CULTURAL CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE

New Perspectives on Development

Edited by
William Ascher and John M. Heffron

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To the memory of our fathers, Meyer S. Ascher and John L. Heffron, who instilled in their children the qualities of curiosity, imagination, and respect for life that sustain this work.

Contents

Illustrations

Figures

Tables

Preface and Acknowledgments

Soka University of America (SUA) is dedicated to peaceful, humanistic development. An important aspect of this is the preservation of cherished cultural beliefs and practices in the face of changes wrought by development. With this in mind, SUA's Pacific Basin Research Center (PBRC) commissioned a broad range of essays on how societies have grappled with the challenge of fostering both development and culture to enhance human dignity. These essays do not presume that beliefs and practices are necessarily desirable just because they are embedded within an existing culture, but rather they address the dilemmas of preserving or innovating cultural aspects to provide for the expansion of broadly shared material and nonmaterial benefits. As the sustainability of the multiple aspects of development becomes the principal focus of development, the question of culture and its role in the change process becomes critical. This book is an effort to provide a broad empirical basis for such a conversation.

The editors wish to thank the university's founder and the founder of the PBRC, Daisaku Ikeda, as well as the administration of the university from the president, Daniel Y. Habuki, on down for their generous support and encouragement over the rich but brief (15-year) life of the center.

Contributors

Mikhail Alexseev is associate professor of political science at San Diego State University, with research interests in migration, ethnopolitical conflict, and post-Soviet Russia. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Washington, has authored two books on global security issues, and consults widely on security challenges in the former Soviet Union nations.

William Ascher is the Donald C. McKenna Professor of Government and Economics at Claremont McKenna College. With a PhD in political science from Yale University, he focuses his research on development policy, political economy, and political psychology, with regional concentrations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the United States. He has authored or edited 14 books.

Carrie Chorba, formerly associate professor of modern languages at Claremont McKenna College, is currently an executive with a Disney educational affiliate. She received her PhD in Hispanic studies from Brown University. Her research is on Mexican literature, popular culture, and identity. She is the author of *Mexico, From Mestizo to Multicultural*.

John M. Heffron is professor of history at Soka University of America where he also serves as dean of students and associate director of Soka's Pacific Basin Research Center (PBRC). With a PhD in history from the University of Rochester, he focuses his research on American social and political history, the history of education, and U.S. foreign relations and its foreign assistance policy in Asia and the Pacific. He is the coeditor of three PBRC books.

Nita Kumar is the Brown Family Chair of South Asian history at Claremont McKenna College. Her PhD is in history from the University of Chicago. Her research focuses on urbanism, education, community, and research methodology, primarily in India. She has written six books on Indian history, culture, and intergroup relations. She is the honorary director of the Centre for Postcolonial Education, NIRMAN.

John Christian Laursen is professor of political science at the University of California, Riverside, where he teaches political theory and history of political thought. With a PhD in political philosophy from Johns Hopkins University, he focuses his research on European philosophical movements, religious toleration, and the intellectual movements of skepticism.

Huaiyin Li is associate professor of history at the University of Texas, Austin, where he specializes in Chinese village governance, agrarian social and political structure, and villagers' resistance to state control. He received his PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles. He has published two books on Chinese village governance and interactions with the Chinese state.

Charles Norchi is associate professor of law at the University of Maine and director of the Marine Law Institute. He is also a research fellow in the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. His research focuses predominantly on law and nation-building, boundary law, and maritime law. He has extensive experience in Afghanistan and other developing, fragile states.

Lynne Parmenter is professor in the Faculty of Letters, Arts, and Sciences at Waseda University and has also been teaching at the University of Otago in New Zealand. She received her PhD in education from the University of Durham in England. Her research focuses on intercultural education, national identity, and East-West cultural encounters and exchange.

Zhou Yongming is associate professor of anthropology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. With a PhD in cultural anthropology from Duke University, he focuses his area of research interests on globalization, development, political ecology, nationalism, ethnicity, drugs, and online politics. His geographical area of focus is China, especially Southwest China and Tibetan areas.

CHAPTER 1

Rethinking Culture and Development

Patterns of Change and Persistence

William Ascher and John M. Heffron

How do globalization and development strengthen—or threaten—the prospects of cultural persistence and vitality? Under what circumstances do these forces erode the cultural foundations that provide people with the sense of belonging and distinctiveness that protects their pride, self-worth, and general coping skills? Under what circumstances can development and globalization serve the positive function of weakening those cultural practices and beliefs that deprive people of their human dignity? What aspects of culture have the barely recognized capacity to shield people from the positive and negative impacts of globalization or expose them further to these impacts? These are the concerns addressed in this chapter and the subsequent chapters of this volume, with specific focus on the accelerating pace of globalization and our concern to protect and enhance the human dignity of all who are affected by it.

Each of the essays in this volume point to one overriding conclusion: there is a need to rethink the connection between culture and development. Scholars, aid workers, and cultural informants do not only increasingly contest the meanings and significance of these two terms; the connection itself, always a tenuous one, has been further attenuated by new forces of globalization. These forces both shrink and expand individual choices, with potentially fatal consequences for traditional notions of the meaning of culture and development. If we are to explore the impacts of development on culture, and vice versa, we will need to start with a definition of culture that captures the complexity that has made working with the concept so difficult.[1] We recognize there are two levels of

cultural practices and beliefs that are important to distinguish for the analyses that follow.

The broader level consists of all the practices and beliefs that are distinctive in comparison with other societies. Thus, fishing with one type of net as opposed to another is an element of "economic (or production) culture"; believing that a citizen ought to be highly politically active is a form of "political culture." By this broad definition, these practices or beliefs qualify as "cultural" just as much as the forms of dance, music, and visual art that we normally think of as constituting the core elements of a culture.

A second, more narrowly circumscribed level of cultural practices and beliefs is that of arts and language. "Arts" include performance arts, such as dance and live theater, as well as the creation of tangible objects such as paintings, poems, and novels. One justification for distinguishing this relatively restrictive set of practices and beliefs from all the rest is that the critics of globalization often point to the erosion or disappearance of distinctive arts and language practices as a major loss that globalization imposes, failing to notice the larger patterns of persistence. Another justification is that much of the support that goes to preserve culture is targeted to maintaining distinctive artistic and linguistic patterns. Thus, when people talk about "preserving culture" they are typically referring to this narrower conception of culture.

While we can and must make this distinction, it is important to recognize, first, that the boundaries of the narrower definition are not sharp. There is "artistry" in many activities that have primarily material ends, such as culinary arts or how fishers decorate and throw their nets. Moreover, cultural practices and beliefs that do not fall within the category of arts and language often have major impacts on the narrower set. For example, the "political culture" belief of nationalism (however the nation's boundaries are defined) may reduce the attachment to subnational, ethnic arts and language. Or, the shift from one set of economic practices to another may either increase or decrease the time available for people to engage in artistic pursuits. Another complicating factor is that the status of being "within a society" has become less clear. We are all increasingly members of a "global society," while at the same time every individual is of many "societies" and "cultures," some nested within others. For example, not only are Indonesian Chinese part of Indonesian society, but they also have important elements of distinctiveness that warrant recognizing an "Indonesian Chinese" society and culture. Therefore when we speak of individuals with the resources to change "their culture" or "their society," the referent is by no means obvious.

The wide variation in how cultural beliefs and practices can be affected by outside forces is yet another reason for preferring a broad to a narrow definition

of culture. On the one extreme, we can focus on the specific issue of what direct efforts to preserve or change cultural practices or beliefs are justifiable. On the other extreme, we can focus on changes in modes of production, political forms, education, and so on, that will have impacts on both the broad definition of culture as the entire set of distinctive practices and beliefs and the narrower set of arts and language. Somewhere in between these two extremes lays the mundane, day-to-day struggles of a people and its culture to reconcile external pressures to change with internal demands to stay the same—demands issuing not only from its conservative elders but also from its radicalized youths.

Finally, the problem of culture and its definition is complicated by the growing analytical distinction between globalization and modernization, the former tending toward a multidimensional, the latter toward a one-dimensional interpretation of development. The concern over the impact of globalization on values, human dignity, and the preservation of valued cultural practices is not new,[2] but much of the older analysis of intercultural influences in the second half of the past century was understandably preoccupied with the impact of the West on the rest of the world.

The phenomenon of globalization has gained not only enormous scholarly attention in recent years, it has also led to the rediscovery of culture as a unique source of human meaning and purpose, reviving in the process an old debate over the virtues of modernization.[3] This is an important event. It was culture in the Bismarckian sense of *Blut und Erde* (blood and iron) that gave rise to the organic unities of twentieth-century fascism and to some of the greatest crimes against humanity in the history of the world. Race and biology became the watchwords of a nineteenth- and twentieth-century conception of culture that placed it at odds not only with the new democratic faith but also with civilization itself. In the psychoanalytic idiom of the day, culture was a kind of neurosis, the outward manifestation of infantile fantasies of omnipotence and the wellspring of our worst instincts of authoritarianism. In the hands of ambitious leaders, culture became the new legitimacy, both forgiving and permitting everything in its name, while declaring open war against the rule of reason in human affairs.

Modernization, on the other hand, was going to be the great leveler, its uniform set of economic policy prescriptions—"stabilize, privatize, liberalize"[4]—to serve as an antidote to the manifold ills associated with culture: its irrational appeal to narrow group loyalties, exacerbation of race and ethnic hatreds, glorification of "the general will," and suppression of the individual. An urban-industrial order (supported by a scientific, agricultural one) tended over by an army of technocrats whose loyalty was not to any one people or group but to the abstract, transcendent principles of the modern state would hold in check those rash, underworld forces of cultural particularism. Those forces were then

unleashed by romantic nationalism and by a process of decolonization beginning after World War I and extending well into the twentieth century. In its earliest iterations, modernization theory drew heavily on the Western backlash against culture. Much of the earlier literature either turned a blind eye to or dismissed culture as an element of backwardness antithetical to structural growth and development. Perhaps the most representative example of this latter view was Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (1958), which made the ability to achieve "empathy" with the personality traits of advanced Western societies a necessary precondition for modernization.[5]

Not until the publication in 1973 of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's *Tradition, Change, and Modernity* did scholars begin to question the application of a grand theory of modernization, often construed as Westernization, to all cases in the developing world. "It would be wrong," Eisenstadt concluded, "to assume that once these forces [of modernization] have impinged on any 'society' they naturally push forward to a given, relatively fixed 'end plateau.' Rather, as we have seen, they evoke within different societies in different situations a variety of responses depending on the broad set of internal conditions of these societies," culture being, at the very least, one of those "internal conditions."[6] It became apparent to a later generation of intellectuals and policy makers, especially in face of the East Asian Miracle, that the early architects of modernization theory were tilting at windmills. Fears of a generalized, reactionary Kulturkampf were greatly overexaggerated; progress and tradition were not antithetical to one another but rather, in given historical circumstances, could be mutually reinforcing. In *Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns* (1963), the anthropologist Clifford Geertz questioned the wisdom of development planning that "takes place in deliberate ignorance of the very social and cultural processes which it is supposedly concerned to transform."[7] In Marxist terms, the modernization of societies, of whatever form, could no longer separate basic aspects of economic production (the division of labor, property rights, owner-worker relations)[8] from the shape and character of the society and culture built on this base.[9]

Anthropologists and ethnographers have long been interested in processes of cultural change and persistence, but even they have tended to view culture as a closed system and change as endogenous, a response primarily to local rather than translocal forces of influence. Resistance, not accommodation, they maintain, has been the norm in relations between insiders and outsiders. Wherever the latter occurs, disasters await—in the form of alienation, anomie, and cultural implosion. Perhaps the most famous example of this paradigm is Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change* (1945), but it is also found paradigmatically in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler, *Tradition, Values,*

and Socioeconomic Development (1961), and much more recently in Larry L. Naylor, *Culture and Change: An Introduction* (1996). A recent exception to this trend is George Spindler and Janice E. Stockard, eds., *Globalization and Change in Fifteen Countries* (2007). Although sensitive to the ways in which identities are "invented, negotiated, resisted, and lost" in the face of globalization, the editors—as their subtitle, "Born in One World, Living in Another," suggests—nevertheless view development as generally toxic for culture, leading to loss of autonomy, out-migration, and the erosion of traditional rites and rituals.[10]

With the work of such critical theorists as Pierre Bourdieu in sociology, Arjun Appadurai in anthropology, and Amartya Sen in economics, interest in the relationship between culture and development has both deepened and broadened in recent years. Three new edited volumes—Susanne Schech and June Haggis, eds., *Culture and Development: A Critical Introduction* (2000), Sarah A. Radcliff, ed., *Culture and Development in a Globalising Society: Geographies, Action, and Paradigms* (2006), and Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton, *Culture and Public Action* (2004)—cover a large amount of ground. Yet with the exception of the latter work, edited by two economists at the World Bank, the material is largely of a descriptive nature, drawing on the insights into development of such fields as geography and demographics and integrating work in development with cultural studies.

This broader treatment of the significance and impacts of development arises, in part, from the global shift that has changed what development means from a cultural standpoint. Over the past three decades, the particular form of modernization that held sway in the first three or four decades following World War II has given way to the broader and much more complex phenomenon of globalization. In its initial formulation, modernization was essentially a one-way transmission of economic and cultural influence, bringing (and in some cases, imposing) practices and beliefs from the economically advanced countries to the poorer countries. The supplicants to the West for aid, technology, and national security were heavily exposed to Western, and largely American, culture, which was strongly associated with success. Cultural mimicry of the "haves" by the "have-nots" was an understandable reaction in the developing regions, and even in the defeated Axis powers. The Soviet Union, more specifically Russia, developed its own cultural sphere in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, bringing the Russian language, marginalization of religion, and particular modes of social interactions to areas that previously had very different linguistic, economic, political, and social patterns.

In contrast, "global" is far less synonymous with "American" or "Western" than "modernization" was in previous decades. Globalization involves a much more intricate, multidirectional, cosmopolitan pattern of influences. These are driven not only by economic globalization but also by the exploding access

to media and the increasing pace of international migrations. Reggae music originating in Jamaica is popular in India; Buddhism has taken strong root in North America; East Asian languages can be heard all over Southern California; Korean soap operas are all the rage in East and Southeast Asia; Thai action movies are screened all over the world with subtitles in a wide array of languages; Brazilian television comedies are very popular in Mali. This dissemination of cultural influences has the potential to fend off the feelings of cultural inferiority that arise from the questionable logic that economically successful nations must be culturally superior as well. Yet the increasingly syncretic cultural practices that now reflect cosmopolitanism risk losing the appreciation for traditional cultural practices.

The knitting together of the global economy contributes to this risk by increasing the economic advantages of speaking one of the global languages and behaving according to global norms. John Gace warns that "economic imperialism has gone hand-in-glove with linguistic imperialism, as people abandon their mother tongues in favour of the globally dominant English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese and Russian. As a result, hundreds of languages have disappeared in the past 50 years, and experts predict there will be fewer than 3,000 languages [of the roughly 6,000 languages of today] left by the turn of the next century."[11] This is not to condemn cosmopolitanism, which typically carries the potential for greater enlightenment and respect for people of different backgrounds and beliefs. However, when cosmopolitanism leads to the casual loss of cultural pride and distinctiveness, there may be profound regret in the future.

The capacity of people to adapt without losing valuable traditional cultural aspects depends, in part, on the opportunities to adapt in the face of intercultural exposure and exchange. Because of the spread of access to mass media, the pace of cultural exposure and exchange is much more rapid than ever before. Cultural diffusions that used to take decades or even centuries now take place in years or even months. On one hand, this often means that societies have less time to adjust to external cultural influences. On the other hand, it may make the challenges to the existing culture more obvious, thereby increasing the likelihood of efforts to mobilize and defend the indigenous culture.

Unlike modernization, which was largely directed by governments and other institutions of the West, with parallel direction from the Soviet Union, globalization is driven by broad forces that are beyond the control of any government or nongovernmental actors. The impacts on culture are correspondingly beyond the control of most specific actors. Technological diffusion can undermine commercial expressions of culture; for example, the spread of mechanical looms from developed to developing countries has undercut the production of hand-woven rugs. Conversely, the spread of international marketing can revitalize culturally reinforcing production, such as the rise of Navajo artisanship

through new markets in Europe and Asia. High-quality Navajo pottery, jewelry, weavings, and paintings can be found in shops in Bangkok. The cultural diffusion resulting from global migration patterns (e.g., the Chinese and Indian diasporas) have had profound cultural influences far from the origins of the migrating peoples (e.g., the complex cultural mix in Trinidad and Tobago).

Finally, some aspects of globalization actually enhance the viability of less populous countries to retain or recapture their political independence, and thereby at least some aspects of their cultural distinctiveness. "Glocalization"— the capacity of a smaller entity to gain or retain a degree of autonomy because it can enjoy the economic benefits of regional or even global economic integration—has made nations like Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia economically viable by virtue of their membership in the European Union. Computers and other aspects of technology, Thomas Friedman argues, have leveled the playing field for economic and cultural influences.[12] When modernization is understood as the secondary effect of a larger, more inclusive process of globalization, people and the cultures they represent find themselves paradoxically at greater freedom to overthrow old stereotypes, invent new cultural forms, and take full advantage of the social and economic opportunities held out to them by development. People will always seek and take comfort from a "consciousness of kind," especially in the face of such impersonal forces as technology and financial markets. But, as the ten contributors to this volume all demonstrate, each in distinctive ways, what matters to people is not culture (even when threatened with its extinction), and it is not development (even when it would enhance their security and well-being). What matters is that they are heard and respected for their contributions to a world in which each of them is made to feel—locally and globally—that it is theirs both to protect and to create anew.

To return to our core questions of how globalization and development influence the prospects of cultural persistence and vitality: What circumstances erode cultural foundations that contribute to human dignity and general coping skills? What cultural aspects protect people from the negative impacts of globalization or expose them further to these impacts? To address these questions, the Pacific Basin Research Center commissioned ten scholars from a variety of professional backgrounds to identify and analyze illustrative trends and experiences in the dynamic relationship between cultural change and persistence. The intention here is that development scholars and practitioners could benefit from fresh analytical insights as well as a broad comparative framework, taking into consideration countries in and around Asia and the Pacific. Case studies drawn from experiences in China, Mexico, Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Russian Far East, New Zealand, as well as Western Europe and the United States, tell a rich story of accommodation, resistance, acquiescence, and change as development strategies play out against various cultural contexts, contents,

and processes. Contributors to this volume cover a wide range of topics bearing on the theme of cultural change and persistence. They draw on both empirical and methodological studies to do the following:

- Explore the sources of cultural tensions arising from internationalization and "modernization" of societies in Asian and Latin American countries bordering the Pacific Basin
- Assess opportunities for cultural advancement offered by globalization
- Examine ways in which groups and organizations value or assert control over cultural traditions in a changing world
- Demonstrate and measure empirically the processes of cultural transition
- Examine how cultural and social institutions are reshaped to accommodate change
- Illustrate tensions between local and global forces of change and persistence, identifying who or what ultimately determines change

The approach to culture and development taken in this book has more in common with the recent literature coming out of world history and stressing the dialectical nature of cultural encounter and exchange than it does with development or cultural studies per se, even with those professing "alternative" approaches to development. Historians like Jerry Bentley, Philip D. Curtin, Urs Biiterli, and Geoffrey Gunn document a process of contact and exchange between divergent cultures stretching back, by some accounts, as far as two thousand years ago. In these exchanges, they find instances of shared meaning and purpose, systems of deference that would have softened interstate and intercultural contacts otherwise characterized by competition and force, and, in some cases, as Gunn points out, by "outright rejection." The great Viennese economic historian Karl Polanyi was one of the first to point out that historically societies have been ruled less by the logic of markets than by elaborate *economic* systems of "reciprocity and redistribution" and that Economic Man "does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end. Neither the process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every step in that process is geared to a number of social interests which eventually ensure that the required step be taken."[13] The ongoing debate in academic circles over the role of family-based Confucian values in the development process in Asia should warn us that the social basis of production is a reality not only for small, close-knit communities like the ones in Polanyi's study but also for large, modern developed economies like Japan and Singapore as well.

In this respect, the chapters in this volume address an important gap in the development literature, which up until now has either underrated or over-drawn the role and function of culture in the development process, reifying culture itself. They bring a fresh perspective to the culture-development nexus by adducing evidence for the following:

1. Mitigating factors that make development a cooperative enterprise between the objectives of the state and the needs of the village
2. The interplay of formal and informal market mechanisms in efforts to stimulate the economy
3. The role of a strong economy in preserving valued cultural traditions otherwise threatened by globalization

Finally, by placing cultural change and persistence on a continuum that recognizes their parity and rejects any notion that one or the other is more or less conducive to development, the way is cleared for a more nuanced and ultimately more practicable understanding of the complex relations of culture and development.

We are less interested here in the constraints to development posed by particular cultural practices—for example, a respect for ancestral burial grounds that halts construction of a bridge or highway or a kinship system that reduces the free play of market forces—than in how cultural groups and organizations in societies influenced by globalization respond to opportunities and pressures for cultural change. How do these societies create new social values that allow individuals and groups to function effectively in an increasingly interdependent, international society, while protecting valued cultural traditions that give meaning to people's lives? Conversely, how can the persistence of traditional cultural practices serve to facilitate processes of development that might otherwise be seen as compromising or rejecting them altogether?

In today's world, a development nexus of free trade liberalism, fiscal conservatism, and international humanitarianism has limited the ability of any one nation to control the direction of its own change. This also makes culture, as emblematic of what makes a society and its people unique, less accessible to direct analysis and understanding. What anthropologists call local knowledge is no longer possible without an appreciation of the complex web of interconnections whereby the local has become dispersed, divided, and concatenated ("a scramble of differences in a field of connection")—that is, global.[14] All the same, when we discuss the persistence in a culture of certain traditional beliefs and practices, it is with the assumption that these values are still active, that they serve at least as symbolic reference points for real behavior, and that they are strong enough either to resist change or, as John Dewey once remarked, to

change the changes around them. This is especially the case in our age of rapid globalization, when change has become a way of life.[15] Received opinion no longer accepts the myth of a golden age of cultural stasis and equilibrium, what the anthropologist Lucy P. Mair once called the "zero point" of a culture, from which all change is a deviation from the norm.[16]

Change may be the natural state of things, but it also implies, as Malinowski pointed out more than 50 years ago, "maladjustment, deterioration, social strain, and confusion in legal and moral principles."[17] Not simply a one-dimensional response to "contact phenomena"—all the many circumstances that arise when one culture encounters another or multiple others—cultural change, like cultural persistence, is a complex social choice driven by considerations of safety and security, rational calculations of success and survival, even some measure of psychological well-being, and an escape from the overburdening predictability of our responses to things.[18]

Yet cultural change has its necessary limits. At the end of the day, a culture must still be able to recognize itself in the mirror. It must be able to point to those lasting features, those salient practices and ideals without which it stands to lose whatever is unique or distinctive about it, however fungible in its particulars. As anthropologists and historians have shown us, cultures are plastic but not infinitely so. They reach a point of incommensurability with other outside forms or they cease to be self-contained cultures able to provide the myths and theodicies that guide and rationalize group and individual behavior, socialize the young, and preserve and reproduce some recognizable heritage from one generation to the next. Cultural change and persistence are thus deeply interconnected. Neither is change an inevitable result of "modernization" nor is persistence simply a sanction for the status quo. Cultural change and persistence, as Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker conclude based on a study of 65 societies in three successive World Values Surveys, is largely "path dependent." Controlling for such indicators of economic prosperity as GDP per capita, literacy, and occupational mobility, they find the persistence of a cultural heritage in developing countries (and in some developed countries like the United States) that not only nurtures and protects existing (premodern) social and religious traditions but also "influence[s] subsequent development" in ways that a one-dimensional view of modernization would not be able to predict. This is a critical point to understand before we can begin to measure either the impact of development on culture or the developmental implications of culture itself.[19]

The apparent coexistence of continuity and change in the modernization process begs an important preliminary question. Who decides, and based on what normative considerations, what is worth changing or preserving in a given culture? Are decisions regarding this question wholly the province of the people of a given culture? What, if any, universal moral prescriptions, the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, for example, might or might not apply? When is the preservation of a traditional social ritual or custom justified and why? When, on the other hand, is it no longer justified on ethical, legal, or some other grounds and subject therefore to change, transformation, or abolition? In the nineteenth century, Americans fought a bloody civil war to determine this question. Southerners defended the institution of slavery as their sacred right, and Northerners effectively denied them that right. One man's medicine is another man's poison, and in every policy decision, including those impacting the culture of a people, there are always trade-offs. To begin the task of trying to resolve competing claims on cultural change and persistence, Ascher in Chapter 2 introduces a normative framework drawing on the policy sciences tradition pioneered by the political scientist, Harold D. Lasswell.

The problem set by Ascher is that between public-regarding behavior that maximizes human dignity and the right of the people of a given culture to determine, without external coercion, what is of value to them, while acting no less themselves out of public regard. He offers a "guiding principle" for determining whether a change in cultural practices—or, on the other hand, their preservation—is warranted or not: "Efforts to promote cultural preservation or change are ethically justifiable if they are consistent with what enlightened people within that culture would choose, *if* they were fully aware of the full consequences of the continuity/change, were under no coercion, and were acting out of public regard." For Ascher and the policy science framework within which he works, the value and dignity of the individual exists prior to culture, which can add to or detract from human dignity but can never substitute for it. Although it may seem obvious, this is a useful and important distinction. Culture and cultural practices are too often reified in the development literature. In other words, they are given the legal and ontological status of individuals. Ascher and the policy sciences generally resist this trend. "The policy sciences framework introduces the intrinsic value of culture only insofar as individuals and the society recognize this value, and," he writes, "the recognition is widespread."

But for Ascher the process does not stop at recognition. The shaping and sharing of such values as wealth and power, respect and rectitude, knowledge and enlightenment are "the first condition of enhanced human dignity" and essential preconditions of the decision-making process leading to either the change or persistence of valued cultural outcomes. In the tradition of Amartya Sen and others, who argue for the centrality of democracy and grassroots capacity-building in all development work, Ascher predicates lasting and sustainable cultural change on the widest possible spread and sharing of decision-making power in the society. Where there is neither the will nor the experience necessary to mobilize mass opinion or to promote broad engagement in change processes, Ascher cites "constitutive policy"—the funding initiatives, program

goals, operational directives, the whole apparatus, formal and informal, at the disposal of governmental and nongovernmental officials to shape and influence cultural activities—and the positive role it can play in bringing about cultural adjustments consistent with democratic ideals. In the end, given the embedded-ness of culture in people's lives, efforts to promote the change or persistence of valued outcomes are "experiments." The proof of their efficacy lies in the ability to fulfill people's needs and expectations that, even with a change in venue or perspective, do not necessarily go away. For women accustomed to working cooperatively in sewing teams, can assembly line work be organized in such a way, asks Ascher, that it becomes a functional equivalent, conferring more or less the same social benefits?

Whether examining traditional patterns of work, religious practices, or varieties of artistic expression, at the heart of any investigation into the inner-workings of culture and its externalities lies the problem of language. Much ink has been spilt on the complex relations of language and culture. The virtue of John Christian Laursen's speculative essay in Chapter 3 is to link in fresh and suggestive ways Europe's recent encounter with the politics of linguistic diver-sity with Asia's looming problems with its ethnic minorities, which "become wealthier and enter more deeply into the modern world" with each passing day. Certainly, this is the case of the Muslim Uyghurs, where in Xinjiang, China, for example, the discovery of oil and other natural resources has set off unfriendly rivalries between the Uyghurs and the surrounding Han majority now pouring into the region. The proliferating diversity of languages not only in China but also throughout the region contrasts with their relative marginalization from mainstream languages and hence from the sources of an otherwise thriving nationalism. Beleaguered linguistic minorities fall prey to the blandishments of ethnic separatism while government races to put out fires that exist primarily in the imagination of a handful of extremists, fueling a spiraling cycle of ethnic protest and conflict. What, if any, are the European lessons for this growing dilemma in Asia and the Pacific? One of Laursen's conclusions is that like Spain, France, Canada, and Switzerland, where governments have been forced to grant a measure of autonomy to well-organized and vociferous language minorities or risk their outright separatism, countries in Asia and the Pacific may need to adopt bilingual policies or other ways to "renegotiate" the power relations among language groups. This and other types of high-level "language plan-ning," successful in Europe and Canada, would go a long way toward preserv-ing and protecting cultural traditions inseparable from the words and phrases used to valorize them.

When not inscribed in language itself, the trope of "traditionalism" describes the symbols, myths, and histories deployed by elites not only to rally internal constituents but also to rally external support for the values and assumptions

of a particular culture. The mobilization of cultural resources for the larger political and economic purposes of development, especially national development, is the subject of John M. Heffron's chapter on the American South and its reintegration into the United States after the Civil War. The Civil War and its aftermath, argues Heffron, confronted genteel Americans on both sides of the conflict with a frighteningly new array of social and political conditions. There was a new class of robber baron, whose ruthless pursuit of personal profit offended finer, provincial sensibilities. In addition, we saw the emergence of machine and partisan politics, the rampant growth of cities and their subsequent "Romanization" by a floodtide of new (mostly Catholic) immigrants, and the rise of potentially disruptive, though numerically insignificant, groups such as the Populists, the Knights of Labor, and the American Federation of Labor. Although retrograde themselves, the qualities industrial progressives assigned to the South—a rarified Anglo-Saxonism, an evangelical loyalty to God and country, certain sturdy, unrepentant rural virtues—provided an antidote, shows Heffron, to forces in the North that were considered rash, anarchic, selfish, and uncivilized and as such a threat to economic progress and development.

As Northerners gazed into the mirror of the present, with its clash of titanic racial and working-class forces, the South began to look more and more attractive every day. Soon their leaders were worshiping its image openly as a last vestige of republican virtue. In their writings, public addresses, and private asides, they stressed the continuity of the Old and New South and took every opportunity to minimize the basic sectional differences between North and South. As the religious, business, and educational leaders of their respective regions, they formed a loosely organized coalition for the promotion of Southern values and institutions, the goal of which was to reduce to acceptable limits, if not to eliminate altogether, the growing drift toward modernism and all that it implied.

Influential Northerners not only acquiesced in the South's attack on Northern materialism and in the resurrection of the social forms of Southern feudalism after the Civil War and Reconstruction, but as Gunnar Myrdal once noted, they also were "thrilled by them." Yankees, wrote Myrdal, "apparently cherish the idea of having had an aristocracy and of still having a real class society—in the South, so [they] manufacture the myth of the 'Old South.'" This glorified image of the South as standing "at the lead of modern civilization" was in the 1850s part of the face-saving rhetoric of a generation of Southern slaveholders confronted with the prospect of utter moral and economic collapse. Its revival and diversification in the 1880s and 1890s in the religion of the Lost Cause, the New South, and Southern progressivism had more "positive," nominally scientific sources, sources no less solidly rooted in the ancient prerogatives of class, race, and Scripture. Drawing on archival research in the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and in the

Rockefeller Archives Center in Pocantico Hills, New York, Heffron's chapter illustrates how a region of the United States once noted for its social and economic backwardness, the American South, could become instead a moral example of right social relations and a model of enlightened social and economic development. Not only did Southerners fight for the preservation of their most cherished traditions but so also did Northern industrial statesmen, who were eager to balance rapid social and economic development with a new social consensus organized around the certainties of an earlier, more traditional order.

Conservative Americans embraced the traditional South in part out of fear of the effects of mass immigration on an otherwise fairly homogeneous cultural landscape. Mikhail Alexseev in Chapter 5 challenges this "identity threat logic" using the example of Russia, second only to the United States as the world's largest migration state. The "clash of civilizations" discourse assumes that when cultures come into contact with one another, they invariably conflict because of their differences, reflecting the assumption that cultures are uniform and inflexible. The best social science research points to a very different conclusion, according to Alexseev. Ethnic hostility is more generally a result of intergroup threats, competition for valued resources, and comparative social and class inequalities. Tensions also result from inadequate security measures provided by state authorities, as well as from conflicting assumptions of the security requirements of groups themselves. Taking the case of the Russian Far East (RFE), which since 2000 has seen a large influx of ethnic Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese, Alexseev examines the role of social context in the cultural tensions that arise from migration, using the security dilemma framework to test the reliability of confrontationist accounts of ethnic conflict. He compares and contrasts ethnic conflicts in the RFE with those in five other provinces spanning the length and breadth of Russia, finding that in most disagreements it is "not intergroup differentials per se that mattered, but rather a disproportionately strong association of a particular ethnic group with a security threat in a particular province." Chapter 5 then gives us a heuristic for deciding when and under what conditions cross-cultural tensions are actually cultural and not due instead to "anti-migrant exclusionism," low levels of threat management, the states' ability to reduce such threats as terrorism and banditry, illegal settlement, unfair and discriminatory business practices, or population displacement and other "non-group-specific variables." Alexseev's study has the virtue of helping put to rest the assumption that international migration invariably leads to a "class of cultures." Instead, it shows that the social context and security capacities of the receiving state, not the internal composition of a given culture, are the strongest predictors of antimigrant hostility.

Two case studies of China (Chapters 6 and 7) and additional cases studies of India (Chapter 8), Mexico (Chapter 9), Japan and New Zealand (Chapter 10),

and Afghanistan (Chapter 11) illustrate in close ethnographic detail some of the ways in which the larger trends and patterns identified in Chapters 1 through 5 have played and continue to play themselves out today in specific country contexts in Asia and the Pacific. Those patterns include the following:

- A change process mitigated by tensions between public-regarding ideals like human dignity and the fundamental right to self-determination of a culture
- A trend in European countries toward bilingualism and all that it implies for cultural change and persistence in other parts of the world where linguistic minorities increasingly demand either their own autonomy or some form of political recognition by the state
- The need, as highlighted by the example of the American South, to view progress and tradition, *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinscaft,* not as opposites but as elements along a continuum shaped by overarching social and political considerations of "national" development
- As immigration becomes a way of life, the increasing role of the state and of local administrative institutions, in deciding questions of cultural cooperation and acceptance versus clash and conflict

With a view to the interaction between formal, "visible" state and local administrative units and "the invisible subtle group values" operating in Huailu county of Hebei province in the 1920s and 1930s, Huaiyin Li in Chapter 6 focuses on changes to traditional village leadership, both its election and its legitimacy, in the process of modernization. Over the course of the twentieth century, the Chinese state would play a larger and larger role in determining how local village government would function, transforming local interpretations of power and power relation, including the role of leadership vis-à-vis both the village and the state. Based on his research in the county's government archives, Li finds growing "disputes" over the duties and responsibilities of the village head as state institutions imposed themselves between central and local government, questioning for the first time such local standards of legitimacy as one's moral standing in the village or an individual's "virtue." Official regulations instead emphasized "one's proper education, age, and popular support through a formal election." Rather than simply rejecting official qualifications for village leadership, villagers combined them with "personality" and "reputation" in deciding the legitimacy of their overseers, hence, in Li's view, becoming "modern citizens" incorporated into the Chinese nation-state while nevertheless retaining a hold on local conventions. For their own part, village heads continued to play one side against the other, utilizing traditional and modern methods of leadership, acting as either the trusted friend or the faceless bureaucrat as it

suited their purposes (primarily to stay in power). "Peasant reactions to state intervention" ran the gamut from acquiescence to accommodation to anger and resentment, sending modernizing elites down to the present a clear message: the new canons of authority would need to "coexist" with traditional, local ones or fail, as so many efforts at state-building in China had before them.

In Chapter 7, Yongming Zhou turns a lens on minority communities in Southwest China undergoing unprecedented development while becoming showcases for a growing effort in China to preserve and protect traditional cultures. One such innovation is the ecomuseum in which an entire area and its denizens are transformed into a heritage site, a living museum. Designed to conserve local cultures while promoting development through tourism, ecomuseums represent the new official view that indigenous cultures are "assets," not liabilities in the development process. The objects of this new interest react with "strategies of adaptation, resilience and transformation" when presented with official efforts to turn their lives into museum pieces for outside consumption. This can be a double-edged sword for villagers—that enshrines their past even as it seeks to transcend it—in the creation of new hierarchies, competitive practices, and occupational roles. Utilizing the concept of social capital, defined as "the capacity by a group of people to preserve their core sociocultural aspects based on mutual trust and common identity," Zhou shows how local villagers in the two cases he studied have managed nevertheless to turn these exigencies into positive gains for themselves personally and for their values as a community.

The Suojia Miao, a minority ethnic group located at the center of China's southwest province Guizhou and dispersed among 12 local villages, was selected as China's first ecomuseum in 1998. Rarely consulted by experts involved in the planning and design of the ecomuseum, the Suoji Miao played an important role in its execution, organizing themselves collectively around all major infrastructure and restoration projects in the area. When the tourist trade began to take off and the demand increased for Suoji Miao handicrafts, villagers found themselves face-to-face for the first time with the relative anarchy of the free marketplace; frenzied buying and selling practices and the lure of individual profit were beginning to threaten the traditional fabric of their lives. In response, village leaders advocated and won support from ecomuseum staff and villagers for a handicraft cooperative that would set uniform prices and production quotas and distribute profits and income from tourism equally among village household. This example of "bonding social capital" shows the creativity and resilience of a people otherwise excluded from processes of change elaborated from above. They also adopted a view toward overcoming their "backwardness" while acknowledging, primarily as an enticement to tourism, their "culture."

In Zhou's second case, the ecomuseum in Zhenshan, home to another ethnic minority in the region, the Buyi, we see a quite different but no less effective

variant of social capital formation, so-called bridging social capital. This village consisted of 140 households, 29 of which were Miao and 1 of which was Han. To make the ecomuseum work, these different ethnic groups would need to work together. Although, what that would end up meaning was not exactly what the developers had in mind. Culture, they would learn, did not simply reduce to the material culture of buildings, furniture, decorative arts, and other physical artifacts. Culture also describes a mode of social organization, one that is subject to change and persistence as much as anything else. When certain households began to take advantage of exclusive kinship connections to run lucrative lodging houses for tourists to the disadvantage of other less-connected families, community leaders, not unlike in the case of the Suoji Miao, began to cry foul. To address this apparent inequality of access to the economic benefits of tourism, a Management Committee consisting of representative villagers created a random numbering system that would essentially turn the entire village into a single hosting agency. Zhou concludes, "Facing the reality that dramatic changes are brought by modernization and globalization, minorities have to consolidate their bonding social capital to preserve their collective identity and mobilization ability, yet at the same time also to expand their bridging social capital by engaging with the outside change more actively. This should not be a process of cultural submission, but rather a process that enables disadvantaged groups to gain access to more resources, and then to employ these acquired resources to preserve their own social-cultural heritages and to advance their well-being." Not all traditional cultures, however, are equally equipped with either the organizational resources or the level of consciousness to manage change or to protect cherished institutions (reciprocity and redistribution, for example) with the same measure of effectiveness. Sometimes they require the good offices of sensitive and caring outsiders to see and act in their own best interests.

Nita Kumar's chapter in this volume recounts the efforts of Western-trained cosmopolitan Indians of the NIRMAN nongovernmental organization to modify the training and celebration of the Hindu Ramlila festival (reenacting the Ramayana epic of the tribulations and final victory of Lord Rama) by making children the centerpiece of the performances. Their initiative in the north-central Indian city of Banaras (Varanasi) is an effort at adaptation for the sake of revival—in the face of Westernization that is especially attractive to youths. This "Ramlila Project" adapted the observance in order to instill in the children greater self-discipline, broader understanding of the complementarities of traditional and globalized culture, and skills that would enable them to go beyond the ambition-stifling attitudes of their neighborhood. Although the Ramayana text was itself reworked in the sixteenth century from a much more ancient source, in order to revive Hindu observance and identification threatened by the

allure of Islam in the wake of the Moghul political dominance, traditionalists have denounced the current Banaras effort for diverging from the standard casting and observance of the festival performances. However, many people in the neighborhood simply ignore the festival as old-fashioned, while some parents resist permitting their children's participation because of the time commitment.

In the Ramlila case, the rationale for broad decision-making participation—one of Ascher's conditionalities—is less compelling because the NIRMAN organization was not of the Khojwa neighborhood where they established their school and sought volunteers for the Ramlila performances. The neighborhood neither initiated nor financed the Ramlila Project, and, indeed, the rationale for the initiative was that the neighborhood residents were initially not prepared to undertake the NIRMAN-led initiatives. To determine whether their intervention was ethically justified, the NIRMAN activists had to decide whether modernizing the Ramlila observance would strengthen or weaken the respect for the Hindu Ramayana epic, as well as pursuing the developmental goals for the children of Khojwa. The NIRMAN activists recognized that the appropriate approach was to offer—rather than impose—the Ramlila opportunity and to recognize that the initiative should be experimental, evolutionary, and adaptable. If the children's participation becomes too limited to proceed, NIRMAN can allow their Ramlila observance to fail gracefully and try other tacks at merging tradition with modernization.

The NIRMAN case also demonstrates the importance of self-awareness of standpoints. Kumar poses the thorny question facing her and her fellow NIRMAN activists:

> We wanted the people of Banaras to be free in the long-term sense of having social mobility, civic services, modern education, and since they obviously want them, global comforts and consumer goods. But modernity has historically posed a unilateral, monopolistic claim on identity. You cannot be complex. You can only make a simple choice. You can be either modern (and seem to be free), progressive (and an agent of change), or you must be traditional, premodern, rooted, and backward. Of course there were always recognizable exceptions, but those were few and belonged to the elite and the metropolises in the high national arts, business, or politics. (149)

In short, the NIRMAN activists recognized that the residents of Khojwa did not share their aspirations: two world views were colliding. The Ramlila modernization requires sensitivity and self-restraint so as not to impose cosmopolitan values at the expense of undermining the community's self-respect and connection with worthy traditional values.

Loss of culture signifies loss of a particular kind of identity, the values, beliefs, and practices people *identify* with individually and collectively. Carrie

C. Chorba in Chapter 9 explores the role of the arts in the construction of the Mexican mestizo national identity and "the evolving context of this identity" under the pressures of colonization, revolution, and "gringo globalization." We have seen in other chapters of this volume how nation-building can serve variously to incorporate (as in the case of the United States and Russia) or to transcend (as in the case of China and India) the centrifugal pull of local and regional traditions. In either case, national identities are constructed most often from above, by officials of the state eager to create or revive cultural icons that inspire national unity and patriotism. Mestizo culture for Mexican officials represented the ideal amalgamation of indigenous and Spanish cultural and biological differences into a single phenotype, complicated, as Chorba points out, by a history of forced miscegenation between a dominant (Spanish) and vulnerable (Mexican) population. Although desiring to elevate the figure of the mestizo to heroic status as the "emblematic Mexican," the arbiters of cultural nationalism find they cannot have it both ways in artistic representations (in murals and public statues) of the conquest and Mexico's revolutionary origins that depict a mestizo past mired in violence, subjugation, and despoliation.

Chorba analyzes the symbolic content and meaning of half a dozen various works of art produced during Mexico's century-long process of nationalization, including the 1992 cartoon series *El Ahuizotl*. To better understand the tension between realist and romantic renderings of the mestizo past and present, and to capture "the complex and multidirectional processes in cultural transformation," Chorba introduces the idea of transculturation. This process combines acculturation (the assimilation of one culture by another), deculturation (the destruction of a preexisting culture), and neoculturation (the emergence of a new, syncretic culture combining in uneasy equilibrium both the best and the worst of Mexico's conflicted past). Thus, for example, the cartoons of *El Ahuizotl* "conflate" Spanish and North American imperialism, "voicing," writes Chorba, "the deepest fear in Mexico during the 1990s: that the PRI's deteriorating politics, neoliberal economics, and NAFTA would drastically transform Mexico's national identity" (176). Deculturation is a legitimate fear in Mexico, for it has a long and largely successful history. Yet the role of public art as at once a divisive, subversive, and unifying force in Mexican national politics. These politics were rooted in the ambiguities of mestizo culture, but can and have served to allay this fear and replace it with a new tradition, the art of storytelling.

"Culture," writes Peter Worsley, "is not so much a sector of social life, marked off from other sectors—notably the political and economic—but a dimension of all social actions, including economic and political life."[20] Perhaps in no other realm does politics or for that matter economics exert a greater influence on culture (and *vice versa*) than in the realm of educational policy, especially when, as Lynne Parmenter shows in Chapter 10, the policy in question is civic

education. This is in part because educational policy when promulgated at the national level touches so many people's lives. Not only is an entire generation of students affected but so also are their parents, their communities, and society at large. Schools have always served as sources of social reproduction, transmitting more or less intact the values and assumptions of one generation to the next. This is a normal function of schooling and indeed of culture itself. When the state through either its elected representatives or its bureaucratic apparatus arrogates this process to itself, appoints itself guardian over the country's culture or cultures using the physical and legal means at its disposal to enforce its own vision of things, the stage is set for a different kind of socialization. However, this is one that in the name of cultural persistence may produce a form of totalitarianism instead. To the extent that educational policy making is ensnared in state politics, the politics, let us say, of "good citizenship," there is always the danger that schools and classrooms will become, rather than places of learning, sites of indoctrination, whether the doctrine happens to be multiculturalism or ethnocentricism.

Parmenter's comparison of two very public government campaigns in New Zealand and Japan to promote national and global citizenship reminds us that cultural change and persistence are, in just this way, relational terms, contingent as much upon external as internal factors. In the case of civics education, where the impetus may be globalization but the goal is almost always nationalization, we observe two quite different government responses based on the surrounding culture. In the case of New Zealand, it is a desire to better orchestrate the country's diversity; in Japan, it is to better preserve and protect its relative homogeneity. Comparing and contrasting the New Zealand curriculum for grades 1–13 published by the Ministry of Education in 2007 and slated for implementation in 2010 with Japan's revised courses of study for kindergarten through junior high school released in 2008 and in the process of implementation through 2012, Parmenter finds an educational politics driven by indigenous cultural forces yet to be harnessed by a process of globalization that because of wide disparities between the two countries receives a very different interpretation. In the Japanese curriculum, internationalization becomes a pretext for enriching and strengthening ties to local tradition: "In order to develop Japanese people who can be active in international society, we have enriched education about the traditions and culture of our country and students' local regions, so that students will take in, preserve and develop such traditions and culture." In New Zealand where the multiplicity of cultures makes it almost impossible to establish a single, unitary national identity and citizenship, globalization is a convenient peg for educational policies that are necessarily focused on the special needs of different ethnic groups, the Maori and Pasifika students, for example.

One of the most interesting conclusions of Parmenter's study is that while a respect for cultural diversity makes it easier for people to accept change when it is necessary, a focus on culture per se, on the virtues of cultural self-sufficiency, such as one finds in Japan, makes it much harder. In New Zealand this is because, paradoxically, the process of consultation with various cultural groups was long and complex yet led to a set of recommendations that could pass muster with otherwise competing constituencies. In Japan, where discussions were also long and drawn out, they were conducted primarily by educational experts and government officials in a "carefully controlled transparency" designed to provide the illusion if not the substance of broad popular support. As a result, for many Japanese, the memory of the war and of Japan's ultranationalism is still fresh in their minds. The latest government-led exhortations to "love for the country" have a chilling effect that is making the new curricular reforms difficult to accept and implement. The appeal to cultural traditions to promote a particular conception of national citizenship can backfire on government planners when the traditions themselves are increasingly viewed by the average individual as anachronistic, retrograde, or even as much as antithetical to the general welfare. Such are the perils of so-called cultural nationalism. Yet greater perils, as Charles Norchi's chapter on the beleaguered Pushtun culture straddling regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrates, await nationalizers when cultural traditions are so entrenched that change and persistence, as terms of development, have little or no real force. For the Pushtun, whose distinctive ways, customs, and forms of political organization have survived "the dissolution of empires, the rise of states, the ebb and flow of trade and ideas, [and] multiple wars," cultural persistence is a dominant characteristic and change unthinkable.

In 1893, the Amir of Afghan tribes and the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, acting on behalf of British-held India, concluded the Durand Line Agreement, establishing an international boundary separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. That boundary is still recognized today although its effect has been to divide and isolate Pushtun tribes that once lived together over an area of more than 100,000 square miles. Initial British efforts to demarcate the Durand Line, which snaked across a rugged terrain of mountains and valleys for 1,519 miles, met the armed resistance of the Pushtun, who saw themselves being artificially cut off from family and kin. "In these valleys," recalled Winston Churchill, "the warlike nature of the people and their hatred of control, arrest the further progress of development. [They have] an absolute lack of reverence for all forms of law and authority." All forms of British law and authority anyway. The alleged ungovernability of the Durand region ignores, as Norchi shows in telling detail, the elaborate inner mechanics of Pushtun society, where authority and control is "imposed through customary and micro-legal

processes" and by "cultural practices that have the weight and effect of law . . . The real law of the Line is found in the culture of the Line."

Norchi's main concern is the application of traditional norms of international law, especially those governing boundary claims, to what he calls "soft and contested borders." The Durand Line is a classic example of the latter. He worries that these norms, rooted in Westphalian notions of state sovereignty and in such customary principles as *uti posseditis juris* (as you possess, so you possess), reward "stability at the expense of the self-determination, and possibly human dignity, of people." He cites a number of legal cases and opinions from around the world in addition to a growing body of human rights law that have begun to put popular sovereignty and norms of self-determination ahead of state sovereignty. He introduces the elements of a "cultural strategy" in adjudicating boundary claims to ensure maximum recognition to the indigenous rights of preexisting populations. While development assistance figures into this strategy, its chief purpose is to offer protection to traditional forms of law and governance and to safeguard the mobility of family, clans, and tribes across and between borders. A policy of culture first, argues Norchi, not only challenges the territorial integrity of states; more important, it promises to return control over processes of change and persistence to the local actors most affected by them.

Notes

1. Kroeber et al. note at least six major categories of definitions, each with multiple variations. See Alfred Louis Kroeber, Clyde Kluckhohn, Wayne Untereiner, and Alfred G. Meyer, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum, 1952).
2. In a pathbreaking book published more than 30 years ago on the impact of modernization on values in selected Asian nations, Harold D. Lasswell, John D. Montgomery, and Daniel Lerner posit that the adoption of the principles of modernization entails shifts in both value priorities (from respect, rectitude, and affection as the most highly valued indulgences; to enlightenment, skill, and well-being; and finally to power, wealth, and respect) and the *content* of the values within each of these categories. Thus *what* is respected (e.g., asceticism versus wealth or celebrity) as well as the priority given to respect per se shifts in the face of influence from the more dominant "modern"—that is, Western—societies. See John D. Montgomery, Harold D. Lasswell, and Daniel Lerner, *Values and Development: Appraising Asian Experience* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), 11.
3. See, for example, "Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development," Paris: UNESCO (1996).
4. Dani Rodrik, "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's *Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform*," *Journal of Economic Literature* 64 (2006): 973.

5. See Umaru Bah, "Rereading the Passing of Traditional Society," *Cultural Studies* 22, no. 6 (2008): 795–819. "The paradigm," writes Bah, "is based in large part on Lerner's model of development communication, which claims a correlation between empathy—a psychological mindset that enables individuals to imagine themselves as other people in other places engaged in other professions—and modernization, which he interchanges with development," 796.

6. Eisenstadt quoted in Benjamin Higgins, "Economic Development and Cultural Change: Seamless Web or Patchwork Quilt?" in *Essays on Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honor of Bert F. Hoselitz*, ed. Manning Nash (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977), 102.

7. Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963): 156.

8. What Marx termed "base." See Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), translated by N. I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904), 9–15.

9. Marx, in the same work, referred to these more general social and cultural aspects as superstructure; they have some impact on the base, but the causal direction, according to Marx, was largely from the base to the superstructure.

10. George Spindler and Janice E. Stockard, *Globalization and Change in Fifteen Countries: Born in One World, Living in Another* (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadworth, 2007): xx.

11. John Crace, "Silence falls," *The Guardian*, November 5, 2002.

12. Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).

13. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944): 46.

14. Clifford Geertz, *Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000), 250.

15. "The human being," wrote Dewey, "has upon his hands the problem of responding to what is going on around him so that these changes will take one turn rather than another . . . Its activities must change the changes going on around it." See Larry Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds., *The Essential Dewey, Volume 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1999), 48.

16. Mair quoted in Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1945), 27.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 1 (2000): 49.

20. Peter Worsley, "Culture and Development Theory" in *Culture and Global Change*, ed. Tracy Skelton and Tim Allen (New York: Routledge, 1999), 37.

CHAPTER 2

Normative Considerations in Promoting Cultural Preservation or Change

William Ascher

Introduction

Both cultural persistence and change reflect, in part, the broad forces of globalization. For example, consider the decline of handwoven rugs upon the introduction of mechanical looms or the rise of Navajo artisanship through new markets in Europe and Asia. We need only remember that the enormous market for Corinth's striking black-figure pottery was eclipsed in the mid-sixth century BCE by the rise of Athens as a competitor and then the new-style Attic pottery. Yet deliberate and direct human action also shapes how language, religion, artistic expression, and historical memory and interpretation are maintained or altered.

As John Christian Laursen's essay illuminates, language is often central to the persistence or change of ethnic identifications, and therefore it is integral to the entire range of cultural expression related to such identifications. Yet the very complexity of the language-cultural connections makes it difficult to assess the full range of consequences. For example, in 2002, the Malaysian government made English the language of instruction for math and science, reversing more than four decades of effort to develop the national language, Bahasa Melayu.[1] Although Bahasa Melayu was the formal language of the majority Malays, its abandonment as the language of instruction was made with negligible input from stakeholders outside of government. The stated rationale was that the translation of technical articles from English into Bahasa Melayu was falling

seriously behind, reducing the ability of Malaysians not fluent in English to access materials important for Malaysia's technology-based economic development. There is no evidence that the cultural implications of abandoning education in Bahasa Melayu were taken into account. It is likely that the emerging literature, theater, and other language-dependent cultural expressions in Bahasa Melayu will regress.

Even more formidable dilemmas arise for minority languages. For example, activists of the ethnolinguistic Aromânian minority, spread throughout the southern Balkans, have been struggling to retain their distinctive language and culture. In Greece, the government does not officially recognize the Aromânians as a separate ethnic group; as a result of decades of repression, the Aromânians' Orthodox religious services in Greece are now conducted exclusively in Greek. Although there are 29 regional Aromânian cultural associations in Greece, and an annual festival persists, Aromânian identity and language use are quickly eroding. Consequently, conflicts are arising within the group. While some Aromânians have been pressing for school instruction in Aromânian, others are identifying themselves as loyal Greeks who fiercely oppose this initiative. The complications of identity and language are reflected by the astonishing range of estimates of the Aromânian population in Greece: from 50,000 to 1.2 million.[2] Romanian governments—emphasizing the linguistic similarity between Romanian and Aromânian—have complicated matters by occasionally subsidizing Aromânian-language schools in Greece, leading to confrontations between the two countries.

Despite Romanian forays into education in Greece, Romanian governments have not recognized Aromânian as a separate language in Romania itself nor its 25,000 to 50,000 Aromânians as a distinct ethnicity. Some Aromânians in Romania have appealed to the Council of Europe to require formal recognition under the Council's language charter.[3] Other Aromânians in Romania are either fully assimilated or simply uninterested in preserving distinctively Aromânian language, customs, or identity.

The persistence or change in religious practices and beliefs face similar complexities, whether the religion in question is observed by the majority of the society or by a minority. For majority religions, the issue is often whether authorities—typically clergy or government leaders—should enforce observance for the sake of piety, societal unity, the reinforcement of mores, or other motives. Following certain religious precepts can reinforce human dignity; however, when taken to the extreme, can result in the nightmare of Taliban rule.

Within a majority religion, questions of how to engage in religious observance and what objectives ought to be pursued in observance divide coreligionists. For example, in the north-central Indian city of Banaras (Varanasi),

Western-trained cosmopolitan Indians have modified the training and celebration of the Hindu Ramlila festival, making children the centerpiece of the performances. This monthlong festival reenacts the tribulations and final victory of Lord Rama.

This Hindu epic (Ramayana) probably originated in the third century BCE and was put in its current poetic form by the philosopher-poet Gosvāmī Tulsidas in the sixteenth century CE. Tulsidas attempted to revive Hindu observance and identification as the allure of Islam increased in the wake of the Moghul political dominance. Tulsidas wrote the Ramayana in the vernacular Awadhi (related to Hindi) to make the epic accessible to the broadest audience, exemplifying cultural adaptation to promote the survival of belief and practice. The current initiative in Banaras is also an effort at adaptation for the sake of revival—competing with Westernization, which is especially attractive to youths—embracing Tulsidas's verses, but recognizing that the epic has misogynist, racist, and elitist elements. The "Ramlila Project" (described in much more detail in Nita Kumar's chapter) modified the traditional Ramayana religious observance not only to enhance its declining popularity in the neighborhood, but also to transform the perspectives of the children brought into the performances: greater appreciation of the compatibility of tradition and globalized outlooks, greater self-confidence and self-reliance, and higher educational and career aspirations. Although the effort had some strong advocates and enthusiastic participation by many children with the support of their parents, traditionalists opposed it, while others disdained the entire initiative, either because it was still "too old-fashioned" or because of the effort it entailed.

In the case of governmental or majority-religion treatment of minority religions, the commitments to permit the observance of minority religions *and* to avoid exacerbating tensions among religious groups is a painful dilemma in many societies, especially in the wake of the enormous population migrations triggered by globalization. Consider the explosive issue of whether Muslim girls should be allowed to wear headscarves in public schools. A ban on headscarves led to mass demonstrations by the Muslims in Southern Thailand in 1987 that was so serious that it provoked military intervention to quell the demonstrations.[5] In 2002, Singaporean Muslim families challenged the long-standing government policy of prohibiting the headscarf in school, arguing that it is required as an expression of modesty as well as religious observance among Muslims and that the Singaporean constitution guarantees freedom of religious expression.[6] Yet the efforts to mount constitutional challenges to the government's ruling were met with the government's prohibition of some human rights lawyers from challenging the decision, asserting that the challenges could disrupt public order, thus undermining the right of legal representation. The headscarf controversy is not confined to Asia: in 1989, French Muslim girls were expelled

from public schools for wearing headscarves, with the school administrators claiming that the headscarf represented oppression of women and provocative proselytizing.[7] This triggered a bitter dispute, prompting a series of inconsistent court decisions attempting to reconcile the tensions in French secularism between religious tolerance and desire to de-emphasize religious differences. Ultimately, the ban was sustained, deepening the divide between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations.

The promotion of artistic expression raises the question about which forms of expression ought to be promoted. In Japan, the Agency for Cultural Affairs designates particular craft techniques and craftspeople as privileged for cultural preservation and supports them with training and marketing. Out of necessity, the Japanese government's policy of promoting some traditional crafts will raise them above others. Not all crafts or craftspeople will receive these designations as resources are finite. Lesser known, lower volume, lesser "exportable" artisanship is likely to be neglected, and the associated designs, techniques, and artistry are more likely to disappear.

Finally, excruciating dilemmas arise in considering whether memories of an incident or circumstance that have been fading within a society should be reinforced as part of that society's historical heritage, or even whether a long-faded memory should be restored. Especially with respect to painful episodes, the quandary is whether the enlightenment and potential strengthening of identity that may come from recognizing past hardships are worth the risk of heightening animosities toward the groups regarded as responsible for the suffering. The heated debates over whether history textbooks should emphasize past domestic and international atrocities reflect this dilemma. For instance, should Japanese textbooks dwell on the "Rape of Nanking" or the abuses of Korean "comfort women"?

All of these cases demonstrate the complexities of cultural persistence and the dilemmas of cultural preservation. Should the maturation of the Malaysian national language and its artistic and literary manifestations be sacrificed for the sake of Malaysia's economic growth? Is the persistence of the Aromânian language enough of a boon to Aromânians trying to preserve their ethnic identity to justify their estrangement from fellow citizens, whether in Greece or in other Balkan countries? Should today's adaptation of the observance of the Ramlila be preferred because of its potential to enlighten and inspire children of Banares, or is the more traditional version worth retaining? Should the Japanese government promote particular traditional crafts if it hastens the decline of others? Is adherence to Muslim piety and modesty worth deepening the rifts between Islam and other religions, or will permitting headscarves lead to greater tolerance for religious observance?

This essay proposes a normative framework for acting to preserve or change cultural patterns in the face of globalization. The framework is based primarily on the policy sciences approach and the work of Harold D. Lasswell and his many collaborators. While this is not the only possible framework, it has the virtue of avoiding both the cultural absolutism that imposes the observer's values onto other cultures and the relativism that provides no guidance. To do this, we depend on the concept of human dignity, with its specialized definition provided by the policy sciences framework, as the key to the assessment.

Our focus here is largely on the question of how to determine the appropriateness of direct, deliberate efforts to preserve or change cultural patterns, confined to the categories of language, religion, artistic expression, and historical memory and interpretation. We recognize that cultures can also be changed indirectly by the introduction of resources, new technologies, new institutional arrangements or by any other novel element into a society.[8] Yet it is easy to demonstrate that the issue of preserving or changing cultural patterns, even if narrowed in this way, has significant impacts on values that people regard with the utmost importance. We will discover that the imperative of trying to maximize human dignity yields the following guiding principle for determining whether particular efforts to promote cultural preservation or change are ethically justifiable:

Efforts to promote cultural preservation or change are ethically justifiable if they are consistent with what people within that culture would choose, if these people were enlightened about the full consequences of the continuity/change, were under no coercion, and were acting out of public regard.

This is not to say that people need to be enlightened in this way for the principle to hold. The principle presumes that in some cases false consciousness prevails. While false consciousness can be addressed by efforts to enlighten people as to how particular cultural practices or beliefs affect other outcomes that they value, we have to allow for the possibility that some discrepancies will exist. The further implications of these criteria are the following:

1. No cultural practice or belief is intrinsically of value; cultural practices or beliefs are valuable only insofar as they provide people with outcomes that they value.
2. The most direct way to ensure that these conditions are met is to structure a decision-making process that involves broad participation, when this is feasible, for policy decisions that affect the various categories of cultural practices and beliefs. Such processes must be structured to guard against the tyranny of the majority. However, many important decisions resting on private (as distinct from governmental or community) actions cannot involve broad participation.

3. Enlightenment requires a systematic value-impact inventory, which can be greatly aided by using a comprehensive framework for exploring the full range of values.
4. The stricture against coercion should be interpreted very broadly, to encompass social as well as physical coercion.
5. Acting out of public regard entails not only considering the full range of implications on the preservation or change of the practices or beliefs but also providing compensatory benefits for members of the society who are disadvantaged by the actions.

The Scope of Cultural Patterns Considered

The efforts of actors in such positions who are trying to preserve culture focus largely on four aspects: language, religious beliefs, artistic expression and practices, and historical memory and interpretation (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). These aspects may seem limited in their repercussions, but a crucial premise of this

Table 2.1   Potential negative consequences

Linguistic conventions that

- cast speakers of different languages, dialects, or accents as inferior;
- demean particular groups with the terms by which they are referred (epithets are the most obvious means, but even some of the conventional terms used for particular groups are demeaning [e.g., "Tuareg" is the Arabic term for "cast out by God"; "Eskimo" is the Algonquin term for "raw flesh eater"]).

Religious beliefs that

- cast nonbelievers as benighted or evil,
- depict one gender as inferior to the other,
- exclude certain groups from religious ceremonies or roles that they wish to perform.

Artistic conventions that

- discriminate against the participation of women or particular groups,
- demean particular groups by depicting them negatively (e.g., depicting "hill people" or forest-dwellers as primitive).

Historical interpretations that

- exacerbate intergroup conflict;
- cast current generations of members of an outgroup as culpable or inferior based on attributions of responsibility for perceived past offenses against the ingroup;
- overcredit a particular group or elites for accomplishments, thereby reinforcing their greater privilege over others;
- ignore historical deprivations against a particular group that otherwise would warrant redress.

Table 2.2 Potential positive consequences

Linguistic conventions that

- celebrate linguistic diversity;
- mitigate fears of cultural domination by adopting an official language not associated with potentially dominant groups (e.g., the Indonesian government's decision to adopt trade Malay rather than Javanese as the national language).

Religious beliefs that

- assert the fundamental equality of all people,
- emphasize the importance of public regardedness.

Artistic conventions that

- enable the artistic expression of diverse groups,
- provide rewarding markets for artistic outputs,
- communicate the artistic richness of diverse groups,
- heighten awareness of the existence and problems of minority groups that otherwise might be overlooked by policymakers.

Historical interpretations that

- highlight the tragedies of high levels of conflict,
- emphasize the positive contributions of diverse groups.

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analysis is that these aspects of culture can have broader consequences for inter-personal relationships.

We must recognize, however, that some impacts of these various categories of cultural practices and beliefs have *distributional* implications that cannot be labeled a priori as either constructive or destructive. Those whose creations are appreciated stand to gain in terms of wealth, respect, power, affection, or other rewards. If practices wither, the related rewards or intrinsic gratification for engaging in or witnessing them evaporate as well. If a ceremonial dance is abandoned because missionaries condemn it as primitive, lewd, or irreligious, the dancers may lose status, while those engaging in substituted ceremonies stand to gain. Some forms of art come into vogue, while others decline in popularity. Language use evolves; a local language or dialect that had been useful and respected may lose currency, reducing the coping capacity of those most comfortable using it. If the language of conducting official government business changes, career opportunities change.

Efforts to *change* cultural practices may focus on the same four aspects, either to reduce negative consequences or to gain advantage. In addition, the impetus for changing cultural practices and beliefs often lies in the rejection of what the change agents see as dysfunctional interpersonal relationships within the society. These relationships may be exploitative and disrespectful of particular types of people or involve generally negative relationships such as violence,

unconstructive rivalry, and so on. These relationships and practices may or may not stem from the four narrower categories of conventionally defined cultural practices and beliefs. For example, in Colombia the endemic violence is not rooted in language, religion, or art; and although it has historical roots, it is not justified by historical interpretation. Yet Colombia has seen many efforts to expunge the practice of using violence as a means of gaining advantage.

The Scope of Actions Promoting Cultural Preservation or Change

Preserving or changing cultural practices or beliefs can be accomplished through multiple actions. The seven action categories of greatest relevance for this analysis are the following:

1. Organizing practices (e.g., creating dance troupes, establishing minority-language schools, leading religious congregations, and establishing an institute for historical research and education)
2. Funding operations of the institutions and outputs of such practices (e.g., paying dancers or subsidizing the price of admission to dance performances, buying art, financing minority-language schools, making contributions to religious institutions, and financing historical institutes and history museums)
3. Endorsing or condemning practices or beliefs, either by prestigious individuals or institutions or by community members attending, witnessing, or participating (e.g., celebrities praising a dance troupe or large audiences attending its performances, political leaders addressing minority groups in their own languages, clergy denouncing "heretical" beliefs, respected politicians invoking historical interpretations, and people attending historical observances)
4. Publicizing practices or beliefs to potential participants, audiences, funders, and so on (e.g., news media coverage of dance performances or minority-language schools, missionary work on behalf of particular religions, publication of history textbooks emphasizing particular historical interpretations)
5. Prohibiting cultural practices or beliefs by threatening or imposing penalties (e.g., criminalizing "lewd" dancing or shunning the dancers, prosecuting art deemed as pornographic or otherwise "antisocial," branding and prosecuting religious dissenters as heretics, punishing students for speaking minority languages in school, accusing those who articulate nonstandard historical interpretations of being unpatriotic)
6. Creating expectations of high rewards for engaging in cultural practices or holding cultural beliefs (e.g., promising stardom to dancers,

convincing minority-language speakers that the resurgence of their language will dramatically improve their circumstances or lead to prosperity through secession, guaranteeing admission to heaven)

7. Arranging decision routines through which people choose the cultural practices and beliefs to be organized, funded, endorsed or condemned, publicized or prohibited (e.g., establishing an arts council to allocate an arts endowment fund to dance troupes or art lessons, instituting sharia law, creating a commission to determine a language-rights policy; reforming the process by which history textbooks are selected for public schools)

How can we, either as members of a society or as outsiders with some potential for engaging in one or more of these types of actions, act in normatively acceptable ways? For the purpose of this analysis, let us suppose that we could be in one of three roles.

First, we may be outsiders with respect to the society in question but have control over some resources to encourage cultural preservation or change. World Bank officials have supported efforts to secure the intellectual property rights of Senegalese musicians; the U.S. Agency for International Development funds cultural practices in a host of developing countries. Second, we may be government officials of the same nation, with resources to support cultural preservation or change, including perhaps coercive power. The Japanese government officially recognizes particular furniture styles, papermaking, calligraphy, and so on as "Japanese Traditional Crafts" and subsidizes their marketing. Finally, we can imagine ourselves as society members who are comfortable enough with our resources that we can afford to act on behalf of our society as a whole. We may donate our funds to support art or dance schools or lend our prestige to religious groups or to movements for minority language rights.

Human Dignity as Broad Shaping and Sharing of Values

We begin with one fundamental normative assertion and one behavioral postulate. The normative assertion is that we should strive to maximize the human dignity of people over whom we have some influence. Human dignity has a specialized meaning. Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal[9] posit that "'human dignity' is defined as 'shared power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect and rectitude.'" They then make three important clarifications:

1. Because some degree of sharing occurs in every human interaction, "shared value" is to be understood as shorthand for "wide rather than narrow participation."[10]

2. "Sharing" carries two sets of meaning: one "distributive," the other "formative." "The distributive reference is to participation in the control of valued outcomes, described according to the degree of equality or inequality. The formative meaning suggests that the amount of a given value available for sharing may be augmented. In general we are in favor of higher levels of outcome since we are concerned about the size of the cake as well as the proportional size of the slices."[11]

3. "Sharing of power as a value goal included in the overriding conception of human dignity."[12]

In other words, enhancing human dignity for a given population entails ensuring not only that valued outcomes are expanded and widely shared but also that *decision-making power* over these outcomes is widely shared. Sharing power enables the sharing of other values by providing the opportunity for a broad range of people to set the societal outcomes and to make the decisions as to who enjoys these outcomes, whether they are tangible or intangible values. This is a crucial point for distinguishing between cultural practices and beliefs that are freely embraced and those that are accepted because of physical or social coercion. Authority over decision making regarding what values—and hence what cultural beliefs and practices—a society will embrace is a key aspect of power. Therefore the first condition of enhanced human dignity with respect to cultural preservation or change is widely shared decision-making power, when possible.

However, sometimes broad and direct participation in deciding on or participating in the various actions of organizing, funding, endorsing, and so on is simply not feasible. For example, the rationale for broad decision-making participation is less compelling when the actions are undertaken by private actors using their own resources. Sometimes these actions are undertaken at a very small scale, as with the organization of a dance troupe or the establishment of a minority-language school. Sometimes even governmental decisions with obvious impacts on cultural practices are made through institutions of delegated authority that create practical limitations on direct public participation, such as the office within the education ministry that formulates language curricula or allocates funds for religious education. Therefore, when broad and fair participation is not feasible, *we have to find an analytical surrogate for the outcomes that would arise if broad sharing of both decision making and enjoyment of outcomes were possible.*

In summary, if we accept that maximizing human dignity ought to be the core objective of people committed to improving a society, then we need to focus on how to either make our specific decisions by identifying the cultural practices and beliefs that enhance human dignity, or address the challenge of

arranging decision routines such that others will make sound decisions in terms of a widespread, fair sharing of benefits. For example, a "national endowment for the arts" may be structured to include or exclude the cultural interests of minority populations or peoples of minority lifestyles. Regardless of whether we focus on specific outcomes or on the process, we must undertake the analytic exercise of projecting the consequences, and the value of these consequences, to the affected individuals.

Dynamics of Cultural Preservation or Change

To assess the consequences of promoting particular cultural patterns or of promoting decision-making institutions, we need to understand the dynamics of cultural creation, dissemination, and adoption. Four insights emerge from the examples associated with each of the actions described in the previous section.

First, some of these actions entail coercion. We use this term to cover both physical coercion (e.g., threats of imprisonment) and social coercion (e.g., shunning). If we define coercion as a high degree of constraint, due to either expectations of severe deprivations *or* indulgences,[13] then we see that coercion can occur through either threats of punishment or promises of rewards. In other words, choice can be restricted either way. Insofar as we value choice, we must be leery of missionaries who gain converts by promising heavenly rewards as well as those who threaten hell or impose punishments on "unbelievers."

Second, some of these examples demonstrate that cultural change can occur through the displacement of traditional practices and beliefs as nontraditional practices and beliefs become more popular, whether through any of the actions outlined previously. We must recognize the partially competitive nature of establishing the standing of alternative cultural practices and beliefs. A normative stance that demands consensus and pure cooperation over cultural matters would be naïve and normatively unjustifiable. Indeed, its logical extension would be tyranny of the majority. Therefore we cannot and should not expect that "the community" will settle on cultural practices and beliefs en masse; in fact, it is often a healthy process when cultural practices compete with one another and some gain favor over others by virtue of their acceptance by more people.

Third, an important distinction is to be made between taking direct action to preserve or change cultural practices or beliefs and the means by which these decisions are taken. The sixth category of arranging decision routines is on a different level than the rest—what in the policy sciences framework is labeled "constitutive policy."[14] Ordinary policies have direct impact on people—everything from regulations to spending decisions. Constitutive policies serve as the guide on how to make "ordinary" policies: laws on how decisions will be made,

institutions within which people make the decisions on ordinary policy, and the decision routines that they can or must use. For example, establishing a cultural endowment fund in which clergy decide what cultural activities will be supported would be one constitutive policy; another variant would be an endowment fund in which community activists make the funding decisions. In principle, sound constitutive policies can achieve sound ordinary policies "wholesale" by establishing the routines through which the right people, with the right knowledge, can make sound decisions. In practice, projecting the consequences of institutional structures, decision routines, and the designation of decision makers should always be considered as challenging.

Fourth, people may accept or reject cultural practices or beliefs because they are unaware of the full range of positive and negative consequences for themselves, for others, or for both. This can be seen as a rationale for endorsing or condemning cultural practices, whether old or new, by articulating their positive or negative implications. When advocates of engagement in particular cultural practices or beliefs state the reasons to support these cultural patterns, they often invoke transempirical arguments (e.g., this will bring God's favor upon us) or mislead about the impacts on various categories of stakeholders.

How to Proceed

In conducting the analytic exercise, two tools developed by the policy sciences framework prove to be particularly useful. First, a sufficiently comprehensive inventory of the types of values involved must be employed. The policy sciences framework offers eight value categories (power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude) to help explore which values may be at stake in maintaining or altering cultural patterns.

Second, the principle of functional equivalency guides us to search for cultural practices that provide similar rewards along the same value dimensions.[15] For example, affection can be achieved through socializing among women sewing traditional apparel together, but it can also be achieved if the women have similar opportunities to socialize while assembling electronics. Respect can be gained through an excelling in traditional storytelling or by excelling in reciting new poetry.

Now we have to consider situations in which we judge that people cannot determine what practices are consistent with their own interests. In such situations, our commitment to broad sharing of values requires that if we are to promote or require changes in cultural practices, we need to project what people would prefer if they were fully aware of alternatives and their consequences and that they themselves adhere to the principle of widespread sharing of valued outcomes. In other words, the analytic exercise would be to anticipate what

basically well-intentioned, public-regarding people would choose if they had the benefit of full enlightenment about the consequences of their options. Of course, no one ever has full enlightenment, yet the analysis need not assume that people know fully how their actions will turn out. In acting on behalf of the society, we have to take into account the distributional implications of our support for cultural preservation or change because of the dimension of sharing valued outcomes. That does not mean that we have to work toward equal benefits, but we must avoid supporting trends that badly exacerbate the narrowing of benefits accruing from cultural practices and beliefs.

Responding to Possible Objections

It is useful to explore how well this normative framework can stand up to possible objections. One objection might be that the framework does not privilege *existing* cultural practices and beliefs, despite the fact that societies and their cultures coevolve, reflecting decades or centuries of decisions and compatibilities with other aspects of the society's functioning. Our approach does not give standing to culture per se; it is neutral in the abstract whether cultural practices or beliefs ought to be preserved except insofar as they provide valued outcomes to individuals. One could imagine a different perspective that gives cultural aspects an intrinsic value, the way we may accord species or existing cultural artifacts the right to survive. Should cultural practices be respected by virtue of their statuses as part of humanity's heritage?

The policy sciences framework does not accord standing to entities other than individuals for several reasons. For one thing, the question of how much standing any particular aspect of culture should be accorded, beyond the fact that some individuals—whether typical citizens, cultural critics, or anthropologists—demand it, cannot be determined. It has long been recognized in the environmental valuation literature that the only definition of value that permits measurement is the value that individuals find.[16] An individual's assertion of the importance of a cultural practice or belief is an expression of his or her values. The policy sciences framework introduces the intrinsic value of culture only insofar as individuals in the society recognize this value, and this recognition is widespread. This position guards against the danger that dominant actors will assert the standing of national pride, ethnic purity, and other constructs that would have destructive impacts on members of society.

The second objection might be that cases will arise in which broad participation in the *shaping* of values by selfish or benighted people will lead to severe deprivations for some members of their society. It is true that broad participation in the shaping of valued outcomes is a requirement of human dignity, but it is insufficient unless the result is broad sharing of valued outcomes. The

broad sharing (i.e., fair distribution) of valued outcomes is a necessary condition. Therefore our criteria would lead us to reject supporting cultural patterns that privileged, non-public-regarding individuals would support in order to gain benefits at the expense of others.

A third possible objection is that significant participation in the shaping of values is simply not something that large numbers of a society's members desire. Should we pose widespread sharing of decisions as a goal if the society is essentially in agreement that decision making on establishing societal values and providing benefits in accordance with these decisions should *not* be widely shared? People may be disposed to defer to the decisions of government leaders, village elders, priests, or others "in authority." By "authority" we mean the power based on acceptance of the legitimacy of the decision makers by stakeholders; they expect that the decisions will be, and deserve to be, accepted. One could imagine that if priests prohibit marriages outside of the religion, people would "willingly" comply even if the prohibition is inconsistent with their preferences and value commitments beyond the value of complying with the authority.

A distinction regarding the levels of decision will help to address this objection. Recall the policy sciences distinction between "ordinary policy" and "constitutive policy." Ordinary policies directly determine the nature and recipients of wealth, well-being, skill, enlightenment, affection, respect, and rectitude. Yet because constitutive policies establish how ordinary policies are made, they influence the distribution of power and thereby other valued outcomes: "The decisions which identify and characterize the different authoritative decision makers, specify and clarify basic community policies, establish appropriate structures of authority, allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize procedures for making the different kinds of decisions, and secure the continuous performance of all the different kinds of decision functions . . . necessary to making and administering general community policy."[17] Therefore if the community supports *how* decisions are made, they share power at this higher constitutive level, even if their decision is to eschew power over ordinary policy.

In addition, the assessment of the whole range of valued benefits would reveal that *if* narrow decision making in shaping values leads to serious deprivations of what the broader population desires, then the arrangement can be considered problematic. Imagine, for example, that the priests decide that certain people should not be permitted to participate in religious rites and that everyone, including those excluded, acknowledges the priests' authority to make that decision. Yet assuming that participation in the rites would provide gratification for anyone permitted to participate, we can still say that the excluded individuals are denied the opportunity to share the valued experience, even if they acquiesce to the way this denial came about. In other words, narrow shaping of values

can be considered problematic if it leads to narrow sharing. Yet for the scenario in which the priests of one religion decide that only coreligionists should be allowed to participate in the rites and all individuals of other religions not only accept the authority of these priests to exclude them but also would secure no gratification from participating in the rites of that religion, there is no basis for finding the narrow shaping of the value to be problematic.

A possible fourth objection is that in some cases our analysis will not converge with judgments of the bulk of the members of the society. People may hold certain values that we would regard as problematic because we somehow know that these values lead to practices that reduce their overall maximization of their valued outcomes, even defined in terms of their current values and priorities. We may be convinced that greater benefits, more widely shared, would result from actions to preserve or change cultural practices, but where does this leave our observance of wide shaping of values? Under what circumstances should we say that these problematic values ought to be changed?

It would seem that if we choose to try to preserve or change cultural patterns against the judgment of the affected people, we would have to invoke the embattled concept of "false consciousness." Yet as far as the society members who are not public regarding are concerned (i.e., are not themselves in favor of widespread sharing of valued outcomes), we are at odds with them in any event; and for those who are public regarding, we are projecting that enlightenment (i.e., clear understanding of consequences) would result in preferences that reflect a balance between individuals' own interests and their respect for the interests of others. To be sure, we would attribute false consciousness to public-regarding individuals who would oppose the actions our analysis calls for, yet it is a "practical false consciousness" in that if we are correct, then more complete knowledge of outcomes could change their position. We are not assuming, as does the Marxist notion of false consciousness, that new values have to be inculcated for people to appreciate their "true" position in the economy and polity.

The fifth objection might be that wide shaping and sharing of values is simply not relevant for many aspects of culture, because relatively small numbers of society's members are involved or affected. It is certainly true that many cultural practices are confined to small groups: a localized artists' group, a choral group reviving traditional folk songs, a not-for-profit crafts marketing company. The support or endorsement of these practices cannot hope to conform to wide shaping or sharing of values.

This objection can be addressed by clarifying that "widespread" must be understood as relative to the span of potentially affected individuals. Sharing in decision making and enjoyment of benefits can be "widespread" in a society of two people if both are adequately involved in both shaping and sharing.

The sixth and final possible objection would be that our analytic capacity might be inadequate to anticipate consequences with adequate accuracy. We can interpret this concern as a legitimate caution against going beyond the limits of our knowledge—a caution that holds for any discretionary action. It may well be wise to apply an equivalent to the precautionary principle that applies to actions with possible environmental impacts.

Conclusions

The concept of human dignity, defined as the broad shaping and sharing of values, provides a compelling set of considerations and criteria for sorting out which cultural practices and beliefs ought to be promoted. The phrase "shaping and sharing of values" is deceptively simple. It requires either broad and fair participation in decision making or, alternatively, decisions that are projected to have the same outcomes if fair, enlightened, and public-regarding people had made the decisions. It also requires broad sharing of the benefits that people value, taking into account possible changes in what people will value as they become more enlightened. We may be able to contribute to human dignity by enlightening others about the consequences of cultural patterns, but this presumes that they would care about the broad sharing of valued outcomes. A more decisive approach to encourage the right cultural practices and beliefs by preservation or change may be to establish institutions and promote processes, such as routines to decide how to allocate money from cultural endowment funds and to make decisions that are likely to further human dignity. This is feasible as long as the processes are conducive to both identifying how cultural preservation or change can enhance or damage the interests of all stakeholders and give authority to individuals committed to a fair balancing of the interests of all. Another approach is to engage in direct promotion of cultural preservation or change. This is feasible to the degree that we can reliably analyze the consequences and therefore obviously requires a sober assessment of our analytic capacity.

Notes

1. See Saran Kaur Gill, "Reversing Direction: Language Policy in Malaysia," *Language Policy* 4, no. 3 (2005): 241–60.
2. Anonymous, "The Vlachs," *Greek Monitor of Human & Minority Rights* 1, no. 3 (1995), http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/vlachs.html.
3. Aromânian Community of Romania, policy statement to the European Council, Bucharest, October 3, 2005, http://www.scd-lunjina.org/dokumenta/free/Policy_statement_-_The_Arman_Community_from_Romania.pdf.

4. Nita Kumar, in her article in this volume, notes the aspiration of the initiative is to "teach [the children] to know themselves better, to be more knowledgeable about their surroundings, and to think more clearly about their future."

5. Chaiwit Satha-Anand, "*Hijab* and Moments of Legitimation: Islamic Resurgence in Thai Society," in *Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1994), 285–89.

6. Kam-Yee Law, "The Myth of Multiracialism in Post–9/11 Singapore: The Tudung Incident," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 5, no. 1 (2003): 51–71.

7. See Claire Saas, "Muslim Headscarf and Secularism in France," *European Journal of Migration and Law* 3 (2001): 453–56.

8. Consider the introduction of sewing machines into a society that previously relied exclusively on hand sewing. Perhaps the women in a village or urban neighborhood had spent much time sewing together, socializing at the same time. Perhaps the introduction of sewing machines will reduce the time devoted to family-related sewing and reduce the opportunities for socializing; or perhaps the women will become involved in sewing for commercial purposes, changing their statuses within their communities. The respect for those who are skilled at hand sewing may decline, while the respect for those who are skilled at using and maintaining sewing machines may increase. In short, the introduction of new resources or technologies can trigger a cascade of changes in behavior and social relations that can alter practices and beliefs. These consequences are often simply byproducts, or unintended consequences, of the introduction of resources, technologies, or institutional arrangements. They are also often highly uncertain.

9. Harold D. Lasswell and Myres McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy* (New Haven, CT: New Haven Press, 1992): 740.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid, 741.

13. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1950): 95–96.

14. Lasswell and McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a Free Society*, 1509–25.

15. This is not the same as the functional equivalency across different societies or technologies, although the basic concept of functional equivalency is shared. See H. G. Barnett, "Invention and Cultural Change," *American Anthropologist* 44, no.1 (1942): 14–30.

16. A. Myrick Freeman, *The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2003).

17. Lasswell and McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a Free Society*, 28.

CHAPTER 3

"Old Times There Are Not Forgotten"

Southern Traditionalism and
American National Development

John M. Heffron

This chapter takes its title from Daniel Decator Emmett's song "Dixie's Land" written, legend has it, one cold and dreary evening in 1859 from the songwriter's apartment in New York. "I wish I was in Dixie" became almost overnight a national sensation, its protagonist, an ex-slave, by turns extolling and eulogizing the virtues of the Old South. Lincoln sang it on the campaign trail but so too did Jefferson Davis at his inauguration as president of the Southern confederacy. The song reached its peak of popularity in the half century following the Civil War, one Northern journalist claiming in 1908 that "it was the most popular song in the country, irrespective of section."[1] The words on Emmett's gravestone, laid 20 years after his death in 1904, convey the song's enduring contribution to "the romance of reunion," which by the end of the nineteenth century had replaced the bitter sectional rancor of the postbellum period, when the memory of the war was still raw and the old hatreds still ran high.[2]

> To the Memory of Daniel Decatur Emmett
> 1815—1904
> Whose Song "Dixie Land" Inspired the Courage and Devotion of the Southern People and Now Thrills the Hearts of a Reunited Nation.[3]

In our time, in the wake of the American civil rights movement, "Dixie's Land" has become for many a despised symbol of the age of slavery, its singing,

not unlike jingoistic displays of the Confederate flag, a rebuke to the hard-won gains of desegregation and racial equality.

The nationalization of "Dixie" and its refrain, "I wish I was in the land of cotton. Old times there are not forgotten," suggests something important, however, about American attitudes toward progress and development at a time, the period between 1897 and 1914, when the country was fast becoming the richest and most powerful nation in the world. Already by 1900 the United States share of world manufacturing output was 23.6 percent, surpassing the leader Britain's 18.5 percent. By 1913 its share had climbed to 32 percent compared to Britain's 13.6 percent. Its financial institutions, the most heavily capitalized in the world, provided the monies for an emerging industrial empire that would incorporate not only the American continent but also large parts of the rest of the world. From combined assets and resources of $9 billion in 1899, the American banking community grew to a total liquidity of nearly triple that amount in 1911.[4]

With a national income in 1914 of $37 billion, the United States was already far in advance of most of its European and Japanese trading partners. Paul Kennedy provides a brief vita of the economic credentials of the Great Power that nevertheless "stood on the edges of the Great Power system," preferring to remain above the fray but also distracted by its own mounting domestic problems.[5]

In 1914, the United States was producing 455 million tons of coal, well ahead of Britain's 292 million and Germany's 277 million. It was the largest producer in the world and the greatest consumer of copper. Its pig-iron production was larger than those of the next three counties (Germany, Britain, France) combined, and its steel production almost equal to the next four countries (Germany, Britain, Russia, and France). Its energy consumption from modern fuels was in 1913 equal to that of Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary together. It produced, and possessed, more motor vehicles than the rest of the world. It was, in fact, an entire rival continent and growing so fast that it was coming close to the point of overtaking all Europe.[6]

Galvanic changes in the industrial and financial sectors of the economy were both cause and effect of a vast movement of people and resources into America's already crowded cities. By 1910 a greater proportion of Americans (20.3 percent) lived in cities than any of the other Great Powers of the time (Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, and Austria-Hungary), an indication of the growing significance of its urban-industrial centers and conversely of an increasingly attenuated rural life, once a defining feature of the American experience.[7]

Coinciding with America's rapid economic advance was the rise of a series of social and political reform movements, loosely described as progressivism,

aimed at both facilitating and controlling what for many had become no longer simply the fact but *the problem* of growth. Urban-industrial "progress," as the economist Henry George reminded readers in 1879, could just as easily produce poverty as wealth, social and political instability as stability. As William Graebner has written in connection with the rise of democratic social engineering, "to be effective the new system would have to mesh with basic American values." Those who presided over the economy understood the country's need for orderly change that would balance the demands (and dislocations) of modernization with America's most cherished traditions. Notwithstanding its recent transgressions, for many of these people, the South's traditional rural character, its paternalistic system of race relations and Anglo-Saxon folkways, even its religious orthodoxy stood for what was best about, and best for, America. The survival of Southern cultural traditions, as conservative and in some cases reactionary as they were, posed no threat to the plans of corporate progressives; indeed, as we show here, it facilitated them.[8]

So completely did Southern boosterism find its way into the rhetoric of American nationalists at the turn of the twentieth century that we need to revise the accepted view of the "Northernization" of the South. Northernization occupies a central place in the historiography of the Civil War and its aftermath, one that cuts across otherwise conflicting Whig, liberal-progressive, and revisionist accounts of the Reconstruction period. It depicts a prostrate South that, for good or ill, was "open game" to the ambitions of Northern businessmen, educators, and politicians; a South that, despite a strong self-identity, was powerless to shape its own destiny or to overcome the influence of the North. Compared to the conservative solidarity of the South, the North's own emerging consensus was an allegedly more liberal, progressive, and humanitarian one.

More recent research suggests that the standard view of Northernization is inadequate for understanding the complex, dialectical forces that governed regional relations in the postbellum era.[9] The flow of Northern aid and philanthropy south after the Civil War was not the divine commission historians have depicted it to be, in which Northern liberals, seething with moral indignation, attempted to "impose" a superior value system on recalcitrant ex-Confederates. In the first decade of Reconstruction, superiority, either moral or cultural, may have been a popular illusion in the North, but it was never a reality. When we look at what the South stood for to the Northern men and women who stayed in the region, weathering the rise and fall of Reconstruction and with their confidence in Southern institutions setting the stage for a new set of national reforms, there is a sense in which it is possible to speak of the North's incipient "Southernization." For despite an antiquated social system inherited from slavery, a historical bias toward limited government and single-party politics, and the South's especially virulent brand of Anglo-Saxon rural and religious

fundamentalism, there were growing numbers of Northern progressives who by the end of the nineteenth century seemed to welcome the rise of the New South. Faced with considerable problems of their own, they saw the region and what it had come to symbolize as an important counterweight to centrifugal tendencies in the North. The most disturbing of those tendencies are familiar to any student of fin-de-siècle America: the predatory individualism of the robber baron; the "inefficiency" of machine and partisan politics; the rampant growth of cities and their subsequent "Romanization" by a floodtide of Southern and eastern European immigrants; and the rise of such potentially disruptive, though numerically insignificant, groups as the Populists, the Knights of Labor, and the American Federation of Labor. Although retrograde themselves, the qualities progressives assigned to the South would provide an antidote to forces in the North that were considered rash, anarchic, selfish, and uncivilized. It seemed there were elements of the old plantation society that even as they were fading in the South took on fresh meaning and significance in the North, becoming, as James C. Cobb writes, "not just compatible with but almost integral to the establishment of a new industrial one." Cobb concludes, "Regardless of who ruled the late nineteenth century South, the prevailing core of reactionary, socially insensitive policies that characterized the era was far more likely to please than to put off the industrialists who were pursuing Southern locations."[10]

The Civil War and its aftermath confronted American reformers on both sides of the conflict with a frightening new array of social and political conditions. As they gazed into the mirror of the present, with its clash of titanic racial and working class forces, the Old South began to look more and more attractive every day. Soon some Northerners were worshiping its image openly as a last vestige of classical republican virtue, with its injunctions to reason, moderation, and disinterested benevolence. In their writings, public statements, and private asides, they stressed the continuity of the Old and New South and took every opportunity to minimize the basic sectional differences between the two regions. As the religious, business, and educational leaders of their respective regions, they formed a loosely organized coalition for the promotion of Southern values and institutions, with the goal of reducing to acceptable limits, if not eliminating altogether, the growing drift toward modernism and all that it implied.[11]

Edwin De Leon describes the unification of North and South as an inevitability in his important essay "The New South: What It Is Doing and What It Wants." "Each successive day," he wrote, "blends and bends more ultimately together the lives and fortunes of the two."[12] Mississippi Democrat Wiley P. Harris opposed any trend toward "sectional seclusion," calling for a permanent alliance between the "grand old party" and liberal Republicans. "We are in a

new world," he said. "We are moving on a new plane."[13] Complaining in 1905 of what he called "Northern sectionalism," Edgar Gardner Murphy, the progressive educator from Alabama, noted a tendency to see the problems of the South as peculiar to the South rather than as issues "between Americans everywhere."[14] Writing of the country's "single and inclusive fate," Murphy called on his fellow progressives to bring into being "a new North as well as a new South."[15]

Rhetoric alone, however, would not be enough to overcome the lag between economic modernization and cultural stability that was at the heart of so many of the North's difficulties. What was needed was a new disposition altogether toward the twin forces of progress and tradition, one that would recognize them not as separate but as interlocking objects of social and economic development. Here too the South seemed to supply the requisite view of things. For the historian U. B. Phillips, at once a critic of white supremacy and an apologist for the disenfranchisement of the freedmen, this paradox was the essence of the Southern experience. Conservatism and progress, according to Phillips, "are not essentially antagonistic. Conservatism need not be of the Bourbon type, never learning and never forgetting; the spirit of progress need not be exaggerated into radicalism," a reference to the nihilism of the free market system of the North. David R. Goldfield, in his study of the agrarian roots of Southern urbanization, sees progress and tradition as "two sides of the same Southern coin." This equilibrium, as Eugene Genovese has pointed out recently, impressed itself upon Northerners in the one area in which their own more divided system seemed least likely to succeed, the area of race relations.[16]

"The Sunny Side of Slavery": Antebellum Sources of Progressive Reform

The stabilization of race relations in the decades following the Civil War drew heavily on the same proslavery religious rhetoric that only a few years earlier had rent them irreparably asunder, bringing racial progress in the country to a bloody standstill.[17] The theological foundations of slavery, laid in the 1850s by such Biblical exegetes as J. H. Thornwell, Thornton Stringfellow, and George Fitzhugh, as it turns out, were deeply embedded in the national psyche, deep enough to withstand the most serious bombshell of the war, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. With relative impunity, black peonage persisted in the South in the growth of farm tenancy, in the working ambivalence of Southern elites toward the free-labor system, and in the infamous black codes that restricted African Americans' civil rights. Finally, it persisted in the transformation of the antebellum plantation into a modern business organization in which ex-slaves and slave owners enjoyed relations "best characterized," writes

Jay Mandel, "as paternalistic in which deferential attitudes are exhibited by the group which is dominated and quasi-aristocratic norms are accepted by the elite."[18]

It is one of the ironies of Reconstruction that by the time conservative Southern Democrats (known as "Bourbons") launched their counterreformation against the North, conducting a great "war of ideas" against "the Yankee magna bona of money and display" and resurrecting in large areas of the South the plantation economy of the past, Reconstruction as a political movement threatening the South's traditional way of life was already dead. Against such an attack, ex-abolitionists were no longer able to take the higher moral ground, saddled as they were with their own considerable political problems in the North. Nor were they any longer in a position, guilty now of their own excesses, to protest allegations of Northern plutocracy or, worse, to see in them the reemergence of the social and economic forms of antebellum feudalism. In fact, Yankees, wrote Gunnar Myrdal, "apparently cherish the idea of having had an aristocracy and of still having a real class society in the South, so [they] manufacture the myth of the 'Old South.'" Yankees recognized in the Southern planter class many of the same qualities they themselves aspired to as successful merchant capitalists. Although a closed society, backward socially and economically in the eyes of the world, the South in its antiquated form held a special place in the developmental plans of the urban-industrial North; the qualities that made it unique and distinctive were to be preserved, not squandered away in assimilation. Every loss of distinction in the South, they came to believe, would only translate into another victory for the renegade values of the industrial Northeast, values like self-help and laissez-faire individualism. Southerners had long argued that these values were essentially undemocratic and un-American. By the 1900s, not only "Yankees" but also such muckraking Northern journalists as Lincoln Steffens, Ray Stannard Baker, and Ida Tarbell began to repudiate them as well.[19]

Yet the question remains, how did antebellum proslavery thought, and its transformation after 1865 into a cult of paternalism, contribute to the growing dialogue between Southern conservatives and Northern liberals?[20] For, as the Southern historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown has remarked, "literary justifications of slavery were not just hymns of praise for a changeless primordial society, but rather a stirring appeal to place the South in the forefront of modern life itself, an effort that required not only a new regional self-consciousness but also concrete demonstration of just, humane, and morally uplifting techniques of patriarchal management."[21]

In emphasizing the moral and social responsibilities of a master class and in downplaying the historical significance of individual rights, the proslavery argument reinforced an even older "service ideal," one reflected in classical

republican doctrines and marshaled at the end of the nineteenth century to support political movements like civil service reform. With the rise of a new stewardship in politics, industry, and education, the slave system of the South would become an important "historical precedent" and "a guide to future action."[22]

The Reverend J. H. Thornwell, one of the leading cognoscenti of the antebellum slave South, was prescient, locating the resurgence of the proslavery argument in the battle of democracy against anarchy and licentiousness: "When the tumult shall have subsided and reason resumed her ascendancy, it will be found that the very principles upon which we have been accustomed to justify Southern slavery, are the principles of regulated liberty – that in defending the institution we have really been upholding the civil interests of mankind – resisting alike the social anarchy of communism and the political anarchy of licentiousness – that we have been supporting representative, republican government against the despotism of the masses on the one hand and the supremacy of a single will on the other."[23]

Members of the Southern planter and professional classes, including educators, ministers, doctors, and civil servants, perceived the South's ascent from slavery to freedom as following a single, unbroken progression, Providential in its design and in its dispensations. With God's sanction and the hands-off policy of the North, ex-Whig planters, for example, could maintain the class relations of slavery, keeping blacks dependent and subordinate, employ the most advanced business methods on the plantation, and yet use their political power to block the growth of manufacturing in their region, all without the slightest contradiction.[24]

Master and slave, far from being adversaries, were "of one blood." Although they filled different stations in life, nevertheless, they sinned equally and sought equally "the great redemption." In Thornwell's mind it was a "malediction of the world" that saw exploitation where none existed, needlessly pitting brother against brother.[25] In a skillful circumlocution around the three-fifths rule, Thornwell argued that slavery was "a relation of man to man . . . not a relation of man to things." To suggest that slavery has or ever could divest a man of his humanity or his freedom, qualities that "come from God, not from man," was a "blasphemy"; the property of man in man—"a fiction." No higher an authority than St. Paul had spoken in favor of slavery defined as a system of reciprocal rights and obligations. In keeping with Biblical sanctions, Thornwell and other proslavery writers depicted the peculiar institution as nothing more or less than "a social and political economy, in which relations subsisted betwixt moral, intelligent, responsible beings." The mission of the South, they argued in the years leading up to the Civil War, was to preserve that relationship for "the security of social order and the development of humanity."[26]

Addressing fellow Southern émigrés in 1910, New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson described the "strange combination" in the South of individualism and social solidarity as essential to "a free and a vigorous and united people." The dominant planter and merchant classes of the New South and a growing number of progressive business leaders in both regions found much to admire in Southern traditions. In the North, they helped shape industrial paternalism, in which workers would benefit (as Fitzhugh once said of slaves) by "continuous intercourse with masters of superior minds, information, and morality." In the South, they reinforced social and economic practices that the war had made obsolete but that were now coming back into national focus, not as the same hard realities that had plagued both sections before and after disunion, but rather as new fictions to soothe and clothe those realities.[27]

Surveying the educational scene in 1905, Edgar Gardner Murphy could rejoice in the sight of the South having finally achieved, after what seemed years of nothing but vilification, its "genuine moral and intellectual leadership." In the South's "sense of responsibility toward the unprivileged" and in its liberation of the common man from the chains of feudalism lay "the true basis of the new nationalism" and the "real basis of the new democracy." Paternalism, wrote Murphy, was the Old South's "noble and fruitful gift," not only to the New South, but also to a "New North" as well.[28]

The South's "protective philosophy" inherited from slavery, its cult of Anglo-Saxonism, and a scientific morality that incorporated religious sanctions against miscegenation with scientific ones against intemperance[29] helped to galvanize the progressive reforms of the early twentieth century. In the 1920s, Southern regional concerns came to occupy a much larger national canvas in the form of Prohibition, resurgent nativism, and religious fundamentalism. As Southerners became increasingly aware of their influence in the North, they no longer hesitated to exploit it for whatever political capital they could, promoting the values of their region and its quintessential "Southernness" while stressing the compatibility of those values with all that was fundamentally American. In the North they organized themselves into fraternal societies like the New York Southern Society, the Confederate Veteran Camp of New York, and the Association of Southern Democrats. "The heart of these societies was tradition," writes their chronicler, "they were dedicated to serving the South and to preserving Southern values and traditions." Yet it was not only "as a means of locating themselves in the present" that ex-Southerners embraced the past. In large urban-industrial areas like New York they found themselves living in an oddly congenial environment, one sympathetic to their traditions and open to their views. In 1893 the New York Southern Society boasted a membership of 1,500, making it the largest fraternal organization in the city and, although composed exclusively of Southern men or the children of Southerners, one of the city's most popular.

"Although still aware of its sectional identity a half century after Appomattox," writes the historian John Lee Eighmy, "the land of Dixie consciously identified itself with a national reform era." What is less often recognized is the extent to which the nation looked southward and to ex-Confederates living in the North for the moral guidance, direction, and leadership no longer available to it in the North.[30]

Race Education for All

The South's dual system of schools, one for whites and one for blacks, is a case in point. At a time when Americans of English descent feared the adulteration of their race by "Negroes and hordes of foreigners," the question became, as one Baptist minister put it in 1889, whether "we shall mould and civilize them, or they shall corrupt and overrun us."[31] Aware of this dilemma and of the need to preserve their own Anglo-Saxon heritage, Southern educational leaders actively sought to make their region a national showcase of racial purity. With the Compromise of 1877 and the return of home rule to the South, they began to invite Northern educators, businessmen, and politicians to view the South's segregated school system. Southerners traveled north to lecture upon it. Ex-Confederates everywhere now argued for "Americanization" with the same involuted logic and missionary zeal they had once brought to the defense of slavery, combining Americanization and proslavery into a single analysis of the problems of the nation and the South's role in solving them. Not only did they seize the leadership of the nativist movement from weak-willed New England Brahmins and ex-Transcendentalists, but they also forged its more conservative elements—native-American proletarians and Southern poor whites—into a popular crusade against the entire spectrum of non-Protestant, nonwhite America.

Northern visitors to the South in the early twentieth century, including a young John D. Rockefeller Jr., received some of their most positive and lasting impressions of Southern schooling at Virginia's Hampton and later at Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute.[32] What Northern men of influence knew as the "Hampton-Tuskegee idea"—the two schools constituting a regional showpiece of Southern black moral and vocational education—helped to define a distinctly Southern paternalistic style in politics, religion, and education. "If I wanted to do the North the best service known to me, I should take the Hampton and Tuskegee kind of education and scatter it through every state north of the Mason and Dixon's line. Your need of this," John Graham Brooks, president of the National Consumers League, told his Southern hosts at the Conference for Education in the South in 1904, "is also our need. In nothing will the North and South win a spirit of sustaining friendship and good-will more surely than

in meeting together these common needs."[33] What, we may ask, were these "common needs," and what made Hampton—the first and arguably the most famous of a growing number of agricultural and industrial schools serving the Freedman—so well-equipped to satisfy them? What were those features of the school that, according to the ex-Harvard president and educational reformer, Charles W. Eliot, had by 1904 gained "remarkable" and "rapid introduction . . . into our urban school system," earning the school broad distinction as "The Twentieth-Century Type of Education"?[34] Finally, what sense does it make to talk about universal race education (race education for all) when the most downtrodden racial groups in the United States at the time—blacks, Indians, Chinese, and Native Hawaiians—were struggling under educational conditions that were markedly inferior to those of the Anglo-American majority?

The Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute opened its doors in 1868 and was chartered by the state of Virginia in 1870. The school was among the first devoted to a demonstration of the method of learning by doing, with the belief that the salvation of the black race would have to be "won out of the ground. Skilled agriculturalists and mechanics are needed," wrote the institute's founder and first president, Samuel Chapman Armstrong, in 1872, "rather than poets or orators." In the school's first brochure Armstrong states the general plan of the institution, where "in the Home or the Farm, and in the School room, the students have the opportunity to learn the three great lessons in life—how to live, how to labor, and how to teach others." The three-year course of study offered, in addition to ordinary school branches, lectures on agriculture and agricultural chemistry; instruction in bookkeeping and other practical business methods; a course in political economy, decrying "communism" and stressing "the utmost amity" and "the most reciprocal relations" between capital and labor; and a "Daily Order of Exercises" beginning with a full military-style inspection at 5:45 a.m. followed by a regimen of prayer, field and shop work, and study ending at 9:00 p.m. Students were trained at Hampton to go out into the rural country schools of the South as industrial supervising teachers to help introduce work in cooking, sewing, manual training, agriculture, basket making, bricklaying, tinsmithing, and other domestic and mechanical arts.[35]

This "little army" of Hampton graduates was to become, in Armstrong's words, "a guild of earnest, high-minded, united and powerful workers to be formed as a nucleus of civilization, and in connection with a similar class from other institutions, become a basis of hope for the race; they will be civilizers rather than mere pedagogues, the future leaders of their race, and occupy a place not yet taken."[36] The goal of race education was never assimilation, a possibility cut off for most Americans by the rigid color and class lines of the period. The goal was moral uplift, self-help, and economic independence; it was character development and community building within the constraints of

a labor economy and under the broad umbrella of evangelical Christian ethics. The Northern philanthropists, missionaries, journalists, and progressive educators who supported this "New Education" brought its message of material and spiritual uplift to the United States as a whole in the declining years of the nineteenth century, arguing with Eliot that the system of manual labor exemplified by Hampton and Tuskegee "should be part of school or home education for everybody." The rapid influx of eastern and southern Europeans into the major urban centers of the industrial northeast may have fueled America's rise to industrial supremacy, but the new labor migrations had also, according to one typical nativist account of 1904, "lowered our standard of living, bred discontent, and brought elements that are utterly un-American in ideas and aspirations into our community." The spread of Hampton's brand of race education with its reformist moral and industrial functions and with its focus on the practical requirements of orderly and productive Christian living would have positive repercussions "along the entire social line." James Leloudis offers the view of one Southern schoolman of the time: The South, he argued, had taken the "Negro and brought him under the sad tutelage of slavery to the portals of civilization. It [would] now take him again in the equally sad tutelage of freedom, and lead him up higher and higher, even until he stands side by side with the white man, his equal, if God has so decreed." According to Leloudis, "Northern [educational] philanthropists responded to those words with enthusiasm, in large part because the Southern approach to race matters worked to soothe their own anxieties. At home, that approach could be used to guide the assimilation of burgeoning numbers of foreign immigrants; abroad, it might be equally effective in shaping America's new dominion over peoples of color in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines."[37]

The impact of Hampton and Armstrong's educational ideas extended, however, beyond those blacks and other oppressed groups most directly affected by the system. Combining the rhetoric of uplift with a salvational message stressing the "dignity of labor" and the value of honest industry, the Hampton-Tuskegee idea became the model for a civilizing Christian educational system that presumed to "save" everyone, white and black, rich and poor alike. The wave of curricular reforms that swept through the nation's high schools from 1896 until the end of World War I, although not attributable exclusively to Southern influences, drew in significant ways from the region's example of economic retrenchment, occupational schooling, and racial separatism. Calls for economy in education, for courses in agricultural and other trade subjects, and for "special kinds of training to different kinds of children"—all prosecuted in a growing atmosphere of paternalism and anti-intellectualism—corroborate the traditional South's large, often stultifying presence in the annals of modern American education.[38]

The Yeoman Myth, North and South

Another central prop in the South's racial caste system, in addition to education, was its ideological defense of agriculture as a way of life.[39] Industrialization, although well under way in the South by the beginning of the twentieth century, had yet to become the violent, bitterly divisive issue it was in the North. Indeed the South remained an agrarian society, and that was precisely part of its attraction to Northern business leaders worried about the explosive implications of rapid social change. Northern educators, who shared these worries, could take comfort in the identification of Southern education with agricultural uplift. Schools like Hampton and Tuskegee as well as growing numbers of free white schools were bringing to the farm, by way of the farm child, the latest scientific methods and improvements. In return, the farm continued to supply the young with such important virtues as thrift, patience, industry, and deference.

It was not only Northern businessmen and educators who wanted to help preserve this system; Southern educators and farm groups like the Grange also wanted to preserve it, fearing the growing influence of city living and urban-style education. When Roosevelt set up his Commission on Country Life in 1908, Worthy Overseer Nahum J. Bachelder of the Grange recommended a "Commission on City Life," in which farmers would undertake the job of uplifting "legislators, governors, trust magnates, stock gamblers, railroad wreckers, and rich malefactors."[40]

Disillusioned by many of these things themselves, Northern educators advocated the addition of agricultural courses to the urban high school and normal school curriculum. They introduced nature study in the elementary grades and general science in the first year of secondary school. They strove to make occupational training an early and important part of the urban schoolchild's education. In all this, they hoped to transfer to the comparatively desolate urban landscape some intimation of the more naturalistic hues and contrasts of country life.

"Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens," wrote Thomas Jefferson. "They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous." Let the manufactures of Hamilton, modeled on the workshops of the Old World, remain in the Old World. America, Jefferson warned James Madison, must not admit them to her shores, lest "we shall become corrupt . . . and go to eating one another as they do there."[41] Jefferson's early critique of cities and industrialism found fresh meaning in the politics of the New South and in the growing belief of Northern businessmen and educators that the process of urbanization, instead of extending democracy, had led rather to its excess, admitting to the franchise a large, landless proletariat that threatened to use the vote for its own selfish, ultimately revolutionary purposes.[42]

In 1897, the National Education Association (NEA) released its Report of the Committee of Twelve on Rural Schools, a Jeffersonian hymn to the virtues of agriculture. Among the 12 was Francis W. Parker, principal of the Cook County Normal School in Chicago and former superintendent of the famed Quincy Schools, a man John Dewey once called the "father of progressive education."[43] Three years in Germany with the followers of Johann Herbart, an autodidact of the practical, taught Parker that "the essence [of education] is the teaching of things and not words alone." In the American countryside, on "the good farm, intelligently managed," Parker discovered "the necessities of life, the comforts of home, the possibilities of an education." Objecting to the unhealthy character of urban life and schooling, he called for "vital reinforcements," reinforcements that "must always come from the sturdy stock of the farm." He recommended the establishment of school gardens or farms run on a remunerative basis by the pupils. He wanted to bring "the measuring necessary for the farm into the classroom" as an aid to instruction in elementary arithmetic. Finally, he urged urban educators to do at least as much as their rural counterparts had done to unite school and home life, to "bring the farm into the school, and project the school into the farm."[44]

Reforms in agricultural, industrial, and science education focused increasingly on the rural school child, subjected to a curriculum that emphasized nature study, farm efficiency and productivity, health, hygiene, and homemaking. Science teachers attending the annual NEA convention in 1913 were told that corn plants and "cuts of beef" could be used to teach the first principles of physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, and physiology. "A close correlation of agriculture with science," according to Josiah Main, "is necessary to the salvation of [all the] sciences in the high school." The progressive educator and publicist Scott Nearing hailed the new agricultural arithmetic in the South, commending to educators the example of "boys and girls standing at the board computing potato yields, milk yields, the content of granaries, the price of bags and the cost of barns and chicken houses."[45]

What appeared as innovations in the North, however, were commonplace in the South. In order to compensate for chronic shortages of books and basic school supplies, educators had long had to rely on extension work and on the farm garden and household. Features of rural life that fired the imagination of Northern progressives were taken for granted in the South. As Northern philanthropists came more and more to appreciate the South, they saw the importance both of reinforcing its distinctive way of life and of using it as a model for educational reform in the North.[46]

For Walter Hines Page—"the Southerner as American" in the words of his biographer—agriculture and Southernness were one and the same.[47] When he advised President Woodrow Wilson that as soon as "the country man comes into

his own, the town man will no longer be able to tax, and to concentrate power, and to bully the world," he was writing from his conviction in the strength and fiber of the Southern character.[48] Page's advice would not have fallen on deaf ears. The civilizing mission of the South in American history had long been one of Woodrow Wilson's favorite subjects, the old ideals of honor and chivalry still surviving, he believed, in its agricultural traditions. In 1903, Wilson congratulated a group of nearly four hundred exiles from Dixie that their fundamental values were "nearer to nature" than those of Easterners, whose values were the cold, impersonal ones of the financial world. "We have got to get down to thinking not in lithographical securities, but in crops; not in stock quotations, but in the products of the earth." Keeping the farm boy and girl on the farm was essential to the preservation of an agrarian order that according to Wilson expressed "what in some unusually vivid way belongs to all Americans."[49] No group understood this better or undertook the job with more zeal or energy than the General Education Board (GEB). Founded in 1902 by John D. Rockefeller, the GEB employed a number of Southern expatriates in key administrative positions. Working in cooperation with the country school and church, the board did more than any other educational agency in the country to rescue the small, independent farmer in the South from myth and superstition and his wary attitude toward anything "scientific." Between 1906 and 1920, the board set aside nearly a million dollars for farm demonstration work in the South.[50]

The GEB's Rural Education Program: Science and Southernness in the Nation's Service

In the eyes of the board, Southern education and agriculture formed a single agency for material and moral uplift. Education would bring to the farm, by way of the farm child, the latest scientific methods and improvements. The farm, on the other hand, would bring to the education of the child such virtues as thrift, forbearance, and industry. A practical science education dispensed by trained professionals, yet rooted in the everyday experiences of farm life, would serve as a model for Northern industrial education at the same time that it kept the country boy and girl on the farm and the Southern black on the plantation.

Keeping the ex-slave within the borders of the South was a major objective of the board's rural education program. The board proposed to involve the farm children in raising their family's earning capacity by using them as a channel for all the latest findings of scientific agriculture, and it proposed to do the same for the black children and their families. But proper schooling would do even more. It would raise the freedman's pride in race and region, improving his physical condition through the eradication of hookworm, his economic

condition through agricultural and industrial training, and his moral condition through the catechistic study of the Bible.

In 1921, at the request of the American Baptist Home Mission Society, an organization active in Southern education and mission work, the GEB conducted a confidential survey of the science teaching in 13 Baptist-affiliated black schools in the South. George Ransom Twiss, a professor of science education at Ohio State University, was appointed to conduct the survey.[51]

Twiss's report stressed the "disciplinary and cultural values of science." Identifying the subject matter of science with "all human experience," Twiss defined the task of the science teacher as the inculcation of "ideals of methodical procedure" directed toward the recognition and solution of "life problems." Through science it would be possible to bridge the mental training received in separate studies with the "generalized habits" of adaptation, order, economy, and system necessary to produce Twiss's "socially efficient individual."[52]

Twiss feared that the Southern black colleges might be getting away from this standard. Thus Virginia Union University emphasized academic excellence and personal achievement but gave too little attention to vocational guidance. Its curriculum was "subjective and theoretical rather than objective and experimental." The girls at Hartshorn Memorial College in Richmond were taught science in a purely deductive fashion, without reference to "the problems of everyday life" or to "the solution of the vital problems of hygienic living." Here too Twiss recommended more vocational training, more home and recreational economics, and more practical civics, in which the girls learned the importance of social harmony and cooperation. At the Colored Normal, Industrial, Agricultural and Mechanical College of South Carolina, he complained that the course in chemistry was too "informational and factual" and that "too few thought questions and problematic situations" entered into the design.[53]

The trouble with the private black schools and colleges, according to critics like Twiss, was that they were more interested in becoming Class A institutions than in meeting the immediate practical needs of the African American people.[54] Their teachers were more interested in the kind of education and in teaching the kinds of subjects found in private white schools than in giving blacks the vocational training they would need to "survive" in the real world. Black as well as white educators criticized black schools in these terms. The president of a black agricultural and mechanical college declared, "The Negro is a farmer and on the farm he will naturally spend the best part of his energies in the cultivation of the soil. He has hardly come within the outer rim, within the mere twilight, of the age which most loudly calls for the engineer, the chemist and the biologist, for the microscopist and the laboratory, the drawing board and the workshop. He is in the rude agricultural stage of development."[55] And there he was to remain, casting his bucket down on the same ground where his

ancestors had once worked, soil and soul joined in ancient kinship ties as old as the earth itself.

The yeoman myth and its promise of salvation appealed to conservative black leaders not because it offered a way out of rural backwardness and impoverishment but because it seemed to redeem these things from a much greater source of recidivism, the values and assumptions of modernity itself. When middle-class whites in the North rallied to the pastoral ideal, it was because they too deplored the kind of cosmopolitanism that Teddy Roosevelt, for example, feared would "[train] boys and girls away from the farm and the workshop," filling them with fanciful ideas and ruining them for productive labor. The South was showing the way, at schools like Hampton and Tuskegee, educating black children for life on the farm and as Christian ministers and teachers to their race.[56]

Conclusion

The sanctification of paternalism as a mode of social control was one of the outstanding legacies of the Southern slave system. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had entered the American vernacular, becoming a kind of local knowledge preserved in its purest form by veterans of the lost cause, broadcast abroad by transplanted Southerners in the North, and institutionalized in the reforms of educational progressivism. The Baptist background and Southern affections of the two most financially powerful figures in educational reform, John D. Rockefeller and his son John D. Jr., helped to assure that the quasi-religious, paternalistic voice of the South would not go unheard or unheeded. An archetypal South in which the virtues of a simpler agrarian past were "reasserted . . . with a vengeance" was soothing medicine for the troubles and headaches of a nascent industrial order. The image of the Southern country man, his head "bloodied but unbowed," not only inspired sons and daughters of Dixie living in the North but also came to express what, according to Woodrow Wilson, the country's first Southern president since the Civil War, "belongs to all Americans."[57]

However, bringing the South's semifeudal agricultural economy up to modern scientific and business standards, while preserving the region's traditional class society, was not to be an easy task. The greatest obstacle to the spread of education and scientific enlightenment in the South was the crop-lien system, a system of debt-peonage cutting so deeply that any talk of mechanization must have seemed abstract indeed. Still, the farmer's misfortunes made him a receptive audience for the histrionics of the New South's religious, educational, and agricultural leaders.[58]

According to Drew Gilpen Faust, agricultural orators were able to reinforce in audiences made up largely of poor, often-desperate farm owners and workers, a sentimental attachment to the soil far out of proportion to its real dollar value. They accomplished this in two seemingly contradictory ways: by enlisting "rational knowledge" in support of a vision of agricultural progress and by identifying the soil with the longevity and persistence of peculiar Southern institutions. Their importunings, together with those of a growing group of "scientific" evangelists, helped to carve out a place on the farm for scientific methods and dogma without sacrificing traditional piety or embarrassing farmers too poor to pay the price of improvement.[59] A superstructure of science and technology, often more imaginary than real, settled over the Southern farm and its religious and rural folkways. As Faust writes, "The paean to rational knowledge that appeared in every agricultural address . . . was ordinarily cast in what the twentieth century would regard as curiously unscientific terms. The orator hoped not only to associate agriculture with both past tradition and future progress but also to unite religion with science into a single legitimating framework . . . In agriculture, the speakers suggested, lay the means of reconciling not just science and religion but traditional morality with the alluring materialism of the modern age."[60]

Agricultural orators were able to elevate the Southern farm, a rather sorry affair in reality, plagued by declining grain and cotton prices and rising production costs, to the forefront of modern life (as proslavery apologists had once done for slavery), while at the same time defending the authority of an antebellum land-owning elite against the leveling forces of urbanization and industrialization. But perhaps the one place where agriculture demonstrated its hegemony most convincingly was in the Southern country school. No longer an anachronism, the country school had become a mighty "engine of progress," a progressive institution not only reinforcing the South's traditional values but also introducing newer, scientific ones as well.

It was not simply that North and South developed a "culture of conciliation," as one historian has put it, in the aftermath of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Conciliation has an air of submissiveness that fails to capture the aggressive way in which Northern business and educational leaders, in the cause of the nation's social and economic development, studied, monitored, and ultimately co-opted characteristic elements of traditional Southern culture. This includes a "spiritualizing" rural culture, which, even as it was fading in the South, became a template for the new agricultural education in the North.[61] It includes an industrial culture designed to uplift poor whites no less than poor blacks, one that took its lead from the Christian ethic of work as redemption, not the Republican one of free labor. And it incorporated a paternalistic system of race and ethnic relations with a religious culture that, in opposition to the

Christian secularism and godless materialism of the North, offered a gospel of spiritual rebirth. The high point of Southern folkways took place at a time when American industry was growing at an accelerating pace, producing not only vast new sources of wealth but also new forms of organization and workplace management—the corporation, mass production, and scientific management. Progress was widening the gap between rich and poor, spawning crowded and congested cities, and creating the conditions for civil conflict and unrest, while pitting labor against capital in a war of all against all. Securing the acquiescence of Northern workers to the dominance of employers would require a respiritualization of cultural traditions that stressed self-help rather than social activism, faith rather than victimhood, home and hearth rather than the picket line or the street. Powerful foundations supported this view, the GEB alone with some $324 million to shore up public education, support agricultural extension, and "harness the powerful motives of religion to the educational chariot."[62] The South may have lost its battle to save slavery but, with its industrial allies in the North, it was winning its war to save the soul of America, putting the country back on a path of growth and development that would be steady, secure, and relatively free of the burdens of the present.

Notes

1. Howard L. Sacks and Judith Rose Sacks, *Way Up North in Dixie: A Black Family's Claim to the Confederate Anthem* (Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press, 2003), 156.
2. See Nina Silber, *The Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1993), title page.
3. Lawrence E. Abel, *Singing the New South: How Music Shaped the Confederacy, 1861–1865* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000), 46.
4. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 202 and Arthur S. Link, *American Epoch: A History of the United States since the 1890s*, 3rd Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 51.
5. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 248.
6. Ibid., 243–44.
7. Ibid., 200.
8. See Henry George, *Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry Into the Cause of Industrial Depression and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth; the Solution*, 50th Anniversary Edition (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1939) and William Graebner, *The Engineering of Consent: Democracy and Authority in Twentieth-Century America* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 16.
9. According to Carl N. Degler, we are moving toward a more symbiotic view of North-South relations. See his presidential address to the Southern History Association in 1987, "Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis: The South, the North, and the Nation," *Journal of Southern History* 53 (1987): 3–18.

10. James C. Cobb, "Beyond Planters and Industrialists: A New Perspective on the New South," *Journal of Southern History* 54 (1988): 55. See also William N. Parker, "The South in the National Economy, 1865–1970," *Southern Economic Journal* 46 (1980): 1019–48 and Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 60 (1967): 292–346.

11. Conservative writers who sought to minimize the sectional differences between the North and South include Walter Hines Page, Edgar Gardner Murphy, Booker T. Washington, Woodrow Wilson, Charles W. Eliot, and Robert C. Ogden. Men of both sections organized themselves into such groups as the Southern and General Education Boards, the Southern Sociological Congress, and the New York Southern Society. See, for example, Donald E. Sutherland, "Former Confederates in the Post–Civil War North: An Unexplored Aspect of Reconstruction History," *Journal of Southern History* 67 (1981): 393–409, and his book-length treatment, *The Confederate Carpetbaggers* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1988). Walter Hines Page, *The Rebuilding of Old Commonwealths* (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1902), Edgar Gardner Murphy, *The Problems of the Present South* (New York: MacMillan, 1905), and Raymond B. Fosdick, *Adventure in Giving: The Story of the General Education Board* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) are among the best contemporary accounts.

12. De Leon and Harris quoted in Paul M. Gaston, *New South Creed: A Study in Southern Mythmaking* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 33.

13. Ibid., 42.

14. Edgar Gardner Murphy, *Problems of the Present South*, 23.

15. Ibid., 201. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of national unity, how congruent actually were the beliefs of Northerners and Southerners? Edward Pessen goes back to before the Civil War for an answer in "How Different From Each Other Were the Antebellum North and South?" *American Historical Review* (1980): 1119–49.

16. Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, "Conservatism and Progress in the Cotton Belt," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 13 (January 1904): 2; David R. Goldfield, *Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers: Southern City and Region, 1607–1980* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1982), 11; Eugene Genovese, *The Slaveholder's Dilemma: Freedom and Progress in Southern Conservative Thought, 1820–1860* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1992).

17. The phrase appears in Mary F. Armstrong and Helen Ludlow, *Hampton and its Students* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875), 95–100. The man of the North, they argue, "has missed the stern discipline of an experience which, terrible as it was, has developed a strength and a stamina, a religious sentiment and character in his enslaved brother which his weak-natured race could never have otherwise gained" (96).

18. See in Drew Gilpin Faust, ed., *Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830–1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1981) the chapters excerpting the writings of Stringfellow and Fitzhugh. See also Reverand J. H. Thornwell, *The Rights and Duties of Masters* (Charleston: Walker and James, 1850). Jay Mandel quoted in Harold D. Woodman, "Sequel to Slavery: The New History Views the Postbellum South," *Journal of Southern History* 43 (November 1977): 548. Mandel is echoed in Charles E. Osler, Jr., *The Material Basis of the*

Postbellum Tenant Plantation: Historical Archeology in the South Carolina Piedmont (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1980) and in Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, "Capitalists Without Capital: The Burden of Slavery and the Impact of Emancipation," *Agricultural History* 62 (1988): 133–60. Pete Daniel carries the story up to the recent past in *The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901–1969* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1972).

19. Gunnar Myrdal quoted in Gaston, *New South Creed*, 179. The best account of the antebellum South as a closed society is John H. Franklin, *The Militant South, 1800–1861* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956). See Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., ed., *The Southerner as American* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1960) in which ten Southern historians argue that the liberal traditions of American nationalism are to a considerable degree Southern in their origins. William R. Taylor identifies a "Yankee-Cavalier dialectic operating in American cultural speculations" in *Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and the American National Characters* (New York: George Braziller, 1961), 225. See also Woodrow Wilson's speeches and addresses to the New York Southern Society in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson¸* vol. 15 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), 68–69 and vol. 22: 188–96; Page, *The Rebuilding of Old Commonwealths*, 139; and Edward A. Pollard, *The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates* (New York: E. B. Treat and Company, 1867), 750–51.

20. Only in the last decade have historians begun to examine the broader social dimensions of a Southern ideology of human bondage, an ideology developed, it is now believed, less in response to mounting abolitionist sentiments in the North than to uphold the veracity of Scripture against the inroads of "pseudo-science" and to maintain against the presidential politics and democratic excesses of Jacksonianism, a federated system of government based on states' rights. Larry Edward Tise argues that many of the conservative principles of Federalism were perpetuated in the proslavery argument in his *Proslavery: A History of the Defense of Slavery in America, 1701–1840* (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1987). In Winfred B. Moore, Jr., ed., *The Southern Enigma: Essays in Race, Class and Folk Culture*, *Contributions in American History*, no. 105 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), George M. Fredrickson observes that the Southern social order, representing the last bastion, not only of federalist principles, but also of relative racial harmony, was "a possible model for the American future" (103). See also his *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) as well as John David Smith, *An Old Creed for the New South: Proslavery Ideology and Historiography, 1865–1918* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985) and Donald Spivey, *Schooling for the New Slavery: Black Industrial Education, 1868–1915* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), two studies that bear out this interpretation. For an analysis of the Christian sources of slavery and their perpetuation, see Jack P. Maddox, Jr., "The Southern Apostasy Revisited: The Significance of Pro-slavery Christianity," *Marxist Perspectives* 11 (1979): 132–41.

21. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, "Modernizing Southern Slavery: The Pro-Slavery Argument Revisited," in *Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann*

Woodward, ed. J. Morgan Kousser and James McPherson (New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1982), 29.

22. Faust, *Ideology of Slavery*, 12, 1–20. See the same author's "A Southern Stewardship: The Intellectual and the Proslavery Argument," *American Quarterly* 31 (1979): 63–80.

23. Thornwell, *Rights and Duties,* 12.

24. Gilpin Faust, ed., *Ideology of Slavery*; Harold D. Woodman, "Sequel to Slavery: The New History Views the Postbellum South," *Journal of Southern History* 63, no.4 (1977): 523–54 reviews the literature on this particular point.

25. Thornwell, *Rights and Duties*, 14, 11, 15.

26. Ibid., 19, 29, 23, 21, 15. For a fuller development of this argument see Edmund Rufen, *The Political Economy of Slavery* (Washington, DC: L. Towers, 1857).

27. Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 22: 1911* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), 189; Fitzugh quoted in Faust, *Ideology of Slavery*, 293; see the section on proslavery in Dan T. Carter, *When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865–1867* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1985), ch. 5 and in Spivey, *Schooling for the New Slavery: Black Industrial Education, 1868–1915* (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2007).

28. Murphy, *Problems of the Present South*, 263, 17, 16, 21.

29. See Jonathan Zimmerman, *Distilling Democracy: Alcohol Education in America's Public Schools, 1880–1925* (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1999).

30. The phrase "protective philosophy" is George Fitzhugh's from an article in *DeBow's Review* in 1857, quoted in Faust, *Ideology of Slavery*, 276; Daniel E. Sutherland, "Southern Fraternal Organizations in the North," *Journal of Southern History* 53 (1987): 588, 589; John Lee Eighmy, "Religious Liberalism in the South during the Progressive Era," *Church History* 38 (1969): 370.

31. Baptist minister D. C. Eddy quoted in Paul William Walesky, "Entertainment of Angels: American Baptists and Americanization, 1890–1925," *Foundations* 19 (1976): 351.

32. Although two decades old now, the best account of these schools still remains James D. Anderson, *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860–1935* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1988).

33. Brooks quoted in *Proceedings of the Conference for Education in the South, the Seventh Session, Birmingham, Alabama, April 26th to April 28th, 1904* (New York: Committee on Publication, 1904): 155.

34. Eliot quoted in "Negro Education All Important," *New York Times*, February 13, 1904, Southern Education Board Records, 1898–1925, Series 5, folder 256, Southern Historical Collection, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The phrase "Twentieth Century Type of Education" belongs to Henry S. Pritchett, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and founder of the National Society for the Promotion of Industrial Education, quoted in Russell Marks, "Legitimating Industrial Capitalism: Philanthropy and Individual Differences," in *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*, ed. Edward Arnove (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980): 109.

35. Armstrong quoted in *The Southern Workman*, vol. 21 (1902): 273; Ludlow Manuscript, 640, Hampton Univ. Archives, Hampton, Virginia.

36. Ibid., 664.

37. James Leloudis, "Education and the Color Line" (paper presented at the International Society for the History of Education, XXI, July 12–16, 1999, 4).

38. The full passage appears in Robert L. Church, *Education in the United States* (New York: Free Press, 1976): "The waning of enthusiasm for common schooling in the South after the war led to a more general deterioration of confidence that giving the same education to all children was an efficacious means of solving social problems. Instead, reformers came to favor the principle of giving *special kinds of training to different kinds of children* [italics added] according to their predicted futures, of preparing different groups for different roles" (141–142).

39. For a fuller treatment of this subject, one that focuses on the reform of agricultural education, see John M. Heffron, "Nation-Building for a Venerable South: Moral and Practical Uplift in the New Agricultural Education, 1900–1920" in *Essays in Twentieth-Century Southern Education: Exceptionalism and its Limits*, ed. Wayne J. Urban (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999).

40. William L. Bowers, *The Country Life Movement in America, 1900–1920* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1974), 105. See also David B. Danbom, "Romantic Agrarianism in Twentieth-Century America," *Agricultural History* 65 (1991): 1–12.

41. Saul K. Padover, *Thomas Jefferson on Democracy* (New York: Penguin Books, 1939), 68, 70.

42. Herbert Agar, one of the so-called Southern Agrarians, revealed the underlying elitism of the agrarian philosophy when in 1934 he recommended a return to the property qualification for voting. See Herbert Agar, "The Task of Conservatism," *American Review* 3 (April 1934):15–22.

43. "Report of the Committee of Twelve on Rural Schools," *NEA Proceedings and Addresses*, 36 (1897): 385–583.

44. Ibid., 527, 528, 531, 532, 535.

45. Josiah Main, "Nature and Content of Science in the Rural School and Its Relation to Secondary Science," *NEA Proceedings and Addresses* (1913): 702–3; Scott Nearing, *The New Education* (New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1915), 185.

46. Yeoman farmers in the North may have resented modernity for the same reasons as their Southern neighbors, but they were powerless to convert its opposite, traditionalism, into a force for conservative change. Only the South could do that. See James A. Henretta, "Families and Farms: 'Mentalite' in Pre-Industrial America," *William and Mary Quarterly* 35, 3rd ser. (1978): 3–32; Roy V. Scott, *The Reluctant Farmer: The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1970); Christopher Clark, *The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780–1860* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990); and Allen Kulikoff, "The Transition to Capitalism in Rural America," *William and Mary Quarterly* 46 (1989): 120–42.

47. As the late Southern historian and sociologist, Rupert Vance, writes, "Agriculture sets the mode for Southern standards of living, and the cotton belt sets the mode for Southern agriculture." Vance's "cotton-culture complex," consisting of large plantations (654–904 acres) divided into Negro and white cropper farms of between 40 and 60 acres and a handful of owner-operator farms, formed the basis Southern culture. See John Shelton Reed and Daniel Joseph Singal, eds., *Regionalism and the*

South: Selected Papers of Rupert Vance (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1982), 56, 20.

48. John Milton Cooper, *Walter Hines Page: The Southerner as American, 1855–1918* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1977), 242.

49. Woodrow Wilson, "A Report of an After-Dinner Speech—Southern Society Dinner, December 10, 1903," in Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 69, 192.

50. Abraham Flexner and Frank P. Bachman, *The General Education Board: An Account of Its Activities* (New York: General Education Board, 1915); Joseph Cannon Bailey, *Seaman A. Knapp: Schoolmaster of American Agriculture* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1945); Fosdick, *Adventure in Giving*, 39–80. Knapp personally authored many of the board's farm demonstration reports. See "Farm Demo in the South—Reports," 4001, box 695, folder 7157, Records of the General Education Board, Rockefeller Archive Center, Pocantico Hills, NY (hereafter cited as GEB Records, RAC). In a circular for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Knapp wrote in 1924 that the one matter of "paramount importance in the world" was the "readjustment of the home." See U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Circular* 314 (1924): 1; see also A.B. Graham, "Boys' and Girls' Agricultural Clubs," *Agricultural History* 15 (1941): 65–68.

51. George R. Twiss, "A Survey of Science Teaching and Equipment in Thirteen Colleges for Colored Youth," #594, box 270, folder 2792, GEB Records, RAC. The confidentiality of the document was probably due to its connection with the American Baptist Home Mission Society, a connection that the board's enemies, if they ever found out, could charge was a violation of its official policy of "disinterestedness."

52. Ibid., *A Textbook in the Principles of Science Teaching* (New York: MacMillan, 1933), 112, 75, 117, 77, 101, 83, 82.

53. Ibid., 57, 69, 189, 110 and "Memorandum—June 7, 1923" GEB records, RAC.

54. Ibid., 10.

55. R. R. Wright, "Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges," *Alexander's Magazine* 1 (1909): 19–22.

56. Wallace Buttrick to Robert C. Ogden, July 4, 1902, box 718, folder 7399, GEB Records, RAC.

57. Charles Reagan Wilson, *Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920* (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1980), 7; "An Address to the New York Southern Society, December 14, 1910," in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 22: 192. See the biography of the transplanted southern merchant Charles Broadway Rouss in Larry A. Mullen, *The Napoleon of Gotham: A Study of the Life of Charles Broadway Rouss* (Winchester, VA: Farmers and Merchants National Bank, 1974).

58. Two early studies of farm tenancy that have been useful in this context are La Wonda F. Cox, "American Agricultural Wage Earner, 1865–1900," *Agricultural History*, 22 (1948): 95–114 and Oscar Zeichner, "The Transition from Slave to Free Agricultural Labor in the Southern States," *Agricultural History* 13 (1939): 22–32.

59. Drew Gilpen Faust, "The Rhetoric and Ritual of Agriculture in Antebellum South Carolina, *Journal of Southern History* 55 (1979): 553, 554.

60. Ibid., 553–54.

61. Liberty Hyde Bailey, the renowned horticulturalist at Cornell University's College of Agriculture, spoke of the South's role in "the spiritualizing of agriculture" at the sixth conference for education in the South in 1903. Relatively free of "urban points of view," the South, he told delegates, "holds the keys to the future." See Liberty Hyde Bailey, "Education through Agriculture," in *Proceedings of the Conference of Southern Education* (New York: Committee on Publication, 1903), 116–23.
62. Edward Ingle, *The Ogden Movement: An Educational Monopoly in the Making* (Baltimore, MD: Manufacturers' Record Publishing, 1908), 20.

CHAPTER 4

Nationalism and the Politics of Language

Analogies from Europe for the Pacific Basin

John Christian Laursen

This chapter is an exploration of nationalism and language in contemporary times. The central issue here is how the value of nationalism is rooted in language. Is it a good thing and should we try to cultivate it, or is it a bad thing that we should try to discourage? It may be positive because it can help balance cultural persistence and change in the face of globalization. On the other hand, it may be a negative force because it may provoke violence and chaos.

If the European experience is any guide, the Pacific Basin will be facing major controversies over language in the coming decades. As the Pacific Basin becomes wealthier and enters more deeply into the modern world, the linguistic minorities in each of its countries may be expected to claim more rights. The west coast of South America has already seen a political resurgence of Aymara and Quechua speakers in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Indonesia contains speakers of 550 languages, with over a million speakers of 15 of them; the Philippines has 171 languages, with over a million speaking 13 of them.[1] The big one, of course, is China, with at least 59 language groups in 7 families. More than half of them (850 million) speak Mandarin, but 90 million speak Wu and 70 million speak each Min and Cantonese. In addition to these larger groups, the government asserts that 22 ethnic minorities have 28 written languages.[2] By European standards, there are rebellions and wars waiting to break out here.

This chapter begins with an exploration of some of the relatively recent European experiences, looking for analogies and patterns that may follow in

the Pacific Basin. Like all comparative work, the reader will have to make some imaginative leaps along with some allowances for differences and disanalogies.

As a preliminary observation, it may well be that this is not something we have much control over because languages do not seem very responsive to deliberate control. Although languages come and go according to a dynamic we do not understand too well, deliberate efforts to eradicate a language, short of genocide, often seem to have the perverse effect of encouraging its use and preservation. So we may expect a multiplicity of languages to persist for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, even within narrow limits, public policies probably can have some effect on the growth or diminution of language-based nationalism. So should such policies encourage or discourage it?

As another preliminary clarification, this chapter will focus specifically on language nationalism. Nationalism is often a combustible combination of religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other identities. Well-known cases such as that of Tibet combined all these factors to stimulate opposition to Chinese rule. But linguistic nationalism can go it alone. In many of the European cases that shall be discussed in the following pages, there is no significant religious or ethnic difference between contending groups, only the language difference. Wherever it is a factor, the effort should be made to differentiate the dynamics of language nationalism from those of ethnic and religious nationalism.[3]

In general, there has always been a tendency toward international dominance of a single language. In Catholic Europe half a millennium ago, it was Latin. Then, Latin was eventually replaced by French as the predominant literary and diplomatic language across wide swaths of Europe. It is no secret that English is now the international business and academic language. All of higher education in Finland and some of higher education in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and other countries are now conducted in English. Soon enough, there may even be more Chinese English speakers than there are British or American English speakers. What will this mean for language nationalism? No one really knows.

Famous philosopher Immanuel Kant originally thought that worldwide unity and peace would come from a "universal cosmopolitan existence," which might have meant the spread of one government, language, and religion to all corners of the earth.[4] But he soon backtracked and called that possibility one-dimensional and stifling, even a "universal despotism which saps man's energies and ends in the graveyard of freedom." Rather, he then postulated, a never-to-be-eliminated variety of languages and religions in healthy competition with one another would be more likely to lead to progress and freedom.[5]

It is not always appreciated that a writer who was thought of as a Frenchman, Michel de Montaigne, considered himself a Gascon. The name is taken from

his region, Gascony, which also spoke a noticeably different language, Gascon. In Montaigne's day in the sixteenth century, Latin was the unifying and cosmopolitan language used by most sophisticated writers, and his father taught him that language as a child. Even the Bible had only very recently been translated into vernacular languages of everyday use. But that set off the escalating growth of the vernacular languages, exemplified by Montaigne's *Essays*. He did not use Gascon in his writings, but rather French, which would give him access to a much larger readership. Similarly, two centuries later, another philosopher, David Hume, was a Scot who tried to eradicate Scotticisms from his use of the English language. He wanted to play in the bigger pond of English as a literary language with far more readers than Scottish.[6]

Will intellectuals from the Pacific Basin stick with the widespread languages of Mandarin, English, and Spanish, or will they try to vindicate more local languages? For every David Hume there was a Robert Burns, who developed Scottish into a literary language by providing the songs and poetry that could make it one.

An older nationalism was associated with the nation-state, beginning for our purposes with the eighteenth century. European wars played an important role in assimilating Gascons and Normans and Provençals into Frenchmen, and people from hundreds of small and medium-sized bishoprics and dukedoms into Germans. In the twentieth century, radio and television played a major role in standardizing national languages, not least in the United States. This pattern has been followed in Asia, too. But after Taiwan lifted the prohibition on television and radio in Formosan in 1996, that native language jumped to 40 percent of usage on the airwaves.

This last fact represents the newer nationalism, based on local languages. This has entailed the reinvention, if necessary, of Basque, Gaelic, Catalan, and other languages that have either fallen into decline or been driven there by massive repression. Basque has been brought back by legal establishment and subsidy; Irish or Gaelic is required in schools and for civil service jobs, although almost no one speaks it as a native or primary language. The first Catalan Language Congress was held in 1906, and the first chair in Catalan language and literature was established at the University of Barcelona only in 1961. But now Catalonia is on the brink of declaring its independence. All of this is the product of political intervention as what had been, at least for a time, mostly oral languages were developed or rediscovered as written languages by officials and intellectuals, not by spontaneous acts of the people. A lesson for the Pacific Basin is that this sort of reinvention might be part of their future.

A key factor that complements almost all language nationalism is perceived injustice or oppression. The aforementioned Basques, Irish, and Catalans all tell their stories of repression and humiliation. The Aymara and Quechua speakers

of South America claim that they have been subjected to repression and second-class status for five hundred years; the Maya can say the same in Central America. Tibetans may claim interference for only two hundred years, and other resentments may date back only fifty or one hundred years. But wherever speakers of one language are privileged over others in educational opportunities, employment, and social and political life, resentments and reactive nationalism will be created. It is useful to distinguish two broad categories here: material economic and political injustices and perceived social and psychological humiliations, which provoke what is known as the "politics of recognition."[7]

It seems likely that the only way to prevent language nationalism based on perceived injustice would be to develop a true equality along all economic and social dimensions among the speakers of any two or more contending languages. Whether this has ever been the case is an open question. To take only one example, in the spirit of multilingualism, a friend of mine from the German-speaking part of Switzerland (St. Gallen) chose to attend university in the French-speaking part (Geneva). He was told by a friendly professor that he would never, ever get the highest possible grade because his slight accent and occasional imperfections in French would prevent him from being perceived as the crème de la crème.

Was my colleague resentful of this inequality? Not really. In another discussion, he and others explained to me that federal appointments in Switzerland are apportioned among four categories: French-speaking Catholics, French-speaking Protestants, German-speaking Catholics, and German-speaking Protestants (note that the Italian speakers are left out of appointments at this level). The best qualified might be passed over for a representative of one of the other communities. But the Swiss explained that this was just part of the price of getting along. Will the countries of the Pacific Basin accept this form of distribution of jobs and power by language group?

The Swiss case is an example of structural inequality at the highest levels of wealth and culture. One reason it works in Switzerland is that most jobs are appointed at the regional or cantonal level, not at the federal level. As a result, if you are passed over for a federal job, you can just go home to a cantonal job.[8] Language-based privileges or quotas will presumably create less resentment in such a decentralized federal system. But one can imagine that they would play out with much more divisive implications at lower levels of less-wealthy communities and in more centralized countries where there are fewer alternative sources of jobs and power. As great structural changes coming from globalization are added to language-based perceived inequalities, tensions may mount.

As long as all the people who are speaking a common language as a second language are really speaking it as a second language, there will be a kind of equality. No one will lose anything because they are not speaking it perfectly.

But when Europeans perceive that English people or Americans are getting special privileges because they speak English like a native, the nonnatives will begin to resent it. Only 17 million of the 200-plus million Indonesians speak the national language of Indonesian as a first language. If they obtain privileges for their fluency, we can expect resentment from the speakers of Indonesian as a second language. If in addition they lose even more because they are nonnative in their speaking of English as the language of transnational trade, their resentments may be compounded.

In addition to the Swiss case, there are cases where language imperfection can be overridden as a status marker by expertise. American universities hire many foreigners for their scientific skills and knowledge, despite their lack of language proficiency. But again, this is an elite level; it rarely plays out that way at lower levels of society, where accent can be a roadblock to professional advancement. As more and more people move around the world in response to economic change, this may lead to more resentment.

This leads us to our next question: Can the resurgence of local languages counterbalance and mitigate the strains of transnational integration? Or does it add to them?

There is a model of spontaneous harmony that would answer the first question with a "yes." Hegel's theory of a thesis followed by the spontaneous emergence of an antithesis and then a synthesis would predict that if transnational integration creates strains, something will emerge that will soften and alleviate those strains. Another analogy is the self-organization of contemporary chaos theory. Using these analogies, the resurgence of local languages could be interpreted as a natural and healthy counterbalance, helping people to adjust to the overwhelming impact of globalization. With this intuitively understandable model, local languages give us stability that help us remain anchored as the tides of globalization wash over us.

But there is an equally intuitive case for answering yes to the second question. If one side of us is pulled toward the bigger world of globalization, and the other side stays firmly rooted in an ever-more-local subnational group, is there no danger that we will be pulled apart? All of these local languages may provide comfort, pride, and local identity, reinforcing our self-esteem, but they may also inspire exclusion and violence. As the strains of transnational integration grow too strong, we may snap and reject it and seek refuge in the local.

An important case to consider in Europe is the Basques, a separate linguistic group in the north of Spain. Basque is almost totally different from Spanish and not related to any other nearby language. The first printed book in Basque was published in 1545, but Basque literature was never abundant and consisted mostly of religious texts. Under the dictator Franco, public use of Basque was suppressed. Basque nationalism turned violent, leading to bombings and

assassinations that have still not ceased. Nationalist politicians appeal to pride in the language and a separate identity, even though the language is only spoken as a first language in some of the smaller rural villages.

Several factors make Basque pride work. One is that the merchant class might want to suppress the violence if it hurt business. However, the large summer resort industry along the Basque coast is relatively immune from the poor reputation that Basque separatist violence creates abroad. That is because the inland valleys have a high population density and the means to afford a summer vacation on the coast. And because Basques are used to the violence—typically directed exclusively against the police and officials—the merchants do not need to attract foreigners who may be deterred by the violence.

The University of the Basque Country in Bilbao is a bilingual university. The weaker students, I was told, have been flocking to classes held in Basque. The reason is that classes in many subjects cannot assign readings in Basque because they simply do not exist. As a result, students know that in classes on the same subject in Spanish they will be expected to read books and attend lecture, whereas the Basque classes only require attendance at lecture. Because exam questions cannot come from anything but the lectures, the classes are easier. "Ahh," I asked, "but if employers know that one has studied in Basque and therefore read less, won't that degree make it harder for the student to get a job?" The answer is no because the diplomas do not reveal whether the classes were taken in Spanish or Basque. So the Basque linguistic nationalists are not wholly transparent about it.

The Basque country is not just caught between Basque and Spanish. Out in the streets, bus stops and subways are full of advertisements for English classes, locally and abroad. "Give your children a future," they say, "help them learn English." Send them to English classes here, and send them abroad to England. Basque nationalists know that they cannot get along in the modern world with only Basque, but it feeds their wounded pride to assert that their second language will be English, not Castilian. The origin of Basque nationalism was a perceived lack of respect from the Spanish speakers. There is reason to suspect that they will not receive much more respect for their language from English speakers.

Something similar can be said for Valencia, also in Spain. Valencia has its own language: Valenciano. Avid defenders of this language insist that Castilian Spanish is a foreign language and should be accorded secondary status. Laws have been passed giving hiring priority in some jobs to Valencian speakers. But Valencians are also jealous of Catalan, the language spoken just to the north, in the region centered around Barcelona. Both of these languages are Romance languages, like Italian and French, and not mutually intelligible to Spanish speakers without study. But they are mutually intelligible to each other. Just a

few years ago, the Valencian Academy of the Language conducted a study on the matter and issued a report concluding that Valencian was linguistically the same as Catalan. The Valencian nationalists were outraged because they very much wanted to be different and have a separate identity from their neighbors to the north, as much as from their neighbors to the west in Madrid. One of the first things they tell foreign visitors is that five hundred years ago Valencia was a much more important city than Barcelona.

Basque activists note that more and more people in the Basque country and neighboring Navarra are signing up for Basque classes and suggest that this is the voice of the people. Similarly, nationalistic Valencians note with pride that more and more people are signing up for Valencian classes and sending their children to Valencian-speaking kindergartens. They also want to understand this as popular demand. Yet, I met at least one Valencian who did not speak Valencian and explicitly said he was an antinationalist but sent his child to a Valencian school because he wanted to make sure she would not be deprived of job opportunities and treated as a foreigner in her home city. It was fear rather than curiosity and an expansive view of culture that motivated him. This is a mirror image of the perceived injustice and humiliation that spurred the resurgence of Valencian in the first place.

Meanwhile, European identity and job opportunities from knowing English are influencing Valencia as much as the Basque Country. No one was flustered when I asked a group why they were worrying so much about which of Castilian, Valencian, or Catalan had priority if their grandchildren were going to speak English. Like the Basques, they saw English as an opportunity, not a symbol of oppression or lack of respect like Castilian and Catalan.

When I mentioned this to a sociologist who has studied nationalism in both Finland and Valencia, he answered that much of Europe now lives by bilingualism. The Finns do not feel inferior because they have to use English at work. They did not develop Nokia into a billion-dollar company by insisting on doing business in Finnish. Instead, they adopted English as a business and school language. But that did not make them forget Finnish. It is still the language of home, and the Finns are even more fiercely nationalistic than the Valencians, according to my sociologist. The overall lesson here is that much of the world might well be bilingual in the future. In linguistics, this is known as diglossia. Where it is already the case, as in much of China, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the power relations of the two or more languages may still be renegotiated.

Barcelona resents Madrid as much as the Basque country and Valencia do. Catalonia has made most of the steps necessary for regional independence from Madrid. Job opportunities are often contingent on learning Catalan. Barcelona is also the home of growing numbers of immigrants who are faced with the

double challenge of learning two languages, Catalan and Castilian Spanish. For the sake of the opportunities, many do. There are now whole neighborhoods of Moroccans, Sikhs, Romanians, and several more immigrant groups. When I asked if this sort of segregation of immigrant groups might lead to riots of the sort experienced in France a few years ago, the answer was "Not for ten or twenty years." The French unrest was not based on language as much as on religion and ghettoization. But it will be interesting to see if the countries of the Pacific Basin take this attitude toward resurgent language nationalism. Putting off discussion about it has the benefit of not drawing attention to it. But it also has the cost of not leading to any proactive ameliorative steps that might be taken.

Offshore in the Mediterranean, the island of Mallorca faces a similar quandary. Nationalists there also want to distance themselves from Barcelona and claim that Mallorcan is a separate language from Catalan, even though they are closely related. Intellectuals make a living translating all sorts of literature from Spanish or Catalan to Mallorcan. This is not market-driven, but rather heavily subsidized by the government and nationalist parties. Teachers, translators, editors, publishers, and broadcasters make up a lobby that will continue to push the claims of the local language as long as their jobs depend on them.

The northwestern corner of Spain is called Galicia, and in the countryside the people also speak their own language: Gallego. In recent years, nationalist legislation has required classes in that language and given employment priority to Gallego speakers, even in the cities. Gallego is very close to Portuguese. Does that mean the Gallegos would like to spin off from Spain and join Portugal? Absolutely not. Here we have a replay of the Belgian situation. The Flemish speakers of Belgium do not want to join the Netherlands, even though their languages are similar, and the French-speaking Walloons of Belgium do not want to join France, mainly because they would be treated as the little sisters of those larger countries. The Gallegos know that they would be the little sisters in a greater Portugal, possibly treated with even less respect by Lisbon than they are by Madrid.

The most recent news out of Belgium is a plan to split the country up by language into three independent parts: Flanders, Wallonia, and the multilingual city of Brussels. The theory is that if Luxembourg, which is right alongside as a demonstration, can go it alone under the umbrella of the European Union, then so can these three units. The case of Spain is instructive because here is one medium-sized country with at least 5 fairly ambitious separatist language groups claiming and often obtaining regional independence, much of that only within the last 30 years. No one really knows what it might come to. As long as the peninsula is under the umbrella of the European Union, there may be no

strong incentive to keep it together. Spain could be divided up into half a dozen or more Luxembourgs.

Are the countries of the Pacific Basin ready for this alternative? Could a large country like China serve the same purpose as the European Union does in justifying a proliferation of language-based Luxembourgs? If the international language of the European Union is English, then the international language of the Chinese Union could be Mandarin Chinese, while numerous language-based regions separate under its umbrella. There are at least two possible paths here: One is for the central government in China to try to maintain full central power and Mandarin as the only official language for many purposes, somewhat on the model of the United States. The other is for the central government to manage devolution of the various linguistic regions into a federal patchwork like Europe.

Note that Europe did not adopt a name that expresses what they have but that had already been taken for other purposes: the English-Speaking Union. I also imagine that the people who speak the other languages in China might not appreciate calling themselves the Mandarin-Speaking Union. Most Europeans could agree on "European Union," tacitly English-speaking; will Asians agree on a Mandarin-speaking "Asian Union"?

Some language regeneration patterns are repeated throughout Europe. As mentioned earlier, Gaelic had been suppressed for many years in Ireland, where it is now taught in schools. But that does not make it a living language, except in a few smaller villages. Most people know it only from school and street signs. Norway has required its students to learn Old Norse, not a living language for many years. But no one actually uses it. These are expensive measures, in terms of time and money and opportunity costs, which may be worth it for the sake of national pride in the richer nations. But can all the countries of the Pacific Basin afford this sort of thing?

Does local-language labeling of foreign practices make them less foreign? Iceland has a board of experts who invent linguistically Icelandic names for foreign inventions. Instead of calling computers some variation on "komputors," they create new words based on ancient language roots: in this case, "tölva" (= tölur [numbers] + -va [word ending of prophetess]). With a population of only a quarter of a million, and very little immigration, this might catch on. But in all the rest of Europe, foreign names are quickly assimilated into normal usage. The countries of the Pacific Basin will have to decide whether to try to create neologisms that might have a softening effect on the foreignness of foreign ideas and products or to give the foreign words and practices a positive connotation that eliminates the need to worry about their foreignness. The latter would appear to be less expensive, if not always possible.

Quebec, Canada, provides some relevant experience as an overseas development of European culture. A French-speaking majority spent two centuries under English-language political domination until a resurgence of French-speaking nationalist power brought them close to independence from Canada twice in failed referendums of 1980 and 1995. In 1974, the first rule of language policing in Quebec required that all signs in English include French translations. For a brief period, a native speaker of one language could learn the other relatively easily from signage. But then, in 1977, the nationalists required that the English be removed and all signs be in French only.[9] Once the nationalist principle that the government should regulate language usage is accepted, it is easy to take it step by step toward exclusion. There may be a lesson here for the Pacific Basin: expect "mission creep."

Eminent philosopher Charles Taylor approves of French-language nationalism in Quebec. Of Quebecois francophone heritage, he has nevertheless thrived in the English-speaking university ambiances of Harvard, Massachusetts, and Oxford, England. His children are bilingual or multilingual. And yet he has argued in favor of the laws that prohibit French speakers in Quebec from sending their children to English-language public schools because, as he says, he wants there to be a French-speaking culture in North America for his children to enjoy. As he puts it, beyond "having the French language available for those who might choose it," we must make "sure that there is a community of people here in the future who will want to avail itself of the opportunity" by actively seeking "to *create* members of the community."[10] So French speakers who might want their children to be able to compete in the continental and international English-language world are deprived of that freedom in order to benefit Taylor's children and his feeling for the culture that might be lost.[11]

In an attempt to mollify the Quebecois and keep them in the country by showing them that they really are part of Canada, the rest of Canada has passed language laws, too. Highway signs must be in both languages. But there are telltale signs that some people do this grudgingly. Where a perfectly good translation of "Fish Lake" might be "Lac du poisson," I have seen a bilingual sign read, "Lac du fish." Technically, they could be treating "Fish" as a proper name, and thus not translatable. But it looks like they are none too enthusiastic about the translation requirement. The countries of the Pacific Basin may expect such reactions too.

Although the French celebrated francophone nationalism in Quebec, the sword of language nationalism has also cut against them. For a long time the Basque-speaking southwest of France remained dormant, largely because the French gave refuge and support to Basque separatists from Spain. But now the Basques are referring to southwest France as "the Northern Basque Country" and working to obtain government funding for language schools

there. Activists promote "the concept of language planning, which was brought to us from Quebec" to make their case for funding the renaissance of the language.[12] One suspects that Paris is not celebrating these developments.

"Language planning" is a bureaucratic term for state intervention in language use and development. It almost always means subsidies and privileges for use of particular languages. That, of course, means that many people will not want to provide such subsidies and privileges for people who use other languages. Consequently, the apex of European language planning legislation so far—the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages—has not been very successful. This is partly because it does not have teeth, essentially serving as a declaration of good intentions. It celebrates diversity and cultural wealth, but its preamble stresses that the "encouragement of regional or minority languages should not be to the detriment of the official languages and the need to learn them" and should be conducted "within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity."[13] Without these limits, it would practically invite separatism. Spain has ratified the charter, perhaps mollified by these phrases. But the Basques, Catalans, and others really do mean to diminish the official language and change sovereignty and territorial integrity. France has not ratified, perhaps because people cannot believe that the opening wedge of legal justification for a government subsidy of minority languages will not eventually lead to separatism.

It is sometimes said that the great divides are religion and color-based ethnicity or "race," not language. But several of the European cases we have discussed are strictly language based, with no differences of religion or color. This is a matter that crosscuts politics in many ways. In the Spanish case, for example, both left and right are united in their opposition to language-based separatism. Most dramatically, in the time of the civil war in the 1930s some of the leftists and constitutionalists who opposed Francisco Franco's right-wing takeover of the republic went as far as to say they would prefer Franco's victory to secession by Catalonia.[14] I think we can expect similarly stubborn opposition to any moves in the direction of separatism by language minorities in the Pacific Basin.

The grand alternative to linguistic nationalism might be cosmopolitanism. This was a neologism of the ancient cynic, Diogenes, who called himself a citizen of the world. When exiled from his hometown of Sinope for malfeasance, he answered that he condemned his own people to staying home in Sinope, while he was on his way to Athens, the great cosmopolitan center of the time. He did not have to cross linguistic boundaries to do so, however, and that is perhaps what makes it more difficult for later people and peoples to embrace cosmopolitanism. Languages make foreignness immediately obvious, and put the nonnative speaker at a disadvantage wherever linguistic nationalism makes native speaking the standard. This is the crux of the problem. If native versus

nonnative usage of language is made to be important through favoritism and discrimination, people will be driven to identify with and defend their native languages.

Throughout this chapter, I have tried to draw attention to the implications for the Pacific Basin. Here is a general summary: East Asia and Pacific-coast Latin America have not yet had the language nationalism and irredentism that Europe has had on the scale that Europe has had it. But that does not mean they may not ever have it. Rather, I would expect that as they get richer and more integrated into worldwide communication, education, transportation, and trade networks, they will be more likely to experience it. Sometimes in order to join those networks, and sometimes in reaction against them, people will turn to English and local languages and against the languages of the established central governments. Those governments can try to suppress these movements, or they can attempt to manage them. The latter may be able to harness them in productive ways and help to prevent violence and chaos. The former may not work at all.

It bears repeating that there is no reason to believe that the nations of the Pacific Basin must inevitably follow the patterns of European language nationalism. However, the European experience may serve as a warning and a set of possible responses to present and future Pacific Basin problems.

Notes

1. James Sneddon, *The Indonesian Language: Its History and Role in Modern Society* (Sydney: Univ. of New South Wales Press, 2003), 196–98; "Languages of the Philippines," wikipedia.org.

2. For surveys of Chinese language policy, see Minglang Zhou, *Multilingualism in China* (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003); Minglang Zhou and Hongkai Sun, eds., *Language Policy in the People's Republic of China* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004).

3. Too many studies risk missing language nationalism by, for example, providing only maps of ethnic groups. See, for example, Stephanie Hemelryk Donald and Robert Benewick, *The State of China Atlas* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2005). This misses the importance of language differences among members of the same ethnic group.

4. Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in *Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), 51.

5. Ibid., "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", *Political Writings*, 113–14.

6. On Montaigne, Hume, and Kant, see J. C. Laursen, "Skepticism, Unconvincing Anti-skepticism, and Politics," in *Scepticisme et modernité*, ed. Marc André Bernier and Sébastien Charles (Saint-Étienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 2005).

7. One locus classicus for this term is Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994).

8. See Wolf Linder, *Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

9. See Marc Shell, *Children of the Earth: Literature, Politics, and Nationhood* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), 44–57.

10. Taylor, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, 58–59.

11. In his response to Taylor in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Anthony Appiah complains that this usage of government power to force other people to create a world that will benefit one's own children "steps over a boundary" (163).

12. José M. Legarra and Erramun Baxok, "Language Policy and Planning of the Status of Basque, II: Navarre and the Northern Basque Country," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 174 (2005): 34.

13. Simo K. Määttä, "The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, French Languages Laws, and National Identity," *Language Policy* 4 (2005): 167–84.

14. See Carlos Taibo, "Sobre el nacionalismo español," in *Nacionalismo español: esencias, memoria e instituciones*, ed. Carlos Taibo(Madrid: Catarata, 2007), 15–16.

CHAPTER 5

Are Cultural Tensions "Cultural"?

Public Responses to Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese Migration in the Russian Far East

Mikhail Alexseev

Social tensions arising from international migration are often defined as "cultural." Opponents of immigration from Washington to Vladivostok typically present it as a threat to the cultural identity of host societies. Public alarmism about being "swamped" or "overwhelmed" by outsiders is ascribed to concerns about racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural identities in host societies[1] and with the ways these identities clash in public as "moral feelings" about social values[2] or as "myth-symbol complexes" framed by elites.[3] One of the best exponents of the identity threat logic has been a Harvard political scientist, Samuel Huntington.[4] In his view, the migration of Latinos and especially Mexicans to the United States poses a threat to the survival of the United States as a nation, since the migrants' desire to maintain distinct social identity predicates putative lack of commitment to U.S. national security interests. From this perspective, salsa outselling ketchup, more people being named Jose than Michael, and the Spanish language being increasingly spoken across America's rural heartland are signs of a nation-splitting "social bifurcation,"[5] with the West and Southwest of the United States turning into a Hispanic Quebec. Throughout Europe, too, vigorous and often fiery public debates over headscarves and crosses, cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, "burkinis" and Muslim hospitals, and cultural assimilation of migrants more generally have squarely framed immigration problems in cultural terms. And in Russia, President Vladimir Putin provided a powerful cultural frame for the

alarmist sentiments over Asian migration—warning in 2000 that in ten years most residents of Asian Russia would speak Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.

Counterintuitive as it may sound, studies in social psychology and political science show that this kind of cultural framing of migration challenges is not necessarily going to resonate within migrant-receiving societies. There is a good reason to challenge the supposedly incendiary appeal of the "clash of civilizations" and "the clash of cultures" rhetoric. And there is a good reason to challenge the idea that resistance to globalization is cultural, even with respect to migration. Social science research on ethnic relations has shown that cross-cultural tensions are at best only partially due to cross-cultural differences, to cultural values, or to pride in one's own culture. The picture is complex and ambiguous because cultural relations appear to be powerfully sensitive to variations in political, socioeconomic, and historic contexts within a state. This happens for at least three major reasons that are not necessarily intuitive.

First, it is not exactly clear "what social and intergroup conditions make group or intergroup differentiation salient and pervasive in social situations."[6] Under what circumstances are language, traditions, religion, physiology, social values, or political preferences "weighted" more or less? For example, would an ethnic Russian who is also Orthodox Christian feel that she is more distinct from a Chechen Muslim or from a Thai Buddhist on ethnic and religious dimensions? And what explains that some of the most brutal and violent conflicts growing out of ethnic prejudices involved groups that had weak cumulative cultural distinctions—for example, Serbs vs. Croats and Hutus vs. Tutsis? Whereas it may be asserted that salient intergroup differentiations set the stage for political and social triggers of ethnic hostility, empirical research so far shows that these differentiations only weakly and inconsistently relate to out-group negativity.[7]

Second, social research has established that the most powerful and consistent predictors of ethnic hostility are intergroup threat,[8] competition,[9] and inequality or status difference.[10] These factors not only cut across ethnocultural distinctions but also are themselves multidimensional. Moreover, how these transcultural factors relate to specific groups in specific social contexts and how these relationships translate into implicit as opposed to explicit prejudices continue to pose theoretical and empirical challenges in social and political psychology. At a minimum, the effects of these intergroup factors have been shown to depend significantly on socialization and personality, most notably on the degree of "right-wing authoritarianism"[11] and "social dominance orientation."[12]

Third, case studies in the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, and Africa[13] and survey research in Russia and the European Union[14] have shown that ethnic distinctiveness, threat, and competitiveness are themselves a function of the

interethnic or immigration security dilemma. The fundamental premise of this approach is that ethnic tensions flare up when ethnic groups find themselves solely responsible for their own security and cannot credibly rely on the institutions of the state for protection. Migration brings about these perceptions because it makes local residents concerned about the permeability of their state's borders and the capacity of the state to regulate and police migrants once they arrive. The sense of "emergent anarchy" makes individuals prepare for self-defense preemptively regardless of how "real" the threat is, causing others to take protective measures in return. This logic drives mutual intergroup mistrust and tensions. It resonates with Myron Weiner's[15] observation that migration creates "nations without borders" and with research in the European Union linking the rise in "explosive public conflicts and deep rifts among political elites" over migration with simultaneous "threats of globalization from without and pluralization from within."[16] The security dilemma means that immigration attitudes are shaped not so much by what migrants are or how they behave or in what numbers they arrive, but by what they *might* become, how they *might* behave, and in what numbers they *might* arrive in the future. Unlike any other theory of antimigrant hostility, the security dilemma explains why marginal migrant minorities—notably, the Chinese in the Russian Far East (RFE)—have been perceived as a strong and tangible threat to Russia's security, identity, and economic well-being.[17]

Whereas the security dilemma framework offers a comprehensive explanation as to how intergroup distinctiveness relates to threat and competition in specific contexts—and thus fills in significant knowledge gaps in political psychology—its implications have not been tested systematically in a multigroup setting. This chapter does precisely that while also revisiting persistent research questions about the relationship between social context and cultural tensions over migration. The study examines whether and how the sense of cultural distinctiveness, intergroup threat, and intergroup competition relate to preferences for exclusion vs. acceptance of migrants, focusing predominantly on Asian migrants in the Russian Federation. In particular, it uses mass survey data to address three specific knowledge gaps in the literature: (1) whether migration policy preferences (exclusion vs. inclusion) differ more across ethnic groups or provinces (social context); (2) whether intergroup distinctiveness, threat, and competition relate to migrant exclusion and inclusion preferences asymmetrically; and (3) whether perceived state capacity to deal with projected migration scales underlies cultural opposition to migration.

The analyses follow a parsimonious quasi-experimental design based on the data from opinion surveys directed by the author and conducted by the Levada Analytical Center (Moscow) and the Public Opinion Research Laboratory (Vladivostok) in September–December 2005 (N = 4,740).[18] Adult respondents

were selected through multistage probability sampling across Russia and separately within seven provinces. In each sample, questions concerned five different ethnic groups of migrants, enabling both cross-regional and cross-group comparisons. Using this data, I compare responses of ethnic Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians) to different Asian migrant groups (Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese) in the same region (Primorskii Krai) and to the same Asian migrant group (the Chinese) in different regions (Primorskii Krai, Orenburg and Volgograd Oblasts on the Russia-Kazakhstan border, Moscow City, and Moscow Oblast). To control for Asian vs. non-Asian ethnicity and border location, I additionally examine responses to the Chechens in all the same regions and to the Kazakhs in Volgograd and Orenburg Oblasts.

Russia in Asia, Asians in Russia:
Exclusionism, Distinctiveness, and Threat

Same Context, Different Groups: Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese in Primorskii Krai

The collapse of communism engendered four major transitions in Russia. Three of these—from central planning to market economy, from one-party rule to institutional democracy, and from the empire to a federal state—have preoccupied most attention of scholars in the post-Soviet field.[19] The fourth transition has been from an "Iron Curtain" state to a rapidly globalizing state. As part of that, Russia emerged from a country that was hard to enter and even harder to leave to one of the world's largest migration states. According to the United Nations Population Division, by 2005 the stock of "foreign-born" in the Russian Federation was second only to the United States. Through migration, Russia became exposed to increasing cultural diversity, with the ethnic composition of migrant flows varying significantly across provinces. This variation, combined with the diversity of social contexts and demographic trends across 11 time zones, makes Russia an excellent laboratory for studying the effects of ethnic distinctiveness, threat, and competition on immigration attitudes.

The focal testing site is Primorskii Krai—the most populous and industrially developed province in the RFE bordering on China and North Korea overland and facing Japan across the Sea of Japan (Eastern Sea). As the Soviet Union unraveled and the planned economy was no longer there to cover the excessive costs of cold and remoteness,[20] integration into dynamic East Asian economies became a matter of survival in the region. Coming primarily in the form of cross-border "shuttle" trade and pendulum economic migration, globalization of the RFE had a predominantly human aspect and a distinctly Asian face. In face-to-face interviews of Primorskii government officials, business leaders,

journalists, and scholars with this author from 1999 through 2005, one persistent theme was that without Asian street markets, cross-border trade (particularly in timber and cars), and seasonal labor, the local economy would not have survived the shocks of the 1990s' transition. This globalization, based on individual or small-group economic activities, was nevertheless intense and widespread—so much so that local economists estimated that by the early 2000s the "shuttle" trade with China alone in the RFE was about twice as much by volume than the official interstate trade.[21] The three principal groups of migrants contributing to the RFE's globalization by around 2005 were ethnic Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese.

While averaging no more than 1 to 2 percent of the local population on any given day in the last ten years, Asian migration into Primorskii Krai produced distinct anti-immigrant backlashes. Importantly, not only did these anti-immigrant sentiments get framed in cultural and identity terms, but they also were directed against both specific groups (as in the stated threat of "Sinification" or the "Chinese factor" or a "Korean spillover" or "Vietnamese sickness") and against all Asian migrants (through racist catchphrases such as "yellow peril," "yellow wave," or "yellow infiltration"). These discourses indicate that antimigrant sentiments coalesced both along ethnic (Chinese, Vietnamese, and Koreans) and racial (Asians) lines. Both categorizations have bases in the local context. On the one hand, members of all three of these groups can be easily lumped into one out-group. Their origins are in states outside Russia and the former Soviet Union and they are racially—not only ethnically—distinct from the Slavs. Physiology, language, social customs, behavior, "Asian values," and non-Orthodox Christian religion form strong cumulative cleavages. On the other hand, because of frequent interactions, local residents have learned to distinguish among Asian ethnics on sight and to appreciate differences in their customs and traditions, particularly cuisine.

Perhaps even more important, in the local context one could expect the Slavs to see Koreans as less culturally distinct and more capable to assimilate (or become Russified) than the Vietnamese and the Chinese. This is because Koreans have a unique historical trajectory in Primorskii. Unlike the Chinese and the Vietnamese migrants—most of whom arrived from outside Russia starting in the 1990s—the majority of ethnic Koreans migrated to Primorskii from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia where they had been deported by Stalin in the late 1930s. These Koreans grew up in the Soviet Union, learning Russian in school and speaking it at home and with friends. They were educated in Soviet schools and socialized into Soviet institutions the same way as any Slav resident of Primorskii was. In contrast, ethnic Chinese were deported to China in the late 1930s, and their descendants were socialized into Chinese institutions and traditions and did not speak Russian. Ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese

migrants who had studied or worked in the Soviet Union and retained some Russian language skills and knowledge of local customs and values have been a small minority, and their degree of Russification was also considerably smaller than that of ethnic Koreans from Central Asia.[22]

At first glance, Table 5.1 illustrates that this sense of cultural proximity has a strong impact on migration policy preferences. A significantly larger percentage of Slavs in the 2005 Primorskii survey wanted to reduce the number of Chinese and Vietnamese migrants rather than the number of Korean migrants. Conversely, a significantly larger proportion of Slavs wanted the number of Koreans to stay the same. Restrictionist sentiments against the Chinese, in fact, were even stronger than restrictionist sentiments against the Chechens—even though the Chinese have not been associated in Russia's public discourses with militant Islam, terrorism, separatism, hostage-taking, or civil wars the way the Chechens have been.

Anecdotally, the linkage between cultural distinctiveness and support for restrictionist policies is beautifully illustrated by this author's experience interviewing the former chief of Russia's Federal Migration Service for Primorskii Krai, Aleksandr Pushkarev, in 1999–2001. At each of three meetings during that time period, Pushkarev emphasized that his administrative assistant was an ethnic Korean. He said he deliberately hired her to impress on every visitor that ethnic Koreans speak flawless Russian and behave like Russians. For that reason, he said, he lobbied the province and the federal government to pursue a policy of ethnic migration substitution—easing visa, entry, and settlement procedures for ethnic Koreans but tightening them for ethnic Chinese and others. At the level of his agency, Pushkarev actually pursued such a policy. During one of the interviews with the author, a phone rang in Pushkarev's office. He picked up the phone, listened, and then yelled into the receiver, "How could you [expletive] allow those 59 illegal Chinese migrants to work at the construction site for that sewing factory! Fire them immediately! Hire the Koreans instead!"

It may be tempting to make a case based on that survey question and Push-karev's testimony that ethnic distinctiveness matters decisively and that it

Table 5.1 Support for exclusion/inclusion of migrants by ethnic Slavs in Primorskii Krai (Opinion Survey, November–December 2005, N = 630)

Question: Talking about migrants of the following ethnic groups, would you prefer that the number of each of them increased, stayed the same, or decreased?

	Chechens (%)	*Chinese (%)*	*Koreans (%)*	*Vietnamese (%)*
Increased	1.5	.5	3.1	.5
Stayed the same	22.4	19.0	46.9	36.9
Decreased	76.1	80.5	50.0	62.6

indeed drives anti-immigrant sentiments and policies. Yet, such a conclusion would be premature.

The first challenge is conceptual. Is lesser hostility toward ethnic Koreans actually rooted in a sense of lesser intergroup distinctiveness, or is distinctiveness secondary to respondents' sense that Koreans are not a migrant minority but a native minority? And if so, then cultural differences could be safely discounted, because ingroup members can be trusted to value ingroup cohesion and assimilation. After all, the Koreans are one of the indigenous populations of Primorskii Krai, and local residents are aware that their settlements existed and were supported by the Russian governments back in the nineteenth century.[23] Moreover, Stalin's deportation of Koreans still left them residents of the former Soviet Union. They can be plausibly seen as part of the same nation-state ingroup, particularly by those born before the Soviet collapse in 1991. Data in Table 5.2 lends credence to this interpretation. The striking finding is that Slavs in Primorskii viewed the Koreans and the Chechens as the least culturally distinct groups while the Chinese and the Vietnamese were seen as the most culturally distinct groups. Moreover, the Chinese and the Vietnamese were seen as culturally equidistant from the Slavs. The big divide is between the perceptions of internal (Chechens, Koreans) vs. external (Chinese, Vietnamese) migrants. From the viewpoint of the incumbent ethnic majority, significant difference along racial, ethnic, behavioral, and religious lines between the Chechens and the Koreans as well as significant proximity along the same lines among the Chinese, the Koreans, and the Vietnamese comes through as less important than the internal/external distinction.

These distributions raise serious questions about the relationship between intergroup distinctiveness and exclusionist sentiments. Comparing Tables 5.1 and 5.2, one sees that (1) perceived intergroup distinctiveness between the Slavs

Table 5.2 Perceived cultural distinctiveness between ethnic Slavs and select migrant minorities in the Primorskii Krai (Opinion Survey, November–December 2005, N = 630)

Question: To what extent are the customs and behaviors of each of the following ethnic groups, other than your own, similar to yours overall?

	Chechens (%)	Chinese (%)	Koreans (%)	Vietnamese (%)
1–Least similar	58.4	69.1	52.9	71.0
"2"	25.2	23.0	30.1	24.2
"3"	14.4	6.6	12.3	4.8
"4"	1.1	1.3	4.0	
5–Most similar	.7		.8	

and Koreans and the Slavs and the Chechens is about the same, whereas support for exclusion of Chechens is significantly stronger than support for exclusion of Koreans; (2) Slavs view themselves as approximately equidistant in cultural terms from the Chinese and the Vietnamese, yet a significantly larger proportion of Slavs would like to reduce the number of the Chinese rather than the Vietnamese in Primorskii; and (3) the Vietnamese ranked first as "the least similar group," but third as the group whose size the Slav wanted to be reduced.

Factor analysis of the two survey items displayed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 is particularly revealing. It shows ethnic differences did not predominantly shape Slavs' perceptions of either ethnic distinctiveness between them and Asian migrants or Slav support for exclusion or inclusion of migrants. Figure 5.1 shows that those Slavs in Primorskii who believed one of the Asian groups as culturally distinct from them also saw other Asian groups as culturally distinct. Also, those who supported exclusion of one ethnic group, whether they were Asians or Chechens, also tended to support exclusion of other ethnic groups. If, on the other hand, ethnic differentiation were the most significant correlate of exclusionism, the analysis would have revealed four factors, sorted by ethnic group. We would then be able to conclude that respondents who saw any particular group as more culturally distinct from the Slavs would also support exclusionist policies against that same group (and not against other groups). On average, Slav respondents showed a general sense of their own cultural distinctiveness *regardless* of any specific ethnic "others" and a general sense of whether they wanted the number of migrants to increase, stay the same, or decrease—again, *regardless* of which specific group. Within these general attitudes, intergroup differences

*Loading on the intergroup distinctiveness factor

Figure 5.1   Factor analysis of cultural distinctiveness and support for migration policy regarding Chechen, Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese migrants in Primorskii Krai

mattered for any given individual,[24] but they were not as significant as the non-group-specific sense of distinctiveness and proclivity for exclusionism.

Furthermore, perceived intergroup threat by Primorskii Slavs did not correlate with intergroup distinctions and exclusionism across groups. A comparison of Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 reveals several important nonpatterns—notably, the following: (1) while the Vietnamese were viewed as the most culturally different group, they were also seen as posing the least threat to the security of Russia; (2) fewer respondents said the Vietnamese posed a strong threat to security compared to Koreans, yet more respondents wanted to exclude the Vietnamese than they wanted to exclude the Koreans; and (3) the Chechens were seen as a strong threat to security by a significantly larger percentage of respondents, yet the latter wanted to reduce the number of the Chinese more so than the Chechens. Cultural differentiation explains the threat-exclusionism linkage for Koreans, but not for other ethnic groups, challenging the idea that cultural tensions arise from cultural cleavages.

Immediately following the question on what degree of threat each group posed to Russia's security, the survey asked what type of threat first came to respondents' minds when they answered that question—terrorism and banditry, illegal settlement, territorial claims, ethnic hostility and violence, undermining of the economy, or population displacement. Factor analysis of these two closely related questions revealed a noteworthy pattern. Responses on the *degree* of threat posed by the Chinese, the Koreans, and the Vietnamese were strongly interrelated, but ethnic hostility and violence as a *type* of threat did not correlate with any specific group. Respondents who had a general sense that migrants of *any* ethnic group posed a security threat to Russia were more likely to feel that migrants of *any specific* ethnic group posed such a threat. If they felt the Chechens were more threatening, they were also likely to feel that the

Table 5.3 Perceived security threat of non-Slav groups

Question: To What Extent Do You Think Migrants of the Following Ethnic Groups Pose a Threat to the Security of Russia?

	Chechens (%)	Chinese (%)	Koreans (%)	Vietnamese (%)
1–Pose no threat whatsoever	3.5	1.9	23.0	18.9
"2"	5.8	7.6	29.9	28.1
"3"	19.8	20.6	20.8	28.6
"4"	21.2	30.5	14.1	14.2
5–Pose a strong threat	49.6	39.5	12.2	10.1

Koreans, the Chinese, and the Vietnamese were more threatening. If they felt the Chinese were less threatening, they felt that the rest were less threatening. In other words, perception of threat most likely developed separately from views about specific ethnic groups and their cultural distinctiveness.

Same Groups, Different Contexts: Chechens and the Chinese in Five Russian Regions

To what extent does regional context matter? To address this question, I examined survey results from five Russian provinces as well as from a representative nationwide sample. The provinces were initially selected for this study because they differ systematically on key putative predictors of immigration and interethnic attitudes—location with respect to external borders and to Russia's political center and cultural heartland, migration scale, ethnic composition of native and migrant populations, degree and nature of globalization (particularly the role played in it by migration), and local policies and predominant elite discourses on migration and ethnic relations. This selection ensures that we can compare at least two provinces with each factor.

Three regions out of five are located along Russia's external borders (Primorskii Krai with China and Korea and Volgograd and Orenburg Oblasts with Kazakhstan), and two are located inland (Moscow City and Moscow Oblast). Of the border regions, Primorskii is located in East Asia, Orenburg at the juncture of Europe and Asia in the steppes south of the Ural Mountains, and Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) along the lower Volga River in the southeastern part of European Russia. All three regions have experienced substantial Asian migration since the collapse of the Soviet Union, although in small numbers relative to the overall province population. The predominant Asian ethnic groups migrating into Volgograd and Orenburg have been the Kazakhs as well as other Central Asian ethnics, mostly Uzbeks and Tajik. This reflects a substantial difference in the type of border location between these two provinces and Primorskii Krai. The latter borders states that were never part of the Soviet Union and are commonly referred to by Russians as "far abroad" or "real abroad"—suggesting a stronger intergroup boundary between the locals and the migrants arriving from these states. Volgograd and Orenburg Oblasts border a former Soviet republic—a part of what Russians consider to be "near abroad," suggesting a weaker intergroup boundary between the locals and the migrants.

Two provinces have been large-scale migration magnets (Moscow City and Moscow Oblast); the rest have substantial migration, but it is not significantly different from Russia's average. Orenburg Oblast has a historically more ethnically diverse population; in Moscow City, ethnic diversity increased the most from the last Soviet census in 1989 to the time of the survey in 2005, while Volgograd,

Moscow Oblast, and Primorskii are close to being homogenously Slavic provinces. Moscow City and Moscow Oblast represent provinces where non-Slav migrant populations have been ethnically heterogeneous, whereas in Primorskii, Volgograd, and Orenburg non-Slav migrants have come predominantly from one to three culturally and ethnically/racially proximate Central Asian groups.

With respect to globalization, Moscow City stands apart as a newly emergent global metropolis. The magnet of approximately two-thirds of foreign investment into Russia since the Soviet collapse, Moscow rapidly rose as Russia's hub of international brand-name shopping, global automobile dealerships, banking, telecommunications, hotel and restaurant chains, and entertainment industries. Moscow's consumption patterns put it in the exclusive club of world-class cities along with New York, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tokyo. While increasingly plugged into this sophisticated, internationalized economy along the outer edges of the Russian capital, most parts of Moscow Oblast at the time of the survey bore significant hallmarks of Soviet era provincialism, particularly with respect to lifestyle, consumption, and the density of global brand name industries. In this sense, its level of globalization was comparable with Vladivostok—Russia's largest Pacific Ocean port that saw exponential increases in cross-border trade after the removal of Soviet-era restrictions on business and international travel in the early 1990s. The distinctive feature of Primorskii Krai, however, is a higher impact of migration on globalization, particularly in the 1990s. Globalization in the region had a distinct Asian face and Asian flavor, almost literally. For the majority of local Russians, the Chinese migrant traders became the conduits to international name brands (albeit, for the most part, counterfeit), entertainment (karaoke), and cuisine. Globalization meant not the arrival of the Big Mac and Tiffany's, as in Moscow, but the wholesale replacement of Soviet cars with used Japanese and Korean cars and hundreds of Chinese and Korean street vendors selling pot stickers and hot meat pies from downtown Vladivostok to remote towns. Rapidly developing border cities in the neighboring Chinese provinces, such as Dunin, Mishan, and Suifenhe, with their supermarkets and mirrored-glass buildings, became the primary travel destination for shopping and business of Primorskii's Russians, while former elite resorts built for the Chinese communist leaders became their top vacation destinations. In contrast, Volgograd and Orenburg Oblasts remained the most "Soviet" of this group, particularly with respect to lifestyles and consumer economy.

Finally, certain distinctions exist among the selected provinces with respect to migration and ethnic policies. The major distinction is between provinces where governments adopted regional tolerance programs (Moscow City), comprehensive ethnic relations programs (Volgograd Oblast), or both (Orenburg Oblast) and provinces where such programs were not adopted (Moscow Oblast,

Primorskii Krai).[25] Of the first three, Orenburg stands out as a province with the most far-reaching and systematically pursued policies of migrant accommodation, integration, and interethnic dialogue. In Moscow City, the effects of the program were counterbalanced by staunchly nationalistic and exclusionist rhetoric of the popular mayor and by the retention of the Soviet system of permanent residency registration (*propiska*), despite a ban by the 1993 Russian Constitution. In Volgograd Oblast, even though an ethnic relations program was adopted, it was not as systematically pursued and propagated by province governments where the Communist Party played a dominant part.

Based on these factors, one would generally expect that Volgograd and Orenburg Oblasts would form a distinct homogenous pair on immigration and interethnic issues. Moscow City and Moscow Oblast are likely to cluster together, although on select issues the former is also likely to cluster with Primorskii Krai and the latter with Volgograd and Orenburg due to the differences on the intensity and nature of globalization. Primorskii Krai is most likely to form a unique and separate subset on most issues. If context matters more than intergroup differentials, we would expect migration attitudes to correlate across provinces that form homogenous subsets. If intergroup differentials trump regional context, then we would expect all provinces to form one homogenous subset for any given ethnic group.

Descriptively, respondents' attitudes to the Chechen and Chinese migrants across these five regions have two noteworthy patterns (Table 5.4). First, in all regions the Chinese are seen as more culturally distinct from respondents than the Chechens, but the Chechens are seen as a stronger threat to Russia's security. This finding indicates that association of ethnic "others" with security threats does not run along the perceived ethnic cleavages. It seriously challenges the claim that anti-immigrant policy preferences are rooted in juxtaposition of cultures.

Whereas this evidence does not automatically imply that regional context trumps interethnic differentials, the second pattern in Table 5.4 does. This is illustrated by the difference between responses in Primorskii Krai and in other Russian samples. Being a sparsely populated and remote outpost of Russia in Asia bordering on the world's most populous state with a history of territorial claims on Russia, Primorskii differs from all other selected provinces in a sense that the Chinese are viewed as almost as threatening as the Chechens. In the Russian Federation as a whole, approximately 40 percent more respondents said the Chechens posed a strong threat to Russia in comparison with the Chinese. In Primorskii Krai, this difference was only 8 percent (Table 5.4).

Further, Primorskii was the only province where this difference was smaller than the difference between the percentage of respondents who saw the Chinese as the least similar ethnic group and the percentage of respondents who saw the

Table 5.4 Attitudes toward Chechen and Chinese migrants in Russia's provinces: Support for exclusionism, assessment of cultural distinctiveness, and perceived threat to Russia's security

		Least similar (%)	Pose strong threat (%)	Their number should be decreased (%)
			Sample location	
Russian Federation	Chechens	69.4	59.1	83.6
	Chinese	75.2	17.8	77.4
Moscow City	Chechens	62.8	57.3	82.2
	Chinese	69.2	18.7	76.8
Moscow Oblast	Chechens	77.9	56.4	86.2
	Chinese	85.0	22.6	83.1
Volgograd Oblast	Chechens	81.1	69.3	87.0
	Chinese	84.7	20.2	75.9
Orenburg Oblast	Chechens	77.4	63.2	82.5
	Chinese	86.5	24.5	78.6
Primorskii Krai	Chechens	58.1	48.9	76.1
	Chinese	69.1	40.2	80.5

Chechens as the least similar ethnic group. In other words, in all the regions where intergroup differentials were smaller than threat differentials, exclusionism was consistent with perceived threat. And in one province (Primorskii) where the intergroup differential was larger than threat differential, exclusionism was consistent with perceived cultural differences. It is also noteworthy that in Primorskii, the difference in the perceived cultural distance of Slavs vs. the Chechens and Slavs vs. the Chinese was consistent with the Russian average, while the difference in the perceived threat coming from the Chechens and the Chinese was less than half the Russian average. This means it was not intergroup differentials per se that mattered, but rather a disproportionately strong association of a particular ethnic group with security threat in a particular province (see Table 5.5).

The way respondents identified most important threats associated with migration in general is consistent with this logic. Primorskii Krai is again the litmus test. It was the only sample in which more respondents wanted to reduce the number of Chinese than they wanted to reduce the number of Chechens. It was the only sample in which the Chinese were seen as posing almost as strong a threat to Russia's security as the Chechens. And it was the only sample in which fewer than half of all respondents identified terrorism as the number one security threat associated with migrants. Given Primorskii's location and history, a

Table 5.5 Rankings of threats

Question: From the following list please select the number one threat that came to your mind when you answered the previous question [to what extent specific migrant minorities pose a security threat to Russia]

	Sample location				
	Russian Federation (%)	Moscow City (%)	Moscow Oblast (%)	Volgograd Oblast (%)	Orenburg Oblast (%)	Primorskii Krai (%)
Terrorism or banditry	72.9	78.6	67.3	77.9	72.8	44.8
Illegal settlement or residency	5.0	4.5	4.8	4.8	7.6	16.3
Territorial claims on Russia	5.4	4.2	6.1	6.1	4.9	12.4
Ethnic and religious hostility and violence	9.9	6.9	9.2	8.4	9.2	7.6
Undermining of Russia's economy	6.5	5.9	5.9	2.9	5.5	18.9
Displacement of the native population	.3		6.6			

significant threat to security associated with the Chinese had to do with fears that they may form illegal settlements and later claim sovereignty over the territories where these settlements are located. Compared with Russia's average, approximately three times as many respondents in Primorskii identified illegal settlement as a security threat and more than twice as many respondents in Primorskii viewed territorial claims as a tangible threat. Both have been most strongly associated with the Chinese migrants through public discourses on "demographic disbalance" and territorial disputes between Russia and China.

This also reflects the way in which in the RFE, predominantly short-term or "pendulum" Chinese migration raised concerns over the "true" intentions of both migrants and the Chinese government. In Siberia, the Omsk Oblast deputy governor, Alexei Kazannik, explained in the mid-1990s why local residents believed that seemingly innocuous migrant "shuttle" trade could lead to a Chinese takeover of Siberia: "From Chinese migrant to Chinese cultural center to Chinese company to Chinese worker and to Chinese soldier."[26] 26 In Vladivostok in the early 2000s, around the time of the Primorskii survey, the local

residents frequently reported to this author that temporary Chinese construction workers kept saying that "Eventually, all those things we build will be ours." Even though few of these migrant workers wanted to settle in the RFE, local residents ascribed to them the intent to claim Russia's territory.[27]

An additional and more refined test beautifully illustrates that seeing any given ethnic group as culturally distinct from one's own does not mean also seeing it as a security threat. In a separate question, respondents were asked to grade different ethnic groups on two positive and two negative characteristics—selfishness and aggressiveness vs. politeness and neatness. It turns out that in Primorskii the Chinese were seen as selfish by half as many respondents and as polite by twice as many respondents as elsewhere. They were viewed as aggressive and neat by about the same percentage of survey participants. At the same time, more than twice as many respondents as on average in Russia saw them as a security threat.

A control test examined the perceptions of Kazakhs (another Asian migrant group) and Russians from the former Soviet republics (an ethnic ingroup with respect to Slav respondents) in Volgograd and Orenburg Oblasts (Table 5.6). The results are suggestive of two patterns. First, with respect to an out-group (Kazakhs), the lack of correspondence among intergroup differentials, threat and exclusionism are even more profound than with respect to the Chinese and the Chechens. Contrary to the pattern with the Chechens and the Chinese, respondents in Volgograd and Orenburg saw the Kazakhs as a culturally "least similar" group (68 and 55 percent, respectively). And yet, only about 9 percent of respondents in Volgograd and 11 percent in Orenburg believed the Kazakhs were a strong security threat. But then nearly 62 percent of those surveyed in Volgograd and 54 percent in Orenburg wanted to see the number of Kazakhs in their provinces reduced. In contrast with attitudes to the Chechens and the Chinese, the correspondence here is with ethnic distinctiveness rather than with threat.

Second, for the ethnic ingroup (Russians from the Commonwealth of Independent States or the "near abroad"), perceptions of cultural distinctiveness aligned perfectly with threat valuation and exclusionism. In both provinces, the majority of respondents saw ethnic Russian migrants as the most culturally similar group, did not believe that Russians were a security threat, and wanted the number of Russians in their province to increase or stay the same.

To tease out how views on ethnic distinctiveness, threat, and exclusion vary at the level of individual respondents across survey samples, I ran one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests. This procedure examines whether individual responses in any given pair of provinces differ significantly from responses in any other province. In so doing, this statistical procedure reveals to what extent differences among individual respondents within a province diverge from one

Table 5.6 Perceptions and attitudes toward various ethnicitie

To what extent are the customs and behavior of members of each of the following ethnic groups, other than your own, similar to yours, overall?			To what extent do you think migrants of each of the following ethnic groups pose a threat to the security of Russia?			Talking about migrants of the following ethnic groups, would you prefer that the number of each one of them increased, stayed the same, or decreased?		
Volgograd Oblast								
	Kazakhs (%)	CIS Russians (%)		Kazakhs (%)	CIS Russians (%)		Kazakhs (%)	CIS Russians (%)
1–Least similar	68.6	6.3	1–No threat	29.3	57.6	Increased	3.5	44.7
2	13.9	3.1	2	19.6	14.4	Stayed the same	35.0	46.3
3	12.5	6.8	3	30.0	14.5	Decreased	61.5	9.0
4	3.0	18.8	4	12.3	10.7			
5	2.0	65.0	5	8.8	2.8			
Orenburg Oblast								
1–Least similar	55.0	10.0	1–No threat	35.1	72.3	Increased	6.0	44.0
2	13.7	4.7	2	23.4	14.9	Stayed the same	40.5	46.2
3	17.9	13.4	3	22.0	7.9	Decreased	53.5	9.9
4	9.1	18.1	4	8.7	1.3			
5	4.4	53.9	5	10.8	3.5			

another more or less than they diverge from individual responses in other provinces. The tests show that regional context was the principal determinant of perceived ethnic differences—in general accordance with expectations outlined earlier in this section. With respect to both Chechens and the Chinese, ANOVA produced nearly identical homogenous subsets of provinces. Valuations of ethnic difference correlated significantly within each subset but were not significantly correlated with other subsets. For perceived ingroup-Chechen and ingroup-Chinese cultural distinctiveness, one such homogenous subset included Moscow Oblast, Volgograd, and Orenburg—three overwhelmingly Slav-populated provinces where globalization had a lesser impact than in Moscow City and Primorskii Krai. The latter two formed a homogenous subset for

responses about the Chechens and two separate subsets with respect to the Chinese. This suggests that association of ethnic groups with threat at the regional level is significant, given Primorskii Krai's unique setting for Chinese migration.

The effects of province context, however, became more ambiguous with respect to perceived threat and exclusionism. The only constant on these dimensions was that Volgograd and Orenburg ended up in the same homogenous subsets. Primorskii Krai did not relate to any other subset of provinces on threat attributed to the Chinese. The Chinese factor came out as the strongest on exclusionism—all provinces clustered into one homogenous subset. This means that individual preferences for reducing the number of Chinese migrants did not differ significantly from the harmonized sample across the five provinces. Support for exclusion was about the same regardless of the province in which a respondent lived.

To summarize at this point, the distribution of survey responses shows that intergroup distinctiveness does not uniformly relate to antimigrant exclusionism. The latter arises from cumulative impacts of demographic, socioeconomic, and political context in a province, the saliency of issues related to migration in that province, and association of specific migrant groups with specific types of threats to national security. Yet the data are also suggestive of three ways in which cultural differentiation plays a specific part in opposition of immigration. First, when it came to cultural differentiation, respondents did not "sweat small stuff." They clearly saw the cultural fault line dividing ethnic Russian migrants from all other groups. This kin group vs. non–kin groups divide was the only one that mattered. Beyond that, respondents across five provinces did not systematically relate cultural differences *across* the non–kin groups to threat and exclusionism. This is a powerful finding, considering that cultural differences between the Chechens and the Asian ethnic groups are at least as pronounced as cultural differences between each of these groups and ethnic Russians. Similarly, finer distinctions between internal and external migrant groups did not relate consistently to threat and exclusionism as evidenced by strong exclusionist sentiments against the Chechens and the Kazakhs.

Second, consistent with earlier findings in social psychology, these results suggest that intergroup differentials—while not directly related to intergroup hostility—increase public sensitivity to threat, competition, and other challenges from out-groups that may fuel antimigrant sentiments. In other words, threat and cultural differentiation are interactive. The third finding, however, adds an important proviso to the way cultural differences and threat perceptions interact. A comparison of views on the Chinese, the Koreans, and the Vietnamese in Primorskii Krai indicates that it is not so much the underlying cultural differentials that galvanize and sharpen vulnerability to external threats but a general sense of security threat that is later projected onto specific groups and

galvanizes the sense of cultural distance. The general sense of threat arising from a province's remoteness, population differentials with migrant-sending states, and a history of border disputes explains a uniquely strong sense of threat associated with the Chinese migrants—in comparison with both other Asian ethnics in Primorskii and the Chechens and the Kazakhs in four other provinces.

The Security Dilemma, Competition, and Tolerance-Intolerance Asymmetry

To investigate the association between province context, ethnic differentials, and migration policy preferences I designed a quasi-experimental series of 64 multiple regression tests based on the 2005 Russian immigration attitudes survey. To isolate the effects of individual perceptions of intergroup differentials vs. regional (province) context and general migration issues vs. group-specific migration issues, I used a 2 × 2 cross-group and cross-issue research design. I ran these tests for four ethnic groups (Chechens, Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese) in Primorskii Krai and for two of these ethnic groups (Chechens and Chinese) in four additional provinces (Volgograd, Orenburg, Moscow City, and Moscow Oblast) and in the Russian Federation.

Three measures of migration policy preferences—the dependent variable—were used for each ethnic group in each province. The first measure was group-specific, asking respondents to indicate if they wanted the number of migrants belonging to each ethnic group to increase, stay the same, or decrease. (See Table 5.1.) The other two were general or non-group-specific measures. They are based on "mirror" questions in the survey that allow us to explore the putative asymmetries between support for migrant exclusion (intolerance) and inclusion (tolerance). Table 5.7 provides the frequencies for these two variables by province and demonstrates that this asymmetry matters. Antimigrant hostility may manifest itself in two ways—as either or both support for exclusion or opposition to inclusion of migrants. In the same way, acceptance of migrants may manifest itself as either or both support for inclusion or opposition to exclusion of migrants. As Table 5.7 shows, these "mirror" measures are not necessarily symmetric. For example, complete support for exclusion (wholesale deportation of migrants and their children from Russia) was approximately the same in Moscow City (28.4 percent) and Primorskii Krai (27.6 percent). But complete opposition to inclusion (granting all migrants permanent residency) was significantly stronger in Moscow City (40.0 percent) than in Primorskii (28.9 percent). A comparison of Volgograd and Primorskii on complete opposition to exclusion and complete support for inclusion offers an example of reverse asymmetry. For some other pairs of regions, these measures are symmetric both ways (e.g., Moscow Oblast vs. Volgograd).

Table 5.7   Preferences regarding status of migrants

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the problems arising from migrants' presence in Russia: "All migrants—legal and illegal—and their children should be deported to where they came from."

	Sample location					
	Russian Federation	*Moscow City*	*Moscow Oblast*	*Volgograd Oblast*	*Orenburg Oblas*	*Primorskii Krai*
Completely agree (%)	23.0	28.4	22.4	22.6	22.4	27.6
Mostly agree (%)	22.0	29.1	28.4	22.7	17.7	25.1
Mostly disagree (%)	36.3	32.4	40.9	39.7	38.1	32.8
Completely disagree (%)	18.7	10.2	8.3	15.0	21.9	14.5

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the problems arising from the migrants' presence in Russia: "All migrants and their children should be granted residency rights where they want to live."

	Sample location					
	Russian Federation	*Moscow City*	*Moscow Oblast*	*Volgograd Oblast*	*Orenburg Oblas*	*Primorskii Krai*
Completely agree (%)	9.1	4.1	2.5	8.5	18.1	3.6
Mostly agree (%)	25.7	16.7	21.0	29.5	26.3	25.4
Mostly disagree (%)	38.1	39.2	52.6	37.8	36.3	42.0
Completely disagree (%)	27.1	40.0	23.9	24.3	19.4	28.9

The distinction between group-specific and general measures is a powerful way to tease the effects of ethnic differentials on resistance to migration. To the extent that group-specific variables matter, tensions are ethnic or cultural; to the extent that non-group-specific variables matter, they are not.

For each of the three dependent variables and for each ethnic group in all provinces and in the Russian national sample, I ran separate tests with two sets of predictors (independent variables). The first set was group-specific; the second was general. For each, I constructed parallel measures of group distinctiveness, the security dilemma/threat perception, and competition. In both sets, I controlled for respondents' college education, income, age, and gender.

For group-specific measures of ethnic distinctiveness, I used survey items described earlier in this essay on perceived similarities of customs and behavior for each group (Table 5.2). For the general measure of intergroup distinctiveness, I used the following question: "How proud are you to be a member of your own ethnic group?" This measure has been shown to be a significant predictor of prejudice in comparative sociology and political psychology.[28]

The immigration security dilemma concept was measured on three dimensions—threat to state security, assessment of migration scale, and strength/weakness of government authority/state power. Respectively, group-specific measures were as follows: (1) the association of each migrant minority with threat (Table 5.3), (2) an estimate of the percentage of province population comprising migrants of each ethnic group, and (3) the capacity of each of the aforementioned groups to bribe Russian government officials. General (non-group-specific) measures for each of the security dilemma dimensions were as follows: (1) the association of migration with specific security threats (tested separately for each item in Table 5.5), (2) an estimate of the percentage of province population comprising all migrants, and (3) the sense of whether ethnic diversity strengthens or weakens Russia, of whether the federal government is capable of resolving interethnic conflicts, and of how much the province is isolated from Russia's federal government agencies and from their influence.[29] Finally, in group-specific tests I included an interaction term between the measure of cultural distinctiveness and security threat associated with each ethnic group.

Competition was measured on two dimensions that also resonate with the security dilemma complex as they reflect an enhanced sense of economic vulnerability in a province. In that sense, they both are sociotropic measures of a kind that predict ethnic intolerance in sociological research more consistently than individual-level measures.[30] The first dimension is economic benefit. It is based on the question "Looking into the future, approximately what percent of the native population of your province will benefit from the arrival of migrants in 10 years or so, given that the current migration policy remains unchanged?"

The prospective valuation here is shared with the security dilemma logic. The second measure is labor market competition. It is respondents' valuation on a standard four-point agreement scale with the statement "Migrants are taking up jobs that could be done by the native residents." These were used as general measures of economic benefits and competition. Regression factor scores of each item with the assessment by respondents of the overall impact on life in their province by each specific ethnic group provided corresponding group-specific measures.[31]

Principal Findings and Supplementary Test Results

As suggested in Part 1, neither perceived cultural distinctiveness nor threat turned out to be "magic bullets" that could explain variation in individual-level preferences for exclusion or inclusion of migrants in Primorskii Krai and elsewhere in Russia. Nor did regional context turn out to be an across-the-board factor in a sense that in none of the provinces I found that the same set of predictors explained all three measures of migration policy preferences for each ethnic group. However, 4 distinct patterns are evident in the 64 regression tests and in additional tests that I ran in Primorskii Krai to examine support for cross-cultural accommodation of Asian migrants:

1. Migrant exclusion/inclusion preferences were more strongly influenced by perceptions of general migration effects rather than of group-specific effects. This confirms the suggestive finding earlier about the greater importance of threat arising from political, demographic, and socio-economic context in a province vs. intergroup (cross-cultural) differentials. The design is shown in Figure 5.2. Each arrow (*a, b, c,* and *d*) represents separate regression tests. The analysis of the total variance in exclusion/inclusion preferences by region and by group shows a distinct pattern. On average, the relationship between group-specific causal variables and general measures of migrant exclusion/inclusion (Figure 5.2, arrow *b*) was the weakest (with the models explaining from 5 to 23 percent of variation in the outcome). The relationship between general (non-group-specific) predictors and general measures of exclusion/inclusion (arrow *d*) was the strongest (with the models explaining from 14 to 40 percent of variation in the outcome). The relationships along ethnic group lines (arrow *a*) were not as strong, explaining from 7 to 29 percent variation in exclusion/inclusion preferences.[32]

    These results are corroborated by supplementary tests. I used the same independent variables except for the distinctiveness-threat interaction terms and with the addition of perceived difference between

VARIABLES

INDEPENDENT (CAUSAL)   **DEPENDENT (OUTCOME)**

Group-specific   Group-specific

(a)

(b)   (c)

General (Exclusion
vs. Inclusion)

General

(d)

Figure 5.2 Quasi-experimental design of the analysis of migration policy preferences in Russia

migration scale at present and ten years into the future. As the outcome variables, I used regression factor scores that provided a measure of how much respondents who supported the increase or decrease of the number of Chechen, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean migrants also supported education and mass media in non-Slav languages. Overall, these tests revealed no systematic divergence by ethnic group in Primorskii.

a. Exclusionism came out as "umbrella exclusionism." It related to general perceptions more than group-specific perceptions (R Squares were systematically and substantially higher for tests using general measures, regardless of ethnic group).

b. Little to no relationship was found between cultural policy-exclusion preferences and perceived cultural difference by group.

c. No significant effects came from the sense that the number one threat posed by migrants to Russia's security was ethnic hostility and violence.

d. Consistent predictors across all ethnic groups were mostly non-cultural but related to security, ethnic population balances, state strength/weakness, economic benefits from migration, and sociodemographic characteristics of respondents (age, sex, income, and sometimes college education).

2. This analysis produced one strikingly strong, positive finding given the
    number of tests across five ethnic groups, five province samples, and
    the Russian national sample. Two predictors were statistically significant
    throughout—association of ethnic diversity with state strength/weak-
    ness and job competition.[33] Other measures of the same theories—the
    immigration security dilemma and labor market competition—were the
    second-best predictors. The assessment of migration scale, particularly
    of the Chechens and of the Chinese and the Vietnamese in Primor-
    skii Krai; the degree of threat associated with ethnic groups; the threat
    of territorial claims, illegal settlement, and terrorism; and the ten-year
    projection of the share of the province population that would benefit
    economically from migration and job competition associated with some
    migrant groups were significant in more than half the tests.[34]

    These findings validate the immigration security dilemma theory
    more so than they do the labor market competition theory. This is
    because the former emphasizes that negative economic effects of immi-
    gration themselves correlate with the sense of "emergent anarchy" or the
    weakness of government authority because migration, by its very nature,
    raises concerns that the government is incapable of defending the sover-
    eignty and security of a state. For that reason, from the security dilemma
    standpoint, perceived economic vulnerability and antimigrant hostil-
    ity do not have to be a function of migration scale and socioeconomic
    decline. In the context of Russia—a country stretching over 11 time
    zones that went through a decade of political instability and experienced
    a near collapse of state authority following the collapse of the Soviet
    Union and the "parade of sovereignties" by the provinces, followed by 2
    civil wars in the North Caucasus—the security dilemma explanation is
    particularly plausible.

    Conversely, actual migration scale and socioeconomic conditions are
    crucial from the standpoint of real or labor market competition theory.
    This intrinsic significance of migration scale is cogently summarized by
    McLaren: "if there are not many immigrants with whom to compete, it
    is less likely that citizens will be threatened by them, and thus willing to
    expel them."[35] Real competition theory also posits that this type of threat
    is going to be particularly acute in economically depressed areas with
    high rates of poverty and unemployment among the natives.[36]

    At the very least, it is clear from Table 5.8 that economic hardship and
    high migration rates around the time of the survey did not automatically
    trigger ethnically colored antimigrant hostility. In particular, general and
    group-specific exclusion sentiments ran highest and inclusion sentiments
    lowest precisely in Moscow City—the area with the lowest unemployment

Table 5.8 Socioeconomic conditions and ethnic demographics in survey provinces

Sample location	% Population below poverty line (2003)	% Unemployment (2003)	Per capita income, Rb (2003)	% Chechens (2002)	% Chinese (2002)	% Kazakhs (2002)
Russian Federation	21	8.6	5,162	n/a	n/a	n/a
Moscow City	25	1.3	16,827	.14	.12	.08
Moscow Oblast	20	4.3	4,425	.03	.003	.04
Volgograd Oblast	20	10.9	3,803	.45	.009	1.7
Orenburg Oblast	29	11.3	3,135	.09	.002	5.8
Primorskii Krai	38	7.9	4,246	.03	.185	.06

Note: Based on the Russian State Statistics Committee data for 2003 and the 2002 Russia Census data.

and highest income. The least migrant hostile and most migrant accepting province, Orenburg, had by far the highest unemployment rate and the lowest per capita incomes among the selected regions.

3. The findings revealed the asymmetry between migrant exclusion and inclusion preferences, running along the same lines as the asymmetry between tolerance and intolerance. The same predictors explained more variation in exclusion than in the inclusion measures. The models explained from 17 to 40 percent variation in support for deportation of all migrants and their children, but from 14 to 29 percent variation in support for granting all migrants permanent residency. This means that the same change in the explanatory variable accounted for more variation in exclusion than in inclusion preferences. This has far-reaching social and policy implications. It means that it is significantly easier for proexclusion rather than proinclusion sentiments to emerge and endure. It also means that a reduction in exclusion preferences does not automatically mean an increase in support for migrant inclusion. Additional tests showed, for example, that respondents who have college educations are less likely to support deportation, but they are not more likely to endorse permanent residency rights. On the other hand, cutting across the exclusion-inclusion asymmetry makes the association of ethnic diversity with state strength and job competition particularly robust predictors of migration policy preferences.

4. A certain pattern emerged between issue salience in a given region and the statistical significance of regression models. Systematically, the models explained less variation in the outcome variables in Volgograd and

Orenburg—both regions with the most limited globalization impacts of those selected, with modest migration, and with regional tolerance and ethnic relations programs. In fact, Orenburg—where the model had the weakest showing overall (explaining on average around 10 percent of variation in exclusion preferences)—is marked by proactive cross-cultural tolerance programs of the local government, with a former scholar on interethnic integration charged with their development and implementation. In the regions with more intense socioeconomic globalization and international migration (Moscow City and Primorskii Krai) the model performed the best, accounting on average for over 25 percent of variation in support for migrant exclusion. More generally, this suggests that exclusion predictors have thresholds or tipping points. It is likely that their effects become statistically significant only after perceptions captured by the independent variables reach a certain level of salience with a province population. Linear models that assume uninterrupted and monotonic relationship between variables cannot capture these threshold effects.

Implications: Cosmopolitanism, Localism, and Decentralism

The present study challenges the notion that globalization engenders opposition in the receiving societies because cosmopolitanism and increasing ethnic diversity challenge local cultural identities. This is particularly revealing in the case of anti-immigrant responses in Russia because migration puts a human, cultural face on globalization and because antimigrant hostility in Russia has been running high. If one considers that Russia became a globalizing and migration state relatively recently, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the simple and straightforward explanation of this hostility is intuitively appealing.

The present analysis does not deny that cosmopolitanism in the form of exposure to international migration produces hostile local responses. But it suggests a different and less-direct pathway from globalization to antiglobalization response. One may think of this pathway as decentralism. The contrast between these two implicit models is represented in Figure 5.3.

The principal and perhaps the most counterintuitive aspect of the decentralism view is that while globalization changes the nature of traditional threats to state sovereignty and security, it may simultaneously increase the *perception* that traditional threats are paramount. Specifically, globalization reduces the utility of territorial annexation and conquest, and yet it is precisely fear of the latter that explained particularly strong anti-Chinese views in Primorskii Krai in comparison not only to the Koreans and the Vietnamese but also to the Chechens.

The Culture Clash model:

Globalization ⟶ Cultural/ethnic ⟶ Intergroup ⟶ Cultural conflict
intermingling differentiation

The Decentralism model:

Traditional and new
security and econ threats

Globalization ⟶ Migration ⟶ Receiving ⤍ Ethnic/cultural ⟶ Anti-migrant
province/country markers ⤍ hostility
context

Uncertainty about government
authority/state power

NOTE:

⟶ - principal linkages
⤍ - secondary linkages

Figure 5.3 Two models of cultural opposition to globalization

The same logic may work with economic threats. On the one hand, globalization changes the nature of economic competition by presenting an outsourcing threat as a negative alternative and job diversification and business opportunity as a positive alternative to traditional labor market competition within a state. On the other hand, in the present study these considerations, if anything, failed to make migration more attractive. Support for restrictionist antimigrant policies had a strikingly robust association precisely with traditional job competition—particularly with respect to numerically marginal migrant groups such as the Chechens and the Chinese across provinces with widely varying socioeconomic conditions and migration trends.

The term decentralism captures three crucial aspects of the antimigration story that emerges from this analysis. First, it refers to processes such as migration that happen to a large extent "below" or outside state control and represent diverse—or "decentered"—social and economic activities. Second, it captures the core concept of the immigration security dilemma, that is, uncertainty about the strength of central authority arising from the sense that migrants make state borders penetrable and may also "melt" into the receiving societies and be hard to police. Third, and interrelated with the first two, the receiving province context is crucial. One may say this is the strongest predictor of anti-migrant hostility because it determines the plausibility of putative security and economic effects of migration—particularly, the sense of diversity contributing to state power and the sense of economic competition.

Cultural differentiation and the distinctions of custom and behavior still matter—but they only come out as significant correlates of migration policy to the extent that they resonate with these security and economic contexts within a province. Province may not be everything, but the way these factors congeal at the province level is decisive in the formation of migration policy preferences and, for that matter, to public responses to globalization more broadly defined.

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30. See James L. Gibson, "Enigmas of Intolerance," *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 1 (2006): 21–34.

31. Obtained through principal component analysis of the respective survey items.

32. The effects of general measures of migration effects on migrant exclusion/inclusion (arrow *c*) were only slightly weaker, with the model explaining approximately 7 to 20 percent of variation in the outcome.

33. For each dependent variable, these predictors were significant in the Russian national sample and in three or four out of five province samples.

34. In supplementary tests of cultural exclusion/inclusion in Primorskii Krai, the most significant predictors were for the most part the same across groups and represented the immigration security dilemma logic (association of diversity with state strength and threats of illegal settlement, economy undermining, and territorial claims).

35. Lauren McLaren, "Anti-immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants," *Social Forces* 8 (2003: 916).

36. This perspective is consistent with broader arguments about zero-sum competition for resources and living space as the principal driver of intergroup and interstate conflict that had been advanced by classical political realists. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). It also encompasses the rational choice theory emphasis on private self-interest as the determinant of political behavior: Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, *Journal of Political Economy* 65, no. 2 (1957): 135–50; Benjamin I. Page, "Elections and Social Choice: The State of the Evidence," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (1977): 639–68; and the underlying public attitudes in Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960); Seymor M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1960). One of the best exponents of the size-hostility linkage in the "realistic threat" paradigm is Susan Olzak's analysis of the relationship between immigration patterns and interethnic conflict and violence in major American cities at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992), 78, 242–243; she found that change in overall immigration rates had a significant effect on antiblack violence. In Olzak's studies, migration size is a crucial underlying component of "competitive exclusion" and intergroup violence, because size was the principal driver of socioeconomic "niche overlap and competition," of which one of the most explicit manifestations was the physical length of "a racial job queue" (209, 210). Olzak's studies also reflect theoretical insights of ecological competition theories, notably, Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). Other studies, such as Mark

A. Fossett and K. Jill Kiecolt, "The Relative Size of Minority Population and White Racial Attitudes," *Social Science Quarterly* 70 (1989): 820–35; Michael W. Giles and Kaenan Hertz, "Racial Threat and Partisan Identification," *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 317-326; James Glaser, "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South," *Journal of Politics* 56 (1994): 21-41; Lawrence D. Bobo, "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations," *Journal of Social Issues* 55 (1999): 445–72; Lawrence Bobo and Vincent L. Hutchings, "Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 951–72; and Lincoln Quillian, "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe," *American Sociological Review* 60 (1995): 585–611 directly inferred racial threat from statistically significant relationships they found between the concentration of ethnoracial minorities and antiminority and anti-immigrant attitudes. In this sense, they linked antimigrant attitudes in theory to the same socioeconomic competition factors that would make little sense if the influx of migrants was marginal and did not tangibly affect economic conditions.

CHAPTER 6

Cultural Transition and Village Discourse in Twentieth-Century China

Huaiyin Li

The transformation of political culture in twentieth-century China has been one of the central issues in past studies of Chinese politics, most of which have focused on intellectual trends and ideological confrontations at the national levels—ranging from the enlightenment movement during the May Fourth period to "bourgeois liberalization" in the 1980s and the dispute between neoliberalism and neoleftism in the 1990s and early 2000s.[1] By and large, two grand narratives have shaped the literature, both of which have assumed the failure of state making in the late Qing and early Republican periods as a taken-for-granted fact. The modernization narrative, prevailing in the writings of liberal intellectuals, interprets the first three decades of the twentieth century as a series of China's frustrations in borrowing democracy and science from the West and a dark age in which warlordism and imperialism inflicted unprecedented agonies and distress upon the Chinese nation. The revolutionary narrative, embraced by Marxist intellectuals in their interpretation of modern China, sees those failures as the cause behind the rise and triumph of the Communist revolutions.[2]

What is often missing in the grand narratives, however, is a discussion of the political process at the local level, especially the changes and continuities in political culture in village communities. This essay contributes to the scholarship on cultural transition in modern China by examining the actual transformation of popular views of power and its impact on local governance during the process of political modernization. More specifically, it scrutinizes how the introduction of modern government institutions together with new concepts about leadership engendered tension and conflicts in the village society where

traditional political culture and practices remained powerful. Findings from this empirical study shed light on the dual process of cultural transformation in a traditional society undergoing modernization: the interaction between visible sociopolitical institutions and the invisible, subtle group values, the mutual penetration between the traditional "local knowledge" pertaining to leadership and legitimacy, and the political discourse of the modern nation-state.

Drawing on government archives from Huailu county of Hebei province regarding disputes over the newly created village head office in the 1920s and 1930s, this study first investigates changes in the shared values and mentalities pertaining to the holding and exercise of power in peasant communities and consequent adjustments in the strategies of legitimization, competition, and operation of village leadership. It reveals two salient changes in this regard. One has to do with the legitimization of office holding. My analysis of the disputes over village head positions show that what justified the occupation or resignation of the village head office was not merely the traditional values that stressed the reputation and personalities of the leaders and their omnipotent role in community governance. Equally important were the modern ideas introduced from outside that emphasized the officeholder's education, appropriate age, and formal election to the office. What happened to the village communities in the early twentieth century, therefore, were not only profound changes in administrative institutions and power configurations but also significant changes in village discourses on local leadership. It is in this context of changing perceptions of community leaders and of mutual penetration between the official representation and popular notions that various forms of local power operated, rivaled, and struggled for dominance. The village notables had to translate into consciousness both indigenous and externally imposed assumptions concerning their roles when interacting with the community. It was on the basis of internalized ideas about village leadership that power contenders formulated their representations and shaped their strategies of mutual rivalry.

This chapter further examines changes in the way the villagers perceived what was legitimate in their everyday social and economic activities. Traditionally, they adhered to the rules and regulations indigenous to their communities when involved in disputes. And very often they defended their stance by accentuating a shared notion about the supremacy of "village regulations" in local society. This situation began to change in the early twentieth century when the local inhabitants were exposed to the formal institutions implemented nationally. Their acceptance of the supremacy of legal codes and legal principles in public debate is evidence that the state systems and discourses slowly yet steadily penetrated rural communities. Rural China in the 1910s through the 1930s, therefore, was not as insulated as the conventional wisdom has suggested but

rather was undergoing a process of modern transformation that brought about significant institutional and discursive changes. These changes have universal implications for understanding the process of cultural transitions in modernizing societies.

Local Governance in Twentieth-Century China

A major change in the political system in twentieth-century China was the penetration of state power into rural society through the formalization of local administrative institutions. To understand how the transition from informal practices in village governance to the formal government system affected the popular values and perceptions of power and power holding in the peasant community, it is necessary to begin with a survey of the institutional changes in local governance during the Qing and Republican periods.

Informal Practices under the Qing

The formal bureaucratic system in late imperial China stopped at the county (*xian*) level, with the magistrate position as one of the lowest in the administrative hierarchy. Below the county were rural households organized into decimal groupings called *lijia* for household registration and tax collection and into another set of decimal groupings called *baojia* for neighborhood surveillance. In the eighteenth century, the *baojia* further assumed the functions of tax collection after the state abandoned the *lijia* system. Local *baojia* practice always deviated from the state's design and varied from place to place.[3] In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Huailu county, what prevailed was a form of voluntary cooperation among villagers who shouldered administrative tasks that should have been performed by the *baojia* personnel. The key position in the cooperation was the *xiangdi*, who performed a variety of tasks delegated by the county magistrate and at the same time served the needs of fellow villagers. This was evident in his roles in all activities pertaining to land taxation. Unlike the statutory tax system that required villagers to pay taxes individually, a common practice in Huailu and neighboring counties was for the *xiangdi* to pay in advance all the taxes of the community members during the collection period, using public village funds or loans; he then collected his monies from individual households after the taxes had been paid. The villagers preferred this cooperative arrangement because the *xiangdi's* collective payment of taxes saved them the time and expense of delivering the taxes individually. Moreover, it precluded the intrusion into local communities of tax-prompting yamen runners under the official tax system and also made it impossible for tax farmers from outside to extort additional taxes from individual taxpayers, a phenomenon not uncommon in many parts of North China.

Village Government after 1900

After 1900, North China villages underwent many institutional changes as a result of the implementation of the New Policy (*xinzheng*) for economic, educational, and administrative modernization. By and large, we can identify two phases in which these changes took place. The first was the late Qing and early Republican period from 1904 to 1927. The most important development during those years was the introduction of the "self-government" (*difang zizhi*) program, especially the creation of the village head (*cunzheng* or *cunzhang*) position and the establishment of new-style primary schools in many villages. Candidates for the village head position, according to official regulations, had to have an established reputation in the local community and a minimum level of literacy to hold the office. Clearly, the state expected local notables, who had been assisting the yamen in rural administration through informal channels, to fill the newly created village office.

The second period was the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Guomindang government took further measures to penetrate rural society such as the installation of a formal government at the ward (*qu*) level and the reorganization of village government into artificial administrative units called *xiang*. In Huailu, eight ward governments (*qu gongsuo*) were created in 1930. The 211 natural villages were organized as 182 *xiang* (the 7 market towns were expanded to 12 *zhen*) and later increased to 204 *xiang*. Therefore, most of the *xiang* remained identical to the natural villages. As the new *xiangzhang* office came into being, the *xiangdi* and village head positions disappeared altogether.[4]

The aforementioned transition from the endogenous *xiangdi* system to the imposed *xiangzhang* system necessarily incurred changes in the villagers' perceptions of local leadership and its legitimacy. Therefore, we need to further address the following questions: what kind of rules and values sustained the operation and perpetuation of the traditional *xiangdi* system; to what extent did the old practices and notions survive and condition the new changes in the twentieth century; to what extent did the villagers accept the externally imposed values; and what implications do these phenomena have for understanding the persistence and changes of village discourse in the modern era?

Village Regulations and Peasant Values

To ensure the smooth operation of the *xiangdi* system, villagers in Huailu created various rules, known as "village regulations" (*cungui*) or "local regulations" (*xianggui*). The importance of the *cungui* was evident in disputes over the *xiangdi* service. When filing a complaint, for example, a plaintiff always accused his or her opponent of "violating the village regulation" (*pohuai cungui*). His or

her petition typically began with a summary of the regulation on the selection of the *xiangdi*, and ended with a request for a just ruling in order to "remedy the [disrupted] village regulation" (*yi zheng cungui*) or to "preserve the old regulation" (*baocun jiugui*).[5] In his initial reaction to the complaint, the magistrate normally instructed the community leader (usually the village head) to mediate the dispute in accordance with local regulations. If the mediation was successful, the village head would report back that the dispute had been settled in compliance with the village regulations. If the dispute evolved into a court session, the magistrate would invariably adhere to local regulations in making a ruling. In no dispute did I find any villagers who openly challenged their *cungui*; instead, they unanimously acknowledged the central importance of the regulations in community life. When they quarreled, it was usually not about the regulation itself but about their own qualifications or lack of qualifications for serving the *xiangdi* as measured against the *cungui*.

It is obvious that endogenous regulations, rather than state laws, played a critical role in sustaining the *xiangdi* system. It should be noted that the prevalence of informal practices in village governance was not limited to Huailu but widely seen in rural China; informality prevailed not only in tax collection and security control but also in other realms of governance, such as civil justice.[6] A salient feature of the traditional pattern of local governance in imperial China, therefore, was the preponderance of local, informal practices over statutory, formal systems.

The village regulations are critical to our analysis of the peasant society, for they not only guided economic practices and social exchanges in peasant communities but also reflected the shared principles and normative commitments of community members. Central to the village norms and peasant values was reciprocity, the mutual obligations and rights of community members. This was evident in the *cungui* pertaining to the annual rotation of *xiangdi* service, tax collection and payment, and sales of land and housing in Huailu villages. All these arrangements sought to achieve a balance of duties and privileges between those who offered a service and those who received it.

By the *cungui* in most Huailu villages, the *xiangdi* had the duty to pay in advance taxes on behalf of his fellow villagers; in return, the villagers had the obligation to repay him before a designated date. Likewise, according to the *cungui*, the *xiangdi* was responsible for all the costs associated with his payment of the taxes, especially the interest he paid on loans for tax payment and his travel expenses to the county seat to deliver the taxes, and the villagers compensated the *xiangdi* by allowing him to act as a middleman in the sale of all kinds of commodities and paying him a commission. To ensure the *xiangdi's* prerogatives as a middleman, the village regulations usually required the sellers or the buyers to ask the *xiangdi* to be their middleman, and the *xiangdi*, in turn,

had the right to demand a commission from the seller or the buyer regardless of whether he actually acted as middleman in the sale.

Not surprisingly, transactions without the *xiangdi* as middleman were treated as "illegitimate sales and purchases" (*simai simai*). A villager called Zhang Taoqi, for instance, was accused by a *xiangdi* of illegitimately selling 3.5 mu of land for 146,000 *wen* and of selling his house for 88 yuan. In that *xiangdi's* opinion, "it is downright intolerable in both human feeling and reasoning [*qingli nanrong*] that I suffered the harms [of advancing his taxes] while I was kept from enjoying the benefits [to be his middleman]."[7]

No less important was the villagers' shared assumption about the right to subsistence, which was pronounced in the *cungui* pertaining to the selection of the *xiangdi*. In most communities, the *cungui* also linked the burden of *xiangdi* service to one's landholding or tax liability. Usually the larger the tax quota a household owed, the earlier and longer it was to furnish the *xiangdi* service. In many villages, people thus created a list of *xiangdi* candidates according to their tax quotas, and each household on the list had to take turns serving as the *xiangdi*.[8] Alternatively, the villagers based the sequence and duration of their *xiangdi* rotation on landholdings. This was especially true where the tax quotas of individual households deviated from their actual landholdings, resulting in the unequal distribution of the tax burden among the landowners. To alleviate the burden of small landowners and ensure the smooth working of the village regulation, it was necessary to base the *xiangdi* service on landholdings rather than on tax quotas. The minimum amount of land that necessitated one-year's *xiangdi* service ranged from 10 to 20 mu. In Nanzhuang village, for example, the village regulation stipulated that households having 20 mu of land serve as *xiangdi* for 1 year, those with 40 mu for 2 years, those with 60 mu for 3 years, and so forth.[9] The village regulation of Mazhuang was more sophisticated. Here, households with 100 mu of land or more were to serve as *xiangdi* for 1 year. Households with less than 100 mu but more than 10 mu had to form groups that together owned 100 mu in total and serve as the *xiangdi* collectively.[10]

Most villages in Huailu were communities predominantly of landowners with farms of 10 to 20 mu or more, who usually met the minimum requirement for one-year's *xiangdi* service. Therefore, most households were involved in the *xiangdi* service. Landless or land-poor peasants with farms smaller than 10 or 20 mu, who accounted for 10 to 40 percent of all households, were not included among the *xiangdi* candidates. This, however, does not mean that the rich excluded the poor from enjoying the *xiangdi*'s privileges. In fact, under most circumstances, serving as a *xiangdi* entailed a burden rather than a profiteering opportunity, for the cost of *xiangdi* service normally outweighed the compensation it was allowed. Exempting the poor from the *xiangdi* service while allowing

them to take advantage of the *xiangdi*'s advance payment of taxes, therefore, was a beneficial arrangement rather than a deprivation.

The poor were able to free ride under the *xiangdi* system for two reasons. Their financial circumstances made it impossible for them to pay advance taxes for their fellow villagers or to pay the interest out-of-pocket, as required by many villages. Forcing the poor to serve as *xiangdi* thus would jeopardize the smooth working of the cooperative system, which would in turn threaten the joint benefit enjoyed by the rest of the community. Free riding was thus a "rational" option. But this is not a sufficient explanation for their free riding, for we may ask why other landowners or contributors to the *xiangdi* system did not simply exclude the poor from their cooperative system. We must remember that those with less land were not outsiders or strangers to the majority in the community. They were the neighbors, friends, and kinsmen of the contributors. It was morally unjustifiable for the relatively wealthier households to limit the joint goods to themselves, disregarding the disadvantaged in their neighborhood. The individual payment of taxes by the poor would be even more uneconomical since their number was even fewer and many were already on the verge of subsistence. To ensure their survival and the solidarity of the community, it was morally necessary to give the poor access to the joint goods even though they did not contribute to their production.

Clearly, what was at work under the *xiangdi* system was a survival ethic embedded in the homogeneous communities of mainly kinsmen and owner-cultivators. By imposing more duties on those of means, and at the same time allowing those in poverty to share the benefits of cooperation at no cost, the community produced a "redistributive effect" among the community members.[11] Contrary to the rational-choice assumption that an effective and durable cooperative system must do away with free riding, the regulations of peasant society such as the villages of Huailu constituted both a rational arrangement for producing collective goods that could not be achieved by individual efforts and a redistributive method of protecting the disadvantaged and maintaining village cohesiveness.

It is clear, then, that two sets of village regulations bolstered the *xiangdi* system. One set, regarding the selection of the *xiangdi*, linked *xiangdi* service with taxpayers' landholding or tax liability. The other had to do with the mutual rights and obligations between the *xiangdi* and taxpayers. It must be emphasized that although such regulations existed in almost every community in Huailu county and were acknowledged by all community members, they usually lacked codified texts and were orally passed on from generation to generation of local dwellers. They surfaced in public discussion and came to the attention of the government only when disputes arose among the villagers. To the extent that these local regulations, as well as the villagers' shared beliefs about their roles

in community life, formed a body of knowledge that was linked with a specific locale, we may label them as a sort of "local knowledge."[12] Such knowledge, needless to say, would predominate in the peasant world until the advent of state penetration under the name of modernization that brought about new notions to the village community.

Between Tradition and Modernity: Village Leadership after 1900

Village governance in late Qing and early Republican China underwent a transition from the informal practices based on local regulations to the formal administrative system imposed by the state. Central to this transition was the process by which community members established and accepted the new leadership. Before the twentieth century, a person had to strive to act in compliance with the popular image of a desirable community leader in order to legitimize and perpetuate his dominance. The legitimacy of his leadership, in other words, was based on the wide recognition and acceptance of his authority in the community, which were in turn linked with his adherence to the values and norms of community members.[13] In the context of state-making and increasing influence from outside in the early twentieth century, however, the process of legitimization could never be limited to the village community. As a position imposed from outside, the legitimacy of being a village head was closely linked with the government's representation and endorsement of the office; this was especially true when the state itself still more or less maintained its own legitimacy to govern the society, thus remaining influential in the community to varying degrees. To understand the process of legitimization, then, we need to consider both the values and attitudes of local communities and external influences on office holding.

To illustrate the changing notions of local leadership and their effect on power relations, the following discussion focuses on disputes over the village head service in the early Republican years. These disputes often centered on people's qualifications for the position. These qualifications included the incumbent or would-be village head's age and literacy, his personality and social background, his moral standing and ability to handle public matters, and, no less important, how he was selected. I will show that the villagers' view of what constituted a qualified village head was a mixture of their traditional notion of a virtuous community leader and the official vision of a formally elected, capable government officer of proper age. Their changing perceptions of community leadership directly shaped their strategies in dealing with lawsuits.

Traditional Values

One such dispute took place in Yaojiali. In 1919, Yao Hanjie, a teacher of the village, initiated a lawsuit against Yao Chengshen, who was 68 and had served as village head for 16 years and as schoolmaster for 8 years. In his initial plaint, Hanjie explained Chengshen's disqualification for the posts he had held. The village head, accused the teacher, "is totally illiterate, temperamental, and likes to shout abuses in the street . . . Those who have tried to argue with him always have gotten scolded and therefore they are all discontented with him." These shortcomings, together with the village head's tampering with public funds, disqualified him for the village head service, concluded the teacher. In his defense, the village head emphasized his past good service and his reputation among the villagers. "The village head office," he explained, "can only be filled by those with a villagewide reputation and upright moral standing. Though not talented, I have been doing things impartially and without misconduct for several decades since I became a village head."[14]

The image of a qualified village head as suggested previously did not completely square with either that of a traditional community leader or that of the village head as envisioned by the state. Emphasis on the village head's personality was more of a traditional value than an official requirement. Its origins can be found in Confucian tradition, which advocated the exemplary role of "gentlemen" (*junzi*) in moral indoctrination. To have a "hot temper" or to "shout abuses in the street" as village head Yao did was considered a severe defect that would disqualify one for this official service.

Moral standing was another factor that affected eligibility for village head service. The reputation of a village head, like that of a traditional community leader, lay not only in his ability to extend patronage to community members but also in his observance of community norms and the virtues associated with a community leader.[15] An ideal village head should be just and impartial in handling public businesses while moral and beyond reproach in private life. The phrases used most often to describe a candidate's qualifications for the office of village head were "a person of good moral standing" (*renping duanzheng*), "impartial and gentle" (*zhongzheng heping*), "upright and selfless" (*zhengzhi wusi*), and "unselfish in public business" (*bangong wusi*).[16] Deviation from community norms would subject the candidate to the villagers' censure and disqualify him for village leadership.

Illicit sex, probably more than anything else, damaged one's community standing. A case in point was a dispute in Dongkun village, in which Zhang Shijun, the village schoolmaster, attempted to remove Zhang Henian from the village head post because he had had an illicit affair with a "bandit woman." The village head denied the accusation. But he admitted later, in his second

counterplaint, that he had had sex with the schoolmaster's "unmarried, beautiful" third daughter when he was still in his early twenties. The magistrate, therefore, removed him from office.[17]

Indulgence in gambling could similarly damage one's eligibility for village leadership. Thus, when villagers of Daguo tried to prevent an unpopular figure, named Du Zhixiang, from taking over the village head position from his deceased father, they accused Du of being addicted to gambling. According to their plaint, Du "used to invite people to gamble in groups," and his only purpose was to "cheat others out of their money and property." Du thus was clearly unqualified for the village head position.[18] Although the magistrate rejected the villagers' plaint, this incident shows the damage that immoral conduct could cause to one's reputation in the community and qualification for village service.

Modern Notions

It should be noted that villagers did not resort simply to traditional values or community norms when fighting unqualified leaders. Living in the twentieth century under the influence of a national discourse on local "self-government," they also turned to official regulations about offices to justify their claims and accusations. Those regulations emphasized one's proper education, age, and popular support through a formal election as the essential qualifications for the village head office. Whether or not the incumbent or would-be village head candidate met these regulations thus often became the focus of his disputes with fellow villagers.

In the aforementioned dispute from Yaojiali village, for instance, the teacher Hanjie repeatedly accused the village head Chengshen of his illiteracy, claiming that the village head's "lack of minimum literacy" had led to his "contempt for school affairs" and "destruction of the village's education." He also attacked the village head on his old age, saying that "being close to his seventies, [Chengshen] is muddleheaded in handling public business."[19] In the teacher's opinion, the village head's old age and illiteracy disqualified him from continuing his job.

Illiteracy and old age, while used as disqualifications for village head service, could also be used as good excuses for quitting or evading this office when it became a burden rather than a desired job. Liu Yurui, vice-head of Xujiazhuang, age 63 in 1926, described himself as "old and infirm, thus unable to handle public matters," when petitioning for retirement. At the same time, he recommended Hu Yuancheng as his successor, describing him as a person "from a well-to-do family and of good character, competent in writing, and impartial in handling official business." Hu, nine years older even than Liu and unwilling to take the vice-head office, described himself as "over 70 years old, walking with difficulty, coughing and spitting all the time, unable to read a single character,"

and thus "unable to take on the vice-head's duties."[20] In another instance, Zhang Xiulin, 62, head of Zhangjiazhuang village, petitioned for retirement in 1919 on the grounds that he had become "incompetent [for the office] because of old age" and was "mediocre, stupid, ignorant, and lacking virtues and abilities."[21]

All these cases suggest the villagers' acceptance of the official notions about local leadership. Old age had long been seen as an asset rather than a liability in community service. The elders were usually among the most respected and influential people in the community, who held positions such as head of intra-village or transvillage associations and clan organizations. However, from the viewpoint of the twentieth-century state, such people were not suitable candidates for the village government, for the new officeholders were to shoulder proliferating duties in local administration and taxation that required ample energy. An ideal village head should be a person "in the prime of life, energetic and strong" (*nianli jingzhuang* or *nianli zhengqiang*).[22] Viewing old age as a disqualification for village service or using it as an excuse for evading this service reflected the villagers' reaction to the state's purpose and was a departure from their traditional values.

The election of village heads offers us another case to judge the villagers' changing notion of legitimacy. By regulation, a village head had to be chosen in a villagewide election. The magistrate, as a rule, only appointed candidates who were ostensibly selected through formal elections. In most cases, the villagers did respond to the state's requirement and reported such an election when asking the magistrate for a formal appointment. Once a dispute over village office service occurred, whether the disputant had assumed or quit his office through a legitimate procedure could become the focus of arguments.

Thus Hu Yuancheng, a plaintiff from Xujiazhuang village who was unwilling to be a vice-head, charged Liu Yurui, the incumbent vice-head, with "reporting to the court in secret a fabricated nomination of him as vice-head candidate without a proper election in compliance with state law." "If he wants to quit his vice-head position," complained Hu, "Liu should have observed the official law and invited all villagers to elect a proper person by ballot to take over his office." In order to prevent Liu from quitting his office and thus shirking his duty to share the burden of military levies imposed on the village, the village head repeated Hu's charge and accused Liu of a "false nomination of vice-village head, which was based on merely his personal, selfish opinion." Like Hu, the village head emphasized the proper procedure to quit public service. "Even if Liu is unwilling to be a vice-head," claimed the village head, "he should remain in office until the expiration of his tenure. Only then could he retire by asking the *xiangdi* to assemble all of the villagers to elect a candidate in accordance with established regulations."[23]

In other disputes, those who attempted to remove village heads invariably emphasized that they had done so through legitimate procedures. The teacher from Yaojiali claimed in his initial plaint that the person who was to replace the incumbent village head had been selected through a "villagewide public election" (*hexiang gongju*).[24] The schoolmaster from Dongkun village also claimed that to replace the village head, the vice-head of the village had beat the gong around the village to bring the villagers together, and the new village head had been elected by "public discussion of the whole village" (*hecun gongyi*).[25] Charging their village head with a variety of misconduct, the *xiangdi* from Qiejiazhuang asserted that they had ousted the head owing to "public anger" expressed by over one hundred households of the village and that they had held a "public election by ballot" (*toubiao gongju*) to find a proper candidate.[26]

It is difficult to determine if these elections were mere formalities or if they were seriously conducted. But one thing is quite obvious from the preceding cases. Once a dispute took place, whether or not the village head had assumed or resigned office through a legal procedure became a focal point of the dispute. Compliance with the state law became as important as personality and reputation in determining the village head's legitimacy.

In sharp contrast with the selection of the *xiangdi* in which endogenous village regulations played a decisive role, state regulations predominated in the selection of village heads. The candidates' compliance with the government's requirements on age, education, and a formal election became as important as character and moral conduct in determining their qualification for the post. The villagers' idealized image of a moral, virtuous, and even-tempered village head chosen by a legal election from those of proper age, then, indicates both the continuation of traditional norms and a growing national influence on the peasant communities.

From the Local to the National: Changing Perceptions of Legitimacy under the Guomindang State

The foregoing discussion has shown how the nationwide systems and standards eroded and even replaced local practices in village governance. State-making in twentieth-century China, as discussed in the preceding pages, was not limited to the institutional changes; accompanying the imposition of a formal administrative system was the penetration of a national discourse into the peasant community, which had profound impact on villagers' perception of legality and legitimacy. The late 1920s and 1930s under the Guomindang government witnessed not only the reorganization of local administrative systems but also the further transition in village discourse from the shared assumption of the supremacy of indigenous values and norms to the wide acceptance of the

priority of national goals and standards over the local ones. The ultimate goal of the Guomindang regime was to transform rural governance from a system based on elite leadership and endogenous institutions to one based on state-imposed institutions and to change the popular view of legitimacy from one based on traditional notions and local practices to the one based on nationwide standards and formal, legal principles. Thus, in addition to creating a nation-wide administrative system reaching all the way down to the village and house-holds, the new regime made great efforts to indoctrinate the rural populace with its nationalist ideas and to transform them from members dependent on their communities or clans into citizens of a modern society. For the Guomind-ang state-makers, the transformation of the consciousness and awareness of the people, or "nation-building" as social scientists would call it, was as important as the transformation of the administrative framework, or "state-making" itself.

In the Name of State Law

To assess the effects of the reorganization in village society, especially changes in the consciousness of the villagers, the following is an examination of two dis-putes. One took place in Shangzhuang village between the *xiangzhang* named Yang Lianyun and the vice-*xiangzhang* named Lu Guanguang. On January 17, 1934, Yang invited Lu and some other villagers to discuss the village's public account and allocate the balance left over from the prior year to individual households. The two village leaders quarreled when Lu insisted that the *xiang-zhang* clarify all details and damaged the account book by ripping out some pages. The county head responded to their lawsuit by asking the ward head to conduct mediation between the two disputants. As it turned out, this old approach to administrative disputes left enough room for the working of local power relations, and Lu survived Yang's vigorous counterattacks, thanks to his friendship with the ward head.[27]

To understand this dispute, an analysis of the two disputants' backgrounds is necessary. Lu Guanguang was able to be a vice-*xiangzhang* because he had sup-port from his descent group, which was one of the two largest descent groups in the community. According to Yang's accusation, Lu had "bribed" members of his group to vote for him during an election held at the end of 1932. Even more important for Lu, however, was his relationship with the ward head. As a member of the literati with wide connections outside the village, Lu was able to build a friendship with the ward head, and the latter in return relied on the cooperation of local elites such as Lu during his term of office. Clearly, it was a combination of these traditional factors that encouraged Lu to be aggressive and arrogant in dealing with the *xiangzhang* over the financial matter. Yang, in con-trast, came from a relatively small lineage of the village. Yet most of the villagers

had supported his election as *xiangzhang*. In his consecutive plaints against Lu, the *xiangzhang* was always able to obtain signatures from the other vice-*xiangzhang*, the three supervisory committee members, and even all the *lüzhang*. This indicates that Yang maintained his influence mainly by his popularity, rather than the support of his own clan. His reputation in the community allowed him to firmly control the position through the annual reelection and even defy the authority of the ward head, as seen in this case. Because of his popularity in the community, Yang was able to control the village government and challenge Lu.

Although the sources of power and the relationship between the powerful figures in the village remained largely unchanged in the 1930s, they did use new strategies. Like the disputants in the previous case, the litigants borrowed a new language and legal methods from the Nationalists. The political discourse of the Nationalists had two targets: imperialism in international relations and tyrants (*tuhao lieshen*) in domestic politics. Mr. Yang labeled Lu as a "native tyrant" in intravillage politics. In his representation, Lu was a typical native tyrant: "Counting on his close relations with the ward head, this native bully has been reckless in the community. Give him an inch and he'll take an ell. So arbitrary in the locality and oppressive to the people was he that the villagers were simply terror-stricken upon hearing his name. They were all forced to keep their resentment to themselves." For Yang, depicting Lu as a native tyrant and portraying him as the enemy of the Nationalist revolution was no doubt the most eloquent way to make his claim legitimate and forceful.

Another strategy used by Yang was to turn to legal regulations. Destroying the account book, from villagers' traditional point of view, might be just a trivial matter of the community, or at most a transgression that deserved public denouncement. In this dispute, however, Yang treated it as a violation of state law that was subject to prosecution. He cited article 144 of the Republican penal code and insisted that destruction of the public account book was a felony. This kind of crime, Yang argued, subjected the perpetrator to punishment "by the law of both China and foreign countries." Not only did Lu violate the law, but even the ward head, according to Yang, was "in infraction of the law" for merely inviting Lu to the ward office "in his personal name" for a "secret talk" rather than in his official capacity.[28] Clearly, Yang was no longer using local regulations or a communal sense of right and wrong to fight his opponent, but he externally imposed legal standards that were supposed to be more legitimate in justifying his claim.

The Triumph of the National over the Local

Another dispute took place between Fan and Tan villages over the allocation of their respective duties in paying "miscellaneous levies" (*zapai*), such as the

mandatory supply of carts, horses, mules, laborers, and straw to the military or local government. These levies were usually imposed on the village as a whole, rather than on individual taxpayers, and it was up to the *xiangzhang* of a village to supply the materials or manpower and then allocate the burden of the *zapai* at the end of the lunar year to individual households according to their tax liabilities. Of course, the more taxpayers there were in a village, the lighter would be the burden shared by individual taxpayers of the same village. To prevent an increase in the shared tax burden, Tan village created a regulation in 1924 demanding that any household, when selling a piece of land, had to retain the tax liability imposed on the plot in the village. In other words, even a buyer outside the village had to share the tax burden owed by the whole village where his property was located (*zuodi xingcai*).

In 1928, three individuals from Fan village bought a total of over 70 mu of land from Tan village and, in line with the aforementioned regulation, their deeds specified that "the lot is sold on the condition of *zuodi xingcai*, and therefore buyer is responsible for sharing the *zapai* of the seller's *pai*." This was unfair, however, from Fan villagers' point of view, for they could not allocate the *zapai* to the newly obtained land that belonged to their fellow villagers. In 1931, the Land-Tax Consolidation Committee of Huailu county made a resolution in accordance with a national policy: "When the land of village A is sold to village B, its tax liability is also transferred to village B, and vice versa. To be fair and consistent, the tax liability of a lot must always go with its buyer's place [*liang sui di zou*]." Under the guidance of Xu Xizhen, a 61–year-old school principal, the *xiangzhang* of Fan village thus immediately transferred the taxes of the three lots from Tan to Fan and listed them under the name of their respective owners. Tan village, however, soon took back the taxes from Fan village, insisting on the validity of its own regulations and the terms specified in the land deeds. In a court hearing held on March 6, 1932, the two *xiangzhang* from their respective villages adhered to their earlier positions; so the county head instructed both parties to consult the county's Land-Tax Consolidation Committee and the seventh ward's Mediation Committee for a proper solution. In their joint report, the two committees remarked that *liang sui di zou* as an official resolution had been announced to all villages: "Fan village's transfer thus was well founded and Tan's rejection was downright wrong." To conform to the countywide policy, the committee members ordered Fan village to transfer the taxes of the three lots from Tan village to its own tax roll, and as a compromise, they also ordered Fan village to pay Tan village 40 yuan to cover their expenses on the lawsuit.[29]

This case is interesting because it shows not only the working of the new policy on tax transfer but, more importantly, the strategies used by the disputants, which in turn reflected their changing perception of the legitimacy of social institutions and actions. The strategy of Mr. Xu, a representative of Fan village,

was to adhere to the resolution of the Land-Tax Consolidation Committee. In his representation, that resolution was a "countywide agreement" (*quanxian gongyi*), whereas Tan village's regulation on tax liability was merely a "privately created regulation" (*sili tiaoyue*) that "opposes the public agreement" (*fankang gongyi*). To enhance his argument, Xu borrowed vocabulary from the national discourse on imperialism and likened the relationship between the two villages to that between a world power (*qiangquan*) and a weak and small nation and Tan village's regulation to an "unequal treaty" (*bupingdeng tiaoyue*). Tan village's refusal to transfer taxes to Fan, in Xu's interpretation, was to "bully the weak and small," and to let his village's land share Tan village's *zapai* was to "turn Fan village into a permanent slave of Tan village." He thus asked the county head to accept his claim in order "to support the weak and to suppress the powerful." So eloquent was Xu's argument that the county head had to agree with him, commenting that Tan village's "private regulation" (*siyue*) was not allowed as a tool to obstruct the implementation of the Consolidation Committee's resolution.

To fight Xu, the *xiangzhang* of Tan village emphasized the relative invalidity of the Consolidation Committee's resolution and the *legal* validity of its own regulation on tax transfer. As he put it, "the Land-Tax Consolidation Committee is not a legislative organ. So how could its resolution completely eliminate all the customs that have been effectively observed in the past? Furthermore, this committee's resolution has no specific date of enforcement. According to the non-retroactive principle of law, all things that occurred before the announcement of the resolution are not subject to its binding power. Therefore, it is difficult to abide by this resolution." He further argued that the claim of Fan village was unjustified, for the resolution that supported it was "completely ungrounded in a legal sense," while its retention of the taxes of the three lots sold to Fan had been agreed on by both the sellers and the buyers, as evidenced by the land deeds. "Since [these arrangements] are clearly stated in the deeds," the *xiangzhang* continued, "they should be honored by both parties, and legally they should be valid for good." And "since all contracts and deeds are protected by law, they can never be invalidated by the resolution of the committee." The *xiangzhang*'s argument thus was equally compelling; small wonder that the county head concurred that the *xiangzhang*'s words "sound reasonable" (*yanzhi chengli*) while insisting on a settlement of the dispute by mediation.[30]

In spite of their contrasting views, the two parties did have something in common in the way they each represented the case: both backed their claims with official regulations or the purportedly formal, legal principles that had been novel to village residents, rather than the shared assumptions or moral principles embedded in the village community. For Mr. Xu, the supremacy of official regulations over local institutions was plain enough because the former was made by the government on the basis of public agreement and the latter

was merely a private product of the local community. Any action based on "private regulations" thus was illegitimate and superseded by official regulations. But the *xiangzhang* of Tan village did not justify his claim by adhering to the importance of the regulation of his own village per se; instead he argued that the immobility of the taxes of the lots sold to Fan was clearly stated on the land deeds signed by both parties in the transaction and that the deeds as legal documents were protected by law.

These arguments are signs of the villagers' changing perceptions of the meaning of legitimacy. Before the 1930s, disputes over the land tax had centered on the observance or breach of village regulations. The villagers legitimized their actions primarily by turning to local regulations or moral principles rather than external systems or legal principles. In fact, not only did the villagers attach great importance to their own regulations, but the county government also accepted local institutions in place of official systems in its handling of the disputes. What prevailed in this dispute, however, was no longer the taken-for-granted supremacy of endogenous institutions, but legal, formal principles or institutions imposed from outside.

Conclusion

State making not only brought conspicuous changes to local institutions but also exposed villagers to new ideas, values, and assumptions that reshaped the way they perceived the externally imposed institutions and articulated their interests. The installation of village government was accompanied by the introduction of new notions about its legitimacy, such as a formal election of the village head, the requirement that candidates meet age and other qualifications, and the assumption that self-government was linked to the strength and prosperity of the Chinese nation as a whole. These ideas contrasted sharply with their traditional assumptions about informal village leadership, which emphasized one's seniority and prestige. Backed by the government and embraced by the elites, these new notions began to influence the villagers' representations of their concerns, especially in lawsuits.

This is not to suggest, of course, that external ideas prevailed over traditional assumptions of the villagers in the early twentieth century. Quite the reverse, the villagers often reacted to the enforcement of new institutions by expressing their own values and notions. While the village head or the schoolmaster may have used the external language to legitimize and disguise his own self-interested actions, the ordinary villagers expressed their anger and resentment by the various means available to them, including private chatting, cursing, spreading rumors, and even revenge. The "hidden transcripts" or "discourse

that takes place 'offstage,' beyond direct observation by powerholders" is equally important for understanding peasant reactions to state penetration.[31]

Village discourse in early twentieth-century Huailu county thus was often a mix of old notions rooted in the community and new concepts borrowed from outside. The elites, as the primary beneficiaries of the new institutions, could use both the vocabulary of official discourse on state making to justify their newly obtained privileges and popular values to legitimize their power within the community. Likewise, the ordinary villagers, while adhering to traditional values to justify their claims, did not hesitate to appeal to exogenous concepts to defend their interests. Thus was a transition in the popular vision of power and legitimacy already under way in early twentieth-century rural society. These facts suggest that state making in early twentieth-century China was not a complete failure as the conventional wisdom would suggest; it involved a process in which the new institutions and official discourse penetrated the rural communities to supersede or coexist with local practices and assumptions in reshaping the local process of legitimization. The "self-government" program in rural China from the 1980s onward, in this light, is not just a break with the party-state's totalistic control of the village society under the collective system but also a continuation of the transformation of village politics from informal community management based on popular values and endogenous practices to formal governance based on accountable procedures and externally imposed principles of legality.

Notes

1. For studies on the intellectual trends in Republican and contemporary China, see Chow Tse-tsung, *The May 4th Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960); Arif Dirlik, *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919–1937* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978); Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995); John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1996); Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994); and Wang Hui, *China's New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003).
2. For further discussions on the modernization and revolutionary narratives in the literature on modern Chinese history, see Arif Dirlik, "Reversals, Ironies, Hegemonies: Notes on the Contemporary Historiography of Modern China," *Modern China* 22, no. 3 (1996): 243–84; Lin Beidian and Dong Zhenghua, "Xiandaihua yanjiu zai Zhongguo de xingqi he fazhan" ("The Rise and Evolution of Modernization Studies in China"), *Lishi yanjiu* 5 (1998): 150–71; and Zhang Haipeng, "20 shiji Zhongguo jindaishi xueke tixi wenti de tansuo" (A Discussion of the

Disciplinary Issues of Modern Chinese History in the Twentieth Century), *Jindaishi yanjiu* 1 (2005), 1–29.

3. T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), chapter 1; John R. Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972), 11.

4. *Hebei tongzhi gao* (Manuscript of the gazetteer of Hebei province) (Beijing: Yanshan chubanshe, 1993), 2889, 2900.

5. Huaiyin Li, "Village Regulations at Work: Local Taxation in Huailu County, 1900–1936," *Modern China* 26, no. 1 (2000), 79–109.

6. Philip Huang, *Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1996) and *Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China: The Qing and the Republic Compared* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001).

7. HL656.1.419, 1915. The Huailu county government archives, currently preserved in the Hebei Provincial Archives, are cited by category (*quanzong*) number, subcategory (*mulu*) number, file (*juan*) number, and year when the file was created.

8. HL656.2.852, 1926; HL656.2.967, 1927.

9. HL656.2.6, 1921.

10. HL656.1.1212, 1920.

11. James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1976), 40–41.

12. Ibid., *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1985).

13. It is worth noting, therefore, that the bases on which one established the legitimacy of his power in a village were different from the resources or bases on which elites established dominance in the community, such as lineage strength and landholding, social hierarchies and networks involved in local religious and lineage activities, roles in tax collection, control of corporate property, roles as paternalistic patrons in local community, monopoly of coercive and military force, or a combination of these factors. Obviously, these means and resources, while critical in producing and maintaining one's prestige and status in the community, were far from enough to justify leadership and dominance.

14. HL656.1.1099, 1919–1920.

15. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), 193–94.

16. See, for example, HL656.1.733, 1917; HL656.1.70, 1913; HL656.1.377, 1915; and HL656.1.1158, 1919.

17. HL656.2.2, 1921.

18. HL656.2.139, 1921.

19. HL656.1.1099, 1919–1920.

20. HL656.2.814, 1926.

21. HL656.1.1158, 1919; similar cases are found in HL656.1.70, 1913; HL656.1.377, 1915; HL656.2.140, 1921; HL656.2.569, 1925.

22. HL656.1.70, 1913; HL656.1.561, 1916.

23. HL656.2.814, 1926.

24. HL656.1.1099, 1919–20.

25. HL656.2.2, 1921.
26. HL656.2.23, 1921.
27. HL656.3.911, 1934.
28. HL656.3.911, 1934.
29. HL656.3.608, 1932.
30. HL656.3.608, 1932.
31. James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1990), 4.

CHAPTER 7

How Our Village Becomes "Ecocultural"

Change, Resilience, and Social Capital in Southwest China Minority Communities

Zhou Yongming

Functionalist anthropologists viewed culture as a well-integrated system with each part working together to maintain "the" equilibrium of the system. This conceptualization assumes that a culture or society either exists in equilibrium or collapses but does not allow room for cultural change or transformation.[1] Since the 1960s, this static view of culture has been challenged and, to a great degree, discredited. In accordance with the shift to viewing culture as a dynamic process, many anthropologists have focused on examining the historical changes of society and culture, often emphasizing the inevitability of change brought by both internal conflicts and external impacts.[2] One of the problems of this viewpoint is how to reconcile continual changes with overall coherence of a given sociocultural system within a period of time. In other words, how can society and culture achieve a relatively stable state that neither inhibits change nor causes the whole society or culture to collapse? This question is of special significance when examining how indigenous communities cope with profound changes forced upon them by the ongoing process of globalization. China is no exception.

It is imperative to discuss the issue of sociocultural change within the context of globalization in southwestern China, given its unprecedented speed of development in recent years. Along with the rapid circulation of capital and people made possible by globalization come new ideas, norms, and institutions.

For example, environmentalism and sustainability have been promoted in the region and foreign-originated institutions such as environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as ecomuseums, which will be the focus of this chapter. While acknowledging the importance of global or national factors, as many studies have observed, this essay concentrates more on the local dynamics of change. Globalization is not viewed as a one-way process in which local cultures and societies have no choice but to submit to an overpowering external force. Local people have shown a remarkable ability to adapt their livelihoods to meet new challenges without losing a series of key structures. Indeed, some scholars use the term "sustainable livelihoods" to emphasize the ability of a people to withstand shocks and external impacts.[3] In my research area in Guizhou, China, local sociopolitical structures had been forced to change dramatically to fit into a socialist system. Land tenure, in many cases, shifted from communal ownership in the old days to collectivization under Mao's regime to a household responsibility system in the reform era. However, despite the changes, local communities have been able to maintain coherence and prevent sudden collapses of whole systems, revealing the remarkable adaptive capacity possessed by human social systems.

This chapter proposes to adopt concepts and perspectives from the resilience theory to tackle changes brought by globalization. The term "resilience" was introduced more than three decades ago by the theoretical ecologist C. S. Holling and has since been developed into an influential theoretical approach in systems ecology and conservation studies.[4] According to Holling, "resilience is measured by the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system redefines its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior."[5] He points out that ecosystems are always in a dynamic state of change, following a succession of patterns and structures over time that can be depicted as an adaptive cycle featuring four phases: rapid growth, maturation, sudden change, and reorganization. The degree of resilience is highest in the first phase but gradually decreases with the maturity and connectedness of the system. It diminishes along the continuum to where a fragile state is reached when even a small disturbance can cause cascading changes. Finally, its lowest point is in the reorganization phase when the system has little stability. Ecologic adaptation is thus a nested process, and ecosystems are constituted by connectivity as well as possibilities for adaptation.[6]

When applying the resilience perspective to the study of ethnic minority peoples and their culture, resilience theory's propositions of nonlinear change and multiple equilibria are of special interest to us. Holling expands a narrower understanding of resilience that assumes that a system has a single equilibrium state, and he proposes the existence of multiple stable states and an enlarged

range of resilience. Thus, resilience does not need to bring the system back to "the" equilibrium state, but rather to one of a number of alternative states. This nonlinear thinking enables us to address a multiplicity of forms of adaptation and transformation of social-cultural systems and to examine the impact of globalization from many different trajectories without assuming the existence of an ideal state.

It is necessary to point out the difference between ecological and social systems. Unlike ecological systems, local actors play a critical role in the resilience of social systems. Because human beings can exert a variety of influences, this makes the process more dynamic and complex. To emphasize the agency of indigenous people, this chapter will employ the concept of social capital to examine their strategies of adaptation, resilience, and transformation. The concept of social capital refers to resources available to individuals, groups, and organizations that can be mobilized and that are based on enduring social relationships of trust and reciprocity.[7] Scholars have further differentiated social capital into two subtypes: bonding and bridging social capital.[8] The former mobilized primarily within communities and by group members working together to cope with changed relationships as a result of development, such as mediating conflicts caused by newly emerged economic opportunities and land use patterns, as well as in upholding traditional values, norms, and practices. The latter is manifested in the interactions between local and outside networks of social relationships. For instance, it can be seen in how local communities establish and utilize social relationships with new resources available for the common good, such as working with NGOs and government in projects of conservation, ecotourism development, and cultural heritage preservation.

In the short history of the resurrection and popularization of the concept of social capital, a number of researchers have tried to use it to analyze Chinese society.[9] Based on ethnographical research, this essay tries to situate the concept of social capital in the context of Chinese minority communities to examine (1) the characteristics of social capital in minority communities, (2) the role of different types of social capital in community development and sociocultural resilience, and (3) the relationship between the minority community and the majority society in the construction and realization of social capital. Even though this essay will discuss these issues separately, it is imperative to bear in mind that they are different aspects of a single issue, namely the role of social capital in minority communities. There will be a brief discussion of the preliminary findings at the end of the essay.

The Ecomuseum: A New Strategy of Cultural Preservation and Community Development

In China, the term "minority nationalities" is used to refer to all ethnic groups that are not Han Chinese. In the 2000 census, the total of all 55 minority nationalities numbered 106 million people, only 8.4 percent of the national population.[10] However, the size and composition of minority nationality populations in China is extremely heterogeneous. In terms of population, using 1990 census data, the smallest, the Lhoba, number only 2,312, while the largest, the Zhuang, are 15.5 million strong.[11] From a social and cultural perspective, the differences among the minority nationalities are significant: some are hunter-gatherers or slash-and-burn cultivators, while others comprise highly sinicized Chinese-speaking groups like the Hui and the contemporary Manchu. Minority nationalities exist all over China and inhabit about 60 percent of Chinese territory, with 90 percent of them living in mountainous areas.[12]

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, a widespread view was that minority nationalities were "backward" people who needed to be reformed to become full members of society in a new socialist China. This belief was based on Marxist doctrines that see the progress of human society as unilinear, starting from primitive communism, progressing through slavery, feudalism, socialism, and eventually reaching the ultimate destination of communism. According to the official classification, most of China's minority societies were in the first three stages of social development, and thus it was urgent to reform them to fit into the socialist system that the People's Republic was constructing. From this perspective, poverty alleviation was thus always a small part of a much bigger social reform project. The degree of economic development was often seen as a yardstick of social advancement, and as in modernization theory, indigenous cultures of minority people were often regarded as impediments to achieving development, and thus in need of "reform." This line of thinking caused the state to adopt various "civilizing" policies and brought disastrous results to minority communities in events that culminated in the Cultural Revolution.

Though the minority cultures are still regarded as less advanced or backward compared to mainstream Han culture, there has been a subtle shift in viewpoint among some scholars and policy makers in recent years that has emphasized how indigenous cultures are assets rather than a burden in the development of minority communities. Realizing that local culture is an integral part of minority people's livelihoods, there has been an emphasis on the importance of preserving it in the process of development. One initiative arising from this change in direction has been the establishment of ecomuseums in some of the minority communities of southwest China from the late 1990s onward. The "eco" in

ecomuseum is the Greek prefix for "space" or "household," not an abbreviation for ecology. The ecomuseum is not a traditional museum located in a building that is separated from the community and environment: it is the entire area within which the heritage site is located. The ecomuseum's philosophy is based on a strategy of managing and conserving heritage *in situ*, with the whole of the local community serving as its "housekeepers."[13] This postmodern idea and practice in museology originated in France in the 1970s, and today there are more than three hundred ecomuseums in the world (although they are not popular in North America, except in French-speaking Canada).

The introduction of ecomuseums into China as a new way to conserve local cultures and environments as a whole, and at the same time promote economic development, has so far been well received by local policy makers. In the early 1990s, Chinese museologists, working with European museologists, started to promote this new type of museum. It was not until late 1998, however, with funding from the Norwegian development aid agency, that China established its first ecomuseum in Guizhou province, southwest China. Since then, a dozen more ecomuseums have been or are being set up, the majority located in minority areas in southwest China (Guizhou, Guangxi, and Yunnan provinces). Since 2001, the author has been following the development of ecomuseums and has visited a half dozen of them. In the following discussion, I will use two ecomuseums as examples to illustrate the role social capital has played in these new cultural institutions.

Case Study One: Bonding Social Capital in the Long-Horned Miao People

Located deep in the precipitous mountains in the middle of China's southwest province Guizhou, Suojia is a cluster of 12 villages with an ethnic population of 4,000. Officially recognized as a subgroup of the Miao ethnicity, these "long-horned Miao" (named after their prominent headgear) live a unique indigenous way of life in a terrain of both austerity and natural beauty, almost in total isolation from the outside world. As a small minority in a larger ethnic group, the Suojia Miao have been victims of centuries of internecine and ethnic warfare. About 250 years ago, they were finally driven into the high mountains; the terrain has provided them with a natural, if harsh, refuge. The long horns worn on the heads of both men and women are said to deceive animals in the forests and also facilitate the distinguishing of fellow villagers from aggressors. In 1998, Suojia became the site of China's first ecomuseum because of its unique cultural traditions and impressive natural environment.

If we view norms and values associated with social trust as important characteristics of social capital, it is easy to demonstrate a strong sense of community

and mutual trust among the Miao villagers. This is closely related to the community's social structure. Sociopolitically, the Suojia community is run in an egalitarian manner. Each village is run by a leadership group consisting of an old, experienced elder, a middle-aged, able chief, and a shaman. The elder is a symbolic figure of moral authority, often serving as the ultimate mediator of conflicts. The chief functions as the caretaker of daily village affairs, as well as an intermediary between the government and the local village. The shaman plays an indispensable role in communication between the villagers and gods, in key life rituals and ceremonies, and also serves as a doctor and fortune-teller. Although the state has incorporated the local community into its formal administrative structure, including these villages under the jurisdiction of a local township government, villages still maintain a high degree of autonomy. In each village, the village elder, the chief, and the shaman thus usually enjoy enormous respect and authority. For example, all marriages have to be sanctioned by the village elder and the chief. Marriages can take place with their permission well under the legal age proclaimed by the state, and the formal marriage certificate will then be obtained when the couple reaches the legal age, sometimes several years later. Compared with other parts of country, then, the power of state has not achieved such a firm grasp on villagers' daily lives.

The position and authority of the village leadership, however, evolves naturally in the course of life, rather than from a mechanism of formal elections. Anyone occupying a leadership position can be replaced through consensus decision making by the villagers. Furthermore, when the village faces important decisions, a gathering of adult male villagers convene, with each having an equal say in the decision-making process. During these proceedings, the village leadership plays a facilitatory role, and the final decision is usually made by consensus. Mutual help in farm work and reciprocity within the community are also norms that are commonly followed. When asked in a survey whom they trust most, the answers given (in order of preference) by villagers are family and kin members, fellow villagers, fellow Suojia Miao members, and lastly but not surprisingly, Han people who live in the plains below the hills.

In addition to the sense of community at a village level, a strong sense of shared identity has enhanced the cohesiveness of the local community. Villagers in the 12 Suojia villages view themselves as different from not only the Han but also other "Miao" people. Various spiritual activities, often viewed by the Han as superstitious and backward, play an important role in upholding and reinforcing their identity. The Suojia Miao organize their spiritual world around the worship of ancestors, deified mountains and trees, and related taboos, perpetuated in numerous year-round festivals and sacrifices. Their rich repertoire of stories and songs transmits a shared heritage that mixes history and myth. All these factors make the Suojia Miao's sense of having a unique cultural identity

both tangible and deeply rooted. From this perspective, bonding social capital is of paramount importance within the Suojia community.

Since the inception of the ecomuseum project in 1998, the bonding social capital of the local community has enabled villagers to respond to the various initiatives collectively. However, during the planning phase of the ecomuseum, local villagers were only nominally consulted by experts, officials, and donors coming from the outside. Since that time, local villagers have shown the outsiders that they can mobilize their own community members for the common good. For example, in the initial phase of the ecomuseum project, the roads connecting villages needed to be improved. The work was shared by every village, with each responsible for a certain length of the road. All members in the village had responsibility, and every household had to contribute labor and time. This was organized successfully by the local community's decision-making process.

When conflicts arose, local communities also handled them independently. For instance, in the middle of the project, the ecomuseum chose to restore ten house buildings to preserve the local architecture style in one of the villages. Because the expenses for the restoration of each building were to be covered mainly by the ecomuseum, the chosen households would have received significant material benefits. The ecomuseum staff was concerned about how the selection might be made without causing resentment within the community. To solve the problem, the village elder and chief convened a meeting of all adult male villagers. After several rounds of discussion and negotiation, ten houses were chosen to be renovated. After consensus was reached, kinsmen of the chosen families and neighbors voluntarily came to help with the renovation work.

Another example of how bonding social capital works within the village can be seen by examining the formation of a crafts cooperative. Once the establishment of the ecomuseum had started to attract a small number of tourists to the Suojia community—mainly backpackers from coastal China and European countries—the local costume, with fine embroidery, turned out to be a favorite souvenir of visitors. In the beginning, local villagers felt uncomfortable about selling their handmade costumes to outsiders, partly because they had little knowledge and experience of market commodity exchange, and frequently they would simply let the visitors decide how much to pay for their products. This practice changed quite quickly after the villagers became more knowledgeable about the market value of their handicrafts (a full local costume was worth $35 in 2005), and they started to actively market them to the tourists. Soon, individual villagers would surround the visitors and hawk their handicrafts aggressively, causing discomfort for many tourists. The village leadership, in consultation with both the ecomuseum staff and villagers, decided to set up a handicraft cooperative, which would assign handicraft production to individual

households, collect the products, and then sell them to the tourists. The sale proceeds would then be distributed among the participating villagers. The founding of the cooperative not only solved the hawking problem that had distressed the tourists but also ensured a relatively even distribution of tourism-related income among village households.

In contrast to the abundance of "bonding social capital" within their community itself, the Suojia Miao have had limited interaction with other ethnic communities. This is the result of a number of factors: the community's isolated location, poor communication, the language barrier, and the haunting historical memory of being oppressed by other ethnic groups, especially the Han. Before a paved road was constructed in 1993 connecting Suojia with villages and towns down the mountains, there was very limited exchange between the Suojia Miao and other communities, except for occasions on which the Miao used their local produce to barter for needles, thread, and other necessities from Han Chinese lowland residents. In addition, the illiteracy rate in Suojia is extremely high. Indeed, the person with the highest education level in 2005 was a girl with only seven years of schooling. All the aforementioned factors have contributed to a lack of interaction, and thus a lack of bridging social capital, between the Suojia Miao and others.

Case Study Two: Bridging Social Capital in Zhenshan Buyi Community

The Zhenshan Ecomuseum is located in a Buyi village that is only 12 miles from the provincial capital, Guiyang. The village sits on a hill with scenic views of a reservoir that surrounds the village in three directions. The area is divided into two parts: the upper village (hillside) and the lower village (waterfront). Taken as a whole, the village has 140 households, with 110 Buyi households, 29 Miao, and a single Han household. Because of the proximity to the provincial capital and frequent interactions with the Han community, many Buyi people under 50 years old speak Mandarin, while the Buyi language is only spoken by the elders in village. Nowadays, the village is led by government-appointed cadres (the party secretary and village head), and the traditional social structure that gave authority to the head of lineage and shamans has long been abandoned. In general, the average education level of the Buyi in Zhenshan is much higher than other minority groups in more remote areas.

Compared to the Suojia Miao, the Zhenshan Buyi have a much closer connection to other ethnic groups, especially to the dominant Han. When the ecomuseum was established, Zhenshan villagers played a much more proactive role than their counterparts in Suojia, who were not given a participatory role in the process. After the villagers heard the news that an ecomuseum had been established at Suojia and more would be planned, the head of the village actually

went to Guiyang to invite the officials and museologists to visit his village, persuading them to pick the village as a site of one of the new ecomuseums. The village head explained to me: "I think our village is a perfect site, because we have the history (that can be traced back to the Ming dynasty [1368–1644]), culture (here referring mainly to the ethnic Buyi and Miao), and the environment (with hills, the reservoir and rivers). And besides, after we explained to villagers the benefits that the ecomuseum could bring to the village, all of them supported this project."

It was obvious from the beginning that the village cadres had strong motivations to welcome the ecomuseum project. During interviews, the Buyi village head stated very clearly that he was aware that Buyi culture had its value and that ethnic culture could become a popular attraction with Han and foreign tourists. Asked where he obtained this idea, he replied that he had visited the Village of Nationalities in Kunming, the capital city of the neighboring Yunnan province. The Village of Nationalities is a kind of theme park that showcases replicas of a dozen "villages" of local minority nationalities and has become a popular tourist spot in Kunming. Obviously this experience inspired the village head to promote tourism at Zhenshan. "The difference from the Village of Nationalities in Kunming is that what we have in the village is 100 percent authentic. We have authentic natural environment (*zhenshan zhenshui*), and we have authentic culture." This pride in Buyi cultural heritage is in sharp contrast to an earlier perception of minority culture. Before the period of reform and opening in China, the dominant mode of thought was to acknowledge Buyi backwardness and the village's need to catch up with advanced "socialist culture," defined according to the norms of the Han culture.

Lobbying efforts by the village were successful. An ecomuseum was set up in 2000 and has quickly become a popular tourist destination for urban residents in Guiyang. According to 2005 statistics, more than one thousand people visit the village each day during the summer months. A management committee for the ecomuseum was established by the villagers to coordinate various activities within the village. Among the first things the committee did was to charge a $2 admission fee for everybody entering the village and use that revenue to improve the road conditions throughout the village. To meet tourist demand, the village organized several dancing troupes of different age groups to perform local songs and dances for visitors. Initially, villagers were hesitant to join these troupes. To assuage their concerns, the management committee invited village elders to be instructors, noting also that if villagers joined the troupes they would be contributing to the preservation of the traditional culture created by their ancestors. Thus, participation became a question of honor and responsibility to ensure that traditions were preserved and transmitted to future generations. An additional persuasive factor was that such performances were

an important source of income. It was therefore not surprising that the troupes became fully operational in a short period of time.

Because of the increased number of visitors to Zhenshan, most villagers have abandoned their traditional ways of making a living—farming and fishing— and have become increasingly dependent on income derived from tourism. One new development is that many villagers have converted their houses into makeshift lodges to accommodate visitors staying overnight. Once again, the presence of bridging social capital has proved pivotal to the success of this new business. Those people with a wider social network, especially with connections to people in Guiyang, have been in an advantageous position when establishing lodges. The most successful households running family lodges thus have close connections with tour companies, which provide them with customers and a source of steady income. Other villagers with poorer connections have to spend more time soliciting customers, and are often subject to the fluctuations in the number of visitors that follow the peaks and troughs of the tourist seasons. Not surprisingly, the majority of village cadres are among those well-connected to outside resources because their positions have given them more opportunity for interaction with outsiders. In Zhenshan, another thorny issue related to the sharing of tourist revenue is the uneven distribution of tourists between the upper and lower villages. The lower, waterfront part of the village is the favorite place for tourists to visit and stay, and so its households receive a much larger part of the tourism revenue. Though incomes have increased dramatically at the village level, the degree of inequality has also widened among individual households and between the upper and lower parts of the village.

An appeal to distribute visitors staying overnight among all the family lodges has thus been proposed some time ago, but initially it did not receive consensus due to opposition from some of the villagers. This case shows the complexity of the issue of social capital. It illustrates that social capital may have its "dark side," as pointed out by researchers.[14] The bridging social capital possessed by certain members of the village may become detrimental to others in the same community. In summer 2007, I was told that villagers had finally come up with a solution through a series of discussions and negotiations organized by the management committee. In the end, the village as a whole would act as a single host to visitors. Those households running lodges were assigned numbers in order. During the tourist season, a village team was put at the parking lot of the main entrance to receive the tourists. It would then assign visitors to different family run lodges according to the predetermined order. By so doing, a more egalitarian scheme was created to enable individual households to share tourism revenue.

Conclusion

In the era of increased ethnic interactions and even globalization, socioeconomic changes in minority peoples are inevitable. They are exposed to, and sometimes imposed with, new cultural institutions that are alien to their existent culture, such as ecomuseums. This essay has shown that they have adopted different attitudes and strategies of response. Facing unprecedented changes, minority peoples have shown remarkable cultural resilience, and social capital among them plays an important role in their dealing with changes in daily life. The previous two case studies have shown that strong bonding social capital exists in minority communities in China, deriving mainly from the strong sense of shared identity among minority peoples. The sense of identity is often related to their history and collective memory, as typically defined by their relationships with other ethnic groups, especially with the dominant Han group.

In the first case, even though there is strong bonding social capital in the local community, the lack of bridging social capital has prevented locals from playing a more active role in the ecomuseum. In Suojia, ironically, although the ecomuseum advocates promoted a participatory role of the local community, when the Chinese museum experts, local officials, and foreign aid agencies decided to establish the first ecomuseum at Suojia, it was essentially a top-down project. Local villagers were simply informed that their place had been selected, and they were asked to provide help in the process. Their opinions were not solicited, and no villager was invited to participate in the making of the plan. I was curious about this element of the establishment of the museum, since it was an obvious contradiction to ecomuseum philosophy. When I asked the official at the provincial culture bureau who was in charge of implementing the project about this issue, he replied that with such a low level of economic development and such a high level of illiteracy and backwardness, it was impossible to have the locals play any meaningful role in establishing the ecomuseum. "We are here to help them out of this backwardness. We recognize that their culture has its values, but these values can only be realized and preserved by their social and economic development. We will let them participate in the management of the ecomuseum, but only after they become better educated and their conditions are improved," the official elaborated.

According to the Han officials' stereotypical and ethnocentric view, the conceived "backwardness" of minority culture legitimizes a social engineering project that aims to achieve a social overhaul, and he sees no reason that the Suojia Miao will not change as a result. Indeed, since I visited Suojia the first time in 2001, the village has changed very much in terms of physical landscape because the local government has invested heavily on roads, electricity, housing, and other projects, trying to make the village a model ecomuseum and more

accessible to outside visitors. But what this Han official failed to recognize is that the "backward" core values of Suojia Miao are very resilient to change. As we have seen, the bonding social capital within the Suojia Miao enabled them to achieve consensus decision making through participatory discussion and negotiation as well as to share tourism revenue more equally by setting up a craft cooperative. These practices are not backward and serve as cultural markers differentiating the Miao from the Han.

The second case of Zhenshan makes us pay more attention to the complexity of social capital. It reminds us that social capital is not a panacea for community and that it is not an abstract concept when placed in a concrete social context. Social capital is related to social relationships that often see conflicts of interest.[15] The Zhenshan Buyi village has both bonding and bridging social capital, but this does not mean that both elements of social capital are always employed for the common good of the whole community. They are rather context-specific, and conflicts of interest among subgroups have to be taken into consideration. The whole village may at times employ social capital to achieve a common goal, such as the efforts to lobby for the establishment of an ecomuseum in the village. Yet in other circumstances, the social capital of one subgroup can cause conflicts with other groups within the community, as shown by the initial refusal of the lower village to share tourism revenue with the upper village. Social capital cannot be deployed as an effective tool for analysis without contextualizing it within the continual fighting for resources and benefits by specific groups and communities under discussion. Nonetheless, the latest egalitarian arrangement of receiving outside visitors can be seen as another example of cultural resilience. In this case, the bonding social capital finally triumphed over the market economy principle that is promoted by the mainstream of contemporary Chinese society.

The task of utilizing social capital in the minority community has two faces and sometimes leads to a dilemma. Confronting the reality that dramatic changes are brought by modernization and globalization, minorities have to consolidate their bonding social capital to preserve their collective identity and mobilization ability. Yet, at the same time, they must also expand their bridging social capital by more actively engaging with the outside change. This should not be a process of cultural submission but rather a process that enables disadvantaged groups to gain access to more resources and then to employ these acquired resources to preserve their own sociocultural heritages and to advance their well-being. This process is admittedly like an adaptive circle in the resilience theory, with the ultimate goal of maintaining the system resilience and avoiding system collapse. In the social system that possesses more complexity than the ecological one, social capital may constitute an important factor of maintaining a community's sociocultural resilience. From this perspective,

social capital can be viewed as the capacity by a group of people to preserve their core sociocultural characteristics based on mutual trust and common identity.

Notes

1. One of the representatives of this school of thinking is Bronislaw Malinowshi. For details, see *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (Prospective Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1984).
2. See Sherry Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 126, no. 1 (1984):126–66 and Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, "Historicization of the Culture Concept," *History and Anthropology*, 12, no. 3 (2001): 213–54.
3. Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway, *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century* (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 1992).
4. For a general discussion of the resilience theory, see Crawford Stanley Holling, "Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems," *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, 4 (1973): 1–23; Stephen R. Carpenter and Lance H. Gunderson, "Coping with Collapse: Ecological and Social Dynamics in Ecosystem Management," *BioScience* 51, 6 (2001): 451–57; Lance H. Gunderson and Crawford Stanley Holling, eds., *Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002).
5. Lance Gunderson, "Ecological Resilience: In Theory and Application," *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics* 31 (2000): 425–39.
6. These propositions have been tested by a number of empirical studies on a variety of ecosystems, in which factors of both biophysical and human-induced disturbances have been taken into consideration. See S. R. Carpenter, D. Ludwig and W. Brock. "Management of Lakes Subject to Potentially Irreversible Change," *Ecological Applications* 9, 3 (1999): 751–71; M. Scheffer, S. H. Hosper, M. L. Meijer, B. Moss, and E. Jeppesen, "Alternative Equilibria in Shallow Lakes," *Trends in Evolutionary Ecology* 8 (1993): 275–79.
7. For a general discussion of social capital concept, see James Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 95–120; Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993) and *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
8. J. Pretty, "Social Capital and Connectedness: Issues and Implications for Agriculture, Rural Development and Natural Resource Management in ACP Countries," (working paper, CTA Working Document Number 8032, Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, 2003).
9. For discussions related to China, see Zhou Yongming, "Social Capital and Power: Entrepreneurial Elite and the State in Contemporary China," *Policy Sciences* 33, no. 3–4 (2000): 323–40; Bill Taylor, "Trade Unions and Social Capital in Transitional Communist States: The Case of China," *Policy Sciences* 33, no. 3–4 (2000): 341–54; Linda Y. Yueh, "An Investment Model of Social Capital with Empirical Application to Women's Labour Market Outcomes in Urban China" (working paper, Univ. of Oxford, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 83, 2001); John Knight

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14. James Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 95–120; Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 1–24.

15. James DeFilippis, "The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development," *Housing Policy Development* 12, no. 4 (2001): 781–806; Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "Is It Time to Disinvest in Social Capital?" *Journal of Public Policy* 19, no. 2 (1999): 199–231.

CHAPTER 8

The "Ramlila Project"

Indian Identities in an Age of Globalization

Nita Kumar

The "Ramlila Project" was undertaken by a team of 12 people from June to December 2007, with the aim of teaching children from a neighborhood in the city of Varanasi, North India, the characteristics and advantages of modernity and globalization using local history and arts.[1] I was part of the team from June to late August, as a historian and concept-developer, and then as the report-writer and commentator on the success of the project. I discuss it in this essay through an examination of two identity formations. One is the identity of the local people who seek globalization, but such is the power of the local-global dichotomy that they also resist it. The second identity is that of the activist-reformers, for whom the challenge is to develop a strategy and an image that can go beyond the perilous tradition-modernity dichotomy that neither reflects reality nor constructs a positive future for anyone by positing such a simple conflict.

Modernity and Globalization in Banaras, or Small-Town India

What we set out to do in this project was to intervene in the modernity of Banaras, which is that of all small-town India. We wished to teach children the simple fact that modernity consists not only of the consumption of modern clothes and foods and the use of English, as they apparently believed, but also of discipline and freedom. Discipline is exemplified as the act of following rules, such as those about cleanliness in public spaces, and freedom, insofar that they can choose how to live their own lives.

The present state of modernity in Banaras (officially Varanasi) is quite different from the norm of modernity.[2] If you walk on the streets of Banaras as an empathetic anthropologist you are impressed, not by a lack of, but by the exhibition of freedom. The traffic is free to move or stop as it likes. It is free to consist of any variety of animal-powered, human-powered, or machine-powered vehicle or of pedestrians or even animals. All are free to use the streets for any other purpose but traveling, if they please, including setting up shop, workshop, cafe, social circle, or resting place. They are free to use the streets as garbage receptacles or as bathrooms. They certainly exercise "choice" and practice "mobility."

The freedom is impressive, indeed awesome. Seldom does one witness freedom in such an unadulterated form. Because it is so extreme, one wonders if it does not also hide another message. A further investigation reveals what this could be. The freedom practiced by everyone in the here and now is purchased at the price of giving up freedom in the future. The people of Banaras know this truth, whether they publicly acknowledge it or not: the young people of Banaras are not placed so as to prove themselves to be competitive in the larger world of examinations and interviews for work and training positions. The overall rate of success of people from Banaras in all-India competitions is very low. They are "backward." That is, they may be free—and happy—now, and perhaps always, but they are not free in the *longue durée* in the sense of having social mobility. They are not free to move up the social ladder to become new or different people, to consume in expanded ways. They are free today, but they are chained to this freedom. They are bound to be what they already are, to endlessly reproduce themselves without recourse of escape from their overdetermined identity.[3]

An understanding of the ironic nature of this freedom was essential to the Ramlila project. Such an understanding attributes power to the rootedness of small-town Indians. This power is the only explanation of the resistance of such Indians to change: thus it is not their "weakness" or "backwardness" that results in a "traditional Indian" lifestyle but the attractiveness of the freedoms and support systems that compose the lifestyle. This implies a dilemma for those who can glimpse the tug-of-war between freedom in the present and freedom in the future. Even if glimpsed, however, it is difficult to imagine an individual negotiating this choice successfully; the long-term resolution of this tradition-modernity dilemma can take place only structurally. The historical roots of the dilemma go deep. The agency of colonialism made the project of modernity (1) alien, violent, and suspect to many people and (3) incomplete because of the weak political will of the colonial state to actually bring about modernity. Both of these historical problems of Indian modernity are directly responsible

in a place like Banaras for its particular nature—its freedom but ultimate lack of freedom, its garbage but claim to aesthetics, its chaos but claim to discipline.[4]

Everywhere in the world, modernity has been heralded and actively taught by schools. It is the job of schools to fashion new, self-directed, disciplined individuals with a work ethic and a vision of themselves as participants in certain kinds of markets and states. Because modern schools in India were introduced by the colonial state, they have suffered from the same two problems mentioned previously: (1) they were viewed as alien, violent, and suspect by many and (2) they were structurally weak. Thus schools became part of the problem rather than part of the solution. They could not be agents of change in the way that they have been elsewhere, where they have worked to make modernity a fait accompli today.[5]

Banaras, however, does not reject modernity today, even if it did so in the past. In the nineteenth century, the majority of its residents kept away from modern schools or refused to start new ones or be complicit with the whole colonial educational project. Today, everyone would claim that they like and want modern education, modern jobs, mobility, civic services, modern comforts, and modern consumer goods. Globalization has removed some of the stigmas attached to modernity, and modern practices seem to belong to everyone, emerging from their solely Western or colonial origins.[6]

Our dilemma in the project became clear. We wanted the people of Banaras to be free in the long-term sense of having social mobility, civic services, modern education, and since they obviously want them, global comforts and consumer goods. But modernity has historically posed a unilateral, monopolistic claim on identity. You cannot be complex. You can only make a simple choice. You can be either modern (and seem to be free), progressive (and an agent of change), or you must be traditional, premodern, rooted, and backward. Of course there were always recognizable exceptions, but those were few and belonged to the elite and the metropolises in the high national arts, business, or politics. There were almost no exceptions in Banaras.

The aim of our project correspondingly became clear: to replicate the feat of the elite in India on a large structural scale. Modernity and globalization are social and cultural capital that the Indian elite has been living off of and reproducing for over a century now.[7] We had to, with a chosen group of children and adults, have a crash course in what ordinarily took the elite a whole family and childhood to accomplish: give them a taste of global consciousness that is also rooted in Indian histories. We chose to do this through history and theater.

The *Mohalla* of Khojwa

We chose a *mohalla* (neighborhood) at random to intervene in, called Khojwa. We wished to make it a model for intervention in any community or public space anywhere in India, after the preparatory moves of getting to know social divisions.[8]

The main occupations of Khojwa are trade and domestic manufacture. Trade is mostly in grain and dry goods, and manufacture is mostly of wooden toys and silk fabric. The caste composition of the *mohalla* is predominantly Vaishya and Vishwakarma, each in turn divided up into several *jatis* (professional castes) such as baniya, who trade, and *barhai*, who work with wood. The weavers or *bunkar* are mostly Muslims, as are the embroiderers or *zardozes*. They can be either Ansaris or Pathans but are predominantly the former. The other castes are Hindu. All the manufacturing professions are low paid and the traders, while better off, share the same cultural preferences in house design and lifestyle. Most of the houses of Khojwa bear a look of genteel poverty, and all of them are explicitly indigenous and not Westernized.

For our purposes, there is a special meaning to the stigma of Khojwa as "backward," which is what it officially is. True to our anthropological methodology, we would never have used the term but for two reasons. One is that the state and development discourse of India differentiates between developed and underdeveloped or "backward" regions, and there is no question as to where Banaras in general or Khojwa in particular falls. The other is that our particular interest is the education of children. Modern education is itself a part of development discourse, and so at its simplest, when we say that Khojwa has poor education, we do mean that it is "backward." Khojwa has many schools, private and public, but even the best of them does not succeed in teaching its students in a way that makes them competitive for further studies after high school. "He wanted to go into a profession but was unsuccessful. *Bahut* form *bhara* (He filled out many [application] forms)," is a familiar description of the student's plight. Nor do the schools teach anything remotely along the lines of civic values.

Khojwa is filthy. It may not be filthier than the rest of the city but can look as if it is because of the water and mud that accumulates and its piles of garbage. The habits of its residents, excluding not a single individual, are to spit on the roads, unburden their mouths of pan juice wherever they like, and of course throw anything exactly where they please. There are no garbage cans or any kind of waste disposal units. In their defense it should be added that this is not a failure of a system. It is an alternative system where the very idea is to spit and gargle on the roadsides and throw waste wherever, for professional cleaners to remove morning and evening and make the public spaces spic and span. That

the professional cleaners may miss a turn or do their job less than thoroughly would be accepted as the problem but not the spitting or garbage disposal itself.

This "alternative" system, comprehensible as it is as a cultural system, is exactly what should have been challenged by a modern school, based on the premises of self-discipline, discipline to a state's institutional branches, and a cooperative ethics of citizenship. Modern schools come in different ideological packagings, from Gandhi's Basic Education to missionary Christian, Hindu, or Islamic schools. All of them in principle would agree that the spitting of *pan* juice and the throwing of waste just anywhere is contrary to the teachings they hope to convey to their students. In practice, all of them exhibit an absence of this desirable civic, ethical teaching. They claim an inability to tackle the recalcitrance of "the guardians," that is the adults of the *mohalla*. In some cases, when asked if the school had parents-teachers' meetings, the response was "We cannot. The guardians of this place are so backward. If we let them come to the school they would just spit everywhere."[9]

The problem that our project set out to tackle was to combine a respect for the cultural systems of the *mohalla* with the necessary reform in its cleanliness and order. This meant building bridges with parents and children, in a deliberate departure from the distancing stance of the educators who labeled them "backward" (as did we, but with deliberate interpretive irony). It meant putting into practice strategies for teaching children how to be smart about modernity, how to change while comprehending their history. It also meant that which is directly the content of the project: the definitions of "self" and "power" of the residents of this typical *mohalla*, Khojwa, are in fact too narrow and too simplistic. Their understanding of "self" needs to be expanded with reference to India and the globe, history and civics, art and aesthetics. They need to be aware of who they are in their neighborhood, then in the city, and finally in the nation.

What about our own "selves"? The attendant problem that presented itself here in our project was that we were not ourselves from Khojwa. Had even one of us had been an identifiable resident with a pedigree in Khojwa, we would have automatically had a different status. The main people in the project were from other cities. I came from the United States, along with another colleague from California. The actor-teachers were from Banaras itself, but from other neighborhoods. The cult of the *mohalla*, or neighborhood, is so strong in Banaras, that no one ever showed respect for or even familiarity with, another neighborhood when it was mentioned, and certainly not with another city.

With this combination of tangible and intangible attitudes imbedded in community memory and practice, it was impossible to try to argue. So as discussed in more detail, for the entire duration of the project we were understood to all as not being a part of Khojwa. We were outsiders—"*bahar se ayen hain*" (they have come from outside). At best, we could be tolerated. Sometimes we

could amuse or impress; people might shake their heads perplexed by our per-spicacity. But we could not on principle be right. Any ideas, and any people-bearing ideas, had to be largely wrong or misguided if they were from outside Khojwa because in principle the right ideas could only originate in Khojwa.

At one level this is charming. It is an effortless assertion of the local against the global, asserting the centrality of the rooted self and the marginality of everything else—much like the Heavenly Kingdom of China—when one would expect the global to have rendered helpless the local. For us, proponents of the necessary progress of Khojwa children, this became an ironic obstacle. The ethnocentrism of Khojwa had to be gently countered by its placement in the larger world.

The Ramlila

The "Ramlila Project" was called that because it chose the popular theater form, the Ramlila, as both a lens into reforming the present and as an established genre and text that could be turned to for symbols and content.[10]

To start from the beginning, the Ramlila is an amateur production in which the actors are not paid, though they are given modest gifts. It has a weighty bud-get, however, which goes toward lighting, sets, musicians, and microphones. Any Ramlila production belongs to the community where it is staged and does not travel except within the neighborhood according to the plot. The Ramlila is the property of the neighborhood; it belongs to them ("*hamari* (our) Ramlila," people would say).

The actual work is done by a committee of 10 to 20 people, of whom 3 or 4 are the most active. They might be on the committee for years, but every year there is a process of nomination and election. There is a president, secretary, treasurer, minister, and so on. In Khojwa, all these come from the professional class of traders. Of the four aforementioned positions, one is in the grain trade, one in milk, one in textiles, and one in *pan*. It is difficult to know how they get along with each other, beyond the fact that they show respect to each other, especially juniors to seniors in meetings, at least in front of the researcher.

There are fixed ways in which the committee proceeds to raise its mon-ies, publicize its events, recruit its actors, and train them for two months. The money is always raised by *chanda*, donations from all the residents of the *mohalla*. The publicity is always through a printed calendar that specifies the dates for each episode of the Ramlila, headed and footed by the names of the committee mem-bers and those in charge. The actors are always children in the main roles and most of the other roles and adults in some of the secondary roles. The training takes place by the *vyasa* or priest in the one room that belongs to the *Sri Prachin Khojwa Ramlila Samiti*, or "The Venerable Khojwa Ramlila Committee." It

is located on top of the outdoor stage used for some episodes of the Ramlila performances. This stage is adjacent to the Khojwa middle and high school building.

There are enough fascinating aspects of the Ramlila that one could write a book on the subject.[11] I will clearly delineate which aspects of the Ramlila the project was involved with, leaving aside those with which it was not concerned.

Ramlila as Sign and Symbol of the Community

The most impressive aspect of the Ramlila for us was that it was truly a people's production. There was no input—no funding, no ideas, no technology—from anywhere else, only what Khojwa could afford and had to offer. The same is true of other *mohallas* and their Ramlilas. So is the Ramlila, then, a kind of mirror of the level of the *mohalla*? Answering that question leads us into the realization that, the claims of a *mohalla's* residents notwithstanding, there is no ultimate consensus about a *mohalla*, either economically, politically, or ideologically. That is, the local or the rooted is itself a fragile thing with internal conflicts and divisions.

The Ramlila is obviously controlled and run by a certain group within the *mohalla*. In 2007 these were Rajesh Kesari, Satya Prakash Singh, and Prem Shakar Tiwari. They were from certain professions and demonstrated the ethics of that profession. They belonged to certain political parties. They were all men. They were all above 40 years old. In any social setup, including the *mohalla*, there are plenty of people of other professions, with other political loyalties, of another sex, and of different ages. While it is possible that everyone accepts the Ramlila Committee as their leaders in defining the cultural stance of the whole neighborhood and there is absolutely no opposition, voiced or unvoiced, as far as we could discover, the majority of people in Khojwa may not see eye to eye with the Ramlila Committee at all and simply keep their response to one of silent distancing and nonconfrontational cooperation.

An example had occurred a month before the launching of the project. When building up a multilevel research base, we asked a random shopkeeper about the Ramlila. He said testily that he knew nothing about it, he was not interested in it, and it had nothing to do with him. This was obviously an untruth. So what kind of a shopkeeper was he? He was deliberately different from the hundreds of other shopkeepers of Khojwa. He had a very new shop with fancy display cases stocked with multinational branded cosmetics and accessories such as L'Oreal and Max Factor and foodstuffs from Britannia and Nestlé, and from the doorway hung Lay's Potato Chips, Uncle Chips, and Indian equivalents that had an equally fancy presentation.

The shopkeeper was a young man dressed in a modern way, and his whole demeanor was one of impatience with an older world. He was uncomfortable with our party of four. We were not easily categorized: dressed in Indian attires of *salwar kamiz* and *kurta pyjama* but buying expensive ice cream, speaking English, and laughing at obscurely mixed English and Hindi jokes. We were obviously insiders to, and comfortable in, Banaras but not typically Banarasi in any way. The shopkeeper was announcing a strict choice and we were evading it. His choice was my consumer goods or the old, stale things from the dusty shops of Khojwa; my definition of a modern, global lifestyle or the Ramlila. In his haste, he distorted the truth. Of course he knew about the Ramlila. What he was saying by denying the knowledge was, "It savors to me of the past and I am turned solidly toward the future, so I am not going to acknowledge its existence any longer."

In hundreds of homes in Khojwa, there are young men like this shopkeeper, albeit not as successful yet as to be able to invest in a fancy shop of their own. You visit a typical house and sit with the parents of the family, and you see that they are educated in vernacular institutions, running businesses, and living within the *mohalla* codes. They have younger children in school. Then there is an older son who just finished with school, perhaps studying in, or just graduated from, one of the many degree colleges in Banaras such as Harishchandra College or Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College. His subject is typically sociology or history, something that needs a few days of mugging up at the end of the year before the exams. He in fact learns nothing of sociology or history in college. He dresses very smartly and has invested whatever he gets from his parents or makes in whatever little part-time jobs he tries in his shirt and pants and shoes (one set of each is all he can afford). He takes special care of his appearance. If he has any more money, he spends it on a course to learn English more effectively. He spends his time trying to find out what he can do. But he has no direction, only dreams. He knows that there are certain jobs that would be lucrative, such as the ones opened up by management degrees. He is not qualified for them. He knows clearly what he is not and what he wants to disassociate himself from: the *dhoti kurta*, the Bhojpuri speech, the *pan* chewing, the idling at tea shops—and the Ramlila.

The irony that surfaced in the project was that we started off thinking of the Ramlila as a community activity and symbol that was now partly endangered because of globalization but then recognized over the course of the project that there had always been a split community anyway, and it was only getting progressively more split. The Ramlila seemed to be a community product on the surface because those who did not share in the mainstream values—perhaps the majority if we include sex and age differences—remained silent and did not protest. Today, it seems less like a community product not because there is

active protest from those who do not share its messages but because the silent protest is visually more dominant. There are more modern products, they are more brightly branded and displayed, the advertisements for them are louder, the consumption of them is more multivocal—a noisy eating of chips as in "I like these new chips" and also "I am the kind of person who eats these chips" and unbeknownst to them "I am, however, not smart enough yet to know that in the countries these chips come from there are draconian laws about throwing garbage, so I toss out my packet in the middle of the road."

We wanted, in our project, to use the Ramlila's power as a community activity. We ended up understanding that the Ramlila's power lay in that it was not actually a community activity but had the social and cultural capital to come across like a community activity. It should be definitely supported, as per our original idea, for being such a culturally powerful product fueled totally from within the community. But it should also be seen as having power as a product in process. It was able to survive and deal with historical processes and social transformations in the past. What we are going through today, namely, globalization, might seem a particularly intense transformation, but in historical terms, may in fact be no more than what the Ramlila has survived in the past—and not merely survived, but adapted to sensitively and powerfully. Rootedness could be understood as more powerful because it was in fact not consensual and yet had survived. At the same time we had to beware of the danger of believing that history continues forever in familiar ways. That the Ramlila had the resilience to survive economic and political transformations in the past did not ensure that it would do so in the future as well.[12]

Ramlila as a Social and Civic Message

The Ramlila performs and sings the story, word by word, of the *Ramcharitmanas* of Tulsidas, composed in 1600 CE as an adaptation of Valmiki's Sanskrit epic *Ramayana,* which in turn was composed in 400 BCE. While the actors declaim and perform, the singers are quiet. Then the singing resumes, and the actors are still. Thus, between the singing and the speaking, the whole *Ramcharitmanas* is ploughed through.[13]

The story of the *Ramcharitmanas*, literally, "the lake of the Acts of Rama," is in four parts: Ram's birth and childhood; Ram's marriage to Sita and exile to the forest on the eve of coronation as King of Ayodhya; the forest life of Ram, Sita, and Lakshman during which they battle many male and female demons, conquer through love as they make new friends and revive friendships, and attract the notice of Ravana—the powerful king of Lanka who kidnaps Sita; and the war between Ram with his monkey and bear supporters and Ravana with his tricky, magical demon armies. In these four books, as they are called,

the Ayodhya, Sundar, Aranya, and Lanka *kands* (action or episode) reside every conceivable plot and stratagem that a playwright could devise. When we say that the Ramlila performs and sings the whole story of the *Ramcharitmanas*, we do not mean that it literally does so. It can only perform a part. What the audience gets from it are always some select messages.

For us, embarking on the project to "use" the Ramlila to educate children, there was not a lake, but an ocean before us. We had concept meetings for a month before we began anything at which we discussed what we understood the messages of the Ram story to be and what we were interested in telling further. These included the following:

1. It was a tale of Aryan colonization, cultural rather than physical. In this it was similar to globalization today. Local cultures were subjugated to the domination of the Aryan (today, Western) hegemony, including their patriarchal, linguistic, hierarchical, and ritualistic practices. While admirable as a tale of peaceful (for the most part) domination, it was also a tale of violence and destruction as local cultures were trampled upon, subjugated, and assimilated.

2. It was directly a hierarchical, imperialistic tale in which the high-caste Kshatriyas and the powerful rulers lorded it over the lower castes, the untouchables, the tribals, and the ordinary citizens. The rulers were supposed to be loved and admired, but we can reserve some skepticism about that since the tale was composed from the rulers' points of view:

    > *Gram nikat jab nikasanhi jayi*
    > *Dekhahi darasu nari nar dhayi*
    > *Honhi sanath janam phalu payi*
    > *Phirahi dukhit manu sang pathayi*
    > When they (Ram and his entourage) pass through a village
    > All the men and women run to the road to catch a glimpse
    >   of them
    > They (the villagers) receive the reward of their lives
    > And, sad at having lost their hearts to the passing figures,
    >   they return home

3. There were many versions of the Ram story that were extant and had been written and performed over the ages and continued to be so.[14] These included the story from other characters' points of view, including Ravana, Ram's archenemy, who had supposedly no saving human grace, only an evil brilliance; Sita, the subordinate spouse of Ram, supposedly a faithful and vacant character; Manthra, the hunchbacked villainess who

causes turmoil through her mean intrigues; the lower classes in general, unremarkable except for their loyalty and devotion; and Hanuman, the monkey devotee of Ram, a simple servant. In versions from these other characters' points of view, the story was somewhat subverted, though one could argue that insofar as it survived it was still hegemonically the story of Ram, and other characters' stories testified to his greatness of tolerance and love.

4. It had a profound gender bias of which one example was paramount. Sita was counted as untrustworthy on her return from captivity under Ravana because no matter how loyal she had been to Ram, for a woman to have spent time under another man's roof meant that she was no longer pure. This was reported by one citizen, a washerman, to be the claims of the citizen-body. Ram, as the king of all the land, could not discount the citizens' doubts through his love of or protectiveness toward Sita. Breaking his heart, he had to banish Sita even after she had been through the fiery ordeal that proved her chastity. Why we feel moved by the story as a gender-discriminatory one is because the authors of most versions make no bones about explicitly describing Sita's anger and resentment at the unjust treatment meted out to her. After the torture of being Ravana's prisoner, she deserved to be back at home with her husband and family. She was also pregnant. Instead of receiving much-deserved comfort, however, she was banished to the jungle, to live in the stark simplicity of an ashram or forest retreat and bring up her twin sons there as a single mother. She was a strong woman, undoubtedly. She was even an incarnation of the goddess Lakshmi, and as Prithvi, the earth's own daughter, she was called appropriately the furrow or Sita. But none of this takes away from our anger at the discriminatory treatment that passes under the name of state politics or blind justice.

5. Guess who was responsible for the reversal whereby the soon-to-be-crowned king of Ayodhya was instead sent into exile? It was a hunch-backed *dasi*, or female servant. As she first voices her conspiracy to the queen Kaikeyi, the poet tells us the following:

> *Kane khore kubre kutil kuchali jani*
> *Tiy biseshi puni cheri kahi bharatmatu musukani*
> The one-eyed, the crippled, the hunch-backed should be
>   recognised as being conspiring and suspect.
> On top of that, a woman, and that a servant! Saying this,
>   [Kaikeyi] the mother of Prince Bharat smiled.

We were disturbed beyond measure at the aspersions cast, beyond those on women and lower-class servors, on those physically challenged. The whole story was one big celebration of the male, the females who supported them, the handsome, the straight backed and "normal," the privileged and possessed of the world.

6. At the same time, the story had plenty of promising leads: the good government of Ayodhya; the honesty and clarity of approach of the main characters; the respect shown to the older and senior; the good behavior toward all, including women and lower classes; the analysis of problems; the strategizing of solutions; the love of nature and both natural and man-made beauty; the belief in agency even though there was divine intervention at the drop of a hat; the complexity of process and outcome and eschewing of simplistic solutions; the weightiness of human emotions; the high drama rife in every turn and twist of the tale.

Finally, we summed up our approach to the story's messages as the following:

1. *Gender-related*. We could stress gender equality after taking problems in (some versions of) the text into consideration.
2. *Class-related*. We could stress egalitarianism and respect for all classes after dealing with the elitism of (some versions of) the text.
3. *Civilization-related*. We could stress the equality of cultures and the necessity of greater tolerance of the local and the small in the face of the big and the dominant, knowing that the Ram story had been written at a certain historical time.
4. *Agency-related*. We could connect every child to their history in a way the Ram story does and make them realize that "god" is within them and that they can be effective agents if they choose to be, through discipline, training, and power of will.

It became amply clear in these preparatory discussions that there was not a clear distinction of modern and traditional, or global and local, activities with the Ramlila neatly classifiable as traditional and local. In fact, it had the resources to be used, and we planned to use it, to make a case for modernity and globalization, while challenging its imperialisms.

Ramlila as Theater

The realization of the power of the Ramlila as a community activity and its riches as a bearer of social and civic messages were both based on research. What came prior and was based on simply viewing the Ramlila and being profoundly

affected by it was its reality as a theater genre. The utter charmingness of the night-after-night playing out of the episodes with children in key roles, all having become gods, dressed in archaic costumes and makeup, accompanied by breathlessly beautiful verses sung in a genre that can get stuck irremediably in your brain—all this was what made us want to work with the Ramlila.[15] What we had to do however, was be more articulate about our position vis-à-vis "theater."

We are all creatures of the Western academy. Even if based in India, we have studied within Western or global definitions of language, literature, philosophy, history, geography, and science. Then our training in and appreciation of the arts is also based on Western models. Earlier I would have said, together with many postcolonial authors, "There are no other models." After working with the Ramlila it would be absurd to say that. There are other models, but they are not objectified and articulated. They have no power. They have private power, perhaps, but they have no generalizable, large-scale, structural power. The understanding we have of the Ramlila and of the Ram story, including the aforementioned analyses, are all based on the Western models of analysis, deriving from a train of thinkers in Europe and America, such as Descartes, Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Marx, Durkheim, and Freud. The only inflection is a tiny one: knowing that these are European analysts, putting them a little bit in the context of their own history, and then just barely suggesting that maybe they did not comprehend the other civilization, India, that also existed, even as they wrote.[16]

Given this fact and this realization, the next step is to also acknowledge the fact that our whole reform effort, the Ramlila Project, is an attempt to make Western or global theater impinge on the Indian genre of the Ramlila. Our project was to introduce children for two months in evening workshops to theater games and exercises. As we knew from our experience in educational work, this would teach them to know themselves better, to be more knowledgeable about their surroundings, and to think more clearly about their future. It would also enable them to appreciate their own neighborhood production of the Ramlila instead of becoming possibly indifferent viewers, and to place that genre intelligently within a larger spectrum of theater techniques.

This idea of theater games with children, and the project of using such exercises to loosen up the self toward itself and its partners, has been, if not developed, at least articulated in the West. For adults to formally organize workshops and play games with children as an educational measure is not a concept native to India, Banaras, or Khojwa. Of course Ram must have had Vashishtha, his teacher, play with him and Lakshman in the ashram—or must he? And in all the indigenous sites of learning there must have been so many gamelike activities developed and used to promote learning. Or must there? In my mind the

answer is a "yes." Homo Ludens is alive and well in South Asia. All the folk literature and everyday life practices attest to it. It is a huge ironic twist of history that South Asians are now oversolemn about knowledge transmission and that children's learning consists of dry swotting and regurgitation of facts. But today, now, in the published form, there is no thinker from India who has written an original or interesting piece of work on theater for children that we are aware of.[17]

Should one agonize over this and work out intellectual positions, or should one just go ahead and do what one knows will work, East and West notwithstanding? We adopted the latter course. We organized our workshops and proceeded to teach the children of Khojwa theater—global, Western theater. The process is described in detail as follows.

There was no destructive fallout from the exercise. Used to jumping around, freely expressing themselves in sound and motion, becoming daily more intelligent at expressing themselves, our students did not start looking down upon the Ramlila. They did not find that it was a limited genre of archaic style and that it was stilted and therefore boring. All these were adult ideas that scholars like myself had been weighing as posing dangers for a suddenly theater-literate group. But this group was children, terrifically rooted in their neighborhood. They performed the feat that is the underrecognized historical feat of colonized and postcolonized countries: they learn the Western cumulatively, without having it replace or discard the indigenous. Their imaginations and lives became richer. They became masters of two worlds instead of one. There was no move to replace the older with a newer world. They simply learned more, including dignity, sensitivity, appreciation, and creative adaptation.

The theater form called the Ramlila proceeded in Khojwa in 2007 in the same ways as in previous years, give or take the changes that happen naturally every passing year. It has surely not stayed unaffected by every other kind of change over the years. If it was indeed started by Tulsidas four hundred years ago, its career has continued throughout: the Mughal period, the later Mughals and the breakup of the Mughal Empire and rise of smaller *nawabdoms* (principalities or governorships) and kingdoms, the early colonial period and the takeover of Banaras by the East India Company, the late colonial period and heyday of the British Empire, and the nationalist and Gandhian periods. Of course this career would have seen many convolutions and adaptations. Everything we see on the stage today, the text of Tulsidas excepted, is something that must have been adopted as an intelligent revision maybe one generation ago. Before that, there were other recensions, each perhaps one generation long.

So our approach included respecting the Ramlila as it exists at present, not being overrespectful of it as something ancient and authentic but seeing it rather as always changing, not directly addressing it as theater but pacing it in

the larger context of theater activities in the world, aiming always at theater-literacy and history-literacy, and assuming that an audience that was theater-literate would be a better audience than one that was not.

The Actual Workshops

The first step was to train a group of actor-teachers. The unforeseen difficulty that arose was that, being average young people, most of the actors understood their acting training to be geared toward producing a performance. When we announced that we were not actually going to *stage* anything, at least during the duration of the Ramlila Project, but were instead going to do workshops with children in Khojwa (though this had not been kept a secret from them), they were visibly disappointed. For them, as to most average people, theater consists of acting on stage. To be fair, once they had started the workshops, they loved them and no one stopped coming unless it was for another unrelated reason.

A second difficulty was that these were truly ordinary, average young people off the streets of Banaras, and with maybe two exceptions, most of them were very average students. They did not know English. Their schools and colleges were provincial and poor in quality. They did not know the major works of literature or art or civilizations of the world. They did not know key concepts. They were certainly intelligent and motivated, but the burden of ignorance, including that of English, in which most readings and concepts are to be found, was indeed great. We got around this problem by functioning totally in Hindi. Every few days after spirits had built up we had an evening of music and acting in which everyone could let themselves go with self-directed creativity. The team grew together and developed excellent rapport, which was one of the main purposes of the training. The other goal was also achieved: for each actor to have mastery of a range of theater games and techniques.

To work with average people off the streets of Banaras also meant that there was a lot of training to do, in simple matters such as punctuality and consistency. In this sense our project worked to produce an unplanned result: the children we worked with also became trained in what was unarguably "personality development," as it is called in local parlance.

Apart from theater training, we had regular discussions on the changes we were interested in making. We discussed stereotypes and then enacted them. Then we could think of the characters in the Ram story in their full potentiality, as given over the ages, as interpreted from different perspectives, and as potential for our interpretation. Our actors turned Ram, Sita, Ravan, and the deer around to mean many things.

Finally, we discussed and enacted Indian History. We talked about the place of Ram, of religion, of Utopia, of performance—both in our lives and of the

places all of these things should have. We acted out our emotions about these things and revised our thoughts on how they could be expressed. By the end of one month, the team was equipped to teach children theater, history, civics, the arts of thought and action, some music and dance, and agency and change.

Meanwhile, the official designer of the project, after several tries, came up with a design that we all loved. It showed Marich, the golden deer who is actually not a deer but attracts Sita into an infatuated state whereby she insists that Ram go after him and kill him for her. Since he is not a deer at all, once Ram is out of range he changes back to his own form. He imitates Ram's voice and cries out, pretending that he needs help. This further forces Sita to send Lakshman for Ram's help, against Lakshman's better judgment. Left alone, Sita falls prey to Ravana.

The golden deer/actor Marich thus provides the key to the most dramatic events in the Ram story. An actor is also a wonderful symbol for a theater project. A golden deer is particularly dramatic. The design being accepted, the head of the deer against a black or red background soon adorned, our visiting cards, banners, posters, flyers, notebooks, pencils, bags, and T-shirts. Here too we had trouble: part of the larger scene of India, with its own systems of work ethics and structural bottlenecks. We had a person working only on these materials for the project, and he was conscientious, running around daily and reporting regularly. Yet, every order failed to be delivered on time. Second, almost every product fell short of the quality we had specified. All the things still looked good, but to our minds a little shoddier, flatter, or less bright than we had imagined and hoped.

We were determined to meet everyone who was anyone in Khojwa. But of course worlds opened into worlds and there were always more people who seemed to be relevant to our project. We began with the high school, its principal and teachers. We were going to work with their students and hopefully use their premises. Then we went to the local politicians and made sure that they were on our side. Each visit, needless to add, meant three or four visits, as people were absent, discussions left incomplete, and others not present were sought to be invited. Since our project was obviously only for the benefit of the local children, no one could be directly against it. Yet all the discussions dragged on. We were not necessarily seeking "permission," rather some kind of support of Khojwa's important people. They did offer their support ultimately. They said that for our workshops we could use the Khojwa Public Library, the gymnasium called Agyavan Bir, or the high school verandahs.

Thus, after the first two or three meetings at the library, where hundreds of children showed up for the workshops, we were told by a mysterious phone call that we could no longer meet there and that no reasons could be given. We planned with the Agyavan Bir people about meeting there. At every stage we

had a pamphlet printed for distribution to the children, then it was amended, then reamended. We were allowed to go to Agyavan Bir only for a day. The next day some of us stood at its gates to tell all participants to go instead to the school, and the rest of us were already in the school setting up. The Agyavan Bir's committee gave us the evasive reason that the place would get dirty with use.

After school was over, it closed and was locked up by 4:00 p.m. Our workshops began at 6:00 p.m. The security guard was kind enough to let us store our materials in one of the rooms and to arrange a wire connection to the electrical outlet in one of the rooms. Otherwise we had nobody's help and only the verandahs for our use. Luckily, they were long, if narrow, and a very nice space. We spread rows of mats and made them comfortable. We strung wire and hung light bulbs along one side (when they got cut off and stolen, we strung up some more and started to wind them up daily and store them safely inside after we were finished). We had a black "wing" for each of our eight groups on which was pinned the name of the group, a picture of its leader, and other pictures and work as it got done.

In most cases two teachers were in charge of a group. The groups were all numbered after colors. There were attendance sheets, and we were strict about not disrupting the planning of the work by admitting children randomly at later stages. When they begged a lot, we sometimes made them sit by until they were ready to be assimilated in the group. At other times we had to promise them "another workshop, next time." There was no question that all the different groups working on the mats, lit up by bright bulbs, alternately doing theater and concentrating on other things, looked very attractive to onlookers. Every day we had many passersby of all ages and kinds standing around to watch us. Every day more people asked us what was happening. The cumulative effect of our workshops reached many more people than just the 60 children or so in the workshop. In that sense, the school's verandahs, open to public gaze as they were, were a better site than the enclosed Agyavan Bir gymnasium or the library.

What did we teach? We had a syllabus based on all the ideas discussed in this chapter, such as the nature of modernity in Banaras, the history and sociology of Khojwa, and the implications of the Ram story. Concretely, the syllabus included social studies worksheets that we based around the Ram story. There were separate units on "Me," "My Neighborhood," "My Family," and so on. In each case there were exercises for the children to do, maps for them to work on, drawings to make and complete, things to find out, and points to ponder. Each exercise was preceded by oral discussion. The children were totally absorbed.

The intention of this set of exercises was to train them to think about themselves, about Khojwa and about Banaras, about their family and their neighbors in personal, interactive terms. They had never done that. Once guided and

encouraged, they were enthusiastic. The references from the Ram story were to make the exercises more interesting; the thrust of the exercises was to make children think about *themselves* and not about Ram, rather to use Ram's story as an insight.

The syllabus revolved around history and sociology. We taught them history orally and theatrically. In the workshop, I described the whole history of the world and of India. As I spoke, our actors arose and acted out the description. Thus, I said, "While the wars were going on between the kings, the common people carried on their work of building houses, creating beautiful things, laboring hard, respecting their work" (in Hindi). The actors showed in improvised action the wars on one side and the labor and construction on another. I linked up the different processes of world and Indian history throughout to the history of Khojwa, which, it being a working-class *mohalla* full of toymakers, mask-makers, potters, and weavers, was easy to do.

As a historian, I felt this was a most meaningful part of the project. The children understood Indian history swiftly, spontaneously, and in a personal way. The actor-teachers themselves understood the history as they would not have in their schools and colleges. Our version of history was a popular, people's history with a deliberately working-class flavor. It had local landmarks and events and addressed issues that everyone knew.

We taught sociology with a map of the *mohalla*, lessons about its composition and problems, and open-ended discussions of "who I am." Again, the theater exercises fed directly into this as children themselves learned to perform in various ways.

Similarly we had music and art workshops. Again, the children were one group and were addressed together by experts. In the music workshop they learned the basics of rhythm and melody, some ragas, and got an overview of the genres of Indian music. They sang along and clapped along. In the art workshop they learned how to control line and form, use color, and make simple pictures. In both cases, the aim was to introduce them to other mediums, together with the written and spoken word and theater, make them express themselves confidently, and feel "smart."

Most important, the children learned acting. They did at least half an hour of theater exercises every day that made them loosen up limbs and senses, work in teams, and become much more alert to demand, response, and possible responses. They discussed the Ram story. They applied it to themselves, their worksheets, their history, and their growing skills and confidence.

None of these workshops were difficult for us because of our practice of using them frequently at NIRMAN. We adapted them to the level and background of the children in Khojwa. We were thrilled at the success of each of them and continually learned how to do them better. After every workshop, we

discussed each group's experiences with individual children and the individual learning experiences.

Throughout the workshops, we filmed our activities. After the work with children was over, we embarked on the editing of the footage to make a documentary called "Children Playing Gods." The double entendre was that not only did children play the roles of the Gods in the Ramlila; they also could play Gods—that is, masters of their own destiny and of their environment—if they so wished. To "be God" or to play God (because playing is what God does) is an old, familiar idea in Hindu India. To be master of your destiny is a modern idea and a suggestion of globalization processes. That the two meanings of playing God actually can be copresent is what the Ramlila Project strove to teach.

The Globalization of the Local

The simple aim of the project had been to make the children of Khojwa smarter (i.e., more global) and to make their wonderful performance, the local Ramlila, smarter (i.e., more global). We succeeded, but in doing so we also learned important lessons about globalization that merit pondering.

The project can take place in any neighborhood of any city in India, and equally in a village. It can take the predominant local cultural activity, as in our case it was the Ramlila. Using that as story and symbol, the children of the neighborhood can be organized in workshops. There can be 20 children or 100, depending on the size of the team. The workshops teach the children how to think about themselves as agents, as citizens, as connected to their history, society and culture; they can teach them actual facts about Indian history, music, art, and theater.

Then there will be opposition from the people of the neighborhood. For reasons that seem initially inexplicable, they will claim that you, the teachers, are outsiders, foreigners, perhaps missionaries, out to destroy their local culture. It seems surprising: why would people put on an identity of local patriotism to oppose what is obviously good for their children? The children have been steadily becoming more alive and active, intelligent, and confident. They have even begun to think of cleaning up their *mohalla*, interpreting their lives and problems intelligently, and always thinking in terms of action and not passivity.

The adults of the neighborhood cannot help but be impressed by what has been achieved. Their opposition comes partly from jealousy between small groups of the *mohalla* and partly from defensiveness in the face of change. The change itself is certain to succeed because it is based on the right kind of synthesis. Without attempting to take credit for what worked out largely by chance, I will say that if globalization has to be the way of life for people, it should at

least be totally based on their local practices, and use those, preferably with a performance genre, to approach the issues of the global present.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the India Foundation of the Arts for funding for this project and NIRMAN for hosting it and facilitating it in numerous ways.
2. Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Dipankar Gupta, *Mistaken Modernity: India Between Worlds* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000). I have differences with these authors, but as with them, "modernity" and "globalization" are being discussed in this essay as cultural systems. They have some grounding in, and correspondence with, economic processes that are also labeled "modern" and "global" but are not systems of belief and practice that are coincidental with economic systems. Thus, Banaras has no modern industry but is characterized by modernity.
3. Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2000). While Gupta talks of rural North India, the same argument of an *identity* of underdevelopment may be made for small-town India as well.
4. Scholars of South Asian modernity typically stress the colonial failure in the political not the technological realm. For instance, Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983).
5. Because this is such a summarized argument, there is not one author to best cite in support of it, but for the failure of education in India to transport a European modernity, see Sanjay Seth, *Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Colonial India* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2007) and for the work of education in a European country, see Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1976).
6. It is important to remember that the awareness of globalization and its discourse have certainly intensified recently, but the economic networking beyond nation-states that it implies is much older than recent times.
7. For an expansion of this argument, see Nita Kumar, *The Politics of Gender, Community, and Modernity: Essays on Education in India* (New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), chapter 5.
8. Nonindustrialized cities like Banaras are divided into neighborhoods called *mohallas*, each of which may have several thousand households. Together ten or twenty constitute a ward, and ten to twenty wards compose the main municipal area of a city, each under a police station. A *mohalla* has a dominant occupation or occupations and some defining characteristics. The layout of almost each *mohalla* is similar: intersecting arteries of streets and many capillaries of lanes, a bazaar area, residential clusters that are also manufacturing or work places, mosques and temples, some historical landmarks, a high school or college, a library, a nationalist statue, a park, or a graveyard. It has a center and fringes. Above all the similarities with other parts of the city, its separate identity is based on its occupation, its history, and its assertion of difference.

9. The best statement of such a distancing from "backward" Indians by the school is made by Sanjay Srivastava, *Constructing Post-Colonial India: National Character and the Doon School* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

10. The genre is described most famously in Anuradha Kapur, *Actors, Pilgrims, Kings and Gods: The Ramlila at Ramnagar* (Calcutta: Seagull Books, 1990); Richard Schechner, *Between Theater and Anthropology* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1985); and Richard Schechner and Linda Hess, "The Ramlila at Ramnagar," *TDR* 21, no. 3 (1977): 51–82.

11. Indeed, my own first book while not only about the Ramlila, described its working, see Nita Kumar, *The Artisans of Banaras: Popular Culture in Urban India, 1880–1984* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

12. For a wonderful look at the play of history and politics with performance, see Sibaji Bandyopadhyay, "Introduction: The Laughing Performer," in *Sacred to Profane: Writings on Worship and Performance*, ed. Anjum Katyal (Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2006): 1–38.

13. Philip Lutgendorf describes the performance in his *The Life of a Text: Performing the Ramcaritmanas of Tulsidas* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1989).

14. For the best discussion of this, see Paula Richman, *Many Ramayanas: The Diversity of a Narrative Tradition in South Asia* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991) and Paula Richman, *Questioning Ramayanas: A South Asian Tradition* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000).

15. Nita Kumar, *Friends, Brothers, and Informants: Fieldwork Memoirs of Banaras* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992) documents this to some extent.

16. For two completely different discussions on the impinging of the West on Indian performance and fashioning by modernity of Indian culture, see Carol A. Breckenridge, ed., *Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1995) and Rustom Bharucha, *Theater and the World: Performance and the Politics of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

17. The performing arts for adults are well-documented, for instance Kathryn Hansen, *Grounds for Play: The Nautanki Theater of North India* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992), the dedication of which is, ironically, a verse from Ghalib that says, "This world is but a child's play before my eyes. Night and day the spectacle unfolds before me." The transformative powers of these arts are similarly well-documented, for instance, Eugene van Erven, *The Playful Revolution: Theater and Liberation in Asia* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992).

Mexico from Mestizo to Multicultural

Arts and Identity at the Turn of the Millennium

Carrie C. Chorba

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the ways in which the arts have been used to construct a specific aspect of Mexican nationalism: the national identity—more precisely, the *mestizo* (or Spanish and indigenous) national identity that was a central part of Mexico's postrevolutionary ideology throughout the twentieth century. The evolving content of this identity is crucial for understanding how Mexicans have confronted colonization, revolution, and now globalization.

I examine this identity through the lens of Mexican art in various forms, from the so-called fine art destined for museums to the bold murals that have received international acclaim to the political cartoons in the popular media.[1] By exploring some very general references to the early twentieth-century Mexican painting and culture, but more intensively focusing on art in the 1990s, I will use representations of the conquest of Mexico as a means to analyze national identity and demonstrate the construction or deconstruction of the *mestizo*, as the case may be.

A fundamental premise of this analysis is that the ultimate purpose of a national identity is to define the nation's unique cultural, economic, political, or demographic characteristics in order to foster national unity and patriotism through the portrayal of community traits and the creation of a sense of belonging.

Following the Mexican Revolution of 1910, the state needed to assign certain qualities to the concepts of national identity (*lo mexicano* or *mexicanidad*)—for

the good of the country. At the time, national unification was one of the most urgent goals of postrevolutionary governments. The state and its supporting intellectuals proudly declared Mexico a *mestizo* nation in attempts to unify a heterogeneous population. Thus they sought to assimilate and integrate various racial, ethnic, political, and economic sectors of society into a single pueblo, or people.

This construction of a new, collective image involved the elevation of the *mestizo* figure from the status of pariah, a position in which it had suffered since colonial times, to that of the emblematic Mexican. Now, it seemed viable that the *mestizo*, embodying as it can the virtues of cultural and biological mixing, would necessarily foment national unity. However, it is very important to stress the fact that the figure of the *mestizo* carried much unwanted baggage and gave rise to many thorny issues. First and foremost, we must understand that this national identity is based on a racial or biological figure whose origins trace back to the first historical moments of contact—and conquest—that took place when the Spaniards arrived on Mexican soil in the sixteenth century. Thus any search for *mestizo* origins would necessarily conjure up images of shameful behavior, forced racial mixing—rape or submission—and military conquest.

For example, a statue placed in the plaza of Coyoacán, one of Mexico City's upscale neighborhoods, in 1982 by the Mexican government depicts a family—a sixteenth-century Spaniard, an Indian woman, and a small child—and is entitled *Monumento al mestizaje* (Monument to Miscegenation). At the time, some said it represented the conquistador Hernán Cortés, his translator and concubine Malintzin (*La Malinche*), and Martín, their *mestizo* son. Many balked, assuming that, due to the violent nature of Mexico's conquest, the child "had been the fruit of a violent relationship, and therefore guilty, that it had to be hidden."[2] The statue was removed from the plaza because of the controversy surrounding it, and it was placed in a quiet neighborhood park instead. This incident in Coyoacán clearly demonstrates the public's discomfort with the inception of *mestizaje*, or miscegenation, in Mexico even though it long served as a national myth of foundation.

But returning to the postrevolutionary days to examine some of the iconic depictions of *mestizaje*, we see that in the 1920s, in order to teach the populace its history and reaffirm the state's revolutionary origins, the state established the *Escuela Mexicana de Pintura* (Mexican School of Painting). While he was the Minister of Public Education, José Vasconcelos actively employed many of these muralists—most famously David Alfaro Siqueiros, José Clemente Orozco, and Diego Rivera—to paint the visual billboards of cultural nationalism in and on government buildings in Mexico. These murals stand as monuments to the country's heroes and revolutionary ideals. The murals (1) laud the indigenous

past as the source of Mexico's cultural wealth, (2) condemn the imperialism of both Spain and the United States, and (3) sing the praises of liberty, revolution, and independence in Mexico. But as we shall see, they do not show *mestizaje* as a harmonious, harmonizing process.

Representations of the Conquest

Visual representation of the conquest, and consequently the inception of *mestizaje* from the first half of the twentieth century, helps us to understand this discomfort with the figure of the *mestizo*. In José Orozco's 1926 mural "Hernán Cortés y la Malinche" we see the so-called Mexican Adam and Eve united by their held hands. Yet, looking closer, we find that Malinche is restrained by Cortes—his arm prevents her from reaching out to the lifeless Indian at their feet (symbolic of her former life), and his right knee prevents her from planting her feet on the ground. Although their union implies synthesis, it is contingent on the subjugation of the Indian, and indeed, the physical restraint of la Malinche.

Diego Rivera's *Palacio Nacional* murals—a monumental series of frescoes depicting Mexican history in its entirety—includes a panel entitled *La colonización o llegada de Hernán Cortés a Veracruz* (Colonization or Hernán Cortés's Arrival in Veracruz). Here, Rivera situates the inception of Mexican *mestizaje*— depicted as the blue-eyed son of Cortés and a faceless Malinche—within a panorama of total destruction of the indigenous world. Cortés is seen paying Christopher Columbus, perhaps for the Indian's souls he has converted (at sword point) and treating the Indians as beasts of burden like his countrymen do in another area of the mural. Even the indigenous breed of dog, the *xoloitzcuintle*, defends his authenticity from the invading beasts. In all, this polemical panel is in keeping with Rivera's communist beliefs.

Less politically charged, but no less poignant, is Jorge González Camarena's 1963 mural entitled "Fusión de dos culturas" (The Fusion of Two Cultures). Here we see clearly the devastating results of the "collision of two worlds": the Spanish conquistador and the Aztec Eagle Warrior mutually impale each other with sword and with spear. The red hue of the mural absorbs both the bloodshed and the blazes that would lay waste to the Aztec empire. In contrast to the concepts of the melting pot or heterogeneity that are so prevalent in the United States, where the individual components of mixture or diversity are affirmed and to a certain extent maintained, we see that *mestizaje*—or fusion—emerges only from the solubility and loss of the original components.

In contrast, Jesús Helguera's 1941 portrait of Cortés and La Malinche shows the most romanticized version possible of the Spanish conquistador and his Indian princess and translator. Absent are any inferences of sexual assault, Malinche's condition as a slave, violent imperialism, or consequent cultural

annihilation endured during conquest. Instead, pure sexual innuendo abounds in Malinche's breathless pose of sensual ecstasy, in the bulging muscles of Cortés's steed, his red toreador's cape (bullfighting being a metaphor for sexual conquest) as well as in the dormant volcano—apt to erupt at any moment. This is the harmonious fantasy of *mestizaje* on which the state pinned its aspirations for national unity. Yet, as we have seen, in contrast to this harmonious dream, *mestizo* origins can be represented as traumatized origins, as a point of departure for anti-imperial discourse, and as a loss of a previous identity through cultural—or total—annihilation.

Symbolism in the 1990s

For almost eight decades after the revolution, the Mexican state was dominated by the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) or Institutional Revolutionary Party. With the exception of the 1968 student protests and consequent massacre at Tlatelolco in Mexico City, the PRI enjoyed—and actively cultivated—an environment that remained relatively free of opposition until the early 1980s. But the 1980s and 1990s were decades of crises in Mexico. As a result, longstanding concepts of nationhood and national unity were crumbling. Mexicans had witnessed the government's widespread economic mismanagement in the economic crisis of 1982 and complete official inefficiency in response to the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City. In addition, democratization began to emerge in Mexico during the 1988 presidential elections and the appearance of a viable political opposition to the PRI. As the *PRIísta* political system crumbled, so did the viability of its previous mestizophile discourse as the singular, unifying factor in postrevolutionary national identity.

Also in the 1990s, the Mexican government made radical changes in its official declarations about the nation's ethnic and cultural makeup. In 1992, President Salinas de Gortari unilaterally altered the fourth article of the Constitution. In it, he defined the Mexican nation as having "a pluricultural composition, sustained originally in its indigenous population."[3] This shift toward multiculturalism represented a dramatic change in state attitudes toward the diversity of the Mexican populace.

But perhaps most important, the 1994 uprising in Chiapas brought indigenous diversity and sovereignty to the forefront of national debates, while simultaneously bringing deep-seated fears about the possible effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA or TLC, which stands for Tratado de Libre Comercio) ran rampant. Although Mexican society and its government continue to negotiate the terms by which they approach multiculturalism—be it through indigenous autonomy or not—and a less economically protectionist

future in the free market, the fundamental changes that these realignments in Mexico's sense of nation and identity entail cannot be underestimated.

During these years of economic and political instability in Mexico, nationalist feelings were at a low. It was then that a number of Mexican artists created novels, plays, movies, and cartoons that interrogated and recreated Mexico's sixteenth-century history in a search for origins, each of which undeniably unfolds within a metaphor of *mestizaje*. These works resulted from the very specific crises, disillusionments, and debates of the end of the century, and they all reveal the urgency with which intellectuals wrote either to salvage or to rework a national mestizo identity that began with the conquest.

This examination of arts at the end of the twentieth century can begin with a film that seeks to revise the figure of the mestizo and the process of *mestizaje* by infusing them with more nuanced theories and conclude with works that represent a backlash fueled by the fears of losing Mexico's unique identity in the shadow of NAFTA.

If, in the twentieth century, the origins of racial *mestizaje* in Mexico were terribly stigmatized, as we saw with the statue in Coyoacán, the opposite can be said about the origins of syncretic religious beliefs during the same historical period. In his 1998 film, *La otra conquista*, Salvador Carrasco recreates the compelling process that takes place as the indigenous protagonist accepts Christianity in the form of a syncretic, Spanish Virgin Mary.

According to theories of syncretism, elements of one religious system are fused with those of another to create hybrid gods, practices, and beliefs. Mother goddesses like the Spanish Virgin Mary and the Aztec Tonantzin were worshipped as one. The syncretic model of religious assimilation serves as a perfect complement to those of cultural and racial *mestizaje*, especially in terms of the perception of them as harmonizing and homogenizing. Yet, the spiritual conquest was no less violent than the military conquest. As a result, the allegedly serene meshing of Aztec and indigenous gods in Mexico's uniquely syncretic form of Catholicism is no less conflicted than the biological and cultural clashes depicted in the murals we saw.

La otra conquista, then, returns to the conquest in order to visually represent the past in all its tragic splendor. By doing so, Carrasco's film works against the now-untenable notions of *mestizaje* and syncretism as harmonious blends of races and belief systems. As the director himself says, "I think we sometimes fall into the trap of exalting *mestizaje* and syncretism as if they were themselves values, as if they were more or less peaceful cultural processes, carried out within a framework of symmetrical power—as if Mexican identity fused two cultures of equal condition . . . we wish to highlight . . . the violence implicit in such processes."[4] Here, Carrasco implies that the concept of transculturation better

explains modern Mexican identity and the foundational events that were taking place on Mexican soil in the sixteenth century.

"Transculturation" is an attempt to describe "the complex and multidirectional processes in cultural transformation."[5] It combines the notion of acculturation (acquiring another culture) with violent deculturation (the loss or uprooting of a previous culture) and neoculturation (the consequent creation of new cultural phenomena). Most important to Carrasco and *La otra conquista* are the notions of multidirectionality and the inherent imbalance of power in such processes.

La otra conquista tells the tragic and compelling tale of Topiltzin, an Aztec scribe who witnesses the unspeakable destruction of his people at the hands of the Spaniards (see Figure 9.1). We first see Topiltzin, a lone survivor, as he climbs from the ruins of the Templo Mayor after the 1520 massacre. In every sense, his world is in ruins as he calls for his mother goddess, Tonantzin, but gets no answer.

Topiltzin's initial reaction to the Spaniards' hostile presence is one of intense resistance, yet he is later captured and forced to renounce his culture and his gods while his feet are being burned, and he is made to face a statue of the Virgin Mary. Topiltzin is spared from death but forced to convert to Christianity under the tutelage of the Spanish clergyman, Fray Diego de la Coruña, in the monastery of Nuestra Señora de la Luz (Our Lady of the Light). Topiltzin's resistance continues but is thwarted at every turn. He then begins the ambiguous and complex process of accepting and appropriating the Spanish Virgin Mary while suffering debilitating fevers and hallucinations. Throughout Topiltzin's trials, Fray Diego has prodded, encouraged, and punished him (see Figure 9.2).

These two protagonists, Topiltzin and Fray Diego, are symbolic of the indigenous and Spanish components of Mexico's early, syncretic Christianity, as well

Figure 9.1   Salvador Carrasco's escaping Topiltzin

Figure 9.2 Salvador Carrasco's Topiltzin and the Virgin Mary

as Mexico's *mestizo* heritage. They also demonstrate the popularly held version of how modern Mexican faith was born. Despite the initial trauma, Topiltzin converts by becoming "Tomás" (his baptized name) and accepting Catholic beliefs. Yet, as mentioned previously, the film complicates this popular but simplistic vision of early evangelization and strives to represent multidirectional transculturation, not harmonious, syncretic mixing. Fray Diego is "converted" by Topiltzin as well and his close contact with Aztec culture. Fray Diego learns to speak Nahuatl, Topiltzin's mother tongue, and delivers a benediction for Topiltzin/Tomás in Nahuatl, saying, "Now that you have left us, wake up. May our venerable mother keep you forever with dignity." Aztec culture has therefore touched Fray Diego, and he has been changed by it.

Yet in the final sequence, when Topiltzin commits his ultimate act of assimilation or appropriation, he dies under a statue of the Virgin Mary as it falls into his arms. The friar believes his work is done, declaring the scene "a miracle that reflects how two different races can be one through tolerance and love." This last scene then ends as the camera pans up and out the window of Topiltzin's cell onto the dawning of a new day.

Although the final scene is decidedly ambiguous and open, I believe it is essentially a problematic conversion and tragic ending of Topiltzin's lineage. The audience is faced with a pessimistic outcome that signals—whether or not intentionally—the absence of the indigenous in modern Mexican spirituality and identity. For if individual Aztecs appropriated the Virgin into their lives in order to regain a lost Tonantzin, we understand that they did so in a vibrant

effort to continue worshiping. Topiltzin, on the other hand, dies in the process. *La otra conquista* shows the conflicted, nonharmonious processes and the cultural annihilation of the indigenous symbols and beliefs (see Figure 9.3).

Turning now to the 1992 cartoon series *El Ahuizotl*, we see how the cartoonists return to the nation's sixteenth-century origins to allegorically speak about the profound changes taking place in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. *El Ahuizotl*'s cartoons are biting criticisms of Mexico's political and economic path at the end of the last century—most notably the modernization and globalization drives of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The cartoons also demonstrate Mexicans' sense that they were undergoing yet another conquest at the end of the twentieth century. By drawing a parallel between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries and by casting the Aztecs as today's Mexicans, the *moneros* or cartoonists also comment on the state of national identity at the time. Despite the profound differences in Spanish and North American imperialism, the artists discussed in this chapter conflate the two, thus voicing the deepest fear in Mexico during the 1990s: that the PRI's deteriorating politics, neoliberal economics, and NAFTA would drastically transform Mexico's national identity.

As we see here, the 1992 series of *El Ahuizotl* is artfully crafted to fit into *La Jornada*, one of Mexico's highest circulating daily newspapers, as each of the issues parodies a journalistic, if at times tabloid, presentation of the major historical moments of the sixteenth century. The setup of the front page of this issue mimics the tabloid genre with its bold type headlines, dramatic visuals, and titillating stories to be divulged within (see Figure 9.4).

Figure 9.3   Salvador Carrasco's death of Topiltzin

Figure 9.4 Gonzalo Rocha González's "Joer"

Here, the Spaniards are awestruck by their first glimpse of Chilangotitlán (a derogatory updating of Tenochtitlán, the Aztec capital) and gasp, "F——k, this is wonderful!!" They are impressed, not by the indigenous achievements in architecture or transportation represented in the pyramids and canals but by the evidence of industrialization and commercial integration of markets on flashy billboards.

In another cartoon, we see Cortés "evangelizing" Moctezuma with a new god: the dollar (see Figure 9.5). The humor lies not only in the deep truth contained within (that evangelization was secondary to the military conquest for the Spaniards) but also in the satirical derision of the materialism that the Occident—and now the North—have both brought to Mexican soil.

By equating Spaniards and gringos, the series further lampoons many of the social, economic, and political ills of Mexico in the 1990s. Consider the cartoons that clarify the relationship between the two (see Figures 9.6 and 9.7). They equate the Spanish military invasion with the North American cultural invasion and the Spanish religious crusade with the North American economic crusade for free trade. Within this paradigm, then, Cristóbal Colón recruits marines for the colonization of the New World much as Uncle Sam does for the imperialistic goals of the United States, and the first news of the Europeans' presence reaches Montezuma along with the rough draft for the NAFTA treaty.

Figure 9.5   Gonzalo Rocha González's "Evangelizing with Dollar"

Figure 9.6 Gonzalo Rocha González's "I Want You"

Figure 9.7 Manuel Ahumada's "TLC"

A messenger, reporting on the first sightings of the Spaniards along the coast says, "They have the body of a deer, hair all over their faces, their feet stink and they sent you the first draft of NAFTA." Here, we laugh as we recognize the parallel drawn between a treaty that wrenches open previously protected markets and a colonial economic monopoly that figuratively rapes a country ("wrench" and "rape" obviously evoking a great Mexican pun or double entendre of *chingar*—a vulgar term for sexual intercourse).

The parallels drawn between the Spanish colonization and the gringo globalization of Mexico easily extend into the realm of the military as well (see Figure 9.8). The impromptu boats or *bergantines* that the Spaniards built in 1521 in order to take Tenochtitlán by water are drawn clearly as American gunboats and are described as "therefore constituting the first motherf——king naval force, direct antecedent to the feared Marines."[6] In other cartoons, the battles on Mexican soil are also labeled with such names as "Operation High Plain Storm/La Operación Tormenta del Altiplano"[7] and "Operation Lagoon Storm/Operación Tormenta en la Laguna"[8] much like Operation Desert Storm of 1991, and perhaps betraying the Mexican fear that its oil fields, too, were dangerously of interest to the United States—and dangerously close to being within their grasp if NAFTA offered up the national petroleum company, Petróleos Mexicanos or PEMEX, to foreign ownership.

Figure 9.8   Manuel Ahumada's "Gunboat"

The cartoons of *El Ahuizotl* not only play with the similarities between six-teenth- and twentieth-century history but also evoke—very forcefully—the deepest and most urgent fears of Mexican society in the 1990s. Then-president Carlos Salinas de Gortari had promised it was "morning in Mexico" and that he would make Mexico into a First-World nation; this both energized and terrified many of his countrymen. These very fears are evident in the fact that the *monero* El Fisgón published a book of cartoons entitled *How to Survive Neoliberalism and Still Be Mexican (Cómo sobrevivir al neoliberalismo sin dejar de ser mexicano)* in 1996.

Into the Twenty-First Century

Admittedly, since these works emerged, dramatic democratization, continued negotiations with indigenous groups, and nearly two decades of neoliberal policies in Mexico have further altered Mexico's national identity and brought

many new nuances to the fore. Yet, the core issues discussed in these works remain pertinent. First, Mexico's origins—be they political, racial, spiritual, or cultural—continue to be a dramatic source of storytelling. And those stories, in turn, will always speak to *who* Mexicans are today. History is ever-present in Mexico and continues to be used to construct and deconstruct national identity. And lastly, race—indigenous, European, *mestizo* or "other"—will continue to challenge this nation whose *mestizo*phile identity discourse skewed many Mexicans' notions of their nation for a very long time.[9]

Notes

1. This focus is elaborated at much greater length in my book, *Mexico, from Mestizo to Multicultural: National Identity and Recent Representations of the Conquest* (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 2007).
2. Jaime del Arenal Fenochio, "La desmitificación de la historia de México," *Istmo* 204 (1993): 4–8.
3. "Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, actualizada hasta Reforma de 14.08.2001": 4.
4. Quoted in Salvador Velazco, "Entrevista con Salvador Carrasco," *La Jornada Semanal* (1999): 4.
5. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1995): 167.
6. Ahumada, Helguera, El Fisgón, Luis Fernando, Magú, Rocha, and Ulises, "El Ahuizotl," *La Jornada* 12 (1992): 3.
7. Ibid., 5, 8.
8. Ibid., 2, 12.
9. Additional sources for this essay include *Political Database of the Americas* (2001), http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Mexico/mexico2001.html; Rafael Barajas, "El Fisgón," in *Cómo sobrevivir al neoliberalismo sin dejar de ser mexicano* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1996).

CHAPTER 10

Global Citizenship, Cultural Change, and Education Policy in Japan and New Zealand

Lynne Parmenter

Introduction

This chapter explores how cultural change and persistence are negotiated within education policy to accommodate globalization in two countries in the Pacific Basin, focusing on the specific issue of global citizenship. Citizenship education has become a major concern in many parts of the world over the past 10 to 20 years.[1] However, one of the tensions inherent in citizenship education is achieving a balance between the traditional role of schools to develop national citizens and the impact of globalization, which makes the restriction of citizenship to the national sphere incomplete if not obsolete.[2]

Education policy makers are thus faced with the task of designing policy and curricula that balance on the tightrope between demands for national citizenship and the need for citizens who can actively engage in global spheres. The introduction of the global dimension often gives rise to cultural tensions, both in the process of creating policy and in the resulting documents and practices. Concurrently, it offers opportunities for broadening the horizons and scope of both the education curricula and the millions of individual students who engage with these curricula.

This chapter examines education policy in Japan and New Zealand. Of course, being an important site of value negotiation, study of education policy in any country provides rich insights into the way in which politicians, policy makers, and practitioners assert control over cultural traditions and cope with

cultural change in that particular society. The reason for selecting Japan and New Zealand in particular is that they highlight contrasts in education policy approaches toward cultural change and persistence, thus they serve as illustrations of the wide range of possible responses to tensions between local and global forces of change and persistence in the Pacific Basin region.

The chapter consists of two main parts. The first section will briefly survey some of the literature relevant to national and global citizenship education. The second section provides a detailed analysis of education policy and curriculum in Japan and New Zealand, examining the ways in which the education system deals with cultural persistence, cultural change, and globalization. Then, the conclusion summarizes the dominant trends in the two countries.

Education for National and Global Citizenship

This section focuses mainly on theories and literature relevant to education for national and global citizenship, but this should in no way detract from the importance of citizenship and identities in other territorial and geopolitical spheres, such as the transnational and subnational spheres, the latter being especially significant in New Zealand.

Education for National Citizenship

The "triumph of nationalism"[3] and subsequent wave of nation-state building, which spread from Europe in the late eighteenth century throughout most parts of the world in the subsequent 150 years, was sustained by the expansion of mass education, one of the fundamental aims of which was to create "good" citizens and subjects. In this period, education for citizenship was generally equated with "a narrow version of moral training,"[4] whereby a good citizen was seen to be one prepared to obey, serve, and even die for the nation without asking too many questions why.

After two world wars and numerous other conflicts throughout the world, the glorification of "the good citizen" as a blindly obedient patriot was toned down in educational circles, at least, but basic assumptions underlying prevailing practices and policies remained largely unchanged in school classrooms in many parts of the world. Thus it is that history education, for example, has continued to be dominated by a nationally filtered view of history in the classrooms of many countries through to the present day. Similarly, geography has continued to focus on national geography, language on national or official language, literature on national literature, and so on. In such ways, the content of education, while often seen as "natural" and rarely promoted as "nationalistic," has played and continues to play a major role in shaping the knowledge and views of the vast majority of individuals in the nation to what politicians and

policy makers consider to be required or desired of national citizens. As Apple states, "Out of the vast universe of possible knowledge, only some knowledge and ways of organizing it get declared to be legitimate or 'official.' . . . But the politics of curriculum doesn't end with the knowledge itself. It also involves who should select it, how it should be organized, taught, and evaluated."[5]

Furthermore, education for national citizenship is not only achieved through the politics of curriculum. The structure of the school system, the roles, beliefs, and expectations of schools, teachers, and pupils and the daily routines and practices of everyday school life all play a significant part in the development of children as national citizens. Assessment systems determine who is seen as a success and who is seen as a failure in a particular national context, with all the implications this has for society at large and for individuals throughout their lives. Another example is the way in which teacher-student relationships provide a primary model of power relations, with children in most classrooms of the world learning at an early age that being a "good" pupil (and often, by extension, a good citizen) means not questioning authority. In such everyday and largely unquestioned ways, the education system, policies, and practices of any specific nation have a huge influence on the development of individuals as national citizens.

In this context, the definition of national citizenship that is adopted by a particular government and promoted in any particular education policy and curriculum has significant effects on the concepts children develop of the nation and the world, as well as on their own individual identities. In the second section of this chapter, the divergent definitions of national citizenship promoted in Japan and New Zealand will be analyzed and their implications discussed.

Education for Global Citizenship

Presenting an ever-greater challenge to education for national citizenship is the growing phenomenon of globalization and global citizenship. In its present form, as an offshoot of the complex global transformations caused by the rise of information and communications technology, economic factors, and political changes[6] evident since the 1970s, education for global citizenship is a new trend that needs to be negotiated and incorporated in one way or another into education policies and curricula around the world. Concurrently, however, the concept of world or global citizenship actually has much deeper historical roots than the concept of national citizenship. As Heater[7] explains, the cosmopolitan idea of citizenship was propounded by Confucius, Indian philosophers, and Socrates among others long before the concept of national citizenship reared its head.

As a new phenomenon with a long history, then, what does education for global citizenship entail? It involves quite different aims, functions, and content from education for national citizenship in the sense that discourses of national citizenship—rights, responsibilities, duties, allegiance, sense of belonging, cultural knowledge, and so on—are much more difficult to apply to the global scale. As Carter points out, if citizenship is taken in a narrow sense to denote membership of a specific political unit that excludes others, then "global citizenship is an oxymoron." [8] However, limiting citizenship to such a narrow definition does nothing to enrich debate on the topic, and most theorists now adopt a much wider perspective, seeing citizenship as a social, economic, and cultural phenomenon rather than merely as a legal status.[9]

Taking this wider view, global citizenship becomes a possibility. However, creating a simple definition of a "global citizen" is still difficult, as the term conjures up so many different meanings depending on the particular context of people involved. Is a global citizen someone who travels around the world, someone who works for an international company, someone who knows about current world affairs, someone who cares about the environment, or someone who speaks English? These were all definitions proposed by university students in various countries in a survey carried out recently by the author of this article. While the divergence of definitions was initially striking, deeper analysis of questionnaire results of the same survey drew out four core concepts common to definitions of a global citizen across countries and continents: "humanbeingness" (humanity), connectedness, engagement, and transformation.[10] Interestingly, interviews carried out with a wider range of individuals in a smaller range of countries by Schattle[11] revealed three similar primary concepts, namely, global citizenship as awareness, global citizenship as responsibility, and global citizenship as participation.

These are empirical or interpretive concepts. At the other end of the scale are normative statements proposing idealized global citizenship theories and policies. A good example of this kind of normative statement delineating the ideal global citizen is Oxfam's "Education for Global Citizenship: A Guide for Schools."[12] This document clearly defines Oxfam's vision of an ideal global citizen as "someone who is aware of the wider world and has a sense of their own role as a world citizen, respects and values diversity, has an understanding of the way the world works, is outraged by social injustice, participates in the community at a range of levels from the local to the global, is willing to act to make the world a more equitable and sustainable place, and takes responsibility for their actions."

Another definition written from the perspective of education rather than the individual is provided by Suarez-Orozco and Sattin, who state that "an education for the global era is an education for lifelong cognitive, behavioral, and

relational engagement with the world. The skills, sensibilities, and competencies needed for identifying, analyzing, and solving problems from multiple perspectives will require nurturing students who are curious and cognitively flexible, can tolerate ambiguity, and can synthesize knowledge within and across disciplines. They will need the cultural sophistication to empathize with their peers, who will likely be of different racial, religious, linguistic, and social origins."[13]

In the end, however, it is national governments, policy makers, and teachers who act as negotiators between normative and empirical views to determine what students will learn through the curriculum. To understand how they interpret, represent, and promote various views, it is necessary to undertake case studies of specific nations, regions, schools, and teachers in much greater detail. The second section of this chapter is an attempt to do this at the national policy level in New Zealand and Japan, but many more case studies at various levels are needed to understand the complex relationship between national citizenship and global citizenship education and the ways in which cultural persistence and change are negotiated within this relationship.

Education Policy and Curriculum in Japan and New Zealand

It goes without saying that education policy has an effect on every citizen of the nation, first for the whole cohort in the formative years as students, then for a large proportion of the population as parents, as well as for communities and society in general. In this respect, education policy is arguably the area of social policy that has the greatest ramifications for the greatest number of people in any particular society.

What is perhaps less obvious is the complexity and ambivalence of precisely how education policy and practice affect individuals. The formulation and negotiation of education policy occur at multiple levels, from national government through local administration and textbook publishers to individual decision makers in schools, but however clearly policy may be formulated on paper, the way in which it affects individual students is highly dependent on the beliefs, attitudes, personalities, and experience of individual teachers and students in the classroom. It is therefore extremely difficult to make generalizations across nations or even across schools, but this section will consider and compare a few of the key junctures at which policy is formulated and negotiated in Japan and New Zealand.

In New Zealand, the New Zealand curriculum for English-medium teaching and learning in years 1 to 13 was published by the Ministry of Education in November 2007, to be fully implemented from February 2010. In Japan, the revised courses of study for kindergarten, elementary school, and junior high school were published by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science,

and Technology (MEXT) in February 2008, to be implemented fully in kindergartens from 2009, elementary schools from 2011, and junior high schools from 2012. This section will focus mainly on these new curricula, which provide indications of future directions in schools in the two countries and on the process of creating them.

Policies, Policy Makers, and the Policy-Making Process

In any nation, education policy is determined to a large extent by the choice of who will formulate it and the process through which it is determined. In New Zealand, the top page of the website for the new curriculum immediately announces that "the new curriculum was launched on 6 November 2007 following one of the most comprehensive consultation processes undertaken by the Ministry of Education."[14] The policy-making process for the new curriculum spanned seven years, beginning in 2000 with a two-year curriculum review, which was summarized in a report to the Minister of Education in September 2002.[15] The draft of the New Zealand curriculum (English medium) was published in July/August 2006; consultation and feedback continued until the end of November 2006. By the end of the draft consultation process, 9117 feedback questionnaires had been received, 2 international critiques (Australia and UK) had been carried out, 168 long submissions, and 774 short submissions from teachers, parents, researchers, professional, religious and community organizations, and government agencies had been received, and four analyses had been completed by New Zealand commentators.[16] The draft curriculum was revised in light of this feedback and the final version published a year later. This long process of consultation, feedback, and redrafting was coordinated by a reference group consisting of educators, academics, and education union representatives. In this way, the process of creating the new curriculum in New Zealand was explicitly designed and carried out as a collaborative endeavor, incorporating and negotiating the interests and opinions of a broad range of those involved in the education sector. Satisfying all demands in the resulting curriculum was never going to be possible, of course, but the time and effort spent in soliciting feedback in the policy-making process is notable.

In Japan, the policy-making process covered a similar time span. Overseen by a central curriculum committee, the new curriculum was developed by 21 specialist subject, topic, or level-specific committees.[17] Committees comprised MEXT officials plus specialist members, including university faculty members, teachers, business people, NPO representatives, media representatives, PTA heads, and local education administrators. A list of members of each committee together with minutes of all committee meetings are available in Japanese on the MEXT website.[18] In this respect, the actual process of making policy

is even more transparent than New Zealand, where such information is not available. On the other hand, it can be argued that this was carefully controlled transparency, with the selection of progovernment policy committee members, the balance of power in some committees and the lack of wider substantial consultation ensuring that no significant challenges to national priorities and initiatives could be raised in the policy-making process. A draft curriculum was released on February 16, 2008, and public comments were accepted by email, post, or fax until March 16, 2008. The final curriculum was then published on March 28, 2008. Of the 5,679 comments received, only 10 percent were from teachers, with another 19.3 percent from business people, and 21.7 percent from housewives.[19] Most of this feedback was completely ignored, with the vast majority of changes being minor stylistic corrections, although in an unprecedented move, references to "love for the country" were added in the final version in response to demands from conservative members of the National Diet.[20] Although the policy-making process was transparent, it was still very much a top-down process, with only a token gesture to consultation and feedback.

What are the implications of these differences? How do they influence resulting policies on national and global citizenship? How is this related to promotion of cultural persistence and change?

In order to understand the implications of these differences, it is necessary to consider how they relate to national politics and social context and how this influences the ways in which national citizenship, globalization, and global citizenship are conceived and developed. Thus, the process of creating highly centralized policy and curriculum in Japan has to be understood as taking place within a strongly nationalistic phase of Japanese politics. When Prime Minister Abe was promoting the preservation and creation of a "beautiful Japan," a committee was set up to rethink education amid widespread fears of declining academic and moral standards and teachers in Tokyo were being fined, suspended, or fired if they refused to bow to the Japanese flag or sing the national anthem at school entrance and graduation ceremonies. Add to this the fact that "soft" or "cultural" nationalism is by far the most prevalent expression of nationalism in Japan,[21] and it becomes clear why cultural persistence, through appeal to cultural traditions, is an essential element of conceptions of national citizenship in Japanese education policy. This is why the homogeneity myth is so essential to Japanese politics[22] and why increasing diversity in Japanese schools is not even recognized in mainstream education policy, let alone encouraged or promoted through the curriculum.

All this, in turn, was explicitly located in education policy within a threatening global context, most commonly by creating fear of losing in international competition or by promotion of the ever-continuing cultural fear that young people today have lost moral values, do not know their traditions, have no

pride in their national identity, and so on. The fear of losing in international competition is illustrated by the use of the decline of Japan's position in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tables as a justification for developing a "back to basics" policy and increasing the number of class hours. A booklet distributed in the beginning of April 2008 by MEXT to parents of every child in Japanese state schools to explain the new curriculum included a table showing Japan's national ranking in science declining from second to sixth, math from first to tenth, and reading from eighth to fifteenth between 2000 and 2006.[23] The fact that Japanese results were still well above average in science and math was not mentioned. The second fear, or cultural threat, can be implied from the official announcement of the new curriculum by MEXT, which explains that "In order to develop Japanese people who can be active in international society, we have enriched education about the traditions and culture of our country and students' local regions, so that students will take in, preserve and develop such traditions and culture."[24]

In such ways, the international context, and the specter of globalization as an amorphous description of this international context, lurks behind the emphasis on national citizenship, promotion of tradition, and patriotism. The processes of globalization thus tend to be seen in a more negative than positive way in Japanese education and are often set in dichotomy to national values and traditions, thus further strengthening the emphasis on cultural persistence, occasionally verging on cultural resistance and engendering opposition to cultural change.

Compared to Japan, where one party has governed almost unchallenged since 1955, the political climate in New Zealand is more changeable, and policies tend to reflect this. At the same time, Maori have remained a far stronger force in New Zealand politics and policies than Ainu have in Japan, and this has also had profound effects on concepts of nation, national identity, and citizenship. Furthermore, with 22.9 percent of its population born abroad in 2006, a growing number of whom are from Asia,[25] New Zealand is incontrovertibly a multicultural society, another fact with extensive ramifications. The combination of these facts means that cultural homogeneity cannot be taken as a basic assumption in the formation of education policy, as it is in Japan. It also leads to a much higher degree of awareness and caution about assumptions regarding national identity, cultural identity and cultural traditions in any policy-making process, as these notions are much more highly charged and contested than in Japan. For example, the draft curriculum of 2006 was the subject of much criticism because of the omission of explicit reference to the Treaty of Waitangi,[26] which has been described as "undoubtedly the preeminent landmark in the development of [New Zealand's] national identity."[27] As a result, revisions had to be made. Similarly, the values statement of the new curriculum was

based on a major literature review commissioned by the Ministry of Education and carried out by researchers at the University of Waikato. The 193-page report foregrounds cultural diversity with chapters on Pakeha (New Zealanders of European origin) values, Maori values, values of Pacific people, and values of Asian people. One explicit aim of the report, stated on the first page, is to "raise significant questions about the so-called Western values that tend to saturate curricula in Aotearoa."[28] Unlike Japan, then, where education policy bases national identity upon assumptions of homogeneity and static cultural traditions, the process of education policy making in New Zealand begins on the basis of a bicultural, multicultural nation in which diversity is respected and assumptions and values are open to negotiation. This naturally encourages a greater acceptance of cultural change, although it does not deny the valuing of (multiple) cultural traditions.

As in Japan, this basis of national identity and citizenship in education policy affects the ways in which the international and global context are interpreted and presented. Taking the same example as Japan, PISA scores are also a subject of policy debate and educational research reports in New Zealand, which also has above-average performance in the international assessment exercise. While concern over national decline in international performance ratings dominates the PISA debate in Japan, the main focus of concern in New Zealand discussions seems to be gaps in performance between different ethnic groups, particularly the poorer performance of Maori and Pasifika students.[29] The emphasis is therefore turned back to national concerns over cultural diversity and equity. The way the results are used in both countries to feed national priorities and justify resulting policy is a good example of the process described by Ozga and Lingard as follows: "All policy developments in education, even in the context of globalization, result in vernacular manifestations; homogenizing pressures result in heterogenizing outcomes."[30]

Furthermore, acceptance of cultural diversity as an essential basis of national citizenship together with openness to cultural change makes it easier for education policy makers in New Zealand to encourage global citizenship, as there is much more conceptual concordance between the national and the global than in Japan.

At the level of education policy making, then, a clear contrast exists between New Zealand and Japan, with the former emphasizing multi-identitied citizens who are open to cultural change, while the latter emphasizes national citizens who contribute to cultural persistence. Even though neither country includes explicit policy statements about developing global citizens in the new curriculum documents, the basis of national citizenship and policy directions on cultural learning ensure that the curriculum in New Zealand is likely to be much more conducive to global citizenship as described in the first section of this

chapter than the curriculum in Japan. Further analysis of the two curricula should help to prove this point.

Curriculum

The status and significance of national curriculum documents vary widely, dependent on a whole range of political, social, and educational factors. In Japan, the detailed courses of study are virtually synonymous with the curriculum actually taught in schools.[31] In contrast, New Zealand's new curriculum is designed to be an overarching framework within which each school plans and implements its own curriculum.[32] As a result, it is much less detailed and prescriptive than the Japanese curriculum documents but is supplemented by many other documents and materials.

However, there are similarities too. As in most other countries with a national curriculum, curriculum documents in both New Zealand and Japan include statements about the purposes, content, and organization of learning in schools. Analysis of the first two elements in particular can provide a clearer picture of how the aforementioned policies actually play out into documents that are referred to by materials publishers, administrators, schools, and teachers throughout the country.

Purposes, Vision, Principles, and Values

In both New Zealand and Japan, curriculum documents begin with statements of purpose, including the vision, principles, and values underlying the new policy. These statements include implicit and explicit references to the views of national and global citizenship underlying the policy. For example, the New Zealand document states the following: "Our vision is for young people who will work to create an Aotearoa New Zealand in which Maori and Pakeha recognize each other as full Treaty partners, and in which all cultures are valued for the contributions they bring."[33]

There is less reference here to the global sphere, although it is stated that students should be "international citizens." Cultural diversity as the basis of nationhood continues in the next section, in which three of the eight underlying principles of the curriculum echo the same theme:

- Treaty of Waitangi: The curriculum acknowledges the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and the bicultural foundations of Aotearoa New Zealand.
- Cultural diversity: The curriculum reflects New Zealand's cultural diversity and values the histories and traditions of all its people.

• Inclusion: The curriculum is nonsexist, nonracist, and nondiscriminatory; it ensures that students' identities, languages, abilities, and talents are recognized and affirmed and that their learning needs are addressed.[34]

Again, there is less reference to the global sphere, although the latter two principles could easily be applied beyond the nation. The last principle, entitled "future focus," mentions globalization as one of the future-focused issues students should be able to explore through the curriculum. The next section, on values, states that students should learn about their own values and those of others, values prevalent in New Zealand, and the values of other groups and cultures. Finally, the key competencies, or capabilities for living and lifelong learning, defined in the curriculum are thinking; using language, symbols, and texts; managing self; relating to others; and participating and contributing.

Looking at these statements in terms of how they relate to definitions of national and global citizenship in the first section of this chapter, it is clear that there is little conceptual conflict between the nation and the global sphere in education policy in New Zealand. The definition of the nation as a culturally diverse polity within which multiple identities, cultural traditions, and values are welcomed positions the nation within the world without having to dichotomize the two. On the contrary, by encouraging education for national citizenship based on such policies, it is possible to simultaneously develop global citizens—those who are aware of other ways of thinking and living, are connected to communities at all levels, respect diversity, are cognitively flexible, and are willing and able to participate and contribute.

In Japan, the expectations of students as citizens are less explicit but can still be inferred from the introductory statements in the course of study. The course of study begins with a discussion of moral education across the curriculum, and it is stated that students should develop the following:

> richness of heart, respect for traditions and culture and love for our country and localities which have cultivated these, willingness to create original culture, respect for public spirit, willingness to strive for democratic society and the nation, respect for other countries, and self-direction to be a Japanese person who can contribute to the protection of the environment and the peace and development of international society . . . Particular attention should be paid to making sure that students acquire respect for their own life and the life of others, are able to live a regulated life, can think about their own future, deepen understanding of the significance of law and order, can participate in society independently, and acquire self-awareness as a Japanese person in international society.

The emphasis on national cultural identity, based on love of the country and its traditions, contrasts strongly with the New Zealand focus on diversity

and leads to a far greater emphasis on cultural persistence (and potentially cultural resistance) than cultural change throughout the rest of the curriculum document. The reference to contributing to the peace of international society is much more than lip service—peace education is important in Japanese schools, and Japanese education policy never promotes negativity toward any other specific nation or culture. Nevertheless, the tendency to instantly qualify most references to engagement in international society in the curriculum documents by the phrase "as a Japanese person" creates a barrier of uneasy tension between national citizenship and global citizenship. While it is quite possible to be a national citizen within the larger framework of global citizenship, it is more difficult to be the reverse—a global citizen within a national framework—but this is what seems to be recommended in Japanese education policy.

Content

The areas of curriculum providing the richest analysis for discussion of cultural persistence and change in the development of national and global citizens tend to be language and social studies. In terms of language, the curricula of both New Zealand and Japan distinguish between national language and other languages. In New Zealand, English is the main national language taught, but a section in the curriculum document is also devoted to New Zealand's other two official languages, Maori and New Zealand Sign Language, and it is specified that any of these may be the medium of instruction in schools. A separate Maori curriculum was published in 2008. In the requirements for the teaching of English, the rationale for learning English includes the following reason: "The study of New Zealand and world literature contributes to students' developing sense of identity, their awareness of New Zealand's bicultural heritage, and their understanding of the world."[35]

In Japan, Japanese is the only national language taught in schools. Similar to New Zealand, the overall aims for the subject in the junior high school are consistent with policy concepts of the nation and the world: "Develop the ability to express oneself appropriately and understand others accurately in the national language, strengthen competence in communication, foster thinking skills, skills of imagination and language awareness, deepen interest in the national language and develop an attitude of respect for the national language."[36]

While content is not specified in detail in the New Zealand curriculum, the Japanese curriculum specifies that children should become familiar with traditional language culture through study of classic texts at all ages, that materials should contribute to the development of self-awareness as Japanese people, love for the country, and a positive attitude toward the development of the nation and society, and so on. As well as the explicit encouragement of national

identity through cultural persistence, there is also a recommendation that materials should contribute to understanding other cultures and a spirit of international cooperation.

Understanding of other cultures is also an important feature of learning other languages. In Japan, this area of the curriculum is entitled "foreign language" ("foreign language activities" in elementary school) but actually means English. In New Zealand, the area of the curriculum is "learning languages," and there is no mention of "foreign," as it includes Maori and New Zealand Sign Language, Pasifika and Asian languages (languages of large minority groups), as well as traditional "school foreign languages," such as French. Again, the rationale for language learning in New Zealand focuses on diversity, introducing students to "new ways of thinking about, questioning, and interpreting the world and their place in it," while the Japanese course of study balances "the development of understanding of diverse ways of seeing and thinking" with the ubiquitous "heightening of self-awareness as a Japanese person living in international society."

Social studies or social sciences is often one of the most fiercely contested areas of the curriculum in terms of cultural values and portrayal of the nation and the world. Japan and New Zealand are no exceptions to this rule, with the previous social studies curriculum in New Zealand subject to fierce criticism and debate in education circles and the media[37] and Japanese social studies curricula, especially history, regularly attacked by critics within and outside Japan.[38] Again, the same themes of encouraging respect for diversity in New Zealand and respect for cultural traditions in Japan are evident in the documents. Treatment of content indicates significant divergence in the focus of the subject, however. In the New Zealand curriculum, students "develop understandings about how societies are organized and function and how the ways in which people and communities respond are shaped by different perspectives, values, and viewpoints. As they explore how others see themselves, students clarify their own identities in relation to their particular heritages and contexts."[39]

In Japan, the emphasis is much more on knowledge and understanding of (mainly) regional and national geography and history, with civic studies in the final year of junior high school. In New Zealand, the aim and specifications for each level focus on the meta level of how societies and cultures work, for example, at Level 4, students "understand how cultural practices vary but reflect similar purposes" and "understand how people remember and record the past in different ways." In Japan, specifications for students of the same age are much more on the micro level; the following is just one example in a long list of finely defined content items: "[Make students] understand the distinctive geographical and climatic features of Japan from a world perspective, and the distinctive features of Japanese territory being surrounded by sea, and have an overview

of Japan's natural environment, including geographical and climatic features within the nation, and efforts to prevent natural disasters."[40]

This attention to specific detail ensures that students across Japan are all acquiring very similar knowledge but, in combination with standard educational practice and assessment, it can lead to a bias toward memorization of a body of factual knowledge at the expense of wider understanding of how it fits together and what it means. Returning to the quotation by Suarez-Orozco and Sattin[41] in the first section, it can be argued that the former approach is much more conducive to the development of global citizens than the latter approach in encouraging "the skills, sensibilities, and competencies needed for identifying, analyzing, and solving problems from multiple perspectives . . . [and] students who are curious and cognitively flexible, can tolerate ambiguity, and can synthesize knowledge within and across disciplines."

As far as other areas of the curriculum are concerned, integrated studies and moral education are also areas of the curriculum in Japan that are particularly valuable for study of concepts of culture, nation and the world, but as they have no direct counterparts in the New Zealand curriculum, they will not be taken up here. One point worth mentioning is that no area of the curriculum is exempt from cultural content, as is evident in the inclusion of Japanese martial arts (judo, kendo, or sumo) as a compulsory element of the health and physical education for junior high schools in Japan in the new curriculum, with the stipulation that this should serve to develop students' "willingness to preserve traditional ways of doing things" and "understanding of traditional ways of thinking."

Textbooks and Assessment Systems

One aspect of education policy and practice, which has a profound impact on the diffusion of curriculum concepts, is the status and use of textbooks. For educators in countries with a flexible curriculum and free choice of teaching materials, such as New Zealand, the issue of textbooks may seem to be largely irrelevant to discussion of cultural change and persistence and citizenship in education policy. In Japan, however, the textbook is the primary, if not only, teaching material used in the vast majority of subjects at all ages. Every student is given a full set of textbooks to keep every year for free. Moreover, textbooks have to be authorized by MEXT before they can be used in schools. Authorization by MEXT requires close adherence not only to the published curriculum but also to government policy so that textbook publishers are required, for instance, to change content about Japan's wartime actions if it is not consistent with the preferred national version of history. This places enormous constraints on textbook publishers and editorial committees in every subject, but

is an extremely efficient way of ensuring that national citizens learn the "official knowledge" politicians want them to have (and are not exposed to "other" knowledge in the school curriculum).

Assessment systems are another aspect of education policy and practice with deep connections to the diffusion of policy and curriculum concepts. In Japan, examinations consisting of questions requiring a single multiple-choice or fill-in-the-blank correct answer are the norm at the two major selection points of the education system: entrance to senior high school at age 15 and entrance to university. Other school tests generally follow the same format. The standard format of tests determines what is tested, and in this case, knowledge of discrete facts is massively predominant. This, in turn, is directly related to methods of teaching and learning in Japanese classrooms, as teachers and schools are accountable to students and parents in terms of ensuring academic success. The same principle applies in New Zealand, of course. There, though, the major school-leaving qualifications are National Certificates of Educational Achievement (NCEAs), which require students to satisfactorily complete internally assessed tasks and projects as well as take exams that test essay-writing skills centered on analysis, evaluation, and description. The way academic achievement is assessed thus has an indirect but significant effect on the way that knowledge and skills are treated in the classroom, the concept of knowledge itself, the way materials are used in teaching and learning, and the role of the teacher and of the student. These, in turn, all affect the ways that curriculum content dealing with culture, nation, and the world is interpreted, presented, and used in the classroom.

Conclusion

Although the aforementioned description and analysis are only a brief overview of policy and curriculum in two specific countries, it raises issues that would benefit from further theoretical exploration and empirical research. Some of the main themes that emerge from the comparison of New Zealand and Japan are the following:

1. Approaches to national and global citizenship vary widely in education policy. There are wide variations in definitions of and approaches to national and global citizenship even across two nations that share the common characteristics of being developed countries located in the Pacific Basin with highly educated populations. An even more complex picture is likely to emerge if other countries in the Pacific Basin were to be included in the comparison.

2. The degree of central control of education policy affects the degree to which political priorities and dominant social trends in the nation are diffused throughout the education system. Effective mechanisms for ensuring maximum diffusion are in place in Japan through a highly centralized education system, a detailed and prescriptive curriculum, a textbook authorization system, and an almost all-pervasive use of textbooks, teacher education systems, employment practices, and school organization. This is not so true in New Zealand, where school and teacher autonomy have greater support. This means that any generalizations at local, school, and individual levels are less applicable to New Zealand than to Japan.

3. Definitions of national citizenship determine the degree of emphasis on cultural persistence and cultural change in education policy and curriculum. In New Zealand, definitions of national citizenship based on cultural diversity and openness to otherness favor receptivity to cultural change, as well as proclivity to global citizenship. At the same time, cultural traditions are valued, allowing for cultural persistence within the discourse of diversity. In Japan, where concepts of national citizenship are based on cultural homogeneity and respect for cultural traditions, cultural persistence tends to be emphasized over cultural change. Both approaches are in line with current political and social trends in the respective nations.

4. Acceptance of multiple citizenships favors openness to cultural change in education policy, curriculum, and practice. Acceptance of and respect for multiple identities and multiple citizenships make it much easier to adopt a positive approach to cultural change, both in the process of policy and curriculum making and in practice in the classroom. This is apparent in New Zealand. In Japan, where assumptions of cultural homogeneity underlie education policy and the curriculum and are bolstered by constant references to "our country" and "our traditions," and where references to identity and citizenship beyond the nation are qualified by the phrase, "as a Japanese person," cultural persistence tends to block receptiveness to cultural change.

5. Globalization seen as a threat tends to generate cultural resistance in education policy and curriculum. Where globalization is portrayed as a threat, in dichotomy to national culture and traditions, cultural persistence can easily evolve into cultural resistance. While cultural persistence is not necessarily incompatible with global citizenship, cultural resistance is probably more difficult to reconcile with the multiple perspectives and flexibility required of a global citizen.

This chapter has focused on the negotiation of national and global citizenship and associated cultural concepts in education policy and curriculum in Japan and New Zealand. Further studies of the same theme at the level of individual schools, teachers, and students would undoubtedly provide even richer complementary material, as it is at this level that concepts have to be balanced with realities and actually become part of people's ways of thinking and identities. Even at the national policy level, however, concepts of the nation, globalization, culture, and citizenship are constantly changing. This has been pronounced in New Zealand, where the accelerated rate and increased diversity of migration over the past 30 years has opened up debate over all these issues. It is likely that Japan will also go through major changes over the next 30 years as resistance to immigration becomes untenable and abandonment of the myth of cultural homogeneity as a basis for education policy becomes inevitable. It will be interesting to observe the ways in which policy makers in each country continue to negotiate concepts of cultural persistence and change in relation to the nation and world as their societies change.

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CHAPTER 11

Culture and Law on the Durand Line

Continuity and Change

Charles H. Norchi

Frontier wars are but the surf that marks the edge and advance on the wave of civilization.

—Lord Salisbury, Guildhall, 1892

The Problem

In a region straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan, a distinct culture predating existing states and empires continues to thrive. Pushtun culture, with its distinctive ways, customs, and forms of political organization, has persisted amid geopolitical and regional forces that carry pressures of change. Among the intrusions into traditional Pushtun life have been the dissolution of empires, the rise of states, the ebb and flow of trade and ideas, multiple wars, and national elites claiming territorial title affecting ancient tribal lands. The tribal way of life is divided by a line that is both imaginary and real. It is expressed in the Durand Line Agreement, a treaty concluded in 1893 between the Amir of the Afghan tribes and Great Britain acting for its possession India. The Durand Agreement denotes a prima facie international boundary[1] separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the line divides Pushtun tribes,[2] clans, and families. Nearly 30 million Pushtuns live in Pakistan, composing nearly 20 percent of the country's population, and approximately 15 million live in Afghanistan, which is nearly half the total population and the country's largest ethnic group.

Figure 11.1 *The Durand Line, its geo-strategic importance* by Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan

The region along the line is frontier[3] area under the jurisdictions of the states of Afghanistan and Pakistan on their respective sides of the boundary. The Pakistani side of the border includes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),[4] the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. The Afghani side comprises mountains and desert from Nuristan province in the northeast to Nimruz in the southwest. Through millennia, passes of the border area have connected South Asia to Central and West Asia. The border is a source of instability and unpredictable state and nonstate behavior. Armed lashkars, or private armies, threaten NATO—including U.S. and Afghan Army forces in Afghanistan—and the state of Pakistan. Taliban and Al-Qaeda units have regrouped in the Durand Line region, benefiting from the culturally based safe haven sanctuary extended by the Pushtun tribes. The Taliban Senior Leadership, *Shura*, is now based in the FATA and its reach extends all along the Durand Line to Baluchistan Province.[5] FATA regulations were promulgated by the British in 1901, and have operated to enable tribes to flourish in an environment of benign government neglect. Taliban operations are directed from the region, and the organization recruits operatives to infiltrate and conduct operations into the West. American forces have been deployed into the area on the Pakistan frontier. Following the August 2008 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, "All roads lead to FATA."[6]

Prevailing state interests have rarely accounted for tribal interests. National elites favor settled and undisturbed boundaries because of longstanding principles of state sovereignty, the allocation of jurisdiction, divisible spheres of action among states, the means of conveyance of title to territory in the state system, and territory and populations as critical bases of elite power. Countervailing claims based on self-determination, culture, and history are invoked by tribes. The Durand Line problem in summation is as follows: (1) the Pushtun culture is divided pursuant to a nineteenth-century treaty, (2) the region is a sanctuary for private armies and the projection of organized violence, (3) the international border is contested, and (4) culturally based demands and claims have been unmet. Thus the region is awash in heavy and light weapons, home to smugglers, and a sanctuary for drug traffickers, private armies, gangs, and foreign radical Islamic forces. The Durand Line area has emerged as an intense and dangerous space characterized by the expectation of violence. Any realistic strategies to address the problem must recognize that in this region states are weak, and culture is strong.

Background

The geography of the Durand Line region has placed its people at the epicenter of migrations, conflicts, and epic historical events. It is a crossroads of nations and armies. The region has long been plied by merchant caravans, marauding bandits, and wandering nomads called *kuchis*. Therefore the commerce, conflict, and exchange that animated the region brought belief systems that shaped the identifications and demands of the peoples living in this intense space. The line is traditionally porous and usually a mere nuisance to the largely Pushtun people who "inhabit more than 100,000 square miles bisected by the Afghan-Pakistani border, inevitably called the Durand Line . . . and . . . incidentally, paid little attention to the international boundary then, and scarcely more today."[7] However, when the boundary is enforced by appurtenant states, it separates tribes, clans, and families.[8]

Trends in geopolitics, tribal relations, and culture cumulatively drive myths and events on both sides of the Durand Line. By the eighteenth century, the international system was increasingly a community of states while Afghanistan was a canvas of tribes and kingdoms under the authority and fleeting control of amirs, a valuable buffer territory, and thus a pawn in the pursuit empire. India, the British raj, was under the effective control of London. As forces of the Russian czar moved steadily southward toward British India and Afghan, fiefdoms fell to the Russians, and the British responded with diplomacy, intrigue, and force. London concluded that the Russian advance could only be thwarted by "forward policies," in other words by getting there first and using common interests to build tribal alliances to create a territorial buffer.[9] This phase of history became known as the "Great Game," a phrase coined by Captain Arthur Conolly before he was executed by Bokharan tribesmen in 1842[10] and immortalized by Rudyard Kipling whose fictional character Kim proclaimed, "Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing the Great Game."[11]

The great "Army of the Indus" comprising British, East India Company, Sikh, and Bengal troops was amassed and marched on to occupy Kabul. The strategy included placing the very unpopular Amir Shah Soojah on the throne in Kabul.[12] From a strategic perspective, the situation bore important parallels to contemporary events. As a chronicler of the era noted, "[I]t was from many respects a highly statesmanlike proposal if an active Forward Policy was to be tried, but it involved two suppositions, and also a deep-seated economic problem. Those points were the certitude that Shah Shujah was sufficiently acceptable to the Afghan people for his restoration to produce the effect desired . . . The economic problem was this: Were the resources of the army in India in stores and transport sufficient? Could the army be maintained so far from its bases . . . Was it adequate for the entirely novel and distant undertaking?"[13]

The British had restored the amir in the belief that he would advance the principal policy aim of retaining India within the Empire. There was a growing insurrection against the British and matters turned badly. British Envoy Sir William MacNaghten was hacked to death and as recorded, "[T]he head and limbs of Her Majesty's Envoy and Plenipotentiary . . . were being paraded in triumph through the streets of Kabul, while the trunk, alongside the corpse of Captain Trevor, was hanging from a meat hook in the bazaar."[14]

By 1842, hostility of the Kabul population to the British presence was intense. That cold snow-swept winter, four thousand British troops, twelve thousand followers, and numerous wives and children departed Kabul toward India. The British column was relentlessly attacked while retreating. At the fortress of Jalalabad near India, a British garrison watched from the rampart, anxiously awaiting the retreating army. Up the Kabul-Jalalabad Road, a lonely, wounded and bleeding horseman sauntered toward them. Except for a few sepoys, there were no survivors. The date was January 13, 1842, and the last remnant of an army, Surgeon Brydon, had arrived in Jalalabad. The dramatic incident inspired lines by Rudyard Kipling:

> When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
> And the women come out to cut up what remains,
> Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains,
> An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.[15]

By 1877 the British were attempting to subjugate tribes while erecting garrisons. The 1879 Treaty of Gandamak signed with the amir, provided that the "British Government will retain in its own hands control of the Khaiber Pass and Michni Pass . . . and of all relations with the independent tribes, territory directly connected with the passes."[16] The British Indian Army expanded or erected cantonments at Rawalpindi, Attock, and Quetta and moved further into the Pushtun tribal areas.[17]

The amir agreed to receive a mission to Kabul under Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand, intended to delineate British and Afghan responsibilities in the Pushtun tribal areas. Sir Mortimer Durand persuaded the amir to agree to a line of demarcation in return for an increase in his subsidy from 12 to 18 lakhs. British Political Agent Richard Issaq Bruce records in his 1900 memoir, "On November 12, 1893, the famous agreement between the Amir of Kabul on the one part, and Sir Mortimer Durand on the part of the government of India on the other, was signed; by which the boundary dividing India from Afghanistan, from Wakkan to the Persian Border, was defined and fixed. No measure has been carried through since our occupation of the Punjab so

pregnant of possibilities for the pacification and strengthening of our frontier, and the civilization and attaching of the Border tribes to our rule."[18]

The agreement between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, signed at Kabul, November 12, 1893, stipulated the following in pertinent part:

> Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:
>
> The eastern and southern frontier of his Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement . . .
>
> The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
>
> The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated . . . by joint British and Afghan commissioners . . . having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
>
> The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and . . . any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.
>
> Being fully satisfied of His Highness's goodwill to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect . . . the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.[19]

The British Special Commissions tasked with demarcating segments of the Durand Line in the field were met with antagonism and outright attack, particularly in Waziristan. Eventually, the Durand Line would extend 2,460 kilometers or 1,519 miles. The British asserted their authority over the frontier tribes at the cost of a series of tribal campaigns. The Chitral campaign of 1895 led to a Pushtun uprising in 1897, which required a force of thirty-five thousand to suppress. That same year in the Waziristan campaign, British and Indian troops

engaged in bloody skirmishes with the mountain tribes, owing to, as Winston Churchill noted in *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War* (1898), British attempts to demarcate and enforce the Durand Line. Stability, which had been a principal objective of the Durand Line strategy was fleeting.[20] He wrote, "In these valleys the warlike nature of the people and their hatred of control, arrest the further progress of development . . . an absolute lack of reverence for all forms of law and authority."[21]

London continued to apply its forward policy: "the policy of endeavoring to extend influence over, and establish law and order on that part of the Border where anarchy, murder, and robbery up to the present time have reigned supreme."[22] By 1900, Lord Curzon was Viceroy of India. Curzon

> dealt cautiously with the Afghans, reconciling the new Amir Habibullah to the British connection with the title of 'His Majesty.' At the same time he settled the restive frontier on lines that lasted up to 1930. The semi-forward policy of extending British authority up to the Durand Line of 1893 demarking the Afghan and British spheres in the Pathan[23] tribal territory had led to a great tribal revolt in 1897. The new policy was completed by the creation of the North-West Frontier Province from the frontier tribal area and the five frontier districts of the Panjab.[24]

In 1901 Curzon promulgated the Frontier Crimes Regulation under which the FATA would be managed by Pakistan into the twenty-first century. "The frontiers thus defined were purely strategic and did not correspond to any ethnic or historical boundary."[25]

In 1947 British rule ended in India. Following partition, Pakistan emerged as a state. The question of the tribes and their lands in Pakistan's NWFP, was reopened. Afghanistan had a historical claim over NWFP and the neighboring Pakistan province of Baluchistan, which had been under the control of Kabul. The Afghans contended that Pushtun tribesmen should be given the choice of joining Pakistan, forming an independent Pushtunistan, or joining Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan argued that the Durand Line treaty was with British India and had to be renegotiated with Pakistan. The issue led to strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and hindered Afghan transit trade through Pakistan.

During the 1980s the Soviets occupied Afghanistan. The region from the Durand Line through the FATA area as far as Peshawar was transformed by an ever-widening war. Pushtun culture adapted and persisted. Pakistan was transformed into a front-line state and the arms conduit to the Mujahideen in their war against the Soviets. A jihadist culture emerged. The area was heavily weaponized. Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Mujahideen and Pushtun culture became agents of principals prosecuting the cold war.

The city of Peshawar in the NWFP became sanctuary for resistance operations and host to millions of Afghan refugees. The Pakistan government sought to maintain control over the supply of weapons covertly supplied to the Mujahideen and to restrict operations to a limit so as not to provoke a direct military response from the Soviets. Daily decisions were handled by the Pakistan government Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Pakistani embassies were issuing visas throughout the Islamic world to anyone who wanted to make their way to the NWFP and join the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Many volunteers came to fight with their Afghan Muslim brethren. There were Islamic radicals from 43 countries, numbering as many as 35,000, according to journalist Ahmed Rashid.[26] They became known as "Afghanis" or *jihadists*. More than one hundred thousand studied in the Deoband dominated madrasahs. They came together in the training camps around Peshawar. One was Osama Bin Laden, who earned his spurs fighting with the Arab Wahhabis. The Pushtun culture along the Durand Line became a key conditioning factor in an unfolding future of violence.

Following the September 11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan resumed its cold war role of front-line state. In this new global war on terror, the center of gravity straddled the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. The character of the frontier, the legitimacy of the line, the territorial title contested by adjacent states, the claims of divided tribes and cultures, and the uncertain character of the 1893 Durand Line Agreement were no longer issues that simmered—they boiled.

An Afghanistan-Pakistan-U.S. commission was established in early 2003 to consider issues of border security. It has not considered the settlement of the border. There were exchanges of gunfire between Afghan and Pakistani soldiers. A July 29, 2003, clash sparked anti-Pakistan demonstrations in Kabul.

In addition to Taliban, the region became a sanctuary for foreign militias from Uzbekistan and Chechnya. Fundamentalist Afghan insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i-Islami (HIG) organization and the insurgency network of Afghan leader Maulawi Jalalauddin Haqqani now operated from the area.[27] His son is Serajuddin Haqani, the Taliban commander who launched an operation against the Indian Embassy in Kabul in which 54 people were killed including an Indian Defense Attaché.

A peace agreement was concluded between Waziri tribesmen and the Islamabad government. The goal was to control "guest fighters" operating against NATO force in Afghanistan and the Pakistani government. It lasted ten months before being renounced by local tribesmen. The attack on the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, in Islamabad was mounted from the Durand region,[28] as was the Marriott Hotel attack, which occurred following a Pakistan Army operation in the Bajaur Tribal Agency.[29]

As of early 2010, American unmanned aerial drones and Special Forces units have been deployed in South Waziristan targeting suspected militant bases.

Pakistan forces have fired flares at American helicopters and the government of Pakistan has publically invoked violation of sovereignty. Most significantly, Islamabad has announced plans to abolish the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FRC) that operate in the FATA region.[30] FATA comprises seven semiautonomous areas where many Pushtuns live: North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Khyber, Kurran, Orakzai, Momand, and Bajaur. The principal crossing points across the line are Torkham, Chaman, Parachinar, and Quetta. These have been controlled variously by Pakistan and Afghan governments. The numerous secondary crossings through passes and valleys are under the control of tribes. When Lord Curzon devised FATA in 1901, the goal was autonomy for the tribes that over time reinforced cultural and tribal isolation. Amid a heightened expectation of violence owing to robust cross-border military operations, the Pushtun culture vibrantly persists.

The People of the Line

The Durand region has been analyzed as an ungoverned space.[31] It is ungoverned from the standpoint of a modern state capable of asserting authority and control over its territory. But it is very much governed from the standpoint of the people who have lived in the area for centuries. It is governed by cultural practices that have the weight and effect of law properly understood. The real law of the line is found in the culture of the line.

Culture "is the term that characterizes the most distinctive patterns of value distribution and institutional practice to be found in the world community."[32] Pushtun culture, the culture of the Durand Line, is a process driven by individuals seeking to fulfill basic human needs. It "comprises inherited artifacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits and values."[33] Pushtun culture selects, modifies, or rejects patterns of behavior by reference to its values. Selection is driven by identifications and expectations but gives rise to demands within a context of varying conditions over time. Thus Pushtun culture is best understood as a value process that is a continuing redefinition both temporally and spatially, and in which individuals behave collectively for the common interest. To understand it requires sorting out operational codes, myths, and flows of social discourse. The analysis of any culture is an "interpretive task encompassing an ongoing search for meaning."[34] In the Durand Line context, culture is more than a process, it is a participant. [35]

The culture of the line remains tribally based,[36] and ethnic dynamics across the region are complex. Numerous groups and tribes have lived together in both peace and conflict for centuries. They have distinct perspectives and standpoints that often clash. Within even the most traditional (the least modern) of these communities, social organization is complex, and there are multiple value

and legal systems at work. In villages, social choices are made in very long-standing customary councils where people divide up the weal and woe of life by procedures that have evolved over a very long history. Transcending the Durand Line, the Pushtun tribes have bonded through blood and long-standing reciprocal relationships amounting to social capital.[37]

A Pushtun is one who speaks the Pushtu language and who traces his lineage through the father's line to one of the Pushtu tribes. They are a patrilineal segmentary lineage system with descent from a common male ancestor. Ethnographers have observed that Pushtun social organization reveals weak internal authority patterns and a high degree of both internal and external conflict.[38] A member of the tribe may be obliged by virtue of an earlier ancestor to defend tribal members of the family against outsiders because of some earlier feud. Lineal relatives numbering in the thousands may be united against intruders. Conflicts that originated among individuals could erupt into conflicts among groups.[39]

The Pushtuns comprise two tribal confederations, the Ghilzais and the Durranis. Each is further divided into Khels, or clans, and subdivided as families known as Kors, or Kahols.[40] The entire basis of social organization is kinship. But there are some exceptions to the kinship institution. Certain tribes are divided among two groups, one known as Spin and the other Tor. These are vaguely akin to political parties. These subtribal institutions seem to exist in order to allow particular tribesmen to belong to a group that might be hostile to that of his neighbor, despite being joined to him by blood ties.[41]

Pushtuns have long been the power elite. They ruled Afghanistan as amirs and kings from Ahmed Shah Durrani in 1747 to President Karzai. From the Pakistan side of the Durand Line, they successfully fought the Soviet Army in the 1980s. The Pushtuns have endured in the face of penetrating change agents including armies, traders, missionaries, political agents, and spies because of a persistent core culture that carries the expectation of authority.

Authority and control in Pushtun society is extensively expressed and imposed through customary and microlegal processes. Microlaw "manifests a constitutional dimension . . . a constitutive process: part of every decision is concerned, not with the immediate decision, but with the structure of decision making itself. Microlaw is effective and sanctioned."[42] The law is enforced coarchically—that is, by the actors themselves rather than by formal institutions—and enforcement is sustained by expectations, reciprocity, and retaliation.

For Pushtuns generally, behavior is shaped by a revered code called Pushtunwali. Observance of this code and microlaw continues today. It is a simple yet demanding social and personal code that functions to ensure survival of the group and preserves political organization through a process of authoritative decision. It demands vengeance against injury or insult to one's kin, chivalry,

and hospitality toward the helpless and unarmed strangers, bravery in battle, and openness and integrity in individual behavior. Honor is given to Pushtuns who can successfully arbitrate the feuds that are endemic among them. Fines and blood money are frequently used to limit violence among rival families. Historically, Pushtunwali has limited anarchy and violence, hence it is a potentially critical factor for resolving greater Durand Line problems.

An important feature of Pushtun society is the equitable distribution of power at the center of tribal social organization. Power is diffused and distributed via the jirga, called a *loya* jirga when meeting on a grand scale. This is the central community decision-making body and has jurisdiction to decide particular issues or cases. Judgments are binding on all parties to any conflict. The authoritative decision process is drawn from Pushtunwali, related customary practices, and Islamic law.

The members of a jirga are called *jirgaeez* who may be appointed by a single party or mutually agreed upon by both the parties. They are likely to be a combination of party-appointed representatives along with certain respected elders who are appointed for their status, respect, and knowledge of jirga proceedings. In its traditional form jirga composition is determined by votes cast by each *daftari*[43] of the tribe and was composed mostly of tribal elders who had developed a reputation for their integrity.

A jirga may be called for matters of great community urgency and policy but is more typically called after a complaint or dispute has been brought before the malik or the khan. Because of the influence and prestige of the malik, he may deliver an opinion and the matter is ended. If the matter continues unresolved, a jirga is called. In such case or conflict jirga, both sides consent to be bound. Typically the jirga includes representatives from all parties affected by the issue at hand. If the issue is particularly weighty such as war or peace or the redistribution of land, every Kundi, Khel, and tribe concerned is represented.[44] All decisions are made through consensus. During deliberations the jirga inquires into *rawaj* or customary law as interpreted by the elders. If Shari'a (Islamic law) is relied on, additional opinions might be requested of the mullah. The sanction or "control-intention" exercised by a jirga includes the sanctions of ostracism, fines, and the burning of one's dwelling. The jirga regulates many facets of life ranging from property issues to the regulation of tribal foreign affairs or with the formal district or state government. While jirgas are regularly convened to resolve disputes, they are also key customary decision-making arenas to address nearly all community problems. For the community, the jirga is sovereign. It has the last word. For the community, the expectation of authority resides with the jirga, hence its pronouncements are applicative prescriptions, or law.

An enduring feature of Pushtunwali customary practices is *badal* or revenge. *Badal* has caused blood feuds to range across whole villages and entire tribes.

Badal extends to all the kin of a victim, even the most remote. A failure of a victim to engage in *badal* brings *sharm*, or dishonor, to the individual, his family, his remote kin, and even his entire tribe. Thus, many tribal areas are in a perpetual state of war.

Customary law and practices and its microlegal dimensions are the principal decision-making arenas for communities whose collective lives unfold in the confines of faux-states. The weal and woe of life is divided in the customary processes that unfold on both sides of the Durand Line. Unwritten law, emanating from political process, is an important feature of community decision making. "Custom . . . concerns the *implicit* creation of norms through the behavior of a few politically relevant actors who are frequently unaware that law is being, or has been, made."[45] As Thomas Barfield observes, "so many areas of Afghanistan have operated without (or outside of) formal government institutions for a very long time. Neither international law nor state law has had traction at the local level."[46] In order to know Pushtun law, one cannot solely rely on formal agreements and other textual statements. One must also observe habitual behavior, behavior that in the beginning might be considered unlawful and if repeated through a period of time, might become regarded as lawful. To make the distinction requires observance of a flow of behavior and a flow of words.[47] For the people of the Durand Line, legal life does not unfold with reference to formal codes and institutions.

A partial contextual and social process mapping across what the French historian Fernand Braudel called the *"longue durèe"*[48] reveals that people of the Durand Line have experienced a progressive erosion of values amounting to a collective accretion of human dignity deprivations. The *longue durèe* of the Durand Line people can be broadly described:

1. Resilient communities that provide values in lieu of the state
2. Persistent customary legal practices and vibrant microlaw
3. Intense intrusions of globalization through power, wealth, rectitude, and enlightenment
4. A historical collective memory of personal insecurity and the expectation of violence
5. The contemporary experience of personal insecurity nearly everywhere and the expectation of violence in many areas
6. Minimal governmental control—two faux-states incapable of serving the population
7. Pockets of nonauthoritative power including private armies
8. Poverty, few resources, and minimal development
9. Increased allegiance to foreign fundamentalist Islamic practices owing to a globalizing rectitude manifestation

10. Complex perspectives in internal and external conflict
11. New external participants including the Pakistan Government, its armed forces, Afghanistan-based coalition forces, and private armies
12. Uncertain and pessimistic future expectations

Cultures, Countries, and Claims

The people of the line are deeply affected by a process of claims grounded on self-determination, human rights, cultural integrity, territorial integrity, the intangibility of borders, and state sovereignty. Boundaries divide spheres of action between states including a complete range of value allocations. "The role of boundaries is critical in dividing the spheres of action between states and their policies and security forces, and thus in avoiding breaches of the peace."[49] States consist of defined territory that assumes defined boundaries. Boundaries and the territory that fronts them receive heightened scrutiny under international law. Owing to sovereignty and the conveyance of title to territory in the state system, unsettled international borders are disfavored. They can be sources of instability and unpredictable behavior. "Statehood must be taken in conjunction with title to territory. Governments have an acute sense of territorial entitlement . . . Politicians and ministers have a natural sense of entitlement based on historical considerations and a sense of the role of the individual State in relation to other States."[50] Claims of national elites that involve territorial title, the principle of trespass, and the roles of boundaries are especially intense.

For Durand Line claims, "the ethno-demography of the region is the key to understanding why the two governments have taken and maintained their respective positions over the years."[51] The government of Afghanistan claims that the line merely identified the areas in which the British and Afghan governments were responsible for controlling tribal peoples. The claim was that Pushtuns of Pakistan should have the option of creating their own nation west of the Indus River. The Durand Line has not been formally recognized as an international border by any Afghan government. It is minimally demarcated. The government of Pakistan claims that as a successor state to British India, it derives full sovereignty over the frontier and its people and has all the rights and obligations of a successor state. On the question of self-determination, Pakistan cites the 1947 British-supervised plebiscite in NWFP that overwhelmingly supported joining Pakistan. These claims remain unaccepted by the Afghan government.

The Afghan government initially objected to Pakistan's membership in the United Nations. In 1949, the Afghan government convened a *loya* jirga in Kabul following the Pakistan bombing of an Afghan border village. The jirga declared support for an independent Pushtunistan and declared that Pakistan

was a new state rather than a successor state to British India and its obligations and borders under international law. Thus previous treaties concluded with the British pertaining to the border were declared null and void. This included, inter alia, the Durand Agreement, the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak, the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919, and the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. The Pushtunistan issue has never been fully resolved.

Afghanistan has long asserted that the rights of Pushtuns to reject Pakistani nationality have not been taken into account since the British portioned India in 1947. Because of the Afghan government's previously mentioned claim that the origin of the line was solely to establish responsibilities for controlling tribal peoples, the government's position is that the withdrawal of the British established the Pushtuns' right to sovereignty on Pakistan's side of the line, but not on the Afghan side in recognition of the continuity of Afghan control.

When a state ceases to exist, or ceases to rule over a territory, and is replaced by another state, a state succession occurs. This transformation complicates boundary claims. One state has been substituted for another in sovereignty over territory.[52] What happens to international borders when there is a change of sovereignty? "In the doctrine of international law it has long been accepted that a change of sovereignty does not, as such, affect international boundaries."[53] However, the answer is not so clear when a former sovereign relinquishes control over colonial territory that then fragments into new states.[54] Great Britain relinquished India, which then partitioned into two separate states.

Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the state was partitioned with the larger territory retaining the name India and the smaller territory adopting the name Pakistan. A transfer of sovereignty occurred.[55] Did Pakistan succeed to the rights and obligations as a member of the United Nations under the charter, or was it an entirely new state? In the view of Pakistan, it was a cosuccessor to British India. The U.N. assistant secretary general and head of the legal department indicated that a portion of the existing state had broken off and formed a new state, with the original state retaining its international personality. The old state retains rights and duties under existing treaties, including those conferring membership in international organizations.[56] The First Committee of the General Assembly recommended that Pakistan be admitted as a new member.[57] Thus Pakistan was denied a right to automatic succession to membership in the United Nations.

This raised the question of succession to treaties concluded by Britain on behalf of India. As a new state, could Pakistan succeed to those treaty rights? In the view of Afghanistan, the answer was no. Pakistan was a new state and not a successor to British treaty rights. Pakistan claimed to have inherited the Anglo-Afghanistan Treaty for the establishment of neighborly relations done at Kabul on November 22, 1921.[58] Afghanistan rejected this view: "No bilateral

treaty will be transferable to a third party by the unilateral action of one party to a treaty without the consent of the other original party to the treaty, and there is no provision in the 1921 treaty under which Afghanistan has given prior acceptance to the transfer of the treaty to a third party, in this case, Pakistan."[59]

The view of the British government differed. On June 30, 1949, the British secretary of state for commonwealth relations stated, "Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India and of His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom in these territories and that the Durand Line is the international frontier."[60] On March 22, 1956, the British prime minister stated, "Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully support the Government of Pakistan in maintaining their sovereignty over the areas East of the Durand Line and in regarding this Line as the international frontier with Afghanistan."[61]

The British supported the binding force of the 1921 treaty and the principle that dispositive treaties creating localized obligations are ipso jure binding on successor states.[62] The government of Afghanistan challenged that legal principle. Afghanistan "was questioning the legal effect of a unilateral assignment of treaty rights and obligations by the mechanism of inheritance agreement between the successor and predecessor without the prior consent of one of the original parties."[63]

Soft Border, Hard Law?

The border is soft, and much of the law is hard. The law concerns states, a border, people, human rights, and the formal international law sources of treaty and customary principles. The policy animating international law of boundaries is stability coupled with finality. International law accords reciprocal deference for the primary power base of elites: the nation-state as a territorial unit. "A principal source of title is the independence of States and its recognition as such. Title . . . connotes boundaries and it is boundaries which play a major role in the public order system. This role has three constituents:

1. The allocation of territory and thus the implementation of the notion of entitlement,
2. The separation of jurisdictions, and
3. The separation of the physical operation of police and security forces."[64]

The effective control by a government over territory is the essence of a state. The criterion of a permanent population is connected with that of territory and constitutes the physical basis for the existence of a state. To be recognized under

international law, a territorial entity must meet the criteria of a state under the *Montevideo Convention* (1933).

Article 1 includes the following:

1. A permanent population
2. A defined territory
3. Government
4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states

This bears on the capacity of Afghanistan to enter into an international agreement in 1893, and it also bears on the historical de minimis control exercised by Pakistan in a frontier along vast areas of the Durand Line. If neither control nor authority is exercised by Pakistan, where is the actual boundary?

The 1893 Durand Treaty purportedly created the boundary. There is a general rule of international law that in the case of dispositive treaties—which are treaties whose subject matter is rights over territory—succession to rights and obligations operates because such agreements "run with the land" and are unaffected by changes of sovereignty over territory. They are dispositive or localized if they are "in the nature of objective territorial regimes created in the interests of one nation or the community of nations; are applied locally in virtue of territorial application clauses; touch or concern a particular area of land."[65] A dispositive treaty creates localized obligations that survive changes in sovereignty. The classic legal view is "rights under treaties relating to cessions of territory and demarcations of boundary, obligations contracted with reference to it alone, and property which is within it, and has therefore a local character, or which, though not within it, belongs to state institutions localized there, transfer themselves to the new state person."[66]

The International Law Association Committee on the "Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain other Obligations of their Predecessors" concluded, "When a treaty which provides for the delimitation of a national boundary between two States has been executed in the sense that the boundary has been delimited and no further action needs to be taken, the treaty has spent its force and what is succeeded to is not the treaty but the extent of national territory so delimited."[67] And Article 11 of the *Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties* provides, "A succession of States does not as such affect (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations of and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary."[68]

There is a rule of international law concerning fundamental changes in circumstances, traditionally termed "rebus sic stantibus." In the event of a fundamental change affecting the subject matter of an agreement, a party may invoke rebus sic stantibus as grounds for withdrawal from the treaty. However, can

rebus sic stantibus operate as grounds for nonperformance or termination of a boundary treaty? Article 62 (2) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states, "A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: if the treaty establishes a boundary."[69]

Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, "Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 (interpretation of treaties) or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." This provision may be invoked to appraise the expectations of the bargaining parties in historical perspective.

The customary international law principle of *uti possidetis juris* is regularly invoked by national elites in international boundary claims. This is a customary principle originating in Roman Law meaning "as you possess, so you possess."[70] It operates in contexts of new states and contested boundaries. The essence of the norm is that "new states will come to independence with the same boundaries they had when they were administrative units within the territory or territories of a colonial power."[71] It rewards stability at the expense of the self-determination, and possibly the human dignity, of people.

Legal scholars view the utility of *uti possidetis* in a number of ways.[72] Ian Browlie accords it a "very high rating as an element in maintaining stability in international affairs . . . what it means is that disputes do not arise simply as a result of the change of sovereignty."[73] Based on the practice of newly independent states, this rule of automatic succession to boundaries that were previously colonial administrative lines has been asserted and applied by international courts.

The *uti possidetis* principle enabled newly independent states in Latin America and Africa to inherit without question the administrative boundaries drawn by former colonial powers. The principle was recognized by the Organization of African Unity in its Cairo Resolution of 1964. It was adopted as practice of the European states in relation to the breakup of Yugoslavia, notably by the Badinter Arbitration Commission. The commission was the adjudicative body that reviewed issues involving boundaries, self-determination, minorities, and applicable principles of international law. On the question of frontiers, the commission observed that frontiers must be resolved according to certain principles. It controversially held that "except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international law. The conclusion follows from

the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of *uti possidetis*."[74]

It should be underscored that there have been profound criticisms of *uti possidetis juris*, and these bear directly on its application to the Durand Line. In this writer's view, the principal is best considered a presumption. As a presumption in law the question is does evidence exist to dislodge the presumptive application of the principle concerned?[75] A blanket application can lead to injustices for the indigenous populations living in frontiers or regions that front boundaries. The principle neither precludes decision makers' arriving at an authoritative determination in respect of boundaries nor precludes submitting the matter to an international tribunal for actual delimitation of legal guidance. Thus *uti possidetis juris* is not a default rule. But for many national elites it has become hard law applied to soft and contested borders.

This hard law of soft borders has been at the center of a number of important decisions of international tribunals whose judgments are invoked in national elite boundary claims.[76] In the *Temple of Preah Vihear* case, the Court noted:

> In general, when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if the line so established can, at any moment, and on the basis of a continuously available process, be called in question, and its rectification claimed, whenever any inaccuracy by reference to a clause in a parent treaty is discovered. Such a process could continue indefinitely, and finality would never be reached so long as possible errors still remained to be discovered. Such a frontier, far from being stable, would be completely precarious.[77]

The Rann of Kutch Arbitration[78] involved a nineteenth-century British vassal state within India. In 1968 following a war between India and Pakistan, the two countries put conflicting claims over the status of Kutch to an international arbitral tribunal. The tribunal was asked to determine the boundary between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch.[79] A key issue before the tribunal was whether a "historically recognized and well-established boundary in the area in dispute"[80] had existed. The tribunal concluded there was no such recognized boundary thus rendering the *uti possidetis* principle inapplicable. "The paramount consideration of promoting peace and stability in this region compels recognition and confirmation that this territory which is wholly surrounded by Pakistan territory, also be regarded as such."[81] The territory was awarded to Pakistan promoting a policy favoring a stable public order.

In the Western Sahara case, the court upheld a right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the face of demands for reintegration by Morocco and Mauritania.[82] In a separate opinion, Judge Hardy Dillard wrote that "it is for the people to determine the fate of the territory and not the

territory the fate of the people."[83] Hence, this opinion cites the human right to self-determination. In *Nicaragua v. Honduras* the court noted, "Once agreed, the boundary stands, for any other approach would vitiate the fundamental principle of the stability of boundaries, the importance of which has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court."[84] But the question of agreement—its nature and validity—required a historical appraisal.

In the *Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkino Faso/Republic of Mali)*,[85] the parties agreed that the settlement of the dispute should be "based in particular on respect for the principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization."[86] The independent state of the Burkino Faso territory corresponded to the former French colony of Upper Volta. The Republic of Mali territory corresponded to the former French Sudan. Those boundaries inherited from France were held to remain inviolable. *Uti possidetis juris* operated to "secure respect for the territorial boundaries, which existed at the time independence was achieved."[87] The chamber observed that *uti possidetis* "is not a rule pertaining solely to one specific system of international law. It is a principle of general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power."[88] The court took note of French colonial law, *droit d'outre-mer*, as evidence of where territorial title would be frozen by application of *uti possidetis*. *Droit d'outre-mer* in operation was especially relevant when the parties invoked colonial effectivities, that is, "the conduct of the administrative authorities as proof of the effective exercise of territorial jurisdiction in the region during the colonial period."[89] The court stated, "*uti possidetis* applies to the new State (as a State) not with retroactive effect, but immediately and from that moment onwards . . . The principle of *uti possidetis* freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock but does not put back the hands."[90] This case is often cited as authority for *uti possidetis juris* as a general principle of international law.

However, equity—justice administered according to fairness in contrast to strictly formulated rules—could favor the population straddling the boundaries over the absolute territorial integrity of the states. A separate opinion by Judge Georges Abi-Saab argued that the decision should have accorded greater weight to the needs of the nomadic population, their culture, and the scarcity of water resources. Thus the court should have based its decision on considerations of equity *infra legem*[91] in the interpretation and application of the law.

While the policy of stability of borders was paramount, there has been increasing recognition of the human rights interest of self-determination. Hence the customary legal principle of *uti possidetis* is no longer an irrepressible force. In twenty-first-century world public order, in contrast with 1893,

self-determination is regarded by many as a *jus cogens*, a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 53) provides that "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of international law." Ian Brownlie has observed, "One of the reasons why respectable lawyers do not like the principle of self-determination . . . is that they precisely see it as a form of instability which will create a basis for strife and civil war."[92] This sentiment flies in the face of world public order trends. It is questionable whether national elites can freeze borders in time irrespective of social change and the accepted norm of self-determination, which is now a central component of human rights law. The Durand Line Agreement of 1893 is subject to conflicting interpretation; there has been a fundamental change in circumstances from the colonial era to a world public order of independent states opening a rebus sic stantibus claim. In addition, human rights are now fundamental goals of international legal processes.

Law and Culture on the Durand Line: A Policy-Oriented Approach

Operation principles must be established to solve the problem of the line consistent with the demands of regional and global elites while at the same time accounting for the human dignity of the indigenous cultures. The principles must recognize that the historical decision making leading to the conclusion of the Durand Line Agreement continued to shape expectations, demands, and identifications much later. In addition to historical elite and community expectations, subsequent state practice bears on the legal character of the boundary. Recognition of title, formally explicit or implicit by conduct, will also bear on the legal character of the Durand Line and the people and culture of the region. Professor Myres McDougal and his associates devised such principles. Here is a distillation applicable to the Durand Line problem:

1. Achieving an agreement is a distinctive process involving participants, groups, individuals, situations (including crisis), strategies, base values, and outcomes unfolding within a context of unique conditions.[93]
2. In appraising the history of any prescription or agreement, every outcome in social process is efficiently described as the culminating event in a sequence of communication.[94]
3. When interpreting a present agreement, the culminating statements in a stream of assertion and counter assertion can only be understood in the setting of all the preceding events that are likely to have affected the final result in any significant way.[95]

4. To identify genuine shared expectations, two principles must be applied: (a) the principle of *travaux préparatoires* and its correlative emphasis upon all preoutcome features; (b) the principle of subsequent conduct referring to postoutcome features.[96]

5. Contemporary decision makers often take into consideration the historical development of agreements as well as broader features of the historical background of the participants that ultimately affected the agreement process.[97]

6. The process of claim continues long after the agreement is formally concluded. Thus, "in the course of making and performing international agreements, controversies may arise between the original parties, *or their successors in interest*, with respect to many different aspects of alleged commitment . . . the parties to these controversies, when they cannot achieve settlement among themselves, appeal to the established community processes of authoritative decision for resolution of their differences and for many types of remedy for asserted injury. Almost any of these controversies may . . . present demands for the reinterpretation of the agreement in the sense of an effort to ascertain the genuine shared expectations of the parties."[98]

Thus the McDougal principles urge appraising the procedures and manner by which the Durand Line Agreement was concluded. In particular, the following questions are raised:

1. On whose behalf, by whose authority, was the agreement concluded? Did the amir have the legal capacity to enter into an agreement on behalf of all Afghan tribes?

2. What is the effect of unequal bargaining power? Was the agreement concluded under duress?

3. What were the expectations and the intent of the respective parties at the time? Have those expectations substantially evolved?

4. If India upon independence assumed international law obligations created by the legal acts of Britain, did Pakistan also assume those obligations as a successor state to India? Or, pursuant to an Afghan government claim, is Pakistan a new state that does not assume the legal obligations of India?

Applying the McDougal principles with historical perspective of the Durand Line Agreement accounting for contemporary postevent outcomes, it becomes obvious there remain unsettled questions of law. The amir may have accepted

terms of the Durand Line Agreement under duress. At the very least, the intentions and expectations of the two contracting parties were uneven.

One strategy to resolve the problem at the level of the state is to resort to international adjudication. The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan could submit the issues to an international tribunal either seeking an opinion on international law that would guide a formal delimitation or requesting the court or tribunal to actually draw a new line, or both. The McDougal principles suggest that the following considerations be incorporated into any compromise or special agreement submitted to the court or tribunal:

1. The age and context surrounding the boundary: populations may have persistently rejected or adjusted to the purported line over time
2. The process by which the boundary was drawn
3. The nature of the entities at the time of the agreement, including principal-agent relationships during a period of colonial empire and tribal confederations
4. The procedures between the parties, the bargaining among the parties, and the historical expectations of the parties
5. The current functional suitability of the boundary[99]
6. The common interests of the appurtenant states, indigenous populations, and the world community of which each is a part

An international adjudication strategy could resolve the Durand Line problem at the level of the state. However a sustainable preferred outcome demands a concurrent culture strategy. The elements of that program are as follows:

1. Provide direct and responsive government and replace FATA arrangements. Durand Line peoples must enjoy the rights enjoyed by citizens of the environing state (Pakistan and Afghanistan).
2. Respect the dignity of the indigenous tribes by protection through the formal legal system that replaces FATA. Build upon the inclusive common interest aspects of Pushtun culture including the jirga mechanism and the hospitality principle known as *nanawatee*. Circumscribe the effect of *badal* or tribal feuds.
3. Intercept and arrest hostile cross-border movements of insurgent elements.
4. Guarantee free passage of families, clans, and tribes. Transit trade and port access must be ensured.
5. Enhance government development assistance to the area.
6. Launch substantial multilateral development initiatives for the region.

7. Establish a multilateral commission to investigate charges of noncompliance by either state and consider tribal demands and claims.[100]

Conclusion

The 1893 Durand Line Agreement must be revisited to examine the persistent culture it divides. The preferred outcome must enhance regional stability, self-determination, transit trade, access to maritime ports, regional cross-border development, and the protection of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government."[101] Where absolute sovereignty was about state security, popular sovereignty is about human dignity. Popular sovereignty is changing expectations about the fulfillment of values of peoples and their cultures regardless of the lines that divide them.[102] Self-determination is increasingly the human rights driver that pressures contested boundaries and weak states. For states that are pathologically weak, the technique of sovereignty is an imperfect tool as territorial integrity comes under critical challenge.

The Durand Line region radiates personal insecurity across early twenty-first-century world politics, owing in no small measure to a vibrantly persistent culture and the world social process in which it unfolds. Richard I. Bruce, a key nineteenth-century British political agent, introduced his memoir writing, "the question of the best means of remedying the defects in our relations with the border tribes is one that is ever present with us. It may slumber for a time, but will inevitably crop up again, and even now tokens are not wanting to show that the time may not be far distant when the problem of the merits or demerits of the Forward Policy will be again prominently to the front."[103] So we have come full circle and more. The Durand Line remains a local and regional problem of world-order impact. At stake is the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the possible dismemberment of Pakistan, sanctuary for Taliban and an Al-Qaeda safe area, the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the expectation of violence for the people of the line and personal insecurity well beyond.

The fate of the people of the Durand Line region has long turned on external value processes of appurtenant states, the region, nonstate actors, and the world community of states. In 1955 Harold Lasswell, while observing the Saharans, noted, "We know that the political consequences of changes in population . . . depend upon the 'threat value' or the 'asset value' of the members of the world community to one another . . . Since the ruling circles of a split world pursue different objectives in terms of social structure and ideology it is only feasible to think of even restricted programs of multilateral cooperation within the frame of an agreement in which are prescribed the permissible portions between

governmentalized and non-governmentalized operation to be preserved at successive stages of the project. Further, it will be essential to determine whether the program is intended to consolidate an existing national unity or to lay the foundation for a new nation (one drawn, for example, from widely varying ethnic sources; or from a single principal source of people and culture)."[104] These observations are applicable to the problems and people of the Durand Line and should be memorialized to relevant elites. Indeed, any transborder program should remove and protect the tribes from "the cross-hairs of the ruling circles of a split world." Such a program in conjunction with a new Durand Line Agreement might begin to fulfill the human dignity of the people of the Line.

Notes

1. A boundary is a line of division between two contiguous properties that is marked by natural or artificial separation. The boundary may be described by a line on a map or words in a treaty such as the Durand Line Agreement.
2. A tribe has the following characteristics: common territory, common name, common language, a common culture, unilineal dissent, economic self-sufficiency, common belief systems and rituals, and a coherent political organization.
3. A frontier is the portion of the territory that lies close along the boundary of another country and so "fronts" or faces it. It is an inexact zone or strip of land running along the boundary.
4. For an official description of FATA policy from the Government of Pakistan perspective, see http://www.fata.gov.pk.
5. Thomas Johnson, "On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgance in Afghanistan," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5 (2007): 93–129.
6. "The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan," *New York Times*, Sept 28, 2008, Week in Review, 3.
7. James W. Spain, *The Way of the Pathans* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), 22.
8. Although the Durand Line mostly divides Pushtuns and their shared culture, real separation is felt at the tribal level and the division of many kinfolk and clans. The Durand Line divides "The Wakhi who live in the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan and the Grogal Pass area in Pakistan; The Kalash/Nuristani who live in Pakistan's Barir Valley where they are known as Kalash and previously Kafirs, and in Kunar Nuristan in Afghanistan where they are known as Nuristani; The Mashwanis who are a tiny tribe split between Kunar Province in Afghanistan and Dir District in Pakistan; The Salarzai who are divided between Pakistan's Bajaur Agency and Afghanistan's Asmar district of Kunar; The Mamund who live in Bajaur Agency, Pakistan and Kunar, Afghanistan; The Mohmands, a large Pashtun tribe. Those living in the Peshawar Valley south of Peshawar reaching the Khyber foothills, are called lower Mohmands. Those living across the Durand Line in Afghanistan's mountains are known as upper Mohmands; The large Shinwari tribe who are in southern and eastern Ningrahar Province in Afghanistan, and in Pakistan from Landi Kotal in Khyber Agency up to the to Afridi territory of Tirah and then nearly to Kurrum Agency; The very large Afridi tribe, divided into eight major

clans, who live in an area of Pakistan called Tirah, east of Afghanistan's Ningrahar Province and north of Pakistan's Kurram Agency. A small number of Afridis, the Zakha Khel clan live in Ningrahar Province; The Mangals who are split between Paktia Province, Afghanistan and Pakistan's Kurram Valley; The Wazirs (subdivided as the Ahmedzai and the Utmanzai) dwell primarily on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line, with one subsection of the Utmanzai living in the Birmal Valley of Paktia, Afghanistan. It is worth noting that the Ahmedzsais living in Wana, South Waziristan, traditionally use agricultural land in Afghanistan during the summers returning to Pakistan in winter; The Sulaiman Khel who occupy the Zamelan plateau in southwestern Waziristan up to Qamaruddin Karez on the Durand Line and crossing into Afghanistan; The Achakzais who occupy the watershed of the Khawaja Amran Range. The Khans have resided in Gulistan and thereabouts, while the main clan has been spread over south-eastern Kandahar province in Afghanistan; the small Barech Afghan tribe that spills over the line into the area of Nushki. The Baluch and Brahuis who are in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan spilling into Afghanistan, with the Mamasani Brahuis extending up into the Helmand Valley of Afghanistan." Azmat Hayat Khan, *The Durand Line: Its Geostrategic Importance* (Peshawar, PK: Area Study Centre, Univ. of Peshawar, 2000): 38–41.

9. In a chapter entitled "Kabul Intrigues" Bruce wrote in his memoir, "The arrangements we had concluded with the Waziris (an Afghan tribe) for the opening up and pacification of the country continued to progress satisfactorily . . . and should another frontier war with Afghanistan or Russia arise, it is then that the value of the position for dealing with these tribes will be fully realized and appreciated." Richard Issaq Bruce, *The Forward Policy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1900), 285.

10. Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha America Publications, 1992), 1.

11. Rudyard Kipling, *Kim* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.), 1901.

12. On October 1, 1838, a "Declaration on the Part of the Right Honourable The Governor-General of India," also known as the "Simla Manifesto" was published. It was written by Governor-General Macnaghten and read in part, "His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and fractious opposition by a British army . . . and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will withdraw." Patrick Macrory, *Kabul Catastrophe, The Story of the Disastrous Retreat from Kabul* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), 80.

13. Lt. General Sir George Macmunn, *Afghanistan: From Darius to Amanullah* (London: G. Bell and Sons 1929), 110.

14. Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha America Publications, 1992), 256.

15. Rudyard Kipling, *The Young British Soldier* (London: C. Sheard and Co.), 1892.

16. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, NJ : Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), 425.

17. Historian Percival Spear wrote, "There remained the frontier proper stretching from the Hindu Kush to the district of Dera Ismail Khan where the various Pathan [Pushtun] tribes held sway. There were four possible lines of defense. The first was

the River Indus . . . The second line was the 'scientific frontier running from Kabul through Gazni to Kandahar.' This was the (former) Mughul frontier. The third was the old Sikh line which was approximately that of the administrative frontier, and the actual frontier in the post-Sikh years. The fourth, eventually called the Durand Line, divided the tribal area between the Afghans and the British. It was supposed that the latter had the advantage of reducing danger from the tribal incursions and threats to the defense against regular invasion. So long as the British held Quetta, any army passing through western passes could be threatened on its flank and rear." Percival Spear, *Oxford History of Modern India, 1740–1975* (Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958), 700.

18. Bruce, *The Forward Policy*, 262.
19. "Agreement Between His Highness Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, G.C.E.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the government of India, representing the Government of India, on the other part," reproduced in *The Durand Line Border Agreement 1893*, ed. S. Fida Yunas (Peshawar, PK: Area Study Center, Univ. of Peshawar, 2003), 35.
20. "To secure the full advantages of the determination of the boundary the line must be held strictly inviolate. Should tribes residing on the British side of the boundary commit depredations in the Amir's territory, it will be necessary, in order to make our agreement effective, either that we should punish them or permit the Amir and his officials to do so." Bruce, *The Forward Policy*, 262.
21. Sir Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War* (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1898), 185.
22. Bruce, *The Forward Policy*, 325.
23. The term "Pathan" was widely applied to Pushtuns, particularly during the colonial period. Today the term "Pushtun" is more commonly used.
24. Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1961), 316.
25. "Afghanistan became a nation-state because it was a buffer state. The state was only able to impose its will upon the tribes and occupy its own territory thanks to the financial subsidies and weapons that were freely provided by the English between 1880 and 1919. The establishment of the frontier was carried out more or less single handedly by the British, in agreement with the Russians. The English forced the Afghans to accept the Treaty of Gandamak (May 1879) and the frontier formed by the Durand Line (1893). The Russians dictated the settlement of 1888 (Amou-Darya) and the agreement of 1895 (Pamir); all of these were underpinned by the St Petersburg Anglo-Russian agreements of 1907." Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), 17.
26. Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press 2000), 230.
27. See International Crisis Group, "Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes," *Crisis Group Asia Reports* 123 (2006).
28. Griff Witte and Imtiaz Ali, "Pakistan Truce Appears Defunct," *Washington Post*, July 16, 2007, A01.

29. Dexter Filkins, "The Long Road to Chaos in Pakistan," *New York Times*, September 28, 2008, Week in Review, 3.

30. Abubakar Siddique, *Pakistan: New Government Announces Major Reforms in Tribal Areas*, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 3, 2008.

31. See Johnson, "On the Edge of the Big Muddy," 93–129.

32. Myres S. McDougal and Associates, *Studies in World Public Order* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1960), 20.

33. Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1944), 37.

34. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), 5.

35. "Every culture, society and group represents a limited selection from the total of human potentialities, individual and collective; The selection is made in accordance with certain dominant values basic to the group; Every stable group exemplifies a more or less complete and coherent pattern, structure, or system of relationships." Edward Adamson Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), 17.

36. See, generally, Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980).

37. See John D. Montgomery and Alex Inkeles, eds., *Social Capital as a Policy Resource* (Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).

38. See, Leon B. Poullada, *The Pushtun Role in the Afghn Political System* (New York: Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, 1970).

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., 5.

41. Spain, *The Way of the Pathans*, 42.

42. W. Michael Reisman, *Law in Brief Encounters* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991), 2.

43. In the tribal *wesh* (land distribution) under Sheikh Malay in the sixteenth century, each tribe was given land, called a *daftar*, and each individual shareholder was called a *daftari*.

44. Spain, *The Way of the Pathans*, 42.

45. W. Michael Reisman, "The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century," *California Western International Law Journal* (1978): 133.

46. Ibid.

47. W. Michael Reisman, *International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication* (The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture, 75 American Society of International Law Proceedings, 198, 101, 108–11).

48. Fernand Braudel, *On History* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), 48.

49. Ian Browlie, *Boundary Problems and the Formation of New States* (Hull, UK: Univ. of Hull Press, 1996), 2.

50. "A considerable proportion of disputes taken to the International Court or to arbitration are concerned with title to territory." Browlie, *Boundary Problems and the Formation of New States*, 3.

51. Ronald Neumann, "Borderline Insanity: Thinking Big About Afghanistan," *The American Interest* (2007), 3.

52. Daniel Patrick O'Connell, *State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967), 3.
53. Browlie, *Boundary Problems and the Formation of New States*, 5.
54. Ibid.
55. See Sirdar Sen, "The Partition of India and Succession in International Law" *Indian Law Review* 1 (1947): 190.
56. U.N. Press Release PM/473, 12th August 1947; GAOR, 17th sess., suppl. No. 9, para. 72; U.N. Doc. A/5209; A/CN. 4/149, p 2.
57. Okon Udokang, *Succession of New States to International Treaties* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1972), 145–47.
58. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 114, p. 174; British Treaty Series, 1922, No. 19 (cited in Udokang, p. 433).
59. Okon Udokang, *Succession of New States to International Treaties*, 433–34.
60. 446 House of Commons Debates (5th ser.) col. 1491. (cited in Udokang, 434).
61. 522 House of Commons Debates (5th ser.) col. 193.
62. Udokang, *Succession of New States to International Treaties*, 435.
63. Ibid.
64. Browlie, *Boundary Problems and the Formation of New States*, 3.
65. International Law Association Reports, *Effect of Independence on Treaties* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1965), 352.
66. W. E. Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1924), 115.
67. International Law Association Publications, *The Effect of Independence on Treaties, a Handbook* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1965): 361–67.
68. *Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties*, Art. 11. 17, ILM (1978) 1494.
69. 8 I.L.M. (1969) 679.
70. For thorough reviews of the evolution and application of *uti possidetis juris* see Suzanne Lalonde, *Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of "Uti Possidetis"* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 2002; Joshua Castellino and Steve Allen, *Title to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003).
71. Malcolm N. Shaw, "The Heritage of States: The Principle of *Uti Possidetis Juris* Today," *British Yearbook of International Law* 67 (1996): 75–154: 97.
72. See Steven R. Ratner, "Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States," *American Journal of International Law* 90 (1996): 590–624.
73. Ian Brownlie, "Problems and the Formation of New States," in *Judicial Review in International Perspective, Liber Americorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley*, ed. Mads Andenas (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000): 45–54: 52.
74. Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3 (January 11, 1992) 31 International Legal Materials 1499 (1992).
75. See also Malcolm N. Shaw, *Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries, European Journal of International Law* 8 (1997): 478.
76. Other international cases in which *uti possiditis juris* played a role include *Case concerning the land, island and maritime frontier dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras)*, International Court of Justice (ICJ) Reports (1992); *Case concerning the territorial*

dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), ICJ Reports (1964); Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, Judgment of 19 October 1981, 91 ILR 543. Court of Arbitration: Cahier (president); Simpson and Simmonds (members); *Guinea-Guinea (Bissau) Maritime Delimitation Case*, Award of 14 February 1985, 77 I.L.R. 635.

77. ICJ Reports (1962), 4 at 34.

78. Rann of Kutch arbitration (1968) 50 ILR 407.

79. The Rann of Kutch is located in Gujarat-West Pakistan. India was successor to the British vassal state of Kutch while Pakistan was successor to British sovereignty over Sind.

80. 50 ILR 2, 4.

81. Ibid., 520.

82. ICJ Reports (1975), 12 at 31–33.

83. Western Sahara case, ICJ Reports (1975), 12 at 116–22 (sep. op. of Judge Hardy Dillard).

84. ICJ Reports (1994), 2 at 38.

85. ICJ Reports (1986), 554.

86. Ibid., 557.

87. Ibid., 565.

88. Ibid., 566.

89. Ibid., 586.

90. Ibid., 568.

91. Ibid., 567. This is, as the Chamber noted, ". . . a form of equity that constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force and which is based on law."

92. Browlie, *Boundary Problems and the Formation of New States*, 11.

93. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller, *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1967): 14.

94. Ibid., xi.

95. Ibid., xvi.

96. Ibid., 121.

97. Ibid., 309.

98. Ibid., 20.

99. Ratner, "Drawing a Better Line," 623.

100. See recommendations of Ambassador Ronald Neumann, "Borderline Insanity: Thinking Big About Afghanistan," *American Interest* (2007): 5–8.

101. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, para. 3, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).

102. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in 1992, "While respect for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity of the state remains central, it is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory." Bhoutros Bhoutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* (1992–1993): 89, 98–99. In his 1999 annual speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary General Kofi Annan stated, "The sovereign state, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and

not vice versa. . . . [I]t is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought us to this juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new era—an era when strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms." U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 1–2, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999).

103. Bruce, *The Forward Policy*, 263.
104. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Political Science of Science," *American Political Science Review* 970 (1956), 961–79: 970.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusions

Intertwining Cultural Adaptation and Economic Development

William Ascher and John M. Heffron

The title of one of the most distinguished development journals is *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. The implication, intended or not, is that economic development entails cultural change—that there is a tension or tradeoff between development and cultural persistence. In this concluding chapter we draw lessons from the volumes' contributions to explore how economic development and cultural *persistence* can be mutually reinforcing. We find that in many cases *persistence through adaptation* is the key. This adaptation can enhance human dignity by preserving and prioritizing broadly cherished cultural practices and beliefs, promoting both cultural aspects conducive to economic growth, and encouraging applications of wealth to underwrite these cherished practices.

To identify the insights on how to enhance human dignity through the mutual reinforcement of cultural patterns and economic development, we apply the five intellectual tasks outlined by the problem-orientation framework of the policy sciences approach. We begin clarifying our normative commitment by summarizing the argument offered in Chapter 2. We then outline the trends most relevant to understanding how cultural evolution and development have interacted. This permits us to draw some broad conclusions about the dynamics that drive the interactions. Understanding these dynamics permits us to project the likely consequences of adopting alternative policies. Based on these consequences, we can identify the strategies that provide the best balance of gains and losses.

Normative Commitment

We favor economic development to enhance society's material well-being, yet this must be balanced against the risk of losing broadly shared, cherished aspects of culture. The term "broadly shared" is crucial here, because human dignity entails the greatest inclusiveness of people within the society. Cultural practices or beliefs that disadvantage, oppress, or humiliate significant numbers of people are not to be regarded as broadly cherished.

We may therefore begin by identifying the fundamental rewards offered by cherished cultural aspects and by economic development. These rewards are both direct and indirect, material and nonmaterial.

The fundamental nonmaterial rewards that culture can provide involve the interpersonal outcomes of affection and respect as well as the intrapersonal rewards of rectitude (i.e., self-assessed righteousness), cultural knowledge, and psychological well-being. People who are "comfortable" with their culture, and are respected by virtue of their cultural affiliation and practices, are likely to derive great satisfaction from their membership in a cultural group.

The provision of material rewards from cultural practices and beliefs is more complicated. The *standing* of particular cultural practices (such as religious identifications or language) can provide wealth, skill acquisition, and power. The basic dynamic is that cultural distinctiveness endows members of certain cultural groups with sufficiently high status to gain access (or even privileged access) to opportunities for education, occupational opportunities, economic cooperation within the cultural group, and political influence. Obvious examples include the intragroup trust that permits Jews in the international diamond business or overseas Chinese in import-export businesses to operate efficiently,[1] the economic and political advantages of Iraqi Sunnis before the fall of Saddam Hussein, or the greater educational and job opportunities of speakers of a nation's official majority language.

The direct rewards from economic development are essentially focused on wealth, skill acquisition, physical well-being, and power. Economic development provides the wherewithal for people to enjoy better health care, education, and the resources to participate effectively in politics. These, in turn, can provide the resources and opportunities to gain the nonmaterial, interpersonal rewards of affection and respect, and people who are less desperate for material gain may also be in a better position to act righteously.

These possible (but not inevitable) connections reflect the potential for culture and development to reinforce one another. Yet one can find cases in which cultural practices are inimical to the accumulation of capital and its deployment to economic improvements. For example, enormously expensive wedding feasts among certain cultural groups in India and other countries can severely reduce

the investment potential of the families hosting the weddings. This is not to say that the feasts are inappropriate, because they may serve crucial social functions, but rather to highlight the potential tradeoffs of cultural practices and economic development. One can also find examples of cultural groups resisting economic advances out of fear of cultural loss or because productive economic practices violate cultural or religious precepts. The strictures against charging interest for loans is perhaps the most prominent example, and although Islamic banking has found ways to lend capital without formally charging interest,[2] the weakness of the financial institutions in Muslim countries still reflects the prohibition against interest charges. And it is easy to find cases in which economic development provides incentives for new economic roles, migrations, or other changes that undermine cherished cultural practices and beliefs. Therefore as we explore the ways that cultural elements and economic development interact, we must be mindful that the interactions can be constructive or destructive.

Trends

Understanding how culture and development can complement one another requires taking into account the major trends that have influenced cultural elements in the face of globalization.

Urbanization. The worldwide trend of urbanization obviously has powerful potentials to separate migrants from their cultural matrix of beliefs and practices and to expose them to new cultural elements. The migrants may be particularly prone to cultural changes because the disposition to move to the city often reflects not only economic motives but also less commitment to maintaining contact with the cultural activities offered by the original locale. Even for those who would like to maintain cultural practices, they often find that the outwardly visible practices associated with their culture run the risk of ridicule or physical risk from others. And even when the towns or cities are populated predominantly by people of the same cultural heritage, the new migrants often risk seeming unsophisticated, and consequently less employable.

However, countervailing patterns can be found. It is common for migrants to congregate with people of the same cultural background and place of origin. The urban-based community may have sufficient wealth to help support cultural practices either back in the original community or in the city. The greater population density of cities provides a greater catchment for cultural practices: temples, language schools, performing arts, and so on can reach greater numbers of people with greater ease. Some cities can come to be recognized as distinguished sites of culture, such as Banaras in India or Barcelona in Spain.

Economic Integration. It is clear that economic integration, as one aspect of globalization, opens the way for beliefs and practices of other cultures to

influence, and thereby potentially to erode, existing cultural components. However, the situation is far more complex than that simple fact would imply. For one thing, formal economic integration in the form of regional groupings such as the European Union can extend into aspects of shared governance and regulation that go beyond strictly economic issues into cultural ones. For example, the European Union adheres to the Council of Europe's Charter to preserve minority languages and cultures.[3] In addition, the cultural groups that are minorities within the nation-state but majorities within subnational geographical areas can press for more autonomy without being subjected to as much economic retaliation by the national government, and secession into much smaller nation-states has become more economically viable. This phenomenon of greater local autonomy enabled by globalization (part of the awkwardly termed "glocalization") is well illustrated in John Christian Laursen's chapter on European language issues.

Historical Prevalence of Cultural Evolution. It is important to appreciate that virtually all cultures have undergone significant changes over time, even if members of the cultural group at any particular point in time may regard the current elements of the culture, or some version of it, as the "authentic" culture. Consider, for example, the Japanese belief that the elaborate tea ceremony is a quintessential aspect of true Japanese culture. Yet the elaborate form of the tea ceremony was unknown until the sixteenth century. Or consider that the form of the "classic" kimono was set four hundred years ago, not in the mists of ancient Japan. In Guatemala, various indigenous groups cherish the distinctive colors and designs of their clothing as important aspects of cultural distinctiveness, even though these characteristics had been imposed on them by the Spanish colonizers to keep track of which individuals were subservient to which colonial masters. Thus an act of oppression came to be regarded as a matter of cultural price and distinctiveness.

Secularism and Anti-Secularism. Beginning with the Enlightenment, the contesting forces of secularism—the reduction of the role of religion in defining roles and directing behavior—and antisecularism have defined the major cultural battleground. Antisecularism is much more than religiosity; it is a stance that regards secularism as immoral and as a threat to societal cohesion. The antisecularist stance externalizes the individual's concern over his or her own religious beliefs to opprobrium of the apparent lack of religious commitment on the part of others.

Dynamics

Numerous causal patterns link culture and economic development, with both positive and negative interactions. It is useful to outline the most prominent

of these interactions before addressing how to maximize the positive synergies between culture and development.

Social Constructionism and the Salience of Cultural Components. Berger and Luckman's landmark analysis of social constructs describes how societies come to regard differences among people, practices, and beliefs as important.[4] These dimensions and their definitions may be taken for granted (e.g., Iraqis apparently accept without much question that the most salient differences among them are the language differences between Arabic speakers and Kurdish speakers and the religious difference between Shias and Sunnis). Because social constructions are so often taken for granted, it is often difficult to change what is defined as the essential aspects of culture, making cultural preservation a challenge when the conditions required to maintain these essential aspects no longer hold. The dynamics of social construction account for the paradox that despite cultural evolution, people tend to regard some state of their culture as *the* culture, whether in its current or imagined pure historical form.

Yet because social constructions grow out of history and interactions, they are not immutable or "natural" categories that would have the same importance across different societies, contexts, and eras. Racial and ethnic differences may be regarded as very important in one context but not in another; even the definitions of race or ethnicity will vary. Which cultural practices and beliefs will be regarded as making a particular group distinct from another is determined by dynamic processes of self-identification and attribution by others.

This creates an important link between individual identification and the perceived content of culture. For example, insofar as Japanese have both a strong identification as Japanese and regard Shintoism as the defining characteristic of Japanese culture, they would embrace Shintoism as an essential aspect of their identification. An *indio* in Guatemala or Peru in theory could be defined as one of indigenous racial background, but it is conventionally defined as one who still embraces indigenous cultural practices, language, and beliefs. The relevance of the status of identifications and cultural dimensions as social constructions is that different aspects of culture can be elevated to a more central status in defining the basis for group identification and unity. It may be possible to alter the bases of identification to maintain this identification at sufficiently high levels despite the changes that economic development may bring. For example, religious identifications initially anchored by ceremonies linked to the group's original locale might erode identification for group members who migrate to other areas, but other aspects of religious observance could receive greater emphasis in order to reinforce the religious identification. Rather than regarding themselves as no longer *indios*, Amerindians who adopt Spanish as their language and nontraditional occupations may be able to maintain the strength of their group identification and cultural pride by redefining

the essence of Amerindian culture, in terms of history, legends, art, and so on. In the United States, Navajos and other Southwestern Native American groups have overwhelmingly adopted Christianity in place of pre-Columbian religions but have emphasized art, jewelry, and textiles as the proud heritage of their culture, even though the artistic styles have changed to meet market demand.

The fact that beliefs about the essence of culture, ethnicity, and identification may be either rigid or adaptable goes a long way toward accounting for the different outlooks on whether economic development will undermine or enhance broadly cherished cultural aspects. The pessimists typically presume that because cultural aspects are closely interrelated, culture is brittle insofar as the erosion of a core belief or practice may unravel the constellation of beliefs and practices that maintains the coherence of the culture and the community's loyalty to it.

Optimists are more likely to presume that changes in the social construction of either culture or ethnic identification can refocus what people regard as the essence of their culture, even if important beliefs or practices have been abandoned. Insofar as cultural understandings are adaptable, cultural identifications can be as well. An underlying premise is that if community members wish to regard still-available common cultural elements as a basis for bonding, they will do so. Another premise is that the new elements will not create serious breaches within the society, as these new elements contribute to broadly shared pride in the society's beliefs and practices.

Substitutability of Sources of Reward. Another implication of social constructionism is that the priorities of different valued outcomes will change, depending on the degree to which particular types of outcomes can be achieved. People are not simply rewarded when what they value is achieved, as if the value is preestablished and unchanging; they often value more what they can achieve. The prosperity that is gained by some through economic development may elevate wealth as a desideratum over other values, including religious rectitude and cultural practices—or it might promote these other values because anxieties over wealth are reduced. Thus the impacts of economic development can go either way for the successful. Similarly, those passed over by economic development might become more religiously or culturally observant to offset the disappointment of economic failure, or the enticement of acquiring wealth may become a preoccupation that eclipses cultural priorities for them as well. While the patterns can go either way, it is clear that the fear of many cultural and religious leaders is that the allure of economic development will contribute to the erosion of culture and religiosity.

Polarization. A consequence of one of the most prevalent trends noted in case studies on cultural change is the polarization that arises when the standing of cultural elements is disputed within the cultural group. When one set of

group members embraces a change in beliefs or practices, the perceived threat to cultural persistence frequently elicits a denunciation from the conservatives. Obviously, if the changes are seen as impinging upon religious belief or observance, the denunciation will be harsher. Even if the intention is to preserve the culture through adaptation, in many cases the adapters will be seen as disrespectful and corrosive; their opponents will be seen as benighted reactionaries. Some of the most acute conflicts within cultural communities arise from this polarization.

Conflict Provoked through Assigning Differential Status to Cultural Elements. In the discourse over preserving, adapting, or abandoning a cultural practice, there are often efforts to establish the relative standing of different cultural elements. Efforts to assert what is "true" or "pure" in a culture are likely to arouse conflict, insofar as people with different practices or beliefs will disagree over these designations. For art and literature, the designations of "high culture" and "low brow culture" demean the latter and those who create or enjoy it.

For language, it is typically assertions of the superiority or greater authenticity of particular modes of writing or speaking, relegating other modes as dialects or simply as inferior, that arouse conflict. An enlightening episode was the heated controversy ignited by the well-intentioned effort of the Council of Europe to mandate that all forty-seven European nations belonging to the Council adopt measures to preserve minority languages. The Council developed a charter comprised of a wide array of measures, from which each member country was to adopt a selection of measures. Beyond the obvious issue of further eroding the sovereignty of member nations, an apparently underappreciated consequence of the charter was that it forced consideration of what constituted a language as opposed to a dialect. In France, in particular, this triggered a bitter debate whether Breton, Occitan, Provençal, Corse, and other linguistic modes should be considered as languages or as "mere" dialects. Not only did this debate arouse resentment against those claiming that "standard French" is the only language, but it even aroused debate as to whether Occitan is a dialect of the Provençal language, or vice versa.[5] By the same token, within religious communities the more intensively observant often belittle those who are less so, for example, asserting the importance of the pilgrimage as a way of putting themselves above those who are unwilling or unable to undertake the pilgrimage.

Rejection of Prevailing Cultural Attitudes by the Young. For a host of reasons, youths are the most likely segment of a cultural group to reject important aspects of prevailing cultural orientations, whether they reject the old or the new. Plato saw intergenerational strife brought on by sons' rejection of the values of their fathers as a crucial dynamic of societal and political change.[6] Many youths seek both differentiation from older generations and conformity with

their own cohort; therefore, allegiances to new cultural constellations congeal in conflict with prevailing cultural practices and beliefs. Plato argues that this is so regardless of the content of the fathers' beliefs and behaviors. This can be seen in the numerous cases of youths rebelling against the traditionalism of older generations but also against the liberalizing tendencies that the preceding generations may have demonstrated. It is certainly no accident that the reactionary "culture police" of Iran and Afghanistan is largely comprised of young males. Of course, not all cases have to be so reactionary. The "search of one's roots" can be a salutary effort that does not impinge upon the human dignity of people who have embraced cultural changes or benefited from the rights that cultural change has brought.

Reciprocal Cultural Interchange. The demoralization of those who cherish their own culture when it is diluted by imported beliefs and practices can be offset by learning that the one's culture also influences others. The feelings of inferiority that people of many non-Western cultures have experienced can be mitigated by the knowledge that the artifacts of their culture are spreading throughout the world—Navajo jewelry, Senegalese music, South Asian yoga.

Influence of Cultural Interpreters. In some cases, particular members of a cultural group have high enough standing such that their interpretations of what is culturally appropriate will be regarded as authoritative by most members of the group. These cultural interpreters, whether clergy, political leaders, intellectuals, and so on may have profound influence in determining what adaptations are to be considered as culturally destructive, constructive, or neutral.

Options for Promoting the Synergies between Development and Culture

The basic dynamics that constructively connect cultural patterns and economic development lie in the investment of assets generated by economic development to enhance cultural elements, and vice versa.

Economic development can contribute to cultural enrichment by contributing to group pride, which in turn can reduce cultural rejection by those who would otherwise equate the culture with economic backwardness. For example, the Japanese worries over whether profound cultural changes were essential in order to keep up with the West were greatly alleviated when the Japanese economy expanded dramatically. Insofar as Japanese industrialists in the post-WWII era have been benefactors of traditional artisanship, performing arts, and ceremonies, their support conveys two complementary messages: that the economically successful do not reject traditional culture as backward and unfashionable and that the industrialists are respectful people rather than cultural philistines.[7]

As populations move beyond subsistence, they are likely to have more time and energy to engage in cultural production of all sorts, from the production of physical objects such as distinctive handicrafts to performances and religious observances. For example, the elaborateness and length of the Ramlila observances described in Nita Kumar's chapter would be far less feasible without some economic surplus in the neighborhoods of Banaras.

By the same token, less economically vulnerable groups are likely to have greater capacity to communicate with one another, which can be crucial in conveying that "we are not alone" in our cultural distinctiveness. The use of the Internet to link together small and dispersed cultural groups (e.g., the Aromânians spread throughout the Balkans, Western Europe, and North America) is clearly of growing importance.

The wealth that comes from economic development can provide the technology and the investment capital to market cultural production beyond the group's geographical boundaries, even internationally, reinforcing cultural pride. For example, the advent of music cassettes in Thailand enabled the Lao peoples to disseminate their distinctive Mor Lam music throughout Thailand.[8] In lieu of commercial outsiders or well-intentioned international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) finding markets for the arts, crafts, music, and so on of impoverished groups, this capital can put the cultural producers into a position of greater control over the products' design and provide the opportunity to capture more of the value added along the chain of marketing.

Economic development can also provide the economic surplus with which economically successful group members can become "patrons of the arts," generous supporters of religious institutions, and so on. The Jains in India (less than 1 percent of the Indian population, and spread throughout the country) have maintained their temples and active religious life through the willingness of very wealthy Jains to underwrite the costs. A similar pattern holds for Jains living beyond India.

Broadly shared cultural commitment can enhance the prospects of economic development in numerous ways as well. Community solidarity derived from common cultural identifications can contribute to social capital. When people identify strongly, comfortably, and proudly with their culture and with others identified with it, the mutual respect and affection within the community can be a basis for effective collective action and solidarity with respect to economic opportunities. We have already cited the commercial advantages that Jewish and overseas Chinese merchants can enjoy.

By the same token, common cultural identification can cement collective action against both material and nonmaterial threats. For example, a group's capacity to fend off efforts by governments or other groups to encroach on their land may depend heavily on the ability of the group to take the risks entailed in

resistance. Similarly, the cultural solidarity of the towns and villages described by Huaiyin Li in this volume enabled local leaders to resist the complete takeover of governance by central authorities.

The maintenance of cherished cultural practices can also help to stem the loss of productive group members, especially the young, whose sense of belonging to the local area depends in part on the attractiveness of these practices. In much of less-urbanized Latin America, the observance of saints' days specific to towns or villages is an important element of distinctiveness and identification. These identifications have been very important in promoting the willingness of emigrants to send remittances back home not only to their own families but also for general improvements through their "home town associations." Similarly, it is likely that the children involved in the Ramlila performances will have a strengthened loyalty to their original neighborhoods even if they leave.

We can also find cases in which the group's perception of the robustness of their culture reduces the resistance to considering new economic roles as acceptable. Economic development typically requires differentiation of economic roles, which may be regarded as a threat if members of the cultural group fear that the culture will unravel in the face of change.

Cultural solidarity permits cultural interpreters to promote widespread endorsement of the acceptability of new economic behaviors. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, highly respected Islamic theologians have endorsed interpretations of the Koran that permit profits to be earned from providing capital for the economic activities of others, thus finding a way to secure capital without violating the strictures against money lending.

Strategies

These potential synergies between economic development and culture require strategies to come to fruition. Several cases presented in this book point to the important potential to rework cultural practices and beliefs. Historical understandings and the cultural practices that commemorate them have been particularly prominent targets for such reworking. Nita Kumar's assessment of the Ramlila festival performances in Banaras reveals how the NIRMAN nongovernmental organization reworked the content and performance parameters to emphasize self-empowerment and to de-emphasize the male dominance of the traditional interpretations. The perpetuation of observances tied to ancient Indian culture was in part to preserve it against the pervasive influence of Western culture and historical interpretation but also to modify the values reflected in the practice of the festival observances. Carrie Chorba shows how Mexican critics of regional economic integration with the United States reworked the mestizo myth. What had been a myth of romanticized union of noble Spanish

warriors and willing Indian women, and of a balanced amalgam of Indian and Spanish cultural element, was rejected in favor of a far harsher interpretation of forced miscegenation and cultural imperialism. This harsher historical understanding has then been applied to the initiatives of regional economic integration and globalization in general, with the United States cast in the role of Spain.

Adaptation rather than out-and-out rejection can also be found in reworking respect and power aspects embedded in governance arrangements. Huaiyin Li describes the reworking of local Chinese governance arrangements in reaction to the penetration of the central government into village-level affairs throughout the twentieth century. Rather than maintaining a brittle rejection of the new modes of governance and criteria of leadership, which would have presented the central government the opportunity to crush local elites, successful local leaders reworked their relationships with local people, amalgamating the traditional forms of power (family standing, reputation, etc.) and the more formal bureaucratic modes.

Accomplishing cultural adaptation without creating destructive conflict between cultural traditionalists and economic developmentalists requires effort to cultivate mutual respect between cultural innovators and traditionalists. Cultural and political leaders have an obligation to avoid polarization that would threaten both culture and development. By the same token, cultural leaders must strive to reduce the previously mentioned tendency of cultural interpreters to designate some practices, beliefs, or variations as superior to others. When cultural elites squabble over cultural interpretations, or denounce "popular culture" as unsophisticated, the potential for a smooth transition to a new synthesis of cultural elements and developmental commitment decreases.

One tack to reinforce this mutual respect is to convey to members of the cultural group that elements of tradition and modernity can coexist—and have coexisted as the culture itself has evolved. What was "modern" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had some impact on virtually all cultures, just as what is modern in the twenty-first century. It is thus important to overcome the common misconception that one's culture is as it has always been. For example, Guatemalan "indigenous" textile designs of the twentieth century were very different from the pre-Columbian designs; further changes to meet market tastes could be regarded as no less appropriate, as long as the cherished traditions of textile weaving are maintained. To realize what is now considered to be an integral part of one's culture was once a novel practice or belief is to understand that novel elements can now be incorporated in like fashion.

Notes

1. Joel Kotkin, *Tribes: How Race, Religion, and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy* (New York: Random House, 1993).
2. The loan can be construed as an ownership stake, so that the lender can achieve a return on the loan that is equivalent to interest. See Rahul Dhumale and Amela Sapcanin, *An Application of Islamic Banking Principles to Microfinance: Technical Note* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
3. See Simo Määttä, "The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, French Language Laws, and National Identity," *Language Policy* 4 (2005): 167–86.
4. See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
5. See Määttä, "The European Charter."
6. For a trenchant interpretation of Plato's views and its role as a precursor to psychoanalytic theory, see Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Character and Constitution," *Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Review* 46 (1960): 1–18.
7. For the ups and downs of Japanese corporate support for arts and culture, see Mituhiro Yoshimoto, "An Overview: Private-Sector Support for Culture and the Arts," Performing Arts Network Japan, The Japan Foundation, http://www.performingarts.jp/E/overview_art/1005_02/1.html.
8. Patrick Jory, "Political Decentralization and the Resurgence of Regional Identities in Thailand," *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 34 (1999).

Index