Varieties of Multiple Modernities

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# Varieties of Multiple Modernities

*New Research Design*

*Edited by*

Gerhard Preyer
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*In memoriam*
*Shmuel N. Eisenstadt*

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# Preface

This book is about the rebuilding of the theory of modernization, initiated by the Shmuel N. Eisenstadt research program for multiple modernities. The contributions, which are new and written by some of the leading figures in sociology, are evidence that Eisenstadt's switch in the sociological theory has taken effect in the global sociological community. They provide a new approach to the theoretical re-systematization of research on globalization and transnationalism. The studies are bound together by their perspectives on what is new in the world society as a 'society of societies'. At the heart of the studies is a notion that multiple modernities, globalization and the emergence of new societies are not contradictory, but that there is no global modernity.

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# Introduction on Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's Sociology: The Path to Multiple Modernities

*Gerhard Preyer and Michael Sussman*

## General Introduction

Since the 1950s, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt was a leading figure in sociology. There is no other sociologist whose research and theorizing spanned nearly 60 years. At the beginning of his career, he contributed significantly to the formation of sociological theory. From the mid-1970s onwards, he established the 'Research Program of *Comparative Civilisations*'. In fact, this shift in the context of sociological theory – away from the '*Comparative Analysis of Institutions*' to the 'Research Program of *Comparative Civilisations*' – was a defining characteristic of his sociological work and his intellectual career (Eisenstadt 1995a: 1–40, 2003a: 1–28, Preyer 2011: 13–57). This new approach contributed to Eisenstadt's critique of the classical theory of modernization and, ultimately, to the establishment of the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities*' (as a result of the 'Research Program 1986') – a viewpoint that changed the way we view the modern world.

In introducing this volume, we explore three interrelated topics: (1) the evolution of Eisenstadt's scholarship leading to the notion of multiple modernities; (2) the relevance of the theory of multiple modernities to our understanding of the modern era; and (3) the impact multiple modernities has on our approach to understanding sociology as well as the world we live in.

We begin our analysis with a sketch of Eisenstadt's intellectual path to 'multiple modernities'. We examine the major axioms, theories, and approaches that dominated sociology from the 1950s and look at how these changed over time. This transformation led to Eisenstadt's critique of Talcott Parsons' widely held conception of structuralism; namely, identifying structural differentiation as the main impact of the socio-structural evolution, the 'Research Program of *Comparative Civilization*' and, consequently, the shift to multiple modernity. It should be noted here that Eisenstadt's primary theoretical interest is the analysis of a general theoretical framework for the analysis of the structural evolution of societies. Second, we describe the subject of this contribution with respect to the extrapolation of the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986' in the emergent domain of global modernities as a new theory of modernization. Thirdly, as a consequence of the theorizing

and research that emerged from the 'First Research Program 1986' and the 'Second Research Program 2003', we conclude the design of a 'Third Research Program 2015' (Multiple Modernities Membership Research Program), which continues the 'Research Program of Multiple Modernities' in general. Sociology is a discipline that deals with contemporary societies. Yet, this domain is not intelligible without a framework of structural evolution and an analysis of the setting of social systems in their environment, their elites, the social exchange, membership and communication. This goes along with the recognition of the borderlines, which are structured in social intercourse.

### Eisenstadt's Path to Multiple Modernities

The history of Eisenstadt's scholarship begins in a period spanning the late 1940s through to the 1960s. Speculative development theories as well as analytical, theoretical and comparative approaches were predominant in sociology during this period. Yet, these main approaches failed to consider the processes of institutionalization. One principal reason for this is that our understanding of sociology was dominated by the School of Functional Analysis of the British social anthropologists Malinowski and Radcliff-Brown as well as the structural-functional theory of Parsons, Shils and Merton. Moreover, the comparative research was cross disciplinary and primarily undertaken by the disciplines of anthropology, history and sociology and conducted by worldwide researchers who applied sociological, political science and economic analyses to social structures.

During this time, the research projects were classified in accordance to different types of societies: primitive, historical, European, and American societies as well as the post-colonial states, which, more or less, recognized a convergence of those societies. The main impulses were given in the publications of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1950) and also of Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950). The structure-functional theory turned at the same time to comparative analysis, which built the analysis of institutionalization as a new focus (Murdock 1949; Spiro 1961: 459–93). The analysis of institutions was transformed into the research of institution-building.

This theoretical background motivated Eisenstadt's research, between the end of the 1940s and 1965, on the change and extension of trust in societal communication, demonstrating that he is not limited to the solidarity of the kinship system. Eisenstadt's research was systematic in its intent towards sociological theory. He researched immigrants, age groups, the comparative analysis of institutions, the function of bureaucracy and its function in cases of

evolutionary centralization of the political system (imperial societies), institutional structure and group behaviour (Eisenstadt 1965a). A particular interest was tribalism. Initially, Eisenstadt's research focused on immigration to Israel and the problem of construction of trust, membership, solidarity, and social change (Eisenstadt 1948a, 1948b, 1949, 1952a, 1952b, 1952c, 1960).

> Both in the studies of immigrants as well as of different age groups and youth movements (and in the study of ritual kinship and ritual friendship which proceeded that of patron-client relationship), the various theoretical and analytical problems referred to above provided essential frameworks for comparative analysis, but these problems were not taken up directly. It was in the analysis presented in The *Political Systems of Empires* and its offshoots that I first addressed major problems of sociological analysis.
>
> EISENSTADT 1995A: 9

As stated above, Eisenstadt viewed the relationship between *social structure*, *culture* and *social change* as the focus of sociological research and theorizing, but also one of the major problems. The basic concept for the analysis of the evolutionary change of political regimes is the disposition of *free resources*, which takes effect in the relationship between social structure and culture. The main result of Eisenstadt's research motivated him to distinguish structural-functional theory and its theory of social evolution as structural differentiation.

Moreover, Eisenstadt addressed the changed theoretical approach that occurred in sociology during the late 1950s and the early 1960s by analyzing sociology theory, which he explains as being the tension between: the 'negotiated order' versus 'deep structure'. Eisenstadt's approach to 'negotiated order' emphasized the cultural and symbolic dimension of social interaction, thereby highlighting, illustrating, pointing out and demonstrating the autonomy of social subgroups. For example, the theories included in this analysis: exchange theory (Blau and Homans), conflict theory (Dahrendorf; Collins), symbolic anthropology (Geertz; Turner; Schneider), symbolic interactionism (Goffman; Strauss and others), but also ethnomethodology (Garfinkel; Cicourel). On the other end of the spectrum was 'deep structure', which predominately designated the sociological domain to the material dimension, the power dimension and institutional order. The different disciplines that assumed deep structure included: Lévi-Strauss and Chomky's linguistics; Cicourel's concept of basic rules; Leach and the French Marxists (such as Godelier; Goldman; Lefebvre; Sebag and Tokei). As noted by

Eisenstadt in 1965, the tension between deep structure and negotiated order was particularly polarized between the theories of Parsons and Homans (Eisenstadt 1965b).

The controversies in the debate about the different approaches in sociological theory varied during the 1970s. Eisenstadt characterized the situation as:

> These controversies were in many ways the forerunners of the more radical ones, which developed [...] from the Seventies on and the problem of the relation between *agency* (creativity) and *structure* and between *culture* and *social structure*. Although these controversies did not deal directly with the problem, it was, to some extent at least, implicit in them, in the stress on the autonomy of culture and of individuals, on going beyond the 'oversocialized conception of man'.
>
>          EISENSTADT 1995A: 9

The pinnacle of the controversies in the debate was the question of the relationship between *culture* (beliefs of cultural visions) and *social structure*. For example, structuralist theories assumed that the relationship between culture and social structure was invariant. Other proposals made assumptions that culture and social structure underlie a continuing change and are determined by patterns of behaviour and structures of power (Swindler 1986: 273–86).

> These concepts became increasingly conceptualized as distinct and 'real' ontological entities (not as in earlier periods of sociological and anthropological analysis) and indeed also in the world of Talcott Parsons as analytical constructs referring to different aspects or dimensions of human action and social interaction. Concomitantly, a shift of emphasis developed – with respect to several dimensions of culture and social structure, and especially a shift away from the structural-functional school's emphasis on values and norms.
>
>          EISENSTADT 2003C: 13–14

Eisenstadt explains the culmination in the 1970s of the controversies of sociological theory with respect to the disagreements that existed about the role of *action* versus *structure* and between *structure* and *event*. Eisenstadt goes along partially with Giddens theoretical framework of "structuration" as he states that *structure* is generated by human factors and the relationship between processes of structuration and human agency as *events* is embedding in a particular temporal, spatial, and systemic framework.

### Sociological Theory and the Research Programs

By the 1970s, Eisenstadt noticed that the controversial elements of theories within the sociological debate were inherent in his own work, particularly his work dealing with comparative civilizations retrospectively:

> These theoretical problems have became closely interwoven with shifts in my own work – especially with that from comparative institutional analysis to comparative civilization analysis in which I frontally analyzed the processes through which relations between the construction of the social division of labour, the regulation of power, the construction of trust (solidarity) and of meaning, and their impact on institutional and cultural dynamics, are interwoven in shaping the crystallization, reproduction and change of social formations. In this way, I also attempted to redefine the relations between agency (creativity), culture, and social structure.
>
> EISENSTADT 2003C: 17

These controversies were embedded in the classical questions of sociological theory:

1. The relation between human *agency* (creativity) and *structure;*
2. The relation between *structure* and *history;*
3. The function of *culture* with respect to the social *order-maintaining* and *order-transforming* dimensions; and
4. The *interpenetration* between *culture* and *social structure*, which is connected with the first issue.

Yet, Eisenstadt reinterpreted these questions by analyzing the relationship between *agency* (*creativity*) and *structure.* His analysis showed that there is *indeterminacy* between the domain of communication and action. The indeterminacy occurs in the structure of the social division of labour and social status positions, which is constructed by social interaction (Eisenstadt 1995b: 330–334). Through this process he re-systemized the historical evolution of his scholarship, particularly in his works dealing with *power*, *trust*, *meaning* and *membership* as a major subject of sociological theory ('membership' added by authors; Preyer 2006, 2009, 2009–2014). The result of this redefinition was an alternative to deterministic, reductionistic, idealistic and materialistic approaches of the interpretation of social actions, social structure and cultural orientations.

By the end of the 1960s, Eisenstadt had turned to one of the major analytical problems of sociological theory, which had engaged him from the beginning of his career in the 1940s, and analyzes human creativity with concepts of charisma and *centre* in line with Shils (1975: 256–76) and a re-interpretation of Weber's concept of charisma (Eisenstadt 1995c: 167–201). Distinguishing Eisenstadt's work on this subject is his analysis of the centre-periphery differentiation of a society. This was conducted not only with respect to the function of the organization, for example, of the division of labour, but also with respect to charismatic function forming the social order. Eisenstadt showed that the relation between the centre zone and the charismatic dimension of a society is the realm of values and beliefs, which established an existential interpretation of the meaning human life. Moreover, Eisenstadt showed that membership of a society is determined more or less by the relationship to the centre zone. The analysis of these conditions refer to:

1.  the relationship between *agency* (creativity) and *structure* to the cosmological orientations;
2.  the relationship between *culture* and *social structure* to the problem of social order and institution building; and
3.  the *constructive* and *destructive* components of the charismatic dimension.

Eisenstadt's work on the reinterpretation of the concept of social order by the centre of a society illustrates that the centre of a society is the fundamental feature of the institutionalization of the charismatic dimension of the collective consciousness (Durkheim) and the collective identity of the members of a society (Eisenstadt & Curelaru 1976).

The analysis of the patron-client relationship did not play a major role in sociology, social science, anthropology or politology in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Yet, Eisenstadt recognized the relevance of the subject. Together with Azmon in 1974–75, he taught a seminar at the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem on friendship and patron-client relations. Together with Roniger, he systematically analyzed the exchange process in *Patrons, Clients and Friendship* (1984), a comparison between the general and the specific exchange (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984, 1980, 1995). Moreover, his research on patron-client relations has a particular significance in sociological theory:

> On the theoretical level, in all social sciences disciplines, the analysis of patronage has become closely connected with outcries against the current 'functionalist', systemic and 'developmentalist' evolutionary emphases in

> anthropology, sociology, and political science in general, and against the assumption of the classical studies of modernization and development that were, as is well known, so closely related to the structural-functional school in sociology in particular. This link with major theoretical controversies could be most clearly seen in the themes of the studies on patron-client relations and in the attempts to define more precisely their central distinguishing core. The first such theme of many of the of the studies was – as opposed to the strong emphasis found both in classical functionalistic anthropology and in the structural functional school of sociology on groups and their needs and boundary-maintaining mechanism – the stress on the importance of personal and interpersonal relations, quasi-groups, net-works and power relation.
>
> EISENSTADT 1995D: 207

The patron-client relationship is informative and significant with respect to our understanding of the relationship between institutions, social regulations and cultural orientations. The result of the studies showed that social entrepreneurs who offer solutions to a new range of problems play a significant role in the formation of institutional regulations. It also showed that the relationship between the interpretation of the cosmic order and the elites determines largely the trust among the members of a society.

Eisenstadt explained the context of the changes that occurred in sociological theory during the 1960s and 1970s in the 'Research Program of *Comparative Civilization*' which examined the different evolutionary structures of modernization. The core of this research program was the question of the development of different patterns of change undergone by civilizations and societies. In fact, the research program returned to Jaspers' concept of Axial Age (Jaspers 1949; Eisenstadt 1982: 299–314).

Moreover, in the 1970s, Eisenstadt also cooperated with Rokkan and the research group of the *Committee on Political Sociology of the International Sociology Association and the International Political Science Association* (Eisenstadt & Rokkan 1973). From the point of view of his history of sociology, it is worth mentioning that this cooperation motivated his analysis of revolutions and social movements and integrated them into a broader frame of civilizational conditions (Eisenstadt 1978). The switch to the comparative analysis of civilizations initiated a new analytical approach to understanding the processes and interactions between *social structure* and *culture* and their development as well as the change of social formations. This was a step to a broader frame of reference in contrast to the comparative analysis of institutions of the 1950s and 1960s.

From this new perspective, Eisenstadt began the 'First Research Program of *A Sociological Approach to Comparative Civilizations: The Development and Direction of a Research Program* 1986' (Eisenstadt 1986 rep. 2007). As stated by Eisenstadt in 2007, the theoretical framework was:

> The starting point of our approach is that the construction of boundaries is part of the human condition; that human social life, social interaction and division of labour are continuously organized in some systematic way, i.e. that there is some tendency to organize activities in systems, and that a crucial part of such construction is the setting up of symbolic-institutional boundaries, which delineate the relation between any single system and other systems, and between systems and their respective environments.
>
> EISENSTADT 1986 REP. 2007: 293–294

The result of Eisenstadt's work was a new theoretical understanding of *structure* and *social structure*. The focus of the analysis of the *social structure* compared to the *structure* was the macro-sociological order, which referred to the identification of processes and actors that shape the relationship between agency (creativity), culture and social structure as well as the relationship between social structure, culture and power by the crystallization, reproduction and change of social formations. In the 'Research Program of *Comparative Civilizations*', Eisenstadt showed that the link between *agency (creativity)-structure* and *culture-social structure* determines the status of the members of a society and its symbolic indication, the social stratification and the patron-client relationship. Of particular focus in this research was the explanation of the institutionalization of cultural visions and orientations as basic premises of social and political order. Eisenstadt's research on this subject identifies that the potentiality of the crystallization of social formation is dependent on general societal conditions and the extension of structural differentiation insofar as it takes into account predetermined *structures* in the processes of institutionalization.

### A Turn to Multiple Modernities

The 'First Research Program 1986' focuses on a critique of the convergence theory of socio-structural change. This initiated the *multiple modernities* perspective, a re-evaluation of the so-called classical theory of modernization.

Eisenstadt's notion of multiple modernities is a contested assessment of the understanding of modernity as a homogenous process, as stated by the founding fathers of sociology. As such, it was also a critique on the classical theory of modernization initiated by Weber.

> THE NOTION OF 'multiple modernities' denotes a certain view of the contemporary world – indeed of the history and characteristics of the modern era – that goes against the views long prevalent in scholarly and general discourses. It goes against the view of the "classical" theories of modernization and of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s, and indeed against the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least in one reading of his work. They all assumed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world.
>
> EISENSTADT 2002B: 1, 2004; PREYER 2010

Eisenstadt explains the notion of multiple modernities with the different constellations between *agency* (creativity) and *structure* and between *culture* and *social-structure,* as well as the role of elites and their coalitions within the expansion of cultural visions in the socio-structural evolution. In this context, modernization, seen as a multiple modernization, is a process of social change that goes back to the Axial civilizations.

> The Axial age civilizations provide an unusually instructive arena for the examination of both the difference between structural differentiation and the differentiation of elite activities – as well as of the variety of possible elite coalitions bearing different cultural visions of orientation. They facilitate an analysis of the impact of these elite coalitions and counter-coalitions on the institutional structure of their respective societies, on the *modes* of structural differentiation, and on the dynamic of these societies. Above all, the analysis of the Axial civilizations provides an arena for a most fruitful analysis of the relation between cultural, civilizational visions and institutional formations, for an analysis of the interweaving of cultural and social structural dimensions in the construction of such formations.
>
> EISENSTADT 1998B: 39

As such, from the theoretical point of view, the Axial age civilizations are relevant for understanding the most basic characteristic of non-congruent societies. The research emphasizes the autonomous cultural elites; the dynamic of these civilizations is initiated by these elites as articulators of solidarity and trust within different collectivities.

The evolutionary result of this change was new types of conflicts between social groups: traditional *group conflicts* were transformed into *political* and *ideological conflicts* and *cult conflicts* embedded in societies were transformed into a struggle between *orthodox* and *heterodox interpretation* of the 'transcendental sphere' of human and social condition. Eisenstadt's view is that there are inherent conflicts in the institutionalization of Axial visions, which are not soluble in the continuation of structural evolution; for example, the implementation of economic and power structures. This initiates tensions in the internal structure of Axial visions with respect to the universalistic and inclusive claims and the exclusivistic tendency. Therefore, the evolutionary situation implies constructive and destructive components of social and cultural evolution.

Theoretically, multiple modernities do not represent a type of sociology that enumerates historical events along the dimension of time; rather, it is a multi-dimensional theoretical description of structural evolution. The research program is not directed towards global modernity as derived from the West as a single pattern and it does not describe a plurality of societal structures. Accordingly, multiple modernities are to be understood as a critique of the classical theory of modernization.

We have evidence that modernization does not lead to a unification and convergence of social structures. Therefore, modernization is neither a route towards evolutionary universals, nor is it based on them. Multiple modernities represent a structural change that continuously modifies belief systems and their implementation in a process of translation and social interaction. There are many modernities and no one single version of modernization. Paradigmatically, the relationship between Axial age civilizations and modernity is re-systematized. Moreover, comparative research provides evidence that modernity does not inevitably emerge from the European Axial civilizations. Structural evolution shows – when modernization is started by structural differentiation – that there are multiple Axial age civilizations and multiple modernities. Consequently, it is turned into a new theory of modernity.

The results of the comparative analysis of civilizations and multiple modernities focus on the major question of sociology: the analysis of the connection between *agency* (creativity) and *structure* and between *culture* and *social structure* (social order). The components are not ontological entities, but they

are essentially interconnected by the *semantic map* (Eisenstadt 1995f: 297–300; Preyer 2011: 78–90, 2012: 187–225). The deconstruction and deontologization of the components has initiated a new direction in terms of their analysis. This is also motivated by Giddens' (1984) structuration approach.

Eisenstadt's general sociology claims to further elaborate approaching the analysis of the semantic map as an evolutionary *universal*; that is, a constitutive basic frame of reference for the research of the socio-structural evolution, which is to apply to all known societies. The components are: (1) the existential definition of the cosmological order and its relationship to the world; and (2) the generation of conflicts and tensions within the structuration of social exchange by defining the cosmological order and its symbolic construction. The basal semantic map determines the central problem of human and social existence, the specification of its solutions and relationship to the social order. Thus, we recognize that the components determine membership conditions in societies and their evolution. The framework of the *semantic map* is established in the 'open space' of the relationship between social systems and their environment. Eisenstadt analyzes this relationship using 'indeterminacy' as a conceptual resource.

The semantic map and the struggle for the distribution of free resources is the research program framework; that is, Eisenstadt's new version of the theory of modernization as a critique of convergence and development theory. As a result of the 'Research Program 1986', the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986' is to be interpreted vis-à-vis this background. We mention this specifically because it is not adequately emphasized in many writings on Eisenstadt's sociology on multiple modernities.

Within this framework, Eisenstadt pairs the role of activities of the cultural and institutional entrepreneurs with the *agency* (creativity) component. This shapes the interplay between *agency* (creativity) and *social structure* but also between *culture* and *social structure* (social order). The influence of these groups takes effect in the different sectors of societies due to their control of the flow of resources, thereby regulating the access to major institutional markets and status positions. The potentiality for the crystallization of these formations depends on general societal pre-conditions (*structure*). The potentialities are realized by *agency* (creativity) only (on application, Eisenstadt 1967, 1985, 1992a, 1992b, 2005a, 2005b). Eisenstadt compares the function of culture, which takes effect in the processes of social order maintenance and order transformation, as two sides of the same coin. The relationship between the features of order-transforming and order-maintaining and the relation between culture and social structure are rooted in the premises of civilizations and the selection of different features of cultural visions. But there is also a gap

between both and the selections are mediated by control and processes of social interaction. The different constellations (configurations) between *agency* (creativity), *structure*, *culture* and *social structure* and the function of elites are major subjects of the comparative historical and sociological analysis.

From Eisenhadt's perspective, the new direction is an answer to the sociological debates on the structure-functional theory of the 1960s and the opposition between *agency* (creativity) versus *structure* in the 1970s. The sociological core of the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986' is not committed to one particular worldview; the shift in sociological theory is the process and conflict related to different semantic maps, symbolic order, membership and ontological belief systems.

Eisenstadt's later research continued his investigation, undertaken in the 1970s, of the Western Revolution and dealt with social revolutions that claimed that the Axial civilizations should be the point of reference (Eisenstadt 1978, 2006). As Eisenstadt showed, social protest is initiated by the consciousness of arbitrariness and the perpetuation of the social order and institutions. The focus of protest is the dilemma of the human existence. In particular, the problem of death and the conflicts that emerge as a result of differentiation of social roles, the regulation of power, the construction of trust and the distinction between hierarchy and equality, the social division of labor and the limiting of access to the centre of societies.

Thus, as stated, from second half of the 1970s, Eisenstadt turned to research on revolutions. During this time, he analyzed the Great Revolutions, the American Revolution and the French Revolution, not only in terms of the switching of political regimes, but also as a new program, promotion and implementation of a cosmological vision that includes a Jacobin component of total politicization of societal communication in general (Eisenstadt 2000a). The renewing turn in the research about revolution is that the Jacobin component of modernity is a universal claim and is totalistic in its orientation. He has linked the Axial age with the Great Revolutions that have impacted fundamentalist movements. Indeed, particular social movements, i.e. sectarian sects, embody the continuation between the Axial age and the fundamentalistic feature of modernity. This theoretical turn is motivated by Voegelin (1975, 1987) and Eisenstadt demonstrated that it occurred and, indeed, was radicalized in the Bolshevist, Maoist and Cuban revolutions and in Fascism and German Nationalism. Fundamentalism of different sorts emerged as consequence.

The struggle to define the political domain finds continuity in the history of modern societies and in contemporary societies as well, as exemplified in Eastern Europe, South America and Africa.

### Second Research Program

The re-explanation of modernity as multiple modernities led to a 'Second Research Program 2003' (Kahavi, Lerner, Brayer-Grab 2003). This program is directed towards a higher and re-specified level of research on multiple modernities than its predecessor. It focuses on the weakening of the function of the national state, on cultural dominance and, at the same time, on Diasporas (Muslim, Chinese, Russian minorities in the new Baltic and Asian republics), minorities and new types of social movements; that is to say, feminist, ecological, fundamentalist and peace movements, which build a new social identity for their members. Communal religious movements, with their anti-modern and anti-Western attitudes and violent strategies against economic, cultural and political globalization have also emerged on the global scene. These new social movements are to be found in the non-Western sphere but simultaneously in Europe and the United States. It is significant in this context that new social movements in the West (among women, the ecological movement but also the fundamentalist and communal religious movements) gave birth to local orientations and new particularism. Specifically, the anti-globalization movement of the last decade in the United States can be characterized in this way.

The 'Second Research Program 2003' is directed towards the new and different changes caused by the dynamics of the global society and its recognition, not as a single entity but as a network of social systems that has already led to new tensions between socially interrelated units. In particular, it is assumed that new cultural and symbolic programs will be set up within the social universe: not only postmodernism, but new syncretic and symbiotic arrangements of cultural symbolism in public places; for example, in architecture. Networking and segmental differentiation have a new relevance for the restructuring of the borderlines of social systems.

As previously stated, new social movements develop in the non-Western sphere as well as in Europe and the United States. Such movements are evidence that we live in a time of continuous change. Collective identities change due to hybridization and the mixture of social units and cultures as a result of *glocalization* (Robertson 1995). This is one of the properties of cultural globalization. This is not at all a new distinction of the binomial *universalism* versus *particularism*; rather, it is a cultural and social syncretism facing the societal community as expressed in the non-harmonic character of political systems, political regulations (political order) and citizenship. That said, it is not argued that primordial collectivities play no significant role in the social universe and intercourse.

Another focus of the 'Second Research Program 2003' is the change that occurs in the public sphere due to the restructuration of the societal self-observation of the members of social systems within this milieu. The tendency of these structural changes is that the public sphere is no longer organized by a civil society, as was the case in the classical period of modernization. For example, new media take effect in the public sphere and change its system of communication and symbolization. The world of simulations rules out reality (Baudrillard 1984).

The 'Second Research Program 2003' evaluates changes to the social structure and all subsystems of societal communication caused by globalization. Such changes are not a unification of social interplay and do not result in a global village; on the contrary, they lead to hybridizations, fragmentation and the change of collective identities by new social movements (Nederveen Pieterse 2004a). Furthermore, this is not caused by single, separate social structures; it occurs within a global societal system. This 'system' is not a single society; rather, it is "a global society of societies" (Hondrich 2001: 141).

One of the main subjects of the 2003 research program is the better understanding of modernity in sociological theory along with a distinction between modern society and its institutions and the ancient and pre-modern society. It is often argued that the models of social organization and social institutions do not apply to pre-modern societies analytically because the former only crystallized in the modern period. On the contrary, the research has shown that these organizational and institutional patterns were not absent in non-Western civilizations. Therefore, the distinction between traditional and modern society is not the main analytical difference in sociological theory explaining social change. The Axial civilizations are the background of the horizon of expectation and claims of particular social groups in their ontology before the transition to the Western modernity took place. But that is not to assume a 'semi-evolutionary' historic continuity; indeed, there is what Weber called 'historical heritages'.

Eisenstadt's work shows that the access of revolutionary groups to free resources, which emerged as a consequence of evolutionary structural differentiation and economic development, has comparable but different initial causes. Moreover, this structural change accounts for the transformed situation in the relationship between culture and social structure, which follows the interpretation of cosmological order and the function of basic elites. *Eisenstadt concludes from his analysis of the contemporary situation a switch in the orientations of social movements.* As a result, we observe a critique on the 'classical' orientations and the great meta-narratives of modernity, because the movements do not believe in the absolute truth or the canon of the modern program. Another

characteristic is the search for a restoration of the lost symbiotic orientations in the classical program. This goes along with a consciousness of the contradiction within the Western cultural and social program of modernization between 'universalism-individualism' and 'rationalism-instrumentalism (interventionism)'. Moreover, fundamentalism in social movements is not inherent in a traditional program, but rather a response to Western modernization and globalization.

### Contributions

Part One of *Global Modernities Extrapolation of the Research Program* analyzes Eisenstadt's sociological theories and their impact on the development of a new understanding of contemporary societies, in particular the different processes of globalization and the tensions and conflicts in societal communication. The initial pivotal work in Eisenstadt's sociology is his reassessment (correction, redefinition) of Parson's structural-functional approach to sociological theory. This is of particular significance given that in the 1950s he initiated some of the key works that led to the analysis of the *semantic map* and to *multiple modernities*.

Part One of this volume examines the theoretical and empirical consequences of the ongoing social structural change in contemporary societies, in particular the changed situation regarding the reinterpretation of *agency* (creativity) and *structure*, which takes effect in the relationship between *culture* and *social structure* as a shift in the reinterpretation between *social structure* and *agency* (creativity).

As noted by Eisenstadt in *Multiple Modernities* (2002b) Western Modernization and its proliferation does not result in a global modernity as a singular world society. In fact, social change was one of Eisenstadt's major areas of research; a major focus of his work was orientated towards a framework analyzing the structural evolution of the 'evolutionary emergent societies' and 'society formations'. Analyzing social change has been a theme throughout Eisenstadt's career: it was the subject of some of his earliest studies on the absorption of immigrants and empires and also his exploration of Axial civilizations; it also featured in his research program on forming civilizations and multiple modernities. Within the framework of the *semantical map*, Eisenstadt's analysis of social change is not solely a matter of external factors, but also includes the transformation of social structure and social order, which are intrinsically initiated by institutions and civilizations as a broader framework of the comparative research that forms the social structure.

Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg highlight some of Eisenstadt's major theoretical conclusions on the topic of social change. Moreover, they also indicate some theoretical shortcomings regarding the newness of the present society. They characterize Eisenstadt's account of social change and compare it to the structural functionalist approach and linear development theories. *Within the socio-structural evolution, social change is not generally systemized as structural differentiation.* Social change can only be understood in reference to the characteristics of status elites within the social division of labour generally, and with reference to newly emerged elites in the Axial age civilization in particular.

Ben-Rafael and Sternberg focus their article on the major circumstances that define social change in contemporary societies with respect to 'globality', 'transnationalism', 'multiculturalization' and 'de-civilization' ('hybridization'). These are some of the main features that impact the changes and contradictions of societal communication. Moreover, those changes occur within the membership condition of social systems. As Ben-Rafael and Sternberg contend, 'globality' is not a homogenous process of communication and social structure; rather it is focused on an inherently conflicted relationship between global processes and local social systems. Therefore, as Ben-Rafael and Sternberg discuss, 'transglobality' focuses on the switch that occurred after Western modernity. For example, the switch to postmodernity and postmodernism *that takes effect in all societal sectors and, at the same time,* [*the switch*] *of cultural orientations and intentional self-definitions of the members of society* (Ben-Rafael 2011).

Manussos Marangudakis analyzes Eisenstadt's history of sociological theory in his critique of the structural-functional approach by examining his work from *The Political Systems of Empire* (1963) through to the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986'. This also includes his theory of *indeterminacy* and the *semantic map*. Within the framework of this work, Marangudakis recognizes the crucial role of various elites who fill the open space between actuality and potentiality, creating and sustaining institutions as a relationship between *agency* (creativity) and *structure.* Marangudakis emphasizes Eisenstadt's conclusion that social development is not just a process of internal systemic growth and rationalization, but is also an unintended consequence of the elite's effort to control membership and the distribution of free resources, both of which play a role in determining societal communication and the roles and status positions of its participants. As such, relatively distinct civilizations – but not global Axial age civilizations – emerge within the socio-structural evolution in the pre-modern past. As Maranguidakis asserts, the fundamental conflicts and tensions are continued and dramatized in the

framework of Western modernity and its different institutionalizations as they occurred within the historical process of Western modernization. For instance, events that occurred in Europe and America that are intrinsically irresolvable and that do not disappear under the condition of globalization.

Eisenstadt's research on multiple modernities also provides a useful background theory for the sociology of law in relation to the global society and its systems of communication as a 'society of societies'. Moreover, societies do not disappear under the conditions of globalization, glocalization and hybridization. On the contrary, under such conditions there is a new restructuration of regional societies. The same is true for different systems of law, organizations and also concepts of society; for example, Japan, China, Western and Eastern Europe and North and South America.

Eisenstadt characterized the contemporary global scene as one in which radical social movements, i.e. Muslim, Protestant, Jewish and the communal religious movements that developed especially under the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, shift in the conceptualization of the relationship between Western and non-Western civilizations, religion and society. The condition of so-called globalization is not a unification of societal communication, but we observe an encounter of Axial and non-Axial civilizations in the global scene. Eisenstadt noted correctly that the structural change in contemporary society is 'postmodern', in contrast to the so-called 'classical' phase of modernization, which began with the French revolution and continued until the First World War (1914–18). There is a weakening of stereotypical definitions of life cycles, which parallels a switch in the boundaries of family, community and spatial/social organizations and a redefinition of social roles, in particular of the occupational and citizenship role cluster. From Eisenstadt's point of view, the current situation is one of growing globalization and a new and simultaneous differentiation of regional societies. This does not mean that there is no reciprocity between the prestige groups in different regions. Eisenstadt emphasized that along the route of Western modernization there have been different ways of implementing the modern cultural program; take, for example, the differences between European and the American democracies. Japanese modernization since the Meiji-jidai is another example of a particular version. And China's modernization, which began in the 1990s, has followed a very different route to the Western version (Preyer & Krausse 2013).

In this volume, Roland Robertson comments on the development of Eisenstadt's research program concerning multiple modernities and its relative neglect of the themes of globalization-glocalization and the critique on globality. In spite of its great influence and, indeed, promising nature, Robertson finds Eisenstadt's explanation somewhat deficient in terms of his disregard of

the relationship between processes of globalization and the theme of multiple modernities. There is considerable slippage between the idea of the relatively independent development or evolution of modernities, on the one hand, and the conception of the global arena; the major problem being that Eisenstadt seems to work from societal and civilizational changes 'upwards' to globality, rather than vice versa. The discussion is placed within the context of what many sociologists now call the global turn in sociology and cognate disciplines (Robertson 2011).

A contemporary switch to global research and to an emerging global outlook can be observed in a number of different disciplines. For example, global world history now pays greater attention to international relations, alternative views of space and time beyond the territorial national state, postcolonial studies as well as feminist theory. This indicates a changed direction of research in sociology and social science as well as overlapping research programs in different scientific disciplines. A main focus became how to give the research of globalization a new profile. In Chapter three, Barrie Axford reviews the different approaches to globalization's place in the global context due to the changes that have occurred since the 1990s. It begins with the switch that is the subject of Nederveen Pieterse's study, assessing the distinction between 'globalization studies' and 'global studies' (2013) and turns to the analysis of multiple centrism and modernities. Related to his analysis of multiple modernities, Axford takes into account the cognitive, affective and evaluative attitudes and expressions that vary societal and human conditions globally. One of the central points of Axford's analysis is that in the era of globalization, the model of Western modernization is no longer valid and successful. This question has become the subject of other studies on the approaches to modernity, which argue that besides institutional differences and pathways of modernization, the Western model has, in fact, globally extended. Axford emphasizes that modernization in different world regions may have a general dynamic, but that it does not have a strong connection to Westernization. With respect to modernity and globality, there are plenty of research subjects in contemporary society that take into account the similarities and differences of social structure, communication and the orientations of the members of social systems. Axford's view is that the switch to a more global perspective in the disciplines of social science is desirable as it entails a greater orientation towards the particular horizon of the disciplines and is indicated as the changed situation in the structural evolution of societal communication.

The theory of multiple modernities concludes that we do not live in a unified world society as a global village, but as different regional societies

in the global scene. This is not a contradiction, because modernization, as a self-confrontation of societal communication, initiates new and particular interconnected domains. Therefore, the turn to global modernities also takes into account the theory and the sociology of law. In particular, there is evidence against the belief that the state regulates the systems and organizations of law and that there is only one type of law, i.e. juridical conflict regulations, among members of a society. Clearly, there are also primary systems of law dominated by religious and ethnic groups and their authorities. Therefore, it can be assumed that globalization does not go along with the institutionalization of the Western legal system and their institutions. China's and Japan's legal systems and the Islamic religious-political law provide significant evidence to support this. From a theoretical point of view, this relates to introducing the distinction between primary and secondary social systems of law within the theory and sociology of law.

Werner Krawietz (2009, 2012) implemented the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986' in his 'Multiple Level Approach' to the theory and sociology of law. Here, 'multiple' means that there are references to different social systems in the analysis of the theory and sociology of law. Continuing his research program he elaborated his framework by distinguishing between different 'orders of law' within the 'society of societies' in contrast to 'world society' (Luhmann 1991). He analyzes the reality of law by making the distinction between primary and secondary social systems of law. Krawietz distinguishes between 'legal order' as an abstract entity that determines all legal rights, duties and power within a society and the 'legal system'. The latter is a system of communication that is established contra-factually by 'normative expectations'. Thus, legal communication is processed as a 'normative system' of legal action. Legal systems with their own standards and validities, not justified by ethics and moral philosophy, make the distinction between the legal meaning of 'directives' and 'norms'. Yet, a legal system is not generally organized by a state in the context of Western modern society.

Krawietz' new research program is focused on the coding, conditioning and determining of the normative-institutional order of law within the multiple modernities turn. It refers to different societies ('global society'/'regional societies') that are not integrated in their communication system of law globally. Therefore, the postulates of 'natural law' and a 'law of reason' are rejected as a universal and global basis for systems of law in a global context. It is not disputed that communication also has, for example, a legal, political, economic and religious meaning. Krawietz shows that there is no 'one' global law and that making 'one' global state is not possible using systematic and empirical arguments.

Part Two of *Multiple Modernities View to Contemporary Societies* focuses on multiple modernities specifically related to the ongoing change of the social structure within different sectors of globalization and the switch of cultural orientations and societal communication. More specifically, the contributions in this section centre on the changes of 'culture' and 'social structure' by modifications of the order of *agency* (creativity) and *structure* under postmodern conditions.

The Asian modernization that took place in, for example, Japanese society, as well as the modernization that occurred in Germany after the *Reichsgründung 1871*, are, historically, counter-examples of the theory of modernization. These examples go against the assumption, which we also find in the sociology of Weber, Durkheim and Parsons, that Western modernization will spreading to all societies. In the contemporary intellectual and political scene, modernity is also a theme that carries the expectation that the innovation of Western modernity is valid for modernization in every society. Moreover, it is also the rhetoric of the elites of the Western political system. Eisenstadt recognized some of the fundamental contradictions of modernization theory, which were not contingent upon, but inherent in the structure of the implementation of the cultural program of modernity. For example, the contradictions between collectivism and individualism, democratization and fundamentalism (Jacobinism), reason and emotion and self-rule as well as subjective expressionism, but also the tragedy of modernity, i.e. anti-Semitism (the holocaust) and Jacobin terrorism (on the internal paradoxes of the modern cultural program, see Münch 1991: 27–48).

Nederveen Pieterse (2001, 2004b, 2007) criticizes development theory as an overall model of modernization. He explains social change and culture as a result of hybridization and the function of power elites in different sectors of society as a critique of, for example, Weber's theory of rationalization, which has remained prominent in sociological theory to this day. However, Weber's view of the power of occidental rationalism in the building of Western societies has been overestimated in sociology since the 1950s. Nederveen Pieterse explains that, as a consequence, Western modernity has no normative claim as a societal model. Therefore, he concludes, modernities should be recognized as multiple and diverse and transcending the ideal-type modernity and its Eurocentric legacy. Moreover, the multipolar realities of twenty-first century globalization and the 'rise of the rest' are a reason for the change in the societal situation.

Nederveen Pieterse's view locates real-existing modernities as mixed social formations that straddle the past and present and import and translate styles and customs from other cultures. This view runs parallel to Robertson's concept of glo*b*alization. According to the above views, modernities are layered. Some

components of modernity are shared among all modern societies. They make up the so-called transnational modernity; other components differ according to historical and cultural circumstances. In this volume, Nederveen Pieterse reflects on East Asia as an alternative modernity and sketches its main features. He concludes by leaving modernity as utopia behind and posits that grounded modernity opens the possibility of coming to terms with the dilemmas that real modernities face.

The realization of human rights was initiated particularly in the United States during the Second World War as a political and humanistic program by the 'Free World' against National Socialism and Fascism in Europe. However, the notion of human rights was also a political and humanistic program in communism, a quasi-religious political Jacobinism program in the Soviet Union and in China after the success of Mao's 1949 revolution and the Cultural Revolution of 1965–1975. Eisenstadt argued that the Axial age civilizations emerged with principles of justice and human rights as an orientation of social movements with different cosmological based interpretations. As a result, a new membership condition emerged in social institutions and communication. In the Western political system, as well as in Western political culture, human rights – as a 'universal principle' and Western-style political constitutionalism – are assumed to be self-evident, derived from human reason and human nature, which are unequivocally accepted to underpin communication and social order.

In section two of this volume, Luis Roniger analyzes the tensions, debates and challenges that accompany the global protection of human rights in the contemporary scene (contemporary era). Roniger posits that the interpretation of these rights is also influenced by processes of globalization and the vernacular endorsement of universal principles, which can be antagonistic. Furthermore, the implementation of human rights in different social contexts and environments initiates challenges and tensions that are described as 'glocalization' or 'vernacularization', i.e. a so-called dialectal interface of globalization. The conclusion is that globalization does not generally initiate a unification of social systems.

Roniger argues that even political repressors cannot ignore these rights; instead, they try to control them with restrictions. He refers to the views of cultural relativists, who argue that the acceptance and institutionalization of universal human rights does not generally hold true in all societies. Roniger's view illustrates how multiple modernities can contribute to sociological theory by showing the problématique of implementation and institutionalization of human rights analytically and prospectively. (On the confrontation between Western modernity and Latin America's society, see Roniger 2009.)

The Iranian Islamic Revolution, as a continual regime constituted by a modern fundamentalist movement, is of significance as the revolution shares many of the characteristics of the Great Revolutions. It is worth noting that, in comparison to Sunni Islam, Shia Islam has a political theology; that is, 'Waiting for the *Imam*!' who can challenge the political order. For Sunnis, the loss of religious political power and order is anomie and for Shias, contra-domination to the political centre is anomie because the *Imam* is always hidden. 'All power the Imams!' is a problematic claim (Gellner 1987).

Mehdi P. Amineh and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt provide an analysis of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. They identify that the causes of this revolution are similar to those of classical revolutions, but they also signal structural differences, largely due to the fact that the modernized economic and professional prestige groups are denied access to the political autonomous centre. Moreover, the Khomeini Revolution also developed in the context of the expansion of modernity, and it was built on many of the structural and organizational aspects of modernity – in particular the use of the media and modern organizational methods for the mobilization of the masses. It was also fully imbued with a number of the institutional and ideological premises of modernity. This distinct combination of modern and anti-Enlightenment and anti-Western cosmological visions – as developed in the framework of new globalizing and inter-civilizational visions – distinguish the Iranian Islamic Revolution from the classical ones, at the same time bringing out some of the paradoxical similarities with the different postmodern movements. Thus, the modern fundamentalist movements, in a way most fully epitomized by the Iranian revolution and, in a somewhat different mode, the communal religious movements, constitute an important, even radical, shift in the discourse about the confrontation with modernity and in the conceptualization of the relation between the Western and non-Western civilizations, religions or societies – thus, paradoxically, sharing many characteristics with various 'postmodern' movements.

Latin America's historical singularity and contemporary changes throw light on the dynamics between agency and structure in terms of singular and sustained disjunctures, tensions and contradictions, as implied in Eisenstadt's approach. Changing scenarios of complexity concerning both new institutional designs and new and traditional cultural models define the pathways of social transformations at the national, regional and global levels.

Judit Bokser Liwerant approaches the analytical contributions and potentialities of the multiple modernities' conceptual proposal for the study of past trajectory and ongoing transformations in Latin America, identified as the first multiple modernities region by Eisenstadt. The article adopts both a theoretical and diachronic perspective to study Latin America's historical global

immersion and its contemporary insertion in an increasingly interconnected world. Bokser Liwerant stresses that Latin America became a meaningful referent at a very early stage of Eisenstadt's trajectory. It also became a sub-set model related to diverse relevant dimensions of his work, thus benefiting and enhancing his heterodox and peripheral perspective, as defined by Spohn (2010, 2011).

Furthermore, the contradictory, contingent, and even antinomian character of both Modernity and Modernization that Eisenstadt highlighted constitutes a meaningful contribution to the understanding of Latin America in terms of multiple modernities. The author considers Eisentadt's approach as a watershed for both his conceptual elaborations and for the meta-theoretical assumptions related to the recognition of the complexity embedded in the peripheral condition of the region, while recognizing its diversity and heterogeneity.

Bokser Liwerant highlights in her analysis several problematic axes resulting from globalization processes and transnationalism; among others: the impact of the loss of centrality of the nation state on different levels; the diversification of social categories; the dialectics between collective identities and individualization processes; the disjunctures between functional differentiation and traditional social formations; between expanding citizenship while emigration and new Diasporas take shape; and between democratization and modernization processes along with equally transformed scopes and meaning of the public spheres and its contradictory criteria for social inclusion and membership.

'Classical' Western modernization was focused in the public sphere as a space for the recognition of rational communication. The public interest was understood as a justified community interest. This, however, is an illusion, because public communication is the domain of irrationality, fighting between prestige groups and propagandistic manipulation. Within this context, the mass media becomes the domain of societal communication, observation and irritation.

Eisenstadt's comparative research on civil society and the public sphere are both focused on different historical and cultural situations. One of the leading questions in this research was whether the concept of civil society is also applicable in societies other than Western societies in Europe and the United States. This question emerged, in particular, out of the research on the connection between nation state and the state, citizenship and the public *sphere*. The public sphere is an autonomous sphere; yet, it is also connected by access to different social systems of society. Civil society entails a public sphere, but the relationship is not reciprocal, meaning not all public sectors of society entail a civil society; for example, the economic sector. The structural change (that

occurs in response to tensions) is that the cultural and political hegemony of the national state is weakened by new social movements, Diasporas and minorities, but also by fundamentalist and communal religious movements that have a non- and anti-Western orientation.

In this changed situation regarding research about the public sphere, the function of civil society and the nation state, it is instructive to look back at the history of the concept of 'public'. Mark Jarzombek analyzes the forgotten meaning of 'public' in the philosophy of Kant. He reinterprets Kant's understanding of 'public', which emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century, as an alternative modernity. In particular, he analyzes the concept of 'sociability' as '*Trieb zur Gesellschaft*' in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* and his concept of empathy. Moreover, he emphasizes the difference with Rousseau's and Locke's concepts of society. At the same time, Kant has a critical understanding of the *Publikum* because it has not achieved Enlightenment. Kant's view is: we do not live in an enlightened century, but in a century of enlightenment. This differs from the Anglo-American understanding; it is a tradition orientated towards common sense and common ground among members of social groups. Jarzombek shows that Sennett lacks sufficient understanding of the 'public sphere' because meetings among strangers and shared experiences are linked by Kantian liberalism, and those social encounters are not implemented in the public sphere as a place of expressive exchange. Jarzombek also takes into account that Kant's city as a public space was not a "ballroom" of reciprocal observation, tempoerance and surveillance. It was a city without industrialization and representation or symbolization of a political centre, such as Paris, London and Washington, D.C. in the West, or communistic Moscow or Peking. Kant's vision of the city has no room for Foucauldian, heterotopic zones. In the meantime, the modern city has fundamentally changed. It is a city without a centre; that is, it has become a metropolitan area. Jarzombek motivates us to think about the differences in the concepts of the 'public' in the history of the self-description of Western modernity as a feature of multiple modernities.

## After Multiple Modernities: The Third Research Program

The core of Eisenstadt's sociology is that human existence always refers to its transcendence (Preyer 2012: 203–205, 205–209). The relation between existence, transcendence and the social domain is often characterized by indeterminacy and the experience of the contingency of social order. The consciousness about this relationship goes back to the Axial civilisations. The sociological

point of view is thus reasoned by the cosmological foundation of social order and their institutions. Eisenstadt recognized this as the universal spread of the charismatic dimension of social order.

The basic problems of social order relate to the shaping of the creativity of the member of a society, its restriction, and the tensions about the prerogative of the interpretation of the relationship between existence and transcendence and, in addition, the conflict about the flow of free resources. But socio-structural evolution and, at the same time, history have no end or ultimate purpose. The theoretical consequence is a new version of the theory of social integration. The evolutionary universal of the semantic map is reproduced on all levels of social evolution as the struggle about membership and status positions in social systems. This is one of the leading changes in contemporary Western societies, because the rebuilding of the welfare state is a struggle between status groups about the flow of free resources.

The 'Third Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* 2015' continues the work of the 'Second Research Program 2003'. Its three main subjects and foci, the product of the collected research, are significant from a comparative and historical perspective:

1. The focus on historical and contemporary changes in leading social sectors and their organization; for example, in (a) the *political* system: the change of sovereignty, citizenship, participation, and the reorganization of the Western welfare state; (b) the *economic* system: economic globalization, capital flows, migration, and global corporations; and (c) the *legal* system: new transnational courts, new legal institutions and new legal regulations, their consequences on the national legal and political systems, and the persistence of the primary systems of law. This can be called the research focus of societal conditions of membership and their continued structuration.

2. The focus on the changes to new collective identities (minorities and Diasporas; for example, Muslim Chinese, and Korean and Russian minorities) and new social movements, in particular with respect to the hegemonic model of the nation state as a charismatic centre. The new social movements have changed their orientation to an ethnic, religious and local setting. We find them in Western and non-Western societies. This initiates a new 'politics of identity', which takes effect in political communication. This is also the question of authority instances and their institutionalization. This can be called the research focus of membership politics of collective identities and their regulation.

3. The focus on the change in the self-description of societal communication from the distinction universalism-particularism to hybridization, glocalization and global mélange. This is particularly relevant in terms of the pluralistic and totalistic tendencies of modernity. This can be called the

research focus of societal observation of the self-identification and description of members of social systems in postmodern societies and their social exchange.

It is fruitful to analyze the above mentioned foci in the framework of the relationship between *agency* (creativity) and *structure* and between *culture* and *social structure*:

1.  *agency* (creativity): the change in societal communication and the new social movements. They are not orientated towards universalistic tendencies and visions; creativity is limited by the new forms of organization and membership in postmodern communities;
2.  *structure*: the changed structure in communication by, for example, network-building and the function of modern technologies of communication;
3.  *culture*: the hybridization (post-hybridization, new syncretism) and the conflicts of contact and communication between Axial and non-Axial age civilizations in the global scene; and
4.  *social structure*: the changes in the economic, political sector and the restructuration of collective identities.

From this perspective we analyze the changed relationship between *power*, *trust, meaning* and *membership* as the basic problem of social order. It is a fragile and imperfect 'order'. Tensions are particularly evident in relation to institution-building and decay and between creativity and the regulation of communication with respect to common commitments. We observe structural changes in political communication in contemporary societies and structural changes in the economic sector as a result of the processes of globalization and glocalization (Robertson; Roniger, in this volume). This requires a new view of the changes to collective identities and social interactions, to be connected with the historical components which are continued and modified in the social structure within these societies. Taking into account every research program on sociological theory, the debate about the flow of free resources becomes an endless evolutionary universal.

Sociological theory was continually dominated by the self-description of modernization that originated in the intellectual history of the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; for example, by the description of the state-centred society, the civil society, the ideologies of the social movement, the paradigm of the division of labour, and of community and society. Post-modernism as anti-modernism is legitimized in this framework as long as sociological theory and common mind are also dominated by these self-descriptions of modernity. The 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after

1986' rejected the paradigm of modernization as Westernization and, at the same time, the dilemma of *universalism* versus *particularism*. Consequently, sociological theory turned to '*transglobality*' as a mix of '*globality* and *transnationalism*', initiated from "globalization, glocalization and hybridization" (Ben-Rafael & Sternberg, in this volume). This also has consequences for the re-description and reinterpretation of the Western processes of modernization. In particular, the sociological theoretical tradition that interprets Weber's view of modernization as rationalization, universalization, individualization and de-traditionalization is coming to an end (Preyer 2010).

Western modernization is no longer a project that we reinterpret or rationalize within the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986'. On the contrary, postmodernity without the self-descriptions of modernity since the nineteenth century is in harmony with multiple modernities, because there is no homogenous pattern of modernization. Both describe and reinterpret theoretically the changed social structures that originate in the early 1960s. However, one aspect must be mentioned. If plural modernity cannot be analyzed using the evolutionary basic assumption of the classical theory of modernization, then the expressions *modernity*, *modernization* and *modern* change their meanings in sociological theory. It can be assumed that this change also takes effect continuously in the common mind of all members of social systems.

The 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986' has a particular significance for the analysis of globalization. This can certainly be concluded from our contributions. From this perspective, the expression 'global modernity' is systematically misleading. The cultural, economical, political and technological globalizations do not form a single global society. Cosmopolitan accounts assume an intellectual and global movement that leads to a unification of global political institutions and the notion of a 'global modernity'. This research program is not helpful in terms of understanding the structural change initiated by different societal modernizations. It recognizes 'mixed social formations', which is not connected to the Western pathway of modernization and its cultural visions. (See Nederveen Pieterse, Axford, in this volume.)

It is important that the significance of multiple modernities is understood and not overlooked. As noted throughout our analysis above, the 'Research Program of *Multiple Modernities* after 1986' goes against the predominant views held by the forefathers of modernization theory, i.e. modernities that are heterogeneous at all stages of their development. Moreover, the value of this new framework is not limited to the discipline of sociology; it is relevant to all disciplines in the humanities and also provides a new lens for us to view the world around us.

Given the current volatility that exists in the world – from weakened European economies, the global spread of religiously motivated terrorism, declining American intervention in the world, to the rise of new international powers such as China – continuing the 'Second Research Program 2003' offers us the ability to explain, understand and, to a degree, predict the social transformations inherent and reflexive in these changes.

A recent example is the so-called 'Arab Spring', which began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to virtually every other Arab country in the Middle East and North Africa. Attempts to comprehend the outcome of the 'Arab Spring' led to great debate amongst onlookers, from scholars to political commentators. Some predicted that democracy would prevail. Others argued that democracy was not possible. Yet, at its heart, and particularly in terms of how the protesting Arab societies were being defined and how the ideas were being spread, were a number of the core concepts included in multiple modernities. It should be noted that the very expression 'Arab Spring' is a blind point in terms of observation of parts of the mass-media, in particular in Europe. This is evident from the continuation of the history of this social movement in the Middle East and North Africa.

The 'Arab Spring' spread via modern technology, such as cellular phones, the internet and Facebook as well as international news conglomerates such as Al-Jazeera and CNN. On the one hand, widespread easy access to such technologies made the transmission of protestors' messages possible. The protestors' demands included democratic reforms, greater freedom of speech as well as a freedom of the press, i.e. similar to the core values of the Western program of modernity.

On the other hand, what differed significantly was the way these values and demands were being defined. As noted in the 'Second Research Program 2003' and similar to the Western program of modernity, this process of definition occurred in the public sphere and within the context of Arab values, culture, and collective identity, which was largely influenced by special interest groups, national values, regional values, and Islam.

In fact, Egypt, which has historically been a centre of influence for change and ideology throughout the Arab world, was a centrepiece and catalyst for social change throughout the Arab states. Moreover, in Egypt the process of redefinition that took place in the public sphere witnessed a very clear distinction between the voices of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist factions and 'nationalist' voices, all competing over their vision for the 'new society' they wanted. The charter of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood and the influence of Sharia law is one example illustrative of the distinctiveness of the process, in comparison to the Western version.

Yet, as noted by the 'Second Research Program 2003', modernity and its defi-
nition is a continuous process. The ongoing nature of this process as well as its
redefinition had distinctive Egyptian qualities, as demonstrated by the current
Egyptian Prime Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who instituted a charter that
closely resembles the previous charter established under the leadership of
Hosni Mubarak. In fact, President el-Sisi's vision for modern Egypt differs
greatly from his predecessor Mohammed Morsi, who made decrees heavily
based upon Sharia law and recently called for an Islamic reformation of
Al-Ahzar University, highly respected throughout the Arab world for its Islamic
interpretations.

Moreover, the 'Second Research Program 2003' is useful for explaining
the increase in religiously motivated terrorism in Europe, which has occurred
in response to Western modernization. As noted by Eisenstadt (2000a), such
movements share a Jacobinism – an anomaly of Western modernity, the so-
called 'anti-modern, moderns'. What we can see from the public sphere in
Egypt, the 'Arab Spring' and the Jacobin element of modernity is how impor-
tant Multiple Modernities and the 'Second Research Program 2003' are to
understanding the unknown of social development, definition and transfor-
mation. At the same time, Islamism's bloody borderlines are a limitation of
Western social intercourse and influence. This leads us back to the problem of
'social order', i.e. that neither societies, nor members of societies are perfect.

The theoretical consequence of the new version of the theory of modern-
ization with respect to the sociological theory of contemporary society is that
modernity is neither *singular*, nor *plural*, neither *universal*, nor *particular*.
Modernity is a particular civilization that is spread by particular elites. A *gen-
eral valid civilization* has not emerged from its continued. Eisenstadt's investi-
gations on the expansion of modernity suggest that modernity is not an
evolutionary pathway to a global civilization. On the contrary, we live in a time
of *global modernities* (on new research, see *ProtoSociology* 2009, 2011a, 2011b,
2012). He concludes that sociological theory has no normative foundation and
he also rejects the enforcement of normative future states of communication,
of welfare, democracy and justice. This is inherent in the relationship between
*power*, *trust, meaning* and *membership*, which is always resolvable through the
communication, interaction and agency of members of social groups and
within the societal sectors and their formal organizations.[1]

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1    S.N. Eisenstadt (2011). *List of Publications 1947–2009.*

# Global Modernities Extrapolation of the Research Program

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# With and beyond Shmuel N. Eisenstadt: Transglobality

*Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg*

### SNE's Contribution to Understanding Social Change

A recurring theme in S.N. Eisenstadt's (SNE) work is his emphasis on endemic factors – in-built tensions, contradictions, conflicts, and antinomies – which account for changes and transformations of social reality. In an early formulation, he states that:

> The possibility of innovation and change is not something external or accidental to any institutional system. It is given in the very nature of the process of institutionalization and in the working of institutional systems.
>
> EISENSTADT 1970: 11; see also EISENSTADT 1965A, 1968A, 1968B

He further applies this principle of dialectical transformation to his analyses of the dynamics of civilizations and modernity. In this emphasis on endemic aspects, it is possible to find a similarity between SNE and the Marxist approach to social change, which once led Bellah to tag SNE as a non-Marxist Marxist.

SNE elaborates typologies of social change according to their scope and impact. He speaks of epochal macro socio-historical transformations and differentiates them from more restricted intra-epochal and intra-civilizational changes. He also draws a distinction between major breakthroughs and secondary ones. Reflecting on Jaspers (1953), SNE argues that a major breakthrough in human history was the crystallization of Axial age civilizations, in the period running from 500 BC to the first century of the Christian era (Eisenstadt 1986). He maintains that the crystallization of these civilizations constituted a series of some of the greatest revolutionary events in human history, which have shaped human history in the last two to three millennia. The central aspect of these breakthroughs was the emergence and institutionalization of new ontological conceptions of transcendental and mundane orders (Eisenstadt 2001: 1916). In relation to these developments, another significant aspect of the dynamics of axial civilizations was their potentiality to generate further internal transformations out of heterodox perspectives inherent in the

respective original civilizations. Accordingly, the most dramatic transformation from within one of the axial civilizations was modernity, which first emerged in Western Europe and later spread throughout the world (Eisenstadt 2001: 1918). From this perspective, SNE sees the great revolutions – the English Civil War, the American and French Revolutions and later the Russian and Chinese ones – as intra-epochal transformations:

> With all their dramatic importance, these revolutions certainly do not constitute the only, or even the major or most far-reaching types of change, whether in pre-modern or modern times.
>
> EISENSTADT 1992A: 397

This linking of civilization with epochal transformations represents an important contribution to both social change theory and civilizational analysis (see Arnason 2001). In this respect, SNE's approach differs from other perspectives, like that of Braudel (1980) who sees in civilizations mainly long-term continuity. Furthermore, while 'classical' civilizational analysis emphasizes spatial-synchronic relations between historical civilizations, SNE also portrays a temporal-diachronic analysis that places the emphasis on socio-historical epochal makeovers. In this respect, his approach also differs from Spengler's (1945) and Toynbee's (1965) who underline recurring cyclical stages (see also Sorokin 1963), or the approaches of Freud (1961) and Elias (1994) who both focus on long-term civilizing processes. In contrast to all these, in his civilizational analysis SNE emphasizes discontinuities and temporal divisions accounting for the generation of new phases of development.

SNE's perceptions of socio-historical transformations are neither evolutionist, nor cyclical. Although his civilizational analysis delineates vast periods of time, it is also clearly distinguishable from a linear evolutionist approach in the vein of Rostow (1960). Against evolutionary aspects in the functionalist perspective, SNE argues that:

> Not all massive social changes necessarily lead to differentiation [and] institutional developments that take place at seemingly similar 'stages' of differentiation may nevertheless lead in different directions.
>
> EISENSTADT 2003B: 6–7

SNE insists on the multiplicity and variety of forms that both axial civilizations and modernity may adopt side-by-side with their common characteristics (Tiryakian 2005). In brief, he calls attention to potential convergence and, at the same time, insists equally on divergences, opposing teleological approaches

that overstate directionality and convergence like Parsons' (1964) 'evolutionary universals in society' or Fukuyama's (1992) vision of an 'end of history'.

For his part, SNE underlines human agency and creativity, highlighting the role of elites as 'bearers' and initiators of social change. The development and crystallization of axial civilizations was only made possible, SNE believes, by the emergence of a new type of elite:

> The development of new ontological metaphysical conceptions in the Axial civilizations was closely connected with the emergence of a new type of elite, carriers of models of cultural and social order. These were often autonomous intellectuals [who] developed the new ontologies, the new transcendental visions and conceptions [...]. They also tended to become potentially independent from other categories of elites [and] saw themselves not only as performing specific technical activities [...] but also as [...] autonomous carriers of a distinct order.
>
> EISENSTADT 2001: 1917

This clarifies the extent to which the later, great revolutions differed from events such as the Meiji Restoration. "The Meiji Restoration," says SNE, "unlike the great revolutions, was characterized by an almost total absence of autonomous, distinct religious or secular intellectual groups as politically active elements" (Eisenstadt 1992a: 389).

Moreover, SNE not only emphasizes conflictual contexts of the emergence of elites but also their contribution to the predominance of cultural traits such as trust, solidarity and cohesion. Here, SNE's perspective differs from Pareto's (1963) who elaborates on recurring ahistorical cycles emanating from inter-elite and intra-elite conflicts. Furthermore, SNE's insistence on the importance of elites for social change is related to his sensitivity to the social and historical context in which it takes place.

SNE's outlook on the dynamics of civilizations leads to his view of the emergence and development of modernity that is best grasped as a 'program' (see also, Boudon 2005; 1986). This notion implies that the dynamics of the social order is anchored in inherent key characteristics, including tensions and antinomies, which trace out paths of eventual development but which cannot be known *a priori*, since they remain open to variance and alternates. In its general formulation, this scheme is more open and less specific than major alternate perspectives (Eisenstadt with Curelaru 1971). In this formulation, SNE's approach contrasts with others – such as Marxism, which gives overwhelming weight to the relations of production and class structures (see Tucker 1978) – or the similarly closed 'technologist-productionist' model that focuses on sources of livelihood and their transformation (Kerr et al. 1962). In both these approaches,

single key-factors – 'prime movers' – account for changes in all other areas of social activity. In contrast, SNE stresses the possibility that additional areas of activity may also play an autonomous role in societal development.

In rejecting a 'prime mover' causation of macro-social transformations, SNE comes close to Weber, who takes issue with any theory of society that gives consistent causal primacy to one factor. According to Weber: "If we look at causal lines we see them run, at one time, from technical to economic and political matters, at another from political to religious and economic ones" (cited in Holton 1985: 128). Weber discards any kind of determinism and, following him, SNE speaks of numerous possible trajectories of modernity, which he elaborates under the heading of multiple modernities. This latter concept reformulates and widens Weber's assessment that "modern capitalism [...] manifests essentially identical economic traits under legal systems containing rules and institutions which differ considerably from each other" (cited in Holton 1985: 129). Like Weber's analyses, SNE attaches considerable attention to the transformative potential of culture, the circulation of ideas of social order, and the confrontations of alternative intellectual and ideological horizons.

In sum, SNE tries to reconcile Marx and Weber: he is close to the former by focusing on social change as generated by endemic dialectical processes; he is closer to the latter when he considers social change in a broad comparative perspective where culture and views of the world play major roles. On the other hand, he is close to both because he is committed to given values – even though the values are not the same. Hence, one cannot mistake his liberal-pluralist outlook when he contrasts, within modernity, totalistic and pluralistic tendencies (see also Dahrendorf 2005). For SNE, as for Weber and Marx, value-judgements must not hinder adherence to scientific procedures in research (Ben-Rafael & Sternberg 2003).

Accordingly, SNE sets in opposition 'destructive' and 'constructive' potentialities and includes both dimensions in the scheme of modernity. In SNE's words:

> In the modern program, all these destructive potentialities and forces are inherent potentialities, most fully manifest in the ideologization of violence, terror and wars; and the total ideological exclusivity and demonization of the excluded are not outbursts of an old 'traditional' force – but outcomes of modern reconstruction [...]. Thus to paraphrase Leszek Kolakowski's (1990) expression, modernity is 'on endless trial'.
>
> EISENSTADT 2005C: 652–653

It is in this perspective that SNE discusses inter-class and inter-elite struggles, demographic expansion, domestic, fiscal and international difficulties of states

and socio-psychological frustrations, as causes and conditions of revolutions mentioned in the relevant literature. SNE argues, however, that these causes do not explain the revolutionary outcome of the breakdown of regimes (Eisenstadt 1992a). It is only with early modernity (whose chronology differs in various societies) that these factors generate revolutionary processes as the result of attacks on the legitimacy of autocratic modernizing regimes from the side of rising new strata and modern ideologies (Eisenstadt 1992a: 394). The 'kernels' of these revolutions, from this point of view, can already be found in the original features of axial civilizations and their ideological and structural components – in contrast to non-axial civilization where they are absent:

> In those axial civilizations [...] the basic ontology of salvation was this-worldly or one which contained a mixture of this-worldly and other-worldly orientations [...]. In the other-worldly civilizations the political arena did not constitute a basic focus of salvation [...] and [...] religious salvation did not constitute a focus of political struggle [...].
>
> EISENSTADT 1992A: 395

Thus, a radical change like the Meiji restoration of 1868 in Japan cannot be seen as a revolution, since appropriate historical civilizational kernels were lacking. Historically, in SNE's words:

> In Japan [...] no autonomous religions or intellectual groups promulgating a universal utopian vision existed. This is the crucial difference between the Meiji-Ishin and the great revolutions [...]. The message of the Meiji Restoration was addressed to the renovation of the Japanese nation; it had no basic universalistic or missionary dimensions.
>
> EISENSTADT 1992A: 396, 390

These contributions by SNE to social change theory are path-breaking: however, a critical look elicits some theoretical problems. The undeniable strength of SNE's analytical framework regarding social change is also a source of weakness. This framework indeed takes on a wide range of variables but without commitment to the question of which variables are more important than others. This all-inclusive perspective escapes the dogmatism of many other approaches; at the same time, it harms the efficiency of the explanatory framework, leaving it rather blurred, without a coherent, systematic, rigorous and understandable statement.

Nevertheless, one observes that among all variables taken into consideration, SNE's analysis somehow favours the influences of cultural and ideological premises, which leaves a flavour of cultural determinism. It is true that SNE

follows Weber in these respects, but the major difference between them is that Weber grants far more room and importance for the economic factor in his socio-historical empirical analyses (see Weber 1976).

Moreover, and in accordance with this point, SNE's concepts of modernity and multiple modernities are most comprehensive. SNE (2001) sees modernity as pointing out the emergence of a social reality where the legitimacy of the social order ceases to be taken for granted and becomes an existential *problématique* for people, as members of society. Social actors become autonomous, entitled to create new coalitions, set life-objectives according to what Boudon (2005) defines as their own 'good reasons' and, above all, question the social order in the light of their own aspirations. This set of perspectives, which developed in Western societies in the context of given civilizational legacies, has not remained these societies' exclusive privilege but has quite rapidly conquered more and more spaces, intermingling everywhere with singular cultures. This is the phenomenon that qualifies for SNE's notion of multiple modernities, and its concretization is reflected in the numerous variations of profiles exhibited by contemporary societies.

This understanding of contemporary societies as modern is charted as wider in scope and specification than major alternative images proposed by scholars. We think here, for instance, of the Marxist capitalist society model and its periodization based on relations of production, or of the industrial society model (Kerr et al. 1962), which proposes a periodization based on technology and sources of livelihood. As in the modernity/multiple modernities approach, one finds in these two alternative models a tendency towards 'inclusiveness' of as many aspects as possible in the frame of one general conceptualization. Among these three, however, it is the multiple modernities approach that is the least reductionist, but it is also the least clearly formulated. More importantly, since the multiple modernities perspective is outlined *a priori* in 'open' terms, it encounters difficulties in specifying the conditions whose fulfilment would signal the end of the age it designates. It is indeed easier to indicate theoretically the conditions or requirements whose fulfilment would mark the end of the capitalist era (i.e. the appearance of a new class structure that differs radically from the previous one), or of the industrial era (i.e. a radical transformation in technology and sources of livelihood, causing non-industrial activities to gain in prevalence) than in the case of the modernity/multiple modernities variant. Thus, the project of modernity can be seen as unbound spatially, as well as with respect to the present and future. Wherever it prevails, it seems 'installed' for good.

One sees here that SNE's use of a dialectic approach to social change is only partial and selective. Dialectic analysis requires that a phenomenon

characterizing something qualitatively new and indicative of a future era or system, must already appear within existing systems. SNE, however, does not indicate anything that transcends, or may transcend, modernity in the social world. From this angle, the project of modernity can be seen as a variant of 'the end of history' theme, recalling Fukuyama's thesis. Modernity is not only 'on endless trial', but also 'on an endless trail'.

### Globality, Transnationalism and Multiculturalism

Hence, besides SNE's contributions to understanding contemporary social change, some questions remain unanswered in the framework of his approach. What is missing in this framework, which permits the widest range of synchronic variations, is the question – 'where to from here?'

Bearing these reservations in mind, and applying the perspective of SNE's own dialectical methodology, we turn to new developments in contemporary societies and inquire both about the relation of these developments to endemic societal contradictions and their transformative potential for that social reality. This approach aims to consider modernity – like any societal reality – as given to gestations that, at least potentially, may push it beyond its characteristic features towards new conjunctures. As far as such conjunctures effectively take shape, conceptualizations accepted thus far might well lose their descriptive and analytical pertinence.

*Globality*. The first concept that seems appropriate for expressing developments that go beyond the modernity/multiple modernities approach is globality. By this notion we mean the endeavour stemming from the enhanced pace of globalization characteristic of our time, and the significant interconnectedness of actors across the globe, which fully imbues their self-awareness. Familiar from the literature (Appadurai 1990), this development is the direct result of the growing 'flows' of ideas, technology, commodities, media, and people – eased by present-day means of transportation and communication facilities. However, globality does not just describe flows cross-cutting societies; it refers to the fact that cross-cutting boundaries have become a norm, and accounts for new and important interests. As such, it is a condition implying a basic contradiction with locality, and focusing on goals related more or less exclusively to one's territory and its institutions. This duality may be bound to tensions between outward and inward references. One example where this contradiction has been clearly illustrated is the dissent that was voiced in several European countries when the European Constitution project was submitted for endorsement by EU populations. We should recall that this project

would have strengthened the status and power of European institutions on the continent and, in turn, the status of Europe as a whole before the rest of the world. On the other hand, it would have weakened the sovereignty of Europe's individual nations, which for many Europeans was still too high a price to pay. However, even the less ambitious document that was finally adopted throughout the EU conveys the recognition of a European reality that undermines, for the benefit of the EU, the notion of the nation state so central in the modernity program of the two past centuries.

That globality is nowadays a significant motivating factor for many individuals is visible, among many other illustrations, by the multiplication of worldwide institutions, agencies and corporations in highly varied fields – from UN-linked networks to numerous humanitarian NGOs, financial organs and professional associations, not to mention industrial concerns and agencies specializing in worldwide circulation of cultural symbols and resources. That this globality is not a given, and reflects tensions, is manifest in the often limited influence and authority of most of those organs and associations at the local level – despite the influence their actions have on individual minds. While SNE was familiar with these aspects, he refrained from asking if this contradiction between globality and locality does not push modernity/multiple modernities beyond their essential assumptions.

*Transnationalism.* Not unrelated to the issue of globality, one may also speak of additional developments hardly captured by the model of modernity/multiple modernities and which pertain to the phenomenon of transnationalism. This phenomenon indeed conveys several major contradictory transformative aspects of present-day societies.

The enhanced pace of transnationalization reflects today's large-scale migrations, mainly to the West from the 'Rest', as well as the formation of new states and borders as in the recent collapse of multinational and/or multiethnic states such as the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It is also facilitated by new transport and communication technologies. Thus, for contemporary migrants, emigrating no longer means a rupture with home, the adoption of a new culture to the detriment of the original one, or total change in behaviour. Today's migrants exemplify what researchers describe as transnational communities or Diasporas. As Glick Schiller and her colleagues point out:

> Our earlier conceptions of immigrant and migrant no longer suffice. The word immigrant evokes images of permanent rupture, of the uprooted, the abandonment of old patterns and the painful learning of a new language and culture. Now, a new kind of migrating population is emerging, composed of those whose networks, activities and patterns of life

encompass both their host and home societies. Their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field. [Hence, a new conceptualization appears] in order to come to terms with the experience and consciousness of this new migrant population. [All in all, one witnesses a] process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement.

GLICK SCHILLER ET AL. 1992: 1

Transnational Diasporas consist of dispersed communities sharing features like an origin, religious identity or legacy, but they also include forms of inter-community interconnectedness and all-diasporic institution-building – articulating them as transnational entities. Like any social collective, these entities may also become scenes of rivalries and competition over hegemony, between candidates for all-diasporic leadership or between supporters of different agendas. Clearly, this kind of entity is becoming increasingly common in the contemporary social world. They sustain semi-liminal Diaspora communities that uphold counter or alternative cultures contributing to the de-charismatization of the state (and the nation) and to the weakening of its control over resources. A founding narrative usually justifies the building of communities, and their aspirations to retain distinctiveness from the locals, concomitantly with their forwarding insertion among them. At the same time, these aspirations sustain Diasporans' allegiance to their legacy dating from 'elsewhere' and identification with the 'here and now'. It is the latter that will support individuals' insertion into the job market and social milieus, and their children's future. These considerations pressurize Diasporans to acculturate to their environments, to invest efforts in adapting to their new circumstances, and learn a new language. In many cases, ultimately, these people acquire a new citizenship, which downgrades their original identity to a secondary rank; this undeniably demonstrates how far the 'dual homeness' that many Diasporans seek and endorse is a contradiction in itself.

The unavoidable consequence of acculturation and semi-assimilation is that the communities of the same origin, but scattered in different parts of the globe, come to generate different, if not divergent perspectives on their common identity. Diasporans become 'different' from what they were originally, but in a different manner in each place. They contribute thereby to the cultural heterogeneity of their Diaspora, which in turn fuels intra-Diaspora tensions and competitions over influence and prevalence.

Tensions and contradictions can also emerge at the level of the individual Diaspora community according to personality, social milieu, life events or other circumstances. Belonging to a Diaspora community may take on different

meanings, and this is also true of Diasporans' allegiance to their new national collective. Hence, both kinds of identity reference may be factors of heterogenization. Being a member of a given Diaspora and being a citizen of a given nation can both be subject to different interpretations, according to a variety of backdrop circumstances. This is particularly crucial with respect to the diasporic identity, since it is entirely voluntary – in contrast to the national identity enforced by institutionalization. Hence, it is by no means improbable that different streams – more or less loyal to the group's legacy – develop within the Diaspora entity as a whole, and possibly in diverse individual communities worldwide. These different streams may crystallize as competing factors of power in all-diasporic institutions, and this, together with other more instrumental aspects, may account for the strengthening of Diasporans' interest in these institutions.

At the same time, on the local scene these processes also advance a weakening and relativization of the authority and coherence of the nation state, which is now less able to control or influence networks and exchange of resources cross-cutting national boundaries. What still aggravates this tension is the fact that in several cases of transnational Diasporas, the original homeland tends to find legitimate ways and means to get involved in the community life of its expatriate nationals. It shows a degree of activism – both in the sphere of their internal public life and at the inter-state diplomatic level – by interceding on behalf of its Diasporans' interests (Verdery 1996).

*Multiculturalism, multiculturalization and de-civilization.* Above all, these developments impact on the lack of coherence and cultural homogeneity of society. Moreover, transnational and diasporic communities contribute enormously to the multiculturalization of society, i.e. the institutionalization of socio-cultural pluralism as a recognized and quite permanent aspect of the social order. This importance is due, among other things, to the fact that many of these new communities reach societies where democracy is pressurized by additional endemic forces, i.e. at a time when local sectors' involvement in political participation is intensifying. Indeed, democracy – which is grounded in the competition of leaders for support in the polity – favours the emergence of political actors from the widest variety of constituencies, who grasp that the political game can be a significant source of social and political benefits. This game consists of bargaining support and sympathy in return for parties' and leaders' responsiveness to claims. From this angle, a democratic regime is a 'market of opportunities' encouraging professional politicians to build up power bases that, among other channels, may draw their resources from identity politics (Calhoun 1994). By joining the game, diasporic communities achieve public acknowledgement and legitimacy, thereby nourishing,

intentionally or unintentionally, society's multiculturalization. It can be assumed that the more Diasporans feel empowered through political activism, the more they will feel inserted in society and, in turn, more inclined to assimilate within their environment. On the other hand, the more benefits they obtain through identity politics, the more willing they may become to increasing their power as a distinct component of society by asserting their difference.

However, the empowerment of minorities and the claims they raise in the public arena may also stimulate tensions stemming from another source, exemplified by several recent Western examples – the non-Diasporan locals anxious about the dominant culture's vulnerability in the face of Diasporans' demands to express community singularities. As the emergence on the political scene of radical groups has demonstrated, these tensions are by no means a negligible outcome of transnationalization and multiculturalization. What may soften these tensions, however, is the fact that multiculturalization itself tends to make collective boundaries more flexible and permeable. The proximity of entities to each other and the direct or indirect influences they reciprocally exert opens up the way to new phenomena, such as what some scholars define as 'hybridization'. This notion, according to Nederveen Pieterse (2002), points out the emergence of in-between categories – engendered by mixed marriages or just cohabitation and cultural exposure – that mitigate contrasts between communities without deleting them. It invites actors – primarily intellectuals – to question their identities, through endless debates in a context where the social fabric becomes more heteroclite than ever.

Hybridization, however, by no means eradicates society's multicultural character. This is well demonstrated by the fact that the numerous individuals of mixed parentage, or who live with a spouse of a different cultural origin, do not prevent the construction and expansion of quarters asserting distinctiveness in the open: in Paris, London, New York or Berlin one finds today Chinatowns, Muslim neighbourhoods, Jewish ultra-orthodox and African areas. That very diversity paradoxically becomes a marker of resemblance among metropolitan centres which, on the other hand, identifies them as banner-holders for their own cultures.

Following this empowerment of Diaspora communities, though, some forces from within may also be tempted to strive not only for the establishment's response to specific demands of theirs (anti-discrimination measures, affirmative action, support of cult places, etc.) but also on behalf of their own notions of 'desirable' society. At the limit – and this may be expected mainly in religious communities – such groups may be tempted to openly combat the mainstream vision (Huntington 2005) on the basis of a fundamentalist program. This hardens the outraged reactions of their environment, mainly by

anti-Diaspora nativists, in a 'go-back-to-your-home' vein. What is commonly referred to as the right of the weaker to express their 'difference' could well be the starting-point of bitter disputes over longstanding societal codes.

Here we must add that fluidity of boundaries, the diffusion of dual-homeness feelings of Diasporans, and all other traits of current social reality are not without significance either for individuals' attitudes – Diasporans and non-Diasporans alike – towards society and the state. For Diasporans, these developments basically signify that social belonging is somehow divided, and thus blurred to some extent; commitment to the national society and the state gets coupled with – and limited by – transnational allegiances. Lines of loyalty to collective identities are no longer as one-sided and all-comprehensive as in the past. Each identity is altered or tempered by the other, and neither can claim exclusivity. This means that – beyond variations accounted for by milieus, groups and individuality – Diasporans who become citizens see themselves as members of the society only 'up to a certain point'. Some may even feel alienated and show reticence for their belonging to, and duty of civility towards, their present-day fellow members of society, and society itself. These feelings, moreover, do not crystallize in a vacuum: how Diasporans feel cannot avoid leaving its imprint on non-Diasporans: laxity vis-à-vis tokens of identity may spill over by contagion among non-Diasporans, challenging the rigour of civil norms traditionally considered 'normative constraints'. Prejudices then rapidly emerge on both sides, particularly among veteran locals, encouraging their extremist wing to call for the exclusion of the 'non-nationals.'

Such outgrowths may still aggravate disregard for norms of civility and set in motion the antithetical processes to developments that Elias (1994) described as 'civilizing processes'. We mean here de-civilizing processes, which amplify anomie in society and, as specified by Roché (1996; 2002) designate the possibility that norms lose their grip on sections of society. This kind of development, as one can understand by enunciating Elias' theory in reverse, takes place where the legitimate authority loses its power and appeal for people.

### Transglobality: A New Phase or a New Era?

Obviously, present-day globality, transnationalism and multiculturalism have tremendous influence on individuals – Diasporans and non-Diasporans – as well as on society. Their impact, as we have seen, is generated by contradictory forces that bring about new situations and developments. These transformations raise the question whether they represent only a degree of change with respect to what was already known in the past or, more than that, are

propelling society towards new horizons. In other words, are we now seeing signals heralding a new sequence of modernity or do they hint at a more impactful development, leading to a new era? In addressing this issue we propose the term *transglobality*, the combination of *globality* and *transnationalism*, as depicting the two main forces that influence the dynamics and transformations of the contemporary social world cited above; namely, as representing major aspects of the newness of our time.

It is worth mentioning that some authors have used the notion of transglobality, but with a different meaning than ours. Münkler (2007) uses the term to describe the source of power, transcending the globe (control not only of the earth but of outer space too), of the United States. For Olupona (2003), transglobality is nearly synonymous to transnationalism. More daringly, Laguerre (2007: 21) sees transglobality in a more complex way:

> While I recognize the existence of diverse types of globality, I reserve the concept of transglobality to refer to the crossing and interconnectedness of these global borders. Transglobality implies the existence of a plurality of global currents, a multiplicity of ways in which they traverse localities, local segmentation, and re-articulation due to diverse global impacts and the hybridity of the global process.

This notion of transglobality refers to a principle of multiple globalities or globalizations focusing on the inherently problematic relationship between the global and the local (see also Laguerre 2003, 2009).

We suggest extending the meaning of the notion of transglobality so as to relate it, in the context of the above, to broader discussions of what lies beyond modernity and whether or not modernity does actually constitute the 'end of history'. Hence, we propose defining the notion of transglobality as encompassing two major aspects of present-day social reality; namely, globality on the one hand, and transnationalism on the other. It is our contention that the concept of transglobality allows for advancing theoretically beyond SNE's all-inclusive concepts of modernity and multiple modernities.

We have suggested the notion of transglobality, among others, in order to advance theoretically and conceptually beyond the problems of the 'broad' and inclusive variant of the modernity image and theorization (Eisenstadt's model of 'multiple modernities'). However, the 'narrow' views of the modernity image are also problematic. Thus, for example, Eisenstadt formulated his 'multiple modernities' approach in order to retain the modernity image and to advance beyond the theoretical impasse of the narrow and unidirectional variants of previous modernization theories, and also in order to

reject the new postmodernity view that can be seen as a narrow variant of the modernity image. His critique on the latter was that, in all their variants, adherents to the claim that we are now in a new era of postmodernity tend to have a narrow and one-sided view of what modernity is or was. Either they tend to see in modernity only a human emancipation program, as does Habermas (1990), or they tend to see in it only repressive aspects, like Foucault and similar scholars. Because of their one-sided outlook on modernity that ignores its other aspects, such scholars tend to declare the appearance of the new era of postmodernity, while emphasizing as indicators and criteria for the emergence of this new era manifestations of those aspects that they tend to ignore in modernity. In any case, the new phenomena which attract the attention of such scholars, are strongly embedded in the main issues and problematics of modernity, and differ from the phenomena and developments we have emphasized in our above discussion. Moreover, the notion of postmodernity as a new era is not a substantive one, and is therefore an inadequate concept from the theoretical standpoint. The same theoretical inadequacy applies equally to concepts like 'late modernity' (Giddens 1999).

In the face of the shortcomings of theoretical constructs – such as multiple modernities, postmodernity, late modernity – which are confined theoretically by the (post)modernity image and its problematic and issues, we propose focusing on transglobality as pointing out new phenomena, that were unknown or hardly discernible in the recent past. These phenomena arise in the context of the formation of new contradictory tendencies and velleities, and account for new attitudes, interests, conflicts, and horizons. In this, our approach tends to coincide with Martin Albrow's (1996) theorization that also attempts to go beyond modernity and postmodernity by advancing the notion of a 'global age'. In contrast to Albrow, however, transglobality as we understand it refers not only to globalization and its impacts, but also to transnationalism and its direct societal consequences on political regime, cultural and identitional self-definitions, all of which are important for understanding contemporary social life.

In brief, the question that has guided these pages asked if the analysis of recent societal developments, drawing on SNE's work, may make use of the dialectical methodology that inspired him to go one step further and ask 'what after modernity?' He himself firmly applied his model to previous stages of social history, but somehow loosened his grip when it came to modernity. By overcoming this reluctance, one may then be able to consider the possibly wide and far-reaching consequences of transformations taking place in our

time, and apprehend thereby the potentialities they convey for pushing society to new horizons. If confirmed and amplified further, the study of these developments might lead us to catch sight of future configurations that would outmode the notion of modernity for their description. These configurations might herald a new era – transglobality? – rather than a new sequence, and their study could fuel the scholarly debate about the end – not of history but – of modernity.

# Multiple Modernities and the Theory of Indeterminacy

*On the Development and Theoretical Foundations of the Historical Sociology of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt*

*Manussos Marangudakis*

From the study of agrarian empires (1963), to his later works on axiality (1986), modernity (2002a) and revolution (2006), Shmuel Eisenstadt remained equally concerned about understanding historical change and developing a sound sociological theory. In fact, he considered them to be two sides of the same coin: social theory is useless if it does not correspond to reality, and reality makes sense only through the lens of social theory. This sounds like a truism, but for Eisenstadt it became a vehicle first to correct and then to alter in a rather radical way structural functionalism, both in its historical context and in substance; I will call it the 'theory of indeterminacy'. Based upon this theory, he developed the most radical historic-sociological model to understand modernity since the development of convergence-modernization theory in the 1960s and World System Theory in the 1970s, the theory of 'multiple modernities'.

## Structural Functionalism Updated

Starting with the *Political Systems of Empires* (1963), the focus of Eisenstadt's analysis was the systemic character of these regimes, the distinctive social structures and institutions that characterized them, and the social processes that were developed by their rulers to maintain the systemic boundaries of their empires. To achieve his goal, Eisenstadt employed a very particular methodology; that is, configurational analysis. Simply put, configurational analysis is the analysis of the essential qualities of social structures, institutions, and patterned social actions that develop inside a social system and define it. Following this methodology, Eisenstadt first differentiated and conceptualized a social pattern (i.e. a configuration), then examined its essential characteristics, and finally interpreted its contribution to the maintenance of the systemic boundaries of the empire in question. The use of this methodology led to a very peculiar, even idiosyncratic, narration that would become the unique feature

of all Eisenstadt's works that followed: eventless historical narration. The argument could be understood and followed only by readers who had already done their history homework; as for the rest, they could abandon all hope.

What is important about agrarian empires? They stand as peculiar institutions between antiquity and modernity without necessarily leading from the one to the other; in other words, without guaranteeing social evolution. Their peculiarity lies in their main and central characteristic: the institutionalization of autonomous political power, as well as the intentional development of 'free resources' and thus the intentional 'encouragement' of social differentiation on large scale, and above ethnic and city boundaries. Since 'empires' by definition extent beyond ethnic boundaries and geographic localities, their mere existence necessitated some form of political-institutional autonomy. Thus, for the writer, empires are the first instances of various *systemic* tensions and fusions between social and institutional structures and their derivates.

The key factor of the analysis of the agrarian bureaucratic empires is that of 'free resources'; that is, means of social power that could be detached from their possessors and potentially be used by other social actors and groups, such as the peasantry that could either be controlled by the landed aristocracy, or be 'free' and thus strengthen the autonomy of the ruler vis. the aristocracy. Using 'free resources' as a guide, Eisenstadt examines the struggles between institutional actors and social groups to control such resources, and especially so between rulers and aristocracy. Following the specific historical developments, the author concludes that the social development of the agrarian empires was limited by the limited level of free resources; and that free resources were limited because traditional and undifferentiated political activities did not match political goals that were more differentiated. To put it in structural-functional terms, even though there was a 'need' for social differentiation, the political apparatus, in spite of the development of bureaucracy, did not 'fulfill its functional role'; social and institutional development were not evolving hand in hand. Eisenstadt was questioning the cornerstone of structural functionalism.

While the conclusions of this magnum opus did not impress many as structural functionalism was becoming out of fashion when the book was first published, secondary findings of the study would lead Eisenstadt not only to a major reconstruction of structural functionalism, but to the construction of a new sociological theory and a new understanding of macro social development. First and foremost, Eisenstadt noticed that structural differentiation in the social system of the empires did not always lead to a corresponding institutional differentiation (as Parsonian structural functionalism assumed) but it was conditioned on the presence of political entrepreneurs or elites with a vision and ability to create original political institutions. Such

a parallel development took place only when both components, i.e. semi-autonomous elites *cum* social differentiation, were present. Second, imperial political systems were ridden by internal contradictions inherent in their own existence – such as (a) between the creation and the control of free resources, (b) the goals of the rulers that bound the system and the inability of the system to implement the imperial polities, and (c) between the desire of the rulers to free themselves from ascriptive groups and functions and their ascriptive legitimation. And third, the fate of the empires depended on a combination of external threats and internal struggles or contradictions that were interwoven in the fabric of the imperial system itself.

The study's findings were particularly critical of the evolutionary presumptions of structural functionalism: First, social change does not necessarily lead to structural differentiation. And second, even when structural differentiation leads to institutional developments, the latter might not be similar everywhere, but might lead similar social systems (e.g., empires) to different paths of institutional and structural developments. In a nutshell, structural differentiation and institutional formation are multi-directional: No social system could be taken for granted; institutional entrepreneurs are necessary for a social system to exist; the system cannot escape internal contradictions; the social system if under particular pressures might collapse.

In sum, Eisenstadt infused structural functionalism with a good dose of agentic volition and uncertainty, but for the moment he had not altered the paradigm in any decisive way. According to Parsons, structural differentiation is an adaptive response of the social system to strains that restores equilibrium and functionality; what the system 'needs', structural differentiation 'provides'. Eisenstadt shifted the epicentre of social change from systemic needs in general to political elites who satisfy their need for power by establishing new and more specialized, or focused, political institutions. But while there is a relief in the system, the status and power struggles of these new elites create new conflicts over scarce resources. Notwithstanding the significance of his critical comments, the *Empires* remained well embedded in the Parsonian framework as he remained committed to the problématique of adaptiveness, flexibility, systemic boundaries and productive capacity.

### From Systematic Needs to the Institutionalization of Elites' Power Struggles

This all started to change as Eisenstadt shifted his focus of attention from social differentiation and organizational capacity to cultural forces like charisma,

trust, solidarity, and religion; and from general social evolution to distinct civilizational paths.

The first step towards a more cultural analysis of the social system was taken in the new introduction of *Political Systems of Empires* (1969) and by a series of studies that paid attention to spiritual, symbolic and moral concerns and the ways they were articulated by political and intellectual elites (Eisenstadt 1995c). His rationale is clear enough: ecological factors and contingency aside, a deep and permanent social division of labour and the specifics of a social system must derive from an arbitrary yet authoritative source; that is, a cultural orientation. Eisenstadt first applied the scheme by developing the analytical dimensions of the concept of centre and periphery relations conceived as dealing not only with the organizational aspects of the social division of labour but with their connection to charisma as a key ingredient of social order (Eisenstadt 1995). As he had already distinguished between different types of centres in ancient and medieval social systems, he now came to recognize that this distinctiveness had much to do with the cultural orientations they articulate, and allow particular elite coalitions and ability to regulate and exploit social arrangements. Charisma was strongly linked to institution building through affecting major components of a social order; namely, trust, solidarity, collectivities, regulation of power, the construction of meaning and the legitimation of patterns of social interaction.

The significance of elites in affecting the structure of the social division of labour and of social systems, as well as the significance of the presence of a 'centre' from a 'periphery', were further explored in studies that explored the distinction between 'organizational' and 'model-based centres' as well as between 'congruent' and 'non-congruent societies', according to the distinctive structural role of the elites and elite functions such as regulation of power, trust and solidarity and the provision of models of cultural order. Examining the particularities of elite functions in various African social systems, Eisenstadt came to the conclusion that the level of stability and dynamism of a social system depended on the ability of the centre to control and shape the periphery (1988a, 1988b). The more specialized and culturally dissociated were the central elites from the structural differentiation of the periphery, the more autonomous they were, and more able to impose their will and their program upon it. Whenever a distinctive cultural order was developed in the centre (that is, 'model-based' centre – 'non-congruent' societies), the more difficult it was to interchange power and authority or to convert wealth into the symbolic functions of the centre. The centre could impose its authority on the periphery not by brute exercise of power, but by charismatic institutions developed and imposed by autonomous cultural elites detached from ascriptive units.

The argument emerging out of these studies was that the internal dynamics of a social system is closely linked to the relative autonomy of the elites, while the latter is closely related to cultural or even civilizational visions and programs cultural elites develop, visions that constitute potentially 'free resources' to be contested by counter-elites or social groups. Decisive to this argument is the remark that there is an elective affinity between the substance of the cultural visions and the degree of autonomy of elites. The more autonomous these elites, the more able the centre is not only to regulate existing social relations but also to attempt to transform the existing social order.

This argument was fully developed during the 1980s as Eisenstadt shifted the focus of attention to the examination of 'Axial civilizations' and their modern legacy. Axial civilizations, as they were understood by Eisenstadt, provide evidence for the power of cultural visions, and of their bearers, to shape societies forming enduring patterns of social interaction and organization (Eisenstadt 1986).

The Axial civilizations, arguably the most enduring forms of distinct social systems in the history of mankind, were formed in a short span of time around the fifth century BCE, when a series of archaic societies mutated into five distinct 'civilizations' based upon equally distinct, though homologous, cultural visions: Deuteronomic Judaism, Greek (platonic) philosophy, Confucianism, Buddhism and Hinduism. Later, two derivatives of Judaism – Christianity and Islam – were added to these pristine and original visions. These cultural visions, promulgated by a new social group of 'intellectuals', in turn became the decisive constituent ingredients of Israel, the Greco-Roman world, China, India, and later on of European Christianity and of the Muslim world. These civilizations were characterized by the institutionalization of specific cultural conceptions that perceived the cosmos as deeply divided between a mundane and a transcendental order.

The institutionalization of these visions created new clusters of semi-autonomous cultural elites of a clerical nature (Jewish prophets, Greek philosophers, Christian priests, Chinese literati, Hindu Brahmins, Buddhist Sangha and the Islamic ulama) who transformed the political elites, establishing above all a new ethical-political concept – 'accountability'. The Axial civilizations came to verify not only the existence of non-congruent societies, but the decisive role intellectuals played in pushing social development 'forward', at higher levels of social complexity *without* any apparent pre-existing systemic 'need' for such a development. While in congruent societies the centre was copying the social differentiation and division of labour of the periphery writ large (kinship, territoriality), in non-congruent societies social differentiation was marked by the development of distinct elite functions that became connected with new, prescriptive – rather than ascriptive – collectivities with ecumenical overtones and applicability.

The development of autonomous cultural elites created new types of social dynamics between centre and periphery, between political authority and social strata, and new types of solidarity and protest. Above all, it facilitated new forms of social protest and social movements that challenged political power either on grounds of accountability or of proper interpretation of the principles of the resolution of the tension between immanent and transcendental domains. These new social movements were primarily different sects and heterodoxies that upheld different conceptions of 'salvation' as well as of the proper way to define and institutionalize alternative conceptions of the social and cultural order. As the by now charismatic centre defined not only political authority but also the proper interpretation of the cultural vision, the possibility of ideological and structural linkages between peripheral social movements of protest and political struggles for the control of the centre emerged in these civilizations, thus linking in systemic ways the relatively autonomous political and ideological networks of power. Thus, axiality gave rise to systemic coalitions of secondary elites and the first 'ideological politics'.

Eisenstadt himself describes this major mutation as follows:

> It is thus that there developed a new type of civilizational dynamics. These new dynamics of civilization transformed group conflicts into political class and ideological conflicts, cult conflicts into struggle between the orthodoxies and the heterodoxies. Conflicts between tribes and societies became missionary crusades for the transformation of civilizations. The zeal for reorganization informed by each society's transcendental vision made the whole world at least potentially subject to cultural-political reconstruction, and in all these new developments the different sectarian movements and movements of heterodoxy played, for the reasons outlined above, a central role.
>
> EISENSTADT 1993: XXXII

According to the specificities of the various cosmological visions that emerged during the axial age, and later on of Christianity and Islam, and according to the relative autonomy of the cultural elite from the political centre, various configurations of salvation (as definitions of solution to the tension between the mundane and the transcendental order) emerged that actually shaped and sealed the socio-political trajectories of the corresponding civilizations.

For example, in India the cultural elites retained a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the political elite, which remained secondary in importance for the duration of the Hindu civilization. In contrast, in China the Mandate of Heaven, though it did hold the Emperor accountable to the principle of cosmic

harmony, did not fuel or legitimize political struggles based upon reinterpretations of the Mandate; Daoism and Buddhism remained confined and isolated in the periphery providing no challenge to the regime. Rather, there developed relatively weak ideological and structural linkages between movements of change, sects and secret societies, and central and peripheral secondary institutional elites. The otherwise numerous movements of protest did not have the capacity to be linked with the central political struggle, or to restructure the major premises of the imperial institutions. In imperial China the class of Confucian literati was absolutely dependent on imperial power, with no autonomous resources of their own to draw from; yet, they remained loyal to the imperial principles and institutional arrangements, strongly oriented to the political centre as the major arena for the implementation of the Confucian transcendental vision. In Byzantium, Christianity and the semi-autonomous Church gave rise to a high emphasis on accountability of the emperors to higher principles generating and legitimating a very intense level of political struggle in the name of the Byzantine version of Mandate; that is, the Emperor as the viceroy of Jesus Christ on Earth and the Empire as a reflection of Heaven on Earth, while Christian sects regularly challenged the imperial interpretation of the mundane and transcendental orders and of the proper meaning of 'salvation'.

Such an argument challenged in a rather radical way the basic principle of structural functionalism; that is, institutions as tension-solving mechanisms. It also called into question the whole idea of 'systemic needs'. Construction of systemic boundaries and thus of systemic needs is effected through definitions of activities and interactions, which cannot be arbitrary. Instead, they depend on ideological and symbolic evaluations that draw from basic ontological conceptions or worldviews that regulate social interaction and the flow of resources. It is these definitions that shape patterns of authority and power, models of hierarchies, modes of economic production, etc. True, each type and each kind of social organization necessitates some basic institutional arrangements, not very different to the ones that Michael Mann specified and described in his theory of social networks (Mann: 1986). Yet, since there is no one single way to organize these functional arrangements, several types of functionally equivalent institutional arrangements may develop with very different boundaries, organizational structures and systemic links.

## From Revised Structural Functionalism to Multiple Modernities

This might sound very much like Parson's understanding of value institutionalization, yet Eisenstadt conceives it in a very different, paradoxical, way.

Rather than solving the problem of internal tensions and systemic instability, institutionalization – as conceived by Eisenstadt – *perpetuates* instability, albeit in a system that increasingly becomes more complex in a futile effort to *escape* instability. This is seen more clearly if we consider the three factors affecting the construction of social order: The distribution of resources according to the predominate type of division of labour; the institutional entrepreneurs or elites able to mobilize and structure resources and social groups' interests; and the nature of the ontological visions that inform the elites and derive from the major cultural orientations prevalent in the social system. Of these three factors, the last two constitute the cultural forms of social order: The institutionalization of the ontological visions concretizes charisma and meaning and crystallizes the activities, structure, boundaries, and the identity of the elites and elite coalitions. In other words, once the major ontological visions have been crystallized, the development of centre formation is inevitable in particular ways and functional prerequisites are set accordingly. Each 'civilization' then constructs its own environment, or civilization is the social transformation of each cosmological vision into particular ecological and social environments. But these cosmological visions do not determine the social system; rather they constitute general guidelines, or affordances, for social actors to develop various social patterns and institutions in wide civilizational frameworks. Within this framework, the social division of labour, elite coalitions and external factors participate and are interwoven in various, historically specific ways.

Furthermore, it is through these cultural arrangements of power that the social system changes. Social systems do not seek stability as such; rather, they constitute organized efforts to secure access to resources, power and meaning in the framework of porous and precarious social systems. Culture provides means and ways to achieve such collective and selective goals and, as such, it constitutes both an order maintaining and an order transforming factor. And while it provides legitimation to a given social order, it also provides the means to challenge it. The ever present 'need' for legitimation and the fact that legitimation is not assumed, but is an intentional and uncertain enterprise, denotes the not-for-given character of legitimation itself. This does not mean that culture is tautological. Instead, culture is the vehicle for order and change, and the specificities of culture affect the ways change and order are manifested. If social order is based upon an interpretation of the cosmological vision, then social change is based upon a reinterpretation of the same vision. The post-Octavian Roman Empire desperately sought a legitimating ideology to anchor its ecumenical claim; it found it in episcopal Christianity. Once the Nicene creed was established as the imperial ideology, the empire was forced to deal

with legitimating issues that derived from various 'sectarian' and 'heretic' rein-
terpretations of this particular interpretation of the Christian beliefs. These
were resolved either with dialectic syntheses (usually in the Christian West), or
by the dissociation of the challengers from the political and ideological civili-
zational centre (usually in the Christian East). In either case, one certain 'solu-
tion' was bound to become the cradle of a future crisis.

The significance of culture in general, and of the cosmological visions in
particular, of shaping the trajectory of social development and of the social
division of labour, is confirmed by the investigation of the most dramatic
instances of social change, the Great Revolutions (Eisenstadt: 2006). While
structural and psycho-sociological factors are useful in detecting and explain-
ing the causes of the breakdown of a regime, they fail to explain the radical
alteration of the basic premises of the regimes, and the outcome of the revolu-
tionary process. Eisenstadt rightly notes that revolutions do not just denote a
breakdown, or a *stasis*, but also the establishment of a new social system, a
new social division of labour and a new political order that is legitimized and
established by a new ontological vision; or, more precisely, by a radical reinter-
pretation of the old vision.[1] The new vision becomes the guiding spirit for the
radical alteration of the definition of truth, of trust, of the crystallization of
new constellations of elites and elite boundaries, of social organizations
and modes of social interaction and institutional patterns. The intensification
of state power in post-revolutionary France but not in post-revolutionary
America, in soviet Russia but not in post-revolutionary England or Latin
America is to be explained not in functional-structural or class terms of bal-
ance of power, but in ideological terms. The revolutionary 'imagined society'
was envisioned and promulgated in radically different ways by the specific
revolutionary elites.

Yet, all civilizations are not equally prone to revolutionary changes. Instead,
it is only this-worldly and combined this- and other-worldly civilizational
frameworks that attract revolutionary processes. In this framework, it is only
imperial and imperial-feudal regimes that are open to revolutionary processes;
that is, civilizational frameworks that consider the political arena as a proper
means to resolve the tension and bridge the gap between the immanent and
the transcendental orders, thus 'achieving' salvation. Yet, as mentioned earlier,
this tension is never really resolved, only updated and renewed. The reason is
that the cultural programs of all Axial civilizations in general, and of this-
worldly (Confucian China) and combined this- and other-worldly (the three

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1   For a detailed description of how the Roman Catholic theology cultivated its own demise
    and the rise of secularism see: Manussos Marangudakis (2001).

monotheistic) civilizations in particular, are ridden with internal contradictions or antinomies that could be amassed into three categories: First is the contradiction between the vastness of the range of possibilities of transcendental visions as such, and the small range of possible implementations of these visions; second, the contradiction between reason and revelation of faith; and third the contradiction between materialization-institutionalization of the visions and freedom entailed in the charismatic dimension of social action and of personal experience.

These are antinomies, tensions and contradictions that, by definition, could never be resolved. Yet, they ignite major projects of social change as their instigators, revolutionary institutional entrepreneurs, yearn to resolve a deep spiritual tension, to bridge the chasm between the sacred and the profane, to bring the ideals of justice and eternal harmony down to earth. Institutionalizations, then, in general, and revolutions, in particular, neither constitute organizational responses to strain, nor a process of socialization, but an effort to resolve a perceived moral tension. What is institutionalized in revolutions is self-renewal and faith, exemplary cases of which are the Jacobin and fundamentalist movements and revolutions that define modernity. The inquiry into the Great Revolutions of modernity; the liberal revolutions of the early modernity (English, American and French); the socialists revolutions of mature modernity (Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban); the revolutions in the Islamic world (Turkish and Iranian); a series of post-colonial nationalist revolutions in the so-called Third World; and the non-axial 'revolutionary restoration' of Japan, as well as the absence of revolutions in other civilizational centres, allow Eisenstadt to examine the legacy of the Axial civilizational patterns and their impact long after the imperial and feudal political regimes that nourished them vanished.

All these revolutions had one common denominator: autocratic modernizing regimes face the contradictions inherent in their own legitimation and collapsed under the pressures of modernizing social strata and a semi-autonomous class of intellectuals who advocated a new vision for the future based upon total mobilization and participation of the periphery to the political centre; promulgation of secular ecumenical values; charismatization of the revolutionary process; glorification of violence; the radical dissociation from the past; and trust in science, reason and volition that humanity could control its fate and nature and achieve an eternally harmonious society.

Great Revolutions define the passage from agrarian empires to modernity, and, for Eisenstadt, the passage from the study of classical Axial civilizations to the study of multiple modernities (2002b). Contrary to the liberal and Marxist perception of one unified universal system of modernity to be found in the

'convergence' or 'world system' theories, Eisenstadt reasons that, instead, we witness the development of several and parallel modern civilizations based upon different cultural premises, of different symbols and social patterns and of ideological and institutional internal dynamics.

This perspective entails a radically different understanding of modernity, which does not perceive modernity as a mechanism for the implementation of the cold logic of industrialism, capitalism, or formal liberal institutions, but instead recognizes value rationality as equally or even more important than instrumental rationality. The social system, any social system, still entails meanings that are linked to values of purposeful action. Indeed, Eisenstadt recognizes that modernity is a new civilization of specific components that are indeed universal. The cultural program of modernity entails a new conception of possibilities realizable through autonomous human, rational action. At the same time, it questions and challenges all kinds of certainty that premodern cultures were taking for granted. The essence of modernity is not the triumph of cold rationality over superstition and tradition, but the triumph of doubt over certainty. But it is not dissociated from the legacies of the Axial Age; in fact, it constitutes the doubt of the Axial certainties.

## Multiple Modernities

The idea of 'multiple modernities' that emerged out of this problématique argues that modernity cannot be identified with the West and its own post-war path to modernization, even though, for a while, it did appear as the genuine carrier of the modernization process. The West was indeed the original, but is not the genuine carrier of modernity. The West, due its own internal dynamics, *did* develop multiple semi-autonomous centres of social power that eventually opened the path to the full development of the fundamental values and visions of modernity that via imperialism spread around the world. And since modernization entails a certain (but not exhaustive) trend towards structural differentiation across a wide range of institutions that were first developed in the West (in economic and political structures, in urbanization and education, in new individualistic lifestyles), the latter appeared as the authentic agent of modernity. Yet, it was soon realized that the adaptation of such social structures and institutions did not lead to a mergence of cultures or of cultural premises; instead, it lead to the constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of distinct cultural programs. These reconstructions of institutional and ideological patterns are carried out by specific actors in connection with activists and social movements pursuing different programs of modernity through

various reinterpretations of the hegemonic cultural program. This comes down to the argument that modernity and the West are not identical. Instead, modernity is a distinct civilization that is superimposed upon axial legacies; the latter, instead of withering away, are modernized – they animate and guide the modern doubts and modern deconstructions.

This definition of modernity in effect multiplied Weber's iron cage *ad infinitum*: There is not a singular iron cage, but as many as the global class of intellectuals is ready to envision and promulgate. We open up the gate of one iron cage, seeking freedom, meaning and self-fulfillment, only to find ourselves trapped in another, more comfortable (for a while) iron cage of our own device. Within different modern societies different cultural meanings and programs of modernity develop according to the interpretation of the basic symbolic conceptions and legacies they inherit from their pre-modern, Axial past.

With regard to this multitude, Eisenstadt finds it important to concentrate on two types of political-cultural programs: The liberal, on the one hand, and the various Jacobin movements and regimes on the other. Starting from the latter, some of the Great Revolutions of modernity (the French, the Soviet, the Chinese and only recently the Iranian revolution), gave rise to the belief in the possibility of bridging the gap between the transcendental and the mundane orders; that is, of bringing utopian, secular or religious visions to life through human action. Contrary to this, the liberal type of modernity acknowledges the legitimacy of multiple individual groups and interests and allowed for multiple interpretations of the common good.

Both liberal and Jacobin types offer solutions to the modern problématique, but they do so without escaping the modern curse. Utopian social movements and revolutions that promise the eradication of social tension and injustice are discredited as soon as the revolutionary passion is institutionalized into mundane bureaucratic institutions, while tensions are magnified; conservative-authoritarian movements that promise stability, order and the return to metaphysical certainty of the glorious past do so at the expense of creativity, personal freedom and social development. Even liberalism, the great winner of political modernity so far, is not free of pitfalls. Recognition of pluralism, of difference and of individual freedom does not solve the basic tensions and antinomies of modernity – liberalism provides a mode of peaceful coexistence, but it is void of any definition of a meaningful life, or of salvation. In fact, it makes more visible the angst that lies at the heart of modern life; thus, the selective affinity between liberalism and religious revivals of strong fundamentalist overtones in the US, or of liberalism and nationalism in Europe. In both cases, personal but meaningless liberty is attracted by an authoritarian but meaningful radicalism.

Late modernity does not signify the secularization of the great divide of transcendental and immanent domains, but the internalization of the divide; the centrality of human action in bridging the divide, thus achieving salvation in this world, forces the individual to reconstruct its personality, to recognize profanity and purity in society and in social institutions, and be engaged in purging acts of salvation. Liberalism has won the political race only to discover that the natural identity of interest and freedom to pursue happiness does not provide permanent solutions to the perennial issue of salvation and the dark shadows of alienation.

This radical understanding of modernity is based upon the rejection of basic presumptions of structural functionalism and, above all, the assumption that culture, social structure and agency are distinct realities inherently prone to growth, development, differentiation and specialization, as well as the assumption that processes inside them are routine or rational. Instead, Eisenstadt's studies indicate that symbolic and organizational aspects of social life are interwoven and that, even though they constitute analytically distinct entities, they cannot be understood historically unless we consider them as constitutive of each other. Such an argument calls into question the whole idea of a natural evolution of premodern societies to modernity, as well as the more 'political' argument that the West constitutes the inevitable future of all societies.

### The General Theory of Indeterminacy

The key-factor in Eisentadt's understanding of historical change is the concept of 'indeterminacy' – the open space that exists between the general capacities of the human species and the concrete specifications of the capacities it employs in a given time and a given social and ecological environment. While the concept is used widely by ethologists, anthropologists and philosophers to denote the freedom of the species, vis. other animals, or for sweeping statements about human potential, for Eisenstadt it became the concept to denote both social order and social change, from the most general to the most specific form of human interaction (Eisenstadt 1995b, 1995e, 1995f: especially chapters 10–13).

Social division of labour, an unavoidable consequence of the inability of the basic human unit, the family, to achieve self-sufficiency, is the basic organizational dimension of social interaction to achieve the goals that family cannot provide. Eisenstadt notes that indeterminacy permeates each and every aspect of the organizational life. It is found in the social interaction amongst actors (collective and/or individual); it is located in-between actors and their goals; and in-between goal-seeking actors and the resources, since access of different

actors to the major resources that are being produced, exchanged and distributed is not specified in any 'objective' way. Resources tend to be used in more than one way and for many different goals; social boundaries do not have an independent existence; symbols are open to interpretation; objects are arbitrarily signified as such by their signifiers and constantly open to new significations. Awareness of such kinds of indeterminacy intensifies fragility and changeability in a quest for more meaningful and more secure social interaction.

'Rules' constitute the answer to this problem of fragility and uncertainty; they stand for the crystallization of a specific response to the question of social organization. Rules specify social roles, institutional arrangements and the structuration of social hierarchies; the media of exchange, i.e. money, power, influence and value commitments; systemic boundaries to define insiders and outsiders; and structural positions, differentiation and status assigned in the web of social networks. The principles regulating these ground rules of social interaction entail not only cognitive or symbolic, but also the normative dimensions of the basic organizational aspects of social organization, i.e. roles, status, and institutional formations, as well as the regulation of the production and distribution of resources.

Yet, any choice of rules, no matter how efficient and functional it might be, does not solve the perennial problem of a stable division of labour. The reason is that, in time, any set of organizational patterns generates new problems that eventually call into question the pattern of social interaction itself, its organizational premises, and eventually the rules that permeate them: The social division of labour cannot be taken for granted.

The problematic nature of the organizational aspects of the social division of labour generates uncertainties with respect to trust, regulation of power, construction of meaning and legitimation of different patterns of social interaction. These issues define the systemic tendencies and 'needs' (in structural-functional terms) of social interaction, but, contra structural-functionalism they are not 'given'; instead, they are effected by specific social processes in which the construction of meaning plays a central role. Meaning itself can never be fully accommodated or be complete as its sources are always restless: Insecurity, existential anxiety, and imagination, the basic and common to all human beings features of human reflexivity, are always out there seeking satisfaction and gratification. Yet, while the existentialists spoke about restless reflexivity in the abstract, Eisenstadt framed and integrated these three components of human reflexivity into a social analysis of two basic axes of meaning: The cosmological-ontological axis, and the axis that defines and specifies the tensions inherent in the symbolic structuring

of social relations (hierarchy vs. equality, competition vs. solidarity, selective vs. collective goals, etc.).

The two axes are substantiated in various codes; that is, ethical orientations focused on the evaluation of specific institutional arenas with broad implications for behaviour and distribution of resources. Codes become the means to specify the proper allocation of resources, the construction of collective identities, the regulation of power, and the meaning of various basic components of life (meaning of nature, time, the substance of the world, etc.). Code-orientations provide the tools to define the arenas of social life, and bind together the organizational and cultural aspects of social life. In the framework of specific institutions, code-orientations are turned to 'ground rules'. Ground rules combine the definition and specification of the basic principles of the division of labour (trust, regulation of power and legitimation) with the regulation of the flow of resources. They specify the institutional boundaries of collectivities, the criteria of regulation of access to resources, the rules of justice, and the definition of collective and selective goals.

The theory of indeterminacy explains the mechanism that generates and stabilizes the institutional structures of every society in general and the multiple forms of modernity in particular. If indeterminacy – the wide 'open spaces' that surround tangible institutional formations – is the cause for the constant structuration of the social division of labour, social development itself is not an automaton-like process, bouncing back and changing course aimlessly at any instance of social deadlock or organizational dysfunction. Instead, social division of labour is guided by the general cultural codes and the cosmological-ontological axis which provides the general coordinates of social development itself. More importantly, these codes are activated and re-interpreted not by a mechanistic process of internal systemic necessity, but by the intentional action of ideological elites that trigger the mechanism of re-interpretation. True, the cosmological axis never acts alone, as it is conditioned by the second axis defined by the tensions caused by the internal contradictions of social interaction. But even this second axis is animated by the visions of the first; even when tensions are caused by general human predisposition (e.g., nepotism versus altruism, rationalism versus revelation) the actual form the tension adopts is structured at large in terms defined by the ontological categories of the cosmological axis.

The cosmological axis provides the raison d'être of 'civilizations' as a legitimate sociological concept. The second axis of meaning that permeates the symbolic structuring of social relations is common to all human communities; left alone, it cannot determine any long-term stability or continuity of any community. Stability and continuity can only be provided by the cosmological

axis; it constitutes the heart of a social system and the foundation of its structural specificities. Civilization is nothing other than the materialization of the cosmological principles in a given time and space. This is the point of departure of Eisenstadt's indeterminacy theory from other micro-cultural and materialist-economic theories of social action and order. For example, the theories of symbolic interaction and ethnomethodology do acknowledge and highlight the value of culture and of reflective metathinking, but they do not take into account the wider ontological frameworks in which various actors make sense of their world and interact with one another. As for macro theories of social development and differentiation, they either ignore cultural factors (e.g., world system theory), or consider them as obstacles for social development (e.g., classic and neo-convergence theory), or they understand them in essentialist and, even worse, in competitive terms (e.g., clash of civilizations theory). All of them fail to see them as living, constantly changing components of social action and order in constant interaction with one another, incubators of social forces with undetermined consequences.

## Heuristic Breakthroughs and Outstanding Issues

In more substantive terms, Eisenstadt's theory of modernity, vis-à-vis the more mainstream ones, stresses two arguments of particular importance to social research and theorizing. First, that there is no such thing as 'premodern' or 'traditional' society or behaviour to be compared with one or many 'modern' ones; there is neither a single traditional, nor a single modern behaviour, attitude, nor cognition, as Axial cultural predispositions affect the ontological premises of social interaction long before the advent of modernity. Each Axiality, notwithstanding their common recognition of the gap between the transcendental and the mundane order, differs greatly on the particular way they understand 'salvation': to put it simply, Judaic 'obedience', Greek 'truth', Confucian 'harmony', Buddhist 'detachment', Hindu 'purification', Christian 'redemption' and Muslim 'submission' differ greatly both in ontological terms and behavioural effects. The specific orientation of salvation (this-, other-, or a combination of this- and otherworldliness) in general, and the various structuration processes of the particular institutionalizations of these ontological maps, have deepened this basic distinctiveness and created a large variety of 'traditionalisms' that need to be examined and analyzed as distinct social systems, rather than as many cases of 'premodernity' defined as mixtures of otherwise neutral social phenomena such as localism and nepotism.

Second, contra to some recent studies, 'multiple modernities' is not identical to religion and its institutional strength, to nationalism, to westernization, to secularism, or any particular ideology.[2] Instead, multiple modernities denotes the institutionalization (at various and multiple levels of the social system) of particular semantic maps and symbolic codes that are inspired by particular ontological visions. To embrace the principles of multiple modernities and of the theory of indeterminacy means to examine the interplay of the two basic axes of the social system in each and every level of social interaction and institutional premises of a given 'society'.

That said, the theory of multiple modernities (but not the theory of indeterminacy) tends to understate the fact that the imperialistic expansion of the West in the past, and the global dominance of the post-Cold War liberal version of the West today, either by force or by example, has put enormous pressure on non-Western countries to adopt Western institutions of specific ontological presumptions that might contradict indigenous social structures. Thus, today, in great contrast to the medieval Axial imperial or imperial-feudal autonomous civilizations, we are faced with disparities between native social structures and imported Western political, economic, and military institutions.

These tensions are particularly intense in countries and regions that initiated westernization programs from above declaring themselves to be either original or adopted parts of the West; countries whose 'civil societies' have not experienced the long and arduous spiritual journey of the Western liberal individual and thus retain various versions of closed society structures. These societies experience not one, but two major cleavages: The 'modernity' cleavage between the ontological vision and the mundane reality of modernity itself, and the 'modernization' cleavage between imported western institutions and non-Western social structures; thus, the question whether civil society is strictly a Western social phenomenon or not. It is the key sociological issue of the post-Cold War era; it is the issue that will put to the test both the theoretical and historical aspects of Shmuel Eisenstadt's sociology.

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2  For an example of a problematic way to employ the theory of multiple modernities see: Kristina Stoeckle (2011).

# Multiple Modernities and Globalization/Glocalization: A Comment on Eisenstadt

*Roland Robertson*

It is virtually impossible to grasp the scope and the general drift of Shmuel Eisenstadt's *oeuvre*. The reason for this claim should be obvious to any serious reader of his work. For a start, his work was very wide-ranging and, in one way or another, covered virtually every part of the world and nearly every sociological theme. Second, many of his titles and subtitles were extremely long and often ambiguous. Third, in terms of its substance, much of his work seems to be contradictory or inconsistent, although this should not necessarily be taken as a negative comment on Eisenstadt's work. Another significant feature that should be noted is that Eisenstadt seems to have escaped the kind of vitriolic commentary that was often heaped on Talcott Parsons. There are many explanations for this difference (Robertson 2007), notably with respect to the great gap between the reception of Parsons' view of modernization compared with that of Eisenstadt. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to say that this gap constitutes one of the greatest ironies of late twentieth-century sociology. This irony is compounded by the fact that Parson's wrote comparatively little – at least explicitly – about modernization and even less about modernity; whereas the work of Eisenstadt – especially in his later years – was heavily concentrated on these very topics. (In fact, this great incongruence between two outstanding sociologists could well be the subject of an exercise in the sociology of knowledge.) In any case, one can highlight the contrast between Parsons and Eisenstadt by noting that the former was the ongoing, continuous object of ideological critique and ridicule, whereas Eisenstadt never encountered such scorn – except, possibly in his own country, Israel. Such considerations must surely enter any serious interrogation of the work of Eisenstadt.

I have been persuaded by the argument of Kavolis (1986) that Eisenstadt, compared, for example, with Louis Dumont, lacked a particular or specific normative stance. In other words, it is hard, if not impossible, to discern a particular standpoint on which Eisenstadt rested his work – or, for that matter, changes in his writing. Declaring my own position in this regard, my viewpoint rests predominantly on that expressed by Assman (2012), who speaks of "implied globality" as part of his critique of Eisenstadt's notion of axiality (Taylor 2012).

As I understand Assman, his claim is that Eisenstadt merely implied globality, rather than making it upfront in his writing. More generally, my approach is close to that of Spohn (2011) and Roniger (2002), both of whom address the topic of globality in their analyses of Eisenstadt's work. It also has a close affinity with Levine's (2011) theme of the "dialogue of civilizations." In Eisenstadt's own work he speaks of civilizational and societal developments or, indeed, evolutions, as possibly leading in the direction of a kind of global or world civilization. With some reservations concerning the precise meaning of "civilization", I tend to view the work of Eisenstadt from a global standpoint. In other words, I start from globality or the world as a whole, *rather than envisaging developments in that direction.* More specifically, I am even more committed – at least in a planetary sense – to working inwards from the world as a whole rather than outwards towards the latter.

In their introduction to the issue of *Daedalus* (Summer 1998) devoted to early modernity, Eisenstadt and Schluchter state that modernity has spread to most parts of the world but has not given rise to a single civilization. "Not convergence but divergence has ruled the history of modernity." They go on to say that what they call the cultural codes of modernity "have not been changed by the evolutionary potentialities of societies, nor by the natural unfolding of their traditions, nor even by their placement in a new international setting." For Eisenstadt and Schluchter, the cultural codes of different societies have been formed by "the continuous interaction" between such societies and their exposure to new internal and external challenges.

While conceding that these modernizing developments had a common starting point in "the cultural program of modernity as it developed in Europe, its creative appropriation by those that followed inaugurated multiple modernities," they go on to insist that the resulting diversity has "been closely connected with a globalization of cultural networks and channels of communication far beyond any that existed before." Eisenstadt and Schluchter conclude that, in a paradoxical way, this contemporary diversity that has undermined a belief in societal convergence "has reinforced some of the Enlightenment assumptions of the centrality of a Eurocentred type of modernity." This might well be fruitfully compared with the somewhat misleadingly titled work of Andre Gunder Frank (1998, 2014), as well as that of Berger (1986).

Eisenstadt and Schluchter maintain that the "recognition of multiple modernities entails an antievolutionary thrust." It is at this point that their argument becomes particularly confusing. They maintain that they are not adhering either to an evolutionary or a historicist approach. They seem – although this is not entirely clear – to be adhering to a *comparative* approach.

It is this lack of clarity or consistency that I wish to address here. I insist that what is lacking in the approaches of both Eisenstadt and Schluchter is their failure to directly address the problematic of globalization (and, indeed, glocalization).

I am particularly concerned with what I regard as limitations in Shmuel Eisenstadt's concept of multiple modernities. These centre upon his apparent ambivalence towards globalization – and certainly glocalization. The latter concept is particularly important, in that it draws direct attention to the relationship between allegedly different forms of modernity and modernization. More specifically, I argue that each perceived process of modernization is most fruitfully regarded as a "local" manifestation of a larger, all-encompassing global modernization. In other words, modernizations have not been entirely autochthonous, rather they have each constituted particular variations on a much broader theme. In fact, the same could be said about the very notion of the axial age and of axiality, these having been central to recent discourse of multiple modernities. Specifically, the very idea of an axial age and there being different trajectories of change as a result of the contingent features of axiality in themselves itself demonstrate this point.

To repeat, it is rather surprising that Eisenstadt rarely confronted the issue of globalization per se. One might well argue against this proposition that much of his work implied approximately the same phenomena as has been covered by the notion of globalization, particularly when the latter is conceived in a multidimensional form. Nonetheless, I would maintain that, for some reason, Eisenstadt veered away from, or was very reluctant to deal with, globalization. Moreover, as far as this author can discern, Eisenstadt never even employed or suggested the crucial matter of glocalization (Robertson 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 2007, 2014). Glocalization is central to the discussion of multiple modernities. Indeed, this is the main topic of the present intervention. However, whether one is using the concept of globalization or glocalization it appears that Eisenstadt seemed to be unable to explicitly distinguish between comparativity and globality. He failed to see that globalization (or glocalization) of necessity involved comparison. To put this differently, considering phenomena globally necessarily involves comparison, but comparison by "participants" rather than by observers. We can simply state this as being *in situ* comparison. In fact, this is perfectly in line with Eisenstadt's concern with what on occasion he called "lead" societies; namely societies that were used as points of reference – as significant others – in processes of modernization. In fact, the very idea of modernization clearly involves a process of catching up. This is the way in which Nettl and Robertson (1968) employed the concept of modernization as long ago as the mid-1960s.

Employment of the concept of glocalization enables us – indeed compels us – to confront the issue of the relationship *between* allegedly different modernities. My contention is that raising this issue directly and explicitly allows us to analyze the empirical-historical relationships between modernities. Moreover, it pushes us in the direction of addressing the issue of *emulation* (Robertson 1995b), the latter having a close relationship with Eisenstadt's conception of a, or the lead society (although he was by no means the only one to use such a conception in the 1960s). Bringing the latter motif into the multiple modernities discourse opens up a whole issue of non-coincidental, non-synchronic and non-simultaneous nature of a plurality of modernities considered as a whole.

One can easily recognize the significance of emulation by pointing to the simple example of the manner in which the concept of modernization entered Chinese political language so strongly quite a few years ago. In fact, there is something rather ironic about the eagerness in which dominant elites in China have embraced the explicit theme of modernization. Readers of this brief intervention will readily recognize this irony by comparing the right-wing antagonism to "old" modernization theory as it arose in the 1950s and 1960s in Western sociology. The strongest opposition to "old" modernization came from Latin American countries. At the same time that Latin American social scientists and politicians, as well as their compatriots in North America and Western Europe, were putting much effort into overcoming the very idea of modernization, elites in East Asia were, so to speak, busy employing with increasing intensity the very same features that were the objects of Latin American vilification. In fact, the present author participated in a conference in Seoul, South Korea, in 1987, convened by Asian social scientists for the specific purpose of celebrating the very successful entry of modernization theory into East Asia!

It is important to recognize that strong globe-oriented inroads were made into the prevailing characterization of modernization by a few social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s; the major feature of these inroads being the introduction of a "voluntaristic" element into the discourse of modernization. During this period, when the Cold War was much warmer than it had previously been, a few intellectuals saw that political elites in the so-called Third World were being constrained to choose between two main images of what came, or has come to be known, as modernization. In other words, to select different images that deprived countries could aspire to.

There can be no doubt that the work of Eisenstadt and those who followed him, particularly with respect to axiality and multiple modernities, is of the greatest importance. Moreover, the research program that Eisenstadt (1986) established at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem will continue to bear much

intellectual fruit. That said, one must certainly not overlook the enormous amount of intellectual effort that has been put into discussing the vast issue of modernity, including those who doubt the value of this very category or concept. One particular feature of the general discussion of modernity, as well as modernism, is that it has raised such issues as the periodization and the "originality" of modernity "itself." In this sense, the discussion of multiple modernities involves many presuppositions and, as mentioned above, entirely neglects the issue of the subjectivity of modernity.

Here I will mention one particular example, which arises mainly from the book by Banerjee (2012) about science fiction in the making of Russian modernity. Banerjee is particularly concerned with the question of the relationship between old European modernity and the manner in which Russian elites have attempted to distance themselves from the modernity that arose in nineteenth-century Europe. This distancing has particularly revolved around the question of whether Russia was as Asian as it was European (Tsygankov 2006). This problematic was well expressed by Dostoevesky who argued that Russia is not only in Europe but also in Asia "because the Russian is not only a European but also an Asiatic [...] we must banish the slavish fear that Europe will call us Asiatic barbarians, and that it will be said that we are more Asiatic than European" (Banerjee 2012: 31). As Banerjee (2012: 11) says, "Modernity is increasingly being perceived as a multifaceted dialogue rather than a unilateral flow from the West to the rest of the world." Invoking Dirlik (2003), Banerjee goes on to state that, rather than being a thing, modernity is a relationship. Obviously this way of thinking is particularly relevant to the geopolitical and geocultural circumstance raised by the problems surrounding the Crimea in 2014.

Eisenstadt (1966: 67) said that:

> [W]estern European modernization and its direct offshoots – that of the United States and the English-speaking Dominions – were the only cases of autochthonous and self-generating modernization [...] All the later cases of modernization took place in a different situation, in which the push to modernization came to no small degree from the outside [...] As modernization spread out first to central and Eastern Europe and then to the Middle East, it did so to societies whose social backgrounds were different from those of the western European ones.

One can readily see the difference between this relatively early conception of modernization and modernity and Eisenstadt's later concern with the idea of multiple modernities, even though the above quotation has some slippage in

the latter direction. Linda Colley (2013) has cogently noted the importance of what she calls the global turn, a turn that she considers to be largely the result of the relatively recent focus on globalization. In so noting this shift Colley maintains, convincingly, that it is American historians who have been the most cosmopolitan in promoting the global perspective. One could produce many, many examples of the global turn, a turn that is by no means confined to American historians or, one might add, sociologists. It might also usefully be pointed out in the present context that Jaspers was, by any standards, a 'globalist' (Jaspers 1953, 1957).

In conclusion, it should be said that there was clearly a shift in the thinking of Eisenstadt concerning the degree of autochthony of modernities. Moreover, in spite of his talk of such themes as world civilization, he hovers with respect to a definite "commitment" to this. A major reason for this is, as I have previously said, his early view of modernization as a process that could be treated independently of consideration of the world-as-a-whole and the history thereof. The degree to which Eisenstadt himself was committed to the view that the theme of multiple modernities could be treated separately from globality and globalization/glocalization is certainly still in doubt. However, it should be emphatically stated that a significant number of multiple modernity analysts appear to think that globalization is not particularly relevant – indeed, may be irrelevant – to the Multiple Modernities Research Program.

# The Multiple Modernities Debates as a Prospectus for Global Scholarship: More Opportunities Than Dead-Ends?

*Barrie Axford*

## Introduction

What sets the concept of, and scholarship on, globalization apart from usual social science is the intimation of a dual transformation. First, of course, is transformation in the actual conduct of affairs in the world and thus in the way that that world is ordered. Second, is the consequent transformation in social-scientific knowledge about the world, such that the taken-for-granted status of disciplinary divides, the hold of methodological nationalism on the scientific imagination and the tendency to compartmentalize existence into discrete spheres of consciousness and activity – and then to ascribe explanatory precedence to one or other of these – are all put aside (Axford 2013). The difficulties with realizing such promise are legion. In summary, they lie in the sheer imprecision of an all-embracing concept like globalization, as well as in the obduracy of existing systems of knowledge and the ways these have construed the world. As a result, study of the global still occupies an uneasy place, caught between some disciplines, implicated in others; often conflating normative and empirical-analytical approaches and perhaps far too willing to include almost any theme under its rubric.

While these problems are by no means unique to global scholarship they vitiate claims made for its significance as an obvious game changer in knowledge construction about social life. The paradigm change or, less expansively, the problem shift immanent in the very idea of globalization and imperfectly delivered through its scholarship commutes too easily to an explicit or sometimes tacit accommodation with longer established disciplinary traditions and worldviews (Lakatos 1970). Nor is this in any way surprising, because old habits die hard. Yet, within disciplines there is now some evidence of an emerging global mentality; of efforts to impart a truly global dimension to fields of study. Take the discipline of history and the much-bruited distinction between world and global history (Mazlish 1998). World history canvasses pre-global times and thus has a longer pedigree than global history. In many respects, it is the

progeny of five centuries of post-Columbian Western history and bears that strong imprint. Global history denotes a quite recent and different field of historiography; albeit one that is still relatively undersubscribed, despite the growing attention of international relations scholars to history and (less wholeheartedly) historical method. It is characterized by alternative conceptions of space and time beyond territorial nationalism. To this extent, it mirrors wider shifts in scholarship on the global, including 'Third World' history, postcolonial studies, feminist history and recent treatments of empire. For all that, it may be that its proponents remain dazzled by the notion of a modernity extant from the sixteenth century onwards and globalization as being no more than a late twentieth-century vintage. Nonetheless, where world history often embraced theories of societal and civilizational convergence and linear trajectories of social change, global history challenges these assumptions in ways that will become apparent later in the chapter.

Such shifts are welcome because they broaden the horizons of scholarship by challenging the particularity of disciplinary knowledge and the methods whereby it is garnered. In relation to global scholarship more widely understood, they demonstrate a growing sensitivity to interdisciplinarity and multidimensionality when conducting research on world-making practices and consciousness. All of which is very pertinent to my concerns in this chapter, which turn on whether, or how, the insights of the multiple modernities analytic can subvent global scholarship and vice versa, by providing an inclusive, historically informed and culturally sensitive treatment of global relations, institutions and consciousness; always allowing that the concepts cannot be used interchangeably. I am less concerned to prescribe a curriculum for global studies – although what I have to say may have obvious implications for any such endeavour – than in offering pointers to a global approach to understanding the origins and morphologies of new worlds than subsists in many discourses on the global. One of the difficulties that attends any discussion of a research agenda for global studies and a syllabus for its pedagogy is that merely stating that the field is, or ought to be, interdisciplinary, transnational/global, contemporary, historical, post-colonial and critical (Juergensmeyer 2013) carries weight, but often amounts to little more than mood music, because it does not actually provide the field with sufficient definition conceptually, and focus, whether analytically or programmatically.

### Global Scholarship: The Search for Global Studies

In this task I am prompted by an interesting, if necessarily inconclusive, set of exchanges in the journal *Globalizations* (2013, 2014) wherein various

commentators responded to an intriguing article by Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2013) called 'What is Global Studies?'[1] These exchanges bear directly on my argument here. In his original article, Nederveen Pieterse focused on the differences between "globalization studies" and "global studies" and why the former is really an adjunct to, or a component of, existing bodies of scholarship, while the latter is, well, different. Globalization remains a much used and intellectually rich concept, as well as having ideological, political and policy implications. But – and here he rehearses the point made above – the ways in which it is addressed as an area of study and research often bears the imprint of particular social sciences and humanities disciplines. So, if it does service, it does so in relation to the agendas of these disciplines. On the other hand, global studies are much less developed and have an ill-defined, imperfectly agreed remit. Although there has been a growth in undergraduate and taught postgraduate programmes under the mantle of global studies (especially in the US), and some excellent literature (for example, Appelbaum & Robinson 2005), the field remains somewhat elusive; appealing but diffuse. I could go on in this vein, but you take my point (and Nederveen Pieterse's of course).

The credo of global studies, indeed of global scholarship, is, of course, the growing salience of the global. Nederveen Pieterse has it thus:

> Global studies reflects the growing pace, scope and intensity of global relations and effects. Global studies has been growing because of the exponential growth of global relations, dynamics and problems; it is a response to ramifying, intensifying and deepening processes of globalization. Global studies has been spreading because global relations and problems require a global approach, a need that is felt by social forces, international organizations, governments and corporations the world over. (2013: 552)

In other words, there is a growing demand for global knowledge. But what constitutes knowledge about the global is both contested and differentiated, conditions that are extant in three "levels" of global knowledge, each of which moves to disparate impulses and serves diverse academic and lay communities and interests. Taken together, they express a growing engagement

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1  I was fortunate enough to be part of these exchanges (Axford 2013b). By and large the responses to Nederveen Pieterse's intervention demonstrate some approbation for his critique of the ways in which normal science addresses the global. But they also show a good deal of frustration. See *Globalizations* vol. 10, 4 and 6, 2013 and vol. 11, 2, 2014).

with, intellectual curiosity about and growing scholarly reflexivity over the nature of the global and how to study it.

The first level is the growing availability of data about the global – sprawling arrays of information collected by all kinds of actors – governments, corporations, international organizations, epistemic communities, security organizations – for all sorts of purposes. From the point of view of scholarship, this level comprises raw data and is largely un-theorized. Yet, it is out of this level that a good deal of early "hyper-globalist" scholarship and polemic emerged and it is here that the concept has most resonance outside academic discourses.

The second level comprises globalization studies/studies of globalization and is largely organized by disciplinary fiat, sometimes glossed with ideological or normative agendas. What globalization "is" and how it should be studied is governed by those disciplines, and sometimes by the normative or ideological temper of dominant schools of thought within them. A modal example of this, and of its consequences, is the extent to which a good deal of scholarly, though surprisingly unreflective, research out of Marxist, neo-Marxist and even non-Marxist international political economy equates globalization with capitalism and/or neo-liberalism. Of course, some eponymous "critical" globalization studies out of the same schools have tried to distance their work from this reductionist coda, while nurturing another. Thus, studies of globalization as a form of, outgrowth from, or even disjunction with westernized modernity have locked the genre into a Eurocentric (not to say Anglo-American) way of conceiving the world and world history. There are also other areas of criticism, including the resolute state-centrism of much work on globalization processes out of international relations and even sociology (Axford 2013a). Nederveen Pieterse is most exercised by the narrowing of intellectual horizons and the unnecessary limiting of the origins and sources of world-making dynamics that are the consequences of discipline-inflected, Western dominated scholarship.

The third level is the domain of global studies, and here things get a little hortatory, because many global studies programmes do no more than refurbish existing international programmes, while claiming to offer a tantalizing glimpse of the wilder shores of scholarly ambition. Hortatory too because the perfectly legitimate claim that the study of new worlds and some older ones needs a scholarship less committed to boundaries still has to deliver the necessary intellectual commitment and pedagogic development. In this regard his prospectus for a critical global studies is unexceptionable but still at a high level of generality. He proposes:

- going beyond the national and the international by elevating the global to the prime frame of reference, while acknowledging that actors relate to it in different ways and with different consequences for themselves and for the social environments in which, and on which, they act;
- that global studies has to be multicentric and thus embrace the powerful critiques of Eurocentrism and orientalism;
- the need for multi-level thinking, that endorses and applies concepts such as "glocalization", examines global relations at multiple social scales[2] and abjures rigid micro–macro distinctions as well as other over-simple analytical dualities;
- a scholarship that is kaleidoscopic in its coverage and remit, as well as in terms of the "disciplinary angles" that provision its making, (Nederveen Pieterse 2012: 5);
- that the search for evidence of globalization is not confined arbitrarily to particular spheres of existence, but is seen as manifest anywhere and everywhere.

It is possible to criticize Nederveen Pieterse's prescription for global scholarship that is fit for purpose on the grounds that it is hortatory and empirically light. In my own short essay on the original article (2013b), I note that his call for nuanced and strategically relevant global studies may just shift the same weaknesses to an even higher level of abstraction.[3] But my current aim is not to debate that point, since the more pressing need is to try to divine more precisely the kind of critical global scholarship that he champions. The question is, will his prescription do service?

Interdisciplinarity and multi-level, or multi-dimensional thinking specify two of the key rules of engagement for global scholarship. They speak of approaches not in thrall to boundaries, however conceived. Of course, there are various issues around how to achieve interdisciplinarity and multidimensionality as guiding precepts and these are rehearsed in many published accounts (for example, see Axford 2013a; Mittelman 2004; Robinson 2009). Here, I want to concentrate upon the substantive and complex theme of *multicentrism* and then one of its key theoretical and empirical inflections,

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2   One might add also at no scales – through circuits and networks that render the idea of level or scale redundant.

3   Nederveen Pieterse's response to my observation makes the counter claim that what he proposes does exactly the opposite and that multicentrism and a multi-level perspective "take GS (global studies) into thick description alongside historical depth" (2014, 168).

*multiple modernities*, as an approach to, but also an evocation of, the transformative potential of global scholarship.

### Multicentrism and Multiple Modernities as Analytics for Global Scholarship

A multicentric approach to global scholarship could be taken as a bland statement of intent. In this guise we are talking only about a scholarship that globalizes global studies, as Fred Riggs has it, by canvassing subject matter from all around the world (2004). Yet, even this anodyne prescription requires at least a degree of 'cognitive retooling' because it challenges the notion of globalization as a Western, or northern, project by insisting that what is global and what should be understood as global issues have to be seen from multiple perspectives – northern and southern, eastern and western, national and regional, collective and personal (Nederveen Pieterse 2012: 10). The multicentric or polycentric motif certainly has the advantage, possibly the killer advantage, of being inclusive and kaleidoscopic and it may, as Nederveen Pieterse opines, serve notice on a scholarship too used to viewing global issues from a limited range of perspectives. Because of that, its grasp of twenty-first century realities – the demeanour of world politics and economics, changing constellations of power as between global north and global south, and the emergence of new globalities inflected by multiple experiences and worldviews – may be that much greater. At the same time, questions remain about the normative assumptions that underlie the project and the conceptual and empirical robustness of the analytical frameworks on offer. I will return to these matters below.

As Nederveen Pieterse also says, taking globalization seriously in cognitive, affective and evaluative terms means appreciating the variety of the human condition globally (*ibid*). And this prescription is not new because the history of ideas is full of reflections couched in pretty much the same frame. Cosmopolitan thinking, certainly in its ethical and transcultural variants, along with warnings of a clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996) traffic visions of universal, westernized modernity, with and without the secular component; while the cosmopolitan treatise also finds expression in classical thought from the Stoics, as well as in some Muslim scholarship (Casanova 2011).[4] Whether

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4    Nor does centrism automatically stop once any Western or northern bias is stripped out. As Nederveen Pieterse notes, multiplying the centres studies just replicates the problem, even if there is merit in having challenged the Eurocentrism of the Western cultural account. What about the views of peoples within each centre? How far does methodological decentralization have to go? (2013: 11).

acknowledging diverse sources of opinion on and experiences of the world adds up to more than an intellectual free-for-all rather than an embracing and subtle scholarship of the global is both contested and contestable. A world arrayed as multiple centres and as epistemologically decentred is a clear advance on Western/Eurocentric accounts of global dynamics. That said, we do have to dig rather deeper to assess the gains made and to identify remaining problems.

Once scholars have parted company with theories of convergence and linearity and with Western dominated models of global development, the difficulty resides not only in being able to tell a story with multiple centres and multiple narratives, but in telling a story that sometimes has no centre at all (Crossley 2008). A good starting point is to accept the quotidian reality of different global narratives, but in doing so scholars must not assume that global history, global processes and global events, play to all these narratives equally. If there is an intellectual and moral wrong to be righted its prosecution is not best served by ignoring the ways in which western modernity – the western cultural account – has, in Fouad Ajami's stark expression, cut deep furrows across the face of civilizations and other collective identities; indeed, other modernities (Ajami 1993).

It is here that the multiple modernities thesis carries weight, because what exercises students of the genre is very much a summary of global scholarship's current preoccupations. These include the weakening of US hegemony and the rise of successor powers, or none; the emergence of a more fluid multipolarity and the crisis or transformative potential in the existing order of (Western) modernity. In all this, modernity remains seminal "unfinished business" for research on globalization (Browning 2011), but many accounts continue to treat the latter as either the global spread of Western secular modernity glossed as a universal process of modernization and human development, or as a facet of the particular dynamism of the Judeo-Christian tradition delivered through American foreign policy and cultural economy (Casanova 2011; Wohlrab-Sahra & Burchardt 2012).[5] But, even where inroads into this account have been made, for example by post-colonial theory and the multiple modernities approach – thus bringing non-Western perspectives closer to the mainstream of debate – profound issues remain.

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5   There is also the sense that all-embracing and casually articulated concepts such as Western modernity actually fail to address the differences in what are actually multiple versions of that condition. At the most obvious we might advert the tensions that arise between American religiosity and European secularism when demarcating any overarching civilizational construct.

In this regard, it is hard not agree with sentiments expressed in a recent article in *International Political Sociology* (Kamola 2013) that many scholars writing on globalization find it easy to accept some things as inherently – is that the right word? – global (the internet, McDonald's, etc.) but not others (Kamola says genocide in Rwanda, refugee camps, etc.) Kamola's argument is that whoever is positioned to designate what is "global," and thus what constitutes firm ground for a theory of globalization, is shaped by a skewed political economy of knowledge production, not least between scholars in the global north and the global south. Casanova makes the related and entirely cogent point about the assumptions of much globalization theory where secularization parades as *a*, perhaps *the*, analytical and normative centrepiece (2011). In cosmopolitan thinking (Archibugi 2008) and even in some particularist versions of the flawed and fragile triumph of Western civilization, religion and religious identity are either neglected as a source of world-making practices or alternative globalities, or else recognized only as the basis of 'fundamentalist' resistance to the secular ideology of modernity (Barber 1994, Appadurai 2006). Here, religion musters as the spawning ground for primitivism and/or fanaticism, rather than the basis for a pluralistic globality.[6]

Let me say more about the multiple modernities thesis in general terms before unpacking it so as to highlight those components that bear directly on global scholarship. Shmuel Eisenstadt's view of modernity and of modernization is made in contradistinction to the version at least implicit in 'classical' studies of modernization, which not only stressed the convergence of industrializing societies, but sometimes envisaged teleological progress towards that goal across political, economic and cultural realms and diverse societies (Eisenstadt 2000b; Preyer 2007). As Gerhard Preyer opines, the idea of multiple modernities is an antidote to the "self- prescription of Western society as a normative orientation and general prototype for all societies" (2007: 10). In the same vein, it is also an indirect response to much theorization on globalization and global systems since the 1980s (Eisenstadt 2009a, 2009b). The universalism bruited as an axial component of contemporary globalization is, on some accounts, also a form of particularism, given its provenance in ideas about and prescriptions for an inclusive Westernized or American modernity (Robertson 1992; Ikenberry 2011). Although they may differ in degrees of approbation, in such accounts modernity is a product of the modern world system that emerges

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6   For a valuable examination of the role of religion in framing foreign policy, including American liberalism as a secular ideology see David Hughes (2014). Hughes also reflects on the past neglect of religion in much international relations theory.

from the West to spawn a singular global modernity, with global convergence delivered through evolutionary change.

The notion of multiple modernities offers a different paradigm. Its core precept is that features of modernity can emerge, find expression and embed in different ways in different parts of the world. Of itself this claim does not reject the historical and current impacts of 'modernizing' processes as these manifest around the globe – the industrial revolution, the urban revolution, the scientific revolution and so on; nor the impact of the western cultural account that bore them. In this regard, we must guard against the danger of denigrating valuable empirical findings found in world polity research on global standardization and rationalization, on the *a priori* grounds that they mask a profoundly ideological view of the making of world society (Schmidt 2006). But what some construe as the ideological components of the modernization thesis – uniformity, standardization, secularization and, of course, Western superiority – are given short shrift. Put simply, the idea of being modern should not require that everywhere looks like, or thinks like, Britain, France or Norway in matters of religious belief, culture, morality and even science and philosophy. At the same time, it is obvious that valorizing diversity in this way might look like another form of non-essentialist essentialism, or a rather naïve kind of normative prescription, both as intellectually injurious to good science as the urge to make untoward generalizations from Western models.

Some modernization scholars and proponents of the multiple modernities thesis share the assumption that modernization is a continuing and open-ended process and accept that once the modern project had become established in the West it spread globally. Where they disagree is in the assumption that societies experiencing modernization tend to converge over time. Rather, those who favour the quotidian reality of multiple modernities emphasize the continuing salience of cultural and institutional differences that obtain despite modernization. Let me be clear: the apparent logic of the multiple modernities thesis is that, as a consequence of its catholicity, the 'open-ended' project of modernity must admit the possibility that there are as many modernities as there are societies that have modernized. This logic has Dutch or Indian or Nordic modernities as *bona fide* evidence of the historicism at work in what might otherwise look like a universal and unremittingly convergent process. Echoes of the debate also appear in versions of the multiple modernities argument with a contemporary remit. Here, the emergence of China as a possible global hegemon in waiting, or of Russia and China as hard evidence of historical particularisms both resisting and accommodating global liberal doctrine, are taken as illustrative of different and viable routes to modernity and, of course, of the return of history (Ikenberry 2010).

So, the core position is that modernities exist outside the Western paradigm. The provenance of these modernities cannot be understood through the categories and analytical tools employed to make sense of Western modernity and there must be no assumptions about inevitable convergence with the institutional and cultural forms of the West. For the most part this musters as a variant of civilizational analysis, though with a more obvious historicist gloss, insofar as modernities in the plural still cluster or crystallize around the main human civilizations (Huntington 1996). These civilizational identities leave significant imprints on the institutions and practices of particular societies and thus qualify simple diffusionist or evolutionary models of social change, by pointing to a more polycentric view of global history.

Modernity now appears as less than universal, or as subject to any evolutionary logic and subsists more as a feature of variable structural change in different social systems (Preyer 2007). The theoretical consequence of this insight for any refurbishment of theories of modernization is that the process no longer needs to be seen as singular or plural, universal or particular. Rather, it emerges out of the variable processes of expansion common to all social systems. Difficulties of cultural translation, along with other barriers, may set limits to such expansion and thus dilute the impact of exogenous and/or universalizing forces on particular locations and rooted identities. Which insights are much in line with anthropological and sociological research on glocalization, and allow indigenization, vernacularization and hybridization to be seen as modest, or more grounded versions of the Multiple Modernities thesis, along with the whole critique of cultural meta-narratives (Preyer 2007; Nederveen Pieterse 2009).

## Multiple Modernities and Global Scholarschip

In what follows I want to pay closer attention to four intricately related aspects of multiple modernities research that augment global scholarship by tempering its over-materialistic feel and through paying attention to temporality and history. Each of them has real intellectual traction in global scholarship, although just how they are handled leaves many issues and unanswered questions, to which I return later in the piece. The areas are (i) temporality – history and the battle to re-historicize global theory; (ii) the idea of culture as constitutive of social relations; (iii) the core theme of modernity as singularity or plurality; and (iv) the 'return' of religion to social analysis in a post-secular world.

First, the matter of *temporality*. Most research on globalization affords primacy to the spatial axis of the space-time continuum, but the narrative of change occurring through time is also central to how globalization is theorized, or should be, even allowing for different conceptualizations of time. Most accounts approach globalization as a temporal phenomenon through its relationship with modernity, while those with a stronger spatial inflection explore the relationships between bound nation states and borderless capitalism. In the former there is no single treatment of the provenance of globalization, which is variously taken to pre-date modernity (Frank 1998; Therborn 2000; Gills & Chase-Dunn 2005), intensify modernity (Giddens 1990; Scholte 2005) or transcend modernity (Albrow 1996; Hardt & Negri 2000; see also Robertson 1992). Accounts with a stronger spatial inflection sometimes treat space as constitutive of the social and focus on the playing out of two generally acknowledged dynamics of globalization – changes to the nation state and changes in the scale of social processes.

Corbridge and Agnew (1995) and Kuus and Agnew (2008) suggest that purely spatial narratives of globalization de-historicize space and the nation state, reducing the latter to a static, essentialized concept not a million miles from the realist model (Teschke 2003; Rosenberg 2005, 2006). More historically informed accounts of globalization, of changes in the state system and in how and where modernities are made are, in part, attempts to redress this failing.

As for *history*; much scholarship on globalization still displays theoretical presentism, a condition in which events are deemed explainable only through recourse to "present causal variables" (Hobson et al. 2010: 16). Here, globalization is depicted as entirely novel, dislocated from the past as well as dislocating in its effects. But history and historical method are central to the scholarship of long-term, large-scale social and political change and such scholarship includes macro-historical research on those processes that might explain change for all societies and civilizations (Snyder 1999; Mann 1986). By contrast, the kind of comparative micro-history found in the work of the *Annales* School places the emphasis on small social and cultural units and how people conduct their lives within them. Here, the research seeks "answers to large questions in small places" (Ginzberg 1980: 26; Braudel 1949, 1979). For example, Fernand Braudel's pioneering work, sometimes labelled the 'new' historicism, lies more in the tradition of historical scholarship that privileged specific social context – time, place and local conditions – against the notion of fundamental, generalizable laws of social change. Modernization theory, theories of imperialism and the work of the Dependency School (Frank 1998) all rely on some elements of historical canvass.

But as sociology developed as an academic discipline from the early twentieth century, especially in the United States, its commitment to historically informed theory gave way to a-historical models and theories of social change and modernization. In structural-functionalism and rather schematic and abstract approaches to modernization, detailed historical and contextual analysis commuted to a focus on identifying and classifying trans-historical features of social change aligned, for the most part, to the emergence of modern societies in Europe (Parsons 1966, 1971). But a further shift occurred from the late 1970s, signalling a return to historical inquiry, initially with a Marxist and then a Weberian problematic. Still informed by readings of the classic texts on historical change, a new and more inclusive research agenda has since become apparent. It embraces "a heightened attention to institutions, theorization of agents and signification, gendered analysis and rejection of Eurocentrism" (Adams et al. 2003: 3). Much of this scholarship still labours in debate on how to deliver a historical sociology of modernity and the transformations associated with it; but that is no bad thing. The main challenge for historical sociology in relation to globalization is whether to imagine a past not indebted to and a future beyond or apart from capitalist modernity, or to treat the allegedly transformative effects of global processes and ideologies as a further playing out of modernizing and universalizing liberalism. (Adams et al. 2003: 66; Morris 2010; Fukuyama 2011).

Of course, within and between these theoretical strands there are important differences, some of which turn on the key issue of whose history is being portrayed or held up as seminal in the emergence of global modernity(ies). The most remarked illustration of this tension is the charge of 'Eurocentrism' levelled at pretty much the whole pantheon of Western thinkers from Marx and Weber, through Douglass North and Milton Friedman to Immanuel Wallerstein and even Gunder Frank, mainly in his early work (Denemark 2009). As summarized by Robert Denemark, "once Europe had risen to dominance, then its scholars conveniently forgot the rest of world history and began theorizing about how "others" were deficient (whether in property rights or in stripping the means of production from their immediate producers)" (2009: 235).

This polemical summary of a complex scholarship is still a salutary reminder that 'history' should not be seen as singular and uncontested. In even more strident vein, Samir Amin refers to Eurocentrism as one of the major "ideological distortions" of our time, one that has had great economic, political and cultural consequences for the demeanour of the modern world (1989). His argument is that Eurocentrism distorted both Greek rationality and Christian doctrine to justify a newly created capitalist social and moral order, the West's

economic, political, cultural, and military conquest of the world, and its systematic exploitation of all non-European human-kind.[7]

Second, is the realm of *culture and cultural explanation*. Culture is, or ought to be, a fecund zone of engagement for global scholarship. Actual engagement and attempts to offer culture as part-payment in a theory of globality are rather more contentious and unsatisfactory. I have written at some length on this matter (Axford 1996; Axford & Huggins 2011; Axford 2013) so I will not labour it here. It is sufficient to say that culture is a charged theme in globalization research, because culture is the contextual expression of interpretative practices by agents; in other words, it is intersubjective and even contingent (Axford 1995). At the same time, what might then appear as no more than a constructivist or phenomenological conceit has to be weighed against the sense that reality construction actually takes place in the context of cultural scripts or cultural structures (Benhabib 2002). World polity research uses this apparent tension to build a theory of global cultural isomorphism, but exactly how that is to be interpreted remains a sticking point for much work on the relationships between local and situated subjects and encompassing global structures and rules. In addition, theories of modal *glocalization* provide useful schematic, and sometimes empirically grounded tools for understanding processes that are both essentializing and relativizing (Roberston 1992; Giulianotti & Roberston 2009). In this regard, the multiple modernities thesis speaks to a non-systemic, historicist, reflexive and pragmatic version of development trajectories, while still recognizing that becoming modern and having modern traits, as Casanova has it (2011: 263), means exhibiting a lot of common features.

Of course, multiple modernities instantiate substantive and perceptual differences between people, practices and institutions, even as the world tends to sameness in key respects. This is not, or need not be, atavistic or reflex opposition to social change of global compass and weight, for modernity (the promise of common features) remains a powerful stimulus to aspiration and patterns of development. Neither does the valorization of difference preclude

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7  In *Globalization in World History* (2002) and *Global History* (2006) *Tony Hopkins*, evangelist for the cause of studying globalization historically, looks to deliver a "truly global history of globalization" (2002: 3). The former volume is important because contributors try to assess the past from a global, rather than a national standpoint. Two key points emerge in *Globalization in World History*. The first is that globalization is a more multidimensional and historically variable process than much scholarship allows. While this is no real news for advocates of macro-historical sociology and strains of world-systems analysis, it is a useful counterpoint to any form of 'presentist' or essentialist globalization theory.

what, for many, is the most characteristic feature of cultural globalization; that 'global melange' of hybrid cultures and identities always challenging to boundaries, whether local or civilizational, phenomenal or imagined. Hybridization runs against the grain of hegemonic projects, including the kind of more diffuse convergence seen in hyper-globalist and some transformationalist accounts of global dynamics.

All of which usefully questions some popular accounts of globalization built around broadly cultural themes – the end of history, a clash of civilizations, the joys and depredations of McWorld, the promise of 'Lexus' cultures represented by 'Davos Man' or the 'transnational capitalist class' (Sklair 2002). For all that, such work still affirms and shapes "growing consciousness of the way the world was growing together, or might implode, culturally" (Boli & Lechner 2005: 30). When discussing multiple modernities both these possibilities and the attendant empirical and normative riffs driven by global convergence, polarization and hybridization all continue to have evidential weight.

Third: *Modernity*, again. We are back on this familiar ground, but how could it be otherwise? To reiterate; the multiple modernities thesis rejects arguments that global expansion of what Casanova calls "the civilization of modernity" (2011: 263) implies and/or necessitates global homogenization or convergence. While the bulk of modern traits appeared first in the West; principally in Europe, we must realize that even the West is not a uniform construct, a normative and programmatic unity, and that the tendency to multiply modernity gets more pronounced as "non-Western societies and civilizations acquire, institutionalize and transform some of those modern traits" (Casnova 2011: 263). Modernization may be a universal dynamic, but is not to be equated with a necessary veneer of Westernization. Whereas most early theories of globalization either pronounced continuity and correspondence between post-Enlightenment modernity and late twentieth- century globality; or else saw them as ontologically distinct and disjoint, the multiple modernities thesis has a longer historical purview through which to identify and comprehend pre-modern forms of globality, and sees no necessary erasure of cultural tradition. At the same time, and subject to variabilities introduced by personal and institutional reflexivity and by context, it sees that all traditions are likely to be transformed in the process of modernization.

Let me tie this argument down by way of illustration. In his *Adam Smith in Beijing* (2007), Giovanni Arrighi pays close attention to China as the prime mover in what he calls an "East Asian-centred world-market society" (2007: 32). He wants to demonstrate that the epicentre of the world economy has shifted from West to East and to do so has to substantiate the claim that this shift is epochal because it signals the possible end of the capitalist world

economy and thus of capitalist history. He does so by reference to what are clearly cultural factors in explaining China's strategic and successful accommodation to Western capitalist mores in the shape of market liberalism. The nub of the argument is that China was heir to different market traditions and working to a different model of growth than either the counties of the Western capitalist core, including Japan. Arrighi is bold enough to call this tradition non-capitalist. In order to justify the definition of China as non-capitalist, Arrighi has to explain how it recovered so quickly from the depredations of the so-called Great Divergence and then Maoism to stand increasingly centre stage as a world economic power.

Arrighi's position is that China's recent resurgence demonstrates Adam Smith's argument in the *Wealth of Nations* that free market fundamentalism is not the only way to better the economic fortunes of a country. Rather, China followed a 'natural' path of development based largely on agricultural and then industrial production for a domestic market. Commerce with other nations was of secondary importance, although overseas trading networks between China and maritime Asia can be seen from the thirteenth century onwards and contributed to economic growth that peaked in the late eighteenth century. This model contrasts with the 'unnatural' course followed by core European nations, who advocated international movement of commercial capital and long-distance trade. Both Smith and Arrighi understand that these paths are not discrete. Thus, in China's history, as well as today, non-capitalist market economics intersect with capitalist market imperatives. In the current intersection he sees the prospect for a Smithian calculus.

So, China's spectacular rise owes as much, if not more, to domestic and regional traditions and practices as to international capital, the strategy of global retailers and the adoption of Western business models. This is less a romantic version of how contemporary China has achieved prominence than an interpretation based on a particular reading of its history. While it may be that Arrighi is over-egging the peculiar or peculiarly local features of Chinese political economy, as well as their effects, his main purpose – to distance what occurred there from anything resembling neo-liberal doctrine made practice through the Washington Consensus formula for development – is worthy of consideration. Interestingly, on the way he addresses criticisms of his earlier work from Gunder Frank who objected to the model of East Asian development and Chinese resurgence as too Eurocentric. Arrighi offers a critique of capitalism as a world-system; indeed as *the* modern world-system, and one inflected with a more pluralist or multicentric feel as regards the significance of non-capitalist market forces, and geographically.

At the same time, evidence for robust multicentrism or multipolarity need not resile from claiming that there are still elements of convergence, not least in economic affairs. The Chinese case underlines the sense that the pattern of global integration is non-linear and may not be cyclical either, if by that is meant the unfolding of a hegemonic cycle or the reproduction of a simple core-periphery model of global political economy. Although it is certainly tempting to interpret what is happening as the playing out of a cycle of global economic integration, wherein a rival takes the place of the preponderant power, the reality is more complex. There is another trend increasingly apparent over the post-war decades, and that is the growing multipolarity of the global economy. The distribution of economic growth is becoming more dispersed, and because of this trend, no one country or region now dominates, or is likely to in the foreseeable future (World Bank 2011; Axford 2014). This is convergence of a kind, though integration may be a less charged description.

Finally, let me address the issue of *religion and modernity/globalization*. As I have noted, the multiple modernities approach to global development allows us to retain the analytical centrality of the concept of modernity, while shedding erstwhile reliance on the unabridged universality of the Western cultural account. Instead, the narrative entertains collision between and imbrication of universality and difference. It acknowledges that all modern societies have, at some point, had to confront and accommodate the Western and, more to the point, the European model of becoming modern. Significantly, when set against most of the literature on modernization and work out of international relations theory from realists through to post-structuralists, confrontation and accommodation often take place on the terrain of cultural systems, notably civilizations and world religions; thus challenging the European idea of modernity as an ineluctably secular process, with its scholarship framed by theories of secularization.[8]

*Secularism* – that is to say, ideological, almost fundamentalist secularism – stands as the defining motif of European modernity, but a motif that has been caricatured in its appropriation by arguments that treat it as an inevitable historical trend and, of course, as a normative *telos* (see Casanova 2006). Such positions make it easy to treat the process of secularization as a form of liberation from the irrationality of religion and religious faith; secular societies are truly modernized societies and in this version modernity and religion are the antithesis of each other. Leaving aside caricature, Samuel Huntington's signal

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8    Of course, I am not disregarding the 'return' of religion to IR, nor the extent to which this has
     been tied in various ways to the claim that we have entered a post-secular era. See, for exam-
     ple, Scot M. Thomas (2005) and Ferrara (2012).

contribution to this debate (1996) was to undermine the intellectually hegemonic power of the modernity-equals-secularization paradigm, to mount a coruscating, though intensely partisan, polemic against the universalist pretensions of modernization theory and cosmopolitan thinking (De Vries 2011) and, last but not least, to locate religion as the key factor in understanding civilizational dynamics and civilizational conflict (Casanova 2011).

Unfortunately, he visits his own form of essentialism on this quite persuasive picture of world order/disorder by treating civilizations as unchanging, territorially limited entities, founded on immutable religious beliefs. The fault lines between the civilizations he describes and the inevitability of clashes along them produces a kind of civilizational realism, where the logic of conflict overrides the room for contingency and accommodation as bruited in the multiple modernities thesis. His thesis also reifies and essentializes the civilizational religions he has so usefully moved centre stage in his analytic.

There is a further sting in the tail of this critique; one that shifts us back nicely to the contested nature of global scholarship by way of the indeterminacy of globalization. Locating the basis of conflict in a globalized world along civilizational (religious) fault lines goes a long way to miss the point about the nature and effects of globalization as process. Casanova is right when he says that the threat and the promise of globalization is the relativizing of all cultural systems in which "all world religions can be reconstituted for the first time as deterritorialized entities detached from the civilizational settings in which they have been traditionally embedded" (2011: 262). Of course, while globalization is the enemy of social closure that still does not preclude local politics founded on exactly that principle, or else on the ideal of global closure as a response to perceived systematic threats.

### And the Downside?

Much of what I have said musters as an endorsement of the multiple modernities approach and its variants as useful components in, if not the only organizing principle of, global scholarship. A full prospectus for that endeavour is outside the scope of this chapter. (see Axford 2013b) To be frank, I do not see many intellectual dead-ends that would vitiate a more wholehearted engagement on the part of global scholars. Nonetheless, it is worth setting down some of the problems with the approach as these might and sometimes do bear on the prospects for and design of an interdisciplinary and multidimensional global scholarship.

For critics, the emphasis on difference, on multiplicity, most notably in culture and religion, is understandable and appropriate for a nuanced treatment of globalization. At the same time, noting difference is one thing, establishing its significance for explanatory purposes is quite another; unless, of course, the object of the exercise is the valorization of *any* differences that appear to redeem local history and culture. If it is not, then it remains of key analytical concern as to whether the differences observed between, say, India or China and the West are so clear, or unique, as to warrant talking about the former in terms of its civilizational distinctiveness. By contrast, how much weight should be given to the factors that allow the analyst to treat India or Japan as part of a "common family of industrial societies" as Schmidt has it? (2006: 81).

Do contemporary India or Japan have much more in common with their respective pasts than they have with contemporary Britain, Germany or Canada? If cultural differences translate into a markedly different pattern of accommodation with twenty-first century globality, then the multiple modernities thesis has a strong case. If not, then the normative project that lies at the heart of the thesis can still succeed, but its analytical purchase may be questioned. Nederveen Pieterse recognizes this tension when he talks about "(r)eal existing modernities" as mixed social formations, in that they straddle past and present and import and translate styles and customs from other cultures. Modernities are layered; some components are shared among all modern societies and make up transnational modernity, "while other components differ according to historical and cultural circumstances" (2009: 19).

But is this still only scholarly obfuscation with an ideological motive? Drawing on work from the "varieties of capitalism" literature found in new political economy (Hall & Soskice 2001; Yamamura & Streeck 2003), Volker Schmidt (2006) is perfectly willing to note differences in modernizing patterns and all institutional (as opposed to just cultural) forms. However, such differences are presented as variations on a theme that displays more significant 'family' similarities. These span economic institutions, social policy regimes, as well as political, or at least constitutional, systems. Analyzed in relation to modes of capitalism – liberal Anglo-American, non-liberal Japanese and European, as well as possibly new forms of the 'oriental' – the relative weight of affinities and differences produce variations on a singular modernity, not multiple modernities defined solely through specific historical-cultural factors (Ikenberry 2010).

Notwithstanding its rather integrationist slant, this slant on the previously unquestioned ontological singularity of modernity as globality, or globality as a form of modernity, also points to some conceptual and empirical problems with the multiple modernities thesis. Principally, these turn on the need for

comprehensive historical and comparative analysis across cultural, economic and political spheres of life. Across-the-board comparisons, as Schmidt writes, then allow for any outcomes – whether intra-civilizational divergence or convergence, the possibility that societies look more like, or have more in common with those in other civilizations than with their own, the sense that ascribed differences between modernities do not actually exist, and so on. To really speak of multiple modernities, research has to find clusters of modern societies (civilizations) with "coherent patterns of institutional co-variation" (Schmidt 2006: 88) and because such a research design has yet to be delivered, the case remains at best moot. So, to repeat what I said earlier, many contemporary issues fall out of civilizational analysis and the multiple modernities debate, or are informed by it, and these constitute a prospectus of global scholarship's current preoccupations. Modernity and globality remain very much themes for our times, part of the liturgy of sameness and difference on which much social science is based.

# Multiple Modernities in Modern Law and Legal Systems: Shmuel Eisenstadt's Grand Design and Beyond

*Werner Krawietz*

## Modernization and Westernization in the Global Legal World

The classical legal theorists and sociologists like Marx, Durkheim, Rudolph von Ihering and, in particular, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons have analyzed modernity and modernization by the cultural and institutional configurations and constellations that came together historically in Europe. They assumed more or less that this cultural program would be adopted globally in the process of Westernization. They all assumed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies. With the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world. In what follows – and this is very important for my thesis – I want to distinguish between (i) Modernization and (ii) Westernization. Taking into account the sum of all legal communications in our global legal world, it might be that in the development of law and justice, today, all societies in sum are growing more modern, but less Western whatever that may mean.

  (a) Following the lines of Shmuel Eisenstadt's 'research program' of theorizing and worldwide legal thinking today, we are dealing – and this is my main thesis – with quite a new phase and paradigm of social, cultural, political and legal evolution named *Multiple Modernities* (Eisenstadt 2002b, 2007: 20–23, 47–50, 57–60, 2009: 7–18; Preyer 2011: 7–9, 207 et sequ.). The notion of 'multiple modernities' denotes a certain view of the contemporary world – indeed, of the history and characteristics of the modern era – that goes against the views of the 'classical' theories of modernization and of the convergence of industrial societies long prevalent in the 1950s. This point is very important for my argumentation. Theoretically – and this is my main thesis – multiple modernities is not a type of legal and societal theory or sociology of law that enumerates historical events; it is a multi-dimensional theoretical description of structural evolution, especially structural evolution of law and legal systems.

(b) 'Multiple modernities' does not assume that global modernity is derived from the West as a single pattern and does not describe a plurality of societal structures. Multiple modernities is to be understood as a critique of the classical theory of modernization. We have evidence that modernization does not lead to a unification and convergence of social structures and legal systems. Therefore, modernization is neither a way towards 'Western' evolutionary universals, for example human rights, rule of law or '*Rechtsstaat*', nor is it based on them. Multiple modernities is a societal structural change that continuously modifies our belief systems, our legal systems and their implementation in a process of social interaction and transformation (Krawietz, Riechers & Veddeler 1998; Krawietz & Varga 2003; Krawietz & Spröde 2004).

Today, when one examines the existing legal systems of central Europe, especially those of Western and Eastern Europe, one gains the impression that the state, or the states, no longer occupy the position we have hitherto ascribed to them in the theory of state and law.

(a) What is happening is that a continuous shift in the politico-legal balance is taking place, in the sense that the individual states are losing their influence over their respective legal systems. One only has to look at the growing importance of the European Communities, the European Union and European law. The latter is superimposed *ab extra* on the legal order of the individual states and has already led to a noticeable transformation of existing legal systems. Within individual state legal systems, too, restructuring and legal change is constantly taking place. This is usually discussed under the heading *Transformation of legal systems.* This transformation is a process of immense complexities beyond the scope of this chapter.

(b) From the point of view of a *general* legal theory it does raise the question, however, what the relationship between law and state is in this situation. The above-mentioned developments and turbulences apply particularly to the central European state legal systems, especially to the *Rechtsstaat* ['law state', rule of law] whatever that may be. We must not be satisfied with simply describing and interpreting the respective developments in the individual legal systems on the basis of the constitution and laws, etc.; in other words, with understanding them analytical-hermeneutically in the way of the humanities. We must attempt to interpret and explain them also from a different angle; namely that of a general theory of law and the social sciences. The last point is very important for bringing legal systems up-to-date and optimizing the cooperation of legal systems and the contemporary development in modern legal theory.

Today, when one looks at the existing legal systems in Central Europe, and also at those of Western and Eastern Europe and beyond (!), there are many

modernities, not one single pattern of modernization. There are also many modern legal systems, not only one single 'World Law', as Alice Tay, Eugene Kamenka and Harold Berman have pointed out so convincingly.[1] In what follows, I distinguish between (i) state legal systems and (ii) non-state legal systems. And I distinguish further between formal and informal law.

(a) The concept of law based solely on the state and concerned exclusively with formal state law seems far too narrow (Krawietz 1993 a: 81–133, 115–118; Von Wright 1997: 94–95). The concept of law has to take into account the manifold informal social conditions and societal prerequisites for the production of law. The new concept of law, by contrast, does not only come into existence in specific bodies set up by the state or in highly bureaucratized 'United States' (let's say the 'United States of Russia', 'the United States of Europe' or the USA), with their legal staffs. The state has neither a monopoly, nor a prerogative for the creation of law, but only a normative-functional authority and superiority (*auctoritas, non veritas facit legem*).

(b) I would like to distinguish here between *regional* societies and *world society* or better *global society* as a whole encompassing all legal communications in our globalized legal world (Giddens 1990; Nelken 1998: 123–130; Krawietz & Narits 2007: 73–109, 81–84, 85). Law and global society are a *societal reality of law and legal order* in interaction and organization systems as well as in state legal systems. At present, however, we have neither *one* global law, nor *one* global state. There are also a number of reasons why it is highly unlikely that either of them can or will ever exist.

### Multilevel Approach to Law and Multidisciplinarity of Legal Investigations in Modern Legal Theory

The changes in the contemporary legal order are hard to identify precisely because they operate at the level of general background assumptions of the past, which are usually taken for granted. The most important problem here is the lack of a socially adequate theory of law, represented by a well-integrated theoretical framework that is conceptually well-structured, empirically extensively tested and generally accepted. What we actually have at our disposal are a number of contradictory and partial theories within different frameworks and various schools of legal thinking. It is against this background of tensions

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1   Cf. Alice Erh-Soon Tay 1988: 1–10; Kamenka 1991: "We live all of us, in one world and many worlds, in competing and interpenetrating cultures, crumbling traditions and new hopes and demands." See Berman 1995: 19–23, 65–66, 1988: 779–801, 2003: 3–16.

between rival concepts of law that we can best understand the debates of contemporary legal theory. The conventional perspectives of the long-standing orthodoxy are no longer adequate, in my view. Instead of indulging in self-defeating controversies, legal theory should make it its task to link a wide variety of legal ideas and conceptions within a broader framework and locate and interpret the law and legal principles within the societal context.

(a) Institutionalist legal theories both of the old and of the new provenance are so much *en vogue* again today,[2] because basic legal research has in the last five decades, more clearly than previously, exposed the secret deficiencies by which the merely analytical approaches in modern legal theory have always been afflicted and which they are still suffering from to this day; namely, (i) the positivist constriction of its norm theory and (ii) their shortcomings in legal and social theory. In continental Europe this applies, for instance, to the various types of pure theories of law, which probably constitute the purest embodiment – albeit each to a different extent – of analytical jurisprudence in its present form. It is quite obvious today, however, that the exaggerated philosophical positivism of these schools supported and strengthened by the postulate for purity, which they advocate, has hitherto prevented these approaches of analytical jurisprudence from ascertaining – additionally and to a sufficient degree – the presuppositions and foundations of their norm theory that are provided by social theory.

(b) The renewal of institutionalist forms of jurisprudence taking place at present, described lately as neo-institutionalism does, on the other hand, appear to provide a suitable way of compensating for the deficiencies in the analytical hermeneutic legal theories, which the basic research in legal and social theory has diagnosed.

(c) Considering what has been said so far in respect of (i) the *rational orientation of law* and (ii) of legal science, we are clearly faced today with a number of different *theories* of a law of reason; some of an older, some of a newer kind, not to mention the current, even internationally active, return to efforts aimed at continuing and further developing legal thinking based on traditional natural law and law of reason (*doctrinal studies of law, legal dogmatics*). Within the field of conventional general theory of law and principles there are a number

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2   For a detailed account see MacCormick & Weinberger (1985). A good survey over the development of contemporary British and Austrian institutionalism is offered by MacCormick & Weinberger (1986), whose contributions to these volumes were, however, produced independently from each other. Further to this new line of research already: Krawietz 1985: 706–714, See particularly, Krawietz 1987: 313–325.

of authors who never tire of advocating a renaissance of the law of reason.[3] It would appear to me – for reasons to be discussed below – to be ill-advised to go down this road in general legal theory. In the following I shall attempt to distinguish both empirically and conceptually between reason and rationality in regard to the law and the basic research involved in the development of a legal theory. Further, reference must be me made to the distinction that, undoubtedly, exists between (i) institutionalized legal practice and its juridical rationality as it is practiced in everyday life within the legal system of modern society by legislation and jurisdiction and (ii) philosophical reason, which in the view of some discourse *theories*, at least, is brought to bear *ab extra* on the law in a 'rational' legal discourse. This concept of reason is by no means identical with the rationality of law and jurisprudence because its application is not determined institutionally by norms; on the contrary, it is not infrequently *anti-institutional* in the discourse. If this is true, legal discourse and legal science have to reveal the structural changes that have taken place under the surface structure of modern legal systems.

Law that is already coded, conditioned and determined by society and history as well as constitutionally and legally is *not*, in my opinion, something that could or ought to be subjected *ad libitum* to a moral-ethical or reasonable disposition by legal theory and philosophy of law.

(a) Trying to give a certain gloss to the postulates of a natural law or a law of reason (R. Dreier: "Natur- oder Vernunftrechtsrenaissance"!) by draping the word and concept *law* around them appears, therefore, a highly problematical thing to do. The use of these terms must not blind us to the fact that this is an inadmissible equivocation since "natural *law*" and *"law* of reason" are not law in the sense of the positivity of all law (including customary practice). At best we are dealing here with normative legal-political demands inspired by moral or ethical considerations. Only a rational orientation and an empirically *and* analytically clean conceptual distinction are capable of establishing clarity in this situation.

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3  See for example, Alexy 1991: 30–44. His, in my view, all too one-dimensional option for the concept of reason, for rational as merely reasonable (!) principles and for rational as merely reasonable (!) norms and rules of law underestimates the practical and theoretical possibilities of a separate *juridical rationality* as it is already applied and firmly established in jurisprudence and in the behavioural social sciences with their foundations in experience and observation and their concern with norms and actions. Those acting in accordance with the prescriptions of the respective valid law act not only legally but also in a formal sense rationally. Elucidating this: Von Wright 1988: 29–32. He rightly regards the contemporary "discussion about rationality" as one of the "key topics in philosophy, sociology and cultural anthropology." See also, Schelsky 1980: 34–74.

(b) The same applies to the relations between *law* and *scientific reason*. Just like the relationship between law and morality, the relation between law and reason requires a clear analytical and conceptual separation, which also attempts to do justice to the *societal* complexities of its subject. It appears thoroughly misguided to me, therefore, to speak of a law of reason if the intention is to pass off as valid laws what are, in fact, merely moralizing, perhaps even 'reasonable' or 'correct' normative demands not covered by democratic, politico-legal decisions. All such postulates – despite being camouflaged as reasonable truths – are by no means legally binding and represent no more than moral appeals with, at best, hidden legal-political intentions. The key question here is, whether and to what extent it is possible at all to perceive right law or the rightness of law and the legal order; in other words, to substantiate legal norms and their application on the basis of their content – and without any volitive and evaluative contribution and additional input! – in a purely cognitive way.

As far as the perception of the validity and the binding nature of law, or of the right content of norms and actions in law and morality, is concerned, it must be said that the social sciences and philosophy are extremely sceptical about the practical possibility of substantiating norms and values in a purely *cognitive* way. Clearly, in everyday life and in the day-to-day application of law, as well as in the scientifically guided and supported ways of mastering both, there is nowadays a consistent demand, be it *expressis verbis* or, at least, implicitly, for *all* interpersonal orientations to be conducted *rationally* whenever possible. This demand also applies to human experiences and actions in the realm of law, which, after all, covers and regulates all areas of social behaviour and action. However, *knowing who* those are who are orientating themselves rationally, or, at least, ought to do so, makes a difference when we are dealing with the *rationality of law* (Krawietz 1997).

(a) Is it all of us, meaning human beings, citizens or legal subjects living in *legal communities*, each group bound by the laws of its community, reflecting rationally – which always means critically! – the respective *valid* law which they have to comply with? Do we mean those who are active in the bureaucratically ordered *organization of the state* and operate, guided and steered by the rules of law, at every tier and on all levels of the legal order with its clearly differentiated division of responsibilities (*rights and duties*) and its hierarchical structure? Or are we talking of the scientists and the social sciences in the sense of those disciplines that are connected with the norms and with social actions including philosophy, especially, practical philosophy, all of which require a rational orientation perhaps even an entirely *new* orientation?

(b) If we reject the pretensions to the universality of law (in the sense of 'natural law' or 'law of nature') of which much legal theory appears to be built, how can we continue to uphold the claim of modern theories that they contribute to our *understanding and explanation of law and legal systems* in a way that goes beyond the limited horizons of dogmatic (doctrinal) legal studies? It may not be going too far to suggest that what we are seeing here are two contrasting types of rationality. In the following I shall concentrate on examining the normative rationality of those orientations which human actions receive from valid law.

(c) What distinguishes legal communication functionally and structurally from other forms of normative communication in the realms of religion, ethics, etc. is, above all, the fact that it always occurs with reference to already valid and effectively operative legal *norms* (or to norm *sentences* in the symbolizing form of the legal language, respectively), which are used in an assumed, already established, normatively binding legal practice (vested with binding normative powers) in a particular regional society.

### Seeing the (In-) Visible Legal Systems: The Road to the Virtual Realities of Law

In my conception of legal and social theory, I have never fallen into the individualistic misunderstanding that society exists basically only of individuals or of groups of individuals. According to this view of legal and moral individualism (Elucidating this, Krawietz 2007: 385–396), all law is simply a result of the properties and decisions of individuals; that is, it results from the expressed and unified will of the assembly of such individuals or of their formations in groups, and in this way serves as a universal means for bringing about a binding order. Against this, I am putting forward a version of legal thinking that is informed and shaped by history[4] and society.[5] According to my view, all law – with reference to all members of a legal community who are included in its normative system – is always found at a deeper socio-structural level than are all actual individuals or their formations in groups whose

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4  For this and the following see particularly: Wyduckel (2003): 109–140: 109–140, see already, Wyduckel 1994: 513–528.

5  Compare: Wieacker 1994: 297–306, 297–298: "As we know, history cannot teach us anything in this respect, primarily because of the unrepeatability of the original conditions. Yet historical solutions may suggest common patterns in comparable constellations, and may thus indicate a framework for contemporary action."

behaviour is regulated on the basis of and in accordance with the standards of this legal system.

(a) One cannot, therefore, determine, describe, or explain the law as a normative, emergent social structure – not even by means of merely analytical-theoretical tools – by taking principally the unbound individuals as one's point of departure without having already determined the emergent (!) properties and characteristics of the legal system itself. The legal system as a whole is and remains a subsystem ('*Teilsystem*') of society. Law gives effect to, mirrors or is otherwise expressive of the prevailing societal relations. This precisely is the central insight of my general legal theory, which I share with the representatives of theory of norms and action, German legal realism, sociological jurisprudence, the sociological institutional theory of law and social systems theory. I shall return to this point below.

(b) Thus, it is simply not the case that all law can be understood as a subsequently imposed limitation and restriction, as it were, on individuals and formations of groups. As a result, I was never able to share the love that both analytical philosophy and Anglo-American idealism have had for socio-philosophical individualism, and an individualistic theory of action, which seeks to trace all human action to the properties of the individual, the acting individual; that is, to trace them to *a priori* life essences informed by reason. These approaches do not manifest an interest in the concrete social forms of life and interaction between human beings, or an interest in the organized social relations accessible through experience and observational methods of analysis in the social sciences, let alone an interest in the societal reality of the law.

In their form, structure and function the legal systems of modern society – considered from the point of view of the theory of norms and action – constitute a single information- and communication system for the whole of society and with a worldwide influence. The normative networks of this system, fixed by the language of law and founded on socially generalized expectations, serve the whole of society by providing orientation and by guiding behaviour in all kinds of experiences and actions. It is the social function of legal systems to ensure that the addressees of the law act in accordance with their rules, i.e. to induce them to comply with the norms. This occurs when the latter fulfill the prescribed behavioural expectations set down and generalized by means of the language of law. A great deal of detailed research is still needed, however, to determine how legal communications are made legally binding and socially effective.

(a) In the following I make the distinction between legal order and legal system. By legal systems I mean largely, but not exclusively, state legal systems in the context of modern society. They are characterized by their bureaucratic and procedural apparatus and their organization of persons and legal subjects

(legislatures, courts, lawyers, etc.) who enact, apply, administer and otherwise deal with the rule of law. The legal order can be understood as an unpeopled, abstract entity that has comprehensively determined all legal rights, duties and powers within a society. As a result it needs careful structuring and systemization.

(b) Legal action is defined as social behaviour governed by normative or factual information. However, legal actions are constrained to limited alternatives by institutions and social systems. The term information has a particular meaning. There are two types of information. The first is practical (prescriptive) information, or knowledge of what ought to be done and of what is better or worse. The second is descriptive information, or knowledge of what is. Practical information of law has always to do with a norm, an ought proposition. These normative propositions include rules, principles, goals, values and interests, etc. The information, both practical and descriptive, that one communicates and processes in making a legal decision comes from learning through experience in one's cultural environment.

(c) The second major determinant of human action is the scope for action permitted by institutions and social systems. Human beings operate within frameworks or structures or rules that both enable them to achieve certain ends and prevent them from achieving others. From the point of view of a socially based theory of legal institutions and social systems theories can now be defined in terms of function as I have already implied at the beginning of my contribution.

The legal system is a system of communication that serves to secure normative expectations (Krawietz 1989: 109–140, 116–119, 120–123, 1993 b: 361–384). New communications are regularly produced by the system, but the system is programmed to steer legal communications to the legal circuit, political communications to the political circuit, economic communications to the economic circuit, etc. Which communications belong to which circuit is a question determined by each circuit according to its own code. The legal system, however, processes legal communications internally. The content of law and the legal order can change through legislation and judicial application. In reducing complexity, the legal system limits itself to certain kinds of communications; that is, only certain kinds of communications generate further communication and thereby continue the operation of the system.

(a) In our society, moral discourse is excluded from legal communication by the binary code of the legal system. The binary code that qualifies the different operations, screens out (!) other kinds of discourse. Somewhat like a digital computer, the legal system does this by selecting communications according to the binary legal code. The coding is what gives communication within the

legal system its legal meaning and excludes (!) from the system other mean-ings. This code could be translated as law (and not: non-law), legal (and not: illegal), legally valid (and not: legally invalid), right (and not: wrong), just (and not: unjust). Only legally relevant communications are operative.

(b) Obviously in today's society many communications can have legal, polit-ical, economic, cultural, religious and other (!) meanings. Because of the binary coding system, however, the communication will have only one meaning within each system. Thus a system of legal meaning is created. There is no starting point and no final point (unless the system disintegrates). One com-munication leads to another, which leads to another, and so forth. Following the distinction between directives and norms advanced by the contemporary analytical-normative theory of law (Opalek 1986; Krawietz & Opalek 1993 c: v–xx; Krawietz 2001: 34–46) or by German legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, it can be said that the legal system procreates itself by *self-referentially* linking new legal directives and legal norms to previously vali-dated ones.

(c) Legal validity is a product of the legal system and is worked out from moment to moment. In this way, further starting points for further directives and legal norms are formed and these simultaneously produce and reproduce the *legal system*. In form and content it presents itself as an *internally coherent and consistent normative whole formed by the primary and secondary systems of the law*. We are, consequently, dealing not only with a system of norm sen-tences, but – and this should be taken note of – with a social/societal legal system consisting of the entirety of all relevant juridical communications as well as – from the dynamic-functional point of view – embracing the constant flow of new communications and legal actions.

### Law's Precarious Hold on Life: Loose Normative Structural Coupling and Mix of Primary and Secondary Social Systems

The basis for my approach is the *positivity* of all law, which – in accordance with the genuinely normative theory of social institutions and systems theory advocated by me – will be understood as *societal selectivity of law* in the follow-ing. Whatever is selected to become law, endowed with legal validity and estab-lished institutionally, is always a selection from other possibilities – neither more, nor less. Every actually made ruling, therefore, proves contingent, con-sidering that it might have turned out to be different. This does not, however, mean that the law is arbitrary since new rulings in the legal system – normally self-referentially (!)– follow on from previously made rulings (of the constitution,

laws, legal rulings and so on). It is precisely the *way the legal system regulates and processes itself* that constitutes genuine juridical rationality as I have demonstrated on another occasion. It also dominates all practical legal action and argumentation.

(a) When analyzing and describing the normative self-production it is necessary, therefore – from the perspective of a communicative system conceived as self-referential, self-maintaining and self-reproducing – to be aware of the fact that one is not dealing with the iterative, as it were, merely repetitive and redundant production and reproduction of variations of well-known and long familiar norms and facts of the legal system.

(b) Instead, it is possible also for new information to enter legal communication while the stock of existing norms remains technically speaking – according to formal law – the same. These new information have to be interpreted and mastered with the help of the existing reservoir of knowledge of norms and facts, if necessary even by way of legal analogy. As a result, the stock of legal rules – of individual, but generalizable legal rules, at least – is modified and, in that sense, increased. The question, what influence such changes exert over the legal order and whether these affect the identity of the entire legal system must remain unanswered for the time being.

In the following we have (i) to identify the configurations and components that constitute the individual operation and normative *communication of law* and (ii) to clarify which *institutional and systemic requirements* have to be fulfilled for an information to be conveyed successfully and a legal communication to be considered socially adequate. In any case, what matters is that the legal communication actually reaches the respective addressee and is, therefore, able to direct him to adhere to the behaviour intended and prescribed by the law, i.e. that it becomes socially effective, it has a social impact.

(a) From the normative-realistic point of view, the *understanding* on the part of the recipient has to be regarded as a *partial aspect of selecting normative meaning*. It is both empirically and analytically distinct from information and utterance and always has a degree of independence. Among the conditions for the positivity of all law there is, therefore, no such thing as *automatic production of law*. The success of a normative communication is not measured by the fact that something has been conveyed correctly or wrongly, but by the fact that a normative information has been *produced, uttered* and *understood* which can and may, but does not have to provide a link for further juridical communication to issue from it. It only has to be *possible* in practical terms to react to the communicated legal text (law, contract, etc.) by *acceptance/ rejection*, which presupposes in any case that it has been understood.

(b) This selectivity continues on the different levels (Krawietz 1992: 14–42, 1999: 69–42; Preyer 2014) of *law production in the secondary system of law*, i.e. in the legislative, executive and the judiciary. From the point of view of *legal dogmatics* it appears in the law production, on the one hand, as a means of concretizing and strengthening itself as well as securing its structures, and, on the other hand, as *self-hierarchization* of the legal system. The communication concept, which is commonly used in the *general* theory of law, social institutions and legal systems, may here assist us in finding our bearings. In view of the traditional, conventionally applied or implicitly presupposed concept of legal action, which is commonly used in legal practice and legal dogmatics, those examining the communication of law from the perspective of the theory of norms and action have to be prepared to see some overdue corrections and necessary (re-) arrangements in the design of the theory. The latter now seems imperative although the legal concept of action hitherto appeared entirely secure. Appearances can be deceptive.

(c) In contrast to the traditional individualistic concept of action the following reflections take their cue from the realization that all communication of law and all legal action in the everyday life of communities has essentially always been guided and steered by normative institutions, organizations and social systems. These normative-institutional facts have not been taken into account sufficiently, in my opinion, either by constitutional legal positivism, or by contemporary statutory and juridical positivism, which today is advocated in the context of the normativism of pure legal science as well as that of institutional juridical positivism. Although these approaches include the actions of collective subjects in their theories of norms and institutions they tend to continue to adhere to an essentially individualistic subject orientation and methodological individualism in their theory of action.

The concept of normative communication employed in the following reflections covers – both empirically and in terms of legal norm sentences – the entire field of legal communication; in other words, (i) the level of national (state) law; (ii) the level of the European communities and the law of the European Union; and (iii) the level of international law of nations and communities (including national and international Non-Governmental Organizations, NGOs, INGOS). It comprises within it, therefore, the entirety of directives and norms that are *self-referentially* produced in the legal system of modern society; that is, with continual logical and social *reference of the respective legal system to itself*, to its constitution, previously passed laws, etc.

(a) The concept of legal communication extends to all forms of legal action and all kinds of normative attribution of responsibility, in particular to the attribution and imputation of rights and duties as we know them today in

the realms of civil law, criminal law and public law. Such a communica-
tive social system is conceived to be self-referential, self-maintaining, and
self-reproducing.

(b) A concept of law based solely on the state and concerned exclusively
with *formal* state law without taking account of the manifold *informal* social/
societal conditions and prerequisites for the production of law seems, by con-
trast, far too narrow. By normative self-reference I mean the institutional legal
fact that self-organization and self-production of the legal system and of the
required laws take place in the legal systems of modern society, i.e. the com-
municative system is conceived as self-referential, self-maintaining and self-
reproducing. There is a continual self-reproduction of the legal system in the
sense that it continually refers back to itself in all its normative/factual opera-
tions, i.e. it takes into account other operations and actions it has previously
undertaken.

Law does not, however, only come into existence in specific bodies set up by
the state or in highly bureaucratized states with their legal staffs. The state
*sensu largo* has neither a monopoly, nor a prerogative for the creation of law,
but only a functional authority and superiority.

(a) From the point of view of the theory of law and of systems theory law
comes into existence in *all social institutions and systems*; namely, in interac-
tion systems, organizations and in the *variety-pool* of society, be it a *regional*
society or – on a higher level of abstraction – *global* society as a whole. What I
mean by global society is not merely – as in Luhmann's approach – the one and
only 'world society' ('*Weltgesellschaft*') in its differentiation into independent
functional subsystems ('*Teilsysteme*') of society, but the societal reality of law
in its interaction and organization systems as well as in state legal systems. My
systems-theoretical approach to law differs from Luhmann's – apart from the
fact that he does not mention *state* legal systems – above all, because the con-
cept of law and society used by me here rests on the differentiation between
*regional* society and *global* society; that is, society as a whole, as I have pointed
out earlier (Luhmann 1991: 51–71, 57; Krawietz 2008: 419–451, 425–426).

(b) This distinction appears to me to be of vital importance as a guiding
principle for the social observation of law. It is only by adhering to it that the
theory of law can avoid the danger of missing the access to the societal reality
of law in its observations and of getting lost in speculations about the world
society of law. Unless I am wholly mistaken, the turn to the societal reality of
law is now not only possible, but indispensable! This is why – with a view to the
requirements to be met by a theory of normative communication – an attempt
is here being made to sketch the outlines of a socially adequate framework
theory of legal communication, which rejects as a matter of principle the

narrow limitations imposed on legal thinking by individualistic *actor-and-subject* centred theoretical approaches.

An information-communication theory dealing with the relationship between norms and action is not a finished product (Krawietz 2003: 27–41). To construct and develop it is a highly demanding task that remains as yet largely unaccomplished. In pursuing this purpose a very broad concept of communication in the context of the modern institutions and systems theories of law has to be used as a basis. This concept takes its orientation from the dichotomization into institutional facts and norms customary in the language of law. Starting-points are practical linguistic information and normative communications – or, at least, those that can be formulated linguistically – with a social relationship to the law without this being necessarily provided by the state!

(a) Law is a specific form of social relation, but not all law is formalized. There is, as I have pointed out on another occasion, not only a formal law, but also an informal one. All forms of social behaviour that serve to establish, concretize and change legal norms, be they general or individual ones, are to be counted as legal communications.

(b) In accordance with a social differentiation established in German law as early as in the nineteenth century, we shall, however, in the following make a distinction, both from a structural and from a functional point of view, between primary and secondary systems in our analysis of law (Krawietz 2009: 121–149). In legal communication, we regard the day-to-day legal actions in everyday life undertaken by private individuals or citizens and legal subjects who derive the orientation for their behaviour from already socially established legal expectations as part of the *primary system of law*, while all decision taking activities by the highly organized and bureaucratized legal staff of the state, i.e. legislative, executive and judiciary, belong to the *secondary system of law*.

(c) No longer is law to be interpreted narrowly and reduced to no more than a static legal order comprising all valid norms, rules and regulations and based only on the hermeneutic access to legal texts. Instead, the entire legal order is to be understood as a dynamic, and in its entirety socially established network of all legal acts, communications and actions, which together constitute the legal system. Communications and legal acts occurring in a particular field always follow on from preceding communications and legal acts. In this way, they contribute – by way of normative structural coupling (Krawietz 2012: 71–102, 2013: 345–364, 366–369); that is, a kind of juridical rationality of linkage – to the continual production and reproduction of the legal system. It follows that the information and communication system of law is a vast network made institutionally permanent and composed of systemic operations consisting of

directives and norms and made up of any number of legal communications. These are created, interlinked and thereby further developed in the everyday practice of law. This network is capable of growing in any direction thematically and of being enlarged at will. All social areas of human activity can be comprised within it and practically the entire world encompassed by it.

(d) The juridical argumentation that we deal with in everyday legal life as well as in the other legal practice, which is normally organized by the state, i.e. in the secondary system of law, becomes accessible to a deeper understanding only if we distinguish both empirically and analytically between the different levels at which law is produced and analyzed, as is shown in my conception of the *multi-level approach*. In addition, it seems imperative to consider it also both in its interdependence and in the context of its impact. One might say, therefore, that the legal system gains its social identity as a result of its self-generated, deliberate normative legal acts. The directives and norms proceeding from them are not issued in accordance with a preconceived master-plan, but pragmatically and in each case according to requirement, and at certain points, as it were, *ad hoc.* Directives and norms emanate from previous directives and norms, which in turn give rise to new directives and norms and so on.


### Results and Conclusions

Modernity and modernization is not an evolutionary *one-way-street* to a global civilization and a universal legal culture. We live in a time of multiple modernities and multiple legal systems in their respective societal environments. This is leading us to a *New Paradigm of Theorizing about Law*.

In legal evolution and the general theory of law this leads to the *Breakdown of Justice Beyond Law* and the *Turn to Communicative Legal Systems* in their respective societal environments.

Further, unless I am wholly mistaken, the *Turn to Societal Reality of Law* is now not only possible, but indispensable! This is why – with a view to the requirements to be met by a theory of normative legal communication – an attempt is here being made to sketch the outlines of a socially adequate framework theory of legal communication.

Law, legal order and legal system – understood as a normatively structured functional communication system comprising all interactions and organizations – on the level of global society is no more than a societal system that includes and integrates all the different national State legal systems of regional societies within it.

The technological, economical, political, cultural and legal globalization do not play together to *one* (and only *one*!) world society. The concept of legal communication extends to all forms of legal action and all kinds of normative attribution of legal responsibility, in particular to the attribution and imputation of rights and duties as we know them today in the realms of civil law, criminal law and public law.

Law is something we may speak of if in a living society and its constitution there exist normatively coded expectations of behaviour concerning the possibility of distinguishing between right or wrong, lawful or unlawful, which can demand compliance, i.e. which have social validity. The normative coding is that which gives communication within the legal system its legal meaning; it excludes *other* (!) meanings from the legal system.

The law is regarded here as an external norm and rule of human conduct. What is important is not for what reasons or motives the norms of valid law are observed, but the very fact *that it happens*. Modern law deals only with the external regulation of human behaviour. However, it is in this that the evolutionary normative institutional achievement of the constitutionally validated legal order is to be found. This external regulation is the basis also for the, as it were, institutionalized politico-legal control-mechanisms of the constitutional state (for instance, through elections, referenda, legislation and other highly selective decision-making procedures within government, administration and jurisdiction).

Legal argumentation, substantiation and decision must not be replaced, on the other hand, by mere reference to other (!) justifications (e.g. ethics, moral philosophy) that are not legally covered by constitution and law – only morally correct and/or sensible, however convincing they may appear as such.

As for the *general* theory of law, this approach rejects as a matter of principle the deep rooted foundations and limitations on legal thinking by 'natural law' and its successor, the 'law of reason', and by individualistic actor-and-subject theoretical approaches. Law is far too important a matter to be left to moral philosophers who draw on natural law and law of reason.

**PART 2**

*Multiple Modernities View to Contemporary Societies*

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CHAPTER 6

# Multipolarity Means Thinking Plural: Modernities

*Jan Nederveen Pieterse*

Multipolarity means thinking in the plural. The Cold War era was bipolar and involved comparisons between capitalism and communism across many dimensions. The period of unipolarity that followed the end of the Cold War was one of relatively unrestrained American superpower, in capitalism and finance and, in later stages, geopolitical expansion. This was the era of neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus, recurrent financial crises in emerging economies and, during the G.W. Bush administration, three new wars. In the process, the US overplayed its hand and became overextended.

In the twenty-first century we enter an era of multipolarity shaped by two markers: the weakening of American hegemony and the rise of emerging societies. Thus, as one set of reference points unravels, or at least loses its model appeal – American hegemony and Anglo-American capitalism – other points of reference slowly, gradually emerge in East Asia, China, the Arabian Gulf and Latin America (Nederveen Pieterse 2008). In international business, the talk is of 'decoupling'. In development studies, the conversation is about 'Asian drivers'. Investors and asset managers talk about the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and other emerging economies, several of which have been upgraded to investment grade. In international affairs, the talk is of 'the rise of the rest' (Zakaria 2008) and the transition from the G7 to the G20 as a leading forum in the world economy, while the president of the World Bank observes that "a multi-polar economy, less reliant on the US consumer, will be a more stable economy."[1]

In this setting, it makes sense to think of modernities in the plural because emerging societies are no longer in the waiting room of history; they have emerged as actors on the main stage. A case in point is the role of sovereign wealth funds from the global South as financial players especially since 2007 (Nederveen Pieterse 2009a). It makes sense because the heading 'developing countries' is no longer adequate. Countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia are no longer just developing countries; they are both developing countries in international rankings and emerging economies in international economic and financial indexes.

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1  Robert Zoellick at the IMF meeting in Istanbul, quoted in C. Giles, K. Guha & D. Strauss, 'Strauss-Kahn renews attack on renminbi', *Financial Times*, 3–4 October 2009: 3.

What is at stake in this argument? Is it merely a technical adjustment of vocabulary, a terminological courtesy in a changing geo-economic landscape? The stakes are larger and concern a shift from a Eurocentric, top-down view of history towards a multilinear perspective on historical change. Marx summed up the unilinear view: "the more developed society shows the less developed the image of its future.". Multilinear evolution has been accepted since the 1940s, yet Eurocentrism and West-centrism die hard, especially when hierarchies coincide with geopolitical fault lines and the citadel of modernity is guarded by a variety of gatekeepers. A 'singular modernity' has often been thematized; not surprisingly, from Heidegger to Jameson (2002), it is an exercise in West-centrism. From world-system theory to 'global sociology' (Cohen & Kennedy 2007), modernity has been theorized as a Eurocentric bulwark. What variation the conventional paradigm of modernity acknowledges is typically *variation in time* – early and latecomers to modernity; early, high modernity; pre-modernity, modernity, postmodernity. When variation in geographical space is acknowledged it is mostly along centre-periphery lines, in which metropolitan centres are more modern than peripheries, so northwest Europe is 'more modern' than Catholic, Mediterranean Europe. According to this 'geography of modernity', Turkey lies on the outskirts of Europe and modernity, and so do the Middle East and the world of Islam (cf. Taylor 1999; Therborn 1995).

So take the discussion about the relations between the West and Islam and the Middle East. In Samuel Huntington's phrase, it is a clash of civilizations (1996). This upholds the model of Europe and the US and considers how Middle Eastern societies deviate from this standard. Then, with Bernard Lewis, we ask the question *What went wrong?* The demonization of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran follows close behind. Enlightenment fundamentalism produces a 'hard modernity' that synchs with a hard geopolitics. Khaldoun Samman's book, *The clash of modernities* (2010), suggests a contrasting view. Rather than to an encounter between modernity and 'failed modernity', it refers to a contest between different, rival modernities with shortcomings on both sides. This matches accounts of Middle Eastern and Muslim societies as alternative modernities (e.g. Kamali 2006), of 'rock and resistance' in the Middle East and North Africa (LeVine 2008) and sites of modern Islam such as Turkey (Göle 2000).

According to Eisenstadt, "modernity is an open-ended horizon in which there are spaces for multiple interpretations" (2000b), a perspective shared by others (Deutsch 1991; Kaya 2003, 2004). This implies a change from a unilinear path of evolution following a single logic, towards multiple paths and, so to speak, a spaghetti approach to historical change.

In this paper I argue, first, that modernities are mixed and composite; if we consider not the ideal type of modernity in the abstract, but real-existing modernities, they all include premodern strands. In the second section I argue that modernities are layered – some components are shared among all modern societies and make up transnational modernity while other components differ according to historical and cultural circumstances. The third section reflects on East Asia as an alternative modernity and sketches its main features. This treatment follows previous discussions of modernities (Nederveen Pieterse 1998, 2000, 2009b).

### Modernities are Mixed

Does 'modernities' make sense? Let me tease out several meanings, without being exhaustive. In one of the early formulations, by Eisenstadt (2000), multiple modernities refer to differences between Europe and the US. This is an argument for which there is ample justification, confirmed in sociology. A different consideration is that while *modern sociology* generally treats modernity as a single configuration (e.g. Giddens 1990), the *sociology of modernity* finds that actual, real-existing modernity in, say, Italy, Scandinavia and Japan is remarkably different (Bauman 1992). Thus, one level or perspective concerns modernity as an ideal type, a paradigm, as in Weber's rationalization and Talcott Parsons' pattern variables, and another concerns real-existing modernities, and here the plural comes in.

Each real-existing modernity is composite and mixed and includes premodern strands and features, many of which are typically overlooked and glossed over when we adopt the 'modern gaze' or ideal-type perspective on modernity. Examples of particularistic or premodern elements in modernity are in Table 1.

Several of these strands live on and have been incorporated into 'modern institutions' (see, e.g. Lash & Urry 1994; Kotkin 1992). If we focus, then, not on ideal-type modernity as an end state or condition, but on 'becoming modern' or modernization as a process, it typically comes about through adjustments of and accommodations with premodern institutions. These have generated transitional in-between social formations that have often constituted important formative periods. Eric Hobsbawm (1954) spoke of the 'feudal capitalism' of Spain and Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (when economic surplus was invested in cathedral building), in contrast to the Low Countries where different relations between aristocracy, merchants and the church prevailed and surplus was reinvested in enterprise. The weak status of aristocracy in the Low Countries, particularly on the seaboard, gave rise to in-between

TABLE 1     *Particularistic or premodern elements in modernity*

| | |
|---|---|
| Status (estates); guilds – crafts, trade unions, professional associations | NW Europe |
| Beruf, craft regulation, apprenticeship | Germany |
| Monarchy, status system, old boy networks, clubs | UK |
| Voluntary associations, rackets, syndicates, clubs | US |
| Ethnic associations; crime networks, Mafias, etc. | Diasporas |

categories such as 'noble merchants'. The 'imperialism of free trade' is a transitional formation that functioned in the nineteenth-century British Empire (Gallagher & Robinson 1982). Manchester School liberalism displays some of these features, as an interspersion of imperial rule and merchant interests: 'Britannia rules the waves'. 'Conservative modernization' characterized the policies of many ruling strata in nineteenth-century France (Bonaparte), Germany (Bismarck), Russia (Count Witte), Ottoman Empire (Tanzimat reforms) and Japan (Meiji Restoration).[2] Here, the general principle is to implement reforms and adopt new technologies and institutions to maintain the core power structure. The various forms of 'colonial modernization' in the western colonies and dependencies – building infrastructure, plantations, machinery, administrative reforms, and later the ethical policy – also indicate the formation of mixed social formations. 'Colonial modernization' is a transitional social formation in itself (cf. Scriver & Prakash 2007). Examples of mixed social formations are in Table 2.

Many of these hybrid combinations of premodern and modern elements live on in institutions of lasting significance. The House of Lords in Westminster and the Upper Chamber in many European parliaments indicate the enduring role of landlords and aristocracies and agricultural interests, often to this day. (Arguably, the EU Common Agricultural Policy or the system of agricultural subsidies, which is the EU's largest expenditure post, owes its longevity to these interests, which are partly of a late-feudal nature and have often been represented in Christian Democratic parties.) European welfare states owe some of their origins to their post-feudal character. Feudalism implied a system of entitlements and duties (*noblesse oblige*), which infused nineteenth-century working class movements and were rearticulated in industrialism. Corporatism, too, owes some features to older forms of state-market cooperation when the

2   On premodern features of modern times see Mayer (1981); cf. Nederveen Pieterse (1989). Conservative modernity is discussed further below.

TABLE 2    *Mixed social formations*

| | |
|---|---|
| Noble merchants | Low Countries, 1300 onward |
| 'Feudal capitalism' | Spain and Italy, 16/17th century |
| Imperalism of free trade | British Empire, 19th century |
| 'Conservative modernization' | France, Germany, Russia, Japan, 19th century |
| 'Colonial modernization' | Colonies, 20th century |

major guild house stood next to the town hall, as in many old towns such as Bologna and Freiburg. Some of these features live on also in postmodern times, in forms of localism and identity politics rooted in older communal traditions, and neo-tribal loyalties to sports teams alongside new loyalties to brand names and logos.

One can make a case, too, for different modernities coexisting and interacting *within a society* or state formation. Cases in point are the American South and Southwest and the Italian South or Mezzogiorno. A common interpretation of the American Civil War is that it was a conflict between two modes of production: industrial, mechanized production in the northeast and manual labour based on slavery in the plantation economy of the South, and mechanized labour won the day over manual labour as a more efficient production system. Both availed themselves of contemporary technologies and economic opportunities, including free trade in the South and protection in the north, so this can be viewed as a contest between rival modernities. Besides, they are modernities whose differences have persisted over time, despite convergence in some respects (notably modernization in the South especially since the 1930s and public works programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the interstate highway system). In the 1970s, the South's institutional framework of low wages, low taxes, low services and no unions – the institutional framework of plantation capitalism, reworked during Reconstruction and Jim Crow – proved to be attractive and competitive for industries facing a profit squeeze after the end of the postwar boom. This sparked the great shift from the Frost Belt to the Sun Belt, which is still ongoing, with vast ramifications for American society and politics.[3]

Robert Putnam (1993) and others argue that modern institutions such as decentralized government and local administration function differently in

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3    I have discussed this as Dixie capitalism, as the actual template of neoliberalism, and as 'the revenge of the Confederacy' in Nederveen Pieterse (2004b, 2008).

Italy's north and south. Even though Putnam recycles stereotypes about the Mezzogiorno, the differences are meaningful and the notion of multiple modernities coexisting in a single state formation may apply here too and have analytical purchase. Both formations are modern because they avail themselves of contemporary technologies and institutions and are different because they deploy them according to diverse historical and cultural legacies. The institutions are similar but they function differently because they are embedded in different cultural, historical and geographical settings. The theme of multiple, in fact *competing modernities* within a country has been adopted also in analyses of prewar Japan where it refers to a contest between 'rural modernity' and 'urban modernity' (Tamanoi 1998; Minichiello 1998).

A different take on modernity's mixed lineages is Tiryakian's argument on the Christian, Gnostic and Chthonic 'metacultures' of modernity (Tiryakian 1996). This takes us still further back in time and brackets modernity by placing it within a wider, layered civilizational frame. Another twist to this line of thinking is the theme of neo-medievalism: the rise of crossborder sovereignty and supranational phenomena such as cyberspace in some respects parallels medieval times and their fractured and overlapping sovereignties (Kobrin 1998; Winn 2004). Medieval modernity is yet another option. AlSayyad and Roy (2006) find that gated enclaves, regulated squatter settlements and camps are "fiefdoms of regulation or zones of 'no-law'" that parallel the medieval city in Europe and the Arab world.

Incorporating the peasantry into industry, services and urbanism is modernity's key challenge and when this fails, one of the outcomes may be medieval modernity – modernity accommodating or shielding itself from a large peasant hinterland.[4] With a stretch of metaphor, the shrinking middle class in the contemporary United States has been termed a situation of 'postindustrial peasants' (Leicht & Fitzgerald 2006).

Different types of mixture arise when elements from other cultures are adopted. Thus in Japan, parents, peers, teachers and the media work together to inform the young about Santa Claus and his visits. The Japanese Santa wears the familiar red and white attributed to the nineteenth-century American illustrator Thomas Nast (Plath 2007: 312). However, in Japanese advertisements Santa is often drawn as an attractive young woman. The androgyny of Santa may reflect the growing influence of the mother in Japanese society (Plath 313). The popular Christmas seems to offer people the means for making sense of life in a modern environment. This is one instance of the 'globalization of Christmas' (cf. Miller 1993). Other forms of mixture arise, of course, from

4   On these dilemmas see Nederveen Pieterse and Rehbein (2009).

contemporary migration flows and multiculturalism. 'Global multiculture' (Nederveen Pieterse 2007) is one of the expressions of transnational modernity. In sum, real-existing modernities are mixed social formations in that they straddle past and present and import and translate styles and customs from other cultures.

### Modernities are Layered

Criteria for alternative modernities include that social formations are enduring and sustainable over time and show sufficient cohesion – historical, geographical and cultural. Modernities, of course, imply overlap: per definition all modernities share core modern features; so multiple modernities do not preclude partial convergence. Thus in the West, over time, we do not see a complete convergence of Europe and the US, and not with Japan either. There is partial convergence – in technology, industrialism, post-industrialism, information technology, banking, transnational corporations, interfirm cooperation, international treaties and conventions, security cooperation, etc.; but there is no complete convergence and no great likelihood of this occurring either. Look closely and in areas of cooperation such as finance, banks perform different roles and accounting standards function differently. In the course of the twentieth century many differences have remained fairly stable, even as each society or region has also undergone major changes. There are enduring differences, too, within Europe, between Northwest, Nordic, South, Central and Eastern Europe. In spite of EU integration, many differences will linger on for quite some time. We can distinguish, then, differences that are temporal and fade over time and differences that are deeply embedded and structural.

A related discussion is that of 'capitalism against capitalism' or the contest between different capitalisms that was initiated by Michel Albert (1993). Originally this, too, unfolded as a comparison and contrast between European and American capitalism, or Rhineland and Anglo-American capitalism, stakeholder and shareholder capitalism, along with another reference point: Japanese capitalism and the 'Japanese challenge'. This debate has given rise to the varieties of capitalism thesis and a large literature in global political economy. It refers to the empirical and widely observed institutional diversity between economic and political systems. The argument of variation between national capitalisms is not necessarily significant, but regional differences do count. An alternative view, the transnational capitalist class argument assumes a transnational alignment of class interests and an eventual institutional convergence of capitalisms. Yet, clearly, these perspectives can be combined.

We can think of capitalism as layered, with convergence at one level (credit ratings, international financial institutions, interfirm cooperation) and divergence at other levels (institutional frameworks, legal standards, different patterns of state, market, society relations).

Fernand Braudel explained world trade as a three layered structure in which 'capitalism' is at the top whose members gain the largest profits in their fields, then in the middle the 'market economy' made up of regular participants of buying and selling activities, and lastly the 'non-market economy' where people participate in bartering or are self-sufficient (Arrighi et al. 2003: 263). These layers exist both within and between social formations.

Just as capitalisms plural is contentious in international political economy, so is modernities in sociology. Yet, the differences in economic and fiscal systems, business environments and corporate governance are ordinary and glaring and in economics the criticisms of 'capitalisms' plural by and large concern the conceptualization and theorization, rather than the analytics and empirical differentiation, which are broadly accepted. The major alternative view, transnational capitalism and a transnational capitalist class, has relatively few adherents. While the diversity in capitalisms is widely recognized and accepted, this is not the case with respect to modernity, even though it logically follows considering that capitalism ('modern capitalism') is one of the institutional dimensions of modernity. Sociology in this regard is more conventional and wedded to the classic paradigms of the nineteenth and early-twentieth century. In Connell's analysis of 'why classical theory is classical' (1997) the construction of the classical tradition reflects the erasure of imperialism and Western power.

We can think of modernities as layered, with strata of shared features – technologies and institutions; strata of partially shared attributes; layers of temporary differences that will likely recede over time; and layers of deep seated differences embedded in the 'grammar' of culture.[5] Societies the world over share modern conventions such as the universal standard time, codes and rules that organize air, sea and land traffic and international and satellite communication and a host of international treaties and conventions. They share basic technologies from the combustion engine to industrial standards and information technology. Commonalities do not preclude differences. English is a lingua franca across many societies, yet it is articulated differently according to local vernaculars, so it is 'globish' rather than English (Nerrière

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5   I make a broadly similar argument with regard to layers of culture – including transnational culture, specific cultures, and 'deep culture' (Nederveen Pieterse 2007).

2004). English is shared but partially so; there are differences between British, American, Indian, Caribbean and Ghanaian English, etc. Besides different diction and vocabulary, and sometimes meaning, each has generated distinctive literatures.

### Looking East

As Mahathir-bin-Mohamad of Malaysia points out, if countries can be westernized, they can be easternized as well (Mahathir & Ishihara 1995). In the past, the rule was to industrialize you must westernize; now to industrialize you must easternize (Luna & Klein 2006; cf. Kaplinksi 1994). For developing countries, looking east, not west, for development examples has been the standard practice for quite some time. East Asia and the development experience of the Tiger economies has been the model to look up to for some time for African countries, Latin America, the Middle East, the World Bank (the 'East Asian miracle') and UN development agencies. For smaller countries, such as the emirates of the Arabian Gulf, Singapore has taken on model functions. Malaysia and its New Economic Policy has been an example for multiethnic societies such as South Africa and Brazil. Hence the times that development means modernization means westernization means Americanization are long gone. Europe, the US and Japan have not ceased to be models in certain respects, but there are now additional models, which are in many ways more relevant and appropriate for developing countries. So there is now a plurality of models.

Advanced countries and transnational corporations also look to Asia and hold up Asian examples in labour practices, management techniques and welfare policies. British conservatives used to look to Hong Kong and Singapore as 'lean welfare states'. We could term this kind of positive evaluation of Asian practices, 'Asianism'.

The idea of an 'East Asian model' is contested and subject to criticism (White 1988). There is ample differentiation in East Asia. Political systems, economic institutions and gender relations diverge across the region. Thus, in Taiwan, small- and medium-size enterprises have received government support and have played a much larger role than elsewhere. Nevertheless, several components are widely shared and may be viewed as building blocks of an East Asian modernity. Some apply to Northeast Asia, not to Southeast Asia. Together they make up an alternative modernity, which serves as a guidepost to many developing countries.

### Developmental States

Chalmers Johnson's concept of the developmental state originally applied to Japan. The general lesson is that there has been no successful socioeconomic development in history without a committed and capable state. We can broadly term this state capitalism with several variants such as bureaucratically coordinated capitalism (Japan).

### Corporatism

Close state-corporate relations characterize all early developers, also in Europe. Invariably, the military industries served as a major nexus and impetus to industrialization (with government contracts involved in iron, steel, railways, machinery, energy, weapons and navy). However, this is not the typical pattern among the late-latecomers to industrialization. Japan went this route from the late-nineteenth century on, but most newly industrialized countries did not, presumably because light industries were the typical starting point and the Cold War arms race and the overwhelming American military presence made it unnecessary as well as impracticable.

### Public Service Banking

Close relations between government and banks have long been part of industrial policy. Schumpeter refers to public service banking as the dominant trend in Rhineland and central Europe, in contrast to the Anglo-American style of banking. This tradition also pertains in East Asian societies.

### They are Post-feudal Social Formations

This applies not just to Asia but to most NICs. They share this feature with European modernities. In this regard, they all deviate from the American pattern that arises from a break with feudalism; the American pattern stands alone and is a historical anomaly.

### Distributive Social Reforms and Policies

This has been a major trend in East Asian economies, partly due to the Cold War and American influence. Land reform and progressive education policies have been hallmarks of development in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Land reform and education policies enabled the East Asian societies to integrate the peasantry into modernity and thus to meet the single most important challenge of modernization. Social policies of housing and compulsory savings plans play a major part in the city-state economy of Singapore (Hill & Lian Kwen Fee 1995). This informs the East Asian emphasis on human development

and human security (in contrast to human rights). Arguably, the human development approach (and the human development index, combining literacy, healthcare and income) is owed in large measure to the East Asian experience. The downside of Asian lean welfare states is that they rely on family support and most of the burden of support falls on women (White & Goodman 1998).

Other components of East Asian modernity include the following: a postcolonial outlook, i.e. a collective memory of colonial experiences. An approach of strategic integration into the world economy, for instance, avoiding or minimizing foreign debt. Their security systems are defensive rather than offensive and the role of the military is generally limited (which is different in Southeast Asia, in Thailand, Burma and Indonesia). National territorial expansionism barely plays a role (with China as an exception).[6]

East Asian configurations have been, of course, dynamic over time and in flux. Over time the Korean chaebol system of business conglomerates has led to corruption and crony capitalism, as in the recent Hyundai scandal. The configuration has been authoritarian in politics and labour regimes and has gradually opened to democratization, though not across the board. The Asian crisis led to IMF interventions and pro-market policy changes in South Korea as well as to the 'IMF homeless'. The influence of international finance led to the expansion of credit cards and consumerism, which, on the upside, decreases the dependence on exports.

These social formations have been increasingly reflexive and engage in self-criticism and self-correction. The labour and democratic movements in South Korea are a case in point. Anti-authoritarianism is a strong current throughout the region. Infrastructure, urban planning, mass transit systems and architecture are under continual review. Ecological constraints are a growing concern. Criticisms of fast-lane turbo capitalism have been rife (Bello 1992). In China this has contributed to abandoning the Shanghai model of fast-track growth and its disastrous uneven development and adoption of the Harmonious Society policy in 2003. Civil society initiatives and people-to-people contacts play a growing role and inspire a 'new regionalism'. One alternative proposal is for a 'civic regionalism', rather than state or market-led regionalism (Sakamoto 2000). Various elements of this configuration have been thematized – in discussions of human development and human security, the World Bank's 'East Asian miracle', Jose Cooper Ramo's 'Beijing Consensus' (Ramo 2004) and reflections in East Asia and China (e.g., Wei-Ming 2000; Shijun 2006; Nonini & Ong 2007; Yan 2008).

Other alternative modernities include Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, as the four most stable and prosperous Latin American countries. They

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6   This is also discussed in Nederveen Pieterse (1998).

are too diverse to constitute a cohesive Latin American modernity, but throughout the region Latin American conditions are increasingly experienced no longer as an affliction, a truncated or incomplete modernity, but as an alternative modernism (Ortiz 2000).

Let us turn to criticisms of modernities plural. One criticism is that by pluralizing modernity we lose the critical edge and 'rupture' that comes with modernity and modern thinking, which matters particularly in early, young or nascent modernities. The external reference point ('modernity') helps to open up ossified local conditions.

I think this is a weak criticism. Critical thinking is *internal* to modernity. Each modernity generates its own reflexivity, its social, political and cultural debates and hence its own critical theory. The external reference point is as likely to be as distorting (applying criteria and standards out of context) and idealized (Heidegger without the Holocaust) as it is inspiring. In the era of global mass marketing and communication there is a surfeit of picture-postcard glamour images of distant icons of modernity – Manhattan skyscrapers, the Big Ben and Westminster and the Eiffel Tower as part of the familiar skyline of Western modernity. Dipankar Gupta, however, rejects the idea of multiple modernities:

> Once we begin to entertain the feasibility of the term 'multiple modernities', we will, in due course of time, suspend our critical judgment and forgive many egregious features that exhibit themselves in contemporary societies. So if there is bride burning, then that too would be a specific type of modernity; if there is an eruption of sectarian intolerance, then that too would be yet another version of modernity.
>
> GUPTA 2005: 7

To a certain extent this is true. To each modernity its pathologies; to deny this would be idealism and ahistorical. In Gupta's view, however, the 'telos of modernity' is a 'deliberative project' that turns on intersubjectivity ("accepting the viability and validity of other points of view and other stations of life," 2005: 4; cf. Gupta 2000). According to Gupta, "modernity owes nothing to the past" and "to make the past irrelevant to the present and to the future is the task of modernity" (2005: 15). In this view, modernity is about the erasure of history for modernity is 'future seeking'; modernity then is a purification, a cleansing the slate project, a view that is diametrically opposite to treating history and tradition as wellsprings and resources of the present and of modernity. With an ideal-type angle on 'project modernity' one can keep modernity neat and clean. The downside is it only exists in the abstract. Gupta's modernity is a telos, an

unrealized, distant ideal, not unlike Habermas' 'modernity as an unfinished project' (yet to fulfill the goals set by the Enlightenment). This is a utopia rather than a sociological perspective. It is modernity without a dark side.

It is a charming yet peculiar notion that the Enlightenment is progressive and therefore so is modernity. True, the Enlightenment gave us science, abolitionism and the emancipation movements. Yet the Enlightenment also gave us 'race science' (and a new justification for slavery), nationalism (and radical nationalism), the new imperialism (on behalf of progress and civilization), the first industrial war (the American Civil War), mastery over nature (and risk society). It gave us, following Lyotard (1979), the great presumptions of modernity (and their disillusionments): science (Hiroshima), revolution (the Gulag) and humanism (with the Holocaust as a counterpoint). Conservative modernity is a major current.[7] Modernity without a dark side means modernity without history, as if it is yet to happen.

There are in each society different currents and different angles on modernity. Thus in India, there are modernizers, such as the industrialists Tata and Birla (both are Parsi families); proponents of alternative modernities such as many in the Subaltern Studies group; neo-traditionalists such as the BJP and Shiv Sena; and those who propose alternative traditions, such as Gandhian tradition, Ashis Nandy and Vandana Shiva. The dismantling of the licence raj in 1991 is the shift from one type of modernity – Nehru's Fabian socialism organized around a centralized state and influenced by the Soviet example; to a hybrid that combines a middle-class service economy and urban growth modelled on the example of Shanghai with a large peasantry (Khilnani 1997; Kaviraj 2000). India did not experience an industrial revolution; yet its cell phone users rose from 3 million in 2000 to 100 million in 2005. India includes over 680,000 villages; a population of 1.1 billion, yet with only 35 million taxpayers (Luce 2007). When in the 2020s India will be the world's third largest economy, its modernity will be a bricolage of these diverse streams.

In conclusion, modernities are a theme of our times. Recognizing that modernities are multiple and diverse and transcending the ideal-type of modernity acknowledges the multipolar realities of twenty-first century globalization and the 'rise of the rest'. It recognizes, further, that all modernities are mixed and layered, also in the West. From modernity as utopia it takes us to a grounded modernity. This opens the possibility of coming to terms with the dilemmas that real modernities face.

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7   The journal *New Formations* (28, 1996) devoted a special issue to *Conservative Modernity* featuring, among others, articles about radical nationalism, British conservatism and Peronism.

# Multiple Modernities, 'East' and 'West' and the Quest for Universal Human Rights

*Luis Roniger*

This contribution discusses the global rise and evolving standing of human rights worldwide, analyzing these trends from the perspective of multiple modernities. It aims to assess the possible contributions of this perspective in addressing some of the tensions, debates and challenges inherent in the rise of this idiom that is supposed to prevail as a 'colourless' discourse of the protection of human beings on a global scale.

Human rights are affected by processes of glocalization and vernacular endorsement of universal principles and discourses in a critical way (on glocalization see Robertson's work). As they take root in different contexts and environments, global discourses take different forms. They become 'thicker' as part of a process of developing locally, yet not without challenges and tensions, a process that social science has described as glocalization or vernacularization as the dialectical interface of globalization.

Human rights have become a global discourse and vision to the extent that even foes and repressors cannot ignore them, even as they may try to control its impact and curtail its practical implications. And yet, many – including critical legal scholars and cultural relativists – have expressed criticisms of the premises of that discourse, while others are sceptical of the universal hold of the normative and stress the evident reticence of states and societies to comply with it internationally. Under the conviction that the roots of these criticisms and reticence may be hard to overcome completely, I will suggest in this work that the perspective of multiple modernities may be instructive to approach this problématique both analytically and prospectively.

### Human Rights: Global Scene and Vernacular Resonance

Human rights are neither eternal, nor static categories, but rather visions and principles that are the product of historical struggles and developments, the proactive result of human agency at the confluence between structural/civilizational developments and historical contingencies. There have been many steps and stages in human rights' rise to global recognition. Limiting ourselves

just to trends in the last two centuries, salient perhaps were the concerns with the humanity of slaves in mid nineteenth-century England leading to end the trans-Atlantic trafficking in African slaves; the efforts of activists anchored in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church as well as in humanism, secularism and various brands of Socialism, aimed at assisting the exploited of colonialism or those suffering from the rise of capitalism; the concern of individuals such as Henry Dunant with the wounded in war following the horrors of the 1859 Battle of Solferino, fought with the destructive weapons produced by the Industrial Revolution, thus spearheading the efforts that by the late nineteenth century created the Red Cross and solidified an international commitment for the Hague conventions and the emergence of humanitarian law in armed conflict (Lauren 1998: 37–71).

Ultimately, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, prompted by the consciousness of the atrocities of the Second World War and the Holocaust genocide. In Hans Joas' terms, the experience spurred a new stage of reflection on the sacredness of the person and value commitment to the discourse of human rights (Joas 2013). It was followed by a series of international conventions leading to the launching of an International Criminal Court in 2002 to deal with crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and, starting in 2017, expanding to a more controversial legal area, wars of aggression.

As these principles and institutions spread globally, they may challenge and be challenged by the very structures of the states that are supposed to enforce them as well as the premises and practices of various societies and cultures. Often, a process of vernacularization occurs as ideas and practices deemed to be universal are adopted dialectically or at least addressed at localized arenas. The dialectics of globalizing and 'glocalizing' principles of human rights and accountability go hand in hand with the existence of multiple disagreements about the generalized respect for individual rights and the effective ways of implementation.

There are many sources for this imbalance. For one, there are various philosophical foundations and traditions for universal human rights. Some stem from a perception of natural law, rooting human rights on various soteriological views on the existence of a higher order, or God's will or providence, and their implications for human nature. Others are humanistic and rationalist, grounding human rights on the universal capacity of humans, endowed with rational capacities as basis for moral and ethical attitudes of respect for human life and dignity. Still others trace human rights to positivist foundations, both to legal and contractual commitments limiting the historical abuse of power and, later on, the agreements reached by international law as basis

for deriving a universal recognition of human rights. Nonetheless, one may argue that these various philosophical foundations and traditions could be reconciled for the sake of agreement on the universal character of the principles of human rights.

Still, evolving meanings are at the roots of disputes over what is covered and what such rights should cover. Also, there have been disagreements as societies have supported different views of what is right and wrong. For example, during the Cold War, the idiom of universal human rights was contested as part of the East/West divide. Geopolitical camps voiced accusations of infringement of civil and political rights vs. parallel claims of infringement of socioeconomic rights, reaching minimal engagement only by the mid-1970s in the framework of the detente and the Helsinki accords.

More fundamental have been criticisms aimed at the supposed neutrality of the discourse, addressed by theorists of post-colonialism, indigenous revival and feminism (Peterson 1990; Asad 2000). Accused of instrumental use and colonial interventionism, Western countries projecting claims of universalism have been described as deluded by an arrogant ethnocentrism pushing for liberal norms and values, the lack of tolerance for distinct cultural understandings, and the entrapment of harmful policies under the halo of protecting human rights in other societies. Law Professor Makau wa Mutua has voiced many of these criticisms caustically. Mutua (2001) pointed out that the human rights discourse is fundamentally Eurocentric. It was launched by Western nations to address problems created by those very nations. For hundreds of years, slavery and colonialism did not rouse international ire. Contrastingly, he claimed, it took the genocide of the Jews in a European context for Western countries to fuel a call for respecting universal human rights (Mutua 2001: 312). According to Mutua, the problem extends beyond the origins of this discourse of universal claims. Countries sensitive to the scars of colonialism may quite justifiably resent a discourse that, beyond its noble aims, can be seen as supporting external intervention and imposition of norms through the guise of universalization. Beyond the Western countries' proclamation of high motives of intervening for the protection of individuals abused and repressed in less developed countries, Mutua suggests there are assumptions informed by an ethnocentric colonial model. He describes this model as a Savage-Victim-Saviour model, in which the Western nations are called to save the victims of another country portrayed as savage. In other words, the discourse of universal human rights may disguise a new form of civilizational imperialism, which will be suspect in many countries concerned with their sovereignty (Mutua 2001, esp. 220–227; Cmiel 2004: 50). According to Mutua, a consensus needs to be built upon balancing the individualist

leanings of human rights with equally important concerns with collective rights and duties as well as with social and economic concerns at the center of many situations affecting many societies worldwide (Mutua 2001: 243–245; and see also Pollis 1996).

Related to the above, some analysts have claimed that developing countries barely able to feed their populations cannot be realistically expected to reach the same individual standards of human rights that developed countries can. This observation, long contemplated by political philosophers like John Rawls (1985, 1993) and Richard Rorty (1991, 1993), offers another tier of inconsistency and double standards for the implementation of universal human rights. Further, those defending collective rights – e.g. those of indigenous peoples – and self-determination may also join in their conditional endorsement of an idiom coined in the language of individualism, even though this is a main domain for the reconceptualization and realization of human rights as effective safeguard of human dignity (Lerner 2003; De Gaay Fortman 2011: 177–199).

Political realism also supports scepticism. The primary anchoring of human rights in the context of international relations is problematic, as it prompts instrumental ways of twisting human rights by member states, in what Bas de Gaay Fortman has defined as 'offensive' and 'defensive' strategies:

> What permeates international relations is, however, human rights as an instrument to uplift a state's own credibility while undermining that of other states. [...] "Offensive human rights" implies a focus on violations by other states [...] motions are put forward to censure the rival state. The term "defensive human rights", on the other hand, refers to the practice of signing and ratifying whatever treaty possibly (not uncommonly with preannounced reservations) as well as incorporating human rights standards in the country's national constitution, not as a first step towards implementation but simply as a point of positive reference whenever questions are asked as to the country's human rights record [...] Implementation has always been dominated by international relations.
>
> DE GAAY FORTMAN 2011: 45–46; see also HEYNS & VILJOEN 2001

Related, due to the structure of vested interests and state blocks of the international community, some states have been targeted in particular while others have been consistently bypassed even if their human rights records should have merited even more serious consideration, in what Don Habibi has identified as a serious proportionality problem of the international community (Habibi 2012).

Likewise, when countries may lose economically or geopolitically as the result of an attempt to enforce compliance with international human rights norms onto other countries, it seems unlikely they will take this path, so goes an argument that haunts the West in its relationships with states such as China and the possible international reaction when China cracks down dissidents or targets followers of the Falun Gong or Tibetans.

In this connection, political realists often point out to the inconsistency of Western policies of intervention in major human rights crises. There is no lack of examples. While professing to support human rights, the Clinton administration in the US was reluctant to define the mass murders in Rwanda as genocide, a move that would have prompted the need to intervene in the defence of human lives. Similarly, the continuous carnage in Syria reached around 200,000 casualties by late 2014 with concerned countries still unable to formulate any coherent policies driven by human rights considerations, and with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant further affecting the lives and physical integrity of thousands in the region.

Violent conflicts also highlight the growing importance of non-state actors and their role in the lack of a widespread recognition of universal human rights. As they challenge state authority, many non-state actors using massive violence leave a track of massive human-rights violations behind, without being accountable to the same extent that states may as they are subject to the constrains of the international community. Unlike non-state actors using violence and repression in their struggle for power, many states are signatory to international treaties and conventions and thus subject to the influence and pressure of other states and the international community to remain accountable to universal standards, as part of an inter-state system supported by international law and institutions.

Still states, the basic foci of implementing human rights, may be reluctant to be held accountable and non-state actors may recur to alternative sources of legitimacy, disregarding the hold of human rights. Tug-of-war may remain between agents pushing for global mechanisms of enforcement and those defending or attacking state sovereignty, either with legal, political or cultural arguments. Human rights may conflict with structures of authority, while state sovereignty or local legislation may override them in many societies. These tensions, sources of resistance and pitfalls limit the universal hold of human rights.

Notwithstanding the tensions and struggles inherent in the glocalization of human rights, it is important to retain such an idiom of universal claims. According to a minimalist approach, it offers the best chance to ensure human life and dignity across societies and civilizations and thus prevent that

individuals would be sacrificed for the sake of groups and states or in the name of culture. Without a universal vision, a world defined by radical relativism is likely to stay in a perpetual state of clashes, abuses and misunderstandings. There are supporting factors: the endorsement and ratification of treaties by states makes them accountable, while the codification of human rights into international law provides landmarks for improvement of local human rights standards. Also, anthropologists stress that cultures are not uniform and static, even though they may be coopted in some societies by forces willing to be their sole interpreters and, as such, demanding control over others' normative behaviour. Individual life and dignity may be enhanced through debate between totalistic and pluralistic interpretations of culture (Zechenter 1997). Yet, such debate can often be opened and bolstered only in the interface between locality and the international and transnational arenas, a major point that the perspective of multiple modernities highlights, as discussed below.

Enforcement remains problematic. A major issue is the gap between the legal idiom and discourse of human rights and its implementation. From a political perspective, we should ask who enforces universal human rights and under what circumstances. In recent decades, international agencies have become a major agent of change. Likewise, international bodies and powerful countries have sometimes intervened in conflict zones, overriding state sovereignty, especially in those cases in which states cannot be relied on to safeguard human rights. Then there is the moral problem of justifying the existence of different standards for various societies and states worldwide. There is also a cultural problem; namely, how to reach a stage in which different cultures accept the international normative as meaningful to them. Related to this cultural question, it remains to be assessed how to reach a bottom-up universalization of principles and norms. Then, social problems remain as well: how to make sense of internal dissent? What if individuals support what from an individualistic perspective is an infringement of human rights? Hereafter, I would like to suggest that the perspective of multiple modernities may be instrumental in assessing the principled issues and tensions discussed above.

### The Perspective of Multiple Modernities

As he moved away from early studies of modernization, S.N. Eisenstadt departed from theories that followed a naive expectation of convergence of societies worldwide as they modernize. According to those theories promulgated in the 1950s and 1960s, at least in the centres of Western power, societies were to ultimately become modern following the path first launched in the West. Many of

those who endorsed such views assumed that the Western model would be projected worldwide by processes of structural differentiation, urbanization and industrialization, the extension of education, technology and communication (Eisenstadt 1995h).

The perspective of multiple modernities developed by Eisenstadt and his colleagues departed ranks from those theories in at least four fundamental ways. First, it stressed that societies modernize by developing distinctive ways of engaging in processes of urbanization, industrialization, expanding communications, developing political regimes and participating in economic and other forms of globalization. That is, while recognizing that processes of structural and institutional differentiation were at the core of modernity, it equally stressed that this very process of increasing complexity created the possibility that different aspects or dimensions of modernity would coalesce in different constellations in various societies and historical contexts (Eisenstadt 2000a, 2007; Preyer 2011).

Second, the perspective of multiple modernities suggested that societies' distinctiveness is connected to various constellations of meaning-making crystallizing historically. Eisenstadt pointed out that the different paths and forms of modernity are rooted in different traditions, cultural and religious orientations, as they confront and amalgamate with the premises of the program of modernity envisaged by the West. While facing similar challenges – something that Peter Wagner's critical assessment of modernity (e.g. 2011) has stressed in that all societies confront then similar epistemic, political and economic problématiques – various societies undergo such change in different ways, through a multiplicity of actions, reactions and amalgams.

Thus, the perspective of multiple modernities stresses that modernities have developed *in a plurality of paths, forms and expressions* due to distinctive visions, ways of interpretation and representation, yet also various modes of construction of identity, attribution of meaning and projection of power and charisma. It stems from this understanding that modernity and Westernization are not identical processes, but rather maintain a tension-ridden and ambiguous interplay. Societies can be expected to change and modernize, yet they do so by not necessarily following a Western paradigm or by adopting Western visions and interpretations as if they were as universal as they have claimed to be (Eisenstadt 1996, 2007).

Third, the multiplicity of modernities is not only partly shaped by the institutions of the building blocks of the international system, i.e. by states and nation states. Equally important according to this perspective is an awareness of other arenas of continuous confrontation and diversity out of modernity, such as transnational and trans-state arenas shaped by transcendental visions

and networks claiming a stake in the elaboration of meaning, reflexivity and resulting mobilization of resources (Eisenstadt 2009a).

Fourth, as stressed by Manussos Marangudakis in his chapter, Eisenstadt's perspective implied a 'theory of indeterminacy', in which elites and social agents fulfill a crucial role in addressing the gap "between actuality and potentiality," in which developments are often the unintended consequence of their actions and interactions. Likewise, albeit attributing to Eisenstadt an assumption of path-analysis over-determination is Wolfgang Knöbl's work (e.g. 2006, 2011), which stresses the impact of contingency and unforeseen factors and events in the unfolding of historical developments. Beyond the implicit debate on where he stood on contingency, Eisenstadt stressed that the reflexivity of modernity intensifies such tendencies and shapes a continuous potential for change, for confrontation and struggle, buttressed by structural differentiation and the ever-changing presence of various social, political and intellectual activists and social movements.

Time and again in his writings, Eisenstadt came back to the analysis of fundamentalist movements and new types of Diasporas, and what I would call the new types of transnationalism. His explicit goal was to dismiss their conceptualization in terms of being diametrically opposed to modernity, while claiming that it is indeed modernity that has a Janus-face of progress and barbarity. He rather connected them to earlier transnational movements such as communism, in that both tried to establish a new social order, rooted in revolutionary and universalistic ideological tenets, some of which are rather totalistic and reject pluralism and tolerance. In his own words:

> Whereas extreme fundamentalist movements elaborate seemingly anti-modern, or rather anti-Enlightenment themes, they paradoxically share many Jacobin revolutionary components – sometimes in a sort of mirror-image way – with the communist ones. The similarity with communist movements lies in the project to establish a new social order, rooted in the revolutionary universalistic ideological tenets, in principle transcending any primordial, national, or ethnic units and new socio-political collectivities.
>
> EISENSTADT 2000B: 600

The concern with characterizing the new fundamentalisms, "mostly, but not only, the Muslim ones," as modern in spite of their anti-modern or at least anti-liberal ideology – illustrated for instance in the attitude of many of these to women – was related to his emphasis on their modern trends: a drive at mobilization and participation, the reconstruction of collective identities and the

"continual tension between the more instrumental and pragmatic, poten-
tially secular orientations, and the more radical Jacobin religio-political ones"
(Eisenstadt 2000b: 63).

All of this is also connected to Eisenstadt's emphasis on the active role that
various social actors – from political elites to carriers of visions of solidarity,
from cultural elites to economic entrepreneurs – play in structuring meaning
and embedding value orientations in institutions and social practices. Such
agency explains why the multiplicity of traditional societies and civilizations
did not become replaced by a monistic and homogenizing unfolding of moder-
nity, but rather developed in new multiple forms through the continuous pro-
cesses of structural, cultural and institutional transformations. Moreover, such
trends do not simply evolve in disconnection from the international and trans-
national arenas, but rather intimately connected to them and expressing an
ambiguous standing towards them, particularly when the latter support mod-
els claiming an universal, global projection.

In the framework of our analysis, we should therefore ask how this perspec-
tive – e.g. on fundamentalism and on the earlier revolutionary movements and
their ambiguous standing towards the original program of modernity, particu-
larly in its liberal orientations – compares with the standing of human rights
and the forces promoting or opposing its universal hold.

### Universal Human Rights in the Framework of Multiple Modernities

There are indeed many sources of resistance and ambiguity expressed world-
wide toward both the cultural program of modernity and the universalistic
assumptions of the discourse of human rights. Yet, in practice, there are some
notable differences between the ambiguities tracked in the attitudes towards
modernity in general and towards human rights in particular, which merit
some attention.

For one, there are major differences in the role that social movements play
as they affect these arenas. Most fundamentalist movements, especially but
not only the Muslim ones, have challenged many of the assumptions of the
original cultural program of modernity in its Western crystallization, while
sharing many of its strategies and tactics. By contrast, in the specific domain of
human rights we see the new social movements and transnational networks to
be mostly working in the promotion of human rights and the universal under-
standing of protection of human life and bodily integrity. As such, these move-
ments energize the domain and are confident even as they clash with states
and social forces opposing their hold.

Particularly since the 1970s, and with a new peak in the 1990s, the human rights agenda expanded to international justice, the defence of women's rights, children's rights, indigenous rights, economic and cultural rights, and health and sustainability. The politics of human rights certainly lagged behind the rhetoric; and yet, non-governmental organizations and local monitoring groups working for the protection of human rights and the networks of transnational advocacy that crystallized in the 1970s had grown stronger by the 1990s. Then, in recent decades, these networks, organizations and groups once again gained increasing confidence, supported by international law and the launching of new frameworks of accountability such as the ICC, conceived in the late 1990s and operational since 2002.

Likewise, in the framework of multiple modernities, some societies are credited with developing distinctive ways of interpreting modernity, shaping an ambiguous, tension-ridden relationship and sometimes an open confrontation with ideas such as Liberalism, which are traced to the original program of modernity crystallizing in Europe and the West. In the domain of human rights, the contested idiom and discourse is the one that claims to be universal due to its international grounding, rooted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the subsequent international conventions and the institutional frameworks that the UN has developed.

Yet, even if debate continues on whether the idiom of human rights violations is biased towards a Western interpretation (and as claimed in some quarters, it has been used to push a Western agenda and buttress Western hegemony in the international system), even its detractors – with only radical exceptions such as North Korea – have *not* opted out, as long as they wish to remain part of the international system. Rather, they have chosen a cooptation of the language of rights, joining international treaties to defuse criticism of their human rights record, and often challenging some of the inferences that they consider to be misguided or biased in implementing a discourse of universal scope.

Some states have been a major source of resistance, reluctant to cede sovereignty and be monitored by international organizations charged with safeguarding universal principles. However, even then, most of these states have increasingly signed international conventions and joined international bodies, including those charged with monitoring the standards of human rights.

Instead of opting out, such states have claimed to sustain alternative visions of rights standing in ambiguous and tense-ridden relationships with the Western interpretations of the universal principles and legal frameworks. Perhaps paradigmatic in this regard has been the case of China as it rose to global salience and purposely sought the world's recognition of such rising global standing. We should turn to its analysis now, as it is instructive for

tracing the ambiguities and tensions inherent in the process of universaliza-
tion and vernacularization of human rights.

## China and Alternative Interpretations of Universal Human Rights

A simplistic reading of the multiple modernities approach would be that there
are distinct traditions evolving separately as they confront modernity. While
the portrayal of the existence of different traditions, religions and civilizations
wrangling with processes of change is basically correct, Eisenstadt's approach
went beyond a vision of separate paths into modernity. Rather, he stressed also
the dialectics of multiple roads to modernity shaped also by international and
transnational forces, out of which a constant process of elaboration of mean-
ing takes place intertwined with the mobilization of resources.

This process of construction and reconstruction of meaning and of mobi-
lization of resources is led by political and cultural elites, individuals and
organizations, in their role as carriers of various collective projects, social
movements and economic entrepreneurs. All of these are not secluded from
the global arena, but rather engage in reactive and proactive moves and geo-
political games at various domains and levels of interaction and institutional
building.

Within this conceptual framework, the effectiveness of the various elites,
agents and social movements in either promoting or rejecting the recognition
of individual human rights is a crucial factor to be analyzed in specific settings
and historical circumstances. China is a good case to examine here. As early as
the stages leading to framing of the Universal Declaration of Human rights in
the UN (1948), there existed controversy regarding the language to be used,
with China prioritizing certain notions and concepts – such as decorum, good
manners, propriety, consideration for others, acting toward others in a spirit
of brotherhood – over others such as the reference to God as the ultimate basis
of universal rights. Needless to say, a common ground was found and the
Declaration was signed and ratified by countries as the core document of our
times supporting universal human rights and as the basis of all subsequent
conventions and international treaties (Glendon 2001; Kohen 2012).

In 1981, China became a member of the UN Human Rights Commission.
A year earlier it had ratified the CEDAW Convention on the elimination of
discrimination against women and in 1981 it joined the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In 1988, it also proceeded to
ratify the Convention against torture (CAT). Since the 1980s, China has
become party and signatory to two thirds of the core international human

rights treaties (Wan 2007: 727). The engagement in international bodies and treaties did not immediately trigger major domestic changes in the realm of domestic policies or institutions promoting human rights. The repression of Tiananmen Square in 1989 probably served as the point of inflexion. Following the international reaction, the ruling elites opted to launch a proactive policy, devoting state resources and encouraging institutions to develop a Chinese policy and conception of human rights, so as to fend off the Western critique. In 1991, the country began to issue annual 'white papers' on human rights, which outline human rights protection policies and address specific issues such as women rights, freedom of religion and minority rights, yet mostly as a means to fend off Western criticisms. Since the 1990s, many conferences have been organized, books and articles on human rights have been published, and centres for human rights established in universities, albeit mostly confined to legal normative rather than to concrete human rights issues. Still, training in human rights has been provided to police, prosecutors and other state officials. Increasingly, partly in connection with the above changes, a movement of right protection or *weiquan* movement has crystallized, not confined to intellectuals or marginalized dissenters, but also integrated by recognized lawyers and journalists (Svensson 2012: 690–1).

Much has changed since the early 1990s, when China started to depart from viewing human rights solely as a bourgeois idea into conceiving it at least as an idea that had to be formally endorsed to be part of the international community. Since then, the legalization of human rights has advanced, and the discourse has gained greater presence in China, albeit with a persistent emphasis on social and economic rights and the collective right to development and sovereignty, which continues to override the recognition of separate individual rights. Indeed, as Ming Wan indicates, "Beijing has used the legal reform, China's membership in international human rights treaties, new laws, and the growing number of lawyers and suits against government as evidence of human rights progress in China." (Wan 2007: 741).

The Chinese involvement in its search for raw materials and other resources in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America can also be seen as a building block in their recognition of the centrality of human rights concerns worldwide. Even though China has not shied away from doing business with governments notorious for human rights abuses such as Sudan, Guinea or Zimbabwe, its economic practices have already generated protests elsewhere. The implications of Chinese investments and business abroad has probably weakened previous attitudes of closure towards the discourse of human rights, prompting the more proactive move towards a position that will not be as easily

discredited and challenged abroad as the previous classist conception of human rights anchored in Marxism.

The professed concern of the Chinese state with social order, harmony and development has been used to claim an alternative understanding of human rights, of universal projection. The professed goals of serving the common good have constituted a source of proactive definition of human rights in legal terms, along with the diffusion of legal actions. Against the background of protest and unrest rooted in socioeconomic gaps, in state officials' authoritarian abuse of power vis-à-vis rank-and-file citizens, such a shift has been the root of dynamic openings and attempts by civil society to press for and obtain justice in areas such as labour and property rights, consumer protection and redress of lower-level bureaucratic abuses.

Denser networks of legal professionals and human rights NGOs became connected with wider social strata, leading also to the vernacularization of the idiom of human rights as a counterbalance to the use and abuse of power in society. In a recent work on the state of human rights in contemporary China, Marina Svensson also calls attention to art, literature and the new media as arenas in which ordinary citizens have voiced their grievances and journalists posted critical reports, embedding the human rights rhetoric in everyday life and often forcing authorities to conduct investigations, thus deepening the quest for effective justice and accountability (Svensson 2012: 696–97).[1]

Another interesting venue of transformation has been the use of international standing and international lawsuits to buttress a position or discredit opponents in factional politics within the ranks of the ruling party. In an article published by the opposition to the CCP abroad reporting on one of the most ferocious repressors of the Falun Gong, Bo Xilai, one finds a paradigmatic example of such use of international developments for intra-party competition. Due to the repressive and brutal measures Bo Xilai adopted in Dalian City and Liaoning Province to eradicate the Falun Gong, he was sued in 13 countries on charges of torture, murder, genocide and crimes against humanity. According to the report (based on a US State Department cable released by

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1   This process is not unique to China and has been documented also in many other societies, albeit that it may unfold in varied forms and domains. In India, for example, individuals have been empowered and attitudes change through participation in local courts. By appearing before the *nari adalats,* modelled after an old judicial forum of a caste or village used for hearing complaints and negotiating solutions between conflicting parties, women have been empowered. Research has witnessed in this connection "innovative ways in which activists use their local knowledge to reshape and reinterpret community idioms, phrases and beliefs to create and persuade the community to adopt new perspectives" (Merry 2006: 47).

Wikileaks), "when Jiang Zemin's faction put Bo forward to be vice-premier and thus in line to succeed Wen Jiabao, Wen objected that given the international lawsuit brought against Bo, he was not an appropriate choice." The argument served in 2007 to sidetrack Bo's rise through the Party hierarchy (Gregory 2012: 4). The broader significance of this case lies in revealing the growing attention that the CCP devotes to the role that the discourse of human rights plays world-wide for China's international standing.

Still, in the domestic arena, until recently, problematic issues continued to be frequently side-lined by the authorities, as they attempt to control the rules of the political and discursive game. Thus, observers have drawn attention to the weak defence system in criminal prosecution, torture, the use of the death penalty, the confinement of dissidents in repressive re-education camps and psychiatric wards, the persecution of religious and minority groups such as the Falun Gong and the Tibetans (Human Rights 2007) or reports of massive organ harvesting of prisoners and underground trade in body parts for profit in China.

Notwithstanding the changes reported above, the gap between the Chinese and the Western interpretations of the international human rights normative on civil and political rights has persisted. Over two decades after the Tiananmen Square crackdown of June 1989, the Chinese state still resented calls for democratization and for individual freedoms. In 2009, Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese writer and human rights activist who called for political reforms and the end of a single-party rule in China, was detained and later convicted on trial and imprisoned for "inciting subversion of state power." He had been connected to a manifesto, the so-called Charter 08, signed by 300 liberal intellectuals and over 7,000 other dissidents, calling on China to opt between authoritarianism and the recognition of universal human rights, a move that would imply "joining the mainstream of civilization and setting up a democracy."

In late 2010, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo, but he was denied the possibility of attending the award ceremony; his wife was placed under house arrest, in addition to the detention, harassment or surveillance of other prominent intellectuals and dissidents; and no celebrations were allowed. China put pressure on other countries, and 15 countries declined to participate in the Nobel Prize ceremony: Besides China, these countries were Russia, Kazakhstan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Venezuela, Egypt, Sudan, Cuba and Morocco. As a counterweight and emphasizing the commitment of the country to its own values, Beijing authorities announced the first celebration of Confucius' birthday since communist rule began. As the international press reported on the eve of the second decade of the twenty-first century, "Conservatives like to contrast what they see as a

Confucian stress on social harmony and moral rectitude with the West's emphasis on individual rights" (Economist 2010: 43).

The internal debate over human rights in China represents a sign of the growing impact of general protest movements on the struggle within the Chinese power elite, and many contemporary Chinese have engaged in many forms of open and subtle protest in demand of a recognition of their rights (e.g. in labour, property and land disputes), as well as calling on the authorities to be accountable, at least in terms of their own proclaimed commitment to social and economic rights and to a stable and harmonious society, which clearly would require the punishment of those abusing their authority.

Following the approach of multiple modernities, the discourse of human rights started to resonate widely. As power elites have moved from rejecting the idiom of human rights to claiming it as intrinsically congruent with their own worldview and visions, we witness a dual process. On the one hand, we see how the Chinese themselves may claim to be carriers of modernity with universal claims. As in the case of Western societies, even if these carriers of modernity may claim universality for their interpretation, the very process of contestation reaffirms the multiplicity of cultural and ideological patterns and modes of institutionalization of visions of human rights. On the other hand, the very shift in the position of the political elites in China has been reflected in the increasing growth of grievances, petitions and protest voiced in ways that fully or partially appropriate the discourse of human rights as anchor to express their demands.

Currently, the discourse of human rights can be expected to be subject to constant struggle and continuous construction and reconstruction in China, *without* being fully shaped by the elites in power. Likewise, we might expect it to burgeon as well, prompted by the debate among different elite factions as they interact and compete for positions of power and to make prevalent their contrasting visions for the country's development and legitimacy. As we saw, the interface of processes of globalization and the Chinese desire to play a central role in the international system have started already to deepen the domestic contestation over the meaning of human rights for the highly diverse society of China. As any other idiom and normative, human rights are deemed to remain fragile as subject to the impact of challenges and objections articulated by countervailing forces in China and grounded in contrasted visions of humanity and social life.

Analysis also suggests how this discourse of global projection has been mediated by local processes and perspectives of legitimacy as well as the actual sociopolitical context of societies reaching out to the global arena. Further assessment

of this thesis is needed by reviewing the process of vernacularization of human rights within societies that have professed to be part of the West. We should refrain from assuming an unproblematic process of adoption, interpretation and implementation of human rights in Western societies. Like in China, albeit in different ways, the discourse of universal human rights has entered some of these societies belatedly and only after major human rights crises. To carry out such inquiry we turn now to the societies of the Southern Cone of the Americas.

### The No-Less Problematic Process in the West: Human Rights in the Southern Cone of the Americas

Vernacularization of human rights in Western societies has also been a more recent process. In Canada, for example, the idiom of human rights permeated society only after the mid-1970s, when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau decided to use it as a means for the federal government to gain greater ascendancy over the provincial governments (Gagnon & Tanguay 1992). In the US, while eventually successful, the struggle for civil rights diminished the relevance of the alternative discourse of human rights, which did not attain the same extent of cultural resonance (Asad 2000). In Latin America, individual rights and freedoms were recognized very early on in the foundational charters and laws of the countries, yet overshadowed for close to two centuries by the laws of emergency that these states equally recognized and implemented so often due to situations of unrest, instability and violence (Loveman 1993; Sznajder & Roniger 2009).

The growing international status of the discourse of human rights is not the best indicator of a generalized acceptance of this vision at the level of societies. The varied extent of vernacularization of the vision of human rights has been the result of different historical experiences. Vernacularization has evolved in multiple forms, related to the distinct paths in which the abuse of power or repression in any particular society have started to be conceptualized in terms of human rights violations; the ways in which elites have engaged in a wider dialogue with global trends; and the ways in which global idioms have resonated with local meanings. The particular circumstances in which this process took place have coloured differently the ways in which societies have started endorsing the view that there are certain acts that should not be committed against any human being and certain treatment that any human being deserves irrespective of where s/he lives; and that certain actions can be defined as human rights violations and as such remain accountable, and can

be defined as crimes against humanity and as such, will be imprescriptible (Wilson 1997).

Since the institutional and cultural context that favours or prevents such transformation has varied from one society to another, it is essential to study contexts of incorporation of human rights specifically and preferably within a comparative-historical framework. For societies such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay or Brazil, the passage from a condescending view of repression as a correlate of a class-divided and conflict-ridden society to be orderly ruled, even by violence, towards a vision that views repression in terms of human rights violations, only began during the last cycle of authoritarian rule. During that period, mainly from the late 1960s to the early 1980s – with variations according to each case – that policies of systematic repression justified in the name of guarding the common good, became contested and delegitimized, leading to a deeper confrontation and debate in society, particularly once democracy had been restored (Roniger & Sznajder 1999, especially: 51–108; Roniger 2012a).

During the last transition to democracy in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, the discourse of human rights – conceived as inalienable individual rights – was *and at the same time was not* an innovation in the local political culture. It was not a new idea, as these nations had adopted sophisticated legal systems enshrining freedoms and liberties in the nineteenth century. Their constitutions often recognized explicitly a long series of legal freedoms and guarantees, as reflected in the figures of habeas corpus and *amparo* that they adopted. In the twentieth century, these nations joined international organizations, signed and ratified international treaties, and made a formal commitment to respect a wide range of human rights.

At the same time, the discourse of human rights had not become deeply rooted in society beyond the formal level of legal recognition. In Argentina, for example, before the period of military rule and repression known as the PRN or National Reorganization Process (1976–83), neither the armed and security forces, nor the Leftist groups willing to carry out a socialist revolution recognized the primacy of human rights as a fundamental marker of public life. Although most elites and social strata were aware of the existence of legal rights, they did not attribute deep significance to human rights. Rather, many saw that discourse as an idiom that could be manipulated and subordinated to their political strategies and projects, be they those of the revolution, as was the case of the Left, or the maintenance of a certain socioeconomic order, as was the case of the right-wing forces. It is significant to see testimonies of guerrilla leaders of the 1960s and 1970s, who were proud of sending activists to face a certain death, provided their martyrdom would contribute to social

sympathy with their political struggle (e.g. the oral testimony of Mario Eduardo Firmenich, leader of the Montoneros in Pigna 1996).[2]

In the framework of ideological polarization, unfulfilled expectations and rising protest, South American democracies begun to crumble in the 1960s and 1970s. Violence was supported across the political spectrum and elites moved to expect and press for the increasing intervention of the security and armed forces to impose order. Violence became almost a basic mode of interaction between political groups and between them and the security forces, while non-partisan sensitivity to human rights violations developed, albeit unevenly, within civil society. In this sense, the foundation of what would become systematic repression and legacies of human rights violations can be traced back to the tacit routinization of widespread violence in everyday life. Based on the Brazilian experience, anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes raises this very issue, prompting the future need of these societies to confront their tarnished self-image and conduct a deep review of consciousness as they emerged from authoritarianism and would have preferred to close the book on the past:

> What if the public routinization of daily mortifications and little abominations, piling up like so many corpses on the social landscape, provided the text and blueprint for what only appeared later to be aberrant, inexplicable and extraordinary outbreaks of state violence against citizens?
>
> SCHEPER-HUGHES 1992: 220

As for the armed and security forces, they developed doctrines of National Security in the framework of the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War. Assisted by the US, which trained many Southern Cone officers through the School of the Americas, these doctrines were based on the premises of counter-insurgency, geopolitics and an organicist vision of national unity and development. From this perspective, the popular movements were perceived as fully identified with communism, the international enemy at that time. In their work, Carina Perelli and David Pion-Berlin highlighted various sources of inspiration for such doctrines centralizing the need for security and public order. The security forces of these countries were equally inspired by views

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2  National Reorganization Process (*Proceso de Reorganización Nacional*, PRN) was the name the Argentine military commanders chose to define the mandate of their rule, as they aimed to establish a new model of social organization. This model was based on popular demobilization and an induced or forced consensus, sustained with repression of any 'subversive elements' and a brutal war against the 'enemy within'. The PRN covers the period from the military coup of March 1976 to the return to democracy in December 1983.

developed in France and the United States to justify their strategies in conflicts in Algeria and Vietnam, respectively. Of course, there were local peculiarities; in Argentina and Brazil the French doctrine of counter-insurgency in a revolutionary war was most influential, as retired French veterans of the Algerian War like Colonel Roger Trinquier were invited to give courses for military officers. According to the view adumbrated by such instructors, the enemy sought not just to take over the state and territory, but rather to dominate the spirit of the population, by making use of countless methods going beyond the conventional use of force. When combined with translation of Nazi textbooks such as *The Total War* by Von Ludendorf, used in Argentine military academies, the result was catastrophic, as these ideas soon transformed the annihilation of subversives into essential for the restoration of national integrity. Thus, even before massive atrocities were committed systematically, polarization progressively identified anyone who was a political activist, leftist sympathizer or dissident of all kinds, with an internal enemy that had to be eradicated (Pion-Berlin 1988; Perelli 1993; Roniger & Sznajder 1999: 18–19).

It is important to realize that when the repressive and genocidal policies were launched in the 1970s and 1980s there was no initial attempt to confront human rights at the level of principles, but rather arguments were used that tied those policies on pragmatic grounds to the goal of restoring public order and achieving a greater common good. In the framework of the Cold War, this was sustained by Manichean ideological arguments, as typical of the geopolitical thought of the time. Illustrative is the testimony of retired Captain Adolfo F. Scilingo about the atrocities he witnessed and participated in, including the flights from which people were launched with heavy loads to their certain death and disappearance at sea:

> Nobody liked it. It was not a pleasant thing. But we did it. It was understood that this was the best way, nobody argued. It was something that was made for the supreme good of the country, a supreme act […]. In the organization, all of us who were subordinate to the naval command believed orders were serious and consistent. But after [the transition] the truth is hidden. Why people hide it? It only makes sense if you did something wrong.
>
> VERBITSKY 1995: 32, 42

Resulting from political polarization, economic crises, widespread violence and ineffective democratic authorities, the promise of restored public security was seen as a highly attractive pragmatic option. Yet, in the eyes of those proclaiming to take power to save the nation, pragmatism meant the 'sacrifice'

of individuals for the sake of the collective. Supported by various ideological justifications and denials, broad sectors of the public supported this move into systematic repression and an authoritarian culture of fear, while claiming to ignore its occurrence and largely failing to question its moral base (Suárez Orozco 1990, 1992; Sábato 1994).

Expectations to restore social order allowed authorities to tip the balance of public support towards authoritarian governments and regimes that were determined to reshape societies while adopting a conditional view of human individuality. Human life could be sacrificed for the sake of a supposed generalized well-being. It was a deadly combination of pragmatic considerations and totalizing visions of internal enemies lurking in the dark as they planned to destroy the 'soul' of the nation. This narrative of salvation of the nation operated even when, as in some cases, the guerrillas had been defeated before the military proceeded to carry out policies of systematic violations of human rights (See the testimonies and debates in Autores varios 1985: esp. 15–18, 74–75).

Under political cultures glorifying the principles of order and authority and subject to increasing protest, destabilization and violence, such interpretations led inexorably to massive human rights violations: thousands were detained or abducted, sent to concentration camps without due legal procedures, kept incommunicado, tortured physically and psychologically, and many of them assassinated and their remains disposed of so that no trace of them remains. Hundreds of thousands had to flee the countries, smuggling across borders or sometimes through territorial and diplomatic asylum. Almost automatically, an arrest implied that the detainee was guilty and thus subject to torture and abuse of all kinds, to make him confess and give the names of other subversives. Repression involved the summary executions and disappearances of thousands of human beings, a phenomenon whose veracity is recognized today, thanks to human rights organizations, to the work of investigating committees and the sociopolitical dynamics that, from time to time, generated testimonies on this dark historical chapter, also leading later on to trials of perpetrators of human rights violations (Sznajder & Roniger 1999; Roniger 2011a).

The human rights issue acquires deeper meanings only when those affected by repression and exile, supported by networks of solidarity and advocacy, confronted the rhetoric of the military governments or militarized civilian governments (as in Central America and Uruguay) and challenged their moral foundations. It was only while addressing the legacies of massive human rights violations that these societies had to reflect on why such violence and abuses had taken place in their midst.

Most Latin American societies undergoing massive repression, executions and exile had known violence, even massive violence, before. What was new at this stage was that unlike past repression, this time there were no class distinctions to prevent some from suffering the severe brutality of the enforcers of order. Members of the middle classes, intellectuals, academics and professionals were all victims of repression, as well as working class people who were targeted massively. Secondly, the repressive governments had to face an emerging sensibility to such atrocities, made known by the networks of exiles, committees of solidarity and new international NGOs that promulgated internationally the moral vector of human rights threatening to delegitimize the home governments. The novelty of the human rights cause then erupts as a cornerstone in the realization of citizens that they have a new instrument of struggle against the home repressive governments, as is evident from the following testimonies, based on interviews conducted after the return to democracy:

> Unfortunately the dictatorship had to come here to start talking about torture, about arbitrary detention and all that kind of stuff. [...] Even before whoever had a commitment to work with the most forgotten [...] the street children, the female prostitutes [knew]. Through this reality I knew that human rights were violated, that female prostitutes were subject to ill-treatment, torture, outrages of all kinds, as were the street children [...] The problem deepened when they targeted college students, that is when they stopped respecting the middle class [who became a target also of massive human rights violations].
>
> FR. LUIS PÉREZ AGUIRRE, interviewed in Montevideo, 14 July 1995

Human rights then moved from an abstract concept into a vernacular discourse, contested and debated with a wider impact than ever before. This transformation was operated only in the 1970s and 1980s due to the combined effect of two factors. For once, only then – during that wave of democratic breakdown and onset of authoritarian regimes throughout the region – what previously had been a format of repression applied along class-lines was replaced by a generalized use of violence also targeting social sectors that, until then, had been immune to the violence used to keep the lower classes 'in their place'. This shift combined with a second factor: the discovery by both 'insiles' and exiles of the strong support of emergent coalitions for human rights that would give international resonance to their claims and bring about condemnation of the home governments and their repressive policies.

The process was uneven and took time for activists to fully embrace it. Initially, as traced in Vania Markarian's research on Uruguayan political exiles, most sustained their previous revolutionary positions and rhetoric in terms of class struggle and revolutionary war against the bourgeoisie and its henchmen, the military. They did not believe in the 'humanitarian lamentations' and purely informative activities of the human rights groups and organizations. They still believed that the traditional forms of resistance in Uruguay would bring them to victory. That position was coherent with a belief in total confrontation between the people and the repressive classes and the need for violence, total dedication and sacrifice while engaged in class war. Addressing human rights NGOs, international organizations and groups of humanitarian and charitable activists in the developed world was perceived as a sign of revolutionary weakness and possibly falling into the many traps set by Western imperialism. It also implied a profound lack of belief in the workings of civil society and liberal democracy. It would take time to slowly open to the rising transnational discourse of human rights, a process that operated similarly among other Latin Americans (Markarian 2005, 2006; Roniger & Kierszenbaum 2005). The discourse of human rights thus entered the minds of those exiled activists tactically, to gather support for their cause; yet, progressively, it turned into a principled commitment that was projected as a moral banner delegitimizing the home authoritarian governments.

The political character of this process of vernacularization rooted in the interface of domestic groups, external Diasporas, and the important role of networks of solidarity, particularly at the centres of Western power, had some shortcomings, which would become clear after these societies democratized. First, it implied that in some cases, such as Chile, the discourse of human rights would soon become politicized and, as such, seen as the arsenal of just part of society, suspected by another sector of society or supported half-heartily by them. For instance, years after the transition, people had still to ponder whether to use the idiom of human rights as they attempted to promote issues of human rights:

> Human rights are a relatively new theme. Neither Chile nor Latin America had a history [of deep reflection on human rights]. Here in Chile and Latin America, it is important to consider that what is at stake is not to recover something that was lost. It is about creating something that has never existed. [The fact that human rights were politically pressed on society] often forces me to avoid using the term human rights in public meetings, and to seek some other alternative term. Since [it is so politically charged], the term of human rights seems to lose convincing value.
>
> DR. ISAAC FRENKEL, interviewed in Santiago, 17 July 1995

Secondly, policies had to be devised in ways that would balance between the explosive and challenging status of human rights and their potential for destabilization, clearly seen in those cases in which the armed forces retained their power through the transition and thus threatened the new democracies if the political elites would carry out policies of accountability. It has not been unusual therefore to see these elites enacting laws intended to prevent bringing perpetrators to trial and to prefer symbolic gestures as long as possible. Even in the case of Argentina, in which the armed forces left power in a haste driven by the economic debacle and the defeat of the Malvinas-Falkland War in 1982, the initial forceful policies of truth and justice of 1984–85 were soon replaced by laws of Final Point (December 1986) and Due Obedience (June 1987), followed by the end of judicial procedures and presidential pardons by 1989 and 1990. Argentina had to wait until the early 2000s to see a new forceful push towards accountability for those responsible for the legacy of human rights violations. Similarly, Uruguay and Brazil did not carry out official inquiries into state violence during authoritarianism until much later. Chile preserved for many years the comprehensive legal framework of immunity of 1978 inherited from Pinochet. Uruguayan civilian elites kept the terms of the transition agreed with the military in the Naval Club pact of 1984 and issued in December 1986 a Law of Expiry that, despite being challenged by popular consultations twice (in 1989 and 2009), remained in force until October 2011. Only about 25 years after the transition did parliament manage to issue an interpretive law that recognized some of the acts committed by the repressors as crimes against humanity and, as such, imprescriptible (Roniger 2011a, 2012b). Yet, as recently as February 2012 the Supreme Court of Uruguay declared that this new legal instrument was flawed, opening debate and the wounds of the past once again.

Throughout the Southern Cone, there have been stages of advance and regression in the policies drafted to reach an agreed upon version of the past, to create a base for accountability and justice, give reparations and compensation to victims and perhaps expect expiation from those who committed atrocities. This is in addition to the reforming of institutions, changing of school curricula to incorporate the grim period as part of historical memory and eradicating the recourse to violence when facing new challenges such as a sense of rising criminality. Often a stage of regression opened up following progressive moves, only opened again as the result of transnational crises and pressures from the international community. Elsewhere we have analyzed that crises in one society triggered a chain-effect in neighbouring societies. Of course, they shared language and cultural and institutional backgrounds that made societies sensitive to developments in the sister nations. Facing the

same issues, societies were prone to look at what the others did to face new challenges. Moreover, six of these societies (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) had cooperated in the framework of the Cold War in persecuting Leftist activists across borders and cooperating in the abduction, torture and assassination of other countries' citizens who had escaped to their territories. Following democratization, it was only natural that any revelation in one country could have repercussions in the others, either because it touched an open nerve in the domain of human rights or because some of its own nationals were implicated in the events that ensued in the neighbouring state (Sznajder & Roniger 1999).

It has taken years, in many cases decades, to fully achieve justice and for the mantle of impunity to erode. What is important to remember is that through the tug-of-war between various interpretations of the past and the various attempts to close the book on these issues, a deeper understanding of human rights has been reached. The passage of time has also weakened the stance of the supporters of past repressive governments; some of the top commanders leading repressive rule – such as General Pinochet in Chile or Admiral Massera in Argentina – have passed away, shaping a sense of unfulfilled justice among human rights organizations and activists. Others, however, including civilians who have condoned the repressive policies, as in Uruguay, have stood trial and have been convicted, giving a new sense of accountability for past actions.[3] Yet, what is even more important is that due to the combined interface between the international community and local organizations and movements the discourse of human rights has deepened its significance and vernacular resonance for many sectors in these societies (Roniger 2011a).

While still anchored in civil and political connotations, the confrontation and debates over past human rights violations have also deepened and widened the hold of such discourse. In recent years, Latin American societies have moved the discourse of human rights to redefine the meanings of justice and relate them also to human development and dignity, and to the politics of recognition. In this respect, Latin American countries are undergoing dramatic transformations. Challenges are currently underway in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, in which the Liberal procedural system of individual entitlements has been placed under increasing pressures and internal debate derived from an increased move to a politics of recognition, which seem to be 'racializing' or 'ethnicizing' collective entitlements as part of new linkages between the politics of justice and a politics of recognition (Lehmann 2013). Likewise, even

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3   Even though some of those convicted individuals are too old or feeble to spend time in
    prison.

societies such as those of Central America or Bolivia, which until recently were rather monistic in their project of nationhood and accordingly marginalized parts of their populations, have started shifting towards more inclusive and even pluri-national definitions, in some cases under the impact of new social movements and in others as resulting from elite decisions (Roniger 2011b).

### Methodological Observations

In terms of discourse analysis, human rights may be defined as a 'second order category'. That is, they emerge only through the mediation of conceptual categories. The following discussion focuses on human rights violations, yet it has general implications for the entire realm of human rights.

Every human being can witness an act of violence (a first order category), yet the act can be interpreted and conceptualized in varied ways, i.e. as a common crime or a human rights violation. When violence occurs and is interpreted as a human rights violation, there is a double transformation: human rights are recognized as a relevant conceptual category; namely, the particular act is subsumed within a general framework and, in parallel, it is suggested that such an act is a transgression of a recognizable norm of universal applicability. Conversely, suppose for a moment that the witness of an act of violence does not consider human rights to have universal scope, or considers them part of a political agenda that s/he does not share, such an individual will not attribute to them a real or effective sense.

It is therefore important to remember that an act of violence or abusive power starts an interpretive process, extending from the level of observation and experience into its encoding, sometimes in terms of human rights violations, but at the same time, that such projection may be denied. The rules of the interpretive processes are shaped by the specific social, political and cultural environment, in multiple forms.

Whoever observes an act of violence can also generate a number of concepts of a 'third order', further removed from the act. That is, while the social actors may conceptualize the act in a second-order category such as human rights violations, observers or researchers may also engage in its contextualization. That is, they may analyze the context in which the act occurred, explaining it as a product of social forces and power structures, death squads and guerrillas, the militarization of society or other parameters.

Encoding observed behaviour and contextualizing it are two separate, though not mutually exclusive, strategies. However, confusing the two strategies of meaning-making may create misunderstandings, such as the sometimes

visceral reaction on the part of those who are morally opposed to human rights violations towards those who may search for explanations without putting forward moral terms of opprobrium.

The interpretive processes of encoding and contextual analysis can be followed in parallel. In both cases, social actors 'translate' as it were what happened, which is open to disagreements and contestation. It is only through their interpretation and attribution of meaning that events become encoded and contextualized by a series of agents, which include the press and the media, the staff of international organizations and vernacular NGOs, the police and the domestic judicial system, as well as researchers making sense of the social and historical contexts.

These are extremely important in the glocalization of a universal discourse on human rights. While the path of legal justice or the joint work of justice and truth commissions is central to the institutional treatment of massive human rights violations, it is important to pay equal attention to the parallel process of sedimentation carried out by the work of journalists, historians, social scientists, social workers and human rights agencies, as well as the various agents contesting the manifestations of abusive power in various societies.[4]

The work of all these agents, the testimony of those who have suffered or participated in actions disregarding human rights, is fundamental for the effective establishment of human rights. Only the making-meaning process led by autonomous social actors and the overcoming of the various sources of resistance through debate and dialogue can enable a full transition from witnessing violence to recognizing universal human rights, differentiating between common crimes and human rights violations, expanding the scope of offences that fall under the category of such violations and defining the circumstances and means of justifying such attribution of meaning.[5]

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4   I emphasize this point because there are those who stress rather exclusively the legal path as the road of a substantive anchoring of human rights in societies. Still, no less important is a series of alternative ways of encoding, analysis and moral engagement with acts of violence such as those that shape legacies of human rights violations.

5   For example, there are types of structural violence and state violence that definitely create human rights violations. Likewise, unintended state violence affects human rights. How to interpret the character of civil defense violence targeting peasants or the violent struggles between peasants? How to categorize terrorist violence? Does the above fit as actions that violate human rights? Is there any way to distinguish when one type of violence is disguised into another, as when state violence masquerades as common crime? What interpretation should be given to political attacks? How to connect victimhood and the act of violence itself? On some of these problems and issues see Roniger 2015.

### Conclusions

The reception of human rights in their contemporary vision is played on two interconnected levels. It is anchored at the international level, but also at the level of societies, where social developments, economic cycles and political challenges can lead to accelerated recognition or can retract the reception of a universal vision of human rights. From the point of view of social science, the crucial question is what is the specific module of incorporation and decantation of the vision and discourse of human rights. Such a module of reception often determines the scope, depth and breadth that such rights effectively have in a given society and historical period.

Following the hindsight of multiple modernities, this work stresses that there are varied ways of vernacular incorporation of the universal discourse of human rights. Social sciences can contextualize these multiple forms of incorporation and glocalization of the human rights discourse without giving up its universal relevance in favour of an epistemic or moral relativism. Another way of expressing this idea is to stress that human rights depend on both social cultural support and the interactions between international forces and societies and state structures whose power is needed to make human rights effective. Otherwise, a society, a state or a political class in power may profess to support universal human rights while in fact preventing their effective implementation in terms of political stability, a raison d'état, or in the name of culture and national sovereignty.

Human rights are an open-ended project for humankind, a project that, in order to crystallize beyond legal documents, requires a dialogue and respect of multiple visions and paths of recognition and vernacular resonance, as envisaged by a perspective of multiple modernities.

# Theorizing of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979: The Multiple Contexts of the Iranian Revolution

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### Introduction

Revolutions are complex phenomena. They are structured in the societies that give birth to them. They are characterized by unexpected changes in the revolutionary process itself. Their long-term consequences can possibly only be understood in their totality after generations. In the following, the focus will be on the rise of new Islamic 'nationalist' based political ideology with related social forces as a result of structural changes under the modern authoritarian regime of the Pahlavi Shahs (1921–1979).

The Iranian Islamic Revolution was one of the most complex revolutions of the twentieth century. Never before had a modern revolution of such depth taken place since the disintegration of the Islamic Empires of Ottoman, Persia and Mughal-India.

The movement, under the leadership of the *ulama* (Islamic clergy) and their Islamic ideology and traditional religious institutions, such as mosques, allowed the leaders to assert themselves against one of the strongest regimes of the 'Third World' with a distinguished but repressive state apparatus (military and secret service). In 1978, millions of Iranians demonstrated to put an end to the secular authoritarian state of the Shah.

A comprehensive literature exists on the causes and nature of the Iranian Islamic revolution. Still, a number of controversial issues have not yet been clarified completely. Also, the theorizing of the revolution has still to be regenerated.

The specific characteristics of the Iranian revolution are, of course, to be explained first of all in terms of the background of Iranian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its political traditions, social and economic development, especially under the impact of Western capitalism and imperialism, and the mode of its incorporation into the emerging world capitalist system.

Mohammad Reza Shah came to power in Iran after the forced abdication of his father Reza Shah in 1941 by the Allied forces, Britain and Russia, because of

his friendly relationship with the Germans. Although Iran had declared its neutrality in the Second World War, the Allied forces occupied the country. The removal of Reza Shah set free many social forces that had been repressed during his reign. Social and political affairs became highly confused due to class and religious antagonism and because it was unclear which political institutions – the *majlis* (parliament established by the 1906 constitution), the cabinet, the court or other social groups or movements – had effective political power. Nevertheless, the occupation by the Allied forces and the Shah's removal led to a break with the authoritarian regime and a semi-restoration of the constitutional order. A free press was reintroduced and many new political parties were established. But political freedom was not the only outcome of the occupation of Iran and the regime change. The Second World War and the occupation resulted in an economic and social crisis in Iran. Socioeconomic unrest contributed to an intensification of political activities and a political crisis, which was the characteristic feature of the period between 1941 and 1953. This period ended with the United States-backed military coup in 1953 against the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddeq and with the suppression of oppositional social forces.[1]

After the coup, another authoritarian state with state-led modernization and industrialization was established under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah with the economic and financial support of the US.

Initially, the Shah tried to consolidate his power through an alliance with the big landowners and the *ulama*. From a strategic point of view the state had no need of the traditional social forces. The process of modernization threatened the needs of the traditional social forces and, ultimately, would bring about a confrontation between the Shah and these groups. The stabilization of the regime and the comprehensive modernization from above – known as the 'White Revolution' and later as the 'Revolution of the Shah and the people'[2] – which was supported by the US and was accompanied by an intensive secular nationalist, anti-Islamic propaganda, resulted in an antagonism

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1 For the role of the US in the coup of 1953, see the US-National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No.28; 'The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953'. George Washington University [www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/iran/]; see also M.J. Gasiorowski & M. Byrne (eds.) (2004).

2 Approved in 1963 through an almost unanimous referendum, the White Revolution originally consisted of a six-point program to break up the old landlordism structure and create the foundations for a modern industrial society. The land reform was the cornerstone for industrialization.

between the *ulama* and the state (see Keddie 1981; Akhavi 1980; Abrahamian 1982; Amineh 1999).

Different social forces reacted to the doctrine of the White Revolution, particularly the landlord class, the *ulama*, the *bazaar* and segments of the secular oppositional parties. The latter were organized in the National Front. The land reform and the policies of the White Revolution constituted a threat to landlordism. The *ulama* saw their influence undermined, among others, by the comprehensive modernization program and by the voting right for women. For the traditional economic sector – the *bazaaris* – the reforms were a sign of intervention into their commercial activities, threatening the autonomy of the *bazaar*[3] (see Abrahamian 1982; Keddie 1995; Akhavi 1980).

The discontent of the religious community and the economic and political crisis led to a revolt in June 1963, which had been proclaimed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989). The revolt was brutally suppressed by the military. The leaders of the National Front were arrested and Ayatollah Khomeini was banished to Turkey. Later he went to Iraq (Katouzian 1981).


### The Historical Background of the Iranian Revolution

The origins of Islam as a political ideology and praxis can be traced back to the nineteenth century and the gradual expansion of European capitalism and its corresponding civilization in the Islamic lands of the Ottomans, Persians and Indians. Proclaiming an Islamic order by a segment of Islamic intellectuals, *ulama*, and traditional economic forces was a response to the marginalization or subordination of these traditional social forces in the industrialized-based social order.

The expansion of European capitalism with corresponding civilization had two dialectical effects in the Iranian social structures. First, it resulted in a gradual convergence of Iranian social structures and European capitalism and civilization. This convergence manifested itself during the rule of the Qajar Empire (1786–1921) in socio-political and economic modernization and reforms of the military, bureaucracy, tax system, the consolidation of private property, the emergence of a modern intelligentsia, and in a gradual process of transition of

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3   From the Safavid Empire (1501–1722) the *bazaar* has played a key role in the urban economy. The *bazaar* includes the urban production of small goods, traditional artisans, the traditional bank and trade system, and the wholesale trade. The *bazaar* was not only the centre of economic transactions but also the centre of the community. The *bazaar* areas had mosques, public baths, religious schools and many teahouses.

the empire to a modern nation state, which started with the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) in the early twentieth century. Second, it resulted in a gradual divergence at the cultural level. This means that the expansion of European capitalism and its ideological and cultural consequences caused not only an economic but also a cultural and/or religious reaction. In particular, the traditional, urban economic sector of the *bazaar* felt threatened by Western economic penetration. In other words, the reassertion of the *ulama*, who were threatened by the rising Western influence was accompanied with the reaction of the *bazaar* to Western economic penetration. The *ulama* were representatives of traditional culture and received important power positions as a result of this conjuncture of interaction. Maintaining Islam in this conjuncture was an eruption of nationalism (See Browne 1910; Keddie 1981).

The *ulama* supported this development and subsequently strengthened the domestic culture and the national consciousness: "Nationalism manifested itself in terms of Islam and Islam in terms of nationalism." In general, early Iranian nationalism emerged at a time of rapid socio-political and economic changes. It was the result of the 'limited' reforms from above carried out under the Qajar Empire as a response to European expansion. Socially, it was founded on the traditional economic sector around the *bazaar*, which was subordinated by Western economic penetration. Culturally, it was upheld by the religious institutions, which assumed a new power position. The result was the strengthening of local culture and national consciousness formulated in terms of Islam. Thus, it was a combination of traditional economic (*bazaar*) and ideological (*ulama*) forces,[4] and the modern intelligentsia that created the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) in the early twentieth century as a nationalist, anti-absolutist movement, and as a response to foreign intervention in Iran (See Abrahamian 1982; Akhavi 1980; Arjoman 1989).

The introduction of a parliamentary-based constitution in 1906 following the Western model (particularly the 1830 Belgian constitution) destroyed the traditional absolutist power of the Shah and resulted in the recognition of the position of the *ulama* as the sovereigns of Islamic law. The *ulama* became representatives of a segment of the domestic nationalist movement (see Browne 1910; Enayat 1982; Keddie 1981). Although internal discord and especially an Anglo-Russian invasion ended this experiment in 1911, the constitution

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4  The *bazaar* depended on the *ulama* for political support while the *ulama* depended on the *bazaar* for financial support to finance their mosques, seminars and other religious institutions. The *bazaaris* and the *ulama* were also connected through family ties. This interdependence was crucial for the political developments in Iran at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.

remained until a new regime replaced it in 1979. At the same time, the lack of modern material conditions for the making of a liberal and constitutional based social order after the Constitutional Revolution created the main background for the rise of the modern authoritarian regime of Reza Shah with its state-led modernization strategy.

Nationalist and democratic sentiment grew during the great destruction of the First World War, when Iran was used as a battlefield by several powers. A number of local social movements expressed these feelings immediately after the war. Reza Shah entered the government after a coup in 1921 and became Shah with the support of the Islamic and secular nationalist forces in 1925. He created the Pahlavi dynasty and inaugurated 50 years of intensive and rapid state-led modernization in a traditional and fragmented society within a mainly rural or nomadic-tribal country. Culturally, the Pahlavi shahs stressed the nationalism that admired pre-Islamic Iran, which was a way of bringing in Western-style modernization.

But, what were the socio-political and economic conditions for the development of a new type of *ulama* and a revolutionary Islam as dominant political ideology that ultimately developed into the determining force of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1978–79?

With the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini as irreconcilable opponent of the Shah's regime and initiator of the revolt of 1963, a new type of Khomeini inspired *ulama* and a new type of *tulab* (religious students) gradually developed. The members of this new group formed the nucleus of the militant *ulama*, who would later become the leaders of the Islamic revolution and the initiators of the Islamic state under the leadership of Khomeini. The reformulation of the Shia political doctrine as revolutionary doctrine was a gradual process starting after the coup of 1953 and reaching its height in the 1960s and 1970s. This process, which came to be known as *ehyay-e fekr-e dini* (the revival of religious thought), was the intellectual origin of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1978–79.

It is interesting to note that the so called 'Islamic fundamentalist' movement made use of the cultural, political and scientific values of modern Iran, which had been the product of the long-term Western-style process of modernization. In fact, the influence of the modern Iranian secular political culture and language on the thinking of the religious reformers was remarkable in this period. Part of the project 'revival of religious thought' was the reform of traditional, religious thought and of the value system as well as the adaptation to the modern Iranian politics and culture. Those social scientists and the media who consider the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Islamic movement to be 'Islamic fundamentalist' or 'traditionalist' know little about how the

mechanisms of Khomeni's theory of the *velayat-e faqih* (the guardianship of the jurist) and the *hokumat-e islami* (Islamic state/government) and the radical Islamic political ideology of the laymen and intelligentsia came about. Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic theory was actually a revision and renewal of Shia political thought and has to be seen as a new phenomenon – the roots of this theory are to be found in the combination of the context of the social, political, economic, and cultural history of modern Iran analyzed above – with the dynamics that developed in the Islamic civilizations.

### The Civilizational Background of the Iranian Revolution

In order to understand fully the Iranian Islamic Revolution's place in world history and on the contemporary world scene, it is necessary to put it in several comparative contexts – namely, those of the Great Revolutions (Eisenstadt 2005c), of the dynamics of Axial civilizations and, of course, of the Islamic civilization (Eisenstadt 1986; Arnason, Eisenstadt & Wittrock 2005), not to mention the vicissitudes of the expansion of modernity, above all in the contemporary era (Eisenstadt 2005c: chs. 16 and 17).

The Iranian revolution shared several basic characteristics with the Great modern revolutions (English-Puritan (Cromwell), American, French, Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese) as well as, to a large extent, also with the Kemalist one; namely, the combination of: downfall changes of regimes; new principles of political legitimation; changes in class structures, closely connected within new modes of political economy; the promulgation of a distinct cosmology; and the concomitant establishment of its 'modern' institutional regime. It is this last characteristic that distinguishes it from some of the changes that occurred in earlier times, which have often been designated as revolutions – in particular from the Abbasid takeover of the Caliphate, often called the Abbasid Revolution (Sharon 1983; Shaban 1990). It also shared with those revolutions – again in contrast to the Abbasid case – some of their basic 'causes' and historical frameworks. It shared with them the constellations of inter-elite and inter-class struggles, the development of new social groups and economic forces, which are blocked from access to power, as well as economic turbulences and the impact of international forces – all of which weaken the preceding regimes. It shared too (and, in this respect, also with the Abbasid revolution) specific civilizational frameworks; namely, those of Axial civilizations, with very strong – although certainly not exclusive – this-worldly orientation. That is to say, Axial civilizations in which the political realm was conceived as a

major arena for the implementation of the predominant transcendental vision of utopian reconstruction and in which, accordingly, the sectarian and heterodox tendencies, which are inherent in Axial civilizations, focus to a major extent on the reconstitution of the political realm. It shared also with these revolutions the specific historical circumstances in which they developed; namely, those of early modernity – conceived in typological and not chronological terms – characterized by the development of the contradictions inherent in their own legitimation of modernizing autocratic regimes, especially the contradiction between the development of many new modernized economic and professional classes. But, they were also denied any political autonomy, any autonomous access to the political centre – access that is inherent or implicit in the ideologies promulgated by these regimes. At the same time, wide sectors of the peasant and urban population were uprooted – in the Iranian scene in a rather typical 'Third World' way, pushing them into city slums. It shared also with the other revolutions, but in contrast to the Abbasid revolution, the transformation of 'traditional' sectarian orientations and activities into modern revolutionary ones – above all, Jacobin tendencies.[5] As in the other revolutions, the central place of intellectual, religious groups, i.e. the Shia clergy, played a crucial role in the revolutionary process, seemingly very similar to the role played by the Puritans in the English Civil War. Just like these movements, it developed many, but rather distinctive, 'fundamentalist' analytical characteristics, the most important of which has been the attempt to bring the Kingdom of God to the Kingdom of Earth by political means – by the transformation of man and society according to their respective pristine visions, which were often promulgated in scriptural terms; to transform the mundane through political means, thus sanctifying the political arena and making it more autonomous – far beyond what existed in the historical setting. While these visions necessarily differ in their concrete definitions, according to their religious premises and the visions of collective identity of different movements, they vary among different Islamist movements and between them and other such movements. Yet, they all share these basic characteristics – their Iranian Jacobin orientations.

Paradoxically, both the fundamentalist and the 'secular' Jacobin movements have deep roots, as Besançon (1981) and Voegelin (1987) have shown, in the extreme, often gnostic, heterodoxies of their respective religious traditions. The Great Revolutions constituted the culmination and concretization of the

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5   On the Jacobin component of modern revolutions and its religious roots, see A. Besançon (1981), S.N. Eisenstadt (1999a) and E. Voegelin (1987).

sectarian heterodox potentialities, which developed in these Axial civilizations, especially in those in which the political arena was defined as at least one of the arenas of implementation of their transcendental vision. The first Great Revolutions constituted the first – or, at least, the most dramatic – and possibly the most successful attempt in the history of mankind to implement on a macro-societal scale the heterodox visions with strong gnostic components that sought to bring the Kingdom of God to earth, and which were often promulgated in medieval and early modern European Christianity by different heterodox sects. In all these revolutions, such sectarian activities emerged from marginal or segregated sectors of society and became interwoven not only with rebellions, popular uprisings and movements of protest, but also with the political struggle at the centre. They were transposed into the central political arenas and the centres thereof. Themes and symbols of protest became a basic component of the central social and political symbolism of the new regimes.

At the same time, we must take into account that the Iranian revolution – just like the Kemalist and the Chinese or Vietnamese revolutions – developed in a non-Christian setting; but, unlike the latter revolutions it promulgated a distinctive anti-Enlightenment, seemingly anti-modern ideology – the central core of which was an Islamic vision rooted in the dynamics and themes of Islamic civilizations, at the same time transforming them into radical modern fundamentalist Jacobin ones.

Like the late Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese and Kemalist revolutions, the Iranian revolution also developed in the context of the expansion of modernity of the modern capitalist system and imperial capitalism. It built on many of the structural and organizational aspects of modernity – especially, of course, in the use of the media and modern organizational methods for the mobilization of the masses. It was also fully imbued with some of the institutional and ideological premises of modernity. Not only did it adapt such modern political institutions as parliament or the presidency – to which there is no reference in any pristine Islamic vision – it also emphasized such themes as equality and political participation in distinctly modern Jacobin terms, far beyond what could be found in the traditional heterodox visions.

### Civilizational Dynamics and the Renovative Tendencies in Islamic Civilization

We shall start with the analysis of the specific dynamics of the Islamic civilization, especially the place of sectarian or heterodox, above all renovative movements within them.

The pattern of political dynamics that developed in Islam was closely related to its basic drive to create a civilization with its own specific premises, a crucial aspect of which was the conflation of the political and religious communities (in which military conquests constitute an important component) as expressed in the ideal of the *ummah* (Islamic community). Indeed, the *ummah* was to be the major arena for the implementation of the transcendental and moral vision of Islam, of the strong universalistic component in the definition of the Islamic community, and the closely connected emphasis on the principled political equality of all believers. This pristine vision of the *ummah*, probably implicit only in the very formative period of Islam, entailed a complete fusion of political and religious collectivities and the complete convergence or conflation of the socio-political and religious communities. Indeed, the very conceptual distinction between these two dimensions, rooted in the Western historical experience, is basically not applicable to the concept of the *ummah*.

The continual confrontation of this ideal with the political realities attendant in the expansion of Islam constituted a most important factor in the development of political dynamics in Islamic societies. Thus, already early in the formation and expansion of Islam, the possibility of attaining the ideal fusion between the political and the religious community, of constructing the *ummah* as a basic tenet of Islam, was actually abandoned. Instead, the mainstream of Islamic (Sunni) religious thought stressed the legitimacy of any ruler who assures the peaceful existence of the Muslim community (Nafissi 2005; Hodgson 1974).

In this vision, strong tensions developed from the very beginning of Islam's history between the particularistic primordial Arab elements or components, seemingly naturally embodied in the initial carriers of the Islamic vision and the universalistic orientation. These tensions became more important with the continual expansion of Islamic conquest and incorporation of new territorial entities and ethnic groups. The final crystallization of this universalistic ideology took place with the so-called Abbasid Revolution. Paradoxically, also in this period – indeed, in close relation to the institutionalization of this universalistic vision – a de facto separation between the religious community and the rulers developed, especially within Sunni Islam (and to a much lesser extent and in a different mode in Shia Islam, especially in Iran); a separation between the *khalifa* (successor of the prophet, head of the *ummah*) and the actual ruler, the sultan. This heralded de facto separation between the rulers and the religious establishment (*ulama*), but not of the religious from the political arenas. This separation, partially legitimized by the religious leadership, was continually reinforced by the ongoing military and missionary expansion

of Islam, far beyond the ability of any single regime to sustain a process, which culminated in the eleventh century and was further reinforced by the impact of the Mongol invasions.

In the various (especially Sunni) Muslim regimes that developed under the continual expansion of Islam, the *khalifa* often became de facto powerless, yet continued to serve as an ideal figure. The *khalifa* was seen as the presumed embodiment of the pristine Islamic vision of the *ummah* and the major source of legitimation of the sultan, even if de facto he and the *ulama* legitimized any person or group that was able to seize power. Such separation between the *khalifa* and the sultan was reinforced by the crystallization (in close relation to the mode of expansion of Islam, especially Sunni Islam) of a unique type of ruling group; namely, the military-religious rulers, who emerged from tribal and sectarian elements. It also produced the system of military slavery, which created special channels of mobility, such as the *ghulam* system in general and the *mameluks* systems and Ottoman *dervshisme* in particular, through which the ruling groups could be recruited from alien elements (Ayalon 1996; Crone 1980; Pipes 1981). Even when some imperial components developed – as was the case in Iran, which became a stronghold of Shia Islam – a complete fusion between the political ruler and the religious elites and the establishment did not ensue.

Despite these vicissitudes, the possibility of implementing such a pristine vision of Islam – of achieving that ideal fusion between the political and the religious community, of constructing the *ummah* – was actually given up relatively early in the formation and expansion of Islam. The fact that political issues constituted a central focus of Muslim theology was to no small extent rooted in this disjunction between the ideal of the Islamic ruler as the upholder of the pristine transcendental vision of Islam and the reality of rulership in Islamic religion (Rosenthal 1958; Crone 2004). Yet, although never fully attained, it was continually promulgated, as Al Azmeh (1996) has shown, with very strong utopian orientations in the later periods by various scholars and religious leaders.

The impact of the fact that the ideal of the *ummah* was never fully given up, and that it was never fully implemented, became evident in specific characteristics of the political dynamism of Islamic regimes and sects, and in the strong chiliastic and utopian components thereof. These dynamics were often imbued with a strong religious vision, which could especially be seen in the potentially strong 'semi-revolutionary' sectarian activities oriented to religious-political change – activities that were reinforced by initial patterns of expansion of Islam and the constitution of its international system.

### Sectarianism and Political Dynamics in Islamic Civilizations

Despite the potential autonomous standing of members of the *ulam*, no fully institutionalized effective checks on the decision-making of the rulers developed in these societies. There was no machinery other than rebellion through which to enforce any far-reaching 'radical' political demands. Yet, in contrast to, for instance, Southeast Asian or Meso American patrimonial regimes, the potential not just for rebellion but also for principled revolt and possible regime changes was endemic in Muslim societies. True, as Bernard Lewis (1973) has shown, a concept of revolution never developed within Islam. But at the same time, as Ernest Gellner (1981) indicated in his interpretation of Khaldūn's work, a less direct yet "very" forceful pattern of indirect ruler accountability and the possibility of regime changes did arise. This pattern was closely connected with a second type of ruler legitimation and accountability in Muslim societies, which saw the ruler as the upholder of the pristine, transcendental Islamist vision, a conception promulgated above all by the different sectarian activities that constituted a continual component of the Islamic scene. These sectarian activities were connected with the enduring utopian vision of the original Islamic era, of the fact that this vision was neither fully implemented, nor ever fully given up. Such sectarian-like tendencies with strong renovative tendencies have indeed existed in the recurring social movements in Muslim societies.

Such renovative orientations were embodied in the different versions of the tradition of reform, the *mujaddid* tradition (Landau-Tasseron 1989: 79–118). They could be focused on the person of a *mahdi* (saviour-figure in Islam) and/or be promulgated by a Sufi order in a tribal group such as the Wahabites or in a school of law. Such political and/or renovative orientations could be directed towards active participation in the political centre, its destruction or transformation, or towards a conscious withdrawal from it. But even a withdrawal, which often developed in both Shi'ism and Sufism, often harboured tendencies to pristine renovation, leading potentially to political action.

These tendencies were related to some basic characteristics of Islamic sects and heterodoxies, which played such an important role in the history of Islamic societies, and to the place of such sectarianism in the expansion of Islam. One of their distinctive characteristics has been the importance within them of the political dimensions, frequently oriented towards the restoration of that pristine vision of Islam which has never been given up. This dimension could be oriented towards active participation in the centre, its destruction or transformation, or towards a conscious withdrawal from it – a withdrawal that, as in

the case of some Sufi groups and of Shi'ism, often harboured potential political reactivation. This potential political orientation or dimension generated some of the major movements, political divisions, and problems in Islam, starting with the Shi'a. A very important characteristic aspect of Islamic societies was, as has been indicated above, that the internal sectarian political impact was often connected with the processes of the expansion of Islam, and especially with the continuous impingement on Islamic societies of tribal elements, which presented themselves as the carriers of the original ideal Islamic vision and of the pristine Islamic polity.

### Renovative Tendencies and the Ibn Khaldūn Cycle

The fullest development of the political potential of such renovative tendencies took place in Islamic societies when such tendencies became connected with the resurgence of tribal revival against 'corrupt' or weak regimes. In these cases, the political impact of such movements became connected with processes attendant on the expansion of Islam and especially with the continuous impingement on the core Islamic polities of relatively newly converted tribal elements, who presented themselves as the carriers of the original ideal Islamic vision, and of the pristine Islamic polity. Many tribes (e.g. some of the Mongols), after being converted to Islam, transformed their own 'typical' tribal structures to accord with Islamic religious-political visions and presented themselves as the symbol of pristine Islam, with strong renovative tendencies oriented to the restoration of pristine Islam. These tendencies became closely related to the famous cycle depicted by Ibn Khaldūn (1958); namely, the cycle of tribal conquest, based on tribal solidarity and religious devotion, giving rise to the conquest of cities and settlement in them, followed by the degeneration of the ruling (often the former tribal) elite and then by its subsequent regeneration by new tribal elements from the vast – old or new – tribal reservoirs. The Abbasid Revolution can, in many ways, be seen as one point in the Ibn Khaldūnian cycles of political dynamics of Islam. Ibn Khaldūn emphasized above all the possibility of such renovation from within the original, especially Arab, tribal reservoir, and not from reservoirs acquired, as it were, through the expansion of Islam. Moreover, he focused more on the dilution of internal tribal cohesion as an important factor in the decline of Muslim dynasties and paid less attention to the 'dogmatic' dimensions of Islam. But the overall strength of Ibn Khaldūn's approach is that it provides an important analytical tool for understanding the dynamics of Islamic societies beyond the geographical scope of his own vision. Such new 'converts', along with the seemingly

dormant tribes of the Arabian peninsula, of which the Wahabites constituted probably the latest and most forceful illustration, became a central dynamic political force in Islamic civilization.

By virtue of the combination of this mode of Islamic expansion with such sectarian, renovative orientations, Islam was probably the only Axial civilization in which sectarian-like movements – together with tribal leadership and groups – often led not only to the overthrow or downfall of existing regimes but also to the establishment of new political regimes oriented, at least initially, to the implementation of the original pristine, primordial Islamic utopia. Significantly enough, once these regimes became institutionalized they gave rise to patrimonial or ìmperial regimes within which the 'old' Ibn Khaldūn cycle tended to develop anew. But, in which, however, the pristine ideal of the unusual, of its renovation, also constituted a continual component of political symbolism and dynamics.

### Sectarianism and Political Dynamics in Shia Islam

Within this broad framework of the dynamics of Islamic civilizations there developed an innovating interpretation of the relation between temporal and religious power by a segment of the Shia *ulama*, which constitutes a more distinct background to the Iranian revolution.

Historically, there is no distinction between state power and religious thought in Islam. Islam does not make a fundamental distinction between politics in its temporal meaning and spiritual power (Lambton 1980: 404). As a spiritual power, the Prophet Muhammad laid down the essential principles of Islam. As temporal leader he created the basis for Islamic political power. After the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the role of political power and the legitimacy of the religious or temporal ruler became an important central problem and a source of polemics within Islam. This was an even more complicated problem in Shi'ism. After the death of Imam Hossein, the third Shia Imam, who had carried out several failed military actions to gain control of the Islamic community, subsequent imams distanced themselves from politics. The depolarization of the Shia imams reached its height with the occultation of the Twelfth or Hidden Imam (873–874). Theoretically, all temporal power was illegitimate and legitimate authority belonged to the imams starting with Ali (the first Shia Imam). Since the occultation of the last Imam, Mahdi, in AD 874, the *ulama* were considered to be the 'general agency' of the Absent Imam (see Algar 1979: ch. 1). The doctrine of occultation authorized Shia leaders to take a break from their claim to political

power. This phenomenon supported the idea that temporal rule is no necessary task of the imam. Thus, the temporal and religious function of the imam became even more separated. This means that in Shi'ism there is a fundamental agreement that there is no leadership of the *ulama* but there is agreement regarding the leadership of the Twelfth Imam. At the same time, Shi'ism recognizes the necessity of some type of leader during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, though there is no general definition of what the tasks and praxis of this leader are, or how the *ulama* should carry out political power in the Islamic community.

The historical scholastic conflict between different Shia schools was an indicator for the continuous separation of the Shia clergy from their political role in the Islamic community. The lack of agreement on the question of the leader led to confusion and a power vacuum, which historically seemed to open the door for the *ulama* to carry out spiritual and political power during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam. The two most important thinkers among the *ulama* who developed a Shia definition of political power in the twentieth century were Ayatollah Shaykh Mohammad Hossein Naini (1860–1936) and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1901–1989). In his famous book *tanbih al-umma van tanzih al mella* (the leadership and the cunning of man), Naini accepted the constitutional monarchy from the point of view of Shia jurisdiction.[6] Khomeini developed his political ideas by making a radical shift from the Shia interpretation of the Western-style constitution to what he called the *velayat-e faqih* and the *hokumat-e islami*.

Khomeini radically criticized the Constitutional Revolution and the proconstitutional *ulama*. As discussed above, Shi'ism considered all temporal and political power during the time of the occultation of the Twelfth Imam as illegitimate. The *ulama* were the mediators of the Twelfth Imam, and their alleged descent from the Prophet legitimated their rule. With his concept of the *velayat-e faqih*, Khomeini radically broke with the traditional Shia dogma over political power. Khomeini's interpretation of the relation between

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6  From 1990 a new trend developed in Iran within the Islamic lay intellectual movement and among some members of the *ulama*. This trend is one of the most important domestic intellectual counter movements that criticizes, in particular, the ruling *ulama* and the dominant political ideology of the *velayat-e faqih* (the state theory of Ayatollah Khomeini) and in general the interpretation of Islam as political ideology. The most prominent elements within this movement are Abdulkarim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabistari, Akbar Ganji, and Mohsen Kadivar, see e.g. A. Soroush (1999),  M. Mujtahed-Shabistari (1996), A. Ganji (2000), M. Kadivar (1998).

temporal and spiritual issues in the context of the theory of the *velayat-e faqih* provides the *ummah* with a certain basis, which is almost equal to that of the Prophet and the imam, covering the monitoring of the executive and juridical power. The movement, which started with the revolt against the Shah's modernization program in 1963, further developed theoretically and practically in the 1960s and 1970s. The public protest of Ayatollah Khomeini against the state legitimized his role as undisputed leader among the Shia *ulama* (Arjoman 1989).

### Shi'ism and Political Power: The New Type of Shia *Ulama* Relations

In the 1960s and 1970s a segment of the *ulama*, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini, started to organize themselves. They established a national network that propagated Khomeini's ideas and programs.[7] It was no coincidence that there was a prepared and organized leadership around Ayatollah Khomeini, which was able to mobilize different social classes and groups against the Shah's regime. The most important successors of the reformist *ulama* and supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini were young clergy who had a positive view of modern sciences. A segment of these *ulama* were belonged to the philosophy department of the faculty of theology of the University of Tehran. They combined traditional with modern education and were therefore able to make contact with non-religious intellectuals. Different discussion groups in the 1960s debated new ideas in seminars and lectures on the Islamic state, and they also published them as articles. Central to these publications was the attempt to develop an ideology that would resist the expansion of secular cultural values and the influence of the West – manifesting itself in the modernization program of the Shah – and that would offer a social alternative. The language and stile of these publications were very modern, literate and professional, and were influenced by secular thought, which became apparent in the choice of subjects in these publications, such as the rights of women, polemics on Marxism, new science and the new world.

The 'resurrection of Islam' depended on how far Islam was able to find answers to social problems. The redefinition of religion and Islam were characterized by a modern ideologization of religion; an attempt to project the new

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7   In his long years as a teacher, Khomeini taught more than 500 *mujtaheds* (persons qualified to engage in *ijtihad* [right to interpretation]) and more than 12,000 *talabeh* (religious students).

ideas and implications on the Islamic norms, values and also symbols in order to contribute to the creation of a dynamic, self-conscious system of social, political and Islamic values.

Together with the emergence of the militant and reformist *ulama*, a new generation of modern Islamic intelligentsia developed that made a great contribution to the development and propagation of revolutionary political Islam. They were able to mobilize traditional elements of society as well as the modern social classes and groups, such as the urban middle class, students and women. In contrast to the earlier intelligentsia, which had defended secular nationalism, liberalism and socialism, the new intelligentsia strove for Islam as a revolutionary political ideology and as a social and political project.

### Islam and the Modern Intelligentsia

These general characteristics of Shia history and civilization constitute the basic framework of the Iranian revolution. It was within this framework and under the impact of the process of modernization and its expansion, that the more specific background of the Iranian revolution could develop.

The modern intellectual history of Iran is characterized by two opposite periods with two different dominant political cultures: the dominant ideas of the first period created the intellectual background for the Constitutional Revolution and could generally be conceptualized as secular, inspired by the Western culture and civilization and modern ideas, such as economic liberalism, rationalism and constitutionalism. The second period was characterized by a radical critique on Western culture and civilization. In this period, the intellectuals referred back to traditional domestic values (Islam), manifesting itself in concepts such as *qarbzadegi* (westoxication) and *bazgasht beh khishtan* (back to the self) to confront Western 'cultural imperialism'. These intellectual trends created the background for the development of the ideology of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.

The most important features of all intellectual movements and their related political organizations since the Constitutional Revolution in Iran until the coup of 1953 were their secular ideas and programs. Secularism was the dominant political culture of different social movements in Iran; namely, liberalism, socialism or Marxism. Even Khomeini himself was a defender of the Iranian constitution until the late 1960s (Algar 1970; Abrahamian 1982).

Despite the heterogeneity of the Islamic movement and its different ideologies with different social backgrounds, interests and political programs, what all these groups had in common was the development of Islam as a revolutionary

political ideology or as a social project against the common enemy (the regime of the Shah), but also as an alternative to competing ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism. But, why was the secular intellectual thinking and praxis (liberal or socialist) replaced by the Islamic social project and ideology?

The thinking and activities of the Iranian intelligentsia of the 1960s and 1970s was connected to a number of structural factors. From the fall of the strong and authoritarian regime of Reza Shah in 1941, as a result of Anglo-Russian military intervention, until the Anglo-American supported coup in 1953 against the nationalist government of Mosaddeq, from a political point of view, Iran experienced a period of proto-democracy. It manifested itself in the rise and development of democratic institutions such as political parties, trade unions, associations and the freedom of the press. In the period after the coup of 1953, all democratic institutions, especially political parties (among others, the National Front and the communist Tudeh Party), trade unions and different independent civil institutions were suppressed. With the help of the military and financial support from the United States, a repressive authoritarian state emerged.

The rapid and comprehensive state-led Western-style socioeconomic modernization and capitalist development of the 1960s and 1970s led to a drastic change in Iranian social structures.[8] Mohammad Reza Shah's aggressive and rapid state-led modernization had little interest in the needs of the modern middle class and the necessity to create an independent and efficient bourgeois class or entrepreneurs. The huge oil income gave the state a great autonomy from social forces. The state became increasingly distanced from the people's cultural identity and unpreparedness for these rapid changes. For the majority of the Iranian population, cultural identity, national independence and authoritarian regime were more important than the class conflict. It is not surprising therefore that the *ulama*, the guardians of Iran's cultural heritage, who had been weakened but not eliminated during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, became the leaders of the revolution. They represented not a single

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8   Despite enormous economic progress and a rising gross domestic product per capita, there were great differences in income levels (Kazemi 1980; Azimi 1990). Rapid economic development increased the gap between rich and poor. In Iran the gap between the very rich and the middle class was very large. Between 1959 and 1977, the share of the urban total income of the poorest 40 per cent of the urban population declined from 13.8 per cent to 11.5 per cent. The share of the middle 40 per cent of the urban population declined from 27.6 to 25.6 per cent. The share of the upper 20 per cent of the urban population of the total income to the contrast rose from 52.1 to 57.1 per cent. These numbers only give a relative picture of poverty in Iran at that time. They are not an exact report of the standard of living of the lowest urban and rural population.

class but the whole nation. The *ulama* were able to attract both the traditional urban groups, as well as the modern middle classes who had sympathy for the *ulama's* new ideology. Iranian policymakers were incapable of creating modern political institutions that would integrate the modern classes into the political system that came to the forefront with the state-led modernization. This led to an alienation of these modern social classes with respect to the state. Furthermore, the modernization process and the radical socioeconomic transformation in the 1960s and 1970s were not able to break with traditional society and its related social forces, causing a contradiction in both the economic as well as the cultural arenas. The power of the modern sector of the economy grew stronger without eliminating or incorporating the powers of the traditional economic sector (the *bazaar*). The Iranian modernization experiment created a fundamental contradiction in the mid-1970s. This caused unbalanced economic and political development: the economic structure was modernized without fundamental changes in the nature of the political system. In the words of Abrahamian (1982) "economic development versus political underdevelopment." At the same time, the secularization process had little influence on the power of the *ulama* as a potential organic ally of the *bazaar* economic sector. Finally, the modernization process lacked a coherent ideology. The Shah's attempts to legitimize his rule through associations with pre-Islamic Iranian history only further alienated the *ulama*, who formed a strong alliance with the other frustrated social classes. The main result of economic development, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, was rapid social mobilization. The index of social and economic development showed a dynamic and rapid social transformation. Iranian policymakers did not succeed in creating an alternative, lasting ideology to what was destroyed by socioeconomic and cultural transformation. Paradoxically, the state created a vacuum that could be filled and propelled by a revolutionary Islamic political ideology. The charismatic leader Khomeini provided a 'national myth' around which the revolution could crystallize. "Understanding the crucial importance of religion in Iran's political culture, Khomeini's national myth linked the shah's opposition with Western imperialism and secularism and called for the simultaneous expulsion of all three" (Ghods 1989: 228).

Rapid urbanization, as a consequence of modernization, was without doubt the most important change in the 1960s and 1970s. The enlargement of cities led to a new composition of the urban population, and unequal development had a direct influence on urban life and the structures of urbanization in Iran. On the one side stood the rich and new urban groups that distinguished themselves from the majority of the Iranian population in their language, their behaviour and their way of life. They were alienated from the daily problems of

the majority of the population. On the other side stood the lower urban classes and groups that were confronted with a primitive daily life and were not able to integrate into the dynamic and rapidly changing new social circumstances. Urban life thus became the domain of great contradictions. The urban poor mirrored the duality of Iranian social life and were a characteristic feature of the cultural problems and contradictions of a society in transition, a society that continuously stood under tension. The *ulama*, the traditional part of society and the migrants from the rural areas, experienced their social life or cultural and religious identity as an antagonism to their daily reality. A great segment of the intellectuals considered themselves to be politically misled. The emerging modern urban classes as result of industrialization had no access to politics and were excluded from participating in political processes.

It is not surprising therefore, that the rising urban forces kept their own values by creating institutions that reflected their own worldview. The most important mechanisms to mobilize the urban poor were traditional religious values and customs, which the *ulama* conveyed in mosques, religious foundations and other institutions. The religious institutions constituted a meeting place for migrants, the traditional urban forces and the *ulama*. The urban poor and the traditional social forces were connected to each other via religious institutions that were controlled by the emerging militant *ulama*. This connection strengthened the opposition of the Islamic forces against the modern and repressive state.

But the social value crisis was not only a problem of the urban poor. The other urban social forces and groups such as the youth, women, the middle class and especially the intelligentsia and the artists also had to cope with individual and social alienation. The Iranian modern intelligentsia, who saw themselves as the pioneers of modernity and modernism after the coup of 1953 felt they were victims of the repressive state, and were unable to legitimize and accept the modernization undertaken by the Shah, who had come to power following a US-backed coup against the nationalist government of Mosaddeq. Furthermore, capitalist development and modernization did not take place without socioeconomic and cultural contradictions in Iran.[9]

Uneven and rapid socioeconomic modernization, changes and transformation were, at this time, the most important themes of the intellectual critical literature. The Iranian intelligentsia wrote mostly about the disintegration of the pre-capitalist agrarian structures and the confrontation between the

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9    Annual migration to the cities varied during 1966 and 1978 between 300,000 and 320,000 people. A great number of migrants was incorporated into the construction industry, which expanded between 1972 and 1977 annually by an average of 6.7 per cent.

traditional society and the modern culture. This led to a radical critique of modernity and westernization. Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969) and Ali Shari'ati (1933–1977), two of the most influential intellectuals in this period, both took great pains to analyze the intelligentsia's estrangement from Iranian society and its adverse results for cultural and social life. By introducing concepts such as 'Westernization' and 'back to Islam', they romanticized the traditions of Islam to confront modernization and modernity. This new generation of the intelligentsia condemned not only the repressive state of the Shah but also his socioeconomic modernization program. They represented a new political culture and a new value system. Not surprisingly, in the period under consideration, a new type of secular intelligentsia developed, with a new political ideology and new ideas. This ideology must be set within the context of the comprehensive populist ideology of Third Worldism.[10] Politically, this group, as well as the Islamic intellectuals, emphasized concepts such as neo-colonialism, the anti-imperialist battle and the 'Third World'. They published many articles on the revolutions in Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, China, and in African countries, and translated many works by critical Western intellectuals and authors. The works of René Guénon were particularly popular among the Iranian intelligentsia. He contrasted the Eastern world with the Western world. He believed that the disintegration of the Western civilization was not the end of the world but that a world, which was only based on material values, would eventually come to an end. Guénon's followers considered the West to be the source of evil forces and the East as the place of light and a place where people blossomed. They also contrasted scientism and rationalism with traditional Eastern values and Western sciences with Eastern insight. Many Iranian authors of the 1960s and 1970s wrote books and essays on these issues. The ideas had many followers in Iranian society. Within parts of the intelligentsia, the works of Martin Heidegger became very popular in their intellectual battle against modernity and urban life. Although this new intelligentsia had different political and social standpoints, what they had in common was their criticism of the West and the potential role of Islam as cultural identity. In contrast to the old generation of intelligentsia, which had proclaimed modernism, futurism and optimism, the new generation of the intelligentsia had a radical critique on modern life. This new group saw the expansion of Western culture

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10      Third Worldism also became influential among the Islamic forces (the conservatives, the party of the Muslim Mujahedin, the Party of Islamic Nation [Hezb-e Mellal-e Islami] and the progressive stream Jama and the Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran [People's Mujahedin of Iran]). They were all influenced by Third Worldism, though they had different standpoints.

as a threat and romanticized the former, simple life in the form of a nostalgic 'return' to Iranian-Islamic culture and getting 'back to oneself'. The universal ideas of the old generation of the intelligentsia were replaced with the critique on *qarbzadegi* and the nostalgic Islamic Iran as well as the *jedal-e sharq va qarb* (East–west conflict) (Dariush Shayegan 1992).

### The Modern Iranian Fundamentalist Jacobin Regime: Modern Jacobinism with Distinct Characteristics

The Iranian revolution constituted a definite break from an Ibn Khaldūnian cycle. It gave rise to a new modern Jacobin regime (Eisenstadt 1999b) promulgated by a new modern fundamentalist movement, which can be defined as 'fundamentalism' in the sense specified above.

The fundamentalist and communal-religious movements, which have indeed gained a very prominent place on the national and international scenes in the contemporary era, share with other modern Jacobin movements – paradoxically, above all with the communists – the tendency to promulgate a very strong salvationist vision or gospel. They show some very interesting paradoxical combination of promulgating highly elaborate, seemingly anti-modern – or rather, anti-Enlightenment – themes with many modern Jacobin revolutionary ideologies, movements and regimes, which they sometimes share – in a sort of mirror image way – with the communist ones (Besançon 1981), the carriers of the most extreme alternative model of classical Enlightenment models of modernity.

The new revolutionary Islamic ideology played a key role in the making of the revolution. Islam as revolutionary political ideology was developed by different groups and ideologues. Despite their fundamental ideological differences, these streams of thought were able to reformulate Islam as a new revolutionary political ideology. The most important characteristic of all these movements was the development of Islam in revolutionary terms as well as in the terminology of a populist political ideology. By means of a modern language and science, with progressive, revolutionary and militant features, these streams of thought represented the face of Islam. They propagated Islam as a political ideology with an own policy, a legal system and an own economic and political model – an Islam that was able to eliminate class differences and create an equal society; an Islam that could put an end to suppression and despotism and guarantee freedom, freedom of opinion, social justice and human rights; an Islam that was able to obstruct the penetration of capitalism and imperialism into Iran and would create an independent Iran. With this

populist picture and their Islamic political ideology, the emerging Islamic forces were able to mobilize the different social classes and groups – from the poor urban classes to the working class, and from the traditional to the modern classes – and create the Iranian Islamic Revolution.

The visions promulgated by these movements and regimes entailed a strong tendency to combine different themes of protest with the constitution of a new ontological definition of reality, with a total worldview rooted in the respective salvationist vision, and to the emphasis that the implementation of this vision was to take place in this world, in the present. Instead of the – basically unfathomable – future, the implementation of this vision was, like that of all the Great Revolutions, to be achieved in the present. Present and future became in many ways conflated.

The fundamentalist movements and regimes also share with the Communist ones attempts to establish by political action a new social order, rooted in the revolutionary universalistic ideological tenets, in principle transcending any primordial, national or ethnic units and new socio-political collectivities. They share, too, the conception of politics as the great transformer of society. Indeed, above all, many of the fundamentalist movements share with the Great Revolutions the belief in the primacy of politics, albeit in their case, religious politics – or, at least, of organized political action – guided by a totalistic religious vision to reconstruct society, or sectors thereof.

These visions entailed the transformation both of man and of society and of the constitution of new personal and collective identities. It was in the name of such salvation that these movements and regimes demanded total submergence of the individual in the general totalistic community, the total reconstruction of personality and of individual and collective identity.

Thus, these movements are political not only in the instrumental or technical sense, but also in their attempts to implement an overall moral vision, to construct a new collective identity through modern political means, and to appropriate modernity on their own terms. It is indeed the ideological and political heritage of the revolutions that epitomized the victory of gnostic heterodox tendencies to bring the Kingdom of God to Earth, of an attempt to reconstruct the world that constitutes the crucial link between the cultural and political program of modernity and fundamental movements.

In both cases, the institutionalization of such a vision gave rise to regimes characterized by strong political mobilizatory orientations and policies aimed at changing and transforming the structure of society in general and of centre-periphery relations in particular. Both types of movements and regimes promulgated such efforts at transformation and mobilization, in combination with the sanctification of violence and terror against internal and external evil

forces and enemies, especially those rooted in the internal dynamics of modern Western 'bourgeois' society.

Both the communist and the modern fundamentalist movements have been international, transnational movements, activated by very intensive networks that facilitated the expansion of the social and cultural visions and the universalistic message that they promulgated; at the same time, continually confronting them with other competing visions. These movements and regimes also shared several basic characteristics of utopian sectarian groups; namely, the tendency to constitute sharp boundaries between the 'pure' inside and the polluted outside as well as the continual constitution of an image of an ontological enemy – world capitalism for the communists, America in the Iranian case, Israel and Zionism – an enemy that epitomizes the evil of modernity and that can also pollute groups; an enemy that one should be on constant alert for. The enemy is often the same as that of communist regimes, or very similar: the West; above all, the US and even Zionists, usually other 'universalisms'. But the grounding of such enmity differed greatly between these two movements or regimes. In the Soviet case, it is the non-completion or perversion of the original vision of modernity, of the Enlightenment. In the fundamentalist case, it is the adherence to the project of the Enlightenment that constitutes the basis of such enmity.

The attitude in political institutions, of course, is one of the most interesting and paradoxical manifestations of this combination of modern Jacobin mobilizatory dimension of modern fundamentalist movements and regimes with their 'anti-modern' or, at least, anti-liberal or anti-Enlightenment ideology, i.e. their attitude towards women. On the one hand, most of these movements, as Martin Riesebrodt (1993) has shown in his incisive analysis, promulgate a strong patriarchal, anti-feminist attitude, which tends to segregate women and impose far-reaching restrictions on them; seemingly, but only seemingly, of a type that can be found in many of the Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia, the roots of which were traditional proto-fundamentalist ones, or in such contemporary traditionalistic, proto-fundamentalist movements like the Taliban, where one of the first acts (in October 1996) of the new Taliban government was to force women out of the public sphere, of schools and even from work. In stark contrast to such traditionalistic regimes, the modern fundamentalist ones mobilize women – even if in segregation from men – into the public sphere, be it in demonstrations, paramilitary organizations or the like. Indeed, the reshaping of the social and cultural construction of women, and the construction of a new public identity of women rooted in Islamist vision, constituted a very important component in the fundamentalist programs in Iran and in Islamist movements in Turkey, and were very often promulgated by educated and

professional women who felt alienated in the preceding secular public space. In the 1996 elections in Iran women not only voted, stood as candidates to the parliament and were elected one of them, Ms. Rafsanjani, the daughter of the then President, claimed that there is nothing in Islamic law that forbids women from taking public office.

### The Ambivalent Attitude to Tradition: Tradition as a Modern Jacobin Ideology

It is the combination of these different components of fundamentalist visions with very strong Jacobin orientations that also explains the very paradoxical attitude of these movements to tradition. The anti-modern, or to once more be precise, anti-Enlightenment attitude and the specific way of promulgation of tradition that developed within the fundamentalist visions are not just a reaction of traditional groups to the encroachment of new ways of life, but a militant ideology that is basically couched in highly modern idiom and is oriented to mobilization of wide masses. Fundamentalist traditionalism is not to be confused with a 'simple' or 'natural' upkeep of a given living tradition or defence thereof. Rather, it denotes an ideological mode and stance oriented not only against new developments, against different manifestations of modern life, but also against the continually changing and diversified tradition. This attitude to tradition is manifest in two very closely connected facts: first, the existing, often conservative, religious establishment of their respective societies, which constitutes one of the major foci of criticism of these movements – to the point where these establishments are even seen as one of their major enemies; second, and closely related, is the fact that the younger sectors, especially within the cities, be it in Turkey or in the Muslim Diasporas in the West, are drawn to the fundamentalist movement and distance themselves from their traditionalist parents. They see the traditionalist way of life of their parents or grandparents as not pure enough, as a simple-minded compromise with the secular society (Gule 1996).

Thus, although seemingly traditional, these movements are, in some paradoxical way, anti-traditional. They are anti-traditional in the sense that they negate the living traditions, with their complexity and heterogeneity, of their respective societies or religions, and instead they uphold a highly ideological and essentialistic conception of tradition as an overarching principle of cognitive and social organization. Most fundamentalist groups tend to espouse a principled denial of continued unfolding of tradition and its interpretation or stance, which does, of course, in itself constitute a very distinct new and innovative

mode of interpretation. This rather paradoxical towards tradition indicates one of the major aims of these movements: to appropriate modernity on their own terms, according to their distinct sectarian and utopian vision combined with strong political orientations.

## The Modern Characteristics of the Iranian Islamic Regime

The strong modern components and, indeed, premises of many of the fundamentalist movements can also be seen in some aspects of their institutionalization as regimes. The Islamic revolution's triumph in Iran did not abolish most of the modern institutions – basically without any roots in Islam – such as a constitution, the parliament, the *majlis* and elections to it, and even to the presidency of the republic. The basic mode of legitimation of this regime, as promulgated in the constitution, contained some very important modern components. It declared, without any attempt to reconcile them, two different sources of sovereignty – God and the people, or the *ummah*. This regime promulgated a new constitution, something which some of the earlier traditionalists opposed vehemently. Both the *majlis* and the mode of election to it were reconstructed with some very strong Jacobin components and clothed in an Islamic *garb*. Interestingly, one of these Islamic *garbs* – the institutionalization of a special Islamic court or chamber to supervise 'secular' legislation – was not so far removed from the special place of juridical institution of the principle of judicial revision, which is characteristic of modern constitutional regimes.

The importance of elections was demonstrated in May 1997, when, against the (implicit) advice or recommendation of the clerical establishment, a more 'open-minded' candidate, Mohammad Khatami, was elected by the votes of women and younger people. In the following elections, the Conservatives attempted to crush the Reformists, and since then there has been a contestation between different Reformist groups and the conservative establishment whose repressive tendencies constitute a continual component of the Iranian scene. These fundamentalist movements and regimes, and, above all, of course, the Iranian one, faced, as did the communist ones, at least some rather parallel problems or challenges attendant on their institutionalization. Among these were the growing contradictions between the salvational vision and the exigencies of maintaining some type of orderly modern political regime and economic system; between their tendencies of totalization and the necessity to face, even to some degree promote, the processes of structural differentiation of economic development, against which

they were oriented; the problems attendant on the potential corruption of their elites and the general, even if partial, 'regression' from the universalistic-missionary vision to the primacy of concrete demands of statehood. But, above all, these regimes also faced the tensions inherent in the relations between their Jacobin tendencies, on the one hand, and, on the other, their acceptance and adoption of some of the basic potentially pluralistic – even if highly regulated or controlled – institutional frameworks of modern constitutional regimes, as well as growing demands for some autonomy and autonomous private spheres among many sectors of society, especially women, youth and professional groups.

### The Iranian Revolution and the New Inter-Civilizational Situation: Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Modernity

The Islamic fundamentalist revolution as promulgated in Iran, which in terms of its causes and even processes is closest to the classical revolutions, signals an entirely new civilizational orientation; a new phase in the development of modernity. This distinct combination of modern and anti-Enlightenment and anti-Western cosmological visions – as developed in the framework of new globalizing processes and inter-civilizational visions – distinguish the Iranian Islamic Revolution from the classical ones, even while bringing out some of its paradoxical similarities. Thus, the modern fundamentalist movements – which are epitomized in the Iranian Revolution, albeit in a somewhat different mode – and the communal religious movements that developed in other Asian countries, entail an important, even radical shift in the discourse about modernity and in the conceptualization of the relation between Western and non-Western civilizations, religions or societies.

The crucial differences between the fundamentalist movements and the other Jacobin movements, especially the communist one, stand out above all with respect to their attitude towards the premises of the cultural and political program of modernity and to the West. In contrast to the seeming acceptance of the premises of these programs, or at least a highly ambivalent attitude towards them, combined with the continual reinterpretation of them that was characteristic of the earlier revolutions and revolutionary movements, i.e. the various socialist and communist regimes, the contemporary fundamentalist and most communal religious movements promulgate a seeming negation of at least some of these premises, as well as a markedly confrontational attitude towards the West.

In contrast to communist and socialist movements, including the earlier Muslim or African socialists, the contemporary fundamentalist and religious communal movements promulgate a radically negative attitude towards some of the central Enlightenment – and even Romantic – components of the cultural and political program of modernity, especially towards the emphasis on the autonomy and sovereignty of reason and of the individual. The fundamentalist movements promulgate a totalistic ideological denial of these 'Enlightenment' premises and a basically confrontational attitude not only towards Western hegemony, but also towards the West and to what they defined as Western civilization, usually conceived in totalistic and essentialist ways. These fundamentalist movements often grounded their denial of the premises of the Enlightenment, or their opposition to it, in the universalistic premises of their respective religions or civilizations, as newly interpreted by them. The communal-national movements built on the earlier 'nativistic', 'Slavophile'-like movements, but reinterpreted them in radical political modern communal national ways. Significantly, in all these movements, socialist or communist themes or symbols were no longer strongly emphasized. In this context, it is interesting to note that the activists, especially in various Arab countries, who were drawn to different socialist themes and movements, became very active in the fundamentalist and also in some of the communal movements of the 1980s and 1990s.

Above all, the fundamentalist movements and regimes promulgate a markedly confrontational attitude towards the West, towards what is conceived as Western, and the attempts to appropriate modernity and the global system on their own non-Western, often anti-Western, terms, but to a large extent formulated in the terms of the discourse of modernity. They attempt to dissociate completely Westernization from modernity; they deny the monopoly or hegemony of Western modernity and the acceptance of the Western cultural program as the epitome of modernity. The confrontation with the West does not take the form of searching to become incorporated into the modern hegemonic civilization on its own terms, but rather to appropriate the new international global scene and modernity for themselves, for their traditions or 'civilizations', as they are continually promulgated and reconstructed under the impact of their continual encounter with the West.

Above all, they promulgate de-Westernization; the decoupling of modernity from its 'Western' pattern – of depriving, as it were, the West from the monopoly of modernity. In this broad context, European or Western modernity or modernities are seen not as the only real modernity but as one of multiple modernities, even if, of course, it has played a special role not only in the

origins of modernity but also in the continual expansion and reinterpretation of modernities. These movements and regimes constitute part of a set of much wider developments that have been taking place throughout the world, in Muslim, Indian and Buddhist societies, seemingly continuing – yet in a markedly transformed way – the contestations between different earlier reformist and traditional religious movements that developed throughout non-Western societies. At the same time, these movements constitute transformation of many of the earlier criticisms of modernity that developed in the West. In these movements, the basic tensions inherent in the modern program – especially those between the pluralistic and totalistic tendencies, between utopian or more open and pragmatic attitudes, between multifaceted as opposed to closed identities, between some collective distinctive and universal reason – are played out more in terms of their own traditions grounded in their respective Axial religions, rather than in those of European Enlightenment, although they are greatly influenced by the latter and especially by the participatory and, indeed, Jacobin traditions of the Great revolutions.

Within all these movements the aggressive and destructive potentialities – manifest in very strong, aggressive and exclusivist tendencies and orientations – in the designation or naming of groups as the 'enemy', often to be excluded from the respective collectivities, even their dehumanization, in strong anti-rational orientations and symbolism, and in the concomitant tendencies to the sanctification of violence, have become closely interwoven with the processes of dislocation, of contestation between interpretations of modernity and with geopolitical struggles, ultimately making them more dangerous.[11]

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11    'The Iranian Islamic Revolution (1978–1979): The Multiple Contexts of the Iranian Revolution' was published in the journal *Perspective on Global Development and Technology* (PGDT): 6 1–3 (2007) 129–157.

# Thinking Multiple Modernities from Latin America's Perspective: Complexity, Periphery and Diversity

*Judit Bokser Liwerant*

Recent decades have seen the development of complex systems of interrelations simultaneously affecting the global, regional, national and local levels and enhancing the expansion, intensification, and acceleration of interactions in an increasingly mobile world. In this context emerge new conceptual challenges associated to the multifaceted and multidimensional character of globalization processes. Multifaceted, insofar as they bring together increasingly interdependent economic, political and cultural aspects; multidimensional, because they are expressed both in transnational networks of interaction between institutions and agents, and in processes of organizational, institutional, strategic and cultural convergence, alignment and standardization. Globalization processes are also contradictory: they can be intentional and reflexive and simultaneously unintentional at the international as well as a regional, national, or local scope.

While Latin America today has been directly impacted by the contradictory nature of these globalization processes (facing both new horizons of opportunity and sectorial inequality), historically, this region has been globally constituted and incorporated into the world configuration by an extension of the European experience of the Americas. Nevertheless, the latter became neither "fragments of Europe" (Hartz), nor replicas of each other, but civilizations and societies in their own right and thus the earliest case of Multiple Modernities, as conceived by S.N. Eisenstadt. He rightly sustained that the Americas followed distinctive institutional patterns and cultural projects in order to enter and/or create Modernity.

Eisenstadt's approach certainly challenges a view of globalization processes as uniform and unchanging as well as the "homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions" of the Western program of Modernity. While retaining a global scope, it emphasizes the contradictory, contingent and even antinomian character both of Modernity and Modernization. Eisenstadt's understanding and explanation of Latin America in terms of Multiple Modernities constitutes a watershed both for its contribution to the theoretical, conceptual and methodological dimensions of research and the meta-theoretical implication related

to the recognition of the complexity embedded in its peripheral condition, while recognizing diversity and heterogeneity.

Whereas the Western program of Modernity constituted a crucial and critical referent for Latin American societies, they developed distinctly modern singular models and paths related to their cultural premises, traditions and historical experiences. Sustained global dynamics developed through a peripheral connection to external centres that provided the parameters of institutional creation and conceptions of nation building. Their being part of the West but simultaneously differing from it led Latin American cultures to a *global immersion* and a *global awareness* (Eisenstadt 2002b; Roniger 2002).

Eisenstadt conceived Modernity as an inherently contradictory and contingent series of open-ended processes. He explicitly set up the Multiple Modernities scenario in contrast to other meta-narratives of the post Cold War era, such as Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' theory or Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis (Thomassen 2010). This view represents a meaningful step forward in the sense that it constitutes a critical reflection upon the profound tensions, contradictions and paradoxes arising from the emergence of globally interconnected realities (Susen & Turner 2011; Spohn 2011; Preyer, 2013).

Multiple pathways of social transformations at the local or national, regional and global levels call upon an understanding of continuity, variability, and changeability in the region and abroad, concerning both new institutional designs and cultural models:

> The notion of Multiple Modernities denotes a certain view of the contemporary world – of the history and defining characteristics of the modern era – that goes against the views prevalent in scholarly and general discourses. It stands against the view of the "classical" theories of modernization and of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s and certainly against the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim and even (to a large extent) Weber; at least in one reading of his work. They all assumed, if only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe, together with the basic institutional constellations that evolved in its wake, would ultimately predominate in all modernizing and modern societies; and with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world.
>
> EISENSTADT 2002B: 1, 2004; PREYER 2010

Moreover, the idea of Multiple Modernities suggests that the best way to understand contemporary society – and certainly to explain the historical

development of modernity – is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs (Eisenstadt 2000c).

Thus, this approach revisits the studies of modernization and its alleged assumption that its cultural dimensions are inherently and necessarily interwoven with the structural ones. The actual unfolding indicated that the various modern autonomous institutional arenas, i.e. the economic, political, educational or family spheres, are defined and regulated and come together in different ways in different societies and in different periods of their development (Eisenstadt 2000b). The processes of building modern institutions and cultural projects in Latin America, following colonization and the Europeans' encounter with native peoples and civilizations, highlight the constitution of societies that differed from those of the metropolis; new civilizations, varying modernities, multiple ones. Thus, in unique ways, migration processes from Europe to the region defined Latin America's contested and ambivalent relations with an outside Western referent.

The cultural program of modernity, which entailed 'promissory notes' to redefine the meaning of human agency and its role in building social and political orders acted permanently as a critical orientation vis-à-vis the centre(s) (Eisenstadt 2000b; Wittrock 2000). Its principles of freedom, equality and individual autonomy as a substratum for association and community belonging; reflexivity as the basis for tolerance and pluralism and the centrality of public spaces for citizenship building confronted Latin Americans with radical challenges as well as common and distinctive ways of becoming modern.

Alternative Western centres acted as a project to follow and to contest. Shifting centres and global foci of identity: Spain and Portugal in the foundational encounter defined by asymmetry; France and England, later, as the imperial balance of power changed; the United States, and the still current tensions and ambivalences.

While its historical development highlights diverse phases, contemporary regional and globalized constellations recover and redefine Latin American Modernities. Institutional arrangements as well as national and regional spaces and borders are modified, new transnational interactions and realms take shape. Belongings and allegiances change and processes of reconfiguration of collective identities point to new forms and tempos of interplay between ethno-national components of identities and new identification networks and flows. Certainly, collective identities overlap with strong processes of individualization, shedding new light on the changing faces of culture and the new role of tradition. Processes that lead to increased complexity and functional differentiation are displayed simultaneously with traditional social formations,

thus calling for a new gaze into the indeterminate binomial modernization/ differentiation.

Eisenstadt's manifold formulations and his multiple conceptual insights opened new analytical roads to explain and understand the compound of trajectories and experiences that defined the parameters of Latin American multiple modernities. This article explores the analytical potentialities of this approach, in a conceptual-diachronic perspective that follows the unique transition of the region from a founding global immersion to a new insertion in an increased globalized and interconnected world. To achieve this aim, it deals primarily with the defining conceptual and historical parameters of the first multiple modernities, while in the second part it focuses on the current transformations unleashed by globalization processes. Changing scenarios of complexity, periphery and diversity accompanied these different moments and are explored through the lenses of this theoretical approach.

## 1

Referring to Eisenstadt's place and contribution to social thought, Edward Tiryakian asked:

> How does one pay homage to a world-class scholar, key contributor to the studies of social change, modernization and civilizational analysis, recipient of the most prestigious prizes a sociologist can obtain, and with an eighty-two page list of publications ranging far and wide in space and time?

His answer draws on a metaphor as a heuristic device, Homer's Odyssey – Eisenstadt's odyssey as "the exploration of modernity" (Tiryakian 2011). He suggests that this intellectual and existential voyage was undertaken for both universalistic and particularistic reasons and reached diverse shores, which, in turn, projected into the complex map of roads and venues, therefore questioning the existence of one station of arrival. While Eisenstadt's exploratory voyage refers mainly to his European and Israeli Jewish experiences, the long trip brought him to the Americas – Latin America included – a continent defined as the first Multiple Modernities. His sociological work and his intellectual career are marked by the radical shift in the context of sociological theory, from the comparative analysis of institutions to the research program of comparative civilizations (Eisenstadt 1995a: 1–40, 2003a: 1–28; Preyer 2011: 13–57). This new approach contributed to Eisenstadt's critique of the classical theory

of modernization, which eventually led to the research program of multiple modernities – a viewpoint that radically changed the prevailing conceptual and methodological formulations. The Jewish civilization and the Israeli challenge of building a modern society differentially – in a culture in which tradition had a central role – conditioned the valorization of periphery and variability. Bringing together the diverse lines of thought, Spohn affirmed "Eisenstadt was a historical-comparative sociologist of global modernity, but from a peripheral and heterodox point of view" (2011: 282). In this framework, Latin America became a meaningful referent at a very early stage in his trajectory and also became a subset model related to diverse dimensions of his work (Eisenstadt 2000, 2009b).

His successive and sustained approach to the continent may be traced back to his participation in the UNESCO Regional Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants held in La Habana in 1956, and in the Seminar on Economic Development, Secularization and Political Evolution, organized by IDES in Buenos Aires in 1963, and up to his appointment as Principal Researcher on Agricultural Development and Modernization in Latin America, UNESCO, 1968–1970. He taught at the Universidad Central de Venezuela and at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and conducted seminars in this field in Israel, both at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at the Van Leer Institute. The seminars dealt with Spanish Colonial America as well as with topics that oriented the research on Latin America, such as collective identities, public sphere, elites and social movements. He underscored Latin America's singularity regarding the relative weakness of primordial criteria in the definition of collective identities, a much weaker combination of territorial, historical and linguistic elements as components of collective identity and the tensions entailed in the dislocation of sectors and collectivities excluded form the public sphere.

Indeed, the region and its specificities acquired a relevant place in the Research Projects on Multiple Modernities. He participated in diverse initiatives on the region, which resulted in the publication of important collective work. Exemplary were *Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres. Latin American Paths,* edited by Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder in 1998; *Globality and Multiple Identities. Comparative North American and Latin American Perspectives,* edited by Luis Roniger and Carlos Waisman in 2002. In this line, *Shifting Frontiers of Citizenship: the Latin American Experience* (2013), edited by Sznajder, Roniger and Forment has Eisenstadt' posthumous work in the area. It came out of a research project that took place at the Institute of Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in which the author of this article participated.

Eisenstadt's work and his studies on modernization and their conceptual and methodological interactions with social categories are part of an ongoing dialogue/debate with theoretical currents and sociological approaches that prevailed in Latin America (Torres 2010). His global scope and distance from a structural-functional conception of social processes lies behind the inclusion of individual and collective agency and the conception of modernity as a mediated and historically contingent process. (Spohn 2011; Tiryakian 1995). Therefore, he developed a comprehensive conceptual and methodological distinction between the components of the structural dimensions of modernity and between them and the cultural ones, as well as the synchronic and diachronic analyses of different societies and of different phases of development within the same society.

Contrary to the presupposition of classical evolutionary and structural functional sociology, Eisenstadt considered that different dimensions of structural differentiation and disembedment of cultural orientations do not always go together (Eisenstadt 1965c; Preyer 2009, 2010) There is no necessary correlation between any degree or type of structural differentiation, of development of autonomous institutional arenas and specific types of modern institutional formations. Such different formations may develop in societies with relatively similar levels of differentiation and, conversely, similar frameworks may develop in societies with different levels of differentiation of the development of autonomous institutional arenas. Approaching Eisenstadt, Preyer has underscored that, on the structural level, the major process of such 'decoupling' has been that of structural differentiation: the crystallization of specific distinct roles. On the symbolic level, the process of such decoupling is manifest above all in the disembedment of the major cultural orientations from one another. Such decoupling can be seen in the transition from immanent to transcendental orientations, or in the structuring of collectivities and models of legitimation or regimes, from primordial to civil and transcendental ones (Cf. Figure 1).

Eisenstadt explains the notion of multiple modernities with the different constellations between agency (creativity) and structure and between culture and social-structure, as well as the role of elites and their coalitions within the expansion of the cultural visions in the socio-structural evolution. The components are not ontological entities, but they are essentially interconnected by the semantic map (Eisenstadt 1995g: 297–300; Preyer 2011: 78–90). In this context, the Axial Age civilizations concept (Jaspers) was determinant because it implied new ontological metaphysical conceptions of a transcendental and mundane order, which were basic to further transformations and thus constitute a major break that precedes and explains modernity.

FIGURE 1     *The structural and cultural dimensions of modernities*

Particularly useful for the comprehension of Latin Americas modernities were, as stated, the necessity to distinguish analytically between the structural and the cultural dimensions of modernities; the conception of modernities in terms of discontinuity, breakdowns, disjunctures, tensions and contradictions; tradition as a creative and integral element of the evolving civilization of modernity and the particularity conceptions of collective identities and the public sphere (Eisenstadt 2013a, 2013b).

These diverse dimensions may be traced to the complex encounters between worlds as epitomized by the simultaneous referent of Modernity – the existing, the European one(s) (in plural) and the ideal to be built in the new ecological realities of the territories and the native populations. Eisenstadt acutely differentiated the central axes around which two broad patterns crystallized in Europe: "those of hierarchy-equality and of relatively pluralistic "ex-parte" as against homogeneous "ex-toto" conception of the social orders" (Eisenstadt 2002a: 10). While in Protestant Europe these patterns were shaped through at least the partial incorporation of heterodox groups into the centre, which implied the inclusion of elements of equality in the religious and political spheres, in Counter-Reformation Catholic Europe – Spain and Portugal in particular – heterodox groups were excluded and the regimes were based "on a fundamental denial of the validity of heterodox teachings on a growing

FIGURE 2   *Multiple Modernities from Latin America's perspective*

monopolization of the promulgation of the basic cultural premises by Church and State, along with a closely related strong emphasis on hierarchy" (Eisenstadt 2002c: 11). Thereafter, both the encounters and the changing models of cultural and social order as well as conquerors and settlers were influenced by the way in which the tension between equality and hierarchy or autonomous and controlled access to the administrative and market centres as developed in Europe, were transformed.

Thus, in Latin America, hierarchy was emphasized to a much greater extent than in Spain and Portugal; so were other patterns of exclusion (and inclusion). Through an in depth analytical insight, Eisenstadt followed the changing spectrum of the encounters between referents and agents of the new spaces, discovering the way in which they determined the diverse development of the different societies, "in particular the patterns of formation and transformation of the criteria of membership into, and exclusion from, the national communities; changes in the patterns of class and ethnic stratification; and changes in the patterns of social and political inclusion and exclusion" (Eisenstadt 2002c: 12, 2013b). Figure 2 presents central trends and specific characteristics of the multiple modernities as were shaped and unleashed in Latin American.

There were certainly profound tensions between the external centres of reference and the inner composition of the populations. The dual dilemmatic

· Different levels and sublevels of analysis in the realm of institutions and in of symbolic codes with a degree of autonomy

| Center and periphery | Structures of elites | Patterns of accountability | Civil society and public sphere |
|---|---|---|---|

· Hermeneutically informed and comparatively oriented mode of social analysis (Silber 2011)

| Universal and particular | Conceptual and empirical | Symbolic and material | Ephemeral and institutional | Contingent and necessary | Open and close |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

· Modernity as historical conglomerate of large scale generative structures: universality and particularity

Against the convergence of modernization, the end of the history and the hegemonic and homogenizing assumptions of the Western program

FIGURE 3     *Modernities in Latin American and Western modernity: Discontinuity, breakdowns and tensions*

referents acted as oscillating parameters at the level of the people/elites binomial as well as at the challenges derived from nation building (Eisenstadt 2002a; Roniger 2002). The analysis of Latin American modernities followed distinct sub-levels or dimensions of analysis both in the realm of institutions and in that of symbolic codes and orientations; each level reaching a degree of autonomy. Thus, as may be seen in Figure 3, Susen and Turner underscore the hermeneutically informed and comparatively orientated mode of social analysis that accounts for diverse aspects underlying human forms of coexistence: the universal and the particular; the conceptual and the empirical; the symbolic and the material; the ephemeral and the institutional; the contingent and the necessary; the open and the closed. Eisenstadt studied modernity as a historical conglomerate of large-scale generative structures expressed in the universality of civilizational achievements and in the particularity of collectively sustained boundaries.

Latin American societies institutionalized new visions of the social and political order through their peripheral connection to external centres of religious, cultural, ideological and political-administrative articulation. Roniger (2002: 79) has rightly defined it as global immersion: from their very inception they were connected to external centres and global foci of identity. However, this original link did not nourish the self-perception of becoming autonomous

centres of modernity, but was permeated and often associated with the ulterior search for alternative modernities; thus, such 'external' and even ambivalent reference points remained crucial. European premises, social cultural orientations and institutional patterns that were transplanted and transformed differed along the diverse societies of the continent.

Indeed, Latin America is not an undifferentiated unity. It is one continent with diverse societies. Braudel referred in plural to the region in *Les Annales*: "*À travers les Amériques Latines*," emphasizing the diverse nature of the different countries and cultures that make up the region. This diversity, which comprises economic, political, and historical dimensions, might best be understood through the ethno-cultural differentiation as a fertile resource to study the civilizational processes. Eisenstadt recreated García Ribeiro's typologies: Indoamerica and Euroamerica. Significant differences exist between Indoamerican countries – Peru, Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia, among others: with highly hierarchical compositions that include Indian lower classes, mestizo middle classes and Spanish and mestizo elites; and Euroamerican countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, which attracted immigration; homogenous mestizo Chile and Colombia; multiracial Brazil, Cuba and the Caribbean areas.

Grand trends and specific historical context explain the way these collective identities unfold in different institutional arenas – territorial, communal or religious – in various political-ecological settings – local, regional, national – and in a global context wherein they interact, intersect, and overlap and their components become re-linked (Eisenstadt 1998b). Modernity entailed a distinctive mode of constructing boundaries. New definitions evolve from the basic components or dimensions of collective identities – civil, primordial and universalistic, transcendental or sacred. Analyzing the connections between political boundaries and cultural collectivities, Latin Americans experienced in singular modes the tensions derived from the particular-territorial boundaries and the more universal ones. Both referents claimed their part and interacted in contradictory ways. Thus:

> Latin American's hierarchical ethos was based on a combination of totalistic, hierarchical principles with strong tendencies toward what may be called topological as opposed to purely linear ways of constructing social space. Consequently, there arose a strong inclination to overlap between such spaces to blur the boundaries between them, and to prefer relational rather than formal-legal definitions of the social nexus. Formal-legal definitions were embedded in interpersonal relations; formal relations were disembedded from citizenship. Between the formal and informal definitions, between the relational hierarchical criteria

> and the egalitarian and individualistic ones, formally espoused in the constitutions and the legal systems, there existed a continuous unresolved tension, sometimes evolving into a disjunction between the formal underpinnings and practical ground rules of society.
>
> EISENSTADT 2002C: 20

Tensions and disjunctures were the basis for a rich and complex analytical perspective in with explanatory strength.

As stated, he further considered that:

> one of the most important differences, which distinguish the American civilizations from both European and the Asian societies was the relative weakness of primordial criteria in the definition of their collective identities and the malleability of collective identities in the region.
>
> EISENSTADT 2002C: 20

Another historical pattern he considered crucial was the protagonic role assumed by the state in "defining citizenship and establishing ground rules for participation in public spheres and access to institutional resources and recognition." Therefore, the centrality of institutional processes of domination, struggle and contestation, compromises and consensus formation were highlighted as basic to the construction of collective identities.

On the relation between nationalism, ethnicity and modernity there has been an ongoing discussion. Brubaker recognizes the contribution of Multiple Modernities literature but questions its criticism of modernization theorists that:

> [A]re said to have dismissed ethnicity (along with religion) as a vestigial private matter, of no public significance; to have treated nationalism as axiomatically civic, secular, and inclusive; and to have vastly overemphasized the power of the nation-state to bind loyalties and generate attractive and inclusive national identities. (2011: 1).

He considers that nationalism and politicized ethnicity are characteristically modern phenomena, "as manifestations of modernity as a singular historical phenomenon, though one that is dynamically changing and, of course, subject to chronic contestation" (2011: 5).[1]

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1   For the discussion: Cf. Schmidt (2006; 2010) and Fourie (2012).

Eisenstadt claimed a dynamic analysis that challenged a static view of people and culture based on an ethno-demographic composition. The historic and anthropological criteria of Merquior and Da Matta exemplify his thesis about relative shifts in borders and the possibility of incorporating or reintegrating identities such as the indigenous one, besides the dominant Catholicism and refer local identity towards the centre (Eisenstadt 1992c), while recognizing, based on Roniger's statement, great inequalities in the distribution and the control of resources (Eisenstadt 1993). In this overall framework, *mestizaje*-miscegenation "became a pervasive concern and a metaphor, often constructed, suspected or experienced as part of the collective image of many of these societies in tandem with religious syncretism and hybrid structures" (Roniger 2002). As properly asserted, it has not been seen as more than a racial matter; it directly concerns behaviour, institutions and political actors (Bokser Liwerant 2013).

### *Walking the Scale: A Conceptual and Historical Journey through Mexico*

Following Eisenstadt's conception of Latin American collective identities, *mestizaje* has been seen mostly along its inclusive dimension. It has been conceived as a resource for national integration, as a material and symbolic tool to bring together Iberoamericanism and universalism and thus its unifying goal has been recognized and underscored as epitomized by Vasconcelos' "cosmic race" (Roniger 2002). However, in spite of its aim to overcome inner ethnic and social divides, this construct carried inner contradictions as it developed a parallel discriminatory dimension, which differentiated the legitimacy of the national actors in the public sphere. Collective identities' interaction with the public sphere's contours entails social practices, recognition and representation. In the public sphere converge demands for visibility and legitimacy, as well as interactions between agency and structure. National thought defines the collective self-image and the conceptual margins of the Other. The nation displays its conception of membership along ethnicity/civility dimensions.[2]

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2    Eisenstadt referred to three main codes in the process construction of collective identity: primordiality, civility, and sacredness or transcendence. The primordial code focuses on such components as gender and generation, kinship, territory, language and race for constructing and reinforcing the boundary between inside and outside. The second, the civic code, is constructed on the basis of familiarity with implicit and explicit rules of conduct, traditions, and social routines that define and demarcate the boundary of the collectivity. The third code – the sacral or transcendent – links the constituted boundary between us and them not to natural conditions but to a particular relation of the collectivity subject to the realm of the sacred and the sublime, be it defined as God or reason, progress or rationality.

The specific dynamics of *mestizaje* in Mexico reveals the complex way in which membership criteria and conditions for collective action were defined given the interdependence between ethnicity, national belonging and the State's political project. The real and symbolic meaning of its founding aim expressed the nation's ethnic and political dimensions. While it called for an ethnic-socio-cultural encounter between its indigenous and the Hispanic-Christian components, its primordialist features had limiting effects on the social construction of diversity. Thus, not every group and culture was a foundational layer of the nation, or was perceived as such (Bokser Liwerant 2008; 2013).

The inner tension between inclusion and exclusion may be traced back to the dilemmatic construction of the Other (indigenous, foreigners) that accompanied the intellectual *Criollo* who, on the one hand, in his quest for autonomy from Spain identified with the indigenous population, but, on the other hand, remained reluctant to lose his ancestors' privileges (Brading 1973; Villoro 1986). The *criollo* faced this dilemma through successive reformulations of the national project: *indigenismo* was articulated as a native claim and, thus, benefited precisely from the new socio-ethnic category: the *mestizo*. At the same time, the latter became the rising political actor in the national scene. Paradoxically, its author-producer, the *criollo*, was disqualified as a foreigner.

The complex relationship between liberalism and the political national project, manifest in the latter half of the nineteenth century, resulted from their divergent ideological and political premises. Liberalism sought to found the nation based on a rupture with its colonial and indigenous past and, therefore, the conceived Other acquired a new meaning. The debates on religious freedom in Mexico reflected the premises of liberal thought on tolerance as an incentive to promote European immigration (Hale 1972). By laying the grounds for Republican institutionalization, Positivism subsequently enhanced existing difficulties to relate to the 'Other'. The unfulfilled efforts of Porfirio Diaz's regime to attract European immigration to Mexico reinforced socio-ethnical splits in the public sphere (González Navarro 1988: 565–583).

The Mexican Revolution was preceded by the search for the Mexican self as a requisite in the construction of the new political and social order. From Justo Sierra to Molina Enríquez, from Antonio Caso to José Vasconcelos, the 'we' was configured in terms of ethnicity and race. The *mestizo* became the emblematic protagonist of the national endeavour. He who had "the unity of origin, the unity of religion, the unity of type, the unity of language, and the unity of desires, purposes, and aspirations" was required to build the new cohesive national and socio-political order (Molina Enríquez 1985). The revolutionary

critique of Porfirismo repudiated in complex ways both the persistence of indigenous people (social inequalities sanctioned by ethnicity) and of foreigners, as a privileged group (Cabrera 1960). The ethnic and socioeconomic dimensions overlapped with far reaching restrictive implications. As the Mexican Revolution prioritized social over individual rights, the legitimacy of the new regime rested de facto on its ability to fulfil its social justice program. The disjunctures between the legal and factual behaviours were further reinforced. The recovery, discovery and creation of the meaning of the national stood at the centre of a 'mysticism' called "the crux of contemporary Mexican nationalism" (Cline 1972: 89–90). Therefore, the dynamics behind the aspirations for universalism and inclusiveness of the *mestizaje* project met limits that require a better understanding of the complexity, inner tensions and contradictions involved in the construction of modernity.

The basic premises of political order influenced the political dynamics, especially the development of non-hegemonic modes of social and political order and modes of resistance, which conditioned the struggle over the definition of public spheres as well as ways of incorporation of different groups into the political body.

Discontinuities and disjunctures along structural and cultural disembeddment seem to mark the process of the making and un-making of a fluid and heterogeneous modernity (Brunner 1987). Multiple practices of modernization thus conditioned an ambiguous logic of institutionalization. Seen from one side, wide social realms are characterized by signs of fragility and absences while simultaneously the State strived for and achieved a strong homogenizing presence. Political instability, authoritarian regimes and democratic breakdowns in Latin America certainly expressed and shaped the disjuncture between economic development and social cohesion (Tiryakian 2011).

Tensions and disjunctures are basic conceptual tools to approach complexity: between the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion of collective identities and social sectors struggling to make inroad into the public sphere (Bokser Liwerant 2009; 2013); between hierarchy and inclusion, elites and representation processes, and elitist patterns and popular massive protest movements; between economic development and social cohesion; along changing parameters of the public sphere and its alternative openness and closure. Challenges faced by State of Law vis-à-vis energies channelled towards the nation state, populism and corporatism (Roniger 2002); renewed creation of authoritarian legacies; unstable democracy building and processes of de-democratization; as well as low institutional trust and violence have also nourished a legacy of institutional weakness and its consequent cumulative deficit when entering new phases of globalization.

The twentieth century draws a complex picture in which most Latin American countries have experienced transition processes from authoritarian bureaucratic regimes to systems of dictatorial-military profile.[3] In the three decades that run from the mid-Fifties to the mid-Eighties, 14 Latin American countries (out of 20) had rightist dictatorial/military governments.[4] Although in unequal terms, this scenario changed when transitions to democratic political institutional governments took place (O'Donnell et al. 1988). Amidst the wide variety of national circumstances, Latin America, in its indisputable process of democratic transition oscillated in contradictory ways between delegative democracies and experiences of a new populism. Starting in the 1990s and in the context of the transition processes, civilian governments of various trends (from conservative to radical nationalists) were established.[5]

While cultural understanding influenced the different ways modernity was built, 'classical' modern institutions do matter insofar as they are central to the construction of citizenship, pluralism and democracy. Thus, the relevance of the ongoing discussion on the parameters and margins of the variation and the multiplicity of values and institutions that may guarantee social criticism (reflexivity) and democratic integration. In this sense, the region has to cope with incomplete achievements (Alexander 2006) or, worse still, the certainly harsh characterization as "mausoleum of modernities" (Whitehead 2002).

Furthermore, as Waissman has analyzed, dualism has defined economy and society. Economic liberalization has led to greater inequality and, in some cases, greater poverty and unemployment. Social polarization inhibits the development of civil society. This dualism is not based on segregation between modern and traditional regions. Rather, it consists of the co-existence of groups with different degrees of inclusion in labour and

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3   The cases of authoritarian burocratic regimes considered by O'Donnell are Brazil after 1964 and during 1966 to 1970; Chile after 1973 and Argentina during 1976. *Vid.* Guillermo O´Donnell, *Modernización y autoritarismo* (1972)*;* David Collier, *El nuevo autoritarismo en América Latina* (1985).

4   The countries are: Argentina (1976 and1983); Brazil (1964–1985); Bolivia (1971–1978 and 1997–2002); Chile (1973–1990); Ecuador (1972–1978); El Salvador (1979–1982); Guatemala (1954–1986); Haití (1964–1990); Honduras (1972–1980); Nicaragua (1967–1979); Panama (1968–1989); Paraguay (1954–1989); Peru (1968–1980) and Uruguay (1973–1985).

5   At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the population of Latin America reached 550 million, of which 227 million lived in countries defined as liberal or conservatives, another 208 million in the so-called Socialist/European-style regimes, 63 million in hard Socialist regimes and 52 million more in non-aligned regimes (Baldinelli 2009; Alcántara 1999; Dallanegra 2008).

a.  Disjuncture between the **formal and the informal rules** of the game

b.  Tensions and contradictions between **the process of incorporation of social
    sectors into the public sphere and of protest movements:**
    1 . *'post-modern' and 'post-materialist' movements;*
    2 . *assertive and aggressive, particularistic, local, regional, ethnic cultural
    autonomous movements, as well as various religious-fundamentalist and
    religious-communal ones*

c.  **Elitist and populist parameters:** corporatist patterns and popular massive waves:
    democratization and repression

d.  **Commitment to representative democracy with low institutional trust**,
    disruption of procedural norms, authoritarian closure and control of public spheres

e.  Corporatist articulation, clientelism and violence

| The coexistence of groups with different degrees of inclusion in social institutions by ordinal criteria | Disjuncture between economic development and social cohesion | Economic liberalization Democratization Exogenous ideological influences Weakened centralist tradition Group organizations Mobilization defense |
| | Marginal civil society | Strong civil society | |

FIGURE 4      *Tensions, disjunctures and contradictions: Conceptual tools*

commodity markets, as well as access to education, health and social secu-
rity. The outcome has been:

> [T]he generation of two poles, a strong civil society, very much like that
> of established democracies, and a marginal one, susceptible to clientelis-
> tic co-optation and coercion. The first pole generates citizens, while the
> second apathetic subjects prone to short lived instances of anomic acti-
> vation, not sustainable because of the low capacity for autonomous orga-
> nization among these strata.
>
> WAISMAN 2002

Individually and collectively, polarization in the structure of opportunities
becomes more acute. Collective frameworks are diluted and new forms of
social cohesion, less known, less defined, less socially oriented and closer
to a "domestic sociability" appear (Lechner 2002). The social contracts that
gave birth to the protection of modern risks did not always correspond
with the democratization processes and they did not respond to basic
premises of central modernity (Mancini 2013). However, Domínguez
(2009), following Eisenstadt, underscores that the modern imaginary is as
Latinoamerican and peripheral as it is Western and central and claims the
multiple modernities code to approach the highly contradictory specifi-
cities and particular dynamics. Figure 4 further illustrates main axes of

tensions, disjunctures and contradictions along which modernity has been sought and built.

## 2

The construction and reconstruction of social spaces imply encounters with different identificational/cultural/political/geographical *moments* of modernity and pose new realities and extended questions to the concept of multiple modernities. For Latin America, these encounters certainly account for the transition from an historical global immersion to a new insertion into globalization.

Globalization processes have led to economic, social, political and cultural changes that upset geographical, territorial and temporal referents, without which it would be impossible to think the structures and institutions, economies, social relations and cultural spaces today. The concept acquired multiple meanings according to diverse theoretical approaches and in relation to their analytical scope and specific focus on the variables of space and time.[6] A broad perspective points to different periods and moments of globalization processes related to uneven developments over time (and in space). There are certainly approaches that underline the fact that, during the last five hundred years, increasingly dense and intense interactions brought by capitalist labour markets, commodity production and the political expansion of the nation state lie behind globalization, as do migrations, wars of conquest, flow of commodities, and ideas. As stated, Latin America's historical trajectory represents a pathway to globality as a result of the world's expansion and the extension of European dynamics. In the last decades, however, a new phase of unprecedented globalization unfolds: trends are closely related and underscore aspects of the same phenomenon; time and space cease to have the same influence on the way in which social relations and institutions are structured; economic, social and political arrangements depend neither on distance, nor on borders, nor do they have the same influence on the final shaping of institutions and social relations. Consequently, social interaction is organized and structured around the unity of the planet as the horizon

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6  Although there is no agreement among scholars regarding its origins or its basic characteristics, there is a convergent approach in identifying radical changes that upset spatial, temporal, geographical and/or territorial references, without which it would be impossible to think of economic, political, social and cultural relations in the contemporary world (Wallerstein 1974; Waters 1995; Robertson 1992; Scholte 1998; Wieviorka 2007).

while there is an intensifying connectivity and/or compression of the world (Robertson 1992; Scholte 1998, 2005). Eisenstadt conceived these radical transformations as a "multi-civilizational reconfiguration of global modernity" (2003a). He emphasized the:

> [...] changing multi-civilizational political and cultural programs of modernity, their institutional and cultural formations, their contestation through new social movements in their postmodern, pragmatic or fundamentalist orientations, and the multiple experiences, perceptions and legitimization of the global system and globality.
>
> SPOHN 2011: 295

His analysis focused on the way classical institutional orders face their capacities restricted or modified, while identities take shape along national and transnational axes. Ethnic, national, and religious old and new Diasporas have been likewise redefining their nature and scope on national and world scenes. Contemporary changes are understood as a further stimulus to revisit and rethink modernity and the various modernization programs and roads, as expressed in his second Research Program, focused on the transformations derived from the dynamics of the global as networks of social systems and their consequent new tensions (Kahavi, Lerner, Brayer-Grab 2003).

For Latin America, the changing role of the State becomes crucial. Whereas Eisenstadt made sustained efforts not to use the concepts of society and nation state interchangeably, contemporary reality exacerbated the concrete and conceptual differentiation:

> While the political centres of the nation and revolutionary states continued to constitute the major agencies of resource distribution, as well as very strong and important actors in the major international arenas, the control of the nation state as the hegemonic centre – over its own economic and political affairs – despite the continual strengthening of the 'technocratic' 'rational' secular policies in various arenas, be it in education or family planning – was reduced. Many global, above all financial, actors became very powerful.
>
> EISENSTADT 2010A

The State, its powers, functions, spaces and territories where it performs have indeed been radically transformed. It seems clear at this stage that, far from what some hurried estimates maintained (Ohmae 1990; Fukuyama 1992), states not only do not disappear but continue to be actors that have a decisive

influence in many fields at national and international levels. They are even considered among the most active and committed forces of globalization. Nonetheless, their sovereign status weakens in various fields: the state becomes incapable, for example, of regulating financial and trade flows, property and authorship rights, universally sanctioned human rights and other cross-border economic, social and cultural transactions. Likewise, the authority of the State loses effectiveness in regulating and applying sanctions to International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) and its relations to communities and identities that go beyond national borders are reconsidered, reconnecting the links between the local, the national and the global. The State thus loses regulatory capacity in certain spheres while at the same time strengthening its influence in others.

State sovereignty, according to which states exercised supreme, comprehensive and exclusive control over their territory, is an historical category arising as an organizing principle in the seventeenth century. In the context of globalization, state apparatuses survive, grow, strengthen and penetrate new spheres of society. On the other hand, sovereignty, as a supreme and exclusive control, ceases to operate because the State's regulatory capacity becomes eroded vis-à-vis the emerging mechanisms of regulation and governance at global level (Scholte 1998; Held 1995; Bokser Liwerant & Salas Porras 1999):

> [States] also lost their centrality and semi-monopoly over the constitution of the international playgrounds and of the rules regulating them. Above all, the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation and revolutionary states, their perception as the major bearers of the cultural program of modernity, the basic frameworks of collective identity, and as the principal regulator of the various secondary identities, became weakened and they are certainly no longer closely connected with a distinct cultural and civilizing program.
>
> EISENSTADT 2009B

Thus, within the framework of globalization, sovereignty loses strength due to the fact that states must share the task of governing with international public agencies and non-governmental, private and civic organizations. In parallel, within their borders, they face new patterns of association among civil society, as well as of political participation – individual and collective – and of building citizenship. These trends impose efforts at redefinition and specification regarding the competence of public and private domains as well as the relations between civil society and the state. In view of the simultaneous and contradictory trends of integration and reconfiguration currently affecting national states, new possibilities for coexistence arise among its sectors.

| Profound transformations | · Scope and nature of the public spheres<br>· Criteria of memebership<br>· Spaces and dynamics of identity<br>· Political realm | Non linear trends |

| Multiple coexistences | · Cycles of economic crises<br>· Social conflicts<br>· Public violence<br>· Neo liberal regimes<br>· Corporatist political forms<br>· Popular mobilization<br>· Plebiscitary democracy | Ambiguities, divergences and contradictory ways |

| Expansive force of democracy and its recessions, regressions and reconfigurations | · Democratization and de-democratization<br>· Centralization<br>· Civic citizenship<br>· Ethnic allegiances<br>· Collective afirmation<br>· Individualization of rights | Multiculturalism<br>Primordial identities<br>Fragmentation<br>De-structuring processes |

FIGURE 5      *Transformations, ambiguities and divergences in contemporary Latin America*

Latin America has experienced profound transformations in the scope and nature of the region's diverse public spheres and their criteria for social inclusion and membership, as well as in in the political realm, the spaces and dynamics of identity building. As stated, such changes follow non-linear trends. Figure 5 seeks to account for, in a synthetic way, the diversity of processes. An increasingly expansive force of democracy takes place amidst global cycles of economic crises, social conflicts and public violence. Neo-liberal and growingly institutionalized regimes coexist with corporatist political forms, popular mobilization and plebiscitary democracy (Sznajder, Roniger & Forment 2013). The region has incorporated global sequences of political opportunities and social conflicts in contradictory ways, as is evident in social transformation; centralization and de-centralization; civic citizenship and ethnic allegiances; collective affirmation and individualization of rights. The region's changing reality reflects, as well, its recessions, regressions, and reconfigurations. It is certainly pertinent to underscore the relevance of the Third Wave of democratization processes – and especially the Latin American experiences we referred to – had on Eisenstadt's transition from a post-traditional formulation to his conceptualization of multiple modernities one (Fisher 2011).[7]

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7  Fisher refers to a second influential referent of this conceptual transition: Eric Voegelin's insight of the Orthodox religious character of modern political ideologies.

Indeed, as Eisenstadt asserts,

> [...] under the impact of intensive globalization processes, far-reaching changes concomitantly developed in the constitution of many social boundaries – weakening and diversifying hitherto hegemonic collectivities and social arenas; and the crystallization of new cultural and social identities that transcend existing political and cultural boundaries; the closely related reconstitution of the place of territoriality in the structuring of social roles and of collective identities and the decoupling of the hitherto predominant relations between local and global frameworks.
>
> EISENSTADT, 2010B: 27

Thus, as a result of increasingly intense cross-border interaction, diverse groups, communities and/or classes adopt identities and loyalties over and above national sentiments. Such is the case with new social movements, members of the corporate elite, epistemic communities, migrants, Diasporas and ethnic groups that place various values (economic growth, human rights including those of women and minorities) above sovereignty and even self-determination. At the same time, globalization encourages and strengthens local, ethnic and indigenous identities, as epitomized by the Zapatista movement in the southeastern state of Chiapas in the early 1990s. This juncture opened and enhanced a diversified scenario certainly preceded and paralleled by new processes and trends. Its claims for recognition and its emphasis on cultural diversity broadened an ongoing discussion on the nexus between culture, society, and politics; a dialogue on the basis of which minority groups could gain legitimacy. Theoretical and practical divergences spilled over into the logic of assimilationist integration, which was profoundly questioned. Mexico as 'a nation of nations' confronted the need to consider itself through a perspective of diversity that would encompass local and regional perspectives, its indigenous peoples and its various ethnic groups (Bokser Liwerant 2009; 2013). By challenging the State as the vertex that produced symbolic resources and cultural identities, an increasingly differentiating nation sought an opportunity to become publicly visible given the changing coordinates of the public sphere. Zapatistas engaged in a struggle over the definition of the public good, both national and transnational, in a call for the creation of a new civil society. The idea of many cultures draws away from the recurrent search for an essentialist 'soul' or national character and instead leads to a reconfiguration of the national as a legitimating myth (Menéndez Carrión 2001; Lomnitz 1992). However, the ethnic revival enhanced an essentialist idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, overemphasizing the internal homogeneity:

the Manifesto Zapatista affirmed that democracy would come when the culture of the nation is refashioned from the perspective of indigenous people (First and Second Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, 1993, 1994).

Implications on national identities and dynamics of social integration are strongly felt, as well as its effect on the redefinition of membership criteria. Intertwined with the complex and differentiated historical trajectory of Latin America, public spheres and democratic spaces are highly fragmented. Continuity, variability and changeability define the broad contours of this trajectory. Latin American citizens were the first in the modern West that failed in their attempt to reconcile social equality with cultural differences, provoking socio-ethnic fissures in the continent's public life (Forment 2003). Contemporary roads towards recognition of difference, a new identity politics and the emphasis on heterogeneity act as substratum that seeks to enhance pluralism. "Struggles for recognition" (Fraser & Honneth 2003) and "identity/difference movements" (Chambers 2008) signal a new political imaginary that propels identity issues to the forefront of the public political discourse in the broadest sense. Elective and civic bonds coexist with ethnic and/or religious affiliations, linking individuals, communities and larger societies in unprecedented ways. Regional and global processes interact. In the current conditions, individuals, networks, groups, goods, commodities and cultural circuits transcend national borders. Transnational scenarios unleash and account for continuous and intense interactions between communal and social, global and local, national and transnational levels. Ethnic, national, and religious old and new movements and Diasporas have been likewise redefining their nature and scope on national and world scenes. The recovery and even resurgence of the concept of Diaspora and the emergence of transnationalism as an analytical approach can be used productively to study central questions of social change. While older notions of Diaspora concern mainly forced dispersal, today this concept covers diverse groups such as migrants, expatriates, refugees and displaced peoples, temporary migrant workers, groups of exiles, or ethnic communities (Eisenstadt 2010b; Baubock & Faist 2010; Nonini 2005; Brubaker 2005).[8] Contemporary approaches gradually point to the dynamics both of collective identities that Eisenstadt so well understood and broadened the concept of return to include old-new dynamics of interactions and interconnectedness.

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8   The research on Diaspora, despite its potential indiscriminate use of the term, has highlighted three essential components: a) dispersion of its members; b) orientation toward an ethno-national centre, real or imaginary, considered to be a homeland; and c) host country maintenance of the group's ethno-cultural borders (Cohen 2008; O'Haire 2008; Brenner 2008; Esman 2009).

Moreover, in its full parameters, the national and transnational dimensions interact, shift and overlap. In this sense, transnationalism has focused mainly on more recent migration movements. While it has emphasized hybridity over distinctiveness and border maintenance (over border erosion) as a key characteristic it should be conceived as an analytical angle that complements and apprehends the current transformation of Diasporas. Transnationalism embraces a variety of multifaceted social relations that are both embedded in and transcend nation states; cross-cutting socio-political, territorial, and cultural borders bringing to the multiplicity, pluralization, and diversification of semantic-ideological and institutional connections between major arenas of life (Ben Rafael 2013; Bokser Liwerant 2014).

Certainly, the state-civil society equation becomes the prominent venue for continuous interactions between individuals and their communities, between national and transnational spheres and particular identities, between inclusion and exclusion processes that constitute the most significant ambiguities around contemporary democratization. Strong and persistent trends of material and symbolic exclusion parallel the search for inclusive political forms, thus hindering democracy itself. It certainly interacts with the dualism it has marked societies and with new trends of fragmentation (Álvarez & Mejorada 2006; Waisman 2002).

Globalization processes and their multidimensional and contradictory impact are expressed both in increasingly inclusive public spheres and sustained migratory processes. Emigration is a global phenomenon of unexpected scope – world stock migration having grown from 75 million in 1965 to 150 million in 1990, 175 million in 2000 and 232 million in 2013. The United Nations identified 37 million Latin Americans living outside the region in 2013; 11 million more than in 2000. Latin America is a relevant case for the global scenario of international migration that has become more massive and diversified (Durand 2010; ONU 2013).

During the 1970s, violence and authoritarianism in the region determined regional and international emigration and political exile, especially in the Southern Cone; a decade later, re-democratization was a pull factor for exiles to return to their homelands. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the combination of economic crises, political uncertainties and security problems again pushed the region into a global international migration pattern. This tendency has expanded, though intermittently, since the 1990s. The last phases of accelerated globalization processes have witnessed significant increases in the number of Latin American migrants. Diversified migration waves reflect and create diverse paths – territorial, cultural, sub-ethnic – and social experiences in unequal terms (Zlotnick 1999; Castles 2000). Following the "new economics of labour migration" (Stark 1991), population movements cannot be explained

only by income differences between two countries, but also by additional factors such as secure employment, availability of capital for entrepreneurial activities and the need to manage risk over long periods. However, the reality of segmented labour markets seems to better describe the bifurcation of migration today. The twofold pattern points to an increasing migration of marginal sectors; mainly non-skilled workers and peasants that lack formal education.

At the same time, there is a sustained increment in the population of qualified labour, including professionals, scientists and entrepreneurial sectors. A close look points to this trend. In 2008, migrants with 12 years or more of education represented nine per cent of the total migration to the United States, while in 2012 this figure reached 30 per cent (BBVA 2013: 32); 33 per cent of the Mexican population with a PhD degree inhabits the US (Olivares Alonso 2013). Mexico is characterized by exceptionally high migration fluxes; close to 10.5 per cent of its total population live outside the country. It is estimated that 11.7 million migrants born in Mexico live in the United States. According to US sources, by the end of the 1990s, the yearly net migration rate of Mexicans peaked at over 500,000 individuals, on average. Out of the total Hispanic population living in the US (almost 50 million), more than 30 million has Mexican origins.[9] From the approximately 11.5 million undocumented migrants in the US, 6.5 million are Mexican, representing 57 per cent of the total. Undocumented migrants from other Latin American countries represent an additional 24–26 per cent (Durand 2010).[10]

Migration causes social transformations in both migrant-sending and receiving countries (Castles 2000). It becomes a multi-level and diversified process encompassing movements that are steady – as are the more traditional waves of migration – as well as repeated and circular, bi-local or multi-local and also instances of return. Multiple relocations and the emergence of transmigrants generate diversified interactions as well as the exchange of economic

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9    Cf. Pew Hispanic Center last decade data, evaluated based on self-described family ancestry or place of birth. http://pewhispanic.org/.

10   If we refer briefly to the south, Argentina, an historical hub of immigration became a country of emigration and exile. Data about the migration phenomenon are not very precise. According to the National Division of Migration, in 2007, there were approximately 1.053.000 Argentinians residing abroad (Resolution 452/2007, Ministry of Interior). The Organization of International Migration estimates the number to be, 971.698, which represents 2.4 per cent of the total population of the country (OIT 2012). In fact, Pellegrino (2003) suggests that worries about international emigration resulted from its qualitative aspects, mainly associated with the highly qualified population that left the country who had high educational levels, a strong presence of professionals and individuals with technical specializations.

and social resources, cultural narratives, practices and symbols between societies thereby creating and redefining associational frameworks and ethnic, religious and national identities (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Castles 2000).

A sort of contradictory process, entailing the emergence of interconnected-unified mental and relational space, contributes to diminishing the impact of physical dispersal while the tension between the universal-particular and global-local axes persists and even reaches acute tones. Global spaces give a new density to the close and specific, the characteristic and particular, and encourage the building of collective identities on institutional bases, spaces and frameworks that are radically different from those previously considered by social theory.

While the conceptual development of religion has been central in Eisenstadt's work, I here underscore his emphasis on the religious dimension of transnational movements. Indeed, religion has assumed a growing public role and visibility amidst secularization processes. Religious traditions have gained a new public relevance, as a result of their interaction with social movements and public agencies and by their claim to a new sort of interaction between private and public morality (Casanova 1994).

He observed virtual transnational religious identities and belongings as well as their interaction with ethnic communities (including new Diasporic ones) as one of the most important developments in the contemporary global scene. Diverse contradictory trends have helped the revival of ethnic identities in many communities precisely through the return to religion and religious mythologies.[11] The ethnic-religious revival is to be found not only in non-Western contexts in the face of fear of the Western influx of globalization, but also in the West as well as Westernized contexts: in America as well as in Japan, Poland, Ireland and Mexico.

Thus, the resurgence of religions often connected with ethnic components become central to protagonists of the political arenas and pivotal elements of collective identities. "Such transposition did not however entail a simple return of some traditional forms of religious organizations, authority or practices but

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11    The re-appropriation of an ethnic past has helped to advance a religious revival, which can be seen in the return of secular Muslims to Islam in Bosnia; in the interaction between Islam and Hinduism on the Indian subcontinent; in the return to nationalist Orthodoxy in Russia; and in the presence of Islamic movements among Islamic communities in the West. All these cases are related to the intensification of ethnic identity among embattled ethnic communities in the midst of what is perceived and felt to be an alien environment (Smith 1995).

**Singular and universal challenges**

**Multiple modernities in Latin America:**

1. New alternative **collective identities** overlapping profound **individualization processes**
2. Increased **complexity and functional differentiation** at the same rythm of **traditional social formations** (indetermination of the binomial modernization / differentiation)
3. Principles associated with **protection of modern risks** not always correspond with **democratization processes**
4. Contraction of **classical institutional capacities** and expansion of **social alternatives** not centered on axes of power
5. Culturally and symbolically, **social solidarity** gets dismantled (privatization of risks, politics of terror)

At least: three processes

1. The diversification of <u>social categories</u>
2. The loss of centrality by the <u>nation state</u>
3. A qualitative change of <u>collective representation</u>

FIGURE 6    *Multiple modernities in Latin America: Challenges and questions*

rather a far-reaching reconstitution of the religious components in the overall cultural and institutional formations" (Eisenstadt 2010b: 22).

Eisenstadt further stresses that in parallel to the contraction of classical institutional capacities, new social alternatives overlap processes of individualization that broaden available options and decisions in contexts of social action that transcend the nation state, which does not require or expresses instrumental rationality (Cf. Figure 6). This sort of social deregulation means that individuals may cease to structure their collective action along ordered known patterns.

According to Eisenstadt, the current situation is one of growing globalization and, at the same time, a new differentiation of regional societies. Indeed, Latin American has been a fertile terrain for theoretical and practical models of development (modernization, dependency, world systems and globalization) (*Vid*. Reyes 2001; Kacowicz 2009; Korzeniewicz & Smith 2000). Since 1960, the region has become a huge laboratory: from economic stability unparalleled in that decade – due to the model of 'inward growth', 'stabilizing development' or 'import substitution industrialization' (ISI) to the explosion of the external debt during the Seventies, and into the difficult era of the Eighties, characterized by policies of economic adjustments (devaluations and inflation) and the rise of unemployment and social dislocations that led to higher rates of poverty and social protest. From there, it was outlined, in the following decade the

national bumps into a stage of macroeconomic growth, continuity of structural adjustment, receiving external financial flows and control of inflation. Subsequently, it was not possible for a phase of macroeconomic growth, sustained structural adjustments, fluxes of foreign capital and inflation control to take place outside the disruptive recurrence of profound crises. The links and interactions between liberalization, democratization and crises were marked by contradictions and disjunctures.

Recent research highlights that in Latin America the "unfulfilled promises of Modernity" are increasingly addressed through the family, social networks and communal instances and less through formal institutions, precisely as part of the prevailing arrangements and in spite of a sustained process of social intervention (Mancini 2013; Lechner 2002). The research expresses the weakening of defined life cycles, the changes in the boundaries of family, community and spatial/social organizations and the redefinition of social roles (in particular of the occupational and citizenship role cluster). One of the sustained paradoxes in the region is precisely that the increase in the complexity and functional differentiation of societies (though weak, in process) takes place not instead of but following the rhythm of the traditional patterns of social formation.

This particular process of traditional individualization – associated with a familiarist conception of welfare – would enhance an informal approach to the uncertainties of modernity. Thus, traditional patterns may be generators or minimizers of the impact of risks, as a key perspective to modern institutional and cultural (civilizational) constellations.[12] It is indeed related to the diverse lines of continuity and change displayed by multiple modernities: it points to the limits of a determinist binomial modernization-differentiation. Particularly important dynamics of functional differentiation develop amidst social and cultural traditional practices.

In fact, it also points to the coupling between structural and dynamic inequalities, which defines new links between social risk, inequalities and welfare regimes in Latin America, while drawing increased social complexity and uncertainty. (Mancini 2015). As indicated, the pathways that social and economic transformations have followed in the region have redefined the principles of protection of social risks and its three main sources: State, family and market. Three processes outlined by Eisenstadt are displayed in Latin America: the loss of centrality by the nation state; the diversification of social categories; and a qualitative transformation of collective representation (Figure 6). If, in

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12    Thus, questioning approaches that consider that risks start where tradition ends (reflexive sociology).

the past, it was possible to guarantee collective agreements it was partially due to the relative homogeneity of social categories, to the centrality of the State (also as symbolic referent of social cohesion) and the presence of these principles in uniform collectivities with capacity to express their demands and engage in social action. The economic consensus and the agreement to regulate social relations inside the national frontiers have been fractured and so the organizational rules that frame social functions become flexible. The changing models of economic development interacted in equally contradictory ways with the political cycles and upheavals previously referred to (Esping Andersen 1989; Waisman 2002).

Contemporary Latin America faces the real and explanatory limits of traditional social categories and classical hierarchies (class structures, occupational structure) to explain the new ways an inner diversified and increasingly uncertain social stratification system is built today. Thus, processes associated with individualization, social uncertainty, transitional and ephemeral occupational status, reduction of social protection become new mechanisms of individual social inequality, which, due to their structural origin and its consequences, transcend the individual dimension and become factors of social reproduction (Beck 1998; Giddens 2002; Eisenstadt 2010b; Mancini 2015). The risk of social exclusion becomes extended and cuts diverse social strata that are, conversely, highly heterogeneous in their inner composition.

Finally, it cannot be denied that close to the emergence of new forms of representation, we are witnessing a process of growing expansion of interest in citizenry, a 'return of the citizen' in which a plurality of approaches coincide (Kymlicka & Wayne 1995; Kymlicka 1996). Perspectives oscillate between those who, in effect, emphasize the weakening of politics as a result of varying losses of credibility, representativity, and citizen participation (and its equivalent in communitarian sectors, understood as public orders), versus those who stress their revitalization, derived from a renewed interest in reconstituting the sphere of politics with new forms and new players. Thus, on the one hand, an over-exhaustion of politics takes shape: a lack of credibility regarding the performance of government figures and public institutions that is expressed through the uncertainty of citizens who do not see themselves reflected in traditional political players (Przeworski 1998); or a minimization of politics, expressed by the displacement of citizens' demands toward the social sphere, which would jibe with the vision of a growing 'privatization' of a citizenry that is no longer anchored in shared representations that are strictly universal and inclusive, but rather in differences, particularities, and fractures (Lechner 1997; Bokser 2002). On the other hand, emphasis is placed on the renewed vigour with which politics is taking shape in light of the broad horizon of the public

sphere and its redimensioning as the field and space where the causeways and modalities of collective coexistence are defined. Together with the recognition of social diversity, the approach that vindicates, within the framework of political pluralism, the solidity of institutions and their efficiency (while remaining anchored in the participation and creation of citizen consensus) is reinforced. Latin America, in turn, would be constrained by the need to overcome historic gaps and lack of convergence between politics and other dimensions, specifically economics, which has given rise to a serious democratic deficit in processes of collective reflection and deliberation (Alarcón 1999).

The re-emergence of the concept of citizenship can also be seen as an attempt to integrate the demands of justice, in direct reference to the concept of individual rights, with those of community belonging, derived from phenomena associated with the rearticulation of collective identities, the rationale of justice, and the feeling of belonging to a specific community (Cortina 1997).

The possibility of bringing together both vectors remits us, in turn, to the recognition and feasibility of minorities and Diasporas displaying their collective dimension in the public sphere.

Axes of continuity and variability both structural and cultural overlap in new ways outlining traces and tendencies towards complexity and heterogeneity of Latin American societies and political praxis; the symbolic, cultural and institutional variability of the diverse configurations of modernity in the region reaffirms the potentialities of the Multiple Modernities conception.

# Kant, Modernity and the Absent Public

*Mark Jarzombek*

The word public has such strong colloquial usage that even philosophically we can forget that it 'has a history'. If we then try to trace that history we usually find our discussion expanding into issues of politics, law, governance, economics and even journalism and art. In this article, I want to focus not on what pubic is or can be or should be, but on what it is not; to argue that, from a philosophical perspective, the idea of the *modern* public is haunted by the devastating and purposeful negation of that concept by none other than Immanuel Kant, often heralded as one of the great fathers of modern liberalism. I would also like to interpret Kant as having proposed a type of alternative to the idea of 'the public' that could be understood even as an alternative modernity. In other words, there is a thematic of rupture in Kant's philosophy that undercuts his attempt to envision a holistic metaphysics. If we interpret Kant from this perspective, the violence of his approach comes better into focus.

Let us start by reconsidering the three maxims of how a society moves towards Enlightenment, as outlined in *Critique of Judgment*: (1) think for oneself; (2) think in the mindset of others; and (3) think consistently (Kant 1914: 169–173). The longer one considers these propositions, the stranger they sound. For example, if we take Maxim 2 seriously, we could become so busy connecting with others and, of course, they with us, that there is little room for that special someone, who presumably would get most of our empathetic energy. Friends, lovers, spouses and even relatives have no particular place in Kant's world. Hegel stated it perhaps all too bluntly; marriage for Kant "is degraded to a bargain for mutual use" (Hegel 2001: 140).

This might seem like a strange and much too casual way to begin a conversation about Kant, but one must remember that Jean-Jacques Rousseau placed a lot of emphasis on the family and its importance both historically in mankind's development and symbolically in each of our lives. According to Rousseau, "The most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural, is the family." Rousseau also dealt directly with issues of love, its passions and complexities in his novel *Julie*, a sensation when it first appeared in 1761 (for a good discussion of Rousseau see: Botting (2006)). Though Kant was always more resolutely intellectual than Rousseau, that does not itself explain his ambivalence to the topic of family and love. This is not to say that Kant is against 'the family'. He deals with the question in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), where

he spends at least a few pages discussing marriage, procreation and parental obligations. But the tone is, as Hegel so aptly noted, lawyeristic. The main issue for Kant hinges on when a young person who was "brought without his consent into the world, and placed in it by the responsible free will of others," becomes "in fact a Citizen of the world (*Weltbürger*)." (Kant 1797: First Part, Par. 28.)[1] In other words, Kant is less interested in the before as he is in the after; for it is only when a person strikes out as an independent *Weltbürger* that he can then presumably engage in Kant's planned three-step plan for enlightenment.

Whereas Rousseau consciously tries to match his philosophy with a real world principle, Kant does not. For him, it is not our family that is the source of our 'naturalness', but rather an innate and placeless sense of "sociability." In Paragraph 41 of the *Critique of Judgment*, just a few sentences after outlining his famous maxims, Kant points out that "sociability" is "requisite for man as a being destined for society, and so as a characteristic (*Eigenschaft*) belonging to humanity" (Kant 1914: 174). The actual phrase he uses for what gets translated as 'sociability' is "*Trieb zur Gesellschaft*," which is much stronger than the English translation might imply. It is an innate drive, a compulsion, or even an instinct toward the social.

The astonishing thing about this *Trieb* is that it is not linear. In fact, for Kant, we (and that means me and all the other billions of 'I's the world over) are motivated by our independence as individuals. In a sense, the *Trieb* is an internal dialectic that makes us want to be both independent and yet connected. Imagine that you are not married, sitting on a beach talking to your friends on Facebook with your IPad. That would be a perfect Kantian situation. With that image in mind we can see that Kant's "sociability" is fully modern in the sense that today we can probably be more 'Kantian' than back in the late eighteenth century. But even then, his proposition is startling. This is not to say that Rousseau was a more conventional thinker, only that Kant's modernity is markedly different from Rousseau's. One might even be tempted to say that he is more utopian than Rousseau, but that would be wrong. It is certainly obvious that today we might have greater difficultly envisioning what Kant might have wanted even in our era, and indeed the underlying tone of my article is to suggest that we can never be as fully modern as Kant would want, even in the age

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1   To this he adds "All this training [by the parent] is to be continued till the Child reaches the period of Emancipation (*emancipatio*), as the age of practicable self-support. The Parents then virtually renounce the parental Right to command, as well as all claim to repayment for their previous care and trouble; for which care and trouble, after the process of Education is complete, they can only appeal to the Children by way of any claim, on the ground of the Obligation of Gratitude as a Duty of Virtue." [First Part, Par. 29]

of Facebook. Stated differently, though we like to generally think that we live in a modern age, Kant was, in some respects, *more* modern than us, if we understand the word modern to mean a break from natural orders.

This break was not just when a young person becomes a world citizen, and it is not just when that person releases himself or herself to the driving dialectic of sociability. It is also a break *within* the discipline of philosophy. Whereas Rousseau discussed 'the public' in his *Social Contract*, differentiating the public person from the private individual and making the public person a key element in his republican ideal (a basic premise of much political thought even today), Kant shuns this distinction and, indeed, clearly tries to deconstruct that classic duality. The word that he proposes instead is *sensus communis*, a complicated term that he points out has a legal, Latin meaning and a more colloquial meaning as 'common sense'. *Sensus communis* is created not at the beginning of the three-step process, but at the end. Just as the *Trieb* is technically and initially split against itself between the I and the We – and solves the issue of motivation – *sensus communis* has a double dimension, a legal one and a colloquial one, which, in the end, resolves powerful communalities itself.

Before I look more closely at the *sensus communis*, let me return to Maxim 2, where Kant asks us to 'think in the mindset of others'. The German phrase is *an der Stelle jedes anderen denken*, which means something a bit more like 'put yourself mentally in the shoes of others'. It involves almost a type of physical displacement of the mind as emphasized by the phrase *an der Stelle*, which means 'in the place [of]'. It is obvious that regardless of what this entails, it is *not* the same as engaging in a public discourse, nor is discourse even asked for. Kant seems to suggest that I am not just sitting down at a table and talking to the person, but, for a while at least, trying to 'be' that person, in my mind. It is a type of alternative ontology where I have to suppress my notion of self-hood and try to become someone else, standing in that person's shoes. This raises the question, how does one inform oneself about this person's – any person's – life and activities? Kant does not say exactly how you and I should go about doing this. What does that person eat? Is he grumpy in the morning? How does he have friends? I would be expected, I presume, to do this with both men and women, since Kant nowhere – despite his culturally conditioned assumption that Man is a he – states that we should be careful to separate men from women. Naturally, in the late eighteenth century, Kant would have imagined a restrained interest in each other's lives. He seems to suggest the advantage of dinner parties in promoting good interaction, even going so far as to say that wine is better than beer for such purposes. Beer makes "guests more dreamy and withdrawn, whereas at a wine-party the guests are cheerful, boisterous, talkative, and witty" (Kant 2006: 63). Even so, his position is as scary as it is

exciting and nowhere does he really discuss the limits of interaction necessary to perform Maxim 2.

Today, we might use the word empathy to describe such a connection. But it is not exactly correct. When we think of empathy, a late nineteenth-century concept, we associate it with emotional contact or with sympathy. It is a psychological attitude associated with a positive human value. But Maxim 2 is not about emotional contact. On the contrary! It is where Kant locates the empirical. The process is purely fact finding. It does *not* involve compassion and certainly does not involve judgement. Its neutrality is key. Perhaps we can see the activity of Maxim 2 as performing a type of sociology or anthropology. We must have a disinterested interest in the life of other people in order to successfully perform this maxim.[2]

Kant wants the person that I am having this exchange with to do the same with me. I am not just the instigator of such interest; I am the subject of the interest of others, *many* others in fact. And finally, we have to remember that he wants all of us to do this with everyone else over the extended period of our lives. That is the essence of Maxim 3, the *cumulative* result of which produces an allusive '*sensus communis*', the sense of the communality. This concept is sometimes discussed as if it were equivalent with 'the public'. Indeed, the use of the word public in English translations can throw one off the trail of this issue. He uses the word *Gemeinschaft* or the adjective *öffentlichen*, but always in a way that does not conflict with the more important neologism *sensus communis*. One sees the problem when the phrase "[…] unter dem *sensus communis* aber muss man die Idee eines gemeinschaftlichen Sinnes […]" is translated as "[…] however, the name *sensus communis* is to be understood [as] the idea of a *public* sense […]." *Gemeinschaft* may indeed often be translated as 'public', but philosophically-speaking this is a mistake since Kant is specifically trying to avoid using the that word (Kant 1914: Par 40, p. 151).

For Kant there is no external, potentially alienated Will separate from our personal lives. In other words, for every Public there has to be a Private, but that duality is precisely what Kant is aiming to avoid, if not in fact deconstruct. In replacing the concept 'the public', which importantly does not appear at all in *The Critique of Judgment*, with *sensus communis*, Kant changes the terms of the discussion, producing a whole new architecture of thought. If we want to coin a term that would best describe *sensus communis*, it would be Sphere of Sociability.

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2  Some scholars mistakenly argued that Kant was a type of empathy theorist. See for example: Calloway-Thomas, Carolyn (2010: 10), Moen & Marcia (1997: 221).

In *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* (1784), Kant admits that the making of a *sensus communis* is a process that is easy to state theoretically, but is, in fact, "difficult and slow to accomplish" in real life. "*Daher kann ein Publikum nur langsam zur Aufklärung gelangen*" (Kant 1784: 483). Kant's use of the word *das Publikum* in this context is not neutral. It is not quite a put-down, but nor is it particularly positive. The people who constitute a *Publikum* are people who have not achieved Enlightenment; namely, who have not elevated themselves out of its limitations.

What, then, does it take to have not a mere *Publikum*, but an enlightened *sensus communis*? It certainly does not require a vote. It does not necessarily require a democracy. Public spaces as we might understand them today are not necessary either, nor even a parliament building. People do need the status of freedom, however, and spaces to meet and talk, but this could be served just as effectively on a public bus as in a private room. In this, Kant's philosophy is strikingly different from the conventions of what we might think when it comes to liberalism. The revolution in Egypt could be considered a good example of Kantian politics in the way that it unified Facebook with events in the street. But it is clearly not Kantian in other respects, since Kant would want the Egyptians to connect with the Israelis and vice versa and for the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood to connect with the secularist, and this is most certainly not going to happen. Once again, Kant is imagining a modernity that was just as difficult in the eighteenth century as it is now.

My point here is to remind ourselves that the concept of 'the public' is hardly as stable as we might suppose, and in the case of Kant we have to deal with a difficult theoretical situation where there literally is no 'public'. We would have to draw up a footnote here, however, for just as Kant suggests that we are not by nature 'public' but 'social', equally we are not by nature 'private'. This complicates matters yet further, for all of us today would generally assume an interiority to our lives that would be impossible in the philosophy of Kant. Though his critique of 'the public' is quite conscious, his critique of 'the private' is, however, an accident of history, since 'privacy' as we understand it today is largely a construct of the nineteenth century. This means that in coming to terms with Kant we should not imply a 'private' where there is none; just as importantly, we should not sneak 'a public' back into his thought, a problem that vexes several contemporary interpretations of Kant.

Among the philosophers against whom Kant was arguing was, of course, John Locke, who gave us the first modern, theorized distinction between public and private, or more specifically between public good and private possession. Locke – like Kant for that matter – was not interested in private thoughts, private feelings or anything that we might include in the general discussion of

'personal privacy'. His primary concern was the relationship between you and what you own. It was a thoroughly mercantile perspective. Owning a sack of coffee beans, for example, requires a distinctive set of legal protections, such as a contract, that guarantees the legitimacy of private ownership and that allows the beans to be sold or marketed without corruptions.

Kant gets rid of the issue of possessions in that standard sense. In fact, his entire perspective is mildly anti-capitalist if not outright anti-legalistic. What I 'possess' is not a thing, but my 'sociability'. And here the nineteenth century German philosopher Max Stirner in his book *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (1845) seems to extract this important message out of Kant's philosophy. Stirner goes past Kant, however, in arguing that what we possess is more limited than sociability; it is self-identity, or what we today might call the ego.

So the question is, not just how does sociability work, but what holds it together if it is not laws or contracts? Basically, it boils down to good behaviour. In *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant writes that the one thing in the world that is unambiguously good is 'good will'. He opens the book with the following forceful sentence: "Nothing in the world – or *out of it!* – can possibly be conceived that could be called 'good' without qualification except a Good Will." In fact, so he continues, "power, riches, honour, even health, and happiness" are for naught "if there isn't a good will to correct their influence on the mind." (Kant 2010–15: 5). Kant is, in a sense, challenging the emerging tradition of Enlightenment legalism, the very one that was to become the foundation of a certain stream of modern thinking. He is clearly fighting several fronts at the same time, whether it be legalism, which for him is too static, or the family, which limits the individual's right to free association.

And this brings us to the reason Kant's philosophy was so distasteful to so many philosophers in the nineteenth century. Kant argued that it was precisely because we are potentially so different from each other that we have to strip away the natural over-determinism of our ontology to engage the ontology of the Other. This *de*-ontological move is the most astonishing aspect of Kant's thought. We may be neighbours, and yet we are completely unknown to each other – and to *ourselves*! – until we begin the laborious, *life-long* process of interaction.

The splitting of the Self into a Self and a not-Self, which is the requirement of Maxim 2, is Kant's most radical proposition, and the one that Hegel would later most vehemently disparage since, for Hegel, it breaks the Self into incompatible and irreconcilable parts. For Hegel, philosophy, because it is philosophy and not social science, *must* talk about the Self as a unit, and for better or worse begin from that basic proposition. One cannot start philosophy, according to Hegel, with a Self split against itself. Ultimately, Hegel won the

argument, since his views became the basic tenet not only of Romanticism and nationalism, but of existentialism and phenomenology with their long reaches into contemporary philosophy and politics.

Perhaps one can say that if Kant removed 'the public' from philosophical legitimacy and tried to replace it with an alternative concept, the *sensus communis*, it was really only the first effort that succeeded. Once 'the public' was removed as a philosophical project it was never really reinstated. Hegel, for example, does claim to put the public back into play, but he limits it by equating it with the nation state. And the situation gets no better with Edmund Husserl. Husserl's idea of the Life-World, for example, is diametrically opposed to the idea that there is a metaphysics of 'the public' or even of 'the nation'. Needless to say, the word does not appear in any of his major writings. In fact, Husserl is so anti-public that there is almost no glue holding society together. Kant at least believed in the significant power of moral teaching and the principle of duty, concepts that provided the 'glue' in the face of the absent public. These enlightenment abstractions are completely absent in Husserl.

According to Husserl, in a lecture he gave in 1935, "to live as a person is to live in a social framework, wherein I and We live together in community and have the community as a horizon." He then points out that by communities he means things such as "family, nation, or international community," where it is expected that I participate in "creating culture" within these continuities. Though this sounds not particularly controversial, remember that the 'I' and the 'We' are firstly separate and, secondly, bound together into a cultural formation. As the lecture continues, he makes it clear that there are only two types of cultural formations, the healthy and the sick. The European nations, he says, "are sick," this largely because of the false promises of science. So he asks his listeners to return to the "birthplace" of Europe; namely to Greece, which developed "a new kind of attitude of individuals toward their environing world." It was "a new type of spiritual structure, rapidly growing into a systematically rounded (*geschlossen*) cultural form that in it totality can be called philosophy" (Husserl 1935).[3]

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3   Some phenomenologists, for example, Alfred Schutz, have tried to solve this problem of the social. Schutz argued that since past and future are outside of the range of 'experience' we must concentrated on our individual contemporary situations, which he calls *Umwelt*, that consists of face-to-face relationships with 'consociates'. This produces 'we' relations, which are defined by a high degree of knowledge of those involved in the interaction. But these groups of "we" are still loosely bonded compared to the more rigorous analytics that Kant is calling for.

The standard English translation 'systematically rounded' is not accurate since the term *geschlossen* means 'closed', 'closed off' or even 'locked up' like a door. The We in that sense is not particularly inclusive. If anything, it resists newcomers and thus stands as the furthermost antithesis to Kant's system that, politically-speaking, made no such injunction. The need for this closedness is, however, obvious in the philosophy of Husserl, since he needs to explain how the 'I' and the 'We' come together if there is no inbuilt social requirement for them to interact for social bonds. Compare this with Kant's use of the term *sociabilitas*, which he defined thus: "While making oneself a fixed centre of one's principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world... to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity - agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect... and so to associate the graces with virtue." (Kant 1996: 218).

Kant's idea of *sociabilitas* and its related command to put yourself in the place of others, even though he means this conceptually and not literally, will yield a coherency only over a long period of time. Initially, if anything, it produces a purposeful destabilization of the ego. Husserl can accept no such shock to the system. A healthy community begins from a powerful 'I' that when multiplied along the line produces a closed social reality, which in turn allows the 'I' and the 'We' to coexist, something which is not possibly and not even wanted if the 'We' is sick.

To simplify, one can say Hegel took away Maxim 2 and asked us to go from Maxim 1 to Maxim 3, which in his philosophy focuses on the nation state. Husserl then took away the nation state as just another metaphysical falsity, leaving, in a sense Maxim 1. And so the damage was done. As liberating as it is, Husserl's world is a potentially dangerous place to be. If the 'We' is sick, that liberates the 'I' from its social obligations. What then?

This quick foray into the twentieth century was only meant to raise the question, how did the 'public' as a philosophical project survive this assault against it? Why is that today we can talk of 'the public' with a sense of normalcy, against the grain of its spectral position within modern philosophical discourse?

The answer has a lot to do, ironically, with the rise of the nation state in the nineteenth century. It was in the interest of the nation state, after all, to have 'a public' that does not reflect on the philosophic impossibility of that term, much less return to Kant's positive-negation of the word. Just as Romantic philosophy wants to produce a stable and active ego, it wants to produce the image of a stable and active public, if only because the nation state needs to stabilize its increasingly bureaucratic and legalistic hold on life. The rise of the

bourgeoisie, of global colonialism and of professional societies in the Victorian era especially in the 1880s played a critical part in normalizing the idea of a public. But the 'public' was put back into the philosophical system really only with Karl Marx, who demanded the abolition of property in the name of some vaguely defined 'public purposes'. In other words, for Marx, 'the public' was the new super structure that was bigger than the defunct bourgeois word, with its self-serving interests. And therein lies at least one of the sources of the modern confusion about the public as a type of enemy of the individualism. But that is a different story and takes me out of philosophy and into history and politics. I want to remain focused on the post-Kantian, philosophical resistance to 'the public', for I am not convinced that the return of 'the public' – often associated with a liberal rejection of self-interest – matches with the anti-public philosophy of liberal thinking.

Let me take as a small example the case of Richard Sennett, who sees himself as a champion of what he calls the "public realm." According to him:

> The most important fact about the public realm is what happens in it. Gathering together strangers enables certain kinds of activities which cannot happen, or do not happen as well, in the intimate private realm. In public, people can access unfamiliar knowledge, expanding the horizons of their information. Markets depend on these expanding horizons of information. In public, people can discuss and debate with people who may not share the same assumptions or the same interests. Democratic government depends on such exchanges between strangers. The public realm offers people a chance to lighten the pressures for conformity, of fitting into a fixed role in the social order; anonymity and impersonality\ provide a milieu for more individual development. This promise of turning a fresh personal page among strangers has lured many migrants to cities. [This takes place in] squares, major streets, theatres, cafes, lecture hall, government assemblies, or stock exchanges.
> SENNETT 2012

Strangers meeting, talking and sharing experiences in the real and metaphorical openness of the public space is very Kantian and is linked to the core principles of Kant's liberalism. But Kant never says that such connections have to take place in a public space. This means that Sennett, by inserting 'public space' into the system, winds up adopting an anti-public position. He claims, for example, that he is part of a "performative school" of thinking, which, "stripped of the jargon," means simply that we focus "on how people express themselves to strangers." It is an interesting and meritorious ambition. Sennett

does not say how this happens in real life and he most certainly does not say that people should go and live like these strangers for a while "in thought and place." Rather, I am expected to *express* myself and it is up to the stranger to try to figure it out. It demands an ethos of attentiveness, which, as admirable as that might be, is – remarkably – not required in Kant. How exactly do we produce attentiveness? How do we compensate for the vastly different social constructions associated with listening and performing? What if my performance is a bad one or if someone goes away misinterpreting it? It is, in fact, precisely because of the stresses in the expressive exchange that Sennett needs the public space to be real, where it serves not as a 'public space', but as a space of temperance and surveillance. Kant's modernity needs no such space.

Sennett, of course, is being reasonable, for Kant's position, as I have hoped to show, is almost nonsensical. It is impossible to imagine a true Kantian modernity; but I am more interested in his nonsense than the liberalist repair job that tries to insert – all too quickly I argue – 'the public' back into the machine.

I close with a thought experiment. What would a Kantian city actually look like? First, it would be a city without houses. Even though Kant could hardly have imagined a city without houses, a purist reading of his texts would make such things difficult to imagine. A house would be the symbolic locus of 'family' and there is no foundational ideology of 'family' in his philosophy, so no houses. It would probably be a city of apartments. One could envision any number of scenarios from linear cities to sprawling field cities to smaller, more irregular towns. At various frequencies in the city there would be meeting and seminar rooms, and places where people can visit and talk. A university as such would be too top heavy for Kant; there would be instead a loose infrastructure of exchange-and-learning centres and community colleges. The city would also have a good deal of glass, both transparent and reflective, for in Kantian world there is no mandate for private intimacy as it is conventionally understood today; namely, as an area outside the jurisdictional gaze of the State. 'Private space' as it conventionally might be called would be needed, but only as places to get away and think about things. To 'think for yourself', i.e. Maxim 1, you have to go to a place where one can shut down the interfering voices of all the thousands of people one knows. But this could happen in any number of places.

So, imagine a city of streets and no freestanding houses; then imagine that the street facades and many of the interior walls are made of glass. But like Swiss cheese, there are dark boxes of space where individuals can spend time alone, perhaps reading a book, listening to music or, at any rate, thinking for oneself. Some of these places may be 'owned' by individuals, but most would

be open to anyone. Next, imagine Encounter Buses that drive around the city, allowing one to meet with people for short exchanges. Perhaps there could be Exchange Pods, where such meetings could be stretched out for hours or even days.

There would also be no professions in the modern sense. And that means there would be no architect professionals. As to how the city would get built, the closest model today that might work for Kant would be 'design-build' where clients and architects work together to solve problems. But if everything were design-build, there would be no progress, no conceptual jump into a better world that is so critical to the Kantian Enlightenment project. We would just have a continual repetition of the same. The *genius*, or several of them, would be required, meaning that the city would have an occasional building by Frank Gehry or Le Corbusier. We would study these buildings and appreciate them just like the other great works of art that make up the history of civilization. The city would even have an assortment of memorial statues dedicated not to our politicians, but to these artistic geniuses as inspiration for those who think that they can be the next genius.

This Kantian city would be a relatively serious place. It is hard to imagine ballrooms or circuses in a Kantian city. There are no Foucauldian, heterotopic zones. Nor would there be major public buildings like courthouses and parliament buildings, since Kant wants us to work together to come up with our own laws, from the bottom up, so to speak, and not just swallow whatever comes down from above. Political parties of any large scale would not exist, but there would be associations created by people who come together to define a particular common interest around a problem or concern. Courthouses would not be banned, of course, but they would only exist in a small-scale and be distributed throughout the urban landscape as places that stabilize and reaffirm the thinking of the *sensus communis*. They would need to be 'blended in' and not freestanding edifices. In the Kantian city, there would be no police force but community watches, no army of any substantial size, and even the sciences would be barely autonomous from the imprint of communal humanism. A place like MIT or Harvard? Impossible. The city would have to be networked across the landscape with other villages and cities and in no way cut off or isolated. There would have to be places where foreigners and other world-citizens could come and meet and, indeed, most inhabitants themselves would have travelled widely in the great coming and going of cultural exchange. In the Kantian town there would be a wide range of hostels and hotels, clustered around 'connection zones'. Residents would have to be accustomed to signs reading: 'Not currently in my office. Work will resume in two weeks.' This means that the Kantian city could never develop an industrial profile with

alienated elites and labouring hordes. Imagine the late nineteenth century Victorian city with its city hall, public parks, post offices, public schools, and concert halls. Most definitely, not Kantian.

The Kantian city is thus difficult to imagine. In some respects it would be more modern than anything we live in today and in other respects it would never produce the industrialized ethos that we now take for granted.

These quick and purposefully reductive ruminations on Kant are meant to show that despite Kant's wide influence in our thinking, we never created a fully Kantian world. Perhaps thankfully, and this means that if we can agree that we live in a world saturated with the presumption of *our* modernity, Kant's modernity, if we can call it that, never became realized as such, even though pieces of it infiltrated here and there into various disciplinary and political realities. Its most powerful impact, however, was to transform the philosophical understanding of the public into a dialectic, the negation of which became the dominant thematic in the philosophy of Hegel, Husserl and others. The modern idea of a public is not just a signifier of certain types of realities, but a signifier of its negation, which it carries with it like a scar despite the various attempts to maintain and normalize it in post-Enlightenment philosophy. What I, therefore, intended in this article was to bring us back to that particularly strained moment in Kant's thought where we can see the beginning of a modernist rupture that, in a sense, is rendered invisible by modernity itself. Kant had hoped that his deconstruction of the concept of the public would yield a new positive, but it did not play out that way. This means that before we can write a history of the concept of the public, we have to recognize not only the productive strangeness of the Kantian premise, but also that this strangeness, built around a strategy of calculated impossibility, wound up producing the unresolved tension about what is 'the public' even today.

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