Women & Men in Political & Business Elites

A Comparative Study in the Industrialized World

Mino Vianello and Gwen Moore

with Giovanna Di Stefano,
Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Brigitte Liebig,
Rosanna Memoli,
Litsa Nicolaou-Smokoviti,
Michal Palgi, Antonella Pinnelli,
Silvia Sansonetti,
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Foreword by
Eva Etzioni-Halevy

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About the Authors

Giovanna Di Stefano received her degree in demography at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza' with a dissertation on 'Women and Men at the Top: Family and Reproductive Behaviour', under the supervision of Professor Pinnelli. She collaborates with Professor Pinnelli in her research on gender and the family.

Eva Etzioni-Halevy is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Sociology, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. Her area of specialization is political sociology, with special emphasis on elites and democracy. Among her many books are: *The Elite Connection* (1993) and the edited volume *Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization* (1997). She has also written three books on elites and democracy in Israel.

Brigitte Liebig is senior researcher and lecturer at the Department of Social Psychology I, Institute of Psychology, University of Zurich. Her current research and publications integrate issues of gender and gender equality into the analysis of elites, organizations, science and education. She has directed various research projects on both national and international levels, and teaches gender studies, social and organizational psychology at universities. Her recent publications include *Wissen*, *Gender, Professionalisierung. Historisch-soziologische – Studien* (ed. with C. Honegger and R. Wecker, 2003).

Rosanna Memoli is Full Professor of Methodology of Social Research at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza'. Among her books are *Nuove prospettive dell' Indagine Sociologica (2002), Strategie e Strumenti della Ricerca Sociale (2004), Disegno della Ricerca e Analisi dei Dati* (1995), *Questioni di Metodologia e Tecnica della Ricerca Sociale* (1992)*, Strategie d'Analisi dei dati nella ricerca Sociale e Metodologia Integrata* (1995). Her interests include studies on sociology of science and growth of knowledge, strategies in empirical research as well as studies on evaluation models and development and perspectives of social economy. She is a member of the Italian Sociological Association, the Italian Statistical Society, the Committee of Logic and Methodology of the International Sociological Association.

Gwen Moore is Associate Professor of Sociology and past Director of the Institute for Research on Women at the University at Albany, State University of New York. Recent publications include 'Elite Studies at the Year 2000,' edited with John Higley in the *International Review of*

Sociology, and *Gendering Elites: Economic and Political Leadership in 27 Industrialized Societies* (Macmillan, 2000), edited and coordinated with Mino Vianello. Her research focuses on comparative elite studies, analyses of gender and authority, and investigations of personal, community and national network structures. She has been a Fulbright Scholar in Germany and has also held visiting appointments in Australia, Bulgaria and France.

Litsa Nicolaou-Smokoviti is Professor Emeritus, University of Piraeus, Greece and Dean of European Campuses, ESCEM École Supérieure de Commerce et de Management, France. She held teaching positions in several Greek and American universities. She is a board member of national and international professional associations, and the International Sociological Association Research Committee on Participation, Organizational Democracy and Self-Management. Her areas of specialization are industrial/organizational sociology, industrial relations, careers and social economy. Her research integrates issues of work organizations, professions, gender, worker participation in organizations and organizational change. She has published extensively, has directed several research projects on national and international levels, and is a member of the 27 countries research team on Women in Elite Positions.

Michal Palgi is Professor and Chair of the department of Sociology and Anthropology at the Emek Yezreel College in Israel and a senior researcher at the Institute for Research of the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea at the University of Haifa. She is the president of the International Sociological Association Research Committee on Participation, Organizational Democracy and Self-Management. She is a member of the 27 countries research team on Women in Elite positions. She has published extensively on gender, kibbutz, and organizational democracy. Her areas of research are: gender-based inequality, worker participation in organizations, privatization, and organizational change.

Antonella Pinnelli is Full Professor of Social Demography at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza'. Her publications include *Nuzialità e fecondità in trasformazione: percorsi e fattori del cambiamento* (with P. De Sandre and A. Santini; Il Mulino, 1999), *Fertility and New Types of Households and Family Formation in Europe* (with H.J. Hoffmann-Nowotny and B. Fux; Council of Europe Publishing, 2001), *Women in the Labour Market in Changing Economies: Demographic Issues* (with B. Garcia and R. Anker; Oxford University Press, 2003) and *Genere e demografia nei paesi sviluppati* (with F. Racioppi and R. Rettaroli; Il Mulino, 2003).

Silvia Sansonetti graduated in statistics for sociology and demography at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza'. On the present study she worked on the data collection and the coordination of the research. She is currently a PhD student at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza' (European PhD SESS).

Renata Siemieńska is professor and chair of the Department of Sociology of Education at Warsaw University, director of the Institute for Social Studies at Warsaw University, and holder of the UNESCO Chair on Women, Society and Development, Warsaw (Poland). She has lectured as visiting professor in several American and Canadian universities and served as president of the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), as expert of UN, UNESCO and the Council of Europe. She has published books and essays on comparative cross-national value systems, ethnic relations, functioning of local communities and local government, women's public participation (politics, labour market) and socialization. Among others *Nie mogą, nie chcą czy nie potrafią? O postawach i uczestnictwie politycznym kobiet w Polsce* (They Can't, They Won't or Are They Incapable? About Attitudes and Women's Political Participation in Poland, 2000).

Mino Vianello is Professor of Economic Sociology at the Faculty of Statistics, University of Rome 'La Sapienza'. He has taught in university faculties across the world. Among his many publications, the most recent include *Gendering Elites: Economic and Political Leadership in 27 Industrialized Societies* (with Gwen Moore; Macmillan, 2000), *Gender Inequality: A Comparative Study of Discrimination and Participation* (with Renata Simieńska; Sage, 1990) and *Un Nouveau Paradigme pour les sciences sociales – genre, espace, pouvoir* (with Elena Caramazza; L'Harmattan, 2001). Since 1987 he has been editor of the *Revue internationale de sociologie.*

Foreword

Eva Etzioni-Halevy

Until recently, the topic of women elites and women within elites has been largely neglected in the mainstream literature on elites. Members of the elite – even in the industrialized democracies – have predominantly been men, and the tacit assumption in both classical and modern elite theory has been that this is so self-evident as to be unworthy of comment. Mino Vianello and Gwen Moore in their previous, extensive writings, and even more so in this book, have filled a glaring gap in this literature, by problematizing the (ostensibly) self-evident, and placing it on the scholarly agenda.

Just as members of the elite have long been predominantly men, so have elite theorists been predominantly men as well; and this may explain, at least in part, why they have evinced little or no interest in the relative exclusion of women (that is, half of the population) from positions of power. By contrast, feminist theorists, who have been concerned with the relative exclusion of women from a place at the top, have been mainly women. Mino Vianello is the exception that proves the rule, in both camps. He is one of the few male elite theorists on the one hand, and one of the few male feminist theorists on the other hand,[1] who is yet concerned with the issue of women and power.

In their edited volume *The Gender of Power* (1991), Kathy Davis, Monique Leijenaar and Jantine Oldersma made a challenging attempt to utilize theories of power for the analysis of gender relations. But overall there have been few attempts to weave elite and gender theories together. Vianello's aforementioned dual exceptionalism has placed him in a unique strategic position that enables him to do research in both fields, to make a simultaneous contribution to each of them, and to lay the groundwork for fusing them together. This, indeed, is what he has accomplished in this monograph issue prepared in collaboration with well-known feminist scholar Gwen Moore, with the contribution of researchers from 27 countries.

Mino Vianello and Gwen Moore are also notable in the field because of the wide, comparative scope of their studies. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein and Rose Laub Coser, in their edited volume *Access to Power: Cross-National Studies of Women and Elites* (1981), made an impressive beginning in this field. Since then, some scholars have turned their attention to women's continued exclusion from power in various countries. But not much, and certainly not enough, has been done in a comparative perspective. This is

not by mere chance or oversight. Comparative research entails specific difficulties, requires a unique perspective, combined with extensive capabilities in management and coordination. Thus the authors' comparative outlook and their abilities in coordinating research projects conducted around the world is a welcome contribution to the field.

As an elite theorist, a feminist theorist and a comparativist, Vianello has been committed to the study of elites and gender for some 30 years. He has already captured the attention of colleagues worldwide through his previous publications in the field, including (with Renata Siemieńska) *Gender Inequality* (1990) and the recent *Gendering Elites* (2000), which he coedited with Gwen Moore. The latter book included a wide array of topics and reflected a great variety of interests. This present publication is more coherently organized, and therefore conveys an even more distinctive message.

Women and Men in Political and Business Elites is impressively comprehensive. Based on a single piece of research carried out by a distinguished team of researchers, who used the same questionnaire and the same research design, it collates data on gender differences and similarities in political and business elites in no fewer than 27 major industrialized democratic countries. In spite of its wide 'catchment area', and the fact that the articles have been written by different members of the team, it is systematically focused on a closely interrelated set of central issues. Given the fact that there are women who have now reached positions of power, the analysis highlights how they have done so, how they fare in those positions, and how they exercise their leadership.

Worldwide, women at the top are still greatly outnumbered by men: in 2000 women accounted for only some 14 percent of all members of parliament, and occupied only one-tenth of all ministerial positions across the world. Nonetheless, things are progressing and, as acknowledged in this special issue's title, considerable numbers of women have achieved a place above the 'glass ceiling', the invisible barrier that has long been blocking women's advancement. But the results of the multinational study reported here show that although the glass ceiling has been cracked, it has not been shattered, and considerable barriers remain. Even though elites are no longer the exclusive preserve of men, there is still a long way to go before women, advancing into elites, achieve parity and equality with their male counterparts.

In almost all respects, there are considerable differences among countries. Thus, as Brigitte Liebig and Silvia Sansonetti show in their contribution, in the last 20 years, several democratic countries have made big strides in bringing parity to the routes to the top for women, so that these are no longer slower and more tortuous than those of men. Other countries have been more sluggish in their progress in this respect. On the whole, however, women are still hampered by substantial gender-related disadvantages.

In the first place, as revealed in Antonella Pinnelli's and Mino Vianello's respective contributions, women need greater resources than do men in

their families of origin, as springboards into the elites. Their parents tend to be more highly educated, which means that women require more extensive cultural capital than men, to enable them to reach the top. Their parents' occupational status is higher: they more frequently hold supervisory posts in their work, which means that women need a more privileged family background than men, for the same purpose. In addition, as Palgi and Moore's article also shows, women require more extensive personal mentoring and sponsoring in the elites they wish to enter; and it is precisely in this realm that they experience greater difficulties than men.

Second, female elite members face more obstacles than male elite members in engaging in normal family life. Once they access their positions, they no longer require more extensive family resources than men in order to fulfil their roles. But to some extent they have to sacrifice family life in favour of these roles. Housework and childcare are not usually shared equally between women in elites and their partners, and this is probably one of the reasons for the fact that their family life is generally more discontinuous than that of their male counterparts.

Women at the top are less likely to form marital unions and have children. They are less likely to have partners in life or, if they do, they are more prone to separate from them. And they more often remain single after marriage breakups. It is possible, of course, that they freely select these alternative lifestyles. But according to this present study's convincing interpretation, it is more likely that higher personal costs are exacted from them for their achievements, as compared to the price men in similar positions must pay.

Consequently, as Siemieńska indicates in her article, women (more than men) are aware of gender inequalities and cultural impediments in women's advancement opportunities. They are also conscious of the fact that they must show greater achievements than men, in order to be noticed. Once in power, women are more postmaterialist in their orientations, compared to men, and they are more apt to favour government intervention, in order to bring about a fairer redistribution of resources, while men are more market oriented.

Despite some similarities in men's and women's leadership styles, Litsa Nicolaou-Smokoviti demonstrates that women business managers are disposed, much more than male managers, to engage in democratic leadership, with emphasis on a non-competitive sharing of power, and on consensual participation, rather than on the imposition of dominance.

Further, Rosanna Memoli, analysing social networks, reports that women in top management belong less than men to various clubs and organizations, probably because of the time constraints imposed by their family obligations. Yet they tend, more than men, to construct formal and informal social networks, outside their own areas of activity. They put more emphasis on solidarity and support within their families and within their jobs, and thus (in Parsons' terms) they display a more 'expressive' type of leadership as compared to men, who are more 'instrumental' in their leadership.

This publication is thus noteworthy also because it provides a convincing reply to the frequently asked question, of why it matters whether women do, or do not, gain access to top positions in public life. Is it really the position holder's gender that counts? Is it not more important how they act in those positions? In this respect the publication proves that women's entrance into elites is important, not just because half of the population (which previously was scarcely represented at the top) now has a higher degree of such representation. Rather, the importance of having women in policy-making positions also lies in that they are distinctively more democratic, egalitarian and oriented to social support and solidarity, as compared to men. Thus the promotion of women into the elites around the world also spells the promotion of trends towards more democratic, egalitarian and caring societies.

In her book *Gender Equity*, J.S. Chafetz (1988) pinpoints the equal representation of women in elites as the single most important factor that is likely to produce gender equality in society at large. Indirectly, the present study lends a degree of support to this theoretical claim. It does not show that women in power go out of their way to extend a helping hand to other women, or that they make the promotion of equality for women their central life-project. But since they are found to be generally more equality and caring oriented, their ability to shape policies is likely to encourage progress towards gender equality as well.

Elite theory has long been concerned with the relationship between elites and democracy. What sort of elites, it has been asked, hinder the advent of this regime, and which elites facilitate its emergence and consolidation. Democracy and democratization have been variously attributed to elite imposition of this regime, to non-state elites' autonomy from the state, to power-holders' compromises, settlements and consensus on democratic rules. Recently, more emphasis has been put on the importance of their linkages with lower-level elites and with the public at large, as significant for democracy. In my own recent work, the edited volume *Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization* (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997), I have highlighted elite linkages with the disadvantaged classes and groups of the public as promoting democracy. One of the present study's 'fringe benefits', so to speak, is that it enlarges the aforementioned theoretical perspectives on the interface between elites and democracy.

For the study alerts us to an additional type of linkages with others: the power-sharing and consensual style of leadership which women exercise more frequently than men as potentially significant for democracy. Thus the book calls attention to an issue that, too often, has been neglected in elite theory: the connection between the micro and the macro; between what elites do in their own personal setting and immediate environment, and democracy in society at large.

Finally, the present study provides some encouraging hints with respect to the possibility of change towards greater equality between men and women in elites. In their article on networking and mentoring, Palgi and

Moore show that the differences between men and women are smaller in social democratic countries than they are elsewhere. According to the authors, this means that the considerable attention that is being devoted in public discourse to gender inequalities in these countries has in fact led to the decrease in such inequalities. Raising consciousness about these issues may thus lead to change, a fact that elites in other countries would do well to take notice of.

In all this the study constitutes a path-breaking achievement. But like all path-breaking, it is necessarily a beginning, rather than the end. The topic of women and power is one that has hardly been scratched at the surface, and much spadework remains to be done. Societies are changing, and so are their elites, the proportion of women in them, and these women's (and their male counterparts') routes to power. All those transformations need to be explored and documented continually, findings need to be updated and reported anew, and theories need to be adapted to changing realities.

Furthermore, new times generate new elites. The postindustrial information society has given birth to high-tech, computer and internet-related conglomerations of power. Globalization has given rise to transnational governance organizations and multinational business corporations. All these entities have spawned their own elites. And the issue of how women fare in them is largely still virgin territory as far as research, analysis and theory are concerned.

Knowing Mino Vianello's creative energy, I have no doubt that he himself will study – and coordinate the study – in several of these areas. And while he continues to show the way, it is to be hoped that others will not merely follow, but make their own contributions to the field. This study by Vianello, Moore and their co-contributors of women's and men's pathways to power will itself form pathways to the fruitful development of this important field.

Note

1 See, for instance, his recent book *Un Nouveau Paradigme pour les sciences sociales – genre, espace, pouvoir* (Vianello, 2001).

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Introduction

The topic 'elite' may be dealt with either in a few lines, or in many pages. There is no half way. In fact, it encompasses issues which are crucial to the social sciences, such as the relation between the distribution of wealth, prestige and power; the exercise of power and the composition of the group that holds it. The list is extensive.

Here, however, we intend to tackle the problem of elites from a particular perspective: that of the relationship between elite and gender – a relationship that has so far been ignored in the entire body of literature dealing with the issue of elites. Today, however, the stereotypical idea that the public arena is a man's world is no longer consistent with reality.

We therefore believe that this timely research will contribute significantly to broadening and deepening our knowledge of elites, as well as emphasizing the emerging role of women within them. All this, we hope, may prove the catalyst for further scientific and public discourse and debate, with the potential to improve policies aimed at expanding women's share of power.

It was, in fact, about four centuries ago that the topic began to attract the attention of social scientists. This coincided with the advent of bourgeois society and its concomitant substitution of the criterion of ascription with that of meritocracy. Otherwise, it was taken for granted that elites were a typically, exclusively and unequivocally male phenomenon.

Whether broadly or narrowly defined, the assumption has always been that the elites of this world (the Paretian 'superior class' of government) have consisted of men. In other words, whether the elites studied were made up of entrepreneurs or trade union leaders, political, religious or intellectual dignitaries, it was always assumed that one was dealing with men.

Why is this so? Simplistic as it may sound, the answer (which can be found *literally* stated in some of the main texts and which we obviously do not share) is that men have an innate passion for power, and consequently fight to attain and keep it. All organizations, states, parties and trade unions are therefore seen as male oligarchies. One may despair (as is said of many socialists after they read Michels) at the apparent impossibility of building a democratic, egalitarian society with no minority ruling the majority, but few have questioned the fact that oligarchies are male.

It is not necessary to examine here elites in various societies and epochs or the history of the theory of elites which, from its inception with Machiavelli to our own times, has been mainly elaborated (not by chance: every society expresses thinkers that reflect it) in Italy. Even leaving aside Machiavelli's patent masculinism, not Pareto, or Mosca, or Michels, or Sartori, or Bobbio (to cite only Italian authors: but the same holds true for Schmitt, Lasswell, Mills, Aron, Dahrendorf . . .) paid attention to the fact that a half

of the population in every society has been excluded from power in the public sphere. Of course, several feminist writers, especially starting in the mid-1960s, called attention to this fact, but their writing went unnoticed by elite theorists.

In elite studies, the discussion centred on who has power; whether it is a 'good' or a 'relation'; whether hidden power counts more than manifest power; whether elites are groups of people or rather the appendage of 'great men'; whether force or manipulation through symbols is more useful to preserve power; whether personal gifts or circumstances help more; and so on. At a certain point, the subject of persons who are excluded from power entered the discussion: but, strangely (or, rather, naturally enough) no one ever raised the issue of why women, *all* women (with few exceptions), do not participate in it.

The research on this topic, starting with the classic studies by Floyd Hunter and Robert Dahl in the 1950s, that introduced the basic distinction between monolithic and pluralist elites, investigated many aspects of the problem: the prerequisites of elite membership; the connection between economic, military, religious, intellectual and political elites; and within the latter, the relation between professional politicians and bureaucrats; et cetera. Almost no one hitherto dealing with elite theory investigated the issue of the presence/absence of women (for an important exception, see Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998).

Another issue was given even less consideration, namely what would be the significance and implications involved in women's access to positions of power in the public domain? First, how would it affect the mechanisms of power? Second, and as a possible consequence, would it signify a different course of development for human history, given that from time immemorial it has been assumed that the fundamental law governing society is that it is ruled by a (male) minority.

In a sense, despite a flourishing body of research, the theory of elites appears terribly static, anchored in fundamentally simplistic hypotheses formulated by Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Weber and Ortega y Gasset.

Although subsequent literature has explored many interesting aspects and social realities, it has produced little in the way of new or stimulating material on the subject of gender.[1] We have already mentioned the debate between those who favour a monolithic perspective and those finding elite heterogeneity. This embraces the relationship between forms of elites and forms of government, the independence of political elites with regard to economic elites and the relationship between class and elite, namely to what extent elites are subject to controls in liberal-democratic regimes, how they perpetuate themselves and exercise power, and issues of a similar nature.

What we have done is to set ourselves the task of identifying those women who with unquestionable success have entered the elite in the public domain, determining what this means for them and for their lives when compared to men in similar positions.

We are fully aware that we are dealing with a minute corps of women.

Indeed, from what can be ascertained both from everyday life as well as from the literature on this topic, it is no mystery that when women wish to enter public life and aspire to a career therein, they face obstacles of all kinds, which are primarily related to the prevailing male monopoly in this sector. Not only does their numerical paucity place them at a disadvantage, they are also presented with the coarse and unscrupulously competitive style of male interaction. This lies at the centre of the structural barriers erected against them. Men are simply comfortable with this style and so seek to perpetuate it. Furthermore, it goes beyond men constituting the majority in a particular setting, which is evidenced by the fact that when men are tokens in female-dominated organizations, they are not forced to deal with the same kind of problems as women are in male-dominated work settings. If belonging to a minority were the determining factor in this scenario, then it should be valid for both sexes in analogous situations. We are aware of this, as we are of the fact that many women who are potential candidates do not step forward, since they refuse to enter a difficult situation. With this current study, however, our intention is to investigate those very women who rise to this challenge.

The method used, as is outlined in detail in the following article, by Sansonetti, is that already proposed by Mosca and used in recent times by Domhoff: that is, we identify women and men who hold important positions in political and economic life. They are selected exclusively from the very exiguous group of top decision-makers in order to determine differences between men and women holding similar positions. We are conscious of the limits of this positional approach, destined as it is to exclude many hidden and informal aspects of power, as well as those of a more formal nature. Yet we maintain that it is the only approach which, when employed in an empirical study, can be used both productively and with considerable ease.

There are many questions about women members of the elite, besides the most obvious one, namely who they are and how they live in comparison to their male counterparts. We attempt to answer some of these questions, those which we consider important, and especially from the point of view of the women concerned.

With recourse to the paradigms used in well-known empirical research on elites, carried out in a spirit that took for granted that members were men, we wanted to test the hypothesis that the structural and cultural conditions faced by women in attaining power and exercising it are in fact adverse to their success. This has resulted in a number of questions specific to women. Some of the most important are:

- What factors actually contribute to a woman enjoying a successful career?
- Do these women come from families belonging to the upper classes of their societies? Have the women been given support?
- Have younger women elite had an easier access to the top in comparison with those of the previous generation?

- Is it true that men enjoy a faster rate of promotion than women do?
- Do women need higher qualifications than men in terms of studies, training and experience in order to reach the same positions as their male counterparts?
- Are they in the innermost circles of power within the elite or are they more likely to serve as buffers and go-betweens?
- Men take for granted not only their right to belong to the elite, but also to enjoy simultaneously a family life. Does the same hold for elite women or rather are they forced to make the choice between family and career?
- Do women top managers display the same style of leadership as men?
- Are their partners supportive or are they more likely to resent their commitments and be critical of their lives?
- Do women in the top decision-making positions believe they have the same amount of influence and power that men have?

These are some of the vital questions we have attempted to answer in our study of political and business life, carried out in the 27 most industrialized countries of the world. We hope that others may likewise be encouraged to further explore other aspects of private and public life.

We end this introduction on a note of hope. Up to now, history has been the history of 'lions' and 'foxes', maintaining power and using it to the detriment of the interests of the common people. We believe that an equitable and significantly increased participation of women in the decision-making processes may alter the tragic course so far traced by the application of this type of logic. As already stated, this research provides an investigative channel through which to monitor the early steps of women on their way to occupying top positions in public life. Our long-term hope is that this shift in the balance of power, albeit gradual, might bring about the crumbling of the wall that the male monopoly in the public sphere has for so long erected against them.

Yet, we are also aware that a third possibility may exist. On the one hand, we face women's inclusion into the mechanisms of power on an equal footing with men and, on the other, women's exclusion from power in public life. A third scenario raises concerns of women's being used. In fact, women might be encouraged to enter public life and pursue a career only to serve as tokens and buffers, and, thanks to a certain degree of authority they themselves may have acquired, thus establish a model for the next generation of women.

Note

1 For recent reviews of the literature, see the two monograph issues on elites which appeared in the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, Vols 9(2), 1999 and 11(2), 2001, edited respectively by Eva Etzioni-Halevy, and John Higley and Gwen Moore.

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Description of the Sample and Research Design

Silvia Sansonetti

The Research Design

A probability sample would not fit the aim of the study, which is not about political and business elites per se, but about the relationship between gender and elites in these areas. Therefore, the sample is purposive and matched. The singularity of this strategy is that women in elite positions are the starting point.

Since the number of women among the elites is small, it was decided to limit the study to 15 women in the political elite and as many again in the business elite in each country. Once every woman had filled in the study questionnaire, a man with the same characteristics (holding an equivalent position, defined by levels, in the same or a similar organization) was then interviewed. Thus, we ended up with about 60 respondents in each country: 30 in politics and 30 in business.

Two business organizations were considered similar when their economic dimensions (turnover, for firms; deposits, for banks; premiums, for insurance companies) were similar. In the political arena, similarities were drawn on the basis of the respondent's membership in a party, the government or legislative bodies.

Levels of position are defined differently for political or business leaders. In the first level for political leaders, we included members of the government, presidents of national legislative assemblies and those in executive positions in the main parties in power. The second level included governors/presidents of regional/provincial bodies, presidents/leaders of the main opposition parties, individuals in executive positions in the main opposition parties, presidents of legislative committees and mayors of major cities; the third level consisted of elected representatives of the upper or lower national legislative assemblies; the fourth and last level incorporated representatives in local bodies of major cities and administrative heads of civil service departments. For business leaders, levels were defined as follows: in the first level managing directors and chief executive officers were included; in the second, members of the central board of the company engaged in managerial or financial functions; in the third, other senior managers; in the fourth, department or branch managers.

Table 1 shows the distribution by level of our sample. Political respondents are more concentrated in level three, typically members of the national legislative assemblies, while business respondents are distributed among the first three levels especially in the second and in the third.

Identifying women political leaders was easier because of their constant exposure to the attention of the mass media, while for women business leaders it was necessary to adopt the following method. The 250 most important corporations in terms of turnover and the first 10 banks and insurance companies ranked according to premiums and deposits were selected; then, one of them was randomly chosen. We proceeded to check whether women actually worked at the top, starting from the first level and shifting to the next and the next until a woman in a prominent position was found. The sample obtained included most women in power in both the political and economic spheres in all the countries included in the study. The male respondents are simply counterparts. Therefore, we cannot speak of a male sample (while as far as women are concerned, we have practically the entire range of the female elite for the countries under study).

The completion rate for women was computed for 21 countries (data of the refusals to fill in the questionnaire were not available for all). It serves to confirm that we have gained access to the majority of the elites of each country, considering at the same time the distribution by levels of our sample. The completion rate, in fact, varies between 65 percent and 95 percent for politicians and it is a little bit higher for business leaders. Only for France and Japan is it lower than 50 percent either for business leaders or for politicians.

Table 1 *Respondents by Elite Sphere, Level and Gender*

Leadership	Level of present position	Men	Women	Total
Political	1	73	81	154
	2	62	61	123
	3	244	236	480
	4	9	19	28
Total		388	397	785
Economic	1	111	101	212
	2	131	148	279
	3	138	164	302
	4	33	36	69
Total		413	449	862
Total		801	846	1647

Note: There are 39 non-responses for the variable 'Level of present position', all belonging to the category 'Political leadership', since 33 cases in Poland (14 women and 19 men), two in Spain (women), two in the Netherlands (one woman and one man) and one in Greece (woman) were coded separately as bureaucrats and one woman in Norway was not classified (see Sansonetti et al., 2000).

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire included more than 100 closed questions divided into seven sections. The first two sections regard the current position of the respondents and their social capital in terms of networks and access to informal channels of communication and information. The third is about the occupational path. The fourth part is concerned with the family either of origin or orientation, while the fifth analyses respondents' attitudes towards the distribution of power in the society in general and in relation to gender. Personal data for year and place of birth, nationality and level of education close the questionnaire. Respondents gave also some information on their organizations, the party for politicians and the business organization for business leaders. The questionnaire was collectively drafted in English, then translated into each country language, and finally translated back into English by a native English speaker in an attempt to limit semantic differences between languages.

Treiman's Social Prestige Score Scale was used to aggregate and compare data relating to occupations (see Appendix A).

Data Collection

The data were collected between 1993 and 1995. Potential respondents were first contacted by phone, and then questionnaires were either sent by post or administered in person. In principle, this difference in collecting data should not have had any bearing on the quality of the data, given the high social status of the interviewees, which naturally implied both a high level of education and a familiarity with the printed word. Needless to say, we were dealing with subjects accustomed to regular contacts with journalists and the like.

Analysis

Given the nature of the sample, inference[1] is used only in order to add strength to our conclusions, not to draw generalizations valid for the entirety of the elite in the 27 countries in the study.

As already stated, about 60 questionnaires were collected in each country. In order to avoid the influence of country peculiarities on the results, a weighting system was adopted consisting of the number of questionnaires collected in every country divided by 15. These weights were then applied to the variables in the corresponding country.

For 1995 the World Bank (World Bank, 1997a) classifies the countries included in our study, on the basis of the income, into different groups. Starting from this classification the countries included in this study have been grouped as follows. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia,

Slovenia, Greece and Portugal, have been considered in a group. Then from the remaining group of countries that the World Bank considers as high income countries[2] there is another group comprising Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands based on the results of Inglehart's (1997) cross-national study of modernization and postmodernization (see Appendix B). This country grouping is used in most of the contributions here, however in some cases, it is not the basis of the hypothesis explored.

Description of the Sample

Countries

Appendix C contains a short description of the countries included in the study.

Characteristics of the Political Leaders

Political leaders make up 48.9 percent of all respondents (824 units, of whom 408 men and 416 women). The average age is 50 for men and 49 for women.

With regard to private life, 634 respondents out of the 753 answering the question have a partner. The difference between men and women is highly significant: 92.2 percent of men vs 76.4 percent of women. The organization of domestic chores[3] is carried out at a highly significant level more by women than by men: on a Likert scale, women are close to point 3 (or half of what is required), while men are close to point 2 (or much less than half). In addition to their career, women political leaders have to take care of the home more than their male colleagues.

The average number of children is 2.24 for men, 1.87 for women: this is a highly significant difference. It clearly appears that men, delegating childcare to their partners and not having to bear the consequences of pregnancy, do not give up having children in favour of their career.

The analysis of the educational background of the respondents does not reveal a significant difference as far as average number of years of education completed is concerned (women 16.65, men 16.95). Many respondents have a university degree. However, a highly significant difference emerges when we consider the kind of studies completed. Results are shown in Table 2. While the gender distribution in law is comparable, more men pursue degrees in economics/business and science/engineering (although the difference here is smaller), while more women than men study humanities. It is noteworthy to remark that the percentage of women without a university degree is higher than the percentage of men. These data confirm that the selection of people with regard to possible roles in public life is already taking place in adolescence.

As far as office is concerned, just 16.9 percent are members of the

Table 2 *University Degree by Gender for Political Leaders (in percentages)*

	Men	Women	Total
No university degree	13.6	15.9	14.8
University degree			
Law	21.8	20.2	20.9
Economics and Business	19.0	9.9	14.5
Science and Engineering	17.5	14.4	15.9
Social science	13.6	15.6	14.6
Humanities	9.8	19.2	14.5
Other	4.7	4.8	4.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(337)	(334)	(671)

There are 153 non-responses.
$p_{\chi^2} = .001$

government (premiers or members of the cabinet), 13.6 percent are party leaders (heads of majority party, heads of opposition party, members of national central board of the party, chairs or vice-chairs of party group in parliament or senate) and 7.4 percent are presidents or vice-presidents of legislative committees. Treiman's index of occupational prestige shows a non-significant difference for males (84.8) and females (84.5), as a result of the sample design.

As to the areas of activities carried out in the course of the last year (three answers were possible), the picture is as shown in Table 3.

The original 29 areas of activity were grouped in 12 categories. The association with gender is highly significant: apart from government (10 units) and foreign affairs (216), where there appears to be no difference between men and women, men dominate in the strategic areas of internal affairs (63.8 percent), economy (66.3 percent), defence (67.8 percent), constitutional matters (65.8 percent) and public works (68.4 percent). The areas where the presence of women is similar to the one of men, are environmental affairs (47.0 percent) and justice (55.7 percent), while in the areas related to social issues like equal opportunities (95.4 percent), welfare (65.9 percent), labour (59.8 percent) and culture (59.4 percent) their prevalence is strong.

The Party As far as party affiliation is concerned, 38.0 percent define themselves as leftists, 36.1 percent as moderates and 25.9 percent as rightists. Even though the difference is not significant, women present higher percentages among leftists (39.3 vs 36.9) and moderates (37.6 vs 34.6), while men are more concentrated among rightists (28.5 vs 23.1). Many (91) respondents do not belong to any party.

The vast majority of the respondents live in a country with a coalition government, and 54.1 percent out of 678 belong to a party of the government coalition. No significant difference emerges between genders.

Table 3 *Areas of Activity in the Last Year by Gender for Political Leaders (multiple answers) (in percentages)*

Areas of activity in the last year	Men	Women	Total (N)
Premier	50.0	50.0	100.0 (10)
Internal affairs	63.8	36.2	100.0 (163)
Economic affairs	66.3	33.7	100.0 (407)
Labour	40.2	59.8	100.0 (87)
Welfare	34.1	65.9	100.0 (425)
Culture	40.6	59.4	100.0 (187)
Defence	67.8	32.2	100.0 (62)
Foreign affairs	50.0	50.0	100.0 (216)
Justice	44.3	55.7	100.0 (97)
Constitutional affairs	65.8	34.2	100.0 (79)
Environmental affairs	53.0	47.0	100.0 (100)
Equal opportunity	4.6	95.4	100.0 (130)
Public works	68.4	31.6	100.0 (79)
Other	67.1	32.9	100.0 (76)
Total %	49.3	50.7	100.0 (2118)

Note: Interviewees who gave three answers number 733, of whom 361 men and 372 women.
$p\ \chi^2 = .000$

As far as the percentage of parliamentary seats held by the party of the respondent, the total amounts to 720, of which 23.9 percent belong to parties without any or with an almost nil representation. Of 669 interviewees, 26.6 percent belongs to a party without or an almost nil representation in senate. Parties that are strong in one house tend to be strong, to a highly significant degree, in the other also.

The average percentage of women in the political party of either the male or female respondents is around 30 percent and generally speaking no significant differences emerge between men and women.[4] However, when it comes to the average percentage of women at the top of the party, the difference increases. In the 10 years preceding the study there was a decrease of women at the top of political parties in 7.1 percent of the cases

(323 units in total), while in 23.6 percent of the cases the situation has remained stable. In the other cases there has been an improvement.

Characteristics of the Business Leaders

There are 862 business leaders in the sample of whom 449 are women and 413 men. The age difference is highly significant among the respondents: men are on average 50, women 46.5.

As to private life, there is a highly significant difference between men (95.4 percent) and women (74.6 percent) who report having a partner. For business leaders, just as for politicians, women take care of about a half of the organization of domestic chores, while men much less than half. The difference is highly significant. Moreover, as far as the number of children is concerned, men have an average of 2.3 children, women 1.4: the difference is again highly significant.

No significant difference appears as far as number of years of education completed are concerned (16.4 for men and 16.5 for women). But the difference is highly significant when we consider the kind of studies (see Table 4): there are more women than men without a university degree and men have usually graduated in scientific disciplines and engineering, while women in law, social sciences and humanities. No gender differences appear as far as economics and business are concerned.

No significant differences are found in terms of occupational prestige (Treiman's index), (men 67.5, women 66.9).

The difference in distribution by sectors (Table 5) is suggestive. Men prevail in strategic sectors: top management and marketing, women in the sectors of personnel management, finance, and administration. The number of direct subordinates for women is between three and 10, while it is between 11 and 25 for men. The difference is significant. As to the number of hierarchical levels above or below, no significant difference emerges. Yet,

Table 4 *University Degree by Gender for Business Leaders (in percentages)*

	Men	Women	Total
No university degree	14.7	16.7	15.7
University degree			
Law	7.8	12.2	10.1
Economics and business	31.2	30.4	30.9
Science and engineering	26.7	14.3	20.2
Social sciences	7.8	11.4	9.6
Humanities	6.9	11.6	9.4
Other	4.9	3.4	4.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(348)	(378)	(726)

Note: There are 136 non-responses.
$p_{\chi^2} = .000$

Table 5 *Sectors of the Firm of the Present Job by Gender for Business Leaders (in percentages)*

Sector of the firm of the present job	Men	Women	Total (N)
Top management	52.8	47.2	100.0 (299)
Personnel	37.4	62.6	100 (91)
Organization	34.8	65.2	100.0 (23)
Administration	40.3	59.7	100.0 (67)
Production	56.0	44.0	100.0 (25)
Marketing	56.2	43.8	100.0 (73)
Management	39.3	60.7	100.0 (28)
Finance	39.8	60.2	100.0 (88)
Accounting	50.0	50.0	100.0 (14)
Research and development	50.0	50.0	100.0 (36)
Public relations	33.3	66.7	100.0 (6)
Foreign relations	44.4	55.6	100.0 (18)
Raw materials	25.0	75.0	100.0 (8)
Other	58.5	41.5	100.0 (53)
Total %	47.8	52.2	100.0 (829)

Note: There are 33 non-responses.
$p\ \chi^2 = .080$

the majority of those who do not have any level above themselves are men (53.9 percent).

The Organization When asked about the nature of the firm, 8.4 percent of the 706 respondents (354 men and 352 women) answered that they work in family enterprises, 58.5 percent in firms quoted in the stock market, 20.1 percent in state-owned firms, 4.5 percent in firms with mixed property and 8.5 percent in cooperatives. There are, obviously, no significant gender differences, since respondents were chosen from similar firms.

The average number of men and women employees in the organizations where the respondents work are similar, irrespective of the respondent's gender (in firms of male managers there are on average 5811 men and 2237 women and in firms of female managers 5361 men and 2141 women).

There are no gender differences in the average percentage of men and women employees with professional training or advanced professional training. In the organizations to which our female respondents belong, 37.2 percent of the women and 44.8 percent of the men are professionals, and in the organizations to which our male respondents belong 34.9 percent of the women and 43.4 percent of the men are professionals.

As far as the organizational structure[5] is concerned, most of the respondents belong to functional organizations (men 49.5 percent, women 47.4 percent), which characterizes firms with stable management. Men appear more often in matrix and product organizations, probably because these are more rigid, and competitive structures tend to penalize women's careers. On the other hand, project organizations, which are more flexible, show a much higher percentage of women than men. This holds true also for other types of organizations. The difference between women and men is significant.

The percentage of women managers at the top of the organizations to which our respondents belong is significantly higher for women respondents (between 6 and 9 percent) than for male respondents (between 3 and 5 percent).

These are the main features of our study sample.

Notes

1 In indicating the probability level, we adopted the following terminology: < .01 = highly significant; .05–.01 = significant; .10–.05 = suggestive.

2 Portugal was classified among high income economies for the first time in 1995 while all other countries have been in this group for a longer time, for this reason Portugal is not in this group.

3 In this elite context domestic chores have to be considered as the organization of them more than an effective exercise of them.

4 Please note, however, that even though not significant, the average percentages of positions at the highest levels of the parties are different for women and for men respondents. In parties to which our men respondents belong they represent a lower proportion (23.4 percent), while in the parties to which our women respondents belong the proportion is higher (26.2 percent).

5 We defined organizational structures as follows: functional if the organization is divided into groups of functions starting from the second level in the organigram onwards; product or project, if it is organized according to the product or the project (it requires the creation of departments or offices of short or medium life); matrix, when it is a mix of functional and product or project organization, with two managers in each department, one of them responsible for functional and the other for product/project aspects of the global organization.

Appendix A

The wide use of Treiman's index in this study justifies this appendix.

Through his empirical occupational prestige study, Treiman advocates

that there exists an occupational prestige hierarchical order valid worldwide, and that prestige is measurable. This is largely based on the belief that all societies have to deal with a number of 'functional imperatives', according to his structural theory perspective. Functional imperatives determine occupational roles and the division of labour, i.e. a differentiation and specialization of individuals in terms of who controls skills, property and authority, resulting in a hierarchical order of occupations and, thus, stratification of occupations. Since the functional imperatives remain the same in all societies, so must the prestige order of occupations (Treiman, 1977: 5). The same kind of occupation might present, however, a slightly different prestige score in different countries, because there is no systematic correspondence between cultural values and occupational prestige. There are two reasons for these differences. First, 'power and privilege associated with an occupation vary across the societies, and so will the prestige' (Treiman, 1977: 21); second 'in addition to power and privilege, other features confer prestige and these are not invariant across societies' (Treiman, 1977: 21).

Treiman's Social Prestige Score Scale offers a standardized occupational status scale that could be used to code occupations in any country, to enable cross-national comparisons uncontaminated by differences in scale procedures (Treiman, 1977: 165).

Treiman's study involved the collection of data related to power, privilege and prestige in 85 previous studies conducted in 60 countries from the end of the Second World War until 1977. He chose the best available study for each country taking into account the sample size and the classifications used. Titles of occupations were classified according to their function. If two occupations fulfilled the same function in the division of labour, even if they implied different tasks, they were classified with the same title. This led to a total number of 509 occupations. To group occupations, he followed the ILO classification ISCO '69, with few exceptions. We refer the reader to the book for the calculation procedures.

The scale presents a range of 92 points: the highest rating is 90 (which is the prestige score of the chief of state), and the lowest is –2 (which is the score of 'gatherer', rated exclusively in peasant India, and of the 'hunter'). As would be expected, the highest status positions are those at the top of political, religious and educational hierarchies and, among more common occupations, the highest prestige rankings are those of scientists, physicians and professors. The only business occupation with a high score refers to bankers of large banks, in other cases business-women/men are not regarded as highly as professionals are. Considering the scale's general pattern, the lowest scores are found for non-specialized workers and illegal or illegitimate occupations. The mean scale score is 43.3 and the standard deviation is 16.9. The distribution appears normally distributed.

The author shows also that this scale is the best compared to all the others available. To validate his theory, Treiman proved the high correlation between his prestige scale and the original data scales coming from different countries and sources. He first computed the correlations between the

original data scales of the 55 most reliable countries in the study and his own scale. The mean value of correlations was .91 with only seven countries presenting a value lower than .87.

Treiman's scale is more complete than those elaborated in each country, because it considers all occupations classified by ISCO '69.

Having analysed the scale's error distribution (the value of the average standard error is 3.05), Treiman concluded that 'while the scale as a whole is highly reliable, it is wise not to make too much of small differences between the scores for specific occupations. A good rule of thumb would be to regard differences of less than 6 points as representing chance fluctuations and only interpret differences of 6 points or more' (Treiman, 1977: 189).

Use of this prestige score scale should be made with caution. It is obvious that 'it is not evident that the sort of work one does is an equally important determinant of individual status in all societies. In some societies wealth may play the dominant role, and in others ethnicity, and in still others different factors, such as family name. The fact is that very little is known about this topic, and it is an obvious line for further investigation' (Treiman, 1977: 228–9).

Appendix B

The grouping of countries adopted in this study is strongly influenced by Inglehart's work.

Since its first realization in the 1970s, covering only six countries (Inglehart, 1977), the World Values Survey (1997) has been extended and in the last edition it included 43 countries.

In this study, the variables of the original questionnaire are summarized into a set of items. Then, the two most important factors, which explained most of all variability, are identified. These two factors are 'authority' and 'well-being'. All other items are placed along these two-factor axes and the interpretation of the results is as follows. The axis of authority is a continuum between traditional and legal-rational (or traditional-secular) authority; the well-being axis is a continuum between survival and well-being. Items at a high well-being level appear out of the rational-secular authority and are defined as postmaterialistic values (tolerance, neighbour friendly, freedom in sexual behaviour, ecology, fantasy, etc.), and characterize 'postmodern' societies. When the well-being level is near to the survival level, items are defined as materialistic values and they characterize 'modern societies'.

Inglehart's work gives us two insights. The first is how countries are placed in the plan defined by these two factors. Countries characterized by a developed welfare state like Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and the Netherlands are very close to each other and the author concludes that they constitute today the most postmodern societies of the world, forming a

group apart, within all protestant societies. In addition, the detailed item analysis revealed that expectations of the feminist movement are a reality in countries where postmaterialist values prevail. This is why these five countries are defined as a separate group in our research.

The second insight Inglehart's results suggest is the importance of the historical context, in which the transition towards postmaterialistic values occurs. Inglehart identified two characteristics that all countries, where the postmaterialistic values are present, have in common, and these are stability in politics and peace. These conditions have been present during the last 50 years in western democracies, and it is a matter of fact that in these countries we have also had economic well-being and creation (as well as expansion) of the welfare state, guaranteeing a minimum well-being to all. This is a basic premise for the transition to a postmaterialistic society. This transition implied a temporal breach as well. There are differences between an older generation, whose childhood and adolescence were set in a financially and politically difficult period (people born before the Second World War) and who still believe in materialistic values, and a younger generation who have always lived in an affluent society (people born after the Second World War) and are more attracted by postmaterialistic values.

Appendix C

Following *The Handbook for Producing National Statistical Reports on Women and Men* (United Nations, 1997a), data concerning these countries are presented in this order: population, public life and leadership, education, maternity and childcare and finally, work and economy. The average marriage rate[1] is 5.59 and ranges between 4.2 in Slovenia or 4.4 in France and Sweden to 9.1 in the US. The divorce rate[2] average is 2.23 and it varies between the highest (4.57) in the US and the lowest value in Italy (0.48), preceded by Greece and Slovenia with 0.8. The average overall fertility rate[3] is 1.63. Spain, Italy and Germany present the lowest value (1.2), while Israel (2.4) the highest, followed by New Zealand and the US (2.1).

Few countries in our study (eight) have a federal structure. The government is elected in 10 of them, appointed in seven, and in the others is formed according to a hybrid system. Almost all (23) countries have a parliamentary regime, while France, the US and Russia have a presidential regime and Portugal a mixed form. The parliamentary electoral system is proportional in 13 countries, not proportional in nine and hybrid in Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland and Russia. The highest percentages of women in parliament are found in the Nordic countries: 39 percent in Norway and Finland, 34 percent in Sweden, 33 percent in Denmark and 31 percent in the Netherlands. The electoral system for the senate, where one exists, is generally not proportional, except in Australia and Slovenia. Women in the senate comprise on average 10.7 percent. The highest values are found in the Netherlands (28 percent) and Australia (25 percent), while women are

completely absent from the Greek senate. Percentages of women in governments as ministers reflect percentages of women in parliament. Here again the Nordic countries present the highest percentages: 29.2 percent in Denmark, 35 percent in Norway, 31.3 percent in the Netherlands, 30 percent in Sweden, while Finland with 15 percent presents the lowest value among them. Women are entirely absent in the governments of the Czech Republic, Russia and Hungary. The percentages of women in the upper echelons of the civil service present the highest values in Norway (48.8 percent), the US (26.1 percent) and Australia (23.3 percent) respectively.

The percentage of women students enrolled in the third level, excluding vocational schools,[4] varies between 40.2 percent in Switzerland and 59.6 percent in Slovenia. Japan is the only exception with 31.6 percent.

In the area of religion, Protestantism reaches a peak in Sweden, Denmark and Finland (between 85 and 90 percent), but is equally strong in the US (60 percent), Switzerland and Germany (around 40 percent). It is present also in Australia (21 percent) and the Netherlands (26 percent). In Germany and Switzerland other traditional Christian religions (Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy or Anglican Catholicism) also account for another 40 percent. These religions are dominant (implying more than 70 percent) in Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, and strong in Australia, Canada and the UK (between 50 percent and 60 percent, prevalently Anglican). Religions somehow inspired by Buddhism, of which small percentages are also found in Canada, Australia and the US, are dominant in Japan. Judaism is the major religion in Israel, while it reaches 3 percent only in Switzerland and in the US. Here Muslims account for 3 percent of the population as they do in Germany and Greece.

Maternity leave exists in all countries and varies between a minimum of eight weeks in Switzerland and 12 weeks in the US and Israel, to a maximum of 24 weeks in Hungary. In only three countries is maternity leave unpaid: the US, New Zealand and Australia (ILO, 1994).

The GNP per capita in PPP$[5] is on average 17,155: the lowest levels are reached in Russia (4480), Poland (5400) and Hungary (6410), the highest in the US (26,980), Switzerland (25,860) and Japan (22,110).

The percentage of women unemployed[6] is 3.2 percent in Japan, followed by Switzerland (3.9 percent) and Austria (4.3 percent), with the highest percentage found in Italy and Finland (16.7 percent) and (Greece 15.4 percent).

Women are predominantly employed in part-time work[7] in the Netherlands (67.3 percent); the percentage is also high in Switzerland (52.9 percent), whereas Greece (8.4 percent), Portugal (11.6 percent), and Italy (12.7 percent) show the lowest percentages.

Women in management[8] represent 14.4 percent in Italy, followed by Australia (13.7 percent) and the US (12.8 percent), while Japan (0.8 percent), Israel (2.2 percent) and Finland (2.4 percent) are the countries which have the lowest percentages. The high figure in Italy can be attributed to the uniqueness of its industrial system, based on small, family-owned

firms, in which women are simply the owners or have responsibility in the firms and carry out supervisory functions (Bagnasco, 1972).

The following analysis of three complex indices computed by the United Nations Development Programme, is useful in completing this description with additional information.

The average of the Human Development Index[9] is 0.917 and the average for the Gender-Related Development Index[10] is 0.888. Both indices are at a minimum in Russia (0.769 and 0.757 respectively), the only country where the Human Development Index is under the value 0.800, fixed by UN as the threshold for high levels. The Human Development Index reaches the maximum value in France (0.946) while the Gender-Related Development Index has the highest value in Norway (0.935).[11]

The Gender Empowerment Measure[12] is on average 0.610 (standard deviation 0.11). The lowest value is found in Greece (0.438) and the highest in Norway (0.790).[13]

Notes

1 The marriage rate is the number of recognized marriages performed and registered per 1000 mid-year population (UN, 1997b).

2 The divorce rate is the annual number of final divorce decrees granted under civil law per 1000 mid-year population (UN, 1997b).

3 The total fertility rate is the average number of children that would be born alive to a hypothetical cohort of women if throughout their reproductive years the age-specific fertility rates for the specific year remained constant per woman (World Bank, 1997).

4 The third level refers to the sixth and seventh ISCED Levels (International Standard Classification of Education adopted in 1976). It includes courses leading to a first university degree or equivalent such as BA/BSc., as well as those which lead to first professional degrees such as doctorates awarded after completion of study in medicine, engineering or law. They also include studies leading to a postgraduate degree and are intended to reflect specialization within a given subject area (UNESCO, 1997).

5 GNP per capita in PPP$ is the Gross National Product converted into international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over the Gross National Product as the US dollar in the US (World Bank, 1997b).

6 These rates are computed by relating the number of women who are unemployed during the reference period to the total of employed and unemployed women at the same date (ILO, 1997).

7 In order to obtain homogeneous data the percentage of women part-time workers is considered only for countries that followed the Eurostat definition as the ratio between women part-time employees and total women employees (Eurostat, 1997).

8 Women in management is the ratio between women classified as legislators, senior officials and managers or managerial and administrative workers and women employed in the whole year (ILO, 1997).

9 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure of development computed by the UNDP (1998).

10 The Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) is a measure of development related to gender computed by the UNDP (1998).

11 Values for Canada are not considered the highest since the values provided for that country by the UNDP are the highest ones in the country group or region.

12 The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) measures the relative empowerment of women and men in political and economic spheres of activity (UNDP, 1998).

13 The Swedish value is not considered as the highest value since the value provided for that country by the UNDP is the highest value in the country group or region.

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2

Demographic Characteristics and Family Life

Giovanna Di Stefano and Antonella Pinnelli

Introduction

If one were to interview a random sample of the population, one would find few women at the top and many men, as a consequence of the greater difficulties besetting women in the path to professional success; one would therefore conclude that many women have had to or have preferred to sacrifice career for family. In the case of the research presented here, however, the situation is the opposite: the women interviewed have achieved successful careers, just like the men interviewed, to whom they are of equal status in terms of both professional accomplishment and working commitment. This raises a few questions: in order to have reached the top, have these women enjoyed conditions on average more favourable than those of their male colleagues in terms of available resources? If this is the case, then equality at work is not the result of equal opportunities between the sexes, and women have needed greater resources than men in order to overcome their discrimination. Given that they are equal to men in the workplace, have the women interviewed set up egalitarian partnerships and families, in which the responsibility of housework and childcare is shared? Have they managed to give up one-half of the traditionally female role? Has it been possible for these women to form a union and have a family life equal to that of their male counterparts, or have they been obliged to sacrifice their partnership and family life for their careers? Or have they even had to – or preferred to – sacrifice a relationship with a male partner, ending up on their own? Do women and men therefore have different preferences or constraints in the frequency and length of their partnering histories, in the choice between cohabitation and marriage, and in the decision to have one or more children? It is the aim of this article to find the answers to these questions.

The main theory taken as a point of reference to study gender differences in partnership and family behaviour between women and men elites is that of the 'new home economics', i.e. that of economic rationality and opportunity costs (Becker, 1981): if the woman possesses resources, she becomes, due to her own economic security, less dependent on the traditional models of behaviour regarding life as a couple and the formation of a family, and

the opportunity costs associated with domestic tasks and the bringing up of children therefore increase. As some studies have shown, women with their own resources are less interested in marriage (Smock and Manning, 1997), they limit their family obligations either by remaining childless or by limiting the number of children they produce (Vianello and Moore, 2000; Knudsen, 1995), and their divorce rate is higher (Lesthaeghe and Moors, 1994). The theory of gender differences is derived from this theory: couples who are more equal will demonstrate less traditional traits of partnership and family behaviour, as shown by Ekert-Jaffé and Sofer (1995). According to the study conducted by those authors, the reduction of gender differences between partners (as measured by the wage gap controlling for other variables) favours the choice of cohabitation as opposed to the choice of marriage. Unlike women, men are not hindered in their careers by having a stable union and children, because the possession of greater resources makes it possible to afford a family life which is compatible with their own requirements. For example, men with resources can afford a wife who doesn't work, while social and cultural norms make it less easy for women with resources to have an analogous option. Indeed, according to Butz and Ward (1979), the higher the income of the man in couples in which the woman does not work, the higher the fertility. On the other hand, when the woman's income increases, in couples where the woman is employed outside the home, fertility drops. The resources available therefore play a different role depending on the gender to which they pertain. Lesthaeghe and Moors (1994) find that young women endowed with greater human capital are more likely than others to cohabit, divorce and limit their fertility, while none of these characteristics make any difference in the case of men. Higher-earning men are more likely to transform cohabitation into marriage and less likely to separate, while the same conditions do not have any influence on the outcome of cohabitation in the case of women (Smock and Manning, 1997). This may mean both that the decision to marry is based on the resources of the man, because those of the woman are regarded as 'optional', and that women with resources are less interested in transforming cohabitation into marriage (Pinnelli, 1999).

A second theoretical line may be defined as structural. Within it can be identified two main arguments. The first regards the marriage market (McDonald, 1995; Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman, 1981): indeed, traditional models of behaviour in the matching of couples predict that the men will be older, better educated and in a higher position from a professional point of view than their partners. The traditional model in the matching of couples is rendered increasingly difficult by the increase in women's level of education (in many countries women are now better educated on average than men) and by their increased entry into the world of work and into higher positions. For women who are more educated and occupy higher levels in the labour market, it may be difficult to find a suitable partner on the 'marriage market' if the expectation is to find one in an equal or superior condition, and this may explain their lower rate of

nuptiality. If the matchmaking rules do not change, it might become particularly difficult for women at the top to find men with these characteristics, obliged as they are to choose from a much more restricted pool than that from which men may choose (women choose from the higher part of the social pyramid, which is narrower, while men choose from the lower part, which is broader). Moreover, while the woman's earning capacity may make her a more attractive partner, this is in conflict with her reproductive capacity and sometimes preferred to it, and it therefore tends to limit fertility. Finally, the woman's greater capacity to negotiate with her partner regarding the division of roles and the care of any children could make it more difficult for her to find a partner prepared for greater domestic and parental commitment.

The second and equally important argument in the structural theory is related to the change over time in the structure of the female population by education and occupation, and concerns the fact that the increase in women's level of education and their integration at a high level in the world of work leads to a delay in the formation of the family and in the birth of children which is, so to speak, mechanical (Di Giulio et al., 1999). For women this delay may mean renunciation for various reasons, including biological ones. The biological age limit for reproduction is much more restrictive for women than for men, given that a woman's fertility starts to decrease after the age of 30 and much more rapidly from 35 onwards, ages which are becoming increasingly common for the birth of the first child (Menken and Larsen, 1986; WHO, 1991). It may not be possible to make up for an initial delay later on. In addition to this biological cause, fertility could also diminish as an effect of other interests increasingly competing with the desire to have a family as career involvement grows over time. Indeed, the results of Di Giulio et al. (1999) show that the more attached women are to their careers, the more they tend to postpone childbearing.

A third theoretical line which has emerged is that of the ideational shifts, that is the long-term trend towards greater individual autonomy in ethical, religious and political domains (Lesthaeghe, 1998). The development of movements of emancipation in the area of gender relations is an important part of these ideational changes. Lesthaeghe and Moors (1994) have shown, in the case of four European countries, that there is an idea-related component in the decision to cohabit, divorce and limit one's own fertility, and that the resources available play a different role in the case of each gender. Young women endowed with more human capital are more likely to cohabit, divorce and limit their own fertility, while this does not make any difference for men. We may expect working women to be selected from an idea-related point of view, and therefore less likely to take on traditional female roles (wife, mother, 'carer').

A fourth theoretical line for the interpretation of gender differences in family and reproductive behaviour considers the importance of the institutions: the laws regulating the rights of the two genders both in society

and in the family and the institutional support given to the family for functions of care (Pinnelli, 1995; McLanahan et al., 1995). Research has shown that constraints vary in force in countries with different institutional frameworks, and in particular that the postponement and greater instability of unions or renunciation of unions and fertility caused by the extension of women's education are more attenuated or even non-existent in countries with more favourable contexts (Blossfeld, 1995; Pinnelli, 1999). The comparison of geographical areas with different institutional set-ups satisfies the need to examine the influence of different geographical-institutional contexts on the family behaviour of women and men (Pinnelli, 1999).

In conclusion, we may expect that partnering and the formation of a family are more problematic for women at the top than for men at the top, and that this translates into fewer women in unions, opting more frequently for non-traditional types of unions (cohabitation), greater instability of unions, more families without children and less children on average for women than for men. Women at the top might obviously be at an advantage with respect to women working in inferior conditions, as they have more economic resources for buying housework and childcare services on the market. However, it is not the object of this study to make comparisons between women.

In the following sections of this article we present a descriptive analysis of gender differences in the resources available in childhood, in family and reproductive behaviour and in the division of roles, then we employ logistic models in order to demonstrate the hypotheses advanced on family and reproductive behaviour, controlling the effect of confounding variables.

The Family of Origin

Gender differences begin in the respondents' family of origin (see Table 1): women are slightly more likely to be the first or second born (79.7 percent of cases as opposed to 75.5 percent), and they are slightly less likely to come from families with more than two children (39.6 percent of cases as opposed to 41.5 percent), though in this case the difference is not statistically significant. They have thus possibly enjoyed a slight advantage compared to the men. This advantage is reinforced by the family's material, social and cultural resources. Indeed, our co-authors' articles concerning these subjects show that women have benefited from a privileged situation more often than men, both economically and from the point of view of their parents' prestige and power. Moreover, the mothers of female interviewees have worked outside the home slightly more often and in more prestigious employment, thus encouraging the socialization of their daughters towards work and a career. Finally, the women are more likely to come from more 'egalitarian' families – which we define as those families in which the parents have more or less the same academic qualifications and are both in paid

work – and this disposes their daughters in turn to form more egalitarian families, compared to current models of couple matching. Women at the top thus originate from more favourable family contexts than men at the top, both from an economic and social point of view and from that of their cultural outlook. In such a framework it is comprehensible that parents should have had no qualms about investing in their daughters.

Forming and Dissolving Unions

To reconstruct the partnering history of all respondents the following questions were asked:

'Have you ever been:
– married;
– separated;
– divorced;
– widowed;
– a cohabitant?'
'Are you currently in a stable relationship (marriage, cohabitation) or not?'

These questions gave rise to six dichotomous variables (the two modalities of which therefore indicate whether the respondent has experienced the event under consideration – or not) which we used to calculate the frequencies subsequently commented upon in the article (see Table 2).

As was hypothesized, even though the women interviewed had enjoyed a situation of privilege compared to the men as regards the resources of their family of origin, they do not appear to have had a more advantageous situation as regards relations in a couple and the setting up of a family of their own. On the contrary, their situation is more difficult. Indeed, the partnering histories of those interviewed and their partner's characteristics reveal important gender differences to women's disadvantage. Only 7.6 percent of the men interviewed have never married, compared to 17.7 percent of the women. And despite the fact that the percentage of women who have married at least once in their lifetime is lower than that of men, the percentage of divorced women is, on the other hand, much higher (23.8 percent vs 16 percent). The same phenomenon can be observed (though the difference is smaller) with separated women (10.3 percent vs 7 percent of men), and for widows (4.6 percent compared to 2.5 percent of men: this as a result of the fact that men are usually older than women in couples and that they have a shorter life expectancy). Moreover, women are more likely to opt for more non-committal types of unions than men: 30.3 percent of women have had at least one cohabitation in the course of their lifetimes, compared to 23.9 percent of men. That women experience more difficulty in the couple relationship is made even clearer by the fact that, at the time of the interview, only 75.4 percent were in a stable relationship, compared to 93.9 percent of men.

Table 1 *Characteristics of Respondents' Family of Origin (in percentages)*

Characteristics	Gender	
	Men	Women
Birth order number		
First-/second-born child	75.5	79.7
Third-/fourth-born child or more	24.5	20.3
Total	100.0	100.0
N	751	798
sign. ($p = .05$)		
Number of children in the family		
1/2 children	39.6	41.5
3/4 children or more	60.4	58.5
Total	100.0	100.0
N	762	807
sign. ($p = .45$)		
Mother's education		
Elementary or less	25.7	18.1
Junior secondary	23.9	21.6
Senior secondary	21.7	22.1
Vocational	10.9	15.9
Higher education	17.9	22.4
Total	100.0	100.0
N	728	769
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Father's education		
Elementary or less	18.4	10.6
Junior secondary	19.5	14.5
Senior secondary	15.7	15.2
Vocational	12.6	16.8
Higher education	33.9	42.9
Total	100.0	100.0
N	740	785
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Mother's primary work status		
Extra-domestic work	40.7	46.3
Unpaid work at home	59.3	53.7
Total	100.0	100.0
N	744	791
sign. ($p = .03$)		
Mother's job supervisory functions		
Yes	32.1	41.8
No	67.9	58.2
Total	100.0	100.0
N	274	330
sign. ($p = .01$)		

Table 1 *Continued*

Characteristics	Gender	
	Men	Women
Father's job supervisory functions		
Yes	68.9	76.4
No	31.1	23.6
Total	100.0	100.0
N	668	707
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Family's economic position		
Very comfortable	5.1	8.8
Comfortable	19.5	20.6
Intermediate	41.1	42.0
Poor	22.7	19.2
Very poor	11.7	9.3
Total	100.0	100.0
N	771	814
sign. ($p = .01$)		

Note: Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is $< .05$.

We synthesized this information on the respondents' unions in a new variable with three modalities, providing information both on their current situation and on their partnering history. The first modality concerns all those not currently in a union: of these, those who have never been in a stable union constitute only 4 percent of the total number of respondents, while those not currently in a union but previously married or cohabiting make up 11 percent of the total. Of those currently in a union (i.e. most), we must distinguish between two cases: 66.1 percent of the total number of respondents have only ever married once, are currently living with their spouse and have never had stable unions with other partners, whether or not they experienced a period of cohabitation with their partner prior to marriage (we shall sometimes, for the sake of brevity, refer to them as the 'first marriage' group). The others, 18.6 percent, are currently in a union (and are therefore either married or cohabiting) but have had various experiences: they may be cohabiting for the first time and not have been in any other unions, but they may also have remarried or embarked upon a new cohabitation when the previous union has been interrupted by a divorce or a separation. If we look at the gender differences as regards this new variable, we obtain confirmation of women's lower rate of stable relationships; 24.3 percent of women are not currently in a stable union or have never been in one, compared to 5.8 percent of men, and 20 percent are currently in a union preceded by other relationships in the past, compared to 17.1 percent of men, while 55.7 percent have married only once, currently

Table 2 *Partnering History (in percentages)*

Characteristics	Gender	
	Men	Women
'Have you ever been married?'		
Yes	92.4	82.3
No	7.6	17.7
Total	100.0	100.0
N	779	817
sign. (p = .00)		
'Have you ever been divorced?'		
Yes	16.0	23.8
No	84.0	76.2
Total	100.0	100.0
N	761	797
sign. (p = .00)		
'Have you ever been separated?'		
Yes	7.0	10.3
No	93.0	89.7
Total	100.0	100.0
N	761	790
sign. (p = .02)		
'Have you ever been widowed?'		
Yes	2.5	4.6
No	97.5	95.4
Total	100.0	100.0
N	760	790
sign. (p = .03)		
'Have you ever been a cohabitant?'		
Yes	23.9	30.3
No	76.1	69.7
Total	100.0	100.0
N	732	766
sign. (p = .00)		
'Are you currently in a stable relationship?'		
Yes	93.9	75.4
No	6.1	24.6
Total	100.0	100.0
N	784	826
sign. (p = .00)		
Partnering history		
Never been in a stable union/currently not in a union	5.8	24.3
Currently in a union, having had various unions in the past	17.1	20.0
Having married only once	77.1	55.7
Total	100.0	100.0
N	776	819
sign. (p = .00)		

Note: Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is < .05.

live with their spouse and have had no other 'stable' partners in their lives, compared to 77.1 percent of men.

The gender differences become more marked when we look at the way in which couples are matched. If we look at the educational qualifications of those interviewed and their current partners (see Table 3), 8 percent of men and 3.4 percent of women have a partner whose studies culminated in a middle-school diploma, 30 percent of men and 16.2 percent of women have a partner with a high-school diploma, while 21 percent of men and 31.4 percent of women have a partner with a master's degree, and 7.3 percent of men and 18.1 percent of women have a partner with a PhD. Women are therefore more likely to have partners with high educational qualifications, conforming to the traditional model of couple matching. This is also confirmed if we look at the qualification gap between the respondent and their partner: nearly half of women (48 percent) have the same qualifications as their partner, 26.1 percent have lower qualifications, 20 percent have slightly higher qualifications than their partner and 6 percent have higher still. Men, on the other hand, are more likely to have less educated partners: 34.9 percent have the same qualifications as their partner, 38.4 percent have the next highest level of qualifications, 13.6 percent have even higher qualifications and only 13.2 percent (about half the corresponding percentage for women) are less qualified than their partner.

Table 3 *Information about Partner's Education (in percentages)*

	Gender	
Characteristics	Men	Women
Partner's education		
Elementary or less	1.3	0.7
Junior secondary	6.7	2.7
Senior secondary/vocational	30.0	16.2
College	33.7	30.9
Master	21.0	31.4
Doctorate	7.3	18.1
Total	100.0	100.0
N	700	592
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Gap between the respondent's and their partner's education		
Partner more educated	13.2	26.1
Partners have same education	34.9	48.0
Respondent more educated	38.4	20.0
Respondent much more educated	13.6	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0
N	691	586
sign. ($p = .00$)		

Note: Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is $< .05$.

Table 4 *Partner's Job and Attitude (in percentages)*

Characteristics	Gender	
	Men	Women
Partner's work status		
Employee	46.6	61.5
Unpaid work in the home	34.3	2.0
Unemployed	3.9	7.0
Owner of the firm	4.7	13.1
Self-employed	10.5	16.4
Total	100.0	100.0
N	717	610
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Partner's job: full/part-time		
Part-time	35.5	10.7
Full-time	64.5	89.3
Total	100.0	100.0
N	437	541
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Partner's job: supervisory functions		
Yes	49.2	76.3
No	50.8	23.7
Total	100.0	100.0
N	425	520
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Partner's job: level of supervisory functions		
Foreman/woman	14.0	4.5
Lower manager	16.4	6.3
Middle manager	37.2	31.2
Top manager	32.4	58.1
Total	100.0	100.0
N	207	382
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Partner's social class		
Employer, more than 9 dependants	5.2	12.8
Employer, less than 9 dependants	16.2	14.6
Manager	29.2	50.1
Dependant without supervisory functions	49.4	22.5
Total	100.0	100.0
N	407	485
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Partner's occupational prestige		
0–54	33.3	22.9
55–60	25.6	21.0
61–70	23.3	30.8
71–86	17.8	25.2
Total	100.0	100.0
N	433	523
sign. ($p = .00$)		

Table 4 *Continued*

Characteristics	Gender	
	Men	Women
Partner's attitude		
Very positive	33.6	56.9
Positive	38.5	27.9
Neutral	21.7	10.5
Negative	5.5	4.3
Very negative	0.7	0.5
Total	100.0	100.0
N	723	610
sign. ($p = .00$)		

Notes: Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is $< .05$.

As far as employment is concerned (see Table 4), there are, predictably, more men than women with partners performing unpaid work in the home, that is to say performing the role of 'housewife' (34.3 percent of men vs only 2 percent of women). Most of the women's partners (61.5 percent of the total) are employees (compared to 46.6 percent of the men's partners), 7 percent are unemployed (vs 3.9 percent of the men's partners), 13.1 percent own and work in their own businesses and 16.4 percent are self-employed (vs 4.7 percent and 10.5 percent respectively, of the men's partners). Occupational prestige is also higher for women's partners than for men's partners. There are also differences in working hours and the performance of supervisory functions by the partner: 35.5 percent of men's working partners have a part-time job, and 49.2 percent perform work involving supervisory functions, while only 10.7 percent of women's working partners have a part-time job and as many as 76.3 percent perform supervisory functions. This information therefore also demonstrates the preference for the traditional couple-matching model, and helps to explain the smaller percentage of women in couples compared to men, also in terms of the difficulty of finding a partner with the desired characteristics on the marriage market.

The partners of women at the top have a great deal of respect for their companions' work (84.8 percent of those women interviewed state that their partner has a positive or very positive attitude towards their work), to an even greater extent than that to which the work of the men interviewed is respected by their partners (72.1 percent of those men interviewed state that their partner has a positive or very positive attitude towards their work).

Children

As suggested by the literature on the subject, and as we hypothesized, women at the top have a lower fertility rate than their colleagues (see Table 5):

Table 5 *Children, Childcare and Housework (in percentages)*

	Gender	
Characteristics	Men	Women
Number of children		
1 child	12.4	17.2
2 children	43.2	32.1
3 children	22.8	13.8
4 or more children	13.4	9.2
Childless	8.2	27.8
Total	100.0	100.0
N	777	807
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Number of children living with respondent		
1 child	28.1	27.8
2 children	41.4	27.5
3 children	13.8	7.0
4 or more children	6.0	2.1
0 children living with respondent	10.6	35.6
Total	100.0	100.0
N	601	629
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Children interfered with respondent's work		
Often	19.0	23.0
Occasionally	44.5	47.5
Never	36.4	29.4
Total	100.0	100.0
N	667	530
sign. ($p = .03$)		
Childcare		
By the respondent	4.7	19.6
By the respondent's partner	56.6	3.8
By other family members	4.8	10.6
In private paid care	10.5	25.4
In publicly financed care	8.3	13.8
By a child minder	2.1	8.0
By more than one help	9.8	13.3
Other arrangements	3.1	5.5
Total	100.0	100.0
N	703	578
sign. ($p = .00$)		
Extent of the housework done in the household (of what there is to do)		
None	23.7	8.8
Less than half	64.7	40.1
About half	7.9	19.9
More than half	2.3	20.7
All or nearly all	1.4	10.5
Total	100.0	100.0
N	733	793
sign. ($p = .00$)		

Note: Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is $< .05$.

27.8 percent of the women interviewed are childless, and 17.2 percent have only one child, compared to 8.2 percent and 12.4 percent respectively among their male colleagues. Moreover, the women are more likely to have less numerous families than the men: 32.1 percent have two children, 13.8 percent have three children and 9.2 percent have four or more children, compared to 43.2 percent, 22.8 percent and 13.4 percent respectively among the men.

Of the respondents with children, the women's children are older and are more likely to have left the parental home (35.6 percent compared to 10.6 percent in the case of the children of male respondents). This is despite the fact that the female respondents are younger than their colleagues, and is a result of the differing gender distribution of life course events: men have children at a later age, they stop having them later and they have more of them, so on average they have younger children than their female colleagues. So even where the educational and professional career is similar, the family history is different, as the woman is subject to greater biological limitations than the man.

Childcare and Housework

The hypothesis that the conflict between paid work and domestic work also exists for women elites is confirmed by the data on childcare and housework (Table 5). Children are more of a burden to their mothers than to their fathers, and they interfere with their mother's work considerably more than with their father's. When they were young and at home after school they interfered with the work of the women interviewed 'often' in 23 percent of cases, 'sometimes' in 47.5 percent of cases and 'never or hardly ever' in 29.4 percent of cases. Interference perceived by men was less frequent: 19 percent of men stated that they often interfered, 44.5 percent sometimes and 36.4 percent never or hardly ever.

Childcare also weighs more heavily on the mother than on the father in the case of political and business elites. Most of the men interviewed (56.6 percent) state that their partners looked after children of preschool age, while only 3.8 percent of the women can say the same for their companions. But 19.6 percent of the women state that they looked after the children personally (compared to 4.7 percent of men), 10.6 percent entrusted them to the care of other family members (compared to 4.8 percent of men), 39.2 percent left them in public or private nurseries (compared to 18.8 percent of men) and 8 percent entrusted them to a child minder (compared to 2.1 percent of men). Finally, 18.8 percent of women compared to 12.9 percent of men opted for a mixture of those solutions, or for different ones. Despite equality in the workplace, then, gender differences in childcare remain strong.

This is confirmed by the division of housework between the two partners. This was measured by asking the question:

'How much of the housework do you do in your home?'
The possible answers were:
1 none;
2 less than half (of what there is to do);
3 about half;
4 more than half;
5 all or nearly all.

The answers to this question confirm women's greater involvement in domestic life compared to men. Most of the men (88.4 percent of the total) do less than half of all the housework that there is to do, or none at all, while 7.9 percent do about half, and only 3.7 percent do more than half or nearly all. On the other hand, 48.9 percent of women do less than half of what there is to do, 19.9 percent about half, and 31.2 percent more than half, or all/nearly all.

The gender asymmetry is therefore very strong in the area of housework and childcare, even for women at the top, despite the fact that their greater resources probably enable them to purchase external help. They too are subject to what has been found of working women in general, namely that work does not exonerate women from family tasks, and that they are mainly responsible for childcare and housework (Nieva, 1985; Fogarty et al., 1971; Bloom Stanfield, 1996). The burden of unpaid work continues to have a crucial effect on the lives of working women, despite their integration into the workforce at higher levels (Connell, 1987).

Gender as Determinant of Union Formation and Dissolution and Childbearing

The findings hitherto presented seem to confirm the hypotheses suggested in theoretical works. If we examine political and business elites, we see that women are more often alone and have more discontinuous partnering histories, they are more likely to be childless and they have fewer children than men. We return later to the interpretations: at this point it is our aim to test the strength of this finding with a multivariate statistical analysis which enables us to take account of other variables which might influence the behaviour described.

It is true that both union formation and fertility have undergone profound transformation in the period in which the professional and family careers of those interviewed have developed. Marital unions are increasingly substituted by informal unions, and both the former and, to an even greater extent, the latter are more likely to end, with the formation of new unions and families. This transformation is rendering the life histories of the population much more varied and less linear than before. The developed countries are not homogeneous: the diversification of family forms and their instability are phenomena principally concerning Western and Northern

Europe and North America; the countries of Southern Europe have only been slightly affected by this transformation. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe still have traditional, albeit somewhat unstable, family forms (Pinnelli, 2001).

Fertility, on the other hand, has undergone a complex evolution. In the first half of the 1960s, a baby-boom affected most developed countries, raising fertility from two to almost three children per woman. The boom was followed by a strong, constant decline in the following decade, the baby-bust, which brought developed countries into remarkable convergence regarding the average number of children: below generation-substitution level, i.e. fewer than two children per woman. Fertility then stabilized in some countries, picked up again in others and fell yet more in others. The lowest levels are now to be found in the South, and in the former Communist countries of Europe; the highest, in Northwest Europe and North America: a reversal of the geography of the 1950s and 1960s.

The family histories of those interviewed took place in all three of these phases. We must therefore take account of the generation to which they belong and country of residence, in order to control two variables which have had a strong influence on family and reproductive behaviour.

We also take account of those resources of the family of origin which have already favoured the woman's career and could be a factor capable of attenuating the problems preventing them from having a family life comparable to that of men, in addition to the discrimination which women generally suffer in access to a career. We also take into account the type of leadership, working on the hypothesis that the business world offers careers less compatible with women's family life than that of politics.

We already know that women elites have more complicated partnering histories than their colleagues, and that they are less likely to share their lives with a partner. Our analysis of fertility has to take account of this notable difference in life patterns between the two sexes, if we are to distinguish consequences of family behaviour that are simply the results of preferences and constraints as regards having children.

We have therefore chosen the following variables (explanatory or control) for the family and reproductive behaviour of those interviewed:

1 Gender (female as category of reference).
2 Cohort of birth: three classes are considered:
   a Respondents born in/after 1950, who were aged up to 45 in 1995 (year of reference of interview), who have yet to conclude their reproductive histories and have not, in many cases, stabilized their own family life;
   b Those born between 1940 and 1949, who were aged between 46 and 55 at the time of the interview and entered into the reproductive and family phase between the second half of the 1960s and the second half of the 1970s, the period of the baby-bust, demographically

speaking, who have ended their reproductive lives (as far as the women are concerned);

c Those born before 1940 and aged over 56 at the time of the interview, who have more children than the others because they were in full reproductive phase at the time of the baby-boom (first half of the 1960s in most of the countries in which the survey took place) and took advantage of the favourable economic conjuncture at the time of the late 1950s and early 1960s in order to start a stable union: these are the categories of reference in order to compare the cohorts to the group which probably has more traditional partnership behaviour and higher fertility.

3 The kind of leadership, that is political elite/business elite (the latter as reference category).

4 The country of residence, representing the institutional, economic and social/cultural context in which respondents live and synthesizing the collective resources available to them. The countries have been classified into five groups, which differ from the classification indicated in the previous article:

a Northwest Europe and North America, where the new models of family behaviour are more widespread, women's status is higher and women's political participation has increased more than in the other countries at national or local level;

b Southern Europe, where women's status and development are more backward, fertility has fallen to the point of becoming the lowest in the world and the family has remained traditional (stable marriage or no union);

c Central and Eastern Europe, where nuptiality and fertility used to be and are still relatively precocious, the level of development is inferior and women's status is contradictory: high rates of participation on the part of women in the workforce and greater gender equality in education compared to in other countries, but a lower overall level of education and, since the fall of Communism, a distinct loss of political power by women.

Within the first area it is possible to distinguish the Scandinavian countries from those of West/Central Europe and from North America, in order to highlight the cultural, institutional and historical differences existing between the countries (the Scandinavian countries can boast of an institutional framework more favourable to the reconciliation of women's work with maternity). Ireland has been included among the countries of Southern Europe, given the persistence of a strictly traditional family model and, at the same time, a strong decline in fertility which has been emerging over the last years (a decline which, given the previously high rate of fertility, has however failed to reach the low levels of South Europe).

This classification derives from (1) trends analysis of various indicators of partnership and fertility behaviour; and (2) static and

dynamic factorial analyses connecting demographic indicators to indicators of women's position, postindustrial development and institutional arrangements for reconciling work and family (Pinnelli, 1999, 2001).

To sum up, we have utilized the following classification:

Southern Europe and Ireland: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain;
Former Communist countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Russia, Slovenia and Hungary;
Western and Central Europe; Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland;
Non-European countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, Israel, New Zealand and the USA;
Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The Scandinavian countries were taken as category of reference so that we compare the other groups of countries to the countries which have the most modern situation.

5 The degree of responsibility entailed in the father's job when the respondent was 14 years of age, for synthesizing family background and resources of the respondent's family of origin (that of the father and not the mother, because it is that of the father which at that time determined the status of the family). The modalities considered were:
   a Father not employed;
   b Father with job which does not involve supervisory functions;
   c Father team-leader or low-level manager;
   d Father middle- or high-level manager.

   The last category was taken as reference in order to compare the others to the best father's position.

6 The respondent's partnering history, added to the models for children. The modalities are:
   a Not in a union;
   b In a union with previous partnerships in the past;
   c In a union which began with a marriage which has never been interrupted, this latter being the category of reference in order to compare the others to the more stable and traditional situation.

We use as dependent variables:

1 Having been in a stable union with a partner at some point;
2 Having had at least one child;
3 Being in a new union after a separation;
4 Not being in a union currently or having been in various unions as opposed to having been in a single union (i.e. marriage) up to now;
5 Having had none or one child or having had two children, as opposed to having had three or more children.

In order to evaluate the dependence of every dependent variable on the set of explanatory variables, we constructed logistic models with dichotomic

Table 6 *Dependent Variables in the Logistic Models*

Variables	%
'Having been in a stable union with a partner at some point'	
Never been in a stable union	4.0
Having been in at least one stable union	96.0
Total	100.0
N 1595	
Partnering history ('not being in a union currently or having been in various unions as opposed to having been in a single union [i.e. marriage] up to now')	
Never been in a stable union/not currently in a union	15.3
Currently in a union (having had various experiences in the past)	18.6
Having only married once	66.1
Total	100.0
N 1595	
'Being in a new union after a separation'	
Currently not in a union	43.3
Currently in a union with previous partnerships in the past	56.7
Total	100.0
N 416	
'Having had at least one child'	
Childless	15.1
At least 1 child	84.9
Total	100.0
N 1525	
Number of children ('having had 0 or 1 child or having had 2 children, as opposed to having had 3 or more children')	
0–1 child	30.5
2 children	39.0
3 or more children	30.6
Total	100.0
N 1525	

dependent variables (dependent variables 1, 3 and 4) and polytomic dependent variables (dependent variables 2 and 5) (Table 6).

The results were presented in the form of odds ratios (henceforth referred to as ORs), representing the ratio between the probability that a given result will occur for a category and that of the category taken as reference.

Determinants of Partnering

The probability of *having been in at least one stable union* in the course of one's life varies with gender and generation (Table 7). Men are much more likely to have been in at least one union than women (over four times as likely, OR = 4.40), while generations born more recently are much less likely to form part of this category than those born prior to the 1940s (OR = 0.33

for those generations born in 1950 and after). This means not only that the forms of union have diversified over time (marriage and cohabitation), but also that there has been a large increase in the probability of not being in any stable union during the course of one's life. The other variables did not enter the model.

If we consider the probability of *having been in more than one union*, i.e. a more complex partnering history, instead of just one union (marriage) which is still ongoing, gender and generation are once again the only influential variables: it is rarer for men to have a complex partnering history than for women (OR = 0.64), and the probability of having a complex partnering history is significantly higher for the more recent generations born in 1950 or after (OR = 1.73). If we consider men and women separately, generation is no longer significant for men, while it is for women (OR = 2.40). The increase in the instability of the elites interviewed is therefore due to the behaviour of women and not to that of their male colleagues. Country of residence also becomes significant for men: elites in countries outside Europe are less likely to have complex partnering histories than those in Scandinavian countries (taken as reference category), while the elites in all the other countries do not differ significantly from those in Scandinavian countries.

The probability of *not being in a union at the time of the interview* is much lower for men than for women (OR = 0.15) and no other variable is significant. In the gender-specific models, only country of residence was significant, showing that men in Western/Central European countries are less likely to be in a union, but women more so, compared to the Scandinavian countries.

Finally, if a union comes to an end, men are much more likely than women to *form a new union* (OR = 5.12), as are the most recent generations (OR = 2.21). While the gender-specific models show that no variable enters the model for men, generation and family resources are significant in the case of women (the probability of forming a new family is higher for the most recent generations, OR = 3.37, and if family resources are scarce, then the probability of forming a new union is lower). The initial social background which enabled women elites to overcome barriers in their career also helps them to overcome the trauma of separation and enter a new relationship.

In conclusion, it is confirmed that women elites are less often willing or able to have a steady partnership than their male colleagues, that they are more likely to have complex partnering histories and that they are less often willing or able to enter into a new union after a separation, even when the other variables considered are held constant.

Determinants of Having Children

The logistic model confirms the influence of gender and shows that several other variables significantly influence the probability of *having had at least one child*: generation, country of residence and type of union (see Table 8).

Table 7 *Determinants of Union Formation: Results of the Logistic Models (Odds Ratio)*

	Having been in at least one stable union/ Never been in a stable union			Currently in a union with previous partnerships in the past/Currently not in a union			Not currently in a union/Having only married once			Currently in a union with various experiences in the past/Having only married once		
Variables	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F
Gender												
Females	1.00			1.00			1.00			1.00		
Males	4.40*			5.12*			0.15*			0.64*		
Generation												
Born before 1940	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Born in/after 1950	0.33*	0.00		2.21*		3.37*	1.03	2.37	0.86	1.73*	1.21	2.40*
Born between 1940 and 1949	0.55	0.00		1.14		1.38	1.25	1.80	1.19	1.24	1.08	1.59
Country	–	–	–	–	–	–						
Scandinavian countries							1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
South Europe							1.15	0.46	1.69	0.64	0.48	0.85
Former Communist countries							0.95	0.55	1.13	0.70	1.40	0.69
West and Central Europe							0.74	0.23*	1.10*	0.65	0.60	0.67
Non-European countries							1.15	0.30	1.85	0.77	0.45*	1.14
Leadership	–	–	–	–	–	–						
Business leader							1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Political leader							0.93	1.19	0.81	0.84	0.95	0.78
Father's occupational status	–	–	–	–	–							
Middle/high-level manager						1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Not employed						0.45	1.02	0.00	1.55	0.75	0.73	0.89
With job which does not involve supervisory functions						0.49*	0.99	0.55	1.14	1.09	1.28	0.94
Team-leader or low-level manager						1.57	0.81	1.01	0.75	1.29	1.53	1.10

Significance of the Models[a]

	Having been in a stable union with a partner at some point			Being in a new union after a separation			Partnering history (not being in a union currently or having been in various unions as opposed to having been in a single union, i.e. marriage, up to now)		
	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F
Number of cases	1369	667	702	347	120	227	1369	667	702
Chi-square test (model with dichotomic dependent variables)									
χ^2	27.99	10.28	–	45.66	–	20.09			
d.f.	3	2	–	3	–	5			
Significance	0.00	0.01	–	0.00	–	0.00			
Goodness of fit statistic: Likelihood ratio (model with polytomic dependent variables)									
χ^2							435.59	172.62	232.35
d.f.							456	218	218
Significance							0.75	0.99	0.24

* Values statistically significant.
– The variable did not enter the model (Forward Inclusion method).
[a] The chi-square test has to give very small levels of significance in the case of models with dichotomic dependent variables, but levels close to one in the case of polytomic dependent variables.

Table 8 *Determinants of Childbearing: Results of the Logistic Models (Odds Ratio)*[a]

	At least 1 child/childless			0–1 child/3 or more children			2 children/3 or more children		
Variables	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F
Gender									
Females	1.00			1.00			1.00		
Males	3.55*			0.33*			0.79		
Generation									
Born before 1940	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Born in/after 1950	0.16*	0.18*	0.15*	6.61*	5.58*	7.19*	1.92*	1.98*	1.80
Born between 1940 and 1949	0.44*	1.16	0.32*	2.61*	1.53	4.57*	1.60*	1.26	2.43*
Country		–							
Scandinavian countries	1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
South Europe	0.55		0.73	1.44	2.04	1.03	0.47*	0.45*	0.46*
Former Communist countries	1.11		1.07	4.46*	4.31*	4.98*	3.30*	3.11*	3.17*
West and Central Europe	0.50*		0.43*	1.53	2.00	1.31	0.76	0.79	0.74
Non-European countries	0.90		0.93	1.08	0.92	1.03	0.78	0.90	0.65
Partnering history		–							
Having only married once	1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Currently not in a union	0.33*		0.32*	2.78*	3.22*	2.67*	1.07	1.75	0.91
Currently in a union (having had various experiences in the past)	0.44*		0.42*	0.87	0.86	0.83	0.37*	0.38*	0.34*
Leadership	–		–						
Business leader		1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Political leader		0.42*		0.65*	1.26	0.33*	0.66*	0.90	0.38*
Father's occupational status	–	–	–						
Middle/high-level manager				1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Not employed				1.12	1.11	1.41	1.03	1.04	1.26
With job which does not involve supervisory functions				1.65*	1.59	1.56	1.21	1.34	1.03
Team-leader or low-level manager				1.48	0.85	2.12*	1.29	1.29	1.31

Significance of Models[b]

	Having had at least 1 child			Number of children (having had 0–1 child or having had 2 children as opposed to having had 3 or more children)		
	Total	M	F	Total	M	F
Number of cases	1299	651	648	1299	651	648
Chi-square test (model with dichotomic dependent variables)						
χ^2	176.74	34.17	73.74			
d.f.	9	3	8			
Significance	0.00	0.00	0.00			
Goodness of fit statistic: Likelihood ratio (model with polytomic dependent variables)						
χ^2				837.67	353.12	443.00
d.f.				1412	694	694
Significance				1.00	1.00	1.00

* Values statistically significant.
– The variable did not enter the model (Forward Inclusion method).
[a] Interviewed with at least one child (including own children, stepchildren and adopted).
[b] The chi-square test has to give very small levels of significance in the case of models with dichotomic dependent variables, but levels close to one in the case of polytomic dependent variables.

The hypothesis of a more favourable situation for men is confirmed in this case too. Indeed, they are much more likely than women to have at least one child (more than three times, OR = 3.55).

The ORs regarding respondents' generation of birth clearly illustrate the strong fall in fertility over time. The younger respondents, belonging to the generation born in/after 1950, are much less likely to have at least one child compared to the oldest generation (OR = 0.16), which is also due to the fact that their reproductive history is still incomplete; the generation born between 1940 and 1949, on the other hand, which has already completed its fertility at least as far as the women are concerned, entered its period of reproduction during the baby-bust and is about half as likely (OR = 0.44) to have at least one child than the oldest generation, born before 1940, which spent its period of reproductive life during the baby-boom and therefore had a higher rate of fertility. The influence of the country of residence is also significant. Compared to the elites of Scandinavian countries, which we have taken as a reference category, those of the countries of Western/Central Europe and Southern Europe are less likely to have at least one child (OR = 0.50 and 0.55). The fertility of elites only partially reflects the new geography of the phenomenon. Indeed, low fertility is reflected in Southern Europe, but not in the countries of the former Communist area, where it is the most recent and unexpected consequence of the dramatic changes caused by the collapse of the Communist political system. The latter is too recent to appraise its consequences on the reproductive behaviour of respondents, whose fertility manifested itself well before these changes.

The last significant variable in explaining fertility is partnering history. For example, the probability of having had at least one child is much lower if the respondent is not currently in a union (OR = 0.33) or if there has been a complex partnering history (OR = 0.44), compared to those respondents who have been in one union only (marriage) which is still ongoing. This is further confirmation that gender differences in the fertility of elites do not depend on the fact that women are more likely to have discontinuous partnering histories than men.

If we consider males and females separately, the interesting thing is that not being in a union or having had a complex partnership history influences infertility only for women. As the other explanatory variables are concerned, the generation of birth remains significant both for women and men, the type of leadership becomes significant only for men (political elites are less likely to have at least one child), and the country of birth remains significant only for women (female elites in the countries of Western/Central Europe are significantly less likely to have a child).

Two children per woman are needed in order to ensure generational replacement. Not having children, or having only one, does not ensure generational replacement, while having three means larger generations than the current ones in the future. From a demographic point of view, these figures are very important for the future of the population. Of course the

elites per se cannot have a great influence on the future of the population, because they are a very limited part of the whole population. But their behaviour is a model of reference for many and can have a great influence on the behaviour of other people. This is the reason why their fertility preferences and behaviours are so important.

All the variables which we have considered have an effect on the probability of *having none or one child as opposed to three children*: gender (men are much less likely than women to have none or one child as opposed to three children, OR = 0.33); generation (the most recent generations are much more likely to have none or one child, OR = 6.61 for generations born 1950 onwards); country of residence (more likelihood of having none or one child as opposed to three children in the former Communist countries); type of leadership (politicians are less likely to have none or one child than business leaders); resources of family of origin (the fewer the resources, the fewer the children); and partnering history (those not currently in a union are more likely to have none or one child as opposed to three, both as an effect of separation and because couples with no children or just one separate more easily). The gender-specific models demonstrate two significant changes, but only in the model for men: the type of leadership and the resources of the family of origin are no longer influential. By contrast, the likelihood of *having two children as opposed to three* does not vary with gender, but the effects of the other variables are close to those in the previous model. In particular, the more recent generations and elites in former Communist countries are more likely to have two children as opposed to three, while elites in Southern Europe, politicians and those who have been in more than one union are less likely to do so. The gender-specific models generate results which are similar to those of the general model, but the effect of the type of leadership disappears in the case of men.

Conclusions

Let us return to the questions which we posed at the beginning, in order to outline the answers provided by the analysis carried out.

The first question was: in order to have reached the top, have women enjoyed family conditions on average more favourable than those of their male colleagues? The answer is: yes. Gender equality between elites is limited to the work position which they have. In order to achieve the same career as men, women have made use of more favourable family conditions (greater resources in the family of origin), which have made it possible for them to overcome the usual discrimination.

As we have seen, however, the advantage ceases here. Indeed, the answer to the next question, 'Do women elites set up egalitarian families?', is negative. When they set up a family, these privileged women do not do so on an egalitarian basis: in the couples formed by women elites, the partner is more often superior to the woman as regards education and profession,

despite the fact that the women too are at a very high level, while in the couples formed by men elites, their partner is often of an inferior status. In other words, traditional models of couple matching persist. Housework and childcare are not shared, but are much more often shouldered by women than by their partners. Women elites are unable to avoid the problem of the double workload. This is probably one of the reasons why women's family life emerges as more discontinuous than that of men.

Indeed, the answer to the third question, 'Is it possible for women elites to have a family life like that of men?', is also negative. Women in top positions find it more difficult to have a family life than their male colleagues. They are more likely than men to have been unwilling/unable to form a union or have children, to have remained on their own after a separation or to have been in more than one union. This shows that women have, to a certain extent, sacrificed their family life in order to pursue a career. If power and a top job bring advantages (e.g. economic) which might favour the formation of a family and fertility, these are reserved for men, especially for those with a partner not working outside the home.

The results which we have obtained confirm the hypotheses that we advanced in the light of the various theoretical positions. The theory of the woman's economic independence and of opportunity costs explains the greater difficulty experienced by women elites in terms of lack of economic interest in having a stable union and greater opportunity costs of having children. The theory of gender relations finds confirmation in the different role of personal resources in the cases of men and women. While resources tend to have a stabilizing effect on the family life of men, encouraging their fertility, they render that of women more unstable, leading them to opt against or limit fertility. Structural theories are also confirmed by the behaviour of the elites interviewed. The matching of couples takes place in the traditional fashion and inevitably condemns more women than men to single status, probably leaving the woman unsatisfied with her choices (her options are probably more limited) much more often than the man might ever be, and thus leading her to separate more often. Moreover, the conflict between career and fertility can be resolved more often in favour of the former than the latter by women elites, given that their earning capacity and attachment to the career itself may be preferred to fertility both by the women and by their partners.

The ideational theory is also confirmed by our findings. We presumed that women elites were selected from an ideational point of view, and less eager to take on traditional roles. Alternative unions to marriage, separation and even living alone, not having children or having just one, are all patterns of behaviour which accord with this ideational aspect, and they could therefore be a consequence of women's choice, at least in part. In order not to take on traditional roles, women deliberately avoid a situation which would inevitably induce them to take them on. The rigidity of role division, even in the families of women elites, helps to explain why some women opt not to set up a family.

Finally, we hypothesized that institutional frameworks more favourable to reconciling work and maternity and more protective of women and the family might attenuate the conflict of roles and create conditions more favourable to the formation of unions, even if they are not traditional ones, and to fertility. Our findings show that the country of residence has no influence on the family behaviour of elites, but that it does influence their fertility, and gender-specific models have confirmed that it affects that of women in particular, and not that of men. Elites living in the countries of Western and Southern Europe are less likely to have at least one child compared to elites in Scandinavian countries, and gender-specific models confirm this finding for women in the countries of Western Europe. There is an increasing tendency in developed countries towards couples splitting into two groups: couples remaining childless and those with at least one child. Couples which have the first child, tend to go on. Our findings show that this tendency is strongest for women elites in the countries of Western/Central Europe, i.e. in those where institutional support and/or informal support is the weakest.

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3

Career Paths

Brigitte Liebig and Silvia Sansonetti

Introduction

Etymologically speaking, the term 'career' originates from the Latin word *carrus*, meaning horse-driven vehicle, or chariot, as they were used during races in ancient Rome. While the drivers of these chariots primarily needed to have enormous physical strength, the modern connotation of the term implies a great amount of additional resources – especially careers pursued in the elite sectors of working life, which are configured in such a way that only a minority of people can ever think of taking part in the race. Yet, recruitment and promotion into political and economic leadership are still shaped very traditionally, and – contrary to principles of meritocracy and equality – strongly based on ascriptive characteristics such as race, origin, status or religion (Barton, 1985). Finally, the concept of 'career' is male: to the present day, careers within public life are settled on an ideology of gender difference and hierarchy that defines professional and public leadership as the priority of men (Collinson and Hearn, 1996).

Accordingly, gender as a factor of recruitment and careers in decision-making has been ignored by elite research for a very long time. With the aim of contributing to the opening of the field, this article focuses on some very basic characteristics of men's and women's career trajectories. It describes the time schedules that characterize the careers of male and female representatives of the political and economic elite and tries to identify the main predictors of success. Beyond that it analyses time-related patterns of careers within the context of different social, political and economic situations.

Women's Careers in Cross-National Context: Theoretical Frame and Methods of Analysis

International surveys sufficiently illustrate women's low representation within middle and senior management and the highest legislative and executive political bodies. Nevertheless, women's career chances within business corporations have improved in many western countries within the last two decades (Izraeli and Adler, 1994; Powell, 1993; Nerge, 1993). While

European and North American studies of the 1970s and 1980s documented that women were less likely to receive promotion and showed less upward mobility than their male colleagues, even when they had the same starting conditions (Povall et al., 1982), more recent research has revealed that women leaders not only begin their careers at an earlier age, but reach top positions earlier than men (Coyle, 1989; Lovelace Duke, 1992; Autenrieth et al., 1993). Considerable changes have also occurred within the political sphere of western countries. Comparing statistics on women in legislative bodies of countries belonging to the European Union at the beginning of the 1980s and the 1990s, we find that women's representation improved in most of these countries by 10–15 percent and even beyond (Liebig, 1997: 27ff.).

In other parts of Europe, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, women belonged for most of the last century to a disadvantaged minority. Most of Southern Europe only recently recovered from former absolutist traditions and dictatorial regimes. Though women's share in high-level employment and politics is still marginal within these countries, the social and juridical status of women as well as their numbers at universities and within employment has improved (Cockburn et al., 1993).

This is obviously true also for the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which experienced revolutionary transformations at the end of the 1980s, and beginning of the 1990s. Highly bureaucratic political and economic structures, which formerly marked out access and routes to power, are now substituted by careers based to differing degrees on models of capitalism, socialism and liberal democracy (Eisenstein, 1993). While some of these countries, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, returned to their democratic roots and are slowly developing a viable economy, others, such as Russia, are still working to establish democratic structures and invest in the reform of their economic system. As for women, equal access to education and participation within the labour force were guaranteed under Communism. Yet, this did not provide them with an equal share in decision-making. As a growing literature on the social status of women within these countries shows, their share in leadership positions even seems to have decreased under the conditions of the recently adopted democratic systems and new economic structures (Funk and Mueller, 1993; Rueschemeyer, 1994; Strykowska, 1995). The political and economic transformations after the fall of Communism revealed that – hidden by formal legal equality – traditional orientations on the division of labour and gender hierarchies within private and public life were kept alive (United Nations, 1993).

The following analysis sets out to study men's and women's ascent and success within business and political life within the frame of the different contexts indicated here, and to ascertain the most important factors determining the duration of their careers. 'Careers', therefore, are defined as sequences of positions, which individuals pass through during their professional or political biography (Herzog, 1982), the process of successively

holding various offices, duties and functions over a certain period of time. The duration of this period informs us about the time-needs for accumulating enough power in order to be recruited into the elites. Though the analysis of time-structures, of course, allows us only to sketch a very rough picture of these pathways to the top, we believe that it helps to reveal in a very basic way the totality of circumstances and demands related to them. In this sense, the (dis)similarity of time-requirements of men's and women's routes to the top is considered as indicating the (in)equality of conditions of success within professional and political careers.

The empirical analysis is based on three country groupings, as indicated in the earlier article on the research methodology (see Sansonetti, this issue, p. 326). In order to analyse the impact of social changes on careers within these country clusters, two age groups were constructed for business and political elites separately: business leaders, who were in 1995 – the year of data collection – below 48 years old (i.e. born before 1947), and political leaders below 49 years in 1995 (i.e. born before 1945) are compared to older decision-makers.[1]

Time-Related Patterns of Careers: Empirical Findings

As a first step of our analysis, we portray the occupational histories of economic elites from the very first position up to the present, not only following the accumulation of prestige, but also the velocity of upward mobility. Besides the number of job changes, we look at different positions in the course of economic and political careers, the age when respondents started their respective positions as well as the duration of these jobs and offices. Career steps are measured by the occupational prestige of positions during professional and political life (see Sansonetti, this issue, p. 333). In doing so, we try to ascertain whether women were confronted with higher demands concerning their professional prestige in order to reach the same positions as their male colleagues, and if they had to invest more time to prove their ability to undertake leadership responsibilities. When comparing the particular time-structure of careers between two generations and three different country groups, we start from the aforementioned assumptions.

Business Elites

Looking at the number of full-time jobs (> 12 months)[2] business leaders had since the beginning of their careers, we find the following averages: men = 4.1, women = 3.8, total = 4.0. The average for men shows significantly ($p < .01$) higher numbers of job changes. But for both sexes the number of full-time jobs ($p < .01$) increases significantly, the younger the respondents get. Table 1.1 illustrates these career steps as they are documented by the social

Table 1.1 *Average Prestige Scores, Corresponding Age and Duration of Jobs of Male and Female Business Elites over Four Positions within Two Generations*

	Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)		Total		Total	
Average	Men (N)	Women (N)	Men (N)	Women (N)	Men (N)	Women (N)	Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)	Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)
First position								
Prestige score	55.8 (166)	55.6 (118)	53.4 (111)	55.3 (172)	54.9 (280)	55.5 (292)	55.7 (284)	54.6 (283)
Age	23.3 (128)	24.0 (82)	23.1 (92)	23.1 (125)	23.2 (219)	23.4 (207)	23.6 (209)	23.1 (217)
Duration	5.2 (120)	4.9** (81)	3.4 (90)	4.2 (123)	4.4 (213)	4.5 (204)	5.1 (201)	3.9** (212)
Previous position								
Prestige score	65.7 (185)	63.7° (125)	61.8 (120)	62.3 (184)	64.2 (308)	62.9° (312)	64.9 (310)	62.1° (304)
Age	40.4 (161)	39.7 (108)	35.5 (108)	32.9*** (153)	38.4 (268)	35.7*** (262)	40.1 (269)	34.0*** (261)
Duration	7.2 (154)	7.3 (108)	3.3 (107)	3.6 (151)	5.7 (264)	5.1 (261)	7.2 (263)	3.5*** (258)
Present position								
Prestige score	67.7 (218)	67.6 (162)	67.0 (138)	66.2 (211)	67.5 (360)	66.9 (375)	67.7 (379)	66.6° (348)
Age	48.2 (203)	47.2 (152)	38.7 (132)	37.4** (200)	44.4 (335)	41.6*** (352)	47.8 (355)	37.9*** (331)
Duration	7.2 (203)	6.9 (152)	3.2 (132)	3.0 (200)	5.8 (355)	4.7** (332)	7.1 (355)	3.1*** (331)

$.05 \le p < .10$ = *, $.01 \le p < .05$ = **, $p < .01$ = ***

°: These differences are not significant even if the Student's *t* is significant because there are less than six points between two averages. Treiman suggested to regard differences of less than six points as representing chance fluctuations.

prestige of the first job, of the previous post and that of the current position. If more than one position was held at the same time, respondents were asked to report only on the most important one.

The prestige scores demonstrate the comparatively high level at which today's business elites within all countries had already started their careers when in their early twenties, ranging far beyond the international average prestige score.[3] As the prestige difference between the first and the previous position shows, important upward steps were taken during the first years of professional activity, within which the young professionals acquired their savoir faire and skills at different levels of societal responsibility. From their mid-thirties up to their forties, the respondents experienced a far less rapid upward mobility, though their careers at this point had reached the most powerful spheres within private or public economy. With regard to the time-requirements of getting there, a closer look at the data, however, reveals considerable differences between the career trajectories of the older and younger generation of business elites. Representatives of elites born before 1947 reached their present top position at the end of their forties, i.e. significantly ($p < .000$) later than younger elites, who attained positions of almost the same prestige about 10 years earlier in life. This abbreviation of careers is confirmed when comparing the duration of jobs. For example, respondents of the younger generation remained for significantly ($p = .05$) less time in their first full-time job, as well as in their last position, before reaching the top. If we take the increasing number of job changes as a sign of increasing demand for know-how and skills acquired as they scaled the professional ladder, we certainly can speak not only of an abbreviation, but an acceleration of careers.

The women elites in our sample started their careers on almost the same prestige levels as men. Beginning at approximately the same age, they reached positions of very high social prestige even earlier than the male respondents. The impression that these women were privileged is confirmed when we take generational differences into account. While within the generation of respondents born before 1947 women embarked on their professional careers at almost the same prestige level and time of life as their male colleagues, they were unable to gain power to the same extent as men during the first phase of their career. On the other hand, the younger generation of women have had to assume job responsibilities requiring higher qualifications than their male colleagues of approximately the same age. As is indicated by the higher prestige of their very first position, they had to be more highly qualified in order to enter the professional arena. Being to some degree disadvantaged in starting their careers, they nevertheless succeeded in continuously gaining speed during their way up, reaching top levels at a significantly younger age than their male colleagues.[4]

The trends towards a shortening or, better, an acceleration of careers appears within all three country groups of our study as shown in Table 1.2. Top business leaders of Eastern and Southern European countries (country group 1) comprise the highest positions compared to the rest of the sample.

Table 1.2 *Average Prestige Scores, Durations and Corresponding Age of Business Elites by Gender, Generation and Country Group*

	Country group I				Country group II				Country group III			
	Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
First position												
Prestige score	57.2	56.5	56.1	54.8	56.1	55.0	53.1	56.1	52.8	56.3	52.0	54
	(35)	(22)	(24)	(34)	(107)	(68)	(53)	(97)	(24)	(29)	(34)	(41)
Age	23.6	24.3	24.2	22.8	23.1	23.4	22.1	22.7	24.1	25.8	23.9	24.3
	(31)	(17)	(19)	(27)	(79)	(51)	(45)	(70)	(17)	(14)	(29)	(29)
Duration	8.7	7.6	4.7	5.5	4.1	4.5	2.9	4.0	4.3	3.3	3.2	3.7
	(28)	(16)	(18)	(24)	(73)	(51)	(44)	(69)	(18)	(14)	(29)	(30)
Previous position												
Prestige score	65.4	59.8°	60.0	61.3	66.1	65.3	62.8	64.3	64.7	62.8	61.3	58.0°
	(35)	(23)	(27)	(38)	(125)	(74)	(61)	(106)	(24)	(28)	(33)	(41)
Age	39.2	39.1	35.4	31.1**	40.6	39.5	35.4	32.9**	40.6	40.7	35.6	34.3
	(71)	(20)	(24)	(32)	(106)	(61)	(52)	(81)	(24)	(27)	(33)	(41)
Duration	8.8	5.1*	3.7	4.7	7.3	8.6	3.5	3.3	4.9	5.9	2.81	3.3
	(26)	(20)	(24)	(31)	(104)	(61)	(51)	(80)	(24)	(27)	(33)	(40)
Present position												
Prestige score	71.0	69.1	72.3	69.9°	66.9	67.2	65.9	65.6	66.7	67.5	64.6	64.1
	(43)	(29)	(32)	(47)	(150)	(103)	(72)	(120)	(25)	(30)	(35)	(44)
Age	47.7	46.6	37.4	36.5	48.5	47.4	39.2	37.2**	47.1	47.4	38.9	38.7
	(42)	(29)	(32)	(46)	(136)	(94)	(66)	(111)	(25)	(30)	(35)	(43)
Duration	7.9	7.0	3.8	3.4	7.4	7.7	2.9	3.0	4.8	4.6	3.3	2.9
	(42)	(29)	(32)	(46)	(136)	(94)	(66)	(111)	(25)	(30)	(35)	(43)

$.05 \leq p < .10$ = *, $.01 \leq p < .05$ = **, $p < .01$ = ***

°: Differences are not significant even if the Student's *t* is significant.

Though our data show that these elites stayed significantly longer on each step of the career ladder than the respondents of the other two groups, careers to the very top turn out here to be the steepest. An explanation for this paradox is generational change. The comparison between the career tracks of older and younger elites reflects a considerable dynamics within the time-structure of careers. Though we do not find strong generational differences with regard to the age of elites at the beginning of their career and the prestige of their first job, younger respondents of Eastern and Southern Europe stayed significantly fewer years in their first position, and reached top positions at a significantly earlier age, i.e. six or seven years earlier than older interviewees. The shortening of careers characterizes both male and female career trajectories, and younger women enjoyed advantageous conditions. As the growing similarity of the time-structure of male/female careers indicates, they seem to have suffered less from disadvantages than their older female colleagues, and reached positions of approximately the same responsibility eight years ahead of them. However, these women's managerial jobs do not reach the prestige level of men of the same age.

Within the Western market economies (country cluster 2) also, the generational comparison confirms the phenomenon of an abbreviation of careers, although to a less dramatic degree. Here, business elites born in 1947 and later stayed a much shorter time in their last two jobs before their present position at the very top. At the same time, female careers improved, at least in terms of the shortening of their career paths. Women of the younger generation were able to save a lot of time compared to the careers of their older female colleagues, and reached positions of the same or even more power at a significantly younger age. However, these female careers also seem to have received a surplus of support compared to their male colleagues. At the same or even at a younger age as men of the postwar generation, they were recruited into positions of similar if not greater power. Furthermore, while within all countries women leaders held positions of less prestige than their male colleagues before their actual leadership function, they were in the case of this specific country group also younger than men. Put into numbers: the younger female elites aged about 34 assumed their current position about six or seven years earlier than their older male and female colleagues, and still about two years earlier than male top managers of the same age.

Careers within Nordic countries (group 3) demonstrate great continuity. To begin with, generational differences between the duration of the jobs are the smallest over all job positions. The velocity of upward mobility increases only moderately here, and the relation between the age of respondents and the prestige of their position is more predictable than in the other two groups. Indeed, although younger leaders, who started their professional careers during the 1970s and 1980s, in this group also reached positions of high prestige about six or seven years earlier, they still have not gained the same amount of prestige as their older colleagues. This means that here

younger age in most cases is related to jobs of less social prestige. More than that, we cannot find the same dynamics within female career trajectories as in the other two country groups, because the time-structure of female and male careers already shows great similarity within the older generation of elites. In addition, the pattern of the relation between female and male careers remains the same over time. Within both generations, women, who are slightly older than their male colleagues, bring a touch more prestige into their first position, fall back with regard to their responsibilities in mid-career, and finally reach, at about the same age, positions comparable to those of their male colleagues.

Political Careers

Professional success is considered among other things a constitutive factor of political careers, even at the lower levels. The 'situs', in other words the proximity of the professional activity and position to the political sphere, is described as the most important resource determining a successful start in political leadership (Herzog, 1982). Consequently, the first subject of our analysis is the professional history of political decision-makers, before they entered the political elite. Table 2.1 presents prestige scores and corresponding ages for the first full-time job held by politicians for more than a year, as well as for those two employment positions preceding their current political office.[5]

As the data show, political elites have generally had very successful professional careers, which they started in their early twenties; by their mid-thirties they already achieved positions of considerable social prestige. Generational effects are highly significant ($p < .000$) in both gender categories with regard to the positions respondents held before reaching the top. Starting their careers at almost the same age, men as well as women of the younger generation reached occupational positions of similar prestige considerably earlier than their older colleagues. Besides this, the construction of two age groups allows us to identify changes within the relation between the time-requirements of male and female careers. Female political leaders born before 1945 began their professional career on a lower level of prestige than men, while the younger generation of women were as highly qualified professionally speaking as their younger and older male colleagues. Compared to the careers of economic elites, the professional trajectories of political leaders can be described as relatively flat curves on a very high level. While their first professional involvement socially is estimated as even more prestigious than those of business leaders, it resulted in positions located slightly below them with regard to their prestige. The data therefore suggest a dual career pattern for political elites: professional and political success overlap. However, this finding does not allow us to draw conclusions either on the synchronicity of careers within economic and political fields or on the causal relation between them.

Table 2.1 *Average Prestige Scores and Corresponding Age of Political Elites over Three Occupational Positions by Gender and Generation*

	Older generation Age ≥ 49.55 (N)		Younger generation Age < 49.55 (N)		Total		Total	
Average	Men (N)	Women (N)	Men (N)	Women (N)	Men (N)	Women (N)	Older generation Age ≥ 49.55 (N)	Younger generation Age < 49.55 (N)
First position								
Prestige score	57.9	54.5°	58.0	58.2	58.0	56.5	56.3	58.1
	(155)	(139)	(129)	(150)	(284)	(289)	(294)	(279)
Age	23.5	23.1	22.6	23.0	23.1	23.0	23.3	22.8
	(105)	(91)	(101)	(103)	(207)	(194)	(196)	(204)
Duration	8.3	7.5	4.4	4.5	6.4	5.9	7.9	4.4***
	(104)	(88)	(100)	(98)	(204)	(186)	(192)	(198)
Previous position								
Prestige score	62.5	58.5°	60.5	61.9	61.5	60.3	60.5	61.3
	(146)	(137)	(129)	(152)	(276)	(291)	(283)	(281)
Age	33.6	34.5	28.2	28.9	30.9	31.5	34.0	28.6***
	(109)	(104)	(106)	(121)	(215)	(226)	(213)	(227)
Duration	8.8	7.3	4.7	4.6	6.8	5.9	8.1	4.7***
	(114)	(107)	(106)	(120)	(220)	(227)	(221)	(227)
Present position								
Prestige score	65.5	64.2	64.4	65.3	64.8	64.8	64.8	64.7
	(185)	(171)	(165)	(189)	(352)	(361)	(356)	(354)
Age	38.9	39.5*	31.3	32.9	35.3	36.0	39.2	32.1***
	(150)	(130)	(133)	(146)	(283)	(276)	(280)	(279)
Duration	10.7	8.9	6.2	5.7	8.5	7.2*	9.9	5.9***
	(143)	(121)	(133)	(141)	(2760	(264)	(264)	(275)

$.05 \le p < .10$ = *, $.01 \le p < .05$ = **, $p < .01$ = ***
°: Differences are not significant even if the Student's *t* is significant.

The need for occupational resources is just one distinctive trait of political careers. Political upward mobility, of course, is strongly based on the accumulation of political experience and party membership. Politicians on the whole had about 14 years of political experience in general and up to 13 years of party membership before getting into positions of the highest social prestige in their mid-forties. Important to note are remarkable differences (p = .000) between the political careers of respondents born before 1946 and those born later. While the older generation of elites started their political engagement in their mid-thirties and got into the most powerful positions at the age of 50, respondents born in 1946 and later started to become politically involved in their late twenties in order to reach positions of power by the age of 40. This means that the time-expenditure for political careers to the top has shortened from around 15 years to about 10–11 years, signifying that approximately four or five years of political life separate these two generations of elites. While the shortening of political careers is for the most part not a gender-related phenomenon, men of the older generation had to invest more time in their political career. Irrespective of the generation they belong to, female politicians made their way up into the elites after slightly fewer years in political life and political parties, and on the whole reached top positions at about the same age as their male colleagues.

The generally short time-span before the interviewees joined a party once they were politically active shows that political careers are controlled by recruitment into crucial functions at different levels of political institutions and that lateral access into high party offices is rather rare. On different levels of party politics at local, intermediate, regional and national level, political leaders have to fulfil several tasks in legislative bodies and governmental positions before getting into the elite. As the analysis of the average number of years within these different offices demonstrates, political careers are built on a lengthy process of accumulating power within the party, starting with comparatively long duration at local levels (5.8 years), later speeding up, holding office at intermediate level (4.6 years) and national political level (4.7 years). Moreover, the elites spend about three to four years in city or county councils, as well as in parliaments at regional or national level. The average number of years in elected or appointed governmental positions is rather small (one to two years), and already signifies the first step into elite circles. Comparing older and younger political elites, a systematic generational effect cannot be observed however, which suggests that the demands concerning know-how and expertise in political offices and functions (which have been operationalized in numbers of years here) remain as high as ever, while the time-span within which top positions in political decision-making bodies are reached has been extremely abbreviated – so that we can speak of an acceleration in this arena also. In particular, female candidates for political elite positions bring with them as much knowledge as their male colleagues in top positions, but they have acquired it in fewer years.

Turning our attention to cross-national differences shown in Table 2.2, career tracks in the first group of countries show the greatest discontinuity.

Within these countries we find a generation of old political reformers, who started their careers at around 40 years of age in the mid-1980s, alongside a totally new political elite who entered the political scene by about the age of 30. This generational gap can also be found with regard to the duration of political activity. As this reveals, the younger generation of decision-makers within this country group reached the most elite positions with about six (men) or four (women) fewer years of political experience, and about 14 (men) or 10 (women) years earlier. Neither the younger nor the older political leaders of this country group, however, have a long party history: most of them got into power after the end of the Communist period with about five years of party membership. But the political transition obviously caused negative changes for women's careers: if we look at the age of these male leaders at the beginning of their party membership and the age when they started their present top position, the data show no differences of time-needs between the two generations. Instead, younger women spent three years more within the party than their male counterparts of the same age, while the older female political elites in the past had to invest about two years less time than men.

Contrary to the transitions reflected by the time-structure of careers in the countries of group 1, the data reveal considerable continuity of political careers in the countries of group 2. Nevertheless, here also the generational comparison shows a strong acceleration of careers. The older decision-makers started their political activity and party membership in their early thirties, while younger elites became active at the age of about 26 (men) or 28 (women). The comparatively long political experience characterizing the careers of older political leaders has been replaced by a shorter one, whereby instead of approximately 15–16 (women) or 17–18 (men) years of party membership, 12 or 13 years of political commitment suffice in order to be recruited into the most powerful positions. As already indicated here, the increased velocity of careers goes hand in hand with changes concerning the time-span of women's rise to positions of power. While female politicians born before 1946 had to invest about 30 months more in their careers than men of the same age and position, the younger generation of women needed one year less than men of the same generation.

As in the economic field, the data of respondents from the countries of the third group reveal comparatively greater stability with regard to the time-structure of political careers. Younger *and* older leaders from the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands got politically involved at a comparatively younger age, i.e. at about the age of 28 (men) or 30 (women), but at the same time recruitment into top leadership positions seems to demand very long political experience. And though male and female politicians born after 1946 entered the party at a very young age (about 23 years), political experience still appears of greater importance than it does within the other countries in the study. However, the time-requirement for

Table 2.2 *Averages for Total Years of Political Activity, Durations of Party Membership, Age Starting Present Position, Prestige of Present Position and Duration of Present Position of Political Elites by Gender, Generation and Country Group*

	Country group I				Country group II				Country group III			
	Older generation Age ≥ 49.55 (N)		Younger generation Age < 49.55 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 49.55 (N)		Younger generation Age < 49.55 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 49.55 (N)		Younger generation Age < 49.55 (N)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Total years of political activity	17.7 (33)	15.0 (36)	11.5 (69)	11.3 (62)	23.1 (125)	23.3 (109)	18.1 (94)	15.7** (110)	29.0 (35)	24.8* (36)	22.4 (9)	17.5 (24)
Duration party membership	9.7 (34)	8.7 (35)	9.0 (64)	7.7 (57)	22.8 (109)	22.6 (94)	17.5 (76)	15.5 (87)	29.1 (40)	25.3* (43)	19.6 (19)	18.9 (32)
Age start present position	52.5 (30)	50.2 (31)	38.3 (61)	39.7 (57)	50.2 (127)	52.7** (108)	39.7 (97)	41.0 (111)	48.2 (41)	50.1 (36)	40.6 (19)	36.8* (24)
Prestige present position	84.6 (35)	83.0 (36)	84.2 (69)	83.2 (66)	84.3 (128)	84.6 (112)	85.6 (97)	85.3 (112)	84.5 (41)	84.8 (43)	87.6 (19)	85.5° (31)
Duration present position	4.3 (30)	5.1 (31)	3.5 (61)	3.0 (57)	6.4 (127)	4.8 (108)	4.2 (97)	3.4** (111)	9.0 (40)	5.6 (36)	2.1 (19)	5.2** (24)

$.05 \leq p < .10$ = *, $.01 \leq p < .05$ = **, $p < .01$ = ***

°: Differences are not significant even if the Student's *t* is significant.

female careers has been reduced from about 20 to about 14 years between the two generations of women. As an effect, the younger generation of Nordic female political decision-makers not only had to invest considerably less time in their careers compared to men of the same age, but constitute the group of youngest leaders (36.8) within the whole sample.

Comparing data on business and political leaders, political careers on the whole start about age 32, i.e. nine to 10 years later in life than career paths leading to top management positions. Within these years, political leaders might invest in their professional careers, but also in their private life, as is suggested by the different numbers of children had by managerial and political elites (see Di Stefano and Pinnelli, this issue, pp. 339–69). On the other hand, the time required for professional ascent into political decision-making bodies is evidently less than that for a top business position. This is especially true for the older generation of business elites, whose career trajectory lasted on average about 23–5 years, that is 8–10 years longer than a political career, if we start counting time from the beginning of party membership. The strong abbreviation of business careers results in this difference of time investments, decreasing to about five years in the younger generation of elites, with business careers lasting about 15 years, political careers about 10–11 years. However, in the light of the dual structure of political careers, these differences are less significant. On the contrary, if we consider the beginning of the professional career as the actual basis for political success in later life, the time-investments for political careers even surpass the years needed for upward mobility in the business sector.

Gender Hierarchies within Elites

A career is a series of steps to be covered within a period of time. Within an organization vertical mobility may be governed in two ways. First, on the basis of formal qualifications, level of remuneration, professional position, hierarchical level and social prestige. Second, from the point of view of professional content (Consoli, 1995; Salvemini, 1992), defined by the characteristics of the tasks. Among these features, we are interested in examining where power is really exercised. Power is the ability to generate the necessary activities to mobilize resources, obtaining and utilizing what is indispensable to reach targets (Kanter, 1977), by absolving the functions of planning, organizing and controlling (Mander and Quaglino, 1997). Power is supposed to be rationally distributed on the basis of hierarchical order, although this is not always the case. In addition, hierarchical organizations do not operate in the supposed rational way (Merton, 1957, cited in Maddock, 1999), and this lack of rationality is evident in the gender discrimination existing in career paths.

From the results based on occupational prestige, it seems that there are no gender differences in the positions held during the career. Social prestige is but a formal attribute, which does not take into consideration tasks that

truly characterize a position. Therefore, it is interesting to consider the difference between the results obtained on the basis of the Social Prestige Score Scale and another scale based on the supervisory tasks actually exercised by the interviewees.[6] From the gender point of view, a comparison between the results of these different measures allows us to discuss the difference between formal positions and power as it is really exercised.[7] Figures 1 and 2 show averages for women and men in terms of Treiman's Social Prestige Score Scale and level of supervisory functions, in total and by group of countries, for business leaders and political leaders respectively. First of all, results for the occupations' prestige scores are shown, then by comparison the supervisory tasks. In the case of political leaders, the positions considered are indifferently referred to as political or civil life.[8]

The picture is similar for both political and business elites. Women have climbed the career ladder in terms of occupational prestige without remarkable differences from their male counterparts.[9] However, looking at the degree of supervisory power our data reveal that men always hold more superior positions than their female colleagues.

For both business and political elites differences are always significant as far as the supervisory tasks are concerned. Therefore, we may conclude that, while from a formal point of view gender equality seems almost a reality, it is far from being put into practice.

For the *business sample*, in the case of the countries of the third group, the difference in terms of social prestige between the first and the penultimate position favours women, while in the final position men make up for the apparent disadvantage. However, the difference in the supervisory power exercised favours men in the first and penultimate position and becomes weaker in the last position. In the case of country groups 1 and 2, the difference in terms of supervisory power always strongly favours men, while, once again, the difference in terms of positions seems very small. In all three groups of countries, although there is a tendency towards gender equality as far as social prestige is concerned a disadvantage emerges for women (except for the social democracies where women appear advantaged in the first and penultimate positions).

The generational comparison of business leaders (graphs not shown here) illustrates that younger female elites show (slightly) higher prestige scores, but they exercise supervisory tasks at a significantly lower level as far as penultimate and final positions are concerned. Women of the older generation present the same result for supervisory tasks, while for the prestige of occupations men of the same age are at a slight advantage. We may conclude that from one generation to another the social prestige score reveals a tendency towards formal gender equality. Even if women on average have made up for an already slight disadvantage, men are always privileged in the area of supervisory power.

For *political elites* the difference in supervisory tasks always favours men in all three groups of countries. In countries of group 1 the social prestige of women surmounts that of men slightly only with regard to the last



Figure 1 *Occupations' Prestige and Supervisory Tasks for Business Elites in Total and by Country Grouping*
Notes: To compare averages between men and women Student's *t* has been used: n.s. = not significant when $p \geq .10$, * = suggestive $.05 \leq p < .10$, ** = significant $.01 \leq p < .05$, *** = highly significant $p < .01$.



Figure 2 *Occupations' Prestige and Supervisory Tasks for Political Leaders in Total and by Country Grouping*

Notes: To compare averages between men and women Student's *t* has been used: n.s. = not significant when $p \geq .10$, * = suggestive $.05 < p < .10$, ** = significant $.01 \leq p < .05$, *** = highly significant $p < .01$.

position. In these countries, the last position was reached on average at the beginning of the 1990s, when the change to a market economy was underway. The transition suddenly revealed the existence of real differences, hidden behind just a formally introduced gender equality. In the case of the countries of group 2, the only significant difference concerns the first position for which men are at a slight advantage in terms of social prestige. At the outset, it was difficult for women in such countries but, further down the track, differences diminished, thanks to the improvement obtained in the political participation of women since the women's movement of the 1970s. In the case of the countries of group 3, only the difference for the last position is not significant. This result may be explained by the fact that the last position was gained usually at the end of the 1970s, that means at the end of a decade in which women had entered public life in great numbers. On the foil of the remarkable advantage of men in terms of social prestige, the data suggest that also in these countries the reduction of the actual gender difference corresponds to a loss from the formal point of view.

Looking at the two generations of political elites, we found that younger women always present a slightly higher level of social prestige than men, while for older women the opposite result emerges. As far as supervisory tasks are concerned, older women exercise a significant lower level of supervisory power than their male counterparts, while the young generation of political women obviously has gained.

As far as the total sample of business leaders is concerned women exercise fewer supervisory tasks during their careers than men. This is true for the last two positions for all groups of countries though statistically no difference between the social prestige of male and female elites emerges. Results for politicians are different in terms of supervisory power exercised while, as far as prestige is concerned, differences are not significant. In the countries of group 1, a difference appears only for the last position, which refers to a period of great social and economic change. In the countries of group 2, no difference appears for the last two positions, a clear indication that policies aimed at improving women's participation in political life had some success. In the social democracies the difference is not significant for the last position, while a high difference in terms of prestige is present. This again reveals a trade-off for women between formal and actual rewards.

Our data therefore confirm that power is still a male monopoly. And even for the social democracies Wright's (1997: 341) statement is still true: 'while, in many respects the Scandinavian countries are among the most egalitarian in the world both in terms of class and gender relations, with respect to the distribution of authority in the work-place they are clearly less egalitarian than the four English speaking countries'.[10] Generation-wise we can conclude that for both political and business elites a change of direction occurred as far as the difference of social prestige between women and men is concerned. For politicians the change in terms of real power exercised, measured by supervisory tasks, took place from the old generation to the younger one.

The Entanglement of Economic and Political Careers

One main reason for the interdependence of careers within political and economic spheres is that they constitute overlapping social and communicative communities. While political success is founded on adequate lobbying from business associations and other economic interest groups, political engagement is considered as a favourable premise for business careers and leadership, since parties and other political organizations provide their members with specific resources such as crucial information, social protection and contacts to key agents within society.

Asked if they have ever been active in party politics, 22 percent of the *economic elites* of our study, that is a quarter of the male respondents, and a fifth (19.3 percent) of their female counterparts answered positively. Notably, business men's careers on the whole are significantly ($p = .05$) more strongly based on integration within the social networks of politics, while the proportion among women business leaders (who have been elected into political offices on local, regional or national levels, or hold an appointed political office) is not less than that of men. The percentages demonstrate a high involvement in political decision-making by members of economic elites. Nevertheless, the decreasing integration of younger business leaders into political circles might be interpreted as a sign of the diminishing importance of political activities for business careers. Yet, in fact, these developments turn out to be strongly influenced by gender, while the number of men active in politics and holding political offices remains rather constant for older and younger generations of leaders, women born in 1947 and after are significantly ($p = .01$) less politically involved than their older female colleagues.

As Table 3 illustrates, the older elites of the Eastern and Southern European countries show the highest percentages with respect to political activity as well as political offices, and they held (or still hold) notably higher numbers of appointed as well as elected political offices, the latter mostly on a local, but also on a national level. Generally, top managers from country group 2 seem to invest much less in political activities, though business leaders from the welfare societies of Northern Europe took the fewest initiatives in becoming politically involved. Across all countries, a decrease of political involvement can be noted within the younger generation of elites, except for the younger male Western European/North American top managers of country group 2, who seem to place greater emphasis on political activity than their older colleagues. Within both generations, women's involvement in politics ranges far below that of men, which could indicate either that women's careers rely less on activities and offices within the political field or that a specifically female power deficit exists. Women from group 1 countries, however, have been – or still are – more politically involved than female business elites in the other two country groups.

The entanglement between economy and politics is illustrated also by the

Table 3 *Political Activity of Business Elites by Gender, Generation and Country Group*

	Country group 1				Country group 2				Country group 3			
	Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Active in party politics	51.2	40.7	37.5	21.7	19.2	24.5	27.1	13.9**	30.8	29.0	17.1	6.7
	(43)	(27)	(32)	(46)	(151)	(102)	(70)	(122)	(26)	(31)	(35)	(45)
Elected to political office												
Local	25.7	27.8	25.0**	5.9	4.0	6.1	5.9	0.8**	4.0	13.3	8.6	4.4
	(35)	(18)	(28)	(34)	(151)	(99)	(68)	(122)	(25)	(30)	(35)	(45)
Intermediate	5.9	0.0	3.8	2.9	2.0	3.0	2.9	0.8	4.0	6.7	2.9	2.2
	(34)	(18)	(26)	(34)	(151)	(99)	(69)	(122)	(25)	(30)	(35)	(45)
National	17.1	11.1	3.7	5.9	1.3	3.0	2.9	0.0*	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0
	(35)	(18)	(27)	(34)	(151)	(99)	(69)	(122)	(25)	(30)	(35)	(44)
Appointed to political office	16.3	11.1	6.5	11.1	7.5	12.4	4.6	2.5	3.8	6.9	2.9	2.2
	(43)	(27)	(31)	(45)	(147)	(97)	(65)	(119)	(26)	(29)	(34)	(45)

$.05 \leq p < .10$*, $.01 \leq p < .05$**, $p < .01$***.

percentage of *political leaders* who were once heads of a major corporation or part of the governing body of a major non-profit organization – such as a public foundation, a museum, or a hospital – before reaching the top. The fact that 20.4 percent of the political elites were once directors of a major business corporation (and that almost 11 percent were heads of more than one) seems to support the assumption that professional know-how and leadership count as an important stepping-stone towards political success. Of even greater importance appears leadership experience within organizations engaged in social or societal issues: 52.5 percent of the political leaders participated in decision-making processes in at least one non-profit organization and 40 percent in more than one organization of this kind. While generally the number of men who held top economic positions (22.5 percent) exceeds the number of women (18.7 percent) to a highly significant degree ($p = .001$), female and male political decision-makers had almost an equal share in leadership positions in the area of non-profit commitment (men 51.1 percent; women 53.9 percent). However, the presence of this kind of commitment diminishes significantly ($p > .001$) between generations. The number of the respondents who held top positions in big business corporations before their current position decreases from 23 percent in the older generation to 17.6 percent among the younger political elites, as does the number of politicians possessing honorary titles, a significant fall ($p = .05$) from 57.3 percent to 47.7 percent. Both changes in this case are not a gender-related phenomenon, but as Table 4 shows, differ considerably with regard to national contexts.

In the country groups 1 and 2, political careers are strongly paralleled by success in the economic field. While this interdependence seems to be losing its meaning for the younger Western European and North American elites of both sexes, especially younger female politicians from Eastern and Southern Europe adapt to the traditionally high degree of business orientation of their colleagues. Nevertheless, we find the greatest gender difference with regard to leadership experience in business corporations and the non-profit sector in precisely these countries. Clearly, less involved in the business world are politicians from Northern Europe, who, on the other hand, have taken initiatives within the non-profit field to a visibly higher degree than politicians from other countries. About four out of five female representatives of the older political elites of Nordic countries started their political careers as agents of governing bodies of non-profit organizations, and further, the younger generation of women have committed themselves more than any other grouping to these institutions.

Once in top political offices, the number of respondents still heading major business corporations decreases considerably, rarely surpassing 10 percent in any countries, with the smallest percentages in the social democracies and the highest in group 2 countries. The percentage of those decision-makers maintaining close contact with economically and socially influential bodies decreases even more so within the younger generation. However, taking the total percentages into account, many male (38.0

Table 4 *Past Positions of Political Elites at the Top of Major Corporations and Major Non-profit Organizations*

	Country group 1				Country group 2				Country group 3			
	Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)		Older generation Age ≥ 48.0 (N)		Younger generation Age < 48.0 (N)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Major corporation	22.6	3.2*	21.3	17.7	29.4	26.2**	19.1	17.1	13.8	15.2	6.3	15.4
	(31)	(31)	(61)	(62)	(119)	(103)	(89)	(105)	(29)	(33)	(16)	(26)
Non-profit organizatons	42.9	41.2	50.8	30.6**	53.0	59.4	44.4	50.9	67.5	81.0	58.8	69.7

$.05 \leq p < .10$*, $.01 \leq p < .05$**, $p < .01$***.
Numbers in brackets indicate the weighted total of valid cases the frequencies refer to.

percent) and female (29.6 percent) politicians continue to hold at least one honorary title or position within the non-profit field, especially in group 2 and 3 countries.

Predictors of Success

In the next step of the analysis we try to measure the speed of the career of the respondents from the very first job to the present one and to identify the most important predictors using multiple classification analysis (MCA).[11] This analysis will be carried out separately for each elite considering the following factors:

1 Gender;
2 Country grouping;
3 A set of indicators concerning the characteristics of careers;
4 One subjective indicator of the economic capital of the family of origin;
5 One indicator of the social position of the family of origin;
6 Two indicators of the cultural capital of the family of origin;
7 Two indicators of the cultural capital of the interviewee;
8 One indicator of the cultural capital of the partner;
9 One indicator of the social position of the partner;
10 A set of indicators of the social capital;
11 The number of children of the interviewee.

Among the characteristics of the career we included: the difference in prestige between the first and the present position; the number of career interruptions and the number of jobs. In the group of politicians we counted, the total number of years of political activity and leadership in college, while in the group of business leaders we measured, the number of positions in the present or in the past as heads of corporations.

As subjective indicator for the economic capital of the family of origin we chose the family position when the interviewee was 14 years old, measured by a Likert scale. As indicator for the social position of the family of origin we decided to take the social prestige of the father's job when the interviewee was 14 years old.

As suggested by Liddle and Michielsens (2000), good indicators for the cultural capital of the family of origin are the school degree of the mother and the father. They were following the consideration of Bourdieu (1984), for whom 'the educational qualification is sufficiently close to the cultural capital to serve as an indicator of it'.[12] Also the cultural capital of the interviewee we measured by the type of school degree (total years spent studying) and school visited (public, private or both).

The cultural capital of the partner's degree is also considered. In fact, studies on careers of couples showed that the cultural capital of one partner seems to be transferable to the other on the basis of a mechanism similar to

the one that permits the cultural capital of a family of origin to be transferred to its children (Bernardi, 1999; Bernasco, 1994; Bernasco et al., 1998). The social position of the partner is measured in terms of the social prestige of his or her present job.

The set of indicators of social capital were chosen starting from Coleman (1988, 1990), who defined social capital as the potential of information inherent in social relations. For both samples, the following predictors are considered: the number of past or present positions as head of a corporation (for business elites this is considered as a characteristic of the career as well); the number of leadership positions held in associations in the past or the present; the activity in various associations; the number of mentors during the career; the interviewee's political leadership in college (for political elites this is considered also a characteristic of the career); the political activity of the family of origin; and the school typology (public, private or both). The last indicator, which is often considered as an indicator of cultural capital, is important for social capital as well, because it is at school that interpersonal relations start that often continue for a lifetime. For business leaders, the political experiences at local, intermediate and national levels are also taken into account.

All the aforementioned variables were tested to enter the model, but just few of them were found to be significant in explaining the speed of career. The resulting beta coefficients (significant under the Fisher probability test), considered in their rank order, indicate the importance of each predictor in explaining the speed of the career trajectory when all other predictors are held constant. The adjusted deviation from the average computed for each category provides the effect of each predictor on the dependent variable. The findings are shown in Tables 5 and 6.[13] Grand Means indicate the averages in the career speed, higher in the case of business leaders than for politicians.

Three results are to be emphasized. First, the country grouping is one of the most important factors in explaining career speed (it is the first for political elites and the second for business elites). Living in a Western market economy implies a slightly slower career trajectory than in the other two groups, where the pace is significantly faster. In particular, career paths of business leaders appear quickest in the group 3 countries, while for political leaders it is fastest in the group 1 countries. These results are confirmed by the step-by-step analysis of the career paths (the extraordinarily rapid progress of careers in the first group of countries seems to depend mostly on the duration of the previous position).

Second, gender is a reliable predictor of career speed in the business sphere, where women's careers are faster than men's. This confirms findings of other studies, stating that women's careers in the business world are the result of choices and negotiations between cultural models, opportunities and ties that take place over a lifetime (Gerson, 1985, cited in Bernardi, 1999). This holds true for both the top and lower levels of careers. The comparison by gender for the total sample as far as time is concerned (age and

Table 5 *Business Elites: Predictors for Career Speed*

Factors	Beta adjusted by factors	Modalities	Number of respondents	Standard deviations	Adjusted standard deviations
Gender	.216***	Men	353	1.9	1.6
		Women	381	–1.7	–1.50
Country grouping	.179***	First	149	0.0	–0.7
		Second	450	0.8	1.0
		Third	135	–2.5	–2.3
Public or private high-school	.111***	Public	519	0.3	0.5
		Private	198	–0.7	–1.3
		Both	17	0.6	1.1
Prestige score range between the first and the present position	.109***	$v \leq 5$	188	–1.2	–1.2
		$5 < v \leq 11$	212	0.4	0.4
		$11 < v \leq 20$	207	0.1	0.0
		$v > 20$	127	0.8	1.1
Director in the past of major corporation	.101***	None	475	–0.6	–0.4
		1 or 2	202	0.7	0.4
		More than 2	57	2.6	2.2
Number of full-time jobs since work	.095***	Less than 3	354	–0.2	–0.2
		3–6	268	–0.5	–0.4
		More than 6	112	1.9	1.6
Years in national politics	.070***	None	698	–0.1	–0.1
		One or more	36	2.5	2.2

Grand Mean = 19.9
v indicates the difference in prestige between the present and the first position

$N = 734$.
The proportion of the variance of the career speed explained by predictors is significant at $P_F = .000$ level.
$.05 \leq p < .10$*, $.01 \leq p < .05$**, $.00 \leq p < .01$***

Table 6 *Political Elites: Predictors for Career Speed*

Factors	Beta adjusted by factors	Modalities	Number of respondents	Standard deviations	Adjusted standard deviations
Country grouping	.154***	First	210	–1.9	–1.7
		Second	450	0.9	0.9
		Third	135	0.0	–0.4
Public or private high-school	.127***	Public	616	0.5	0.5
		Private	159	–1.8	–1.6
		Both	20	–1.2	–2.5
Total years of political activity	.114**	0–5	101	1.0	1.6
		5–15	198	–0.9	–0.5
		15–25	289	–0.4	–0.7
		25+	208	–0.9	0.7
Years of education	.112***	Less than or equal to 14	81	3.2	2.4
		More than 14	714	–0.4	–0.3
Leadership position in college	.094***	Yes	279	–1.3	–0.9
		No	516	–0.7	0.5
Father's education	.086***	Up to vocational included	512	0.6	0.5
		High school or higher	283	–1.1	–0.8
Number of children	.085***	0	132	–1.8	–1.2
		1 or 2	384	0.0	0.0
		3 or more	278	0.9	0.6
Grand Mean = 22.7					

$N = 795$.
The proportion of the variance of the career speed explained by predictors is significant at $P_F = .000$ level.
$.05 \leq p < .10$*, $.01 \leq p < .05$**, $.00 \leq p < .01$***

duration) are significant for business elites (see Table 1.1), however not for political elites (Table 2.1).

The third and indeed important result concerns education: for both sectors, going to private high-schools implies a quicker career trajectory. Whoever studied in both state and private high-schools presents a career path which is a little slower for business leaders and a little quicker for politicians. For business leaders, the time spent at high-school is devoted to learning and to building relations within their own environment. For politicians, the number of people encountered and the variety of relations are more important. For them, popularity is instrumental in a rapid ascent to the top. However, this does not mean that the political arena is easier than the business arena. And as shown in Table 6, also the cultural capital of the family of origin (represented by the educational level of the father), appears to be a necessary prerequisite which makes the difference among politicians.

As far as the *business elite* is concerned, further significant predictors are, in order of importance: the variation of prestige between the present and the first position, the number of other corporations headed in the past, and the number of full-time jobs and years spent in national politics. Among these predictors, only the last is not characteristic of the career path of business people.

A quicker career path often means a small variation of prestige. If people entered at the very top as first position, moving up will present little variation of prestige. Those who present a higher variation have generally travelled a longer path.

Past leadership of other corporations and the number of full-time jobs (the first is a characteristic of the career as well as an indicator of social capital, the second just a characteristic of the career) may be considered jointly. We expected a positive relation between the first factor and career speed, since a greater number of positions as head of a corporation implies more relations, that is a higher social capital. However, the analysis reveals this predictor to be an obstacle. The greater the number of past positions the interviewee has held as head of a corporation, the slower her or his career has been. Moreover, there is a proportionally direct relation between the number of full-time jobs and the career speed, i.e. the greater the number of jobs the quicker the career path. This is true as long as the number of jobs is fewer than six: the social relations and the skills learned by the experience compensate the waste of time in looking for a new occupation or in adapting to a new work environment. When the jobs number more than six, the relation is inverse, that is to say, the greater the number of jobs, the slower the career. Therefore, experience in a diversity of fields offers greater opportunities for career abbreviation.[14] However, this cannot be too dispersive, such as having been head of many corporations or having had a high number of job changes.

The last predictor is the total number of years spent in national politics, which is an indicator of social capital. For business elites, involvement in

top-level politics is the only kind of political commitment that can affect their career speed, even though they are also involved at other levels (Table 3). Results show that more than one year spent in national politics implies a slower velocity in moving from the first to the current job.

In addition to factors such as national context and type of school attended, the analysis shows that the following predictors are significantly influencing the career speed of *political elites*, in this order of importance: total number of years of political activity, years of education, leadership position in college, father's education, and number of children.

As regards the total years of political activity, an obvious result emerges: whoever has been in politics for more than 25 years presents a longer career path. However, this result also holds for interviewees who have been in politics for just a few years: in this case, to compensate for a lack of experience in the public sphere, a longer career path in professional life is necessary. At the same time, this result emphasizes the fact that access to the political elite is open not only to professionals of politics, but to people coming from civil society as well, thanks to electoral mechanisms, even if conditioned by other factors (for instance, cultural capital). Beyond that leadership experience in college obviously influences the speed of political careers, and equally can be interpreted as an indicator of early political activity as well as of social capital. Leadership positions at college level were obtained by people whose career paths moved ahead more quickly, while slower careers were associated with people who did not have this experience.

But also cultural capital seems a crucial factor for political success, when total years of education and the level of father's education are taken into account.[15] A longer period at school (that is a high level of education) as well as a higher cultural level of the father facilitate a quicker career.

Last but not least the number of children affects the speed of careers: a smaller number of children generally mean fewer interruptions in the career path, which obviously becomes faster. However, the number of children does not appear as a significant predictor for the velocity of careers in the business sample. This result may depend on different strategies to handle work-life balance in business and political elites (see Di Stefano and Pinnelli, this issue, pp. 339–69).

Determinants of Careers and Leadership

Finally, we focus on the subjective assessments of career and leadership by the respondents and look for changing patterns of assessment over time and differences between country groups. Starting from the findings of our analysis in the preceding sections, which showed a significant shortening of careers, we expect these statements to reflect a diminishing importance of experience-related factors. On the other hand, we assume that social contacts and personal relationships will remain crucial factors of success,

while determinants related to knowledge and professional expertise will probably gain importance in all countries. Beyond that, we expect careers and leadership within the group 1 countries to be gradually influenced by highly bureaucratic structures and to develop the formal and informal rules and preconditions typical for careers found in western democracies. Last but not least, we expect assessments of male and female elites to express either the differences or the similarities of career preconditions which have been illustrated in the preceding paragraphs.

Respondents were asked to assess various resources and forms of support for their careers and their leadership function within the last 10 years. The ratings were measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 (with 1 equal to very little and 5 equal to very much). Starting from the subjective point of view of today's elites, these data inform us about the specific conceptions concerning basic qualities and attributes of careers and leadership functions as well as the potential changes of priorities within these spheres (Liebig, 2000).

The rank of total values shows that the premises for successful careers within the *economic field* are rated by male and female elites of all three country groups in a remarkably similar way. The majority of leaders estimate meritocratic factors such as knowledge and expertise and organizational or economic achievements as having highest priority (ratings > 4) for a successful business career. As we expected, interpersonal relations, contacts with key people and skill in public presentation also range rather high, disclosing the importance of communicative and social resources required by business leadership. Compared to these aspects, other items such as 'seniority', 'loyalty to political or economic ideology', 'assistance to a top manager' or 'geographic mobility' are on the whole evaluated as far less relevant. Interesting to note is that contacts with the political sphere range at the very bottom of the list, which seems to support the assumption of a diminishing importance of politics for careers in the business world.

Only small differences appear between business elites of different countries. Respondents from group 1 countries on the whole rate the items – with some exceptions – lower than the elites of the other countries. While this might indicate lack of experience with the demands of career in market economies, lower ratings of contacts to key people, loyalty to ideology or to top figures of the firm might speak for the new orientation towards meritocratic criteria of selection and recruitment. At the same time, the generally higher ratings of the country groups 2 and 3 could be interpreted as a sign of the multiplicity of skills and resources needed in these traditionally highly competitive economies. Further, our empirical data show the strong correspondence between the ratings of male and female leaders of all ages in the Nordic countries, while considerable differences emerge between the ratings of men and women of both generations in western market economies. Here women stress the importance of all forms of social support like skills in public presentation and of being an assistant to a top manager significantly more often than their colleagues. While in all countries

seniority has lost meaning, this depreciation shows particularly significant effects in this country group.

Also *political elites* assess knowledge and expertise as a primary resource for career and leadership. In their eyes, this requirement is followed by skill in public presentation, interpersonal relations and 'political achievements'. And, contrary to the field of business, as expected loyalty to the party programme or political ideology is stressed. At the end of the list appears being an assistant to a top government official, but also mentorships and seniority range relatively low.

Comparing political elites across the three country groups, we find also in this case a generally high consensus with regard to the assessments of basic conditions for successful political careers and leadership; also generational changes of value orientations are limited. However, in all three country groups seniority is significantly less important for younger women leaders, and also tendentially for men. Obviously older women rate this item considerably more important than men: one has just to think of the disadvantages these pioneer women might have experienced confronted with their senior colleagues. Supportive, communicative, medial and interpersonal factors are stressed primarily by women leaders also in the political field. Focusing on gender and generational differences within the three country clusters, once more perspectives of female and male leaders from the Nordic social democracies demonstrate great similarity. Only a few cases, such as evaluating the meaning of knowledge and expertise, were rated by women of both age groups significantly less than men. In many other cases, differences of ratings between the older and younger generations of women elites compensate each other, giving a picture of great unity within the political elite. Furthermore, within the group 1 countries no clear pattern of difference in gender perspectives emerges. We find once more the greatest divergence of ratings between male and female elites in group 2 countries where differences turn up especially between the older female elite and their male colleagues of the same age. Primarily seniority, but also mentorships, interpersonal support and mobility are more often emphasized by women than by men. These differences nevertheless lose ground within the younger generation of female elites, who seem to have adopted the views of men, except that they still stress the importance of interpersonal relationships.

The Acceleration of Careers in Times of Stability and Change: Summary and Conclusions

The analysis of time-related patterns of careers reveals not only their gendered character, but the impact of social changes and of different political and economic contexts.

Before analysing the details, the abbreviation of careers in the last decades is the most important finding of our study. This does not only imply

that the time-span for professional ascension has shortened, but also that age limits for promotion into top positions have decreased. At the same time, basic requirements for these careers – operationalized in the case of the business leaders as 'job mobility' and the degree of 'social prestige of the first job', and, in the case of the politicians as 'occupational resources', 'years of political and party experience' as well as 'years in political offices' – turned out to remain as high as ever. Representatives of today's business elites born after 1947 started their careers at the same levels as the older generation of business leaders, but show a high degree of job mobility, ascending the ladder more quickly into positions of very high social prestige. The same is true for the younger generations of political elites, who also reached their top positions strikingly earlier in their political biography. The observation of the time-structure of the careers of economic and political elites, therefore, discloses not only an abbreviation, but actually an acceleration of careers. This means that demands concerning personal investments into a career have obviously increased: qualification for leadership nowadays has to be acquired in much less time. It demands not only special skills in planning the career efficiently, but also more personal effort and the readiness to subordinate all else to the career. Beyond that, life experience – which formerly constituted a fundamental virtue for leadership – is increasingly replaced by premises such as flexibility and mobility, by the capacity to quickly enlarge one's field-related knowledge and skills, and by the ability to be 'up to date' with regard to changing values.

While the acceleration of careers is not a gender-specific phenomenon, women quite often have had to offer an even greater amount of resources, especially when trying to get into 'start-positions' for careers among the business elites. However, once on the track, their careers could profit from the positive effects of an increased awareness of gender inequality and of governmental and organizational policies aimed at the integration and promotion of women in top leadership. The effects of the convergence of career-related changes as well as progress made within gender policies can be identified most clearly within the group of younger female business leaders. They only take about 12–13 years to reach positions of prestige and power, which took about a decade longer for the older generation of male and female business elites. On the other hand, in politics, women of the older generation have experienced some advantages, which might be due to the fact that recruitment and promotion within this field imply certain forms of open confrontation and not heterogeneous definitions of qualification and aptitude, defined behind closed doors (Liebig, 1998; Fornengo and Guadanini, 1999). While these pioneer women were recruited into leadership in a much shorter time-span and on the basis of fewer resources than their male colleagues, the time-structure of male and female careers and corresponding prerequisites show great similarity within the generation of younger political elites.

Nevertheless, the feature of the dynamics described here varies within different economic and political constellations, which we studied by

contrasting the three country groups. As time-structures of careers in group 1 countries show, the political and economic transformations these nations were undergoing profoundly influenced conditions for upward mobility. Thereby our results support the finding that the circulation of political elites in many Eastern European countries was even more profound than the transitions at the highest levels of business (Best and Becker, 1997; Siemieńska, 2000). However, within the economic sphere women's careers could gain from additional opportunities in an era of reorganization, while women's political careers had to face hitherto unknown obstacles. The time-structure of careers in group 2 countries appears to be less dynamic. Yet, the business careers of women, achieved during the 1970s and 1980s, also gained speed in these countries, and seem to have surmounted barriers that were still causing delay in their upward mobility within the older generation of female elites. As for the economic elites of these countries, the time-related changes of political careers confirm the assumption that many of these countries have made huge strides in supporting the realization of gender equality in public life and have attempted to equalize pathways to the top for women during the last 20 years. Greatest continuity is shown by time-related patterns of careers within the countries of group 3. The female elites of these countries by tradition seem to be able to build their careers in the economic field on rather similar conditions to their male counterparts. Especially within politics, women seem to have profited by special facilities and by the efforts made in the Northern European countries to invest in measures for gender equalization and the promotion of women.

Finally, the analysis reveals careers within the economic and political fields to be characterized by considerable, though diminishing, exchange and interdependence. Political activity obviously favours upward mobility and recruitment into the business elite, although we cannot say that participation in party politics is an indispensable precondition of business careers. While political involvement seems of importance for business leaders of Eastern and Southern European countries, it plays a minor role within business careers in the Nordic part of Europe. But within almost all of these countries the political involvement of business leaders decreases over time. Female careers especially increasingly lack integration into politics, suggesting that either women base their business careers on other forms of support, or that the construction of gender hierarchies within business elites follows different rules. The tendency towards a disentanglement of careers can be observed also within the sphere of politics, where leadership functions in profit and non-profit organizations obviously constitute a crucial co-factor for the political success of the older elites, while its importance decreases for younger political leaders, and especially for younger female political decision-makers. Democratic mechanisms of elections obviously provide opportunities to enter the political elite even to non-professional politicians, under the condition that they have long occupational experience. Once more, the traditions and lobbies of specific countries play a major role concerning the degree of interlacement, which also in this case

turns out to be smaller within the Northern European countries, while business experience turns out to be of great relevance for politicians of the group 2 countries and increasingly seems to be gaining meaning in group 1 countries.

In general, it can be said that the determinants of careers in elite business and political sectors and the conditions of successful leadership are widely similar cross-nationally as well as for both sexes. But the subjective assessments also reflect the time-related transformations of careers within the economic and political sphere. Factors such as seniority and loyalty, which once supported recruitment into leadership, have lost meaning in the eyes of younger elites, while pathways to the top remain almost universally strongly based on knowledge and expertise as well as on social and media support.

Notes

1 The age groups were constructed on the basis of the median age of the total sample of business leaders (48.0 years), and of the total sample of political leaders (49.5 years).

2 By evaluating solely those jobs which lasted more than a year we hoped to grasp only the most important steps on the ladder to the top. Only 1 percent of all women and 0.5 percent of all men within the total sample have never had a full-time job. A highly significant difference between the average number of full-time jobs in business and politics ($p = .000$) confirms the importance of job mobility for business elites.

3 The 'standard scale score' has a range of 92 scores (–2 to +90); the average prestige score of the 509 professions integrated into the score is 43.3 (SD = 16.9).

4 This is also demonstrated by the fact that 48.3 percent of the female leaders were in their forties; however, male leaders made up only 38.0 percent of this age category, while as many were in their fifties.

5 If an occupational position was held simultaneously with the actual political office, this is reported within the category of previous job.

6 Supervisory tasks were subjectively evaluated by the interviewees on a five-point scale: 1 = no supervisory functions, 2 = work leader or forewoman/foreman, 3 = lower manager, 4 = middle manager, 5 = top manager.

7 Since the variable of the supervisory tasks is not available for the present position, this comparison refers only to the previous steps.

8 The two graphics shown in each figure refer to different scales.

9 There are no statistically significant differences for the social prestige in total, by groups of countries and by generation.

10 The research by Wright on classes was carried out in Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, the US and the UK.

11 The MCA is based on an additive model (Andrew et al., 1973), therefore it presents the problem of interactions. In order to control for interactions the following strategy was adopted. First the missing values were recoded and replaced with the mode, the median or the average according to the nature of the variable (continuous or discrete) and its distribution (values of kurtosis and skewness). The average was used for continuous variables with an almost normal distribution, the median for continuous variables with highly skewed not normal distribution, the mode for discrete variables or continuous variables highly concentrated in one value. Then, the variables were recoded into new variables in order to increase discrimination and avoid overlappings.

12 See also Liddle and Michielsens (2000) and García de León et al. (2000).

13 The MCA presents the ability to show the effect of each predictor (i.e. deviation) on the dependent variable both before (i.e. unadjusted) and after (i.e. adjusted) controlling for the effects of all the other predictors. In the tables both adjusted and unadjusted deviations are shown.

14 Even within the same organization careers do not follow a linear, but a rather oblique path, which allows to acquire experience in different sectors of the firm.

15 García de León et al. (2000) analysed the level of educational achievement by gender and sector reaching a different conclusion, namely, that education is more important for business than for political leaders. It is necessary to stress that here these variables are analysed under a dynamic perspective, in relation to the career speed.

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4

Business Leaders' Work Environment and Leadership Styles

Litsa Nicolaou-Smokoviti

The success of a business organization or of any group within the organization depends to a great extent on its leadership. Most of the thinking about leadership and relative research have used western managers as examples and rely on certain cultural assumptions. It is questionable whether the existing knowledge about leadership and the theories developed can help to diagnose and solve management problems in a global economy or whether they can assist a modern manager to select the appropriate *leadership style* in dealing with a multinational and multicultural workforce.

Managers need to be leaders, in the sense that they must be 'organization builders' as well as 'people builders'. Yet, the idea of leadership is not strongly associated in popular thinking with business and managers.

We attempt here to study how leadership is practised by men and women managers, comparing the attitudes, self-perceptions, motivations and practices of men and women at various levels of authority in work organizations within various social, economic and political environments. We hope that the findings will extend previous theoretical perspectives of leadership style and will contribute to the formulation of some new hypotheses useful for international comparative research on managerial leadership.

Special emphasis is placed on gender, especially since gender permeates economic, social and organizational life. Little is known about the way men and women differ in the way they behave in leadership roles, how various factors influence their experiences within work organizations, and in what way gender differences in management and leadership style affect the organizations in which they work. Gender seems to be a critical variable to introduce in a research study of leadership, especially since leadership behaviour was, until recently, limited mainly to male managers and women were underrepresented in leadership positions. The increasing number of women in management makes it important to include gender when studying managerial leadership styles and environmental variables.

Country is also a very important variable to consider when studying managerial leadership and leadership styles, especially since there is very limited cross-national leadership research and the various countries offer a variety of contextual variables and an opportunity to study similarities and

differences within various cultural and organizational environments. It is interesting to understand how women, as compared to men within various environments, share organizational power and authority which affects structures, norms and sociocultural transformation. Furthermore, an international setting provides several advantages because of the large numbers of men and women leaders, thus permitting comparability, understanding and generalizations.

Methodology

For the purposes of the analysis presented in this article, we used only business leaders (and not political leaders) as our sample.

Our dependent variable is the manager's leadership style. Five different leadership styles were identified on the questionnaire and each respondent was asked to indicate the extent to which each style was indicative of her or his own personal leadership style. The leadership styles identified were 'competitive', 'task-oriented', 'directive', 'risk-taking' and 'democratic'. A response of 1 indicated that the leadership style was 'not at all' indicative of their own style whereas a response of 5 indicated that the respondents felt that the leadership style was 'very much' like their own.

Four independent variables were used in this study: gender, age, authority and country. The three-category country typology is described in the article by Sansonetti (this issue, p. 326).

No single measure for level of authority was included in the questionnaire. Ten items were identified which reflect various aspects of the respondent's level of authority. These items were factor analysed using a varimax rotation and resulted in two factors (see Table 1).

The first factor reflects responsibilities associated with the day-to-day operation of the organization. Also included in factor 1 is influence over

Table 1 *Factor Analysis*[a]

Factors	Variable names	Loadings
Factor 1		
Power/influence	Influence over hiring new employees	.859
	Influence over promotion and transfer	.837
	Influence over work arrangements	.726
	Influence over selecting own staff	.594
Factor 2		
Authority	Hierarchical levels above respondent	.837
	Title of present position (recoded)	.799
	Influence over policy and strategy	.649
	Influence over finances/ budget	.523
	Autonomy in implementing strategy	.420

[a] Varimax orthogonal rotation.

finances and budget, but this item also loads high in factor 2. Factor 2 appears to be a fairly concise measure of authority. People who score high on factor 2 have few or no hierarchical levels above them, are more likely to be a CEO or a member of the board of directors than a branch or low-level manager; not only do they have high levels of influence in policy and strategy, but also exercise autonomy in influencing strategies. The number of people supervised is the least important variable in this factor, but also appears at approximately the same level of influence in factor 1. Factor scores were generated on the basis of the above factor analysis and factor 2 was used as the measure for authority in this study. We should point out that a big part of our data analysis is made up of trends and tendencies which may not be statistically significant, but they point out the direction in which to look.

An Overview of the Literature

This section is divided into three parts. In the first part, we define leadership and management distinguishing one from the other. In the second part, we discuss leadership styles as a basis for understanding the specific leadership styles studied in the present research. In the third part, we define authority and authority hierarchy.

Managing and Leading: Managerial Leadership Defined

Although effective management requires leadership, the two terms are not synonymous. In practice it may be difficult to distinguish one from the other. We can understand leadership as a type of managerial behaviour, since leading involves the manager in interpersonal interaction with people. Managing and leading can be distinguished on the basis of some characteristics that are particular to each of the two functions (Albanese, 1981: 395–7).

Managerial behaviour has three characteristics: (1) it implies the existence of manager–managed relationships within an organizational context; (2) it is legitimized by a 'formal authority' which is vested in a job position within the organization; and (2) managers are accountable for the job behaviour of those managed and for their own behaviour.

Leadership behaviour has three different characteristics: (1) it can occur anywhere, within or outside the formal organizational context (for example, informal groups have leaders, not managers); (2) it does not owe its legitimacy to the authority vested in a formal job position, but is legitimated by the voluntary followers; and (3) a leader is not accountable for the behaviour of followers in the way that a manager is accountable for the job behaviour of those managed.

Leadership research does not always differentiate managing from leading. In our research, the two often are synonymous, especially since the

two are studied within the business environment. Here we speak rather of *managerial leadership*, defining it as behaviour that involves follower behaviour beyond the required performance on the job (see Katz and Kahn, 1978: 527–8).

The study of leadership implies the assumption that leadership makes a causal difference for effective management and organizational performance. A great number of research studies have been conducted on leadership and its effects on individual behaviour and organizational performance but with diverse conclusions. Such studies have contributed to a number of theoretical approaches that, in turn, contribute to the development of perspectives and research hypotheses that deepen our understanding of leadership styles and their implications for effective management. There is one idea upon which all studies on leadership seem to agree, that leading is *one* way (among others) of influencing people and the organizational environment so that organizations use their resources effectively and people work productively and with satisfaction.

Leadership Style Defined

Leadership style can be defined as a stable mode of behaviour that the leader uses in his or her effort to increase his or her influence, which constitutes the essence of leadership. 'A leader's style refers to the characteristics [we would say *behaviours*] which are most typical across situations' (Hollander, 1978: 27).

Leaders have a variety of styles from which they can choose, taking into consideration the specific conditions of the specific situation. It is unwarranted to conclude that there are just two leadership styles as early theories supported, that is 'task related' and 'people related' (Stoghill and Coons, 1957). Instead, more recent theories recognize that these two dimensions do not fully exhaust the meaning of leadership style and have extended their perspectives so as to include a variety of leadership styles each of which could be fitted to a specific situation (McGregor, 1961; Fiedler, 1967; House, 1971; House and Mitchell, 1978; Harris and Moran, 1991; Hersey and Blanchard, 1996; Sparrowe and Liden, 1997).

We can draw some general and important points which direct recent thinking (see also Albanese, 1981: 415–17).

1 There is no 'one best or more effective style of leadership'. The most effective style depends on the interaction between leader, followers and the situation.
2 No managerial leader has a single style. Leaders adapt their style to the situation. Although they may have a typical style, they do not always use this style.
3 Leadership style is a relational concept (Hollander, 1978: 28). It both affects and is affected by the followers and the situation.
4 Leadership styles can be learned. Leaders are not born with a certain style.

5 Several styles can be equally effective in a specific situation and group of followers.

The interest in leadership styles emerged with a set of experiments conducted in 1938 by three social scientists (Lewin et al., 1939), who used groups of children to study approaches to exercise control. This classic study identified three types of control: autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire, referred to as leadership styles, and reactions of hostility and aggression towards each style on the part of the experimental groups of children.

These very early studies are still discussed (Locke and Schweiger, 1979: 306, 312). Their importance lies in the fact that they created an awareness of possible effects on groups of *leaders' styles.* Also, they created an awareness among people of the importance of leadership style and increased their sensitivity to the importance of the psychological climate in a group which can influence productivity and morale.

Since 1938 many studies have concentrated on leadership styles and suggested several classifications of styles, which generally fall on a continuum from autocratic to democratic leadership style, differentiating seven styles of varying degrees of leader authority and group freedom (see Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958).

Leadership research over the subsequent decades still relied heavily on the two dimensions of leader behaviour – task and people. The Ohio State University leadership studies emphasized these two dimensions using initiating structure and consideration. Fiedler's (1967) contingency approach uses task-motivation and relationship (people) motivation. House and Evans's path-goal approach uses instrumental (task) and supportive (people) leadership behaviour. Studies at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research showed that effective supervisors were both 'employee-centered' (people) and 'production-centered' (task) (Albanese, 1981: 415–16).

More recent research concluded that a leader's style cannot be fully explained by his or her concern for people or task. Beyond these two leader styles – task or people oriented – other dimensions are possible in the work environment, depending on the involvement of subordinates in decision-making, the interaction of the organization with the external environment, and so on. Task-related and people-related are two important dimensions of leadership style, but they do not exhaust the meaning of leadership.

In the preceding overview of leadership styles, the main idea is that each style leads to different behavioural consequences among the followers. The best leadership style depends on the criteria used. If the criterion is productivity, any of the styles may be effective. If the criterion is group freedom, the more democratic styles are effective. If fast decision-making is the criterion, the styles maximizing the leader authority seem the best. Therefore, the *value* of the leadership style is evaluated by the desired outcomes.

Managers can use several styles, depending on the situation, but may have a tendency to favour one style over another. Some of the labels that are used to refer to specific styles are: directive, negotiative, consultative, participative, delegative. The major idea with respect to leadership styles is that different styles lead to different behavioural consequences. *There is no style that is best in all situations.*

The several approaches to the study of leadership styles, starting from the simple trait theory and moving to increasingly more complex and sophisticated models, such as the path-goal and the leader-participation models as well as the efforts made to define situational factors, lead to a greater ability to explain and predict behaviour. In the last decades several steps were made towards predicting the most effective leadership style and the conditions under which each leadership style could fit the specific situation. Further progress is expected to be made with leadership models, but task-oriented or people-oriented styles seem to continue to be considered as best guides to employee satisfaction and high performance.

Yet, outcomes of leadership style are inconclusive. According to research findings, each style of leadership can lead to different behavioural outcomes, while other research findings do not support this conclusion. The best leadership style seems to depend on different criteria such as productivity, group participation, decision-making and the desired outcomes. Research findings in some cases claim that autocratic leaders can accomplish more than democratic leaders, but autocratic leadership can create tensions, frustration, apathy and dependence on the leader. In other cases, research findings supported that when autocratic leaders are absent, work accomplishments decline, while democratic leadership has a greater impact upon job satisfaction of group members.

Therefore, although the task-related and the people-related dimensions remain very important, they alone do not fully exhaust the notion of leadership style. We should keep in mind that effective managers use leadership style behaviours according to the situation. Consequently, leadership style should be considered as a relational concept (see Hollander, 1978: 28).

A more complete comparative examination of leadership theories within different national and cultural environments is very essential and necessary in order to test their universality across countries (Bass, 1996). Dealing with cultural differences in a global intercultural economy and an interdependent world requires special qualities that a modern managerial leader should possess, such as cultural sensitivity, innovation, intercultural communication skills, a leadership style which is appropriate for the specific situation, and the ability to adjust to a changing cultural environment (Harris and Moran, 1991). A modern managerial leader must be alert, open to the cultural environment, well-informed about cultural idiosyncrasies in which he or she lives and performs, and able to adopt the proper leadership style for the specific situation and the particular cultural environment.

Authority Defined

Authority, Power and Influence Authority is the right to command others. In the literature on management, it is viewed as the foundation of management, imposed by the formal structure. The manager's authority is distinguished from other types of power such as charisma or knowledge which are associated with the notion of leadership (Hostiuck, 1974: 205).

Chester I. Barnard provided a framework for the concept of authority similar to Weber's theory, known as 'acceptance theory' of authority (Barnard, 1938: Ch. XIII). He distinguishes two types of authority, according to the source: authority of position (the leader as a source of influence, independent of him- or herself as a person), and authority of leadership (the leader's influence deriving from his or her personal charisma and ability).

Therefore, the concept is closely related to the concept of power. *Power* can be defined as the ability of a person or an entity to influence the behaviour of another person or entity, and constitutes an important integrating structure within organizations. *Authority* is defined as legitimate power, i.e. power that is justifiable (Bobbitt et al., 1978: 235–6).

Etzioni also focused on power concepts, avoiding the term authority (Etzioni, 1964: 59–61). He made three classifications of power in organizations: coercive power (involving physical means of control of human behaviour), utilitarian power (involving the use of material means of control, such as provision of goods and services) and normative/social power (involving purely symbolic means of control, such as prestige, love, esteem).

According to Etzioni, power in organizations can emanate from various sources, such as a position, a person, or a combination of these two. Positional power may be coercive, utilitarian or normative. A person occupying such a position is termed an official. Personal power is always of a normative type and the person who holds this type of power is termed an informal leader. A person possessing both, positional and personal power, is termed by Etzioni a formal leader (Hostiuck, 1974: 209).

Positional power is the power inherent in a leader's organizational position. The leader has the *authority* over subordinates up to the degree defined by the organization and disposes various rewards and sanctions (Bobbitt et al., 1978: 264). The distribution of power in the management hierarchy constitutes a structure of *influence*.

Influence is the process of effecting a change in another person. A person exercising *influence* has power when he or she can influence another person and has *authority* when the other person accepts this as legitimate. French and Raven described influence in organizations without using the term authority. They defined five bases of power: reward, coercive, expert, referent and legitimate. Some of these concepts are identical with authority, but French and Raven avoided that term (Hostiuck, 1974: 208).

Hierarchy of Authority and Authority Levels Division of work and hierarchy of authority characterize bureaucratic organizations. The hierarchy of

authority is part of the coordination of the control system and is functional for the organization's decision-making and problem-solving (Bobbitt et al., 1978: 69).

In his classical definition of the ideal type of modern bureaucracy, Weber recognizes a high degree of division of work at both the task and administrative levels, and a hierarchy of authority whose lower organizational levels are supervised by the top.

A hierarchy of authority refers to work positions arranged in order of increasing authority and facilitates coordination. Persons in high levels of authority can take decisions regarding coordination and direction of work activities of lower levels (Schermerhorn et al., 1985: 18).

Thompson (1961: 3–4) described modern organizations as consisting of an elaborate hierarchy of authority based on a highly elaborate division of labour. A hierarchy of authority supervises organizational units and gives the organization a vertical dimension (Bobbitt et al., 1978: 63).

Data Analysis

Research Hypotheses

In the present study we 'group' leadership styles in five distinctive 'types'. These are: competitive, task-oriented, directive, risk-taking and democratic. These styles are drawn from the general theory of leadership and continue the long research tradition which emphasized in the past the task and people dimensions.

We expect that analysis of attitudes and perceptions of men and women leaders participating in the broader international study on gender and elites will support the following research hypotheses:

1 On the basis of previous research findings, men and women leaders are expected to differ in leadership style: men tend to use a more competitive and directive leadership behaviour while women tend to use a more democratic and participative leadership behaviour.
2 Attitudes and perceptions of male and female managers about their organizational roles are expected to influence their leadership style.
3 Differences in gender, age and level of authority are expected to influence leadership style. At the high levels of authority, women tend to use the same leadership behaviour as men.
4 Societal and cultural differences are expected to influence gender attitudes and perceptions about social and organizational roles, which in turn explain gender differences in leadership behaviour with regard to gender.

Leadership Style Orientation and Gender

We first proceeded to a tabular analysis of gender vs leadership style variables (see Table 2). We came out with the following major associations between the above two variables, i.e.:

Table 2 *Leadership Style Orientation by Gender, Business Leaders (percentages)*

	Competitive*		Task-oriented		Directive		Risk-taking		Democratic	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Not characteristic	5.6	8.7	4.4	6.5	4.1	6.2	4.1	5.4	2.9	3.0
Little characteristic	11.4	14.9	8.5	6.3	13.9	16.6	13.1	14.2	11.3	6.7
So so	21.1	27.6	12.3	13.0	28.7	29.0	32.0	25.8	32.2	25.3
Characteristic	37.1	29.3	33.3	34.5	37.4	28.4	35.2	34.9	39.1	41.0
Very characteristic	24.9	19.5	41.5	39.7	15.9	19.8	15.7	19.6	14.5	24.0
Total *N*	342	369	342	368	345	373	344	372	345	371

*$p < .01$.

Competitive leadership style: Men are more competitive than women ($p < .01$), while 62 percent of the men consider the competitive leadership style as characteristic or very characteristic of their own style; only 48.8 percent of women do so.

Task-oriented leadership style: No difference between men and women can be noticed. The majority in both genders rank high on being task-oriented. This style is characteristic or very characteristic for 74.8 percent of the men and 74.2 percent of the women.

Directive leadership style: Some slight difference between men and women can be found ($p < .08$). Men appear slightly more directive than women.

Risk-taking leadership style: No significant difference between men and women is noted.

Democratic leadership style: Women appear much more likely to have democratic leadership style than men ($p < .004$). A majority of women (65 percent) indicated the democratic leadership style as being characteristic or very characteristic of their own style vs 53.6 percent of men.

When we combine the two positive leadership style responses (characteristic and very characteristic), we find that almost three out of four respondents (74.5 percent) indicate that they are task-oriented. This is followed by the democratic work style orientation, which is endorsed by 59.5 percent by the respondents. Competitive, directive and risk-taking are all endorsed by about one-half of the respondents (55.2 percent, 50.7 percent, 52.8 percent respectively).

For both men and women, by far the most frequently endorsed leadership style is task-oriented. Four out of 10 respondents (40.6 percent) stated that being task-oriented is very characteristic of them. The next most endorsed leadership style is competitive, however the percentage endorsing this orientation falls to 22.1 percent, and almost half of these endorse the task-oriented leadership style. Being directive and risk-taking was the least endorsed by the respondents, the respective percentage distributions being 18.0 percent and 17.7 percent.

As already noted, the most frequently endorsed leadership style is task-oriented. Looking at gender differences, almost none are found with respect to this orientation: 74.8 percent of the men endorse this orientation as being either characteristic or very characteristic of their leadership style; 74.2 percent of the women do the same. Equally, no gender differences were noted for directive and risk-taking leadership styles. Thus, men and women are very similar in terms of being task-oriented, directive and risk-taking.

However, men and women do differ significantly with regard to being either competitive or democratic in their leadership styles. Men are more competitive than women, whereas women are more democratic than men.

Leadership Style Orientation by Age and Gender

We now turn to the examination of how age is related to leadership style. Looking at the entire data set, there is nothing of significance. When we look at just the men or the women, we have the same result. Young men do not differ from older men in terms of leadership style. The same goes also for women. However, when comparing men to women some very interesting differences emerge.

Focusing our analysis on the men, we find that with regard to being competitive, there is virtually no difference between younger and older men. However, older men tend to be slightly more task-oriented than younger men. Older men are more directive than younger men and are also more risk-taking and likely to be more democratic.

If we look at the differences between men and their leadership styles, controlling for age, we find no statistically significant differences between men of differing ages regarding their leadership style. The percentage differences between the older and younger men are all less than 10 percent, most differing by just one or two percentage points.

Taking competitive leadership styles as an example, 15.4 percent of the older men noted that being competitive was not characteristic of their leadership style. The respective figure for the younger men was 16.2 percent. There is no substantial difference. For those giving an intermediate answer, 24 percent were older men and 22.1 percent younger. For those who noted that being competitive was characteristic, 60.6 percent of the older respondents said so, and 61.8 percent of the younger. The same lack of significant differences was found as far as men are concerned for the rest of the leadership style variables.

Looking at the women, no differences with regard to age were found among them for four of the five leadership style orientations. However, regarding being task-oriented, younger respondents (82.1 percent) reported they are more likely to endorse this position than the older respondents (64.7 percent, $p < .02$). Consequently, the only exception is that younger women are more likely to be task-oriented in comparison to older women. Also, but this is not statistically significant, older women are more likely to be risk-taking than younger women.

The lack of age-based differences in leadership styles for both men and women business leaders indicates leadership styles as being a reflection of personality, rather than of age and position.

Leadership Style Orientation by Authority and Gender

In order to establish a measurable variable representing the level of authority, we factor analysed a number of questionnaire variables. From this analysis, two factors came out (see Table 1). The second one is clearly an authority factor being made up of the following variables: 'hierarchical levels above respondent', 'title of present position', 'influence over policy and strategy', 'influence over finances/budget' and 'autonomy in implementing strategy'. The rotated factor loadings permit us to see the makeup of the authority variable we are using: people with high scores have a high level of authority.

We proceeded to cross-tabulations of the authority level variable with leadership style variables. Authority level was found to be significantly related to three out of five leadership style variables (i.e. competitive, directive and risk-taking). Those who have a high authority level are much more likely to be competitive, directive and risk-taking than those low on authority. For example, 33.1 percent of those high on authority have a competitive leadership style, while only 13.2 percent of those low on authority do the same.

We did not find any significant relationship between authority level and task-oriented or democratic leadership style.

For all business leaders, no correlation was found between gender and authority level. Cross-tabulating gender and authority level, no statistically significant differences were found. Inspection of percentages shows that men have a slightly more pronounced tendency towards a high level of authority than women: 22.0 percent of men rated high on authority vs 17.8 percent of women.

In order to test the hypothesis that at the high levels of authority women tend to use the same leadership behaviour as men, we ran two sets of tables, contrasting levels of authority to leadership style. Although there are some statistically significant differences between the men and also between the women, there is almost none between the genders.

Let us look at the results of the risk-taking leadership style. For the men who have a low authority level, 23.6 percent rate themselves as being low (not at all or just a little risk-taking) in this leadership style. The respective figure for the women is just slightly higher (28.6 percent). In the same table, looking at the men who have a high authority level, only 16.3 percent rate themselves as being low on risk-taking. For the women who have a high authority level, 18.9 percent rate themselves as being low on risk-taking, very close to the percentage found for the men. For both the men and the women, those who have a low authority level are more likely to be low on risk-taking compared with those who are high on the authority level.

Turning now to men and women who are high on the authority level, 60.5 percent of the men rate themselves as being high on risk-taking. Looking at

the women, 64 percent high on the authority level rate themselves as being high on risk-taking. We thus find very little difference, with women high in authority having only a slightly increased tendency than men to be high on risk-taking.

A similar pattern is found for the other four leadership style variables – differences within the men and women groups but very close similarities between them.

Leadership Orientation by Gender and Country Grouping

We now turn to country categories to test the relations between country, gender and leadership style (see Tables 3, 4 and 5). For three of the leadership style orientations, statistically significant differences are found for men coming from one of the three country categories.

Competitive Almost seven out of 10 of the men from the group 3 countries (68.2 percent) indicate that having a competitive work style is either characteristic or very characteristic of them. This percentage drops slightly for the men from unstable or new democracies (60.0 percent), but drops much more for men from group 1 countries (45.8 percent). In fact, almost two out of 10 of the men from these countries (19.4 percent) indicate that being competitive is not characteristic of their leadership style, whereas less than 2 percent of the men from group 2 and 3 countries claim the same. The same pattern is noticed for women as well.

This phenomenon can be assigned to the fact that group 3 countries are dominated by capitalistic socioeconomic systems, where competition among firms promotes competitive work patterns. On the other hand, in the group 1 countries the government regulation used to be so tight that firms and individuals were discouraged from using competitive tactics.

Directive and Risk-Taking The patterns for being directive and risk-taking are quite similar and almost the opposite of what was found for being competitive. Men from the group 1 countries rank higher on being directive or risk-taking than men from the other two groups of countries. Men from the group 2 countries are more directive than men from the new democracies, who scored lowest on these two leadership style orientations.

Turning to women, statistically significant differences were found for four of the five leadership style orientations (competitive, task-oriented, directive, risk-taking). Again, as with men, women from the group 1 countries are much less inclined to be competitive than women from the other two groups of countries. Women from group 2 countries appear as most risk-taking.

Task-Oriented Women from the group 3 countries are least task-oriented (68.4 percent) followed by women from the group 2 countries (76.5 percent). For women from the former socialist countries, 79.5 percent indicate a high

Table 3 *Leadership Style Orientation by Gender, Business Leaders, Group 1: Former Socialist Countries (percentages)*

	Competitive		Task-oriented		Directive		Risk-taking		Democratic	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Not characteristic	19.4	23.3	6.8	8.2	11.0	9.5	12.5	14.9	6.9	6.8
Little characteristic	16.7	15.1	6.8	6.8	5.9	18.9	11.1	16.2	87.3	1.7
So so	18.1	26.0	6.8	5.5	26.0	17.6	20.8	18.9	34.7	27.0
Characteristic	19.4	12.3	26.0	27.4	31.5	24.3	26.4	25.7	33.3	35.1
Very characteristic	26.4	23.3	53.4	52.1	26.0	29.7	29.2	24.3	16.7	28.4
Total *N*	72	73	73	73	73	74	72	74	74	74

Table 4 *Leadership Style Orientation by Gender, Business Leaders, Group 2: Unstable and New Democracies (percentages)*

	Competitive		Task-oriented*		Directive		Risk-taking		Democratic	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Not characteristic	1.7	4.2	8.3	0.0	3.3	1.4	5.1	2.7	0.0	1.4
Little characteristic	13.3	16.7	0.0	0.0	13.3	12.3	21.7	16.2	8.3	5.5
So so	25.0	29.2	10.0	13.5	38.3	37.0	33.3	27.0	33.3	28.8
Characteristic	38.3	37.5	43.3	31.9	35.0	34.2	36.7	41.9	46.7	49.3
Very characteristic	21.7	12.5	38.3	44.6	10.0	15.1	3.3	12.2	11.7	15.1
Total *N*	60	72	60	74	60	73	60	74	60	73

*$p < .08$.

Table 5 *Leadership Style Orientation by Gender, Business Leaders, Group 3: Stable and Consolidated Democracies (percentages)*

	Competitive**		Task-oriented		Directive*		Risk-taking		Democratic*	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Not characteristic	1.9	5.8	4.7	8.1	2.4	6.6	0.9	3.5	2.3	2.2
Little characteristic	9.5	14.3	9.5	8.1	17.0	17.2	11.3	12.8	13.1	8.4
So so	20.4	27.4	14.7	15.3	26.9	30.0	35.7	27.4	30.8	23.6
Characteristic	43.1	31.8	33.2	34.2	39.6	28.2	37.6	35.8	38.6	40.4
Very characteristic	25.1	20.6	37.9	34.2	14.2	18.1	14.6	20.4	15.0	25.3
Total *N*	211	223	211	222	212	227	213	226	214	225

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

score on being task-oriented. Therefore, women from the group 3 countries appear as less task-oriented.

Summarizing the findings according to country category, we have the following indications.

Group 1 Countries We found some differences between men and women but not statistically significant. A strong tendency for men to have more

authority than women was found: 44.4 percent of men rated themselves as high power vs 27.4 percent of women.

Regarding age and authority level, in the former socialist countries no clear pattern and no statistically significant differences between age and authority level were found, just a very slight tendency for older respondents to have more authority.

Group 2 Countries Looking at new democracies, no statistically significant differences are found between gender and leadership styles. The only one close to being significant is task-oriented ($p < .08$), where women appear as more task-oriented than men.

New democracies fall in between the other two categories. Women appear to have just slightly less authority than men. The only statistically significant difference found does not concern gender, but age, and can be summarized in the sentence: ' The older you are, the more authority you have'.

Group 3 Countries In these countries many significant differences between gender and leadership styles were found. Men appear more competitive, task-oriented and directive than women. Women, however, seem more democratic than men. In terms of risk-taking, women appear slightly higher than men.

No correlation between gender and authority level was found. Men and women rate themselves fairly closely through all levels of authority.

Regarding age and authority, in the stable democracies we found a strong tendency for older respondents to have more authority than younger respondents (almost statistically significant): 23.2 percent of older respondents rate themselves high on authority vs 12.0 percent of younger mamagers.

Conclusions

Based on the preceding data, we can identify four interpretations about different leadership styles.

Gender

Examining the relationship between gender, authority level and leadership style, two leadership style orientations were found. Men high in authority are more competitive than those lower in authority (68.3 percent vs 55.3 percent respectively). Men having high levels of authority are more risk-taking than those lower in authority (60.5 percent vs 39.8 percent respectively). No significant differences were found between the three remaining leadership styles. However, differences were found with regard to being directive, with higher authority men being more directive than those with lower levels of authority (56.2 percent vs 39.4 percent respectively).

Like men, women with high authority appear to be more directive and risk-taking than women with lower authority (directive percentages 66.7

percent vs 40.2 percent and for risk-taking 64 percent vs 47.4 percent respectively). The difference between high and low authority women with respect to being democratic is almost significant ($p < .16$). Low authority women are more democratic than high authority women (63.9 percent vs 61.3 percent). This is an interesting finding, since it appears that higher authority women are taking on a perspective consistent with high authority men. Women as a whole are much more likely to have a democratic leadership style than men.

A difference emerges in the leadership styles of men and women. Men are following more a competitive style of leadership, whereas a democratic style is the main characteristic of women.

Age

There are no age differences between women or men as far as style of leadership is concerned. The only differentiation is that older male leaders tend to become less competitive, while older women leaders tend to become less democratic. This means that in older age the position in the hierarchy becomes more significant and influences leadership style. Older men tend to use a more flexible style of leadership, while older women tend to use a stricter style of leadership.

Authority Level

Women and men tend to follow the same style of leadership in top management positions, the rationale being that high levels of authority imply the same style of leadership, i.e. competitive, directive and risky. We could argue that high levels of authority and responsibility may require a specific leadership style that is independent of gender.

Country Differences

The style of leadership is related to context, but gender differences appear to be rather subtle. In group 3 countries (stable and consolidated democracies), no differences appear between men and women in terms of authority level. Looking at new democracies, men appear just a little more likely to have a higher authority level than women. For group 1 countries (former socialist), however, men appear to have more authority than women.

Significant gender and work style differences emerge only in the group 3 countries. What is suppressing the effects of gender in the other two groups of countries? It is a reasonable hypothesis that in this area, as in others, the impact of egalitarianism is felt.

Future comparative research is warranted on social roles and socialization processes in specific societies, in order to throw light on various gender dimensions in the world of work and leadership behaviours in a variety of organizational and cultural contexts. The findings of the present research could serve as hypotheses for further investigation.

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Appendix – The Political Leaders

Mino Vianello

The findings concerning the political leaders' work environment on the issues dealt with in this article are interesting mostly from a descriptive point of view and do not lend themselves to an extensive analysis. We divide them into paragraphs.

In this appendix, the countries are grouped in a different way than generally in this study, on the basis of the continuity and stability of their democratic system. They are consequently grouped as follows:

Group 1: former socialist countries;
Group 2: unstable or new democracies: Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Ireland;
Group 3: stable and consolidated democracies: all the other 14 countries.

Difficulties Faced by Members of the Government in Carrying out their Activities

About three-quarters of them, without relevant gender differences, had from time to time to overcome resistance in obtaining support for the measures they proposed in their respective areas of jurisdiction. No significant gender differences appear between the three groups of countries. Yet, males tend to face more difficulties in groups 1 and 2, females in group 3 countries.

The obstacles consist in the first place in fiscal constraints. No significant gender differences emerge. As far as the countries are concerned, in group 1 parliamentary debates come next to fiscal constraints (as to the latter, women cabinet members in this group of countries perceive them as an obstacle significantly more than men). In group 3, controversies between cabinet members rank first.

Work Milieu

The work milieu (which heavily absorbs the energies of the respondents: an average of 62 hours for men and 64 for women, that tends to increase in the countries of group 3: respectively, 64 and 66 hours) appears as moderately unpredictable, at times characterized by aggressiveness, by the presence of collaborators who are not motivated enough, by rather undynamic structures, while the evaluation is positive in terms of openness and democracy. Gender differences are strong: for each of these aspects, in fact, women express a significantly more positive evaluation, above all as far as the motivation of the collaborators and the dynamism of the structures are concerned (only for unpredictabilty the difference is not significant). As far as the countries are concerned, this is true above all in group 3.

Career

In general, men and women evaluate to the same extent as tendentially high their position in terms of responsibility and power. This is true especially in the countries of group 3.

As far as the factors that contributed to the advancement of careers are concerned, the picture is the following (L = low, M = medium, H = high; n.s. = non-significant gender difference; W = women):

1	Educational background and experience	H	n.s.	
2	Seniority	L	sign.	+ W
3	Political results	M	n.s.	
4	Loyalty towards leaders	L	n.s.	
5	Contacts with key people	M	n.s.	
6	Mentors	L	sign.	+W
7	Ability in presenting one's ideas	M	sign.	+W
8	Ability in interpersonal relations	M	sign.	+W
9	Geographic mobility	L	sign.	+W
10	Political contacts	M	n.s.	
11	Having been a collaborator of a leader	L	n.s.	
12	Loyalty to the party programme	M	sign.	+W

The most important factor, therefore, is being prepared (1), the least, having been the collaborator of a leader (11). The other factors (above all 2, 4, 6 and 9) count, but little. The gender comparison evidences that women give more importance than men to these minor factors and to the factors that concern the ability to be in touch with the milieu (7 and 8) and loyalty towards the party programme (12).

As far as the countries are concerned, differences which are non-significant in groups 1 and 2 (with the exception of items 7 and 9, where a suggestive difference appears in favour of

women) become significant in group 3 (6, 7, 8, 9, 12). Women leaders, therefore, in the area of solid democracies attribute more importance than men to these factors, that is factors stressing expressive and integrative behaviour and idealistic commitment.

Visibility

Visibility – measured in terms of presence in public debates and in radio or television, as author of articles in periodicals, as object of interviews – is clearly correlated with the level of office held. In general, the average, with no gender difference, is between less than once per month and almost never.

As far as the countries are concerned, women show a higher level of visibility (significantly higher in terms of access to the media and being interviewed) in the countries of group 1.

Burdens and Gratification

No substantial gender differences exist as to the gratification inherent to the role of leader. To be endowed with the responsibility of taking decisions is the element most praised by men and women alike, together with the feeling of having power. Other aspects – like lack of anonymity, work heaviness, social obligations, exposure to media, lack of personal space – are felt as indifferent and, in fact, negative aspects.

In general, there are no gender differences, except for social obligations which women evaluate positively more than men at a significant level. Women leaders, on the other hand, evaluate more negatively than men the lack of personal space.

As to the countries, in group 1 the ranking is the same as in general, but the average score is higher both for men and women: in other words, in the ex-socialist countries power is felt as an element of gratification more than in the other countries. It is interesting to remark that lack of anonymity is felt at a significantly higher extent as a positive factor of gratification for males, while it is negative for females.

In group 2, the ranking does not change in comparison with the general one, and no significant differences appear between men and women.

In group 3, power and responsibility come first, but are felt to a significantly higher extent as positive by women, who equally evaluate social obligations as significantly more gratifying than men do.

Commitment to Encourage Younger People in a Political Career

The commitment to recruit and promote younger people to a political career is rather high, especially on the side of women political leaders, who show a significantly higher proclivity than men in this respect. The gender difference is revealed in the people who are encouraged: males and females each tend to help the careers of, on average, two people, but women tend to help women and men, men. This difference, which is not significant in the countries of group 1, becomes significant in the countries of group 2 and even more so in the countries of group 3, where in general women tend to help not only women but younger people significantly more than men do.

As to the characteristics that a young person should have to start a political career, the ranking of the eight characteristics shown to the respondents is about the same for men and women. But the scores the items receive vary significantly by gender: women insist on the expressive and integrative skills (ability in presenting one's ideas, ideological inspiration, ability in interpersonal relations, attractive personality), while men emphasize the instrumental ones (preparation, which, however, comes first both for men and women). For women, in particular, ideological inspiration is almost as important as preparation.

As far as countries are concerned, differences become significant above all in group 3, where women show very high scores as to integrative qualities. These qualities, on the other hand, appear to be privileged by males in the former socialist countries, where the ideological commitment appears to be still strong, above all among males.

Satisfaction

The conflict between the requirements of work and those of personal life is felt rather keenly both by men and women, but work is a strong cause of stress and burn-out especially for women leaders: the difference is highly significant.

The satisfaction with regard to one's success in civil life is tendentially high, and very high as far as political career is concerned. From this point of view, women's satisfaction is suggestively higher than men's.

In both cases, satisfaction tends to increase moving from the countries of group 1 to those of group 2 and from these to those of group 3. As far as satisfaction with political career is concerned, the difference is significantly higher for women.

While for the first form of satisfaction the score is moderate and no significant difference appears in general between men and women, the difference is highly significant in the countries of group 1 and significant in the countries of group 3, while it is merely suggestive in the countries of group 2. It looks as if societies where egalitarianism was pursued in one way or another offer women more satisfactory situations.

* * *

Societies are very complex phenomena. We have an instance of it here: while the five Northern countries and the stable democracies offer more opportunities to people in general, from several points of view political women leaders are not advantaged. This, of course, can easily be explained with the deep-rooted formalization of political processes and the mediating nature of politics, which is traditionally more heavily exposed to lobbying in the stable democratic countries than in the other countries. Both processes, formalization and lobbying, are typically male phenomena. This may be one of the reasons why women's participation is more difficult in the stable democracies. At the same time, these countries show areas in which women leaders fare better than men. Systems exert contradictory influences on the life and careers of their members. However, all aspects here considered tend to confirm that gender equality is a process underway.

5
Values

Renata Siemieńska

Women's participation in public life and their presence among the power elites – either through election or nomination – are minimal, as is well known. The process of democratization, observed in many parts of the world, is not accompanied by a significant growth in the number of senior positions within economic and political structures being occupied by women; especially when we consider decision-making positions. Half of the world's population is largely absent from the bodies responsible for political decisions. In mid-2000, there were only about 5100 female representatives in all the parliaments of the world; they thus accounted for just13.8 percent of all parliamentary representatives. These figures indicate that there has been little growth since 1987, when they accounted for 9 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000). If the rate of growth stays at this level (0.36 percent per year), parity between men and women will only be reached at the beginning of the 22nd century. The number of women occupying senior government positions is also low. In 2000 they occupied one-tenth of the ministerial positions throughout the world, and one-fifth of the vice-ministerial positions (UN, 2000). Within business, women also seldom reach senior positions on decision-making bodies.

Analyses show that the presence of women on decision-making bodies is not directly correlated with the level of economic or social growth, nor with the development of democratic systems in individual countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Many various factors have been shown to impede women's participation within the economic and political elites. Among them are cultural factors, such as those which make the choice of some careers easier than others as well as those which influence women's aspirations to become decision-makers. Cultural factors also influence the level of support for women candidates, affecting the electoral behaviour of men and women. They also affect which political goals, such as gender equality, are considered to be socially important by various groups and organizations. The cultural factors also shape the beliefs and behaviours of party gatekeepers, i.e. those who determine who will be put on the lists of candidates, and often influence the selection of people to be appointed to political (governmental) and economic positions. Therefore, we can say that the traditional or egalitarian views on women's participation in political and economic decision-making bodies influence both the supply-side of the

equation (i.e. whether women want to run for elections and be appointed to such posts) and the demand-side (that is, whether they obtain support of the party gatekeepers and the media, as well as financial support from sponsors and actual votes during elections).

The purpose of this article is to analyse the structure of opinions and attitudes of elites towards gender inequality within several groups of countries, taking into account their macro-structural conditions, as well as individual satisfaction with the job performed by the members of the elites studied. The countries are clustered in two ways. First, according to the criteria applied in the author's earlier works (Siemieńska, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b), and second, according to the criteria of clustering countries which belong – as Huntington puts it – to different civilizations (Huntington, 1996). According to Huntington, the systems of values observed in today's societies are still largely based upon religious grounds, although this does not mean that the members of these societies are, necessarily, religious. Huntington writes (among others) about the Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic cultural roots providing the grounds for the value systems of the countries studied and their elites. The results of the analyses conducted by Inglehart (1997) on worldwide value systems, in which he referred to Huntington's theory, were helpful in classifying countries according to his civilization criteria. Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Great Britain and Germany were clustered together as Protestant countries because of the dominance of Protestant culture there. Portugal, Spain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Ireland were grouped together as Catholic countries. The post-Communist countries were clustered in a separate group for reasons explained later. Non-European countries such as the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Israel were grouped together because their cultures were shaped by mixed immigrant populations. Greece was excluded because the study did not include other Orthodox countries not clustered in some other group. The only other Orthodox country that was studied was Russia, and it was included in the group of the post-Communist countries despite the fact that all the other countries in that group are Catholic.

The other method of classification of countries mentioned earlier and used by the author in former analyses (Siemieńska, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b) is a multidimensional one. Owing to the specific traits of the countries compared, the differences in their history and the various levels of women's participation in public life, they have been grouped in the following way: (1) the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), which stand out due to a particularly high rate of women's participation in public life, being advanced welfare states and having a high standard of living as well as an active feminist movement; (2) the newer democracies of Western Europe (Portugal, Spain, Greece) with relatively low living standards; (3) the post-Communist countries currently undergoing political and economic transformation (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Russia); (4) stable Western European democracies

(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain, Ireland); and (5) non-European democracies (US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Israel) whose development was shaped by mass immigration.

The post-Communist countries have been clustered in a separate group in both classifications because, as several studies have shown (Inglehart, 1997; Siemieńska, 2000a), the recent past (in this case, living under a Communist regime) plays a significant role as a factor modifying their value systems in many respects.

The Need for Women in the Elites: What Do Women Have to Offer?

There is often discussion as to why the presence of women among decision-makers is important. This issue arouses numerous controversies. The opponents of their presence state that there is no need to change the traditional pattern, that politics should be an area of activity for those who possess certain qualities. According to them, some people have been equipped by nature to play specific roles and/or are appropriately prepared to perceive significant social problems and solve them adequately. There is only one conclusion here; politics should be for men. Although this point of view has been challenged for years, it still has its supporters. Others, among whom the feminists are a significant group, do not agree with such arguments, and present a number of reasons why women should take part in the decision-making process. Foremost, it is women's right to political representation which is granted to all citizens and defined in the documents of international organizations as a human right. As some underscore, increased women's participation in politics and the widely understood power elites would result in the creation of elites that are more representative of society. As a consequence, the level to which society legitimizes its leaders would increase. Another reason cited for why women should be present in politics is that they bring specific qualifications to politics, qualifications strictly related to their experience as performers of certain social roles which are still, to a large extent, carried out by women. Another argument for the presence of women in the world of politics is the rise of competition among candidates, due to women running for elections and so increasing the total number of candidates. This would increase the probability of electing high-quality candidates, and ensure that a more rational choice of problems be taken into account by the decision-makers (Darcy et al., 1994). One more given is the level of education and experience in work and social activity possessed by contemporary women. Nowadays, they are fully prepared to compete with men, holding higher positions that are not limited to the area of 'female issues'.

Alvesson and Due Billing (1997) list four types of arguments usually emphasized in discussions of the issue.

1 The equal opportunities position: 'The low proportion of women managers is seen . . . as a reflection of fundamental inequalities and injustices in society and working life as a whole. In this perspective women are seen as being discriminated against, and denied the same opportunities as men both in a general career context and specifically with regard to the possibility of attaining managerial positions' (Alvesson and Due Billing, 1997: ss.153–4). The emphasis here is put on the moral aspect of inequality.
2 'The meritocratic argument is interested in combating the irrational social forces which prevent the full utilization of the qualified human resources' (Alvesson and Due Billing, 1997: s.157). This point emphasizes the fact that inadequate use is made of the skills of highly qualified women when they do not occupy managerial positions.

   Both approaches underline some common features of each gender which, despite these, are not treated equally and are not evaluated according to the same criteria by society.
3 The special contribution position underlines the right to and the need for access by women to managerial positions due to their specific experiences, system of values, way of thinking and behaving. These are particularly important for the democratic elites, thought to be more adequate than their predecessors in the context of a shift in dominant values, especially in western societies (a shift from modernist to postmodernist values).
4 The alternative values position, similar to the previous position, underlines the differences between the systems of values and priorities of the genders: values and priorities which are not only different from each other, but also remain in conflict with each other. According to this argument, women bring in a different kind of rationality, oriented towards human needs, as opposed to the technological rationality created by men.

Taking into account these differences in the attitudes and arguments that explain the small number of women in decision-making positions, it is proper to ask the basic question whether and to what extent women and men occupying these positions are aware of gender inequalities in accessing power and how they justify them. It is often pointed out that women who have succeeded do not see an inequality of opportunities. They believe that their own example is the best proof that there is no such thing.

Socialization Factors and Mechanisms in Acquiring Attitudes and Values

There are several theories that explain the character of the value systems and attitudes of individuals, as well as the mechanism by which they change and create intergenerational differences, as the result of a series of factors

typical for the period of adolescence of the individual or generation, as well as the result of intergeneration interactions. The theories of Mannheim (1974) and Inglehart (1977, 1990) provide an example of such theories, even though the authors differ in how they formulate the relationships between modernization and cultural differences between age groups.

Mannheim (1974), in his theory of generational changes, states that the quicker the social changes, the more likely it is that groups of young people will appear who will have a common culture and common interaction models that are clearly different from the models cultivated by the older generation (Abma, 1991). The rapidly changing situation forces them to find answers which are adequate to the new necessities, preventing imitating and taking over the models of the older generations. In turn, the theory proposed by Inglehart (1977, 1990) emphasizes the conditions under which the individual grows up (socialization hypothesis). He believes that the period of early youth (around the age of 15) is most important. In his opinion, but also in the opinion of many other researchers (Jennings, 1990), only minor changes take place later on in the value systems developed at this stage. Following the 'limited resources hypothesis', the circumstances in which a given generation matures have great influence on the formation of a system of values. Entry into adulthood brings along with it its own system of values which, in time, begins to prevail in the adult population as the older generation passes away and is replaced. In this way a slow but systematic intergenerational change takes place.

The empirically stated dependencies have become the basis for formulating a hypothesis stating that the more a society modernizes in the economic-social sphere, the greater will be the differences between the systems of values of the various generations. An analysis of the results of research conducted in 10 Western European countries in 1981 and 1990 partially confirms this hypothesis (Ester et al., 1993; Inglehart, 1997).

Many researchers emphasize that an important role in the process of socialization is played by the family, being the environment in which the individual grows up, as well as by the broader social environment in which the family is embedded. In the case of American society, it was found that the environment in which an individual grows up is twice as important in the sense of the exerted influence, as that in which the individual lives as a grown-up (Miller and Sears, 1986). Some authors find that it is not socialization, but vertical and horizontal mobility of the individuals and the discrepancies in social status that, by becoming a source of tension in the individuals, cause them to become, for example, radically conservative or radically egalitarian. However, the results of other studies suggest that the attitudes and values held in such cases are to be found 'half way' between what was taken from the environment of early socialization and what is typical of the environment in which the individual lives later on. Other researchers stress that the relatively minor similarity between the attitudes and political orientations of the parents and their children (Jennings and Niemi, 1974) is evidence of a smaller than is usually assumed role of the

parents in the socialization process. It has, nevertheless, been shown that such a conclusion is only acceptable when socialization is understood as the duplication of knowledge and parental attitudes. It is necessary to take into consideration the possibility that, even if the parents fully and successfully control their children's socialization process, they might not want to pass their values on to them. In such a case, the socialization process carried out according to their intentions will lead to differences between the children's and parents' values (Bronfenbrenner, 1967; Inkeles and Smith, 1974). What is more, as Kagan and Moss (1962) show, the persistence of certain traits from childhood to adulthood may take on various forms – similarly the appearance of the same behaviours in various periods in life may have a different meaning.

Everyone seems to agree that an important role in the socialization process should be played by the school as the institution which, by definition, is convened in order to form the younger generation by passing on a given set of knowledges, as well as a given system of values and life aspirations. Yet, many studies show that, in fact, its role is much more modest (Beck, 1977) than one would think, with respect to the passing on of attitudes, as well as of information and abilities. School usually prepares the younger generation to live in a way which is in accordance with the expectations of the given society's elite. In stable democratic societies, in which changes are taking place relatively slowly, such expectations are usually consistent with the expectations of the majority of society. In a period of rapid and, even more so, violent changes, they may be significantly divergent.

It is also pointed out that an important role in the socialization process is played by peers, who are drawn together by the similarity of the problems confronted by their generation, both regarding the expectations of the older generation and the need to adapt to the prevailing conditions. Yet, the direction of the influence exerted by peer groups differs according to country. Sometimes, they reinforce the orientations and attitudes promoted by the school. At other times, they offer completely different, evidently contradictory, models (Nathan and Remy, 1977).

Various social groups and institutions may also ascribe to the various agents an excessive or insufficient role with respect to that expected of it. For example, in situations when the authorities wished to abruptly break the society's cultural continuity, as was the case in Russia following the 1917 revolution as well as in other Communist countries, they tried to weaken the influence of the family, reinforcing, at the same time, the role of the educational institutions controlled by them, i.e. the schools and youth organizations.

The role of certain agents of socialization may sometimes become particularly significant. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, Polish sociologists pointed to the enormous role of the family in the life of Polish society, much greater than, for example, in western countries. Its significance resulted from the fact that, in a situation where there were no institutions

with which the people would be willing to identify, the family became the basic reference point and support group for the individuals. A type of 'vacuum' that existed between the family and nation was also a reason why the family played a particular role in the socialization process (Nowak, 1979).

The content of a gender identity is deeply rooted in culture and might differ from culture to culture. As Bem (1987: 226) wrote considering opportunities to raise gender-aschematic children in a gender-schematic society: 'As every parent, teacher, and developmental psychologist knows, male and female children become "masculine" and "feminine", respectively, at a very early age. . . . Children typically learn that gender is a sprawling associative network with ubiquitous functional importance through their observation of the many cultural correlates of sex existing in their society.' However, 'parents can attempt to attenuate sex-linked correlations within the child's social environment, thereby altering the basic data upon which the child will construct his or her own concepts of maleness and femaleness. . . . The child who has developed a readiness to encode and to organise information in terms of an evolving sexism schema is a child who is prepared to oppose actively the gender-related constraints that those with a gender schema will inevitably seek to impose' (Bem, 1987: 239, 244). Therefore, the family environment and its conception and attitudes towards women's and men's roles in society are crucial, even though they are not the only ones to which children are exposed. There are also many other factors of a cultural, social and economic nature which might hinder or facilitate women's entry to the public sphere of life.

Analyses of the social conceptions of existing or desired relations in economics and politics, the relationships between men and women as well as the ways in which institutions function in various countries demonstrate that, even in the countries considered to be democracies by researchers, significant differences exist in these respects (Inglehart, 1997). Social conceptions are elements of the political cultures of the various societies. They are the result of the political knowledge possessed, the abilities, attitudes and values of the political system as a whole, the way in which their own role in this framework is perceived, the political institutions, and the system of relationships between them. The attitude towards the system and the conceptions of it – as is stressed by Almond and Verba (1980) – may be (1) cognitive in character, consisting of a conviction, information and analysis; (2) affective, consisting of the impression of affiliation, aversion or indifference; or (3) evaluative, in which case moral opinions play a significant part.

It is necessary to be aware of the nature of attitudes, values and behaviour and the relationships between them. Attitudes are dispositions or tendencies to positive or negative behaviour towards some objects. Attitudes have three components (1) cognitive, (2) affective and (3) predisposition to action. These components are not necessary closely related to each other because they can depend on, for example, the distinctive experiences of an individual and his or her social position. As researchers have pointed out

for years (e.g. Triandis, 1971; van Death and Scarbrough, 1995), the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is fairly weak when one tries to find a relationship between attitudes and a particular behaviour rather than a set of behaviours. The reason is that 'Behavior is not only determined by what people would like to do but also by what they think they should do, that is, social norms, by what they have usually done, that is, habits, and by the expected consequences of the behavior' (Triandis, 1971: 14).

Therefore, society's members' attitudes towards women's participation in political and economic life also influence women's decisions concerning their involvement. The dynamics and effects of positions within organizational hierarchy and the ratio of the sexes make it possible to understand the career patterns and work orientations connected with gender. This approach is applied in structural explanations of gender differentiation and inequalities. Gender division of labour is used in organizational policy explanations. And, as a third approach, shared meanings, symbols and assumptions regarding women's roles in organizations are used in studies of organizational culture in general and within particular countries (Alvesson and Due Billing, 1997). The process of globalization is causing the internal structures of corporations and occupational groups to become much more similar across national boundaries due to the multinational character of such organizations.

Moreover, the attitudes related to gender roles are connected in some way with more general value orientations consisting of sets of interrelated attitudes and values within the cultures of the different societies.

Elites' Perceptions of Gender Inequality in Public and Private Life

Our research has already shown that women tended to acknowledge inequality more often than men both with regard to its extent and the ways in which it is demonstrated by the isolation of women in the work environment, as well as its sources, embedded as they are in the culturally defined gender roles which locate women mainly within the sphere of private life, while men are located mainly in the sphere of public life (Liebig, 2000; Nicolau-Smokoviti and Baldwin, 2000; Hojgaard and Esseveld, 2000; Siemieńska, 1999a, 2000b).

We are aware that the evaluations expressed by our respondents in this study may be based on their own experiences, observations of other people's situations, as well as on their broader, more abstract knowledge of the mechanisms by which societies operate.

Various aspects of gender inequality are observed with varying intensity in different groups of countries. They are most frequently stressed by the elite members of 'non-European democratic countries' and the 'new democracies of Southern Europe'; least frequently, by the elites in post-Communist countries. In addition, in some aspects the attitudes and

opinions of women and men are very similar, whereas in others they clearly differ. Generally speaking, women more frequently than men notice the inequalities, as well as the social and cultural barriers which make it more difficult for women to enter the political and economic elites. However, the number of women and men who do not agree with the view that women prefer men to occupy decision-making positions, and that women lack the specific preparation to perform such roles, is quite similar. Women, on the other hand, much more frequently than men are convinced that they are isolated in the professional environment dominated by men, that those who have power (usually men) are reluctant to elect (or to appoint) them to the highest positions, and, finally, that they must achieve more than men in order to be acknowledged. They also believe more frequently than men that earning money is the best way to ensure women's independence, and disagree much more frequently than men with the opinion that, when there are not enough jobs, men should be first to get them.

The members of political elites more frequently notice the inequalities and the social and cultural barriers faced by women attaining positions at the top of the decision-making circles of authority than the members of economic elites.

Social Background as the Factor Influencing the Perception of Gender Inequality in Gaining Leadership Positions

Women who have succeeded often see the reasons for the evident inequality in access to decision-making as lying in the process of socialization. Many women who have succeeded in politics believe that a happy family, parents and partners who all taught them to be independent and told them that they were capable of reaching high, responsible positions, were the reason for their achievement. Research shows that social capital as defined by Bourdieu (1984) is a significant resource for the elite members, and especially successful women.

The educational level of the parents of people belonging to political and economic elites substantially differs from the average educational level in societies to which they belong. Particularly, the level of the father's education is significantly higher, and this holds especially true for the fathers of female politicians. The percentage of mothers with university-level education is three times less than that of fathers. It should also be stressed that the mother's education went no further than high-school much less frequently than the father's education. This was so particularly in the case of female politicians or female members of the economic elites. In summing up, the parents of female elite members are, in general, better educated than the parents of male elite members, which points to the importance of socialization, particularly in the case of socialization for non-typical roles, as is the case with female elite members.

Women who have become members of the economic elites very often have fathers who held managerial positions. The same is true, though to a slightly lesser extent, of men. It is also possible to speak of a significant (higher in the case of women) reproduction of the elites in the world of politics ('elites' being broadly understood, i.e. the fathers of the present members of the political elites did not necessarily have to be members of the political elite, they might have held managerial positions in the economy). A similar, although weaker, correlation exists for members of elites between their positions and the positions held now or in the past by their mothers. Reproduction is, therefore, significant in all types of countries (Siemieńska, 1999a; Liddle and Michielsens, 2000). A region where the positions of the parents play a particularly important part is that of the new democracies of Southern Europe. A region where their role is the least pronounced, for obvious reasons, is that of the post-Communist countries. Even in their case, however, we can speak of a significant degree of reproduction as far as the economic elites are concerned (over half have fathers who held managerial positions). The position of the mothers in these countries was as significant in the case of women's careers in the economic elite as in Scandinavia and the non-European democracies, where it is lower than in most European countries.

Many members of the elites come from families whose members were found in positions of authority in political institutions. It is difficult to say on the basis of the questions asked in the questionnaire used in this study whether this is the result of socialization in an interest in politics, or a trump card facilitating entrance to the elite, though we expect that there is a combined impact of both these factors. Having family members involved in political activity is typically conducive to entering politics but also plays a significant role in leading towards entry into the economic elite.

Similar to the previously discussed 'resource' ('parents in managerial positions'), having family members in positions of political authority is a more important factor for women in entering the elite than it is for men. This resource was held by a total of 33.9 percent of the men and 36.9 percent of the women included in the studies of the political elites, and by 17.7 percent and 20.1 percent of the male and female members, respectively, of the economic elites studied. It may, therefore, be said that family influence is a resource mainly in the area of politics or economy, where it is conducive to children or other kin entering the given elite. However, it is also helpful in reaching high positions in the social elite in general. Having family members in the structures of political power is particularly frequent in the Scandinavian countries, and relatively less frequent in the post-Communist ones.

Over 80 percent of the women in the political and economic elites had husbands with above average education, which may be treated as yet another trump card for career women (owing to a better understanding of the aspirations of their partners, as well as the higher positions they hold). In the case of men, the percentage with spouses who have above average

education is definitely lower, approximately 60 percent in each of the elite sectors discussed.

Perception of factors conducive to making a career is somewhat divergent from the factors which we defined earlier as 'family resources' held by members of elites. Women, slightly more frequently than men, are convinced that their promotion was the result of their personal abilities; this applies in the area of politics, as well as the economy. Nevertheless, women also more frequently believe that political connections have played an important role in their careers. We present the social background of elites and their perception of the conditions which helped them to reach their positions in political or economic hierarchies in order to later answer the question as to what extent these conditions have influenced elite members' perceptions of gender inequality, and to what extent this perception is related to the more general systems of values possessed by members of elites.

As stated earlier, female members of political and economic elites perceive gender inequalities in advancement opportunities much more frequently than men. Also younger people tend to observe them more often than the older. The higher their mothers' education, the more frequently the members of the political elites have perceived this inequality, especially the fact that women are isolated in a predominantly male environment and lack informal contacts. Also, though to a lesser extent, the fathers' education influences the perception of the unequal possibilities for women and men. Members of the political elite with a postmaterialist orientation notice them more frequently than members of the economic elite (Table 1).

The position occupied within organizational structures shapes the perception of women's situation, even when it is the very highest echelons of power that are the subject of study. Women who occupy the most powerful positions acknowledge gender inequality and the barriers encountered by women less frequently than women who occupy even slightly lower positions (Nicolau-Smokoviti and Baldwin, 2000).

Does Personal Workplace Experience Shape Value Systems and the Perception of Gender Inequality?

Individual workplace experiences and the range of household duties of the members of the political and economic elites explain to some degree the perception of gender inequality. However, the relationship between these factors varies in the different groups of countries used in this article. A general index of the perception of gender inequality has been constructed which encompasses various areas of inequality and their sources (Table 2).

Individual workplace experiences and the range of household duties of men belonging to the political elite explained this perception to a greater extent (adjusted $R^2 = .60$) than in the case of women (adjusted $R^2 = .35$).

Table 1 *Factors Determining Perception of the Barriers Faced by Women Aiming to Reach Top Positions (Pearson's Correlation Coefficients)*

	Political elite						Economic elite					
Men occupy top positions because:	Gender	Mother's education	Father's education	Year of R's birth	Years of R's education	Value orientation	Gender	Mother's education	Father's education	Year of R's birth	Years of R's education	Value orientation
Women prefer men to occupy top positions					–.07**	.26***		–.07**	–.08 ***	.07***		.18***
Women lack specific training	–.06***			.09**	.09**					.07***		
Women are isolated in mostly male environment	–.16***	.09**										
Women are prevented from reaching the top	–.12***			–.12***		–.16***						–.08***
Due to how women are brought up	–.13***			–.12***			–.13***	–.08**	–.07***			
Women lack informal contacts	–.29***	–.07**				–.11***	–.25***			–.11***		–.08***
Women are accepted in leadership positions * in the field	.16***			.07 *		.10***	.09***					
Men and women treated equally in my organization	.24***			.06**		.12***	.11***					
Women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition	–.38***				.07**	–.10***	–.31***			–.07***		
When jobs are scarce men should have more rights						.22***	.14***	–.08**		.11***	.13***	.08***
Family suffers when women work full-time	.13***			.11**		.23***	.31***			.10***	.07***	
Paid job best for women's independence	–.16***						–.20***	–.11**	–.09***			

Level of significance: ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$. Only statistically significant correlation coefficients shown in the table.

Table 2 *The Most Important Elements of Workplace Experience and Perception of Household Duties as Factors Differentiating Elites' Perception of Gender Inequality (the Overall Index) (the Predictors with the Highest Betas in Multiple Regression Models)*

	Political elite		Economic elite	
Regions	Men	Women	Men	Women
Scandinavia	(-) Feeling of influence at work Perception of own expertise	Number of levels in hierarchy below respondent Career associated with political loyalty	Perception of work conditions (index v198–200) Career associated with mentor's support	Career associated with contacts with key people* (-) Career associated with skills in interpersonal relations*
Southern Europe	Career associated with political contacts Career associated with support of top governmental leaders	Access to informal channels* Having enough information to do job well*	Feeling of influence at work* Career associated with political contacts*	Career associated with skill of public presentation* Career associated with mentor's support*
Western Europe	Number of levels in hierarchy below respondent Access to informal channels	Extent of domestic work done by respondent** Career associated with mentor's support	Career associated with loyalty to top organizational leaders* Career associated with political contacts	Career associated with political loyalty* (-) Career expectancy in 5 years
Non-European democracies	(-) Career associated with contacts with key people Career associated with political contacts	Importance of political/ economical career (-) Career associated with contacts with key people	Career associated with political contacts Number of levels in hierarchy below respondent	(-) Career expectancy in 5 years Career associated with skills of public presentation
Post-Communist countries	Experienced symptoms of overworking (-) Career associated with support of top governmental leaders	(-) Career associated with skills in interpersonal relations (-) Experienced symptoms of overworking	(-) Extent of household work done by respondent** Perception of work conditions (index)*	Rank of respondent's position* Career associated with geographic mobility*

Level of significance *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$. Other betas coefficients are insignificant.

Among economic elites, the same was true to an even greater extent and still more in the case of men (adjusted R^2 = .97) than women (adjusted R^2 = .79). However, household duties very rarely belonged to the most important among 'explaining' predictors. The individual workplace experiences played a crucial role.

Among the members of the post-Communist elites, the perceived burdens of professional and household duties proved to be the strongest factors differentiating the perception of gender inequality. At the same time, they did not appear among the most significant factors in the other groups of countries. Perhaps this distinctness of post-Communist countries is caused by the fact that their elites are composed mostly of people who are new to the political and economic elites, while in the other countries they are made up of 'professionals', prepared for these roles by lengthy training and systematic career development. As we know, the elites of the post-Communist countries are, more so than those of any other countries, the effect of circulation rather than reproduction (Vianello and Moore, 2000; Siemieńska, 1999a), due to the changes in the political and economic systems in the early 1990s.

A variety of factors distinguishes women's and men's perception of gender inequality and this is especially true of those who belong to the economic elites. In the case of women, one of the most significant factors is their expectations concerning the positions which they will occupy within the next five years, showing that their feeling of security in relation to the occupied position is lower than that of men.

The Cultural Circle (Based upon the Dominant Religion) as a Factor Determining the Perception of Gender Inequality

In accordance with Huntington's concept, differences between cultures are conditioned by religions and differences between religions lead to divergent systems of values in societies (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). A comparison was made of attitudes towards gender inequality, women's opportunities and the barriers they encountered in trying to access higher positions within the social hierarchy, relative to the dominant religion (Catholic or Protestant) (Table 3). Two additional groups of countries were singled out due to their specific historical experiences: post-Communist and non-European countries (a general explanation of this classification was given at the beginning of this article).

The comparison once again reveals differences in the perception of gender inequalities between post-Communist countries and others (Siemieńska, 2000a). In post-Communist countries there are particularly strong conservative attitudes in the areas which were subject to open manipulation in the previous era. In particular, Communist propaganda particularly strongly emphasized the existence of equality between men and women in the labour market, women's opportunity to succeed at work and

Table 3 *Perception of Gender Inequality in Countries with Historically Different Religions (in percentages)*

Men occupy top positions because:	Protestant	Catholic	Post-Communist	Non-European
1. Women prefer men to occupy top positions[a]	25	33	9	42
2. Women lack specific training[a]	27	31	32	26
3. Women are isolated in a predominantly male environment	8	8	11	7
4. Women are prevented from reaching the top	7	8	10	9
5. Due to how women are reared	10	7	9	3
6. Women lack informal contacts	10	10	18	9
7. Women are accepted in leadership positions in the field[a]	28	14	17	14
8. Men and women treated equally in my organization[a]	23	18	24	12
9. Women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition	11	13	11	10
10. When jobs are scarce men should have more rights[a]	73	67	20	76
11. Family suffers when women work full-time[a]	26	21	13	24
12. Paid job best for women's independence	4	8	5	6

[a] 'Strongly disagree'; in other questions answer is 'strongly agree'.
Greece was excluded from this table and all others showing findings divided according to cultural circles.

the absence of a conflict between household duties and professional life. Therefore, the situation was perceived by members of Communist societies as not requiring a re-evaluation of men's and women's roles so that the burden of various duties could be distributed more evenly, but as the existence of 'excessive equality between the genders'.

This is also the reason why members of post-Communist elites have been much more inclined than the elites in other countries to accept that 'when jobs are scarce men should have more rights to them', that 'family suffers when women work full-time' and that 'women prefer men to occupy top positions'. They have observed more often than others that 'women are isolated in a predominantly male environment' and that 'women lack informal contacts', which showed that members of the elites had been aware of the isolation existing in everyday relations within workplaces and politics. The sphere of the relationship had never been the subject of propaganda nor of public debate under the Communist system, however. This meant that evaluation of these issues had not been shaped by certain views having been rejected by the earlier propaganda or by being the subject of policy to overcome the traditional treatment of women. In many cases, the perception of some dimensions of gender inequality was almost invariant over all

the groups of countries compared, e.g. 'women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition', 'women are prevented from reaching the top'.

Comparison of Protestant and Catholic countries shows that, in some respects, the Catholic countries are more conservative and gender inequalities are less often acknowledged there. For example, respondents from Catholic countries admit less often that women are unaccepted in leadership positions in their field or that men and women are unequally treated in their organization as well as less often disagreeing strongly with the claim that 'when jobs are scarce men should have more rights'. However, at the same time, and more often than members of elites in Protestant countries, they strongly disagree with the claims that 'women prefer men to occupy top positions' or that 'women lack specific training', as the table shows. In general, the differences between Catholic and Protestant countries, as well as the non-European countries, are far less significant than the differences between all those countries and the post-Communist countries.

Thus, the findings are consistent with the comparisons of the more general systems of values between societies of different religions and the attitudes towards family, sexual relations, etc. (Inglehart, 1997; Tos et al., 1999; Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

Overall Differences between Groups of Countries Classified on the Basis of the Diversity of their History, their Political Systems in the Recent Past and their Traditions of Feminist Movements

The overall index of differences in the perception of gender inequality shows once more that the post-Communist countries are distinguished by less intense perception of gender inequality and its sources (Siemieńska, 2000a, 2000b) (see Table 4).

The structure of the perception of gender inequality and its sources shows that it is hard to talk about a simple pattern of correlation between the perceived aspects of gender inequality and their causes in the compared groups of countries. Furthermore, the perceptions are different in the case of men and women belonging to elites of the same type (political or economic) in the different groups of countries. More detailed comparisons confirmed the hypothesis that the different cultures and histories of various societies influence the perceived level of inequality and its reasons, as well as their structures.

Perception of the Way Women Function

It is often noted that, once they achieve the position of a decision-maker, women lack solidarity, do not cooperate with other women and, for various reasons, tend not to promote them. This observation has been made by both men and women, especially feminists. Without mentioning here the reasons

Table 4 *Elites' Perception of Gender Inequality Within Workplaces and Society (Overall Index) (in percentages)*

Region/perception of gender inequality	Total	Political elite		Economic elite	
		Men	Women	Men	Women
Scandinavia:					
1 low (1–25)	0	0	0	0	0
2	3	1	3	6	3
3 medium (36–45)	41	51	22	47	49
4	54	44	73	47	46
5 high (55–60)	2	3	3	0	2
Southern Europe:					
1 low (1–25)	1	3	0	0	0
2	10	5	11	11	12
3 medium (36–45)	43	45	35	53	40
4	46	47	54	33	48
5 high (55–60)	1	0	0	2	0
Western Europe:					
1 low (1–25)	1	1	1	1	1
2	7	9	6	10	3
3 medium (36–45)	50	55	28	66	48
4	41	34	62	24	46
5 high (55–60)	1	1	3	0	2
Non-European democracies:					
1 low (1–25)	1	2	1	0	1
2	16	22	16	27	3
3 medium (36–45)	47	42	34	55	54
4	35	35	44	18	40
5 high (55–60)	1	0	4	0	1
Post-Communist countries:					
1 low (1–25)	0	1	0	0	0
2	13	14	17	13	5
3 medium (36–45)	64	68	63	62	63
4	22	16	20	25	31
5 high (55–60)	0	0	0	0	2

The index constructed on a basis of items shown in Table 3.

for this phenomenon, I examine how it is perceived by men and women who are members of the elites we examined. It can be assumed that there must be differences between the various groups of countries in this respect. The problem has often been a topic of debates in those countries where the feminist movement has been active for a long time, causing people to be more sensitive to the issue of the lack of solidarity and to the fact that some women, in a way, break away from their own gender. This could, in turn, become a reason for activities aimed at contradicting these accusations. Anyway, we may suspect this kind of behaviour more often among women belonging to the top elites than among those occupying lower positions in organizational structures. In the post-Communist countries the issue had never been the subject of public debate under the former regime which, we



Figure 1 *Differences in Elites' Perception of Female Politicians' Solidarity ('Women Politicians Act Together') among Groups of Countries*

assume, has also contributed to different levels of awareness of this issue among members of elites in various groups of countries. On the basis of the data collected within the framework of our study, we are unable to fully answer these questions. We may only state that in the post-Communist countries, perception of this problem is less uniform than anywhere else. The most numerous groups here are the people who state that women tend to cooperate with each other, as well as those who have exactly the opposite view regarding this matter. In all groups of countries, men are slightly more convinced than women that female politicians cooperate with each other (see Figure 1).

In Catholic countries, unlike in the Protestant ones, the number of people who believe that women do not cooperate with each other is greater. The personal experiences of respondents gathered thus far, as well as their expectations with regard to their own future career, have little influence on the evaluation of the level of solidarity among female politicians in the whole of the examined population (adjusted R^2 –.15).

Consistency of Gender-Oriented Attitudes with General Value Orientation: Materialist vs Postmaterialist, Left-Wing vs Right

The basic structure of the values and attitudes regarding the social order is changing. Inglehart suggests that societies are shifting from the set of values characteristic of the 'modernization' stage to those characteristic of the 'postmodernization' stage (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). He defines 'materialist' values as those which emphasize economic and physical security and are typical of the former stage, while 'postmaterialist' values, emphasizing self-expression and quality of life, are characteristic of the stage of 'post-modernization': 'Postmaterialists are not non-Materialists, still less are they

anti-Materialists. The term "Post-materialist" denotes a set of goals that are emphasised after people have attained material security, and because they have attained material security' (Inglehart, 1997: 35). The rise of the latter – also called 'postmodern' – he considers partially responsible for the decline of state socialist regimes. He has also found that people who attach great significance to postmaterialist values are more frequently in favour of gender equality and a less traditional family model. However, the relationship is more complicated; the type of value orientation is determined by a series of factors on the level of society as a whole, as well as on the level of the individual.

The analyses presented later allow us to observe which kind of value orientation prevails in the elites of different types of societies and, also, to state what factors – apart from the individual traits and experiences of the respondents – are conducive to the presence of people with a postmaterialist orientation in the elites.

Value orientation was examined by using Inglehart's four-item battery, from which the respondent selected the two most important goals which should be realized over the next 10 years. It included two materialist goals 'maintaining order in the nation' and 'fighting rising prices', and two postmaterialist ones, 'giving people more say in important government decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech' (Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997).

By comparing the findings with results on representative national samples obtained earlier (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Siemieńska, 1999a, 2000b), our results show that in reality groups of countries clearly differ in value orientations, both in the case of entire societies, as well as in the case of people occupying the top positions in the political and economic structures (Table 5).

The elites of post-Communist countries are less postmaterialist oriented than the elites of all the other groups of countries, and the percentage of materialist-oriented people is significantly higher here. The results of applying the other classification used were similar (Figure 2), showing once again that the elites of post-Communist countries differ significantly from those in other countries.

In all groups of countries, members of the political elites are much more postmaterialistically oriented compared to members of the economic elites. The smallest differences are observed between the two kinds of elites in the post-Communist countries, which may result from the fact that these elites are just forming, and are frequently made up of people who, in a case of the

Table 5 *Materialist vs Postmaterialist Orientation of Elites in Countries with Historically Different Religions (in percentages)*

Value orientation	Protestant	Catholic	Post-Communist	Non-European
1. Postmaterialist	21	29	12	22
2. Mixed	70	59	68	69
3. Materialist	9	13	21	8



Figure 2 *Differences in Elites' Value Orientation among Groups of Countries (in percentages)*

economic elite, had been previously active in the political elite, or, in the case of both elites, have been in the opposition during Communist times, or who had not previously belonged to either of the elites. The gender of the respondents is a predictor which differentiates the attitudes of people from the world of politics to a greater extent than those in business. Women have a more postmaterialist orientation; this pattern is clearly visible among members of the political elites and appears, in most cases, in the economic elites. The lower, compared to all other groups of countries, postmaterialist orientation of members of the elites in post-Communist countries confirms the earlier findings (Siemieńska, 1996).

The correlation found between the value orientation held by the members of elites and their perception of unequal opportunities is consistent with the dependence between general value orientation and preference for several other values demonstrated by Inglehart to hold in countries on different continents, with different political experiences and possessing different levels of economic development (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). The most important predictors of perception and attitudes towards gender inequality are gender and characteristics of respondents' countries. In general, women, postmaterialist-oriented respondents, members of the elites of postmaterialist-oriented societies and of those with a higher level of democracy, as well as people living in countries which have experienced democracy continuously for a longer period of time and characterized by a higher level of economic development, are more sensitive to women's position and have more often perceived their discrimination (Siemieńska, 2000b).

The grouping of the countries in the analyses showed that this grouping is an important factor predictive of differences in attitudes and perception

of gender inequality, demonstrating the role of the specific historical experiences of the different groups of countries. The findings are consistent with the cross-cultural analyses conducted on national representative samples in 1990–1, which also demonstrate a relationship between general value orientation and feminist beliefs. Respondents who have a postmaterialist orientation tend more often to express feminist beliefs (Hayes et al., 2000).

One factor which significantly differentiates views of the members of the political and economic elites regarding gender inequality and discrimination is their right-wing or left-wing orientation. Left-wing oriented women (as well as younger men) perceived inequality particularly often and opted for the integration of women in decision-making bodies and their increased participation in public life (Liebig, 2000).

Are the Attitudes Concerning Gender Equality Related to the Choice of a Preferred Economic System?

There are also some differences in opinions between both types of elites with respect to the extent to which the role of government and that of market mechanisms are considered as preferred basic factors in shaping the economy and social relationships. The respondents were asked to indicate their preferred approach, by choosing one of the following options:

'Many approaches to social and economic change have been used by governments in modern societies. Here are some options:

1 A major government role in directing political and social change, such as economic planning;
2 A moderately active government role, such as government guidelines and incentives;
3 A modified market approach with some government incentives;
4 A basic market approach with the smallest possible role for government.'

Despite differences among particular countries, there is a regularity, in that political elites more often opt for some role for government ('moderately active government role' and 'modified market approach'). There are differences among the political elites of the various groups of countries (Table 6).

Post-Communist political elites are more ready to ascribe a leading role to the market than the political elites of many other countries. The economic elites are more convinced that market mechanisms should play a decisive role in economic and political changes. In the majority of countries, women politicians and female members of the economic elites thought more often that the government should play some role in the changes, while men were more market-oriented. The exception, in this respect, are almost all the new democracies of Southern Europe.

Do the observed differences between opinions of the elites in the different countries correspond to the opinions of their citizens? Answers to

Table 6 *Elites' Conception of a Preferred Economic System in Countries with Historically Different Religions (in percentages)*

Preferred economic system	Protestant	Catholic	Post-Communist	Non-European
1. Major government role	8	11	6	18
2. Moderately active government role	36	39	21	26
3. Modified market approach	44	30	42	29
4. Basic market approach	12	20	31	27

a similar, though not identical, question asked in many countries as part of the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Inglehart et al., 1998) provide interesting results. First of all, the relation between preferences regarding the extent of state interventionism in the various countries and their level of economic development is worth noting. Comparative research has shown that the citizens of poorer countries more often opt for a stronger economic regulatory role for the state. Thus, among the 43 countries compared in 1990, the highest level of support for government ownership was shown in China and Nigeria, and the lowest in the US, Canada and West Germany. This relation was modified in the Communist countries, which in 1990 were taking steps towards the transformation of their economic and political systems, from a strongly centralized model with the state having a leading role, into a democratic system with free market economy. In these countries, despite a much lower level of economic growth (as measured by per capita GNP), the citizens opted just as often for free market mechanisms (as measured by attitudes towards private ownership), as in many developed countries, like Norway, Sweden, France, the Netherlands or Italy (Inglehart, 1997). This violation of the aforementioned regularity can be explained by a general disappointment in the Communist countries with the way the state functioned and the level to which their needs were fulfilled, as well as the belief which accompanied the transformation that the change of economic system would result in the growth of its effectiveness, and, consequently, a rise in the standard of living (for instance, Siemieńska, 1999a). This exception can also be seen in the case of the relationship between preferred economic solutions (more private ownership vs more government ownership) and the materialist vs postmaterialist value orientation of societies. In the majority of countries, except for the post-Communist ones, the more often a postmaterialist orientation is observed, the greater the tendency to opt for more private ownership. In general, research on elites has shown that the views of the elites and their value orientations reflect the views and value orientations of their societies. However, the elites of post-Communist countries, which are less postmaterialist oriented, opt for a greater role for market mechanisms than those in other countries.

It has been assumed that preferences regarding the state's role in the management of the economy can be related to general attitudes to social

politics, including the perception of women's situation. In other words, that the preference for the state to play a more dominant role, characteristic of social-democrat attitudes, will be related to a higher level of awareness of the existing inequalities between men and women in the public sphere, as well as a greater tendency to accept a family model in which the woman is not limited to the private sphere and the traditional role played by women within its frames. Again, the analysis was conducted by grouping the countries in two ways (the method I used in the earlier work (Siemieńska, 2000b), and the one applied by Inglehart, based upon Huntington's concept). However, the hypothetically assumed relation was rather weak, especially in the case of members of the economic elite.

Considering the first-mentioned classification of countries, no relation was established in the case of the economic elites in any of the groups of countries or in the case of the political elites in post-Communist and Scandinavian countries. The relationship was the strongest among the members of the political elites of non-European democracies and slightly weaker in Western European countries, as well as among men. The male members of the political elites in the two groups of countries which preferred a dominant economic government role less often think that, for example, 'women are prevented from reaching top positions' (in Scandinavian countries $r = –.40$, $p < .001$, in non-European democracies $r = –.29$, $p < .05$) or that 'women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition' (respectively $r = –.17$, $p < .05$ and $r = –.27$, $p < .05$). In general, six out of 12 items describing the role and situation of women in the family and public life (see items in Table 3) were significantly correlated (at least on the level $p < .05$) with preferences concerning the role of the state in the economy.

Using Inglehart's classification, the relationship was also found more often among the male members of the political elites than of those in the economic elites, which was especially visible in Protestant countries. Those who opted for a dominant economic role for the state less frequently agreed with the view that, when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to get them, or that family suffers when women work full-time. This means that in the area of general social politics, they tended to be 'equality-oriented'. At the same time, however, when the situation of female decision-makers was considered, they tended not to notice inequality and the existing barriers, and they generally disagreed with the view that women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition or that women are prevented from reaching the top, and, consequently, they thought that women occupying leadership positions in the field were accepted. The only question answered differently by them was regarding women not preferring men to occupy top positions. On the other hand, men who belong to the political elites of Western European countries and who opted for the domination of free market mechanisms in the economy more often noticed the barriers encountered by women with regard to the occupation of high positions in decision-making bodies, while at the same time opting for the conservative family model ('family suffers when women work full-time') and for giving men a privileged position in the labour market.

Only in the case of Western European countries can we talk about a relationship, though only a weak one, between the views of female members of the political elites regarding the situation of women as decision-makers and their economic preferences. People opting for the domination of free market mechanisms more often thought that 'women are isolated in a predominantly male environment' or that 'women lack informal contacts', but, at the same time, they thought less often that 'women have to achieve more than men to receive recognition'. Women who preferred a dominant economic role to be played by the state showed a tendency to have the opposite views.

It should also be noted that in Scandinavian countries, in the case of men, and in Western Europe countries, in the case of both men and women, there was a correlation between the preferred economic and social order and orientation towards materialist or postmaterialist values. People preferring the dominant role to be played by the state were more often materialist-oriented, while people convinced that market mechanisms should play the leading role were postmaterialist oriented. This relation was present among men in Protestant countries. In the remaining groups of countries (in both classifications), there was no correlation between views and value orientation.

Conclusions

To recapitulate, the context of the political and economic character of a society as well as its value orientation are the most significant determinants of the value orientations of people found at the top of the political and economic ladders. This demonstrates that, to a certain degree, they are representative of the general populations in their countries. Members of the political elites are much more postmaterialist oriented compared to the members of the economic elites in all groups of countries. The smallest differences between the two kinds of elites have been observed in the post-Communist countries. This may result from the fact that these elites are just forming and frequently consist of people who had previously been active in the political elite or in the opposition, or those who had not belonged to any of the categories mentioned earlier. The gender of the respondents is a predictor which differentiates the attitudes of people from the world of politics to a greater extent than that of business. Women are more postmaterialist oriented. This pattern is clearly visible among members of the political elites and appears in most cases in the economic elites. The weaker postmaterialist orientation of members of the elites in the post-Communist countries compared to those in all other groups of countries confirms earlier findings (Siemieńska, 1996), as well as Inglehart's previously presented theory. The described differences in preferences concerning the leading role of the government or market mechanisms in social and economic change also show a slightly higher tendency among women than men to opt for a dominant

role for government, usually to guarantee a more just redistribution of resources.

Certain models of behaviour and mechanisms differentiating the life-paths of women and men in public life are characterized by fairly significant permanence. Value orientations, including the concepts of women's and men's roles, are deeply embedded in the cultures of various societies. They are preconditioned by the system of political and economic factors existent both at present and in the past. They include the way in which women are mobilized to go beyond their traditional roles and to combine them with participation in public life. The experiences of the last few decades have clearly affected both the consciousness of various societies, as well as that of their elites.

The most important predictors of perceptions and attitudes towards gender inequality are gender and the national characteristics of the respondents' countries. In general, women, postmaterialist-oriented respondents, members of elites of the more postmaterialist-oriented societies and those with a higher level of democracy as well as people living in countries which have experienced a longer continuous period of democracy and which are characterized by a higher level of economic development are more sensitive to the situation of women and more often observe their discrimination.

An important predictor of the differences in the attitudes and perceptions of gender inequality is differences in the particular histories of the groups of countries. There are also some differences in opinions between both types of elites and between men and women within each of them regarding the degree to which the government and market mechanisms should shape the economy and social relationships.

Post-Communist political elites tend to ascribe the leading role to the market more often than the political elites of many other countries. Economic elites are more convinced that market mechanisms should play the decisive role in economic and political changes. In most countries, female politicians and female members of the economic elites believe more often than men that government should play some role in the changes while men are more market oriented. However, almost all the new democracies of Southern Europe are an exception from this generalization.

The differences between the views of the elites of the various countries show that their value orientations, as well as their views on gender inequality (which in some groups of countries are relatively strongly correlated), are a product of the specific political systems and dominant cultures. In countries where, as in the Scandinavian group, social democratic governments have been in power for a relatively long period of time and have shaped institutions and influenced the internalized ideology, relatively coherent systems of values were created in which attitudes towards equality of men and women are embedded. On the other hand, those societies which have experienced fundamental systemic changes in their recent past, as has been the case with the post-Communist countries, are characterized by elites with incoherent systems of values and attitudes (including ones tending towards gender inequality). Furthermore, these societies are

relatively more conservative. The analyses showed that elites in the Protestant countries are more progressive than Catholic ones, which is consistent with findings concerning general social value orientations and socially accepted concepts of the role of women in the countries.

To conclude, therefore, our research shows that democratic systems where the state plays a relatively significant role, and where people believe that equal opportunities should be provided for women and men, create more favourable conditions for the development of mechanisms which support the increasing representation of women in elites.

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6

Social Capital: Mentors and Contacts

Michal Palgi and Gwen Moore

Introduction

Many social and personal factors contribute to the achievement of an elite position. In this article, we examine informal factors, specifically mentors and personal contacts, in two dozen industrialized democratic countries.[1,2] Looking at the small number of women in top positions and men in comparable posts, we ask whether social capital in the form of personal contacts with powerful actors has been equally important to women and men in elite positions. We investigate gender differences and similarities in the presence of mentors and in the breadth of elite contacts among these national leaders.

A common theme in writing on leading positions in business and politics posits that women are disadvantaged in informal male-dominated networks and cultures even when they hold high-level formal positions (Acker, 1990; Martin and Collinson, 1999; Kanter, 1977; Epstein, 1988). According to this view, a small number of women may achieve top formal positions in powerful organizations, but they typically remain outsiders to these organizations' male-centred informal networks. In a related vein, others have argued that women in business and politics can further their careers and help overcome this informal exclusion by forming close professional ties to a mentor who can vouch for them in elite circles. Mentors are sometimes seen as a critical component of the mobility of women into top leadership positions (Catalyst, 2002).

Both mentors and elite contacts can be seen as social capital, defined by Lin (2001: Ch. 2) as 'investment in social relations with expected returns'. According to Putnam, social capital refers to connections among individuals – their social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam, 2000: 19). Social capital consists of the stock of active connections among people: the trust, mutual understanding and shared values and behaviours that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible (Cohen and Prusak, 2001: 4). The networks that constitute social capital also serve as conduits for the flow of helpful information that facilitates achievement of communal and personal goals (Putnam, 2000).

Bourdieu (1984) maintains that women possess fewer social resources

than men and that that is the reason for their inferior standing in the labour market. Women competing against men in the labour market have to possess a higher level of human capital. Watkins (1984) explains that this is due to the process of selection and placement: when workers are being selected from among candidates with similar characteristics, cultural and social resources become a more important factor. Social capital, like human capital and cultural capital, then, can be developed and used as a career resource. Following Bourdieu (1984), we would expect such social capital to be more important to the careers and performance of women than of men in male-dominated organizations.

Mentors

Both men and women often recruit the aid of a mentor in order to overcome organizational and social barriers that stand in their path to the top. In the literature (Noe, 1988; Burke and McKeen, 1990; Mobley et al., 1994; Walsh and Borokowski, 1999; Ragins and Cotton, 1999; Ragins et al., 2000; O'Neil and Blake-Beard, 2002) two main types of mentors are mentioned, formal and informal. Formal mentoring is arranged by organizations for their junior employees, while informal mentoring is not part of the formal organizational structure. This article looks only into the function that informal mentors have had in the lives of political and business elites.

Mentoring can be analysed by considering the balance of rewards for the mentors and the protégés. While the mentors invest time and effort as well as risk their reputation at times on behalf of their protégés, they also can benefit by receiving power, prestige, self-esteem and friendship rewards. The protégés, on the other hand, benefit from the activities of their mentors who contribute to their career development by increasing their visibility within the organization, helping them advance in the organization and furthering their interests (O'Neil and Blake-Beard, 2002; Ragins and Cotton, 1993). Also mentors can be of psychosocial importance to their protégés by enhancing the latter's effectiveness, self-esteem and self-efficacy, usually by being a role model to the protégé, a counsellor and a friend (Kram, 1985). However, the protégés have to invest in trying not to fail their mentors, and give them respect, esteem and acknowledgement in their path to the top. Looking at mentoring as an exchange relationship leads us to consider the additional complexity of cross-gender mentoring. Some studies point to the problematic issue of women not having female mentors and needing to use male mentors. They suggest that men have a different style of coping and a different life situation from those of women, and therefore their mentoring is limited. Men, owing to tradition, stigmas and stereotypes, are more reluctant to have female mentors (Kanter, 1977; Noe, 1988; Burke and McKeen, 1990; Dreher and Ash, 1990; Mobley et al., 1994; O'Neil and Blake-Beard, 2002). Other studies (Kalbfleisch, 2000) look at the similarity and attraction paradigm according to which mentors and protégés would prefer their

counterparts to be similar to them. This would make the mentoring activity non-threatening to both parties and compatible with their personal attributes. In male-dominated power positions, this tendency would work in favour of men.

Studies in the health care industry (Walsh and Borokowski, 1999) suggest that cross-gender mentoring issues are of less concern for mentors and their protégés in this field, in which women are quite well represented compared to others. The question is what happens in fields where women are relatively scarce. This study compares women and men in national elite positions in business and in politics. It is assumed that mobility paths and obstacles for politicians are different from those for business people. Politicians need more social connections outside their workplace in order to reach their constituencies. Business people need more connections within their own field in order to advance. As women's networks are more limited than men's, especially at the start of their career (Moore and White, 2000), they have a greater need to gain access to leaders and lay people in varied sections of society. A mentor who is well connected politically, socially, or in business can be very helpful in overcoming network barriers. Thus, women in high positions in business and in politics have more mentors than men as their network is more limited and the mentors can serve as a bridge for important connections (Fagenson and Jackson, 1994; Palgi, 2000). Politicians, male and female, have more mentors from outside their workplace than business people (Palgi, 2000).

Another aspect of mentoring is the type of mentoring used. Studies show (see, for example, Bauer, 1999) that there are two types of mentoring: grooming-mentoring and networking-mentoring. Grooming-mentoring is one-on-one mentoring where the mentor devotes his or her resources and time to one protégé and the protégé depends mainly on this one person to develop in the organization. Networking-mentoring is based on a strategy where several mentors from different hierarchical levels support one or more protégés. This type of mentoring brings less resentment from colleagues, as they do not see favouritism applied to one person by one particular mentor.

In our study, we looked at the number and types of mentors each person had and can see which strategy women and men in high positions used, grooming-mentoring or networking-mentoring.

Interpersonal Contacts[3]

Research over the past three decades has consistently demonstrated the importance of communication and discussion networks both in the functioning of national elites and in advancing individuals' careers (e.g. Miller, 1986; Moore, 1979). Elites with extensive interpersonal contacts across sectors are better able to settle disputes and implement national policies than are those with few ties among disparate groups (Higley et al., 1991). Studies of organizations have often found that persons who are better tied

into informal organizational networks are more influential and more likely to be promoted than are their peers who are less well connected (e.g. Miller, 1986; Ibarra, 1992).

Some research on gender and networks has found that women in top positions remain somewhat peripheral to elite networks. For instance, a study of national leaders in politics, business and civil society conducted in Australia, West Germany and the US in the 1970s to early 1980s found that women elites were somewhat isolated from male-centred leadership networks in each country (Moore, 1988; Higley et al., 1979; Wildenmann et al., 1982). The tiny number of women in elite positions were less integrated in policy discussion networks that included each nation's most powerful leaders (Moore, 1988).

Earlier analyses of patterns of elite contacts among women and men in the Comparative Leadership Study showed that men reported more frequent and wider-ranging personal contacts with other elites in their own and other sectors (Moore and White, 2000, 2001). In general, the gender differences were similar across country groups and were greater in the political than in the economic sectors. Additional investigation of detailed patterns of contacts within country groups and sectors and of any impact that mentors have on present elite contacts are reported in this article.

Data and Measures[4]

Our questionnaire included questions about the existence of several types of mentors in the lives of high-positioned politicians and business executives. These were:

> *Mentors within work:* (1) peers in workplace, (2) supervisors in workplace and (3) chief executive officers or other high officers.
> *Mentors outside work:* We included two measures: mentors who were 'friends and colleagues from other organizations' and mentors who were educators, family members, political or religious acquaintances, labelled 'other mentors'.

In some analyses we use measures of mentors who were superiors in the workplace, which include both supervisors and chief executive officers. For each type of mentor we differentiated between male and female mentors.

Among the important features of personal networks are their size (i.e. large, small), composition (i.e. homogeneity, diversity) and range (breadth of ties). Large and diverse personal networks offer varied and extensive ties to their members. Small, homogeneous networks are more effective in offering intense and supportive relationships. We measure here network range (ties to how many different elite types). A broad range of ties gives access to and possibly influence over elites in varying sectors and positions. By contrast, a narrow range probably indicates few connections outside the leader's specific sectoral or organizational milieu.

The measures of interpersonal contacts asked about the respondents' ties to other elites in their own and other sectors. Respondents were asked to indicate how frequently in the recent past they had had personal contact with a list of other elites in prominent leadership positions (see Aberbach et al., 1981, for similar contact measures). The range is measured by answers to a set of 10 questions asking 'How frequently in the past year have you had any contact in person or on the telephone with:

the chief executive officer of your firm (asked of business leaders only),
members of the firm's board of directors (business only),
heads of other firms,
the head of government (prime minister, president),
members of parliament,
members of the cabinet/government,
national party leaders,
top civil servants,
interest group leaders, or
trade union leaders?'[5]

For each question, the response categories are (1) daily, (2) weekly, (3) monthly, (4) less than monthly, (5) never.

Network range is the number of different elite groups the respondent reports having had contact with in the past year (all those coded 1–4 for frequency). Greater range indicates more involvement in elite networks. For business leaders, the overall range of contacts varies from 0 (none) to 10 (reports contact within the past year with each of the 10 groups).[6] The possible range of within-sector contacts for business elites is 0–3 (chief executive officer, firm's board of directors, heads of other firms). Political leaders were asked only one question about business contacts (with heads of large firms), for a total range of 0–8 and a potential range of within-sector contacts up to 5 (government head, members of parliament, members of the cabinet, party leaders, civil servants). The contacts are divided into political, business and civil society (range 0–2, heads of national interest groups and trade union leaders).

In multivariate analyses we also include an indicator of social class (mother's education), age (year born) and a measure of the hierarchical level of the position currently held. Level of position for business leaders is the number of levels above respondent in the organization. For chief executives the number is 0, reverse coded as 5, the values are 1 (four levels above) to 5 (no levels above respondent). Politicians' current position is measured by a four-point scale of level of office (with 4 the highest – for head of government and leaders of major parties, cabinet members, parliamentary leaders – to 1, regional and local officials).

Gender inequality, including women's access to top positions, differs across countries, with social democratic countries leading others in the proportion of top political posts occupied by women. In addition, public support for family life and careers – in relative availability of day care

facilities and parental leave policies, for instance – varies cross-nationally. We use the three country groupings described in the introductory article by Sansonetti (this issue, p. 326).

Results: Mentors

The comparison between the business leaders and the political leaders (Table 1) shows that both had more male than female mentors while they were on their way to their present position. Also, women leaders, especially the political leaders, had more female mentors than men leaders had. Men superiors were the most common type of mentors for the business leaders and 'men others' for the political leaders. The women political leaders also had many 'women others' as mentors. Also, business leaders had more male mentors than political leaders did, while they had female mentors less often. There are almost no gender differences in the percentage of leaders who had men and women peers within work as mentors. Male and female leaders report having had fewer women mentors than men from among their peers. There are also no gender differences in the percentage of business leaders who had a male superior at work as a mentor – about two-thirds of each gender had such a mentor. There are however gender differences among leaders in the percentages that report having had women supervisors as mentors. A higher percentage of women (15.1 percent) than men (9.0 percent) report having had such a mentor. From among the non-work

Table 1 *Percentage of Women and Men Who Had Mentors of Various Types by Sector*

	Business leaders		Political leaders	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Work mentors				
Men peers	25.6	28.4	29.7	25.3
Women peers	18.5	15.0	28.1	17.1
Men superiors	63.2	64.0	27.2	24.9
Women superiors	15.1	9.0	14.8	9.4
Non-work mentors				
Men friends, colleagues	21.7	22.7	20.6	21.0
Women friends, colleagues	15.7	6.6	24.1	12.6
Men others	34.9	28.6	57.6	46.2
Women others	14.5	22.6	45.7	28.6
Mentors all types				
Any men	76.4	75.0	71.1	56.4
Any women	40.9	33.1	56.8	36.2
(*N*)	(299)	(303)	(272)	(297)

Note: See text for variable descriptions.

mentors of the business leaders, women have more women friends and colleagues and more 'men others' (family friends, teachers, etc.) as mentors. Men have more 'women others' as mentors.

The Political Sector

The results for political leaders are slightly different. More women leaders than men report having had mentors at work and, generally, outside work. Thus more women leaders report they had men peers, women peers (in this type of mentor the gender difference among the political leaders is especially big), men superiors and women superiors as mentors.

Table 2 analyses the number of superiors who were mentors. All in all there were fewer women mentors in business and in politics than men mentors. Furthermore, having one female mentor was more prevalent among women leaders (business and political) than among men. The same can be seen when looking at male mentors: more women leaders than men had the one-on-one pattern of mentorship.

Country Groups[7]

The analysis of the number and gender of mentors by country set shows the following (Table 3):

1 In politics, both men and women leaders had fewer male mentors than in business in all country sets.
2 In politics, both men and women leaders had approximately the same proportion of female mentors as in business in all country sets.

Table 2 *Number of Mentors Who Were Superiors in Own Organization by Gender and Sector (in percentages)*[a]

	Women		Men	
Number of mentors	Women mentors	Men mentors	Women mentors	Men mentors
Business leaders				
None	85.2	36.8	91.0	36.0
One	11.8	21.1	6.0	19.1
Two or more	3.0	42.1	3.0	44.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(297)	(301)	(299)	(303)
Political leaders				
None	84.9	72.8	90.6	75.1
One	9.2	11.8	5.0	8.8
Two or more	5.9	15.4	4.3	16.2
	200.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(271)	(299)	(272)	(297)

[a] The number of mentors who were supervisors or chief executive officers of respondent's own organization.

Table 3 *Number of Mentors Who Were Superiors in Own Organization by Gender and Country (in percentages)*[a]

	Politicians		Business	
Type of country	Women	Men	Women	Men
Country group 1				
Male mentors – none	63.8	75.7	46.0	41.5
Male mentors – one	10.3	4.3	18.0	20.8
Male mentors – more than one	25.9	20.0	36.0	37.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(58)	(70)	(50)	(53)
Female mentors – none	82.7	87.5	86.0	88.2
Female mentors – one	12.1	5.6	12.0	9.8
Female mentors – more than one	5.2	6.9	2.0	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(58)	(72)	(50)	(51)
Country group 2				
Male mentors – none	75.9	75.3	33.1	32.1
Male mentors – one	11.8	13.2	22.3	20.7
Male mentors – more than one	12.3	11.5	44.6	47.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(162)	(174)	(193)	(193)
Female mentors – none	85.1	93.7	84.5	92.2
Female mentors – one	9.3	3.4	11.9	5.7
Female mentors – more than one	5.6	2.9	3.6	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(161)	(174)	(193)	(192)
Country group 3				
Male mentors – none	73.1	73.6	40.0	43.1
Male mentors – one	13.5	0.0	20.0	12.1
Male mentors – more than one	13.5	26.4	40.0	44.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(52)	(53)	(55)	(58)
Female mentors – none	88.3	84.9	87.3	89.7
Female mentors – one	3.9	9.4	10.9	3.4
Female mentors – more than one	7.8	5.7	1.8	6.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(*N*)	(51)	(53)	(55)	(58)

[a] The number of mentors who were supervisors or chief executive officers of respondent's own organization.

3 In all country sets, when the leaders indicated they had more than one mentor, it was usually more than one male mentor. The cases in which there were more than one female mentor are relatively scarce.

4 In country group 1, more women who were political leaders had male mentors than women in the other two sets of countries. Also the percentage who had more than one mentor is higher than the percentage that had only one mentor. In the other two sets of countries these

percentages are similar. That is, networking-mentoring prevails more among women who are political leaders in country group 1, as opposed to the others where no particular pattern prevails.

5 A similar percentage of male politicians in all three country sets had male mentors. However, in country groups 1 and 3 network-mentoring prevailed.

6 In country group 2, there were the fewest male politicians as well as business leaders who had women mentors when compared to the other two sets of countries. In addition, there were more business leaders who had mentors in the group 2 countries.

7 Business leaders, men and women, in all sets of countries use networking-mentorship more than the one-on-one, as far as male mentors are concerned.

Table 4 presents multiple regression analyses where the independent variables are country set, human capital (age and education), eight mentor measures (men and women mentors in superior positions in the respondent's organization; men and women mentor peers in the respondent's organization; men and women mentor friends and colleagues of the respondent; and other men and women who acted as mentors), and the dependent variable is the hierarchical level of position held (for the business people) or the title of office (for the politicians). The regression model was statistically significant for businessmen and women and for the women politicians. It was not significant for men politicians. Among men and

Table 4 *Regression of Present Position Measures for Business and Political Leaders by Gender (standardized coefficients)*

	Business		Politics	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Mother's education	.041	.025	–.008	–.016
Year born	–.183**	–.180**	–.126*	–.078
Total years of formal education	–.026	–.005	.093	.113
Mentors – men superiors	–.253**	–.091	.041	–.068
Mentors – women superiors	.088	.039	.008	.138
Mentors – men peers	.083	.066	.098	–.065
Mentors – women peers	.003	–.095	–.089	.097
Mentors – men friends, colleagues	.000	.082	–.062	.029
Mentors – women friends, colleagues	.146*	.018	–.214**	–.078
Mentors – men other	.117	–.044	–.092	.086
Mentors – women other	–.024	–.031	.048	–.096
Country group 2	.110	.122	–.178*	–.131
Country group 1	.345**	.457**	–.205*	–.165
R^2	.232	.221	.094	.066
(*N*)	(248)	(256)	(247)	(254)

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$ level of significance, two-tailed test.
See text for variable descriptions.

women in business the model explains almost a quarter of the variance in hierarchical position held. Among the politicians it explains less than a tenth.

When comparing women and men business elites, it can be seen from Table 4 that the country set has the strongest effect. Country group 1 has a positive effect on present position of both men and women business elites when compared to the social democratic countries (group 3). That is, in these countries men and women in business have higher level positions than their peers with comparable characteristics in the social democratic country set. While having a male mentor who is a supervisor in the organization has no effect on men, it has a relatively strong effect on present position of the businesswomen leaders. A striking result is that having women friends and colleagues as mentors has a positive effect on the position of these women. Year of birth has a positive effect on all elites, indicating unsurprisingly that older leaders generally have higher positions.

In the regression analysis of the male politicians, none of the predicting variables was significant. For women four were. While having women friends and colleagues as mentors has a positive effect on the position of the businesswomen, it has a negative effect on the women politicians. The same pattern occurs for the country sets. While country groups 1 and 2 have a positive effect on the present position of both men and women business elites relative to the social democratic countries, for the politicians they have a negative effect: that is, in these countries men and women in politics have lower level positions than their peers with comparable characteristics in the social democratic country set.

Results: Elite Contacts

Table 5 shows the four measures of elite contacts by sector and gender.[8] The results show that men consistently have a somewhat wider range of elite contacts overall (as shown in previous analyses; see Moore and White,

Table 5 *Range of Contacts for Women and Men by Sector (Means)*

	Business		Politics	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Total range	5.61	5.89	7.11*	7.32*
Range business	2.74	2.77	.82*	.88*
Range politics	1.83	2.00	4.57*	4.69*
Range civil society	1.05	1.12	1.72	1.75
(*N*)	(321)	(321)	(296)	(323)

* < .05, level of significance, one-tailed test.

Notes: Total range 0–10 for business leaders, 0–8 for political leaders. Range business is 0–3 for business leaders, 0–1 for politicians. Range politics is 0–5 for both. Range civil society is 0–2 for both.

2001), in their own sectors, and in civil society than do their women peers. Men's contact advantage is larger in politics than in business, except in contacts with leaders of civil society.

With cultural and structural variation across country groupings, we next examine the results for the range of contact measures individually within the three country groupings (Table 6). Looking first at country group 3 (the social democratic countries), we see dramatically different results than in the previous table. Men have a small edge in the range of business contacts, but on all other measures women reported a wider range of elite contacts in the past year. Looking at the results for the other country groupings shows how unusual the results for the social democratic countries are.

In country group 2, men reported wider ranges of elite contacts of most types. Among business leaders, men reported a wider range of contacts overall and in the civil society sector. Within-sector contacts – as opposed to out-of-sector contacts – were similar for men and women. Gender differences are larger among elected politicians, with men predominating on three of the four measures. Only in range of contacts with business elites are women and men politicians similar.

Men reported wider ranges of contacts of all types in country group 1 than did their women peers. Indeed, the gender gap among both elected

Table 6 *Range of Contacts for Women and Men by Sector and Country Group*

	Business		Politics	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Country group 1				
Total range	6.21*	6.99*	4.29*	4.99*
Range business	2.80*	2.95*	.88	.95
Range politics	2.23	2.75	2.23*	2.75*
Range civil society	1.17	1.29	1.17	1.29
(*N*)	(63)	(61)	(61)	(63)
Country group 2				
Total range	5.33	5.59	3.39	3.76
Range business	2.75	2.73	.86	.85
Range politics	1.67	1.85	1.65	1.91
Range civil society	.92	1.01	.88	.99
(*N*)	(201)	(201)	(177)	(180)
Country group 3				
Total range	5.96	5.76	4.20	3.97
Range business	2.66	2.72	.89	.93
Range politics	1.95	1.74	1.95	1.74
Range civil society	1.36	1.29	1.36	1.29
(*N*)	(58)	(56)	(58)	(56)

* < .05, ** < .01 level of significance, one-tailed test.

politicians and business leaders is larger for several of these measures than in the other two country sets. The gender differences are large, but the rate of contacts among business leaders is also high, generally higher than in the two other country groups. The overall range of contacts reported by political leaders differs less from other country sets.

In sum, Table 6 shows considerable variation in ranges of elite contacts across the three country sets. Country group 3 (the social democratic group) contrasts with the others because women report wider ranges of contact than do men. Country group 1 stands out by its consistent male advantage and the large gender differences in the range of contacts reported. The range of contacts for business leaders is highest in this country group, perhaps because economic growth and the development of markets are central concerns to elites in those countries. Elected politicians in group 3 have the highest range of elite contacts and the smallest gender differences. This group of countries has the largest proportions of parliamentary seats occupied by women, and women appear to be well integrated into elite contacts in their countries. These results demonstrate the importance of considering differences in contacts across country groupings.

In the next set of analyses, we examine the impact of country set, social background (mother's education), two mentor measures (men mentors and women mentors in superior positions in the respondent's organization), and hierarchical level of position held on the range of contact measures for men and women separately. Table 7 shows the results of multiple regression analyses for the four contact range measures for business leaders. Hierarchical level, among both women and men, has the strongest effects on range of contacts. As expected, the higher the level of position held, the wider the range of contacts of all types among business men and women. The mentoring variables are generally not statistically significant, with the exception of the positive impact of men mentors on contacts overall and contacts in the political sector for women. However, the two mentoring variables are always positive for elite business women, while they are often negative or weaker among men business leaders.

Table 7 also shows that the measure of social class is unrelated to all but one of the measures of contacts, net of other variables. This indicates that while higher social class is important in gaining an elite position, it does not distinguish the range of elite ties among women or men who are in top business positions. Where they are alike on other variables, older elites have slightly wider ranges of contacts, especially among women for overall and political contacts.

The country group measures show inconsistent effects. The impact is statistically significant for contacts with civil society leaders among both men and women in country groups 1 and 2 and for women's contacts overall in group 2, with lower levels of contact than in the social democratic countries.

The next table shows the regression results for political leaders (Table 8). Again, hierarchical level is the most consistently related variable, with

Table 7 *Regression of Range of Contact Measures for Business Leaders by Gender (Standardized Coefficients)*

	All contacts		Business contacts		Political contacts		Civil society contacts	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Mother's education	.038	.100	.044	.185**	.027	.053	.025	.190
Hierarchical level	.329**	.431**	.313**	.410**	.263**	.350**	.213**	.307**
Year born	.151**	–.067	–.027	–.084	–.161**	–.055	–.100	–.032
Mentors – men superiors	.129*	–.058	.045	–.098	.127*	–.016	.090	–.086
Mentors – women superiors	.052	–.021	.073	.032	.058	–.053	.019	.032
Group 2 countries	–.179**	–.118	.062	–.076	–.135	–.039	–.319**	–.239**
Group 1 countries	–.089	–.094	–.011	–.085	–.047	–.015	–.169**	–.214**
R^2	.160	.206	.104	.222	.121	.137	.118	.125
(*N*)	(266)	(276)	(266)	(276)	(266)	(276)	(266)	(276)

* < .05, ** < .01 level of significance, one-tailed test.
See text for variable descriptions.

Table 8 *Regression of Range of Contact Measures for Political Leaders by Gender (Standardized Coefficients)*

	All contacts		Business contacts		Political contacts		Civil society contacts	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Mother's education	.019	.100	.019	.189**	.063	.009	–.062	.080
Hierarchical level	.207**	.158*	.096	.106	.220**	.087	.109	.152**
Year born	.004	.100	–.031	–.035	–.066	–.010	.130*	.247**
Mentors – men superiors	–.074	–.008	.071	.111	–.115	.002	–.059	–.090
Mentors – women superiors	–.006	.138	–.077	.068	–.048	.086	.111	.134
Group 2 countries	–.063	–.235**	–.071	–.189*	–.007	–.115	–.092	–.224**
Group 1 countries	–.166*	–.312**	–.069	–.140	–.111	–.275**	–.188*	–.205**
R^2	.083	.128	.024	.093	.103	.074	.062	.140
(*N*)	(232)	(243)	(232)	(243)	(232)	(243)	(232)	(243)

* < .05, ** < .01 level of significance, one-tailed test.
See text for variable descriptions.

statistically significant effects in four out of eight equations. However, net of other variables, position level is less important among political leaders than among their business counterparts. As in Table 7, the measure of social class is not significant in these equations when other variables are controlled. Age has a weak effect except for contacts with civil society leaders in which younger men and women have wider contacts. None of the mentor variables has statistically significant effects in these equations. While weak, the effects of mentors are more often negative for women than for men in the political elite. The contrast of the mentor results for business and political leaders indicates that having had mentors in the past is more significant in current elite contacts among business than political leaders.

On all measures men and women political elites in groups 1 and 2 countries reported narrower ranges of contacts than did their peers in social democratic countries. Most of the equations in which the difference is statistically significant (six of eight) involve male elites. In fact, for range of contacts overall, with political leaders, with business leaders and with civil society elites, men in country group 3 reported narrower ranges of contacts than did their women counterparts in the other country groups.

The regression analyses of ranges of contacts among business and political elites yielded roughly similar results for men and women. The hierarchical level of the position held was important for both groups among business elites, but less so for political elites. Mother's education showed little impact in these equations, indicating that social background does not play a role in current elite contacts, net of other factors. Older elites reported slightly wider ranges of contacts of most types, though the differences were generally small. Women business leaders who reported having at least one male or female mentor had a somewhat wider range of contact of all types, net of other variables. This was not the case for business men, suggesting that mentoring continues to play a role in elite business women's access to powerful elites. Mentors seemed less important in current contacts among political elites. The effects were weak and inconsistent.

In the social democratic countries, political and business elites generally report wider ranges of contacts than do their peers in the other country groups, consistent with the bivariate results shown in Table 6. Group 1 countries differ somewhat from the others. Women and men political elites in those countries consistently reported lower ranges of contacts in comparison to their social democratic colleagues. But among business leaders in country group 1, men hold an advantage in most cases both in relation to their women counterparts in these countries and also to business elites in country group 3. These multivariate results for country sets are consistent with those reported in Table 6.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this article we have analysed two types of social capital that leaders in business and in politics use in their career, mentors and elite contacts. The general findings are that business leaders are different from political leaders in the type of mentoring and the range of contacts. But all types of leaders have invested time and attention in these connections, thus increasing their social capital (Lin, 2001).

We expected mentoring patterns to vary between the two sectors and also the two genders because the mobility paths and obstacles facing each group are different. Politicians need more social connections outside their workplace to reach their constituencies. Business people need more connections within their own field in order to advance. Because women are rare among elites, they will need more mentors and might look especially for female mentors who can understand their situation better. In fact, the results show that the mentoring patterns are different in politics and business. Business leaders used more mentors from work, especially male supervisors. Nevertheless they also used other men, such as friends and acquaintances to a great extent. Political leaders, as expected, have relied more on other (non-political) men and women for mentoring purposes. It is very clear that just a small portion of them have had mentors from their own sector. Women, especially in politics, have relied more on mentors than have their men peers. They often looked for role models and supporters from among women.

From the number of mentors each type of leader had we can see what strategy women and men in high positions used, grooming-mentoring or networking-mentoring (Bauer, 1999). We looked only at men mentors, as they are not as scarce as women mentors are. In general, a higher percentage of men and women business leaders used networking-mentoring in comparison to grooming-mentoring. Among the politicians there is a gender difference. The percentage of women using grooming-mentoring is higher than the percentage of men. This could be due to two main reasons. The first is that fewer women than men had enough social capital, that is social connections, to help them advance. The second explanation could be that more women found grooming-mentoring, which is more intimate and more personal, as fitting them in their way up the political career ladder. This pattern among politicians is especially strong in the social democratic country set.

Our data rely on the memory and perception of mentoring and we cannot be certain that the reports accurately represent reality, but they do represent the reality and attitudes of the respondents. Men in both sectors report few women mentors of any type. One explanation is that men had almost no women mentors. Another is that fewer men give credit to women who have mentored them. A similar pattern is found among women in the highest business positions. While overall the majority of business leaders of both sexes reported having men mentors who were their superiors, only a

few of these women did so. We suspect that these common patterns result in part from a reluctance to cite mentors that respondents see as having lower 'status' than themselves, that is, women in general for men or past supervisors of the women who have reached top positions.

The question whether mentors do help in the advancement of women is not fully answered in our study. The regression analysis shows that having a male superior as a mentor does not help in the career of business women, but having women friends and colleagues as mentors does. A possible explanation is that many of the women in top positions chose not to report having men mentors who were their superiors. Another promoter of career is the country set one belongs to. Business women with similar characteristics seem to have higher positions in country groups 1 and 2 than in group 3. This might result from the flatter hierarchies in the social democracies compared to the other country groups.

In the political sector, mentoring has little effect on women's and no effect on men's hierarchical position. The recruitment of female friends and colleagues as mentors does not promote the careers of women in politics, in contrast to the findings for business women. Country set is an important factor. Opportunities offered to women politicians in country groups 1 and 2 are smaller than those in the social democracies. The greater number of women in high political positions in the social democratic countries might account for this finding.

In addition to mentoring, we looked at patterns of contact with other elites as measures of social capital. In general, men reported broader ranges of contacts with other elites in their own sector and outside it. The gender gap was larger among political leaders than among their business counterparts. Contact ranges differed across the three country groups, with leaders in the social democratic country group showing distinct patterns. There, but not elsewhere, women frequently reported wider ranges of contact with other leaders than did their male counterparts. This result suggests that women leaders in the social democratic countries enjoy interpersonal relations with other elites that are more similar to those of men than of women in other countries. In regression analyses the hierarchical level of position held was typically the most strongly predictive of elite contacts among women and men. Other variables – age, mother's education and country group – had less systematic effects on the range of elite contacts.

In the regression analyses we also examined the net effect of past mentors on current contacts. Among women in business, having had a male mentor who was a superior is associated with a broader range of total contacts and of political contacts. In most cases, neither male nor female mentors who had been supervisors of the respondents had much impact on their contacts with other elites during the past year. The impact of mentors in these leaders' careers probably came when they were younger and more junior.

We had expected men to have more 'social capital' of both types. For mentors, we were wrong. Women generally reported having more mentors of the varying types than did their men peers. The term mentoring is often

used to refer to special assistance from a superior on the job. Among business leaders, the majority of men and women reported having men (but rarely women) superiors as mentors. Men did not have an advantage on the mentoring indicators of social capital. Indeed, on average, women had more mentors of most types. Perhaps women who do not have mentors – especially among their male superiors – are unlikely to achieve elite positions.

On the second measure of social capital, elite contacts in the past year, we found larger gender differences in favour of men, as we had expected based on earlier analyses. On the range of contacts with a variety of other elites in the political, economic and civil society spheres, men generally reported wider ranges of personal contacts in the past year. An exception was in the social democratic countries where gender equality measures seemed to pay off in women's greater access to their elite colleagues. Our conclusion, then, is that men enjoy some advantage in contacts with a variety of other elites in the other country groups.

The results for the social democratic countries are instructive. These nations stand out for higher levels of contact social capital among elite women. On the other social capital measure, mentors, these countries differ less from the two other country groups. Thus, in the social democratic countries women aspiring to elite positions often do work with mentors, as do their women peers elsewhere, but gender differences in interpersonal contacts among elites are far smaller in those countries than in others. The considerable attention to gender equality issues in public discourse and in public policy in the social democratic countries has facilitated women's full(er) participation in the formal and informal aspects of public life. Scholars and policy-makers outside the social democratic countries who are seeking to advance the development of gender equality in their nations would benefit from a close look at these models.

Notes

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1 In this article and the one that follows the countries are grouped as described in the introductory article by Sansonetti.

2 We excluded Norway, Hungary and Russia from these analyses because of incomplete data.

3 This section is partly based on Moore and White (2000).

4 This section uses material from Palgi (2000) and from Moore and White (2000).

5 We omitted questions about contacts with military and religious leaders from the analyses due to substantial missing data.

6 The question about frequency of contact with the chief executive officer of the corporation was not asked in Israel and Switzerland. In Switzerland the question about contact with the head of government was also omitted. The overall mean value for these variables was used for those cases.

7 The country sets are: 1. mostly former Eastern Bloc countries, 2. Liberal countries, 3. Social Democracies.

8 See Moore and White (2001) for results of slightly different measures of contact range.

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7

Networks: An Application of Multidimensional Scaling Analysis

Rosanna Memoli

The preceding article, by Palgi and Moore, examines mentoring and elite contacts separately. The purpose of this article, however, is to analyse a larger set of informal networking measures simultaneously.

One of the objects of research into the mechanisms of women's promotion to roles of leadership in public life is to analyse the processes that make up the structure, behaviour and action of elites. The formation of elites, the way in which they are characterized, and their means of production depend on the economic, political and social features of the systems to which they belong (Siemieńska, 1999). Once they have reached the top, these elites tend to work out strategies aimed at continuing success and at the consolidation of their position. Even in modern democracies, where rigid mechanisms for the reproduction of elites have given way to mechanisms for their circulation, their behaviour has common traits.

Structure and system are macro concepts, while the concept of elite implies units of a micro nature. Therefore it is necessary to integrate macro and micro levels of analysis. The term 'social structure' is used to denote an 'interweaving of relatively stable interdependencies, which exist between a certain set of social positions, roles, institutions and social groups . . . regardless of the identity of the components which may happen to become the subjects of relations' (Gallino, 1978: 698). We will, therefore, refer not to individuals as such, but to the whole set of relations which they bring into being as a function of their role.

The concept of structure is integrated with that of the elite when we study the structure of a particular group where the interweaving of relations is based on the sharing of values, norms and cultural models dictated by the position which an individual occupies. Structure and elite are obviously not synonymous, but given that elites are a social stratum capable of exercising power and influence on the socioeconomic system, the relationship between micro and macro units is clear.

The need to integrate micro and macro profiles of analysis and to remain anchored to methodological choices consistent with the nature of the concepts used means that our analysis is organized on two levels: one comparative and the other relational.

The first level studies the analysis of the behaviour and action of elites by highlighting their social structure, i.e. the interweaving of the relations and the interdependencies within them. At the second level, we observe how the behaviour and action of elites may differ with respect to the social system in which they operate.

To study the interweaving of relations we use network analysis. From a sociological point of view, network analysis makes it possible to reconstruct the ways in which subjects act strategically in the fabric of social relations of which they are a part and which they reproduce on a daily basis. Networks are defined as whole sets of interactions which are entertained between social subjects and that may be activated when they deem necessary by means of instrumental actions which use channels through which social resources flow.

Access to Resources as a Prerequisite for the Activation of Formal and Informal Networks

The goal of this article is to evaluate how elites utilize networks of relations available to them. In the cases studied two groups of leaders constitute an elite since they depend on a series of exceptional elements in terms of power and prestige, which are characterized as resources from which they benefit because they are part of a system with opportunities to relate to others.

Network analysis in social research has both theoretical and empirical aspects. At the present level of knowledge, there is no real logical continuity between the two levels because the theoretical characteristics of a relational model cannot always come into operation. Conversely, the relational techniques hitherto available do not have a theoretical referent which can be effectively linked to substantive principles.

The data under study were not gathered in order to be processed with relational analysis algorithms. The network approach is, in this context, understood as a set of logical principles on the basis of which hypotheses were worked out. The fact that individuals belong to a given occupational stratum enables them to activate a series of contacts with people and institutions making it possible for them to accumulate the necessary resources in order to be able to stay there. From a logical point of view, the study of leadership formation and behaviour lends itself to analysis in terms of 'social networks', because we deal with a group of small dimensions and composed of homogeneous units. The scheme shown in Figure 1 assumes that there are both formal and informal relations between individuals and that these may be activated through both individual and institutional contacts. From the intersection of these two dimensions we may construct different relational forms.

Before we start our analysis of interpersonal relational resources in elite behaviour, we will review the indicators used. This preliminary examination is necessary insofar as it gives us some insight into the construction of the models to which we subsequently refer.

In the first place, the activation of resources for the exercise of leadership is facilitated through formal and informal channels in which contacts are made with people and/or institutions. For example, formal channels might include contacts with leaders and/or participation in associations as indicators of possible access to sources of public or private funding while access to the media are indicators of contacts with institutions. On the other hand, informal channels might include contacts with persons who have sponsored the rise of leaders to their current positions, personal contacts, and kinds of communication with specific modalities of access to information (written information, meetings, electronic communication, etc.) typical of contacts with institutions. All these resources constitute the instruments which each individual may use in order to gain access to and create his or her network of relations. The quality and quantity of contacts with the representatives of the main economic, financial, political and administrative institutions are the basis upon which networks are constructed and the strategies for the exercise of power and the control of consensus-building are operative.

But our attention does not rest only on the persons who are part of the network and on the density of their contacts, but also on the quantity of the information exchanged within the networks, the dense level of contacts between members of the same elite, how they are ordered in fairly complex form, and how relational channels of information are activated in the role.

As far as formal resources are concerned, we have compared those which might derive from access to funding, vital in an electoral campaign, with access to the media. Nowadays, in many countries, the increasingly widespread system of public funding of political parties produces a kind of levelling out in the distribution of this resource between its aspirants. On the other hand, access to the media, even though this too is generally regulated by norms guaranteeing fairness, is distributed in a uneven way between members of the same party.

As for the business elites, it is not so much financial investment in various



Figure 1 *Access to Resources*



Figure 2 *The Map of Relational Resources*

forms of communication that is important, or even access to the media, but the means of communicating within one's own organizational structure and with other institutions that counts.

When we examine informal channels, however, participation in associations becomes important for cohesion and representation. In the realm of informal resources, we examined contacts with persons who might have contributed to professional success.

The resources to which elites have access in the performance of their functions were compared using the scheme presented in Figure 1.

The Construction of Networks

The indicators examined form the background of the analyses which follow.

The goal is to draw a map of the mechanisms of power, using the network approach and making particular use of multidimensional analysis. Consequently, a matrix was constructed of 12 groups. Each group outlines a structure formed by the combination of three different elements: type of elite, politico-economic system and gender. Each element of the matrix represents the corresponding information for a single group. By placing the groups in reciprocal relations to each other, we can see whether they maintain similar or different patterns of behaviour (see Figure 2).

Relations within and between Elites – Contacts with Persons and Institutions

In the context of network analysis , the strategy is traditional as it is based on a micro-structural point of view. It was made possible by the broad range of information produced by the interviews.

Our goal is to see whether a differentiated social structure within the groups identified exists, and whether certain types of structure may be differentiated in relation to specific dimensions (Guttman, 1959; Parsons, 1966). Through the interpretation of these dimensions it becomes possible to evaluate the distance between the various groups. From the point of view of network studies, we consider 'positions' or 'social roles' in the place of single individuals. The principle of 'structural equivalence' requires that, while individuals may have direct relations with other individuals, the type of relation remains 'equivalent' (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 347). For example, two political leaders are structurally equivalent in the sense that they represent social positions that require uniformity of behaviour. So, once the positions have been identified, the networks of relations existing between the positions can be explored and it is reasonable to suppose that the actors within each group are interchangeable as far as their relational links are concerned.

It also seems logical to hypothesize that, depending on the specific characteristics of the political and economic system to which they belong, the leaders of different systems may modify the way in which they interpret their role. Similarly, we may assume that the same role may be interpreted in different ways , by men or women. Network studies allow the analysis of specific models of social relations (Sailer, 1978; Burt, 1982) through the identification of structurally equivalent categories of actors to be expressed in a model of structural equivalence. Nodes and their connections are treated simultaneously, and the analysis of a case-by-case matrix, can be extended to the original case-by-affiliation matrix of incidence. The model for the construction of the matrix requires that single individuals are aggregated in broader sets according to the principle of structural equivalence of the units.

This reduces a points network to a block model (Scott, 1997: 184). The further the groups are from each other, the more the network of formal relations for each of them is differentiated. As we have already mentioned, each group is identified on the basis of sector of activity, politico-economic system and gender. The principle adopted for the interpretation of spaces is that of structural differentiation. Following this principle spaces may be divided up into relatively homogeneous areas. As a result groups belonging to the same sectors show the same behaviour in the way in which they relate to persons representing the main institutions like chief officers of major corporations, national and international representatives of interest groups, senators, members of parliament, heads of government, ministers, party and trade union leaders, military and religious leaders, top public service

officers. Groups belonging to different sectors of activity appear at opposite extremes, and the different way of relating depends on the frequency with which people meet.

All the parameters estimated display good data structure that fit the model of Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS). From the graphical representation in Figure 3 it appears, as expected, that business and political leaders are located at the extremes.

Within this structure we may note that, while business leaders constitute a fairly close-knit network, different groups of political leaders are more loosely distributed.

The economic elites display strong homogeneity both in terms of the socioeconomic make-up of their countries of residence and gender. For politicians the network is less dense, but there is nevertheless substantial homogeneity both in terms of politico-economic systems and gender. The greatest differences among politicians are to be found between females in group 1 countries and males in group 3 countries. The latter in turn occupy a position which is very close to that of males in group 2 countries (the composition of each of the three country groups is described by Sansonetti, this issue, p. 326).

The results of the multidimensional analysis are centred, as we have



Figure 3 *Contacts between Elites: Graphic Configuration of Relations*

Key

M = Males
F = Females
PL = Political leaders
BL = Business leaders
SD = Social democracy
ME = Market economy
ND = New democracy

V 1 Chief officers of major national corporations
V 2 Parliament/senate/congress
V 3 Cabinet members
V 4 Senior civil servants
V 5 High-level military leaders
V 6 Representatives of national or international interest groups
V 7 Executive heads of government
V 8 Party leaders
V 9 Trade-union leaders
V 10 High-level religious leaders

already said, on the concept of social structure: that is, on the connections between people who occupy social positions and have the same corpus of attitudes and reciprocal actions. A social structure may, therefore, be interpreted as depending on the composition of various relations, seen as connecting mechanisms between the subjects involved in the analysis. The greater the difference between the positions, the greater the difference between the actors and, conversely smaller differences make actors positions more similar.

Our goal of exploring how a network of social relations might bring together the structure of the different groups is based on the hypothesis that the more intense the network of relations in position of leadership the easier it is for leaders to establish joint objectives with which to reconcile differing opinions and to work out strategies of cooperation.

The structure obtained is the result of the analysis of the frequencies of interpersonal relations between leaders. From the analysis previously conducted with the MDS, we saw that the 12 initial groups fell into two clusters, distinguished by context – politics or business – within which the role of leader is exercised. Each typology of leadership constitutes a structure within which networks of male and female leaders from different politico-economic systems have been detected.

We can now distinguish the connections, i.e. the characteristic models, by which different groups' patterns of behaviour diverge. Male political leaders in group 1 countries are characterized above all by the contacts which they have with the other sectors like: bureaucrats, ministers, heads of government and chief officers of major corporations. The female political component in the same countries differs from their male counterparts in that contacts with chief officers of major corporations do not form part of their model of behaviour. Another element of differentiation is given by the lower frequency of meetings with party leaders and members of parliament.

The male components in group 2 countries differ from those in group 1 because networks of relations also include members of parliament and party leaders in addition to ministers and the chief of the executive, but exclude bureaucrats and chief officers of major corporations. The female component in group 2 countries forms a network of relations which includes government members, heads of government, top civil servants and party leaders. The difference between males and females is that males have more frequent relations with members of parliament/senate/congress while females have more frequent relations with top bureaucrats.

Male political leaders in group 3 countries tend to have networks of relations which, albeit different as far as the intensity of relations is concerned, include members of government, the prime minister, party leaders and top bureaucrats.

In the male model of group 2 countries relations with members of parliament/senate/congress tends to replace those with bureaucrats. But apart from this element, this model is substantially similar to the previous

ones. Female political leadership in group 3 countries differs from male leadership in its preference for relations with prime ministers, top bureaucrats and chief officers of major corporations.

In general, female political leadership tends to form a substantially uniform network of relations in the three different groups of countries. In the case of business leaders, relations with their chief executive officers were excluded from our analysis because they only apply to this group, and could not constitute an object of comparison with the other groups. So, apart from relations within their own firm, male business leaders in group 2 countries have networks of relations including members of government and parliament, the prime minister and party leaders. Females manifest an identical model. In both cases, the male and female groups pursue relations with chief officers of major corporations and representatives of interest groups.

The distance between the relational model observed for political leaders and the one observed for business leaders is accounted for by the different intensities of the relationship which each group has with the political governmental leadership. For the former these relations are very frequent, while for the latter they are less so (less than once a month).

In the case of male business leaders in group 1 countries, the network of relations is characterized by more frequent relations as measured by monthly contacts with chief officers of major corporations and interest groups and less frequent ones (less than monthly) with politicians, members of government, the prime minister, parliamentarians and bureaucrats.

In the case of female business leaders in the same countries, the model differs from the male one insofar as monthly relations with chief officers of major corporations are associated with contacts with top bureaucrats (less than monthly). Monthly contacts with the representatives of interest groups, with members of parliament and government members (less than monthly) tend to be close to each other.

The network of relations of male business leaders in group 3 countries is characterized above all by monthly relations with the chief officers of major corporations, representatives of interest groups and top bureaucrats (less than monthly). However, there are no relations with politicians or the representatives of institutions. In the case of the female component of business leaders in similarly structured social-democratic countries, the model of relations is fairly close to the male one, in the sense that less than monthly relations mainly involve chief officers of major corporations and representatives of interest groups, top bureaucrats and trade union representatives.

As we have already said, the whole set of groups of business leaders occupy a position which displays substantial similarity. Therefore, the differences in the models of behaviour of this group are not as marked as those seen for political leaders.

MDS shows how the different groups of leaders share a relational structure which is fairly homogeneous regardless of the type of leadership

exercised. Examination of the distances between the different groups was also conducted by means of cluster analysis and it emerged that the structure of the groups does not vary substantially from that obtained using MDS. Indeed, the six groups of business leaders form a homogeneous cluster as well as the political leaders. If this result is also compared with that obtained with MDS, then the two representations are equivalent. This corroborates the validity of the interpretations hitherto suggested.

Lastly, a further check was conducted by subjecting the data to correspondence analysis. This analysis gives a result which leads to interpretation similar to that of MDS, i.e. that the political leaders of the three country groupings occupy positions which are close to each other but far from the economic leaders. The homogeneity between political leaders is due to their communications with the prime minister, ministers, members of parliament, senators and party leaders. In other words, there is a stronger interaction within political leadership where individuals occupy the same positions, and therefore an equivalent relational structure even in the different politico-economic systems. Given the way in which the different groups are positioned in the diagram, we cannot conclude that there are any different patterns of relational behaviour between males and females.

If we extend the analysis further, we note that male and female political leaders in group 1 countries are very close to each other and their relational model also appears very similar to that of male political leaders in group 2 and 3 countries.

The position occupied by female political leaders in group 2 and 3 countries is a little further away. In other words, female interpersonal relations seem to be directed mainly towards members of parliament/senate/congress and party representatives.

Business leaders also constitute a professionally homogeneous group whose structural equivalence may be attributed to communication with the representatives of national and international interest groups and to those of major corporations. As for political leaders, the similarity between the groups is owed to the homogeneity of the network of relations which prioritizes relations between individuals playing the same roles. This standardization of the system of relations does not show any substantial modifications which may be attributed to gender.

The only gender difference observed occurs in group 3 countries where women have more connections with the representatives of interest groups, while the closest males' relations are with the chief officers of major corporations.

Women pay greater attention to 'reality' while men pay greater attention to relations with top leaders.

In conclusion, no elite (political or economic) is superimposed over another. Therefore their behaviours are strongly conditioned by systems of internal rules and norms and the model crosses the boundaries of the politico-economic or gender systems.

Informal Relations

To analyse informal contacts, we investigated membership in associations and private clubs. This is in itself a resource which allows access to other resources. Furthermore, if organizational functions are performed within these associations, than this reinforces the position of the individual insofar as it may mean further opportunities to broaden networks of interaction. For the two groups of elites, membership in professional associations is preponderant (56.4 percent) followed by a similarly high percentage of those in social and sports clubs (47 percent). The least frequented clubs are military ones (4.5 percent). Participation in trade union organizations (25 percent) or women's groups (26 percent) involves less than a third of those interviewed and similarly participation in service associations like the Rotary Club or the Lions Club (22 percent) or in religious organizations (15 percent).

As for institutional contacts, different groups of leaders were compared according to activity, country and gender in order to estimate the means of access to this resource.

Of the three variables observed in the formation of the groups, it was gender which generated the greatest distances. The entire male component is projected onto the right side of the graph (see Figure 3) and at least four groups may be identified within it. The initial central group between the first and the fourth quadrant includes political and the business leaders of group 1 and 2 countries, while male political and business leaders from group 1 countries are located very close to each other in the top right-hand corner of the first quadrant. The positions of political and business leaders in group 1 countries are therefore close. This implies a similarity in structure with regard to involvement in associations. The male business leaders from both group 1 and group 2 countries are very close to each other, as are the male political leaders from both group 1 and group 2 countries.

As far as the female component is concerned, groups are found mainly in the second quadrant.

In synthesis, the location of groups on the graph is determined mainly by the differentiation of patterns of behaviour according to gender.

As far as males are concerned, the greatest differentiation is in the close positions of the group 1 countries, while the second biggest differentiation is in leadership type. The difference between females is also indicated mainly by the type of leadership exercised.

To better understand these results, we must interpret them as dimensional factors. The grouping of variables makes it possible to understand how the different activities combine to form models for each group even if not all elements are connected. Within models for political leaders, dimensions were measured in all the three groups of countries. In group 1 countries we have 3 dimensions – activities in professional, sports and social associations, activities in religious and military association, and activities in trades union and women's groups. For male political leaders in group 2 countries, participation in professional associations is associated with

activities in exclusive clubs. In group 3 countries, participation in professional associations is associated with activity in religious groups, trade unions and women's groups, while activity in exclusive clubs is associated with activity in military clubs.

In these three models, the element common among political leaders in the three groups of countries is that participation in professional associations is a major characterizing element. This is followed by participation in free-time associations in group 1 countries and in group 2 countries professional associations, special interests like religious, trade union, women's groups. As far as female political leaders are concerned, participation in professional activities is prevalent both in group 1 and in group 3 countries, and is associated in both groups with participation in exclusive clubs and women's groups and trade unions. The model for group 2 countries shifts slightly away from the previous two, with professional associations as a separate factor, while participation in free-time associations, women's groups and trade unions is included in the first dimension.

For male business leaders the only two models processed concern group 1 and group 2 countries: here participation in exclusive clubs and military clubs is associated with the first dimension. Moreover, participation in trade unions and women's groups is associated with group 2 countries, while activity in sporting clubs is associated with them in group 1 countries. Only two models were processed for the female component: that of group 2 countries and that of the group 3 countries. In both models, participation in professional and religious associations is dominant for the first factor, while, in the case of the male model, activities in women's groups and exclusive clubs are also included in the first factor in group 2 countries.

Networks of Information (Political Leaders)

In this section, we investigate political leaders' contacts and their information gathering. Political leaders have their own collaborators, colleagues, etc., and use external interlocutors to gather information.

The questions were formulated so as to record the form of the contacts like written information, planned meetings, internal newsletters, instruments of mass communication or other. In the analyses for country groupings and for gender, different channels of information were classified according to whether or not they were internal to work contexts. Internal channels were distinguished in political channels, in the strict sense, and in administrative-bureaucratic channels, concerning procedural aspects of political activities. The channels of information external to work environment may also be divided into: political activities, in the strict sense, and administrative-procedural activities.

By looking at these measurements and comparing them with the results obtained, we discover differences within the country groups and between genders.

As far as male members of government in group 1 countries are concerned, channels of information come from individual entourages. In group 2 countries, on the other hand, the strongest communication comes through interactions of ministers with parliamentarians and political leaders but the relationships with bureaucrats is less marked. In group 3 countries, relations with politicians like ministers, parliamentarians and party leaders are dominant. This model is a compact structure, of internal relations, while external relations with representatives of trade unions, associations and economic organizations constitute a separate dimension.

Forms of communication are independent and usually include written information, internal newsletters and the media, while other non-specific forms of communication are almost always located in a separate dimension.

For female members of the government, models of relationships are constructed in a slightly more heterogeneous manner than those for males, in the sense that they include external relations. In internal relations the intersection with administrative sources seem to prevail over strictly political sources.

As for country groupings, the female relational models tend towards greater homogeneity. For the group of male parliamentarians in group 1 countries, political and external contacts with leaders of the trade unions and with economic organizations and sector groups are a single factor. Relations within one's own parliamentary group form an independent factor. For male parliamentarians in group 2 countries, on the other hand, internal communications, whether of a political or of an administrative nature, are distinct from that of external contacts. For male parliamentarians in group 3 countries the model of behaviour is closer to that of group 1 countries. The singularity of this model when compared to the previous ones is that forms of communication are located in interpersonal relations, for example, media communications and newsletters and other indicators expressing contacts with representatives of national interest groups and union leaders.

While models for women parliamentarians are distinct for the three groups of countries, male models are substantially homogeneous. In group 1 countries, contacts with one's own parliamentary group is seen to be the main factor, followed by other indicators of political contacts. In group 2 countries, written forms of communication and communication via the media are most important. The same tendency to include forms of communication in factors which explain the highest percentage of variability is also present in group 3 countries.

The forms of communication used to establish contacts both within one's own group, e.g. through newsletters and formal meetings, and outside, through mass communications, are very important for parliamentarians in all countries. For male party leaders in group 1 countries, networks of communication include both internal contacts with political leaders and external contacts with representatives of trade unions and economic organizations. Contacts with government representatives and parliamentarians constitute a network of relations which is included in the second factor. For males from

group 2 countries, on the other hand, contacts are with politicians representing the government and parliamentarians, but components inside and outside the party also constitute a unit contributing to the formation of the first factor. In group 3 countries, the male model is similar to that of group 1 countries. It should be noted that communication in these models, as in those of the female component, occur via the media and are of particular importance for political leaders, who need to establish contact with the electorate in their countries.

In the case of female leaders in groups 1 and 3 countries, there is a tendency to include various internal and external forms of communication within the network i.e. to give equal importance to relations with representatives of government and parliament, officials, one's own party members, other parties, and also the representatives of economic and sector organizations. In group 2 countries, the female model is similar to the male one.

Interpersonal Relations as a Career-Building Resource

The questionnaire investigated respondents' mentoring experiences for nine gender-specific roles:

1 Religious acquaintance,
2 Supervisor in workplace,
3 Higher-level executive,
4 Family member,
5 Peers in workplace,
6 CEO/other higher,
7 Educator,
8 Friend, colleague in other organization,
9 Political acquaintance.

Between 10 and 12 percent of respondents failed to answer this question and a very high percentage of those who answered indicated that they had never made use of this resource in order to reach the position occupied at the time of the interview (between 67 and 97 percent).

Only a minority (ranging from 3 to 33 percent) used this typically relational resource. Male managerial roles (direct superior, office boss or higher-status executive) are those most frequently quoted so we can assume that relations in the workplace are those which may most effectively contribute, together with professional skills, to attaining high positions. Family relations came second, with mainly women taking on a mentoring role in family relations and in working relations between colleagues of equal status. Political relations are third followed by the other resources with fairly low contributions.

In detail, two structural aspects became clear: associations between the groups of leaders, and association between elites and mentors. In order to

simplify the analysis of the findings, we first examined the roles of mentoring exercised by males, as these were found to be the most numerous, and then mentoring by females.

If we examine the graph relative to male mentoring, we see a detailed picture of the structure which connects the roles of leaders to those of mentors (Figure 4). In fact it may be seen from the projection of the variables, that there are three nuclei. The upper-left nucleus is centred on political elites and the upper-right one on economic elites. Within each nucleus there are different groups of leaders from which we can measure the connections with mentoring roles.

Looking at the diagram, we see that there are some mentoring roles which are connected to specific roles of leadership, while other roles are less specialized. For example, the economic elites of group 2 countries are connected to high-status managerial mentoring roles, while the political elites in the same countries are diametrically opposed, and connected to the mentoring roles exercised by politicians.



Figure 4 *Male Mentoring Roles*

Key

M = Males
F = Females
PL = Political leaders
BL = Business leaders
SD = Social democracy
ME = Market economy
ND = New democracy

V 1 Mentors (man) peer in workplace
V 2 Mentors (man) CEO or other higher-level executive
V 3 Mentors (man) family member
V 4 Mentors (man) political acquaintance
V 5 Mentors (man) supervisor in workplace
V 6 Mentors (man) educator
V 7 Mentors (man) friend/colleague in other organization
V 8 Mentors (man) religious acquaintance

As was discovered for other structures of relations, the two groups of elites are distinct from each other, but also have notable internal homogeneity.

The two groups of leaders are clearly distinct. More specifically, it appears from the figure that both male and female political leaders in group 2 countries occupy positions which are very close to each other and distant from all other groups. This means that their structures are fairly homogeneous with regards to the use of the relational resources in question i.e. the connection with political roles. Male and female political leaders in group 1 countries occupy a position which leads one to presume substantial homogeneity, at least in terms of mentoring relations in the sphere of the family, religious and acquaintances in work organizations. The positions of male and female leaders in group 3 countries differ. In the case of females, mentoring roles are more connected to the family sphere, while male connections are less focused. Gender differences are mainly present in these countries similarly for business leaders. Male relations are stronger with direct superiors or those of higher status, while for females they are not so strong.

The economic elites display a more closely knit structure in that the relations between the roles mainly concern superiors in the workplace and acquaintances in other work organizations. The differences between male and female mentoring in economic elites are comparatively higher than in political elites.

Female mentoring roles were examined in a separate analysis (Figure 5). In the structure obtained the connections are much closer and nearer to the centre of the diagram. It should be noted that the location of the points on the diagram is strongly influenced by distance between religious and political roles. In this kind of analysis, the further away the points are from the centre of the diagram, the more they are characterized by their own structure and a lack of connection with all the other roles. So we see that female mentoring relations develop primarily in the family sphere, then in the workplace between peers, and finally between friends and colleagues in other organizations. This is in contrast to the male model, where differences between types of elites are increasingly subtle. Although groups can be distinguished from each other, they are still very densely clustered in the central area.

Therefore relational models of political and economic leaders are close to each other with regard to the question on mentoring, positive answers were between one and two. So the percentage of those stating that they had been sponsored by more than two people in their careers was very low. In the workplace male managers (direct superior, office boss or manager of higher status) have more often sponsored the careers of their subordinates. Sponsoring by family members came next. Women relatives and work colleagues sponsored the careers of their relatives and colleagues and thirdly political contacts constituted a relational resource.

From the results it appears that differences in mechanisms of career advancement depend mainly on the sector of activity. The politico-economic



Figure 5 *Female Mentoring Roles*

Key

M = Males	F = Females
PL = Political leaders	BL = Business leaders
SD = Social democracy	ME = Market economy
ND = New democracy	

V 1	Mentors (woman) peer in workplace
V 2	Mentors (woman) CEO or other higher-level executive
V 3	Mentors (woman) family member
V 4	Mentors (woman) political acquaintance
V 5	Mentors (woman) supervisor in workplace
V 6	Mentors (woman) educator
V 7	Mentors (woman) friend/colleague in other organization
V 8	Mentors (woman) religious acquaintance

systems of different countries do not influence the way in which careers progress. Last of all, gender does not have a clear-cut or decisive influence on that part of the career which depends on the recognition received by individuals from inside the network to which the respondent belongs.

The second phase of the analysis dealt with female mentors who were related to the respondents through family, workplace, friendships and political acquaintances. Women peers in the workplace tend to help each other followed by female help through family ties. Next come friends and colleagues in other organizations and in fourth place, political acquaintances. While, in the case of men's careers, relations with direct superiors and office managers take precedence, beneficial relations in women's careers include colleagues of the same status and family members. Independently of the occupational sector and of the country of residence, women exercising mentoring roles come either from the same area of work as the respondent, from the family or from the political domain.

Conclusion

Using network analysis, this article has looked at elites not in terms of the characteristics and social origins of the individual members but in terms of their social relations.

This analysis shows how relations involving traditional elites, like religious and military ones, are less dense than those involving trade union representatives, the technocrats of the bureaucratic apparatus and the representatives of international interest groups. We are clearly witnessing the modification of networks, with the rise of new figures alongside the traditional political and economic ones. Rather than a hypothesis of the 'circulation of elites', the results of our study appear to confirm a 'satellite, pluralist elitism' (Keller, 1963) extended to various groups and characterized by changes in behaviour according to situations, goals and the specific nature of each individual institution. Various forms of interaction exist like meetings, formal and informal encounters, written information and the media all of which favour the opening up of various social groups, the intensifying of relations and democratization.

There are no other groups of elites (cultural, sporting, entertainment, military, religious, etc.) in our study and therefore no comparisons can be made for these groups. Nevertheless, what emerges is that the leaders of other institutions who enter into relations with our respondents constitute closely knit networks which interact reciprocally on the formation and action of other elite sectors. Our findings also show that the superimposition of interests and functions in the institutional domain to which political and economic leaders belong makes them interrelate with each other thus reinforcing the sense of cohesion and homogeneity between them. The results of this study mediate between strongly specialized elites (Keller, 1963) and strongly integrated ones, where the trend towards specialization is quite marked, but where there are also situations of interaction as a product of the intersection of institutional interests. In other words, in the various networks of relations studied, the trend is that each elite interacts mainly within its own institutional domain. This however does not preclude interaction with elites of different institutional areas.

The resources needed to become part of an elite include social origin, level of education and personal ability but also interaction in the appropriate social circles. Leaders have an intricate network of 'cliques' which overlap at different levels and extend beyond the network of institutional relations. As for mentoring, such connections have not so much involved the respondents as passive, but rather as active subjects. In line with studies by other scholars we also found that the types of behaviour observed were substantially similar as elites rule in a manner which is independent of social system and of ideologies (Marger, 1987).

The main goal of this study was to investigate the ways in which elite women might contribute to the formation of networks of relations different from those of males. Historical events like modernization and life itself have

led women to become part of elites and have certainly impacted on the way in which they interpret leadership roles. In fact, the data show that women tend to construct formal and informal networks of relations focused mainly on their field of activity although they also cultivate external relations with administrative chiefs, trade union representatives and the chief officers of major corporations. The results obtained here seem to confirm those of other studies on the characteristics of women in the working place such as their readiness to listen to others, to be open and supportive, and do their work with a keen sense of responsibility. Therefore, women do not tend to imitate the male model, but tend to bring their own specific, particular qualities into the workplace. So the distinction made by Parsons between the 'expressive' roles typical of women and 'instrumental' roles characteristic of men is relevant here. Male/female differences are more marked in groups 1 and 3 countries than in group 2 countries.

Male/female differences are more evident in the activation of informal channels, where social relations are external to work. Unlike their male colleagues, elite women are less likely to be members of various kinds of association perhaps because of family commitments.

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Gender Differences in Access to and Exercise of Power

Mino Vianello

This article consists of two parts: in the first, we deal with access to power, in the second with exercise of power.

A short theoretical note on the phenomenon which is power is necessary, although even a mere hint at the history of the concept or any attempt to give an exhaustive definition of it would take us too far from our topic and would therefore be inappropriate here (for an introduction to the problem of power and its history, see Lukes, 1986).

Yet, in explaining the parameters used in this article in order to measure power, the reader will immediately realize that the way they are constructed is in the end inextricably tied up with the conception one has of the phenomenon. Consequently, although we are interested in giving here a definition of power only in relation to its accessibility and exercise, we cannot avoid considering it per se.

In the context of our research study, which investigates the behaviour of elite actors in complex organizations of various kinds, power is seen as the possibility that these people have to give orders to subordinates, who accept them in the prescribed spheres. It is, to put it concisely, the Weberian concept of authority (in its stricter sense of *Herrschaft*) upon which our parameters are based.

In other words, we restrict ourselves to forms of intervention which succeed in inducing in subordinates – i.e. in the people who are formally members of the organization – behaviours that, at least to a greater extent, respond to the will (that is, to an intentional decision) of the person who gives the order.

It is beyond our scope to dwell on the variety of forms that power and the exercise of it can take, or focus on how in every act of power they are all present to a greater or smaller degree. It is enough to stress that power manifests itself through a decision which leads to an order. The exercise of power implies always, therefore, a cost: an investment of energies which clashes with a more or less strong (rarely no) resistance from the receiver of the order.

Our focus is, consequently, on the ability to overcome this resistance and get the desired result, without considering the reasons why obedience is

given (such reasons may go from the noblest and most rational to the basest, or to mere passivity) or the nature of whoever is giving the orders (a firm, for instance, on the basis of the Weberian model, should embody the principle of formal rationality, but in reality may function on the grounds of a paternalistic approach of a traditional kind, for instance following the philosophy of the firm's founder).

The measure adopted here varies by area as well as quantity of power in a specific context (Dahl, 1961). It depends on the limits and needs of the overall research design, which does not deal with power in its broadest sense. A study of this kind should involve examining what we call a 'negative' conception of power: that is, the underlying structure that conditions people, shaping their conscience and identity – following in the steps of Marx, Veblen, Freud and the Frankfurt School (in whose framework Foucault too may be included).

We are, therefore, aware of the limits of our approach.

Access to Power

The question we ask is whether women who have made it to the highest levels of public life had a more privileged 'background': that is, more advantages or more opportunities in comparison with equally successful men, or whether, on the other hand, they should be considered as exceptional individuals.

What do we mean by 'background'?[1] Perhaps the educational level of the parents, on one side, and whether they performed a supervisory role in their own careers, on the other, supply the best criteria to gauge the phenomenon. Table 1 presents data on our respondents' parents' educational attainment.

It is clear that the educational level of the women leaders' parents is much

Table 1 *Mother's and Father's Education by Respondent's Gender (in percentages)*

	Mother		Father	
Educational level	M	F	M	F
Elementary not completed	2.0	1.6	2.3	0.7
Elementary completed	22.8	15.8	15.8	9.1
Junior secondary	23.7	21.0	19.1	14.4
Senior secondary	22.5	23.4	16.4	15.6
Vocational training	11.0	16.1	12.3	16.9
Bachelor's degree	11.6	14.7	16.7	20.9
Master's	5.2	6.1	13.1	16.0
PhD	1.2	1.3	4.4	6.4
N total	653.0	685.0	667.0	699.0
	$p = .006$		$p = .003$	

Table 2 *Supervisory Functions of the Parents by Respondent's Gender (in percentages)*

	Mother		Father	
Educational level	M	F	M	F
Supervisory functions yes	28.3	38.4	67.8	75.4
Supervisory functions no	71.7	61.6	32.2	24.6
N total	305	354	612	642
	$p = 0.006$		$p = 0.003$	

higher than that of the male leaders' parents. In other words, elite women need a stronger cultural background, with its implications at the personal and social level, than elite men to reach their same position.

Another index used by Liddle and Michielsens (2000) to highlight the impact of the family of origin is whether the parents had a job with supervisory functions when the respondent was 14 years old (see Table 2).

This measure – although not as strong as the educational measure because the data show that a large number of mothers were housewives and we do not know anything about their activities and why they did not work – nevertheless indicates that a higher percentage of elite women's parents had jobs involving a supervisory role in comparison with elite men. Once more, women need a more favourable background to attain the same power positions men do.

As far as the two categories the sample is taken from, political and business elites, the impact of the privileged background origin is much more marked for the business than the political elite (Liddle and Michielsens, 2000; data not shown). Only two comparisons, both concerning the father (education and managerial responsibility), are significant for both categories.

Access to top business positions requires, therefore, a much more privileged background than access to top political positions. This may be explained on the grounds of the autocratic nature of corporations where democratic mechanisms of selection are virtually non-existent.

In both sectors, however, women need more resources than men to achieve the same result.

The country grouping we adopt here, following Liddle and Michielsens (2000), differs slightly from the one indicated in the article by Sansonetti (this issue). In order to test their hypothesis, Liddle and Michielsens assembled the countries on the basis of their economic and political structure, maintaining that the history of policies aimed at mitigating social differences affects the way social divisions interact with gender. On this basis, Greece and Portugal were included in country group 2, i.e. the group of full regime capitalist countries.

The differences between the three groups are very strong indeed. In the

former socialist countries the impact of parents' background is never significant; in the social-democratic countries in only one case (the mother's education); in group 2 in all comparisons. The conclusion drawn by Liddle and Michielsens, which we share, is therefore that, where an effort was made, as in groups 1 and 3, to attenuate the impact of social origins, the findings prove that gender is not an independent variable, and that the production of gender power is connected to the structure of social stratification in terms of the background of the family of origin. This factor, however defined,[2] clearly plays a central role in the female challenge to male monopoly as far as public power is concerned.

Exercise of Power

In this section we develop the analysis of gender differences with respect to the perception of the use of power that elite members have in the performance of their functions. This is an issue widely debated theoretically (Dahl, 1990, 1991), but much less explored empirically, and almost not at all from the point of view of gender (Frey, 1993; Nagel, 1995; Wright, 1997).

In analysing this phenomenon, the variable considered is not the formal hierarchy of offices endowed with different degrees of power, but *the impact office-holders feel they have in carrying out their functions.*

All in all, realistically, our respondents evaluate the level of their own power between 'moderate' and 'much'. The gender difference is not significant, although women tend to give a lower estimate of their own power (especially in the countries of group 3 and this may be, above all, the result of social and cultural policies in countries of long-established egalitarianism, where to state that one has much power is usually considered unbecoming – a feeling women in general tend to be more prone to than men).

Given the specific object of this research – gender difference – the question is whether women's lower degree of the exercise of power, as it is perceived by them, is due to structural barriers or not.

In order to investigate this issue, government members, representatives who play a role in legislative offices (like chairs or vice-chairs of parliamentary or senate committees and of the respondent's own party group in the parliament or senate, etc.) and party leaders are treated separately from one another within the category of political leaders and, of course, from business leaders.

The indices used are based on a factor analysis carried out on all variables concerning the exercise of power as perceived by the respondents,[3] which for lack of space cannot be reported here. They vary from category to category: six variables for the government members, five for incumbents of legislative offices, 11 for political leaders and 13 for business leaders. The indices, built on the basis of a five-point Likert scale, consist of the following items:

1 Political leaders
   a Government members (118 cases):
   'If in the last year you, as a member of the cabinet, have taken an initiative which was initially opposed by the majority of the members of it, how often did you eventually succeed in winning their support?'
   'How much influence do you have as a member of the government on matters of national importance?'
   – 'On matters in your sphere of responsibility?'
   – 'On what goes on in the ministry under your jurisdiction?'
   b Holders of legislative offices (476 cases):
   'If in the last year you took initiatives that were originally opposed by the majority of the members of your own party group in the parliament or senate, how often did you eventually succeed in winning their support?'
   'If in the last year you took initiatives that were originally opposed by the majority of the members of parliament or senate committee you are a member of, how often did you eventually succeed in winning their support?'
   c Party leaders (157 cases):
   'If in the last year you took initiatives that were originally opposed by the majority of the members of your own party's executive committee, how often did you succeed in winning their support?'
   'How much influence do you have over the decisions adopted by your party?'
   – 'On the party apparatus?'
   – 'On the strategies which are necessary to implement the decisions of the executive committee?'

2 Business leaders (862 cases):
   'How much influence do you have in your organization concerning work arrangements and decisions of who will do what?'
   – 'Financial and budget decisions?'
   – 'Hiring new employees?'
   – 'Promotion and transfer?'
   – 'Selecting your own staff?
   – 'Policy and strategy decisions?'

In order to make comparisons between women and men that may take into account broad sociocultural contexts, the countries are grouped in the three categories described in Sansonetti's article (this issue, p. 326). The average of the factor scores is shown in Table 3.

As expected, the level of perception of the exercise of power is, in the first two groups of countries, higher for business leaders,[4] who enjoy an almost autocratic authority within their corporations, above all in the countries of the first group, that is the less developed countries.

Besides this, for both women and men members of the government and party leaders, the index increases, passing from the first grouping of

Table 3 *Factor Scores of the Perception of the Exercise of Power by Gender and Country Group*[a]

	Political leaders							
	Government members		Legislative office holders		Party leaders		Business leaders	
Countries	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Group 1								
	Mn –4.2,	Mx 1.5	Mn –1.8,	Mx 2.4	Mn –2.7,	Mx 2.5	Mn –2.8,	Mx 1.2
Means	–.92	–.08	.33	.24	–.31	–.35	.42	.28
N	12	10	55	59	20	22	74	75
t-test	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
Group 2								
	Mn –2.4,	Mx 1.8	Mn –3.2,	Mx 2.4	Mn –2.8,	Mx 2.5	Mn –4.2,	Mx 1.2
Means	–.30	–.07	–.15	–.07	.00	.11	–.04	–.25
N	24	38	166	132	36	17	217	233
t-test	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		$p = .03$	
Group 3								
	Mn –.93,	Mx 1.8	Mn –3.2,	Mx 2.4	Mn –1.1,	Mx 2.4	Mn –2.6,	Mx 1.2
Means	.72	.64	.24	.04	.35	.42	.17	.21
N	16	12	32	46	10	13	61	74
t-test	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	

[a] These are the scores obtained on the first factor with the analysis of principal components. Only one case was found, in which a second factor with an eigenvalue higher than 1 was discovered: in the case of the cabinet members, with a contribution of 25.6 percent to the explanation of variance. The contributions of the factors to the explanation of the variance are the following: political leaders: government 49.5 percent, legislative offices 72.7 percent, party leaders 60.2 percent, business leaders 50.1 percent.

countries to the second and from the second to the third, while it shapes up as a parabola as far as the other two categories (holders of legislative offices and business leaders) are concerned: a possible sign that a step forward in socioeconomic development is matched for both genders by a more marked perception of exercise of power on the side of members of the government and party leaders, while for the other categories operating in the countries of the second group it brings along a reduction of the level of the perception of the exercise of power, probably as a consequence of the conspicuous increase in the need to mediate between the various interest groups which characterize fully blown market societies.

Gender differences tend to be minute. The *t*-test shows that there is only one statistically significant score, in favour of male business leaders. In all other cases, differences are non-significant. As a matter of fact, in five cases women's scores are higher than men's.

The question, then, is: if the perception of the exercise of power on the side of women is not lower than men's, are the factors that promote it respectively for women and for men the same?

Given the gap between men and women as far as access to the public sphere is concerned, exhaustively documented by both the literature and real-life experience, it is reasonable to suppose that, at an equal level of perception of the exercise of power, women are backed by more favourable conditions than men (Verba et al., 1978; Vianello et al., 1990). More specifically, we can hypothesize, although it is true for all people that family of origin and family of orientation have a strong impact on participation in public life (Bourdieu, 1987, 1989; Crompton, 1993), parents' and partner's status count more for women than men.

At the society level, if Inglehart (1997) is correct, we should find that, as far as gender differences in terms of social advantages are concerned, countries rank from less developed to free market, to social democracies.

Also, again with reference to the same author's thesis concerning the transformation from modern to postmodern society (Inglehart, 1997), we can surmise that in the less developed countries the factors that explain the amount of power women perceive they exercise tend to be more of an external nature (parents' and partner's status), while in the others – and above all in the social-democratic countries – of an internal nature (values).

Finally, we can also surmise that, in general, father's and partner's status count for women more than interactive factors (like informal flow of information, economic and political contacts, etc.).

In order to verify these hypotheses, female and male members of the political and business elites were compared with respect to 26 individual socioeconomic variables concerning: careers, ways of access to power, parents' and spouse's status, support received, education, visibility, affiliation to associations and hierarchical position, controlling for the level of the perception of power exercise. Of course, unfortunately we do not know whether these variables have the same degree of importance in all countries and what their relative importance is with respect to one another.

The variables used are as follows:

1 Career:
   a Number of months the present office has been held;
   b Increment of the prestige inherent to the office held by the respondent from the first occupation to the penultimate, the last and the present (three indices were used to measure it);
   c Whether the respondent held top offices in big organizations;
   d And how many.

   For political leaders only:

   e Number of months' affiliation to a party;
   f And number of years the respondent held one or more offices in the party;
   g Number of years the respondent held offices in the government;
   h Number of years the respondent held offices at the legislative level (like chair of a parliamentary or senate committee and of one's own party group in parliament or senate, etc.).

   For business leaders only:

   i Number of years the respondent held an elective political office (in the party or the public apparatus) at the three levels: local, intermediate, national.
2 Ways of access to power:
   a Access to information via informal channels;
   b Evaluation of this information from the point of view of the possibility it grants to perform one's job efficiently;
   c Frequency of political contacts with (index):
      – members of legislature;
      – prime minister;
      – government members;
      – national party leaders.
   d Frequency of contacts of an economic nature with:
      – top managers of major corporations;
      – representatives of national or international interest groups;
      – trade union leaders.
3 Parents' and spouse's status (index):
   a Mother's;
   b Father's;
   c Spouse's.
4 Help in the career:
   a Political involvement of the family of origin (index);
   b Loyalty towards and contacts with key people in political and non-political organizations, to have worked as an assistant of a high dignitary;
   c Number of patrons who protected the respondent's career.

5 Education:
   a Highest degree achieved;
   b Number of years of school completed;
   c Whether the respondent attended mainly a private or state school;
   d Discipline in which the respondent achieved university degree.
6 Visibility:
   This index reflects the frequency with which the respondent in the last year:
   a Took the floor at public meetings;
   b Appeared on the radio or television;
   c Published articles in periodicals;
   d Was interviewed by the media.
7 Affiliation with associations:
   This index is the sum of the affiliation to the following associations:
   a Professional;
   b Social or sport clubs;
   c Religious organizations;
   d Rotary, Lions, etc.;
   e Military circles;
   f Trade unions;
   g Women's organizations.
8 Hierarchical position (business leaders only):
   a Number of direct subordinates;
   b Number of hierarchical levels above the respondent.

We can now verify the hypothesis that, given an equal level of perception of exercise of power, women are backed up by more favourable conditions than men.

Results

Government Members

The hypothesis is only very partially confirmed. At the low and medium levels of the perception of the exercise of power,[5] out of 26 possible comparisons (that is, as many as the variables considered) between men and women who are alike in terms of perception of the exercise of power, 20 do not show any significant difference between male and female leaders. Out of these 20, only seven show higher scores for women. There is only one significant difference (none highly significant) indicating that women enjoy better conditions, and an evocative one, that higher percentages of women than men attended state school (contrary to the stereotype that considers private schooling as a privileged channel of access to power).

At the high level of the perception of the exercise of power, while, if the hypothesis were true, an increase in the number of significant differences should have been found, the picture does not substantially change:

19 non-significant comparisons, with women showing a more privileged condition only in seven cases. Yet, in support of the hypothesis, two highly significant differences appear relative to variables that are traditionally most heavily discriminatory for women: the father's and spouse's status.

Comparing the picture concerning the two levels of the perception of the exercise of power, it appears clearly that the three variables which to a relevant extent tend to diverge between men and women are: the mother's status, from non-significant to suggestive; the father's, from significant to highly significant; and the spouse's, from non-significant to highly significant. The difference concerning the variable in relation to affiliation to associations evolves in the same direction, that is to say, from non-significant to 'suggestive'.

As far as members of the government are concerned, consequently, it is justified to uphold the view that women and men do not belong to distinct universes, with women privileged by a constellation of more favourable conditions than men. Yet, in general and especially moving from the lower to the higher levels of the perception of the exercise of power, women appear to come from a superior social background to men.

Holders of Legislative Offices

The hypothesis appears to be even less valid for this category, which, being numerous, allows for a tripartition in terms of the perception of exercise of power: low, medium, high.

At the low level, no comparison is significant, and only in eight cases do women enjoy better conditions.

At the medium level, 13 comparisons are non-significant, of which seven reveal better conditions for women. One comparison hints at the hypothesis (mother's status); four are significant, but of these only one (concerning the spouse's status) supports the hypothesis; and four are highly significant, but show that men enjoy more privileged conditions![6]

The contingency coefficient concerning education shows a highly significant difference between men and women: men outdo women with regard to degrees in law and economics; women outdo men with regard to those who do not hold a university degree, achieved a degree in engineering (contrary to a common stereotype, a significant association with this discipline will be found also for other categories) and in the category 'other'.

At the high level, 21 non-significant comparisons are found, out of which only eight point in the direction of better conditions for women. To have had the support of a mentor is the only significant comparison which indicates a more advantageous condition for women.

The hypothesis, therefore, is tendentially rejected, especially when the high level of perception of power exercise is considered. It is at the medium level that women benefit to a highly significant extent from more favourable conditions as far as the affiliation with associations and, to a more modest extent, social origin are concerned.

It looks as if for this category, the more women feel they exercise power, the less they benefit from advantageous conditions. The stereotype which maintains that successful women are backed by privileged conditions does not hold. In fact, it appears to pertain more to men.

It is reasonable to argue that, since the fortunes of this category depend to a great extent on electoral mechanisms typical of democratic systems, personal qualities may count more than contextual advantages: people at the top, as is the case with our respondents, are highly motivated, and women especially eager to emerge as individuals.

Party Leaders

At the low and medium levels, out of 23 comparisons, 19 are not significant, and 10 of them point in the direction of more advantageous conditions for women. Barely four comparisons are significant, of which only two (spouse's status and number of mentors) support the hypothesis.

With regard to education, a pattern emerges showing that there is a greater number of women graduating in engineering and, vice versa, of men in law.

Comparing the low and medium with the high level of perception of the exercise of power, only one – easily explainable – difference, concerning the length of party affiliation, appears, which changes from a non-significant (in the direction of a more advantageous condition for women) to a significant comparison.

Business Leaders

At the low level of the perception of the exercise of power, no statistically relevant, not even suggestive, comparison (yet, 14 indicate a better condition for women) emerges out of 24 comparisons.

At the medium level, there are 22 non-significant comparisons, of which 11 point in the direction of a more favourable condition for women. The only (highly) significant comparison in support of the hypothesis concerns the spouse's status.

Although the contingency coefficient is highly significant, it is not justified to state that women enjoyed privileged conditions in terms of education: in fact, they achieved to a larger extent than males a vocational degree and a baccalaureate or a master's, while men tend to bunch to a higher proportion at the extremes – junior and senior high school, on one side, and a doctorate, on the other.

At the high level of perception of the exercise of power, 14 non-significant comparisons are found, of which seven support the hypothesis of a favourable condition for women. Out of the four significant comparisons, only one shows a favourable condition for women (access, via informal channels, to information conducive to job efficiency) and three (mother's, father's and spouse's status) out of the five highly significant ones show favourable conditions for women.

With regard to university curriculum, a suggestive association between the number of men who graduated in economics and the number of women in engineering is found.

The hypothesis does not appear to be strongly upheld for this category either, above all for the low and medium levels of the perception of exercise of power (it is noteworthy that, comparing one level with the other, the only difference that emerges concerns the spouse's status), while it appears more probable for the high level (access, via informal channels, to information conducive to job efficiency, and mother's, father's and spouse's status).

We repeat that, unfortunately, we do not know the relative weight of these conditions and whether it is the same in all countries. However, even if approximately, the results are in the same direction and do not lend themselves to divergent interpretations.

In conclusion, the hypothesis that elite women need a constellation of conditions more favourable than elite men in order to feel that they exert the same amount of power appears to respond to a stereotype more than to reality – with the exception to a reasonable extent for the support deriving from the father's and, above all, the spouse's status.

However, even if the traditional factors concerning the status of the family of origin and family of orientation appear to have an impact of some relevance on discriminating elite men and women in terms of their perception of their ability to exert power, for both women and men in none of the three groupings of countries does this ability depend heavily on these variables. Even merely suggestive correlations for the different categories within the three groupings of countries are very rare, and do not indicate any difference in the direction of the hypothesis put forth. Nor are significant differences (Fisher transformation) found between the correlation coefficients referring to males and those referring to females within the same categories by groupings of countries. Status, therefore, whether ascribed or acquired, at the top level counts only to a modest extent.

We may wonder, at this point, which of the most relevant variables examined so far has more predictive power in explaining the phenomenon under consideration.

The multiple classification analysis by category of respondents, carried out on the following variables used as predictors – father's and spouse's status, response regarding women's decisional autonomy,[7] access to informal channels of information conducive to job efficiency, and economic and political contacts[8] shows that they have only a moderate impact (the R ranges from .19 for female business leaders to .29 for male political leaders, with an average of .23).

For both male and female political leaders, structural facts inherent to informal networks of communication come to the foreground, followed by the father's status for males and the value of decisional autonomy for females.

Also for male business leaders, informal communications and contacts (in this case – as one would expect – of an economic nature) come to the

foreground, followed this time, however, by the spouse's status. For female business leaders, the spouse's status comes to the foreground together with economic contacts and informal communications.

There is no correlation between male and female top leaders. In fact, Spearman's rho between the rank orders, on one hand, of the beta weights of the male political leaders and of those of women and, on the other hand, of the beta weights of male business leaders and of those of women are in both cases .06: that is, of almost absolute indifference, which means that the rank order with which the items affect the phenomenon under consideration is not the same for both genders.

The results obtained support only very lightly the hypothesis that factors of a personal nature – social conditions and values – explain for women elites rather than for their male counterparts the level of the perception of the exercise of power in comparison with interactive factors like the flow of informal communication and economic and political contacts.

A more detailed analysis, designed to control for the subcategories of the political respondents as well as the groupings of countries, sustains the hypothesis better than the global analysis does. In the first place, the explained variance of the perception of the exercise of power increases (from a minimum of .27 for the male business leaders of the less developed countries and of the fully blown free market countries to a maximum of .90 for the male and female party leaders of the less developed countries [the average rises to .49]); and, in the second place, the impact of the predictors changes with gender. The rank orders of the beta weights relative to the variables under consideration computed on all subcategories by groupings of countries show that the father's status, which comes in second place for women, has a negligible impact for men. Also the spouse's status has a larger impact for women than for men. Vice versa, the 'external' (structural) variables, concerning political and economic contacts, which play a minor role for women, come in first place for males. The value of decisional autonomy for women, finally, has – as expected – a larger impact for women than for men; besides, for the latter, the opinion that women prefer not to be autonomous as far as decision-making is concerned prevails!

It is interesting to observe that the access to informal channels of information ranks in third place for both, but in a different context: for males after contacts with the economic and political world, for women after status.

As far as differences between groupings of countries are concerned, the rank order of the variables considered testifies to the fact that in the less developed countries the value of decisional autonomy for women, totally absent among men, appears to play a very modest role also among women, while the status of the father and of the spouse count more for women than men; in the fully blown free market countries, status, especially of the spouse, also matters – and even more so – for women than men, while for men the major impact derives from contacts; in the social democracies, in line with Inglehart's thesis, for women the value of decisional autonomy switches to first place.

In general, the father's and above all the spouse's status, important for women more than for men in the power elite, shows up among the relevant factors in all situations. For males, however, it ranks after contacts, especially of a political nature.

The analysis carried out controlling for the functions performed (i.e. the three categories of political leaders, and that of business leaders) validates that the factors which influence the perception of the exercise of power tend to shape up in a slightly different way for elite women and for elite men: for the latter, it stems above all from a network of contacts established in a life course, while for the former it appears to be more the effect of inherited resources that facilitate getting access to the centres and channels of power.

One may wonder whether gender differences in terms of the exercise of power appear with regard to the areas the respondents were active in during the preceding year (for a more detailed analysis, see Drew, 2000). But the cluster analysis does not evidence such differences, although a more articulated tendency to deal with these matters emerges on the side of men. Yet, it is necessary to recall that these are the areas respondents were active in, but we do not know how much, and what their level of interest in these areas was and what results they achieved. Besides, it is also necessary to keep separate the ideological from the technico-political level: for instance, one person may fight for disarmament in terms of civic mobilization, while another might to so at the political, economic and legislative level. However, the clusters are as shown in Figure 1.

Clusters for men and women coincide to a certain extent (we provide evidence of this by underlining the areas and using bold or italic type: for instance, the first cluster for males includes the same areas we find in the first cluster for females, except 'Agriculture' and 'Industry' which for males appear in the second cluster, and 'Family' which for females appears in the

Figure 1 *Gender Cluster by Areas in which Political Leaders Have Been Active in the Year Preceding the Study*

Males	Females
1. Culture, Energy, Traffic, Assistance to elderly people, State property, Family, Monuments, Postal services and telecommunications, Gender equality, Disarmament	1. **Agriculture**, **Industry**, Assistance to elderly people, Culture, Defence, Postal services and telecommunications, State property, Energy, **Transportation**, Disarmament, Monuments, **Traffic**, **Public works**
2. **Agriculture**, **Industry**, **Transportation**, Human rights, Immigration, **Public works**	2. Constitutional affairs, Human rights, Immigration, Finances
3. Defence, **Pensions**, *Justice*, **Health**, *Work*	3. Foreign affairs, Education, **Health**, **Pensions**, Treasury
4. Environment, Constitutional Affairs, Education, Finances	4. Environment, ***Justice***, Family, ***Work***, Internal affairs
5. Treasury, Budget	5. Gender equality
6. Foreign affairs	
7. Internal affairs	

fourth cluster, and 'Gender equality', which for females appears in the fifth cluster), but not completely.[9]

The lower degree of specificity of female clusters indicates perhaps a lower degree of power. This is true especially as far as the three key areas of 'Treasury', 'Internal affairs' and 'Foreign affairs' are concerned, which for men represent areas of absolute absorption that do not mix with others, while for women they match with other areas without too much coherence (see for instance cluster 3 which involves deeply dissimilar fields that presuppose different technical backgrounds).

Conclusion

Contrary to what we found with respect to access to power, no relevant differences in terms of the perception of their exercise of power appear to exist between women and men who hold top positions in public life, although for men, more than for women, it seems to be factors of a structural nature that have an impact on the phenomenon here considered. Yet, this is only a tendency, which does not alter a substantially homogeneous picture.

It seems that, while to enter the elite of power women need more advantageous conditions than men, once they are in, the input required to feel that they exert power to the same extent as their male counterparts does not demand from them more favourable prerequisites than it demands from men (Vianello et al., 1990; Wright, 1997).

In fact, as we have seen, it is even possible to detect in some cases the opposite tendency: men need to enjoy a better situation than women in order to feel that they exert as much power as women do.

This holds true in general and within each of the three groups of countries as well as comparing groups of countries.

We are entitled to conclude, therefore, that one of the main pillars of the traditional approach to elites, which considered them the typical and exclusive monopoly of men, is questioned by these findings, because, while we know that nowadays there are women at the highest levels of public life, we did not know, prior to this research, that they are equal to men in feeling that they exercise power to the same extent as men without the need to be backed by more favourable conditions.

Notes

1 Tables 1 and 2 in this article are reproduced from Liddle and Michielsens (2000), who used several other indices to analyse this phenomenon.

2 Liddle and Michielsens prefer to adopt a Marxist terminology, relying heavily in their analysis on Wright's work. For an analysis of women's position in the post-Communist countries, see Siemieńska (1999), and in the Scandinavian countries, see Bergqvist et al. (1999).

3 For a general treatment of the issue, see Frey (1993).

4 No inter-category comparison, strictly speaking, is possible on the ground of these scores, since indices are built on different items. Yet, these items being homogeneous, in the sense that they are all based on Likert scales, the reader can get an approximate indication from them: for instance, the range of greatest variation is found among members of the government, the smallest among business leaders, which looks realistic.

5 The scores of the index of power exercise were split. Where – as in the case of the members of government, for instance – the low number did not allow for a tripartition into 'low'–'medium'–'high', 'low–medium' indicated scores below the average and 'high' indicated the scores above the average. Since these are factor scores, the average is 0. In the other cases a tripartition in percentiles was done.

6 These items are: having held top offices in major organizations, and how many; seniority in the present office; and frequency of political contacts (see item 2c).

7 This is a five-point indicator of agreement–disagreement with the statement 'This is what women prefer' with reference to the statement 'There are more men than women holding top positions in society'.

8 See, respectively, items 2c and 2d in the list of variables.

9 In the case of 'Justice' and 'Work' the reader should note the use of underlining, bold and italic type in the figure.

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Conclusions

Main Findings

Family

Women elites, di Stefano and Pinnelli find in their article, are in a different situation in respect to men as far as family is concerned. In fact, their partners are men often superior to them in educational and occupational rank, while the opposite is true in the families of male leaders.

Furthermore, they do not escape the burden of the double workload: housework and childcare are not usually shared, and this is probably one of the reasons why women elites' family life appears to be more discontinuous than that of men. In fact, they are less likely than men to form a union or have children (although one may suspect that some women prefer not to follow the traditional family patterns), often remain single after marriage breakdown or go through more than one union. In other words, women elites pay a high cost in terms of personal life compared to men.

While cultural and institutional contexts have no influence on the family behaviour of women leaders, they influence their fertility level: women elites in the Scandinavian countries tend to have at least one child compared to women elites in West and South Europe, whose fertility level is lower.

Career Paths

As to gender differences, Liebig and Sansonetti's article shows increasing similarities between women's and men's careers to the top, in terms of, for example, the professional resources or the time-span needed to get to the very top. Especially in the economic sphere, we find generational changes that hint at a greater awareness on the part of companies that it is worth their while to integrate and promote women: in fact, we found that younger women need less time to reach the top in comparison with men of the same age. Nevertheless, these changes take place in the context of a general shortening of career steps in terms of time, although the demands remain the same, or even increase. The strongest changes in this sense characterize the professional and political biographies of elites in the post-Communist countries, while the comparatively greatest continuity of time-related patterns of career is found in the Scandinavian countries.

These developments and changes in male and female career trajectories are reflected in the fact that elite members no longer consider the most important determinants of careers to be seniority and loyalty, but knowledge and expertise.

Generally speaking, business leaders prepare early for their careers. They have had to make the right decisions at the right time from their teenage years onwards, choosing the right environment wherein they obtain a consistent social capital to invest during their future career. On the other hand, even if top political leadership positions appear easier to attain thanks to democratic electoral mechanisms, this is actually not the case due to a selection process based on cultural capital or on professional experience.

Style of Leadership

Gender substantially affects leadership style, as shown in Nicolaou-Smokoviti's article: women appear to be more democratic, more inclined to share power, ready for non-competitive ways of communication, trying to promote consensus and participation rather than imposing their ideas and personal projects. However, we also find that position in the hierarchy discriminates equally among women in the sense that those who are in a lower position appear to share the aforementioned characteristics to a higher degree. In other words, high levels of authority are related to a competitive, directive and risky leadership in the case of women also.

Age also has an impact on this tendency: older women, like older men, appear to be less democratic, adopting a rather stricter style of leadership.

Networks

Palgi and Moore's contribution examines mentoring and elite contacts separately, while Memoli's contribution analyses a larger set of informal networking measures simultaneously.

Both women and men – especially in business – reported having mentors earlier in their careers. Business leaders most often had mentors who were male supervisors at work. Few women and very few men in business had female mentors in the workplace, though some had them from their family and acquaintances. Political leaders of both sexes were somewhat less likely to have had mentors of any kind. Their mentors typically came from outside politics. Overall, women in both sectors relied more on mentors than did their male peers.

Men generally reported wider ranges of personal contacts with elites in the economic, political and civil society sectors than women did. A leader's position level is also important, with higher-level leaders reporting more contacts than others.

In answer to the question of which countries provide the best opportunities for women elite positions, we concluded that the social democratic countries show an advantage. This indicates the powerful effect of social equality policies and the resulting social structures that facilitate the movement towards equality in leadership.

In general, Memoli's article shows the modifications taking place in networking. The relations involving traditional elites, like the church and the military, are not so close as those involving trade union representatives,

the technocrats of the bureaucratic apparatus and representatives of international interest groups. This change points in the direction not so much of a circulation of elites, but of a kind of pluralist elitism: that is, somehow a democratization of elites.

Each of the two groups of elites tends to interact mainly within its own institutional domain, although they also have contacts with elites belonging to other institutional domains and with elites who are outside the sphere of power. This kind of tendency seems to be substantially the same in all countries.

As to gender differences, women tend to construct formal and informal networks which do not always pertain to their fields of activity. They not only give greater priority than men to exchanges within their own elite, but also pay attention to external relations: that is, with bureaucrats, trade union representatives, chief officers of major corporations, and also help other women.

This confirms the results of those studies that show women committed to doing a 'good' job. In this sense, they tend to diverge from and not to imitate the male model, expressing rather their resources in terms of solidarity and support.

This tendency towards a greater openness appears to be stronger in the countries that have known egalitarian policies: that is, the former socialist countries and the social democracies.

Women leaders tend also to be less affiliated than men with associations of various nature.

Power

Women leaders, as stated by Vianello in his article, referring to the work of Liddle and Michielsens, come from a higher social background than men who hold the same offices at the top of political or business hierarchies, although this difference is to a remarkable extent mitigated in the post-Communist countries and the social democracies: that is, where policies aimed at promoting egalitarianism have been pursued.

On the contrary, once women have gained access to power, the resources required in terms of background to feel that they exert power to the same extent as their male counterpart do not differ. In fact, the opposite tendency emerges: men seem to need to enjoy more favourable conditions than women in order to feel that they exert as much power as their counterparts do.

Values

Political and economic elites do not escape a general rule, Siemieńska states: people's values and orientations are affected by the history of their respective countries. In this sense, elite members resemble the rest of the population of their own countries.

However, political leaders are much more postmaterialistically oriented

than business leaders. This is true in all groups of countries. As to gender differences, women leaders, both in the political and the business elite, are more postmaterialistically oriented than men, and, especially in the political elite, tend to favour more than men an active role on the part of the government in economic matters in order to guarantee a just redistribution of resources. They also tend to emphasize more frequently and to a greater degree than men, the issue of gender discrimination in terms of socialization, promotion and work conditions, and chances to exercise power.

Attitudes towards gender inequality seem to hold a distinct position in the system of values. In fact, no clearly defined pattern emerges in terms of correlations with postmaterialistic or material values, although postmaterialistically oriented leaders show a slight tendency to consider this issue more frequently. Furthermore, preference for absence of government intervention or, on the contrary, for its active role in economic matters does not appear to be correlated with the perception of and attitudes towards gender inequality.

As far as countries are concerned, there are significant differences among them. Where, as in the Scandinavian countries, the social democratic governments established, in the course of time, more open and progressive institutions and supported an egalitarian ideology, more coherent value systems are found, in which greater attention to gender equality issues is present. On the other hand, the countries that have experienced profound changes in relatively recent times, such as the post-Communist countries, present elites without a coherent system of values and attitudes – elites which, however, seem to lean rather towards a conservative ideology.

Theoretical Implications

The contribution of this research to the theory of elites seems to us clear.

In the first place, we provide evidence that the belief that the public arena is a domain typically, exclusively and definitely open only to males – so that, if a few women are found in it, they have to be considered exceptions or tokens – is a misconception. Provided, of course, that no reaction – which is always possible – sets in and pushes women back into the household as their basic realm, from now on elite theorists have to study the phenomenon and take into consideration its changing composition.

The classical approach was based on the assumption that elites tend to be monolithic even when they are characterized by pluralism, since they are closely intertwined for social, economic and political reasons, and besides, are closed to outsiders. The main issue we believe we have raised concerns the question whether the entrance of women into the elites may start to change them. In fact, our study lends firm support to the hypothesis that more and more elites will become less unified and homogeneous, losing slowly the closed, caste-like aspect they have traditionally presented, and that one of the factors pushing in this direction is women's

presence in elite sectors. We cannot generalize this consideration, because our study is restricted to the political and business elites, but there are good reasons to think that this tendency will be found also in the elites of other areas.

Further, another question comes spontaneously to mind: will a strong, autonomous, lasting participation of women in top decision-making positions lead to a change in the mechanisms of power that traditionally characterize elites' activities?

These are, we believe, the main issues raised by this study, which can give only partial and tentative answers to them.

In fact, if there are differences between elite men and elite women, there are also many strong similarities – so that it is possible to see the entrance of women in top positions in public life either as a factor of change or as a factor of reproduction of the male logic. We may add that these dichotomies represent a static approach. As we discuss later, a new scenario is developing very fast on a world scale – globalization – in whose framework elite women may have to face an unexpected challenge. The costs women leaders have to bear at the personal level are too high (García de León, 1994) to expect that no change will take place in the way their careers develop and, consequently, in their relationships with their male counterparts.

We found also that younger women move up as fast as, and in fact faster than, men, and also that, once they reach top positions, they know how to handle power to the same extent as men.

Furthermore, both women's behaviour and orientation, especially among younger ones, appear to be more democratic, since they express values of openness, solidarity and a disposition to cooperate which are rarer among men. They show besides – as was to be expected – a greater sensitivity to the problem of gender inequality.

But there are at the same time many strong similarities, especially among women and men managers: a fact that may give support to the hypothesis that in the end women's participation in decision-making processes at the top of public life may reinforce the masculinist logic that has imbued it up to now. However, also in this event, the composition of elites would change deeply, due to pressures of different kinds, especially economic, resulting from globalization with its logic of competition.

In any case, therefore, we believe that this study should convince the elite theorists to revise their field of study – a field that some of them stated was by now exhausted and to which nothing more might be added. In fact, we are in the presence of an epochal transformation: the emergence of women as public subjects, a phenomenon which is taking place not only in the advanced parts of the world on which we concentrated our attention, but around the globe.

They should consider that the theory of elites was, in fact, formulated and elaborated in a world where women were excluded from power in the public domain and where men celebrated their deeds drawing support and inspiration from the myth of the 'Great Man', which we find explicitly, for

instance, at the roots of the philosophy of one of the most famous theorists, Max Weber (Bologh, 1990). The premises on which that theory was built have to be replaced by others that reflect the values, styles of behaviour and life experiences of women. It seems plausible to think that the emergence in public life of the 'other half of heaven' cannot leave realities and theories unaffected, especially in the presence of new, somehow unexpected political and economic developments of historical dimensions: globalization, with its implications for the labour market and the formation of centres of power.

What does globalization, in fact, mean for elite women? As we already hinted at, we maintain that the aforementioned fragmentation of elites may increase as a result of it, because the future may present a growing gap between, on the one side, social expectations and values and, on the other, reality.

Globalization leads inevitably to an emphasis on the importance of efficiency and productivity, with the result that business leaders' and political leaders' worlds of values, perceptions and attitudes may drift away from each other more than they already have. Furthermore, we already know that elite business women's behaviour and attitudes tend to resemble their male counterparts' more than is the case for women political leaders in relation to their male counterparts. In other words, it might be possible that elite business women will move along a more conservative line, while elite political women, for obvious electoral reasons, will stress their democratic and progressive tendencies. And it might also happen that women of the two categories will grow apart from each other more than their male counterparts will.

This is clearly only an hypothesis that studies in the future can test as globalization evolves. Nevertheless we think it a plausible hypothesis.

* * *

Our research shows that structural, political and cultural barriers that hinder women's access to top positions in public life do exist: women, for instance, in comparison with men, must come from a more privileged background to reach equivalent positions in public life; they need to have more channels of information, networks of connections and mentoring; and they have to endure many more sacrifices in terms of their personal life. These are all obstacles that may be overcome. In fact, our study shows that where, as shown especially in the social democracies, affirmative policies are adopted, opportunities for women increase. An important aspect of these changes derives from the resocialization of men as far as family life is concerned, which implies a transformation of male existence.

Our study illuminates a crucial phenomenon, absolutely new in human history: how the male monopoly in public life is opening up to women, and what this means for them, as well as for society.

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Acknowledgements and History of the Research

This study has a long history. In 1973, Mino Vianello began to explore the feasibility of comparative research on women's participation in decision-making in the upper echelons of public life. However, it soon became clear that, at that time, most potential colleagues were interested in studying other aspects of gender issues such as the labour market, the family and civil rights. Yet, a small group of gender scholars designed and carried out research on gender and decision-making in four countries. The results were published in 1990 under the title of *Gender Inequality*, by Mino Vianello and Renata Siemieńska.

By then the issue of women's exclusion from public life had become an integral part of mainstream sociology. So, in 1990, Mino Vianello's proposal for another study drew the eager attention of numerous colleagues, with final participation from scholars in the 27 most industrialized nations of the world. Soon after its inception Gwen Moore agreed to serve as co-coordinator of the study.

The basic goals of the research were to understand the experiences of women 'above the glass ceiling' in these countries, especially their pathways to, attitudes towards and behaviour in the top economic and political positions that are held overwhelmingly by men. As a democratically run project, each participant could study her or his specific area of interest on gender and power by including items in a common questionnaire. The sampling criterion adopted was to compare top women in politics and business with men from equivalent levels and similar organizations in each country. The analysis of the data was not done by individual countries. As equal collaborators, authors were the final and exclusive arbiters of the topic and content of their contributions.

In 2000 a book was published, *Gendering Elites* (Vianello and Moore, 2000). In recognition of the path-breaking significance of this study of gender and power, the project was named a finalist for the European Union's 2002 Descartes Prize for excellence in collaborative scientific research.

Gendering Elites includes substantive sections on (1) pathways to power, (2) power: strategies, contexts and uses, (3) hindrance or asset? combining everyday life and elite careers and (4) the cultural dimensions of gender (in)equality in elites. Reflecting collaborators' interests in elites' family background, current family status and gender attitudes, 12 of the 17 substantive chapters addressed these topics. Less attention was given to other

key topics, such as gender differences or similarities in elite networks, mentoring, gender differences in careers and leadership styles.

Our goals in the present work are to present the findings in a more comprehensive and accessible way, and also to cover areas omitted in the previous volume. Many of the contributions here, for instance on career paths and on leadership styles, are entirely new. Others are substantial revisions of chapters in the earlier volume (for example, on power, family structure and values). Some examine issues such as social background, careers or elite networks, with new theoretical or methodological approaches.

We hope that this book will advance understanding of gender and elite power in industrialized countries, and that it will be valuable to students, scholars and policy-makers alike.

We said that this study has a long history. In fact, it is not over. The results presented here have become the basis for another research project on gender and power, based this time on in-depth interviews with top national leaders.

* * *

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