematic of the crisis
that we now face in all aspects of the social world. Therefore, the question becomes what can counter that systemic impotence to meet the basic needs of humanity?

As for the impact of the significant migratory shifts that have occurred in the last decades, surely there is a much greater presence of Africans, Asians, and Latinos in the U.S. today, and the 2010 census provides ample evidence of this. There is also some level of greater visibility, and interaction particularly among young people. Organizations such as Domestic Workers United and the Taxi Workers Alliance foster connection between people, and support the development of social capital among the most vulnerable of the immigrant population. At the same time, bills such as Arizona’s SB1070 and the strong opposition to the DREAM Act that would provide conditional permanent residency to students who came to the country as minors and graduated high school are evidence of the vulnerable and fragile realities that immigrants face in the United States. Transnational yes, but included, no, not really.

So ultimately, as the longtime activist Grace Lee Boggs is apt to say, this precarious moment leaves us with both possibility and danger. Since our future is uncertain, it is up to us to write our own history.


**Notes**

2. Mora McLean used this phrase at the Transnational Africa Forum held at Bowdoin College Brunswick, Maine, December 2008.
6. Ibid., 37.
12. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 32.
22. Ibid., 62, 63.
26. Jesse Drucker. The richest 1 percent had the highest share of nation’s income since 1929 and lowest tax in 18 years.
27. The Working Group on Coloniality at Binghamton University, 2.
28. Aníbal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein “Americanity as a Concept or the Americas in the Modern World System.”

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African transnationalism is a far-reaching dimension of globalization with many complex causes and manifestations. One area of African transnationalism that is little studied is the emergence of an indigenous and Diaspora philanthropy sector. Focusing on examples from west, east, and southern Africa and the African Diaspora in North America, this chapter describes aspects of the development of this sector. In particular, it highlights how African social innovators are adapting Western notions, practices, and structures of giving to African voluntary traditions and circumstances, as well as how global flows of financial, social, and intellectual capital across Africa and its Diaspora influence the sector’s formation. The chapter suggests how these dynamics are creating new approaches to philanthropy in Africa and its Diaspora. Also, the chapter shows the resilience of Pan-Africanism in the global flow of ideas that shape the African Diaspora’s identity and social movements. It concludes with a commentary on the promise and pitfalls of an indigenous and transnational African philanthropy for equitable development. It also suggests a research agenda for better documenting the sector’s development and impact.
Social Finance across Cultures and Sectors

Formal, institutional “philanthropy,” as defined in the West is the systematic and, allegedly, altruistic and voluntary giving of resources, primarily money—by individuals or institutions to support some collective social good through institutions such as foundations or nonprofits—and arguably is a relatively new phenomenon in Africa. However, through the cross-cultural study of philanthropy’s many social forms throughout history, it is increasingly accepted that all societies, including those in Africa, have had some form of giving that in the West is called philanthropy.

For example, over the past 20 years, a rich literature documenting culturally distinct traditional and contemporary voluntary sector practices among U.S. ethnic groups and various countries proves that philanthropy is not unique to the West. And even in the West, the degree to which this type of giving is fully altruistic and voluntary widely varies. Furthermore, professionals in the field continue to debate technical differences between philanthropy, which is oriented toward some type of social change, versus charity, which is oriented toward more immediate relief of human suffering. At best, the lines between social change and social services are largely defined by context. For example, in a village without potable water, providing it can have a variety of longer-term social impacts such as allowing children, especially girls, who formerly had to spend much time collecting water, to attend school or improve their health. Leaving these semantic debates aside, philanthropy’s undeniable diversity has called for a more inclusive, flexible model. Especially in global, increasingly diasporic economies, where innovators mix and match voluntary sector practices from various cultures, philanthropy is best seen as the private, voluntary means that any culture, social group, or individual uses to redistribute financial and other resources for the purposes of promoting some collective good. The institutional and social mechanisms that surround these voluntary practices will vary across societies and their constituent communities and may not be explicitly defined as philanthropic from a conventional Western perspective. This approach accepts philanthropy as a social relation that may be manifested in different institutional guises and at different geographic scales, including local, regional, national, or transnational.

Philanthropy, therefore, takes place in different social institutions—from extended, transnational family networks to international grantmaking foundations. It includes a variety of hybrids, such as microfinance pools, rotating credit and savings pools (called “giving circles” in philanthropy jargon), social enterprise, corporate giving programs, and individual donations, all constituting a private social finance sphere
oriented toward public benefit. However, the boundaries with public finance are increasingly blurred. Some people make a distinction between philanthropy and social enterprise. Social enterprise refers to the strategic investment of financial capital (grants, donations, loans), social capital (volunteer time), and intellectual capital (ideas and know-how) to create businesses that make a profit to address social problems.

Hybrid funding mechanisms, such as public-private partnerships, government funding of NGOs and tax breaks to foundations, and other charities providing public benefit, make the lines between public and private funding for social improvement quite porous. “Philanthropy,” with its dual connotations of private giving for public benefit, is increasingly used as a catchall phrase for these various non-governmental forms of giving.

For the purposes of this chapter, philanthropy, social enterprise, and a variety of their hybrids are considered social finance—private capital, regardless of the source—used to promote a broader social good.

A Transnational Social Finance Boom

Various factors in the global economy have fostered a remarkable growth in the global social finance sector, including philanthropy and social enterprise. First, in the last two decades, even with the Great Recession, there has been a remarkable expansion of wealth in the world, a significant portion of which is used for social finance and innovation. As the number of entrepreneurs has expanded over the past decade, there has been a resulting growth in wealth. For example, there are now 10 million millionaires in the world, with about 100,000 of them in Africa. From 2008–2009, there was a 13.2 percent increase in the number of African millionaires, who together have $1 trillion in net assets.

Throughout the world, new social enterprises and philanthropies are popping up to capture a more than $40 trillion transfer of wealth that is about to be made from the current generation of older people—baby boomers—to the next generation in the United States alone. And wealthy people are creating and funding NGOs, foundations, social enterprises, and all kinds of hybrids to address social problems.

There is now a worldwide and expanding market of capital—grants, loans, and investments—to create foundations, social businesses designed to make profit to solve a social problem, and a great variety of hybrids that use these new wealth creation and business strategies to promote the social good. Unfortunately, definitive data about the total current size and growth rate of this sector is unavailable. One study claims that just in the United States, 11 foundations and 119 NGOs are created every day.
Recent studies indicate that the U.S. sector alone has at least 1.5 million recognized nonprofit organizations and about 70,000 foundations. The Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project undertaken by Lester Salamon and colleagues at Johns Hopkins’ Center for Civil Society Studies is compiling comparative nonprofit data on countries. Aggregate data for the 35 countries studied found about 20 million nonprofit organizations (not including religious congregations) worldwide with revenues exceeding $1 trillion. Taken together, the nonprofit sector of these countries would represent the world’s seventh-largest economy, employing 40 million full-time workers and 190 million volunteers (including religious). Yet, as in the United States, private philanthropy—foundations, families, and corporations—still plays a limited role compared to the contributions from governments and individuals. In the Hopkins study, private philanthropy provided only 12 percent of the total civil society revenue—less than a third of that provided by the government and less than a quarter of that generated from fees and service charges. And although the recession has slowed things down a bit, the long-term trend is that philanthropy and social entrepreneurship will remain one of the fastest-growing sectors of the worldwide economy as people look for business investment strategies that promote the social good.

Second, as wealth has grown, social disparity has increased to alarming rates, promoting civil strife, social dislocation, global migration and Diasporas, religious strife, and great stress on an already rapidly declining natural environment. In other words, the demand for social change has increased, motivating indigenous, foreign, and Diaspora activists working on a variety of social justice efforts, creating new organizations to this end, and attempting to fund-raise for them. The interchange of ideas, innovation, change agents, and finance have coalesced into an increasingly transnational social finance sector.

Third, the social finance sector’s growth also is influenced by the decline of multilateral aid efforts, growing questions about whether the global-aid system fosters or stymies development, as well as a steady downsizing of governments across nations that is only accelerating as a result of the Great Recession, especially in the West. For example, controlling for Iraq and Afghan war-related reconstruction aid, U.S. development aid has declined 22 percent since 2002. Finally, globalization itself, including diasporic migration, mass media and communications, and instantaneous financial exchanges, has encouraged the development of a transnational social sector, blending diverse philanthropic practices and traditions. In fact, recognizing this global trend, a new specialty in social finance research and practice has emerged focusing on Diaspora philanthropy and social innovation.
The United Nations estimates that the world’s 214 million international migrants remitted $325 billion to their home countries in 2009, significantly more than both foreign, private, and government donations. Especially with the Great Recession’s tightened credit markets and growing poverty rates, wealthy countries such as the United States are adopting social finance innovations created in or for low-income countries, such as microfinance and “giving circles,” essentially rotating savings associations for community benefit existent, in fact, throughout Africa and Asia since ancient times.

Technological innovation—especially through the Internet, mobile technology, and digital bank transfers—has accelerated development of a transnational philanthropy sector, enabling people in distant locales throughout the globe to fund and/or organize social projects and movements worldwide. Diasporas are using technology in innovative ways to promote giving and development in their home countries. Among the many examples is GiveIndia.org, created by Indian entrepreneurs, a mostly virtual institution that identifies, screens, and then acts as a transfer agent so that people from throughout the Asian Diaspora and others can support community projects. Give2Asia.org, associated with a U.S.-based nonprofit, the Asia Foundation, provides a similar transnational philanthropy service. Kiva.com is a successful virtual international microfinance pool that expanded on the ancient self-help financing pools of Asians, Africans, and others. It has recently established a U.S. program to support U.S. micro-enterprises that are increasingly unable to access credit in the postrecession era. The growing use of these technologies for social protest, human rights monitoring, and revolution in places like Tunisia, Egypt, and throughout the Middle East—as well as ruling regimes’ redoubled efforts to control grassroots access to the Internet—is one manifestation of the new transnational social finance and organizing networks that digital tools have enabled.

Philanthropy is not, and has never been, the sole preserve of Western countries. The West has no monopoly on social innovation. A transnational lens brings into clear view the exchange of innovative ideas and capital forms across multiple countries, translocalities, and diasporic agents that together create a global philanthropy market and social system that is reaching communities everywhere.

**Pan-African Indigenous Philanthropy in Africa**

Wealthy countries do not dictate the nature and pace of innovation in Africa either. Especially with the development of a fully global social finance sector, the cultural and financial interchange that crosscuts this
transnational philanthropy sector is multicentric. As is the case with globalization more generally, innovation is accelerated and can come from any place at any time. Poor countries and their Diasporas are not only recipients of Western private giving—they have become donors themselves.

These Diasporas send as much innovation as they receive, and global migrants mix and match sociocultural practices, sometimes creating new ones that are not easily reduced to their component parts. This creates a kind of reverse innovation where social benefit techniques created by poor people and countries are adopted by wealthy ones to resolve their own, or even international, disasters.

There is a longstanding practice in international philanthropy of Western and other wealthy countries’ foundations and individuals giving to the world’s poorer countries. The World Bank, the United Nations, the Aga Khan, and the Ford, Mott, Rockefeller, MacArthur and Kellogg foundations have been particularly important players in international donations to Africa and also in supporting the development of the continent’s emerging philanthropic foundations.

In addition, there is a longstanding and growing citizen-to-citizen transnational African social finance and innovation sphere that is not fully documented, including organizations and individual donors from various backgrounds. Looking at women’s philanthropy in the United States alone, organizations such as the Ms. Foundation, Global Fund for Women, Women’s Funding Network, and a growing number of new foundations are an expanding source of financial and intellectual capital for African development. Organizations such as the Silicon Valley-based World of Good and Beads for Life, as well as numerous other social enterprise and fair trade groups, have created transnational social marketplaces for the sale of African crafts directly from women and others living in poverty, providing a means of survival and development in a competitive global economy. Virtual social enterprises, philanthropies, NGOs or hybrids can take a variety of forms combining varying degrees of in-person or Internet-based social and economic transactions.

Reflecting downward trends in philanthropy overall during the Great Recession, data from 2009 and 2010 suggest notable declines in U.S. philanthropy to Africa from both foundations and individuals. The case examples above suggest that transnational remittances and social enterprises, from the African Diaspora and elsewhere, are increasingly important sources of alternative funding for Pan-African development. However, no data comprehensively documents the extent of this emerging social finance sector and much more research is needed.
Remittances

Often lost to the eyes of the global media and a public fixated on Africa’s undeniable political and other challenges or the giving of foreign celebrity philanthropists is a thriving and growing transnational philanthropy and social enterprise sector rooted in the African Diaspora. Because of remittances, Diaspora Africans actually are the primary source of the continent’s social finance with remittances of about $20 billion to $40 billion annually, despite a decline in giving levels due to the worldwide recession. In addition to providing vital family support, remittances have a ripple effect on local economies, supporting small businesses and the livelihoods of those who are not direct recipients. Furthermore, studies of the social practices of the contemporary African Diaspora in the United States indicate that immigrants sustain their ancient giving circles, for example, esusus (Yorùbá of Nigeria) and harambees (Kenya), and form hometown associations that are a source of transnational social finance for projects as diverse as school or clinic construction, scholarships and other development efforts.

However, African philanthropy’s development has expanded beyond remittances to include a vibrant array of organizations created by Africans with transnational ties living in Africa and its Diaspora. African immigrants are harnessing this market for giving by developing nonprofit and other organizations funded, in part, by Africans as well as foundations and diverse individual donors.

Indigenous Pan-African Foundations

An African Diaspora and indigenous philanthropy sector is emerging with several different elements. Wealthy African business people and entertainers living in the Diaspora also are an important source of philanthropy. Sports stars such as NBA players Dikembe Mutombo and Akeem Olajuwon have set new standards of giving by constructing schools and supporting education and youth programs in their home countries of Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria.

Mo Ibrahim, a cell phone entrepreneur from Sudan, created a $5 million African Presidents Award to encourage orderly governmental succession and the rejection of corruption on the continent. And Nelson Mandela has a foundation to support a variety of causes in South Africa. Some of these foundations raise funds primarily from foreign donors to support their projects, combining these donations with their own resources to support their projects.
However, a promising new trend is self-financed private foundations. For example, the statesman and former Nigerian general, TY Danjuma, created Nigeria’s first homegrown private foundation in 2007, which is professionally staffed by Nigerians and self-identifies as an indigenous foundation distinct from Western counterparts. In addition to being created by Nigerians, another distinctive aspect of the TY Danjuma Foundation (TYDF) is that it has plans to support indigenous social finance pools such as esusus and adashis, the Yorùbá and Hausa variants of revolving community savings and credit associations, which meet their guidelines for community and girls’ development. In addition, a TYDF priority is to encourage more wealthy Nigerians to support social change-oriented philanthropy. The foundation held its first philanthropy innovation conference in 2010, which had Pan-African attendance from throughout Africa and its Diaspora. In another innovation, in 2010 Nigeria became the first country in the world to require companies to create corporate social responsibility programs to operate. Although there is much controversy about whether the legislation actually will result in more corporate responsibility, these new developments in sub-Saharan Africa’s most populous country indicate a new energy and interest in social finance for public good.\(^{16}\)

**Community Foundations and Funds**

Initially formed in the 1990s with a combination of indigenous African resources and seed grants from Western foundations (the Ford, Mott and Kellogg foundations, in particular), community foundations are a distinctive type of NGO oriented toward fundraising to encourage individual and community philanthropy and grants for local projects. The foundations also engage in issue-based advocacy; provide technical support to NGOs; and can act as a conduit for corporate or other institutional giving, such as government aid, through the establishment of specialized funds. Modeled on community foundations created in the early twentieth century in the United States as a conglomeration of individual and corporate charitable funds, this is the world’s fastest-growing sector of philanthropy.

The Kenyan Community Development Foundation is the country’s first community foundation founded in 1997 as a resource for Kenyans and international donors to support community-driven development.\(^{17}\) It funds a variety of locally based projects, including indigenous fundraising efforts such as harambees, to promote development and a culture of philanthropy. It also has led the development of an East African association of grantmakers designed to promote public accountability, transparency, and effectiveness among foundations and NGOs.
The Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania originally was founded in the 1990s by a coalition of mostly European government agencies that sought a new way to fund Tanzanian development projects. It is the largest indigenous foundation in the country, with leadership that is active in the Pan-African philanthropy movement, and it represents a new phase in the development of the country’s social-finance sector. In addition to its professional staff and a board of directors, it also is governed by a community membership association with a president, who is a professional evaluator and consultant from Tanzania. And for about a decade, South Africa has had an association of community foundations, a spin-off of the larger South Africa Grantmakers Association.

Another type of community foundation is the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), created by Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Ugandan women activists in 2000 to promote women’s rights and development. A Pan-African philanthropic institution, it is distinctive as the only foundation focused on women’s issues in the entire continent.


Recognizing the potential benefits of tapping Diaspora philanthropy, an interesting trend is that African community foundations are establishing nonprofit arms in other countries designed to help them raise both public awareness, funding and, potentially, work on both new and old Diaspora issues worldwide. For example, in 2008 the Kenyan Community Development Foundation formed the Friends of the Kenyan Community Development Foundation as a U.S.-based public charity and a tool for the Kenyan Diaspora in the United States and others to support its work. Similarly, the AWDF formed the African Women’s Development Fund USA. And Somaliland’s innovative Edna Maternity Hospital has a Minnesota-based sister nonprofit that raises awareness about the high rate of maternal deaths in Africa and supports the hospital.

The East African Association of Grantmakers represents a broader trend toward the organization of a Pan-African philanthropy sector.
There now are regional grantmaker associations in west and southern Africa, all formed in the past decade. And in just the past five years, two self-described Pan-African philanthropy associations have formed. TrustAfrica, based in Dakar, Senegal, with an office in Johannesburg, South Africa, is an African philanthropy, think tank, research agency, advocate, and provider of technical assistance. Initially supported with Ford Foundation financing, it has become largely independent.

TrustAfrica was instrumental, along with the continent’s entire indigenous philanthropy sector, in creating the African Grantmakers Association, the first-ever Pan-African philanthropy association created by Africans. The AGA held a groundbreaking conference in 2010 to convene the entire sector and create an action agenda to advance the sector.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

Africa’s indigenous philanthropy sector also has been influenced by global technological trends and has contributed to those trends as well. Interesting models have emerged from Kenya, its Diaspora, and South Africa. For example, Kenya’s Ushahidi is a mobile phone-based program that allowed Kenyans to track and map human rights abuses following a national election. It also was adapted to help international rescue workers find Haitian earthquake victims and has now been used for disaster relief in multiple countries.

Created by a Kenyan immigrant living in the United States, MamaMikes.com is an Internet-based tool that allows account holders to purchase vouchers for goods and services for family members or others living in Kenya. Cheaper than wiring money and allowing remitters to more actively plan financial support to their extended families, MamaMikes is an innovative use of technology for Diaspora philanthropy.

APPLYING BUSINESS PRACTICES

African activists and social entrepreneurs also are using business practices for development. Naturally, there is controversy about whether such market-based, so-called neoliberal approaches perpetuate, worsen, or transform social inequity in Africa and elsewhere. Nonetheless, there are a variety of interesting strategies being used in African social finance. For example, building on the world’s first such exchange established in Brazil in 2003, the South African Social Stock Exchange (SASIX) was formed in 2006. And a United Kingdom exchange, building on the Brazilian and South African examples, was formed in 2009. SASIX, like several other social investment or impact stock exchanges
that are now in development worldwide, is a kind of philanthropy market that provides prospective donors with research about NGO quality and potential impact, enabling them to sort through a growing number of social projects to select those that might best fit their interests. In 2010, the Kenyan Social Investment Exchange was created, “offering carefully selected development projects available as investment opportunities with both a social and financial return. Each project is rated in terms of Social Impact, Environmental Impact, Sustainability and Financial Returns so that you—the investor—can decide exactly how to make a difference.”

In addition, an international businessman from Ghana who has lived in the United States for decades has established MicroClinics for Ghanaian nurses to establish clinics in rural areas. These microenterprises help nurses earn a living while providing much-needed primary health care and quality pharmaceuticals.

**Linking “Old” and “New” Diasporas**

African Diaspora philanthropy is arguably as old as the African Diaspora itself. As evidenced by seventeenth-century accounts of susus throughout the Caribbean, as well as African-Americans’ use of the black church as a kind of revolving community finance pool, the evidence suggests that slaves from Africa recreated African voluntary practices and institutions along with other social and cultural forms. In addition, African-American missionary societies, women’s associations, and nonprofits have been active philanthropists to Africa from the nineteenth century.

Of course, Pan-African organizations oriented to social improvement and justice have existed for centuries, including Garveyism, various “Back to Africa Movements,” and the sophisticated development and advocacy organizations of today, such as Africare and TransAfrica. In addition, the National Congress of Negro Women and Opportunity International long have had international arms that focused on African development.

With the emergence of an indigenous African philanthropy sector, this trend toward developing Pan-African social benefit organizations is being revived in multiple ways that are not fully documented. African immigrants in general, but women in particular, are forming all manner of self-help nonprofit and voluntary associations for social finance and benefit throughout Africa and its Diaspora. Anecdotal evidence from foundations and women’s funding groups in the United States alone suggest an increasing number of requests from African immigrant women-led nonprofits seeking funding for transnational projects. Examples in Minnesota include Resources for the Enrichment of Africans Lives,
founded by an Ethiopian activist to connect women mentors from the United States with orphaned Ethiopian girls. The Minnesota African Women’s Association organizes African immigrant women from diverse backgrounds for community development and women’s rights in Minnesota and Africa. There are comparable women immigrant organizations representing the Caribbean and Latina communities, including, for example, the Black Latina Movement in New York.29

African-Americans are continuing and updating the long tradition of Pan-African voluntary associations. For example, My Sister’s Keeper in Boston promotes women’s rights for Sudanese women in the United States and abroad; African American Kenyan Women Interconnect (AAKEWO) connects African-American women volunteers and philanthropists with Kenyan villages for community building and support; the International Leadership Institute in Minneapolis has philanthropic, cultural, and scholarly exchanges between African-Americans, African immigrants, and others to multiple African countries since 2000.30 There are countless similar African Diaspora women’s organizations working transnationally throughout the world. An inventory of these organizations would aid their activism and social impact, as well as increase understanding of their role in promoting global identities as well as inter-ethnic economies and social action.

These organizations are now forming coalitions, often linking the old and new African Diasporas, to increase the capacity, scale, and social impact of their members’ missions. For example, the Pan-African Women’s Philanthropy Network (www.pawpnet.net), of which the author is the cofounder and chair, was founded in 2004 to “promote collaborative philanthropy, caregiving, volunteerism and social action among diverse African ancestry women and their allies for the development of African descent communities everywhere.” The Network has an online community, with about 400 members from 20 countries, and it provides mutual support, technical assistance, and convening to build a global community of Pan-African women activists and philanthropists, including a worldwide summit of women social innovators working in Africa and its Diaspora.

The US-West Africa Group was founded in 2010 as an “African Diaspora-led cooperative that serves as a bridge for knowledge and investment capital flows between the United States and West African economies with a mission to foster alliances and partnerships between entities in the United States (Canada) and West Africa, as an African response to globalization, and toward security of the African region. The US-West Africa Group promotes, supports, and strengthens business, trade, investment, knowledge, economic and socio-cultural transactions,
between the United States and West Africa.” Priority Africa Network, created in 2003, has a national Pan-African Community Dialogue Series that attempts to strengthen understanding and relations across the old and new Diasporas. The Black Alliance for Just Immigration is a coalition of diverse black Diaspora and other activists devoted to building a broad-based constituency for immigration reform. Although based in the United States such organizations also increasingly work globally on policy issues.31

The growing collaboration between the old and new Diasporas in the social finance front is not only driven by grassroots social innovators and activists, but the emergence of a Pan-African global policy environment. The African Union’s recognition of the Diaspora as its sixth region, and the creation of the Western Hemisphere Diaspora Network to support its engagement, has fostered a conceptual framework being used by activists worldwide to advance old and new Diaspora linkages. The United Nation’s Declaration of 2011 as the International Year for People of African Descent is also raising global awareness of the Diaspora.32 Increasing recognition by African and multilateral agencies of the importance of African remittances to development, and even its influence on home country politics, has helped to create a policy climate that promotes transnational social finance and remittances, including the old African Diasporas in various countries.33 Multinational corporations are increasingly interested in the almost 1 billion-person African market and, perhaps, a combined African/African Diaspora market of more than 2 billion persons worldwide.34

There are broader sociopolitical trends that may also underlie this movement toward Pan-African identities, especially in an increasingly competitive global economy. As several social scientists note about Diasporas in the United States, there is a tendency to create what they call “pan-ethnicities,” such as “Pan-Asian” or “Asian-American.”35 Such identities include several distinct groups to both increase the scale of community affinity and, potentially, political influence. Also, other scholars claim that Western racial concepts, like other ideologies, have been exported worldwide with the development of a global economy. They propose that globalization has ushered in a phase of neo-racism where dark skin and African ancestry are still perceived as inferior, but race-based inequities are increasingly cloaked in post-racialist rhetoric. Contemporary Pan-African identities may also create the foundation for protest movements to increase scales of social inclusion, such as the Pan-African women’s social finance and philanthropy movements presented here, to resist and transform persistent global ideologies of racism.36
Pan-African Social Innovation

Traditionally, the West is seen as the world’s social innovator. Of course, even a cursory understanding of world history (e.g., origin of humanity in Africa, the invention of writing in Iraq, and the first state bureaucracy in China) demonstrates that innovation is a universal practice and capacity. However, social innovation has become its own sector, blending philanthropy, social enterprise, and technology. Indigenous African contributions to worldwide social innovation today are beginning to be organized and recognized more fully.

For example, a new Kenya-based organization, Voices of Africa, promotes sustainable development and fair trade, highlighting the country’s social innovation. Afrinnovator.com is one of several blogs that serves as a virtual exchange for those interested in African-based social innovation. Supported by the European-based NGO Social Innovation Exchange, in 2009, African social innovators and their supporters convened in South Africa for the continent’s first social innovation tour and conference. Other NGOs, including Ashoka, Synergos, and Acumen Fund have provided important overseas support to African social entrepreneurs and innovators fostering the development of its transnational social finance and innovation sector.

A Transnational Philanthropy Sphere and Market

These new developments in African Diaspora philanthropy are a rich area for study that could increase our understanding of contemporary governance, social movements, and globalization. But new conceptual models are needed.

The dynamics of contemporary transnational African philanthropy do not fit neatly into conventional models of cultures, economies, and sociopolitical lives available in the social sciences and other fields. Arjun Appadurai offers a model of transnationalism that is useful in understanding the dynamics of contemporary transnational and Diaspora philanthropy. He depicts transnationalism’s intersecting cultural—and, by implication, social, economic and political—interchanges as global flows of people, ideas, and money that coalesce into “scapes.” These scapes—as opposed to societies and places with hard and fast boundaries—have become key fields of transnational exchange in the global economy. For example, “financescapes” formed to amass and distribute global capital. “Ideoscapes” of key ideologies, concepts, images, and associated words, such as “philanthropy,” “social innovation,” “modernity,” and “development,” have emerged. And new “ethnoscapes” have formed, as people...
create alternative identities drawing from a globally accessible pool of cultural knowledge, media images, and ideologies.

These “scapes” intersect in unpredictable ways, coalescing into what Appadurai calls “diasporic public cultural spheres” where individual agents negotiate contending ideology, power, and resources, constructing new ideas, structures, practices, and even movements with the potential for social change—for example, in our case, an emergent transnational African philanthropy sector and its leadership. The intersection of these transnational flows cuts through local communities throughout the globe, creating “translocalities”—places and identities that are at once global and local. Understanding globalization’s impact on a particular community or field requires a translocal perspective sensitive to the influence of local social and economic systems as well as their interface with global flows of culture, power, identity, ideology, economic, and natural resources.

Philanthropy has entered a new era defined by the intersection of these transnational forces. A transnational African philanthropy sphere has emerged as the global economy, digital communications, diasporic migration, and instantaneous global finance have connected localities. Wealthy and poor migrants have taken their traditional voluntary sector practices and adapted them to the social and economic conditions of their new homelands and also use them as tools to support their mother countries, often using the Internet and other digital technologies, such as mobile phones, to create new philanthropic practices. They are connecting them to the Old African Diaspora and other Diasporas to create new forms of philanthropy that are not easily reduced to either their traditional or non-African influences.

Applying Appadurai’s model, philanthropy is a contested ideoscape as new ethnoscapes of ethnic minorities, Diaspora migrants, and others, such as “social entrepreneurs,” define, document, and create distinctive giving practices. African Diaspora innovators—transnational “agents” in Appadurai’s parlance—meld and adapt various voluntary sector practices, transplanting them to fit the needs of their local constituents and markets. With this expanding evidence of philanthropy’s diverse cultural practices and social forms, even immigrant remittances are being accepted, studied, and promoted for their philanthropic and community-development potential. Distinctions between local and international giving are not clear-cut, as they merge into a transnational network of global private, financial, intellectual, and social capital that is exchanged for social benefit. In such a framework, communities no longer have hard and fast geographic boundaries but are both local and global places—what Appadurai would call “translocalities”—defined by
a combination of influences from both their immediate environments and distant places.

Transnational “agents,” including international or domestic foundations from many countries, corporate leaders, grassroots activists, social entrepreneurs, NGO leaders, and others, have created a global philanthropic market with fierce competition for resources in which social improvement programs are bought and sold, becoming commoditized, and power is contested and re-balanced. Any community can be a philanthropic translocality where resources from indigenous, foreigners, and diasporic agents are comingled to fund projects, such as a school or clinic. For example, Accra, Nairobi, and the Twin Cities of Minnesota would be such a translocality today with a transnational diasporic network of domestic, immigrant, and foreign funders, activists, and volunteers.

Diaspora Flows of African Social Finance

In addition to a conceptual model that reflects the diasporic nature of emerging Pan-African philanthropy, an inventory of these forms from multiple countries, their capital flows, goals, and impact would help advance the study of contemporary African transnationalism. The sector is still in early formation. Creating a baseline model of its early development also would help compare its growth to longstanding corporate foundations and their “corporate social responsibility” programs, which, by some accounts, sustain rather than transform structures and practices of inequality and environmental degradation.

The development of the social finance sector as an alternative to African and African Diaspora development approaches, which have been largely ineffectual, is exciting. However, new conceptual models are insufficient to advance the Pan-African philanthropy movement as a vehicle for development. As a practitioner, activist, and scholar of the field since the 1990s, I have some reflections and cautions that might help the movement avoid the pitfalls of its Western counterparts and maximize its potential for progressive social transformative.

Marketing Babble Signifying Nothing

One of the downsides of social finance, no matter how well intended, is that it can degenerate into empty buzzwords or marketing techniques that mask destructive practices. Among the most prominent examples are corporations with philanthropy programs that with one hand give out charity, but with the other have discriminatory hiring practices or harm
the environment in their manufacturing processes. Some even practice “green-washing,” to cultivate a public image as an environmentally responsible business—but do not live up to this image in their actions.

**Social Finance Run Amok**

There are also the bad-actor nonprofits that raise money supposedly to help for the public good but then divert the money for personal use or that of family and friends. Indigenous African social finance and philanthropy pools like esusus, harambees, or apprenticeships are not immune either. There are people who collect their part of the pool when it is their turn but do not make their scheduled contribution. And there are the community apprentices...
whose labor is exploited because their employers do not follow through on their obligated payment to help them start a business.

And there are the banks, which in the good name of social investment, charge outrageously high, even usurious, rates and fees for micro-loans, which is an increasingly serious problem in Africa. Foundations are not immune to these kinds of slippery ethical slopes, and in countries that provide tax breaks, examples abound of those trying to use them as tax-free investment fronts for their businesses. Or wealthy people create foundations, but hoard the money, distributing little funding to the NGOs and other worthy causes that need their support to help disadvantaged communities.

**GOVERNMENTS PASSING THE BUCK**

Governments can advance philanthropy and social investment with the ulterior motive of freeing themselves from meeting the needs of the poor, and instead building bureaucracies that do little more than push paper with few benefits to the mass of their constituents. This is a risk, especially in austere times such as the Great Recession. But even in large philanthropic markets like the United States, NGOs and foundations cannot promote the social good alone—they need the active support of the government to make a difference.

**A CLOAK FOR CAREERIST COWARDICE**

Well-funded foundations can become too comfortable, losing the courage of their convictions with little impact on society’s toughest problems. They can become more like nonprofit businesses, primarily concerned with maximizing donations, investment returns, visibility, or prestige and their staff’s careers, with comparably little attention to improving the quality of life, promoting opportunity, speaking out on behalf of the most vulnerable, or sustainably using our natural resources. For example, several scholars and activists in the United States say that, historically, philanthropy supports mostly institutions that promote the interests of the wealthy and powerful—most notably orchestras, ballets, museums, and other cultural institutions—instead of addressing the needs of the poor. Others claim that the industry is advocating for its own self-interests, such as lobbying for tax breaks and limiting even reasonable government oversight that a high percentage of the public is losing trust and confidence in the sector seeing it too as just out to make money. Such arguments can, however, be overstated and unfairly target cultural institutions that also can be important vehicles for expression, education, and
even social development especially for youth in low-income communities and countries.

VENTURING TOO FAR

Social enterprises also can encounter moral lapses when they forget the social purposes of their profit making and create companies that are little different than their for-profit counterparts. Venture philanthropy, or so-called “free-market philanthropists,” can go too far in the application of business management principles to social causes. For example, such approaches can be naïve in their application of business-derived evaluation techniques. Foundation philanthropy, and a demand for social finance, develops because the capitalist market has failed to meet the needs of vulnerable people such as those who are homeless or do not have access to quality medical care, education, and the like. Thus, the assumption that the very market factors that may have helped to produce the inequity in the first place would be fully equipped to resolve them has its inherent limits. Nonetheless, venture philanthropists—and this is a general trend in the field—tend to overemphasize quantitative evaluations of short-term results, similar to the annual business cycles of for-profit businesses. However, quick payoffs are rare in the social sector and outcomes can take generations. Much social sector work—for example, the search for a cure for cancer or public policy reform—are, by definition, long-term projects with progress that is not easily measured with short-term metrics. With a focus on promoting social accountability and impact, Pan-African philanthropists should adapt the best of business practices for the realities of social change.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY INTOLERANCE

Protecting women’s basic human rights and gender equity are ongoing challenges worldwide, including African and African Diaspora societies. The community development literature has documented the critical role of women as engines of equitable economic development. Furthermore, in most societies, including those of the African Diaspora, women have a primary role for community-based social finance and development. Abusing women’s rights and preventing their full development as persons undermines development. For a Pan-African philanthropy sector to fully emerge, women’s rights must be promoted to fully enable their participation in family and community development.

Furthermore, in many parts of Africa and its Diaspora, there continue to be serious problems incorporating and successfully managing diversity,
including people of diverse ethnic, religious, and sexual orientations. The popular media worldwide chronicle conflicts between long-standing black and new immigrant communities but also, increasingly, efforts to strengthen inter-group relations such as the ones described in this chapter. Intolerance, discrimination, and model minority competitions undermine sustainable development, especially, in a competitive global economy. Inclusive and participatory communities that embrace diversity are in a better position to take advantage of the equitable development benefits that Pan-African philanthropy can bring.

Communities that can create and sustain global identities will be more successful in a global economy. But inter-ethnic tensions between old and new African Diasporas are common and limit capacity for the types of sustained transnational collaboration necessary for Pan-African philanthropy and, ultimately, success in a global economy.

Finally, youth are not only a pool of new community leaders they bear the brunt of the largely failed development strategies imposed in Africa and much of its Diaspora. Engaging them in the development of a Pan-African philanthropy sector as leaders and beneficiaries has multiple benefits. Supporting youth leadership programs can improve youth quality of life, access to future opportunity, and can strengthen the culture of giving and mutual support across ethnic, racial, gender, and religious lines so critical to Africa and its Diaspora’s continuing development.

**Toward a New Future**

With a few notable exceptions, my African academic colleagues do not recognize indigenous philanthropy in Africa or its Diaspora. As one close African colleague recently commented to me about my Pan-African women’s philanthropy work, “Why focus on philanthropy? It’s not like it is something that we Africans do.” And many of my Western colleagues certainly do not see Africa as having its own philanthropic or social enterprises’ traditions, noting, erroneously that, “Philanthropy was created in America.” For me, as an anthropologist, that sentiment is almost like saying that Africans who trace their ancestry through their mothers do not really have families. As the literature reviewed earlier in this paper shows, “philanthropy” is a Western term for a universal human tendency to organize social groups to promote broader community ends and comes in many forms—just as families do. Philanthropy, giving, or whatever term one would like to use, is hidden in plain view throughout African communities as well as its old and new Diasporas. It is increasingly being formalized today, blending traditional African practices with Western ones to create an exciting, new potential form of global social finance.
The development of Pan-African social finance should be studied and encouraged. Alternative solutions to address the alarming social challenges facing Africa and its Diaspora are needed more than ever. Remittances and other forms of self-help throughout the old and new Diasporas are already the glue that holds together the Diaspora’s tattered social fabric. The development of a Pan-African social finance sector has the capacity to be more than an industry—it could be a social movement to promote progressive social change and activism throughout the Diaspora, old and new. Promotion of true corporate social responsibility along with indigenous giving, volunteerism, and activism are more important than ever as communities throughout Africa and its Diaspora attempt to rebuild in a difficult postrecession environment with declining government and multilateral assistance. But social finance is more than a potential source of funding for community rebuilding.

New Pan-African social finance practices could potentially become a form of African social capitalism that could create new cutting-edge models to transform philanthropic and broader economic practice in the West and elsewhere. Activist research that recognizes and documents these practices while promoting the best of them is necessary. Research combined with activism also can advance a Pan-African civil society, building linkages across new and old Diasporas; creating a global critical mass of advocates for equitable policy and public accountability; and providing a check on pervasive government and multinational corporate power. In many ways, contemporary Pan-African social finance and philanthropy have been the basis of every successful black Diaspora social movement from the days of the Underground Railroad, African liberation, civil rights, and anti-apartheid movements. Reviving and updating this tradition of Pan-African social finance and protest is essential as the Diaspora worldwide attempts to reshape its future.

Notes


14. But all connect activists, consumers, including donors, and social innovators across multiple countries. For more on Bead for Life, founded in the United States and working in Uganda since 2004, visit http://www.beadforlife.org/. Also, visit http://www.worldofgood.org/ for more on their global fair trade work.


20. At the time of publication of Transnational Africa, the author was hired as the first AWDF USA’s executive director. See http://www.awdf.org/awdf-usa for more on AWDF and AWDF USA.

21. For more information, see http://www.ednahospital.org.

22. See http://www.trustafrica.org/ for more information on these organizations as well as their members. See http://www.eaag.org to learn more about the East African Association of Grantmakers.


30. See http://sites.google.com/site/culturalreconnection/ and http://www.mysisterskeeper.org/ for more information on these organizations.


36. Faye V. Harrison. “Embracing New Model Minorities and Black Immigrant Sagas in the ‘Postracial’ Reconfiguration of Structural


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“I Am the Bridge between Two Worlds”: Transnational Connections among Darfurians in Maine

Lacey Andrews Gale

Introduction

“It’s Africa again” my husband said as we were eating breakfast. The phone had been ringing steadily since 5 a.m. The Caller ID flashed numbers that began with Guinea’s country code: 224. I had been avoiding picking up the phone for days, dreading having to say no to my former research assistants who were living in desperate conditions across West Africa in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. Finally, mid-morning, I received a text from Saidou letting me know that violence had broken out before the Guinean presidential election in the town where he—a refugee from Sierra Leone—was living. He believed that he was being targeted because of his ethnic identity as a Fulah, entirely too credible a fear as one of the candidates for office was a Fulah, and refugees historically have been made scapegoats at times of political and economic insecurity in Guinea. I was torn between fear and skepticism. I had already sent Saidou $400 between January and June for two surgeries and Ramadan-related needs. Saidou is not the only person I send money to, and I had recently promised my husband that I would not send any more money to
Africa this year. But how could I deny such a compelling request? After some deliberation, I finally sent Saidou a text, telling him that I could not send him money for transport to Liberia and asking him if he had thought about moving to a different part of Guinea for safety.

I spent the rest of the evening with Saidou in the back of my mind, wondering how I would ever forgive myself if something were to happen to him and his family. The next day, I called Chernor, another refugee friend in Guinea who lives in the capital, Conakry. His family lives near Saidou, and Chernor confirmed that while there had been some pre-election violence that pitted the Mandingoes against the Fulahs, it had since subsided. I felt some relief, but wondered yet again how I would react if Saidou were a family member and if I, myself, had come to the United States as a refugee?

I began studying and working in sub-Saharan Africa 20 years ago and have been negotiating relationships with friends and acquaintances in East and West Africa ever since. I am intimately acquainted with the tenuous relationship between friendship and patronage and the complicated aspects of remitting money and goods, including triangulating information to determine the legitimacy of requests for help; identifying a trusted receiver; weighing the pros and cons of different types of remittance-sending mechanisms; and dealing with emotions of guilt, fear, and frustration, especially when the receiver’s country is seemingly cut off from the rest of the world because of conflict, weather, or poor infrastructure. I have had endless internal debates about how to respond to pleas from my friends. How much do I send, to whom, and why? Do I send out of guilt, a sense of obligation for the work people did for me as research assistants, or an understanding of the extreme poverty and deprivation they endure? Do I only send money at certain times of the year or am I willing to send money for urgent situations, such as medical emergencies or family obligations such as weddings, baptisms, and burials? Clearly, my research on remittance-sending and transnational relationships among the Darfurian population in Portland, Maine, originates not only from academic curiosity, but from a very real, personal interest in understanding better how others negotiate these situations.

I am constantly reminded during interviews that my situation is simple emotionally and logistically compared with members of the Darfur Diaspora in Portland, who regularly remit to family and friends in Cairo, multiple locations in Sudan, and elsewhere. More than two million people from the Darfur region of western Sudan have been displaced since the escalation of warfare in 2003—about one-third of the population.1 Access to cash and other financial resources is an essential need, but there are few sources in conflict zones other than humanitarian
assistance. An important resource is the remittances sent by members of the Diaspora. The Portland Darfurians remain connected through a variety of media, such as phone calls, letters, Facebook, and visits home, particularly since the January 2011 referendum that led to recognition of Southern Sudan as a separate state, and opened a new range of possibilities for transnational connections and commerce.

Adults and children are in constant negotiations concerning what it means to be Darfuri in Maine, what connections to “home” will be maintained by the next generation, and what their financial, emotional, and political commitments are to a future in the United States. In the politically charged post-referendum atmosphere, Darfurians in Portland feel that they are unfairly stereotyped as “Arabs” by some of the other Sudanese tribes in Portland, because of their Muslim faith, their geographic origins in Darfur and Khartoum, and the presumed involvement of the Darfur people in military campaigns against the Southern Sudanese. In this charged atmosphere, young men and women are struggling to make sense of what home means to them and how they can support people suffering in Sudan while making a life for themselves in Maine. They see how their parents juggle demands from family, friends—and friends of friends—in other countries who believe that those who have been resettled to the United States are rich and have an easy life. That assumption is in stark contrast to what I have observed and heard over the past five years of conducting research and offering leadership programs to refugees and immigrants in Maine. Parents may work four jobs between the two of them, struggling to make sure one person is always home with their young children. A young woman cooks and cleans for her father and younger brother, goes to college, works and gives speeches to raise awareness about the genocide in Darfur. Men consider working in Iraq for the United States army as Arabic interpreters for the enticing salary so that they can better support family back in Sudan, despite the high casualty rate among interpreters.

Many questions arise when I consider the dilemma of those who “won the lottery” of being resettled to the United States. How do they weigh their duty toward supporting family and friends in Darfur against their needs here in the United States? What keeps them connected back home? Obligations to family? Desire to elevate their status? Involvement in politics? Will the generation who is coming of age in the United States maintain the same level of commitment? What is the substance and significance of the connections back home for a second generation that sees itself as American, compared with the young men and women who arrived in Maine old enough to feel “Sudanese?” How do these connections to home and the sense of being an “authentic” Sudanese person
influence how young women view marital choices, family relationships, leadership roles, and intergenerational dynamics? Through fieldwork, interviews, and involvement in a federally funded leadership program for resettled refugees, I have learned how such transnational connections take a variety of forms, have different meanings, and offer different constraints and opportunities to Darfurian refugees, depending on gender, age, and social status.

Most refugees I have interviewed, both in West Africa and Portland, view relationships as the crucial component of creating a “home” that exists in two places at once. They continue to nurture pre-displacement social and family connections through visits, arranged marriages—and fostering children, despite considerable cost and hardship, in the hope of ensuring future financial, emotional, and social support. I have found anthropologist Stephen Lubkemann’s definition of transnationalism from his work with the Liberian Diaspora to be a useful guide in thinking about such connections for refugee populations: “...a transnational is a member of a Diaspora who finds himself or herself with long-term commitments and responsibilities to both a country of origin and a country of resettlement. Such commitments could include marriage, children, relatives, businesses, school, and work, among others... In short, transnationals are individuals who plot life strategies and see their social, political, and economic future as one that will involve investment and activity in two countries simultaneously.”

In this chapter, I explore generational and gendered aspects of transnationalism through my research with Darfurian household heads on remittance-sending practices and with young men and women on leadership and their connections to home. I identify points of tension and conflict within the Darfurian community that offer us an understanding of the substance and significance of transnational connections for different community members. The research is based on two fieldwork projects: one conducted during 2006–2008 that focused on remittance sending among household heads and a second project under way (2010–2011) that is examining youth leadership and intergenerational dynamics among Sudanese youth in Portland.

**Background**

The population of Maine, according to the 2010 United States Census, is 1.3 million of which the immigrant population is more than 55,000 persons (about 4%), including resettled refugees, asylum seekers, secondary migrants, migrant workers, and illegal immigrants. Catholic Charities Maine (CCM) is a non-profit organization that resettles refugees under
the auspices of the State Department’s Office of Refugee Resettlement. Since 1975, the CCM has resettled more than 12,000 refugees from Somalia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Djibouti, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Togo, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries. More recently, Maine has become a destination for refugees who initially were resettled in a different state and subsequently decided to move to Maine; they are known as “secondary migrants.” It is not certain how many secondary migrants have moved to Maine, but unofficial estimates suggest that as of 2006, it may be as many as 8,000, split primarily between Portland and Lewiston.\(^8\)

The African Diaspora in Maine is composed primarily of Somalis, Somali Bantus, Sudanese, and those from the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) who live in Portland and Lewiston. The Sudanese population is organized on tribal lines, the most populous tribes in Portland being the Acholi, followed by the Azande, Nuer, Fur, Dinka, and Nuba. There are more than 30 different tribes from Sudan in Maine, each of which is divided into subclans and different linguistic groups. It is difficult to obtain an exact figure for the number of Sudanese people in Maine. Figures vary from 2,000 to 5,000 people, with the most dependable sources estimating around 3,000. The Darfuri population, which hovers around 150, is considered the largest Darfur community in the United States. The January 2011 referendum spurred a great deal of organizing on the part of the Southern Sudanese community, including a daylong public program titled “Post-referendum Sudan” that brought in outside speakers and influential leaders in Portland for speeches and debate about the future of Sudan. Portland community members tirelessly promoted awareness about the election process and registration among the Sudanese Diaspora through individual efforts linked with the electoral commission in Southern Sudan and the local chapter of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

The Darfuri population has been in a challenging position on the referendum. They were not allowed to vote in the referendum since they are not from Southern Sudan. Fur Cultural Revival, a community-based organization started by members of the Fur community, decided to tone down the tenor and pace of their advocacy work during the referendum process with the international Save Darfur campaign, an alliance of more than 100 faith-based humanitarian and human rights organizations.\(^9\) They were in a difficult situation: they did not want to divert attention or support from the referendum, yet they did not want to lose their focus on the conflict in Darfur and the humanitarian emergency facing the
internally displaced people in the Darfur region. The community also is divided internally through politics that predate resettlement to Maine, stemming from a range of factors—identity issues related to peoples’ region of origin in Darfur, perceived or real alliances during the conflict, social status and familial reputation, and affiliation with particular clans and subgroups. I discovered this division firsthand when I was effectively blocked from interviewing half of the households in the community during my fieldwork interviews on remittance sending in 2006–2008.

The Remittance Project

My remittance research was intended to complement long-term research conducted in Darfur by my colleagues at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. Their findings showed that displaced people in Darfur were becoming increasingly reliant on remittances—the money that is sent home—despite the breakdown in sending mechanisms as a result of the 2003 conflict. Remittances are a significant financial flow to developing countries: Officially recorded remittances were $160 billion in 2004, compared with $166 billion in foreign direct investment and $79 billion official development assistance. It is estimated that in 2005, at least $167 billion was remitted, a figure that the World Bank says may be an underestimate by as much as 50 percent. This is three times the value of official development assistance and is the second-most important source of income to developing countries after foreign direct investment.

According to political scientist Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome’s review of remittance and philanthropic giving patterns among African Diasporas, many studies contend that the value of informal remittances is greater than the formal. For instance, the estimated value of unre-corded remittances by Sudanese migrants in 1984 was up to 85 percent of all remittances. While there are some notable studies that explore the sending side of the remittance equation, “Literature on remittances tends to focus on receiving countries and perhaps because of this bias much is made of the potential for remittances to be used for development purposes.” Our project goals were directed toward better understanding the significance and scale of remittance-sending among the Darfur community in Portland.

What little is known about the scale and scope of remittances from refugee populations in the United States suggests a staggering financial commitment to the home country. While it is difficult to obtain exact figures, fieldwork conducted by anthropologist Laura Hammond in Lewiston in 2004 among Somali refugees revealed sending patterns that
give a sense of the extreme pressure refugees are under to send money, given the predominantly low-income employment rates among Somalis in Maine. In conversations with money-sending agents, Hammond was given estimates that every month 2,000 to 3,000 Somalis in Lewiston send $200,000 to $300,000 to Somalia and the countries surrounding it. This amount increases during the holy month of Ramadan. “As large as these sums are, agents in Minneapolis/St. Paul, where the Somali population is much larger, estimated the flow may be ten times as high.”

Lubkemann has focused on the Liberian Diaspora in the United States, using a variety of methods to establish reliable demographic information and to track remittance-sending activity among a sample of households. He found that over a three-year period “. . . the 136 households surveyed reported remitting a total of just over $1 million or an average of $335,000 per year to relatives in Liberia as well as $631,230 to relatives living in other West African countries.” The average per remitting household ranged between $3,700 and $4,150 per year in 2002–2004. If these levels of remitting reported in Minneapolis households are reasonably representative of the Liberian Diaspora in the United States as a whole (7,000–8,500 households) by Lubkemann’s estimates, the Liberian Diaspora was remitting roughly between $19 million and $23 million in cash directly to family members in Liberia—with an additional $10–$13 million going to Liberians living in exile throughout the West African region.

As these studies illustrate, even in a country like the United States, with well-established financial systems, data on remittance flows are difficult to come by and often unreliable. Hammond gives some reasons, saying, “This is partly because of a reluctance on the part of remitters to discuss the amount of money they send to their relatives, for fear that they may lose social welfare support or be subject to taxation, because discussing individual and family economic matters is not culturally accepted, because they are employed in the informal sector (often illegally) or because they send money through unofficial channels.” Given the lack of available data, my collaborators and I wanted to test methods of gathering remittance-related data, to map migration and remittance-sending patterns, and to explore how linkages between remittance-senders and remittance receivers are established and maintained. We hoped the interviews would allow us to establish descriptive demographic statistics for the community, record migration histories, reflect some sense of scale for remittance activities and sending patterns, and create a database that would reflect the complexity of multiple remittance destinations and receivers.

The research began in August 2006 with networking among state and community organizations serving refugees in Maine, as well as
trust-building activities with the Darfurian community association, the Fur Cultural Revival. We employed a range of methods, including community meetings, introductions to community members through community leaders, and the creation of a community roster. Participant observation was a key aspect of the research during community meetings and before-and-after interviews. Time spent at the research assistant’s home—talking informally, meeting visitors, watching interactions, and the exchange of information and goods—was particularly valuable. Once the project had been introduced to the community and given the proper permission from community leaders, I began qualitative interviews with the help of a Darfurian community member who worked as a research assistant throughout the project, which spanned 18 months from 2006 through 2008. I use the term “refugees,” but in reality the population I worked with also included asylum seekers. Together with my colleagues at the Feinstein International Center and my research assistant, I developed an open-ended interview protocol that included basic household demographic questions; a life-history matrix that chronologically mapped residence, employment, education, and remittance activities; and a family tree designed to capture remittance-sending activities by determining the geographic location of the receiver; the relationship to the receiver; the age, status, and gender of the receiver; and the reasons for sending money.

Our household census in 2007 gave a total of 76 people in the Darfur community at that time—42 adults and 34 children in 19 households. The gender ratio was 24 men to 18 women, which, despite the small sample size, is consistent with Sudanese demographics in the United States related to dynamics of the resettlement process. We interviewed 24 men and women in 13 out of the 20 households. In retrospect, I now understand that this high refusal rate was due to a combination of factors, some of which were listed in the section above. The schisms among the Darfurians living in Maine stem from political affiliations and orientation toward the conflict in Darfur as well as issues that arose after resettlement in Portland. Most members of the community have an uneasy relationship with “home” that includes paranoia concerning the activities of political groups and potential spies in the United States, and political affiliations that result in schisms that effectively divide the Darfur community in Portland into two camps—an aspect that severely constrained my ability to gather information about remittance-sending activities in Portland. Half of the community would not meet with me because my research assistant was from the opposite camp. The sensitivity of the topic and misconceptions about the purpose of the research discouraged community members from participating as well, even after...
extensive efforts were made to communicate the goals of the project. As an intensive study of each household in the Portland Darfurian community was not the main goal of the project, we decided not to pursue the issue further. What became clear was that those households where people agreed to be interviewed consisted of members of a large extended family (18 people spread over four households) or were members of the Fur Cultural Revival community organization and active in the Save Darfur campaign.

As it became clear that the participants were reticent to answer direct questions concerning their remittance-sending activities (to whom they sent assistance, what type of assistance they sent [money, goods], and how much/how often), I began to use alternate methods of data collection. I asked interviewees help me draw their family tree after they had told me about their migration history to the United States. When possible, I interviewed both the head of the household and the spouse, as I was interested in how or if men and women discuss connections to home and whether household heads and their spouses negotiate the remittance sending process. Did they pool their incomes to send money home? Did they discuss to whom they would send money, for what purposes, and when? In identifying the different members of their family tree, their ages, marital status, work status, and residence, it became easier to talk about their relationships with each person and how they supported them. I also wanted to understand more about their lives here in Portland. The combination of the two methods elicited some interesting findings, though not the tangible “how much, how often” data we had anticipated. We learned more about the ways in which Darfurians’ path to resettlement in the United States laid the groundwork for a web of remittance-sending obligations. The following case study traces the migration history of a particular family in the Darfur community and offers a more intimate look at the path and decisions people have made as refugees.

**The Eldest Carries the Heaviest Burden**

M. is from Darfur and F. is from the Gadarif region, although she traveled with her family to Darfur during school holidays to visit her family. They are cousins and met when M. traveled from Darfur to Gadarif to look for work. M. is the first born son, and F. was her father’s favorite and was asked to support the family by him before he died. They speak Arabic in the home because F. did not learn the Fur language in Gadarif. F. was born with a congenital heart defect and had surgery in Khartoum. She was supposed to marry someone else, but when she had surgery, M. cheered her up as she was recovering, and they fell in love. They were
married in 1998 and he received support from his family to move to Khartoum to work and to prepare for their journey to Cairo.

F. stayed in Gadarif with her family when M. went to Cairo to get settled in 2000. She was five months pregnant when he left. He traveled with three other Darfurians, two of whom now live in Portland. In Cairo M. managed a store for an Egyptian. He sent clothes to F. and two installments of cash. He also sent her money to help her prepare for the arduous journey from Khartoum to Cairo, which she undertook in 2001 shortly after their daughter was born. They had a second child in Egypt in January 2003, which was very hard on F. without family support.

M. and F. and their two children arrived in Portland through the refugee resettlement program in September 2003. They both began working two months after they arrived in Portland. M. started work at a meat processing plant, and then changed jobs several times before he started to work as a security guard five nights a week on the second shift. He then quit work due to a conflict with a new supervisor and started to drive a taxi. F. finished high school in Sudan and currently is enrolled in Adult Education classes in Portland as well as working at a local hotel in the housekeeping department. Like most working families, they have arranged their schedules so as to not have to rely on child care: F. works days and weekends, M. works nights and is home on weekends. Their children are now old enough to be in school for most of the day.

F. is the second born and was very close to her father. After she left Sudan, he became sick and quit his job. She felt great pressure to remit. Before her father died in 2004, he called her to let her know that she was in charge of the family. She sends monthly support to her brother in Khartoum who travels to Gadarif to bring the money to F.’s mother who, in turn, distributes it regularly among 14 people in the household as well as others on an emergency basis. F. talks with her brother regularly about what types of expenses are to be covered each month. Her older brother also tries to contribute with earnings from his job. Her sister is continuing her education at a private university, so F. has increased her working hours to pay for the expenses. She was also sending money to her brother in Cairo for several years, but he returned to Khartoum in March 2007. She sent him a large sum of money after her tax refund and he bought a car to start a taxi business.

M. brought his mother and father to Khartoum from Darfur in 2005 and his father died in 2006. M. is the first-born son and is responsible for his family in Khartoum and Darfur. He sends monthly support to his mother for household expenses and to assist his brothers with their businesses. He also sends money to his mother’s and father’s siblings and his father’s second wife’s family in Darfur once or twice a year. F. recently
gave birth to a daughter and M. has slowed down the taxi business to stay home with their baby while F. goes back to work. When last I saw her, she looked exhausted and said sadly several times that she had no chance to relax and spend time with her family. She told me that both her sisters had just finished school and married, which required a large financial contribution on her part.

Findings

The data from interviews, family trees, group discussions, and participant observation reveals a link between migration patterns and remittance-sending. For resettled refugees in Portland, the journey to the United States began with a stepping-stone movement within Sudan, often from Darfur to a major city and then to the capital of Khartoum, once linkages were established to help support the individual or family while in the city. To be eligible for resettlement, a person has to present a case for refugee status to an office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. For Darfurians, the closest U.N. resettlement office is in Cairo. Some received assistance from relatives in Sudan who sponsored their trip in the first place, but arrivals in Cairo before 2001 had to be relatively self-sufficient because the remittance networks were not yet in place in the United States. Key social relations were created in Cairo that led to resettlement in Portland, with certain families acting as community anchors. Before travel to the United States, approved refugees in Cairo were asked to list the names and contact information for relatives and friends who had already been resettled to the United States. Therefore, it is not surprising that most Darfurians in Portland know one another’s families and have common social connections in Cairo.

While all the households interviewed in Portland have family members in Darfur, they are not able to remit as often as they would like. The majority of those interviewed reported sending money to Khartoum on a monthly basis, with several more remitting every other month. In addition, nearly half the respondents reported remitting to Cairo on a monthly or bimonthly basis. Half the respondents also sent money to Darfur on an irregular basis (though at least annually), depending on their means of communication and transport. Most community members have a contact person in Khartoum with whom they communicate by phone to organize their money-sending activities. For many, this point person is a family member, often a brother, sister, or mother. They are trusted to give an accurate picture of the current family financial situation, to create a list of needs—whether it is monthly expenses or emergency requests—and to distribute the money to others as the
remitter requests. The point person may or may not be the one to travel to Darfur to further distribute the money. Some families have a family member or trusted friend who conducts business between Khartoum and Darfur and is willing to carry the money with them on business trips to distribute to selected receivers. Other families will appoint someone to travel to Darfur from Khartoum once or twice a year to carry money for distribution.

The family trees I drew up for the nine households composed of married couples revealed support being sent to both the husband’s and wife’s sides of the family in multiple locations (Cairo, Khartoum, Darfur) for regular expenses such as schooling (books, transport, fees, exams, food), household needs, and to support small businesses. These sending patterns are similar to other African migrants, whose remittances are primarily used for daily needs and household expenses. In most cases, both the husband and wife were working. They each took responsibility for sending money to their own family members. Of these nine households, four marriages were brokered in Cairo before departure; the men improved their status by taking a wife before leaving, and the women enhanced their ability to assist their families in Cairo and Sudan by an arrangement with a promising “resettler.” In other cases men scrambled to bring wives from Sudan as their case came close to being approved. After they were settled in Portland, the refugees continue to help their family members come over to the United States via the family reunification program.

I found that the composition of the four non-marital households varied. Three households consisted predominantly of single young men, in one case three brothers and their mother who needed constant care, in another case three men who became friends through the resettlement process, and the third, a single man who was waiting for his fiancée to come over from Sudan on a school visa. The remaining household was composed of an older disabled man, “S” and his high school-aged daughter and son. Their remittance-sending activities were limited by their tiny income. They are members of an extended family in Portland that includes 18 people and stretches over four households. These four households consist of the sons and daughters (and in two households, their spouses and children) of S., and his brother, who remains in an Internally Displaced Persons camp in Darfur. Together, the household members determine who will send money, a decision that shifts over time depending on earnings and other factors; there are frequent family conferences on this subject.

One son started a car-exporting business to Sudan, an entrepreneurial adventure, which brought in considerable profit during the brief window of time when South Sudan was stable, but not yet well enough organized
to impose tariffs upon entry and sale of vehicles. At one point, I was told it was possible to buy a “Hummer” in the United States for $12,000 to $15,000 and sell it in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, for more than $60,000. Minus the fees for shipping, port duties in Mombasa, Kenya, and expenses related to transporting the car to Juba, a sharp entrepreneur could make as much as $30,000 per car. This venture required initial capital, so family members decided individually how much they were willing to invest in his scheme. Currently, they support family members in Khartoum, Darfur, and Cairo, where S’s wife is currently waiting with their son to clear the security screening stage of the resettlement process. S went with his daughter to Cairo in 2009 to visit his wife. Family members in Cairo tend to be children, elders, and fiancées whose travel out of the Sudan was financed and organized by Portland relatives. Many are not capable of supporting themselves while waiting for resettlement and often need money for medical expenses and school fees in addition to household expenses.

According to the respondents, it is relatively easy to transfer money from Portland to Khartoum. Most Darfurians use the Somali money transfer system popularly known as xawilaad or hawahla. An alternative to Western Union, the Somali system does not require a reference number, test question, or identification to pick up the money. All that is needed is the phone number and the name of the receiver. Once the money has been sent through a shop in Portland, the xawilaad in Khartoum or Cairo calls the receiver so they know the money has arrived. Generally, people do not send large amounts of money at one time, as it is too risky for the person picking up the money. Some community members have tried single large transfers in order to support business ventures in Darfur. However, they all say they will not try this again due to the security risk for the receiver and the lack of return on the investment. They do not in general need to verify how the money is spent as they only send it to a trusted person. They know the situation of their families very well, and sometimes the family will call with a special request and they will say how much they need and for what purpose.

When emergencies or extra demands arise from family in Sudan or Egypt, community members will take on another job or work longer hours to meet the need. Remittance-sending from Portland peaks at certain times of year, corresponding with particular events. As Jacobsen observes in *The Economic Life of Refugees*:

Like economic migrants, refugees desire to retain contact, increase their social status, and preserve their dignity before the gaze of their community—whether this community is part of the Diaspora or in the
School fees are an annual expense for family members in Sudan or Egypt along with school-related expenses such as uniforms, school supplies, books, lunches, and transport. Tax refunds are also an important source of remittances and some families send large amounts at that time or put the refund in a savings account specifically for emergency phone calls from Sudan or Egypt. Remittance-sending sharply increases during the month of Ramadan, when Darfurians in Portland send money to family members for symbolic foods, tea, and sugar as well as clothing for the holiday.

In general, the Darfurian household heads I interviewed told me that they have many opportunities in the United States and are glad to be in Portland. However, they also conveyed a deep sense of frustration about the limited and low-paying employment opportunities, the high cost of housing, and their inability to save money due to the constant demand for remittances. They want to do everything they can to support their family back home, but it is exhausting.

For these first-generation immigrants who are household heads, the remittance research clearly shows their sense of financial obligation and their desire to nurture and support transnational family relationships. It is less clear how youth and grown dependents of these household heads view home and their role in maintaining these social ties. The next section centers around findings from research on youth and community leadership and explores the ideas expressed during interviews by two Darfuri women in their 20s who I see as the “bridge” generation of the community.

“I Am the Bridge between Two Worlds”: Darfuri Youth in Portland

This was the title of E’s letter to the editor at her high school paper several years ago. As she said to me, “People do not understand how it feels to be a bridge between two nations, but I do because I’m Sudanese in the morning and when I’m in school I’m an American. . . .” Her remarks were in response to my questions about how she sees herself and her connections back to Sudan. This interview took place as part of a research project with Sudanese youth leaders in Portland. The point of departure for this research was the sensationalized media accounts portraying the recruitment of American-based Somali youths into terrorist organizations. I had become curious about the perspectives of refugee youths on
their situation, particularly as my remittance research with Darfurians had largely ignored generational differences. What are the ambitions and fears of resettled youth? What is their sense of connection back home? I wondered whether these Somali youths portrayed in the media were representative of a larger faction within the population of Diaspora youth, or just a small minority.

In conversations I had with Sudanese youth leaders and adults in Portland leading up to the project, key concerns for youths include relations with the police and the city and state government; educational attainment (or lack thereof); improving the situation for youths who remain in Sudan or refugee camps; communication with parents; changing gender roles; and expectations for the future (among others). I wanted to know what potential the youth feel for influencing these areas of concern. What kinds of resources do they need? What are the opportunities available to them in Maine and back home? What are the constraints? My goal was to map out the concerns of Sudanese young people and provide recommendations concerning programs and policies that might best support their efforts toward peace building, community development, and positive leadership, both in their current location and back home.

My background reading on the subject and preliminary conversations with community members identified basic trends among refugee youths in the United States that helped ground my research. Resettled youths face multiple transitions simultaneously, from conflict to third country resettlement and from child to adult. Students face language, developmental, and cultural barriers in addition to the normal challenges of class work. Many are also experiencing increased tension with their parents that may lead to a cultural disconnect and isolation. Pressure from various sources to be socially accepted can create barriers between refugee and immigrant youths and their families.

As I started having one-on-one interviews with youth leaders, I began to recognize the assumptions that I held about youths going into the project. At first, my intention was to interview young people between the ages of 15 and 25, generally the age window Sudanese people I spoke with recognize as constituting the category of “youth.” The more I spoke with young men and women, the more complicated the situation became as I began to recognize the generational and cultural divides that existed within this age range. As a result of the existing network in the community (and the instant rapport I felt with this age group) I found myself focusing on the “20 somethings”; those Sudanese young men and women who have a foot in both worlds, having grown up in the home country and in countries of first asylum as urban refugees or camp-based
refugees and then having gone through parts of the American educational system. They see the youth who grow up primarily in the United States as lost and struggling to find their way. As one told me, “The difference between people who come here younger and those who come here older is that those who come older know what it is to be home. They know what it is to suffer. They know what it is not to have education, not to have money, not to have anything at all. So that’s why this group is a lot more serious.”

These divides are rooted in age-related transitions and statuses and widened by a mutual lack of listening and understanding both between the 20-somethings and the younger generation and between the youths and the adults. Adults believe that youths do not listen; that they are delinquents in regards to educational attainment, drug and alcohol use, crime rates and teenage pregnancy, and they no longer are connected to their culture and language. The youths don’t believe that the elders listen to them or care about their opinions and solutions. They take offense that all youths are seen as delinquents and feel that all their attempts at organizing and leadership have been squashed by the elders who want to remain in power. Attempts at bridging this divide in the political or public arena have come to naught, perhaps due to the contentious and charged nature of these attempts at peace-building. This friction is not particular to refugee groups and is well-documented in the literature on immigration.

What makes their situation particularly compelling, however, is that this divide exists in a context of intense pressure to remain connected to home for familial, cultural, and political reasons, given the forced nature of their flight from Sudan and the humanitarian crisis back in Darfur. This pressure is deeply felt, yet youths are confused about how to fulfill these obligations and are struggling to figure out what “home” means to them. In particular, E. and M., two Darfurian women “20-somethings,” impressed me with their articulate reflections on the gendered and generational aspects of what it means to be Darfurian, the different types of young people in the Sudanese community, the complicated nature of their relationship with home, and the divided and contentious nature of the Sudanese community in Portland. The following quote from M., a young woman in her mid-twenties, concerns her relationship with home and is worth reading in its entirety to absorb the power and deep sadness of her words:

Back home . . . now that’s a very good question. Sometimes I even ask myself what is back home to me anymore . . . People say to me, “If you never been there, then you’re not supposed to be talking.” They
are actually better than me because they at least know something. But even if they have somebody who died or suffered—we all suffer and die! For example, I lived in a place next to Khartoum. It was safe my entire life. But that doesn't mean we weren't suffering. We had our own ways of suffering, too! My dad was working for the government, yeah, but he wasn't making enough money. We didn't have the best life, having cars, the best clothes, everything. We were just like the people living in Darfur. People from Khartoum, when they know from your paper [identification card] that you are from Darfur, they don't care. You don't get a good job. Even in the schools, they don't care about you . . . when they say that we weren't suffering, they were wrong. We even suffered more than them 'cause they were in Darfur! They are all Darfurians! Nobody look at you [in Darfur] and say, “Look at that girl from Darfur—she is walking!” Cause they are all in Darfur! But us in Khartoum, they know you are from Darfur when they look at you. From your face. When you walk and come in and speak Arabic, they don't say anything, but when they look at the paper [identification card], they say, “Oh, you're from Darfur! We'll call you later!” and they never call you back for a job. So we suffered more than the people who were inside Darfur . . . They just don't understand that. They think if somebody shoot you or if somebody didn't shoot you, then the person who got shot is suffering! It is better to get shot— I know then I am dead. But if you're alive and people look at you like you're dead? We did not have a better life like they think we did. ~ M, March 2011

E., who is several years younger than M., grew up in Khartoum and came to Maine when she was 13 in 2005. Her father, a businessman, grew up in Darfur near Nyala and moved to Khartoum where he met E’s mother. E.’s mother did not grow up in Darfur, nor did E. ever visit Darfur, which has caused her considerable angst since being resettled to Portland and becoming involved with the Save Darfur campaign. E. and M. have both encountered resistance from others in their community when they give speeches about Darfur. M. told me, “People would say: ‘You haven’t even been in Darfur! And you think you’re a Darfurian and you want to send out a message?’ So what if I haven’t been there? I am still from Darfur! My dad is from there, my cousins, my uncles, everyone! And when someone asks me, do I say, ‘I’m from the north?’ No, I say ‘I’m from Darfur,’ even if I haven’t been there. So there are a lot of people who want to put you down in their own way. If they like it or not, if I want to work for Darfur, I will work! They are my people!” This question of authenticity is a sticking point for many youth, particularly those like M. and E., who are dedicated to raising awareness about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. There is an idealized sense of home among the 20-somethings. E. told me that she felt a pull to return to Sudan to
get married and to work. I asked her what she thinks she would do in Sudan and this is what she had to say:

We [youth] have to play a big role. I think everybody is looking towards the U.S. after leaving our country for so long—what is the new thing that we’re bringing? I think everybody will just have their eye on U.S., like “OK, are you a doctor now? Are you a teacher?” . . . You can’t go to America for 8, 9, 10 years and come back empty-handed . . . If we make that connection with the youth back home then we could have some from the U.S. and some from Sudan go to Darfur and volunteer, help with anything those youth over there need, ’cause that’s the group we are focusing on—they’re the ones who are faced with the war and the suffering. We want to be able to help them. We have Internet connection there, so if we buy two or three computers and we have meetings we can see each other having meetings together and sharing idea through Facebook and what we want to do and how we can change Sudan. I love that idea. ~ E., March 2011

This optimism around returning to Sudan is tempered by E.’s and M.’s recognition of women’s roles back in Sudan. As M. recounted to me, she would like to be married to someone her family approves of and have children, but she also wants to finish her education and find a Darfurian man who will respect her:

We saw how women were treated back home and when I think about it, I’m going to get married and I’m going to have the same problem! My husband won’t respect me and I’m not going to have any opinion to say anything—it’s like he’s the boss of all! I’m supposed to be listening to him even if he’s wrong! He’s the man, he comes from work. He wants his food ready, his clothes ready. And if the kids are sick, I’m supposed to take them to the hospital. The woman does everything. If the husband marries his wife, he’s supposed to take care of her! But he doesn’t do that! The woman cannot say anything! She’s a woman, so what! Young girls who had the chance to move to America or a country in Europe, we want to change that. We don’t want to see that continue for the rest of our lives. We want to see something new. So that’s why we want to go to school, have an education, try to go back [to Sudan] and change some of the mentality. We’re not going to go say, “Oh, women who are married, all this time your husband has been doing you wrong, Divorce him!” No. but we’re trying to give them new ideas to refresh their minds. Because if a woman is sick, she cannot get up in the morning and say “You know, please, could you take care of the kids, dress them, they can go to school?” “No!” the husband will say, “No!” He doesn’t care if you are sick. He’ll just call your mom or your sisters. That is just wrong! Because you are my husband, you are supposed to help me! These are the small things we want to change. If we
just go and get married we’ll be doing the same thing! We didn’t change anything! What’s the point of leaving [Sudan]? - M., March 2011

Both young women are concerned about the divisions that wrack the Darfurian community in Portland, and have been frustrated in their attempts to build relationships with older women in the community or to forge connections with Sudanese youths in other communities in Portland. E. is resigned to expressing herself through music and poetry for now. “I don’t want to start another Sudanese youth for change organization—it can’t just be me. Others need to take their time and realize that their country is in need of their help . . . I make sure that I put my voice out there about Darfur in any kind of place I go: a conference, meeting, school, anything. I just use my voice ‘cause I have nothing else to use for now and I think it’s a strong weapon! I’m still working. I’m still in school. I still have a long way to go.”

**Conclusion**

Darfurian youth—both the 20-somethings and the second generation—by necessity have to find a way to weave the transnational ties together with the threads of belonging in Maine. Their parents are haunted by the needs of their family and friends and consumed with the responsibility to provide for those back “home.” Young women and men are struggling to figure out a new way of being that honors the past, yet makes the most of opportunities offered in Maine. E. and M.’s words bring this tension to life and underscore the gendered and generational nature of transnational ties, a subject that clearly warrants further research. The strain of this task is already evident in the disproportionate rates of juvenile incarceration and school suspensions, drop-out rates from school, and conflicts with the police, among others.

E. wrote a poem while in high school that she has recited in many venues and most recently recorded as part of an album produced for her singing group in Portland. I find it significant that she has revised this poem over the years, illustrating the internal conflicts and shifts in perception that young refugees experience as they move away from an idealized vision of Sudan and “home” to a more nuanced understanding of their situation. Research that deepens our understanding of the substance and significance of this shift over time for young refugee men and women has the potential to make a great contribution to the field of transnationalism.

E’s poem, Version One

Sudan

My home, my homeland, my country
My love
Surrounded by beauty
Darfur surrounded by beautiful people

E’s poem, Version Two
I speak for the thousand people who don’t have a voice in Darfur
I speak for the thousand mothers who have been speaking forever,
but no one is listening
Sudan, beautiful home is ruined
Ruined only by us and fixed only by us, by our unity

Notes
3. From the perspective of governments, the United Nations, and humanitarian actors there are three durable solutions for refugees at the end of the refugee cycle: *resettle* in a third country such as the United States mentioned by Lubkemann in this quote, remain in the country of refuge and integrate with the local population, or repatriate. For more on this subject, please refer to Gale 2008.
5. The remittance project was designed with colleagues Karen Jacobsen, Helen Young, and Abdal Monium Osman at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University in order to investigate remittance-sending activities among a small community of refugees from Darfur in the United States. The research was intended to complement their long-term research in Sudan.
6. The six-month (11.2010–5.2011) research project, “Youth leadership in the Sudanese Diaspora” is funded by a grant from the UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Services.
9. According to the Fur Cultural Revival’s website, its mission is “to broaden the public’s awareness of genocide in Darfur, serve the needs of
the Darfur community residing in the greater Portland area, and preserve
the Fur tribal culture.”

10. World Bank Global Economic Prospects. Economic Implications of

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16. Ryan Allen’s 2006 research for the State of Maine’s Department of Labor
showed that Somali refugees earned substantially less than other refugees
in Maine.


19. Ibid.


21. Refugee status has a very specific legal definition that was drafted in the
1951 United Nations Convention. “A refugee is someone who, owing
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”
Shandy 2007, 64.

23. Four of the households are composed of members of one family and pool their resources when sending money to Khartoum, Cairo, and Darfur. Therefore, my discussion of sending frequencies should be seen more as an indicator of sending patterns than a measure of how many people are sending money.


25. I have chosen to identify respondents by a letter, rather than a pseudonym.

26. I did not ask who is included in the discussions around remittances. In retrospect, answers to this question would have been revealing in terms of a household member’s social status and would help us to better understand women’s roles and the transition from youth to adulthood.

27. A Hummer is a brand of sport-utility vehicle and military-style truck known for its off-road capabilities and ruggedness—particularly desirable in South Sudan where roads and infrastructure are poor to nonexistent.


30. Interview, March 2011.

31. From 2007–2010, I was involved in a capacity building project funded through the Department of State’s Office of Refugee Resettlement and led by the Maine’s office of Multi-Cultural Affairs in collaboration with the Maine Association of Non-Profits and the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. We recruited three cohorts of refugee leaders from a range of communities (Somalis, Cambodians, Sudanese from over 11 different tribes, Rwandese, Congolese, Azerbaijani, Iraqi, and Somali Bantus) for intensive training in leadership and organizational development. The one issue that consistently united participants despite sometimes vast differences in language, culture, and education was the widening gap between elders and youth. Through my work with community leaders—both elders and youth—I became well acquainted with both sides of the divide and had many conversations with youth leaders about their perspectives on the issues.

32. Interview: Ochira, January 2011. Ochira is from South Sudan, not Darfur, but his trenchant assessment of the divide among youth holds true for my work with Darfuri youth.


34. Dianna Shandy’s 2007 book *Nuer-American Passages*, is a superb example of anthropological research—that investigates the continuities and discontinuities of cultural practices during the resettlement process—her chapter on gender relations offers a nuanced portrait of marriage and marital negotiations and provides an inspiring model for future research on issues of gender and generation among refugee Diasporas.

35. Maine established a juvenile justice advisory group in response to federal policies, which require states to determine the existence and scope of disproportionate minority contact (DMC) with the law and to take meaningful measures to explain and address it. According to the State
of Maine’s website for the DMC program, the goal is to reduce over-representation of minority youth at various stages in the juvenile justice system.

References


The twenty-first century has been described as the era of the global South. Christianity has experienced exponential growth in the southern hemisphere. African Christianity, in particular, has made significant strides and put a stamp on global Christianity. This is the result of the phenomenal rise in the number of Christians on the continent and also reflects the Christian churches’ unprecedented role in the political and social transformation of Africa since the end of the Cold War. The world has taken notice of African Christianity’s role in civil society and re-democratization efforts as well as its role in the Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Church. Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of African Christianity in the contemporary period is the shift I have described as the reverse mission phenomenon—African missionaries venturing to the cosmopolitan centers, especially in Europe and America, to reevangelize the West.

My chapter will examine the transnational dimension of African immigrant and diasporic Christian communities and their impact on American culture. It will examine how African Christian traditions are shaping and, in turn, are shaped by the values of their host countries.
It also will examine the global outreach of African Christianity and its implications for Africa and the world at large, focusing on the creative tension produced in the intersection between African values and American and European secular values. Lastly, my comments will examine the future of African Christianity.

Examining the changes African Christianity has undergone in the past few decades allows us to understand not only how African Christianity engages with Christian groups and movements in the West, especially in the United States and Europe, but also how it is leading to the broader transformation of global Christianity. To sketch the influence of African Christianity on the global stage, it is necessary, first, to provide a brief overview of the various expressions of Christianity on the African continent, especially missions, independent African churches, and the new Pentecostal charismatic movements. I will discuss transnationalism as it is exemplified in African Christianity in the phenomenon of reverse mission. Finally, I will touch on the influence and role of African Christianity in the Euro-American context, focusing on the relationship between African Christianity and civil engagement.

**African Christianity on the Continent: Prelude to the Twenty-first Century**

The twenty-first century has presented a new face of Christianity, one that differs significantly from the Christianity of earlier centuries that was the subject of many good empirical ethnographical studies. In Africa, the conversions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by a dual relationship and compromise between traditionalism and Christian evangelism. Indeed, the explosion of independent African churches in the pre- and postindustrial period is indicative of this phenomenon. Cultural and religious pluralism and the selective use of tradition were very much in character with African culture and society. At the same time, Christianity and indigenous religious traditions changed each other as they negotiated religious beliefs and practices.

Two primary and formidable religious and social formations—the mission church and independent African Christianity—set the stage for the eventual growth and expansion of evangelical charismatic Pentecostal movements that followed. For its part, mission Christianity began to take root on the continent as early as the fifteenth century, with the encounter between the Portuguese and people along the west-central coast of Africa. It continued into the twentieth century, with Protestant evangelical Christian missions producing Euro-American-type churches that reflected the liturgy, leadership, and structure of the Western Christian
The Changing Face of African Christianity

metropolis. It would take the creative and innovative emergence of the African prophetic movements of the twentieth century to fashion new religious contours that would domesticate and transform the mission churches into forms of indigenous Christianity that values and appreciates African traditional religious sensitivities, symbols, and practices.

The Emergence of African Pentecostalism

In the last three decades, Africa has witnessed an upsurge of evangelical Christian forms manifested in Pentecostal charismatic fervor. The continent, in all probability, harbors the world’s largest number of Pentecostal charismatic movements. How should one define African Pentecostalism and how does one account for its explosive success? Two explanatory models have been offered. First, Simeon Ilesanmi argues that religion has rushed into the vacuum created by failing states and that African Christianity, generally, and Pentecostalism, in particular, have provided an avenue for African agency or, at the very least, the appearance of African agency. It is still too early, however, to attribute gains in African democratization to Pentecostalism. Pentecostals in Africa have radically altered the balance of religious, political, and ritual power in the African social world. This shift is evident in the religious courts of the new Pentecostal leaders: revival camps, and prayer-created holy cities, which even the sacred kings must visit to empower themselves to deal with civil and religious matters in their domain. Second, many have suggested that Pentecostalism has gained prominence because its evangelizing message is responsive to the material and existential needs of the people. Although this is true, a price has been paid for meeting these needs, as Pentecostal movements and leaders often have drawn on sectarian distinctions, encouraging religious xenophobia. As a result, certain Christian values and symbols are used, to the detriment of others, frequently resulting in intolerance, symbolic and actual violence, and human rights violations.

Pentecostalism is a phenomenon inseparable from modernity and should be seen as complementing the increasingly cosmopolitan character of businesses, ideas, and people. Studies of Pentecostalism should not only consider the issues of origin—that is, where and when Pentecostalism began—but also should address the influence of this movement on individuals and the society. Therefore, this study is particularly interested in these transnational dimensions of Pentecostalism and how members of the church community imagine themselves as part of the narrative on globalization. In this sense, Pentecostalism links the local with the global as members of the church community use media and other forms of communication to spread the gospel to other communities around the world.
A transnational study of Pentecostalism will reveal the role of the church in civil society. Charismatic churches not only respond to crisis situations by providing services to the poor and the oppressed, they also have become an avenue for upward mobility. The prosperity gospel propagated by Pentecostal churches is an indication of how membership in such charismatic communities can ensure one’s position in the global middle class. The gospel also allows those who formerly were oppressed or colonized to invert power structures in ways that are advantageous to themselves and their communities. This is the role of the reverse missionaries, the African preachers who have established mega-churches in major cities of the West. In maintaining large followings, these Pentecostal leaders are putting a new face and story behind the church in their host countries.

African Pentecostalism is in no way monolithic. Unlike the African independent churches before them, African Pentecostal and charismatic churches entirely reject African cosmology, belief forms, and practices of indigenous African traditions, showing preference for the values and world view of modern Christianity in concert with African postcolonial social experiences. Despite this attempt to distance themselves from indigenous models, many Pentecostal practices surreptitiously reflect traditional forms of African religious spirituality, including speaking in tongues, possession by the Holy Spirit, and an emphasis on the proximate, this world salvation, as evidenced by a focus on materiality, prosperity, and pragmatism. However, the two are quite distinct, particularly with regard to Pentecostalism’s almost uncontrollable quest for wealth, spiritual, and secular individualism and the disparaging of traditional customs, values, and moral ethos.

The dark side of African Pentecostalism is exemplified in the story of one evangelist, the so-called Rev. Dr. King, also known as Chukwuemeka Ezeuko, who was sentenced to death on January 11 2007 for having had six female members of his congregation doused in petrol and set aflame in Nigeria. This baptism by fire resulted in the death of one woman, Ann Uzor. This came amid allegations of sexual abuse and harassment of female members. The church, the Christian Praying Assembly, seems to have been a cult, whose members believed King was Jesus. Upon being sentenced to death, King said, it was an honor and, a privilege to die by hanging as a prophet of God, because Jesus Christ also was hanged. In addition to being a murderer, King also showed a lack of a basic knowledge of the Biblical narrative. Justice Kayode Oyewole, the presiding judge, made the following statement upon condemning King to death: “The violence demonstrated by the accused is a throwback to the dark ages and an assault to the gains attained by humanity in the
areas of respect for human dignity, freedom and liberty.” One cannot overlook the irony that Ezeuko chose the name Rev. Dr. King after the African-American civil rights leader who modeled his life on the ideas of pacifism and nonviolence.

African Christianity in the twenty-first century remains a diverse and complex phenomenon. The explosive growth of Pentecostalism in the past three decades has irreversibly altered the landscape of African Christianity. Having established the contours of contemporary Christianity in Africa, I now will turn to the phenomenon of transnationalism and the ways in which this phenomenon has shaped Christianity not only in Africa, but also across the globe.

**Transnationalism and African Christianity**

The emerging presence, power, and influence of African immigrant religious communities in the United States and Europe are changing the American and European religious landscape. From magnificent cathedrals and evangelical headquarters to modest storefront churches, African Christians are creating distinct identities to perpetuate their cultural values. The impressive and ever-expanding variety of these congregations indicates a growing and formidable trend in the Euro-American religious field. Already we have seen major cities such as Washington, D.C., Atlanta, New York, London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Hamburg begin to undergo a fundamental religious transformation. Unlike those who arrived during the earlier waves of immigration, the new immigrants retain an ability to utilize modern technologies of communication and travel, which are used to expand and strengthen their communities. As a consequence, we see a reformation and adaptation of the Euro-American locale to serve a community that retains a non-Western memory within a Western environment. In effect, we can observe the resiliency, adaptation, and even expansion of the traditions of African Christianity that use a transglobal paradigm that is best captured with the language of transnationalism.

Transnationalism signifies the movement of people, capital, and ideas across spatial and cultural boundaries. Theories of transnationalism and globalization are essential to understanding how the movement of people and ideas across borders shape Christianity in Africa. Former paradigms of assimilation, secularization, and the loss of identity are no longer sufficient to explain the complex web of geographic, cultural, and personal connections that bind people and places. In an age of technological advancement where people often have ready access and movement across global space, immigrants can maintain ties with their homelands.
and participate in various global networks of people and institutions. Deteritorialization refers to the ways that people, movements, and political formations, and in this case, religious institutions, transcend specific territorial boundaries and identities.\(^4\) The religious communities formed by African immigrants depend on shifting notions of home. Whether home is conceptualized and imagined as a physical location to return to in life or death, or as a spiritual root that informs the ways faith, commerce, childrearing, and community are practiced, relationships among religious groups around the globe redefine transnationalism. The traditional model of immigration, rooted in a commitment to the centrality of the nation-state, fails to capture this new reality. The old paradigm reflected a flow of people fleeing from wars and economic strife with an eagerness to leave the old ways behind and wholeheartedly embrace the new culture. In the era of transnationalism, however, immigrants prefer a life of transition and are comfortable occupying a space as individuals who journey between home and the new land.

Referring to African immigrant religious institutions and organizations as transnational communities captures the reality of immigrant religious communities, with experiences and practices that transcend national boundaries of the United States and Europe. These ideas, beliefs, and activities also operate beyond the cultural spaces of the African continent, imagined or real. The African continent figures as home and the American space is conceived of as the locale. Looking at home and the host land merely as two entities, however, glosses over the complexity of how these spaces are imagined. For several African immigrant churches, the transnational relationship is not merely bidirectional, but rather involves a web of transnational networks that move through the entire world. The religious communities create new ideological, epistemic, spatial, and temporal configurations that include distant places such as Asia, South America, and Europe, where these communities currently are enjoying phenomenal growth. At the same time that a delocalized, polycentric identity is emerging, many immigrant religious communities retain a strong allegiance to a common source. This phenomenon is exemplified in the Redeemed Christian Church of God. Although the Church is based in Nigeria and holds its annual worldwide convention at the Redemption Camp on the outskirts of Lagos, it also holds an annual convention in America at the RCCG’s U.S. headquarters in Texas. The Redemption Camp in Lagos functions as a mini Mecca, imbuing the Texas headquarters with an authority it otherwise would lack.\(^5\)

The emergence of transnational African Christianity in the twenty-first century has left in its wake conflicts, dilemmas, and crises, especially in the Diaspora. African churches constantly must negotiate their
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religious identities with two centers of authority: the homeland church (in Africa) that sends out missionaries, and the host countries’ secular and religious centers that consider the new immigrants strange Christians. When viewed as strange Christians appearing in white robes, as an Atlanta journalist inquiring about these churches described them during a phone interview, African churches are marginalized. Madan Sarup notes: “If one considers the opposition of self and other, the other is always to some extent within. What is considered marginal and peripheral is actually central, since identity construction has to do not with being but becoming.”

We no longer can leave unquestioned the idea of American civil religions that do not take immigrant religions seriously. Those who originally were thought to be outside the mainstream of American religion are now being integrated. Sarup’s thesis underscores the need to explore the cultural and social significance of African religious institutions, especially when examined along the two poles of margin and center.

African Christianity and American Culture

The spread of African religious practices, especially the African Pentecostal charismatic movements, requires that we understand transnational migration and cultural flows as constituting a new paradigm for investigating questions of identity, nationalism, gender, ethnicity, and race. The cultures in question are highly dynamic and transient, yet still traditional. Sermons affirm the African heritage and tradition, but remind the congregation that they are in America, a country with its own traditions and practices. Thus, the commonplace distinction between traditionalism on the one hand and modernity on the other is not a productive model for analyzing African immigrant religious communities in the United States.

According to simplistic dichotomies, religion is the domain of tradition, standing outside of and in opposition to modernity and enlightenment. Moreover, Africa long has been made to bear the burden of serving as the exemplar of antimodernity. Thus, African customs and practices often are deemed out of sync with Western notions of progress and so are rejected and discarded. Negotiating two identities—that of the homeland and that of the new country—is a more complex phenomenon than it might seem. Two stories illustrate this complexity. The Redeemed Christian Church of God in Sacramento has a congregation that is 70 percent female. In response, the Church has created an enlarged space for women in leadership roles in the Church. RCCG women also are adopting American styles of dress and appearance. In Nigeria, women are
encouraged to cover their heads, but the practice is much less common in the United States. On the other hand, the Nigerian Reverend Sisters of the Daughters of Divine Love continue to wear traditional habits, even though they long have been abandoned by their American counterparts. For the Nigerian Reverend Sisters, wearing the habit in the United States reveals the complex relationship between tradition, modernity, the African homeland, and the adopted home of the United States.

Among African immigrant religious associations in the United States, Christian communities are notable in terms of size, rate of growth, level of social engagement, and distinctiveness within a wider faith tradition. In the Christian communities themselves, there are varied traditions, including Pentecostal and charismatic churches, African independent churches, and specialized African ministries within mainline denominations. Churches and denominations such as Deeper Christian Life Ministry, the Redeemed Christian Church of God, The Holy Order of Cherubim and Seraphim, The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, The Celestial Church of Christ, and The Church of the Lord (Aladura), represent distinct and unique expressions of world Christianity that are making significant inroads in America. Leaders of these groups are resolute in terms of their own personal faith and in respect to their vision for community development. Their churches have been instrumental in renewing values of family and community in the lives of immigrants and in providing avenues for civic involvement. Their success in the United States likely will influence public views of immigrant religion, persuading Americans to take more seriously the spiritual and social significance of these communities.

Within immigrant African churches, there are diverse expressions of identity. Pastors’ opinions range from those who would rather not be associated with anything African to others who argue for the growth of a culturally based African church in America. In reality, there is a great deal of fluidity, as church leaders and members express the complex identities of their transnational lives. In any one church, ethnic cell groups may coexist with prominent markers of Pan-African identity and symbols of global internationalism. There is a strong desire to maintain traditional values of family and community while embracing American ideals of freedom and individualism.

The religious groups are becoming more involved in social and political issues affecting their wider neighborhoods, towns, and cities, a fact reported by Helen Rose Ebaugh and J. S. Chafetz in “Religion and the New Immigrants,” a study done under the Religion, Ethnicity, and New Immigrant Research project in 2000 that dealt directly with the interface of religion and immigration. The researchers focused on 13 immigrant congregations in Houston, Texas, and reported on findings, from structural
adaptation to social services to immigrant adaptations and language, asserting that immigrant communities that practice minority religions in the United States are more successful than majority religions at attracting native-born Americans. They also suggest that religious organizations are providing social services and social activities to their congregations. Activities include food and clothing drives, youth seminars, substance abuse counseling, and material and spiritual outreach to various groups, such as the homeless, migrant laborers, and the incarcerated. In African religious communities, there also is substantial involvement in politics, oriented toward issues both on the African continent and in the United States. Churches are lively centers for debate about African social, economic, and political issues, for promulgating particular views and agendas, and for disseminating written materials. Political expression also is expanding to encompass debates within the United States, including immigration policy, citizenship, race relations, affirmative action, abortion, and gay marriage.

Sermons of religious leaders, while not overtly political, often contain political messages. Most religious leaders describe their desire to keep politics and religion separate, and especially their reluctance to tell other people how to vote. At the same time, some pastors related how, during the recent presidential election, they would lecture on particular topics that deeply concerned them and hoped to sway the membership toward their viewpoint. For example, a pastor related how, before embarking on a marathon prayer session in which prayers were said on issues as diverse as personal success to paying one’s outstanding bills, he called for a special prayer session on the passage of the health care bill, saying that it would please God to give President Obama a triumph and put the devil to shame.

The politics of language captures nicely the range of questions and conflicts that immigrant African Christians are wrestling with as they establish themselves in the West. Holding onto their language, culture, and values serves as an anchor, grounding immigrants who face the herculean task of fitting into a strange society. At a meeting of the Anglican Church in Atlanta, an Igbo member of the congregation shouted at the bishops, “This is America!”—meaning that members could exercise their democratic right to conduct services in whatever language they chose, regardless of the bishops’ opinion.

In a similar context, my daughter, who years ago attended her aunt’s wedding in a Redeemed Christian Church of God service in London, was conversing with her cousin when an usher came to stop her from speaking in Yorùbá. “We do not speak that language in our church here!” My daughter, a lawyer, responded immediately, “How dare you ask me not to speak my language in the church!” Followers of the new evangelical Christianity in Europe and America resist the use of vernacular language
in worship, arguing that it limits the spread of the African Christian gospel to the rest of the world, an issue that set evangelical Pentecostal charismatic churches in opposition to the nationalism of Africans living in Europe and America.

What do we make of the insistence on English language as a medium of expression when most of the devotees prefer to use a native tongue in liturgy? It is a conflict between nationalism and transnationalism. The Igbo, for example, prefer a church where Igbo language is used. This is helpful for their non-English-speaking parents and helps socialize children into Igbo culture and tradition. To the church hierarchy, however, insisting on English emphasizes a global church, a reverse of the nationalism that dictated religious practices in Africa in the 1960s, shortly after the independence of most African nations. Similar conflicts arose when the Vatican Council encouraged Catholic churches to promote the use of local languages in liturgy.

Reverse Mission

African Christians are playing an increasingly active and influential role in American public life. Perhaps the most striking example of the growing willingness of immigrant communities to engage the larger culture, not only in the United States, but in the West more generally, is the emergence of the phenomenon on the reverse mission.

To African Christian evangelists, the United States, Europe, and Asia have become new African mission fields. The call of the grand Biblical commission—“go ye forth and make disciples of all men”—resonates with Africans as they now actively participate in sending missions to the West. In addition to scores of indigenous African churches and evangelical Pentecostal charismatic churches, conventional denominations—Catholic, Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian—are creating ethnic and national ministries to enable like-minded Africans to continue practicing their faith traditions, to sing the songs of their Lord using their own melodies with drumming and percussion under the aegis of the old missions, without being accused of making too much noise.

It is important to point out that many immigrants, especially African Christians, define and construct global identities that reflect their perceived role as missionaries to the West and to the entire world. Pastor Gbega Talabi of Victory Life Bible Church in Sacramento describes this global mission:

“Today, Africans have joined the league of voices bringing the new wave of evangelism in a great prophetic dimension to the Western world. It is
important to examine the causes, the benefits, and the impact on a world that is distressed, riddled with crisis, and looking for urgent answers to global problems.”

This ideal of spiritual agency provides purpose to these movements and also a global sense of home that transcends fixed notions of place and identity. Such findings can be viewed as evidence for a new awareness and vitality in immigrant identities\(^7\) as they address and adapt to a world characterized by movement and dislocation.

A striking example of a reverse mission undertaken by an African evangelist to the West is the ministry of the Rev. Sunday Adelaja in Kiev, Ukraine.\(^8\) Adelaja, a Nigerian, initially, and somewhat to his dismay, found himself in Belarus (then part of the Soviet Union) on a scholarship to study journalism. While in Belarus, Adelaja helped to found some underground churches. Deported by the KGB for his religious activities, Adelaja went to the Ukraine at the invitation of Jeff Davis, a traveling evangelist who was doing television ministry and needed someone familiar with the language who could represent his interests. From this beginning in Ukraine as a television evangelist, Adelaja began the process of founding churches. In 1994, the first—Word of Faith Bible Church—was founded from a Bible study group. From this small beginning, Adelaja now is the head of the largest church in the Ukraine, with 20,000 members and 20 services every Sunday in various auditoriums throughout Kiev. There are now hundreds of daughter churches of the Embassy of God, the current name of the church, throughout the Ukraine, the former Soviet Union, Europe, the United States, and even Israel. Adelaja is one of the most powerful public figures in Ukraine, and is credited, among other things, with aiding in the election of the mayor of Kiev. The story of Adelaja is fascinating on many levels. First, there is the irony of Adelaja’s ejection from Belarus. Marx’s famous description of religion as the opiate of the people is seriously challenged by the story of Adelaja. Communist Russia, found the peasant agency that Adelaja stirred to be threatening. This reveals the tragic circumstances of many people who found their religious lives suppressed under the Soviet system. Most important to our purposes here is the fact that the most dynamic and powerful religious leader in Ukraine is Nigerian. Ukraine’s mega-church is African in origin. It is not too much to say that Adelaja’s missionary work has permanently altered the religious landscape of Eastern Europe, instilling African religious sensibilities in a region that previously had been a religious vacuum.

A similar instance of the growth of African churches in Europe is represented by the example the Kingsway International Christian Centre
in East London. Founded in 1992 by Matthew Ashimolowo, another Nigerian, the KICC quickly rose to fame as the largest black church in the United Kingdom. The church now boasts a weekly attendance of more than 12,000 people and holds services in a church the size of an arena. Ashimolowo, an extremely charismatic figure, has written dozens of books and regularly appears on television and radio. In 2005, Ashimolowo was convicted by the Charity Commission of having embezzled funds from the church, which encourages its members to tithe 10 percent of their income. Ashimolowo was required to pay back more than 200,000 pounds sterling. It was also claimed that he used the charity’s credit card to buy a 12,000 pounds timeshare in Florida and ran a commercial business from church premises. Among the benefits he received was a 120,000 pounds birthday party, of which 80,000 pound was spent on a Mercedes. Ashimolowo denied any wrongdoing; whether this is true is perhaps less interesting than the way the story was advertised in the British newspapers: “Flamboyant pastor must repay £200,000” was one headline from the London Evening Standard. It reflects the subtle racism prevalent in European and American societies. The Charity Commission seemed relieved to have found some way to bring Ashimolowo down to size. There seems to have been a certain sense that a black minister—and an African, no less—of such unchecked power and popularity was a cause for concern.

There may well be unforeseen consequences of the African reverse mission, such cultural conflicts that arise when the two groups meet each other. African churches have been plunged into the controversies of our contemporary times. Nigerian and African bishops, for instance, opposed the consecration of an openly gay Episcopal bishop, causing the near collapse of the global Anglican Communion. This struggle suggests the new global power of the African Church. Time magazine voted the Anglican Primate and Archbishop of Nigeria, Jasper Akinola, one of the world’s most powerful individuals.

Christianities in Conversation: Reflections on the Future

The increasingly global impact and influence of African Christianity is significant. Two recent events exemplify this interaction. First, consider an episode that occurred during the recent presidential election in the United States involving vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin and a visiting African cleric. Palin received the blessing of an African cleric, Bishop Thomas Muthee of Kenya, who some members of the press described as a witch doctor. In 2005, Bishop Muthee prayed for
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Sarah Palin to succeed in her bid for the governorship of Alaska and to be protected from witchcraft and other forces of evil.\textsuperscript{13} This was a case of a Christian African priest saying an African prayer in an American setting. Interestingly, the elders of Barack Obama’s Luo ethnic group in Kenya did the same in imploring their dead ancestors to protect Obama from the perils and dangers of American politics.\textsuperscript{14} In the African context, it would be customary for them to pray to their ancestors for Obama to achieve victory in his presidential campaign, and to pray even more now for his continued protection and success as the American leader. The failure of the American press to understand these practices led them to misrepresent them as threatening and ominous.

Secondly, the election of Obama invokes a very different but positive reaction from many Africans in the Diaspora. My reaction to his election drew on my African Christian sensibilities. As I rose after a long night’s vigil of watching the results of the presidential election on television, I found myself humming the beloved Yorùbá lyrics made famous by a very popular vocalist in Nigeria:

\begin{verbatim}
Welcome a new dawn! 
A renewed harmony of beginning has come
\end{verbatim}

The old familiar melody, the drumming and the voices, like the Negro spiritual, came back to me instinctively, as I reveled in the joy of Obama’s victory the morning after the election. Rising from the depths of my Yorùbá Christian heritage, the old familiar melodies and lyrics of my youth came back to me, musical traditions rooted deep in the material culture of the Bible, the resource Christians draw upon in music, praise poetry, and prayer, and in incantations for personal, social, political, and economic growth.

A Proposed Vision for the Future of African Christianity

In view of the myriad problems and conflicts facing Africa today, I would like to see the emergence of an African Christianity as a dominant civil society organizer, a force in democratic government on the continent. While I recognize that in the post-Communist era, the church as a part of civil society has played a major role in the African democratization processes, it still is not clear whether the church has maintained an equally central role in nurturing these democracies. As a central voice of moral reasoning and the conscience of the state amid corruption, national xenophobia, human rights abuses, political violence, and oppression, the
church certainly has not responded strongly enough. It seems to me that African Christianity can ameliorate the pain, suffering, and humiliation caused by injustice.

Conclusion

The role of African Christianity in the contemporary world is a much-discussed topic that, unfortunately, has been misrepresented in the media. In general, news stories focus on the phenomenal growth of these traditions, insinuating that the growth is threatening. Regardless, Africa now occupies a key place in the discourse on global Christianity, as Philip Jenkins and others have pointed out. If there has been, as he says, a paradigm shift in global Christianity, there is no doubt that African Pentecostal and charismatic traditions are in the heart of it. Indeed, African evangelicalism, filled with a spirit of reverse mission, has spread the world over, infusing global Christian tradition with its own brand of religious creativity, ultimately resulting in the reordering of transnational religious and cultural landscapes. The emerging presence, power, and influence of African immigrant communities in the United States and Europe has created a space for critical reflection on the role of Africans in the social and religious transformation of Western metropolises. Unlike earlier waves of immigration, the new immigrants retain an unsurpassed ability to use modern communication and to travel, which serves both to expand and strengthen these communities.

Notes

1. The issue of failing states becomes more complex in light of recent statements made by the French president in Côte d’Ivoire. During a speech that could have been copied directly from Mircea Eliade’s *The Myth of Eternal Return*, Sarkozy suggested that African backwardness is the result of a circular notion of time, which generated a preoccupation with the mythical past to the detriment of the progressive future. Sarkozy failed to note the gratitude that he and others owe to this backwardness, which has allowed the world to take advantage of African labor and oil reserves.
3. Ibid.
5. My first visit with Pastor Adeboye was in 1998; he was leaving from Miami to Jamaica to inaugurate new churches.
11. Ibid, 1.

References


Independence in Africa brought with it a sense of national liberation and, to a certain extent, a false sense of nationalism that encouraged individual aspirations without the consequent rights. Communal and individual hopefulness, once raised by the expected changes from national self-rule, implied that Africans would be free to determine the terms of the continent’s progress resulting from positive human infrastructural advancement. However, it was soon clear that aspects of national consolidations that created postindependence policies were constructed on fragile foundations. This situation made transformation from the drudgeries of precolonial and colonial conditions of misery, poverty, and marginality difficult to achieve. Consequently, for most African women, this meant that education did not always predict personal advancement. The immediate result was the continuing legacies of gender inequity, especially among western-educated postindependence African elites, whose emergence promised new and global frontiers.

Frequently in the new dispensation, a western-type education for African women provided opportunities for marriage to western-educated African men for whom the compulsion to western-based elitism required the exclusion of women in the new nation-building project. During the colonial period, most educational curricula targeted girls for training in Home Economics, and often discouraged them from taking courses in the
social and natural sciences or business. Reflecting a patriarchal colonial agenda about education in Africa, Home Economics in the curriculum targeted schoolgirls from late-elementary through secondary school education. Initially indifferent to significant indigenous institutions and cultural practices that required women’s participation for community health and advancement, that curriculum gradually became at odds with those practices, firmly embedding full marginalization of women as an African traditional mode in the emerging nations. A well-known example of this is the complex system of markets across West Africa sustained by local wares and managed by women but overlooked by the calculations of national economists. It seems implausible that despite irrefutable knowledge about the dominance of women in the African market place, most acclaimed contemporary African economists are men. In the colonial schools, European women teachers of Home Economics became the example for educated African womanhood. At the level of transnational cultural transactions, indications of the tenuous impact of this model are evidenced by the fact that many African women educated within this paradigm abandoned all except the most basic housekeeping aspects after marriage because their western-educated African husbands preferred the local cuisines. The other aspect of this approach, which is often ignored in discussions about transnationalism and Africa, is the documentation, in the early African novel, of African men as cooks and stewards in colonizer’s homes. Mostly instructed about European housekeeping modes by European men or women, stories of African men as cooks, stewards\(^1\) and washer-men\(^2\) in contemporary African novels indicate the extent of gender role confusion and the marginalization of women during that period. Further examination of colonialism’s efforts to subvert gender roles in Africa during that period is necessary for the implementation of useful dialogues and action among contemporary African men and women.

Taking their cue from exclusive colonial structures, most postindependence institutions were able to provoke significant cultural shifts with regard to women’s participation in society. In their search for self-sufficiency after independence, many educated women ended up as primary school teachers, secretaries, or full-time housewives—making it difficult for them to traverse social class and geographical boundaries except through marriage. This situation slowed African women’s participation in the maintenance of indigenous transnational networks that were taken for granted in the complex kinship and market systems. African women’s exclusion from the emerging global marketplace effectively closed most traditional access used to ensure traditional gender-based rights to women, ensuring the lack (or abhorrence) of the full knowledge and direction about concrete and abstract African assets in
the search for western-type progress for African women. A core assumption of this chapter is that transnationalism or globalization has been an intrinsic part of African social formations from antiquity. Its contemporary form, characterized by information technology, is reflected in the oral narrative form traditional Africans used in communication, education, community, and nation-building.

Earlier transnational convergences involved internal and indigenous migrations on the continent that enabled meaningful intercultural transactions. And, despite contemporary anticipations of progress, reduced access to traditional community and nation practices in post-independence Africa resulted in broken communication networks among African nations, except through consumption of new and western technologies. It is necessary to note here that before the colonial era, although certain cultural practices were recognized as similar among different groups, most groups considered themselves autonomous from their neighbors and implemented intergroup transactions from that viewpoint. Current transnational attitudes and practices are difficult to address or express in most of Africa because many aspects of postindependent states lack avenues for coherent intergroup participation and articulation. Although a consequence of European intervention in Africa, this problem cannot be completely blamed on colonization because contemporary African leaders are fully aware of traditional African nation-building and maintenance practices. Indubitably, persistent problems resulting from the shelving of enabling traditional approaches—post-independence—is an African problem. Significantly, erasing the roles of African elders as teachers, current approaches to leadership on the continent encourage nullification of productive aspects of traditional African archives, especially those embedded in oral traditions.

Using examples from African oral traditions and contemporary African literature, this chapter addresses the impact of transnationalism on gender and African life and experience. According to Judith Lorber, gender is a social and cultural construction that shapes feminine and masculine identities in a society. Different from “sex,” which is derived from biology and physiological differences between men and women, gender operates at both the individual (microstructural) and institutional (macrostructural) levels, enabling societal coherence through a series of agreed upon norms and constraints. In many traditional African societies, resulting predominant roles did not mean total exclusion from the relevant aspects of life and some groups developed parallel institutions or roles in the different processes that enabled continuing discussions and practices of gender equity. Variations within the structure with facilitating rules of engagement are evident in Africa’s oldest institution: the family.
Since the intention here is to explore African women, gender, and transnationalism, my interest is global and my references include works by men and women. My work begins by examining women, especially African women, in the global imagination. It is significant to note that Europe’s colonization of Africa brought with it another wave of internal migrations following closely on the heels of the transatlantic slave trade. Further, from the colonial period to the present, migrations continue within the continent and to other parts of the world, intensifying Africans’ need for western education and the shelving of traditional methods of communication and education on the continent.

Although the term “transnational” poses some problems of definition, it is largely accepted that there are close linkages in the meaning between it, globalization, and internationalism. For African studies, the difficulty of defining transnationalism stems from the dilemma that Africa poses for many scholars. Although most analysts and researchers agree that Africa is a continent made up of sovereign nations, the unique issues that different groups and nations experience remain problematic because conventional research (publishable) methods still are contending with methods of disaggregation of the continent and its peoples. Reflecting the colonial imperative and consequent refusals to acknowledge the African nations’ sovereign rights, the perception of the continent as one nation facilitates western-educated researchers’ launching of research programs about Africa that ignore the plural realities inherent to African communities, their experiences, and lives. Although archeological findings continue to unearth evidence about migrations of early homo sapiens from the continent to other parts of the planet, modifications of global discourses about subsequent human self-awareness and consequent actions tend to ignore Africa’s many nations, their people, and the continent’s contributions to global advancement.

The Traveler and the Elder: African Narrative Traditions and Diaspora Considerations

Discussions about Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” and the related Theory of Forms often address questions of education, intellect, and the state, along with the idea of the Good. However, as scholars continue to grapple with Plato’s meaning, the focus revolves around what is imagined within discourse firmly rooted in the West. Discussions about forms, matter, and meaning continue to find that the human intellect has yet to find ways to engage the idea or meaning of uniqueness. Conclusions about how the many/one argument confounds the human mind, and therefore human reality, appear unreachable. Although Aristotle’s Third
Man Argument\(^5\) seems to confound Plato’s Theory of Forms, it is necessary to see how some of the discussions of the experiences of the prisoners in Plato’s cave were played out during Africa’s colonization and continue to inform images of Africa today.

In its examination of the movement from the deterring chains and darkness of the cave into the light, Plato’s Allegory of the Cave provides an instance of the journey from ignorance to reason. In other parts of the world, interpretations and analyses of that allegory have been deployed in finding ways to advance individual and national consciousness through reason and reasoned actions, encouraging research and human development. However, rather than advocating the continent as the birthplace of humans, and therefore human imagination, the focus on Africa and Africans often encourages the claim that Africa’s place within the global community is comparable to that of a child in the womb, stalling discussions about transnational transactions involving African nationals except when they are involved in intercontinental travels or relocations. Although scientific research continues to show that sufficient minor, but important, evolutionary activities have taken place in the human womb over the centuries, the prevailing focus on Africa’s stagnation in a comparatively neonatal phase emphasizing the necessary darkness before birth continues to hound Africa and Africans, specifically women in contemporary global imagination.

With regard to the prevailing applications of the allegory’s imagery, it appears that for Africa and Africans—whether the discussion is about colonialism, postindependence, globalization, or transnationalism—the journey from the dark cave to reason is synonymous with traveling from Africa to any location outside the continent. This point of view is given credence through the acceptance of the status quo by the failures of contemporary African nations and their leaders. Over the course of global encounters and history, this viewpoint includes Africans’ efforts to move from African traditions to other, and non-African, considerations. Breaking the hold of imagined Africa’s darkness seems incompatible with prevailing efforts to provide economic, political, and humanitarian aids to Africans who were perceived as having a congenital inability to see anything but the shadows cast by real objects that exist outside the continent. At its furthest reach, Africa’s delayed efforts to achieve its potential since western interference evokes the Third Man Argument in which the ensuing and honest confusion about which premise to reject is often interpreted as an inherent inability to visualize a way forward. For African women, such efforts are further obscured by gender considerations and the use of theories of gender created and developed outside the continent about non-African women. Particularly problematic is the
equation of the term “gender” to the idea of “woman.” Such consider-
ations sometimes ignore the lives of African women-as-women, even as
they focus on human rights issues on the continent. Hopefully, ongoing
discussions about transnationalism will begin to examine the African
woman as a woman and human in ways that will facilitate meaningful
discussions about her participation and contributions in the continent
and globally.

The term “transnationalism” was first used by Randolph Bourne in his
article titled “Trans-National America.” Bourne argues strongly against
parochialism and its attendant restrictions and ills, exhorting English-
Americans to become more accepting of the spirit of independence that
enabled the building of his homeland. He asserts,

Only the American—and in this category I include the migratory alien
who has lived with us and caught the pioneer spirit and a sense of new social
vistas—has the chance to become that citizen of the world. America is
coming to be, not a nationality but a transnationality, a weaving back and
forth, with the other lands, of many threads of all sizes and colors. . . .

This is her only hope and promise. A trans-nationality of all the
nations, it is spiritually impossible for her to pass into the orbit of any one.
It will be folly to hurry herself into a premature and sentimental nation-
alism, or to emulate Europe and play fast and loose with the forces that
drag into war. No Americanization will fulfill this vision, which does not
recognize the uniqueness of this trans-nationalism of ours [my italics].

Bourne carefully crafts his definition of the terms “trans-nationalism”
and “trans-nationals,” pointing to some detrimental effects to the dream
of the founders of his homeland if the different constituent nationali-
ties continue to insist on the creation of sociocultural hierarchies based
on each group’s time of arrival in the new nation. He appeals to those
using claims of earlier arrival as a means of exclusion to be more accom-
modating of later arrivals to the young nation, insisting that each group’s
contributions are vital to national development and social well-being.
While Bourne’s focus is on nation-building and the purposes of the
democratic imperative, this chapter focuses on narrative vision and prac-
tice and engages the idea of transnationalism from an African perspective
with the intention of reassessing gender roles in the migration process,
thereby encouraging more equitable transactions in intra- and intercul-
tural experiences. While gender-role assignment is not a bad thing in
itself, historical negations of female gender roles across cultures continue
to affect women’s contributions to overall global advancement. Although
African communities and individuals continued to use the oral traditions
to encourage migrations to indigenous spaces that remained untouched
by colonists, the concrete European transnational agenda about the place of women in society retarded indigenous advancement during the colonial period.

Through the use of the ritualized forms that govern narrative land through narrative performance, the African storyteller acknowledges that participation in narrative performance is a journey into the unknown. The storyteller and her/his audience sit within a structure commonly described in African literary studies as the story-circle. The norms of the story-circle are taught early to children, forming the beginnings of one’s participation within the community in general and the family in particular. Community members usually make the shifts from the story-circle to Narrative Land and eventually to Spiritland without much difficulty. During storytelling sessions, the rules of story-circle are respected by those both within and outside it. Over time, and as a strategy that informs sociocultural success, performers and audience members learn that rather than a real place, narrative land is a tool for the exploration of possibilities, and that relocation to Spirit land has consequences beyond the control of the story-circle. Thus, the farther reaches of the story-circle are defined by traditional religious beliefs and, although accessible to all, only visionaries, priests, and priestesses are assured safe passage. In addition, participation in the circle is fluid and based on the members’ narrative performances or audience skills. From the Mandingo griot, who narrates local histories, the Nyanga Shé-Karisi narrator of the Mwindo epic to the 4-year-old narrator of short folktales across the continent, different African groups have distinct ways of authorizing and supporting each individual as a storyteller of the community. Over time, everyone learns to incorporate age-old skills with personal styles in ways that enable them to transport the imaginations of relevant story-circles in their lives to and from their community’s imagined narrative land. Children storytellers encounter appropriate interruptions as they learn the crafts of narrative performance and the story-circle, and build their skills using prevailing applications of local storytelling tools, including the ubiquitous call-and-response.

In traditional African communities, the back-and-forth between the land of the living, narrative land or Spirit land is accomplished in different ways. Although participation rituals and protocols are learned during childhood, all are not always in agreement about the process. However, community members were required to learn the basics of participation to enable them identify departures from local norms, thereby ensuring their identity and security. With few exceptions, those with more experience—the elders—led communities at all levels. As practiced narrators, traditional African elders not only led kinship and political institutions, but also
provided instructions about transitions from one idea to the next in social interactions. Practiced in the art of using words to introduce, tame, or placate the unknown and even domesticate the wild, the African elder-as-narrator socialized the youth to seek success through careful examinations of the good, as well as contrariness, in nature. In many traditional African communities, the first deployment of narrative vision was educational, teaching community members about encounters with, and expectations of, each other as well, as that which is most feared—other communities and worlds. From good girl-bad girl story to epic, familiar narratives formed the enabling design for individuals to create and secure their identities within the group. Further, each African community used the ideas presented in different versions of local narratives to illuminate different instances of self and group reflection. The success of this approach to the acquisition of the essentials of narrative form and structure, and therefore competent working knowledge of local norms and institutions, is evidenced by the fact that many contemporary Africans extend the utility of this approach to socialization in transnational arenas.

One traditional Igbo narrative whose plot is cogent here explores the choices available to a woman who, after her first husband dies, finds that she lacks the adequate means to take care of herself and her child. Thus challenged, she marries a second husband from a distant land. As she prepares to move to her new home, the mother tells her child that she would have to go to the new and faraway home by herself. She promises that if her new home is good, she will send for the child, but if not, she will send back a package. For many years, the mother and child manage as best they can until they are reunited. But in some versions of the story, no reconciliation takes place between mother and child. It is left to narrative participants to imagine the conditions in the faraway home, as well as possibilities for the mediation of resulting challenges. Although it is plausible that the story is a cautionary tale, the different conclusions suggest that for the communities where the narrative occurs, not all narrators agreed with the idea that exploring a new world is a bad thing; or, that it is prohibited to any gender or age-group. Some of the ideas embedded in this story include: the plight and treatment of widows and their offspring (the gender of the child is never mentioned in any of the versions I have heard); the tendency for men to raid other communities for their most vulnerable citizens (in this case, widows); and, communication and trade—the promised package to be sent home should conditions not be conducive to physical family reunions. This last idea is not unlike the Western Union phenomenon and the experiences of contemporary African immigrants for whom visa problems and high travel costs prohibit frequent reunions.
Most discussions about transnationalism in traditional Africa involving women deal with marriage, exchange, and capture, including enslavement. Though often presented as possessing a prolific tendency to adapt to new situations, the traditional African female character frequently found herself in interesting and difficult situations. Understanding the nature and form of African thought and dialogue structure facilitates interpretations and analyses that reveal different African communities’ theorizing about men and masculinity, woman and womanhood and children, and the African Diaspora. Consequently, the African imagination encompasses its Diasporas. In the Epic of Sundiata, for example, not only is the king’s bride-to-be an ugly hunchback, she also is the wraith7 of the powerful Princess of Do, who is estranged from her brother because he deprived her of her inheritance. In retaliation, the princess changes into a buffalo and ravages Do for a long time, causing her brother much anguish. The king offers a prize to anyone able to rid Do of the buffalo and bring back peace to his people. Two brothers who are hunters join the ranks of those who seek to free Do and receive the prize. However, it takes an act of kindness by them toward the princess, disguised as a poor old woman, to begin the process of freeing Do. After she reveals herself to them, the princess gives the hunters complete instructions on how to kill the buffalo. And, since the prize for killing the buffalo is a maiden of their choice from Do’s most beautiful girls, the buffalo woman instructs the hunters to choose her wraith, the hunchbacked Sogolon, beginning a trajectory toward national excellence that will culminate in the reign of Sundiata, the Great King of Mali. Eventually, Sogolon becomes the wife of King Naré Maghan Kon Fatta at his capital, Nianiba, where King Maghan’s wives have yet to bear him a son. Although the king’s totem is the lion, it takes many days for him to convince and subdue his new bride, the buffalo woman. Sogolon’s son, Sundiata, the child of the buffalo and the lion, eventually becomes king, bringing unity and peace to Mali after years of war and strife—a feat the Princess of Do could not accomplish because of her brother’s cruelty.

After her husband’s death, Sogolon focuses on helping to fulfill a prophecy about her son. Forced into exile by her jealous co-wife, she takes her children into exile across several West African kingdoms, including old Ghana. As the family moves from one royal court to the next, their encounters provide insights about transnationalism in medieval West Africa. Some treat Sogolon’s family with due respect, others are indifferent. One king becomes hostile after he receives some gold from one of their enemies and tries to intimidate and trick the young Sundiata with magic and sorcery. But Sundiata, son of the buffalo and the lion, refuses to be distracted from his destiny. As Sogolon grows old and frail,
her older daughter, Kolonkan, takes on some of her responsibilities in the family, including going to the market to buy food. When courtiers from their homeland eventually find them in distant Mema, it is because Kolonkan recognizes the condiments, baobab leaves, and gnougou, and decides to engage the courtiers, who were posing as vendors in conversation about these delicacies.

In the modern novel, when Tambu’s grandmother in Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions finds that life without her husband is difficult, she sends one of her sons, Babamukuru, to the Mission, practically giving him up to the colonizer in a leap of faith that traverses cultures. Closer analyses of Africans’ failures and successes in European-style Missions and educational institutions on the continent will facilitate an understanding of transnationalism at home and abroad. Although the rest of Dangarembga’s novel examines the difficult cultural transactions that are part of the transnational encounters during and after the colonial period in Africa, a major part of the difficulty posed by colonialism in Africa was the rebuilding of destabilized interest groups and nations. While Europeans were working from a European idea of the state during that period, many Africans thought that the defining character of the emerging states would, in fact, be African. Working from the point of view, that as creative agents living on African soil, their Narrative land would be the same as the indigenous people’s, many African witnesses of Europeans’ reinvention of Africa failed to imagine that, despite the colonizers’ idea of Narrative land would not evolve from their new geographical location. That clash of imaginations remains unresolved for Africans. Unlike Sundiata’s sister, having been encouraged to abandon their narrative heritage, many contemporary Africans have difficulty recognizing the elders from the homeland, dismissing them and their modest wares as unimportant throwbacks from a lost heritage. Having full knowledge of her ancestor the Buffalo Princess, Kolonkan, always was alert to her responsibilities to the productive completion of the story-and-destiny of Mali. In the new marketplace of ideas, most contemporary Africans refuse to acknowledge or recognize the significant sociocultural and political equivalents of the baobab leaves and gnougou that the Buffalo (African) woman uses to cook for her children.

Gender, Transnationalism, and the African Imagination

Sogolon dies soon after she meets with the emissaries from Mali, and Sundiata negotiates for land to bury her body in Mema before his departure. The conversations that ensue about Sundiata’s request for a piece
of land for his mother’s interment is instructive. When Sogolon’s family arrived at Mema, the king welcomed them with open arms. He liked and respected the young warrior Sundiata very much and made him his viceroy. However, when he found out that Sundiata was to return home to save Mali from destruction by Soumaoro, the sorcerer king, the king of Mema became angry because Sundiata’s departure meant the loss of his viceroy. The king refused to give land for the burial, insisting that Sundiata’s return to Mali was uncalled-for, especially since he had been so gracious to Sogolon and her family. During the ensuing argument, the king of Mema asked Sundiata to pay for the piece of burial land if he wanted to leave. Sundiata agreed, went outside “and brought the king a basket of bits of pottery, guinea fowl feathers, feathers of young partridges and wisps of straw” as payment for the land. Surprised and hurt, the king said, “You are mocking, Sundiata, take your basket of rubbish away. . . . What do you mean by it?” Eventually, Sundiata’s meaning was provided by the king’s advisor, an old Arab:

“Oh king, give this young man the land where his mother must rest. What he has brought you has meaning. If you refuse him the land he will make war on you. Those broken pots and wisps of straw indicate that he will destroy the town. It will only be recognized by the fragments of broken pots. He will make such a ruin of it that guinea-fowl and young partridges will take their dust baths there. Give him the land for if he reconquers his kingdom he will deal gently with you, your family, and his will be forever allied.”

Although important to the story, the point here is neither Sundiata’s threat to Mema nor the fact that to avoid war, the king of Mema gave him a resting place for his mother. Rather, this chapter’s focus is on the African narrator’s attention on several embedded issues crucial to negotiating transnational understanding: the king of Mema’s inability to understand Sundiata’s declaration of war on behalf of his mother’s dignity; the king’s advisor’s comprehension of another culture’s nonverbal signal; the advisor’s ability to mediate potential conflict; the king of Mema’s withholding of cultural understanding during Sundiata’s time of need, despite his eager use of Sundiata’s personal courage, knowledge, and services to advance Mema’s national policies; and lastly, the fact that Sogolon’s last resting place is in the Diaspora. This last point is important, as her burial at Mema extends each group’s reach because “. . . [her] family, and [the king of Mema’s] will be forever allied.” To understand this aspect of African communities’ approaches to kinship, it is necessary to remember that Sogolon started out as the wraith of the Buffalo princess of Do.
Unable to possess her for a week after their marriage, King Naré Maghan has this to say about Sogolon:

“I have been unable to possess her—and besides, she frightens me, this young girl. I even doubt whether she is a human being: . . . All night long I called upon my wraith but he was unable to master Sogolon’s.”

From the traditional African narrator’s point of view, the woman’s ability to traverse existing terrains made it possible to invoke her as the arbiter of every nation’s expansionist paradigm, planting her presence in places where family and political relationships seemed favorable. Synonymous with, yet autonomous from, the land in many communities, the African woman-as-female principle endorses self-predication and is non-self-partaking. For the African woman-as-woman, and throughout Africa’s history, the question of uniqueness and purity are ignored if the end result is one-over-many because of inherent requirements for community erasure in the latter premise—when communities are erased, the sun rises for no one.

In his essay, “Chi in Igbo Cosmology,” Chinua Achebe’s discussion of duality in Igbo thought is instructive because it helps direct attention to the belief in Spirit land in other African communities. Focusing mostly on the idea of the chi, or personal god, Achebe highlights the ways in which traditional Igbo thought worked to harness the individual to the surrounding universe. He says:

For a long time I was convinced that there couldn’t possibly be any relationship between chi (spirit being) and chi (daylight) except as two words that just happened to sound alike. But one day I stumbled on the very important information that among the Igbo of Awka a man who has arrived at a certain point in his life when he needs to set up a shrine to his chi will invite a priest to perform a ritual of bringing down the spirit from the face of the sun at daybreak. Thereafter it is represented physically in the man’s compound until the day of his death when the shrine must be destroyed.

Not only is this reminiscent of the specifications for setting up shrines, churches, and mosques around the world, it also evokes the movement from the cave to the light discussed above. Although human understanding and practices of the avenues to enlightenment and progress are not inherent to any one culture, this also means that the risks of simplifying and taking for granted the ideas of globalization, transnationalism, and internationalism are high, placing human freedom in the hands of those interested in maintaining power at all costs.
African Identities and Globalization

The colonial educational curriculum of African women was predicated on the premise that the paths of the African woman, and a reasoned western-type curriculum would never meet. Derived from an argument with a viewpoint that refused to engage African ways of knowledge, that curriculum was effectively a disservice to all involved from its inception. However, the consequent agenda was endorsed and contemporary African leaders continue to disregard the consequences. Africa’s schools continue to languish, with an occasional push toward progress from external sympathizers. The resulting migrations to destinations outside the continent provide a glimpse of what Africans, and especially African women, could contribute to continental progress using relevant curricular strategies.

Conclusion: Transnationalism, Gender, and Africa’s Expectations

In current intercontinental migrations, and unlike Sogolon’s from Do to Nianiba and other medieval west African destinations, enough African male stalwarts are not arriving on the scene with the intention of building peace by stopping the devastations caused by the angry buffaloes of war, hunger, child soldiers, HIV-AIDS and other social or political ills that ravage the continent. Instead, customs officials at different ports of entry around the planet watch (with amusement?) when Africa’s women cringe as their men—sons, husbands, fathers—are humiliated by unnecessary searches and sometimes imprisoned as illegal aliens in foreign lands. For most contemporary Africans, the alternative to poverty and its tribulations are the degradations, misperceptions, and humiliations experienced when natural-born citizens of host countries squander understanding, rather than acknowledge the contributions of Africans in the new locations. None of this is meant to infer that African women are free of responsibility in discussions or evaluations of Africa’s current inability to reach its potential. Because they were marginalized and ignored during most of Europe’s interference in Africa, many traditional African women’s institutions survived the onslaught of colonialism. Today, the powers inherent in those groups are yet to be harnessed and deployed by African women at home and abroad because, as a group, educated African women still are working to find their niche in various arenas.

A major problem for this group is the absence of opportunities to speak with one voice about African issues, especially because African women’s expertise gradually was shelved as western-style classrooms began to include courses beyond Home Economics. A point of view that enabled the traditional African woman to express herself beyond
the home, and the ability of African ways of enabling all to articulate individual expertise outside of local norms made it possible for certain women to reject marriage, participate in different kinds of construction, create arts and crafts, and so on. While it could be argued that some of these were part of home industries, the fact is that most such activities were eliminated when the girl-child went to school. Eventually, African women who fit these profiles have to justify their desires to be engineers, chemists, artists, and sculptors, and especially soldiers. And since the tendency to justify one’s natural talent frequently provides opportunities for narrations of victimhood, the situation has also recreated the African man as a natural enemy to the African woman, so the cycle continues. Within many transnational locations, according to Bourne, the problem of early arrival to the scene indicates procession—leaving African women to decide whether to fall in line behind each other, African men, or Western women. In this regard, feminism, womanism, gender and women's studies programs, and other frameworks used in the study, and evaluation of women’s contributions to global stability and advancement have yet to decide on an agenda that recommends the most productive outcome for African women.

In their joint introductory article, “Researching African Women and Gender Studies: New Social Science Perspectives,” guest editors Akosua Adomako Ampofo, Josephine Beoku-Betts, and Mary Johnson Osirim offer glimpses of prevailing research on gender in the social sciences. The article focuses on the expansion of discursive spaces with a view to encouraging the recording of best practices by some professional African women and productively engaging global needs and practices in the Diaspora. For example, Mary Osirim’s article, “African Women in the New Diaspora: Transnationalism and the (Re) Creation of Home,” offers concrete examples of African women in Boston and Philadelphia whose works and lives illustrate a new Pan-Africanism through the creation of transnational ties and the strengthening of existing African-descended communities. Using interviews and prevailing theoretical analytical frameworks, Osirim shows how immigrant African women in the target geographical areas participate in the immigrant streams productively and to the benefit of their families and adopted communities. Although the conclusions are cogent to the research projects, neither article provides insights or programs about the activities or contributions of transnational African men. In a similar vein, but focusing generally on higher education and specifically on the experiences of African women scholars in Women’s Studies classrooms in the United States, Josephine Beoku-Betts and Wairimū Ngarūya Njambi’s article, “African Feminist Scholars in Women’s Studies: Negotiating Spaces of Dislocation and Transformation
in the Study of Women,” also explores “some of the problems and dilemmas that African women scholars face in U.S. academic institutions.”\textsuperscript{13} It concludes that rather than breaking them, marginalization experiences provide some African women who are professors and scholars “with necessary tools . . . to act subversively.”\textsuperscript{14}

Unlike the African narrator, who in times of crises focused her or his efforts on both genders to encourage and illuminate praiseworthy actions or place blame on community members, the current efforts that focus on only one gender in the African academy ignores Africans’ efforts to build unified communities and continues the deleterious agenda of colonial-style education in Africa. A common response to the last statement is usually, “But, traditional African societies privileged men and maleness.” This response favors current failed leaders and leadership strategies on the continent, which tend to ignore and sustain the absence of women’s participation in the postindependence African state. However, contemporary African Studies can ill afford to endorse the prevailing confusion between gender studies and the identification with popular western feminist viewpoints about the marginalization of African women. The fact is that many so-called traditional African communities were predominantly, but not completely, patriarchal, and women largely were able to maintain contiguous and complementary, rather than parallel, groups and alliances. Ignoring this aspect of African communities’ approach to the health of society also disregards individuals’ agreements to the rules and norms that strengthen identity. For contemporary African women, given failed leadership in postindependence African states, such disregard will ensure that they remain permanently in transition—transnationalists without homesteads. African Studies should provide credible research programs that counter continuing colonialism’s efforts at home or abroad.

Finally, it is not too late to note that when African parents (especially the nonwestern educated) became aware of gender inconsistencies in many western-style schools across the continent, they began to encourage their daughters to attend school. For many African students, success in school frequently involved traveling away from home, sometimes for indefinite lengths of time and depending on available resources. Although modern travel in Africa favored men at that time, a significant number of African women were able to travel individually, or as wives, to different regions in and outside the continent.\textsuperscript{15} What this means is that whether or not they were able to benefit from western presence in the different regions, “their [African] past—with all its imperfections—was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans . . . delivered them.”\textsuperscript{16} Using examples from African life and experiences to examine traditional and current trajectories of transnationalism and globalization
will encourage the contemporary African woman to construct her identity and gender roles using relevant predictions of productive aspects of traditional and modern African cultures.

**Notes**

7. G. D. Pickett’s (translator) note in the book reads: Most West African tribes believe in wraiths or doubles, but beliefs vary and are often difficult to determine even for one tribe. The Mandigoes believe that there are two spiritual principles in man; the life principle, (*ni*) which returns to God at death, and the wraith or double (*dyaa*), which can leave the body during sleep, and after death stays in the house of mourning until the performance of ritual sacrifices releases it to wander among the places frequented by the dead person until, after fifty years, it rejoins the ni. Much of the activity of the double in this book, however, seems better explained by references to the Hausa concepts of “kurwa” and “iska.” For a full discussion of all three ideas see J. Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959, 58–60).


**References**


Immigrants from different countries have settled in America. For many, America becomes the final or training ground for professional careers, and for others, a refuge from a turbulent homeland. Neighborhoods are increasingly culturally diverse as the popularity of pizza, halal, and kosher food, Chinese takeout, Middle Eastern kebabs, Spanish plantains, Caribbean curry goat, and African fufu in urban centers demonstrate. Foderaro notes the growing number of foreign-born college presidents like Molly Easo Smith of Manhattanville College (Indian), Michael A. McRobbie of Indiana University (Australian), and Nariman Farvardian of the Stevens Institute of Technology (Iranian), including Jamshed Bharucha, president of Cooper Union (Indian) and A. Gabriel Esteban at Seton Hall University (Filipino), to highlight their presence at the higher echelons of academia. She estimates the number of international scholars—researchers, instructors, and professors—at 115,000 in 2010, an increase from 86,000 in 2001. Allan E. Goodman of the Institute of International Education admits to feeling in the minority at a Washington gathering to honor “about 40 scholarship recipients—undergraduates at the nation’s strongest institutions in math and science. They were from India, Asia, the Middle East, North Africa.” Dr. Farvardian’s remark reflects the inevitability of cross-cultural exchanges: “If you haven’t given students the exposure and appropriate experience in how to deal with the global economy, you’ve done them a disservice.”

1
Wikipedia offers a list of notable Africans in academia, science, acting, athletics, business, fashion, journalism, literature, music, and government. Academicians include Professors Kwame Anthony Appiah of Princeton; Kwabena Boahen of Stanford; Emmanuel Kwaku Akyeampong of Harvard; Claude Ake of Yale; and Pashington Obeng of Wellesley and Harvard; Victor Ukpolo, Chancellor of Southern University of New Orleans; and Jem Spectar, president of the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown. Clearly, many African immigrants grace America's corporate and academic thresholds. Media and a growing range of social networks further expose locals on the African continent to foods and patterns of behavior traditionally considered foreign.\(^2\)

Despite the growth in immigrant populations in neighborhoods, corporations, and schools, American students are open to study-abroad programs, but prefer to study under domestic, rather than foreign-born, instructors. de Oliveira E., Braun, Carlson, and Oliveira S., attribute this dualistic thinking to ethnocentrism. Students who studied abroad reported lower levels of racial prejudice.\(^3\) Florence\(^4\) and Onyekwuluje\(^5\) found resistance to foreign-born and trained teachers among American students. Ukpokodu's experience offers a classic example:

I notice that students do not see me as one, who is competent, even though I demonstrate good knowledge of the disciplines, and teach and provide them with valuable experiences. This feeling of marginalization often manifests in questions such as, “Dr. U., I don't know if you know the answer to this question,” or “I don’t know if you can answer my question.” American students expect me to act in a subordinating manner, to feel less than they are, regardless of my status.\(^6\)

In “Women Faculty of Color in the White Classroom: Narratives on the Pedagogical Implications of Teacher Diversity,” Vargas shows that “knowledge and knowing are predicated on one’s positionality and identity, in how one both constitutes and is constituted by others.”\(^7\) Students, faculty and administrators with limited experiences of people different from them rely on stereotypical presumptions in relating to women faculty of color.\(^8\) Vargas highlights the alienation they encounter including “estrangement fueled by hostile student behavior.”\(^9\) Onyekwuluje draws on her experience and understanding of stereotypical undertones to “handle the efforts made by some students to cast doubt, verbally and in writing, on my credibility.”\(^10\) Paradoxically, while author bell hooks\(^11\) recalls the dismissal of African and Caribbean Black professors of students like her with “no background to speak of,” Uwah feels pressured by American Black administrators, faculty, and students to play the race card against white privilege.\(^12\)
Amy Chau’s *Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother* provides a glimpse of differences in Asian and American child-rearing patterns, particularly concerning academics. In contrast, Florence, Traore, and Lukens illustrate the often-simmering tensions within racial groups. On the whole, immigrant parents emphasize academics and hierarchical relations at the expense of children’s creativity and freedom. Adversarial attitudes undermine collegiality and inhibit cultural bridging among teachers and students. Differences in primary backgrounds account for disparate expectations, academic, and social interactions, as the incidents between Yaani, an African-American student, and myself demonstrate. Merryfield, Jarchow, and Picker advocate fostering global perspectives among teacher candidates, rather than ethnocentric views of America. “A Matter of Habit: Unraveling the Teaching/Learning Knot,” acknowledges skepticism, but calls for mutual concessions in cross-cultural interactions.

Differences between teachers and students within racial groups can be as significant as differences across racial groups in higher education. Tatum, Traore, and Lukens illustrate the tensions between African-Americans and recent immigrants from the Caribbean and the African continent in public schools. Such disparities are complicated by the presumptions and expectations students and teachers bring to classrooms. The competing interests and cultures in class settings were on display in the troubled relationship between a student and me. Yaani, (a pseudonym) was a Black student who attended my classes infrequently, often arriving late and hardly participating in discussions. She begrudgingly submitted assignments late, thus requiring further attention. During one class, Yaani erupted in anger when I urged her to explain what I thought was her baffled expression. “Ask me a question,” I urged her. Then, I recall a thin smile forming at the sides of her mouth.

“You don’t want me to,” she said, grinning. Immigrants like myself are relieved enough to communicate in a new language. Idioms and cultural nuances come later, and are sometimes never learned. Caught up in my attempts at engaging a student, I took the bait. I repeated my offer. She smiled and spoke, her voice rising with each syllable, the passionate anger evident, “Why are you rude to me?”


In moments of crisis, one searches for the right response, and Yaani had more to say: “You’ve been rude to me today. You were extremely rude to me last week. Why are you rude to me? Answer now!” Recovering from my initial defensiveness, I responded: “We will discuss this at the end of class. Right now, it is more important that you understand the significance of literature reviews.”
Teacher-education programs foster a reflective practice. The recent focus on linking theory to practice in teacher-education programs is replacing the traditional focus on introducing candidates to “best practices.” Engaging in classroom research avoids being “‘too theoretical’—meaning abstract and general—in ways that leave teachers bereft of specific tools to use in the classroom.” In this light, teacher initiatives precede institutional mandates in transforming classrooms. As Mills notes, this professional attitude among teachers “embraces action, progress, and reform rather than mediocrity and stability.” It can unearth unanticipated issues, compelling the addressing of issues that undermine teaching and learning. The exchange with Yaani left me shaken. It also led me to explore the possible causes of classroom contention. In reflecting on personal biases and assumptions through autobiographical projects, teachers engage in a “critical examination” that generate self-awareness and greater respect for cultural diversity.

Notwithstanding a shared African diasporic identity with Yaani, my interactions with her highlighted the emotional stakes in teacher-student confrontations, triggering otherwise bottled-up expectations, frustrations, and aspirations despite a structure of defined learning outcomes and classroom protocols in transnational settings. Both Yaani and I felt wronged. I focused on institutional goals. Yaani felt justified in her demands. Each of us had difficulty hearing the other. My interactions with Yaani demonstrated the differences of habitual choices and priorities in decision-making. Each encounter involved deliberating over emerging challenges for appropriate solutions to both immediate issues and precedence.

To explore the causes and impact of classroom misunderstandings, this discussion focuses on the influence of socialization on cultural accommodations among Africans in the Diaspora. The sections: “Learning goals,” and “Classroom protocol” demonstrate tensions in teacher-student interactions. Everyday experiences shape self-image. Social rewards and penalties help us gauge what is appropriate to given times and places and gradually, patterns of beliefs and behaviors emerge, defining an individual’s identity and value structure.

Changing demographics in American schools compel a reassessment of the teaching and learning process and teacher-preparation programs. In an increasingly global environment, inevitable misunderstandings between Americans and foreign-born teachers—parents as well as students—undermine concerted efforts to promote academic success: “Globalization has the potential to generate more cultural clashes and conflicts, destroy local cultures, breed hostility, create new pockets of poverty, and ruin the environment.” Zhao advocates the preparation
of global citizens to combat these threats to social order. Merryfield, et al., compiled a workbook for fostering global perspectives in teacher candidates. They provide examples of American teachers receiving training in “China, Thailand, Egypt, Ghana, New Zealand, Australia, Mexico, Belize, Poland, Honduras, Kenya, Nigeria, etc.” Merryfield maintains that, “Given the demographics of large numbers of white, middle-class pre-service and in-service teachers and an increasing number of K-12 students of color, new immigrants, and students living in poverty, cross-cultural experiential education is essential in teacher education.”

**Socialization**

Socialization endows one with strategies for handling stress. For many, notes Jacobs, habit “supplies starting points and dispositional momentum. But there remains plasticity of character, and it is shaped and oriented by our own deliberate actions.” Due to cultural and linguistic disparities, African immigrant teachers are frustrated by the apparent lack of discipline, apparent low levels of student commitment to learning, and disregard for school property. Differences in educational background create misunderstandings with colleagues and students regarding role expectations, classroom civility, and enforcing academic standards. For most African immigrants, years of enforced schedules in schools create frustrations when boundaries are blurred or transgressed. My frame of reference is the Kenyan experience. Because of my educational background, my academic requirements and expectations of student behavior may appear excessive and alien to students accustomed to incompletes, makeup work, and bonus points for assignments. In addition, the diversity in students’ socialization ability, and skepticism of schools and teachers, propel me into an ongoing search for cultural goalposts—appropriate standards and expectations.

**Primary Cultures**

In Kenya, social hierarchies—age, gender, class, embedded in tradition and legal structures—shape social interactions. The preference for cultural cohesion and amiability reflects this upbringing. While the focus on social harmony often suppresses marginal perspectives, it offers relative order and stability. Kenya occasionally has violent strikes, particularly at the university level and, more recently, political demonstrations following contentious elections. My verbal exchanges with Yaani were both surprising and unnerving. The shock of her allegation of my insensitivity stemmed from my ingrained classroom protocol, with a focus on teacher-centered defined outcomes.
According to the *World Factbook*, Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product was $65.95 billion, its population about 41 million, and growth rate, 2.4 percent (in March, 2011). Its gross enrollment percentage for primary school students was 100 percent, and secondary school, 48.2 percent according to UNICEF (2008 estimates). About 7 percent of the GDP is spent on education at all levels. Government claims of a free primary education (FPE) have not absolved students and parents from miscellaneous financial obligations, including the cost of uniforms and examination fees. The unemployment rate is around 40 percent, and about 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (2008 estimates). Kenya’s poverty is heightened by its inability to guarantee access to education, health maintenance, employment, or relocation following political displacements, although some root it in endemic corruption. Indeed, some wealthy Kenyans live lifestyles most Americans only dream about.

In Kenya, students’ performance in qualifying examinations determines eligibility to move to the next academic rung in a highly competitive educational system. In the pyramid-shaped education system, about 15 to 20 percent of primary school students make it to college. With 50 percent of the 33 million people living on $1 a day or less, education is a privilege and the avenue to social mobility. Parents invest in children’s education religiously; some families sell ancestral lands and family herds and borrow from unscrupulous lenders at exorbitant interest rates to cover tuition. Kenyan Nobel laureate, Wangari Maathai attributes the reverence for education to a belief that it is “a panacea for all other problems.” In the United States, social welfare offers residents a cushion against hard times and unfulfilled hopes. The sense of entitlement to resources and consumer excesses in Western host countries, relative to countries of birth, are a constant eyesore and source of ambivalent admiration among African immigrants. In schools, one finds pens, books, and ripped papers and half-full bottles and cans of beverages. The differences between Kenyan scarcity and American plenty provide difficult-to-reconcile conflicts in gauging how much students value education. Contrary to the atmosphere of general abundance in America are the experiences of immigrant teachers from poor countries characterized by “high levels of poverty” in many rural areas.

In response, program participants continue to publicize issues of poverty in Kenya and raise funds for school supplies, including stationery. Paradoxically, the stereotypes of America as the land of golden streets—compared to poverty-stricken African countries—prevail. Ousmane Mamourne Traore, a Malian Fulbright graduate of The Ohio State University, was surprised at the “beggars, drug sellers, gun sellers, drug addicts, and alcoholics . . . homeless people. If I tell my friends
back home that I saw beggars and homeless people—mainly African-
Americans—in America, they will hardly believe it. For them, all African
Americans are international basketball players, boxers, sportsmen, or
musicians.”

McFarland views students’ resistance to institutional dictates as a
social drama with players, progressive plot structures, and an audience
with discernible conclusions. Each classroom conflict reflects three
overlapping levels at which parties operate: the academic, social, and
personal frame. By giving priority to social or personal issues, students
derail the focus on academics: “Challenges usually characterize teachers
as corrupt or inept and the classroom activities as ineffective.” On the
other hand, teachers apply institutional policies and practices with some
flexibility; a lack of consistency that students find confusing.

Yaani: What I know about Yaani comes from conversations and
classroom observations as well as her performance on assignments. In
later discussions, she admitted to a fear of failure and self-consciousness
among younger and more confident classmates. In 2006, Yaani’s 19-year-
old son signed up for the Army without her knowledge and despite her
lingering reservations. A 13-year-old daughter was preparing for high
school, haunted by the usual pangs of growing up. Yaani’s commitment
to her children’s welfare and choice to pursue a master’s degree testifies to
her resilience. The smile on Yaani’s face when she spoke of returning to
school underlined the sacrifices involved. She cited Maya Angelou as a
role model but took issue with Angelou’s “mutism” following her rape at
the age of seven. “It was an escape,” Yaani charged rather coldly. But these
facts emerged much later in the relationship. During the confrontation,
I wanted to address her concerns, yet focus on the subject matter. At the
time, the choices appeared irreconcilable.

The differences in background shaped both Yaani’s and my choices
in class. Contrary to my Kenyan educational experience, Giroux decries
the exclusivity of individual experiences in education, what he terms an
uncritical acceptance of the “authority of experience” but he readily
chides neoconservative conceptions of knowledge that privilege teacher
and subject matter authority. Giroux advocates a “critical analysis” of
primary experiences, with the awareness “that one’s perspectives can be
superseded.” John Dewey advocated a pedagogical approach integrat-
ing psychological and sociological aspects with neither subordinated to
the other or neglected. While instinctual habits—in this case, teachers’
or students’ preferences—have their place, schools foster socially desir-
able habits and inappropriateness to the manner, time, and place of
action. The ambiguity of Dewey’s cautions against pitting individual and
institutional needs fails to settle complex situations. Like Pauly and
Willis.\textsuperscript{53} I worry that students' choices inhibit their grasp of material and also distract classmates who require focus and space.

**Learning Goals**

Appeals to unifying ideals and a common culture have roots in the founding of the Republic, despite ongoing debates of what it entails and the growth in students' cultural pluralism. The view of schools as cultural transmitters requires a rigid curriculum and standardized pedagogies as advocated by neoconservative think tanks led by people such as William John Bennett, Alan Bloom, Mortimer Adler, and E. D. Hirsh. In this light, school failure means the students' inability to master a body of facts within a mainstream curriculum and reflects Freire's banking pedagogies, a vision that “privileges the white male, middle class and ignores everyone else.”\textsuperscript{54} Ravitch pits the choice for a standard academic curriculum against a focus on values and teaching styles. The focus on the product (standards and academic achievement) requires a systematic study of particular subjects. For order and regularity (and, some would argue, control), most institutions require clearly stated course objectives aligned to city, state, and national academic standards in a range of content areas. Ravitch attributes the “lost sense of purpose” to Dewey's progressive calls for building curriculum around children's interests.\textsuperscript{55} At its worst, the trend detracts from a focus on factual competency and limits teacher and administrator authority. The shift reflects an inhibitive trend of political correctness within schools and the larger society that erodes shared values and the national ethic.\textsuperscript{56} While some scholars attribute the malaise in schools to haphazard concessions to minority preferences, others fault the inflexibility in educational goals at the expense of students' needs.\textsuperscript{57}

A teacher's preference for order, uniformity, and standard assessments ignores the diversity in students' interests, capacities, and aspirations.\textsuperscript{58} The fantasy of a fact-based, orderly learning process can drive repressive and alienating choices.\textsuperscript{59} I worry that students dismiss my priorities as unrealistic course requirements. Yaani's confrontation diverted what should have been a focus on academics. Though debatable, the decision to address the issue later, acknowledges student concern. Rarely do I articulate the ambivalence so explicitly, although every choice I make as a teacher involves one or the other.

Shor attributes student alienation and a status quo of endemic social inequalities to the Eurocentric “passive curriculum of teacher centered talk,” and the call for “structure, content, and high standards for language and achievement,” advocated by E. D. Hirsch.\textsuperscript{60} Teaching, Freire charges, suffers from “narration sickness.” Students' voices are usually
tentative. He decries the “banking” approach to education that favors teachers and subject matter over critical consciousness. Walkerdine questions the Marxist association of power to material and institutional positions. Even when young, students exhibit social privilege or marginality: “Individuals, constituted as subjects and objects within a particular framework, are produced by that process into relations of power.” In her study, 4-year-olds taunt female classmates and the teacher, using sexist language, representing a subversion of the teacher-student relationship to a male-female framework. Ironically, students’ resistance to a teacher’s authority is accepted as “progressive, rather than contradictory.” As cultural nursemaids, teachers are guardians of an impossible dream. For the most part, the centrality of education for mobility in Kenyan schools, emphasizes teachers’ interests over students’ interests. Social settings reinforce hierarchical relationships based on age, class, and gender. Youths defer to adults. Wealthy patrons command respect, and male interests often trump female concerns.

On a cursory level, Pauly and Willis apparently dismiss the depiction of students as downtrodden holy innocents. Schools where students run amok—emotionally or physically taunting and holding teachers hostage—illustrate students’ responsibility for the teaching and learning process. Willis’ ethnographic study demonstrates how students’ choices—truancy, counter-school culture, and rejection of academics disqualify them from accessing middle-class jobs and lifestyle. The ongoing “guerrilla warfare” between institutional and students’ preferences disputes an obvious coercion in labor (cultural) reproduction. While Willis’ study illustrates the impact of students’ “counter-school culture” on academic achievement, my African immigrant status underscores a cultural dissonance from differing expectations and patterns of behavior. Citing Oscar Handlin, Martin extends the term “immigrant” to experiences of “alienation and its consequences” in other U.S. residents. African-Americans like Yaani exemplify this phenomenon. Tatum attributes the development of cliques and “oppositional stance” to a protective armor against “the psychological assault of racism.” Students cross borders “of meaning, maps of knowledge, social relations, and values that are increasingly being negotiated and rewritten as the codes and regulations that organize them become destabilized and reshaped.”

Education need not separate the mind from body, thought from action for it need not draw a sharp line between liberal and vocational education. More to the point, it need not separate reason from emotion and self from other. The reproductive processes can be brought into the educational realm, thereby overriding the theoretical and practical grounds for ignoring feeling and emotion, intimacy and connection. Such pronouncements
ignore the complexity in decisions and, in Kenyan schools, limits to stu-
dents’ and teachers’ choices. K-12 classrooms with more than 50 students
hinder any teacher’s accommodation of students’ interests.

Guiffrida highlights the significance of faculty support in the academic
success of African-American students in predominantly white institu-
tions.71 Darling-Hammond (2006) attributes the attrition in novice
teachers to “the lack of systematic supports” for candidates.72 In response,
Guiffrida advocates the long-held African-American tradition of “other
mothering,” in which faculty provide “comprehensive advising regarding
career guidance, academic issues, and personal problems.”73 Historically,
Black teachers felt morally and spiritually obliged to uplift the race.
However, putting the onus on Black faculty ignores the responsibility
of all faculty and structural factors that influence the minority students’
academic performance.74 But some students resented the intrusion when
I followed up on class absences or below-average performance on assign-
ments. A few criticize Black faculty for making excessive demands on
minority (Black) students.75 hooks notes how these alienated students
assume she will take their side in class discussions, resist theory as alien-
ating and expect to not “work as hard (in her class) as they do in other
classes.”76 Students’ resultant sense of betrayed trust can strain relations.
They could also rely on extrinsic factors to perform. On the other hand,
weary of maternal symbols in teaching, Walkerdine warns against the sex-
ist construction of teachers as mothers. They are stuck in a nurturing role
while everybody else enjoys the autonomy, freedom, and support.

**Classroom Decorum**

In the cited incident, I worried about the impact of an emotionally
charged exchange on academics, initially felt defensive and later refocused
the discussion. Such events set precedents for subsequent interactions. For
teachers, the consistent expectations, rewards, and punishments regulate
classroom interactions. Our course requirements constitute a pact and
broken pacts have consequences. Typically, students are not consulted in
syllabi constructions except through integrating previous groups’ evalua-
tions. In contrast, Freire’s call for democratic learning processes honors
less visible concerns, perspectives, or cultures.77 In border-crossing, for a
more comprehensive reality, teachers honor alternative narratives, includ-
ing theirs.78 The process engages the group; it is a welcome break from
monologue lectures. Engaged students seek clarity where necessary, or
offer interpretations and critiques of an author’s work. The process chal-
lenges the group to take risks and voice opinions; in essence, each takes
responsibility for creating a learning community.
Shor calls the distancing of students from “teacher space”—gravitating to the back and corner of classrooms—the “Siberian Syndrome.” The classic resistance is “one form of student agency in the contact zone of mass education.” Students’ resistance ranges from open to subtle confrontation against “the official culture of schooling and the authority of the teacher.” While the front of the classroom symbolizes teacher and school authority, the back and sides offer students safe havens to socialize, nap, “read illicit material,” play games, copy homework, and tests from each other, etc. Students do not always want to take responsibility for the teaching/learning process. They resist negotiation, feel insecure in academic settings, and distrust teacher interventions, while some shy away from visibility. Some students see a teacher’s power-sharing attempts as a denial of authority, if not incompetence. Students’ resistance range from outright critiques, to dropping out of the class, disgruntlement, limited participation, cliques, and negative evaluations.

Yaani may have doubted my receptivity to her demands. I addressed her emotional needs, but not at the expense of the class. Even then, it would be at a time appropriate to me. But after-class consultations disrupt the teachers’, as well as students’, schedule. These meetings involve extra time and organization. Further, the teacher still determines when, how, and to what degree students have voices in classrooms.

Democratizing classroom environments involves uncomfortable issues, practices and tough choices. I typically intervene in classroom discussions to avoid digressions and foster collaborative approaches to learning. Cohen commends group work for teaching heterogeneous students, but warns against its dilemmas. Not unlike the wider society, schools reflect existing class, gender, and race privilege, with a few students dominating class discussions. Compelling participation and dissuading otherwise dominant voices silences some students, even as others are empowered. The call for broader engagement can involve drawing out students who prefer more passive learning, often for “fear of ‘losing face.’” My dismissal of Yaani’s expressed concerns, regardless of the timing, made her lose face in a group of peers—most of whom sit back during discussions, passively observing the exchanges unfold. Quiet students may find refuge in silence, but confusions linger and so do regrets from lack of feedback.

The class confrontation with Yaani shows how easily one falls into familiar patterns of behavior, in this case, Kenyan and African-American, however fluid the categories. Her comfort with speaking out against a perceived injustice and insistence on immediate redress contrasts sharply with my preference for classroom amiability. My immediate
subordination of Yaani’s displeasure for a defined outcome may be rooted in years of allegiance to institutional goals, prioritizing outcome over process. It was more important that the group, including the withdrawn and angered Yaani understand the concept under discussion. Teachers should be open-minded and tolerant of students’ input and preferences, but within limits. We readily fall back on authoritative dictates if and when students’ voices disrupt a defined process and outcome. Imposing an agenda and timing reflects my authority as teacher and mirrors the traditional dichotomy between rationality and affectivity in class settings. The demographic complexity in school settings subverts standardized practices. Teachers and students should be cross-culturally sensitive. As a teacher, Yaani too confronts forums of culturally diverse students, including some for whom English is a second language.

Following our exchange, Yaani and I talked long after the rest of the class had left. Having established the source of our misunderstanding, we reiterated our expectations of each other and designed a framework for subsequent interactions. She wanted me to know she was not “flighty” and really cared about her studies. I wanted her to know that every student’s learning was important to me. She nodded in agreement. The discussion had progressed to a mutual exchange between colleagues. Toward the end of the half-hour discussion, we designed a plan to help her study and submit her assignments on time. I offered to review her work prior to, rather than after, the due date, and she agreed. There are interactions that linger in one’s mind long after the event. I will remember Yaani looking up to me with a smile and saying, “I looked at you in class and thought to myself, that is the kind of teacher I want to be. You focused on the topic and refused to be drawn in (to the verbal exchange).” Yaani acknowledged the primacy of the academic script. In teaching, such acknowledgements are jewels.

**Language/Idioms**

My first few years in the United States felt like a roller-coaster ride. Although I spoke the language, what I heard sounded foreign to me. I smiled to cover my apprehension and frustration. Frequently, assertions such as, “You have an accent,” identified me as the outsider. Sometimes the pronouncement feels like a judge’s verdict, rather than curiosity or, in my case, commendation. I speak English but students always ask about my nationality, while rarely identifying my country of origin. African immigrant teachers like myself contend with added cultural challenges—accents and linguistic nuances. In my early years, I relied heavily on lip-reading to understand people’s speech. It gets easier with time.
Recently, the word “issue” has taken on new connotations. I recall my earlier bafflement with the use of “attitude.” To say X has an “attitude” is damning. I would wait for clarification, the accompanying adjective that never came. Increasingly, the term “issue” appears to absolve students of all improprieties. “I had issues,” is offered as an excuse for tardiness, late or un-submitted assignments, class absences, limited class participation, below-average performance, and emotional outbursts. If I ask for clarification, I am told, “I cannot talk about it!” Students accustomed to partial or extra credit, makeup work, and incompletes pose further challenges. Where to draw the line? To many immigrants, one’s previous concerns for subsistence overshadow such issues until specific incidents compel a redress, as my mishaps with Yaani demonstrate.

After class, I reviewed the course requirements with Yaani and other students who missed the first session. Yaani and I spent more time reviewing class requirements. Our discussion ran the gamut from discipline to advance work and review, consultation when in doubt, etc. Yaani’s excuse for tardiness was that she had “issues” at school. She signed up to review an article at the beginning of the third class rather than pair up with classmates she viewed as younger. Yaani attributed her self-consciousness to a late return to academics. As a single mother, it was difficult to coordinate schedules for paired work. I agreed to Yaani’s request to review a journal article the following week, reminding her of my policy of promptness and offering to discuss her assignment with her prior to our next meeting. She agreed to the terms, but Yaani was absent at the next meeting and I received no communication from her.

Yaani arrived 40 minutes late the following week. We reviewed the rubric for the activity, stressing accountability. Interrupting, Yaani called me out for not giving her time to review the article she selected. “We discussed it last week as scheduled in the syllabus,” I responded. Her frustration was apparent when she said, “How could you expect me to present when we had parent-teacher conferences?” I responded with, “We can discuss this after class.” She said my expectations were unrealistic, adding adamantly, “We need to talk about it now.” “No,” I continued, “this issue is between you and me. We will discuss it at the end of class.” None of her classmates had missed a presentation. Yaani grumbled for the rest of the class while I stayed focused on the task at hand. Every once in a while, Yaani would lean over and draw the student next to her into a conversation. She packed her bags and put on her coat as the class wound down. Seated in a semi-circle, we all tried to ignore the obvious disruption. Yaani was the first to leave. I did not hear from her that week and chose not to follow up.

On the day Yaani accused me of rudeness, I arrived earlier than usual to meet with a guest who was sitting in on the class. I invited her into
the circle, introducing her to the students. Yaani smiled in acknowledgement. Later I learned Veronika and Yaani had spoken before my introductions. Our focus that day was on the role of literature reviews in the research process. We discussed the significance of existing studies to current research projects. The distinction between grounded theory and a traditional approach that builds on, or critiques existing theory poses some problems for students. I explained the distinction in various ways, utilizing different instances and phrases. Margaret Mead’s ethnographic study exemplifies a grounded theory approach. Her summations of Samoan traditions emerged from her observations and interviews. However, given the limited timeframe, students would draw upon existing studies on educational issues and also generate primary data in class settings.

Typically, when students have baffled expressions, I randomly ask a question to review the concept or lead into a subsequent topic. After three such questions, I noticed Yaani’s blank expression, which led to the cited exchange. The class was silent, with all attention on my interaction with Yaani. This followed initial nervous chuckles and perhaps relief that someone else was the focus. Later Veronika, another American, said she knew exactly what I meant when Yaani responded with, “You do not want me to.” She recalled how one student held her head down, face in her hands. Veronika later said some students rolled their eyes and a few avoided my glance, expecting a scene.

In moments of crisis, one mentally designs a game plan to address the threat. It is a habit, the presumption of guilt at a confrontation. Had I said something that upset her? I wondered. She had more charges. Recovering from initial defensiveness, I refocused Yaani’s charges to the rational exchange on research procedures. My concern for the material at hand must have dawned on her. At some point during the exchange, her anger apparently mellowed. She looked angry but listened. I focused on the significance of the discussion to subsequent assignments. The class settled in silence. After a while, I asked if she understood the distinction. She nodded and mumbled an assent. The diffusion of tension was a welcome reprieve for the whole class.

Although apprehensive, I summarized the lesson and spoke with students seeking consultation at the end of class. Yaani hung around at the edge of the group until it cleared. She approached me, seeming less confrontational. I approached her, throwing empty punches, smilingly calling her by name. Her initially hesitant smile gradually settled to acceptance. The moment seemed eternal. I asked Veronika to wait outside for me while I spoke to “my friend.” Although spontaneous, my reference to Yaani as a friend must have defused the potential tension,
setting the tone for a more collegial, less threatening exchange. Facing each other at arm’s length, Yaani began by excusing her oversight. She and some other classmates had parent-teacher conferences when she was scheduled to discuss a journal article. At the time, students came up to inform me, given that attendance was required. “We were close to where you stood. You must have overhead my discussion with two other students regarding Parent/Teacher conferences,” Yaani insisted. I hadn’t. Later, she admitted that I was talking with another student and probably missed the exchange. We acknowledged our mutual misinterpretation. She was upset that I didn’t accommodate her prior commitments.

Manrique refers to the conventional emphasis on political correctness in public spheres as “‘disguised civility’ that regulates behavior in academe, at least insofar as issues of race and national origin are concerned.” Brown roots Blacks people’s desire to appease in historical precedence dating back to slavery. A Black person needed to show a “myriad of emotions to be considered human,” but anger posed a quandary. It reinforced “negative stereotypes of Blacks as bestial and savage.” On the other hand, lack of anger led to the “erroneous notion that Blacks were happy within the institution of slavery.” The need to appease a threatening person persists and those in vulnerable positions readily adopt the same demeanor. While Brown urges minorities to “voice their anger,” she acknowledges using humor to “alleviate tensions,” that arise around issues of class, gender, and race. Instinctively, I chose to defuse the tension between us, by joking rather than confronting Yaani’s contentious responses. The opening effectively eliminated defensiveness in the exchange.

Freire’s charge of “narration sickness” in teaching makes sense. Teachers talk endlessly at blank faces, presenting illustrations in apparently foreign terminology. As an African immigrant teacher, I use different phrases, words, and examples that draw upon both my primary and acquired cultures. Sometimes we strike gold. In one class, I was providing a rationale for the next assignment. “Why do you teach?” I asked the class, meaning what factors shape(d) your career choice? “We teach who we are,” I noted. We bring our frustrations and aspirations to classrooms—in this case, diasporic and African-American values. “I like that,” Yaani interjected at the time. I stopped. Yaani repeated the phrase at the end of that class and the next, a week later. We teach who we are. Narration sickness? Not this time. This was narration cure.

**Negotiating the Tightrope**

Social constructs impact classroom interactions because “Different bodies, skin colors and genders carry unequal authority into the room.”

Scholars call for culturally relevant pedagogies that honor students’ histories to avoid privileging the status quo. The complexity of teacher/student relationships also reflects the intricate desires each brings to class, most of which are unconscious. In introducing unfamiliar interactions and knowledge, classrooms cause discomfort and surprise. Britzman (2003) notes how “ideas, words, and books arouse anxiety in the learner . . . that the learner has methods for defending (themselves) against knowledge.” Some students cover up their lack of comprehension by acting out; for others, the fear of being ostracized by classmates supersedes a teacher’s disapproval. To reduce tension and control in the learning process, teachers also avoid texts or ideas that appear “abstract or controversial.” Darling-Hammond derides colleges for watering “down their training to minimize readings and homework and the focus on survival needs, such as classroom discipline, rather than curriculum and teaching methods.” My general education classes introduce students to established and emerging theories in the field before they engage more specialized areas. Frequently, students complain about the reading load and focus on “dead white men.”

Yaani’s hesitant entrance on the first day mirrors a teacher’s uncertainty, albeit for differing reasons. I wonder about the abilities and commitment to learning of students who registered for the class. Onyekwuluje, a first generation Nigerian immigrant, enumerates some questions that confront her teaching of sociology poignantly: “Will White students like me? Will they see me as an authority figure? Will they like my teaching method and style? Will uninterested White students appreciate the subject matter? Will White students think I am too Black? Will Black students think I am too White?” Manrique (2002) a Filipino immigrant professor, extends the apprehension Onyekwuluje associates with the teaching-learning process to administration issues. She questions her identity and professionalism when confronted by “disguised civility.” Manrique challenges her colleagues on search committees who associate “foreign-sounding names” with lack of fluency in English. A student drops Manrique’s class, claiming not to understand her “speech accent.” Ukpokodu, “a professor of color, a woman, from a Third World country, and linguistically different with a noticeable accent,” complains about the students’ dismissal of her competence and professional commitment. Similar to Walkerdine, Onyekwuluje calls for an acknowledgment of “ideological meanings that oppress or keep one marginalized or make students question the credibility of some professors . . .” Like Onyekwuluje, I consider ways to create an inclusive classroom that honors the challenge of learning. My preference for factual transmission rather than emotional appeasement is dearly bought.
There is the danger of occasional student resistance, not necessarily in rebellion or as directly as Yaani. Notwithstanding differences in ability and motivation, most working-class students come to class at the end of a long, tiring day. In teacher-education programs, students arrive after a grueling day with youngsters and demanding jobs. Some worry about getting home, making dinner, and preparing for the next day’s class. The choice of more education inevitably involves many sacrifices.

Yaani arrived more than an hour late to our second session, having missed the first class. She appraised the scene rather apprehensively and with some hesitation, as though stepping into alien territory. We smiled at each other across the room, much like strangers facing each other in a subway car. Although late, Yaani appeared attentive, eyes focusing on different speakers. We were discussing the (Action) Research cycle—identifying an area of focus, data collection, analysis, and interpretation and the action plan: a systematic process for classroom decisions. At one point, I directed a question to Yaani. She talked for a while, clearly grasping for a lucid and informed response. She smiled tentatively but stopped, mid-sentence, with obvious hesitation, “I don’t know.” Turning to the student beside her, she added, “Does this make sense to you?” My response to Yaani built on her question, challenging her to rephrase, refine and re-articulate. She beamed, became more focused, sat up straight, shoulders back, evidently confident.

On the day students presented their Action Research reports, Yaani was late. We sat in a semicircle; latecomers squeezed in close to the door. Yaani settled down after failed attempts at an inconspicuous entrance. She was animated during the presentation. Yaani’s research project was on motivating students to write more and share their pieces with classmates. Then, Yaani made a surprising admission. “I have learned a lot about myself,” Yaani continued, “I must do more. I realize I have not done enough as a teacher and a student.” Another student in the group made a similar admission. The reflective project students undertake can be revealing. Yaani’s admission was monumental in view of our previous angst-ridden interactions.

At the tenth session, Yaani arrived about 10 minutes late. She set down her belongings, but stepped out yet again, a pattern of behavior I learned to accept from her. In recapitulating the reliability/validity distinction in research studies, I called on Yaani. After a series of hesitant, “Aahhhhs,” and “Uuummms,” I waited, apprehensive about putting her on the spot. No one responded. After the question, Yaani and her classmates initially avoided my glance. Her eventual response revealed that she grasped more than she exhibited. Even Yaani’s “Am I right?” showed greater confidence. The class chuckled, their smiles enveloping Yaani in
affirmation. When the class ended, a classmate requested further clarity on an upcoming assignment. “Yaani, help me out,” I urged her. “I guess I cannot refer to my notes,” she added mischievously. “No,” I responded, smiling. I urge students to understand concepts rather than perpetually turn to texts for reference. Yaani turned to her classmates and reiterated, close to verbatim, my previous instructions, with additional comments. “You asked the same question last week,” Yaani noted, “That is what my students do. They ask the same question, again and again.” The group of teachers laughed, knowingly.

During the last class, Yaani sought advice in dealing with her eighth-grade daughter. The girl initially resisted commuting from a New York City school in Queens to one on Long Island, accusing her mother of imposing her desires on her children, asking, “Why should I be the one to commute?” “Load of guilt?” I interjected. “Oh, yes,” Yaani continued, “I wondered if I did the right thing.” The class sat in silence as Yaani continued her story. The daughter was four when Yaani, at 22, moved to the suburbs “to give her a good education.” However, on the weekend, when they drove back to the city to visit the grandfather, Yaani’s daughter refused to disembark from the car to buy soda from a store, claiming the neighborhood was dangerous. Yaani sounded pained. “This is where I grew up. I left for better opportunities. Now, my daughter feels it is beneath her. What should I do?” Yaani asked, turning to me. hooks attributes the dissociation from the socially negated to internalized racism.106 “What should she do?” I asked, turning to her classmates. A debate ensured.

**Conclusion**

African-immigrant teachers like me vacillate between fostering individuality and conformity when one undermines the other, an ambivalence that confirms prevailing research findings on the essentials of teaching. Delpit’s work underscores the importance of minority students learning the language and rules of the dominant culture.107 Familiarity with theory is crucial at the college level.108 Giroux recommends exposing students to oppositional texts to offer frameworks for interrogating primary experiences and choices.109 Meanwhile, teachers walk a tightrope of trying to please a range of stakeholders with often contradictory goals—students’ interests, curriculum objectives and grading policies, personal concerns, community and national interests. Disparities in primary value structures and host country demands compel parties into cultural redefinitions. Teachers and students inevitably engage in cross-cultural interactions. In urban schools, dominant white female middle-class
teachers work with students whose cultural orientation differs from their own.

African-immigrant teachers cannot afford to dismiss or resist cultural adaptations in host countries. Kenya’s calls for education reform remain focused on course loads and school structures. But the focus on tests and academic scores ignores the impact of cultures on the teaching and learning process. Dr. Laban Ayiro, a senior lecturer at Kenya’s Moi University, and a Nairobi University professor of physics, Angeyo Kalambuka, dismiss the presumption that teaching guarantees learning. To ignore existing inequalities and tout the value of education for the masses is disingenuous. Further, the focus on book learning ignores the impact of schools on other aspects of schooling, including moral and aesthetic values.

Despite prohibitions and redirections, rewards and penalties for performance, a teacher’s efforts can fail to deliver. Some scholars question the presumption of powerful teachers imposing authority on victimized students. Student-teacher interactions reflect social constitutions of identity, debunking the linear stereotypes of power relations in transnational settings. Walkerdine highlights the tentative nature of power relations. A teacher may have the institutional authority, but students respond differently based on categories established outside schools—male/female; Black/white; African immigrants/native-born citizens; upper-/working-class, etc. These perceptuals positions render individuals “at one moment powerful and at another moment powerless.” American students enjoy a home country advantage over immigrant teachers. They also could exhibit anti-immigrant resistance. Class considerations involve border crossings that destabilize both teachers and students.

Familiar patterns of behavior and defined institutional outcomes are a teacher’s anchor, given the complexity of teacher-student relationships. Teachers draw upon their socialization and training, even as they accommodate students’ interests. Shor links routines to security; a destabilization offers the “chance to notice, question it and consider alternatives.” A teacher’s failure to challenge students is a disservice to the profession. Serenity comes from acknowledging the lack of certainty in teaching; it compels trust in a seemingly impossible immediate and uncertain future. In this light, classroom diversities compel negotiations for inclusive pedagogies and egalitarian relations. Exposure to oppositional texts broadens individual perspectives and increases tolerance.

Kambutu and Nganga’s program of planned international experiences in Kenya for American students illustrates the participants’ change in perceptions. Prior to the trip, American students were apprehensive about being stranded in a foreign culture lacking modern facilities,
associated with strange diseases, famine, and high literacy rates, and requiring interaction with barely dressed people. Though the scholars admit to lingering ethnocentricism in participants, most students in the program found the experience “life-changing.”

Participants had the opportunity to be immersed in “unfamiliar cultural practices,” generating cultural transformation. Similarly, Vargas reiterates the findings of an annual status report on minorities in higher education by the American Council, focusing on students’ exposure, classroom discipline, and the economy. The report “highlights the benefits (of racial and ethnic diversity) to individual students; these include greater openness to challenge and diversity, reduced levels of ethnocentrism, and gains in critical thinking skills . . . (and scholarship in women and ethnic studies) has transformed teaching, research, and service . . . In addition graduates (acquire competencies) to work in the global work environment.”

Yaani’s interaction with immigrant teachers like me exposes her to diverse pedagogical structures and worldviews, crucial skills, given the diversity among American students. Paradoxically, universities and colleges hire minorities for the same reasons used to fire them. Immigrants contribute significantly to institutions because they are “highly educated and motivated individuals,” and the cultural diversity helps balance “dominant perspectives in traditionally male-dominated institutions.” In addition, immigrant professors are role models for students from both dominant and minority backgrounds.” In both Brown’s and Manrique’s universities, some students express surprise at encountering knowledgeable and challenging non-white professors. On the other hand, “our alienness does not mean that we are from a different culture or look different. We are also viewed as competitors and, worse, as intruders.”

These perceptions influence the reception of administrators, colleagues, and students alike. However, because identities are not fixed, immigrant instructors and students make pragmatic choices that foster cross-cultural exchanges. On the other hand, Brown urges the faculty not to sacrifice learning from contentious moments for superficial amicability. Political correctness merely postpones inevitable cross-cultural clashes.

Everyday teacher and student choices unravel the teaching-learning knot to create new realities and transnational identities. Identities can be “enabling and exclusionary.” Both Yaani and I progressed from habitual patterns to a negotiated level of perception, recognition, and articulation. Yaani learned to wait her turn during class discussion and voice her concerns differently. My presumption of teacher authority, a routine in traditional African settings, was questioned. I addressed my discomfort to honor issues I would rather avoid in class settings. In increasingly
global workplaces, cultural identities are in perpetual flux. Giroux calls for border-crossing in both teachers and students. This involves rethinking the familiar and ordinary for spaces of “multiple cultures, languages, literacies, histories, sexualities, and identities.”

I initially sidestepped Yaani’s demands for immediate redress to avoid being drawn into a boxing-ring psychic assault. My initial defensiveness was spontaneous and so was the refocusing on content rather than the emotional exchange. Contentious exchanges between teachers and students, however legitimate, distract focus, drawing attention away from the subject matter. Even then, students can resist these academic scripts. On the other hand, such incidents compel parties into negotiations and cultural accommodations. The discussion with Yaani made subsequent interactions more amenable. That semester, Yaani missed more classes and always offered elaborate excuses. I was receptive yet insisted on stipulated class standards on assignments. When Yaani failed to submit one assignment toward the end of the semester, I called and e-mailed her reminders to submit the work within the week to avoid losing points. She claimed to have begun the assignment on time, but stated, “It took me to therapy.” The self-reflection on her choice of teaching and her role in classrooms raised issues long avoided, she claimed. In each case, I listened but reminded her of class requirements. We agreed on an action plan for the next assignment. Despite multiple excuses, Yaani fulfilled class requirements. It was a feat for us both.

Five years into a two-year program, Yaani accumulated 55 credits, well beyond the requirement for graduation, except for the elusive aggregate B average. Despite conventional claims of African-American students who devalue academic success—disengaging and sometimes dropping out—students like Yaani persevere, aware that not having a degree limits future prospects. Three years later, Yaani e-mailed me for an appointment to discuss her grade in my class, but she did not show. Although surprising, I realize we had forged a relationship, fraught with cultural missteps. When we crossed paths a year later, Yaani called out, “You remember me?” In response, I addressed her by her full name.

She smiled, saying, “I am still here.”
“You know what I want for you,” I said.
“Yes, you want me to do well,” Yaani replied.

Notes


27. Ibid., 10.


40. Maathai, A Memoir, 139.
46. McFarland, Resistance, 1267.
49. Giroux, Schooling, 98.
52. Pauly, Classroom Crucible.
53. Willis, Learning to Labor.
54. Giroux, Schooling, 120.


59. hooks, “Confronting Class.”


63. Ibid. 3.

64. Pauly, *Classroom Crucible*.

65. Willis, *Learning to Labor*.

66. Ibid. 1–51.


75. Guiffrida, “Othermothering.”

76. hooks, “Confronting Class,” 141.


78. Giroux, *Border Crossings*.


81. Ibid. 13.

82. Ibid.

86. hooks, “Confronting Class,” 136.
88. Obiakor and Grant, “*Foreign-Born,*” 14, 56, 97, 100–101.
92. Ibid. 90.
97. Ibid. 75.
99. Onyekwuluje, “Who is Coming to Class,” 244.
100. Manrique, “Foreign Woman,” 150.
101. Ibid. 151.
102. Ibid. 158.
104. Walkerdine, *Schoolgirl Fictions*.
106. hooks, *Teaching to Transgress, Class Matters*, 2000, 35.
108. hooks, “Confronting Class.”

112. Kalambuka, “Education System.”

113. hooks, Teaching to Transgress, “Confronting Class,” Pauly, Classroom Crucible; Shor, Empowering Education, 1996; Walkerdine, Schoolgirl Fictions; Willis, Learning to Labor.

114. Walkerdine, Schoolgirl Fictions, 3.


116. Amodi, Crossing Borders; hooks, Teaching to Transgress, “Confronting Class”; Giroux, Border Crossings, “Teacher Education.”

117. Shor, Negotiating Authority, 22.


119. Ibid. 949.

120. Vargas, “Women Faculty of Color in the White Classroom,” 19.


122. Brown, “Useful Anger.”

123. Manrique, “Foreign Woman,” 147.


126. Ibid. 2.


128. Aronowitz, “Against Schooling.”

129. Ibid.

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Introduction

International migration is an agent of change that creates new social realities and responses, both in immigrants’ countries of origin and in host countries. Emigration opens up development opportunities for people and countries that must be exploited. Yet, it also can have negative effects—in terms of vulnerability, loss of human capital, deconstruction of families and communities, and creating tensions in host societies. Migration policies could be essential determinants of the equilibrium between these contradictory effects. Economic crises add other concerns, since migrants from developing countries have become one of the social sectors most affected by the recession.

Undocumented, or clandestine, migrants are those who enter a national territory illegally or without legal documents. They generally cross the borders with no documents or with fake papers and escape the point of control or overstay the time allowed by their visas. From a simple legal perspective, Tapinos (2000) classifies clandestine migrants into six categories: (1) the migrants who enter a country legally, possessing an authorization of residence, but engage in an illegal activity; (2) those who enter a country legally but work illegally; (3) migrants who enter the receiving country legally, but remain inactive; (4) migrants who enter the country illegally and engage in an illegal activity; (5) those who enter the receiving country illegally and
remain inactive migrants; (6) migrants who enter a country illegally, regularize their status, and obtain a residence permit; however, they still engage in illegal activities.

Undocumented migration is not a new phenomenon in North Africa. It goes back to the 1960s and the 1970s, when many North Africans—Moroccans, in particular—took advantage of open borders with Europe and stayed in Europe without the authorities’ consent. This phenomenon was tolerated because the need for labor was high. According to Ennaji and Sadiqi (2008), undocumented migration should be understood in the context of the immigrant’s desperation to escape the hardships at home. It expresses the will of the individual to move to a new land, settle down, and work in the host country to improve their living standards and socio-economic conditions.

Undocumented migration is frowned upon by officials, who consider it a negative move that should be combatted. Consequently, the European Union (EU) ratified the Schengen Treaty in 1985, and signed the Schengen Agreement in 1990. As experienced by Africans wishing to enter the EU, the agreement is a means of preventing undocumented workers from getting into Europe.

Who are the undocumented migrants from Morocco? The majority are young people who have a low or average level of education and come from a modest social background. Their dream of an El Dorado is magnified and reinforced by satellite television. They leave their homes for Europe, which they believe will offer them opportunities for work and a better life. What are the reasons behind this behavior?

**Causes of Migration**

Social scientists from North African states have typically provided six major reasons for undocumented migration:

i. Their country does not offer them jobs and career development.
ii. There is no social strategy, and unemployment among young people is extremely high (12% in rural areas and 20% in urban areas). As a consequence, the young are poor, disillusioned, and hopeless.
iii. The European continent is attractive and fascinating to them, and there are more avenues for entertainment.
iv. The attractive image of Western Europe that is propagated by legal migrants who visit Morocco during the summer holidays seduces many young people. The legal migrants drive luxurious cars and have a great amount of money to spend, attracting the undocumented migrants.
v. Remuneration is low in Morocco, and young people think that even if they find a job in Morocco, the pay will not be adequate. The minimum wage is approximately 2,500 Moroccan Dirhams (equivalent of $300) per month.

vi. Considerably weakened parental authority gives young Moroccans relatively more freedom than the ‘other youth in north African countries’.

At times, the undocumented migrants’ families go into debt and need to sell their property to be able to pay between 1,000 and 3,000 euros to traffickers who have promised to get them into Europe. There is compelling evidence to show that these migrants go to Europe mainly for economic reasons. Most of them are either unemployed or underemployed and wish simply to earn decent wages and improve their standards of living. What they hate about their country is the lack of opportunities, poverty, unemployment, and government bureaucracy. They think that the host country will offer them better lives and a better future.2

Victims of Undocumented Migration: Action and Reaction

The media play a counterproductive role in undocumented migration. Television unwittingly gives credence to the illusion of a Europe where everything is possible, a stereotype corroborated by emigrants who return home for holidays and claim to be living very comfortably. Moroccan mass-media reports also show the tragedies of victims of undocumented migration who try to cross to Europe. But they also paint Europe with beautiful colors, influencing how Moroccans view Europe and the West, in general.

Furthermore, Morocco has recently become a popular gateway to Europe for undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. The coastal cities of Tangier, Nador, Asilah, Larach, and Martil in the north and Agadir, Sidi Ifni, Tarfaya, Dakhla, and Laayoune in the south are cities that sub-Saharan Africans, Algerians, and Moroccans use as their meeting points before embarking on adventurous trips to Europe. Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria also have their own ports used by undocumented migrants. Almost every boat trip ends up with casualties of these desperate population movements. Most undocumented migrants are either captured and detained in Morocco or Europe, or are deported by Spanish and Italian authorities. According to the Moroccan Department of Statistics (2008), more than 4,000 undocumented Moroccan migrants were detained in Spain, Italy, and France. In addition, many young Moroccans who may remain in their country have their head in Morocco and their heart in Europe.
The sea is the favorite route to Europe. Other means of access to Europe include air transportation and travel on land. Europe has become the “El Dorado,” a desired destination for many young Moroccans. Since the early 1990s, the EU has increased its measures controlling the entry of foreigners, with the aim of discouraging them from migrating. Many developed countries have done likewise. Today, border cities like Ceuta and Melilla, on the coast of North Africa, gateway cities for migrants, are increasingly protected by fences, helicopters, and detection systems. But, as with every forbidden thing, this makes migration even more desirable. Potential migrants organize themselves to avoid the obstacles, but sometimes at the expense of their lives. Undocumented migration generally is based on networks and intermediaries, benevolent or paid. Sometimes “mafia networks” are used that involve great risks, and “If you dare, you can make it.” is their motto.

Another method of emigration is to obtain a tourist visa through the help of intermediaries, like family members, with the plan to utilizing the visa and not come back within the allotted time. In the past, successful migration was sometimes achieved with the help of intermediaries who facilitated trips to Italy, Spain, or France. But with growing negative perception of migrants in Europe—and especially with the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and violent incidents in the French “banlieus” (poor suburbs where a majority of immigrants live) in November 2005—the consulates of these European countries have made it more difficult for Moroccans and other African immigrants to secure visas. These restrictions however, led to an increase in covert migration. In spite of the reinforced control of its borders, especially at the level of Ceuta and Melilla, Europe has not succeeded in intercepting Harragas (undocumented migrants) at the Fueteventuras Island (Canary Islands). Undocumented migrants also have explored passage through Greece. Increasingly, it is becoming obvious that the era when migration involved only men is over. Instead, we are now in a time in which children and women are significant parts of migration.

Many undocumented migrants use paterras (little fishing boats), containers, or trucks hauling goods across international boundaries to cross the Straits of Gibraltar. Undocumented migrants using paterras wear no lifejackets and have no radio equipment. As a result, they are exposed to bad weather conditions and cannot call for help in case of emergency. They are covert travelers on the sea who try to slip away undetected. The media often report casualties and losses of life. The exact number of victims who have died at sea will never be known, but it is estimated that more than 1,000 people have drowned when jumping into the Straits of Gibraltar. Many women and minors are among those who died at sea.
during this arduous journey. There is higher loss of life during the summer when the weather is better and it is easier for the undocumented migrants to reach the other side of the Mediterranean. The main destinations are Malta, the Canary Islands, the Island of Lampedusa, and the port cities of Ceuta, Melilla, Tangier, and Nador. Although the sea is jointly patrolled by Moroccan and Spanish authorities to stop undocumented migration, many manage to enter European territory, while others are intercepted by these authorities. In the summer of 2005, Spanish authorities intercepted more than 20,000 undocumented migrants off the coast of Spain. According to a report by Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish Minister of the Interior in 1998, 557 paterras were stopped, 75 people were reported missing, 155 were rescued from drowning, and five bodies were found. From January to June 1999, 137 paterras were stopped, 10 people were reported missing, 67 individuals were rescued from drowning, and five bodies were recovered.3

The Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Mostapha Sahel, reported in October 2005 that more than 500 undocumented migrants were intercepted every week on the Moroccan territory, and 526 were arrested between September 8 and 14, 2005. As a result of this cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan authorities, the overall rate of undocumented migration into Spain has dropped by 14 percent, and in the Canary Islands by 49 percent.4 In 2005, 368 undocumented migrants died while attempting to reach the northern side of the Mediterranean, compared to 289 in 2004. There were 266 undocumented migrant deaths off the Canary Islands, and 98 off the Spanish coastline.5 The same report states that 40 percent of Spanish people as compared with 54.1 percent regard undocumented migration as a threat to their security and think unemployment will increase and jeopardize their future prospects for upward mobility. Thus, a large segment of the Spanish population believes that migration has an adverse effect on their well-being. The majority in the Spanish parliament think that immigrants who commit acts of delinquency must be extradited to their countries of origin. A similar attitude is held in the rest of Europe, where undocumented immigrants are perceived as a threat to stability and security. Given their precarious status, undocumented migrants live in ghettos, work without a permit, live in appalling conditions, and cannot assert their rights for fear of expulsion.

According to official statistics, the Moroccan immigrant community in Spain represents 27.44 percent of the country’s entire migrant population, the third-largest group after Latin Americans (34.98%) and other Africans (29.85%).6 The volume of undocumented migration from Morocco is higher because Morocco is no longer the only source of
migrants; many sub-Saharan Africans have started pouring into Morocco before they attempt to cross the borders into Spain. Many of them stay in Morocco for a long time. According to several local estimates, there are between 25,000 and 30,000 sub-Saharan undocumented immigrants in Morocco. In September 2005, many Black Africans tried to climb the fence separating Nador and Ceuta in groups of about 300 and fought with the police to cross to the other side. Fifteen young black people and one Spanish soldier were killed in this confrontation. The growing number of people who have died while trying to get into Europe has, however, led to a wave of sympathy in Morocco. Since 2000, the Moroccan press and television have been reporting, with compassion, the death of many Moroccans and other African nationals attempting to cross to the other side of the Mediterranean.

Europe is afraid of being overwhelmed by undocumented migrants, and prefers to involve the Maghrebi states in setting up barriers to discourage these migrants from reaching Europe. Consequently, Europe compels Morocco and other North African governments to stringently police their borders. However, it is extremely difficult to secure the vast borders along the Maghreb across the Sahara and Sahelian regions. French President Nicolas Sarkozy then the Interior Minister, proposed that France adopt “selected immigration” to limit his country’s legal migration to highly qualified and skilled immigrants and students.

Between 4,000 and 6,000 migrants have died since 1997 in the Straits of Gibraltar and in Atlantic waters. However, since there is no documentation and no official statistics, the numbers are probably higher. In addition to the efforts of the Moroccan authorities, the media often carry programs that warn people of the high risks and perils of undocumented migration in the form of articles in newspapers and documentaries on Moroccan TV and radio. The media also report on the harsh living conditions of those who make it to Spain, who are often shown living in slums, with no water, no electricity, no sanitation, etc. The El Ejido events are a good case in point. Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido (south of Spain) revolted against racism, exploitation, and the harsh working and living conditions they experienced while living in tents during the extremely hot summer of 2000. The violence in El Ejido was exacerbated by outsiders who had been alerted by Spanish-based neo-Nazi web sites.

These undocumented migrants generally come from semirural or urban areas, and they do not integrate easily into the host country, which accepts them only for economic purposes. They accept whatever jobs that they can find and generally work in appalling conditions. Thus, they take up jobs that the local people cannot or choose not to do, especially in
agriculture and construction. In this way, they fill a lacuna in the host country. Once in Europe (mainly France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Holland), migrants form groups, helped by their predecessors, and do odd jobs, like selling phone cards and cigarettes, or washing cars, etc. They do not project a good image of their fellow Moroccans or Africans. At times, they are aggressive because this is the only way they can express themselves in a society that is hostile to them.

The EU Commissioner Franco Frattini has acknowledged that even if Europe barricades itself, deports hundreds of thousands while subjecting them to degrading conditions, and mobilizes the police forces of the Maghreb—which often assist undocumented immigration—it will not prevent the continuous flow of undocumented immigrants. If Europe wants to help reduce undocumented migration, it must adopt and encourage sustainable development in the Maghreb and other African regions. The EU can cut down on undocumented immigration only if the causes of this immigration are purposefully addressed.11

Undocumented migrants are better able to adapt in their host countries than integrate. As they are usually realistic and pragmatic, in order to achieve their most important goals, they learn the local language very quickly, locate all the important places in the city, and acquire useful information to enable them to find jobs, housing, and inexpensive food. Given the overwhelming state interest in combatting undocumented migration, the tendency to cast it as one of the most critical problems that the contemporary world is facing, and the amount of debate that the matter has generated—particularly the criticism of the criminalization of covert labor migration—it is appropriate to ask whether this problem can be addressed at all. To do this, we should take the following points into account:

- Undocumented migrants have been pushed into migration by poverty, and are rejected by their home states because they are unskilled and have not succeeded or reached the desired level of success in their home countries.
- They are attracted by the freedom of expression and democracy in Europe, as well as by wealth and prosperity, which encourages equal opportunities and rapid social advancement.
- They are rejected by the host country because they are poor, semi-educated, and come from a developing country that is culturally different, and they do not speak the local language at all or are never able to master it.
- Undocumented migrants are also motivated by the measures in place to protect human rights in Europe, which allow the free movement
of people to fulfill their needs and feed their interests, and has laws encouraging integration of migrants from EU countries.

The arguments against state policies that criminalize covert labor immigration can be summed up as follows: Although the liberal world economy and the host country generally allow the free circulation of goods and products, they monitor foreign residents and restrict the movement of migrants for socioeconomic and security reasons. The problem of migrants could be solved by reconciling the needs of the migrants with those of the host country. However, it is difficult to combine the strong desire of the migrant to live in Europe on the one hand with the host country’s rejection on the other—hence the difficulty of finding an adequate solution to this serious issue.

Given that economic, political, and social constraints drive the urge to migrate, this phenomenon is difficult to resolve. Although the governments of the source countries try hard to stop the movement of undocumented migrants, they cannot eradicate it. Similarly, the host countries’ governments cannot stop undocumented migration, but can control it by establishing quotas on the number of migrants to be allowed in, according to their economic needs and priorities. Nonetheless, attempts are being made on both sides of the Mediterranean to reduce undocumented migration by:

a) Moving certain industries south of the Mediterranean,
b) Increasing investment in the source countries, and
c) Training potential migrants before they are allowed to migrate to Europe.

If the undocumented migrant gains legal residence in the host country, he or she adapts to the country’s way of life, works hard, and tries to save money to send to his or her family back home or to invest in their country of origin. Thus, these migrants have their heads in Europe and their hearts in their home country. Altogether there are more than 1.5 million Moroccan immigrants in Europe, and about 1 million return to Morocco each summer to vacation with their families. Only about 10 percent return permanently to their home countries.

In the host European countries, undocumented Moroccan and other African labor persists, despite efforts to combat the entry of the undocumented immigrants. Undocumented employment of foreign workers, breaching labor laws, has risen sharply (86,800 cases in 1996 compared with 79,500 the previous year). The host countries profit a great deal from the exploitation of the most vulnerable sector in the labor market: the
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In fact, the processes of globalization, transnational flows of capital, the exchange of goods, investment, and global communications and transportation systems, lead to both social mobility and displacement. In addition, the increasing and widening economic gap between the north and the south has accelerated the rate of migration.

Migration Policy and Action Plan

In July 2006, EU ministers and African leaders held a Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat. To discourage undocumented immigration into Europe, participants agreed on an action plan that included development assistance to African countries. The EU pledged nearly $23 billion to the African countries that suffer because of undocumented migration to promote development projects and reduce poverty. The ministers also discussed ways to foster legal migration and compassionate methods to stop the flow of undocumented migration such as cooperation, legal advice, assistance for undocumented immigrants, and greater collaboration between the two continents.

Despite the good intentions of the conference to address the chronic problem of undocumented immigration, it failed to adequately address the factors that lead to economic migration. Although the development aid offered by Europe is important, it is insufficient when compared with the remittances sent by African immigrants abroad: $17 billion in 2000 and 2003 alone. For most of these countries of origin, these remittances are an important source of income—sometimes exceeding foreign direct investment.

Moreover, many Africans still believe that Europe, which is responsible for the legacy of colonialism, must make concrete contributions to the development of the continent. The president of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konare, warned that “selective immigration policies” in Europe have driven skilled labor out of Africa at the expense of the continent. Also, human rights concerns and a lack of trust between Africa and Europe, may hinder cooperation between the two continents. However, African governments are expected to promote good governance, root out corruption, and foster economic growth and development. On the other hand, Europe must continue to work with Africa to find a plausible permanent solution. Beyond aid, the EU should continue to search for new ways to support economic development in Africa over the long term. Due to the high death toll of undocumented migrants and the huge cost of policing efforts for Europe, it is necessary to develop this African-European dialogue into a serious partnership to curb undocumented migration.
Despite their overall contribution to the economies of the host countries, undocumented migrants are denied most social rights, which subjects them to more exploitation. On one side are workers who find themselves in an undocumented status through no fault of their own (which is mainly the case with domestic workers who overstay their visas). Then there are employees who are identified with a specific sort of employment by the work-permit system. The third category comprises those migrants who enter through family ties, and find themselves compelled to enter the labor market illegally because of regulations set by the receiving country.

In many European countries, undocumented migrants can be deported at any time. In Italy, as in other EU countries, the immigration policy has increasingly become a political issue. With the issuing of “the Dini decree” in 1995, the Italian government began deporting undocumented foreigners, and subjected those who employ them illegally to a two- to six-year prison sentence. In addition, it allowed for the legalization of undocumented immigrants if the employer reported their position.16

For a large number of Moroccans, migration is the only solution to financially support an extended family. Although migrants sometimes are heavily indebted to intermediaries, including traffickers, remittances represent an important source of income for the families and source countries. Still, research conducted in various countries shows that those Moroccans who migrate are usually underemployed. At the demand level, research conducted in Spain in 1996 showed that Moroccan women were favored as maids in families with children.17 Domestic work is very demanding, both physically and emotionally, because it involves hard work and caretaking. When the undocumented migrants gain legal status, their overall situation gradually improves, making the migratory experience a process of empowerment.

As far as Moroccan immigrants in Spain are concerned, Alegret and Solana18 argue that they represent the largest number of immigrants working in small towns and rural areas in Spain. Recently, Spain launched a campaign directed at about 46,000 undocumented Moroccan immigrants. Der Erf and Heering19 claim that “more than 60,000 Moroccans received residence permits in 2001 during five phases of regularization that had started since 1980s.” The flow of undocumented immigrants has not stopped, and any study that investigates the issue of immigrants in Europe must deal with this category of foreign immigrants.

Ennaji and Sadiqi20 state that for some Moroccan workers, Islam has provided a cohesive basis of identity as opposed to communism and French culture. Notwithstanding the outbreak of Muslim fundamentalism among Maghrebis in France—which has been exaggerated for
political purposes—an Islamic identity still appeals to members of the second generation as an alternative to the choice of nationality. Moreover, second-generation migrants in France welcomed the socialist victory in 1981 since the socialist administration reversed many anti-immigrant policies that were instituted in the late 1970s. Beginning with that victory, more positive decrees were issued in an effort to open French society to non-Europeans living in France.

Despite all the measures and actions taken by Europe to curb undocumented migration, according to European estimates, approximately half a million undocumented immigrants still enter the EU annually.\textsuperscript{21} To fight against undocumented migration effectively, the EU must consider the motivating factors that push many African youth to leave their families and homes in Africa to improve their prospects in Europe.

 Conclusion

Undocumented migration is a real problem for the host countries, particularly Spain, France, and Italy, while migration is lucrative for the source countries. For example, 2 to 3 billion euros ($3.16 to 4.74 billion in August 2008) are sent to Morocco each year.\textsuperscript{22} Many migrants who have been able to gain legal status send money home to families they have left behind. Billions of dollars each year are sent back to Africa from the Diaspora around the world—in many cases making up a sizable chunk of the home country’s GDP. Thus, migration is an economic advantage for Morocco, which also provides migrants with psychological and cultural support. However, undocumented migrants are ill treated and underpaid by employers in the host country. Since there are considerable economic advantages from the work of undocumented migrants, both the source and host countries should negotiate strategies to reduce undocumented migration, which can damage bilateral relations if it gets out of control.

Notes

1. Every year, the European Union receives dozens of thousands of illegal migrants from Africa alone according to European estimates.
2. This phenomenon of illegal migration is not specific to North or black Africans. East Europeans, Latinos, Chinese, Pakistanis, Lebanese, Kurds, and Iraqis are also a part of the illegal migration process.
4. See the Moroccan daily *Le Matin* of May 20, 2005: 8.
6. Official figures provided by the Ministry in charge of Moroccan migrants abroad.
7. Morocco has recently become a very important transit country for illegal migrants from black Africa, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Morocco lately has been promised 40 million euros from the European Union to deal with this situation.
14. This is according to a report issued by the Office of the United Nations Special Adviser on Africa in 2005.
16. Despite the difficulties encountered at the beginning, the legalization process showed that about 25 percent of Italy's non-EU nationals were "illegal" with Filipinos constituting the vast proportion. However, the point should be made that it is important to investigate the gender and ethnic component of the undocumented as well as the documented workforce to precisely pinpoint the degree of "feminization." It is worth noting that there are two levels of the labor market, one for EU citizens and one for migrants who dominate the low-wage and lower-status job markets.
18. Ibid.
20. 2007.

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