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Lessons from the Population Policy Acceptance Study – Volume 1

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Charlotte Höhn

Abstract This introductory chapter deals with the following aspects: First of all, it provides the background for the present two volumes, thereby presenting at the beginning a precise description of the demographic situation in Europe as the impetus for our book and the DIALOG Project as a whole. Then an overview of previously published studies on population-related issues is given. The comparable and competing results of the latter and their relevance for the surveys carried out in the Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) and for the present book are explained. Secondly, the aim, structure, general objectives and organisational aspects of the DIALOG Project, of which the PPAS is the cornerstone, are presented. The third and last part of this chapter deals with the structure and the content of the two volumes.

Keywords: Demographic situation · Population Policy Acceptance Surveys · DIALOG Project

1.1 State of the Art

1.1.1 The Demographic Situation and the Challenge Which it Poses

Virtually all the industrialised countries have witnessed marked demographic change since the 1960s. Fertility fell below replacement level, leading to demographic ageing and population decline, in conjunction with increasing life expectancy. While population decline has been and can continue to be mitigated by international immigration, demographic ageing remains a prominent phenomenon. The UN Study on "Replacement Migration" (UN 2000) illustrates options as to maintaining population size and the size of the working-age population, or to halting demographic

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ageing, albeit this latter option is rather theoretical. The example of Europe serves to illustrate this.

The 47 countries which make up Europe according to the UN definition had a population of 728 million in 1995. The total fertility rate (TFR) for this Europe declined from 2.6 births per woman in 1950 to 1.57 by 1990–1995. Life expectancy at birth rose from 66.2 years in 1950–1955 to 72.6 years in 1990-1995. Thus, the proportion of the population aged 65 or older has risen from 8.2% in 1950 to 13.9% in 1995, while the potential support ratio (number of working-age persons (15 to 64 years) per person aged 65 years or older) declined from 8.0 in 1950 to 4.8 in 1995.

In the UN's 1998 *medium variant* (assuming annual net immigration of 428,000), Europe's population is expected to decline after 2000, reaching a level of 628 million in 2050, when 27 million persons (4.3%) would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendants. Working-age population would peak in 2010 and start to decline to 364 million in 2050, one-quarter less than the 1995 figure. The elderly population will grow, and the potential support ratio will fall from 4.8 to 2.1 in 2050.

Assuming that 1.8 million migrants came to Europe per year, the continent's population could be kept constant at its 1995 level. 127 million persons, or nearly 18% of the total population of Europe, would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendants. The potential support ratio would be 2.38 in 2050 (instead of 2.1 in the medium variant).

Annual net migration of 3.6 million would be required in order to maintain the working-age population at its 1995 level. The total population would grow from 728 million in 1995 to 809 million in 2050, accommodating 26% of post-1995 immigrants or their descendants. The potential support ratio would then be 2.62 in 2050.

If the goal were to stop demographic ageing (measured here by keeping the 1995 potential support ratio constant at 4.8), 25.2 million immigrants per year (a total of almost 1.4 billion from 1995 to 2050) would be required. By 2050, Europe's population would grow to 2.3 billion inhabitants, of whom almost three-quarters would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendants. Such a scenario is hardly conceivable or realistic. It clearly shows the limited effect of immigration on halting population decline and demographic ageing (UN 2000, 79–84).

Demographic ageing therefore remains a political and societal challenge to ensure that the social security systems continue to provide pensions and health care, including long-term care of the oldest old. With such a need for reform, also the issue of intergenerational solidarity and of fair burdens – sharing among generations – are evoked and are at stake.

Low fertility is accompanied by lower propensities to marry or remarry and an increasing incidence of divorce. Living alone, or living with a partner in a consensual union, or remaining in the parental home, has become very popular among the younger generations in Europe. Family-formation is delayed and eventually even discarded. Age at first marriage and at first birth, as well as childlessness, are all on

the increase. The most frequent family form among the middle-aged generations still comprises two (married) parents and two to three children. However also couples, be they married or cohabiting, are remaining childless more frequently. And because of divorce or separation of the parents, an increasing number of children are living with a lone parent, mostly their mother, occasionally also in a reconstituted family with a stepparent. Family forms and living arrangements are undergoing profound change and diversification.

Also the living arrangements of the elderly are changing. Among the elderly of today, most men are still married, while women (being typically younger than their husbands and having a higher life expectancy) are frequently widows. Only a small fraction of the elderly lives in old-age homes or in nursing homes. Three- or more generation households have become rare. Having said that, the generations of a family are often in close contact and live at short distances, albeit in separate households. Relatively little is known about such actual family ties among generations since official statistics are based on the principle of co-residence of household members. This should also been born in mind when looking at 1-person-households of younger persons; in addition, quite a number of "living-apart-together (LAT)" – arrangements are statistically not visible.

With increasing childlessness, divorce and separation, and as the numbers rise of those who opt not to marry at all, the living arrangements of the future elderly will change. The future elderly will much more frequently live in one-person households. Mutual support in informal networks (friends, neighbours) or formal support (nurses, doctors, hospitals) will have to step in if family support is not forthcoming.

Demographic change hence entails numerous challenges to society, social policies and every individual. In political terms, demographic change has the advantage of developing slowly over decades (or generations), thereby allowing time to react and adapt to the evolving ageing of the population. Policy-makers will have to know citizens' attitudes and expectations towards having children (What is people's desired fertility? What can policies do to support these desires? Where are the constraints?), as well as citizens' attitudes and expectations with regard to their preferred living arrangement in old age (How long do they want to be economically active? What standard of living do they expect? What do they expect from their own children or grandchildren, from their partner?). This knowledge can help tailor reform policies to what the populace wants and adjust to demographic change.

Policy-makers may also wish to know whether and how it is possible to halt demographic ageing. As already mentioned, immigration does not contribute greatly to achieving such a goal, if this is indeed desirable. The main reason is that immigrants are ageing too, and in the future will lay claim to vested rights in terms of pensions and old-age security just like the resident population. Therefore, the only demographic solution to the demographic challenge would be to increase fertility. The question of whether it is possible to increase fertility requires at least some advice from demographers, but certainly also has to consider the views and expectations of the citizens concerned.

1.1.2 Studies on Demographic Change and the Impact of Population-related Policies

We aim below to assess the state of the art before the inception of the DIALOG Project. We are looking into studies that analyse the possible interactions between demographic change and policies related or relevant to such change.

Demographic change and its policy implications will be discussed in view of

- studies on low fertility and related policy measures
- studies on family forms, living arrangements and related policy measures
- studies on gender relations, demographic change and related policy measures, and
- studies on demographic ageing, intergenerational solidarity and related policy measures.

1.1.2.1 Studies on Low Fertility and Related Policy Measures

Studies relating to the determinants and consequences of fertility decline could easily fill a whole library. A comprehensive study is included in "Determinants and Consequences of Demographic Change" by the United Nations (1973). An effort to revisit the issue is offered in Höhn and Mackensen (1980).

Theoretical approaches to understand fertility decline can be broken down into

- economic theories,
- sociological theories,
- psychological approach,
- ideational and value change,
- gender perspective, and
- proximate (demographic) determinants.

An excellent recent overview of these different approaches (and their most influential proponents) is provided by Dirk van de Kaa (1996) in his article on "Anchored narratives: The story and findings of half a century of research into the determinants of fertility". These approaches cover historical and contemporary situations all over the world. Van de Kaa also critically discusses so-called grand theories of fertility decline, which aim to combine the theoretical approaches of different disciplines, such as the theory (or rather the model) of demographic transition. While it is not possible to fully and definitively explain fertility decline since there are too many factors involved, it has been established in general terms that the trend towards declining fertility is inevitable as societies modernise. It is equally impossible to determine the level where fertility would stop declining. The issue of lowest-low fertility has received more attention since the 1990s.

There are also many studies which focus more on current European issues, namely persistent low and lowest-low fertility. Deserving of mention is, amongst others, Josef Schmid's study on the background of low fertility, written for the Council of Europe as early as in 1984. The study by Van de Kaa on "Europe's

Second Demographic Transition" (1987) became a classic, and he wrote his own sequel in 1999. Here, the "grand theory" of demographic transition which was based on historical experience and observation in Europe, leading to a new, stable equilibrium at replacement level (the authoritative study was penned by Coale and Watkins (1986) and considered a model for developing countries) is completely modernised to match observed fertility below replacement level in contemporary Europe. Van de Kaa's diagnosis is persistently below replacement fertility due to changing partner and gender relations, new living arrangements which focus on couples and singles against a background of affluence, individualisation and progressive values.

Lowest-low fertility emerging in Southern Europe and in the Central and Eastern European countries in transition in the 1990s is studied, inter alia, by Golini (1998) and Kohler (2001) and Kohler et al. (2002). Kohler explains postponement of family formation by pointing to the precarious economic circumstances faced by younger generations, diffused by peer orientation and aggravated by higher lifestyle expectations. Empirical evidence on such expectations is not collected in a comparative way.

There are few studies on low fertility and related policy measures, obviously pronatal in nature in a European context. The bulk of studies on fertility and related policies address developing countries, and aim to foster fertility decline by introducing family planning programmes, and through female empowerment, education and development. It still seems to be much easier to enhance fertility decline than to promote a rise in fertility. Given that the desired number of children in Europe usually does not surpass two children, and that the decision on the number and spacing of children is a basic human right, the legitimacy of state intervention is limited to creating opportunities to have the number of children desired by couples and individuals.

Among the few studies on the possibilities and limits of pronatal policies, we should mention Anne Gauthier (1996), Künzler (2002), McDonald (2002) and Demeny (1987, 2003). They are theoretical in nature insofar as they do not rely on survey data as to the expectations of (potential) parents. Such survey data have become outdated, given that they date from the early 1990s (Kamaras et al. 1998). They indicate a rather limited effect of pronatal policies on having a child. Monetary benefits seemed to have a greater impact on the timing of a (desired) child than additional childcare arrangements. The more recent (theoretical) discussion claims that policies helping to combine work and family by offering more childcare facilities are preferred.

1.1.2.2 Studies on Family Forms, Living Arrangements and Related Policy Measures

Studies on family forms and living arrangements as such are the domain of family sociology. They belong to family demography as soon as they deal with family formation (the birth of a first child), family expansion (the birth of further children), the impact of marriage or cohabitation on fertility, family dissolution (divorce or

separation or death of a parent) or the joint analysis of the family life cycle. Here we will limit our overview to studies falling within the purview of family demography.

Studies on family formation and the impact of marriage or cohabitation on fertility have become more numerous both from a theoretical approach (Becker 1981; Bongaarts, Burch and Wachter 1987; Roussel 1989) and in an empirical perspective (Palomba et al. 1998; Klijzing and Corijn 2002; Pinnelli et al. 2001), based on survey data which became available in the 1990s.

While in 1981 Becker develops the economic analysis of family formation, marriage and divorce with microeconomic tools, Roussel writes a sociological analysis of the "uncertain family", inspired by the considerable demographic change that has been observed since the mid-sixties. The demography of the family from a formal perspective with multi-state family life tables, the analysis of several generations and persons of different ages forming a family, the living arrangements of children in different family forms, and the analysis of the family life cycle, are brought together in a manual edited by Bongaarts, Burch and Wachter (1987).

The empirical analysis of the Family and Fertility Survey demonstrates in a comparative perspective the greater importance attaching to marriage for fertility than in couples cohabiting. The emergence of "new" living arrangements, of living as a single person or as an unmarried couple, is accompanied in most countries by lower fertility. Being married is no longer the unchallenged living arrangement among adults, although it remains the dominant family form in most countries. Divorce and separation are also on the increase, and are boosting the number of monoparental families, mostly of mothers. While living as an unmarried parent is frequently a transitory phase in life, it often jeopardises the opportunity and preferred environment to achieve desired fertility.

Studies on family forms, living arrangements and related policy measures rarely deal with the impact of divorce laws on the family, but usually on family formation. In that respect, we refer to the studies on the efficacy of pronatal policies already mentioned above.

1.1.2.3 Studies on Gender Relations, Demographic Change and Related Policy Measures

Studies on gender relations, their impact on family formation/fertility and marriage/motherhood remained in the feminist domain until the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994. The ICPD Programme of Action stresses the importance of the empowerment of women for development and well-being. Since then, empowerment of women through education and full participation in the labour force, in intra-family decision-making, as well as in all public domains (gender mainstreaming), has ranked very high on the political agenda. It goes without saying that empowerment of women is a political goal in itself. At no point is the implicit goal of reducing family size/fertility mentioned. However, women are also to be empowered to decide on the number of their children with the contraceptive method of their choice – which as a rule means rational planning of the number of births, and hence a reduction. The ICPD

naturally refers to worldwide situations, but its focus and concerns relate more to the less-developed countries.

When it comes to industrialised countries, including Europe, gender relations and fertility and partnership have been analysed by Blossfeld (1995), Mason and Jensen (1995), McDonald (2000), Neyer (2003) and Avramov and Cliquet (2005). There is a desire for equal partnership relationships, the sharing of household chores and of childcare. Policies aimed at enhancing gender mainstreaming and all policies aimed at helping people to reconcile work and family rank high on the political agenda. Empirical evidence of what women really want is scarce, and internationally-comparable surveys virtually non-existent.

1.1.2.4 Studies on Demographic Ageing, Intergenerational Solidarity and Related Policy Measures

Studies are available on demographic ageing and its macroeconomic consequences on the pension system, on health expenditure, health insurance and health care, and on the labour market (Kinsella and Velkoff 2001; OECD 2000; United Nations 1992). The need to reform these systems is widely acknowledged and figures high on the political agenda of many European countries (see also Avramov and Cliquet (2005)).

Much less is known about the attitudes and expectations of the citizens concerned, about their view of the elderly of today, of how they would like to live when they themselves are old, when they would like to retire, what they expect of the State, and what demands they make of their children.

The role of the three- or even four-generation family and its members is not well documented and understood. Official family statistics are based on the household co-residence principle. Although there are not many three- or four-generation households statistically, family members do in fact interact in a very efficient way. Many family members do not live far away from each other, and they support each other on a daily or regular basis. Grandparents look after their grandchildren when the parents are working. Others make generous financial gifts. Emotional support between generations is customary. Long-term care apparently functions well within the extended family. Knowledge on an empirical base is, however, only coincidental and scattered. There is insufficient awareness and appreciation of, and support for, the existence of intergenerational family solidarity, which is nonetheless an important pillar of society.

1.1.3 Conclusions for Further Research such as the DIALOG Project

Marrying and having a child or children are no longer considered “natural” goals of adult life. There are other options such as education, professional career, leisure and sports. Deciding about the number of children and the date of their birth in a free and

informed manner is a basic human right, and consequently any interference on the part of the state into these private choices is rejected. The state (and the economy) is, however, deemed responsible for providing opportunities for families, in particular for the living children. But also the role and the contribution of the older generation in the family context remains important and is likely to increase in the future.

While theoretical and macro-demographical studies on these aspects are available (for a comprehensive overview of studies carried out for the Council of Europe see Höhn 2005), survey data on attitudes, opinions and expectations towards the state and appropriate and desired measures were not available in a comprehensive, timely and comparative fashion. Here, the DIALOG Project is intended to fill major deficits in providing information to policy-makers, academia and the families and individuals concerned. The challenges and tasks are as follows:

- Analyse the current population policy context and impact of changes in demographic behaviour on future policy options regarding the management of change in family formation patterns and demographic ageing;
- Harmonise data and establish an international database on population policy acceptance;
- Analyse results from the Population Policy Acceptance Surveys regarding practices, attitudes and expectations of individual citizens;
- Carry out and analyse results from a Delphi survey in view of evaluating the congruence of policy options brought to the fore by the key policy actors and viewpoints of individual citizens;
- Study fertility intentions and their relation to other life choices of men and women and to policy measures;
- Examine the conflict area of "reconciling work and family" in its diverse dimensions and evaluate the policy measures that were taken to assist families, particularly those implemented in reaction to the partial incompatibility between paid work and family in view of their effectiveness and their gender-specific objectives;
- Study the acceptance of existing and proposed family-related measures in the national context and in a comparative perspective;
- Study the culture-specific significance attached to family relations, children, parenthood and intergenerational solidarity among populations of several European countries;
- Study families' capacity for caring with regard to the elderly in terms of the perception of needs, identification of the gender perspective and resource persons for care, preferred living arrangements of the elderly and expectations towards public policies in view of one's own ageing;
- Compare the survey results with some basic data of the surveys which were carried out the early 1990s in some countries participating in this project;
- Propose standards of population-related policy in the field of support provided to families in a life-cycle perspective regarding family formation, partnership relations and care for children and the elderly, and expectations about one's own old age.

At the policy level, a systematic comparative analysis of the acceptance of existing population policy measures and expectations regarding the future is expected to provide an informed basis for the development of integrated population policies through citizens' active participation in shaping their own family-related choices in a more family-friendly environment. Dialog between policy actors, citizens' associations and individuals is expected to promote democratic decision-making processes regarding population policy formation, and to improve governance.

Scientific results are expected to bring about a broadening of theoretical knowledge regarding the impact of population policies on individual behaviour and interaction between attitudes, expectations and behaviour. The results relate both to empirical concerns and to impetus for the verification and construction of theories concerning the relationship between fertility behaviour, intrafamily transfers of resources and care, gender equity and public policies.

1.2 Aims and Structure of the Dialog Project

1.2.1 The DIALOG Project

This DIALOG Project, full title "POPULATION POLICY ACCEPTANCE STUDY – The Viewpoint of Citizens and Policy Actors Regarding the Management of Population-related Change" aims to contribute both scientifically and by advising policy-makers in understanding and addressing low fertility (in the context of changing family forms and living arrangements, stability of couples, and gender relations), as well as aspects of demographic ageing (in the context of intergenerational transfers, living as an elderly citizen, and expectations for old age) in their interaction with population-relevant policies, that is policies with a potential to interact with having children, family life, partnerships, relations with elderly family members and with policies.

Citizens' viewpoints are captured by Population Policy Acceptance Surveys. The viewpoint of policy actors is collected through a Delphi Study. Both citizens and policy actors are invited to give their opinions on the management of population-related change. In the Delphi Study, policy actors were confronted not only with demographic facts in their respective countries and with desirable political measures, but also with the results of the survey on citizens' expectations.

The dialogue involved not only citizens and policy actors in this explorative stage, but there was also a dialog between demographers and researchers from institutes in 14 European countries. The questionnaire for the Population Policy Acceptance Surveys had been jointly developed and agreed upon. The data were collected with a sample design which was also comparable and carried out at the expense of the participating countries. Under the DIALOG Project, a common database (IPPAS) was developed, and, with these data, researchers in different countries joined together to analyse and compare data and to discuss their findings by phone, e-mail

and during consortium meetings. Finally, all the findings were widely disseminated through conferences organised with policy actors, civil society players and the scientific community and published in articles and monographs. Among the conferences, we would like to mention the IUSSP General Conference 2005 in Tours (Studia Demograficzne 2006) and the Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart sponsored by the Robert Bosch Foundation in November 2005 (BiB; Robert Bosch Foundation 2005). This monograph is the major scientific outcome of the DIALOG Project.

1.2.2 Objectives of the Population Policy Acceptance Surveys

The overarching objective of the national Population Policy Acceptance Surveys was to collect data on practices, attitudes and opinions concerning demographic change, fertility behaviour, intergenerational exchange of resources and services, and population-related policies. The surveys aim to capture values and attitudes affecting fertility decisions, perception of the advantages and disadvantages of having children, the meaning of family and parenthood, preferences and aspirations regarding gender roles, work and family, aspirations in life, opinions and attitudes towards the elderly and demographic ageing, the role of government in providing support to families and the elderly.

1.2.3 Work Plan

The study was set up as a three-year research project consisting of nine work packages.

Work package 1 is the project management and co-ordination work package.

Work package 9 deals with the exploitation and dissemination of pertinent results from work packages 2 to 8. Work package 1 and 9 together are run by the co-ordinating institute, the Federal Institute for Population Research in Wiesbaden, Germany.

The study was developed as a strategic policy analysis at three levels:

- Firstly, at the macro level to identify the relevant population policy measures and types and extent of needs that they currently meet;
- Secondly, at the level of formulating policies to identify measures to be implemented in future with a view to addressing problems associated with demographic change;
- Thirdly, at the level of users to better understand the viewpoint, needs and expectations of individual citizens regarding current and future policy measures.

The levels of analysis are interwoven in the scientific procedure, but for operational purposes they are identifiable in specific work packages, namely:

- Work package 4 (General Population-related Policies and Attitudes) largely addresses the first level of analysis. It collected demographic and socio-economic

data and information on the content of population-related policies for each country. The contextual analysis set the stage for the comparative analysis of the interaction between population-related policies and demographic processes. It is a tool for partners to identify between country similarities and differences and general trends at the European level with a view to revealing the relationship between the demographic setting, cultural norms and individual values and expectations towards the state.

- Work package 3 (Delphi Study) largely addresses the second level of analysis by organising the national and European Delphi rounds.
- Work package 2 (International Database), and the Work Packages responsible for thematic comparative analysis of PPAS, namely WP 5 (Gender Issues), WP 6 (Work and Parenthood), WP 7 (Child-friendly Policies) and WP 8 (Intergenerational Solidarity and the Elderly) largely address the third level of analysis. The harmonisation of the national PPAS in an international database obviously precedes the comparative analysis of data. Synthesis Reports prepared by the WP leaders provided descriptive overviews, and are published as Working Papers.

All partners were actively involved in Work Packages 2–8, in particular to provide contributions to these two volumes.

1.2.4 Partnership

The composition of participating countries was not coincidental, but followed the existence of national demographic research institutes. Partnership was composed of institutes that either have the mandate or the experience of advising policy-makers in their countries, or international organisations, on population-related matters. In some countries, no partner institute could be persuaded to join. A number of countries does not have such a demographic infrastructure. One condition for joining the DIALOG consortium was to take on a Population Policy Acceptance Survey with funding not covered by EU project finance.

The following list of partners reflects not only the broad geographic coverage of European countries, but also identifies the main responsibilities as partners (in particular the content of the work package (WP) for which the partner is responsible) and the existence of a national Population Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS) carried out by that partner.

Partner 1: Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB), Wiesbaden, Germany

Management and Coordination (WP 1)
Exploitation and Dissemination (WP 9)
PPAS Germany

Partner 2: Population and Social Policy Consultants (PSPC), Brussels, Belgium

International Database (WP 2)

Partner 3: Consiglio Nationale delle Ricerche – Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione e le Politiche Sociali (CNR/IRPPS), Rome, Italy

Delphi Study (WP 3)
PPAS Italy

Partner 4: Vaeestoeliitto ry – Population Research Institute (PRI), Helsinki, Finland

General Population-related Policies and Attitudes (WP 4)
PPAS Finland

Partner 5: Austrian Academy of Sciences – Vienna Institute of Demography (OEAW), Vienna, Austria

Gender Issues (WP 5)
PPAS Austria

Partner 6: Warsaw School of Economics – Institute of Statistics and Demography (ISD), Warsaw, Poland

Work and Parenthood (WP 6)
PPAS Poland

Partner 7: Stichting Nederlands Interdisciplinair Demografisch Instituut (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute) (NIDI), The Hague, Netherlands

Child-friendly Policies (WP 7)
PPAS Netherlands

Partner 8: Centrum voor Bevolkings – en Gezinsstudie (CBGS), Brussels, Belgium

Intergenerational Solidarity and the Elderly (WP 8)
PPAS Belgium

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PPA Surveys are hence available for 14 European countries:

Germany, Italy, Finland, Austria, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania and Cyprus.

1.3 The Structure of this Publication

This publication is the final scientific outcome of the DIALOG Project. In two volumes, it comprises the contributions made by all the researchers engaged in the project.

Volume I continues with the methodological Chapter 2 by Dragana Avramov and Robert Cliquet, who set up the international database based on the national Population Policy Acceptance Surveys of the participating countries, and provided

an infrastructure to improve methodologies for comparative research in view of data harmonisation, and with Chapter 3, drafted by Marc Callens, on multilevel methods for comparative analyses.

Possible typologies of welfare and population-related policies are proposed by Beat Fux. In this theoretical Chapter 4, Beat Fux endeavours to find suitable typologies in particular for the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Analysis of the micro-level data from the European comparative PPA Study of attitudes, experiences, preferences and evaluation of policies follows in part II concerning the broad area of family matters.

Facts and opinions on marriage and cohabitation are discussed by Marietta Pongracz and Zsolt Speder (Chapter 5). Ausra Maslauskaite and Vlada Stankuniene assess changes in family transformation in the post-communist countries (Chapter 6). This is one of the few chapters where not all the countries for which data had been collected are dealt with. Given the considerable, largely under-researched differences in demographic behaviour and trends in Central and Eastern Europe as compared to Western Europe, such analysis is welcome.

The value of children is looked at in three contributions, namely by Ingrid Esveldt and Tineke Fokkema (Chapter 7), Irena Kowalska and Wiktoria Wróblewska, who compare value of children with desired fertility and fertility behaviour (Chapter 8) and Tomas Sobotka and Maria Rita Testa (Chapter 9), who concentrate on analysing attitudes and intentions to remain childless, conduct that is so far somewhat less common in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.

Desired fertility is the general subject of part IV. Christine van Peer and Ladislav Rabušic (Chapter 10) analyse desired and achieved fertility with a view to estimating completed fertility. Kalev Katus, Asta Pöldma and Allan Puur (Chapter 11) contrast fertility preferences with expectations about old age, thereby not only combining two modules of the PPAS, but also looking into the question of whether people are aware of the value of children for their own life course once they have become old. The role of family policies and of education on intentions to have a first child is examined by Osmo Kontula (Chapter 12).

The reconciliation of work and family life as it relates to the combination between employment, housework and child care is studied in part V. Majda ƒernič Istenič and Andrej Kveder (Chapter 13) analyse preferences to reconcile family and professional life versus the actual arrangement. The reconciliation of work and family life under different institutional settings and partnership models is studied by Irena Kotowska and Anna Matysiak (Chapter 14). The role of orientations towards work and family life, in particular women's involvement in the labour market, are the theme of analysis of Kalev Katus, Asta Poldma and Allan Puur (Chapter 15).

Part VI, as the final part of family matters, is devoted to the analysis of family policies as they relate to reproductive preferences. Anneli Miettinen, Ingrid Esveldt and Tineke Fokkema (Chapter 16) raise and analyse the question of whether financial or institutional measures are more strongly preferred. In a subsequent contribution, Ingrid Esveldt, Tineke Fokkema and Anneli Miettinen (Chapter 17) study the impact of family policies on fertility behaviour and focus on the childless and on one-child parents as the two groups most susceptible to family policies. Nada

Stropnik, Jože Sambt and Jiřina Kocourková (Chapter 18) analyse two selected family policy measures, namely parental leave and child allowances, in the interrelations of preferences and availability of these measures.

Volume II starts with a chapter on demographic trends, population-related policies and general attitudes. Osmo Kontula and Ismo Söderling (Chapter 1) study demographic change and family policy regimes, proposing a typology for the DIALOG countries. Demographic trends and citizens' knowledge of demographic trends and facts is analysed by Jürgen Dorbritz (Chapter 2). Ralf Mai, Robert Naderi and Peter Schimany (Chapter 3) provide a cross-national analysis of expectations placed on public welfare and their influence on attitudes towards the care for elderly.

Chapter 4 deals with a comparison of the current PPA survey results for those countries which had asked the same questions in the PPA survey taken at the beginning of the 1990s. Jürgen Dorbritz studies the question of whether attitudes on population and family policies have changed.

Part II is devoted to the Delphi Study. Rossella Palomba and Piero Dell' Angelo (Chapter 5) present the method and the main results from the policy Delphi study which they organised. On the basis of the results, namely the expectations and propositions of the policy actors interviewed, they wonder whether Europe's demography will be different in 2030. Alfred Bertschinger (Chapter 6) combines results from the Delphi study with pertinent contextual factors and PPAS results. Also Adele Menniti and Maura Misiti (Chapter 7) compare the views of Delphi experts and citizens' views of the role of female employment.

Part III on gender roles in the context of the PPAS starts with an analysis of the gender dimension of the family by Dimiter Philipov (Chapter 8). The issue of gender and fertility is studied by Kerstin Ruckdeschel (Chapter 9) on the basis of attitudes towards gender roles and fertility behaviour.

Part IV focuses on demographic ageing, intergenerational solidarity and the elderly. Ronald Schoenmaeckers, Marc Callens, Lieve Vanderleyden and Lucie Vidovi¢ová (Chapter 10) study attitudes towards demographic ageing and the elderly. The role of ageing-related policies versus citizens' opinions and expectations concerning activation of both older workers and elderly people who have already retired is analysed by Janina Jozwiak, Irena Kotowska and Anita Abramowska (Chapter 11). Preferences and expectations as to age at retirement are studied by Lucie Vidovi¢ová, Beatrice Manea and Ladislav Rabušic (Chapter 12).

In Chapter 13, Dragana Avramov and Robert Cliquet analyse the social policy of the European Union, as well as policy preferences voiced in the PPAS. They point to needs for social policy adaptations and reform in order to set the stage for population-friendly policies.

Chapter 14 wraps up the two volumes by providing policy implications and conclusions.

Each volume offers a list of references per volume. In Volume II the International Population Acceptance Study database (IPPAS), including the PPA Standard Questionnaire on CD ROM is given in annex.

Part I
Theoretical Background, Methods and Opportunities for Analyses of the International Population Policy Acceptance Study Database (IPPAS)

Chapter 2
From Population Policy Acceptance Surveys to the International Database

Dragana Avramov and Robert Cliquet

Abstract The Population Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS) is designed as a research instrument and tool for informed policy deliberations. The national fieldwork was undertaken between 2000 and 2003 in 14 European countries: Belgium (Flanders), the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Finland. The collated international database (IPPAS) is a large and rich statistical data file containing individual data items on more than 35,000 women and men. IPPAS encompasses information practices, attitudes and opinions of Europeans concerning demographic changes, fertility behaviour, intergenerational exchange of resources and services, and population-related policies. It contains information on values and attitudes affecting fertility decisions, the perception of advantages and disadvantages of having children, the significance of family and parenthood, aspirations in life, opinions and attitudes towards population policy issues and measures, the role of government in providing support to families and preferences and aspirations regarding gender roles, paid labour and family life, and care in old age.

In this chapter we first discuss the planning of the survey, themes addressed, questionnaire and sample design and data processing. Then we highlight opportunities that IPPAS provides for the analysis. Finally we address the lessons learnt regarding international database construction.

Keywords: Population policy survey · Methods · Sample · Questionnaire · Codebook · Database · Survey analysis

2.1 Introduction

The Population Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS) is designed as a research instrument and tool for informed policy deliberations. The national fieldwork was undertaken between 2000 and 2003 in 14 European countries: Belgium (Flanders),

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the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Finland. The collated international database (IPPAS) is a large and rich statistical data file containing individual data items on more than 35,000 women and men. Questions addressed cover a broad array of attitudes, preferences and expectations of citizens towards family and public policies (DIALOG 2002; Höhn et al. 2006).

2.2 Planning of the Survey

Welfare states and more specifically social protection systems in Europe are undergoing far-reaching reforms. They entail the redrawing of boundaries between state, markets, family, civil society and individual citizens. Two societal processes – family building and ageing – are both major domains of public policy and key areas of population studies. Knowledge of the interaction between changes in population and family structures and processes and welfare reforms is an important tool for the management of societal change.

General features of population development at the turn of the 21st century, which are associated with declining fertility and increasing longevity, and the resulting population ageing, have been extensively documented by the research community. Today, the policy actors generally acknowledge that the outcomes of population change that occurs in the domain of partnership, fertility, mortality and ageing have profound implications for social protection, welfare policies and the well-being of citizens. Whereas it is generally accepted both in research and in policy circles that public policies should and can impact on demography in areas of morbidity and mortality, and migration levels and trends, there is less consensus about the power of family-oriented policies (Avramov 2002; Avramov and Cliquet 2003, 2005).

The needs for family-related policies are today argued mostly in terms of a prevailing mismatch between the desires of individuals and obstacles to the realization of expectations that are presented in the course of their life. Namely, the wish for children remains persistently higher than realised fertility in many European countries. The need for population policy adaptation is argued in terms of the economy and the long-term sustainability of pension systems. In spite of the increase in life expectancy and disability-free years for the younger, we still observe in many countries a persistently high incidence of early retirement (Avramov and Maskova 2003).

It is generally known that the combined effects of increasing longevity, gender-related differences in life expectancy, low fertility, the increasing proportions of divorced people and the increasing wish or custom among the aged to remain in their own household, result in increasing numbers and proportions of single elderly people, and more particularly of single elderly women. The need for public support and care is generally recognized. However, the balance between public and private solidarity remains a twilight zone. Knowledge about practices and expectations

regarding family support, both between co-residing and non co-residing kin, has largely remained fragmented and limited to specific support functions.

Overall citizens' attitudes regarding the existing framework conditions that impact their family life and working conditions, policy measures and expectation towards public policies have remained under-researched. In a time of intense policy debates about needs for reform of social protection and adaptation of welfare transfer payments at the turn of the 21st century, there was little, if any, scientifically sound information available about the viewpoints of individual citizens.

National Population Policy Acceptance Surveys (PPAS) were developed to address directly the practices and preferences with respect to private strategies and public policies that underpin family formation, partner relations and care provisions for children and the elderly. The database was to form a solid foundation to establish a virtual dialogue between citizens and policy actors in the policy formation process. Its architecture was developed to contribute to policy formulation and the development of measures that are acceptable and desired by the population and feasible under the current socio-economic framework conditions.

The underpinning rationale for the PPAS is that in democracies public policies can achieve socially desired aims if they are acceptable and taken up by a broad population base. Whereas population-related policies need to be acceptable, in order to be effective and efficient they also need to contribute to realigning of expectations of citizens in view of the expected demographic future.

Population Policy Acceptance Study (DIALOG) is a multi-method research project. The large population survey as its principal instrument was planned to enable integrating the viewpoints of individual citizens in public policy formulation. The rationale is to involve European citizens more actively in identifying options for the management of demographic change. The database facilitates an evaluation of how well existing public policies that address family building, partner relations and care of children and elderly people are accepted by individual citizens, and which societal aims they actually achieve.

The data collated in IPPAS encompass information on practices, attitudes and opinions concerning demographic changes, fertility behaviour, intergenerational exchange of resources and services, and population-related policies. They contain information on the values and attitudes affecting fertility decisions, perception of the advantages and disadvantages of having children, the significance of family and parenthood, aspirations in life, opinions and attitudes towards population policy issues and measures, the role of government in providing support to families and preferences and aspirations regarding gender roles, paid labour and family life, and care in old age.

2.3 The Themes Addressed in PPAS

The main domains covered by the survey can be grouped into six broad themes: (1) general population trends and population-related policies; (2) family forms

and gender relations; (3) fertility, children and parenthood; (4) work and family life; (5) ageing and intergenerational relations; and (6) needs for changing population- and family-related policies.

2.3.1 General Population Trends and Population-related Policies

PPAS recorded information on the knowledge of current population trends in as far as they are perceived either as a threat for social cohesion or experienced as an opportunity for change. It further measured attitudes among citizens towards population trends, and population- and welfare-related policies.

The general part of the Population Policy Acceptance Survey deals in particular with attitudes and preferences concerning the government's role in major social challenges, namely care for the elderly, child care, health care, housing, labour force participation, female emancipation and the reconciliation of work and family life. The prospective dimension addresses attitudes and preferences towards current and future demographic developments: population size, population dejuvenation and greying.

2.3.2 Family Forms and Gender Relations

The objective to address the theme "family" within the conflicting area of "private" and "public/economy" is intended to contrast the life parameters of the individual with the general tendency for the transformation of lifestyles. Data are collated on the practices, attitudes and expectations of individual citizens as they relate to family relations, children, parenthood and intergenerational solidarity.

Particular attention is given to gender relations within the family. The main issues dealt with are: general attitudes and preferences concerning gender roles in partnership, parenthood and occupation; attitudes, experiences, preferences and evaluation in specific domains such as employment, housework, child care, financial management, and decision making in the household; and opinions about government policies with respect to gender-related rights.

2.3.3 Fertility, Children, Parenthood

IPPAS includes information on the attitudes, practices and expectations with respect to a number of issues that belong to the broad domain of reproductive behaviour. They cover among others:

- attitudes, experiences and preferences about having children and family size;
- attitudes, experiences and preferences about the significance of parenthood and parenting;

- attitudes, experiences and preferences about child care and combining work and parenthood;
- opinions about government policies supporting parenthood and child care, more particularly with respect to preferences for support in child care, use and availability of child care facilities, child allowances and parental leave.

The data from the international PPAS on individual attitudes, experiences and preferences with respect to children can be related to the evaluation of the policy measures that were taken to assist families in having and raising children. The acceptance of these measures and their effects on fertility decisions offer significant value added for research.

2.3.4 Work and Family Life

In view of the partial incompatibility between work and family life, as one of the major causes of very low fertility in modern society and a source of distress which impacts people's quality of life, this theme is one of the major focal points of the IPPAS.

The conflict area of "compatibility of paid labour and family" addresses diverse dimensions:

- attitudes, experiences, preferences and evaluation of the combination between work and parenthood;
- attitudes, experiences, preferences and evaluation in specific domains: employment, housework, child care, and care of elderly;
- opinions about government policies with respect to facilitating the combination of work and parenthood.

Family needs and expectations are set in the context of the changing structure of the labour market. This allows for the analysis of the conflicting area of "compatibility of paid labour and family" in its varied aspects. For this purpose the actual conditions in which women seek to combine family work with gainful employment are ascertained. Particular attention is paid to the participation of fathers in child care and domestic work. The actual behaviour of the respondents in relation to family work is contrasted with the answer pattern on the normative level. Gaps, deficits and contradictions between normal day-to-day life and the general perception of values can be identified.

A further point of emphasis relates to the evaluation of the policy measures that were taken to assist families, particularly those implemented in reaction to the partial incompatibility between paid work and family, in view of their effectiveness and their gender-specific objective. Attention is given to the identification of a tendency towards acceptance/rejection of the concept of paternal leave, in view of the favour for increasing participation by fathers in child-rearing by the younger generation of both sexes.

2.3.5 Ageing and Intergenerational Relations

Population ageing comprises two phenomena: population dejuvenation due to low fertility, a topic addressed largely under the IPPAS sections on family, gender, childbearing, childrearing and work; and population greying due to gains in longevity.

With respect to population greying, IPPAS recorded information on practices, attitudes and expectations of individual citizens with respect to

- population ageing, and in particular population greying;
- attitudes towards the elderly, assistance to older persons, living arrangements as old dependent person;
- policies with respect to age at retirement, (labour) activities of the elderly and old-age benefits.

Special attention is given to data for the study of the caring capacity of families regarding elderly people in terms of the perception of needs, identification of the gender perspective and resource persons for care, preferences about living arrangements of elderly people and expectations towards public policies in view of one's own ageing.

The data of the international PPAS on individual attitudes, experiences and preferences with respect to intergenerational solidarity, the elderly and ageing can be related to the evaluation of the policy measures concerning those issues.

2.3.6 Population- and Family-related Policies

Population-related policy is the central focus of the PPAS. Consequently, for each of the substantive population and family issues dealt with in the study, the acceptance of existing and proposed family- and population-related measures can be analysed in the national context and using a comparative perspective. In particular, the impact of changes in demographic behaviour on future policy options regarding the management of change in family building patterns and population ageing can be investigated. Further, the results evaluating the congruence of policy options brought to the fore by the key policy actors and viewpoints of individual citizens can be confronted.

The international database, together with the contextual data and the Delphi policy deliberation both collated under the Population Policy Acceptance Study enable standard-setting for policy support to families in a life cycle perspective regarding family formation, partner relations and care for children and elderly people, and expectations towards one's own old age.

2.3.7 *Intra- and Inter-country Differentials in Attitudes, Expectations and Preferences Regarding Population and Family Issues and Related Policies*

A major asset of the IPPAS is the possibility for an international comparative analysis of the data recorded in the 14 participating countries. European populations exhibit important variations in their attitudes, preferences and practices in family life, and in their attitudes and expectations regarding population dynamics and related policies. An international comparative study contributes substantially to the explanation and understanding of differential behaviour and expectations towards the state and family and informal networks.

The possibility to study East–West differentials at this juncture in European history characterised by the remarkable overall societal transition in the East, and the socio-economic transformations resulting from globalisation all over Europe, is scientifically interesting and socially pertinent. IPPAS also allows the identification of common characteristics in the development of attitudes and expectations regarding population and family development and related policies in an enlarging and unifying Europe.

A second important domain in the study of differentials in attitudes and preferences regarding family and population issues and related policies concerns the variation within countries. All of the major themes studied in PPAS can be analysed via the database according to the socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents: age and sex, household and family characteristics, education, activity and income, religion, urbanisation of residence, values in life.

Finally, the various subjects that form the central focus of PPAS can be mutually interrelated. This is significant since gender relations, family forms, parenthood and child care, work and family life, and intergenerational relations, are known to be mutually interrelated, often in very subtle or complex ways. The availability of information on these issues in a single database offers the opportunity to shed light on some of these interactions.

2.4 The Survey Questionnaire[1]

The PPAS standard questionnaire includes mainly closed questions which were easy to code numerically. There were only in a few opportunities to add one or more additional answers which were numerically coded afterwards.

The questionnaire consists of a general part (core questionnaire) and five modules on specific issues: gender roles, values in life, caring, ageing, and child care. Both

[1] The standard PPAS questionnaire in English is provided on a CD-ROM together with the database and the codebook annexed to the second volume.

the core questionnaire and the modules include a few optional questions, in addition to the main body of questions, which are part of the standard questionnaire.

The PPAS questionnaire was originally drafted in English. It was translated into the national languages of the participating countries, and translated back into English by independent translators not involved in the translation of the IPPAS questionnaire into the national language. The aim was to assess the degree of comparability of the questions in view of the international comparative study. No major translation-related difficulties were found. Wherever differences in question formulation occurred, they resulted from differences in the interpretation of concepts and notions. These differences are identified in the codebook and must be allowed for in the analysis.

2.4.1 The Core Questionnaire

The core questionnaire consists of four major sections which address the following issues:

- attitudes towards general social policies and demographic developments: the government's responsibilities, knowledge and preferences about demographic trends;
- attitudes towards household and family structures and developments: attitudes towards lifestyles, marriage and children;
- attitudes towards having children and policy measures supporting parenthood: desired and expected family size, attitudes towards measures facilitating parenthood, views about child allowances, experiences and views on parental leave;
- respondents' socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics: sex, age, education, household composition, number of children, religious affiliation, income, employment and homework; satisfaction with several aspects of present living conditions. Some of these items were also asked for the respondent's partner.

2.4.2 "Gender Roles" Module

The "gender roles" module deals with:

- attitudes towards men's and women's work and household tasks;
- attitudes towards financial responsibilities within the couple and decision-making in the household;
- views on gender role division regarding parenthood and child care;
- views on governmental policies concerning gender-related rights.

2.4.3 "Values in Life" Module

The "values in life" module includes:

- attitudes towards values in life with respect to different aspects of daily life (time use, partnership harmony, social appreciation, income, holidays, housing, self-fulfilment, job satisfaction);
- the reconciliation of those aspects of life with family size.

2.4.4 "Caring in Family Life" Module

The "caring in family life" module includes the following:

- support in case of need for help or care in domains such as finance, disease, old age;
- preferred combination of type of job and family size.

2.4.5 "Ageing" Module

The "ageing" module deals with:

- evaluation of population ageing;
- views on/perceptions of the elderly;
- views about support for elderly people in need of care or help;
- relations with and assistance for older persons;
- preferred living arrangements in old age;
- expected and preferred age at retirement;
- attitudes on types of deprivation after retirement;
- views on (labour) activities and work organisation in old age;
- preferences about retirement policies;
- views on transition from work to retirement;
- preferred governmental policies towards pensions and old age benefits.

2.4.6 "Child Care" Module

The "child care" module includes:

- preferred support in child care;
- experience with child care arrangements;
- opinion of child care facilities;
- views on the place of children in society.

2.5 PPAS Samples

2.5.1 Sample Design

The minimum sample size was set at 1,500 per country. Both men and women were interviewed, and the age range covered as a minimum people 20–60 years old.

The sampling frame was usually based on population registers and the sampling structure was in most cases multistage. Most countries used one or more stratification criterion in composing their sample. In nine countries, the sampling units were persons, and in four countries respondents were selected out of a household sample. Most countries applied internal weighting in order to make their sample representative of one or more of the socio-demographic control variables they applied. Only two countries substituted interviewees who could not be contacted or refused to be interviewed (for details see CD-ROM annexed to this book).

2.5.2 Realised Samples

The recommended sample design was generally implemented. However, due to the combination of financial, organisational and motivational reasons there are some deviations.

An overview of the number of interviews realised per country is given in Table 2.1. In total, the IPPAS database includes information on 35,377 respondents, 16,470 males and 18,877 females.

All samples are nationally representative. The age range covers or even exceeds the minimum recommended range of 20–60, with the exception of two countries (Cyprus and Italy) where the upper age limit was set at 50. In most countries the sample size considerably exceeded the recommended size of 1,500 respondents. Only in three countries (Czech Republic, Cyprus and Lithuania) it was smaller than the recommended size.

The non-contact rate – i.e. the percent proportion of non-contacts on the total number of visited addresses – lies in most countries below 20 or even 10%. The refusal rate – the percent proportion of respondents refusing to participate as against the total number of persons contacted – is below 30% in most cases. With two exceptions, the overall response rate is higher than 60% (see again Table 2.1).

2.6 Fieldwork

The surveys were undertaken between 2000 and 2003. The fieldwork lasted less than three months in most countries.

In two-thirds of the participating countries, the surveys were implemented as a face-to-face interview, in four countries (Belgium (Flanders), Estonia, Poland and Finland) they were carried out by means of a mail or self-completion survey, in

Table 2.1 Realised samples (unweighted data)

Country	Number of respondents							
	Male	Female	Total	Number of non-contacts	Number of refusals	% non-contact rate (5) × 100/(4 + 5 + 6)	% refusal rate (6) × 100/(4 + 6)	% overall response rate (4) × 100/(4 + 5 + 6)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Belgium-Fl[a]	1,899	2,058	3,957[b]	1,693[c]	41	30	1	70
Czech R.	423	671	1,094	181	338	11	24	68
Germany[a]	2,030[b]	2,080[c]	4,110[d]	624[f]	1,833[e]	10	31	63
Estonia	979	1,002	1,681	430	181	19	10	73
Italy	1,764	1,736	3,500	1,229	1,876	19	35	53
Cyprus[a]	541	597	1,138	108	221	7	16	78
Lithuania	613	787	1,400	1,014	550	34	28	47
Hungary	1,381	1,676	3,057	817	1,126	16	27	61
Netherlands	1,072	917	1,989-1,755[a]	584–818[b]		–[b]	–[b]	(68–77)[c]
Austria	826	1,169	1,995	52	276	2	12	86
Poland	2,101	2,403	4,504	889[a]	375[a]	15[a]	8[a]	78[a]
Romania	754	802	1,556	–	279	–	15	–

Table 2.1 (continued)

Country	Number of respondents							
	Male	Female	Total	Number of non-contacts	Number of refusals	% non-contact rate (5) × 100/(4 + 5 + 6)	% refusal rate (6) × 100/(4 + 6)	% overall response rate (4) × 100/(4 + 5 + 6)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Slovenia	770	780	1,550	23	631	1	29	70
Finland	1,617	2,199	3,816	–	–	–	–	56[a]

Belgium (Flanders): [a] data are limited to the Flemish region;
[b] complete questionnaires;
[c] includes: incomplete questionnaires, wrong person interviewed, non-response because of health.

Cyprus: [a] data are limited to the territory of the EU Member State.

Germany: [a] 2,000 Western Germany, 2,000 Eastern Germany;
[b] 1,016 Western Germany, 1,014 Eastern Germany;
[c] 1,042 Western Germany, 1,038 Eastern Germany;
[d] 2,058 Western Germany, 2,052 Eastern Germany;
[e] 781 households and 1102 individuals;
[f] 512 households and 112 individuals; 148 drop-outs for other reasons must be added (total number of drop outs: 2,655).

Netherlands: [a] The Internet-based survey was undertaken in two parts: 1,989 persons responded to the first questionnaire, 1,755 responded to the second one.
[b] No distinction can be made between non-contacts and refusals.
[c] The overall response rate of those selected for the PPA survey lies between 1755 × 100/ 2573 = 68.2 (second questionnaire) and 1989 × 100/2573 = 77.3 (first questionnaire). These figures underestimate the real response rate, since the selected sample was already subject to pre-selection by the agency that organised the survey. The Dutch response rates are not comparable to the response rates of the other countries.

Poland: [a] The sample included 3,810 households. Due to non-contacts 889 households were dropped. 408 selected for inclusion in the sample did not include members aged 18–64 years. For 375 households no member was interviewed due to refusal. 4,497 persons were interviewed in 2,138 households.

Finland: [a] The response rate was calculated on the basis of the available information (3821) × 100/ (7000 - 71 (mail was returned due to wrong address) - 65 (mail returned because of serious illness, or because of inability to understand Finnish) - 6 (excluded because of the age limit)) = 55.7 %.

Source: Avramov and Cliquet, 2008

one country (the Netherlands) they were performed by means of computer-aided personal interview (sent via the Internet), and in one country (Italy) the investigation was organised as a telephone survey.

In the case of face-to-face interviewing, the fieldwork was usually undertaken by commercial agencies, as was the recruitment and training of the interviewers. The initial contact was made either by letter or directly. The interviews lasted between one and one-and-a-half hours. The number of interviews per interviewer was usually fewer than ten respondents (for details see CD-ROM annexed to the second volume of this book).

2.7 Data Processing and Variables

In the majority of the countries, the completed questionnaires were evaluated by the commercial organisation that organised the fieldwork.

The data processing was performed either by the commercial agency or by the partner institution. The preparation of the national PPA SPSS datafile was done by the partner institutions themselves in the vast majority of the countries.

2.8 The National PPAS Databases

The national questionnaires include two types of variable: the variables from the PPA standard questionnaire and country-specific variables. The latter were included in most country questionnaires as a response to specific national interests or theoretical orientations pursued by the participating institute.

The participating institutes prepared their country databases for their own national analysis. They quality controlled their data and corrected the data wherever necessary. They also checked their data for representativeness. Internal weighting of the data was introduced in a number of countries (for details, see CD-ROM annexed to the second volume).

2.9 The International Database (IPPAS)

Population and Social Policy Consultants (PSPC, Brussels) compiled the International Population Policy Acceptance Survey database (IPPAS) and drafted the preparatory and supporting tools and documents, such as the SPSS datafile and the codebook.

2.9.1 Establishing the IPPAS International Database

In order to compose the international PPAS database (IPPAS) as tool for the international comparative analyses, PSPC first produced the guidelines for the

production of the national databases which would be incorporated into the international database. The guidelines described the format that the international database should have (SPSS file), the general codes to be used, and the basic variables to be included in the database. Further, an empty IPPAS database in SPSS-11 format and corresponding codebook including the basic variables and their values in the standard PPAS questionnaire were compiled for the use of the national partners. The national database in this format was integrated in the international PPAS database. Wherever necessary, PSPC visited the DIALOG partner institutions to discuss conceptual problems related to the inclusion of the national PPAS database in the international PPAS database.

The collection of the national databases, the establishment and distribution of the international PPAS database to the DIALOG partner institutions was made via e-mail or/and CD-ROM.

2.9.2 Quality Control of the Basic Variables and Their Comparability

The quality control of the basic variables in the IPPAS database was preceded by a thorough examination of each of the national questionnaires. Wherever necessary, codes were harmonised to enhance the international comparability of the data. Next, each national database was carefully examined, and adjustments made wherever needed. Finally, the national databases were merged into the IPPAS database and the frequency distributions for all of the basic variables compared by country to identify and correct possible distortions or errors such as inversions of variable value codes.

In order to facilitate the international comparative analysis of the database, a comparative table of the IPPAS variables per country was prepared (see CD-ROM annexed to the second volume). This table allows easy identification of the countries which can be used for comparative analyses of the IPPAS variables.

2.9.3 Weighting Factors

The IPPAS database includes two weighting variables, an internal weight (IWEIGHT) and a pooled weight (PWEIGHT).

The internal weights were provided by the countries that applied weighting of their sample (IWEIGHT). If the national data were not weighted, the respondents' internal weight received the value 1. The IWEIGHT variable is used for analyses per country. A special internal weight (IWEIGHTG) has to be applied when using the re-coded country variables RCCTRY, or RCCTRYE which distinguish between Eastern and Western Germany. The internal weight values for these two regions = 1; the internal weight values for the other countries are identical to the values in variable IWEIGHT.

For use of the IPPAS pooled data, a pooled weighting factor (PWEIGHT) was calculated as follows: PWEIGHT = IWEIGHT $\times$ (population size per country/total

population size for all countries)/(number of respondents per survey/total number of respondents for all country surveys together). In case data are pooled for a selection of PPAS countries, a specific pooled weight has to be calculated, using only the countries selected. Specific pooled weights can easily be calculated, using the variables IWEIGHT, NPOPSIZE, and NSURSIZE available in the IPPAS database.

2.9.4 Contents of the International Database (IPPAS) and Codebook

The IPPAS database comprises 336 basic variables from the PPAS standard questionnaire and some other basic variables, 406 country-specific variables, and 145 re-coded or re-grouped variables.

It was originally intended to include a number of composite variables based on variable sections concerning attitudes on particular issues, but it appeared that too often some of the basic variables for a particular item were missing from one or more of the national databases. The codebook therefore includes only a few suggestions for possible composite variables, but those are not elaborated in the IPPAS database.

The IPPAS codebook closely follows the structure of the IPPAS database. It includes: labels and titles of variables, and codes and code description of variable categories. In addition, it includes comments on their availability per country or parts of the sample and, in particular for the re-coded and regrouped variables, the construction of the variables and their relation to the basic variables.

All variables can have the following general codes: (–6) refused to answer, (–7) don't know, (–8) non-applicable, and (–9) no information. All of these codes are normally classified in the SPSS database as "missing". Some of these codes can be retrieved by deleting them from the "SPSS Variable View" column "Missing", whenever necessary for analysis.

2.9.4.1 Basic Variables

The basic variables from the PPAS standard questionnaire and some other basic variables, a total of 336 variables, are classified in eight groups (see contents of questionnaire above):

- general variables on interview date, internal and pooled weighting variables, survey size, population size corresponding to the age composition of the survey sample, and several other basic demographic variables needed for the analysis of some of the PPAS data;
- core questionnaire variables;
- gender module variables;
- values of life module variables;
- caring module variables;
- ageing module variables;
- child care module variables.

2.9.4.2 Country-specific Variables

This section of the database includes 406 additional variables which were selected from the national databases of some countries and were thought to include interesting additional information on specific PPAS issues. In some cases, country-specific variables are available for several countries and can be used for partial comparison of data. The country-specific variables have been added to the database to illustrate country-specific phenomena or to allow for some more detailed analysis of particular problems for groups of countries.

2.9.4.3 Re-coded and Re-grouped Variables

This section includes 145 re-coded or re-grouped variables PSPC constructed to facilitate cross-country comparative analyses and the use of identical re-coded variables in the different analytical and comparative parts of the DIALOG project.

The re-coded variables consist in essence of two types of variables: corrected basic variables and combinations of basic variables. The latter group consists of a wide variety of variables, ranging from re-coded variables in which the large number of codes has been reduced to a smaller, manageable number (e.g. age groups), and variables constructed on the basis of the combination of different basic variables (e.g. total expected number of children; household composition), variables comparing actual data with PPA estimated data (e.g. percentage difference between the PPA estimated percentage of aged population and the actual one), and computed variables (e.g. equivalised income).

A major difficulty for the comparative study involved dealing with missing data. Considerable differences in coding procedures appeared to have been used for distinguishing or not distinguishing non-response (non-applicable, refusals, don't know, unidentifiable missing information) in the national surveys. Differences in coding procedure were also found when questions had to be skipped. Such inconsistencies were dealt with by creating re-coded variables in which the data were more suitable for the purposes of international comparison.

In the course of the DIALOG project, as the comparative analysis progressed the IPPAS database and codebook have been continuously refined and updated. Several new re-coded or regrouped variables have been added to the database in the course of the analytical work.

2.10 Analysis of IPPAS

2.10.1 Opportunities for Analysis

The research opportunities of the IPPAS database are manifold. The database permits an international comparison of differences and similarities in attitudes and behaviour, analysis of national data from an international comparative perspective, analysis of socio-demographic and socio-economic intra-country differentials in

attitudes and behaviour, analysis of interrelations between a range of variables on the pooled data, study of small social sub-populations on the pooled data.

The international comparison of the PPAS results is obviously vital to the DIALOG approach. European countries and cultures, whilst showing clear trends towards increasing convergence, still exhibit a remarkable variation in attitudes, values and behaviour in population and family policy-relevant or -related issues. Cross-national or cross-cultural comparison, consequently, offers rich opportunities to study important components of the country- or region-related determinants of demographic behaviour and expectations of population- and family-related social policies. One of the salient findings in IPPAS is the simultaneous presence of country differences and similarities in population (policy) related attitudes, preferences and expectations (e.g. Figs. 2.1 and 2.2).

The study of East–West differentials is both scientifically particularly interesting, and socially important.

International comparative studies are equally important for national study purposes. The European picture which appears from the international comparison also allows better understanding of the presence or absence of national specificities – an aspect that national policy-makers often fail to see in a broader perspective.

Country differences and similarities are only one source of differentiation, albeit an important one. A second important domain in the study of differentials in attitudes and preferences regarding family and population issues and their related policies concerns domestic variation. All of the major themes studied in the DIALOG project can be analysed according to the socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents that were recorded: age and sex, household and



Fig. 2.1 Desired further population increase: an example of inter-country variation in Europe
Source: IPPAS database (Avramov and Cliquet, 2008)



Fig. 2.2 Opinion regarding the increasing number of divorces (percentage bad or very bad): an example of inter-country similarity in Europe
Source: IPPAS database (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

family characteristics, education, activity and income, religious affiliation, urbanisation of residence, values in life. Typically for population studies, age is an important variable for all analyses. One of the attitudinal questions that show a quite remarkable difference according to age relates to parenthood as a duty towards society (Fig. 2.3).



Fig. 2.3 It is your duty towards society to have children: agree/strongly agree (Germany)
Source: IPPAS database (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

Last but not least, the IPPAS database gives the possibility to use pooled and weighted data for several purposes. Pooled data may serve for exploratory purposes to investigate interrelations between various variables. This type of analysis permits the formulation of a series of research questions and hypotheses to be explored by using the IPPAS database and other sources.

When the identified trends are similar in a group of countries, as is the case for preferred age at retirement according to age (Fig. 2.4), pooled data clearly pinpoint the magnitude of policy challenges for the future. IPPAS data suggest that young people prefer to retire even earlier than their parents, who in turn are causing considerable policy concern because they have been retiring much too early.

Dissatisfaction with the amount of free time was recorded only in four countries: the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Austria, and Slovenia. The number of respondents in higher age groups is insufficient to analyse each country separately. The pooled data, however, illustrate issues to be addressed in further research and policy formulation in a life course perspective. Figure 2.5 shows the prevalence of dissatisfaction with one's available time according to age. The proportion of people dissatisfied with the amount of free time is highest among those in middle age.

The sample size, which is too small to address all policy-relevant issues or specific population sub-groups, is a persuasive reason for pooling data for exploratory purposes. Whereas the PPAS national survey samples are limited in size and usually too small to study the specific characteristics of minority groups in the population,



Fig. 2.4 Preferred age at retirement among those not yet retired (pooled and weighted data)
Source: IPPAS database. Pooled and weighted data for the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Finland (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)



Fig. 2.5 Dissatisfaction (not very or not at all satisfied) with the amount of free time, by sex and age group: an example of attitudinal differentiation according to stage of life
Source: IPPAS database. Pooled and weighted data for the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Austria and Slovenia (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

the pooled data can encapsulate a few thousand respondents. The pooled database, hence, makes it possible not only to compare nations, but also many small social sub-populations that often require special policy concern and care. In the field of demography, well-known minority or problem groups are one-parent families, large families, divorcees, widow(er)s, reconstituted families, childless couples, retired people and immigrants. Many of those subgroups are experiencing various forms of material and non-material deprivation that require social policy responses (Avramov 2002). Considering such groups in large international databases often makes it possible to isolate sufficient numbers, allowing for statistically-justified problem- and policy-oriented analyses (Table 2.2).

The national PPA surveys were carried out using national resources and without any formalised commitment by countries to completely comply with the recommended survey design. Not all national research teams were able or willing to include all of the standard questions and modules in their survey. This resulted in marked variations in questionnaire coverage from one country to another (Fig. 2.6).

2.10.2 Constraints Related to Collation of National Data

In a number of cases some countries not only eliminated entire modules or questions, but also dropped one or more sub-items of particular question sections. The possibility for comparison between countries has thus been reduced further, and an

Table 2.2 Weighted frequency of several socio-economic and demographic minority subpopulations in the IPPAS database

Sample Identification	Size	Subsample Identification	Size	%
All households	29,972	Single person households	4,629	15.4
Marital status	35,483	Divorced + separated	2,523	7.1
Marital status	35,483	Widowed	1,695	4.8
Living arrangement	23,650	Non-married cohabitation	2,275	9.6
Living arrangement	29,203	LAT relations (not living with parents)	1,637	5.6
Women 45+	6,324	Childless women of age 45+	658	10.4
Women <65 full-time working	4,554	Women <65 full-time working with 3 children in the household	383	8.4
All respondents	29,972	One-parent families	1,137	3.8
All respondents	31,563	Respondents with 5 or more own, step- and adopted children	633	2.0
All respondents	26,758	Respondent or partner is pregnant	408	1.5
Retired + not yet retired	17,104	Retired	942	5.3
All respondents	35,550	Respondents 65+	2,327	6.5
Female respondents	18,198	Women with part-time job	2,782	15.3
All respondents	34,818	Educational level < secondary education	4,320	12.4
Equivalised household income	17,084	Equivalised household income up to 20th percentile of the distribution in 9 countries	3,236	18.9

Source: IPPAS database (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

opportunity for analysis was missed, particularly in the case where a set of items would have been suitable for constructing and comparing a composite variable. Table 2.3 shows how the opportunities for the inter-country comparison of a composite variable on traditional gender role attitudes are reduced, firstly through the absence of the complete question(s) in some countries, and secondly through the elimination of some sub-items in others.

There are many reasons for the country deviations. In addition to the lack of a formal obligation to comply with the core questionnaire and all the modules, several other factors contributed to the variation in the composition of the national survey questionnaires and results obtained. In some cases, some of the modules were not included because the national institute recently undertook a specific survey on the topic of the module (e.g. ageing/elderly in Belgium, Italy, Hungary, and the Netherlands). In other cases, the national institute chose not to include a particular topic (e.g. gender in Belgium, Finland, and Slovenia; values in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands). In one case, in Italy, the survey methodology (telephone survey) did not allow for a lengthy interview. In another case, in the Netherlands, the survey was done by a computer aided personal interview sent over the Internet. In some countries the available financial resources were too limited to cover all of the PPAS subjects (e.g. Cyprus and Romania). In some cases, several of these factors



Fig. 2.6 Percentage of standard questions of the core questionnaire and the five modules included in the national surveys
Source: IPPAS database (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

cumulated, resulting in relatively weaker contributions to the overall international endeavour.

However, when variables or items are available, the response rate in the IPPAS is usually very high, as Table 2.4 shows for a small selection of the IPPAS basic

Table 2.3 Country availability of sub-items on questions concerning traditional gender roles

Name variable	BE	CZ	DE	EE	IT	CY	LI	HU	NL	AT	PL	RO	SL	FI
G1B	–	–	+	+	D	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–
G1C	–	–	+	+	–	+	+	+	+	–	–	+	–	–
G1D	–	–	+	+	–	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–
G1E	–	–	+	+	D	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	–	–
G1H	–	–	+	+	–	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
G2B	–	–	+	+	–	–	+	+	–	+	+	+	–	–

G1B: A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works;
G1C: Family life suffers when a woman has a full-time job;
G1D: What most women really want is a home and children;
G1E: Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay;
G1H: In their job women are less ambitious than men;
G2B: A man has to earn money; a woman looks after the home and family.
+ = item available; – = item not available; D = item differently formulated
Source: IPPAS country overview (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

Table 2.4 Selected items response rate (100 respondents – % discrete and system missing values)

Variable	Belgium	Czech R.	Germany	Estonia	Italy	Cyprus	Lithuania	Hungary	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Finland	Pooled sample
1	99	–	99	–	–	100	100	98	100	–	97	100	100	–	80
2	–	97	87	–	73	–	93	81	100	–	91	81	99	–	79
3	–	96	91	98	–	94	94	80	100	–	85	79	92	–	68
4	86	94	74	81	94	61	99	70	82	99	97	98	98	94	88
5	100	99	100	100	99	92	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	99	100
6	100	93	99	100	58	–	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	99	90
7	100	99	100	100	–	100	100	100	100	100	100	–	99	99	84
8	100	95	100	100	99	100	81	100	100	90	100	89	100	84	98
9	93	83	94	89	–	96	100	74	93	84	99	95	87	88	78
10	98	100	94	100	99	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	95	98
11	–	–	100	99	99	99	100	94	88	99	99	96	–	–	88
12	99	99	100	99	–	99	100	99	–	–	99	–	100	99	62
13	–	–	–	–	–	–	99	–	–	–	87	99	99	–	27

Table 2.4 (continued)

Variable	Belgium	Czech R.	Germany	Estonia	Italy	Cyprus	Lithuania	Hungary	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	Finland	Pooled sample
14	99	99	99	100	99	–	100	–	–	–	99	91	96	–	80
15	–	100	99	99	–	–	100	–	–	99	99	98	99	98	68
16	–	90	82	70	–	–	70	–	56	66	26	72	79	82	50
17	–	99	99	100	–	99	100	99	88	99	99	99	99	–	78

Variable 1 : Government responsibility: looking after the elderly (CI1A)
Variable 2: % difference estimated and actual population size (RCCI3DE1)
Variable 3: % difference estimated and actual aged population (RCCI5DE1)
Variable 4: Additional number of children expected (RCCF1AY)
Variable 5: Current marital status (CQ3)
Variable 6: Living arrangement (CQ4)
Variable 7: Household composition (RCCQ6)
Variable 8: Number of children living at home (CQ9B)
Variable 9: Income group (RCCQ13B)
Variable 10: Education respondent (RCCQ21A)
Variable 11: Having a job is the best way for women's independence (G1F)
Variable 12: Values in life: having enough time for yourself (V1A)
Variable 13: From whom expect health care at higher age (H2)
Variable 14: Opinion on rising number of elderly (A1)
Variable 15: Daily help for elderly is best entrusted to spouse/partner (A4A)
Variable 16: Expected age of retirement (A7)
Variable 17: Best child care is by own parents (B1C)
Source: IPPAS database (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

and re-coded variables. In some cases, lower response rates must be acknowledged, either because of different interview instructions, or because of insufficient interviewer instruction or control, or because of the interview method (e.g. interview by telephone). For the pooled database, the overall response rates vary much more widely for the reasons given above.

Another type of difficulty experienced in DIALOG concerns the occurrence of differences in notions and concepts between countries.

An internationally well known problem relates to the educational level. Notwithstanding the existence of an international standard classification of education (ISCED), developed by UNESCO, countries differ in their educational systems and research teams differ in the use of the educational variables. Difficulties are experienced, especially when one endeavours to construct an ordinal, or interval variable for educational level attained. For this reason, IPPAS re-coded the educational variables into a variable with only three categories: (1) primary or lower secondary education, (2) higher secondary education, and (3) post-secondary education.

An unexpected difficulty in the establishment of the IPPAS occurred due to the difference in the definition of a seemingly simple concept of "child". Most countries did not apply an age limit to the notion of children, but some did, e.g. Belgium recorded as children in the household only those below 19 years of age. Some variation occurred in the definition of "own children": some considered only "own" biological children, others included step- adopted and foster children, and sometimes even children already deceased. For most analyses, the inter-country variation in the definition of children will have little effect on the trends or associations observed, but the construction of the variables in the international database and the comparative analysis would have been easier and more pertinent if stringent conceptual rules had been followed.

The concept of LAT relations is yet another example of the need for greater precision. LAT was defined in the question on living arrangements as "I have a spouse/partner but we do not live in the same household (Living Apart Together)". The analysis showed that this definition allowed the inclusion not only of couples who have established separate households – which is the living arrangement usually understood by LAT relations – but also young people in love who are still living with their parents. Considerable supplementary calculations needed to be made for IPPAS in order to achieve comparability from one country to another. On the basis of the combination of household composition and living arrangement, a more detailed re-coded variable was constructed in the international comparative database, distinguishing LAT relations in the standard sense of the concept from LAT relations where the partners have not yet established their own households, but still live in their parental home (Table 2.5).

In summary: financial, organisational, methodological, motivational, and/or conceptual elements form the basis of the national deviations from the agreed standard PPAS questionnaire. The lessons learnt from the IPPAS are that research teams that intend to contribute their national data to an international project ought to be strongly committed both to the common research goals and to the questionnaire

Table 2.5 Comparison of basic and re-coded variables on living arrangement (pooled and weighted sample)

Name variable	Label variable	Value category	Label category	%
CQ4	Living	1	No partner	18.9
	arrangement	2	LAT	9.7
	(basic variable)	3	Living with spouse/partner	61.4
RCCQ46	Living	1	No partner	26.2
	arrangement	2	LAT, living with parents	4.7
	(recoded	3	LAT, living without parents	5.6
	variable)	4	Living with spouse/partner	63.5

Source: IPPAS codebook and database (Avramov and Cliquet 2008)

construction, variable design, and survey methodology. It is also necessary to define accurately and in advance all of the key concepts to be used in the investigation - even those that are seemingly self-evident.

The conclusion to be drawn is that there are strong advantages in undertaking the national surveys within the common formalized framework that obliges national partners to comply with agreed guidelines for the core questionnaire and the modules. This was not possible for the national Population Policy Acceptance Surveys, which were funded from domestic resources and from which national databases were compiled before the launching of the international DIALOG project. Whereas DIALOG had an initial advantage of capitalizing on national research efforts, this became a relative disadvantage because of the vast amount of work that had to be put into streamlining for comparability.

2.11 Conclusion

The International Population Policy Acceptance Survey database (IPPAS) is a large and rich statistical data file containing individual data items on more than 35,000 respondents from 14 countries well spread across the European continent. The database encapsulates a broad array of attitudes, preferences and expectations on population trends and policies, and provides an opportunity for thorough and comprehensive comparative analyses of the recorded data with several pertinent statistical methods. It also permits use to be made of the pooled and weighted data to identify specific highly policy-relevant population challenges or to study in detail population subgroups that are small in numbers in national samples.

The EC funding of the comparative and analytic phases of the study contributed considerably to the adoption and compliance within the project consortium of common strategies and methodologies with respect to the definition of the study goals, the establishment of the international database, and the conceptualisation of the transnational analysis of the recorded data. The availability of international funds from the very outset of the study for the development of the survey tools as well would undoubtedly have enhanced the potential for more comprehensive comparability of PPAS data.

An important innovative aspect of the DIALOG project is the integration of three different sources of information on recent population and family trends and related policies. The international database from a comparative attitudinal survey among citizens (IPPAS), an international comparative Delphi study among policy makers and other stakeholders, and an international comparative desk review of recent demographic trends and population-related policies offer unique opportunities for a scientifically well-founded and politically pertinent understanding of needs and challenges for policy adaptation and reform.

Chapter 3
Selected Statistical Methods to Analyse IPPAS

Marc Callens

Abstract We use the IPPAS database and a widely-available software package such as SPSS to illustrate the use of three major contextual regression methods in cross-national research: separate regressions, analysis of covariance and multilevel analysis. Compared with other analysis methods, multi-level modelling proves to be a general and flexible, but complex method. However, especially when the number of countries becomes small, one might also resort to analysis of covariance or separate regressions as a simple alternative.

Keywords: Cross-national surveys · Multilevel analysis · Comparative research

3.1 Introduction

Due to their different historical, cultural, economic and political backgrounds, European countries form an important source of variation in attitudes, preferences and practices in the domains of family and population and their related policies. In the context of cross-national research, two general theories are relevant: "structuralism" and "culturalism". While the structuralist thesis predicts that, due to shared similar "structures", similarities are to be found across countries, the culturist thesis instead predicts that cultural specificity (e.g. values) results in cross-national dissimilarities.

In contemporary cross-national research, the concept of "social structure" has been differentiated into its constituent components: the market, the family and the government. Social ecology models have further identified several different levels, ranging from the supra state to local government, from the world market to the local labour market and from the neighbourhood to the individual. However, these multi-dimensional models have not yet been fully integrated into cross-national analyses (Gauthier 2002).

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A natural way to analyse the impact of this layered multidimensional social structure is to use a contextual regression model. Contextual regression models integrate variables at several levels of a hierarchy (e.g. individuals and countries) in one analysis. Important contextual regression strategies that can be used to tackle such cross-national analysis problems are separate regressions, analysis of covariance and multilevel analysis (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998).

First, we start by explaining the separate regressions approach. Next, the analysis of covariance model is given, and finally several multilevel models are presented. In each case, we first describe the appropriate statistical model(s), followed by a discussion of their advantages and disadvantages illustrated by an example.

All illustrations are based on the same subset of IPPAS variables. The outcome variable y is "Tolerance for the parenthood mandate" (CL5E: It is your duty towards society to have children). This variable has five response categories: Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Neither agree nor disagree (3), Disagree (4) and Strongly disagree (5).

Explanatory variables x at the individual level are "Religion" (CQ11: What role does religion play in your life?), "Country" (COUNTRY), "Age" (RCCQ1AGE: age in years) and "Age-centred" (Age-minus-grand mean: age in years). "Religion" has four categories: Very important role (1), Important role (2), Not an important role (3) and No role at all (4). In some models, "Age" (in years) is used in a centred version "Age-centred" (in years). Centring is a transformation of a variable such that the variable is expressed in terms of deviations from the grand mean (i.e. age – average(age)).

Explanatory variables z at the country level are "Country" and "West". "Country" is a categorical variable with twelve elements: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia. Romania and Cyprus are not included in this analysis, as data for the outcome variable "Tolerance" are not available for these two countries. "West" is a binary variable, indicating whether a country is situated in Eastern or Western Europe.

3.2 Separate Regressions

In separate regressions, J country-specific datasets are analysed separately. The same model is used in each country, resulting in J equivalent models, one for each country:

$$\begin{aligned} \boldsymbol{y}_{i1} &= \alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{i1} \\ &\ldots. \\ \boldsymbol{y}_{i\mathrm{J}} &= \alpha_{\mathrm{J}} + \beta_{\mathrm{J}} x_{i\mathrm{J}} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{i\mathrm{J}} \end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

where $\boldsymbol{y}_{ij}$ is a response variable and x_{ij} is an explanatory variable at the individual level with subscript i referring to individuals $1, \ldots, n_j$ and subscript j to countries $1, \ldots, J$. The parameters of interest are country-specific intercepts α_j and regression coefficients (or slopes) β_j. For reasons of simplicity of presentation, only one

explanatory variable is used in the notation. An extension to models with multiple explanatory variables is straightforward. Finally, there is also a normally distributed error term ε_{ij} indicating that the response variable is assumed numerical. Model 1 can easily be adapted – by using appropriate error terms and/or transformations – to accommodate for other response types such as binary or count variables.

The analysis is performed on separate datasets, one for each country. Exactly the same model is normally used in each country. The idea is then – using specific statistical tests – to compare the model parameters across countries. A major problem with this approach from a statistical point of view is a lack of parsimony, which becomes rather acute when the number of countries becomes large. Therefore, researchers tend to use only a fraction of the available countries, often selected by convenience. Sometimes the selection is such that each included country represents a specific dimension of an interesting theoretical construct (e.g. welfare regimes). A major drawback of separate regressions is that no country-level explanatory variables can be included in the analysis.

In our example twelve models are actually estimated separately, one for each country. In each model, the outcome variable "Tolerance" (CL5E) is predicted by two explanatory variables "Religion" (CQ11) and "Age-centred" (Age-minus-grand mean). Table 3.1 compares the results for two countries, namely Belgium (Flanders) and Estonia. "Religion" (CQ11) has four levels. To represent these four categories, SPSS automatically creates three dummy variables, contrasting the first three categories against a reference category (no role). The intercept parameter α_j has an interpretation as the average tolerance for the reference category of "Religion" (i.e. no role) at the mean age. This value is 4.098 for Belgium and 2.621 for Estonia.

The other four fixed parameters β_1, β_2, β_3 and β_4 have the usual interpretation of a non-standardised regression coefficient: the increase of the response variable

Table 3.1 Results for separate regressions for Belgium (Flanders) and Estonia

Belgium (Flanders)			
Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	4.098	.032	.000
Religion: Very Important	–.455	.051	.000
Religion: Important	–.120	.045	.008
Religion: Not Important	–.027	.042	.525
Religion: No Role	0	–	–
Age-centred	–.007	.001	.000
Estonia			
Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	2.621	.098	.000
Religion: Very Important	.090	.150	.550
Religion: Important	.012	.112	.913
Religion: Not Important	–.015	.107	.890
Religion: No Role	0	–	–
Age-centred	–.018	.002	.000

Source: IPPAS

that corresponds with a 1-unit increase of the explanatory variable. For Belgium, there is no significant difference between the reference group and the Not Important group. However, the Very Important and Important groups differ significantly from the reference group. The effect of "Age-centred" is estimated at –0.007, indicating that "Age-centred" is negatively related with "Tolerance". The results for Estonia are somehow different. No difference is found between the "Religion" groups. The effect of "Age-centred" is estimated at –0.018, again indicating a negative relationship, but compared to Belgium, this relationship is twice as strong.

3.3 Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA)

In a classical contextual regression model such as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), intercepts and/or slopes are allowed to vary across countries in a non-random way. Both the individual level and the country level are included in one model that encompasses all countries. Individual-level explanatory variables have the same role as in ordinary regression. Countries are entered in the model as J–1 dummy variables, such that countries are allowed to differ in the intercept:

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{ij} = \alpha_j + \beta x_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ij}. \tag{3.2}$$

The aim of ANCOVA is to assess the effect of countries, while checking for individual effects. The model relies on the assumption that all countries have the same slope β. ANCOVA only gives a measure of the magnitude of the overall country effect.

Table 3.2 presents the results for analysis of covariance . The country level is

Table 3.2 Results for the analysis of covariance

Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	3.258	.035	.000
Austria	–.109	.041	.009
Belgium (Flanders)	.926	.037	.000
Czech Republic	–.793	.049	.000
Estonia	–.440	.043	.000
Finland	.449	.037	.000
Germany	–.347	.037	.000
Hungary	–.069	.038	.071
Italy	.033	.038	.385
Lithuania	–.479	.045	.000
The Netherlands	.951	.042	.000
Poland	–.482	.037	.000
Slovenia	0	–	–
Religion: Very Important	–.535	.026	.000
Religion: Important	–.317	.021	.000
Religion: Not Important	–.112	.020	.000
Religion: No Role	0	–	–
Age-centred	–.015	.000	.000

Source: IPPAS

incorporated by introducing eleven dummy variables to code country membership (Slovenia being the reference category). Therefore, we can study in ANCOVA if countries are equal for "Tolerance" and if not, which countries are deviating. The model also contains two individual-level explanatory variables, "Religion" (CQ11) and "Age-centred" (Age-minus-grand mean). The effect of these individual level variables is assumed to be constant for each country.

The intercept α equals 3.258. This value corresponds to the average "Tolerance" for the middle-aged, "Religion" plays no role-group in Slovenia. Values for the reference category in other countries can be obtained by adding the corresponding β value to the intercept (e.g., $\alpha_{\mathrm{Belgium}} = 3.258 + 0.926 = 4.184$).

Results suggest that Belgium (Flanders), Finland, Italy and the Netherlands have a higher-than-average level of "Tolerance"; that is to say all western countries except Austria and Germany.

A major problem with the ANCOVA approach is that, since ANCOVA expresses the differences between countries using all degrees of freedom, no context-specific explanatory variables can be introduced. ANCOVA is limited to expressing context variance in terms of overall differences: It is not possible to explain which characteristics of the context are important. Even adding a simple binary country-level variable to an ANCOVA model is redundant.

Another problem in analysis of covariance is that the effect of an individual-level characteristic is assumed to be constant over all countries. In our example, this assumption is quite unrealistic as we have found in separate regressions that parameter estimates for "Religion" and "Age-centred" vary widely across countries. A solution within the context of ANCOVA is then to introduce J–1 Country $\times$ k–1 Covariate fixed-interaction terms. However, in terms of parsimony, such an approach is unattractive as the number of estimated parameters rapidly becomes overwhelming (e.g. for "Religion", the number of extra regression parameters is 33).

3.4 Multilevel Analysis

3.4.1 Multilevel Modelling

In the multilevel model, intercepts $\boldsymbol{\alpha}_j$ and coefficients $\boldsymbol{\beta}_j$ are random variables, assumed to follow a (multivariate) normal distribution (Snijders and Bosker 1999):

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\alpha}_j + \boldsymbol{\beta}_j x_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ij}. \tag{3.3}$$

In fact, each coefficient in the multilevel model can be split into γ, an average across countries, and $\mathbf{u}$, an unknown country-specific random deviation:

$$\begin{aligned} \boldsymbol{\alpha}_j &= \gamma_{00} + \boldsymbol{u}_{0j} \\ \boldsymbol{\beta}_j &= \gamma_{10} + \boldsymbol{u}_{1j} \end{aligned}, \tag{3.4}$$

where the first index in the subscript for γ and $\boldsymbol{u}$ refers to the individual level and

the second index to the variable at the country level. The random deviations $\boldsymbol{u}_{0j}$ and $\boldsymbol{u}_{1j}$ have corresponding intercept variance τ_0^2 and slope variance τ_1^2 respectively. Their covariance is noted as τ_{01}. Covariance and variances are the additional parameters that are estimated in random coefficient models. If the latter are significantly different from zero, then we can say that country effects pertain.

Three sub-models are used in the multilevel modelling framework: the empty model, the random intercept model and the random coefficient model. The simplest multilevel model is the empty model or unconditional model:

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \boldsymbol{u}_{0j} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ij}, \tag{3.5}$$

where γ_{00} is the population average and $\boldsymbol{u}_{0j}$ the random deviation from this average for country j. The empty model does not consider explanatory variables. It only provides an estimate of the grand mean γ_{00}, the individual level variance σ^2 and the country level variance ${\tau_0}^2$.

The next step in multilevel modelling is the inclusion of an explanatory variable at the individual level in the random intercept model:

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{ij} = (\gamma_{00} + \boldsymbol{u}_{0j}) + \gamma_{10} x_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ij}. \tag{3.6}$$

Expression (3.6) has four parameters to estimate: the intercept for the average country γ_{00}, the regression coefficient γ_{10}, the individual level variance σ^2 and the country level intercept variance ${\tau_0}^2$. If the latter variance is zero, then the country level is not relevant. That being so, we could drop the random deviation term $\boldsymbol{u}_{0j}$ in expression (3.6) and arrive at the ordinary linear regression model, with fixed effects only.

It cannot be ruled out that the slope γ_{10} can also differ between countries. If this is the case, then we have to extend expression (3.6) with the random effects term $\gamma_{10} x_{ij}$ to arrive at the random coefficient model:

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{ij} = (\gamma_{00} + \boldsymbol{u}_{0j}) + (\gamma_{10} + \boldsymbol{u}_{1j}) x_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ij}. \tag{3.7}$$

The random intercept or the random coefficient model can be further extended by introducing a country-level explanatory variable z_j. If the variation among countries (in the intercepts or in the slopes) shrinks or disappears completely, it is then said that the country-level variable has explained this variation. It should be borne in mind that the estimation of country-level regression slopes was not possible in either separate regressions, or in covariance analysis. This is something that only multilevel models are able to achieve.

Adding a country-level explanatory variable z_j that can explain variation in the intercept gives the following model:

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{ij} = (\gamma_{00} + \boldsymbol{u}_{0j}) + \gamma_{10} x_{ij} + \gamma_{01} z_j + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ij}. \tag{3.8}$$

Adding a country-level explanatory variable z_j that can account in addition for slope variation comes down to add a cross-level interaction term:

$$\boldsymbol{y}_{ij} = (\gamma_{00} + \boldsymbol{u}_{0j}) + (\gamma_{10} + \boldsymbol{u}_{1j})x_{ij} + \gamma_{01}z_j + \gamma_{11}z_j x_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ij} \tag{3.9}$$

To decide which (multilevel) sub-model is the most appropriate, a likelihood ratio test (LRT) can be used. An LRT-test compares the deviance values for two competing models. A rule of thumb is that the difference in deviance should be at least twice as large as the difference in the number of extra parameters estimated. If the difference in deviance is significant, the model with the smallest deviance is considered the better one (Snijders and Bosker 1999, 88–91).

In multilevel analysis, six different "multilevel" models can be typically compared with one another: the null model, the random intercept model, the fixed model, the extended random intercept model, the random coefficient model and the cross-level interaction model.

3.4.2 The Null Model

The null model (see Table 3.3) does not contain any explanatory variables. It is a benchmark model against which subsequent models are evaluated. The only fixed effect in this model is the intercept γ_{00}, which has an interpretation as the average value of Tolerance over all individuals and all countries. This value is 3.01, which is the midpoint position of the 5-point scale, rated 1–5.

There are two estimated variances. The residual variance σ^2 is the estimated variance at the individual level and the intercept variance τ_0^2 is the estimated variance at the country level. In the null model, σ^2 equals 1.55 and τ_0^2 equals 0.31. Thus, the variance between individuals is nearly five-times the variance between countries.

The intraclass correlation coefficient ρ, defined as the ratio of the intercept variance over the total variance, is estimated at 0.17. This intraclass correlation coefficient has an interpretation as the proportion of variance that is accounted for by the country level. Hence, according to this model there is an important similarity between the results of individuals in the same country. Consequently, it is appropriate to use multilevel models.

3.4.3 The Random Intercept Model

By extending the null model with the individual level explanatory variable "Religion" (CQ11),we arrive at a random intercept model (see Table 3.4). The intercept γ_{00} now has an interpretation as the mean "Tolerance" for the parenthood mandate against the Religion reference category (no role at all). For the categorical variable "Religion", a 1-unit increase corresponds to the difference of a specific level

Table 3.3 Results for the null model

Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	3.008	.160	.000
Residual Variance	1.554	.012	.000
Intercept Variance	.308	.132	.019

Source: IPPAS

Table 3.4 Results for the random intercept model

Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	3.270	.160	.000
Religion: Very Important	–.650	.026	.000
Religion: Important	–.394	.021	.000
Religion: Not Important	–.133	.021	.000
Religion: No Role	0	0	–
Residual Variance	1.516	.012	.000
Intercept Variance	.304	.130	.019

Source: IPPAS

(dummy-coded 1) against the reference category (coded 0). The expected tolerance for the Very Important, Important, Not Important and the No Role groups is 2.62, 2.88, 3.14 and 3.27 respectively.

When comparing the residual variances of the random intercept model and the null model, it becomes clear that the introduction of "Religion" has explained 2.5% of the individual level variance ($\sigma^2_{\text{intercept}} = 1.516$; $\sigma^2_{\text{null}} = 1.554$). There is no noticeable reduction in the intercept variance.

3.4.4 The Fixed Model

The fixed model in Table 3.5 is the same model as the random intercept model, except that now the intercept is no longer random, but fixed. This fixed model is just an ordinary regression model. The expected tolerance for the different religion groups is now 2.64, 2.93, 3.24 and 3.35. There is only one random parameter: the residual variance σ^2, estimated at 1.78.

To decide which of the two models, the random intercept or the fixed model, has the better fit, a likelihood ratio test can be used. The difference between the deviance of the two models is 5041 (D_{fixed}–$D_{\text{intercept}} = 109008$–$103967$), which is large. Hence, the random intercept model fits the data far better, and should be preferred over the fixed model.

3.4.5 The Extended Random Intercept Model

In the extended random intercept model in Table 3.6, a country-level explanatory variable "West" is added to the random intercept model. "West" is a binary vari-

Table 3.5 Results for the fixed model

Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	3.356	.017	.000
Religion: Very Important	–.717	.025	.000
Religion: Important	–.423	.021	.000
Religion: Not Important	–.117	.022	.000
Religion: No Role	0	0	–
Residual Variance	1.780	.014	.000

Source: IPPAS

Table 3.6 Results for the extended random intercept model

Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	3.624	.176	.000
Religion: Very Important	–.649	.026	.000
Religion: Important	–.394	.021	.000
Religion: Not Important	–.133	.021	.000
Religion: No Role	0	0	–
East	–.708	.248	.017
West	0	0	–
Residual Variance	1.516	.012	.000
Intercept Variance	.184	.083	.026

Source: IPPAS

able coded 0 for Eastern European countries and coded 1 for Western European countries. The intercept γ_{00}, estimated at 3.62, now has an interpretation as the mean "Tolerance" the for parenthood mandate against the "Religion" reference category (no role at all) in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, this mean "Tolerance" for the reference category is estimated to be .71 lower, i.e. 2.91.

The variances σ^2 and τ_0^2 are now estimated at 1.51 and 0.18 respectively. The introduction of "West" has caused the cross-country variation to drop from 0.30 to 0.18, a 39% reduction. Thus, a substantial proportion of the cross-country variation in "Tolerance" has been explained by "West".

3.4.6 The Random Coefficient Model

Table 3.7 presents the random coefficient model. Here, a random slope for the individual level covariate "Age-centred" (age-minus-grand mean) is added to the extended random intercept model. In this random coefficient model, the effect of "Age-centred" on "Tolerance" is allowed to be stronger in some countries than in others.

Table 3.7 Results for the random coefficient model

Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	3.630	.154	.000
Religion: Very Important	–.550	.026	.000
Religion: Important	–.323	.021	.000
Religion: Not Important	–.115	.020	.000
Religion: No Role	0	0	–
East	–.802	.181	.056
West	0	0	–
Age-centred	–.016	.002	.000
Residual Variance	1.468	.012	.000
Intercept Variance	.184	.080	.022
Intercept-slope Covariance	.002	.001	.063
Slope Variance	.000	.000	.033

Source: IPPAS

The intercept γ_{00} now has an interpretation as the average "Tolerance" for the No role religion-group of average Age in the average Western European country. This value equals 3.630. The average slope γ_{20} across countries for "Age-centred" equals –0.0157. This average slope has an interpretation as the effect of "Age" on "Tolerance" for the parenthood mandate for the average country.

In the random coefficient model, there are now four random components, the level-one Residual Variance σ^2, the Intercept Variance τ_0^2, the Slope Variance τ_1^2 and the Intercept-slope Covariance τ_{01}. The random Slope Variance for "Age" is estimated at 0.00003. The 95% confidence interval for the average slope ranges from –0.146 to –0.168. Accordingly, the "Age" effect is clearly negative in all countries, but high effects of "Age" are 13% larger compared to low effects.

The Intercept-slope Covariance τ_{01} is estimated at 0.002. A positive covariance indicates that countries with a higher general "Tolerance" tend to have a lower country effect of "Age". However, the Intercept-slope Covariance is hardly significant here ($p = 0.063$).

Should a random coefficient model be used, or should we adopt an extended random intercept model? The difference in deviances between both models is 12 ($D_{\text{extended\_intercept}} - D_{\text{random\_coefficient}} = 102995–102893$). This value indicates that the random slope model significantly outperforms the extended random intercept model in terms of goodness of fit. Consequently, the random coefficient model should be preferred.

3.4.7 The Cross-level Interaction Model

In a cross-level interaction model (see Table 3.8), interaction between an individual-level variable and a country-level variable, a so-called cross-level interaction term, is introduced. The use of cross-level interactions can be based on two different

Table 3.8 Results for the cross-level interaction model

Parameter	*B*	*SE*	*p*
Intercept	3.578	.178	.000
Religion: Very Important	–.550	.025	.000
Religion: Important	–.323	.021	.000
Religion: Not Important	–.115	.020	.000
Religion: No Role	0	0	–
East	–.697	.251	.020
West	0	0	–
Age-centred	–.017	.002	.000
East × Age-centred	.002	.003	.563
West × Age-centred	0	0	–
Residual Variance	1.468	.012	.000
Intercept Variance	.189	.085	.026
Intercept-slope Covariance	.002	.001	.071
Slope Variance	.000	.000	.041

Source: IPPAS

arguments. If a random slope is found, one can try to explain the corresponding variance by introducing country-level variables. However, even in the absence of a random slope it is legitimate to include a cross-level interaction term on substantive grounds. The effect of the cross-level interaction term "West" × "Age-centred" is clearly not significant ($p = 0.563$). Therefore, the impact of "Age" on "Tolerance" does not differ between Western and Eastern Europe, and the random coefficient model hence remains our preferred model.

3.5 To Multilevel or not?

In general, the decision to use multilevel modelling or another contextual model depends on the focus of the statistical inference and the magnitude of the group sample sizes (Snijders and Bosker 1999). The multilevel model is appropriate when one wishes to test effects of country-level variables or when the countries are regarded as a sample from a (real or hypothetical) country population. On the other hand, when the primary goal is to draw conclusions pertaining to each of J countries, then an analysis of covariance should be the first choice.

A rule of thumb is that when the number of countries is small (i.e. $J < 10$), analysis of covariance is preferable. On the other hand, when J is large and the country sample sizes n_j are small (i.e. $n_j < 100$), the random coefficient approach is more appropriate. Finally, when both the number of countries J and the country sample sizes n_j are large, then both approaches are appropriate (Snijders and Bosker 1999, 43).

In technical terms, there is no doubt that multilevel analysis should be considered a superior method for contextual research problems. However, in practice, due to a lack of data and the small number of countries involved, the application of multilevel modelling to the PPAS database might become cumbersome. If such is the case, one might resort to analysis of covariance or separate regressions as a second option. However, neither analysis of covariance nor separate regressions will be able to give an answer to the quest in quantitative cross-national research: to replace the name of nations with the names of country-level variables.

Chapter 4
Pathways of Welfare and Population-related Policies

Towards a Multidimensional Typology of Welfare State Regimes in Eastern and Western Europe

Beat Fux

Abstract This article starts with a critical review of Esping-Andersen's inspiring approach to distinguish between different welfare regimes. The demand firstly to expand the scope of comparative welfare research to all countries participating in the DIALOG project, and to Eastern Europe in general, and secondly the attempt to cope with important shortcomings of Esping-Andersen's theory, particularly the assumption of strong path dependency, are the main reasons to draft theoretical considerations which focus on a reconciliation of typological approaches on the one hand, and on a functionalist modernisation theory on the other. By referring to (i) Stein Rokkan's cleavage theory, (ii) Kaufmann's concept of welfare as a system of dynamic interdependencies and (iii) Cliquet's generalized Fishbein model (resource-restriction behaviour model); we specify in a first step the relevant sociological dimensions determining the different structures and developments of welfare systems. This leads to the proposal to divide a triad of trajectories (rather than regime types), which are taken as distinct solutions as to how countries can participate in the process of modernisation. Based on a broad set of variables, we try to show in the subsequent sections that the country-specific configuration of cultural and structural macro-conditions, which depend on long-term historical legacies, determine the scope of distinct policies as well as the perception and evaluation of demographic trends. It can be shown that there are strong correlations between the cultural prerequisites and the development of national welfare systems. Furthermore, the hypothesis according to which the Eastern European countries with a Catholic history tend to develop welfare systems in which intermediate institutions (e.g. the family) play an important role (subsidiarity, intergenerational solidarity). By contrast, more secularized Eastern European countries tend to follow rather the trajectory of an encompassing (etatist) social policy. Furthermore, poor economic

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conditions (particularly in the second belt of transitional countries, (e.g. Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) currently hamper a rapid improvement of their welfare systems.

Keywords: Modernisation · Welfare regimes · Values and attitudes · International comparison

4.1 Introduction

"*Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur.*" Already before Christ, a renowned ethnography applied a trisection typology to describe Europe beyond the ancient "iron wall" – the Roman Limes. Since Julius Caesar "Comentarii de bello gallico" (1990), trichotomic classifications have also enjoyed highest popularity in the field of welfare research.

Undoubtedly the most influential recent proposal has been provided by Gøsta Esping-Andersen in "The three worlds of welfare capitalism" (1990) where distinguishing between a) the *Social Democratic* (primarily the Nordic countries), b) the *Conservative* (mainly the continental European corporatist countries), and c) the *Liberal* (or residual) welfare regime,[1] typified by the Anglo-Saxon countries and also including the former colonies of the U.K, or indeed Switzerland.

Esping-Andersen theoretically underpinned his work with considerations that were already developed during the early post-war period by Thomas H. Marshall (1963), and particularly Richard Titmuss (1963, 1974), both affiliated with the London School of Economics and Political Science, of which William H. Beveridge had been director in the interwar period.

In this tradition, the different institutional and conceptual arrangements of (Western) European welfare states were either labelled according to the leading founders of corresponding policies (*Beveridgeian* vs. *Bismarckian* countries, or *mixed countries* which combine tax-based and means-tested provisions with work-related social insurance systems), or – according to Titmuss – as a) the *residual*, b) the *industrial achievement-performance*, and c) the *institutional redistribution welfare model*.

The succeeding comparative research in this field mainly focused on the growth of the welfare state as a response to two fundamental developments, namely "the formation of nation-states and their transformation into mass democracies after the French Revolution, and the growth of capitalism that became the dominant mode of production after the Industrial Revolution" (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 22). By consequence, academic interest prioritized macro-sociological explanations of these long-term processes against the background of so-called "grand theories"

[1] Regime is defined as a set of norms, rules, procedures and institutions which impose constraints on the behavior of its subjects. "To talk of 'regime' is to denote the fact that in the relation between state and economy a complex of legal and organizational features is systematically interwoven." (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2).

(Toqueville, Weber, Marx, Durkheim or Rokkan), and in particular on the concept of *modernisation*.[2] These theories neglected the impact of the micro level of individual actors, as well as that of endogenous causes, and were, by consequence, blind to intercultural or inter-country differences, variations, and heterogeneities. The success of Esping-Andersen's approach can be reduced to the fact that he struck at precisely this Achilles' heel of modernisation theory.

Notwithstanding, Esping-Andersen rapidly became the subject of notable criticism. The most important points are that it remains unclear whether regimes attain the status of ideal types (Weber), or if his classification is a "Realtypologie" (real types; see Kohl 1993). Esping-Andersen intermingled in this respect cross-sectional empirical evidence with far-reaching generalizations. Claus Offe pointed out that he bases his considerations on a rationalistic understanding of politics leading to an optimistic voluntarism regarding the impact of political regulations (1996). If modernisation theories tend to overrate dynamics, then Esping-Andersen omits a historical perspective and follows a snapshot strategy (Borchert 1998). He furthermore was attacked from the feminist camp (Lessenich and Ostner 1998) because of neglecting issues such as gender and the family.

If trying to summarize the most prominent derivatives in welfare regime research (see also Arts and Gelissen 2002), one can speak of five relevant developments: a) In an empirical perspective the *number of regimes* has been increased or at least differentiated. b) Where Esping-Andersen's – in line with Titmuss – concentrates mainly on the Public-Private Mix of welfare provisions and taking into account the dimensions of de-commodification and social stratification, the recent approaches amplify the *number of dimensions*. c) Current analyses expanded also the *accounted policy fields* (e.g. gender, health, family). d) Furthermore, *additional countries* have been regarded. Finally, one can observe e) a trend to *reduce the hiatus between the modernisation-theoretical and the typological approach*.

Ad a) the objection whereupon the three worlds of welfare capitalism are undercomplex was firstly tested in empirical terms. From a mere methodological perspective, Obiger and Wagschal (1998) detected at least four or five clusters in their re-analysis of Esping-Andersen's data. Greater relevance attached to the arguments mentioned by Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1993, 1996) van Kersbergen (1995) and Bonoli (1997), according to which there are fundamental differences within Esping-Andersen's Conservative cluster. Similar to the division of the Beveridge Cluster into an Anglo-Saxon and a Nordic sub-type, these authors split the more developed

[2] Modernisation – or nowadays globalization – is closely linked to liberalism. The notion of modernisation comes from a view of societies as having a standard evolutionary pattern, as described in the social evolutionism theories. Each society would steadily evolve from barbarism to ever greater levels of development and civilization. The more modern states would be wealthier and more powerful, and their citizens freer and having a higher standard of living. Relevant correlates are therefore processes like industrialisation, secularisation, and individualisation. This view was advocated in the social sciences for many decades by Max Weber (occidental rationalization and bureaucratization) and Talcott Parsons who stressed the importance of societies being open to change and fighting against reactionary forces which restricting development.

Western European countries from the Southern European counties. However, from a functionalist perspective one may argue that these sub-types are both anchored in the Catholic value system. Consequentially, these country differences are gradual and real-typical rather than general and ideal-typical (Flora, Kuhnle, and Urwin 1999 or Fux 2002). Castles and Mitchell (1993) and Korpi and Palme also turned their attention towards the political-cultural differences between liberal (e.g. United States, Switzerland) and radical countries (e.g. Australia, New Zealand), and deduced corresponding regime types.

Ad b) Esping-Andersen lays his focus mainly on two analytical dimensions, namely the level of de-commodification and social stratification. More recent proposals add various other dimensions depending on different theoretical considerations. Leibfried (1992) or Castles and Mitchell (1993) introduced poverty and poverty-oriented policies or benefit equality (e.g. taxation) as additional dimensions. Siaroff's proposal (1994) answers to the objection of neglecting the gender dimension, and considered new indicators such as the family orientation of the welfare system or female work desirability. Ferrera (1996), Bonoli (1997), or Soede et al. (2004) applied differentiated institutional dimensions (e.g. eligibility rules, benefit formulae, scope of policies). This obviously incomplete list was supplemented by further dimensions such as governance (Korpi and Palme 1998) or values (Fux 2002).

Ad c) As already mentioned, the gender blindness of Esping-Andersen's approach led to typologies which either integrated gender and family-related aspects into the setting of relevant dimensions (e.g. Leibfried, Korpi and Palme or Soede et al.), or restricted their classifications to particular policy fields such as gender policies (Siaroff 1994; Künzler 2002) or family policies (Fux 2002).

Ad d) Beside technical reasons such a lack of appropriate comparable data, it was considered common sense for almost half a century that the welfare state has to be taken as a project of the Western hemisphere in the sense of a response to the particular developmental problems of capitalism and modernisation. Comparative research therefore made virtually no effort to analyze the particularities of Eastern European welfare systems. Early attempts to situate transition states started[3] in the late 1980s and focused on the margins of the welfare state (e.g. family policy) rather than on central institutions (e.g. social insurance). During the last decade, comparative analyses were hampered by the rapid social and political change, in conjunction with people's multiple uncertainties. One can currently observe a joint effort at attempting to make up this lost ground.

Ad e) probably the most important shortcoming of Esping-Andersen's approach is that he does not provide an exhaustive explanation of the historic growth of European welfare regimes on different trajectories. His empirical analyses mainly reflect the situation in the post-war period, and in the late 1980s in particular, and suppose a far-reaching path dependency of national welfare policies. Jens Borchert (1998) argues that it is essential to integrate a historical-genetical perspective where different

[3] Among such attempts one should mention the first round of PPA–surveys, in which Hungary and the Czechoslovakia also participated, in addition to the GDR.

"critical junctures" in certain periods such as the genesis of Western European welfare states before World War I, the reconstitution of these policies during the interwar period and the current reforms in many countries would be analyzed separately and contrasted with a mere typological approach.

In this respect, it is expedient to refer to Stein Rokkan's and Peter Flora's (Flora et al. 1999) approach, which links a functionalist theory of modernisation with conceptual mapping of European welfare states. In other words, they elucidate both the developments and the current shaping of different welfare regimes as a result of four historical junctures, namely (1) the Reformation-Counterreformation movements of the 16th and 17th centuries, (2) the national revolutions of the post-Napoleonic era, (3) the Industrial Revolution, and (4) the international revolution of 1917. These critical junctures created country-specific sets of cleavages which determine a country's social and political conditions until the present. Therefore, Rokkan also assumes path dependency, even if this has been transposed to a higher level.

According to Rokkan's approach, the following divides and cleavages define the conceptual map of Europe. The edict of Milan (313 AD) divided the Eastern and Western Roman Empires. In the Eastern European countries with Autocephal Orthodox Churches, as well as in the areas conquered by the Muslims, autocratic political systems prevailed, while in the Western countries a political constitutionalism became the predominant feature. The corresponding clientelism (or paternalism) characterizing the Eastern trajectory subsequently hampered the processes of democratization and economic growth.[4] Regarding the private sphere, a major distinction of the countries with a Byzantine heritage is their prevalence of patrilinear kinship systems (e.g. lineage-centered naming and forms of settlement) as well as the principle of seniority whereby siblings were ranked according to their age, and the firstborn male child receives all or his parents' most significant and valuable property. In many regions of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, a gendered division of labour supported the persistence of these male-dominated structures and thus patrilinear systems of kinship. Arranged marriages were frequent and the penetration of principles of church marriage laws was comparatively weak. Furthermore, the proportions of multi-generational and complex households are significantly higher than in Western parts of Europe (Therborn 2004). Not by accident, this divide between the Eastern and Western Roman Empires matches quite well with Hajnal's (1965) line between Trieste and St. Petersburg separating Eastern and Western marriage patterns.

Although Rokkan's original conceptual map ends with the Iron Curtain, the four above-mentioned junctions can easily be applied to Eastern Europe as well (Aarebrot and Berglund 1995). He identifies first a North–South axis based on the integration of the State and the Church in the aftermath of the Reformation. The Protestant countries in the North represented extensive integration and subordination of religious leadership to the State, and led to the formation of state Churches.

[4] Clientelism is obviously also a phenomenon that could be found in other rural peripheries such as, Southern Italy.

In the mixed Protestant and Catholic countries, as well as in the secularized Catholic countries (e.g. France and Belgium), the State gained a considerable degree of autonomy from religion, albeit on the individual level the Roman Catholic doctrine influenced citizens' thinking and behaviour. Both the Protestant countries as well as the secularized Catholic countries successfully isolated religious interest from governance.[5] The Counter Reformation Catholic countries, by contrast, permit one to observe a dualism between the religious and the secular authority, and the Roman Catholic Church obtained an often conflicting influence on state interests and governance. The lack of secularization furthered on the micro level of individual ambivalences and even anti-etatist attitudes. In the Orthodox and Muslim countries, finally, there is an amalgamation of religious leadership and state power which is moreover often linked with strong clientelist ties. In other words, secularization is still at odds with religion in these areas.[6]

The second axis identified by Rokkan passing from West to East is based on the strength of establishment of the political centre, the city networks and trade routes, and is therefore linked with the third critical juncture, namely the Industrial Revolution. In the centre, we find the city-belt countries, which are characterized by an early outset of industrialization and the growth of strong commercial city networks and trade routes on the one hand, and weak political centres on the other. The weakness of the State was balanced out by co-opting the main interest groups by means of consociational devices.[7] The city-belt runs from the North of Italy (Venice and Milan) across the Alps and along the Rhine to the Low Countries and the industrial centres of Great Britain.

These countries are surrounded on both sides by Eastern and Western Empire states, characterized by early state formation with strong political centres and weak commercial city networks. In the West, one should mention Denmark, the UK, France, Spain and Portugal. In the East, mainly the historical Empires of Russia and Turkey and as designated by Aarebrot and Berglund – the Eastern Defense Empire States Sweden, Prussia-Germany and Austro-Hungary. The latter subsequently crumbled to form a large group of countries which could be further broken down into sub-groups according their religions. In the wake of the international revolution (Rokkan's fourth critical juncture) and by virtue of the creation of the "iron wall", most of these split-offs were re-unified under the communist regime.

On the bases of these three fundamental divides, the growth of different welfare regimes can be reconstructed as follows. In the Northern European countries with political centres that were strong but largely independent from the Roman Catholic Church, where furthermore the social-democratic labour movement was integrated

[5] The conflict between the State and the Church over control of the school system during the nineteenth Century illustrates this issue.

[6] According to Aarebrot and Berglund (1995, 217), secularization in Russia and Turkey could only take place after Lenin and Atatürk, and served rather to strengthen the non-democratic option in the same way that religion had legitimized traditional authoritarianism during the old regimes.

[7] This strategy is well documented in the literature under the terms of e.g. "verzuiling" in the Netherlands; "familles spirituelles" in Belgium or "Proporz" in Switzerland.

into political decision-making, generous redistributive and equality-oriented welfare systems developed early. Similar welfare systems also developed later in the former communist countries, although these were to a much greater degree imposed on the population by authoritarian regimes, and neglected the heterogeneous cultural particularities of these countries. Because of the pivotal role played by the State, this path of modernisation can be referred to as an etatistic trajectory.

Countries sharing the experience of Roman Law and Catholic doctrine anchored their welfare systems in the principle of subsidiarity. Instead of an all-embracing state, institutions on lower levels – particularly the family – were clearly favoured as major welfare actors, since in the tradition of natural justice the family is seen as the catalyst of the state. However, there are distinct interpretations of the concept of subsidiarity. Within the non-secularized Counter Reformation countries, the family or kinship networks function as principal welfare providers. Mostly corporatist and comparatively poor welfare instruments serve as supplements whenever the primary networks fail. Corresponding policies target rather equity and fostering civil society than equality and social integration. Welfare systems in the Orthodox countries and the Muslim areas are similar, but as a result of traditional authoritarianism, kinship ties are of a pronounced clientelistic nature. Thirdly, the secularized Catholic countries also follow the same path, but with the distinction that the concept of subsidiarity has been detached from its religious origin and has been reinterpreted in a more secular way,[8] and that it was possible for refined welfare systems on an average level of social expenditure to develop due to the primacy of the state. I would like to refer to this second path of modernisation as the familialistic trajectory.

The city-belt states developed neither strong political centres, nor strong bureaucratic apparatus. Because of the early industrialization and the salient position in trade and commerce, a powerful bourgeois patriciate arose which is characterized on the one hand by its openness and tolerance, and on the other hand by considerable confidence in the market mechanism. Liberal constitutions were established in all of these countries, even if in some of the city-belt countries political power was split among different interest groups. The combination of liberalism and cooptation of heterogeneous interests led to complicated decision-making processes, which obviously hampered the growth of generous welfare systems. Residual social policies are based on individuals' self-responsibility and on trust in their capacity to organize their own interests. Therefore, we label this feature the etatistic trajectory.

To resume our considerations, we can state first that Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states was path-breaking since he was able to show that the growth of welfare systems is not only a response to fundamental societal developments, but that there are distinct solutions as to how countries can manage the challenging issues of structural disparities and risks with which individuals are confronted. Although his proposal secondly has been criticized (e.g. that the number of regimes is too small,

[8] Franz Schultheis (1988) has done a stirling job of reconstructing this phenomenon for France, showing that French family policy emerged from the struggles between paternalist, natalist, and familialist interest groups.

that his argumentation is based on a snapshot of Europe in the 1970s and 1980s only, that he intermingles ideal types (as defined by Max Weber) and real-types, and neglects the dimensions of gender and the family), we also should take into account that his principle results have been confirmed by various alternative typologies that are based on different theoretical backgrounds. Thirdly, there are two main reasons to scrutinize this typology here, namely the problem linked with his ahistorical explanation (see: path dependency) and the necessity to widen the spectrum to include Eastern European countries, which until now have been examined in virtually no study of regime typology. In positive terms: Our approach attempts to reduce the hiatus between structural-functionalist modernisation theories and regime-typological approaches. The starting point is Stein Rokkan's conceptual map of Europe. This permits us in particular to transpose path dependencies to a macro-analytical level or, in other words, to reduce similar types of welfare systems to similar historical conditions. Against this background, hypotheses can be formulated on the current state and future growth of the welfare state in Eastern and Western Europe.

4.2 Theoretical Approach and Design of the Analyses

The current structure of a country's welfare system is obviously not the result of accidental structural and cultural conditions. Actors on the macro level (such as political interest groups, governments, etc.), as well as on the micro level (individuals and families) are considered as embedded in a network of interdependent relations. Both evaluate societal processes and react to each other's demands. The outcome, namely the implementation of particular welfare policies, is therefore the result of a complex trade-off between sub-systems where the actors refer to external factors (e.g. historical caesurae, cultural traditions and values, the economy and socio-structural preconditions), as well as evaluating earlier activities and those effects. The government, just as families and individuals, are considered to be rational actors trying to balance their limited resources[9] and the behavioural outcome within this bargaining. Such a "discourse" or "dialogue" between actors on different levels is called a system of dynamic interdependencies (see Fig. 4.1).



Fig. 4.1 Model of dynamic interdependences

[9] The configuration of caesurae, cultural traditions and socio-structural conditions constitutes the resources that restrict the scope of action.

Esping-Andersen constructed his typology (in line with the power resources approach) against the background of three interacting factors, namely (1) the nature of class mobilization, (2) class-political action structures, and (3) the historical legacy of regime institutionalization (1990, 29). The latter is measured (a) by the level of de-commodification and (b) by the kind of stratification and solidarities.[10]

In order to avoid a class deterministic explanation, we apply the following factors: By dividing between the socio-cultural background on the one hand, and structural preconditions on the other, we consider (a) a set of values. Regarding the structural dimension, (b) a country's economical performance, (c) human development, and (d) governance will be taken into account. These four groups of external variables cover the four poles of Talcott Parsons' AGIL scheme. In order to appoint the pivotal actors, we select (e) polity variables (e.g. development of the party composition of the cabinet) as well as (f) policy variables and (g) indicators measuring politics. The latter cover views of the parliaments on demographic issues and corresponding policies. Policies are obviously the core dimension. In this regard, we focus on the level and structure of social expenditure, as well as on gender- and family-related policies. Unfortunately, comparable data which would make it possible to describe policies on lower levels (e.g. voluntary associations, individuals) are lacking. Their role and impact will be considered indirectly via the structure of welfare provision. As to the outcome, we concentrate (h) on previous behaviour expressed in major demographic indicators. Finally, we include (i) female labour force participation as an important dimension of actual behaviour. The analyses cover mainly the period 1990–2002. All variables, operationalizations and sources are listed in the Appendix (Appendix, Table 4.6).

4.2.1 Scope and Design of the Study

The major aim of this chapter is to situate the countries participating in the DIALOG project regarding their population-related policies in a broader European context, and in particular to indicate similarities and differences in their past, and possibly also future, welfare state development.

A further and more theoretical aim is to contribute to a reconciliation of structural-functionalist modernisation theories and regime-typological approaches. Against this background, the scope of the following analyses and the main hypotheses can be formulated.

Modernisation means a long-term process of social change. The social structure developed towards functionally-differentiated societies, and traditional economies were replaced by functionally-differentiated social organizations and advances in

[10] Decommodification signifies the degree to which a (social) service is rendered as a matter of right, and the degree to which a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market (Esping-Andersen 1990: pp. 21–22). In addition, he takes into account which social stratification system is promoted by a certain social policy and whether the welfare state builds narrow or broad solidarities.

technology. Modernisation refers therefore to baseline trends such as, first of all, the democratization of wealth due to the processes of industrialization and tertiarisation, secondly the secularization of the value system and therefore a continuous spread of values such as equality, freedom of choice and security, and finally a trend towards individualism in the sense of increasing appreciation of achievement and self-responsibility (see also footnote 2). Liberal-democratic political ideals also spread in line with these structural trends, whilst secular and materialist values promoted new styles of living that are based on an individualist and achievement-oriented culture. Obviously, the growth of modern welfare regimes is systematically interwoven with the modernisation of societies. Although structural-functionalist theorists stressed the universal or global scope of corresponding developments, one should not overlook the fact that modernisation also supports national particularities as well as their identities.

Regarding our research topic, we assume that modernisation does not necessarily imply a convergence in both a structural and in a cultural sense. On the contrary, we hypothesize that three main distinct trajectories of modernisation can be identified (see Fig. 4.2). A first path is characterized by stressing the structural aspects of modernisation, aiming to guarantee or at least to improve equal opportunities for all citizens. As was shown in the introduction, strong, secularized political centres are an essential prerequisite for this etatistic trajectory. A second path focuses on cultural modernisation and intends particularly to refine individual independence and freedom of choice. Pluralism of socio-structural development emphasized individualist values and established a residual welfare system in which more obligations imposed on the responsibility of the individuals determine the individualistic trajectory. A third pattern of modernisation centres on value security and intends to reconcile the legacy of tradition with the promises of modernity. The resulting welfare system reverts much more to intermediate organizations (e.g. voluntary associations, civil society) and intergenerational solidarity. To examine whether these three trajectories can be validated is the first objective of this study.



Fig. 4.2 Trajectories of modernisation

A deliverable based on our interpretation of Rokkan's approach in the introduction was a conceptual map according to which the Eastern and Western European countries can be clustered into nine groups. A second objective is to reduce the number of groups and to examine the hypothesized correlation with the above-mentioned trajectories.

We refer in our analyses to a relatively broad sample of about 40 countries,[11] going beyond those participating in the DIALOG project. To situate the 14 countries involved in the Population Policy Acceptance Survey is a further objective.

Welfare typologies were formed by clustering countries on the basis of very different indicators.[12] Here, we choose the following three-step design: First, we apply principal component analysis to each of the above nine dimensions in order to group the countries according to their scores regarding the main factors. Secondly, we analyze the grouping by means of correlations, presuming that an assumed isomorphism on the four poles of the AGIL scheme, the three dimensions measuring welfare policies and the two behavioural dimensions indicates a latent construct, namely the three postulated trajectories of modernisation. Finally, all factors will be input into a cluster analysis in order to validate the typology. Such a design obviously provides neither a causal explanation, nor does it allow an examination of particular impact hypotheses. Nevertheless, we expect a fruitful validation of our theoretical considerations.

A striking finding of the present literature on welfare regimes is the relative robustness of the different classifications (Arts and Gelissen 2002, 151ff). But to which cluster do the rapidly-developing Eastern European countries belong? In this respect, an additional analytical building block can be useful. Robert Cliquet pleaded for a "resource-restrictions behaviour" model (Cliquet et al. 1992), according to which particular thresholds or facilities could disturb the correspondences between the socio-cultural framework on the one hand and the behavioural outcome on the other. This idea is valuable for our purpose as it assumes that within the group of the late transition countries the current economic situation hampers the implementation of requisite adjustments to the welfare systems. On the other hand, we particularly expect a rapid rapprochement to take place in the Eastern European Catholic countries towards the cluster of their sibling countries in the West.

[11] Europe as defined here includes all countries up to the borders of Russia. Only small countries are left out (e.g. Liechtenstein, Gibraltar, San Marino and Monaco). Where possible, Western Germany (FRG) and Eastern Germany (former GDR) were presented separately. A small number of countries must be excluded from individual analyses because of a lack of data.

[12] The indicator variables widely vary according to the authors' theoretical assumptions. Here is a list of indicators used in selected typologies: *Esping-Andersen:* Decommodification, Stratification; *Leibfried:* Poverty, social insurance and poverty policy; *Castles and Mitchell:* Welfare expenditure, Benefit equality, Taxes; *Siaroff:* Family welfare orientation, Female work desirability, Extent of family benefits being paid to women; *Ferrera:* Rules of access (eligibility), Benefit formulae, Financing regulations, Organizational-managerial arrangements; *Bonoli:* Bismarck and Beveridge model, Quantity of welfare state expenditure; *Korpi and Vogel:* Bases of entitlement, Benefit principle, Governance of social insurance programme.

4.3 Europe's Cultural Zones

In order to operationalize the European value system, we applied Likert-type scales as well as single items. Inglehart's scales measuring secular-rational values, self-expression and postmodernism establish the main dimension, namely traditional vs. modern (Inglehart and Baker 2000). As an indicator to separate the territories following the familialistic trajectory, we developed a scale of familialism, measuring the strength of family ties. Furthermore, the proportions of the major religious denominations and church attendance has been entered the analysis. In addition, political attitudes, the valuation of authoritarianism (government orientation), competition, achievement orientation, and equality, were taken into consideration.

The results of a principal component analysis,[13] summarized in Table 4.1, confirm that the traditional (authoritarian, orthodox)[14] vs. modern and religious vs. secular (self-expression, familialism) span the main axis of Europe's cultural map. These explain 27.4% and 23.1% of the variance. A third factor splits Catholic vs. Protestant countries (12.95). Further factors – both are significantly weaker – are defined by the variables competition and achievement, and equality, Islam and political attitudes, respectively.

Figure 4.3 will visualize these findings by means of a biplot, which locates the variables (and factors) as well as the individual countries in one single graph. The results fit surprisingly well with our theoretical considerations. We can first observe that the Nordic countries, as well as the liberal and the economically more developed Catholic countries, rank highest on the modern side, in stark contrast to the Balkan countries and the late transition states. The former groups, however, differ on the second axis. The Scandinavian and the liberal countries are more secular than e.g. Belgium, France or Austria, which in this respect correspond with the Southern European countries, as well as with the Eastern European Catholic group. One exception has to be mentioned. The Czech Republic is comparable with the other Eastern European Catholic countries as regards the degree of modernisation, but is more secular. Aarebrot and Berglund (1995, 218) had shown that Czechoslovakia already belonged to the highly-secular countries in the Inter-War Period. We can furthermore deduce from the figure that religious legacies are highly relevant among Eastern European countries. The Protestant countries (Eastern Germany, Estonia and Latvia) indicate a similar degree of modernisation, but are more secularized. Again, the communist legacy obviously furthered the secularization of the Balkans

[13] Principal component analysis (PCA) is a classical technique employed to reduce the number of variables (dimensions) in order to detect structures in the relationships between variables. In statistical terms, it is a linear transformation that chooses a new coordinate system for the selected data such that the greatest variance by any projection of the dataset comes to lie on a first axis (called the first factor or first principal component), and the second greatest variance on the second axis (second factor or second principal component). As an example, the first principal component or first factor in Table 4.1 represents a high prevalence of rational and postmaterialist values in line with a weak government orientation and a highly reticent stance towards from the Orthodox denomination. The meaning of this factor can be interpreted as a syndrome of "modern" values, while the second factor is much more closely correlated with variables indicating "secularisation".

[14] Significant correlating variables in brackets.

Table 4.1 Items indicating Europe's value system (PCA factor scores)

		Factor 1 modern values	Factor 2 secular values	Factor 3 Prot. vs. Cathol.	Factor 4 competi-tiveness	Factor 5 Islamic values
Modern rational values	*secular*	0.95	–0.07	0.04	–0.03	–0.04
Government orientation	*gov*	–0.92	0.02	–0.01	–0.03	0.14
Postmaterialism	*postmat*	0.88	0.16	–0.04	–0.18	0.20
Orthodox	*Ortho*	–0.77	0.06	0.29	–0.25	0.11
Self-expression values	*s.exp*	0.03	0.95	0.13	0.05	–0.03
Church attendance	*attend*	0.16	–0.80	–0.49	–0.07	–0.13
Familialism	*fam*	0.29	0.76	0.31	0.22	0.00
No denomination	*none*	–0.16	0.62	–0.17	–0.37	–0.07
Catholic	*Cath*	0.26	–0.29	–0.85	0.09	–0.12
Protestant	*Prot*	0.53	0.19	0.66	0.23	–0.25
Competition	*compete*	–0.27	0.12	0.21	0.86	0.06
Achievement	*achiev*	0.42	–0.03	–0.30	0.69	0.31
Equality	*eq*	0.07	0.03	–0.14	0.19	0.79
Islam	*Muslim*	–0.16	–0.42	0.35	0.14	0.60
Left-wing orientation	*left*	–0.22	0.21	0.22	–0.46	0.58
Variance explained		**27.4**	**23.1**	**12.9**	**9.7**	**8.3**

and the late transition states, independently from their strong traditionalism. A distinct position is occupied by Turkey, which combines religiousness and traditionalism. In general, one can state that these results fully support our theory-based grouping as formulated in the introduction.



Fig. 4.3 A cultural map of Europe (biplot)
Key: F-1 to F-5 : rotated factors of the principal component analysis Variables/scales (greyed) : see details in Table 4.6 and Appendix; Country short keys: see details in Appendix; DIALOG countries are boxed in Missing (due to a lack of) : ALBA, CYP, DK, GR, LUX, RU

Were one to try to locate the DIALOG countries on this cultural map, one can say that on the first axis (indicating the degree of modernisation), Finland, the Netherlands, Germany (FRG), and Switzerland rank highest, at approximately the same level. This group shows slight differences on the second axis which indicates secularisation. On this dimension, Finland and the Netherlands rank slightly higher. Austria, Belgium (Flanders) and Italy are also situated right of centre, indicating a certain degree of modernisation. They are however slightly less secularised. The latter holds true also for Slovenia, Hungary and Lithuania, with the difference that these permit one to observe average values on the modernisation axis. All other DIALOG countries (Estonia, Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland) are also characterized by moderate modernisation. However, they vary widely on the secularisation axis. While Poland is comparable in this respect with Ireland or even Turkey, Estonia, Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic in particular are as secular as e.g. Finland.

4.4 Economic and Social Development, Governance

Because of the internal congruence in the results, we discuss the results of the economic resources, human development and governance together. The Principal Component Analysis of the economic indicators (Table 4.2), namely the wealth of the countries (GDP/c), unemployment rates, and inflation, shows a very strong first factor (explaining 54% of the variance), while the second factor (inflation) separates mainly the late transition countries from all others. The Principal Component Analysis of the human development indicators, the gender empowerment measures and the governance indicators even led to one single factor indicating a strong East–West divide.

Economic performance and social development are closely correlated with the degree of modernisation (Fig. 4.4). The countries are equally distributed as to economic performance. By contrast, social development still shows a gap between East and West, and between the late transition countries and the other European states. Turkey

Table 4.2 Economic indicators (PCA factor scores)

		Factor 1 wealth	Factor 2 crisis
Per capita GDP 1995	*gdp_c_95*	0.91	–0.31
Per capita GDP 2002	*gdp_c_02*	0.90	–0.33
Per capita GDP 1990	*gdp_c_90*	0.90	–0.28
Per capita GDP 2000	*gdp_c_00*	0.90	–0.33
Unemployment rate 2000	*unempl_00*	–0.83	–0.39
Unemployment rate 1995	*unempl_95*	–0.69	–0.49
Inflation 1992	*infla_92*	–0.60	0.34
Inflation 2000	*infla_00*	–0.11	0.87
Inflation 2002	*infla_02*	–0.17	0.85
Inflation 1996	*Infla_96*	–0.25	0.83
Variance explained		**54.0**	**25.5**



Fig. 4.4 Economic and social development vs. modernisation

is clearly an outlier due to deficits regarding gender equalization as well as governance. These findings indicate that the advanced Eastern European countries are making up for their lost economic ground, while social modernisation is more inert.

Among the DIALOG – countries, there are gradual differences in their economical performance (wealth), as well as in their social development. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Austria and Belgium rank highest with regard to both dimensions, followed by Italy and the Eastern European DIALOG countries. In this group, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary demonstrate slightly better performance than Estonia and Lithuania. Poland's economy is comparable with that of Lithuania, but it ranks slightly higher when it comes to social development.

4.5 Demographic Trends and Their Governmental Evaluation

This section focuses on two aspects. On the one hand, we attempt to cluster the countries under observation according to their demographic structure, and on the other hand we analyze the governmental views on recent demographic developments and whether they assess corresponding policies as necessary.

Nineteen demographic indicators measuring population growth, dependency rate, migration, marital behaviour (rate and age at first marriage), fertility (TFR and extramarital fertility), divorce and life expectancy were entered into a principal component analysis (Table 4.3). A first factor (34.9%) indicates whether or not a country experienced the second demographic transition, and particularly the strength and spread of post-transitional conditions, namely a decrease in and postponement of marriage, (early) increasing extra-marital birth rates, and a high life-expectancy. This factor splits the Western and Eastern hemispheres. The scores rank highest in the Northern European countries, followed by the liberal countries, the Western Catholic countries and Southern Europe. The second factor (24.0%) covers reproductive behaviour and shows the highest scores in the Balkan and Islamic territories,

Table 4.3 Factors related to demographic development (PCA scores)

		Factor 1 2nd demo. transition	Factor 2 reproduc-tive beh.	Factor 3 migration trends	Factor 4 marital behaviour
First marriage age 2000	*marage00*	0.940	–0.034	0.050	0.235
First marriage age 1990	*marage90*	0.938	0.012	0.116	0.190
Life expectancy (m) 2002	*lexp02_m*	0.894	–0.066	0.280	–0.020
Marriage rate 1990–2000	*df_marr*	0.835	0.278	0.135	–0.215
Life expectancy (f) 2002	*lexp02_f*	0.832	–0.349	0.224	0.112
Extramarital births 1990	*extra90*	0.611	0.176	–0.572	0.447
Pop. growth 1995–2002	*pop95_02*	0.544	0.522	0.448	–0.079
TPFR 1995	*igf95*	0.072	0.941	0.174	–0.017
TPFR 2000	*igf00*	0.326	0.866	0.065	–0.023
TPFR 1990	*igf90*	–0.415	0.838	–0.117	0.108
Dependency rate 2002	*dep_r02*	0.420	–0.763	–0.058	0.176
Migration balance 1990	*migs_90*	0.234	0.101	0.843	0.187
Extramarital births 2000	*extra00*	0.398	0.038	–0.702	0.547
Pop. growth 1990–1995	*pop90_95*	0.356	0.563	0.665	–0.188
Net migration 1995	*migs_95*	0.433	0.012	0.567	–0.256
Net migration 2000	*migs_00*	0.458	0.165	0.549	0.097
Dependency rate 1990–2000	*dif_dep_r*	0.023	–0.068	–0.100	–0.739
Divorce rate 2000	*div_r*	0.229	–0.133	–0.088	0.683
Marriage rate 2000	*marr00*	0.210	0.422	0.341	–0.521
Variance explained		**34.9**	**24.0**	**14.5**	**6.4**

followed by the Nordic countries. The Eastern European Protestant countries come in last. A weaker (14.5%) third factor is related mainly to migration. Loadings are highest in the West and South of Europe, as well as in Turkey. Finally, the fourth factor (6.4%) covers ageing and divorce behaviour. Scores are highest in the Protestant countries, both in East and West.

The genesis and diffusion of a new demographic regime since the 1970s, known as the second demographic transition, constitutes a process which, according to van de Kaa (2002) or Surkyn and Lesthaeghe (2002), is caused, firstly, by socio-economic progress in society, secondly by a population's cultural endowment and, thirdly, by technological improvements and their application. In this sense, there is no doubt that demographic trends are correlated with modernisation. However, as we will illustrate, this connection is obviously not that simple.

The first demographic factor covers major elements of the post-transitional regime – or the individualistic family model as it is referred to by van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe. The scattergram with the scores of this factor on the one axis, and modernized values on the other, shows a significant correlation. Reproductive behaviour (factor 2), however, seems to be – at least at first glance – independent of modern values. An in-depth analysis, which would go beyond the scope of this article, could probably show that, for instance, temporal structures could have an intervening impact (see e.g. Fux 1994).[15]

[15] For example: The commencement of the new demographic regime varies country by county. The behavioral adjustment with such new conditions frequently causes a rapid drop in fertility, followed later on by a recovery phase. Such processes cannot be detected on the basis of cross-sectional data.

Factor three, which covers migration processes, is of a different nature. Here, we assume that net migration can be seen rather as short- and medium-term responses to country-specific labour market conditions.

As to the relationship between divorce (factor 4) and modernisation, we observe at least that the scores are highest in both Protestant country groups. Furthermore, if instead of modernism (factor 1 of the value system) the degree of secularization will be plotted against the fourth demographic factor, we obtain a correlation, even if it is rather weak. As we know from comparative legal studies, civil law is significantly more tolerant towards divorce in Protestant countries than in the Roman law tradition.

In order not to exceed the scope of this chapter, we outline only briefly the results of the analyses on the evaluation of demographic trends by the government, as well as the correlation between the composition of the national cabinets and modern values.

As to the former, there is evidence that in countries where the second demographic transition started comparatively early, and where the new demographic conditions are consolidated, the government is scarcely concerned about the ongoing processes. We observe, furthermore, that these views mainly cover the factual demographic issues. For instance, in countries with pronounced immigration, ageing or mortality, these obvious topics are also a matter of political concern. By consequence, we find a correlation between the indicator of modernisation and the evaluation of demographic trends (1st factor) which indicates a significant gap between East and West. The party composition (the poles of the first factor are formed by pure Social Democratic and pure post-communist regimes) also indicates a similar correlation.

If one attempts to situate the DIALOG countries in the first factor, which is by far the most relevant to a characterization of the demographic structures, one can state that there is a three-fold stratification. Finland follows the Nordic pattern (early start of the second demographic transition and pronounced post-transitional structures). A rather large group of countries, namely the Netherlands, Switzerland, Western Germany (FRG), Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Eastern Germany (GDR) and Belgium, shows relatively minor differences in this respect. However,



Fig. 4.5 Demographic trends (1st and 2nd factors) vs. modernisation



Fig. 4.6 Governmental views on demographic trends and cabinet composition vs. modernisation

these are clearly delimitated as against a third group consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania, which launched later, or at a more moderate pace, into the second demographic transition.

4.6 The Welfare State and Behavioral Outcome

We have already mentioned the broad variety of the dimensions with which the structures of welfare systems are measured (see footnote 12). Here, we focus on the following dimensions: (a) the extent or generosity of benefits (total social expenditure), (b) welfare recipients (exp. by old-age, health, family, unemployment and others), (c) the benefit formulae (universal or targeted), measured via the coverage of provisions and variables indicating whether policies are gender- or equality-oriented, and whether or not provisions are parity-specific, (d) the structure of family-related policies (enrolment, allowances, leave schemes), (e) the governance of welfare policies as an (obviously weak) indicator of the delegation of obligation to a plurality of lower-level institutions (expenditure for administrative purposes).

The Principal Component Analysis (Table 4.4) of this broad set of indicators led to four factors where at first sight the generosity and scope of welfare activities (i.e. encompassing family-oriented welfare regimes) is the most influential by far (explained variance: 39.9%). A second factor (15.3%) covers mainly the strength of the family dimension within the welfare systems, particularly the generosity of parental leave schemes. The child orientation of family policies forms a further factor (9.3%), and finally the centrality of the State creates a fourth factor (7.2).

The result regarding the extent of national welfare systems supports the obvious North–South divide of total social expenditure (Fig. 4.7). The Northern European countries, followed by the secularized Catholic countries in the West, have developed generous benefit systems. The Eastern European Catholic and Protestant countries take up average positions, while the extent of welfare provision is lowest in the

Table 4.4 Factors related to the development of the welfare state (PCA scores)

		Factor 1 Encomp. and family-oriented	Factor 2 Universal, equality-oriented	Factor 3 Primarily child-oriented	Factor 4 Residualism, fragmentation
Total social expenditure	*exp_tot*	0.90	0.21	0.18	0.16
Fathers entitled to leave	*male_leave*	0.87	0.09	−0.01	−0.06
Total expenditure: health	*exp_health*	0.81	0.16	0.25	−0.04
Total exp.: unemployment	*exp_unemp*	0.80	0.17	0.04	0.11
Total exp.: age, survivors	*exp_old*	0.77	0.12	−0.02	0.07
Enrolment 0–3, 2001	*enrol01*	0.75	−0.29	0.24	0.03
Enrolment 0–3, 1993	*enrol93*	0.74	−0.26	0.21	0.02
Total expenditure: families	*exp_fam*	0.71	0.42	0.38	0.08
Child allowances	*kizul_ppp*	0.69	−0.02	0.23	0.25
Index maternity leave 1993	*ind_93*	0.07	0.89	0.09	−0.07
Coverage maternity leave	*l_cover_ind*	0.35	0.69	0.20	0.05
Index maternity leave 2002	*ind_02*	0.01	0.68	0.31	0.09
Parity-specific allowances	*parity*	0.22	−0.63	0.49	−0.06
Coverage child allowances	*a_cover_ind*	0.21	0.16	0.77	0.27
Total duration leave	*leave_tot*	0.18	0.24	0.67	−0.17
Total exp.: administration	*exp_admin*	0.04	−0.16	−0.10	0.89
Total exp.: other purposes	*exp_oth*	0.20	0.30	0.18	0.83
Variance explained		**39.9**	**15.3**	**9.3**	**7.2**

Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia), the late transition countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine) and Turkey.

Figure 4.8 broadens this basic dimension by indicating differences in the scope of welfare policies that are clearly linked with modernisation. The less modernized groups (the Balkans, the late-transition and Islamic countries) focus their welfare



Fig. 4.7 Welfare expenditure by policy field and country, 1995



Fig. 4.8 Target differences of welfare policies

systems mainly on the issue of old age, while in the most highly modernized countries it is possible to observe a balanced structure of all distinct policy areas.

Items deriving from the PPA dataset permit one to specify how individuals evaluate the structure as well as the trends of national welfare policies. As an indicator we selected the proportion of respondents answering that the government is currently paying less attention to individual welfare areas than was the case in the recent past (Fig. 4.9).[16] Two findings are worth underlining. Firstly, the responses indicate general satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the Government in the sense that the population does not really differentiate between policy areas. In other words, the political norms on which national welfare systems are based (and thus the foundations on which distinct regime types are based) seem to be universal and are shared by the individuals. There is no indication that the population wishes to change the previous paths. Secondly, we observe a divide which is correlated with the degree of modernisation, even if the small number of countries vitiates such a general assertion.

So far, these results allow a discussion of the major differences between countries regarding the scores in the above factors. We first observe that the first factor includes both the economically-advanced and secularized Catholic countries, as well as the Nordic countries. The main characteristic of this factor is the rather generous and well-balanced structure of welfare expenditure (see Fig. 4.8), with a particular focus on family issues (e.g. male leave entitlement and high enrolment rates). Among the DIALOG countries, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Finland and Austria rank highest as to this factor. Mainly due to the absence of leave entitlement for fathers, lower enrolment rates, and less generous expenditures, the DIALOG countries Switzerland, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary rank on an average level as to this factor, whilst Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic

[16] Based on the variables ci2a to ci2i (without ci2h), which are available in the PPAS data set, albeit not for all countries. We standardized the data by age and restricted the samples to people younger than 55.



Fig. 4.9 Perception/evaluation of policies by individuals

and Romania rank lowest. As to the interplay between the distinct factors, one can point out that the Western European Catholic countries also show comparatively high scores on the third factor (child-oriented welfare system), while the Northern European countries show the highest scores as to the second factor, indicating a universal, equality-oriented welfare state.

The highest scores as to the second factor (universal and equality-oriented system) are achieved by all the Nordic states, or among the DIALOG countries mainly Finland. Particular characteristics of this factor are, in addition to the generous provisions, mainly the high level of provision of leave opportunities, and especially the absence of parity-specific child allowances (no natalism). For historical reasons (communist legacy), some of the Eastern European countries such as Hungary out of the DIALOG group, or Albania, and Croatia, also show a positive score as to this second factor. Particularly the Catholic countries (out of the DIALOG countries Italy and Belgium) rank lowest.

If one takes a look at the third factor which indicates a predominant child orientation (parity-specific allowances, high level of provision of child allowances), we find the highest scores among the Eastern European Catholic countries (out of the DIALOG countries: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic and Slovenia). But we also find comparatively high values in the Western European Catholic group (besides France in particular Germany), and in Estonia.

The fourth factor indicates a highly-fragmented, residual welfare system. Therefore it does not come as a surprise that the liberal states, most prominently Switzerland, show the highest values as to this principal component. All other country groups show only rather slight differences concerning this factor.

These differences in the ranking and the configuration of the four factors are fully congruent with our theoretical considerations insofar as they support the idea of different trajectories in the development of modern welfare systems. We can clearly detect an all-embracing type, namely in the North of Europe (e.g. Finland out of the DIALOG group), focussing on equality and indicating a balance between the different welfare branches (including family policies). Secondly, we find a group favouring the interests of families and children. This consists mainly of countries with a Catholic legacy. We observe the highest scores in the Catholic Eastern European territories, which indicates that these countries were successful in establishing a welfare system during the communist era that was congruent with their particular cultural prerequisites. Finally, the liberal countries, in which more welfare obligations are delegated to a plurality of lower-level institutions, rank highest as regards the fourth factor.

The following Fig. 4.10 illustrates the correlation between the degree of modernisation and the strength of the welfare state.[17] We assume a non-linear structure by taking into account the fact that cultural modernisation have been able to develop even if particularly weak economic conditions hamper the implementation of welfare instruments. We clearly find the assumed ranking order, namely that the Nordic countries, as well as the liberal states and the economically-developed and secularized Catholic countries, are in the pole position, followed by the group of Eastern European Catholic countries (i.e. Slovenia, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic). The late transition countries in particular rank lowest. This finding supports the resource-restriction behaviour model, as formulated by Cliquet.

As the left-hand part of Fig. 4.10 shows (modernisation vs. first welfare factor), there is a correlation between the spread of modern values and the implementation of an all-embracing welfare system also covering the interests of families. Relatively independently of the principles according to which countries organise their welfare



Fig. 4.10 Welfare state arrangements and female labour force participation vs. modernisation

[17] Because all factors support our theoretical suppositions, we only document the first factor.

states, a selection of DIALOG countries, namely Finland, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Italy, are rather homogeneous.

By considering one single behavioural outcome dimension (female labour force participation), the correlation between the structure of the welfare state and the behavioural outcome also finds support. Again, we plead for a non-linear association for the same reasons. A closer look at this figure exposes, on the one hand, the general correlation between behaviour and modern values. On the other hand, we can deduce from the graph that the chosen trajectory is of relevance. When it comes to female labour force participation, gendered welfare systems (there is no obligation to qualify them as conservative, as Esping-Andersen does) do obviously create significant differences in the outcome. The secularized Catholic countries, for example, permit one to observe here an equally high level of cultural modernisation, but lower participation rates than the Nordic, as well as the liberal, countries. Compared to the left-hand part of Fig. 4.10, the countries divide according to their different historical backgrounds. Countries which follow the etatistic trajectory (out of the DIALOG countries this is Finland), and also the liberal countries (Switzerland and the Netherlands), show comparatively high participation rates. Despite the degree of modernisation, women are less frequently integrated into the labour market in Germany, Austria or Belgium. There is a group of Eastern European countries (among the DIALOG group: Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania) which rank at approximately the same level, but which rank lower on the modernisation axis. Finally, Italy together with Poland, and Hungary, make up the rearguard on this axis.

The discussion of these dimensions rounds off our empirical *tour d'horizon*, and we finally proceed to some concluding remarks which can be documented with a cluster analysis in which all analytical dimensions (all factors) were entered.[18]

4.7 Conclusion

Our conclusions are based on the hypothesis that modernisation is something like a "basso continuo" structuring the development of European countries. The welfare state is obviously an important midwife in the birth of modernisation. However, in contrast to structural-functionalist modernisation theories, as formulated in the 1970s, we assume that there are distinct trajectories of modernisation, and by consequence also distinct welfare regimes. The approach of Stein Rokkan, who developed a conceptual map on which differences in the form of modernisation were reduced to the configuration of historical divides, can be easily broadened to include Eastern Europe. Linking up with this approach, we attempted to carve out nine country groups which differ mainly in their cultural legacies, as well as with regard to their social-structural prerequisites. In a subsequent step, we reduced the number of groups based on the hypothesis that there are three trajectories which

[18] For technical reasons, we must exclude Turkey, and therefore the Islamic world, from this analysis.

on the one hand are based, in turn, on different focal values (equality, freedom of choice and security), and on the other on the focal actors, which could be either the state, lower-level institutions and particularly the family, and finally the individual. We argue that the current welfare state arrangements are also bases in this framing. In order to empirically underpin this view, we went on to discuss a number of dimensions, whereas these dimensions are anchored in a macro-sociological actor model. The above results strongly confirm our hypothesis.

If we finally discuss the solution of a K-means cluster analysis[19] where all factors were taken into account (Fig. 4.11), we can summarize the findings as follows. First, we find a relatively dense cluster following the etatistic trajectory. These are the Nordic states. Secondly, there is also a "family of nations" (Castles and Mitchell 1993) in the Eastern hemisphere where the late transition countries are characterized by the persistence of rather traditional structures which stand, however, in opposition to secularization due to their communist legacy. The two other clusters are much wider, and show marked internal differences. These are first



Fig. 4.11 Final cluster solution

[19] Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis tool which aims at sorting different objects into groups in such a way that the degree of association between two objects is highest if they belong to the same group, and otherwise is lowest. Cluster analysis can be used to reveal structures in data without providing an explanation as to why they exist. If one has hypotheses concerning the number of clusters, the K-means method can be applied. This iterative procedure splits a set of objects into a selected number of groups by maximizing variation between items relative to variation within items. In rough terms, one may think of it as as doing a one-way ANOVA where the groups are formed by making the largest F-value possible by reassigning members to each group.

and foremost the countries with a Catholic history. These can be subdivided into those which became secular and developed strong welfare systems based on the concept of subsidiarity. Secondly, we find the non-secularized countries (Counter Reformation countries), which permit one to observe much weaker welfare systems. These prioritize the family as an important actor in this respect. Mutual self-help within the family is partly a substitute for the welfare state. Both sub-groups can be seen as variants of a familialistic trajectory of modernisation. We can also show that Eastern European Catholic countries which are currently divesting themselves of the legacy of their former communism, also tend to prefer this trajectory. Some of them (e.g. Slovenia) have already caught up with the Southern European countries in most respects. This situation is strongly contrasted by a sub-group of the former communist countries, namely those with a Protestant history, which rather tend to develop along the lines of the etatistic trajectory. One group of countries is less easily to identify. The liberal countries, located in the European city-belt, are characterized by strong cultural modernisation. However, due to the weakness of the State and the dominant role of the market, hampering the implementation of strong welfare instruments, these are disposed to mix a highly modern and pluralized culture with partly (phenotypically) traditional forms of behaviour. In our figure, this group, which follows an individualistic trajectory, is located just between the Protestant and the Catholic hemispheres.

A final remark relates to the Eastern European Catholic countries. If Max Weber discerned that the spirit of Protestantism was the driving force behind the development of modern capitalism, we found gentle hints in our analyses that the spirit of Catholicism could be an important force in the forthcoming process of European convergence in the field of welfare policies.

Charles de Gaulle once said "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs", thereby expressing the notion that there are subcutaneous factors defining not least a country's national identity, and subsequently also the implementation of policies. A macroscopic conceptual map as presented here focuses on such determinants as might underpin analyses which are based on individual data. On this basis, one can try to locate the DIALOG countries within the theoretical approach presented.

As to Finland, one can state that this country clearly belongs to the Nordic cluster. Even if the welfare state will probably not experience a further expansion, modern and equality values are more or less common sense. The country also has strong etatist resources at its disposal. These conditions will doubtlessly determine the country's future development.

Liberal and individualistic conditions are relevant factors explaining the situation of the Netherlands or Switzerland. Again, modern values are wide-spread in both countries. Nevertheless, welfare state residualism leads to behavioural outcomes often including conservative elements.

The system of families is a relevant element, both in secularized countries such as Belgium, Austria, and Germany (particularly Western Germany), as well as in Italy. While the former combined this resource with modern welfare systems, the welfare state is less well established in Italy. By consequence, the impact of the family is much more prominent.

If one takes a look at the Eastern European countries participating in the DIALOG project, one can find that etatist elements are still relevant in Estonia, as well as in Eastern Germany (former GDR).

Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia, as well as Cyprus, permit one to observe something like a double-bind situation in the sense that familialistic structures are as relevant as their communist legacy. It seems that particularly Slovenia and Cyprus adjusted their welfare systems more quickly to the direction of the Southern European countries. There are many indicators which permit one to assume that the three other countries will follow this path.

Although familialistic structures are also pertinent in the Czech Republic, one can assume that due to this country's early secularisation, it will combine this resource with etatistic, and/or individualistic elements.

Finally, Romania is characterised by the ongoing process of economic and social transformation, which still hampers the adjustment of the welfare state.

On this basis, one can conclude that the sample of DIALOG countries represents all theoretically-postulated clusters. I expect that the micro-analytical analyses in the present volume will show that the long-term historical factors, as described in this chapter, do have an impact in organising everyday life, as well as concerning the implementation of policies. In this respect, the conceptual map presented can be seen as an attempt to validate the outcome of the DIALOG project.

Appendix

Table 4.5 Country short keys

Country group		Short key	Country (PPA countries outlined)
1	Northern European Countries	DK	Denmark
		ISL	Iceland
		N	Norway
		S	Sweden
		SF	Finland
2	Liberal countries (see: city-belt)	CH	Switzerland
		NL	Netherlands
		UK	United Kingdom
3	Eastern European Protestant C.	D-est	Eastern Germany (former GDR)
		EST	Estonia
		LAT	Latvia
4	Western European Catholic C. (secularized)	A	Austria
		B	Belgium
		D	Western Germany (former FRG)
		F	France
		LUX	Luxembourg
5	Northern and Southern Peripheries (non-secularized Catholic Countries; incl. Greece and Cyprus)	CYP	Cyprus
		E	Spain
		GR	Greece
		I	Italy

Table 4.5 (continued)

Country group	Short key	Country (PPA countries outlined)
	IRL-n	Northern Ireland
	IRL	Ireland
	P	Portugal
6 Eastern European Catholic C.	CRO	Croatia
	CZ	Czech Republic
	H	Hungary
	LIT	Lithuania
	PL	Poland
	SLO	Slovenia
	SR	Slovak Republic
7 Balkan countries	ALBA	Albania
	BOS	Bosnia
	MAZ	Macedonia
	MONTE	Montenegro
	SERB	Serbia
8 Late Transition Countries	BELA	Belarus
	BG	Bulgaria
	MOLD	Moldova
	RU	Romania
	UKR	Ukraine
9 Islamic countries	TR	Turkey

Notes: Countries mentioned but not included in the Analyses: **US** = United States; **NZ** = New Zealand; **AUS** = Australia; **CAN** = Canada; **JAP** = Japan.
Greyed = PPA countries

Table 4.6 Variables and operationalizations

Label	Source	Operationalization
		Cultural variables
cath	***1,2,3,***	Proportion of Catholics, %, (ca. 2000)
prot	***1,2,3,***	Proportion of Protestants, %, (ca. 2000)
ortho	***1,2,3,***	Proportion of Orthodox, %, (ca. 2000)
muslim	***1,2,3,***	Proportion of Muslims, %, (ca. 2000)
none	***1,2,3,***	Prop. without denomination, %, (ca. 2000)
attend	***3,***	Regular attendance at relig. services, %, (ca. 1997)
secular	***3,***	*Scale:* secular-rational (+) vs. traditional (–) values Country's factor scores, (1995–98) based on PCA using 5 items:[20] ("God is important in respondent's life"; "It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination"; "Abortion is never justifiable"; "Respondent has a strong sense of national pride"; "Respondent favours more respect for authority").
s.exp	***3,***	*Scale:* self-expression (+) vs. survival oriented (–) values Country's factor scores, (1995–98) based on PCA using 5 items[21]

[20] As scale construction concerns, see Inglehart/Baker 2000.

[21] As scale construction concerns, see Inglehart/Baker 2000.

Table 4.6 (continued)

Label	Source	Operationalization
		("Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality-of-life"; "Respondent describes self as not very happy"; "Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition"; "Homosexuality is never justifiable"; "You have to be very careful about trusting people".
fam	***3,***	*Scale:* familialism, % with strong (upper quartile) family orientation Likert scale based on 6 items (1995–98)[22]: "Family is important in respondent's life" (v4); "Parents' duty is to do the best for their children even at the expense of their own wellbeing vs. Parents have a life of their own and shouldn't be asked to sacrifice their own wellbeing for the sake of their children" (v13); "Marriage is an out-dated institution" (v94); "More emphasis on family life" (v115); Abortion (Dummy: justified or not) (v199); Divorce (Dummy: justified or not) (v200).
postmat	***3,***	% postmaterialists (1995–1998) Index based on the Inglehart's 12 item Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery[23]
left	***3,***	% with a left-wing orientation (v123: 1–3), (1995–98)
eq	***3,***	% opting for more equality (v125; 1–3), (1995–98)
achiev	***3,***	% opting for achievement (v126: 1–3), (1995–98)
gov	***3,***	% opting for strong role of the government (v127: 1–3), (1995–98)
compete	***3,***	% strongly opting for competition (v128: 1–3)
		Economic variables
G90-G02	***4,***	Per capita gross domestic product (PPPs in US-$) 1990–2002
gdp_90b02	***4,***	*ditto:* Increase of GDP/c 1990–2002 (abs. Values)
mean90_96	***4,***	*ditto:* Mean annual increase of GDP/c 1990–1996 (in %)
mean97_02	***4,***	*ditto:* for 1997–2002
infla_92	***5,***	Inflation rate 1992 (in %) *ditto:* **infla_96, infla_00, infla_02**
Gini	***5,***	Family income Gini index (ca. 2000)
unempl_95	***4,***	Unemployment rate 1995 (%) *ditto:***unempl_00**
		Demographic variables
pop90_95	***6,***	Population growth 1990–1995 (average annual increase in %) *ditto:* **pop95_02**
pop_2002	***6,***	Population on 1st January 2002 (in 1'000)
migs_90	***6,***	Net migration balance 1990 (per 1'000 av. pop.)*ditto:* **migs_95, migs_00**
dep_r02	***6,***	Dependency ratio 2002 (65+ of 15–64)
dif_dep_r	***6,***	Average percentage point difference of dependency r. 1990–2002
marr00	***6,***	Total first marriage rate for females below the age of 50, 2000
df_marr	***6,***	Percentage point difference: TFMR 1990–2000

[22] The scale is similar to the familialism scale developed by Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986.

[23] See: Inglehart and Abramson 1999.

Table 4.6 (continued)

Label	Source	Operationalization
		Cultural variables
marage90	***6,***	Mean age of women at first marriage 1990, *ditto:* **marage00**
div_r	***6,***	Per cent point diff. in female first marr. age 1990–2000
extra90	***6,***	Extramarital births 1990 (per 1'000 births) *ditto:* **extra00**
igf90	***6,***	Total period fertility rate 1990; *ditto:* **igf95, igf00, igf02**
lexp90_m	***6,***	Life expec. at birth men 1990 *ditto:* **lexp90_f**(em.), **lexp02_m, lexp02 _f**
		Social development variables
hdi_90	***7,***	Human Development Index 1990, *ditto:* **hdi _95, hdi_00, hdi_02**
dhdi9095	***7,***	hdi95 minus hdi90, *ditto:* **dhdi9502**
gov_96	***8,***	Governance Index 1996 (civil rights, political stability, efficiency of the government, quality of regulations, rule of law and anti-corruption) 1996; *ditto:* **gov_98, gov_00, gov_02**
GDM_92	***7,***	Gender-related development index 1992, *ditto:* **GDM_98, GDM_02**
GEMP_98	***7,***	Gender empowerment measure 1998, *ditto:* **GEMP_01**
		Views on population policies variables
Vw_frt96	***9,***	View on fertility 1996, *ditto:* **Vw_frt03**
Po_frt96	***9,***	Policy to modify fertility 1996, *ditto:* **Po_frt03**
contra96	***9,***	Access to contraceptive methods 1996, *ditto:* **contra03**
w_pop96	***9,***	View on population growth 1996, *ditto:* **Vw_pop03**
Po_pop96	***9,***	Policy on population growth 1996, *ditto:* **Po_pop03**
age96	***9,***	Ageing of the population 1996, *ditto:* **age03**
exp96	***9,***	Life expectation 1996, *ditto:* **exp03**
Vw_imm96	***9,***	View on immigration level 1996, *ditto:* **Vw_imm03**
Po_imm96	***9,***	Policy on immigration level 1996, *ditto:* **Po_imm03**
Vw_emg96	***9,***	View on emigration level 1996, *ditto:* **Vw_emg03**
Po_emg96	***9,***	Policy on emigration level 1996, *ditto:***Po_emg03**
		Policy variables
kizul_ppp	***10,***	Family allowances 2002 (PPPs in US-$)
leave_tot	***11,***	Total parental leave (in weeks)
f_gdp_93	***4,***	Family cash benefits (in % of GDP, 1993), *ditto:* **f_gdp_98**
m_leav93	***11,***	Maternity leave (1993, in weeks) , *ditto:* **m_leav02**
pay93	***11,***	Percentage of wage replaced (1993, in %)
ind_93	***11,***	Maternity leave index (1993, duration*wage replacement) *ditto:* **pay02**
Parity	***11,***	Parity-specific child allowances (Dummy)
enrol93	***12,***	Gross enrolment rate of the public in early (0–3) childhood education (1993, in %) *ditto:* **enrol01**
l_cover_ind	***2,11,***	Coverage maternity leave (2002, entitled to leave in % of all women), own computations
A_cover_ind	***2,11,***	Coverage child allowances (2002, entitled for allowances in % of all women), own calculations
exp_old	***4,13,14,***	Total expenditure on old age and survivors, (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_health	***4,13,14,***	Total expenditure on health (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_fam	***4,13,14,***	Total expenditure on families (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_unemp	***4,13,14,***	Total expenditure on unemployment (2002, in % of GDP)

Table 4.6 (continued)

Label	Source	Operationalization
exp_oth	***4,13,14,***	Total expenditure on other purposes (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_admin	***4,13,14,***	Total expenditure on administration (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_tot	***4,13,14,***	Total social expenditure (2002, in % of GDP)
male_leave	***12,***	Fathers are entitled to parental leave (2002, Dummy) Gauthier 2004
		Polity variables
G90_r	***15,***	Right-wing in % of all cabinet posts 1990, *ditto:* **G95_r, G00_r, G00_r, G02_r**
G90_c	***15,***	Centre part. in % of all cabinet posts 1990, *ditto:* **G95_c, G00_c, G00_c, G02_c**
G90_l	***15,***	Social Democratic and other left parties in % of all cabinet posts 1990, *ditto:* **G95_l, G00_l, G00_l, G02_l**
G90_pc	***15,***	(Post-)Communist parties in % of all cabinet posts 1990, *ditto:* **G95_pc, G00_pc, G00_pc, G02_pc**

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Table 4.7 Variables and operationalizations

	Values					Econ.		Dev.	Demography				Views		Welfare				Polity				LFP
	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-1	F-2	F-1	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-1	F-2	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	
A	0.73	–0.41	–1.25	1.07	–0.01	1.22	–0.02	0.82	0.57	–0.59	0.55	0.56	–0.78	0.17	0.85	0.05	–0.25	0.31	–0.32	1.74	–0.18	0.79	58.7
B	0.82	0.35	–1.09	–0.63	0.31	0.84	–0.39	0.64	0.20	–0.53	0.48	0.69	–1.32	–0.32	1.48	–1.30	–0.21	0.59	–0.50	–0.11	0.34	1.23	51.1
BELA	–1.30	0.34	0.41	–0.92	–0.97	–0.35	4.43	**–2.07**	–1.23	–0.09	0.01	–0.01	1.23	0.35	–0.38	0.35	–1.84	–0.86	1.62	–0.08	1.02	–0.78	45.3
BG	–1.03	0.31	0.38	–0.64	0.24	–1.19	–0.39	**–1.66**	–0.70	–0.78	–1.17	–0.62	1.17	–0.01	–0.86	0.24	–0.63	–0.75	0.42	0.59	1.10	1.16	47.5
CH	1.37	0.65	–0.23	1.42	1.07	1.70	–0.06	0.96	0.63	–0.59	1.36	–0.26	–0.99	0.90	0.46	–0.51	–1.13	2.90	–0.40	0.32	–0.41	0.34	71.6
CRO	–0.49	0.17	–1.66	1.76	0.69	–0.94	–0.66	–1.06	–0.20	–0.61	0.06	–1.39	1.42	–0.61	–1.60	0.62	–0.05	3.66	0.00	–0.66	–2.34	–0.98	48.9
CYP	**–0.48**	**–0.46**	**0.16**	**–0.06**	**1.35**	0.57	0.22	**–1.09**	0.37	1.31	1.67	–1.38	1.04	1.17	–0.86	–0.39	–0.40	–0.30	–0.24	0.47	0.28	1.24	59.1
CZ	–0.19	1.54	–0.64	1.96	–1.25	0.08	0.01	–0.30	–1.01	–0.71	0.53	0.63	0.42	–1.11	–0.86	0.23	1.10	–0.52	0.26	–1.41	0.75	2.11	57.1
D	1.34	0.60	0.12	0.68	–0.04	0.85	–0.36	0.80	0.40	–0.81	1.73	0.38	–0.98	0.78	1.31	–0.66	1.06	0.51	–0.16	–1.34	1.04	3.08	58.8
DK	**1.24**	**0.26**	**1.76**	**0.39**	**–0.31**	1.22	–0.17	0.95	1.56	0.55	–0.67	0.23	–1.30	0.29	1.42	1.64	–0.12	0.84	–0.95	–0.79	–0.65	–1.13	72.6
E	0.45	–0.37	–0.71	–1.68	0.57	–0.33	–1.02	0.49	0.54	–1.13	1.08	0.26	–0.19	0.17	0.58	–0.48	–1.16	–0.39	–1.41	3.23	0.83	–1.26	44.9
EST	–0.79	0.96	0.80	0.35	–1.16	–0.59	–0.16	–0.50	–0.84	–0.42	–1.76	1.14	0.03	1.22	–0.76	–0.60	1.84	–0.55	0.40	0.54	–0.52	0.20	57.9
F	0.92	0.77	–0.77	–1.14	1.03	0.56	–0.58	0.39	1.19	0.22	–0.59	0.04	–0.41	1.59	1.40	–0.50	1.07	–0.50	–0.63	–0.74	–0.08	0.39	55.8
GR	**–0.59**	**–0.07**	**–0.14**	**–0.23**	**1.06**	0.03	–0.26	–0.18	0.10	–1.25	1.08	–0.85	0.90	1.53	0.27	–1.34	–1.43	0.05	–1.73	–1.34	1.18	–1.13	42.7
H	–0.27	–0.47	–0.53	1.11	–0.54	–0.24	0.08	–0.47	–0.77	–0.32	0.21	0.43	0.96	1.20	–0.61	0.68	2.03	0.40	–0.34	0.29	–0.49	0.42	49.8
I	0.71	–0.28	–1.01	–1.08	0.72	0.58	–0.53	0.13	0.70	–1.49	0.40	–1.38	–0.96	0.30	1.01	–0.95	–0.87	–1.43	0.04	0.20	–0.40	1.31	42
IRL	0.62	–2.33	–1.05	0.22	–0.91	0.54	–0.26	0.65	0.67	1.09	0.10	–0.10	–0.54	–1.73	0.51	–1.41	0.53	0.56	–0.15	–0.24	–1.56	–0.24	55.2
ISL	0.99	–0.24	1.96	1.26	–0.37	1.32	0.14	0.99	1.92	2.07	–1.61	0.56	–1.11	–0.87	**1.37**	**1.05**	**–0.19**	**0.84**	–0.13	1.33	–0.76	0.48	79.8
LAT	–0.81	0.97	0.30	0.30	–1.31	–0.51	–0.02	–0.92	–1.73	–0.52	–0.25	2.84	0.71	0.11	–0.63	0.00	0.36	0.46	0.77	–0.23	–2.03	–0.25	56.8

Table 4.7 (continued)

	Values					Econ.		Dev.	Demography				Views		Welfare				Polity				LFP
	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-1	F-2	F-1	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-1	F-2	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	
LIT	–0.79	0.13	–1.21	0.68	–0.02	–0.64	–0.11	–0.79	–1.31	–0.26	–0.71	–0.05	0.23	0.91	–0.71	0.07	–1.03	–0.29	1.13	0.23	–1.26	–0.25	57.2
LUX	**1.11**	**0.66**	**–0.48**	**–0.84**	**0.27**	**2.50**	**–0.08**	0.81	0.56	0.08	1.82	0.65	–0.71	0.60	1.12	–0.94	0.45	–0.87	–0.11	1.85	–0.16	1.35	51.5
MAZ	–1.33	–0.09	0.33	0.55	1.22	–2.76	–1.77	**–1.05**	–0.46	1.38	–0.06	–1.67	–2.79	–2.16	**–1.06**	**0.23**	**–0.28**	**–0.57**	1.62	–0.08	1.02	–0.78	40.8
MOLD	–1.97	–0.33	0.90	–1.34	–0.31	–1.36	0.24	–2.20	–2.32	0.47	–0.67	0.41	1.46	–1.16	–1.30	0.23	–0.38	–0.53	1.62	–0.08	1.02	–0.78	54.2
N	0.93	–0.02	1.73	0.12	–1.05	1.53	–0.12	1.19	1.04	0.66	–0.48	1.11	–1.00	–0.51	0.80	1.43	0.55	–0.73	–1.05	0.45	0.17	–0.45	73.9
NL	1.38	0.92	–0.17	–2.29	–0.24	1.10	–0.08	1.05	0.59	–0.01	0.56	0.13	–1.30	0.29	1.04	–0.14	–1.07	–0.40	–0.38	0.63	–0.16	0.79	64.7
P	0.41	–0.21	–1.31	–0.54	0.56	0.28	0.03	0.26	0.42	–0.46	–0.07	–1.07	–0.30	0.74	–0.57	–1.13	0.31	0.63	–0.58	–1.23	–0.60	–0.73	60.8
PL	0.09	–2.16	–0.63	–1.19	–1.21	–0.73	–0.29	–0.53	–0.85	0.02	0.23	–0.61	0.46	–0.92	–0.31	–0.45	1.23	–0.78	–0.11	0.44	0.35	–0.12	46.4
RU	**–1.38**	**0.03**	**0.43**	**–0.25**	**0.30**	–0.71	0.84	–1.49	–1.01	–0.39	–0.42	–0.82	1.37	–0.23	–1.08	–1.25	1.25	–0.04	–1.33	0.14	0.65	–0.89	51.8
S	1.48	0.56	2.17	0.21	–0.41	0.74	–0.29	1.13	1.24	0.32	–0.13	2.34	–1.21	–0.53	1.34	2.87	–0.31	–0.05	–1.87	–0.32	1.70	–0.84	73.4
SF	1.57	0.75	1.19	–0.02	0.57	0.41	–0.65	1.05	0.92	0.28	–0.33	0.34	–1.21	–0.33	0.89	1.83	0.10	0.04	–0.76	–0.54	–0.38	–0.48	66.1
SLO	–0.20	0.36	–1.09	0.54	0.29	–0.03	–0.04	–0.12	0.40	–0.73	–0.52	–0.42	0.63	1.25	0.44	–0.51	0.47	0.02	0.52	–0.18	–1.10	0.30	58.6
SR	–0.44	–0.08	–0.65	0.76	–1.01	–0.71	–0.56	–0.72	–1.16	0.03	0.43	0.23	0.94	1.72	–0.36	0.88	1.00	–0.53	0.63	–0.32	–1.38	–0.15	51.4
TR	0.03	–2.44	1.62	0.80	2.77	–0.55	1.86	–2.01	–1.46	3.63	0.77	–0.49	–5.24	–0.65	–1.61	–0.50	–2.03	–0.66	**0.00**	**–2.17**	**0.56**	**–0.87**	26.6
UK	0.62	–0.03	0.67	–0.76	–0.87	0.79	–0.26	0.80	0.62	0.11	–0.08	0.73	–0.99	–0.85	0.31	0.15	–0.37	0.47	–0.97	–2.06	0.23	–0.37	66.3
UKR	–1.64	0.50	0.23	–0.67	–0.78	–1.15	1.73	–1.82	**–1.48**	**–0.44**	**0.13**	**0.27**	1.92	–1.23	–1.12	0.31	0.45	–0.39	1.62	–0.08	1.02	–0.78	50.7

LFP = Labour Force Participation rate; greyed = PPA countries; bold: imputed data

Part II
Attitudes Towards (The Change of) The Family

Chapter 5
Attitudes Towards Forms of Partnership

Marietta Pongracz and Zsolt Spéder

Abstract The study analyses attitudes towards forms of partnership (marriage, cohabitation, living alone) in twelve European countries using the IPPAS comparative dataset. Basic patterns of partnership behaviour in Europe will be shown in the introduction using census data, after which people's partnership-related attitudes will be confronted with practices on a country level, and only very loose associations shown. Considering attitudes toward marriage and cohabitation, we can see a high level of preference for marriage as an end-state partnership form, at the same time as a high level of tolerance for cohabitation. The rationales of marriage postponement differ between regions of Europe: In the former communist countries it is material circumstances, and in the Western countries it is post-material and individualistic value orientations which may be responsible for marriage postponement. The available attitude components enable us to construct an overall index of partnership behaviour that will also be analysed on a European and country level. The multivariate analysis reveals that openness towards non-marital partnership is influenced by such general factors as age, gender, religion and partnership status, but that the role of country-specific effects is significant as well.

Keywords: Marriage · Cohabitation · Values · Preferred lifestyle

5.1 Introduction

Changing partnership behaviour, especially the spread of cohabitation, as well as the relationship between marriage and cohabitation, have recently been the subject of considerable attention (Cherlin 1992; Kiernan 2002; Lesthaeghe, Moors 2000a; Macura et al. 2000; Toulemon 1997) as crucial elements of theoretical debates on the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe 1995; Coleman 2004). In this debate, many contributions highlight the crucial role of value orientations. The social transformation at the turn of the 90s, and the changes in family formation in the

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former communist countries since that time, fostered new research and led to new understandings on the topic (Kotowska, Jozwiak 2003; Lesthaeghe, Surkyn 2004). Our analysis is linked to this issue, but we were able to focus on a very specific aspect, albeit in a limited manner. We consider attitudinal differences among twelve countries according to partnership behaviour. Prior to this analysis, a brief description will be given of variation in partnership behaviour in the European countries. The analysis of the ideational aspect will start with an interpretation of the basic distributions. Then we will compare patterns in partnership practice with ideals of and attitudes towards partnership forms. A multivariate analysis will be the final part of our study. Here we first construct an index measuring attitudes toward marriage. The first multivariate analysis constitutes an attempt to capture country differences by retrieving control variables on a step by step basis. Then, national models will be compared. In our empirical analysis we will use the data from the International Population Policy Acceptance Survey (IPPAS), and Eurostat census data from around the millennium.

5.2 Variations in Partnership Behaviour in Europe

Pluralisation of union formations emerged at different times and at different speeds in different countries within Europe. Postponement started in the seventies in many Western countries, but some were late-comers (Lesthaeghe, Moors 2000). Countries recently joining the EU, the majority of which are in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), were characterized by a high marriage rate and marriage at a younger age until the early 1990s (Monnier, Rychtarikova 1992; Nibhrolchain 1993). The average age at first marriage was considerably higher in Western European countries with the exception of Portugal, while the percentage of marriages was significantly lower than in the CEE countries.

Between 1990 and 2001, the marriage indices of Western and Eastern regions became highly similar. Whilst in 1990, the TFMR varied in the 0.5–1.1 interval, ten years later the interval ranged between 0.4 and 0.7. Willingness to marry in Eastern European countries has diminished so much that seven out of the ten countries in Europe with the least intensive marital behaviour now belong to the group of the new Member States.[1] The marriage indices in highly-religious Poland and Lithuania are lower than that of Denmark or Finland, which were at the forefront of the second demographic transition. Willingness to marry has been dropping too in the majority of Western European countries, although this started earlier, so that the change is less pronounced. Quite surprisingly, though, a recent increase in the propensity to marriage can also be observed in some Northern and Western European countries (e.g. Finland, Denmark and France). Tendencies of growing homo-

[1] We are aware that postponement distorts not only measures of fertility, but also of nuptiality, e.g. TFMR (cf. Philipov, Dorbritz 2003).



Fig. 5.1 Total first marriage rate in Europe, 1990 and 2001
Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe, 2003

geneity and convergence can thus be revealed in Europe in terms of marriage as a preferred form of union.

The convergence cannot be demonstrated so clearly for the other generally-accepted marriage index, i.e. the mean age of women at first marriage.

Whilst the average age of women at first marriage has increased considerably in the countries that recently acceded to the EU, there is still a well-established difference between the marriage patterns of Eastern and Western Europe. However, mean age at first marriage is on the increase, and a levelling-off at what age remains to be seen.

An increasing age at marriage and a generally low propensity to marry are clear indicators of changes in the union formation patterns among young people by country. Census data collected in European countries in 2000–2001 enable us to add indicators of a different nature; they describe the partnership status of different age groups, according to different types.[2] The share of cohabitation is of the utmost interest (Table 5.1).

We focus on two younger female age groups (25–29, 30–34), being the subject of changes in union formation. With a few exceptions (Slovenia, Latvia and Italy), it was found that the majority of young women establish and live in some form of union before the age of 30. However, the prevalence of marriage and cohabitation differ greatly from country to country. In some countries

[2] A more detailed analysis using census data can be found in Spéder 2005.

Table 5.1 Proportion of women living in partnership and the proportion of cohabitation among partnerships

Country	Proportion of women living in a partnership		Country	Proportion of cohabitations among partnerships	
	Ages 25–29	Ages 30–34		Ages 25–29	Ages 30–34
Lithuania	74.4	75.7	Denmark	56.8	31.8
Romania	73.2	81.6	Norway	51.7	34.3
Cyprus	72.4	84.4	Finland	50.1	31.8
The Netherlands	68.0	78.9	The Netherlands	46.4	24.4
Finland	66.4	73.5	United Kingdom	43.7	24.7
Hungary	65.0	77.6	Estonia	41.4	28.0
Denmark	64.5	75.7	Austria	31.5	18.8
United Kingdom	62.5	70.4	Germany	30.3	17.6
Portugal	61.8	79.3	Slovenia	27.1	17.2
Germany	61.7	74.4	Hungary	21.2	12.7
Estonia	61.2	66.9	Latvia	12.8	7.3
Norway	59.0	73.6	Portugal	12.3	9.6
Poland	56.2	72.6	Romania	11.5	7.8
Austria	56.2	70.1	Italy	9.8	6.6
Greece	55.7	76.1	Lithuania	9.5	7.7
Slovakia	55.7	73.2	Czech Republic	8.7	5.7
Czech Republic	55.0	71.3	Greece	7.9	3.8
Slovenia	46.7	71.8	Poland	4.4	2.5
Latvia	45.8	57.8	Cyprus	4.1	1.6
Italy	43.0	68.8	Slovakia	3.7	2.9

Source: own calculations, Eurostat census data

(Lithuania, Cyprus and Italy), marriage seems to be exclusive among the young cohorts, whilst in others (Denmark, Norway and Finland) it is no longer dominant in the 25–29 age group. In the majority of countries taking up positions in the above-mentioned two extreme groups, marriage is dominant but cohabitation is strongly prevalent.

Heuveline and Timberlake recently categorised the European countries according to the function of cohabitation using life course data (Heuveline, Timberlake 2003). The cross-sectional distributions of the census data do not enable us to repeat it, but it was possible to identify some kind of differences. In one cluster of countries (Denmark, Norway, Finland and the Netherlands), about half of the female population living in unions cohabits until the age of 30. The prevalence of cohabitation in the 30–34 age group suggests that cohabitation in these countries is not a temporary but a permanent form of union with relatively high frequencies.

In the countries belonging to the second group (Estonia, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary), it is quite common to have experience of cohabitation by



Fig. 5.2 Mean age of women at first marriage in Europe, 1990 and 2001 (year)
Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe, 2003

the age of 30, but the declining proportion of cohabitation among women in unions at an age of 30 to 34 seems to indicate that cohabitation is not a preferred lifestyle, but rather a transitory form of union.

In the largest group (Italy, Lithuania, Romania, the Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, Cyprus and Slovakia), cohabitation at younger and later ages alike is condemned. Women in these countries are homogenous with regard to the primacy of marriage among partnerships, but are heterogeneous in terms of their ages on marriage.

Even though marriage is still the dominant type of partnership today, it has lost ground as the exclusive form of consensual union among heterosexual couples throughout Europe. In the first place, cohabitation is becoming more and more popular, but its prevalence, duration and outcome vary considerably by countries and regions. Those variations do not however question the fact that cohabitation has become a legitimate form of partnership in Europe (Kiernan 2002; Toulemon 1997). The question is to what extent the particular population accepts or relates to this demographic behaviour that shows signs of convergence in terms of union formation. It is still not clear whether the differences in partnership patterns of individual countries can also be identified in the set of values of the particular society, or whether public opinion is independent of couples' actual behaviour. An attempt has been made with regard to these points to answer questions on the basis of the relevant database of the international PPAS comparative survey.

5.3 Opinions on the Decline in Marriages and Mariage Postponement

The questionnaire programme of the IPPAS aimed to directly reveal peoples' opinions on recent demographic trends, among them marriage decline and marriage postponement. People's assessments of the "declining significance of marriage" could be shown on a scale ranging from –50 to +50, where negative values show affirmation, and the positive values show denial of the decline.[3] The country-specific distribution of the scale permit us to assume that the decline in marriage figures was not considered to be a positive phenomenon by the population in the European countries under investigation.

The figure shows that index values are in a range under zero or so for each country which reveals a slightly negative assessment of decreasing marriage rates. Opinions on diminishing willingness to marry are linked to respondents' de facto family status inasmuch as those living in marital unions are more negative toward this phenomenon than those living in unmarried cohabitation. Although the difference between the opinions of people who are in the two forms of partnership even exceeds ten index points in some countries (Austria, Finland, Hungary and Western Germany), the overall conclusion is that the drop in the number of marriages is equally considered to be an unfavourable tendency by both married and cohabiting men and women alike. We therefore have good reasons to ask whether or not the



Fig. 5.3 Opinions on the declining number of marriages by types of partnership[4]
Source: own calculations, IPPAS dataset

[3] The scale was generated from a five-degree scale attitudinal answer.

[4] Respondents had to qualify the following statement on a five-grade scale: To what extent do you see the decline in the number of marriages as a positive or a negative process?

different age distribution of those who are in the two forms of partnership explains the differing opinions of those who are in marital or cohabiting unions. Yet it has been found by analysing the attitudes by age that the falling marriage rate is considered by those under 30 to be only slightly less dramatic – by one or two points – than by older people at the age of 30–49 (table not shown). Thus to a smaller or greater extent the constant decline in marriage rates experienced throughout Europe is considered to be a slightly negative, unfavourable tendency in all countries by men and women, young and old alike, and only de facto marital status, i.e. the fact of the respondent being married or unmarried, affects opinions.

As discussed earlier, in addition to diminishing willingness to marry, marital behaviour in Europe has been characterized by a constant postponement of marriage. Postponement started in different periods, and demonstrates different dynamics in the Eastern and Western parts of Europe as it was presented above (Lesthaeghe, Moors 2000). In the 1990s, the Eastern European region became highly similar to the Western parts, but there are still pronounced differences.

Similar to demographic behaviour, regional variation has been revealed in respondents' stated rationales of postponement. Table 5.2 shows the opinion of young people under 30 as regards factors which cause people to marry at an ever older age. This age group has been selected as they are the ones who are getting married, making it highly important to understand what they think about the rationale behind marriage postponement. The table also reveals that the ranking and frequency of answers listed in the questionnaire differ considerably in the Eastern and Western regions.

In the former communist countries, the first three positions in the ranking are taken by reference to objective (and material) reasons, while in Finland, Austria and the Netherlands those ideational motives are the most frequent which point clearly toward individualism. Germany is positioned somewhere in between the two groups by virtue of the selection of objective and ideational reasons alike. The two objective reasons in the case of Eastern Germany are accompanied by an ideational motive, as opposed to Western Germany where two ideational motives and an objective one were identified among the three most frequently selected reasons. This structure is fairly indicative of Germany's past and present: although young people overwhelmingly picked answers identical to those of their counterparts in countries undergoing transformation, the aspects of having "independence and autonomy" also came up, while subjective motives played the dominant role in Western Germany, where "problems finding a job" were also frequently stated as reasons for postponement due to recent labour market difficulties.

Apart from Germany, the picture is clear. The high frequency of references to scarcity of housing, inadequate income potentials, and labour market difficulties in the former communist countries is a true reflection of inherited and ongoing economic problems in these countries, as well as of the different patterns and attitudes towards marriage versus cohabitation. Making reference to objective motives suggests that postponement is seen among young people in the former communist countries as a result of objective circumstances (obstacles), whereas in Western countries individual preferences or/and decisions are emphasised. These are expressed

Table 5.2 Motives in the postponement of marriage and the ranking of the index values

Country/Motives	Austria		Czech Republic		Finland		Eastern Germany		Western Germany	
	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index
Labour market difficulties	6	55	3	81	6	54	1	78	2	70
Difficulties in finding a home	5	59	1	90	8	51	5	51	7	59
Insufficient income to get married	9	50	2	81	7	51	3	69	6	62
Diminishing value attached to marriage	4	60	9	51	2	68	6	57	4	64
Increasing desire for independence	1	77	4	58	3	63	2	74	1	74
Cohabitation has become more acceptable	2	64	5	57	1	69	4	65	3	67
Refusal to accept responsibilities	3	62	6	54	4	54	7	54	5	63
Postponement of first childbirth	8	52	7	54	5	57	8	54	8	57
Comfort of living with parents	7	53	8	52	9	35	9	53	9	55
Labour market difficulties	3	76	2	85	8	49	2	92	2	78
Difficulties in finding a home	1	88	1	85	4	62	1	92	1	84
Insufficient income to get married	2	80	3	83	6	57	3	84	3	72
Diminishing value attached to marriage	7	59	4	61	3	65	7	56	8	53
Increasing desire for independence	6	62	6	60	2	65	5	62	4	63

Table 5.2 (continued)

	Hungary		Lithuania		The Netherlands		Poland		Slovenia	
Country/Motives	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index	Ranking	Index
Cohabitation has become more acceptable	4	69	7	56	1	70	9	53	6	56
Refusal to accept responsibilities	8	54	5	61	5	60	6	60	7	56
Postponement of first childbirth	5	62	8	50	7	54	4	66	5	57
Comfort of living with parents	9	50	9	44	9	45	8	55		

Source: IPPAS

in references to diminishing value attached to marriage, higher social acceptance of cohabitation, avoidance of responsibility and greater independence.

5.4 Opinions on Marriage and Consensual Unions

Statements on marriage and cohabitation in the survey questionnaire have been intended to identify (analyse) social tolerance toward the pluralisation of union formations. We have tried to find the answer to the question of whether changes in demographic patterns (such as the diminishing exclusivity of marriage, growing popularity of cohabitation) are concomitant with changing values within society, or whether public opinion is more traditional or liberal and individualistic than the actual experience of forming unions. In order to answer the question, we compared social practice (the rate of those living in cohabitation) with national attitudes towards partnership forms.[5]

The questionnaire included the following statements that were agreed upon by respondents in each country at rates indicated in Table 5.3.

The statement "marriage is the only acceptable way of living together for a man and a woman" contradicts the apparent tendency towards pluralisation of union formations throughout Europe. The majority disagree with this statement (Table 5.2), although it appears to be justified to analyse the opinions thoroughly because of the considerable national differences. The correlation between opinions rejecting or accepting marriage as the exclusive form of union and proportions of women aged 25–34 living in marriage or cohabitation is shown by the diagram below.

The figure shows that in countries where the premarital cohabitation of young people is limited to younger ages, and the majority of women marry by the age of 34 (Lithuania, Poland and Hungary), the exclusivity of marriage as a union pattern is more acceptable than in countries where permanent cohabitation has a greater prevalence (the Netherlands, Finland and Estonia). In other words, there is some correspondence between actual demographic patterns and values, and people's attitudes.

The statement "Married people are generally happier than unmarried people" was agreed with by the majority of people only in a small number of countries (Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic).

The regression line and the dot chart fail to reveal any correlation between the frequency of people living in partnership in individual countries and the opinion of the population. With regard to the same proportion of married people, the percentage of those who agree with the statement demonstrates that the situation in the Netherlands and Estonia is diametrically opposed to that in Italy, Lithuania and the Czech Republic. The significant deviation of opinions is presumably linked to the issue of the definition of the term "happiness", as well as to subjective feelings about marriage among the respondents.

[5] We used the Eurostat census database when describing the partnership pattern of the countries under study. The IPPAS samples are too small in some countries to obtain reliable measures.

Table 5.3 Attitudes towards different features of partnerships (as a percentage of those agreeing with the statement)

	IT	AT	BE(2)	CZ	EE	FI	DE	HU	LT	NL	PL	SL
Marriage is an outdated institution.	17.6	23.4	23.9	12.9	46.6	15.7	23.7	11.1	14.4	17.3	8.9	20.4
Married people are generally happier than unmarried people.	22.3	36.9	14.8	56.7	51.1	34.7	28.1	53.2	61.0	23.9	48.9	42.0
It's better to have a bad marriage than no marriage at all.	6.2	3.5	2.0	10.5	5.6	2.8	5.1	9.9	21.7	2.0	6.1	5.8
Marriage is the only acceptable way of living together for a man and a woman.	24.2	18.7	–	24.3	26.8	16.2	11.7	32.1	50.5	11.7	30.1	22.1
It's alright for a couple to live together without intending to get married.	–	84.7	70.4	63.4	62.3	78.6	86.1	70.7	50.6	87.2	50.2	82.9

Source: IPPAS

A close linear correlation can be shown to exist between the social acceptance or rejection of cohabiting unions and union-formation patterns of individual countries (Fig. 5.6).

The population in each country proved to be highly tolerant towards cohabitation, and a distinct correlation can be perceived between union formation patterns and social acceptance (Fig. 5.6). It should be stressed that in countries where cohabitation is primarily a premarital experience – such as in Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary – the respondents advocated living together without intending to get married at very high rate although the PPAS question does not involve the intention of later marriage. All this would lead to the conclusion that there are some signs of internalisation and convergence of values in public opinion both in countries with a strong tradition of unmarried union formations, and in those with have a shorter history of pluralisation.

Among opinions on marriage, there are some exaggerated views which could even be labelled extreme, given that it is hard to understand or imagine agreeing with the statement that "a bad marriage is better than no marriage at all". However, one respondent in five in Lithuania, a country known for its acceptance of traditional values and marriage, supported this statement, which is far removed from today's reality in Europe (cf. Table 5.3).

In spite of the general acceptance of cohabitation, it cannot be considered as



Fig. 5.4 Country-specific distribution according to partnership status and assessment of the statement "*Marriage is the only acceptable way of living together for a man and a woman.*" Sources: own calculations, Eurostat Census data and IPPAS data



Fig. 5.5 Country-specific distribution according to partnership status and assessment of the statement "*Married people are generally happier than unmarried people.*"
Sources: own calculations, Eurostat Census data and IPPAS data



Fig. 5.6 Country-specific distribution according to partnership status and assessment of the statement "*It's all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married.*"
Sources: own calculations, Eurostat Census data and IPPAS data

an ideally-desirable end-state type of partnership preferred by a dominant majority of people (cf. Fig. 5.7). Considering the preference according to ideal partnership form, the popularity of marriage is unquestionable despite the emergence and growing prevalence of cohabitation and pluralisation of living arrangements. With the exception of Germany, people in all countries prefer marriage, with premarital cohabitation or without, while cohabitation as the chosen living arrangement had a low level of support. It is furthermore of interest that no substantive difference can be found between overall public opinion and the opinions of people under 30 in Slovenia, Poland, Lithuania and Italy (Fig. 5.7). In these countries, there is no evidence that the age group that is supposed to be the most closely attached to partnership formation differs very markedly from society as a whole.

In our opinion, negative opinions with reservations about cohabitation pertain only to cohabitation as the choice of a living arrangement which does not entail an intention to ever marry. Opinions on consensual unions as premarital cohabitation are more positive. Unfortunately, due to the ambiguous wording of the questions on ideal living arrangements, the rate of those who prefer premarital cohabitation cannot be considered reliable, and thus this cannot be analysed separately. Therefore, we classified those preferring premarital cohabitation as an ideal partnership as marriage-oriented, and it was assumed that they consider cohabitation to be a temporary and not a permanent solution. We have to acknowledge this, although we



Fig. 5.7 Distribution of preferred living arrangements among young people (under age 30) and total population

are aware that most probably a number of premarital cohabitations would turn into permanent cohabitation and marriage would never take place.

Germany demonstrates a distinct pluralist and individualist character regarding preferred living arrangements. Both living alone and LAT enjoy a relatively high degree of popularity, and cohabitation as a substitute for marriage was also preferred by a considerable proportion of people. However, with the exception of Germany, the state of living alone is neither an attractive nor a desirable living arrangement.

5.5 Determinants of Union Formation Attitudes and Differences Among European Countries

It has been discussed above what differences in patterns of cohabitation and marriage are demonstrated by the young across countries of Europe, and also that considerable differences can be found when it comes to attitudes towards union formation. Finally, we found a loose correlation by country between the incidence of cohabitation and selected elements of attitudes. In this section we attempt to answer, using multivariable analysis, to what extent differences in attitudes towards marriage can be shown for countries participating in the survey, and to what degree the impacts of different components, e.g. age, sex, religion, education, account for such differences.

To analyse the issue within the confines of the data available, a general scale for attitudes towards union formation was firstly developed. Then, a series of linear regression models was estimated on the pooled data to analyse what variables prove to be significant control factors and whether country impacts continue to be significant once these have been introduced. Countries were represented by a set of dummy variables. The final model was ultimately run for each country separately, thus providing an opportunity to compare the control factors considered to be significant in the overall data structure, and to see what differences in impacts they have for each country.

The general attitude variable concerning union formation was developed by consolidating the answers obtained for four attitude components surveyed earlier. They are as follows:

- Married people are generally happier (disagree = 1; else = 0)
- People who want to have children ought to get married (disagree = 1; else = 0)
- It is alright to live together without intending to marry (agree = 1; else = 0)
- Marriage is the only way to live together (disagree = 1; else = 0).

The individual attitude statements reveal respondents' attitudes towards marriage, but underline different aspects. The first reveals happiness, the second reveals the context of childbirth, and the third and fourth reveal the degree of the exclusivity of marriage and tolerance towards unmarried union formations, respectively. A scale ranging from 0 to 4 was developed using the specified scores, and only respondents

who gave a relevant answer to each one of the four questions were included in the analysis. Low scores are attained by respondents who deem marriage to be a sort of prerequisite for happiness, and consider it to be indispensable for childbirth and the only acceptable union formation for a man and a woman. Respondents who score high consider marriage neither more favourable nor more acceptable. We have therefore reached the assumption that respondents with high scores are more open to unmarried union formations. On this scale, the following average values were attained by residents of these countries (in descending order):

By developing the sequences of models by retrieving control variables on a step-by-step basis, we are interested in the stability of the country effects. If in case of control variables the stability of differences by countries were to prevail, then we can assume country-specific influences to apply.

The differences inherent in sampling are checked for in the first stage (Model 1), where the "sex" and "age" of the respondents are the explanatory variables. Finland was selected as the reference country here, as it was throughout the model-building. In comparison, the differences among countries in all instances are significant. The former communist countries, with the exception of Slovenia, are in the negative while the Western European countries which were included are all in the positive. Marriage is thus deemed to be of a higher value in the former countries than in the latter, and people in "Western" countries were more open to non-marital partnerships.

In the second stage, two additional variables "educational level" and "religious behaviour" of the respondents were included in the analysis, which have proved their relevance in analysing family relationships and had a substantive impact on them. It is primarily strong religious behaviour that has a major impact, but the influence of education is also significant (Model 2). It is not surprising that marriage is considered unfavourable and undesirable by those who are less religious. In terms of education, the higher the educational attainment is, the greater the tolerance toward unmarried union formations. We have to point out that incorporating religious behaviour in the model brought the considerable impact of age to the surface. The older a person is, the more he/she is convinced that value attaches

Table 5.4 General attitude toward unions in European countries (0 = general preference to marriage, 4 = general openness to non-marital partnership)

Country	Mean
The Netherlands	3.16
Germany	3.03
Finland	2.92
Austria	2.81
Slovenia	2.78
Hungary	2.20
Czech Republic	2.12
Lithuania	1.83
Estonia	1.51
Poland	1.42

Source: own calculations, IPPAS

to marriage and that it is more beneficial than any other form of union. The differences revealed by country remain in the second model too, and their directions do not change either. Diversions can be identified in the weight of the impacts only. The discrepancy between the former communist countries and the Western European countries do not vanish, with the exception of the situation described for Slovenia.

Two dummy variables for union forms have been introduced in Model 3 to account for the fact that living in marriage or cohabitation can have an impact on attitudes towards union formation ("the selection effect"). One of them refers to marriage, the other to cohabitation. The two variables proved to be significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Their influence is in line with expectations. Married respondents have lower scores on the scale than their unmarried peers if all other factors are allowed for. Additionally, as expected, those living in cohabitation score higher, and are more open to non-marital partnership. The country variables change only to a minor extent; all remain significant and the course of the impact also does not change.[6]

General attitudes could influence partnership related-beliefs. The structure of the dataset and the minor differences among participating countries related to the questionnaire programme enable us to include a variable measuring gender role attitudes in the last step of model formation (*Model 4*). ("What most women really want is a home and children"). Unfortunately, gender role-related attitudes have been incorporated by five countries only, so that our findings are limited. What we can point out here is that there is a significant correlation between this attitude variable and the constructed attitude variable for union formations. The control variables used previously have remained significant. Model 3 *l* has to be applied to the general analysis of country surveys, since data for as many as nine countries have been processed there.

How can we interpret the fact that individual country variables have a significant impact in the case of strong explanatory socio-economic variables? What we know from our models is that country-specific general attitudes towards the formation of unions are different neither because of the different religious behaviour of the populations, nor because of the different proportions of those in marriage and cohabitation ("the selection effect"), since these variables were allowed for. Consequently, factors not examined in the model should account for the significant differences between countries. We cannot unfortunately draw an accurate picture of these: They may well be the consequences of complex structural impacts not analysed in the models (e.g. institutional settings) or by the same token they may reflect general differences in people's mentalities and cultures by individual countries.

By applying the model for each country separately, it can be revealed whether the differences within the country are explained by the factors that appear significant for the entire sample. Two factors are significant and have a strong impact

[6] The Polish data unfortunately do not allow us to identify whether or not respondents live in cohabitation; the Polish results have therefore been omitted.

Table 5.5 Series of models analysing general attitudes toward partnership (linear regression)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Sex	–0.283	***	0.063	***	0.065	***	0.047	***
Age group	0.031	***	–0.241	***	–0.193	***	–0.202	***
Religion			0.278	***	0.329	***	0.265	***
Education			0.083	***	0.092	***	0.072	***
Married					–0.082	***	–0.108	***
Cohabitation					0.075	***	0.074	***
Women's role							0.158	***
Austria	0.058	***	0.044	***	0.081	***		
Czech R.	–0.048	***	–0.092	***	–0.068	***		
Estonia	–0.150	***	–0.171	***	–0.151	***	–0.108	***
Lithuania	–0.097	***	–0.113	***	–0.081	***	–0.026	***
Germany	0.155	***	0.075	***	0.105	***	0.164	***
Hungary	–0.044	***	–0.066	***	–0.024	***	0.100	**
Poland	–0.322	***	–0.240	***				
The Netherlands.	0.143	***	0.104	***	0.130	***		
Slovenia	0.042	***	0.025	***	0.056	***		
R square	0.278		0.346		0.316		0.329	

Source: IPPAS

for each country (Table 5.6). Younger, less religious people in each country score higher on the scale of openness towards non-marital cohabitation, i.e. they tend to reject the benefits and exclusivity of marriage as a form of partnership. Except for two countries – the Czech Republic and Lithuania – the results suggest that gender also accounts for a difference of opinion: Women show a more tolerant attitude with regard to cohabitation. Being in marriage or cohabitation has an impact of a different degree (and significance level) by countries. Married respondents naturally regard marriage more positively. Cohabitation has however a less significant impact in some countries, but if at all, it is accompanied by a more tolerant attitude towards cohabitation. It should be pointed out that in Austria, for example, the fact of being married has the strongest impact. All in all, the parallel models according to the different countries reveal that the variables introduced explain the differences in attitudes with varying weights for every country and the impacts that are significant for the overall sample are not necessarily significant for the individual country. At the same time, we have not measured any impact course diverging from what was found for the overall sample.

This linear regression analysis is naturally far from being complete, since the limitations imposed by the data available have not allowed a full-range consideration of potential explanatory variables. We do however believe that it is important to emphasise that differences between countries remain even after the inclusion of control variables, so that it is justified to assume that attitudes towards union formation depend on country-specific, perhaps culturally-driven factors.

Table 5.6 Estimates of *t*he influencing factors on general attitudes toward partnership, within countries (linear regression)

Variables	AT		CZ		EE		FI		DE		HU		LT		NL		PL		SL	
Gender	0.077	***	–0.045		0.059	**	0.147	***	0.071	***	0.072	***	0.043		0.111	***	0.064	***	0.059	*
Age group	–0.168	***	–0.325	***	–0.430	***	–0.146	***	–0.209	***	–0.295	***	–0.352	***	–0.204	***	–0.191	***	–0.170	***
Religion	0.096	***	0.165	***	0.075	**	0.386	***	0.168	***	0.226	***	0.196	***	0.448	***	0.257	***	0.221	***
Education	0.113	***	–0.013		–0.006		0.090	***	0.099	***	0.109	***	0.068	**	0.095	***	0.078	***	0.127	***
Married	–0.197	***	–0.099	**	–0.089	***	–0.078	***	–0.175	***	–0.069	***	–0.130	***	–0.026				–0.070	*
Cohabitation	0.007		0.016		0.129	***	0.083	***	0.051	**	0.132	***	0.101	***	0.029				0.064	*
R square	0.137		0.188		0.288		0.266		0.162		0.253		0.245		0.304		0.124		0.145	

Source: IPPAS

5.6 Conclusions

Differences in marital behaviour which have been experienced over a period of decades between the Western and Eastern regions of Europe have been considerably diminishing over the last 10–15 years. In the countries recently acceding to the EU, the falling marriage rates and the increasing mean age at first marriage indicate a tendency towards convergence, i.e. marital behaviour is becoming more uniform, even if people in the Eastern region tend to marry first at a relatively younger age. Although marriage continues to be the dominant form of union, the hegemony of marriage has come to an end, and unmarried cohabitation is growing in popularity and prevalence. Within the general trend towards the pluralisation of union forms, significant differences can be revealed by country and by region in terms of the extent and duration of partnership relations, as well as their outcomes. Analysing the correlation of union patterns and opinions on pluralisation of couple formation processes in the PPAS countries, we have come to the conclusions summarised below.

Declining marriage rates throughout Europe are considered to be an undesirable tendency by the population of each country, regardless of sex and age. A notion of the other feature of marital behaviour, namely the postponement of first marriage, is more differentiated and is traced back to structures of reasons that vary by region. In the Eastern and Central regions of Europe, i.e. in the former communist countries, mainly objective (material) circumstances, reasons due to the poor economic situation, are held accountable, while in the Western region it is primarily the primacy of postmaterial and individualistic values that is believed to be the main reason and explanation for marriage postponement.

A notion of the pluralisation of union formation processes demonstrates a particular dualism, and even ambivalence. On the one hand, statements expressing superiority of marriage are commonly rejected (married people are happier, marriage is the only acceptable way of living together), but on the other hand the overwhelming majority deems marriage to be a desirable, not outdated, and indeed even preferred lifestyle. Even though public opinion fundamentally tolerates cohabitation with no intention to marry, the proportion of those who prefer cohabitation as a permanent lifestyle is fairly low among young and older people alike. We believe that ambivalence of opinions would deserve an in-depth analysis and a thorough survey, and only a few of the potential components are mentioned here.

Acceptance of marriage which is more positive than one would think on the basis of demographic indexes can probably be explained by marriage's deep social roots as a prevailing lifestyle which has developed over the centuries.

The multivariate analysis revealed that openness toward non-marital partnership is influenced by age, gender, religiosity and partnership forms, but that the role of country-specific effects, which are presumed to be cultural in their nature, also turned out to be significant. Cross-sectional data were naturally not suitable in our case to identify causal relations, but do enable us to show associations among attitudes, social characteristics and related social behaviour.

Chapter 6
Family Transformations in the Post-Communist Countries: Attitudes Toward Changes

Vlada Stankuniene and Ausra Maslauskaite

Abstract This article is dedicated to the investigation of attitudes towards family changes in the DIALOG countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and of the impact of the ideational factors of the second demographic transition (individualism, secularism and female emancipation) on these attitudes. Family transformation is discussed in terms of de-institutionalisation of the family and changes in fertility patterns. The main focus is on differences in family transformation between the CEE countries and attitudes towards changes. The article is based on the PPAS data and on population statistics provided by the Council of Europe. The methods applied are descriptive statistics, factor and cluster analysis, and variance analysis. The research findings lead to the conclusion that demographic developments in the CEE countries are echoed in attitudes towards family changes: they are usually best accepted, and attitudes towards them are less negative, where they started earliest and are the most advanced, and vice versa. Nonetheless, this general interdependence is modified by the power of ideational factors of the SDT.

Keywords: Family transformation in the CEE countries · Attitudes towards family changes · Individualisation · Secularisation · Gender emancipation · Second demographic transition

6.1 Introduction

In the 1990s, in parallel to the transformation which took place in the advance from totalitarian rule to a democratic market society, rapid changes started in the family formation and fertility patterns of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which for several decades had been undergoing moderate change, or had remained stable. These enormous changes that have occurred in the family as an institution follow the second demographic transition (SDT). In this context, the most frequently mentioned factors in the family changes are economic difficulties and the

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factors that have conditioned the SDT. All this seems to naturally predetermine the similarities in the family changes of the CEE countries. Therefore it is not surprising that the descriptions denoting uniformity prevail in discussions of recent family changes in the CEE countries. Meanwhile, these countries differ in terms of their starting point, the pace of family changes as such, their trajectories, and the level achieved at the beginning of the 21st century. Further, the set of indicatory features of the changes is by no means identical. The factors predetermining the start and intensity of family changes are naturally also not identical. Whereas the factors of the transformational socio-economic environment and of fundamental social modernisation should, supposedly, predetermine a similarity of family changes in the countries of the region, the cultural and structural path dependencies, and different historical experiences (Mamolo 2005; Reher 1998) evidently condition specific features and trajectories of the changes characterized by different national dimensions.

In an attempt to grasp the essence and factors of the recent family changes in the CEE countries, similarities/dissimilarities of the changes, as well as their likeness to the "old" European countries, along with social approval/disapproval, as well as to predict the future trends, attitudes towards family changes might provide useful information. To that end, the PPAS data are used to analyse subjective evaluations for the recent family changes and their links with SDT factors. For that purpose, the responses of respondents aged 20–64 years which concern the subjective assessment of changes in family life (question CL1), values of children and family (CL5), gender roles (G1, G2) and religious attitudes (CQ10, CQ11) are analysed. The methods applied for the analysis are descriptive statistics, factor and cluster analysis, as well as variance analysis. The post-communist area is represented by six countries (the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia) against the background of five "old" European countries (Austria, Western Germany, Finland, Belgium (FL) and the Netherlands), i.e. the countries whose PPAS questionnaires included a question on the assessment of changes in family life (CL1). The chapter starts with a brief demographic analysis of the family transformation dynamics in the CEE countries. The analysis is based on Council of Europe data, and reveals the differences in the family transformation patterns across the CEE region. The following sections are dedicated to the investigating attitudes towards the family changes and to analyzing of the ideational factors (individualism/familism, secularization, female emancipation), which determine the patterns of these attitudes.

6.2 Overview of the Family Formation and Fertility Changes in CEE Dialog Countries: A Short Background

The different scholars investigating family changes in the CEE countries usually note that family changes have been taking place in the region since the 1990s. However, this is mostly presented as a rather uniform phenomenon across different CEE countries, although the dynamics of the key demographic indicators alone show a

significant variance at the start, in the pace and scope of changes, as well as in the present stage of the family changes in different CEE countries. This section therefore presents a brief comparative assessment of the indicators illustrating the modernisation process of the family in which two aspects are accounted for: the changes in the *family formation pattern,* illustrated by the non-marital birth rate (which permits an indirect assessment to be made of the spread of cohabitation and de-institutionalisation of the family) and the mean age of women at first marriage, and changes in the *childbearing pattern*, described by the total fertility rate and mean age at first child. Moreover, a description of possible determinants of the family changes is attempted on the basis of conclusions drawn by different scholars.

The onset of family changes in the CEE region. Although in all the CEE DIALOG countries rapid family changes actually started at the same time, i.e. at the beginning of 1990s, the turning point (starting point of the definite changes in the indicators used for estimation of the family transformation) towards the recent family changes has nevertheless been different, and the course of the changes has also been far from uniform. Furthermore, the changes in partnership and in childbearing started at different times and took different paths.

Changes in family formation. Among the countries under discussion the family formation changes started earliest in Eastern Germany in the 1960s, in fact, at the same time as in the Western countries, with Slovenia lagging not far behind (Table 6.1). At that time, the proportion of non-marital births in these countries started growing; the rates of marriage started dropping and the proportion of never married started increasing (Recent Demographic Developments 2004; Ščircelj 2000). In the 1980s, these countries began experiencing ageing of marriages. The timing and rate of the changes were actually on a par with those of the countries of "old" Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, the non-marital birth rate in these countries was also close to the Western European level (Council of Europe 2004; Sobotka 2004a). In Hungary and the Czech Republic, the changes in family formation became visible in the 1980s: in Hungary - at the beginning of 1980s (Kamarás 1999, 2003; Pongracz, Molnar 2003), in the Czech Republic - in the mid-1980s (Recent Demographic Developments 2004). In the latter countries, however, the rate of the changes was slow and the level of change which had been achieved by 1990 was much lower than in Eastern Germany and Slovenia (Table 6.1). These changes set in most recently in Lithuania and Poland, namely at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the start was sudden and the advance vigorous (Table 6.1).

The beginning and pace of change in family formation therefore differed from one CEE country to the next, even before the 1990s, so that situations varied at the outset of the recent changes. This is clearly shown by an immense difference in the non-marital birth rate among the CEE countries under survey in 1990 (with Eastern Germany at one extreme – 35%, and Poland at the other – 6.2%) (Table 6.1).

Fertility changes. Once the demographic transition was over, the fertility level of all the CEE DIALOG countries stayed at replacement level for some time. Fertility dropped below replacement level at different points in time, and subsequent declines continued at different rates. The TFR fell below replacement level earliest in Eastern Germany and Slovenia (at the beginning of the 1980s) and following

a rather rapid further decline stood at around 1.5 in 1990. Although the TFR fell below replacement level in Hungary and the Czech Republic at approximately the same time, early 1980s – mid-1980s, it continued to fall slowly, reaching around 1.9 in 1990. In Lithuania and Poland, the TFR stayed at replacement level until the beginning of the 1990s (Table 6.1). Ageing of fertility started earliest in Eastern Germany (in the 1970s), a decade later - in Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic (late 1980s), another decade later - in Poland (since the beginning of 1990s) and in Lithuania (in the mid-1990s).

Thus, the situation of the CEE DIALOG countries in terms of advancement of family changes varied when they were challenged by the transformation of the economy and society. In Slovenia and, notably, Eastern Germany family changes both in partnership and childbearing had already advanced significantly by the 1990s, and the relevant demographic indices differed only slightly from those of "old" Europe. Family changes were gaining momentum in Hungary and the Czech Republic, while in Poland and Lithuania the traditional features of the family were actually still prevalent.

Recent family changes in the CEE region. Although the general pattern of the rapid family changes in the CEE region was similar in the early 1990s, the level of changes reached varies significantly at the beginning of the 21st century, i.e. at the moment of the PPAS, due to the different starting positions and the pace of change.

Table 6.1 Changes in family formation and fertility in the CEE DIALOG countries, selected indicators

	Turning point to recent changes				Turning point to recent changes			
	Date	Level at turning point	1990	2002	Date	Level at turning point	1990	2002
Indicators of family formation					Fertility indicators			
Non-marital births (proportion, %)					TFR			
Czech Republic	1960–85	4.5–7	8.6	25.3	1980–85	∼2	1.90	1.17
Germany (Eastern)	1965	9.8	35.0	55.4	1980	1.94	1.50	1.06
Hungary	1960–80	5–7	13.1	32.3	1978–79	2.01	1.87	1.30
Lithuania	1960–90	5–7	7.0	29.5	1990	2.03	2.03	1.24
Poland	1960–90	4–6	6.2	14.4	1991	2.06	2.05	1.24
Slovenia	1960–70	∼9	24.5	40.2	1980	2.10	1.46	1.21
Mean age of women at first marriage (below age 50)					Mean age of women at first child			
Czech Republic	1991	21.6	21.6	25.2	1978–88	22.4	22.5	25.6
Germany (Eastern)	1980	21.8	23.3	25.3*	1970	23.3	24.6	26.3*
Hungary	1975	21.1	21.9	25.5	1976–80	22.4	23.1	25.6
Lithuania	1995	22.3	21.9	25.5	1994	23.0	23.2	24.3
Poland	1990	22.6	22.6	24.4	1989–91	23.3	23.3	25.0
Slovenia	1980	22.5	23.7	27.4	1979–80	22.9	23.7	27.2

* 1995

Source: Council of Europe, 2004

Family formation. In the CEE DIALOG countries the recent changes in family formation which started under varying circumstances with regard to partnership have been progressing rapidly, but at different rates (e.g. the proportion of non-marital births rose by 15–20 percentage points in all the countries under survey in 1990–2002, and by less than 10 percentage points only in Poland; this indicator was growing fastest in Lithuania) (Table 6.1). Around the PPAS date (2001–2003), the non-marital birth rate in Eastern Germany and Slovenia was actually close to the rate of Western and Northern European countries (over 40%). The indicator was slightly lower (25–32%) in Hungary, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, while Poland in fact represented the opposite pole to Eastern Germany and Slovenia (non-marital birth rate – 14%). The ageing of marriages was already witnessed in all countries under survey in the 1990s (Table 6.1).

Fertility. All the CEE countries under survey passed to lowest low fertility status in the 1990s (i.e. the TFR dropped below 1.3). The CEE countries are uniform in this respect. Nevertheless, the state of fertility in the countries is rather different. In the Czech Republic and Eastern Germany, the TFR has fallen to an extremely low level – to 1.17 and 1.06 in 2002 respectively (the level in Eastern Germany in 2002 is achieved after an increase from 0.77 in 1993–94), and to 1.2–1.3 in other countries. In 1990–2002, the TFR was declining fastest in Poland, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, and slowest in Slovenia (Table 6.1). Ageing of fertility was taking place in all the CEE countries under survey during this period. The process was most advanced in Slovenia and Eastern Germany (according to the progression of this indicator they have approached the countries of "old" Europe), and least advanced in Lithuania (Table 6.1).

Factors of family changes: a theoretical framework. The factors predetermining the family changes under discussion also differ widely. Many attempts by different scholars have resulted in an identification of the variety of the factors, which differ in terms of their character (long-term and short-term, fundamental and temporal, macro and micro level), and of the effects on the demographic development of the family.

Two opposing hypotheses are formulated in the debate on identification of family transformation factors in the CEE countries: the "crisis thesis" and the "second demographic transition thesis" (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002a; Macura et al. 2002; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003). The first presupposes domination by the structural (economic, social) factors, inspired by the transformational controversies, and short-term family changes at the same time; while the second presupposes domination of ideational factors (i.e. a value shift), and together with that, long-term fundamental changes. In most cases the two hypotheses are voiced in parallel (Lesthaeghe, Surkyn 2002a). However, these two groups of factors usually do not comprise a wide variety of other factors mentioned by different authors, especially from the CEE countries.

Since the rapid family changes of the CEE countries started particularly at the time of the greatest economic difficulties, i.e. at the beginning of the 1990s, many authors noted firstly the impact of economic pressures on childbearing and matrimonial behaviour. Among the "crisis" factors usually mentioned are: growing

unemployment, a sudden drop in income, falling living standards, spreading poverty and socio-economic instability (Macura et al. 2002; Rychtarikova 2000).

In addition to the "crisis" factors, the factors claimed to have led to the transformation which were singled out by the initiators of the theory of the "second demographic transition" are usually the following: spread of individualisation, increasing importance of values related to self-realisation, accentuation of individual autonomy in all spheres of life, increasing freedom of choice, weakening of all types of institutional control and authority (religion, family, etc.), growing gender emancipation, and finally, the spread of modern contraception (Lesthaeghe, Surkyn 2002a; van de Kaa 1997). The factors of both groups are usually placed together. The strength dynamics of the factors are also described: from the domination of "crisis" factors at the beginning of the 1990s, through a gradual addition of the "second demographic transition" factors in later years, to a strengthening and even domination of the latter factors (Lesthaeghe, Surkyn 2002a; Rabušic 2001).

Some authors stress the impact of specifically post-communist factors on family changes. The inherited shortage of housing, the significance of which has increased further during the period of transition to a market economy owing to the soaring prices of homes which caused a discrepancy between demand and supply of housing (Pavlik et al. 1997; Stankuniene et al. 2000). The factors of deprivation have also been pointed out, which had a painful impact on a certain segment of the population during the transition period: the fact that there is no longer a guaranteed job for life (Lesthaeghe, Surkyn 2002a), fewer educational opportunities and social guarantees (Stankuniene 2005). The effect of anomie has also been considered as an important family transformation factor (Philipov, Dorbritz 2003).

One might suppose that differences in the timing of the starting point of the family changes alone were responsible for the differences in the main determinants of changes, or even in the pace of change. In Lithuania and Poland, where the family changes only started in the 1990s, socio-economic difficulties probably served as an impetus for changes in family-related behaviour. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, and especially in Eastern Germany and Slovenia, where the family changes started considerably earlier, economic pressures accelerated previous value shifts.

The differences in the timing and pace of the family changes might have been related to the subjective treatment of that phenomenon in society. Therefore, a subjective evaluation of the family changes (their acceptance or rejection) and an analysis of value orientations related to partnership and childbearing, might throw some light on the notion of the essence and factors of family changes in the CEE countries.

6.3 A Subjective Assessment of Family Changes

The subjective assessment of family changes provides very important information on the universality of changes, as well as on the fundamental aspects of and the path taken by further changes. The more positive the assessment is, the higher the degree of fundamental change and the lower the resistance to its further spread.

Dominating negative assessments with regard to certain family changes indicate social disapproval and, probably, its slower spread. The absence of a definite opinion ("neither good nor bad") should indicate indifference, neutrality or tolerance towards the changes, as well as the existence of a non-hostile environment for the spread of the phenomenon. Rapid societal transformations in the post-communist countries may also indicate manifestations of anomie (through confusion in values and standards). The attitudes towards changes in partnership and childbearing will be analysed in this section (the statements on family changes are given in Appendix).

A general overview of attitudes towards family changes. Subjective assessments on family changes in CEE DIALOG countries demonstrate a rather contradictory picture. Various attributes of the family transformation receive quite different assessments; besides, the assessments differ considerably from one country to another. On the other hand, the CEE countries are similar due to the fact that negative assessments towards the majority of family changes are dominant, and that negative attitudes are substantially more frequent here than in the countries of "old" Europe (Appendix 1).

Among all family changes, the spread of cohabitation is distinguished by the frequency of positive assessments. It is most frequently assessed positively ("good" or "very good") in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Eastern Germany (30.5%, 26.7% and 25.1% of respondents respectively) and most rarely in Lithuania and Poland (16.2%). A relatively large section of respondents gave a positive assessment of the increasing number of births among cohabiting couples. Here, Eastern Germany takes one extreme (19% of respondents giving a favourable assessment), while Hungary and Poland (2.9% and 4.5% respectively) take the other. Other family changes receive few favourable assessments in all countries: those with favourable opinions constitute less than 10%. Declines in fertility and marriages, increases in divorces and in the number of single adults, as well as of children from one-parent families, receive very few positive assessments.

Among other CEE DIALOG countries, Hungary and Lithuania are distinguished for the most frequent negative and Hungary for extremely negative attitudes towards the family changes. The Czech Republic and Eastern Germany represent the other extreme among the CEE DIALOG countries: a majority of the family changes is much more frequently given a positive or neutral assessment in these countries, as is also the case in Slovenia. Meanwhile, Poland is notable for its contradictory assessments towards the family changes. Some changes in Poland are assessed negatively more frequently than in other countries (the spread of cohabitation is assessed negatively here by more than 40% of respondents, whereas in other countries this indicator ranges between 20% and 34%), while others are more frequently assessed positively (e.g. the fact that more and more families have only one child is assessed positively by 9.8% of Poles, and by only 2% to 7% in other countries).

Although differences in assessments towards family changes among the CEE DIALOG countries are quite significant in comparison to the countries of "old" Europe, the CEE region has a distinctive position. Here we see much less approval as regards the family changes and fewer neutral attitudes, and hence much more disapproval. When it comes to assessments of family changes, the Czech Republic and Eastern Germany are closest to the countries of "old" Europe, closely followed by Slovenia.

However, it is hard to make more generalised conclusions based exclusively on the data of assessment frequencies which are quite controversial both by different family change attributes and by countries. The factor analysis revealed two groups of inter-related attributes of the family changes. The first group combines three attributes of family changes presented for subjective assessment: the spread of cohabitation (CL1A), the rising number of births among unmarried couples (CL1H) and the falling number of marriages (CL1C), virtually identifying the change in the family formation pattern. Attributes of the second group are: the rising number of childless couples (CL1B), the falling number of births (CL1D), and the increasing number of families with only one child (CL1F), i.e. they are related to the fertility pattern. The further analysis of family changes is based on these two attribute groups.

Attitudes towards changes in family formation. An analysis of the set of attributes of family changes, representing the change in the pattern of family formation, distinguishes between two groups of respondents: those who disapprove of these changes ("bad" or "very bad") and those whose assessments are positive ("good" or "very good") or neutral ("neither good, nor bad"). The responses of the first group are designated as conservative, and those of the second group are referred to as non-conservative (Fig. 6.1).

Disintegration of the institutional family order is mostly assessed positively in those CEE DIALOG countries in which family transformations started earliest (Eastern Germany and Slovenia), and conservatively where these changes are a new phenomenon (Poland and Lithuania) (Fig. 6.1; Table 6.1). The impact of the timing of family transformation on the assessments of family changes is also confirmed by their differences among various generations (Table 6.2). The earlier family transformation started, the fewer differences there are between the opinions of different generations, and the larger part of respondents from older generations is non-conservative about the family formation changes. In the countries which entered the family transformation path most recently, the majority of older respondents are



Fig. 6.1 Assessment of the changes in family formation (in % of respondents by country)
Source: IPPAS

conservative (in the cases of Lithuania and Poland, this is extremely obvious). Over and above this, in those countries in which the pace of family change is fastest, the proportion of individuals with non-conservative assessments is also increasing most rapidly, this however mostly concerning the youngest generations (e.g. Lithuania) (Table 6.2).

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the assessments are also influenced by other factors in addition to the timing of the family formation changes. This is primarily illustrated by the cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary. In an evaluation of the family formation changes, the Czech Republic and Hungary take diametrically opposed positions, even if these changes actually started at the same time in both countries, namely in the 1980s. While Hungary is characterized by considerable degree of conservatism, the Czech Republic demonstrates liberal assessments (non-conservative opinions).

Attitudes towards the decline in fertility. The CEE DIALOG countries are quite homogenous in their attitudes towards the decline in fertility. In all of these countries the majority of respondents give a negative assessment of the decline in fertility. That assessment is currently similar to the one found in the "Western" DIALOG countries (Fig. 6.2). Nevertheless, there are two opposite poles in this homogeneity – the first one includes the countries with extremely negative assessments (best represented by Hungary) and the other represents those countries which are less concerned about these changes (best represented by Poland) (Fig. 6.2). The latter stands out among all DIALOG countries through its relatively low level of concern about the decline in fertility. This might be an effect of a large nation or of a natural

Table 6.2 Assessment of the family formation changes by age of respondents in CEE DIALOG countries (in % of respondents)

	20–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60–64
Czech Republic					
non-conservative	88.8	83.7	78.3	66.7	44.4
conservative	11.2	16.3	21.7	33.3	55.6
Germany (Eastern)					
non-conservative	93.9	91.2	86.4	75.4	61.3
conservative	6.1	8.8	13.6	24.6	38.7
Hungary					
non-conservative	58.6	57.2	41.5	33.1	23.8
conservative	41.4	42.8	58.5	66.9	76.2
Lithuania					
non-conservative	77.9	65.5	47.1	34.3	14.3
conservative	22.1	34.5	52.9	65.7	85.7
Poland					
non-conservative	65.7	53.8	44.5	36.1	26.2
conservative	34.3	46.2	55.5	63.9	73.8
Slovenia					
non-conservative	81.9	73.5	68.8	46.9	40.9
conservative	18.1	26.5	31.2	53.1	59.1

Source: IPPAS



Fig. 6.2 Assessment of the decline in fertility (in % by country)
Source: IPPAS

increase still observed before the time of the survey. Moreover, the low level of concern as regards declining fertility might be caused by the low level of public awareness of population changes, and by the fact that the public debate is dominated by other concerns.

Patterns of assessment of family change. Although larger or even major sections of DIALOG societies already accept modern forms of family formation, relatively large sections continue to disapprove of declining fertility and express their concern about the current situation. This is particularly characteristic of the CEE countries (Fig. 6.1; Fig. 6.2). Attitudes towards family changes are likely to take opposite directions, as if there were a degree of approval of some attributes of family modernisation (family formation changes), whereas others are frowned upon (decline in fertility).

The DIALOG countries can be classified into more or less homogenous groups, which are characterised by a similar pattern in the assessments of family changes (Fig. 6.3). The first and most homogenous group is formed by Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and is characterized by a moderate or slightly better expressed acceptance of the new family formation pattern and a relatively moderate negative attitude towards the decline in fertility. One of the countries of "old" Europe, namely Western Germany, also falls into that group. Hungary, Lithuania and Finland fall into the second group. These countries are concerned both about the de-institutionalisation of the family, and about declining fertility. Hungary takes up an exclusive position in that concern about all attributes of family changes is extremely strong even if – according to current demographic indicators of family changes – it is quite close to the Czech Republic. Poland represents the third, highly specific group. Despite the fact that the family changes are rapid, especially in respect of fertility, the significant concern here refers only to symptoms of the de-institutionalisation of the family, while the decline in fertility is regarded with less anxiety. The Netherlands and Austria constitute the fourth group, which is characterised by liberal attitudes both towards the family formation changes, and towards the decline in fertility.



Fig. 6.3 Assessment patterns of family formation changes and fertility decline[1]
Source: IPPAS

As we can see, Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovenia are closest to the countries of "old" Europe, not only in terms of actual values of indicators of matrimonial and reproductive behaviour, but also of attitudes towards the family changes (Fig. 6.1; Fig. 6.2; Fig. 6.3). They are not uniform, nevertheless. Among them Eastern Germany is the most westernised both as to the actual family changes, and to its attitudes towards these changes. In Slovenia, the actual family changes are noticeably advanced towards modernisation, but their assessments remain more conservative. Whereas in the Czech Republic modernisation in family changes, especially in family formation, falls behind Eastern Germany and Slovenia, attitudes in their acceptance resemble those in Eastern Germany. It might be assumed that in terms of value shifts the Czech Republic, just like Eastern Germany, is best prepared for further family modernisation, and that factors of the SDT are best manifested here. Resistance to family modernisation can still be observed in Lithuania, Poland and especially in Hungary. However, demographic behaviour and attitudes are modernising rapidly here, especially in Lithuania.

If one takes certain reservations into account, the PPAS data allow one to test the influences of some of the main value factors of the SDT (individualisation,

[1] SPSS factor analysis for the variables CL1A-D, F, H was applied. The Principal Component Extraction Method and Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation Rotation Method were used and two factors extracted. The factors explain 68% of the total variance. The first factor ("decline in fertility") encompasses the variables CL1D, CL1B, CL1F with the factor loadings 0.8; 0.78; 0.71 respectively. The second factor ("family change") encompasses the variables CL1A, CL1H, CL1C with the factor loadings 0.84; 0.79; 0.73 respectively. Mean factor scores for both factors for each country were calculated and presented in Fig. 6.3.

secularisation and emancipation) on assessments of the family changes. As attitudes toward the decline in fertility are somewhat homogenous among the DIALOG countries, they will be not examined further. Thus, only those family changes will be considered in the following sub-sections which relate to family formation.

6.4 Individualism/Familism and the Assessment of the Family Formation Changes

Individualism occupies an exceptional position in the SDT. Individual autonomy leading to the liberation of the individual from the traditional societal bonds, to decreasing institutional control over his/her choices and decisions, and to the variety of living styles, influences the demographic behaviour of the individual. The opposite pole to individualism is collectivism, as is familism when one investigates individual and family relations. Familism as a concept describes "family identity" or "centrality of the family" (John, Resendiz, de Vargas 1997). Familism is also defined as "exclusiveness" centred on family relationships (Heller, 1976) and "spirit" of the strong family system (Dalla Zuanna 2001). Thus, while individualism liberates an individual from family bonds, familism retains subordination of the individual to the family. Familism, as well as individualism, are cultural principles common to the members of a society, possessing a symbolical power to shape behaviour, attitudes and societal structures. Although familism is frequently related to an extended family, the concept is also used to analyse the nuclear family and parent-child relations (Dalla Zuanna 2001).

Familism in the CEE DIALOG countries. The PPAS provided a unique opportunity to analyse some aspects of familism: attitudes towards the centrality of family and children in the individual's life.[2] Familism is expressed through the statements about children and home as an extremely important thing, which ensures fulfilment, as well as through the belief that a psychological need for intimacy may only be satisfied through relations with one's children and the notion that having children is the individual's social obligation to the community.

The DIALOG countries are divided into three regions in terms of support for familistic attitudes: countries where familistic culture is strongly expressed, weakly-expressed familistic culture, and mixed culture[3] (Fig. 6.4). The majority of the CEE

[2] The statements included in the analysis are: "It is only possible to be happy and satisfied in our modern world within a family, at home and with one's children" (CL5A); "I always enjoy having children around me" (CL5B); "I like children because they give me the feeling of being really needed" (CL5D); "Having children is an obligation towards society" (CL5E); "The closest relationship one can have with a person is that with one's own child" (Cl5G).

[3] SPSS factor analysis for the variables CL5A, CL5B, CL5D, CL5E, CL5G was applied. The Principal Component Extraction Method and Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation Rotation Method were used and one factor extracted. The factor explains 55% of total variance. The factor loadings for the variables are: CL5A (0.76), CL5B (0.77), CL5D (0.8), CL5E (0.68), CL5G (0.69). Mean factor scores for factor for each country were calculated and presented in Fig. 6.4.



Fig. 6.4 Orientations towards familism (factor score means for countries)
Source: IPPAS

DIALOG countries, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania, are listed among the countries showing a strong familistic culture.[4] The weak familistic culture is typical of the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland and Western Germany.[5] It could be assumed that in these countries familistic principles regulating relations between the individual and the family have been overshadowed by individualism. The weakness of these countries' familistic culture is also not homogeneous: it is the weakest in the Netherlands and Belgium, whereas it is slightly stronger in Finland and Western Germany. The mixed-culture group includes Austria, Eastern Germany and Slovenia.[6]

Familism and assessments of the family changes. If familism supports the subordination of the individual to the family, it might help to sustain the traditional family based on marriage and sanction the alternative forms of family which manifest individual autonomy in matrimonial behaviour. To study the interplay between attitudes toward familism and assessments of the family formation changes, firstly a cluster analysis was used, grouping the respondents according to the evaluation of familistic statements.[7] The group of individualists included those who gave a neutral evaluation of the statements regarding the family and the central position taken up

[4] The Least Significant Difference multiple comparison test for means with the significance level of 0.05 was used. Factor score mean groups for LT, PL, CZ, HU are not significantly different. However, each of the countries listed is significantly different in comparison with every other DIALOG country.

[5] NL, BE(FL), FI, DE(W) support the hypothesis about differences of mean groups. Factor score means are significantly different when comparing them with the other DIALOG countries and among the listed countries.

[6] SLO, DE(E), AT do not support the hypothesis of significant differences between the listed countries ($p>0.05$), but do confirm significant differences as against other countries ($p<0.05$).

[7] The statements CL5A-B, CL5D-E, CL5E were used for K-mean cluster analysis. Final cluster centres for "individualists" – 3; 3; 3; 4; 3; for "familists" – 2; 1; 2; 2; 2.

by children in one's life (CL5A), the psychological relevance of children for the individual (CL5B, D, G), and "disagreed" with the opinion that having children is one's obligation to society (CL5E). The familists comprised those who "agreed" or "fully agreed" with every statement which supported familistic goals (Cl5A-B, D-E, G).

Individualistic or/and familistic attitudes influence the assessments of family changes. Individualism implies a non-conservative assessment of changes in the family as an institution, something which is obvious in the countries of both "old" and "new" Europe (Table 6.3). In all the DIALOG countries, the dominant majority of the population which shares individualistic attitudes makes neutral or positive assessments as to the family changes. However, depending on the size of this majority, countries are divided into "old" Europe (here it is the largest – over 90%) and "new" Europe (where it is slightly lower – under 90%). Moreover, "old Europe" forms a somewhat homogenous group: in every country (except Finland) the predominant majority of individualists assesses family changes in a non-conservative manner. Contrary to this, the different regularity is observed in the CEE countries. According to the proportion of individualists voicing non-conservative views, Eastern Germany is on a par with the countries of "old" Europe, with the Czech Republic and Slovenia following them closely, and Poland and Lithuania lagging quite far behind. Hungary stands out among all the countries surveyed. Here, the individualists are rather more conservative towards the proliferation of de-institutionalisation of the family, regardless of the fact that actual changes in this field are far more advanced, at least in comparison with Poland, Lithuania and even the Czech Republic (Table 6.1).

Familists in the CEE region (with the exception of Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic) exhibit more conservative views on the family changes, which is not the case in the countries of "old" Europe (with the exception of Finland). Among familists in the CEE region, the most conservative assessments are made in Hungary (61.8%) and Poland (60.3%). This probably proves that "strong-family societies are usually more conservative" (Reher 1998).[8]

Familists in Lithuania and Slovenia share the conservative and non-conservative views to almost equal degrees.

Summing up, the general trends in the CEE countries reveal that the prevailing familistic culture still supports the institutional pattern of family formation. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that Catholicism strengthens familism and vice versa (Dalla Zuanna 2001) with the consequence that Catholic culture must be having a consolidating impact on maintaining the conservative views, especially in Poland. Familistic orientations emphasizing the importance of children in the life of the individual sustain the family based on marriage, which is considered to be the most beneficial for the child. Meanwhile, in Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic (as in the countries of "old" Europe) familism is weakly connected with

[8] The fact that these countries are noted by particularly strong familist views is confirmed by the findings of the European Value Study: as many as over 90% of respondents indicate that families "are very important" in their lives (the degree of agreement to the importance of family is lower in other DIALOG countries) (Mitrikas 2000).

Table 6.3 Orientation toward familism and individualism and assessment of family formation changes (in % by country)

CEE DIALOG countries	Indivi-dualists	Fami-lists	"Western" DIALOG countries	Indivi-dualists	Fami-lists
Czech Republic			*Austria*		
non-conservative	88.9	73.8	non-conservative	95.0	69.9
conservative	11.1	26.2	conservative	5.0	30.1
Germany (Eastern)			*Belgium*		
non-conservative	94.7	76.6	non-conservative	93.9	78.5
conservative	5.3	23.4	conservative	6.1	21.5
Hungary			*Finland*		
non-conservative	62.7	38.2	non-conservative	77.4	54.1
conservative	37.3	61.8	conservative	22.6	45.9
Lithuania			*Germany (Western)*		
non-conservative	76.2	47.0	non-conservative	90.3	69.8
conservative	23.8	53.0	conservative	9.7	30.2
Poland			*The Netherlands*		
non-conservative	77.5	39.7	non-conservative	95.3	78.3
conservative	22.5	60.3	conservative	4.7	21.7
Slovenia					
non-conservative	85.8	56.4			
conservative	14.2	43.6			

Source: IPPAS

the maintenance of the marriage-based family. This specific feature of the two countries might be predetermined by a high level of secularisation, and additionally in the case of Eastern Germany, by a non-Catholic culture.

As mentioned above, familistic views are not related in the countries of "old" Europe to support for the traditional family formation pattern. In these countries, familistic beliefs as to the central position taken up by children and the family in the life of the individual survive alongside modern attitudes towards family formation and co-exist with the proliferation of the modern family formation pattern. By these means, an intertwining of tradition (familism) and modernism does not lead to a conflict. An orientation towards children, a recognition of the subjective importance of children and support for the modern family signify a realisation of the familistic values through alternative forms of family life.

All in all, since the familistic culture is generally stronger in the CEE countries than in the countries of "old" Europe (Fig. 6.4), a higher proportion both of familists and of individualists hold conservative views when it comes to an assessment of the family formation changes (Table 6.3). Moreover, obvious differences and even opposite extremes are revealed among the CEE countries: with Hungary and Poland (where familism together with Catholicism have preserved the highest degree of conservatism) at the one end, and Eastern Germany (where individualism in combination with secularism and non-Catholic culture predetermine liberalism) at the other.

6.5 Secularisation and the Assessment of the Family Formation Changes

Religion is losing its institutional control over worldviews and social behaviour in contemporary secular societies. This condition naturally impacts interrelationships between religion and the family, as well as matrimonial and reproductive attitudes and behaviour. However, despite its diminishing institutional role, religion is not disappearing, but retains its subjective significance. With the rejection of coherent religious doctrines and a formal religious affiliation, a non-church religiousness is on the increase (Bellah et al. 1985). Therefore, in contemporary secular societies being religious does not imply that a person's matrimonial and reproductive attitudes and behaviour are in accordance with any religious doctrine. In this section, we will scrutinize the tie between secularisation and family changes: firstly by examining the level of secularisation in the DIALOG countries, and secondly by exploring assessments of the family changes in various groups according to their religiousness.

Secularisation in the CEE region. Secularisation has advanced in diverse societal contexts in "new" and "old" Europe. While in the latter region secularisation was catalysed by political liberalism, and by cultural and structural modernisation, in the CEE region it was the outcome of political totalitarianism and communist modernisation.[9] These diverse paths to secularisation determine the different religious situations and character of religion-family relations in both regions of Europe.

Religiousness is a multidimensional phenomenon which impacts the cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal levels.[10] The PPAS data provided an opportunity to examine religiousness by assessing two of its dimensions: formal institutional affiliation and the subjective significance of religion. Various combinations of these two dimensions made it possible to distinguish between three types of religiousness: *believers* (who declare their affiliation to the religious community and recognise the subjective importance of religion), *secular believers* (who declare their affiliation to the religious community, whilst considering religion to be subjectively unimportant) and *non-believers* (who declare no religious affiliation and consider religion to be subjectively unimportant). Three different situations are observed among the CEE DIALOG countries according to the respondents' distribution in every country (Fig. 6.5). The first group of the most religious countries is represented by Poland, where the absolute majority of residents are believers in whose lives religion plays a significant role.[11]

[9] The concept of communist or state socialist modernisation describes the specific type of modernisation which resulted from the totalitarian political regime in the CEE countries. Communist modernisation is characterised by relative economic and structural modernisation, as well as by a lack of social and cultural modernisation in society (Illner 1996; Péteri 2004; Tomka, Zulehner 2000).

[10] The study of religiousness encompasses several dimensions: religious affiliation, religious experience (subjective significance of religion), ritualistic, intellectual, consequential (Boss-Nünning 1972; Glock 1968).

[11] In the case of Poland, the original questionnaire focused not on the subjective but rather on the



Fig. 6.5 Religiousness in DIALOG countries (in % of respondents by country)
Source: IPPAS

Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic belong to the opposite type of the most secularised countries across the region. Lithuania, Slovenia and Hungary belong to the third group. Neither believers nor non-believers compose the dominant majority here. Findings of other studies (Tomka et al. 1999) imply that a strong value conflict and polarisation of views is incidental to this situation. To a certain extent this resembles the religious situation in "old" Europe, which historically belongs to the Christian area, but where the Christian worldview is competing in an atmosphere of cultural plurality on a market of secular worldviews and other religious faiths.

Secularisation and the assessment of the family changes. Considering the role placed by religion in terms of social control over the family as an institution, it might be expected that believers will share the most uniform attitudes towards the family changes and assess them in a conservative manner. Nevertheless, the study proves that believers in various CEE countries demonstrate very different assessments of the family changes (Fig. 6.6). In Eastern Germany and Slovenia, only about one-half of believers assess changes in family formation conservatively (and even less than one-half in Eastern Germany). A similar situation is found in the highly-secularised Czech Republic. Accordingly, more than one-half of believers in these countries consider changes in the family formation either positively or neutrally (non-conservative). Thus, in those CEE countries where family transformation started earliest (Eastern Germany and Slovenia), or where these early demographic changes are accompanied by a high level of secularisation (Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic), even a significant part of the religious population is tolerant of the family changes. Consequently, in these countries even religion has lost the power to sanction some aspects of family life. Moreover, this reveals that society's resistance to the changes is already weak and that the modern family formation

ritual dimension of religion. In the PPAS database, a variable measuring ritual activity was coded into a variable measuring the subjective importance of religion. This must be considered in further analysis of the data.



Fig. 6.6 Assessment of family formation changes by believers (in % by country)
Source: IPPAS

pattern is common and will proliferate. Lastly, the situation in these countries is closest to that in "old" Europe.

In Poland and Lithuania, the significant part of believers (approximately 40%) also evaluates the family changes in a non-conservative manner. Hence, this might also indicate the diminishing social control of religion over the family, increasing the social normativeness of the modern family formation pattern and the potential for its further spread. This is not the case in Hungary, however, where believers' evaluation of the family changes is the most conservative in comparison with other CEE DIALOG countries.

The group of believers in all CEE DIALOG countries is therefore not homogenous in its assessment of the family changes. In Eastern Germany, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, that group consists of relatively equal proportions of social modernists, who hold liberal views, and the socially orthodox, who hold conservative views. Believers in Poland and Lithuania evaluate the family changes in a similar manner, although the proportion of the socially orthodox is slightly larger here. Hungary stands out as an exception, the majority of believers being socially orthodox. Unlike the situation in the CEE, the majority of believers in "old" Europe share the views of the social liberals, with the highest proportion being found in Belgium (FL) (83.3%), a slightly smaller share in the Netherlands (73.9%) and Austria (71.9%), and a relatively smaller proportion in Western Germany (63.3%). The divisions between "old" and "new" Europe are probably influenced by the duration of family transformation, by countries' historical destiny, which determined the diverse paths of secularisation and, consequently, by the modernisation of religion,[12] which was impossible in the CEE under the totalitar-

[12] The concept "modernization of religion" describes the 20th century reforms within the religious institutions in Europe and North America. The reforms are driven by the need to redefine the relationships between the religious institution and society in a modern context. As Steve Bruce points out, "the same social forces which undermine the traditional religion of preindustrial societies also create conditions which encourage new forms of religion and which give new life to old forms" (Bruce 1999). In the case of the Catholic Church, the process of modernization started after the Second Vatican Council in the second half of the 20th century. It encompassed the revision of the

ian system. In many CEE countries – excluding Hungary – secular believers assess changes in the family as an institution in a similar manner to non-believers. Approximately 75% of Slovenian, Polish and Eastern German secular believers and 64% of Lithuanian secular believers are non-conservative. Consequently, a diminishing subjective significance of religion, even when the formal affiliation to the religious community is maintained, marginalizes the role of religion in evaluating the family changes. The Hungarian situation differs slightly, 49% of secular believers assessing family changes in a non-conservative manner.

Non-believers in all CEE countries are more positive, i.e. non-conservative, in their assessments of the family changes. Approximately 80% of non-believers (90% in Poland) express non-conservative views. Hungary constitutes an exception, where even non-believers are more reserved about non-conservative attitudes (60%).

Summing up, religiousness has implications for a more conservative evaluation of family de-institutionalisation, but this relation is rather ambiguous. Being a believer does not necessarily imply being conservative in one's assessment of the family changes. In all CEE DIALOG countries, the group of believers consists of social modernists, who share liberal views, and the socially orthodox, who share conservative views. Yet, unlike in "old" Europe, the believers of the CEE region (excluding Eastern Germany and, to some degree, Slovenia) more often share the socially orthodox views. Secular believers and a majority of non-believers in the CEE region (excluding Hungary) often share the social modernist views. Thus, secularisation is obviously interconnected with more liberal views towards the changes in family formation, but religiousness does not necessarily lead in contemporary societies to conservative views of the family changes.

6.6 Female Emancipation and the Assessment of the Changes in Family Formation

The processes of gender emancipation plays an exceptional role in the theory of the SDT. According to the findings of some surveys, more liberal attitudes on gender roles are related to family formation through cohabitation (Clarcberg et al. 1995; Lesthaeghe, Surkyn 1988); inequality of gender relations in public and private spheres plays a decisive role in low fertility (McDonald 2000a, b). Nevertheless, the interplay of gender emancipation and the family changes may not, however, be of universal use (Batalova, Cohen 2002). In the countries of "new" Europe, where the family changes typical for the SDT were unfolding vigorously from the 1990s onwards, gender emancipation can hardly have been among the decisive factors. On the other hand, there is virtually no doubt that the gender emancipation process was taking place in the CEE countries prior to the transformation of the last decade of

liturgy, the redefinition of the relationship between the Church and society, and the increasing role of lay persons within the Church (Tomka, Zuhlener 2000).

the 20th century, or, more to the point, that gender emancipation is not central to current developments.

The reason which burdens the analysis of gender emancipation and the family changes arises from the historical development of the CEE societies. Here, the development of political democracy and the market economy started after a significant level of structural female emancipation had been achieved in some spheres (for example, high labour force participation and education of females) without achieving progress in cultural gender emancipation. The communist legacy was one of quasi emancipation, which was different from the gender emancipation observed in the countries of "old" Europe. Quasi emancipation fused structural female emancipation with patriarchal gender identities, and thus created favourable conditions for the establishment of "masculine democracies" (Kligman 1996) in the beginning of the 1990s. When the redistribution of economic resources and power (economic, political and symbolic) started in the region, thus giving rise to the establishment of "the patriarchally-biased socio-political systems that seemingly privilege the interests of men more than those of women" (Kligman 1996). Women's labour market opportunities were diminishing (Ferge 1997; Ghodsee 2004); their social support received through social policy significantly reduced (Pascall, Manding 2000). Meanwhile, extreme patriarchal models of gender identities were reinvented within the culture. Women were accordingly associated with family and privacy, and the males with the public domain. Thus, unlike "old" Europe, political democracy and market economy in the CEE region have not catalysed the process of gender emancipation, but rather have strengthened cultural and social hierarchies and gender-based inequalities.

Female identity models. To evaluate the role of female emancipation in the assessment of family changes, four models of female identity were constructed. Since only few countries incorporated questions on gender issues in their questionnaires, the analysis covered four countries of the CEE group (Eastern Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland), as well as Austria and Western Germany.

The female identity models included: *emancipation* (**E**) – orientation toward employment in a positive settlement of the female role conflict;[13] *limited emancipation* (**LE**) – orientation toward employment with emphasis being placed on the female role conflict;[14] *limited patriarchy* (**LP**) – orientation to the home but employment is accepted as an economic necessity[15] and *substantial* (or extreme) *patriarchy* (**P**) – orientation to home as women's destiny.[16]

[13] Agreement with the statements: *"The relationship between a working mother and her children can be just as close as that of a non-working mother"* (G1A) and *"Work for a woman offers the best opportunity to be independent"* (G1F).

[14] Agreement with the statements: "*A pre-school child will probably suffer if his/ her mother works*" (G1B) and *"Work for a woman offers the best opportunity to be independent"* (G1F).

[15] Agreement with the statements: *"Work is good, but what most women really want is a home and children"* (G1D) and: *"Most women have to work today to support their families"* (G1G).

[16] Agreement with the statements: "*Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working*" (G1E) and *"It is the task of the man to earn money and that of the woman to look after the home and the family*" (G2B).

Table 6.4 Acceptance of female identity models (in % of respondents by country)

	Emancipation (E)	Limited emancipation (LE)	Limited patriarchy (LP)	Patriarchy (P)
Austria	64.7	44.3	25.0	22.4
Germany (E)	76.8	21.8	16.2	8.3
Germany (W)	65.2	40.2	24.0	17.7
Hungary	32.0	27.1	68.7	34.8
Lithuania	49.0	46.2	55.2	18.1
Poland	39.1	35.5	39.1	25.2

Source: IPPAS

Each of the CEE DIALOG countries surveyed represents a specific distribution of female identity models (Table 6.4). Domination of a single but distinct female identity model is observed in Eastern Germany and Hungary. The majority of the population in Eastern German society supports the emancipation model (76.8%), whilst in Hungary, it supports that of a limited patriarchy (68.7%). Eastern Germany also stands out from the other CEE countries by virtue of the very low level of public support given to the two models representing a patriarchal female identity: the limited patriarchy is supported by only 16.2% of the population, and the extreme patriarchy by 8.3%. An opposite trend is observed in Poland and Lithuania, where there is no single dominant female identity model. Equal halves of the population of Lithuania, respectively, supported the emancipationist models (both emancipation and limited emancipation) and the limited patriarchy, about 40% of the population of Poland supporting the latter model. The fact that no single dominant female identity model can be found in these countries may signify a conglomerate of gender culture from the Soviet and transformational periods when contradictory, ideologically-conflicting female identity models intertwined. Thus, attitudes toward female emancipation in CEE DIALOG countries take Eastern Germany to one extreme, and Hungary to the other, with Lithuania and Poland in between.

Female emancipation and the assessment of the family changes. The link between attitudes toward female emancipation and the assessment of family changes in the CEE countries contradicts that observed in "Old" Europe (Table 6.5). Hungary, Lithuania and Poland demonstrate a highly specific pattern – the supporters of the extreme patriarchal, patriarchal or limited emancipation female identity models are much more conservatively disposed towards the changes in the family as an institution than the societies of "old" Europe. Those who adhere to more emancipationist views are a good deal different too: they are not re-playing the assessment pattern of family changes typical of "old" European and Eastern German societies. The advocates of emancipationist female identities in the CEE countries are divided into approximately equal proportions of conservatives and non-conservatives. Thus, it is evident that in the CEE countries (with the exception of Eastern Germany) female emancipation is advancing despite a noticeable preservation of traditional views on family formation. Meanwhile, in the "old" European societies emancipation is directly related to the non-conservative assessment of family changes. Here, even adherents of patriarchal female identity models are inclined, albeit less frequently,

Table 6.5 Acceptance of female identity models and assessment of the changes in family formation (in % of respondents by country)

	Emancipation (E)	Limited emancipation (LE)	Limited patriarchy (LP)	Patriarchy (P)
Austria				
non-conservative	84.3	75.8	65.1	58.1
conservative	15.7	24.2	34.9	41.9
Germany (East)				
non-conservative	84.0	75.9	71.6	69.1
conservative	16.0	24.1	28.4	30.9
Germany (West)				
non-conservative	84.4	77.9	63.4	55.8
conservative	15.6	22.1	36.6	44.2
Hungary				
non-conservative	51.9	41.4	40.3	30.2
conservative	48.1	58.6	59.7	69.8
Lithuania				
non-conservative	53.6	41.9	42.9	34.7
conservative	46.4	58.1	57.1	65.3
Poland				
non-conservative	51.4	38.2	35.9	36.1
conservative	48.6	61.8	64.1	63.9

Source: IPPAS

towards a non-conservative evaluation of changes in the family as an institution. This might perhaps be explained by the timing of the changes in the family as an institution, since they started earlier here, and have by now acquired the status of the normative pattern of family formation. Furthermore, the family changes and the emancipation of women were taking place at the same time and were interdependent. A similar situation prevails in Eastern Germany, where the family changes started earlier than in the other CEE countries and developed in concurrence with increasing labour market participation by women and a preservation of the working mother model during the transformational period (Adler 2004b).

Thus, contradictory trends in female emancipation in post-communist countries (fall in economic activity against the background of a slow weakening of patriarchal relations in the private domain and strengthening of patriarchal views) and different timing of female emancipation and family transformation failed to shape an interconnection between the views in assessing these phenomena. This, in turn, reinforces our conclusion that there is no direct interrelation between the recent changes in family formation and female emancipation in the CEE countries.

6.7 Conclusions

The family transformation process in the CEE countries is far from uniform, despite a synchronous and sudden acceleration of the family changes starting from the 1990s. There are significant differences in the timing of the start of the changes,

their pace and levels achieved across the region. Moreover, the PPAS findings prove the differences in subjective assessments of these changes among the CEE countries, hence representing the diverse levels of acceptance by society. According to the demographic trends, the changes started earliest in Eastern Germany and Slovenia (the first indications of the changes were manifested in the 1960s–1970s), slightly later in the Czech Republic and Hungary (in the 1970s–1980s), and latest in Lithuania and Poland (in the 1990s). The demographic developments are echoed in attitudes towards the family changes: they are usually best accepted, and attitudes towards them are less negative, where they started earliest and are most advanced, and vice versa. Nonetheless, this general interdependence between the demographic character of the family transformations and the social acceptance of the changes is modified by other contributory factors.

Firstly, attitudes vary in terms of an assessment of the different attributes of the family changes. In general, changes in the family formation pattern (de-institutionalisation of the family) receive greater social approval (and a lesser degree of disapproval), while the significant decrease in fertility is the object of greater disapproval. Despite the general nature of this trend, clear divisions persist in attitudes towards the family formation changes among the CEE DIALOG countries. Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovenia demonstrate the wide social acceptance of changes in the family formation pattern, while Lithuania, Poland and Hungary are more reticent towards them.

Secondly, attitudes towards changes in the family formation pattern are conditioned not only by their timing, but also by the power of the ideational factors associated with the SDT (individualisation, secularisation and emancipation). Two opposite poles are identified: with Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic at the one extreme and Hungary and Poland at the other. In highly-individualised, secularised and non-Catholic Eastern Germany, where the demographic family formation changes are most advanced among the CEE countries, their assessment is the most positive. Meanwhile, in the highly-secularised Czech Republic, the social acceptance of family formation changes that started relatively early in demographic terms is more moderate, conditioned presumably by the strongly expressed familistic culture. In Poland, taking the opposite pole due to its religious atmosphere and familistic orientations, the family formation changes have started most recently and are assessed the most conservatively. In Hungary, the extremely strong familistic culture has the deepest impact on the dominance of the most conservative attitudes towards the family formation changes, despite a rather high level of secularisation and a relatively early start of the family transformation process. As to assessments of the family formation changes, Lithuania and Slovenia stand between these two poles, with the exception that Lithuania still shows a greater resemblance to conservative Poland, while Slovenia takes up the other, non-conservative extreme.

Female emancipation, which was and remains a crucial factor for the family transformation in "Western" DIALOG countries, shapes attitudes toward the family formation changes in the CEE region differently (with the exception of Eastern Germany). Positive attitudes towards female emancipation are not directly interconnected with social acceptance of the family formation changes, so that

female emancipation was and is developing along with the preservation of the traditional family formation pattern.

Consequently, the subjective assessments of family transformations in the CEE DIALOG region are far from uniform. Differences are generated by the inherited historical factors, demographic developments, and structural and cultural path dependencies. The variant interplay of these forces divides the CEE countries, with Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovenia approaching the "Western" DIALOG countries and demonstrating a high degree of social acceptance of the family changes, and with Lithuania, Poland and Hungary showing moderate to low social acceptance.

Appendix

Table 6.5 Assessment of family changes (in % of respondents by country)

	CEE DIALOG countries					
	CZ	DE (E)	HU	LT	PL	SL
	POSITIVE					
CL1A . . . cohabitation	30.5	25.1	21.1	16.2	16.2	26.7
CL1B . . . childlessness	7.5	7.1	2.9	1.9	6.8	3.4
CL1C. . . fewer marriages	10.0	7.6	4.4	2.5	7.7	8.5
CL1D . . . fewer births	2.7	2.8	1.9	0.9	7.1	1.5
CL1E . . . one-parent family	2.7	3.9	1.1	0.2	3.9	1.8
CL1F . . . one child	4.5	6.7	2.5	5.9	9.8	2.8
CL1G . . . living alone	2.9	6.7	0.9	0.8	4.4	2.8
CL1H . . . non marital births	7.5	19.0	2.9	10.0	4.5	9.4
CL1I . . . divorce	1.6	2.7	1.3	0.6	2.5	1.5
	NEGATIVE					
CL1A . . . cohabitation	19.8	23.4	30.1	34.0	40.2	27.3
CL1B . . . childlessness	66.8	74.7	85.1	84.6	64.0	83.0
CL1C . . . fewer marriages	40.5	38.3	57.6	68.3	53.4	49.8
CL1D . . . fewer births	84.2	89.7	92.0	92.2	70.9	92.4
CL1E . . . one-parent family	78.8	68.9	93.9	87.9	77.2	86.7
CL1F . . . one child	60.2	58.7	79.7	60.3	54.1	73.6
CL1G . . . living alone	61.2	52.9	92.0	84.3	64.8	79.9
CL1H . . . non marital births	31.7	20.1	70.3	38.1	59.0	40.2
CL1I . . . divorce	86.4	74.2	90.3	90.7	81.6	86.2

Table 6.5 (continued)

	"Western" DIALOG countries				
	AT	BL (FL)	DE (W)	FI	NL
	POSITIVE				
CL1A . . . cohabitation	30.3	39.9	25.8	19.6	42.0
CL1B . . . childlessness	8.2	15.4	7.5	3.5	20.4
CL1C. . . fewer marriages	10.1	13.5	10.5	3.4	19.9
CL1D . . . fewer births	5.2	8.0	4.6	2.0	20.5
CL1E . . . one-parent family	10.3	6.0	3.9	0.4	4.6
CL1F . . . one child	9.0	*	5.0	1.8	4.6
CL1G . . . living alone	9.4	9.9	5.8	1.1	15.2
CL1H . . . non marital births	12.2.	18.3	19.8	12.5	34.8
CL1I . . . divorce	3.5	1.4	4.2	0.5	3.2
	NEGATIVE				
CL1A . . . cohabitation	22.4	10.4	23.1	26.2	8.4
CL1B . . . childlessness	66.4	35.4	66.8	68.1	23.2
CL1C . . . fewer marriages	37.4	23.6	39.9	50.6	14.2
CL1D . . . fewer births	80.5	57.9	82.6	81.8	22.8
CL1E . . . one-parent family	53.9	63.2	70.8	87.0	70.7
CL1F . . . one child	52.1	*	62.3	79.0	51.9
CL1G . . . living alone	50.3	31.8	55.7	73.5	25.2
CL1H . . . non marital births	28.6	23.0	24.1	32.3	12.9
CL1I . . . divorce	77.2	81.6	73.7	91.4	84.5

* The question was not included in the national questionnaire.
Source: PPAs
CL1A: "The increasing number of unmarried couples living together"
CL1B: "The increasing number of couples opting to remain childless"
CL1C: "The drop in the number of marriages"
CL1D: "The fall in the birth rate"
CL1E: "The increasing number of children spending a part of their childhood with only one parent"
CL1F: "The increasing number of only children"
CL1G: "The increasing number of people living alone"
CL1H: "The increasing number of births in non-marital co-habitation"
CL1I: "The increasing number of divorces"

Part III
Value of children

Chapter 7
Motivation to have Children in Europe

Tineke Fokkema and Ingrid Esveldt

Abstract Attitudes toward parenthood in eleven Western, Central and Eastern European countries are central to this chapter. Using data from the Population Policy Acceptance Survey, our analyses show that Europeans still value children highly, mainly as a source of private, parental, and family joy. Children are considered less as an essential element of personal happiness or a duty to society. We further demonstrate that, paradoxically, the highest appreciation of children is found especially in the lowest-low fertility countries. Besides inter-country differences, our analyses also reveal that individual-level characteristics have an effect on the extent to which children are appreciated. The most strong and universal findings refer to the effect of education and religious feeling: Greater value is attached to children among less well educated people, and among those to whom religion is important in their life. The value attached to children further relates to the transition, either realised or expected, to parenthood, rather than to family size: Childless people attach less importance to having children than parents, especially when they do not intend to ever have children, while only modest differences are found between parents concerning the number of children.

Keywords: Values · Motives · Children · Cross-country differences

7.1 Introduction

Western countries have faced major changes in several respects, which undoubtedly have had an impact on the meaning, function and position of children in people's lives and in society. Because of a shift from agrarian to industrialised societies, and later to post-industrialised societies, the economic utility of childbearing has disappeared. While in former years children contributed directly to the household income, children became "economically worthless" in industrialised societies (Zelizer 1985, 3): Raising children costs a substantial amount of money, whilst providing virtually

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no economic gain in return. In addition, due to the establishment and development of the welfare system (e.g. introduction of old-age pensions), children are no longer seen as providing the economic security for parents' old age.

Another major change concerns women's increased levels of education and labour participation, giving women an alternative role to that of a mother or even of a wife. For a long time, Western industrial society has been characterised by a distinct gender-based division of tasks: While the husband worked outside the home and brought money home for purchases, the wife was responsible for all the work within the home, including child care. In recent decades, opportunities for women in employment and education have advanced considerably in most European countries, eroding the value of marriage for women (Ermisch 1996) and increasing the opportunity costs of children (Becker 1981). It is important to note that this move toward gender equality in the public sphere has not been accompanied by shifts toward gender equality in the private realm: The vast majority of domestic tasks and childcare still lies on women's shoulders (McDonald 2000a). This traditional division of labour in the home continues especially in the Southern, Central and Eastern European countries (Chesnais 1996), and becomes even more pronounced after the birth of the first child (Palomba and Sabbadini 1993). As a result, women trying to work in both the public and private realm run the risk of becoming overwhelmed with too many tasks.

Finally, there is a noticeable value shift towards individualisation and personal self-fulfilment (so-called post-materialistic values). In former years, it was practically unthinkable to decide deliberately not to become a parent (Toulemon 1996, 24). Both Western, Central and Eastern European countries were for a long time characterised by strong family attitudes, and childlessness was frowned upon. The baby boom era of the 1950s and 1960s was one of the "generalisation of the right to have children" (Toulemon 1996, 24). The following decades were marked by an increasing recognition of the "right not to have children" and to give preference to personal lifestyles that are less compatible with parenthood (Sobotka 2004a). This shift was enabled or facilitated by women's improved socio-economic position in combination with the rapid spread of modern contraception. So, rather than a commonly expected goal, the decision to have a child has increasingly become a matter of choice and personal lifestyle (Sobotka 2004a). It is important to note that the value shift towards individualisation and personal self-fulfilment especially holds in the Western European countries, due to long-lasting material prosperity. Central and Eastern European countries put less emphasis than other countries on values attributable to the "self-expression dimension", which may be caused by general feelings of an insecure, unpredictable life, as well as by the previous influence of the repressive authoritarian regimes (Inglehart and Baker 2000). The transition from a planned to a free market economy in Central and Eastern Europe has been accompanied by a rapid increase in unemployment, poverty and housing shortages (Kotowska 2003; Philipov and Kohler 2001; UN/ECE 1999, 2000). Furthermore, after the end of communism, previous social policies were scaled down and many of the pronatal, or at least family-friendly, policies were discontinued (Macura 2000). Hence, it is not surprising that Central and Eastern Europeans attach

greater importance to materialistic values than do Western Europeans (Esveldt and Fokkema 2006); only recently have post-materialistic values seemed to gain some importance in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Given the above-mentioned changes, it is not surprising that Europe as a whole is faced with a steady decline in fertility (Kohler et al. 2002). Nevertheless, research findings show that the majority of men and women who are now of childbearing age intend to have children (Esveldt and Fokkema 2006) and most of them do realise these intentions later in life. The main driving force behind the current low fertility rates is not the rise of voluntary childlessness, but the postponement of parenthood and, therefore, the decline in family size (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Philipov and Kohler 2001; Smallwood 2002; Sobotka 2004a). Apparently, people still value children highly. But why would the majority of Europeans still appreciate children that generate financially little in return, entail high opportunity costs, cause reconciliation problems (especially for women) and are less compatible with post-materialistic values?

To gain an insight into this issue, this chapter focuses on the inter- and intra-country variations of the value attached to children in Europe. The main research questions are: (1) Are Europeans still child-minded? (2) Do children actually hold the same meaning for individuals across European countries? (3) Does the motivation to have children differ between individuals? and (4) Do individual characteristics have uniform effects across European countries?

7.2 Data and Method

In order to answer the research questions, we used the Population Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS). The PPAS is an international database containing the data of the national surveys conducted between 2000 and 2003 in 14 European countries: Belgium-Flanders (BE), the Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Italy (IT), Cyprus (CY), Lithuania (LT), Hungary (HU), the Netherlands (NL), Austria (AT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI) and Finland (FI). For details about the PPAS, see Part I. In 11 of the 14 countries (not in Italy, Austria and Romania), the respondents aged 20–50 were asked to assign their level of (dis)agreement (on a scale of 5 points, running from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree") on the following items:

1. I believe that in our modern world the only place where you can feel completely happy is at home with your children.
2. I always enjoy having children around me.
3. I believe that you can be perfectly satisfied with life once you have proved to be a good mother or father.
4. I like having children because they really need you.
5. I believe it's your duty towards society to have children.
6. I do not believe you can be really happy if you do not have children.
7. I believe the closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child.

Answers to these items give insights into the reasons for having children and the extent of appreciation of the diverse values of children in general. The items involve both personal preferences (items 2 and 4) and normative prescriptions for people's lives in general (items 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7). Therefore, it is not quite clear whose situation is being evaluated (self or generalised other) with these particular items. Nevertheless, factor analysis reveals that all the items focus on a single factor, which indicates that these items measure one underlying construct. Hence, we constructed a "Value-of-Children" scale, calculated as the sum of the scores obtained in each item. We re-coded the items (0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) so that the score on the Value-of-Children scale is at least 0 and at most 28, with a higher score denoting a higher value of children. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) is 0.85 for the combined multinational sample, ranging from 0.71 (Hungary) to 0.85 (Western Germany) (see Table 7.1). To examine whether the value of children differs significantly across the countries, Scheffe's test of difference between means is carried out. Scheffe's test simultaneously compares all pairs of means using a single variable, in this case the Value-of-Children scale. It is the most conservative multiple comparison test because it requires greater differences between pairs of means to achieve a statistical significance.

To assess the effects of several demographic and socio-economic personal characteristics on the extent of child-mindedness and whether any inter-country differences in the value of children can be attributed to a different composition of the population, multivariate regression analysis is carried out using the pooled multinational sample. Besides a set of country dummies, we include the following independent variables: Gender, age, partnership, desired fertility, number of children, educational level, employment status, religiosity and, for nine of the eleven countries (no information for Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands), the importance of materialistic and post-materialistic values.[1] Details of the measurement of these

[1] In order to gain an insight into the general aspirations in the personal lives of the European population, the respondents were asked to assign the level of importance (on a scale of 1 to 5, running from 'very important' to 'very unimportant') for the following eleven issues: (1) living with your partner in harmony, (2) providing security to people close to you, (3) having enough income/money, (4) being satisfied in your job, (5) living in a nice, spacious house, (6) being appreciated and respected outside your family, (7) striving for self-fulfilment, (8) having holidays at least once a year, (9) having enough time for yourself and for your own interests, (10) husband and wife both earning their own income, and (11) having enough time for your friends. In line with Inglehart's (1977) post-materialist theory, we divide these eleven values into the following two groups: (A) Materialistic values: 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10; and (B) Post-materialistic values: 1, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 11. In the 1970s, Inglehart developed a thesis on the rise of post-materialism. He examined whether individuals in modern industrial societies, being under the influence of material prosperity, exchange 'material achievement' values for new goals relating to quality of life. In developing his thesis Inglehart used Maslow's need pyramid (1954). Maslow's theory classifies needs hierarchically into the following five dimensions: (1) Self-realisation, (2) Esteem, (3) Belongingness and love, (4) Safety, and (5) Physical needs, whereby people will satisfy their physical needs first, pursue safety second, and so on. Inglehart reduced these five needs down to two categories: post-materialist needs (1, 2 and 3) and materialist needs (4 and 5). In a state of expanding material prosperity, where physical needs and safety have been satisfied, post-materialistic values will rise.

Table 7.1 Value of children (percentage of those who (strongly) agree) and Value-of-Children scale (mean), respondents aged 20–50, weighted cases

Country Values	BE	CZ	DE-E	DE-W	EE	CY	LT
The only place where you can feel happy is at home with your children	38.9	70.7	54.0	38.1	46.1	43.7	82.7
I always enjoy having children near me	62.3	80.8	68.3	61.9	87.8	89.5	89.6
You can be perfectly satisfied with life if you have been a good parent	50.3	70.9	64.4	54.3	41.9	80.2	85.4
I like having children because they really need you	35.7	78.5	73.6	62.0	84.9	66.8	90.0
It is your duty towards society to have children	6.4	55.3	42.5	39.3	40.3	59.1	46.0
You can not be really happy without having children	12.0	43.6	45.3	31.9	44.5	67.8	48.2
The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child	48.9	79.8	71.8	63.3	73.8	75.1	65.8
Value-of-Children scale (0–28)	13.8[a]	20.5[b]	18.2[c]	16.5[d]	18.4[e]	20.1[f]	20.5[g]
Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient	0.79	0.84	0.83	0.85	0.74	0.80	0.82
The only place where you can feel happy is at home with your children	59.0	17.2	74.1	71.8	40.6	52.6	
I always enjoy having children near me	88.2	49.5	93.6	85.0	59.1	75.4	
You can be perfectly satisfied with life if you have been a good parent	83.9	44.2	82.1	70.1	54.4	65.5	
I like having children because they really need you	95.5	36.4	77.7	80.2	27.8	63.1	
It is your duty towards society to have children	35.8	4.1	53.3	31.8	13.9	33.0	
You can not be really happy without having children	59.6	5.0	49.5	42.4	21.9	37.0	
The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child	75.1	37.6	72.6	67.3	65.8	65.3	
Value-of-Children scale (0–28)	21.2[h]	11.9[i]	21.2[j]	18.3[k]	14.8[l]	17.7	
Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient	0.71	0.79	0.81	0.81	0.79	0.85	

[a] Significantly differs at the 0.05 leve—l from CZ, DE-E, DE-W, EE, CY, LT, HU, NL, PL, SI and FI according to Scheffe's test of difference between means.
[b] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), DE-E, DE-W, EE, NL, SI and FI.
[c] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), CZ, DE-W, CY, LT, HU, NL, PL and FI.
[d] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), CZ, DE-E, EE, CY, LT, HU, NL, PL, SI and FI.
[e] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), CZ, DE-W, CY, LT, HU, NL, PL and FI.
[f] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), DE-E, DE-W, EE, HU, NL, PL, SI and FI.
[g] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), DE-E, DE-W, EE, NL, SI and FI.
[h] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), DE-E, DE-W, EE, CY, NL, SI and FI.
[i] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), CZ, DE-E, DE-W, EE, CY, LT, HU, PL, SI and FI.
[j] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), DE-E, DE-W, EE, CY, NL, SI and FI.
[k] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), CZ, DE-W, CY, LT, HU, NL, PL and FI.
[l] Significantly differs at the 0.05 level from BE (Flanders), CZ, DE-E, DE-W, EE, CY, LT, HU, NL, PL and SI.
Source: IPPAS

independent variables are presented in the Appendix. Next, in order to examine whether the effect of personal characteristics is uniform across the countries, the multivariate analysis is repeated for the countries separately.

The original pooled multinational sample (excluding Italy, Austria and Romania) of those belonging to the age group 20–50 was 18,569 cases. After elimination of the cases with missing data on the constituent items comprising the dependent variable, the Value-of-Children scale, this number was reduced to 18,050.[2] For the multivariate regression analysis, we also dropped those cases that had missing values on any of the independent variables, resulting in a respective sample size of 16,085[3] respondents (excluding the importance of materialistic and post-materialistic values) and 12,024[4] respondents (including the importance of materialistic and post-materialistic values; excluding Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands). The results of the multivariate analyses are given in Table 7.2 (pooled multinational model) and Table 7.3 (country-specific models), respectively. Contrary to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 7.1, the multivariate results are based on unweighted cases.[5] Finally, to facilitate a comparison of the degree to which the various personal characteristics relate to the value of children, the coefficients of the factors have been standardised.

7.3 Results I: Cross-Country Variation in Attitudes Toward the Value of Children

Children are still highly valued in our European society, as shown in Table 7.1. However, some values of children receive greater support than others, and children do not have the same significance for individuals across European countries. The respondents mostly seem to appreciate the symbolic value of children ("I always enjoy having children near to me" and "The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child") and children as a means of achieving self-fulfilment ("I believe you can be perfectly satisfied with life once you have proved to be a good mother or father"). Over 75% of the respondents say that they like to have children around, with the highest percentages in Poland (94%) and Lithuania (90%). In addition, with the exception of the Dutch (38%), half of the respondents agree that the relationship with one's children is the most enduring bond that one can have in life. With the exception of the Estonians (42%) and, again, the Dutch (44%), the

[2] The unweighted cases per country are: 2,757 (BE), 671 (CZ), 1,360 (DE-E), 1,444 (DE-W), 714 (EE), 1,124 (CY), 871 (LT), 1,541 (HU), 1,180 (NL), 3,106 (PL), 1,115 (SI) and 2,167 (FI).

[3] The unweighted cases per country are: 2,601 (BE), 588 (CZ), 1,074 (DE-E), 1,145 (DE-W), 706 (EE), 994 (CY), 862 (LT), 1,055 (HU), 1,156 (NL), 2,957 (PL), 1,058 (SI) and 1,889 (FI).

[4] The unweighted cases per country are: 582 (CZ), 1,063 (DE-E), 1,123 (DE-W), 699 (EE), 974 (CY), 858 (LT), 994 (HU), 2,918 (PL), 966 (SI) and 1,847 (FI).

[5] Repeating the multivariate regression analysis with weighted cases did not show relevant different outcomes.

Table 7.2 Determinants of the degree of pro-child attitudes, respondents aged 20–50, unweighted cases (standardised regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2
Gender		
Female	–0.01	–0.00
(ref. male)		
Age	–0.36 ***	–0.40 ***
Age squared	0.33 ***	0.39 ***
Partnership		
Living with partner	0.02 *	0.03 **
(ref. not living with partner)		
Desired fertility		
Intention to have a(nother) child	0.14 ***	0.13 ***
Uncertain about desired fertility	0.03 ***	0.03 ***
(ref. no desired fertility)		
Number of children		
1	0.23 ***	0.23 ***
2	0.33 ***	0.34 ***
3+	0.28 ***	0.28 ***
(ref. no children)		
Educational level		
Low	0.11 ***	0.09 ***
Medium	0.10 ***	0.08 ***
(ref. high)		
Employment status		
Paid job	–0.02 **	–0.03 ***
(ref. not in job)		
Religiosity	0.16 ***	0.17 ***
Values		
Materialistic values (low-high)		0.14 ***
Post-materialistic values (low-high)		–0.01
Country		
Poland	–0.07 ***	–0.08 ***
Czech Republic	0.00	0.02 ∼
Lithuania	–0.03 **	–0.02 *
Cyprus	–0.09 ***	–0.08 ***
Slovenia	–0.12 ***	–0.10 ***
Estonia	–0.10 ***	–0.09 ***
Eastern Germany	–0.07 ***	–0.04 ***
Western Germany	–0.14 ***	–0.13 ***
Finland	–0.32 ***	–0.33 ***
Belgium (Flanders)	–0.42 ***	
The Netherlands	–0.37 ***	
(ref. Hungary)		
Adjusted R^2	42.2%	33.2%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ∼ $p < 0.10$

Source: IPPAS

Table 7.3 Determinants of the degree of pro-child attitudes by country, respondents aged 20–50, unweighted cases (standardised regression coefficients)

	NL	BE	FI	DE-W	DE-E	EE	SI	CY	LT	CZ	PL	HU
Gender												
Female (ref. male)	–0.05 *	–0.05 **	–0.07 **	0.00	0.06 *	–0.01	–0.04	–0.02	–0.06 ~	0.07 ~	0.01	0.07 *
Age	–0.38	–0.25	–0.99 ***	–0.04	–0.30	–0.74 ~	0.34	0.00	–0.26	0.04	–0.25	–0.53 ~
Age squared	0.36	0.17	1.05 ***	–0.01	0.33	0.90 *	–0.34	–0.09	0.30	–0.02	0.23	0.59 *
Partnership												
Living with partner (ref. not living with partner)	0.04	–0.06 **	–0.02	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.09 ~	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.03
Desired fertility												
Intention to have a(nother) child	0.27 ***	0.21 ***	0.28 ***	0.30 ***	0.20 ***	0.13 *	0.10 ~	0.18 ***	0.05	0.09	0.05 *	0.13 *
Uncertain about desired fertility (ref. no desired fertility)	0.05	0.04 ~	0.09 **	0.12 ***	–0.00	–0.01	–0.01	0.10 *	–0.01	–0.04	0.02	0.00
Number of children												
1	0.24 ***	0.32 ***	0.22 ***	0.26 ***	0.40 ***	0.18 ***	0.14 **	0.11 **	0.30 ***	0.15 *	0.26 ***	0.13 **
2	0.43 ***	0.40 ***	0.35 ***	0.43 ***	0.49 ***	0.23 ***	0.23 ***	0.24 ***	0.36 ***	0.28 ***	0.39 ***	0.19 **
3+	0.37 ***	0.36 ***	0.34 ***	0.30 ***	0.29 ***	0.30 ***	0.11 *	0.24 ***	0.28 ***	0.17 **	0.36 ***	0.18 **

Table 7.3 (continued)

	NL	BE	FI	DE-W	DE-E	EE	SI	CY	LT	CZ	PL	HU
(ref. no children)												
Educational level												
Low	0.19 ***	0.23 ***	0.10 ***	0.11 ***	0.05 ~	0.13 **	0.12 **	0.18 ***	0.12 **	0.02	0.06 **	0.12 **
Medium (ref. high)	0.15 ***	0.12 ***	0.09 ***	0.11 ***	0.09 **	0.11 *	0.07 ~	0.08 *	0.15 ***	0.00	0.10 ***	–0.01
Employment status												
Paid job (ref. not in job)	–0.04	–0.03	–0.01	–0.01	0.00	–0.06	–0.08 *	–0.01	–0.05 ~	0.01	–0.04 *	–0.10 **
Religiosity	0.16 ***	0.19 ***	0.10 ***	0.17 ***	0.09 **	0.01	0.15 ***	0.26 ***	0.16 ***	0.07 ~	0.20 ***	0.09 **
Values												
Materialistic values			0.15 ***	0.10 **	0.11 **	0.07	0.18 ***	0.10 **	0.20 ***	0.23 ***	0.13 ***	0.22 ***
Post-materialistic values			–0.10 ***	–0.12 ***	0.08 *	0.03	–0.06	–0.01	0.04	0.02	0.09 ***	–0.11 **
Adjusted R^2	31.2%	20.7%	17.9%	30.4%	28.0%	12.3% R^2	11.4%	23.0%	22.0%	14.7%	21.8%	14.0%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ~ $p < 0.10$

Source: IPPAS

majority thinks that being a good parent is the greatest satisfaction in life. Table 7.1 further shows that especially the post-socialist participating countries also place a high value on children in order to find one's own identity ("I like having children because they really need you") and because of domestic happiness ("The only place where you can feel happy is at home with your children"). Having children is less considered as a means for hedonistic interests ("I do not believe you can be really happy if you do not have children") or an obligation towards society ("I believe it's your duty towards society to have children"). Low percentages are found especially in the Netherlands: No more than four and five per cent respectively of Dutch people consider parenthood as a moral duty and think that one can not be really happy without children. Only in Cyprus ("duty" and "hedonistic"), Poland, the Czech Republic ("duty") and Hungary ("hedonistic"), do more than 50% of the respondents agree with these values of children. So, children are regarded and valued by people mainly as a source of private, parental, and family joy; they are considered less often to be an essential element of personal happiness or a duty to society.

Is there an association between the value a country attaches to children and its national period total fertility rate (TFR)[6] at the time of the survey? Figure 7.1 shows that, contrary to some experts' hypotheses, *low* fertility is associated with a *positive* perception of children's role in people's lives. A very high score on the Value-of-Children scale is found in the Czech Republic (21), the country with the lowest fertility rate at the time of the PPAS. Belgium (Flanders), the Netherlands



Fig. 7.1 Relationship between the Value-of-children scale and the period total fertility rate in the PPAS year by country, respondents aged 20–50
Source: IPPAS

[6] The TFR for a given year is the measure of the number of children that a woman would have over her childbearing years (15–49) if, at each age, she experienced the age-specific fertility rate of that year. The age-specific fertility rate is the number of births occurring during a specified period to women of a specified age or age group, divided by the number of person-years lived during that period by women of that age or age group.

and Finland, the countries with fertility rates above 1.5, on the other hand, show the lowest scores: 14, 12 and 15 respectively.

Before jumping to conclusions, one has to bear in mind the drawbacks of looking at the period TFR.[7] In the study carried out by Sobotka (2004a), it turns out that the current lowest-low fertility rates in many of the Central Eastern European countries is attributable mainly to postponement and is, therefore, a temporary phenomenon. There are already signs that the total fertility rate is recovering to higher values in some countries. In other words, it is not unlikely that those countries with the highest score on the Value-of-Children scale among people aged 20–50 will eventually show the highest completed fertility rate regarding this generation. However, other explanations for the negative association between the Value-of-Children scale and the period TFR are also possible. According to Inglehart (1990), for instance, people value those things most highly of which they have the least. Another explanation could be that the rapid decline in fertility in the Central and Eastern European countries in the 1990s, along with the declining propensity to marry, has not yet resulted in major changes in generally approved family values or the acceptance of alternative living arrangements. Finally, it is also possible that people in the former socialist countries face more restrictions in order to have the number of children they want.

7.4 Results II: Individual Variation in Attitudes Toward the Value of Children Across European Countries

Do attitudes concerning the value of children differ from individual to individual, both within and across countries? To assess this, we carried out multivariate analyses for both the pooled multinational sample and the separate country-specific samples (for details about the measurement of the independent variables, see Appendix). The results are presented in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, respectively.

When looking at gender first, we see no significant effect on the value of children in the pooled multinational sample (Table 7.2), meaning that men and women on average share the same sentiments regarding children. However, Table 7.3 shows a significant gender effect for the Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders), Finland, Eastern Germany, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Women in Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic and Hungary are more child-minded. This is in line with the common expectation that females are socialised to anticipate having children more

[7] The TFR can be used for international comparisons, as it takes into account differences in reproductive age structures. However, the *period* measure is vulnerable to changes in the timing of births. When births are delayed, the TFR will be deflated if the same number of births become distributed over a larger number of years. So, the *completed* family size will not decline as long as births postponed earlier are produced later in life. Whether they will be is uncertain, although there is at least some agreement that the "real" level of fertility is rather higher than it seems in most countries and that future period rates are likely to rise somewhat (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Philipov and Kohler 2001; Smallwood 2002; Sobotka 2004a).

than males and, as a consequence, that women feel greater ideological pressure to become a mother, and that motherhood is essential to their identity. Women in the Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders), Finland and Lithuania surprisingly report lower levels of support for having children than men. Apparently, the social and economic costs of motherhood are so high in those countries, discouraging women from exhibiting attitudes that are as strongly pronatal as men (Jones and Brayfield 1997).

The age effect on the value of children is non-linear, initially decreasing with age and later increasing. In other words, both younger and older persons are *more* enthusiastic about children than their middle-aged counterparts. Perhaps younger people idealise those things that they do not yet have, while older people continue to adhere to traditional family values. However, looking at Table 7.3, it turns out that this curvilinear effect is not universal: Only in Finland, Estonia and Hungary is the effect statistically significant.

The multinational models in Table 7.2 show that individuals living with a partner are *more* pronatal than single people. This effect, however, is only statistically significant in Slovenia. Furthermore, a *negative* partner effect is present in Belgium (Flanders).

As expected, there is a *positive* relationship between desired fertility and the value attached to children. High values of children are especially observed for childless people who are determined to become parents in the future, as well as for parents who definitely want to have another child. This holds for all countries in question, with the exception of Lithuania and the Czech Republic, although the size of the standardised regression coefficient is much higher for the Western than for the Eastern European countries. In addition, also in line with our expectation, parents exhibit *more* favourable attitudes toward the value of children than childless persons. The effect of the presence of children is significant in all the countries in question, and more importantly, the standardised regression coefficients demonstrate that this variable best explains the variation in pro-child attitudes in each individual country, with the exception of the Czech Republic.[8] It is interesting that the differences between parents relating to the number of children are comparatively modest. This suggests that the value of children to parents may be related more to the transition to parenthood than to their family size.

The socio-economic status also affects individual orientations toward the importance of children. First, educational attainment exerts the expected impact: The higher the education attained by respondents, the *less* enthusiastic they are about children. Apparently, more highly educated persons see children as only one aspect of life, or they are unwilling to claim that children should be the most central aspect

[8] The country percentages of the variation in attitudes explained toward the central nature of children which can be attributed to the presence of children alone are: 8.8 (BE), 7.9 (CZ), 19.5 (DE-E), 15.1 (DE-W), 8.2 (EE), 11.4 (CY), 10.9 (LT), 6.5 (HU), 18.8 (NL), 13.3 (PL), 4.7 (SI) and 9.0 (FI). None of the other individual characteristics had a greater impact, with the exception of "the importance of materialistic values" in the Czech Republic: 8.2% of the 14.7% of the explained variation in attitudes toward the central nature of children in this country can be attributed to this variable alone.

for either themselves or others (Jones and Brayfield 1997). This effect of education applies to all the countries in question, with the Czech Republic as the main exception where no substantial differences can be observed between the three educational groups. In addition, in Eastern Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Finland, the effect of education is not linear: People with a Master's degree are considerably less pronatal than those who have achieved less than this level of education, while no significant differences are found among people with low and intermediate levels of education (results not shown).

Second, people's labour force participation has the expected *negative* impact, but is not as pronounced and uniform as one would perhaps expect. In Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary, people who are in employment are found to consider children to be *less* valuable than do those who are not in paid work. In addition to the models reported in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, we also checked whether gender has an influence on the effect of the paid job we find (results not shown). We expect having children to be more aggravating and detrimental for working mothers than for working fathers. Women still do the bulk of domestic work, and more often incur employment penalties (in terms of lost opportunities for employment, earnings, and career advancement) than men. Apparently, however, these issues have no negative impact on the way working women consider children: The interaction effect between employment status and gender is not significant.

The value which people attach to children also very much depends on their religious affiliation. This holds for ten of the eleven countries, with Estonia as the only exception. People to whom religion is *less* important in their life consider children to be *less* indispensable. This is not surprising. Christianity and Judaism, the predominant religions of the Western world, formally espouse traditional, pro-family ideologies that advocate childbearing within marriage as a vital component of moral life, while strongly discouraging birth control and abortion. Hence, persons who do not identify with any religion are free from the direct pronatal influences of the Church (Jones and Brayfield 1997).

Considerable importance attached to materialistic values (e.g. "providing security to people close to you" and "having enough income/money") appears to *increase* the likelihood of valuing children highly in nearly all the countries in question; only in Estonia is no significant relationship found between value attached to children and materialistic values. This is not in line with our expectation: Given the high cost of raising children and the low -to-non-existent level of economic support provided by children, one would expect that having children would conflict with striving for material goals.

Post-materialistic values (e.g. "living with your partner in harmony" and "being satisfied in one's job"), on the other hand, do not have the expected negative effect on the extent to which children are appreciated. A negative relationship is found only in Finland, Western Germany and Hungary. Surprisingly, a positive relationship is observed in Eastern Germany and Poland.

Finally, Table 7.2 demonstrates that national differences still exist after taking individual-level characteristics into account. In other words, inter-country variations in attitudes toward the value of children, described in the previous section, are

not attributed to compositional differences in the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of respondents across the eleven national samples. The effect of the country is strong: 29.8% of the 42.2% of the explained variation in attitudes toward the value of children can be attributed to the country of residence alone (results not shown). Moreover, the sequence of the countries hardly changes after verification for personal characteristics. By running a series of equations with each country subsequently serving as the omitted reference group, the sequence of national attitudes toward the value of children is as follows: (1) Hungarians and Czechs are the most child-minded, followed by (2) Lithuanians, (3) Poles, (4) Eastern Germans, (5) Cypriots, (6) Estonians and Slovenes, (7) Western Germans, (8) Finns, (9) Belgians (Flemish), and (10) Dutch respondents come in last. This order of ranking is very similar to the one in Table 7.1, obtained using Scheffe's test. Although outside the scope of this study, it is likely that these inter-country variations are attributable to different socio-cultural circumstances (such as variation the societal provisions in combination with other structural forces) and different notions of children and child-rearing (cultural interpretations).

7.5 Summary

All European countries are nowadays confronted with low fertility. This does not mean, however, that Europeans do not appreciate the diverse values of children. Using the Population Policy Acceptance Survey, the international database containing the data of the national surveys conducted between 2000 and 2003 in fourteen Western and Central Eastern European countries, our analysis shows that Europeans still value children highly. We also find that some aspects of having children are more valued than others. Children are especially regarded as a source of private, parental, and family joy; they are considered less as an essential element in personal happiness or an obligation towards society. Our analysis further shows that, paradoxically, the highest values of children are found in those countries with currently the lowest total fertility rates. The Hungarians and the Poles attach the greatest importance to having children, either for themselves or for generalised others, while the Belgians (Flemish) and Dutch are the least enthusiastic about children. Multivariate models show that personal demographic and socio-economic characteristics have an additional effect on the extent to which Europeans appreciate the diverse values of children. The strongest and most uniform findings refer to the effect of education and religiosity: Lower values of children are observed among more highly-educated people and among those to whom religion is less important in their lives. The value of children seems further to be related to the transition, either realised or expected, to parenthood, rather than to family size: Childless people place less value on having children than parents, especially when they have indicated that they have no intention to ever have children, while only modest differences are found between parents as to the number of children. Surprisingly, as raising children costs a lot of money, people who consider materialistic values as very important in their life

show the highest scores on the value of children, with Estonia as the exception. In addition, no significant, universal relationship is found between the importance attached to post-materialistic values on the one hand and having children on the other. Only Finns, Western Germans and Hungarians are less enthusiastic about children when they highly strive for post-materialistic goals. Finally, women appear to value children less than men in the Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders), Finland and Lithuania.

Appendix: Measurement of Independent Variables

Gender:	respondent is female (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Age:	age of the respondent in years (20–50)
Partnership:	whether or not the respondent lives with a partner (0 = living with a partner, 1 = not living with a partner)
Desired fertility:	the certainty of respondent's intention to have a(nother) child: intention to have a(nother) child/pregnant, uncertain about desired fertility, no desired fertility (reference group)
Number of children:	number of children the respondent has: 0 (reference group), 1, 2 or 3 or more
Educational level:	level of education attained: low (primary or lower secondary education), medium (higher secondary or non-university education) or high (university education; reference group)
Employment status:	whether or not the respondent has a (full- or part-time) paid job (0 = paid job, 1 = not in job)
Religiosity:	the extent to which religion is important in respondent's life (5-point scale with 0 = not important at all, and 4 = very important)
Materialistic values:	respondent's level of importance for five issues: (a) providing security to people close to you, (b) having enough income/money, (c) having holidays at least once a year, (d) living in a nice, spacious house, (e) husband and wife both earning their own income (5 point scale with 0 = all five materialistic values very unimportant, and 1 = all five materialistic values very important)
Post-materialistic values:	respondent's level of importance for six issues: (a) having enough time for yourself and for your own interests, (b) living with your partner in harmony, (c) being appreciated and respected outside your family, (d) having enough time for your friends, (e) striving for self-fulfilment, (f) being satisfied in the job (5 point scale with 0 = all six post-materialistic values very unimportant, and 1 = all six post-materialistic values very important)

Chapter 8
Intergenerational Changes in the Value System in Europe

Irena Kowalska and Wiktoria Wróblewska

Abstract This chapter presents intergenerational differences in the value system in the PPAS countries. The analysis focuses on the position of materialistic and non-materialistic values, as well as on the value attached to children, in the personal lives of the older generation (born in 1946–1955) and of the younger generation (born in 1971–1980) in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) and in countries in Western Europe. The hypothesis is that the value system differs between these two distinct generational groups and the range of changes depends on a country's historical background and its geographical and economic position in Europe. This is explored by using the principal component method to relevant variables classified as reflecting materialistic and post-materialistic values and children-related values. The detailed cross-country descriptive analyses by generation and gender reveal differences in relevance of particular variables evaluated in terms of the percentages of respondents who assessed them as "very important". The results confirmed that, in general, the importance of post-materialistic values increased in all countries among the younger generations of both males and females as compared with the older generations. However, the pace of the evolution of the value system in the CEE countries is slower: materialistic values are still highly relevant among both the younger and older generations. Moreover, the shifts in the system of values are generation-related, but not gender-specific.

Keywords: Value system · Materialistic and post-materialistic values · Family- and children-related values · Intergenerational change in Europe

8.1 Introduction

Significant changes in the family-formation and dissolution processes which have been reported in Europe for over 30 years have been underlined by various factors. These comprise the broadly-understood political, socio-economic and cultural

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transformation (Van de Kaa 2003). In most of the CEE countries, the family transformation is closely associated with the political and economic reforms which originated in the late 1980s (Kotowska 1999).

Multifarious changes in different spheres of life include those deserving the utmost attention: shifts in norms and attitudes reflected by individuals' increased autonomy, having one's own preferences while selecting certain norms and values, relativism and far-reaching tolerance, as well as permissiveness in private life. These changes are subsumed under "individualisation". The latter phenomenon consists of the creation of new norms and principles accompanied by abandoning the previous authorities, as well as a certain degree of instrumentation and fragmentation of values aimed at adjusting them to the changing needs of an individual in various spheres of life.

It is customary for both economic and non-economic factors to be taken into account in the search for the major determinants of the reported shifts in the system of values prevailing in modern society. These factors are represented by the "materialistic" and "post-materialistic" notions in the value theory by Ronald Inglehart. According to his theory, the system of values evolves gradually as a result of the natural process of replacement of older populations by new generations, which grow up in different historical and socio-economic conditions. Such conditions shape an individual's personality and value system (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000). Inglehart's formulation refers to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, which defines five levels of needs: 1) Physical needs, 2) Safety, 3) Belongingness and love, 4) Esteem, and 5) Self-actualisation[1] (Maslow 1954). He reduced these five groups of needs to two categories: post-materialistic and materialistic needs. The importance of these needs to an individual depends on the level of material prosperity; if physiological needs are satisfied, post-materialistic values arise.

Regularities in intergenerational transmission of values were extensively discussed in the 1970s by Margaret Mead, an American anthropologist (Mead 1970). Cultural continuity and a slow pace of change are conditioned by the existence of a set of unquestionable values, authoritatively represented by the older generations. Modern cultures are modified by the information inflow, swift changes, constant inventions and migration. They confront young people with situations never encountered by the older generations. In such cultures, it is not parents and grandparents, but the behaviour of peers and the media which set the prevailing patterns of behaviour and attitudes.

This chapter aims to present intergenerational differences in the system of values in the PPAS countries. The analysis focuses particularly on the position of materialistic and non-materialistic values, as well as on the values of children in the personal lives of older and younger generations of the CEE and Western countries.

Both the selection of this subject and the scope of analyses have been determined by the adopted hypothesis that the value systems differ from one generation

[1] Self-actualization needs – realizing personal potential, self-fulfillment, seeking personal growth and peak experiences.

to another, and that the range of changes depends on the historical background, as well as on the geographical position of a country in Europe and its level of economic and social development.

The analysis covers two groups of generations: the older one, comprising persons born in years 1946–1955, i.e. aged around 45–55 years at the time of the survey, most of them having adult children; the younger generations include persons born in years 1971–1980, i.e. persons surveyed at the age of making family-related decisions. The younger generations in the CEE countries hence consist of those who reached adulthood after the communist system had collapsed, and who experienced living conditions which were totally different from those experienced by their parents. In order to account for possible different reactions by sex, the analysis was carried out separately for men and women.

In the first section, the principle component factor analysis was used to investigate the relationships between various value-related variables included in the PPAS. The analysis was carried out for the pooled weighted data of the CEE countries and the Western countries. The second section includes a general description of the value structure and changes by generations across countries. In order to assess the extent to which materialistic and post-materialistic as well as child-related values are appreciated, the strongest greatest degree of support for the distinct variables was compared (designated as: *very important* or *strongly agree)*. Section 8.4 deals with the significance changes in intergenerational values across countries by use of the chi-squared test.

In order to find answers on the research questions, we used in our analysis the IPPAS data for 13 countries (except Cyprus). For Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Italy (IT) and the Netherlands there was no information about variables which were selected to define the materialistic and post-materialistic variables.

8.2 Classification of Value-Related Variables and Their East–West Differences by Generations

According to Inglehart's scale, and following the proposal by Fokkema and Esveldt (2006), the value-related variables from the PPAS were defined as materialistic and post-materialistic. The first group covered the following statements: "Providing security to people close to you", "Having sufficient income/money", "Living in a nice, spacious house", "Having holidays at least once a year", "Husband and wife both earning their own incomes". The group of post-materialistic values were comprised of the statements: "Living with your partner in harmony", "Being satisfied in the job", "Being appreciated and respected outside your family", "Striving for self-fulfilment", "Having enough time for yourself and for your own interests", "Having enough time for your friends".

Children-related values are assessed by means of the following statements included in the questionnaire: "The only place where you can feel happy is at home with your children", "I always enjoy having children around me", "You can be

perfectly satisfied with life", "I like having children because they really need you", "It is your duty towards society to have children", "You cannot be really happy without having children", "The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child".

In general, the factor analysis with the principal component factors and Varimax rotation (Morrison 1976), applied to the selected variables, confirmed the adopted classification of variables into three groups (Table 8.1).

The first factor was ascribed by the children-related variables. The structure of the variables was the same for both older and younger generations in the CEE, as well as for the Western countries. The results obtained for the remaining factors differed between these two groups of countries. In the CEE countries, the values which correlated most closely with the second and the third factors were materialistic and post-materialistic values, respectively. That result applied to both the older and younger generations. However, within this group the generational differences were found for such values as, for instance, "Being satisfied in the job" and "Striving for self-fulfilment". In the older and younger generations, job satisfaction might have been related rather to financial aspects of employment, and this is why the variable is more closely correlated with the materialistic than post-materialistic values, but contributes more to the second factor for the older generations. For the younger generations, striving for self-fulfilment was shifted to the factor related to materialistic values. It may be associated with the necessity to dispose of the financial means of realizing their ambitions, which in turn would place that variable among the materialistic instead of among the post-materialistic values.

In the Western countries, the second factor was related to post-materialistic values for the older generations, while the third factor was more closely correlated with the variables related to materialistic values. It can be assumed that this is an effect of shifts within these generations' value systems, allotting a higher rank to striving for self-fulfilment, to the need to build relationships with friends, to seeking respect from others, to having enough time for oneself and to the independence of each spouse, rather than the necessity to satisfy material needs, which also include having holidays once a year and being satisfied at work. Higher material status, as well as the stage in the life cycle (either living as a couple without children or in a one-person household) may stimulate such shifts.

The fourth factor was formed by two variables: "Living with your partner in harmony" and "Providing security to people close to you", which shows that they can hardly be included in the groups of either materialistic or post-materialistic values. According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, these values, and the former in particular, can be classified as "needs related to relationships", i.e. as the group of "Belongingness and love". Under the present analysis, these variables may represent the family-related values and will be described separately.

Results for the younger generations in the Western countries were different from those discussed for the other groups of persons. The variables of the group of materialistic and post-materialistic values were correlated with the factor axis as such, i.e. the second factor was formed by both materialistic and post-materialistic values. Perhaps members of these generations can choose freely from the set of different

Table 8.1 Rotated factor loadings for value-related variables by generations and group of countries

Value-related variables	Central and Eastern European countries							
	Generation '46–55				Generation '71–80			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Only feel completely happy at home with your children	**.690**	.141	–.014	–.017	**.676**	.107	.009	–.006
I always enjoy having children near me	**.673**	.128	–.048	.124	**.651**	.146	–.155	.325
You can be perfectly satisfied with life if you have been a good parent	**.711**	.166	.004	.156	**.741**	.149	–.037	.201
I like having children because they really need you	**.712**	.141	.005	.226	**.706**	.127	–.027	.269
It is your duty towards society to have children	**.663**	.003	.158	–.067	**.666**	–.039	.289	–.168
You can not be really happy without having children	**.605**	.040	.160	.035	**.662**	.033	.057	–.056
The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child	**.660**	.020	.108	.056	**.643**	.058	.070	.061
Having enough time for yourself and for your own interests	.007	.109	**.653**	.238	–.027	.086	**.678**	.201
Living with your partner in harmony	.110	.166	.125	**.826**	.094	.135	.188	**.807**
Providing security to people close to you	.176	.218	.213	**.749**	.168	.281	.199	**.724**
Being appreciated and respected outside your family	.159	.336	**.537**	.304	.146	.353	**.564**	.210
Having enough time for your friends	.078	.179	**.795**	–.018	.003	.211	**.773**	–.009
Having enough income/money	.008	**.709**	.005	.214	.042	**.716**	.067	.170
Having holidays at least once a year	.103	**.649**	.177	.181	.060	**.665**	.213	.117
Living in a nice, spacious house	.167	**.763**	.143	.072	.136	**.758**	.026	.104
Striving for self-fulfilment	.125	**.463**	**.548**	.048	.074	**.526**	**.467**	.038
Husband and wife both earning their own income	.151	**.655**	.233	–.064	.142	**.625**	.208	.023
Being satisfied in the job	.098	**.496**	.308	.227	.064	**.446**	.381	.233

Table 8.1 (continued)

Value-related variables	Central and Eastern European countries							
	Generation '46–55				Generation '71–80			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Only feel completely happy at home with your children	**.681**	–.070	.059	–.078	**.653**	.055	.041	
I always enjoy having children near me	**.694**	.082	–.099	.089	**.655**	–.089	.214	
You can be perfectly satisfied with life if you have been a good parent	**.696**	–.035	.121	.138	**.714**	–.014	.197	
I like having children because they really need you	**.793**	–.033	.078	.053	**.774**	–.015	.093	
It is your duty towards society to have children	**.546**	.101	–.007	.161	**.645**	.153	–.063	
You can not be really happy without having children	**.687**	.160	–.021	–.050	**.752**	.120	.039	
The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child	**.592**	–.038	.015	.090	**.657**	–.002	.044	
Having enough time for yourself and for your own interests	–.100	.468	.119	.259	–.093	**.480**	.334	
Living with your partner in harmony	.140	.008	.193	**.773**	.126	.120	**.752**	
Providing security to people close to you	.137	.190	.101	**.800**	.163	.180	**.751**	
Being appreciated and respected outside your family	.116	**.519**	.157	.414	.142	**.407**	**.563**	
Having enough time for your friends	–.007	**.588**	.224	.022	–.073	**.620**	.157	
Having enough income/money	–.032	.158	**.809**	.050	.027	**.549**	.283	
Having holidays at least once a year	–.007	.327	**.651**	.109	–.009	**.674**	.224	
Living in a nice, spacious house	.173	.378	**.502**	.109	.143	**.686**	.102	
Striving for self-fulfilment	.064	**.702**	.166	.005	.024	**.745**	.031	
Husband and wife both earning their own income	.050	**.702**	.079	–.002	.131	**.653**	.032	
Being satisfied in the job	.031	.090	**.675**	.159	.083	**.403**	**.494**	

Source: IPPAS, own calculations

values and do not treat them as competing with one another or being more or less important. However, it is also worth mentioning that the variables related to the first factor, i.e. those which describe children-related values, show negative correlation with this very factor representing the group of materialistic and post-materialistic values. The third factor represented family-related values, supplemented by "being appreciated and respected outside the family" and "being satisfied in the job". Such a result seems to indicate that young people attach the same amount of importance to extra-family relations/job satisfaction as to a life spent in harmony with a partner.

8.3 Cross-Country Intergenerational Differences in Values

8.3.1 Materialistic Values

According to Bauman, the inability of the communist regime to provide consumer choice was one of the major factors behind its collapse (Bauman 1992). In Western societies, choice became a criterion of a good life and personal success. To what extent was this choice possible in the countries under transition during the first decade of socio-economic changes, and now? We will try to answer this question by comparing the direction and pace of change in the system of values in the CEE and Western countries.

Discrepancies in standards of living between societies in Western and Northern Europe on the one hand, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the other, set the background for a differentiated assessment of the importance of materialistic and post-materialistic factors (Kowalska 2000; Moors and Palomba 1995b). The much higher standard of living in the former group of countries ensures that the means are available to satisfy not only the lowest-level needs (having one's own home and adequate means for maintenance at an average level), but also to meet the higher-level needs. In the second group of countries, even the most basic needs may be difficult to satisfy for large groups of people. Limited access to the labour market in the former communist countries makes employment a desirable asset, but difficult to obtain for some groups (Keane and Prasad 2000; Macura 2000; Szulc 2000). It contributes to increasing economic and social diversification. The above reasons lead to the high ranking of materialistic variables in the value system recognised in the CEE countries, fully confirmed by the PPAS results.

The description of the relevance of particular variables across countries and generations is based on the percentage of respondents who have ranked a given variable as very important. Here, the focus is on differences between countries and generations.

Materialistic values are of a considerably higher significance for the respondents from the CEE countries than for other societies. Hence, respondents from these countries led the field within the group of materialistic values. "Having enough income, money" is of the highest significance for the contemporary societies. It was

recognised as very important by over 50% of all respondents in the overwhelming majority of countries. The percentages were considerably higher in the CEE countries.

No major differences were revealed between the older and younger generations. The Czech Republic was the only country where the importance of this value increased in the younger generation of both females and males. In Poland and Hungary, only younger females evaluated it higher. Income was given the highest ranking by Hungarians (83% in the older and 84% in the younger generations), followed by Lithuanians (68% and 67%, respectively) and Poles (65% and 64%), while Finns (22% and 23%) and Estonians (33% and 31%) ranked it the lowest.

The second most important variable is "Having holidays at least once a year". As a rule, this value was ranked higher by younger persons, both females and males, and was the most essential for Hungarians (70% in the younger generations and 63% in the older generations considered it very important). On the contrary, it was a relatively less important for Estonians of both generations (slightly more than 20% recognised it as very important), and for the younger and older inhabitants of both parts of Germany (about 30% of "very important" marks).

"Living in a nice, spacious house" is given a much lower assessment than the statements above. As may be anticipated, it was several times more important for respondents living in the CEE countries than in the other countries under study. The value peaked in the groups of Hungarians (62%) and Poles (58%), and was the least enthusiastically received by Finns (14%), Slovenians (16%) and by Western and Eastern Germans (21 and 16%, respectively).

In the majority of CEE countries the importance of "Living in a nice spacious house" was higher for younger generations of both females and males, as compared with older ones. The frequency of the highest evaluation of this variable among females varied between 63% in the younger generation in Poland and Hungary to 14% among older females in Eastern Germany. Extremely high percentages among males were noted in and Hungary (62% in the older group of respondents) and in Poland (57), respectively. In the remaining countries the frequency was two times lower.

An assessment of the variable "Husband and wife both earning their own income" also differed from country to country. The double-earner family pattern was considerably more important in some of the CEE countries than in the other countries. This value was assigned the highest evaluation in the first group by 46% of people in Hungary, and in the second group by 11% in Finland and by 9% in West Germany.

It is worth underlining the various ways in the intergenerational cross-country changes of the importance a husband and wife earning their own income. The inhabitants of Western Germany are the only group among whom both younger men and women increased their level of approval of families in which the husband and a wife have independent sources of income. This increase is greater among men than among women. In Estonia and the Czech Republic, the increase was noted only among younger females, while in the remaining countries the value was more supported by younger males. There were no changes between younger and

older generations among either females or males in Poland, or among females in Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary and Finland.

8.3.2 Post-materialistic Values

Spare time which might be freely used for oneself, or spent with one's closest family and friends, is in short supply in the contemporary world. This shortage increasingly affects populations in the CEE countries due to the labour market situation. The oversupply of labour makes it easier for employers to require people to work overtime. Additionally, the underdeveloped transport and commuting systems result in an extension of the time devoted to economic activity at the expense of free time. This inconvenience affects the younger generations more than the older ones. These conclusions stem from an analysis of the PPAS data on the hierarchy of post-materialistic values as viewed by respondents.

The value "Having enough time for yourself and for your own interests" is very important to an average of one-third of respondents, mainly in the former communist countries. The highest percentage of the "very important" marks was noted in Slovenia and in Western Germany (38% each), in Poland and in the Czech Republic (35%). Estonians were the least attached to the idea of having free time (14%).

The variable was given a remarkably higher evaluation by the younger generation. Lithuania was the only exception, with almost the same level for both young and old. The highest acceptance rate (49%) for having free time by younger generations was noted among Slovenians, and the lowest (at 19%) among Estonians. For older persons the percentage varied between 9% in Estonia and 36% in Western Germany. In a majority of countries, the intergenerational changes are much more pronounced among males than among females. The only exceptions are the Czech Republic and Western Germany, with lower percentages of support among young females, and Lithuania with a slight decline among males.

"Striving for self-fulfilment" is of crucial significance to 26% of all PPAS respondents. The percentage varies between 52% in Hungary and 16% in Finland (Finland and Western Germany are the only Western countries for which data are available). The need for self-fulfilment is one of the values given a markedly higher ranking by the younger generations than other values in all countries. Its importance was more strongly stressed in the CEE countries than elsewhere, with Hungary leading the field (58% of "very important" marks among the younger generations), followed by Slovenia (36%) and Poland (30%). Lithuania, with the strongest support of 19% in the younger generation and 17% in the older, and Eastern Germany with 20 and 17% respectively, are the only Eastern countries with a very low evaluation of the weight of "striving for self-fulfilment". Low acceptance of this variable was also noted among both generations in Finland (19% for younger persons and 13 for older ones), and among the older generation in Western Germany (14%).

The family is a place in which a majority of its members are appreciated and respected. However, everybody would also like to be respected outside the family environment. The PPAS data results show a high importance attached to

expectations to meet this need in both groups of generations. This situation is typical of the CEE countries. The value "Being appreciated and respected outside the family" is very important for 26% of all interviewed persons. The proportions of the highest marks differ more across countries as compared with other values. Hungarians expressed the strongest need to be appreciated and respected (this value was very important for 53%), whilst almost 30% of respondents in Poland and Lithuania would like to be appreciated and respected, occupying the second place in the ranking, and Finns gave it a very low evaluation (6%), bringing up the tail-end of the field.

The importance attached to appreciation and respect is relatively high for both young and old. It receives a higher evaluation from young persons in majority of countries. Only in the Czech Republic did young males give it a lower evaluation. However, the intergenerational differences are not significant. The percentages of persons expressing the strongest need to be appreciated and respected outside the family vary from 5% among the older generation in Finland to 53% among both generations in Hungary.

In the overwhelming majority of countries, the need for "Having enough time for friends" is not very important. The proportions of persons evaluating it as highly important vary between 6% in Estonia and 26 in Hungary. At the same time, the younger generations in the countries under study are much more interested in having time for friends than the older ones. This particularly applies to younger males in Hungary (38%) and in Western Germany (34%).

The value "Being satisfied at work" is the most important among post-materialistic values. In general, this value means much more to respondents in the CEE countries and to the younger generations in all countries. Almost 60% of all respondents would like to find satisfaction at work. The highest proportion (65%) was noted among the younger generations in Hungary, and the lowest (33%) among the older generations in Finland. It is worth noting that the value "Being satisfied in the job" is more important for both younger males and females in a majority of countries. However there were no differences between generations among females in Hungary, Czech Republic, Eastern Germany and Poland.

One can conclude that generally all countries under study showed the increasing importance of post-materialistic values among younger generations of both males and females as compared with older generations. Only among females in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Eastern Germany did the variable "Being appreciated and respected outside your family" loose its importance, while the variable "Being satisfied at work" remained equally valued by both older and younger respondents.

8.3.3 Values Related to the Family

Two distinguished values related to the family seem to indicate its importance for a majority of people. "Living with partner in harmony" was evaluated as very important by 65% of all respondents. The highest proportion was noted in Hungary (80%)

and the lowest in Slovenia (55%). Young respondents attached greater significance to the quality of the partnership than older ones in the majority of countries, but the differences between the percentages were not significant. The proportion varied between 44% in Finland and 84% in Hungary for older males, and from 49 in Slovenia to 76 in Hungary and the Czech Republic for younger males.

In general, young respondents seemed to attach greater significance to the quality of a partnership than older ones. Exceptions are Western and Eastern Germany and Hungary (for both males and females) and Lithuania (for males).

The variable "Providing security to people close to you" was allotted equal significance to living with a partner in harmony by Hungarians (81% of respondents held it to be very important) and by Poles (61%). For respondents from other countries under study, its meaning was lower than that of the partnership variable – except younger females in Slovenia – and the percentages of those who considered it as very important were below 50%. Intergenerational differences were significant in only a small number of countries. Both younger males and females in Western Germany considered the security variable to be more important, similarly to younger females in Poland and younger males in Finland.

8.3.4 Children-related Values

Discussions on the second demographic transition have pointed out the changes in parental behaviour and attitudes towards children as one of the factors contributing to the close of the era of the "child-king" and the start of adult-centred preoccupation with self-fulfilment and the higher quality of partnership. Children are still perceived as very important, but their position at the top of the value pyramid can no longer be taken for granted.

The PPAS data confirm the hypothesis that children are still considered to be substantial for parents. They are valued by mothers and fathers as a source of parents' satisfaction and happiness and as a means of achieving self-fulfilment and finding an identity.

The assessment of child-related values is based on the percentage of respondents who considered the distinguished children-related values to be very important, and allows for the following conclusions.

Children-related values were ranked higher in the CEE countries than in Western Europe. At the same time, their importance was lower in the younger generations in the overwhelming majority of countries. The most essential argument for having children was "I like having children because they really need you". This value enjoyed the highest ranking among the older generations in Hungary (82% responses: "very important"), in Italy (62%) and in Poland (55%). Support for it among young persons was highest in Hungary (74%) and in Italy (60%). This value was the least weighty argument for Belgian respondents, Finns and Dutch people of both generations (9%, 10% and 7%, respectively, in the older generation vs. 8%, 4% and 8% in the younger generation).

The statement "The only place where you can feel happy is at home with your children" took up a relatively high position among child-related values, especially in the CEE countries, and also showed remarkable inter-country variations. Except for the Netherlands, with its extremely low support for that statement among younger and older generations of males and females (3–5%), the younger generations valued that variable markedly lower in the majority of the remaining countries than their older counterparts. The percentage of respondents who considered it very important ranged among older males from 48% in Poland to 17% in Western Germany, and among older females from 46% in Poland, Italy and the Czech Republic to 18% in Western Germany. The relevant figures for younger generations were as follows: among males the lowest level of support was noted in Estonia (5%), the highest in Lithuania (39%), among younger females the value was very important for only 8% in Finland, and for 10% in Estonia and Eastern Germany, vs. 40% in Lithuania and 42% in the Czech Republic. The relative intergenerational differences between percentages of the highest value attached to the presence of children at home by both females and males are greatest (almost three-times lower) in Finland, Eastern Germany and Estonia. Moreover, young women were considerably more supportive of that statement than young men only in Hungary, Estonia, Austria and the Czech Republic.

An opportunity to "enjoy having children near me" was evaluated as less important by respondents in Western countries: Percentages of those who selected it as very important varied between 12% in the Netherlands and 19% in Belgium. Slovenia also belonged to the group of countries where this variable ranked low (21%). The highest importance of that variable was noted in Poland (69%) and Hungary (63%).

Both young and older males are very consistent in their evaluation of the value "enjoy having children near me". In all countries, the young generation evaluated it lower as compared with older one. This value was evaluated higher by younger females in two countries (Lithuania and the Netherlands). The discrepancies between percentages in both generations were noticeably higher in the Western countries. The intergenerational differences in the percentages of "very important" marks are significant for both females and males in all CEE countries except Lithuania (for females) and in all the Western countries excluding the Netherlands (for females). This means that in the majority of countries, young generations became less supportive of the statement that they enjoy having children near them.

To be perfectly satisfied with life when being a good parent is much less important for younger persons than for older ones. Among older people, the proportion of respondents who held the variable to be very important varied from 14% (the Netherlands) to 62% (Italy) in Western countries, and from 20% (Estonia) to 64% (Hungary) in the CEE countries. The highest acceptance rate among the younger generations was noted in Hungary (56%) and the lowest in Estonia (11%).

It should be emphasised that high percentages of persons who evaluated the statement "You cannot be really happy without having children" as very important were recorded in the CEE countries. The perception of a child as a main source of happiness was the most prevalent in Hungary (48% for the older and 38% for

the younger generations), followed by Estonia (36% in the older generations) and Poland (26% in the younger generations). At the same time, these percentages were strikingly low for Dutch, Belgian and Finnish respondents, proving this value to be of minor importance.

Support for the idea of having children being regarded as a duty towards society was faint, especially in Western countries. That variable was of primary importance for 37% of Poles and 27% of Estonians from the older generations, and for 20% of the younger generations, while in the Netherlands the corresponding figures reached only 1% in both generations, and were 2% and not even 6% among the younger populations in Belgium (Flanders) and Finland, respectively.

8.4 The Significance of Intergenerational Value Changes Across Countries

The above description of intergenerational changes in the value systems in the CEE and Western countries has to be supplemented by comments about the dynamics of transition in the separate groups of values across countries, generations and gender. A deeper insight is gained by the more detailed evaluation of the direction and pace of the intergenerational transformation of values which is based on data provided in Table 8.2 and Table 8.3.

Variables classified as "post-materialistic" values showed highly-diverse results for individual countries, as well as for specific values. In general, the importance of post-materialistic values increased for the younger generations in almost all countries for which data were available. That change was not always statistically significant, however. Insignificant increases related to the variable "Being satisfied at work" for all countries except Germany and Hungary, and to the variable "Being appreciated and respected outside the family" for the CEE countries except the Czech Republic. Other variables, such as those related to self-development and having enough time for oneself and one's friends, were increasingly assessed by younger generations in all countries with two exceptions. Lithuania did not experience significant intergenerational shifts, with the exception of the variable "having enough time for friends". On the contrary, that variable was valued equally by older and younger Czechs. What is more, greater intergenerational differences were discernible for males than for females in Western and Eastern Germany and in Belgium (Flanders), while a reverse phenomenon was found among the CEE countries.

Most of the materialistic variables were valued equally by younger and older respondents in almost all countries, since the differences were statistically non-significant. The younger and older generations however revealed shifts in some aspects in Poland, Hungary, Finland and Germany. In Poland, only the "having enough income" variable was equally relevant to both groups of respondents. Other variables were valued higher by younger women. In Hungary, the "having holidays at least once a year" variable was more important for younger males and females. Either the two-income family or "having enough income" was valued higher by

Table 8.2 Patterns of changes in the values system between the generations (1946–1955, 1971–1980) by country and by sex (Relation of the percentage of "very important" responses in the generations '71–80 to the generations '46–55)

Groups of values		AT	BE(FL)	FI	DE-W	IT	NL	CZ
Values related to children								
Only feel completely happy	Males	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
at home with your	Females	–	–	–	–	–	=	–
children	Males	–	–	–	–	.	–	–
I always enjoy having	Females	–	–	–	–	.	+	–
children near me	Males	.	–	–	–	–	–	–
You can be perfectly satisfied	Females	.	–	–	–	=	–	–
with life if you have been a								
good parent	Males	–	=	–	–	–	–	–
I like having children	Females	–	–	–	–	=	–	–
because they really need								
you	Males	–	=	–	–	–	=	–
It is your duty towards	Females	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
society to have children	Males	.	=	–	–	.	–	–
You cannot be really happy	Females	.	=	–	–	.	–	–
without having children	Males	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
The closest relationship you	Females	–	–	–	–	–	=	+
can have with anyone is								
with your own child								
Materialistic values	Males	.	.	+	+	.	.	+
Having enough	Females	.	.	–	+	.	.	+
income/money	Males	.	.	+	+	.	.	+
Living in a nice, spacious	Females	.	.	–	–	.	.	+
house	Males	.	.	.	+	.	.	–
Having holidays at least	Females	.	.	.	–	.	.	–
once a year	Males	.	.	+	+	.	.	–
Husband and wife both	Females	.	.	=	+	.	.	+
earning their own income								
Post–materialistic values	Males	.	+	+	+	.	.	+
Having enough time for	Females	.	+	+	–	.	.	–
your–self and for your								
own interests	Males	.	.	+	+	.	.	+
Striving for self–fulfilment	Females	.	.	+	+	.	.	+
	Males	.	=	+	+	.	.	–
Being appreciated and	Females	.	+	+	+	.	.	–
respected outside your								
family	Males	.	.	+	+	.	.	+
Having enough time for	Females	.	.	+	+	.	.	+
your friends	Males	.	.	+	+	.	.	+
Being satisfied in the job	Females	.	.	+	+	.	.	=
Values related to the family	Males	.	+	+	–	.	.	+
Living with your partner in	Females	.	+	+	=	.	.	=
harmony								

Table 8.2 (continued)

Groups of values		EE	DE-E	HU	LT	PL	SL	
Values related to children								
	Males	.	.	+	+	.	.	–
Providing security to people close to you	Females	.	.	–	+	.	.	–
Only feel completely happy at home with your children	Males	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	Females	–	–	–	+	–	–	
I always enjoy having children near me	Males	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	Females	–	–	=	+	–	–	
You can be perfectly satisfied with life if you have been a good parent	Males	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	Females	–	–	–	–	–	–	
I like having children because they really need you	Males	–	–	–	–	–	+	
	Females	–	–	–	+	–	–	
It is your duty towards society to have children	Males	–	–	–	–	–	=	
	Females	–	–	=	–	–	–	
You cannot be really happy without having children	Males	–	–	–	–	=	+	
	Females	–	–	–	–	–	–	
The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child	Males	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	Females	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Materialistic values								
Having enough income/money	Males	=	–	=	=	=	=	
	Females	–	–	+	=	+	+	
Living in a nice, spacious house	Males	–	–	–	+	+	–	
	Females	+	–	.	+	+	–	
Having holidays at least once a year	Males	+	+	+	+	+	+	
	Females	+	–	+	+	+	+	
Husband and wife both earning their own income	Males	–	–	+	–	=	+	
	Females	+	=	=	=	=	=	
Post–materialistic values								
Having enough time for your–self and for your own interests	Males	+	+	+	–	+	+	
	Females	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Striving for self–fulfilment	Males	+	+	+	+	+	+	
	Females	+	–	+	+	+	+	
Being appreciated and respected outside your family	Males	+	+	+	–	+	+	
	Females	+	–	–	+	–	+	
Having enough time for your friends	Males	+	+	+	+	+	+	
	Females	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Being satisfied in the job	Males	+	+	+	+	+	.	
	Females	+	=	=	+	+	.	
Values related to the family								
Living with your partner in harmony	Males	+	–	–	–	+	=	
	Females	+	–	=	+	+	+	
Providing security to people close to you	Males	+	–	–	–	–	–	
	Females	+	–	=	=	+	+	

Source: IPPAS

Note: + increase by more than 2.0%; - decline by more than 2.0%; = no changes i.e. increase/decline by less than 2.0%;. not available.

Table 8.3 Patterns of dependence in the value system between the generations (1946–1955, 1971–1980) by country and by sex. (Pearson Chi-Square test)

Groups of values		AT	BE(FL)	FI	DE-W	IT	NL
Values related to children							
Only feel completely happy	Males	***	***	***	ns	***	∼
at home with your	Females	**	***	***	ns	***	ns
children	Males	*	ns	***	∼	.	*
I always enjoy having	Females	ns	ns	***	ns	.	ns
children near me	Males	.	***	***	∼	ns	ns
You can be perfectly	Females	.	***	***	∼	ns	∼
satisfied with life if you							
have been a good parent	Males	***	ns	***	**	.	ns
I like having children because	Females	∼	ns	*	∼	.	ns
they really need you	Males	***	ns	***	*	***	ns
It is your duty towards	Females	***	*	***	**	**	ns
society to have children	Males	.	ns	***	ns	.	ns
You cannot be really happy	Females	.	ns	*	ns	.	ns
without having children	Males	***	ns	***	ns	ns	ns
The closest relationship you	Females	ns	∼	***	*	**	ns
can have with anyone is							
with your own child							
Materialistic values	Males	.	.	*	*	.	.
Having enough		.	.	ns	ns	.	.
income/money	Males	.	.	ns	ns	.	.
Living in a nice, spacious	Females	.	.	ns	ns	.	.
house	Males	.	.	.	*	.	.
Having holidays at least	Females	.	.	.	ns	.	.
once a year	Males	.	.	ns	**	.	.
Husband and wife both	Females	.	.	∼	∼	.	.
earning their own income							
Post-materialistic values	Males	.	**	***	**	.	.
Having enough time for your-self	Females	.	**	**	ns	.	.
and for your own interests	Males	.	.	***	***	.	.
Striving for self-fulfilment	Females	.	.	**	∼	.	.
	Males	.	∼	ns	**	.	.
Being appreciated and	Females	.	∼	ns	ns	.	.
respected outside your	Males	.	.	***	**	.	.
family							
Having enough time for	Females	.	.	***	ns	.	.
your friends	Males	.	.	ns	ns	.	.
Being satisfied in the job	Females	.	.	ns	ns	.	.
Values related to the family	Males	.	ns	***	ns	.	.
Living with your partner in	Females	.	*	***	ns	.	.
harmony	Males	.	.	ns	**	.	.
Providing security to people	Females	.	.	ns	*	.	.
close to you							

Table 8.3 (continued)

Groups of values		CZ	EE	DE-E	HU	LT	PL	SL
Values related to children								
Only feel completely happy	Males	*	***	***	**	ns	***	ns
at home with your children	Females	ns	**	***	∼	ns	***	**
I always enjoy having	Males	**	***	***	***	ns	***	ns
children near me	Females	ns	***	***	ns	ns	ns	**
You can be perfectly satisfied	Males	ns	***	***	∼	∼	***	ns
with life if you have been a	Females	ns	ns	***	ns	ns	***	**
good parent								
I like having children because	Males	**	**	***	**	ns	***	ns
they really need you	Females	ns	**	***	ns	ns	***	∼
It is your duty towards	Males	ns	***	*	*	∼	***	ns
society to have children	Females	ns	***	**	ns	*	***	**
You cannot be really happy	Males	**	***	***	**	∼	ns	ns
without having children	Females	ns	**	*	ns	ns	ns	ns
The closest relationship you	Males	ns	**	***	ns	**	***	ns
can have with anyone is with	Females	ns	**	ns	ns	ns	**	ns
your own child								
Materialistic values								
Having enough income/money	Males	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
	Females	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Living in a nice, spacious	Males	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
house	Females	ns	ns	ns	ns	∼	***	ns
Having holidays at least	Males	∼	ns	ns	∼	ns	ns	*
once a year	Females	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	**
Husband and wife both earning	Males	ns	*	ns	ns	∼	ns	ns
their own income	Females	∼	*	ns	ns	ns	**	ns
Post-materialistic values								
Having enough time for your-self	Males	***	***	***	***	ns	**	**
and for your own interests	Females	ns	**	ns	**	ns	ns	***
Striving for self-fulfilment	Males	**	∼	*	***	ns	***	ns
	Females	ns	*	∼	***	ns	ns	**
Being appreciated and	Males	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
respected outside your family	Females	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Having enough time for	Males	*	ns	**	***	ns	***	ns
your friends	Females	ns	ns	ns	ns	∼	ns	***
Being satisfied in the job	Males	ns	ns	ns	*	ns	**	.
	Females	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	.
Values related to the family								
Living with your partner in	Males	ns	*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
harmony	Females	ns	∼	ns	∼	ns	**	***
Providing security to people	Males	ns	ns	ns	*	ns	ns	ns
close to you	Females	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	**	ns

Source: IPPAS, own calculations
Note: Statistically significant at: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ∼ p < 0,1;
ns - not significant;. - not available

younger males in Western Germany. The income variable was valued lower by younger women in Eastern Germany, while younger men attached less importance to having a nice house. However, significant changes in the position of materialistic values were more frequent in male rather than in female cohorts in Germany and Finland. In addition, the materialistic variables were valued lower by younger females in Finland than among the older generations.

Declines in the importance of most variables related to the value of children among younger generations were statistically significant in Finland, Estonia, Eastern Germany, Poland and Slovenia, as well as in Austria and Italy (the list of surveyed variables for these two countries was not complete). No significant differences between the generations were found for a majority of these variables in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Belgium (Flanders), Lithuania and Hungary. Younger generations in Western Germany were less appreciative of variables associated with children as a source of happiness.

Among two variables related to family values the rising importance of the variable "Living with partner in harmony" was statistically significant for the younger generations among males and females in Finland, Estonia and Poland, and among females in Hungary and Slovenia. The second variable "Providing security to people close to you" was valued differently by younger males and females in Western Germany, who considered it more important than younger females in Poland and younger males in Finland.

Gender-specific differences were not clearly cut. However, a lack of correlation between child-related values and generation membership was more visible among the female population. This means that declines in the value attached to children are more relevant to younger generations of males than of females.

8.5 Conclusions

The analysis focused on the position of different values in the personal lives of older and younger persons in the post-communist countries and countries of Western Europe. In general, the factor analysis applied to the selected variables confirmed the adopted classification of variables into three groups: materialistic, post-materialistic values and child-related values. Only two variables, i.e. "living with your partner in harmony" and "providing security to people close to you", can hardly be included in these groups.

The factor constituted by the child-related variables was the most coherent for both older and younger generations in both the CEE and Western countries. Coincidentally, the variables describing child-related values showed negative correlation with the factors representing materialistic and post-materialistic values.

Generally, all the countries under study show the increasing importance of post-materialistic values among younger generations of both males and females, as compared with older ones. Materialistic values become more significant in the majority of CEE countries, whilst remaining almost unchanged in Western countries. Values related to children are evaluated more frequently as very important by persons in

the CEE countries, but the intergenerational shift towards their lower importance is shown by all countries under study.

The changes in the importance of materialistic and post-materialistic values in the younger generations are more profound than older ones. The younger persons present less altruistic attitudes. They are more interested in striving for self-fulfilment, in being appreciated and respected outside the family environment, but less in family life and children. Although they still consider children to be substantial for parents' lives and for family life, the value of children has been declining as compared with the others. This may mean that children are recognised mainly as a source of parents' satisfaction and happiness.

The hypothesis about the range of intergenerational changes in the value system depending on the historical background and the geographical and economic position of a country in Europe has been confirmed. The pace of the evolution of the values is slower in the CEE countries as compared with Western countries. The importance attached to materialistic values is still very high in the former, and the discrepancies between younger and older generations are not significant in that respect. The lack of data for more Western countries did not permit a more detailed analysis of inter-country differences.

In principle, correlations between sex and the importance attached to different variables related to values in life, as well as child-related values, were negligible among members of the older and the younger cohorts. Hence, it can be stated that the shifts in the system of values are primarily generation-related but not gender-specific.

Chapter 9
Attitudes and Intentions Toward Childlessness in Europe

Tomáš Sobotka and Maria Rita Testa

Abstract This study uses the IPPAS data for 13 European societies to analyse attitudes related to childlessness and intentions to remain childless. We combine descriptive analysis of all analysed countries with logistic regression of intentions to remain childless in Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Italy and Poland for respondents aged 18–39. We observe that attitudes toward children and childlessness are similar for men and women, but depict a wide cross-country differentiation, with respondents in the Netherlands and Belgium (Flanders) showing the most positive attitudes towards childlessness. The survey indicates that a significant proportion of younger childless respondents in each country intend to remain childless or are uncertain about parenthood. Germany stands out by the overall high levels of intended childlessness, as well as by a high proportion of uncertain and undecided respondents. Our analysis has documented a high degree of correlation between intended childlessness and preferences for less traditional living arrangements; as well as a strong association between respondents' positive attitudes toward family life and their fertility intentions.

Keywords: Childlessness · Attitudes towards fertility · Fertility intentions · Parenthood

9.1 Introduction

Substantial changes in family-formation patterns in European countries during the last decades have been accompanied by a gradual increase in permanent childlessness. Parenthood has lost much of its centrality in people's lives, and has become increasingly perceived as a matter of personal choice. Most societies have experienced a growth of less traditional and less permanent living arrangements, in particular informal unions and single-person households (Kuijsten 1996; Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000a).

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The recent increase in childlessness is closely linked with an intensive postponement of union-formation and parenthood. Much of the existing research suggests that several features differentiate contemporary childlessness from its characteristics in the past. First, despite the fact that a clear distinction between voluntary and involuntary childlessness is impossible, it is generally recognised that a considerable share of men and women are childless by choice rather than due to adverse life circumstances (Qu et al. 2000; Tanturri and Mencarini 2004). Second, the diminishing importance of family life is linked to a growing reluctance and ambiguity about parenthood. This inability to decide is an important factor contributing to late family-formation and increasing childlessness. Third, marital and partnership status are becoming less important "determinants" of permanent childlessness. An increasing proportion of extra-marital births, in excess of 40% in many European societies, clearly indicates that marriage has ceased to be the only widely-accepted arrangement for childbearing and, conversely, that permanent non-marriage (traditionally labelled as "celibacy") does not necessarily imply permanent childlessness. In many advanced societies, cohabitation is frequently linked to childbearing (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004) and even a significant proportion of single women eventually become mothers (Heuveline and Timberlake 2003).

The shifts in family behaviour have proceeded in parallel with diminishing normative pressure to follow socially-prescribed pathways, and, consequently, an expanding range of lifestyle options is available to individuals at various stages of their life course (Leshaeghe 1995; Inglehart 1990). The rising importance of individual choice in the domains of sexuality, partnership behaviour and parenthood has resulted in a "pluralisation" of private living arrangements, where "the trend is not towards a world of singles, but towards a variety of forms of private life among which those with children form a specific sample" (Schulze and Tyrell 2002, 75). The rapid spread of modern contraception, especially the pill, gives women very good control over their reproduction, and further facilitates changes in values and behaviour (Presser 2001; van de Kaa 1994).

These general observations do not apply to all societies to the same extent. Diverse institutional settings and cultural traditions, as well as differences in the onset and progression of recent family transformations imply a great diversity in the levels and character of childlessness across Europe. Whereas the countries of Western and Northern Europe experienced the start of interrelated changes in demographic behaviour and family values as early as in the late 1960s and early 1970s, most post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe have experienced comparable changes only since the early 1990s (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002; Sobotka 2004).

The increasing importance of "choice biographies" implies that attitudes and intentions are of paramount importance for understanding non-parenthood, as well as fertility trends, in contemporary Europe. Although general trends indicate an increasing societal acceptance of the choice to remain "childfree", parenthood still constitutes a highly-valued and normatively-supported part of most individuals' biographies. Thus, negative fertility intentions among childless men and women are of particular interest. Rovi (1994) proposed that those who do not intend to have a

child form a distinct group whose intentions are at odds with the normative parental imperative and, possibly, also with the established social and gender relations. Furthermore, Rovi (1994, 347–48) also argued that the "no" answer to the question on parenthood intentions makes it possible to make a distinction between voluntarily and involuntarily childless, and that "negative" fertility intentions are considerably more permanent than positive ones. This fairly large degree of reliability of negative fertility intentions among childless people has been confirmed by several studies (Noack and Østby 2002; Schoen et al. 1999) and questioned by some others (Qu et al. 2000; Rindfuss et al. 1988).

This contribution addresses a number of issues outlined above. We use the data from the International Population Policy Acceptance Survey (IPPAS) to analyse attitudes related to childlessness and intentions to remain childless in 13 European societies.[1] Although countries (or regions in the case of Flanders in Belgium and Eastern and Western Germany) are our primary units of analysis, we also inspect aggregated data for Eastern and Western parts of Europe, distinguishing between the former state-socialist countries and other regions. We look at attitudes among the respondents of all age groups surveyed (typically, 18–65), but we investigate intentions to remain childless only among respondents aged 18–39. We analyse separately the results for men and women, focusing on the differences in intended childlessness, as well as on selected factors associated with it, such as age and partnership status. Although parenthood attitudes and intentions among men have been frequently overlooked, research into the link between fertility intentions and subsequent behaviour suggests that men's influence on couples' fertility decision-making may equal the influence of women. Indeed, several studies found that in case of disagreement between partners, man's intentions have a very similar influence on subsequent childbearing and that their resistance against having another child usually prevails (Thomson 1997; Thomson and Hoem 1998; Voas 2003). This effect may be, however, much weaker when a woman is childless (Berrington 2004). A separate analysis by gender is motivated not only by some expected differences in the factors influencing intentions to remain childless for men and women, but also by the hypotheses on the increasing tendency among men to withdraw from binding commitments, and parenthood in particular (Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996; Jensen 1995; Lesthaeghe 1995).

The IPPAS survey also makes it possible to distinguish between respondents who do not intend to become parents and those who are uncertain. Morgan (1981, 283) has argued that uncertainty is "an inherent part of fertility intentions" and, consequently "adequate understanding and analysis must incorporate this uncertainty". Although the group of "uncertain" or "undecided" may share many characteristics with the respondents having "negative" intentions, we find this distinction useful as uncertainty may be more situational and temporary, i.e. may be more condi-

[1] There are several studies based on the IPPAS data analysing childbearing intentions (see also Fokkema and Esveldt elsewhere in this monograph), but only Miettinen and Paajanen (2005) have focused solely on reproductive intentions of childless respondents.

tioned by respondents' current partnership, health or socio-economic status. For countries with a larger sample size and a sufficient number of childless respondents (more than 400 childless men and 400 childless women) – Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Italy and Poland – we use logistic regression to identify the main factors associated with intended childlessness. The results provided by the regression analysis are complemented by a brief overview of the main reasons for intended childlessness and uncertainty selected by the respondents as important and very important.

A part of our analysis is structured alongside the following research hypotheses:

- H1. As a result of a low prevalence of childlessness in the recent past, general attitudes toward childlessness in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe may be less permissive than in other European countries. However, we also expect to find major differences in attitudes towards childlessness by age in the former group, as the recent societal transformation has particularly affected younger birth cohorts that have been more receptive to profound social and cultural changes.
- H2. In line with the concept of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 1987) and the hypotheses of increasing individualisation and declining normative pressures for parenthood, we expect to find in every society a significant minority of men and women who do not intend to become parents.
- H3. A substantial proportion of respondents, especially at younger ages, will express uncertainty about parenthood. This may be related to a growing ambiguity about parenthood in people's lives, but also to rising, multifaceted uncertainty in young adulthood (Mills and Blossfeld 2005).
- H4. Men are expected to display a higher rate of intended childlessness and uncertainty, which is in line with the hypothesis on their lower commitment to parenthood.
- H5. Out of the basic demographic characteristics, age would be of primary importance for women's intentions as women's fecundity is closely linked with age. We expect that for men a current partnership status may be more important for their intentions than age, since men's intentions may rely to a greater extent on having a stable partner.
- H6. The educational level, isolated from other factors, may have a different impact on men's and women's intentions. Specifically, a high level of education is associated with low levels of intended childlessness among men (Weston et al. 2004). Furthermore, both men's and women's intentions are expected to be closely related to their preferred living arrangements: Respondents who express a preference to live without a partner or for a partnership with a low level of commitment, such as a "living apart together" (LAT) relationship, would more frequently intend to remain childless.

Our article is structured as follows: The following section reviews the data and methods used, and gives an overview of variables selected for multivariate analysis. Then we provide a comparative analysis of attitudes towards childlessness. The subsequent part examines intentions to remain childless, providing first a cross-country

overview, followed by a regression analysis for the four selected countries and a brief review of the main reasons for intended childlessness and uncertainty. The last section summarises and discusses major findings.

9.2 Data

9.2.1 Selected Countries and Sample Size

With the exception of Cyprus, our comparative analysis utilises data for 13 countries that participated in the IPPAS: Austria, Belgium (Flanders), the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. In addition, the data also allow us to distinguish between Eastern and Western Germany, which are characterised by persisting marked differences in family and fertility patterns (Adler 2004a; Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2002). Although not all European regions are equally represented in the survey, the data contain a sufficient number of the former state socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (seven plus Eastern Germany) to enable a broad comparison between "Eastern" and "Western" Europe. We use weighted data for the comparative as well as multivariate analyses.

The sample size and age composition of the survey varies between countries and in combination with other factors, such as different proportions of the childless in younger age groups, produces sizeable differences in the number of childless respondents below the age of 40. Table AN1 in the Appendix lists the sample size for respondents aged 18–39 by sex and childlessness status for each country. It is apparent that the small number of childless respondents in many countries limits the reliability of our findings related to fertility intentions.

9.2.2 Limitations of the Survey

The IPPAS survey provides a rich source of information on attitudes and intentions toward childbearing in contemporary Europe, as well as on different factors and subjective reasons influencing these intentions. Besides the limited sample size of childless respondents, the survey has, however, further limitations hindering our comparative research:

- Some of the questions have not been asked in all the countries participating in the survey.[2]

[2] For instance, the Austrian, Belgian (Flemish) and Romanian surveys did not include a question on preferred living arrangements, and the Romanian survey also did not contain a question on the number of the respondent's children. In the latter case, we used the information on the number of the respondent's children still living at home to identify childless respondents below the age of 40.

- Many of the questions have been modified to an extent which may affect respondents' answers. One such modification concerns the range of pre-defined answers. For instance, the questionnaire for Austria and Hungary did not offer the option "do not know/uncertain" on the question on fertility intentions. The questionnaire for Italy frequently provided a more limited range of reply options for the questions on attitudes than the questionnaires for all the other countries. Furthermore, the exact wording of the question often differed between countries.
- The time horizon for childbearing intentions was not specified in the survey. Although we generally interpret the data as reflecting "permanent" (life-long) intentions, some respondents might have understood the question differently and expressed their intentions as related to their life circumstances at the time of the survey.
- Finally, it is apparent that in questions where respondents were free to choose multiple answers, the instruction on how to deal with these options must have differed widely between countries. In our analysis, this was particularly the case with regard to the reasons why respondents with negative fertility intentions did not want to have a(nother) child (see Section 9.3.4 below).

We comment on some of these problems and limitations throughout the paper. In order to provide a comprehensive yet meaningful cross-country analysis, we occasionally had to modify the data and make inferences based on results that are not fully comparable.

9.3 Methods

9.3.1 Comparative Overview of Attitudes Towards Childbearing

This analysis is based on four questions that capture respondents' attitudes towards children and childlessness. To study the responses by age and sex and analyse the overall prevalence of more "traditional" or negative attitudes towards childlessness, we also construct indicators that summarise responses across countries and combine responses to different questions. The aggregate indicators are computed by assigning equal weight to each country (or to each question), and treating Eastern and Western Germany as distinct regions. An alternative approach – weighting results by population size – would give results mostly mirroring the experience of the three most populous countries represented in our analysis, namely Germany, Italy and Poland.

9.3.2 Logistic Regression Analysis of Intended Childlessness in Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Italy and Poland

We use logistic regression models to analyse the main factors influencing intentions to remain childless. The question on fertility intentions was worded as follows: "Do

you intend to have a(nother) child in the future?" The response options were: "No," "Don't know, uncertain," "Yes," "I am/my partner is pregnant," and "I cannot have any more." Our analysis contrasts childless respondents who have chosen the "No" answer with those replying "Yes"; the dependent variable is coded 1 if people intend to remain childless, 0 otherwise. We also ran a model that contrasts uncertain respondents with those who intend to have children. Those who are pregnant or cannot have a child are excluded from the analysis.

Only countries with a sufficient sample size were selected for this analysis, namely Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Italy and Poland. In these countries the selected sub-sample of childless respondents below the age of 40 exceeds 400 for men and women alike. Although this selection does not sufficiently represent different European regions, and over-represents countries with a Catholic tradition, it contains the most populous countries participating in the PPAS survey and ensures a sufficient sample size for a multivariate analysis. For Poland and Germany, where individual records were weighted to achieve representativeness on a national level, we have run an additional model with unweighted data. The results have remained very similar for Poland, whereas for Germany the size of several coefficients has changed to a large extent. Thus, the results for Germany are not robust and should be interpreted with caution.

9.3.3 Selected Variables for the Regression Analysis

Our model includes demographic, socioeconomic and attitudinal explanatory variables. Tables 9.9 (for women) and 9.10 (for men) show the distribution of respondents in each country across different levels of the analysed variables. The basic demographic variables include age (age groups 18–24, 25–29 and 30–39), sex and current partnership status (distinguishing between "single" without a partner, "married" and "with partner"). The baseline category "with partner" includes all unmarried respondents in a co-residential partnership or reporting a "living-apart-together" relationship. The category "single" includes those who have never married, as well as those who are separated, widowed or divorced and do not have a partner.

The socio-economic variables include employment, type of place of residence (distinguishing between "urban" and "rural" settlements, where the latter includes the categories "rural area", "small village" and "small town"), educational enrolment (where available), level of education achieved and income. Employment status is coded as "employed", either full- or part-time and "not employed"; the latter group also includes those working occasionally.[3] The covariate education includes three categories "low", "medium" and "high" educational level. The first category groups people with primary (either completed or not completed) and lower

[3] The categorization of employment is problematic since it does not make it possible to distinguish between respondents who are unemployed and those who are not seeking a job (students, housewives and persons on maternity, parental, sickness and disability leave).

secondary education; the "medium" category comprises upper secondary and post-secondary non-university education; and the "high" category represents university education. In the analysis for Germany and Poland, we were able to distinguish respondents who were still in education (category "studying") from those who had completed their education. The covariate "household income" is not available for Italy, and has not been used for Poland due to different coding. For respondents with partners we also included information about their partner's educational attainment and labour market participation; these variables are coded in the same way as for the respondents.

Respondents' values and attitudes are captured by their subjective religiosity, their evaluation of two statements related to children and parenthood and preferred living arrangement (irrespective of the respondent's current marital status or type of living arrangement). The religiosity covariate reflects the importance religion plays in respondents' lives rather than the intensity of the religious practice, or particular religious affiliation. Respondents claiming that religion plays a "very important role" or an "important role" are coded as "religious".

The following two statements are used for evaluating attitudes towards childbearing: "The only place where you can feel completely happy and at ease is at home with your children" and "It is your duty towards society to have children". Whereas the former reflects a personal orientation towards childbearing and family life, the latter constitutes a normative statement which makes it possible to distinguish respondents with more traditional family values and negative attitudes towards childlessness. The other two statements concerning attitudes towards childbearing, and which are analysed in the descriptive part, are not included in the regression analysis due to co-linearity (see also Fig. 9.1). The covariate "preferred living arrangement" is based on the following question: "Which living arrangement do you personally prefer?" We distinguish between "marriage" (i.e. marriage without previous cohabitation), "cohabitation followed by marriage", "cohabitation" (without subsequent marriage), "living apart together" (denoted as LAT) and "single"; this last category also includes those who chose flat-sharing and other living arrangements.

Among other important factors that are commonly associated with family size preferences, we had no information about respondents' number of siblings (Axinn et al. 1994; Fernández and Fogli 2005; Rovi 1994) and about partners' intentions (Berrington 2004; Thomson 1997; Thomson and Hoem 1998; Voas 2003).

Some of the covariates in our selection may potentially be endogenous. In particular, an individual's attitudes may influence his or her intentions to remain childless, but may also be equally strongly affected by his or her intention to have or not to have children. It can even be argued that the current partnership status reflects in part a respondent's parenthood intentions. In reality, attitudes and intentions often evolve simultaneously and are likely to influence each other in a reciprocal fashion. Consequently, our findings related to attitudes and parenthood intentions should not be interpreted as causal relationships.[4]

[4] However, models estimated without the covariates potentially affected by endogeneity provided



Fig. 9.1 Proportion of respondents (%) giving a more "traditional" or family-oriented response to selected statements by age and sex (mean age profile for 12 countries)
Source: IPPAS
Notes: The data represent mean values of age and sex-specific proportion of respondents providing indicated answers. All the countries participating in the IPPAS survey were included except Cyprus and Romania; each country was assigned an equal weight. Eastern and Western parts of Germany were considered separately. The full wording of the questions is given below Table 9.1. Question 3 was not asked in Austria and Italy.

9.3.4 Analysis of the Subjective Reasons for Intended Childlessness

Our final overview of the main reasons for "negative" intentions is based on eleven pre-defined questions in the IPPAS survey listing various reasons suggested to respondents who indicated that they do not intend to have a(nother) child or who are uncertain. The exact wording of all the reasons is summarised in Table 9.5 below. We look at the proportion of childless respondents aged 18–39 who selected particular reasons as "important" or "very important" for their intentions to remain childless. To reduce instability related to the small sample size, the answers of respondents who do not intend to have a child and who are uncertain were combined. The respondents could choose multiple reasons for their intentions; this choice resulted in a huge cross-country variability in the mean number of reasons labelled as important. For instance, Italians chose on average 4% of suggested reasons as important or very important (i.e. fewer than half of respondents selected at least one reason as important), whereas respondents in Austria and Slovenia chose on average

results similar to the "full" models shown in our analysis. Therefore, we may assume that endogeneity is not strong enough to bias the other estimated coefficients.

more than 50% of all the reasons offered. We had to standardise country-specific data in order to create a summary indicator for all the countries. We computed relative weights for every reason in each country[5] (Eastern and Western Germany are considered separately), and then combined country-specific results in order to create an overall mean weighted rate for each reason in all the countries analysed. This enabled us to rank the reasons according to the weighted proportion of respondents considering a given reason as important. We did not include the Italian data because the results for Italy differed most markedly from the other countries.[6]

9.4 Attitudes Toward Childlessness

Table 9.1 lists the proportion of men and women (all ages considered) with negative attitudes toward childlessness or a strong family orientation. The statements capture different aspects of attitudes, ranging from an expression of family orientation and home-centeredness (Q1, see Note for Table 9.1) up to a relatively strong normative statement about duties toward society (Q4). The remaining two statements are related to a general perception of childless people as unhappy (Q2) and to a negative evaluation of an increasing proportion of childless couples (Q3).

Table 9.1 reveals considerable cross-country differences, including some contrasts between the "Eastern" and the "Western" part of Europe, fairly strong family orientation of respondents in many countries and a relatively high level of support for the "normative statements" (Q2 and Q4), especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

A majority of Europeans negatively evaluated an increasing number of childless couples (Q3); the mean value for all countries was 63% for men and women alike, and surpassed 50% even among childless respondents below the age of 40. Estonia, Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands were the only countries where less than half of the population perceived this trend as bad or very bad. Except for Hungary, childless persons aged 18–39 assessed that trend less negatively than the total population.

[5] The weights are built up as follows: The number of positive answers (i.e. listed as "important" or "very important") is divided by the maximum number of respondents replying to any of the selected reasons. The computation of these ratios is needed because respondents in many countries did not reply to all the reasons, especially if these reasons were not related to their situation (e.g. respondents who have a partner did not reply to the question of whether the lack of a suitable partner was important for their intention). A mean positive response rate per question was calculated. This mean positive response rate served to compute the weighted positive response rate to each particular reason with the mean value of 1 for every region considered. Reasons with a relative weight above 1.0 were cited as "important" or "very important" more frequently than the average reason.

[6] Most of the pre-defined reasons were selected as important by a tiny fraction of Italian respondents, and the only reason that emerged as relatively important was the lack of a steady partner (10% among women and 21% among men). The peculiar results for Italy are probably related to the survey method. Differently from other countries, where face-to-face interviews were conducted, the Italian survey was conducted by phone.

Table 9.1 Proportion of respondents expressing negative or "traditional" attitudes towards childlessness by sex and childlessness status (in %)

Countries	Q 1: Only feel happy at home with children (strongly agree or agree)*				Q 2: Cannot be really happy without children (strongly agree or agree)*				Q 3: Increasing number of couples remaining childless (bad or very bad) **				Q 4: Duty towards society to have children (strongly agree or agree) *			
	Women (18–65)	Men (18–65)	Childless women (18–39)	Childless men (18–39)	Women (18–65)	Men (18–65)	Childless women (18–39)	Childless men (18–39)	Women (18–65)	Men (18–65)	Childless women (18–39)	Childless men (18–39)	Women (18–65)	Men (18–65)	Childless women (18–39)	Childless men (18–39)
AT	61.2	62.6	31.8	48.8	–	–	–	–	67.6	69.6	52.2	51.8	39.5	45.5	15.6	48.8
B (Fl)	42.1	45.7	23.3	29.7	13.7	11.4	12.1	10.1	31.0	40.2	25.7	33.3	6.7	9.4	3.2	6.5
CZ	76.4	69.1	60.0	50.9	50.8	44.8	46.1	28.9	70.0	65.7	65.0	51.8	64.3	57.7	59.5	50.0
DE-E	62.1	57.1	42.2	31.0	53.8	45.8	32.1	19.4	76.8	73.1	70.9	55.2	47.6	51.1	32.5	35.1
DE-W	42.5	41.9	31.3	29.1	37.4	32.0	24.9	18.1	69.5	65.4	56.1	50.8	43.4	45.7	31.7	31.6
EE	48.8	60.4	31.0	35.7	57.1	53.8	29.2	20.3	35.8	37.1	19.9	18.9	47.2	58.9	37.4	43.5
FI	50.2	48.1	19.0	24.6	24.0	29.0	21.1	20.5	67.2	70.7	53.5	58.7	16.6	23.9	7.9	18.0
HU	64.2	62.3	47.5	45.8	65.9	59.8	51.1	41.0	85.4	84.1	81.4	83.1	38.7	38.8	39.4	31.6
IT	80.0	80.7	74.3	73.1	–	–	–	–	55.7	62.0	50.0	57.5	46.3	51.0	39.1	42.5
LT	85.8	80.6	76.3	59.1	52.8	54.8	29.1	27.3	86.7	82.7	76.3	63.6	52.2	55.0	28.8	27.3
NL	22.7	22.9	10.5	9.0	5.5	4.6	3.5	3.8	20.9	28.8	12.0	20.5	4.8	7.2	2.1	1.0
PL	76.8	72.0	59.3	56.5	51.7	48.3	39.7	38.2	66.2	63.2	58.7	52.9	56.9	55.8	42.2	40.5
SI	73.4	76.0	52.1	61.7	44.9	41.5	34.0	32.2	83.1	82.9	70.5	73.1	36.4	36.7	18.6	28.4
Mean ("East")	69.6	68.2	52.6	48.7	53.8	49.8	37.3	29.6	72.0	69.8	63.2	57.0	49.1	50.6	36.9	36.6
Mean ("West")	43.7	44.2	23.2	28.3	20.2	19.3	15.4	13.1	52.0	56.1	41.6	45.4	26.2	30.4	16.6	24.7
Mean (all countries)	60.5	60.0	43.0	42.7	41.6	38.7	29.4	23.6	62.8	63.5	53.2	51.6	38.5	41.3	27.5	31.1

Source: IPPAS

* the percentage of respondents who (strongly) agree.

** the percentage of respondents who evaluate that change as bad or very bad.

Notes: The full wording of the questions is given below. The exact wording differed in some countries.

Q1: "The only place where you can feel completely happy and at ease is at home with your children."

Q2: "You cannot be really happy without having children."

Q3: "Opinion on the increasing number of couples who decide to remain childless."

Q4: "It is your duty towards society to have children."

Interestingly, most respondents also agreed with the statement that they only feel completely happy and at ease at home with children (Q1). These responses were more differentiated by parenthood status: All countries considered, around 60% of all men and women, but only 43% of childless people below the age of 40, agreed with this statement. Given that younger childless people frequently live single or in childless households, this proportion is still surprisingly high. A relatively stark contrast exists among childless individuals between the former communist countries, where about one-half of childless respondents only feel completely happy at home with children, and the group of "Western" countries, where 23% of childless women and 28% of childless men agree with this statement. This contrast is not, however, clear-cut, because childless Italians express the highest home and child orientation (73–74%), while among all the respondents, Italy ranks second after Lithuania. These figures reflect a persistence of strong family orientation among Italians, which is deeply rooted in Italian culture (e.g. Dalla Zuanna 2001; Micheli 2004).

Fairly sizeable contrasts between the "Eastern" and the "Western" part of Europe are found in responses to two statements with a normative connotation (Q2 and Q4). Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands displayed the most libertarian attitudes towards childlessness: Well below one-tenth of respondents agreed that having children is a duty towards society, and the proportion agreeing that a person cannot be happy without having children was similarly low in the Netherlands (5% among all and only 1–2% among the childless) and slightly higher in Flanders (13%). A strong accentuation of individual freedom of choice and the absence of negative views on voluntary childlessness in the Netherlands was also documented in the Population and Policy Attitudes survey in 1990 (e.g. several contributions in Palomba and Moors 1998). The similarity of Flanders to the Dutch pattern may be surprising insofar as we consider the influence of the Catholic cultural tradition there, which is markedly more collectivist than the Protestant tradition. Around one-half of respondents in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were of the opinion that one cannot be happy without children, and with the exception of Hungary and Slovenia, a similar proportion of respondents agreed that having children is a duty towards society. This proportion was fairly high also in Austria and Italy. The evidence presented so far indicates that childless younger respondents hold a considerably more positive view of childlessness than the overall population, and that the views of men and women are widely in agreement. Are the more positive attitudes towards childlessness among younger childless respondents linked to their "childfree" status, or are these merely effects of the age or birth cohort? Figure 9.1 shows the proportion of respondents who expressed more "traditional" or family-oriented attitudes to the analysed statements. The data are stratified by age and sex; all countries where a given question was asked in a given age group are assigned an equal weight. Age turns out to be a very important factor: The proportion of individuals with more negative attitudes towards childlessness increases almost linearly with age; at the age of 65–69, a majority of people expresses the "traditional" view with respect to all the questions concerned. There are only marginal differences between men and women. Overall, the proportion of more "traditional" responses to Q1 and Q3, on the

one hand, and to the more normative Q2 and Q4 on the other, are almost identical, suggesting that respondents replied to these questions in a systematic way. Among men below the age of 35, there are almost no age differences in the proportion agreeing that having children is a "duty towards society"; among women, the lowest proportion agrees at the age of 25–29.

Figure 9.2 combines the age profiles of "traditional responses" to all four statements in each country. Former state-socialist societies are plotted separately. The figure confirms that the attitudes towards childlessness in Central and Eastern Europe remain less permissive and more traditional than in most other parts of Europe. With the exception of Estonia, where people hold less negative views of childlessness and responses are sharply differentiated by age, all countries of this region have a remarkably similar profile of attitudes towards childlessness, and also a relatively pronounced age differentiation. In contrast, there is considerable heterogeneity across Western, Northern and Southern Europe, with the Austrian and Italian populations having fairly negative attitudes towards childlessness, the inhabitants of the Netherlands and Flanders being characterised by the most positive view, and Finland and Western Germany falling in between. A comparison of Eastern and Western Germany indicates that Eastern Germans remain more family-oriented and less positive about childlessness, but that this difference is only slight among younger respondents. Thus, Eastern Germany does not constitute an exception from the pattern found for other post-communist countries.

9.5 Intentions to Remain Childless and Uncertainty

9.5.1 Overview of Major Findings

Table 9.2 provides an overview of intentions to remain childless among men and women below the age of 40. It ranks countries according to the proportion of childless women who are either uncertain or do not intend to have a child. In contrast to the large degree of homogeneity found among the former communist societies re attitudes towards childlessness, they differ widely in terms of intended childlessness and uncertainty as to intentions. Despite huge differences between countries, the analysis reveals that a substantial proportion of currently childless men and women did not intend to become parents, or expressed uncertainty. Negative fertility intentions among childless women ranged from 6% in Slovenia and Lithuania up to 21% in Austria and 25% in Western Germany. Interestingly, Eastern German childless women were much keener on starting a family than their Western German counterparts, and only 11% expressed negative intentions. The proportion of uncertain persons mostly surpassed the proportion with the negative intentions, although the results varied by country. For instance, Lithuania, with a very low proportion of women saying "no", had a high proportion of uncertainty (24%). One-third of childless women in Finland and Poland expressed uncertainty.



Fig. 9.2 Age profile of the proportion of respondents expressing more "traditional" or negative attitudes to childlessness by country, in % (average for four statements)
Source: IPPAS
Notes: For each country the mean age profile of the proportion of respondents expressing more "traditional" attitudes towards childlessness was computed as a mean proportion of respondents who "agree" or "strongly agree" with questions Q1, Q2 and Q4 and who evaluated the increasing number of couples who decide to remain childless as "bad" or "very bad" (Q3). The responses of men and women were weighted equally for each age. The profile for Austria and Italy is based on Q1, Q3 and Q4 only, as Q2 was not included in the survey there.

Table 9.2 Proportion of men and women aged 18–39 who do not intend to have a child or are uncertain (in %)

Countries	Intentions of childless women			Intentions of all women[2]	Intentions of childless men			Intentions of all men[2]
	"No"	Uncertain	"No" + uncertain	"No" + uncertain	"No"	Uncertain	"No" + uncertain	"No" + uncertain
HU	6.9	0.9[1]	7.8[1]	2.8[1]	12.9	1.8[1]	14.8[1]	6.5[1]
EE	3.2	10.3	13.5	6.7	2.1	16.2	18.3	10.8
IT	9.1	6.2	15.3	7.6	11.8	8.1	19.9	12.8
RO	10.2	8.6	18.8	7.9	10.2	17.0	27.2	13.9
SI	5.7	14.9	20.6	8.0	8.2	12.1	20.3	11.0
AT	21.2	–[1]	21.2[1]	6.8[1]	22.6	–[1]	22.6[1]	11.7[1]
NL	9.9	19.7	29.6	16.2	15.4	25.3	40.7	28.4
LT	6.3	23.8	30.0	7.4	6.4	16.5	22.9	9.1
CR	19.3	12.0	31.3	10.6	9.4	24.4	33.9	21.2
DE-E	10.6	22.5	33.1	13.9	24.9	26.2	51.1	33.6
BE(Fl)	14.5	19.3	33.8	14.8	18.3	25.9	44.2	23.7
FI	8.0	32.7	40.7	20.0	7.2	38.9	46.1	29.0
PL	8.5	32.7	41.2	15.8	13.5	40.3	53.8	29.5
DE-W	24.9	21.0	45.9	23.1	29.5	29.8	59.3	39.8
Mean ("East")	9.1	17.8	26.9	10.0	10.7	21.8	32.5	18.4
Mean ("West")	13.3	19.8	33.1	16.3	16.4	25.6	42.0	26.7
Mean (all countries)	12.6	18.6	31.2	13.2	15.0	23.4	38.4	22.9

Source: IPPAS

Notes: [1] In Austria and Hungary the questionnaire did not offer the option "do not know/uncertain", so that the total proportion of both categories is not fully comparable with other countries and is likely to be underestimated. In Hungary, the figure in the "uncertain" category refers to respondents who explicitly stated that they do not know whether they intend to have a child or how many children they intend to have. These two countries were excluded from the computation of regional mean values.

[2] Proportion of all men and women aged 18–39 intending to remain childless or uncertain, irrespective of their actual parity status

Results for men typically paralleled those for women, but with higher levels of both negative intentions and uncertainty. Childless men in Germany appeared to be the most unwilling and reluctant to have a child – one-quarter of childless men in Eastern Germany and 30% of those living in Western Germany did not intend to have a child, and very similar levels were found with respect to uncertainty. Uncertainty among childless men reached around 40% in Finland and Poland. These data provide evidence that many young Europeans do not perceive parenthood as an inevitable part of their life course. When we consider negative intentions and uncertainty together, childless people of reproductive age in Finland, Poland (mostly due to a very high uncertainty) and Germany appeared the least family oriented: In Western Germany, 46% of childless women and as many as 59% of childless men did not have a clear intention to become

parents. The data lend support to the hypothesis that men are generally more reluctant to have children; this was the case in all countries except Lithuania and Slovenia.

The contrast between men and women becomes even stronger if we consider the intention to remain childless and uncertainty about parenthood relative to the total population below the age of 40, including those who already have children. This seemingly contradictory analysis may be indicative of the level of voluntary childlessness among the total population, irrespective of the actual proportion of childless people in each age group of reproductive age. Then the overall male-female difference increases to the factor of 1.8 and reaches 2.4 in Eastern Germany. This is explained by a higher share of childless men in younger age groups, linked to their later entry into parenthood. When the total population is considered, Western German men and women below the age of 40 remained the least enthusiastic about parenthood, with 23% of women and 40% of men being ambiguous or not wanting to establish a family. In the light of these results, it is no coincidence that Western German women have the highest childlessness rates in Europe, with about one-quarter of all women born in the second half of the 1960s remaining permanently childless (Dorbritz 2003; Sobotka 2005).

Figure 9.3 features the mean profile of intended childlessness by age and sex in twelve countries. Until around the age of 30, intended childlessness among men surpasses the levels found among women; around 20% of childless women and 30% of childless men did not intend to have a child or were uncertain. Uncertainty was more common than the negative intention until the mid-thirties, and it increased most markedly after the age of thirty, when many people probably realised that their partnership situation or socioeconomic position might not become sufficiently favourable for parenthood in the foreseeable future. Close to one-half of childless men and women aged 30–34 expressed negative intentions or uncertainty. The intention not to have a child increased most sharply among women after the age of 35 and surpassed intended childlessness among men. This is partly a selection effect – most of the women who planned to have children realised their intention before reaching this age, and the share of people who were voluntarily childless increased as a result. But it appears to be also an effect of a "reality check": Many women, facing a "deadline" posed by approaching biological infertility, realised they would never become mothers. At the age of 35–39, only one-quarter of childless women and one-third of childless men expressed an unambiguous intention to become parents.

One of our main research interests lies in exploring how the preferences for specific living arrangements are linked with intended childlessness. We assume that a preference for living arrangements that are generally characterised by lower partnership commitment reveals a respondent's underlying family orientation and is in turn reflected in the high level of intended childlessness and uncertainty as to intentions. This section provides a brief overview of preferred living arrangements among childless respondents and the extent to which these arrangements are preferred with or without children. Subsequently, we address this relationship in a multivariate analysis.



Fig. 9.3 Age-specific proportion of childless women and men below the age of 40 who do not intend to have a child or who are uncertain. Mean values for 12 countries (in %)
Source: IPPAS
Notes: Figure is based on the average values of age-specific proportions for childless respondents for all countries except Hungary and Austria; Eastern and Western Germany are treated as separate units.

Figure 9.4 features preferred living arrangements among childless women below the age of 40 in ten countries.[7] The patterns are very similar for men, although they expressed on average slightly higher preferences for less traditional living arrangements. The graph includes results for childless Eastern German men, who have the most untypical preferences found in the survey.

The greatest contrast was found between countries where "direct" marriage remained the most frequently preferred living arrangement (Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia) and all the other regions, where cohabitation followed by marriage constituted the most frequently preferred option. Cohabitation without subsequent marriage was not particularly popular, and was preferred by more than 15% of childless German women and Dutch men only. Single living, non-coresidential partnership ("LAT") or flat-sharing with friends and other less traditional arrangements were preferred by about one-tenth of childless respondents. Younger Germans constituted the only notable exception: 23% of Eastern German and 28% of Western German childless women preferred to live single, live separately from a partner or share a flat with friends. German men expressed even less traditional preferences, and childless Eastern German men served as an example of the most "post-modern" preferences found: Whereas only 3% preferred "direct" marriage,

[7] This question was not asked in Austria, Belgium (Flanders) or Romania.



Fig. 9.4 Preferences for living arrangements among childless women aged 18–39 (in %)
Source: IPPAS
Notes: The last column displays preferred living arrangements among childless Eastern German men aged 20–39.

45% preferred to live single, share a flat with friends or have an "LAT" relationship. In Eastern Germany, such preferences correspond with the actual high prevalence of non-traditional living arrangements and more than one-half of children being born to cohabiting or single women (Konietzka and Kreyeneld 2002). However, it appears puzzling that similar preferences were also found among young Western Germans

Besides asking about their preferred living arrangements, the IPPAS also asked respondents whether they preferred to live with or without children. On average, more childless respondents expressed a preference to live without children than would correspond to the findings on intended childlessness. Some respondents probably replied to the question on living arrangements in relation to their current preferences (which may reflect a particular stage in their life-course), whereas they responded to the question on childbearing intentions bearing their long-term plans in mind.

The combination of preferences for particular living arrangements and childlessness is depicted in Fig. 9.5. These data are available only for seven countries and regions. In line with the finding on childbearing intentions, more childless men than women prefer a living arrangement without children. The graph shows an expected gradient, where a preference for legal marriage not preceded by cohabitation is linked with the strongest preference for children and a preference for single living, or a non-co-residential partnership is linked with the strongest preference for childlessness. Cohabitation followed by marriage was associated with a higher preference for childlessness (18%) than "direct" marriage (9–10%). However, a starker contrast was found for respondents preferring unmarried cohabitation not followed by marriage: Almost half of men and 37% of women who preferred this type of



Fig. 9.5 Proportion of childless men and women saying they that prefer a living arrangement without children (out of the total respondents preferring a given living arrangement, in %). Mean values for seven countries
Source: IPPAS
Notes: The figure is based on the average values of the following countries and regions: the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany (Eastern and Western regions are considered separately), Italy (does not include single living), Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland.

living arrangement also expressed a preference for childlessness. In this case, the differences between men and women were notable and many men with a weak family orientation appeared to favour "settling for" childless unmarried cohabitation. A quarter of women who preferred single living still preferred to have a child while being single; this proportion was the same for women who preferred LAT.

9.5.2 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis

The results for the models of the "negative" intention to become a parent as contrasted to the "positive" intention (odds ratios) are summarised for women in Table 9.3 and for men in Table 9.4. The tables do not feature results for the type of residence and income level, which turned out to be not significant for any of the countries analysed. We have performed the analysis separately for Eastern and Western Germany, but the models were unstable due to the small sample size,[8] and consequently we display results only for Germany as a whole. We also run the model contrasting "uncertainty" versus "positive intentions" to have children; these results

[8] Our descriptive analysis shows that there are considerable differences in intentions to remain childless between Eastern and Western regions of Germany. A more in-depth investigation of these differences will be the object of our future research.

Table 9.3 Odds ratios of intended childlessness among childless women aged 18–39

	B (FL)		DE		IT		PL	
Age								
Age 18–24	0.86		0.29	+	0.53		0.43	
Age 25–29	1		1		1		1	
Age 30–39	17.21	***	3.18	*	3.38	*	4.79	+
Partnership status								
Single, no partner	1.69		1.09		2.55	+	1	
With partner	1		1		1			
Married	0.58		9.98	**	0.43		0.81	
Own education								
Low	3.13	+	6.69	**	2.25		4.08	+
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	0.80		3.49	+	1.03		0.92	
Still studying			1.27				1.44	
Partner's education								
Low	7.12	*			1.47		2.07	
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	1.06		0.19	*	0.13	*	0.16	
Employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	1.18		0.77		1.28		2.39	+
Partner's employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	1.22		0.58		0.63		1.62	
Religiosity								
Not religious	1		1		1		1	
Religious	0.74		0.24	**	0.72		0.83	
Only feel happy at home with children								
Agree	1		1		1		1	
Indifferent	0.74		1.64				1.12	
Disagree	3.56	*	2.52		2.47	*	0.64	
Duty towards society to have children								
Agree	1		1		1		1	
Indifferent	0.65		1.72				1.95	
Disagree	0.56		1.12		1.14		1.50	
Preferred living arrangement								
Marriage			5.26		0.84		1.82	
Cohabitation, then marriage			1		1		1	
Cohabitation only			36.35	***	4.05	*	14.83	+
LAT			31.47	***	14.07	***		
Single, flat-sharing			48.18	***	2.04		20.38	***
Log likelihood	−90.7		−85.3		−114.3		−82.0	
N	302		267		541		293	

***p <= 0.001; **p <= 0.01; *p <= 0.05; +p <= 0.10

Source: IPPAS

are briefly summarized in the text and displayed in tables AN-2 and AN-3 in the Appendix.

As evidenced in the regression analysis, negative fertility intentions and uncertain intentions are closely related to the status of being "single" and age. Men and women below the age of 25 intend to have a child more often as compared to respondents who are 25–29 years old; results for uncertainty vary by country. However, young adults do not always display higher levels of uncertainty than older respondents. Quite to the contrary, Belgian (Flemish) women and Italian and Polish men below the age of 25 show significantly lower levels of uncertainty than their older counterparts aged 25–29. In line with the findings of the descriptive analysis, the likelihood of not intending to have a child or being uncertain increases sharply after the age of 30, and this increase is particularly pronounced among women. Many of these women have probably adjusted their fertility intentions downwards when confronted with adverse circumstances that unfolded during their life course (see Berrington 2004; Rindfuss et al. 1988; van de Kaa 2001; Weston et al. 2004).

The age-related increase in the frequency of intentions to remain childless is in agreement with a view that the option for voluntary childlessness results from a gradual series of postponing decisions (Rindfuss et al. 1988). Having no partner seems to be one of the main obstacles for the desire for children. Single respondents without a partner express "negative" intentions or uncertainty more often than respondents who have a partner, as well as married respondents. Germany seemingly constitutes an important exception: Married men and women alike intend to remain childless markedly more often than other respondents. This suggests that childlessness within marriage is broadly accepted in Germany and that married childless Germans form a select group of people who have not entered parenthood soon after the marriage, and do not intend to do so in the future. However, this effect disappears if we exclude the preferred living arrangement from the regression model. Then the model comes much closer to the "common sense" results: Women without a partner show elevated levels of intended childlessness, whereas men without a partner show the same level of intended childlessness as their married counterparts.[9]

The intentions of unmarried respondents with a partner do not differ significantly from married respondents ones in most cases. However, Flemish men and women with a partner display greater uncertainty than those who are married, and unmarried German women display a peculiar pattern of markedly less frequent "negative intentions" in comparison with their married counterparts (see also footnote 9). Contrary

[9] These results show that the stated preferences for living arrangements are tightly linked to childbearing intentions (see also below). Respondents who intend to have a child frequently select living arrangements that are commonly perceived as favourable for childbearing (marriage and cohabitation followed by marriage), whereas respondents who do not intend to have a child commonly select less traditional living arrangements. This effect is so strong as to produce the peculiar positive association between being single and an intention to have a child. The impact is smaller for respondents who have a partner. However, it is important to note the limited robustness of these results: When unweighted data are used in the model, the preferred living arrangement does not show such a pronounced association with intentions to remain childless.

Table 9.4 Odds ratios of intended childlessness among childless men aged 18–39

	B (FL)		DE		IT		PL	
Age								
Age 18–24	0.33	*	0.67		0.82		0.40	
Age 25–29	1		1		1		1	
Age 30–39	7.66	***	1.18		2.35	*	3.07	*
Partnership status								
Single, no partner	4.77	**	1.90		3.12	**	1	
With partner	1		1		1			
Married	1.12		7.60	**	1.18		0.68	
Own education								
Low	1.27		1.88		1.15		2.70	*
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	0.41	*	0.86		0.46		0.06	**
Still studying			0.29	*			1.62	
Partner's education								
Low	1.32				0.43		9.04	
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	0.47		2.07		0.18		1.78	
Employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	0.87		0.50	+	0.84		1.31	
Partner's employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	1.86		2.54		1.84		1.01	
Religiosity								
Not religious	1		1		1		1	
Religious	1.89		0.39	+	0.99		0.60	
Only feel happy at home with children								
Agree	1		1		1		1	
Indifferent	1.63		3.47	**			1.85	
Disagree	4.08	**	2.55	+	1.34	*	0.26	*
Duty towards society to have children								
Agree	1		1		1		1	
Indifferent	0.97		1.48				0.96	
Disagree	4.15		1.45		1.40		1.23	
Preferred living arrangement								
Marriage			1.84		1.90	*	2.47	
Cohabitation, then marriage			1		1		1	
Cohabitation only			6.11	**	6.09	***	1.82	
LAT			8.83	***	5.80	**	32.59	***
Single, flat-sharing			22.20	***	28.27	***	68.47	***
Log likelihood	−110.8		−152.3		−208.7		−110.3	
N	296		343		699		318	

***p <= 0.001; **p <= 0.01; *p <= 0.05; +p <= 0.10

Source: IPPAS

Notes: The models in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 also check for urban-rural residence and income. The variable "Preferred living arrangement" is not available for Belgium. The "indifferent" response option in the attitudinal covariates is not available for Italy. We excluded "Low education" of the partner for Germany and "Single with a partner" and "Living apart together" for Poland because of a too small number of cases.

to our expectations, men's partnership status is not more important than age for intended childlessness.

Our description of the effects of socio-economic covariates focuses especially on the effects of education. Among women, low educational level is linked with a high frequency of "negative" intentions, especially in Germany (odds ratio of 6.7). However, with the exception of Poland, women with a low educational level do not express a significantly higher level of uncertainty. There is no consistent pattern among highly-educated women in comparison with women with a "medium" level of education. Interestingly, highly-educated women in Germany show an elevated frequency of intentions to remain childless, which indicates a U-shaped pattern of intended childlessness by education. For men, we find a weak negative effect of low educational level on parenthood intentions (more pronounced and significant only in Poland), and we do not find any consistent results for uncertainty. However, highly-educated men in all analysed countries have both low preferences for intended childlessness and, with the exception of Belgium, also low levels of uncertainty.

Being a student strongly reduces intentions to remain childless among German men, but not among women. A similar interaction effect between gender and educational participation is found in the analysis of the determinants of ideal family size in Europe (Testa and Grilli 2006). Among Polish men, on the other hand, students express higher levels of uncertainty. For respondents with a partner, the effect of their attained education is further corroborated by their partner's educational level. This appears particularly important for intentions to remain childless among women: Women with highly-educated partners are markedly less likely to intend to remain childless (odds ratios below 0.2 in Germany, Italy and Poland) than women who have a partner with middle- or low-level education. Only in Belgium (Flanders) does the main difference lie between women with partners with a low educational level (high levels of intended childlessness) and partners with a medium educational level.

The strong negative association between attained educational level and intentions to remain childless, evidenced in some countries for women and in all countries for men, may come as a surprise. It is possible that low intentions to remain childless among highly-educated women, as depicted by the model, are an outcome of checking for many factors that are typical of this group, and are associated with higher levels of intended childlessness, such as being single, or having less traditional attitudes towards childlessness. However, a bivariate analysis shows similar results, albeit with a less marked polarisation between educational categories: Women with a low level of education intend to remain childless considerably more often than women with a medium level of education. If we do not check for other factors, Poland, Germany, and to a small extent also Belgium (Flanders), show a U-shaped pattern of intentions to remain childless among women, with women with both a high and low educational level having higher levels of intended childlessness than those with a medium educational level. For men, a strong association between low educational attainment and intentions to remain childless is observed.

Differently from education, the employment situation does not appear to have any consistent and significant effect.[10] The most consistent finding concerns men: Having a partner who is not employed is linked to higher levels of intended childlessness. This result is particularly strong and significant only in the case of Eastern Germany. Furthermore, for Polish women, non-employment is associated with more frequent intentions to remain childless (significant at the 10% level). The negative effects of unemployment may become more prominent in the phase of realisation of expressed desired fertility (Toulemon and Testa 2005).

Although the income level was not strongly associated with intentions to remain childless, a higher income might be expected to reduce uncertainty about parenthood intentions: It reduces the constraints which a child may place on the parents' standard of living, and broadens the range of options available for (paid) childcare. Among women, a higher income is indeed linked with lower levels of uncertainty as to intention (the result is significant at the 10% level only in Belgium (Flanders)), but there is no consistent and significant effect for men.

As for attitudinal covariates, religious women intend to have children more often than women who are not religious, but the effect of religiosity is strong and significant only in Germany, where religiosity also reduces uncertainty about parenthood intentions. Among men, religiosity has a significant effect only in Germany, where it is also linked with a considerably stronger family orientation, and in Poland where it is linked with a low level of uncertainty about parenthood intentions.

Out of the two analysed statements about children and childlessness, the first one ("...[only]...feeling completely happy and at ease at home with your children") turned out to be considerably more important for predicting intentions to remain childless than the second, normative statement ("It is your duty towards society to have children"). Disagreement with the first statement is strongly correlated with the intention to remain childless and uncertainty about childlessness, for women and men alike. An indifferent response is also related to high levels of uncertainty as regards intentions, and in Germany also with intended childlessness. Poland constitutes an anomaly, where men who disagree that they are only completely happy at home with children display very low levels of intended childlessness (this result is weaker and not significant for Polish women). Considering childbearing a duty towards society is only weakly associated with a personal intention to remain childless. Although disagreement with this statement is slightly more often correlated with the intention to remain childless, this effect is not consistent between countries, and is strong and significant only for men in Eastern Germany.

As envisioned, preferred living arrangements are closely linked with intentions to remain childless. Men and women who prefer less committed living arrangements frequently intend to remain childless and express high levels of uncertainty concerning parenthood intentions. This association is usually stronger and more

[10] A weak link between employment and intentions to remain childless may be partly explained by the problematic definition of employment status, which does not distinguish between specific categories of non-employment (footnote 3).

significant than the effect of age and partnership status. Interestingly, intentions of people who want to cohabit and then marry (our baseline category) are very distinct from those who want to cohabit without subsequently marrying. The former are relatively close to respondents who want to marry without cohabiting. Curiously, the preference for "direct marriage" is associated in Germany with a higher frequency of intended childlessness among women and considerable uncertainty as to parenthood intentions among men than the preference for cohabitation followed by marriage. Similarly, Italian men who prefer marriage intend to remain childless more often as well. For both men and women, the preference for cohabitation without marriage is closely correlated with intended childlessness. This result is more pronounced for women (odds ratio 4.1 in Italy, 14.8 in Poland and 36.4 in Germany) than for men (odds ratio 1.8 in Poland, 6.1 in Italy and Germany). Thus, in terms of intended childlessness, people who prefer to cohabit only are very close to those who prefer an LAT relationship, and usually also closer to those who prefer to remain single than to those respondents who want to cohabit and marry afterwards.

9.5.3 Reasons for not Intending to have a Child or Being Uncertain as Expressed by the Respondents

Intentions to remain childless are usually related to a combination of several reasons, which often consist of a mixture of lifestyle choices and different constraints or adverse personal circumstances. Although there is a vast cross-country heterogeneity in the proportion of respondents choosing different reasons and the number of reasons per respondent, respondents in most countries have typically chosen several reasons in justification of their intentions. Even the reason which ranks as the least important, namely the desire on the part of the respondent's partner not to have a child, has been cited as important on average by one-fifth of respondents. Many respondents selected concern about the future of their children as an important reason: It was the most frequently chosen reason among women and the second most frequent reason among men. This reason is fairly difficult to interpret as it may have different meanings for diverse groups of respondents. Among many young people, it probably reflects general feelings of uncertainty about the future.

Interestingly, there were no differences between men and women and between the respondents from the former communist countries and from the other regions of Europe: In all these cases, more than 40% of respondents listed concern about the future as an important reason for their intention. Among men, intentions are strongly influenced by their partnership situation. Having no steady partner was the most frequent reason, mentioned as important by one-half of childless men who intended to remain childless or were uncertain. This result is in line with the findings of the multivariate analysis presented above. For women, a lack of a steady partner is relatively important as well. However, it ranked lower than concern about the possible consequences of parenthood for material well-being and fear that life would not be enjoyable with a child. Health reasons were relatively important for women as well, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

Given the generally-perceived difficulties attaching to combining work and motherhood, occupational and professional activities surprisingly ranked among the less frequently stated reasons for the "negative" childbearing intentions among childless men and women alike. It is roughly as important a reason for both sexes as the threat that parenthood may pose to their leisure time. This finding can be interpreted as a sign that only few women have such a pronounced career orientation, which would lead them to deliberately refrain from becoming mothers.[11]

9.6 Summary and Discussion

We have examined contemporary attitudes towards childlessness, as well as the prevalence and features of intentions to remain childless among younger Europeans. This analysis also contributes to an understanding of men's and women's decision-making towards parenthood. Many of our findings indicate that parenthood frequently competes with other options and opportunities in people's lives. Respondents not only weight different advantages and disadvantages of parenthood, but they may also consider childlessness as a possible option. This is clearly reflected not only by the non-negligible proportion of men and women who intend to remain childless, but also by a significant share of respondents who are uncertain about their intentions as regards parenthood.

Most respondents cite several reasons for opting for not intending to have a child. Thus, intended childlessness cannot be frequently explained by a single "reason", but by a mixture of lifestyle choices and different constraints or adverse personal circumstances. As there was no indication of the time framework of the stated fertility intentions in the IPPAS survey, we assumed that most respondents expressed their long-term intentions. In particular, we considered respondents who stated that they did not intend to have a child as revealing their intention for permanent childlessness rather than referring to the near future. However, we should take into account that some respondents may have expressed their intentions as related to their life circumstances at the time of the survey.

Attitudes towards children and childlessness are generally comparable between men and women, but they differ by partnership status, have a considerable age gradient and depict wide cross-country differences. Respondents in Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands show generally the most positive attitudes towards childlessness, whereas relatively traditional attitudes prevail in the post-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Austria and "familistic" Italy. Childbearing is often seen in these countries as a duty towards society; childless people are commonly considered as unhappy and respondents strongly accentu-

[11] Although employment and career may not strongly affect the intentions of childless women, it may have a more prominent impact at the stage of actual decision-making on childbearing. It is also plausible that many women acknowledge the difficulties of reconciling work and family life only after they actually become mothers and are directly confronted with realities on the labour market.

Table 9.5 Reasons for not intending to have a child or being uncertain about parenthood. Ranking and mean proportion of responses "important" and "very important" based on 11 predefined reasons (childless respondents aged 18–39, in %)

	Women				Men			
Rank	Question number	Reason	Relative weight	Adj. %	Question number	Reason	Relative weight	Adj. %
1.	Q8	Concerned about the future	1.45	47.8	Q3	No steady partner	1.72	51.7
2.	Q6	Maintain standard of living	1.29	42.9	Q8	Concerned about the future	1.46	46.5
3.	Q9	Would not enjoy life	1.23	37.3	Q6	Maintain standard of living	1.31	43.5
4.	Q3	No steady partner	1.19	39.3	Q9	Would not enjoy life	1.13	36.1
5.	Q7	Child would cost too much	1.13	39.3	Q7	Child would cost too much	1.05	36.4
6.	Q2	State of health	1.09	40.0	Q5	Leisure time	0.92	32.1
7.	Q4	Job	0.93	33.5	Q4	Job	0.89	31.3
8.	Q5	Leisure time	0.92	31.8	Q2	State of health	0.75	25.8
9.	Q10	Too old	0.71	26.7	Q1	Does not want a child	0.62	23.2
10.	Q1	Does not want a child	0.64	25.7	Q10	Too old	0.61	21.9
11.	Q11	Partner does not want	0.60	23.1	Q11	Partner does not want	0.55	22.6

Source: IPPAS

Notes: The ranking is based on the mean values of standardised relative weights of each analysed reason in twelve countries (all countries except Italy; Eastern and Western Germany are considered separately). See sub-section 9.3.4. on methods for the computation of relative weights. Questions 5 and 6 were not asked in Slovenia, Question 9 was not asked in Estonia and Questions 10 and 11 were not asked in Belgium (Flanders).

The exact wording of the questions relating to different reasons was as follows:

Q1: "I already have all the children I want";
Q2: "My state of health does not allow me to have a(nother) child";
Q3: "I live alone and I don't have a steady partner";
Q4: "My job and professional activities would not allow it";
Q5: "I would have to give up leisure-time interests";
Q6: "I want to maintain my present standard of living";
Q7: "A(nother) child would cost too much";
Q8: "I am too concerned about the future of my children";
Q9: "I would not be able to enjoy life as I have so far";
Q10: "I am/my partner is too old";
Q11: "My partner does not want a(nother) child."

ate the value of happy family life with children. This finding supports part of our first hypothesis, which envisioned that the low childlessness levels recorded until recently in all Central and Eastern European societies will continue to shape people's generally negative attitudes towards voluntary childlessness. The very positive evaluation of family life, expressed also by the majority of younger childless respondents, may be also in part a consequence of the family patterns of the previous era.

Attitudes towards childlessness are highly differentiated by age not only in the former communist societies, but also in several other countries, especially in Finland. Thus, the second part of our first hypothesis, envisioning that the age gradient will be particularly pronounced in the former communist societies among the younger cohorts because of their strong receptivity to recent social and cultural changes, is confirmed only to some extent. Unfortunately, we do not have more detailed data that would unable us to disentangle the age effects from the period effects.

In line with the second hypothesis, we found in every country a significant proportion of childless respondents who intend to remain childless or are uncertain about parenthood, but we also detected a considerable degree of heterogeneity between countries. A high proportion of Austrian and German respondents intend to remain childless, whereas indecisiveness is most pronounced among Polish and Finish respondents. Germany stands out for the high overall level of both intended childlessness and uncertainty. These trends may be viewed as the outcomes of structural and institutional constraints, which encourage the traditional male-breadwinner family model based on marriage, and are detrimental to the combination of employment and family life (e.g. Federkeil 1997; Kreyenfeld 2004). However, our study also indicates that irrespective of these institutional constraints, a "culture of childlessness" has emerged in Germany as a consequence of high and gradually increasing childlessness levels in the past decades. Germany has become a society where a child-free lifestyle enjoys considerable popularity and, in combination with a widespread preference for less traditional living arrangements as well as high intended childlessness among the married respondents, it has become a widely-accepted option.

The example of Italy points out that the spread of childlessness and its wider societal acceptance are culturally specific. Italian women make their family-related decisions in an environment where institutional support for the traditional family model is even more engrained than in Germany, and where the possibilities for combining work and family life are considerably more constrained. But, differently from Germany, Italian culture retains a strong "familistic character" and children and family life continue to be highly valued by the large majority of the population.

We have not found support for our third hypothesis, envisioning that uncertainty about parenthood would be particularly pronounced among young adults. For most younger respondents, uncertainty is probably seen as temporary and thus does not affect their long-term life planning. The frequency of uncertainty as to intention increases sharply after the age of 30. A slight decline can be observed among men

at young ages; however, as the regression estimates indicate, this is more closely linked to their partnership status than to age. Until reaching their early thirties, childless men express both higher levels of intended childlessness and uncertainty as to parenthood in comparison with women. In combination with their stronger preference for less conventional living arrangements, our findings lend a modest degree of support to various hypotheses on men's greater reluctance towards, or even retreat from, parenthood.

Our research provides a limited degree of support for the fifth hypothesis, namely that men's parenthood intentions are more closely connected with their partnership status, whereas age is of paramount importance for women. Among the subjective reasons for intentions to remain childless or uncertainty, a lack of a steady partner ranked as the most important reason among men. On the other hand, if we check for several factors in a multivariate analysis, "having no partner" is not strongly related with intended childlessness among men, but it is rather manifested by higher levels of uncertainty about parenthood intentions.

Not only the current partnership status, but also preferences for living arrangements, are tightly interwoven with intended childlessness. A descriptive analysis has shown an expected gradient between the level of partnership commitment and childbearing preferences (first part of our sixth hypothesis). Respondents who prefer arrangements with a low level of commitment, such as single-living or living-apart-together relationship, also express a high degree of preference for childlessness. Living arrangement preferences and intentions to remain childless obviously constitute two sides of one coin and reveal underlying values, life-style preferences and personality traits.

A further link can be established between attitudes towards childbearing and intentions: Our study found a relatively strong correlation between a respondent's very positive attitude towards family life with children and his or her intentions towards childbearing. Similarly, Schoen et al. (1997) have found a direct relationship between attitudes towards childlessness and fertility intentions among childless respondents.

Individuals who prefer to cohabit and subsequently marry are rather similar in their childlessness preferences to those respondents who prefer "direct" marriage. A strong family orientation among both groups of respondents was also detected by the multivariate analysis. However, men and women who prefer cohabitation without subsequent marriage emerge as a group which is clearly distinct from the group of respondents who prefer to cohabit and then marry. The former group shows high levels of intentions to remain childless and of uncertainty, which brings it closer to respondents who prefer a non-co-residential partnership, living single or flat-sharing.

The mechanism which links childbearing intentions with the preference for marriage cannot be investigated with our data. It is possible that willingness to marry is perceived as a sign of partnership commitment sufficient for family formation, or that marriage is generally seen as a favourable arrangement for childbearing, also from the normative and institutional perspective. Our study has revealed some contrasts between the preferences expressed by men and women. A descriptive analysis

has suggested that women who prefer cohabitation without subsequent marriage express stronger childbearing intentions than men who prefer to cohabit. Similar differences have been found for those respondents who prefer single living, where a quarter of women would still prefer to have a child while living single. These findings again point to a stronger family orientation among women.

A negative correlation of educational attainment with intentions to remain childless among men is in agreement with the second part of our sixth hypothesis. Moreover, we also found that women with a low educational level frequently intend to remain childless, whereas women with higher educational attainment do not necessarily express a high preference for intended childlessness. Conversely, highly-educated women in Flanders and Poland are less likely to intend to remain childlessness, other things being equal. This finding appears to be at odds with the fact that highly-educated women also have the highest levels of childlessness (e.g. Dorbritz 2003; Lappegård 2002; Shkolnikov et al. 2004; Spielauer 2005), although childlessness is becoming more widespread across all educational levels (McDonald 1998). Also some theoretical arguments imply that voluntary childlessness should be more common among highly-educated women due to more employment choices and, presumably, also stronger career orientation, when compared to women with a low educational level. For the latter, family formation may serve as one of the few lifestyle options available to them for self-fulfilment and also for reducing their uncertainty (Friedman et al. 1994).

We interpret our findings as a sign that an exclusive orientation towards work and career is relatively rare among women with high educational attainment, and that most of them prefer to combine both employment and family life by having at least one child. Indeed, it may be that the effects of being highly educated come to play only later on, namely in the transition from the first to the second child. Several other studies have also found that the desire for childlessness is relatively low among more highly-educated women (see Miettinen and Paajanen 2005 for Finland and Heiland et al. 2005 for Germany). However, the relationship is sensitive to different question wordings, and if intentions are referred to a short time period, for example, childless and highly-educated people intend less often to have a child (Testa and Toulemon 2006).

Our study also shows that the partner's education matters as much as a woman's own education. Given that highly-educated women postpone childbearing to a relatively late age, and that they face higher opportunity costs of childbearing, and thus more problems of coordinating their work, partnership and family "careers", we would not expect the observed association between educational attainment and childlessness to disappear in the foreseeable future.

Our multivariate analysis can be further extended to address the issue of endogeneity, to consider intentions to remain childless and uncertainty in a joint model, and to inspect interactions between various factors associated with intended childlessness. The IPPAS data cannot be used, however, to address an issue which emerges in different forms throughout this article: How do the attitudes, intentions and preferences related to living arrangements and family formation influence each other, evolve during the life course and affect subsequent behaviour? Only a lon-

gitudinal study would enable us to find an answer to this research question. Our contribution indicates that the process of forming a family can differ between men and women, and that men's overall stronger preferences for childlessness and for the less traditional living arrangements may constitute a limiting factor in a couple's family decision-making (Thomson 1997; Voas 2003). Or are men's intentions and preferences less firm and thus more easily adjustable to the preferences of their partners, as suggested by Rindfuss et al. in 1988? Further research in this area may greatly enrich our understanding of contemporary low fertility.

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Appendix

Table 9.6 Sample size by country, sex and childlessness status. Respondents aged 18–39 (non-weighted data)

	Women			Men		
	Total	Childless	% childless	Total	Childless	% childless
AT	505	200	39.6	353	212	60.1
B (FL)	913	441	48.3	814	472	58.0
CZ	308	84	27.3	168	98	58.3
DE (East)	387	166	42.9	364	239	65.7
DE (West)	468	246	52.6	459	311	67.8
EE	427	258	60.4	275	185	67.3
FIN	853	429	50.3	559	358	64.0
HU	573	229	40.0	520	290	55.8
IT	1194	610	51.1	1226	810	66.1
LT	323	80	24.8	275	110	40.0
NL	394	202	51.3	319	190	59.6
PL	1137	469	41.2	1040	597	57.4
RO	315	131	41.6	320	147	45.9
SI	362	146	40.3	382	212	55.5

Source: IPPAS

Notes: The number of childless respondents for Romania has been estimated from the variable listing the number of children in respondent's household.

Table 9.7 Odds ratios of uncertain childbearing intentions among childless women aged 18–39

	B (FL)		DE		IT		PL	
Age								
Age 18–24	0.53	+	1.58		2.94	+	0.61	
Age 25–29	1		1		1		1	
Age 30–39	2.16	*	7.29	***	7.79	***	2.43	
Partnership status								
Single, no partner	1.62		0.83		2.82	+	1	
With partner	1		1		1			
Married	0.43	+	1.92		2.39		0.25	**
Own education								
Low	0.76		0.47		1.51		2.67	+
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	0.48	*	1.00		0.22	+	1.16	
Still studying			0.81					
Partner's education								
Low	2.62				0.27		14.89	*
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	1.21		0.73				0.96	
Employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	0.80		0.99		1.01		1.30	
Partner's employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	1.23		0.21	+	3.30	+	0.46	
Religiosity								
Not religious	1		1		1		1	
Religious	0.92		0.45	+	1.33		1.08	
Only feel happy at home with children								
Agree	1		1		1		1	
Indifferent	0.99		3.61	**			1.58	
Disagree	1.65		2.68	*	1.38		1.01	
Duty towards society to have children								
Agree			1		1		1	
Indifferent			0.48	+			2.04	*
Disagree			0.60		1.13		1.55	
Preferred living arrangement								
Marriage			1.19		0.74		0.73	
Cohabitation, then marriage			1		1		1	
Cohabitation only			4.29	*	1.33		4.25	+
LAT			5.53	**	1.22		1.05	
Single, flat-sharing			5.73	**	0.91		2.84	*
Log likelihood	−159.0		−126.4		−110.3		−224.8	
N	326		282		532		398	

Source: IPPAS

*** p <= 0.001; ** p <= 0.01; * p <= 0.05; + p <= 0.10

Table 9.8 Odds ratios of uncertain childbearing intentions among childless men aged 18–39

	B (FL)		DE		IT		PL	
Age								
Age 18–24	1.12		1.52		0.43	*	0.40	**
Age 25–29	1		1		1		1	
Age 30–39	2.87	**	3.66	**	1.19		1.93	+
Partnership status								
Single, no partner	5.17	***	0.79		2.00		1	
With partner	1		1		1			
Married	0.26	*	0.67		0.18		0.22	**
Own education								
Low	1.66		0.74		1.67		1.63	
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	0.84		0.33	**	1.19		0.39	
Still studying							2.12	*
Partner's education								
Low	1.12				1.28			
Medium	1		1		1		1	
High	1.02		0.78		0.40		0.74	
Employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	0.59		0.87		0.92		1.28	
Partner's employment								
Employed	1		1		1		1	
Not employed	0.60		0.99		1.20		0.90	
Religiosity								
Not religious	1		1		1		1	
Religious	1.20		0.90		0.87		0.45	*
Only feel happy at home with children								
Agree	1		1		1		1	
Indifferent	1.64		2.46	*			1.62	+
Disagree	3.22	**	3.00	**	1.25		0.96	
Duty towards society to have children								
Agree	1		1		1		1	
Indifferent	0.56		1.67				0.99	
Disagree	1.12		1.03		1.89	+	1.44	
Preferred living arrangement								
Marriage			6.18	**	0.49	+	0.99	
Cohabitation, then marriage			1		1		1	
Cohabitation only			2.98	*	2.32	*	2.78	
LAT			6.90	***	5.25	**	12.55	***
Single, flat-sharing			5.17	***	24.34	***	7.38	**
Log likelihood	−167.9		−187.6		−168.5		−267.8	
N	331		340		680		474	

Source: IPPAS

*** p <= 0.001; ** p <= 0.01; * p <= 0.05; + p <= 0.10.

Notes: The models in tables APPENDIX 2 and 3 also check for urban-rural residence and income. The variable "Preferred living arrangement" is not available for Belgium. The "indifferent" response option in the attitudinal covariates is not available for Italy. All the other empty spaces are due to variables dropped from the analysis because they showed too few cases.

Table 9.9 Covariates used in the regression analysis (proportions in %). Women

	B (FL)	DE	IT	PL
Age				
Age 18–24	48	46	35	74
Age 25–29	31	29	39	19
Age 30–39	21	25	26	7
Partnership status				
Single, no partner	31	45	35	79
With partner	54	48	52	
Married	15	7	13	21
Own education				
Low	8	10	15	5
Medium	34	38	69	43
High	58	28	16	16
Still studying		24		36
Partner's education (distribution among respondents with a partner)				
Low	10	6	21	5
Medium	52	53	61	72
High	38	41	18	23
Employment				
Employed	70	87	53	74
Not employed	30	13	47	26
Partner's employment (distribution among respondents with a partner)				
Employed	90	94	88	96
Not employed	10	6	12	4
Religiosity				
Not religious	66	76	28	10
Religious	34	24	72	90
Childlessness attitudes				
Only happy with children				
Agree	23	42	74	60
Indifferent	33	25		22
Disagree	44	33	26	18
It is your duty towards society to have children				
Agree	4	32	40	46
Indifferent	16	29		28
Disagree	80	39	60	26
Preferred living arrangement				
Marriage		5	52	71
Cohab. followed by marriage		52	39	21
Cohabitation only		16	5	1
LAT		9	3	1
Single, flat-sharing		18	1	6

Source: IPPAS

Table 9.10 Covariates used in the regression analysis (proportions in %). Men

	B (FL)	DE	IT	PL
Age				
Age 18–24	38	29	35	60
Age 25–29	32	28	34	25
Age 30–39	30	43	31	15
Partnership status				
Single, no partner	38	65	45	82
With partner	44	29	45	
Married	18	6	10	18
Own education				
Low	13	10	18	14
Medium	47	47	72	55
High	40	28	10	10
Still studying		15		21
Partner's education (distribution among respondents with a partner)				
Low	7	10	16	6
Medium	43	53	70	62
High	50	37	14	32
Employment				
Employed	77	81	64	75
Not employed	23	19	36	25
Partner's employment (distribution among respondents with a partner)				
Employed	84	93	77	94
Not employed	16	7	23	6
Religiosity				
Not religious	76	87	35	13
Religious	24	13	65	87
Childlessness attitudes				
Only happy with children				
Agree	30	33	74	60
Indifferent	32	29		24
Disagree	38	38	26	16
It is your duty towards society to have children				
Agree	6	34	44	45
Indifferent	24	28		33
Disagree	70	38	56	22
Preferred living arrangement				
Marriage		3	42	67
Cohab. followed by marriage		41	45	20
Cohabitation only		10	9	2
LAT		13	3	3
Single, flat-sharing		33	1	8

Source: IPPAS

Notes: Tables 9.9 and 9.10 show the distribution of respondents in the model contrasting the "negative" and the "positive" childbearing intentions (see Tables 9.3 and 9.4).

Part IV
Fertility Intentions

Chapter 10
Will we Witness an Upturn in European Fertility in the Near Future?

Christine Van Peer and Ladislav Rabušic

Abstract Fertility in many European countries is not only low, but very low, and in some even lowest low. What fertility levels are going to prevail in the near future? Firstly, some indicators of the "fertility climate" are presented. The study shows that a country's actual level of fertility correlates to people's attitudes on how fertility should be dealt with on a societal level. Secondly, levels of expected fertility, so-called "hypothetical completed fertility" (HCF), are calculated on the basis of the information on individually-expressed intentions in the IPPAS database. The structure of the HCF indicator is analysed, together with its interrelation with the "value-of-children" indicator. Multinomial regression is performed to find the net effects of factors which we regard as relevant to expected fertility. Finally, we will speculate on the future of European fertility and on the framework within which it operates.

Keywords: Fertility · Expected fertility · Europe · Values · Childlessness

10.1 Introduction

European scholars interested in population studies have been more and more concerned by trends in fertility, especially by its tendency to stabilize well below replacement level. The crucial question is whether it will remain so. Despite some past optimism that the replacement level will become a prevailing and final stage of demographic transition, current views have started to express doubts about such an outcome, and many analysts of fertility hypothesise that low fertility is an essential feature of (post)modern societies (see for example Bernhardt 2004; Billari 2004; Bongaarts 2002, van de Kaa, 1987, 2004).

Given that fertility in many European countries is not only low, but even *very low* (below 1.5 children per woman) and in some even *lowest low* (below 1.3 children per woman), the absolutely vital question is what kinds of these *lows* are going to prevail. The reason is simple. Even a small increase in the total fertility rate of

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e.g. two tenths, for instance from 1.3 children to 1.5, matters and will have large and long-term population consequences. While the former rate means a negative growth rate of –1.57% with a population-halving time[1] of only 44 years, the latter translates into a growth rate of –1.07% with a halving time of 65 years (Billari 2004, 6).

Fertility behaviour – like every aspect of human behaviour – is shaped by (vested) interests, and these are influenced by values, attitudes and preferences. It comes as no surprise that social science researchers are quite often engaged in inquiries into human values and attitudes, hoping that by knowing these they will be able to anticipate people's future behaviour. This is precisely why fertility preferences have become more or less standard topics of surveys aiming to map the fertility climate. There have been hopes that such knowledge will lead to improvement of population projections and make them more accurate. It is however not quite that simple.

While at the aggregate level some intra-cohort studies show a striking correspondence between desired fertility and its subsequent realisation (Cliquet et al. 1992; Monnier 1987; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003; Westoff 1990), surveys have repeatedly recorded a rather weak correspondence between intentions for a planned number of children and the actual outcome, the former being relatively much higher than the latter (Bracher and Santow 1991; Coombs 1979; Noack and Ostb 1985, 2002; Van Peer 2002).

The interpretations of this difference are many. Some argue that it is quite natural because desired fertility is an attitude, and attitudes change. In this approach, fertility is viewed as a dynamic process over a lifetime. Since people (i.e. respondents in social surveys) are not able to envisage their future fully, they may (and do) change or readjust – due to unanticipated events in the course of their lives – their intentions as to the (original) number of children. Moreover, it seems to be a proven fact that fertility decisions are a sequential process: they are re-examined and re-evaluated after each birth.

Other scholars tend to believe that the difference between the intended and achieved number of children is an indicator of the unmet need caused by unfavourable social and economic conditions on the one hand and by unmet family policy needs on the other (e.g. Chesnais 1998; Hakim 2003). Still others would argue that it is an artefact of a survey situation when respondents tend to give socially acceptable answers. And lately, a new explanation has been put by Voas (2003) who stressed – in his view – a very influential mechanism creating the mismatch between desired and actual fertility that has been overlooked so far: the effect of partners' holding different preferences (Voas 2003). As he puts it:

"Even in a situation where both man and woman separately have preferences that would produce total fertility above replacement levels, the interaction of their preferences can easily lead to much smaller families. Similarly, moderate reproductive preferences among individuals may be consistent with high average fertility among couples." (Voas 2003, 643).

[1] Population-halving time is the number of years needed for a population of a certain size to decrease by half, provided that the fertility rate remains the same over all those years.

This is indeed confirmed in some research findings. For instance, Family and Fertility Survey (FFS) data from the beginning of the 1990s show that the degree of compatibility between the number of children desired by a woman and her partner's desired fertility is a significant factor in determining whether or not she attains her desired family size (Van Peer 2002; see also Bracher and Santow 1991).

Bongaarts (2001) has described the divergence between actual fertility and desired family size (which has typically been two children) as a new and unexamined phenomenon. In this chapter, we will try to explore it by means of an analysis of people's ideas about their expected fertility in the IPPAS countries at the beginning of 21st century. The question we pose is: what fertility aspirations do current generations of IPPAS countries have, and how are they associated with values concerning children and the family and other factors?

This research question is of particular interest in view of the recent fertility decline in the transition countries. If an upturn from their low or lowest low fertility to or even above the European average can be expected, this might indicate that the lowest fertility rates observed in these countries were attributable both to a temporary alteration in their value systems (leading young people to postpone fertility), and to economic and social changes. Our research question is also relevant in view of the low fertility rates observed in the German-speaking countries.

In the first part, we will be dealing with indicators of the fertility climate, and showing that the country's actual level of fertility correlates with people's attitudes on how fertility should be dealt with on the societal level. Secondly, we will be calculating levels of expected fertility based on the individual intentions expressed. In the third part, we will focus briefly on voluntary childlessness. In the fourth part we will analyse more thoroughly the structure of the expected fertility. In the fifth part we will focus on the value-of-children and its correlation to expected fertility. It is assumed from surveys on the fertility climate that people in modern societies do not usually attain the number of children they wish for. According to the Family and Fertility Surveys of the 1990s, it appears that achieved fertility in most European countries lies below the desired number of children. This is where the role of policies comes in. In the sixth section, therefore, we will focus briefly on the link between the expected final number of children and belief in fertility-enhancing policies. And in the seventh part we will perform multiple regression to find the net effects of factors which we regard as relevant to the expected fertility. Finally, we will speculate on the future of European fertility and on its conditions.

10.2 Method

Our analysis is centred on the question which asks the respondent to state his/her expected family size. In the IPPAS questionnaire, it was phrased as follows:

Do you intend to have a(nother) child in the future? with answers as follows: *1. No; 2. Don't know, uncertain; 3. Yes, namely___ (number); 4. I am/My partner is pregnant, then I intend to have ___ more children*

This item combined with the question on the number of children respondents actually have enables us to create our dependent variable "expected number of children". It can – perhaps more precisely – also be called *hypothetical completed fertility* (HCF) because by their answers the respondents gave us their view on the number of children they intend to bear and rear during the course of their lives. In the analysis, we focused on the 20–40 age cohort. These are people born between 1962 and 1982.[2] As such, it is a mixture of people consisting of those who have only started a partnership and who have only recently formed their first views on the number of children they might have on the one hand, and of those who have almost completed their childbearing. We will take this fact into consideration.

The central variable, HCF, will naturally be combined and analysed with a number of additional variables from the IPPAS questionnaire.

10.3 Results

10.3.1 Fertility Climate

To understand the context of fertility in the survey we have asked some questions indicating the fertility climate. For the purpose of our paper we used the following item: *There have been many changes in the way people are living together. How do you rate the declining number of births?*

Figure 10.1 shows that the declining number of births is perceived negatively in all countries by substantial numbers of respondents (about 75% on average), except for Estonia and the Netherlands whose populations seemingly do not regard low fertility as a problem. On the other hand, almost all Hungarians, Slovenians and Lithuanians do. The attitude towards the declining number of children does not differ with respect to sex. Differences between childless respondents and respondents with children were small. Also, age did not reveal any pattern. In no country was there a 10% difference between the 20–29 and 30–40 age groups.

A question immediately arises as to whether there is a link between the attitude towards the declining number of children and period fertility rate. Apparently, those countries with the lowest TFR should have populations who regard the declining number of births negatively. To answer it, an aggregate data file was created (N = 13, i.e. the number of countries) with two variables: the share of people (in %) who regard the declining number of children as a problem and the period TFR. By simply performing a regression of these two aggregate variables, we found out that the assumed relationship really exists: The lower the TFR, the higher the share of people who regard the declining number of births as a bad thing (Beta = –0.53, Adj. R square = 0.22). However, as Fig. 10.2 suggests, there is some deviation from the

[2] In some of the IPPAS countries where the survey was carried out in 2001, the respondents were born in 1961–1981.



Fig. 10.1 Share of respondents of the IPPAS countries who regard the declining number of births as bad or very bad (in %)
Source: IPPAS

pattern: Finland on the one hand, and Estonia with the Netherlands on the other. Especially Estonia is an outlier. Had we removed it, the adjusted R square would have increased to 0.39 and beta to –0.66 indicating an even stronger link.



Fig. 10.2 Share of respondents who regard the declining number of children as Bad and Very Bad by TFR (2000)
Source: IPPAS

Another idea of the fertility climate is given by the distribution of agreement or disagreement with the statement that it is one's duty towards society to have children. As is shown by Fig. 10.3, the concept of children as a moral obligation of citizens for the reproduction of society is not accepted at all in the Low Countries, i.e. the Netherlands and Belgium, and to a certain degree also not in Finland. On the other hand, it is accepted quite clearly in the Czech Republic and Poland where about 50% of respondents agreed with the statement. In all other countries the share of "Agree" answers ranges between 28% in Slovenia and 46% in Italy.

One could assume that on the aggregate level, in the countries where it is generally felt that having children is a moral obligation towards society, there would also be higher fertility rates than in the countries where such a feeling is less pronounced (in this case, we regard the TFR as the dependent variable). However, the data do not support such a relationship. On the contrary, as Fig. 10.4 shows, the inverse relation is true. The Czech Republic, Poland and Italy, where children are quite frequently regarded as an obligation towards society, have very low period fertility, while the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland, where such an attitude is almost non-existent, have one of the highest TFRs among the DIALOG countries.

How can we interpret this "illogical" finding? Firstly, we should be aware of the "ecological fallacy" problem which says that patterns of behaviour at a group (aggregate data) level do not necessarily reflect corresponding patterns on an individual level. In other words, drawing conclusions about individuals on the basis of observations of ecological units (regions, countries, etc.) can sometimes be wrong (Babbie 2001). Secondly, the finding might provide some hope that populations with low TFR but quite a pronounced feeling of having children as a duty towards



Fig. 10.3 Opinion towards the statement "It is your duty towards society to have children" in the IPPAS countries (in %)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 10.4 Regression of agreement with the statement "children are one's duty towards society" and TFR (2000)
Source: IPPAS

society will ultimately have a higher TFR – we should keep in mind that our samples are relatively young people (aged 20–40) who still have time to fulfil their "moral obligations". If we regard people's views on the declining number of births and on their moral obligations towards society as predictors of future individual fertility choices, there may be a reason for hope in current low fertility countries. If however these collective preferences do not predict or reflect individual preferences, they do at least indicate a collective sense of the drawbacks of low fertility.

The low intensity of such feeling in the Low Countries and in Finland on the other hand might indicate that bearing children is understood there as a very individual and private matter which, however, does not prevent people from having a relatively high number of children.

10.3.2 "Hypothetical Completed Fertility"

A hypothetical completed fertility rate was calculated from the data on desired fertility in combination with the number of children that respondents already have. Contrary to standard demographic usage, this rate was calculated not per woman but per respondent (though later on we shall also show the rate calculated for both sexes separately). In so doing, we are stressing the fact that in fertility decisions, both sexes play a role and therefore it makes sense to apply our indicator of the future number of children "per capita".

The results presented in Fig. 10.5 show that the HCF is not lower than 1.6 children per capita in any of the countries and, moreover, in the majority of countries, it



Fig. 10.5 Expected fertility of age group 20–40, both sexes (TFR 2000 in boxes)
Source: IPPAS

reaches at least two children. They suggest that at least in some European countries intentions to have children have not been diminishing. The rather high expected fertility level in the former socialist countries is remarkable, especially when compared with their current TFR levels.

The data also show a relatively large distance of 0.65 children between the three highest expected fertility levels that we recorded in Finland, Estonia and in Poland, and the three lowest HCF levels that were found in the German-speaking countries: Eastern Germany, Western Germany and Austria.

A similar clustering HCF also appears when ranking the countries by the female and the male (see Table 10.1). What is interesting here is that the female hypothetical completed fertility rate is above 2.0 children in the majority of the countries, and that males have, on average, lower HCF than females, except in Lithuania. In Hungary, the Netherlands, and in Eastern Germany, the difference is higher than 0.3 children, which from a demographic point of view can be regarded as substantial. The message of this result for population policy is more or less clear. If there is to be an increase in numbers of children born, young men need to have been persuaded somehow to decide to have more children. Here again, the phenomenon of negotiation on the final number of children between male and female partners can be seen as an important but so far somewhat neglected factor.[3]

According to Goldstein et al. (2003a), young couples desire small families because they have been brought up in small families themselves. The hypothesis of transmission of reproductive intentions from one generation to the next was also

[3] In our surveys, male and female respondents were not partners.

Table 10.1 Expected number of children and the 95% confidence intervals, age group 20–40

	95% CI				95% CI				*F–M difference*
	Female	Lower	Upper	*N*	Male	Lower	Upper	*N*	
FI	2.37	2.26	2.47	*468*	2.32	2.20	2.44	*471*	0.05
NL	2.34	2.20	2.49	*291*	2.00	1.87	2.14	*300*	0.34
PL	2.34	2.26	2.42	*766*	2.14	2.04	2.23	*652*	0.20
EE	2.33	2.20	2.46	*228*	2.33	2.16	2.49	*143*	0.00
HU	2.21	2.12	2.29	*552*	1.74	1.61	1.87	*245*	0.46
LT	2.09	1.96	2.22	*237*	2.22	2.10	2.35	*201*	–0.13
CZ	2.08	1.94	2.21	*175*	1.91	1.74	2.08	*150*	0.17
SL	2.07	1.98	2.16	*316*	2.09	1.99	2.18	*328*	–0.01
IT	1.99	194	2.04	*1.180*	1.90	1.84	1.95	*1.165*	0.09
B(F)	1.91	1.84	1.98	*785*	1.86	1.78	1.95	*664*	0.05
DE-E	1.81	1.72	1.90	*342*	1.47	1.35	1.58	*306*	0.34
AT	1.78	1.69	1.87	*503*	1.56	1.46	1.65	*522*	0.22
DE-W	1.75	1.64	1.86	*387*	1.59	1.45	1.73	*359*	0.16
Total	2.09	2.07	2.12	*6.526*	1.96	1.93	1.99	*5.845*	0.13

Source: IPPAS
Note: Countries are ranked with respect to female column.

confirmed in FFS analyses. According to Chesnais (1998), this process "generates an exponential spiral of population implosion". Our results, however, do not allow us to follow this line of reasoning in any country other than Austria, and one can only wonder whether the interpretation of Goldstein et al. would have been be so pessimistic had they had our figures.

With respect to HCF of different age groups, we have found that there is no clear-cut pattern in the DIALOG countries. In Table 10.2, we have HCF (both sexes mixed) for the 20–29 and 30–40 age cohorts, and also – in order to compare with the intentions of the older age group born in the 1960s – the cohort 1965 completed fertility. As far as the younger generation is concerned (20–29), only Austrian and to a lesser degree also German respondents expect to have low fertility. Others seem either to approach to or even to surpass the replacement level. In many instances, the younger generations have higher HCF than the older ones, which is a known fact – previous research shows that younger age groups usually have higher expected fertility than older age groups.

The reasons for this observation can be manifold. On the one hand, older respondents will take into consideration the number of children they already have. The value of children may alter in the course of their reproductive life, especially when events like parenthood completely change their circumstances. Other events in a lifetime, like marital disruption, or the occurrence of fertility problems, can alter fertility preferences as well. Also societal circumstances such as the irreconcilability of raising children and professional career can play a role. Attitudinal change can help to rationalise new and current behaviour; it makes people feel better about changed circumstances (Morgan and Waite 1987). Younger respondents, on the other hand, may give answers that are closer to their ideal. They do not take into account the risk of experiencing various life events that may have an impact on fertility.

In our data, younger respondents have lower expectations than older respondents in only three countries (Austria, Hungary and Poland). The biggest difference between younger and older ones is in Austria, at 0.72 children. Young Austrians have by far the lowest expected completed fertility. The differences are smaller in Hungary and Poland but the expected fertility among young generations in the latter two countries is nevertheless reasonably high (1.95 and 2.03 respectively). In all other countries, the younger cohorts have higher hypothetical complete fertility levels than older cohorts.

Table 10.2 further compares the hypothetical completed fertility of the age group 30–40 with the real completed one of the cohort of females born in 1965 (the latest international data on completed fertility available). We are aware of the fact that such a comparison is not quite correct because we compare HCF rates of both sexes with the female cohort fertility. This was however necessary since in order to obtain a statistically-meaningful magnitude of sub-samples compared, it was impossible to have only female respondents in both age groups. From this comparison, an indication can be deduced of the degree to which preferences will have been implemented. Assuming that the 30–40 year olds at the time of the survey (being born between 1961 and 1971) more or less represent the 1965 cohort, it is apparent that in the DIALOG countries respondents personally expect higher fertility than is shown by the real demographic data – but there is still a chance that data for e.g. completed fertility of females born in 1970 will be a bit higher than that of

Table 10.2 Hypothetical completed fertility "per capita" by age groups and the completed fertility of the 1965 cohort

	20–29		30–40		*Cohort 1965 completed fertility*
AT (–)	1.23	DE-E	1.60	DE-W	1.48
DE-W (+)	1.70	DE-W	1.66	IT	1.49
DE-E (+)	1.72	B(F)	1.86	DE-E	1.57
B(F)**	1.94	IT	1.90	AT	1.64
HU (–)	1.95	AT	1.95	LT	1.73
IT (+)	2.00	CZ	1.97	SL	1.77
CZ (+)	2.03	SL	2.03	NL	1.78
PL (–)	2.03	NL	2.11	B(F)	1.86
SL (+)	2.13	LT	2.13	EE	1.87
LT (+)	2.18	HU	2.23	FI	1.91
NL (+)	2.25	EE	2.29	CZ	1.93
FI (+)	2.35	FI	2.34	HU	1.97
EE (+)	2.36	PL	2.46	PL	2.00
Total	1.99	Total	2.06		

Source: Council of Europe

Note: (–) indicates that the younger age group (20–29) has lower expected fertility than the older one (30–40) / the older age group has a lower expected fertility than the 1965 cohort;
(+) indicates that the younger age group has higher expected fertility than the older one / the older age group has a higher expected fertility than the 1965 cohort

1965 cohort. As Eastern and Central European countries have more youthful first marriage and childbearing patterns, this can mean there is more time for recuperation of lost fertility at older ages due to postponement of fertility at younger ages, while respondents in countries with later first marriage and first childbearing may have less reason to be optimistic about attaining the final number of children they actually would have desired. Despite their low period TFR's, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland have relatively high HCF values. It might be that a greater fraction of postponed fertility can be made up when women get older in the transition countries. As was shown by Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000a), there has been insufficient recuperation after age 30 in Belgium and Germany.

We agree with scholars who have argued that it was mainly a temporary change that was responsible for the past low to very low fertility in low-fertility countries. They envisage that the total cohort fertility of younger generations will come much closer to replacement fertility than current period rates indicate, and that simply ceasing postponement will result in a substantial increase in period TFRs (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999). Compared to earlier measures of hypothetical completed fertility based on previous surveys, the FFS data from the beginning and from the mid 1990s show that German speaking countries still had ultimately wanted family sizes of around 2.0 children (see FFS Standard Country reports) at that time.[4] It was lowest among the FFS countries but not as low as is shown in our IPPAS survey 10 years later. The important finding is that the difference between German speaking countries and other European countries has become larger. By now, young Austrians have by far the lowest expected completed fertility

10.3.3 Voluntary Childlessness

One possible indicator of future fertility is planned childlessness.[5] As Figure 10.6 shows, intentions to have no children during their lifetimes are relatively moderate among our respondents aged 20–40. Exceptions are both regions of Germany and the Netherlands, where the intended childlessness is at the level of 10 or more percent. Minimal levels of planned childlessness (5 or less percent) were recorded in former communist countries and in Finland.

However, we get quite a different picture if we also add those respondents who were childless at the time of survey but were not sure whether to have a child in the future or not.[6] Some scholars (e.g. Morgan 1982) think that "don't know" responses

[4] Unfortunately, changes in preferences and ultimately expected family sizes are not available from successive longitudinal surveys (with some exceptions for some countries). From those that do exist we know that preferences have remained quite stable since the 1970s, see e.g. de Graaf (1995).

[5] As this topic is dealt with more thoroughly in Chapter 9 "Attitudes and intentions towards childlessness in Europe" ; we will touch on it only briefly here.

[6] There is great variation over countries in the number of uncertain responses: from 3% in Hungary to 34% of 20–40 year old males and females in Finland.



Fig. 10.6 Share of respondents aged 20–40 with 0 children who intend to have 0 children in the future or who are not sure yet whether they will have a child (%)
Source: IPPAS

need not be treated as missing data, but instead as both valid and meaningful responses. We agree. In the context of our survey (i.e. the effects of population policy), the answer "not sure yet" might be regarded in many cases in the interview as a euphemism (or politically correct way) for the answer "no". Having this in mind, the share of possible future childless respondents is rather substantial in Western and Eastern Germany (31% and 23% respectively), Finland, Netherlands, Belgium, and, surprisingly, also in Catholic Poland (19%). This finding partly accounts for the lower ultimate number of children in Germany. Dorbritz and Schwarz (1996) showed that rising childlessness was mainly responsible for the reduction in fertility. Our data suggest that the refusal to have a child among childless respondents or their hesitations to have child(ren) can be regarded as an important factor in the reduction in hypothetical completed fertility.

Interestingly enough, intended childlessness in Austria is considerably lower than in Germany one. That means that this factor should not play the decisive role in the recorded low Austrian HCF. In a study based on the 2001 Eurobarometer data, Testa and Grilli (2004) found that the recorded German and Austrian lowest fertility preferences in Europe remained so even after verifying for different individual and contextual features. The preference to be childless did not appear in this study to be the main driving force of low fertility ideals, but rather the preference for smaller families. The authors repeat the argument put forward by Goldstein at al. (2003) that the mechanism of social interaction is responsible for the transmission of fertility ideals from the older to the younger cohorts.

10.3.4 Structure of Hypothetical Completed Fertility

The preference for smaller families, mentioned by Testa and Grilli (2004) as a decisive variable for expected fertility, leads us to show the structure of hypothetical completed fertility of the IPPAS data. Information on the structure of HCF completes the information on mean HCF given earlier because it translates the HCF as the mean into a more real situation – the discrete number of children – and thus gives us a better idea of family size expectations.

The structure is depicted in Fig. 10.7 with the cluster analysis based on these three variables (share of respondents expecting 0–1 child, 2 children and 3 or more children); we get quite an interesting picture of similar and dissimilar countries (see Fig. 10.8).

The results of this cluster analysis of IPPAS countries tell us that there are four groups of countries: The first group consists of two countries, the Netherlands and Poland, having 51% of respondents planning for two children, 17–18% of respondents planning for 0–1 child, and 31% expecting to have three children and more. The second group contains the Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania and Hungary with an almost ideal normal distribution of their HCF structure, where 2-children preferences oscillate around 55%. The third group is composed of three countries: Eastern Germany, Western Germany and Belgium with quite a large share of respondents wishing to have 0–1 children only. Finally, the fourth group again consists of two countries – Estonia and Finland. Their characteristic feature is that they have a large share of respondents (46 and 44%) planning for three or more children. The remain-



Fig. 10.7 Structure of hypothetical completed fertility in the IPPAS countries (in %), respondents of both sexes, aged 20–40
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 10.8 Cluster analysis of the IPPAS countries by the structure of expected children (Dendrogram using Average Linkage - Between Groups)
Source: IPPAS
Note: Figures in parentheses show the hypothetical completed fertility

ing two countries stand on their own: On the one hand there is Slovenia having by far the most clear-cut model of two-children families, 62% of respondents said they were planning for two children. On the other side there is Austria where 50% of respondents (the highest share of the IPPAS countries) expect to have no children or one child.

When analysing hypothetical completed fertility, we should keep in mind a basic question: i.e. whether our IPPAS respondents, who represent their respective populations, will meet their expectations and will ultimately have the numbers of children that they indicated. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves how likely our data on hypothetical completed fertility are. Perhaps Table 10.3 can help, in which typologies of respondents were created according to current number of children and plans for future children.

Let us first look at column 6. Those are respondents who have child(ren) and who plan to have more. Their HCF is quite high, ranging between 2.52 (Eastern Germany) and 3.57 (The Netherlands). The mean age is still relatively suitable for meeting their level of completed fertility. The share of the type is, however, not very large, on average it is 13% in the IPPAS countries.

Then there is column 5, i.e. those who have child(ren) but are not sure if they will have more. As they did not say how many children they expect to have in the future (because they were not sure whether they will have them at all) their HCF given there is just the current mean number of children. Since the age of these respondents is relatively high, it is very likely that these respondents will only seldom have more children. Their fertility is rather low, but with the exception of Eastern Germany and

Table 10.3 Typology of respondents aged 20–40 with respect to actual number of children and intentions to have additional child(ren): share of types, hypothetical completed fertility (HCF) and mean age

	(1) Having 0 child, planning 0			(2) Having 0 child, not sure to have more			(3) Having 0 child but planning child(ren)			(4) Having child(ren) but planning 0			(5) Having child(ren), not sure to have more			(6) Having child(ren), planning more		
	%	HCF	Age	%	HCF *	Age	%	HCF	Age	%	HCF	Age	%	HCF #	Age	%	HCF	Age
B (F))	9	0.00	32.2	11	––	27.5	32	1.99	25.4	32	2.03	35.3	7	1.71	32.5	9	2.70	30.8
CZ.	5	0.00	29.6	8	––	25.7	26	2.08	24.1	35	1.95	34.9	13	1.77	31.5	12	2.77	27.4
DE-E	10	0.00	31.6	12	––	28.9	28	1.88	26.3	34	1.76	35.8	7	1.28	31.1	8	2.52	30.8
DE-W	17	0.00	31.4	15	––	29.1	27	2.12	26.9	27	1.98	35.9	7	1.47	33.3	8	2.68	31.9
EE	1	0.00	32.0	7	––	28.5	33	2.31	25.0	19	2.05	35.1	22	1.77	33.0	18	2.96	30.4
IT	6	0.00	30.8	4	––	29.0	47	2.08	27.2	27	1.83	35.7	3	1.63	34.1	13	2.65	32.6
LT	3	0.00	33.1	5	––	29.0	19	2.13	24.4	38	2.04	34.4	22	1.63	31.9	14	2.89	29.3
HU	5	0.00	28.9	1	––	32.4	45	1.98	24.8	34	2.22	33.2	1	1.37	33.3	13	2.78	28.9
NL	9	0.00	31.4	12	––	31.1	35	2.27	27.5	22	2.22	36.4	9	1.76	32.9	13	3.57	30.9
AT	9	0.00	29.0	n.a.	––	n.a.	33	1.03	26.9	42	2.10	34.8	*n.a.*	*n.a.*	*n.a.*	16	2.82	30.7
PL	5	0.00	28.6	14	––	26.3	21	2.05	24.3	32	2.46	34.2	17	1.80	31.2	11	2.99	28.5
SL	3	0.00	28.6	6	––	27.1	37	2.17	25.3	32	1.99	35.5	10	1.64	32.9	12	2.60	30.2
FI	4	0.00	31.9	19	––	28.9	30	2.24	26.1	17	2.39	36.4	15	2.01	33.4	16	3.20	30.2
Total	8	0.00	29.6	9	––	28.1	30	2.02	26.0	29	2.13	34.9	10	1.86	32.5	13	2.92	29.9

Source: IPPAS

Notes: * Expected fertility cannot be computed because respondents are not sure about the number of intended children.
This is the actual number of children. Expected fertility cannot be computed because respondents are not sure about the number of intended children.

Hungary, it is higher than the 1965 cohort fertility in all countries. The share of this type is small, except for Estonia, Lithuania and Poland.

The type of respondents in column 4 indicate that they have completed their fertility. They do not intend to have additional child(ren), and their age is relatively high, in fact the highest of all the types. Their expected completed fertility oscillates around two in the majority of IPPAS countries. They comprise shares from 17% (Finland) to 42% in Austria.

In column 3 there are respondents who have no children as yet but do plan to have some in the future, therefore fertility is purely hypothetical. It is the youngest type of all the six, and if this should be the new generation of "baby-bearers", the future fertility in the analysed countries will be close or even above the replacement level, with one striking exception – Austria. Here, childless respondents plan one child only. Austria is a real outlier in this respect, and what is interesting is that the respondents from other German-speaking territories are very different, with HCFs of 1.88 and 2.12.

10.3.5 Value of Children (VOC)

The main reason why people have children in modern societies is that they value them. "The twentieth-century economically useless but emotionally priceless child" (Zelizer 1994, 209) is for many, despite the low birth rates, one of the principal goals in life. In our article, a very important aim was to discover the relationship between the value-of-children and expected family size. The value of children was measured by means of seven items (the exceptions are Italy where only four items were available, and Austria with five items) that were merged into a composite index "value of children". The index ranges from 1 to 5: the higher the score, the higher the value ascribed to children.[7]

It is quite interesting that the mean of the value of children index is highest in the former communist countries Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (see Fig. 10.9) that also – currently – have very low period fertility rates. On the other hand, low means of index were recorded in Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands where the fertility level is not so low.

At the aggregate level, there is a strange relationship between the mean value-of-children index and the country's TFR (see Fig. 10.10). Countries with a high value-of-children index have the lowest period fertility and vice versa (beta $= -0.86$).

[7] These items were worded as follows: (1) I believe that in our modern world the only place where you can feel completely happy and at ease is at home with your children; (2) I always enjoy having children near me; (3) I believe you can be perfectly satisfied with life once you have been a good mother or father; (4) I like having children because they really need you; (5) I believe it's your duty towards society to have children; (6) I do not believe you can be really happy if you do not have children; (7) I believe that the closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child. Before adopting the index, measures of reliability (Cronbach alpha) were computed for each country. The alpha values were satisfactory in all countries, i.e. they were higher than 0.7.



Fig. 10.9 Value of children in the IPPAS countries (mean of the value of children index)
Source: IPPAS

Apparently, the ecological fallacy is at play here because at the individual level, the relationship should not be negative but positive. It is very hard to believe that populations who value children emotionally and socially "only" with a medium strength (Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands) would have on average higher fertility than those who evaluate them relatively highly (the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary). Therefore we understand this result as an indication that in coun-



Fig. 10.10 Total fertility rate by mean value of children in the IPPAS countries (aggregate level data)
Source: IPPAS

tries with relatively high value of children but low period fertility there is something going on which prevents the contemporary young generation from having children.

Would we obtain a different picture if we ran a simple regression with the hypothetical completed fertility on aggregate level instead of TFR? Indeed yes, as Fig. 10.11 shows. Here, the relationship between the index of VOC and expected fertility does not exist (Adjusted R Square is 0.09, beta = –0.02). Countries with a relatively high level of VOC have different expected fertility (for instance Austria, Slovenia or Estonia), and vice versa, moderate values of VOC translate to quite different means of expected fertility in Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland. It is interesting that the previous negative association between levels of births (measured as aggregate TFR) and the value of children (measured as the mean of VOC) disappeared but it is still not in the assumed pattern: higher intensity of VOC being accompanied by higher hypothetical completed fertility.

Let us therefore use individual level data and check if there is a correlation in our dataset between the VOC index and hypothetical completed fertility. The result is shown in Table 10.4. The table shows quite clearly that at the individual level Pearson correlations are positive in all countries and in many of them are not trivial. Nevertheless, the fact is that its strength varies. On the one hand, it is almost zero in Estonia and Slovenia, on the other it is relatively strong in Eastern Germany (0.34), the Netherlands (0.41), Austria (0.42) and former Western Germany (0.46).[8] Our



Fig. 10.11 Hypothetical completed fertility by means of value-of-children index (aggregate level data) in the IPPAS countries
Source: IPPAS

[8] Standardised measures of associations and correlations higher than 0.2 in survey data are usually regarded as a good indication of the existence of a relationship.

Table 10.4 Pearson correlation between mean hypothetical completed fertility and mean value of children index (VOC)

IPPAS country	Pearson corr.
Slovenia	0.06
Estonia	0.08
Lithuania	0.12
Italy	0.17
Poland	0.18
Hungary	0.21
Finland	0.26
Belgium (Flanders)	0.27
Czech Republic	0.27
Eastern Germany	0.34
Netherlands	0.41
Austria	0.42
Western Germany	0.46

Source: IPPAS

assumption then that values do play a role in fertility has been confirmed in many countries. We do not know why there is no such relationship in Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Italy or Poland, or only a minimal one.

10.3.6 Demand for Policies

We also had a look at the potential effects of policies on fertility. We constructed a two-point scale variable indicating the degree of belief in the potential fertility-enhancing effect of policies. The scale synthesizes the subjectively-perceived effects on facilitating parenthood, the timing of children (tempo) and the number of children (quantum).[9]

If we rank countries by the proportions of their respondents' belief in the fertility-enhancing effects of policies, it shows that more than 50% of respondents are strong social policy believers in Finland, Slovenia and Poland, and almost 50% in the Czech Republic and Eastern and Western Germany. In Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands only about one out of four respondents believe strongly in effects of policy. If we compare the desired family sizes of those who believe strongly in policy effects with those who believe only weakly, we obtain some idea of the potentials of policies. It appears that strong believers want more children. The correlation is significant in precisely those countries where the lowest values for hypothetical completed fertility are noted: Austria, Eastern and Western Germany and Belgium. This finding can in our view be interpreted as a demand for better policies in these low fertility countries. There is at least a reason to believe in the potential of family

[9] Items included are: It would be easier for me to have the number of children I want; It would enable me to have my next child sooner; I would reconsider the possibility of having a(nother) child; I would probably decide to have a(nother) child.

Table 10.5 Mean HCF values 20-40 year old men and women, by belief in fertility effects of policies. Countries ranked by proportions of strong believers

	Strong belief in policy effects		Weak belief in policy effects		Difference
	HCF	%	HCF	%	
Finland	2.65	61.1	2.42	38.9	+0.23
Slovenia	2.12	59.7	2.03	40.3	+0.09
Poland	2.39	56.8	2.42	43.2	–0.03
Czech Republic	2.15	49.2	1.96	50.8	+0.19
Eastern Germany **	1.90	47.7	1.49	52.3	+0.41
Western Germany **	2.08	47.3	1.68	52.7	+0.40
Hungary	2.11	35.1	2.08	64.9	+0.03
Belgium *	2.02	28.2	1.83	71.8	+0.19
Netherlands	2.51	26.9	2.47	73.1	+0.04
Austria **	1.89	25.3	1.54	74.7	+0.35

Source: IPPAS

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

policy to enhance people's wish for attaining their desired number of children, and thus enhancing fertility.

10.3.7 Why do People want Small or Large Families?

A lot of fertility research in the past decades has looked into the links between fertility and cultural values, employment history, educational level and other individual or household-level characteristics on the one hand, and contextual features on the other hand. Although similar patterns of explanation are often found, results often seem anomalous, due to both societal changes and to changes in people's status and preferences. Patterns of explanation change over time, and inter-country differences need to be linked to cross-national differences in for example the adoption of family-friendly policies.

Using again individual level data, we will have a brief look at other factors in the IPPAS dataset, in addition to the value-of-children index (which has shown a correlation with HCF on the individual level in all countries), that may determine different levels of preferred fertility. The strength of multivariate analysis is that it disentangles the net effects of several characteristics, verifying for the effects of the others.[10] By means of multinomial regression analysis, we estimated both the impact of demographic, socio-economic features and value orientations on the desired family size. Multinomial regression is similar to logistic regression, but it is more general because the dependent variable is not restricted to two categories. It

[10] We cannot test the impact of other possibly determining factors but the ones available only in our dataset. What we miss most is the information on partner's plans for the number of children, and how they interact with plans of the respondent.

provides parameter estimates (odds ratios) for categories of the dependent variables. Odds ratios compare the odds of one group of people belonging to one category of the dependent variable (in our analysis the group with low fertility aspirations), compared to the odds of another group. The magnitude of the odds ratios within a tier (e.g. the low fertility group) indicates which variables have the strongest effect for that tier's category of the dependent variable.

For the dependent variable (HCF) we distinguished three subgroups indicating three levels of hypothetical completed fertility: respondents with low fertility aspirations (0–1 children), medium fertility aspirations (2 children) and high fertility aspirations (3 or more children). We will comment on the contrasts between the group with the highest fertility aspirations and the group with the lowest fertility aspirations. The "high fertility level" group is used as the reference group. A model was constructed which checks for all relevant individual-level socio-demographic and socio-economic independent variables.

1. Demographic background variables are introduced as control factors: age and sex of the respondent, the number of own children already born to the respondent and age at first parenthood. Age is first introduced as a continuous control factor. Two age groups are distinguished in the model (20–30 and 31–40) in order to account for the differences in timing of fertility of both groups. Timing of fertility is obviously an important determinant of fertility intensity. There is a well-known negative association between the age at first birth and completed fertility. Also, previous fertility research indicates that even a comprehensive research instrument cannot eliminate the impact of the number of children attained on the intentions expressed (Callens and Deven 1993).
2. Human fertility occurs in relational units, and thus it can be assumed that the connection between partnership type and fertility is a close one. The legal status of a union (married/unmarried cohabitation) is considered dubious for treatment as an independent variable because conversions of cohabitations into marriages are often a consequence of parenthood rather than a cause. Moreover, our data show that married and cohabiting people's HCFs do not differ significantly; cohabiting people in fact have slightly higher fertility. Therefore, we put marriage and cohabitation into a single category.
3. Educational level (the highest educational level attained) and current employment status (employed full-time or part-time or not employed) are introduced as indicators of the respondent's socio-economic status. Also preferred employment is introduced.
4. Cultural theories connect changes in family building behaviour with changes in value orientations. The "value-of-children" (VOC) is introduced as the only variable pertaining to the respondent's value system. Numerous studies have shown that religiousness still exerts a strong positive effect on fertility. However, the factor religion was left out of our final model because it correlates with the VOC indicator and adds little to the explained variance in the total model.

All the independent variables are categorical ones for which the reference category is put first (value 1.00) in the table. There are only two exceptions: age at first birth and age of respondent, which are continuous factors in the multinomial logistic model.

Table 10.6 shows the odds ratios for belonging to the first category of the dependent variable, i.e. to the group with low fertility aspirations, for people having different characteristics on each of the independent variables introduced in the model. Multinomial logistic regression was run separately for all 11 countries.

How to read Table 10.6 is illustrated by interpreting some results for Eastern Germany (see the column labelled as DE-E). All odds ratios must be compared to the reference group, i.e. the group desiring at least three children, and to the reference category of each variable: This category is put first in the model, and is indicated with Fig. 10.1.

The odds ratio for the factor "age at first birth" in DE-E is 1.47, and it is highly significant: It means that the odds of having a small number of children increase in line with increasing age at first parenthood. And because it is the highest value of all the countries, we can say that this factor "timing of first birth", compared to other countries has the biggest effect in Eastern Germany. The odds ratio for age of respondent is 1.19, and is also highly significant. This means that the older the respondent, the higher the odds of desiring a small family. There is a slightly significant effect of the sex of the respondent: Males have lower odds of belonging to the low-fertility group. The effect of the respondent's sex is similar in all countries, and points to the fact that females have children at younger ages, thus reaching higher fertility than men at comparable ages.

The odds ratio of people with high educational levels in Eastern Germany having a small family is very small (0.03), in comparison to people with low educational levels. In most countries education has a clear, similar and significant effect on the desired family size: After checking for the effects of other variables included in the model, the odds of the most highly-educated people belonging to the low fertility group are significantly lower than the odds of those with the lowest education. In other words, more highly-educated people desire larger family sizes. This finding goes against the postulated negative relationship between education and fertility. Our finding is not unique. In general, socio-economic differentials in fertility have been strongly reduced, and research (Schoenmaeckers et al. 2002) has shown that in some countries an inversion of the classical negative relationship between fertility and socio-economic status is beginning to appear: The higher fertility levels of the lower educational and occupational strata have disappeared, but somewhat higher numbers of children are desired among the better educated. Pursuing a higher educational qualification seems no longer an impediment for achieving the desired number of children. And the postponement behaviour of the more highly educated does not seem to influence their ultimate desired fertility. According to Lesthaeghe and Willems (1999), the traditional effect of postponement (having a negative impact on fertility) will slow down or may even stop as the gaps in socio-economic positions between men and women are gradually closing. He also maintains that this process of closing gender gaps is lagging behind in some countries, implying that

Table 10.6 Odds ratios of belonging to LOW fertility group (0 or 1 children). Women and men, aged 20-40. HIGH fertility group (3 and more) = reference group

		DE-E	AT	DE-W	B(F)	IT	CZ	HU	SL	NL	PL	FI
Cox & Snell (*)		0.61	0.76	0.55	0.55	0.22	0.49	0.39	0.35	0.42	0.47	0.39
Age first birth		1.47***	0.78***	1.18***	1.33***	1.13***	1.31***	1.29***	1.28***	1.12***	1.26***	1.10***
Age		1.19***	1.43***	1.35***	1.30***	1.22***	1.17	1.26***	1.38***	1.44***	1.29***	1.34***
Sex	Female	1.00*	1.00	1.00*	1.00***	1.00***	1.00*	1.00*	1.00***	1.00***	1.00**	1.00
	Male	0.46	0.50	0.41*	0.27***	0.67**	0.29**	0.44**	0.22***	0.44*	0.52**	0.75
Educational level	Low	1.00***	1.00**	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00**	1.00***	1.00***	1.00	1.00*	1.00***
	High	0.03***	0.09*	0.27*	0.02***	0.41***	0.13**	0.15***	0.02***	0.65	0.28**	0.14***
	Medium	0.22	2.78	1.96	0.22***	0.75*	0.31**	0.44***	0.16***	1.14	0.70	0.29***
Current Employment	Full time	1.00***	1.00**	1.00	1.00**	1.00	1.00**	1.00**	1.00	1.00***	1.00	1.00
	Part time	12.81***	4.65**	1.26	1.78	1.67**	2.25	0.68	1.67	3.32**	1.33	1.46
	Not employed	0.39	0.78	0.74	0.74	1.38*	0.17**	0.69	0.95	11.38***	1.69**	1.98**
Preferred	Full time	1.00***	n.a.	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	n.a.	n.a.	1.00	1.00***	1.00***	n.a.
Employment	Part time	0.20***		0.33**	0.33**	0.67**			0.36**	0.07***	0.44**	
	Not employed	0.05***		0.07***	0.40*	0.40***			0.62	0.07***	0.43**	
VOC	(Very) high	1.00***	1.00**	1.00***	1.00**	n.a.	1.00***	1.00***	1.00	1.00**	1.00**	1.00*
	(Very) low/medium	4.84**	3.37**	8.26***	1.82**		4.45***	2.13**	1.75*	3.17*	1.57	1.38
Relational status	No partner	1.00	1.00**	1.00	1.00	1.00***	1.00*	1.00	1.00***	1.00	1.00**	1.00
	Living spouse	0.49	4.76**	0.89	0.94	0.48***	1.29	0.63	0.19***	1.50	0.33***	0.64
	LAT	0.13**	7.94*	0.63	0.97	0.51***	4.00	0.40**	1.43	1.49	1.03	0.95

Source: IPPAS

Notes: Estonia and Lithuania are left out of the analyses because they have insufficient observations to perform the analysis.

(*) The Cox-Snell R^2 attempts to provide a logistic analogy to R^2 in OLS regression. It varies from 0 to 1, as does R^2 in OLS. It says how much of the variability in our dependent variable is explained by the total model.

*** significant at the 1 per cent level; ** significant at the 5 per cent level; * significant at the 10 per cent level.

For each variable, odds and their significance are given relative to the reference level (first category, indicated by 1).

The p-value for the entire multinomial factor is given beside the reference level.

some women in some countries will continue to postpone childbearing (entailing the possibly fertility-reducing effect).

In the model, we included information both on the current employment of the respondent, and on the desired employment of the respondent. The effect of this variable is dependent on the labour market situation, the levels of unemployment, the availability of part-time jobs, the gaps between labour force participation between men and women. Its effect is therefore very country-specific. The employment variable, contrary to education, has different net effects (that is after checking for the effects of other variables in the regression model) in different countries; there is no uniform pattern.

In Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and Italy, the odds of people currently not working to end up in the low fertility group are significantly higher than the odds of people currently working full time. In Poland, low levels of social protection for unemployed people may contribute to smaller desired family sizes among unemployed people. In the Netherlands and Finland, this finding possibly reflects a favourable social policy climate: Working full-time is no impediment to achieving higher fertility levels, and thus it even enables people to desire larger families. On the contrary, in Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic, people working full-time have a higher risk of achieving low fertility compared to people currently not working. The impact of full-time work is considerable in these two countries. This is probably due to the more problematic reconciliation of work and raising children. The collapse of the Communist regimes brought about the dismantling and the weakening of the socialist family protection systems. In Eastern Germany, for instance, working mothers lost a lot of their social protection after reunification and according to Chesnais, the fertility rate was cut in half in only two years in the ensuing period (Chesnais 1998).

In Eastern Germany and Austria, Italy, and also in the Netherlands, part-time work means an increased risk of low fertility, compared to full-time work. The effects of part-time work are strongest in Eastern Germany and Austria. The odds of part-time workers in Eastern Germany having only one or no children at all are 12.8 times greater than the odds of full-time workers. Part-time work may not be used as an instrument for combination here; it may be rather performed out of economic necessity, or the part-time jobs may require only a low qualification level. Looking at preferences with regard to employment, however, indicates that the preference for part-time jobs associates with lower risks of ending up with a small family. For instance, in Eastern Germany the odds of people *preferring* to work part-time to have only 1 or 0 children are 5 times lower (0.20) compared to the odds of people preferring to work full-time. People desiring to work full-time also desire the lowest fertility. Actual employment clearly does not reflect the preferred employment situation.

10.4 Conclusions

In this chapter we were looking at the fertility climate in the DIALOG countries. By analysing it by means of several indicators, we were trying to find clues as to whether we can expect any upturn in fertility in the near future. Our results led us to some speculative ideas.

Firstly, it seems to us that we have revealed indications of a possible end to lowest low fertility. Looking at people's views on the declining number of births and on their moral obligations towards society, and assuming that these views are reflections of personal values and intentions, already gave some reason for hope in current low fertility countries. Estimations of future fertility on the basis of expressed individual intentions gave us clearer indications that fertility levels in current low fertility countries will possibly recover in the near future. It seems to us that fertility may come closer to replacement level not just in the Nordic countries, but also in several of the transition countries (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland) and in Italy. If intentions become true, women will bear more children than is suggested by the current low period measures such as the total fertility rate.

Secondly, we are inclined to believe that we have found indicators which entitle us to express our assumption that Europe is moving towards a two-speed fertility area. The data show a gap of about 0.65 children between the highest observed completed fertility levels (Finland, Estonia) and the lowest observed completed fertility levels (Eastern Germany, Western Germany and Austria). There seems to be a preference for larger families in *Nordic countries.* The results allow us to wonder whether a new transition is on the way there, with the average family size being larger than before. Higher fertility levels may be wanted and realized when there is no need for competition between jobs, time-off and children. If both parents work and good family policy is available, this may leave room for a changed attitude towards the ideal family. The three-child family is already popular among the more highly educated. If we regard this group as the trendsetters, this could lead to ongoing higher fertility.

While fertility levels in former Eastern Bloc countries like the Czech Republic seem to be recovering (as the postponement effect is being abandoned), *German-speaking countries* seem to be moving into another transition: from medium to low fertility. Our results suggest that fertility levels will remain far below the European average. Desired childlessness is most widespread in Western Germany, while Austria is the country where the smallest families are desired (Austria is the only country among all DIALOG countries where the one-child family is more popular than the two-child one). Having no children or having only one child have become alternatives to the two-child family in both countries. On the other hand, we found that the value-of-children still correlates strongly with fertility behaviour there (in both Germanies values-of-children have shown to have a very strong impact); and we found out that there is a latent demand for family policies in the German-speaking countries. Part of the explanation of this "German pattern" may be found in the fact that the effect of postponement on completed fertility probably

still plays a part in the German-speaking countries. In Germany and Austria (and also in Belgium) female labour participation still lags behind male participation. Hence the end to postponement of fertility, following Lesthaeghe's reasoning, may be somewhat further away. Austria, Belgium and Germany also have later childbearing patterns than Eastern and Central European countries.

Compared to earlier measures of hypothetical completed fertility based on previous surveys, it is remarkable that the difference between desired fertility levels in German-speaking countries and other European countries has become larger. The FFS data from the beginning and the mid-1990s show that the German-speaking countries still had ultimately wanted family sizes of around 2.0 children (see FFS Standard Country reports) at that time. It was the lowest among the FFS countries, but not as low as is shown in our IPPAS survey ten years later.

Southern Europe takes a particular place in the European picture. TFR levels dropped very quickly and sharply there. Italy saw a massive postponement effect which has not been matched by any sizeable recuperation after age 30 (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000). Although Italy's HCF is higher than expected on the basis of TFR, it still ranks on the lower part of the HCF continuum. Italy still has considerable potential for increases in female labour force activity, the gender gap is the largest of all IPPAS countries, and there is high youth unemployment. Since Italy still has considerable potential for increases in female labour force activity, the halt to postponement may be further away. Italian women now give priority to investment in human capital. According to Chesnais (1998), mothers in Italy have to make difficult economic sacrifices, and the obstacles to childbearing are still enormous. A remaining additional obstacle is the difficulty of combining gainful employment with a large family, as was recently shown in a study by Salvini (2004). She believes that the lack of job security and uncertainty about the future may be equally strong obstacles to an upturn in fertility (Salvini 2004, 34).

But: will expectations be realized?

Our results are more or less scenarios for the future. Whether they become reality will depend on conditions in the family policy context (good parental leave, extensive day care, family allowances), but also on the European labour market, the availability of (part-time) jobs, the gender equity system, changes in family values, congruency between partners. Alleviating the burden for young mothers is the necessary precondition for women to realize their desired fertility – and we did find evidence of a demand for better policies at least in the low-fertility countries.

The multivariate analysis showed that higher education no longer prevents women from wanting large families, as it did in previous decades. This is a positive evolution. But nowadays, the less-educated seem to encounter impediments for realizing their desired number of children. This finding must be put in relation to the labour market opportunities for this segment of the active population. The varying country results pertaining to the labour market situation of people showed us that improving conditions on the labour market remains an important field of action for social policies; such policies should aim at allowing people to combine both work and a family, by offering high-quality, flexible jobs. In this way, family strategies need not counteract employment strategies and vice versa. In countries that offer high-quality

part-time jobs, good parental leave, crèches, family allowances, and in countries having a gender balance in labour participation and household task division, fertility is ultimately generally higher. A multi-level analysis performed on FFS data by De Rose and Racioppi (1999) showed that lowest expected fertility (0 or 1 child) is enhanced by a lower degree of modernisation in social and demographic conditions, and by an unfavourable gender system.

We must, however, not lose sight of the fact that, without the policies that have already been implemented in the past decades in the field of gender equality, creating more opportunities for women to reconcile motherhood with gainful employment, financial support for families with small children and leave schemes for young parents, fertility might even have been lower. These policies have had their benefits but, according to some scholars, currently might be insufficient in order to restore actual fertility to the levels necessary for population replacement. "Up to date actions did not correspond to the real scale of the problem but were in most cases symbolic political acts accompanied by the creation of institutions and facilities for the partial management of incompatibility at the time of the arrival of a child and in the early family formation years, but not in the life-course perspective" (Avramov and Cliquet 2003, 386). Our results on hypothetical completed fertility show that the potential for fertility recovery is present, but more drastic changes in policies may be needed in order to bring these potential behavioural changes to reality and enable people to achieve their desired goals.

As is argued by Avramov and Cliquet (2003), it may be necessary to rethink the entire life-course perspective of education, work, parenthood and retirement. The highest burden of duties is now on people during the early years of family formation. The above mentioned authors suggest that the "current stress accumulation" among young adults could be relieved by spreading formal education over a larger age range, by directing more societal resources to the young phase in the life course, by providing good jobs for young people, and by offering them sufficiently flexible opportunities to have both a job and a family.

If they are right and this is the *conditio sine qua non* for a permanent fertility increase to replacement level, then our European societies will have to undergo a change that is almost revolutionary.

Chapter 11
Fertility Preferences and Expectations Regarding Old Age

Kalev Katus, Allan Puur and Asta Põldma

Abstract The article studies the associations between fertility preferences and old age. Data for the study comes from the IPPAS database and covers the DIALOG countries in Europe. Along the progression of population ageing and increasing life span – currently 3.5–4 generations are living at the same time, instead of 1.5–2 generations before the onset of demographic transition – societies are finding themselves in a situation which calls for building new bridges between generations. The analysis is set to identify population groups representing stronger as well as weaker ties across generations. The article applies multivariate analysis to three indices of generational solidarity, constructed upon the IPPAS database. All three indices support the hypothesis that weaker ties are represented among childless and one-child-oriented people, while stronger ties can be found among those oriented towards three children.

Keywords: Population ageing · Fertility preferences · Generation · Children · Parity · Inter-generational relations · Europe

11.1 Introduction

Population ageing is the last process which finalises the demographic transition, taking place as it does roughly a century after the completion of the transition itself. Also, through a major change in the population's age structure, ageing influences almost all social processes and initiates a fundamental transformation of society. This transformation involves shifts in the economic patterns of production and consumption, organisation of health and social care, taxation and pension systems, housing and several other important social issues. As all the nations in the world have at least entered the demographic transition, ageing and the transformation of national societies have assumed the role of a process uniting the contemporary world.

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Major high-level conferences involving researchers and policy-makers have increasingly addressed the issue of population ageing and its implications. To name some recent events, the UN conferences in Madrid in 2002 and in Berlin in 2002 were targeted at discussing, in particular, the complex implications of ageing (UN ECE 2002; UN 2002). The European Population Conference in Strasbourg in 2005 indicated population ageing as one of the main concerns of European societies for the coming decades (Schoenmaeckers 2005). The recent European Union Green Paper "*Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between generations"* calls for pointed policies in the field of population ageing (EU 2005).

The understanding of the need for major reforms to face the new age structure among the population has spread from the scientific community of demographers to a wider audience of other scientific disciplines, as well as policy-makers. Policy-makers are indeed entitled to take appropriate measures. In most cases the actual implementation of reforms can assume various forms, and certainly takes place at a different pace from one country to another. Currently, no pan-European consensus exists on the topics referred to. Also, different countries may prefer different ways, rather than a unified road, and the effectiveness of policies on ageing may vary from country to country.

Common to all countries in Europe, the necessary reforms to meet the challenges of population ageing are not welcome by the population in most cases, as the reforms usually imply an increase in the retirement age and a reduction in pensions in relative terms, just to name some more common fears. Even small steps taken in this direction in France, Italy and some other European countries have met with a clearly negative reaction by the wide audience. It is never easy to introduce a system of reforms perceiving ageing – according to Frank Notestein (1954) – not as a problem in a wider context, but just a pessimistic view of the greatest triumph of humanity, namely increasing longevity.

Whatever reforms may be planned in connection with population ageing, they enhance and support the growth of solidarity between generations, and avoid aggravating differences or even opposition between the different generations living together at a given point in time. It also means evolving and underscoring the growing prevalence of the life-course concept: whatever the current age, all people have been children, and some decades later have reached or will reach maturity, and then old age.

At the same time, the life-course understanding and personal ties across generations may be stronger than in others in some population groups, for whatever reason. This article discusses the differentiation of these intergenerational ties from a demographic point of view, namely relative to fertility behaviour and preferences.

Concerning fertility, during the demographic transition, together with the second transition the parity outcome of female as well as male cohorts has been substantially homogenised (Coale, Watkins 1986). The consolidation of the two-child model has been nearly universal, with a particular decline in models with a higher number of children per family. Nevertheless, a notable prevalence of one-child and three and more children models is still persistent, and varies between nations, with a recent increase in childlessness in many European countries (Council of Europe

2005). This article aims to analyse whether males and females with a higher or a lower fertility preference and behaviour express a more positive attitude towards population ageing and the elderly in society, i.e. stronger ties and solidarity across generations.

The ageing process is well advanced in the European and DIALOG countries in this volume, deemed as demographic forerunners. In this respect, it is surprising that there are no comparative analyses on attitudes towards the elderly against the background of demographic variables such as variability of fertility behaviour and preferences among the adult population, i.e. analyses connecting three generations. No studies of this kind are known to the authors.

There are probably good reasons for such a situation. Firstly, individual databases containing data on attitudinal questions in the field of population covering several or most European countries are not very widespread. More importantly, even at the national level, attitudinal information expressed by the adult population on one specific field – the elderly – is rarely combined with behavioural and attitudinal information on other demographic topics, i.e. children. Internationally, this kind of database may not have existed prior to the IPPAS. It should be mentioned that a first round of the PPA in the early 1990s also did not integrate analyses of this type (Dorbritz, Fux 1997; Moors, Palomba 1995b).

Against the background of a rapidly-growing interest and analyses on the elderly and population ageing, as well as on children and fertility, the need to integrate different generations into research is obvious (Lesthaeghe 2002). In this article, generational integration is accomplished with regard to the adult population aged 20–49 years, or in other words the reproductive-age population. This population segment has or could have children of their own, i.e. the possibility to realise their preferences in the field. On the other hand, they also need to prepare for older age, and their current attitudes towards the elderly may show, amongst other things, whether or not they have contemplated their own future.

11.2 Data

The data are derived from the PPA survey in 14 European countries, with German data available for East and West in addition. The IPPAS database is described in Chapter 2 of this volume. The information used for the current analysis is derived from two different modules, namely fertility and ageing: firstly, information on fertility, namely the actual number of children already born, as well as those expected, and secondly, views and attitudes on the elderly and preferences and ways of caring for the elderly.

Fertility is an age-specific process. Moreover, age at first birth (and subsequent births) varies between countries. That gap has been widening recently as “fertility ageing” (postponement of births) has progressed at different rates across the European countries (Billari 2005a; Sobotka 2004a). If there is a need to define people – women as well as men – by the number of children in a wide age range and in

comparison between countries, the method usually applied is an integration of data on children already born and those planned or expected. This method has proven to yield results closer to reality than the ideal number of children or children ultimately expected (van de Kaa 2001). The relevant information is available in the IPPAS database for all DIALOG countries, except Romania.

Figures 11.1 and 11.2 provide data about the total number of children, separately for those already born plus those planned, for respondents aged 20–49 years, i.e. the reproductive-age population. The graphs cover males and females separately. It is evident that the age structure of the population and the survey samples in PPA countries are not identical. These factors should be born in mind and added to the variation of fertility timing in the different countries as regards two components of the total number of children.

In most of the countries, children already born make up more than 50% of the eventual total number of children. This is particularly true for females as compared to males. Among women we find the children already born in relation to the children planned to form a ratio of two-thirds to one-third. In principle, men have a lower share of children already born being a few years older than their female partner/mother at parenthood. Evidently, the proportion is higher in the countries dominated by a relatively early childbearing age, and lower in the countries where childbearing is postponed to an older age. Cyprus seems to be an exception, with a higher proportion of planned children both for men and women, and much higher desired fertility as compared to most other countries. This may reflect a relatively



Fig. 11.1 Number of children already born and planned. Males
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 11.2 Number of children already born and planned. Females
Source: IPPAS

recent fertility decline in the country with the prevailing higher share of less realistic future plans than in other PPA countries. Also Hungarian men stand out.

The country with the lowest total number of children already born and planned should be mentioned. It is Germany, or according to Wolfgang Lutz the "German-speaking countries" in a wider context (Goldstein et al. 2003). Indeed, Germany displays a low level of children planned/expected and children already born. This is particularly true for the male population orientated to smaller families as compared to females. Austria (and Belgium/Flanders) come close to that situation.

Concerning attitudes towards senior citizens and providing care, the data from three questions of the PPA questionnaire are used. The first question (A2: *There are widely varying views on the elderly in our society. Would you please indicate your own opinion on the following statements*) seeks to specify the respondents' general views of the elderly. The respondents were asked to express their opinion on various views on a five-tier scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".

The positive statements are as follows:

- Thanks to their great experience the elderly are still socially useful;
- The elderly guarantee the preservation of traditional values in society;
- The subsequent generations could profit from the presence, knowledge and experience of the elderly;
- Society should take into consideration the rights of the elderly;
- Society should take into consideration the problems of the elderly;
- The elderly are an important resource for emotional support.

The negative statements are the following:

- The elderly are an obstacle to change;
- The elderly are a burden on society.

The second question (A3: *There are widely varying views on the care of the elderly in our society. Would you please indicate your own opinion on the following statements*) addresses care of the elderly in society. The statements for the respondents to express their views – also on a five-tier scale – are as follows:

- Children should take care of the elderly;
- It is the duty of the relatives to take care of the elderly;
- I would like my aged parents to live with me;
- If one of them needed care, I would ask my aged parents to live with me;
- Old people should live in old people's homes only if there is nobody in the family who could take care of them.

The third question (A4:*It could happen that an elderly person continuously needs a little help in daily living. Do you think these items are best entrusted to. . .*) used in regression analysis focuses on the continuous, although not necessarily extensive, help for the elderly in everyday life. The statements are designated to identify the person(s) who should provide that care, on the same five-tier scale:

- Spouse/partner;
- Children;
- Other relatives;
- Friends or neighbours.

In the case of the second and third questions, some statements are not included in the analysis, either those almost exactly copying other statements, with only a minor variation, or those that were too broad to be adequately understood by the respondents.

The information gathered on views and attitudes concerning the elderly has been summed up in three indices discussed in the next section.

Not all the PPA countries collected information on both aspects – children and attitudes towards the elderly. Such data are available in the IPPAS database for eight countries (nine cases if Eastern and Western Germany are considered separately), namely Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. The first round of multivariate logistic regressions on the general attitudes towards the elderly omits Finland, lacking this battery of items.

11.3 Indices of Generational Solidarity

To consolidate the data on attitudes towards the elderly, three composite indices have been calculated, one for each group of statements described in the previous section. As these indices summarise respondents' attitudes - among the population aged

between 20 and 49 – towards the elderly, and will be analysed by the respondents' parity, they cover three generations. In this respect the indices have been labelled as generational solidarity indices, not as an attempt to create any universal solidarity index, but to serve the purpose of the given analysis which is our aim.

The first solidarity index – image of the elderly – is calculated on the basis of answers to eight statements regarding general views of the elderly, by adding the grades together and standardised to the original five-tier scale. The two negative statements have been adjusted to the opposite, i.e. harmonised with the other answers. The minimum index value is one point, i.e. all the statements received responses of "strongly agree", or in other words, the general attitude of a respondent towards the older people was the most positive. The maximum index value is five, indicating the most negative view of the elderly.

Figure 11.3 shows the frequency distribution of the index on the image of the elderly, all countries combined. Technically speaking, it is not the perfect normal distribution, but the shape of the distribution curve is relatively close to normal: most people are concentrated around the value of 2.0 at the centre of the index distribution, exhibiting a decline towards both extremes. It is worth noting that no extremely negative assessments (index values between four and five) were recorded. For the further analysis, the population group with the most positive attitudes has been defined with the first three groups in the figure, leaving the rest – average as well as more negative attitudes – to another group.



Fig. 11.3 Frequency distribution of the first generational solidarity index: Image of the elderly (from positive to negative)
Source: IPPAS

The second solidarity index – family care – is calculated in a similar manner, on the basis of answers to the question on care of the elderly in society: Care is provided either by the family network, based on generational solidarity, or vice versa, by societal institutions. The population group with the strongest solidarity attitudes towards providing care by themselves and/or via the family network is defined by the first four groups in the figure, leaving the rest – indifferent and those preferring professional arrangements – to another group. Figure 11.4 tabulates the frequency distribution of the index. The shape of this curve is even closer to the normal distribution, though likewise skewed to the left side and the positive attitude.

The third solidarity index – informal care – estimates the respondent's orientation or readiness to provide continuous care and assistance to elderly by family members, relatives and friends. The index is based on the same calculation procedure as applied for the previous two indices. The population group with the strongest solidarity attitudes towards care provision by family members, relatives and other informal care-providers is defined by the values 1 and 2, leaving the rest (attaching a lower value to informal assistance and a higher value to formal help) to another group. Figure 11.5 tabulates the frequency distribution of the informal care index and, once again, the typical shape close to normal distribution is rather evident. It is worth noting that no extremely negative assessments (index value between four and five) were recorded, and the distribution is generally skewed to the left and towards informal care.



Fig. 11.4 Frequency distribution of the second generational solidarity index: Family care (from family to non-family care)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 11.5 Frequency distribution of the third generational solidarity index: Informal care (from informal to formal care)
Source: IPPAS

11.4 Results

All three indices of generational solidarity have been used for regressions against parity, applying the multiple logistic regression models. The models also incorporate other characteristics to verify their explanatory power and impact, including sex, age, education, marital/partnership status and religiosity. Two sets of models were estimated to facilitate an analysis containing data for all countries combined. The first set produced non-adjusted estimates for parity through inclusion in a model as a single covariate. The second set of models produced the estimates for parity that were adjusted for the effects of all other covariates. Country-specific analysis applied the second set of models.

Data presentation for all three solidarity indices is similar. The graphs reflect logistic regression coefficients for models with data on all countries pooled. The reference group is comprised of the individuals having or planning two children, and coefficients for those with/planning none, one child and three or more children have been graphed. The data on both adjusted and non-adjusted models are presented. The same regressions have been modelled for each individual country, while all the other details remain constant. These country-specific results are outlined in the corresponding Tables 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3.

The data on multivariate regression of Solidarity Index 1 are presented in Fig. 11.6. Childless people and those planning to remain childless evidently demonstrate a more negative general attitude towards the elderly than any other parity group, while

Table 11.1 Logistic regression coefficients of the first generational solidarity index: Image of the elderly

Country	Childless	1 child	2 children (reference group)	3+children
Austria	0.809	0.892	1.000	0.953
Czech Republic	0.418**	0.754	1.000	1.022
Estonia	1.013	1.042	1.000	0.960
Germany	0.600**	0.940	1.000	1.116
Lithuania	0.760	1.091	1.000	1.356
Poland	0.941	0.986	1.000	0.946
Slovenia	0.935	1.177	1.000	1.349

Source: IPPAS

those having or planning three or more children express a much more positive attitude towards the elderly. Those having or planning one child exhibit a somewhat more positive attitude towards the elderly compared to the reference group of individuals having or planning two children. However, according to the adjusted model the position of this group changes its sign, becoming somewhat negative in relation to the reference group. As regards the remaining parities, other characteristics integrated into the model explain the difference on both sides to a certain extent, but the positive attitude towards the elderly shows an obvious increase as the number of children in the respondent's family grows.

In the country-specific Table 11.1 on the number of children (including planned children) and the perception of the elderly, the level of coefficients varies substantially from country to country. However, the general outcome of the previously-discussed model – the positive attitude towards the elderly increases with the growing number of children in the respondent's family – holds true in all cases with the exception of Estonia and Poland (Table 11.1). In these countries, people with three or more children do not display an increasingly positive attitude towards the elderly. What is more, Estonia does not exhibit a decline among childless people. In both cases, however, differences in the attitude towards the elderly only marginally depend on parity – unlike in most other countries studied.

Table 11.2 Logistic regression coefficients of the second generational solidarity index: Family care

Country	Childless	1 child	2 children (reference group)	3+children
Austria	1.161	0.979	1.000	1.533**
Czech Republic	0.467**	0.945	1.000	1.283
Estonia	1.398	1.102	1.000	1.067
Finland	1.397	0.874	1.000	1.246
Germany	0.823	0.912	1.000	1.410**
Lithuania	0.992	1.270	1.000	1.375*
Poland	0.853	0.981	1.000	0.986
Slovenia	1.044	0.960	1.000	1.620**

Source: IPPAS

Table 11.3 Logistic regression coefficients of the third generational solidarity index: Informal care

Country	Childless	1 child	2 children	3+children
Austria	1.292	1.152	1.000	1.467*
Czech Republic	1.298	0.975	1.000	0.860
Estonia	1.322	1.062	1.000	1.244
Finland	1.132	0.732	1.000	1.274
Germany	0.880	0.989	1.000	1.185
Lithuania	1.723	1.436	1.000	1.932**
Poland	1.249	1.035	1.000	1.087
Slovenia	0.969	0.914	1.000	0.926

Source: IPPAS

It was possible to make two observations as regards country-specific patterns, both of which hold true not only for the solidarity index discussed above, but also for the remaining two. Once again, there are substantial differences in fertility levels between the PPA countries, including the different positions that people with parity two may hold. Parity two, however, is the reference group in the multivariate analysis for all countries. The other statement concerns the rather heterogeneous group of zero parity. On the one hand, the group contains people who do



Fig. 11.6 Logistic regression coefficients of the first generational solidarity index: Perception of the elderly
Source: IPPAS

not want to have any children. On the other hand, it also covers those who cannot have children because of primary or secondary infertility. Only the first group can be expected to have a weaker solidarity across generations, whereas the second group, in contrast, may exhibit even stronger solidarity than other parities. It is evident that the proportions of these two groups vary considerably between countries.

Figure 11.7 presents the coefficients of multivariate logistic regression of the generational solidarity index on family care. As in the previous case, the general data association is very similar: The positive attitude towards care provision by the family and next of kin (rather than by professional organisations) increases with the growing number of children in the respondent's family. Data adjustment plays a bigger role, and other characteristics than parity explain about half of the more negative attitudes among childless people. On the other hand, the adjusted coefficients for parity of three or more are even higher than the non-adjusted coefficients. Unlike the previous solidarity index, there is a relatively noticeable difference between parities one and two (the reference group).

The country-specific coefficients are heterogeneous, as in the previous case (Table 11.2). Some countries, such as the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania and Poland, demonstrate linear growth of solidarity as parity increases. Other countries – Austria, Estonia, Finland and Slovenia – present a similar picture, with the exception



Fig. 11.7 Logistic regression coefficients of the second generational solidarity index: Family care
Source: IPPAS

of childless people who exhibit greater solidarity compared to people with one child. The heterogeneity (and marginal or extremely marginal role in some countries) of the group of childless people discussed earlier could explain this irregularity. Poland is the only country where the group with three or more children displays a slightly lower level of solidarity compared to the reference group with two children. The social difference between these two groups may appear smaller in Poland, compared to other countries.

The results of the multivariate regression on the generational solidarity index on informal care – personal, family and next of kin participation in providing care – are tabulated by parity in Fig. 11.8. Summing up the findings for all countries, the general outline is rather close to that for the index on the perception of the elderly, i.e. the growth of solidarity by parity increase is accompanied by slight differences between parities one and two. The differences are somewhat smaller across parities, and the adjusted model seems to play a slightly bigger role in reducing these differences.

The country-specific data in Table 11.3 stress the higher solidarity level in the childless group compared to the reference group. This holds true for almost all countries, with a clear and noticeable exception in Germany and a minor one in Slovenia. At the same time, Germany is known for its very high (and increasing) level of voluntary childlessness, whereas in many other countries the group is much smaller, and among other things, the proportion of childlessness caused by infertility is much higher. As the previous indices, the group of three or more children demon-



Fig. 11.8 Logistic regression coefficients of the third generational solidarity index: Informal care
Source: IPPAS

strates the highest level of solidarity for almost all countries with the exception of the Czech Republic, and again to lesser degree in Slovenia, where the impact of having or planning to have children is rather flat.

11.5 Discussion

Populations had an average lifespan of around 30 years before the demographic transition, meaning, among other things, that one and a half generations lived together at the same time. It was rather typical for the youngest child to have lost at least one parent before reaching adulthood. Naturally, there were cases of three or maybe even four generations living together, but this was the exception rather than the rule. Under such conditions, the relations between generations were less important in traditional societies than relations between people of the same generation (Laslett 1977; Schofield 1997, Schofield, Reher, Bideau 1991 Wrigley, Davies, Oeppen).

Mortality transition has increased life expectancy about two and a half times (Caselli 1993; Vallin, Meslé 2001). In modern society, typically three, and increasingly even four, generations live together for a shorter or longer period. Under these circumstances, the relations between the generations have developed substantially – in quantity and quality. Moreover, the differentiating roles played by people in various age groups, any by adults in particular, stress the importance of inter-generational relations.

Changes in inter-generational relations can be approached on two levels. Firstly, changes on the family/kin level. Modern societies most probably have yet to find the best model for the deployment of the growing wealth of generational relations, for example, for handing down knowledge and experience to the offspring. School and home have different roles to play in teaching the younger generation, but all too often fail to work towards the same end. Families feel increasing pressure to support their grandparents or great-grandparents. European countries seem to prefer different options, particularly regarding the choice between home care and institutions for old people in continuous need of assistance and care. Research is ongoing in the field, including the CARMA project within the EU framework (CARMA 2004).

Secondly, the population or societal level, which is sometimes described as the transformation of the age pyramid into an age pillar (Long 1991). It has been suggested that the changing and intensifying relations between generations on this level are of prime importance for the future of mankind. When population ageing reaches the final stage for demographic forerunners in the near future, there will be no turning back. The new population age structure, in which three-four generations live together at the same time, will be the future for all nations, with the third-age population being the most numerous. There is growing literature on policy implications of the new demographic regime (Avramov, Cliquet 2005; Demeny 2003; Keilman 2003; Macura, MacDonald, Haug 2005). A recent study by Charlotte Höhn summarises the work of the European Population Committee in the field for the last five years (Höhn 2005).

As is the case with many other aspects of population ageing, societies will find themselves in a novel, unprecedented situation necessitating the formation and intro-

duction of new inter-generational relations (Avramov, Cliquet 2005; Demeny 2003; Sgritta 1995). Needless to say, these relations should be based on understanding and respect for the different roles played by the different generations. A hypothesis has been put forward that the third age would assume the leading role in this new system of relations (Laslett 1993).

The structure of several important areas in society is not yet ready at present to meet new challenges. The economy in particular is still based on the growth model and intensive use of the working-age population, whereas other generations – children and the elderly – are perceived as "non-productive". The age dependency ratio will definitely grow in the future, stabilising on "less favourable" levels as compared to the current situation. In this new reality, the economic structures should be modified to take advantage of the new age structures of the population. However, there are other strategies available like transferring economic activities to countries and regions where the "old methods" could be employed for longer. In the globalised world, the transfer of capital has become easier than ever.

The current analysis allowed the identification of the individuals and population groups that represent weaker ties across the generations and express less favourable attitudes, particularly concerning the elderly. The general outcome of multivariate regressions presented and discussed in the previous section is obvious: People with more children, i.e. those who demonstrate a more positive attitude by their own behaviour towards children, also exhibit a more positive attitude towards the elderly, and a greater readiness to provide care either themselves or in the person of other members of family or next of kin. In particular, the differences are the most pronounced between the respondents with a one-child orientation and those with three or more children as the two rather opposite strategies.

Readers have surely noticed that against the background of an unambiguous message contained in the combined data from all PPA countries, individual countries handled separately present a much more heterogeneous picture. There are of course differences between countries, considering fertility as well as the different levels of the ageing process in each nation and the national traditions regarding the role of the elderly in society. However, the manners in which generational solidarity is secured may not be identical.

European societies are now facing the task of building bridges between generations and stages of life. At the individual level, life-course thinking should assume a greater role, while the role of the strategies oriented towards short-term goals and values should diminish. At the national level, reforms bringing various activities in society corresponding to the new age distribution are envisaged. These tasks will not be easy to accomplish, and some countries may achieve more effective results than others, heralding a new round of the re-grouping of countries by their influence and power in the world.

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Chapter 12
The Influence of Education and Family Policies on Age at First Birth

Osmo Kontula

Abstract Age at first birth has become an important population policy issue in Europe after a relatively steep decline, followed by stabilization, in total fertility to reach an exceptionally low level. Fertility postponement has played an important role in this population transition. Low fertility has contributed to negative natural population growth in a number of European countries. The aim of this chapter is to study the variation in age at first birth in DIALOG countries, paying special attention to the possible influence exerted by educational level on this event. The educational association of the postponing effect on age at first birth will be further elaborated by classifying DIALOG countries according to their family policies. Europe is divided into Western Europe and Central/Eastern Europe when it comes to age at first birth. On average, Western European women have their first child when they are four years older than women in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the survey results, postponement of the first birth was only happening in the West in the 1990s and in the early 2000s. As a consequence, the difference in age at first birth was indeed increasing between these two European regions. These results indicate that some social traditions are highly persistent in family life in the former state-socialist countries. Education has made a difference to age at first birth in all the DIALOG countries. Highly-educated women have their first child roughly three years later than less well-educated women. This effect has remained unchanged in recent years. In the West, education has been more closely associated with the first birth in recent times than was previously the case; in the East, by contrast, this association has been lessening. In the analyses of associations between four family policy regimes and age at first birth, only the imposed home care regime made a real difference to family-founding age. Age at first birth was significantly lower in countries belonging to this family policy type. It is disputable whether this difference was due to the new family policy approach adopted in the 1990s in these post-communist countries, or whether it was a result more of different traditions and family resources.

Keywords: Age at first birth · Fertility postponement · Level of education

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12.1 Introduction

Age at first birth has become an important population policy issue in Europe, after a relatively steep decline, followed by stabilization, of total fertility rates to reach an exceptionally low level. Fertility postponement has played an important role in this population transition. Low fertility has contributed to negative natural population growth in a number of European countries. Extremely low period fertility rates in many parts of Europe have raised concerns about their future consequences in terms of the potential magnitude of the population decline, massive population aging, and the ability of governments to finance social security systems (Sobotka 2004a).

Low fertility has spread to all the DIALOG countries. Low fertility emerged in Central Europe in the beginning of the 1980s, in Southern Europe at the end of the 1980s, and in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1990s. The total period fertility rate had reached a below-replacement level in the 1990s in all DIALOG countries except Cyprus. During the first half of the 1990s, the decline in the total fertility rate (TFR) was extremely steep in the Central and Eastern European transition countries, including in the eastern part of Germany, and in Cyprus. With the exception of Finland, the TFR also declined in the Western European DIALOG countries at the beginning of the 1990s, but the decrease gradually levelled off, and fertility stabilized or even increased during the later half of the 1990s (Kontula and Miettinen 2005).

An important factor in this fertility decline has been the postponement of family formation. Fertility postponement is conceptualised as an increase in the age at which women give birth to their first child. The onset of the current shift towards later birth timing proceeded across Europe in three distinctive waves, starting in Western and Northern Europe in 1971–1973, and encompassing most countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1992–1995, shortly after the collapse of their centrally-planned communist economies (Sobotka 2004a).

Women's mean age at first birth has surpassed the age of 30 in a number of European countries. One important variation has been found in the timing of these family-related events in Western European and in the transition countries. People in the transition countries marry and have their first child 3–4 years younger than people in the Western European countries (Kontula and Miettinen 2005). In contrast, they have their sexual initiation 2–3 years later than people in Western European countries (Kontula 2003). This implies that young inhabitants of Western European countries are sexually active for an average of 5–7 years longer than inhabitants of the transition countries before they form a family by having their first child.

The aim of this paper is to study the variation in age at first birth in DIALOG countries, paying special interest to the possible influence of educational level on this event. The educational association of the postponing effect on age at first birth will be further elaborated by classifying DIALOG countries according to their family policies.

The research question will be studied and compared in DIALOG countries with PPAS survey datasets. Family policy types are based on national reports and results

of the synthesis report (Kontula and Miettinen 2005). The findings will be discussed in the framework of preconditions for reproductive choice and parenthood.

12.2 Preconditions for Individual Reproductive Choice

The increase in age at first birth in numerous European countries is dispositional to principles related to sexual and reproductive rights to decide whether or not, and when to have children. These rights have legal, social and medical aspects. The important medical aspect is the provision of effective, affordable contraception. The social aspect includes the freedom and resources to select individual priorities for life, such as living alone and engaging in higher education for a number of years, and the right to choose whether or not to marry, and when.

Women have gained almost complete independence from men in many European countries by attaining higher education and participating massively in paid labour. In addition, they have been more or less freed from unintended pregnancies by a broad range of modern contraceptives. In the light of these shifts towards female autonomy, it is not surprising that most developed societies have low or very low fertility rates, and women are having children later and later in life.

The proponents of the concept of the second demographic transition have repeatedly stressed the catalytic role of efficient contraception in the behavioural and cultural change that characterises the transition to fertility postponement (van de Kaa 1994). The improvement in contraceptive technology constituted a "critical source of empowerment" for women, who could control more effectively not only their reproductive timing, but also their education and employment (Presser 2001). In a macro perspective, higher education has been found to be an important precondition for the proper use of modern contraceptives (Bajos and Guillaume 2003).

The pill was particularly important for two main reasons: It completely shifted control over pregnancy to women, and constituted it one of the most effective contraceptive methods. In many countries, a boom in pill use among young women was closely linked with the start of fertility postponement. Having children now required a conscious decision to discontinue pill use.

Teenage pregnancies contradict or even invalidate the trends towards fertility postponement. High rates of teenage pregnancies are due, in addition to the low prevalence of pill use, to a number of social and economic conditions. The most important causes of misery have found to be inequality, intolerant attitudes, poor education, and a lack of sexual health services. Teenage mothers often come from socially-disadvantaged families. Lower rates are seen in countries that accept that young people have a right to be sexually active, provide good sex and relationship education and easy access to contraception and sexual health services (Kontula 2004).

Anderson (2000) has found that unemployment had a very strong upward effect on first birth rates in Sweden among women with very low earned income. The working class young seem to have a low motivation to continue their education;

they tend to leave school early. This creates a high number of teenage parents with low education and low income. In the UK, girls from the poorest backgrounds are ten times more likely to become teenage mothers than girls from professional backgrounds (Governmental Response 2002). Poor young women are the least able to plan pregnancies successfully and jointly with their partners.

In post-communist societies, especially in Russia, even the medical profession had an ultra-cautious attitude toward modern contraceptives. They were perceived as something "unnatural" and labelled as harmful by physicians who never mentioned their advantages. Official figures showed that contraceptive supplies met only 25% of demand in 1988. The authorities feared that widespread availability of the pill might lead to a greater decline in the birthrate and to greater female autonomy (Popov and David 1999). This tradition and policy has kept the rates of teenage pregnancies high in many post-communist countries.

12.3 Preconditions for Parenthood

Young people face many challenges when it comes to successful parenthood. The timing of the first birth depends on a number of choices and priorities in life. One of the most important choices is the selection of the type of education and a job with career perspectives in the labour force. In most societies, leaving the parental home also constitutes a crucial precondition for making individual choices on union formation and parenthood.

During the last four decades young Europeans have spent an ever-longer portion of their lives in education; post-secondary education, in particular, has undergone massive expansion. Post-industrial economies generate demand for a highly-educated, flexible workforce. Women have especially benefited educationally from this development, and now make up more than half of the graduate and postgraduate students in a majority of European countries.

Even though young people usually benefit later economically from their prolonged education, they often loose or at least postpone some important social benefits that are immediately available to others who spend less time in education. Prolonged education has frequently been interpreted from a life-course perspective as leading to a delayed transition to economic independence, and hence to adulthood.

One of the most important preconditions for having a child has been sufficient economic security. The notions of sufficient economic security and wealth accumulation have been transformed; young adults are more demanding with regard to income, housing and consumer goods accumulated prior to parenthood. An orientation towards luxury products or high-quality furniture and housing may delay marriage and childbearing.

Among Dutch women born before 1960, there was a substantial difference in first-birth timing for those who followed the traditional pathway of direct marriage and subsequent childbearing after leaving the parental home – and had their first child at age 24.5 on average – and those with less traditional biographies. Mean age

at first birth was almost five years higher among Dutch women who followed the path of leaving home, living single, cohabiting, marrying, and then having a first child (Matsuo 2003).

Interest in education is often also an indication of specific value preferences. People with higher education have values and preferences that are distinct from individuals with lower education. Hakim (2003) has pointed out that a number of women are "home-centred" or "family-centred" and prefer, instead of education and career, to give priority to family life. They are economically less active and tend to have children considerably earlier than other women (Meron and Widmer 2002). Former state-socialist societies, where many women had children early in life and entered the labour force only after they had achieved the desired family size, constitute a very different model in comparison to modern Western life style (Sobotka 2004a).

Turkenburg (1995) has shown that less well-educated women pursued different strategies according to their priorities attached to motherhood and other life domains, and that they differentiated between family-oriented strategies, partner-oriented strategies, and individually-oriented strategies. Family-oriented strategies are related to the values of responsibilities, partner-oriented strategies to attachment and mutuality, and individually-oriented strategies to freedom and individual pleasures.

Highly-educated women are likely to seek more egalitarian relationships and, above all, to develop higher standards concerning a potential partner's qualities in terms of education and income. These increased standards lead to delayed union formation and marriage, contributing in turn to further postponement of childbearing (Oppenheimer 1988). The "lack of a suitable partner" consistently ranks with family, fertility, and reproduction as one of the most important reasons given by women in various surveys for postponing childbearing, or for not having children.

12.4 Age at First Birth in Dialog Countries

Mean age at first birth has been rising continuously since the 1970s in most European countries, and is now at 27–28 years, or above, in many Western and Northern European countries (Table 12.1). Age at first birth is still lower in Central and Eastern European countries, at about 24–25 years, but there has been an increase during the latter half of the 1990s. Among DIALOG countries, based on national statistics, the "oldest" first-time mothers can be found in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Italy (28.7–28.9), and the youngest in Romania, Estonia and Lithuania (24.1–24.6). The transition period in the 1990s among Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries has not yet lowered the cultural barrier to Western European DIALOG countries in the process of founding a family.

In the period 1990–2002, the increase in age at first birth was most noted in the Czech Republic and Hungary (3.1 years) and smallest in Finland (0.8 years).

Table 12.1 Mean age at first birth, 1990, 1995 and 2002 in DIALOG countries

Country	1990	1995	2002	Change 1990–2002
Belgium	26.4	26.4	27.6 (1997)	(1.2)
Switzerland	27.6	28.1	28.9	1.3
Czech Republic	22.5	23.3	25.6	3.1
Germany	26.6	27.5	28.4 (2001)	1.8
Estonia	22.9	23.0	24.6	1.7
Italy	26.9	28.0	28.7 (1997)	(1.8)
Cyprus	24.7	25.5	26.7	2.0
Lithuania	22.9	22.8	24.3	1.4
Hungary	22.5	23.8	25.6	3.1
The Netherlands	27.6	28.6	28.7	1.1
Austria	25.0	25.6	26.7	1.7
Poland	23.0	23.5	25.0	2.0
Romania	22.4	22.7	24.1	1.7
Slovenia	23.9	24.9	27.2	3.3
Finland	26.8	27.6	27.6	0.8

Note: In Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, within current marriage
Source: national reports; national statistics

The results of the increase in age at first birth are shown in Table 12.2 (women) and in Table 12.3 (men) by five broad age groups. Some countries are missing in the age groups 60–69 and 70+ because they did not include respondents in their PPAS samples who were older than 60 or 70 years of age. Romania surveyed only people who were younger than 50 years of age. One has to keep in mind when it comes to the age group of 30–39 that a number of respondents had not yet experienced parenthood due to their young age. In this age group median ages will increase along the life course.

On the basis of Tables 12.1 and 12.2, results of ages of first birth are also illustrated in Figures 12.1–12.2. In these figures, the results are sub-divided not only

Table 12.2 Age at first birth in DIALOG countries by age groups, women

Country	30–39	40–49	50–59	60–69	70 +
Austria	24.1	23.9	23.1	23.7	
Belgium	26.2	25.0	24.2	24.1	
Czech Republic	22.5	23.1	23.9	23.8	24.3
Estonia	22.5	23.2	24.5	25.5	25.6
Finland	26.0	25.9	24.6	24.9	24.7
Germany	25.0	24.5	24.0	24.4	
Hungary	22.4	22.2	22.6	22.6	24.0
Italy	26.6	26.2	24.5		
Lithuania	23.2	25.2	24.9	25.7	25.9
The Netherlands	27.8	27.0	25.6	2.56	27.1
Poland	23.1	23.5	23.4	23.6	
Romania	21.5	26.0			
Slovenia	22.5	22.7	24.0	23.7	
Total	24.6	24.5	24.0	24.2	25.0

Source: IPPAS

Table 12.3 Age at first birth in DIALOG countries by age groups, men

Country	30–39	40–49	50–59	60–69	70 +
Austria	26.2	26.7	26.2	26.6	
Belgium	28.3	27.4	26.4	26.3	
Czech Republic	24.1	25.5	26.7	2.76	26.2
Estonia	25.2	25.2	25.5	27.3	28.2
Finland	27.5	27.6	26.8	26.2	28.5
Germany	26.8	27.0	27.0	27.3	
Hungary	24.8	25.8	25.8	26.4	28.4
Italy	28.1	28.6	26.2		
Lithuania	24.6	25.8	26.7	27.5	27.9
The Netherlands	29.7	30.5	29.0	28.1	30.4
Poland	25.4	25.9	26.2	27.7	
Romania	24.3	27.7			
Slovenia	25.3	25.9	25.7	27.1	
Total	26.6	27.0	26.6	27.0	28.7

Source: IPPAS

by gender, but also by two groups of DIALOG countries: Western, and Central and Eastern European countries. This division of countries reveals the divergent nature of the evolution in age at first birth in these two regions of Europe. Romania was left out from these figures because it had surveyed only two age groups.

The survey results in Western European DIALOG countries are in line with the national statistics showing a trend with increasing ages at first birth among younger respondents. The higher ages at first birth for people aged 70+ are due to postponement during World War II. Men in Germany, Austria, Italy and the Netherlands



Fig. 12.1 Median age at first birth in DIALOG countries (Western European women)



Fig. 12.2 Median age at first birth in DIALOG countries (Western European men)

show a different pattern with lower ages at having become a father. There may be two major groups with regard to types of behaviour, namely those with early family formation as twens, and those postponing family formation. As already mentioned, median ages at first parenthood of those aged 30–39 years at the time of the survey are likely to increase, and this is particularly true for men, even for Finnish men. Trends are clearer among women than among men aged 30–39, but for Western European women too, a further increase in age at first birth can reasonably be expected. There is a postponing effect from one generation to another in age at first birth in the Western European countries.

Another observation is that men were generally older than women in each coun-



Fig. 12.3 Median age at first birth in DIALOG countries (Central and Eastern European women)



Fig. 12.4 Median age at first birth in DIALOG countries (Central and Eastern European men)

try when they had their first child. This age difference was approximately three years in several countries in Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). The difference was 12 years in Estonia and Lithuania. A similar age difference in Western European countries was either 2.5–3.0 years (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) or 1.5 years (Austria, Finland and Italy).

Interestingly, the survey results do not show any postponement in age at first birth in Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries. This finding seems to run counter to the official national statistics in these very countries, which showing some postponing effect in age at first birth. In this framework, it was notable that the survey results even point to some decrease in age at first birth among younger respondents in these countries. This preliminary decrease is considerable among female respondents in Estonia and Slovenia, and among male respondents in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. This finding raises at least the question of whether or not the postponement in ages at first birth in these Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries indicated in official statistics will be followed by a recuperation after the age of 30.

One more observation is that age at first birth is much more homogeneous among male than among female respondents. The only exceptions are Dutch males, who become fathers 2–3 years older than other Western European males. This age distribution is much more noticeable among women. The variation within the two groups of DIALOG countries is around three years, and the difference remains unchanged from one generation to another.

12.5 Age at First Birth and Educational Level

Numerous studies have illustrated that "being in education" strongly reduces the "risk" of having a first child. For example, increasing educational levels explained

Table 12.4 Median age at first birth and change in 1990–2002 by four family policy models

Family policy models	Median age at first birth	Change 1990–2002
Day Care Service model	27.4	2.1
Income Transfer model	27.9	1.6
Labour Market model	28.1	1.5
Imposed Home Care model	24.9	2.2

about half the increase in mean age at first birth among Dutch women born between 1931–40 and 1961–65 (Beets et al. 2001).

The differences for DIALOG countries in age at first birth of women by three educational levels (post-secondary, higher secondary, primary or lower secondary) are presented in Table 12.4 (Appendix). Results for the female age group 30–39 in Western European DIALOG countries are illustrated in Fig. 12.5, and in Fig. 12.6 for Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries.

Education plays an important and indisputable role in all DIALOG countries in the process that leads to founding a family. On average, female respondents had their first child three years later in the post-secondary educational groups in comparison to the primary or lower secondary educational group. In addition, this difference remained unchanged from one generation to another. Education has retained its important role in young people's lives, and has shaped a number of choices, including the age of family-foundation.

In Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries, the ages of first birth do not vary much within individual educational levels in the 30–39 female age group:



Fig. 12.5 Median age at first birth in Western European DIALOG countries (Women 30–39 years of age by educational level)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 12.6 Median age at first birth in Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries (Women 30–39 years of age by educational level)

The variation is approximately two years. The variation is much bigger in Western European DIALOG countries: 4–5 years in each educational group. This difference is based especially on two countries that stand out with much higher ages in each educational group, namely the Netherlands and Italy.

As Fig. 12.6 reveals, the greatest differences between the post secondary and primary or lower secondary educational groups within the 30–39 female age group was found in the Czech Republic (6.6 years), Hungary (5.4 years) and Slovenia (5.2 years). Education seems to have played a bigger role in these countries in family formation than elsewhere. Women with a high level of education were postponing their parenthood even more than older generations (see Table 12.4, Appendix).

The least significant influence which has been exerted by education in relation to first parenthood can be discerned in the Netherlands and in Lithuania. The difference in age at first birth of the higher and lower educational groups in the 30–49 age group was only 1.3–1.6 years.

Interestingly, it is only in Western European DIALOG countries that education seems to be more closely associated with age at first birth in the younger generation (30–39 age group) compared to the older generation (50–59 age group). In Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries, by contrast, education was less closely associated with age at first birth among younger than among older respondents. The exceptions were Hungary and Poland, where the role of education had stayed the same. This finding calls into question the hypothesis that higher education is going to have a major postponing impact on age at first birth in Central and Eastern European DIALOG countries in the near future.

12.6 The Influence of Family Policies on Age at First Birth

One aim of this article was to study whether different family policy types in DIALOG countries had been associated with age at first birth. Family policies are grouped here according to the typology previously presented in DIALOG report D15 (Kontula and Miettinen 2005). The typology is a combination of different models of family policy and welfare, focusing especially on the generosity of the state in its policies towards families. DIALOG countries were divided into four family policy models:

1. **Day Care Service model**
   Finland, Slovenia
2. **Income Transfer model**
   Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Austria, Italy
3. **Labour Market model**
   The Netherlands, Switzerland, Cyprus
4. **Imposed Home Care model**
   The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Lithuania

Generally speaking, countries belonging to the Day Care Service and Income Transfer models provided more generous support for their families. In the Day Care Service model, support was channelled more into childcare services with the intention to support reconciling paid work and family. Part-time work in those countries (here Finland and Slovenia) was rare. Income Transfer countries relied more heavily on financial transfers than on public childcare services, and they encouraged either the male-breadwinner model or reconciliation of work and family with the help of female part-time work and with assistance from relatives.

Countries belonging to the Labour Market and Imposed Home Care models granted their families less generous support. Labour Market model countries relied on the well-functioning market that, thanks to a low unemployment rate, provided young women with good opportunities to work part-time. Day care services were available only locally, or were organized by employers. Countries belonging to the Imposed Home Care model (all former communist countries except Slovenia) faced economic hardship and had high unemployment rates. They could not afford to provide very high income transfers or public services to families. Home care without public support was imposed in these countries, a situation completely different to the former 100% provision of state-run childminding. Any public support that remained was increasingly channelled to poor families (means-tested allowances).

Median ages at first birth and the changes in these ages are presented for these four family policy models in Table 12.5. Median ages were close to each other (27.4–28.1) in the Day Care Service model, the Income Transfer model and the Labour Market model, suggesting that these three different family policy models have no impact on age at first birth. This median age (24.9) was much lower in the Imposed Home Care model. Knowing, however, that age at first birth was traditionally much lower in the CEE countries under socialist conditions, it

would be unwise to conclude that the Imposed Home Care model has encouraged family foundation at an early age. However, it is disputable what role family policy has in transition countries. For example, education is presumably less important in a society where there is high unemployment and enduring economic hardship.

Median age at first birth increased from 1990 to 2002 in all four family policy models. This progress had been somewhat more marked in the Imposed Home Care and Day Care Service models than in the Income Transfer and Labour Market models. These different family policy models were almost equally associated with this transition. In the DIALOG countries, there seem to be some other and more important determinants that make a difference to the evolution of age at first birth than the family policy models applied.

12.7 Conclusions

Europe is divided into Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe in terms of age at first birth. Western European women have their first child an average of four years older than women in Central and Eastern Europe. The trend towards postponement is more marked in the transition countries. According to the survey results, the recuperation of first births was going on in the 1990s and the early 2000s in the West. As a consequence, the difference in age at first birth was increasing further between these two European regions.

The assumption that there is necessarily an interrelation between early births and higher fertility rates was contradicted by the finding that the early births had been associated with very low fertility rates in Central and Eastern European countries. It had become very common to strictly limit the number of children in these countries after an (early) first birth. Part of this reproductive behaviour is due to more efficient family planning services.[1]

These results indicate that some social traditions are very persistent in family life in the former state-socialist countries. Women were accustomed to having a child or children early in life, and they entered the labour force only after they had achieved the desired family size (Sobotka 2004a). Social change, inspired by Western modernisation (Hoffmann-Nowotny and Fux 2001), including a period of living independently before getting married, have not been seriously integrated so far into post-communist family life. The former GDR and Slovenia are notable exceptions to this rule. Modern societies have moved from a collectivistic, family-focused model of society, placing emphasis on responsibility, towards one which is individualistic and emphasises individual rights.

Some early pregnancies, especially among teenagers, are due to ultra-cautious and even incorrect perceptions as to contraceptives. There are a number of physi-

[1] The level of fertility is obviously not determined solely by timing effects, but also by the ultimate number of children born. The quantum of fertility is, however, not the subject of this article.

cians in the East who still regard modern contraceptives as unnatural and harmful (Popov and David 1999). According to the survey results in Central and Eastern European countries, only in Hungary and Slovenia did more than half of young persons use contraception in their first intercourse (Bajos and Guillaume 2003).

Misconceptions combined with insufficient provision of contraceptives make it easy to understand why the former socialist countries still have higher teenage pregnancy rates. They were four times more common in Romania in the 1990s than in the West, and in Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary they were three times more common than in some advanced Western European countries (Kontula 2003). The increasing level of contraceptive prevalence may further reduce the incidence of unintended pregnancies in the future in most of the post-communist societies of Europe, and consequently lead to additional fertility postponement (Sobotka 2004a).

Sobotka's (2004a) results show that none of the European countries analysed would have reached the extremely low period fertility level in the absence of fertility postponement. Lowest-low fertility seems to be a temporary phenomenon driven by intensive fertility postponement. Most European societies are likely to experience some recovery in period fertility rates once a postponement of childbearing comes to an end. The Netherlands are the only European country where first birth postponement has come to an end, at least temporarily, since the late 1990s.

Education made a difference to age at first birth in all DIALOG countries. Highly-educated women have been having their first child roughly three years later than less well-educated women. This effect has remained unchanged in recent years. Education has played a very important role in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. In the West, education has recently been more closely associated with the first birth than was previously the case; this association has been weakening in the East, by contrast.

Education is considered a youth role, while marriage is associated with an adult role. Marriage prior to the completion of formal education generally violates the common sequencing norms. If a union is formed before marriage, partners will feel, in particular, the pressure of social norms reflecting incompatibility between full-time education and union formation.

Education has many-facetted consequences, and it impacts individual values and lifestyles. It can change the goals in life, as well as social roles and aspirations. The highly-educated often postpone their sexual initiation and steady relationships in order to meet the other aims in their life. As a consequence, they marry later and they also have their first child older than the less well-educated. Education has frequently impacted on values and lifestyles that have implications on social interaction. The highly-educated have at least moderate means and resources to control their lives. They also have better knowledge and skills to engage in rewarding couple relationships. Educated women are consistently better at negotiating with their partners. Higher education also provides tools for improved and satisfied interaction with a partner.

Prolonged education delays the transition to a steady job, and hence to economic independence, but it also influences the timing of parenthood in a number of indirect ways, through a less traditional or family-centred value orientation. Other factors that are commonly identified as the main determinants of first birth postponement are the conflict between employment and motherhood, the individual and societal impacts of uncertainty, the widespread adoption of the contraceptive pill, and profound changes in the character of intimate relations (Sobotka 2004a).

In the analyses of associations between four family policy models (Kontula and Miettinen 2005) in DIALOG countries and age at first birth, only the Imposed Home Care model seemed to make a real difference to the age of founding a family. Age at first birth was significantly lower in countries (all belonging to the CEE) belonging to this family policy model. However, this difference should rather not be attributed to the new family policy approach adopted in the 1990s in these post-communist countries, which was based more closely on different traditions and family resources. The combination of work and family obligations was more of a burden for women than a real matter of choice.

Most Central and Eastern European countries have faced subsidy cuts, high inflation and high unemployment since the early 1990s. In recent years, family allowances and other family benefits were subjected to a means test in several countries. The imposition of a means test on previously universally-available allowances marked a sea change in the politics of state support for families (Gauthier 1999). A small family was a good compromise between the overall costs and benefits of having children (Avramov and Cliquet 2003).

Some studies emphasise the "risk aversion" of individuals who are considering having children, as well as the fact that the future costs and benefits of children cannot be known with certainty: When uncertainties about future economic, social or personal conditions increase, individuals may tend to play it safe in order to avoid risk (Sleebos 2003). There have been risk-ridden scenarios, for instance related to unemployment (high youth unemployment rates) and also to unpredictable national family policies. Especially in some transition countries, people have been very distrustful as to the new generation of family policies. These policies have fluctuated from time to time. It has been safer to wait for a better and more predictable period in life.

The shared experience of Soviet rule left families in CEE countries highly critical of the inadequacy of public policy provision since transition. After a long period of state dependency, politicians were then trying to promote a self-help philosophy through the media, but the public still looks to the State to provide for families and to offer them jobs, reasonable working conditions, adequate wages and pensions, and support for families unable to meet their own needs. The widespread view is that the State is failing to deliver. People know that they cannot rely on central government to provide the level of support required, and they tend to place greater trust in local government (Hantrais 2004).

European governments have previously been very cautious to formulate such specific population policies that could have an impact on age at first birth. Any kind

of state control on peoples' private lives has been an unpopular policy approach. Lutz and Skirbekk (2004) have suggested that policies targeting the timing of childbearing may become more acceptable than policies aiming to influence the quantum of fertility. Family values are highly respected throughout Europe, and there are good arguments in favour of recommending earlier family formation, rather than the current practice, especially in modern Western societies.

Appendix

Table 12.5 Median age at first birth in DIALOG countries by age groups and educational levels, women

Country - Age group	Primary or lower secondary education	Higher secondary education	Post-secondary education	Total
Austria				
– 30–39	22.1	23.7	26.2	24.1
– 40–49	22.8	23.1	27.5	23.9
– 50–59	22.0	22.8	26.7	23.1
Belgium				
– 30–39	24.1	25.3	27.9	26.1
– 40–49	23.0	24.6	27.1	25.0
– 50–59	23.6	24.2	25.8	24.2
Czech Republic				
– 30–39	19.3	22.0	25.9	22.5
– 40–49	22.8	22.7	26.1	23.1
– 50–59	22.7	23.8	25.4	23.9
Estonia				
– 30–39	19.6	21.9	23.5	22.5
– 40–49	22.9	22.0	24.5	23.2
– 50–59	22.4	24.4	25.4	24.5
Finland				
– 30–39	22.7	24.8	27.3	26.1
– 40–49	23.2	25.6	26.7	25.9
– 50–59	22.7	24.3	26.7	24.7
Germany				
– 30–39	22.9	24.6	26.5	25.0
– 40–49	22.0	24.1	25.8	24.5
– 50–59	23.0	23.8	24.7	24.0
Hungary				
– 30–39	20.0	22.3	25.4	22.4
– 40–49	20.4	22.7	24.8	22.2
– 50–59	21.2	23.2	25.3	22.6
Italy				
– 30–39	24.8	27.3	29.7	26.6
– 40–49	24.5	26.6	30.2	26.2
– 50–59	23.8	24.6	26.9	24.5

Table 12.5 (continued)

Country - Age group	Primary or lower secondary education	Higher secondary education	Post-secondary education	Total
Lithuania				
– 30–39	22.0	22.4	23.5	23.2
– 40–49	24.0	23.6	25.7	25.2
– 50–59	22.7	23.3	25.9	24.9
The Netherlands				
– 30–39	26.7	27.8	28.4	27.8
– 40–49	26.7	26.8	27.9	27.0
– 50–59	24.6	25.6	27.4	25.6
Poland				
– 30–39	21.0	23.0	25.3	23.1
– 40–49	21.4	23.5	26.2	23.5
– 50–59	22.5	23.9	26.1	23.5
Romania				
– 30–39	21.0	21.9	23.7	21.5
– 40–49	25.5	27.1	26.0	26.0
– 50–59	–	–	–	–
Slovenia				
– 30–39	20.2	22.4	25.4	22.5
– 40–49	22.0	22.1	25.0	22.7
– 50–59	23.6	23.5	26.8	24.0
Total				
– 30–39	23.0	24.1	26.3	24.6
– 40–49	23.0	23.9	26.4	24.5
– 50–59	22.9	23.8	26.0	24.0

Source: IPPAS

Part V
Reconciliation of Work and Family

Chapter 13
Preferences Regarding Reconciliation of Family and Professional Life Versus Reality

Majda Černič Istenič and Andrej Kveder

Abstract An increasing amount of research suggests that a substantial proportion of men, and of women in particular, experience conflict between work and family roles. How these roles are combined and priorities as to how they should be combined to improve the quality of family and working life have not been fully explored, especially not within an international framework. In the present contribution, the differences between actual and desired working hours arrangements among both men and women in selected PPAS countries are studied and compared with their current and preferred additional numbers of children. Additionally, current and preferred working hours arrangements are analysed by individuals' socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics. The results indicate that both actual and preferred employment is influenced by respondents' actual and additionally expected numbers of children, however differently for men and women. The gender, age and education of the respondents have been proven to be significant determinants of actual and preferred working arrangements, whereas the respondents' attitudinal characteristics did not reveal a uniform picture of influence among countries.

Keywords: Actual and preferred working-hours arrangements · Reconciliation of work and family · Actual number of children · Additionally expected number of children

13.1 Introduction

Today, dual-earner families have become increasingly the norm (Roxburgh 1999), and the prevailing employment paradigm expects individuals to work approximately 40 hours per week in order to be considered as legitimate employees (Rubin and Riney 1994). An increasing amount of research indicates that, due to these dual

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normative expectations, a substantial proportion of men and women experience conflict between work and family roles (Graenglass, Pantony and Burke 1989; Hochschild 1997; Moen 1992; Ross, Mirowsky and Goldstein 1990). The processes of work-family interaction have been conceptualised in the literature in terms such as role strain, role conflict, role ambiguity, spillover, stress contagion, work-to-family and family-to-work conflict, work-family fit and work/family balance (Campbell 2000; Clarke et al. 2004; Long Dilworth 2004; McManus et al. 2002; Netemeyer et al. 2004, Shumate and Fulk 2004).

Since women undertake a greater share of household labour and childcare, women with children are overloaded with work relative to fathers and women without children. That would diminish the satisfaction which a mother derives from both her family and from her job, and would lead to her having greater social role-related tensions and conflicts than women without children (Warren and Johnson 1995). Work overload may be particularly likely among working mothers when expectations as to their roles are high, and simultaneously resources and measures to reconcile these multiple roles are lacking. Most research has also demonstrated that the higher number of children in the household, and their lower age, significantly increase these negative effects (e.g. Long Dilworth 2004). Consequently, a need for employment schedules that are more amenable to the integration of paid work and family demands is becoming increasingly apparent (Chait Barnett and Gareis 2000). In this regard, part-time work can be considered as one of the possible solutions to this problem which offers a sort of compromise between the firms' needs and the needs of women and men as to the reconciliation of work and family life (Laufer 2003).

In the present article, both favourable and unfavourable impacts of part-time work on women's employment careers, their patterns of reconciliation between the demands of family and gainful employment, and as a consequence the impact of women's labour force participation on their demographic behaviour, were discussed on the basis of an increasing amount of literature which is available on these issues. Main statements and findings of previous studies were taken into account to formulate starting-points for research in that chapter. Our first aim was to explore the relationship between actual and desired working hours arrangements and the number of children among men and women in the PPAS countries. The analysis distinguished between the current number of children and the number of additionally expected children, as well as between two major groups of respondents: those aged 20–35 and those aged 36–49 years. We also examined interrelationships between actual and desired working hours arrangements and socio-demographic characteristics of individuals to demonstrate heterogeneous patterns observed among the populations under study. Finally, actual and desired working hours arrangements were referred to attitudinal characteristics of individuals. For this purpose, a set of attitudinal variables were identified, encompassing respondents' views on life values, gender roles, marriage, having children, lifestyles, forms of childcare and religiosity. By using the two-stage cluster analysis, respondents' main typology was identified and compared with preferences for working hours arrangements.

13.2 The Research Background

As recent debates about women's employment indicate, the part-time work alternative has no one single meaning. A review of the literature regarding part-time employment (Hoque and Kirkpatrick 2003; Walsh 1999) reveals that part-time jobs are not homogenous, but highly segmented. They are composed of retention jobs that mean permanent, predictable, regular working hours and scheduling arrangements, on the one hand, and of secondary part-time jobs marked by lower compensation, few prospects for advancement and greater scheduling flexibility, on the other hand. Part-time workers have different motivations for such work arrangements, either to supplement their own or their household's income, or to manage more easily overall family responsibilities. Furthermore, the part-time workforce is also segmented on a voluntary or involuntary basis, depending upon the availability of full-time jobs and childcare facilities. Part-time jobs can be taken up voluntarily by categories of workers that otherwise would not have acquired access to the labour market (Wielers and van der Meer 2003). It may also rely upon the varying importance of employment relative to other life goals that may vary over time, depending upon the overall work context and the family life cycle.

Some previous research on part-time work (Hakim 1996) revealed that women part-time workers do not necessarily feel trapped in such work arrangements, as one might expect, as long as they have the opportunity to choose among different "work-lifestyle" options. Other authors have stressed the dual disadvantage faced by women who work part-time, namely their inferior position in the labour market, as characterised by their perceived lower commitment to work and absence from prime labour market positions and the invisibility of the work they perform in the household (Stier, Lewin-Epstein 2000).

Surveys on female employment have traditionally focussed on their behaviour, but have neglected insight into their choices, preferences, motivations or attitudes (Clarkberg and Moen 2001; Hakim 1996, 2003; Walsh 1999). Other more qualitative research (Jackson and Scharman 2002) has stressed that the importance which women ascribe both to work and family time highly corresponds with their inclination to create for themselves a more flexible career that does not require an "either/or" choice, and that involves their partners playing an important role in this process. Relatively scarce research into attitudes and preferences concerning work and family life has focused mostly on women as caregivers, particularly mothers with young children (European Commission 1997). Less attention, however, has been given to men. Previous studies reveal that there are significant links between expressed preferences and socio-demographic characteristics such as age, education, and income.

In addition to a rise in women's employment, the last four decades have also seen a drop in fertility. Being overtaxed with paid work and family obligations may lead to men and women deciding to have a smaller number of children. Clarkberg and Moen (2001, 1117) argue that "it is likely that today's dual-earner families have fewer children at least partly in response to the demands of their jobs". Comparisons between fertility rates and female economic activity rates in EU

Member States (European Commission 1997) indicated that the relationship is not very clear despite these two related trends. However, recently-calculated employment and fertility rates in the EU 25 (European Commission 2006) definitely indicate that these two developments are interconnected. Indeed, the lowest fertility levels coexist with low female employment rates in Italy, Greece, Spain and some former socialist countries (Poland, Slovakia and Hungary), while high fertility is accompanied by high female employment rates in the Nordic countries and in France.

Therefore, following a view by Brewster and Rindfuss (2000, 271) that "women's labour force behaviour lies at the heart of most explanations of fertility and fertility change", one ought to seek measures which allow women and couples to combine employment with having children.

Guerrina (2002, 52) has stated that "forecasts regarding the impact of current demographic trends on economic growth are forcing most Western European governments to reconsider traditional divisions between the public and private spheres, and to promote policies seeking to help men and women to reconcile employment and parenting". The focus on flexible forms of employment, working hours and reconciliation of work and family life is apparent in the policy concerns of the European Union, which has promoted a range of directives on working hours, parental leave and part-time workers rights, such as the Parental Leave Directive and Part-Time Work Directive (Bleijenbergh et al. 2004; Cousins and Tang 2004; Lewis and Smithson 2001). The Directive on part-time work guarantees part-time workers of both genders formal equality with full-time workers (equal treatment within the labour market regarding wages and working conditions), but not material equality (a minimum level of social welfare in the form of a living wage), the latter being left to the national social security systems in each Member State (Bleijenbergh et al. 2004). The commitment to strengthen equal opportunities policies and promote flexible employment and reconciliation of work and family life is also expressed in the European Employment Strategy (Cousins and Tang 2004; Hardy and Adnett 2002), and additionally in the European Commission's 2002 Employment Guidelines (Hardy and Adnett 2002).

However, the relationships between the growth of female employment, extensions of non-standard working arrangements and demographic, social and cultural changes occurring across Europe are complex. It has been suggested that significant national differences in these contextual factors owing to different national regulatory frameworks and traditions shape the diversity of experience in reconciling work and family within the EU (Hardy and Adnett 2002; Perrons 1999; Stier and Lewin-Epstein 2000). Cousins and Tang (2004) suggest that these national differences are influenced by the nature of different welfare state regimes and the particular gender order underpinning them. In this respect, national differences in the decline of the traditional "male breadwinner" family model and the extent to which "one-and-a-half breadwinners" or "dual-earner" models have replaced this model are of crucial importance (Hardy and Adnett 2002). The social organisation of work and childcare in different national contexts influences both the acceptability of combining paid work for mothers with small children, and men's involvement in childcare and housework. Within this perspective, a need to consider the labour

force status of each partner in a couple becomes apparent, as fertility and labour force decisions of both members of a couple are closely related (Baizán 2004).

Taking into account the above evidence, our study focused on actual and preferred working hours arrangements of individuals, both women and men. It is assumed that practised and preferred working hours arrangements depend upon the demands of family life, which are operationalised by the number of children, both current and additionally expected. In other words, the number of children is considered as an indicator of family obligations. Furthermore, we expected that individuals with a higher number of children would practice and prefer part-time working arrangements, or even no employment, more frequently than individuals with a lower number of children. Moreover, individuals with different socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, partnership union, age of the youngest child) as well as attitudinal characteristics (such as life values, views of gender roles and family values) practice and prefer different working hours arrangements. Gender is considered to be a major factor in differences regarding both actual and preferred work arrangements. It is expected that women would be engaged less frequently than men in full-time work and satisfied with their current work arrangements. It is also expected that people, especially women, working full-time and caring for small children would prefer to reduce their workload. Additionally, more family- and child-oriented people would tend to show a higher interest in part-time employment, or even in not being employed at all, in comparison to those individuals who are more inclined to change lifestyles (approval of alternative family forms, childlessness, single parenthood, etc.).

13.3 Methods

The first part of the analysis is descriptive in nature, and in comparative terms shows the actual working hours arrangements and preferred change as related to the current and additionally anticipated number of children. Working hours arrangements were operationalised into three distinct categories:

1. Full-time work – working hours corresponding to a nationally-defined minimum (e.g. 40 hours per week),
2. Part-time work – working hours corresponding to less than full-time, most commonly associated with half-time (e.g. 20 hours per week), and
3. No job – refers to non-working respondents; this category includes unemployed persons (i.e. those who want to work but cannot find a job), and persons who are economically inactive (i.e. persons outside the labour market, who have no job and are not seeking work).

Selected socio-demographic variables including gender, age, education, marital status and the age of the youngest child were used to examine their influence on preferences regarding working hours arrangements. For analytical purposes, certain variables were transformed from their original measurement scales. Three distinct

age groups of respondents were identified: respondents younger than 30, those 30–39 years old, and those 40–49 years old. The education scale was also reduced to three categories: primary or low level of secondary education, secondary and other non-university education, and university and higher education. Marital status was defined in its broader sense, and thus four distinct categories were formed:

- no partner,
- LAT – living-apart-together (non-residential union), but still living within the parental home,
- LAT alone – living-apart-together (non-residential union), and living on one's own (i.e. not within the parental home), and
- cohabitation – partners living together, either married or in a consensual union.

On the basis of preliminary analyses, 37 variables were chosen for the second part of the analysis:

1. respondent's socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, marital status), and
2. respondents' attitudes with regard to satisfaction with living conditions, life values, views on gender roles, value attached to marriage, value attached to children, views on lifestyles, views on forms of childcare and religiosity.

A list of cases with missing values was employed, and thus only respondents having valid values on all the selected variables were entered into the analysis (n=8,319). Exploratory segmentation models were run in order to discover any distinct groupings of individuals, based on the selected characteristics. A two-stage clustering procedure was selected for this task:

1. Hierarchical clustering was estimated using the squared Euclidian distance and Ward's method of calculating the distance among the groups. On the basis of the dendrogram, the most likely number of clusters was selected, and group centroids were estimated.
2. Local optimisation clustering using the K-means method clarified the groups of cases identified with the hierarchical procedure. Thus, the final segmentation of the individuals was achieved.

Due to the relatively large number of units, the first phase (hierarchical) of the clustering procedure had to be adjusted. Ten sub-samples, approximately ten percent in size, were drawn from all the respondents selected for the analysis. Hierarchical clustering procedures were run separately on each of the sub-samples, and the most probable number of clusters was determined. The most stable distribution (i.e. the most frequently occurring number of clusters) was selected as the most appropriate one and used as the group centroids entered into the local optimisation phase.

After the final clusters had been estimated, the main characteristics of the groups were identified. A relative measure of difference between the overall mean and the group mean was calculated. The relative measure was defined as the log of the relative difference. The groups' means showing the highest deviation from the overall

mean were identified as the main group characteristics. The exploratory groups as defined by the segmentation were then investigated in the comparative contingency tables across the groups of working hours preferences and different countries.

A note of caution has to be imposed on the results presented in the first section of the results. Due to very scarcely populate categories of the observed variables, some of the presented results may not be especially reliable. An asterisk (*) designates all the data cells containing fewer than ten units. This deficiency of the presented results can be mainly attributed to the fact that those categories present a relatively negligible portion of the population. However, some of those scarce sub-groups can be considered as substantively different from others, thus justifying their inclusion in the presented results. A larger sample would be needed in order to increase the level of reliability of the estimates.

13.4 Actual and Preferred Work Arrangements and the Number of Children

Results concerning interrelations between the current work arrangement or its preferred change and the number of children which the individual currently has or would like to have are presented for four major subgroups, defined according to age and gender. The lower age group encompasses women and men aged 20 to 35 years, while 36 and 49 years of age limit the higher age group. Firstly, findings for the pooled samples are shown. Secondly, cross-country differences are discussed.

Looking at the current number of children, young women who prefer to work part-time (i.e. they work part-time and do not want to change) and those with no job, had the largest number of children (1.18 and 1.11 respectively). Half of the women with part-time work arrangements who would have liked to change it already had fewer than one child (0.93). Fully-employed women had considerably fewer children (no change preferred 0.56 and preferred change 0.55). Women who did not want to remain jobless revealed the fewest children (0.42) among all the groups.

Men showed a very straightforward pattern of childbearing. The relation between the number of children and their activity was positive, meaning that those who were more active (full-time employment) had the most children, while those with no job had the fewest.

The results presented in Table 13.1 show the relationship between the number of children and work preference across selected countries.

Younger men demonstrated a tendency to have fewer children when their work involvement decreased (Table 13.1). This downward trend was most pronounced for Italian and Polish men, whereas in the Netherlands men who preferred to work part-time tended to have the most children (0.4). Furthermore, men working full-time who would have preferred to change their work commitment had more children than those who preferred to work full-time, with the exceptions of Estonia, Lithuania and the Netherlands. Young women who preferred to work part-time or who were jobless reported the highest number of children.

Table 13.1 The median number of children by actual and preferred working hours arrangements and gender (respondents aged 20–35 years)

Country	Full-time NC		Full-time C		Part-time NC		Part-time C		No job NC		No job C	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Belgium (Flanders)	0.4	0.2	0.6*	0.5	0.7*	1.4	0.5*	1.0	0.0*	1.4	0.0	0.2
Estonia	0.7	0.8	0.6*	0.5	0.0*	2.0*	0.5*	1.3*	0.0*	0.0	0.1	0.3
Eastern Germany	0.3	0.4	0.4*	0.4	0.2*	1.3	0.2*	0.8	0.8*	0.6	0.1	0.6
Western Germany	0.2	0.2	0.3*	0.1	0.3*	1.6	0.0*	0.8	0.0*	0.8	0.1	0.5
Italy	0.3	0.2	0.4*	0.4	0.1*	0.7	0.1*	0.4	0.0*	1.0	0.0	0.4
Lithuania	0.9	1.2	0.9*	1.1	1.3*	0.9	0.3*	0.5	0.5*	1.5	0.4	1.0
The Netherlands	0.3	0.1	0.2*	0.0	0.4*	0.9	0.3*	0.8	0.0*	1.2	0.0	0.1
Poland	0.7	0.9	1.0*	1.2	1.1*	2.4	0.3*	1.5	0.6*	1.0	0.2	0.6
Slovenia	0.6	0.8	0.8*	1.1	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	1.4	0.0	0.2
Cyprus	0.5	0.6	0.8*	0.8	0.3*	2.3*	0.3*	1.6*	0.0*	1.7	0.1	0.6

Source: IPPAS

Note:* - low reliability of estimates; M - male, F - female; NC - no change, C - change

Part-time employment and unemployment among older women also resulted in more children (from 1.91 to 2.11) when compared to women who were employed full-time (1.73 and 1.77). Men showed a slightly different and inconsistent pattern. Men aged 36–49 who were dissatisfied with their non-working status reported the largest families (1.82). Men who preferred to work part-time reported the fewest children. That kind of arrangement, and preferences towards it, was evidently not very common for the male population in the active segment of their lives.

Cross-country comparisons of older respondents (Table 13.2) show a clear tendency towards a higher number of children prevailing among men preferring to work full-time (in Italy, the Netherlands and Cyprus) or not (in Belgium (Flanders) and Poland), as well as among those who preferred to be jobless (in Western Germany and Slovenia) or not working who wanted a change (Western Germany). The part-time working arrangement among men, whether by preference or not, seems to result in the lowest reported number of children in the majority of the countries under study.

Older women who preferred not to work tended to have the highest number of children. This pattern can be observed in Belgium (Flanders), Western Germany, Italy, Lithuania and Poland. Women working full-time who did not want to change had the fewest children in almost all the countries observed. Preferences to reduce workload under full-time work arrangements were characteristic of women with more children. The exceptions were Estonian and Lithuanian women working full-time who did not want to change, who had more children than women who wanted to work less.

Table 13.2 The median number of children by actual and preferred working hours arrangement and gender (respondents aged 36–49 years)

Country	Full-time NC		Full-time C		Part-time NC		Part-time C		No job NC		No job C	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Belgium (Flanders)	1.7	1.5	1.8	1.6	1.4*	1.9	2.2*	2.1	0.8	2.3	0.9	1.8
Estonia	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.7		2.0*	2.2	1.9*	1.7	1.8	2.0*	2.0
Eastern Germany	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.2	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.8
Western Germany	1.3	0.7	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.8	0.6	1.9	1.5	2.0	1.6	1.9
Italy	1.5	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.0*	1.6*	0.6*	1.7*	2.0*	1.9	1.4	1.9
Lithuania	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.7		2.1	1.5	1.6	2.0	2.1	1.8	1.6
The Netherlands	1.7	0.4	1.5	1.0	1.4	1.9	1.1	2.2	2.0*	2.0	1.3	1.7
Poland	2.2	2.1	2.6	2.4	1.9*	2.6*	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.2	2.3
Slovenia	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.0*	2.4*	1.8*	1.9*	1.5	2.4	1.9	2.0
Cyprus	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.0*	2.2*	2.7*	2.3*	0.0*	3.0	1.6	2.6

Source: IPPAS

Note:* - low reliability of estimates; M - male, F - female; NC - no change, C - change

No data are available for Estonia and Lithuania concerning part-time arrangement with no change for men

The introduction of the additional number of children entails additional complexity when it comes to understanding both sets of preferences for change: that of the working schedule, as well as the preference to have more children. Therefore, on the one hand, young non-working women who were seeking work wished to have the highest number of additional children (1.25). On the other hand, the wish to change from part-time employment was accompanied by a desire to have the fewest additional children (0.60). The preferences expressed by young men were similar to those of young women, with both employment categories scoring the highest and lowest numbers of additional children (1.57 and 0.81, respectively).

Looking at the country comparison (Table 13.3), the pattern of preferences about additional children among younger men from the whole sample can also be observed for Belgian (Flemish), Estonian, Eastern and Western Germans, Polish, Romanian and Slovenian young men. Therefore, men who did not want to stay jobless expressed the highest desired fertility. The lowest number can be observed among men currently working part-time who would like to change. Deviations from this pattern can be seen for Italy, Lithuania and Cyprus.

The highest median of the additionally-expected children of young women is associated with dissatisfaction either with the "no job" status, or with working full-time, whereas the lowest values refer to both groups of part-timers. Women from Belgium (Flanders), Estonia, Poland and Slovenia belonged to those who were dissatisfied with the "no job" status, whilst women from Eastern and Western Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were not satisfied with full-time work. Women from Lithuania and Cyprus differ from that pattern.

Table 13.3 The median of the number of additional children by actual and preferred working hours arrangements and gender (respondents aged 20–35 years)

	Full-time NC		Full-time C		Part-time NC		Part-time C		No job NC		No job C	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Belgium (Flanders)	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.5*	0.3	0.0*	0.4	1.4	1.3
Estonia	1.2	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.5*	0.0*	0.7*	0.6	1.0*	2.8	2.1	1.8
Eastern Germany	0.6	0.7	0.5	1.1	0.0*	0.4	1.0*	0.4	0.7*	0.7	1.0	0.9
Western Germany	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.3	0.6*	0.4	2.0*	0.8	1.6	0.8	0.8	0.9
Italy	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.1	1.1	1.0	2.5*	1.0	1.8	1.5
Lithuania	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.9	1.5*	0.6	0.7*	0.4	1.3	0.6
The Netherlands	1.1	0.1	1.8	2.0	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	7.0*	1.0	1.2	2.0
Poland	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.4*	0.4	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.7
Romania	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.1*						0.4	1.1	0.8
Slovenia	1.1	0.6	1.2*	0.7	1.0*	3.0*	0.8*	0.0*	0.0*	0.4	1.9	1.7
Cyprus	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.0*	0.6*	1.0*	1.0	0.0*	0.7	1.2	1.0

Source: IPPAS

Note: * - low reliability of estimates; M - male, F - female; NC - no change, C - change No data are available for Romania as to part-time arrangement for both genders and no job with no change for men

For older women (36–49 years), the highest median of the additional number of children was found among those who would change their full-time work and who preferred to work part-time (0.06 and 0.05 respectively). Women who were dissatisfied with part-time work and who were jobless expected the lowest numbers of children (0.03 and 0.02 respectively). Men showed a different pattern again – the more they were involved in their working life, the more children they expected in the future. Indeed, both groups of full-timers expected the highest median number of additional children (0.10 and 0.14 respectively), while the jobless expected the lowest numbers (0.02).

Cross-country comparisons referring to older respondents (36–49 years) indicated that most of the respondents did not want an additional child, regardless of their work arrangements.

Women's increasing labour market participation was associated with a lower number of children, and thus women tended to have less and less time for their family obligations. However, in spite of their high degree of involvement in professional work, they still expressed a wish to have more children. Men tended to utilise their full-time employment to provide for their family since they reported the highest number of children. Furthermore, fully-employed men also wished to have more children.

13.5 Actual and Preferred Work Arrangements by Respondents' Socio-Demographic Characteristics

Respondents with different socio-demographic characteristics tend to have different preferences regarding working hours arrangements. Preferences of respondents aged 20–49 were therefore examined across different socio-demographic categories in a cross-country perspective. Looking at actual and preferred working hours arrangements by gender, the cross-country comparison reveals some major differences, which in turn are also statistically significant (Fig. 13.1).

Men more frequently worked full-time, and preferred to do so, than women did. The exceptions were Western Germans, where the majority of men expressed their preferences to downscale their full-time work. Relatively strong preferences for change (about 20%) were also observed among Eastern Germans, Italians, the Dutch and Belgians (Flanders). Involuntary non-activity was the second most frequently reported working hours arrangement among men, particularly in the post-socialist countries. The proportion of non-working men in these countries varied from 40% in Estonia to 21% in Slovenia. Women more frequently preferred to change their full-time employment, with the exception of women in Western and Eastern Germany and the Netherlands, who more often preferred to work part-time (particularly the Dutch) or not to work at all. Women from former socialist countries rarely worked part-time. In general, women tended to prefer a change in their working hours arrangements. Belgian (Flemish), Western German, Italian, Lithuanian, Slovenian and Cypriot women would like to decrease their workload, while women from Estonia, Eastern Germany, Italy, Poland and Romania would like to increase it.

Preferences regarding working hours arrangements also tend to change with age (Fig. 13.2). The differences observed among three age groups (under 30, 30–39 and 40–49) were statistically significant in all countries except Cyprus and Estonia.



Fig. 13.1 Actual and preferred working hours arrangements by gender
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 13.2 Actual and preferred working hours arrangements by age
Source: IPPAS

The preference to work full-time increased with age. In the majority of countries the oldest respondents most frequently worked full-time without any preference to change. The exceptions were Belgium (Flanders), Romania and Slovenia, where those satisfied with a full-time job prevailed in the middle age group (30–39 years). Other working hours preferences constituted a quite heterogeneous group. However, the younger respondents were predominantly not working in all the countries studied.

Education also proved to be an important factor for preferred working hours arrangements (Fig. 13.3). The observed differences proved to be statistically significant (except in Estonia, where the chi-square tests were inconclusive).

When it comes to higher education, the preferences to work less than full time were stronger in the majority of countries. At the same time, the proportion of those preferring to work full-time was highest among respondents with a university education. The exceptions were Belgium (Flanders) and Italy, where the proportions of full-timers were similar in all educational categories. The situation among part-time workers is rather unclear, and is also obscured in the majority of countries due to the very low proportions of the population in those categories. The picture is more homogeneous for those without a job. The proportions of non-working respondents were highest among the less well-educated in almost all the countries.

The results presented above showed rather unambiguous patterns of working hours arrangements across gender, age groups and education. By contrast, comparisons of working hours preferences across different ages of the youngest child and marital statuses did not reveal a clear picture.



Fig. 13.3 Actual and preferred working hours arrangements by education
Source: IPPAS

Upon inspection of working hours preferences across different ages of the youngest child, the differences do not appear to be highly pronounced (Fig. 13.4). However, tests confirmed the statistically-significant differences in Belgium (Flanders), Western Germany, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Poland. There was no statistically-significant variation in Italy, while the statistical tests were inconclusive in other countries.

The proportions of non-working respondents tended to decrease with the age of the youngest child in countries such as Estonia, Eastern and Western Germany, Lithuania and Poland. The Dutch showed a rather unique picture, given that the proportions of non-working respondents increased when the youngest child grew older. Furthermore, the Dutch also demonstrated the most pronounced pattern of preferring to work part-time in terms of devoting additional time to the child in its earlier years.

Similar to the age of the youngest child, the marital status of the respondent did not differ greatly when it came to working hours preferences (Fig. 13.5). The differences observed were however statistically significant in Belgium (Flanders), Eastern and Western Germany, Italy, Lithuania and Romania.

The results in both categories of full-timers, those with “no change” and those with “change”, showed a rather diverse picture. Only those respondents who preferred to work part-time showed some common attributes. Among them, it was mainly those who were living together with their partners who prevailed, particularly in countries where part-time work is most widespread (in Belgium (Flanders), Western Germany and the Netherlands). Those who were cohabiting also prevailed among respondents who preferred not to work part-time (in Belgium (Flanders), Estonia, Western and Eastern Germany and the Netherlands). Conversely, those who



Fig. 13.4 Actual and preferred working hours arrangements by the age of the youngest child Source: IPPAS

did not have or live with a partner predominated among respondents without a job. This was particularly true for the "no job" respondents who wanted to change their status.

13.6 Actual and Preferred Work Arrangements by Attitudinal Characteristics of Respondents

The two-stage clustering procedure, described in Section 13.3, led to four distinctive clusters of respondents with respect to their attitudinal characteristics. Table 13.4 offers a brief overview of the newly-identified clusters, while the detailed overview of all the variables included across the four clusters can be seen in Table 13.5 in the Appendix.

The respondents belonging to the first group can be characterised as individuals who positively evaluated alternative forms of family, preferred non-marital cohabitation over marriage, accepted single parenthood or not having any children, and also approved of divorce as an acceptable way of dissolving a union. Members of the second group had more moderate views regarding changing lifestyles, marriage and



Fig. 13.5 Actual and preferred working hours arrangements by partnership union
Source: IPPAS

consensual unions in comparison to the first group. The third group was composed mainly of people with a strong traditional sense of marriage, and also attaching greater importance to religious beliefs. However, they are predominantly not married, and are not in favour of parenthood. The members of the fourth group did not perceive marriage as an ideal form of partnership, while they were in favour of parenthood as an important value. They were also the least religious group.

A statistical comparison of differences in the working hours preferences expressed across the four clusters gave highly-significant results. Those who preferred to work full-time, on the one hand, embraced changes in lifestyle while, on the other hand, they perceived marriage as a traditional institution and expressed strong religious beliefs (46 and 39%, respectively). Respondents with moderate views constituted a majority among full-time workers with a preference for change (in 24% of cases). Those who preferred to work part-time were predominantly oriented towards parenthood (11%). Respondents working part-time with a preference for a change

Table 13.4 Segmentation according to acquired subset of variables

Group	Description
1	Those who positively evaluate changing lifestyles: alternative forms of family, non-marital cohabitation, single parenthood, childlessness, divorce
2	Those with moderate views, equally in favour of marriage and non-marital cohabitation
3	Those strongly in favour of marriage, but not in favour of parenthood, those most religious, unmarried.
4	Those not in favour of marriage but in favour of parenthood, the least religious

mostly expressed either strong preferences towards parenthood (6.4%) or positive statements towards changing lifestyles (6.7%). Among respondents who preferred to remain jobless, those in favour of marriage as a traditional institution prevailed (9%). Non-working respondents seeking employment predominantly expressed positive attitudes towards changing lifestyles (34%).

The cross-country comparison of attitudes and preferences for working hours arrangements (Fig. 13.6), however, showed a rather less unambiguous picture than the overall results presented above. Statistically-significant interrelations between attitudes and working hours preferences could only be observed in three out of seven of the countries analysed (Western Germany, the Netherlands and Poland).

Less than a fifth of the members of the group with mostly moderate views and the most traditional respondents (Group 3) from Western Germany were employed full-time and did not want to change. More than half of Dutch people who held positive attitudes towards changing lifestyles were employed part-time. Furthermore, 25% of more traditional respondents from the Netherlands were not in work, and did not wish to work. Two-thirds of those in favour of alternative forms of family in Lithuania were not working. Relatively high proportions of non-working respondents among those who approved of changing lifestyles could also be observed in Estonia, Eastern Germany, Poland and Slovenia.



Fig. 13.6 Actual and preferred working hours arrangements by groups of respondents' values Source: IPPAS

13.7 Conclusions

The results of the comparative analyses correspond to our expectations, as well as to those based on the results of previous research already discussed in the first part of the article. In spite of a considerable degree of heterogeneity among selected countries due to the different social and cultural contexts, our initial hypotheses have been confirmed in general.

The number of children proved to be an important factor associated with the actual and preferred working hours arrangements, and can thus be considered as a proxy for family obligations. In the majority of the countries under study, women's increasing labour market participation has been shown to be negatively associated with the number of children the women reported to have, regardless of their age. Therefore, women preferring to work full-time had considerably fewer children than those who either preferred to work part-time or not to work at all. Although women aged 36–49 and satisfied with their full-time employment reported that they had fewer children, they also who would like to have more children. They represent an important share of women who would like to have more children, together with young women who do not work and are dissatisfied with their work status.

Men turned out to be quite distinct from women as regards their working hours preferences and the number of children they have. They also showed a less uniform pattern since the men with the most children were either in full-time employment, or were aged 36–49 and not working. However, young men dissatisfied with their non-working status wished to have more children in the future. In addition, men who were employed full-time also expressed similar preferences for additional children.

It has also been established that gender, age and education are important factors associated with the respondents' actual and preferred working arrangements. Preference for full-time work was more characteristic of men, and of older and more highly-educated respondents, than of women, younger and less well-educated respondents. Preferences for part-time work were more a characteristic of women and middle-aged respondents. A cross-country comparison of part-time work by educational categories has showed quite a diverse picture. In some countries (Western Germany, Slovenia and Cyprus) less well educated respondents were more likely to work part-time, whereas in some other countries (Eastern Germany, Italy, Lithuania and the Netherlands), part-time work was more characteristic of higher-educated persons.

The analysis of associations between respondents' attitudinal characteristics and their preferred work arrangements did not bring any general or conclusive observations. Nonetheless, respondents who were more oriented towards children wished to participate in the labour market less actively.

Although some of the cross-country conclusions presented here may only represent an informative statement due to the scarcity of definite employment categories in some countries, the pooled results bore an unquestionable message for policy makers. There is a strong preference to shift from full-time employment towards part-time work. These views are mainly expressed by women aged 30 to 39, in order to reconcile family and work. The growing demand for part-time work is

additionally influenced by young women, those with a lower level of education, and who are dissatisfied with their non-working status. Non-activity is no longer perceived as a favourable situation. Our results confirm that a call to accommodate more people in the labour market, and more women in particular, concurs with preferences expressed by sizeable population groups. Based on the presented results, we can conclude that the problem of reconciliation of family and professional life calls for further attention to be paid by researchers, as well as by policy makers at national and European levels, in order to obtain a better understanding of the problem and to make progress in adjusting the labour market to citizens' family-related needs.

Appendix

Table 13.5 Means of selected variables across the clusters

Variables	Clusters				Total
	1	2	3	4	
Opinion on the increasing number of couples who live together unmarried	1.90	2.87	3.68	2.47	2.89
Opinion on the increasing number of couples who decide to remain childless	2.36	3.86	4.09	3.08	3.59
Opinion on the declining number of marriages	2.06	3.35	3.94	2.83	3.26
Opinion on the declining number of births	2.00	4.12	4.13	3.36	3.73
Opinion on the increasing number of children in a one-parent family	2.33	3.99	4.26	3.63	3.81
Opinion on the increasing number of only children	2.08	3.64	3.86	3.37	3.48
Opinion on the increasing number of persons who live alone	2.49	3.76	3.98	3.21	3.56
Opinion on the increasing number of births among unmarried couples	1.97	3.13	3.98	2.75	3.15
Opinion on the increasing number of divorces	2.32	4.07	4.41	3.81	3.92
Marriage is an outdated institution.	0.45	0.15	0.06	0.37	0.21
A woman should be able to have a child as a single parent if she so desires.	0.42	0.85	0.49	0.80	0.70
Greater emphasis should be placed on family life in the future.	0.89	0.95	0.95	0.76	0.90
A child needs a home with both a father and a mother.	0.82	0.86	0.98	0.45	0.79
Married people are generally happier than unmarried people.	0.38	0.26	0.74	0.08	0.36
People who want children ought to get married.	0.35	0.30	0.87	0.15	0.42
One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together.	0.34	0.51	0.28	0.60	0.45
It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married.	0.77	0.91	0.33	0.95	0.75
It is better to have a bad marriage than no marriage at all.	0.07	0.03	0.12	0.02	0.05

Table 13.5 (continued)

Variables	Clusters				Total
	1	2	3	4	
Marriage is the only acceptable way of living together for a man and a woman.	0.15	0.04	0.55	0.03	0.18
You can only feel completely happy at home with your children.	2.56	2.32	1.62	3.66	2.47
I always enjoy having children near me.	1.74	1.70	1.36	2.91	1.90
You can be perfectly satisfied with life if you have been a good parent.	2.58	2.00	1.54	3.22	2.22
I like having children because they really need you.	1.86	1.82	1.53	3.12	2.05
It is your duty towards society to have children.	2.82	2.92	2.09	4.04	2.95
You can not be really happy without having children.	2.77	2.76	2.25	4.05	2.93
The closest relationship you can have with anyone is with your own child.	2.04	2.04	1.78	3.09	2.22
Women are less ambitious at work than men.	3.22	3.70	3.57	3.63	3.60
The job should be more important to a man than the family.	3.93	4.11	3.95	4.13	4.05
Working women are highly respected.	2.72	2.86	2.77	2.88	2.83
It is good for a child's development to be taken care of by family members/friends at an early age.	1.91	2.32	2.25	2.65	2.34
Children kept in a day-care centre most of the week have a bigger chance of problems later in life.	2.88	3.37	2.70	3.26	3.12
The best childcare is by their own parents.	1.79	1.79	1.44	2.08	1.77
Age of respondent (in years)	32.41	34.39	36.55	33.86	34.64
What role does religion play in your life?	2.67	2.62	1.75	3.18	2.52
Highest level of education	4.36	4.38	4.08	4.47	4.32
Married	0.45	0.47	0.28	0.45	0.41
Male	0.44	0.46	0.48	0.54	0.48

Source: own calculations based on the IPPAS data.

Chapter 14
Reconciliation of Work and Family Within Different Institutional Settings

Irena E. Kotowska and Anna Matysiak

Abstract The IPPAS data are used to analyse work-family life arrangements from two perspectives: a desirable increase in female employment, and a highly-desirable rise in fertility. The practised and preferred work-family arrangements are studied in terms of the family-partnership models by employment patterns, with special emphasis being placed on institutional settings. The descriptive analysis is combined with the multinomial logit models, formulated for couples' choices of family-partnership models, as well as for fertility intentions.
Strong preferences for families among women in either full- or part-time employment, and impacts of preferences on the family-partnership models practised, show potential for further increases in female labour force participation. Our analysis confirmed a high relevance of an institutional setting supportive of the work-family balance from the perspective of desirable increases in female employment.
Our hypothesis, namely that fertility intentions would be higher under the welfare regime which is characterised by the lowest level of incompatibility between family and work than within other institutional settings, was not confirmed. However, countries whose welfare regimes provide developed public support for parents (Finland, Belgium (Flanders) and Slovenia) do seem to be more promising in terms of fertility prospects than countries in which the institutional setting enhances polarisation between the male breadwinner and dual-earner models (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania and Poland).

Keywords: Employment patterns · Welfare regime · Reconciliation of work and family · Fertility intentions

14.1 Introduction

Reconciliation of work and family has become one of the fundamental challenges to be faced by European societies. Challenged by the shrinking labour force, as well as

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by the rapid ageing of the population and of the work force taking place in parallel to globalisation and technological change pressures, Europe is searching for solutions to increase its development potential. A rise in female employment is indicated as one of the primary targets to be achieved. However, having more women in paid work could have a negative effect on fertility, which is already at a low level, in turn raising more and more concerns. Therefore, better reconciliation of work and family life is clearly stated as a topic that should be afforded higher priority in the European Union's future social policy (European Commission 2005a, 94 final 2005; Vignon 2005).

Work-family reconciliation issues can be discussed from the perspective of encouraging women's labour market involvement (e.g. Jaumotte 2003; OECD 2001) within the framework of family policies (e.g. Gauthier 2004) or in a combination of labour market and family (fertility) perspectives (e.g. Meulders, Gustafsson (eds.) 2003; Palomba 2003). The present paper adopts the latter approach, i.e. we have presumed that both an increase in female employment, and a rise in fertility, are equally important in Europe. Our focus is on solutions which would get more women into employment, as well as helping more children to be born. Fertility levels in countries with a high female employment level (e.g. the Nordic countries) show that these two targets are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The international data obtained from national surveys carried out between 2000 and 2003 (the Population Policy Acceptance Survey data) make it possible to study how family life is combined with employment in 14 European countries. They represent different stages in family-related developments, the level of economic development and welfare regimes: Austria, Belgium (Flanders), the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovenia (the DIALOG countries). Moreover, the PPAS data offer a unique opportunity to analyse people's preferred work-family life arrangements.

Our first research question refers to interrelationships between practised and preferred work-family life arrangements within different types of institutional settings (work-related settings and family-related policy). The work-family life arrangements are considered in terms of the family-partnership models, to be defined in social research into relationships between employment and family in the second half of the 20th century (Leira 2002), i.e. the male breadwinner model, the modernised male breadwinner model and the dual-earner model. Different institutional settings are classified with regard to the family-employment relationship. By taking into account attitudes towards the family (supportive subsidiarity versus compulsive subsidiarity), the way in which care work is divided (traditional division versus sharing care work) and the structure of the labour market (part-time incidence, rigidity of the labour market) (Trifiletti 1998, based on Meulders, O'Dorchai 2003), it has been proposed to identify institutional settings in terms of the support given to the family-partnership models defined (Kotowska et al. 2005). Results of comparative analyses of both preferred and practised family-partnership models by Kotowska et al. (2005), are used as a starting point to formulate the

multinomial logit model of choices made by couples regarding the labour force participation of both partners: A dependent variable is the family-partnership model practised, while explanatory variables account for both micro-level determinants of choices (respondents' individual characteristics, the family life cycle) as well as macro-level factors (institutional settings). Model estimates are expected to show to what extent the combination of family and employment practised is influenced by preferences concerning work-family life arrangements and welfare regimes. These two variables are crucial for policy implications related to an increase in female employment.

The second research question refers to fertility impacts of the institutional settings which are supportive of different family-partnership models. Assuming that the existing institutional regimes define opportunities for combining work and parenthood, one can ask about their influence on fertility intentions. For that purpose, the multinomial logit model is used with the number of children intended as a dependent variable and explanatory variables which refer to micro- and macro-level factors (individual characteristics of respondents, the family life cycle and institutional settings).

In the paper, we adopted the UN definition of the family nucleus, proposed in 1974 and modified several times to account for the changing patterns of family formation and dissolution. A family is constituted either by a couple (married or cohabiting) with/or without children, or by a lone parent with children. This definition is used in population and housing censuses, as well as in household classifications, as family and non-family households and by family type (see e.g. Hantrais 2005). However, we also analyse in the following by use of the sociological definition of the family distinguishing couples without children from couples with children and by age.

The paper starts from the section which presents the analytical concepts used in our study: family-partnership models which conceptualise reconciling the demands of family and work, their operationalisation in terms of practices and preferences, and the typology of different institutional settings with regard to the family-employment relationship. The subsequent section briefly presents the main findings as to preferred and practised family-partnership models. Next, the results of modelling the choices between different work-family life arrangements are discussed. The last section presents estimates of modelling fertility intentions under different institutional settings.

Since the availability of PPAS data modules differs between countries, country coverage varies for different parts of the analyses presented. For instance, while the data on family-partnership model preferences is available only for eight countries (Belgium (Flanders), Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Romania), the family-partnership models practised can also be studied for the Czech Republic, Germany and Finland. Nevertheless, the lack of information on selected respondents' characteristics in some countries, used as covariates in logit modelling, makes it possible to estimate the choice between different family-partnership models only for the Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders), Slovenia, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. The second model, related to fertility intentions, is

estimated for twelve countries of the DIALOG group (except Romania and Cyprus). In our study we use weighted data for the descriptive and unweighted data for the multivariate analysis.

14.2 Family-Partnership Models and Welfare Regimes – Suggested Analytical Concepts

To study how work is reconciled with family in different countries, we propose to use a concept of family-partnership models which are to be defined in order to conceptualise female employment in terms of combining family and work with gradually-changing female labour market participation (Leira 2002). The male breadwinner model-female homemaker-carer model, which presumes a specialisation of the roles of the mother as a homemaker-carer and the father as an economic provider, the modernised male breadwinner model (female part-time homemaker-carer model) which is based on a concept of sequencing employment and family work by mothers, and the dual breadwinner model – dual carer model, which refers to the shared societal roles of parents (Leira 2002).

Given the increasing female labour market participation which came about after the second World War, the male breadwinner model has been gradually displaced, first by the model where the father is still the main economic provider and the mother's professional work stems from a need to supplement the household income, yet is subordinate to her family duties, and subsequently by the dual-earner model. However, that process is highly diversified across countries, due mostly to a diversity of institutional settings and policy approaches forming the context of work-family reconciliation. The social models range from social democratic in the Scandinavian countries, through conservative in Southern and some Western European countries, to liberal in the United Kingdom and Ireland (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The newly-acceded countries of the European Union form a separate group in this respect, given that their social models are still evolving.

These changes in family-partnership models adequately mirror trends in female labour market participation which have taken place over the last three decades. A notable increase in female labour market participation has been accompanied by changes in the age profiles of their economic activity. The single-peaked pattern, as well as the bimodal curve, are gradually shifted towards the inverted U-shaped distribution. These shifts in age patterns are related, inter alia, to changes in combining work with family life, and to a gradual displacement of the male breadwinner model by the modernised male breadwinner model and the dual-earner model. Ideational age-specific patterns as viewed over the life cycle reflect strategies to reconcile work and family in general. The single-peaked pattern of economic activity represents the full withdrawal of women from the labour market after starting a family. The bimodal curve describes two strategies of work-family reconciliation: A notable group among mothers opts for temporary career-breaks to care for small children, while others withdraw from the labour market indefinitely. The inverted U-shaped

pattern of female economic activity refers to a situation in which women remain on the labour market regardless of their stage in the family life cycle (Kotowska et al. 2005). Remaining cross-country differences in female labour force participation illustrate the diversity of strategies adopted and transitions from the male breadwinner model to other models.[1]

To operationalise the family-partnership models practised by couples, the PPAS data on employment of both women and men have been taken jointly along with their family status (a couple without children, a couple with children). Employment data made it possible to distinguish between full- and part-time work.[2] Our data unfortunately do not make it possible to identify the modernised male breadwinner model which reflects sequencing employment and family work by mothers. We assume that this model refers to combining family with work on a part-time basis by mothers. Similarly, we can identify couples with dual earners, but cannot account for sharing care duties. Again, we assume that the dual-earner model refers to couples with equal male and female labour market participation.

The family-partnership models practised have been defined as follows[3]:

- the male breadwinner model: a male as an economic provider, having a full- or part-time job, while the female stays at home,
- the modernised male breadwinner model: a male has full-time job, while the female works part-time,
- the dual breadwinner model (dual-earner model): either both have full-time jobs or both work part-time.

Analyses of people's preferences for work-family arrangements were based on the survey questions about desired ways to combine parenthood and work. The question was directed to both women and men. All respondents were asked to choose the best work-family life arrangement for themselves and their partners. The answers were grouped as follows in order to describe family-partnership model preferences:

- the male breadwinner model: if a full-/part-time job and children or a full-/part-time job and no children was declared to be the best solution for men, and no job when children are present or the children are young for women,

[1] As shown by Burniaux et al. (2004), participation rates of prime-age males for the OECD countries vary only slightly across countries, while those of older workers reveal the largest disparities, followed by juveniles (15–24 years old) and by prime-age women (Burniaux et al. 2004, 86–87).

[2] Despite the fact that, unlike the labour force surveys, the PPAS did not apply a strict definition of employment, full- and part-time work, the results of the study are consistent with the findings of other studies carried out in this field (Kotowska et al. 2006).

[3] It should be mentioned that it was not possible to distinguish between the unemployed and inactive among the non-employed. For this reason, the category of male breadwinner model also includes those women who are not in paid work although they would like to have a job and are looking for work. This results in a higher percentage of those who practise this model, particularly in countries where unemployment is high.

- the modernised male breadwinner model: if a full-time job and (no) children was declared to be the best solution for men and a part-time job and (no) children for women,
- the dual-breadwinner model (dual-earner model): if the situation is preferred in which both have either a full-time job and (no) children or a part-time job and (no) children.

Policy regulations relevant to balancing employment with family life include employment policy measures which generally allow for adjustments of workload to the requirements of both employers and employees, and family policy measures which mainly affect women's (mothers') decisions either to stay at work or to leave the labour market. Therefore, reconciliation of work and family should be studied within the broad structural context to be framed in terms of institutional settings (welfare regimes), in which special attention attaches to family-employment relationships.

The typology of welfare regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen in 1990 and modified in 1999 (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999), although widely used, was also a subject of criticism, thus leading to new classification proposals.[4] The proposal formulated by Letablier (1998) and modified by Trifiletti (1998) (based on Meulders, O'Dorchai 2003) was adopted to classify the institutional settings in the DIALOG countries. Letablier's approach devoted a great deal of attention to the different conceptualisation of women's work and the varying degrees of acceptance of the early socialisation of children in analyses of the family-employment relationships. Its extension by Trifiletti took into account attitudes towards the family (supportive subsidiarity versus compulsive subsidiarity), the way in which care work is divided (the traditional division versus sharing care work) and the structure of the labour market (part-time incidence, the rigidity of the labour market). All in all, the types of institutional settings defined according to these aspects can be interpreted in terms of the level of support given to different family-partnership models. That proposal to classify institutional settings in European countries used to the DIALOG countries led to the following groups (Kotowska et al. 2005):

- Austria, Germany and the Netherlands belong to the group which is characterised by the work-family arrangement designated as work-family alternated, i.e. supportive of the modernised breadwinner model. Policies help parents to combine paid work with child-rearing, presuming that the labour market participation of

[4] Critical remarks concerned neglecting gender and arrangements for care provision when defining interrelations between the state, the market and the family, as well as the omission of the Mediterranean countries. Increased attention has been paid since the 1990s in the debate on welfare state regimes to the inclusion of the gender dimension in the welfare state typologies: conceptualisation of women's work, division of paid and unpaid work, and responsibility for care as important dimensions of institutional settings (e.g. Daly, Lewis 2000; Esping-Andersen 2002; Fux 2002, 2004; Gelissen 2002; Gornick et al. 1997; Knijn, Kremer 1997; Korpi, Palme 1998; Leira 2002, Letablier 1998, Lewis, Ostn er 1994; Pfau–Effinger 2000; Trifiletti 1998, 1999).

one parent, most often the mother, is subordinated to family life, i.e. she ceases or reduces her economic activity to raise young children;

- Finland, Belgium and Slovenia are placed in the second group of countries in which public policy aims to improve either gender equality or family well-being, and the situation of women as mothers, and supports reconciliation of employment and family. One can therefore state that there is clear support for the dual-earner model;
- Italy and the post-communist countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, are in the group which covers countries in which state support is weak due to financial constraints. An underdeveloped system of institutional care obliges family networks to substitute state support. Family and employment are in competition, and this leads to polarisation of female labour market participation: Women either withdraw from the labour market or work full-time. One can conclude that there is implicit support for the male breadwinner and dual-earner models.

These groups differ in terms of actual societal opportunities and constraints placed on the roles of women as an economic provider and a home-carer, i.e. in levels of structural incompatibility between family and women's work as defined by Liefbroer and Corijn (1999). The lowest level of structural incompatibility arises in countries in which there is support for the dual-earner model, whilst the highest level refers to those countries in which family and work are in competition.

14.3 Preferences and Practices of Work-Family Life Arrangements

Family-partnership models by employment patterns, both preferred and practised, were analysed for three groups of couples: childless couples, couples with children aged 0–5 and couples with children aged 6–12.

Preferences concerning family-partnership models by country of residence, as well as by the presence and age of the youngest child, are shown in Figs. 14.1 and 14.2.

In general, the most commonly-preferred family-partnership model is the dual-earner model. In most of the post-communist countries, as well as in the Netherlands and Cyprus, the majority of respondents selected this model as their ideal work-family arrangement. The modernised male breadwinner model was the most commonly preferred in Belgium (Flanders) and Italy, while the male breadwinner model was most often selected in Lithuania. All models were opted for in equal measure in Estonia.

Childless respondents, in general, preferred the dual-earner model more often than those with children, and less often the male breadwinner model. The only exceptions were Estonia (where both models were preferred in equal measure, but less frequently than the modernised male breadwinner model) and Lithuania (strong preferences for the male breadwinner by both childless couples and couples with



Fig. 14.1 Preferences for family-partnership models by country of residence, percent of responses classified to a given model (respondents aged 20–49)
Source: IPPAS

children). In Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the preferences of childless respondents are similar to those of respondents whose youngest child is 6–12 years old: in Italy, Belgium (Flanders), the Netherlands and Slovenia couples without children notably more often opted for both spouses to work full-time.

When children were small (0–5 years), respondents opted to reduce mothers' labour force involvement by increasing preferences for part-time work by mothers (except for Estonia and Poland), along with preferences towards their ceasing work altogether (especially in Lithuania and Poland). Respondents with small children in Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland would choose the family-partnership



Fig. 14.2 Preferences regarding family-partnership models by country of residence and age of the youngest child, percentage of responses classified to a given model (respondents aged 20–49)
Source: IPPAS
Notes: MB – male breadwinner model, MMB – modernised male breadwinner model, DE – dual-earner family-partnership model

model relatively more often which entails a woman not being in paid work (at least 30% selected that solution).

Practices related to reconciling family and work are illustrated by Figs. 14.3 and 14.4.

The dual breadwinner model is the most prevalent practice; the modernised male breadwinner model is only the most frequent in the Netherlands. Italy and the post-socialist countries are distinct from the remaining countries in terms of the male breadwinner model being practised as the second most important one, and the modernised male breadwinner model being lived on a marginal scale. Slovenia is an exception due to a strong prevalence of the dual-earner model and the lowest incidence of the male breadwinner model.[5]

The dual breadwinner model is generally less commonly practiced when children are 0–5 years old. This drop in dual earning is the least pronounced in Belgium and Finland. In other countries, different strategies are used to reconcile work and family. In Germany, the dual-earner model is replaced either by part-time employment of mothers or their withdrawal from the labour market. In Italy and the post-socialist countries, mothers either stay in full-employment or leave the labour market. Finland reveals the highest prevalence of dual-earner families or partnerships among countries outside Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, when children are 0–5 years old, mothers' withdrawal from work seems to apply as well.

Comparisons between preferred and practised work-family life arrangements demonstrated that both dual-earner and male breadwinner models were less commonly preferred than practised. In contrast, the modernised male breadwinner



Fig. 14.3 Practised family-partnership models, percentage of couples classified to a given model (respondents aged 20–49)
Source: IPPAS

[5] The lowest incidence of the modernised male breadwinner model in Slovenia results not only from approval of full-time employment as standard. Until 2001, regulations only permitted part-time work on the part of mothers who cared for a child with health problems, as well as of persons who themselves had health troubles.



Fig. 14.4 Practised family-partnership models by couples, the percentage of couples classified to a given model (respondents aged 20–49)
Source: IPPAS
Notes: MB – male breadwinner model, MMB – modernised male breadwinner model, DE – dual-earner model.
Only countries with a sufficient number of observations are presented.

model was more commonly demanded than achieved. There were three exceptions: Lithuania, where the male breadwinner model was more commonly demanded than achieved, and the Netherlands and Romania, where dual earning was more commonly preferred than practised. Additionally, the modernised male breadwinner family was more often practised in the Netherlands than preferred.

In general, strong preferences for families with women in either full- or part-time employment, as well as the discrepancies between preferred and practised work-family arrangements, indicate unsatisfied demand for female labour market participation and show potential for an increase in female employment. That demand varies not only by countries with different institutional settings, but individual characteristics of respondents and the phase of the family life-cycle also contribute towards these differences.

The analytical approach based on modelling the choices between family-partnership models with regard to different determinants therefore offers a greater insight into the potential for increasing employment among different groups of women.

14.4 Practised Family-Partnership Models and Welfare Regimes – Empirical Results

In order to model the choice of work-family life arrangement made by couples within different institutional settings, we estimate a multinomial logit model. In this approach, the odds of practising family-partnership model k as opposed to family-

partnership model k', where k' denotes the dual-earner model, are defined as:

$$\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(Y=k')} = e^{\alpha+\sum_{h=1}^{H}\tau_{jl_h}^{WX_h}},$$

where:

k = a category of the dependent variable, with k' denoting the reference category (in our case the dual-earner model),
h = 1, . . . , H, H – number of covariates X_h,
j = 1, 2, 3 – welfare regime,
$\tau_{jl_h}^{WX_h}$ = estimated parameter describing the influence of the characteristic $X_h = l_h$ in a welfare regime j on the odds of practising family-partnership model k versus family-partnership model k'.

The model was estimated on a sample of 3,311 women aged 20–49 for whom information was available on their preferred family-partnership model and their practices in that respect. This implies studying the following countries:

- The Netherlands, classified into the welfare regime providing alternated arrangements supportive for the modernised male breadwinner model (welfare regime A),
- Belgium (Flanders) and Slovenia, classified into the welfare regime providing public support for the dual-earner model (welfare regime B),
- Estonia, Italy, Lithuania and Poland, classified into the welfare regime enhancing polarisation between the male breadwinner and dual-earner models (welfare regime C).

One should take into account while interpreting the results that the welfare regime providing alternated arrangements supportive of the modernised male breadwinner model is represented by only one country.

In our study we focus mainly on two main determinants of the choice between various family-partnership models under different institutional regimes: the stage in a family life cycle and preferences for work-family arrangements. The family life cycle is operationalised by using the age of the youngest child and a number of children as covariates. Our hypothesis is that under the welfare regime supporting the dual-earner model (regime B), family responsibilities will make women withdraw from employment to a lesser extent than in the other welfare regimes as well as reduce the working hours less often than in welfare regime A, which supports the modernised male breadwinner model. Consequently, due to a lack of public childcare, the male breadwinner model will be most often practised by mothers in welfare regime C, enhancing the polarisation between full-time employment and non-employment, and welfare regime A, which provides alternated arrangements for work and family reconciliation. However, these two welfare regimes differ in

terms of the use of part-time work. In this point a question arises as to whether more part-time employment opportunities in welfare regime A make women withdraw from employment to a lesser extent and (re-)enter employment after childbirth with a higher intensity than in welfare regime C, where a reduction in working hours is hardly practised. A positive answer to this question would mean that part-time employment can increase female labour force participation and can serve as a family-work reconciliation measure.

A covariate describing female preferences for work-family life arrangements is introduced into the model in the form of the preferred family-partnership model. This is done with the aim in mind of studying the degree to which preferences determine respondents' practices in that respect, and how this influence differs across welfare regimes. Moreover, we control for age and education level, since these variables led to diversified practices in the comparative analyses (Kotowska et al. 2005). Additionally, we account for religiosity.

All covariates are introduced into the model on a stepwise basis in the following sequence: welfare regime, preferred family-partnership model, respondent's age, respondent's educational level, age of the youngest child, number of children and religiosity. Each covariate is followed by interaction between this covariate and the welfare regime. The reason for introducing the interactions is that each of the covariates may influence the choice of a family-partnership model in a different way, depending on the institutional setting.

Referring to the Bayesian Information Criteria for the assessment of the models' goodness-of-fit, we chose the model with three main effects (preferred family-partnership model, respondent's age and respondent's educational level) and interaction between the welfare regime and age of the youngest child. None of the other covariates introduced into the model (number of children and religiosity), or interactions between the remaining main effects and the welfare regime, significantly improved the fit of the model.

The estimation results are presented in Table 14.1. They indicate a strong influence exerted by the age of the youngest child on respondents' choice of family-partnership model. Its direction and strength are generally consistent with our hypotheses on the effects of the family life cycle on the choice of family-partnership model. There are, however, also some unexpected findings.

First of all, women in welfare regime B, which provides public support for work and family reconciliation, are indeed less likely to practise the male breadwinner model, and to opt more often for the dual-earner model, than in the other welfare regimes. What is more, having a small child does not increase the odds of women withdrawing from employment for the care period versus dual earning, while it is widely the case in other welfare regimes. This result is fully consistent with one of our hypotheses. What is interesting, however, is that as a child becomes older, the odds of practising the male breadwinner model versus the dual-earner model decrease much more quickly in welfare regime C, which enhances polarisation, than in welfare regime A, which supports the modernised male breadwinner model. This means that women in the former regime (re-)enter employment more intensively than in the latter.

Table 14.1 Estimation results, multinomial logit model with a dependent variable "Practised family-partnership model" (reference category: dual earner model), women aged 20–49

	MALE BREADWINNER MODEL			MODERNISED MALE BREADWINNER MODEL		
Preferred family-partnership model						
male breadwinner	3.08***			1.72***		
modernised male breadwinner	1.35***			2.97***		
dual earner	1.00			1.00		
Age						
20–29	1.39**			0.44***		
30–39	0.70***			0.76**		
40–49	1.00			1.00		
Education						
primary/lower secondary	6.10***			1.73***		
higher secondary	2.63***			1.37***		
post-secondary	1.00			1.00		
Age of the youngest child	*Welfare regime*			*Welfare regime*		
	A	*B*	*C*	*A*	*B*	*C*
0–2	4.92***	0.68	4.61***	3.35**	2.12***	2.55***
3–5	4.83**	0.70	2.39***	5.87***	3.01***	1.79**
6–12	4.56***	0.97	1.58***	5.08***	2.10***	1.33
13–18	2.52	0.83	0.86	2.60*	1.89***	0.93
no children aged 0-18	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Source: IPPAS

*** - significant at $p<0.01$, ** - significant at $p<0.05$, * - significant at $p<0.1$

Notes: A: welfare regime providing alternated arrangements supportive of the modernised male breadwinner model (the Netherlands), B: welfare regime providing public support for the dual-earner model (Belgium (Flanders) and Slovenia), C: welfare regime enhancing polarisation between male breadwinner and dual earner models (Estonia, Italy, Lithuania and Poland)

Although welfare regime A is represented in our study only by the Netherlands, there is evidence in the literature that this effect is also present in other countries classified in this group (e.g. Geisler, Kreyenfeld 2005; Drobnic et al. 1999 for Germany).

Having children, particularly small children, also exerts a strong influence on the choice between the modernised male breadwinner and dual-earner models. The estimation results reveal that this effect is positive and present in all welfare regimes under study. It is strongest in the welfare regime supporting alternated work-family life arrangements. What is striking is, however, that it is also observed in the welfare regime providing support for dual earning. The latter finding leads us to reject our hypothesis of a lower propensity to reduce working hours in welfare regime B, which supports the dual-earner model, than in welfare regime A, which supports the modernised male breadwinner model.

A reduction in working hours to reconcile motherhood with work is also used in welfare regime C, which provides virtually no support for parents in that respect, and which thus enhances the polarisation between male breadwinner and dual-earner families or partnerships. This effect, however, applies only to women with the youngest children (0–5), and fades away further as the children become older.

Apart from the presence and age of the child, preferences for work-family life arrangements also strongly influence couples' practices in that respect. Those preferring the male breadwinner model are more likely to practise it than the dual earner model. The same applies to those who prefer the modernised male-breadwinner family or partnership. An unexpected result was that the effect of preferences is equally important across welfare regimes. This means that differing practices on the part of couples across countries with regard to the family-partnership model go hand-in-hand with differing preferences.

The other two covariates (age and educational level) also did not enter the interaction with the welfare regime. This means that irrespective of the welfare regime the youngest are more likely to practise the male breadwinner model versus the dual-earner family or partnership than older people. Exactly the opposite holds for the choice between the modernised male breadwinner and dual-earner models – those who are more likely to practise the modernised male breadwinner model as opposed to the dual earner model are respondents in the oldest age group (40–49). A low educational level is definitely much more often linked with the male breadwinner model or modernised male breadwinner family or partnership than the dual-earner family or partnership.

In general terms, the results described above confirm the widely-known fact that institutional settings affect female employment, especially when children are small. They clearly show that mothers remain in employment to a large extent, either on a full- or part-time basis, in countries where public support is provided for work and family reconciliation. By contrast, in countries where this support is much weaker, mothers are more likely to withdraw from employment for the care period. What is interesting is that this effect is more pronounced in the welfare regime which provides alternated arrangements in support of the modernised male breadwinner model than in the welfare regime which enhances polarisation between full-time employment and non-employment. Together with the result on the use of part-time employment in the welfare regime providing public support for work and family reconciliation, it means that focusing only on the development of part-time employment opportunities for mothers is not sufficient to increase female employment. Such a policy must be accompanied by other measures which serve to reduce incompatibility between family and work.

14.5 What are the Prospects for Fertility Increases Within Different Institutional Settings?

In the previous section we showed how the institutional setting influences couples' choice of work-family life arrangement. In this section we turn our attention to the fertility impacts of the welfare regimes which are supportive of different family-partnership models. For this purpose we implement a multinomial logit model with a dependent variable taking three values: Yes, I intend to have more children, I do not know if I will have more children and No, I do not intend to have any more children

(as a reference category). The model is estimated on a sample of 11,107 women aged 20–49. This implies studying the following countries grouped according to the type of welfare regime:

- Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, classified into the welfare regime providing alternated arrangements supportive of the modernised male breadwinner model (welfare regime A),
- Belgium (Flanders), Finland and Slovenia, classified into the welfare regime providing public support for the dual-earner model (welfare regime B),
- the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania and Poland, classified into the welfare regime enhancing polarisation between the male breadwinner and dual earner models (welfare regime C).

In our study we pay special attention to the influence exerted by the welfare regime on fertility intentions. We expect fertility intentions to be the highest in the welfare regime providing the strongest support for work and family reconciliation, i.e. that made up by Belgium, Finland and Slovenia. In the other two welfare regimes, a negative influence exerted by young children on female employment, as shown in the previous section, may constitute a barrier to an increase in the family size. On the other hand, however, we showed that practised work-family life arrangements are to a large extent coherent with female preferences in that respect. If this coherence is not caused simply by a lack of other opportunities, the institutional setting should not exert a great deal of influence on fertility plans.

Apart from the welfare regime, we introduce into the model covariates describing micro-level determinants of fertility intentions: respondents' individual and family characteristics such as age, marital status, educational level, number of children and religiosity. All these characteristics are entered on a gradual basis in a sequence given above. Each covariate is followed by an introduction of an interaction between this covariate and the welfare regime in order to test different impacts of each covariate on fertility intentions dependent on the welfare regime.

Referring to the Bayesian Information Criteria for goodness-of-fit, we chose the model which includes three main effects (marital status, respondents' educational level and religiosity) and interactions between the welfare regime and age, as well as the welfare regime and number of children (Table 14.2). None of the other interaction effects significantly improved the fit of the model.

Hence, the impacts exerted by the welfare regime on fertility intentions should be interpreted through the influence of age and number of children. These results generally do not confirm our hypothesis of higher fertility intentions in the welfare regime providing public support for work and family reconciliation. However, they seem to indicate diversified effects of different institutional settings for fertility intentions.

Firstly, it is confirmed that much higher fertility intentions are formulated by younger than older respondents. The strongest effect is definitely seen in welfare regime B, with public support for work and family reconciliation, and the least influence is exerted in welfare regime A, providing alternated arrangements in support of the modernised male breadwinner model. The analysis of the predicted probabilities of fertility plans presented in Table 14.3 reveals that probabilities of intending

Table 14.2 Estimation results, multinomial logit model with a dependent variable "Do you intend to have more children?" (reference category: NO), women aged 20–49

	YES			DON'T KNOW		
Marital status						
married	0.85*			0.52***		
widowed/divorced	0.79*			0.73**		
single	1.00			1.00		
Education						
primary/lower secondary	0.51***			0.44***		
higher secondary	0.73***			0.72***		
post-secondary	1.00			1.00		
Religion						
very important	1.75***			2.12***		
important	1.41***			1.30**		
not so important	1.27***			1.19*		
not important at all	1.00			1.00		
Age	*Welfare regime*			*Welfare regime*		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
20–29	7.84***	77.61***	45.96***	10.36***	33.83***	15.66***
30–39	1.20	7.90***	9.74***	5.76***	9.37***	6.07***
40–49	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Number of children	*Welfare regime*			*Welfare regime*		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
no children	3.95***	9.27***	32.67***	2.69***	2.23***	2.74***
one	3.14***	4.72***	8.65***	2.50***	1.41*	2.52***
two	1.08	0.72	1.37	1.34	1.02	1.04
three or more	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Source: IPPAS

*** - significant at $p<0.01$, ** - significant at $p<0.05$, * - significant at $p<0.1$

Notes: A: welfare regime providing alternated arrangements supportive of the modernised male breadwinner model (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands), B: welfare regime providing public support for the dual-earner model (Belgium (Flanders), Finland and Slovenia), C: welfare regime enhancing the polarisation between the male breadwinner and dual-earner models (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania and Poland).

to have an additional child by respondents aged 20–29 and 30–39 are similar in all welfare regimes, but lower among those aged 30–39 than those aged 20–29. Those who differ across the welfare regimes are respondents aged 40–49. They are more likely to decide about an additional child within institutional setting A than within another welfare regime. What is more, the probability of intending to have a child (their next child) in this age group is nearly equal to that of respondents aged 30–39 (about 20% of whom still state that they plan to have additional children).

Secondly, the comparison of those who are undecided as to their fertility plans with those who do not intend to have additional children reveals a relatively large share of the former among those aged 20–39 in welfare regime B. Although the probability of intending to have another child among respondents in this age group is similar within all institutional settings, the relatively high percentage of those who are undecided and

the lowest percentage of those who do not intend to have additional children makes welfare regime B appear quite promising in terms of fertility prospects.

Thirdly, childless women and those who have one child are much more frequently in favour of increasing the family size, or at least are more frequently undecided, than those who already have two or more children. Mothers with two children do not significantly differ in that respect from mothers with three or more children. This means that fertility intentions mainly oscillate around one child, slightly less often around two children, with higher parities being desired much less frequently. Although this conclusion holds for all the welfare regimes under study, differences between fertility intentions of women with at most one child and women with three or more children are definitely largest in welfare regime C (enhancing polarisation between the male breadwinner and dual-earner models) and lowest in welfare regime A (providing alternated arrangements in support of the modernised male breadwinner model). Analysis of the predicted probabilities describing fertility intentions reveals that childless women are most likely to state that they plan to have a child in welfare regime C, and least likely in welfare regime A (Table 14.3). In contrast, those who have at least two children definitely formulate a desire to have another child much more often in welfare regime A than in the other welfare regimes, and particularly C. These results indicate the high probability of intended childlessness among some women prevailing simultaneously with a desire to have a large number of children among the others within the institutional setting which

Table 14.3 Predicted probabilities of intending to have additional children/being undecided/not intending to have any more children, by welfare regime and age/welfare regime and actual number of children

Welfare regime	*Age*			*Actual number of children*			
	20–29	30–39	40–49	0	1	2	3+
Yes							
A	0.71	0.23	0.20	0.55	0.37	0.16	0.14
B	0.70	0.21	0.04	0.60	0.32	0.06	0.08
C	0.67	0.22	0.03	0.73	0.34	0.07	0.04
Don't know							
A	0.11	0.14	0.02	0.12	0.10	0.06	0.04
B	0.22	0.24	0.04	0.21	0.15	0.14	0.13
C	0.17	0.16	0.04	0.13	0.18	0.10	0.08
No							
A	0.18	0.63	0.77	0.33	0.53	0.78	0.82
B	0.08	0.55	0.92	0.19	0.53	0.81	0.80
C	0.16	0.61	0.92	0.14	0.48	0.82	0.88

Source: IPPAS

Notes: A: welfare regime providing alternated arrangements supportive of the modernised male breadwinner model (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands), B: welfare regime providing public support for the dual-earner model (Belgium (Flanders), Finland and Slovenia), C: welfare regime enhancing the polarisation between the male breadwinner and dual-earner models (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania and Poland).

Predicted probabilities were calculated for the given welfare regime and age group/actual number of children; the rest of the respondents' characteristics was set to the mean.

supports the modernised male breadwinner model. On the other hand, the welfare regime offering virtually no support for work and family reconciliation, i.e. resulting in polarisation between full-time employment and non-employment, seems to be supportive of low fertility – one, perhaps two children are definitely desired, but higher fertility intentions are relatively rare. The fertility plans of respondents living in the welfare regime providing public support for dual earning are somewhere between the fertility plans of respondents living in the other welfare regimes. What is however particular about this welfare regime is the high percentage of those who are undecided as to their fertility plans. This hesitation is particularly prevalent among childless women.

Other estimates show that highly-educated, married and religious women are more likely to have a child. Other women, i.e. those with low educational achievement, the unmarried and the less religious or non-religious, are not only more likely to plan to have no more children, but they are also less likely to be undecided and hesitant in that respect.

The results presented on fertility intentions by welfare regimes contradict those presented by Goldstein et al. (2004). On the basis of the data from the Eurobarometer 2001, they compute two indicators: personal ideal family size, based on the question of the number of children which the respondent considers to be ideal, and the expected family size, which is the sum of children a woman already had at the time of the survey and the number of children she "still plans to have". Both indicators, calculated for women aged 20–34, show that respondents living in countries which we classified as welfare regime B have the highest family-related ideals/expect to have highest number of children. Exactly the opposite holds for respondents living in countries classified as belonging to welfare regime A, and in Italy.[6] These results would fully correspond to our research hypotheses. It should be mentioned however that Goldstein et al. (2003) do not disaggregate their indicators by the number of children a woman already has. Generally higher fertility in welfare regime B may mean that their inhabitants are more often close to their fertility plans, and do not intend to have any more children.

Summing up, the results of our study make us reject the hypothesis of the highest fertility intentions in the welfare regime which we consider to be the most supportive of work and family reconciliation by providing public support for working parents and enhancing dual earning. The analysis indicates the overall preferences for having a child to be stronger in welfare regime C, i.e. in those countries which have the lowest fertility in Europe. These relatively high fertility intentions apply to childless women, which does not provide any grounds for optimism as to an increase in fertility in these countries. In contrast, taking into account the relatively high incidence of being undecided (especially among childless women), welfare regime B, with developed public support for parents, seems to offer more possibilities to increase fertility plans than other regimes, and therefore appears to be promising in that respect. An interesting result was obtained for welfare regime A. It indicates a polarisation of fertility

[6] The Eurobarometer 2001 only covered the EU-15.

intentions in countries with a welfare regime which supports the modernised male breadwinner model: Women either plan to remain childless, or intend to have three and more children, more frequently than in other countries. It is fully consistent with findings on differences in fertility behaviour across European countries (e.g. Billari, 2005, Frejka and Sardon, 2004).

14.6 Concluding Remarks

A desired increase in female employment can be achieved by enhancing transitions from the male breadwinner model towards the modernised male breadwinner and dual-earner families or partnerships. Strong preferences for families or partnerships with women in either full- or part-time employment, revealed by the analyses, as well as the impacts of preferences on the work-family life arrangements practised, allow to conclude that there is potential for further increases in female labour force participation, especially of more well-educated women.

Women's preferences in terms of labour force participation may be affected by transformations that are taking place on the contemporary labour market. Unstable, discontinuous employment speaks in favour of dual earning to hedge the risk of a deterioration in family welfare. The growing educational attainment of women makes them able to satisfy increasing labour market requirements. Moreover, deinstitutionalisation and destabilisation of the family, low fertility, ageing and reforms of social security form a new rationale for female employment, which may also shape preferences. However, expectations in terms of employee availability and mobility, as well as more individual efforts and time required to manage labour market changes, bring family and employment into competition, especially when there are small children to be cared for.

Our analyses confirm the widely-known fact that the most supportive welfare regime for mothers' employment is one which provides public support for reconciliation of work and family. Countries with a welfare regime which imposes polarisation of labour behaviour are characterised by low levels of both fertility and female employment. Reducing incompatibility between caring for small children and work would result in a lower incidence of male breadwinner families or partnerships and induce more mothers to remain in employment. Higher availability of part-time jobs would extend employment choices in these countries.

Outcomes concerning mothers' withdrawal from employment for the care period, stronger in the welfare regime providing alternated arrangements in support of the modernised male breadwinner model than in the welfare regime enhancing polarisation between full-time employment and non-employment, should be treated with some reservation since they refer to the Netherlands only. Despite this fact, and referring to evidence contained in the literature on the slow transitions into employment after childbirth in the countries classified into this welfare regime, one can conclude that the development of part-time work opportunities for mothers seems

to be insufficient to increase female employment, but that it should be accompanied by other measures aimed at reducing the incompatibility between family and work.

Summing up, our results confirm a high relevance of the institutional setting supportive of the work-family balance from the perspective of increases in female employment considered to be desirable.

Such a clear conclusion cannot be drawn with regard to the second research question asked. Our focus was on fertility impacts of institutional settings which create different opportunities for work and family reconciliation. These fertility impacts were defined in terms of fertility intentions. Expectations were not confirmed that fertility intentions would be higher within the welfare regime which is the most supportive of reconciliation of work and family (Belgium (Flanders), Finland and Slovenia), i.e. characterised by the lowest incompatibility between family and work, than in other institutional settings. However, model results seem to indicate diversified effects of different welfare regimes for fertility intentions. In general, preferences for only one or two children were formulated. Preferences for one child are visibly stronger within welfare regimes which offer hardly any public support for work and family reconciliation, i.e. in countries with the lowest fertility in Europe (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania and Poland). This observation confirms the expectation that fertility will remain low in this region. Taking into account the incidence of being undecided and definitely not intending to have another child, the welfare regime with developed public support for parents seems to offer more possibilities to increase fertility than other regimes. Moreover, fertility intentions in countries with a welfare regime which supports the modernised male breadwinner model (the Netherlands, Germany and Austria) revealed polarisation of procreative intentions, consistent with findings on fertility behaviour. More frequently than in other countries, women either plan to remain childless or intend to have two and more children. At that stage of the study, one can conclude that other factors than institutional settings are decisive for current fertility intentions. However, one cannot state definitely that reducing the incompatibility between family and work would not lead to desirable fertility effects in the long run.

Chapter 15
Work-Family Orientation and Female Labour Market Participation

Kalev Katus, Asta Põldma and Allan Puur

Abstract The present article studies the association between work-family orientation and female labour market participation, comparing the situation in nine European countries. The results indicate a considerable diversity in both women's practiced and preferred labour market statuses related to the work-family orientation. Differences are manifested in all countries included in the analysis, regardless of the type of welfare regime, existing patterns of female workforce participation, and diversity in the shares of women with different work-family attitudes. The results of logistic models show the persistence of the effects of the work-family orientation after adjustments have been made for control variables. They lend support to the hypothesis that the work-family orientation does not simply reflect socio-economic characteristics or a life-cycle stage. Instead, it seems to be a relatively independent dimension, with discernible repercussions on the labour market as well as with regard to fertility behaviour. The recognition of diverse preferences for the combination of family and work could lead to policies that account better for the needs of various sub-groups of the population, and would contribute to more efficient reconciliation between work and family.

Keywords: Female labour force participation · Values · Attitudes towards work and family · Reconciliation between work and family · Europe

15.1 Introduction

Changing patterns of female workforce participation and the status of women in modern societies have attracted substantial attention in research and policy debates. For several decades, statistics have documented a considerable increase in female labour force participation throughout the European continent (EC 2005; Rubery, Smith, Fagan 1999). As a result, female employment rates have moved noticeably closer to the levels observed among the male population. In Central and Eastern

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Europe, the trends have been influenced by the societal transformation which in the first half of the 1990s brought along some reduction in the formerly very high levels of female employment in many countries in the region.

As regards the future, the observed upward trend is likely to continue. In order to achieve the goals set at Lisbon in 2000 of becoming the world's most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by the end of the present decade, the European Union must step up its efforts to tap its human resources. To underpin sustainable economic growth with greater social cohesion, the EU's Employment Strategy emphasises in particular a need to increase the integration of women, as well as of the young and the old, in the labour force. The stated aim is to increase the employment rate for women to more than 60% by 2010.[1]

The increasing female labour force participation appears to be an irreversible phenomenon that requires profound adaptations of economic and societal structures. It brings to the fore the questions about reconciliation between work and family, and gender equality. Reconciliation of paid work and family has become a major challenge to be faced by contemporary societies. The involvement of women in the labour market, on the one hand, and concerns about low fertility, resulting in accelerated population ageing and workforce shrinking, on the other, lend relevance to the issue. In that context, a smoother reconciliation between work and family life is recognised as an issue that should be afforded higher priority in shaping the EU's social policy (Vignon 2005).

Strategies for reconciliation between employment and family, applied by individuals and couples, can be conceptualised in terms of work-family models that concern the allocation of responsibilities, specialisation of roles and the division of labour between partners. To capture the essential features of such strategies in the light of changes in female labour market participation, researchers distinguish between three major models – the male breadwinner model, the modernised male breadwinner model and the dual-earner model (Duncan, Pfau-Effinger 2000; Kotowska et al. 2005; Leira 2002). As defined by the authors, the male breadwinner model presumes complete separation of roles within the family, with a woman as a homemaker-carer and a man as an economic provider. The modernised male breadwinner model represents a compromise arrangement, in which a woman does some paid work as a secondary earner, for example working part-time. Apart from the latter two, the dual-earner model refers to the symmetrical roles of partners in the labour market, sharing the responsibility for providing income. However, the dual-earner model refers to two different arrangements with regard to sharing family responsibilities. On the one hand, it includes the dual-earner-dual-carer model, which is yet not often practiced. On the other hand, it involves the female double-burden model, in which women are responsible both for providing income and for caring for the family,

[1] In addition to the Lisbon targets for 2010, the Stockholm European Council of 2001 set intermediate targets for employment rates of 67 percent for the overall working-age (15–64) population and 57 percent for women in the EU in 2005. The weak labour market performance of recent years means that the overall employment rate has lagged far behind the intermediate target (–6.7% points), while the female employment rate fell short by only 1.3% points (2004).

which makes it more difficult to combine family and work. Labour market statistics do not make it possible to distinguish between the two types of model, and it is necessary to recognise that here.

Assuming that these three types of work-family model can be reflected by women's employment status (to be out of the labour market, working part-time and working full-time), the change in female employment can be viewed in terms of work-family models (see also Kotowska and Matysiak in this volume). Increasing female employment has been paralleled by the transformation in the ways in which paid employment and family responsibilities are combined. The prevailing trend, simply put, has implied a gradual shift away from the male breadwinner model towards the dual-earner and/or modernised breadwinner model.[2] Labour market statistics reveal that the development along this direction can be traced universally, but that at the same time considerable diversity across countries can still be observed. Among the Member States of the European Union in 2004, the percentage of the non-employed, including housewives, in the working-age female population ranged from less than 30% in Denmark and Sweden to more than 50% in Greece, Italy, Malta, Poland and Spain. Among employed women, the share of part-time work varied from 75% in the Netherlands at one extreme, to less than 10% in the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and the Slovak Republic at the other extreme. When focusing on the age groups 25–44, in which the reconciliation of work and family is the most acute, these differences in the patterns become even more pronounced. It should be added, however, that diversity in female employment patterns is strongly affected by different availability of part-time jobs.

From an analytical point of view, progress in female labour market participation and the development of reconciliation strategies relates to two broad sets of factors. On the one hand, possibilities to combine employment and family result from the institutional setting, defined by the general labour market structure, various programmes and regulations related to training and employment, arrangements for parental leave and other provisions for working parents, the availability of child-care services, subsidies and benefits, family allowances, taxation, etc. The analyses of the institutional setting have underlined the essential contribution made by the modern welfare state and its instruments towards developing the legal and economic framework for reconciling work and family—well-defined, integrated social policies appear to alleviate the incompatibility between labour force participation and family life (Houston 2005; Leira 2002; Sainsbury 2005). As regards the DIALOG countries addressed in this volume, the relevant information on employment and family policies is discussed in detail by Fux (2004) and Kontula and Miettinen (2005).

[2] In the context of these contemporary developments, the male breadwinner model is sometimes labelled "traditional", as opposed to the "modern" dual-earner family. Research into family models has pointed to the fact that the development towards symmetrical roles can be regarded to a great degree as a return to the pre-industrial model. In the historical perspective, the single (male) breadwinner family is a recent invention, and it remained popular for a relatively short period in the 19th and 20th centuries (Davis 1984; Pott-Buter 1993).

The institutional setting is responsible for the structural incompatibility between work and family. Another source of differences in women's labour market participation relates to culture, which includes broad ideologies, values, beliefs, norms and preferences (Hofstede 1998, 2001). In practice, values and norms are used to define the appropriate way of living, and to exclude some forms that are considered less appropriate; preferences guide the choice between alternative options. With regard to reconciliation between employment and family life, this refers primarily to the perception of men's and women's roles in the labour market and the household, arrangements for the care of children, etc. Moreover, the more successful the welfare state is in reducing structural constraints and enhancing the scope of choice for its citizens through implementation of family-friendly policies, the more likely are attitudes and preferences to grow in their relative importance. Recognition of independent status and the explanatory potential of the cultural factor is reflected in the studies on the work-family nexus and gender equity, explicitly incorporating the respective dimension (Duncan, Pfau-Effinger 2000; Jansweijer 1992; Liefbroer, Corijn 1999; Riolli-Saltzmann, Savicki 2003; Sackmann 2000).

The present chapter follows the general reasoning of the latter studies. More specifically, it aims to find out to what extent the employment patterns, considered both in terms of practice and preference, are influenced by attitudes towards the reconciliation of work and parenthood. The main assumption behind the following analyses can be briefly summarised as follows: In addition to the institutional framework, decisions and preferences for the different work-family models are influenced by relevant attitudes towards work and family. The study focuses on women because in contemporary societies women are primarily confronted with the reconciliation issue and face real choices between alternative work-family models, while men only rarely give up life-long, full-time employment.

There is nothing particularly novel about this claim from a theoretical point of view. While it is widely assumed that culture makes a distinction, nevertheless, judging on the inventory of relevant research in Europe for the 1990s commissioned by the EC Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, evidence concerning the relationship between attitudes and labour market behaviour remains relatively scarce and scattered (EC 1999). In the Population and Policy Acceptance Survey, carried out in 1990s, interest focussed on the preferred models, leaving aside any influence exerted by attitudes on practiced modalities of reconciliation between work and family (Dorbritz 1998; Fux 1998; Nebenführ 1998). Regarding more recent research, a British study by Catherine Hakim revealed persistent differences in labour market behaviour between lifestyle preferences that cut across the levels of income and social classes (Hakim 2000, 2003b, 2005).

The research question "how much attitudes matter for practiced and preferred work-family arrangements" is set within the framework of the Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS). The value added to the present study also stems from the comparative perspective offered by the PPAS. As presented in the earlier chapters of this volume, through assembling the new data on population-related attitudes and behaviour from 14 nations, representing different welfare regimes and regions of Europe, the PPAS offers a particularly favourable basis for pursuing the type

of research proposed. While the other major data sources relevant to the topic, for example the labour force survey, provide a definitely more refined account of labour market behaviour, they typically neglect, partly or wholly, the attitudinal items.

The chapter is structured in six sections. Following the introduction, the second section explains the analytical approach applied, the specification of dependent and independent variables in logistic models. The third and fourth sections present the main findings, obtained by means of both descriptive and multivariate techniques, respectively. In the fifth section, attitudes towards combination of work and family are confronted with fertility levels. The concluding section summarises the results and discusses policy implications that may be drawn from the findings.

15.2 Data and Methods

The data used come from several modules of the International Population Policy Acceptance Study database (IPPAS database).

Dependent variables describe female labour market participation. The information about women's practised attachment to the labour market is derived from the general characteristics module (questionnaire item CQ14). It distinguishes between three labour market statuses: full-time employment, part-time employment and non-employment.[3] In terms of combining work and family, one can assume that these statuses approximate, respectively, the dual-earner, the modernised male breadwinner and the male breadwinner models. The prevalence of the latter model tends to be somewhat overstated among practiced labour market statuses as the database does not support a detailed distinction between reasons for non-employment (homemaking, unemployment, education, health-related reasons, etc.). The preferred participation in the labour market is derived from the questions concerning the desired combination of pursuing a job for oneself and raising children (H3A) (with the distinction between full-time employment, part-time employment and non-employment).

The patterns of labour market attachment are operationalised by means of the employment rate. This indicator reflects the proportion of the population who have a job, and is also desegregated into full-time and part-time employment.[4]

[3] Casual employment, which appeared as a separate category in relatively small numbers in Cyprian, Hungarian and Rumanian data, was included in part-time employment. To assess the validity of the data concerning labour market status, the authors compared employment rates derived from the IPPAS with those reported by the EU labour force survey. For the majority of countries, the match between the two sources was fairly good, indicating that the IPPAS has performed well against the elaborate measurement framework of the labour force survey, with a carefully-defined time reference and guidelines for numerous borderline situations.

[4] Rubery, Smith and Fagan (1999) have pointed out that from the measurement point of view the employment rate has several advantages over the widely-used economic activity rate, which records the proportion of individuals who are either in employment or looking for a job. In general terms, the employment rate is considered a better indicator for the performance of the economy, given the relatively high unemployment rates in many countries. Amongst other things, this capacity is also reflected in the fact that the Lisbon and Stockholm targets are formulated in terms of

The information for the independent variable is derived from the gender module, which includes two specialised sets of questions about attitudes towards sharing paid employment and household activities between women and men. Several items of the two sets have been repeatedly used in other social surveys (e.g. World Value Survey/European Value Survey, International Social Survey Program). A general discussion of the gender module is available from Philipov (2006). The following questionnaire items were applied for the purposes of the present study:[5]

G1b. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
G1d. A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children.
G1e. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
G1h. Women are less ambitious at work than men.

The first statement refers to perceived negative consequences of mothers' employment for the development of children. The second statement denotes an attitude related to an ultimate value through the phrasing what women really want. It is, therefore, considered as reflecting a gender ideology. A similar interpretation can be given to the third statement that addresses opportunities for women's self-fulfilment associated with a homemaker role as opposed to a working woman. The fourth statement compares an image of women and men in terms of their professional career orientation.

Respondents were asked to express their acceptance or rejection of each item. The answers were recorded on the five-grade Lickert scale, where 1 stands for strong agreement and 5 corresponds to strong disagreement with a statement. In terms of combining work and family, the statements were presented so that lower values consistently represented greater support for separation of women's and men's roles within the breadwinner-homemaker model, as opposed to the modernised breadwinner and dual-earner models with a more symmetrical sharing of income provision and household responsibilities. Also, it should be noted that these statements have a general, impersonal character. Being general, they are to a lesser extent influenced by personal behaviour and diversity of life situations, which allows for better comparability across population groups. Also, it can be assumed that the general attitudes are to a lesser extent subjected to a social desirability bias as compared to personal attitudes (Hakim 2005; Turner and Martin 1984).

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the employment rate. Regarding women, the boundary between inactivity and job-seeking is sometimes blurred, especially in the settings where women's ascribed role is to a great extent as wives and mothers, which makes the inferences drawn from activity rates open to greater uncertainty compared to men. The literature also provides examples of the limitations of the employment rate, such as neglect of the variation in the number of hours worked, unpaid household work, partly inconsistent practices of recording absence from work, for example parental leave, etc. (Drew 2000; Jonung and Persson 1993). However, these limitations do not overstate the results of the analyses in this volume.

[5] Since the information on gender roles is not uniformly available for all IPPAS countries, the questions selected reflect an attempt to reach a compromise between the coverage of countries and different attitudes relevant to women's labour market participation.

To construct a dependent variable that would make it possible to generalise women's work-family orientation, responses for the above-mentioned items have been summarised into a composite index. The minimum value of the index stands for 4 points, and means that respondents have expressed their strong agreement with the separation of women's and men's roles in all statements. The maximum value of the index is 20 points, which corresponds to strong disagreement with the breadwinner-homemaker model in all statements.

The IPPAS database makes it possible to construct the work-family orientation index for Austria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Cyprus. These nine countries were included in our analyses.[6] Due to noticeable intra-country variation, Eastern and Western Germany were treated as two separate units. The analyses focused on the age range 20–49, in which the problems of reconciliation of employment and family responsibilities primarily occur. Considering the country coverage and age limitation, a sub-sample of respondents was formed comprising 7,131 women and 6,645 men. Most of the analyses that follow pertain to the female part of the sub-sample (based on weighted data).

Figure 15.1 presents the frequency distribution of the index of work-family orientation for all the countries combined. The index has been adjusted to exclude a small fraction of respondents not responding to one or more of its four components.[7]

The index of the work-family orientation reveals a fairly symmetrical spread of attitudes that resembles the normal distribution. In other words, the constructed index captures a considerable variation in the attitudes of the population towards gender roles and reconciliation between employment and family in both directions. For analytical purposes, three basic categories of work-family orientation are distinguished on the basis of accumulated agreement or disagreement with alternative models. On the one hand, the predominant acceptance of the breadwinner-homemaker model is classified as a *traditional* orientation. On the other hand, the prevailing rejection of strong segregation between men's and women's roles is classified as a *modern* orientation towards combining paid work and family responsibilities. The attitudes, which were neither strongly in favour of separation of men's and women's roles nor strongly against it, were classified in the residual category of an *intermediate* work-family orientation.

Applying the cut-off levels shown in the figure, an average of 15.7% of women aged 20–49 were classified as supporting the traditional work-family orientation in the countries studied, 28.4% were classified as representing the modern work-family orientation, and 55.9% were left in the intermediate category. Not surprisingly, the proportions of the three groups are dissimilar across the countries (Table 15.1). The prevalence of the traditional work-family orientation ranges from 12.8% in Germany

[6] The exception is the preferred labour market status not available for Austria and Hungary.

[7] On average, the proportion of values missing for such a reason is limited to 3.2% with a salient cross-country diversity. From less than one percent in Estonia, Germany and Lithuania, the percentage of excluded responses amounts to 8.9% in the Hungarian and 11.6% in the Dutch surveys.



Fig. 15.1 Work-family orientation index for nine countries
Source: IPPAS
Note: The index is based on four gender-related items (G1b, d, e, g)

to 37.3% in Hungary. The prevalence of the modern work-family orientation varies from 38.3% in the Netherlands to 9.4% in Lithuania.

The focus of the present study, however, is not on the examination of variation in attitudes on work-family nexus and gender roles (relevant analyses are presented in other contributions to this volume). This chapter focuses primarily on the influence exerted by work-family orientation on female labour market participation and the corresponding work-family models.

Table 15.1 Work-family orientation index by countries, females aged 20–49

Country	Traditional	Intermediate	Modern
Austria	18.1	47.5	34.4
Estonia	20.4	67.2	12.4
Germany	12.8	51.9	35.3
Eastern Germany	4.7	38.2	57.1
Western Germany	14.5	55.1	30.3
Hungary	37.3	48.1	14.6
Lithuania	24.7	65.9	9.4
Netherlands	15.8	45.8	38.3
Poland	14.9	67.0	18.0
Romania	14.8	59.2	26.0
All countries	15.7	55.9	28.4

Source: IPPAS
Notes: The index is based on four gender-related items (G1b, d, e, g)

The analysis of an influence of work-family orientation on the employment status of women, practised and preferred, is structured in two parts. In the first part, the relationship between women's practised and preferred labour market status is examined by means of descriptive methods. In the second section, multivariate regression models are applied to look at that relationship by checking for the effects of other major factors (age, human capital, family composition, etc.), which are known to be relevant to female workforce participation.

To reveal the diversity of impacts in terms of their direction and strength across different institutional settings, the analysis is country-specific throughout, but the results are presented for the IPPAS countries combined.

15.3 Work-Family Orientation and Labour Market Participation – Results of Descriptive Analyses

15.3.1 Female Labour Market Participation in the PPAS Countries

The presentation of the findings starts from the descriptive analysis of women's practised and preferred labour market participation, dependent on work-family orientation.

In the IPPAS countries, the employment rate for women aged 20–49 stands at an average of 63.3%.[8] As discussed in detail by Kotowska et al. (2006), there is considerable cross-country variation in female employment experience. The highest rate of employment—96.9% of women 20–49 reportedly employed—is featured by Cyprus.[9] Relatively high levels of female employment (above 70%) can be observed for Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands and Slovenia, with Cyprus, Finland and the Netherlands having already reached the 2010 Lisbon target for women's employment. Women in Italy demonstrate the lowest level of labour market attachment among the countries concerned (53.3%); the female employment rate is also somewhat below average in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, and more so in Poland.

The distinction between part- and full-time work reveals an even greater diversity. Full-time employment rates among the IPPAS countries range from 21.4% in the Netherlands to 70.1% in Slovenia. The Netherlands are in the forefront of part-time employment, and this is the only country where women hold part-time jobs more frequently than full-time positions. It is followed by Austria, Belgium (Flanders) and Germany, the part-time employment rate in these countries being clustered around 27–29%. In Germany, however, the prevalence of part-time jobs differs significantly

[8] The data used throughout this paper are weighted to account for the specifity of sampling schemes applied in national surveys. In the case of aggregates for the IPPAS countries combined, weighting for size of country populations is added.

[9] The female employment level for Cyprian women evidently involves an upward bias due to the inclusion of casual employment. The EU labour force survey reveals the female employment rate for the comparable age group to be slightly above 70% (EC 2005).

between the Western and Eastern parts of the country, with nearly 30% versus 17% respectively. In this respect, the pattern of female employment in Eastern Germany rather resembles the model observed in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with a fairly low prevalence of part-time jobs. Among the latter, Slovenia features the lowest part-time employment rate (2.5%), followed closely by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (5–6%). Around one-tenth of women aged 20–49 in Estonia and Lithuania are in part-time work. Female part-time employment also does not appear to be very popular in Finland, which has been regarded as the result of a relatively rapid transformation from the agrarian family model with the norm of women as full-time workers (Pfau-Effinger 2000).[10]

15.3.2 Practised Employment-Family Models

Turning to the association between work-family orientation and women's labour market participation, one can expect that the acceptance of distinct specialisation within the family (a breadwinner husband and a home-maker wife), would be translated into lower levels of female employment, whereas rejection of that model would relate to a comparatively stronger commitment to the labour market. The analysis revealed a rather extensive contrast in the female employment rate according to the work-family orientation that followed the expected direction (Fig. 15.2).

In the nine countries under study, an average of 55.4% of women who accepted the traditional work-family model were working (Table 15.2). Rejection of the latter and support for the modern symmetrical arrangement of paid work was associated with an employment rate of 72.7%. Women classified in the medium category of the work-family orientation, who neither strongly approved nor disapproved of the two alternative models, featured an intermediate level of employment (65%). Full- and part-time work made roughly equal contributions towards bringing about this pattern. The difference in the full-time employment rate between women with traditional and modern work-family orientations, respectively, amounted to 8.2% points; the respective difference in part-time employment was somewhat greater, at 9.1% points. From a methodological point of view, the results showed that the four questions on attitudes were sufficient to identify and differentiate between women with traditional and modern work-family orientations. The resulting taxonomy performed well, displaying systematic differences in labour market behaviour. A comparison with men indicates that the association between the work-family orientation and the labour market participation attachment appears to be highly gender specific – apart from women, the attitudes make only a slight difference

[10] To account for the varying proportion between full- and part-time work, labour statisticians have introduced the concept of the full-time equivalent employment rate, which considers the hours actually worked. This measure, regularly reported by Eurostat for working-age (15–64) men and women, offers a modified ranking of the IPPAS countries. According to recent statistics, the highest female FTE employment rate is featured by Finland (61.3%), Estonia (58.5) and Slovenia (58.3), while the lowest levels are reported for Italy (40.2), the Netherlands (41.5) and Poland (44.2).



Fig. 15.2 Practised female employment pattern by work-family orientation. All countries combined
Source: IPPAS
* The description of the Y axis: the employment rate i.e. the percentage of employed (full- and part-time) among women with a given work-family orientation

for the practised employment pattern among men. The average difference in the employment rate is less than three percentage points. This result corresponds with the general notion that men are continuously expected to provide for the family, and that men have relatively few alternatives to (full-time) employment.

To examine relationships between the practised labour market participation and the cross-country work-family orientation, women with traditional and modern attitudes are compared. Table 15.2 reveals a highly consistent pattern – the differences in the labour market participation of women classified according to their work-family orientation are manifested in all countries, notwithstanding the welfare regime, the existing pattern of female workforce participation, or other contextual specific components.

The differences in the employment rates related to traditional and modern work-family orientations appear quite extensive. The strongest association between female labour market status and work-family attitudes was found in Austria, where acceptance of the traditional family model translated into a female employment rate that was more than 30% points lower. Also, the strength of the relationship exceeded the average in Eastern Germany, Romania and Hungary, with the difference in employment rates amounting to 20 and more percentage points. In Cyprus, Estonia and Lithuania, the work-family orientation exerted a somewhat lesser influence on

Table 15.2 Practised employment patterns by work-family orientation, females aged 20–49*

Country	Traditional	Employed Intermediate	Modern	Traditional	Full-time Intermediate	Modern
Austria	40.5	66.9	71.2	19.0	39.7	42.8
Estonia	62.8	68.0	72.4	50.0	57.0	60.3
Germany	59.3	69.0	71.6	33.5	41.9	44.2
Eastern Germany	41.9	65.6	65.1	25.8	45.6	50.1
Western Germany	60.4	69.9	74.5	34.0	41.3	41.8
Hungary	54.8	67.2	74.0	49.4	62.2	69.9
Lithuania	59.1	63.7	70.5	49.6	54.6	61.4
The Netherlands	67.9	65.0	84.1	22.6	17.3	25.9
Poland	50.2	59.3	66.6	47.0	52.6	59.2
Romania	50.0	62.2	73.1	42.4	44.2	57.1
Cyprus	94.1	96.9	99.2	53.9	60.1	77.5
All countries	55.4	65.0	72.7	38.7	44.9	46.9
Country	Traditional	Part-time Intermediate	Modern	Traditional	Non-employed Intermediate	Modern
Austria	21.4	27.2	28.4	59.5	33.1	28.8
Estonia	12.8	11.0	12.1	37.2	32.0	27.6
Germany	25.8	27.5	27.4	40.7	30.7	28.4
Eastern Germany	16.6	20.0	14.9	58.1	34.4	34.9
Western Germany	26.4	28.6	32.7	39.6	30.1	25.5
Hungary	5.4	5.0	4.1	45.2	32.8	26.6
Lithuania	9.6	9.2	9.1	40.9	36.3	29.5
The Netherlands	45.2	47.7	58.2	32.1	35.0	15.9
Poland	3.2	6.7	7.4	49.8	40.7	33.4
Romania	7.6	18.0	16.0	50.0	37.8	26.9
Cyprus	40.2	36.9	21.7	5.9	3.1	0.8
All countries	16.7	20.1	25.8	44.6	35.0	27.3

Source: IPPAS

* the percentage of employed (non-employed) among women with a given work-family orientation

women's practised labour market participation, but the differences in employment levels are clearly discernible and statistically significant in these countries as well.

With the exception of the Netherlands, the significantly lower labour market participation of women who favoured the traditional sharing of earner and homemaker roles was primarily due to differences in full-time employment (Table 15.2). Understandably, the greater contribution of full-time jobs reflects their prevailing position in the structure of female employment in the IPPAS countries, particularly in the CEE countries.

Apart from full-time employment, the contribution of part-time employment is mixed. In the countries where more part-time jobs are available, also for reconciliation between work and family, i.e. in Austria, Western Germany and the Netherlands the association runs in the expected direction, but is less pronounced than in the case of full-time employment.

The expected pattern is also displayed in Poland and Romania. In Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania, the direction of the interrelationship appears slightly

reversed for part-time employment. The same is true for Eastern Germany. Evidently, this finding reflects the less well established position of part-time employment in the CEE countries (EC 2005b; McRae 1995). As a relatively recent invention in these countries, practised on a rather limited scale, part-time employment attracts women with traditional as well as modern work-family orientations. Although the motives and circumstances for opting for a part-time job may be different, part-time employment rates for the two groups are not particularly different.

15.3.3 Preferred Employment-Family Models

This section analyses the three alternatives discussed above, i.e. full- and part-time employment and non-employment, from the viewpoint of preferences. In this context, the preferred employment-family model refers to the combination of paid work and family responsibilities, which appeared to best meet the respondents' personal needs and aspirations.

The interrelationship between the preferred employment pattern and the work-family orientation is, as expected, more pronounced than for practised employment patterns, as preferences are less strongly determined by opportunities and constraints of the existing labour market structure (Fig. 15.3). Among women who accepted the breadwinner-homemaker model, an average of 58.7% preferred to be employed, while 41.3% considered only being a housewife as the most suitable option for themselves.[11] Disapproval of the traditional work-family model was associated with a markedly higher preference for employment: Nearly nine out of ten (88.4%) of women who supported the modern orientation toward work and family preferred to have a job.[12] With regard to the preference between employment and non-employment, the intermediate category held a medium position, with 75.2% of those who preferred to be employed, somewhat closer to the percentage of women who supported the dual-earner model.

The decomposition between full and part-time employment revealed that both patterns of women's labour market status made an approximately equal contribution to an increase in preferences for employment. In other words, the preferences for full- and part-time employment rose more or less parallel when moving from the traditional to modern work-family orientations. Interestingly, despite the considerable difference in the share of those who opted for employment, the proportions of those who preferred full- and part-time work remained essentially unaltered across the three groups of work-family orientations. Among women with a traditional work-family orientation, an average of 29.5% gave their preference to

[11] Apart from the practised employment, data on the preferred employment model are not available for Austria and Hungary (BIB 2004).

[12] Among women with a modern work-family orientation, 11.6% gave a preference for the homemaker role for themselves. This apparent discrepancy points to the difference between general attitudes and preferences with regard to the personal situation - despite a substantial congruity, the two dimensions do not fully overlap (Bohner and Wänke 2004).



Fig. 15.3 Preferences for female employment by work-family orientation. All countries combined
Source: IPPAS

full-time employment, while 29.3% preferred part-time jobs. Support for the dual-earner family model was associated with a higher popularity of full-time work (44.7%), but the share of those women who preferred part-time employment increased virtually to the same level (44.3%).

Similar to practised employment, the relationship between preferred labour market status and work-family orientation follows a closely consistent pattern across the countries. Without exception, acceptance of the traditional work-family model is associated with the lower employment rate, and conversely support for the more modern arrangement translates into a noticeably higher level of female employment. In Western Germany and Poland, the differences related to women's orientation go beyond 30 percentage points. They range between 20–30% points in Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania and the Netherlands. Only in Romania does the work-family orientation make a smaller difference between the labour market statuses of women (7.6% points).

To this end, it is worth noting that the breadwinner-homemaker model enjoys continuously high popularity among the population in several countries. In the countries for which the data are available, an average of 23% of women aged 20–49 preferred non-employment over full- or part-time work. The corresponding proportion appears the highest in Lithuania, where 47.6% stated a preference towards the breadwinner-homemaker model, followed by the Netherlands and Estonia, with 36 and 32.1% respectively. Also in Italy, Western Germany and Poland the preference

for homemaker status was above the average of the IPPAS countries. As can be seen in Table 15.3, among women with a traditional, and in some cases intermediate, work-family orientation, the respective percentages reach levels as high as 40–50%.

It is evident that these results offer a reason to contemplate the policy objectives and measures in the work-family domain. The mainstream policies in the family sector are prevailingly geared to facilitate the combination of paid employment and parenthood (Meulders, Gustafsson 2003; OECD 2001). Without questioning this aim to any extent, it seems however that it has relatively little to offer to individuals who lean toward the family rather than toward paid work as their main priority. The evidence from the IPPAS could inspire policy-makers to recognise that there are several equally valid alternative work-family models which are effective and eligible for societal support. At present, according to Hakim (2005), a focus of social and family policies has swung so far towards the working mother that there is a risk of bias against non-working mothers in most modern societies.

Table 15.3 Preferred employment patterns by work-family orientation, females aged 20–49*

Country	Traditional	Employed Intermediate	Modern	Traditional	Full-time Intermediate	Modern
Estonia	57.1	68.3	82.5	26.4	28.8	50.9
Germany	49.7	75.0	88.0	16.6	25.0	36.1
Eastern Germany	74.1	86.9	93.7	51.9	45.9	55.3
Western Germany	47.7	73.1	85.6	13.6	21.5	28.2
Lithuania	47.4	51.7	70.5	14.0	16.8	40.9
The Netherlands	54.8	51.7	82.6	11.9	7.4	10.0
Poland	59.6	75.1	89.8	37.1	50.6	67.1
Romania	88.1	93.4	95.7	69.5	78.8	90.5
Cyprus	63.8	78.2	91.5	27.7	38.8	58.5
All countries	58.7	75.2	88.4	29.5	39.4	44.7
Country	Traditional	Part-time Intermediate	Modern	Traditional	Non-employed Intermediate	Modern
Estonia	30.8	40.1	31.6	42.9	31.7	17.5
Germany	33.1	50.0	51.9	50.3	25.0	12.0
Eastern Germany	22.2	41.0	38.4	25.9	13.1	6.3
Western Germany	34.1	51.6	57.4	52.3	26.9	14.4
Lithuania	33.3	34.9	29.5	52.6	48.3	29.5
The Netherlands	42.9	44.2	72.6	45.2	48.3	17.4
Poland	22.5	24.6	22.7	40.4	24.9	10.2
Romania	18.6	14.7	5.2	11.9	6.6	4.3
Cyprus	36.2	39.4	33.1	36.2	21.8	8.5
All countries	29.3	35.8	43.6	41.3	24.8	11.6

Source: IPPAS

* the percentage of women with a given work-family orientation who preferred to be employed (either full- or part-time) and non-employed

15.4 Work-Family Orientation and Labour Market Participation – Findings from the Multivariate Analyses

Having discussed the bivariate association between the work-family orientation and female labour market status, it is important to check whether the relationship might be spurious, i.e. whether the observed association could be ascribed to some factors that exert a simultaneous influence on both attitudes and on labour market behaviour. It is not difficult to assume that the effect of attitudes is overstated in cross-tabulations, for example because women with higher educational attainment favour full-time work whilst at the same time being more likely to be in employment.

To address that issue, a binomial logistic regression was applied. Consistent with the analyses presented in the previous section, our dependent variables were the women's practised and preferred labour market status. The dependent variable was set to 1 if the respondent was or preferred to be employed, and to 0 if the opposite was the case. Due to mixed results obtained across countries on the full-/part-time distinction, no attempt is made to model the choice between these alternative employment arrangements.

The main independent variable was the work-family orientation, operationalised as a categorical covariate with three levels (traditional, intermediate and modern). The control variables included a set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics which are commonly known to influence female labour market participation, namely age, educational attainment, number of children, and age of the youngest child. Several authors have drawn attention to the importance of religiosity as a factor shaping attitudes toward gender roles and women's employment, as well as related behaviour, and therefore religiosity was included in the regression models (Fux 1998; Inglehart, Nebenführ 1998; Pippa 2003).

The working sample was limited to women aged 20-49. In addition, the multivariate analysis was limited to women who were reportedly living with a partner (either married, cohabiting or in an LAT relationship). The objective of this additional selection criterion is to obtain greater homogeneity of the sample in terms of labour market decisions – single women, especially single mothers, are thought to have much more restricted choices in terms of labour market positions than their counterparts living in partnerships.[13]

The modelling strategy applied in this section is straightforward. Three sets of logistic models were estimated for both dependent variables, i.e. the practised and preferred labour market statuses. The purpose of the first was to produce non-adjusted estimates for each of the covariates, including them in a model one at a time. The purpose of the second set of models was to produce the estimates that

[13] In the stage of the exploratory analysis, the models were also fitted without imposing the constraint on the partnership status. In comparison to the latter, focusing on women currently in partnerships did not alter the results, but simply made them more pronounced.

were adjusted for the effects of all other covariates. The first and second sets of models were estimated for all the countries combined. The relevant differences in the institutional framework and other contextual factors were operationalised by means of dummy variables for each country. The third set of models was run for each country separately to check for differences in impacts of the work-family orientations across different settings.

Estimates for the first and second sets of models, together with the applied coding schemes of covariates and the reference categories, are presented systematically in the tables below. The results of the third set of models are discussed where relevant. In the tables, modelling results are given in terms of odds ratios with significance levels associated with them.

15.4.1 Practised Employment-Family Models

The model estimates for women's practised employment are presented in Table 15.4. Compared to the reference category of the modern work-family orientation which supports the dual-earner family, the model reveals significant differences in labour market participation among women with the traditional and intermediate orientations.

According to the non-adjusted model, both the traditional and intermediate work-family orientations appear to be related to the lower likelihood of the respondent being employed. For women with a traditional orientation, the odds of being employed are around 69.3% points lower than for the modern orientation – the reference category. Concerning women in the intermediate category, the reduction in the odds ratio is, as expected, smaller (41.2% points). The influence of the work-family orientation variable is significant.

The introduction of checking for other covariates in the model leads to a certain decrease in the regression coefficients, but the effect of work-family attitudes does not disappear. The estimates from the adjusted model reveal that there is still a rather extensive and statistically-significant reduction in women's labour market attachment associated with the traditional as well as intermediate work-family orientations. Acceptance of the family with a woman regarded as a homemaker-carer and a man as an economic provider is related to a likelihood of female employment which is 61.7% points lower than for the reference category. As regards the intermediate category, the decrease in the odds ratio accounts for 33.3%.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the comparison of adjusted and non-adjusted models is that the relationship between the work-family orientation and women's practised labour market participation is to a significant extent unaffected by checking for education, family life cycle stage and religiosity. The persistence of the effects after adjustments for control variables lends support to the hypothesis that the work-family orientation does not represent a simple reflection of women's demographic and social characteristics. Instead, our independent variable seems to capture a relatively autonomous attitudinal dimension, which has discernible repercussions on labour market behaviour.

Table 15.4 Women's preferred labour market participation. Estimates of logistic models for all countries combined

Covariate	Category	Non-adjusted dds ratio	Adjusted dds ratio
Work-family orientation	Traditional	0.31**	0.38**
	Intermediate	0.59**	0.67**
	Modern	1.00	1.00
Age group	20–29	0.50**	0.99**
	30–39	0.83**	1.41**
	40–49	1.00	1.00
Education	Primary or lower secondary	0.67**	0.62**
	Upper secondary	1.00	1.00
	Post-secondary	2.14**	1.91**
Number of children	0	4.56**	2.98**
	1	1.13	0.90
	2	1.00	1.00
	3+	0.79**	1.10**
Age of youngest child	0–2	0.17**	0.17**
	3–6	0.57**	0.58**
	7–14	1.00	1.00
	15+	0.90	1.20
Religion	Religious	0.72**	0.80**
	Non-religious	1.00	1.00
Country	Austria	0.71*	0.91*
	Estonia	1.09	1.19
	Eastern Germany	1.02	0.73
	Western Germany	1.00	1.00
	Hungary	0.78*	1.22*
	Lithuania	0.74	0.96
	Netherlands	1.12**	0.38**
	Poland	0.76**	0.67**

Source: IPPAS
Note: ** significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level

The estimated regression models for individual countries confirm the general validity of the results obtained by means of descriptive methods[14] (Table 15.5). Although the strength of the association varies, in all the countries included in the analysis the relationship between attitudes and women's practiced labour market attachment follows the expected direction – the traditional and intermediate work-family orientations are related to the lower likelihood of female employment as compared to the reference category, i.e. to the modern orientation. In other words, the multivariate analysis did not invalidate our finding that the influence of the

[14] The applied selection criteria resulted in no cases left for Cyprus, and as a result the country was dropped from the multivariate analysis. With regard to Romania, information was not available on the number of children, but it was decided to include this country in the regression models.

Table 15.5 Women's practised labour market participation. Estimates of logistic models by countries

Country	Traditional Odds ratio	Intermediate Odds ratio	Modern
Austria	0.17**	0.48**	1.00
Estonia	0.36	0.44	1.00
Germany	0.43**	0.76*	1.00
Eastern Germany	0.68	1.11	1.00
Western Germany	0.33**	0.61*	1.00
Hungary	0.47	0.72	1.00
Lithuania	0.48	0.50	1.00
Netherlands	0.16**	0.46**	1.00
Poland	0.48**	0.75**	1.00
Romania	0.56	0.71	1.00
All countries	0.38**	0.67**	1.00

Source: IPPAS
Notes: ** significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level

work-family orientation is relevant regardless of different welfare regimes and the mixture of employment-family models.

Moreover, the association is relatively statistically significant for the majority of countries under study. With regard to the traditional work-family orientation, estimates reveal the strongest influence of work-family orientation on labour market behaviour in Austria and the Netherlands. Checking for the effects of other variables, acceptance of the breadwinner-homemaker model reduces the odds of female employment by more than 80 percentage points in these countries. In Estonia and Western Germany, the corresponding reduction amounts to 64–66 percentage points, while in Hungary, Lithuania and Poland it ranges between 52 and 53 percentage points. Only in Romania and Eastern Germany is the decrease in the odds of female employment associated with a traditional work-family orientation of less than 50%.

The effects of control variables follow the patterns usually observed in the studies of female workforce participation, but the discussion of these effects would go beyond the aims of this chapter.

15.4.2 Preferred Employment-Family Models

Model estimates for women's preferred labour market status are presented in Table 15.6.

The estimates reveal a high degree of coherence with the results of the descriptive analysis – women with traditional and intermediate orientations would prefer employment less frequently than their counterparts who supported the dual-earner family.

Also in the multivariate framework, the differences associated with women's work-family orientation come into view as more pronounced in the preferred rather than practised labour market status. Judging on the non-adjusted model for all

Table 15.6 Women's preferred labour market participation. Estimates of logistic models for all countries combined

Covariate	Category	Non-adjusted odds ratio	Adjusted odds ratio
Work-family orientation	Traditional	0.15**	0.18**
	Intermediate	0.39**	0.40**
	Modern	1.00	1.00
Age group	20-29	0.87	0.96
	30-39	0.98	1.04
	40-49	1.00	1.00**
Education	Primary or lower secondary	0.62**	0.77*
	Upper secondary	1.00	1.00
	Post-secondary	2.81**	2.66**
Number of children	0	2.01**	2.06**
	1	1.91**	1.74**
	2	1.00	1.00
	3+	0.65**	0.74**
Age of youngest child	0–2	0.67**	0.84
	3–6	0.89	1.08
	7–14	1.00	1.00
	15+	1.10	1.08
Religion	Religious	0.76**	0.80*
	Non-religious	1.00	1.00
Country	Estonia	0.76	0.91
	Eastern Germany	4.53**	3.02**
	Western Germany	1.00	1.00
	Lithuania	0.50**	0.59**
	Netherlands	0.66**	0.57**
	Poland	1.19**	1.87**

Source: IPPAS
Notes: ** significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level

countries combined, the likelihood of preferring employment is almost 85% points lower for women with a prevailingly traditional work-family orientation than for a modern orientation (the reference category). Belonging to the intermediate group also implies an extensive reduction (61.5% points) in the odds of preferences for employment. Not surprisingly, both differences are statistically significant.

Apart from the practised labour market participation, adjustment for the effects of control variables brings along only a marginal change in odds ratios. With regard to women who are inclined towards the traditional work-family orientation, the reduction in the likelihood of preferring employment is limited to 3% points. The change in model estimates is even smaller among women belonging to the intermediate group. This result is consistent with our expectations, and underscores the fact that the attitudes underlying the taxonomy of women's work-family orientation are relatively independent from the family life cycle stage, education and social status.

The models estimated for individual countries validate the consistency of the relationship across different institutional settings (Table 15.7). In all countries under

Table 15.7 Women's preferred labour market status. Estimates of logistic models by countries

Country	Traditional Odds ratio	Intermediate Odds ratio	Modern
Estonia	0.34	0.61	1.00
Germany	0.18**	0.49**	1.00
Eastern Germany	0.21	0.46	1.00
Western Germany	0.17**	0.52**	1.00
Lithuania	0.58	0.67	1.00
Netherlands	0.08**	0.24**	1.00
Poland	0.19**	0.35**	1.00
Romania	0.45	0.91	1.00
All countries	0.18**	0.40**	1.00

Source: IPPAS

Notes: ** significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level

study, the work-family orientation affects women's preferences for labour market status in line with the hypothesised pattern – belonging to the groups with the traditional and intermediate stances implies a considerable decrease in the likelihood that women would prefer employment to homemaking as compared to women with a modern orientation.

Women's work-family orientation makes the greatest difference in the Netherlands, where the traditional orientation reduces the odds that women would prefer employment by more than 90% points, compared to the modern work-family orientation (the reference category). A very strong influence of work-family attitudes on women's labour market preferences is also observed in Germany, in both the Eastern and Western parts of the country, and in Poland with a difference in odds ratios of more than 80 percentage points. At the other end of the scale, Lithuania should be mentioned, with the slightest difference of 42.1% points.

15.5 Work-Family Orientation and Fertility

The analysis undertaken in this article would be incomplete without taking notice of the differences in fertility related to women's work-family orientations. This perspective is particularly important against the background of modern demographic trends, which have pushed fertility to low or very low levels in virtually all countries of Europe. It has been generally accepted that in the longer term, the persistence of current patterns will bring demographic ageing to unprecedented levels and threaten the sustainability of societies.

Table 15.8 offers a simple comparison of fertility levels between women aged 20–49 with the traditional, intermediate and modern work-family orientations. The table presents the mean number of children, including step-children and adopted children, but excluding deceased biological children.[15] Although this measure is not

[15] The data are derived from IPPAS questionnaire item CQ9a.

Table 15.8 Average number of children by work-family orientation

Country	Children born			Children born and expected		
	Traditional	Intermediate	Modern	Traditional	Intermediate	Modern
Austria	1.84	1.55	1.19	2.24	1.89	1.59
Estonia	1.79	1.50	1.09	2.44	2.35	2.15
Germany	1.23	1.13	1.06	2.17	1.70	1.68
Eastern Germany	1.35	1.28	1.20	1.75	1.81	1.74
Western Germany	1.22	1.11	1.00	2.20	1.68	1.65
Hungary	2.04	1.43	1.32	2.47	2.05	1.97
Lithuania	1.82	1.55	1.11	2.22	2.06	2.00
The Netherlands	1.40	1.34	1.17	2.34	2.10	1.95
Poland	2.21	1.77	1.34	2.76	2.35	2.00
Cyprus	1.79	1.67	1.02	2.98	2.96	2.47
All countries	1.69	1.41	1.14	2.41	2.01	1.79

Source: IPPAS

Notes: The number of children born refers to item CQ9a, and the number of children born and expected refers to item RCCQ9TE in the IPPAS database.

perfect from the viewpoint of fertility analysis, it highlights significant differences that exist across the different work- family orientations.

In the countries studied, support for the breadwinner-homemaker model translates to an average of 1.69 children per woman. Among women inclined toward the modern work-family orientation, the mean number of children is limited to 1.14. As expected, the fertility of the intermediate group of women is positioned in the middle between the fertility of women with traditional and modern work-family orientations. In relative terms, women with a traditional orientation display an almost 50% higher fertility. This finding is repeated across all the countries included in the analysis, although with some variations. In cross-country terms, the Netherlands and Germany feature a somewhat slighter difference, with an excess number of children ranging from 12.1% in Eastern Germany to 22% in Western Germany. In Austria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Cyprus, women's orientation and fertility appears to be much more closely associated – traditional attitudes toward the work-family model correlate to a number of children that is higher by 55–76 %.

Besides dissimilarities in the levels of fertility in terms of the quantum, the observed differences are presumably related to the pace of childbearing. Numerous studies have shown that women who are oriented towards professional activity postpone childbearing to a greater extent in order to establish a solid position on the labour market and to secure career advancement. To account for potential differences in the pace of childbearing, we repeated the comparative analyses merging the number of children already born with those ultimately expected. As a result, the excess fertility associated with a traditional work-family orientation was reduced from 48 to 35% on average, but the general pattern remained virtually unchanged. It is interesting to note from the viewpoint of fertility developments that in the majority of countries the expected fertility of women with a traditional work-family orientation reached the replacement level, whereas the modern orientation was associated with below-replacement fertility.

Despite the evidence about the rather strong relationship between the work-family orientation on the one hand, and women's labour market participation and fertility behaviour on the other, it is important to note that the results presented do not allow a conclusion to be reached as to the causal links. As respondents' status and attitudes all refer to the same time point in the IPPAS dataset, it is not possible to distinguish between the extent to which the attitudinal orientations might have true predictive power for women's labour market behaviour, and how much their orientations might reflect *a posteriori* rationalisation of earlier life choices (Lesthaeghe, Moors 2000a; Lesthaeghe 2002). Despite this methodological restriction, the results add to a need to incorporate value orientations and attitudes in studies on demographic and social processes.

15.6 Summary and Discussion

The findings reported indicate that despite a long record of rising female employment and the relatively high levels reached in many countries at the turn of the 21st century, there is considerable diversity in female labour market participation by work-family orientation. The four questions on gender roles used to define the work-family attitudes properly identified women with traditional and modern work-family orientations. The resulting taxonomy performed well, displaying systematic differences in labour market behaviour.

The acceptance of segregated gender roles between men and women proved to be related to lower female workforce participation and a greater prevalence of the traditional breadwinner model. Support for more symmetrical roles of men and women was reflected in the stronger attachment of women to the labour force and the higher frequency of the dual-earner or modernised breadwinner models. The described relationship holds both for the practised and preferred work-family models, with a somewhat more pronounced effect on the latter.

It is perhaps even more noteworthy that the differences in the labour market participation of women by work-family orientation are manifested in all the countries under study, regardless of the type of welfare regime, the existing pattern of female workforce participation, and the patterns of attitudes expressed in terms of shares of women with modern and traditional orientations. The differences in employment rates related to the traditional and modern orientations are quite extensive, exceeding 20% points in several countries. Regarding preferences for employment, the difference goes beyond that level in almost every country under study.

The multivariate analysis by use of logistic models with socio-demographic variables (age, educational attainment, number of children, age of the youngest child and religion) and the work-family orientation variable support the hypothesis that the work-family orientation does not represent a simple reflection of the socio-economic position, educational level and the family life-cycle stage. Instead, it seems to be a relatively independent attitudinal dimension, with discernible repercussions on labour market behaviour. Also, regressions run by individual countries confirm impacts of the work-family orientation on women's labour market participation.

Although the construction of the work-family attitudes index followed a different scheme, the results allow for parallels with Catherine Hakim's recent research on Britain, conducted within the framework of the preference theory (2003, 2005). Similar to the present study, Hakim describes the relative independence of attitudes, related to gender roles and the work-family balance. The British and earlier American findings suggest that core attitudes, conceptualised in terms of lifestyle preferences, have substantial implications for the labour market as well as for family behaviour (Rexroat, Shehan 1984; Shaw and Shapiro 1987; Spitze and Waite 1980). These influences cut across levels of education, income and social class, and in terms of their intensity are comparable to human capital and economic position.

Hakim took one step further towards causal inferences, and made a claim about the prevailing direction of the influence (2002). The cross-sectional character of the IPPAS dataset, however, does not allow for exploration of that avenue as the statuses and attitudes of the respondents all refer to the same time point. Therefore, it is not possible here to attempt to distinguish between selection and adaptation processes, i.e. to investigate to what extent attitudinal orientations might have a true predictive power for women's labour market and family behaviour, and how much orientations might reflect the *post hoc* affirmation and rationalisation of life choices already made (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000; Lesthaeghe 2002). The associations measured in the cross-sectional framework obviously capture the whole of this recursive process, offering no opportunity to decompose the observed statistical associations into causal constituents. Despite these limitations, the findings presented unequivocally contribute to the call to firmly incorporate culture, value orientations and attitudes in studies on demographic and social processes (Avramov, Cliquet 2005).

The association observed between work-family orientation and women's labour market behaviour offers a matter for contemplation also in terms of policy implications. Most importantly, it recapitulates a noticeable diversity of populations with regard to references and expectations related to the work and family nexus in virtually all European countries. This conclusion is supported by recent cross-cultural studies which indicate that although there is a major, irreversible transformation of values and attitudes as societies transform from agrarian through industrial to modern post-industrial, the complete or near-complete homogeneity of views on reconciliation between work and family has not yet become a reality (Inglehart, Pippa 2003). And developments towards greater individualisation of choices and lifestyles, characteristic of the post-modern age, leave it somewhat open whether it is reasonable to expect such convergence.

The differences in work-family orientations lead to a question of how well the existing policies, aimed at reconciling work and family, consider the heterogeneity of attitudes and preferences. Although there is sufficient room for improvement, noticeable progress has been achieved during recent decades in prohibiting discrimination, reducing gender-specific barriers to achievement in the labour market and promoting equality between men and women (Heide 2004; Loufti 2001; Rosilli 2000). Critics have remarked, however, that in many countries the measures promoted and exercised nowadays with regard to reconciliation of work and family tend to neglect a diversity of preferences among the target population. More

specifically, it has been noted that the mainstream policy agenda is paving the way towards unisex employment and family roles for everyone, based on the misleading assumption that women form a basically homogeneous group with a single set of aspirations (Crittenden 2001; Hakim 2005).

In practice, the policies that are designed for people who are inclined towards the uninterrupted, continuous combination of employment and family offer little or no support to those who would prefer a different model with the separation of breadwinner and carer roles at least for a certain stage of life. If based on the individuals' genuine choice, the alternative models should not be prioritised against each other, but rather regarded as complementary pathways towards reconciliation strategies over the life course. The recognition of diversity of preferences and aspirations should lead to policies that are more neutral between different work-family orientations, and enhance the scope of self-fulfilment for the entire population.

In the context of rising concerns regarding the sustainability of the current demographic trends in the long term, it is necessary to recall that women who are oriented towards the male breadwinner model tend to have the highest fertility rates, and, perhaps, can be therefore most easily persuaded to push fertility closer to the replacement level. Evidence supportive of this argument was also provided by the IPPAS – on average, the difference in the number of children between three work-family orientations amounted to 40%, with even wider cross-country differences.

To conclude the discussion of policy implications, it is difficult not to agree with the statement of Paul Demeny, who underscored the necessity of a serious rethink of policies potentially affecting parental willingness to have children, including reconciliation between work and parenthood, if low fertility is recognised as a social problem and a challenge to Europe's future (2003). The contribution of the IPPAS to the knowledge base of this effort consists to a great extent in highlighting the increasing role of culture and the significance of an attitudinal dimension.

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Part VI
Family Related Policies

Chapter 16
Family Policies: Financial or Institutional Measures?

Preferences of Childless Persons and One-Child Parents

Anneli Miettinen, Ingrid Esveldt and Tineke Fokkema

Abstract The ageing of European societies is shifting governments' focus towards means to influence families and fertility. However, increased attention towards family policies is combined with increasing demands to cut public spending in many countries. There are requests to introduce means-testing, or otherwise to restrict eligibility to financial benefits, which have traditionally been the core of government support for families. Increasing attention to the relationship between women's employment and childbearing is also shifting the emphasis towards institutional measures which address reconciliation of work and family. To what extent is public opinion in agreement with these changes? What policies do people themselves prefer? Using data from the Population Policy Acceptance Survey, we examine public preferences concerning family policy measures and their improvement in the DIALOG countries. We examine the preferences towards financial and institutional measures among childless persons and parents who have one child, as these two groups are likely to be those among whom family policy measures can be expected to influence childbearing choices. We analyse the opinions in three groups of countries based on their recent fertility development (lowest, low and moderate fertility). While there is marked variation between country groups as to how different measures are valued, some of the variety in the opinions is also related to individual level socio-demographic factors. In addition, we find that expectations towards government are not always in agreement with existing policies.

Keywords: Family policy · Attitudes · Eastern Europe · Western Europe

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16.1 Introduction

Increasing fertility has not so far headed population policy agendas in Europe, although it is widely acknowledged that societies' demographic sustainability requires that fertility levels will eventually have to start to climb towards replacement fertility. Influencing fertility and family formation in general is considered a sensitive matter, and governments have not been very eager to explicitly present desired fertility levels. It is expected in policy circles that focusing on families' well-being in general, via family and other policies, will eventually result in higher fertility. It is also believed that the fall in period fertility to unprecedented low levels is only a temporary phenomenon, and that a recuperation of fertility will follow later. General reluctance towards introducing pronatal policies is further supported by research literature on the relationship between policies and fertility which seems at best to suggest only a marginal impact of policies on fertility (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Gauthier 2000).

Whilst governments appear not to value highly the promotion of explicit measures to enhance fertility levels, they may wish to support family formation by introducing policies which enable families to have the number of children they want. Demand for family-friendly policies and more flexible forms of reconciliation of work and family have already emerged as high-priority issues on both national governments' and EU agenda. At the same time, particularly in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, governments face demands to cut public spending and tighten national budgets.

Investments in family policies are justified only if we have some idea of what kind of impact we can expect them to have, and how major and long-standing the effects will be. It can be expected that in order for a (family) policy to be effective, it has to be substantial and meaningful for families. It has to address issues which are considered relevant at different family-formation phases and among different population groups. Attempts to modify childbearing via measures which are highly unpopular among the population will only result in governments spending money on ineffective policies.

In this chapter we look at attitudes and preferences towards family policies in the DIALOG countries, namely at what measures people themselves would prefer. Financial benefits have traditionally been the core of government support for families. However, there has been an ongoing discussion of whether family benefits should be more targeted, instead of being universal provisions. The increasing attention paid to the relationship between women's employment and childbearing is also shifting the emphasis towards institutional measures which address reconciliation of work and family. To what extent is public opinion in agreement with these changes? While the focus on policy attitudes does not describe what kind of impact can be expected, information on preferences can provide additional understanding to assess the potential impact of policies on behaviour. Information on public opinion towards various financial and institutional measures and differences between population groups will provide governments insights into what policies to pursue in the future. We compare also the public opinion towards family policy measures in countries with different

fertility levels. While the context and background of low fertility is not uniform across Europe, we can assume that different family policy models are partly related to differences in fertility development, and that policy measures may not have a uniform impact in different countries. With this respect it is interesting to look whether the preferences towards policy measures are very different in countries with extremely low fertility levels, compared to those in countries with more favourable fertility.

The chapter begins with a description of recent trends in family policies in the DIALOG countries and provides a summary of current provisions. In Section 16.3, we look at the results from the Population Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS) on attitudes towards financial and institutional family policy measures among childless people and one-child parents, and analyse the variation in these attitudes across population subgroups and across countries with different fertility levels. Finally, Section 16.4 ends the chapter with summary conclusions.

16.2 Recent Trends and Current Provisions in Family Policies in the Dialog Countries

Definitions of what policies are counted as family policy vary from one study to another. In general, family policy is understood to include measures which provide economic and institutional support for families in childbearing and child raising, and where the benefit/service is explicitly allocated to the family (Gauthier 1996). Practically every European country has implemented some family-friendly policies, although the scope and nature of the measures varies markedly. Some general dividing lines do however seem to persist which are used to categorize countries. The division of countries into Southern, Western and Northern groups can be found in many studies (Gauthier 1996; Fux 2005; Siaroff 1996). The categorisation of the Eastern group is more difficult, and although they form an economically and politically distinctive group, individual countries have very different backgrounds when it comes to family traditions, religion and culture.

In the CEE countries, the collapse of the former communist system marked profound qualitative and quantitative change also in family policy. Before the 1990s, the aim of family policies in these countries was to keep women in the labour force. Therefore, universal policies and services to aid reconciliation of work and family were developed in many cases earlier than in the Western European countries. In addition, family policies included pronatal features (substantial birth grants, access to housing, etc.), most notably in Romania. Economic support for families was mainly provided via child benefit, which remained a substantial source of additional income for families in many CEE countries until the late 1980s (ILO 1987).

During the transition period and the reconstruction of the economic and political system in the 1990s, many policies were discontinued and the level of benefits reduced. Increasing unemployment and the falling standard of living in many families, combined with problems in balancing public finances, led governments to cut

overall social spending and opt for more restricted and income-targeted measures to fight poverty. In the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, financial support for families was reduced, eligibility for benefits was restricted, and means-testing was imposed on previously universal benefits. Public day care arrangements for the under-threes were reduced markedly, and at-home care of small children was encouraged by introducing or improving longer parental leave schemes. Developments in Hungary differed somewhat in pace because longer parental leave already existed before the 1990s and the reductions in family provisions took also place later, namely during the latter half of the 1990s. The unification of the former GDR and the FRG led to the gradual adoption of Western German family policy model also in Eastern Germany. This is particularly visible in the reduction of public day care arrangements for small children. Only in Slovenia was the transition period not followed by marked changes in family policies. Instead, Slovenia chose a more active role, and in the beginning of the 1990s the government adopted a comprehensive family policy which included, for example, measures to increase children's day care and to gradually increase child allowances.

By the end of the 1990s, CEE governments started to once more gradually improve the level of family policy provisions. Financial benefits for families were improved by increasing the level of child allowances (in Slovenia), introducing a birth grant (in the Czech Republic), and by improving income compensation during family leave (in Hungary and Romania). Tax deductions were introduced for families with dependant children (in Estonia and Lithuania), and their level improved (in Hungary), or governments had plans to introduce tax-related measures (the Czech Republic and Poland). Provision of day care arrangements started to increase gradually, particularly for children aged 3+. However, the extension or financial improvement of parental leave schemes, combined with relatively poor day care arrangements for children below 3 years of age, has meant that a temporary home-carer model has become a predominant form for women to combine work and family in these countries, at least during the very first years after child birth. In addition, informal and private unpaid care arrangements are still widely used in these countries (Kontula and Miettinen 2005).

Other family-friendly policies related to employment besides improvements of parental leave have been scarce in CEE countries. The parental leave period is well secured, with a high income compensation rate (for those with a previous employment history) in most of the countries, but after that, economic difficulties encountered by families have meant that it is necessary for both partners to be in full-time employment to meet the needs of the family. Consequently, increasing flexibility of working time or a reduction in working time has not been a very common form of reconciliation of work and family. By the beginning of 2000, policies to increase part-time work, or to make working hours more flexible, have not gained much support from governments, and the proportion of women working part-time in CEE countries is clearly lower than in many Western European countries (Kotowska et al. 2006). However, Kotowska et al. (ibid) argue that there is considerable interest in

part-time work in many CEE countries, expressed in work and family reconciliation preferences among the respondents in the PPAS.

Family policy development in the Western European countries has followed an altogether different route. Increasing labour force participation of women, and especially mothers, also increased governments' attention to policies that foster reconciliation of work and family and support women's employment. Improvement of the conditions under which parental leave is granted, part-time work and increased attention to the division of care responsibilities between men and women in the family, have marked a gradual change from the male-earner family model towards recognizing the needs of dual-earner families in many Western European countries. Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Germany and the Netherlands have introduced measures which increase possibilities for a parent (mother) to work part-time when the children are young. In Austria and Germany, parents may combine parental leave or use part-time leave with part-time work until the child reaches 2–4 years of age, during which they can receive income compensation. In Belgium (Flanders) and in the Netherlands, the parental leave period is much shorter, from three to six months. In the Netherlands, the leave period has to be used in the form of reduced working hours without general compensation (some branches and the public sector offer some compensation for reduced working time); in Belgium (Flanders), full-time leave with compensation can be changed into part-time leave with reduced compensation to combine it with part-time work. Part-time working is a typical form of employment among women/mothers in these countries, particularly in the Netherlands.

Although the development of public day care for small children has been increasingly on the government agenda in many Western countries, the availability of child care arrangements for children below three years of age lags far behind the level of day care arrangements in the Nordic countries. The governments of the Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders), Austria and Germany have announced plans to increase the number of day care places for small children, but a shortage of places is still prevalent and private day care arrangements (mother/father, grandparent, hired private help) are widely used. A part of the child care costs is eligible for tax deduction in the Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders) and Germany.

In the Nordic countries, changes in family policies during the 1990s have been only gradual, and the emphasis has been placed on more flexible reconciliation of work and family life. In Finland, the economic crisis in the beginning of the 1990s did not markedly reduce family policy provisions in general, but halted the development of direct financial benefits for families until the beginning of 2000. During that decade, greater emphasis was placed on increasing flexibility in working time and child care arrangements by introducing a private care allowance to hire private help, granting a right to a place in public day care for every child below school age, and decreasing the fees for public day care.

The government has so far had a very limited role in supporting families in Italy and Cyprus. The main goal has been to prevent social exclusion and poverty, the focus being placed on large families. Family provisions are selective, benefits

are means-tested, and the supervision and provision of many services for families has been transferred from the government to local actors, NGOs and churches. By the end of the 1990s, governments had adopted a slightly more active role in both Cyprus and Italy. Eligibility for and the amount of child allowance has been improved in Italy, and the government has introduced a tax deduction for dependant partners and children. The role played by the government in Cyprus was more restricted, and during 1990s the government introduced a scheme to encourage NGOs to develop family support programs and services on a local level. Part-time employment and other forms of flexibility in working life have not been popular in Southern European countries, although, part-time working gradually increased in Italy during the latter half of 1990s.

In general, the 1990s are characterised by growing interest in increasing and improving family policy measures in European countries, although there are still marked differences between countries. In the CEE countries, financial benefits for families have remained as the major form of support for families, although the level of benefits was reduced markedly in the beginning of or during the transition period in most countries. Despite the abolition or reduction of the public day care system in the beginning of the 1990s, improvement of institutional measures has not entered the government agenda in the CEE countries (with the exception of Slovenia and Estonia). In the Western European DIALOG countries, by contrast, the emphasis has been on the development of institutional measures in the form of improving preconditions for part-time employment and providing flexibility in combining parental leave and employment. The development of public day care has received more attention, but so far only minor concrete improvements have occurred everywhere except in Finland. In the Southern European countries, despite recent improvements in both financial and institutional measures, family benefits have remained more selective and the level of many provisions is low.

Table 16.1 lists selected family policy provisions in the DIALOG countries around the year of the PPAS (2000–2003).

16.3 Family Policy Preferences in the Dialog Countries

The overview of recent family policy development in the DIALOG countries revealed considerable variation between countries in the generosity and type of family policies they emphasized. We now turn to look at public opinion concerning policies and their improvements. We describe, firstly, public attitudes towards selected financial and institutional family policy measures in the DIALOG countries, and compare the preferences towards financial or institutional measures among childless persons and parents with one child. Considering the potential impact of family policies on childbearing decisions, the most critical groups affected are those who currently do not have children, as well as parents with one child, as it can be expected that these groups still consider having (more) children. We assume that preferences towards certain family policy measures reflect perceived obstacles and risks

Table 16.1 Indicators of child allowance, taxation, family leave, public day care and part-time employment in the DIALOG countries in 2000–2003

	Child allowance	Taxation	Family leave: duration	Family leave: compensation	Public day care: % of children		Part-time work
	Amount for 1st child % of average gross earnings	Tax unit Tax deductions	Maternity leave Parental leave	Percentage of wage/flat rate	< 3 yrs	3+ yrs	Women aged 20–39 years, % in part-time employment
Czech Republic	18.70 e/mth (means-tested, income limit) 4.4%	Tax unit: individual No family-based tax deductions	M: 28 w P: until child 4 yrs	M: max. 13 e/day, means-tested P: tied to minimum income, means-tested	< 1%	89.2%	7.7%
Estonia	10.00 e/mth 2.8%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for families with 3+ children	M: 20 w P: until child 3 yrs	M: 100% P: 38.4 e/mth	47%	82%	8.5%
Hungary	14.80 e/mth 4.3%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for children	M: 24 w P: until child 3 yrs (different schemes)	M: 70% P: varies by schemes; flat rate to earnings compensated	10%	87%	4.7%[a]
Lithuania	n.a.	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for families with 3+ children	M: 18 w P: until child 3 yrs	M: 100% P: 60% until child 1 yrs, 27 e/mth until child 3 yrs	15%	56%	11.5%
Poland	10.50 e/mth (means-tested, income limit) 1.8%	Tax unit: individual No family-based tax deductions	M: 20 w P: 36 mths, until child 4 yrs	M: 100% P: 25%	2%	39%	10.0%

Table 16.1 Indicators of child allowance, taxation, family leave, public day care and part-time employment in the DIALOG countries in 2000–2003

	Child allowance	Taxation	Family leave: duration	Family leave: compensation	Public day care: % of children		Part-time work
	Amount for 1st child % of average gross earnings	Tax unit Tax deductions	Maternity leave Parental leave	Percentage of wage/flat rate	< 3 yrs	3+ yrs	Women aged 20–39 years, % in part-time employment
Romania	5.40 e/mth 3.2%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for children	M: 18 w P: until child 2 yrs	M: 85% P: 85%	no data	66%	10.9%
Slovenia	13.00 e/mth 1.4%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for children	M: 15 w P: until child 1 yr	M: 100% P: 100%	29%	71%	6.0%
Austria	105.40 e/mth 4.7%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for children and dependant partner	M: 16 w P: until child 1.5-2 years, 4 yrs if part-time	M: 100% P: 436 e/mth	10%	73%	30.1%
Belgium (Fl)	71.20 e/mth 2.6%	Tax unit: family Minimum income limit increased/each child Tax deductions for child care costs	M: 15 w P: 13 w (26 w if part-time)	M: 80%–60% P: flat rate (550 e/mth full-time leave)	61%	98%2.5+	31.1%
Germany	154.00 e/mth 4.7%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for children, child care costs	M: 14 w P: until child 3 yrs	M: 100% P: 300 e/mth until child 2 yrs (income ceiling), possible to work part-time	4% W 14% E	74% W86% E	29.0%

Table 16.1 (continued)

	Child allowance	Taxation	Family leave: duration	Family leave: compensation	Public day care: % of children		Part-time work
	Amount for 1st child % of average gross earnings	Tax unit Tax deductions	Maternity leave Parental leave	Percentage of wage/flat rate	< 3 yrs	3+ yrs	Women aged 20–39 years, % in part-time employment
Netherlands	58.87 e/mth 2.1%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for children, child care costs	M: 16 w P: 6 mths part-time leave+ part-time work (parents can use simultaneously)	M: 100% P: not paid (some branches offer part of wage)	22.5%	98%4+	62.8%
Finland	90.00 e/mth 3.9%	Tax unit: individual No family-based tax deductions	M: 17.5 w P: 26.3 w, extedend leave until child 3 yrs	M: < 67% P: < 67% (26.3 w), then 294 e/mth until child 3 yrs	36%	67%	18.8%
Cyprus	53.00 e/mth (only for 4+ child) 3.6%	Tax unit: individual No family-based tax deductions	M: 16 w P: 3 w	M: 75% P: unpaid	no data	no data	6.6%
Italy	10.33 e/mth (means-tested, income limit) 0.6%	Tax unit: individual Tax deductions for dependant (partner, child), esp. for families with 3+ children	M: 21 w P: 30 w	M: 80% P: 30% if child below 3 yrs	9%	98%	16.9%

Sources: Esveldt and Fokkema, 2006; Kontula and Miettinen, 2005

[a] Hungary: Data on part-time employment of women per all employed women, OECD 2005.

Note: Due to many differences in national schemes, provisions are not always strictly comparable.

related to family formation among childless persons. Parents with one child already have some experience of raising children, and their assessments of policy measures accordingly reflect the difficulties and problems encountered during this family phase.

Secondly, we analyse the extent to which socio-demographic characteristics are related to attitudes, and whether the influence of these characteristics differs depending on the fertility level of the country. In this, we use regression analysis. We analyse the impact of these variables separately among childless persons and one-child parents. In addition, we look at the individual impact of country variables and discuss whether the cross-country differences could be related to the level of current provisions in the countries.

In the PPAS, respondents were asked whether they favoured or opposed improvements in existing policy measures, or the introduction of altogether new family policy measures. For our analysis, policies were grouped into financial and institutional measures using factor analysis. Financial measures included improving parental leave, reducing income tax, income-related family allowance, an allowance at birth, a home care allowance and a substantial increase in child allowances. Cronbach's alpha was 0.82. Institutional measures include an improved day care system for the under-threes, care arrangements for school-age children, flexible working time arrangements and part-time work possibilities. Cronbach's alpha was .76. We have restricted our analysis to respondents aged 20–50 years of age. The total unweighted N of the sub-sample was 13,371 persons, and 9,423 persons after the exclusion of Belgium (Flanders) and Italy due to data limitations. For socio-demographic variables, we used sex, age group (20–29, 30–39, 40–50), partner status (not in union, in union) education level (low = primary or lower secondary education, medium = higher secondary, high = post secondary), employment status (inactive, paid job), expected number of children (0, 1, 2, 3+), and country dummies.

In order to observe the relationship between public attitudes towards policies and the countries' current fertility levels, we grouped countries on the basis of the total fertility rate (TFR) during recent years. Lowest-fertility countries, in which TFR is 1.30 or below, include the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Low-fertility (TFR 1.31–1.5) countries include Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, and Western Germany. Moderate-fertility (TFR above 1.5) countries include Belgium, (Flanders) Finland and the Netherlands. Italy and Belgium (Flanders) are included only in the first descriptive tables.

We used regression analysis to examine the impact of socio-demographic variables to the attitudes towards financial and institutional measures. Regression analysis estimates the independent effect of each variable on the attitude, when the impact of other variables is controlled for. In addition to socio-demographic variables, we examined the impact of separate countries. Analyses are preformed separately on childless persons and parents of one child, and in three fertility groups, in order to examine whether the socio-demographic factors are related to attitudes in a similar fashion in these three groups.

16.3.1 Attitudes Towards Financial and Institutional Family Policy Measures

Overall, the respondents tended to favour all family policy measures listed in the study. However, there were differences in the expressed preferences towards separate measures, as well as in the attitudes among individual countries. Respondents from CEE countries seem to be generally more responsive to new policies or improvements in existing policies than respondents from the West or North (Table 16.2). This may be explained by the recent history of reductions in many family provisions in these countries. Attitudes towards selected policies are very favourable also in Italy and Cyprus, and there appears to be considerable public pressure to increase governments' roles in family support in these two countries. A very different family policy tradition, as well as ideology towards governmental involvement, is reflected in attitudes towards policies among respondents from the West and North. Acceptance of various policy measures is less manifest, and there is greater variation in attitudes towards different policies.

Among the lowest-fertility countries, and in the CEE countries in particular, financial measures seem to be more commonly preferred as against institutional ones. Only in Eastern Germany are institutional measures more commonly favoured than financial ones. Measures which aim to reduce childbearing costs at an early stage of parenthood, an allowance at birth and improved parental leave arrangements receive the strongest support in the CEE countries with a very low TFR. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, tax-related measures are more commonly favoured than a substantial rise in child allowance in many CEE countries (except in Hungary and Slovenia). In Eastern Germany and Poland, means-tested benefit receives stronger support than the other financial measures.

Despite almost complete elimination of the public day care system for the under-threes, improvements in day care arrangements for small children are not considered to be as important as the financial problems faced by families (with the exception of Eastern Germany and Slovenia). In addition, it appears that (temporary) home care is a preferred type of care arrangement for small children when one considers the support given to improvements in parental leave and/or home care allowance, compared to support given to improving day care of young children. It has to be remembered that there is an extended parental leave period in many CEE countries until the child reaches three or four, but that the income compensation rate is low in many cases. Work-related measures also receive less support from the public (again Eastern Germany is an exception, as is Hungary, where work-related measures receive almost as much support as many financial measures). A reduction in working time without any financial compensation may be impossible if family finances are tight.

Long-standing difficulties encountered in obtaining access to adequate housing in the transition countries are most probably reflected in that measures related to improving housing are favoured especially in the CEE countries, in addition to measures related to decreasing educational costs.

Table 16.2 Preference towards family policy measures in the DIALOG countries, childless respondents and one-child parents aged 20–50 years, % (strongly) in favour

	Financial measures						Institutional measures					Other	
	Improved parental leave arrangements for working women	Lower income tax for people with dependant children	An income-dependent allowance for families with children	An allowance at the birth of each child	Allowance for parents who do not take a job + care of their young children	A substantial rise in child allowance	Better day care facilities for children < 3 yrs	Better day care facilities for children 3+ yrs	Child care facilities for school-going children	Flexible working hours for working parents with young children	More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time	A substantial decrease in the costs of education	Better housing for families with children
TFR < 1.31													
Czech Republic	83	85	76	89	82	85	65	76	70	79	83	70	80
E-Germany	84	84	85	83	81	82	91	93	89	90	91	78	71
Hungary	89	90	89	83	75	92	71	82	76	91	90	93	94
Italy	–	89	–	–	–	89	89	–	–	–	89	–	80
Lithuania	95	90	84	95	96	80	86	88	82	82	78	87	88
Poland	88	82	90	89	86	64	82	80	79	76	78	89	88
Romania	98	98	96	95	85	96	96	97	93	92	92	94	97
Slovenia	97	93	92	97	90	94	98	99	92	89	94	96	98
TFR 1.31–1.5													
W-Germany	82	84	80	65	79	71	81	87	78	87	86	70	75
Austria	87	88	75	62	68	68	82	85	75	89	91	–	78
Cyprus	93	96	85	82	62	84	90	91	90	90	90	90	85
Estonia	93	87	57	86	84	94	68	86	35	90	86	95	–
TFR > 1.5													
Belgium (Fl)	66	74	–	–	63	63	73	71	71	79	84	–	–
Netherlands	71	60	56	34	48	49	70	–	52	71	79	61	34
Finland	77	71	66	57	75	63	68	78	72	80	75	39	47
Below 1.31	91	89	87	90	85	85	85	88	83	86	87	87	87
1.31–1.5	89	89	74	74	73	79	80	87	70	89	88	85	79
Over 1.5	71	68	61	46	62	58	70	75	65	77	79	50	41

Source: IPPAS

In the low-fertility countries (Austria, Western Germany and Cyprus), institutional measures receive on average more support from the population than financial measures. Public opinion is particularly supportive of new forms to increase flexibility in work and part-time working. Only in Estonia, like in the other CEE countries with the lowest fertility rates, implementation of or improvements in financial measures and measures related to decreasing educational costs are preferred over institutional measures. However, contrary to the other CEE countries, improvements in child allowance receive greater support than introduction of tax-related measures or means-tested benefits in Estonia. Estonia also resembles the other CEE countries in that improvements in day care are not favoured as much as provisions which would enable families to take care of their child at home, at least for some period. In the other low-fertility countries (Austria, Western Germany and Cyprus), better day care arrangements receive stronger support than, for example, an allowance for parents to take care of the child at home for a certain period.

Public support towards improvement of family policies is less accentuated in the moderate-fertility countries (Belgium (Flanders), Finland and the Netherlands). Overall, institutional measures, particularly those related to work, receive stronger support than financial measures. Among financial measures, improved parental leave arrangements and tax-related measures receive the most support. This strong preference for tax-related measures over child allowances, for example, even in cases where the level of the direct financial benefit is relatively high (as in Western Germany and Austria) seems to question the importance of direct cash benefits as a general means to support families. It is often argued that transparency and simplicity related to direct benefits makes them more appealing to families, while it is more difficult to anticipate or assess benefits received via tax deductions or other indirect ways. It may also point to the fact that in these countries, an increasingly large proportion of families with children are dual-earner families with two income earners and two tax payers, among whom the relative importance of direct cash benefits is decreasing and individual tax-related measures have become more appealing.

In general, parenthood increases public support for both financial and institutional family policy measures (Fig. 16.1 and 16.2). Among the lowest-fertility countries, parenthood particularly increases support for financial measures (with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, where there are hardly any differences between childless persons and one-child parents). Institutional measures receive stronger support from parents only in Lithuania and Romania. In low-fertility countries, we see that having a child increases support for institutional measures particularly in Austria and Western Germany. In addition, parenthood visibly increases the support also given to financial measures in these two countries as well as in Cyprus. In Estonia, the only CEE country belonging to the low-fertility group, there are no marked differences between childless persons and one-child parents in how they value new measures.

In two countries with moderate fertility (the Netherlands and Finland), parenthood only has a marked upward influence on support given to financial measures.



Financial measures: improved parental leave, lower tax, income-dependent allowance, allowance at birth, child allowance allowance for home care
Institutional measures: day care <3 yrs, care facilities for school-age children, flexible working hours, part-time work
For Romania: no children = no own children liviing in the household

Fig. 16.1 Preferences towards financial and institutional measures in the DIALOG countries, childless respondents aged 20–50 years (median component values)[1]
Source: IPPAS

The tendency of parents to emphasise financial more than institutional measures in practically all the DIALOG countries is somewhat surprising given the major differences in day care arrangements of small children and work-related measures. There may be several explanations for this. On the one hand, in many CEE countries, the extension of the parental leave period until the child is three years old may compensate for the deterioration of the day care system for small children. Financial compensation during parental leave varies from earnings-related benefits to low or means-tested flat-rate compensation. On the other hand, work-related measures, particularly those related to a reduction of working hours, may not receive strong support in these countries as long as both partners' income is needed to maintain the family livelihood. As institutional measures gained more support among parents (in relation to financial measures) in Western European countries, it is likely that a larger share of women with children would want to remain in employment, but that current institutional measures are insufficient to allow smooth reconciliation of work and family.

[1] Higher score implies higher preference towards policy measure. Belgium (Fl) and Italy are not included.



Financial measures: improved parental leave, lower tax, income-dependent allowance, allowance at birth, child allowance, allowance for home care
Institutional measures: day care <3 yrs, care facilities for school-age children, flexible working hours, part-time work
For Romania: children = own children living in the household

Fig. 16.2 Preferences towards financial and institutional measures in the DIALOG countries, one-child parents aged 20–50 years (median component values)[1]
Source: IPPAS

16.3.2 Factors Related to Preference of Financial and Institutional Measures

We now turn to look more thoroughly into how socio-demographic characteristics are related to attitudes towards financial and institutional measures in the lowest-, low- and moderate-fertility countries. We also look at the impact of these factors separately among childless persons and parents with one child.

Both age and partner status can be understood to reflect the phase of life and current childbearing stage, which is then related to family policy attitudes. In general, increasing age decreased acceptance of both financial and institutional measures, and partnership status did not have a uniform impact (Tables 16.3 and 16.4). Older respondents are perhaps more likely than others to remain childless or to have all the children they wanted and therefore show less preference towards family policy measures. Living in union significantly increased acceptance of both institutional and financial measures among childless persons in the lowest TFR group. The interval between partnership formation and childbearing is still relatively short in these countries, and childless respondents living in union are consequently more likely to plan to have children, and are thus more responsive to policy measures.

Table 16.3 Acceptance of family policy measures in the DIALOG countries, childless persons aged 20 to 50 years, OLS regression (standardised regression coefficients)

		Financial measures			Institutional measures		
	Fertility level:	Below 1.31	1.31–1.5	Over 1.5	Below 1.31	1.31–1.5	Over 1.5
Sex	Female	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	Male	–.104***	–.015	–.037	–.076***	–.142***	–.088**
Age	20-29	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	30-39	–.004	–.053+	–.040	–.030	.069*	.001
	40-50	.025	–.039	–.064*	–.015	–.002	.025
Partner status	Not in union	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	In union	.038+	.004	.022	.040*	.031	–.005
Education	Low	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	Medium	–.030	–.096*	–.088+	.079**	–.026	–.030
	High	–.109***	–.202***	–.257***	.029	–.019	.131***
Employment	Inactive	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	Paid job	.010	–.033	–.011	–.027	–.044	–.024
Expected number of children	0	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	1	.030	.142***	.120***	.060**	.055	.021
	2	.151***	.124***	.162***	.108***	.083**	.142***
	3+	.079***	.127***	.159***	.056**	.086**	.044
Country	E-Germany	ref.			ref.		
	Czech Republic	.030			–.176***		
	Hungary	.148***			–.058*		
	Lithuania	.065**			–.165***		
	Poland	.114***			–.333***		
	Romania	.207***			–.041+		
	Slovenia	.072**			–.184***		
	W-Germany		ref.			ref.	
	A.ustria		–.074*			.083*	
	Cyprus		.037			.058+	
	Estonia		.097***			–.218***	
	Netherlands			ref.			ref.
	Finland			.275***			.001
Adj. R^2		.078	.075	.171	.113	.077	.046

Source: IPPAS

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $+p < 0.10$

Family policies are often believed to be particularly appealing to women. In this study, too, women valued both financial and institutional family policy measures more than men did in practically all countries. However, parenthood decreased and even changed the gender differences in the acceptance of financial measures in the lowest- and moderate-fertility countries. The differences between the sexes were more marked in the acceptance of institutional measures, particularly among one-child parents in countries with low or moderate fertility. It appears that policies

Table 16.4 Acceptance of family policy measures in the DIALOG countries, one-child parents aged 20 to 50 years, OLS regression (standardised regression coefficients)

		Financial measures			Institutional measures		
	Fertility level:	Below 1.31	1.31–1.5	Over 1.5	Below 1.31	1.31–1.5	Over 1.5
Sex	Female	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	Male	–.004	–.030	.006	–.079***	–.153***	–.231***
Age	20–29	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	30–39	–.073*	–.001	–.059	–.055+	.018	–.007
	40–50	–.129***	–.065	–.177**	–.046	–.029	–.111
Partner status	Not in union	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	In union	.001	.032	–.012	–.022	.036	–.045
Education	Low	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	Medium	.022	–.087	.019	.021	.109*	–.090
	High	–.024	–.141*	–.130*	.011	.127*	.081
Employment	Inactive	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	Paid job	–.018	.018	–.131**	–.020	–.019	.094*
Expected number of children	1	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	2	–.011	.102*	.074	.011	.081*	.062
	3+	–.018	.056	.115*	.012	.051	–.017
Country	E-Germany	ref.			ref.		
	Czech Republic	–.012			–.167***		
	Hungary	.082**			–.054+		
	Lithuania	.059*			–.162***		
	Poland	.053			–.310***		
	Romania	.175***			.016		
	Slovenia	–.006			–.148***		
	W-Germany		ref.			ref.	
	Austria		–.117**			.044	
	Cyprus		.001			.006	
	Estonia		.077 +			–.327***	
	Netherlands			ref.			ref.
	Finland			.137**			–.017
Adj. R^2		.037	.043	.096	.083	.143	.096

Source: IPPAS

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $+p < 0.10$

which aim to increase flexibility in working time and improve institutional child care arrangements are still very gendered: women (with children) are more likely than men to consider these measures relevant and valuable.

Higher education decreased the acceptance of financial measures in all the DIALOG countries among both childless persons and parents. Differences between educational groups were however less marked in the lowest-fertility countries, and were not significant among parents. In these countries, families' economic difficulties are perhaps likely to touch all socio-economic groups; therefore the financial measures

received wide support. Parenthood decreased the differences between educational groups in all three TFR groups.

Contrary to our expectations, education had a less marked and less straightforward impact on acceptance of institutional measures. Earlier studies and discussions concerning the relevance of family policy measures related to reconciliation of work and family suggest that these measures would be most appealing to persons with a higher education, and to highly-educated women in particular (e.g. Fux 1998). However, respondents in the lowest TFR countries with a medium level of education (higher secondary education) tended to value institutional measures more highly than persons with the highest or a low level of education. The differences were not significant among parents. In the low-fertility countries, increasing education tended to decrease acceptance of institutional measures among childless persons, although the impact was not significant. Among parents, on the other hand, increasing education increased acceptance of institutional measures.[2]

In countries with moderate fertility, only respondents with post secondary or higher education showed a markedly stronger preference towards institutional measures, while respondents with a medium level of education tended to show the least favourable attitudes. The impact of education was significant only among childless persons. The somewhat different impact of education on the preference towards institutional measures among parents in the low- and in the moderate-fertility countries may point to differences in the availability of institutional measures to combine work and family in these countries, as already mentioned in the previous section.

Being in employment appeared to have only limited impact on the acceptance of different policy measures. Employment tended to decrease the acceptance of financial measures, but the impact was significant only among parents in moderate-fertility countries. We would also have expected employment to increase support for institutional measures, particularly in countries with low fertility, given their limited availability of institutional measures for parents to facilitate combining work and family. Employment however increased support for institutional measures only among parents in the moderate-fertility countries.

Expected family size can be understood to measure differences in respondents' family orientation, the higher number of expected children implying a stronger orientation towards the family. Among still childless persons, those who wished to have a small family (only one child) showed less interest in improving family policy measures than those who wished to have more children. However, the emphasis placed on financial measures did not increase from two to three+ children, and persons who wished to have a large family (3 or more children) were less supportive of institutional measures than those who wished to have two children. Among those who

[2] A more thorough analysis of the impact of education in the low-fertility countries revealed that attitudes of men and women towards institutional measures appeared to be somewhat different among childless persons: Education decreased acceptance among men, and among women, education had a slight positive association with the acceptance of institutional measures. Interaction effects were not significant in the analysis.

had already become parents, future family size expectations did not influence attitudes markedly. These findings may point to differences in preferred family models among respondents. Larger family size may be preferred by persons who also favour a more traditional male breadwinner family and, consequently, are less responsive to measures for reconciling work and family which aim to decrease obstacles to female employment. Somewhat contrary to this hypothesis is the fact that a large family size also decreased the support given to financial measures in the lowest-fertility countries among both childless persons and parents, and among parents in the low-fertility countries.

Wide and relatively uniform support for financial measures in countries with the lowest-fertility suggests that economic considerations receive considerable attention in families' lives across all population groups.

Among the lowest-fertility countries, respondents from Romania and Hungary, and childless persons in Poland, appeared to be particularly favourable towards improvements in financial benefits. In these countries, particularly in Romania and Poland, the level of financial benefits besides earnings-related maternity allowances is relatively low, and considerable public demand exists for their improvement. The attitudes of Czechs were somewhat surprising, given the current poor status of financial family provisions in the Czech Republic. Czechs were clearly less favourable towards implementation of financial measures than respondents from the other CEE countries, allowance at birth of a child (which was introduced recently in the Czech Republic) receiving the strongest support (see Table 16.2).

Institutional measures received the least support from Poles, followed by respondents from Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Besides Eastern Germany, measures aimed at reconciling work and family were favoured less commonly on average than financial measures. This seems to suggest that governments should focus more on relieving the costs related to bearing and raising children and improving the financial situation of families.

The attitudes of Estonians standed out markedly among the low-fertility countries. Public opinion in Estonia was clearly more in favour of improving financial benefits, and less of institutional measures, than opinion in the other low-fertility countries. It appears that a relatively uniform level of preference attached to financial measures over institutional measures in all CEE countries. However, the demand for increasing part-time employment and flexibility of working time, particularly among parents with small children, may start to increase in the future, as argued by Kotowska et al. (2006), provided that family economy is able to sustain diminished income and that part-time jobs are available. Compared to day care arrangements, improvement of part-time work possibilities received stronger support in Hungary and in the Czech Republic (see Table 16.2).

Among the Western low-fertility countries, Austrian respondents differed from Western Germans in that they favoured financial benefits less commonly than Western Germans, and institutional measures more than Western Germans. The differences between countries in the acceptance of financial benefits decreased among one-child parents, while they increased (and became significant) in the acceptance of institutional measures. Current family policy provisions do not offer an easy ex-

planation of these differences, as the level and type of provisions are rather similar in these two countries. Attitudes towards individual measures were also rather similar in these countries; tax-related measures and measures to reduce working time or increase flexibility in working time received the strongest support.

In the moderate-fertility group, financial measures received markedly more support from Finns than from the Dutch, but attitudes towards institutional measures did not differ in these countries. The relative uniformity of opinions towards institutional measures is somewhat surprising, given the different family policy models in these two countries. It is possible that satisfaction with current day care policies in Finland (see Table 16.2) is related to the country's generous day care system, while in the Netherlands there may be a general reluctance towards increasing the government's role in family matters, reflected in the relatively low acceptance of improvements in any of the policy measures compared to the other DIALOG-countries (see Table 16.2 and Fig. 16.1 and 16.2). In both countries, however, the flexibility of work arrangements and part-time working received stronger support than the other institutional measures.

16.4 Conclusion

We examined attitudes towards a number of financial and institutional measures and factors related to the attitudes in the DIALOG countries, paying particular attention to the question of whether the fertility level of the country was reflected in attitudes, and to what extent socio-demographic factors were related to preferences.

The results show that socio-demographic characteristics explain some of the differences in acceptance of financial and institutional measures. The family phase is reflected in the attitudes, and parenthood particularly increases support for financial measures. In general, age tends to decrease support for financial measures, particularly among one-child parents. As could be expected, institutional policy measures are more appealing to women than to men, implying that reconciliation of work and family is still "women's issue" in many countries. The impact of education is not as straightforward as might be expected. Increasing educational level tends to decrease support for financial measures, but its relation to institutional measures varies. In the lowest-fertility countries, economic problems related to childbearing and child upbringing affect all population groups, and the impact of education on attitudes is therefore less visible. In low-fertility countries, education increases support for institutional measures only among one-child parents, and among childless persons in moderate-fertility countries.

Family orientation, or the idea of the number of children one wishes to have, also appears to influence attitudes. The impact is more visible among childless persons than among one-child parents. In general, increasing expected family size tends to increase acceptance of both financial and institutional measures. However, when the expected number of children exceeds two, particularly the preference towards improvements in institutional measures diminishes. The influence of family size

expectations varies somewhat between country groups. Among the lowest-fertility countries, but also in the moderate-fertility countries, large family size expectations tend to reduce support for both financial and institutional measures when compared to those who wish to have two children. Among low-fertility countries, support given to financial benefits decreases when the expected family size increases from one to two, and remains the same thereafter. Increasing family size expectations increase, however, the support given to institutional measures in low-fertility countries. Among one-child parents, a two-child preference is connected to support for policy improvements. It seems that family size expectations and family orientation influence perceptions of policies, and therefore would require more attention from the government.

Besides socio-demographic variation, there are also considerable differences between countries in how the public supports family policy measures. The DIALOG countries form a very heterogeneous group in terms of family policy provisions and models. While attitudes among the population are in many cases in agreement with the family policy situation in the country, variety between countries cannot always be related to differences in adopted policies. CEE transition countries tend to value financial benefits over institutional provisions. However, the CEE countries do not form a uniform group, and the results showed major differences between countries. For example, attitudes in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia appear to diverge markedly from the current situation in the country. Czechs express less favourable attitudes, and Slovenians more positive attitudes than could be expected on the basis of current benefits. The attitudes of the population in two countries with moderate fertility, the Netherlands and Finland, also show some discrepancy with current policies. In Finland, dissatisfaction with financial benefits particularly among one-child parents does not match with the level of current financial benefits, when compared to those in the Netherlands. These findings suggest that country-specific cultural and social norms and practices, as well as general expectations towards the government's role in family matters, must be taken into consideration when designing future family policies.

Chapter 17
Anticipated Impact of Family Policies on Fertility Behaviour Among the Childless and Among One-Child Parents

Ingrid Esveldt, Tineke Fokkema and Anneli Miettinen

Abstract The fertility level has fallen to clearly below replacement level in most European countries. However, not many European governments have put low fertility on the political agenda. The development of family policies is still scattered; there is no consensus as to which policy measures to pursue, and governments' expectations vary regarding the impact of family policies. In this article, we look at expectations as to the impact of the introduction of preferred family policy measures on fertility behaviour from the point of view of the national populations themselves. Do Europeans think that if new or better policies are implemented, they might have their desired child sooner, or that they might increase their number of children? And do these expectations vary across European countries, and between socio-demographic groups within each country? Using PPA survey data, we examine the anticipated impact of family policies on fertility behaviour among the two groups with the highest intention to have a(nother) child: childless people and one-child parents. Furthermore, in order to obtain insight into inter-country differences, three country groups are considered, based on their recent fertility development: Lowest-, low-, and moderate-fertility countries. Our results show that there is considerable scope for governments to persuade people to bring forward the timing of childbearing, or to have more children, by introducing specific family policies. While minor differences in the anticipated impact of family policies do exist between socio-demographic groups, there is considerable variation between the TFR country groups: The anticipated impact is especially large in those countries in which fertility is currently lowest.

Keywords: Family policy · Impact · Fertility · Eastern Europe · Western Europe

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17.1 Introduction

Fertility has dropped to below-replacement levels in recent decades in almost all countries in Europe, albeit there are unmistakeable country differences in the speed of the fertility decline and the current fertility level. The two major underlying components of the drop in fertility to well below replacement level are the postponement of childbearing (i.e. the increase in mean female age at first birth, which therefore narrows the timeframe for fertility) and a reduction in the quantum of children ever to be born (due to an increase in the proportion of women remaining childless, and to a decline in the incidence of relatively large families, that is of three or more children). The demographic outcome of this is an ageing, and in due time possibly declining, population.

When trying to explain these fertility trends, several possible reasons have been mentioned, such as the increasing educational level and labour force participation of women, rising costs of children, changing norms and values, political changes and economic uncertainty (Becker 1981; Ermicsh 1996; Kotowska 2003; McDonald 2002; Philipov and Kohler 1999; Potoczna and Prorok-Maminska 2003; Van de Kaa 1987). Beside these likely causes, part of the drop in fertility might be explained by family policy (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002; Neyer 2003), as well as by gender inequality practices (McDonald 2000a, 2002). It is for instance said that Italy has such a low fertility level because emancipation outside the household (education, the labour market) has not been accompanied by emancipation inside the household (Chesnais 1996; Palomba and Sabbadini 1993). Hence, when trying to reconcile work and care, women look for a part-time job, but the possibilities to work part-time vary from one country to another, and are particularly restricted in, amongst others, Italy (Del Boca 2002). Another example of policies contributing to a very low fertility level are the major cuts which took place in the 1990s in benefits for families in many Central and Eastern European countries (Balicki 2001; Forster and Toth 2001; Fratczak et al. 2003; Macura 2000).

An ageing population, with a growing percentage of elderly people and an ageing and shrinking working-age population, may have severe economic and social consequences. A smaller (less productive) and older (less innovative) working population may for instance threaten economic growth and cause a shortage of people to provide care and support for the elderly, as well as jeopardizing the affordability of facilities such as the pension system and health care services. The main concern of many countries is the anticipated effect of age-structure change on the financial bases of social security schemes (Caldwell et al. 2002, p. 10).

Although both low fertility, and its negative social and economic consequences, are recognized by most governments, only a few European countries are taking action to directly increase the number of children people have by introducing pronatal policies (United Nations 1998, 2001). Why is that? Apart from arguments such as the environment (population growth is irresponsible), governments are not yet convinced that low fertility is permanent or harmful. There is also a widespread feeling that governments should not intervene in people's personal lives and their decisions as to whether, when, and how many children they would like to have (Caldwell

et al. 2002; Kohler et al. 2005). Furthermore, governments have serious doubts about the effectiveness of such policies in influencing demographic behaviour and raising fertility levels (Gauthier 2001).

However, there are also arguments suggesting that it might be worthwhile for governments to have a look at their family policies. We already mentioned that low fertility partly seems to be the outcome of policy actions in the past (e.g. cuts in family benefits, privatisation of family services). In addition, a number of studies show that past pronatal policies did have an effect, albeit mainly in the short term (timing) and less in the long term (number of children) (see, amongst others, Berelson 1979; David and Wright 1971; Frejka 1980; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Hoem 2005; Höhn 1988; Monnier 1990; Vining 1984; Zakharov and Ivanova 1996). A last, very important argument is that preferences generally appear to be higher than the actual number of children (Bracher and Santow 1991; Esveldt and Fokkema 2006; McDonald 2002). According to McDonald (2002, p. 427), there is evidence "... that women in their early twenties express preferences for numbers of children that are, on average, above replacement level (...) Preferences fall as they advance through their twenties, but remain well above actual behaviour. This suggests a willingness on the part of women to have more children than they will eventually have." McDonald, and many others with him, argues that a combination of costs of children, uncertainty, and the nature of social institutions puts up a barrier that keeps women from realising their dreams, and that this barrier might be overcome by a well-considered, comprehensive package of socio-economic and family policies.

Most of these studies referring to the relationship between government policies and fertility behaviour overlook one of the main factors in this relationship, namely people's view of the impact of family policies on their decisions as to whether and when to have (additional) children. One of the assets of our survey, the Population Policy Acceptance Survey, is that it does precisely that. Respondents are asked which policies (out of a list presented to them) they prefer, and whether introduction or improvement of these policies might influence the timing and number of the children they intend to have. It offers us the opportunity to increase our understanding of one of the core factors in designing a successful policy: The perception that (future) parents have of the impact of family policies on the timing of childbearing and the number of children.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the opinions of childless people and parents with one child as to the potential impact of the introduction of new or improved family policies preferred by themselves in countries with different fertility levels. The focus is restricted to childless people and one-child families because these two groups have the highest intention to have (more) children (Esveldt and Fokkema 2006), and therefore they are the most important groups for policymakers. Apart from that, we expect that both groups will think differently about the impact of family policies since they have different points of departure and other concerns when it comes to deciding whether or not to have a(nother) child. In many countries, for instance, the financial position of childless people is generally less secure than that of parents, which makes it more difficult for them to start a family (De Sandre 2000; Delgado and Castro Martin 1998; Kotowska 2003; Potoczna and Prorok-Maminska

2003). We will also compare countries in which the speed of the fertility decline and the current levels clearly differ. We assume that people living in countries with a different current fertility rate may react differently, as these differences can be linked, amongst others, to variations in past and current socio-economic settings (see Kohler et al. 2002, 2005).

The main research questions which we would like to answer are: (1) How do childless people and parents with one child estimate the impact of the introduction of new or improved family policy measures on their fertility behaviour (timing of childbearing and number of children)? (2) Is there a connection between people's perception of the impact of family policy measures on their fertility behaviour and the fertility level of the country they are living in? and (3) Which additional individual characteristics influence people's estimation of the impact of family policy on their fertility behaviour?

In Section 17.2, we present information on the data, measurements and methods used. In the third section, we give the results. First, we describe the impact of family policy measures that people anticipate on their fertility behaviour, for both childless people and for parents who have one child. We also give a first insight into the differences between people living in countries with different fertility levels. The descriptive information will be followed by the results of the multivariate analyses: The effect of a number of characteristics of the respondents on the potential impact of policy measures, along with the differences between people living in countries with different fertility levels. We end this chapter with a summary of the most important conclusions and policy implications.

17.2 Data, Measurements and Methods

17.2.1 Data

The original pooled multinational sample of the Population Policy Acceptance Survey comprises 35,377 cases. We initially excluded from this article respondents from Italy and Cyprus due to limited data availability (Italy) and technical problems (Cyprus). Next, childless people and parents with one child, aged 20–44, were selected, resulting in a total sample size of 9,101 cases, 6,124 of whom are childless people and 2,977 one-child parents. The focus is restricted to the 20–44 age group since intentions to have children are relatively rare once people have passed the age of 44.

17.2.2 Measurements

The dependent variables are four statements referring to possible consequences for the respondents' private lives of the introduction of new or improved family policy measures. The variables measure the percentages agreeing that introduction might

have an impact on their fertility behaviour, i.e. on the timing of childbearing and the number of children. The exact wording of the question is: "If those measures which you consider desirable were introduced, would this have consequences for your own personal life? Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements." Next, the respondents were presented with the following four statements with which they were asked to agree or disagree:

- It would be easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have.
- It would enable me to have my next child sooner.
- I would reconsider the possibility of having a(nother) child.
- I would probably decide to have a(nother) child.

To compare countries with different total fertility levels (TFRs), the DIALOG countries are divided into three groups, in analogy to previous studies (see, amongst others, Billari et al. 2003; Caldwell et al. 2003; Kohler et al. 2002, 2005). The clustering of the countries is based on differences in fertility levels, caused in turn by variations in socio-economic changes, socio-economic incentives, and institutional settings. The first group of countries consists of moderate-fertility countries (MFC) with a TFR higher than 1.5. Countries with a TFR of between 1.3 and 1.5 form the second group of low-fertility countries (LFC). The third group consists of the lowest-fertility countries (LSFC), with a TFR of 1.3 or below. The DIALOG countries Finland, Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands have (in 2003) the highest TFR of more than 1.5, even though this is still well below replacement level. The TFR lies between 1.3 and 1.5 in Western Germany, Austria and Estonia, and a TFR of 1.3 or below can be found in the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia (Figs. 17.1–17.3).



Fig. 17.1 Total fertility level in the moderate-fertility DIALOG countries, 1960–2003



Fig. 17.2 Total fertility level in the low-fertility DIALOG countries, 1960–2003

17.2.3 Methods

We start with a description of the attitudes of childless people and one-child parents towards each of the four statements, and compare the three TFR country groups. These descriptions were used to answer the first research question and to obtain an initial impression of the differences between the TFR country groups (second research question).

Next, by using the pooled multinational sample, we conducted logistic regressions[1] for each of the dependent variables (the four statements) and for childless



Fig. 17.3 Total fertility level in the lowest-fertility DIALOG countries, 1960–2003

[1] This method estimates the independent effect of each variable (i.e. checking for the effect of all the other variables) on the anticipated effect of policy measures.

people and one-child parents separately. Besides the TFR country group variables (with MFC as the reference group), we included the following independent variables: age (20–24 = reference group, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44), gender (male = reference group, female), partner status (living with a partner = reference group, not living with a partner), intention to have a(nother) child (uncertain = reference group, yes, no), level of education attained (low = reference group, medium, high),[2] and employment status (having a paid job = reference group, inactive). With these models we first try to assess the influence of these demographic and socio-economic characteristics on people's attitudes towards the impact of family policies on their fertility behaviour (third research question). In addition, the models will reveal whether or not differences between the TFR country groups still remain after checking for possible inter-country differences in population composition.

17.3 Results

17.3.1 Descriptive Analyses[3]

During the interview, respondents received a list of new or adapted family policy measures selected by the researchers, and were asked which of these measures they would prefer to see implemented by the government. The list contained financial as well as institutional regulations (see Table 16.2, Chapter 16). The two regulations favoured (and missed) most by both childless people and by parents with one child are improvements in parental leave and lower income taxes for families with dependent children. Childless people, however, show an equally strong preference for both arrangements (15%), while parents give their first priority to lower income taxes (18% versus 15%). Taking all the family policy measures together (and not only the first priority), one-child parents have a slight preference for institutional measures, while financial measures are more commonly preferred by childless people (Esveldt and Fokkema 2006).

After having made their choice, respondents were asked whether they think that introduction of their favourite measure might influence their fertility behaviour. They were presented with four statements with which they were asked to agree or disagree (see Section 17.2).

We will first describe the results on the first two statements for people who had said that they *did* intend to have a(nother) child or who had not yet decided. People who said that they did *not* have any such intentions were excluded here, as neither of these statements is relevant to them. The reactions are then given to the third and fourth

[2] Low = primary or lower secondary education, medium = higher secondary or non-university education, and high = university education.

[3] Belgium, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Western Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Finland are included in the descriptive analyses. Austria did not include the option "uncertain".

statements for people who said that they had *no* intention to have a(nother) child, or were as yet undecided. Those respondents who stated that they wanted a(nother) child have been excluded here as the statements do not really apply to them.

Figure 17.4 shows that the majority of *childless people* agree that policy has a supportive function in having children: 64% of them think that the introduction of new or improved family policy measures would make it easier for them to have the number of children they want. This concerns people who previously claimed that they intended to start a family or had not yet decided. Generally speaking, the percentages of those who have already made the decision to start a family are higher than of those who still have their doubts (Fig. 17.12, see Appendix). In general, the percentages increase as the TFR level in the country decreases (58, 67 and 68%, respectively), although the difference is very small between people living in countries with an average TFR of between 1.3 and 1.5 and those with the lowest TFR.

Seventy percentage of those *parents* who already have one child believe that policy would help them (Figure 17.5). They show, on the whole, the same pattern as childless people, but all the percentages are slightly higher, varying from 60% in the moderate-fertility countries (MFCs) to 75% in the lowest-fertility countries (LSFCs). Moreover, the differences between doubters and those who know that they would like to have a second child are considerably smaller, while the difference between people living in LSFCs (1.3 or below) and LFCs (1.3–1.5), on the one hand, and those living in MCFs (> 1.5), on the other, is somewhat greater for parents (Fig. 17.13; see Appendix).

The statement that the introduction of new or improved family policy measures would make it easier to have the number of children one wants is rather easy to agree with. The high percentages do not therefore come as a surprise. This does not however actually say anything about influencing fertility behaviour. The next statement does precisely that. To examine the extent of the effect of policy arrangements on the timing of childbearing, respondents were asked whether they think that introduction would enable them to have their (next) child sooner.



Fig. 17.4 It would make it easier for me to have the number of children I want to have, for childless people who have intention or are uncertain about having a child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.5 It would make it easier for me to have the number of children I want to have, for one-child parents who have intention or are uncertain about having another child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS

Postponement of the first or next child is generally seen as one of the important factors explaining the differences in countries' fertility levels. Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether people think that the introduction of their preferred policy would influence them to have their (next) child at an earlier date.

As expected, the percentages are much lower for the second statement (Figure 17.6). On average, one-third of *childless people* are convinced that the implementation of their first policy choice would enable them to have their first child sooner. In this case too, those who have already decided that they would like to have children are more inclined to believe in the impact of policy measures than doubters (32–43 versus 18–39%; Fig. 17.14; see Appendix). The expectations of childless people in countries with a fertility level of 1.5 or lower are relatively high (38 and 39%, respectively; Fig. 17.6), compared to their counterparts living in the MFCs (27%).

Parents with one child express greater confidence in government policies. Half of them think that the policies preferred by them would enable them to have their second child at an earlier date (Fig. 17.7). Parents who are still uncertain about



Fig. 17.6 It would enable me to have my first child sooner, for childless people who have intentions or are uncertain about having a child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.7 It would enable me to have my next child sooner, for one-child parents who have intention or are uncertain about having another child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS

having a second child show a little less confidence in the fertility impact of government policies than those who plan to have more children (Fig. 17.15; see Appendix). In countries with (very) low fertility levels (1.5 or lower), this percentage exceeds that in MFCs (54 and 51 versus 41%: Fig. 17.7). One explanation could be that postponement of childbearing seems to have been protracted in many of the LSFCs because the external conditions are not favourable to childbearing, and that there is a negative perception of both low government expenditure on family support, and of the high costs for the families themselves related to children (Kocourková 2001). The finding that the percentage is clearly higher for parents than for childless people might be explained by the fact that it is easier for parents to consider having their second child at an earlier date than for childless people to start family life at an earlier date. The step to parenthood has much more far-reaching consequences, both in financial terms and for daily life.

The percentages regarding the third statement ("I would reconsider the possibility of having a(nother) child") are lower than in the first two cases (Figs. 17.8 and 17.9). This was to be expected for people who have no childbearing intentions, given that the decision to have a child is much more far-reaching than it is for people who already intend to have children to decide to have this child sooner than planned.Nevertheless we conclude that the percentage saying that they would reconsider this decision is rather high, especially if we consider the fact that these people had initially claimed that they did not intend to have children. Slightly fewer than one-third (29%) of *childless people* concede that they would reconsider the possibility of having children (Fig. 17.8). The percentage is so high mainly due to the group who have not yet made up their mind (Fig. 17.16; see Appendix): 34–44% versus 13–24% of those who claimed that they did not intend to have children. They are more convinced of the supportive impact of policy measures on their decision. The percentages are highest in the countries with a fertility rate just below replacement level (> 1.5) and in the LSFCs (≤ 1.3), 30 and 31%, respectively (Fig. 17.8). In the intermediate group (1.3–1.5), the percentage is less than one-quarter (although



Fig. 17.8 I would reconsider the possibility of having a child, for childless people who have no intention or are uncertain about having a child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS

higher for doubters, at 44%; Fig. 17.16, see Appendix). What might influence this result is the fact that the LFCs (1.3–1.5) consist of three countries, including Western Germany, where the proportion of persons who wish to remain childless or to have only one child is the highest in Europe (Goldstein et al. 2003a; Esveldt and Fokkema 2006).

The pattern for *parents* is slightly different (Fig. 17.9). All in all, the percentages are higher than is the case for childless people, at 44 versus 29%. In other words, one-child parents also seem to be somewhat more convinced of the influence of government policy than the childless with regard to this statement. Furthermore, also in this case percentages for parents who have not yet made up their mind are higher than those for parents who do not intend to enlarge their family (Fig. 17.17; see Appendix). In contradistinction to the childless, parents living in the MFCs (> 1.5) resemble parents in the LFCs (1.3–1.5). Both are less inclined than parents living in the LSFCs (≤ 1.3) to change their mind as to their number of children if family policy measures were to be implemented: 39 and 41% respectively, versus 48% (Fig. 17.9).



Fig. 17.9 I would reconsider the possibility of having another child, for one-child parents who have no intention or are uncertain about having another child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS

The last statement is perhaps the most interesting, as respondents here explicitly say that, on condition that the government implements the policy measures which they prefer, they would probably decide to have a(nother) child. Almost one-quarter of *childless people* make this claim (Fig. 17.10). Again, the percentages are higher among those who are still uncertain about having children, ranging from 28 to 39%, than among those who said that they did not want any children, ranging from 8 to 17% (Fig. 17.18; see Appendix). The percentages of the latter group are nevertheless quite substantial.

The percentages are the highest once more in the LSFCs ($\leq$ 1.3) (26%; Fig. 17.10), followed by the moderate- ($>$ 1.5) and low-fertility countries (1.3–1.5) (20 and 18%, respectively). Furthermore, it is notable that in the LSFCs a remarkably high percentage (17%) of childless people with no further desired fertility state that they would probably decide to have children after all if the policy measure which they prefer were to be implemented (Fig. 17.18; see Appendix).

As in case of the previous statements, *one-child parents* in general show higher percentages, although the pattern is more or less the same as that for childless people. More than one-third think that a change of policy would probably affect their reproductive behaviour (Fig. 17.11). Those who are still not sure about having more children have much greater confidence in the impact of government policies on their decision (46–70%), but 19 to 28% of those who do not intend to enlarge their family also say that policy action would probably cause them to change their minds (Fig. 17.19; see Appendix). Again, in the LSFCs the potential effect to be expected from the introduction of family policies is the highest (41%; Fig. 17.11).

17.3.2 Logistic Analyses

Do demographic and socio-economic characteristics have an influence on people's estimation of the impact of family policy on their fertility behaviour? And if so, do differences in the composition of the population serve as an explanation for the



Fig. 17.10 I would probably decide to have a child, for childless people who have no intention or are uncertain about having a child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.11 I would probably decide to have another child, for one-child parents who have no intention or are uncertain about having another child, aged 20–44(%)
Source: IPPAS

differences between the three TFR country groups? Logistic analyses are carried out in order to answer these questions. The findings are presented in Table 17.1.[4]

The results regarding the first statement ("It would make it easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have") show that some individual-level characteristics influence people's expectations about the general support of government policies on their reproductive aspirations. Three variables clearly stand out both for childless people and for parents.

Firstly, the older the people are the *less* likely they are to expect that their favoured policy measure would make it easier for them to have the number of children they intend to have. This especially holds for those childless people who are in their thirties or forties and those one-child parents aged 35 or older. It is probable that expectations about health restrictions or physical complications in older age come to play here. Findings of a study of Esveldt and Fokkema (2006) showed that one of the most important reasons put forward by parents for not wanting another child is their health status.

Secondly, and even more important, is whether they have already made up their minds about having a(nother) child. Those who say that they intend to have (additional) children much *more* often expect a positive impact of government policies than those who have not yet decided whether they want to have (more) children.

Thirdly, having or not having a paid job also plays a role. The effect among one-child parents, however, is opposite to that among childless people. Inactive childless people *more* often expect family policies to make it easier for them to have the children they want to have; one-child parents without a paid job, on the other hand, have *less* confidence in the impact of government policies. Several studies (Kohler et al. 2002; Kotowska 2003; Palomba 2005) refer to the fact that in many countries

[4] Table 17.1 shows the exponential coefficients; a value higher than 1 indicates a higher likelihood of the expected impact of policy measures (and a value lower than 1 means a lower likelihood) for the category of the variable concerned compared to the reference category of that variable.

Table 17.1 Logistic regression of the potential impact of policy measures on fertility behaviour, by parenthood, aged 20–44

		"It would be easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)	"It would enable me to have my first/next child sooner" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)	"I would reconsider the possibility of having a(nother) child" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)	"I would probably decide to have a(nother) child" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)
		Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
CHILDLESS PEOPLE					
Constant		0.85	0.58**	1.12	0.73
Gender	male	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	female	1.12 ~	1.12	1.14	1.23
Age	20–24	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	25–29	0.99	1.15	1.24	1.01
	30–34	0.71**	1.01	1.25	1.26
	35–39	0.64**	0.95	0.91	0.87
	40–44	0.46***	0.72	1.06	0.90
Partner status	living with partner	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	not living with a partner	0.74***	0.69***	0.97	0.89
Intention to have children	uncertain	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	yes	3.02***	1.01		
	no			0.26***	0.21***
Educational level attained	low	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	medium	0.99	1.40**	1.03	0.93
	high	0.89	0.96	0.96	0.77
Employment status	having a paid job	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	inactive	1.21*	1.25**	1.59**	1.57**
TFR-country groups	> 1.5	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	1.3 - 1.5	1.14	1.73***	0.89	1.41 ~
	1.3 or lower	1.56***	1.79***	1.60**	2.53***

Table 17.1 (continued)

		"It would be easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)	"It would enable me to have my first/next child sooner" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)	"I would reconsider the possibility of having a(nother) child" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)	"I would probably decide to have a(nother) child" (1 = agree, 0 = disagree)
		Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
PARENTS WITH ONE CHILD					
Constant		1.48	0.51*	4.66***	3.75***
Gender	male	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	female	1.20	1.09	1.09	1.10
Age	20–24	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	25–29	0.96	0.95	0.91	0.66
	30–34	0.74	1.15	0.70	0.76
	35–39	0.55**	0.81	0.63	0.65
	40–44	0.35***	0.82	0.40**	0.50*
Partner status	living with a partner	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	not living with a partner	0.89	0.87	0.76 ∼	0.59**
Intention to have children	uncertain	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	yes	1.60***	1.15		
	no			0.23***	0.19***
Educational level attained	low	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	medium	1.16	2.18***	0.92	0.73 ∼
	high	0.99	1.55*	0.84	0.57**
Employment status	having a paid job	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	inactive	0.68**	0.95	1.01	0.83
TFR-country groups	> 1.5	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
	1.3 - 1.5	1.71**	1.56*	1.22	1.43 ∼
	1.3 or lower	2.02***	1.80***	1.60**	1.98***

Source: IPPAS

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ∼ p < 0.1

Note: unweighted data, Italy and Cyprus are excluded.

it is more difficult for young people to get and hold a job, and more to the point, a job that offers them the financial means to start a family. Since childless people have a preference for financial support by the state (Esveldt and Fokkema 2006), it is not surprising that childless people without a paid job in particular think that introducing new or improved policy measures would help them to have the number of children they intend to have. Although the most favoured policy measures among one-child parents are also financial ones, one-child parents have a slight preference in overall terms for institutional arrangements (i.e. facilitating work-child care). It therefore comes as no surprise that expectations as to the impact of governmental support are higher among those with a paid job than among those who are not active on the labour market.

In addition, "living with a partner" appears to be another precondition for childless people to express confidence in the positive impact of government policies. Single people *less* frequently expect any impact from government policies than those who live with a partner. A likely explanation is that not having a partner is often the reason why singles do not yet have children (Esveldt and Fokkema 2006), and policy cannot change that.

Contrary to our initial hypotheses, men and women have nearly the same opinions (only a minor gender difference is revealed among childless people where women have very slightly *greater* confidence), and their educational level also does not seem to play a decisive role.

Finally, also after checking for individual-level characteristics, the differences described above between the three TFR country groups are still shown. People in the lowest-fertility countries (TFR 1.3 or below) have the strongest belief that new family policies might help them to realise the number of children they would like to have, followed by those living in the low-fertility countries (TFR 1.3–1.5; only significantly deviating from the moderate-fertility countries (TFR $>$ 1.5) in case of one-child parents).

If we look at the second statement ("It would enable me to have my first/next child sooner"), the results are quite different. While here too, childless people's partner and employment status influences the anticipated impact of family policy on the timing of childbearing – single childless people and those without a paid job having *less* confidence – neither the age of the respondent, nor his or her certainty about wanting a(nother) child, appear to play a decisive role. If one assumes that the problem of delaying childbirth is an age-related issue, the absence of an age effect suggests that it is not the lack of family policy measures that keeps people from having children, but that other factors play a more marked role here.

In addition, contrary to the first statement, the educational level attained has an effect on agreement with the statement that family policies would enable them to have their first/next child sooner. This effect of education is non-linear: Those who have attained intermediate education are especially convinced that they would have their first/next child sooner were their preferred family policy measure to be introduced. This also accounts (to a lesser extent) for parents with the highest educational level. These results suggest that some policy measures might in fact help more highly-educated persons to have a second child sooner.

Again, if one takes demographic and socio-economic characteristics into account, virtually no change is noted as to the effect of the country fertility level. In countries where the fertility level is higher than 1.5, people believe much *less* frequently that government policies can help them to have their desired child sooner than their counterparts in the low-fertility and lowest-fertility countries. Contrary to the previous statement, however, this difference is now more pronounced, whilst no significant differences are revealed between childless people living in countries with a TFR of between 1.3 and 1.5 and those living in countries with a TFR of 1.3 or lower.

Looking at the last two statements ("I would reconsider the possibility of having a(nother) child" and "I would probably decide to have a(nother) child"), as expected, people who have no intention to have (additional) children *less* frequently believe in the persuasive power of the introduction of the policy measures which they would prefer to see introduced. Table 17.1 further shows that, in accordance with the first two statements, childless people without a paid job believe *more* frequently that policies would make them reconsider or probably decide to change their mind and have a child. Instead of an employment effect, an age and partner effect is found among one-child parents. As expected, the oldest age group and those one-child parents who do not live with a partner are *less* likely to reconsider or probably decide to have a(nother) child than their counterparts. Moreover, a linear education effect is observed with regard to the fourth statement: The higher the level of education attained, the *less* likely they are to think that they will decide to have a second child once their preferred policy measure is introduced. Finally, also with regard to the third and fourth statements, childless people and one-child parents who live in the lowest-fertility countries are the *most* convinced that policies would make them change their mind or decide to have a(nother) child.

17.4 Conclusions

Looking at the opinions of the population, it seems that there is some scope for family policy. The potential impact on fertility behaviour of the implementation of people's preferred family policy measures is certainly not negligible. The lowest percentage that we found is still 18% of childless people living in the LFCs (1.3–1.5) saying that they would probably decide to have a child if the government introduced their preferred policy measures; the highest percentage is 75 in case of one-child parents living in the LSFCs (≤ 1.3) who think that implementing the policies chosen by them would make it easier for them to have the number of children they want. If we take desired fertility into account (no intentions, uncertain, intentions), the percentages still range from 8% of childless people with no desired fertility and living in LFCs (1.3–1.5) who believe that they would probably decide to have a child if new or improved policies were to be implemented, up to 84% of one-child parents in LFCs who are still not sure whether they would like to have more children, and who say that they would reconsider having another child.

Furthermore, we found that parents generally seem to be slightly more sensitive to the impact of policies than childless people. Even among those parents who do not want a second child, 44% say that they might reconsider their decision, and 35% even say that they might probably decide to have another child. Parents, having had the experience of needs, can define exactly which policies they miss which might persuade them to speed up the timing of childbearing or to have another child.

The multivariate models show some minor differences between demographic and socio-economic groups. Surprisingly, men and women have the same attitudes towards the impact of policies. It is not, as one might expect, that women have greater confidence in the potential impact of policies because they have more to gain from policies than men do. Also, age does not appear to be a major factor. It is only the highest age group that has less confidence in the fertility effects of policies. This, however, obviously has to do with either the physical impossibility to have (additional) children or with the fact that they have voluntarily opted to remain childless. Having a partner does not constitute an influence for childless people when it comes to the number of children, but it clearly enlarges their belief in the impact of policies regarding the timing of childbearing and a more general belief in the supportive role of policies in having the number of children they would like to have. Parents with a partner believe more strongly that policies might persuade them to decide to have a second child after all. The childbearing intentions that people have play an important role. Childless people who intend to have children more often think that family policies might support them in having the number of children they would like to have than those who are still uncertain as to whether or not to start a family. In addition, this latter group, in turn, declares much more often than those who claim that they do not wish to have children that they might have children after all, were the right policies to be in place. The pattern is the same for parents. In the case of both parents and childless people, their intentions do not play a decisive role when it comes to the timing of childbearing.

As for the socio-economic variables: The effects of education are limited and not linear. Among both childless people and parents, those with a medium level of education have greater confidence in the impact of policy on the timing of childbirth than either those with a low or high level of education. Parents with a low level of education are distinct from parents with a high level of education by virtue of their stronger belief in the potential impact of policies on their decision to have a second child. Having a paid job or being inactive is virtually insignificant for the parents' attitude, but plays a decisive role for childless people. The anticipated effects of policies are greater for inactive people, both as to the timing of childbearing, and to the reconsideration or decision to have children after all. Their stronger conviction of the impact of policies on their fertility behaviour might suggest that they lack the means to have a child at this moment, or to have a child at all, and certain policy measures might help them to start a family at an earlier date or to reconsider their decision as regards children. This is supported by the fact that (childless) young people in particular face a less secure economic position. They cannot afford to start a family, or are afraid to shoulder the financial risk.

Most interesting, however, are the results concerning the TFR country group differences. Especially in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the current extraordinarily low period fertility levels are in fact partly the result of the postponement of childbirth to later ages (Sobotka 2004a). Some governments are convinced that fertility will increase to higher levels if current social and economic improvements are sustained. Our findings show that people believe that policies might influence their fertility behaviour, which suggests that there is scope for new and better policies, which may eventually lead to higher fertility. This impact is especially significant in the lowest-fertility countries (where TFR is 1.3 or below), all of which are CEE countries. It is in these countries in particular that changes in the political and economic situation went hand in hand with economic crisis in the past decade and where severe cuts were made in family policies and benefits. This has caused a major decline in fertility.

The results underpin the notion that, amongst other things, a lack of family support and family policy measures has made people decide not to have children, for the time being at least, but they also show that implementing preferred new or better policies might encourage them to bring forward the timing of childbearing or to have a(nother) child. Especially parents and childless people living in the lowest-fertility countries believe that implementing the family policies which they prefer would affect their childbearing behaviour.

Appendix



Fig. 17.12 It would make it easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have, for childless people by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.13 It would make it easier for me to have the number of children I intend to have, for one-child parents by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.14 It would enable me to have my first child sooner, for childless people by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.15 It would enable me to have my next child sooner, for one-child parents by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.16 I would reconsider the possibility of having a child, for childless people by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.17 I would reconsider the possibility of having another child, for one-child parents by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.18 I would probably decide to have a child, for childless people by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS



Fig. 17.19 I would probably decide to have another child, for one-child parents by childbearing intentions, aged 20–44(% agree)
Source: IPPAS

Chapter 18
Preferences Versus Actual Family Policy Measures

The Case of Parental Leave and Child Allowance

Nada Stropnik, Jože Sambt and Jiřina Kocourková

Abstract Attitudes and preferences regarding parental leave and child allowance arrangements are compared with actual schemes. The focus is on the length and mode of taking parental leave, as well as on the dependence of child allowance rates on family income, the age of the child and the number of children. The results have shown a weak correlation between the actual duration of parental leave in different countries and people's evaluation of its sufficiency, which points to the importance of cultural norms, female employment patterns and equal opportunities for understanding people's attitudes and expectations. No common pattern was found regarding the preferred mode of taking parental leave. The prevailing preference is towards child allowance dependent on income but independent of the age of the child. As concerns the dependence of child allowance on the age of the child, preferences strongly correlate with arrangements at the time of the national surveys. In general terms, child allowance as a social assistance policy measure is most commonly preferred, while an allowance which bears prevalent characteristics of a population policy measure is least commonly preferred.

Keywords: Parental leave · Child allowance · Family policy · Preferences

18.1 Introduction

Parental leave and child allowance are two of the most important and widespread family policy measures. The first primarily enables reconciliation of parenthood and employment by granting working parents leave of absence so that they can take care of their child in the first year(s) of his/her life. It is (generally) associated with job security and wage compensation or a lump sum that lower the opportunity costs of

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a parent's temporary absence from work.[1] Consequently, parental leave promotes and supports gender equality in the labour market and in childrearing.[2] A positive impact on children's health and general well-being must also be acknowledged. The basic characteristics of parental leave that influence the parents' decision-making regarding the duration of their take-up are the maximum length of leave, possible modes of taking it and the benefit level. The availability, quality and affordability of childcare services for children up to age three play an important role too (Galtry 2002; Moss and Deven 1999).

Child allowances are transfer payments to families with dependent children aimed at covering part of the child costs throughout (or for most of) the period of the children's financial dependency on their parents. These allowances contribute to horizontal equity of families with the same income but a different number of children. They may include elements of social assistance (e.g. higher child allowances for families on a lower income) or population policy (higher allowances for children of higher birth order in order to stimulate fertility), but may also vary with the age of the child (higher allowances for older children, or for very young children, in order to compensate for childcare costs).

Although most of the transition countries already had favourable parental leave arrangements before 1990, this family policy measure was given priority in the 1990s in many countries (Kocourková 2002). This resulted from a post-communist philosophy of de-institutionalising childcare and supporting parents who wanted to stay at home with their very young children. On the one hand, there was disinvestment in state-run and state-financed pre-school childcare services – particularly for children below three years of age – (e.g. in Poland and the Czech Republic), and parent fees were dramatically increased, while on the other hand mothers were encouraged to stay at home and care for their pre-school children themselves.[3] At the same time, improvements in the parental leave arrangements in the European Union Member States were related to increased female labour force participation and implementation of the principle of equal opportunities for both sexes (see Moss and Deven 1999). Recent developments in most European countries indicate a trend towards placing a growing emphasis on fatherhood (expansion of fathers' entitlements[4] and introduction/extension of paternity leave), flexibility in taking

[1] Parental leave also covers non-employed parents in an increasing number of countries, but this aspect is not the subject of the present analysis.

[2] These objectives may seem contradictory in practice. Long parental leave may have both positive and negative effects for parents, and it is far from superfluous to point to the fact that it is mostly women who take this leave. A shorter period of leave may be optimal for women with a high level of attachment to the labour market in terms of minimizing negative effects on their knowledge and skills, and consequently also on their careers and future earnings.

[3] For an overview see Stropnik (2003).

[4] For instance, it has also been possible since 2000 for Hungarian fathers to take up childcare leave (GYED) before the child's first birthday (Tárkányi 2003). Half of the parental leave is the father's individual right in Slovenia, but this has only applied since 2001, before which the mother was able to transfer (a part of) her right to the father.

leave[5] and the rights of unemployed parents,[6] rather than on a general prolongation of parental leave.

In some former communist countries, child allowances used to be a significant source of income that prevented poverty in families with children. In the beginning of the 1990s, the pressure on government expenditures and increased poverty among families with (more) children led many countries to move from universal child allowances towards more targeted ones (like in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). However, by the end of the 1990s steady economic growth allowed for more generous child benefits, e.g. in Hungary (Stropnik 2003). In general terms, in a growing number of European countries child allowances vary with the number of children in the family, which reflects demographic concerns. Other changes which have taken place in the last decade include the introduction of a large family supplement as a kind of upgrade of child allowances.

Parental leave has been the subject of more research in Europe since equal opportunities for both sexes became a top political and policy issue. The most frequent research topics have been: impact of parental leave on fertility (e.g. Andersson 2004; Engelhardt 2004; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Hoem 2000; Hoem et al. 2001; Oláh 1997; Rønsen 1999 and 2004; Corman 2000); impact on female employment and hours of work (e.g. Rønsen 1999; Merz 2004); fathers' participation (e.g. Leira 1999; Rost 1999); and the opportunity costs of taking parental leave (e.g. Blau, Ferber and Winkler 2002). As concerns child allowances, the researchers were mostly interested in their fertility impact (e.g. Ekert-Jaffé and Mougin 1999; Engelhardt 2004; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Rønsen 1999) and in the impact on poverty alleviation (e.g. Redmond 2000).

The main objective of our analysis is to identify people's attitudes and preferences regarding possible alternative arrangements of these two family policy measures in the DIALOG project countries. The focus is on the length and mode of take-up of parental leave, as well as on the dependence of child allowance rates on family income, the age of the child and the number of children. Gauthier (1998) performed a similar analysis using the data from the first round of PPA surveys undertaken in the 1990s (see Moors and Palomba 1995b).

The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 18.2 we present the arrangements of parental leave and child allowance in fourteen European countries at the time when the national surveys were taken. Methods and variables are described in Section 18.3. Preferences and measures in force at the time of the national surveys are compared in Section 18.4. In Section 18.5, the determinants of attitudes and prefer-

[5] Flexibility mainly takes two forms: the possibility of working part-time while on leave (sometimes resulting in a longer leave period), and the possibility of taking leave until the child reaches a certain age, varying between 4 and 9 years (Deven and Moss, 2002).

[6] In 1995 in Slovenia, the wage compensation was extended to mothers whose permanent or longer fixed-term employment was terminated without their violation or fault during parental leave (Stropnik 2003). Since 1994, parental leave may be extended in Poland if both parents remain unemployed (Golinowska et al. 2003).

ences regarding individual characteristics of parental leave and child allowance are evaluated and discussed. The last section concludes with some summary remarks.

18.2 Measures in Force at the Time of the National Surveys

Parental leave at the time of the national surveys, presented in Table 18.1, takes account of all paid childbirth- and childcare-related leave (maternity leave, parental or childcare leave, and paternity leave if applicable), if taken continuously, and with job security. We opted for this way of presentation because we assume that people usually do not perceive parental or childcare leave as separate leave, but rather jointly with maternity (and paternity) leave. What is important for them is the age of the child at which the parent taking care of her/him has to return to her/his job. We also presume that only paid leave combined with job security offers parents a real opportunity to take the whole leave available. Those on a low income cannot afford to miss out on earning opportunities, while those on a high income suffer high opportunity costs in the absence of a (decent) benefit. Job security is of the utmost importance for parents with high labour market attachment, particularly when unemployment is high. In Poland and the Czech Republic, for instance, an additional year of leave (until the child reaches the age of 3.5 and 4 years, respectively) is available but rarely taken up. In Poland, it is not paid (except to single parents and in the case of multiple births), and a legal ban on dismissal or termination of employment contracts only protects women during pregnancy and maternity leave (Bodnárová et al. 2001). There is no job security in the fourth year of leave in the Czech Republic.

At the time of the national surveys in the fourteen countries observed, the total duration of paid leave combined with job security ranged from only twelve and fourteen weeks of maternity leave after childbirth in the Netherlands and Cyprus, respectively, to parental leave until the child reaches the age of three in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Finland. In Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia and Finland there was a possibility of both full-time and part-time leave. In Germany and Italy, leave could be taken until the child reaches the age of eight.

Parental allowance[7] was a wage substitute only in the minority of the countries observed, and it amounted to (basically) 25% of the wage in Poland, 30% in Italy, 60% in Lithuania (until the child reaches the age of one), 70%/40%/25% (depending on the wage level, and with the minimum level) in Finland (until the child reaches the age of ten months), 70% in Hungary (until the child reaches the age of two), up to 85% in Romania[8] and 100% in Slovenia (at least the minimum wage). It was a lump sum in Austria, Belgium (Flanders), the Czech Republic, Estonia,

[7] Maternity allowance was wage-related in all countries, but fully compensated for wages in only a half of the countries observed.

[8] Parental allowance amounted to up to 75% of the former wage in the Netherlands, but the leave

Table 18.1 Parental leave (taken continuously, paid, with job security) at the time of the national surveys (2000–2003)

Country	Duration (in terms of the child's age)[1]	Possibility of part-time leave[2]	Flexibility
Belgium (Flanders)	Up to age 0.5	Up to age 0.8; or 1/5 reduction of working time up to age 1.5	
Czech Republic	Up to age 3		
Germany	Up to age 2[3]	Yes	3rd year until age 8, upon approval by employer
Estonia	Up to age 3		
Italy	Up to age 1.2		Until age 8
Cyprus	Up to age 0.3[4]		
Lithuania	Up to age 3		May be taken in parts; entitled persons may take it alternately
Hungary	Up to age 3	Age 1.5–3	
Netherlands[5]	Up to age 0.2		
Austria	Up to age 2	Up to age 4	
Poland	Up to age 2.5		
Romania	Up to age 2		
Slovenia	Up to age 1	Up to age 1.7	
Finland	Up to age 3	Up to school age[6]	

Sources: DIALOG project, WP4 country reports (internal material); European Commission'(2001)
Notes:
[1] Only leave to which employed parents are entitled (on the basis of social insurance or as residents) is included. Paternity leave is added where applicable. Special arrangements for certain groups are not taken into account.
[2] After maternity leave.
[3] Paid until age 2.5–3 in five out of sixteen Federal *Länder*.
[4] At the time of the survey there was only maternity leave in Cyprus (parental leave was introduced in 2003).
[5] Only maternity leave is paid in the Netherlands. Parental leave, lasting until the child reaches the age of 0.7, is paid in the public sector and very rarely in the private sector.
[6] Until the end of the year in which the child starts attending school.

Finland (starting from when the child reaches the age of ten months), Germany (also income dependent and available up to an income ceiling), Hungary (for insured parents in the child's third year) and Lithuania (in the child's second and third years).

Child allowance arrangements at the time of the national surveys are evident from Table 18.2. The Western European countries under consideration have universal schemes; only in Italy is child allowance dependent on family income (since 1988). The former communist countries do not show a common pattern. In Estonia, on the

was available only for those employed in the public sector, or if included in the collective agreements.

Table 18.2 Child allowance arrangements at the time of the national surveys

Country	According to family income		According to the age of the child		According to the number of children	
	Dependent on income	Independent of income	Higher for older children	Inde-pendent of age	The same for each child	Increases with the number of children
Belgium (Flanders)*		X	X			X
Czech Republic	Income ceiling: 3 times the living minimum		X		X	
Germany		X		X		The same for first 3 children, and for 4th and subsequent children
Estonia		X		X		For 2nd and subsequent children twice the amount for 1st child
Italy*	Income ceiling in absolute amount			X		X
Cyprus		X		X	For all children in families with 4 and more children	
Hungary		X		X		X
Netherlands		X	X		X	
Austria		X	X			X
Poland	Income ceiling: 50% of average wage per family member			X		X
Romania		X		X	X	
Slovenia	Income ceiling: average wage per family member			X		X
Finland		X		X		X

Source: DIALOG project, WP4 country reports (internal material)

* Eligibility limited to persons covered by social insurance

one hand, income testing was abandoned in 1992. On the other hand, there was a shift in the Czech Republic and Poland towards income-tested benefits, and there is also an income ceiling on entitlement. This was for economic reasons, and in the Czech Republic there were also ideological reasons which were responsible for this development (renaissance of liberal social policy). Also Hungary tried an income-tested child allowance in the mid-1990s but turned back to a universal scheme in 1998. Child allowance has always been income-dependent in Slovenia, while in Lithuania there was no child allowance until 2004.

Child allowances are independent of the age of the child in two-thirds of the observed countries, while they are higher for older children in one-third of the countries (mostly the Western European ones). Child allowances prevail that increase with the number of children in the family. In Estonia, child allowance is only lower for the first child, while in Germany it is higher for the fourth and subsequent children than for the first three. In Cyprus, only children from families with at least four children are eligible.

18.3 Method

A sub-sample of respondents aged 20–49 years was formed for our analysis comprising 23,345 persons. The lower limit is imposed by the lowest age of respondents in one of the countries, while the upper limit is approximately the age at which the respondents' children become independent or – due to their age – are no longer eligible for child allowance.

Since not all the questions were asked in all the countries, or were posed using considerably different wording from that in the common core questionnaire, the number of countries and observations varies for the specific analyses. Due to significant intra-country variation identified by the descriptive statistical analyses, Eastern and Western Germany are treated as two separate units of observation.

Descriptive statistical analysis was used to identify the main differences between countries. The cross-national comparison of attitudes towards parental leave had to be limited to only four countries because of the non-availability of data for other countries. By contrast, ten out of fourteen countries could be included in cluster analysis and grouped according to the level of support for three types of child allowance. Finally, the binary logistic regression method was applied to a theoretical model described in Section 18.5.1 in order to estimate the characteristics of the respondents that determine their lower or higher propensity to have individual attitudes and preferences regarding the characteristics of parental leave and child allowance.

18.4 Attitudes and Preferences

18.4.1 Duration of Parental Leave

Our informed hypothesis is that people evaluated the duration of parental leave having in mind the age of the child at the end of the total leave related to childbirth.

Therefore, countries are listed in Fig. 18.1 - starting from the left with those having the shortest parental leave – according to the age of child at the end of paid parental leave (with job security). One would expect attitudes concerning the duration of parental leave to be related to the actual arrangement at the time of the survey, i.e. lower proportions of respondents evaluating the current parental leave as too short in the countries with longer parental leave, and vice versa.[9] Surprisingly, the shares of those who evaluated parental leave in their country as too short do not decrease at all from the left-hand to the right-hand side of Fig. 18.1, which points to a weak correlation between the duration of parental leave and people's evaluation of it (Kendal's tau-b = 0.07). This correlation is even positive (and statistically significant), which means that in the countries with longer parental leave more people perceive that leave as too short, as compared to the countries with shorter parental leave.

The highest percentage of respondents (45%) who evaluated the current duration of parental leave as too short was registered in Finland, which in fact is one of the countries with the longest total leave. This can be explained by the wording of the question in Finnish which unmistakably related it only to parental leave lasting until



Fig. 18.1 Evaluation of the duration of parental leave,[1)] by country (% of respondents aged 20–49)
Source: IPPAS
Notes:
1) The age of the child (in years) at the end of parental leave (as defined in Table 18.1) at the time of the national surveys (2000–2003) is given in parentheses.
2) Finnish respondents were asked to evaluate the duration of what is called parental leave in that country, and not also of home-care leave.
3) In some German federal states, parental leave is paid up to age three.
4) The category "too high" sums up to 100%.

[9] Since the actual duration of leave was not specified in the question in all countries, we can not assume that all respondents were properly informed before evaluating it.

the child reaches the age of ten months (or 0.8 years) and not also to home-care leave (lasting until the child reaches the age of three). There is an important difference in Finland in the level of benefit received during these two types of leave. While during parental leave the allowance is tied to earnings (70%/40%/25%, depending on the level of earnings), the home care allowance is a flat-rate benefit. The survey results thus indicate that Finnish respondents would like to have longer parental leave with an earnings-related allowance.

More than half of the respondents in Slovenia (56%) considered parental leave lasting until the child reaches the age of one to be long enough. Even more respondents (61%) in the Netherlands were of the same opinion, although leave there lasts only until the child reaches the age of 0.2 years (or three months – see footnote 8). In Romania, Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic, 68% or more of respondents aged 20–49 were satisfied with parental leave lasting until the child reaches the age of 2–3 years. The German intra-country difference is most probably due to the different history of parental leave development in the two regions of the country. Before 1990, mothers in Eastern Germany had to return to full-time work after twelve months of paid leave, so that the changes following reunification brought along the possibility for parents to spend more time with their small children. As many as 82% of Eastern German respondents considered 2–3 years of parental leave to be long enough, as compared to 71% of Western German respondents.

18.4.2 Preferred Mode of Taking Parental Leave

After maternity leave, only part-time parental leave was available in the Netherlands (see note 2 below Table 18.3), while full-time leave was the only way of taking parental leave in Poland and Romania at the time of the surveys, and both full-time and half-time leave were possible in Slovenia. The first conclusion that may be drawn from Table 18.3 is that the available modes of taking parental leave were also the most popular in three out of four countries (see bold figures in grey cells).

Almost two-fifths of Romanian respondents and more than a quarter of the Dutch were not in favour of any of the country-specific combinations of modes of taking parental leave and duration of leave that were offered. The four countries observed also differ widely according to the most frequently preferred mode. In Romania, the majority would prefer flexible parental leave while full-time leave is least frequently preferred, also compared to the other three countries. Since flexible jobs are limited in number, while part-time jobs are scarce and not favoured by either employers or employees in Slovenia, most of the respondents opted for full-time parental leave. This is also true for Polish respondents, particularly for females; however, many also prefer half-time leave – and particularly flexible leave. The preferences expressed by Dutch respondents are quite different: Preferences for half-time and flexible leave

Table 18.3 Preferences towards the mode of taking parental leave (% of respondents aged 20–49)

Country	Full-time leave	Half-time leave	Flexible leave	Not in favour of these measures
Netherlands	17	**36**	**32**	15
Poland	**38**	14	21	27
Romania	5	14	**42**	**39**
Slovenia	**76**	10	9	5

Source: IPPAS

1) This is a simplified presentation of the original alternatives offered in the national questionnaires, where modes of taking parental leave were combined with the country-specific duration of leave.
2) The Netherlands are included in the table for comparative reasons although there is no paid parental leave in that country (with the exception of public sector employees and according to some collective agreements).
3) Grey cells indicate the arrangement of parental leave valid at the time of the national surveys.
4) Figures in bold mark the highest levels of support in individual countries.

prevail. Part of the explanation may be found in the traditionally low percentage of women employed full-time, particularly if compared to the former communist countries.

18.4.3 Preferred Child Allowance Arrangements

In the countries where child allowance is dependent on family income and available for families below an income ceiling (Czech Republic, Italy, Poland and Slovenia), the majority of respondents (46–71%) prefer such an arrangement. There is, however, a relatively high level of support for an income-tested scheme also in some countries where income is not a criterion for entitlement: In Finland, Cyprus and Germany between 49% and 55% of respondents selected it as their preference. The two arrangements were given the same level of support in Hungary. If those respondents who prefer a child allowance as an exclusive right of low-income families are added to those who opted for income-dependent child allowance, the majority in Hungary and the Netherlands, too, does not favour a universal child allowance, while Estonians are divided in two equal groups. People are manifestly in favour of a child allowance that includes elements of a social assistance policy measure. Only in Belgium (Flanders) and Romania does the majority prefer the present universal child allowance independent of income.

Preferences regarding the dependence of child allowance on the age of the child strongly correlate with arrangements at the time of the national surveys. However, the existent (in)dependence of child allowance of/on the number of children is preferred by the majority in only about half of the countries. Respondents from countries with the same child allowances for all children regardless of the birth order (the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Romania) strongly prefer this option, which is also true for the majority of respondents from the countries where child allowance increases with the number of children (Belgium (Flanders),

Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy and Slovenia). Only in Hungary is the present child allowance scheme preferred that increases with the number of children. In Cyprus, where they have child allowances only for families with at least four children, the majority is against distinguishing among children according to birth order.

The general conclusion is that preferences are rather weakly correlated with the arrangements that are in force. Romania and the Czech Republic are the only countries where the actual child allowance arrangements according to income, age and number of children are completely in line with the majority preferences, and Hungary is quite close to that. One may wonder whether Czech governments in the 1990s simply happened to enact the scheme that people preferred; did they have a good feeling/knowledge of people's attitudes; or did they simply succeed in convincing the public of the desirability of the policy which they had introduced? In 1993, there was a shift towards an age-related scheme, while the dependence of child allowance on the number of children was abolished; and child allowance was made income-dependent in 1996.

Table 18.4 presents the level of support for three types of child allowance. The types of child allowance are defined taking into account only preferences regarding dependence of child allowance on family income and the number of children. The third dimension (preferences regarding the age of the child) is left out primarily because there is no clear-cut link between age-related scheme and the designed typology; age-related child allowance scheme could be integrated into all three types. The definitions of three types of child allowance are given in the notes to Table 18.4. Child allowance as a family policy measure is intended to lower child costs for families; child allowance as a population policy measure is aimed at stimulating births; child allowance as a social assistance policy measure takes account of an unfavourable income position of the family.

In general terms, a child allowance as a social assistance policy measure is most frequently preferred while an allowance which bears prevalent characteristics of a population policy measure is least frequently preferred. In order to obtain an additional insight into the results presented in Table 18.4, similar countries were grouped by performing cluster analysis[10] based on the same typology. The aim of cluster analysis was to identify the groups of countries where the differences between countries in different groups are as great as possible, while the differences between countries in the same group are as small as possible. Equal weights were assigned to all three child allowance dimensions (family policy dimension, popula-

[10] The application of Ward's hierarchical method resulted in a number of groups (clusters) and group centroids. We used the K-means method in the second step in order to improve these results. The main deficiency of Ward's method (as well as of all other hierarchical methods) is that the allocation of units is final, with no possibility of reassignment to another (more appropriate) group during the procedure. On the other hand, the K-means method is sensitive to the initial value setting. If one is unfortunate, one can therefore trap into a local optimum which may be far from the global optimum. Empirical evidence suggests that one comes very close to the global optimum if centroids from hierarchical methods are taken as initial seed-points in the application of the K-means method (see e.g. Ferligoj, 1989, p. 88). However, in our analysis (with a small number of cases) the results of the described procedure were the same as those obtained using Ward's method.

tion policy dimension and social assistance policy dimension) that simultaneously acted as criteria.

The dendrogram presented in Fig. 18.2 suggests two groups of countries with regard to support for child allowance as a family policy, population policy, or a social assistance policy measure. Eastern Germany, Lithuania, Western Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Slovenia belong to the first group. In the second group, particularly Romania but also Hungary differs considerably from Estonia, Cyprus and Finland. Preferences are clearly pronounced in the first group of countries, while they are more balanced in the second one.[11]

The second group is also not as homogeneous as the first one.

Respondents in the first group of countries are much more strongly in favour of child allowance as a social assistance policy measure, and less strongly in favour of child allowance as a population policy measure, than respondents in the second group of countries; they also somewhat less frequently favour child allowance as a family policy measure. The Czech Republic – which has the highest level of support for the social assistance dimension and the lowest level of support for the population policy dimension – is the most typical representative of the first group. The highest

Table 18.4 Support for three types of child allowance (% of respondents aged 20–49)

Country	Child allowance as . . .		
	. . . a family policy measure[1]	. . . a population policy measure[2]	. . . a social assistance policy measure[3]
Czech Republic	30	4	50
Eastern Germany	31	10	40
Western Germany	28	10	40
Estonia	35	14	31
Cyprus	29	12	34
Lithuania	31	10	42
Hungary	23	22	18
Netherlands	31	5	36
Romania	53	15	21
Slovenia	15	9	44
Finland	21	15	35

Source: IPPAS

Notes:

1) Child allowance as a "family policy measure": independent of family income and the number of children.

2) Child allowance as a "population policy measure": independent of family income, and increasing with the number of children or only from the third child onwards.

3) Child allowance as a "social assistance policy measure": dependent on family income or for low-income families only, and independent of the number of children.

[11] This is evident from the centroids:

Cluster	Family policy type	Population policy type	Social assistance policy type
1	27.74	7.91	42.05
2	32.19	15.75	27.77



Fig. 18.2 Clusters of countries according to support for three types of child allowance Source: IPPAS

share of respondents preferring child allowance as a family policy measure (53%) was registered in Romania, while Hungary has a relatively high share (22%) of those who prefer child allowance as a population policy measure, as compared to other countries in the second group. Both countries have relatively low shares of preferences for child allowance as a social assistance policy measure.

18.5 Determinants of Attitudes and Preferences

18.5.1 Models and Variables

In determining the components of our theoretical model, we built on the analytical framework developed by Gauthier (1998). In this model, public support of individual characteristics of parental leave and child allowance is a function of both individual- and aggregate-level determinants. We expect people's attitudes and preferences to be influenced by their demographic characteristics (sex, characteristics related to life cycle and those related to family responsibilities), fertility intentions, economic characteristics, and personal experience/knowledge of the parental leave and child allowance schemes. In line with our results presented in Section 18.4, we presume that attitudes/preferences are not influenced by actual schemes, i.e. that they are not country-specific.

Applying the binary logistic regression method, we have built five empirical models:

- Model 1 for an evaluation of the likelihood that parental leave is considered to be too short rather than sufficiently long;

- Model 2 for an evaluation of the likelihood that part-time or flexible parental leave is preferred over full-time leave;
- Models 3–5 for an evaluation of the likelihood that child allowance dependent on income, age of the child, or number of children is preferred over alternatives that are independent of these characteristics.

Life cycle-related demographic variables include respondents' age and attained educational level. Six five-year age groups are observed as well as three educational levels (below higher secondary, higher secondary, and post-secondary). Two demographic variables are related to family responsibilities: number of children (0, 1, 2 and 3 and over) and living arrangement (living with spouse/partner, living apart together, and no partner). Fertility intentions are brought into the model through the general intention to have a(nother) child in the future. Economic characteristics of respondents are represented by the variable "employment status" (full-time, part-time, casual work and no job). Personal experience/knowledge of the schemes is captured by the variable indicating whether the respondent or his/her partner have ever taken parental leave (Models 1 and 2) and by the variable indicating whether the respondent or his/her partner was receiving child allowance at the time of the survey (Models 3–5). A country dummy is included in order to account for the remaining variation between countries.[12]

In predicting the influence of explanatory variables on people's attitudes and preferences, particularly as regards the parental leave scheme, we cannot fully rely on Gauthier's (1998) results,[13] but also have to consider the situation/environment in Europe as of the 2000s. Under the hypothesis that women take all or most parental leave, attitudes towards the current duration and available modes of taking parental leave are expected to depend on sex, labour force attachment and education of women as well as on their previous experience with parental leave. Due to an increasing importance attaching to equal opportunities, we expect women and more educated persons to have a higher likelihood of being satisfied with the current duration of parental leave and to prefer part-time and flexible leave to full-time leave. We presume that the likelihood of preferring a child allowance dependent on income and the number of children increases with the number of children one has and the general intention to have a(nother) child in the future. The likelihood of preferring child allowance dependent on income is expected to decrease with the attained educational level of the respondent as a proxy for income, while - on the

[12] The availability of data was a decisive constraint for our theoretical model; ideally, additional variables would have been included. Some possibly relevant explanatory variables had to be omitted because they were not available for many countries ("satisfaction with the total household income") and/or there were too many missing cases ("the age of the youngest child"). Including such variables would have meant loosing too many observations.

[13] Gauthier (1998) used the data collected about a decade before those included in the IPPAS database. The number and representation of the European countries in the two databases is also different: The first one included six European countries (as compared to twelve included in our logistic regression analyses), among them one former communist country and two Southern European countries (Spain being the one missing in the second database).

basis of Gauthier's (1998) results – the likelihood of preferring a child allowance dependent on the number of children is expected to increase.

The results in Section 18.5.2 are presented in terms of odds (ratio between the likelihood that a particular outcome will occur and the likelihood that it will not). Since all independent variables are categorical, the results can only be interpreted within categories. Values smaller than 1.00 indicate that the likelihood of the occurrence is lower for this particular category than for the reference category (all other factors being controlled for).

18.5.2 Attitudes and Preferences Regarding Parental Leave

The likelihood that parental leave was evaluated as too short rather than sufficiently long (Model 1) and that part-time or flexible leave was preferred to full-time leave (Model 2) by the respondents with specified socio-economic characteristics and by respondents in individual countries – always relative to reference groups which have odds equal to 1.00 – are presented in Table 18.5.

18.5.2.1 Duration of Parental Leave

Women are somewhat more likely than men to evaluate parental leave as too short (rather than sufficiently long) (see Model 1). Women's concern for the child's well-being evidently outweighs the risk of their worsened labour market position due to motherhood. Respondents aged 35–49 are significantly less likely than respondents aged 20–24 to consider parental leave as too short, which may be due to their weakened interest in the measure. Those who themselves (or their partners) have taken parental leave are less likely than those without such an experience to be satisfied with the duration of leave.

As expected, there is a higher likelihood for people intending to have a child in the future to evaluate parental leave as too short than for those without such an intention. This likelihood is also higher for people working part-time than for those working full-time, which may be explained by the higher level of labour force attachment of the latter. The educational level does not seem to significantly influence people's attitudes in this respect.

In the Czech Republic, which is the reference country, paid parental leave combined with job security may last until the child reaches the age of three, and may be prolonged until the child reaches the age of four, but without job security. The likelihood that parental leave in their countries is evaluated as too short is significantly higher for Polish, Dutch, and particularly Slovenian and Finnish respondents. There are self-evident explanations for this for Slovenia and the Netherlands (see Table 18.1), given that 1) parental leave lasts until the child reaches the age of 1 in Slovenia, and 2) only maternity leave is paid in the Netherlands while parental leave, if taken continuously, may last until the child reaches the age of 0.7 years) as well as for Finland (see Section 18.4.1: Respondents evaluated the duration of what is called parental leave in Finland, so that they did not take home-care leave into account). However, on the basis of the PPA data we are not able to explain why

Table 18.5 Determinants of attitudes and preferences regarding the characteristics of parental leave and child allowances

		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Sex	Male	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
	Female	1.09	*	0.73	***	0.91	**	0.97		0.76	***
Age group	20–24	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
	25–29	1.00		0.90		1.03		0.91		0.90	
	30–34	0.95		0.97		1.22	**	0.94		1.08	
	35–39	0.83	*	0.97		1.32	***	1.13		0.91	
	40–44	0.74	***	0.80		1.37	***	1.17	**	0.79	**
	45–49	0.74	***	0.91		1.60	***	1.23	**	0.79	**
Living arrangement	Living with spouse/ partner	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
	Living apart together	0.96		1.14		1.11		1.34	***	0.85	*
	No partner	0.93		1.12		1.35	***	1.21	***	0.99	
Number of children	0	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
	1	0.88		0.95		0.78	***	1.38	***	0.85	*
	2	0.99		1.09		0.66	***	1.48	***	0.84	*
	3+	1.08		1.10		0.58	***	1.63	***	1.24	*
Intention to have a child in the future	No	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
	Yes	1.28	***	0.90		0.85	***	0.99		1.00	
Education	Below higher secondary	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
	Higher secondary	1.00		1.19	*	1.05		1.13	*	1.33	***
	Post-secondary	0.96		1.76	***	1.10		1.18	**	1.54	***
Employment status	Full-time	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
	Part-time	1.27	***	1.26	*	1.08		1.01		0.90	
	Casual work					1.13		1.08		0.88	
	Not in work	1.09		0.89		1.31	***	0.87	**	1.07	

Table 18.5 (continued)

		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Receiving child allowance at the present time	No					1.00		1.00		1.00	
	Yes					0.94		1.12	**	0.94	
Ever having taken parental leave	No	1.00		1.00							
	Yes	1.33	***	0.56	***						
Country	Belgium (Flanders)					1.00		1.00		1.00	
	Czech Republic	1.00				3.42	***	0.83	*	0.78	**
	Eastern Germany	0.39	***			2.15	***	0.31	***	1.11	
	Western Germany	1.13				2.24	***	0.38	***	1.24	***
	Italy					22.71	***			4.22	*
	Hungary					2.06	***	0.27	***	4.18	***
	Netherlands	1.73	***	1.00		1.98	***	2.77	***	1.35	***
	Poland	1.26	**	0.30	***	4.72	***	0.19	***		
	Slovenia	2.42	***	0.08	***	5.40	***	0.38	***	1.86	***
	Finland	2.74	***								
–2 Log Likelihood		11464.9		4819.8		13787.3		13277.1		10628.9	

Source: IPPAS

1. ref (0): Parental leave sufficiently long — 1: Parental leave too short
2. ref (0): Full-time parental leave — 1: Part-time or flexible leave
3. ref (0): Child allowance independent of family income — 1: Dependent on family income
4. ref (0): Child allowance independent of age of child — 1: Dependent on age of child
5. ref (0): Child allow. independent of no. of children — 1:Dependent on no. of children

* significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level.

Notes: 1) Data were not weighted. 2) Regression coefficients are expressed in odds.

Polish respondents – who are entitled to 36 months of parental leave following 6 months of maternity leave[14] – are significantly less satisfied with the duration of parental leave than Czech respondents.

18.5.2.2 Part-time or Flexible Parental Leave Rather than Full-time Leave

Contrary to our expectations, but in line with Gauthier's (1998) findings, women are significantly less likely than men to prefer part-time or flexible parental leave to full-time leave. This is also true for persons who have taken parental leave (or whose partners have done so), as compared with those who have never taken it (see Model 2). It appears that women and those with parental leave experience (in their family) are more inclined to perceive parenting in the child's first year(s) as a full-time obligation or task. On the other hand, the logistic regression results have confirmed the expected differences in preferences according to educational level. More educated people are significantly more likely than those with below-higher secondary education to prefer part-time or flexible arrangements that enable them to better reconcile their parental role and employment, and minimize the opportunity costs of childrearing (which, of course, are much higher for more educated people). In Poland and Slovenia, the likelihood to prefer part-time and flexible leave to full-time leave is significantly lower than in the Netherlands. The traditional behaviour – imposed or enabled by available options – is evidently very strongly embedded in all three countries.

18.5.3 Preferences Regarding Child Allowance Arrangements

The results of logistic regression Models 3–5 in Table 18.5 show the likelihood of individual characteristics of child allowance being preferred by respondents with certain socio-economic characteristics and living in different countries, as compared to the likelihood for reference groups of respondents.

18.5.3.1 Child Allowance Dependent on Family Income

The likelihood that child allowance dependent on income is preferred over an allowance that is independent of income (Model 3) is significantly lower for women than for men, and for persons intending to have a child in the future as compared to those without such an intention. The likelihood increases with respondents' age and decreases with the number of children; it is significantly different for persons aged 30–49 than for those aged 20–25, and for persons with children as compared to those without any children. The former relationship may be explained by the accumulated experience regarding child costs and the awareness that families on a lower income need more support in raising children. The latter relationship is contrary to our expectations: One would expect people with more children to have lower (per capita) income,

[14] Parental leave in the 25th–36th months is not paid only in the case of two-parent families having their first child.

and to thus prefer an income-dependent child allowance. However, educational level, as a proxy for income position, does not significantly influence preferences.

Persons without a partner are significantly more likely than those living with a spouse/partner to prefer an income-dependent child allowance. This may be due to the fact that one-breadwinner families usually have a lower income than two-breadwinner families. Personal experience may also explain a significantly higher likelihood of preferring an income-dependent child allowance for persons without a job as compared to those in full-time employment.

18.5.3.2 Child Allowance Dependent on the Age of the Child

The results show a significantly higher likelihood of a child allowance dependent on the age of the child being preferred to an age-independent allowance (Model 4) for persons without a partner (as compared to those living with a spouse/partner) and for persons with children (as compared to those with no children). The more children people have, the more likely they are to prefer age-dependent child allowance to an allowance that is independent of the age of the child. The likelihood is also higher for more educated people than for those with below-higher secondary education, and for persons receiving child allowance for their children at the time of the survey (as compared to non-recipients), while it is lower for persons who do not have a job than for those in full-time employment.

In Belgium (Flanders), which is the reference country, child benefit is dependent on the age of the child (higher for older children), and the majority of Flemish people are content with that (see Section 18.4.3). People in all other countries observed are significantly less likely to prefer such an arrangement. Only in the Netherlands, where they also have an age-dependent child allowance, is the likelihood to prefer it significantly higher than in Belgium (Flanders).

18.5.3.3 Child Allowance Dependent on the Number of Children

Women are significantly less likely than men to prefer a child allowance dependent on the number of children (see Model 5). The same is true for persons aged 40–49 as compared to those aged 20–24. It is surprising that the number of children itself does not have a more significant influence on preferences for child allowance dependent on the number of children by those with three or more children as compared to those without any children. The likelihood for child allowance dependent on the number of children to be preferred is significantly higher for people with at least higher secondary education than for those with a lower level of education. The likelihood of prevailing preference for a child allowance dependent on the number of children is higher than in Belgium (Flanders) in all but one of the countries observed.[15] The only exception with a significantly lower likelihood than in the reference country

[15] This was the actual arrangement at the time of the surveys in all these countries but the Netherlands.

is the Czech Republic, where child allowance is the same for each child (see also Section 18.4.3).

18.6 Concluding Remarks

The results have shown a weak correlation between the actual duration of parental leave in different countries and people's evaluation of its sufficiency. This points to the importance of cultural norms, female employment patterns and equal opportunities for understanding people's perceptions, attitudes and wishes. It may be concluded that Europeans on the whole want to have an option of parental leave lasting 2–3 years. However, a more comprehensive picture of people's expectations could not be drawn due to the PPA data constraints.

In the countries observed, people are mostly satisfied with the current mode(s) of taking parental leave. It seems that they tend to accept what is available and to adapt to it. Or might it be that governments manage to offer what people need and want to have? Be that as it may, the Dutch will probably not understand why the Slovenians prefer to fully retreat from their jobs for one year of parental leave, while Slovenians (and a great majority of other Europeans) would not be able to imagine themselves starting to work part-time when their child is below three months of age.

There is a high preference for the university in granting the child allowance. It is however interesting that in most of the countries the majority favours child allowances with elements of (income-dependent) social assistance. People obviously want all children to receive a child allowance, but the level of benefit should take account of the financial situation of the family. Preferences regarding the dependence of child allowance on the age of the child strongly correlate with actual arrangements, meaning that the majority supports child allowance independent of the age of the child.

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