CRITICAL CULTURAL STUDIES OF CHILDHOOD

YOUTH WORK, EARLY EDUCATION, AND PSYCHOLOGY

Liminal Encounters

Edited by Hans Skott-Myhre, Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw & Kathleen S. G. Skott-Myhre
This series focuses on reframings of theory, research, policy, and pedagogies in childhood. A critical cultural study of childhood is one that offers a “prism” of possibilities for writing about power and its relationship to the cultural constructions of childhood, family, and education in broad societal, local, and global contexts. Books in the series open up new spaces for dialogue and reconceptualization based on critical theoretical and methodological framings, including critical pedagogy; advocacy and social justice perspectives; cultural, historical, and comparative studies of childhood; and post-structural, postcolonial, and/or feminist studies of childhood, family, and education. The intent of the series is to examine the relations between power, language, and what is taken as normal/abnormal, good, and natural, to understand the construction of the “other,” difference and inclusions/exclusions that are embedded in current notions of childhood, family, educational reforms, policies, and the practices of schooling. Critical Cultural Studies of Childhood will open up dialogue about new possibilities for action and research.

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Youth Work, Early Education, and Psychology

Liminal Encounters

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Hans Skott-Myhre, Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw, and Kathleen S. G. Skott-Myhre
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INTRODUCTION

Immanent Approaches and Liminal Encounters in Youth Work, Early Education, and Psychology

Hans Skott-Myhre, Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw, and Kathleen S.G. Skott-Myhre

This edited collection is an effort to rethink the set of relations generally referred to as working with young people. The necessity to think again about how various modes of praxis are deployed is premised in an acknowledgment that the sociopolitical landscape, in which this work is embedded, has shifted considerably as we enter the twenty-first century. The advent of global capitalism with its neoliberal imperatives for education, psychology, and child and youth care (CYC)/youth work (YW) has had far-reaching effects, both for the definitional categories that comprise children, youth, and adults, as well as for the sets of relations between the subjects. Indeed we might say that we are in a period in which the terms of civil society generally are being upended, disrupted, and very possibly eviscerated (Hardt, 1995). We would argue that the traditional modes of civil society that were designed to integrate and shape young people as functioning members of society, such as education, the family, modes of psychotherapy, as well as orphanages and other forms of residential care, are in various stages of crisis and reconfiguration.

In some instances, this opens calcified institutions to new and welcome radical practices, while in other circumstances it makes such institutions available for the full predatory incursions of the worst forms of economic and social exploitation. It is this double-edged
movement that opens this volume to the question of the liminal and the force of immanent praxis. To this end we propose this book as a series of propositions that highlight politicized strategies to working with young people under current conditions of late liberal capitalism. Its intention is to interrogate ongoing approaches, and provide alternative perspectives drawing on the pedagogical affordances of liminal approaches founded in immanence.

The chapters that follow build upon the prior critical interventions of prominent childhood and youth studies scholars (Burman, 2008; Cannella, 1997; Skott-Myhre, 2009) and showcase the work of practitioners, activists, and researchers. To do so, this collection sets out to offer strategies and alternative revisionings of what it means to work with young people at a time of species extinction, climate change, colonial conundrums, technological mediated worlds, and global prescriptions. The authors in the collection draw from a wide range of theories that sidestep developmental and humanist perspectives, highlighting relationality, entanglements, coshapings, and mutual responsibilities.

The writings in this collection are premised in two integrally related philosophical concepts: liminality and immanence. We use these terms as theoretical frameworks because they hold the capacity to simultaneously describe the movements of domination and capture under global capitalism as well as the concomitant movements of refusal, alternative, and revolt (Negri, 1999). The concept of immanence has been used in both these senses by key theorists that map the terrain of contemporary capitalism such as Antonio Negri (1999), Hardt and Negri (2005), Deleuze (1992), Deleuze and Guattari (1977), Deleuze and Guattari (1988), Braidotti (2013), and Gatens (1996) among others. In these works, immanence holds a commonality of essence entwined with a radical distinction in form.

The definition of the essence of immanence derives from the work of the philosopher Spinoza (2000). In Spinoza (2000) immanence is a system that produces itself with no outside. It is an autopoietic substance whose primary, if not sole, impetus is its own expression of an infinite set of capacities. For Spinoza, this is the nature of God or what he calls substance, or in another term, it is the set of conditions under which all things and thoughts are produced. Immanence, as an explanatory framework for the production of everything, stands in opposition to two other significant theoretical frameworks that underlie how human beings in Europe and North America undertook to understand society, the natural world, and history per se.
The first of these is the philosophy of Rene Descartes (1968) who proposed a dualistic explanation of existence premised in his explorations of human consciousness. In brief, he suggested that human thought is in a hierarchical relation to the body and the realm of the senses. In his reading of the world, materiality operates mechanistically, while the mind has the capacity to operate nonmechanically through the application of reason. The body is, in his view, a machine to be controlled and operated by the mind that has access to the higher realms of reality through reason. Descartes’s God exists outside the material realm as pure thought and human’s aspirations should be toward an ethics premised in reference to this ideal outside realm of pure reason. Obviously, this is a very different and nonimmanentist view.

Indeed, it has been argued (Deleuze, 1988; Lloyd, 2002) that Spinoza’s work was a direct critique of Descartes. Specifically, Spinoza asserted that the mind and body did not exist in a hierarchical relation. Nor was the mind privileged through reason to access the higher realms of knowledge. Instead, Spinoza proposed that the mind and the body operate as parallel functions that operate together to create our knowledge of the world. Rather than see the material realm of the body as simply mechanical, Spinoza proposed that no one could know what a body could do. He also saw the mind as the thought of the body. By which he meant that there is a complex and intricate interplay between the senses and thought, in which the body’s capacity to sense gives rise to the very possibility of thought. But, that which is thought can either open or foreclose the capacities of the body to both act and, through action, open the possibilities for more sensate encounters.

Descartes’s body-mind dualism and view of nature, as a mechanism to be controlled and managed through reason, has had significant implications for how we have thought about the natural world, our bodies, and other species. It has given rise to systems of taxonomy and hierarchy in both the fields of natural and social sciences. Within the world of adult-child relations, it could be argued, with some force, that the very distinction between adult and child bodies with its explicit and implicit levels of hierarchy and disciplinary functions is rooted in Cartesian logic (Skott-Myhre, 2009). Similar arguments apply to race, gender, sexuality, and interspecies conceptualizations of taxonomy and hierarchy with immense implications for current social and environmental ecologies. All of this has direct implications for the fields of childhood studies, CYC/Youth YW, and psychology.
The other theorist of significance here is G. W. F. Hegel (2004) whose work on the dialectic has had deep implications for our views of history, society, and politics. Like Descartes, Hegel also proposed an understanding of the way the world is produced as being dependent on an ideal outside realm of perfect form. The material world was composed in a hierarchical relation to this realm of pure form as inferior and incapable of attaining perfection. However, as human beings were able to perceive the possibility of pure form through reason and rationality, they could attempt to build social institutions and practices that attempted to strive toward the realm of absolute pure form or Hegel’s notion of God. Of course, these efforts would be found lacking and would ultimately fail, but in their effort to achieve pure form they would construct better and better social, economic, and political forms and drive history forward. Hegel’s view of human progress would also have immense implications for how we view the world today. His teleological view of progress has direct implications for notions of development in psychology and education, and his dialectal view of history, driven by lack, similarly influences our notions of disability and models of emotional and neurological deficits.

Contrary to this model, an immanent perspective has no concept of lack. Immanence derives its force out of the productions of the moment which are always exactly all they can be since they are all there is. Similarly, in immanent conception there is no teleological progress toward an ideal outside because there is no outside. There is no progress in immanent thought, simply pure production. Movement is driven by the capacities of all elements of a given moment rather than by any sense of an abstract outside set of ideals or principles.

The chapters in this volume will operate in an immanent fashion in striving to avoid dualism, lack, taxonomies, hierarchies, and teleological notions of progress. In doing this, the authors here are attempting to rethink adult-young person relations within the problematics of the twenty-first century. It is, of course, somewhat ironic that this volume is, to a greater degree, premised in the work of a seventeenth-century philosopher, in order to think the politics of the twenty-first century. However, as Negri (1999), Holland (1998), and Casarino (2011) have pointed out, it is with the specific atmospherics of the twenty-first century that the neglected and misread work of Baruch Spinoza becomes truly relevant and perhaps for the first time comprehensible in ways it could not have been before.

To some degree, this is true because of the fact that the current mode of global capitalism is now also a form of immanence (Casarino,
INTRODUCTION

It is Niklas Luhmann (1995) who proposes that the current form of society is composed of autopoietic communication systems. He theorizes that these systems are self-enclosed and self-producing systems whose sole impetus is their own proliferation and extension. Baudrillard (1994) also suggests that the current mode of society is an infinite system of autoreferential reproduction, an infinite regression of copies of copies. Hardt and Negri (2009a) propose that the current mode of global capitalist rule they call Empire is a decentered self-producing network that spreads itself rhizomatically through overcoding the creative capacities of living labor. All of these descriptions suggest that capitalism is an immanent system that functions as an abstract system of code that extends itself immanently through overcoding living systems. Under such conditions, the terms of exploitation and appropriation of living things are taking place at the level of code—perhaps more importantly, through the overcoding of our unconscious desiring production (Deleuze, Guattari, and Massumi, 1977), our capacity to form social relations (Hardt and Negri, 2009b), and at the level of living bodies and their capacity to create and produce between and across species.

It is at this level of the struggle, between immanence as a parasitic system of abstract code and immanence as living material force, that the question of the relationship between young people and adults is engaged as a contemporary politics. To the degree that those working with young people continue to try to frame social relations on Hegelian and Cartesian models, the work will have little or no effect within the overarching framework of global capitalism. Put simply, if the theorists of capitalism and immanence, we have cited above, are even partially correct, Cartesian and Hegelian models are irrelevant to the living concerns of young people growing up in the twenty-first century. Everything, from social relations, to psychological constructions of desire and identity, to pedagogy and learning is being gradually overcoded within the virtual machine of immanent capital. For the authors in this volume, the overcoding of social relations by an abstract parasitic system with no regard for its host must be resisted and a life affirming set of praxis and politics proposed.

It is in this regard that we are putting forward the notion of the liminal as a counterforce to the abstract immanent machinery of global capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) suggest that one strategy for contesting a system that functions at the level of code is to create spaces of noncommunication or to open flows of creativity that exceed the capacity of language—to engage life as art which they
define as blocs of pure sensation. Deleuze (1990) in his investigation of the sensate in *The Logic of Sense* opens sense as a space of indeterminacy, wherein the body senses that which is prior to any capacity to articulate. We are proposing the liminal as just such a space between that which operates prior to the ability to articulate and that which frees articulation immediately following speech. Put simply, the liminal operates both before and after articulation, as a space as yet uncoded. It is what Deleuze and Guattari (2009) call becoming. That which is becoming is never anything in particular because it is the intuitive sense of pure possibility—of what could become as the dynamic extension of immanence as infinite expressive capacity.

To rethink working with young people, in this way, is to open a field of immanent relations. Such a field holds several key characteristics: (1) it operates without a reference to ideal form; (2) it opens onto capacity rather than lack or deficit; (3) it exceeds the ability of overcoding to capture it within a value system of exchange or the dollar; (4) it is premised in an ecology of material bodies collectively engaged in common projects; (5) it is inclusive of histories of struggle without being captured by the logics of appropriation and domination that produced them; (6) it welcomes struggle and indeterminacy; (7) it does not sacrifice sensation to reason nor the obverse but uses both productively; and (8) it seeks to propose a field of living immanent relations over abstract coded forms of society.

In this volume we have collected authors who, we propose, work within some combination of the above. We have chosen to focus on three settings where young people and adults work together: childhood studies, CYC/YW, and psychology. As a result, the collection includes three parts. The first part, “Rebelling, Refusing, Becoming, Fleeing, Creating, Deconstructing, Imagining, and Thinking Youth Work/Child and Youth Care,” highlights a set of possibilities for rethinking YW and CYC theories and practices. This part proposes YW and CYC as ethological enterprises centered on the generative possibilities of the collective capacities to be found in the institutions where CYC and YW take place. Collectively, the chapters have three related aims. First, they argue that YW and CYC sites (such as residential programs, group homes, emergency shelters, schools, streets, and so on) hold the capacity for developing subjective and social forms of revolt and resistance. Second, they examine the innate capacities of the assembled bodies of youth and adults as they argue for a machinery of creative force that exists, by definition, as a monstrous space of deviance. Finally, drawing on postmodern, postmarxist, postcolonial, and nomadic feminist writing and thought, the chapters seek
to refound YW and CYC work outside the traditional frameworks of phenomenology and development.

The second part, “Intensities, Experimentations, Diffractions, Embodiments, and Affects in Early Education,” brings education in conversation with recent scholarship on posthumanisms and materialisms. In particular, the part draws on the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Indigenous knowledges, and feminist science and technology studies scholars to rethink relations in classrooms and schools. The chapters aim to engage with “life as we know it” in education differently, dismantling hierarchies and proliferating entanglements, relationships, affects, and networks in the lives of children. In this part, the authors not only consider the implications and challenges of critical scholarship as they unsettle colonialisms and anthropocentrism in education, but also provide new possibilities for new modes of life and relating with children.

The final part, “Immanent and Critical Encounters with Psychology,” engages with recent literature in the field of psychology to open up new spaces for creative conversations in childhood and adolescent psychology. The chapters rethink concepts such as deficits and deviance and contest the dominant constructions of pathology premised in the dialectical approach to difference as lack. Collectively, the authors in this part propose “struggle and difference” as fields of resource and possibilities. This part seeks to bring childhood and adolescent psychology into the realities of twenty-first-century postmodern capitalist society. The part seeks to provide viable critiques to developmental, diagnostic, and patriarchal models of childhood and adolescent psychology.

In the first part on Child and Youth Care/Youth Work, we begin with Hans Skott-Myhre’s chapter titled, “Schizoanalyzing the Encounters of Young People and Adults.” In this chapter, Skott-Myhre proposes the encounter between young people and adults as a liminal space of plenitude absent any abstract outside third term or dialectical relation. Utilizing Deleuze and Guattari’s (1977) concept of schizoanalysis in combination with Merleau Ponty’s (2013) work on intersubjectivity, the encounter of bodies in the context of CYC/YW is reformulated as a space of revolutionary political force and social reinvention. In their work, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) delineate two positive tasks and four theses for, what they term, schizo-analysis. Skott-Myhre investigates the ways in which these historically neglected clinical proposals might reinvigorate the field of CYC/YW in terms of both practice and theory.

Scott Kouri and Jeff Smith open the next chapter, “Street Analysis,” as a story about the experiments of two youth workers
and the emergence of a liminal form of YW peer supervision. They present this experience both theoretically and by practice example to articulate how their multiple personae worked through processes of desiring production (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988. They show how explorations of our unconscious and material surroundings created new opportunities for them to move beyond the traditional supervisory dyad (supervisor/supervisee) into something less stable, constrained, and therefore more uncertain and productive. They use Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of group formations to assess the revolutionary capacities of bodies and subjectivities acting for, with, and against each other within the academic, clinical, supervisory, personal, and impersonal contexts that assemble to produce their current supervisory praxis.

Nicole Land, in her chapter “Riddling (with) Riddled Embodiments,” engages embodiment as a riddle, arguing that we might conceptualize embodiment as multiply performative and iteratively active. Thinking embodiment(s) as continually riddling the body amid the fractured, material-discursive, and transcorporeal matters of a productive, emplaced, and enfleshed world, she carefully and experimentally foregrounds the following inquiry: if embodiments are riddled, what possibilities for embodiment(s) emerge? Drawing from research with female adolescent hockey players, the question “what can a hockey-body do?” is used to interrogate using images and discussion. Land thinks embodiment(s) with various feminist materialist scholars and new materialist philosophers, drawing their work into momentary experiments with hockey bodies. The fractured, incongruent, and tangential character of this chapter, Land tells us, is intentional, consistent with the contention that riddling is to engage with liminality, tension, impermanence, and indeterminacy, while finding fleshy nourishment in the contingent and contested riddles of embodiment.

In the final chapter in this part, “Boundaries, Thresholds, and the Liminal in Youth Suicide Prevention Practice,” Ian Marsh and Jennifer White explore some of the ways youth suicide and suicidality are discursively constructed by young people, academics, and professionals working in the field of youth suicide prevention. They critically examine some of the assumptions commonly made about what it is like to be suicidal, what causes suicide, and what are deemed appropriate practices of prevention in relation. Three areas are focused on: (a) suicide as a historically constituted object of inquiry, presently in transition from modernist medical-scientific thought and practice to more community-focused, social justice-oriented, and decolonizing
understandings; (b) young peoples’ experiences of suicidality; and (c) the uncertainties, “threshold concepts,” and “troublesome knowledge” of practitioners undertaking suicide prevention work with young people, and the promise and potential of these ideas as pedagogical resources.

The next part, premised in childhood studies, begins with a chapter by Sylvia Kind and Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw titled “Charcoal Intensities and Risky Experimentations.” Here they argue that experimentation in early childhood education is a complex social-affective-political phenomenon. It opens up worlds and creates new venues for thinking and doing. It actively extends experience. By testing new and unpredictable mixes of bodies, forces, and things, experimentation invents. Yet, experiments are not without risk, of course. Outcomes cannot be predicted or known in advance. Drawing on an art exhibit, they propose that the production of art between children and adults is an opportunity to pause and pay attention to regions of intensity and affectivity through experimentation.

Denise Hodgins follows with “Hope and Possibilities with/in Car(e) Pedagogies.” Drawing on science studies, in particular Puig de la Bellacasa’s notion of matters of care, she takes seriously toy cars in the classroom to consider what they might teach us about our pedagogies with young children. Following a diffractive methodology, this chapter includes many car(e) stories to performatively (re)present cars in, near, and far from the classroom as matters of care. These stories highlight how early childhood materials are not innocent, but that both their troublings and loves are ethically, sociopolitically, geohistorically, and material-discursively situated. The chapter concludes with imaginings of how a framework of matters of care might support commonworlding pedagogies.

In the next chapter, “Touching Place in Childhood Studies: Situated Encounters with a Community Garden,” Fikile Nxumalo is inspired by recent provocations to consider what it might mean to inherit colonial histories in these times of wounded places, where seeking possibilities for more ethical relations with more-than-human others remains an important task (Haraway, 2011; Rose, 2004). She seeks to open up possibilities for an engagement with childhoods’ situatedness within ongoing settler colonial relations by paying attention to everyday encounters with a community garden in an early childhood education setting. In this, she experiments with orientations that bring attention to messy historical and sociomaterial relations, while interrupting all too easy moves to romanticize children’s “nature” encounters. She asks us to consider how this close noticing
might generate different stories of this particular place and, in so doing, create anticolonial resonances for environmental education.

The final chapter in this part on Early Education, Luke Kalfleish’s “An Ontological Curriculum: Liminal Encounters of Subjectivity and Affect,” proposes that, as we move past disciplinary practices of enclosure and into a society of control, public institutions will find themselves in a “transition” or what Deleuze believes to be a more accurate description—a complete dismantling (Deleuze, 1995). He points out that this dismantling has been outlined by current scholars in the field of critical pedagogy (Giroux, 2011) and curriculum theory (Pinar, 2012) alike, and its origins have been labeled many names such as neoliberalism, empire, and casino capitalism. He delineates how its tactics have been outlined with great lucidity as austerity, standardized testing, and anti-intellectualism to name a few. He suggests that what is needed now is a conversation on what curriculum or pedagogy can be and the postmodern conceptual tools that can be used to reorientate pedagogical practices away from reductionist value systems of quantification and technocratic methodologies of behavior control. Drawing on the recent emergence of affective pedagogy (Dahlbeck, 2014) and a Spinozist/Deleuzian ontological theory of Affect, he proposes what Hardt and Negri (2009b) refer to as building institutions of constituent power rather than constituted power. This reorientation, he tells us, is an attempt to constitute institutions of education as spaces of generative affect sparked by liminal encounters of subjectivity and the relationships that these encounters produce.

The next part on Psychology begins with Kathleen Skott-Myhre’s essay, “Youth: A Radical Space of Pilgrimage.” Skott-Myhre utilizes the theoretical perspectives of Gloria Anzaldúa’s work on border subjectivity and Rosi Braitotti’s proposals about nomadic subjects to propose that youth is a time in which one is suspended in the space between and should be understood as holding the potential for revolutionary experience. Rather than viewing young people as enduring a period of storm and stress, a phase that one will simply “get over,” perhaps psychologists and psychotherapists might begin to see youth redefined as a “radical space of pilgrimage” (Watkins and Shulman, 2008, p. 134) with both personal and political implications.

In the next chapter, “Some Liminal Spaces in Lacanian Psychoanalysis,” Kareen Ror Malone looks at how one might understand liminality in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan is associated with structuralism, an approach in which formal distinctions, their juxtaposition, and organization are prime analytical categories. Malone’s
chapter challenges this view of Lacan through two examples. First, the Lacanian idea of the institution of Symbolic functioning is elaborated in a case study of a severely traumatized child. At the most fundamental points, there is an interstitial overlap and differentiation that operate in what could be considered a zone of liminality, even if conceived in somewhat different terms. Second, she turns to Lacan’s exegesis of one of Freud’s best-known examples from The Interpretation of Dreams (1998) in which the cusp of perception and consciousness, sound, and representation are seen as the dynamic space where the coordinates of one’s consciousness are inscribed, translating what is unsayable and intimate in to anchors of one’s daily awareness.

Bethany Morris takes up issues pertaining to childhood schizophrenia in her chapter, “Lines of Flight: Minoritarian Literature as a Means to Deterritorialize Early-Onset Schizophrenia.” She proposes that theories stemming from the antipsychiatry movement of the 1960s can provide an alternative way of understanding the behaviors demonstrated by those diagnosed with mental disorder and offer therapeutic interventions that could be far less detrimental to the individual. By exploring alternative modes of understanding human experiences within this framework, it is possible to open up a range of opportunities, both for ways of being in the world, as well as for different forms of therapeutic aids for those in distress. One such therapeutic tool that could provide a means to explore the occurrence of alternative experiences with young people is literature. In this regard, she makes a case for how literature can provide insight into the experiences of those children who have been diagnosed with early onset schizophrenia.

The final chapter is Emaline Friedman’s “Problematising Mindfulness with The Creative Production of the Self.” Friedman tells us that, despite the oft-cited difficulties of faithfully integrating Eastern meditation and mindfulness practices and the demands of the Western world, many European countries have begun to introduce these practices into the school curricula of young people. She engages the question of youth mindfulness theoretically by considering the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the refrain alongside psychological theories and speculation on the nature of synesthesia. She argues that recent transdisciplinary interest in affect, inextricable from the intersection of thought and the univocal plane of immanence, can assist in reframing suggestions about which elements comprise an enriching early education (and to what degree they are useful) for young people in the postmedia era.
This collection is situated in a liminal space of its own. It operates across and between disciplines with all of the chapters borrowing richly from theoretical frameworks that trouble the boundaries between childhood studies, CYC/YW, and psychology. Although each of the authors is writing from a set of concerns located within their particular discipline, the common thread is an attempt to break the strictures of the discipline and open the field of child/youth/adult encounter to political projects of common purpose. It is our hope to be evocative and troubling to ourselves and to our readers. With this in mind, proceed with due haste or appropriate caution.

References


It seems clear that something has changed radically in the ways in which adults and young people engage each other, think of each other, think of themselves, and consider the world around them. When did this happen? We might propose that it was somewhere around 1968 that the world of civil society and correspondingly our world of social relations such as the family, schools, institutions of incarceration, as well as those of care, began to become unfamiliar. Indeed, as we accelerate into the twenty-first century, we might even say that the institutions in which we are embedded as workers and recipients of service have begun to feel a bit alien. We have argued in our introduction that a good deal of this is the result of significant shifts in the way capitalism has begun to influence, or perhaps even dominate our lives.

For the field praxis and thought known as child and youth care or youth work, such a shift has major implications. As providers of care premised in youth-adult relations, we work in these institutions and are deeply engaged in their transformations under an ever-expanding field of capitalist appropriation. The title of this part is indicative of the responses to the evolving world of young people and adults in the twenty-first century proposed in the chapters that follow. For child and youth care in the twenty-first century there is a need to rebel, refuse, creatively flee, become, deconstruct, imagine, and rethink the world of youth-adult relations. The following chapters are proposals to that end.
The arena of praxis and theory that comprises what has become known as child and youth care encompasses a broad range of settings inclusive of residential care, street-based services, emergency shelters, schools, and foster care among others. Theories of child and youth care have been centered on ideas that are proposed to facilitate successful relationship building between adults and young people (Stuart, 2009). Although in the contemporary context it may seem pithy to say so, the fundamental element in the construction of the field of child and youth care remains the encounter between young people and adults. This collision of bodies determines the contours of the various activities, programs, policies, laws, regulations, and practices that comprise the structure and delimited space of child and youth care as an emerging discipline and profession. This engagement has been variously conceived in many terms including relational, disciplinary, familial, developmental, cultural, and spiritual (Stuart, 2009). This chapter both challenges and extends the predominant framings of child and youth care while attempting to offer an alternative theoretical frame.

It should be noted that in framing the encounter in terms of social categories such as adult, youth, family, culture, and so on, there is the risk of founding the description of our work through an analytic omission. This omission is a subtle slippage that mistakes the name for
the thing named. It is to accept a certain order of the world as a given. Indeed, it could be argued that, to premise our understanding of our work in an assumed commonality of social convention is to begin the conversation in the middle without an adequate understanding of the complicated genesis and effects of such an assumption. It is to bypass, with prejudice, the actuality of the complicated nature of social identity, subjectivity, and freedom. In short, it is to elide a definition of our work as inherently involved in the distributions of power inherent in the capacity to name.

When we name ourselves as adult and the other as youth or child, when we assume that families are a given and desirable way to organize society, when we determine a taxonomy of development for the bodies that we encounter in our work, when we map the bounded strictures of culture as knowable or possible to possess, and when we articulate spirituality as a universal, we foreclose the actuality of the dynamism of living entanglement and creative becoming.

Such a foreclosure, in the name of common sense, is premised in the valorization of representation as capable of revealing the world in its actuality. The representation of the world of child and youth care through language understood as capable of an accurate production of the world is, at root, riddled with problematic struggles over who gets to say what the world is and who we are in it. To claim social form as given truth (i.e., there is such a thing as a child with certain given attributes and capacities that can be known through observation from the outside) both impedes our ability to perceive anomalous bodies that exceed this description and blinds us to the ways in which such bodies can open new forms of social relations and encounters. Put simply, when we engage the other (and ourselves) with evidence and certainty, we shrink the world of exceptional and unanticipated capacity to a fraction of its actual infinitude.

In addition, for most of us, much of what we know as common sense is provided not by our firsthand encounters, but through reported evidence from experts. As Foucault (1977) has pointed out, oftentimes this knowledge is disseminated by a complex web of social institutions such as parents, schools, churches, governments, the media, and so on. Because these ways of knowing are so pervasive, they saturate and shape our perceptions outside of our conscious awareness. What we take for granted without reflection or critique about the world does not originate from our lived experience, but out of a world of description we are thrown into at birth. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) make this point when they assert that language commands rather than informs us. They argue that language is composed
of what they call “order words” that dictate both the world in terms of structuring it in a particular manner and us by way of command to fit ourselves into the world described. Language then is not simply command but simultaneously “linked to statements by a ‘social obligation’” (p. 79).

The world of social obligation is heavily reliant on the production of normative or ideal notions of what constitutes desirable social order. The division of the world into taxonomies and hierarchies of identity founded on the study of the world through science is a powerful form of command that inducts us into imagining that we must ascribe to the evidentiary truths of the moment. Of course, if we study the history of science, we know that such truths about the world are in a constant process of revision and that some truths about race, gender, and disability have proven themselves profoundly problematic over time. Yet, we still defer to the commands of scientific discourse in the realm of child and youth care when we seek to define our encounters by way of developmental, neurobiological, or evidence-based research.

Outside of the problematic of founding our relationships with each other on the basis of the ever-shifting world of scientific evidence, as disseminated by an increasingly dubious web of neoliberal institutional imperatives, is the issue of the ways in which norms are integrally related to a utopic outside. I am using utopia here as Foucault (1986) suggests, as a placeless place. That is to say that the norm does not actually exist. It is a statistical construction of a subject that we have never encountered and will never encounter. The developmental norm of the child or adolescent is pure fiction in terms of any lived subject. Real living subjects are not normative. They are filled with exceptions and idiosyncrasies that must be covered over or excluded (read statistically adjusted) in order to make any serious claim about their status.

That is to say, living subjects can only be produced scientifically through comparison with a conglomerate determined rather arbitrarily by imposed social narratives of time, such as age, which itself is premised in a particular social construction of Western industrial time. This comparative production of the living subject results in a nonsubject that only exists in the mind of the observer commanded into a certain field of perception by their embedded social obligations. This nonsubject constitutes a certain kind of space or a placeholder for the actual subject. This placeholder, as a mythos, stands between the actual subjects as an essential form of mediation that structures the encounter always within the confines of the existing dominant social.
This triad of subject-mythos-subject defines the dynamics of a productive dialectic premised in the relation of a third term to the dual encounter of the two living subjects in the child and youth care encounter. This third term constitutes an outside that defines the structure and form of each definitional element of the bodies involved, as well as their constitutive relation within the dominant social. In short, this third term is an ideal abstract outside that defines the parameters of what it is to be a young person and what it means to be an adult. More importantly, however, it specifically defines the ways in which the bodies engaged in the encounter fall short of the ideal abstract form determined by the third term. In these formations of the encounter, the space between is a liminal space saturated by lack. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983) describe it:

Lack is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is counterproduced as a result of antiproduction; the latter falls back on the forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack. It is lack that infiltrates itself, creates empty spaces or vacuoles and propagates itself in accordance with the organization of an already existing organization of production. The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one’s needs satisfied. (p. 28)

In this extended quote, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) lay out the mechanism by which the production of lack by the dominant social system creates a sense of scarcity where there is actually an abundance of production. This analysis of lack as a functional element in the construction of the ways we think of our work and the manner in which we organize the institutions in which we work is powerful and profound. In order to understand the full implications, however, it is important to clarify a few preliminary points.

First, the assertion we have made that language is a social set of commands implies that what we hold in common is our subjection to linguistic command. While this is certainly a significant portion of what comprises our identity and the ways in which we interact with one another, we must remember that this construction of our commonality exists only as a utopic space or placeless place. In other words, the shared common produced by linguistic social command only exists as an effect and has no actual existence independent of the living subjects it commands.
This apparently paradoxical formulation can be clarified if we remember that language is a description of the world, but not the world itself. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) put it, “Language is not life; it gives life orders” (p. 76). Language is an effect of living production and should not be mistaken as the primary element in that relation.

Life itself is what we hold in common. It is living force that is the genesis of production and it is actual not utopic. That is to say, it produces itself in actuality as what Hardt and Negri (2009) refer to as the commonwealth. Put simply, it is what we produce together, in our lived actuality, which gives us an infinite source of wealth in common. It is specifically this wealth that the dominant system of rule in our age, capitalism, endeavors, through the productions of linguistic command, to turn into the empty signifier of lack, the dollar sign. This is what is meant when Deleuze and Guattari (1983) state, “Lack is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is counterproduced as a result of antiproduction; the latter falls back on the forces of production and appropriates them” (p. 30).

What does this mean when we apply it to child and youth care work? First, we might well want to examine the ways in which lack functions personally and professionally in our perception of the world. How much are we driven by models of scarcity? How much of our perception of need is derived from our social conditioning within the neoliberal regimes of capitalist society? Do we see our interactions with the young people we encounter as driven by a sense that they lack something? Do we derive our practices out of a belief that the problems we encounter in our work are founded in something that is missing? Is our language the language of lack: neurological deficit, developmental delay, missing father figure, lack of parental control, academic deficit, attention deficit, and so on. More subtly, are we inducted into the neoliberal discourses of individual accountability that sneaks lack in through the back door by implying a lack of accountability? Or in terms of asset building are we subjecting communities to a hidden discourse of lack in determining what they need to thrive? The constructions of lack as a mode of social control are both pervasive and powerful. They are, as Hardt and Negri (2009) point out, also a profound perversion of what we truly hold in common.

This is a perversion of the common functions by reversing the relations between the productive force of life and the forms of the social produced by living subjects. All social institutions are founded and are entirely reliant on the living subjects that produce them. Without
social subjects there is no society. In this formulation, all institutions are subject to the force of the living subjects that produce them. In this, social institutions should only exist to the degree that they promote and affirm life. However, this relation can be perverted to the degree that living subjects become subjected to the social institutions they create and produce. Through the mechanisms of abstraction, life can appear to be in a dependent relation on the abstract linguistic descriptions of capitalism so that the stock market’s wellbeing becomes the most important signifier of a healthy society, while actual living beings, both human and otherwise, suffer and die without apparent consequence.

The alternative to this perversion of the common is the reassertion of what we hold in common through our mutual production. Such production, as both Marx (1972) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) point out, is rooted in the collective acts of living beings working together. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty argues that the very definition of our subjectivity is rooted in our mutuality of production. It is in the mutuality of producing who and what we imagine ourselves to be, as subjectivity, that the production of new worlds and new peoples is engaged (Marx, 1972; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Merleau-Ponty (1962) proposes that this production occurs in the encounter between bodies.

I must therefore, in the most radical reflection, apprehend around my absolute individuality a kind of halo of generality or a kind of atmosphere of “sociality.” This is necessary if subsequently the words “a bourgeois” and “a man” are to be able to assume meaning for me. I must apprehend myself from the onset as centered in a way outside myself, and my individual existence must diffuse round itself, so to speak, an existence in quality… My life must have a significance which I do not constitute; there must strictly speaking be an intersubjectivity; each of us must be both anonymous in the sense of absolutely individual, and anonymous in the sense of absolutely general. (p. 521)

In this dense and complex passage, there are a number of key points for us to consider if we are to take the question of relational child and youth care seriously. We might begin by considering that, to engage our own individuality in relation to the other, we must entertain what Merleau-Ponty refers to as radical reflection. This reflection calls upon us to acknowledge the ambiguous status of our perception in relation to the preobjective state of the body as the ground of perception. Such reflection would deny us the possibility of any form of absolute knowledge and instead refer us to a relational
form of knowledge that is produced both between bodies and in the relationship of the particular body from which our perceptions arise. This ambiguous relation that founds our sense of ourselves as individual also operates at the level of the social and the linguistic. Again, rather than founding knowledge in the world of linguistic definition, Merleau-Ponty proposes that the linguistic terms that define for me who I am by class, gender, sexuality, and so on, can only be made sense of if they are understood intersubjectively.

This notion of intersubjectivity opens a form of space between subjects, but also a space between the subject and the grounding of identity in the body itself. That is to say, that our definitions of ourselves are derived from the ambiguous relation of absolute experience, perception, and the naming of what is perceived. Merleau-Ponty tells us that this set of relations produces us within a space that is outside ourselves in the world of intersubjective relations. In this set of relations, we are founded in the absolute singularity of the body and its phenomenological preobjective experience of the world, as well as in the world of intersubjective relations that defines us in terms of the general linguistic categories of the social.

In radical reflection we can begin to apprehend the actual complexity of our relations with ourselves and the other in a way that allows for a space between that is not founded on lack, but instead on infinite relational production. Merleau-Ponty suggests that, it is through such reflection that we might come to understand our relations with other as a liberative set of encounters. “Taken concretely, freedom is always a meeting of the inner and the outer . . . we are involved in the world and with others in an inextricable tangle.”

In this liminal space between, where the inner and the outer collide in an “inextricable tangle,” there is the possibility of a realm of encounter between the social categories of youth/child and adult, the singularity of the bodies and their capacities, and the common realm of life as production. In short, this formulation allows us to propose the encounter between young people and adults as a liminal space of plenitude absent of any abstract outside third term or dialectical relation. Here, radical reflection allows us to enter a set of relations that opens the field of youth/child-adult encounter as the common per se. Our institutions are opened onto what Deleuze and Guattari (1983) refer to as desire.

Engaging the question of lack, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) tell us that desire is not derived from need, instead needs arise out of desire. Desire is not the fear of what we lack. Desire is the force that connects all things in an infinite web of production. It is “in touch with the
conditions of objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them” (p. 27).

Desire then is living force that connects the flows of living bodies in their encounters with each other as sheer capacity. This means that desire is indeterminate in form. Desire instantiates itself contingently within the necessity of a particular moment and geographical location, deriving the elements of its composition from the open capacity of all bodies in collision with each other in that place and time. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983) put it, “Desire clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way that is all the more intense because it has few needs” (p. 27).

If we use this formulation regarding desire to make sense of the encounter between bodies nominalized as youth/child/adult, we open our practices to pure creative formulation. The question shifts from remediating lack to inquiring as to what can be done with the richness of material found in the thoughts, physical capacities, and pure living force of all of the elements of the encounter itself. Instead of relying on the certainties of scientific preconfigurations of how we are to see each other, we enter the encounter with each other, open to find out what is possible. Put simply, we enter a space between knowing—a liminal space of what Deleuze (1994) has called transcendental empiricism.

For Deleuze, this way of attending to what we know is premised in the direct apprehension of our capacity to sense that which can only be sensed and not articulated through what can be represented: “difference, potential difference and difference in intensity” (p. 57). Levi Bryant (2008) points out that transcendental empiricism opens the possibility of intuition as a viable and essential category of knowledge. Such intuition, however, is not solely rooted in the affective responses of the body, but engages thought both conscious and unconscious. In this, Bryant notes, Deleuze proposes to go beyond the binary opposition of thought and being in such a way that thought no longer represents being but is instead productive of being. To make sense of this, however, we must understand that Deleuze is referring to thought and the body as a singular productive mechanism in which, to paraphrase Spinoza (2000), the mind is the thought of the body. That is to say that our consciousness is an effect of the liminal encounter our body has with other bodies.

How are we to make sense of this in child and youth care work? In what ways would the encounters that frame our work be constituted differently if we were to take sense and sensibility more seriously? Would our work more closely resemble art or dance as Krueger (1994)
has suggested? If we were to abdicate our allegiance to the negative or to lack as Foucault (1983) suggests, would we be able to engage more fully in our work without fear of burnout or compassion fatigue premised in our own sense of need and insufficiency? If we understood that we were connected to all of life as the absolute source of our individual force, would we be able to avoid what Spinoza (2000) calls the sad passions? If we were to rely less on our conscious ways of knowing and place them more directly in connective relation with our unconscious sensibilities, would we open greater flows of positive creative force?

Of course, such a way of working is in direct violation of all the prohibitions, boundaries, trainings, and evidence-based, objective-driven, funding-derived, neuro-informed structures and practices of our field and its immersion in the neoliberal hegemonic structures of our time. As such, this kind of proposal has political ramifications and possible personal repercussions for any child/youth/adult encounter approached in this fashion.

This was certainly true when Deleuze and Guattari were writing as well. It is important to note that their writing was intended to have not only philosophical implications, but direct implications for action as well. For Guattari, as a Lacanian psychoanalyst and director of a radical antipsychiatric clinic, there were clearly clinical implications as well. Their two-volume text, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, proposed an analysis of capitalism as the dominant system of rule and strategies for undermining and fleeing its apparatuses of capture and control. Among these and pertinent to our discussion here is their proposal for a form of psychotherapy they termed schizoanalysis. This form of therapeutic endeavor holds three qualities that I would argue operate at variance with our commonly held notions of what constitutes therapy or child and youth care. They will require greater exposition but in brief: (1) there is no binary relation between the individual and the collective; they are parts of the whole; (2) there is no binary relation between the conscious and unconscious; they are also parts of the whole and (3) the work is premised in the productive plenitude of desire rather than the poverty of lack.

Schizoanalysis offers us a way to think about our work without the stultifying hindrance of binary formations of lack. Instead of utopic formulations of placeless ideal places, we have a method by which we might deploy contingent assemblages of force within the liminal space that is the encounter between bodies in our work.

Deleuze and Guattari (1983) propose schizoanalysis as a series of positive and negative tasks. The first positive task Deleuze and
Guattari tell us is “discovering in a subject the nature, the formation, or functioning of his desiring machines, independent of any interpretation” (p. 322). For child and youth care workers to take on this first positive task, it is important to be sure that we understand the nature of desire here. As we have noted, this desire is not founded in lack. It is not the desire for something the subject does not have. It is instead desire for pure capacity. In practice, it is the exploration of Spinoza’s assertion that no one knows what a body can do. This implies an intensive investigation of the actual components of every encounter and the ways in which they might come together to do unexpected and unanticipated things that violate the constraints of who we think we are and what we think we are capable of doing.

Each moment is made up of what the psychoanalysts refer to as partial objects, that is, fragments of bodies, thoughts, and language nominally composed within overarching frameworks of social convention. The socially dominant composition of these partial objects is to place them within repetitive systems that make claims to totality. The composition of the body is something we possess. A body is linked to who we are as a known visual constant—a constant with certain repetitive components that makes claims to a self that can be known through photographs or mirrors or through the recognition of others. This assembling of the many components of the body, from its face, to its hair, to its sexual organs, hands, and so on, inducts us into recognizing ourselves within certain social normative configurations, such as race, gender, ethnicity, family affiliation, and even nationality. This is reinforced by the social codes of a particular historical period and geographic location.

Desire, however, opens these partial objects to the flow of life as creative force and offers the possibility of connecting these partial objects in new configuration that flee the constraints of social repetition. When we encounter both young people and our fellow workers who creatively reassemble their body through fashion, surgery, body modification, and tattoos, we are encountering the capacity of desire. Of course, each contingent assemblage of desire is fodder for social reappropriation. So tattoos, piercings, and fashion become increasingly commodified along with breast implants and other forms of surgical modification of the body. However, certain assemblages of the body—such as transgendered bodies, bodies of ambiguous race or ethnicity, and so on—remain dangerous to the dominant realm of social order. These bodily assemblages open what Deleuze and Guattari call lines of flight from the capacity to represent them within appropriable frameworks.
It is important to note, however, that the dominant social deploys lack in powerful ways to induce subjects with a sense that they are inherently a space of lack. This is a complex formulation beyond the scope of this writing, but suffice to say this is the case with female bodies, sexually transgressive bodies, and racially ambiguous bodies. The representation of such bodies, as lack, can induce a compelling need to be accepted within the representations of normativity, which raises Spinoza’s question of why we seek, so powerfully, our own servitude.

The first positive task of schizoanalysis is to work together to violate the terms of such servitude—to assist each other in discovering new and continually shifting assemblages of our own partial objects into productive machines. Machines in this context means a series of connections between objects that opens flow and leads to the capacity for unanticipated creative acts. It is important, here, that we refuse to represent such acts, except in their instantiation as an experiment in new linguistic forms that function not as a process of definition and naming, but in the use of language as a field of poetic experimentation. In this we might remember Walt Whitman’s (2001) assertion in *Song of Myself*:

The past and present wilt—I have fill’d them, emptied them. And proceed to fill my next fold of the future.

Listener up there! what have you to confide to me? Look in my face while I snuff the sidle of evening, (Talk honestly, no one else hears you, and I stay only a minute longer.)

Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)

I concentrate toward them that are nigh, I wait on the door-slab.

Who has done his day’s work? who will soonest be through with his supper? Who wishes to walk with me? Will you speak before I am gone? will you prove already too late?

In this poem we can see the ways that Whitman refuses to be captured by the social construction of a linear coherent self. His self is infinite; it is large and contains multitudes. This is the field of desire in which we wait on the door slab of the next moment, engaged in conversation not limited by social convention, because we can speak in a momentary space where the dominant social is not listening.

In this regard, the second positive task is to interrogate the ways in which “a sequence of desire is extended by a social series” that has the capacity “to cause the social to take flight through the multiplicity of holes that eat away at it and penetrate it, always coupled
directly to it... ensuring... a process into an effectively revolutionary force” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, pp. 340–341). Having refused the repetitive dominant force of social representation and sought in ourselves our own desiring force of creative assemblage, we can now return to the social and deploy its representations to the ends of our own idiosyncratic desire. We now have the capacity to ask how a social sequence can lead to revolution or flight. We cannot refuse our engagement with the social. In our work and our lives we are constantly embedded with the world of global capitalism. As Negri (1996) points out, there is no outside to capitalism; it is everywhere. The question then becomes, exploring the ways in which it fails to fully encompass the creative force that is desire. In what ways does it not account for or fully appropriate our creative capacities to build relationship and community?

The field of representation, that is, global capitalism, is in a parasitic relation with living force. It produces nothing but code and that code is built on the creative labor of living beings. There is a gap then between the creative force that is life and the speed of appropriation that is the capacity of capitalism to encode what is created. This liminal space is the space of revolutionary politics. In our work, it is the unexpected and unanticipated moments of freedom, when we apprehend that we are operating outside what we know. These are moments of sense, where our way of knowing is operating intuitively toward the creative possibilities of an interaction without regard to the overarching rules, procedures, diagnosis, age conventions, professional identities, but at the same time playing all of these into new configurations that open them up to the field of play rather than work.

Deleuze and Guattari (1983) propose schizoanalysis as just such liminal play that operates in the space between the dominating rule of the social and the creative force of life. In this way, they propose that we open our work into play, but play that is very serious in its revolutionary possibilities. The investment of desiring play, as political, means that we need to acknowledge the first thesis of schizoanalysis which is that “every investment is social, and in any case bears upon a sociohistorical field” (p. 342).

There is no possibility of a field of relational child and youth care that is not invested in the social. As a result, because the social is always political, that is, a field of power relations and contestations of force, the work of child and youth care is derived within a sociohistorical field. Any call that attempts to portray our work outside the political is both a farce and a call to complicity with the brutal systems
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of domination and control. In a field that calls for relationship as its modus operandi, each of us is by definition operating within a social field. However, if we are functioning within the theoretical parameters of schizoanalysis, this is complicated by the fact that desire is both producing us and being produced by us. That is to say, our investments, or particularities of social assemblage, are derived in the liminal space between our bodies, thoughts, and the impacts and traces of other bodies on ours that give rise to thoughts and then to capacities for action.

This is what Merleau-Ponty (1962) means when he suggests that we are not, in the first instance, the social/political categories of class that give rise to revolutionary possibility. Instead, it is the intersubjective space between bodies that anomalous behavior gives rise to acts that create the possibilities for new social affiliations such as the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. It is, however, not out of such affiliations that revolution occurs, but out of the recognition of the possibility that one could act because another has already violated the rules.

Schizoanalysis recognizes that our work with young people cannot be separated from its sociohistorical content and the inevitability of a constant reconstituting of our social world. To the degree we attempt to hold the world still and repeat those investments derived from the dominant social, we will offer little to the world to come. On the other hand, to the degree we seek to discover our investments in the anomalous encounters of bodies and their acts, the world to come is ours to engage.

To extend this world of possible form Deleuze and Guattari (1983) propose a second thesis, premised in the first, “within the social investments we will distinguish the unconscious libidinal investments of group or desire and the preconscious investments of class or interest” (p. 342). In our work, as schizoanalysts in child and youth care settings, we would investigate the ways in which we unconsciously carry forward the investments of our social identity formations. In what ways does our agency, working group, outreach center, transitional living program, or group home carry certain class investments? How are we unconsciously attempting to replicate and valorize the middle class or create justifications for the plutocracy and its impacts on wealth distribution? In what ways do we, as a group, mutually reinforce political and social agendas that actually create others within our organization through preconscious investments in ideas such as meritocracy, the importance of hierarchy and discipline, the valorization of maturity, the acceptance of profit and money as the only possible mode of exchange, and the normalization of family
structures and patterns of heteronormative sexuality? Schizoanalysis would suggest that we collectively interrogate these preconscious and unconscious social investments and seek to open them to new possibilities of institutional structure and relational practice.¹

This leads us to the third thesis of schizoanalysis, which proposes that, “the primacy of the libidinal investments or the social field over the family investment . . . the relation of the non-familial is always primary” (p. 356). In our field of child and youth care, the question of the family is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, we tend to valorize the family as a preferred social structure while, on the other, we often vilify parents and other members of the family as pathological. Here, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that we interrogate the family as social form and seek nonfamilial forms to seek the formations of desire.

Here Deleuze and Guattari are following Marx (1972), who tells us that he considers the family to be the original form of slavery. He suggests that it is with the first division of labor between men and women that the social diagram of the slave/master relationship is put into place. His collaborator Engels (2010) wrote an entire book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State delineating the close relationship between the ability to control patriarchal lines of lineage and the development of private property and the father’s control of that property. He traced how this leads to capitalism and the development of the modern nation-state. None of this is possible, he argues, without the social institution of the patriarchal monogamous family.

In his book Policing the Family Donzelot (1997) diagrams the ways in which the family has been complicit in the social reproduction of the state from the monarchies of Europe, where the fathers offered their sons for war and their daughters for the literal reproduction of the money for war, founded on the taxation of agriculture. Put in another way, the mothers and daughters produced docile bodies for use by the despot as either cannon fodder of labor. Donzelot goes on to describe how when the patriarchal family began to break down during the French Revolution, there were movements by both young people and women to operate more freely outside the rules and restrictions of the father. This movement was short-lived, however, as the new regimes of power quickly allied themselves with the emerging social sciences and turned the mothers into the vehicles for the dissemination of new rules and restrictions premised in developing notions of social, medical, and emotional hygiene. Indeed, Donzelot argues that mothers became the instrument for the new despotic rule
of what he calls the psy-complex. That is the new system for regulating our bodies and minds on the basis of theories about mental health and normal development.

The psychiatrist R. D. Laing (1999) picks this up in his work on madness and social dysfunction. He locates the family as the source of what he calls the family trance. He describes this as the way in which families indoctrinate their children in the commonsense beliefs of the ruling class to such an extent they can no longer differentiate between what they have been told about the world and the world itself. He proposes that families operating on behalf of the dominant society lull their children and themselves into a dream state in which their experience becomes secondary, always filtered through the ideas and beliefs promoted by the ruling regime. He says that if one should happen to wake up, there will be savage repercussions and severe pressure placed on the newly wakeful subject to go back to sleep.

Deleuze and Guattari (1983) argue, similarly, that the family is an agent of social reproduction and that psychoanalysis, and by extension family therapy, interferes with any possible radical or revolutionary restructuring of the existing social by having us turn everything into a family relation. They suggest that this keeps us from being able to see the broader social picture and the actual causes for what is happening in our society. A couple of examples that might be cited are the fact that we immediately turn to family structure and single mothers as problematic rather than the broader issues of the economic realities of capitalism or holding parents responsible for the appropriate social reproduction of bourgeoisie values at a time when the middle class is collapsing. Both of these illustrate the way we are distracted by familializing problems and diverting our attention from the general crisis of capitalist rule.

Hardt and Negri (2009) pick this up in their book Commonwealth. They argue that the family is one of the top three social institutions in capitalist society that corrupt the possibilities of working together for the common good. They note that the family is the main site for “collective social experience, cooperative labor arrangements, caring and intimacy” (p. 160). At the same time however, the family reproduces hierarchies and norms of gender and sexuality that are enforced both overtly and tacitly. It also promotes restrictive forms of intimacy that valorize heteronormativity and the notion that one’s affections and alliances should first be to one’s family not to the common good. It also tends to promote narcissism and individualism over altruism through placing the needs of one’s family members in front of the needs of neighbors or friends. Finally, they argue that the family is the
main vehicle for the inculcation and dissemination of private property as both a primary and fundamental belief and a physical reality.

Schizonalysis proposes that we interrogate child and youth care’s support and affirmation of the concept and practices of the family. Certainly, there must be a more interesting and less pernicious social form that we could experiment with and in doing so bring forward new social possibilities for ourselves and the young people and adults we encounter in our daily work.

Finally, the fourth and final thesis of schizoanalysis distinguishes between the “two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoiac, reactionary and facisizing pole and the schizoid revolutionary pole” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 366). In this last thesis we encounter the political polarities of lack. The ways in which we invest our thoughts and corporeal investments as force constitute in the final instance what Foucault referred to as power, which he tells us has two forms: the power over and power as what we have termed desire.

The former is premised in lack and fear. The paranoiac pole is a series that always seeks completion. It operates on the law of closure rather than extension. To do what one says one will do and no more regardless of the other’s need, is to constantly seek to close oneself off, to protect oneself from the onslaught of feared demands that may drain one. It is the law of lack and paranoia that refuses, is constantly disappointed by, and lives in resentment of what life demands.

We know this pole very well. It is the formulation of our work that constantly calls for us to protect ourselves, to never lose control, to set firm boundaries, to never take our work home, that kids need and want discipline, and that we are our own worst enemy. It encourages what Foucault (1983) refers to as the microfascisms of self-discipline:

The strategic adversary is fascism. And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini—which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively—but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. (p. xiii)

Foucault (1983) asks the questions: How do we resist the inner fascist? How do we develop practices that “rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism?” (p. xiii). This is the politics of schizoanalysis that calls upon us to work collectively within our work to develop practices and modes of reflection that drive the paranoiac fascistic impulses out of our preconscious social investments.
The schizo pole, as opposed to the fascistic pole, offers us the practices that might be deployed in such a task. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) suggest that we enter into a process of scrambling the codes of the social so as to make them unrecognizable. In this, we posit radically perverse sets of relations that flee the dominant atmospheric of capitalist logic and seek out a mobile logic of new collectivities. The ego and its centralized model of bureaucratic mediation of desire needs to be disassembled so as to set into motion the creative forces of desire in their material instantiations as acts composed of bodies collectively producing the world. The blockages of the flows of desire, constituted by the rigid deployments of representation, would be released producing ruptures and breaks “well below conditions of identity” (p. 362). This is what Foucault (1983) refers to as preferring, “what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems, believe what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic” (p. xiii).

Schizoanalysis, as a practice that opens a liminal space for new productions of youth/child/adult encounter, in the end offers a logic of love—love as desire; that is to say love as the collective assertion of the all of the capacities of life itself in every unique and idiosyncratic form. Such love is contingent upon the particularities of a historical moment and geography that calls together the specific elements available. Such love is neither predictable nor defined from the outside. Instead, it is love produced out of a collectivity of bodies defined as youth/child/adult working together to produce new worlds, new peoples.

Note

1. For examples of this see Guattari’s work at La Borde, R. D. Laing’s work at Kingsley Hall, Franco Basaglia’s work in the asylums in Italy, and the Just Therapy work of the Family Center in New Zealand.

References


CHAPTER 2

Street Analysis: How We Come Together and Apart in Localized Youth Work Peer Supervision

Scott Kouria and Jeff Smith

Introduction

“A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000, p. 2), and a subjugated group working itself out of a bind is a better friend than a supervisor trapped in a tree. This chapter is a schizoanalysis of youth work supervision. For the purposes of this chapter, the term supervision” refers to the processes that youth workers engage in when they meet in private environments to provide (as the supervisor) and receive (as the supervisee) direction and support regarding clinical issues that young people (as clients) bring into counselling settings. While we continue to take up both supervisor and supervisee roles in our professional lives, we have endeavored over the previous years to experiment in alternative practices outside of our formal work settings. This chapter is a representation and extension of those practices that we have come to call street analysis. Following Deleuze and Guattari (2000) we work with the concept of desire as a productive force and use the analytics of subject and subjugated groups as a way to analyze how desire flows within our supervisory assemblages. After providing a theoretical framework for our approach, we proceed by example in exploring the ways we have composed new forms of collegial relationality and practitioner subjectivity. We focus on the transformation of negative affects, based on a perspective of lack,
into active and productive forces of desire immanent to life itself (H. Skott-Myhre, chapter 1).

The seeds of street analysis were planted years ago during an Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000) reading group. The two of us were the only clinicians in the group and shared a set of hopes and frustrations related to our practice. Frustrated by supervision that did not adequately address our political, creative, and spiritual aspirations, we hoped to construct an alternative. Feeling separated from the lives of our clients and colleagues by real material differences and formative discourses of boundaries and professional identities, we initially set out to find more relational and politicized accounts of what supervision could be. We quickly realized, however, that there were no shortcuts past our own subjectivities and the ways we are related to each other. Our early experiments indicated to us that becoming something different than what we are is more a process than finished product.

Our street analysis experiments took place on many unsteady landscapes (sidewalks, trails, beaches, and graveyards, as well as time spent in vehicles in between) and created unique opportunities to participate in the production of desire as “...that which suddenly sweeps us up and makes us become” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 279). Our street analysis thus became transformational processes where frustrations could be turned into a constitutive force capable of composing us differently (Skott-Myhre, 2008). What we describe in this chapter is the process of two friends who have attempted to master our own weakness for identity and transcendence, and to enhance our understanding of that same weakness in our fellows. We invite you to lodge yourself in this experiment and explore which, if any, of your affects are intensified. Our main hope is that this chapter will help us connect with others engaged in projects of experimental subjectivity, praxis, and supervision.

Desiring Groups: A Conceptual Framework

Deleuze and Guattari (2000) pose desire as a constituting and generative life force underling all forms of production. Desire does not seek after something that an individual is lacking; it propels all life and precedes subjects and objects of desire. Desiring production, which Deleuze and Guattari use to unify the psychoanalytic theory of familial reproduction and Marx’s theory of social production, renders youth work supervision an issue of desire for us. We move past the hypothesis that psychic repression is different from social oppression
and also upset the notion that either of them is based on lack or scarcity. A productive view of desire, for example, helps us reject illusions of lack such as the belief that a supervisee (or client) lacks knowledge and skill which a supervisor (or clinician) can provide (for a fee). Illusions of lack, from this perspective, are fabricated and then exploited in capitalism by widening the gap between a subject and the purported objects of their desire. Desire, according to Deleuze and Guattari, instead precedes and constitutes subjects, groups, and social formations, which in turn either subjugates or increases desire’s creative potential. Creative potential is therefore primarily measured by the degree to which desire itself is freely developed by the subjects and groups through which it flows.

To go further, Deleuze and Guattari (2000) provide a normative framework that juxtaposes unconscious desire (prepersonal creative potential) to preconscious social investment—subjective beliefs, values, and aims. How unconscious desire and preconscious social investment are developed in different group formations helps us think through how we as youth workers get together and relate in particular spaces. The analysis of group formations provided by Deleuze and Guattari rests on their differentiation between “the unconscious libidinal investment of group or desire, and the preconscious investment of class or interest” (p. 343). It is in the relationship between free-flowing desire and codifying forces that the first analysis of group formations lies: to what extent can desire freely produce and to what extent do creative singularities get crushed by large aggregates and regularized through training and supervision? The second analytic is found in the relationship between unconscious libidinal investments (free-flowing desire without particular aim beyond its own expression and amplification) and the preconscious social investments of groups such as particular beliefs about practice, hopes for the future of young people, and career-oriented organizational advancement.

Preconscious social investment operates at the level of beliefs, goals, and values; and is always an investment in one form of social organization or another. Whereas unconscious desire is open ended and perpetually overflowing social formations, preconscious social investments direct flows of desire toward a defined project. Changes to the dominant codes, selections, and processes within the social, including even revolutionary projects, can still work at the preconscious level. Deleuze and Guattari (2000) state, “Preconscious revolution refers to a new regime of social production that creates, distributes, and satisfies new aims and interests” (p. 347). However, many forms of supervision have progressive ambition, for example, insuring that
social determinants such as poverty, race, and gender are accounted for when discussing the complexity of a client’s life, adhering to a particular goal subjects desire to preconscious social investment. These investments relate to class, belief, and position within a given organization and therefore can have revolutionary objectives while still repressing the creative and unpredictable flows of desire. In terms of revolutionary capacities, Holland (1999) explains,

A preconscious revolutionary break operates in the service of and with a view toward a new socius, with new aims and interests, new forms of codification or axiomatization, new forms of power. An unconscious revolutionary break, by contrast, operates in the promotion of molecular desire, subordinating molar forms to the subversive free-play of desiring-production. (p. 103)

Although unconscious desire is free flowing and open ended, it does tend to follow the beaten paths of preconscious social investment due to those being maximal avenues for development (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000). Simultaneously, however, desire is always in excess of those beaten paths and introduces creativity into a system of organization. While desire’s purpose is always expression and its own amplification, other purposes are always determined after the fact by the groups and subjects that desire constituted in the first place. In Nietzschean terms, preconscious revolutions are reactive in that they respond to current regimes, whereas unconscious revolutions, following the power principle, are active in that they go to the limit of what they can do (Holland, 1999).

Read as a preconscious investment, street analysis was a response to an illusion that something was missing in our professional work: a more complex analysis of the social and of the self, a more thorough-going critique of therapy, and a less hierarchical model of interacting. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s (2000) theory of desiring production however, we reformulated this dialectic of lack/desire as a starting point. The shift from a presupposition that we needed a stronger critical foundation for our supervision was decisive as we moved from a position of lacking what we desired to a more creative and experimental alternative. In other words, we attempted to rid ourselves of preconscious investments in order to allow desire to flow more fully through our street analysis. We stopped asking about what was missing and began examining the machines of our own desires and what they were capable of producing. Freeing ourselves fully of preconscious investment was impossible and we turned instead to Deleuze
and Guattari’s analytics of group formation to provide us with a nuanced critical vantage point.

The degrees of unconscious and preconscious investments that are made of desire provide the analytics of group formations (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000). Desire, in its partial and fragmented form, is structured within both dominant social formations as well as revolutionary groups. Whenever desire is organized along lines of investment at a preconscious level, the revolutionary capacities at best institute a new dominant norm. In therapeutic milieus, these can be theories that seem to contest dominant modes of working but inevitably become new trends to be consumed, in time, as best practices. Similarly, preconscious investments are manifest when revolutionary theories are embodied in capitalist or fascistic group formations.

Generally, the taken-for-granted codings within a given field represent the interests of the dominant groups—in our particular case psychiatry, professional bodies, and educational institutions. Preconscious revolutionary groups can compose themselves through investments in alternative social aims, coding practices, and organizations, but do not inevitably free desire from subjugation. Unconscious revolutions by contrast do not compromise desire and instead repel rigidifying group structures or coding practices. The analysis of group formations provided by Deleuze and Guattari (2000) focuses on the relationship between a group’s structure and the flows of unconscious desire rather than the group’s relation to the dominant social formations and codes. Deleuze and Guattari explain that a revolutionary group will remain a subjugated group as long as “power itself refers to a form of force that continues to enslave and crush desiring-production” (p. 348). A subjugated group, therefore, may work to dismantle the dominant regime while, or even by, usurping the productive forces of desire for its particular cause and therefore simultaneously enclosing any deviations from its new codes and aims.

Unlike a subjugated group, a subject group is revolutionary at an unconscious level and works to bring desiring production itself into the social field. A subject group develops desire by scrambling the codes of the dominant group without instituting a new regime based on a particular set of codes, beliefs, values, or investments. Importantly, however, these two group forms analyze relations and processes rather than static identities, for, as Deleuze and Guattari (2000) argue, groups are continually passing from one type of group to the other. Subject-groups are continually deriving from subjugated groups through a
rupture of the latter: they mobilize desire, and always cut its flows
again further on, overcoming the limit, bringing the social machines
back to the elementary forces of desire that form them. (p. 349)

For us, street analysis has been one way of working toward unleash-
ing unconscious desire into youth work supervision while also resist-
ing the subjugation of desire to new norms. Desire thus functioned
by assembling the streets, life forms, theory, time, and inorganic mat-
ter in new configurations without specific purpose. The only aims
we had were to invest in unconscious desire and introduce our rep-
resentations of supervision to asignifying processes that interrupted
dominant codes. We experimented by saturating our professional
with liminal personae and bodily intensities that produced us anew
on evening strolls.

Deleuze and Guattari (2004) state, “We know nothing about a
body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects
are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects,
with the affects of another body” (p. 257). Importantly, Deleuze
and Guattari, following Spinoza, understand bodies as any distinct
yet constitutively related entity that has the capacity to affect and be
affected. A body then can be a cell or a solar system, a human body or
a body of water, all of which have capacities that are expressed in rela-
tion to other bodies. We understand our ideas and subjectivities to
be products or expressions of bodily relationship rather than internal
or prior to them. Supervision and praxis hence become processes of
relating, affecting, and producing ourselves as experimental expres-
sive responses to the problems that arise between bodies within a
geography of interaction. By prioritizing bodies and affects, we are
able to rethink subjectivity as contingent upon the material, imagi-
nary, and discursive geography within which it is formed. A contin-
gent and immanent process of subjectifying frees us up from both
a repository unconscious and a strictly rational consciousness and
instead foregrounds desire as it machines fragments of the geography
(material, imaginary, and discursive) in a composition of proliferating
subjectivities, relationships, and practices.

Schizoanalysis 1: Graceless-Ending Assemblages

The therapeutic body, composed of the human and nonhuman bodies that
scatter clinical geographies, is produced, ordered, and constrained by the
temporality of the 50-minute hour and set loose on other more unpredict-
able lines such as the odor of the client’s sweat and soiled clothes, the hum
of the cheap plywood guitar that responds to the thud of old dull strings, the guttural groan that spawns a limbic line of flight, and the honk of a horn in the parking lot behind dusty old blinds. The scent of homelessness enters into composition with the honk and groan producing a memory of a bygone session in a different city. The horn sounds again, this time seeming to punctuate the 50-minute hour, and my heartbeat enters into syncopation with the clock on the wall, it speeds into a thought: how do I close this session gracefully? And in the absence of such grace, I make an announcement that we will have to resume our work next week. These human bodies, affected by the honking horn, unwashed clothing, and ticking clock are able to express particular capacities. The sounds, colors, and smells are not of another nature than the music therapist and client, but rather constitute them as a particular event. The event becomes a horn-honking-cheap-guitar-dead-stringed-homeless-heartbeat-behind-dirty-blinds-fifty-minute-hour-and-graceless-ending assemblage.

The acts of the body above have no meaning and cannot be explained through communication because, as Skott-Myhre (2009) argues, a body cannot read another body. Each collision only allows for a body to know its own immanent state of being and express its idiosyncratic capacities. The problem of transcendence arises when knowledge about therapist and client subjectivities is asserted from the outside and their capacities are ordered or constrained by concepts delivered from outside of the encounter itself. Transcendent concepts overcode, order, or otherwise organize bodies into particular predetermined subjects, rather than explore their affects. Our schizoanalytic task therefore is to get back to our own bodies and their capacities and desires as they interact with a living world immanent to them.

Subjectivity reconsidered from an immanent, relational, and geographical perspective problematizes the autonomous subject, particularly when they become recognizable in hierarchical structures such as training and supervision. A supervisor who explores, manages, supports, and dispatches the supervisee according to particular interests (ending sessions on time) and predetermined models (containment, boundaries, and consistency) exemplifies an illusion of autonomy and an application of transcendent organization and codification. A focus on bodies, relationships, and affects helps us refocus on how institutional environments and discourses organize the pure productivity of bodies into preauthorized paths and delimited vectors. For example, when a therapist consults with a supervisor about a “stuck case,” there are already arranged identities to be performed. The therapist consults the knowledgeable supervisor who, for the benefit of the absent
but implicit client, listens to the case reconstruction and orders things in improved ways. Themes from supervision revolve around clinical issues that reduce the complexity of a body responding in geography to an internalized pathology. The vice principal, the district counselor, the social worker, the clinical psychologist, the pharmacist, the youth worker, the secretary, the prescribing-methadone-family-physician, the psychiatrist, all of whom are actually present, disappear from the conversation while those who exist outside of the clinical milieu are recoded in it—the absent father, the addicted mother, the drug dealing brother, and the convict best friend. Our supervisory conversations are saturated and distorted by these characters and the relative social and psychological capital accorded them. In schizoanalytic street analysis our problem is how to get back to the bodies involved in the interaction of supervision, youth work, and clinic, and to engage an unconscious immanent to its material geography.

Eschewing transcendent formulations, our supervisory praxis becomes an experiment immanently constructed through the relationships of the bodies together in the moment of interaction, composed of the geography and ideas that spring from it. Supervision is an ill-formed solution to a misdiagnosed problem of a lacking practitioner and we are working toward the liberation of the desire (affects, intensities, and expressions) held captive by such transcendent formulations. Our goal has been to understand our own desiring machines and set them loose in particular geographies with the purpose of constructing new forms of peer relationality. Rather than getting together after a day of being with youths to consolidate our experiences and extend our theorizations, we take our work histories with us into new processes of resubjectification. On a stroll downtown we fold clinical material, our childhoods, the smells from the street, the lamppost light, and try to contain each other to only the very minimal level of consistency and rationality.

Schizoanalysis 2: Kerouac’s Rotten Liver

I’m surprised by the role that Kerouac’s rotten liver played in assisting a young person to invest in preferred relationships with substances (be that anywhere along the continuum between abstinence and life-threatening habitual use). You the reader might question the usefulness of this archaic object. I myself asked: how would such a battered object be health inducing? Since Jack already killed it, why insist on plugging it in again? Well, the answer is that on one hand I’m sentimental... about Beat prose, about my father’s connection to that lifestyle, the many fuels
that propelled that crazy machine, and the costs. On the other hand as a straight edge “helper” I covet transitional objects (based on my own object relations) to remove the shards from these youthful faces, the syringes from their arms and legs that exist within myself. I struggle with all the tweaking, sleeplessness, violence, poverty, and deceit all performed against the backdrop of needles hissing meth. But . . . that rotten liver routine is too fat, it’s too slow and old for them. These kids are too fast to make the connection. Their drugs of choice bypass organs and move directly to the brain. I’m out of sync with the movement of these substances.

During our street walk we rework age, speed, addiction, and agree that, while being a slow and beat old liver recycler surrounded by speeding youth is a psychological complex, it is not a problem in itself. The idea that a connection between the old and the young, the slow and the fast is impossible is what is problematic. The Street Analytic commitment to working affirmatively allows for a rendering of how differing speeds (slow/fast) produce a threshold that can be mutually transformative. Transformation does not require a correspondence between identification and a reading across bodies (i.e., young people do not need to know that Kerouac’s liver was in operation). The task is neither to know how to properly use Kerouac’s liver but rather to explore what plugging it in produces. De Landa (2010) writes that a component part of an assemblage (a rotten liver) can become detached from one assemblage (Kerouac’s corpse, the Beat Generation) and be plugged into another (a young person’s meth pipe, the humanistic hole in my bleeding heart, the abscess on her arm), which can produce different interactions. It was useful to extract the introjection of pipes and needles from my body (and the affect that my concern about young people’s problematic substance use produces in me), which freed me to attend to other concerns, such as providing a positive social response to a young person’s story about resisting violence.

In the course of street analysis someone asks me: “Why is the liver still rotten?” The question has historical material correlates to important people in my life and their current states of health as well as those who have died. The rotten liver is an emblem of overconsumption, death, and symbolic of my fear of mortality and decay. If it sits as an organ, as a complete whole, it is rendered less useful to assemble with other objects. As a clinically relevant complex that intrudes upon the productivity of encounters with young people, we work through it. The persons associated with my fear are fragmented into conceptual personae. Our supervisory formation explores how Kerouac’s liver links up to other objects and personae in an assemblage.
Liminal Personae

Victor Turner (1969) observed that while human relatedness is comprised of social structure, roles, hierarchy, and social status, liminality occurs when these structures are suspended. In the example above, persons, or personae, take flight from rigid social positions (therapist, youth) in a process of separation (of partial objects) and enter into liminal experiences (the schizoanalytic process) and return again (back to work the next day). While street analysis remains open to creative flows, no space is completely smooth, for example, client confidentiality continues to operate as an ethic.* This moving back and forth between structured persons and liminal personae functioned to allow desire to move between streets and sessions. Jung (1964) described the gradual suspension of ego functioning that allows the unconscious to come forth as individuation, while also emphasizing the need to return to the world and make a contribution. We used Jung’s technologies of dream interpretation and active imagination to catalyze our supervision along lines of the unconscious, while simultaneously resisting the teleos of a rigid interpretive framework. Rather than searching for the meaning of an unconscious product we asked ourselves about its functionality, “what can it do?” Instead of attempting to integrate unconscious material into a “whole self,” we asked what connections it could make across multiple social and geographical landscapes and personae.

Schizoanalysis 3: Leaving the Den of Psychoanalysis

There is a dragon deep down in this lake and Father sees a safe harbor beyond. Young folks are always in danger and a damsel is always in distress. She asks how Father would advise her on a clinical case she is struggling with. “Know your shadow” intones Father as he turns to those of us who know not our own shadows. Is it our duty to help Father overcode? Two of us brothers voice concern about decolonizing psychoanalytic practice and Father challenges us to speak about what it would look like. He says that it is important to differentiate between working a complex under the guise of decolonization, particularly for the Caucasian among us, and actual decolonizing the work as explored by Franz Fanon (2004). One supervisee talks about feeling a swell of shame move from his gut up into his throat; he attempts to speak about it but his voice is tight, slightly high pitched, strained. Parapraxis has him from the get go: “I don’t care... ah... I mean... I don’t know how to begin. Like where do we start? Working our complexes or decolonizing?
If we spend too much time working our complexes, we aren’t out working in a decolonizing way... we may be individuating ourselves and helping those out on the streets, but aren’t we still reoccupying and not repatriating (Tuck and Yang, 2012)? So how do we deal with these problems?” Father roars in response, his legs spread slightly, not quite menacing yet not in a gesture of free love either: “The depths are nothing to fear once you’ve learned how to swim with the dragon. First you work the inner, which opens possibilities for the work that needs to happen in the world... However, I dare say, at this time... those depths are no place for you.” He gestures across at the damsel who wants to care deeply about her fragile clients. “Here we must speak of a safe harbor. I hereby authorize the building of a safe harbor in this place. It’s full of goddamn savage and reckless ideas and we must find a way to anchor amidst this chaos. The two pushing for a hostile takeover of all that is sacred, may they be the first into the lake.” The brothers obey their Father and move slowly toward the lake, snickering and gibbering about this and that. “Wait and we’ll see what the coiled beast beneath teaches them,” Father growls. He turns around: “It’s too dangerous for you my love, for you I build a monument: This is a safe harbor. A place to anchor in rough seas.” With the brothers on their way to be slain by the beast (and presumably learn the proper codes), the others huddle in the Den to talk about that which is sacred: The clients, the cases, and, most importantly, the transference/countertransference. As the brothers reach the water, Father climbs atop a table in the center of the room, knocking over a vial of sandalwood tincture and, after a very brief hiss that sounds like a viper trapped in a plastic grocery bag, he loses sight of his wayward disciples. They are already neck deep in the blackening water. Tentacles tickling their white trash flesh as they plummet into the black giggling uncontrollably about Father, perversion, mortgages, humanism, desire, client conceptualization, paranoia...

By rerouting active imagination and dream work through schizoanalysis, we successfully fail to arrive at the wholeness given teleological importance by traditional Jungian psychology. The symbolic process that remains open to a dispersed unconscious takes the place of the unconscious that can be capitalized upon by individuation processors. By subjecting Jungian techniques to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2000) analysis of desire and groups, we drift between traditional clinical supervision (The Subjugated Den) and experimental street analysis supervision. By deferring teleological goals, fragments of the unconscious (strange personae, partial objects, geographies, fears) perpetually transform without end by allowing us new connections. Rather than attempting to present and organize these unconscious
fragments in consciousness—and integrate them into a whole personality—we submit our group to an unpredictable and material unconscious without interiority.

Street analysis, born of experimentations with liminality on walks in our neighborhoods, is an assemblage of supervision, personal analysis, collective unconscious, materiality, and practice theories that achieved consistency in specific geographies. Street analysis conjured proliferations of personae as our experiences of work and our own subjectivities interacted with geographies of the streets, universities, beaches, paths, and mountains upon which we do supervision. Our personae are liminal and ambiguous; they “elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space” (Turner, 1969, p. 95). Through conceptual experimentation and the liberation of fragments of our own subjectivities (Kerouac’s liver and sandalwood vials), proliferating characters (the brothers and the damsel) emerged in place of clearly defined subjects (i.e., client, supervisor, and clinician). Personae emerge from groups we belonged to over three years together, as well as experiences and relationships across the lifespan, and more broadly from the annals of settler history. These virtual characters began to take center stage over our coalesced personalities and were the material from which we could refashion ourselves before resubjectifying as acceptable subjects for the places and relationships that we work, study, and raise families in.

Our movement out of the office and into the world outside transformed the street analysis further by introducing new characters into the drama and further suspending our roles and normative forms of relating. No longer fully contained within institutions fixed on establishing safety and predictability, the process was suffused with street happenings. The cast of characters out there, the smell of piss in alleyways, the clacking heels of tourists on a night stroll, the bark of dogs guarding people’s tents and possessions in the park, sirens, and bass rumbling from cars and bars intensified our affects and fashioned our subjectivities. Street analysis also served to reconnect us with public space, as a commons for sociopolitical gathering, which is increasingly stratified by businesses, consumers, professionals, and security guards. Letting loose on the streets gave us a better sense of the lives of those we work with by day, allowing for a temporary unsettling of the hierarchies, comforts, and routines of the office that constrain transformative interaction. The streets also allowed new characters to intervene in our habits and make old habits more visible.
I’m waiting for the rest of my group on Yates and Douglas and guy from up North approaches me for the second time. “Hey man, give me another 5 bucks and I’ll leave you alone.” “I gave you $4 which was my limit. I’ve got a family and I’m the only one earning any money at home. That’s my situation. I thought I made that clear.” I’ve got the guilt about inequality—not enough guilt to give up the rest of my pocket money but enough to make me feel uneasy about my presence here. I’m a greedy settler refusing money to an Indigenous homeless man. What a sad state of affairs, being tangled up in structural violence. No matter what happens it’s a lose/lose situation but I still come out on top. Maybe he has another thought because next he balls up his fist. He swears like a wolf. I laugh like a hyena, move my leg back and wait for him to make a move. His eyes are bugging out. I’m a privileged white guy waiting for my colleagues to join me on unceded Native land. I’m well fed. My family is warm at home sleeping in clean beds. I’m sober. I have a social analysis somewhere in my memory though it’s hard to retrieve. He spits on the road. What if I fight this guy? It’s a pretty public space. I hope he doesn’t have Hep C. His cheeks have that sunken antiretroviral look. I feel sick as I contemplate how to take him out without drawing blood. The guy tells me, in a loud voice, to give him five bucks; this time his teeth look menacing. I tell him “fuck off.” I feel young. Bang! A pulse of adrenaline goes off in my heart. Then I feel weak. I take an awkward step toward the guy to clock him before he gets the upper hand on me or pulls a blade. My white face is ugly; it looms large, a colonial presence. He backs off. Walks up the road. My friend arrives on the block and the guy approaches him. My friend gives him money. I grieve the transaction. The guy comes back and apologizes to me stating that he wasn’t angry with me; it was some other guy that triggered him. We’re all a bit fucked up about it. It takes me some time to find the motivation to analyze the experience. I’m defending and thinking that maybe doing our work in the streets isn’t such a good idea. Then the rest of our crew arrives and I’m glad to be out in the city working this complex. We dive in deep and schizoanalysis folds it all together: race, class, gender, history, music, trauma, relationships, humanism, poststructuralism, response-based practice, violence, and resistance. The personae match the intensity of the conflict and we are off the hook this evening, shouting murderously about complexes that oscillate across the chasm between fascism and less organized madness. Loosening the grip on these shadow elements of our psyche and feeling that adrenaline allows for more fluid conversations in the busy week to come: new intakes, integrated case management meetings, hospital visits, and other outreach engagements.
Conclusion

Our preference for the affects and intensities of the street will keep us walking along these dark roads for some time to come. We analyze our dreams under streetlights to set off deterritorializing elements as our groups wrap themselves around the guts, brain, and bowels of the city. Walking these streets bring unexpected turns, interruptions, relationships, flows, and much more visceral intersections with social factors only abstractly present in other locals. Poverty, colonialism, homelessness, vulgarity, and addiction have a face and body which becomes less separable from our own organs out there. The cold creeps off the concrete into our sneakers and through our bones, our gaits sometimes limping and sometimes smoother. Then we settle in at a warm cafe to edit this chapter and get distracted by a familiar track on the stereo. These ebbs and flows between pain and comfort remind us of our lives: “you got shot” “yeah and I had to give up basketball,” “I’ve been at the gym all week . . . Feeling strong” “That car crash fucked you up” “that’s why I stopped martial arts,” “Here’s a recording of my band,” “This is what you need to do man, look at the affect when you talk about it.” Fragile bodies, shaped by our collisions with other bodies: bullets, telephone polls, textbooks, drugs, worksites, skateboards, fists, guitars, and wedding bands. Godless and terrified of death, we open and close topics like ventricles wanting to cover as much territory as possible while the blood flows. The hearts of our sleeves are on again off again. We listen closely one moment and fly off on a word or vocal tone the next. A discursive free fall accompanied by strange sounds, a multitude of silences, and a million tiny gestures.

Notes

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1. While confidentiality could be viewed as an institutional constraint, we have become increasingly less interested in discussing client “issues” and more focused on our own complexes, object relations, projections, and change.

References


Riddling (with) Riddled Embodiments

Nicole Land

Educator, youth, guardian, animal, counsellor, toddler, best friend, coach, and bully—bodies and embodiments assemble, congeal, and explode as the emergent and contingent matters of being and thinking with young people collide with the stringent, evidence-based rational dictates of the predominant Eurowestern machinery by which we are often taught to understand children and adolescents. In such a space, embodiments “are”—embodiments are not a thing, not an experiment, not uncertain; they are archetypes, sturdy characterizations, and firm conceptualizations of the body. Trapped in this vein of theorizing the (human) body, our ways of knowing embodiments are strong armed into clarity through traditionalist science and psychology, and are enduringly loyal to a singular, stable definition of the body. Amid such structuring of the body, embodiments exist in the midst of a highly regulated material-discursive milieu that skilfully holds embodiments at arm’s length from creativity, potentiality, and liminality.

Perhaps this act of defining embodiment through the rational and empirical imperative to hammer down, to make enduringly clear, a singular definition holds the potential to trouble all that might be the body. In a flux of materiality whereby educators become entangled with muscles, counsellors crash into crayons, and coaches collide with speed, riddling might ensnare embodiment as it flees the very structural confines that nourish it. Here, embodiment engages with the liminal, becoming experimental, enfleshed, entangled, and emplaced; it becomes local and connective, leaving behind the molarity and stability it previously rested upon.
From Spinoza to Braidotti (2013) to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), through Kirby (2011), Grosz (1994), and Barad (2007), embodiment abounds as everything from a theoretical concept and material reality to a problem to be solved and a problem solved. As we live theory, working to “weave flesh onto...theoretical bones” (Tuana, 2008, p. 194), ideas and practices of embodiment articulate themselves on an array of material-discursive (Barad, 2007) potentiality, becoming perceptible as anything from “letters of a corporeal alphabet” (Braidotti, 2011 p. 194), to microontologies (Hird, 2009), from “how we got ourselves so trapped in relation to biology” (Wilson, 2010, p. 197), toward “neither pure cause nor pure effect but part of the world in its open-ended becoming” (Barad, 2009, p. 25). Embodiment charms forward the “contributions, viscerality, leakiness, sensuality, imagination, movement, affects, fluids, relations, [and] capabilities” (Evers, 2006, p. 233) of bodily materialities as they become agential, pertinent, and forceful.

Running and reading with bodies, traversing the steeply scientific foothills of Eurowestern conceptualizations of the body, and dodging the grassy knolls of epistemological conflict that inhabit such a landscape, we might lose our footing, stumble over a perfectly placed pebble, and face plant into Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) belief that “we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body” (p. 257). Foregrounding what Buchanan (1997) calls the “Spinozoist question: what can a body do?” (p. 74), I wonder if it is not the question of a body’s affective capability that creates space for experimentation, but if, rather, there might be a (perhaps intentional) problem with the question. What if, instead of asking what a body can do, we ask what embodiment(s) might do? What if we drag Deleuze and Guattari’s question of corporeal potentiality left, such that it becomes a problem of what embodiment(s) do and how bodies might be embodied? Perhaps the friction created by this movement would warm the embodiment question to the meticulously material, performative, and intra-active theorizing of Barad, Mol (2002), Kirby (2011), and Law (2004)? Here we might interrogate what embodiment is; we might experiment with articulating local embodiment(s).

Interrogating embodiments with the question, “why do we assume that bone poses a riddle that only flesh can resolve?” (Kirby, 2011, p. 23), Kirby (2011) posits the query upon which this chapter is inaugurated. What if we rub Kirby’s notion of riddled skin and bone into the fleshy abrasions generated when Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987)
question becomes “what can embodiments do?”. If we take very seriously the productive potentiality of riddling and responding, rather than simplifying and answering, we might begin to experiment with embodiments as riddles, foregrounding the uncertainties, multiplicities, and contingencies of embodiments. If we stutter toward messy, entangled, complicated embodiments, rather than the clean renderings of the body foregrounded by a discourse-driven “ruthless linear nature of the narrative of knowledge production in research methodology” (St. Pierre, 1997, p. 179), what embodiment(s) become perceptible? If we engage in a concerted experiment to move from “research about bodies to a way of researching through bodies” (Evers, 2006, p. 230), what does embodiment become? How does embodiment become?

In engaging riddled embodiments, as this chapter endeavors to do, we carefully and experimentally foreground the following inquiry: if embodiments are riddled, what possibilities for embodiment(s) emerge? Drawing from my research with female adolescent hockey players, in which we interrogated the question “what can a hockey-body do?” using images and discussion (Land, 2014), I will think embodiment(s) with various feminist materialist scholars and new materialist philosophers, drawing their work into momentary experiments with hockey bodies. Beginning with Deleuze and Guattari, moving to Law and Kirby, then Barad, and concluding with Alaimo, I will format these moments of contact as riddles. While these engagements with embodiment might not overtly fit together in a coherent whole, the fractured, incongruent, and tangential character of this chapter is intentional. “We” emerges as a strategic theoretical choice in this chapter, where any “we” is an us, an assemblage, a collective of reader-paper-writer-word bodies recreated and reassembled in each engagement with this chapter. If we hold that embodiments are riddled, to craft experiments with embodiment into a traditionally linear argument directed at proving a truth would be to distort embodiment(s). Throughout this chapter, we will plunge embodiment(s) into the immanent flux of “nonarbitrary, nondeterministic, causal enactments through which matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is iteratively enfolded into its ongoing differential materialization” (Barad, 2007, p. 179), in an effort to experiment with embodiment(s) so that we might articulate (an) enfleshed, entangled, and emplaced riddled local embodiment(s) through the hockey bodies of female adolescent athletes.

Hockey interjects itself within this work, but less as a phenomenon and more as phenomena (Barad, 2007), as the material-discursive matterings of hockey and hockey bodies matter as material data, not
as a dictatorial conceptual formation. As such, hockey bodies are not a firm theoretical boundary, and while these experiments are local and not necessarily generalizable, they are meant to be expansive as they invite readers to inject their own work into the riddle(s) of embodiment(s). Hockey bodies matter, in this work, only in interaction, where all contact, exchange, and momentarily perceptible phenomena are ever active and made within or from the same ontological indeterminate matters (Barad, 2007). Familiarly with hockey is far from a prerequisite for engaging with this chapter; relations with, and inquisitions into, bodies emerge as the fuel for this riddle. With readers, guitar bodies, tree bodies, paint bodies, therapy bodies, and everything bodies will begin to populate these pages, injecting novel embodiments into these experiments and further riddling with embodiment. Hockey bodies, like any embodiments, are made in and with embodiments, not as a product of embodiment(s), but as an iterative mattering in the embodiment(s) that might be made possible. Hockey bodies, in collaboration with reader bodies, riddle with the question of what embodiment(s) can do, muddling this wondering not with an answer but with potentialities, liminality, alterity, and marks on bodies.

**Hearing Hockey Is a Hockey Body**

The humanistic five senses of touch, smell, sight, hearing, and taste are often the foundation of embodiment studies, with these specific sites of embodiment targeted as conduits of insight into the body. These Eurowestern five senses tie closely to biological knowledges of speaking and knowing the body. Hockey and Allen-Collinson (2007) depict “a range of sensory activities involved in sport” (p. 118). The first of these is movement, which targets “sensations emanating from organs (including the skin), ligaments, tendons and muscles” (p. 119). Then, as “perhaps the most fundamental way in which sportspeople listen is to their own embodied selves” (p. 120), the next area of focus is the aural. A third focus for embodiment research is the visual, as “sports participants see in active ways so as to make sense of [their environment]” (p. 121). Since “sport is often intimately connected with sweat and a certain kind of pungency” (p. 122), the olfactory is a fourth focus. Finally, the haptic experience is emphasized, as a “sportsperson’s touch is mainly an active one combining pressure between the sporting body, terrain and equipment” (p. 123).

While being aware of these Eurowestern conceptions of sensuality might prove valuable as we engage with embodiments, this division
and concretization of perceptive experience into five distinct categories diminishes the potentiality of any sensory integration (e.g., might athletes perform a haptic-aural movement?), but it also leaves little space for any event that might be outside the language attributed to these five senses.

Evers (2006) proposes that embodiment might be thought of as a practice of researching “through bodies in a way that does not treat biology as given but affective, liminal, moving, doing and creating” (p. 233). In this way, Evers positions biology, and the five senses, as another force amid the multiplicity of forces with which a body might interact, such that any sense or amalgamation of senses, might inform what a body can do in diverse ways in any instant. If any traditional sense is liminal, moved toward its borders, then perhaps we might imagine any one sense as fractured—for example, sight is no longer solidified sight, with any one body seeing the outside world; instead, sight becomes tangential and creative. Sight is no longer one sense, bracketed off from taste, but comes to be through and of taste and touch and the auditory. Sight becomes minor and throws itself toward an infinite, fast-moving horizon of alterity, opening space for sight to be disobedient, surprising, and productive. Thinking with Deleuze and Guattari (1987), we might imagine the becoming minor of any traditional sense, until all semblance of traditional embodied sensing is thrown into immanent flux.

How does your hockey body change if the lights go dark? What is the hearing we are invoking in this discussion? Do we not hear hockey when the lights are on? If there is a singular auditory method, to be able to hear hockey only when the lights are out implies that hearing is not present, or at least is filled with difference, when the lights are illuminated. Perhaps the hearing we are hearing is multiple? Is this hearing connective, made in the coalescing of darkness and bodies, rather than through a linear transmission of the sounds of hockey toward the human ear? Is naming what happens in the event of “hearing” with the broad swipe of Eurowestern-dictated “hearing” adequate?

If we pause to inhabit with the language that traditional scientific discourse might give us to understand hearing, hearing emerges as a strictly linear process involving a sound wave that travels to a human and transmits a neurological message down a predictable, stable pathway:

Sound waves striking the outer ear are directed down the ear canal until they hit the tympanic membrane and are converted into
vibrations. . . . These vibrations are transferred to the malleus, the incus, and the stapes, in that order. . . . As the stapes vibrates, it pulls and pushes on the thin tissue of the oval window to which it is attached. Vibrations at the oval window create waves in the fluid-filled channels of the cochlea. . . . As waves move through the cochlea, they push on the flexible membranes of the cochlear duct and bend sensory hair cells. . . . Neurotransmitter binding. . . . send[s] coded information about sound through the cochlear nerve to cranial nerve VII and the brain. (Unglaub Silverthorn, 2007, p. 350)

If we hear hockey differently, hear a differential hockey, when the lights are not bright, does such a stable notion of sensing and hearing hold merit? Is this understanding of hearing the only hearing that happens for hockey bodies? If we work to hear the body in such a way as to disrupt the stability of this scientific hearing, we can touch physical sensation “not as a fixed object but as a line of infinite extension” (Skott-Myhre, 2008, p. 16). Hearing one hockey moment is not identical to hearing (in) another hockey moment. Hearing becomes a multiplicity, as hearing becomes hearings, as various forces come together to mark iterative sounds and idiosyncratic bodily interactions that we might hear. Hearing becomes embedded in the constitution of any moment, such that the separation between outside and a hearing individual within humanistic hearing is no longer enough. A hockey body is not hearing hockey; hearing hockey is a hockey body. To name hearing as simply hearing, a molar sense, infringes on the various, and perhaps unknown, hearing that the body might be enabled to speak with if we imagined hearing as “affects and local movements, differential speeds” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 260). Hearing is an encounter, hearing is an event. To hear is more than waves vibrating in the cochlea. Hearing is made of the stuff of stapes and cranial nerves, but consists of other local forces and bodies, such that hearing might coalesce in an energized, powerful, “radical performance” (Skott-Myhre, 2008, p. 17) of its own potential.

Hearing hockey in the dark is not strictly bracketed to the auditory. Hearing is not localized to the human ear. Hearing is threaded through with the smell of touch, the taste of sight, and the sound of taste. Hearing “produces itself through lines of force that criss-cross its surface, simultaneously composing and fleeing their own composition” (Skott-Myhre, 2008, p. 16). Darkness touches the auditory; the well-dictated boundaries of sight and hearing collapse through each other, such that being able to hear hockey in this moment becomes see hearing, auditory looking. The aural marks a “contradictory and
discontinuous story” (Sermijn, Devlieger, and Loots, 2008, p. 634) in which the anthropocentric labeling and languaging of sensing implodes into “anonymous matter, [marked] by infinite bits of impalpable matter entering into various connections” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 255). Traditional hearing—and, we might imagine, all sensing—can no longer stand as a holistic or adequate language of the body. The body speaks through touch yelling, quiet smelling, impatient sight. This coming together of various forces, from both what might come to be a localized body and all the forces surrounding and making such a body, can be understood as bodily language. Such a speaking is inherently incongruous, constituted only by intermittent instances of “movement and rest, slowness and speed” (p. 253). Any sense, any “ability to detect [or speak] in pressures and textures” (Kirby, 2011, p. 133), is a “necessarily differentiated/disrupted sensory modality, not just within itself, but because its ‘own’ sense is also enlivened by an entire field of corporeal sensation” (p. 133). The language of the body becomes unpredictable, disobedient, and affective in its own corporeality. What if we hold that this fractured speaking is a speaking of the body, a screaming of a local embodiment?

In this moment, hearing as an unstable, temporal, and active force might come to be part of a body, but it no longer fits in its traditional specific bodily location. Hearing is not chained to the ear. If hearing no longer fits into the predictable puzzle of the body given to us by traditional scientific discourse and instead speaks with a fractured, riddled language of the body, a rethinking of the “whole” status of the body is required. If bodies are the difference to a stable amalgamation of sensations, organs, and carbon, then are bodies ever complete? Do bodies need well-contoured borders to be bodies?

**Multiple Anaerobic Threshold Bodies**

Physicality is often portrayed as a biologically inert matter, an “inherent, fixed property” (Barad, 2007, p. 151) of the body that is made meaningful through the laboratory equipment that brings understandings of molecular biologies as biochemically active into existence. In the milieu of sports, biochemistry is a particularly potent force on bodies. Popular imaginaries place trust in the scientist whittling away at his laboratory bench, dropping chemical reagents on fat tissue, for example, and viewing its reactions through a microscope. Through this “method assemblage” (Law, 2004, p. 38) of physiological inquiry, which both stems from and sustains the “embedded hinterland of scientific method [and] the practices it carries, [which] work to produce
a reality that is independent, anterior, definite, and singular’ (p. 37), bodies are made perceptible as an inert, docile body. Here, (hockey) bodies are quantifiable, and the matter of bodies becomes appropriated by the machine of scientific objectivity. This is the canonical scientific machine that female adolescent athletes know well.

Traditional anatomical perspectives on the body leave little room for intensive difference. The scientific hinterlands of physiology speak often of anatomical variance, but only within the language and context of its own ontologies—a body is allowed to have an extra bone, for example, but what bones might be imagined to be is held stable within these sustaining assemblages. The perceived solidity and veracity of scientific inquiry forecloses on difference, a desire-filled difference as per Deleuze and Guattari, to produce what Law (2004) calls “stories [that] help to sustain a strong perspectival and singular version of out-thereness even as they manufacture multiple realities” (p. 53). Contradicting itself, scientific supremacy assumes and at the same time helps to enact “the standard version of Euro-American metaphysics while also crafting something different” (p. 53); the study of anatomy is internally fractured and contradictory, and these discrepancies are not problematic but are generative. They open the body to difference as bodies are “crafted, assembled, as part of a hinterland” (p. 54). If bodies are made within different method assemblages, anatomy also orients itself toward the multiple. Any “inhereness and out-thereness can be, and indeed usually [is], multiple” (p. 57).

Within a traditional Canadian exercise physiology laboratory, anaerobic threshold (AT) is used to provide a training prescription for athletes. AT is firmly located within a modernist sporting assemblage, producing constrained, ordered bodies (Pronger, 2002). AT gains traction within a language of measured, commodified bodies wherein AT is translated into human practices such as swimming workouts that use the anaerobic threshold to make swimming times faster... The science becomes ‘real’ in this marriage of practice and textuality. But something valuable has been lost: namely, alternative visions of the reality of swimming and the body. These visions might prefer to construe swimming and the body not as productive, performative, linearly temporal, a resource for the professionalization of sport, but rather to make swimming play, liberation, a non-linear, perhaps spiritual, experience of the body that is worthwhile in and of itself, inaccessible to the reality of modern techno-scientific culture. (Pronger, 2002, p. 48)
Do the bodies present in AT end with the production of AT? When AT is invoked, are (hockey or training) bodies congruently completely foreclosed on by the fascist forces of a modern sporting machine? Perhaps to imagine only limited bodies within this scientific assemblage is also a violent act; perhaps this method hinterland might “manifest realities/signals on the one hand, and generate non-realities/silences . . . on the other” (Law, 2004, p. 113), where to riddle with embodiments is to riddle with alterity.

Sitting on a Monarch bicycle during a prehockey season fitness test, my body is produced as only a biochemical system that draws on both aerobic and anaerobic energy systems to sustain my feet as I pedal to exhaustion. Anaerobic, short-term energy burrows into readily available energy stores, exploding into powerful pedal strokes until these energy stores become drained and lactate is produced. Aerobic, long-term energy is more stable and lends my muscles less explosive, more sustainable power. My AT is the intersection of these two energy stores, the moment where lactate begins to accumulate within my exhausted muscles. Strapped to my face, its hard plastic edges cutting into my gums, a metabolic cart kicks out data about the rate at which I breathe and produce CO$_2$. A heart rate monitor measures the lub-dub rhythm of my heart. I’m told that the more economical I can make my movements, combined with my aerobic fitness or VO$_{2\max}$, the higher my lactate threshold and overall fitness and performance will be.

My (hockey) body is made as an AT body and only an AT body. This body is formulated as a reality, a truth, a body validated by the efficacy of scientific methods. My AT body is predictable, produced in methodological patterns sustained by the specific “practices of [a] method assemblage [that] craft[s] out-thereness by condensing particular patterns and repetitions while ignoring others” (Law, 2004, p. 113). This moment is both violent and generative. Any other bodies that might be active in this moment are made invisible, but are also enabled by the scientific hinterland that makes my AT body. The bodies not perceptible within this instant, the bodies filled with “out-thereness or absence are a set of potentials” (p. 116). The method assemblage of modern Eurowestern science might also enable assemblages that “mediate and produce entities that cannot be refracted into words” (p. 122). How might these differential methods produce bodies injected with alterity, embodiments filled with potentiality?

Lungs fervently yank oxygen into their vessels, tossing muscle fibers the energy they borrow from as they metabolize intramuscular fuel into the power that feet push against pedals with. What are
the silences, the out-therenesses of this moment, where AT is only one enacted body? What happens if we refuse to accept AT as the “real” body and instead “seek practices which might re-work imaginaries...[and] imagine coherence without consistency” (Law, 2004, p. 139)? What other bodies cohere with and through my AT body? Rewriting AT bodies as many messy bodies, bodies made of flux and unpredictability and informed by a differential ontological project, might enact bodies that hold a differential disruptive potentiality than the body prescribed by the hinterlands of a modernist sporting assemblage. Science no longer holds prescriptive supremacy over the body. Imagine a body where “the world makes us in the same process by which we make the world” (Pickering, 1995, p. 26) and where the “boundaries between our flesh and the flesh of the world we are of and in is porous” (Tuana, 2008, p. 198): AT bodies become through and of the mutability of skin, wheels, alveoli, plastic, arteries, and oxygen. The moment of AT is no longer controlled or linear because we can materialize with the otherness of the dominant scientific apparatus as lungs riddle bike tires, riddle biochemistry, riddle bone, riddle alterity, riddle tendon, riddle, riddle, riddle.

**Practice(ing) and Smoothlier SpacetimeMattering**

Free fundamentals, warm-up, conditioning, individual puck-possesion skills, team strategy and systems, conditioning to exhaustion, fast-paced and high-reward game (to deemphasize the highly competition-driven nature of the previous 50 minutes). The tried and true Hockey-Canada-mandated format (Hockey Canada, 2014) of a well-planned practice is omnipresent in the riddles of female adolescent hockey bodies. Skill building? Check. Hockey sense? Check. Fitness? Check. Fun? Oh right—that too. This practice pattern exerts its intensive potentiality to enact an ice session that is entirely linear, predictable, and ascribed to a predetermined framework of temporality(ies).

If, as Barad (2007) asserts, “intra-actions are the dynamics through which temporality and spatiality are produced” (p. 179), then thinking with hockey practice while foregrounding data bodies can trouble the traditional boundaries of physicality as well as its spatial and temporal orientation. As hockey bodies traverse the ice in the flurry of practice, phenomena are originally and forever ontologically entangled; thus, “human bodies, like all other bodies, are not entities with inherent boundaries and properties but phenomena that acquire specific boundaries and properties through the open-ended dynamics
of intra-activity” (Barad, 2007, p. 172). Practice too, as a phenomenal assemblage, is neither made nor strictly able to perform the traditional temporalities of a hockey player. Hockey bodies do more than fast and slow, forward and backward, stationary and acceleration; they are also made of and make more than these temporalities. Practice matters with temporalities and spatialities that are injected with the difference made with fundamentals, puck possession, and bag skates.

Skating matters as both motion and corporeality, productively stripped of any traditional notion of linear causality. Skating matters as we think with practice to imagine a practice that performs spacetimematterings made with differential practice temporalities. Spacetimemattering is a fractured and patterned assemblage of mattering, whereby “causal structures are stabilized and destabilized [not] . . . in space and time but . . . in the making of spacetime itself. It is through specific agential intra-actions that a differential sense of being is enacted in the ongoing ebb and flow of agency” (Barad, 2007, p. 140). Agential matter comes to matter though differential patterns of mattering that make phenomena matter, while also making matter, space, and time matter in the ongoing reconfigurings of all matter. Spacetimemattering matters through an “intra-play of continuity and discontinuity, determinacy and indeterminacy, possibility and impossibility” (Barad, 2007, p. 182); as such, practice is a spacetimemattering. The momentary temporal and spatial conditions invoked in practice are not only those made in a contemporary practice configuration; they also come to matter in that they are porous and “[teeter] on the cusp” (p. 182) of dissolving into differentially indeterminate motions, corporealities, speeds, and sequences: matterings.

Conceptualizing practice as spacetimemattering, practice becomes a “boundary-drawing practice” (Barad, 2007, p. 140), where spatiality and temporality matter differently and intentionally to produce iterative and creative spaces, temporalities, matters, and chronology latitude bodies. Amid this fluctuating material practice, bordering speeds and locales in accordance with traditional rules of separate space and matter is no longer sufficient. Both hockey bodies and the velocities and locations they perform physically strain the boundaries of spacetime(s) within the hockey-body assemblage they bring into being, while also challenging the borders of the body that such a pattern of mattering is meant to encase. Motion and position become just as contested as the bodies iteratively produced in their mattering.

If ontological indeterminacy is the flavor of matter, it stands that it is through the agential cuts at play within any moment during/with practice that spacetimemattering might participate in the cuts that
make a body perceptible with motion. In this way, a skating hockey body is no longer conceptualized as moving quickly. A body is not doing motion. Rather, bodies are motion, heavy slow quadriceps, as spacetime mattering(s) come to matter. Well-patterned, conventional agential cuts that mark speed as something performed by a human are disrupted, as the matterings that constitute body motion location matterings enter into a differential pattern of intra-activity with the spacetime mattering that constitutes this performance of a hockey body. In this disruption, motion is no longer a body moving slowly or quickly. Within the differential patterns of mattering that enact a hockey body, differential spacetime matterings matter with differential descriptions or languaging made with this spacetime mattering. Words are part of the agential phenomenal moment that is a stride or a parallel stop, iteratively made in the dynamism of a hockey body. The agential play of spacetime mattering with a practice skating hockey body foregrounds how the meaning and practice of mattering (spacetime mattering—motion, location, body) in any moment is “not [a] human-based activit[y] but [a] specific material (re)configur[ing] of the world through which boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially enacted” (Barad, 2007, p. 183).

Barad (2007) argues that “it is when the body doesn’t work—when the body ‘breaks down’” (p. 158), that the leaky nature of its created borders becomes apparent. Moving embodiment(s) is a riddle. Riddling makes clear that the traditional separation of space, time, and matter dissolves into spacetime mattering in a patterned moment of practice mattering. Spacetime matter can be seen to exert its inherent dynamism through a myriad of intra-actions, such that the body it performs is no longer consistent with the dominant intra-activity that creates an ideal spatiotemporal body or traditional performed motion. Riddling embodiments trip traditional patterns of mattering, performing a novel environment in which material-discursive constraints might be configured differently because a hockey body matters as/of spacetime mattering.

**Transcorporeal Snow-Ice**

To riddle with Alaimo (2010) is to be injected with “the immediacy and potency of all that the ostensibly bounded human subject would like to disavow” (p. 5); to riddle from a place where “‘the environment’ is not located somewhere out there, but is always the very substance of ourselves” (p. 4). Transcorporeality is the movement of all phenomena, everything, across nature, where nature is
made of the intra-activity and continual relations of exchange amid all matter. Any body is porous and to bracket a body becomes a futile practice because all membranes become threaded through with the holes of all other borders until transcorporeal exchange becomes the communicative currency of any transcorporeal body. Touching with transcorporeality and ontologically porous bodies “entails a rather disconcerting sense of being immersed within incalculable, interconnected material agencies that erode even our most sophisticated modes of understanding” (p. 17).

Ice is an anchor, a limb, and a launch point of a hockey body; it’s a chilly ankle and a bumpy puck. Ice is the crystallized performance of strong water molecules, uniquely marked by the stiff steel of the skate blades it cups. Ice is the Zamboni it brings into being, the thin coat of water that replaces its scraped and snowy surface. The fluffy, mismatched piles of abrasive snow that ice piles upon itself, made perceptible through the skate blades that skim ice’s fragile surface, are transcorporeal movement. Snow is transit, exchange, and speed. Snow is a nature-culture, a material-discursive network, both a “site of the direct application of [agency—water, pressure, scraping] . . . [and] permeable sites that are forever transformed by the substance and forces . . . that penetrate them” (Alaimo, 2010, p. 30). Snow is iteratively nourished by ice, marked perceptible by ice while also marking ice as perceptible. Snow, ice, and movement are transcorporeal motion, where even naming ice as distinctive from the snow it matters with is a fractured and transient act of mattering.

Alaimo (2010) inhabits with transcorporeality at a point of terrifying discomfort, where the fleshy human body is “substantially coextensive” (p. 125) with the risky, poisonous, and hybrid vitality of nature. Transcorporeality is intentionally and productively murky, touching a “chemically reactive” (p. 114) body that is contaminated by coextensive environmental agencies. Any body is no longer pure or protected by its own (permeable) material limits, but rather is oriented toward an immanent flux of contaminants and nature agencies. Transcorporeality is precarious, but not always in a dangerous way. Perilous exchanges might chisel at traditional “humanness,” but such an exchange might be productive. Transcorporeality is both an ethic of warning and an ethic of communicative and iterative potentiality. How might hockey bodies be made of and destroyed by the transcorporeal transit of agential matterings? If snow is the transit of transcorporeal matterings, how is snow troublesome and productive in the process and performance of a hockey body?
Frozen, soft, wet, cold, fluffy, and slippery—“matter is agency here, an agency that transforms the very stuff of the human” (Alaimo, 2010, p. 154). Snow riddles ice as ice piles snow upon itself, and the matters that make a hockey body perceptible as such are agential matters that are “permeable, emergent beings, reliant upon the others within and outside our porous borders” (p. 156). In this moment, a hockey body requires each configuration of snow as it matters on ice. A hockey body becomes more than a thigh-helmet-heart-snow-puck assemblage and matters as a moment of transcorporeal materiality(ies). This iterative hockey body relies with and makes snow. It is the material action of scraping the ice and the crystallized fluff that leaps from ice and clings to skate blades. It is the snow that sticks to socks, plastering shins with a creative pattern of chilly cottony matter. Snow is the moving farcicality of boundary making, the transcorporeal mattering of a hockey body.

With Alaimo (2010), the material agencies that Barad (2007) foregrounds matter completely to the perceptibility of a hockey body while that body always matters as more than matter, becoming iteratively and importantly made of transcorporeal matter, matter that knows no boundaries and enacts a “material world that is never merely an external place but always the very substance of ourselves and others” (Alaimo, 2010, p. 158). Alaimo touches with Barad, burrowing into the agential snow that iteratively makes ice, building on ontological entanglement and making matter matter as environmental interchange, as discursive porosity, as the intangible uncertainty of interconnection. If the material-discursive hockey body is momentarily performed by material agencies with Barad, such a body becomes even more the stuff of transcorporeal snow with Alaimo, making perceptible a hockey body as snow, where boundaries become absurd and accountable and hockey snow bodies are “always already posthuman” (p. 158).

**Riddling Embodiments**

Experimenting with the assertion that “we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 257) riddles with a body that is multiply performative and iteratively active—a continually riddled and riddling body nourished by the fractured, material-discursive, and transcorporeal matters of a productive, emplaced, and enfleshed world. Carefully touching
with the liminal flux of material wonderings that ask what Buchanan (1997) calls the “Spinozoist question: what can a body do?” (p. 74), while also radically throwing this question into an arena with riddled borders, so that we might interrogate what embodiment(s) can do, might foreground the body’s vast potentialities. This chapter inaugurated itself on a question of bodies and embodiment, wondering if it might not be the question of a body’s affective capabilities that creates space for experimentation, but if instead we might riddle with what embodiment(s) might do. By experimenting with the contested ambiguity of the body, we worked to imagine with the entangled queries of “what can a body do” and “what can embodiment(s) do,” messily mattering with differentially perceptible possibilities for embodiment(s). Thinking with the enfleshed, entangled, and emplaced local hockey bodies of female adolescent athletes, experiments carefully articulated various local embodiments while also attempting to sit with embodiment as riddled. The orienting intent of this chapter was not to formulate a hygienic, epistemologically secure theory of embodiment, but to cautiously elucidate productively imperfect, inadequate, “indistinct and . . . slippery [embodiments] without trying to grasp and hold them tight” (McCoy, 2012, p. 769).

Iteratively riddling with experimental, re-markable (Kirby, 1997), transitory, and ontologically entangled embodiments, embodiment demands thorough engagements with its material consequences and epistemological responsibilities. No longer can even a snow-drenched skate be approached as singular; rather, it is remarkable because the matters that enact its material-discursive perceptibility are in iterative flux, continually performing the indeterminacy that is ice, motion, hockey, body, me, you—agential matter. Bodies matter. As a relentlessly re-markable “specific slab of enfleshed existence” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 131), embodiments materialize, practice porosity, matter with transcorporeal flows and canonical scientific apparati, assemble as nomadic matters, touch with alterity and violence, read snow-ice, and scream with a curious language of muscular performativity. Contaminated, reflexive, atomic, and chiasmatic, bodies are iteratively performative, “implicated in the very ontology of what [they are] looking at” (Kirby, 2011, p. 133).

As we engage with embodiments, we riddle with the iterative importance of bodies. Marks are left on bodies and zigzagging material agencies inhabit nonlinear memories and temporalities. Embodiments “are neither pure cause nor pure effect but part of the world in its open-ended becoming” (Barad, 2003, p. 25). Bodies matter. Radical liminality and nomadic biologies paint with a body, ice
permeates flesh with speed, and typing fingers corrode bodily permanence. Hearing hockey is to touch the fragrance of hockey bodies, and to engage (any) embodiments at all is to riddle—where riddling is to engage with liminality, embracing the productivity of tension, impermanence, and indeterminacy, and finding fleshy nourishment in the contingent and contested riddles of embodiment.

References


This chapter explores some of the ways youth suicide and suicidality are discursively constructed by young people, academics, and professionals working in the field of youth suicide prevention. It looks to problematize some of the assumptions which underpin current mainstream suicide prevention practices in relation to young people, and to draw attention to the restrictions placed on our understanding of, and responses to, youth suicide through the rather limited (and limiting) discursive resources at our disposal when we try to “speak the truth of youth suicide” using knowledge produced by means of positivist research methods. What we are trying to do is understand how youth suicide is talked about, and what is done in relation to the issue, through a focus on language use and by critically examining the assumptions commonly made about what it is like to be suicidal, what causes suicide, and what are deemed appropriate practices of prevention. In other words, we are interested in the question, what does youth suicide prevention do? We also take up a few ideas, mostly around boundaries, thresholds, transitions, liminal experiences and spaces, drawn from anthropology, literature, education, feminist scholarship, performance studies and related fields. We aim to illuminate aspects of academic constructions of youth suicide, the expressions of first-person experiences of suicidality, and therapeutic practices with young suicidal people, not usually visible in traditional, mainstream, modernist, suicide prevention literature. In so doing we
are not endeavoring to set out a competing theory of suicide (what
it truly is, its real causes, and so on), but, instead, we are attempting
to speak in another way about suicide, to articulate ideas based on a
different set of assumptions, in the hope of instigating new conversa-
tions around the subject. We set the stage for our work by begin-
ning with the concept of liminality.

The term “liminality” derives from the Latin limen, meaning
threshold. It entered academic discourse in 1909 with the anthro-
pologist Arnold van Gennep using it as a way of signifying the transi-
tional middle phase in any rite of passage between the death of an old
social role and rebirth into a new role in society; in such a situation
the subject is in a liminal state—no longer belonging to the old world
but yet to enter the new (van Gennep, 1960).

The notion of such a “liminal phase” or “liminal state” was later
taken up by another anthropologist, Victor Turner (1967, 1969),
who argued that during “the ‘liminal’ period, the characteristics of
the ritual subject . . . are ambiguous; he [sic] passes through a cultural
realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming
state” (Turner, 1969, p. 359). According to Turner, “the attributes
of liminality or of liminal personae (“threshold people”) are neces-
sarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip
through the network of classifications that normally locate states and
positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there;
they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by
law, custom, convention, and ceremonial” (1969, p. 95). Beyond
anthropology the concept of liminality has been taken up in fields
such as performance studies (e.g., McKenzie, 2001), education (e.g.,
Cook-Sather, 2008; Meyer and Land, 2003, 2005), political anthro-
pology (e.g., Thomassen, 2009), sociology (e.g., Klein and Williams,
2012), and occasionally health and social care (Clouder, 2005; Warner
and Gabe, 2004).

In this chapter we seek to explore the utility of “liminality” as a
way of making sense of some of the unsettling, in-between, transi-
tional, chaotic, and ambiguous aspects of contemporary suicide pre-
vention theories and practices in relation to young people, aspects
often overlooked when suicide is constructed solely from within a
dominant biomedical framework (White, 2012). In order to frame
our inquiry we draw in part on Thomassen’s (2009) idea that experi-
ences of liminality by particular types of subjects (“single individuals,
social groups, or whole societies”) can be conceptualized as involving
both temporal and spatial aspects; that is, they can “involve moments
(sudden events), periods (weeks, months, or possibly years) and epochs
(decades, generations, maybe even centuries),” and can also have spatial dimensions in that liminality “can relate to specific places, thresholds, areas or zones, ‘countries’ or larger regions” (Thomassen, 2009, p. 16). With this in mind we look at how suicide has come to be, in the “West” over the last two centuries, discursively constructed as an object of medico-scientific study but is, perhaps, entering a liminal “in-between” phase as sustained critique points to the limitations of such an approach (Marsh, 2010; Webb, 2010; White and Morris, 2010) and more youth-driven, community-wide, and social justice oriented conceptualizations of suicide emerge (Kouri and White, 2014; Kral and Idlout, 2009; Reynolds, forthcoming 2015). One way to frame this change is by drawing on notions of transitions, transformations, and “troublesome knowledge.” We then explore the experiences of young people in relation to suicide and suicidality within this changing context, by thinking with a series of first-person accounts of suicidality. Specifically, we have included several excerpts from Laura Delano’s public accounts of her lived experience of suicidality and her extensive involvement with the formal mental health system in the United States over a 13-year period. She has written a detailed blog of this experience titled “Journeying Back to Self” (Delano, 2010) as part of the Mad in America website http://www.madinamerica.com/author/ldecano/. She also has her own website Recovering from Psychiatry, http://recoveringfrompsychiatry.com, which we have also drawn from (Delano, 2013). We suggest that aspects of these experiences could productively be conceptualized as “liminal,” understood in terms of transitions, thresholds, and boundaries, and read as transformative. Finally, we look to explore some of the uncertainties, ambiguities, and difficulties often present in youth suicide prevention work, experiences often overlooked in the literature and in practice.

Transitions, Transformations, and “Troublesome Knowledge” within a Disciplinary Field

Meyer and Land (2003, 2005) introduced the notion (within a pedagogical context) that “in certain disciplines there are ‘conceptual gateways’ or ‘portals’ that lead to a previously inaccessible, and initially perhaps ‘troublesome’, way of thinking about something” (2005, p. 373). By moving through such gateways or portals new ways “of understanding, interpreting, or viewing something may thus emerge” (p. 374), which are often transformative, irreversible, and integrative.
(exposing the previously hidden interrelatedness of something). “In addition,” they write, “they may also be troublesome and/or they may lead to troublesome knowledge” (p. 374), which “frequently involves the humbling of the participant” (p. 376).

They make use of the term “liminal” to describe the transitional, uncertain, in-between space/time when the “known” has been given up, but new knowledge has yet to be fully integrated, and, as Cousin (2006) suggests, this notion of liminal states may act as “a useful metaphor to aid our understanding of the conceptual transformations students undergo, and the difficulties or anxieties that attend these transformations” (p. 4). Although Meyer and Land (2003, 2005) are mostly concerned in their writings with the transformational learning processes individual or groups of students go through, we believe that their notions of troublesome knowledge, liminal states, and threshold concepts can be also used to make sense of the changes whole disciplinary fields can undergo. In relation to suicidology (the field concerned with the study of suicide and suicide prevention), certain “conceptual gateways,” and what could be thought of as “troublesome knowledge” for the field to grapple with, can be identified.

Suicide as a Historically Constituted Object of Inquiry

Youth suicide as an object of study is created through an array of interacting social forces, materialities, and expert formulations (Marsh, 2010). In other words, youth suicide is brought into being through a range of historical, social, legal, medical, media, forensic, documentation, and statistical practices. Suicidology is a social practice that is deeply rooted in the scientific tradition and is strongly influenced by psychology, medicine, psychiatry, and epidemiology (Fitzpatrick, Hooker, and Kerridge, 2014). It draws largely on a vocabulary of medical science, one of pathology, abnormality, detection, diagnoses, and treatment to describe suicide. This orientation is also used to theorize about its origins and causes, and to construct ideas as how to best prevent its occurrence. Young peoples’ experiences of suicidality are strongly shaped by the “discursive contexts” (or “regimes”) within which they constitute and reconstitute a sense of identity (Cover, 2012; Kouri and White, 2014), and the assumptions, ideas, and related practices of suicidology can exert a powerful force on those within its field of influence. In other words, “Suicidology, . . . is not only descriptive, it is evaluative. It is directed towards the prevention and control of suicide—values which are intrinsic and built
The claiming of suicide for medicine was an early-nineteenth-century event (Hacking, 1990; Marsh, 2010). In 1821, French physician and aliéniste Jean-Etienne Esquirol declared that suicide was a form of “pathologie interne” and was thus “one of the most important subjects of clinical medicine” (Esquirol, 1821, p. 213). Here new truths of suicide, based on notions of diseased interiorities (bodily and mental), were detailed for the first time. These ideas were taken up and extended throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and have come to exert a powerful effect in terms of the formation of objects, concepts, and subjects in relation to suicide, as well as on the marginalization and foreclosure of competing claims to knowledge (Marsh, 2010). Although this nineteenth-century reformulation of suicide as a question of pathology was somewhat arbitrary, it has undoubtedly been productive in terms of opening up possibilities for thought and action. One can point to the generation of multiple theories on causes and prevention; the development of practices such as observation, risk assessment and management; the formation of subjectivities such as the “suicidal patient”; and the creation of organizations such as the American Association of Suicidology (AAS) and of academic departments concerned primarily with suicide prevention as evidence of its productive powers. But it has also come to limit, to a troublesome degree, what can be authoritatively said and done in relation to the issue of suicide. As Judith Butler (2004) notes, “Certain kinds of practices which are designed to handle certain kinds of problems produce, over time, a settled domain of ontology as their consequence, and this ontological domain, in turn, constrains our understanding of what is possible” (p. 309).

The “compulsory ontology of pathology” (Marsh, 2010) within suicidology means that “authoritative knowledge” (and as a consequence research and prevention practices) is almost always founded upon dominant medical-science/psychiatric assumptions. This not only acts to restrict creative thought and action within the field, but also excludes those who draw on alternative discourses to frame experiences and to construct ideas. One thinks here of suicide attempt survivors, social justice activists, and those operating from within other disciplinary fields (e.g., anthropology) who could add so much to our understanding of suicide but who are deemed to produce knowledge insufficiently objective or rigorous to count.

By relying so heavily on such a narrow range of (positivist) methodologies, the knowledge produced within the field of suicidology
can only take us so far, and many interesting and important research questions that are worth asking are not being explored. This includes, for example, questions that pertain to meaning, values, morality, contexts, language, culture, relations of power, and discourse (Fitzpatrick, Hooker, and Kerridge, 2014). A range of critical, poststructural, and constructionist theories have been effectively mobilized in many related fields, including nursing, social work, counselling, and education, and it is somewhat surprising that the field of suicidology has shown such little appetite for pushing the boundaries of the field through greater theoretical pluralism or methodological diversity. Suicidology seems strangely resistant to the idea that there are many ways of knowing, and that questions of knowledge and knowledge production are not outside of ideology or politics.

A great deal of knowledge on the subject of suicide has been generated, and for the most part the theories and facts produced have arisen from, and supported, the assumption that suicide is pathological—that is, people who kill themselves are, in some form or other, mentally ill. But an aetiological link between mental illness and suicide remains unsubstantiated, and the empirical support for the claim that almost all people who end their lives are mentally ill rests for the most part on “psychological autopsy studies,” which have recently been critiqued for being “methodologically flawed” (Hjelmeland et al., 2012, p. 621). The identification of those at risk remains highly problematic despite decades of research (Law, Wong, and Yip, 2010), and the evidence for the effectiveness of interventions once “suicidality” has been identified is sparse (Johannessen et al., 2011; Nock et al., 2013; van Praag, 2005).

Suicidology, though, has established a somewhat self-authenticating style of reasoning that, in Ian Hacking’s (1992) terms, “generates its own standard of objectivity and its own ideology” (p. 132). Nietzsche’s (2010 [1873]) words on “seeking and finding ‘truth’” within the “realm of reason” resonate here:

When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding “truth” within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare “look, a mammal” I have indeed brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. (pp. 33–34)

Mainstream suicidology produces knowledge which is held to reveal the truth of suicide, but we would perhaps do well, following
Nietzsche, to try to understand the somewhat circular nature of the production of knowledge and truth within suicidology; to question the value of the knowledge and truths produced; as well as to show more concern as to their effects (intended or otherwise). Such an approach would undoubtedly involve confronting “troublesome knowledge” and the uneasy occupation of a liminal space between the formally taken-for-granted and newly emergent understandings. Other disciplines (e.g., education, sociology, history) appear to have successfully negotiated epistemological and ontological challenges from outside and there are a few signs that suicidology is at least aware of the need to have new voices heard within its conversations.

**Multiple Voices**

The bias toward quantitative research approaches within mainstream suicidology has historically led to the production and circulation of authoritative knowledge so far removed from the direct experiences of those who are or have been suicidal that they seem to come from a different world altogether. As David Webb (2010) describes it,

> The academic and professional discipline of suicidology strives hard to be an objective science, but in doing so renders itself virtually blind to what are in fact the most ‘substantial’ and important issues being faced by the suicidal person. To me, as someone who has lived with and recovered from persistent suicidal feelings, when I look at the academic discipline of suicidology, it feels as if the expert ‘suicidologists’ are looking at us through the wrong end of their telescope. Their remote, long-distance (objective, empirical) view of suicide transforms the subjective reality and meaning of the suicidal crisis of the self—that is, the actual suicidal person—into almost invisible pinpricks in the far distance. (p. 40)

Recently, however, steps have been taken by several organizations to include the voices of those with lived experience of suicidality in the project of suicide prevention. As one example, the AAS recently put out a press release to describe some of the ways the organization intends to engage with “people who have been suicidal.” Since the voices of those who have been suicidal have been excluded from the mainstream conversation on prevention (Webb, 2010), the AAS’s declaration that they are taking a “groundbreaking step to engage people who have been suicidal” is of interest here (AAS, 2014). They explain that AAS “is working to create a new division that will give
people with the lived experience of suicidal thinking a chance to have a stronger voice in the field of suicide awareness” (para 1). What this means in concrete terms for the organization is that “from now on, all new or renewing AAS members have the option of declaring their primary affiliation as Lived Experience/Attempt Survivors” (para 2). As further justification for this move, the president of the organization is quoted as saying “AAS is the only membership organization for the suicide awareness field, comprised of numerous subgroups including clinicians, researchers, crisis centers and survivors. It’s time to bring those who have lived the experience into the fold and out of the shadows” (para 3).

When the move to include those with experiences of suicidality is trumpeted as “groundbreaking,” it has a rather startling effect because of how powerfully it points out the historical absence of certain voices and experiences within highly regulated scientific communities and professional contexts like suicidology. While we are certainly not questioning the ethics of diversifying the voices and experiences of those who participate in the work of youth suicide prevention, and we welcome the move to formally recognize the knowledge of those with lived experience within the field of suicidology, it is interesting to pay attention to what this declared commitment does at this time. For example, how might it differentially position people and groups in particular ways (i.e., researcher, clinician, those with lived experience), such that asymmetrical relations of power are merely reproduced rather than disrupted or undermined? Who is positioned as the host (i.e., the ones at the center who are “doing the bringing” of others in) and who is positioned as the Other (i.e., the ones who are being brought into the fold) (Ahmed, 2012)? What might it mean to be “brought out of the shadows” and what does this imply about where the light is? What are the terms, processes, and norms through which those with lived experience are required to speak and act? Such questions and critical forms of analyses enable a more nuanced and complicated reading of the move to diversify and democratize suicide prevention.

The move to recognize different voices within suicidology (albeit conducted in a somewhat problematic way by one of the main suicide prevention groups) points to the broader field of suicide prevention being in transition as the modernist, medico-scientific monologue gives way a little to a more inclusive conversation on what and how we know, and what should be done, in relation to suicide. Perhaps a threshold has been crossed.
I spent most evenings in bed early, having finished all my homework well before curfew, writing poetry fueled mostly by loneliness. I wrote about feeling like I was in a detached bubble, watching the rest of the world go on around me without feeling like a part of it. I wrote about yearning for something I wasn’t sure of, wanting desperately to be somewhere I wasn’t, feeling numb and cold and unsure of how to feel alive. (Delano, 2010, Chapter 5, para 7)

The coming together of youth, suicidality, and the assumptions embedded within psychiatric and mental health services can all too often lead to young people experiencing a heightened sense of dislocation and dissonance. Instead of suicidal thoughts, feelings, and behaviors being seen as indicative of a desire to change or part of an experience of challenging upheaval (i.e., as elements of a transformational process), they are too often reduced to (static) symptoms of underlying illness, to be assessed, managed, controlled, and treated (Marsh, 2010; White, 2012). Moreover, the categories and classifications through which their “symptoms” are read are largely predetermined (e.g., DSM-V), and young people’s own unique experiences of suffering are reconceptualized through a biomedical lens which usually leads to a flattening of experience and a smoothing over of complexities and contradictions (Grant, 2011; Hornstein, 2013). This pathologizing, medicalized approach can leave young people experiencing themselves and the wider world in a more alienating, negative, and hopeless way (Delano, 2013; Webb, 2010). As Laura Delano (2010) put it,

With the snap of a finger, I was labeled and forever changed. I was now a case in a file, a category, a collection of symptoms. I walked out with a script in my hand, not sure of what had just happened. What I did know was that I felt even more alone. My entire life, with all of its good and bad and beautiful and confusing and bright and scary and exciting and emotional pieces I’d elaborately been putting together throughout my childhood, as every child does, was to be resolved with a pill. I was speechless. That evening, at dinner, I took my first dosage of the turquoise and white capsules I was to begin a relationship with. Pandora’s Box was opened. (Chapter 2, para 10)

It is not surprising that in many Eurowestern contexts, only 50 percent of youth who experience a suicidal crisis ever seek help
from a formal mental health service provider. Among those who do seek treatment, the dropout rate is very high, with half of all youth attending less than five sessions (Michelmore and Hindley, 2012). Suicidal youth are often reluctant to seek professional support for the following reasons: they believe they do not need help, perceive that the help will not be beneficial, prefer informal sources of support, and/or they have a strong motivation to be self-reliant. A study by Ranahan (2013) also raises important questions about the potential for mainstream youth suicide prevention practices to create distance between the caregiver and the suicidal person, at a time when what young people might need most is a close and enduring relational connection. Ranahan interviewed child and youth care practitioners, supervisors, and educators about working with suicidal youth. A consistent finding was the belief that once suicidality was suspected, a series of action steps would need to be activated, including a practice that Ranahan called “flooding the zone,” whereby the professionals “…overpower the likelihood of the adolescent dying by suicide by surrounding the adolescent with services and other helping professionals” (p. 144). This study surfaced important ethical considerations regarding the practice of “flooding” suicidal young people with a barrage of services, often without their input or against their own preferences. It is clear that formal mental health services or standardized crisis response strategies are not always the most appropriate, helpful, or culturally responsive approach for meeting the needs of suicidal youth.

Although the main academic suicide journals (Crisis, Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, and Archives of Suicide Research) rarely publish qualitative research (Hjelmeland and Knizek, 2010), several studies which feature the insights and voices of young people who have lived through a suicidal crisis have been published within the broad health and social care literature over the last ten years (Bostick and Everall, 2006, 2007; Everall, Altrows, and Paulson, 2006; Nolle, Gulbas, Kuhlberg, and Zayas, 2012). Such firsthand accounts point to states of suicidality more often than not arising within complex, multidimensional contexts, with intense feelings of despair, fear, confusion, contradictory emotions, and uncertainty predominating. What we can learn from these studies is that suicidal thoughts and behaviors among young people typically occur in dynamic sociocultural contexts, where individual vulnerabilities, relational identities, cultural and familial expectations, and normative discourses intersect in highly complex and conflicting ways. Young people are often faced with managing multiple and competing expectations which
can sometimes lead to intense and difficult emotions, and under certain circumstances of escalating stress, this can contribute to negative identity conclusions such as worthlessness (Everall Bostick, and Paulson, 2006) or burdensomeness (Nolle et al., 2012). As Laura Delano describes it,

By senior year, I’d created an internal void that seemed to never be filled. Pleasure began to recede into the distance, and I was left feeling either entirely empty or filled to the brim by profound sadness. I felt like I was going through the motions of life without actually living, like I was sitting in the passenger seat of someone else’s car, moving towards a destination I wasn’t sure of. (Chapter 5, para 6)

What Grant (2011) refers to as reductionistic, “stripped down” (p. 37) representations of people who are suffering stand in contrast to the firsthand accounts provided by Laura Delano, which tend to draw on a wider array of language resources and styles to convey experiences of suicidality. The more diverse and broad discursive resources drawn on here also allow for the construction of identities, understandings, and accounts of being suicidal which act as enablers for the authors to go on living. For example, Laura Delano (2013) writes,

I see my once-profound urge to die as not only the most significant consequence of my psychiatric indoctrination, but also a crucial step towards the profound realization of how much I actually yearned to live. Leading up to my suicide attempt were years of shame, guilt, and secrecy; of fake smiles and spark-less eyes; of believing so deeply that I had no agency over my “illness” that each day would just be a fight against myself; of feeling hopelessly dependent on my doctors and therapists and parents and the hospitals I kept checking myself into; of knowing no other way to understand myself than as a manifestation of psychiatric pathology; of ever-increasing iatrogenic dysfunction as one prescription became two, became three, became four, became five, while believing all along it was my “disease” causing me such turmoil; of feeling completely disconnected from myself and from the world; of finding peace of mind only after fantasizing about my death. (para 8)

Accounts of the lived experience of suicidality, like Laura Delano’s, also highlight that “being suicidal” is not a static or singular identity category. On the contrary, those who have considered and/or attempted suicide are always multiply constituted and are constantly reconstructing themselves (Rogers, 2003). It is also important to acknowledge that the categories of “suicidal persons,” “nonsuicidal
persons,” and “professionals” are themselves highly problematic for the ways in which they imply that these identity categories are final, singular, and stable, as opposed to emerging, multiple, fluid, and overlapping.

**Uncertainties and “Troublesome Knowledge” of Practitioners Engaging in Youth Suicide Prevention Practice**

In this final section we explore how suicide prevention practice and professional development for health and social care practitioners could be revitalized to include notions of “troublesome knowledge” and “threshold concepts” (Clouder, 2005; Meyer and Land, 2003, 2005, 2006; Mezirow, 2000). These concepts and processes have much to offer educators, supervisors, and student practitioners since they point to the emergent and fragile nature of learning and sense making and highlight the ways in which new understandings are always unfolding in multiple directions at once. Disruptions, impasses, oscillations, uncertainty, and liminality are prized for their pedagogical value. Specifically, they provide useful resources for educators who are charged with designing curricula for health, social care, and child and youth care practitioners, many of whom will encounter suicidal youth in their practices. They can also help us to “speak back” to the certainty and enclosed nature of standardized, evidence-based approaches to youth suicide prevention which privilege expert knowledge over young peoples’ experiences; emphasize skills and knowledge acquisition over subjectivity, values, or emotion; and assume that having certain types of knowledge about suicide will solve this complex, “wild” problem (White, 2012; White, Morris, and Hinbest, 2012).

For practitioners working with suicidal young people there is often a sense of dissonance—between the known/experienced limitations of practice (the numerous contingencies involved in assessing risk, for instance) and the certainties expressed within prevention discourse in relation to reducing suicide. Some of the challenges facing suicide prevention practitioners in reconceptualizing suicidality in a more useful/collaborative way can be framed in terms of occupying and negotiating liminal spaces. We suggest that notions such as “troublesome knowledge” and “threshold concepts” open up possibilities for transformational learning (Meyer and Land, 2003, 2006; Mezirow, 2000) in relation to youth suicide prevention work.
Threshold Concepts

As described earlier, threshold concepts can be seen as portals or gateways that can lead to previously inaccessible, often troublesome, ways of thinking about something, with potentially transformative effects on learners' understandings and identities. It is not surprising that the notion of a threshold concept has been seen as such a “pedagogically fertile and energizing topic” (Meyer and Land, 2005, p. 374) among educators working in higher education settings where the focus is on preparing practitioners for human service work. For example, Clouder (2005) has recognized “care” as a threshold concept within healthcare education. She notes that many students come to the healthcare profession out of a strong desire to provide care for others. Through their practice placements and participation in the curricula, students will generally experience a range of challenges to their preconceived, uncomplicated ideas about what it means to care. Very often they will have to confront troublesome knowledge. This could include, for example, learning that not everyone wants to be on the receiving end of their care or discovering that institutional constraints or discourses of professionalism preclude certain kinds of caring from being expressed. Such encounters with troublesome knowledge, and the loss of previously taken-for-granted ideas about what it means to care, mark the space of liminality and carry with them the potential to be transformative.

Stacey and Steckly (2012) have suggested that within mental health nursing the notion of “recovery,” especially its formulation as a dynamic and social process, meets the criteria for a threshold concept (see also Meyer and Land, 2005). Specifically, threshold concepts tend to be transformative, irreversible, integrative, and troublesome. Like the concept of “care,” the notion of “recovery” is a contested concept that has multiple meanings. For example, students may learn that some people’s experience of recovery is best facilitated by an absence of formal mental health treatment. This can sometimes be a difficult position for students (as future professionals) to grasp, and hints at the potential of recovery as a threshold concept. Students will need to reappraise their own beliefs and understandings in order to integrate the new learning. Such transformative learning often includes a conceptual and ontological shift. Stacey and Steckley suggest that there are a number of pedagogical strategies that are particularly well suited for creating the conditions for transformative learning. These include: inviting mental health service users into the classroom to narrate their own experiences of recovery; problem-based learning, group supervision; and debates.
Sharing multiple firsthand accounts with students, such as those of Laura Delano, can provide students with different and competing understandings of what it might mean to feel “cared for” or experience a sense of “recovery.” These narratives can be placed in conversation with other ideas, texts, and voices as a way to generate more richly described, and complicated accounts of caring practices. For example, Laura Delano (2010) characterizes herself as “free from Psychiatry—from psychiatric labels, psychiatric drugs, and psychiatric treatment”—and today, she writes and speaks about her experiences of psychiatric oppression and liberation and frames her activism around human rights and social justice. Another first-person perspective might show how someone else might have had a more productive engagement with these same practices. By showing that there is no single right way to engage with all suicidal youth, and by deliberately creating the conditions for students to confront their own commonsense understandings, we believe we are making room for a more nuanced, contextualized, and insightful approach to emerge. This kind of preparation for practice goes beyond mastering “inert and ritual knowledge” (Perkins, 1999, p. 11) and/or demonstrating specific behavioral competencies, to include meta-level conceptualizations, values, and transformed subjectivities (Barnett, 2012).

Threshold concepts and troublesome knowledge hold promise for transforming youth suicide prevention practice. Like “recovery” and “care,” the concept of “youth suicide prevention” is underpinned by a strong values base and carries within it the seeds of troublesome knowledge. For example, students and practitioners typically wish to alleviate another person’s suffering but at the same time, in their professional roles they are generally set up to prevent an escape from suffering through suicide. Meanwhile, depending on the practice context, “youth suicide prevention work” could take the form of fairly intrusive measures, including involuntary hospitalization, constant surveillance, and restriction of individual autonomy and self-determination (Cutcliffe and Stevenson, 2007). These prevention practices raise important questions about the ethics of standard suicide prevention strategies and confront the practitioner with troublesome knowledge. By designing professional development curricula and clinical supervision practices to engage with these messy realities and difficult questions, youth suicide prevention practitioners will be invited into a more complicated understanding of prevention work. We suggest that such transformative learning opportunities will not only leave them better equipped to face the inevitable uncertainties, ambivalence, and
liminalities that characterize the lived experience of another person’s suicidality, but invite an ongoing reflexivity about the potential for professional prevention practices to be dehumanizing and distancing (Rogers and Soyka, 2004). Laura Delano articulates this point very powerfully,

When suicide is seen as something to be prevented, honest listening—which, to me, means listening without needing to act and without needing to find an immediate answer—is deemed irresponsible or even dangerous. Doctors are trained to see preemptive intervention as the only “responsible” course of action: to quickly diagnose and ramp up “treatment,” which, of course, only further buries the designated “safety risk” in The System. This was my experience, and I went along willingly, because I believed I needed to. Never once was my urge to die seen as something meaningful, as something to be explored and faced, not “prevented”. Never once was I presented the opportunity to take the time to listen to it, or to consider that if I did, I might discover that on the flipside of my urge to die was an urge to live, just in a very different way. (para 21)

As Laura Delano suggests, suicide prevention typically en folds a broad range of practices and technologies within its purview, many of which are explicitly directed toward stopping, disallowing, closing down, controlling, and regulating young people who are constructed as “risky” or “dangerous.” As one alternative to these standardized practices of control and containment, we wonder about the productive potential of a more open and allowing stance when engaging with young people who have lost the desire to live. Might an ethos geared toward “allowing” lead to an increased range of creative possibilities and contextualized responses, many of which could produce a “preventative” effect (if “prevention” is necessarily to be the main guiding principle in this area)?

Of course, many will immediately point to the potential dangers associated with “allowing suicide,” as if by opening up space for multiple considerations for thinking otherwise about suicide, we are somehow also condoning suicide. This is not our aim. However, we do concede that the taking of one’s own life is always, already a possibility. To deny this by declaring it to be forbidden, or by restricting what people can say, think, or do about it through increasingly tighter practices of expert pronouncements, surveillance, confinement, and control, is not the kind of social world we aspire to, nor is it one that we think engages young people in the ongoing project of living.
Conclusion

Suicidology as a discipline is having to confront “troublesome knowledge” in relation to the value of the truths it produces and the utility of its prevention practices. One question we have sought to explore is whether the space available for multiple, diverse, collaborative, empathic, and compassionate thoughts and actions is reduced by constituting suicide almost solely from a language of abnormality, illness, deficit, risk, and threat. By binding our search for understanding to notions of certainty, prediction, control, and “quantifiable metrics” (Joiner, 2011), and restricting our responses to a list of prohibitions and prescriptive expert advice, we have suggested that an unfortunate consequence is that it all too often (albeit unwittingly) leads to conformity, disengagement, alienation, and anxiety (with practitioners as well as young people).

We have suggested that there is much to be gained from having a disciplinary field more open to a diversity of methodological approaches, and forms of inquiry which are participatory in nature and inclusive of multiple voices and perspectives, including those of young people themselves as well as front-line clinicians and those bereaved by suicide. There is also a need to critically engage with the language practices of suicidology. Social constructionist, feminist, discursive, and poststructuralist approaches, for example, provide tools to better understand the ways in which relations of power operate within the field, the constituting effects of the production and circulation of “authoritative knowledge,” and the problematic nature of the assumptions which underpin mainstream research and practice in relation to youth suicide. In terms of reconstituting practice, we suggest that critically engaging with the notion of “prevention” itself could be a useful endeavor. The questioning of mainstream research, theory, and practice may lead to discomfort and disquiet, but by moving beyond the “known” and “accepted” in youth suicide prevention work new ways of understanding, interpreting, and viewing the issue may emerge, and such knowledge has the potential to be transformational, leading to more positive and life affirming ways of working with young people.

Notes

1. This question was inspired by Sara Ahmed’s book, On being included: Racism and diversity in institutional life (2012), where she “follows diversity around” and asks “what it is doing.”
2. David Perkins defines this as “that which appears counter-intuitive, alien (emanating from another culture or discourse), or seemingly incoherent” (in Meyer and Land, 2003, p. 7).

3. For there was no discovery of pathological anatomy (Esquirol, 1821; Winslow, 1840), or diseased instincts or impulses (Pritchard, 1840), to support medical claims of expertise, and an aetiological link between underlying pathology and signs and symptoms of “suicidality” has been theorized in many different forms since but convincing empirical support has proved to be elusive.


References


Primarily informed by Piaget’s early twentieth-century child developmental theories, most Western early education is resolutely committed to individually focused child-centered learning. Yet, the lives of twenty-first century children are no longer defined within the boundaries of an industrial society, which situated children’s education within the family realm, separated older children into grades, and based pedagogy primarily on Western views of development. Part II begins to respond to these challenges, and simultaneously to open opportunities, by reconfiguring conceptions of childhood and pedagogy, making them relevant to the context of twenty-first century children (the rising of new global economies, the increase of digitization of everyday technology, uncertain ecological futures, concerns for sustainability, and complex colonial legacies).

By making education more relevant to our schizophrenic society, this part experiments with new paradigms and reimagines what is possible in education. The chapters not only resist binaries and divides, but also situate childhoods within entangled human and nonhuman, and cognitive and embodied issues and concerns. What is proposed in this part differs from the idealized natural worlds usually associated with Romantic Eurowestern traditions of childhood. The chapters engage with the actual, messy, unequal, and imperfect worlds real children inhabit in the Western world.
The children excitedly enter the studio and gather around the long tables covered with white paper. The chairs have been pushed away against the wall and a range of charcoal pieces have been set out inviting various compositions, movements, and collaborations. The group of four year old girls begin by making marks on the paper. As they draw the charcoal travels, spreading over the paper, covering fingers and hands; paper and skin receptive to its soft blackness. It moves between paper, fingers, hands, arms, and face, moving faster and more intensely as it becomes more noticeable what this charcoal-drawing can do.

As the events unfold charcoal becomes make-up and the children become black princesses, ride the bus to the castle, and anticipate dancing at the ball. They play with ideas of blackness, darkness, covering, hiding, concealing, being seen and not seen, becoming unrecognizable and unnoticeable, and they wonder what their mothers will say, expecting them not to notice or recognize them when they come to pick them up at the end of the day. Charcoal, child, Disney, princess, adventure, desire, anticipation, blackness, and un-recognizability play together in this charcoal-drawing game.

One girl with red hair dances in front of the camera, asking intently “Can you notice me? Can you notice me?” A little while later the rest of the children gather around asking for their photos to be taken, and take turns posing for the camera. Most of the photos are out of focus, as they can’t seem to stop moving, but the girl becomes still. There is a pause as she looks directly at the camera’s lens and momentarily assumes a serious expression. The shutter
clicks, rendering a relatively sharp image and she runs away while the educators wonder how to step into and intervene in this intense charcoal-covering-blackness-princess eruption.

Materials, objects, places, and environments are inextricably bound to experimentation. In this regard, Gilles Deleuze helps us see encounters of materials, objects, places, and humans as part of the flow of experience. In his view, we are never separate from the world; we are made up of relations; thought creates itself through encounters. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), thought is experimentation. Stories are told through it, forces are harnessed, and roles are performed.

Experimentation is a complex social-affective-political phenomenon that we might embrace in our classrooms to transform life. Experimentation opens up worlds and creates new venues for thinking and doing. It actively extends experience (Guattari, 1995; Stengers, 2005). It reveals what human and nonhuman bodies can do and produce when they encounter each other. Through experimentation we discover how something works by relations among the parts of assemblages—structures, flows, and connections. In this way we can see teaching and learning as a process of creating what Deleuze and Guattari (1996) called lines of flight. By testing new and unpredictable mixes of bodies, forces, and things, experimentation invents. The process of inquiry into the unknown is embedded in the experimentation of experience with all its unpredictable connections. Experiments are not without risk, of course. Outcomes cannot be predicted or known in advance. There is always the danger of reproducing the same, of decomposing one or more elements of the assemblage. But if we are prudent in our experimenting, we can open up worlds.

For the past three years we have worked with these ideas in a research project investigating the role of materials in early childhood education. The project included a succession of dynamic collaborative experimentations with materials such as blocks, paint, clay, paper, and charcoal, and culminated in an exhibit. We saw the exhibit as a stop (Applebaum, 1995), a moment of pause, and a gathering that would bring particular encounters and events from the project together in an experimental interplay. We were interested in what might be produced and how it could enable us to see things differently. This chapter, like the exhibit, is a kind of gathering as it brings elements of the exhibit and viewers’ responses together (Figure 5.1). It is an opportunity to pause and pay attention to regions of intensity as we continue to think through experimentation.
The Exhibit

In the gallery the photograph of the young girl is captivating. Her face, eyebrows, lips, and neck are rubbed all over from forehead to collarbone with soft, richly black charcoal, her clear blue eyes in stark contrast to the blackness. Strands of red hair partially cover her face as she stares directly at the viewer with a solemn unsmiling expression. It’s an unusual photograph in this exhibit as nearly every other photo is of children in movement, doing something. This one is a large 14” × 20” portrait of a girl looking directly at the viewer.

The photograph is one in a series of four. Around this photo are others of children drawing with chunks of charcoal on long strips of paper covering a line of tables. Charcoal marks the paper and children’s bodies, and in the arrangement of photos one can see the movement of charcoal from paper to hands to arms to faces. Charcoal plays between the children as bodies become canvas, and other materials such as small square hand-held mirrors and a row of chairs are drawn into the children’s compositions and enactments. In the background of these photographs charcoal-on-paper drawings and photographic portraits of children from other events and explorations fill the walls of the small studio that the group of children are gathered in. Each photograph, and grouping of photographs, is a matrix of many events and happenings.
Beside this grouping of photographs is a long vellum text panel. The panel draws attention to the concept of experimentation while gently floating in and out from the wall as it catches the light breeze in the room. There is a series of four videos with glimpses from children’s experimentations with paint, clay, paper, and blocks playing simultaneously, and a long wall of over a hundred closely grouped 8” × 8” square photographs.

There is a video playing at the other end of the gallery showing assembled moments and processes from the charcoal events. In the video, a larger-than-life projection filling the entirety of one wall, we see children searching in the forest for the remains of trees that had been burned long ago by fires that had raged through the forest; from a time before the children, the Centre, and the campus were a presence in this landscape. We see children gather charcoal from the old burned hollow trees, and pound, grind, sift, pour, exchange, and experiment with the black remnants. We see them draw on paper, sticks, the ground, and themselves. We see a close-up of teacher’s hands and children’s hands together under running water in the sink, two soapy brown hands washing the charcoal off two blackened white hands in the round white porcelain sink of the Children’s Centre bathroom. The video plays these particular events forward and backwards in repetition so we see black charcoal being washed on and off, inviting the viewer to wonder about these acts of gathering, covering, and uncovering.

On another wall there are photos of children sitting around a large copper fire bowl watching sticks they have collected and wrapped burn into charcoal while they sing, laugh, and joke together about their “bums burning.” Close to this is a small grouping of white clothing, two child-sized shirts, a delicate blouse, and a frilly dress, that are hung from fallen tree branches suspended from the ceiling. The clothing has been well used and is marked all over with dark smudges of charcoal. There are piles of black charcoal dust on the cement floor underneath the installation as if the clothing couldn’t hold all of the blackness and so the excess has fallen to the ground below. Over time soft traces of this charcoal begin to spread out on the gallery floor, marking the viewer’s shoes as well. The exhibit is a tangled web of intersecting material events and suggestions.

But it is the photograph of the girl that compels the viewer. Here is where they stop. Some linger in front of the image, hesitant to walk away. There is deep longing in their voices as they wonder why more early childhood centers aren’t like this and allow for experimentation and full-bodied, disorderly, and expansive engagements with
materials. Others ask if it is for sale, wanting to frame and hang it in their living room. “It’s like the girl from National Geographic” they say, referencing the memorable 1985 cover photo of the Afghan girl. A few others walk in to the gallery, stop in front of the image, puzzle over its presence in the exhibit, and walk away visibly agitated and disturbed, the encounter generating intense discussions of race, racialization, and the offensive “blackface.”

In this chapter we would like to consider these three responses. Our intent is to engage with rather than critique these responses, using them to help frame our discussion. The responses are written as selective interpretive events, not factual accounts, and are not intended to create a binary or hierarchy with one being better than others. Neither are these responses intended to be understood as a matter of individual perspective. We understand these responses to be part of experimentation, not outside of it, with all responses existing at the same time in a complex interplay of the rhizomatic and arboreal, of affect, lines of flight, representation, and the habitual. Each of the responses presented particular challenges and invitations and, in spite of the risk and the potential dangers, we are interested in what experimentation does, and what is produced or set in motion by particular materials, images, encounters, and events. Each response shows us what has been gathered through this project and exhibit, and the challenges of thinking differently as we work with experimentation.

The Romance of Experimentation

Experimentation with materials has a certain romance in early childhood as it evokes images of engaged, imaginative children getting messy as they test, try out, and experiment with what paint, clay, sticks, charcoal, and other materials can do. It evokes, as the exhibit certainly did, images and impressions of creativity, freedom of expression, divergent thinking, playfulness, flexible purposing (Eisner, 2002), and artistic invention. The exhibit offered a freshness of vision in suggesting something other than what is possible within the constraining structures of schedules, preplanned activities, and educators’ reluctance to disrupt the daily orderliness of things as is too often typical in early childhood settings. It presented a compelling and very beautiful view of children’s artistic experimentations: a curriculum animated by children’s desires, sensibilities, and lively, embodied, aesthetic experiences.

Upitis (2003) discusses enlivening schools by making attention to beauty and the arts foundational to curriculum and speculates about
qualities of curriculum that might be associated with romance. She describes these qualities as “excitement, fear, ambiguity, flexibility, uncertainty, sensuality, newness, struggle, exploration, and surprise” (p. 56). She emphasizes that these are integrally connected to artistic experience and to the qualities of teaching and learning that resist standardization and conformity. Dewey (1934) as well emphasizes the immediacy of experience and the interconnected processes of “doing and undergoing” (p. 46). According to Dewey, an artistic experience is a dynamic one of acting, responding, making, considering, creating, experimenting, forming, and transforming. There is a lively fullness of experience and affective, sensory, bodied, holistic engagements.

These things were certainly evident in the exhibit. The photographs, videos, and material traces brought charcoal, and other materials, to life as vibrant artistic experiences and events. Pausing long enough in the gallery the viewer might be able to imagine the velvety softness of charcoal on skin and sense its responsiveness as it is crushed in the hand. It would be possible to follow its movements as it was scraped from the blackened trees in the forest, collected in containers, and transformed through multiple configurations and experimentations, and perhaps as well, to imagine the smell of it burning in the firebowl with the smoky fragrance lingering on clothing and in hair. Such vibrant encounters and exchanges with materials are significant aspects of children’s artistic processes. Perhaps the worthwhileness of these kinds of engagements are too easily forgotten amid the demands of what we think early childhood curriculum, teaching, and learning should be about, and the rush of moving too quickly from one thing to another. But getting to know a material by what it does, how it moves and mutates, and being guided by the novelty, the intrigue, and the discovered complexity of the material are valuable aspects of artistic creation and children’s engagements.

Burton (2001) for instance, in a discussion on children’s artistic development, emphasizes the responsive and experimental engagements with materials so children can develop a sense of fluency with the materials and have confidence and “faith in their action with materials” (p. 35). She considers the similar ways that young children and adult artists work with materials. She describes an initial sensorial, tactile encounter, where the artist “makes a physical gesture towards the material” (p. 37) and the material responds—“it moves-fast or slowly, it resists or responds; it assumes weight, becomes rougher or smoother, denser or translucent” (p. 37).
Burton describes a back-and-forth responsiveness, a play between material and maker out of which ideas, images, and other material experiments emerge. There is a relational and empathetic relationship or dialogue (Ruozzi, 2010), involving close attentiveness to the auditory, sensory, tactile, and affective qualities of the material. Bunn (2011) discusses this at length as she describes how artists and makers work with materials through organic, generative, and responsive exchanges. An idea, image, or form is not imposed on a material, as if the material is a vehicle for meaning, rather emerges in concert with material actions. Ingold (2013) elaborates on this as he places the maker as a participant in a “world of active materials” (p. 21). He describes improvisation as a rhythmic quality of working with the ways of the world. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s (1996) ideas, he views artists and makers as itinerant wayfarers. Their work is not iteration, a repetition or representation of the world, but itineration as they join with the forces and flows of the world.

Materials are not just static bits of matter waiting for someone to do something to them, but are always already in the midst of becoming something else. Materials have their own vitality (Bennet, 2004) and we find ourselves participants in an active world of lively materials. Thus children, like artists and makers, follow materials as they work with them. They join with materials as they circulate, mix, and mutate. Clay blends into the river, a fire burns and leaves charcoal behind, paper is caught up by the wind, and paint slides and slips over surfaces. Children join and intervene in these processes, moving with materials’ flows, rhythms, and own inclinations. Every mark, gesture, and action becomes a question: What can this material do? What can it become? How can I join its becoming? And so there is an emergent dance that takes place between bodies, places, children, and charcoal, generating a richness and vibrancy of experience through sensual, sensory, tactile exchanges, and sustained engagements over time; time that is intensive, uninterrupted, and experienced as long durations—a lingering, rhythmic, and immersive sense of time that plays against pressures to structure, order, tidy up, and tidy away.

We imagine these things were present in the imaginations of educators as they gathered in the gallery, walked around the exhibit, and paused in front of the photograph of the girl with the blackened face. The emotional and sensory connections to the images of children’s experimentations evoke memories, longings, and sensations, and desire for time and space to engage in these kinds of experiences themselves. We imagine being with the photographs, videos, and material traces generated affective responses that were felt on the
skin in an embodied seeing. In this way art is an encounter with the sensible (Springgay, 2003). It has the potential to move, affect, and generate felt sensations and meanings.

Deeply felt and embodied learning, knowing through one’s hands, haptic engagements and experiences that are rich, holistic, and nurturing of body, mind, and heart are things that matter in early childhood education and certainly there is still much to do in enlivening early education in these ways. We need constant reminders not to forget the richness and generativity of sustained material encounters and inventive experimentation. Yet in the beauty, romance, and enchantment of experimentation there often is a tendency to see only the surface; that which appears to be beautiful, pleasurable, creative, and inventive while filtering out the fear, uncertainty, and struggle. There can be a tendency as well to revive familiar habits of child-centered practices and images of childhood innocence as if all there is in front of us charcoal and child, recognizing only the known and familiar, interpreting what we encounter through what we expect to find, such as an individual and autonomous child’s expressive experimentation with a material, which closes down thinking and the possibility for the new. As O’Sullivan (2006) discusses, we tend to see only what we have already seen and what we are already interested in.

Child-centered practices, “freedom” of expression, and images of naturally creative and spontaneously inventive children are strong attachments in early childhood education. While, as Stengers (2005) explains, certain things are possible because of our attachments, for instance, these attachments can lead to extended uninterrupted playful experimentations that allow children time and space to create and invent, they also limit our vision. For instance, we can see experimentation as only physical and apolitical as if things just naturally happen—the material flows and mutates and the child moves along with it in a playful responsiveness without the recognition of culture or histories, with blackness only associated with an individual child’s creativity or burned wood and the physical properties of charcoal.

In these practices, processes of racialization, for instance, become invisible as relations of power, structural injustices, and intersecting inequities (Bhabha, 1994; Mohanty, 2003; Stoler, 2008) are not elements in the conversation. What is not discussed are the discursive and material struggles in racial formation (Jiwani, 2006). From a systemic and discursive perspective, we might see how children’s racialized identities and understandings of racialization are mediated by dominant discourses in their particular social contexts. While children exert agency in what they see as desirable (e.g., what they choose
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to draw, how they choose to use charcoal), this agency is mediated and constrained by the available discourses constructing race (MacNaughton and Davis, 2009). There is no attention to the ways in which racial identities are constantly being produced anew within different and competing discourses.

Art offers us the power to be affected and to be moved—to be moved not just in emotional, sensory, and embodied ways but also from habitual perspectives and sedimented ways of being. Art has affects (O’Sullivan, 2006). These affects however are not the result of individual responses but from forces that act within complex networks and assemblages. As Davies (2014) writes, “Affects arise not from individual responses, but from the forces that pass between one being and another, creating a state of change in which something new might be generated” (p. 8).

Capturing the Beautiful (and Exotic)

In the exhibit it was the image of the girl that generated the most attention. Several visitors asked if it were for sale, wanting copies for themselves, and after the exhibit a local newspaper columnist asked if he could publish it as a provocation for what education with young children should be like. Yet an image is not just a neutral object of contemplation, and this photograph in particular was not intended as a standalone image. Things are always tangled within complex materialities, histories, and relations. Thus, there is risk in decontextualizing one element, of taking it out of its webs of connection, and trying to cut it loose and disentangle it from its messiness. Berger (1991), for instance, writes that this is the risk of the photograph—it brings stillness and silence to a moment. He argues that the violence in photography is not just that it assumes to be a copy of reality, a true record of what really happened, but that it isolates and freezes moments, removing them from the continuum of time. Yet paradoxically it is also this stillness and silence that allows one to attend more closely to the nuances of the image.

Perhaps these viewers noticed how the girl in the photograph looked back, purposefully one of the few photographs in the exhibit of a child looking directly at the camera, returning the gaze of the viewer with a seriousness of expression, giving a sense of looking and being looked at, as if asking for a response. It was also the only portrait-like photograph in the exhibit and so it stood out in its difference. To some the photograph of the girl was seen as an example of the quintessential “beautiful moment”: one child’s experimentation,
her body covered in charcoal, an utter immersion in the event. Yet for others, the attraction was not just in its reference to children’s creative adventures. Its difference, uniqueness, and blackness stood out from among the others. It was recognized as something “other than,” as a representation of “diversity.”

Recognition tends toward thinking in terms of representation, where the photograph symbolizes, identifies, or refers to something. It positions the viewer as separate from the viewed, and engages him or her in a process of making sense or meaning of what is seen. The photograph becomes an object that can be talked about, a “form of writing” (O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 15) that can be read, critiqued, and interpreted using various discourses and interpretive frameworks. For these viewers, race was visible—but as something exotic, as the Other, as different from whiteness. Perhaps we could say that an antibias or a multicultural perspective emerged through the responses of some viewers. Yet, these responses are far from innocent. Several scholars in early childhood education (Pacini-Ketchabaw and Berikoff, 2008; Vandenbroeck, 2004, 2007) remind us that multicultural and antibias approaches do not go far enough to challenge “norms” as they do not necessarily consider how pedagogies are part of governing and colonizing strategies. For example, although multicultural and antibias approaches were introduced to preserve the integrity of diverse cultures, some cultural studies scholars (e.g., Giroux, 1996) argue that the actual effects of multicultural and antibias interventions lead in the direction of assimilation. Critiques of assimilation “interrogate the structural and subjective workings of normative whiteness” (Robinson and Jones-Diaz, 2006, p. 66) embedded in such practices.

Discussions about the photograph became framed in essentialist and universalist views of culture and childhood. These views erase complexity and heterogeneity within, across, and among children, creating “others” through categories such as “exotic” (Robinson and Jones-Diaz, 2006; Vandenbroeck, 2007). Another area of contestation is how culture and race are conceptualized in these responses. Using culture or race as an analytic tool of interpretation holds several dangers. For example, if we interpret others (the exotic) as a matter of cultural difference, we risk seeing the “other” as a threat to cohesion (Inda, 2000).

While we might recognize that these responses consider some power relations (for instance, there is recognition that institutional and societal structures create and maintain injustices such as racisms), this analysis of power relations does not go far enough. Here there
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is an oversight of microinteractions, complexities, and contradictions of power dynamics (Robinson and Jones-Diaz, 2006; Vandenbroeck, 2007).

When we attend to power dynamics of race, we might begin to see race as an intersecting or interlocking with other markers of inequality, such as gender, nationality, migration, class, sexuality, ability, language, and so on (Razack, 2002). Antiracist scholars use the terms racialization and racialized to move away from an unexamined conception of race as an essential category (something exotic) toward an analytical view of assumptions about “race” and how these assumptions are fundamental to our understanding of people and their cultures (Ali, 2006; Hall, 1997). Antiracist perspectives also pay specific attention to the racial normalization and categorization that is part of society (MacNaughton and Davis, 2009). Goldberg (1993) argued that

racialized discourse does not consist simply in descriptive representations of other. It includes a set of hypothetical premises about human kinds... and about the differences between them (both mental and physical). It involves a class of ethical choices. ... And it incorporates a set of institutional regulations, directions, and pedagogical models. (p. 47)

Antiracist approaches differ from representational approaches to diversity/culture perspectives in that they re-envision identity as rational and unified (Grewal and Kaplan, 1994) and simultaneously question the often-assumed construction of racialized children as “vulnerable” and “at risk” when compared to the civilized, superior, white Euro-American citizen (MacNaughton and Davis, 2009). Instead of understanding racialized identities as natural and fixed, antiracist approaches (drawing from poststructural theoretical frameworks) see them as active, productive, ongoing, and complex. Identity is seen to be socially constructed, mobile, multiple, and always in a process of formation in relation to the social context and to others in the lived environment; identity emerges through discourse and representation (Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1997). With this approach, children are viewed as crafting mixed identities within the cultural boundaries of their communities and nation (Taylor, 2008).

Taylor (2007) showed that children’s play is not innocent; children “can and do recognize cultural difference as gendered and as racialised” (p. 147). Taylor notes that when children play they “are able to recognize the links between cultural diversity, power and belonging,
and can be cognizant players in negotiating the cultural politics of identity” (p. 147). For instance, she recounts a moment of play in the sandpit where a four-year-old boy who had just arrived to Australia from the Middle East attempted to join a group of white boys in their play. The Middle Eastern boy was rejected several times and, in one instance, he was told by one of the white boys that “he cannot play with them because he does not talk like them” and his skin is dark brown (2008, p. 201). Taylor explains how this moment is “an unambiguously racialized struggle over belonging,” not only to the sandpit where the boys are playing, but also to the early childhood center they all attend and to the Australian nation (p. 201): “Not only did the children share an understanding of their border’s selective gatekeeping function, but they had no trouble in articulating their respective racialized subject positions in terms of prevailing Australian discourses of core white and marginal nonwhite (‘brown’) cultural belongings” (p. 201). Through her illuminating examples of how children’s conversations during play are political, Taylor (2007, 2008) challenges the innocence of childhood that developmental research highlights. As our introductory narrative shows, children’s play needs to be considered within the context of nation-building discourses that position whiteness as superior and normal.

In experimentation it is impossible to think outside of representation, of how images mean, or what blackness, brownness, or whiteness represents. Images circulate in relation to other images, in relation to the viewer’s own subjectivity and ways of seeing, and in relation to contexts, cultures, and histories. Images and objects are entangled in complex semiotic webs. The point is not to do away with these semiotic entanglements, but to rupture or puncture (Atkinson, 2008) the habitual so that we might be disturbed and moved.

The Photograph as a Sticky Sign

O’Sullivan emphasizes that it is the ideas that arise from affects, the causes, and conditions of specific encounters with art that offer generative and hopeful openings. It is not only in its signification, what the images or photographs mean or represent; rather it is the affects that are carried forward that act as potentialities for new ways of thinking. He writes, “Affect has to do with the body and with thought, and with what a body-thought is capable of” (O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 39). It is the ability to be moved and to act, to affect and be affected. Hickey-Moody (2009) further notes that “to be affected is to be able to think or act differently” (p. 50). The powerful affects
of anger and confusion when looking at the photograph meant that
it could not be ignored or responded to only in light of children’s
material or physical experimentations. These acted as forces that rup-
tured the beauty and romance of experimentation. Experimentation
here stops as it becomes impossible “to escape history” (Deleuze and
Guattari, 1996, p. 111). The photograph, the image of the girl with
a blackened-charcoal face, is not static. It needs to be seen as a matrix
of multiple convergences (Ingold, 2012). Photographs “acquire lives
of their own,” connecting to different affective systems of relations.
Thus, what is important is “what they do”; “how they circulate and
move around” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 6).

Perhaps we can consider, as Ahmed (2004) does, that affects cir-
culate through the photograph. The photo thus becomes “sticky, or
saturated with affect,” or a site of tension (p. 11). The attention here is
in the production and circulation of the image and the movement and
attachment of affects. Affects around the photograph become “a form
of cultural politics or world making” (p. 12). The stickiness of the
image becomes an effect of the various histories of contact between
bodies, objects, and signs (Ahmed, 2004). Its stickiness “depends on
histories of contact that have already impressed upon the surface of
the” image (p. 90). In the exhibit, for instance, the image acts to gen-
erate resonances of “black face”—a form of entertainment based on
racist Black stereotypes. The image repeats histories, insults, colonial
debris. This does not mean that its stickiness is the property of the
image, as a semiotic reading might infer, but that it “accumulates and
affects that which it touches” (p. 91). It has effects: it not only binds
but also blocks movement (Ahmed, 2004). Ahmed speaks about how
the binding effect of an object stops it from “moving and acquiring
new value” (p. 92). The image becomes “a ‘sticky sign’ as an effect of
history of articulation, which allows the sign to accumulate value,”
namely affective value (p. 92). The image becomes an insult through
its association with other events and images, or “other forms of deri-
sion” and, simultaneously, “slow down or ‘clog up’ the movement
between objects, as other objects and signs stick to them” (p. 92).
Yet this slowing down, or stopping, must also be understood as an
essential force within experimentation.

The Stop

An exhibit, documentation of a project, or a photograph, even if only
temporarily, brings movement to a still. This becomes a problem if
we see these things as finished products, end points, or a record of
“what has happened” as it can reiterate discursive and representational readings. Yet we can also engage with an exhibit, for instance, as a kind of gathering (Law, 2004), a gathering that brings elements together in such a way that it continues to provoke and generate creative possibilities. In this way an exhibit can allow for necessary and momentary pauses so that we can be moved by joyful eruptions, troubling events, and other regions of intensity. Each “stop” (Applebaum, 1995) or gathering is a puzzle, a question, a possibility, and a productive encounter.

According to Applebaum (1995) the stop “lives in the interstices of action” (p. xi). It is an actual moment of gathering attention, a time of awareness, offering choices to remain habit bound, to repeat the known, or to explore the unknown, that which remains outside of our field of vision. There will always be more than meets the eye or, in the case of the photograph, more possibilities than we habitually bring to make sense of things. Lynn Fels (2004), engaging with Applebaum’s concept of the stop in her teaching and writing, describes the stop as “a moment of risk, a moment of opportunity” (p. 91). She writes, “The moment of the stop—perceived failings, hesitation, stumbling, transgressions, and startled recognitions—are signposts to new ways of engaging in our world(s) of embodied experience” (p. 93).

John Law (2004) proposes thinking of gatherings as allegories, bringing into presence certain things while speaking of, or narrating, absent others, making possible, through such gatherings, multiple and ambivalent ways of knowing. What is needed, he writes, is a kind of gathering that “stutters and stops, that is more generous, that is quieter and less verbal” (p. 146). By this we take it to mean gatherings that interrupt conventional significations and representations and open up to greater connectivity and complications.

We might say then that art, as well as having a representational function (after all art objects—like everything else—can be read), also operates as a fissure in representation. And we, as participants with art, as representational creatures ourselves, are involved in a dance with art, a dance in which, through careful manoeuvres, the molecular is opened up, the aesthetic is activated and art does what is its chief modus operandi. It transforms, if only for a moment, our sense of our ‘selves’ and our experience of our world. (O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 50)

In this way the exhibit was less about making sense of experimentation, generating coherent and predictable interpretations or knowledge, or settling on one preferred perspective. Rather it was
interested in pushing the boundaries of what can be experienced and in exploring “possibilities of being in—and becoming with-the world” (O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 52). In this way the exhibit becomes an event site (O’Sullivan, 2006) as it organizes productive encounters—encounters involving refusal and creation, dissent and affirmation. It does not position itself against representation, racialization, child-centered practices, in it, or outside of it, rather at an oblique angle always opening itself up to an outside and to particular histories.

The photograph in the exhibit acted as an object of dissent, a photograph that resisted easy consumption as it evoked difficult racialized histories yet played with the playfulness, inventiveness, and perceived innocence of children and the romance of experimentation. It is this stuttering that produces a hopeful account. O’Sullivan (2006) insists that dissent is important as a “simple celebration of the world can be nothing more than acceptance of the status quo and an abdication of any critical position” (p. 77). Thus, photograph was a necessary interruption. Without it the beauty and romance of experimentation would have dominated the exhibit and it would have been too easy to read it as an example of “best practice” or a reaffirmation of the autonomous, spontaneous, and naturally creative child. It was also included in the exhibit without written text directly narrating the context of these children’s experimentations. With it the photograph would primarily have been read as a representational object. As O’Sullivan (2006) insists, “An object of encounter is fundamentally different from an object of recognition” (p. 1). As an object of recognition, the photograph reconfirms what is known, it represents and acts as a mirror of something “already in place” (p. 1). Instead, inserted as a question—albeit a risky and potentially very dangerous one—it generated rich and intense conversations, increased sensitivity to complicated lines of connections, and continues to act as a provocation for our ongoing work.

**Practice as Experimentation**

Experimentation has the potential to bring life to sedimented discourses. It aims to increase our capacity to act in the world, to produce new forms of life (see O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 78), and to open up perceptions and understandings. This is always a risky endeavor. In experimentation we engage with children, materials, narratives, and situations, as they act on and act with each other, entering into complex and entangled networks and assemblages. We get to know the power, possibilities, and consequences of a material. In experimentation we
work within the tensions and ethics of listening to children’s own concerns as we attend to the things, materials, and discourses they play with—how children take the substance of their lives, including the circulating images, narratives, and ideas, and make something of them, inventing, reproducing, transforming. We are interested in what children select, what they choose as desirable, and what a material such as charcoal can bring into play. Yet experimentation is not innocent as if it only involves children’s creative inventions. It is not “free” experimentation without any obligations or responsibilities.

Nxumalo (2012) writes about experimenting as “a productive relational attunement to everyday material-discursive becoming,” in order to unsettle representational and romantic notions of “race.” She suggests paying attention to the new possibilities for grappling with “difference” that might emerge in specific assemblages—in other words, to the “relational assemblages of affects, things, and other human bodies” that “create an opening for new mutable becomings and new subjectifications” (p. 289). Experimentation, Nxumalo notes, “is a productive and creative view of difference where differences are not given entities out there, awaiting discovery” (p. 292). Experimentation, of course, is not outside of the “complexities, contradictions and multiplicities inherent in everyday life” around racialization (p. 290). It’s always unpredictable what might emerge from these intensely relational and political events. Nothing is innocent; everything is filled with contradictions, incoherencies, and risks. Nxumalo explains that we might end up in fixed identities or in molar viscosities that “create ‘sticky’ affects that fix bodies” (p. 292). There is always the risk of “normalizing Whiteness, invisibilizing its role in the constructions of difference” and when this takes place productive possibilities are blocked (p. 294). Nxumalo says that experimentation is an “affective politics” that “seeks the degrees of openness of any situation and in so doing confronts inequities on their slippery, contingent, and creative effects in everyday life” (p. 296).

In this chapter we began to experiment with the responses to the art exhibit, and particularly to a photograph that quickly became sticky. As we continue to experiment, we are appreciative of each of the responses to the photograph and the exhibit, as they have enabled us to produce new compositions. The responses, and the exhibit itself, have been for us tools for thinking, as Stengers (2005) proposes. She says that tools for thinking require that we “differentiate between what we may ask from it and what we may not” (p. 186). Thus, we are provoked to engage with each response, as artist Leah Oates (n.d.c) reminds us, only with small gestures, motions taken, sounds heard,
words spoken, images recorded, the wonder, the many confusions, the intensity of the whole moment.

**Note**

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**References**


I sit on the floor of the small classroom where the educators have made available for the children wood blocks, a wood house, a light table, and scarves. I watch as Wayne builds a long track/road with the wood blocks for his cars and trucks. He works for a long time. I am struck by how carefully Wayne works. How meticulously he creates this space for the cars and trucks that he has gathered around him. For several minutes he works with a chunky yellow jeep-type car in particular: inspecting its tires, touching its body, sending it rolling only to chase after it and then send it rolling again. Zach has now wandered into the room with small cars clasped in his hands. I remember that I have seen Zach this past week carrying cars with him regularly. Almost always it seems. The cars are grasped securely, fingers wrapped around several in each hand. I wonder about the cars. My eyes move between Zach and Wayne, the cars and the block tracks and tunnels. My early childhood training tells me that toddlers are possessive, that Zach is holding tightly to the cars because he does not want to, cannot, share them with others without some kind of adult intervention or support. But I begin to wonder if something else is going on. Are the cars being cared for, loved, in ways that I have not imagined before?

This opening narrative was generated near the start of a collaborative research study in a small urban city in Western Canada, where four early childhood educators and I explored how children, educators, and things emerge as gendered caring subjects within early childhood practices (Hodgins, 2014). This chapter engages with the question that I pose at the end of the narrative, the notion of caring
for cars. Specifically, I argue for a reconceptualized understanding of care in early childhood education that resonates with an ethic of relationality and interdependence. Drawing on the work of feminist science studies scholars, I thicken understandings of care as “an affective state, a material vital doing, and an ethico-political obligation” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011, p. 90; see also Haraway, 2008). Feminist challenges to simplified, uncontextualized, apolitical notions of care have influenced visions of pedagogy as a relational, ethical, and political endeavor (see Cameron, Moss, and Owen, 1999; Dahlberg and Moss, 2005; Dahlberg, Moss, and Pence, 2007; Moss and Petrie, 2002; Noddings, 2003/1984, 2005). Extending these pedagogies, I attend specifically to relationality and interdependency with/in the more than human.

Care is an essential aspect of early childhood education, albeit one that is often understood as an un-problematic, universal principle that educators (caregivers) know how to execute (see Thompson, 2015). However, traditional developmentalist framings of care position children’s relations with the world within exclusively human contexts, where the world and materials exist for use in children’s development. Increasingly, early childhood scholarship is questioning the materializing affects of this traditional anthropocentric view and experimenting with how humans might respond differently. The aim is to unstick human-centered accounts and strategies and to reimage pedagogy as emerging through less-than-seamless, often unequal, always imperfect human and more-than-human relatings (see Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2012, 2013; Taylor, 2013; Taylor and Blaise, 2014; Taylor, Blaise, and Giugni, 2013; Taylor and Giugni, 2012; Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2015; Taylor, Pacini-Ketchabaw, and Blaise, 2012). This chapter adds to this scholarship with an exploration of how thinking with the cars from Wayne and Zach’s classroom might help to bring a postdevelopmental and more-than-human ethic of care to pedagogy; to make our pedagogical choices and practices of the world (Haraway, 1994).

Following a diffractive methodology (Barad, 2007; Haraway, 1994, 1997; Haraway and Goodeve, 2000), I tell many stories in this chapter related to the cars in Wayne and Zach’s classroom. Leaning on the work of Barad and Haraway, my intention is to attend to the effects of differences and relationalities, “to get at how worlds are made and unmade, in order to participate in the processes, in order to foster some forms of life and not others” (Haraway, 1994, p. 65). Through my storytelling, “a fraught practice for narrating complexity” (p. 64), I pay attention to everyday small encounters, events, and relations related to children and toy cars and trace some of the
geohistorical trajectories of these events. Some of the stories I tell are written as italicized narratives that interrupt the more predictable academic writing. The aim of this layered storytelling is to act at the level of interference; offered to the reader not as “data facts” to be digested, but as provocations to add layers of meaning, challenge assumptions, and raise questions of implication and response-ability (Haraway, 2012).

I begin my storytelling by considering how Latour’s (2004) notion of matters of concern opens up possibilities for (re)imagining child-toy encounters, and how Puig de la Bellacasa’s (2011) matters of care further encourages our “engaging with their becoming” (p. 100). Following this section are several car(e) stories that I tell in my effort to performatively (re)present cars in, near and far from the classroom as matters of care, attending to some of the “webs of relatedness that compose the world” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012, p. 202). I conclude the chapter with further imaginings of how a framework of matters of care might support what Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw (2015) refer to as commonworlding practices; caring pedagogies indebted and committed to “sustainable and flourishing relations” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012, p. 198).

Turning to Matters of Cares

In my effort to think carefully and curiously with the cars in Wayne and Zach’s classroom, I am drawn to Latour’s (2004) provocation to take up the cars as matters of concern in order to get closer to them, to consider the “thinginess” or “thingy” qualities (see Latour, 1993) of the cars. Latour (2004) builds on Heidegger’s careful attention to things, to see them as rich, complicated and made from gatherings, but challenges the Heideggerian bifurcation between Thing and object (Gegenstand). “What would happen,” Latour asks, if we paid the same careful attention to ordinary, mundane, “routine or boring” objects (p. 234)? For Latour (2008), considering “the whole machinery” (p. 39) of who and what participate in making and maintaining an object’s existence is how matters of fact (indisputable and simply there) become matters of concern. As matters of concern, a very different kind of attention to materials—in this case to toy cars—emerges in early childhood classrooms: an attention to their assemblies and assemblages. Toy cars then cannot simply be understood matter-of-factly as materials in/for the classroom, home or playground, isolated from any agency and socio-political-techno-historical context, there for children and their development. As matters of concern, toy cars are
always already assembled\(^1\) with a host of other human and nonhuman participants: metal, plastic, machinery, factories, soil, air, water, workers, players, drivers, desire, economies, neoliberalism.

Puig de la Bellacasa (2011) offers an extension of Latour’s matters of concern with her proposal of matters of care—not to replace “concern at the heart of the politics of things” (p. 89), but to thicken the vision (and consequent action). For Puig de la Bellacasa, the use of the word concern (instead of fact) brings “connotations of trouble, worry and care” (p. 87). But the word care, she explains, pushes more toward “a notion of material doing” (p. 90). Drawing on a feminist vision of care that “engages persistent forms of exclusion, power and domination” (p. 91), attending to matters of care adds layers of/to concern—“who will do the work of care, as well as how to do it and for whom” (pp. 91–92, italics in original)? In her words,

As is the case with most feminist attempts to re-affect the objectified world, this way of knowing/caring in our staging of things relates to a politics of knowledge, in that it generates possibilities for other ways of relating and living, it connects things that are not supposed to reach across the bifurcation of consciousness, and transforms the ethico-political and affective perception of things by the way we represent them. (p. 99)

For both Latour and Puig de la Bellacasa, the staging of things matters. Toy cars like the ones in Wayne and Zach’s classroom are typically represented in early childhood discourses with/in developmental and gendered logics—their reach and purposefulness is narrowly recognized and described (for more see Hodgins, 2014). Cars as matters of fact in early childhood are detangled from their ethico-political dimensions. Cars as matters of care attend not only to their assemblies and assemblages, but to their affective dimensions as well. This is not a matter of simply considering how children feel about the cars they engage with. Drawing on Smith (1997), Puig de la Bellacasa (2011) argues for the inclusion of the affective dimensions, including the researcher’s (and I add educator’s) experience, to how “a gathering/thing/issue is constructed and holds together” (p. 88). With Puig de la Bellacasa’s conceptualization of matters of care, in the sections that follow, I tell several car(e) stories. I work to “follow lines of surprising connections” and offer several car(e) stories as “situated in crowded worlds” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012, p. 202). Drawing on a “non-idealized vision of care” and a feminist attentiveness to who does care, how, and for whom, I trace some of the webs of relatedness
in relation to cars to consider what new trajectories emerge through reaffecting the cars in the classroom (p. 197).

**CarTouche**

A small table in the corner of the room houses two children. Blocks-as-tracks laid on the carpeted floor lead up to this “dragon cave” where two boys are crouched, knees bent under bellies, heads resting on the floor. Several small toy cars are tucked under one of the boy’s legs. He rests atop the cars much to my eye like a mama bird sitting on her eggs in a nest. At various times the cars under his legs are checked on, moved a little, touched briefly, but remaining tucked (safely) under his legs. The other boy reaches over and begins to gently rub his back. “Here you go,” he says.

Barad (2012) suggests, “So much happens in a touch: an infinity of others—other beings, other spaces, other times—are aroused” (p. 206). Thus, following Haraway² (2008), I ask: When toy cars in the classroom are touched, whom and what are touched? In my 25 years of work with children I had not, until after those moments with Zach, Wayne, and the cars, considered the entanglements of cars. That the toy vehicles in the classroom had actually come from and were connected to somethings and somewheres previously was not my concern. While it appears obvious to me now that the emergence of toy cars (vehicles) is imbricated in the technology, production, and marketing of the automobile, I had not considered this co-shaping before.

Toy vehicles seem to arrive in the early childhood classroom (see Blatz, Millichamp, and Fletcher, 1935; Dewey, 1915, 1933/2008) and in (certain) family homes (see Eaton’s, 1909, 1920, 1934; Mitchell, 1934/1942) as a source of enjoyment and tool for child development through the first half of the twentieth century when both the automobile (see Volti, 2004) and child studies (see Smuts, 2006) are growing in significance in North American culture. At the turn of the twentieth century, the German company Bing, reportedly the largest toy factory in the world at that time, was quick to recognize the appeal of the new automobile technology for toy production. “The future of the traffic in the street and on the road undoubtedly lies with the Motor Car. We cannot, therefore be surprised that the young are eager to get acquainted with this new and interesting form of conveyance” (Bing Catalogue, 1906 as cited by Jaffé, 2006, p. 52). Bing would be joined by many other companies in the production of toy vehicles throughout the twentieth century, eager to cash in
on this growing market, including several British companies\(^2\) that by the mid-twentieth century were leading the charge in producing and selling small vehicle replicas. Today, varying types of toy vehicles at a range of price points are offered to consumers in abundance (see Louise Kool and Galt, 2014; Quality Classrooms, 2013; Toys R Us Canada, n.d.; Wintergreen, 2014).

*Knapman (2013) tells the story of how the concept of Matchbox cars (which were produced by the east London company Lesney, with owner operators Lesney and Odell) was inspired by a rule at Odell’s daughter’s school that students were only allowed to bring toys that were small enough to fit inside a matchbox. Odell created a “scaled-down version of an existing Lesney toy, the model road roller, packaging it in a matchbox and sending it with his daughter to school. It was an instant hit” (para 4). Stories such as these are touched when I touch the cars in the classroom.*

By World War II, toy manufacturing dominance had solidly swung from Germany to America and Britain (Jaffe, 2006), and the optimism and economic growth that followed the war helped fuel the Western consumer culture we live with/in today. Technology advancements related to how things were made, what things were made of, and how things were transported and marketed were central to this economic growth and optimism (a legacy and continuation of progressive narratives from nineteenth-century imperialism and industrialization). By this time, plastics dominated in toy manufacturing which significantly altered the production and replication abilities of manufacturers (DriveSteady, 2011; Jaffe, 2006). Not only could plastic be molded with greater ease and accuracy, it was a cheaper material and so, combined with the increased ease of mass production, cars and trucks (toys in general, see Thrift, 2003) became increasingly accessible to more consumers as the twentieth century evolved—just like the real cars and trucks these replicas were modeled on. The mid-twentieth century saw the ushering in of North American “car culture” which included the enormous increase in automobile ownership, the mass construction of highways, the migration of city dwellers to suburban communities, and consumers’ increased reliance on cars (see Berger, 2001; Franz, 2005; Volti, 2004).

*The image of sprawling roadways and suburbanization has me wondering about the land that was cleared to make way for asphalt and concrete. What do we pave over in our zealous, insatiable quest for “the good life”? Vela (2013) tells the story of the McLaughlin family selling their successful carriage factory in 1907 to make way for producing Chevrolets and Buicks at the plant in Oshawa, Ontario. The plant would grow to*
become GM’s export manufacturing base by the 1920s. By the 1980s, GM’s Autoplex would be one of the largest car assembly plants in the world. Closure of the plant is regarded as marking “the end of an era,” both an economic and identity crisis. My curiosity about what we pave over has led me to (re)search Oshawa and the First Peoples of that area. The City of Oshawa’s (n.d.) website tells me several settler stories; first of Lake Ontario Iroquois briefly in the 1400s settling near the Harmony Creek, but they “did not stay in this village long, as evidence suggests that it was abandoned after approximately 20 years” (para 1). The remaining stories are of white settlers from the 1700s onward filling in the apparently abandoned and empty area with farming, services, and industry. But Central Lake Ontario Conservation Authority (2002) tells other stories: that Indigenous peoples inhabited the now-named Oshawa area for thousands of years before Anglo-European colonization began; the First Peoples of the area consisted mainly of North Shore Iroquois; and that historical accounts of the area are largely based on (thought to be exaggerated) British and French settler records, rather than First Nation oral histories.

The car culture that the twentieth century ushered in, Moss and Petrie (2002) suggest, also “played a large part in shaping childhood” (p. 179). They point out that with increased concerns for child safety (e.g., being hit by a car, being kidnapped) children are driven to and fro in the family car more than they were in the past. Yet the suburbanization that flourished post-World War II also contributed to the increase in private transport and the chauffeuring about of children in cars. Moss and Petrie write:

The car’s high status as an item of consumption, relating to privacy and individualism, finds an identifiable place within advanced liberalism and “political government which will govern without governing ‘society’” (Rose, 1999, p. xiii). It does so by appealing to parents’ perception of what is involved in caring for their children’s safety. At the same time it limits the possibilities for children to use outdoor space. (p. 180)

Several respondents in Benson, MacRury, and Marsh’s (2007) report written for BMW resonate with Moss and Petrie’s view of the automobile as a status item of privilege: a driver’s home away from home, where they can experience “me-time,” “cocooned” in their car. One female driver from North London describes her morning drive into work after she drops off her children as “15 minutes’ peace and quiet, which is rare” (as cited in Benson, MacRury, and Marsh,
The luxury of peace and quiet while alone in a car is not afforded to those who battle crowds on busses or subways during their daily commute. Clicking your child into the car seat of your own private vehicle as opposed to wrestling the stroller into place on public transport keeps (much) unwanted mixings and minglings with undesirables at bay. For some, the automobile is a vehicle for insulation against the discomforts of (particular) public spheres.

How many of the children who participated in our study arrived to their classroom every day after being harnessed into safety seats in their parents’ cars, the car not moving till everyone is buckled up? How many times are children warned of the very real dangers of cars as they cross the road, walk through a parking lot, as they are told to hold hands or are scooped up into adult arms? What is it to be suddenly larger than this risky object, now in the driver seat, if you will, rather than strapped into a booster or car seat in the back? Are toy cars (these miniature versions of the real dangerous thing) vehicles to child-car love, exploration, celebration, and engagement outside of car risks? And yet, these little loved plastic cars also touch multiple controversies related to public health, including concerns about chemicals used in plastic production leaching into the environment (e.g., migrating into the body through saliva) and the long-term impact of this on human physical and neurological health (see Grossman, 2009; Knoblauch, 2009; Kovacs, n.d.; Schmidt, 2011; White, 2009). In 2007, Mattel was forced to recall 19 million toys manufactured in China, including hundreds of thousands of die-cast toys like their small replica vehicles Hot Wheels and Matchbox for containing excessive amounts of lead (Story and Barboza, 2007). In 2011, two specific cars associated with their Hot Wheels line were recalled because they were found to contain arsenic (Moore, 2011). And what of the nonrenewable resources used in both their production and transportation, and their contribution to air, water, and soil pollution (Allsopp, Walters, Santillo, and Johnston, 2006; Grossman, 2009)? It is not nearly only human bodies that are impacted by these toy vehicles.

Amid all of this trouble, how do we care about cars?

In 1957 my father bought his first car, a 1949 Ford, soon after he turned 16. My father paid for his learner’s license and his driving instruction with money he had saved—first through a paper route, then delivering prescriptions (on his bicycle) at 12, and by 14 delivering for a meat shop (where he continued to work as a butcher until he graduated from
university in 1963). He paid $395 for the car with money his boss offered to lend him and which my father paid back tiny bit by tiny bit, week after week. He was the third of my grandparent’s six children and the first person in his family to have a driver’s license, making this 1949 Ford the first vehicle in his family. Both of my grandparents were blind and so my father’s driver’s license and car enabled him to help them in many ways. The license and car became symbols of his autonomy and independence, as well as his interdependence with and responsibility for his family.

I know this story (and many others related to my father’s first car) and how much he loved that car. It’s family folklore. Yet, the idea, the notion that the cars in Zach’s hands might actually be being cared for, struck me as revolutionary. How had I shelled my father’s first-car love story so that it had never penetrated my thoughts about children, pedagogy, and curriculum? Even more puzzling might be that I seemed to have also shelved my knowledge of my son’s love of his toy cars and trucks. My son did not experience his love of/for cars by himself. I lovingly chose each small die cast car that I could find which replicated working city vehicles. I created a huge dirt pile area in our backyard for his play with his larger digger trucks. I packed up the bag of small travel-sized Bob the Builder vehicles that would go with us everywhere in the car. Thinking back to his own childhood fascination with small die-cast cars, Knapman (2013) describes that his childhood cars survive today “tucked away in my parents’ loft awaiting the next generation to them for a spin” (para 2). Like Knapman (2013) and Lange (2012), I have saved these treasured toy vehicles for some (unknown) future use. Perhaps these experiences and memories of car love were not as shelved as I think, but were with me in the classroom. While Puig de la Bellacasa (2011, 2012) reminds that researchers (and I add educators) are not objectively unaffected by that which/whom we engage with, we bring our loves with us; this love is not an idealized, smooth, and harmonious affective state and material doing. “In the name of love” is never innocent, sweetly pure. Our loves perform cuts, at times tremendous harm, and as Skott-Myhre and Skott-Myhre (2015) richly put forward, our loves are embedded in neoliberal capitalist economies. How does this car love exist despite the car troubles shared in the previous touching stories? How much does it fuel them?

Angus is sitting on the lap of his caregiver holding a small black car in his hand. His two hands wrap over the car, hold for a minute. Then one hand enveloping the car he brings it up to his face. He is not looking at anyone, not talking. He seems to be with the car. I step closer with my
camera, slowly, quietly. Angus does not seem to notice me, or the camera. Car-hand, car-cheek, car-lips touches. What is felt, what is becoming, in this car-child-camera-educator moment? I wonder.

I cannot count the number of times someone said to me, “He’s such a boy,” as they watched my son with cars/trucks (e.g., truck digging in the sand, car zooming on the playgroup floor, waiting for the neighborhood garbage truck to arrive, getting to climb into the city street sweeper). Toy cars and trucks are among the most quintessential “boy toys” (for young and old) marketed, produced, and purchased today (for more see Hodgins, 2014) and it is not difficult to make the connection between cars as a gendered toy for boys and cars as a gendered technology for men. From its inception, the automobile was claimed as a territory for men—a technology associated with freedom, autonomy, and progress. The automobile was a vehicle to mobility (both geographic and economic), the access of which was a classed, gendered, and racialized project (for US accounts, see Berger, 2001; Franz, 2004, 2005; Scharff, 1991; Sugrue, n.d.). In some ways access was feared and regulated through class, gender, and race (e.g., who could buy a car, get a license, motor in particular places), but the vehicle also (eventually) opened up avenues of access previously denied (e.g., women’s greater access to public life, rural dwellers—often poor, often raced—access to goods and services they could now drive to purchase). Yet Scharff’s work suggests that the cultural construction of cars as a masculine technology acts as an erasure of women’s roles in said technology (e.g., as drivers, consumers, inventors, mechanics, producers, marketers), a technology so central to our economy today (see also Franz, 2005). Landström (2006) puts forward that this ongoing cultural construction is actually a “cultural phenomenon in conflict with everyday experience” (p. 31). Not only are women involved in car technology, many love their cars too (Benson et al., 2007; Scharff, 1991). Perhaps the same is true of toy cars. Are toy cars as a gendered script (love story) in conflict with everyday experience? What happens when we make space for that which we do not expect? What happens when we don’t?

A wooden dollhouse sits on the floor of the classroom. Three children walk around the dollhouse driving die-cast cars on the dollhouse roof. “Baby cars” they have come to be called. A baby car pokes in through the dollhouse window only to reemerge quickly, back to roll over the roof. Walking. Rolling. Some talking. Baby cars moving along the dollhouse roof. A plastic baby doll wrapped in a blanket is tucked under one of the children’s arms as she drives her baby car on the roof.
Hopeful Possibilities

With Puig de la Bellacasa’s matters of care, in this chapter I have taken the relationship with toy cars seriously to consider what this approach might teach us about our pedagogies with young children. Haraway asks us to consider what we are accountable to if we try to take our inheritance seriously (Gane and Haraway, 2006) and in that spirit I have traced some of the histories and presents/presences of toy cars that are knotted with/in everyday, often mundane, actions. Haraway further suggests that when we take something seriously, “I think I/we end up differently accountable—and differently curious—... than I/we were at the beginning” (in Gane and Haraway, 2006, p. 145). The car traces that I followed evoke a curiosity beyond the classroom, developmentalism, gendered logics, and innocent and apolitical narratives childhood, which ultimately raise different questions (and tensions) about accountability. These tracings complicate that we (educators, early childhood researchers) are simply (only) accountable to the children and families we work with. As the car tracings illuminate, children’s development exists with/in multiple partial yet always connected relationalities: production factories; water, air, and soil ways; chemical compounds and “natural” resources; human experience and memory; and economic and political materialities. Who and what will we choose to be accountable to/for in our everyday action?

This is not, as Puig de la Bellacasa makes clear, only an epistemological project, and certainly not one for constructing epistemological (moral) standards. With feminist science studies scholars like Haraway and Puig de la Bellacasa, it is a call to “enlarge our ontological and political sense of kinship and alliance, to dare in exercises of category transgression, of boundary redefinition that put to test the scope of humanist care” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012, p. 201). For me, this offers a vision for caring pedagogies: taking human and more-than-human chains of touch seriously in order to make visible “the layers of naturecultural relations” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009, p. 309) that make these touchings possible, “while [also] actively speculating on what could be possible” (p. 310). In other words, attending to relationalities not simply as they “are” but as they might be. Caring pedagogies, where humans are neither preeminently centred nor transcendent, might offer a way to envision, account for, and engage in commonworlding practices in the present that are responsible to/for what we have inherited (Haraway, 2008) as well as committed to flourishing, (more) equitable, relations today and tomorrow.
The car stories of touch and love that I have told illuminate that children and their developmental needs are not the only considerations in the classroom and that caring pedagogies are much more complex than our often taken-for-granted assumptions of care in early childhood practices suggest. Attending to Wayne and Zach’s caring for cars meant that we watched, listened, and felt for the various relationalities that make car(e) moments. While this ignited a (care)full recognition of cars as important to the children in the classroom, not so easily dismissed or minimized because/if we educators do not understand their appeal, it also presented some difficult questions about which bodies and materialities we choose to care about/with. This chapter’s car stories highlight that early childhood materials are anything but innocent, that both their troublings and loves are ethically, sociopolitically, geohistorically, and materialdiscursively situated. Pedagogies that “invite the risk of response” (Haraway, 2011, p. 95) to that which/whom are both troubling and loved may be an avenue for choosing with care the actions we take in, near and far from the early childhood classroom.

Notes

1. I use the term assembled as Latour (2005) puts forward: that which is gathered or fitted together, as well as why/how that which comes together and their generative potential.


3. Meccano is considered the first company to produce die-cast cars (in the 1930s); they manufactured these under the name Dinky Toys (Force, 2002; Jaffé, 2006). In 1948 Lesley Smith and John Odell set up the Lesney company in east London to make small metal cars and in 1953 launched their (what would become) hugely successful Matchbox cars (Jaffé, 2006). Shorty after Matchbox cars were launched, in 1956 the British company Mettoy started a line of die-cast vehicle replicas under the brand name Corgi. The main American competitor to the British die-cast car and truck miniatures did not arrive until 1968 when Mattel introduced Hot Wheels (the boy toy to counterpart to their Barbie dolls and paraphernalia for girls).

4. As was suburbanization of which the automobile was both a producer and product of (for a brief review, see Berger, 2001).

References


CHAPTER 7

Touching Place in Childhood Studies: Situated Encounters with a Community Garden

Fikile Nxumalo

INTRODUCTION

I situate this chapter alongside recent work in early childhood studies that has used more-than-human epistemologies and ontologies to consider nature pedagogies in relation to Indigenous knowledges, human/more-than-human relationalities, natureculture entanglements, and anticolonial possibilities (Duhn, 2012; Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2013; Ritchie, 2012; Somerville, 2006; Taylor, 2013). Inspired by this work, and its commitment to resisting simplistic and romantic couplings of children and nature, I seek to notice the practices; sociomaterialities; and colonial histories and relations that come together to enact the production of a community garden that I visit with children and early childhood educators in the childcare centers where my research is situated. My specific localities in the Greater Vancouver area are unceded Musqueam, Squamish, Stó:lo, and Tsleil-Waututh First Nations territories (Musqueam Band, 2011; Squamish Nation, 2008; Stó:lo Nation, 2009; Tsleil-Waututh Nation, 2013).

Putting to work an emergent methodology that I refer to as refiguring presences (see Nxumalo, 2015, in press), I rethink, refigure, and complicate what is considered present in everyday child-educator community garden encounters by paying particular attention to Indigenous relationalities, colonial displacements, garden histories, sociomaterial encounters, and more-than-human vibrancies (Massey,
2005; Pratt, 1992; Simpson, 2011). I pay particular attention to the unruly propensities of more-than-human actors (Ginn, 2008), and the possibilities this noticing might bring as knowledge making that complicates the boundaries enacted in this place. My intent here is to see what anticolonial resonances might emerge through these practices of refiguring presences. I view these resonances as having the potential to unsettle everyday taken-for-granted relations (Nxumalo, in press).

I begin the chapter by discussing how and why I use “touch” to refigure presences in community garden encounters. For the remainder of the chapter, I engage in literal and metaphorical practices of refiguring presences in the garden assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) through entangled histories, sociomaterialities, and more-than-human actors. More specifically, I refigure presences in the garden through touching historical children-garden pedagogies, political formations of gardens, and settler colonial worldings of gardens. I then map and experiment with touching and unsettling garden lines and line making—attending closely to the complexities and disruptive potentials of the lively yet messy assemblages of garden things, and child-garden worm encounters. I conclude the chapter by revisiting the anticolonial resonances that might be enacted through this work.

Refiguring Presences in Community Garden Encounters

Haraway (2006) inspires close attention to the political and ethical potentialities set in motion through human/more-than-human encounters, asking: “Which worldings and which sorts of temporalities and materialities erupt into this touch” (p. 145)? Taking up her invitation to think with, respond to and become accountable to the worldings enacted through specific encounters, I experiment with refiguring what is considered present in a community garden through research practices that restory (Cameron, 2011) this place. In so doing, I am placed within multiple connecting “temporalities and materialities” (Haraway, 2006, p. 145). I intentionally use “touch” in restorying this place to emphasize that the practices of refiguring presences that I enact in this chapter are particularly attentive to material and affective relations with the garden assemblage. I affect and am affected (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) by more-than-human relationalities, entanglements with past-present histories, and the tensions that are thrown up by encounters with the community garden.
In other words, by “touching,” I mean more than my physical presence in the garden with children and educators; I touch through affective modes that allow me to restory place in politically disruptive ways. I touch with particular politicized curiosities as well with openings to my own unsettling.

Refiguring presence is also a creative knowledge-making (Haraway, 1997) process; as I engage with making connections, I also experiment with hopeful, yet risky possibilities for refiguring what is seen as present in this garden and the garden encounters. Through both the relationalities and dissonances that emerge from actual and metaphorical acts of touching, I seek out responsive and responsible interruptions of colonial, anthropocentric, and innocent worldings of gardens and gardening practices. However, touching does not come without dangers: “There is a risk of idealizing the paradigmatic ‘other’ of vision, for instance, as a signifier of embodied unmediated knowing and relating. Thinking with touch does not assure resolution; it opens new questions” (Bellacasa, 2009, p. 299). The hopeful possibilities that I enact point to ways of knowing and relating that elude easy resolution and are always partial. As Haraway (2008) reminds me:

> Touch ramifies and shapes accountability. Accountability, caring for, being affected, and entering into responsibility are not ethical abstractions; these mundane, prosaic things are the result of having truck with each other. Touch does not make one small; it peppers its partners with attachment sites for world making. Touch, regard, looking back, becoming with—all these make us responsible in unpredictable ways for which worlds take shape…Touch and regard have consequences. (p. 36)

Importantly, refiguring presences through generative human/more-than-human cominglings, mutualities, and relationalities assumes neither the absence of human difference nor the presence of equal relations between humans. In other words, the sociomaterial asymmetries enacted through presences of settler colonialism, racialization, whiteness, gender, and class are never erased from gardens and are an intrinsic part of my own situated, contingent, and embodied location as a racialized settler immigrant in colonial gardens and colonial garden histories. In this chapter I intentionally attempt to decenter the human by foregrounding human/more-than-human entanglements and more-than-human vibrancies. I do this in ways that engage gardens in both their dampening and transformative effects within ongoing sociomaterial formations of empire.
I engage touch through art images of gardens, historical imageries of gardening, and specific sociomaterialities of everyday child-educator-garden encounters. I engage touch with images not to represent place but rather to enact a politicized (re)storying of place within a settler colonial context—a noninnocent, entangled, and implicated worlding. Bellacasa (2009) refers to this as “touching vision” where “refusing the distinction between vision and touch troubles the ground of objectivity” (p. 308). What might these practices of refiguring presences do? What interruptions might be created to practice-as-usual? What connections might emerge and enact disruptions to visions of already demarcated, categorized, “settled” and defined colonial place? How might inhabiting multiple and differential place relations as a site for early childhood inquiry open up lines for engaging with complexity? As I discuss in the next section, situating gardens within Eurowestern early childhood pedagogies is one place to begin to encounter these complexities.

**Cultivating Nature’s Children Gardening Pedagogy Histories**

The childcare centers where I work are located alongside a second growth forest, a large part of which is a designated protected conservation area and is home to several animal species including deer, raccoons, black bears, and coyotes. The forest has become an important part of the children’s pedagogical experiences (Nxumalo, 2015). A community garden that lies at the edge of a part of this forest has also recently become a place of interest for educators and children. The community garden’s stated purpose is to engage in “healthy recreational activity while growing nutritious food, benefiting from the connection to nature, and social interaction.” The space has been divided into garden plots, separated by wooden planks available for rental to members of the local community to grow organic vegetables in numbered assigned plots subject to adherence to the policies and procedures in the gardening agreement.

As with many early childhood nature pedagogies in British Columbia, gardening is not new to these children; each of the centers has a garden area in their outdoor play spaces, where educators and children tend and grow flowers and vegetables. These practices have a long history in Eurowestern early childhood education. Eighteenth-century Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau inspired generations of romantic nature-based early childhood pedagogies with his
beliefs in “‘Nature’ as the child’s best teacher” (Taylor and Giugni, 2012, p. 114). For instance, in 1840 Friedrich Fröbel began gardens specifically designed to prepare kindergarten children “for living in a perfectly ordered civil society” (Taylor, 2013, p. 41). Rudolf Steiner, Maria Montessori, and Loris Malaguzzi are other notable early childhood educational philosophers inspired by Rousseau’s emphasis on connecting children with nature (Taylor and Giugni, 2012). In early twentieth century North American schools, gardens were part of the nature study movement and were designed to give children opportunities to learn about “nature” through the garden (Frost, 2009). School gardens were also widely introduced as tools to teach desired moral and social attributes such as pride in community, and individual responsibility for public property (Lawson, 2005). They were also used to teach the respectability of labor. Children, under close adult supervision, were trained to work efficiently in the belief that this training could be transferred to factory work (Lawson, 2005). This role of the adult figure in “leading” or shaping children followers is apparent in the wartime propaganda poster depicted in Figure 7.1. Here children are depicted joining the “school garden army” using the famed children’s tale figure of the pied piper, now remade into America’s nation building and patriarchal Uncle Sam character.

These histories remain an active presence in Eurowestern early childhood garden pedagogies; continuing to do the work of maintaining nature/culture divisions; enacting romantic discourses of a special relationship between children and nature; and structuring childhood (and education) as a preparatory site toward normative adulthood (Taylor, 2013; Williamson, 2002).

**Situating Community Gardens in Political Formations**

*As children and educators engage in “everyday” gardening practices—planting, tending, weeding, and learning about healthy foods, I am unsettled as I consider the seeming innocence of these practices. I wonder what looking into the entanglements of gardening with empire building and settler colonialism might do?* (field notes)

Community gardens in urban environments have been introduced with different purposes in a multitude of spaces and places, including, but not limited to: providing food to poor urban families; targeting immigrant families to inculcate “civic duty, health and sanitation, and middle-class aesthetic values” (Lawson, 2005, p. 8); building
a sense of community; beautifying city neighborhoods; supporting war efforts materially and discursively; revitalizing depressed neighborhoods; and as a source for local business development (Lawson, 2005).

Figure 7.1  Follow the Pied Piper (Barney, 1919)
Source: US Department of Agriculture Poster Collection.
In North America, community gardens flourished during the Great Depression as relief gardens; during World War I as liberty gardens; and during World War II as victory gardens or war gardens (Williamson, 2002). In British Columbia, there were over 1,400 victory gardens in 1943, prompting a headline in the Vancouver News Herald stating that “if all the Victory Gardens in British Columbia were lumped together, they would occupy a space approximately three times the size of Vancouver’s great Stanley Park” (Buswell, 1980, para 11). As illustrated in Figure 7.2, through government propaganda in Canada, the United States, and Britain, gardening during wartime became permeated with nationalist idealism and figured as a weapon of war. As Ginn (2012) notes, “The garden, a place where craft, soil and blood mingled, was doubly inscribed not only as a place from which the war might be won, but also as a reason why the war should be won” (p. 297). During this time, these community gardens were also referred to as “food gardens for defense” (Buswell, 1980).

More recent community garden movements have arisen from the resistance movements generated during the 1960s civil rights and counterculture eras (French, 2008; Warner, 1987). These community gardens, while typically not conceptualized by the government, require governmental support to provide land for gardening. Other reasons behind the recent rise in community gardens have been a concern with climate change and an accompanying interest in organic gardening (Ministry of Community Development and Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 2009). An in-depth discussion of all of the diverse and entangled reasons for the emergence of current community gardens and their many formations are beyond the scope of this chapter, and it is not my purpose to minimize the beneficial effects of community gardens. From this very brief historical overview, my primary purpose is to restory community gardens in ways that disrupt innocence; these are intensely political and ideological places.

The community garden I encounter with children and educators is not outside of these political formations; this organic-only garden, while a place where healthy food might become more accessible, is still located within a locus of sociomaterial stratification, racialized class privilege, and individualized neoliberal relations to food access (see Nxumalo, Pacini-Ketchabaw, and Rowan (2011) for an in-depth illustration of connections between neoliberal formations and food/eating practices in early childhood education). These asymmetries are continually “made, marked and re-made” (Ginn, 2013, p. 5), such
“Food is no less a weapon than tanks, guns, and planes… the duty of every loyal citizen [is] to do everything possible, to accept any sacrifice, so that there shall be plentiful supplies of food for the fighting forces and facilities for delivering then” (Bassett 1981, p. 7, as cited in Williamson, 2002, p. 13).

Source: Library and Archives Canada/Harry Mayerovitch fonds/c115716.

Figure 7.2  Plant a victory garden (Unknown, circa 1944)
as through practices of plot rental fees and contracts; garden rules; and individual allotment plots. They are also continually articulated through affective materializations, such as the fence that borders the garden and the accompanying signage marking the garden as patrolled private property. As the following section suggests, the asymmetries of gardens also need to be considered within their presence in settler colonial logics (Casteel, 2003; Longhurst, 2006; Plumwood, 2005).

**Digging Deeper: Community Gardens in Worldings of Settler Colonialism**

As I dig into colonial worldings in gardens of North America, I notice an idyllic vision of nature (Casteel, 2007) materialized and enacted in paintings such as the one shown in Figure 7.3. This painting depicts romanticized visions of a Garden of Eden-like paradise in North America figured as representative of the innocence and normative whiteness of childhood. While this particular painting was an American-commissioned work, many of the nineteenth-century landscape paintings emerged when artists were commissioned to produce paintings from colonial excursions to the Americas, bringing back representations of the “discovered” world to Europeans (Clark,

![Image](https://example.com/image.png)

**Figure 7.3** “The Voyage of Life: Childhood” (Cole, 1842)

*Source:* National Gallery of Art (Open Access), Washington, DC.
Pacini-Ketchabaw, and Hodgins, 2015). These depictions of idyllic garden-like landscapes stand in stark contrast to the violences enacted during and after these voyages of “discovery” and conquest (Battiste et al., 2005; Povinelli, 2011; Simpson, 2011).

I also unearth colonial imaginaries of *terra nullius* that attempted to erase Indigenous presences and set about “improving” “empty wild” land into property used for “productive” farms and gardens (Ginn, 2008, 2009). As the late ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood (2005) noted, today’s gardens continue to be imbued with settler colonial practices of “domestication and Eurocentric ideals of beauty” (para 5), imposing order through various flora and fauna. Eurocentric ideals of gardens emerge and are enacted in gardening books, magazines, clubs, and various shows that situate gardens within commodifying practices, privilege particular aesthetics, and “idolise the gardens of the Euro-centre” (Plumwood, 2005, para 6; also see Highlights for the Armchair Gardener, 2002). These imaginaries and gardening practices come together to help shape what belongs, lives, and grows inside certain gardens, and what becomes classified as a weed or a “invasive pest.”

I do not want to suggest an uncomplicated fixed division between “alien” and “Indigenous” species. For instance, my use of the term “Indigenous” carries with it omissions that mask the complexities, nuances, politics, and situatedness of Indigeneity—such as specific cosmologies, ceremony, living knowledges, and many human and more-than-human relations (de Finney, personal communication, May 1, 2014). Further to this, within the limits of this chapter, I am not discussing in depth the historical contingencies and situated contradictions in how divisions between “alien” and “Indigenous” have been and continue to be viewed and taken up in gardening practices of killing and “saving” certain plant species (; Braun, 2002; Ginn, 2008, 2009). Some of these include practices of preserving or saving certain places as “wild” nature; forest conservation; neoliberal natures; and “native species” gardening trends, among several techniques of contingent and contradictory stratifications of land (Braun, 2002; Ginn, 2009; Langford, 2012; Lorimer, 2012). What I am more interested in here, is beginning to untangle some of the sociomaterial workings of plant, animal, and land domestication as active presences in establishing settler colonialism. Also as I discuss later in the chapter, I am interested in the slippages, resistances, and mutualities that create stutters to colonial ways of seeing and doing garden encounters with young children.
As I continue to dig into settler colonial practices that introduced imported species which have diminished or destroyed Indigenous species (Plumwood, 2005), I find an example that illustrates that domestication relationships are complex; they are not inherently exploitative and solely human directed (Haraway, 2008). I find this example in camas, a starchy flowering vegetable that the Coast Salish Peoples domesticated for many generations using multiple and complex practices (Kwiáht, 2014). Some of the multiple human and more-than-human entangled participants in empire building that lead to the decline of both wild camas fields and domesticated camas gardens include: increased potato cultivation that effectively displaced camas, appropriation of lands for settler agriculture, the spread of invasive grasses that accompanied sheep grazing, and colonial restrictions on traditional food cultivation and gathering (Corntassel and Bryce, 2012; Deur and Turner, 2005; Kwiáht, 2014).

The land on which we stand—gardens, plants, organisms, soil, and many unseen presences—all “hold the memory of all traces” (Barad, 2011, p. 146) of their intimate entanglements with violent empire building in settler colonial places. As Saguaro (2006) notes, there are many variations of gardens in settler colonial places, but they are all imbued with colonial histories, including displacements of people, plants, and animals. To illustrate this, I turn to the story of X’muzk’i’um (Camosun Bog), a place on Musqueam territories, and wonder about both the traces of empire, and the Indigenous relational presences that are alive in this place that has been a part of Musqueam First Nation stories, food, medicine, and ceremony for thousands of years (Point, 2012). I pause here and let the following words “speak” for themselves:

X’muzk’i’um (Camosun Bog)  

“[X’muzk’i’um Camosun Bog] is also a place that I take my grandchildren. It’s a place that has been here for thousands of years. And there are very few people within the city of Vancouver that even know of this place”. (Susan Point, Musqueam artist, 2012)

“This was our garden, our people’s garden; where they had picked the berries, picked the medicinal plants…we have to save this for our children and our children’s children.” (Rose Point, Musqueam elder, 2012)

When the bog shrinks that means people have drained the bog for urbanization, for uses of land, removing what Western culture calls unusable land or unusable space…If it is allowed to shrink anymore that actually erases all of the corroborating evidence of the story of Musqueam…it removes all traces of any of the stories that we are able to tell…We can
What memories do places like X’muzk’i’um (Camosun Bog) hold of past and present Indigenous relationalities? What might we (myself, educators and children) learn from the story of this place as a Musqueam people’s garden for medicine and ceremony; from its near destruction from construction site dumping and intentional draining; from its ongoing partial restoration by Indigenous and non-Indigenous people (see Camosun Bog Restoration Group, n.d.); and from ongoing colonial dispossession from this place?

These stories, while necessarily incomplete, hold and enact a “revolutionary force” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 19) that disrupts taken-for-granted settler understandings of what gardens are and can be. I see this as “knowledge potent for constructing worlds less organized by axes of domination” (Haraway, 1991, p. 192). Camas and X’muzk’i’um stories resonate and stay with me as I reconsider the community garden I encounter with children and educators in connection to seen and unseen presences. If we take seriously the idea that “touch is never pure or innocent...[and is] inseparable from the field of differential relations that constitute it” (Barad, 2012, p. 215), how then might touching place in early childhood education be refigured to interrupt the violent banality of disregard for these presences?

Unsettling Forest/Garden Lines

A fence encloses the community garden we visit with children, separating it from the surrounding forest. The fence seems to struggle to separate the ‘wild’ forest from the ‘domesticated’ garden. The deer we sometimes encounter in the garden feeding on the vegetables also seem out-of-place, yet highlight the tenuousness of this separation. The possibility of an encounter with the coyotes and bears that inhabit the forest is another unsettling affective presence. ‘Wild’ vegetables also seem to contest this separation by growing ‘outside of garden row formation’ beyond the boundaries of the forest-garden fence-line. A pile of uprooted weeds sits at the entrance to the garden; while some plots appear neat and carefully tended with rows of vegetables, others are overgrown with weeds. (field notes)

The creation of lines around what counts as “pure” nature is intimately entangled with settler colonial past-present histories. As previously discussed, I consider certain acts of domesticating, demarcation, and controlled planting of landscapes as part of the making of colonial projects within imaginaries “of a pristine, purified and timeless
precolonial nature” (Instone, 2010, p. 97). What emerges from paying attention to the “materializing effects” created by the ways in which boundaries are drawn between the human/more-than-human and between nature/culture (Barad, 2011, pp. 123–124)? Here I want to touch and be touched by lines such as the fence that struggles to contain the garden and forest boundaries (Figure 7.4), the lines that separate each garden plot, and the gate to the garden with the sign marking this place as “private property.” These lines are enacting colonizing orderings, management, and mastery over the cultivated plants and the “wild” forest. As Tuhiwai Smith (1999) notes, “The line is important, because it was used to map territory, to survey land, [and] to establish boundaries” (p. 53). I witness the lines separating the individual garden plots and separating the forest from the garden as connected with the colonial mapping of territories. I become curious about how certain demarcating lines are made and decided.

Deleuze (2009) suggests, “Some lines are segments, or segmented; some lines get caught in a rut, or disappear into “black holes”; some are destructive, sketching death; and some lines are vital and creative” (p. 1). What if we (myself and educators) consider both the productive and oppressive forces) of the lines in the relations that come together in the forest-garden assemblage? How do the vibrancies of place restored through multispecies relations sit alongside the borderlines of the garden? What might we learn by paying attention to not only colonial framing enacted by lines, but also to leaks, cracks, and ruptures in these lines? How do these lines escape their intended effects as acts of containment, representation, and visibility (Holmes, 2012)? What is set into motion as children notice and touch the vegetables growing in the forest beyond the fence line (see Figure 7.5), and as they encounter deer feeding on the vegetables in the garden? These
“escapes” of plants and animals between forest and garden line are not without danger, including possible harm to the forest floor. However, before I consider pulling up the “wild forest vegetables,” I want to engage with the potentials of the presence of unruly assemblages. Perhaps these moments might also be seen as encounters with the active presences and queer performativities of the more-than-human world (Barad, 2011; Ginn, 2013). Such unexpected encounters might also bring into view potentialities for alternative relations to this place beyond an already known, defined, and separate “domesticated community garden” and “wild forest.”

Perhaps common worlds (Latour, 2004; Taylor, 2013) emerge here through such unpredictable assemblages, where the composers of these entangled worlds “are certainly not all human, nor are they evenly empowered or equally interested in the composing” (Ginn, 2013, p. 2). How might touching these messy and continually shifting common worlds of forest/vegetable garden/human/animal co-presences be a place to relate differently to nature as natureculture (Haraway, 2008)? These different relations might include “a dissonance, a provocation to re-think and to walk differently . . . [and consider] . . . human-plant-place relations, colonial dispossession, and other modes of connection between humans and nonhumans”
I pause in this place to consider the possibilities suggested by nonconformity, co-implication; by becoming with (Haraway, 2011). I wonder about the disruptive potentialities enacted by the forest and the garden vegetables in interrupting and unsettling colonial ordering practices that are embedded in the domesticated garden. Encountering this garden as a place of liminality may create pedagogical openings for destabilizing Eurocentric colonial rootedness (Head and Muir, 2006). Perhaps this unsettles the dualities between nonhuman nature and human culture, and between the wild and domesticated that have acted to erase Indigenous presences. These dualisms can be traced back to “Enlightenment logic [which] positioned the thinking human subject at the centre of the world” (Potter and Hawkins, 2009, para 2).

Perhaps as Tsing (2013) suggests, close attention to the vitality and assemblages of plant worlds might be a way to begin to bring into view some of the ways in which more-than-human worlds are made; where humans are not the central participants. She notes that “to even begin to tell these stories offers a reminder of the entangling of multiple scales and trajectories in the making of social landscapes” (p. 36). While both the community garden and the adjacent forest have emerged from human disruptions to the landscape (see Nxumalo, 2015 on the logging histories of this forest) such as logging, cultivation, weeding, and composting practices, the active relations between the multiple plant and animal species that inhabit the forest have created assemblages beyond human control (Tsing, 2013). I witness these interruptions as creating openings toward inhabiting messiness and for generating politicized dialogues with this place. Touching this forest garden, and its lines and boundaries in this way is about much more than exposing children to learning about a pure and separate nature (Taylor, 2013), but a place where early childhood educators and children might begin to “to live the consequences of non-stop curiosity inside mortal, situated, relentlessly relational worlding” (Haraway, 2006, p. 143). In these understandings then, places, such as this forest garden, are neither simply physical nor easily categorized, but places of complex mutual encounter and “ethics then emerges not from a transcendant interpretation of nature, but from our always imperfect and never innocent responses to the specific natural-cultural entanglements through which we come to be in the world” (Weakland, 2012, p. 129). Apprehending the emergent interactions between the forest and garden highlights
the tenuousness of boundaries around what counts as “pure” nature (Ginn, 2009; Haraway, 1997). The garden perhaps then is “never simply the product of settler’s imaginations, but a much more contested material landscape, where trees, [plants, worms] and weeds “push back” to alter the nature of the project” (Ginn, 2009, p. 40). In other words, more-than-human socialities (Tsing 2013) disrupt and subvert colonial impositions of control, belonging, and order.

**Relating to More-than-Human Assemblages**

*This garden has invited multiple possibilities for engaging with the “otherwise”. This particular community garden, its location on the edge of the forest, the shifting “disorderly” assemblages of things in it—have become a site of curiosity for children and educators. These things include chairs, carefully tended plots alongside overgrown untended plots, giant-sized vegetables and flowers, a pile of uprooted weeds, a concrete shed, worms, a makeshift “no stealing” sign—and more… A tire is picked up and carried along, then put down on a log as it becomes too heavy for the child to carry. (field notes)*

I intentionally want to refigure these materialities by considering ways of relating that go beyond seeing and responding to these “things” (Figure 7.6) as garbage, clutter, out of place, and ugly. The “things” that are in the garden and the different ways they beckon to and affect the children (questions, curiosity, and touch/carrying) are suggestive of what Taylor (2013), drawing from Donna Haraway, terms a “queer kin relational ontology” (p. 83) that perhaps disrupts the romanticization of the “child in the pristine garden” in normative garden pedagogies and as seen in the “New World” painting in Figure 7.3. Perhaps attending and responding to children’s relations with the more-than-human vibrancies of the “queer” things in this place might enact anticolonial ways of seeing—ways of seeing that begin to appreciate the complex liveliness of this garden and its resistances to a simple categorization as an organic-only community garden, or as an enclosed, pure, romantic natural place awaiting children’s learning about nature. These messy relations are “characterized by lively processes and impure forms, co-existing in inhabited landscapes” (Lorimer, 2012, p. 595) that elude categorization within the borders of community gardening. Disruptions of purity are important
in a settler colonial society where purificationist resonances in delini-
eations of belonging for plants and animals are entangled in complex
ways with settler constructions of belonging (Head and Muir, 2006).

In touching this assemblage of images and seeking out other prac-
tices/ways of becoming with these seemingly disparate “things,”
my hope is to create interruptive affects. I wonder if attending to
these affective resonances might interfere with the technologies and
histories of control that permeate gardening practices in this settler
colonial place? What new realities and knowledges might be enacted
through attention to the human and more-than-human “transforma-
tive mutualism” (Tsing, 2012, p. 515) enacted through the garden,
the forest, the things in it, and the assemblages that come together
therein? More-than-human assemblages in this place perhaps point to
the instability and leakiness of the boundaries created by anthropo-
morphic colonizing conceptions of place such as the “domesticated”
garden and the “wild” forest.
**Touching Garden Worms**

A noninnocent relational ethics (Simpson, 2011; Whatmore, 2006) of caring and protection seems to emerge in children’s embodied encounters with the worms that are abundant in the garden’s soil. The educator and myself witness relations marked by mutual attentiveness, curiosity, and touch: children name the worms, imagine worm families, and are closely attentive to the worms’ various actions and movements, including their movements on their hands, which they describe as for example, “tickling me”, “looking at me”, “thinking” and “giggling”...

I see potential in these mundane encounters between children and worms for an ethical becoming with through mutual *touch*, responsiveness, and curiosity rather than a predefined “learning” experience (Haraway, 2008; Pacini-Ketchabaw and Taylor, 2013; Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2015). Here ethical caring relations are seen as emerging in the middle of the everyday life through immanent materialized connections (Bellacasa, 2009). That is to say, seemingly mundane and unimportant things and places can be a site for caring ethical relations involving “tasks that make living better in interdependence, but which are often considered petty and unimportant, however vital they are for liveable relations” (Bellacasa, 2011, p. 9). I emphasize the word *seemingly* here to emphasize that, as I have attempted to illustrate throughout this chapter, the garden is far from a mundane place. For example, Camas and X’muzk’i’um (Camosun Bog) gardens speak as complex, sacred, and pedagogical places in Indigenous ontologies.

Even the playfulness of children’s encounters with gardens and garden worms (Figure 7.7) is a site to consider how touching worms holds consequential possibilities for children to learn how to get along with and care for more-than-human others in these messy inherited histories (Pacini-Ketchabaw and Taylor, 2013). If we take seriously John Law’s (2011) contention that “different practices enact different realities” (p. 3), we might ask how “nature” is enacted by paying attention to the kind of worm that emerges through these embodied practices. Perhaps then we might encourage relations that foreground the worm as responsive—as evoking care, attention, and responsibility. Here worms evoke affective responses through the specific mutual sociomaterial compositions they take in these encounters (Bertoni, 2012).

The worms in this encounter emerge through complex human-more-than-human interrelationships including their movements on children’s bodies and through the soil, in relation with children’s
and educator’s words and actions. Through these situated encounters, the assemblages of worms children and their relations that emerge suggest enactments of worms through mutual interaction between humans and nonhuman species. In paying attention to disruptive presences in these encounters, I want to highlight the politically potentiality of the “ordinary” (Ahmed, 2004; Berlant, 2008; Blaise, 2013, Stewart, 2007, 2011, 2012; Tsing, 2005). Perhaps these ordinary encounters might be seen as holding potential to seek less
anthropomorphic ways of relating to this place; as a vibrant assemblage (Bennett, 2010)—rather than a mute site awaiting children’s meaning making.

In this particular situated settler colonial place, the ethical animal-place-body resonances I am tentatively suggesting here are always already partial; relationality does not aim to erase or transcend difference (Haraway, 2011). As Lorimer (2012) states, “The coming into being of humans and non-humans involves immanent processes, not the revelation of universal and transcendent forms” (p. 596). Attention to reciprocal encounters between children and the more than human plant, animal, and objects in this garden neither erases nor resolves difficult ethical questions such as “what counts as a livable life and a grievable death” (Butler, 2004, p. xv) in the making of the forest garden and its entanglements with past-present colonialisms? In other words, perhaps educators might also begin to consider how touching earthworms in this garden is also to touch colonial histories.

The colonial “temporalities and materialities” (Haraway, 2006, p. 145) that emerge from touching earthworms in this community garden are complex and here I just briefly engage with where they might take us (myself, educators, and children). Touching worms takes us to glaciers during a Pleistocene ice age that brought indigenous worms in North America close to extinction; it takes us to colonial ships, which brought most of the earthworm species currently in North America (Smithsonian Environmental Research Center, 2013):

New earthworms began entering North America as early as the 1600s, with the first European settlers. They crossed over in root balls or the dry ballast of ships. As the British, French, Spanish and Dutch colonized the American continent, they were largely oblivious to another colonization going on under their feet. European earthworms thrived in the upper soils of forests and gardens. Native earthworms, if there were any, remained deeper underground. In the end Europe’s earthworms established an empire. (para 2)

In British Columbia, these introduced worms quickly spread through the land, outpacing the few remaining indigenous earthworms. Known as “ancient earthworms,” these indigenous worms inhabit British Columbia’s forest soils (Marshall and Fender, 1998, 2007). While worms’ benefits to the earth’s ecosystems are well known, recent work also points to the destructive effects of the spread of introduced worms to Canadian forests (Addison, 2009). This story illustrates the contingencies, complexities, and contradictions of
domestication relationships. As I discussed earlier, more-than-human socialities are active and unruly participants in domestication relationships (Cassidy, 2007; Haraway, 2008; Tsing, 2013). Children’s relations with garden worms, the forest, the community garden, as well as the boundaries and porosities therein, become even more complicated, noninnocent, and unsettling.

Conclusions: Opening Up to Anticolonial Resonances

In this chapter, I have intentionally focused my attention toward knowledge-making practices that trouble the enduring innocence of the child-garden/child-in-nature figure. I have attempted to critically engage with the sociomaterialities, tensions, and situated histories that emerge from refiguring presences in everyday encounters with a particular community garden. I have made no attempts to “tidy up” this place and have resisted avoiding the “mess” that emerges from making visible connections between histories of community gardens, children in gardens, and settler colonialism. Instead, I have experimented with literal and figurative “touch” as a way to refigure presences by foregrounding colonial territorialities, and multiple place stories. I have also noticed and become unsettled by everyday encounters with unexpected and unruly performativities of more-than-human assemblages. I see this unsettling as an important part of enacting anticolonial resonances and possibilities—possibilities that disrupt normative and orderly gardening pedagogies.

While I suggest that educators and children actively seek out the histories, and Indigenous ontologies of the places they inhabit, and consider what an “interspecies garden ethics” (Plumwood, 2005, para 23) might look like in their particular contexts, I also wonder what other effects these moments of unsettling (which cannot necessarily be known in advance) might have for practice with children. I remain hopeful that noticing with children unexpected garden assemblages and more-than-human relations might enact a beginning toward unsettling the “colonial order of things” (Stoler, 2008, p. 193) embedded in the romantic visualities of gardens and gardening in early childhood environmental education.

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Notes

1. I use “more than human” to refer broadly to all that exceeds the human, whereby the human and nonhuman are active co-constitutive participants (Whatmore, 2006).

2. In its intentional selection of particular sociomaterial histories and their connections with everyday garden encounters and “things,” my work shares an affinity with Michel Foucault’s (1980) genealogies as “a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its emptysameness throughout the course of history” (p. 117).

3. I work closely with educators and children as a pedagogista in four early childhood group care centres. My role includes supporting possibilities for creative and transformative pedagogies; and, creating shifts towards contextualized understandings of practices with young children.

4. In this chapter, I place multiple perspectives alongside each other with political intent; namely, Indigenous knowledges, “biological” perspectives of plant and worm species; and materialist more-than-human perspectives. This is to suggest neither that these perspectives are the same, nor that there are no important and at times even incommensurate differences between and within them (see Nxumalo, in press). My intents here are multiple and interrelated. First, I want to interrupt Eurowestern theories as the center of knowledge production in the academy and in early childhood pedagogies. Second, foregrounding Indigenous knowledges is an integral part of my methodology which intends to interrupt taken-for-granted everyday settler colonial place relations. Third, I want to highlight pertinent and productive affinities between Indigenous ontologies and materialisms in interfering with anthropocentrism.

5. See Nxumalo (in press) for an in-depth discussion of the entanglements of my researcher subjectivities.

6. Community garden reference omitted to maintain anonymity.

7. Thank you to Dr. Sandrina de Finney and Vanessa Clark for pointing me toward the Camas example.
8. To view an image of X’muzk’i’um (Camosun bog), please go to http://susanpoint.com/files/2012/02/cultural_secret.jpg.

References


Introduction

This chapter explores affect within student-teacher relationships. To do this, I will use the concept of “affect” as composed by Baruch Spinoza (1991, 2007) in Ethics (1992) and further in Theological-Political Treatise (2007), specifically, I will focus on Deleuze’s (1988) and Negri’s (2011, 1991) immanent interpretation, and their implementation of the term within their own philosophy. When approaching the implementation of affect and Spinoza’s ontological repositioning, this chapter proposes the use of critical pedagogy (Freire, 2000; Giroux, 2009, 2011; Kincheloe, 2003) in conjunction with the emerging new discourse of affective pedagogy as defined by Watkins (2006), Dahlbeck (2014), and others. In order to unravel the way Spinoza defines and uses affect, it is important to follow its genealogical trajectory through its ontological construction in Deleuze (1992, 2007), followed by Negri (1991, 2013), through to its implementation in educational theory within the discourse of Affective Pedagogy. This genealogical inquiry, so to speak, constitutes the ontological and ethical foundations of the term and is followed by its potential implementation into the discourse of curriculum theory (Pinar, 2012).

Why Deleuze and Spinoza?

Deleuze’s affinity for Spinoza is twofold and is perhaps best characterized by Deleuze (1995) himself: “The paradox in Spinoza is that
he’s the most philosophical of philosophers, the purest in some sense, but also the one who more than any other addresses nonphilosophers and calls forth the most intense nonphilosophical understanding” (p.165). Here we have the dual nature of Deleuze’s Spinoza, on the one hand we have the great pure ontologist, the philosopher of philosophers, while on the other hand we have the one thinker who, according to Deleuze (1988), best “teaches the philosopher how to become a nonphilosopher” (p. 130). The relevance here is this: We do not need the permission of old dead white men to create and put to use concepts and experiences that help shape our craft, either as educators or as youth workers. I do not have to prove my worth to Deleuze or Spinoza; it is they who have to prove their worth to me. And they earn this by function and nothing more. In this chapter I ask how does “affect” work? And what can it do for me? And it is in this direction that the complex ontology of Spinoza that is further expressed by Deleuze and Negri, ceases to be a test or an appeasement to any transcendent authority, and instead becomes a force—a force of life, a living breathing philosophy for the nonphilosopher.

The challenge is balancing the complexity of Spinoza and Deleuze with their radical pragmatic and liberating conceptual tools. Attempting to use Affect in the Spinozist/Deleuzian sense of the word means integrating its relations with other concepts, because leaving out all ontological pretext in attempting to implement a concept like affect means butchering it from its larger body, thus making it lifeless and unusable. The benefit of framing pedagogy around encounters of subjectivity and affect is that it recenters our understanding toward what it is teachers really do, which is build relationships with young people.

Affective pedagogy shifts discourses toward building spaces designed for the immediate benefit of the relations and subjectivities that compose them, and in order to do this one must draw on an immanent ontological position based in praxis (Dahlbeck, 2014). This means opening up new possibilities in the staple educational discourse of critical pedagogy (Giroux, 2009; Freire, 2000; Kincheole, 2003) while also extending the emerging field of affective pedagogy (Dahlbeck 2014; Watkins 2006; Zembylas, 2007) within the context of biopolitical capital (Hardt and Negri, 2001, 2005, 2009).

Affect

For Seigworth and Gregg (2010), it is not what affect or affect theory is that should concern theorist of affect but instead what it can do. To
elaborate on this shift from the content to the action of affect, the two editors reiterate Spinoza’s famous line, “no one has yet determined what the body can do” (as cited in Seigworth and Gregg, 2010, p. 3), in order to emphasize that affect remains within the continuous unraveling of what it is exactly the body or bodies can do, and how one can use it to map out this infinite domain of bodies. In his series of lectures on Spinozist affect, Deleuze (1978/1980/1981) states:

And here it is no longer the domain of a comparison of the mind between two states, it is the domain of the lived passage from one state to another, the lived passage in the affect. So much so that it seems to me that we can understand nothing of the Ethics, that is of the theory of the affects, if we don’t keep very much in mind the opposition that Spinoza established between the comparisons between two states of the mind, and the lived passages from one state to another, lived passages that can only be lived in the affects. (para 21)

This quote from Deleuze is important because it reiterates Spinoza’s distinction between our ideas of affect and what affect really is materially among bodies. Thus Affect is a lived passage of duration among bodies. It is not two states in comparison with each other, but rather the transition of the body(ies) between those two states. Again it is worth repeating Spinoza’s “we do not know what the body can do,” a statement that sets up the conceptual transitions from subjects of sovereign power to bodies each as “a singular essence, which is to say, a degree of power” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 27). This de-essentialism of the individual is not to suggest that human bodies are limitless in their own right, but rather that their engagement with other bodies and environmental conditions remain limitless in their capacities to affect one another as assemblages (Skott-Myhre, 2008). In this new understanding of bodies, affect breaks free from limited essentialized beings and becomes relational between bodies contained by capacities to be affected and to affect other bodies in either an empowering act of composition or a disempowering act of decomposition. It is within this ontological relation of bodies as modes with certain capacities of affect that we find the definition of Spinoza’s affect so important.

This is the ontological affect that Hardt and Negri propose as the center of institutions of affect. Returning to the last chapter of Commonwealth, Heart and Negri (2009) are worth quoting at length regarding this issue:

The path of Joy is constantly to open new possibilities, to expand our field of imagination, our abilities to feel and be affected, our capacities
for action and passion. In Spinoza's thought, in fact, there is a correspondence between our power to affect (our mind’s power to think and our body’s power to act) and our power to be affected. The greater our mind’s ability to think, the greater its capacity to be affected by the ideas of others; the greater our body’s ability to act, the greater its capacity to be affected by other bodies. And we have greater power to think and to act, Spinoza explains, the more we interact and create common relations with others. Joy, in other words, is really the result of joyful encounters with others, encounters that increase our powers, and the institution of these encounters, such that they last and repeat. (p. 379)

My interest in the student-teacher as immanent encounters is done so on two main personal fronts in regards to building encounters of joy and affect as outlined above by Hardt and Negri (2009)—first being that my work in educational institutions and the subjectivities that I engage with have always been blurred, in teacher’s college I was the student-teacher, and now in grad school I am the teacher-student. As a “teacher” I had access to the system, I learned the language of administration, I learned how to walk as an authority figure and where to stand, how to position myself as a subject of authority. As a student I was given space to take risks, to let students get away from the ever expanding apparatus of standardized testing by dismissing absurd technocratic rules that strangled creativity of both the students and myself.

It is my role as a teacher that I discovered that typical Marxist terms like “false consciousness” and “alienation” were useful but not wholly satisfying in terms of describing my encounters with young people as subjective bodies. In that they did not adequately concern themselves with why it is students and I could learn more by staying in at recess and playing scrabble then in the following whole afternoon of classes I would teach them. How do I better understand the phenomena of these encounters in and of themselves, as encounters of subjectivities, rather than solely through the larger political forces that constitute them?

The second front that I have found the encounter of subjectivities to be of value is in my pursuits as an activist. Although I have issues with the term activist, it best categorizes my pursuits as a young person, working primarily with other young people to build relationships and construct alternative avenues for community politics. In this capacity I have found that being a teacher or being a student is less about education and more about institutions, in how do we play certain roles in these institutions that we attempt to build together.
In the seminal work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire (2005) outlines the encounters of teachers and students as engagements of subjectivities, and holds dialogue as the main form of engagement between student and teacher; thus, the relationship between student and teacher for Freire (2005) is fundamentally if not completely linked through language. In solidarity with the students the teacher and student engage directly with the larger sociopolitical and historical contexts, but always through language (Kincheole, 2003). Thus, the student-teacher relationship is largely defined as one wholly through language.

What immanent affect does is extend the craft of teaching beyond the domain of language and into what Deleuze (2007) considered the AND of a relation. Teaching and the institutional roles that compose it are indeed embedded in discourses, but the actions of teaching are the encounters of bodies and the subjectivities they produce. This is why Deleuze and Guattari (1992) considered affects to be like weapons on the longitudinal and latitudinal cartographic plane of bodies. Critical theory and self-reflexivity are only one component of teaching, the other is what is actually done, what it is educators and students do together as bodies, and that’s where affect can assist in outlining new territory for empowering educators, in the hopes of building new spaces of learning.

**Ontology**

An ontology is a set of parameters about life or reality that one uses as reference points (common concepts include truth, being, the self, etc.). It is not about proving my ontology to be correct but about analyzing how it comes to be and what characterizes its processes. It is like shining a spotlight on a phenomenon that strips that phenomenon bare to its most basic assumptions and it is up to the researcher to inquire about how the assumptions are constructed and why. It is making bare all the deep epistemological pillars that uphold a specific ideology or process of thought that constitutes human behavior at least partially (Kinchole and Mclaren 2005).

At its most basic description ontology is the inquiry of what it means to be or “being.” Ontology is primarily associated with the disciplinary tradition of philosophy, and its origins are most notably attributed to Aristotle and his *Metaphysics*. It was in the *Metaphysics* that Aristotle drew out the infamous inquiry of “being qua being” as its own conceptual pursuit separate from physical scientific studies. The pursuit of being in and of itself remained one of the
cornerstones of philosophical insights in the history of ideas capsizing with Heidegger’s “being and time” (Jacquette, 2002). Heidegger can be seen as bringing “phenomenology back to classical ontology” in a “brooding reflection over the failure of modernity and destruction of its values” (Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 29). The poststructural turn of philosophical thought in the second half of the twentieth century, and its reflection on traditional philosophical tools such as language, power, and oppression, revealed the limitations of these dominant Western philosophical discourses while also exposing these traditional ontological questions of being as *transcendental ontology* (Hardt and Negri, 2001).

Hardt and Negri (2001) refer to *transcendental ontology* as a “transcendental apparatus” that is “capable of disciplining a multitude of formally free subjects,” and according to Hardt and Negri (2001), historically philosophers have simply disputed “where this mediation was situated and what metaphysical level it occupied, but it was fundamental that in some way it be defined as an ineluctable condition of all human action, art and association” (p. 78). From Descartes, to Kant, and to Hegel, there has always been a tight relationship between modern European politics and metaphysics, or as Hardt and Negri (2001) put it: “Politics resides at the center of metaphysics because modern European metaphysics arose in response to the challenge of the liberated singularities and the revolutionary constitution of the multitude” (p. 83). Thus, *transcendental ontology* essentially acts a form of appropriation, one that acts through abstract representations in order to condition bodies and the relations that compose them (Hardt and Negri, 2001). For example, within schools, bodies are abstracted to the roles of “students” or “teachers” and are punished for deviating from these forms of representation. What this appropriation does, as *Transcendental Ontology*, is immediately contain any form of possibility of different relations (both meaningful and hostile) and the ontological production that these relationships could possibly generate.

In Antonio Negri’s *The Savage Anomaly* (1991), Negri claims that Spinoza offers an “ontological philosophy of praxis” (p. 125) or “the constitution of collectivity as praxis” (p. 21), while also mapping out how the radical potential that Spinoza’s ontology offers is subsumed and appropriated (transcendental ontology) within the academic and political discourses that contextualize Spinoza during his particular historical epoch as well as in the present one, a process that leads to what Negri refers to as “Spinozism.” This is the general theme of Negri’s *The Savage Anomaly*, but is also the cornerstone of Negri’s
later works, where this infinite ontology verses contextual appropriation is a theme extended and enriched (1996, 2001, 2005, 2009). But what is this “ontology” that Negri deems to be the true interpretation? And why has it been continuously dismantled and appropriated? And what use is it for contextualizing affect?

Transcendent ontology is configured as a fundamental component within Hardt and Negri’s theory of *Multitude* (2005) and *Empire* (2001). Hardt and Negri (2001, 2005, 2009) outline that abstracting ourselves into static representations and conditioning our behavior and relationships to those ideas is not only a fundamental tool for appropriation, but is also fundamentally backwards in terms of configuring any form of liberating political practices. In this context people rely on assumptions and stereotypes as points of reference for their own patterns of thought and action, which Freire (2005) would label as a disengagement of subjectivity. What Spinoza provides, according to Negri (1992) and Deleuze (1988) as well as many others (Gatens, 1996; Ruddick, 2010; Williams, 2010), is a way out of this habit of appropriation. Ruddick (2010) outlines the potential of Spinoza’s ontology in this regard: “The conception distinguishes between innate power and domination/alienation, providing contemporary Marxists and post-Marxists with a basis for understanding resistance as something more than a reaction-formation to the oppressive capacities of capitalism or other structures of oppression” (p. 25).

In *Spinoza: A Practical Philosophy*, Deleuze (1988) outlines Spinoza’s ontological and ethical paradigms with great lucidity and constitutes the term affect within the plane of immanence. Deleuze distinguishes between the common interpretation of Spinozian affection (*affectio*) and affect (*affectus*), from what Deleuze thinks is the more legitimate one. The common interpretation positions the two terms within the mind/body dichotomy of transcendent ontology, *affectio* being the affect of the body and *affectus* being the affect of the mind. This interpretation however fails to capture the complexity of Spinoza’s affect and also reappropriates it into the dominant Cartesianism paradigm of Spinoza’s historical period, a paradigm that Spinoza worked so diligently to undermine (Jarret, 2007). Deleuze (1988) makes clear how these two terms of affect work within both the body and mind holistically:

The *affectio* refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body, whereas the *affectus* refers to the passage from one state to another, taking into account the correlative variation of the affecting bodies. (p. 49)
Here Deleuze (1988) makes the distinction that affect does not influence the mind or body independently, but rather a positioning of an affective body within relation(s) to other affecting bodies. Spinoza breaks down the mind/body dichotomy specifically in Part II, proposition 13, of The Ethics where he claims that “the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body—i.e. a definite mode of extension actually existing. And nothing else” (p. 71). Spinoza explains further that we “have ideas of the affections of a body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, a body actually existing” as “the human Mind is united to the Body” (p. 65). This reorientation of mind/body by Spinoza is referred to as “parallelism” and is fundamental to Spinoza’s generative ontological paradigm, as Delueze (1988) elaborates:

The practical significance of parallelism is manifested in the reversal of the traditional principle on which Morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness. It was said that when the body acted, the mind was acted upon, and the mind did not act without the body being acted upon in turn (the rule of the inverse relation, cf. Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, articles 1 and 2). According to the Ethics, on the contrary, what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind. There is no primacy of one series over the other. (p. 18)

This parallelism is what lays the groundwork for Spinoza’s ontology and ethics, which provides the context for truly affective relationships within the Spinozist/Deleuzian understanding of the term. By undermining the traditional mind over body dichotomy, the dichotomy that upholds transcendental ontology, Spinoza reconstitutes morality from the bottom up, in that morality is no longer the divine law of good and evil but a rigorous ethics of good and bad, or, as Spinoza phrases it, “joy” versus “the sad passions”; this is an ontological reversal from the judgment of the sovereign power to a generative expression, or, as Deleuze (1988) puts it: “There is, then, a philosophy of ‘life’ in Spinoza; it consists precisely in denouncing all that separates us from life, all these transcendent values that are turned against life” (p. 26).

Ontology and Education

In their work Commonwealth Heart and Negri (2009) conclude their series with a final chapter subtitled “Instituting Happiness.” The two
thinkers summarize their seminal political critique with a hopeful inquiry into what is to be done next or more accurately now. In their concluding chapter, Heart and Negri propose what most mainstream educational theorists do that any kind of claim to a theory of education is also a claim to a theory of sociopolitical orientations, meaning that to inquire about what it entails to teach is to inquire about what it entails to be social and political. This contextualizing of education within its larger sociopolitical context is what Dewey (1997) and more critically Freire emphasize as fundamentally necessary in any serious approach to pedagogy. Even teaching methods that are based on self-proclamations of nonpolitical pedagogy are saturated in market-driven ideologies of what it means to be a “citizen” or “consumer” or “productive,” and all within technocratic and psychological epistemologies based in control (Kincheloe, 2003; Giroux, 2011; Pinar, 2012).

Now more than ever there is no escaping the political when in engaging with the educational. What constitutes the abstract roles of a student and the roles of the teacher and their relationships to each other is to discover that this process of abstraction is equivalent to the process of abstraction from body to citizen—worker—woman, or what Deleuze refers to as “becomings,” and what it means to play these abstract roles that are codified be ideological discourses. It is this engagement, or “micro-politics,” that thinkers such as Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, and others, help navigate (Gatens 1996), whether this navigation is the technologies of the self, the multiplicity of desire, or the ontological expression of life in contrast with the apparatuses that seek to appropriate it (Hardt and Negri 2001). This intricate and complicated entanglement of bodies and the affects they produce is where teaching and learning really happens.

In his outlining the parameters of the society of control, Deleuze (1995) describes the position of schools and other institutions as being in perpetual flux or in a constant motion of training and retraining. For Deleuze; “One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated from the workspace as another closed site, but both disappearing and giving way to frightful continual training, to continual monitoring” (1995, p. 180). In this new society of control that Deleuze articulates, the walls of the institutions fall and what it is replaced with is a smooth surface of the constant ineptness of vocational preparation. This dismantling has been outlined by current scholars in the field of critical pedagogy (Giroux, 2009 and curriculum theory (Pinar, 2012) alike, its origins have been labeled many names such as neoliberalism, empire, and casino capitalism, while
its obscene tactics have been outlined with great lucidity: austerity, standardized testing, and anti-intellectualism to name a few (Giroux, 2009; Kincheloe, 2003; Pinar, 2012; Reynolds and Weber, 2004). As Pinar (2012) points out, what is needed now is a conversation on what curriculum or pedagogy can be, and the postmodern conceptual tools that can be used to reorientate pedagogical practices away from reductionist value systems of quantification and technocratic methodologies of behavior control.

**Schools as Producers of Subjectivities**

Although the dismantling of these institutions in their material form is certain, this does not mean a breakdown of the subjectivities they produce: Hardt and Negri (2000) remind us that “the enclosures that used to define the limited space of the institutions have broken down so that the logic that once functioned primarily within the institutional walls now spreads across the entire social terrain. Inside and outside are becoming indistinguishable” (p. 196). This is what the intimate detail of Foucault’s work outlines, how exactly it is that disciplinary practices produce themselves immanently and subjectively within “biopower” (Hardt and Negri, 2000). According to Hardt and Negri (2000), “Biopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it... Biopower thus refers to a situation in which what is directly at stake in power is the production and reproduction of life itself” (pp. 24–25). In the context of the school it is not the principle’s discipline but the habits and mannerisms of the students that enact them (as biopower) that produce the institutions as they are. Thus the role of the principle, as the one in power, is an illusion. The great force of biopower is what hangs in the back of your head as a teacher in the guise of “what if today these kids just decide not listen to me?”. This is the dreaded feeling that makes some teachers into dictators and others into saints. The former looks to squash any sense of creative interaction, while the latter pleads and guilts them not to do so.

This process of institutions separating people from the means of producing themselves (in expressing a surplus) is fundamental to capitalism. In the words of Marx, this is the social relation that holds variable capital to constant capital, in that the factory worker (variable capital) has always had the ability to produce a surplus but lacked the means of doing so in the form of machines (constant capital) (Hardt and Negri, 2009). Hardt and Negri (2009) claim that now in the
capitalism of biopower the space between variable capital and constant capital (or our ability to express ourselves subjectively) has never been weaker. Students today have never had more powerful tools for learning at their disposal and this is a fundamental anxiety among many administrators characterized by demands that students not bring in what they have learned “out there.”

In the context of schools, in the discipline society, schools were in charge of producing subjectivities aligned with factory workers. In the context of biopower, it is the subjectivities themselves as they are produced that is the drive of production and accumulation (Hardt and Negri, 2009). This is just one example of why schools find themselves in crisis; structurally speaking, the most important point is that public schools are no longer needed simply because they were constructed to serve specific economic ends that no longer exist. During industrial capital schools were responsible for producing certain subjectivities that maintained production and the separation of people from the means to produce value, whereas now it is the producing of subjectivities themselves that produce value; thus, the tools for doing so are immediate and always shifting.

Affective Pedagogy

Megan Watkins (2006) is often cited as being one of the founders of engaging Spinoza’s affect within educational theory (Dahlbeck, 2014; Mulcahy, 2012). In her article “Pedagogic Affect/Effect: Embodying a Desire to Learn,” Watkins (2006) plugs the “Deleuzian/Spinozistic” term of affect into the discourse of pedagogy and educational theory. Watkins conceptualizes affect as “understood from a Deleuzian/Spinozistic perspective as force or capacity” (p. 270). Watkins uses the work of Gibbs (2002) and Newton (2003) to explore the biological studies of affect within the realm of the physical body, while also attempting a reconfiguration of affect into Vygoskian social psychology. Watkins is careful to distinguish between affect and emotion, unlike many (see Ahmed, 2004; Boler, 1999) in the biological field who tend to clump the two together (as cited in Watkins, 2006). Watkins (2006) describes her use of affect as a tool to redefine the classic binaries of mind/body and unconscious/conscious; Watkins (2006) describes this attempt:

It involves not simply focusing on nature/culture and individual/society but the relations of mind/body and consciousness/unconsciousness in reconceptualising being, so crucial in theorising pedagogic
practice. Affect provides a useful mechanism for doing this. The notion of affect I want to pursue does not deny its biological realisation; rather, it is more the case that I want to broach this dimension of affect from a philosophical perspective as an ontological issue. (pp. 271–272)

Watkins’s choice here to frame affect as an “ontological issue” outlines the significant weight that Spinoza’s affect brings with it and is why her conceptualizing of the term is so important. What Watkins (2006) and others such as Zembylas (2007) make clear is that without the ontological weight of Spinoza/Deleuze there is no true affect, because it allows the term to fall back into the domain of emotional intelligence or other psychological concepts.

Using the Deleuzian/Spinozaistic form of affect, Dahlbeck (2014) cites Watkins (2006) and defines affective pedagogy “as the idea that generating (and being sensitive to) bodily affects-understood in terms of force and capacity rather than emotion or feeling” (p. 20). Dahlbeck (2014) draws on Watkin’s Deleuzian/Spinozaistic conceptualizing of affect and refers to Sam Seller’s (2009) assertion that pedagogy must be based in ethics rather than technical or methodological assertions resulting in a more ontologically inclined inquiry. Sam Seller (2009) presents pedagogy as “an inherently relational, emergent, and non-linear process that is unpredictable and therefore unknowable in advance” (p. 351). By using this form of pedagogy, Dahlbeck (2014) avoids “academic success” as the goal of affective pedagogy and instead frames it as follows:

Affective learning pertains to the idea that generating (and being sensitive to) bodily affects—understood in terms of force and capacity rather than emotion or feeling (Watkins, 2006, pp. 270, 273)—can be thought of as the very hotbed of learning, where learning is understood as a creative process of experimentation with an exploration of one’s bodily capabilities—of exploring the as of yet unknown—rather than as a purely reflective process of developing one’s supposed natural ability to recognize and identify that which is already known. (p. 20)

Seller’s (2009) conceptualizing of pedagogy is important for the context of affective pedagogy (Dahlbeck 2014). In his article “The Responsible Uncertainty of Pedagogy,” Seller (2009) raises the challenging question that “perhaps pedagogy cannot readily be described because it is inherently relational?” (p. 350). In his attempt at wrestling with pedagogy as a fluctuating relational event between bodies, Seller (2009) chooses to define pedagogy as a process that “is thereby
framed as a fundamentally relational process, which has ontological primacy over the knowledge and identities it produces” (p. 351). This correlates well with the Deleuzian/Spinozaistic affect because it eliminates any top-down ontological presumptions, because if pedagogy truly is “an inherently relational, emergent, and non-linear process that is unpredictable and therefore unknowable in advance” (Seller, 2009, p.351), then there is a constant opening for generative and context specific forms of relations among bodies, a process that results in what Dahlbeck (2014) describes as being “able to create something new and becoming something different body and mind” (p. 22). What follows then is an attempt to rebuild curriculum as it stands now in hopes of what it can be within the new domain of affective relationships.

**Building an Ontological Curriculum**

For those prospective and practicing teachers for whom teacher education has been primarily an introduction to the instructional fields—the teaching of reading or mathematics or science—curriculum theory may come as something of a shock, if only due to its emphasis on ‘what’ one teaches, rather than on ‘how’. Of course how one teaches remains a major preoccupation of curriculum theorists, but not in terms of devising a ‘technology’ of ‘what works’, not as a form of social engineering designed to produce predictable effects (i.e., ‘learning’), too often quantified as scores on standardized exams. (Pinar 2012, p. 30)

This best outlines my experience of attempting to engage with curriculum in the field of teaching. During teacher’s college, my first encounter with curriculum was as a pretext to in-classroom experience, so it was solely an encounter with the language and ideas proposed by the ministry of education maintained by the curriculum documents. The Ontario curriculum is constructed as a series of “expectations” within different teachable subjects; thus, the curriculum acts as a discursive structure in which all real life educational experiences are positioned. All lesson plans were to be configured to the set parameters of the curriculum “expectations”; it was not about what we taught but rather about how we taught. Thus, learning to teach meant learning the technocratic methodologies of knowledge production, tricking the students into learning via technology or entertaining practices. This is the kind of discourse that produces
horrible slogans like “edutainment,” while terms such as “pedagogy” or “scholarly” that remain untaught, or worse, are appropriated into one-dimensional definitions that are to be regurgitated and reproduced without criticality.

When I was finally in a classroom and creating lesson plans every day, I discovered that most, if not all, teachers were not using the curriculum expectations that were used in our teaching method courses. In fact, the process of lesson planning and materials gathering was much more creative and collective of an experience than the top-down forcing of curriculum expectations. The only reason the curriculum expectations remained relevant was because our evaluations were largely based on our collection of lesson plans and how well we had aligned them with curriculum expectations. From my experiences then, curriculum’s main function is a wholly political one, in that it forces administrative discourses on young ambitious teachers, and within such a hostile job market it is the equivalent of intellectual blackmail. Learn and speak the language or don’t get a job. Learn the code, regurgitate the code, and forget about pedagogy or any pursuits of critical inquiry.

William Pinar (2012) outlines an alternative form of curriculum, one that transitions away from technocratic methods and standardized value systems and into the possible domain of understanding education as encounters of subjectivities. For Pinar (2012), the role of curriculum is to understand “what knowledge is of the most meaning” in terms of characterising education as meaningful experience. Pinar (2012) explains:

Curriculum theory, then, is a field of scholarly inquiry within the broad academic field of education that endeavors to understand curriculum as educational experience...curriculum theory aspires to understand the overall educational significance of the curriculum, focusing especially upon interdisciplinary themes—such as gender or multiculturalism or sustainability—as well as the relations among the curriculum, the individual, society, and history. (pp. 30–31)

Exploring the potential of creating truly affective relationships among teachers and students involves exploring the fundamental presumptions that construct educational institutions and ourselves. If there is to be a transition away from old industrial forms of educational institutions, and their quantitative systems of value, it must be within new ontological encounters of subjectivities where affect and the capacity to affect are engaged.
In their final chapter of *Commonwealth*, Hardt and Negri (2009) link education with the concept of human nature:

Human nature similarly is not immutable but rather open to a process of training and education. This does not mean that there are no limits to what we can do or that we can break absolutely from the past to create a clean slate... What it does mean, though, is that change is possible at the most basic level of our world and ourselves and that we can intervene in this process to orient it along the lines of our desires, toward happiness. (p. 378).

By linking education with human nature, Hardt and Negri (2009) remind us that any project of education must be an ontological one. Cynicism at its worst is the entrenched certainty that we are all biologically determined according to certain transcendental absolutes; it is the robbing of our capacity to create, and the blocking of the infallible fact that we are infinite in our relations and our abilities to transform them. This is the project that Spinoza’s ontology prepares us for; it is only equipped with an ontology or what Negri (1992) refers to as a “constituent ontological praxis” in which we have the conceptual tools to tackle the ever present now, because the most mendacious ideology is the one that denies us the immediacy of action, of creative transformation, of the only thing we can truly claim to own—our capacities to affect and to be affected.

**References**


PART III

Immanent and Critical Encounters with Psychology

*Kathleen S. G. Skott-Myhre*

The authors in this part write from the edges of the massive disciplinary edifice that is contemporary psychology. As we enter the twenty-first century, the domains of human experience that psychology purports to address are in profound crisis. Psychological pain and emotional suffering are endemic and profound. Anxiety is the existential condition of daily life for people around the world. Capitalism no longer simply exploits and appropriates our bodies, but is now deeply involved in turning our very consciousness and desires to its own ends. Without a doubt this could be the moment where psychology could take a role in assisting human beings in reclaiming their emotional and psychological lives. Instead, however, the heart of the discipline of psychology as a discipline continues its long trajectory of supporting the status quo and assisting in the integration of human capacity into the regimes of domination and control.

This part contains elements of an alternative psychology. Using a transdisciplinary approach that returns to psychology as a field inclusive of literature, philosophy, and cultural critique, it opens a liminal space at the borders where psychology collides with critical thinking and the politics of immanence. The authors here propose psychology as field that has the capacity to produce new modes of subjectivity, consciousness, and affect. Together they ask that we rethink concepts such as deficits and deviance and contest the dominant constructions of pathology premised in the dialectical approach to difference as lack. Collectively, the authors in this part propose “struggle and difference” as fields of resource and possibility.
CHAPTER 9

Youth: A Radical Space of Pilgrimage

Kathleen S. G. Skott-Myhre

INTRODUCTION

French ethnographer, Arnold van Gennep (2011), first introduced the concept of liminality to the field of anthropology in the early twentieth century as the transitional or middle stage of a three-stage model in ritual rights of passage. Anthropologist Victor Turner (1995) later focused upon and expanded the concept of liminality as an important place or period situated between two phases in which an individual has separated from the society to which they previously belonged and has yet to be reintegrated into that society. It is in this space of ambiguity and uncertainty, of restlessness and anticipation that we find youth.

Utilizing the theoretical perspectives of Gloria Anzaldua’s (1999) work on border subjectivity and Rosi Braidotti’s (2013) proposals about nomadic subjects, this chapter proposes that youth is a time in which one is suspended in the space between and should be understood as holding the potential for revolutionary experience. Rather than viewing young people as enduring a period of storm and stress, a phase that one will simply “get over,” perhaps psychologists and psychotherapists might begin to see youth redefined as a “radical space of pilgrimage” (Watkins and Shulman, 2008, p. 134) with both personal and political implications.

Caught Up in a Discourse

In 2005 I had been fleetingly duped into a particular way of understanding what “adolescence” was all about. I had written a short
commentary describing my misguided knowledge of what adoles-
ence was all about based on the dominant discourse of developmen-
tal psychology (Skott-Myhre, 2005). In the aforementioned article, I
was referencing a period of time when my son was 13 years old and I
was noting all of the signs of his spiraling journey into the depths of
what G. Stanley Hall (1904) characterized as the “sturm and drang”
or “storm and stress” of adolescence. I was in the throes of my gradu-
ate work and was paying close attention to the literature that pointed
out and supported my identification of his risk taking, pleasure seek-
ing, rebellious, and antisocial behaviors and activities (Steinberg and
Morris, 2001). The first sign I thought I perceived of his spiraling
downwards was when his sweet and gentle nature morphed into con-
tradICTIng and debating our shared dedication to our well rehearsed
and discussed interpretation of what it meant to have values, and our
mutual respect for following the rules. Sure we discussed current
events and our joint disapproval of the destruction of the planet and
he offered up the poor treatment of animals, all in the name of feed-
ing our already gluttonous middle-class desire for meat products. He
had even convinced me that we might opt out of the support of ani-
mal cruelty by adopting a vegetarian lifestyle. In spite of my growing
discomfort with his personal rebellion against me as his mom, I could
not have been more proud of my son for taking a stand.

The shift became more serious and concerning, in my eyes, when
he began adopting the alternative clothing style that was a combina-
tion of the various subcultures of punk, grunge, and skater that he
was drawn to. At first I thought it was “cute” and accepted, even
supported, his choice of personal style including helping him to dye
his hair green. But things became a bit more difficult as he started
hanging out with other adolescents who (by their own admission)
experimented with drugs, broke rules at school, broke laws on the
street, ran away from home, and engaged in “inappropriate” sexual
activities.

As I voiced my motherly concern to my angel of a son, he began to
fight back and justify the various illicit activities that his friends were
engaging in. He even began to join them in their derelict undertak-
ings by staying out past his curfew, smoking cigarettes, sneaking out
in the middle of the night, and skipping school. I feared for my son
and our relationship, but took refuge in the long-held notion that
adolescence was merely a transitory state that developmental theo-
rists explained as a turbulent (but temporary!) period of time charged
by hormonal factors that contribute to this stormy season of change
(Erikson, 1993; Hall, 1904; Piaget, 1977). I understood that he was
in need of figuring out who he was and separating himself from (oh the pain!) his parents.

In retrospect, I am astonished by the force and subtlety of the ideas about adolescents that permeated my experience of my relationship with my son. Erica Burman (2007) in her work *Deconstructing Developmental Psychology* notes the power that developmental psychology, “more than any other psychology” (p. 2), has on our day-to-day interactions and how we think of our relationships and ourselves. She suggests that part of that power is in the way developmental psychology presents itself as simply a matter-of-fact accounting of how life is arranged and how we grow and change. Burman reminds us, however, that such an account cannot be disentangled from the broader social forces that comprise late-stage capitalist society. Although developmental psychology proposes its field of study to be a neutral scientific description of familial relations and their impact of the growth and development of children, its descriptions obscure the actualities of capitalist exploitation and appropriation within the home. The home and the relationships produced within the family are central to the ways in which the dominant mode of society reproduces itself.

As Fredericci (2004) points out, the home, as a site of unpaid female labor, is central to capitalist economic appropriation. Without women who do the labor of social reproduction without compensation, the capitalist mode of accumulation would be thrown into significant crisis. Burman (2007) notes that because of the importance of the home, both economically and as a site of social reproduction, what goes on in the home carries immense emotional anxiety and fear of social censure on the part of both parents and children. The stakes for the dominant society are large, and the investment put into controlling and disciplining the behavior and relationships within the home is significant. Burman (2007) argues that developmental psychology and its discourses about development and appropriate relationships play a central role in the control and discipline of families. There are few families who do not feel the power of developmental psychology as a way that they evaluate themselves, their children, and their relation to the broader society.

The mandate to parents to civilize their children on behalf of the rest of society is both powerful and pervasive. Burman (2007) suggests that it is this mandate, in combination with the descriptions of young people as inherently different biologically, psychologically, and emotionally, that produces adolescents as “mysterious and alien” (p. 77). Such a view of young people also, she notes, makes their articulations insensible unless rearticulated in adult discourse. The
incorporation of this discourse into the home environment drives a wedge between parents and children that predisposes parents to read their children as alien and to treat their behavior as inexplicable. Similarly, as young people begin to experience the efforts by their parents to control and subjugate them, they understandably mount varying degrees of resistance and sabotage. What is lost here is the possibility of a joint understanding of the modes of exploitation and appropriation, by the dominant system of discipline and control that women and children hold in common. Any ability to see common points of struggle, alienation, and marginalization is obscured by the discourses of development.

The impact that this had for me was that I neglected to take into account my own journey, a journey that was transpiring right alongside my son's. I had been divorced since my son was two years old, I was working as a cosmetologist, and I was going to graduate school. I too was exploring a new identity and separating myself from my idealized version of what it meant to be a parent.

One of the unfortunate effects of the discourse of development that divides women and adolescents is the way that it promotes a reading of development as primarily sited within the individual biologically and psychologically. In this, it misses the possibility of adolescence as a key social reading of the relationship of society to life. Moira Gatens (1996) makes the case that we might want to rethink development in terms of morphology rather than more linear accounts of change. Gatens proposes that morphology allows us to see the body as active and desiring, “that breaks with traditional boundaries between desire and instinct, between consciousness and bodies” (p. 58). The body as active and desiring is premised on a different reading of desire. We tend to think of desire as the desire for something, but here it is the desire to act, to do, or to produce. In this sense the adolescent body is not a body that lacks sociality, but a body that has the full capacity of living force that inherently exceeds domination. It is important and interesting to note that Gatens is primarily focused on reading the female body in relation to its subjugation. For our purposes, it is evocative to consider the possibility that the adolescent body and the female body, as mother, could both be read morphologically. Reading the bodies of adolescents and mothers in this way, as sites of active desiring production, we can begin to see how the social discourses of adolescence and adolescent-adult relations strain and constrain the living capacities of the body. This is particularly obvious within the conditions of appropriation and exploitation of the capacities of social exchange to be found in the home. In this sense, the rebellious and
resistant behaviors of the adolescent might be seen as indicative of specifically the areas where society is acting as agent of domination. We might well make the same case about unruly women.

Another problem with the reification of the discourse of adolescence as both problematic and transitory is that we cut short the possibilities that lie within this liminal space as we try to rush young people through what could be a highly productive space in order to assuage our own fears.

We all have various spaces that we retreat to, are drawn to, or run to, as we remake ourselves over and over again. We reflect and consider all of the alternative ways that we can be in the world. For some of us, we reconsider what it means to be a mother, a wife, a daughter, a sister, a teacher, a scholar, a friend, an artist, and so forth. We experiment with various “selves” and try on new “identities.” We hang out with new friends, wear new clothing, and style and color our hair in new ways. It may be the transition from daughter to wife, or perhaps wife to divorcee. We wrestle with time and space as we continually reflect and review where we are, where we are going, and from where we have come. What strikes me as I write this are all of the “landing points” or launching points that we use to mark identity. What intrigues me is the space between the launching and the landing. What happens as we move through this liminal space between that moves, inspires, and transforms? Why do we consider those wonderfully transformative spaces as something to endure, to “get through” or, in the case of adolescence, a phase that will pass? What if we began to consider that space in a new way? What if we journeyed alongside those who find themselves in such a space? What if we stopped looking at what could be and started paying more attention to what is?

I would like to begin to rethink the “phase” of “adolescence” in such a way that it starts taking on a new language, a new way of being in relationship with young people that offers the possibility of salvaging an important period of time in their (our) lives and offers us the opportunity to consider the political implications and the opening up of creative conversations in new ways with young people. Perhaps a new language will bring to light valuable insight into our own spaces.

**The Question of Adolescence as Border Subjectivity**

Conceivably we can begin to think of adolescence in the same manner that Gloria Anzaldúa (1999) describes her own “border subjectivity”
as a space in which one dwells for an indeterminate period of time creating, being, and becoming. I am not speaking of “becoming” in the usual sense of the word. A young person is not hanging out waiting to “become” an adult. Rather, I am speaking in terms of an immanent process of becoming.

Rosi Braidotti (2013a), following and elucidating Deleuze and Guattari, describes a nomadic form of becoming subject. This subject is produced through interactions with other subjects, rather than through any assertion of a preexisting internal self. The becoming subject is composed of virtual capacities which are only enacted in collisions with radically differentiated others. Becoming is indeterminate and contingent rather than composed teleologically or structurally. There is no predetermined trajectory that a young person advances through toward a prestructured destination biologically, emotionally, or psychologically. The notion of becoming along a predetermined trajectory from immature to mature from an immanent perspective, Braidotti argues, is a societal overcoding of a far more idiosyncratic and singular process of subjective composition.

Braidotti (2013) suggests the term “nomadic” to describe the movement of a becoming subject. Such a subject is in constant motion or flux. It is moving across the social terrain composing and being composed by all of the disparate elements encountered in each moment of the journey. The subject, as nomadic, develops through an ongoing process of interrelational metamorphoses in a complex ecological relation of dynamic power relations. In this context, power is both a hierarchical set of relations in which superior forces compose the subject, as well as a set of force relations in which the subject is sheer productive capacity. Becoming, for Braidotti, is an affirmation of the infinite possibilities of living force. The becoming subject is produced though an ever-shifting field of rigid structural elements that define and delimit the boundaries of who one is, or who one might be, and forces of decomposition that violate and constantly open the definitional parameters of the subject to indeterminacy and flux. Consequently, becoming is the subject in a nomadic configuration, always in motion while situated as the compositional center point of that movement.

The fact that the subject dwells within the world of dominant structures and definitions, while at the same time constantly exceeding the boundaries of such definitions in both large and small ways, is what defines the subject as what Anzaldua (1999) calls a border dweller. The border subject is one who lives in the liminal space between worlds. For Anzaldua, Border subjectivity is inherently
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hybrid. Such a subject is made up of the binary elements of race, gender, sexuality, age, and so forth, without falling to either side of the duality. Therefore, the border subject is neither male nor female, gay nor straight, Mexican nor American, youth nor adult, but is a shifting hybrid that is inclusive of elements of all without being any of them. It is a radically inclusive form of subjectivity that functions like a border town that includes all types of different modes and shadings of subjectivity and identity. The border town is formed and shaped by the forces geophysical, political, and cultural that brought it into existence. Those who are drawn to the border town, for whatever duration, also shape the cultural and social contours that comprise the community’s identity. Similarly, Anzaldua (1999) argues that border subjectivities are shifting amalgams of liminal encounters.

As a mode of subjectivity, adolescence might well be described in the terms we have been using above, such as nomadic, becoming, and border dweller. Adolescence is, like the border town, a social space created by historical and geographical forces to particular ends. It is a hybrid form that merges elements of childhood and adulthood, indeterminate performances of gender, race, sexuality, and class, as well as mixed expectations of social and emotional behavior. We might describe adolescence described this way as inherently liminal.

We need to think carefully about this term adolescence. Like Anzaldua’s (1999) border subjectivities, the becoming subject of adolescence is and is not adolescent. After all, the social space delineated by adolescence is circumscribed by the boundaries it shares with childhood and adulthood. As such, if we are to take Anzaldua seriously, the borderlands of adolescence are the most productive registers of the becoming subject. As a nomadic subject, the adolescent is in a constant traverse across the social landscape of liminal encounters engaged on the borders of becoming adult and child. We must remember, however, that this process of traverse is thoroughly material. The encounters are between actual bodies. While the dominant category of adolescence is being produced at the level of the abstract signifier, the becoming body/mind is being composed out of material encounters of the other. This means that the compositional field of border subjectivity imbricates not just the body/mind-designated adolescent, but also all other bodies along the border, adults and children alike. The encounter along the border of adolescence has significant possibilities for all the bodies involved. Engagements on the border have the capacity to unsettle and trouble binary forms of subjectivity. Such engagements can provoke the kind of anxiety that can evoke reactionary formations of false certainty. The production of
the firm taxonomies and hierarchies of adult identification and practice are no different than the rigid exclusionary practices of nationalist identity, fear of the immigrant, and race baiting that occurs on the borders of the nation-state. However, the obverse is also the case. The hybrid forms of identity, culture, music, food, families, and language are also products of the borderland of the nation-state. As adults, we might wonder about similar configurations of subjectivity and identity to be found along the border with young people.

Anzaldúa (1999) called herself a Mestiza and stated that she had no country because her homeland cast her out. But, she belonged to all countries because she was lesbian and there are lesbians in every country. She was a feminist and proclaimed herself cultureless because she challenged the cultures she was born into as being composed of male-derived beliefs that overcoded the feminine creative force within the religious and spiritual life of the community. Yet, she stated that she was cultured because she was participating in the creation of a new culture. She described her process of becoming as,

Soy un amasamiento, I am an act of kneading, of uniting, and joining that not only has produced both a creature of darkness and a creature of light, but also a creature that questions the definitions of light and dark and gives them new meanings. (p. 182)

As a mother, I wonder what new meanings might be derived in the borderland encounter with my son. As a woman, I am intrigued by our joint marginalization and what the commonality of both of us being border subjects living at the edge of the bounded territory of adult male patriarchy might presage. If adolescence as nomadic becoming is an active, productive process that incorporates and expands the lived experiences of the young person as they reside in the liminal space of the border, then what are the implications for me as an adult? Perhaps it is an opening of understanding and joint experiencing of the world through old and new eyes. Perhaps this is a space that so-called “adults” can join with and become a part of the creative capacities of youth.

As a mother, somehow this seemed less daunting when my son was still a child. I cannot help but recall all of the “firsts” my son experienced as a child—his first snow, his first encounter with an animal, his absolute glee in running through a puddle after a rainstorm. As I watched the wonder and delight on his face, I too saw snow for the first time all over again. I was becoming child. In this recollection, I can embody this notion and can, at times, call this particular way
of experiencing the world forth at will. I also recall a time as a young woman of 14 when I saw the world with perfect clarity and had a grasp on how I could not only make it on my own, but could also be a force within my family and within my community. I could see how my small acts of kindness or resistance affected my world. I understood how I could be an impact on the world one small act at a time. I was no longer insignificant.

These openings of memory evoke my becoming child and trouble the border that encloses me as an adult. They are rich with a force and capacity that opens my world to new ways of perceiving possibilities of action and thought. It is, of course, possible that such memories might, just as easily, trigger regret or loss. I could find myself yearning for my lost childhood and the lost relationship I had with my son when he was a child. This is the trap of nostalgia that depotentiates the force of becoming to be found in the relation with the other. It is to mistake memory as a vehicle for referencing what is past, rather than as an evocation of the force of memory that brings to light the capacities of the present. It is, after all, in the present that we remember and it is the present that is being produced by memory, not the past. What is evoking my memory are the current encounters along the border that are troubling the realm of certainty and foreclosure that comprise the rigid version of who I imagine myself to be.

Borderlands include many borders. Some borders are between others and ourselves; my son and myself. Others comprise the various territories of our identity, such as the border between memory and current perception. These are all liminal spaces that overlap and intersect. They are, as Anzaldua (1999) would say, hybrid spaces unrestricted by our usual sense of fixed cartographies. These borders compose spaces of passage from one state to the next and the next and so on.

**Implications for Psychotherapist/Psychologist Working with Young People**

Up until now I have been reflecting on my relationship with adolescence through the lens of how I have come to it as a mother. I have tried to understand the ways in which developmental psychology has limited and constrained the creative capacities of the nomadic configurations of border subjectivities. Now, I want to turn to the implications of this line of thinking and becoming for myself as an academic and a psychologist/psychotherapist.
What is becoming psychologist? The question is fraught with contradictions, contestations, and quandaries. For me, the first point of quandary and contestation is the idea that there is a clear and delineated boundary between my private self and my professional self. As a radical feminist psychologist, the idea that I could somehow separate my lived experience as a woman, as a mother, and as a daughter from my work as an academic, psychologist, and psychotherapist strikes me as both untenable and possibly unethical (Skott-Myhre, Weima, and Gibbs, 2012). The separation of my life from my work is part of the apparatus of psychology as it has been deployed to support the systems of domination and rule that is contemporary global capitalism (Burman, 2007; Parker, 2007; Watkins and Schulman, 2008). The function of separating myself as a woman, a mother, and a daughter serves to simultaneously distance myself from the commonalities of struggle I share with other women, mothers, and daughters under regimes of patriarchy and misogyny. It also obscures the contestations and collaborations to be found along the borders with other modes of subjectivity. When I propose to leave myself outside the classroom, the office, or the therapeutic spaces where I have worked, I engage the falsehood that I might be able to entertain the inherent sociality of psychology with a degree of separation and neutrality. To do this I must partition myself in ways that do injustice to my own struggle and those who struggle in my presence.

The call for such a partition lies in the Western discourses of mind/body separation and the valorization of the mind over the body. This line of thinking, delineated in the introduction to this volume, proposes psychology as the arbiter in the struggle between the irrationality of desire and the truths of reason. The purpose of traditional psychology is to use reason to discover the truths about human behavior and the structures of human consciousness. It seeks to found objective knowledge and dispassionate inquiry at the heart of the discipline of psychology. Such a vision is not rich enough for my blood.

Instead, I am called to a vision of psychology as a field that opens capacities for the production of new subjectivities and new worlds. This vision evokes the work of Ignacio Martin-Baró, Watkins and Schulman (2008) who refer to this as liberation psychology. They suggest that such a psychology is inherently collective and inclusive. Rather than operating on principles of partition and separation between the mind and body; therapist and client; adults and children, liberation psychology opens liminal spaces between subjectivities creating the very borderlands we have been describing.
Instead of the psychologist as the overseer and articulator of truths about human consciousness and behavior, we have the psychologist as “a convener, a witness, a co-participant, a mirror, and a holder of faith for the process through which those who have been silenced” (Watkins and Schulman, 2008, p. 26). In these roles, Watkins and Schulman propose that psychology might assist in the production of collective “historical memory” (p. 26). This is a move away from the individual as the sole source of memory to the idea that we all hold historical memory and that our individual subjectivities are collectively produced as a result of historical contestation and struggle at the level of culture and society.

To make the move from the individual to the collective, psychology would endeavor to engage in “critical analysis” (Watkins and Schulman, 2008, p. 26) wherein we would work together with those we encounter in our praxis to understand the conditions that constrain our capacities as effects of a dominant system of control and discipline. In understanding the disciplinary apparatus that seeks to limit the infinite field of capacity that is composed of all we hold in common, psychology would open the door to revisioning new futures and new worlds unconstrained by the current system of capitalist values. Psychology, in this vision, would moderate and balance reason and rationality by reopening the field of the imagination as critical to our future social and cultural self-production. This process is designed to resubjectify the rigid taxonomies and hierarchies of age, race, gender, and sexuality through a new psychology that operates at the level of the political, as the struggle to assert living force over abstract systems of domination.

This would be a communal psychology or a psychology we can all share with some of us choosing to make it our primary mode of life, while all of us have a say in its production as a way of making sense in terms of strategies for living. Such a psychology would place a central emphasis on the ecological health and well-being of all living things in an acknowledgment of their entangled relations (see Pacini-Ketchaw and Kind; Nxamolo, this volume). The process of nuanced, careful listening to the articulable and the inarticulate underlies any effort to make sense of what has happened, what is happening, and what might be possible to happen. The long-standing interest that psychology has had regarding dreaming would shift from archaeological field of interpretation to an investigation of dreaming as a dynamic way of accessing our collective wisdom and visioning the passage forward. Instead of psychology as a discipline that amplifies modes of social conformity, Watkins and Schulman (2008) propose a
praxis that investigates how we might develop modes of “oppositional consciousness” (p. 26). I would propose that this is a description of a truly nomadic psychology that traverses the dominant social, opening liminal spaces of creative alternative as it crosses the boundaries of taxonomy and hierarchy as well as the desert of value that it is capitalism as money and only money.

As I review this set of proposals, it strikes me that young people or adolescents already sustain many of the skill sets we desire to produce as adults interested in psychology as a liberatory praxis. The nomadic transit or passage across the liminal space of adolescence is profoundly counterposed to the transit of capitalism as it creates deserts of value and empties landscapes of life only to fill them with empty abstractions. Relevant to this transit, Watkins and Schulman (2008) describe what they call radical pilgrimage. They refer to Exodus and say that the process of becoming liberated is like entering a desert. To enter the desert, we must leave behind our world of certainty and engage an unfamiliar terrain in which what we have known no longer functions and where a future world, where we know what works, does not yet exist. Liberation, they tell us is “a long process filled with challenges, doubts and potential backsliding” (p. 36). They describe “a period of pilgrimage, trial and error, where exploration, confusion and the experience of being lost dominate” (p. 36). In this period of pilgrimage, subjectivity can be broken and remade multiple times.

Everyone can recognize this process as their own adolescence or the adolescence of someone they know or have known. What is remarkable is the ways in which we, as a society and as adults, have failed to see this as a model for liberation rather than a period of adjustment to be overcome. Youth as a time of rupture from the conventional and static patterns of the dominant social opens a space of radical pilgrimage with direct implications for reinventing social relations. It is a period of exploration and experimentation with forms of subjectivity, collectivity, praxis, and consciousness. The fact that we imagine this liminal space as temporally limited on the basis of an abstract system of linear development forecloses, to some degree, its social and cultural force.

What if we moved away from our framing of this space as temporary and problematic and began, instead, to engage it as a template for social change? How might it reconfigure youth-adult relations if we sought to learn from young people how to enter the desert and how to abandon our socially produced abstractions of self? Instead of abandoning young people to the desert while we stand on the edges fearfully peering in from the outside, what if we joined them?
To join them, however, would require a new set of social relations in which adults became trustworthy as fellow risk takers and not covert colonists, who wish to turn the desert back into the realm of the familiar.

In adopting the social relations described above, I would argue, psychology could have a role to play in assisting adults to open themselves to the possibilities of liberation. Rather than supporting parents in shaping their young people to the dictates of a brutal and insensate social regime, psychology could work to open lines of communication that would seek what we hold in common in our frustrated desires and creative aspirations.

This would mean opening up the possibility of “sitting” with ourselves, the young people, and the adults we encounter in our work in a different sort of way. It would suggest opening up new and creative conversations with them that puts the question of desire front and center. As young people in our contemporary society are already engaged in the pilgrimage, we would need to pay particular attention to their phenomenological expertise. We cannot take precisely the same road, because the tasks of liberation are different for each of us. But, the modes of survival in the desert are common to all of us. Engaging seriously with young people, as holding wisdom about the liminal spaces of indeterminate subjective production, can assist us in understanding our role in the collective struggle for a common vibrant valorization of living force. We might well learn as parents, law enforcement, social service administrators, psychiatrists, and ourselves as psychologists that the liminal space of adolescence is full of possibilities, full of potentialities. Once we set aside the normative discourse of youth as pathological and deviant, we can begin to uncover the vast areas of possibility and resource. This has implications, not just for youth and our encounters with them, but for us as well. Once we let go of the notion that young people are “unfinished” and need to be regulated and managed, the conversations open up in ways that allow us to let go of our own “lack.” As therapists and as parents, we are being given the opportunity to see ourselves as competent and resourceful.

What might letting go of our own narratives of lack look like? For me it means that every encounter I have with young people opens me to the liminal force of the nomadic. In praxis, this calls for me to be particularly attentive. In order to pay attention, I have to monitor and interrogate my own presuppositions about the young person in front of me. I have to acknowledge that I have been inducted, in deep ways, into the discourses of development and taxonomy that prefigure my
encounter. In addition, I have to relinquish the security of my expertise and the authority of my adult status. This does not mean becoming neutral, however. Instead, it calls upon me to struggle with my training in diagnosis, pathology, social normativity, and so on. The way this looks in praxis is that I listen more carefully and seek spaces for collaboration and mutual explorations of the ways we both might discover a different mode of subjectivity and self-praxis. I find myself using the tools of critique in a mutually reflexive way in which interrogation of our social positions and practices is open to both the youth and myself. I ask questions that are not founded in what I think I already know and from which I might look for confirmation of my bias. My questions are therefore indeterminate and contingent and built out of the interaction as it evolves. I also take seriously the colonial cultural patterns built into the psychological structures of encounter. I am aware of the fact that the space in which we meet is quite likely one where I feel comfortable and have a certain sense of ownership. I work to deconstruct this by engaging in practices of hospitality and gestures of respect. Culturally, I look for the borderspace between us where we can find both commonalities of habit as well as productive and informative differences. I aspire to explore those areas left behind or passed over in my attempts to be the perfect competent parent, or the perfect and all knowing therapist who can “fix” a broken child. Desiring transit and nomadism in my work, my praxis with young people becomes movement that elides any perception of stagnation or “resistance.”

In the introduction to this piece, I cited the work of anthropologists Arnold van Gennep (2011) and Victor Turner (1995) as it related to liminality. I noted how they both used the term to describe rituals of transition from one stage to another. Turner, in particular, used the term liminal to discuss ritual as a way of returning an individual to a society from which they have been separated, as a process of reintegration. And as I conclude, I am going to suggest a new ritualistic use of the liminal pertinent to our contemporary moment. In a society of absolute abstraction it is impossible to integrate and we are all separated, not just from society but from ourselves and the things we produce. In this society, the ritual use of the liminal does not transition us from one stage to another, nor does it integrate us back into the society from which we are separated. Instead, psychology might well deploy the ritual use of the liminal as a way to transit a hostile social desert in hopes of integrating us into an as-yet unknown society of the future. Thinking about liminality in this way, psychologies of liberation might open us to becoming adolescent and the production
of new subjectivities premised in the desires of living force and the liberating movement of nomadic consciousness.

References

Although the work of Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst, remains stubbornly inside academic corridors for most Anglophones, he is widely received in many countries in psychology departments, in the mental health fields, and of course in psychoanalysis (Hill, 2002; Parker, 2010; Roudinesco, 1997). Thankfully, in recent years, there is more evidence of specifically clinical works by English-speaking therapists with a Lacanian orientation and Anglophone appropriations of Lacanian ideas for the clinic and for psychology (Miller, 2011; Fink, 2007; Parker, 2015).

Given his beginnings in clinical work with psychotics, Lacan’s early formulations as a psychiatrist (Clement, 1983), and his developing ideas and turn to psychoanalysis were indelibly imprinted with the particularity of working with this population. If Freud listened to hysterics, Lacan listened to psychotics (Vanheule, 2011). It is thus no surprise that Lacanian ideas have permeated the thought of many clinicians in thinking about those persons who, in mental health, are considered the most “severe” cases (Apollon, Bergeron, and Cantin, 2002; Mathelin, 1999; Vanheule, 2011). Further, Lacan’s work with psychosis dictated a number of important and abiding interests for him. Its continuing thread inflected his work in a matter, one might say, that takes little about human subjectivity for granted. As this chapter hopes to explicate, this careful emphasis on the very framing of subjectivity involves a sort of stringent liminality, as one works toward an analytic ethics and adequate theoretical scaffolding that cannot depend on everyday notions of
consciousness and agency. One may be focused on the ruses of the “norm-male” neurotic, as Lacan (1978/1998) called it, who slips a truth within a *faux pas* or as in instances of psychosis, where subjective stability is more ephemeral and the form and boundaries of the body itself are not so easily assumed. Regardless, Lacan will explore the interstitial spaces between perception and consciousness, speech and body, need and demand, desire and drive, address and cry, in order to articulate the most radical psychoanalysis possible (Grigg, 2009).

Examinations of Victor Turner’s (2008) classical notion of liminality reveal its enormous depth, and show how it attempts to capture, in a different form of knowledge, a noncategorical “between” space that is generative yet inherent to the social tie. Yet it is impossible to positivize (Malone, 2012; Turner, 2008). In considering the liminal philosophically, Meyers (2008) notes how its status conceptually can be approached within systems that are both continuous, but as well, within the functions of discontinuous systems; each approach reveals preconditions of the liminal. Lacan may fall more into the second category, but is no less aware of the limits of traditional forms of truth and knowledge (Lacan, 1978/1998). This chapter examines this liminal Lacan around two examples: (a) one set of observations that circle around dreams, awakening, and what is outside the set of language and (b) in terms of a poignant case study of a child who, in all likelihood, would typically be diagnosed psychotic. But, perhaps, a little backgroundering on Lacan is well advised.

The Lacanian orientation is infamous for its emphasis on language, articulated through Freud’s particular formulation of the unconscious. Lacanian readings of Freudian texts reveal a different Freud, one that was not simply treating the unconscious as what is not conscious, but as a particular modality of subjectivity, which, within the experiment of psychoanalysis, emerged in its most naked form. Drawing on canonical psychoanalytic texts, Lacan shows those moments within Freud where rhetoric and grammatical structure are his guideposts to index moments of interventions; the purity of the language in its structure and transformation of interpersonal parameters guides Lacan in a rewrite of the Freudian subject. From an early manifesto, Lacan (1966/2006a) writes:

> Whether it wishes to be an agent of healing, training, or sounding the depths, psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient’s speech. The obviousness of this fact is no excuse for ignoring it. Now all speech calls
for a response. I will show that there is no speech without a response, even if speech meets with silence. (p. 206)

Lacan emphasizes on the operation of language, on rhetoric and the tropes of speech, metaphor and metonymy as the two axes of language (Lacan liberally borrows from Roman Jakobson on the last point [Dor, 1998]). Yet Lacan (1966/2002c) follows these paths, not to play language games that extend semantic meaning through additional language—let us call that hermeneutic hemorrhaging—but to render a crossing, a moment wherein speech and the real crisscross fleetingly.

My doctrine of the signifier is first of all a discipline in which those I form have to train themselves about the different ways in which the signifier effects the advent of the signified, which is the only conceivable way that interpretation can produce anything new.

For interpretation is not grounded in some assumption of divine archetypes, but in the fact that the unconscious has the radical structure of language and that a material operates in the unconscious according to certain laws, . . . discovered in the study of natural languages [langues] that is, languages . . . that are or were actually spoken. (p. 496)

What produces a signified, not as description of the world, but as a subjective moment that traverses the very act of speaking? It is a matter of speaking, not as representing some predicate that is hidden (like pregiven repressed material), but as that which lies within the knots of language itself. These knots constrain a speaking subject to the place of her own enunciation. At one level it is quite mundane, a pun, a double meaning, for example, a client/analysand saying “that’s the last thing I need to give up” meaning either “I want to give this up finally” or “I’ll never give this up” (Fink, 2014, vol. 2, p. 20). But at the level where speech, image, and what escapes its capture intermingle, the very being of the subject and its construction are at stake. Creating such moments is anything but hearing a simple double entendre. This umbral threshold where an admixture of elements intersect must be thought on its own disparate terms rather than synthetically in terms of some overarching concept or intuition of its impact. Neither synthetic move can be appropriated outside of the contingency of the moments of inmixing (Lacan, 1970). Rather, the creation of a signified for the subject emerges in an unpredictable askew coalescence that would be an impossible
space and time if we think only in linear dimensionality (which is why Lacan turned to topology [Dravers, 2004]). Nonetheless, it is in this place that a new is generated by the aftermath of language, like the debris strewn sea foam on the beach after days of rough waters. The signified Lacan seeks is the unknown of the subject, not a thing or idea in the world.

Language may possess formal properties, which condition this bricolage of effects, but it is a language that is wedded to jouissance (excessive enjoyment founded in the body) and caught within the circuit of an address to and from another (Lacan, 1966/2006b). Language in itself is neither a vehicle of meaning nor even made of words. Any differential element may function like the signifiers in language, each referring to another. Signifiers join together to make sense when construed with other signifiers or contra-wise create non-representational nonsense. In either case, it is the enunciated (the said) of the enunciator (the sayer) (Dor, 1998). Given this structure, conscious intent is not requisite.

*Sense: There are probably many types of desks suitable for academic work.*

*Nonsense: Black fish/Blue fish/old fish/new fish (Seuss, 1960, no pagination)*

And of course, many children begin with nonsense as the path to learning language. The overall point is that language in psychoanalysis works where it jumps, hits an impasse, is cut, unties a certain binding that we might call meanings, sense, and the conscious everyday subject. Or alternatively, the knotting brings a subject into a livable relation to her own body. Listening to others through an understanding of the facets of language and its demands on a living body guides the psychoanalytic experience. This frame is how speaking in Lacanian psychoanalysis can produce something “new.” This participation in the production of the new through psychoanalysis requires a theoretical scaffold; the theory follows the praxis, but like Freud, Lacan has his meta-psychology—the structuration of the speaking being that allows the analyst to maintain a position and hear resonances or impasses at certain points.

Following this thread of how language mixes with nonlanguage, but still is marked by its advent, leads into our examples, the one related to psychoanalysis with children and the other to Lacan’s (2003/2013) reflections on liminal points within analysis and in subjective constitution. Each, in its own way, reveals the interface where
the new arrives, through a breakdown, crossing, or coming to the edge of the sayable.

**Seminar I: The Case of Robert**

Lacan is best known for his *Écrits*, a volume of publications from presented or previously published papers. A recent translation allows English readers to work with this large portion of the Lacanian corpus (Lacan, 1966/2006d). Lacan’s seminars are less well known in which Lacan presented on various topics, a biweekly seminar held each year from the 1950s to the 1980s with one interruption. These seminars, particularly many of the early ones, show how Lacan, as part and parcel of participating in a psychoanalytic association, discusses case presentations and directs clinical supervision. In Lacan’s 1953–1954 seminar, the first to be written up although not the first year in which such seminars were held, Lacan, as was typical at the time, takes up a re-reading of Freud. In this seminar, he focuses on Freud’s *Papers on Technique* (Freud, 1963). Within this exegesis of Freud, there is a case presentation from a clinical group on child psychoanalysis. It hopefully shows that the space of treatment is never a simple discrete space, with categorical distinctions and epiphanies, but rather a knotting of symbolic, imaginary and real dimensions that emerge in a certain relation to one another, scaffolding a new possibility for the subject.

For this case, it is important not to expect the wordplay or famous Lacanian cuts to a session’s duration. It may be better to refer to Colette Soler’s (2014) observations in *Lacan, the Unconscious Re-Invented*. For purposes of an explication of liminality, I highlight her meditations on Lacan’s idea of *lalangue* and *métoralité*. As Soler’s essays reveal, throughout his work, there was always this seam of three domains, one marking a symbolic realm and its constraints, another marking the attraction and force of images, and the real where the stubborn disruptiveness and insistence of ineffable and insistent effects, not given to spoken appropriation and/or tamed by being hidden in the lining of compelling images. In order to leverage this inmixing, one listens to the *métoralité* in speech, a pun on materiality and *le mot* (or word). It is a drumbeat in Lacan to iterate the necessity of sticking close to the materiality of speech, its sounds, gaps, elemental nonsense, and specificity. *Lalangue*, as pure differential sounds that make up the initial intrusion of speech from the other, carries both symbolic and real effects. In lalangue there is no meaning outside of a ribbon of sounds and modulations that nick and mark elements of the subject’s embodiment and official entry.
into speech through the (M)Other, Lacan’s notation for the primary Other. Many dimensions of Lacan’s ideas outlining the formation of the subject as duration, embodiment, and place of speaking are articulated where one ascertains a logic that organizes independent registers of speaking and finds the negativities of structured speech. One cannot seek such denseness of subjective investment in sense and meaning.

How many times have I said in supervision to those under my supervision, when they say to me—*I had the impression that he meant this or that*—that is one of the things that we must guard most against is to understand too much, to understand more than what is in the discourse of the subject. To interpret and to imagine that one understands are not at all the same things. It is precisely the opposite. I would go so far as to say that it is on the basis of a kind of refusal of understanding that we push open the door to analytic interpretation. (Lacan, 1975/1988, p. 73)

There are many monikers under which Lacan’s ideas are formulated in terms of the twilight arena of subjectivity that he later calls the littoral (Lacan, 1971/1987). Femininity, the lessons of psychotic constructions, the most radical “ends” of analysis, the limit point of the cure as related to an ethics of human suffering—all must travel in this realm where the speaking forces a signified as a subject (not as a thing of the world). It is not a realm of understanding yet it does incarnate a liminality, which allows the flash that only has a before and after.

As part of Lacan’s 1953–1954 seminar on Freud’s ideas on technique, Lacan examines the different nuances of Freud’s notion of transference and ends with a reflection on the ways one can understand the superego. Regarding transference, Lacan references the imaginary register. Another dimension of transference resides in the Symbolic register, as a distinctive aspect of the “intersubjective” relationship that constitutes psychoanalysis. An initial way to code Lacan’s division of transference types separates out imaginary transference as a dyadic indentificatory relation/transaction where overlapping sameness is highlighted. In contrast, another sort of transference is based in the symbolic register. In the former, identification with the analyst or superior knowledge wins out to settle difference; this is a misuse of power in the Lacanian sense. This style of exchange recalls everyday egotistical exchanges, identifications, and rivalries. The Imaginary is evoked in certain therapeutic strategies of idealizing
the analyst or therapist who provides a model for more suitable behavior. One should not dismiss the imaginary, however, in that the image is our first “wrapping” of the body Freud (1923/1958) notes in *Ego and the Id* that the ego is the projection of a bodily surface. Lacan’s (2002) famous mirror stage presents a prototypic imaginary structure where one’s perception of one’s body as a gestalt, as a singular body, is given when it is reflected back in the mirror. We see ourselves being seen. One’s own bodily image remains a singularly compelling investment for both infants and adults. As Lacan refined his ideas on the Imaginary and this discernment is implicit in the first transcribed seminar, he suggests that the image, by itself, does not hold the subject it outlines in space or time. A bodily image that is continuous and located correlative to an image of the world that is meaningful requires some initial frame. A body, like a picture, requires a frame.

In contrast to the imaginary, the Symbolic transference is introduced by speech, wherein as speaking beings, our desires and meanings are forever linked to the response of the Other, the limits of language, its stable, disorganizing, or promissory character. Although Lacan was more normative in his earlier works and as a result the vagaries of speaking were later seen from new perspectives, speech implies a limit to what can be said. It implies that we are never sure what the other wants; this is the desire of the Other, which is evoked in Symbolic transference. Language as law inscribes a subject as an entrant to symbolization who bears a mediated relation to the experienced or prohibited experiences that are assumed to lurk behind the unsayable or encountered as unbearable jouissance. One of the properties of language as Symbolic, where one uses signifiers that represent the spoken signifier to another signifier, rather than just using words as signs to present things to others, is that a subject can flow metonymically within language.

We can say that it is in the chain of signifiers that meaning *insists* but that none of the chain’s elements consists in the signification it can provide at that very moment:

> The notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier thus comes to the fore. (Lacan, 1966/2006c, p. 419)

If signifiers did not slide, we would be pretty programmable. On the other hand, to produce that subjective signifier, the symbolic chain necessarily knots real effects, the body through symbolic articulation. There must be a frame, or simply a stopping. In Lacan’s use of Freudian ideas, the subject secures a “repression” or “castration” of
the metonymic sliding and overwhelming real enjoyments. Without this repression over an unknowable signified, what Freud called primal repression (Freud, 1915/1925), metonymic chains interspersed with decentered enjoyments may become fixated and stabilized through imaginary identification, without the wall of language for protection. Such fixations dominate the emotional range of a person (LeFort, 1994). In the latter case, the sliding stops but the stop sign is not based on an inscription where a metaphor sits over some unknown and unknowable, giving a singularity and expressive space to the body. If there were not metaphorical cuts and singular nominations, signifiers could incessantly rotate, held down by imaginary adhesions and object-like positions dictated by the Other without (experienced) mediation. Without metaphor, where something can be made absent, meaning would not pin down a social world, nor would signifiers enjoin the subject as a signifier over something impossible, a kind of metaphor over an unarticulated signified; there would be no anxiety in the usual sense, the embodied ripples evoked by the other’s call, the lapping sounds that surround us and evoke the body would remain unconnected to the social and identifications made available by the signifier. All of the above, from Lacan’s reflections on transference to these explications of metaphor and metonymy lead to the case at hand.

In one of the most memorable moments of Lacan’s (1975/1988) seminar from 1953 to 1954, Rosine LeFort, a child analyst, presents a poignant story of a child who, in relation to LeFort’s body, words, and actions, constructs his body and creates a symbolic identification. In this construction, elements of imaginary fantasies and figures, absolute and total, mingle with nascent symbolic foundations and real effects. The result shows the careful collage of Lacanian treatment—one must know what register is at stake, but seldom is speech in transference so simply coded. In a child, who seems to have little contact with reality, normative maturity, or any command of speech at age three years and six months, one will necessarily encounter elemental structural effects that are tangled at the roots of the body and the inscription (or not) of any nonreferential grammar in the materiality of the word; for the wolf child, the grammar was inscribed in two words, wolf and miss (and a cry to emptiness itself, mummy). Lefort’s waiting and response to images of the wolf child’s body begin a process of producing a signified that the subject of a signifier can assume, rather than be consumed by. The child’s inscription in relation to the word, wolf, is leveraged to allow transformation in his corporeal and intersubjective existence.
The wolf child whose name is Robert was received in Jenny Aubry’s wing of an inpatient institution that worked closely with institutionalized children to counter the effects of early or total institutionalization. The wolf child had passed through 25 different orphanages and hospitals, had experienced a number of surgeries, and had, at five months, been taken away for a last time from a psychotic mother who had forgotten to feed him. LeFort begins working with him upon his arrival at Aubry’s “clinic.” She describes him as shouting, making guttural noises, yelling wolf, and attacking other children. His gait is uneven and his motoric skills are odd and ineffective. He is not in this world. He evinced piercing howls particularly at moments of changing, in a doorway, emptying the “chamber pot,” changing rooms, and other children’s invasive cries. Four characteristics are of note at this phase: (1) transitions are frightening, (2) motor coordination indicates a form of embodiment that cannot adjust its distance to world or even that the things of the world do not refer to subjective intent, (3) the body is not bounded, with shouts and loss of clothing precipitating intense responses, and (4) he says wolf.

In a Lacanian sort of way, we are occupying a space between the imaginary and the symbolic. While the word, Wolf, suggests an inscription and Miss, a call to another, the child’s sense of his body, is atypical and his sensitivity to his environment is not without relevance for sensate and bodily boundaries. Given point one about transitions and open doors, LeFort begins by arriving and staying with the child in a consistent way. As wolf is soon shown to mark, not Robert per se, but a moment which inscribes him and this moment at first is the mark of transition (open doors), LeFort’s consistency addresses an inscription that is only enacted and evokes a defining trauma.

The wolf child responds to her consistent presence by indicating that she may now occupy the place/objects of (his) world, although whether world and subject are demarcated is a question here, and this must eventually bring up a question of address for the child:

After having piled up everything on top of me in a very agitated state, he bolted and I heard him at the top of the staircase, which he didn’t know how to go down himself, saying in a pathetic voice...for him unusual, Mummy, looking into the emptiness. (Lacan, 1978/1998, p. 93)

As LeFort grows to hear Wolf!, as an inscription of a jouissance linked to open doors and movement from one room to another, she comes to watch a drama of bottle feeding (self-feeding) which
leads to a panic resembling the one described above. Through watching this drama, she comes to believe that milk and doorways were linked, thus allowing a starting substitution, where experience of outside to inside and infant to Other is now at play. At the other end, similar figurations coalesced around excretion and the chamber pot—its being empty and excretion being “systematically” linked to Lefort’s physical presence. At one point, she remarks to the child that she knows he can’t afford to give his pooh to her (he always takes the pot—which he habitually uses in her presence—outside to be destroyed). He responds with “have no more, have no more.” Once the pooh incrementally becomes “his,” he can begin to have a separation of marks of traumatic jouissance from some object created by him—the anchor for a foundation of a self-image. Here the use of wolf can now be tracked by Lefort as marker of the subject, and the pooh as an object of exchange with the Other (as an object for another). This slowly leads to a position allowing a bounded image of self, or at least its root to emerge. The wolf child then begins to be aggressive differently—not just showing “auto-destruction” (p. 94). Put in Saussurian and street vernacular, his shit is worth something.

The wolf child elaborates on his excrement. Now he shows the metonymic movement, of objects, but as working in a horizontal and barely differentiated succession. Some might call it projection, but it is really a substitution. Projection requires a certain surface and we cannot be sure of the surface yet. Sand, shit, and milk begin to be his, held and mixed in a container. When some sand spilled, the child panicked, suggesting what was at stake. He yelled for it; he named it: “Wolf! Wolf!” Robert is now the wolf.

So Lefort can now discuss Robert’s “life” with him. Pooh is a gift, milk is given from outsiders, and he pees when he is mad at her (on her or in the pot). She tells him that, although he gives her only pee, she is not mad, as he can’t be giving away that pooh quite yet. He responds that yes it is pee not pooh and indicates that he is sorry. LeFort aims to constitute the reality of the pot with Robert. The pot seemingly operates as body. Robert cannot stand it being emptied and has many rituals around its being emptied. So here we have a real object—not because it is a physical object but because, it is simply the place holder of affects that roam in the child. But in the slow work of using her own body and speaking of Robert’s experience to him, Robert also edges this real experience with the form of his body qua container. Lefort simply works the basic signifiers as such, pooh, pee, milk, and the rituals of the pot. Robert’s terror of the
empty pot indicates that his deposits in it and the pot are one; form is content, a pretty perilous existence. His body, like the pot, will live through being empty. An empty pot, which, at one time evokes cries of Wolf and intense fear, now is played with, as either empty or full. Dressing, a similar wrapping for his embodiment (and not so removed from anyone’s daily life), is not so threatening when Robert undresses. The function of clothes as holding (a virtual image) the real affects as marks of trauma and bodily enjoyment takes a while to work through, with times of sad nakedness and dependence. But the cut occurs, as the child’s body became a form. He was, of course, now the Wolf, both inside and out. He soon attacked his own image whenever he espied it. As the wolf migrated to the Other (which is correlative to this imaginary embodiment the child now possessed), LeFort endured innumerable indignities, emulating her/him, starving her/him and feeding foul substances to her/him. But the wolf was migratory if imaginary and dyadic. At a critical point, Robert indicated a new relation of his surface to the other—its projection and formation. He pushed LeFort into another room and stayed by himself in “his” room. He then, upon her return, lifted his arms to her: a first instance of this relation of address to her after many months.

There are innumerable other stages to this series of substitutions and physical attempts wherein this subject—the wolf child—attempts to subjectivize the wolf to “exorcise” it. The real, as marks of unutterable suffering and affect are indicated as marks on the surface of the other’s body as separate and as different from his own bodily surface. These defining inscriptions are created through a theatrical series of substitutions that allow for a symbolic position to be articulated and altered through the efficacy of an address. Here image works as both an element of the Imaginary and signifier; the pot and its contents are real bodily traces of dispersal and destruction, but it is a reflective image. As well, over time the real effects demonstrated through the images of broken bottles, pooh, and sand are pushed under the bar of a metaphor, while the sand and pooh are metonymically exchanged in a series of substitutions. Of course, this means that Robert faces some difficulties as he ties the knot and becomes a subject of space and time (he begins acting out some discrete historical traumas). And all is created through the witness of the Other, which render these actions singularly human, as a representative of a subject for another signifier. At the end, there is a moment, too beautiful not to repeat, that suggests an announcement of the awareness of a symbolic place no longer solely derived from the marking of a moment as simply an
object of a dangerous Other or instance of trauma (i.e., wolf). Robert baptizes himself:

In the first of these scenes, Robert, completely naked and facing me, collected up the water in his cupped hands, raised it to the level of his shoulders, and then he said to me, softly—Robert, Robert.

This baptism in water—because it was a baptism—given the collected manner in which he accomplished it—was followed by a baptism in milk. (Lacan, 1988, p. 98)

In On the Names of the Father, Lacan (2013) writes, “Here we can no longer escape a question: Beyond the one who speaks in the Other’s Locus—that is—the subject—what is there whose voice the subject assumes each time he speaks” (p. 72). It is in the liminal that the subject makes the link between universal and particular so as to enter its dialectic.

Commentary after this case reflects on the operation of the real and the functions of the supergo. The latter, once it is conceived as an agency founded in language, operates as pure imperative, and as such enmeshed with a parasitic jouissance. But if this agency is conceived through its tyrannical effects within language, its relation to prohibition and to law is equally compounded by language. Language is law—as opposed to force or instinct—and such language will always allow some creative wiggle room: in its metaphoric potential and metonymic insistence. It renders a signified as a subject: heterogeneous, spliced, and knotted, yet transformed through cuts and twists on the surfaces of its images and speech. These contingent transformations are only measured by real effects—ones that have not been said and will never be eliminated.

**Silence, Writing, and Repetition—the Crawl Space of Subjective Constitution**

In the English translation of Recollection, Repetition and Working Through, Freud (1914/1958) remarks that the beginning of treatment “sets in with a repetition” in lieu of the production of signifiers within free association. Put simply, patients start off an analysis and have nothing to say. Freud links the “nothing to say,” with actions (qua behaviors), and with repetition; these activities (or nonactivities) by the analysand are a contrast class with the speech of free association. The former are located within the province of what one might call resistance. The latter are part of what leads toward the
interpretative work of analysis. Acting out or acting instead of speaking or remembering certainly may be different than the repetition compulsion more generally. But in this text by Freud, repetition and acting out serve as the contrast with speaking or associating. Freud’s initial distinction in this essay sets up dissimilar categories in an analysand’s behavior, producing signifier material and certain forms of silence. In the case of the latter, with regard to the speaking invoked by the fundamental rule, the analysand claims that nothing comes to mind, the analysand has nothing to say. So instead the analyst may encounter a repetition of a scene, anxiety, or witness an ill-considered act. These forms of “staging subjectivity” crowd out remembering and association. It is certainly not a case of literal remembering that Freud wants as his clinical material, but of the meandering speech and dreams that create an encounter through the production of a network of signifiers. Although remarked in relationship to the beginning of analysis, the “compulsion to repeat” comes up many times while an analysand is under treatment. Freud (1914/1958) notes, “At last, one understands that it is his (the analysand’s) way of remembering.” Thus by the end of his essay, Freud has admonished patience in a balance between remembering, association, and working through the resistances, which is a process that is both heterogeneous to speaking—it may block it—but absolutely necessary to validate the work of remembering.

The following looks at this resistance or dimension separate from signifiers, from the interpretative work of analysis and the unconscious knowledge it produces. Ulterior to this speaking, there are various forms of silence by the analysand. One of course cannot dismiss the way that actions instead of words—acting out and transference—can be articulated or rather read within the process of therapeutic work. Such modalities reveal patterns of desire within the course of analysis. As an analyst one may witness and generate, through a kind of reflexive rotation of perspective, an unexpected encounter with the patient’s staging of his position vis à vis the Other. In thinking with Freud about the function of these moments in analytic work that run counter to its fundamental rule, the target is precisely this space of repetition and nonproduction of signifiers as indicative of the structural landscape of the subject and of silence as a difficulty at the cusp of drive and inscription. Perhaps the inability to speak indicates a point of logic within the unfolding of a positioning.

Put differently, the pure imperative, aligned earlier with the super-ego (which is not, despite American efforts, a cartoon character), may silence free association and hinder one’s assumption of one’s
own history. Yet the drive must emerge as such, as a push toward no object in particular, but as a resonance of effects, divorced from sense and from any image that would really represent a satisfaction. At this point, one is not loved by another insofar as one embodies an ego ideal—a nice girl, a smart girl, whatever. Rather, one is ravished by the Other; there are no captions, no frames. Perhaps the trail of free associations and talk has led to a new more symptomatic relationship to the jouissance that is not as filtered through the imagined desire of the Other. As part of the analytic working through of “resistances,” one must tumble through the loosening of the imaginary and symbolic collusion of self-idealizations that have served as offerings to or a buffer against an Other, an Other who is nonetheless foundationally tied to what has given one a place from which to speak. But civilized incarnations of the Other’s desire are not without less domesticated inscriptions, where whether one is dreaming of an image or an image is dreaming of you is quite unclear (Lacan, 1973/1981, p. 76). This is not a smooth period within the analytic process.

Some of the remarks made by Lacan (1971/1983) in Seminar XI on dreaming opened up for me the question of the jouissance at stake when “nothing comes to mind.” In Seminar XI, Lacan recalls a story of his being awakened from a nap by a knocking on the door. There is a dream, a representation, around this knocking that is repressed in the coming to consciousness, even as this awaking consciousness is organized around this representation. There is a perception that almost disappears under the ciphering of the dream and an erased representation of an outside perception that has been encased in the dream. Still, there is an awakening around this representation and then there is consciousness. Lacan makes note that in “the interval that separates them (consciousness and perception) . . . [the] place of the Other is situated in which the subject is constituted.” (p. 45)

I considered Lacan’s meditations on reality and dreaming relevant to my concern with not speaking because the acting out is a sort of misaligned intrusion of reality as suffused with real effects in terms of psychic life. Like the knocking on the door that awakens one, it is neither consciousness as ego syntonic nor the circling of signifiers that intimates unconscious knowledge. Freud couples silence with repetition and acting out in reality. Reality is where the deciphering must be directed. The unconscious is not repressed knowledge, but revealed as traces marking real effects (jouissance/affect/anxiety). As such, it reigns over speaking under transference. In Lacan’s interrupted dreaming, the subjective dimension is suspended: it lies between a perception that abruptly intrudes, and systems of dreaming
and symbolized perception. There is a liminal split second, where you are inscribed but have not organized your symbolic coordinates as yours. The representation (like a repressed trauma or memory) remains between consciousness and perception, is written by the Other, and as such leaves subject silent. What has been written can be neither in the dream (so that we are asleep still) or conjugated purely as (social) reality. At this boundary space between perception and memory/consciousness/speech and allied to not speaking by Freud, one is witness to an mise en scène that places the analysand in a moment where her being seen, her being written supersedes—the liminal moment where the subjection supersedes the subjectivization. Not yet to be spoken but now irreversibly present, the talking cure is now knotted to the bodily affects which must shift. In *Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through*, Freud (1914/1958) seems to treat such instances as essential yet antagonistic to the analytic process while Lacan places silence and resistance in a rather more complex position.

Lacan’s story of the knocking, which awakens him, is an occasion in *Seminar XI* to revisit Freud’s famous dream of the dead child asking of the father, “Father, can’t you see I am burning.” This is, of course, a recounting of a dream heard by a woman at a lecture on dream interpretation who then herself dreams a variation of it. It is apparently a very instructive dream. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud (1900/1998) gives the following account:

The preliminaries to this model dream were as follows. A father had been watching beside his child’s sick-bed for days and nights on end. After the child had died, he went into the next room to lie down, but left the door open so that he could see from his bedroom into the room which his child’s body was laid out, with tall candles standing around it. An old man had been engaged to keep watch over it, and sat beside the body murmuring prayers. After a few hours’ sleep, the father had a dream that his child was standing beside his bed, caught him by the arm, and whispered to him reproachfully: ‘Father, don’t you see I’m burning?’ He woke up, noticed a bright glare of light from the next room, hurried into it and found that the old watchman had dropped off to sleep and that the wrappings and one of the arms of his beloved child’s dead body had been burned by a lighted candle that had fallen on them. (pp. 547–548)

There is an extraordinary pathos in this “model” dream presented by Freud. The father dreams to keep the child alive while simultaneously recalling a reproach that intimates the child’s ultimately fatal fever. But what are the structural elements that interest Lacan? Is
there not a logic of desire that is revealed within this dream? The following does not come near to unpacking all that can be harvested from this dream. In the context of thinking about where an analysand or patient is positioned when one is not able to free associate (the space of resistance), the following only speaks to some of the issues relevant to this dreaming between life and death, between perception and consciousness.

The dream of the burning child, like Lacan’s dream of being awakened by a knocking, marks a place between perception and consciousness and marks the place of the subject as a being who is structured through the traumatic imposition of the Other. What Lacan makes clear in the dream of the burning child is that, in part, what wakes the father is an encounter with the Other which is beyond life and death from the position of the “father” who controls creation, if you will, where he has failed as a father. In the dream of the burning child, in the exchange between father and son, the Other appears in its unutterable horror: a figure returns from beyond death to query the living man, “Did you not hear what I desired?” Outside of the possible parallel to capricious yet insistent “divine intervention,” this is the outside, the iconic function whereby perception is titrated as unconscious structure and inscription. What is of interest is that the child speaks from outside of the set: like other burning oracles, the message defines the question of one’s existence beyond living being and brings its interlocutor to full accountability (and perhaps also a place from which to give account). Yet as Lacan glosses this dream and in relationship to his much more benign napping, the trauma of the dream becomes the trauma at the center of the subject’s relation to reality, that is, the intervention of the Other that changes perception into consciousness. The father wakes up as an effect of the unspeakable nature of that which forms consciousness itself. It is the transition that wakes him.

It is as if by chance the candle falls, the wartime trauma occurs, the daily worries are such that they intensify to wake the subject. The real, as what is impossible to say or what must be effaced for the subject to signify, erupts on accident, as what operates at the limit point of pattern. That which might have been spoken, when one has nothing to say, but instead repeats some “X,” creates logical points, a grid, a repeating configuration of rotating places, with one trap door. Functioning like primitive trademarks on pottery, these elements are differential but they don’t yet enter conversation; they do not talk back. In Lacan’s *Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”* (Lacan, 2006), where the Symbolic and its impasses are conceived often in the terms
of the insistence of the Symbolic chain, the infamous letter itself only reveals an addressee and engenders a cycle of thief and reparation. The inaugural scene, however, where everyone is stunned by the act of thief, each character acts their part out in silence. The repetition and the entire plot of Poe’s story is played out without the contents of the letter ever being known. The precise formal shifting of positions shows a knotting to the real effects (if the King sees the letter, the queen will die, and so forth) and so as stolen, the letter generates the action of the story, but is itself not absorbed within the Symbolic.

The idea that reality, even if in the form of a real life trauma, intrudes upon a dream and invokes the subject touches upon post-traumatic syndrome, a growing diagnosis in spite of the fact that there is no drug that goes with it. One of the features of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is that the diagnosed person’s dream life is interrupted by a repetition and a reproduction of trauma or the intrusion of anxiety. The trauma is simply what it is, like putative reality. Yet the trauma wakes the person up like a nightmare. Dream life and real life and/or trauma are confused. In the PTSD’s splicing of waking and dreaming (flashbacks, night terrors, nocturnal panic attacks), the interpretative work that is produced as unconscious knowledge may come against a repetition that perhaps strands the subject within a constitutive moment, between perception and the question of the (voiceless) subject as within the locus of the Other.

In the truncated seminar on the names of the father, Lacan (2013) notes that there is no question about the question of the Father because we are “beyond” the possibility of question. “[I]t speaks of that of the subject prior to the question” (p. 88). What interests me about such constitutive moments is their relation to dead stops within the analytic cure when one’s usual roads into the production of a new knowledge are waylaid; one has nothing to say, dreams are fused with reality, trauma as part of what materializes reality overcomes the subject. It is this resistance to the production of signifiers, not only an acting out to an Other, but as also a circling that renders moments of the structural stakes of the being of the subject. So what is being considered is what Freud called resistance as a sort of topological position, a place where the intermittent, interpretative work of the unconscious meets what cannot be spoken. The traumatic real gets replayed in the trauma, but from the side of reality or in a certain silence determined by emerging real effects. It is, as if the “underwriter” of the policy merges with the policy he has guaranteed. Nothing comes to mind; the traumatic event from reality defines the dream. The working of the signifier, whether conscious or unconscious, is helpless.
So of course, we can see the nonproduction of signifiers as resistance. Yet, as with resistance more generally, to see an analysand’s difficulties in free associating solely as an obstacle misses some significant points about the subject of psychoanalysis. In this respect, in distinction to some North American psychoanalytic colleagues, Freud was quite keen to understand the logical necessity of resistances for the analytic process. *Working through* was essential even when one was facing a closing of the unconscious. Toward the end of the article on repeating, Freud (1914/1958) writes, “[O]ne must allow the patient time to get to know this resistance of which he is ignorant, to ‘work through’ it, to overcome it, by continuing the work according to the analytic rule in defiance of it.” (p. 375)

In *Seminar XI*, Lacan (1973/1981) takes up Freud’s question of “repetition” and resistance. Lacan’s recasting suggests the direction of the analytic process in relationship to resistances, as a mode of one’s positioning toward the Other and as a moving toward an ethical impasse for the subject. Lacan in *Seminar XI* speaks of repetition as entailing the new; one cannot repeat the same thing exactly, but also he also frames it as an act that makes something present to another and as a human act; thus, it is one that entails structure; it is enveloped in the topology that defines the subject by the fact that one speaks (Lacan, 1973/1981, p. 50).

The analytic process bears upon human repetition in a way that places the analytic process at the limits of remembering. Such limits are imposed by trauma, and by what mediates the impossibilities of speaking, such impossibilities are not unrelated to possibility; rather, they are the foundation of possibility—turning perception into consciousness. And it is the analytic wager that such structural moments are relayed through the singularity of a subject to her speech (Soler, 2014). If repetition reflects an edge between the real and its symbolization, and if the unconscious is as much about repetition as Lacan (1972/n.d.) suggests in the *Knowledge of the Analyst*, analysis must also work within repetition’s relentless logic. Lacan, in that same series of talks, speaks about analysis as tied to a grammar rather than to a dictionary.

There are two points to finish. First, there is the encounter within the structure that is being elementally isolated as a precondition of this or that subject. This is a liminal and heterogeneous inmixing of the edges and overlap of real, symbolic, and imaginary dimensions. Here, at least in the terms of *Seminar XI*, we are handling the subject’s constitutive formation in face of the Symbolic father, as function. We see a different but equally liminal reconstruction in the
case of Robert. If Robert indicates a movement toward a coalescence, Lacan’s rude awakening is equally a foundational awakening in the liminal moment between perception and reality, the moment of the real that grounds the symbolic layering that, in turn, founds the reality. Social construction usually begins with this reality, which, on my view, shows a certain naiveté.

There is also a second and final point, related to repetition. Repetition may be considered as that which does not create signifier material that enters the dialectic of interpretation, but instead falls under resistance. Such repetition may, in part, be thought of in terms of the placeholder qua algebraic letter that marks a discernible set, a one, a history that is not continuous or synthetic. Letters here do not link up in any immediate way with signifiers. There is no substitute or metonymic displacement. The letters remain nondesignated, outside of sense, but herald the emergent subject as the one who speaks from an irreducible point that defines her investment in the spoken: the act of Robert.

Notes

1. I assume that the remark in the context of the history of this case is anything but mundane.
2. I owe some of my ideas about this case to a seminar by Paola Mieli on Savoir and the Frame of the Cure and to the members of that seminar. I assume no “correct” transmission of their ideas, but I am indebted to the articulations presented in the seminar (Mieli, 2015).

References


Early onset or childhood schizophrenia has been a vexing problem for psychiatry and psychology going back to Freud (1978). It is perhaps only with theories arising through the antipsychiatry movement of the 1960s (Laing, 1967, 1969), that we find alternative ways of understanding childhood schizophrenia in ways that offer some possibilities for nonpharmaceutical intervention. The roots of possibility for rethinking childhood madness lie in the fact that antipsychiatry tended to view madness as something that was socially constructed, in contrast to the traditional assumption that it was a pathology within the individual (Bourg, 2007). By exploring alternative modes of understanding human experiences within this framework, there may be ways to open up a range of opportunities, both for being in the world, as well as for different forms of therapeutic aids for those in distress. One such therapeutic tool that could provide a means to explore the experience of alternative perception with young people is literature. Specifically, I will demonstrate how literature can provide insight into the experiences of those children who have been diagnosed with early-onset schizophrenia and how those insights can open up a space for thinking about schizophrenia outside of the traditional medical model.

When we begin to think of madness in childhood, within a framework of socially constructed distress, the social discourses about what constitutes madness and childhood become central to our concerns.
Indeed, we might well note madness as a mode of thought that elides contemporary notions of reason and rationality and childhood as a time of life when social reason is being developed. In both of these domains the question of fantasy and the imagination within the framework of social discourse are central areas of concern. The issue of discourses about childhood imagination in the diagnosis of schizophrenia is particularly evocative and somewhat problematic when we consider the role of the imagination in the day-to-day play of children not diagnosed. This is perhaps no more obvious than in the world of children’s literature. Children’s literature then, as a realm of imagination and fantasy, might offer us a vehicle to examine the assumptions made in the diagnostic criteria about children labeled with schizophrenia—in particular, those pertaining to irrationality, fantasy, and imagination. This reading of literature and madness in children may offer us a means by which to problematize the psychiatric community’s construction of childhood as it constructs social norms surrounding imaginative engagement. The social norming of the imagination by psychiatric diagnosis, in this sense, could be held accountable for potentially stripping children of a particular way of experiencing the world characterized by imagination, creativity, and exploration. From this perspective, we might wonder why children’s imaginations are being subjected to control and regulation. How might this have implications for our own social imaginary? It is from a framework emphasizing alternative modes of understanding to psychiatric knowledge that literature might well be employed as a means to engage with the experiential lives of children who have been traditionally viewed as a psychiatric concern.

Deterritorializing Identity

In order to appreciate the potential literature has to operate in lieu of a psychiatric intervention, it is important to recognize some assumptions that psychology relies on, and what an alternative perspective may look like. Psychology is reliant on the assumption that in the core of every individual is a core self (Parker and Burman, 2008). Even R. D. Laing (1967, 1969), who is considered a key proponent in the antipsychiatry movement, based many of his theories on the existence of an inherent self. Such constructions of identity and self can be said to have derived from the period of the Enlightenment, a time when rationality was privileged in order to obtain objective truths and when it was believed that the best way to obtain such truths was through scientific empiricism (Skott-Myhre, 2006). French philosophers Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1983), and later feminist scholar Rosi Braidotti (2011), follow in the tradition of Spinoza and challenge this notion of self or stable identity and provide a completely different way of conceptualizing our existence and ways of being in the world. Spinoza (2000) asserted that the identity of an individual is constructed through her relations with other individuals and forces, and that these relations are constantly changing. Therefore, the identity of the individual is not stable, but continuously in flux (Tiessen, 2012b). Deleuze and Guattari (1983) expand on this notion and argue that nothing can be known about a body until it is known what that body can do, and because bodies are constantly coming into contact with other bodies, there is no end to what a body could become. As Skott-Myhre (2008) states, “As soon as we think we know who we are, we can immediately see the possibility of who we might become” (p. 7). Individuals then are the product of “relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 261). Tiessen (2012a) elaborates on this further, stating that “we can think, for instance, of ourselves—our desires, drives, movements, decisions, material situation, and embodiedness—as a site, a crossing, where forces come into play and intersect” (p. 79). The result then is a “self” that is actually a process rather than a stable core, and a concoction of all of the experiences, interactions, and encounters (Skott-Myhre, 2008).

Feminist scholar, Rosi Braidotti (2011), picks up on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the nomad and elaborates on it to develop her own understanding of identity politics. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the nomad is a “hunter [that] follows the flows, exhausts them in place, and moves on with them to another place” (p. 162). The affect that is created as a result is the nomadic deterritorialization, that is, “a space of thinking and desiring outside of stratified space, an open thought system that roams outside of codes” (MacDonald, 2012, pp. 125–126). With this notion, Braidotti attempts to offer another way of understanding the self.

Braidotti (2011) argues for an understanding of the body or embodiment of the subject as “neither biological nor a sociological category, but rather as a point of overlapping between the physical, the symbolic and the sociological… the body refers to the materialist but also vitalist groundings of human subjectivity and to the specifically human capacity to be both grounded and to flow and thus to transcend the very variables—class, race, sex, gender, age, disability—that structure us” (p. 25). She provides the example of the European identity, explaining that while it promotes a sort of unification, it is
rather “a concoction of diverse cultural, linguistic and ethnic groups with a high level of conflicts…though they get homogenized by the gaze of the colonial observer” (2011, p. 33).

The individual’s identity can be understood from this perspective as well. Others can look at an individual as an embodiment of the various forces and histories that make an individual one unified construction, but in actuality that is an oversimplified notion of identity. Rather, the person is a collection of possible selves, ones that reinforce and contradict one another. By approaching the concept of identity from this perspective, avenues of being in the world become available, which subsequently allows for the understanding of behavior typically thought of as pathological as rather an expression of the various affects operating on and within the individual at a particular given time.

**Toward a Minor Reading**

There is little argument against the importance of reading for children in the Western contemporary world. A great deal of research is done on children and their reading development, and there is a multitude of programs and organizations dedicated to making sure children are reading at the appropriate, age-designated “reading level.” Reading is taught the moment the child enters school, and various skills pertaining to reading are elaborated on throughout an individual’s education (Fitzgerald et al., 2015). However, if literature and stories are understood from a framework of bodies and affects, such as that provided by Deleuze and Guattari, the possible functions of literature become much vaster. That is, the very existence of literature can be understood from “the give and take that it enables (because) it is only within an economy of give and take, of cause and effect, of comparison and contrasts that meaning, materiality, or any other actualization comes into being” (Tiessen, 2012, p. 14). Each time the child approaches the text, she is bringing with her a new combination of forces that have transformed her since the last time she approached it. As a result of coming into contact with this new body, the text is able to provide a new experience. The text and child interact with each other in this give-and-take economy, each recreating the other. Vygotsky (2004) argued against the insistence of the separation between reality and fantasy, claiming that once an object of the imagination has been externally embodied, it begins to exist in the world through its affect on other things. By employing Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of what constitutes a body, and viewing
literature within this framework, the affect for one body (the book or story) to have on another body (the audience) has limitless potential, as both of those bodies are changing as they continuously come into contact with other bodies (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Therefore, the child that emerges upon reading a story is not the same child that entered into the story, and she will bring those understandings and experiences she encountered with her until the next collision of bodies occurs.

Foucault (2006) demonstrates how perceptions around madness have changed throughout history dependent on the social context of the behaviors at the time. For example, hearing voices lost much of the religious connotations during the Enlightenment and modern science attempted to provide an explanation. If madness has a history of being read from different theoretical perspectives in much the same way literature has, perhaps literature, especially that which, like fantasy, has permission to deviate from what is considered “normal,” can be used to explore possible current conceptualizations of what it means to be mad. More specifically, what does a child diagnosed with schizophrenia look like through a critical lens set against the literary backdrop of fantasy? If literature is a prominent vehicle for imaginative exploration in children, then it becomes problematic when those same children are diagnosed with a form of psychosis which is representative of the same behavior the characters of their favorite books engaging in. When the criteria for schizophrenia are contrasted with the characteristics of a good fantasy novel, the lines between real and imaginary, play and learning become blurred. As Jung (1953) explains, a realm lacking physical substance is no less real than one filled with objects that can be touched. Rather, it can be understood as differently real. This experience is even more germane to children, as they are of the deemed age-appropriate population who are encouraged to engage with this mode of experience on a regular basis (Cohen, 1992); moreover, the literature made available frequently reflects this understanding of children’s experience with reading by employing alternate realities, magic, talking animals, and other fantastic elements, such as works like C. S. Lewis’s *The Chronicles of Narnia*, Phillip Pullman’s *His Dark Materials*, or J. K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter* series.

When reading and working with literature, it is possible to interpret and extrapolate metaphors, uncovering what the author could have meant, or questioning how the different audiences since its publication could have reacted. However, a work of literature also has the potential to exist outside of representation and rather be a means to
something, that is, it can do something (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986). The question then becomes what that something is, what potential it has for children navigating their own psyche, as well as the possible implications it has on their relations with adults. By engaging with such a question there is a unique potential for literature to provide a means for individuals to explore and experiment with their modes of being.

In order to use literature as a means of interacting with children in this particular way, an understanding of the approach taken here is necessary. The novels cannot simply be read in a passive way, but rather must be engaged with in a political sense. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) read the work of Kafka from a minoritarian perspective, and thus reappropriated his work as a political endeavor. To read something as minoritarian literature is to apply three characteristics as delineated by Deleuze and Guattari (1986). The first characteristic is that “in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization” (1986, p. 16). To deterritorialize is to destabilize boundaries round a given notion or understanding, which allows for more of a fluidity. Second, “everything in [it] is political” (1986, p. 17). This means that everything must be taken up with an understanding of action and resistance. Finally, “in it everything takes on a collective value” (1986, p. 17). There is no subjective or personal understanding because the personal is political. By using this approach to literature, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) demonstrate that literature ultimately holds revolutionary potential, claiming “[it] finds itself positively charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation” (p. 17).

The same sort of approach can be taken to children’s literature. Texts such as *Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone*, *A Bridge to Terabithia*, and *A Wrinkle in Time* can be deployed to demonstrate the potential literature has from a minoritarian perspective, but the same approach can be employed with a wide variety of texts, especially those which engage the imagination, such as fantasy. To then use this approach to working with children whose behaviors have been read as symptomatic of a disorder, it is important to apply the same minoritarian perspective to those behaviors constituted as mad.

**Reading Age, Thresholds, and Lines of Flight in Literature and Pathology**

In order to fully appreciate the ways in which literature can be engaged this way, and then discussed alongside diagnostic criteria in a similar
fashion, I have provided examples of discourses uncovered in the children’s literature mentioned previously, how they can then be read through the minoritarian lens that provides a means to subvert the dominant discourses, and then finally, how the diagnostic criteria for early onset schizophrenia can be regarded from the same lens.

The novels which were selected to demonstrate the potential of literature through a minoritarian lens were J. K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone* (1997), Katherine Paterson’s *Bridge to Terabithia* (1977), and Madeleine L’Engle’s *A Wrinkle in Time* (1962). These novels can be thought of as portal fantasies, with the characters crossing thresholds or portals to enter into new worlds and ways of being. *Harry Potter* is the first book of its series that follows a young boy, Harry Potter, as he discovers he is a descendant of wizards and witches. On his eleventh birthday he is given the opportunity to leave his abusive adopted family and go to Hogwarts, a school specialized in wizardry. *Bridge to Terabithia* tells the story of an unlikely friendship between a young boy, Jess, and a new girl in town, Leslie. The two form a special bond while creating an imaginary kingdom, Terabithia, which they can retreat from the pressures of prepubescence. Finally, *A Wrinkle in Time* features three children, Meg, her little brother Charles Wallace, and her classmate Calvin as they travel across space and time to rescue Meg and Charles’s father from a far-away planet being controlled by a giant Brain intent on removing any sort of free will from the planet’s inhabitants. Each novel has many relevant themes for discussion here, but the focus will be on those which have an overlap across the three of them.

The first discourse explored that is particularly important for both the literature and the diagnostic criteria is the role of age. Age is an influential factor in the lives of children in contemporary Western culture. It guides and restricts behaviors as appropriate or inappropriate; it comes with a set of developmental norms seen as ubiquitous (Raby, 2002). The arbitrary label of “children’s literature” implies that these books are acceptable for a certain age range, or that there is an age range in which individuals who fall into that bracket will experience more entertainment with them. Similarly, age, and the assumed developmental stage that accompanies it, is taken into consideration when applying the diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia to a child, especially because its typical onset is in early adulthood (APA, 2013).

The role of age is probably the most prevalent in *Bridge to Terabithia* (Paterson, 1977). From the beginning, it is explained that there is an understood hierarchy based on age among the students at
Jess and Leslie’s school, with the older ages having certain privileges. For example, it is noted that the younger boys started races during recess because the older boys would take the balls from them (p. 4). It is assumed that because they are older, they are more entitled to the balls, and thus those in the younger and subsequently inferior position must entertain themselves in another way. However, the children in *Terabithia* are caught in an in-between situation, where in some cases they are too young, but there are also circumstances where they are too old to engage in certain behaviors. For example, Jess is frustrated that his little sister is able to run out the door and kiss their father when he comes home from work, but he feels that he is too big to do the same. In fact, he thinks that “he had been born too big” (pp. 19–20). Leslie also expresses this sentiment when she gives her paper dolls to Jess’s little sister, May Bell, with a sigh, claiming that when May Bell reaches her age, “you just don’t play with paper dolls anymore” (p. 48). Jess and Leslie clearly want to engage in certain behaviors, but feel they are unable to because of their age.

This in-between stage, however, also provides Jess and Leslie the opportunity to experiment with different ways of being. Because they are not allowed to play with the balls at recess, they must find another way to spend their time. When Leslie beats all the boys at racing, the races come to an end, forcing Jess and Leslie to find something else to do. Because of the lack of structured activity, the two become close, pushing the norms surrounding the opposite sexes, which eventually leads to them engaging with their imagination. This in-between stage also puts Jess and Leslie in the position to have relationships with adults. While Jess’s parents occupy the more authoritative role, Leslie’s parents engage with the children as if they were friends, which makes Jess uncomfortable at first, but then he comes to appreciate this relationship (p. 86). Similarly, Jess and his teacher Miss Edmunds grow closer than they typically would have if Jess was younger. The adults do not assume the role of imparting knowledge to the children. Rather, they learn together, whether it be Jess teaching Mr. Burke some home renovation skills, or Miss Edmunds and Jess exploring a museum together. Jess and Leslie’s age puts them in the position to both explore with their imagination, creating *Terabithia*, as well as develop meaningful relationships with adults who are eager to learn alongside the children.

These ideas surrounding age are also prevalent in the literature on schizophrenia. The diagnostic criteria state that, in order to diagnose delusions and hallucinations in children, such occurrences must be distinguished from that of “normal fantasy play” (APA, 2013,
Also, as stated in the literature previously, developmental stages play an important role in determining what constitutes normal childhood beliefs and what constitutes pathology (Carlson, Naz, and Bromet, 2005). Similarly, the assessment of speech and language skills relies on a familiarity with developmental trajectories. Children with schizophrenia usually struggle with aspects of language that relies on concentration and organized output (Wozniak, White, and Schulz, 2005). In fact, in the diagnostic features section for schizophrenia in the DSM 5 (2013), the clinician is advised to compare the child to unaffected siblings to determine if any of the major areas of functioning (interpersonal, academic, or occupational) have been affected. Such a statement assumes that there are expected ways for children to behave and deviations from those expected ways may look different than from adult deviations. This idea is then further enhanced by the assertion that the delusions and hallucinations of children are often less elaborate than those experienced by adults. Developing schizophrenia at a younger age, rather than the traditional mid- to late 20s, also comes with a direr outcome, with the expectation that an earlier onset predicts a worse prognosis (APA, 2013).

The second discourse that can provide insight to this approach is the use of thresholds. Thresholds can be understood as literal or symbolic entry points. They serve as a portal to a new experience or ways of being. Once crossed, they represent a transitional point in either the plot, character development, or one’s understanding of her identity, in which certain knowledge is gained that will affect the course taken. Upon crossing a threshold, there is no returning to the state prior to crossing. In this sense, thresholds hold a great deal of potential for all involved. There is an understanding that a particular way of being in the world is being left behind, and one is to either continue on the journey, or become stuck in the state reached following the threshold. The previous theme of age intersects with this theme in that each book deals with a coming of age story where the characters must leave behind old roles in exchange for new ones.

The use of literal thresholds in literature can be used for plot developments or metaphors for character development. For example, in the novels discussed here, the characters enter into ulterior realms, crossing a boundary between this world and another, a boundary that is less distinct than might be expected. For Harry Potter, the definitive threshold he crosses which will change his life forever is his eleventh birthday. As soon as the clock strikes midnight, the shack that he and the Dursleys were hiding out in started to shake, followed by a knock on the door. It is then that Hagrid shows up to take Harry
shopping for the materials he will need at Hogwarts (p. 45). In the case of *Harry Potter*, the world of wizards and witches exists among the world of the muggles; however, it is not accessible to the muggles due to enchantment spells meant to place a veil over that mode of existence. For Harry Potter to get to Hogwarts he must meet a train at platform 9¾, which does not seem to exist. He is instructed to walk straight at the barrier between platforms 9 and 10 and not to stop. He closes his eyes and runs between the two platforms, until he magically arrives on platform 9 ¾. It would appear then that between platforms 9 and 10 is a threshold that only a select few are able to cross. This idea is further elaborated on when Hagrid, the game-keeper at Hogwarts and the one responsible for taking Harry out to get all of his materials for school, decides to stop in for a drink at The Leaky Cauldron. To a muggle, The Leaky Cauldron appears as a run-down shop, but to anyone privy to the magic, such as wizards and witches, it is a place one is able to go and enjoy a few drinks. There are also definite thresholds that are restricted to the students, despite their initiation into the realm of magic. When Harry and his friends are sneaking around the school at night, they open a door to hide and realize that they crossed over into the forbidden corridor which is guarded by a three-headed dog. For Harry’s journey, this discovery represents a drastic change in his experience at Hogwarts and is therefore a threshold he unknowingly stumbled over. Similarly, Harry ventures into the part of the library that houses the dark arts books, which is not open to students, unless they have special permission. The Forbidden Forest is also prohibited to students, but Harry secretly follows Professor Snape there to eavesdrop on a conversation between him and Professor Quirrell, and then later is accompanied by Hagrid and some of the other students to find an injured unicorn. Harry takes many chances by crossing such thresholds that are supposed to be restricted to him, and by doing so, is privy to a wide range of knowledge and experiences.

Thresholds in the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia are those words that rely on the psychiatrist’s decision. In Criterion A of the disorder, words such as “frequent,” “incoherence,” “grossly,” and “diminished” (APA, 2013, p. 99) all rely on the psychiatrist to determine when a threshold has been crossed that signifies pathology. The use of such words offers the interpretation that there exists an acceptable level of “abnormal” behavior until a psychiatrist weighs in when enough is enough. Criterion B utilizes words such as “significant,” “markedly below” and “expected level” (APA, 2013, p. 99) to help the psychiatrist determine if Criterion A behaviors are pathological.
A severity index is included to aid the psychiatrist in determining such thresholds, in which the psychiatrist decides if the behaviors rate anywhere from a 0 (not present) to 4 (present and severe) over the course of seven days (APA, 2013). While there is a severity index included in the DSM-5, there is also a note included, stating that “diagnosis of schizophrenia can be made without using this severity specifier” (APA, 2013, p. 100). One of the key criteria for most mental disorders is that there must be a significant level of impairment in the level of functioning in one of the major areas of life, such as work, self-care, or interpersonal relations. For childhood onset, those areas are interpersonal, academic, or occupational (APA, 2013). This criterion expects the psychiatrist to have a clear understanding of when a level of functioning threshold has been crossed. As mentioned earlier in regards to the theme of age, for a psychiatrist to diagnose onset in childhood, he or she must also determine what is pathological and what “normal” childhood behavior is. In this case, a birthday may be a threshold that is crossed which dictates what is normal and what is symptomatic of a disorder for a child.

Another prominent theme in these novels and the diagnostic criteria that is pertinent to the discussion here is lines of flight. The discourse of a line of flight borrows Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) notion of a line of flight, and is of great importance for this method of engagement with young people. It is best understood in this context as the moment when a way of being or understanding is abandoned for another, crossing those thresholds discussed earlier, and is characterized by a high degree of experimentation, deterritorialization, and creativity. The line of flight is the trip or departure in order to collide with another body; it is the process before what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) referred to as “becoming” in which there is a creation of a new body. In regard to this research, the most immediate line of flight is the moment the child qua reader enters into the story. Therefore, all books hold the potential to provide a line of flight for the reader. This potential is important when considering the diagnosis of schizophrenia as the pathologization of those behaviors characteristic of a line of flight. For all of the novels discussed, all of the children appear to be seeking refuge from a particularly troubling situation. Such situations make that first line of flight appealing. This initial flight then allows for subsequent lines of flight and the collision of bodies.

With *A Wrinkle in Time* (L’Engle, 1962), there are instances of Meg taking a line of flight even before she goes tessering to new worlds, which are very similar to those illustrated in the diagnostic criteria. Her teachers become frustrated with her as she tends to
daydream in class. She grows bored quickly with her lessons and lets her mind wander (p. 30). Because it is accepted that traditional education is the most efficient way to learn, such behaviors are reprimanded or seen as a cause for concern. Meg takes flight in a non-traditional way and uses her imagination to explore different ways of understanding. She becomes frustrated because her way of being is problematic for others, causing her to be reprimanded or become the subject of their concern (p. 32). Her little brother Charles Wallace is also regarded as being different and while it is clear that he has superior intellectual abilities to other children his age, he is also a cause of concern for some, as his preference to remain quiet and in his own head gives the impression he suffers from some sort of developmental delay (pp. 13–14). However, his mother appreciates his gift and when Meg asks her if Charles Wallace understands more than the rest of them, she responds it is because he is different and new, elaborating that his difference is not physical, but rather in essence (p. 54). She goes on further to say that because of him she is able to have “a willing suspension of disbelief” (p. 55) suggesting that Charles Wallace’s ability to exist in his own unique way is both inherent to who he is, as well as influences those around them and allows them to take flight in ways they are not accustomed to. Although their ability to escape provides them with unique opportunities, it threatens the dominant discourse of what it means to learn and the acceptable ways of doing so. For example, one of the reasons Meg gets into trouble in school is because she has learned from her father to do mental shortcuts when doing math problems; however, her teachers expect her to do it the long way that they teach. This method frustrates her and she gets a mental block as a result (p. 50). Both children are gifted intellectually, but because of the way they arrive at their understandings subverts the traditional notion of institutionalized education, they are deemed odd or different, and subsequently punished.

This line of flight is paralleled with the very literal departure the children take when they tesser space and time and arrive in new worlds. The first time the children tesser with Mrs. Whatsit, Mrs. Which, and Mrs. Who, they are not given any warning. Because the story is told from Meg’s perspective, the reader is able to travel with her as she tries to understand what is happening to her both mentally and physically. First, there is a complete loss of light and sound, and she feels that Calvin’s fingers are being torn from her, leaving her feeling completely alone and vulnerable. Panicking, she attempts to gain a sense of her own physical existence, and is unable
to, realizing that when she tries to move her body, there is nothing to move. Her corporeal self ceases to exist for a short period of time, until she gradually becomes aware of a tingling sensation through her limbs. She comes to understand that where she is, is not simply darkness, but rather a void where the world of tangible objects is absent. Suddenly she becomes aware of the beat of her heart and the rotation of the earth, which she realizes she is moving with. Light eventually breaks in and she is able to hear her brother, and then Calvin, but is unable to be with them physically, until she feels a push and a shattering, as if traveling through a wall of glass (pp. 65–67). Clearly Meg experiences this departure as quite intense, and more importantly, something she must do entirely alone. Tessering is more difficult for her than the others, but she understands it as something she needs to do in order to arrive at these distant planets and eventually save her father and brother.

When the children arrive on the planet of Camazotz, they learn that the people there are heavily policed and restricted from any sort of lines of flight. All actions and thought are uniform and monotonous without any room for experimentation or freedom of expression. The planet is run by a combination of various machines processing paperwork and a giant brain controlling free will. Mistakes made by those inputting information into those machines run the risk of putting the population in “danger of jammed minds” (p. 130), suggesting there is a complete lack of potential for psychic exploration by the people of Camazotz. The man with the red eyes that the children meet explain that a desire for such experiences does not exist on the planet because this also means that there is a complete relegation of pain and trouble to IT (the bodiless telepathic brain that dominates the planet of Camazotz). By turning over the power of thought and decision making to IT, they lose the ability to put themselves in novel or rewarding situations, but also in ones that inflict pain and suffering, and thus they have no opportunity for learning or growing. They are kept in one state, perceived happiness, for the fear of what the results of a line of flight may produce. When Charles Wallace falls victim to IT’s control, he resembles someone who has been brainwashed, assuring Meg and Calvin that he believes himself to be saved from all of his troubles, and that Camazotz is a superior planet because “everything is in perfect order because everybody has learned to relax, to give in, to submit” (p. 150). Without any lines of flight, there are no opportunities for creation or becoming, hence the static nature of the planet and its people, which is a source of horror for Meg and Calvin.
The fear of jammed minds weighs on the minds of those operating the machines, but in reality, the minds of the people of Camazotz are already jammed: blocked from exploration, experimentation, and any sort of psychic enrichment.

Turning now to the diagnostic criteria once again, the line of flight takes place precisely the moment before the diagnostic criteria are used to interpret or describe the behavior. Each distinct “symptom,” as well as the collective whole, is the initial departure, before blocked by psychiatric intervention. Each supposed problematic behavior transposes a traditional behavior as a subversive means to a desired goal, and as a whole, they provide an opening to an unorthodox existential experience. Many of these behaviors are accessible to the general population, usually through a change in certain bodily chemistry or biology due to the ingestion of certain psychoactive substances, such as drugs or alcohol, or the loss of hydration or nutrients in the body. The difference between these more accessible lines of flight and those demonstrated by individuals labeled with schizophrenia is the method of administration and the duration. The diagnosis of schizophrenia attempts to collect those methods of psychic exploration and attribute them to something happening to the person that they then must be cured of. In contrast, those moments of escape associated with the ingestion of substances are seen as more legitimate examples of experimentation because there is the assumed promise of returning to “normal,” likewise forgoing certain nutrients that the body requires can easily be amended, also returning the body to “normal.”

The problem then with supposed pathological lines of flight appears to be the method of engagement and the duration of such a trip. The diagnostic criteria state that there must be continuous signs of the disturbance for at least six months and that window must include at least one month of symptoms that meet Criterion A (APA, 2013, p. 99). That means that for five out of the six months, the only disturbance that must be observed concerns levels of functioning in one or more major areas of the individual’s life, as delineated by the American Psychological Association as work or school, interpersonal relations, and self-care. A line of flight that only lasts a few hours then does not disrupt those parts of the individual’s life that rely on her to operate in an efficient manner, to complete her assumed duties, and participate in the world in a socially acceptable way. Those whose flights are for an undetermined amount of time threaten their ability to participate in a world that relies on efficiency, coherence, and self-discipline.
Conclusion

By doing a minor reading of these novels and then comparing those discourses to the ones uncovered in the diagnostic criteria, they provide moments of subversion of the dominant medical discourses and open up possibilities for both the reader and the diagnosed. By doing so these texts have the possibility of deterritorializing the hold that contemporary psychiatry has over modes of being that have been labeled schizophrenic, and open them up to a world which relies on a more holistic understanding of human experience and mental strife. Just as each of these texts is linked with a great deal of intertextuality, so are lived experiences; and to compartmentalize those ways of being that transcend the dominant modes of understanding into an array of mental disorders at varying levels of severity strips the individual of the opportunity to explore and make meaning that pertains to her understanding of the world.

In this context it might well be argued that lines of flight blocked by psychoactive medications or other such interventions prevent the child from further exploring potentials for becoming. Such blockage, similar to what Meg and the children witness on the planet of Camazotz, prohibits creative ways of being by attempting to fit every individual in to a strict mold. Mediums that encourage lines of flight, such as novels, provide a way for the child to do so in a way that both reinforces and subverts the dominant discourses. Novels, in particular, challenge the assumption that lines of flight must be restricted to a limited timeframe. As soon the child learns to read, she is encouraged to do so throughout her life. It is also common for individuals to re-read their favorite books, discovering something new each time and thus becoming something new each time. Fantasies are also becoming more and more popular among young adult and adult audiences, meaning that such lines of flight that are made available in childhood are also accessible in adult years.

Novels can thus provide an alternative therapeutic tool for engaging with those who read them, as well as a framework for an interpretation that resists a medical model that may be inappropriate for the individual. Those working with young people can use novels as a means to explore the possible psychic lines of flight they may be experiencing in a safe space. The novels can also serve as a reference point for dialogue. The Open Dialogue approach in Finland emphasizes the importance of dialogue in the therapeutic intervention, and has been quite successful in treating first break psychosis (Seikkula and Olson, 2003). When taking this approach with young
people, novels can serve as a transitional object from experiences to talking with a professional about those experiences and do so in a way that neither pathologizes nor normalizes them. The young person and the professional working with him or her can come to view his or her experiences against a literary backdrop in which those behaviors which may have been labeled symptomatic of a mental disease are instead regarded within their contextual life story of the individual.

References


Problematising Mindfulness with the Creative Production of Self

Emaline Friedman

The forthcoming is by no means a condemnation of mindfulness practices, nor another woeful admonition of the dangers involved in integrating Eastern practices into the Western world. The questions of this essay are those of combinations and blends; when mindfulness meets elementary school youth in America, what are the forces, interests, and subjective processes coordinated in this mixture? This piece will offer a critical perspective on the implementation of mindfulness-based interventions with youth. Mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) and their implementations are currently the focus of movements nationwide (see The Hawn Foundation MindUp [Hawn Foundation, 2011] or Inner Resilience Program [Lantieri and Goleman, 2008]) that appeal to the effectiveness of such interventions for handling a number of different problems perceived to be experienced by youth attending public schools (Zoogman et al., 2014).

Here, MBIs are not being dismissed outright. Instead, this piece points toward the possibility that the good intentions of MBIs to reduce stress and to increase emotional wellbeing is an attempt to address a systemic, institutionally created set of issues. Rather than instituting interventions that engage directly with such a set of issues, MBIs become instrumental in passing the reparative burden off to the students they aim to improve. The auspices of improved student experience tied to MBIs make it especially difficult to understand the potentially high risk of passing this burden using MBIs and like interventions that bear largely on emotional wellbeing. It is decisively a problem of context. The high-performance demands that color
the overall school environment create the risk that students come to equate their own wellbeing with high achievement abilities. A preliminary concern is the likelihood that the achievement of the goals of MBIs will emerge within the school environment, powerfully recast as an instrument to reify and circulate the values of individual achievement measured by test scores and grades.

The suspicion cast here on mindfulness practices for school-age youth derives from two sources. The first is somewhat of a speculative concern; if mindfulness practice carries benefits, then what are the chances that its implementation in schools would be able to transmit these benefits? This opens onto the perpetuation of particular values through the delimiting of a skill set of self-management that we now observe to be expected earlier and earlier in life (Duncan, 2015). This is a problem that will require a response by a more theoretical argument laying out the stakes involved in the institution of these practices on the level of the creative self-development of youth. The issue, then, is of the capture, recoding, and reterritorialization of the values often associated with mindfulness onto those implicit in its use in public schools, as extracted from the literature on the rationale, effects, and expectations of mindfulness programs. The second concern attends to an assumption in the first. What are the purported benefits of mindfulness, and what, precisely, is being intervened upon when MBIs are utilized? This question will be explored by engaging more extensively with a specific effectiveness evaluation of the MBI, Master Mind (Parker et al., 2014). At this point, I will delve into a few concepts that elucidate the creative processes of self-production with which the practices and realities of MBIs may foreclose or hinder. This hinges directly on youth’s establishment of autonomous rather than prefigured modes of responding to, and to some degree managing their experience of elements in the world.

I would like to suggest that in many deployments, mindfulness may be akin to resisting the many sources of environmental stimulation, and thus inimical to the self-development of creative tools for respecting and managing the many directions that attention entertains. Even if the world of technology, distraction, rapid-image stimulation feels foreign and unnerving to us, this is indeed a major facet of the world in which youth today grow. Following theorists of new media (Hansen, 2011; Hayles, 1999; Wise, 2012), we observe that developments in communication technologies, online interfaces, and digital forms of expression present opportunities for understanding the emergence of perception and attention that extend beyond our usual cognitive accounts to include the ways in which the high
A Clarification: Individual Achievement and Individuation

To continue, we will situate these concerns against the backdrop of the particular form of individualism required to manage the increasingly high demands for achievement placed on school-age children. The problematic of introducing youth to the training of the mind may be read in the context of Foucault’s (1977) notion of training the body, adapted for the postmedia era in which societies function via control rather than discipline (Deleuze, 1997). Work on Foucault has generated much research on the ways in which social institutions, like schooling, deploy modes of training the body (e.g., sitting in a particular posture or folding one’s hands) that are formative of subjectivities, like “student” (see Hill, 2009; Stickney, 2012, for example). The impact of this notion that subjects are created through the forms of discipline and workmanship that one could expect to constitute a life, is greatest when discipline was a more prevalent, if not exclusive, means of maintaining order. Foucault’s (1977) analyses focused on these societies, locating them in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, as Deleuze (1992) has discussed extensively, our current context of global capitalism houses the turn to societies of control.

Societies of control operate, not solely by way of creating subjects through the manipulation of bodies, but by extending that reach to the mind. This shift is seen most clearly in the transition of production from the enclosed space of the factory to the free-floating, almost gaseous spirit of the corporation. A similar abstracting function operates for money, where societies of discipline operated off minted money that fixes gold as a numerical standard, while societies of control have fluctuating rates of exchange and standards. What changes in the shift from a disciplinary society to one of control is that of the distinct modes of anxiety and self-policing that accompanies the motivating forces of a nonlocalized situation of work, or for youth, school, and their corresponding expectations. When the enclosed space of discipline, or only having to be a student when in the school locale, extends to an ever-present identity of the student volume of simulations and possibilities make attention less of a choice and more an undercurrent of muscular responses. Though it is not within the scope of this chapter to do so, these developments alone are enough to merit a serious rethinking of classroom practices and procedures.
that is marked by a valuation of oneself according to the standards of school, disciplinary actions take a backseat to the pressure that hangs loosely in the air to regard oneself as such. It is in this context that fluctuating standards for achievement come to create supposed individuals that have corresponding increases in capacity related solely to these standards. At stake here is the mirroring, in the educational setting, of the shift from exerting power directly on bodies to exercising control that penetrates the mind directly.

However, it is certainly not the case that implementing mindfulness practices would in any way propel or reify the contemporary form that power takes in the culture of global capitalism. It is the case, though, that within such a context it becomes exceedingly difficult to avoid addressing the individual whose mental capacities are mainly dedicated to deciphering and attempting to meet always-rising sets of standards and expectations. “Individuality” or “developing oneself” all too easily becomes conflated with becoming more and more adept at meeting demands that are raised frequently and unexpectedly. The movement from the control of behavior to the control of children’s mental activities and organizations directly marks a new threshold of subjectification that threatens to replace or overcode elements of the mental or existential territory that I will later argue are of utmost importance to creative self-production. Joining the type of ideas that may be learned in school, the format of schoolwork, implementation of specific learning standards, yet another site of struggle is opened up between imagination and duty.

The impact of the switch from a society of discipline to one founded in control has significant ramifications for the climate of elementary schools. Pressure from high-stakes testing, tests whose results are used to make major determinations (about, for example, the school’s funding status or its student’s abilities to progress), creates an environment wherein academic success is measured by test scores and grades (Abbott, 2014). Due to the imperative to compete for accolades, academic advancement, and adequate compensation, the operations of the school must understand academic success so measured as a priority, thus tacitly informing protocols, lesson plans, and the daily operations of the school. After the execution of the (2001) No Child Left Behind program, many schools were encouraged to utilize interventions to improve academic competence (Barna and Brott, 2011). But, many research findings suggest that even within these interventions, like the use of academic counsellors, it is recognized that personal and social developments are absolutely crucial to developing academic achievement (Barna and Brott, 2011). Therefore, the reigning and
looming bureaucratic demands for heightened achievement cannot, in practice, be separated from the ways in which personal and social development is deployed as a value held by the school. This is an especially pertinent idea with respect to MBIs because they explicitly target the crafting of emotional wellbeing.

As public schools in America depend on marks of academic achievement for the continuation of their operations, and academic achievement is wrought through personal development, it appears that personal development becomes an instrument for the greater economic demands of the institution rather than as a goal unto itself. It is undoubtedly the case that overall emotional wellbeing is more conducive to being able to fulfill the expectations and duties to which one is submitted. But, the concurrent development of self-understanding alongside high-stakes testing and the host of behavioral constraints used to maintain orderly obedience in the classroom can create a conflation between sense of self and high degrees of achievement and obedience. The effects of this instrumental use of the development of personhood can be observed to develop recursively in the ways that personhood is understood and developed in interventions like mindfulness training. We will now look to the literature on mindfulness practices and implementations in order to get a better sense of what attributes and attitudes are implicitly promoted in these practices.

### Mindfulness Literature

The majority of literature on mindfulness interventions in school, including meta-analyses of the small body of existing research, understand mindfulness more or less as a state of consciousness in which there is an enhanced attention to moment-to-moment experience (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Zoogman et al., 2014). Creators and advocates of MBIs suggest that variables like executive function, effortful control (inhibitory control), self-regulation, and executive attention be emphasized as the main fruits of mindfulness practice in youth (Thurman and Torsney, 2014). Each one of these variables is correlated with successful outcomes like high academic functioning, good social adjustment, and general measures of anxiety, depression, stress, wellbeing, and even mindfulness itself (see Black, Milam, and Sussman, 2009; Burke, 2010; Greenberg and Harris, 2012).

For the sake of fine-tuned analysis rather than broad stroke generalization, I will focus on a review of the mastermind program, developed explicitly for elementary school students, for the remainder of this section. This will allow the pinpointing of some of the assumptions and
expectations where MBIs are concerned. The Master Mind program (Parker et al., 2014) is a four-week intervention designed uniquely to be implemented by regular classroom teachers and to double as a preventative intervention on future substance abuse. Involving only 15 minute lessons each day for one month, the program was developed to be accessible, undistruptive of academic learning time, easily plugged in to natural transition points of the school day, and to allow for daily engagement. Despite its creators’ reassurance that emotional skills go hand in hand with academic achievement, the logistic design of the intervention is created as to not to disturb the regular flow of academic learning. The program is divided into four sections.

The first section is Awareness of the body, which teaches (1) awareness of bodily sensations including breathing, (2) the entire body, and (3) the present moment. Awareness of feelings focuses on becoming more aware of emotions and appropriate expression thereof, while the awareness of thoughts section focuses on teaching children to “understand how thoughts work” and includes (1) lessons for calming a busy mind, (2) understanding that not all thoughts are facts, and (3) letting thoughts go. The final section, awareness of relationships, focuses on teaching the understanding of others’ behavior and compassionate ways of communicating. Mindful moving that relies on developmentally appropriate yoga positions is peppered throughout these sections. The key features of the program are mindful breathing, mindful journeys, mindful movements, daily practice, and real-world applications. These real world applications include making healthy choices and avoiding risky behaviors (as per the secondary goal of substance use prevention), and coping effectively with stress.

Improvements in cognitive, emotional, and behavioral regulatory abilities, as well as reduced intentions to use substances were expected for students who participated in the Master Mind program. Students reportedly experienced improvements in the areas of attention, social-emotional competence, and decreases in aggressive behavior. Self-regulatory abilities are abilities meant to encompass the modulation of one’s thoughts, behaviors, and emotions. Unsurprisingly, the ability to self-regulate is cited as leading to success in school both academically and socially. Attention control, sustained concentration, and executive functions more broadly are all considered key ingredients for learning and achievement, and inability to regulate negative emotions is accordingly disruptive and problematic.

The measures used to assess the Master Mind program were executive functioning (inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, and working memory), behavior and emotion regulation, and intentions to
use substances. A Flanker Fish task was used to measure executive functioning, and involves identifying a target item while ignoring distracting items that flank the target. The behavior and emotion regulation measure was assessed entirely by teacher’s reports on the Children’s Behavior Checklist-Teachers Report Form (Achenbach and Rescorla, 2001) and on the Self-control Rating Scale (Kendall and Wilcox, 1979).

There are a couple apparent issues with these constructions. The first, which will not be taken up at length, is the likelihood that if students do in fact exhibit signs of anxiety and depression; these would be problems difficult to untangle from the systemic bureaucratization of school as seen in changes like high-stakes testing. In this light it would seem that MBIs are attempting to undo problems generated by the larger systemic issues it faces. MBIs become, not just a reactionary, but a preparatory agenda for a coming of age in which the problems suggested take on a normative status or backdrop for experience. Furthermore, these approaches engage concepts that we can use to beg the question of whether or not an intervention is necessary at all. Where does this knowledge about the ways school age youth engage with their surroundings come from?

Take the use, throughout the review, of “daily stressors.” Daily stressors are positioned as disrupting to children’s lives and as draining the resources that children rely on to make healthy choices. Exactly what a daily stressor is never stated outright; it is presumed to be understood that we all know what sorts of environmental factors contribute to stress. This may be an understandable though reductive means of gaining common ground when discussing work-place culture or the factors that hinder the procession through the day as experienced by adults with concrete goal orientations. Justification of the intervention is in large part premised on the assumption that stressors are necessarily unproductive and to be avoided. While it seems undeniable that elementary school is a high-intensity environment, it is much less clear (1) whether this basically neutral fact merits intervention and (2) what subjective processes may be entangled in such interventions.

The measures used to assess the effectiveness of the program speak volumes to the influence of the reality of the contemporary school environment discussed. The cognitive flavor of the assessments and framings of the procedures for implementing mindfulness practices make abundantly clear that, if MBIs are to enter into the school environment, it is the latter that will shape the deployment of the former, and not the reverse. The assurance that students gain a better
ability to identify target items in the face of distraction suggests a high valuation of cancelling out “noise” in their environments. If the environment in question is one in which focus is necessarily directed to schoolwork, rule following, and often mandated testing, it seems rather evident that the idea here is to insure docile compliance with these demands, even if that entails neglecting the elements of the school environment that offer sources of energy and intrigue. Rather than serving as a potent reminder to witness and accept the contents of one’s consciousness nonjudgmentally, or any other goal recognizable from literature on mindfulness practice in other contexts, the requisite qualities for maintaining the achievement orientation of public schooling seems to overshadow other possible uses of mindfulness practice.

Moreover, the emphasis on emotional management suggests that school mindfulness practices aim to use awareness of the body as a means to develop ways to verbalize emotions. This sets up a correspondence between the felt body and the words that we use to describe inner experience, and sets strict limits for understanding one’s own experience of one’s body. From early on, attending to one’s inner landscape is instrumental for being able to offer meaning, in the form of an emotion. Communicating emotions as descriptions of inner experience may be confusing and disheartening for a few reasons. On the one hand, it conveys a sense that one’s emotions reside inside their body to be explored and expressed in order to divulge a secret of one’s own making. Emotion seems to be something that inheres within, but curiously there already in the form of a word-feeling pair as if existing to be reified in communication. It’s difficult to deny the importance of communicating emotions, but communicating emotions is often an act quite difficult to derive from attunement to one’s body without concomitant isolation of whatever may exceed a certain emotion as it can be appropriately expressed in school.

This is especially troubling considering that this is taught in tandem with “understanding how thoughts work” in the awareness of thoughts section of the program. Leaving aside the specifically questionable notion that having a busy mind would be problematic for youth, who are at this time developing their own forms of feeling out their mental landscape, a taught knowledge of how thoughts work more generally diminishes, through universalizing concretions, what sorts of processes in the mind and body count as thoughts. Through the capture of the notion of thought and the teaching of its qualities, thought is delineated as having specific qualities. This is a crucial point: if we inform, rather than allow the discovery of what thought
is, the creative capacities for thought to develop in novel forms and through the use of tools unique to the sensibilities of youth now foreclose upon what thought can be.

**Vitality Affects, Amodal Perception, and “Noise” in the Mind**

But what are the forms of thought and perceptive processes at risk when thought and its relation to self-management and expression are taught? It is difficult to say precisely, and attempting to give specific predictions has little value considering that the aim here is to glean the imperative of letting thought unfold as it will. Undergirding this discussion lays the imperative to remember that one never knows quite what a body is capable of when unfettered to make its own connections, and “body” here neither isolates the workings of the body from the mind, nor restricts “body” to that of the individual child.

So, to get a sense of what facets of experiential life may contribute to the development of creative, unforeseen ways of knowing, we can look to a few conceptions of perception that bridge affect and creative autoproduction on an integrative mental/relational plane. Using the concepts of *vitality affects* and the *refrain* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), I will vie for the importance of freed mental space and the nontaught or autoconfiguration of the means of navigating one’s own mind as part of creative self-production more broadly. The importance of the latter, placed in the context of the obfuscation between individuation and individual achievement mentioned, comes to bear on the political question of whether adaptive or revolutionary developments of subjectivity are being fostered.

It appears that when MBIs like *Master Mind* want to teach the “letting go” of thoughts and the idea that “not all thoughts are facts,” there is an assumption that the busy or noisy quality of the mind has a similar, highly verbal tenor to what is commonly referred to in mindfulness circles as “monkey mind.” Monkey mind is the nervous chatter that often interferes with the ability to meditate. The chatter of monkey mind consists of running through mental lists of tasks that were or remain to be accomplished throughout the day, thoughts, judgments, and the like that elicit the likeness of beginning to meditate to trying to fall asleep—same type of busy mind.

However, theorists of *affect*, specifically Stern’s (1985) account of *vitality affects*, help us see the importance of leaving open the possibility that not all thought is monkey mind, and that this assumption limits the freedom of the mind to explore ways of knowing and the
elements of thought that rely on nonverbal and asignifying connections. Insofar as affect is both part of thought and emotion (though cannot be reduced to either), it will shed light on what important components of experience are ignored with a taught understanding of thought and the presumption that appropriate verbal communication of emotions is the sole expression of feelings and sensations in the body.

Thinking through the dynamic experience of affect by the individual, Daniel Stern’s (1985, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2010) notion of “vitality affects” or sometimes “dynamic forms of vitality” speaks directly to the creative capacities of affects that are amodal, or that do not arise from any sensory modality exclusively. These amodal affects are understood to be elements more prevalent earlier in life. These affects are not at all exclusive to youth, but actually comprise a barely discussed form of nonverbal thought experienced as the passage of vital forces both within and beyond the individual human body. Vitality affects are the affects that accompany movement, both physical and mental, that provide us with a dynamic sense of aliveness. They are the felt experience of force with a temporal contour or a feeling of going somewhere, but they do not belong to any particular contents. Neither pure perceptions, direct cognitions, nor sensations in a strict sense (owing to their amodal breadth), vitality affects are “subjective phenomena that emerge from the encounter with dynamic events” (Stern, 2010, p. 7). These affects are the connective fiber between the movement of our minds, bodies, and that which is external, and thus the style that thought and emotional content emerge and interact for us.

Stern’s notion of dynamic forms of vitality, or vitality affects, is crucial for making a distinction between affect and emotion. It is the danger of reducing the former to the latter that comes into the picture when appropriate emotional expression and verbalization is taught to very young students. Affect differs from emotion in that emotions refer to the coming together of a vitality affect (including the intensity and temporal shape) and a specific emotion (containing notions of directedness, goal, and action tendencies) (Stern, 2010). It is my contention that, where mindfulness practices are concerned, emotional regulation becomes privileged at the behest of affective development and attunement. These are by no means mutually exclusive, but the prioritization of emotional management is problematic in that affectivity is more productive of creativity and diversity because it is at the same time more specific, but also more global than emotional contents. Looking at the affective forms of emotional content
bypasses dwelling on the parts of emotions that require management to begin with—the goal, direction, and actions that allow for the fixing of subjects and their emotions.

By looking at vitality affects we gain access to emotional contents with an understanding of our experience of an emotion’s dynamism as signatures of its passage through and encounter with us. Noting shifts in force and the corresponding profiles of fluctuating excitement and interest in a moment accesses the living, moving parts of thought and feeling rather than what they should mean and what to “do” with them. Again, development of affective forms is less susceptible to flattening and normalizing within the tight play of identitarian capture because it is not at all tethered to any fixed identity position or personality traits.

Commentary by Guattari (1995) on the earliest forms of “self” expresses the crucial notion that these more expansive, creativity-inducing components of thought and experience of the world are distinctly more possible earlier in life:

A primary assemblage of subjectivation, the ‘emergent self’, is already apparent at birth and is deployed until the second month. Outside of any linguistic or corporeal distinctivity, it develops a Universe of early perceptions of forms, intensities, of movement and number. These abstract and amodal forms install themselves transversally in the diverse perceptual registers… The emergent self—atmospheric, pathic, fusional, transitivist—ignores the oppositions of subject-object, self-other and of course masculine-feminine. (p. 66)

The distinction between vitality affects and categorical emotions (like sadness or happiness) in Stern’s work and the omnipresence of the former is precisely what Massumi (2002) intends to draw out in his characterization of affect per se. For him, affect already implies a synesthetic, global crossing of intramodal sensation. Furthermore, and also essential for our purposes in thinking through just why this limitation and control of affects is so striking, affect participates in the virtual, or that which is not yet. Affect is autonomous in that it is not confined to the particular body whose vitality or potential it catalyzes and whose actually existing qualities functionally limit the play of affect (Massumi, 2002). Because affect refers indiscriminately to power to affect and be affected, affect is a de-subjectifying force that flows through and between subjects, implying its nature as an impersonal and relational abstract force. In this way, attending to affect rather than emotion, which is an inherently individualistic mode of understanding the quale of the mind and body, provides an
immediately relational way of exploring thoughts and feelings that eschews a socially sanctioned, rule-based understanding of how to treat oneself and others for attention to the components of the presently sensed moment.

In view of the fact that one’s potential interactions are dependent on their nonfixed capacity to transform the effects of one sensory mode into a different mode, amodal vitality affects become critical for thought and awareness. With MBIs we see the potential for the replacement of these affects with categorical (verbal) emotions, and the closure of the field upon which they stir by directed thought and accompanying ground plans for this field’s very composition. To reiterate, the notions of vitality affects, or amodal sensory perception, give us further insight into what sorts of processes may be cut up or disjointed, perhaps alongside or in addition to “stress,” when mindfulness activities are adapted to quell the arousal of the mind and body. Given this instruction, we watch the recession of availability of affective senses that produce selfhood through the emergence of ability to affect and susceptibility to be affected in favor of over-general, subject-making capture in the form of emotions.

In fact, this would run directly counter to individuation as a kind of relational becoming, the importance of which will come into view in the following section. I would now like to develop in greater detail the self-making or autoproductive function of the organization of the vitality affects and global, noncategorical forms of sensation. Indeed, a sense of selfhood that may be developed through fostering and extending these forms of affect relay very different ideas about the world and one’s connection to it than a sense of selfhood developed through emphases on directed focus, and attentional control.

**The Refrain as Autoproductive Function**

The *Master Mind* program, in the setting for which it was developed, certainly seems to misrepresent the function of things in the world as distractions, placing internal sensations in the form of emotions as the true stuff of selfhood. If an educational healing attempts to work through intimate awareness of self and world without broaching the dynamism of life before the level of verbal emotions, then what forms of self-management, production, and expression might be left unidentified? If priority is given to shutting out the “noise” in the environment, even while purporting to begin with an awareness of it, what stirrings and impressions of the world become discarded, or perhaps merely residue, a lost fodder for musing and daydreaming?
The development of, what I refer to as, a refrain may be as complex as a nonrational narrative akin to an entire life story or as simple as the humming of a tune while walking. A refrain, as described by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), works through a sort of non-necessary privation of affect. This means that the development of a refrain touches on an initiatory “making personal” of a sensory trigger, pointing to a moment of unfettered preference to explore and develop a sort of presubjective alignment with a particular source of stimulation.

The refrain is composed of an aggregate of matters of expression that draws a desired territory, or a safe space, that develops into a series of territorial motifs and landscapes. This means that refrains gather forces that recall and reincite the movement of affect, thus creating a smooth ground as the basis and first sign of developing relational architecture. If a refrain can be figured as a fragile center point within chaos, determined solely on the basis of intuitive decision making or without rationally-developed criteria, it becomes more clear that the formation of a refrain is also an early means of providing oneself with a relational architecture, which may serve as a scaffold for more nuanced modes of relating to one’s surroundings. The refrain speaks to individuation as a relational becoming because it gives its subject the means to connect up to this territory, as a base to relate and explore further. Very much like the inner presentation of a security blanket, refrains are like resources that are densely packed reminders of successful individuation, developed relationally, by entering into and creatively operating on the stream of stimuli in one’s environment.

The refrain must be existentially consistent only to the degree that it may be returned to through whatever means available, be they material, discursive, or as we have seen with vitality affects, incorporeal and immaterial. It is neither volitional nor intentional, and pertains even less to the development of executive functions and attentional control. The refrain is the enactment or bringing together of these microinfluences or microtriggers for expression. The flows of matter, signs, rhythms, and intensities brought to bear on the immanent, half-thought knitting of the refrain are the components of self-productive differentiation from the surrounding milieu. Rather than the expression of a certain categorical emotion as an in situ, best attempt to understand self, with the refrain we see the possibilities for expression of nonessential subjects capable of and indeed created through an outpouring of imitations in collision with each other. Imitations that are altered as they are weaved into and expelled from subjective universes of reference.
The forces that operate refrains are triggers that lack any domain specificity (they are not consistently interpersonal, linguistic, familial, or otherwise). They are installed and emerge through chaos, so even though we cannot say that we choose or construct our own refrains, we may learn a sort of faithfulness to them. This is the faithfulness of following the call to produce a refrain as the putting in place of context- and trigger-sensitive autonomy that mutates and rearranges with experience. In this light, there are intimate issues of choice, safety, and creativity at stake in letting this process flow and resolve freely or allowing MBIs the authority to push the installment of another type of refrain (perhaps, for example, the insistence that one follow one’s breath) prefigured for a certain kind of training of the mind.

Already at the level of a reemergent or consistent refrain, it is clear that the likelihood of an asignifying, affective takeover is discreet and valuable in its capacity to keep open and active the indexation of amodal perception as a heuristic for thought. Take the infamous example of an early refrain in Freud, the “Fort-da,” or in English “Gone-there” refrain. When Freud (1950) seeks to observe the mental apparatus in children’s play, he is captivated by a repetitive game invented by a young child roughly resembling a solitary game of peek-a-boo. The child stages the disappearance and return of the objects in his reach. Freud interprets this game in a number of ways, all hovering around an expression of the pull of the Death Drive or as a means of mastering the pain of the comings and goings of motherly presence. However, we may understand the early creation of a refrain as an experimental, but un-thought instance of indexing and collaging of various elements of intrigue from the chaotic soup of surroundings. These surroundings may be corporeal, in one’s classroom, for example, or incorporeal, in the form of ideas and imaginings.

If the refrain is useful for our purposes, it is because it involves a making visible or making acknowledgeable forces and comings-together that were previously imperceptible for consideration of “self.” For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), for the unseen to become seen, that which harnesses this movement, the refrain, must operate on a prepersonal level—in the dynamic, asignifying world that may be altogether more available to youth than their guides. The notion of the refrain is just one example of the intimate, unique, and globally reaching means of creative self-production that grasps and infuses rhythm and intensity in the felt play of perpetual reorganization of matter. It is a world-dense encircling of affects that spurns heightened relational curiosity through its demarcation of an organizing and organized body without strictly drawn borders.
Conclusion

Self-regulation, one of the main objectives stated in the literature, is only self-regulation in the sense that a self is instrumental in regulation, but not in any position to express or modulate a way of being in the world. Youth are asked simultaneously to be able to be extraordinarily present to their experiences and that they behave and perform a preordained sense of that which is regular. The instrumentality of the self in a process of regulatory control drives forward or literalizes the individualizing ethos that displace the means of societal control and their psychological consequences onto expanding domains of internality. It is not so much that meditative practice more broadly is prescriptive of modes of self-regulation, but its instances within the early schooling environment may very likely be.

Considering that we can think of mindfulness practice for very young children through the framework of their immense, amodal capacities to be the site of budding relational architecture, through the creation of novel modes of autoproduction, on the one hand, and through the use of technologies of control to impinge upon not only bodies, but minds too, we may want to reconsider the integration of these practices into schools.

Are mindfulness based interventions doubling as ruthless interventions on the possibilities for youth to be youth, or for creativity to emerge? The answer is certainly not, but if we are interested in providing means for youth to explore their own capacities through the pre-personal currents of relational affectivity, we may choose practices that reflect and encourage embodied movement and the development of relational architecture. If early self-exploration is guided through sets of rules and strategies that code emotion, already implying a particular subjectivity as the most intimate form of “going within,” there are far fewer opportunities to experience the nuances, the “when” and the “why” that arise when these practices are managed autonomously. These are the nuances that I have argued provide the ongoing means of creative production of self.

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