



**Lesley
Williams Reid**

CRIME IN THE CITY

**A Political and Economic Analysis
of Urban Crime**

Criminal Justice Recent Scholarship

Edited by
Marilyn McShane and Frank P. Williams III

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Crime in the City

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Lesley Williams Reid

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Economics, Politics and Crime

How do economic and political conditions influence aggregate rates of crime? Although this appears to be particularly straightforward question, years of research have failed to provide a satisfactory answer. A limited understanding of the relationship between macro-level economic and political structures and crime continues to characterize current criminology. This limitation is particularly problematic due to the increasing relevance of the structural changes that have reshaped the United States economy over the past thirty years.

U.S. economic restructuring has resulted in shifts in the composition of labor markets, as well as significant changes in the very nature of employment (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Rubin 1995). Largely due to such shifts, U.S. cities have witnessed intensive demographic, political and economic reorganization leading to a changing class structure, increasing inequality, and rising racial segregation (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1996). At both national and local levels, these changes have had significant effects on crime that current theories are ill equipped to explain. Although a growing number of scholars have documented these weaknesses (Greenberg 1993; Hagan 1994; LaFree 1999; Zahn 1999), the current body of research and theory has yet to sufficiently clarify the relationship between trends in rates of crime and changes in the political economy of cities.

Renewed interest in the structural causes of aggregate crime rates has spawned significant theoretical advances. Social disorganization theory, strain theory and critical criminology have each expanded our understanding of the causal mechanisms behind variance in crime rates across nations, cities, and communities. Too little conclusive empirical

research, however, has emerged from these theoretical perspectives. Hence, research that can improve our understanding of the effects of economic and political conditions on crime rates remains both important and timely in the current context of rapid economic and political urban reorganization.

This study uses a longitudinal, comparative method to examine the effects of economic restructuring and political reorganization on rates of crime. It analyzes economic, political, and crime data for four U.S. cities: Detroit, Boston, New Orleans and Atlanta. Although similar in terms of above average crime rates over most of the post-World War II era, these cities differ in terms of the economic and political changes each has weathered. The comparative aspects of this research allow for disaggregate analyses that examine variance in rates of crime at the city level, recognizing that cities are the junctures at which broad economic and political trends influence individual action.

The longitudinal aspects of this research employ quantitative time series techniques. Assumptions required by many quantitative time series techniques have serious implications for conceptualizations of both history and time (Jensen 1997). For example, the oft-used ARIMA analysis removes time-dependent components of data that are the source of spurious correlation. In doing so, however, ARIMA analysis also purges long-run trends in the data, effectively eliminating history. Longitudinal research that relies on quantitative time series data is limited in the degree to which it can explain the relationship between economics, politics, and crime. Time series data must be interpreted in tandem with an exploration of the historical context in which they are located. Only by maintaining an ongoing dialogue between theoretical rationale and analytic technique can the researcher ensure that quantitative analyses are explaining historical trends, and not simply erasing them (Alford 1998; Isaac 1997; Ragin 1987). Hence, this study contextualize the comparative, quantitative analysis in this study with a historical overview of the political economy of each city. It use both primary and secondary sources of historical data to describe trends in the political-economic profile of each case, paying particular attention to major shifts in economic development, public policy, and social institutions. Together the use of quantitative, comparative and historical methods may provide new insights into the relationship between aggregate economic and political conditions and rates of crime.

CRIMINOLOGY IN CONTEXT: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

In his 1991 American Society of Criminology presidential address, John Hagan (1992) spoke of the “poverty of a classless criminology.” In a laudable effort to distance themselves from the pejorative discourse of early criminology and even contemporary popular culture that invoked images of a so-called criminal class, criminologists of the post-war era abandoned any discussion of class and crime. A similar indictment could be levied against criminologists for their abandonment of the implications of context on crime. In an effort, although perhaps not so laudable, to fashion itself as a science and a profession, criminology has regularly omitted the role of both temporal and spatial context in shaping crime in favor of the highly individualized style of criminology that has dominated the vast bulk of criminological research over the past fifty years (Birkbeck and LaFree 1993; Taylor 1999). As a result too little contemporary criminology actually attempts to put crime in context.

At its essence, crime is a social phenomenon that involves individuals, but as importantly it involves time, place and structure (Findlay 1999). Understanding the broader temporal, spatial and structural context in which crime occurs necessitates engagement in analyses of macro-level processes. That engagement is impeded by the individualistic and social psychological focus of contemporary criminology.¹ This is not to say that understanding individual motivation and the psychological underpinnings of crime is not essential to understanding crime; but it is instead to say that it should not be emphasized at the sacrifice of context (Taylor 1999).

What follows is a detailed overview of the strengths and weaknesses of current research in criminology. First, I offer a review of the weaknesses of current research, particularly its continued difficulties with addressing the link between politics, economics, and crime, especially in the post-industrial era. Second, I provide a brief review of the strengths of current research in criminology in terms of the emerging emphasis on both temporal and spatial context. A further review is included in Chapter Two that puts both the research discussed below, as well as a broader body of more established criminological research, in a theoretical context.

The Weaknesses: Five Problems Characteristic of Current Research

Five problems characteristic of current research contribute to the continued lack of clarity in our understanding of the impact of political and economic conditions on crime. First, current research provides only a limited understanding of the ways that macro-level economic conditions influence crime. Although a respectable body of research has examined the relationship between inequality and crime (e.g. Blau and Blau 1982; Blau and Golden 1986; Bridges and Myers 1994; Hagan and Peterson 1995; Harer and Steffensmeier 1992; Kovandic, Vieraitis and Yeisley 1998; LaFree and Drass 1996; Messner 1989; Messner and Golden 1992; Messner and South 1986; Patterson 1991; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994), very little research has explicitly examined the influence of the factors at the root of rising, or declining, income inequality.

Contemporary studies examining more direct measures of economic conditions have dealt primarily with the effects of unemployment (Crutchfield, Glusker and Bridges 1999). As I will discuss in the next section, unemployment may be a less meaningful concept in the contemporary political-economic era than in prior eras. Marginal employment and chronic joblessness may be more illustrative of current trends in urban labor markets (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Moore and Larramore 1990; Rubin 1995; Wilson 1996; Wilson, Tienda and Wu 1995). Changes in urban employment may result in a greater need for informal, and possibly illegitimate, sources of income (Allan and Steffensmeier 1989; Freeman 1997; Skinner 1995; Tilly 1991, 1992; Wilson 1996).

Second, very little research takes seriously the possibility that the effects of economic conditions may be mediated by political context. Changes in economic structures often necessitate changes in political structures. Both the form of political change and the consequences of political change may be best understood through an analysis of changes in urban class structures. Historically, cities have witnessed both middle class flight to the suburbs and upper middle class gentrification of inner city neighborhoods. Such changes in class composition have likely had profound implications for the urban political economy. Declines in the size of the middle class are associated with the loss of an important tax base, leaving cities that are increasingly unable to meet the needs of a minority electorate (Logan and Molotch 1987;

Reed 1988). Such losses may, or may not, have been offset by urban gentrification.

Further, the loss of the middle class has necessarily lead to an increasingly bifurcated class structure composed of the traditional urban political, economic and social elite who are historically tied to place and the urban poor who are economically and socially tied to place (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1996). This bifurcated class structure means that at specific times there may have been fewer points of intersection between the interests of the poor and the interests of the elite, potentially leading to increasingly adversarial urban class relations. Adversarial class relations may be manifested as shifts in political stability, as well as changes in city-level social and criminal justice policies, thereby influencing rates of crime. Again, urban gentrification may have offset class bifurcation; but it may have exacerbated class bifurcation as young, often childless, urban professionals have replaced stable, city-dwelling families (Caulfield 1992; Suchar 1992).

Third, criminologists infrequently place adequate emphasis on longitudinal processes and historical contingency. In repeated attempts to clarify the often-ambiguous links between economics, politics and crime, criminologists have not fully examined the role of longitudinal change in macro-level analyses (LaFree 1999).² Even in research that uses longitudinal methods, an understanding of time and history is often lacking. Isaac and Griffin (1989) argue that the vast majority of quantitative time series research ignores historical processes. This critique is especially true of time series analyses of the relationship between crime and economic or political conditions. The bulk of economics-crime research uses time simply as a method by which to measure correlated fluctuations in both crime and indicators of economic well-being, providing little, if any, explanation for the relevance of a certain time period.

Moreover, little current research acknowledges the profound economic changes that have occurred between World War II and the present. Our understanding of crime would benefit from research with a longitudinal, historical perspective that emphasizes the often neglected concept that changes in crime rates are situated in specific historical contexts (LaFree 1998; see also Carlson and Michalowski (1999, 1997) and Michalowski and Carlson (1999) for examples of recent research that take seriously issues of temporal variance).

Finally, research linking crime and political and economic conditions often fails to yield meaningful results due to the use of data at an overly aggregate level. The bulk of macro-level, longitudinal studies of the relationship between crime and social conditions is based on national-level data (e.g. Cantor and Land 1985; Carlson and Michalowski 1997; Devine, Sheley and Smith 1988; Hale and Sabbagh 1991; Land, Cantor and Russell 1995); state-level data (e.g. Grant and Martinez 1997; Allan and Steffensmeier 1989); or aggregate city-level data (e.g. Blau and Blau 1982; DeFronzo 1996; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Sampson and Groves 1989). Emerging research suggests that highly aggregate data masks considerable variation at the state, and more importantly, city-levels of analysis (Carlson 1998; Crutchfield, Glusker and Bridges 1999; Lattimore et al. 1997). City-level analyses can provide a more nuanced understanding of how economic and political structures influence crime rates.

Simply using city-level data may, however, be insufficient. An explicitly comparative method of analysis that takes into account historical, cross-case variance in economic and political restructuring may better account for spatial variance in rates of crime. Beyond the theoretical and methodological importance of comparative city-level analyses, such analyses may be more amenable to the development and implementation of local-level policy that may temper the potentially criminogenic effects of economic and political dislocation.

In summary, while current theory and research have expanded our understanding of the relationship between economic conditions, political structures and rates of crime, significant shortcomings in both theoretical development and empirical analyses remain to be addressed. In terms of theoretical development, a full understanding of aggregate differences in crime rates will need to draw on a wide range of theories (Agnew 1999). More specifically, a synthesis of theories that recognizes the points of intersection and the points of departure across theories is necessary. Such an approach may allow for the inclusion of the key points of different theories, but expand beyond the sum of the theories to provide a potentially more comprehensive understanding of aggregate variation in crime rates. In terms of empirical analyses, future research needs to correct the weaknesses of past research, not simply delineate them. Specifically, research exploring the relationship between economic conditions, political structures and rates of crime should incorporate both longitudinal analyses that account for the role of shifting economic and political structures and comparative analyses

that account for distinct differences across communities. In these ways, this study represents an attempt to add some measure of clarity to our understanding of the political economy of urban crime by avoiding a number of the weaknesses characteristic of past research.

The Strengths: A Brief Review of Recent Research

The weaknesses I have outlined are broad generalizations of the dominant literature in criminology. There are exceptions to these generalizations, some quite significant. Current strengths in criminological research examining the effects of political-economic conditions on crime have emerged from early work that examined broader historical and comparative causes of crime (e.g. Allan and Steffensmeier 1989; Devine, Sheley and Smith 1988).

Three basic themes organize emerging literature in criminology that seriously considers the effects of political and economic restructuring on crime during the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial era. First, a small body of recent literature explicitly deals with the issue of historical context in the relationship between crime and unemployment. Second, a similarly small, but expanding, area of research explores the increasingly important effects of labor market conditions, beyond unemployment, on rates of crime. Finally, a diffuse strand of research explores the effects of political changes and rates of crime. I provide further details regarding these themes below.

Historical Context

Historical political, economic and social context may be the most evidently absent aspect of current crime research.³ To some degree this may be as much a result of a lack of data as of an aversion to historical methods. In the United States we have sufficiently reliable crime data beginning in the 1930s.⁴ Earlier data are available for individual jurisdictions and internationally, but not in as comprehensive a format.

Gurr, Grabosky and Hula's (1977), *The Politics of Crime and Conflict* is the most extensive historical account of crime. Over an expanse of 800 pages, Gurr, Grabosky and Hula (1977) trace the relationship between street crime, social mobilization and institutions of public order, including but not limited to the police and criminal justice system. This study represents flagship research in terms of its historical detail and broad coverage; the analysis begins in the sixteenth

century in Stockholm and continues through the twentieth century in London, Calcutta and Sydney, in addition to Stockholm.

More contemporary integration of historical context in crime research draws on Gordon, Edwards and Reich's (1982) theory of social structures of accumulation (SSA). The SSA theory explains capital efficacy in the distribution of economic rewards by historically contextualizing the periods of capitalist expansion and decay that are determined by the historical configuration of capital and the state.

In their research drawing on SSA theory, Carlson and Michalowski (1997) examine the oft-debated relationship between crime and unemployment. The effect of unemployment on crime has been a long-standing disagreement in criminology because many studies have found conflicting results. Carlson and Michalowski (1997) are able to add clarity to this debate by demonstrating that the relationship between unemployment and crime is historically contingent. In other words, the direction and magnitude of the effect of unemployment on crime varies depending upon the institutional arrangements between government and industry that are part of the current SSA. Contradictory results in past research linking crime and unemployment are due to the omission of historical context by treating any period of years as a simply a sample of any population of years.

Labor Market Conditions Beyond Unemployment

Laudable recent research recognizes the increasingly important effects of labor market conditions beyond unemployment on rates of crime. One of the most promising variants of this research examines the effects of secondary labor market employment on crime. The theory of segmented labor markets holds that there are two labor markets, the primary and the secondary. The primary labor market consists of jobs typified by high wages, stable employment, bureaucratic management, and opportunities for advancement. Secondary labor market jobs, by contrast, generally require few skills, necessitate little job training, provide minimal job security, pay low wages, and provide limited mobility (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Gordon 1972; Osterman 1975).

Labor market participation research finds that employment in secondary labor market jobs increases criminal involvement due to the degree to which inadequate employment undermines commitment to legal rules and provides the time and opportunity to participate in leisure activities that underlie risk-taking and, often, criminal behavior (Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997).⁵ Importantly, this research finds that

the impact of secondary labor market employment is exacerbated in areas where there is a high percentage of secondary labor market employment. So that it is not simply that the individual is not tied to the labor market, but that they associate with many others with equally weak ties to employment (Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997). Further, research finds that the effects of labor market structure impact juvenile delinquency as well as adult criminality (Bellair, Roscigno, and McNulty 2003; Bellair and Roscigno 2000).

Labor market research also finds significant differences across cities with regard to the impact of secondary labor market participation on the relationship between employment and crime (Crutchfield, Glusker and Bridges 1999).⁶ In high-tech cities, such as Seattle, secondary labor market participation impacts crime rates through the intervening effects of education. In traditional manufacturing cities, such as Cleveland, secondary labor market participation impacts crime directly. Similar findings hold for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas more generally (Lee and Ousey 2000; White 1999). Educational attainment is not as important a factor in this context. Finally, cities with traditionally large service sectors, in Crutchfield's analysis Washington, D.C. (Crutchfield, Glusker and Bridges 1999), have more entrenched crime due to a long history of secondary labor market employment.

Political Conditions and Crime

Finally, a narrow strand of research explores the relationship between politics, very loosely defined, and rates of crime. The bulk of recent research in this area looks at what can be termed the politics of crime (Beckett and Sasson 2000).⁷ Crime is a core issue in urban politics across the United States and has been so for the past thirty years (Jacob and Lineberry 1983). Politicians at all levels of the U.S. government play to the inflated fear of crime in the United States for political gain (Beckett and Sasson 2000). The result has been a crime control industry that monopolizes the budgets of federal, state and local governments. The U.S. federal government's budget allocation for crime control has tripled since 1995; increasing from just over one trillion dollars in 1995 to well over four trillion in 1999 (Chambliss 2001).

While the bulk of research on crime and politics concentrates on how crime, as a social problem, impacts U.S. politics, recent research

also argues that politics may impact crime. This research takes two primary approaches to understanding how politics may be affected by crime. First, research indicates that politics may influence crime by the ways in which politicians and government agencies deal with the inter-related issues of social welfare and social control. The most basic premise of this research is that government policies may lessen crimes of the poor by lessening the negative impact of the vagaries of the market that unduly influence the poor (Cullen 1994; Currie 1989).⁸ Welfare state spending, the extent and form of which is an inherently political decision, tends to lessen aggregate rates of crime (Fiala and LaFree 1988; Gartner 1990, 1991; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997). Hence, the nature and scope of welfare policy is one mechanism through which politics impacts crime.

A second mechanism through which politics may impact crime is the legitimacy of existing political institutions. Research indicates that crime rates fluctuate in opposition to trends in the level of legitimacy accorded the U.S. political system, so that as political legitimacy decreases, crime increases (LaFree 1998). While LaFree's (1998) research is highly speculative in that he merely tracks trends in crime and the historical legitimacy of political institutions, related research comes to similar conclusions using more robust techniques and circumscribed research questions (Grant and Martinez 1997; Jacobs and Woods 1999). In particular, Jacobs and Wood (1999) find that interracial homicides in which blacks kill whites are lower in cities with black mayors than in cities with white mayors. They attribute this to black perceptions of both the heightened efficacy of the local government and the increased influence of a black electorate under the leadership of a black mayor (Bobo and Gilliam 1990).

CRIME IN CONTEXT: POST-WORLD WAR II POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

The emerging research that links changes in the urban political economy and crime holds that to understand crime, we must first understand the context in which crime occurs. This does not simply mean the situation in which a single crime is committed, but instead refers to the broader, macro-level context in which crime rates are embedded. The twentieth century has witnessed remarkable economic and political changes, the impacts of which have been felt both within the United States and across the globe. Social change is a facet of

every society. When social change occurs at a hyper-accelerated rate, change becomes crisis (Hobsbawm 1994). It is at these points of extremely rapid change, or crises, that an understanding of social problems, such as crime, is best situated (Findlay 1999).

Hobsbawm (1994) identifies three categories of change that have accelerated at such a rapid rate as to exhibit a true tendency toward crisis: Globalization, social relations, and ethnic interactions. Hobsbawm (1994) argues, as have others, that the globe has become a far more unified operational unit than at any point in past history. The rate of globalization, suggests Hobsbawm (1994), has accelerated so rapidly that it is now beyond the capacity of the existing government of any one state or the collective behavior of any one group of people to come to terms with.

This acceleration of economic and political globalization has led to the breakdown of historical and traditional forms of social relations, ranging from extended families to the territorial nation-state (Hobsbawm 1994). As traditional social relations disintegrate, the void left is rapidly filled by an “a-social individualism” that has long characterized Western, capitalist nations. Subsequently, rapid changes in the ethnic composition of cities across the globe are exacerbating increasing tensions caused by changing social relations. As the descendants of western Europeans become a minority group, they more desperately cling to their historical monopoly on political and economic power, and in doing so increasingly identify ethnic and racial minorities as a threat, an “other” that brings with it poverty, immorality, and crime (Hobsbawm 1994).

These changes are at the basic core of the crisis in the urban environment witnessed by the U.S. in the latter half of this “short twentieth-century” (Hobsbawm 1994: 15). In this section, I provide a focused discussion of two aspects of urban change that are directly related to the crises identified by Hobsbawm. First, I discuss the restructuring of employment and the social relations between labor and capital. Second, I discuss changes in trends in poverty and inequality that are a consequence of transformations in employment. An understanding of changes in the nature of work and changes in the nature of stratification will provide the framework within which we can understand the fundamental transformations of social relations, especially urban social relations, that effect criminal behavior. This

discussion will set the stage for the theoretical argument that I propose in Chapter Two.

Twenty-First Century Employment: Unstable, Insecure and Inefficient

It is virtually irrefutable that the U.S. economy and, subsequently, the nature of work in the United States have changed dramatically over the past fifty years. The foundation of the U.S. economic infrastructure has shifted from an industrial base to what is termed a post-industrial base. Deindustrialization, or the private disinvestment in the U.S. productive infrastructure (Bluestone and Harrison 1982), represents one of the most significant economic shifts in the United States over the past five decades (Meisenheimer 1998).

The Manufacturing to Service Shift

The primary result of deindustrialization has been the decline in manufacturing jobs. Manufacturing employment has been on the decline in the United States for the past thirty years. Between 1970 and 2000, the proportion of the United States workforce employed in manufacturing industries decreased by one half, yielding a decline in total manufacturing employment from 31 percent to 15 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002). The real crisis in manufacturing employment began to emerge in the early 1980s as the growth of manufacturing jobs first became stagnate and then actually began to shrink (Bluestone and Harrison 1986).

Over this same period the U.S. workforce experienced a parallel increase in service industry employment. At the conclusion of WWII, service industries employed only 10 percent of nonfarm workers in contrast to the 40 percent of workers employed in manufacturing industries (Meisenheimer 1998). By the early 1980s, service industries surpassed manufacturing and became the largest employer among major industries (Meisenheimer 1998). The proportion of the U.S. workforce employed in service industries has increased, since 1970, to almost 40% of all workers (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002).

This manufacturing to service shift has led to fundamental changes in the very nature of work, both within the United States and across the globe. These changes have shifted the objectives, organization, control, and prospects of work (Amin 1994). In terms of the objectives of work, industries have shifted from the manufacture of goods to the distribution of goods and the provision of services. This shift in

objectives has led to subsequent shifts in the organization of work. Manufacturing production necessitated the organization of labor in terms of factory assembly lines and work group teams. The distribution of goods and the provision of services have allowed work to be decentralized, with workers operating independently or through electronic networks. This change in the organization of work precipitated changes in the control of work. Typical worker-employer relationships during the industrial era were contractual and relatively permanent. In the post-industrial era, worker-employer relationships tend toward the individualistic and particularistic. Finally, the long-term prospects of work have changed from an expectation of virtually lifetime employment during the industrial era to an understanding that work is likely to be short-term, part-time or contingent during the post-industrial era (Amin 1994).

The impact of these changes, as the U.S. economy has shifted from an industrial to a post-industrial foundation, is less clear. Have these changes been to the benefit or the detriment of the typical worker? The pessimists in the post-industrial debate hold that changes in the nature of work in the U.S. have benefited the few while leading to a decline in the overall quality of employment for the many, especially for women and minorities. On the other hand, the optimists in the post-industrial debate argue that changes in work structures have improved working conditions for all workers and lessened racial and gender inequality, as the premium on skill in the post-industrial era has eroded historical patterns of discrimination.

In terms of objective work outcomes, the manufacturing to service shift has resulted in two primary changes in the quality of jobs in the U.S. First, the shift away from manufacturing as the dominant industry of employment in the United States has led to increases in part-time, temporary and contingent work. Second, the manufacturing to service shift has resulted in changes in the distribution of wages in the United States.

Part-Time, Temporary and Contingent Work

Job security is an important component of the quality of work. A number of factors related to deindustrialization might lead to declines in job security. The past fifteen years have born witness to the tendency of firms to outsource nonessential tasks, growth in the temporary help industry, technological advancements that have

displaced low-skill workers, and increased local and global competition (Rubin 1995; Meisenheimer 1998). But are these trends as widespread as they appear and has the manufacturing to service shift led to a decline in the stability of U.S. jobs? Several measures are relevant to a discussion of job stability: Worker displacement, involuntary part-time work, and contingent work.

Displaced workers are those who lose their job as the result of an employer closing or moving the workplace, the elimination of their position, or insufficient work. Displacement is not simply the losing of one's job, but the structural elimination of one's job. As such it does not necessarily result in a short-term spell of unemployment, but frequently results in the failure of displaced workers to find re-employment on par with the jobs they lost (Noyelle 1987; Parker 1994; Perrucci, Perrucci, Targ and Targ 1988; Rubin and Smith 1999; Smith and Rubin 1997).

Worker displacement is a serious problem resulting from deindustrialization. Between 1980 and 1991, roughly two million people were displaced per year (Moore 1996).⁹ The vast bulk of these displacements have been the result of large-scale elimination, or relocation, of manufacturing plants. Service industries have consistently had lower rates of worker displacement than manufacturing industries. The service sector has had the lowest rate of displacement of all industries since the mid-1980s (Meisenheimer 1998). This is, of course, to be expected in light of the concurrently rapid decreases in manufacturing and increases in service employment, respectively.

Involuntary part-time employment is another relevant indicator of employment stability both in the industrial and post-industrial eras.¹⁰ For most workers who are employed part-time, their hours of employment are by choice (Blank 1990; Meisenheimer 1998). Part-time employment better accommodates worker preferences for time to devote to family, school or leisure. Explaining part-time work in terms of worker preferences, however, was much more valid during the 1950s and 1960s than today (Tilly 1996, 1991). Involuntary part-time employment, as a percentage of total employment, has risen since 1970. The growth in part-time employment is not due to supply-side issues of worker preferences. Fully 20% of part-time workers report that they would prefer to work full-time if such jobs were more available (Meisenheimer 1998). Instead, the growth in part-time employment, at least in part, represents demand-side changes as firms have increasingly

relied on part-time work as a means to cut labor costs (Blank 1990; Tilly 1991).

It is important to note that involuntary part-time work varies greatly across industries. As of 1996, involuntary part-time work was greatest in the construction industry and tended to be lowest in both professional and personal service industries (Meisenheimer 1998). Within the service sector, it appears there is a bifurcation of part-time work between “good” part-time employment and “bad” part-time employment. Good part-time jobs are most often found in professional services and represent employer attempts to retain valued employees. Bad part-time jobs are those that are designed by employers to be permanently part-time (Noyelle 1990). These permanently part-time jobs benefit employers by lowering labor costs through on-demand scheduling and the elimination of benefits (Tilly 1992).

A final measure of job stability is the prevalence of contingent work. While part-time and temporary work are both measures of current and past labor market experiences, contingent work is a measure of expectations of future work status. Contingent workers are those who lack an explicit or implicit contract with their employer to continue their work into the future (Meisenheimer 1998).

Just over four percent of U.S. workers are employed in contingent jobs (Hipple 1998). This small minority of contingent workers differs from the noncontingent majority of workers in a number of key ways. Young workers, those between the ages of 16 and 24, are the most likely to hold contingent jobs, with a contingency rate ranging from 8.4% to 11.5% (Hipple 1998).¹¹ Within this age group, contingent workers are more often in school than non-contingent workers, likely representing a lower commitment to work in the short-term. Women hold contingent jobs more often than men (Hipple 1998). This trend is not surprising in that women are more likely than men to be employed in occupations and industries in which contingent work is prevalent. Women are also more likely than men to hold part-time jobs (either voluntarily or involuntarily), which are often contingent. Contingent workers are also more likely than non-contingent workers to be racial or ethnic minorities.

Across industries, contingency rates are highest in construction and services at approximately seven percent each (Hipple 1998; Meisenheimer 1998). By contrast, rates of contingent work in manufacturing industries, transportation, and finance industries are less

than three percent (Hipple 1998). Within the service sector, there is also considerable variance. Hospital and health service industries have very low numbers of contingent workers, while business service and personal supply service industries have very high rates of contingency. In terms of occupation, contingent employment is found in both low- and high-skill jobs. In low-skill occupations, agriculture and farm workers have very high rates of contingent employment, reflecting seasonal changes in demand (Meisenheimer 1998). In high-skill occupations, college and university instructors have a particularly high rate of contingent employment; 28.4% of postsecondary teachers work in contingent jobs (Hipple 1998).

In sum, the restructuring of employment relations has increased employers' reliance on forms of non-standard work, including part-time, temporary and contingent work. In each of these forms of non-standard work, women and non-white workers are in the majority (Belous 1989; Callaghan and Hartman 1991; Tilly 1996). While non-standard work provides workers with flexible use of their time and may, in fact, reflect workers' preferences, evidence suggests that a portion of the growth of the non-standard workforce represents growth of involuntary part-time, temporary and contingent work (Callaghan and Hartman 1991; Rogers and Henson 1997).¹² These trends, paired with the manufacturing to service shift, have important implications for the wage structure of the United States.

Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure

Available Current Population Survey (CPS) data indicate divergent trends in earnings for men and women, and blacks and whites. Since the 1970s men, both black and white, have experienced an absolute decline in real earnings.¹³ White men, however, retain their substantial absolute earnings advantage over black men and both black and white women. While white men have maintained their earnings advantage, the decline in black male earnings since the 1970s, combined with increases in white female earnings, has resulted in a reordering of the earnings hierarchy by race and gender. In the late 1970s, black men earned substantially more than both black and white women. By the early 1980s, there is a shift in the direction of these trends. As white women experienced real increases in average earnings, black male earnings declined. As a result, by the mid 1990s black men earned less, on average, than white women did. Black female earnings have remained essentially stable since the 1970s. While not sharing the

earnings gains of white women, black women avoided the precipitous decline in earnings of their male counterparts.

The decline in real wages for men is even more acute after taking into account changes in the economic returns to education. All workers, with the exception of those holding advanced degrees, experienced a loss of real wages since the 1970s (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 1999). The decline in wages of less-educated men is the most pronounced of all changes in the returns to education. Since the 1970s, wages for men without a high school diploma dropped by approximately 30%. The wages of male high school graduates and men with some college experienced similar, if less dramatic, declines over the same period, falling 17% and 12% respectively (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 1999).

What do these trends reveal about work rewards in the restructured economy? It appears that most workers, with the exception of white women, earn less today than they did twenty years ago. Even taking into account the bidding up of wages for more-educated workers, only the wages of the most-educated workers have increased over this time period (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 1999).

Changes in wages are likely related to the manufacturing to service shift. Manufacturing sector wages are consistently higher, on average, than service sector wages (Braun 1997; Thurow 1987). In 2000, the average weekly wage of manufacturing employees was \$598, while the average weekly wage of retail trade employees was \$273 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002). Granted, not all service sector workers hold low paying jobs such as retail sales. The service sector is comprised of a diverse compilation of jobs ranging from health care or legal services to personal services such as janitorial services or fast food restaurants. What is important to recognize is that the number of service industries employing low-skill labor at low wages has been on the rise at the same time that the number of manufacturing industries employing skilled labor at family wages has been on the decline. It appears likely that as male employment declines in manufacturing jobs in the core of the economy, men, especially less educated men, may earn less. By contrast, while some women may benefit from greater access to non-traditional jobs, more women may be economically benefiting, at least marginally, from service-sector, non-standard, and subsequently gendered employment in the post-industrial economy.

Post-Industrial Realities: Material Poverty and Patterns of Inequality

One consequence of transformations in the structure of employment at the local, national and even international level has been unmistakable transformations in both the scope and severity of inequality and poverty. I discuss each below.

Inequality

Over the past thirty years, inequality has been increasing among both workers and families (Danziger and Gottschalk 1990; Freeman 1997; Karoly 1990). In terms of individual earnings inequality, evidence indicates an overall polarization of wages (Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Perrucci and Wysong 2003). Since the early 1970s, the percentage of the labor force employed in both the top and bottom ten percent of the earnings distribution have increased markedly (Morris, Bernhardt and Handcock 1994). This trend has held for all workers with the exception of black female workers, who have not experienced gains in high wage employment. The trend toward wage polarization, however, is most pronounced for white male workers who have witnessed increases in employment in low-wage jobs that surpasses growth in high-wage jobs (Morris, Bernhardt and Handcock 1994).

The past three decades have witnessed a similar morphing of the shape of the distribution of family income in the United States, yielding a relatively flat income distribution with more families being pushed from the middle toward either tail. Family income inequality began to increase in the 1970s as the income of the poor decreased. Inequality continued in the 1980s as the income of the rich grew relative to the incomes of those in the middle (Karoly 1990). The result was a stretching of the distribution of income resulting in a smaller middle class (Freeman 1997). Expanding inequality in terms of family income is a primary result of the growth of wage inequality. For nearly two decades, wages at the bottom and the middle of the wage distribution have remained stagnant or even declined, while the wages at the top of the wage distribution have increased significantly (Economic Policy Institute 2000).

A portion of the growth in wage inequality over the past thirty years can be attributed to the decline in manufacturing jobs and the rise of service jobs. Deindustrialization often serves to erode the earnings of workers in the middle of the earnings distribution as low-income service jobs replace middle-income manufacturing jobs (when those

jobs lost due to deindustrialization are replaced at all) (Moore 1990).¹⁴ The post-industrial economy is characterized by an expanding pool of jobs that provide little by way of rewards, opportunities, security and mobility. In fact, some have argued that the reindustrialized economy is characterized by joblessness (Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994), broken career ladders (Osterman 1996) and increased economic inequality (Danzinger and Gottschalk 1993; Burtless 1990).

The decline of manufacturing and the expansion of the service sector have had a direct impact on the distribution of earnings in the United States. Manufacturing industries not only pay higher wages than service industries, they also have a more equal distribution of pay than service industries (Braun 1997; Thurow 1987). Service sector employment necessarily increases inequality in that the growth in service sector employment most often takes the form of increases in high-wage, high-skill technology and knowledge intensive service work and increases in low-wage, low-skill labor intensive service work (Lorence and Nelson 1993; Nelson and Lorence 1988). This polarization of "good" and "bad" jobs is further exacerbated by the loss of the middle-wage manufacturing jobs that dominated the labor markets of the 1950s and 1960s. Further, if we look at the polarization of good and bad jobs that has accompanied deindustrialization it appears that the bad jobs may actually be worse today than they were during the industrial, accord era when the benefits of working in core-sector manufacturing industries filtered down to many workers in peripheral industries, including service sector industries (Braun 1997).

Rising inequality is the result of both the contraction of manufacturing employment and the expansion of service employment. The plummet of men's wages in the U.S. has been due in large part to the decline in manufacturing jobs. Even controlling for factors such as human capital, unemployment and cohort effects, manufacturing decline has contributed significantly to the rise in the number of low-wage male workers (Dooley and Gottschalk 1985; 1984). Up to 20 percent of wage inequality since the late 1970s has been the result of the elimination of manufacturing jobs (Bluestone 1990; Harrison and Bluestone 1988). The real question in the job polarization debate asks, is the growth of good, service sector jobs adequate to compensate for the rapid expansions of bad, service sector jobs -- especially in the wake of losses in medium-income, manufacturing sector jobs (Braun 1997)?

Poverty Trends

Approximately 32 million people are poor in the United State today, and another 25 million hover near poverty (Proctor and Dalaker 2002). In the context of the rapid restructuring experienced by the U.S. economy over the past twenty-plus years, the extent of poverty should not be a surprise. In terms of material poverty, two aspects are important to understanding the effects of economic transformations on poverty in America. First, we need to examine the working poor and, second, we need to explore the urban poor. These two poverty groups often intersect, but there are also important differences that have implications for the current research on political-economic changes and crime.

The working poor emerged as a significant social problem in the 1980s as real wages, especially for men, began to precipitously decline. What, however, do we mean by the working poor? The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the working poor as those persons in the labor force for at least 27 weeks out of the year whose incomes fall below the official poverty threshold; \$17,960 for a family of four in 2001 (Proctor and Dalaker 2002; Quan 1997). The Census Bureau defines the working poor somewhat differently by limiting their definition to full-time workers, a particularly problematic limitation considering recent increases in non-standard employment (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994).

The majority of working poor, using the BLS definition, do not work full-time, despite the positive impact of full-time work on raising incomes above a poverty level (Quan 1997). The poverty rate for the working poor who are employed in full-time jobs is just over four percent; the poverty rate for the working poor who only work part-time is three times greater (Quan 1997). Although the bulk of the poverty population is either too young or too old to work, between twenty and thirty percent of the poverty population is composed of the working poor (Devine and Wright 1993; Rothman 1999). Within the population of the working poor, workers who have low levels of education or who are gender or racial minorities predominate (Quan 1997).

An analysis of the working poor is important to any discussion of poverty because it contradicts the all too popular mantra that the poor are poor because they won't work. Large percentages of the poverty population that can work (those who are neither too old nor too young) do work. Yet they work at jobs that are insufficient to keep their families out of poverty. The working poor do not fit the stereotypes we

often hold of the poor. They are generally part of two-parent families (although a non-trivial percentage is headed by single-mothers), white, urban, and have a high school education (Devine and Wright 1993; Ellwood 1988; Quan 1997).

Invariably, what the working poor are is poorly employed. Not surprisingly, the rate of poverty is greatest for those employed in the service sector. Over 12 percent of service workers have incomes below the poverty line (Quan 1997). Within the service sector, female service workers have a substantially greater rate of poverty than male service workers do. Much of this gender difference is related to the type of service jobs men and women hold. Household service workers, such as housekeepers or child-care workers, are almost exclusively women and have a poverty rate of over 20 percent. By contrast, protective service providers, such as security guards, are almost exclusively men and have a poverty rate of under 4% (Quan 1997). Similar disparities are evident in the poverty rates of black and white service sector workers; the overall poverty rate of black service workers (17.7 percent) is a full six points higher than white service workers (11.1 percent) (Quan 1997). The working poor frequently experience other labor market problems characteristic of the post-industrial era. Beyond bouts of unemployment and perpetually low wages, the working poor frequently work in contingent, temporary and involuntarily part-time jobs (Quan 1997).

A second component of the poverty population that is central to a discussion of post-industrial poverty and inequality is the urban poor, the population that is often referred to as the urban underclass. Defining an urban underclass is a somewhat contentious endeavor. The underclass is not simply the segment of the poverty population with the very lowest incomes. In fact, poverty is not a litmus test for underclass status (Devine and Wright 1993). The poverty of the urban underclass is the urban poverty that is increasingly characteristic of many cities in the post-industrial era. Underclass poverty is a structural condition that is characterized by chronic poverty, pervasive social deterioration, almost complete racial and ethnic segregation, widespread crime, social and community isolation, and most importantly rampant joblessness (Devine and Wright 1993; Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987, 1996).

Thus far my discussion of the employment-related changes associated with the shift from an industrial to a, so-called, post-

industrial society has focused on those who are actually employed in some form. What has been missing from this discussion is a recognition that unemployment still exists. It is easy to overlook the continuing problem of unemployment in an era recently marked by impressively low levels of official unemployment. Over the second half of the 1990s unemployment remained stable at less than 5%, reaching a low of 4% in 2000. However, national, state, and, in some cases, even citywide estimates of unemployment miss large pockets of poverty where employment is the exception and unemployment the rule. It is unemployment in such urban pockets of poverty that may be more salient to understanding the relationship between crime and unemployment, and other labor market conditions, than overall U.S. unemployment.

Contraction of State Capacity to Deal With Poverty and Inequality

The effects of employment transitions in the post-industrial era may not necessarily have had an increased criminogenic effect. Changing employment structures do not by definition lead to changes in the magnitude of either poverty or inequality. While the restructuring of work may have serious implications for how individuals organize their lives and structure their time (Wilson 1996), the insecurity and instability that are the consequences of work restructuring in the post-industrial era may not have dire implications in terms of crime if they are not coupled with rising inequality and deepening poverty. In that intentional policies account for much of both the current levels of poverty and inequality, government policies may also serve to buffer the effects of work restructuring thereby lessening the negative effects of poverty and inequality (Fischer, Hout, Jankowski, Lucas, Swidler and Voss 1996).

Social welfare policies are one of the central links between the public and the private sectors in the U.S. and as such they are complicated by the multiple logics and institutional interests of capital and the state (Friedland and Alford 1991). Policies aimed at reducing poverty, and to a lesser extent, inequality take the predominant form of social welfare programs that distribute services and resources so as to improve the lives of individuals (Bell 1996; Gilbert and Sprecht 1986; Nelson 1995; Titmus 1963). During the U.S. post-WWII economic expansion, the development of social welfare policies was an essential component of the U.S. economy. During this time period, Keynesian economics was the dominant force behind public policy.

The importance of Keynesian economics to a discussion of social welfare policy is due to the degree to which it established a central role for the state and in doing so established distinct links between economics, politics, and social welfare policy. Keynesian theory argues that the capitalist economic market is in a constant state of experimentation (Hutton 1986). Experimentation may lead to positive results, but state intervention is essential to limiting the level of market failures. Markets require management to counter cyclical change, regulation to temper uncertainty, and arbitration by the state as necessary (Hutton 1986). Keynesian economics recognizes that the ideal world of competitive markets is far different from our real, highly complex world (Okun 1970). Government policy, according to welfare Keynesian economics, should strive to narrow the gap between the ideal world of orthodox economics, and the real world we inhabit (Okun 1970). The market is not always self-regulating and will often yield undesirable outcomes such as poverty. The role of the state is to use its budgetary and legislative resources to limit the undesirable effects of the market (Okun 1975; Samuelson 1970).

Social welfare policies expanded during the prosperity of the mid-twentieth century in an attempt, at least in ideological terms, to lessen the inherent tension between the conflicting philosophies of democratic politics, that implies the rights of citizens to equal access to the most basic resources, and market economics, that rewards those that have the most, be that money, skills or even guile (Nelson 1995). In the post-industrial era just as the squeeze of corporate profits led to a dismantling of the labor-capital accord, the squeeze of corporate profits led to the dismantling of the industrial-era welfare state.

Corporate backlash against barriers imposed by a strong centralized government, including increased welfare provisions, are at the root of what Grant (1995) terms the “new federalism.” The new federalism is characterized by the devolution of social spending, fiscal responsibilities, and economic development from the federal government to state governments (Grant 1995). Since the 1970s, post-industrial capital mobility has forced cities, regions, and even states into greater competition for capital, based not on valued resources, but on the incentives states can offer businesses. At the same time, the new federalism provides regional areas with the power to offer incentives that reduce costs of production including decreased local and state

taxes, decreased government regulation of the production process including labor control, and decreased social spending.

Of those incentives cities and states offer to businesses, tax reductions prove to be less important, while reductions in social spending appear more important (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). Safety nets provide bargaining power to workers. In the presence of social safety nets, if work is withheld, workers are not immediately destitute. However, the less coverage provided by social safety nets, the greater the power of management over workers. Hence, it is in the direct interest of capital to reduce social spending.

One of the more recent, and most comprehensive, effects of the new federalism has been what we now know of as welfare reform. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996, commonly known as welfare reform, replaced the most comprehensive means-tested cash assistance for the poor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant program. Under TANF, there is greater flexibility in the use of federal funds at the state level. Within the general TANF guidelines, states can use funds for programs other than direct cash assistance and they can establish their own criteria for receipt of what cash assistance is available. Further, TANF is a fixed dollar amount. AFDC was a program in which the federal government matched state funds for poverty assistance. More generous states were rewarded for their generosity with more federal funds. Under TANF, the federal government does not match state funding beyond the required minimum. Thus states, especially more generous states, face increasing pressure to cut welfare benefits (Twentieth Century Fund 1995). Such pressures are exacerbated by the economic stagnation of the early 21st century (McMurrer and Sawhill 1997).

Beyond the exacerbation of pressures to further limit social welfare expenditures, the diminished capacity of the contemporary welfare state may have two further effects. First, the absence of welfare state spending, as alluded to at that beginning of this discussion, is likely to have magnified the effects of post-industrial transformations on both poverty and inequality. Second, the shrinking of the welfare state is likely to have the effect of furthering the chasm between the urban underclass and middle-class, upper-middle class and well-off Americans. This may further alienate the urban poor from the U.S. political system and lead to greater alienation and distrust.

An understanding of crime necessitates an understanding of the social structures in which crime is embedded. Hence, in order to understand crime in the second half of the twentieth century it is necessary to consider the decline of the industrial, welfare-state economy and the ascent of the post-industrial, impotent-state, hypercapitalist economy in terms of the effects of this transition on the autonomous agency that operates at the individual level in the commission of crime. I will return in depth to the development of the theoretical linkages between political-economic transformations and crime in Chapter Two.

CONCLUSION: GOALS OF THE CURRENT STUDY

To reiterate, the overall goal of this study is to contribute to the emerging body of research that considers the effects of political and economic structures on aggregate criminal behavior. In particular, I propose in this research to augment current research in the following ways. First, this research is comparative in that it recognizes the value of disaggregate analyses that examine variance in rates of crime at the city level. Second, by examining the effects of changing economic and political structures in U.S. cities since World War II this research is temporally contingent. Finally, this research uses more detailed measures of economic change that may affect crime rates and detailed measures of city-level political structures that may contextualize economic change, thereby influencing criminogenic responses.

The proposed study may contribute to our current understanding of trends in crime in a number of ways. First, this study may further our current understanding of the nexus between crime and other social concerns by examining the way in which discrete measures of economic conditions affect crime. This approach goes beyond current research on unemployment and inequality by exploring the direct effects of specific employment-related characteristics of cities that may promote or inhibit inequality and economic distress. Further, by including measures of city-level politics this project examines the previously under-researched political context in which crime is situated. Second, this research goes beyond traditional geographic boundaries by using an explicitly city-level comparative research strategy. This research crosses traditional intellectual bounds by integrating quantitative analysis with a historical perspective, in which

the results of quantitative analysis are interpreted in the context of the historical political economy of cities. Third, this research rethinks justice by proposing a theoretical framework that links macro-structures to micro-behaviors through an understanding of class conflict, the methods individuals employ in understanding class relations, and the social psychological development of meanings of social justice and injustice. Finally, this research may provide knowledge valuable in developing policies at the city level that could break the link between crime and political and economic conditions.

Theoretical Links Between Crime and Urban Political Economy

The concept that economic and political conditions are related to rates of crime is not new to criminology. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, this chapter discusses the dominant criminological theories that speak to the relationship between political-economic conditions and crime. Second, it proposes an alternative to these theories that considers the implications of the dramatic political-economic transformations presented in Chapter One.

CURRENT THEORIES LINKING CRIME AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Despite their shortcomings, contemporary criminological perspectives have greatly expanded our understanding of the relationship between economic conditions, political structures and aggregate rates of crime. Foremost among these perspectives, in terms of the sheer quantity of research, is social disorganization theory. Recent research, however, has also found support for both strain theory and theories emerging from critical criminology. The following review does not represent the full scope of theories that speak to the relationship between political economic conditions and crime, but instead focuses on those theories that are of particular relevance to this research.

Social Disorganization Theory

As urban sociologists, such as Williams Julius Wilson (1996), have reinvented social disorganization theory in an attempt to better understand the social problems that are characteristic of the contemporary urban environment, so too have criminologists. Social

disorganization explanations of crime draw heavily on the early work of Shaw and McKay (1942, 1969). According to Shaw and McKay, community distress created social disorganization, defined as the disruption of primary relationships, the weakening of norms, and the erosion of shared culture (Kornhauser 1978). In sum, the contemporary social disorganization theory of crime contends that the loss of urban social structure has precipitated the decline of social control, thereby leading to increases in rates of crime.

The social disorganization model defines communities as systems of interrelated networks (Kasarda and Janowitz 1975).¹ The role of an urban community network, according to social disorganization theory, is to maintain itself through the continued socialization of its members, including, but not limited to, the application of negative sanctions to deviant members. The maintenance of this system can be undermined by social disorganization manifested at the community-level as weak social networks, limited participation in local organizations and little social control. As the antithesis of social disorganization, each aspect of social organization (networks, organizations, and control) forms the social fabric of a community (Kasarda and Janowitz 1975).

This social fabric structures communities in the following ways. First, both formal social networks (e.g. school, church) and informal social networks (e.g. extended family, neighbors) enable community members to recognize non-members and thereby guard the property of members against crime perpetrated by nonmembers. Second, participation in local organizations serves to instill community solidarity through the support of those institutions that are the organizational base through which community members work toward common goals (Kornhauser 1978). Finally, social organization is manifested as the ability of a community to exert either positive or negative social control on its members. In past research, this has been understood most often in terms of supervising juveniles in order to prevent delinquency (Krohn 1986).

Contemporary ecological criminology has elaborated on and empirically tested social disorganization models. Drawing on the urban studies of Park and Burgess (1921; Park, Burgess and McKenzie 1925), the original work of Shaw and McKay (1942, 1969), and subsequent research, the social disorganization perspective argues that community distress, in terms of poverty, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility, exerts both direct and indirect effects on rates of crime (Sampson 1991, 1993; Sampson and Groves 1989; Vesey and

Messner 1999). The indirect effects of poverty, ethnic and racial heterogeneity, and residential mobility operate through the intervening variable social disorganization. High rates of poverty in a community lessen the ability of community members to maintain ties to organizations within the community thereby increasing social disorganization and subsequently increasing crime. Frequent in- and out-migration disrupts both networks and organizational affiliations, thereby increasing social disorganization and increasing crime. Finally, ethnic and racial heterogeneity leads to associations based on identity, not common community membership. This weakens networks, organizations, and social control thereby increasing crime.

Recent research has expanded the scope of causal influences on social disorganization (Bellair 1997; Elliot et al. 1996; Sampson 1993; Sampson and Lauritsen 1994; Taylor and Covington 1988; Veysey and Messner 1999). Sampson (1987) has found that family disruption contributes to social disorganization. Adults in one-parent families are less able to monitor their own children (Cohen and Felson 1979) and are less able to contribute to aggregate control of all children in a community (Sampson 1987). Less social control, especially over youth, leads to greater levels of crime. Sampson and Groves (1989) assert that individuals in urban communities are less likely to maintain social networks, join community organizations, and exert social control over peers. Hence urban communities are characterized by a greater degree of social disorganization than rural or suburban communities and therefore exhibit greater rates of crime.

Of particular relevance to this research, another vein of recent, and potentially productive, social disorganization research examines employment as a mechanism of social control. Marginal employment, that which is characterized by low wages, variable hours, few benefits, limited requisite skills, and constrained mobility, has detrimental effects on both individuals and communities. As discussed in Chapter One, Crutchfield (1995; 1989; Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997) finds support for his argument that marginal employment increases criminality by failing to provide disincentives to prevent crime. Individuals with "good" jobs avoid situations that may jeopardize those jobs, while individuals with "bad" jobs do not (Uggen 1999). Recent ethnographic work lends support to the hypothesis that property crime is motivated by both the need for "fast cash" and involvement in a

street culture that does not value present or future employment prospects (Duster 1987; Jacobs and Wright 1999; Sullivan 1989).

Strain Theory

Classical strain theory asserts that a culture establishes certain values that are equated with shared definitions of success (Merton 1938). Structural conditions, however, frequently block large segments of the population from reaching this shared definition of success. Limited access to culturally defined success yields a division between aspirations and expectations; this division is referred to as strain. Most individuals do not resort to crime in response to strain. According to Merton (1938) and other early strain theorists (Cloward and Ohlin 1961; Cohen 1955), two responses to strain may lead to criminal involvement. Individuals may respond to strain by utilizing illegitimate means to achieve legitimate goals or they may respond to strain by replacing legitimate goals with new goals and new means of achieving them (both of which are often illegitimate).

A recent and promising variant of contemporary strain theory is Agnew's (1992; 1999) general strain theory. In general strain theory, Agnew (1992) identifies three mechanisms that lead to strain. First, strain can be the result of the failure to achieve goals. Similar to traditional strain theory, general strain theory asserts that this form of strain occurs when a society or community places great emphasis on certain goals for which the means of achieving are structurally limited. Expanding on traditional strain theory, Agnew (1992) argues that blocked access to goals encompasses three types of strain inducing divisions. Strain can be conceptualized in keeping with traditional strain theory as the difference between aspirations and actual achievements or strain can encompass the differences between expectations and actual achievements. This indicates an important difference between aspirations, that may be unrealistic, and actual expectations based on evaluations of the achievements of common referents (Agnew 1992). Strain can also take the form of the difference between equitable outcomes and actual achievements. Agnew (1992) draws on social justice literature (Cook and Hegtvædt 1983; Hegtvædt 1987; Molm 1990) to argue that strain is the result of an infringement on a sense of equity. It is not that the individual doesn't get what they want or what they think they deserve, but that they do not get out of an

interaction what they put into it. Strain results when the individual does not receive equitable rewards, especially relative to others.

Second, strain, according to general strain theory, may result from the loss of positive stimuli (Agnew 1992). At the individual level the loss of positive stimuli could take the form of the loss of a parent or adult mentor (Brezina 1996). Agnew (1992) differentiates between blocked access to goals (especially when goals have never been experienced directly) and the actual loss of positively valued stimuli. Strain results from the loss of something of value as the individual attempts to prevent the loss, substitute the lost stimuli for another stimuli, or seek retribution for the loss. Third, strain can be the result of the presence of aversive stimuli. At the individual level, aversive stimuli could be anything from criminal victimization to child abuse (Brezina 1996). Strain results from the attempt to avoid noxious stimuli, end that stimuli, or again, retaliate against the source of that stimuli (Agnew 1992; Brezina 1996).

General strain theory has a broader application than previous variants of strain theory in that it attempts to explain both individual and community differences in crime. Important to this research is Agnew's (1999) extension of general strain theory to understand aggregate differences in crime rates across communities. Agnew (1999) argues that typical urban problems such as poverty, inequality and urban decay will contribute to strain by increasing aggregate inability to achieve goals, by removing positive stimuli, and by magnifying the presence of negative stimuli. At the community level, the loss of positive stimuli could take the form of the loss of major industries or the out-migration of middle class residents (Agnew 1999). The presence of aversive stimuli, at the community level, could be urban blight, concentrated poverty, or high crime rates. An increase in the negative effects of each type of strain, in the presence of a criminogenic community context, will yield higher aggregate rates of crime. Agnew (1999) further asserts that the effects of community distress on crime will be mediated by the degree to which communities attract and retain similarly strained individuals, thereby increasing the potential for interactions among those experiencing strain. Each experience of strain increases an individual's likelihood of expressing negative emotions, such as anger or frustration (Agnew 1992).

Anger links strain and criminal behavior at both the individual and community levels (Agnew et al. 2002). In distressed communities,

individuals are more likely to experience strain as the result of factors such as poverty, divorce or urbanization. The greater the degree to which a community is composed of strained individuals, the greater the number of people in that community who will express that strain as anger. Subsequently, the more people in a community who express strain as anger, the more people in a community who will engage in criminal activities to diffuse that anger. Hence, distressed communities are more likely to have high crime rates than non-distressed communities.

Critical Criminology

In addition to social disorganization and strain theories, recent empirical research provides evidence in support of various forms of critical criminology. Critical criminology represents a much more diverse body of theory and research than either social disorganization or strain theory. Thus, this review of critical criminology will be somewhat longer than the reviews of either social disorganization or strain theories. This section discusses the emergence of critical criminology, outline the central themes in critical criminology, and proposes a model that attempts to integrate the core concepts of critical criminology in terms of explanations of variance in crime rates.

Although far from the first critical explanation of crime, contemporary critical criminology emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s as conflict criminology (Greenberg 1993). Conflict criminology challenged the then dominant liberal perspectives on crime in terms of the definition of crime, the role of power, and the relationship between crime and the state. Conflict criminology research emerged among other radical movements across the United States and Western Europe. This historical context led radical scholars to question how crime is defined and by whom (Cohen 1993). Understanding the subjective nature of definitions of crime led conflict criminologists to examine the central role of power in the defining of crime and the invocation of law.

By the late 1970s, conflict criminology, as well as its close relative, radical criminology, faced considerable, and arguably well-deserved criticism. As a result, conflict criminology, as such, disintegrated. It reemerged, however, as a loosely cohesive group of critical perspectives on crime that encompass a broad range of theories. Although far from representative of the entire scope of critical criminology research, three primary themes of critical criminology are

particularly relevant to the current research: Economics and crime, power and crime, and politics and crime.

Economics and Crime

Whereas social disorganization theory and general strain theory take urban social problems as a given, critical criminology explores their root causes in capitalism. From the critical perspective, crime is a latent outcome of capitalist crises of production and consumption (Colvin and Pauly 1983; Lynch, Groves and Lizotte 1994; Taylor 1999). Hence, changes in the structure of capitalism will necessarily yield changes in the scope and form of crime. The neo-Marxist approach argues that escalating crime is the result of capitalist crisis based on the contradiction between production and consumption. From this perspective, economic distress actually taps business cycles, thus economic contraction may increase crime rates (Wallace and Humphries 1993; Wright 1981). If structural conditions create crime, then crime cannot be eliminated without first eliminating the causal structural conditions. The nature and extent of crime, therefore, will not change without a radical restructuring of contemporary capitalism.

A small, but growing, body of research analyzes the effects of changes in the U.S. economic structure on changes in crime rates from a critical perspective. Much of this research draws on Gordon, Edwards and Reich's (1982) theory of social structures of accumulation as introduced in Chapter One. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) argue that the waves of capitalist growth and decline (Kondratieff 1935) are the result of shifts in the social structure of accumulation, in other words the organizations and institutions, including the state, that maintain stable class relations and promote capital accumulation. Each set of social structures of accumulation eventually hinders further capitalist expansion and is therefore replaced by a new set of social structures of accumulation. Carlson and Michalowski (Carlson and Michalowski 1997; Michalowski and Carlson 1999) find that social structures of accumulation influence both the direction and magnitude of the relationship between unemployment and both crime rates and incarceration rates.

Grant and Wallace (1994) argue that the presently emerging social structure of accumulation is based upon spatialization, or the increasing use of geographic relocation, or the threat of geographic relocation, as a labor control tactic. Capital is increasingly mobile, therefore

relocation, or the threat of relocation, is the primary form of labor control within the current social structure of accumulation (Grant and Wallace 1994; Grant and Martinez 1997). Applying the idea of spatialization to a study of crime, Grant and Martinez (1997) find that variance in crime rates across U.S. states is determined, in part, by the position of each state in the spatial class structure created by the current social structure of accumulation. In this context states vary in the degree to which workers have power within the labor process and the state serves as a representative of both labor and capital. Specifically, Grant and Martinez (1997) argue that the current social structure of accumulation frames individual perceptions of class and property relations. Thus, criminogenic responses to economic restructuring are the result of changes in shared meanings of work and property relations.

Power and Crime

Structural criminology, as outlined by John Hagan (1988), explains the relationship between power and rates of crime. Structural criminology critiques most orthodox theories of crime for failing to acknowledge the power relations that are endemic to crime. Structural criminology identifies two types of power relations: Instrumental power relations and symbolic power relations (Hagan 1988). Instrumental power relations refer to the actual control of physical resources and the use of that control to achieve goals. Symbolic power relations refer to the perception of legitimacy afforded certain individuals or groups and their actions, including the perceived legitimacy of existing power and property relations.

Structural criminology is also characterized by a unique approach to methodology. Orthodox theories of crime often imply structural causes, but fail to account for such causes methodologically. One way to account for structural causes of crime is to study the manner in which instrumental and symbolic power relations change over time (Hagan 1988). Therefore methods of data collection and analysis must be dynamic and relational, taking into account changes in power relations over time. The key to adapting criminological methods to structural theories of crime is through the collection of prospective and retrospective crime data over time (Hagan 1988).

Politics and Crime

Three basic theoretical orientations comprised early thought linking politics and crime in conflict criminology (Tierney 1988). First, the

convergence orientation argued that the difference between political action and criminal action was becoming increasingly blurred. As political and economic opportunities for poor, minority populations in urban, inner cities disappeared, this population increasingly rejected legitimate, institutional channels for more effective, although often illegal, strategies to obtain political and economic resources (Cohen 1973; Horowitz and Liebowitz 1968; Young 1970). Second, the political subculture perspective argued that not only had the distinction between criminal and political acts blurred, but the distinction between criminal and political organizations had blurred as well. If an organization, such as the Black Panthers, advocated illegal activities to achieve political goals, did it represent a political organization or a criminal subculture (Unsworth 1987)? Third, and most contentious, the crime as politics orientation argued that all crime was at its very essence political. All crime was political because in order to maintain power those with power defined what is criminal and applied that definition to the behavior of those without power (Becker and Horowitz 1972; Quinney 1970; Turk 1969). Thus even those who did not commit crime with expressly political motives were considered political prisoners (Greenberg 1976; Quinney 1974; Wright 1973).

Since its origin, mainstream criminologists and social movement theorists, alike, have discredited research linking political conditions and crime. Mainstream criminologists argued that conflict criminologists romanticized crime (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973). By making intent irrelevant, mainstream criminologists asserted that the conflict perspective crafted an unrealistic image of the criminal. Social movement theorists, particularly resource mobilization theorists, held that social movements, including those manifested as demonstrations and riots, were purposive and political, and hence not criminal (Oberschall 1978). By contrast, crime was, by definition, apolitical and without a moral dimension, according to the resource mobilization perspective.

Despite serious criticism, research linking crime and political conditions survived the backlash of the 1970s, albeit in a limited scope. Current research linking political conditions and crime is more carefully crafted, both in terms of theoretical rationale and empirical methods. Two related themes comprise this contemporary body of research. The first approach argues that there is a moral dimension to

crime. The second reasserts a correlation between crime and political, or proto-political, protest.

The role of social justice is key to contemporary research linking crime and political conditions. Crime, from this perspective, may represent an effort to seek justice when blocked from legitimate channels of legal redress (Black 1984). A small body of ethnographic research supports this perspective. This research indicates that crime is, in part, an expression of deeply held grievances against others manifested in the selection of targets and the justification of criminal actions as a response to real or perceived wrongs (Anderson 1978; Katz 1988).

Similar research relating crime to political conditions, from an explicitly neo-Marxist approach, suggests that at least some crime is a political response to shifting class relations (Hughes and Carter 1981). Individual criminal responses to macro-level economic shifts are mediated by middle-range political conditions in which both micro and macro experiences are embedded. Research drawing on this perspective has hypothesized that the relationship between crime and unemployment is mediated by the degree to which individuals define class relations as just or exploitative (Grant and Martinez 1997).

The second approach calls for a partial reintegration of criminology and collective action research. This approach argues that criminologists and sociologists should “hold open the possibility that there is a bit of protest in crime and a bit of crime in protest” (LaFree and Drass 1997: 850). One variation of this theme holds that crime represents a safety valve. Collective action reduces crime because it provides a quasi-legitimate alternative to crime. A second variation holds that crime and collective unrest emerge from a similar structural context, therefore crime and social unrest are positively associated. In their study of crime in London, Stockholm, Sydney, and Calcutta, Gurr, Grabowsky, and Hula (1977) find a link between sharp increases in rates of crime and periods of public disorder and civil strife. More recent empirical research in this area finds a positive relationship between rates of crime and collective action up until the 1970s, and then no relationship thereafter (LaFree and Drass 1997). Similarly, recent research suggests that crime varies inversely with various measures of political legitimacy, including attitudes toward the government, trends in civil litigation, and levels of political participation (LaFree 1999; 1998).

THEORETICAL SCOPE AND CONCEPTUAL HYPOTHESES OF THIS STUDY

In this research, I propose a fourth perspective explaining variance in rates of crime. This perspective draws on the strengths, and attempts to avoid the weaknesses, of social disorganization, strain and critical theories. While each dominant theory of crime contributes to a broader understanding of the issue, no theory is adequate in and of itself. As Agnew asserts (1999), a full understanding of aggregate differences in crime rates will need to draw on a wide range of theories. The theoretical model that I outline in the remainder of this chapter has the greatest affinity with the critical perspective, but recognizes the value of both social disorganization and strain theory.

The theoretical basis for this research does not simply integrate aspects of social disorganization, strain, and critical theories of crime. This research is informed by each, but represents a theoretical model for understanding crime that is a substantial departure from the disorganization, strain and critical paradigms. The primary difference between the theory I advance and the dominant theoretical paradigms I have discussed is the degree to which the former emphasizes the effects of changes in macro-level social structures on the determination of crime rates. An understanding of crime is dependent upon an understanding of the social structure in which crime is enmeshed. Therefore, an analysis of crime in the United States in the postwar era necessitates an analysis of the demise of the industrial, welfare state political economy and the rise of the post-industrial, impotent-state, hypercapitalist political economy.

While at its essence, crime represents the autonomous agency of an individual; agency is embedded in a broader structure. That broader structure is comprised of three components: Economic conditions, class relations and state actions. Changes in any component of this structure will change the context in which individual action is situated. Individual action will necessarily change in response to changing context. While a change in the proportion of manufacturing jobs available in the local labor market will not cause an individual to turn to crime, a change in the proportion of manufacturing jobs will change both the structure of opportunities and expectations, thereby yielding aggregate changes in criminality. Hence the transformation of the U.S.

capitalist economy from an industrial to a post-industrial base is at the heart of explanations of changes in rates of crime.

The remainder of this chapter has two goals. First, it outlines the theoretical model that informs this research (see Figure 2.1). In doing so, it discusses the likely effects of economic conditions, class relations and state institutions on post-WWII, U.S. crime rates. Second, it attempts to establish a theoretical link between broad political, economic and social structures and the individual, autonomous behavior that is, by definition, the source of changes in macro-level rates of crime.


Social Structures and Rates of Crime

Economic Conditions

Between World War II and the 1970s the relationship between employers and employees was characterized by the labor-capital accord (Bowles and Gintis 1982; Rubin 1986). During this period, workers relinquished their right to organize as a class over issues of production, investment, and policy in exchange for relatively high levels of income and employment stability. This relationship rationalized the inherently conflictual relationship between labor and capital. Through legal codification, changes in worker expectations, and dramatic profit growth, the rewards of the labor-capital accord benefited many workers (Rubin 1986). After 1970, however, business efforts to maintain profit levels in a vastly changed global economy rendered the accord unacceptably expensive and employers increasingly unwilling participants (Rubin and Smith 1992).

In the face of increased competition in the early 1970s, industries maintained profits both by reducing costs and by using their capital more profitably (Rubin 1995; Grant and Wallace 1994). Competition in the contemporary post-accord economy requires flexible production strategies that reorganize both the means of production and the social relations of production in an attempt to increase control of production processes and better respond to rapidly changing market demands (Rubin 1995).

Figure 2.1 Integrated Critical Model of Aggregate Crime Rates



Three processes aid capital in post-accord flexibility. First, as discussed in Chapter One, firms have increased their degree of labor flexibility by relying more on part-time employment, contingent employment, and outsourcing. Just as it is no longer profitable for capitalists to maintain a stockpile of production components, it is no longer profitable to maintain a paid labor force that may or may not be used. Second, firms have shifted patterns of capital investment from the production of goods to the production of services. Services garner greater profits with less capital investment, fewer employees, and have the added security of an expanding international clientele as more and more firms outsource non-essential tasks (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). Finally, firms have relocated production facilities from traditional U.S. manufacturing cities to newly industrializing regions, both within the U.S. and abroad (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Rubin 1995).

These post-accord competitive measures are at the root of significant social problems at both the individual and community levels. The movement away from full-time permanent employment results in increasing uncertainty and insecurity in the lives of many individuals. In the current era, the prospects of life-long, stable employment are in decline. In a period of such uncertainty in terms of employment, the relationship between legitimate employment and illegitimate employment (including "criminal employment") seems likely to be far more contingent and unstable than in prior periods (Taylor 1999).

The decline of manufacturing and the subsequent growth of service industries have had similar effects. This may be best observed in the increasing bifurcation of the U.S. workforce, as discussed in Chapter One. Evidence suggests that the increasingly service-based U.S. workforce is divided into a small cadre of highly skilled workers, with both the ability and opportunity to rapidly learn new skills and reshape their jobs, and an expanding pool of less skilled workers for whom flexibility is not an asset (Rubin 1995). This distributional trend may have dire consequences for the work outcomes of less privileged workers, as the benefits of the new core of the service sector fail to filter down to other workers, as they did during the accord era (Belous 1989; Harvey 1989; Reid and Rubin forthcoming).

Finally, the movement of what remains of manufacturing production away from traditional urban centers has resulted in massive social change in many, if not most, U.S. cities. Although firms move, plants move, and jobs move; people and communities stay. Further, the

loss of a traditional manufacturing base results in unemployment and underemployment. For these communities, both the capitalist tax base and the social cohesion provided by stable, equitable employment is lost (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). Even those communities benefiting from economic expansion face problems due to the movement of industries. So-called boomtowns are characterized by haphazard growth, suburbanization, and immense inequality, exacerbated by business incentives in the form of lowered taxes. This process forces boomtowns to compete with other boomtowns, fearing the loss of their relatively privileged positions, and with bust-towns, attempting to salvage themselves in any way possible (Bluestone and Harrison 1982).

Conceptually, one would anticipate that as manufacturing employment declined in a city the rate of crime might increase in that city. Why might this be the case? There are three characteristics of manufacturing employment that are lacking in much service employment. First, manufacturing employment provides higher wages for less-skilled, less-educated workers than service employment. During the accord era, manufacturing jobs, both in unionized and nonunionized firms, often provided wages and benefits sufficient to support an entire family. Service employment, with the exception of the small percentage of high-tech, high-skill service jobs, tends to provide few benefits and wages insufficient, if the sole source of income, to keep a family out of poverty.

Second, manufacturing employment is generally more stable than service employment. The relationship between labor and management in manufacturing industries tends to be contractual and somewhat permanent. By contrast, the relationship between labor and management in service industries is often individualistic and particularistic. As a result, workers in service industries face much more uncertainty about the short-term stability of their source of income than workers in manufacturing industries.

Third, the long-term prospects of work are much different in manufacturing industries than in service industries, at least manufacturing industries as they existed during the accord era. During the accord era, workers, especially unionized manufacturing workers, held a realistic expectation of virtually lifetime employment. Service workers, especially service workers in the post-accord economy, recognize that work is often short-term, part-time and contingent.

Class Relations

The shift in the United States away from a manufacturing base and toward a service base has likely contributed to crime rates by increasing levels of economic distress and insecurity. This shift has also affected the nature of class relations in the United States in the post-war era. As the majority of Americans have experienced either modest growth or actual erosion in their living standards, a minority in the upper tail of the income distribution has experienced significant income growth (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 1999). The result has been increasing inequality that has widened the gap between the upper class and most everyone else. This increasing distance between social classes in the post-war era has likely influenced crime by changing the degree to which individuals who are not part of the advantaged minority are committed to the social structure that creates and justifies the existence of that minority.

Although the decades between WWII and the 1970s were a period of trends toward less inequality, the 1980s and 1990s were a period of sharply increasing wage, wealth and family income inequality. In terms of family income, the poorest fifth of families received 5.0 % of aggregate income in 1947, but received only 3.3% in 2000 (after a high of 5.5% in 1973) (Jones and Weinberg 2000; Mishel, Bernstein and Schmidt 1999). By contrast, the richest fifth of families received 43.0% of aggregate income in 1947, but received 49.6% in 2000 (after a low of 42.8% in 1968). Across the latter decades of the twentieth century the gap between the income rich and the income poor has widened, as those in the middle of the income distribution have experienced a decline in their share of aggregate income from 17.0% in 1947 to only 14.9% in 2000 (Jones and Weinberg 2000; Mishel, Bernstein and Schmidt 1999).

From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between inequality and crime may operate through an individual's assessment of the equity of the system by which economic resources are distributed in society (Fowles and Merva 1996). In other words the distance between social classes may shape aggregate criminality in a city. In contexts in which the distance between social classes is particularly great, the individual is more likely to judge that system to be unjust, especially if the dominant political ideology, such as in the United States, stresses equality of opportunity.

Given that an individual perceives class relations to be inequitable and unjust, two possible responses could result in higher rates of

aggregate criminal offending (Fowles and Merva 1996). First, a growing number of individuals may resort to crime to redress their grievances. Second, the perceived injustice may generate a sense of frustration and anger that could translate, in extreme cases, to violent crime. Either response is indicative of a rejection of the dominant social institutions that undergird the existing structure of inequality and the dominant ideology of domination and subordination (Colvin and Pauly 1983; Hagan 1992).

Relative deprivation, as used in strain theory, is an important causal mechanism underlying the relationship between crime and inequality. Relative deprivation, as discussed earlier, is based on the tendency of an individual to make comparisons between one's position relative to the position of others. As well stated by Marx (1976: 268-269):

A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace rises beside the little house, the little house shrinks into a hut.

Under conditions of intense inequality the person residing in the little house is more likely to consider it a hut. But who is one residing in a hut to blame for the fact that they are not residing in a mansion? Some may blame themselves, some may blame the resident of the mansion, and some may blame the system of domination and exploitation that structurally determines levels of societal inequality.

I argue that crime may be influenced by individual commitment to the dominant ideology of domination and subordination in a given societal context. Class relations serve to create the orientation through which the individual accepts or rejects the dominant ideology of domination and subordination (Colvin and Pauly 1983; Hagan 1992). Not all who reject the dominant ideology of domination and subordination will turn to crime. Some who do not benefit from the existing system may not reject the dominant ideology, but may instead blame themselves or attempt to better their chances within the system through education. Others may reject the system, but work to create a system they perceive as more just. But some will reject the system of domination and exploitation and the social control structure that supports that system, thereby turning to crime.

Social control structures are the manifestations of the existing system of domination and exploitation in which the individual is immersed. In Marx's terms, social control structures are part of the superstructure that is based upon the mode of production. Social control structures both compel law-abiding behavior from the individual and provide the ideological orientation that defines the individual's relationship with social control structures and the agents that enforce social control (Colvin and Pauly 1983). This control structure arises from both objective class relations, including hierarchical positions within the class structure, and the individual's relationship to these institutionalized class structures (Colvin and Pauly 1983; Etzioni 1970).

In his compliance theory, Etzioni (1970) suggests that there is a link between the individual and the existing social control structure and the individual's ideological commitment to compliance. Thus association with social control structures, which are defined by class position, determine the degree of acceptance of the dominant ideology that legitimizes that social control structure. In other words, aggregate experiences of members of subordinate classes with members of the dominant class shape the attitudes of an individual toward the dominant ideology and the related authority structure that enforces that ideology. Subsequently, these class relations influence rates of crime by shaping the perceived legitimacy of both the dominant ideology and authority structures.

One can expect that as the distance between social classes increases, crime will subsequently increase. One measure of the distance between social classes is inequality. Therefore, in keeping with a large body of previous research, I hypothesize that inequality will be positively associated with rates of crime.

State Actions

State responses to economic distress and class antagonism may lessen urban distress. At the community-level this refers to the degree to which state agencies serve collectively as either a welfare state or a police state (Carlson and Michalowski 1999). In the role of welfare state, local governments actively support the provision of social services. A city that is characterized by a generous public social support network will likely exhibit less crime (Cullen 1994). Conversely, the more paltry and mean-spirited the provision of social welfare support at the city level, the greater the potential for high crime rates (Currie 1989). Contrary to conservative critics of the U.S. welfare

system (e.g. Murray 1984), evidence suggests that state assistance lessens crime (Currie 1989, 1993; DeFronzo 1983; Messner 1986). I argue that this is the result of the degree to which state welfare provisions affect rates of crime. Welfare provisions directly affect crime by protecting individuals from the criminogenic consequences of economic distress. They indirectly affect crime by lessening class antagonism because they imbue the community with the perception that the state works in the benefit of all classes, not solely the economically dominant class.

The disruptive effects of economic distress and class antagonism may also be exacerbated by the state, primarily via punitive criminal justice policies. Overly punitive criminal justice policies can hasten the erosion of individual commitment to the system of social order. Local criminal justice policies that are focused on punitive measures fail to lessen crime, and may actually increase recidivism (Andrews and Bonata 1994; Byrne and Pattavina 1992). A criminal justice system that is based on maintaining social order through supportive rehabilitation may, however, lessen crime (Cullen 1994). In fact, formal mechanisms of social control may only be effective in the context of support, rehabilitation and societal reintegration (Braithwaite 1989). Overly punitive criminal justice policies can also erode aggregate commitment to the dominant social order at both the community and city-levels. This erosion can occur both through increasing levels of economic distress as the productive capacity of a community is lessened by incarceration and through increasing levels of class antagonism as the legal system is viewed as protecting social order for the benefit of the dominant class at the expense of the poor and disenfranchised.

Spending, be it on social welfare programs or criminal justice programs, is not always an independent decision on the part of local governments. Local governments are, of course, limited by the broader political context and their own fiscal capacity. City governments, however, do act as the local representative of higher levels of the government. While social services or the police may be in large part controlled by actors outside of the city government, the direct point of interaction between the individual and the institution, be it of social welfare or social control, is the local city government.

Thus, in sum, I hypothesize that state spending on social welfare services will lead to decreasing rates of crime and, conversely, that

state spending on police and criminal justice services will lead to increasing rates of crime. In this way, commitment to the dominant political and legal order may be directly related to individual perceptions of the services provided by the city government, as the localized representative of that order.

Agency and Rates of Crime

If changes in crime rates are representative of changes in individual behavior, how might the rapid structural changes endemic of the late twentieth century American political economy influence the trends in crime through individual agency? The answer to this question may be found in the shift in the dominant culture of capitalism that has arguably accompanied the economic shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy.

An apparent debate, made quite explicitly in criminology, pits the virtues of capitalism against the vices of capitalism in creating crime. One argument holds that hard work and commitment lead to economic success in a capitalist, free-market economy, thereby inhibiting crime. The second holds that capitalism values material success at all costs even the commission of crime. It is my argument, detailed below, that these perspectives are not antithetical, but instead are complementary and aid in understanding shifts in crime within the U.S. context.

The virtues of capitalism are found in the very ethos of the so-called "American Dream." The early Horatio Alger stories and the everyman truisms of Benjamin Franklin (e.g. a penny saved is a penny earned) undergird the perception that success American-style comes from hard work, diligence and thrift. This perception is central to the relationship between social control, social organization and crime. Even recent research stemming from both the social disorganization and social control camps argues that employment inhibits crime because it serves as a disincentive (e.g. Crutchfield 1989; Wilson 1996). If you are convicted of a crime you will be excluded from opportunities to work hard and obtain the American dream.

The vices of capitalism are found in a different take on the American ethos. In their theory of institutional-anomie, Messner and Rosenfeld (1997; 2000) argue at length that the American dream represents the cultural prerogative of capitalism that values material success at the expense of all and any other standard of success, such as status, honor, or familial commitment. One of the defining

characteristics of being a member of U.S. society is committing oneself to this dominant cultural ethos in which the individual is encouraged to pursue material success with the belief that achieving that success is sufficiently likely. The ethos of American capitalism is a double-edged sword (Messner and Rosenfeld 2000). It represents both the supreme American virtues of success and ambition and the supreme American vices of crime and deviance (Merton 1968; Messner and Rosenfeld 2000).

The individualistic American ethos is not temporally stable. But instead, hyperindividualism has expanded as the dominance of market relations has invaded new venues of social exchange (Giddens 1990; Lash and Urry 1994). A defining feature of the capitalist ethos during the economic shift from an industrial to a post-industrial society is the increasing significance of the entrepreneur as hero. This is not to say that the entrepreneur has not been lauded by the American public throughout history. But the new youthful, media-savvy entrepreneurs with tenuous, if any, commitment to philanthropy or public works are very different from the entrepreneurs of the industrial era, whose prominence depended not only upon their monetary success but also on their commitment to public service (be that service fact or carefully crafted fiction) (Taylor 1999). Not only do these new entrepreneurs serve as unrealistic role models, they sever a sense of both present and future commitment to community and the less privileged.

A society characterized by such high levels of inequality and that includes such a conspicuous vanguard of entrepreneurial wealth as the United States, necessarily leaves a large body of people facing a serious dilemma (Messner and Rosenfeld 2000). Success is defined in monetary terms, thereby eliminating the capacity of those with few opportunities for economic success to establish themselves in other ways. This creates a tension between achieving success and the legitimate means available for doing so. Hence the ethos of American capitalism creates pressures to succeed in a narrowly defined way and to pursue that success despite structural limitations on the means available. This fosters the tendency to use any means necessary, including criminal or deviant means, to achieve monetary success (Messner and Rosenfeld 2000). The “dark side” of the American dream, in Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2000) terms, is the fundamental tension between the structurally high level of U.S. inequality, which relegates a large portion of the population to economic failure, and a

cultural ethos that instills a preoccupation with the achievement of monetary success without adequately providing prohibitions on the socially acceptable means to achieving that success. The result is crime.²

This debate over the effects of capitalism within the field of criminology mirrors a much more fundamental, and historical, debate within the broader sociological discipline. In *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Daniel Bell (1996) lays out the debate over the tensions between asceticism and acquisitiveness, the double-edges of the sword of capitalism. Bell (1996) reiterates Max Weber's classic thesis that the modern capitalism of the U.S. and Western Europe developed under the conditions of asceticism promulgated by early Protestant theology (Weber 1995). Early Protestantism equated one's work with one's calling and stressed thrift and delayed gratification as a means of demonstrating one's piety and future salvation. This asceticism was, however, replaced over time with the acquisitive drive that characterizes contemporary capitalism (Bell 1996).

Bell (1996) was not the first to point out the destructive potential of the tension between acquisitiveness and asceticism. Alongside Weber (1995) himself, early sociologists documented the foibles of a capitalist culture and the capitalist class as acquisitiveness outstripped asceticism as the driving force behind western capitalism (e.g. Sombart 1915; Veblen 1912; and, as goes without saying, Marx 1976). As Daniel Bell (1996) outlines, Werner Sombart (1915) established that acquisitiveness, and little more, already drove the early twentieth century capitalist. Acquisition, according to Sombart (1915), was both unconditional and limitless. The drive of capitalism was economic acquisition at all costs, including the disregard and even destruction of moral restraint. Beyond the realm of the modern capitalist, Sombart argued that the ethos of acquisition encompassed not only relations of economic exchange, but also the realms of culture, values and society in general.

As Bell (1996) indicates, the weakness of both Weber (1995) and Sombart (1915) is their exclusive focus on the origins of capitalism to the exclusion of the structural transformations that are endemic to capitalism. As Weber (1995), and to a lesser degree Sombart (1915), concede, capitalism in both its ascetic and acquisitive forms, is an ideal type. As such neither exists to the absolute exclusion of the other. Instead they can, and in fact do, exist simultaneously.

In that ideal types can exist simultaneously, the more important question becomes, what structural conditions are conducive to the predominance of the vices of capitalism over the virtues of capitalism? Is the capitalist culture that spawns the so-called American dream a virtue or a vice? Obviously it can be, and often is, both. The argument is not that it is one versus the other, but under what conditions it becomes one to the sacrifice of the other. So to return to the arena of contemporary criminology, under what structural (including spatial and temporal) conditions does the drive for economic, acquisitive success, pass asunder the social control mechanisms that instill restraint, thrift and communitarianism?

Whence the decline of the asceticism of the so-called Protestant ethic? Beyond delayed gratification and thrift, a central precept of the early Protestant ethic is a sense of both obligation to and reciprocity within one's community (Weber 1995). In terms of the religious underpinnings of the Protestant ethic, this sense of obligation was understood in terms of one's calling. As it remains residually in the secular U.S. capitalist ethos, this obligation is understood in terms of civic obligation, as in keeping with the early industrialists who gained legitimacy not simply through wealth but through public service and philanthropy, and who even embraced philanthropy as a moral duty (see for example Andrew Carnegie's (1890) *The Gospel of Wealth*). The legacy of this commitment to philanthropy on the part of industrialists and financiers such as Henry Ford, Andrew Mellon, and John D. Rockefeller are felt today in the continued work of foundations bearing their names.

Both the ecclesiastical and secular understandings of obligation and reciprocity are, however, founded, at least in some base form, on a rational exchange calculus. The exchange in early Protestant religion was good works for salvation. In the more contemporary, secular understanding of the Protestant ethic, the exchange is hard work for security, stability and a reasonable standard of living. So if the residual Protestant asceticism is an exchange of a reasonably good and just life for hard work and some degree of regard for fellow humans, when that reasonably good life is not forthcoming or fails to improve upon the past, then the impetus for the more virtuous aspects of the capitalist ethos may be sacrificed by individuals and acquisition may become predominant.

The transformation of the U.S. capitalist economy from an industrial to a post-industrial basis has within it the undoing of the asceticism of the Protestant ethic and fuel for the advance of the acquisitiveness of the culture of capitalism. The increasing insecurity and instability of employment in the post-industrial era has done much to undermine the standard of living of large segments of the U.S. population over the past thirty years. Further, it is not simply one's own insecurity that is at issue but it is more importantly the security of one's family and the future livelihood of one's children. The shrinking of the middle class over the past thirty years is a source of real discontent for many segments of U.S. society. The unraveling of the middle class yields both a fear of falling amongst those within the middle class (Ehrenreich 1989) and a sense of diminishing expectations (Krugman 1997) for those who hoped that they or their children might someday make it into the middle class (Kreml 1997). Quite simply, as achieving the American Dream is no longer viable through the asceticism characteristic of the Protestant ethic more may turn to other means, possibly deviant or criminal means, of achieving success through acquisition.³

The shift of the U.S. economy from an industrial base to a post-industrial base may lead to distrust in politics and the very political system within which the exchange of hard work for a decent living was made. As Bell (1996) outlines, it is dignity and a sense of self-worth that instills in the individual the sense of personal responsibility upon which support of a political system relies. The basis for dignity and personal self-worth, and therefore personal responsibility, is a job that provides a reasonable standard of living. Hence both employment and social welfare are the prerequisites of a stable and secure society (Bell 1996). With distrust of the political system comes the loss of *civitas*, to use Bell's (1996) terminology, without which respect for the law is impossible.

The idea that the U.S. capitalist system brings with it an ethos that fosters acquisition that is valued at all costs (e.g. Messner and Rosenfeld 2000) may explain the U.S. crime problem as it compares to other nations, but it fails to explain either temporal or spatial variability within the U.S. Temporal and spatial variability in crime rates across the U.S. may be explained by temporal and spatial variability in the relative strength of acquisitiveness versus an ethical commitment to empathy and community. Further, this relative strength may be determined in part by the structural economic organization of the U.S.

at a particular period in time. It is likely that the economic realities of instability and insecurity and the political realities of the demise of the welfare state and the elevation of self-interest over public-interest, as the ethos of acquisition gains dominance over the ethos of asceticism, have an influence on rates of crime (Bellah et al. 1985; Etzioni 1993; Hutton 1995).

Intertwined with this conceptualization of the economy and the polity is a simple understanding of justice that may also be reformulated in the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial society. The tension between justice and capital accumulation is but another cultural contradiction of capitalism, to borrow once again from Bell (1996). The idea of a just society is central to the acceptance and legitimization of the political and legal order. Power relations are, by definition, conflictual. They are based upon long-term relationships of domination and exploitation. Any society is composed of "multiple overlapping and interconnecting socio-spatial connections of power" (Mann 1986: 1). In this context, crime is embedded within patterns of power and domination (Findlay 1999).

Day to day interactions, however, are governed not by outright conflict, but by consensus (Jackman 1994). Consensus does not negate the conflictual basis of class relations; it only explains the lack of outright conflict. Conflict is kept in check by an ideology shared across classes that rationalizes the current system of domination and subordination (Snow and Benford 1988). Social order is not maintained simply by satisfying individual wants, that is economically and politically unrealistic; instead social order is maintained by persuading individuals that what they have is what they deserve and inequality is somehow just (Box 1988). Ideology manages conflict before it begins, hence the tenacity of exploitative class relations under a generally accepted political and legal order (Jackman 1994).

Ideology is a form of political communication (Waters 1990). The dominant class engages in exploitative relations with subordinate classes by maintaining an inclusive ideology that vests all classes in the current system. An inclusive ideology and exploitative relations can exist simultaneously because actual exploitation occurs through institutions, not individuals. This perspective resolves a major dilemma in research linking crime and class. Research linking class-based causal mechanisms and crime has been roundly rejected for the simple reason that street-crime most often occurs within classes, not

between classes. However, this reconceptualization of the operation of class relations would predict that class-based crime would be directed at dominant institutions and ideology, not dominant class members.

A key concept in understanding consensual class relations is understanding how dominant political and economic classes communicate ideologies across the stratification system. Individuals interpret ideology differently depending on the economic, political and social contexts in which the individual is embedded (Gamson 1992; Przeworski 1979). Contexts “frame” (Snow and Benford 1992) individual interpretations of the justice, or injustice, embedded in a given ideology (Molm 1990; Moore 1978). In this way both actual and perceived power relations are shaped by economic conditions, state policies, and class relations. I argue that this consensual ideology may dissolve when economic conditions are distressed, class relations strained, and state response limited, leading the individual to shift from an investment in the dominant ideology to a rejection of that ideology. Crime is one manifestation of the breakdown of consensual ideology. This does not mean that crime is some ill-formed retaliation against the dominant class. It is, instead, simply recognition that the dominant “rules of the game” are no longer tenable for the individual.

Analyzing Crime Across Time and Space

This chapter serves three purposes. First, this chapter outlines the methods used in this study. To this end it discusses the historical, comparative and longitudinal methods employed as part of a broader overall discussion of the research design of this study. Second, this chapter outlines the sample of cases employed in this study. This study uses the term cases in two senses. There are longitudinal cases that represent the years examined in this study and there are comparative cases that refer to the actual cities that analyzed. Different criteria are used for the selection of each type of case, city or year, and this chapter discusses the rationale for these choices. Finally, this chapter details the specific variables and data employed. It does not outline specific hypotheses in relation to each variable in this chapter. The hypotheses that drive this study are discussed in broad conceptual terms in the previous chapter. More specific, empirical hypotheses are presented in later chapters in the context of the analyses of each city in order to tailor the more specific hypotheses to the historical political and economic contexts of each case.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study uses a longitudinal, comparative method to examine the effects of economic restructuring and political shifts on rates of crime. It analyzes economic, political, and crime data for four U.S. cities: Detroit, Boston, New Orleans and Atlanta. It investigates these cities because, although similar in terms of above average crime rates over most of the post-World War II era, they differ in terms of the economic and political changes each has experienced during this same time

period. It contextualizes findings from the quantitative analyses with historical analyses of the political economy of each city. It uses both primary and secondary sources of historical data to describe trends in the political-economic profile of each case, paying particular attention to major shifts in economic conditions, class relations, and political structures.

This contextualization is essential because assumptions required by many quantitative time series techniques have serious implications for conceptualizations of both history and time (Jensen 1997). Many statistical techniques used in time series analysis view historical context as “noise” that interferes with quantitative analyses and is theoretically irrelevant and statistically random (Alford 1998). Hence, quantitative data are only capable of explaining so much of the relationship between economics, politics, and crime. Time series data must be interpreted in tandem with an exploration of the historical context in which they are embedded (Isaac and Leicht 1997). Only by maintaining an ongoing dialogue among ideas, evidence and analytic technique can the researcher ensure that quantitative analyses are explaining historical trends, and not actually erasing them (Isaac 1997; Ragin 1987). Together the use of quantitative, comparative and historical techniques may provide new insights into the relationship between aggregate economic and political conditions and rates of crime.

This study is, however, comprised primarily of longitudinal, quantitative analyses.¹ In Alford’s (1998) terms, multivariate arguments are in the foreground of this analysis. Although I speak of the importance of research that employs the intersecting techniques of quantitative, comparative and historical research, this may be an endeavor too ambitious for any single researcher, it is at least for this single researcher.² I do not claim in this research to employ quantitative, comparative and historical methods equally. This, to reiterate, is not a historical study nor is it a comparative study. It is a quantitative longitudinal study that is enhanced by the addition of historical and comparative components. I attempt, as suggested by Alford (1998), to theorize the relationship between crime and political-economic conditions broadly by defining my research questions in terms of multivariate, comparative and historical terms. I employ both historical and comparative analyses in the interpretation of the quantitative, time series analyses. At least in a narrow sense, my use of both historical and comparative methods is *ad hoc* in that I only employ

these methods for their utility in enhancing the dominant quantitative and longitudinal analyses.

In many ways, the issues of historical, comparative and longitudinal methods are interdependent, so that my emphasis on one over the others is not so very problematic in that they each represent an attempt to integrate both time and space into the sociological research enterprise. The key thrust of both contemporary historical and comparative sociological research is the transformation of the discipline into one with greater recognition of the importance of what is termed historicity (Isaac 1997). Historicity simply refers to the essential dependence of social processes on local time and place (Isaac 1997). And even contemporary historical sociology and comparative sociology remain, in part, self-conscious reactions to the ahistorical universalisms that dominated sociological discourse in the not so distant past (Isaac 1997; Tilly 1984). This is the rationale for my use of historicity to add to the growing body of work in criminology that represents a similar self-conscious reaction to the ahistorical universalism that dominates criminological discourse.

Historical Aspects

Much sociology is historical analysis, be it explicitly or implicitly so. The issue of change is central to both past and present sociological scholarship. Sociology is as central to understanding the structural transitions that characterize the current era as it was at its origins in the nineteenth century, when it was integral to understanding structural transitions in the wake of the industrial revolution (Tilly 1984).

Although there is a good degree of diversity in historical sociology, Skocpol (1984) holds that true historical sociology shares the following characteristics. First, research questions that drive historical sociology are situated in both time and space. Second, historical sociological research examines processes over time and seriously considers temporal sequence. Third, historical sociology finds the interaction between both action and context central to understanding both intentional and unintentional outcomes. And finally, historical sociological research explores both specific and general features of social structures and social change. Not all sociological research meets these criteria of historical sociology. However, not all sociological research need be historical research (Skocpol 1984). Although there is

substantial diversity within historical sociology, historical processes remain the central organizing topic of historical sociology (Isaac 1997). Historical sociological research asks how patterns of social relations are created and recreated by historically grounded processes (Isaac 1997).

Historical sociological methods have an unambiguous relevance to current criminological research. Although this is true of criminology in general, it is particularly true of criminological research that deals with the intersection of economics, politics and crime. The necessary relationship between declines in social control, social support, generalized tension, strain, disorganization, disorder and crime has very little temporal generalizability, despite claims to the contrary (Tilly 1984). Further, the difference between order and disorder, and by relation, the use of legitimate and illegitimate force is a false dichotomy (Tilly 1984). In order to avoid fallacious arguments that claim universality where it is unlikely to exist, Tilly (1984) argues that social scientists, including criminologists, must explain social phenomena in terms of historical contingency, in other words bounded by time/place limits but moored to broader structures and processes.

How should researchers go about grounding explanations of social phenomena in historical context? Griffin (1992; see also Isaac and Leicht 1997) contrasts two basic approaches to historical research: Time-as-context and eventful time. Time-as-context is the most common approach to historical sociology (Griffin 1992). In such research, time and place serve as the context of the analyses, serving to demarcate the scope of the generalizability of the findings of the research. By contrast, eventful time refers to research that recognizes that time is not simply a static context, but instead is an active process that actually transforms social structures. Such research takes seriously the “sequential, ordered, contingent character of social events” (Isaac 1997: 6). In doing so, this research better understands the impact of local affects, both in terms of time and space.

Historical sociology, according to Isaac (1997; Isaac and Leicht 1997), should not use one approach at the exclusion of the other. Time-as-context runs the risk of failing to capture the important effects of sequential actions. Eventful time, however, loses its explanatory power if it is not used in tandem with time-as-context. In this research, I draw on both time-as-context and eventful time approaches. I use time-as-context to develop a historical political-economic profile of each city included in the analyses. This narrative informs the hypotheses I

investigate as well as the interpretation of the results. I use eventful time to quantitatively trace convergent and divergent trends between rates of crime and political-economic conditions at the local level, paying particular attention to the direction, magnitude and timing of changes in trends.

Comparative Aspects

In some respects, the demarcation of comparative and historical methods is artificial. There is a great deal of overlap between the two approaches, particularly as they involve comparative research. So while there may be historical research that is not comparative, comparative research is frequently historical. Of course, the intersection of historical methods and comparative methods is quite explicit in the form that is often taken by both those who would consider themselves historical scholars and those who would consider themselves comparative scholars. That intersection is comparative historical research (Paige 1999). The overlap of comparative and historical research is so very distinct due to their shared focus on time and space. As I alluded to in my discussion of historical methods, comparative research has a similar charge in looking at social phenomena through a spatially contingent lens, much in the same way that historical sociology looks at social phenomena through a historically contingent lens.

My discussion of historical methods may, however, have stressed the role of historical contingency to a degree that it overshadowed the importance of generalizability in social science research. This has long been an issue of contention in both historical and comparative research, the most recent manifestation of which debates the merits of generalizable research versus context-oriented research (see the products of this debate in *Comparative Social Research* (Engelstad and Mjoset 1997)).

If the determinants of any given social phenomena are both historically and spatially contingent, then is generalizability possible? And if we accept that the object of any sociological research is to lead to generalizations about social phenomena (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Wieviorka 1992), then do comparative and historical methods have a place in sociology? Quite obviously they have a place in sociology, evidenced by the extensive use of both approaches in the

sociological canons.³ The question, therefore, is how do historical and comparative approaches deal with the issue of generalizability, a key debate in both methodological fields?

In this section, I have three primary goals. First, I will step away from this debate on the role of generalizability and explain in greater detail exactly what forms of research qualify as comparative. Second, after defining comparative methods, I will return to the debate over generalizability in comparative and historical research. Finally, I will outline my use of comparative methods in this study.

What are comparative methods? Ragin (1987) asserts that comparative social science is best defined by its unique goals. Comparative research has two basic goals: To explain and to interpret macro-social variation (Ragin 1987). The idea of macro-social variation is key to distinguishing comparative research from other forms of research. Comparative research is interested in understanding the expansive similarities and differences between large units of analysis in terms of the level at which social phenomena are explained, most often, but not exclusively, at the level of a culture or a society (Ragin 1987).

Comparative research, by definition, is most interested in making comparisons across cases. Comparisons may differentiate between cases and make what appears to be disjointed phenomena unified cases of a single concept or comparisons may do the opposite and divide what appears to be unified (Wieviorka 1992). Very often comparative research does both. In discovering similarities and differences across cases, comparative research is able to explain and interpret society within a temporal and spatial context. This temporal and spatial context is key to comparative research because comparative research is intrinsically interested in the discrete cases themselves, and not merely the aggregate sum of their constituent variables (Ragin 1987).

Comparative research, however, does not share one single methodological approach. Within comparative sociology there is perhaps a quantitative-qualitative rift that is even greater than the quantitative-qualitative rift within sociology in general (Ragin 1987). This methodological debate stems from the alleged dichotomy between variable-oriented and case-oriented research.⁴ Variable-oriented comparative research tends to examine social phenomena variable by variable for numerous cases at one time, whereas case-oriented comparative research tends to examine cases, singly or in small numbers, for a specified period of time (Ragin 1987). Unlike variable-

oriented research, case-oriented research examines social phenomena case-by-case for a number of variables at one time. Both approaches are comparative, but they often employ very different methodological techniques.⁵

The debate surrounding variable versus case-oriented research is deeper than a methodological dispute. The contemporary variable-oriented versus case-oriented debate emerged with Przeworski and Teune's (1970) claim that the ultimate aim of social research is to replace the unique entity, the case, with the analytical concept, the variable. The idea is that the case means little void of the variable. You can't compare apples and oranges without the concept of fruit, as a point of comparison, and the concept of vegetable, as a contrasting alternative (Goldthorpe 1997; Sartori 1994).

Those advocating the variable-oriented approach hold that generalizability is difficult, if not impossible, from a case-oriented perspective. Goldthorpe (1997) asserts that case-oriented comparative research fails to be generalizable, because first, the small number of cases employed by case studies provides too little data from which to make valid inferences. Second, cases are often not independent from other cases. Case studies are not capable of determining the effect of cases excluded from the study on the cases included in the study. And third, case-oriented research tends to develop theories inductively, versus deductively, yielding theories that simply reiterate observations and cannot actually be tested (Goldthorpe 1997). Drawing on Popper's (1957) philosophy of science that differentiates between generalizations and representations, Goldthorpe (1997) suggests that many events studied as historical comparative case studies are simply too unique and specific to be included in the arena of science.

Those working within the case-oriented paradigm reject Goldthorpe's indictment that case-studies lack generalizability. Generalizability is not beyond the scope of case-oriented research, according to its proponents. Comparative case studies decompose complex historical processes into series of events that can be causally connected (Goldstone 1997). These causal relationships can then be explained using a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning. And incrementally, as theory develops, general hypotheses may be proposed and tested on a broader pool of cases, without the assumption that there exist some general hypothesis that will apply to all cases, in all places and at all times (Goldstone 1997). The explanations that case

studies provide can be falsified, and hence fit even into the strict definition of science as espoused by Popper (Abramson 1992).

A third approach holds that variable-oriented and case-oriented approaches are complementary. This approach rejects Goldethorpe's dichotomization of case versus variable-oriented research (e.g. Goldstone 1997; Ragin 1987; Skocpol 1984). Case-oriented and variable-oriented comparative methods each have inherent weaknesses. Case-oriented research tends to be overly particularistic, while variable-oriented research tends to over-generalize (Ragin 1987). In order to minimize the effects of these weaknesses, some comparative research employs both case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches. Ragin (1987), however, argues that combined approaches tend to emphasize one approach over the other. So that quantitative analyses may be used to add rigor to what are essentially qualitative case studies and qualitative case studies may be used to contextualize what are essentially quantitative analyses. This use of combined strategies is, in part, an attempt to address the generalizability debate within comparative research, and as I have noted, historical research.

A similar tension regarding general theory in sociology exists within comparative historical sociology, referring specifically to the intersection of historical sociology and, primarily, qualitative comparative sociology (Paige 1999; Wieviorka 1992). The debate centers on the contention by some comparative scholars that historicity, the bounding of research in time and space, should take precedence over the development of generalizable theories (Quadagno and Knapp 1992; Sewell 1996; Stinchcombe 1978). This contention is in contrast to Burawoy (1989), among others, who claims that the focus of all sociology, including comparative and historical sociology, is the advancement of general theories; if general theories were not of import, than the research would be history, not sociology (Wieviorka 1992).

The escape from this conundrum, according to Paige (1999), is the trend in recent, second-generation comparative historical inquiry to be neither particular nor universal. Such an approach utilizes historically conditional theory to explore the determinants of time-space anomalies and to contribute to broader general theories. The result, according to Paige (1999) is historically conditional, but still generalizable, propositions. In this way historical and comparative social research is attempting to bridge methodological differences (Ragin 1992) and theoretical differences (Paige 1999).

This study is comparative in a fashion. I compare the relationships between economic, political and social conditions and crime in four cities. This study fits the criteria of comparative research in that its comparative focus is on macro-social variation. I look at the relative effects of similarities and differences in core political-economic variables: Industrial structures, labor market characteristics, political infrastructure, and state policies. However, the comparative nature of this analysis is not at the same level of analysis as the core of comparative research. I explore historical differences across cities within the United States. This unit of analysis is quite different, both in scale and variability, from the bulk of comparative research that compares differences across societies, nations, and cultures.⁶

In that this study is comparative, it employs a combined case-oriented and variable-oriented strategy, to borrow Ragin's (1987) terminology. It is variable-oriented at the level of the case. For each individual city my analyses are quantitative and longitudinal, contextualized by the historical trends in political, economic and social conditions within the city. This study is case-oriented at the level of comparison. I compare the quantitative relationships between crime and political-economic conditions across cities using the logic of the comparative method. To use Przewski and Teune's (1970) idea that comparative inquiry is conducted at the level of a system, in this research each city represents a system. So in the comparative analyses that are included in this study, I explain variation in rates of crime as the result of both factors that are extrinsic to the system, most notably the impact of national and global post-industrial economic restructuring, and factors that are intrinsic to the system, or the state policies that are specific to each city and that serve to affect rates of crime in interaction with the economic effects of deindustrialization that originate outside of the system.

Longitudinal Aspects

This research also uses a longitudinal method. The longitudinal aspects of this research intersect with the comparative and historical as well. As I alluded to earlier in this chapter, the differentiation between longitudinal methods and historical methods is to some degree arbitrary. I distinguish between the two methods in order to clarify that this is a quantitative study that uses quantitative time series techniques

familiar to both sociologists and criminologists. To this end, I outline in this section the quantitative techniques I employ in this research. I, first, discuss the manner in which I attend to issues of temporality by tracing sequential changes in trends in the variables of interest in this research. I, then, outline the quantitative time series techniques that I use in my city-level analyses. Both of these discussions are particularly relevant because of the degree to which issues of time have been underemphasized in both quantitative and qualitative historical analyses. Most research, especially research on crime and punishment, has paid scant attention to the importance of temporal scale and even less attention to the implications of the choice of statistical technique on the conceptualization of time (Aminzade 1992; Jensen 1997).

Understanding Trends

Both historical research, of all ilk, and quantitative time series research have been criticized for ignoring the independent impact of time (Jensen 1997). Despite a growing body of literature that carefully considers the impact of temporal aggregation, sequence and scaling, most research fails to consider the important conceptual issues related to time (Isaac and Griffin 1989; Jensen 1997). The primary conceptual issue that is too often ignored in quantitative historical research is the effect of the choice of analytical time series technique on the results. Although this is the topic of the immediately subsequent section, to introduce the issue suffice it to say that there is frequently too little discussion of the theoretical fit between the theory being tested and the analytical time series technique being used. Regarding the analysis of trends, two specific conceptual issues deserve greater attention than they are presently accorded in the bulk of longitudinal research (Jensen 1997; LaFree 1999). Longitudinal research needs to pay particular attention to both temporal aggregation and temporal sequence.

At the crux of the issue of temporal aggregation is the answer to the question, what is meant by a relationship over time? If we say that two variables are correlated across time are we saying that one variable influences the other from year-to-year, or some other time-period to time-period, in other words over the short-run? Or, are we saying that one variable causes a change in the trend of another variable over a period of years (the entire post-war era in this case), in other words over the long-run? Or, as a third alternative, are we saying that the relationship between the two variables is fractal and that it persists

across both temporal scales (i.e. the relationship holds over the short-run and over the long-run) (Jensen 1997). Either approach is valid as long as the level of aggregation is consonant with the theory being tested, and the appropriate statistical technique is used to measure the relationship.

Attention to the level of temporal aggregation is surprisingly absent in both quantitative and qualitative longitudinal research. In historical research the trend is to examine the relationship between social phenomena over broadly defined eras (Jensen 1997). This trend leads to a significant loss of precision in comparison to a better-specified analysis of either short-run or long-run processes. The level of specificity used in longitudinal analyses is determined by the research question being asked and the theoretical orientation that grounds that research question. Any level of aggregation is appropriate. What is not appropriate is the capricious shifting across levels of aggregation without thought to theory or method (Jensen 1997).

A dominant strength of time series analyses is their ability to establish temporal order thereby strengthening causal arguments (Davis 1985). This strength is sacrificed when time and temporal sequencing are not taken seriously by the researcher. Jensen (1997) argues that in order to be related over time two variables must meet three minimum requirements. Both phenomena must begin at approximately the same time; both must fluctuate, either positively or negatively, together; and both must cease at roughly the same time. In order to establish that two variables meet these minimum requirements, one must pay particular attention to trends in the data over time.

In a similar vein, LaFree (1999) asserts that in order to establish a relationship between two or more phenomena one must first examine the length of the trends in each phenomenon. Do the two phenomena begin and end at approximately the same time? Do the two phenomena share roughly equivalent periods of particularly high or particularly low values? Once the researcher establishes that the trends are of the same length, they must ask how comparable the shapes of the trends in each phenomenon are? Are the phenomena positively or negatively related? LaFree (1999) argues, contrary to Jensen (1997), that one phenomenon may impact another in such a way that the trend in the second becomes asymmetrical to the trend in the first. Two phenomena may have symmetrical trends over one period of time and asymmetrical trends over a second period of time. Finally, the researcher must ask if the

relationship between the two variables is linear? Two phenomena may act together such that one phenomenon may reach a threshold or a tipping point (Granovetter 1978) at which its effect on the second phenomena may increase or decrease exponentially.

Both the choice of temporal aggregation and the analysis of temporal sequence must be closely linked to the research question and the broader theory upon which it draws. In this study I explicitly attend to the issues of both temporal aggregation and temporal sequence. With regard to the issue of temporal aggregation, I am interested in long-run trends, first and foremost. Since long-run relationships are the focus, short-run, point-to-point effects are less important. This focus on long-run effects influenced my choice of quantitative analytical techniques. As discussed in greater detail below, the quantitative time series techniques that I use test for long-run shared relationships between variables.

Examining temporal sequence is the starting point of all of the analyses in this study. Although one would expect that this would be the case of any time series analysis, it often is not (see for example the seminal research of Cantor and Land (1985) that is long on equations but completely void of a single trend). In each analysis, I first examine the univariate trends in each variable. I examine the behavior of each explanatory variable as it relates to crime, looking specifically at the length, shape and linearity of the variables. Finally, as I discuss in greater detail below, I statistically test the degree to which the explanatory variables and crime variables share common trends over time.

Quantitative Procedures of Analysis

Quantitative criminology, as other quantitative social science research, has been slow to use recent advances in econometric time series analysis. Recent evidence suggests that much of the extant research examining crime rates over time suffers from serious methodological errors (Greenberg 2001). In an attempt to avoid such errors, this research uses econometric time series techniques. These techniques include unit root analysis, cointegration tests and error correction multivariate analysis.

Researchers have long recognized that a time series regression model that includes a non-stationary variable (i.e. a variable that grows over time and does not regress to the mean) will be autocorrelated and

yield invalid inferences based on conventional tests of significance (e.g. Fisher's F , Student's t , Durbin-Watson) (Hamilton 1994).⁷ This is what we know as the problem of a spurious regression. The hallmark of a spurious regression is a high R^2 in the presence of substantial autocorrelation. Such regressions can be very misleading. The outcome is biased toward finding a statistically significant relationship where none actually exists.

Thirty years ago, work in time series analysis took one of two approaches: The statistical time series analysis approach or the regression time series analysis approach. Statistical time series analysis was the domain of economists. Pure ARIMA analysis is a statistical time series technique. Statistical time series analysis attempts to model the value of a variable at one point in time solely as a function of its past values. Hence Y_t is not a function of X , but a function of Y_{t-1} . Autocorrelation was seen as an aspect of the dynamic processes of the data to be modeled, not purged. Regression time series analysis was the domain of sociologists and political scientists. Regression time series analysis used essentially the same model used with cross sectional data that takes the form of $Y_t = \beta X_t + \epsilon_t$

Analysts using the regression technique recognized the problem of autocorrelation and corrected the problem using generalized least squares (GLS) regression. GLS adjusts for autocorrelation by including dynamics in Y that are not accounted for by X in the error term. The problem with this approach is that it views the dynamic aspects of Y as a problem to correct instead of a component of the equation to be modeled. Each approach had its weaknesses. While the statistical approach was theoretically vacuous in comparison with the regression approach, it was many degrees more powerful statistically.

Beginning in the late 1970s, analysts began to recognize the value of combining the approaches using the integrated ARIMA technique. This integrated technique first estimates the dynamic processes (autoregressive and moving average) in the dependent variable. Once identified, those processes are included as explanatory variables in a regression model that includes independent variables. This approach, however, depends upon the assumption of a stationary dependent variable. In the past, social science research has generally dealt with non-stationarity by removing the trend, generally via differencing. Differencing simply means that the researcher removes nonstationary trends in the data by subtracting the previous value of the dependent

variable from the current value of the variable. Therefore variables are differenced to achieve stationarity prior to analysis, hence the “I” (integrated) in the ARIMA (autoregressive, integrated, moving average) notation.

The decision to difference is by no means innocuous. Differencing changes the dependent variable from the value of that variable to the point to point change in that variable. While the differencing approach used in ARIMA analysis eliminates the mathematical problem of spurious regression, it creates a theoretical problem by also eliminating any long-run information contained in the data (Harris 1995; Jensen 1997). In other words an analysis using differenced variables is only estimating short-run relationships.

Achieving stationarity via differencing has frequently been accepted uncritically in both sociology and criminology where time series data are used less frequently than cross sectional data. In fact, benchmark research linking economic conditions and crime fails to consider the implications of differencing. Although earlier research in the field did not have the benefit of more recent developments in econometrics, even criminological research published within the past five years continues to use methods that rely on differencing when it is theoretically inappropriate. Differencing may not be theoretically problematic for many research questions that rely on time series data. But in research that is interested in the criminogenic effects of changes in political and economic structures, the inclusion of long-run trends is essential.

A regression between variables that are integrated will produce spurious results, whereby variables that are completely unrelated appear related. However, in some cases series that are integrated may actually be related and we are left with the problem of distinguishing between a spurious relationship and one that has meaning. Differencing assumes that a relationship between integrated variables is spurious and eliminates the relationship. There are alternatives to differencing to avoid spurious regressions and determine if integrated variables are actually related. More recently developed cointegration techniques retain long-run information while controlling for time trends in non-stationary time series.

Cointegration theory holds that even if two time series are non-stationary, the linear combination of the two may be stationary. In other words, the values of the variables will maintain equilibrium over

in time because of errors in measurement. This implies that the error in the equilibrium will be non-zero at any given point of time. However, we can say that over a period of time we would expect the mean of the equilibrium error to be zero as positive errors in some periods are compensated for by negative errors in other periods. Furthermore, should there be a shock to the system such that the values of the two variables are moved away from equilibrium, we would expect this error to be non-permanent over time (Harris 1995). Therefore we have a useful way of distinguishing between relationships that are spurious and relationships that are meaningful by looking at the equilibrium error over the long-run. If a cointegrative relationship exists, the equation can be estimated using an error correction model, thereby retaining long-run relationships (Kennedy 1998).

As with any time series analysis, cointegration analysis begins with a visual inspection of the trends in both time series. Cointegration assumes that one variable Granger-causes (Granger 1969) another variable. A variable, X_t , Granger-causes another variable, Y_t , if the behavior of past values of X_t is a better predictor of the behavior of Y_t than Y_t 's past alone. The underlying assumption of cointegration is that a long-run equilibrium relationship determines the values of both variables, X_t and Y_t (Harris 1995). In other words, there must be a theoretical rationale to expect two or more variables to share a common trend over time.

The Engle-Granger two-step method (Engle and Granger 1987) is the most frequently used method of establishing the existence of a cointegrative relationship between X_t and Y_t . In step one of the Engle-Granger method, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to determine if X_t and Y_t each have a unit root (i.e. they are $I(1)$ or integrated of order 1). If both $Y_t \sim I(1)$ and $X_t \sim I(1)$ analysis continues with step two. In step two of the Engle-Granger method, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to determine if Y_t and X_t are cointegrated. If $Y_t \sim I(1)$ and $X_t \sim I(1)$ then $Y_t - \beta X_t \sim I(1)$ unless X_t and Y_t are cointegrated, in which case $Y_t - \beta X_t \sim I(0)$ (i.e. the linear relationship of X_t and Y_t is stationary). To test for cointegration, first estimate the equation:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \beta X_t + \epsilon_t$$

Then, using the residuals from the previous equation, estimate:

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha \Delta X_{t-1} + \beta \Delta Y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

If $\alpha = 0$ then $\Delta X_t \sim I(1)$ and X_t and Y_t are not cointegrated. If $\alpha < 0$ then $\Delta X_t \sim I(0)$ and X_t and Y_t are cointegrated. In the latter case, an error correction model can be used to estimate the relationship between X_t and Y_t as:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \beta_1 X_t + \beta_2 \Delta Y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

where the error correction term ΔY_{t-1} equals $\beta_2 - 1$. In this equation, X_t is the short-run change in the dependent variable. It is a function of the short-run change in independent variable (ΔX_t) and an error correction term (ΔY_{t-1}) that represents the long-run tendencies of the relationship between X_t and Y_t . This error correction model can be estimated using OLS without the threat of spurious regression and without the loss of long-term trend dynamics (Harris 1995). Further, other exogenous variables can be added to equations with cointegrated variables as long as the added variables are stationary or have a unit root (i.e. $I(0)$ or $I(1)$).

It is important to note that the Engel-Granger two-step method, due to its use of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, is very powerful (Harris 1995). Thus it is easy to identify spurious cointegrative relationships. In order to avoid spurious cointegrative relationships, hypothesized relationships must be substantially supported by theory. In fact, for two variables to be cointegrated there must be logical, theoretical grounds upon which to base an assumption that the variables would vary closely together over time.

I approach the analyses in this research in the following way. First, I examine the stationarity properties of the data. Although I do not present all of these analyses, I determine the order of integration of each variable by examining the autocorrelation/partial autocorrelation functions, calculating Akaike Information Criteria values, and conducting unit root tests. Second, I test for hypothesized cointegrating relationships between the relevant variables using the Johansen test for cointegration. Third, I estimate multivariate models predicting trends in crime rates if there are cointegrative relationships in the model, and if all of the other included variables have unit roots or are stationary, I

use an error correction model (ECM) to estimate short and long-run relationships in the data. I also test for exogeneity, to determine causal order, using Granger causality tests, and I test the stability of the system, to determine if the model holds across the length of the series, using Chow breakpoint tests.

SAMPLE

The Years

I examine time series data of the relevant variables for the entire post-World War II period. I have limited my analysis to the post-war period because of its conceptual importance in terms of U.S. political economy. The time period between 1947 and the present represents two distinct eras: The labor-capital accord era and the current post-accord era. As I have discussed above, these two eras are of central importance to understanding the changing political-economic profiles of U.S. cities since World War II.

I have also limited this study to the post-war era because crime data prior to this era are problematic due to the number of reporting jurisdictions and significant differences in definitions of crimes across jurisdictions. The greatest impediment to any longitudinal research is the lack of sufficient data over time (LaFree 1999). This study, as all others like it, is constrained by the availability of data. Not all variables are available for the entire post-war period for each city. To compensate for the limitations of quantitative time series data, I employ a research strategy that is not simply longitudinal but is also historical. I use archival research and secondary sources to develop a profile of the political and economic histories of each city to contextualize the quantitative data.

The Cities

This research employs an explicitly comparative analysis of four cities: Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta. I have selected these cities for two primary reasons. First, all have rates of crime above the national average during much of the relevant time period. Second, each city has a different history of economic and political restructuring. Detroit is the prototypical rust-belt city that has experienced substantial declines as the result of the restructuring of the auto industry. Boston is

the would-be victim of economic restructuring. Unlike Detroit, Boston has been able to successfully transform itself into a center of high-tech, knowledge intensive industries. As a contrast to both Detroit and Boston, Atlanta is the prototypical southern boomtown. Through most of the relevant period Atlanta has experienced economic expansion and population growth, albeit with continued increases in poverty and inequality. New Orleans represents a southern city that is not a boomtown. Unlike Atlanta, New Orleans has experienced both a slow economy and population declines during much of the study period, despite periods of rapid single-industry expansion.

A likely critique of this sampling method is that it samples on the dependent variable, crime rates. Let me emphasize, however, that this research is case-oriented, not variable-oriented (Ragin 1992). In this research the cases are the political bounds of each of the four cities: Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta. So I am not necessarily interested in variance in rates of crime (although this variance does exist in trends in crime rates across cities). Instead I am interested in variance across high crime cities. I am interested in the ways in which different political and economic circumstances have influenced rates of crime in each particular case.

VARIABLES, DATA SOURCES, AND COLLECTION STRATEGIES

Indicators of Economic Distress

This study examines the effects of shifts in city-level employment patterns on rates of crime. I argue that the shift of dominant employment from manufacturing industries to service industries has had a positive impact on rates of crime. Therefore, I include in my analyses the percent of city employment in relevant industries.⁸

I analyze the effects of manufacturing employment and service employment on rates of crime. Manufacturing employment is simply employment in those industries under the 1-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) manufacturing grouping. Service industries are more difficult to define. The service sector as a whole is comprised of a broad range of industries and hence a broad range of employment forms. In defining the service sector I draw on the classification scheme developed by Singleman (1979) and revised by Noyelle and Stanback (1984). In this scheme industries are classified on the basis of

their outputs. The benefit of this classification is that it enables the service sector to be broken down into more discrete industrial groupings.

Under this classification scheme, 2-digit SIC industries are grouped to distinguish between services that are primarily intermediate and services that are primarily final outputs. Distributive services, such as wholesale trade, and corporate producer services, such as business and legal services, are predominantly intermediate service providers. They provide services to other producers or retailers, not directly to individual consumers. I term these corporate services. I term those industries that produce services primarily for immediate consumption by individuals consumer services. Retail trade, entertainment, and personal services are all part of the consumer service sector. In my analyses I examine the consumer service industries solely.⁹

A shift toward service-sector employment does not necessarily lead to negative outcomes in terms of income. Therefore I also examine the effects of trends in low wage service-sector employment on rates of crime. To this end I include average earnings by industry.

Beyond the effects of low wage service-sector employment, unemployment and underemployment may also increase rates of crime. In certain urban contexts, employment itself may be becoming a meaningless concept. Therefore, I include in this analysis the unemployment rate in each city.

Indicators of Class Relations

To capture the effects of class structure I examine the effects of inequality as a measure of class relations. An indicator of an increasingly bifurcated urban class structure may be inequality. In that inequality may continue to influence urban crime rates, I examine the effects of the 90-10 earnings ratio in each city.

Indicators of State Response

In order to assess the degree to which the provision of social services by local governments affects rates of crime, I include measures of actual levels of social service spending. In order to explore the ways in which criminal justice policies may influence rates of crime, I include data on levels of spending on police and local jails/prisons.

Indicators of Crime

This project uses annual time series from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data at the city-level. I examine both violent crime and property crime. More specifically, I analyze homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary rates separately. I recognize the limitations of using official UCR statistics versus victimization surveys or other forms of self-report data (Short and Nye 1958). Such data, however, are not available longitudinally nor, to any adequate degree, comparatively. Further, while official UCR statistics may underestimate the actual frequency of crime, they provide reasonable estimates of comparative frequencies, especially for the major index crimes (Gove, Hughes and Geerken 1985).

Detroit: The First City

In approaching a case study, Becker asks the researcher to continually ask the question, “What is this a case of?” (Becker 1992). Becker argues that this is not an a priori assumption, but instead this is the very question the researcher should strive to answer. What then is Detroit a case of? Arguably, Detroit is the archetype of twentieth century industrial urban space. Over a decade ago, Benedict Anderson (1992: 6) presciently noted that “all communities larger than primordial villages... are distinguished by the style in which they are imagined.” In other words communities are characterized by how they are conjured by the social imagination (Rutheiser 1996). The image of the urban, industrial city that inhabits our collective consciousness is very much the image of Detroit. Immigrants, industry, tycoons, and transportation are all part of the Detroit of the past. Suburbanization, poverty, crime and failed attempts at urban renewal are all part of the Detroit of the present.

The subtitle of this chapter is “The First City” because Detroit may very well be one of the most representative of all cities in the United States (Herron 1993). Across the twentieth century, the fate of Detroit has foreshadowed the fate of many other American cities (Widick 1989). So while the native son of Detroit, Henry Ford, may have declared that history is bunk, the history of Detroit represents a template of the contemporary urban political economy against which the political and economic trajectories of other cities may be compared.

Viewing Detroit as an ideal type of urban structure is not new. The manner in which comparisons between Detroit and other cities have been made, however, has changed dramatically over time. In the post-war boom of American industrial might, Detroit, as the epicenter of the

thriving automobile industry, stood as a symbol of capitalist vitality and progress. In the post-Cold War retrenchment of global deindustrialization, Detroit stands as a warning, albeit too late for some, of the havoc that can befall cities abandoned by the companies that once lauded them as their meccas.

In representing all that can go wrong, Detroit also serves as a scapegoat. Leaders and residents of other cities can transfer their animosity toward the failings of their own city by favorably comparing themselves to the more devastating failings of Detroit (Herron 1993), in much the same way that the south is blamed for the racism and bigotry that is pervasive across America (Griffin 1995). As Phillip Levine (1989) artfully states, in Detroit “a war was fought... American capitalism, armed with greed, racism, and the design for the world’s gaudiest fish-tailed Cadillac took on the land, the air, and the people, and we all lost.” By blaming Detroit, without understanding Detroit, residents and leaders of other cities can reassure themselves that what has happened in Detroit will not happen within their limits.

Mollenkopf (1983) asserts that there are three types of cities. First, there are those cities that were originally based on traditional manufacturing industries, but are now sites of finance, technology and service trades. These include cities such as Boston and Chicago. Second, there are those cities that emerged after industries had coalesced in the northeast and midwest and whose original economic basis is primarily in non-manufacturing industries. Atlanta and other southern and western cities are typical of this category. Finally, there are cities that were once centers of manufacturing, but have never been able to successfully redefine themselves and offset the loss of their manufacturing base in the later part of the twentieth century. Detroit is typical of this last category of cities.¹

Each city in this analysis represents a possible case of Mollenkopf’s (1993) three types of cities. Detroit is a victim of manufacturing decline. Boston is a survivor of manufacturing decline. Atlanta is a new city, for which manufacturing decline has had little relevance. And the final city, New Orleans, does not adequately fit within the bounds of Mollenkopf’s typology. New Orleans is a fourth type of city for which manufacturing decline has had little relevance, but for which service and technology expansion has been similarly irrelevant.²

Despite these differences in classifying cities, Detroit is the exemplar of the archetypical city, at least in how the city is envisioned. Hence, Detroit is the starting point of this analysis. This chapter serves as the basic template for each of the other chapters that discuss the political economies of Boston, Atlanta, and New Orleans. I do not provide a complete chronological history of each city, that is beyond the scope of this study. Instead I provide a chronological discussion of two interrelated themes that characterize the urban political economy. First, I look at economic changes over the post-war era. Second, I analyze the political history of the city. This discussion serves as the contextual foundation with which to understand changes in crime over the post-war era. In my discussion of the political-economic history of Detroit, I present trends in crime in Detroit and relate those trends to broader political and economic trends in the city. Finally, I present specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between crime and political-economic conditions and quantitatively explore those hypotheses.

DETROIT HISTORY, AUTO HISTORY

Detroit is first and foremost an auto city. The Detroit of the twentieth century has succeeded and failed in tandem with the successes and failures of the auto industry. Detroit's historical economic foundations did not hinge on the auto industry; Detroit was a strong industrial center prior to the automobile. The dominance of machine shops and metalworking in Detroit, paired with the willingness of Detroit banks to finance start-ups in the automobile industry, ensured that industry's dominance in the twentieth century Detroit economic landscape (Hyde 1980; Pound 1940). The economic links between the city of Detroit and the automobile industry are clear. By 1920 the corporate headquarters of both GM and Ford were located in Detroit and almost 40% of all passenger cars produced in the United States were produced in southeast Michigan.³ Detroit's growth was the result of the boom of the industry in the early twentieth century. Likewise, Detroit's decline was the result of the stagnant performance of the auto industry in the later part of the twentieth century (Jones and Bachelor 1993).

Post-War Prosperity

World War II brought considerable benefits to Detroit and its manufacturing infrastructure (Clive 1979). During the war, both the popular media and the government referred to Detroit as the “Arsenal of Democracy” (Henrickson 1991). Jobs in Detroit were tied in with the needs of the war (Henrickson 1991); although auto manufacturing was curtailed by war shortages and quotas, as much as 80% of auto manufacturing facilities were converted to war production uses (Reuther 1976). During the war and into the first years immediately subsequent to the war, Detroit experienced absolutely full employment and the opportunities available to both women and African Americans expanded (Hyde 1980).⁴ This need for labor spurred population growth as new factory workers migrated to Detroit from rural Michigan and the southern U.S. (see Table 4.1).

Following the war, automobile manufacturing resumed and production output followed an increasingly upward trend, as did overall auto industry employment (Verway 1984). The auto industry achieved unprecedented success in the 1950s (Widick 1989). Consumer demand was just part of the auto industry surge after WWII. Only the United States emerged from the war with its industrial base not only unscathed, but strengthened. Former trade partners, especially Germany and Japan, were left in ruins. War-torn industries in Europe and Asia were unable to compete with American manufacturing prowess. Hence, the U.S. was enviably positioned to profit from industrial expansion, particularly in the automotive sector. By the middle of the twentieth century, the U.S. economy was in a position of global hegemony and U.S. corporations, especially those in heavy manufacturing industries such as automotive firms, were dominant within the global economy (Trachte and Ross 1985). The dominance of the U.S. automotive industry is clear in that North American factories accounted for 80% of worldwide production of cars and trucks by 1950 (Babson 1984).

Poverty and economic insecurity in Detroit, however, were not eliminated during the years following WWII (Babson 1984). Year to year automobile production was volatile. Unemployment affected large segments of the autoworker population in the 1950s and early 1960s. A number of factors contributed to the unemployment problem in segments of the Detroit auto industry. These factors included a series of post-war recessions; the elimination of smaller manufacturers such as

Table 4.1 Summary Characteristics, Detroit 1950-2000

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
<i>Population Characteristics</i>						
Population (thousands)	1849	1670	1511	1203	1027	951
% Black	16.2	28.9	54.2	62.6	75.5	81.2
% Female Households	--	--	18.0	33.0	45.9	63.1
% HS Only Graduates	22.2	22.1	28.1	31.5	27.7	30.0
% College Graduates	5.0	5.3	6.2	8.3	9.6	11.0
<i>Income, Poverty and Inequality</i>						
Income (thousands)*	--	13.5	15.3	16.0	12.6	14.7
% Poverty	--	--	14.7	21.9	32.4	26.1
% Suburban Poverty	--	--	4.9	5.4	6.3	5.9
% Black Poverty	--	--	17.9	26.7	35.2	26.4
% Child Poverty	--	--	18.8	31.5	46.6	39.5
90/10 Income Ratio	--	4.9	7.6	9.8	12.8	--
Suburb/City Income Ratio	--	--	1.2	1.5	1.9	1.9
Dissimilarity Index	0.81	0.87	0.89	0.87	0.87	.60
<i>Employment and Wages</i>						
% Unemployed	--	10.2	7.2	18.5	19.7	13.8
Manufacturing Wages (in thousands)	41.5	42.9	43.7	47.2	51.4	54.9
Service Wages (in thousands)	23.6	22.1	20.4	18.5	16.2	19.2
% Manufacturing	53	48	41	37	27	17
% Service	18	19	21	22	24	25
<i>State Revenues and Expenditures (all in thousands)</i>						
Total Revenues	--	1871	1668	2498	2521	1971
Tax Revenues	--	927	937	784	650	636
Transfer Payments	--	161	190	126	69	--
Police Spending	--	218	234	321	358	301

* All figures in constant dollars

Packard and Midland Steel that were unable to compete with the big three auto manufacturers; the spatial decentralization of the auto industry; and the specific difficulties faced by Chrysler, whose plants were concentrated in Detroit (Widick 1989).

Unemployment fluctuated during the 1950s and 1960s in tandem with contractions and expansions in the automobile industry. The degree of unemployment faced in Detroit during the 1950s and 1960s was, in fact, comparable to what it would face in the wake of the massive disinvestments in Detroit on the part of the major auto industries in the 1970s and 1980s. By the final recession of the 1950s, unemployment in Detroit reached a high of 17% (Babson 1984). Volatility of unemployment differentiated post-war years from the entrenched unemployment in more recent years. It was this volatility, however, that provided some of the impetus behind both the expanding role of labor unions in working toward insulating their members from economic recessions and the expanding role of the Detroit city government in providing social services for unemployed and laid off autoworkers.

Despite the economic hardships faced by some segments of its population, the city of Detroit led the United States in national prosperity during the 1950s and 1960s (Babson 1984). In 1949, immediately after WWII, automobile sales topped the 1929 record of five million units. By 1955 automobile sales reached eight million units, buoyed by highway construction and nationwide suburbanization. Detroit's workers benefited greatly from post-war prosperity. By 1955, industrial wages reached \$98 per week, far surpassing the \$75 a week national manufacturing average and 40% higher than manufacturing wages in Detroit immediately after WWII (Babson 1984). This era of prosperity allowed labor unions in the Detroit region, particularly the UAW, to gain wage increases, pensions, and health and disability benefits for its members. Most dramatic of these benefits garnered by the UAW during the period of post-WWII prosperity was the modified guaranteed annual wage for auto manufacturing workers. While not the annual wage demanded by then UAW president Walter Reuther, the modified guaranteed annual wage provided extensive unemployment compensation for auto workers, an important benefit in light of the volatility of auto industry employment (Babson 1984; Widick 1989).

The growing strength of labor unions in the economic arena translated into growing strength in the political arena. Beyond their

role in coordinating the interests of labor in the work sphere, unions coordinated the interests of labor in the political sphere as well. The sheer scope of unionization in Detroit in the 1950s had significant political implications, as unions actively organized their members in local and national political campaigns. Union political leadership became increasingly sophisticated in the 1950s (Henrickson 1991). The UAW was particularly successful in organizing rank and file members as local Democratic party delegates to work for the election of the candidates supported and groomed by the union for city, state, and national political offices. During this period the scope of union-supported political agendas broadened (Henrickson 1991). Increasingly during the 1950s, union political candidates adopted the liberal political agenda that formed part of the liberal-labor coalition that dominated Detroit politics during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. Social services, including child welfare, education, housing and health issues, were increasingly prominent in the labor candidates' political platforms (Reuther 1976).

Liberal-labor coalition politics dominated the Detroit political landscape during this era. A study of the Detroit power structure in the 1950s and 1960s found that two groups shared political power in Detroit (Kadushin 1978). The first group was the Detroit power elite, those with social and economic monopolies in the city. The second group was composed of working class people whose power rested in their influence over rank and file union members who, in aggregate, wielded power in the economic realm as labor union members and in the political realm as a unified, highly organized voting block (Kadushin 1978).

Black Detroit residents, as an important and organized political coalition in Detroit, were obviously missing from the Detroit power structure during the 1950s and early 1960s, despite a rapidly growing black population (see Table 4.1). Racial antagonism was long a part of the Detroit urban landscape, with major race riots erupting during both the Civil War and WWII. However, racial divisions were kept at ebb during the 1950s and early 1960s by severely limiting the political power of the black Detroit population.⁵ Whereas liberal politics in Detroit would be supported by black constituents after the 1960s, liberal politics before then were unintentionally undermined by black support. For most of the 1950s, Detroit's mayor was the conservative Albert Cobo. Cobo was elected in 1947, and maintained his

incumbency until 1957, by explicitly linking his Democratic opponents with the interests of Detroit blacks (Conot 1974). By doing so, Cobo was able to draw white union voters away from the liberal-labor candidate and win elections (Eisinger 1980).

Crime and Prosperity

Crime is a dominant theme in the image of the urban, industrial city that inhabits our social imagination. Therefore a dominant characteristic that places Detroit in the center of our collective definition of the city is the perception that Detroit is an urban crime mecca. Crime in Detroit, however, is not, nor has it ever been, much higher than other similarly sized urban centers. In fact, rates of some crimes in Detroit have been considerably lower than in other cities in this study. But as with other social problems, Detroit's crime problem foreshadowed the crime problem that other cities would face.

Trends in Detroit crime can be divided into three distinct eras: Roughly 1947-1965, 1966-1985, and 1986-1998. During the years spanning from the end of WWII up until the early to mid-1960s, crime in Detroit was stable and rather low (see Figure 4.1). During these years the overarching trends in the political and economic structures in the city were characterized by stability and high expectations for the future. These two trends in the Detroit political economy, arguably, influenced the low and stable crime rates in the city across the 1950s and first half of the 1960s.

The Detroit economy was strong and expanding during these years. The positive results of the manifestation of the labor-capital accord were realized in Detroit in their purest form. Manufacturing employment reached its height in the mid-1950s and declined only marginally in the early 1960s (see Figure 4.2). Increasingly strong unions guaranteed the benefits of employment in the manufacturing sector. Wages increased for manufacturing sector workers in the 1950s and remained at a consistently high level during the early 1960s (see Figure 4.3). Despite periods of significant unemployment, workers could anticipate rapid re-employment and could rely on union and government-provided safety nets to withstand periodic slowdowns in the automotive economy. The result of increasing wages and benefits during this period was a working class that was both expanding and improving their economic position, so as to rapidly move into middle class lifestyles.

Figure 4.1 Crime Rates, Detroit 1948-2000




Figure 4.2 Employment Ratios, Detroit 1948-2000





Figure 4.3 Wages, Detroit 1948-2000 (2000 dollars)



Stability and positive expectations characterized the political climate of Detroit during the 1950s and early 1960s as well. The city government in Detroit during these years increasingly represented the interests of the working class. Although never capturing the mayor's office, Detroit's liberal-labor coalition exerted influence through the city council. That influence was meaningful during these years because of the fiscal health of the city, due in large part to the fiscal health of the automotive industry (see Table 4.1 for city revenue data).

A strong city government with a liberal, pro-labor stance allowed for the expectation of increasing representation on the part of Detroit's growing black population. Although essentially excluded from political power during these years, African American labor and political organizations saw incremental improvements in the status of blacks in Detroit. Before the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., the Detroit black community had real reasons to expect a greater voice in city politics in the then near future.

Together economic and political stability created the structural conditions that fostered commitment to the given system of social control. The political-economic experiences of Detroit residents in the 1950s and first half of the 1960s indicated that change within the system was not only possible, but was actually in progress. A system that appeared to actually work for many people in Detroit functioned to maintain the low crime rates of the 1950s and early 1960s. High hopes and expectations for the future vested Detroit residents in the existing political-economic structures and maintained an aggregate commitment to the protection of the existing social order.

Contracting Accord, Expanding Unrest

Between 1965 and 1980, Detroit area auto plant production topped two million cars per year. This rate was 30% greater than the production averages a decade prior (Babson 1984). After 1965, however, employment in the auto industry declined steadily in Detroit (Verway 1984). Although the prolonged boom of the auto industry lasted through the 1970s, the city of Detroit benefited less and less from that boom. The boom conditions continued, but without the rise in auto industry employment that the immediate post-war boom had witnessed.

Three conditions lessened Detroit employment in an overall booming auto industry. First, employment shifted to the suburban areas

of metropolitan Detroit and away from the central city. Prosperous suburbs developed in the Detroit metropolitan region as new, automated production facilities replaced increasingly obsolescent factories in the city proper (Widick 1989). Second, the automation of many non-assembly line jobs eliminated significant employment. As the auto industry moved to new, automated plants, firms replaced the retiring cohort of union employees with a considerably smaller, younger wave of union workers (Babson 1984). Finally, plant managers lessened employment costs by instituting mandatory overtime policies. The existing employees benefited from premium overtime pay and the plants benefited from meeting production demands while avoiding the costs of benefits and social-security payments for new hires (Babson 1984). However, the labor market was adversely affected by fewer jobs and the unions were adversely affected by a declining membership base.

Harsh working conditions intensified in the era of the late 1960s and 1970s, both in the city of Detroit and in the surrounding metropolitan region. Unauthorized wildcat strikes multiplied in Detroit plants. In 1970 alone, wildcat strikes shut down Chrysler's Eldon Avenue Detroit plant four times. While union sanctioned strikes focused on wages and benefits, harsh working conditions and disciplinary firings triggered the majority of wildcat strikes during the 1960s and 1970s (Scott 1974). Together union-sanctioned and wildcat strikes resulted in production losses that surpassed any previous era (Babson 1984).

The increasing number of wildcat strikes reflected an increasing disjuncture between the UAW and growing radical groups, such as the black militant DRUM (Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement) organization (Georgakas and Surkin 1975). By 1973, labor discord in Detroit had reached a level that the national UAW could no longer ignore. The UAW suspended national negotiations with Chrysler in 1973 and sent staff to visit the twenty-plus Detroit-area plants. Based on their findings, the contract subsequently negotiated between Chrysler and the UAW included provisions that limited mandatory overtime, established expedited grievance procedures, and created National Safety Committees whose members would be hired by the unions but paid by the companies to conduct bi-weekly health and safety inspections of every plant (Babson 1984).

During the later half of the 1960s the division between the demands of rank and file union members and the goals of organized

labor was mirrored in the division between the growing body of black radicals and the liberal-labor political coalition, both black and white. Black rebellion in Detroit in the late 1960s called to question the efficacy of coalition politics in Detroit (Darden et al. 1987). As the black population of Detroit expanded during the 1960s, so to did their expectations of the political structure to meet their needs. Black activism took hold both in the civic political arena and the union political arena. In the early 1960s, numerous black revolutionary workers movements emerged on the shop floor to challenge the UAW leadership (Georgakas and Surkin 1975; Geschwender 1977). In 1961, black labor organizations broke with the UAW and other labor unions and mobilized black Detroit residents in support of mayoral candidate Jerome Cavanaugh against the labor-supported incumbent Louis Mariani. Black labor organizations were able to secure the victory of their candidate over the candidate supported by the liberal-labor coalition, effectively making a place for race in the coalition politics that had dominated Detroit since before WWII.

Cavanaugh's terms in office were rife with contradictions (Eisinger 1980). On the one hand Cavanaugh was a staunch supporter of Johnson's Great Society program. Cavanaugh worked closely with federal agencies to secure antipoverty and urban renewal funds for Detroit (Widick 1989). He also expanded economic opportunities for blacks by issuing an executive order implementing equal employment guidelines and authorizing the enforcement of those guidelines (Darden et al. 1987). On the other hand, while Cavanaugh's agenda expanded opportunities for middle class blacks, his efforts did little to actually improve conditions for most black residents of Detroit, who were either poor or working class (Widick 1989).

Throughout Cavanaugh's second term, urban unrest increased, culminating in the riot of 1967. Over five days in the summer of 1967, Detroit experienced one of the most violent and costliest riots of the twentieth century (Darden et al. 1987). By the end of the riot, 33 people were dead, 347 injured, 3,800 arrested, and approximately 5,000 homeless (Locke 1969). Both Darden (1987) and Widick (1989) hold that this riot was unlike previous riots in Detroit in that it was not a riot between races. Instead they argue that it was the result of a long list of race-related abuses faced by poor and working class blacks in Detroit. Studies of those who participated in the riot found that the typical black rioter had no criminal record, tended to be young, and was under- or

unemployed. Further many explained their participation in terms of hostility that they harbored toward whites and middle class blacks, in addition to their distrust of the political system and elected political leaders (Widick 1989).

Violence escalated in Detroit in the years following the riot. The response of the local political powers to the riot was to increase police vigilance, especially in black communities. In 1971, during the Gribbs mayoral administration, the Detroit police department formed a special task force aimed at lessening street crime. The new police unit was called STRESS, Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets. STRESS was controversial from its inception, especially in the poor black communities it targeted (Georgakas and Surkin 1998). During the first year of the STRESS operation, Detroit's rate of civilian killings by police officers surpassed all other cities in the U.S. with a rate of 7.2 per 1,000 officers. Within the STRESS unit alone, officers killed 20 civilians in two years (Georgakas and Surkin 1998).

The 1967 riot, and the subsequent violence, resulted in an escalation of white fear of black Detroit residents and, relatedly, a heightened rate of white flight from the city of Detroit to the outlying suburbs. Between 1967 and 1973, Detroit went from majority white city to majority black city (Chafets 1990) (see Table 4.1). This rapid change in the racial makeup of the Detroit population was an important factor in the election of Detroit's first black mayor. In 1973, former state senator and labor activist, Coleman Young defeated then commissioner of police, John Nichols, in a racially polarized election. By making control of the police and the dissolution of STRESS a central component of his campaign, Young was able to gain the complete support of the new majority black population in his mayoral race (Darden et al. 1987).

Young's policies in the first ten years of his almost twenty years as the mayor of Detroit were threefold (Jones and Bachelor 1993). First, Young overhauled the city government bureaucracy and in doing so opened up many more opportunities for black Detroit residents in the city infrastructure. Second, Young worked toward his agenda for the economic revitalization of Detroit, especially the downtown financial district, by forming alliances with private sector Detroit elites. Third, Young worked closely with state and national politicians, regardless of party affiliation, to secure inter-governmental funds for Detroit. During the first half of his twenty-year term in office, Young was able to

accomplish many of his goals for the economic development of Detroit, especially the redevelopment of the downtown financial district (Jones and Bachelor 1993).

Crime and Contraction

In all, the late 1960s and the entire decade of the 1970s comprised an era of unmet political and economic expectations in Detroit. The inability of the city's industries and government to fulfill the implied promises of the 1950s for continued affluence and democratization contributed to a growing dissatisfaction with the then current political-economic status quo. These years represent the second distinct era in crime in Detroit. The second era ranges from approximately 1966 to the late 1970s (see Figure 4.1). Although rates of burglary had begun to exhibit signs of a positive trend in the early 1960s, the real explosion in crime began sometime after 1965 for all types of crime. For the next twenty years all crime exhibited a dramatic upward trend in Detroit.

This era represented a period of contraction in the Detroit economy. During these years, companies began to feel the pressures of foreign competition and began the process of industrial restructuring to adjust to those pressures. During these years, unions were able to maintain wages, but they lost significant employment in the manufacturing sector (see Figure 4.2 and 4.3). This trend benefited current union members, but diminished the employment expectations of workers that were no longer unionized or had never been unionized. In addition, working conditions during these years indicate that union members were less well-off than they had been in the immediately prior era, as well. This degradation of working conditions coincided with the influx of a second generation of union workers who expected more from their employers than their fathers (and in some cases mothers) had. The result was increasing dissatisfaction and increasing worker insurgency outside of the established union infrastructure.

The political landscape in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s was characterized by a similar dissatisfaction. In the 1960s, a growing black population placed increasing demands on the government to meet the specific needs of the black community. It became increasingly apparent that the interests of the traditional white political power structure were not consonant with the interests of the black community, particularly the poor and working class black community. A variety of organizations that represented various segments of the black

community began to realize that the Detroit political system was failing them. These organizations, both in labor and in the civic sphere, began to work outside of the existing political and economic structures.

The 1967 riot represented the greatest direct attack on the political system in Detroit. The riot was an active manifestation of obvious, wide-spread disinvestment in the existing social order. For poor and working class blacks in Detroit, playing by the rules of the game evidently did not work. The result of the 1967 riot was an intensification of class, and more importantly, racial antagonism. The immediate consequence of this intensification of antagonism was the increase in the police presence in Detroit, especially in predominantly black neighborhoods. The more long-term result was increased white flight from the cities to the suburbs. White flight led to a shrinking tax base and limitations on the provision of social services. Hence, just as the black community gained a powerful voice in the mayor's office with the election of Coleman Young, the mayor had fewer resources with which to assist the poor and working class black community.

Dissatisfaction in the economic arena, paired with dissatisfaction in the political arena led to increasing animosity toward the existing social order and increasing tendencies toward crime. Playing by the rules in the 1950s and early 1960s meant a future of economic prosperity and political representation. By the 1970s, poor and/or black Detroit residents found that neither prosperity nor effective representation were forthcoming. According to the theory outlined in Chapter Two, the necessary outcome of these political and economic shifts would be the increase in crime witnessed during the late 1960s and 1970s in Detroit.

The End of the Proverbial Road

U.S. automotive industrial dominance could not last. By the early 1970s changes in worldwide auto production were evident. American companies were losing their virtual monopoly on auto production, held since the end of WWII (Babson 1984). Dominance of the U.S. and global automobile markets by Ford, Chrysler and GM was predicated, in part, by their ability to produce and market cars to the wealthy, consumer car culture of the United States. As long as the United States was prosperous and gasoline cheap, Americans bought the high-power, high-price, high-profit margin models that Detroit and the big three produced. With the oil crisis of 1973, the U.S. auto industry rapidly

lost its market dominance. By the late 1970s and early 1980s the combined effects of rising interest rates and escalating fuel costs eliminated the competitive edge of the large, "gas-guzzlers" that were the mainstay of American auto manufacturing (Babson 1984). The confluence of these factors enabled Japanese and German car manufacturers (who had the plants, the labor, and the technology to produce more economical cars) to profit from the changing global economy.

Economic recession, high energy prices, a shrinking market for large U.S. cars, and fierce global competition devastated the Detroit economy (Darden et al. 1987). By 1980, North America accounted for just over 20% of global car and truck production (Trachte and Ross 1985). In Detroit, production declined to under one million cars, the lowest figure since the early 1950s (Babson 1984). In this same period of the automotive industry experienced a ten percent loss on investment equity (Jones and Bachelor 1993). Ford, GM and Chrysler U.S. motor vehicle production declined by almost 3.5 million vehicles (Trachte and Ross 1985). Their response was a massive reorganization of their industry including changes in product design, the introduction of new technology and production processes, global centralization and concentration, and an international division of labor (Darden et al. 1987). The big three automakers laid off 250,000 workers. An additional 450,000 workers lost their jobs in firms that supplied the auto industry (Darden et al. 1987).

The economic consequences of the free-fall of the auto industry, and manufacturing industries in general, were felt across Detroit. Babson (1984) documents that between 1978 and 1981, 42 auto-related manufacturing plants closed in Wayne County, in which Detroit is located. Further, according to Babson (1984), by the end of 1982 over one hundred plants had closed in southeastern Michigan. Unemployment skyrocketed. In 1982, Michigan unemployment was 17% and Detroit unemployment topped 20% (see Table 4.1). One in three Detroit workers experienced some period of unemployment during the first three years of the 1980s (Babson 1984). As a result, banks foreclosed on 300 Detroit home loans in each month of 1982 (Babson 1984).

Even for those workers who were able to retain their jobs in the crisis of the early 1980s, those jobs lost many of the benefits that they had once been characterized by. Between 1978 and 1982, the real

wages of autoworkers in Detroit declined from \$4.36 to \$3.85 per hour (Trachte and Ross 1985).⁶ This wage level was lower than that of a decade prior. While the deterioration of autoworkers' wages was greater than that of any other manufacturing workers in Detroit (Trachte and Ross 1985), wages, benefits and bargaining power for all workers in Detroit declined throughout the eighties.

By 1982, over one half of the population of Detroit received some form of public assistance, including unemployment insurance. During that same year, however, 8,000 unemployed workers were reaching the end of the unemployment compensation each month (Babson 1984). In 1982, over 600,000 metropolitan Detroit residents lived under the federal poverty line (see Table 4.1). Unemployment among black Detroiters reached 37% and for black teenagers that number was 68%. As conditions in Detroit worsened the suicide rate increased by 20% over 1980 rates and the infant mortality rate reached 33 deaths per 1,000 live births (a number typical of third world countries) (Babson 1984).

The Detroit city government was not spared the economic crisis of the 1980s. During these years, the city of Detroit experienced a precipitous decline in revenues. Not only did Detroit lose city revenue, it also lost intragovernment revenue from the state as Michigan cut transfers to cities in an attempt to deal with its own budgetary problems caused by the automobile industry crisis. Further, the crisis in Detroit occurred just as the Reagan-led federal government began to institute massive cuts in federal urban aid. When the bottom dropped out of the Detroit auto industry, Mayor Coleman Young's extensive economic development agenda proved to be incapable of meeting the needs of the increasing number of poor and unemployed Detroit residents (see Table 4.1) (Jones and Bachelor 1993). During the first years of the 1980s, Detroit's debt doubled and its bond rating was lowered to below investment grade, severely curtailing its ability to secure further revenue through short-term debt (Darden et al. 1987). Young's response was to create an emergency economic agenda that included increasing city taxes, negotiating wage concessions with local unions, and cutting municipal services. In the early 1980s, the city cut essential services including trash collection, public transportation and social welfare services (Babson 1984) (see Table 4.1).

The decline in the dominance of the U.S. automakers impacted the bargaining power of both organized labor and the state relative to the

bargaining power of capital. As automotive and related manufacturing industries attempted to compete in an economy they no longer dominated and were ill-prepared to compete in, they turned to a strategy that Grant and Wallace (1994) term spatialization. Spatialization refers to the use geographic relocation, or the threat of geographic relocation, as a tactic to control labor and to induce concessions from local, state and federal governments. Detroit auto manufacturers were not closing their doors for good, they were simply closing their doors in Detroit and reopening them elsewhere.

Industrial spatialization, including both relocation and the threat of relocation, dramatically changed the bargaining position of unions in Detroit in the 1980s. During the accord era labor unions improved the standard of living of their members through continued upgrading of benefits and wages. All workers during the accord benefited from the strength of unions and collective bargaining agreements because of the spillover effect of collective bargaining agreements that led to increased wages and benefits for nonunionized workers as well as unionized workers (Rubin 1986). Beginning in 1980, however, the benchmark for manufacturing wages was no longer productivity or American living standards, but instead shifted to the far lower labor costs of overseas and non-unionized Southern labor (Babson 1984). This meant that organized labor could no longer work to better workers' standard of living, but had to make concessions to simply keep workers working.

Manufacturing workers were far from the only segment of labor to see declines in their bargaining power in the 1980s. Unionized teachers, municipal workers, and even Detroit Symphony Orchestra musicians walked off their jobs to battle threatened wage cuts (Babson 1984; Mirel 1993). Non-industrial firms faced declining profit margins in the 1980s as the result of shrinking consumer income and rising inflation. These firms cut the wages of their employees in attempts to keep their businesses open.

One prominent example of the impact of deindustrialization on non-industrial sectors of the economy was the reorganization and deunionization of Cunningham Drugstores. In 1982, the directors of Cunningham Drugs parent company, CD Holding, closed Detroit stores, effectively eliminating unionization, and then reopened the stores as Apex Drugs. The unionized clerks who had been making \$6.17 per hour with benefits were now unemployed and Apex hired new clerks at

\$3.57 per hour without the option of full-time employment and the benefits that full-time employment entailed (Babson 1984).

The bargaining power of the Detroit city government lessened relative to the bargaining power of capital, as well. By the late 1980s, Coleman Young had learned that political power without economic power is a hollow prize. In Detroit under Young's tenure, economic power rested with the white power structure. Young's economic revitalization plans succeeded only as long as the economic power structure was willing and able to back them financially (Widick 1989). Prior to 1980, Young's Detroit made allegiances with the corporate community, but these allegiances were generally made on the city's terms. Young's relatively successful revitalization of the Detroit financial district is a prime example of early equitable allegiances between the city and the business community. The Detroit downtown was revitalized with the intensive support of Henry Ford II. This unification of government and corporate efforts came at a point in time when both were financially healthy and working toward an end that benefited them both.

The budget crisis of the 1980s, however, changed the bargaining position of the city relative to capital. As the economic strength of the auto industry temporarily waned in the early 1980s, its political strength increased. Auto industry demands on the Detroit government for tax abatements, lenient enforcement of tax collection, and direct subsidies became commands that the crippled city government meekly accepted in order to avoid the threatened loss of all economic development (Wylie 1989).

The most glaring example of the loss of bargaining power of the city government relative to industry was the construction of the GM Central Industrial Park facility. In 1981 GM approached the city about building a \$600 million Cadillac plant in Detroit. This plant was to take the place of the Dodge Main plant closed in 1980. The GM "brideprice" to build on the old Dodge Main site, however, was particularly high. The city spent \$200 million clearing the site and providing infrastructure for the 500-acre plant, which in the end netted no new jobs to Detroit (Babson 1984; Widick 1989).

Beyond the economic costs to the city of Detroit, the project came at profound personal costs to the residents of the community that was literally destroyed to make way for the plant. 450 acres of the 500-acre proposed plant site was a neighborhood known as Poletown. The

Detroit City Council, with the support of the Michigan State Legislature, declared that it was in the public interest that Poletown be condemned by the city, the almost 5,000 residents relocated, the land cleared, and the ownership transferred to GM. Under Michigan's so-called "quick take" law, passed by the state legislature just two months before the Poletown project was announced, the city was able to begin clearing the Poletown land while residents' disputes were still being heard by the courts. Under GM's threat to move to another site outside of Michigan, the city of Detroit razed the Poletown neighborhood in less than a year. Despite GM's mandate that the land be made available by the city within a year, the plant did not open for another five years and then with a considerably smaller labor force than originally promised by GM.

Crime and Crisis

In terms of crime, the 1980s represented an escalation of trends that had begun in the 1970s. Crime in Detroit reached all time highs for all crimes except aggravated assault (see Figure 4.1). The escalation of trends in rates of crime in the early 1980s mirrored the escalation of economic and political trends of the 1970s as well. In terms of economics, unions made concessions to capital simply to keep jobs. Manufacturing employment and manufacturing wages both plummeted. The labor-capital accord was substantially eroded, as was the liberal-labor Detroit coalition government. While African Americans found a powerful voice for their interests in Coleman Young, Young's political power was essentially meaningless without economic power to support it. The result of the shifting political-economic structures in Detroit was an evident realization that the problem is not that the system does not work for the given individual, but that the political-economic system does not work period. According to my theoretical perspective the result would be, as is evidenced in Figure 4.1, increasing rates of crime.

Entrepreneurs in the Public Interest?

So what of more recent economic developments in the Detroit economy? The current Detroit economy is characterized by a deep chasm between the economic health of the city and the economic health of the suburbs. Even as automobile factories closed in dramatic numbers in the 1980s, Ford, GM and Chrysler were restructuring

production processes in ways that benefited Michigan, but failed to benefit the city of Detroit. Strikingly, manufacturing employment in the Detroit metropolitan area is at almost the same level today as it was at the end of World War II (Henrickson 1991). It is the actual city of Detroit that has experienced rampant industrial disinvestment. The central city has experienced less growth and development in the automobile industry than the suburbs for the entire post-war period (Morehead 1981). However, industrial disinvestment in the city increased greatly in the 1980s and 1990s (Darden et al. 1987; Jones and Bachelor 1993).

New production facilities brought on-line in response to the automotive recession of the 1980s and necessitated by more competitive just-in-time production strategies were unlike the production facilities auto manufacturers had relied on in the past (Babson 1984). With square footage in the multi-millions, new factories that consolidated what had been spatially separate operations required immense amounts of land. The city simply did not have the land to compete with the suburbs for sites of new manufacturing facilities. Hence the greatest decrease in manufacturing employment within the city occurred in the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1992, manufacturing employment in the city of Detroit declined by 42%, while manufacturing in suburban Wayne county and the surrounding Macomb and Oakland counties increased 12% (Farley, Danziger and Holzer 2000). The early 1990s continued the downward trend in Detroit's economy that began in the 1980s. By 1993, only one in four adult Detroit residents were employed (Gallagher and Lippert 1992).

The continued slide of the Detroit economy led then mayor Coleman Young to comment on the future of the Detroit economy "If something doesn't happen, this goddamn thing is going to explode" (Gallagher and Lippert 1992: 1A). The Detroit economy has not exploded, at least not yet. The tenacity of the Detroit economy can be attributed to three trends prevalent across many urban centers in the mid to late-1990s: The melding of local government and business interests, the increasing irrelevance of organized labor, and the prolonged national economic recovery between 1991 and 2001.

Without question, a significant reason that the Detroit economy was able to hang on in the 1990s was due to the growing strength of the overall U.S. national economy during the 1990s. Gross domestic product, employment and hours worked all increased significantly

during this time (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 1999). Both the unemployment rate and inflation in the United States dropped to post-war lows of under five percent and under two percent, respectively. Despite trends in stagnate family incomes, tenacious poverty, and rising inequality, U.S. economic health staved economic freefall in 1990s Detroit.

The opportunities of the 1990s U.S. economy could only benefit Detroit in a specific political-economic context. That context is one in which the bounds of politics and economics are blurred. Coleman Young represented the last bastion of liberal-labor coalition politics in Detroit. In part, avoiding an economic explosion in Detroit required a change in the face of the local government. Detroit industry was, by the early 1990s, recognizing that the health of industries in the metropolitan region was, in no small part, dependent upon the health of the central city (Rusk 1993). Detroit industry inroads into the running of the local government were stymied by the entrenched Coleman political regime, however. In the late 1980s, a business organization aimed at aligning the interests of the city and industry, Detroit Renaissance, commissioned a long-term blueprint for urban revitalization titled the *Detroit Strategic Plan*. Detroit Renaissance was little different from the hosts of business enterprises that have attempted to link business and government interests in Detroit's past (for example New Detroit, Inc. that attempted to placate the economically and racially divided Detroit population after the 1967 riot). The difference with the founding of Detroit Renaissance was that the conservative interests of business faced little liberal opposition due to the insecure position of organized labor and the desperate situation of the Detroit black population. The 1993 mayoral campaign brought a new political regime with a more conservative, business-friendly agenda. Whereas the *Detroit Strategic Plan* was not fully supported by the Coleman administration, the subsequent Archer administration not only supported the plan, but also used it as a framework for government policy (Kleinknecht, Prater and Gilchrist 1990; Lippert and Chesley 1994).

The basic economic recovery plan endorsed by Detroit business and government throughout the 1990s was two-fold. First, economic recovery was based on greater regional cooperation (or cooptation, depending upon one's perspective). The 1970s and the 1980s were characterized by dual animosity of the city toward the suburbs and vice versa. City residents felt shunned by suburbanites and suburbanites felt

threatened by city dwellers (Chafets 1990). Reflecting their constituencies, city and regional governments cooperated little before the 1990s. After 1990, existing regional planning commissions, such as the South East Michigan Commission on Growth, gained greater influence over government policy within the city of Detroit.

Second, Detroit's economic recovery benefited from the creation of enterprise zones, funded by regional, state, federal and corporate sources. In 1994, Detroit was awarded one of a half-dozen federal urban empowerment zone designations. Among other benefits, the designation provided tax breaks for employers located in the zone or hiring workers who live in the zone as well as one hundred million dollars in federal social service grants (Montgomery 1994). The empowerment zone designation was the capstone of efforts at urban economic renewal on the part of Archer and local business organizations, most notably Detroit Renaissance.⁷

The survival of the Detroit economy in the current twenty-first century recession is suspect. As in many other urban centers, the so-called Detroit renaissance is based on a weak foundation. The basis is a new form of extractive economy, a service extractive economy. The service extractive economy in Detroit is focused on three issues: Casino gambling, professional sports and tourism. Like other cities desperate for an influx of cash and people, Detroit has turned to industries that are based on entertainment. In 1999, downtown Detroit witnessed the opening of a land-based casino and a professional baseball stadium both funded, in large part, by city-revenues and both receiving substantial tax-breaks on future profits (Dzwonkowski 1999; Stroud 1996). It is important to recognize that this new economy is extractive both in terms of the revenue capital receives from its clientele and from both the city and its citizens.

This service extractive economy is paired with a business extractive economy. Urban enterprise zones are, virtually by definition, tax abatement zones. The primary driving force in the Detroit political economy is one that almost seamlessly melds business and political interests. The end result was foreshadowed by Ronald Reosti, the lawyer who represented Poletown residents in their legal actions against both the city and GM in the early 80s (Darden et al. 1987). Reosti argued, "cities and communities have to surrender their constitutions if necessary to get private development. In essence, private development is so essential that the only way the city can

compete and make greener pastures is to keep giving the city away. It's a nothing strategy" (quoted in Darden et al. 1987).

Current Crime

The final era of Detroit crime spans the post-1980 crisis years until the 2000 Detroit UCR data. Crime across these years exhibits divergent trends. During the previous two eras homicide, assault, robbery, and burglary shared a common trend. After approximately 1985 however, disaggregate crime rates exhibit very different trajectories. While rates of assault continue to increase, homicide, robbery and burglary rates exhibit a marked decline. This is an interesting, and atypical, observation. As I will document in later chapters, disaggregate crime rates in Atlanta, Boston, and New Orleans do not exhibit this divergence.

In these recent years, crime and political-economic context appear to be decoupled. Crime has declined in Detroit during these years in which unemployment remains staggeringly high, wages remain high in the manufacturing sector for those few who still hold manufacturing jobs, and service sector wages have declined as service sector employment has increased (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). At the same time, city tax revenues have declined, as have welfare payments. By contrast police spending continues to increase.

It appears that in this context, the relationship between crime and political-economic conditions is not as significant as it was in prior years. Perhaps, according to the theoretical rationale that I suggest, this is the result of diminishing expectations. There is no longer a tension between what is expected from the labor market or the city government and what, in reality, is provided. The frame of reference is no longer the prosperity of the 1950s, but the crisis of the 1980s. Doing better relative to the crisis years is more important than doing worse than the more distant post-WWII years. Hence Detroit has experienced declines in crime, despite the continued declines in the economic well-being of the city.

HYPOTHESES

As detailed in previous chapters, my basic argument is that although crime represents the autonomous agency of an individual, agency is embedded in a broader social structure. That broader social structure is comprised of three components: Economic conditions, class relations

and state responses. Changes in any component of this structure will affect individual action. Hence the transformation of the U.S. capitalist economy from an industrial to a post-industrial base is at the heart of explanations of changes in rates of crime. This section details my specific hypotheses linking trends in crime in Detroit to trends in the Detroit political economy.

Economic Conditions

During the years between World War II and the 1970s the relationship between employers and employees was characterized by the labor-capital accord (Bowles and Gintis 1982; Rubin 1986). The labor-capital accord rationalized the inherently conflictual relationship between labor and capital by codifying the rights and responsibilities of both labor and capital. In the face of increased competition in the 1970s, industries systematically dismantled accord agreements in order to maintain profits in a rapidly changing global economy (Rubin 1995; Grant and Wallace 1994).

The Detroit automotive industry is a model example of the accord era and its subsequent decline. As documented earlier in this chapter, automotive industry labor, as well as manufacturing labor more generally, received substantial benefits and wage increases from the 1950s through 1970s. Figure 4.3 shows that average manufacturing industry wages increased substantially throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s. By the late 1970s, Figure 4.3 indicates the waning of the accord, as wages first fell and then stagnated during the 1980s and 1990s. The effects of declines in the labor-capital accord on industries beyond manufacturing are also documented in Figure 4.3. Up until the late 1970s, average wages in consumer service industries, although considerably lower than manufacturing wages, remained stable. At about the same time that manufacturing wages began to stagnate, service wages began to decline significantly as the benefits of core industry employment no longer filtered down to peripheral industry employment in the post-accord era.

The demise of the labor-capital accord is also supported by changes in the composition of the Detroit labor market since 1960. Figure 4.2 documents the precipitous decline in manufacturing employment throughout the post-war period. Although manufacturing employment declines began in 1960, the decline was considerably more

dramatic in the late 1970s as automotive and related manufacturing industries restructured employment strategies. Again, although consumer service industry employment had been on the rise throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the rate of increase multiplied with the industrial restructuring of Detroit labor markets in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.

How might changes in the economic structure of Detroit influence crime rates? Conceptually, one would anticipate that as manufacturing employment decreased, and as consumer service employment increased, the Detroit rate of crime would rise. Why might this be the case? First, the stabilizing characteristics of manufacturing employment, such as a regular schedule and a living wage, are often lacking in service sector employment. Second, manufacturing employment provides higher wages for less-skilled, less-educated workers than service employment. On this basis, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: There will be a negative and significant relationship between rates of all crimes and the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing industries in Detroit. In contrast, there will be a positive and significant relationship between rates of all crimes and the percentage of the labor force employed in consumer service industries in Detroit. The magnitude of the relationship is likely to be greater for property crimes than for violent crimes, with homicide rates having the weakest relationship.

Hypothesis 2: Average wages in both manufacturing and service industries will be negatively related to rates of crime. The relationship between manufacturing wages and rates of crime will likely be stronger than the relationship between service wages and rates of crime because manufacturing wages are consistently higher than service wages.

Class Relations

With regard to class relations, I argue that class structures form the context that establishes the parameters within which the legitimacy of mechanisms of social control are interpreted. In this way, class relations influence rates of crime by shaping the perceived legitimacy

of both the dominant ideology and authority structures. One can expect that as the distance between social classes increases, crime will subsequently increase. Across the post-war era in Detroit, income inequality, as measured by the 90/10 income ratio, increased rapidly (see Table 4.1). This indicates that the distance between the rich and the poor has increased Detroit since 1960. Although not directly documented by the evidence at hand, this increasing distance is likely paired with increasing class bifurcation, as a large percentage of suburbanization in Detroit was the result of a middle class exodus in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Hypothesis 3: Inequality will be positively associated with all rates of crime in Detroit between 1960 and 1996.⁸

State Responses

A city that is characterized by a generous public social support network will likely exhibit less crime than a city characterized by insufficient social welfare support (Cullen 1994). Levels of social welfare provision and support for such services vary over time, hence the more paltry and mean-spirited the provision of social welfare support at the city level, the greater the potential for high crime rates (Currie 1989). Social welfare support is not always an independent decision on the part of local governments. Local governments are, of course, limited by the broader political context and their own fiscal capacity. As is evidenced in Detroit, the capacity to provide for social welfare declined precipitously with the crisis in automotive manufacturing in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, capacity for spending on criminal justice programs is likely to be similarly constrained by forces beyond the control of the city government. The Detroit experience, however, indicates that social welfare spending, in this case transfer payments, declined as police spending increased even after the 1980 crisis (see Table 4.1).⁹ I argue that declining social service support paired with rising punitive criminal justice support hastens the erosion of individual commitment to the system of social order, thereby increasing rates of crime.

Hypothesis 4: The ratio of government spending on social welfare services to police services will be negatively and significantly related to rates of each crime in Detroit.

Temporal Stability

Attention to the issue of temporality is essential to understanding historical variation in any phenomena (Jensen 1997). If one variable is hypothesized to have a causal, or correlational, effect on another variable, then at the very least the two variables should exhibit some degree of temporal synchronization. The phenomena the variables measure should begin at approximately the same time, fluctuate together over time, and end at approximately the same time. In the case of crime, there is not a specific beginning and ending time, but trends in crime can fluctuate in tandem (or opposition) thereby exhibiting temporal synchronization. It is often the case, however, that a relationship between variables may not hold for the length of an entire time series. There are theoretical reasons to expect that the relationship between crime and the political-economic conditions in Detroit may not hold across the universe of available data. In other words, the effect of political-economic context may be temporally contingent.

In this analysis there is a strong theoretical rationale to expect that the relationships tested will be temporally contingent. In the case of Detroit, 1980 was a turning point in the automobile industry and a turning point in the political and economic well being of the city. It is likely, therefore, that the models may not hold across the length of the time series.

Beyond the documented changes faced by Detroit after 1980, this time period reflects broader shifts in the national political economy. Drawing on Gordon, Edwards and Reich's (1982) theory of social structures of accumulation, 1980 marks the onset of the active dismantling of the political and economic institutions comprising the social structure of accumulation characterized by the labor-capital accord and responsible for significant post-war prosperity. This reorganization of political-economic arrangements will likely change the context in which crime is situated to such a degree as to change the very nature of the relationships between crime and both economic and political variables. As Carlson and Michalowski (1997) document, the post-accord period after 1980 reflects a bifurcation of living standards

in the United States, as the restructuring of production around labor-displacing, high-tech processes increased the permanent surplus population, the so-called underclass, while reducing unemployment overall. The permanency of limited work opportunities for the inner-city poor in the entrenched post-accord economy is likely to have lessened the relationship between economic conditions and rates of crime during the 1980s and 1990s.

Hypothesis 5: Models including economic variables will exhibit temporal instability between the 1960 through 1980 and the 1981 through 1996 time periods. The relationships between economic variables and rates of crime will lessen in magnitude or lose statistical significance in the later era.

ANALYSES

Methods

My analyses consisted of three stages. In the first stage, I examined the univariate series of interest. This step required examining the time plots of each variable. In addition to the dependent and independent variables listed above, I include two further control variables: The unemployment rate, to capture labor market effects beyond the manufacturing/service shift, and the number of police officers per capita, to capture the effects of law enforcement's ability to identify and document crime. Obviously I could, and very likely should, include a broader range of control variables. My ability to include further control variables was limited by the availability of local, time series data and the degrees of freedom available in my multivariate analyses of a relatively short time series. It is difficult to assess the consequences of excluding potentially important explanatory variables. Variables that are suggested by criminological research that were not available for inclusion in this analysis include the age distribution of the population, particularly the population of young men; the percent black; and the poverty rate among others (see Sampson 1983 and Crutchfield, Glusker and Bridges 1999).

Preliminary univariate analyses suggested that most, if not all, of the variables in my analyses were nonstationary. I conducted a number of univariate tests on each of the series including examination of descriptive statistics, calculation of the Jaque-Bera tests for normality,

examination of the univariate correlograms and Ljung-Box Q statistics to assess autocorrelation and nonstationarity, and conducting Dickey-Fuller/Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots (these procedures are discussed in Chapter Three, for further discussion of these tests see Hamilton 1994).

In cases of those variables where the null hypothesis of a unit root (being $I(1)$) was not rejected at the $p < .05$ level, I performed Johanson tests for cointegration between each $I(1)$ crime variable and each $I(1)$ explanatory variable. As outlined in Chapter Three, cointegration theory holds, essentially, that although individual series may be nonstationary, the linear combination of series may be stationary if two of the series share common long-run trends. The value of cointegration to multivariate time series analyses is that the presence of cointegration enables the use of regression in levels, versus first-differences, of series without the interference of problematic autocorrelation.

In the second stage of my analysis, I estimated the long-run relationships between each crime series, homicide, assault, robbery, and burglary, and a number of models tapping changes in Detroit's economic structure, class structure and political structure. In that I am interested in examining the long-run dynamics in each model, I only estimated models in which I was able to identify a cointegrative relationship, thereby allowing me to use the levels of each crime rate as the dependent variable in each model.

Finally, in stage three, I examined the temporal stability of each model. I test the structural stability of each model using the Chow breakpoint test with 1980 set as the year at which the relationship changes.¹⁰ In the final part of this stage of my analyses, I estimated bivariate relationships between each crime rate and statistically significant explanatory variables in those models that the Chow breakpoint test indicated that the model might not hold across the entire time series. I essentially repeated stages one and two of my analysis for the selected series. The ideal application of the results of the Chow test would be to re-estimate the original equation for the years before and after the break. In other words, re-estimate the equation separately, first, for the sample of years before 1980 and then for the sample of years after 1980 and compare the results. In this analysis, however, this approach was not feasible because of the small number of cases in each sample of years before and after the break (20 years and 16 years

respectively). Therefore, I estimated bivariate relationships as a limited proxy for the full model.

Results

Table 4.2 presents the results of the unit root tests. In the case of each variable, the Dickey-Fuller unit root test indicates that all of the series are nonstationary in levels and stationary in first differences suggesting the presence of a unit root. My examinations of the correlograms and the Ljung-Box Q statistics support this conclusion. Finding that each variable has a unit root indicates that a regression model including any of these variables would likely exhibit significant serial correlation.

Since each variable is integrated of the same order $[I(1)]$, it is possible that some combination of the variables is cointegrated. To reiterate, cointegrated series will tend to vary together. If a disturbance leads to a short-run increase in the distance between the variables, an equilibrating force will tend to bring them back together over time. Hence, the relationship between the variables tends to maintain itself over the long-run. A visual inspection of line graphs of the variables suggests that each of the crime rates may be cointegrated with the percent of the labor force employed in consumer industries, manufacturing wages, inequality and the number of police per capita.¹¹ Each crime rate moves roughly in parallel with each of these variables, although the hypothesized cointegrative relationship may have weakened in the 1990s for all of the crime variables except assaults.

Table 4.3 presents the results of Johansen tests for cointegration for each crime variable and each explanatory and control variable. In the Johansen test, significant cointegration is supported when the residuals of the regression of the series in levels are stationary. The results of these tests indicate cointegrative relationships between manufacturing wages and both homicide and robbery; the ratio of welfare spending to police spending and both robbery and burglary; unemployment and robbery; and police per capita and homicide, robbery and burglary. The identification of a cointegrative relationship between the dependent variable and at least one independent variable allows model estimation using OLS regression in levels, with the addition of an error correction term (see Chapter Three for further discussion).

Table 4.2 Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests, Detroit 1960-1996

Variable	$\hat{\alpha}$	Decision
Homicide Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-1.92	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-2.99	reject
Assault Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-0.15	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-3.50	reject
Robbery Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-2.64	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.62	reject
Burglary Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-2.30	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.51	reject
Manufacturing Wages		
<i>Level</i>	-1.55	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.44	reject
Service Wages		
<i>Level</i>	-0.85	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-3.84	reject
Manufacturing Employment		
<i>Level</i>	-0.09	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.76	reject
Service Employment		
<i>Level</i>	-0.61	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-6.63	reject
Inequality		
<i>Level</i>	-0.61	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-6.63	reject
Welfare/Police Spending		
<i>Level</i>	-1.74	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-6.49	reject
Unemployment		
<i>Level</i>	-2.90	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.26	reject
Police Per Capita		
<i>Level</i>	-2.18	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-5.27	reject

Table 4.3 Johansen Tests for Cointegration, Detroit 1960-1996

Variable	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Manufacturing Wages	22.69**	8.83	24.08**	12.60
Service Wages	6.22	6.54	8.30	6.41
Manufacturing Employment	5.29	14.10	7.78	10.30
Service Employment	2.04	12.47	7.29	7.66
Inequality	5.08	8.12	7.62	6.31
Welfare/Police Spending	14.13	6.95	17.83*	15.56*
Unemployment	12.62	8.80	15.97*	14.08
Police Per Capita	22.36**	9.48	24.91**	17.79*

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Tables 4.4 through 4.6 present the results of error correction model (ECM) estimations of murder, robbery and burglary rates, respectively.¹² Looking first at the determinants of homicide rates, only two variables consistently contribute to an explanation of homicide rates. First, as anticipated, manufacturing employment exhibits a negative effect on homicide rates. In Model A, the most parsimonious model, a one percentage point decrease in manufacturing employment results in 1.39 more homicides per 100,000 Detroit residents.¹³ Second, contrary to expectations, the ratio of welfare spending to police spending has little effect on homicide rates. Only in Model D does the effect of the welfare/police spending ratio reach statistical significance, and then only at the .10 level of significance. The direction of the relationship, however, is as expected. As the ratio increases toward parity, the homicide rate decreases.

Table 4.4 Error Correction Model Estimates of Homicide Rates, Detroit 1960-1996

Variable	A	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	0.00 (1.62)	0.00 (0.29)	0.00 (0.50)
Service Wages	0.00 (1.46)	0.00 (2.25)	0.00 (1.76)
Manufacturing Employment	-138.65* (-2.10)	-172.94* (-2.78)	-244.96** (-2.90)
Service Employment	103.74 (0.32)	147.06 (0.47)	51.33 (0.15)
Inequality	--	--	-2.32 (-1.09)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-9.80 (-1.45)	-13.67+ (-1.83)
Unemployment	0.62+ (1.79)	0.54 (1.59)	0.54 (1.53)
Police Per Capita	0.07* (2.48)	0.06* (2.24)	0.07* (2.45)
Error Correction	0.64** (3.18)	0.63** (2.88)	0.57* (2.52)
Constant	-44.16	-30.46	37.76
Adj. R ²	0.89	0.90	0.90
Chow (1980)	3.46*	4.81**	4.00**

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 4.5 Error Correction Model Estimates of Robbery Rates, Detroit 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	0.01 (0.45)	--	-0.01 (-0.63)	-0.02 (-0.64)
Service Wages	0.11* (2.16)	--	0.16* (2.70)	0.16* (2.48)
Manufacturing Employment	-5692.52* (-2.42)	--	-6939.88** (-2.81)	-6178.96+ (-1.87)
Service Employment	-6212.50 (-0.53)	--	-5061.97 (-0.40)	-3900.15 (-0.30)
Inequality	--	--	--	24.31 (0.29)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-406.38* (-2.13)	-335.75 (-1.30)	-299.69 (-1.06)
Unemployment	36.23** (2.90)	29.18* (2.23)	33.31* (2.42)	33.30* (2.40)
Police Per Capita	1.12 (1.11)	1.98* (2.38)	0.93 (0.84)	0.81 (0.69)
Error Correction	0.73*** (4.78)	0.80*** (5.98)	0.65*** (3.96)	0.66*** (3.96)
Constant	181.34	137.71	1709.84	959.28
Adj. R ²	0.75	0.74	0.72	0.72
Chow (1980)	2.09+	1.31	2.66*	3.52*

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 4.6 Error Correction Model Estimates of Burglary Rates, Detroit 1960-1996

Variable	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	--	-0.00 (-0.07)	-0.03 (-0.67)
Service Wages	--	0.18 (1.35)	0.27+ (1.89)
Manufacturing Employment	--	-8374.09 (-1.51)	725.31 (0.10)
Service Employment	--	-16738.43 (-0.59)	-2533.75 (-0.09)
Inequality	--	--	317.15+ (1.73)
Welfare/Police Spending	-755.21* (-2.04)	-648.95 (-1.11)	-199.37 (-0.32)
Unemployment	84.39** (3.30)	103.28** (3.34)	104.60** (3.47)
Police Per Capita	2.54 (1.63)	2.39 (0.97)	0.95 (0.38)
Error Correction	0.85*** (8.48)	0.77*** (5.84)	0.79*** (6.12)
Constant	916.31	4135.86	-5148.82
Adj. R ²	0.78	0.70	0.72
Chow (1980)	1.31	5.48**	9.30***

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 4.5 presents the results of the error correction model estimating robbery rates. In the case of robbery rates, the negative effect of the percent of the labor force employed in manufacturing holds. F tests for nested models show in Table 4.5 that Model A best fits the data. In Model A, a one percentage point increase in manufacturing employment yields a decrease in the number of robberies by 56.92 per 100,000 residents of Detroit. Two further economic variables impact rates of robbery across all models. First, contrary to my expectations, service wages are positively related to rates of robbery. As the average wages of employees in consumer service industries increase, rates of robbery increase. A ten-dollar increase in wages leads to one more robbery per 100,000 people in the Detroit population. Second, the rate of unemployment is positively related to rates of robbery. As unemployment increases, rates of robbery increase.

Finally, Table 4.6 presents the results of error correction model estimates of burglary rates in Detroit. The results of my analyses of burglary rates are substantially different from my analyses of either homicide or robbery because burglary rates were not cointegrated with any of the economic variables, therefore I was unable to estimate long-run relationships using the ECM procedures for Model A. In the best fitting model, Model B, two variables contribute to trends in rates of burglary. In keeping with the results of my multivariate analyses of robbery, unemployment was positively associated with rates of burglary. Supporting my expectations regarding the influence of the ratio of welfare spending to police spending, the results presented in Model B of Table 4.5, indicate that that as welfare expenditures increase relative to police spending (or vice versa) the burglary rate decreases significantly.

Table 4.7 presents the results of the final stage of my analysis. In each of the multivariate analyses, I tested the temporal stability of the relationship between the variables. In the Chow breakpoint test the data are partitioned into subsets. The purpose of the test is to determine if the coefficient vectors can be regarded as constant over the subsets. A statistically significant F-test indicates that the model is not stable, but is instead temporally contingent. Based on the results of Chow breakpoint tests (presented in the final rows of Tables 4.4 through 4.6), I determined that a number of the models exhibit temporal instability.

Table 4.7 Error Correction Model Bivariate Estimates, Detroit 1960-1996

Crime Rates	Other Variables	Years	Cointegrated	<i>b</i>	<i>t</i>	Adj. R ²	Constant
Homicide	Manufacturing Emp.	60-80	Yes	-469.94***	-9.98		230.38
		81-96	Yes	15.48	0.41		48.74
	Unemployment	60-80	Yes	-0.46	-0.89		36.09
		81-96	Yes	0.07	0.17		52.30
Robbery	Manufacturing Emp.	60-80	Yes	-12417.76***	-8.34		6226.49
		81-96	No	--	--	--	--
	Service Wages	60-80	Yes	0.02	0.60		431.38
		81-96	No	--	--	--	--
	Unemployment	60-80	Yes	-5.12	-0.25		1016.83
		81-96	Yes	34.85**	3.15		809.43
Burglary	Unemployment	60-80	Yes	36.98	0.98		2017.80
		81-96	No	--	--	--	--

Note: ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

This is not surprising in that visual inspections of line graphs of all of the variables included in this analysis fail to find any variable that exhibits a change in the direction exhibited by crime rates beginning in the mid-1980s. The ideal approach to dealing with temporal instability would be to re-estimate the model across the theoretically appropriate sub-samples of the data. Unfortunately, the very small number of cases that I have to estimate precludes the use of this approach. However, the break in the multivariate relationships may be the result of breaks in bivariate relationships between crime rates and those variables that had statistically significant effects on rates of crime in my multivariate models.

In the last stage of my analysis, I estimated bivariate relationships between those variables that are statistically significant in each multivariate model that exhibits significant temporal instability. The overall results of these bivariate analyses suggest one major difference that may account for this temporal instability. I find that the effects of manufacturing employment on rates of both homicide and robbery hold for the years prior to 1980, but not subsequent years. So while manufacturing decline influenced increases in crime through the 1960s and 1970s, the dramatic declines in the 1980s and 1990s did not have the same effect.

Further, the results in Table 4.7 suggest that unemployment had less of an impact on rates of crime prior to the 1980s destabilization of the Detroit political economy than in the more recent years that have witnessed declines in both crime and unemployment. I should stress that the results of my analyses of sub-samples of the data can only be used to suggest possible sources of temporal instability in the models, because they are only the most likely sources of temporal instability out of a wide range of relationships that may be changing across this time period. Again, ideally one would re-estimate the original models for the years before and after 1980 separately. With such a limited number of years in this time series that approach was not possible here. These bivariate analyses are merely an attempt to explore the forces that may be responsible for temporal instability in the models.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The intent of this analysis was to establish the effects of the Detroit political-economic context on rates of crime. In particular, my intent

was to document the effects of economic conditions, class relations and state responses on crime in Detroit between 1960 and 1996. I hold that an understanding of crime is dependent upon an understanding of the social structure in which crime is enmeshed. Therefore, an analysis of crime in Detroit in the later half of the twentieth century is necessarily enmeshed in the analysis of the decline of the automotive industry, as well as related manufacturing industries; the increasingly bifurcated class structure and related trends in inequality; and the weakening of the liberal-labor political coalition and its related welfare-state agenda.

In terms of the economic changes witnessed in Detroit over the past forty years, I find that only two aspects of economic change have had statistically significant impacts on rates of crime. Consistent with my hypotheses, declines in manufacturing employment lead to increases in rates of both homicide and robbery. However, my analysis of the accord and post-accord eras in Detroit, combined with the Chow breakpoint tests for differences in the multivariate relationships across time periods, suggests that the effects of the rate of manufacturing employment on crime is historically contingent.

The effect of manufacturing employment on crime appears to be stronger in the years prior to the automotive industry collapse. This finding is consistent with my overall understanding of the relationship between manufacturing employment and rates of crime. My argument is that employment in manufacturing industries provides benefits and structure that are absent from employment in service industries. Manufacturing employment during the accord era offered greater stability than service employment. During the accord, workers in service industries faced much more uncertainty of the short-term stability of their source of income than workers in manufacturing industries.

Further, the long-term prospects of work are much different in manufacturing industries than in service industries, at least manufacturing industries as they existed during the accord era in Detroit. This explains why manufacturing employment lessens crime in the accord era. In the post-accord era, manufacturing employment, even in the automotive industry, no longer possesses the same degree of stability as it once did. In the absence of expectations of manufacturing employment to provide both short and long-term economic stability, there would be little reason to expect that changes

in rates of manufacturing employment would lessen rates of criminal offending.

Contrary to my expectations, service sector wages exhibited a positive impact on rates of property crime. I hypothesized that increased wages, regardless of source would lessen rates of economic distress thereby lessening rates of crime. However, my findings are consistent with routine activities theories that hold that decreases in wages lead to decreases in rates of crime because Detroit residents, especially poor and working class Detroit residents who would be most likely employed in the consumer service sector and the most likely crime victims, would have less property to be victimized and would be less likely to be away from home at leisure. While contrary to my expectations, this finding supports a broad range of criminological theory.

My analyses of the effects of government spending on social welfare services relative to police services are mixed, allowing me to draw only limited conclusions. I argued that declining social service support paired with rising punitive criminal justice support would lead to increases in rates of crime. This argument was supported in terms of homicide, robbery and burglary rates. However, although statistically significant, the coefficients added little to the explanatory power of the multivariate models. In the case of property crimes, the effect of the ratio of welfare to police spending disappeared with the inclusion of economic variables.

Based on my findings, I draw three summary conclusions. First, changes in manufacturing employment have important effects on changes in rates of crime in Detroit. Detroit has always had a strong manufacturing base. When such a base is eroded it would be surprising if the political-economic structure that limits crime were not eroded as well. Second, the political-economic context of Detroit, in which rates of crime are embedded appears to have shifted in the waning years of the twentieth century. Erosion of the economic structure that provided stability in the accord years, appears to have little relevance in the post-accord Detroit political economy. Finally, although limited, the degree of exchange of social service spending for police spending in the years after 1980, appear to exhibit at least some criminogenic effect in Detroit. While economic variables are the most consistently important in understanding Detroit crime, political and class variables are not without some effect.

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Boston: The Real Renaissance

Although Detroit politicians and city planners have repeatedly attempted to create a so-called Detroit renaissance, the true urban renaissance has occurred in Boston over the last two decades. Changes in Boston have been so rapid and so dramatic that Bluestone and Stevenson (2000) claim Boston has been through a revolution. And that revolution has created a contemporary Boston that bears little resemblance to the city it was in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Speaking in retrospect from the 1990s, Kevin White, mayor of Boston between 1968 and 1983, remarked, “at one point we were like Detroit. Ten years later, we are one of the five most prestigious cities in the country” (quoted in O’Connor 1993: xii). During White’s mayoral term, Boston was hemorrhaging jobs, led by a city government on the perpetual verge of bankruptcy, wracked by racial antagonism, and plagued by violent crime (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). Boston was facing as great a level of urban distress as any city has faced in the latter half of the twentieth century.

By contrast, Boston in the year 2000 is an urban economic success story. Its economic recovery is complete. High-tech industries have filled the void left by manufacturing disinvestment and provided a diverse pool of employment opportunities for both professionals and less-skilled workers (Glickman, Lahr and Wyly 1996). However the growth of new industries has not come at the expense of the city itself. While nodes of suburban and exurban industrial growth have developed in the Boston metropolitan region, the central city remains a primary focus of industrial development. The city is not a hole in the center of the successful Boston metropolitan region. Without question, neighborhoods with disproportionately high levels of poverty and

segregation exist in the central city. Yet there is relatively little of the inner city distress characteristic of many cities, including Detroit, Atlanta and New Orleans (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000).

In the post-war era, Boston has experienced a complete transformation from a manufacturing industrial base to a service base. This transformation has come without a loss of jobs or wages. Further, Boston has created a city government conducive to business without sacrificing city services. In that Boston's political-economic trends have differed from those of the other cities in this study, the relationship between political-economic conditions and crime in Boston may differ significantly from that of Detroit, New Orleans or Atlanta. This chapter, first, explores Boston's political-economic history and, second, examines the relationship between crime and political-economic conditions in the city.

BOSTON'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS

Over its long history, Boston has witnessed a number of reconfigurations of its economic structure. Boston's earliest economy was based on shipping and whaling. With the collapse of these two major industries in the early 1800s and the introduction of new technologies Boston's economic base shifted to textiles. By the early twentieth century, textile industries were rapidly moving away from Massachusetts and toward Southern states (Lankevich 1974). The decline of the textile industry led to a recession in Boston that spanned from the early 1930s through WWII (Harrison 1984).

Pre- and Post-War Recession


Although World War II did not bring to Boston the benefits that it brought to many other U.S. cities, the war provided a temporary reprieve from the steady economic decline that had plagued Boston since the Depression. Manufacturing employment rose during the years of WWII as mills once again reached levels of full-employment in order to meet war demands for textiles and shoes (Thernstrom 1973). But not even the prosperity of WWII could provide a permanent remedy for Boston's failing economy (O'Connor 1993). After the war, manufacturing industries resumed their southward exodus leaving those manufacturing workers who were able to retain their jobs with more

meager incomes as high unemployment forced down market wages (Krushnic 1974).

According to Bluestone and Stevenson (2000), WWII represented a bridge between the textile manufacturing era and the high-technology era. Although many manufacturing firms had left Boston by the end of WWII, industrial firms remained a primary employer, employing almost 30% of workers in 1950. Textile manufacturing industries alone employed 20% of all workers (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). By 1990, however, industries manufacturing both durable and nondurable goods employed only 5% of Boston workers (see Figure 5.1). Job loss resulting from manufacturing decline in Boston after WWII was dramatic. During the 1950s, alone, 77 of the 99 corporations located along the Route 128 industrial corridor in Boston relocated to the suburban metropolitan region, adding to the city's net loss of 50,000 jobs in this decade (Green and Donahue 1978). Job loss was particularly detrimental to organized labor. The Massachusetts AFL-CIO lost over 275,000 members in the 1960s and the first years of the 1970s (Green and Donahue 1978).

Boston trade union activism tended toward the conservative in the decades following WWII (Green and Donahue 1978). This relative conservatism had two sources. First, since prior to WWII AFL unions and CIO unions clashed in Boston. The AFL trade unions opposed the CIO on a number of fronts, but in the local Boston context the CIO threatened the AFL's virtual monopoly as the political voice of union members. The AFL was strongly entrenched in Boston's ward politics and multi-term mayor James Curley would not, or could not, bargain with the CIO as he had the AFL (Green and Donahue 1978). The result was a division in city-wide union ranks during the immediate post-war decades that limited the political and economic power of organized labor in Boston. Second, unions existed in a declining economy that lessened union membership and reinforced a strong tradition of job consciousness (Green and Donahue 1978). As job prospects lessened, unions became increasingly insular and increasingly segregationist, limiting union membership to the growing ranks of women, blacks and immigrants in the Boston labor market.

Figure 5.1 Employment Ratios, Boston 1948-2000



In the 1950s and 1960s, it appeared that Boston's economic decline would continue as the city's traditional textile manufacturing base continued to erode. Two primary factors led to the decline in Boston's textile industry. First, the decline in textiles in Boston, and throughout New England, was the result of shifts in the textile market away from heavy woollens. The increasing prevalence of central heating lessened the need for heavy woolen clothes, therefore cottons, and later synthetic fabrics, increased in popularity. Benefiting textile firm owners, cottons and less-expensive synthetics could be manufactured at lower labor costs in other regions of the country and the world (Harrison 1984). Long before heavy manufacturing moved south to avoid union wages and benefits, the textile industry had relocated for the same reasons (Green and Donahue 1978).

Second, the industrial infrastructure in Boston was growing obsolete. The inability of Boston's textile industries to retool and remain competitive by producing lightweight fabrics was due, in large part, to the financial inertia of the economic, investing elite of Boston (Adams 1977). By choosing not to invest in existing textile industries before WWII, the Brahmin economic elite of Boston contributed to the growing obsolescence of the region's existing industrial infrastructure. Although part of Boston's financial inertia stemmed from complacency and a lack of incentive to invest in risky endeavors, the bulk of the financial inertia of Boston's investment community was intertwined with the growing chasm between the Brahmin economic elite and the Irish political elite (Shannon 1984).

From the Civil War to World War II, conflict between Irish Catholic immigrants and their descendants and Protestant Yankees led by their elite Brahmin class dominated Boston politics (Eisinger 1980). Savvy Irish leaders used Boston's traditional ward politics to their advantage and by 1914, Irish Bostonians had secured their political dominance with the election of James Michael Curley as mayor over another Irish Democratic candidate (Galvin 1970). The Yankee Brahmins were not without recourse. Until the end of WWII, the Irish-controlled city hall had to contend with the powerful, Brahmin economic leaders of the city (Schabert 1989). Relations between Irish political leaders and Brahmin economic leaders became so contentious by WWII that the Brahmins essentially exerted a localized capital "strike," refusing to invest in the city of Boston (Green and Donahue 1978). By the end of WWII, investment in Boston was at a standstill.

Together regional industrial collapse, Brahmin economic retreat, and Irish political aggressiveness made Boston off-limits to outside investment (Green and Donahue 1978). According to contemporary *Boston Globe* reports, “the negative attitude of the Yankee-dominated insurance industry was so fervent that no mortgages on buildings in Irish-dominated Boston were granted” (quoted in Green and Donahue 1978: 117).

Relations between the city government and the capital-wielding elite improved in the 1950s and 1960s. Facing rapid declines in Boston’s traditional manufacturing infrastructure, a new generation of Irish Democratic politicians recognized the dire need for economic investment in the city. Mayor John B. Hynes, and his successor Kevin White, worked closely with the Brahmin elite to obtain the political legitimacy and financial cooperation they needed to attempt to improve Boston (Green and Donahue 1978).


The coordinated interest of government and capital in the 1950s and the 1960s drove the so-called urban renewal of Boston. While urban renewal led to new office buildings, high-rent residential property and an expansion of the finance, real estate and insurance sector, it did little to expand employment opportunities sufficient to replace those lost in the manufacturing sector. Beyond failing to alleviate Boston’s employment problem, urban renewal led to growing racial and ethnic conflict as the city razed poor and working class neighborhoods to secure land for business development (Gans 1962).

Trends in Post-War Crime

Trends in political and economic conditions in Boston have differed from those same trends in other cities. The economic restructuring of Boston’s industrial base came decades earlier than in Atlanta, Detroit, or New Orleans. Interestingly, changes in trends in crime appear to have come earlier to Boston as well.

Although the shape of trends in Boston crime rates mirrors those in Atlanta, Detroit, and New Orleans, the timing of those trends diverge from the timing of trends in crime elsewhere. Crime in Boston can be divided into three eras (see Figure 5.2). The 1950s and 1960s were a period of slowly climbing rates of crime. The 1970s was a decade of booming crime rates. By 1980, crime reached its apex in Boston and for all crimes except assault, rates declined after 1980.

Figure 5.2 Crime Rates, Boston 1948-2000



Together, economic decline and a political system largely dominated by business interests did little for Boston's poor and working class residents in the 1950s and 1960s. As Boston's level of urban distress increased during the first decades after World War II, Boston's crime rates began to increase. Rapid increases in crime did not occur, however, until the more devastating economic distress and political dislocation of the 1970s.

Distress and Decline in the 1970s

In the 1970s, Boston was facing urban problems as great as the most distressed urban cities. Boston experienced rising unemployment, a high rate of poverty, falling per capita income, increasing crime, and a city government on the verge of fiscal crisis (Bradbury, Downs and Small 1982). Boston frequently topped lists of problem cities during the 70s (Stanley 1976). In a study conducted by the Brookings Institute, Boston ranked below Detroit, Michigan; Gary, Indiana; Oakland, California; and Patterson, New Jersey on a series of indicators measuring urban quality of life (Bradbury, Downs and Small 1982).

Aggregate indicators of Boston's economic distress indicate the degree of economic distress workers and families experienced in Boston during the 1970s. Although unemployment was under five percent in 1970, between 1970 and 1980 unemployment increased by almost fifty percent (see Table 5.1). While per capita income increased marginally in the 1970s, wages in manufacturing were stagnate and wages in services declined dramatically.

The city government-business elite partnership that had fueled urban renewal programs and the downtown building boom eroded during the 1970s. Two factors hastened this erosion. First, the city government found itself unable to continue in its role as the central urban planning body in Boston due to dire fiscal crisis. Throughout the 1970s, the Boston city government was on the verge of financial collapse (Weinberg 1984). At the height of its economic crisis in 1976, Boston's city government spent \$70 million more than its projected revenues. As with most municipalities, the bulk of Boston's revenue came from property taxes. Boston had long battled with the state to try to establish a more broad-based taxing system with little success (Thernstrom 1969). Being a city and state election year, the government had few politically feasible options with which to make up the shortfall. Further, with the collapse of national credit markets in

Table 5.1 Summary Characteristics, Boston 1950-2000

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
<i>Population Characteristics</i>						
Population (thousands)	801	697	641	562	574	589
% Black	5.0	9.1	15.6	21.7	24.0	23.8
% Female Headed Households	--	--	25.4	39.6	43.7	48.0
% HS Only Graduates	28.9	29.3	34.3	35.0	26.6	24.0
% College Graduates	6.4	7.6	10.3	20.3	30.0	35.6
<i>Income, Poverty and Inequality</i>						
Income (thousands)*	--	13.2	13.4	15.4	19.4	23.4
% Poverty	--	--	15.5	20.2	18.7	19.5
% Suburban Poverty	--	--	5.7	6.3	5.3	5.7
% Black Poverty	--	--	24.4	28.6	24.2	22.6
% Child Poverty	--	--	28.8	30.9	28.3	25.6
90/10 Income Ratio	--	5.1	7.1	8.9	10.9	--
Suburb/City Income Ratio	--	--	1.10	1.20	1.15	1.67
Dissimilarity Index	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.76	0.68	0.70
<i>Employment and Wages</i>						
% Unemployment	--	5.2	4.3	6.1	8.3	6.2
Manufacturing Wages (in thousands)	27.6	29.0	31.8	32.6	40.8	48.8
Cons. Service Wages (in thousands)	19.2	19.1	19.5	16.6	19.4	23.4
% Manufacturing	31	24	18	13	7	7
% Cons. Service	23	21	19	17	17	18
<i>State Revenues and Expenditures (all in thousands)</i>						
Total Revenues	--	1344	1436	2236	2376	1995
Tax Revenues	--	806	941	983	718	802
Transfer Payments	--	246	249	64	167	--
Police Spending	--	120	133	150	196	208

* All figures in constant dollars

1975, Boston had little access to credit outside of the city. The city just narrowly avoided declaring bankruptcy in 1976 (Weinberg 1984)

The second factor that was responsible for the erosion of the short-lived city government-business elite partnership during the 1970s was the rise of civic unrest. Civic unrest came from two sources during this decade, school busing protests and anti-urban renewal protests. The latter half of the 1970s were wracked by the school busing controversy (Weinberg 1984). In 1974, as the result of an NAACP suit against the Boston School Committee, the Massachusetts' State Supreme Court mandated that Boston schools implement a desegregation plan that relied heavily on busing (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). After the court ruling, racial tensions heightened in the city. In the wake of the 1974 school-busing plan, middle and upper-middle class whites moved to the suburbs or enrolled their children in private schools (King 1986). Poor and working class whites directed their anger toward white political leaders elected with their support. The result was "a family feud between the Irish who had made it and the Irish who hadn't" (Lukas 1985: 246).

Anti-urban renewal protests also contributed to the declining legitimacy of Boston's city government during the 1970s. With the authority of the federal urban renewal legislation, the Boston Redevelopment Authority demolished blighted inner-city neighborhoods, clearing land for higher value homes and businesses that drew middle and upper income residents and consumers into the city (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). Many of these city-sponsored urban renewal developments permanently displaced entire neighborhoods to further economic gain for wealthy investors (O'Connor 1993). Through the 1950s and 1960s, no neighborhood groups effectively organized significant resistance against urban renewal. But by the end of the 1960s, residents of neighborhoods slated for renewal began to generate true grass-roots opposition to urban renewal (Green 1986). In the 1970s, these protests effectively stymied the urban renewal movement that had transformed Boston's cityscape in the two decades immediately following WWII. With greater organization and a growing political voice anti-renewal organizations battled with developers, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, and the white urban gentry. As with the busing conflict, the result was an expanding class struggle over housing between the "haves" and the "have nots" throughout the 1970s (Green 1986).

Crime and Crisis in the 1970s

Crime rates grew dramatically in the 1970s (see Figure 5.2). Although rates of property crimes (robbery and burglary) reached their highest points in 1980, as did rates of homicide, the most rapid increase in crime came in the 1970s. This rapid increase in crime mirrored rapid increases in economic distress and political instability. Manufacturing employment continued to plummet, as did consumer service employment. Not surprisingly joblessness increased rapidly during the 1970s (see Table 5.1). Although the manufacturing economic base of Boston was essentially dismantled, high-tech industries had not yet emerged as a significant enough power to counteract the negative effects of manufacturing decline.

Although it could not be said that Boston's local political system in the 1950s and 1960s adequately represented the interests of the majority of the city's population, the government was an active and effective agent of urban renewal. By the 1970s, however, Boston's city government had lost the economic wherewithal to engage on relatively equal grounds with the economic elite. After two decades of urban renewal projects that devastated working class Boston neighborhoods, as well as a protracted school integration struggle, the city had also lost what legitimacy it held with the general electorate. Thus in the 1970s, crime increased as economic distress was most acute and political legitimacy most undermined.

Recovery and Renaissance

In the 1980s and the 1990s, Boston experienced a renaissance that other cities have only been able to invoke as public relations fodder. Notions of urban renaissance that had been bandied about urban planning circles had become manifest in Boston (Schabert 1989). Boston's renaissance came on two fronts in the late 1980s and 1990s, an economic front and a political front.

Boston's economic recovery was due largely to how it reconfigured itself around a new industrial base after the loss of its previous manufacturing infrastructure (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). Boston's ability to take advantage of the growing dominance of high-tech industries in the national and global economy did not simply emerge in the 1980s. Since WWII, Boston had been incubating fledgling high-tech industries that would rise to national and

international prominence in the 1980s. In the late 18th century, Boston's deep-water harbor made the shipping and whaling industries dominant. In the late 19th century, Boston's proximity to high volume, fast running rivers made the textile mills dominant. In the late 20th century, Boston's educational infrastructure made the high-tech industry key to the region's and nation's economy.

Boston's high-tech dominance emerged from a long history of successful and profitable partnerships between private industry, academia and the federal government (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). From its founding in the mid-19th century, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) established close links with industries. Through the twentieth century, new and expanding colleges formed links with both industry and the federal government (Rosegrant and Lampe 1992). These links served as the impetus for the development of large-scale research and development organizations on Boston area campuses funded by and serving both the U.S. government and private industry (Saxenian 1994). These firms incubated the numerous high-tech ventures that would fuel Boston's economy in the 1980s and 1990s.

Boston's economic miracle of the 1980s and 1990s is generally attributed to high-technology industries. The technology and knowledge service sector in the 1990s served as Boston's primary export commodity. As early as 1976, Boston exported over 29% of the services it generated in the form of education, health care and high-tech consulting (Carlaw 1976). The high-tech sector, however, is composed primarily of service employment. At the height of Boston's high-tech renaissance only 10% of jobs were actually in high-technology and only 6% of jobs were in high-tech manufacturing (Dukakis and Kanter 1988; Rosegrant and Lampe 1992).

Although non-manufacturing industries expanded across the United States after WWII, nowhere was their growth more rapid or pervasive than in Boston (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). Service sector growth in Boston differed, however, from service growth elsewhere because it was primarily composed of business and producer services, not consumer services. By 1990, Boston had one of the largest and fastest growing levels of employment in these "good" service sector jobs. Boston's greatest levels of service sector employment occurred in finance, insurance and real estate and health and education services. Together these service sector industries offered a diverse range of employment opportunities for both high-skilled

professionals and less-skilled support personnel (Glickman, Lahr and Wyly 1996).

Boston's recovery was not due to economic factors alone. By the 1980s, the efforts of Boston politicians to provide the city and the region with an image of a "good business climate" came to fruition (Harrison 1984). The city government supported typical pro-business policies such as lower tax rates and bond-financing plans. However, the city government also supported policies that assisted the high-tech business boom directly but that were not patently pro-business. The city provided generous social service programs for immigrants to provide both high and low-skill employees to businesses facing dire labor shortages (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). More importantly, the city diligently protected the quality of its public education system, even during the budget shortfalls and busing crises of the 1970s (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). By the 1990s, the Boston metropolitan region ranked second among metropolitan regions in educational spending, spending \$7,400 per pupil per year on K-12 public education (Glickman, Lahr and Wyly 1996). The result is a highly trained and highly educated workforce.

Boston's economic renaissance of the 1980s and 1990s has garnered real benefits for the city's workers. Expanding employment in Boston during the 1980s and 1990s led to remarkably low levels of joblessness. During the first half of the 1990s, Boston and its immediate suburbs netted over 250,000 new jobs (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). As a result, Boston has faced little unemployment since the mid-1980s. As early as 1987, the unemployment rate in the Boston metropolitan region was 2.7 percent. Since 1984, unemployment in the region has averaged 4.6 percent (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). Even the central city itself has experienced very low levels of unemployment. Since 1990 unemployment in the city of Boston has averaged around five percent (Division of Employment and Training 1999). In such a tight labor market, employers have had to extend employment opportunities deep into the workforce queue, providing quality employment to some of the typically most disadvantaged urban workers (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000).

The Boston success story is not without caveats. Poverty exists in Boston despite the economic growth of the past decade. Nearly 40% of all female-headed households with children have incomes falling below the poverty line. The racial and ethnic breakdown of poverty rates in

the city, however, is very different from trends in Detroit, Atlanta or New Orleans. Black poverty is quite low in Boston. Less than 25% of black Bostonians are poor. Among Hispanic and Asian immigrants, who represent an increasing proportion of Boston's population, poverty rates top 30%, however. And living below the national poverty line is particularly difficult in Boston, the second most costly place to live in the United States (Glickman, Lahr and Wylly 1996).

Despite the continued incidence of poverty and inequality in Boston, the Boston renaissance is a reality. Political factors and market forces have transformed Boston from an urban nightmare in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s into an exemplar of urban rejuvenation today. Boston benefited from being in the right industries at the right time, but city policies served to take advantage of opportunities to the benefit of the many, not just the few, in the city.

In many ways, Boston has been the "advance scout" for both the industrial and post-industrial eras in the United States (Bluestone and Stevenson 2000). Boston's textile mills heralded the industrial revolution in the United States. By the time industries were beginning to coalesce in other cities, Boston was facing a rapidly declining industrial base. Likewise, Boston was one of the first cities to enter the post-industrial high-tech and professional service age. So perhaps, and just perhaps, Boston suggests a positive future for other cities still in the throws of the "creative destruction" that replaces their prior industrial manufacturing base with a new post-industrial service base.

The Early Crime Decline

The early economic recovery of Boston parallels an early decline in rates of crime. Whereas most of the United States did not experience declining crime rates until the 1990s, all crime, except assaults, peaked in the early 1980s in Boston (see Figure 5.2). It is not surprising that Boston's economic and political renaissance acted to lessen rates of criminal offending. For a city of Boston's size, its rates of unemployment, poverty and income inequality are remarkably low (see Table 5.1). What is surprising is that continued drops in levels of both manufacturing and service employment accompanied Boston's plummeting crime rates. Boston, it appears, has been able to reconfigure its economy from a manufacturing basis to a service basis without sacrificing the well-being of its poor, working and middle

classes. It is likely this trait of the Boston post-industrial economy that has enabled the city to avoid disinvestment on the part of its residents.

HYPOTHESES

I argue that the changing structure of the U.S. economy over the post-war decades has transformed the very nature of work, urban politics and class relations in U.S. cities since WWII. I interpret these transformations in pessimistic terms, anticipating that they will lead to a host of urban social ills, most notably crime. Arguably, Boston presents an alternative scenario. While Boston's political economy has been revolutionized over the past fifty years, the end result is a reinvigorated economy and a progressive local government. How then might political-economic conditions and crime in Boston be related?

Economic Conditions

From the end of WWII until the early 1970s the inherently conflictual relationship between labor and capital was rationalized by a series of institutional structures that in aggregate comprised the labor-capital accord (Bowles and Gintis 1982). However, the labor-capital accord had less relevance for Boston than for other highly unionized cities such as Detroit or Pittsburgh. By the beginning of WWII, textile and nondurable goods manufacturers in Boston had already employed profit maximizing strategies that were symptomatic of the dissolution of the accord. So while Boston has a strong history of unionized manufacturing, labor in Boston was never the direct beneficiary of the post-WWII labor capital accord.

The employment milieu in Boston over the post-war era suggests the growing information, technology, and knowledge service base of the economy. Between 1960 and 2000, the share of employment of both the manufacturing sector and the consumer service sector declined markedly (see Figure 5.1). As Boston lost large numbers of jobs before 1980 and gained large numbers of jobs after 1980 the industrial composition of the pool of available jobs changed dramatically. Because manufacturing employment was well in decline before 1960, I do not anticipate that the decline in manufacturing affects crime in Boston between 1960 and 1996. Further, in that consumer service employment actually declined as a proportion of total employment I

would not anticipate that consumer service employment would impact crime in Boston.

Hypothesis 1: There will be no relationship between rates of all crimes and the percentage of the labor force employed in either manufacturing or consumer service industries in Boston.

Manufacturing and service wages in Boston exhibit parallel trends between 1960 and 1996. Between 1960 and approximately 1975, manufacturing wages increased marginally while service wages remained stable. During the economic crisis of the late 1970s and into the recovery of the early 1980s, wages for both manufacturing and service jobs declined. By the mid-1980s, wages had resumed an upward trend.

Hypothesis 2: Average wages in both manufacturing and service industries will be negatively related to rates of each type of crime. The relationship between manufacturing wages and rates of crime will likely be stronger than the relationship between service wages and rates of crime because manufacturing wages are consistently higher than service wages.

Class Relations

I argue that class relations affect crime because class relations create the structure in which the legitimacy of existing economic and political stratification is evaluated. The greater the degree of inequality, the more unjust existing stratifying structures are deemed. Boston income inequality, as measured by the 90/10 income ratio, increased through the 1990s, but declined in the most recent years. The Boston renaissance has not affected all Boston residents equally, but I anticipate that inequality will not have an impact on crime in Boston because of the relatively low levels of inequality in Boston.

Hypothesis 3: Inequality will not be associated with rates of crime in Boston between 1960 and 1996.

State Responses

Decreases in social service support paired with increasing criminal justice support may lead to an erosion of individual commitment to the system of social order, thereby increasing rates of crime. In Boston, as in the other cities in this study, the ratio of welfare to police spending declined dramatically over the past four decades. However, the increases in police spending and the decreases in welfare spending were not as pronounced in Boston as they were elsewhere. While welfare spending declined, police spending did not increase substantially. Hence,

Hypothesis 4: The ratio of government spending on social welfare services to police services will not be significantly related to rates of each crime in Boston.

Temporal Stability

Boston witnessed a political and economic turning point with its emergence as a center of high technology industries in the first years of the 1980s. Hence there is a strong theoretical reason to expect that the relationships tested will be temporally contingent. I suspect, therefore, that the models may not hold across the length of the time series.

Hypothesis 5: All of the models will exhibit temporal instability between the 1960 through 1980 and 1981 through 1996 time periods. Manufacturing and consumer sector employment and wage variables are unlikely to exert any influence over rates of crime after the 1980 emergence of knowledge services in the Boston economy.

ANALYSES

Methods

To reiterate, this analysis is composed of three stages. First, I determine the order of integration of each of the univariate series of interest by examining the time plots of each variable and conducting univariate tests on each of the series. These procedures include examination of descriptive statistics, calculation of the Jaque-Bera tests for normality, examination of the univariate correlograms and Ljung-

Box Q statistics to assess autocorrelation and nonstationarity, and conducting Dickey-Fuller/Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots. If the null hypothesis of a unit root (being $I(1)$) is not rejected at the $p < .05$ level, I use the Johanson cointegration test to detect shared long-run trends between each $I(1)$ crime variable and each $I(1)$ explanatory variable.

Second, I estimate error correction regression models for each crime series, homicide, assault, robbery, and burglary, which include a number of models tapping changes in Boston's political economy. I only estimate models in which I was able to identify a cointegrative relationship using the levels of each crime rate as the dependent variable in each model.

Third, I test the temporal stability of each model. I use the Chow breakpoint test to determine if the coefficients in each regression model hold for the separate time series before and after the 1980 breakpoint.

Results

With the exception of assault rates, the results of the Dickey-Fuller unit root tests in Table 5.2 indicate that each of the series are nonstationary in levels and stationary in first differences suggesting the presence of a unit root. Although the unit root test does not indicate that the assault rate time series has a unit root, both correlograms and the Ljung-Box Q statistics indicate the opposite. A correlogram of assault rates in levels indicates nonstationarity, a correlogram in second-differences indicates the variable is overdifferenced. Therefore I conclude that, despite the results of the unit root tests, rates of assault has a unit root.

Table 5.3 presents the results of Johansen tests for cointegration for each crime variable and each explanatory and control variable. The Johansen test results indicate very little cointegration among these variables. Homicide is not cointegrated with any of the other variables. Assault and robbery rates are cointegrated with unemployment. Burglary exhibits cointegrative tendencies with service sector wages and the number of police per capita. Only in the presence of significant cointegration can models be estimated using the error correction form of OLS regression in levels, therefore I do not estimate the determinants of homicide rates in subsequent analyses.

Table 5.2 Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests, Boston 1960-1996

Variable	$\hat{\alpha}$	Decision
Homicide Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-2.30	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.78	reject
Assault Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-1.06	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-2.79	accept
Robbery Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-1.70	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-3.84	reject
Burglary Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-1.53	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-3.55	reject
Manufacturing Wages		
<i>Level</i>	0.28	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-5.22	reject
Service Wages		
<i>Level</i>	-2.19	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-5.08	reject
Manufacturing Employment		
<i>Level</i>	-1.08	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-6.59	reject
Service Employment		
<i>Level</i>	-1.58	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.52	reject
Inequality		
<i>Level</i>	-1.19	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.65	reject
Welfare/Police Spending		
<i>Level</i>	-1.43	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-7.74	reject
Unemployment		
<i>Level</i>	-2.41	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.82	reject
Police Per Capita		
<i>Level</i>	-1.60	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-5.23	reject

Table 5.3 Johansen Tests for Cointegration, Boston 1960-1996

Variable	Homicid e	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Manufacturing Wages	4.83	2.70	3.98	6.99
Service Wages	11.47	7.35	13.16	17.08*
Manufacturing Employment	12.22	7.41	6.77	6.07
Service Employment	11.00	7.61	2.19	6.56
Inequality	10.38	9.63	6.62	7.58
Welfare/Police Spending	11.08	11.09	12.46	8.32
Unemployment	11.78	17.46*	15.53*	10.65
Police Per Capita	9.48	8.86	13.77	17.29*

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

The determinants of assault rates in Boston between 1960 and 1996 are presented in Table 5.4. None of the larger models improves on the most parsimonious model, A. The results presented in Model A suggest that only manufacturing employment and service employment have a significant impact on rates of assault. Contrary to expectations both manufacturing employment and service employment are negatively related to rates of crime.

Table 5.5 presents the results of the error correction model estimates of rates of robbery. Of the three nested models presented, Model A best explains changes in robbery between 1960 and 1996 ($F=3.33$). In the case of robbery rates, service employment has a negative effect. A decrease in service employment yields an increase in rates of robbery. Manufacturing wages are negatively associated with rates of robbery. An increase in manufacturing sector wages yields a decrease in rates of robbery.

Table 5.4 Error Correction Model Estimates of Assault Rates, Boston 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	-0.00 (-0.45)	--	-0.00 (-0.53)	-0.00 (-0.55)
Service Wages	-0.01 (-0.59)	--	-0.01 (-0.47)	-0.01 (-0.42)
Manufacturing Employment	-7736.63** (-7.83)	--	-7641.44** (-7.73)	-6973.00** (-3.62)
Service Employment	5515.82** (2.98)	--	6075.02** (3.19)	5766.80** (2.94)
Inequality	--	--	--	15.30 (0.36)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-258.67*** (-6.12)	-25.80 (-0.76)	-27.56 (-0.80)
Unemployment	-8.48 (-0.87)	-60.98** (-3.48)	-7.17 (-0.74)	-9.06 (-0.88)
Police Per Capita	-0.67 (-1.57)	-1.90** (-2.94)	-0.65 (-1.56)	-0.64 (-1.54)
Error Correction	0.65*** (4.06)	0.72*** (5.64)	0.70*** (4.29)	0.72*** (4.40)
Constant	1255.22	1971.68	1136.05	978.77
Adj. R ²	0.97	0.89	0.97	0.97
Chow (1980)	9.72***	7.52***	5.88***	9.64***

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 5.5 Error Correction Model Estimates of Robbery Rates, Boston 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	-0.07** (-2.93)	--	-0.08** (-3.35)	-0.08** (-3.09)
Service Wages	0.00 (0.09)	--	0.03 (0.60)	0.03 (0.56)
Manufacturing Employment	-5160.28 (-1.53)	--	-3047.08 (-0.97)	-4916.74 (-0.80)
Service Employment	-17691.90* (-2.62)	--	-15724.17* (-2.51)	-14738.13* (-2.27)
Inequality	--	--	--	-42.44 (-0.30)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-302.42*** (-4.94)	-278.76* (-2.70)	-277.29* (-2.59)
Unemployment	-45.21 (-1.47)	-11.84 (-0.45)	-31.23 (-1.04)	-26.79 (-0.83)
Police Per Capita	0.65 (0.46)	-1.26 (-1.32)	0.79 (0.59)	0.78 (0.58)
Error Correction	0.48* (2.31)	0.77*** (5.90)	0.39* (1.95)	0.40* (1.90)
Constant	7219.20	1580.14	6413.16	6836.85
Adj. R ²	0.76	0.80	0.79	0.78
Chow (1980)	5.82***	2.58	3.53***	4.02**

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 5.6 Error Correction Model Estimates of Burglary Rates, Boston 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	-0.17** (-3.16)	--	-0.18*** (-3.72)	-0.18** (-3.48)
Service Wages	0.05 (0.46)	--	-0.11 (1.15)	0.11 (1.14)
Manufacturing Employment	-9087.20 (-1.18)	--	-2349.07 (-0.35)	-3665.48 (-0.28)
Service Employment	-37808.42* (-2.46)	--	-36552.63** (-2.76)	-35213.85** (-2.55)
Inequality	--	--	--	-19.09 (-0.06)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-524.97** (-4.73)	-711.93** (-3.23)	-717.91** (-3.15)
Unemployment	-40.46 (-0.59)	-62.52 (-1.34)	-15.39 (-0.24)	-10.83 (-0.16)
Police Per Capita	2.81 (0.90)	0.13 (0.08)	3.21 (1.13)	3.18 (-1.11)
Error Correction	0.61** (3.03)	0.90*** (8.83)	0.48* (2.46)	0.49* (2.39)
Constant	14180.60	1664.30	12543.32	12702.43
Adj. R ²	0.66	0.80	0.72	0.71
Chow (1980)	12.19***	2.02	7.23***	6.95***

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 5.6 indicates the results of error correction estimates of rates of burglary. Comparing Model A and Model C indicates that Model A is the most parsimonious model ($F=2.50$). Model A indicates that manufacturing wages and service employment have the same effect on burglary rates as on robbery rates. A decrease in manufacturing sector wages yields an increase in burglary. An increase in service employment yields a decrease in burglary.

The final stage of my analysis tested the temporal stability of the model. Although the results of Chow breakpoint tests (presented in Tables 5.4 through 5.6) indicate that all of the models exhibit temporal instability, further analysis does not indicate that any of the variables are cointegrated. Without establishing cointegration it is not possible to re-estimate the bivariate relationships as done in the analyses in Chapter Four.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Boston has experienced both distress and excess during the decades since World War II. In this chapter, my intent was to document how the economic and political distress up to the 1980s and the economic and political excess since 1980 have influenced Boston crime rates between 1960 and 1996. I hold that an understanding of crime is dependent upon an understanding of the social structure in which crime is enmeshed. An analysis of crime in Boston in the later half of the twentieth century is necessarily enmeshed in the analysis of the Boston high-tech renaissance, including Boston's reconfigured industrial structure and its continued provision of welfare-state services.

Of the economic changes witnessed by Boston since WWII, my quantitative analyses indicate that only three factors influence rates of crime. The results both support and fail to support my hypotheses. In terms of the economic changes witnessed in Boston over the past forty years, I find that the determinants of crime differ for violent crime and for property crime. For violent crime (in this case aggravated assault only), the decreases in relative shares of both manufacturing and service employment across the post-war years are both associated with decreases in rates of aggravated assault.

Only two aspects of economic change have had consistent effects on rates of property crime. Contrary to my hypotheses, increasing shares of consumer service employment relative to total employment in

Boston are associated with decreases in rates of property crimes (robbery and burglary). Only manufacturing wages are associated with crime and then only with rates of property crime. Increases in manufacturing wages are associated with decreases in rates of both robbery and burglary. This finding supports my general hypothesis that wages, especially more generous manufacturing wages, will lessen rates of crime.

In Boston, neither inequality nor government spending are related to rates of any form of crime. I argued that declining social service support paired with rising punitive criminal justice support would not lead to increases in rates of crime in the Boston case. This argument was supported by analyses of Boston crime rates. Why was this the case? Boston has a particularly healthy economy. The city has a relatively low unemployment rate and a relatively low poverty rate. Further, while other cities in this study experienced economic growth in the immediate post-war years and economic decline after 1970, Boston experienced approximately opposite trends. Hence, welfare spending in Boston was particularly high in the 1950s and 1960s when need was particularly great. A good portion of the decline in welfare spending may be the result of lessening need. In this context the criminogenic effects of the exchange of welfare spending for police spending may not manifest.

Based on my findings, I make a number of conclusions. Manufacturing employment has not influenced crime in Boston. In many ways this should not be surprising. By 1960, the beginning of my quantitative analyses, manufacturing industries had already experienced dramatic contraction. Boston had already experienced an industrial shift away from manufacturing by 1960. The transformation of the service economy, however, was still in its beginning stages. Hence, one would expect changes in service employment to influence changes in rates of crime.

So for Boston, economic restructuring has not had the same effects on rates of crime as in other cities. While the decline in manufacturing employment led to steep increases in crime in Detroit, it had no influence on crime in Boston. And while increases in service sector employment led to marginal increases in crime in Detroit, in Boston service sector employment actually lessened crime. The end result of the manufacturing-service shift in Boston was an early and consistent decrease in rates of crime in Boston. So just as Boston represented the

economic “advance scout,” it has also represented the crime “advance scout.” It may be, that as restructured economies in other cities become more entrenched, crime will continue to decline as it has in Boston.

New Orleans: The City That Care Forgot

New Orleans is unique among American cities. Part of the unique nature of New Orleans stems from the degree to which the city, and the people of the city, value its history. New Orleans, however, is a city often so taken by its past that it neglects its future (Johnson 1968). In an earlier chapter, I introduced Mollenkopf's (1983) typology of cities. According to Mollenkopf, there are declining cities with a traditional industrial base, there are redefined cities that have expanded beyond their traditional industrial base, and there are cities that emerged after industries had coalesced elsewhere. New Orleans fails to fit within this typology. Instead, New Orleans represents a fourth type of city. New Orleans is a city for which manufacturing decline has had little relevance, but for which service and technology expansion has been similarly irrelevant. New Orleans, however, is the largest representative of a host of old, Southern cities such as Savannah, Charleston, and Richmond. From that perspective it warrants inclusion in this study.

New Orleans has a long history, much longer than most large, Southern cities. The French broke ground for the city in 1718 and by 1723 New Orleans was the capital of French Louisiana and a thriving colonial trading center (Dufour 1968; Garvey and Widmer 1998). Despite its age and early prominence, New Orleans never developed a strong manufacturing infrastructure. In fact, New Orleans was virtually untouched by the rapid industrialization of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Gill 1997). So New Orleans is not the decaying and obsolete manufacturing center, nor is it the revitalized manufacturing-turned-technology powerhouse, and neither is it the sun-belt boom town that emerged in the twentieth century. New Orleans' economy, political traditions, and social and class relations remain influenced by its unique

history. As a result the social problems that are felt in contemporary New Orleans were created, in large part, by the historical conditions that have made New Orleans unique.

FIFTY YEARS OF NEW ORLEANS' POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY

The Image of Postwar Reform

Immediately after World War II, New Orleans appeared to be in an opportune position to diversify its economy and reclaim its antebellum role of economic, financial and trade dominance in the South. In the years between the early 1940s and the mid-1950s, New Orleans underwent an economic metamorphosis (Fairclough 1995). World War II had brought prosperity that New Orleans, and the entire South, had not known since before the Civil War.¹ The South received a large percentage of war-production contracts, especially in shipyards and assembly plants (Kemp 1981). Its location and port infrastructure made New Orleans the ideal site for coordinating ship building across the Gulf Coast region during WWII (Smith 1966). The war effort also increased demand for oil and petroleum products, leading to the first major boom in the New Orleans oil and gas industry. Between the late 1940s and the early 1950s oil output more than doubled making Louisiana, with New Orleans its hub, the second largest oil producer in the nation (Fairclough 1995; Smith 1970).

World War II provided the momentum necessary for the economic and political leadership of New Orleans to secure greater commercial and industrial prosperity for the city (Kemp 1981). Throughout the 1950s, New Orleans was able to capitalize on its post-war prosperity. In 1951 alone, industries worth over \$200 million dollars located in the city.² In the early years of the 1950s firms such as International Harvester, Kaiser Aluminum, and American Cyanamid opened production facilities in New Orleans (Haas 1974). These firms provided numerous new jobs to the burgeoning New Orleans working and middle classes.

The 1950s also witnessed extensive expansion of New Orleans' port facilities, especially for international trade and shipping. The expansion of the port facilities during the decade of the fifties included a 40% expansion of river frontage, a 50% increase in total existing wharf area, and the construction of four entirely new wharves

(Baughman 1968). The most significant port related improvement in the 10 to 15 years subsequent to WWII was the construction of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). Although the idea for an artificial waterway to circumvent the ever-changing passes at the mouth of the Mississippi River had existed since the nineteenth century, work on MRGO did not begin until the mid-1950s (Barry 1997). The waterway cut 40 miles off of the river distance from the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans, and more importantly provided a more direct and navigable link to the city wharves and the deep-water Industrial Canal lessening both port and river congestion (Baughman 1968).

Beyond physical improvements to New Orleans' port and waterways, the city also made significant changes in port policies in order to attract international, especially Latin American, trade. The impact of international trade on the New Orleans economy was dramatic during the 1950s (Haas 1974; Kemp 1981). In 1946, the New Orleans Dock Board established a foreign trade zone, the second in the United States, that eliminated duties on foreign commodities transhipped through New Orleans to other foreign ports (Baughman 1968). Further, manufacturing firms could add value to products within the zone without additional tariffs or duties. Companies, both foreign and domestic, established numerous production facilities within this foreign trade zone in the 1950s and 1960s. The result of increased trade for New Orleans' workers was expanded labor market opportunities in stevedoring, piloting, shipbuilding and related trades (Baughman 1968).

Together increased physical port space and increased trade led to an expansion of shipping employment in New Orleans. Shipping related trades, particularly stevedoring and shipbuilding were generally unionized. The expansion of these trades in the 1950s expanded the extent of unionization in New Orleans (Fairclough 1995). With increased unionization came higher benefits and wages for the New Orleans working class.

Despite the rate of growth in the shipping, petrochemical and even manufacturing industries in New Orleans after WWII, three trends foreshadowed the future stagnation of these industries in the city: A continued lack of a manufacturing infrastructure, racial tension, and an entrenched oligarchic class system.

Louisiana remained one of the least industrialized states after WWII. Although manufacturing expanded during the 1950s and 1960s, the rate of growth in manufacturing lagged significantly behind the

national average (Fairclough 1995). As documented in Table 6.1, only 20% of the New Orleans labor force was employed in manufacturing in 1950. This is considerably lower than any other city in this study, including Atlanta. Mechanization further reduced employment in New Orleans' key industries including shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and transportation. Between the mid-1940s and 1960 employment in petroleum refining declined 16% and employment in shipbuilding declined 63% (Fairclough 1995).

Mechanization of agriculture further transformed the demographics of the state during the post-war years. Louisiana's farm population decreased by over 600,000 in the 1950s (Fairclough 1995). Before 1950 most sugarcane, rice and cotton crops were harvested manually. By 1960 machines harvested virtually all sugarcane, absolutely all rice, and most cotton crops (Fairclough 1995). Sharecropping, the last vestige of the southern plantation economy, disappeared in the post-war years.

Displaced agricultural workers flooded the New Orleans labor market. According to Fairclough (1995), the South's black population shifted from a rural peasantry to an urban proletariat rapidly during these years. The result was that industrial expansion during the 1950s and early 1960s did not keep pace with the burgeoning population. The tension between a tight labor market and the influx of rural blacks intensified the determination of New Orleanian white workers to defend their privileged position in the local job market. This tension as only a precursor of the heightened racial tension that would consume the city in the 1960s (Fairclough 1995).³

One final trend emerged (or rather reemerged) in the 1950s and early 1960s as prelude to New Orleans' economic and political future. Louisiana politics is commonly referred to as the greatest free show on earth, and New Orleans is the center ring. Prior to rise of Huey P. Long, those who ruled New Orleans ruled the state of Louisiana. Haas (1974) argues that prior to Long's election, New Orleans was the epicenter of a ruling oligarchy that controlled state affairs. This oligarchy was composed of the intersecting interests of New Orleans' traditional political, social and economic elites.

The New Orleans' elite controlled state politics through the tightly controlled Old Regular Democrats political machine. Although New Orleans was the largest city in the state, it had a remarkably small

Table 4.1 Summary Characteristics, New Orleans 1950-2000

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
<i>Population Characteristics</i>						
Population (thousands)	570	628	601	558	497	485
% Black	31.9	37.2	42.0	55.2	62.0	66.7
% Female Households	--	--	21.3	29.8	37.8	54.7
% HS Only Graduates	16.6	18.5	26.1	32.1	29.1	23.4
% College Graduates	6.1	7.7	10.2	16.1	19.3	25.8
<i>Income, Poverty and Inequality</i>						
Income (thousands)	--	11	13	16	14	17
% Poverty	--	--	26.4	26.4	31.6	27.9
% Suburban Poverty	--	--	13.3	10.8	15.1	13.1
% Black Poverty	--	--	39.1	37.3	42.2	35.0
% Child Poverty	--	--	35.1	38.7	46.3	40.3
90/10 Income Ratio	--	11.6	12.5	14.5	14.8	--
Suburb/CC Income	--	--	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.5
Dissimilarity Index	0.63	0.65	0.74	0.70	0.68	0.66
<i>Employment and Wages (in thousands)</i>						
% Unemployment	---	10.0	8.9	7.8	5.8	9.4
Manufacturing Wages	28	29	30	32	35	39
Cons. Service Wages	24	22	20	18	16	17
Oil and Gas Wages	37	40	49	50	57	84
Shipping Wages	21	23	19	32	34	44
Manufacturing Emp.	21	18	14	10	8	6
Cons. Service Emp.	18	19	21	22	24	34
Oil and Gas Emp.	2	2	1	1	1	1
Shipping Emp.	8	7	7	7	4	1
<i>State Revenues and Expenditures (all in thousands)</i>						
Total Revenues	---	334	510	767	892	756
Tax Revenues	---	170	255	296	3389	333
Transfer Payments	---	158	84	99	93	3
Police Spending	---	49	64	75	70	70

voting population (Haas 1974). A traditional patronage system enabled the Old Regulars to easily dominate voting in New Orleans, and thereby dominate state politics through New Orleans' large number of electoral representatives.

It wasn't until Huey Long that a gubernatorial candidate was able to unite rural Louisiana interests and defeat the New Orleans machine. Long's tenure, as well as the tenures of his populist successors, was characterized initially by outright control of New Orleans and subsequently by outright conflict with New Orleans. Through WWII, the mayor of New Orleans was Long's protégé Robert Maestri. Although Maestri brought considerable benefits to the city, he was aligned with the populist faction of the Louisiana Democratic Party and not the traditional, ruling elite of New Orleans represented by the Old Regulars (Deutsch 1968).⁴ Maestri was adept, however, at the workings of New Orleans' tradition of political patronage and easily co-opted the Old Regulars political machine while in office. Having lost control of both local politics and the local political machine, the traditional New Orleans elite oligarchy sought every opportunity to regain control. That opportunity finally surfaced at the end of World War II.

Under the auspices of government reform, the social and financial leaders of New Orleans organized as the Crescent City Democratic Club (CCDC) to defeat Maestri and the Old Regulars political machine in 1946. The key to the CCDC and their candidate DeLesseps (Chep) Morrison's success was two-fold. First, the CCDC capitalized on the post-war population growth in New Orleans (Gill 1997). The CCDC, and related auxiliary organizations, sponsored massive voter registration drives to break the machine control of the small voting population in the city. Second, the CCDC actively exposed the ways in which the Maestri government's corruption affected everyday life. In one effective campaign strategy, CCDC and Morrison campaign staff and volunteers would place Morrison campaign signs in potholes and piles of uncollected garbage. The Maestri administration would immediately remove the sign and correct the problem. According to contemporaneous accounts, New Orleans residents quickly learned that to have their neighborhood roads fixed or refuse removed they simply had to call Morrison headquarters and request a campaign sign (Deutsch 1968; Haas 1974).


Morrison's reform agenda, backed by the newly organized CCDC, secured a narrow victory over Maestri. Morrison served as mayor of New Orleans for 16 years after his 1946 election. Although elected as a so-called reform candidate, Morrison's election was actually a reinstatement of the political control of New Orleans in the hands of the old-guard elite. Although supporting the interests of the traditional New Orleans elite, the structure of the Morrison administration stressed efficiency and economy in the city government (Haas 1974). The expansion of the transportation, oil/gas, and to a lesser extent manufacturing industries in New Orleans was, in large part, the result of the Morrison administration's efforts to lessen government corruption.⁵ Further, the increase in the international trade aspects of the Port of New Orleans was without a doubt influenced by Morrison's direct cultivation of personal relationships with Latin American political leaders of all ilk (dictators and military leaders included) (Haas 1974).

Morrison was neither able nor willing, however, to shed all aspects of the New Orleans system of political patronage. CCDC members, including many converts from the Old Regulars machine, held many politically appointed offices or garnered prime patronage contracts during Morrison's terms (Haas 1974). Morrison remained an effective economic and political asset to the city, however, until the last years of his fourth term.⁶ By the end of the 1950s New Orleans was facing political upheaval beyond the political savvy of Chep Morrison.

Crime and Reform

Trends in New Orleans crime can be divided into two distinct eras with a third era appearing to emerge in recent years: From 1948 to approximately 1960, from 1960 to the early 1990s, and the most recent years up to 2000. The first era spans from the late 1940s until approximately 1960. During these years, New Orleans experienced both low and stable rates of crime (see Figure 6.1). Property crimes exhibited the earliest increases. First burglary and then robbery began to increase in the late 1950s, heralding the second era of crime rates in the city.

Figure 6.1 Crime Rates, New Orleans 1948-2000



The years following WWII in New Orleans were a period of expansion in both the economic and political arenas. Although at a lesser rate than other cities, employment opportunities expanded in New Orleans in the late 1940s and 1950s. Along with employment opportunities, wages increased and unionization expanded.


Beyond the expansion of economic opportunities, political opportunities expanded in New Orleans as well. Although Chep Morrison was a representative of the old-guard New Orleans elite, he lessened corruption in the city government and professionalized the civil service bureaucracy. The power of machine politics declined and voter registration increased. As a result a broader range of constituencies had the opportunity to participate in the democratic process versus the patronage process.

Together the expansion of economic and political opportunities likely vested New Orleanians in the improving social order. Manufacturing, shipping and the oil/gas industries provided greater economic rewards to the working class. Further, these industries provided stable employment and relatively generous wages. City services expanded greatly for middle and working class New Orleans residents. One of Chep Morrison's most enduring and politically successful endeavors was the creation of the New Orleans Recreation Department (NORD). Morrison, and hence the city government, was viewed as representative of the majority of New Orleans residents. Hence with expanding economic opportunities and greater government representation the low crime rates of the 1950s are not unexpected.

From Integration Struggles to Interracial Politics

Economic growth in New Orleans in the 1960s continued much as it had in the late 1940s and 1950s, albeit at a slower pace. As documented in Figure 6.2, employment in manufacturing, shipping and oil/gas industries was stable throughout the 1960s. Stability in employment was mirrored by stability in wages. Manufacturing employment increased marginally with the opening of the Michaud assembly plant. Port expansion continued with the completion of the MRGO in 1963. Employment in shipping trades began to face considerable decline, however, as the Dock Board commenced a major wharf-refitting project to better accommodate transport containers and further erode work opportunities in shipping related trades.

Figure 6.2 Employment Ratios, New Orleans 1948-2000



Integration struggles dominated New Orleans politics during the early part of the 1960s. Issues of race were always an important topic on the New Orleans political scene. New Orleans' unique history contributed to a unique pattern of racial politics. The first blacks in New Orleans, as in other Southern cities, were slaves. By the mid-1700s over 1,000 slaves lived in New Orleans (Wright 1989). Unlike most other Southern cities, New Orleans also had a large population of "free people of color." By the end of the 18th century there were as many free blacks living in New Orleans as slaves (Wright 1989).

Although far from integrated into white society, free blacks had many of the same rights as whites in antebellum New Orleans. The post-Reconstruction backlash against newly freed blacks, however, severely limited the rights of ex-slaves and former free people of color. Creole blacks, the former free blacks and their descendants, and American blacks, the former slaves and their descendents, existed in very different cultural spheres well into the twentieth century (Fairclough 1995; Whelan, Young and Lauria 1994). This division in the black community served to weaken their power relative to the dominant white governing coalition until the 1960s. Consolidating interests around school integration in 1960 and increased voting power with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 transformed the New Orleans black community into a more united, although far from wholly united, political force.

In 1960, the last full year of the Morrison administration, school integration protests rocked New Orleans. Federal courts imposed a deadline by which the Orleans Parish School Board was required to submit an integration plan. The school board's response was to close the public schools and transfer control of the school system to the state (Gill 1997). Taking control of the New Orleans school system, the state passed rapid-fire legislation in an attempt to maintain segregation. As would prove important in subsequent years, Moon Landrieu was the only New Orleans legislator to oppose laws aimed at maintaining segregation in New Orleans. In November 1960 the federal government finally forced the state to capitulate and integrate New Orleans schools.

Despite the token nature of integration in New Orleans in 1960, the response of middle and working class whites in New Orleans was violent. The day after four black children entered two New Orleans schools over 2,000 whites and blacks rioted in downtown New Orleans

(Garvey and Widmer 1998). Over the course of the next few months the state and the New Orleans school board continued to battle against school integration making New Orleans the front line of integration battles across the state. The city government, following Morrison's lead, did little to avert the integration crisis.⁷ Morrison was looking toward a gubernatorial race and could not afford to lose the support of segregationists across the state (Fairclough 1995).

Morrison's successor as mayor after his resignation in 1961 was Victor Schiro. Schiro took a stronger stand on integration in New Orleans, in both schools and businesses. Through the 1960s, civil rights advances spurred white flight to the newly developing suburbs of the New Orleans metropolitan region (Kemp 1981). Suburbanization drew many working and middle class whites out of the city, while affluent upper middle class and elite whites remained in the city. The result was an increasing bifurcation of both the class and race structures in New Orleans. Table 6.1 provides some data suggestive of the increasing class and race stratification in New Orleans. Segregation, measured by the index of dissimilarity, was greatest in 1970 and declined thereafter. Income inequality increased rapidly after 1970 in the city. The difference between the city and the suburb was not as great as other cities witnessed, Detroit for example. Although poverty was consistently greater in the city than in the suburbs, the ratio of suburban to central city average incomes remained near unity suggesting the loss of middle class residents from the city to the suburbs.

Although the Schiro administration supported integration efforts, business leaders were particularly vigilant of the status quo and failed to organize a successful campaign to win community acceptance of peaceful integration as had been accomplished in other Southern cities, such as Atlanta (Fairclough 1995). This failure contributed to New Orleans' eventual stagnation (Fairclough 1995). Part of the reluctance of New Orleans' economic elite to take a stand was not that they were more racist than in other cities, but much less progressive (Inger 1969). City business leadership in the 1960s was part of the closed economic, political and social elite who valued tradition more than economic progress. One witness to the integration fracas of 1960s lamented this "deadly apathy toward progress in New Orleans... This is one of the few American cities I know of in which the populace is still content with bread and circuses (i.e. Mardi Gras) once a year and the

aristocracy, having provided the free show, feels no obligation to provide anything further” (Betty Wisdom, quoted in Fairclough 1995: 254). It was this antipathy toward progress that led to New Orleans’ economic plummet in later decades.

Integration Struggles and Crime

Increases in rates of burglary and robbery in the late 1950s were followed by increases in aggravated assault in the 1960s. During the 1960s all crimes except homicide increased steadily (see Figure 6.1). While the economic opportunities of New Orleans residents did not decline in the 1960s, the degree to which the city government met the needs of the citizens quite obviously did. By remaining silent on the issue of integration, the city government in the early part of the 1960s alienated both the black community and the anti-integration working class white community. The indifference on the part of the city government and the business elite exposed the close association between the two and the increasing distance between the poor and working class, black and white, and the political and economic elite. The result in terms of crime was an increasing level of property crimes across the 1960s.

The Oil Boom and New Orleans’ Economic Expansion

New Orleans maintained a thriving economy much longer than many other large cities in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. While the 1973 oil crisis brought economic decline to many U.S. cities in the rust belt, it brought an economic boom to New Orleans. The OPEC oil embargo led to an increased reliance on domestic production throughout the 1970s. New Orleans was ideally situated to profit from the expansion of the oil industry.⁸ The oil boom changed the downtown landscape of New Orleans. As oil and gas industries increased both land and offshore production in Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico they located large satellite headquarters in the New Orleans central business district. The result was an addition of 3.5 million square feet of office space in the CBD during the 1970s (Wright 1989).

The building boom in the central business district was also the result of major expansions in the tourist industry. The administrations of both Moon Landrieu and Ernest “Dutch” Morial emphasized the expansion of the New Orleans tourist industry. During Landrieu’s terms as mayor, he oversaw the renovation of the French Market and

major renovation projects in the French Quarter, as well as the construction of the Moon Walk along the Mississippi River below the French Quarter (Wright 1989). Landrieu was also responsible, in large part, for the construction of the Superdome. For his part, Morial continued to support tourism in New Orleans, but also sought to diversify the New Orleans economy (Hirsch 1992b). The development of the Almonastar-Michaud Industrial district was one example of Morial's efforts to expand the manufacturing infrastructure in New Orleans (Whelan, Young and Lauria 1994).

The 1970s economic expansion in New Orleans was facilitated by radical changes in the focus of the city government (Wright 1989). The mayoral administrations of Moon Landrieu and Dutch Morial represented a break with past political traditions. Both administrations shared two primary foci: Expanding the professional civil services in city government and garnering federal urban development funding. Hirsch (1992a) asserts that Landrieu both saw and brought the future to New Orleans. Landrieu added a professional bureaucracy to the city government with regard to both city planning and the provision of city services. He also recognized the necessity of eliminating race-based exclusion from city government. During his administration the percent of black civil service employees expanded from less than 20% to over 40%, including top positions such as major department heads and the chief administrative officer. Morial, the city's first black mayor, expanded open access to the city government by eliminating historical white privilege in access to the city's business contracts. The Morial administration ostensibly awarded contracts on the basis of merit, not political patronage to black political groups or entrenched white power holders (Whelan, Young and Lauria 1994).

Part of both Landrieu's and Morial's success at opening up political and economic opportunities for African Americans came from their success at securing federal funding for the city.⁹ Landrieu was able to expand opportunities for blacks in New Orleans without political backlash from whites because the "economic pie" was expanding in New Orleans during his administration. Part of this expansion was due to the growth of the oil industry during the 1970s and the first years of the 1980s. Landrieu, however, was directly responsible for the growing pool of federal dollars funneled into the city during his terms.

New Orleans had never received significant funds from the state or the federal governments because previous administrations had not sought funds, sharing the white elite perspective that the acceptance of federal funding was an acceptance of federal intrusion into local self-governance (Whelan, Young and Lauria 1994). Both the political and economic leadership of the city was wary of any outside assistance due to the federal control of the city during Reconstruction and the state control of the city during the Huey P. Long administration. After making the acceptance of federal dollars palatable to the New Orleans elite, Landrieu rapidly sought and received federal funds. The federal government contributed 7% to New Orleans' budget at the beginning of Landrieu's administration. By his final year in office, federal funds accounted for 23% of New Orleans' capital budget (Whelan, Young and Lauria 1994). Morial continued to seek federal funds for New Orleans, but he also anticipated the reduction of federal aid under the Reagan administration and attempted to reduce city reliance on federal funds and increase the revenue base of the city. His efforts would prove not to be successful enough to withstand the economic crises New Orleans would face in the mid-1980s and early 1990s.

The Late Crisis

With OPEC setting oil prices across the industry, the oil industry remained (and remains) volatile. The oil boom in New Orleans was short lived. In 1981, at the height of the boom, there were 502 actively producing rigs off the Louisiana coastline (Garvey and Widmer 1998). By 1986, the oil boom was over and less than 100 rigs remained. Recession in the Louisiana oil industry plummeted New Orleans into a serious recession in the later half of the 1980s. The city's over reliance on the industry pushed both households and the city into poverty with the oil glut of the 1980s (Wright 1989). The New Orleans financial crisis was exacerbated by steep declines in federal and state revenues to the city. With cuts in federal and state contributions to city revenues and with Morial's self-defined failure to establish an independent revenue base, the city of New Orleans amassed considerable debt in the late 1980s (Whelan, Young and Loria 1994).

Morial's second term felt the beginnings of the downturn in the New Orleans economy. The real crisis, however, occurred during the administration of Sidney Barthelemy. When Barthelemy took office in

1986, the city had a \$30 million deficit (Wright 1989). The Barthelemy administration was able to cut the deficit, but only at significant costs. Despite city employee protests, the Barthelemy administration laid off 1,200 city employees and cut the workweek of almost 6,000 remaining employees to four days with a 20% wage reduction in order to trim the city budget. These cuts eroded much of the gains the middle class black population had achieved during the Landrieu and Morial administrations.

Racial antagonism in the city increased with the economic contraction of the 1980s. In the 1980s, New Orleans shifted from a majority white to a majority black population (see Table 6.1). This demographic shift was largely the result of population decline in the city over the previous thirty years (Wright 1989). While the population of New Orleans shrunk, the population of the surrounding metropolitan region grew primarily due to whites leaving the city. This changing demographic composition of the city had profound implications for New Orleans' political economy.

While Morial had ensured election to a second term with high popularity within the black community, Barthelemy won the mayoral election over William Jefferson with the backing of the majority of white voters and only a minority of black voters (Hirsch 1992a). In his first election, Morial appeared to be the economic conservative that would appeal to the white elite vote. Morial, however, sought to professionalize public service in New Orleans by eliminating "politically-connected incompetence" tied to both the black community and the white community (Hirsch 1992a). The end result was that Morial alienated the white community and further divided the black community along traditional Creole/American lines. Barthelemy gained the mayor's office by uniting the conservative segments of both white and black New Orleans. Barthelemy, unlike either Morial or Jefferson, posed no threat to the white elite's status quo (Hirsch 1992a).

The white elite status quo was to matter less in New Orleans politics in the 1990s, however. In 1992, the City Council imposed integration on parading Mardi Gras organizations, the Carnival krewes, by disallowing krewes from parading publicly if they racially discriminated in membership. Despite the eventually lax enforcement and penalties of the policy, the end result was the further disengagement of the traditional white, predominantly Catholic, social elite from the political and economic arenas in New Orleans (Gill

1997). Although this ordinance was spearheaded by black councilwoman Dorothy Mae Taylor and vehemently supported by black community leaders, white business leaders, including a faction of the social elite, backed the plan. James Gill (1997: 219), in stating the case against the old-line Carnival krewes, argues:

All the impressive statistics about the money Carnival brought to the city meant nothing compared to the cost of rejecting new people and ideas and stifling the entrepreneurial spirit. New Orleans, at the end of World War II, had every opportunity, as one of the world's greatest seaports, to join in the bonanza that brought spectacular progress to other parts of the United States... But Mardi Gras was back, and New Orleans lapsed into its familiar torpor; a golden opportunity to reverse decades of decline was lost... New Orleans might have benefited from the kind of new blood that had helped its heady development before the Civil War, but later generations were even more comfortable and hostile to outsiders than the Creoles of old. The mentality of the closed and secret society suffused the city, which was determined to keep its distance from the land of opportunity.

New Orleans' banks made loans conservatively and rarely to entrepreneurial interests headed by those outside of the homogenous social elite. Lawyers, insurance, and financial services were equally insular. The result was that the leadership of new businesses looking to locate in New Orleans was rarely welcomed in the business sphere and actively shunned in the social sphere.

Although the reform-oriented eras of the Landrieu and Morial administrations lessened the traditional social elite's control over the city government, the social elite hastened their disengagement from New Orleans political and economic leadership after the 1992 debacle over krewe desegregation (Gill 1997; Hirsch 1992a). As Gill (1997) states, the social aristocracy holds that it is of the greatest impropriety to stay were you are unwanted. The boundaries separating the social aristocracy were not eliminated; they are simply more obfuscated from the public gaze than in past years. In a sense, the further insulation of the social elite created a city within a city in New Orleans.

The Contemporary Political-Economic Context

With the 1994 election of Dutch Morial's son Marc Morial to the mayor's office, it appears that New Orleans had witnessed some significant changes in political leadership and acceptance of deviation from the political-economic status quo. However, neither the second Morial nor the subsequent mayor have been able to reverse economic trends in motion since the 1970s in New Orleans. The tourist industry continues to show the greatest growth of all industries in the city (Garvey and Widmer 1998). Service sector jobs created by tourist and related personal service industries employed the greatest number of New Orleans workers. The result is a relatively stable economy, but not an expanding or prosperous one, in contemporary New Orleans.

Crime in Boom and Bust

Throughout the economic boom and bust years of the 1980s, crime in New Orleans followed a dramatic upward trend, culminating in 1993 with New Orleans topping the ranking of homicide rates nationwide. After 1993, it appears likely that New Orleans has entered a new era in terms of rates of crime. The later half of the 1990s have experienced significant declines in crime, leading off with declining burglary rates beginning in the early 1990s.

HYPOTHESES

As detailed in previous chapters, my basic argument is that although crime represents the autonomous agency of an individual, agency is embedded in a broader social structure. What then is the broader political-economic structure of New Orleans that affects rates of crime? As in previous chapters, this section details my specific hypotheses linking trends in crime in New Orleans to trends in the New Orleans political economy.

Economic Conditions

In understanding the political-economic context of both Detroit and Boston, I emphasized the importance of the national political economy, in particular the ascent and decline of the labor-capital accord that codified the relationship between labor and capital in the 1950s and 1960s (Bowles and Gintis 1982; Rubin 1986). The precepts of the accord, however, were explicit only in certain industries. Legal

guidelines governed labor-capital relations during the accord era primarily in core industries, in other words large-scale manufacturing, transportation and extractive industries. As stated, New Orleans has never had a strong manufacturing base. At its height, manufacturing industries employed less than 20% of New Orleans' workers (see Figure 6.2). New Orleans has, however, had both a strong shipping/transportation sector and a strong oil/gas sector. Both industries have characteristics that suggest they might provide employment similar to manufacturing employment, at least during the accord era. Employment in the shipping industry in New Orleans has been highly unionized and has traditionally paid relatively high wages for skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar workers (Fairclough 1995).¹⁰ While never having a significant union presence, the oil and gas industry in New Orleans also provided a family wage to less-skilled workers. Until the 1980s, the oil and gas industry had the added benefit of internal career ladders for workers with only a high-school education.

Service industries have dominated New Orleans employment throughout the twentieth century. While manufacturing employment peaked at 20%, the lowest level of service sector employment since World War II was 20% (see Figure 6.2). Being a traditionally service-based economy, it is likely that the shift from an industrial, accord-structured economy to a post-industrial, post-accord era has had less of an impact on New Orleans than it had on either Detroit or Boston. This is not to say New Orleans felt no impact of changes in the national economy. As documented in Figure 6.2, employment in service, manufacturing, shipping and oil/gas were stable up until approximately 1970. After 1970, shipping and oil/gas employment remained relatively stable while manufacturing and consumer service employment diverged dramatically. Between 1970 and 1996, manufacturing employment declined precipitously from 18% of total employment to only 6% of total employment. Across these same years, service employment ascended rapidly from 23% of the labor force in 1970 to 32% in 1996.

Industry specific wage rates show a similar divergence (see Table 6.1). Although sharply stratified, wages in each industry remained relatively stable until approximately 1970. After 1970, wages in manufacturing, shipping, and oil/gas industries increased, while wages in the service industry declined.¹¹ As employment in core industries

decreased as a percentage of total local employment, the benefits of those industries failed to filter down to less privileged service sector industries as they had during the accord.

How might changes in the economic structure of New Orleans influence crime rates? Despite the lack of dominance of the manufacturing sector in the New Orleans labor market, I continue to anticipate that as manufacturing employment decreased, and as consumer service employment increased, the New Orleans rate of crime would rise. Further, the stabilizing characteristics that differentiate manufacturing employment from service employment also characterize shipping and oil/gas employment, therefore I expect that changes in shipping and oil/gas employment would also negatively affect rates of crime. Second, just as manufacturing employment provides higher wages for less-skilled, less-educated workers than service employment, so too does shipping and oil/gas employment. On this basis I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: There will be a negative and significant relationship between rates of all crimes and the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing, shipping and oil/gas industries in New Orleans. By contrast, there will be a positive and significant relationship between rates of all crimes and the percentage of the labor force employed in consumer service industries in New Orleans. The magnitude of the relationship is likely to be greater for property crimes than for violent crimes, with homicide rates exhibiting the weakest relationship.

Hypothesis 2: Average wages in all industries will be negatively related to rates of each type of crime. The relationship between manufacturing, shipping and oil/gas wages and rates of crime will likely be stronger than the relationship between service wages and rates of crime because wages in these industries are consistently higher than service wages.

Class Relations

Consistent with my general argument that class relations influence rates of crime by influencing the legitimacy afforded to mechanisms of

social control, I expect that as the distance between social classes increases, crime will subsequently increase. The effect is likely to be more pronounced in New Orleans because of the increasingly dichotomous class structure that has typified the city as the middle and working classes have left the city in large numbers beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the 1980s. New Orleans has experienced rapidly increasing levels of income inequality as measured by the 90/10 family income ratio quantifying the increasing distance between the rich and the poor (see Table 6.1), hence I propose:

Hypothesis 3: Inequality will be positively associated with all rates of crime in New Orleans between 1960 and 1996.

State Responses

Since World War II, local spending on social welfare programs and local spending on the police have been steadily converging. With its entrenched history of patronage politics, it is not surprising that social welfare spending in New Orleans remained greater than police spending for most of the given years (see Table 6.1). Police spending did not surpass welfare spending until the city government budget crisis of 1986. Although the city government cut all spending as the result of the budget catastrophe, welfare spending was virtually eliminated while police spending quickly resumed its upward trend. I argue that declining social service support paired with rising punitive criminal justice support hastens the erosion of individual commitment to the system of social order, thereby increasing rates of crime.

Hypothesis 4: The ratio of government spending on social welfare services to police services will be negatively and significantly related to rates of each crime in New Orleans.

Temporal Stability

Both an empirical examination of political-economic trends in New Orleans and a historical narrative of the New Orleans political economy do not suggest the presence of any dramatic changes in the relationships between the variables included in this study and rates of crime. Unlike either Detroit or Boston, New Orleans has not experienced any dramatic breaks in the trends over time, with the

possible exception of the drop in welfare spending in the 1980s, therefore I argue:

Hypothesis 5: All of the models will exhibit temporal stability across the 1960 to 1996 time series.

ANALYSES

Methods

Again, my analyses consisted of three stages. In the first stage, I examined the univariate series of interest by examining the time plots of each variable and conducting univariate tests for nonstationary. In cases of those variables where the null hypothesis of a unit root was not rejected, I performed Johanson tests for cointegration between each I(1) crime variable and each I(1) explanatory variable. In stage two, I estimated the long-run relationships between each crime series (homicide, assault, robbery, and burglary) and a number of models tapping changes in New Orleans's economic structure, class structure and political structure. In that I am interested in examining the long-run dynamics in each model, I only estimated models in which I was able to identify a cointegrative relationship, thereby allowing me to use the levels of each crime rate as the dependent variable in each model. Finally, in stage three, I examined the structural stability of each model using the Chow breakpoint test. My analyses of previous cities entailed testing the model stability around a certain year, in this case I did not anticipate a structural break in the relationship in any model. Therefore I tested for breakpoints at the one-quarter, one-half, and three-quarter marks in the series.¹²

Results

Table 6.2 presents the results of the unit root tests for stationarity. Dickey-Fuller unit root tests indicate that each of the series is nonstationary in levels and stationary in first differences indicating the presence of a unit root. Correlograms and the Ljung-Box Q statistics further support this finding. A regression model that includes one of these variables in levels would likely exhibit significant serial correlation.

Table 6.2 Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests, New Orleans 1960-1996

Variable		$\hat{\alpha}$	Decision
Homicide:	<i>Level</i>	-0.36	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-5.41	reject
Assault Rate:	<i>Level</i>	-0.08	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-4.77	reject
Robbery Rate:	<i>Level</i>	-0.83	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-4.93	reject
Burglary Rate:	<i>Level</i>	-1.19	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-5.03	reject
Manuf. Wages:	<i>Level</i>	-2.64	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-7.97	reject
Service Wages:	<i>Level</i>	-1.00	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-7.20	reject
Oil/Ship. Wages:	<i>Level</i>	-1.22	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-5.40	reject
Manuf. Emp.:	<i>Level</i>	0.09	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-6.16	reject
Service Emp.:	<i>Level</i>	0.59	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-7.75	reject
Oil/Ship. Emp.:	<i>Level</i>	-1.34	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-5.75	reject
Inequality:	<i>Level</i>	-0.28	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-8.42	reject
Welfare/Police:	<i>Level</i>	-1.39	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-4.94	reject
Unemployment:	<i>Level</i>	-1.04	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-4.88	reject
Police Per Capita:	<i>Level</i>	-1.64	accept
	<i>First Difference</i>	-4.15	reject

Table 6.3 presents the results of Johansen tests for cointegration between each variable and each type of crime. The results of these tests indicate cointegrative relationships between manufacturing wages and all four crime rates; service employment and assault and burglary rates;

Table 6.3 Johansen Tests for Cointegration, New Orleans 1960-1996

Variable	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Manufacturing Wages	20.38**	23.40**	20.80**	20.90**
Service Wages	9.72	12.83	11.91	15.80*
Oil and Shipping Wages	11.45	12.92	9.30	10.12
Manufacturing Employment	4.38	5.09	12.23	10.10
Service Employment	13.83	18.89*	13.50	10.45
Oil and Shipping Employment	7.72	13.75	8.45	9.31
Inequality	5.81	8.44	14.81	9.28
Welfare/Police Spending	8.34	5.94	13.45	13.77
Unemployment	7.37	6.89	11.35	13.08
Police Per Capita	6.57	4.12	7.41	11.32

and service wages and burglary. The identification of a cointegrative relationship between the dependent variable and at least one independent variable allows model estimation using OLS regression in levels, with the addition of an error correction term.

Tables 6.4 through 6.7 present the results of error correction model estimates of murder, assault, robbery and burglary. In each equation Model A includes only economic variables, Model B replaces manufacturing variables with oil/gas industry variables, Model C adds government spending to Model A, and Model D adds inequality to Model C. There is no model that includes only the government spending variables because none of the variables in that model exhibited cointegration.

Table 6.4 Error Correction Model Estimates of Homicide Rates, New Orleans 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	0.00 (1.02)	--	0.00 (0.19)	0.00 (1.00)
Service Wages	-0.01* (-2.71)	-0.01* (-2.54)	-0.01 (-2.38)	-0.00 (-1.41)
Oil and Shipping Wages	--	0.01+ (1.90)	--	--
Manufacturing Employment	-284.73* (-1.98)	--	-305.95* (-2.06)	-161.94 (-0.76)
Service Employment	-30.67 (-0.14)	145.06 (0.71)	12.19 (0.05)	31.85 (0.14)
Oil/Shipping Employment	--	117.61 (0.75)	--	--
Inequality	--	--	--	7.41 (1.03)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	--	3.16 (0.84)	5.61 (1.30)
Unemployment	5.88 (1.16)	0.86 (0.21)	5.94 (1.14)	6.84 (1.32)
Police Per Capita	0.17* (2.75)	0.20** (3.58)	0.20* (2.63)	0.22** (2.81)
Error Correction	0.40* (1.99)	0.49** (2.79)	0.32+ (1.48)	0.24 (1.05)
Constant	48.97	-4.89	11.70	-143.61
Adj. R ²	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.84
Chow	1.64	1.15	1.50	2.05

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 6.5 Error Correction Model Estimates of Assault Rates, New Orleans 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	0.01* (2.12)	--	0.01+ (1.96)	0.01 (1.69)
Service Wages	-0.02 (-1.19)	-0.01 (-1.00)	-0.02 (-1.28)	-0.02 (-0.86)
Oil/Shipping Wages	--	0.00 (-0.52)	--	--
Manufacturing Employment	-197.82 (0.21)	--	275.13 (0.28)	645.27 (0.46)
Service Employment	1783.83 (1.26)	1292.24 (0.93)	1525.99 (1.04)	1428.97 (0.93)
Oil/Shipping Employment	--	-1342.59 (-1.27)	--	--
Inequality	--	--	--	21.75 (0.48)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	--	-12.99 (-0.54)	-5.82 (-0.21)
Unemployment	-11.97** (-3.40)	- 143.53** (-5.05)	- 109.99** (-3.27)	- 107.91** (-3.16)
Police Per Capita	0.61* (3.54)	0.88* (2.26)	0.92+ (1.93)	0.95+ (1.95)
Error Correction	0.61** (3.54)	0.62** (3.50)	0.61** (3.41)	0.61** (3.27)
Constant	457.20	1446.90	589.63	189.23
Adj. R ²	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
Chow	1.66	1.43	2.82*	3.04*

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 6.6 Error Correction Model Estimates of Robbery Rates, New Orleans 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing	-0.01	--	-0.01	-0.01
Wages	(-0.72)		(-0.91)	(-1.22)
Service Wages	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.04
	(-2.18)	(-2.28)	(-2.36)	(-1.47)
Oil/Shipping Wages	--	0.00	--	--
		(1.90)		
Manufacturing	-4076.63*	--	-3915.72*	-2443.73
Employment	(-2.79)		(-2.64)	(-1.19)
Service Employment	-3666.92+	1681.18	-4234.74+	-3736.39
	(-1.60)	(0.84)	(-1.80)	(-1.60)
Oil/Shipping	--	4451.04**	--	--
Employment		(2.89)		
Inequality	--	--	--	68.73
				(1.02)
Welfare/Police	--	--	-32.89	-14.20
Spending			(-0.90)	(-0.35)
Unemployment	-143.76**	-195.26**	-140.74**	-137.97**
	(-2.88)	(-4.82)	(-2.80)	(-2.75)
Police Per Capita	1.31*	1.86**	1.00	1.10
	(2.13)	(3.34)	(1.40)	(1.53)
Error Correction	0.06	0.19	0.02	0.02
	(0.27)	(0.98)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Constant	3983.04	1882.27	4389.96	2989.25
Adj. R ²	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.93
Chow	0.65	1.78	2.06	1.59

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 6.7 Error Correction Model Estimates of Burglary Rates, New Orleans 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing	-0.04+	--	-0.04*	-0.04+
Wages	(-1.68)		(-2.10)	(-1.75)
Service Wages	-0.08+	-0.09+	-0.11*	-0.12*
	(-1.65)	(-2.54)	(-2.46)	(-2.20)
Oil and Shipping	--	-0.01	--	--
Wages		(-0.95)		
Manufacturing	-9101.96*	--	-7600.85*	-8649.07*
Employment	(-2.92)		(-2.47)	(-1.99)
Service	-8073.11+	-646.41	-12500.96*	12683.16*
Employment	(-1.72)	(-0.13)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Oil and Shipping	--	6722.82+	--	--
Employment		(1.84)		
Inequality	--	--	--	53.62
				(-0.38)
Welfare/Police	--	--	-210.52*	-226.62*
Spending			(-2.77)	(-2.63)
Unemployment	-233.06*	-335.31**	-222.11*	226.14*
	(-2.14)	(-3.38)	(-2.08)	(-2.07)
Police Per Capita	1.66	3.48*	0.15	0.06
	(1.27)	(2.64)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Error Correction	0.65***	0.58**	0.54**	0.54**
	(4.08)	(3.40)	(3.04)	(2.94)
Constant	8824.62	5080.08	11302.62	12375.60
Adj. R ²	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.89
Chow	1.11	1.29	1.07	1.01

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 6.4 indicates that of those models that are nested, Model A best fits the homicide rate data. Both manufacturing employment and service wages have a statistically significant effect on rates of homicide. Supporting my hypothesis, manufacturing employment has a negative effect on rates of homicide. A one percentage point decrease in manufacturing employment yields an increase in homicides of 2.85 per 100,000 New Orleans residents. Neither service employment rates nor shipping and oil/gas employment rates have a significant effect on rates of homicide. In terms of wages, only service wages significantly affect rates of homicide. In both models A and B, a one dollar decrease in service wages increases homicide rates by less than one per 100,000 residents.

Analyses of assault rates reveal little (see Table 6.5). In the best fitting model, A, both manufacturing wages and rates of unemployment exhibit a significant effect on rates of crime in the opposite direction than hypothesized. According to this analysis, an increase in manufacturing wages yields an increase in rates of assault. An increase in unemployment, however, appears to be associated with a decrease in crime. Although not consistent with my hypotheses, both are in keeping with routine activities theories of crime.

Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present the results of error correction regression models for rates of robbery and rates of burglary. These analyses present a more coherent story than the previous analyses of homicide and assault. In Table 6.6, A is the most parsimonious model of robbery rates. In this model, service wages, service employment and manufacturing employment each exert a statistically significant effect on rates of robbery. Service wages and manufacturing employment have the expected effect on rates of crime. A one dollar increase in average service sector wages decreases burglary rates by less than one burglary per 100,000 residents. A one percentage point decrease in manufacturing employment yields an increase in robberies of 40.77 per 100,000 residents. Service employment, however, has the opposite effect on rates of crime than expected. A single percentage point increase in service employment is associated with a 36.67 decrease in the number of robberies per 100,000 residents. Although Model A and Model B cannot be directly compared, Model B indicates that, contrary to expectations, robbery and shipping, oil and gas employment are positively associated.

Finally, Table 6.7 presents error correction regression estimates of rates of burglary. For rates of burglary, Model C best fits the data of the three nested models. In Model C, each relationship is statistically significant and as hypothesized, with the exception of the relationship between rates of burglary and service employment. Both manufacturing and service wages share a negative relationship with burglary. As wages decline, burglary increases and vice versa. Manufacturing employment also exhibits a statistically significant effect on rates of burglary. A one percentage point increase in manufacturing employment is associated with a 91.02 point drop in burglaries per 100,000 residents in New Orleans. The ratio of welfare spending to police spending is associated with rates of crime in New Orleans only in the case of burglary. As hypothesized, as welfare spending decreases relative to police spending the rate of burglary increases.

Finally, the last rows of Tables 6.4 to 6.7 present the results of Chow breakpoint test. The purpose of the test is to determine if the coefficient vectors can be regarded as constant over the subsets of years. A statistically significant F-test indicates that the model is not stable, but is instead temporally contingent. As hypothesized, all of the relevant models hold across the time series and, therefore, are not temporally contingent.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter my intention was to explore the connection between the historical political economy of New Orleans and changes in crime rates over the latter half of the twentieth century. Specifically, I sought to document the effects of economic conditions, class relations and state responses on crime in New Orleans between 1960 and 1996. In analyzing the determinants of crime in New Orleans, I was particularly interested in the effects of the unique political and economic aspects of the city.

In this conclusion, I will first discuss trends in crime and the explanatory effects of economic, political and class factors on determining rates of crime in New Orleans. The stable crime rates of the 1950s in New Orleans coincide with a significant degree of political and economic stability. The economic outlook for New Orleans in the immediate post-War years was positive and, for most, the future

seemed promising. Although industrial expansion during this era was to prove insufficient, that was not anticipated at the time. New Orleans was virtually without overt political or class conflict during the 1950s. Under the long reign of Chep Morrison, both the economic elite and the majority of the New Orleans population perceived the city government as working in their interest.

The rising crime rates beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s corresponded with economic stagnation and increasing political unrest. Crime rates continued to increase during the 1970s and 1980s despite the economic boom of the oil industry. But importantly, the boom in the economy did not benefit all segments of society and within the central city poverty increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s as the middle class and upper middle class relocated to the suburbs, first Metairie and Kenner, then the Westbank, and finally the North Shore of the New Orleans metropolitan region.¹³ Finally, crime rates in New Orleans appear to be on a very real downward trend in the 1990s. Once again facing political and economic stability, if not prosperity, New Orleans crime rates appear to have stabilized.

Throughout this book my central argument regarding economic conditions has dealt with the national shift from an industrial society to a post-industrial society. I argued that this shift entails a shift in the type of work available in local labor markets. As the nature of the primary work in an area changes it is highly likely that the manner that work influences the way in which individuals structure their lives will change as well. In testing this hypothesis, I have examined the impact of the shift from manufacturing employment to service employment in cities that have historically had strong manufacturing foundations, Detroit and Boston. In turning my lens to New Orleans, I was looking toward exploring a more conservative test of this hypothesis. Would the manufacturing to service shift have the same impact in a city that has never had a strong manufacturing base as existed in Detroit and Boston? Consistent with earlier findings, the analyses presented in this chapter indicate that manufacturing employment continues to exert a negative effect on rates of crime despite comprising a relatively small percentage of employment.

In New Orleans, I argued, employment in the shipping industry and the oil and gas industry may serve a similar function as employment in manufacturing in cities where manufacturing is dominant. Analyses do not support this hypothesis. The percentage of the local labor force

employed in the oil/gas and shipping industries has no significant effect on rates of homicide and assault. Employment in these industries have an unexpected positive effect on rates of robbery and burglary.

My analyses of the effects of government spending on social welfares services relative to police services suggest only minimal support for my argument that declining social service support paired with rising punitive criminal justice support would lead to increases in rates of crime. This argument was supported only for burglary rates. However, although statistically significant the coefficient added little to the explanatory power of the multivariate models.

I make three summary conclusions on the basis of the empirical analysis presented in this chapter. First, changes in manufacturing employment have important effects on changes in rates of crime in New Orleans despite the relatively minor manufacturing presence in the city. While it would be surprising not to find this effect in heavily industrialized cities, it is surprising to find that the effect holds in New Orleans. Second, although the shifts in the structure of class relations are obvious in the case of New Orleans, the measure of income inequality used in this analysis does not capture these class dynamics. That an empirical relationship between class dynamics and rates of crime was not supported by this analysis does not necessarily negate my general argument but instead attests to the difficulty in quantifying the class structure of New Orleans. Finally, while the political-economic context of New Orleans has shifted over the course of the twentieth century, the shifts have not been as dramatic as in other cities and have not been dramatic enough to yield breaks in the relationships between crime and political-economic factors.

Atlanta: The Same Old New South

Atlanta represents the prototypical Southern boomtown. In Mollenkopf's parlance, Atlanta is one of a host of cities that emerged after manufacturing industries had coalesced in the northeast and mid-west and whose economic basis has always been in primarily non-manufacturing industries, particularly in services, finance and trade. Atlanta appears to fit this profile well.

ATLANTA POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Atlanta was founded in 1837 under the name of Terminus reflecting its status as the terminal point for the Western and Atlantic railroads. Atlanta remained, however, a small town until after the Civil War. The coastal port of Savannah was the central city in the Georgia economy, followed by the manufacturing cities of Augusta, Columbus, and Macon. The focus of growth in the state shifted to Atlanta during Reconstruction due in large part to its essential railroad connections to Northern cities (Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 2000). Atlanta played a key role in reuniting Southern and Northern trade, evidenced by its self-proclaimed designation as the "Gateway of the South" (Bullard and Thomas 1989).

By the turn of the century Atlanta was a regional center of economic activity and city leaders promoted it as the "Capital of the South" (Bullard and Thomas 1989). Atlanta's population topped 100,000 in the early 1900s, becoming the largest city in the state. Although this was a period of rapid industrialization across the United States, Atlanta did not become a manufacturing center, but instead expanded on its transportation and distribution functions to become a

regional banking and finance center. As this chapter will document, Atlanta built upon its early twentieth century position as a regional economic center to become a city central to the national and international exchange of capital. Across the five post-WWII decades, the Atlanta metropolitan region witnessed consistent economic growth and diversification. The result has been population growth and both expanding employment and rising average incomes.

The apparent success of Atlanta, however, is in reality a paradox (Jaret 1987; Sjoquist 2000). Both in historical and contemporary contexts, Atlanta offers sharp contrasts. Since the 1960s, Atlanta had been promoted as a place of racial tolerance and, in more recent years, as a black middle-class mecca. Contrasting this perception, at 35% Atlanta has one of the highest rates of black poverty in the nation (Sjoquist 2000) (see Table 7.1).¹ Atlanta's protracted economic boom belies the pronounced inequality that characterizes the city. Atlanta has one of the smallest middle classes of any similarly sized city. The earnings of those in the top ten percent of the income distribution are almost twenty times greater than the earnings of those in the bottom ten percent of the income distribution (see Table 7.1). Further, the earnings of white Atlantans are almost three times greater than the earnings of black Atlantans. Atlanta is a paradox: A black mecca rife with segregation, and discrimination, an economic powerhouse plagued by inequality and urban poverty.

This chapter explores the historical development of the paradox that is Atlanta. Atlanta's political-economic history, and subsequently this discussion, is comprised of three distinct eras: The post-war boom of the 1950s and 1960s, the urban contraction/suburban expansion of the 1970s, and the renewed, albeit reconfigured, boom of the 1980s and 1990s. As with each of the previous chapters focusing on Detroit, Boston and New Orleans, I explore the relationship between political and economic conditions during each era and trends in crime. I use this historical analysis of Atlanta to propose empirical hypotheses regarding the relationship between economic conditions, political conditions and rates of crime that I test quantitatively in the final section of this chapter.

Table 7.1 Summary Characteristics, Atlanta 1950-2000

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
<i>Population Characteristics</i>						
Population (thousands)	337	510	500	422	394	416
% Black	36.6	38.2	51.5	66.6	67.1	61.1
% Female Headed Households	--	--	21.3	36.0	41.6	56.0
% HS Only Graduates	18.7	21.1	22.6	25.7	23.3	22.3
% College Graduates	6.8	7.1	13.0	18.1	23.8	34.6
<i>Income, Poverty and Inequality</i>						
Income (thousands)*	--	11	15	17	17	26
% Poverty	--	--	19.8	27.5	27.3	24.4
% Suburban Poverty	--	--	10.1	9.1	7.6	7.8
% Black Poverty	--	--	27.3	37.6	35.0	33.0
% Child Poverty	--	--	26.4	39.2	42.9	38.8
90/10 Earnings Ratio	--	6.7	9.6	17.1	17.8	--
Suburb/City Income Ratio	--	--	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.6
Dissimilarity Index	0.83	0.77	0.82	0.77	0.67	0.82
<i>Employment and Wages</i>						
% Unemployment	--	8.5	13.9	11.0	7.8	14.0
Manufacturing Wages (in thousands)	22	26	31	32	39	40
Cons. Service Wages (in thousands)	21	20	20	19	18	13
% Manufacturing	12	12	19	15	11	9
% Cons. Service	8	12	24	24	23	29
<i>State Revenues and Expenditures (all in thousands)</i>						
Total Revenues	--	50	92	350	801	814
Tax Revenues	--	23	46	99	209	241
Transfer Payments	--	175	97	91	55	9
Police Spending	--	37	45	66	84	99

* All figures in constant dollars

Post-War Expansion

World War II brought significant benefits to the economy of cities across the United States, but as was the case for New Orleans and much of the South, Atlanta benefited disproportionately (Roth and Ambrose 1996). Atlanta's traditional role as a main rail transportation hub and its expanding role as an air transportation hub made Atlanta essential to the war effort. The federal government established numerous military bases and supporting infrastructure in the city. These bases and industries led to plummeting unemployment rates, rising incomes, and an exodus of rural Georgians from their small hometowns into Atlanta to relieve war-related labor shortages.

The years immediately following the war continued to benefit the Atlanta economy. In 1947, both GM and Ford opened manufacturing facilities in the city. Lockheed Aircraft opened an assembly plant in Atlanta four years later. Between the end of WWII and 1954, 800 new industries located in Atlanta and 1,200 national corporations situated primary or regional offices in the city (Roth and Ambrose 1996). During this era a trend pairing economic diversification with the continued consolidation of financial, government and corporate service sectors in the city began and continues until today in Atlanta's economic landscape.

Without the natural advantage of being located on a port or navigable river to spur its growth, Atlanta has been promoted by intense boosterism (Rutheiser 1996). Civic boosterism, originally on the part of a cohesive white business and social elite and later on the part of a coalition of white business leaders and black politicians, transformed Atlanta from a remote railroad hub to an international city (Jaret 1987; Rutheiser 1996). From the first post-bellum Atlanta boom to the most recent economic expansion, the pervasive message promoted by Atlanta boosters has been that what is good for business is good for Atlanta and what is good for Atlanta is good for all Atlantans (Roth and Ambrose 1996).

An intimate, but public, relationship between the business elite and the local government was a key component of the post-war stability in the Atlanta political economy. While many other city governments (Boston, Detroit, and New Orleans included) developed a quasi-independent bureaucratic infrastructure during the 1950s, the Atlanta city government remained intrinsically tied to the Atlanta business

elite. Across this century, business leaders frequently controlled politics and set policies toward the end of enhancing the city economy in their interest (Bayer 2000). For the better part of the twentieth century, leaders of the largest corporations in Atlanta essentially “ran the city as a benevolent oligarchy with a practically telepathic link to city hall” (Powledge 1991: 46).

From 1936 until 1961, William Berry Hartsfield served as the mayor of Atlanta.² Hartsfield epitomized the boosterism traditional in Atlanta (Shavin and Galphin 1982). He also cultivated the close relationships with industry that would shape the political structure of Atlanta for the rest of the twentieth century. Although influential in the early part of the century, Atlanta’s ward-based patronage system was in decay by Hartsfield’s election in 1936 (Rutheiser 1996). Without the political support base guaranteed by machine politics, Hartsfield was particularly dependent on the support and economic backing of Atlanta’s major economic interests. The close pre-war relationship between city hall and the business elite in Atlanta presents an early instance of the type of public-private partnerships that have dominated much urban politics in the late twentieth century (Harvey 1989).

During Hartsfield’s twenty-five years in office, with the unmitigated support of, and in direct partnership with, the business community, the city established an expressway system beginning 10 years before the U.S. interstate highway program and built a major international airport (Martin 1967). Hartsfield’s administration also annexed the most populace portions of Fulton County to the north of the city as part of the 1952 Plan for Improvement. This measure tripled the geographic size of the city and increased its population by 100,000.

Economic growth was the singular priority of the governing coalition of businesses and the city government in Atlanta during the late 1940s and 1950s. Improving race relations was an objective of the power holders in Atlanta only in so much that a reputation for oppressive race relations tarnished the progressive image the city sought (Stone 1984). Black political and economic power grew in the post-war years. Similarly to New Orleans, blacks were prohibited from voting in Democratic primaries prior to 1946. Because Georgia was a one-party state, blacks had little political influence. The invalidation of whites-only primaries by the United States Supreme Court and the repeal of the Georgia poll tax rapidly increased black political power in Atlanta. Recognizing the widening political opportunities for black

residents of Atlanta, a number of organizations, including the NAACP, conducted massive voter registration drives (Bayor 1996). In 51 days in 1946, one such drive increased the number of black Atlanta voters from 3,000 to 21,000 (Roth and Ambrose 1996).

Across the 1950s, services, facilities, and legal rights for blacks in Atlanta improved as black power at the polls increased (Shavin and Galphin 1982). Despite their growing political strength, African Americans continued to be excluded from the white government and business coalition. Mayor Hartsfield increasingly consulted black community leaders, but the opinions of these leaders meant little relative to the opinions of the white business elite who continued to control Atlanta government into the 1960s (Bayor 1988; Shavin and Galphin 1982).


Post-War Crime

Crime in Atlanta between 1948 and 1960 mirrored trends in crime nationwide. During this era crime rates were low and stable. While property crime rates were stable between 1948 and 1960, violent crime rates (homicide and aggravated assault) actually decreased across these years (see Figure 7.1).

While crime in Atlanta was stable during the 1950s and 1960s, economic opportunities grew during the post-war era. Despite continued segregation and discrimination, political enfranchisement for African Americans, and hence political power, grew exponentially. A diversifying economy allowed for a variety of employment opportunities for the growing Atlanta population. New manufacturing and corporate service sector jobs provided growing wages. The result was economic stability for many, if not most, Atlanta residents.

Although political power resided in the hands of a very small coalition of business and state elite, some power was diffusing into diverse segments of the Atlanta community. Even as the traditional Atlanta power structure appeared to be sharing power to a greater extent than before WWII, that power structure was improving Atlanta dramatically. Transportation, utilities and other public services improved during the 1950s. Together a booming economy and expanding political system vested Atlanta residents in the existing social system. The status quo appeared to be leading to a better future.

Figure 7.1 Crime Rates, Atlanta 1948-2000



The result was a commitment to the system of social order and a remarkably low crime rate for the years between 1948 and 1960.

The Booming Sixties

The decade of the 1960s was the first true boom in the post-war Atlanta economy (Bullard and Thomas 1989). Although the Atlanta area experienced consistent growth since the turn of the century, the city experienced its greatest economic and demographic expansion between 1960 and 1970. In the early 1960s, Atlanta established itself as the unrivaled economic powerhouse of the southeast. By the end of the sixties, Atlanta was expanding from a city of regional dominance to a city of national dominance. The increasing number of national companies locating in Atlanta in the 1960s led to increased benefits to workers. Employment in manufacturing, corporate service and consumer service industries increased during the 1960s. Wages in each of these industries, in addition to average wages in general and per capita income, increased as well (see Table 7.1).

The rapidly expanding economy generated a building boom in Atlanta's downtown. The downtown skyline changed dramatically in the 1960s. Prior to 1960 there was only one skyscraper in Atlanta. Between 1960 and 1970, 17 skyscrapers were built in Atlanta. Along with the construction of a handful of suburban office parks, these large office buildings added 5.2 million additional square feet of office space to Atlanta (Roth and Ambrose 1996).

Atlanta reached its peak population in 1960 (see Table 7.1). Across the decade, however, the population of the city began to decline as the city began to experience significant suburbanization. Atlanta began to experience a decrease in its share of the metropolitan population in the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1970, Atlanta's population as a percentage of the metropolitan region's population declined from 42% to 31%. The rate of suburbanization in Atlanta would increase further after 1970.

Although the 1960s began with politics as usual in Atlanta, by the end of the decade Atlanta experienced significant changes in the distribution of political power between the city and the state, blacks and whites, and business and the government. Before 1962, County Unit System regulations determined state-wide elections. Under this policy statewide elections were decided by unit votes and not popular votes.

Each county had twice the number of unit votes as state House of Representative seats. In the state House of Representatives, 159 counties had one seat, 30 larger counties had two seats, and the 8 largest counties had 3 seats. The result was that the County Unit System could dilute the urban vote by 99:1 (Shavin and Galphin 1982). With the invalidation of the County Unit System in 1962, political representation in Georgia shifted in Atlanta's favor.

Atlanta's increased state-level political power increasingly revealed the growing chasm between the city and the state on the issue of integration. In 1959, then mayor William Hartsfield publicly declared Atlanta "a city too busy to hate" (Rutheiser 1996). While Hartsfield may have been overstating the tolerance of Atlanta, compared with the extremism of the rest of the state Atlanta was progressive.

This disparity between the city and the state was no more apparent than during the integration of public schools in 1961. In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, the NAACP filed suit against the Atlanta school system. The NAACP won their case and the courts ordered Atlanta to propose a school desegregation plan by 1959. As happened in Louisiana, and most of the South, the Georgia legislature attempted to circumvent court ordered school integration (Shavin and Galphin 1982). The legislature passed such extreme laws as stopping state funding to integrated school districts and making teaching an integrated class a felony.

Atlantans were not unambiguously in support of school desegregation (Rutheiser 1996). The ruling government-business coalition, however, recognized the economic damage that would be incurred if Atlanta experienced the well-televised violence that accompanied forced integration in other Southern cities, such as New Orleans and Little Rock. The city government and business elite quickly developed a well-orchestrated plan for peaceful integration of Atlanta's public schools. After months of prayer vigils, public service announcements, and police surveillance and infiltration of white supremacy groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, nine black students entered four public high schools without protest or violence on August 30, 1961 (Shavin and Galphin 1982).

Hundreds of reporters from across the nation had descended on Atlanta in late August in anticipation of the fracas experienced in New Orleans. Instead they were met with image-conscious Atlanta's typical

media savvy (Roth and Ambrose 1996). Hartsfield's administration briefed the press in a city hall pressroom built specifically for the event, drove the press from school to school to witness the black students entering the once segregated schools, gave the press tours of the city, and concluded the day with an integrated cocktail party in a prestigious downtown hotel.

That afternoon President Kennedy praised Atlanta in a press conference and urged other cities "to look closely at what Atlanta has done and to meet their responsibility, as the officials of Atlanta and Georgia have done, with courage, tolerance and, above all, respect for the law" (quoted in Roth and Ambrose 1996: 186). The integration of Atlanta public schools was, of course, little more than symbolic. It took many years for Atlanta to achieve even marginally integrated schools and much of that integration came as the result of suburban white flight in response to integration. In one day, however, Atlanta had achieved a national image of tolerance and progressivism, adding to its expanding national prestige.

Atlanta public schools were not the first, nor would they be the last, site of racial struggles in the city. Throughout the early half of the 1960s, however, issues regarding race would be decided, as had the integration issue, by a coalition composed of the city government, business elite, and black civic leaders. Most prominent of the host of black Atlantans was, of course, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In Atlanta, King was an integral part of the desegregation of a host of public facilities.

As the city power structure was preparing for the peaceful integration of Atlanta schools, students at Atlanta University organized a massive sit-in at whites-only Rich's department store in downtown Atlanta. The Atlanta police arrested over one hundred protesters at the sit-in, including King. The protestors refused to post bail and remained in jail for weeks, bringing much negative publicity to the city. Under pressure from the rest of the business community, Rich's executives and black attorneys, along with a host of other business leaders representing both the white and black economic elite, negotiated a settlement. The terms of the settlement stipulated that the students would post bail and Rich's would integrate its stores. In order to avoid increased racial tension in the city, Rich's would not integrate, however, until October, after the planned integration of Atlanta's public schools. Not all of the students involved in the protest supported this

agreement and some planned to renew their sit-in. Martin Luther King quelled their impatience by reportedly saying,

I'm surprised at you. The most able leadership you could have to represent you has made a contract with the white man, the first written contract we've ever had with him. And now I find people here who are not willing to wait another four or five months, after waiting 100 years and having nothing to show for it until now (quoted in Shavin and Galphin 1982).

By the later half of the 1960s, however, the hegemony of the white business elite appeared to be beginning to wane. In 1966, two separate police shootings of young black men ignited riots in Atlanta. While minor in comparison to the large scale riot that rocked Detroit just one year later, the Atlanta riots revealed the growing inability of the white business/government coalition to meet the needs of the expanding poor, black population. With the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, a greater commitment to black political progress emerged in Atlanta (Roth and Ambrose 1996).

In 1969, the new majority black population of Atlanta defeated the business community's hand picked candidate for mayor. At the end of the 1960s, Sam Massell, the first Jewish mayor of the city, and Maynard Jackson, the first black vice-mayor, controlled the government portion of Atlanta's traditional government-business ruling coalition. Their administration heralded the changes in Atlanta politics to come in the 1970s.

Crime in the Turbulent Sixties

In comparison to much of the country, the sixties weren't all that turbulent in Atlanta. Major social institutions changed dramatically during this decade, but with relatively little controversy and almost no violence. Much of the economic and political success of Atlanta during the 1960s, however, was more image than substance. Increases in employment and wages masked a growing inequality on the basis of race and location. Manufacturing employment expanded, but labor unions continued to limit black access to the most lucrative manufacturing jobs (Rutheiser 1996). National business relocation to Atlanta spurred a massive downtown building boom, at the expense of poor, black downtown neighborhoods, leading to increasing

segregation and overcrowding in the majority black southern side of the city. Atlanta schools, lunch counters, and retail stores were peacefully integrated, while white residents protested by quietly moving north to the burgeoning suburbs outside of Atlanta. By the last years of the 1960s the image of Atlanta's progressive economic and political success was increasingly just that, a mere image.

Crime in Atlanta during the 1960s paralleled the increasing transparency of Atlanta's image of economic and political success. Crime trends remained as stable as they had been during the 1950s during the greater part of the 1960s (see Figure 7.1). After 1965, however, crime began to trend upward toward the dramatic increases that would characterize the 1970s. These post-1965 years are the same years in which the political-economic status quo appeared to be failing an increasingly large segment of Atlanta's population, particularly the growing poor, black segment. The result was an emerging disinvestment in the existing structure of social order by those it failed to serve, manifested as a slowing expanding rate of crime.

Urban Contraction, Suburban Expansion

In the early 1970s, Atlanta's economic boom, which had lasted for over a decade, came to an end. Although recovery came quickly to Atlanta before the end of the decade, the recovery was quickest and strongest in the new nodes of commercial development north of downtown, in both Atlanta and the suburbs.

The downtown real estate construction boom in the 1960s continued into the 1970s. The success of John Portman's mammoth Peachtree Center spawned projects on a similar scale throughout the downtown and midtown regions. This building boom, however, was based more on speculation in the 1970s than it had been in the 1960s (Rutheiser 1996). The result was twofold. First, the downtown area declined as real estate investors developed competing business complexes in Midtown, Buckhead and suburban nodes of economic expansion. Second, by the mid-1970s office space exceeded demand leading to plummeting rents and increasingly empty buildings, especially downtown.

The geographic diversification of commercial real estate in the 1970s paralleled the suburbanization of both people and jobs. Between 1970 and 1980 the population of Atlanta declined from 31% of the

metropolitan area to only 21% of the metropolitan area (Bullard and Thomas 1989). During the 1970s, Atlanta lost over 70,000 individuals, a full 14% of its population (see Table 7.1). Most of those moving from the city into the suburbs were white, however the number of African Americans living in the suburbs increased by 200% in the 1970s. By 1980, 14% of suburban residents were African Americans and 66% of the city residents were African American (see Table 7.1).

With the increase in white flight from the city to the suburbs, neighborhoods within the city that had been previously segregated became integrated and then predominantly black, lessening but not eliminating segregation in the city (see Table 7.1). In the suburbs, middle-class flight from the city crossed racial lines but did not lessen segregation significantly. Whites left the northern side of the city for the northern suburbs while blacks left the southern side of the city for the southern suburbs. While racism and anti-integration bias spurred part of white flight to the suburbs, a major force driving both white and black suburbanization was the deteriorating housing stock in Atlanta and the growth of spacious, subdivisions in the Atlanta suburbs (Silver and Moeser 1995). Unlike many other cities, the racial line dividing Atlanta into a white north and a black south opened opportunities for black suburbanization to the south (but not the north) (Rutheiser 1996).

In the early 1970s, politics appeared anything but usual in Atlanta. The rules of engagement between the city government and the business community appeared to change in the first half of the 1970s. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a new set of dominant players on the political scene (Rutheiser 1996). In 1973, Maynard Jackson was elected Atlanta's first African American mayor. Although Jackson was a member of one of Atlanta's most prominent black families, he was considered a maverick by both the white elite and an older generation of African American leaders (Rutheiser 1996). In support of those who had elected him, Jackson was committed to affirmative action, minority set-aside programs, and neighborhood autonomy and preservation (Rutheiser 1996). The business community did not support these programs. By severing the ties that had united the interests of the city government and local businesses for decades, Jackson alienated and angered much of the white business community (Harmon 1996; Rutheiser 1996).

Although business no longer dominated Atlanta's government directly, Jackson could not afford to alienate the business leadership

permanently. The business community in Atlanta controlled too many resources, both economically and organizationally, to be ignored (Stone 1984). With Atlanta in recession, Jackson distanced himself from community groups and reestablished ties with the business community during his second term. By the end of the 1970s, the traditional government-business coalition that had long ruled Atlanta was dominant again. The government-business coalition of the 1980s and 1990s, however, was one composed of an overwhelmingly black government and an overwhelmingly white business elite.

Economic Recession, Crime Expansion

Crime rates soared in Atlanta during the 1970s (see Figure 7.1). The economic and political opportunities of the 1960s had failed to come to fruition during the 1970s. While the progressive image of Atlanta began to wane during the 1960s, the image meant little in the 1970s. Although African Americans had garnered significant political power during the 1970s, in the face of economic recession that political power was virtually meaningless. The reconfigured ruling coalition included black representation but the dominant interests were once again the dominant interests of the business elite. Poor and working class interests were again marginalized. The result of the marginalization of poor and working class interests, combined with shrinking levels of employment and a high rate of unemployment, was growing crime.

The Renewed and Reconfigured Boom

The 1980s and 1990s represent a return to the economic boom that characterized the 1950s and 1960s in Atlanta. This late twentieth century boom was not, however, centered in Atlanta's downtown. During the eighties, and more so in the nineties, the downtown stagnated as Midtown, Buckhead and suburban areas flourished (Rutheiser 1996). Between 1980 and 1995, the city's share of metropolitan employment declined from 55% to 29%. Across these same years, downtown Atlanta's share of metro employment dropped from 15% to 7.5% (Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 1993).

In terms of population, the city declined relative to the suburbs during most years in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 7.1). The population of the city of Atlanta shrank from 422,474 in 1980 to 394,017 in 1990 (Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 2000). The

population has increased in more recent years, reaching 416,000 in 2000. Nonetheless, Atlanta's central city population is smaller in population than any of the other cities in this study, including New Orleans. Atlanta's national size ranking continues to decline, falling to 40th place in 2000.

Atlanta has been one of the highest economic growth areas in the country in the 1980s and 1990s (Sjoquist 2000). In terms of the number of jobs, Atlanta, both the city and the metro-region, continues to expand. Between 1980 and 2000, the number of jobs available in the metropolitan area increased 4.1% per year. In the central city, the number of jobs increased 1.0% per year over this same time period (Atlanta Regional Commission 1997). However, the post-2001 economic downturn hit Atlanta particularly hard with over 65,000 jobs lost in the metro area in 2002 alone.

Employment growth rates by industry in Atlanta across the 1980s and 1990s indicate a continued diversification of Atlanta's economy. When compared with other metropolitan regions, the Atlanta metro region ranked no lower than third in employment growth in any industry during the 1980s and 1990s (Sjoquist 2000). The greatest employment growth in Atlanta was composed of service sector jobs, particularly the low-skill, low-wage consumer service sector jobs. However, unlike most other cities, including all of the cities in this study, the Atlanta region and the city of Atlanta have both experienced positive annual average growth in manufacturing sector jobs, typically higher-wage jobs for less-skilled, less-educated workers (Sjoquist 2000).

The growth in the manufacturing sector in Atlanta may not have led to the relatively high wages typical of that sector. Part of the growth in Atlanta's manufacturing in the past decade is likely the result of Atlanta's lack of a strong union tradition. Across its history, Atlanta has had little unionized labor and few core industries. The greatest level of unionization in Atlanta came in the 1930s with unionized textile workers (Bayor 2000). The labor struggles of southern textile workers, who were typically women and often African Americans, did not lead to the large scale extension of generous wages and benefits that typified accord-era contracts negotiated by unions representing workers in core industries. Further, as the textile industry declined in Atlanta so to did the extent of unionization. Hence, part of the steady increase in manufacturing employment across recent decades in the city is attributable to Atlanta's weak history of unionization (Rutheiser 1996).

Black control of the local political process continued through the 1980s and 1990s (Roth and Ambrose 1996). Throughout the 1980s, Andrew Young served as mayor of Atlanta. Andrew Young was one of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s lieutenants, served in Congress and was the ambassador to the United Nations under Jimmy Carter. Young was a skillful conciliator, and under his administration the close relationship between city hall and the business elite was fully restored (Roth and Ambrose 1996). During the 1990s, African American politicians remained in power in the mayor's office. Maynard Jackson served another term in the 1990s followed by Bill Campbell who was replaced by Atlanta's first female mayor, Shirley Franklin.

Despite continued political power of African Americans, the main priorities of the city's political and business leaders have never shifted (Bayer 2000). What has been seen as good for business has been seen as good for Atlanta. Left out of this equation has been Atlanta's poor, especially the increasingly segregated African American poor. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the northward shift of jobs and Atlanta's white population increasingly left poor neighborhoods on the south side of the city increasingly segregated and increasingly jobless. White flight to the suburbs was, more specifically, white middle class flight. Within the city racial disparity in income increased during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1989 the median white household income was \$61,691 while the median black household income was \$22,322. Income inequality more generally increased in Atlanta in the last two decades (see Table 7.1).

Part of this growing income inequality may be in large part the result of discrepancies in employment and occupations between blacks and whites. Black male unemployment in the city increased from 10.8% in 1980 to 13.4% in 1990, while white male unemployment decreased from 7.2% to 3.6% between 1980 and 1990. Racial occupational differences may also influence levels of inequality in Atlanta. The city's history of racist hiring practices relegated the majority of blacks to unskilled jobs until the 1970s (Bayer 1996). Although Atlanta's black political leadership redressed some employment inequities through changes in hiring practices and minority set-asides, these programs benefited upper and middle class blacks while doing little for poor and working class blacks (Orfield and Ashkinaze 1991). As a result, a majority of blacks in Atlanta today remain under-represented in both professional and manufacturing

industries and over-represented in service industries and retail trade (Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 2000).

Crime in the New Boom

The economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s in Atlanta did not appear to have the same effect on rates of crime as the boom of the 1950s and 1960s. Rates of homicide, assault, robbery and burglary exhibit similar trends across the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 7.1). While the earlier boom years in Atlanta corresponded with low and stable crime rates, the later boom years corresponded with erratic and relatively high rates of crime. The theoretical relationship between economic conditions, political conditions and rates of crime are less supported by the observed rates in the last decades. While one would anticipate that increasing wages and political diversification would lessen crime, the observed rates of crime do not support this hypothesis. The high level of inequality in Atlanta during the 1980s and 1990s may be exerting an influence on rates of crime during this era that is masked by overall economic strength and political stability. As Bayor (2000) states, contemporary Atlanta is a gilded city. “The outside (is) gold in the form of skyscrapers, business growth, tourism, and a reputation for prosperity and progressivism. Just beneath the surface (is) the base metal of poverty and segregation - the problems created by Atlanta’s history of racially discriminatory policy decisions” (56).

HYPOTHESES

How has the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy affected rates of crime? My argument is that the dramatic changes in the structure of the U.S. economy as the result of industrial restructuring has changed the fundamental nature of work, urban politics and class relations in U.S. cities since WWII. Such dramatic changes in the political economy of cities have in turn impacted a host of urban social problems, specifically crime. Does this argument hold, however, for a city such as Atlanta that has never had a strong industrial base?

Economic Conditions

In previous chapters I have discussed changes in economic conditions as they relate to the breakdown of the labor-capital accord (Bowles and Gintis 1982). The labor-capital accord rationalized the inherently conflictual relationship between labor and capital between roughly the end of WWII and the oil crisis of the early 1970s. The accord was advantageous to labor because it ensured relatively high wages and benefits. Although accord-era benefits often changed the wage and benefit structure for both non-unionized workers and workers in peripheral industries who did not have the protection of accord-era federal policy or negotiated contracts, the primary beneficiaries of the accord were unionized workers in industries in the core of the economy. Because of Atlanta's weak history of unionization, the changes brought forth by the labor-capital accord are not likely to have had the same influence on Atlanta that they had on other cities.

Although Atlanta has experienced net increases in manufacturing employment over the entire post-war era, the manufacturing industry's share of total Atlanta employment has decreased over the past thirty-five years (see Table 7.1). The continued diversification of Atlanta's economy, however, has lessened the degree to which consumer service sector employment has grown relative to other forms of employment in Atlanta (see Table 7.1). While Detroit, Boston and New Orleans have all experienced steep increases in consumer service employment, Atlanta's share of consumer service sector employment has remained stable since the mid-1960s and has actually declined in the late 1990s.

While employment trends in Atlanta diverge from the experiences of the other cities in this study, trends in wages by industry in Atlanta are more typical. Atlanta's growth in manufacturing employment has been accompanied by a steep increase in wages in the manufacturing industry (see Table 7.1). Between 1960 and 1996, manufacturing wages almost doubled. Service sector wages have not experienced an equivalent growth. Between 1950 and 1970, wages in consumer services remained stable. Since 1970, however, service sector wages have declined by over \$2,000 (see Table 7.1).

Although Atlanta may have experienced a political-economic history that has been less tied to the labor-capital accord than other cities, the theoretical links between employment, wages and crime are likely to remain. On this basis I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: There will be a negative and significant relationship between rates of all crimes and the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing industries in Atlanta. By contrast, there will be a positive and significant relationship between rates of all crimes and the percentage of the labor force employed in consumer service industries in Atlanta. The magnitude of the relationship is likely to be greater for property crimes than for violent crimes, with homicide rates having the weakest relationship.

Hypothesis 2: Average wages in both manufacturing and service industries will be negatively related to rates of each type of crime. The relationship between manufacturing wages and rates of crime will likely be stronger than the relationship between service wages and rates of crime because manufacturing wages are consistently higher than service wages.

Class Relations

Class relations impact crime by creating the structure in which individuals judge the legitimacy of existing patterns of domination and exploitation. The greater the degree of inequality, the more unjust patterns of domination and exploitation may appear to those who are the dominated and the exploited. In times and places where inequality is greatest we could expect implicit and explicit protest against the current political and economic system. Crime represents one form of implicit protest.

Income inequality, as measured by the 90/10 income ratio, has increased dramatically in Atlanta over the past four decades. Although the greatest rate of growth in inequality occurred during the 1970s, inequality has remained at an exceptionally high level throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This indicates that the distance between the rich and the poor has increased in Atlanta since 1960. Although not directly documented by the evidence at hand, this increasing distance is likely paired with increasing class bifurcation, as a large percentage of suburbanization in Atlanta was primarily the result of a white middle class flight.

Hypothesis 3: Inequality will be positively associated with all rates of crime in Atlanta between 1960 and 1996.

State Responses

A city may be able to lessen the criminogenic effects of economic decline through the provision of social welfare services (Cullen 1994). City government spending is, of course, limited by the broader political context and fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity may limit the range of social spending options available, but city hall must still decide the relative levels of spending appropriated to social welfare functions and social control functions. In Atlanta, the ratio of welfare spending to police spending declined dramatically over the last four decades. Decreases in social service support paired with increasing criminal justice support leads to the erosion of individual commitment to the system of social order, thereby increasing rates of crime. Hence,

Hypothesis 4: The ratio of government spending on social welfare services to police services will be negatively and significantly related to rates of each crime in Atlanta.

Temporal Stability

Atlanta's post-WWII history is characterized by three unique eras. The 1950s and 1960s represent a period of economic expansion. The 1970s represent a period of economic stagnation. The 1980s and 1990s represent a period of renewed economic expansion, albeit in a different geographic form. Therefore I argue,

Hypothesis 5: All of the models will exhibit a temporal break between 1970 and 1980.

ANALYSES

Methods

As in previous chapters there are three stages to this analysis. In the first stage, I determined the order of integration of each of the univariate series of interest by examining the time plots of each variable and conducting univariate tests on each of the series including

examination of descriptive statistics, calculation of the Jaque-Bera tests for normality, examination of the univariate correlograms and Ljung-Box Q statistics to assess autocorrelation and nonstationarity, and conducting Dickey-Fuller/Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots. If the null hypothesis of a unit root (being $I(1)$) was not rejected at the $p < .05$ level, I performed Johanson tests for cointegration between each $I(1)$ crime variable and each $I(1)$ explanatory variable.

I estimated the long-run relationships between each crime series, homicide, assault, robbery, and burglary, and a number of models tapping changes in Atlanta's economic structure, class structure and political structure in the second stage of my analysis. I only estimated models in which I was able to identify a cointegrative relationship using the levels of each crime rate as the dependent variable in each model.

Finally, in stage three, I examined the temporal stability of each model. I tested the structural stability of each model using the Chow breakpoint test with 1970 and 1980 as the years at which the relationship shifts.

Results

Dickey-Fuller unit root test results are presented in Table 7.2. Dickey-Fuller unit root tests indicate that each of the series are nonstationary in levels and stationary in first differences suggesting the presence of a unit root, with the exception of assault rates and the level of inequality. Although the unit root test does not indicate that these two variables have unit roots, correlograms and the Ljung-Box Q statistics indicate the opposite. A correlogram in levels of each variable indicates nonstationarity, a correlogram in second-differences indicates that both variables are overdifferenced. From this evidence I conclude that despite the results of the unit root tests, both rates of assault and the level of inequality both have a unit root.

Because each variable appears to be of the same order [$I(1)$], it is possible that one or more of the variables are cointegrated. Table 7.3 presents the results of Johansen tests for cointegration for each crime variable and each explanatory and control variable. These tests indicate that the following variables are cointegrated: Homicide and service employment; assault and service wages; robbery and both service wages and the welfare/police spending ratio; and burglary and service wages, service employment, and inequality. In the presence of significant

Table 7.2 Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests, Atlanta 1960-1996

Variable	$\hat{\alpha}$	Decision
Homicide Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-2.04	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-3.87	reject
Assault Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-0.26	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-2.49	accept
Robbery Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-1.31	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-3.42	reject
Burglary Rate		
<i>Level</i>	-2.02	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-3.40	reject
Manufacturing Wages		
<i>Level</i>	-1.30	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-7.48	reject
Service Wages		
<i>Level</i>	-2.28	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-8.42	reject
Manufacturing Employment		
<i>Level</i>	-1.36	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.11	reject
Service Employment		
<i>Level</i>	-2.05	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-7.25	reject
Inequality		
<i>Level</i>	-1.50	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-2.61	accept
Welfare/Police Spending		
<i>Level</i>	-1.65	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-5.73	reject
Unemployment		
<i>Level</i>	-0.60	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-7.69	reject
Police Per Capita		
<i>Level</i>	-1.32	accept
<i>First Difference</i>	-4.04	reject

Table 7.3 Johansen Tests for Cointegration, Atlanta 1960-1996

Variable	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Manufacturing Wages	13.02	11.12	13.95	8.40
Service Wages	11.76	16.03*	16.19*	16.33*
Manufacturing Employment	15.35	11.37	17.73	15.41
Service Employment	18.74*	12.13	15.03	20.36**
Inequality	9.68	9.99	9.64	17.15*
Welfare/Police Spending	12.33	12.38	12.52*	15.13
Unemployment	7.06	9.60	9.58	5.34
Police Per Capita	15.45*	6.73	9.81	7.60

cointegration models may be estimated using OLS regression in levels, with the addition of an error correction term.

Regression models of homicide, assault, robbery and burglary are presented in Tables 7.4 through 7.7. The determinants of homicide rates in Atlanta between 1960 and 1996 are presented in Table 7.4. The given models explain little variance in homicide rates. Across the three nested models, only service wages have any effect on rates of homicide. In each model an increase in service sector wages yields an increase in homicide rates. This is a seemingly anomalous finding. Homicide rates are typically difficult to determine empirically and difficult to control through policy. This finding could be explained through a routine activities framework (Cohen, Felson and Land 1980; Cohen and Felson 1979). It could be that increased wages in low-wage service sector jobs increase discretionary income used for recreation. Recreation that may include activities that will put an individual at

greater risk for becoming a victim of a homicide or perpetrating a homicide, including drinking and the use of recreational drugs.

Table 7.5 presents the results of the error correction model estimates of rates of aggravated assault. In the case of assault rates, manufacturing wages exhibit a consistent positive effect on rates of assault. An increase in manufacturing wages yields an increase in rates of aggravated assault. By contrast, an increase in service sector wages yields a decrease in rates of crime. Although the largest of the three models does not yield a significant increase in the explanatory power of the model, Model D indicates that both manufacturing and service employment, as well as the level of inequality effect rates of assault. Similarly to the effects of wages, an increase in manufacturing employment relative to service employment yields an increase in assault, while an increase in service employment relative to manufacturing employment yields a decrease in assault. Finally, inequality is positively related to rates of assault.

Table 7.6 indicates the results of error correction estimates of rates of robbery. The determinants of robbery appear to be quite different from the determinants of either homicide or assault. Model A is the most parsimonious model. According to Model A, of manufacturing and service wages, only service wages have a significant effect on rates of robbery. An increase in service sector wages yields an increase in robbery. The effects of employment on robbery also differ from their effects on violent crime. A one percent increase in manufacturing employment decreases robberies by over 50 robberies per 100,000 residents of Atlanta. By contrast, a one percent increase in service employment increases robberies by over 40 robberies per 100,000 Atlanta residents.

The final table, Table 7.7, presents the results of error correction model estimates of burglary rates in Atlanta. The determinants of burglary rates are very similar to the determinants of robbery rates. With regard to wages, a one dollar increase in service wages yields an increase of burglary rates of 25 burglaries per 100,000 Atlanta residents. With regard to employment, an increase in manufacturing employment relative to total Atlanta employment is associated with a decrease in burglaries. As manufacturing employment increases one percent, burglaries decrease by over 250 per 100,000 Atlanta residents. Changes in service sector employment have the opposite result. As service employment increases relative to total employment in Atlanta

Table 7.4 Error Correction Model Estimates of Homicide Rates, Atlanta 1960-1996

Variable	A	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	0.00 (0.94)	0.00 (1.06)	0.00 (1.02)
Service Wages	0.01* (2.01)	0.01* (2.08)	0.01* (2.09)
Manufacturing Employment	232.84 (1.44)	197.94 (1.14)	312.25 (1.16)
Service Employment	-93.85 (-0.67)	-47.61 (-0.27)	-139.74 (-0.58)
Inequality	--	--	0.92 (0.58)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	1.40 (0.57)	1.76 (0.69)
Unemployment	-2.66 (-1.22)	-3.02 (-1.34)	-2.99 (-1.28)
Police Per Capita	0.08 (1.51)	0.07 (1.22)	0.08 (1.38)
Error Correction	0.64** (3.54)	0.67*** (3.73)	0.64** (3.50)
Constant	-50.60	-56.23	-77.89
Adj. R ²	0.76	0.76	0.75
Chow (1970-1980)	1.99	1.94	1.75

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 7.5 Error Correction Model Estimates of Assault Rates, Atlanta 1960-1996

Variable	A	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	0.04** (3.09)	0.04** (2.99)	0.05*** (3.75)
Service Wages	-0.16*** (-5.10)	-0.16*** (-5.03)	-0.14*** (-7.76)
Manufacturing Employment	-2010.49 (-0.67)	-1499.10 (-0.45)	8319.95+ (1.77)
Service Employment	-1293.37 (-0.50)	-1973.75 (-0.62)	-10212.06* (2.94)
Inequality	--	--	79.47** (2.89)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-18.97 (-0.39)	6.27 (0.14)
Unemployment	-58.08 (-1.39)	-53.34 (-1.21)	-41.55 (-1.01)
Police Per Capita	3.04 (3.31)	3.19** (3.15)	7.25*** (7.32)
Error Correction	0.33+ (1.63)	0.34+ (1.60)	0.11 (0.53)
Constant	3087.58	3146.19	1372.46
Adj. R ²	0.98	0.98	0.98
Chow (1970-1980)	1.00	2.18	1.16

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 7.6 Error Correction Model Estimates of Robbery Rates, Atlanta 1960-1996

Variable	A	B	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	0.01 (1.62)	--	0.02 (1.59)	0.01 (0.76)
Service Wages	0.04+ (1.73)	--	0.04+ (1.67)	0.04 (1.31)
Manufacturing Employment	-5190.90* (-2.11)	--	-4516.25+ (-1.66)	2783.76 (0.52)
Service Employment	4238.18* (1.99)	--	3402.11 (1.31)	-2515.98 (-0.52)
Inequality	--	--	--	67.44* (2.03)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-48.81+ (-1.67)	-21.74 (-0.55)	22.29 (0.45)
Unemployment	-68.50* (-1.99)	-63.36* (-3.36)	-63.66 (-1.77)	-57.36 (-1.25)
Police Per Capita	0.08 (0.10)	2.62* (7.37)	0.24 (0.27)	1.90 (1.56)
Error Correction	0.99*** (6.39)	0.77* (5.20)	1.01*** (6.40)	0.61* (2.88)
Constant	-109.99	922.28	-51.70	-1026.95
Adj. R ²	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.94
Chow (1970-1980)	0.89	1.22	0.71	1.53

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 7.7 Error Correction Model Estimates of Burglary Rates, Atlanta 1960-1996

Variable	A	C	D
Manufacturing Wages	-0.01 (-0.27)	-0.01 (-0.14)	-0.03 (-0.96)
Service Wages	0.25*** (3.95)	0.25*** (3.99)	0.31*** (4.18)
Manufacturing Employment	-25867.89** (-4.11)	-23728.95** (-3.52)	7552.07 (0.62)
Service Employment	29685.45*** (5.44)	27822.58*** (7.33)	2565.22 (0.24)
Inequality	--	--	283.62*** (4.02)
Welfare/Police Spending	--	-25.86 (-0.26)	170.16 (1.51)
Unemployment	6.99 (0.08)	10.34 (0.12)	-17.54 (-0.17)
Police Per Capita	-0.75 (-0.36)	-0.37 (-0.18)	7.51+ (1.72)
Error Correction	1.03*** (8.51)	1.06*** (8.71)	0.78*** (5.01)
Constant	-4647.35	-4742.12	-9154.00
Adj. R ²	0.94	0.95	0.93
Chow (1970-1980)	1.85	1.13	2.08

Note: + $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

the rate of burglaries increases. A one percent increase in service employment is associated with an increase in burglaries of almost 300 burglaries per 100,000 residents.

In each of the multivariate analyses, I tested the temporal stability of the relationship between the variables. I used a Chow breakpoint test to determine if the relationship between the variables in each model differed during the decade of the 1970s. The results of Chow breakpoint tests (presented in the final rows of Tables 7.4 through 7.7) do not indicate any temporal instability across these years.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Throughout this manuscript I have explored the effects of economic conditions, class relations and state responses on crime. I argue that in order to understand trends in crime we must understand the social structure in which crime is embedded. The shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy over the latter half of the twentieth century has dramatically changed the urban political-economic landscape. In this chapter I have explored whether or not the industrial/post-industrial shift has had a significant impact on crime in Atlanta, a city that never developed a strong industrial base.

Of the economic changes experienced in Atlanta since WWII, my empirical analyses indicate that only relative shares of manufacturing and service employment consistently affect rates of crime. Consistent with my hypotheses, increasing shares of manufacturing employment relative to total employment in Atlanta lessen rates of property crimes (robbery and burglary). By contrast, increasing shares of service employment relative to total employment in Atlanta heighten rates of property crimes. Changes in the distribution of employment by industries in Atlanta do not have similar effects on rates of violent crime (homicide and aggravated assault).

As has been the case with my analysis of crime rates in other cities, wages, be they from manufacturing or service industries, do not exhibit a consistent relationship with rates of crime. In Atlanta, rates of aggravated assault have been positively associated with manufacturing wages and negatively associated with service wages. Burglary rates, however, have been positively associated with service wages. While these findings are difficult to clarify, the case of Atlanta may be complicated by consistently high rates of inequality.

In this analysis, I suggest that rates of inequality may influence crime by lessening aggregate commitment to existing patterns of exploitation. Exceptionally high levels of inequality have characterized Atlanta, both in contemporary and historical context. While income inequality is only one measure of the multiple layers of stratification that exist in Atlanta, the most consistent finding in this analysis is the positive relationship between inequality and all rates of crime except homicide.

In the case of Atlanta, my analyses linking government spending on social welfare services relative to police services yield one evident conclusion. For no type of crime does the ratio of welfare spending to police spending have a significant effect. Atlanta has always been unabashedly a city for which the priorities of business are the priorities of the city government. In this context it is not surprising that city spending would have no impact on rates of crime. If state welfare spending lessens the effects of inequality by working to align the interests of divergent classes, a city government that has never served that function would not be expected to ever serve that function.

To conclude, although Atlanta has not experienced the same decline in the manufacturing sector and rapid rise in the service sector as many other cities, manufacturing employment and service employment tend to have the same effects as in those cities for which the effects of industrial restructuring have been felt more profoundly. But in Atlanta, the so-called gilded city (Bayer 2000), inequality appears to be the unequivocal crime inducing factor across the latter half of the twentieth century.

The Comparative Political Economy of Crime

I began this project with a question, how do political and economic conditions influence aggregate rates of crime? I argued that, although this appeared to be a relatively simple question, criminologists have been unable to provide a satisfactory answer, in part, because too little research has analyzed rates of crime in a historical political-economic context. I suggested that what little research examined trends in crime from a historical perspective often failed to yield meaningful results because of the use of overly aggregate, national-level data. I concluded that in order to explain changes in crime trends in the twentieth century, research exploring the causes of such shifts needed to become both more historical and more comparative.

This research represents an attempt to move in that direction. I have argued that an analysis of U.S. crime in the postwar era necessarily requires an analysis of the demise of the industrial, welfare-state political economy and the rise of the post-industrial, absentee-state political economy. Through a series of chapters exploring the political-economic histories of Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta I have attempted to document the ways in which each city has traversed this dramatic global transformation. That documentation of city-level political and economic transformations since World War II provides the context within which I interpret changes in rates of crime in Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta.

My strategy in this study has been to explore changes in the political economy of each city, Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta; relate these changes to concurrent changes in rates of crime; and examine the quantitative effects of changes in political-economic factors on changes in rates of crime. By political-economic factors, I

have meant an understanding of the changes in the nature of work, changes in the nature of stratification, and changes in the nature of political relations and institutions. These three essential social structures provide the framework within which we can understand how fundamental transformations in urban social relations have affected trends in criminality in the twentieth century.

My success in using this strategy depends not only on the explanatory power of the statistical models that I present but also on the validity of the theoretical rationale that I offer. Although my approach has drawn on a wide foundation of criminological theory, my study is based on a reconceptualization and integration of contemporary criminological theories. While this research is informed by social disorganization, strain, and critical theories of crime, it represents a significant departure from these three paradigms. In this research I have attempted to suggest a more comprehensive understanding of aggregate crime that integrates economic factors and political factors.

Establishing a theoretical link between broad political-economic structures and individual, autonomous behavior, that is by definition the source of changes in macro-level rates of crime, required proposing a theory that suggested linkages between macro-level structures and micro-level behaviors. Crime, at its essence, represents the autonomous agency of an individual. That autonomous agency, however, is embedded in a wider social structure. I have suggested that urban political-economic social structure is comprised of three components: Economic conditions, political infrastructure, and class relations. Hence, I argue that a change in any component of this structure will affect individual action. In that the transformation of the U.S. capitalist economy from an industrial to a post-industrial base has dramatically influenced each of these three social structures, I hold that this transformation must be at the core of any explanation of the dramatic changes in post-war crime rates.

Without question, influences outside of the three-factor matrix I have proposed contribute to post-war crime trends in the United States. Rates of crime have shifted rapidly over the past five decades. The simple rapidity of changes in post-war crime undermines the social psychological theories prevalent in criminology (LaFree 1998). Undoubtedly social psychological factors influence individual criminality, but aggregate shifts in the rate of offending cannot be explained by large-scale shifts in biology, personality, or patterns of

interpersonal relations. Likewise, the rapidity of post-war crime shifts discounts explanations that posit the criminogenic effects of generational changes in entrenched values and norms (LaFree 1998). Hence, while I recognize the viability of numerous explanations, I propose that political-economic factors have had significant influence on changing rates of crime over the past five decades.

I have three objectives in this concluding chapter. First, I intend to revisit the theoretical paradigm I have proposed that links political-economic conditions and rates of crime. Second, although my intention in this research has been to use historical and comparative techniques to contextualize quantitative time series analyses that explore the relationship between political-economic conditions and crime, I have not yet, however, introduced substantial comparative analysis into this research. Therefore I will both compare and contrast the ways in which political-economic conditions have influenced crime rates in Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta. Finally, I will conclude this chapter by exploring the implications of this study for future theory and research.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND CLASS RELATIONS

My goal in this research has been to trace the effects of political and economic conditions on rates of crime over the latter half of the twentieth century. This necessarily entails exploring the effects of the global transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. The shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy is at the core of significant individual and community level urban social problems. In the post-industrial era, the movement away from full-time permanent employment has resulted in increasing uncertainty and insecurity in the lives of many individuals. In an era of declining prospects of life-long, stable employment, the relationship between legitimate employment and illegitimate, including criminal, employment is likely to be more contingent than in earlier eras.

The transformation of the dominant U.S. economy from a manufacturing base to service base has instigated an increasing bifurcation of the U.S. workforce. Recent empirical evidence indicates that the service-based U.S. workforce is divided into a small cadre of highly skilled workers, for whom flexibility is an asset, and an

expanding pool of less skilled workers for whom flexibility is a detriment (Rubin 1995). For those less-privileged workers the transformation from a manufacturing economy to a service economy in the United States has been associated with increasingly unstable employment, paltry wages and limited benefits.

The transformation of the U.S. economy away from manufacturing production has resulted in substantial social change in many U.S. metropolitan regions. The decline of the traditional manufacturing base that has under-girded many urban economies has resulted in significant unemployment and underemployment. The fiscal and social well-being of those cities that have lost their traditional industrial infrastructure has been eroded by the loss of the tax base and the social cohesion provided by the stable and relatively equitable employment associated with manufacturing industries. Cities in those areas of the country that have been the loci of growth in the new service economy have faced problems due to the movement of industries including haphazard growth, suburbanization, and immense inequality.

The decline in urban manufacturing employment may result in rising rates of urban crime because three characteristics of manufacturing employment are lacking in much service employment. First, manufacturing employment provides higher wages for less-skilled, less-educated workers than does service employment. Prior to the widespread shift in the U.S. economy from an industrial framework to a post-industrial framework, manufacturing jobs, both in unionized and nonunionized firms, often provided wages and benefits sufficient to support an entire family while contemporary service work, with the exception of the small percentage of high-tech, high-skill service jobs, tends to provide few benefits and low wages. Second, manufacturing employment tends to exhibit greater stability than service employment. While labor-management relations in manufacturing industries tend to be contractual, the labor-management relations in service industries tend to be individualistic. Third, manufacturing employment, especially in unionized manufacturing firms, provides more stable long-term work prospects than service employment.

The disruptive effects of the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy may be less disruptive to cities with proactive, welfare-oriented governments. At the city-level, political choices made by state agencies serve collectively as either a welfare-state or a police-state (Carlson and Michalowski 1999). In the role of welfare state,

local governments actively support the provision of social services. A city with a generous public social support network will likely exhibit less crime than a city with a paltry and mean-spirited system of social support (Cullen 1994). Welfare provisions directly affect rates of crime by protecting individuals from the criminogenic consequences of economic distress and indirectly affect rates of crime by lessening class antagonism and instilling the community with the perception that the state works for the benefit of all classes, not solely the economically dominant class.

By contrast cities characterized by punitive criminal justice policies can lessen individual commitment to the system of social order. Overly punitive criminal justice policies can increase crime by eroding aggregate commitment to the community and the social institutions that comprise that community. An emphasis on criminal justice at the expense of social welfare may increase class antagonism, as those who are not served by the welfare system and over-served by the criminal justice system begin to view the social order as benefiting the dominant class at the expense of the poor and disenfranchised.

Increasing levels of insecure and unstable employment in the post-industrial era have done much to undermine the standard of living of large segments of the U.S. population over the past thirty years. The shift of the U.S. economy from an industrial basis to a post-industrial basis may lead to distrust in politics and the very political system within which the exchange of hard work for a decent living was made. If Bell (1996) is correct and dignity and self-worth instill in the individual the sense of personal responsibility upon which support of a political system relies, then support for that system will drop in the absence of steady employment and just social welfare services. Without trust in the dominant political system, respect for the law is impossible. Hence it is plausible that the economic realities of instability and insecurity and the political realities of the demise of the welfare state and the elevation of self-interest over public-interest impacts rates of crime.

Social order is not maintained simply by satisfying individual wants, that is economically and politically unrealistic. Instead social order is maintained by persuading individuals that what they have is what they deserve and inequality is somehow just (Box 1988). This shared sense of justice may dissolve when economic conditions are distressed, class relations strained, and state response limited, leading

the individual to shift from an investment in the dominant ideology to a rejection of that ideology. Crime is one manifestation of the breakdown of a shared ideology.

What evidence has the political-economic experiences of Detroit, Boston, New Orleans and Atlanta provided? In the following section I present a comparative analysis of each of the four cities in this study. I compare and contrast their political-economic histories and the factors that have influenced their crime trends in an effort to provide support, or fail to provide support for, the theoretical explanation of the relationship between political-economic conditions and rates of crime discussed above.

THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CRIME IN FOUR CITIES

Part of the potential value of this research is its comparative approach. Cities are the spatial locations within which local labor markets operate, political exchange occurs, and class relations are interpreted. So while the large-scale industrial to post-industrial shift has occurred at a global level, its effects are manifested in cities at the local level.

My intent in this research has been to present an explicitly comparative analysis of four cities: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and New Orleans. I used two primary criteria in selecting these cities. First, crime in each of these cities has remained above the national average for most of the years since World War II. For Detroit, Boston, New Orleans and Atlanta, crime has been a significant social problem. Second, the restructuring of the U.S. economy from an industrial based economy to a post-industrial based economy has occurred at different rates and with different outcomes in each city.

Detroit and Boston are the northern “bust-towns.” Each city began the twentieth century as a major manufacturing center. Deindustrialization had very different effects on each city, however. Detroit is the prototypical rust-belt city. The decline in automotive manufacturing beginning in the late 1970s decimated Detroit’s economy and in the almost two decades since the bottom fell out of the U.S. auto industry, Detroit has yet to recover. The story of Boston begins much like the story of Detroit, but the endings diverge. Boston is the would-be victim of economic restructuring. Manufacturing decline commenced in earnest before World War II. While other cities

were booming in the wake of the war, Boston floundered. Unlike Detroit, however, Boston has been able to successfully transform its economic base. When Detroit was facing steep decline in the 1980s, Boston was reaching the pinnacle of its recovery, having reshaped itself into a center of high-tech, knowledge-based industries.

New Orleans and Atlanta are the southern counterparts of Detroit and Boston. In contrast to both Detroit and Boston, in New Orleans and Atlanta, as in much of the South, manufacturing industries have never truly dominated their economies. But like Boston, Atlanta has capitalized on the nationwide growth in the importance in service sector industries, while New Orleans has been unable to find a niche in the contemporary economy.

Atlanta is the case study of a southern boomtown. Since WWII, Atlanta has witnessed economic expansion and population growth. Although financial, real estate and insurance industries are particularly strong in Atlanta, the city's economy has diversified over the past fifty years. Unlike any of the other cities in this study, Atlanta actually experienced growth in the manufacturing sector over the past two decades. Part of Atlanta's ability to attract manufacturing industries, however, has been the weakness of organized labor in the city. Hence, Atlanta's success has failed to lessen poverty and has come with steep increases in inequality. In contrast to Atlanta, New Orleans represents a southern city that is not a boomtown. Unlike Atlanta, New Orleans has experienced both a slow economy and population declines during much of the study period, despite periods of rapid single-industry expansion. While Atlanta's economy has diversified and expanded most in the areas of business service that are strong components of the contemporary service economy, New Orleans' has remained tied to its early industries in the oil and gas and shipping sectors.

My selection of the four cities to include in this study was also an attempt to select cities that were representative of ideal types of cities. In this way each city is not a case in and of itself, but is a case of a certain class of cities that share at least some political and economic similarities. In selecting each city, I drew on Mollenkopf's (1983) assertion that there are three types of cities. Mollenkopf suggests that there are, first, those cities that were historically based on traditional manufacturing industries but are now sites of finance, technology and service trades. Boston is representative of this type of city. Second, there are cities that emerged after industries had coalesced elsewhere

and whose historical economic basis was primarily in industries other than manufacturing. Atlanta is typical of this category. Finally, there are cities that were dominated by manufacturing, but in the wake of deindustrialization were unable to create a new economic base. Detroit is typical of this last category of cities. New Orleans does not adequately fit within the bounds of Mollenkopf's typology. New Orleans is a fourth type of city for which manufacturing decline has had little relevance, but for which service and technology expansion has been similarly irrelevant. I argue that although not included in Mollenkopf's typology New Orleans is a representative of a host of old, Southern cities that reached prominence before the Civil War in the antebellum South and never reached a comparative level after Reconstruction.

Hence, each city in this analysis represents a possible case of each of Mollenkopf's (1998) three types of cities. Detroit is a victim of manufacturing decline. Boston is a survivor of manufacturing decline. Atlanta is a successful new city, for which manufacturing decline has had little relevance. And the final city, New Orleans, is an unsuccessful old city, with a similar weak traditional manufacturing base.

Although these cities are representative of specific types of cities, they also have unique, divergent characteristics in their political-economic history. These political-economic histories have influenced trends in rates of crime. In the remainder of this section I will more closely compare these cities on the basis of trends in their post-war crime as well as both the similar and different aspects of their historical and contemporary economic, political and class relations.

CRIME IN DETROIT, BOSTON, NEW ORLEANS AND ATLANTA

Figures 8.1 through 8.4 compare rates of crime in each of the four cities, Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta for each of the four types of crime, homicide, aggravated assault, robbery and burglary. Trends in crime can vary on three possible dimensions. Trends can differ in terms of their shape, the timing of their changes and their magnitude. Although I selected these cities because their rates of crime were above average for the entire post-war era, trends in crime across the four cities in this study are surprisingly similar in terms of shape,

Figure 8.1 Homicide Rates, 1948-2000




Figure 8.2 Robbery Rates, 1948-2000




Figure 8.3 Aggravated Assault Rates, 1948-2000





Figure 8.4 Burglary Rates, 1948-2000



timing and magnitude. In terms of shape, trends tend to be parallel across cities. Timing of changes in rates of crime is also highly similar across cities. Only in terms of magnitude in the past two decades is there any real divergence in crime in Detroit, Boston, New Orleans and Atlanta. In Atlanta in the 1990s, all crime rates are visibly greater than in other cities, with the exception of rates of homicide. In Boston in the 1990s, all crime rates are noticeably lower than in other cities, with the exception of rates of aggravated assaults.

How can we reconcile such similarities in rates of crime, the dependent variable, when the economic, political and class variables, the independent variables, appear to be so very divergent? Two issues may suggest answers to this question. First, although the historical overview presented above suggests that these cities vary significantly in terms of political-economic variables, I have not yet compared empirical data to confirm that observation. Second, multivariate analyses of crime rates may indicate that although the outcomes are similar the factors that lead to those outcomes may differ across cities. To explore these two possible sources of an answer to the question of how divergent inputs can lead to similar outputs I, first, compare these cities in terms of the variables I have used in my quantitative analyses in this study and I, second, compare the results of multivariate analyses of rates of crime in Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta.

The measures of changes in the city economies I analyzed were the proportion of city employment in manufacturing and service industries and the industry-specific average wages.¹ In general, I hypothesized that the shift of dominant employment from manufacturing industries to service industries has had a positive impact on rates of crime. To examine this hypothesis, I included in my analyses the proportion of city employment in manufacturing and consumer service industries. I recognized, however, that a shift toward service-sector employment may not necessarily lead to negative outcomes in terms of income. Hence I examined the effects of average earnings by industry.

Trends in both manufacturing employment and wages are very similar for all of the cities I examined. Each city experienced dramatic declines in the percentage of manufacturing employment between 1960 and 1996. By 1996, employment in manufacturing in all of the cities was under fifteen percent, with the exception of Detroit, which despite having a relatively large manufacturing sector today, experienced the most precipitous declines in manufacturing since 1960. While I

focused on the decline in manufacturing employment relative to employment in other industries, in terms of raw numbers each city also experienced steep declines in manufacturing sector jobs. The exception to this trend is Atlanta, which with continued diversification of its economy actually posted a modest increase in manufacturing between 1960 and 1996.

Despite declines in manufacturing employment, manufacturing wages have increased in all four cities across the relevant time frame. Although each city experienced a drop in manufacturing wages in the early 1980s, wages remain well above their 1960 level. Detroit, the city that has experienced the greatest loss of manufacturing jobs, has the highest manufacturing wages. This trend is not surprising in light of organized labor's more successful efforts maintaining wages, than employment.

Trends in consumer service sector employment and wages diverge across Detroit, Boston, New Orleans, and Atlanta. In including the proportion of jobs by industry, and not the actual levels of jobs, I was interested in exploring the extent to which the service sector has filled the employment gap left by the loss of urban manufacturing employment. Have the so-called bad service sector jobs of the consumer service sector replaced manufacturing jobs? This has not been the experience of all of the cities in this study. The decline in manufacturing employment in Detroit and New Orleans has paralleled an expansion in service employment. With industries other than manufacturing and service remaining essentially stable in the post-war eras, service employment appears to have effectively replaced manufacturing employment in the Detroit and New Orleans labor markets.

By contrast, consumer service employment has actually declined as a proportion of total employment in both Boston and Atlanta. Unlike either Detroit or New Orleans, both Boston and Atlanta have experienced industrial diversification, especially in the most recent decades of the twentieth century. As a result, manufacturing jobs lost in Boston have not been "replaced" by service sector jobs. In Atlanta, although the proportion of jobs in manufacturing has declined over the past four decades, there has been no actual loss of manufacturing jobs.

Trends in service sector wages exhibit an equal variance across the cities in this study. Those cities with the greatest growth in service sector employment have experienced the greatest declines in service

sector wages. Both Detroit and New Orleans exhibit sharp decreases in service wages. By contrast service wages in Boston have grown dramatically. While not exhibiting marked growth, service sector wages in Atlanta have declined only minimally in the last decade.

Beyond economic factors, I have argued that political factors may have influenced changes in rates of crime. In order to assess the degree to which the form of government spending affects crime, I looked at the effects of the ratio of transfer payment spending to police spending on crime. While the transformation of the fiscal importance of welfare services relative to police services is remarkable, what may be more remarkable is the degree to which all of the cities in this study have experienced very similar transformations. Only in Detroit is the level of police spending not at least double the level of welfare spending. Although the trends in welfare relative to police spending are similar in shape, they differ in magnitude. Both Atlanta and New Orleans exhibit the greatest drop in the ratio of welfare spending to police spending between 1960 and 1996. Part of this disparity across cities is due to the very low levels of police spending in both Atlanta and New Orleans in the 1950s and 1960s, relative to the contemporary levels of police spending in their northern counterparts.

Finally, in that I have argued that inequality may influence urban crime rates, I examined the effects of the 90-10 income ratio on rates of crime. Inequality has increased in all of the cities in this study over the past forty years. Based on the histories of both cities it is not surprising that levels of inequality are greatest in Atlanta and New Orleans. Although in 1960 New Orleans had the highest level of inequality, by 1996 Atlanta had surpassed New Orleans as the city with the highest level of inequality. Across the entire 1960 to 1996 time period, inequality in Boston and Detroit remained lower than in the southern cities in this study.

There are greater differences in the multivariate determinants of crime rates across Detroit, Boston, New Orleans and Atlanta. Below I present comparisons across the multivariate models that I have presented in previous chapters. Because I have detailed the results of these analyses elsewhere my comparative discussion will compare general findings across cities.

The most consistent finding across cities addresses the relationship between manufacturing employment and crime. Rates of crime tend to increase as manufacturing employment decreases. In all four cities, as

manufacturing employment decreases as a share of total employment rates of all crimes increase. This finding is strongest and most consistent, however, for rates of property crime.

Supporting my original argument, these analyses find that as the stable jobs provided by the manufacturing sector are lost, the crime rates increase. Hence the decline in urban manufacturing employment appears to result in rising rates of urban crime. In the absence of the stability and positive prospects afforded by manufacturing employment crime appears to be a more likely option to deal with economic distress. This finding holds across cities. In other words the negative effects of declining manufacturing employment have been felt in those cities with a tradition of manufacturing and in those cities with a limited historical manufacturing infrastructure.

Service employment does not have as consistent effects on rates of crime. Changes in the proportion of the local labor market composed of jobs in consumer industries have a statistically significant effect on rates of crime in only two cities. Interestingly those two cities are Boston and Atlanta, the two cities with the lowest proportion of consumer service sector employment. The effect of service sector employment, however, is the opposite in each city. In Atlanta, consistent with my original hypothesis, increases in service sector employment tend to be associated with increases in rates of crime. By contrast, in Boston increases in service sector employment tend to be associated with decreases in rates of crime. Hence it appears that an increase in service sector employment, relative to other types of employment, does not necessarily lead to increased crime.

Wages are equally inconsistent across cities. Only in Boston and New Orleans do wages affect crime as I anticipated. In Boston, increases in manufacturing wages over the past forty years have tended to lead to decreases in rates of crime. In New Orleans decreasing service sector wages appear to be related to increasing criminal offending. Increases in manufacturing wages in New Orleans tend to be, however, positively related to rates of crime. In other words as manufacturing wages increase, crime has increased. In Atlanta, similarly, any increase in wages, be it service or manufacturing wages, tends to be associated with increasing rates of crime.

Government spending and levels of inequality less frequently exhibit a statistically significant effect on rates of crime. In both Detroit and Boston, as welfare spending has decreased relative to

spending, rates of crime appear to have increased. This is in keeping with my contention that cities that emphasize criminal justice at the expense of social welfare may exhibit higher rates of crime than cities that do not. In those cities increasing crime may emerge due to increasing class antagonism as the legal system is viewed as protecting social order for the benefit of the dominant class at the expense of the subordinate classes. This appears to be the case in Detroit and Boston, cities that have experienced significant protest against the local government.

Inequality only appears to be related to rates of crime in Atlanta. Consistent with my hypothesis, rates of crime appear to increase in Atlanta as the level of income inequality increases. I proposed that inequality might affect crime by influencing individual commitment to the dominant ideology of domination and subordination. The greater the level of inequality the more transparent existing patterns of exploitation, and the less likely individuals are to be vested in the system that supports that exploitation. Why might it be that inequality only appears to influence crime in Atlanta? Not only does Atlanta have the highest level of inequality of the cities in this study, it has also had the most rapid increase in inequality. Hence the level of inequality may be the determining factor in whether or not income inequality has any effect on rates of crime.

In summary the results of this analysis are mixed, at best. While declines in manufacturing employment appear to have had unequivocal effects on crime, other effects are not as conclusive. In these analyses, however, I have attempted to address a large number of issues using very broad strokes. While offering modest evidence in support of my theoretical arguments, this research does offer a number of suggestions as to the future of further research examining the relationship between political-economic conditions and crime. I explore those contributions of this research in the final section of this chapter.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The goal of this study was to contribute to the emerging body of research that considers the effects of political and economic structures on aggregate criminal behavior. In particular, I intended this study to augment current research in three ways. First, because economic and political structures in U.S. cities have changed dramatically since

World War II, this research could provide a temporally contingent analysis that would capture the effects of these changes on crime. Second, I suggested that a comparative approach such as this was necessary to explore the value of disaggregate analyses that examine variance in rates of crime at the city level. Finally, I proposed that this research would provide an analysis of city-level political and economic structures that could provide the important context within which to understand and control crime. To what degree has this study achieved these three aspects of my primary goal?

The results from my analyses are not overwhelmingly consistent or irrefutably conclusive. They, in fact, raise as many questions as they answer. The only consistent finding is that declines in manufacturing employment over the post war era have led to increases in rates of crime. But what does this mean? Changes in the U.S. wage structure do not regularly influence rates of crime, therefore it does not appear that manufacturing job loss is simply the loss of “good” jobs. Of course, manufacturing jobs fall into the category of “good” jobs for reasons other than their relatively high wages. It may be that the loss of manufacturing employment equates with the loss of job stability and security, which fundamentally changes how one structures one’s life. In the absence of stability and security individuals may be more likely to engage in the risk-taking behaviors that are associated with crime. But this cannot be determined from the evidence at hand, and instead suggests an avenue for future research drawing more detailed links between the characteristics of available employment and individual criminal behavior.

The evident effects of the decline in manufacturing employment on rates of crime may, paired with evidence from Detroit and partial evidence from Boston indicating that this relationship is historically contingent, suggests a second possible explanation. It is plausible that the decline in manufacturing is not the important issue, but the crises incurred during a significant transformation of an urban economy is the key issue. If this were the case, it is not manufacturing employment that deters crime, but economic stability. Again, this is not immediately evident from the given analyses, but suggests that future research examine the relationship between crisis-level economic reconfigurations and aggregate criminal offending.

What are we to make of the findings that do not hold across cities? With the exception of the relatively consistent association between

manufacturing employment and crime, no variables had the same effects on crime across all four of the cities in this study. I suggest that these inconsistencies stem from two sources. First, I took on an arduous task in this study. I attempted to make quantitative comparisons, across four distinctly different cities, for a period of four decades. The resulting analyses were limited by a number of factors. I tried to limit the variables in each quantitative analysis to the data that were available for all of the cities. This limited the data I could include in analyses. The analyses were further limited by a very small number of cases. While forty years may be a long historical period, it is a short time series when using annual data. Future research should look toward more nuanced models that are city-specific, and in some cases comprised of more cases.

The second possible source of inconsistencies in the explanation of crime across cities is less of an indictment of the current research. The inconsistencies are very likely the result of real differences in the political and economic contexts of each case. That inequality is only relevant in Atlanta speaks volumes to the conditions under which inequality influences crime. While Atlanta is a so-called “boom-town,” that boom has come with increasingly transparent inequities, resulting in gains for those who are already the most privileged and losses for those who are already the least privileged. In a similar manner, that the relationship between economic conditions and crime is historically contingent in Detroit but not elsewhere, indicates the truly devastating effects of the automobile industry’s plummet in the Detroit economy, but obviously not elsewhere. Thus, in sum, inconsistent findings likely reflect real differences across cases that would be obscured by analyses using data at a higher level of aggregation.

What is the conclusion to this story? There really isn’t one yet. This research provides evidence that economic conditions, political conditions and the historical and spatial context in which each occurs matter. Although this study has provided real insight into how these factors influence crime in individual cities, many avenues of future research and theory building remain.

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Notes

CHAPTER ONE

¹ As I will discuss, the issue of spatiality in crime is far more advanced in criminological research than temporality (e.g. Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Morenoff 1999).

² Reliance on cross-sectional analyses is particularly characteristic of social disorganization research (see Chapter Two). This is ironic in that the classical basis of social disorganization research was the urban Chicago School that was concerned specifically with urban changes and neighborhood transition (Byrne 1986).

³ Interestingly, a much broader body of work deals with the historical context of incarceration (e.g. Barlow, Hickman and Chiricos 1993; Chiricos and Delone 1992; Hagan and Palloni 1990; Jacobs and Helm 1996; Michalowski and Carlson 1999).

⁴ I intentionally use the vague term, sufficiently. The data to which I refer are the FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) series. UCR statistics are available through 1930, however there are serious questions as to both their reliability and their validity prior to 1954. The basis of these concerns deals mainly with the coverage of the reporting jurisdictions. While the contemporary UCR represents law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction of over 95% of the United States population, there remain significant gaps in coverage, particularly for rural areas.

⁵ Crutchfield's research (1995; 1989; Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997) draws directly on segmented labor market research. Crutchfield essentially expands on early segmented labor market research that held that secondary labor market employment fails to instill in workers those behaviors that are valued by primary labor market employers (see Harrison and Sum (1979) for a review of

early research on impediments to mobility between the primary and secondary labor markets). Crutchfield includes in these behaviors a commitment to employment that would lead the individual to avoid criminogenic situations that may jeopardize that employment.

⁶ Labor market participation is not necessarily a panacea for crime. Research indicates that for school-age young adults employment, at least employment in the secondary labor market jobs most often available to teenagers, actually increases criminal involvement (for an overview of youth labor market activity and crime see Williams, Cullen, and Wright 1996).

⁷ The dominant crime-then-politics causal order is likely the result of a historical backlash against critical criminology's overly simplistic crime as politics assertion of the 1970s. I will discuss this possibility further in Chapter Two.

⁸ An opposite premise that criminal justice policies that rely on incarceration, versus social welfare improvement, increases rates of crime by degrading local labor markets and family structures also has empirical support (Rose and Clear 1998).

⁹ There is a sizeable body of literature that debates the measurement of displacement. Some defend the official measure as a valid estimate of the tenured workers with significant investment in training who are most adversely effected by structural job losses (Flaim and Sehgal 1985; Browne 1985). Others critique this measure as underestimating the magnitude of economic dislocation (Doeringer 1991; Moore 1990). This estimate is therefore a conservative evaluation of the number of displaced workers that is based on the more limited official measure of displacement.

¹⁰ Part-time work is generally defined as less than 35 hours per week.

¹¹ The contingency rate is the proportion of the workforce holding contingent jobs.

¹² The claim that the flexibility of non-standard work benefits workers is undermined by the experiences of women with young children, who continue to represent an increasing proportion of the labor force. For these workers, non-standard work arrangements make child-care and household labor even more difficult to balance with work demands.

¹³ CPS earnings data broken down by race and sex are only available since 1979.

¹⁴ A broad body of research indicates that for many permanently displaced workers, reemployment comes after a significant delay and at a significant loss of wages and benefits (Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt 1998; Morris, Bernhardt,

and Handcock 1994; Rubin and Smith 1992; Smith and Rubin 1997; Wallace and Rothschild 1988; Wetzel 1995)

CHAPTER TWO

¹ Contemporary social disorganization theory draws, at least implicitly, on the network analytic perspective of urban sociology (e.g. Fischer 1995, 1982, 1975; Wellman 1979; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1997). Network analysis of communities examines the social linkages and related exchange of resources within the urban context (Wellman and Leighton 1979). There are, however, substantive differences between network analysis and social disorganization. Social disorganization theory does not clearly differentiate between networks and communities. In most social disorganization research the two concepts are considered synonymous. Social network analysis makes a clear distinction between localized, neighborhood networks and diffuse, community networks (Wellman 1979). Hence social disorganization research tends to assume that the social support provided by community is bounded by locality, whereas social network analysis would not make that assumption a priori.

² The actual type of crime that this tension elicits varies by context. The drive to reach economic success by any means necessary is as likely, if not more likely, to lead to white collar crime, as it is to lead to street crime. An individual whose self-definition is tied directly to their relationship to the market may be more likely to turn to deviant methods (i.e. white collar crime) to achieve economic success than an individual who is only marginally integrated into the market economy (e.g. a chronically unemployed person).

³ Again, although I look specifically in this study at street crime, this basic premise would hold for other types of crime as well.

CHAPTER THREE

¹ I use the term longitudinal and quantitative together and, to some extent, interchangeably. I consider quantitative, longitudinal methods as distinct from historical methods. For this reason, I provide a separate discussion of my use of historical and longitudinal methods. By a broad definition, longitudinal methods, at least the quantitative time series methods that I employ, are a variant of historical methods. I make a distinction between them for two reasons. First, I make the distinction in order to emphasize that my empirical analyses span both a historical and a contemporary era. I am not examining a social process that has both a beginning and an end, I am instead studying an ongoing transition. Second, in terms of broader criminology research I make

the distinction between historical and longitudinal methods to make clear that although I use time series methods that are somewhat common in criminology; I use them, as they should be used, not as a substitute for cross-sectional cases, but to understand historical change.

² Pescosolido and Rubin (2000) discuss, in further depth, the kind of methodological integration that I suggest. As they suggest, it is likely that true methodological triangulation may not be feasible for the individual researcher, but instead must emerge from a true collaborative effort by scholars using multiple methodological approaches.

³ Marx, Weber and Durkheim each relied extensively on both historical and comparative sociological methods.

⁴ Variable-oriented research tends to be quantitative, while case-oriented research tends to be qualitative. These are, however, only general tendencies.

⁵ The intersection of historical and comparative methods generally involves case-oriented, not variable-oriented, comparative methods.

⁶ This is not to say that my research is in some way novel in examining a unit of analysis that is smaller than a nation. Numerous comparative studies look smaller units (see for example Abramson 1992 and Kimeldorf 1988).

⁷ Past research has indicated that crime rate time series tend to be non-stationary (Carlson and Michalowski 1997; Greenberg 2001; Hale and Sabbagh 1991).

⁸ In these analyses I have drawn on a large number of different data sources for various years. These include: *County Business Patterns*, *State of the Cities Data System*, *Current Population Survey*, *Survey of Buying Power*, *City Government Finances*, and local data from individual municipalities. In some instances I imputed missing cases in time series. Further information on individual data sources available from the author.

⁹ The following 2-digit SIC codes are included in my definition of consumer services: 52-59, retail trade; 70, hotels and lodging; 72, personal services; 75-76, repair services; 76-78, entertainment services.

CHAPTER FOUR

¹ But it is important to recognize that this typology is of cities and not metropolitan regions. Complicating any understanding of Detroit is the continued affluence and productivity of the metropolitan region in which Detroit is located. While the city has stagnated and withered, the cities and counties surrounding Detroit continue to thrive.

² That New Orleans does not fit within Mollenkopf's typology indicates a weakness of Mollenkopf's argument and not the irrelevance of the inclusion of the New Orleans case. New Orleans is the largest representative of a host of old, Southern cities such as Birmingham, Baltimore and Richmond. Like New Orleans, each of these cities reached its greatest prominence before the Civil War in the antebellum South.

³ Ford's headquarters were actually located in the town of Highland Park that is totally surrounded by the city of Detroit.

⁴ These opportunities were neither without limit nor without conflict. Both Southern whites and blacks, in addition to Northern blacks, faced considerable discrimination during the WWII era in both labor markets and housing markets (Babson 1984; Geschwender 1977; Meier and Rudwick 1979; Thomas 1992; Widick 1989).

⁵ This does not mean that the black community in Detroit was not organizing in order to lay the foundation for future power. Black labor in Detroit was especially active during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Beginning with the founding of the Trade Union Leadership Conference (TULC) in 1957 and culminating with the organization of the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) in 1963, black union members worked actively, both within the union apparatus, in the case of TULC, and outside the union, in the case of DRUM, to gain power in Detroit.

⁶ 1967 dollars.

⁷ Archer's goal in developing the enterprise zone within Detroit is the creation of 5,800 jobs over ten years (Lippert and Chesley 1994). Ironically, the same area of the city covered by the zone lost more than 5,800 jobs in 1987 when GM closed plants in the area.

⁸ The quantitative analyses only span the 1960 through 1996 time frame because of data availability on all for cities.

⁹ In these analyses I use transfer payments as a measure of social welfare expenditures, similar results hold for other measures of social welfare spending.

¹⁰ A less formal method can also be used to determine overall historical periodization in a time series. In order to determine turning points in a relationship that is not time invariant, Issac and Griffin (1989) suggest the use time-varying parameter regressions. This method requires obtaining coefficient estimates for the relationship of interest for a window of time within the series. Then the researcher "moves" that window forward in the series by adjusting the endpoints. A plot of the coefficients of this series of regressions should reveal the point at which the given relationship shifts. While a useful technique, its utility is limited to bivariate models in time series as short as those used here.

¹¹ I include the number of police per capita to control for the capacity of the criminal justice system to monitor crimes reported.

¹² Assault rates were not cointegrated with any of the explanatory or control variables, disallowing estimation in levels.

¹³ Each coefficient in the analysis represents the change in crime elicited by a one point change in the given independent variable. Both manufacturing and service employment are ratios, therefore their values are bounded by 0 and 1. Hence a one-point change in that variable is, in reality, impossible. In my discussion of the results of these analyses throughout this text, I convert the actual coefficient to coincide with the result of a one-hundredth of point change in the ratio of either manufacturing or service employment.

CHAPTER SIX

¹ Not that New Orleans was a typical antebellum Southern city. Anticipating the devastation that the Civil War would bring to New Orleans' trade and finance-based economy, local business and political leaders vehemently opposed Louisiana's succession.

² In 1951 dollars.

³ As proposed by Bonacich (1975, 1976), a racially split labor market served to incite white workers to protect their labor market privilege by erecting barriers to limit black inclusion, especially in unionized occupations.

⁴ The considerable animosity between the state and city governments was within, not across, party lines. Like the rest of the South, Louisiana was a one party state. A united Democratic party dominated Louisiana politics from the end of Reconstruction until the Great Depression. The party was split with the rise of Huey P. Long into a traditional faction and a progressive Longite faction and remained so until the 1960s (Hirsch 1992a). Conflict between the factions was settled in the Democratic primaries and not the essentially meaningless general elections. The one party dominance effectively eliminated the black vote in Louisiana by prohibiting blacks from voting in the "private" party primaries until private primaries were held to be unconstitutional (Gill 1997).

⁵ Corruption in New Orleans of the 1940s meant the control of much of the city government by organized crime (Deutsch 1968).

⁶ An interesting sidebar that highlights the fact that Morrison presented the image but not the substance of reform was in his sole sponsorship of the two-term mayoral limit rule. Sponsoring this change in the city charter helped to secure Morrison's image of zealously guarding the integrity of New Orleans' city government. Morrison strategically sponsored this act at the end of his

second term and it took effect at the beginning of his third term. Under the revised city charter, Morrison served a third and a fourth term, circumventing the two-term limit because his first two terms were served under the previous city charter.

⁷ The New Orleans elite, including Mayor Chep Morrison, was little involved in the integration issue. For the New Orleans elite, integration had little relevance to their own children's private education (Gill 1997). Morrison did not publicly voice a stance on integration until after the eruption of violence, which he feared would disrupt commerce by tainting New Orleans' image (Gill 1997).

⁸ Houston and Dallas were equally positioned to capitalize on the greater reliance on domestic production during the 1970s and early 1980s. For reasons previously discussed, they were better positioned than New Orleans to turn the oil boom into sustained economic expansion.

⁹ Morial had greater success at this in his first terms than in his second when the effects of U.S. economic contraction were finally felt in the city.

¹⁰ The union presence in Louisiana has been weak, as in many other Southern states. Currently, Louisiana is a "right to work" state, making closed shops illegal. The current right to work legislation was passed in 1972. Louisiana, however, was a right to work state until 1956 when Earl Long negotiated the repeal of the law in the state legislation, along with a number of programs, in exchange for not endorsing integration legislation (Fairclough 1995).

¹¹ The oil and gas industry witnessed the greatest wage increases as production employment in the city declined and technical oversight and management employment rose in the 1980s.

¹² I only present results of the Chow breakpoint test for the midpoint year, 1978. Tests for structural breaks at 1969 and 1986 yield similar findings.

¹³ This study does not assess the characteristics of crime victims or suburban crime. UCR statistics on crimes reported to the police does not provide characteristics of victims.

CHAPTER SEVEN

¹ Although the fifth highest in the nation, Atlanta's rate of black poverty is surpassed by Detroit and New Orleans.

² Hartsfield's 25 year tenure was interrupted between 1940 and 1942 when he was defeated by Julian LeCraw. Hartsfield replaced LeCraw when LeCraw joined the military midway through his term.

CHAPTER EIGHT

¹ I also included shipping, oil and gas industries in my analyses of New Orleans. I am not including those variables in these comparisons, because they are not directly comparable to the other cities.

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