

GLOBAL REORDERING

Series Editors: S. Breslin and
A. Broome

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**THE EUROPEAN
UNION IN A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD**

World Trade, Global Governance
and the Case of the WTO

Megan Dee





The European Union in a Multipolar World

Global Reordering

Series Editors: **S. Breslin and A. Broome**

How is the global order changing, and why? The contemporary dynamics of the global political economy and global security in the twenty-first century are experiencing a series of fundamental transitions, which are challenging and transforming the existing global order. These dynamics are reshaping relations between and within different categories of actors such as states, club forums, international organizations, transnational policy communities, private sector agencies and corporations, and civil society organizations. At the same time, processes of global reordering have led to the emergence of new issue areas and policy problems that the existing landscape of national, regional, and global governance is struggling to effectively address.

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▶ **The European Union
in a Multipolar World:
World Trade, Global
Governance and the
Case of the WTO**

Megan Dee

University of Warwick, UK

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For Alex



Commit your works unto the Lord and your thoughts shall be established. (Proverbs 16: 3)

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CCP	Common Commercial Policy
DFQF	Duty-Free, Quota-Free
DG	Directorate-General
EBA	Everything But Arms
EC	European Community
G5	Group of 5 (EU, United States, Brazil, China, India)
G20	Group of 20 (developing countries concerned with agricultural issues in the WTO)
G33	Group of 33 (coalition of developing countries pressing for flexibility to undertake limited market opening in agriculture)
G90	Group of 90 (LDCs, ACP and African Group countries in the WTO)
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LTFR	Less Than Full Reciprocity
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South
NAMA	Non-Agricultural Market Access
NAMA-11	coalition of developing countries seeking flexibilities to limit market opening in industrial goods trade

RAM	Recently Acceded Member
SDT	Special and Differential Treatment
SEM	Single European Market
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TGWA	Trade, Growth and World Affairs
TiSA	Trade in Services Agreement
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRIPS	Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
T-TIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
WTO	World Trade Organization

1

The Emergence of a Multipolar World

Abstract: The world of today is witnessing the rise of new and diverse global powers capable of wielding influence in both global markets and global governance. Multilateralism has become increasingly difficult, yet never more important. Diplomacy has a renewed significance. This is an emerging multipolar world. In this introductory chapter the concepts and debate on an emerging multipolar world are developed and considered. Setting out the book's main aims, outline and principal arguments, this chapter offers an important overview of what an emerging multipolar world might mean for the world's foremost global trading bloc and economic power, the European Union.

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Introduction

There is little doubt that the world is a very different place today than it was 30, 20 or even 10 years ago. The end of the Cold War was to bring with it both shrinking borders and new power brokers; closer interdependence and greater global insecurities. Globalisation has brought the abroad ever closer to home. Power is diffuse. Gone are the days when the 'West' could dictate policy and shape the world in its own image. The world of today is instead witnessing the rise of new and diverse global powers capable of wielding influence in both global markets and global governance. The wealth of the economic powerhouses of the latter half of the 20th century, including the United States, Europe and Japan, has begun to wane, while the global south is on the rise, not least in the form of the emerging economies, China, India and Brazil. Multilateralism has become increasingly difficult, yet never more important. Diplomacy has a renewed significance. This is an emerging multipolar world.

For observers of international politics the interaction of 'poles' – that is, the 'great powers' – in the world has been a topic of interest since Thucydides first posited that, 'the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must'. Great powers, and the balance of power between them, are topics at the core of both scholarly theory and policy debate and, though the world may be changing, the importance of power has not. While the emergence of a neo-Westphalian system is now speculated – with the growing influence of international institutions, markets, civil society and transnational corporations seen to be shaping the world as never before (Dennison et al., 2013, 4; Held, 2010; Setser, 2008) – states and, as in the case of the European Union (EU), unions of states still constitute the main units of power within the international system. Understanding how global reordering and the changing dynamics of an emerging multipolar world order impact the behaviour of states within the international system is thus of continuing and ever increasing importance.

It is to these issues and the broader impact of a changing world order that this book is aimed. Specifically, this book is interested in how the emergence of a multipolar world is impacting the behaviour and role of one particular actor – the EU. Considered to be something of a *sui generis* global actor, and power, the EU is perhaps an unusual candidate of focus in a book dedicated to the subject of global reordering and multipolarity. However, as this book shall highlight, the changes that have taken

place within the international system since the end of the Cold War have been largely economic in character. Despite its idiosyncrasies as a global actor, the EU is, by any definition, a 'pole' within the global economy and a powerhouse of the multilateral trading system. With 28 member states and a population of just over 500 million people, the EU remains today one of the world's largest, richest, single markets. Speaking with one voice in its external trade and commercial policies, the EU has also wielded considerable influence within global economic governance, not least in the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The emergence therefore of a multipolar world – particularly a multipolar trading world – has had, and will continue to have, important ramifications for this great economic power.

Such ramifications are already being made manifest. While some project optimistic forecasts that the EU's unique political make-up, international identity and 'multilateral genes' (Jørgensen, 2009, 189) make it well-suited to tackle the new dynamics of a changing world order (Santander, 2014, 70; McCormick, 2013; Leonard, 2005), others have increasingly lamented the EU for its fall from influence and decline within international politics, the global economy and in systems of global governance (Webber, 2014; ECFR, 2014; M. Smith, 2013; Dennison et al., 2013; Whitman, 2010; Fischer, 2010). Within the WTO – an international institution established in 1995 largely in response to EU and US demands – the EU's power and position have particularly been brought into question (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014; Young, 2011; Dür & Zimmerman, 2007), with the seemingly failed or failing WTO's Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations frequently cited as example of how an emerging multipolarity is negatively impacting global governance and the influence of the EU within it (Webber, 2014; M. Smith, 2013, 661; Peterson et al., 2012, 8; Gowan, 2012; van Langenhove, 2010, 12). Widely associated with the rise to prominence of the emerging economies and their increasing influence within the multilateral trading system (i.e. Economist, 2009), the EU's perceived decline as a global trading power-broker does raise several critical questions about its response to, and role within, an emerging multipolar world.

In particular, these contrasting expectations of the EU's role in a changing world present something of a puzzle. Why, if the EU is expected to be a pole best suited to an emerging multipolar world, has it been seen as a declining power with a diminishing relevance and performance in systems of global governance? More than this, it raises

the question explicitly of *how* the EU has been influenced by the emergence of a multipolar world, and *why* claims have reverberated of the EU's perceived fall from grace.

In responding to these research questions this book shall present the following core arguments. First, the EU has experienced a substantive shift in its role positioning and performance within the WTO and multilateral trading system since the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was launched in 2001. Moving from a proactive, and reformist pusher and leader in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has since transformed its approach to play a variety of different roles including defender, mediator, laggard, cruiser and bystander.

Second, rather than being a reflection of a Europe in Decline, the changes in the EU's role within the Doha Round are evidence of a Europe in transformation. Reflecting pragmatism in dealing with the changing dynamics of the international system, the EU's strategic reorientation and its more reactive roles within the Doha Round in favour of bilateral and regional trade agreements have demonstrated the EU's increasing ability to broaden its role-set to adjust to the new geopolitical reality of a multipolar world.

Third, the EU's role in a multipolar world going forward should be considered less as the EU being a unique and 'different' type of actor or power, but rather as the EU acting as any other pole. In this respect a shift in focus away from the Power Europe (Normative, Civilian, Ethical, etc.) debate, which has tended to position the EU in a narrow role-set of a proactive and reformist role model for others to follow, is recommended. Instead focus is directed towards a broader reconceptualisation of Pragmatic Polar Europe which addresses the EU's capacity to adopt a multitude of roles, across a multitude of negotiation forums, in order to practically and strategically adapt to a changing world.

Highlighting the concepts and debates surrounding the issue of global reordering and multipolarity, and the EU's place as a 'pole' in today's international system, this chapter thus sets the scene for the book in its assessment of the EU in an emerging multipolar world. In so doing the chapter is broken into four sections. Section 1 addresses the concepts and debate surrounding the emergence of a multipolar world. In Section 2 the changing dynamics of a multipolar international system are outlined with specific reference to its implications for global governance and multilateralism. In Section 3 focus is turned to the EU itself, addressing its make-up as a global actor, and power, and elaborating upon the

contrasting expectations of what a multipolar order will mean for the world's largest trading bloc. Section four then provides a brief justification for focusing specifically on the WTO and its Doha Round along with an overview of the chapters to follow.

The emerging 'multipolar' world

A multipolar international system exists where there are 'a number of states wielding substantial power in the international system; there are a number of "great powers"' (Young, 2010, 3, see also Haass, 2008, 1). In a multipolar world order, 'several major powers of comparable strength... cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns' (Huntington, 1999, 35). Multipolarity is distinctive from a *bipolar* system which has just two great powers of roughly equal size and capability (Mearsheimer, 2001, 269–70), whose relationships, alliances and behaviour are central to international politics (Huntington, 1999, 35). It further differs from a *unipolar* system which consists of just one great power (or 'hyper power'), 'whose capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced' by any other state in the system (Wohlforth, 1999, 9).

It is an undisputed fact that the end of the Cold War brought an end to a bipolar world order that had existed for over 40 years, dominated by the United States and Soviet Union, and established, for a time, a unipolar world dominated by the United States as the world's only superpower. The unparalleled power capabilities of the United States and its pre-eminence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have been well documented (Ikenberry et al., 2009; Jervis, 2006; Ikenberry, 2001; Wohlforth, 1999; Huntington, 1999). Nearly three decades since the end of the Cold War and the United States continues to demonstrate an enduring preponderance. Spending nearly as much on its military and defence as the whole of Europe and East Asia combined,² the United States is the only power in the world with the capacity to sustain a global military force (Mearsheimer, 2010), and it possesses nearly half of the world's operational nuclear warheads (SIPRI Yearbook, 2013, 12). In economics and technological development, the United States is a global leader. It is moreover a truism that the United States has had an unprecedented political influence on the creation, and landscape, of today's world order, not least in terms of the international institutions it sponsored and helped establish after World War II (Vezirgiannidou, 2013).

Despite its preponderance, the longevity of the United States' 'unipolar moment' (Krauthammer, 1990) has nevertheless come under some scrutiny (Layne, 1993). A burgeoning debate has begun to focus upon whether the world is now witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world order (Wade, 2011; Held, 2010; Hiro, 2010; Moravcsik, 2010, 154; Drezner, 2007), in which several centres of power or 'poles' exist. In sharp contrast to the proponents of unipolarity who espouse the military superiority of the United States, those arguing that a multipolar world order is emerging have focused instead upon the growing economic powers, and particularly, the emerging economies, or BRICS³ – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (NIC, 2012; Wade, 2011; Held, 2010, 2–3; Young, 2010, 3; Moravcsik, 2010, 154; Drezner, 2007).

In this emerging multipolar world, power is perceived to be more diffuse (Haass, 2008). No longer assessed solely on the grounds of military hard power; the 'great powers' of the 21st century are being assessed on their global shares of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), their competitiveness in global markets and their shares of world trade (see Held, 2010, 2; Young, 2010; Drezner, 2007). Global economic and demographic trend reports are becoming polarity calculators (see IMF, 2013; NIC, 2012, 2008). More than this, while power in this emerging multipolar world continues to be seen in part as a calculable asset, assessed in terms of economic strength, population (and thus market) size and technological capabilities of the major economies, it is also being associated far more with political influence in systems of global governance (Young, 2010, 3).

Conceptualisations of power are thus increasingly being understood in relational terms, whereby, 'A has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do' (Dahl, 1957, 202–203; see also Strange, 1994, 25; D. Baldwin, 2013). As a consequence, power, and the great powers, are today being identified not only as those actors with (or the potential to have) great material resources, but as those who are able to influence decisions and shape outcome within the international system and, most particularly, in international institutions. The fact that, by 2025, China and India are expected to have the world's second, and fourth, largest economies, respectively (NIC, 2008, *iv*; IMF, 2013), and that the developing economies are likely to outpace both the export and GDP growth of the developed economies by a factor of two or three in the decades ahead (WTO, 2013a, 45), are trends expected to impact not just the wealth, and power, of the world's current global

leaders – the United States and the EU – but also the global balance of power in political decision-making.

While the United States continues to dominate the global landscape as the world's largest military power, in economic and geopolitical terms an emerging multipolarity is now revealed in which the United States, the EU and BRICS (particularly China, India and Brazil as the leading BRICS import and export nations) are its key poles and with a growing number of middle or intermediate powers rising through the ranks. In this emerging multipolar world the balance of power is, however, unevenly distributed. As Posen (2009, 348) argues, 'polarity is not synonymous with equality... The great powers themselves vary in their capabilities'. While trends indicate that a more balanced multipolar world order may well emerge in the decades ahead (NIC, 2012), the current multipolar system is unbalanced (see Mearsheimer, 2001, 44–45) with the United States and the EU still largely superior to the BRICS in economic, military and political clout. As reflected in Table 1.1, in global shares of GDP – a useful indicator of the overall output of an economy – the United States and the EU today each account for nearly 20 per cent, compared to a combined BRICS share of 26 per cent. In terms of relative wealth moreover – an important indicator of the standard of living in each of the world's economies – the United States and the EU have by far the largest GDP per capita (at \$49.8k and \$31.2k, respectively) compared to a combined BRICS tally of \$51k.

In global competitiveness – an index calculated across a variety of pillars including, for example, labour market efficiency, infrastructure,

TABLE 1.1 *Global economic indicators of the major powers*

Economy	Global share of GDP (PPP) (%)	GDP per capita (PPP) (\$)
United States	19.5	49,797
European Union	19.9	31,213
China	14.1	8,305
Russia	2.9	16,594
India	5.7	3,707
Brazil	2.9	11,545
South Africa	0.7	10,942
Total BRICS	26.3	51,093
Total EU + US	39.4	81,010

Source: Google Public Data Explorer, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014 (Figures for 2011, based on Purchasing Power Parity).

higher education standards, social institutions and market size – the United States ranks fifth in the world while five of the EU's member states sit in the top ten rankings.⁴ China, in comparison, ranks 33rd in the world, while South Africa, Brazil, India and Russia rank between 53rd and 64th (World Economic Forum, 2013, 15). In terms of status moreover, China, India and Brazil continue to be identified as developing countries.⁵ Despite China's vast market size with a population of 1.3 billion, 128 million of its citizens continue to live below the poverty line (World Bank, 2014a). In India, one third of its 1.2 billion population lives in poverty (World Bank, 2014b). By contrast, the United States and the EU's member states are industrialised, classified as developed countries and high-income economies. Such asymmetry of wealth, competitiveness and status between the major powers⁶ does therefore make it important not to over-exaggerate claims of dramatic changes in the global balance of power (see also Young, 2010, 12).

And yet, the changing dynamics of today's global economy, most notably with regard to world trade, have enabled the emerging economies to exert a growing influence which requires closer analysis and better understanding. In the past 30 years global trade has undergone substantive changes. World merchandise and commercial services trade have increased, on average, by 7 per cent every year. Between 1980 and 2011 the developing economies raised their share of world exports from 34 per cent to 47 per cent, and their share of world imports from 29 per cent to 42 per cent (WTO, 2013a, 45). In the last 20 years the emerging Asian economies particularly have experienced an average growth rate of almost 8 per cent – three times the rate in the West (Held, 2010, 2). In 2008 China alone accounted for nearly one third of global economic growth and was one of the few large economies in the world to actually expand following the global financial crisis (Held, 2010, 3).

Only 20 years ago the World Wide Web became a public domain. Since then transactions and currency exchanges for businesses and enterprises of all sizes can be made at the push of a button. Improved transportation, communication and information technologies are making trade across borders quicker, simpler and cheaper. In that time, world trade has grown on average nearly twice as fast as world production, placing considerable importance onto international supply and production chains (WTO, 2013a, 45). Being competitive in trade today is no longer just a question of producing the best, and cheapest, product. Instead it is increasingly about 'trade in tasks', production lines and 'value chains' as

products designed in one country are assembled in another, and often-times using parts built from any number of locations around the world (see also Lamy, 2013, 23). This change has particularly boosted China's growth and, in just over 30 years, China has leapfrogged its way from ranking 30th to first as the world's leading merchandise exporter and second leading merchandise importer (WTO, 2013a, Table B.4).

Trade in services has also boomed during this time. In 1980 China and India had just 0.55 per cent and 0.78 per cent shares of global exports in commercial services, respectively. Today they are the world's fourth and eighth leading exporters and third and seventh leading importers of commercial services, respectively (WTO, 2013a, Table B.5 & B.6). The movement of trade has also changed dramatically in the last 30 years. In 1980, 56 per cent of world trade was between developed countries (North–North). Today North–North trade accounts for just 36 per cent (WTO, 2013a, 62). Twenty years ago less than one third of developing country trade was with other developing countries (Lamy, 2013, 20). Today, developing countries are the largest market for other developing countries, with South–South trade rising from 8 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent in 2011 (WTO, 2013a, 62).

With these changing trends in world trade, the agenda of trade negotiations has also invariably altered. The multilateral trade rounds conducted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, which were dominated largely by efforts to cut tariffs, customs barriers and subsidies on industrial products, textiles and agriculture, have today become far larger, more technical and focused increasingly upon a growing range of 'behind-the-border' issues (Young & Peterson, 2006). Today's multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the GATT's successor, the WTO, have sought to address issues as wide ranging as competition policy, procurement practices, intellectual property, trade facilitation, telecommunications, financial services, rules of origin, investment measures, environmental and labour standards and, above all, tackling non-tariff barriers to trade. With a more comprehensive multilateral trade negotiation agenda, bilateral and regional trade negotiations have also become more commonplace as states strive to either complement or bypass the more complex multilateral process (Lamy, 2013; Bhagwati, 2013). A dense, interconnected network of preferential trade and investment agreements between states and regions around the world has thus grown extensively since the late 1990s, adding to the complexity of the multilateral trading system.

Closer interdependence between the world's economies has further meant that trade disciplines and national practices implemented in one country have immediate effect in others. All states have industries to protect and business interests to pursue and the interdependence of trade has meant that every state's trading preferences and practices have an immediate impact in other countries. For the emerging economies particularly, their rapid economic growth has notably corresponded with a growing interest, and activity, in trade policy at a global multi-lateral level. If poles or great powers, 'are powers with general interests i.e. whose interests are as wide as the state-system itself, which today means world-wide' (Wight, 1978, 50), then the emerging economies are becoming ever more important poles within today's multilateral trading system. As former Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy (2013, 22), has stated, 'The emergence of developing countries as key players and as real contributors to global dialogue on trade and economics is a fundamental feature of the new geopolitical reality'.

Despite the existing power imbalances between the poles of today's emerging multipolar world therefore, the emerging economies are today capable of wielding considerable clout in geopolitical terms. In global governance and at the multilateral negotiation table the United States and the EU are thus being met with an increasing assertiveness from the emerging economies, each of whom have growing global trade interests to pursue, and developing national industries to protect.

Multipolarity and global governance

The term 'global governance' has become something of a buzz word in international relations (IR) scholarship in the past few decades (Barnett & Sikkink, 2008, 63). Global governance may be defined as, 'governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers' (Finkelstein, 1995, 369). International institutions are particularly important as forums for global governance across specific issues, with the WTO a principal forum for global trade governance. With 160 members, the WTO is the main governing body negotiating, agreeing and enforcing the rules relating to the global management of trade. It is moreover a crucial global governance forum codifying many of the global changes occurring in world trade. Thus the WTO is a useful test case in understanding how changes to the global economy, and to the

global balance of economic power, are shaping global governance and the role of the EU within them.

New players in global governance

As Barnett and Sikkink (2008, 78) point out, 'Any consideration of global governance must necessarily be concerned not only with collective action and international cooperation but also with questions of power'. For most observers of IR, the emergence of China, India and Brazil as 'global players' in the world economy has correlated to a growing political assertiveness within global governance (see Young, 2010, 3). However, how that assertiveness is being translated into influence, or into influence over whom, has largely remained unexplored. Focus has instead tended towards one-off cases where the emerging economies were believed to exert a new influence, such as the commonly cited example of the 2009 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen in which the EU was seen to be 'side-lined' from the top-negotiating table by the BASIC group including Brazil, South Africa, India and China (Afionis, 2011, 342; Wurzel & Connelly, 2011, 8; Vogler, 2011, 27; Oberthür, 2011, 670). The Copenhagen Summit has been especially used as a prominent example in showcasing the apparent decline of EU influence in the face of the emerging powers, with the EU widely lamented for its 'unconvincing' performance (Afionis, 2011, 342) and lack of influence (Wurzel & Connelly, 2011, 8).

The full extent to which the emerging economies have in fact developed as power brokers, capable of playing different roles and utilising their influence in systems of global governance nevertheless remains open to debate (see Tan, 2013). Particularly important to consider in the case of the emerging economies is that, in many international institutions the developing world remains at an automatic disadvantage as structures remain largely as they were in the 20th century being dominated by the United States, Europe and the 'West' (Faundez & Tan, 2010, 1; Young, 2010, Table 2).

Through more informal modes of decision-making however, the emerging economies are starting to demonstrate an improved position. As was evident at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, the emerging economies are becoming more visible as relevant and important players in the core group of negotiators involved in global decision-making. One other notable example is in the former Group of Eight, whose members

represented the world's most advanced economies, all from within North America and Europe, which is today replaced by the Group of Twenty, whose members also include China, India and Brazil.⁷ Within the WTO moreover, where a system of 'concentric circles' is employed in order to garner common ground between the most powerful actors before seeking consensus among wider groups of players (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 30), the emerging powers are now seen as essentially 'veto players' (Ahnliid & Elgström 2014, 80). With the former innermost negotiating circle, known as the 'Quad' – made up of the world's then leading trading powers the United States, the EU, Canada and Japan – now replaced by what is the G5 – made up of the United States, the EU, China, India and Brazil (Ahnliid, 2012; Mandelson, 2008b), the emerging economies are now capable of exerting weight in WTO decision-making structures. Thus, in a substantive shift from the former days of the GATT where China, India and Brazil were considered as 'bit players' (M. Baldwin, 2006, 939), today it is almost unthinkable for any multilateral trade agreement to be concluded in the WTO without their participation and consent.

Further informal recognition of the status of the emerging economies as rising power brokers in international institutions has been the increasing acceptance by the 'Big Two' – the United States and the EU – that they can no longer achieve all that they want globally without taking into account the preferences of other powers (Ikenberry et al., 2009, 16). The unilateralism that marked US foreign policy in the early 2000s has subsequently begun to be replaced by a renewed focus upon multilateral methods of decision-making and support for international institutions (White House, 2010, 12–13). The EU has also recognised the growing influence of the emerging economies and the need to work with them as partners in furthering 'effective multilateralism' (Council, 2008a, 11). Similar recognition is also being afforded the emerging economies in the increasing frequency of calls for formal reforms of the United Nations and international economic institutions to better reflect the new balance of global power (Gowan, 2012; Breslin, 2010; Sotoro, 2010; Zurn & Stephen, 2010). Such informal recognition is moreover important for the emerging economies because, as Hedley Bull (2002: 196) espoused:

Great powers are powers recognised by others ...to have certain special rights and duties. Great powers, for example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect peace and security of the international system as a whole.

Thus, while the formal structures of today's global governance reflect little plurality between the world's major economies, informally the emerging economies are gaining in recognition and informal status as power brokers within today's systems of global governance.

The EU as a 'pole'

Within the debate about an emerging multipolar world discourse has further developed around the EU and its own position as a 'great power' or 'pole' (Santander, 2014, K.E. Smith, 2013; McCormick, 2013; Gowan, 2012; Moravcsik, 2010; 152; Grevi, 2009; 37; Posen, 2009; Buzan, 2004; Wohlforth, 1999, 31). For scholars of the realist school, the EU presents something of a challenging subject (i.e. Ikenberry et al., 2009). As a polity the EU is neither a state nor an international institution. While the diffusion of power since the end of the Cold War has opened up the possibility of actors, other than states, possessing power resources, capabilities and projection in the international system (Haass, 2008), a critical emphasis that continues to be pushed by realists is that the great powers are states who have both great military and economic power to project their influence abroad (Waltz, 1979). Poles are further considered to be, 'endowed with the resources, *political will and institutional ability* to project and protect their interests at the global, multi-regional and regional level' (Grevi, 2009, 9; see also van Langenhove, 2010, 9; K.E. Smith, 2013, 117, emphasis added). For the EU, its competence to act across all matters of economic and foreign policy, and to project and protect its interests at all levels of governance, has been an issue at the heart of the debate over its capacity to act in international affairs since the 1970s (i.e. Sjöstedt, 1977; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006).

Two specific challenges must be identified in assessing the EU as a pole, and thus an actor that others should pay attention to. First, the EU has limited military capability and has made little effort to match or balance the military spending of the United States (Posen, 2006). Comparative to the emerging economies, EU military spending has also been on the decline, while India and China are today the world's first and second major importers of major arms, respectively (SIPRI Yearbook 2013, 10). While the combined military forces of the EU's member states technically make the EU the second largest military power in the world

(SIPRI Yearbook, 2013, 6), the EU does not have the political will or the institutional ability to translate those resources into the sort of combined military force, with power projection capabilities that realists particularly would expect of a traditional great power (Posen, 2006; Kagan, 2003). The second challenge for the EU is that it does not always 'speak with one voice' in its external relations and its capacity to act in every international situation has at times been weakened by its own internal divisions and institutional weaknesses (Thomas, 2012; Hill, 2004). As Waltz (1979, 131) argued, a great power requires, 'political competency and stability'. The variable competence with which the EU can act internationally has therefore been marked as a major stumbling block from realists' expectations (Mearsheimer, 2001; Wohlforth, 1999) with the EU perceived as a divided global actor who is not, 'able or inclined to act in the assertive fashion of historic great powers' (Haass, 2008, 3).

In sharp contrast to the realist school however, a burgeoning body of EU scholarship – prominently more liberal in its leaning – has emerged in which the EU's global power is argued to reside not in its competence and military capabilities but in its economic, as well as, normative influence in the world. The EU's strategic priority of 'effective multilateralism' has been particularly highlighted as evidence of the EU's uniqueness as a global power (Young & Peterson, 2014, 225), whereby the EU adopts something of a 'postmodern' approach (Cooper, 2003) that moves beyond *realpolitik* to pursue consensus and cooperation among states interconnected by economics, democracy and the rule of law (i.e. McCormick, 2013; Moravcsik, 2010; Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007; Manners & Whitman, 2003). Extensive studies have been conducted into the EU's 'positive influence in the world' and its 'leadership' in global governance (Keleman & Vogel, 2010; Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008; Groenleer & Van Schaik, 2007; Van Den Hoven, 2004; Smith & Woolcock, 1999).

Focus has also been given to analyses of the EU as a particular 'type' of global power (i.e. Diez, 2014). Manners (2002, 242), for example, argues that the EU is a 'Normative Power' whose greatest strengths lie in it being a different sort of power, one with the ability to influence and attract others through its core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Others suggest that the EU is an 'Ethical Power' (Aggestam, 2008) whose major global influence lies in its ethical preferences and treatment of third countries. Others still have focused on the economic and non-military strengths of the EU and its ability to shape the world not through military might but through

diplomatic cooperation, economic power and international institutions. For the EU to be a great power the argument thus follows that it must become a 'Great Civilian Power' (Schnabel, 2005, 72). As McCormick (2007, 6) states:

The EU made a conscious decision to pursue non-military options, and the nature of the international system today is more suited to a new model of superpower, one that prefers to avoid military solutions to problems, that prefers to achieve its objectives through influence rather than coercion, and that prefers to lead by example.

On the whole discourse on the EU's 'difference' as a power emphasises the EU's willingness to go first in the pursuit of a rules-based effective multilateral order and at times, at the expense of its own self-interest and policy preferences (Diez & Manners, 2014, 56; Young & Peterson, 2014, 224)

From a purely economic perspective the EU is however, also worth considerable attention in an emerging multipolar world. The EU is today one of the world's largest and richest single markets, and is the world's largest trading bloc. The EU is a global economic powerhouse and possesses many of the material resources required of a 'great power' and even 'superpower' (McCormick, 2013; Moravcsik, 2010; Schnabel, 2005). As a union of 28 member states, the EU has moreover evolved extensively since it was first formed in 1957. Not only has it undergone various stages of enlargement, but also substantive developments in the path towards political, economic and security union. Crucially, despite its variable levels of competence, in all matters of economic, trade and commercial policy the EU has the competence to act for its member states. On all international trade matters therefore the EU is at its most 'state-like', with the European Commission granted the authority to both initiate the EU's negotiation position and to subsequently speak for its member states in all international trade negotiations. The EU thus formally 'speaks with one voice' in the multilateral trading system.

If, as David Baldwin (2013, 276) has argued, scope and domain matter in any power analysis, then the question of who the poles or great powers are may be expected to differ according to policy field and environment. As Young (2010, 3) suggests, 'rather than a single balance of power it might be worth thinking of multiple dimensions of power'. With this in mind the statement can be made that, in the scope of global trade governance and within the domain of the multilateral trading system,

the EU is unquestionably a great power and pole within an emerging multipolar world order. The EU's strategic priorities, its trading preferences and how it behaves within global trade governance thus matters in a changing world. As a result, the EU is referenced in this book among the ranks of the 'great powers' or 'poles' of the emerging multipolar trading world order and in the specific context of global trade governance.

Contrasting expectations: what place for the EU?

Having established that the EU is a pole within this emerging multipolar world, an important debate must also be elaborated which focuses on the EU's expected position and role in a changing international system. As highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, some scholars have emphasised what they perceive as the comparative advantages of the EU within a changing world focusing on multilateralism and systems of global governance (McCormick, 2013; Jørgensen, 2009; Elgström & Strömvik, 2005). The EU's institutional idiosyncrasies, its make-up as a multilateral polity itself and the endeavour among EU member states to agree to a common position before acting internationally, have thus been identified as a strength for the EU in dealing with the changing dynamics of today's world (Elgström & Strömvik, 2005), rather than being seen as a disadvantage. In his book, entitled *Why Europe Matters*, John McCormick (2013, 164) makes the case that:

Europe has had so much first-hand experience of cross-border cooperation that it has developed more effective instincts about the changing dynamics of the international political and economic environment. And the habits it has formed through cooperation have placed it in a stronger position to exploit and influence the opportunities that arise, and to address new challenges.

Others further suggest that because the EU has 'multilateral genes' (Jørgensen, 2009, 189) and a 'coordination reflex' (Whitman, 2010, 27) it is well-suited to the multilateral diplomacy of today's international system (K.E. Smith, 2013, 116). The fact that the EU is used to networks, negotiations and systems of governance within its own union, with diplomats and officials familiar with the balancing act of negotiations between growing numbers of states, engenders the argument that the EU is a global actor at an advantage in other multilateral systems (Moravcsik, 2010, 166–167; Elgström & Strömvik, 2005). From these accounts the EU is seen as a 'model for the future' (Lake, 2013, 567), showcasing the added value of compromise and consensus between states.

However, discourse on the EU's global role, particularly prevalent in the later 2000s and early 2010s, has increasingly started to question the EU's leadership, influence and power in today's international system (Dennison et al., 2014; K.E. Smith, 2013; M. Smith, 2013; Allen & Smith, 2012; Grevi, 2009, 37; Whitman, 2010). Concerns over the EU's future role notably identify the rise of the emerging economies as explanation for what is perceived as a potential EU 'fall' or 'decline' (Webber, 2014, 25; Oberthür, 2011; Young, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Fischer, 2010; M. Baldwin, 2006), along with the EU's relative economic and financial weakening as a result of the global recession and corresponding Eurozone crisis (Allen & Smith, 2012, 171–175). A survey of EU citizens in 2010 further found that 45 per cent of those surveyed thought the EU would become a secondary economic power in the future (Eurobarometer, 2010, 62). Thus despite its suggested comparative advantages as an actor best capable of tackling the changing dynamics of an emerging multipolar world, the EU has also been seen to suffer, 'confusion in the face of the growing power and influence of Russia and China' (Whitman, 2010, 28), with its abilities 'to deliver in a world of great powers' increasingly being brought into question (Eurobarometer, 2010, 55; Grevi, 2009, 37).

Case justification and book outline

Intended to move the debate beyond the question of whether the EU qualifies as a 'pole' or not, this book is concerned with how the rise of the emerging economies has explicitly shaped the EU's own behaviour and role within the particular context of global trade governance and the multilateral trading system. Its interest therefore is less in quantifying the international system into a league table of power capabilities, but more on addressing the emerging influence of new powers in the international system and how this impacts the EU's positioning and activity within the WTO and its multilateral trade negotiations.

In so doing this book focuses on several elements of analysis. Drawing upon IR theories, as well as broader discourses on economic diplomacy, role theory and international negotiation, this book seeks to highlight expected behavioural implications of a multipolar world for states, as well as the EU as a union of states, within the international system. Further testing those theoretical implications, this book focuses upon the case study of the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations and the EU's changing

role within the Doha Development Agenda or 'Doha Round'. This case study has been chosen for several reasons. First, the WTO's Doha Round is a negotiation involving 160 of the world's states that commenced in 2001, largely at the EU's urging (van den Hoven, 2004). Over the Doha Round's near decade and a half⁸ history the emerging economies have evolved to become principal players alongside the United States and the EU. The Doha Round thus offers a crucial snapshot of the emergence of a multipolar world over time, and the effects that these new poles are having upon global governance and the EU's role within it.

Second, by focusing upon the WTO's Doha Round negotiations over time – from the first efforts to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations beginning at the WTO's first Ministerial Conference in 1996 through to the WTO's ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali in December 2013 – it is possible to map the evolution and development of an emerging multipolarity within the multilateral trading system. This is useful moreover as few longitudinal accounts of the Doha Round negotiations as a whole have yet been produced. With the round ongoing this is perhaps unsurprising; however, the trajectory that the negotiations have taken over time, and the most recent developments that have taken place in the form of the 'Doha-Lite' deal agreed at the WTO's Bali Ministerial Conference in December 2013 warrant consideration and any pertinent trends to be identified.

Third, this case has been chosen because the EU is recognised to be an economic and trading superpower and a vital 'pole' in the global balance of power within multilateral trade negotiations. How the EU's performance has thus changed over the course of the Doha Round negotiations offers an important benchmark for understanding changes to the EU's influence and its place in the current world order.

Finally, this case importantly enables insights into the EU's role in a changing world order without being overly hamstrung by deliberations over its 'capacity to act'. In external trade the EU is believed to be at its most 'state-like'; it 'speaks with one voice' in multilateral trade negotiations and has exclusive competence to act for its member states. While the EU's member states thus remain fundamental in setting the terms of the European Commission's negotiation mandate, it is the Commission that formally negotiates on their behalf. As such, questions over EU competence and capabilities as a global actor are reduced as major factors impacting its negotiation behaviour, allowing closer analysis of the impact that more structural variables have upon the EU.

In addressing the questions highlighted earlier – *how* has an emerging multipolar world order explicitly impacted the EU's role in the WTO's Doha Round, and *why* has the EU's performance been perceived as diminishing in the face of rising powers – this book is broken down into four subsequent chapters. In the next chapter the theoretical implications of multipolarity are elaborated and analysed. Drawing upon the main schools of IR theory, as well as related international political economy discourses, this chapter presents several practical takeaways relating to the expected behavioural implications of multipolarity on states, and further outlines an analytical framework for analysis of the EU's role within multilateral negotiations. In Chapter 3 the evolution of the EU's global trade agenda is discussed. Providing a broad overview of the EU's trade policy preferences, this chapter addresses the EU's policy-making processes, and the changes in EU trade strategy and respective role positioning towards the WTO. Chapter 4 then turns its attention to the WTO's Doha Round explicitly. Focusing upon the EU's role performance within the WTO's negotiations from the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 to the ninth Bali Ministerial Conference held in December 2013, this chapter details the changes in the EU's actual negotiation behaviour over the course of the 2000s and early 2010s in response to an emerging multipolarity. In Chapter 5 the changes identified in the EU's role are considered within the context of an emerging multipolarity. We turn now therefore to the theoretical implications of multipolarity and a framework of analysis.

Notes

- 1 'Hyperpuissance' was a term first coined by French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine in 1999 in reference to the United States at that time.
- 2 Figures reveal that global military spending in 2012 totalled an estimated \$1,756bn of which the United States accounted for 39 per cent at \$685.3bn, comparable to Europe's \$407bn and East Asia's \$268bn, together making up 38 per cent of global spending (SIPRI Yearbook, 2013, 6).
- 3 The acronym BRIC was coined by Goldman Sachs in 2001 in describing the four largest emerging economies to watch out for in the 21st century, including Brazil, Russia, India and China. Since 2001 South Africa has joined the list making the acronym BRICS.
- 4 These include Finland (3rd), Germany (4th), Sweden (6th), the Netherlands (8th) and the United Kingdom (10th). Useful also to note however is that

EU member states, Croatia (75th), Romania (76th), the Slovak Republic (78th) and Greece (91st), all rank below the BRICS in world rankings (World Economic Forum, 2013, 15).

- 5 As classified by the World Bank. The WTO does also loosely identify China, India and Brazil as emerging or developing countries (WTO, 2013a, Box B.1) but emphasises that this is not indicative of any legal right or obligations they then have under WTO agreements.
- 6 As Gowan (2012) puts it, 'asymmetrical multipolarity'.
- 7 Members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.
- 8 At the time of writing.

2

The EU in a Multipolar World: A Framework of Analysis

Abstract: What are the theoretical assumptions surrounding the issue of an emerging multipolar world order? And how can these assumptions underlay and support empirical analysis of the EU's response to an emerging multipolarity within global trade governance? In this chapter these questions are considered. Focusing first on the theoretical implications of multipolarity as outlined within the main IR and IPE discourses, the chapter then develops a framework of analysis for understanding and assessing the EU's role within multilateral trade negotiations.

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Introduction¹

What are the theoretical assumptions surrounding the issue of an emerging multipolar world order? And how can these assumptions underlay and support empirical analysis of the EU's response to an emerging multipolarity within global trade governance? In addressing these questions this chapter sets out a framework for analysis that encompasses elements of International Relations (IR) theory and related International Political Economy (IPE) discourses, and which draws upon negotiation analysis, diplomacy and role theory to outline expected implications of an emerging multipolarity upon actor behaviour. This is important for several reasons. First, IR and IPE theories offer many useful insights into how states – and particularly the poles of an international system – may be expected to respond in the face of rising powers. This is a critical starting point as more often than not, claims of a new world order and of a diminishing 'West' in the face of the rise of the 'Rest', have been largely ambiguous. Addressing the theoretical assumptions of multipolarity and its expected implications for states and for the EU therefore provides a grounding for analysis that can both better frame the debate and offer a more detailed understanding of how the EU is responding to the new dynamics of a changing world order.

Another reason for taking IR and IPE theory as a starting point is that, despite a general breadth of theoretical literature focused upon changing distributions of power within the international system, relatively little clarity has been shed on how, or indeed why, the emergence of multipolarity impacts the behaviour and influence of others in the international system. Reason for this lack of clarity essentially lies in the fact that theories of IR and IPE present often largely contrasting images of what multipolarity means, as well as how states are expected to behave in response to the rise of new powers. Scholars seeking to find a theoretical explanation for the current changes taking place in the international system would thus be at something of a loss in knowing where best to start. One intention of this chapter therefore is to offer a practical takeaway of the various positions of the predominant schools of thought in IR scholarship, outlining the challenges that may be expected from a multipolar world order, and detailing those related behavioural implications that may be expected of international actors involved in multilateral negotiations.

In so doing this chapter is broken into two main sections. Section 1 focuses on how the main schools of IR theory address the emergence of a multipolar world and its implications for state behaviour. Drawing upon several practical takeaways taken from these IR and IPE discourses, Section 2 then outlines a framework of analysis for assessing the EU's response to an emerging multipolar world, focusing specifically upon role theory to identify the different behavioural characteristics the EU might display, and the roles it could adopt in the context of multilateral negotiations.

Theoretical assumptions on an emerging multipolar world

The emergence of a multipolar world order could, according to a variety of theoretical perspectives, be expected to have notable implications on the behaviour of states and other actors within the international system. For realists particularly the changing balance of power and the increased number of poles within the international system is believed to create greater uncertainty and competition between states (Mearsheimer, 2001, 44–45; Waltz, 1979). Liberals on the other hand stress the significance of international institutions in a multipolar world and the greater likelihood of cooperation and interdependence as states work together to address global challenges (Moravcsik, 2010, 156; Keohane, 1990). Constructivists further emphasise how global reordering creates new social hierarchies (Lake, 2013, 556) and shapes international norms (Price, 1998). In the following sub-sections each of these theoretical approaches shall be outlined along with some practical takeaways for taking forward.

Multipolarity and realism

As was highlighted in Chapter 1, the realist theory of IR identifies the poles or great powers of the international system principally as those states with the greatest power resources – including territory, population, wealth and technological and military superiority – and who have the competence and capacity to project that power beyond their own borders (Waltz, 1979, 131). Those states with the greatest material power are therefore taken to be the dominant strategic players within the international system and whose presence affects the behaviour of other states

(Posen, 2009, 348). Within realist (or more particularly, neo-realist²) scholarship the number of great powers or 'poles' is understood as a key variable explaining the behaviour of states and the stability of the international system (see Mearsheimer, 2007, 78–82; Donnelly, 2005, 38).

While disagreement prevails within the realist school over the relative stability of multipolarity compared to uni- or bi-polarity (i.e. Ikenberry et al., 2009; Posen, 2009; Mearsheimer, 2001, 2007; Layne, 1993), agreement is nevertheless found over the expected traits that multipolarity will produce in shaping state behaviour, including *uncertainty* and *competition*. In a multipolar world order, uncertainty is thought to be more commonplace. Unlike a bipolar world where there are only two great powers taking centre stage, in a multipolar world order the fact that there are three or more great powers makes it harder for poles to assess and calculate the behaviour of others, resulting in more miscalculations of risk and potential for conflict (Mearsheimer, 2007, 79; Layne, 1993).

Maintaining a balance of power also becomes a far more complex affair. As Posen (2009, 350) highlights, in a multipolar world, 'the arithmetic of coalitions influences matters great and small. The overall balance of capabilities, and the military balance in particular, are easily altered in a significant way depending on who sides with whom'. For realists therefore, there is a fine balance wrought between state cooperation and conflict in a multipolar world (Hyde-Price, 2007, 16). States are expected to work together where necessary. However, alliance formation is also expected to be more fleeting and issue-specific (Grevi, 2009, 12), with greater potential for such efforts to resort in conflict.

For this reason IPE realists have also made the case that international trade liberalisation may be easier in a bipolar system where states forge military alliances with one or other great power, and are thus more likely to open their markets to others within that bloc (Gowa, 1989; Gowa & Mansfield, 1993). In a multipolar world order the diffusion of power across several players, by contrast, creates more credible exit threats and less incentive for states to engage altruistically in alliances, resulting in less trade liberalisation (Gowa, 1989). Krasner (1976, 321) also takes up this point in arguing that, 'a system composed of a few very large, but unequally developed states...is likely to lead to a closed [international trade] structure'.

This in turn emphasises the 'persistent competitiveness' perceived by realists to exist between poles in a multipolar world (Posen, 2009, 351). From the realist perspective states will compete with one another to

further their own interests while weakening others. As Posen (2009, 351–352) suggests:

In a multipolar world... competitors likely will believe the safe way to improve one's relative position is to pursue policies that weaken others. Increasing others' costs when they undertake initiatives will seem wiser than undertaking one's own adventures.

Buck-passing is thus to be expected within a multipolar world (Mearsheimer, 2001, 270) as states, 'attempt to get other states to assume the burden of checking a powerful opponent while they remain on the side-lines' (Mearsheimer, 2007, 76). 'Bait-and-bleed' (Mearsheimer, 2001, 139; Posen, 2009, 352) strategies³ (Mearsheimer, 2001, 139) may also become more common in the economic and political sense as states seek to improve their own relative advantage while their competitors undertake protracted and costly negotiation processes with one another. A further competitiveness challenge identified by IPE realists regarding international trade stems from the level of tariffs states will apply to goods and services from foreign competitors. As Krasner (1976, 321–322) claims, while some market opening is feasible in an unbalanced multipolar order, only modest gains would be achievable. Reason for this is that, while the advanced economies are equipped to handle trade liberalisation, market opening among the less developed poles can result in social instability and political vulnerability. Advanced economies cannot force emerging economies to accept more market opening, and by mercantilist logic it is in the emerging economies' interests to protect their more fragile national businesses and industries by maintaining high tariffs on foreign imports. Some degree of rising protectionism in the face of international trade competition is therefore predicted within an unbalanced multipolar system.

A further competitiveness factor to be taken into account within an unbalanced multipolar system is, as Gilpin (1981, 94–95) suggests, that rising power leads to increasing global ambitions. As Layne (1993, 11) further points out, 'rising powers seek to enhance their security by increasing their capabilities and their control over the external environment'. The rise of the emerging economies therefore coincides not only with greater economic competitiveness between the poles, but also a rising ambition by the developing poles to establish their own footholds in the international system, to expand their interests abroad – particularly economic interests (see also Kennedy, 1987, xxii), and to shape

the international system itself in a way which best serves their own interests. The 'persistent competitiveness' presented by new poles within the international system may thus be found in the form of global trade rule-making and the increasingly competing efforts of the United States, the EU and emerging economies to set the terms of global governance (Jacoby & Meunier, 2010, 309). The emergence of a multipolar world in which the rise of the emerging economies is a key factor is therefore expected, from a realist perspective, to have largely negative implications for the established powers, for international free trade and with an expected increase in competition among the major powers to control the rules of global governance.

Multipolarity and liberalism

In contrast to the response of the realist school to multipolarity, liberal IR theory adopts a more positive outlook that focuses less upon the issues of competition and uncertainty and more upon the potential for cooperation and interdependence within a multipolar world. While realist scholars have criticised liberalism for being 'ill-equipped' to explain the complex patterns of cooperation and conflict that characterise multipolarity – suggesting that they focus upon the world as it 'ought to be' rather than how it actually is (Hyde-Price, 2007, 16) – liberalism nevertheless adopts a more 'multidimensional approach' (Keohane, 1986, 191) that draws upon structural and rationalist groundings, but which also allows for other factors such as domestic decision-making, international institutions, non-state actors, and conditions of complex interdependence to influence and shape state behaviour (Keohane, 1986, 190–200). In contrast to realism, a change in the global balance of power, and the emergence of new powers in the international system, seen from the liberal perspective is something that can be achieved peacefully because the 'search for power' is not the only driving factor shaping state interests (Keohane, 1986, 194).

At the core of liberal IR theory is the understanding that international institutions mitigate conflict situations. Keohane (1990, 734) stresses that, 'state behaviour can only be understood in the context of international institutions, which both constrain states and make their actions intelligible to others' and that, 'insofar as states regularly follow the rules and standards of international institutions, they signal their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation' (Hoffmann et al., 1990, 193). The institutionalisation of global politics enables states to interact and cooperate with one

another in such a way as to move beyond *realpolitik* and power politics, to focus instead upon the benefits of civilian forms of power such as high capita income and a central position in trade networks, and in playing an important role in systems of global governance (Moravcsik, 2010, 156).

In liberal logic the rise of new powers in the international system, particularly democratic powers,⁴ is found to be beneficial for the peace and prosperity of an international liberal order as the principles of economic interdependence, respect for the rule of law and reciprocity generate greater potential for common problem-solving and win-win scenarios (Moravcsik, 2010, 172). Within a liberal multipolar or ‘inter-polar’ (Grevi, 2009) international order, ‘cooperative engagement’ and ‘reciprocal cooperation’ between the West and the rising East and South are encouraged (Brzezinski, 2012). Uncertainty is also mitigated as information levels increase, ‘due to the existence of multiple channels of contact among states’ (Keohane, 1986, 197). Emerging multipolarity is thus considered from the liberal perspective to be a largely peaceful and cooperative transition for states within a much wider process of globalisation, institutionalisation and complex interdependence.

Multipolarity and constructivism

Our third theoretical school to shed insights into expected state behaviour in an emerging multipolar world is social constructivism. Constructivism is a theory of IR that looks beyond more rationalist logics of realism and liberalism to focus on the social nature of the international system and the relationships and interactions between states. Specifically, constructivists argue that the polarity of the international system is not of itself prescriptive of state behaviour, but rather what the great powers themselves make of it (Lake, 2013, 556). Emerging multipolarity is understood not simply as a change to the structural balance of power, but also as the advent of new great power hierarchies and collective identities (see also Peterson et al., 2012, 5). The strategies of the great powers, and particularly of new emerging poles, must therefore be taken into careful consideration in shaping public discourse and diplomatic interactions (Scott, 2013). How the great powers identify their role within an emerging multipolarity must, furthermore, be a key consideration in addressing their behaviour and social interactions in global governance.

Taking into account not just the strategic and social roles of the major powers, constructivism further identifies an important normative

dimension to the interactions and behaviour of states. First, in reference to international institutions, is the assumption that a logic of normative appropriateness shapes the practices and rules defining 'appropriate behaviour' and the interactions of states within systems of global governance (March and Olsen, 1998, 948). A second, more specific assumption is that the major powers of the international system drive and shape international norms themselves. As Price (1998, 635) identifies, where 'crucial' states support a particular norm, a norm cascade may be expected among other states in the international system, especially those concerned with their international reputation, as they seek to follow suit for fear of being left out (see also Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). With specific reference to an emerging multipolar world two possible implications may therefore be highlighted.

One implication is that the increased number of major powers in the international system could result in greater concern for international reputation. Both established and emerging poles may thus be expected to take greater interest in their reputations and how they are perceived by others. Such reputational concerns may be expected to lead to the emerging poles striving to demonstrate their responsibility as global players by supporting norms driven by the established poles. Evidence of this may already be being seen in the efforts that China has exerted since the late 1990s in demonstrating to the international community that it is trustworthy and a 'responsible great power' (Breslin, 2010). This, as Wade (2011) suggests, may further result in a form of 'hegemonic incorporation' whereby the emerging poles seek to, 'go along with the wishes of the dominant states and use their participation [in multilateral forums] to secure national advantage within this constraint' (Wade, 2011, 352). The efforts made by the emerging economies to become members of international institutions such as the WTO may moreover be taken as evidence of the logic of normative appropriateness shaping the behaviour of new as well as established poles.

A second and alternative outcome, however, may be found where the norms supported by emerging poles in the international system differ from those of the established powers resulting in norm competition. China critics have been particularly vociferous in emphasising the possibility of China seeking to overthrow the existing liberal order espoused by the West and seeking to assert its own normative brand on the international system (see Ikenberry, 2008). Rather than a norm cascade taking place therefore, international reputation concerns in an

emerging multipolar world may instead result in emerging poles striving to demonstrate their independence by asserting their own norms in contrast to the established poles. In such a scenario the interactions of poles within multilateral forums may be especially fraught, with Wade (2011, 352) suggesting a form of ‘Westphalian assertion’ in which, ‘states assert their national sovereignties in the form of “nos” yielding cooperation mainly for the purposes of blocking initiatives from others’.

Multipolarity and multilateralism: Some practical takeaways

A common understanding, highlighted by theorists from across the political spectrum, is that multipolarity creates both greater complexity and a greater need for state interactions within a multilateral context (Wade, 2011, 353; Held, 2010, 185–186; Posen, 2009, 350; Grevi, 2009, 23; Haass, 2008, 7). Multilateralism is defined, ‘as the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more States, through *ad hoc* arrangements or by means of institutions’ (Keohane, 1990, 731). For the EU particularly – itself a multilateral institution – an effective multilateral system is one based on a strong international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order (Council, 2003a, 9). The extent to which existing systems of global governance and multilateralism are effective in a multipolar context does, however, remain open to some question (Zürn & Stephen, 2010; Held, 2010, 185–186).

Challenges for social interaction, most especially cooperative interaction, between states within today’s international institutions can particularly be identified in the heterogeneity of interests presented by the major powers (Ahnlied & Elgström, 2014; Wade, 2011), as well as in how long, or the extent to which, the rising powers can be expected to acquiesce to the hegemony of established Western powers or to strive to assert their own preferences for global governance structures (Wade, 2011; Breslin, 2010). Multipolarity thus presents the very real potential for multilateral stalemate in systems of global governance or a ‘Multilateral Governance Dilemma’ whereby:

Multipolarity generates a higher premium on policy cooperation...but larger numbers of states with larger differences in their preferences, interests and beliefs makes cooperation more difficult to achieve and sustain. (Wade, 2011, 353)

Theories of IR do further suggest that competition and cooperation can be expected to go hand in hand in a multipolar system. In much the same way as state behaviour can be driven by both the constructivist

logic of normative appropriateness and the rationalist logic of material consequences, so too can it be expected that states will seek cooperation with others in multilateral settings, while also looking to further their own competitive interests. As constructivists would also suggest, the emergence of a multipolar world can be expected to create new social hierarchies within those multilateral settings. A renewed emphasis is therefore placed onto the strategies of the major powers within such forum, as well as the roles that they would seek, and be able, to play. With new social hierarchies moreover, will come new behavioural constraints, reputational concerns, potential norm competition and changing conceptions of 'appropriate' behaviour. Such constraints can particularly be expected to impact the established powers who will be required to adapt their previous patterns of behaviour to take into consideration new players within the social hierarchy.

Effective multilateralism may therefore prove an increasingly challenging goal to achieve in an emerging multipolar world as states seek to cooperate multilaterally while managing the new geopolitical dynamics of multilateral settings. Such dynamics may moreover be expected to result in extensive forum-shopping by the major powers as they look to pursue their interests in alternative regional or bilateral forum where they may be better placed to exert their influence in obtaining their preferred outcomes (Woolcock, 2010, 28; see also Young, 2011). Such practices of forum-shopping and multi-level negotiation have already become apparent in the international system today, and can be expected to make multilateral negotiation processes increasingly convoluted.

Assessing the EU's response to multipolarity: a framework of analysis

It is these theoretical takeaways that form the foundation of this book's analytical framework and the following chapter's empirical analyses. In this section a framework for analysing EU behaviour within an emerging multipolar world is elaborated. This framework is developed explicitly with multilateral negotiations in mind. This is useful as multilateral negotiations – such as those conducted through global conference diplomacy (Rittberger, 1983) within international institutions such as the United Nations or WTO – provide a crucial forum for understanding the interaction of the world's poles and how an emerging multipolarity shapes

polar behaviour. As multilateral negotiations are typically longitudinal in nature they moreover encompass the changes in power distribution that take place over time. They are also broad-ranging and address many different issues and policy fields in which the major powers, as global actors with global interests, take a key interest.

This framework also focuses on consensus-based multilateral negotiations which require unanimous agreement by all members to secure an outcome (Kissack, 2010, ch. 3). While there is much that may be learned from voting patterns in majoritative multilateral negotiations and how these patterns may change over time with the emergence of new powers, what is of interest in this study is how the balance between competition and cooperation between the major poles is achieved within multilateral negotiation environments. Consensus-based negotiations which require compromise from all parties for agreement to be reached thus enables important insights into how the emergence of new poles has impacted others' ability (not least the EU's) to achieve their competitive interests within a wholly cooperative environment. This framework further adopts elements of role theory, drawing upon analysis of role positioning and role performance to address how actor behaviour within multilateral negotiations has evolved over time and how it may have changed in response to changes in the distribution of global power.

Introducing role theory

As detailed in the previous section, an assumption of global reordering and the emergence of a multipolar world order is that the rise of new powers will bring about new social hierarchies in systems of global governance. Such hierarchies can be expected to influence the behaviour of states and the adaptation of their behaviour to accommodate new players. The strategies that the major powers thus pursue, how they react through concern for their international reputation and the role that they seek to play are thus important means of analysing the response of major powers to the changing distribution of power in the international system. Drawing particularly on the work of Elgström and Smith (2006, 5), an actor's role in international politics and in multilateral negotiations refers to:

[P]atterns of expected or appropriate behaviour. Roles are determined both by an actor's own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors.

Recognising that an actor may take on multiple roles in a multilateral negotiation environment (Zartman, 1994, 5), and that change to the global distribution of power may result in increased role uncertainty and competition (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 78), an actor's own role conception – or more broadly, how an actor chooses to position itself within a negotiation context – is associated with, 'perceived responsibilities and obligations in foreign policy and includes policy-makers' perceptions of what functions their state should perform in the international system' (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 78; see also Aggestam, 2006). Role positioning takes into consideration, 'the potential range of options and strategies' that the actor will pursue in its foreign policy behaviour (Aggestam, 2006, 20), and therefore the extent to which an actor's negotiation objectives are feasible or realistic relative to the preference structures of other negotiators.

How the EU then performs in multilateral negotiations – that is, the 'appropriate behaviour', or more generally, the actions and output that the EU undertakes in its role performance – reveals important insights for understanding how it is responding to the changing distribution of power within the international system and, more explicitly, within systems of global governance. What role has the EU sought to play in the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations, how has its role positioning and performance changed with an emerging multipolarity? More than this, what *role-set* – that is, what image, perception of power and strategic approach to foreign policy more broadly (Aggestam, 2006, 21) – is the EU today following? This is particularly important in addressing how conceptions of the EU's role-set have developed since the 1990s where claims of the EU as 'Normative Power Europe' (Manners, 2002), and its perceived pursuit of an ambitious and 'normatively different' foreign policy approach within multilateral negotiations, have in fact played out over the course of the 2000s and early 2010s in response to an emerging multipolar world.

Assessing role in multilateral negotiations

In addressing these question there are a variety of different role conceptions that the EU may adopt in the context of multilateral negotiations. Helpful in assessing those roles is consideration not only of the 'patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour' that the EU may follow within the negotiations themselves, but also of the strategic goals, negotiation preferences and relative bargaining position of the EU approaching the

negotiations themselves (see also Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014; Elgström & Stromvik, 2005; Meunier, 2000). Important questions to therefore consider when assessing the role of the EU in multilateral negotiations are: What does the EU want? And, how actively does it pursue those goals?

Role positioning: what does the EU want?

A key factor in understanding the EU's response to an emerging multipolar world is to consider what it wants from the negotiations in question and how those objectives may have changed over time in shaping its role positioning. Two key factors may be addressed in shaping EU role positioning within the context of multilateral negotiations. These include: (1) the EU's overall strategic orientation and (2) the EU's preference structures relative to other major powers (Jørgensen et al., 2011; Elgström & Stromvik, 2005, 121; Meunier, 2000, 112–115). With regards to the EU's strategic orientation, as Ahnliid and Elgström (2014, 79) elaborate, a negotiator may be, 'a supporter of the present system... a revisionist actor [or] ... a shirker, an actor that avoids responsibilities and obligations'.

The EU's general strategic orientation, or more pertinently, its strategic aspiration, as a global actor has long been associated with that of a 'different' or 'distinctive' sort of player (see Young, 2007, 789; M. Smith, 2007, 532; Manners & Whitman, 2003; van den Hoven, 2004; Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002). Conceptions of the EU as a 'postmodern' (Cooper, 2003), 'civilian' (Duchêne, 1972) and 'normative' (Manners, 2002) power in which the EU is seen to position itself as a power beyond power – one that pursues civilian and positive forms of influence in order to persuade others to want what it wants, and to set the standard in the pursuit of normative goals – have only been supplemented by the EU's own policy rhetoric in which it positions itself as a global leader, 'taking on responsibility for building a better world' (Council, 2003a). The EU's role-set, particularly since the establishment of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which created the formal tools for EU global outreach in 1992, has thus developed with the EU setting itself apart as a leading global player, setting ambitious standards for peace and prosperity for others to then follow (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, 912; Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002; Andresen & Agrawala, 2002, 49).

Within systems of global governance the EU has also sought the pursuit of its strategic priority of 'effective multilateralism' (Council,

2003a). As a multilateral institution itself, well familiar with the need for cooperation and compromise in order to find common solutions, the EU frequently builds upon its own example of international cooperation by externalising its multilateral preferences abroad and positioning itself as a champion of multilateralism within international institutions (Jørgensen et al., 2011; Kissack, 2010; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006). As a result the EU's strategic focus on effective multilateralism has meant that it is widely recognised by others to want, as a strategic objective, the strengthening of international institutions and international rules and standards, and to support multilateral cooperation and multilateral solutions in order to achieve that goal (Elgström, 2007; Chaban et al., 2006).

While prioritising effective multilateralism as a strategic goal and pursuing areas of common interest with negotiation partners, the EU should nevertheless also be understood as a rational actor that seeks to enhance its position and pursue its interests within multilateral negotiations. As well as the EU's strategic aspirations therefore, focus must also be given to its specific interests and objectives within negotiations. As Woolcock (2010, 29) highlights, 'even if the parties to a negotiation have a common interest in reaching agreement, they are likely to have different views on what the final outcome should be'. Recognising also that cooperation and competition go hand in hand in IR, what the EU wants out of multilateral negotiations must not only encompass its own strategic aspirations and preferences, but further take into account the preference structures and 'red-lines' of its negotiation partners, most especially the other major powers. In making that assessment within the context of multilateral negotiations where the interests of many actors must be taken into consideration, the EU may be found to adopt a position which is more *conservative* than its negotiation partners, whereby the EU seeks to preserve or defend its own status quo position, or more *reformist*, whereby the EU seeks change from others (Meunier, 2000).

This is important because, while the Normative Power Europe discourse would suggest that the EU's 'difference' from others is what sets it apart as an influential global actor (Manners, 2002; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Schiepers & Sicurelli, 2007; Diez & Manners, 2014), it must also be assumed that the more reformist – that is, change-seeking and 'different' – the EU is in negotiations, the harder it must then try to lead, push or persuade others to support its objectives. The EU's ambition is therefore an important factor to take into consideration in this regard and, more particularly, how realistic the EU's negotiation objectives are,

relative to the preference structures and ‘anticipated minimums’ (Iklé, 1964, 192) of other negotiation partners, in order to find some ‘zone of agreement’ that would make an outcome agreement possible (see Afonis, 2011; Underdal, 1983). In bargaining terms moreover, the EU may be expected to, ‘seek the best possible deal in negotiations; that is, to obtain the most from its opponent while conceding the least’ (Meunier, 2000, 104). In integrative negotiations, such as multilateral trade negotiations where all parties seek to maximise their benefits while minimising their concessions (Meunier, 2000, 113), the EU may therefore seek to cooperate in some areas of negotiation through concession-making in order to contribute towards an outcome agreement, but to balance any concessions with reciprocal gains made elsewhere. As this further highlights, the rational accountability of different preference structures at play in a negotiation is as crucial to understanding the EU’s role positioning as its own, often more normative, strategic aspirations.

Role performance: how active is the EU in the pursuit of its objectives?

A second dimension to consider in assessing the EU’s role in a multilateral negotiation is its role performance and the activity that the EU then exerts in the pursuit of those objectives. This, more broadly, may be considered the EU’s output, and is concerned with how and when the EU acts in negotiations in order to achieve its preferred outcome. Jørgensen (2009) identifies two styles of output, or ‘outreach’, in multilateral diplomacy as *proactive* or *reactive*. A proactive output is here identified where the EU actively pursues its negotiation objectives, being a first-mover, making particular demands which can set the tone for negotiations and, where necessary, working with others to build consensus in order to achieve, or alter, an outcome agreement. Conversely a reactive negotiation output can be identified where the EU is unresponsive, cruising or delaying.

Where the EU is reactive this may be for a number of reasons. It may be a specific negotiation tactic whereby the EU drags its feet in order to deter agreement on an issue it disagrees with. It may be in response to the EU’s energies being more proactively exerted elsewhere such as at other levels of negotiation, or in alternative forums, and thus with difficulties of capacity. As Jørgensen (2009) also highlights, the EU may also find it challenging to both maintain internal unity and coordination while proactively pursuing its objectives with third parties. A further reason for the EU being reactive in its output is that it does not have any particular

position on the issue or issues under negotiation. In such cases it may therefore choose to be reactive by following the lead of others, by cruising through the negotiations until others are ready to make a decision or, as realist theory would suggest, by buck-passing the responsibility of decision-making onto others while it remains on the sidelines.

In contrast, a proactive output may be identified in a number of methods aimed at setting the terms of negotiation, persuading others to follow, mediating between others in order to find agreement or, in more defensive cases, in actively blocking an agreement. One formal method of proactive output is the submission of proposals and offers. In negotiations, a party's ability to come up with proposals that overcome differences is often an important method by which agreement is reached (Zartman & Berman, 1982, 20). Putting forward proposals is a key form of proactive negotiation behaviour aimed at influencing negotiation partners, to serve as path-breakers or to encourage favourable terms (Iklé, 1964, 193–194). Another form of proactive output is to make an offer or concession and which will typically be required in negotiations where, 'the stakes can be considered as increments of the same item' (Zartman & Berman, 1982, 166). An especially proactive output may be identified where concession is made without any expectation of reciprocation by others. In such cases the EU may seek to achieve consensus at any cost, and is thus willing to actively sacrifice its own preferences in order to bring others to the negotiation table.

The EU may also demonstrate proactive behaviour by using diplomatic methods prior to the negotiations themselves such as conducting meetings at international conferences or through formal diplomatic meetings, or *demarches*, direct to capitals. In the lead up to and during multilateral negotiations coalition-building may also be a useful tactic in garnering support from other negotiation partners and in order to manage the complexity of the negotiations by bringing the number of main actors and key issues down to a more manageable number so that consensus can be achieved (Elgström & Jönsson, 2005, 2; Rittberger, 1983, 177). Issue-linkage may also be utilised in order to generate more scope for negotiation partners to support EU objectives, particularly where issues are linked to economic incentives or concession (Iklé, 1964, 69). In more negative scenarios, where the course of a negotiation is moving in a direction that the EU does not favour, a further proactive form of negotiation behaviour that it could adopt is to actively block an agreement by utilising the right to veto.

Identifying negotiation roles

With these two dimensions therefore in mind, Figure 2.1 offers a simple conceptualisation of the different negotiation roles that an actor may adopt in a multilateral negotiation environment. Represented in this diagram are eight commonly identified negotiation roles including a leader, pusher, mediator, cruiser, bystander, laggard, defender and blocker (see also Ahnlied & Elgström, 2014; Andresen & Agrawala, 2002; Zartman, 1994; Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994). As Figure 2.1 reflects, each of these roles corresponds to an actor’s positioning, reflected in the vertical spectrum between reformist and conservative, and its performance, reflected in the horizontal spectrum between reactive and proactive output.

Focusing first on quadrant 2 in the top right of Figure 2.1, a role that the EU has often been associated with in multilateral negotiations has been that of a *leader* (i.e. Wurzel & Connelly, 2011; Zito, 2005). Understood as a form of negotiation behaviour in which an actor could exert ‘positive influence’ over others in ‘the collective pursuit of some common good or joint purpose’ (Underdal, 1994, 178–179), from as early as 1990 the EU has been using leadership rhetoric in statements, particularly in reference to multilateral environmental negotiations whereby the EU, ‘as one of the foremost regional groupings in the world, [would] play a *leading role* in promoting concerted and effective action at a global level’ (European Council, 1990, emphasis added).

Marking out the role of a leader in multilateral negotiations are two key aspects. First, a leader has an especially reformist position which seeks to




FIGURE 2.1 Assessing role in multilateral negotiations

Source: Author’s own compilation.

bring about a concerted change for the ‘common good’. Second, a leader demonstrates the willingness to proactively work with others in order to ‘lead the way’. A leadership role is thus distinctive from other roles in that the leader commits to taking on the responsibility of bringing about concerted change (Underdal, 1994, 179). This may be through providing direction or ‘going first’ (Andresen & Agrawala, 2002, 49; Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008, 36), coming up with innovative or problem-solving solutions (Keleman & Vogel, 2010; Malnes, 1995) or being instrumental to the progress of negotiations through, for example, agenda-setting, making non-reciprocal or ‘sacrificial’ concessions in order to persuade others to follow or coalition-building (Andresen & Agrawala, 2002, 42; Young, 1991). A leader is therefore an important power broker in a multi-lateral negotiation context – exerting a positive influence over others in order to shape their decisions towards producing an outcome to meet the common good.

A similar power broker role in multilateral negotiations is that of a *pusher*. In contrast to a leader however, a pusher is an actor that actively pushes a reformist agenda in negotiations but, would, ‘hesitate to commit to potentially costly policies’ (Vogler & Hannes, 2007, 392). As Hovi et al. (2003, 16, note 69) state, ‘the concept of a pusher is straightforward: an actor “pushing” for strong joint commitments’. A pusher therefore acts in its own interests, pushing for support among others where necessary, for example through coalition-building, but also considers the costs to benefits (Johnson & Urpelainen, 2012, 650), and is driven by its own preferences and not by any responsibility to a ‘common good’. A pusher may thus, ‘try to organise the [negotiation] participants to produce an agreement that is consonant with [their] interests’ (Underdal, 1994, 5). Such a role is therefore proactive in striving to push forward change (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994, 80–81) through concession-making or coming up with proposals, but would not be associated with any sacrificial behaviour, instead expecting reciprocation by others.

A further role identified in quadrant 2 of Figure 2.1 is that of a *mediator*, which may also be associated with the role of ‘conductor’ (Underdal, 1994, 5), ‘facilitator’ or ‘bridge-builder’. In contrast to a pusher or leader, a mediator does not negotiate as such but instead operates within the negotiations as a virtually neutral party concerned with facilitating an agreement between others (Underdal, 1994, 5). A mediator thus sits towards the centre of the role-positioning spectrum whereby it has no particular interests to pursue and thus has no obvious orientation

towards reform or the preservation of the status quo. However, a mediator does also seek to play some proactive role by facilitating consensus among other conflicting parties.

Moving to quadrant 1 in the top left of Figure 2.1 another role that an actor may adopt in a multilateral negotiation is that of a *cruiser*. A cruiser is a 'filler' who has 'no strong interests of their own, and so are available to act as followers' (Underdal, 1994, 5). A cruiser is positioned towards the centre of the reformist-conservative spectrum in that it has no particular interests to defend or to push, but is generally supportive of reformist efforts by others and will follow attempts to find consensus in order to achieve an outcome agreement. Unlike a pusher, leader or mediator however, a cruiser will not proactively seek change but will more likely buck-pass responsibility for achieving such goals to others.

Related to the role of a cruiser is a *bystander* – positioned in quadrant 3 in the bottom left of Figure 2.1. Similar to a cruiser, a bystander is an actor within multilateral negotiations who is relatively central on the reformist-conservative spectrum having no strong interests to push or defend. Unlike a cruiser however, a bystander will not play a 'filler' role in following others who seek reform. A bystander, or 'shirker' (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 79), is instead an actor present in negotiations but one who avoids responsibility and obligation and is not therefore directly involved in the specifics of the negotiation process. Thus, while a cruiser will follow others in the interests of securing an outcome agreement, a bystander will sit back throughout the negotiations as a fly on the wall as others negotiate around it. By way of contrast, the role of a *laggard* – also identified in quadrant 3 above – can be identified with an actor that is more conservative, preferring to maintain the status quo, but rather than standing back as a bystander, is more reactive to the reformist efforts of others and will drag its feet and cause delays in an effort to prevent change (Andresen & Agrawala, 2002; Sprinz & Vaahoranta, 1994, 81).

Two further power broker roles must also be identified including a *defender* and a *blocker*. Reflected in quadrant 4 in the bottom right of Figure 2.1 above, defenders and blockers are distinguishable from laggards by their output. Similar to a laggard a defender and a blocker will each have a conservative positioning. In contrast to a laggard's more reactive negotiation style however, defenders and blockers adopt much more proactive methods in order to defend their interests and prevent reform. Defenders in multilateral negotiations may therefore be defined

as, 'single-issue participants, concerned more with promoting their issue than with the overall success of the negotiations' (Underdal, 1994, 5). A defender may use similar tactics to that of a pusher, for example building coalitions to generate a body of support for its interests, but rather than pushing for reform, will actively defend its interests against others' reformist attempts.

Closely related to this is the role of a blocker that will, 'seek to block an agreement and protect their freedom of action, often with reference to a limited number of issues' (Underdal, 1994, 5). A blocker is, more specifically, a veto player within multilateral negotiations: one who will actively block a consensus-based outcome agreement should it not meet with its own particular, typically more conservative interests. A defender may thus resort to becoming a blocker should its interests be threatened by an outcome agreement, but a defender will utilise other tactics first in order to prevent such an outcome. Both roles may furthermore be associated with methods of 'Westphalian assertion' whereby states use 'nos' to exert their national sovereignty within the negotiation process (Wade, 2011, 352).

Conceptualisations of the EU's role-set

The EU may be identified with any number of these different roles within a multilateral negotiation. Where the issues under negotiation are broad-ranging it can be assumed that the EU's negotiation positioning will move between more reformist and more conservative preference structures, with similar corresponding levels of output that will see it behaving more proactively or reactively to any given issue. Returning moreover to the main IR theories, correlations can be drawn between the positions of different theories and the roles that states might be expected to play. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, for realists, states might be more likely to follow a largely conservative role-set in an emerging multipolar world, which would see them adopt patterns of behaviour related to a laggard, bystander, defender or blocker. This might for example include reactive patterns of behaviour such as buck-passing or bait-and-bleed strategies, as Mearsheimer (2007) espoused, or more proactive efforts such as alliance formation (Posen, 2009) in order to defend against costly reform attempts, or even through the use of its veto to prevent change. For liberals however, a more positive and reformist role-set might be expected, with states likely to perform mediatory, pusher or leadership roles in




FIGURE 2.2 Liberal and realist conceptualisations of role-set in multilateral negotiations

Source: Author’s own compilation.

working cooperatively with others within multilateral negotiations to achieve a positive sum outcome (Moravcsik, 2010).

Collaborating liberal conceptualisations of role-set in a multipolar world moreover, has been much of the EU studies literature itself, illustrated in Figure 2.3. Conceptualisations of the EU as a global actor have particularly emphasised the EU playing a proactive, if not always effective, role in multilateral settings (Jørgensen, 2009; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Understandings of the EU as Civilian Power Europe (Duchène, 1972) also fall into this bracket by stressing the EU’s preferences towards soft (Lavenex, 2004), non-military forms of positive influence, and its endeavours to strengthen international institutions and the rule of law through cooperation in an effective multilateral system (McCormick, 2013, 132; Moravcsik, 2010). In this literature more broadly, the EU’s prioritisation of effective multilateralism and its efforts to ‘take on responsibility for building a better world’ (Council, 2003a) are often closely associated with it taking on a distinctive leading role within international institutions (McCormick, 2013, 42; Jørgensen et al., 2011) as well as in its ability to build upon its own internal consensus-based decision-making process to facilitate agreement among others and thus play the role of mediator (McCormick, 2013, 108).

Normative Power Europe proponents have, furthermore, tended to associate the EU’s role in multilateral negotiations largely with that of a leader (Forsberg, 2011; Falkner, 2007; van den Hoven, 2004). Seen to follow patterns of behaviour that include the use of persuasion, ‘norm entrepreneurship’, the setting of ambitious targets for others to follow

and of coming up with policy solutions (Falkner, 2007; van den Hoven, 2004; Smith & Woolcock, 1999), the ‘appropriate behaviour’ that has thus been expected of the EU has been as a ‘force for good’ (Manners, 2008, 59).

More than this, emphasis within the more specified, and often more rationalist and interest-driven, literature focused upon the EU as a trade policy actor, has also tended to associate the EU’s role-set with proactive rather than reactive roles (i.e. Elgström, 2007; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; Young, 2006; Elgström & Smith, 2006; Meunier, 2000).⁵ The EU is thus seen in the trade policy literature as following a role-set that positions it to proactively defend its internal interests, especially those in agriculture, while proactively pushing, and at times leading the way, in the pursuit of its more reformist interests for further trade liberalisation (Young, 2011, 2006; Mandelson, 2008a; Paeman, 2000).




FIGURE 2.3 *Conceptualisations of the EU’s role-set in EU discourses*

Source: Author’s own compilation.

As Figure 2.3 illustrates, the analysis and discourse on the EU has thus tended to favour proactive roles on the horizontal axis, while saying very little on the EU performing more reactive roles, such as cruiser, bystander or laggard. The emergence of a multipolar world order can, however, be understood to create a new social hierarchy which would constrain and modify the EU’s negotiation behaviour and the roles that it adopts in multilateral negotiations. The EU’s role positioning, performance and role-set more generally, must therefore be expected to alter as a response to this new hierarchy and the new challenges for cooperation and competition that it presents. Pursuing

a leader, pusher or mediatory role must especially be seen to bring new challenges for the EU in an emerging multipolar world as new powers seek to proactively pursue their own reformist or conservative agendas which could make compromise and consensus far harder to achieve.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in this chapter the expected implications of an emerging multipolar world on the behaviour of states and other global actors have been discussed. Drawing upon several theoretical takeaways of how multipolarity may be seen to shape actor behaviour, an analytical framework for analysing actor roles specifically within the context of multilateral negotiations was proposed. Highlighting first the dimension of an actor's strategic orientation and negotiation positioning between reformist and conservative, and second its behavioural output as reactive or proactive, this framework details a number of roles that may be associated with the EU's preferences and behaviour in multilateral negotiations. These are expressed as leader, pusher, mediator, cruiser, bystander, laggard, defender and blocker. How then has the EU's role positioning, performance and role-set been impacted as a result of an emerging multipolar world? What roles has the EU played within multilateral trade negotiations more particularly, and how has that role adapted with the emergence of new powers? It is to these questions that the following empirical chapters shall turn.

Notes

- 1 My thanks to Chris Clarke, Matthew Watson, and Gabriel Siles-Brügge for their comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
- 2 For a detailed account of the differences between realist and neo-realist theories, please see Donnelly (2005).
- 3 Bait-and-bleed and bloodletting strategies are identified by Mearsheimer (2001, 139) as possible responses by states in dealing with military aggressors. Bait and bleed requires a state to bait others into a protracted and costly warfare with each other while the baiter remains on the side-lines with its military strength intact (Mearsheimer, 2001, 154–155).

- 4 As liberal democratic peace theorists would suggest, democracies are less likely to go to war with one another.
- 5 Exception to this may be seen in description of the EU as a 'laggard' during the late 1970 and early 1980s where the United States was proactive in pushing for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT but where the EU dragged its feet and caused delays (see Paeman & Bensch, 1995).

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The Evolution of the EU's Global Trade Agenda: Transforming Role Position in the WTO



Abstract: In this first of two empirical chapters assessing the EU's response to multipolarity, the evolution of the EU's global trade preferences and positioning within the WTO is considered. Reflecting on the EU's substantive strategic shift in its global trade agenda since the turn of the 21st century, it reveals how the EU has moved away from an ambitiously reformist and staunchly Multilateralism-First approach – toning down its former multilateral ambitions to better account for the preferences and position of the other major powers – to today pursue a more avid Competitiveness-First approach to its global trade agenda.

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Introduction

The EU has evolved into a formidable global trade actor since its formation as the European Economic Community in 1957. Initially established as a customs union of six member states, the EU is today the largest trading bloc in the world, enlarged now to 28 members, and with a lucrative single market of over 500 million people. The evolution of the EU as a global actor, particularly with regards to its widening and deepening as a polity, has had a marked impact upon the EU's external trade policy (Young & Peterson, 2006), positioning the EU not only as a global economic superpower but as a prominent player and power broker in the multilateral trading system. How therefore have the rise of new powers in the international system and the emergence of a multipolar world order impacted the EU's global trade agenda and its own strategic orientation towards the multilateral trading system? In this chapter this question is considered with specific focus to the role-positioning dimension detailed in the previous chapter and thus to developments in the EU's trade strategy and preferences within and towards the WTO.

Broken into three sections, Section 1 presents a brief introduction to the EU's trade-policy making and external trade negotiation processes. Section 2 then considers developments in the EU's global trade agenda since the end of the 20th century, particularly addressing its strategic shift from the 'managed globalisation' to 'Global Europe' to 'Trade, Growth and World Affairs' (TGWA) approaches. The final section then offers a comparative perspective of the approaches of the other major poles towards the multilateral trading system and the WTO's Doha Round. In so doing this chapter presents the case that the EU's role positioning within the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations has undergone a substantive evolution since the turn of the 21st century and with the emergence of multipolarity. Moving from an ambitiously reformist and staunchly multilateralist approach in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has, since the mid- to late 2000s, been required to pursue a far more moderated multilateral trade agenda, toning down its former ambitions to better account for the positioning of the other major powers.

EU trade policy in the making

Since its creation the EU has centred its trade policy on the principle of 'uniformity' – having no barriers to trade between its member states

and with a common external tariff to be applied to goods imported from outside of the Union (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Art 113). Through its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), established under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the EU presents itself as a single trading bloc within the international system. In addition to its common external tariffs, the EU speaks with a single voice in its external trade negotiations, with authority delegated by the Council of the European Union to the European Commission to negotiate for the EU at the international level (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Art 113). Efforts, both within the European Court of Justice (ECJ, 1994) and later through successive EU treaty reforms (Treaty on European Union, 1997, 2001; TFEU, 2007), were to further codify the EU's competence in trade policy and, following the 2009 implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU, 2007), this was further solidified with all remaining trade and trade-related issues transferred from the national competence of its member states to the European Union (Young, 2011, 719; Woolcock, 2010, 385).

The EU is not, however, a homogeneous block when it comes to building its commercial policy. While ongoing processes of widening and deepening has brought the EU's 28 member states into 'ever closer union' there still exist many areas of contention among individual members' trading interests as well as in their preferred approaches to trading practices and rule-making (M. Baldwin, 2006). Finding consensus among the EU-28 is as such a difficult, yet critical, process before a common negotiation mandate can be adopted by the Council and carried forward by the Commission in external trade negotiations. Finding commonality between the EU-28 has nevertheless been aided over time by the EU's own internal process of market integration and reform. The Single European Market (SEM) programme, launched in 1992, particularly boosted EU coherence in its external trade policy through the introduction of common rules and approaches to EU regulation, the removal of trade barriers between member states (Young & Peterson, 2006, 804) and with a resultant enhancement in European firms' competitiveness who were then keen to secure foreign market access (Young, 2011, 721). On agriculture also – a sector which has proven a particular misnomer for the EU as a champion of free trade and open markets due to its high levels of protection – the EU has undergone successive reforms of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since 1992, including in 1999, 2003, 2008 and 2013, in an effort to make it more market-oriented and open to international disciplines.

Much has been written on the complexities of the EU's decision-making processes in trade policy, and the, often fraught, inter-institutional relationships that shape the EU's negotiation position entering trade negotiations (Meunier & Nicolaidis, 2011; Da Conceição, 2010; Dür, 2008; Damro, 2007; Kerremans, 2004). The EU is not, however, wholly unique in this respect. By way of comparison, the United States requires that its Trade Representative (USTR) – who is nominated by the president and acts as US negotiator in all trade negotiations – receives negotiating directives from the US Congress. The issuing of what is termed Trade Promotion Authority⁴ (TPA) by Congress to the USTR is, much like the EU Council's own internal negotiation process, an often complex and laborious process and, once granted, Congress continues to have detailed oversight over USTR activity. Congress moreover, like the EU's Council and Parliament, retains the authority to review and decide whether any proposed trade agreement will be implemented.

Important also to highlight is that, while the EU must undergo extensive internal deliberations in deriving a negotiation mandate, often this process and the inter-institutional dynamics at play between the Commission, Council and Parliament can be used to its negotiation advantage. While some have suggested that EU trade policy-making results in a lowest common denominator position (Paeman & Bensch, 1995; Meunier, 2000), with the Commission seen to be inhibited by an inflexibility to the demands of others as well as being slow to react (Smith & Woolcock, 1999, 444; Elgström, 2007), so too can this be used as a bargaining strength. More particularly, the inter-institutional complexity of EU trade policy-making, and the heterogeneity of interests within the EU's membership mean that third countries often have to accept that the EU can only move so far or so quickly and thus have to work around EU demands (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011, see also Deese, 2008, 17; Elgström & Strömvik, 2005).

The evolution of the EU's global trade agenda

In the past half-decade the EU has undergone a number of substantive shifts in its global trade agenda which has shaped both its approach to the multilateral trading system and its objectives within multilateral trade negotiations. From the 1970s the GATT was largely dominated

by the EU and United States as the 'Big Two', with negotiations centred upon tariffs and other 'at-the-border' issues such as anti-dumping measures and technical barriers to trade. However, the EU of the 20th century GATT was a very different player to the EU of the 21st century WTO. Since the turn of the 21st century there has been a proliferation of the view of the EU as a 'leading actor' and 'multilateral champion' within the WTO (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 79; Elgström, 2007; M. Baldwin, 2006; Smith & Woolcock, 1999). During successive multilateral trade rounds of the 20th century GATT, from the Kennedy Round (1964–1967), Tokyo Round (1973–1979) and for much of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994), the EU was, however, a far more reticent and conservative player, largely concerned with defending its CAP from international disciplines than with comprehensive or ambitious multilateral trade deals (Young & Peterson, 2014, 80; Woolcock & Hodges, 1996, 305–306).

EU reticence to commit to any far-reaching concessions in agriculture during the Uruguay Round² was largely blamed for the Round's failed midterm review (Woolcock & Hodges, 1996, 310–315; Meunier, 2005, 106), and it was not until after the Uruguay Round's failed Ministerial Conference held in Brussels in 1990 that the EU demonstrated a substantive shift in its stance towards multilateral trade negotiations, moving from a defensive to a driving partner in advocating the Uruguay Round's conclusion (interview, former EC negotiator, Uruguay Round, Brussels, May 2011; Woolcock & Hodges, 1996, 315–316). Coinciding with the introduction of the SEM and reforms of its CAP in 1992, the EU was to demonstrate greater flexibility in agricultural negotiations, and a more proactive stance in support of stringent international trade disciplines in services and intellectual property, a strengthened rules-based system through the creation of a 'Multilateral Trade Organisation' (GATT, 1990) and the introduction of a strengthened dispute settlement mechanism (Paeman & Bensch, 1995; Devuyt, 1995; Woolcock & Hodges, 1996; Young, 2011). By the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the EU was to be one of the main advocates of the multilateral trading system and the WTO as its flagship organisation.

Since the birth of the WTO the EU's global trade agenda and its subsequent role positioning within multilateral trade negotiations has evolved yet further. Three major strategies can be identified in the EU's approach to the multilateral trading system, and within multilateral trade negotiations during this time. These include, first, the EU's 'managed

globalisation' strategy from 1999 to 2006, second, 'Global Europe' from 2006 to 2010 and since 2010, the 'TGWA' strategy. We turn now to consider these strategic re-orientations in more detail.

Multilateralism-First: managed globalisation (1999–2006)

Following the birth of the WTO in 1995 the EU underwent a major upgrading of its multilateral trade agenda. Previously dominated by traditional trade policy, focused principally upon 'at-the-border' issues such as tariffs, agricultural subsidies, levies and trade facilitation, the EU began to develop its interests in extending international rules across a broader array of 'behind-the-border' issues associated with both commercial policy – including trade in services, intellectual property, investment measures, competition and procurement – and social trade policy – addressing normative issues such as environmental and core labour standards (Young, 2007, 791).

It was at this time that the Commission began to signal a new strategic direction for the EU in its approach to global trade governance and in the multilateral trading system more particularly. Initiated by the European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, the doctrine of 'managed globalisation' first entered into public discourse in September 1999. The strategy sought to 'manage' or 'harness' globalisation through the basic principles that international rules should be written, and obeyed, and that international institutions should have their jurisdiction extended, and their powers enhanced (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 353). With a clear multilateralist agenda that sought the strengthening and advancement of multilateral trade disciplines to a growing WTO membership across a wider range of trade and trade-related issues (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 357–358), the EU's strategy was not only to promote openness in global trade but 'openness the European way', seeking to export its own norms and standards as a 'globalizer' for the multilateral trading system (Meunier & Nicolaidis, 2006, 912, 915). Coinciding also with the EU's own internal developments, including its 1995 enlargement to include Austria, Sweden and Finland, the signing of the Treaty on European Union in 1992 and the launch of the Eurozone in 1999, the EU's strategic aspirations during this period were both ambitious and far-reaching, raising expectations of the EU taking on a far greater global role in the new Millennium (Hill, 2004; Smith & Woolcock, 1999).

For the EU's role positioning this was to have several critical consequences. First, the managed globalisation doctrine resulted in the EU prioritising the WTO and multilateral trade agreements over its bilateral or regional agreements. A moratorium was placed on all new preferential trade agreements negotiated bilaterally and plurilaterally (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 358) and a Multilateralism-First doctrine was applied. In this way the EU sought to achieve greater market freedom for itself but within the context of enhanced multilateral disciplines applicable to all. This was particularly significant in the context of the emerging economies who, at the turn of the 21st century, were advancing but still lagged behind the EU and United States (M. Baldwin, 2006). Their size and potential for growth nevertheless presented both opportunities for EU firms and a source of future competition. Important therefore was the need to anchor the emerging economies within the WTO and the multilateral trading system and to ensure that they would play by EU rules.

In addition to prioritising the WTO as the EU's preferred regulatory forum for global trade governance, the managed globalisation strategy was also notable in placing specific emphasis onto the normative dimension of the EU's trade agenda. Already starting to pursue a 'deep' trade agenda since the end of the Uruguay Round (Young & Peterson, 2006, 798), the managed globalisation strategy was to indoctrinate far greater issue-linkage between the EU's trade policy and other 'non-trade concerns', including many with distinctively normative dimensions such as development, the environment, human rights and good governance (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; Young, 2007, 789; van den Hoven, 2004). This strategy was notable for positioning the EU not only as a keen multilateralist, but as a development champion within the WTO (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, 919) and the foremost advocate for the launch of new multilateral trade negotiations with a distinctive development flavour (van den Hoven, 2004).

Intending that a new multilateral trade negotiation should last no more than three years, the EU sought a swift, 'comprehensive and ambitious' round (Council, 1999a) that could complement not only its own trade preferences, but those of the developing world. The launch of the *Doha Development Agenda*, or 'Doha Round', at the WTO's fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001 was thus to mark a major victory for the EU's managed globalisation strategy and was to position the EU as the WTO's leading, and most ambitious, actor.

A mixed approach: global Europe (2006–2010)

By the mid-2000s the EU's managed globalisation strategy was however to have experienced several difficulties. The rise of the emerging economies as economic powers, coupled with the more assertive role of India and Brazil especially within the WTO, had resulted in slow progress in the Doha Round negotiations going forward. The rapid economic rise of China, closely followed by India and Brazil, had leapfrogged these countries into positions of some importance in the multilateral trading system, giving them a new political influence within the Doha Round (Kerremans, 2004; M. Baldwin, 2006). Economically their rapid rise presented serious difficulties for the EU. Thanks in large part to the process of trade liberalisation, achieved by successive trade rounds of the GATT, most advanced developed countries had already taken substantive steps in lowering their tariffs. The rapid growth of the emerging economies had, however, increasingly highlighted a problem of free riding within the multilateral trading system (HLTEG, 2011, 31). No longer considered small enough or poor enough by the industrialised world to warrant exemption from multilateral trade disciplines (Mandelson, 2008c) the emerging economies nevertheless continued to utilise their development status and the principles set out in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration within the Round to protect themselves from potentially costly processes of trade liberalisation.

More than this, despite the initial intention of completing multilateral trade negotiations within three years, by 2006 negotiations within the Doha Round had reached an impasse and were formally suspended (WTO, 2006). With progress slow in the WTO, the United States had further rechanneled its energies into its own growing network of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (as well as other 'WTO Plus' agreements which included competition and investment) through a strategy of 'competitive liberalisation' (Sbragia, 2010, 375–377). In contrast, the EU had only completed a small number of outstanding free trade agreements between 1999 and 2006,³ having concentrated its main efforts on the WTO. With increasing concerns over its global competitiveness, particularly in light of the United States' zealous efforts to secure market opening bilaterally (Sbragia, 2010, 377), and with ongoing challenges presented by the emerging economies at the multilateral level, the EU was to undergo a substantive strategic re-evaluation of its global trade agenda in the mid-2000s.

For the first time linking its internal competitiveness with growth and jobs to its external trade performance (Bendini, 2014, 5), the 'Global Europe – Competing in the World' strategy was formally launched in 2006 (Commission, 2006). Global Europe presented a major shift in the EU's approach to the multilateral trading system. With the challenges of 'effective multilateralism' proving to be increasingly costly (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 358), Global Europe saw the EU ending the moratorium on bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements set down in the managed globalisation strategy, to reopen the door to the EU's pursuit of its trade interests beyond the WTO. Still prioritising the WTO as the main forum for its external trade negotiations (Commission, 2006, 2), the EU began to pursue a mixed multi-level approach combining both multilateral and bilateral trade agreements.

Recognising that its trade policy and overall approach to international competitiveness would need to adapt in the face of a changing world (Commission, 2006, 3), the Global Europe strategy was to have several implications for the EU multilateral trade agenda. Importantly, it signalled a shift in the EU's approach to the emerging economies. Recognising that the rising powers were combining their high growth with high barriers to EU exports, the EU specified for the first time that, 'as [the emerging economies'] role and the benefits they draw from the global trading system grow, so too do their responsibilities to play a full part in maintaining a global regime that favours openness' (Commission, 2006, 6).

In addition, the EU's renewed pursuit of bilateral and regional trade agreements was justified as 'complementary' to the multilateral level; serving as 'an opportunity to test out innovations which, if successful can then be applied to multilateral frameworks' (Lamy, quoted in Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 359). The EU thus began to pursue several 'WTO Plus' interests, such as competition and investment not yet being addressed within the WTO's Doha Round at the bilateral level. From 2006 onwards the EU was to follow this mixed approach by pushing for continued progress within the WTO's Doha Round, while at the same time initiating its own bilateral trade negotiations with countries such as South Korea, Ukraine, Canada, India and several ASEAN countries. Thus, while the EU continued to present itself as an advocate of the Doha Round from 2006, emphasising that, 'there will be no European retreat from multilateralism' (Commission, 2006, 10), its leadership rhetoric was to decrease as it redirected focus to its growing 'competiveness-driven'

(Commission, 2006, 10) free trade agreements outside of the WTO (Elgström, 2007; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006).

Competitiveness-First: TGWA (2010–)

The year 2009 was to mark the start of a new European Commission for the EU and with it a new European Trade Commissioner, Karel de Gucht, to office. With a new Commissioner at the helm of DG Trade the EU again undertook a re-evaluation of its trade strategy. Launched in November 2010, the TGWA strategy (Commission, 2010) was to form a major component of the new Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. With demand for European products weakened since the 2008 global economic crisis, there was a growing awareness of the EU's enhanced reliance on trade, and exports most especially (Bendini, 2014). With projections of developing and emerging countries accounting for nearly 60 per cent of world GDP by 2030, the TGWA was therefore a direct response to concerns over EU competitiveness in a world where 90 per cent of world growth would be generated from outside of Europe (Commission, 2010, 4). TGWA as a result placed a renewed priority onto securing the EU's presence in traditional markets while also 'conquering new ones' (Bendini, 2014, 1). Further refreshed in a Commission policy communication to the European Council entitled 'Trade, Growth and Jobs' in 2013 (Commission, 2013), the EU's trade strategy has notably prioritised the EU's attentions onto tackling non-tariff barriers and regulatory issues with its primary industrialised trading partners – including the United States and Japan – while 'striking the right balance between ambition and reality' in the way it engages with large emerging economies. In sharp contrast to the managed globalisation strategy of the early 2000s which prioritised Multilateralism-First, and with a notable upgrading of the Global Europe strategy in favour of bilateral and regional negotiations with key strategic partners, the EU's global trade agenda since 2010 has thus been driven principally by a Competitiveness-First strategic orientation.

For the EU's multilateral trade agenda the TGWA strategy, and supplementary Trade, Growth and Jobs communication, has had several crucial implications. Firstly, it has deliberately refocused the EU's global trade agenda onto 'new' issues such as market access for services and investment as well as overcoming regulatory barriers in order to bolster jobs and growth within the EU itself (Commission, 2010, 4; 2013, 3).

Important to note is that many of these new issues are not dealt with under the current remit of the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations. Secondly, while the EU continues to stress that the Doha Round remains its 'top priority' (Commission, 2010, 5), and that its trade agenda must ultimately 'strengthen the multilateral trading system centred on the WTO' (Commission, 2013, 1), the TGWA strategy places a far greater emphasis onto EU bilateral free trade agreements and, more specifically, onto investment agreements with third countries. Building upon the Global Europe agenda of establishing new bilateral trade agreements with third countries, TGWA not only identified the need for the EU to conclude outstanding competitiveness-driven free trade agreements with Singapore, Canada, India, Brazil and other MERCOSUR countries, and several ASEAN members (Commission, 2010, 10–11), but in its 2013 communication, notably identified the prioritisation of trade, investment and regulatory agreements with advanced industrialised countries including the United States and Japan (Commission, 2013, 4–6), while also pursuing new 'balanced forms of partnership' with emerging countries (Commission, 2013, 7). The EU has since opened negotiations in April 2013 with Japan for a free trade agreement, in July 2013 with the United States for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and in November 2013 with China for an Agreement on Investment. In completing that agenda two-thirds of EU external trade could as a result be covered by bilateral free trade agreements (Commission, 2013, 4).

Comparison therefore of the EU's TGWA strategy and Trade, Growth and Jobs communication of the 2010s with that of the managed globalisation strategy of the early 2000s reveals some stark differences. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the EU was a fundamental advocate of the WTO, the principal *demandeur* for multilateral trade negotiations, prioritising the WTO as the core forum for negotiating a comprehensive and ambitious trade liberalisation agenda for the multilateral trading system, and a leading reformer for new multilateral disciplines in a wider array of 'behind-the-border' trade-related issues. Since the turn of the 2010s the EU has demonstrated a fundamental shift in that approach. Now pursuing above all its need for foreign market access in services and investment in an effort to build growth and jobs and enhance its global competitiveness, the EU's multilateral trade agenda has subsequently been moderated substantially to a largely rhetorical stance in support of the WTO, but with its primary negotiating focus engaged elsewhere. It is clear that the EU's strategic aspirations regarding the multilateral trading

system have seen a significant moderation, and indeed demotion, of its previous ambitions for the WTO in favour of the bilateral approach.

Taking account of the ‘other’

As this chapter has reflected thus far, the EU’s multilateralist aspirations have experienced some diminution since the early years of the WTO, with the EU moving away from its leading normative and multilateralist stance approaching the launch of the Doha Round, to a more rationalist and competitiveness-driven approach a decade later. While economic interests have played a key part in this evolution so too have the changing geopolitical dynamics of the multilateral trading system itself. As role theory reflects, the ‘other’ is important in assessing an actor’s role positioning, recognising that the rise of new powers in the international system may create increased role uncertainty (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 78) as well as potential role competition as the major powers manoeuvre for position within multilateral settings. Important therefore in considering the evolution of the EU’s role positioning within the multilateral trading system and the WTO more deliberately, is to address how the other major poles – and specifically those involved in the WTO’s core circle of negotiators alongside the EU – have themselves identified with the WTO and its Doha Round negotiations.

The United States

For the EU, the United States has long been accepted as both a major partner, and a competitor, in systems of global governance (i.e. Sbragia, 2010). Since the 1970s the EU and the United States have formed a formidable duopoly within the multilateral trading system with their, often conflicting, interests largely responsible for shaping the scope, agenda and timescale of multilateral trade negotiations. The United States has, however, much like the EU, experienced its own strategic reorientations towards the GATT/WTO in the past two decades. Following the Tokyo Round it was the United States that was to play the part of principal *demandeur* pushing for the launch of a new multilateral trade round (Paeman & Bensch, 1995).

After the establishment of the WTO, however, it was the United States that was to take up the role of ‘reluctant partner’ to EU efforts

in pushing for the WTO to address a deeper trade agenda. While initially open to multilateral negotiations to cover procurement, the environment and labour standards (WTO, 1996), the United States was highly sceptical of including competition and investment within the WTO's trade agenda (Blustein, 2009, 66), preferring a 'mini-round' approach that was narrow in scope and focused specifically on issues including agriculture, services, intellectual property and a commitment to ban tariffs on e-commerce (Steinberg, 2002, 353). The United States was, however, to step aside from its previous leadership of the GATT after the WTO's formation in 1995 (van den Hoven, 2004, 263). With the EU adopting that role by pursuing developing world support for a new Round the United States was to adopt more reactive cruiser and bystander roles during much of the late 1990s. It was only after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 that the United States firmly committed to the launch of a new, comprehensive and ambitious multilateral trade round (Blustein, 2009; Lamy, 2004).

In sharp contrast to the EU's managed globalisation strategy from 1999 to 2006 moreover, the United States has long considered the WTO as one forum among many for the pursuit of its global trading interests. A consistent proponent of 'competitive liberalisation' (Sbragia, 2010), the United States has pursued an aggressive strategy of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements in order to gain better access for American goods in foreign markets, resulting in a somewhat 'laissez-faire' approach (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010) to the WTO.

The EU's shift from managed globalisation to Global Europe, and later TGWA, was, however, in many ways, to reflect a growing symmetry in EU and US strategic approaches to trade. Much like the USTR who has consistently stated US support for the WTO and the completion of the Doha Round while pursuing 'reciprocal trade agreements' bilaterally and regionally (Anthony Gardner, US Ambassador to the EU, Chatham House, 2014), the European Commission has similarly adopted a strategy of pursuing competitiveness-driven FTAs while stressing its ongoing prioritisation of the WTO (Commission, 2010, 2013). In terms of role positioning therefore, the EU and the United States have found themselves less as role competitors within the WTO (although increasingly so at the bilateral level), and much more as role facilitators with one often providing opportunity (and at times excuse) to the other in the positions they subsequently adopt.

China

Within the multilateral trading system China's role has come under particular scrutiny (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014; Breslin, 2013; Li, 2011), with China recognised to be taking a far more active role at both the multilateral and regional level since the turn of the 21st century (Breslin, 2013). As a regional great power China has built a growing array of preferential and free trade agreements both within Asia and its close abroad. China's activity at the regional and bilateral level has further developed since the 2010s with China now negotiating free trade agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia and Norway, and with negotiations under consideration with India, South Korea, Japan and, since November 2013, the EU.

Only acceding to the WTO in 2001, China has for much of the 2000s been categorised as a 'Recently Acceded Member' (RAM) in multilateral trade negotiations, allowing it certain privileges and opt-outs to aid its transition to an open market economy. China has subsequently benefited considerably from its WTO membership (Economist, 2011), and its economic development since the turn of the 21st century has leapfrogged it into a position of some significance within the WTO today. Now the world's foremost exporter in manufactured goods, and second only to the United States as the largest importer of manufactured goods (WTO, 2013a), China has, much like the other emerging economies, developed far greater stakes in the multilateral trading system. It has subsequently, since 2008, entered the WTO's core circle of negotiators, the G5, which ensures it a place at the Doha Round's top negotiation table. With domestic industries to protect and foreign markets to conquer, China has thus much to gain from the WTO and in shaping its course.

Despite this, China has presented itself as a difficult figure within the WTO. Exhibiting a largely conservative 'status quo' positioning within negotiations to date, China has maintained a relatively aloof and 'shirker-like' (Schweller, 2011, 291) stance within the WTO while allowing others to take the lead. China has thus been seen as much more a 'rule-taker' than a 'rule-maker' within this forum (Santander, 2014, 7; Li, 2011; Breslin, 2010), often conforming to decisions rather than challenging them (Breslin, 2013, 616). Thought moreover to be 'stuck in defining its identity' (Li, 2011, 331), China is described as having a double-hatted role within the WTO, playing the part of both leader of the developing world and of an emerging great power (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 86). China's strategic

approach to the WTO has thus been played out most prominently in the frequent emphasis on its RAM status (USTR, 2014), and its development status more broadly (Li, 2011; Mandelson, 2008c), in an effort to avoid making concessions. For this reason China is most commonly perceived as a free-rider in the Doha Round (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 86): having gleaned much of the benefits from past rounds of trade liberalisation, but unwilling to incur the, 'unbearable responsibility' that leadership of a major multilateral institution would present (Li, 2011, 343).

India

A similar picture may also be found in India's approach to the WTO since the turn of the 21st century. Much like China, India has been the subject of growing interest to analysts of the WTO and the multilateral trading system with its increasing economic strengths and potential for further growth often contrasting sharply with its particular development interests (Narlikar, 2013; Mukherjee & Malone, 2011; Wagner, 2010). In contrast to China however, within the multilateral trading system India has often been cast as a potential, and indeed 'easy' negotiating partner for the Western powers (Narlikar, 2013, 595), and as a likely supporter (Schweller, 2011, 292) within systems of global trade governance, due not only to its size, but thanks to its 'like-mindedness' as a democratic, English-speaking nation.

However, India has proven itself an active and oftentimes formidable actor within the WTO. Despite claims of India being an 'easy' partner, it has in fact presented a significant challenge to the West, and not least the EU, within the WTO. Early efforts by the EU to deepen the WTO's trade agenda with the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations were particularly unpopular with India. Indian resistance to the inclusion of labour standards on the WTO's negotiation agenda in Seattle was further blamed for the failure to launch a Millennium Round in 1999, and since the launch of the Doha Round, India has continued to present a reluctant and conservative figure within negotiations (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 79). Rather than being a supporter and negotiation partner for the EU therefore, India's approach within the WTO has positioned it much more as a 'can't do' country. one that is highly confrontational, inflexible (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 86; Narlikar, 2013, 606) and the foremost challenger of the developed world's efforts to introduce new trade issues within the WTO (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011, 318).

While India has demonstrated some awareness of its responsibilities as an emerging power (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, southern developing country, Geneva, May 2011), a prominent and ongoing theme in its strategic positioning within the WTO has nevertheless been that of resistance. India has been a consistent promoter of development issues while defending its own trade regime and development interests within the WTO (Brümmer, 2005). Seen to be something of a Third World leader (Narlikar, 2013, 604) and a foremost coalition-builder for developing country issues (2013, 603), India is a member of several development-oriented negotiation blocs within the WTO, including the G20, the G33 and the Asian developing members group. In addition India is also a member of NAMA-11, a group of developing countries seeking flexibilities to limit market opening in industrial goods trade.

Despite its influence as a leading developing country and a member of the WTO's G5, India has nevertheless not sought to present itself as a leader of the WTO as a whole. Pursuing also its own growing regional trading interests through bilateral and regional trade negotiations (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011, 311), India has been a much more tentative actor when it comes to taking responsibility for the Doha Round negotiations (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 79; Narlikar, 2013, 606; Mukherjee & Malone, 2011, 318), preferring instead to play on its development status in the defence of its own national interests rather than position itself as a reformer or champion of multilateralism as a whole (Wagner, 2010, 69).

Brazil

Brazil too has become an important member of the WTO and of the G5 circle of core negotiators. While having a comparably smaller population and more modest economic advancement than India and China, Brazil is a foremost exporting nation with extensive agricultural industries to develop and further represents an important, and increasingly wealthy, market for others to access. Brazil has also become an important regional great power. With the largest economy in Latin America, Brazil is a powerful presence in the region and a leading member of MERCOSUR with its growing network of free trade and preferential agreements with other countries and regions around the world. Brazil has also exhibited keen multilateralist behaviour since 1985, placing particular emphasis onto the importance of multilateral diplomacy (Fonseca, 2011, 387).

In contrast to India and China moreover, whose positioning has often presented them as difficult negotiators within multilateral trade negotiations, Brazil is considered to be much more a supporter of the multilateral trading system and of the WTO's Doha Round as a whole (Ahnliid & Elgström, 2014, 86; Fonseca, 2011, 394). While a prominent member of several developing country negotiation blocs within the WTO – including the G20 and NAMA-11 – Brazil has not overtly utilised its development status to obstruct progress within negotiations (Burges, 2013, 585), instead presenting itself as a 'bridge-builder' between global north and south issues (Burges, 2013). Brazil has thus worked with both the developing and developed world since the WTO's creation in furthering Brazil's growing trading interests and supporting the multilateral process as a whole.

Since the 2008 financial crisis Brazil has nevertheless been found to be more assertive within the WTO, seeking to 'push the envelope' in asserting Brazil's presence as a shaper of the multilateral trading system in the 21st century (Sotero, 2010, 73). In 2013 this was further reflected in the successful nomination of Brazil's former WTO Ambassador, Roberto Azevêdo, to the position of WTO Director General. For the EU, Brazil's 'bridge-builder' and multilateralist approach to the WTO has thus far been welcomed (Ahnliid, 2014, 86). However, by positioning itself as a bridge-builder and a 'benign, conciliatory, consensus-creating persona' (Burges, 2013, 577), there is also some potential for role competition between Brazil and the EU who has itself sought to act as a 'mediatory power' between the north and south within the WTO (Meunier & Nicoläidis, 2006, 919).

Conclusion

In concluding, this chapter has sought to present an overview of the EU's global trade agenda in comparative multipolar perspective. It has been argued that changes to the EU's strategy have demonstrated a substantive shift in the EU's role positioning within the WTO and its multilateral trade negotiations. In the WTO's early years the EU's managed globalisation strategy was notably successful in its bid to position the EU as a leading player in the WTO. At a time when the emerging economies were advancing but not yet making substantive economic gains, and when the United States was itself refocusing attentions onto the bilateral

level, the EU was well positioned to take up the opportunity of pursuing a deeper trade agenda that would open up new markets, incorporate the developing world into the multilateral trading system and codify further multilateral trade disciplines.

The enigmatic rise of China, India and Brazil over the course of the 2000s was, however, to create cause for the EU to modify its approach to the multilateral trading system. With opposition from the emerging economies assertive in playing the development card, the increasing competitiveness of the United States pursuing its objectives outside of the WTO and with the challenges presented by the global economic crisis since 2008, the EU has been required to moderate its former ambitions and its normative positioning of 'Multilateralism-First' to a more 'Competitiveness-First' approach focused upon the pursuit of EU growth and competitiveness interests at a multitude of levels. In the following chapter these issues and arguments shall be developed further as we turn to look explicitly at the EU's role performance in the case of the WTO's Doha Round.

Notes

- 1 Or 'fast-track' authority.
- 2 As well, arguably, as its incoherence in presenting a unified front in the agricultural negotiations (see Woolcock & Hodges, 1996, 314–315).
- 3 With Chile, Mexico and South Africa.

4

The EU's Changing Role Performance in the WTO's Doha Round

► *Abstract: In this second of two empirical chapters assessing the EU's response to multipolarity, focus turns to the EU's role performance within the WTO's Doha Round. Offering an important longitudinal analysis detailing developments over time, this chapter considers the EU's negotiation behaviour and activities towards negotiation partners and how its output has changed. It shows that the EU has played multiple roles within the WTO's Doha Round but with a clear trend; moving from principally proactive and reformist roles to a more reactive role-set over the course of the round's negotiation history.*

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Introduction

In the previous chapter we considered the evolution of the EU's global trade agenda and its implications for the EU's role positioning with the WTO. In this chapter this picture is developed further with focus on the EU's role performance within the specific case of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda. Broken down into two main sections, the first section presents an introduction to the Doha Round's main negotiation issues, challenges and timeline. The second section then presents analysis of the EU's role performance within the Doha Round multilateral trade negotiations to date. In this section focus is given specifically to the EU's role in what are identified as three major phases in the Doha Round negotiations so far, as well as critical periods of role-shift for the EU. These include the Round's launch and the EU's early leadership (1996–2004), the Round's difficult interim and the EU's defensive shift (2005–2008), and the lead up to the 'Doha-Lite' or Bali Agreement and the EU's reactive turn (2008–2013). Analysis shall thus look particularly at the changes in EU negotiation behaviour over the course of the WTO's negotiation history from its first Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 up to the ninth Ministerial Conference held in Bali in 2013.

Drawing upon the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2, and specifically the 'output' dimension focused upon the EU's negotiation behaviour and activity, this chapter identifies the multiple roles that the EU has played within the Doha Round over the course of its negotiation history. Notably, this chapter highlights a clear progression in the EU's role evolution within the Doha negotiations since the Round was launched in 2001. Setting out as a proactive and reformist leader and pusher for much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, it will be shown that the challenges of the Doha Round's crux negotiation issues, along with the strategic orientation, preference structures and output of the other major powers, have led to a role-shift with the EU now adopting the reactive roles of cruiser, laggard and bystander in response to the new geopolitical reality of the multilateral trading system.

The WTO's Doha Round negotiations

Following the successful conclusion of the GATT's Uruguay Round (1986–1994) the WTO was created as the first international institution

intended to establish, monitor and enforce the rules of trade between nations at the global level. To operate as the flagship institution of the multilateral trading system, the WTO began its life in 1995 with the legacy of GATT behind it, and with a growing multilateral agenda ahead. Thanks to the Uruguay Round's Final Act, the multilateral trading system was to experience, 'the largest liberalisation of trade in the world' (interview, former EC negotiator, London, April 2011), cutting tariffs across the board with a commitment by the GATT's contracting parties not to raise them again on 95 per cent of world visible trade (Hyett, 1996, 91). Also agreed under the Uruguay Round Final Act was a 'built in agenda' which detailed the negotiations and agreement to be reached on several topics by set dates in the future, and which included among them the further liberalisation of trade in agriculture. The WTO's formative years were thus to be dominated by negotiations focused primarily on its work programme and which was to inspire the EU particularly to seek the launch of a new round of trade negotiations spanning a broader and deeper set of trade and trade-related issues (Kerremans, 2005).

The Doha Development Agenda was formally launched by the WTO in November 2001. Covering an impressive 21 subject areas the Doha Round represents the largest, most comprehensive and ambitious trade negotiation in the history of the multilateral trading system. It further holds enormous benefits for the global economy, with estimates suggesting an injection of \$360 billion in new trade¹ (Bouët & Laborde, 2009), and even wider benefits through the securing of market access (Hoekman et al., 2009). Initially intended to last no longer than three years, the Doha Round has, however, missed several deadlines, experienced numerous periods of stalemate and impasse, and, at the time of writing, is now entering its 14th year. The Doha Round is thus not only the largest, but also the longest, round of multilateral trade negotiations to date.

Under the Doha Round's original mandate, negotiations within the WTO have spanned a huge variety of different and contentious issues. With well over a decade of negotiation history the issues that have, and continue to present areas of contention between the WTO's members, are far too numerous and complex to disseminate in the space available here. However, a number of crux negotiation topics must be flagged as critical to the major thrust of the Doha Round negotiations, and which have presented the main areas of challenge to the negotiations as a whole. These are briefly summarised below.

Agriculture

Agriculture has been a topic of particular contention within the Doha Round and not least for the EU who, as one of the world's largest (and most protected) agricultural markets, is the main focus of demands for 'fairer' trade within the multilateral trading system. Within the Doha Round, agricultural negotiations span three pillars including market access, export competition and domestic support. With a protected agricultural sector, including the use of domestic support measures through its CAP, higher tariffs on imported agricultural products and the use of export subsidies, the EU sees itself as, 'the major net loser in any deal' that requires extensive liberalisation of agricultural trade (Mandelson, 2008a).

Within the agriculture negotiations the EU, the United States and Brazil particularly have stood at opposing sides of the negotiation table. The United States has been foremost in calling for the complete elimination of all export subsidies and cuts to the highest agricultural tariffs (CRS, 2005), demanding ambitious reforms by the EU to bring its CAP more fully under WTO disciplines. Brazil has also made demands of the EU in its agricultural sector. The EU is Brazil's foremost trading partner, accounting for 21.4 per cent of Brazil's total trade, of which 40 per cent is in agricultural products (Commission, 2014a).

Brazil is also a member of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting nations which is proactive in making reformist demands of the EU and other developed countries to liberalise their agricultural markets. The EU's largely conservative positioning over agriculture has tended, however, to defend against making extensive concessions in agriculture, particularly with regards to domestic support, and has instead emphasised the 'multi-functionality' of its agricultural sector in an effort to keep 'non-trade concerns' within the negotiation remit and maintain, in some part, its protected status from trade liberalising rules (Council, 1999b, pt. (a)).

NAMA

A second area of focus within the Doha negotiations has been that of industrial goods or Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA). NAMA negotiations aim to reduce or eliminate tariffs, including tariff peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation and non-tariff barriers for non-agricultural goods, and, in particular, on products of export interest to developing

countries. In balancing against the concessions it would be expected to make in agriculture, the EU has been an especially ambitious and reformist player within the Doha Round's NAMA negotiations in its efforts to 'conquer new markets' (Bendini, 2014) through substantial tariff reductions, particularly by the emerging economies, and the elimination of tariff peaks.

Despite an early focus within negotiations on the products most likely to benefit developing countries (and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) especially), a major point of contention within the NAMA negotiations during the latter half of the 2000s and early 2010s has been the extent to which the emerging economies should qualify for Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) and Less Than Full Reciprocity (LTFR) through reduced reciprocal measures relative to the industrialised countries (WTO, 2001). These principles were included as an important element of the Doha Round's development dimension purporting that developed countries would lower their import duties and other trade barriers and allow special treatment to developing countries, but without the expectation of full reciprocal concessions in return.

Within the Doha Round the EU and the United States have, however, increasingly sought to gain access for their goods to other markets – not least in China, Brazil and India whose dramatic rise since the Doha Round's launch in 2001 has created considerable competitiveness challenges for the established poles whose own markets are already open, as well as presenting important foreign market opportunities for European and American firms. A challenge facing EU and US negotiators however is the high level of tariff and non-tariff barriers to European and American products entering emerging markets. For one thing there is a considerable amount of 'water' between developing country's bound tariff rates and the rates actually applied (HLTEG, 2011, 39).² Notably, China has become one of the EU's fastest growing export markets (Commission, 2014b). A major supporter for China's accession to the WTO in 2001 (Eglin, 1997), the EU has nevertheless met with increasing resistance from an increasingly influential China capable of utilising its development and Recently Acceded Member (RAM) status within the WTO to defend against the EU's reformist efforts to reduce its trade barriers.³ India too has substantial non-tariff barriers that the EU seeks to tackle within the Doha Round, including quantitative restrictions, import licensing, mandatory testing, certification for large quantities of products and lengthy customs procedures. With a high average applied

tariff of 13.5 per cent, Brazil's market is also an expensive one for the EU (Commission, 2014a), and thus the emerging economies have increasingly become a target for EU demands for improved market access for industrial goods.

The LTRF principle has, however, required that the EU maintains, and even lowers further, its low tariffs for industrial goods but without the expectation of full reciprocation by emerging economies during the course of the Doha Round. For the emerging economies the LTRF principle has been an important means by which to gain access for their goods in the developed world. For the EU however, it creates a potent avenue of increased competition to which there is few reciprocal gains to be found. For the EU, along with the United States, demands for more ambition by the emerging economies in opening up new sectors to WTO disciplines and of lowering both bound and applied tariffs on industrial products, and thus to take on greater responsibility within multilateral trade negotiations, have been a major negotiation issue since 2006 (Mandelson, 2008c). The EU has therefore emphasised that any concessions in agriculture that it must make are conditional upon genuine steps forward by the emerging economies within the NAMA negotiations (Council, 2008b). In these negotiations however, the emerging economies have been highly resistant, preferring instead to cut bound rates in areas of existing liberalisation only.

Services

Another area of focus within the Doha negotiations, although arguably less high profile than agriculture and NAMA, has been trade in services. As an excelling area of global trade, services negotiations within the Doha Round encapsulate the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and address four major components including market access, domestic regulation, GATS rules on safeguards government procurement and subsidies, and special treatment for LDCs. Similarly to the NAMA negotiations, services have also proven an area of interest to the EU in its reformist efforts to gain improved market access for its own services sectors. In particular the EU has sought full negotiation modalities on a broad and deep package of commitments from WTO members, particularly addressing market access and national treatment disciplines (Council, 1999b). On market access however, where the EU has sought the most ambition in its efforts to achieve binding commitments through

multilateral disciplines on services, efforts to improve market access within the Doha Round have instead been pursued through a more informal plurilateral or bilateral 'request and offer' procedure which has been favoured by the United States. As with the NAMA negotiations however, the EU has been consistent in demanding that ambition by others in the services negotiations is a condition of its own agricultural concessions (Council, 2008b).

The 'Singapore Issues'

First debated at the WTO's first Ministerial Conference in 1996 at Singapore, the 'Singapore Issues' – including trade and investment, competition, procurement and trade facilitation – have been a particular issue of contention between the EU and emerging economies. Pushed as an agenda item predominantly by the EU at the Doha Round's launch, and originally included under the Doha Declaration agreed in 2001, the Singapore Issues have nevertheless proven a major stumbling block to the negotiations. For the EU, whose approach was a 'global negotiation without limits' (Paeman, 2000, 53), these new issues represented important sectors for economic gain. The United States also supported their inclusion on the negotiation agenda, and has particularly championed negotiations on procurement and trade facilitation (Blustein, 2009, 154). For the emerging economies however, these issues have been less of a priority – preferring instead liberalisation of the Uruguay Round 'built-in agenda' issues and, not least, in the crux issue of agriculture. India especially has been strongly opposed to the inclusion of the Singapore Issues on the Doha Round agenda. With resistance from India and other developing countries the issues were subsequently unbundled in 2004 with investment and competition dropped from the agenda completely (to then be taken up at the bilateral level), government procurement pursued through a plurilateral agreement and only trade facilitation continued on the Doha agenda at the multilateral level. Trade facilitation has thus continued to be a topic of interest in the Doha negotiations, principally due to the large swell of support for trade customs and disciplines between countries to be simplified and improved across the WTO's membership.

A further crucial issue at play within the Doha Round which must be highlighted is that negotiations have been based on a 'single undertaking' whereby nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed. The single

undertaking allows negotiators to use the concessions they must make in some sectors of the negotiations as leverage to gain ground in others. Thus, the EU position in the Doha Round can be best understood as a dual strategy of aiming to concede as little as possible in the agricultural negotiations, where it is most conservative, while trying to gain as much as it can in market access for its industrial goods and services in other markets (see also Young, 2007, 123; Paeman, 2000, 54–57). The same approach is also used by others, so that offers or concessions made are conditional on progress made in other areas of the negotiations in order to achieve an overall gain from the package as a whole.

Where this has run into difficulties, however, is where offers fail to generate similar levels of ambition by others and positions become entrenched. Over the course of the Doha Round these divisions have been manifested in delays not simply in agreeing a final consensus deal, but in negotiating the very framework, rules and formulae (known as ‘modalities’) by which such a deal might start to take shape. The Doha Round negotiations therefore involve significant bargaining complexities as well as highly divergent positions between what have now become the major poles within the multilateral trading system.

While this brief overview misses the more nuanced positions of each of the major poles it nevertheless highlights the substantive challenges at play within the WTO and the difficult task facing negotiators in bringing the Doha Round to a satisfactory conclusion. Further reflected in Figure 4.1, the changing economic environment – which has seen a substantive growth among the emerging markets relative to the United States and the EU – along with a changing geopolitical landscape at the international level with the emergence of the BRICS group and the replacement of the Group of Eight by the Group of Twenty, has run in course with the Doha Round’s negotiation history.

Evaluating EU role performance in the Doha Round

As Figure 4.1 reflects, the case of the WTO’s Doha Round presents a particularly valuable point of inquiry in understanding the EU’s response to an emerging multipolar world. As a negotiation the Doha Round was launched at a time of global shift at the turn of the 21st century and has since spanned over a decade of developments in the rise to prominence of the emerging economies. More than this, as an integrative multilateral




FIGURE 4.1 Time-line developments in the WTO's Doha Round in context

Source: Author's own compilation. Graph figures from the IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2014 (Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes; the base year is country specific).

negotiation involving 160 members, and premised on a model of ‘concentric circles’ in which those actors with the largest stakes in the system form the negotiation core, the Doha Round represents a crucial forum in analysing the behaviour and interactions of the world’s established and emerging poles, and how the EU particularly has subsequently navigated the new great power hierarchy presented by an emerging multipolarity.

Despite this, scholarly focus upon the EU within the WTO and Doha Round negotiations has thus far been fairly sporadic. With the considerable scholarly attention given to the EU’s trade policy relatively little has been paid to changes in the EU’s behaviour and activities within its multilateral trade negotiations (see also Young, 2011; Dür, 2006). Instead, focus has tended to concentrate either on individual negotiation events, such as the EU’s efforts to launch the Doha Round (van den Hoven, 2004; Kerremans, 2005), or on high-profile WTO Ministerial Conferences (Ahnliid, 2012; Ismail, 2008; Kerremans, 2004). As a consequence, analysis of the EU and the Doha Round has thus far tended to suffer from some ‘presentism bias’ (Jørgensen, 2007, 510), which has led to a neglect of more longitudinal analyses which better enable variation in the EU’s performance to be identified.

An important aim for the following analysis therefore, is to contribute towards this discourse by presenting a comprehensive overview of the EU’s role performance within the Doha Round thus far, and how it has evolved in response to an emerging multipolar system. Focusing upon the EU’s role performance within the WTO’s biennial Ministerial Conferences and its General Council meetings⁴ over the period 1996 to 2013, attention in the following sub-sections is given specifically to the EU’s negotiation output – assessed along the proactive–reactive spectrum detailed in Chapter 2 – and thus on EU negotiation behaviour and tactics, including when it acts and what methods it has used to pursue its preferred negotiation outcome.

The WTO’s early years: leading the field (1996–2004)

As detailed in Chapter 3, from the WTO’s first steps the EU was positioned to play a leading role in any new negotiations. At the WTO’s first Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996 the EU was first to promote the concept of a new ‘Millennium Round’ and the need for a wider and deeper multilateral trade agenda. In the lead up to the WTO’s third Ministerial Conference, held in Seattle in December 1999,

the European Council was further highlighting, 'the importance of the EU playing a leading role in these negotiations' (European Council, 1999), and had begun conducting an extensive diplomatic *tour des capitales* of those WTO members most reluctant to agree to a new Round to garner support – notably including India, Malaysia, Indonesia and Egypt (Bridges Weekly, 1999a; interview, former EC negotiator, London, April 2011).

In October 1999 the Commission's negotiating directives were formally approved, in which all of the EU's objectives for new trade negotiations, covering topics from services, the Singapore Issues, NAMA, trade and environment, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and technical barriers to trade were included in detail (Council, 1999b). Now pursued as part of the EU's 'managed globalisation' strategy which sought extensive and far-ranging trade liberalisation across a far deeper range of negotiation topics (see Chapter 3), the EU was primed to enter negotiations at Seattle with a mandate for the launch of a 'comprehensive, balanced and ambitious' trade round. On the contentious issue of agriculture moreover, the EU had, in the week prior to the Seattle Conference, cut its budget supports for agricultural export subsidies in a move aimed at, 'building good faith with its trading partners' (Bridges Weekly, 1999b).

The Seattle Conference was, however, to end in failure for the WTO and the EU. Beset by mass anti-globalisation protests, as well as a deeply unhappy body of developing country members resistant to efforts to broaden the WTO's negotiation agenda to include 'new' issues such as core labour standards, the Conference ended with no outcome agreement and no Millennium Round. Faced with the stark reality of the need to persuade the developing world of the benefits that a new Round might present, from early 2000 the EU began to modify its approach. Recognising that its negotiation position was at odds with the developing world, the EU undertook a substantive shift in its strategy to better address the development issues of a new trade round. Further pursuing the same tactics adopted prior to Seattle, the EU was to conduct another concerted diplomatic *tour des capitales* of developing countries (interview, former EC negotiator, Brussels, 16 May 2011; van den Hoven, 2004, 262–263) in order to persuade them of the benefits of a new round.

Altering its tactics to focus on what the multilateral trading system could do for developing countries, the EU notably began to promote its Everything But Arms Initiative, which provided duty-free and quota-free

(DFQF) access for LDC products to the EU (Kerremans, 2004, 373). In addition the EU fought hard for a WTO waiver for its preferential trade agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and further implemented its Uruguay Round commitments on textiles in order to garner third world support in other issues (Van Den Hoven, 2004, 264). Further demonstrating flexibility over developing country demands for clarification of the TRIPS language relative to the Access of Medicines and also modifying its own language over core labour standards, by the time of the Doha Ministerial the EU's proactive output had ensured a considerable swell of developing country support for a new Round (Steinberg, 2002, 353).

In a further alteration from Seattle, the United States had also begun to shift its favour towards the launch of a multilateral trade round (interview, WTO spokesperson, Geneva, 19 May 2011; Lamy, 2004; Blustein, 2009). The subsequent launch of the Doha Round at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001 was thus to prove a marked success both for the modification of the EU's role positioning and performance and for the United States in supporting the EU's bid for a new round. Most notably, the launch of the Doha Round saw the EU attain its core goal of securing an 'ambitious, balanced and comprehensive' new Round, encompassing not only trade in agriculture but also, importantly, in other issues including services, NAMA, TRIPS, the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) and trade, and, significantly, in the Singapore Issues, all of which were to be achieved in a Round that would be agreed as a single undertaking (WTO, 2001).

In a further success for the EU's modified development approach (van den Hoven, 2004; Council, 2001, pt. 4), negotiations were launched as the *Doha Development Agenda* aimed at integrating developing countries into the multilateral trading system. While the EU did have to 'accept the unacceptable' (Bridges Weekly, 2001) in agreeing to a comprehensive agriculture mandate which would include the phasing out of export subsidies, it nevertheless did so with confirmation that the special nature of agriculture and its 'non-trade concerns' would also be taken into account within the negotiation remit (WTO, 2001, pt. 13; Council, 1999b, pt. (a)).

The EU did not, however, achieve all that it would have wanted from the Doha Declaration. On its more reformist objectives including the Singapore Issues and its normative agenda of negotiations on environmental and labour standards, the EU failed to garner the necessary

support from India and others in the developing world for full and comprehensive negotiations to take place. Importantly, on the Singapore Issues, while being a leading advocate of their full inclusion under the negotiation agenda, the EU had to accept that they would not be negotiated formally until after the WTO's fifth Ministerial Conference at the end of 2003 and, even then, only with full consensus from all WTO members. Continuing to present a major sticking point for India particularly, this postponement of the Singapore Issues was a concession between the EU and developing country interests. Subsequently the full scope of the Doha Round was far less than the EU had initially sought for as it was, 'not ideal from a European perspective ... But everyone made the concessions necessary to achieve a balanced result' (Lamy, 2004).

After the Doha Round's launch, negotiations within the WTO moved into a new phase focused on the modalities to be employed in negotiating the Round's conclusion by 2004. However, following the Doha launch negotiators made limited headway (Lamy, 2004, 6). Agriculture in particular had shown itself to be an early crux issue for the Round with the EU targeted by much of the developing world, as well as the United States, in demanding what was described as 'genuine liberalisation' in agricultural trade (Bridges Weekly, 2003). The Singapore Issues also continued to present a major issue for negotiators. For the EU their inclusion on the Doha Round agenda remained a clear priority but which continued to be resisted by many developing countries (Blustein, 2009, 139). While the United States remained open to negotiations on government procurement and trade facilitation (Blustein, 2009, 154), the EU was increasingly to find itself as an outlier in its efforts to broaden the Doha agenda to include all four Singapore Issues.

In the lead up to the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference, originally intended to serve as the Round's midterm review, the EU set itself the objective of securing modalities for the 'comprehensive, balanced and ambitious' multilateral trade negotiation it was seeking (Council, 2003b). From January 2003 this was pursued through a proactive output centred upon an offer for agricultural concessions, including proposed cuts to EU trade-distorting domestic support by 55 per cent, average tariffs by 36 per cent and a substantial cut in the volume of export subsidies (Hofreither, 2008, 351). In July 2003 at a mini-ministerial held in Montreal, European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy further initiated a joint working paper between the EU and the United States that would seek to move negotiations forward through establishing broad proposals

across all three pillars of the agriculture negotiations which would act as a compromise between the EU and US agriculture stances (Blustein, 2009, 140). In an effort by the EU to demonstrate renewed flexibility over the agricultural negotiations and show concession to the developing world, the Commission also conducted an information campaign with the EU's trading partners to inform them of changes brought about through a further CAP reform introduced in 2003 (Council, 2003c).

Despite its efforts, the EU failed to generate sufficient support from the developing world. Instead of securing the backing of India, Brazil and others to move negotiations forward, the EU–US joint paper instigated their opposition and rise to prominence within the negotiations. Many developing countries, including the G90 group of developing and least-developed countries, found the proposal short on specifics (WTO, 2003a). For the emerging economies particularly, the EU–US joint paper on agriculture was antagonistic, and indicative of efforts by the 'Big Two', not only to dominate the Doha agenda but also to retract on their commitment under the Doha Declaration to reduce agricultural export subsidies (House of Lords, 2003, pt. 39; Blustein, 2009). Reacting quickly and concertedly, the emerging economies agreed to an alliance – called the G20⁵ – in order to deter EU–US efforts and to achieve substantive agricultural market opening within the developed world.

Despite their differences as agricultural exporting and importing nations, and with traditionally diverse approaches to agriculture, India, Brazil and the members of the G20 were, through their defensive coalition, effective in blocking the EU–US joint paper and subsequently delayed progress in the agriculture negotiations (interview, senior official, WTO unit, DG Trade, May 2011; M. Baldwin, 2006, 939). India, moreover, further threatened to block any deal that included the Singapore Issues (Bridges Weekly, 2003; WTO, 2003b). With emerging economy resistance, the Cancun Ministerial was thus to end with no outcome agreement, no modalities agreed and with the further expectation that the Singapore Issues should be removed from the Doha negotiation agenda.

While Cancun came as a major shock to the EU (Lamy, 2004, 7), it was also to mark a major milestone in the emerging multipolar reality facing the multilateral trading system. With Canada and Japan dropping away from the former Quad, and India and Brazil rising to the forefront of negotiations in agriculture through the G20, Cancun signified the beginning of the end for the EU and US duopoly that had dominated the

GATT and WTO since the 1970s, and the emergence of a 'new topography in global trade politics' (Mortensen, 2009, 86). Despite a proactive output as a major pusher for the Singapore Issues, a demonstration of flexibility over the challenging issue of agricultural concessions and a broad-based leadership role in promoting modalities in order to move negotiations forward, the EU had failed to account both for the force of feeling among the developing world in opposing a deeper and more ambitious Doha Round, and for the new great power hierarchy that the rise of the emerging economies was to herald within the WTO (interview, senior official, WTO Unit, DG Trade, Brussels, May 2011).

In response to the failure at Cancun in September 2003 the EU thus underwent a further shift in approach, this time through a substantive moderation of its expectations and former ambitions, for the Doha Round as a 'global negotiation without limits' (Paeman, 2000). In November 2003 the Commission revisited the EU's negotiation objectives and concluded that it should be ready, 'to explore alternative approaches to negotiating the Singapore Issues...possibly through removing them from the single undertaking of the negotiations' (Commission, 2003). It further argued that, on agriculture the EU would show, 'continued readiness to make significant commitments provided that our trading partners also show real movement' (Commission, 2003).

By December 2003 negotiations again resumed with a view to making maximum progress in the year ahead (Commission, 2004a) and, by July 2004 negotiators met again to finalise a deal on the negotiations modalities. With the EU softening its stance on the inclusion of the Singapore Issues on the negotiation agenda, and with a renewed commitment to demonstrate flexibility over agriculture, the EU's negotiation position approaching the July meeting was much more closely in line with the preference structures of the developing world comparative to the Cancun Ministerial. Continuing to pursue a proactive output, the EU was to take up a prominent position in the preparation for the July meeting. At the core of the EU's negotiation output was a letter sent by EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and EU Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler to all WTO members in May 2004 (Commission, 2004b). The letter detailed the EU's revised approach to the Round and which outlined, for the first time, the EU's willingness to bind cuts in its domestic support of agriculture and eliminate export subsidies on the condition that others made cuts in their export promotion schemes.

In addition the Commissioners called for further ambition to be shown by others on NAMA and services, but which detailed the EU's willingness to join the majority consensus and to drop its calls for the Singapore Issues covering investment and competition to be included under the single undertaking. Importantly, the EU also specified a proposal that, on agriculture and NAMA, LDCs and the most vulnerable developing countries should not have to open their markets beyond their existing commitments – in effect offering the G90 a 'Round for Free' (Commission, 2004b, 3). Coupled also with further diplomatic *démarches* worldwide (New York Times, 2004), the EU's offer and proposal was to provide a major motivator for reviving the negotiations (Grant, 2007, 173–174), convincing LDCs especially that the Doha Round did not represent a threat to them (Lamy, 2004, 7), and eventually bringing about the July 2004 Framework Agreement (WTO, 2004) which was to reflect much of what the EU outlined in its May 2004 letter to WTO members (Young, 2007, 130; Grant, 2007, 173–174).

The July 2004 Framework Agreement was a notable milestone for the Doha Round. It agreed on a deal on agricultural modalities, further secured negotiations on trade facilitation (Dür, 2008, 34), detailed a date for May 2005 for revised offers to be submitted for the services negotiations (WTO, 2004, (e)) and reaffirmed the Round's development dimension including confirmation of the principle of SDT and a specific emphasis on LDCs (WTO, 2004, (d)). While the Round had missed its first deadline of being completed by 2004, the scene had nevertheless been set for the WTO's next Ministerial Conference to be held in 2005, and with the expectation of conclusion by 2006.

Focusing more particularly on the EU's role during this period, it is clear that the EU was to adopt a strong *demandeur* or pusher role for the start of negotiations thanks to its reformist position and proactive output following the WTO's creation in 1995. The EU's managed globalisation strategy was, however, also to position the EU primarily as a leader within the WTO between 1999 and 2004, not only seeking a substantive reformist agenda with a new focus on a wider range of new 'behind-the-border' trade and trade-related issues, but also espousing a clear normative dimension to negotiations which drew on the need to integrate the developing world into the multilateral trading system. As a leader the EU was further ready to accept responsibility for the launch and progress of a new round, while also demonstrating some willingness in its output to accept sacrifices in unpacking and eventually dropping

the Singapore Issues from the negotiation agenda, and in having to put its own defensive interests of agriculture not only on the negotiation table but further accepting that concessions would be necessary to ensure progress towards modalities. As with any leadership role however, the EU was to experience opposition from those less inclined to follow. The early defender, and later blocker, role adopted by India, and further reinforced by the creation of the G20 coalition, was to demonstrate a critical gap in the EU's reformist aspirations and its capacity to persuade others – and not least the emerging economies – to match its level of ambition. As the Doha Round entered its next phase of negotiations this capacity would be challenged yet further as focus again returned to agriculture.

A difficult interim: pushing and defending (2005–2008)

The momentum that had been generated at Geneva in 2004 was to go some way in moving negotiations towards a revised 2006 deadline. The WTO's sixth Ministerial Conference, which took place in Hong Kong in 2005, was seen as a 'crucial opportunity for WTO members to reinvigorate the Doha Round' (House of Lords, 2005, 5; CRS, 2005). For the EU however, Hong Kong was to present a challenging conference. The G20 and the United States had continued to put pressure on the EU to set a date for the agreed elimination of its agriculture export subsidies and to make further offers on the reduction of its agricultural tariffs after the July 2004 Framework Agreement. The European Commission was also facing growing pressure from its own member states in response to further agricultural concessions submitted in July and October 2005 (EUobserver, 2005; New York Times, 2005). It was only after agreement of the EU budget, and a majority vote of support following an extraordinary meeting of the Council, that the Commission would finally concede to a deadline of 2013 for the complete elimination of export subsidies in agriculture (New York Times, 2005; Wilkinson & Lee, 2007, 9). In making this concession however, the EU was, for the first time, to frame its position in the Doha Round in full defensive terms, stressing to negotiation partners that its 'threshold of pain had been reached' (WTO, 2005) and that the EU would concede no more on agriculture (Grant, 2007, 176).

Further expecting that others would now follow suit in demonstrating both the flexibility and ambition required to submit their own negotiation offers (CRS, 2005, 18), the EU was to be disappointed. In July 2006 leaders pledged to give their trade negotiators the flexibility they needed

to reach a compromise deal, deciding to hold last-ditch talks in Geneva (EurActiv, 2006). However, by 24 July 2006, new WTO Director General and former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy formally announced the suspension of the Doha Round (WTO, 2006). The United States was roundly blamed for this failure (EurActiv, 2006; Economist, 2006). Refusing to make bigger cuts to its farm subsidies if the EU and emerging economies did not reduce their tariffs on agricultural and industrial products respectively, the US stance was staunchly resisted by the EU who continued to emphasise that, following its concession at Hong Kong, it could go no further on agriculture (Financial Times, 2006). Moreover, with no further offers being presented by any of the major powers in services or NAMA the EU had little to gain from further conceding to such demands. Unable to push the United States or emerging economies to raise their level of ambition in negotiations on services or NAMA, and hand-tied internally by the agricultural interests of its member states, the EU could do no more.

When the Doha negotiations resumed again in 2007, the EU had subsequently undertaken its own internal re-orientation of its global trade strategy. Now pursuing with greater aplomb a number of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements following agreement of its 'Global Europe' strategy (see Chapter 3), the EU had begun to signal the start of its own refocus onto the bilateral level, while making increasing demands of the emerging economies to take on greater responsibility at the multilateral level. No longer accepting their development status as reason for the non-reciprocation of liberalisation offers and concessions, the EU began to adopt a tougher line in its reformist demands for greater market access for European exports to the emerging economies in order to give the EU, 'something in return' (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, southern developing country, Geneva, May 2011; Mandelson, 2008a).

Following the Round's return to business in 2007 negotiators began to gear up for the next WTO mini-ministerial, to be held in July 2008. This meeting was considered a milestone for the WTO and a 'window of opportunity' for bringing the Doha Round to its successful conclusion (Ahnliid, 2012, 68). For the EU, its negotiation position approaching the 2008 mini-ministerial remained consistent with that of its former strategy of striving for progress, with more ambition in areas of NAMA and services, and with modalities to be agreed in agriculture based upon the concessions it had made previously. More ambitious relative to Hong

Kong however, the EU was much more of the preference outlier in 2008 by pushing hard for the Round's conclusion at a time when others were less expectant of a result (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU member state, Geneva, May 2011; EurActiv, 2008).

For European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, the chance of concluding the Round before his term ended was a major incentive for raising ambitions (Blustein, 2009). The Global Europe strategy had also inspired a greater determination to secure market access opportunities for European goods and services abroad, a requirement only magnified by Europe's disappointing growth in sharp contrast to the emerging economies that year (see Figure 4.1). Encouraged to push for a greater level of responsibility among the emerging economies through greater reciprocation, especially in the NAMA negotiations, in Council Conclusions prior to the 2008 meeting the EU's negotiating position was explicit in calling on its negotiation partners to make, 'meaningful contributions commensurate with their level of development. For emerging economies, in industrial tariffs in particular, this requires granting additional market access' (Council, 2008b, (2)).

Entering the 2008 meeting the EU was also to demonstrate a proactive output in its effort to secure its objective of concluding the Round. In particular, bolstered by a further CAP 'health-check' which had taken place that year, the EU was to demonstrate further flexibility not only in offering a cut in its average agricultural tariffs by 60 per cent, a cut to tariff lines on industrial goods to 2 per cent (House of Lords, 2008), but also to submit an ambitious offer on services. Under the impression that the Round was approaching its endgame and therefore close to finding agreement (interview, senior trade official, EU member state, Brussels, May 2011; interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, May 2011), the EU was to be one of the first to accept the draft texts on a proposed package of modalities (Blustein, 2009). This tactic was a bold move in seeking to bring others to the point of consensus. Such a step was, however, to prove premature.

Further complicating negotiations at Geneva was a contentious debate surrounding the issue of safeguards for developing countries. India, supported also by new G5 member, China, had called for a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for developing countries to protect against an influx of agricultural goods from the developed world by temporarily allowing them to raise their tariffs. At the 2008 meeting however, disagreement over the types of constraints that would limit the use of the

SSM had been presented by the United States (Blustein, 2009, 266). For the first time finding itself, ‘in the unusual position of being on the edge of a Doha argument rather than in the middle’ (Mandelson, 2008b), the EU was not to be pivotal to these negotiations. Endeavouring instead to act as a mediator between the conflicting sides, the EU chaired a group of technical experts to try to find a compromise solution between divergent Indian, Chinese and American interests (Mandelson, 2008b; interview, senior official, EU delegation to the WTO, Geneva, May 2011). With divisions over the SSM nevertheless proving ‘irreconcilable’, and with India again threatening to walk out of discussions (Bridges Weekly, 2008), the meeting at Geneva was to close with no agreement on modalities and with the Round left languishing in stalemate.

The EU had not only reached the limits of its negotiation mandate set by the Council in the concessions it had offered, but had further ‘played its hand’ in showing its readiness to bring about a conclusion to the Round (interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011; interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU member state, May 2011). The EU’s proactive pusher and defender roles had thus generated little in the way of results. With limited will among the other major powers to make ambitious concessions or offers, and with the EU reaching the red-lines of what its own member states could accept (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU member state, May 2011; EurActiv, 2008), the Doha Round had yet again reached an impasse.

The reactive turn: from impasse to ‘Doha-Lite’ (2008–2013)

The July 2008 mini-ministerial was to signify a moment of sea change both for the Doha Round and for the EU’s role within it. In December 2008 WTO members met again in agreeing to revised draft modalities in agriculture. However, dogged by the global economic recession, negotiations again ground to a halt in 2009. Over the course of 2009 stalemate further continued between the positions of the United States and China in the WTO’s NAMA negotiations, specifically over the formula to use for modalities (interview, First Secretary to the WTO, southern developing country, Geneva, May 2011, interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, May 2011). The WTO’s seventh Ministerial Conference held in Geneva at the end of November 2009 further reflected a waning political will for progress among the WTO’s members, who, beset by their own

economic and financial crises, and with concerns of rising protectionism (HLTEG, 2011), were to give little attention to the flailing Doha Round.

Several attempts over 2009 and 2010 within the Group of Twenty⁶ – at times initiated by the EU – to intensify negotiations and bring the Doha Round to a successful conclusion (i.e. Bridges Weekly, 2011a) were moreover to produce little progress. Itself suffering from the effects of financial and monetary crisis, the EU was increasingly to turn its attentions inwards to focus upon its own internal challenges and the need to again re-evaluate its global trade agenda. Continuing growth by the emerging economies during the recession had further emphasised the need for the EU to improve its competitiveness and growth in a changing world (Commission, 2010). Now more actively pursuing bilateral and regional trade relationships with economic strategic partners, the EU's former prioritisation of the Doha Round and multilateral trade negotiations were to undergo a dramatic demotion in favour of its new competitiveness-driven Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy.

The EU's agreement in principle to the revised draft modalities at the July and December 2008 General Council meetings was to further present the EU with an opportunity to reposition itself within the WTO. While continuing to speak out in favour of the Doha Round and its necessary conclusion, since 2008 the EU has been much more a fly on the wall as others negotiate around it, positioning itself as a blameless party in the stalemate preventing progress, and awaiting breakthrough from the United States and emerging economies (interview, senior trade official, EU member state, Brussels, May 2011; interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011).

Preferring to sit back from the main thrust of negotiations, the EU has nevertheless run the risk of being seen as insignificant to the main issues still being negotiated (interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011; Ismail, 2012). Briefly manoeuvring itself to again play the role of mediator, in May 2011 the EU was to submit a 'compromise proposal' in an effort to again facilitate agreement between the United States and China over the sectors and formulae to use in cutting tariffs in industrial goods (interview, senior trade official, DG Trade, Brussels, May 2011). This 'compromise proposal' was to be pitched as an important step to kick-starting negotiations (interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, May 2011) as well as a necessary effort by the EU to show it, 'still had something it could throw into the mix' (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member

State, Geneva, May 2011). The proposal was, however, to receive mixed reviews. Seen by some as helpful for moving negotiations forward (interview, senior trade official, northern developed third country, Geneva, May 2011) and an intelligent attempt to build bridges between the United States and China (interview, WTO spokesperson, Geneva, May 2011), for others the EU attempt was too late to be useful (interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011). It was further criticised for giving the United States what it wanted (interview, senior trade official, southern developing third country, Geneva, May 2011, Interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed third country, Geneva, May 2011), while failing to bridge the gap between developed and developing world contentions (Bridges Weekly, 2011b).

The EU's role performance within the Doha negotiations has since been marked by a noticeable reactive turn with its negotiation behaviour far more clearly associated with that of a cruiser, bystander and even laggard. This reactive turn was first to become evident in response to a growing swell of support among WTO negotiators for what was being referred to as 'Plan B' or the 'early harvest' approach (interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011). With stalemate preventing progress in the Round after 2008, Plan B was a refocus of negotiations onto those aspects of the Doha Round which had already found some ground for consensus, decoupling them from the single undertaking, and thereby bringing about some limited outcome agreement. The Plan B approach was first backed by members at an informal meeting of the WTO's Trade Negotiations Committee at the end of May 2011 (WTO, 2011a) but was initially resisted by the EU which was seen to be dragging its feet against any move that would take the Doha Round away from the single undertaking (interview, Ambassador the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011; interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU member state, Geneva, May 2011). It was not until the WTO's eighth Ministerial Conference, held in Geneva in December 2011, that the EU began to moderate this laggard role. Dropping its insistence that all issues under the Doha mandate should be agreed under a single undertaking, the EU was finally to shift its support to an 'early harvest' approach that would allow areas of negotiation where agreement had been reached to be finalised without recourse to other sectors (WTO, 2011b).

Further shaping the EU's reactive behaviour at the 2011 Ministerial were its growing concerns over being asked to concede more on market access

(interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, May 2011; interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU member state, Geneva, May 2011). While maintaining its position from 2008, with the former concessions and offers made in its effort to bring the Round to a conclusion, at the 2011 Ministerial the EU was to adopt much more of a cruiser role whereby it hung back and buck-passed responsibility onto the United States to take the lead in making reformist demands of the emerging economies (interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, May 2011). The 2011 Ministerial was subsequently to conclude with a fairly ambiguous outcome. The United States' own reformist demands (interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, May 2011) failed to generate support among the emerging economies, and the outcome document was notably weak on agreeing next steps for negotiations (WTO, 2011c, 3).

Following the 2011 Ministerial Conference negotiations continued at a ponderous pace. With analyses and reports claiming that 'Doha is Dead' (i.e. Herman and Hufbauer, 2011; Ismail, 2012; Economist, 2012), over the course of 2012 and 2013 efforts within the WTO were increasingly to move towards finding a 'Doha-Lite' deal on a selection of early harvest negotiation issues. Backed by the EU (Council, 2011) these included the last remaining Singapore Issue, trade facilitation (aimed at easing customs procedures and cutting red tape at the border to speed up trade flow), some agricultural components (including the elimination of export subsidies first detailed at Hong Kong in 2005 and easing administrative procedures affecting farm exports) and development issues (including rules of origin and DFQF market access for LDCs). Gearing up to agree a 'Doha-Lite' deal at the WTO's ninth Ministerial Conference in December 2013, negotiations were to concentrate on agreeing draft texts for members to approve at the Ministerial.

For the EU however, the years 2012 and 2013 were a period of marked inactivity within the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations. In November 2011 the Transatlantic Economic Council at the EU-US Summit announced the creation of a High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWGJG) to investigate the potential for an EU-US agreement on trade and investment. In July 2012 the working group was to issue its first interim report (HLWGJG, 2012, 1) and, in June 2013, the EU and the United States formally launched negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with its first three negotiation rounds scheduled to take place between July and December 2013. With an anticipated economic benefit of €120 billion to the EU economy

(CEPR, 2013) the TTIP negotiations were aimed at cutting tariffs across all sectors, while tackling a number of non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade between the EU and the United States including the streamlining of technical regulations, standards and approval procedures.

Simultaneously to the TTIP negotiations, in March 2013 the EU, the United States, and 21 other WTO members, together accounting for 70 per cent of world trade in services, also announced the launch of negotiations on a Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) within the WTO. Formed as an agreement of like-minded members, and premised on the GATS, the TiSA negotiations are currently running alongside the Doha Round in an effort to generate momentum for trade liberalisation in services which may later then be adopted by the WTO as a whole.

It was therefore despite the EU's energies being deployed elsewhere that preparations were to move forward within the WTO for the Bali Ministerial. Generating momentum in the WTO's preparations was the appointment of Roberto Azevêdo as WTO Director General in September 2013 (WTO, 2013c). Upon taking up office, Azevêdo consistently pushed for negotiators to agree a draft text for approval at the Bali Ministerial in December 2013 (WTO, 2013d) – a position that was supported by a majority of WTO members (WTO, 2013e). In what was then a highly fraught five-day-long negotiation, extended beyond its scheduled end-date by one day, and teetering close to failure on several occasions, Ministers finally hailed a victory for the WTO's Bali Ministerial Conference on the morning of Saturday 7 December 2013 with agreement on trade facilitation, some agriculture components, LDC issues and with a Post-Bali Work Programme agreed in principle (Dee, 2013).

Sitting back as a bystander throughout much of the Bali negotiations, the EU was however to have a low profile at Bali. Broadly supportive of the draft texts circulated the night before the final day of the Conference (Council, 2013), the EU remained on the sidelines of much of the negotiations: its consent being required for agreement to be reached but otherwise remaining aloof from the major issues. On the topic of agricultural export subsidises particularly the EU merely maintained that: 'The EU has already made tremendous efforts in recent years to reduce its use of export subsidies, which have not been matched by other WTO members across all aspects of export competition' (Council, 2013, (6)).

It was instead agriculture negotiations over food stockholding and disagreement between the United States and India that was again to prove

a major block to consensus being found at Bali (Bridges Negotiation Briefing, 2013), and which was only overcome in the final hours with agreement over a peace-clause.⁷ With Azevêdo further taking a proactive role himself in pushing through a negotiation agreement at Bali, the EU was thus able to take a more reactive back-seat while supporting the work of the Director General to bring about a conclusion.

In the next concluding chapter the outcome at Bali in 2013 and the EU's role going forward within the WTO shall be returned to. Important for this analysis, however, has been reflection of the substantive shift that has occurred in the EU's role within the Doha Round since the early years of the WTO up to the Bali Ministerial. As has been shown, the EU's role within the Doha Round negotiations has experienced a notable evolution since the round's launch in 2001. Illustrated in Figure 4.2, this evolution has followed a clear progression from the role of leader and pusher in the WTO's early years and the launch of the Doha Round, through to a proactive yet more conservative defender role in the Doha Round's difficult interim years, and from 2008 onwards, the shift from proactive to reactive output with the EU's role changing from mediator, to laggard, cruiser and finally bystander by the time of the 2013 Ministerial Conference.




FIGURE 4.2 The evolution of the EU's role in the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations (1996–2013)

Source: Author's own compilation.

Conclusion

In this chapter the EU's role performance within the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations has been analysed. Detailing the developments in the

Doha Round negotiations, along with the EU's output in its negotiation behaviour and activities towards negotiation partners, it has been shown that the EU has played multiple roles but with a clear trend, moving from principally proactive and reformist roles to a more reactive role-set over the course of the round's negotiation history. Such adaptation in role performance, as with its role positioning detailed in the previous chapter, may be seen as a direct response to the strategic orientation and output of the other major powers within the WTO and multilateral trading system.

Positioned as a leader in the WTO's early years, and a *demandeur* for the launch of a new trade round, the growing assertiveness of India, along with Brazil and China, as well as the consistent pressure from the United States for the EU to make concessions over agriculture, were to result in the EU both lowering its ambitions and adopting a defender approach to their demands. With the EU's proactive output proving ever more costly, little reciprocation being offered by the emerging economies or the United States, the failed push to achieve an outcome for the Round, and faced by the challenge of global recession, the EU was to further shift its role performance from 2008.

Briefly playing the part of mediator in an effort to facilitate agreement between the United States, India and China in 2008 and between the United States and China in early 2011, the ongoing impasse in the Round has led to a refocus of the EU's attentions away from the Doha Round and onto its own preferential trade and investment agreements with strategic economic partners at the bilateral and regional level. The EU has subsequently adopted principally laggard, cruiser and bystander roles within the Doha Round since 2008, with the EU sitting back and waiting for others to negotiate their way out of impasse. In the final and concluding chapter this evolution in the EU's role-set shall be developed further. In particular, what does the transformation in the EU's role over the past decade and a half signify for its role-set in a changing world? Is this evidence of a Europe in Decline? And what does the future hold for the EU and the WTO moving forward?

Notes

- 1 The EU's TGWA strategy outlines that a Doha deal could result in an increase in world trade by over €300 billion a year and world income by more than €135 billion (Commission, 2010, 9).

- 2 Applied tariffs are the duties actually charged on imports. Bound tariffs are the commitment not to increase a rate of duty beyond an agreed level. Following the Uruguay Round agreement bound rates were applied to 100 per cent of agricultural tariffs and 99 per cent on NAMA tariffs for developing countries. Due to liberalisation among many developing countries since the Uruguay Round, however, they have voluntarily chosen to levy 'applied tariffs' at much lower rates. The scope – or 'water' – nevertheless remains for these countries to significantly increase their applied tariffs if they became more protectionist and which would still be legal under the WTO. Bound tariffs on industrial products in the EU are between 4 and 5 per cent and are 30 per cent for the emerging economies (House of Lords, 2008, pt. 42).
- 3 The European Commission reports that 45 per cent of EU companies operating in China report missed business opportunities owing to market access and regulatory barriers (Commission, 2014b).
- 4 The WTO's Ministerial Conference and General Council are the topmost decision-making bodies within the WTO and their meetings have provided important milestones in determining the trajectory, and outcome, of the Doha Round to date.
- 5 Not to be confused with the Group of Twenty leading economies in the world. The G20 in the WTO is formed now of 23 members including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
- 6 The Group of 20 major economies which replaced the Group of Eight in 2009 – not to be confused with the WTO G20 which is formed of approximately 20 developing countries who work together in the agriculture negotiations.
- 7 Underpinning these negotiations were concerns raised by the United States that subsidised food stock purchases, such as those endorsed under India's National Food Security Act, are trade-distorting, presenting the risk that India could be challenged under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism. A proposal by the G33, led by India, had however called for new rules on public stockholding for food security purposes and on domestic food aid, in which food purchased at administered prices for the purposes of food security could be included under the WTO's 'Green Box'. In an effort to find a compromise between the positions of the United States and India, a 'Peace Clause' was agreed which would commit WTO members to refrain from bringing legal challenges against countries with food stockholding programmes for an interim period until a permanent solution can be reached.

5

Meeting the Challenge of a Changing World

Abstract: *In this concluding chapter the EU's role-set in a changing world is considered. Offering a reconceptualisation of the EU as Pragmatic Polar Europe, it challenges perceptions of the EU as both a power in decline and a power with comparative advantage in a multipolar world. Instead it shows that the EU has responded pragmatically to meet the challenges of a changing world, broadening the scope of its role performance and modifying its role positioning to take into consideration the preferences and 'red-lines' of others. In this way the EU demonstrates a capacity to utilise all of its diplomatic, bargaining and negotiation tools in order to react and respond practically to the new geopolitical realities of an emerging multipolar world.*

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Introduction

In an emerging multipolar world the ability of all states to manage their international relations, manoeuvre the complexity of shifting power politics and navigate the changing dynamics of a new world order are of increasing importance. In this multipolar world, 'diplomacy becomes a respected career again' (Posen, 2009, 350), while collective problem-solving and decision-making has become ever more challenging. It has been within this context of global reordering, and of addressing how an emerging multipolar world has explicitly impacted the role of the world's largest trading bloc and economic power – the European Union – that this book has been aimed.

Offering an overview of how the rise to prominence of the emerging economies within the multilateral trading system has shaped the positioning, behaviour and activity of the EU within the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations, this book has sought to present both the theoretical implications of what an emerging multipolar world will mean for EU behaviour, as well as detailed empirical analysis of how this global shift has impacted the EU's specific role within global trade governance. With contrasting expectations of the EU as being both a power in decline and also a power best placed to meet the new dynamics of a multipolar world order, this book has further aimed to address 'why' the EU has met with such diverse expectations of its future role by focusing upon the EU's explicit strategic and behavioural reaction to the rise of new powers since the turn of the 21st century.

In this concluding chapter an analysis of the findings from the previous empirical chapters is presented along with details of how the EU's role in a changing world may be best understood. It presents the argument that the EU's role-set has adapted pragmatically to an emerging multipolar world. Now punctuated far less by a distinctive pattern of behaviour that positions it as proactive and reformist leader and pusher, the EU's role-set today encompasses a far broader set of behavioural characteristics reflective of both reactive and proactive outputs, with a more moderated preference structure that takes into consideration the objectives, and red-lines, of the other major powers. Further challenging both the expectation of Europe in Decline, and Europe at an Advantage in an emerging multipolar world, it suggests that the EU has responded to an emerging multipolarity as any established economic power should. Transforming both its approach, and behaviour, within the WTO in

order to meet the new social hierarchy that multipolarity presents, the EU may be considered therefore less as a distinctive 'type' of power in a multipolar world, but more as a Pragmatic Polar Europe – as one pole among several, with the capacity to utilise all of the diplomatic, bargaining and negotiation tools available to it in order to react and respond practically to the new geopolitical realities of a rapidly changing world.

Understanding the EU's role in a multipolar world: theory revisited

Presented in this book has been the substantive shift that the EU has undergone both in its role positioning – involving its global trade agenda and strategic approach to the WTO – and its role performance – with a marked change in EU negotiation behaviour and activity which has seen a gradual adaptation from a largely proactive to reactive output – within the WTO and its Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. As Figure 4.2 outlined, the EU has played multiple roles within the WTO since its first Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996 and up to the WTO's first 'Doha-Lite' agreement announced at the ninth Ministerial Conference held in Bali in December 2013. A clear progression may also be identified in the EU's role within the WTO over this period which has seen it shift from a predominantly reformist and proactive leader and pusher within the WTO's early years to a much more reactive role performance, playing the part of laggard, bystander and cruiser as it has exerted its energies far more enthusiastically into alternative forums in the pursuit of competitiveness-driven trade and investment agreements with strategic economic partners.

Revisiting the theory of international relations and related international political economy discourses, the transformation of the EU's performance and positioning within the WTO since the turn of the 21st century may be explained in several ways. For the liberal school of IR theory, the EU's early roles within the WTO, which saw it acting as a proactive and reformist leader, pusher and mediator in an endeavour to launch and lead the Doha Round negotiations forward, may be taken as evidence of the cooperative engagement expected of states in an emerging multipolar world. The EU's efforts to incorporate the developing world into the multilateral trading system, to garner the support of the emerging economies for trade liberalisation and to champion the development dimension

of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations were demonstrative of this cooperative engagement and of how states can mitigate uncertainty and competition by focusing upon multilateral cooperation and negotiated agreements in which all parties may maximise their benefits in a positive-sum game.

After the dramatic sea change of 2003, which brought the emerging economies much more front and centre in the Doha Round negotiations through the formation of the G20 coalition, the EU further demonstrated efforts to build reciprocal cooperation with the emerging powers. Continuing to present offers and concessions in striving to push negotiations forward, the EU nevertheless began to more actively call upon the advanced developing countries to 'give something in return' and to defend against ongoing demands for further trade liberalisation of its own agricultural sector. An expectation of mutual reciprocation thus became a key component of the EU's cooperative efforts.

However, the EU's role shift, evident after the failed effort to conclude the Doha Round in 2008, in favour of more reactive roles including laggard, cruiser and bystander is, for the liberal school, more difficult to explain. According to liberal theory, states seek reciprocal cooperation within a multipolar world, thus allowing established as well as emerging poles to make gains. This only works however when all parties play by the same rules. Despite EU expectations and demands for reciprocation from others, the emerging economies particularly have continued to play on their development status and to assert and protect their national sovereign interests. Impasse has been the subsequent result with an entrenchment of positions by both established and emerging powers.

For the realist school of IR theory, impasse, particularly over the question of reciprocation, is to be expected. For realists, an emerging multipolarity creates greater uncertainty in the international system as well as a condition of 'persistent competitiveness'. Under such conditions, trade liberalisation is difficult to achieve as there is less incentive for states to behave altruistically and emerging economies will seek to protect their growing industries from foreign competitors, rather than opening their borders in meeting the demands of developed economies. The EU's concern with its own growth and competitiveness in the face of the emerging economies' rapid rise, worries over rising protectionism following the global economic crisis and its own increasingly ardent efforts to address such challenges by maintaining its own openness while gaining access to new markets has been especially evident in

the competitiveness-driven approach to its new global trade agenda. The EU's strategic reorientation away from the managed globalisation, 'Multilateralism-First' approach of the early 2000s, in favour of the 'Competitiveness-First' Trade, Growth and World Affairs (TGWA) strategy is particular proof of this. The EU's reactive turn within the Doha Round more specifically provides further evidence. With the EU buck-passing responsibility for driving forward negotiations onto others, stressing the need for the emerging economies to act responsibly in line with their growing status, and through its avid pursuit of trade liberalisation through alternative negotiation forum, or 'forum-shopping', the EU has demoted its multilateral role in order to exert its energies onto the bilateral and plurilateral level where it is better capable of pursuing its need for improved foreign market access.

As constructivists would further argue, the adaptation of the EU's role within the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations – since its first leadership efforts in the late 1990s and early 2000s, to its defender and pusher roles from 2005 to 2008, to its mediator, laggard, cruiser and bystander roles after 2008 – has been in response to the new great power hierarchy within the multilateral trading system and the corresponding modification of the EU's own strategic outlook and evolution of what is considered its 'appropriate behaviour'. The transformation of the EU's role positioning and performance within the WTO may chiefly be seen as a response to the new and diverse social hierarchy at play within the WTO and the resultant multilateral governance dilemma (Wade, 2011) it has created within the Doha Round.

The inclusion of India, Brazil and later China into the WTO's inner circle of core negotiators along with the EU and the United States has introduced not only new players, but a new heterogeneity of interests, practices and expectations of what an agreed Doha Round might look like. Such heterogeneity of interests, along with the increasing assertiveness of the emerging economies after 2003 in defending against reformist efforts by the EU and the United States, has drawn to a close the conditions that made EU leadership a possibility in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The impasse which has resulted from disagreement and entrenchment of the positions of the G5 members has further required a modification of expectations by the EU as the Doha Round's principal *demandeur*, a lowering of its ambitions to better take into consideration the preference structures and red-lines of the emerging economies as well as the United States and the adoption of both reactive and proactive

methods of output in order to navigate the geopolitical reality of this new social hierarchy.

The 'appropriate' behaviour that may be identified with the EU and its role within a multipolar world may therefore be considered through both liberal and realist conceptualisations (see Figure 2.2). In the WTO's early years, and in the lead up to the launch of the Doha Round in 2001, the EU acted appropriately by taking on a reformist and proactive role-set that sought to broaden the scope of multilateral trade negotiations and prioritise the WTO as the main governance forum for achieving its trade objectives. Its proactive output – particularly evident in its efforts to shape the negotiation agenda, making ambitious offers and proposals and even, at times, sacrificial concessions in an effort to persuade others to follow its lead – was all appropriate, in the liberal conceptualisation, in a period where the emerging economies had not yet made a substantive assertion within the WTO, and where the United States was willing to itself sit back and allow the EU to take the lead. The global reordering that has taken place since then, most notable after 2003, has meant that the EU no longer has the luxury of leadership within the Doha Round. Its conceptualisation of 'appropriate' behaviour has thus been modified to encapsulate a more realist perspective of an emerging multipolarity.

The EU's later adoption of mediator, defender, laggard, cruiser and bystander roles within the WTO's Doha Round may thus be attributed to this broader conceptualisation which has seen the EU continue to promote multilateralism and the successful conclusion to the Doha Round, but which has offset the EU's multilateral preferences with the need to uphold its own economic interests and competitiveness. Where EU efforts to promote cooperative engagement and reciprocation have met with resistance by the other major powers, the EU has thus adapted its 'appropriate' behaviour to include buck-passing, delaying and cruising tactics of its own and to engage its focus elsewhere in the pursuit of a growing array of bilateral and plurilateral preferential trade and investment agreements.

Normative, or just pragmatic, Europe?

Assessing the 'appropriateness' of the EU's patterns of behaviour within the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations does, however, raise important questions about the EU's 'difference' as a global power. An important

point of discussion throughout this book has been the conceptualisation of the EU as a distinctive or different 'type' of power and actor in international relations: that is, as one who champions effective multilateralism, promotes norms such as development and the rule of law and seeks to lead by example as a force for good. The associated *role-set* – that is, the image, perception of power and strategic approach to foreign policy more broadly (Aggestam, 2006, 21) – commonly associated with the EU has thus been that of a *sui generis* global actor and normative, civilian or ethical power, distinctive from traditional conceptions of great power (see Figure 2.3).

The Normative Power Europe debate has particularly placed emphasis onto the EU's *role-set* as a 'different' type of power in the world. Expected to follow patterns of behaviour that include 'norm entrepreneurship', the setting of ambitious targets for others to follow, of coming up with policy solutions and, where necessary, sacrificing its own self-interest in the pursuit of a collective good, the 'appropriate behaviour' associated to the EU is that of it setting a positive example for the world, and of leading the way for others to follow. As a consequence, conceptualisations of the EU as a power or pole have tended to adopt a very narrow *role-set* in which the EU is positioned as a proactive and reformist pusher and leader.

However, as this book's analysis of the EU's role within the WTO's Doha Round has reflected, while this *role-set* was, to a certain extent, an accurate depiction of the EU at the turn of the 21st century, the EU has since had to substantially broaden its *role-set* within the WTO. The emergence of a multipolar world has established a new great power hierarchy in global trade governance, along with a new bargaining complexity for multilateral trade negotiations, making it increasingly difficult for any pole to achieve all that it would want without recourse to the preferences of others. The narrow *role-set* which has depicted the EU as a different sort of player in global governance, expected to play the role of leader or pusher in multilateral negotiations, is therefore increasingly outdated in a multipolar world. Instead, the EU has performed a variety of diverse roles within the WTO since the mid-1990s which has seen the EU navigate the bargaining complexities of the Doha Round.

Such role diversification has been important for the EU's adaptation to multipolarity. For one thing, as detailed in Chapter 2, it must be understood that where the EU is most reformist in its objectives within a multilateral negotiation – making highly ambitious demands for change – it must do a great deal to persuade, push or lead the way for others

to support and follow such objectives. Importantly, in order to find a consensus between negotiators some zone of agreement must also be present. However, where the EU has been its most 'different' in making particularly ambitious and reformist demands of others – notably evident in its early efforts to secure negotiations on the Singapore Issues – the EU failed to persuade others, despite its proactive efforts through diplomatic missions, concessions and sacrificial offers. Positioned as a preference outlier in championing the Singapore Issues early in the Round, the EU stood apart from the other major powers whose own preferences were in sharp contrast to those of the EU. As the Singapore Issues were to further exemplify, in a multipolar world, and even an unbalanced multipolar world where the emerging economies are still rising through the ranks, there are limits to what the EU can push for where it sets itself so conspicuously apart from the preference structures of others.

More than this, the normative distinctiveness of the EU's global trade agenda from 1999 and the EU's willingness to play the role of leader in championing the development dimension of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations were largely responsible for the formation of the Doha Development Agenda and its enshrined principles of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) and Less Than Full Reciprocity (LTFR). Over a decade later, and with the emerging economies now utilising these same development principles to resist demands by the EU and the United States for greater reciprocity in market access, there is some argument that the EU has become a victim of its own development agenda within the WTO.

It has thus been a necessary adaptation which has seen the EU modify its role positioning and performance over time in adjusting to the new geopolitical reality of an emerging multipolar world. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, this adaptation reflects an important pragmatism on the part of the EU within today's emerging multipolar world. Differentiating from the Normative Power Europe discourse with its emphasis on EU difference and normative distinctiveness as a global power, a reconceptualisation of the EU's role-set is here proposed which instead focuses upon the EU as any other pole, one who thinks strategically and acts pragmatically in the pursuit of both its normative preferences and rational interests.

Pragmatic Polar Europe is a reconceptualisation of the EU's role-set that conceives of the EU pragmatically utilising all of the diplomatic, bargaining and negotiation tools available to it in order to pursue its goals and maintain its polar position in an emerging multipolar world. As Figure 5.1




FIGURE 5.1 *Reconceptualising the EU's role-set in a multipolar world*

Source: Author's own compilation.

illustrates, it presents a broader spectrum for EU role positioning and performance in responding to global reordering and change. In contrast to Normative Power Europe, which distinguishes the EU predominantly as a leader and pusher in multilateral settings, in exerting normative means of power within international affairs, and providing a model for others to follow, Pragmatic Polar Europe allows for the EU to respond to an emerging multipolarity as any established pole might. Capable of adopting any number of different roles, pursued in multiple negotiation forums and in seeking both rationalist- and normative-driven interests, Pragmatic Polar Europe conceives the EU as responding to a changing world reasonably, practically and with recourse to the world as it actually is, rather than as the EU would prefer it to be.

As highlighted in the previous section, this reconceptualisation of the EU's role-set thus conceives of the world through a variety of theoretical lenses. The EU may maintain what it sees as a global responsibility to seek cooperative engagement with others within global trade governance and reciprocation through multilateral positive sum games, but it can also act pragmatically by further pursuing competitiveness-driven bilateral and plurilateral agreements where it may also be able to achieve additional gains.

In terms of self-image and perception of power this reconceptualisation further moves away from the EU's 'different' identity with its distinctive approach to international relations and its need to maintain a reputation as a global standard-setter and champion of effective multilateralism. Instead, Pragmatic Polar Europe encourages the EU to see itself as both a strategic and normative player in a changing world order. More

particularly, due to the complexity, uncertainty and increased competitiveness of a multipolar world, Pragmatic Polar Europe assumes that the EU will not act altruistically in a bid to push a normative agenda or to 'lead the way for others to follow'. Sacrificial concessions typically associated with that of a leader, and particularly those which put European interests behind those of others (especially the advanced developing world), may therefore be a thing of the past. The EU may play the role of pusher or mediator within multilateral negotiations when it seeks to achieve its interests multilaterally, but this will be linked more closely to the likelihood of mutual reciprocation, and thus to a careful awareness of the preference structures of the other major poles and what is realistically and practically achievable from a multilateral outcome agreement.

As such Pragmatic Polar Europe assumes some moderation of EU ambition in playing a leader role. In a multipolar world leadership is a luxury requiring not only altruism and sacrifice by the leader, but also a willingness among others to follow. The uncertainty and competitiveness of multipolarity make these conditions increasingly difficult to both offer and accept by any major power.

As a multilateralist however, Pragmatic Polar Europe also assumes that while the EU may not offer leadership in multilateral negotiations, it will also not be a blocker preventing change. As was shown in Chapter 4, the EU has not adopted the role of blocker at any stage of the Doha Round negotiations, preferring instead to utilise the roles of defender or laggard where negotiations have moved in a direction it has been unhappy with. It is further unlikely that the EU would adopt veto tactics within the Doha Round going forward because its own reputation is at stake in the Round's completion and success.

Instead Pragmatic Polar Europe can be expected to adopt proactive and reformist roles, as well as reactive and conservative roles where it is in its interests to do so. The roles of laggard and defender may particularly be more commonplace for the EU if the emerging economies start to flex their muscle to adopt more reformist role-sets themselves. The roles of cruiser and bystander may moreover be increasingly expected of the EU at the multilateral level as it continues to exert its energies bilaterally and plurilaterally. Such forum-shopping and multi-level negotiation is further considered a pragmatic response for the EU, enabling it to pursue its interests in forums where it has the best bargaining position, can bypass complexity and is better capable of pursuing and securing its competitive interest.

From the perspective of Pragmatic Polar Europe therefore, rather than distinguishing the EU by its differences, focus is directed to the similarities in EU behaviour to other poles in today's world order. One pole in particular warrants mention in this regard. The EU is, alongside the United States, one of two established economic powers in today's emerging multipolar system. Much like the United States, the EU has adopted multiple roles within the WTO's Doha Round. Like the United States, the EU has also sought to pursue a Competitiveness-First approach to its global trade agenda by actively pursuing competitiveness-driven preferential trade and investment agreements with third countries outside the WTO. Both the EU and the United States remain major powers within the WTO, both are crucial to the success of the Doha Round and both have sought to bypass the stalemate of the Doha Round by pursuing their objectives for improved foreign market access at the bilateral level. As this suggests, to understand the EU's role-set within a multipolar world requires specific insight into its response to global reordering across all forums, through the utilisation of all methods and tactics available to it, and with particular consideration to the comparative roles also being played by the other major powers.

Europe in decline or Europe at an advantage?

At the beginning of this book, two core questions were outlined as a basis for discussion. First, how has an emerging multipolar world order explicitly impacted the EU's role within the WTO's Doha Round negotiation history? And second, why has the EU's performance in the multilateral trading system been perceived as diminishing in the face of rising powers? In addressing the first question, this book has reflected upon the EU's evolving role positioning towards, and performance within, the WTO's multilateral trade negotiations over time in order to capture the EU's response to the rise of new powers within global trade governance. It has shown that the EU's role in multilateral trade negotiations has followed a progression from that of leader and pusher, to defender, mediator, laggard, cruiser and, most recently, bystander within the Doha Round to date. But does this role shift necessarily signify that the EU has experienced a diminishing performance?

Further reflected at the start of this book were the somewhat contrasting expectations which have seen the EU as both a power in decline,

and as a power best suited to a changing world order. An important point of consideration in addressing the second core question posited in this book is that while the EU's role positioning and performance have changed within the WTO as a consequence of global reordering, explanation for that change needs to move beyond the presumption that with new powers rising, old powers will decline, nor should it assume that such evolution is a consequence of any particular comparative advantage on the part of the EU itself.

Responding first to the Europe in Decline discourse, it is true that the EU has experienced decline in growth, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, and is increasingly concerned with its competitiveness as the emerging economies continue to assert a global reach. The progression of the EU's role over the course of the Doha negotiations, along with its refocus onto bilateral and plurilateral agreements, may also be taken as the behaviour of a declining power. However, while this analysis does corroborate claims that the EU has experienced a diminution in its former ambitions within the Doha Round (Young, 2011; Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014), this is not thought to be indicative of a diminution in the EU's power and position as the world's largest trading superpower.

Instead, the EU's moderation of its former ambitions and role positioning within the WTO's Doha Round is found to be indicative of the EU's strategic reorientation. In much the same way as the managed globalisation strategy was, at that time, considered a pragmatic necessity in the face of an increasingly globalised world (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 354), so too can the EU's reorientation towards Global Europe, and its successor TGWA strategy, be seen as a pragmatic necessity in the face of today's geo-politicising landscape. The EU's formally normative and highly ambitious agenda for the Doha Round has thus been moderated to a more realistic, competitiveness-driven approach in which the EU has adopted a greater interest in reciprocation and a growing preference for pursuing its trading interests in those forums where it is most likely to achieve results. No longer pushing leadership rhetoric within the WTO, along with its sacrificial undertones of enabling the developing world to grow their economies through SDT, the EU today has adapted its strategic focus to 'strike the right balance between ambition and reality' (Commission, 2013) and to see trade as an engine of growth and competitiveness rather than an engine specifically for extending EU normative power and preferences abroad.

This transformation has further been reinforced in the EU's role performance in the Doha Round where the EU has modified its output from largely proactive tactics, including issue-linkage, concessions, offers, worldwide diplomatic *démarches* and policy proposals, to a more reactive stance which has seen it sitting back and buck-passing the responsibility of taking the lead (and arguably the blame) onto others in looking for a way through negotiation stalemate and impasse. While these tactics have caused some to question the EU's relevance within negotiations going forward, as well as its capacity to actually achieve its goals in this forum, the EU remains a critical partner within the WTO and, thanks to its size and importance to global trade, will not be excluded from any negotiation process or outcome agreement. The EU may as a result take this opportunity of stalemate in the Doha Round to refocus its attentions, improve its strategy and exert its energies across multiple forums, without fear of being left behind at the multilateral level.

Important also to note is that the evolution of the EU's role within the Doha Round has not been as a result of specific role competition by the other major powers. The emerging economies have not sought to overtake the EU's former leadership by taking on proactive or reformist roles themselves but have instead remained firmly entrenched in narrow role-sets as proactive yet conservative defenders and blockers. There is no indication moreover that they will strive to transform that role-set in the immediate future in order to present an alternative leadership for the Round moving forward. The evolution of the EU's role within the WTO should therefore be considered as something of the EU's own choosing, and not as a consequence of EU decline in the face of role competition or challenge.

More than this, the EU has not been alone in striving and struggling to bring about a conclusion to the Doha Round. The EU has perhaps more to lose than most, not least in terms of reputation as the Doha Round's principal *demandeur*, and in expectation as it adjusts to what is achievable in a multipolar system; but the failures of the Doha Round should not be laid solely at the EU's door. In fact an emerging multipolarity has made it clear that all powers have experienced some adjustment and 'decline' to what is achievable from multilateral negotiations.

In responding moreover to the claims that the EU is at an advantage – a pole 'best-suited' to the changing dynamics of a multipolar system due to its 'coordination reflex', 'multilateral genes' and in being positioned as a 'model for the future' – focus is again redirected not to the EU's

'difference', but rather to its capacity to act as any other pole in order to maintain its position and pursue its interests. As this analysis has reflected, the EU has been no more or no less advantaged in responding to the rise of the emerging economies than the world's other established pole, the United States. While the EU was, in many respects, well-suited to adopt the role of leader in the WTO's early years, to push forward a deep trade agenda, and to promote a development dimension to the Doha Round, this has been unsustainable as the emerging economies took on more prominent roles themselves. The EU's Multilateralism-First approach was thus replaced with the advent of the Global Europe strategy and the EU's 'multilateral genes' and 'coordination reflex' have since become increasingly less a priority. Global Europe, followed by TGWA was instead to signify a certain 'normalisation' by the EU in its strategic approach to the multilateral trading system which saw it adopting a similar role-set to the United States by moderating its multilateral ambitions, broadening the scope of its role performance to encompass both proactive and reactive forms of negotiation behaviour and to more earnestly pursue preferential trade and investment agreements with key partners.

The EU does nevertheless continue to have multilateral genes. As a multilateral institution itself the EU will invariably lean towards multilateral coordination and cooperation where possible, rather than going it alone, for which the United States has come under criticism. The EU as a 'model for the future' is however increasingly less clear in a multipolar world. The EU's internal challenges since 2008, including financial, economic and monetary crises, along with a difficult transition from the Lisbon Treaty, have made the EU 'model' somewhat less attractive to the outside world. Moreover, the normative principles that have cascaded through Europe and North America and which the EU promotes are not those necessarily prioritised by those in the emerging south. The EU's own prioritisation of 'effective multilateralism' has further softened over the past decade as it looks less to formal structures such as the WTO where multilateralism has proven increasingly difficult, and more to informal structures such as the Group of Twenty, TTIP or TiSA for negotiation and coordination.

Defining the EU's role in an emerging multipolar world should thus become less about identifying a prescriptive role-set which raises expectations of the EU as being a trailblazer in the decades ahead, nor which lowers them in expecting Europe's diminution and decline,

but rather turns attention to EU positioning, strategy and patterns of behaviour in relation to other major powers in the international system. From this perspective, multipolarity is itself the advantage for the EU. It provides incentive to look at the EU through macroscopic rather than microscopic lenses, focusing upon the structure of the wider system, the preferences of others and the changes it induces in the EU's behaviour. Reconceptualising the EU as Pragmatic Polar Europe further reverts the gaze by lowering expectations of the EU as being set apart from others and looks instead at the EU as one pole among several: a Europe neither in decline nor at a particular advantage, but merely a Europe in transformation.

Epilogue

At midnight on 31 July 2014 the deadline for adopting a Protocol of Amendment for the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement, set out in the 'Doha-Lite' Bali Agreement in December 2013, passed without resolution. The Trade Facilitation Agreement was the WTO's main success story from the Bali Ministerial Conference. Intended to ease customs procedures and cut red tape at the border to speed up trade flow, the agreement, once in force, was estimated to inject a potential \$1 trillion into the global economy (Hufbauer & Schott, 2013, 7). Ongoing disagreement, particularly between the United States and India over public food stockholding was, however, to present an ongoing block for negotiations (Bridges Weekly, 2014a). Failing to find resolution in time to instigate the multilateral agreement, the positive steps taken forward at Bali were already to show signs of unravelling, leading many to start voicing the need for trade facilitation to also be pursued plurilaterally (Bridges Weekly, 2014a).

At the time this book was going to press agreement had finally been reached between the United States and India over the Trade Facilitation Agreement and on the blocking issue of food security which was hailed as 'a significant step in efforts to get the Bali package and the multilateral trading system back on track' (WTO, 2014). Expectations for the post-Bali Work Programme nevertheless remain uncertain.

The limited overall outcome from the Bali Ministerial Conference, along with the continuing challenges that have beset WTO negotiators even on such early harvest issues as trade facilitation, does

raise significant questions for the WTO and the future of global trade governance. Farm trade, industrial goods and services all still remain at the core of the outstanding Doha Round agenda. As the WTO's Director General has warned, 'I am not hearing – not from anyone – about what they *can* do' (Bridges Weekly, 2014b, emphasis in original), with ever-growing concerns that the WTO's membership is unprepared to make the concessions necessary for a compromise agreement to be found. For the EU more particularly, its position since the Bali Ministerial in December 2013 has continued to be one of tacit support. At the WTO's Trade Negotiations Committee in June 2014 the EU specified that any post-Bali Work Programme would need to have parity of ambition between all areas of the Doha agenda and that, 'it needs to enshrine the principle that challenging the well-known sensitivities of others will require Members to make commensurate concessions in fields sensitive to them' (European Union, 2014, 2). In a substantial come-down from its early stance of Doha being a 'comprehensive, balanced and ambitious' trade round, the EU has now accepted the need for simplification of the Doha Agenda, stressing that, 'WTO Members need to treat the DDA as the next step in the process of trade liberalization and not the "Round that will end all Rounds"' (European Union, 2014, 2).

Such pragmatic response reflects the transformation in the EU's approach towards the WTO and the global trading system more broadly. No longer expecting to achieve its former ambitions of a 'global negotiation without limits', the EU's recommendation of simplifying the Doha Agenda is to be encouraged if an outcome agreement is to be reached. More than this, the EU has recognised that the WTO and multilateral trade negotiations will remain critical in managing the complexity of global trade. Concluding the Doha Round, even as a limited agreement is an important step forward, both in securing its lucrative economic benefits, and in enabling trade negotiators to move on to address the growing number of new trade issues facing global markets and global governance today. Renewed flexibility on the part of all major powers, including the EU, will be critical to this process.

What remains clear, however, is that a return to the EU's former ambitions for a global trade negotiation without limits and of an EU self-identity as a leader of the WTO is unlikely in the years ahead. At a meeting of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council on Trade in November 2014 it was reiterated that, 'while remaining committed to further strengthening the multilateral trading system, the EU will continue to focus on the

development of its bilateral trade relations' (Council, 2014, 10). During this meeting the Council was further to invite the Commission to update its TGWA strategy (Council, 2014, 11) moving forward. Such an update may well be expected to follow the same rationalist competitiveness-driven approach reflected in the past two EU trade strategy documents.

The multipolar transition that has taken place within the multilateral trading system since the turn of the 21st century, and which has created new complexities and challenges within global markets and global governance, has induced a new pragmatism in EU trade strategy and negotiation behaviour. With such pragmatism the EU may well disappoint those expectations of it leading the way to victory for the Doha Round negotiations. It may, however, equally exceed expectations of the EU being a power in decline by demonstrating how a flexible, coherent and balanced multi-level negotiation strategy and performance can produce results, and in time, smaller multilateral victories in the WTO by working constructively with others.

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- see also* competition policy; investment measures; Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
- zone of agreement 35, 97