



BONNIE S. MCELHINNY
(EDITOR)

Words, Worlds, and Material Girls

Language, Gender, Globalization



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Words, Worlds, and Material Girls



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Language, Gender, Globalization

edited by

Bonnie S. McElhinny

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Introduction

Language, gender and economies in global transitions: Provocative and provoking questions about how gender is articulated*

Bonnie McElhinny

1. Gender and language as terrains for working through globalization

It is striking how thoroughly the debates in socialist, Marxist, materialist, global, postcolonial and transnational feminism have bypassed studies of language and gender. From older theoretical debates about the unhappy marriage of feminism and Marxism and the relative significance of production and reproduction to newer debates about the relative value of affirmative action, comparable worth campaigns and stratified reproduction, from older debates about the value of household work to more recent discussions about the taylorization of work in cleaning agencies and transnational domestic labor migration, from discussions of the gender-segregation of work and the feminization of work in the service economy to the effects of structural adjustment, from what helps facilitate the emergence of feminist activism to debates about imperialism and colonialism and their effects on the elaboration of gender and sexual identities both in the colonies, the neo-colonies and the metropole – much of this goes largely uncited, and unaddressed in the body of literature on language and gender, which is now about 30 years old. This is hard to account for as an empirical gap. Instead, some of ways that we define gender as we undertake linguistic studies may be at stake (see McElhinny 2003). To begin thinking about how we understand gender, it is helpful to start with historian Joan Scott's comprehensive essay, "Gender, A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," which, though it is now two decades old, remains one of the most nuanced approaches to the study of gender.¹ She argues that any definition of gender must recognize that it is both "a constitutive element of social relationships based on

perceived differences between the sexes” and “a primary way of signifying relationships of power” (1986: 1067). When understood in the first sense, gender encompasses four elements: (1) culturally available symbols (like Adam and Eve or witches), (2) normative concepts (which are embodied in religious, educational, scientific and political doctrines), (3) forms of subjective and intersubjective identity, and (4) forms of social organization in families, labor markets, education, and politics.² Studies of subjective and, especially, intersubjective identities have long been the strength of feminist work in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology (for a few key works in studies of language and gender see Bucholtz and Hall 1995; Bucholtz and Hall 2004; Bucholtz, Liang and Sutton 1999), and the papers in this volume continue to attend to these, but in general they also go beyond this emphasis to recognize that to understand social meaning “we need to deal with the individual subject as well as social organization and to articulate the nature of their interrelationships, for both are crucial to understanding how gender works, how change occurs” (Scott 1986: 1067).

What does it mean to study gender as “a primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated” (1986: 1069)? Why might understanding gender in this way be particularly helpful for studying language now, in today’s version of a global economy? Scott’s formulation picks up on one of the most important lessons of feminist thought, namely that gender categorization can structure nodes of thought whose thematic subject is not explicitly gendered at all (cf. Sedgwick 1990). Private/public, nature/culture, and rational/emotional are some famous binary categories, with implications for gender categorization. The inverse is also true, though perhaps less widely investigated: in some situations where gender (and other social categories) seem to be the explicit subject matter, other kinds of social structurings may also, or even more centrally, be at stake. Edward Said (1978) has famously argued that the sexual submission and possession of Oriental women by European men stands in colonial discourse for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, such that sexual images are construed as the iconography of rule (though see Stoler 1991 for a critique of this position). Gender often becomes a key tool for signalling differentiation, and is used as a form of legitimation, especially at moments of significant social change. In this, it is not so different from language. When entities are understood as outside human political or economic activity, as part of the natural or divine order, they are often used to justify and rationalize political power (Bauman and Briggs 2003; Gal and Woolard 2001). To vindicate political power, the reference must seem sure and fixed, outside

human construction. Gender and language have, individually and together, been summoned up to undergird or legitimate other social relations, as when Edmund Burke's attack on the French revolution was built around a contrast between ugly sans-culottes hags and the more "natural" softly feminine Marie Antoinette (Scott 1986), or when nineteenth century scholars of African linguistics suggested that the way a language handles grammatical gender helps establish its place in a racial hierarchy (Irvine 2001). Nakamura (2004, 2005) shows how debates about how Japanese women "naturally" speak undergirded, as they arose from, debates about gender and occupation in Japan after World War II. The American occupying army – like many other imperial occupiers – proposed to liberate women and others from "traditional" educational and economic systems with, for instance, a co-educational school system. The ideology of Japanese Women's Language had become a symbol of the Japanese imperial tradition during the war, and was criticized afterwards as a key factor preventing women from gaining social status. Given the difficulties of building counterarguments that supported imperial tradition or argued against equality, the opposing discourse simply argued for Women's Language as an outcome of women's nature. Women were thus construed as socially equal, but biologically different. Debates about gender and language during the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II were debates about whether or how to modernize gender, as they naturalized certain ideas about how language and gender each work. They were also, however, debates about modernity and tradition, nationalism and the meaning of military occupation. We can see why questioning the significance of language or of gender is often questioning an entire political edifice. The prevalence of naturalizing accounts of language and of gender may explain some of the challenges that have faced scholars in linking up studies of language and gender, history and political economy, since we are not ourselves immune from such ideologies (Irvine and Gal 2000). Several papers in this volume (Yang, Inoue, Weidman, Gaudio) suggest what it means to try to study gender and language as a terrain on which other issues are worked through. Yang's research (2006 and this volume) on language, gender and neoliberal restructuring in China and Inoue's on the language of Japanese schoolgirls (2006 and this volume) show, in a particularly compelling way, how language and gender can become an idiom through which other social transitions are contested and constructed (see also Ginsburg and Rapp 1995; Poovey 1998).

Gender always seems to be available as a tool for signaling differentiation; nonetheless, there are some points at which gender is foregrounded as the idiom through which difference and inequity is understood. Rather than assuming the centrality of gender, in ways which can often isolate it from other axes of differentiation, the key analytic dilemma such moments present are precisely WHY gender has become so prominent. Some scholars have argued that gender and ethnicity and perhaps also sexuality have been markedly foregrounded in recent years, while class has faded in salience. Linguist Deborah Cameron (2000a) has noted that the rise in interest in self-help books dealing with gender conflict may be linked to the shift from an industrial to a service economy, and linked also to the tensions that arise as men take on “feminine” work. Literary critic Frederic Jameson (cited in Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 10–11) is worried that gender and “race” have become the focus for comment precisely because they are so easily reconciled with the demands of liberal ideology. Journalist Naomi Klein (2000) argues that the putatively progressive focus on sexual and gender diversity in identity politics, on multiculturalism and gender-bending, dovetails neatly with, and has been quickly harnessed by advertisers and corporations, in ways that obfuscate poverty, global economic inequities, and class. Diversity, she argues, turns out to be a great tool for marketing to multiple consumers in a global market. Provocatively, Klein argues that the “abandonment of the radical economic foundations of the women’s and civil rights movements by the conflation of causes that came be called political correctness successfully trained a generation of activists in the politics of image, not action” (2000: 124).

Anthropologist Sherry Ortner has argued that gender and ethnicity have come to carry a “surplus antagonism” over and above whatever historical and structural friction they embody in their own terms (1991: 185). Ortner (1991), in a study of her own high school graduating class, points out that though most Americans do not talk about class, class becomes displaced onto other categories. Because hegemonic American culture takes both the ideology of mobility and the ideology of individualism seriously, explanations for non-mobility not only focus on the failure of individuals (because they are said to be inherently lazy or stupid), but shift the domain of discourse to arenas that are taken to be ‘locked into’ individuals – gender, race, ethnic origin, age and so forth (171). This locking in is understood in biological terms. What Ortner explains in political and national terms, the anthropologists John and Jean Comaroff, like Klein, have recently discussed in economic and global terms. They argue that the flexible relation

of labor to capital has eroded the conditions that give rise to class opposition as an idiom of identity and/or interest (2001: 11). If it is true that class conflict takes place on the terrain of nation-state, the global dispersal of manufacture fragments class consciousness and class alliance (12). Then, they argue, “gender and race, even if not in themselves explicit vehicles for [an autonomous discourse of class], are frequently “reinvested” with its practical dynamics and express its stark antagonisms” (15). Perhaps, then, social scientists and activists need to “find class.” This is the approach taken in a long, dogged, brilliant article by Ben Rampton (2003), as he tries to find linguistic evidence of class consciousness amongst British youth who themselves focus on gender, ethnicity and sexuality when talking about identity.³ But the Comaroffs would argue otherwise. They think we need to develop a richer understanding of why and how gender, race, ethnicity and generation have become such compelling idioms of identification and categorization, mobilizing people for and against reigning hegemonies (2001: 11). Charles Briggs’ work (1997, 2004; Briggs with Briggs 2003) on the mobilization of gender and “culture” during a recent cholera epidemic and infanticide trials in Venezuela does precisely this. He shows how structural adjustment, which often weakens financial support for state-run health, education and welfare institutions led to a defensive discursive stance in national legal and medical institutions in Venezuela, at the cost of those thrust to the margins of that state. He considers these effects by analyzing media debates and legal, medical and police discourse about a purported epidemic of infanticides which serves to exoticize and demonize certain indigenous women; he also analyzes medical and political rationalizations for the high rate of death of indigenous people in a predictable and preventable cholera epidemic. “Cultural” difference becomes the terrain on which political and economic inequities are naturalized.

Whether, indeed, and when gender, ethnicity, generation and sexuality have become foregrounded is the first question that the wide range of national and social contexts considered in this volume helps us to consider. Papers in this volume analyze language, gender and globalization from 10 different national sites: Catalonia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Nigeria, Vietnam, Philippines, Tonga and the United States. Where and when they are foregrounded, is it true that these identities carry “surplus antagonism”? What does this look like, on the ground? How do we give gender and ethnicity their due, not reducing them to other categories of analysis, as was so often done in earlier Marxist work, while trying to discern when and how they are bearing a burden over and above their own weight?⁴ We need at

least to push beyond an approach which asks how political economy affects gender or language, a formulation which construes each of these terms as independent. Instead, we need to consider how gender, language and political economy are *articulated*, that is, how certain notions of language and of gender are produced through certain theories and practices of political economy (see also Scott 2000: 79), as well as how certain ideas about political economy are produced through certain theories and practices about gender and about language.

2. Studies of language and globalization

In much recent scholarship, globalization has been offered as an explanation for the changing ways that people understand interactions and social relations. Harvey (1989) conceptualizes globalization as changing experiences of space and time, shaped by the periodic crises of capitalist over-accumulation. He argues that the Fordist regime of mass production of standardized products in Western economies became so successful and efficient that it began to overproduce, leading to the lay-off of workers and a reduced demand for products. A post-Fordist regime of flexible accumulation has emerged in its place, with a focus on flexible labor processes, production arrangements, and consumption focused on niche markets vs. mass production, all of which have transnational implications (see Lancaster (2003: 320) for a useful chart comparing some of the key social formations and practices associated with Fordist and post-Fordist regimes). Others less wedded to the language of economic determinism (cf. Inda and Rosaldo 2002) also note the ways economic changes have been linked to changes in the flow of capital, people, commodities, media and ideologies. These changes are often linked to changing understandings of the global and the local. Giddens (1990: 64) defines globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”

If the focus on intersubjective accounts of how gender works in sociolinguistic studies has not always fully opened linguistic studies of gender to studies of political economy, we can also argue that recent studies of political economy focused on global issues have often seemed bereft of gender and linguistic analysis. Freeman (2001) asks what the implications are for the fact that the most frequently cited “theoretical” treatises on globaliza-

tion (Appadurai 1990; Hannerz 1996; Harvey 1989; Featherstone 1990; Robertson 1992; Waters 1995) ignore gender as an analytic lens (Sassen 1998 is a significant exception), while many local studies, labeled, not uncontroversially, as “empirical,” do focus on gender.⁵ How might globalization be understood differently, if gender is taken seriously? Do we get a different take on globalization if we center on language?

We need to begin, however, by noting that it would be a mistake to fix the definition of globalization too quickly. “Globalization” is best understood as a keyword, in the sense originally elaborated by Raymond Williams (1976). It is a site at which the meaning of social experience is negotiated and contested. Lexical labels are one kind of contested representation. Indeed, rather than being dismissed because they are minimal, this minimalism itself requires explanation: how do complex, contextually nuanced discussions get summed up in, entextualized through, a single word, like *globalization* and *terrorism* and *risk* (see Miskimmin, this volume) or *fundamentalism* (see also Collins and Glover 2002)? How do words become compacted doctrines? How do key terms and concepts circulate, become coopted, or embody critique (Grewal and Kaplan 1994: 2)? Marchand and Runyan (2000) argue for talking in terms of *global restructuring* rather than *globalization* to signal the fact that the processes being discussed are multidimensional, multispeed, disjunctive and indeterminate. Tsing offers a similar caution, arguing for carefully considering the ways that *a global frame* allows us “to consider the making and remaking of geographical and historical agents and the forms of their agency in relation to movement, interaction, and shifting, competing claims about community, culture and scale” (2002: 456). Grewal and Kaplan (1994: 10) argue for a critical discursive approach to some of the theoretical and terminological debates over the relative advantages and disadvantages of *centre-periphery*, *global-local* and *transnational*, emphasizing that we need to ask who is using these terms, where, to whom, and why are they useful. They argue that the distinction of *centre-periphery* (linked to Wallerstein’s influential notion of a world-system), like other binary distinctions such as *colonizer-colonized* or *dominator-dominated*, may have the advantage of accounting for conflict, history and asymmetry in world history, but nonetheless tends to sneak in a Eurocentric perspective by suggesting that the “centre” is the key mover and shaker in world affairs, as it obscures the complexity and variability within each of the categories so labeled. In particular, it can obscure inequalities (including those linked to gender) in each category. *Global-local*, another binary formulation that has emerged to talk about world-scale so-

cial relations, seems to address some of those problems because it is not so clearly linked with spatial boundaries and geographical regions, and it encompasses unequal relations within as well as between nations and regions. However, Grewal and Kaplan (1994: 11) point out that “what is lost in an uncritical acceptance of this binary division is precisely the fact that the parameters of the local and global are often indefinable or indistinct – they are permeable constructs. How one separates the local from the global is difficult to decide when each thoroughly infiltrates the other. Global-local as a monolithic formation may also erase the existence of multiple expressions of ‘local’ identities and concerns and multiple globalities.” Furthermore, a reification of these differences may overlook precisely the ways in which labeling a perspective as “local” – the process of *localization* – could be a way of dismissing it (cf. Briggs’ 2004 nuanced work on the way that any simplistic or dismissive understanding of indigenous people’s discourse about the origins and impact of a recent cholera epidemic in Venezuela may not fully take into account the ways in which their views are global, too). And the focus on global-local, despite claims to the contrary, may not, in the end, fully take into account complex social divisions (including gender) on the “local” level. The debate about “globalization” also often assumes, though it need not do so, ethnocentric/Eurocentric overtones, since it focuses on the homogenizing effects of the West, or the question of assimilation or opposition to the West.

There can, sometimes, be curious collusions between neoliberal and critical (including Marxist) discussions about capitalism’s extension when the movement of capital seems inevitable, when agency seems to belong mostly to capitalism, and when the appearance of capitalism seems to taint all as capitalist. Certain varieties of neoliberalism and of Marxism often make capitalism’s penetration of new markets, and areas of life, seem unstoppable, varying only in whether this is seen as cause for celebration or lamentation. Fairclough (2000), however, points out that an assumption of the inevitability of “globalization” is part of the ideology of neoliberalism, and sets out to unpack how this impression is created in the speeches and documents produced by the Blair government in the U.K. Gibson-Graham (1996) considers the ways that “globalization scripts” and “rape scripts” share not only a lexicon (the terminology of “penetration” and the opportunities to tap “virgin” markets) but also a narrative about how power works, as an act of non-reciprocal penetration, after which something is lost, never to be regained (see Freeman 2001 for a helpful critical overview of this argument). To challenge metaphors of monolithic discourses about global-

ization is to challenge monolithic understandings of capitalism's form and meaning, and the inevitability and invulnerability of commodification, market incorporation, proletarianization, and multinational invasion as dominant social processes. In their fine analysis of the semiotics of route maps in in-flight magazines, Thurlow and Jaworski (2003) point out that the magazines are not just global in their themes and format, but *globalizing*, in that they have a "constitutive role in the processes of globalism and the discourses of globalization" (591). The world is presented as already globalized in these magazines, in a way that naturalizes that assumption or that hope. The maps show the airlines appropriating the world in webs of commercial influence, a world in which often and oddly enough individual countries are not represented by colour-coding.⁶ The papers in this volume resist reifying the "global" and "local", in favor of considering how ideologies of globalization and localization shape the politics of inclusion or exclusion on the terrains of gender and of language.

3. Organization of this volume

This volume is organized into four sections, each of which takes up and investigates some of the key questions thrown up in debates about what globalization means and does. *Scattered Hegemonies* includes papers which take up the question of what hegemony might look like in new configurations of political and economic power in Tonga, China, and for Aboriginal groups in Canada. *Emerging into History* includes papers which investigate the role that language played in contests over modernity, nationalism, colonialism, and cosmopolitanism in the early 20th century in India, Japan and the Philippines, as they offer examples of what a historical linguistic anthropological approach might look like. Studies of multilingualism have long been one of the key sites for the study of language, gender and political economy. *Multilingualism, Globalization and Nationalism* considers the ways that what language and what nationalism mean may change during moments of significant industrial restructuring, heightened immigration and national disruption due to war in Canada, Catalonia and Vietnam. Chapters in *Commodities and Cosmopolitanism* challenge the idea that globalization means homogenization by interrogating the meanings that global commodities and worldliness have in interactions in the China, Tonga and the U.S. Many of the papers address their topics in ways that could easily fall under other section headings.

3.1 *Scattered hegemonies*

Susan Philips (1998) has recently challenged linguists studying institutional discourse to move beyond strictly Gramscian approaches to hegemony in nationalist contexts to an approach which thinks about how language and power are organized across institutions and groups, both within a nation and transnationally. A number of papers in this volume (Philips herself, Yang and Miskimmin, as well as Gaudio and Besnier) take up ethnographic perspectives on language, gender and “scattered hegemonies.” Scattered hegemonies is a notion developing by the feminist literary theorists Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan. They argue that if feminist political practices do not acknowledge transnational cultural flows, feminist movements will fail to understand the material conditions that structure women’s lives in diverse locations. If feminist movements cannot understand the dynamics of these material conditions, they will be unable to construct an effective opposition to current economic and cultural hegemonies that are taking new global forms. Without an analysis of transnational scattered hegemonies that reveal themselves in gender relations, feminist movements will remain isolated and prone to reproducing the universalizing gestures of dominant Western cultures” (1994: 17). To do this, we need to address the relationship of gender to a number of different hegemonic forces, which are also differently hegemonic: global economic structures, patriarchal nationalisms, “authentic” forms of tradition, local structures of domination, legal-judicial oppression, and even certain approaches to feminism (1994: 17). Analyzing scattered hegemonies thus requires analyzing multiple, overlapping and discrete oppressions in ways attentive to transnational flows.

Philips’ own chapter in this volume takes up this (and her own) challenge by considering how the marked disjuncture between the symbolic capital of women engaged in traditional and highly valued Tongan practices might serve to obscure the economic disadvantage of being a woman engaged in these very activities. To do this, she analyzes how the language of Tongan women who participate in a *koka’anga*, a traditional women’s work group that produces large pieces of decorated bark cloth (*ngatu*), is marked by their position within national and transnational economies. Tonga’s economy relies heavily upon remittances from overseas migrants and sales taxes on products purchased with this money. Women in Tonga who produce *ngatu* are interpolated into a global economy both through sale of their products and through exchanges with Tongan women overseas, for whom the procurement of *ngatu* and its use in ritual gifting and ex-

changes is an important way to continue to be Tongan. For the women who stay in Tonga, the exchanges are an important way to gain access to Western manufactured goods and to sustain the ties that keep the remittances coming, though the amount of money earned from making *ngatu* is modest. Philips considers the ways that love songs and sexual joking told during the work itself establish moral ideologies for the dilemmas women face in a village markedly shaped by transnational labour migration.

In her chapter for this volume, Yang documents the forms that neoliberal discourse takes in China, a society which still also pays homage to socialism and draws on socialist discursive forms, as she considers the ways that the state's over-emphasis on gender tends to downplay class frictions which are intensified by economic restructuring. A number of scholars (Afshaar and Dennis 1992; Beneria 1992; Kingfisher 2002; Thomas-Emeagwali 1995) have pointed out how welfare state reform and structural adjustment policies since the 1980s have accentuated the feminization of poverty, in both the global north and the global south, by cutting back on funds for state bureaucracies, health and education. In general, these studies have focused on "Western" welfare reform or structural adjustment policies in countries of the "South." But China presents a distinctive case, since the transition to neoliberal policies is also a transition from a Maoist planned economy to a Dengist market economy. Yang considers how the focus on women's liberation, a centerpiece of the communist gender program since the 1920s, has been replaced by a rationalization of women's unemployment as liberatory. The former ideology of equality is presented as resulting in "unnatural" burdens on women who had to bear the double shift of work and household tasks.⁷ Yang tracks how dominant ideologies supportive of neoliberal restructuring are legitimated in public discourses and in institutional practices, even as this leads to massive layoffs of women (over 60% of the workers laid off in recent reforms are women), and how these ideologies are understood and contested by the women who are affected. She examines media narratives about "reemployment stars" (women who succeed as entrepreneurs) and contrasts this with personal narratives about the increasing difficulty in finding work and mounting economic hardship told by women from a factory. Her analysis does not simply argue that there has been a rapid and sudden change in discursive forms and ideological stances (see also Gal and Kligman 2000 for critiques of 'transition' discourse in Eastern Europe); instead, she offers a careful, nuanced analysis of some of the continuities between communist forms of political rhetoric and institutions and some of the more recent versions.

One of the contributions that social studies of language can offer studies of globalization, as I mentioned above, is to consider precisely how keywords become sites of contestation. Hugh Mehan (1996) has pointed out that in a variety of kinds of conflicts proponents attempt to capture or dominate modes of representation; they attempt, that is, to make them hegemonic. When they are successful “a hierarchy is formed in which one mode of representing the world ... gains primacy over others, transforming modes of representation from an array on a horizontal plane to a ranking on a vertical plane” (253). Miskimmin (this volume) unpacks the keyword *risk* as it is used in pre-school programs for Aboriginal children in Toronto. She shows how implicit and explicit re-definitions of risk by Aboriginal participants challenge medical, individual and psychological understandings of risk, and replace them with political, economic and cultural understandings. Aboriginal Headstart programs have the dual, and perhaps contradictory, aims of preparing Native students for participation in mainstream schools and educating them in Aboriginal heritage. Oddly, as Miskimmin notes, these pre-school programs are run by Health Canada; indeed the very fact that an educational program is situated under a health and medical rubric is evidence of historical and continuing colonial interventions into Aboriginal practices as a kind of “racial uplift,” with certain linguistic, medical and hygienic practices being closely linked to integration (see also Pujolar, this volume). One of the hallmarks of neoliberal political and economic restructuring has been the assumption that it is the primary responsibility of individual actors acting rationally – not the government – to manage the risks involved in modern life and social transitions (Inoue 2007). Health Canada draws on the long established connection between risk and medicine, especially as it has been elaborated in epidemiology research, to specify which participants are most in need of the program. For Health Canada, labeling individuals as *at risk* mandates a certain kind of intervention, while measuring how *high risk* people are enables objective measurement of problems defined as individual problems (e.g. learning difficulties, emotional and behavioral problems, mental or physical disabilities, health problems, physical, sexual or psychological abuse, neglect, teenage pregnancy, exposure to peri-natal stress, juvenile delinquency, death of a parent, parental substance abuse). At best these problems are highly decontextualized from community concerns. Aboriginal participants define *risk* differently, in ways that are explicitly critical and suspicious of the value of mainstream medicine and education. The different definitions of “at risk” contribute, Miskimmin argues, to the failure of the program to actively enlist community members’ participation in the

school, as they show the different ways of life actively being contested in federal policy and aboriginal practices.

3.2 *Emerging into history*

It is important to underline that many remain cautious about attaching *global* only to recent economic and political developments, in the way the frame “globalization” sometimes does. “Globalization” can erect stereotypes about the cultures and nations of the past as consistent and self-contained (Tsing 2002). International and transnational movements of people, goods and ideas have a long history (Wolf 1982), and some of the more recent developments can be linked, in complex but direct ways, to earlier colonial and imperial ventures (as Miskimmin’s and Philip’s work, this volume, also show). A number of chapters in this volume challenge any simplistic characterization of the contemporary moment alone as “global” by considering the ways that notions of modernity and global circulations of technology and knowledge have shaped language and gender at earlier moments in the 20th century, often with continuing implications for today. More importantly, however, they suggest the need for developing richly historical and genealogical approaches to the study of objects often assumed, occasionally even reified, in sociolinguistic studies, as they attend to the rich tools for textual analysis that sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology offer. These studies go beyond a focus on the social construction of gender or language or identity. They take on the critique that historical anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot has offered of constructivism: “[c]onstructivism’s dilemma is that while it can point to hundreds of stories that illustrate its general claim that narratives are produced, it cannot give a full account of the production of any narrative” (1995: 13).⁸ Constructivism is not, Trouillot argues, fully attentive to sociohistorical processes, and “tracking power requires a richer view of historical production than most theorists acknowledge” (1995: 25). These papers are precisely interesting in considering how certain categories emerge into history (see also Bauman and Briggs 2003; Kuipers 1998).

Weidman’s chapter examines how new ways of speaking and singing, as well as new ideologies about voices, were enabled by new economic and political formations and new technological innovations in South India. She considers how the female voice became central to the idea of South Indian music as a high cultural art form that was seen as representative of uncolo-

nized Indianness in the early 20th century. She charts how the construction of a “classical” music tradition for South India – generally described and naturalized as a “revival” of such traditions – was part of the ideological work of middle-class nationalists intent upon forming a sense of Indianness over and against the West, and upon elevating an India seen as degraded by centuries of foreign rule. It is frequently the case that in colonial contexts women are used to represent tradition, resistance, or the inability to modernize. The status of women was and is seen as a sign of the modernity of a particular state, and practices deemed oppressive to women (harems, veiling, female genital circumcision, arranged marriages) were and are used to justify imperial interventions. In nationalist ideology which was shaped by, but also contesting, colonial rhetoric the idealization of (certain) women and (certain) women’s practices was often thus closely associated with the preservation of tradition and respectability. The devadasi system, a system in which women were dedicated to music and service in Hindu temples, was seen as a site where both women and music were degraded and perhaps prostituted; traditional music was to be made respectable again by associating it with respectable (read: middle-class) women. She challenges any simple-minded understanding of public performance as power, instead showing the ways that women’s performances can be seen as a strategic response to powerlessness; though they sang in public, they generally did not speak. Her essay raises thoughtful theoretical and methodological questions about how scholars can write such a history of voice, and points out the need to draw the interdisciplinary resources of linguistic anthropology, ethnomusicology, and technology studies into studies which do not treat voices as a natural means of self-expression, but rather ask how voices, and ideologies about them, arise.

Inoue’s work (this volume, and 2002, 2003, 2006) also looks at the emergence of a new social category, the Japanese schoolgirl, at the turn of the 20th century and the linguistic ideologies associated with her.⁹ As in southern India, the treatment of women and girls was seen as central to establishing a modern nation-state. In Japan, modernization was seen as a preemptive strike against the Western attempts at colonization that were underway in many other Asian countries in the early 20th century. Girls were incorporated into the mandatory state education system in order to be educated as “good wives and wise mothers” who would help raise modern citizens and thus help build a modern Japan. Male intellectuals wrote extensively about the speech of Japanese schoolgirls, describing speech forms that have since become identified as “women’s language” in Japan. Discus-

sions of verb-ending forms became a form of metapragmatic containment of schoolgirls. By focusing on the nonreferential aspects of speech, they suppressed the referential voice of girls, and produced the dismissive effect of girls who were frivolous, irrational, incoherent, garrulous, lazy and vulgar. Inoue's chapter notes that the contemporary discourse of Japanese women's language erases this historical emergence to construct women's language as an essential and timeless part of culture and tradition. Inoue's essay, like Weidman's, explores the conditions of possibility for being heard and cited, by analyzing intellectuals' descriptions of school girls, but also by considering the way these accounts are embedded within a variety of projects of modernity, including language modernization, the construction of state ideas about womanhood, and the place that Japan was seen to hold over and against the West. Like Yang and Weidman, Inoue shows how gender is a terrain on which other debates are worked through. Inoue argues that in the surge of commentaries about the strange sounds coming from Japanese schoolgirls' mouths at the beginning of the 20th century, the schoolgirl was an empty signifier, functioning as a sign to the degree that she represented something other than herself. The focus on the behaviors, including and especially the linguistic behaviors, of these Japanese schoolgirls appeared when there was significant concern about whether Japan would be held up against Western standards and found wanting, as well as when concerns were rampant about whether Japanese civilization and morality could withstand Western influence.

If Weidman and Inoue's essays focus on the politics of audibility and visibility in the context of struggles over modernity – on what convergence of forces renders some object or voice public – in my chapter in this volume I focus on the politics of seizing other's voices, and the ways that this results in particular historical narratives being written. In particular, I draw on recent work on entextualization and recontextualization to examine the ways that annual reports of public health published during the American occupation of the Philippines use erasure and ventriloquism to minimize Filipino public health initiatives, especially those of Filipino male physicians. Most studies of entextualization and discursive control have, as Gloria Rahejia Goodwin notes, focused on specific societies, but colonial documents “exhibit the connection between entextualizing processes and power relationships in a larger arena of cultural politics” (1999: 121). She notes that “To wrench certain stretches of speech ... from the contexts in which they were uttered and to insert them into colonial documents radically stabilized and transformed their meanings, and excluded, marginal-

ized, or otherwise tamed speech that was not congruent with colonial views ... or colonial political interests” (1999: 121). In the Indian case that Goodwin studies, ventriloquism, or the appropriation of the speech of the colonized, constructs a discourse about the consensual nature of caste ideology, and creates the illusion that the control of the Indian population was carried out with the consent of the colonized. In American documents, ventriloquism has a similar effect, but it also serves to amplify American arguments for the necessity – and benevolence – of their presence. The necessity for incorporating Filipino voices in colonial texts, of ventriloquizing them, can be linked precisely to the American project of benevolent assimilation. It requires the presence of a colonial other, presented not as peers or as primitives but as protégés. In public health initiatives, the unequal relations established were often between American and Filipino men. Thus, although I have also found that the actions of women were central to debates about modernity, nation, imperialism and citizenship (McElhinny 2005, 2006), colonial politics were about establishing hierarchies of masculinity too. Although some Filipino initiatives were erased from the colonial record, often Filipino initiatives were incorporated into American public health texts, and thus re-authored, and authorized as in some way American. Textual analysis here serves to challenge the pretexts of the American imperial presence as one benefiting the health of the Filipino people, as it theorizes the relationship between ventriloquism and erasure, the role of discourse in establishing colonial hierarchies of masculinity, and how to challenge hegemonic versions of history.

In addition to undertaking genealogical analyses, another way to expand our empirical focus is to adopt a historically sensitive approach to the emergence of new publics. A *public*, according to Susan Gal and Kathryn Woolard (1995: 132), is “a form of language-based political legitimation.” The concept is closely tied to the *public sphere*, which Jürgen Habermas, among others, identifies as those nongovernmental communicative interactions that legitimate, or at least influence, the way power and resources are allocated within a nation-state or other polity; the term also refers to the places in which such interactions occur and to the technologies that mediate them. Gaudio’s chapter undertakes a historical analysis of the emergence of northern Nigerian publics in the context of two globalizing systems, European imperialism and Islam, and of the oral and written genres (Arabic literary genres, Friday sermons, *wak’ok’i* or song-poems, and Hausa newspapers, radio, television and, increasingly, videos) key to the establishment of these publics. Gaudio tracks the confluence of conditions that have led to

the rise of a commercial Hausa-language video industry, and the contradictions it faces: the male entrepreneurial elites who shape the industry want to construct a northern Nigerian public on the basis of normative Islam but in order to attract mass audiences and maximize profits they may need to resort to means which sometimes contradict these very norms. Gaudio tracks the conflicting ideologies of gender, sexuality and language manifest in the industry through a close reading of the text and multiple audience receptions of *Ibro 'Dan Daudu*, a Hausa-language video-film in which popular actors perform humorous impersonations of 'yan daudu, i.e. men who are said to talk and act "like women", who are widely reputed to be involved in prostitution, and whose activities have been targeted as contributing to public immorality. He contrasts portrayals of 'yan daudu's linguistic and other behaviors in the film with his own ethnographic portrayals, as he considers the ways that a variety of different men in venues ranging from internet discussions, magazine reviews, and conversations amongst friends understand the film's portrayals. He shows how films which critically address controversial and immoral topics can work to construct an Islamic Northern Nigerian public that is distinct from – and morally superior to – the rest of Nigeria and the West, but almost inevitably they come to be seen as capitalizing upon immoral desires in order to make money.

In theoretical and methodological terms all of the chapters in this section explore the implications for studies of language and gender of what Gal (1998: 333) argues is one of the salutary effects of recent work in linguistic anthropology: the expansion of empirical foci from face-to-face talk to studies of mass media and the ways they connect disparate communities and textual debates.¹⁰ The mass media in Weidman, Inoue, McElhinny and Gaudio are newspapers, gramophone recordings, the writings of male intellectuals, scientific journals, annual reports of public health, videos, internet conversations, and magazines. Such studies do not mean that studies of face-to-face interaction have been displaced, but rather perhaps that they have been decentered.

3.3 *Multilingualism, globalization and nationalism*

Interestingly, one of the points of discussion at the original conference at which many of these papers were presented was some people's surprise that more papers did not deal with gender and multilingualism, since this is one of the sites where studies of language, gender and global economy have

been most robustly developed (though Besnier (2007) has recently argued that even in these studies analysis often seems to stop at national boundaries). Indeed, the question which is most frequently debated in the emerging literature on language and globalization (Coupland 2003; Heller 2003a, 2003b; Leap and Boellstorff 2004) may be how best to understand the effects of cultural and linguistic imperialism (Canagarajah 1999; House 2003; Pennycook 2003; Philipson 1992). Recent works in what Nair calls *post-colonial pragmatics* have taken up similar questions but have been more attentive to the ways that gender and other aspects of identity intersect with imperialism. Nair (2002) sketches out the contemporary dilemmas that the values of English can raise for the writing and speech of a postcolonial feminist. Chandra (2003) considers debates in mid-nineteenth century India about whether Indian women should be educated in English, and the roles these debates played in both fixing the value of English as “international” and native languages, such as Marathi, as “local”, but also the roles they played in elaborating new forms of patriarchy. Native languages were portrayed by some as more unchaste and impure, and the kinds of gendered positions they made available to women who spoke them were taken as evidence of the inferiority of Indian culture; an education in English was seen as a way to elevate the national character. Women who learned English, however, were often criticized by other women for developing (overly) intimate relationships with husbands, at the cost of relationships with other women in their households. Critics of English-language education argued for the respectability of Marathi, and women’s (especially upper caste women’s) continued use of it was seen as necessary for the continued survival of the “mother” tongue. The vernacular was thus feminised over and against a masculinised English, in the name of preserving it. Policing language was thus a way to police sexuality, and also a way to police caste and nation.

In bilingual or multilingual societies, in areas where national boundaries have been drawn and redrawn, in postcolonial contexts, and in diglossic linguistic situations, it is often the use of, or access to certain languages which differentiates the speech of men and women, or more elite and less elite men and women. In colonial or post-colonial situations, access to economic and political power may depend on being able to speak the language of the imperial, or former imperial power (see, also, essays in Pavlenko et al 2001). Examples include using Spanish or Portuguese in central and South America, or English among the Celtic peoples in England among many native groups in North America, and in former British colonies in the

Caribbean, Africa and Asia. Harvey's (1994) and Hill's (1987, 1992) work offers examples of how this plays itself out in Spanish-Native bilingualism in Peru and Mexico, in two different cases in which women speak less Spanish than men, though for complexly different reasons. Walters' (1996) article on the linguistic choices of non-Muslim women from Western countries married to Muslim Tunisian males points out that only members of formerly colonizing nations can remain monolingual, or even bilingual in English and French, without learning Arabic, and be considered educated. This process is uniquely inflected by gender: "to the extent that an Anglophone wife masters Tunisian Arabic, she de-exoticizes herself to a great extent, and probably loses some of whatever symbolic value she might have as a 'trophy' wife, whether for her husband or in the society at large" (543). Haeri's (1997) study of variation, gender, classical and modern forms of Arabic challenges Orientalist stereotypes which suggest that women used less classical Arabic because they led sheltered lives and were segregated in a private domain. She found that education is directly correlated with the use of Classical Arabic among men (more educated men use it more, less educated men use it less), but the same is not true for women. Many Koranic schools did and do not open their doors to women. She argues that more highly educated women use features of the local urban Arabic standard, which is associated with modernity, progress and change of the status quo. Women's, and younger men's, greater use of urban standards may be understood as a favorable response to modernization. Gal (1978) showed the ways that young women in an Austrian community were less committed than men to the traditionally male-dominated system of subsistence and agriculture associated with Hungarian-speaking peasants, and had more to gain by associating themselves with wage labor, as worker's wives. These women, she argued, were driving a shift from Hungarian to German in this community. This work underlines the ways in which we have already been talking about the ways language and gender are shaped by global processes for some time.

Several papers in this volume continue this long-standing focus on studies of gender and multilingualism, as they begin to suggest some new questions that arise when one attends more fully to recent aspects of globalization. In a series of papers Monica Heller (see e.g. Heller 2003a, 2003b) has documented the changing meaning of language and ethnicity in francophone Canada in the new global economy. In an economic context where the meaning of the nation-state is changing and where the economy is shifting from resource extraction (agriculture, forestry, mining, fishing) and

industrial labor to service sector work, ethnolinguistic minorities who have organized around nationalist discourses and institutions find that the political and economic bases upon which they have constructed their identity are also being rapidly undermined, even as their linguistic skills become particularly valued in a global economy. The meaning of language also changes. Heller notes that language is coming to be understood less as an inalienable characteristic of group members and more as a measurable skill; language skills may be given more importance than ethnic ties in establishing who belongs in the francophone community. Language moves from being a marker of identity to a marketable commodity, distinct from identity.¹¹ Tensions can thus arise between political and economic bases for imagining community. In her chapter in this volume, Heller considers how political organization around ethnonational identity can lead to an erasure of differences within a community organized around gender and class, but she is also interested in how various forms of social categorization, including gender, intersect in process of social change, so as to position people differently with respect to the strategies and resources open to them. She offers a historical overview of the ways gender has figured in ethnonational struggles among francophones in Canada, and finishes with a consideration of the implications that growing industries (call centres, translation) which require feminized, if not necessarily feminine, labor, have for defining linguistic standards and linguistic authenticity, both for those who take up jobs in these sectors and those who do not.

Pujolar's chapter considers the ways that language courses for immigrants, themselves increasing globally in number and size as migration flows increase, represent a site where access to resources is regulated by dominant groups. In particular, he considers the politics associated with learning Catalan, a language which is not generally understood as a "global" language, and which nonetheless presents immigrant women with a new structure of opportunities. He considers how the habit of using Spanish in classrooms for immigrants in Catalonia serves, in some ways, to preserve the linguistic power of Catalan speakers, as it undermines the legitimacy of the Catalan language in local public spheres, as well as the linguistic and cultural capital of immigrants. A discourse of "integration" emerges in these classrooms, part of what he calls "advanced" liberal (or neoliberal) rule which is characterized by a certain detachment of practices of expertise from public control, and a privatization of expertise that is governed increasingly by market rationalities. He argues that neoliberal rule creates a fundamental paradox for immigrant women in which their subjection to the

appropriate procedures of surveillance is increasingly seen as a sign of integration. However, immigrants have few means, because of a lack of economic or political power, to develop their own sources of authority.

Nguyen's chapter presents yet another case study of the kinds of research enabled by recent political and economic changes. Recent reforms in communist Vietnam and China have made possible the circulation of scholars and scholarship in ways that are part of global flows, as they contribute to the study of globalization. She considers how the killing of many young men during the American war in Vietnam intimately affected the lives and linguistic practices of women faced with a shortage of suitable marriage partners. In particular, she takes up the question of why Vietnamese-speaking women who have married ethnic minority men and live in their husbands' villages choose to use ethnic minority languages rather than Vietnamese when speaking in public settings, even when others tend to use the often more statusful Vietnamese. She argues that they are reluctant to reveal themselves in the shameful, or at least pitiable, position of being Viet women who could not find Viet husbands, and who thus had to marry men who are generally more poor and seen as more marginal to the nation-state. Her essay offers an intimate picture of the linguistic and emotional wounds associated with the upheaval of warfare. Nguyen's essay also points out the ways that Russian linguistic models have shaped the way research has evolved in Vietnam, again a topic little considered by sociolinguists (though see Harlig and Pleh 1995 for series of essays on this topic in an Eastern European setting). She points out the ways that Soviet-style survey research on people's multilingual speech practices serves to support Vietnamese state ideologies about the separate but equal spheres in which Vietnamese and other languages are used. Her essay raises the provocative question of what a sociolinguistics which not only studies global phenomena, but attends to and draws on canons and methods of research developed in multiple national and analytic traditions, might eventually look like.

3.4 *Commodities and cosmopolitanism*

The question of whether global phenomena are homogenizing ones is a particularly controversial question – and one that sociolinguistic and pragmatic studies are particularly well-positioned to take up (see also Meyerhoff and Niedzielski 2003). Corporations ask themselves how to sell products in a global marketplace, how to sell in multiple locations, how and

whether to address the world, and how to accommodate linguistic and cultural differences while remaining internally coherent (Klein 2000: 115). Though some companies try to get the world to come to them – to speak their language and absorb their culture – and argue that an inability to get consumers to do this is a sign of corporate weakness, other companies adopt a different approach, focusing on selling diversity, and trying to distance themselves from any easy critique of Western imperialist practices. Machin and van Leeuwen's (2003) analysis of 44 different versions of *Cosmopolitan* considers the ways that one company takes on this challenge. They argue that many cultural products appear to be "local" in content yet embody global content as well, and that localization may hide deeper, underlying similarities. All the versions of *Cosmopolitan* which they study are structured around a problem-solution discourse schema, in which the problems facing women are identified, and various solutions are proposed. In all versions, an atomistic form of individualism is promoted, in which fellow human beings, even or especially those closest to the readers, are unreliable and selfish, and thus constantly posing problems. The solutions are always individualistic – there is no solidarity with others, no solace from religious or cultural traditions, no collective action, no structural and political solutions. The magazine promotes, Machin and van Leeuwen argue, "the spirit of strategic communication that pervades the neo-capitalist world" (2005: 506). Though it has local accents – for instance, though most versions focus on colleagues, friends and lovers, some Asian versions add husbands, and although in the U.K. taking control of sexual encounters always works, in the Taiwanese version this can have ambivalent outcomes – the focus is on independence, freedom, career success, sexual satisfaction, and individual strategies for overcoming obstacles to these goals.

One of the sharpest changes in corporate worlds in the last 15 years is that many successful corporations now produce brands, rather than products. One of the sharpest critics of these changes has been the Canadian journalist and social activist Naomi Klein. In her 2000 book, *NO LOGO: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies*, she argues that branding is not the same as advertising. Ads inform people about the existence of a product, and try to get them to use it, arguing that their lives will be better if they use it. But now, she argues, companies are not advertising products, they are advertising brands – a lifestyle, an experience – and penetrating into domains previously untouched by commercialism. The vice president of marketing at Starbucks as much as acknowledges that there is no difference in products, or at least that consumers do not perceive one: instead, he argues, the job of

companies is merely to establish emotional ties with an experience, in his case, the Starbucks' experience of coffee romance, warmth and community (Klein 2000: 21) (compare Gaudio 2003).

Klein is particularly worried about "the marketing of cool" to the youth market, arguing that it harnesses the tendency of youth to raise questions about the world to consumerism and commercialism rather than more radical political commitments. Her conclusions about the effects of globalization thus parallel those of Machin and Leewwen. However, this approach makes an assumption that the significance of the text lies in its signification, that all one needs to know about the meaning of a text is the text itself. Bucholtz's chapter argues that we need more complex understandings of what people make of branding practices, a project she undertakes in an ethnographic study of how students in an ethnically diverse high school in California talk about brands and shopping. She tracks the confluence of forces that have led to an increasing integration of American youth into consumer culture, but through a set of rich analyses of face-to-face interactions argues that the new global economy may be far-reaching, but it is not all-encompassing, and that young people take up positions toward commodity culture that may variously resignify, reject, or reproduce dominant discourses of consumption. Bucholtz's paper, alongside others in the volume, highlights the problems with any simplistic opposition of global forces and local interaction, and any glib understanding of the meaning that global commodities will have in local contexts.

One homogenizing approach to globalization focuses too exclusively on histories of European and American imperialism in ways which run the danger of not acknowledging the diversity of global forces and locations of globalization (compare Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Pennycook 2003; Zhang 2005). Some people are worried that cosmopolitanism, or laying claims to having worldly knowledge, can sometimes exacerbate such trends. As numerous commentators have noted, "the point of view that makes the improvement of a resentful and unappreciative world by imperial powers into a matter of morals can call itself cosmopolitan" (Gilroy 2005: 62). The opposition of imperial ambitions, disguised as universalist ones, over and against "local" ambitions is what Appiah calls "*toxic cosmopolitanism*" (2005: 220). It is a love for others manifest in an attempt to impose purportedly superior ways, and is in part what leads to a wariness about the use of the term, in some circles. Little better is the version of cosmopolitanism we might call *consumer cosmopolitanism* – one in which superficial encounters with difference become a form of cultural capital for the traveler

or consumer. This is a form of cosmopolitanism more focused on self, than other. But some people still hold out hope for cosmopolitanism. A third form of cosmopolitanism is what Gilroy calls *vulgar or demotic cosmopolitanism*. This form of cosmopolitanism relishes, he argues, “the ordinary virtues and ironies – listening, looking, discretion, friendship – that can be cultivated when mundane encounters with difference become rewarding. The self-knowledge that can be acquired through the proximity to strangers is certainly precious but is not longer the primary issue ... especially in turbulent political climates it must take second place behind the principled and methodical cultivation of a degree of estrangement from one’s own culture and history” (2005: 67).

Zhang’s work is a salutary intervention into the idea that either globalization or cosmopolitanism is a naturalization of Euro/U.S. centrism. In her chapter she uses variationist methods to consider the language of Chinese professionals (“yuppies”) working for foreign businesses in Beijing, and the ways that their speech compares with the speech of those working for state institutions. Yuppies’ decreased use of some key local variables associated with Beijing Mandarin and their increased use of a variable associated with Hong Kong/Taiwan speech is evidence of, and linked to, the emergence of new urban elites, China’s participation in a global market and, strikingly, China’s participation in a transnational Chinese community. These speakers are simultaneously of Beijing, mainland China, and the international business world, and their linguistic repertoires reflect this in sensitive ways. Their jobs give them extensive contacts with people from other parts of the world, and access to international travel and consumer goods gives them more modern, cosmopolitan lifestyles than other Mainland Chinese. Crucially the impact of Western popular culture is less significant than that of Hong Kong and Taiwan. This world is transnational, but this is a distinctively Chinese cosmopolitanism, and a novel transnational linguistic market has been constructed alongside, and to facilitate, it.

Being fixed in place and restricted from access to global circuits is often construed as a sign of deprivation while global access is a sign of power. But Zhang’s paper also considers how the same economic forces that allow for the production of a more cosmopolitan accent are linked with more restrictive roles for women. Gender differences are not very marked in the speech of state professionals, with only one of four variables showing significant gender variation; however, gender differences are sharply delineated in the speech of professionals working for foreign-owned businesses, with women markedly leading men in the use of non-local, cosmopolitan

features. Zhang unpacks the significance that these patterns have for the state-mandated emancipation of women under socialism, and the distinctive career trajectories open to men and women in foreign-owned businesses. Her work, like Yang's (this volume), investigates some of the linguistic consequences of a transition from centrally planned economy to a more market oriented one, from a socialist egalitarian state in China to a socio-economically more stratified one.

Besnier, like Bucholtz, argues that globalization is never just the imposition of certain experiences upon other's lives; rather, globalization informs and transforms people's lives in ways that may well be unpredictable and surprising. Similarly, what cosmopolitanism means will be determined in different local contexts. Besnier's chapter argues that studies of language and gender have been at their strongest in studying local and contemporary contexts, but at their weakest in thinking about the influences of extra-local and historical ones. A corollary is that traditional forms of gender identity have been more widely and extensively studied than those affected by transnationalism and globalization. He tracks the meanings the use of English has in two relatively new institutions in Tonga that are associated with modernity and cosmopolitanism: a secondhand marketplace and a transgendered beauty pageant (for related analyses see Besnier 1994, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007). In an analysis of interaction in a newly formed space for commodity exchange in Tonga (a secondhand marketplace in which people sell many products received from diasporic relatives), he shows how participants construct themselves as modern and cosmopolitan agents, who nevertheless remain grounded in local norms of appropriateness. He also considers the ways that *leitī* (transgendered men) lay claim to cosmopolitan identities by using English in beauty pageants, and the audience's assessment and judgments of these claims. His work considers the subtle ways that globalization and transnationalism are gendered. He notes, for instance, that women's appropriation of global symbols, such as the use of English, is less threatening to their identity as women than men's appropriation of the same symbols is to their identity as men, and that a non-elite man who speaks "too much" English or seeks the company of Westerners runs the risk of being identified as a *leitī* without displaying any other sign of femininity. All non-elite Tongans, however, must be careful of the ways that they lay claim to cosmopolitan identities, including through language usage, for fear of putting on airs. He thus demonstrates how participants themselves emphasize that laying claim to cosmopolitan identities is not a denial of, and may even be part of, laying claim to a local identity.

4. Conclusion

Philosopher John Dupre argues that what unites feminist scholars is “not that some systematic understanding of gender differences is required, but that gender differences are an ethically indefensible, yet nearly universal, basis for systematic inequalities of power” (1990: 59). But is it enough to study power? Does a focus on ‘power’ give us enough analytic precision to take on the kinds of questions we have not yet taken on? What counts as descriptions of gender difference, and what counts as explanation? Pujolar argues that it is important “to consider what [our] findings tell us about social problems and processes of wider relevance. Without this additional level of analysis, a piece of research runs the risk of remaining theoretically irrelevant and socially meaningless in the sense that a more or less accurate description of a number of social interactions does not necessarily help to answer important questions such as what makes a particular social practice sexist, or in what way some language choices contribute to [political subordination]” (2000: 249). Rosemary Hennessey argues that a feminist theory moves beyond description to explanation if it can identify key sites for action, sites which have a particularly strong effect on the ideological construction of reality (1993: 28). A claim to truth is defined, in her terms, in terms of a theory’s ability to intervene in the ideological construction of reality, in part by identifying key sites for action. Further, the aim of explanation may not be simply to explain the problems one sets for oneself (though this is one criterion for evaluating the explanatory power of a theory), but to consider how to secure certain constructions and framings politically, making them count over others in organizing the consciousness and practice of historical agents. These are projects to which sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology have much to contribute – as these papers show. These studies of language and gender move us beyond considering how gender is socially constructed (an approach well developed in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology) to thinking about what the social construction of gender does (see Hacking 1999). Doing so allows us to link up our work with the growing group of social scientists and activists who are thinking through the contemporary impact of neoliberalism, changing forms of governance, globalization, changing work regimes, and changing family forms.

Notes

- * A much earlier version of this chapter were offered as an introduction to a conference on language, gender and political economy that I organized at the University of Toronto in October 2003. A more recent, and markedly revised, version was given at a talk at Georgetown University's Department of Linguistics in March 2006. My thanks to Deborah Tannen for the invitation to speak to this group. Not all of the original participants in the conference have contributed papers to this volume, though Charles Briggs, Jennifer Dickinson, Penny Eckert, Glynis George, Kira Hall, Normand Labrie, Barbara LeMaster, Hy van Luong, Mary Talbot, Keith Walters, and Andrew Wong all were a vital part of the discussions, and their comments are reflected indirectly in the revisions of these papers in many ways. The workshop was funded by the Canadian Social Science and Humanities Research Council, the University of Toronto Connaught Foundation, the Departments of Anthropology and Linguistics, the Program in Culture, Communication and Information Technology (CCIT) at University of Toronto, Mississauga, and the Semiotics Program. My thanks to these organizations, and in particular to Marcel Danesi, Hy van Luong, Diane Massam and Bill Thompson. for their support. Two graduate students (Marnie Bjornson, Abigail Sone) participated from the beginning in planning the conference, and Susanne Miskimmin joined in later as the conference's organizational assistant. Katherine Brasch, Jie Yang, Shaylih Muehlmann, Lesley Gotlib, Chris Gotthart, Maureen Murney, Isabelle Lantagne, Teodosia Villarino, and Anna Polonyi all provided crucial input into the intellectual and administrative aspects of the conference. Kori Allan and Lindsay Bell provided invaluable editorial assistance in assembling the book manuscript. The conference included a graduate student workshop which also showcased how the next generation of scholars is contributing to the study of language, gender and political economy. We will all be learning much from Marnie Bjornson's work on changing notions of citizenship and attitudes towards immigrants and language training policy in the Netherlands, Katherine Brasch's work on Brazilian immigrants in Toronto, Andrea Jacob's work on language and gender ideologies in Israel, Natasha Mack's work on the effects of circular migration and social welfare policy on gender identities in Martinique, Josee Makropoulos' research on francophone girls' understandings of identity in a changing economy, Amanda Minks' work situating Miskitu children's expressive practices in the context of population migration, transnational flows of capital, and stratified access to material and expressive resources, Noelle Mole's work on how ideas about gender, harassment, discrimination are changing in Northern Italy as labor policies under the EU change the rules for member states, and Jessica Weinberg's research on Jewish and Palestinian Israeli women's bilingual/binational peace activism. Finally, my thanks to Kori Allan for her meticulous assistance in editing the

chapters in this book, and to two thoughtful reviewers, both for their comments on my chapters, and also for their thoughtful comments on the manuscript as a whole.

1. Though Scott's (1986) views do not explicitly emphasize the ways in which any of these aspects of gender are elaborated in transnational, international or global contexts—her focus is more on national sites—her argument can be readily extended to such analytic frameworks.
2. About a decade ago Gal (1999) pointed out that sociolinguists had not yet fully considered gender as a structural principle organizing social institutions such as workplaces, schools, courts, and the state and the patterns they display in the recruitment, treatment, and mobility of different men and women. Although the number of studies of gender and institutions has increased, arguably this remains the case.
3. For a more developed argument with respect to sexuality, see Lancaster (2003). He argues that changes in production and consumption are linked with debates about gender and sexuality, kinship, and personal life, such that sexuality in transition and crisis is linked to capitalism in transition and crisis. The questions of how, precisely, remain to be taken up. He argues that queer theory will remain ill-equipped to really engage the new social conditions until it attends to political-economic problems and institutional articulations as credibly as it took up questions related to signification, representation, and performance in the nineties.
4. See Wolf (1982: 91) on how kinship is bleb of its content in some approaches to political economy.
5. See Lutz (1995) on the gender politics of labeling works as 'theoretical' and 'empirical.'
6. Addressing another key debate in studies of globalization – the question of whether the nation-state is undermined, reconfigured, or even strengthened – Thurlow and Jaworski (2003) point out that there need be no opposition between an increased global presence and a strengthened national one: a nation can show its strength by having a national airline, with international reach (580). The discourse of globalization “becomes a means by which airlines can render themselves both international *and* national” (emphasis in original – 600).
7. In one of the chapters in her dissertation, “Ritualization of Social Anger: Language, Masculinity and the Neoliberal Restructuring in China,” Yang (2006) also looks at the ways that neoliberalism can also create a crisis of masculinity. Although women suffer unemployment in higher numbers in contemporary China, men's unemployment is seen as a greater threat to social stability. Yang looks in fine linguistic detail at the ways that working-class men who have lost their putatively life-long jobs display their anger in rather ritualized ways in public at a factory's Re-employment Service Center when they are called in to transfer their work dossiers to other sites, and the ways that managers attempt

to transform and divert men's social anger from class conflicts to gender, sexual conflicts or family issues. Male workers often think through their marginalization in the language of gender, and in terms of language and gender, rather than in terms of class.

8. For other recent critiques of the notion of social construction, as not inappropriate, but as insufficient, see Grewal and Kaplan (1994) and Hacking (1999).
9. For related work adopting a rather different analytic frame, see Nakamura (2003, 2004).
10. See Gupta and Ferguson (1997) for a similar plea for transformation of methods in sociocultural anthropology.
11. Cameron (2000b) and Gee, Hull and Lanksheer (1996) also argue that there are new work orders which make novel demands on the linguistic abilities of workers. New management styles adopted in the context of global competition have intensified awareness of language as something that needs to be managed, in order to enhance productivity or produce corporate norms/brands. Cameron (2000b, 2001) shows that call centres are a relatively new service workplace that arose because of advances in telephone and computing technology that allowed customer service work to be done at central, rather than local, locations where labour costs are low, and work can be organized to maximize productivity. She notes that many of the linguistic strategies associated with good customer service are the same ones linked to performing femininity, such that women are seen as particularly apt at this work, but in ways which also suggest how what it means to be feminine is associated with this same kind of servicing of other's emotional and interactional needs. If in the 1970s, commentators focused on the relatively new transfer of manufacturing jobs to countries where labour was cheaper, now we're seeing the transfer of a variety of different kinds of service work (informatics, call centers) overseas to places like India and the Philippines (for English speakers). This will be a key theme for linguistic analysis in coming years.

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Section I. Scattered hegemonies

Chapter 1

Symbolically central and materially marginal: Women's talk in a Tongan work group*

Susan U. Philips

In this paper I explore the relationship between gender ideology in speech and song produced by women in a Tongan work group and the global political economic position of these women. The *koka'anga* is a women's work group that transforms small pieces of plain bark cloth, or *tapa*, into *ngatu*, or very large pieces of decorated bark cloth. In so doing the women create women's wealth, or *koloa*. The women coordinate their work through directives, gossip, love songs, and allusive joking/teasing about one another's putative romances. I argue here that while the women's talk is symbolically central in Tongan life, it is materially marginal within a global economic framework. The women's work product, the decorated bark cloth, plays a central role in ritual exchanges at all levels of Tongan society, both in Tonga and in overseas Tongan communities. And the gender ideology they reproduce through their singing and joking is also central to Tongan ideas about what it means to be Tongan, so it has great cultural value. But the work product and the talk that facilitates and accompanies it ultimately have little economic value within a global economic framework. Marcus (1981, 1993) has described Tonga in political economic terms as on the extreme periphery of the global economy, with an economy fueled largely by remittances sent home from overseas immigrants from Tonga to the United States, New Zealand, and Australia (see also Besnier, this volume). To this I would add that if we understand Tongans' positions within this transnational economy to be differentiated, then the women who produce *ngatu* and the talk that goes with it are on the periphery of that extreme periphery. Most of these women are poor, even by Tongan standards.

Earlier work in anthropology on political economy stressed relations between what we have conceptualized as colonial centers and colonized peripheries (Frank 1967; Wolf 1982). The colonized were clearly conceptualized as economically exploited by virtue of the colonial extraction of

sources of wealth, and an associated concentration of capital in Western European metropolitan centers. Some developments since then in cultural theory on the nature of globalization and transnationalism have incorporated the emphasis on center-periphery relations, but sought more culturally enriched and local accounts of the nature of the relationship between centers and peripheries (e.g. Appadurai 1986). Images of movement – of goods, people, and now discourses – have become salient.

For this paper, I too develop the more culturalist side of the symbolic-materialist connections in transnational political economic processes. The symbolic centrality and material marginality of the Tongan women's work contrasts with the more familiar idea in linguistic anthropology that language associated with economic gain will be positively valued, i.e. that symbolic and material capital go together (Gal 1978, 1979; Woolard 1985, 1986; Heller 2003), at least some of the time (Hill 1985, 1987). The type of situation documented here, in which it is the very poor women on the extreme periphery who produce work and talk that is not only greatly valued, but also central to local ideas about what it means to have a particular ethnic and national identity, strikes me as quite common in the context of globalizing processes that appear to threaten such identities through their homogenizing effects. This common disjuncture between what is culturally valued and what is economically valued suggests a general need to reconsider the nature of the relationship between cultural value and economic value, both generally, and in relationship to the speech in women's lives. Thus my purpose here is to explore various aspects of that relationship in ways that will open up our thinking about it.

I tape-recorded the *koka'anga* that is the focus of analysis here as part of a larger research project in Tonga in which a range of activities in a single village were recorded during the period 1987–1990, to allow for a comparison between legal speech in courts and non-legal speech. In this cultural context most extended conversation involving women outside the home (a very private context) was both gender segregated and involved work of some kind. Following the taping of the event, about which more will be said later, information about the women's marital and household living situations, church affiliations, economic positions, and relations with one another was provided to me by a Tongan research assistant who had arranged and was present for the taping and whose sister was part of the group. Later still the same research assistant and another of her sisters transcribed, translated, and entered into a computer database the speech from the recording.

In the discussion to follow I will first provide background on some salient features of Tongan gender ideology that are relevant to the women's talk in their work. Attention then turns to the political economic position of the women and their work in the *koka'anga*. I locate Tonga and *ngatu* production within a global political economy, and the women and their village within the Tongan political economy. I also discuss the political economic position of the church to which the majority of the women belong within both the global and the local political economy. Discussion continues with a focus on the talk in the specific *koka'anga* that was tape recorded. I describe the general organization of this talk, and the nature of the love songs sung by the women. We then see here how sexual joking is intertwined with the singing of love songs. Illicit sweetheart relationships are humorously suggested to be relevant for the women in the group, particularly the women whose husbands are overseas. Were such imagined relationships actual, it would threaten the women's very participation in this work group from which they derive income, so that while the joking provides entertainment in the context of hard work, it also serves as a form of social control. This counterpoint between sweetly sentimental love songs and bawdy sexual joking participates in a broad register contrast in Tongan public life between restrained and relatively unrestrained behavior, so that the women's speech and song not only reproduce dominant Tongan gender ideology, but also reproduce a deeply appreciated register contrast in Tongan life. Their speech and song is thus symbolically central to Tongan life and has great cultural value. Once the bark cloth leaves the work group, it continues to have great cultural, but small economic value, but the content of the singing and talk of the women is left behind, and will not be heard again in the public ritual contexts of *ngatu* exchange. Yet Tongan memory and knowledge of the context of production may still be part of both the cultural value and whatever economic value the bark cloth has, complicating our understanding of this relationship. The paper concludes with a re-consideration of the relationship between cultural and economic value.

1. Gender ideology in Tonga

Gender ideologies are organized in society through the social organization of the discourse genres that carry those ideologies (Philips 2003). No community has just one gender ideology. They are always multiple. However, some ways of representing gender are more salient than others in any given

society, and some are more favorable to women than others. In Tonga the most explicit and widespread gender ideologies are associated with three cross-gender dyads: the sister-brother relationship, the wife-husband relationship, and the sweetheart-sweetheart relationship.

The brother-sister relationship is of great importance throughout Oceania (Marshall 1983). The sister's greater ritual power relative to her brother's is well documented for Tonga. And as in other Polynesian societies (Huntsman and Hooper 1975; Schoeffel 1978), the wife is said to be subordinated to the husband in Tongan representations of the relationship, although there are images that counter this. A woman therefore has more power in the brother-sister relationship than in the husband-wife relationship in Tongan gender ideology. The sweetheart-sweetheart relationship has been discussed less, indeed almost not at all. While romantic encounters in private are widespread, a commonly approved vision of courtship among Tongans is that a man courts a woman by flirting with her and singing love songs to her as she presides over the making and serving of *kava*, a narcotic drink, at *kava* parties where other men will also be present. The public nature of such courtship is thought to protect the woman and provide evidence of her virtue. Women also report having love songs composed for them by those courting them. In love songs, the message is framed as from one who is supplicative, suffering and subordinated to one who is dominant (Philips 2003). This means there is a hierarchical dimension to all three key Tongan dyadic gender relationships. The sweetheart relationship can become a marital relationship, and the marital relationship is romantically conceptualized as coming out of a sweetheart relationship. The marital relationship is also defined in normative gender ideology as monogamous and as precluding sweetheart relationships with others. In these ways the sweetheart and marital dyads are intertwined.

All three gender dyads usually do not receive explicit attention in the same social contexts. In other words, explicit invocation of these dyads is domain-, context-, and discourse genre-specific in Tonga. For example, in Tongan Magistrate's Courts, one hears relatively little about sweethearts, even when victim and defendant have been in such a relationship, or about wives. But the sister-brother relationship explicitly is held up as a general model for appropriate public cross-gender interactions with people one does not know (Philips 2000). On the other hand, on the radio the sweetheart relation dominates because of the constant broadcast of love songs on the radio. Yet in the *koka'anga* I describe here, while love songs are numerous, they have a different quality than on the radio because of the coun-

terpoint of sexual joking that interlaces the love songs, which casts a very different light on the sweetheart relationship and would not be considered appropriate for the radio.

Besnier directs attention to the gendered relationships that get left out of this dyadic framework, most notably for him *fakaleitī*, men who act like women, including by having romantic and sexual relations with other men (Besnier 1997, 2002, 2004b, this volume). Many *fakaleitī* prefer that their sweetheart relationships not be made public in part because this would be disrespectful to their sisters, and these relationships will never become marital relationships (Besnier 2004b). Like *fakaleitī*, female entrepreneurs in *feas*, the second hand or flea markets of Tonga, also do not fit into the dyadic kinship framework of gender relationships (Besnier 2004a, this volume). But dyadic kinship rhetoric dominates representations of women in Tonga, regardless of how successfully it captures women's experiences.

Gender ideology is also seen by Tongans to be manifest in women's work and the products that result from this work. *Ngatu* itself is laden with gendered meanings. Tongan decorated bark cloth, or *ngatu*, is a key material sign of female gender identity.¹ Its production is considered by Tongans to be a major form of traditional work for women, and the nature of work that women and men do is central to their gender identity. *Ngatu* is women's wealth, or *koloa*, and the *koka'anga* is the key event that transforms bark into wealth. As *ngatu*, bark cloth becomes an object that is exchangeable, with both symbolic and economic capital. *Ngatu* is also considered a traditional form of chiefly art that is interwoven with other chiefly traditions (Kaeppler 1995). *Ngatu* production is linked to the brother-sister dyad in Tongan gender ideology through the idea that women produce *ngatu* for their brothers, out of love for them. To some extent, then, it is possible to speak of a social organization of gender ideologies and of the forms of talk that sustain them. In this paper I consider the role of a global economy and the political economic organization of gender and gendered labor in shaping the organization of gender ideologies, and the forms of discourse that carry those ideologies.

2. The political economic position of the *Koka'anga* women

In this section I characterize the political economic position of the women in the Tongan *koka'anga* whose talk we are going to look at. I look at three aspects of the *koka'anga* women's political economic positions. First I con-

sider how Tonga as a nation is positioned within a global economy. Here I focus on remittances to Tonga from Tongans who have immigrated overseas, and consider the involvement of bark cloth producers in Tonga's participation in a global economy. Second, I turn to the economic position of the village of Lotulahi, a pseudonym for the village where the *koka'anga* women live, and to how these women are located economically within the village. Finally, I will consider the relevance of the women's predominant church affiliation with the Free Church of Tonga for their political economic position. While it is not common to think of churches as involved in and positioned in global political economies, they are, and I develop here but one small example of such involvement. In general I argue that all three of these aspects of the *koka'anga* women's political economic position marginalize them relative to other Tongan women.

2.1. *Tonga within a global political economy*

Tonga has been described as having a remittance economy (Evans 2001; Stevens 1996, 1998). As Evans (2001) notes, cash enters the Tongan economy through the migration overseas of Tongan workers and the remittances they send back home. Estimates of the number of Tongan migrants to New Zealand, Australia and the United States range from 40,000 to 90,000, with approximately 100,000 Tongans remaining in Tonga (Small 1997). Remittances are the greatest source of income for the country as a whole. Sales taxes in Tonga, rather than income taxes, assure that the government receives a portion of this. International aid donations are a second key source of income in Tonga. These sources make possible the maintenance of government bureaucracies that provide jobs, which in turn also contribute to the cash economy.

Several ethnographic studies (Cowling 1990; Gailey 1992; Lee 2003; Small 1997) have documented the nature of Tongan migration, the transnational relationships between Tongans who stay at home and Tongans in overseas communities, and the lives of overseas Tongans. In this work, there is a significant focus on kinship networks, their role in the circulation of material wealth and the maintenance of the relationships that drive the Tongan economy. Tongans themselves saliently conceptualize those with whom they are dealing overseas as relatives.

Women come into the analysis of transnational relationships through their participation in women's work groups, *kautaha*, of which the

koka'anga is an example. Gailey (1987, 1992) and others (Besnier 2004a; Evans 2001; James 1997) all argue that it is still true, as it was in the colonial era, that women in Tongan villages do not have access to cash income to the extent that men who can sell their agricultural products do. The production of *koloa*, or 'women's wealth', has been identified as one way that Tongan women can participate in the economy.

There are several things women can do with their *ngatu*. They can use the *ngatu* they produce for ritual events their families become involved in such as funerals and weddings where people are thanked and honored through gifts of *koloa*. They can sell their products directly to others and to Tongan craft organizations. They can also exchange their products with other Tongan women who provide different forms of *koloa*, cash, or Western European manufactured goods in return. These women can be from another village, but more attention has focused on exchanges between overseas Tongan women and Tongan women who have stayed in Tonga (Addo 2004; James 1997; Small 1985). As Tongans have migrated overseas, they have continued cultural practices that call for them to possess women's wealth, primarily the gifting of *ngatu* and mats on important ceremonial occasions. To procure mats and bark cloth, women overseas engage in exchanges with women still in Tonga in which the overseas women give Western goods in exchange for Tongan mats and bark cloth (Addo 2004; James 1997; Small 1985).

James argues that exchanges of this kind between women at home and women overseas are part of an "economy of affection" (1997: 39) in which women talk about being motivated by the desire to show their love, particularly to close female relatives. Addo (2004) elaborates on this same point from the perspective of Tongan women in New Zealand. The kinship ties between these women are an important aspect of the transactions. Most importantly, both James and Addo see such exchanges as crucial in maintaining the ties that bind the remitters to their remitees, keeping remittances flowing into Tonga.

At the same time, the value of the mats and bark cloth is very precisely calculated, the implication being that the wealth producers should get Western goods which are equivalent in value to the mats and bark cloth. As James (1997) discusses, some Tongans seem reluctant to confront how commodified the process has become, and to be ill at ease with the commodification. Tongans concerned about it seem to feel that as women's wealth becomes more commodified, something is lost, and that something not in keeping with *anga-faka Tonga*, 'the Tongan way', is taking place.

We see, then, that women in Tonga who produce *ngatu* are interpolated into a global economy both through sale of their products and through exchanges with Tongan women overseas. For the overseas women, the procurement of *ngatu* and the participation in ritual gifting and exchanges of *koloa* is an important way to continue to be Tongan and to participate in Tongan community life. For the women who stay in Tonga, the exchanges are an important way to gain access to Western manufactured goods and to sustain the ties that keep the remittances coming. The need for *ngatu* for purposes of exchange on the part of Tongan women both at home and overseas is what links Tongan women's production of *ngatu* to the global economy. Both the social and the economic support of *ngatu* provide the motivation for the activity of producing it, and this in turn creates the opportunity for women to talk in the ways we will consider below.

However, it is important to bear in mind that while there is an economic value to the *ngatu* women produce, this value is not great in global economic terms. One Tongan woman takes home and keeps for herself one large Tongan *ngatu* of the 12 that theoretically are produced during a year in a work group. She does at least 12 days of work in the *koka'anga* a year to earn one large *ngatu* for herself. This does not take into consideration the labor and/or costs needed to produce the undecorated small pieces of *tapa* or bark cloth before these are brought together in the *koka'anga* to be made into one large decorated piece. The amount that this *ngatu* is worth, \$700 dollars at the time of this study, is all the cash this woman will bring in during one year. A sister to such a woman living in Hawai'i could earn the same amount in one week working privately as a companion and caretaker to an elderly person, but then go on to work another 51 weeks of the year earning just as much each week. So an exchange of the in-Tonga sister's *ngatu* for, say, a \$700 refrigerator from the overseas sister, will be a year of cash-earning income for the first sister, and a week of cash-earning income for the second sister. It is in this sense that the *koka'anga* woman's wealth is extracted and she is economically marginalized relative to her overseas female exchange partners.

2.2. *The economic position of the village within Tonga, and of the koka'anga women within the village*

Internally within Tonga, it is clear that the country is differentiated into political economic centers and peripheries. Nuku'alofa, the capital of

Tonga, which is located on the main island of Tongatapu, is the political economic center of the island group, and home to approximately a third of the population of the country. The two other major island groups to the north, Ha'apai and Vava'u, also each have smaller regional centers of population. These three regional centers are differentiated from the villages in the so-called rural areas by being transportation centers (e.g. all bus routes go to Nuku'alofa), offering banking services, governmental services, commercial establishments that sell Western goods, food markets for the sale of local produce, hospitals, and concentrations of schools, as well as sustaining European populations that one does not typically encounter in villages (Philips 1995). These regional centers are also the main locales for wage-earning jobs.

At the time this data was collected, Lotulahi was a large village of approximately 1300 people on the western side of the main island of Tongatapu. Lotulahi is situated about nine miles from the capital of Tonga, the town of Nuku'alofa. The village is basically a peasant agricultural village, where agriculture is practiced for both subsistence and cash crop purposes (Stevens 1996). However, it is also a "bedroom community" in relation to the capital, and many people commute to Nuku'alofa every weekday. Key village figures hold highly visible positions in the national government, whose offices are in the capital. Men also work for the government and private organizations in common occupational roles such as drivers, teachers, and mechanics. A number of women from the village also hold positions in Nuku'alofa as teachers, bank clerks, government secretaries and clerks, and store clerks. However, women from this village do not hold the highly visible positions in the government that some men do.

During the late 1980s through the early 1990s, this village had many signs of a community significantly depopulated by overseas immigration. There were a number of family homes tended by single men or simply left empty. At the same time, there was more home improvement and new building of homes than in other villages on this end of the island, suggesting the greater impact of the remittances being sent home on people's lives than in other villages.

There were only two *kautaha*, or women's work groups, in Lotulahi at the time this research was being carried out, one for mats and one for bark cloth. Both groups were led by high status women, though I cannot speak further about the composition of the mat making group. Two groups is far fewer than one finds in other villages in Tonga (Evans 2001; Small 1985). In general the ethnographic literature on Tongan economic activities sug-

gests that the further away a village is from a regional center, particularly the major center of Nuku'alofa, the greater the proportion of women who will be involved in the production of *koloa*. In processes of sale and exchange, the woven mats and baskets and the bark cloth move from the peripheries to the centers. One obvious reason for this is that the further away one is from the regional centers, the fewer the opportunities are for women to engage in cash-earning jobs. They are more likely to resort to the production of *koloa* to create wealth that can be converted to cash or other goods, while women in the centers are more likely to be involved in other forms of work to acquire cash. Lotulahi's role as a suburb in relation to the capital of Nuku'alofa is one that makes it easier for its residents to be more directly engaged economically with the regional center of Tonga than is true of some villages.

However, none of the women in this *kautaha*, or work group, participated in the salary or wage earning sectors of the economy the way some women in Lotulahi did. Of the 14 women who participated in this *koka'anga*, ten were married with children and had their own households. The other four women lived with relatives.

The men whom the ten women were married to were also not participating to any significant degree in the salaried sources of cash income in the capital of Nuku'alofa the way some men in the village were, with one important exception to which I will return. Of the ten husbands, four were living overseas in New Zealand and elsewhere, where they would typically have had entry-level low income jobs that nevertheless paid much more than work they could have gotten in Tonga. Two of the husbands were local farmers who supplied food for their families, but were also able to sell their agricultural products to bring in cash income. Thus only two out of ten husbands were participating in farming in what was basically a peasant agricultural village. Two women were married to men who cleaned a park in the capital of Nuku'alofa. One woman's husband was a carpenter.

The final woman, 'Alisi, was married to a man who worked for the government in the capital in what was viewed locally as an important job, and the only white-collar job among the spouses. Not coincidentally this man's wife was the leader of the group, elected year after year by the group, and the *koka'anga* was held on her property in a structure built for that purpose. It was 'Alisi, the leader, who with her relatives formed a core of the group. Two of the four unmarried women were related to and lived with 'Alisi. 'Alisi was also related to her partner in the group, Seini, the woman she sat across from and with whom she coordinated both their work and the work

of the group as a whole. Seini was married to 'Alisi's brother, the carpenter referred to above. Finally, 'Alisi also had a cousin in the group who lived in another household.

Note, then, that of the 14 women who were present on the day that I tape recorded their *koka'anga*, only six, which is less than half, were living with husbands. Both the number of unmarried women and the number of women with husbands overseas is indicative of the way in which Tongan overseas migration, especially the greater migration of men relative to women in earlier decades, had penetrated and shaped the composition of this *koka'anga* at the village level.

The general economic image of Lotulahi, then, and of the *koka'anga* women's place within it, is that while the village as a whole is closely tied to the political economic center of Tonga, Nuku'alofa, the women of the *koka'anga* and their husbands are relatively marginal to that economic involvement with Nuku'alofa compared to other women and men in the village. The women of the *koka'anga* in particular are without significant ability to produce cash income apart from their involvement in this *kautaha* or work group.

2.3. Church affiliation and political economic affiliation in Tonga

For the women of the *koka'anga*, their predominant membership in the Free Church of Tonga (nine out of 14 women) is also an important aspect of their political economic position in the village of Lotulahi. Their denominational affiliation contributes to their economic marginalization, with regard to both their prospects (and those of their spouses) for access to income producing jobs in the Tongan economy, and their opportunities to participate in the remittance-based transnational economy. For these reasons, participation in the *koka'anga* figures as a more important source of income for these women than is true of women in other religious denominations.

In the Tongan national context, the Free Church of Tonga is a minority Protestant denomination, both in its lack of close ties to the Tongan state and, relatedly, in its numerically small membership. By contrast, the Free Wesleyan Church is closely affiliated with the state and, relatedly, had a membership of over half of the population of Tonga at the time this research was carried out. This church is attended and sponsored by the king and his family. As the quasi-state church, the Free Wesleyan Church is the

one Methodist denomination of three that has ties with the international Methodist Church organizations. It was common to hear the idea that because this church is the state church, it was easier to get jobs in the government and other kinds of economic benefits if one was a member of this denomination. The members of other denominations, including the Free Church of Tonga to which the majority of *koka'anga* participants belonged, were correspondingly viewed by Tongans as at an economic disadvantage compared with members of the Free Wesleyan Church.

In the kind of hegemony between state and civil society envisioned by Gramsci (1971), Tongan state hegemony is sustained by a state-church collaboration between the monarchy and the Free Wesleyan Church, a collaboration that is the product of an ongoing historical process which goes back to an initial forging of state church relations in the mid eighteenth hundreds. The Tongan warrior Tāufa'āhau is known for having unified the country and for presiding over its transition from a traditional polity to a nation state.² An important part of his political strategy was his alignment with Wesleyan Mission missionaries, who in turn had the political and military support of their British government. In the late eighteenth hundreds, this leader, who by then had become the first king of Tonga, Tupou I, became impatient with the way in which the Wesleyan Mission was subject to its parent church in Australia. He wanted to establish an independent church with himself as its head, controlled by Tonga in Tonga. This is how the Free Church of Tonga came into being in 1885 (Campbell 1992: 85). This splitting of the church involved religious persecution, almost led to a reoccurrence of civil war, and did lead to the transfer of lands and economic resources to the Free Church of Tonga. It also led to the shift of the majority of Tongans to membership in the Free Church of Tonga. The Old Wesleyans, as those associated with the original Wesleyan Mission came to be called, retained the transnational affiliation with international Methodism, and the access to resources that came with that affiliation.

In the 1920s, when Queen Sālote had become ruler and was still a young woman in her twenties, she was not pleased with her relationship with the Free Church of Tonga. Rev. J. B. Watkin, who had been its expatriate leader since its founding, was now an old man. He refused to acknowledge the queen as the temporal head of the church in the way previous kings had been recognized. The church was also considered to be financially corrupt, and lacking in adequate training of ministers (Wood-Ellem 1999: 105). In 1923, the queen initiated a reunification of the two Wesleyan churches, which she saw as reunifying the people of the country. Although the leaders

of the Free Church of Tonga resisted this reunification, she proceeded with it, and the newly reunified church became the Free Wesleyan Church. Now the Free Wesleyan Church became the church with the overseas links to international Methodist organizations and resources. The majority of Tongans followed their queen and shifted their loyalties to the Free Wesleyan Church. Those who remained with the Free Church of Tonga lost their transnational ties to other churches, and the resources that came with that. They also ultimately lost lands and buildings in Tonga.

The village of Lotulahi is a stronghold of Free Wesleyan support for the king. There were three Free Wesleyan congregations in Lotulahi at the time this research was carried out, one large group with a church in the center of the village on a large piece of property at its crossroads, and the other two at each end of the village as it is strung out along the main government road. The larger, newer, and updated homes and larger home plots and homes in the center of the village were more likely to be owned by Free Wesleyans. The community members who are nationally prominent were also more likely to be Free Wesleyans, the *koka'anga* leader's husband being an exception to this pattern as a member of the Free Church of Tonga. The village officer and district officer, both paid governmental positions, were Free Wesleyans. And the noble for the village, as well as the chiefly family that used to hold the noble title, were also Free Wesleyans.

In contrast, there was one small Free Church of Tonga on a small plot of land, although still close to the village center. And among those attending this church were some of the poorest people living in the smallest, oldest houses in the village. The relative poverty of the Free Church members was due in part to their having fewer opportunities for jobs locally because of their weaker ties to the state. However, the position of their church also affected their transnational movement overseas and their capacity to generate remittances from overseas workers. Basically, when Free Wesleyans go overseas, they establish Free Wesleyan congregations, and as they bring over other members of their families, those members join the same congregations. Those congregations, and not just a person's family members, are important sources of mutual aid, jobs and information about jobs, and opportunities to participate in systems of distribution of goods and money in which the church is involved.

Today the formal Free Wesleyan Church organization itself also provides many opportunities for the generation of economic capital that are not available to Free Church members through movement back and forth between Tonga and overseas communities. The Tongan seminary for the

training of ministers is accredited by an international accreditation process of the Methodist Church. Some of its graduates will end up in overseas congregations. The numerous congregations overseas send representatives to annual church meetings in Tonga and make contributions to the Tongan national church organization. Tongan congregations send fund raising groups to overseas countries to raise money through dance performances, which are hosted by and perform for multiple overseas congregations on fund-raising trips. When overseas Tongans come home for visits, they participate in the activities of the church in their home villages – the men’s Sunday kava gatherings, and the congregation-based Sunday *faka’afe* or ‘feasts’, as well as regular church services. Through their families in Tonga, overseas Tongans participate in the annual *misinale*, or family donations to their local churches. By virtue of the much smaller membership of the Free Church of Tonga, due to its lack of state sponsorship in Tonga, and the lack of transnational ties with the international Methodist Church, the opportunities for the members of this church to participate in the transnational flow of people, information, and economic resources are much more limited than the opportunities for members of the Free Wesleyan Church.

To summarize, then, there are several aspects of the *koka’anga* women’s political economic position that contribute to their marginality in a global economy. First of all, in the transnational economy in which Tongans participate as overseas workers, the women in the *koka’anga* are the women who have stayed behind, and they are not as well-positioned to generate cash income as are their overseas female relatives, although they are able to do so by producing *ngatu* because of the continued demand for *ngatu* in Tongan ceremonial life both at home and abroad. Second, the village of Lotulahi is close to the economic center of Tonga, but while this allows many people in the village to commute to wage earning jobs, the women of the *koka’anga* do not have such jobs, nor do their husbands have such jobs on any scale, especially compared to the Free Wesleyan men. Finally, the women’s membership in the marginal Free Church of Tonga has been an important factor in their lesser access to cash earning jobs in Tonga and overseas. For all of these reasons the production of *ngatu* is one of the few means the *koka’anga* women have for creating wealth that can be converted into both other forms of wealth and into social capital. And these were the only women in Lotulahi engaged in such production, and thus in the production of the talk that accompanied *ngatu* production, to which our attention now turns.

3. Speech in the *Koka'anga*: An overview

Of the 14 women at the *koka'anga* on the day of the four-hour taping, 13 women were identified as members of the *koka'anga*, while the fourteenth was a visitor. Twelve is the more common number for such a group, because of the familiar schedule of making one *ngatu*, one 70 foot piece of decorated bark cloth, each month, with a different woman receiving the product as her own individual *ngatu* each month.

During the work activity of the group, ten of the women sat cross-legged facing one another in two rows, five on each side of a wooden form that looked like a long overturned canoe. 'Alisi, the leader, and her sister-in-law, Seini, sat across from each other at the head of the form. The additional women who were part of the group, but did not sit at the form, provided the women seated at the form with the supplies they needed to carry out their work – thin strips of pounded bark, *manioke*, or 'manioc', to paste the pieces together, and the *koka* or 'stain' for the decoration.

Before the *koka'anga* itself was held, the women had in previous days already cut, soaked and pounded small strips of bark (*hiapo*) that were now in a softened state, or had had it done for them. They also had already prepared a seventy-foot long bottom layer for this *ngatu*. All of the labor to be done on the day I taped focused on the production of a top layer, and its application of decoration and attachment to the bottom layer. The women first used sticky starchy pieces of *manioke* to attach the smaller pieces into larger pieces that would serve as panels in the larger *ngatu*. They then attached the panels for the top layer to the bottom layer, decorating each panel as it was attached. To decorate the panels, stencils had been taped to the wooden form over which the women worked, the bark cloth was laid over the stencils, and then stain was applied to the upper surface so that the design from the stencil underneath was highlighted. There was a regular, coordinated rolling, lifting, and throwing of the entire piece of *ngatu* from one side of the form to the other as it emerged. The women must pay attention to one another's work as they work, must work at roughly the same speed, and must produce the same effects of their work at approximately the same time. And this work is highly repetitive in a rhythm of paste, stencil, roll and toss, paste, stencil, roll and toss. In the final stage of the *koka'anga*, the women took the completed *ngatu* outside, unrolled it and spread it on the grass to dry, critically examining their work as they did so. As I left they were highlighting the stenciled brown-stained design with dark paint.

During the work over the form in which the panels were attached and stenciled, there were several kinds of talk. First, there was a basic layer of directives called out to the group as a whole and to individual women. This directing was clearly the job of the leader, 'Alisi. However, the older and more knowledgeable or effective women also called out directives to the younger less knowledgeable women. And the women who were less experienced in *ngatu* production also asked questions of the more experienced and typically older women. This framework of directives, then, involved a hierarchical structuring of relations among the women that was predominantly age-based. Second, there was a good deal of general though somewhat fragmented conversation through which the women told each other about recent past events in their lives and about upcoming events they expected to be involved in and/or events that were important to the village as a whole. Much of this involved women who were seated close to one another. Third there was the singing of love songs, accompanied by the singers' evaluations of their own performances and by sexual joking or teasing, my focus here.

4. Love songs in Tonga and in the *Koka'anga*

The term in Tongan for 'love songs' is *hiva kakala*, which literally means 'flower songs', suggesting the frequency with which flowers appear as images of loved ones in the songs. A quality that all Tongan song genres have in common, or an aesthetic principle they adhere to, is *heliaki*, which Kaeppler (1993a: 6) translates as 'not going straight' or 'to say one thing but mean another', accomplished through metaphor and allusion. In the Western literature (Collocott 1928; Kaeppler 1993a; Moyle 1987) Tongan love songs are associated with Tongan chiefly traditions. However, as we will see, love songs are pervasive throughout Tongan society, both in performance and composition.

According to Moyle (1987), Ve'ehala, a Tongan noble highly respected for his knowledge of Tongan traditions, envisioned *hiva kakala* as emerging early in the last century out of an earlier form of poetry called *sipi*, or 'serenade':

This activity was much practiced at the time of courtship. Young men would stroll to the house where young ladies were, and perform their serenade. A set of small melodies, Samoan and Tongan, were first sung, and

then the serenade would start. A man would first of all serenade in the form of a poem describing the nature of their love ... How clever were the Tongans at the repartee of their exchanges! They would continue with something like a poem, having outstanding words, gentlemanly and suitable for a circle of chiefs, and also having hidden meanings ... Very recently some composers have adapted the serenade, given it a melody, and called it the *hiva kakala* [fragrant song]. Composers recently have further developed the *hiva kakala*, but it originated with the Second King who spread it to composers of his generation (Moyle 1987: 179–180).

Today *hiva kakala* accompany the dance form known as the *tau'olunga*. Unlike the majority of Tongan dances, the *tau'olunga* is an individual rather than group dance. Kaeppler describes it as an informal dance type performed at almost any gathering the purpose of which is “to display the grace and beauty of high chiefly women” (1993a: 29). The music of the *hiva kakala* is characterized by both Moyle and Kaeppler as more acculturated than other Tongan song genres. Kaeppler calls it “the most Westernized of all Tongan music” (Kaeppler 1993a: 29), noting the structure of verse-chorus alternation in the love songs.

Neither *hiva kakala* nor the *tau'olunga* dance which they accompany have the nationalistic connotations associated with some group dance-song forms, particularly the *lakalaka*. For example, L. Shumway says of the *lakalaka* that it “is presented as a gift by a whole village on an important occasion to commemorate a national event or to honor the royalty or nobility” (L. Shumway 1981: 468). *Hiva kakala* nevertheless do partake of a general celebration of Tongan identity and values said to characterize Tongan musical forms (Kaeppler 1993a; E. Shumway 1977).

In my own experience, love songs (along with Western church hymns) have the widest range of usage of the Tongan genres, and not just because of the common occurrence of situations in which the *tau'olunga* is danced. Groups of singers perform such songs at evening church fund-raisers. They are sung in men's *kava* parties, where small groups of men gather to converse, sing, and drink the narcotic drink *kava* together. They are also sung in women's work groups. One hears them as open trucks full of workers being transported to work sites pass by on the road. Tapes by nationally known singing groups and individual composers and performers can be purchased in general and specialized stores in the economic center and capital of the country, Nuku'alofa. Most pervasively love songs are played all day long on the national radio stations.

In addition, more new love songs are composed by more people than any other genre. New songs are continually being composed, while favorites can stay in the national repertoire for decades, the oldest known that is still being sung dating back to 1852 (Kaeppler 1993b: 48; Moyle 1987: 198). This oldest song, “‘*Ana Lātū*”, began its life as a lament, or *tengi-hia/tangi*. It was transformed into a love song sung at *kava* parties sometime during the twentieth century, but is also still sung as a lament. Moyle and Kaeppler both include versions of the song in their publications, but the versions are different, demonstrating the existence of variants of love songs, even as some will insist that whatever version of a song they know is the correct one. There is a close conceptual relationship between love songs and laments. Laments concern the death of loved ones. Love songs are also overwhelmingly about loss and separation, and the longing for a loved one who is unattainable or unavailable.

Because of their *heliaki*, or their allusive metaphorical qualities, love songs can apply to a wide range of relationships, so even though this genre is represented by the Tongan and Western scholars cited above as created and produced primarily by men, there are also women composers and women sing the songs. Moreover, despite the vagueness of referents in most love songs, many are indexically connected to their composers and the circumstances of their composition through stories that go with the songs (see Collocott 1928). Thus, for example, Moyle tells us that the above mentioned song “‘*Ana Lātū*”, was composed

when, according to folklore, a boatload of men was about to depart from Nomuka island to participate in a civil war. Just before departure, word was brought from the shore that ‘*Ana Lātū*, the wife of one of the men named Uaiselē, was dying. Uaiselē immediately returned to shore to find ‘*Ana* dead, and he sat beside her body and sang a song ... (Moyle 1987: 198).

While listening to the radio, Tongans occasionally would direct my attention to a song playing and tell me the identity of the composer and the circumstances that led to the composition of the song. Stories connected to the widely celebrated songs composed by the late Queen Sālote (Sālote Tupou III 2004) were most often mentioned in this way, but people knew stories about popular commoner groups too. For example, one song about a lost love that was very popular during one period of my fieldwork was said to have been composed by a man whose wife had left him for his brother in

a situation where the brothers were both members of the popular singing group that recorded the song!

As we will see in the discussion to follow, songs can be re-indexicalized and connected to people in the context in which the singing is taking place, as well as connected to the context of the original composition of the song.

Table 1 displays one song as it was sung during the *koka'anga*, a song in which we can see many of these general features of love songs.³

I will refer to this song as “He Uisa”, following the Tongan practice of naming songs after their initial words. Here we see, for example, the key metaphor for lost love in this song in line 8, “the arrow that pierces my heart”. Note that the sweetheart, whose gender is not indicated through the content of the song, sings of suffering and pain from the betrayal and loss of the loved one, emphasizing, in lines 15–18, his or her unworthiness relative to the loved one. The emotional intensity of the suffering is conveyed by a range of aspects of language structure, including the use of *kuo*, the perfect tense/aspect marker (which here conveys emphatically that something which has gone on in the past is still ongoing), the use of emotional pronouns, such as *si'oku*, ‘my’ in lines 3 and 8, and lexical items such as the five syllable *oiaue*, a wail of dismay repeated in lines 5, 11, and 19. Rhyme, as in all Tongan song genres, is achieved through couplets, each line of which ends in the same vowel, as for example in lines 17 and 18 ending with the words *taau* and *nāunau*.

This particular song, as it was sung in this instance, has a structure of three verses, each followed by a chorus. Each verse and each chorus is theoretically four lines long, with each line made up of two phrases separated here by commas. This structure is characteristic of all of the 20 plus songs the women sang during my taping. However, whereas the love songs on the radio carefully reproduce this kind of ideal symmetry, as well as very precise articulation, this reproduction is variable in the *koka'anga*. “He Uisa” lacks this perfect sequence of four line verse-four line chorus units, and was selected for Table 1 in part to show the kind of thing that happens to such a structure when the women sing while they work. Note how in the first verse, the first two lines are repeated in lines 3 to 4 when they “should” be different, as they are in the third verse, lines 15–18. Note also that the second verse, lines 9–10 has only two lines instead of four. The women themselves comment on forgetting the lines of some of the songs, but then they are involved in vigorous physical labor as they are singing and it is their physical work that takes center stage in this activity.

Table 1. He Uisa – verse and chorus structure

First verse

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. He uisa 'e kuo kafo, si'oku loto | Oh, my wounded heart cries out |
| 2. He me'a vivili, ko e māvae | From this unending separation |
| 3. He 'uisa 'e kuo kafo, si'oku loto | Oh, my wounded heart cries out |
| 4. He me'a vivili, ko e māvae. | From this unending separation |

Chorus

- | | |
|---|---|
| 5. He 'oiauē, tangi 'oiauē | Oh! cry oh! |
| 6. Kuo 'ikai te u 'ilo, pe 'e anga-fēfē | I cannot understand a thing like this |
| 7. He ta'e'alo'aloa, si'i tokelau | How could it have come from the gentle
northern wind |
| 8. He ngahau kuo uhu, si'oku mafu. | The arrow that pierces my heart |

Second verse

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 9. Ka ne u 'ilo'i, te u kafo ai | If only I knew I would be wounded this
way |
| 10. Tā pē ko e fai, ko si'oto lavaki. | Then behold my love's betrayal. |

Chorus

- | | |
|--|--|
| 11. Toe 'oiauē, tangi 'oiauē | Again oh! cry oh! |
| 12. Kuo 'ikai te u 'ilo, pe 'e anga-fēfē | I cannot understand a thing like this |
| 13. He ta'e'alo'aloa, 'e tokelau | How could it have come from the gentle
northern winds |
| 14. He ngahau kuo hulu, si'oku mafu. | The arrow that pierces my heart. |

Third verse

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 15. Kumi ā 'e koe, si'ao tatau | Go look for the one you deserve |
| 16. Mo ha taha kuo, mo maheni fau | And for the one you love |
| 17. Ko kita ni ia, kuo ta'e taau | As for myself, I am unworthy |
| 18. Mo ta'e fe'unga, mo ho nāunau. | And cannot reach your heights |

Chorus

- | | |
|--|--|
| 19. Toe 'oiauē, toe 'oiauē | Again oh! again oh! |
| 20. Kuo 'ikai te u 'ilo, pe 'e anga-fēfē | I cannot understand a thing like this |
| 21. He ta'e'alo'aloa, he tokelau | How could it have come from the gentle
northern winds |
| 22. He ngahau kuo hulu, si'oku mafu. | The arrow that pierces my heart |

Just as the labor is vigorous and rhythmic, the women sing with heavy rhythmic emphasis and vigor, so their work in a sense permeates the song. Such singing stands in contrast to the love songs on the radio which mimic the feelings expressed in the words of such songs in their sweetness and slowness. The exuberance of the women's work and singing also spills over into lively sexual joking interspersed with the singing.

5. The sexual joking

Once the singing begins, the sexual teasing that accompanies it begins almost immediately, and it is initiated by 'Alisi, the group leader.'⁴

- (1) 'Alisi: *Ko e fefine ko eni ko e kumi hano mali.*
 'This woman is looking for a husband.'
 Song: *Tangi si'i pua ko Laukau*
 'Cry my dear pua tree, called Laukau'
 'Alisi: *Ko Lopeti.*
 'It's Lopeti.'
 Sela: *Ko si'i Lopeti kuo si'i 'alu.*
 'Lopeti is gone.'
 Song: *Mo e mohokoi*
 'And the flower [called Loving You].'
 'Alisi: *Ko e si'i tangi ki hono mali.*
 'She is longing for her husband.'

Here, just after the first verse and chorus of a song, 'Alisi suggests that, like the person in the song, whom she interprets as a woman, one of the women in the group is looking for a husband. In reality, this woman's husband, Lopeti, is overseas. 'Alisi then changes or modifies her relating of the song to the woman's situation by suggesting that she misses or cries for her husband, like the imagined woman in the song cries for her absent lover. Comments of this type that connect the words in a song to individual women in the group continue from here on throughout the work task. At first only 'Alisi is making comments, but eventually others begin to join in.'⁵

At the end of the fourth song, in a sequence that elicited the greatest amounts of laughter from the women at any time during the taping, 'Alisi initiates the joking again, but this time, her work partner and sister-in-law

Seini, opposite her, co-constructs the humor with her, and they repeat their co-construction for my edification:

- (2) Alisi: *‘Alu ‘e mali ‘o e finemotu’a ko e fehi’a ia ai.*
 ‘This woman’s husband has gone because he doesn’t like her.’
 Manu: *Tuku ho’o loi.*
 ‘Stop your lying.’
 Susan: What did she say?
 Seini: *Fehi’a ia ai ko e ta’e kaukau.*
 ‘He doesn’t like her because she doesn’t bathe.’
 Tupou: *‘Ai ‘etau kau.*
 ‘We are all on the same side’ [i.e. in the same boat with her].
 Alisi: *Fehi’a e motu’a, talaange ki he finemotu’a.*
 ‘The husband doesn’t like her, tell it to the lady.’
 Seini: *Talaange ki ai fehi’a e motu’a he finemotu’a ko e ta’e kaukau.*
 ‘Tell the lady that her husband doesn’t like her for not bathing.’
 Liliani: She said her husband doesn’t like her for not bathing.

While this joking has from the beginning been partly for me and the tape recorder, as it is most specifically here, it gradually shifts to a situation where the women are focused more on each other, more women are involved, and there is less focus specifically on women whose husbands are overseas. This third excerpt follows the second singing of “He Uisa”, the version that appears in Table 1. Here the excerpt begins just at the end of the song.

- (3) Lose: *Mālō e hiva.*
 ‘Thanks for singing.’
 Seini: *Mālō manatu ai pē fa’ahinga ki he hiva.*
 ‘Thanks for the memories from the song for some of us.’
 Alisi: *‘Io.*
 ‘Yes.’
 Seini: *Nau hangē ko ē ‘oku nau faka’amu.*
 ‘They look wistful.’
 Sa’ane: *Pehē pē.*
 ‘[They look] just like that.’
 Seini: *Ngaahi ‘aho ‘uho’uha.*
 ‘These days are rainy’ [a time to stay inside and make love].

- Sela: *Tuku ai pē ke nau faka'amu.*
 'Just leave them to their wishful thinking.'
- Mele: *Fo'i faka'amu hela'ia.*
 'This wishing to be tired [from making love].'
- Sela: *Fo'i "e he" 'a Tupou.*
 'You're going "ha ha" [i.e. laughing], Tupou.'
- Seine: *Ko ia 'e Tupou.*
 'That's right, eh Tupou?'
- Manu: *Fo'i faka'amu ke tau ofi ki hotau 'ofa'anga.*
 'We hope to get close to our lovers.'
- Sela: *Ko ia Tupou.*
 'Isn't that right, Tupou.'
- Tupou: *'Io.*
 'Yes.'
- Manu: *Ka tau fiemālie.*
 'We'll be satisfied.'
- Seine: *Faka'amu ai pē.*
 'Just wishful thinking.'
- Tupou: *Faka'amu ai pē.*
 'Just wishful thinking.'

The women's very mildly risqué sexual teasing of one another creates a vivid counterpoint to the serious, tender, demure and totally socially appropriate and dignified words of the love song. The joking also creates a new kind of indexical relationship between the songs and the social context. Whereas in the literature on love songs and love poetry, the emphasis is on stories that link the songs to their composers and the circumstances of composition, here the links are to the women singing the songs, and to behavior that is in violation of, rather than in keeping with, the propriety of the songs.

The joking references to the predominantly married women's imagined sexual romantic relationships outside of marriage represent a common way of envisioning sexual romantic relationships in Tonga. Sexual joking is very widespread, and while my knowledge of it is limited, I can say that one of its most pervasive themes is the suggestion or imagining of a romantic relationship between two people for whom such a relationship would be inappropriate or illicit, and highly unlikely, yet possible. For example, on the rare occasions when I walked to church on Sunday with the unmarried adult son in the household where I was living rather than with the daughters, men we walked by would occasionally call out remarks suggesting we

were romantically involved or planning to marry. Such joking is highly contextualized. There must be something in the actual situation the stuff of which can be used to imply such a relationship. The mere physical co-presence of a man and a woman not married to each other and not related by consanguineal kinship seems to be enough to make such an inference, though there are clearly situational constraints on the joking itself, not all of which I can account for. Such joking would not, for example, occur between people who did not know one another, or would not occur in the presence of a visiting preacher in front of a church before a church service.

In the case of the *koka'anga*, the content of the love songs provides part of the context for linking the longing and suffering of the sweethearts in the songs to the imagined longing of the women in the *koka'anga* who are said to be looking for husbands, rejected by the husband, hoping to get close to their lovers, and wishfully longing for or dreaming about sexual encounters now in the past. But the other aspect of the situation that provides this contextual opportunity is the women of the *koka'anga* themselves. Most are older married women with grown children, over half of these women have husbands who are working overseas or are women who have never been married and are living with relatives. Thus while none of the women in the *koka'anga* are likely to be looking for lovers, it could happen, and the women who do not have husbands in their homes are the particular targets of the sexual teasing.

The teasing, then, links the sweetheart dyad of the love songs to the marital dyad in the lives of the *koka'anga* women. It makes what is appropriate for sweethearts inappropriate for wives and old maids, and humorous by virtue of its incongruity.

The teasing also has a scatological side to it – the awareness of actual bodies that come in contact, hence the imagined revulsion of the husband whose wife does not bathe – and this too is lacking in the love songs. The juxtaposition, yet linking, of the sentimental sweetness of the love songs and the slightly bawdy hilarity of the joking makes salient the point that neither way of representing the sexual romantic relationship is the whole story, a point that is not gained when either kind of representation of this relationship occurs alone. The image of love in the *koka'anga* particularly contrasts with the publicly pervasive love songs one hears on the radio all day long. The unsentimental, mischievous play with the ideas in the love songs projects a vision of strength and practicality about the realities of life that cannot be gleaned from the love songs. Marriages in which one partner is overseas for years, for example, really are threatened by such separations.

However, the flip side of this entertaining play is a constant policing of sexuality in Tongan society. Women whose husbands are overseas, and women who may some day have husbands overseas, are reminded that those around them do and will consider them to be prime candidates for adultery. This will not be funny at all if it happens and is found out. It can lead to ostracism from economic and social activities such as the *koka'anga* itself, not to mention the kinds of beatings to which unmarried female lovers can be subjected (Philips 2000, 2003).

Ultimately, then, the gender ideology in the singing and teasing about sweethearts is linked to the political economic position of the women in the group by reminding them that their participation in the group is contingent upon their adherence to a particular sexual morality. The coerciveness of this message is greater for women who have the fewest strategic alternatives for economic survival, like many of the women in the *koka'anga*.

6. A broader dualism in the counterpoint between love songs and sexual joking

The counterpoint between the images of sweethearts in the song and teasing surrounding it can be seen as part of a broader legitimated dualism in Tongan society between an emotionally restrained, controlled, and serious yet positive demeanor, and a more emotionally unrestrained demeanor that is more energetically joyful and/or hilarious, albeit still stylized. Sorrow and anger can also be expressed in both ways, but these emotions are less salient for this dualism.

Both the restrained and unrestrained demeanors are evident and intertwined in many large-scale public, official, celebratory, highly organized ritual events such as weddings, the openings of new buildings, the investitures of new nobles, college graduations, and some charity fundraising. On such occasions, the central activities have the solemn restrained quality, while peripheral activities have the unrestrained and often celebratory quality. A classic example would be when a young woman dances the *tau'olunga* in a highly stylized restrained way, smiling demurely, while behind her and to her sides are her relatives dancing in the more spontaneous manner with broad movements and big smiles on their faces. However, such dual expressions may also be alternated. For example at an 'Atenisi University graduation, the central procession of graduates, their reception of diplomas, and the speeches honoring the occasion were basically re-

strained, but this was all followed by a procession of groups of female family members of individual graduates literally whooping, grinning, and dancing as they displayed the huge Tongan *ngatu* and mats they were donating to 'Atenisi University in honor of the occasion.

This dualism has been documented for other Polynesian societies by anthropologists working from within a cultural symbolic paradigm. In the most detailed and enlightening discussion of it, Bradd Shore has described a range of symbolic associations between these two ways of being for Samoa (Shore 1982), not all of which are internally consistent. Among the associations he notes for what he refers to as the formal and intimate styles is that of the restrained style with titled people or chiefs, and the relatively unrestrained style with untitled people or commoners. Vilsoni Hereniko's (1995) study of clowning on Rotuma makes similar associations.

The symbolic association of chiefs with restrained behavior and commoners with unrestrained behavior is also relevant for Tonga, but not without careful qualification. Here Judith Irvine's (1990) discussion of speech registers among the Wolof can be drawn upon to help clarify the Tongan situation. Irvine describes a register associated with the griot praise-singer caste, who produce emotionally labile praise songs to honor nobles of the noble caste on public occasions. Griot behavior, both in and out of such performances, is contrasted by Wolof with that of nobles, who are seen as relatively lacking in verbal gymnastics or even verbal fluency. However, Irvine is careful to point out that the two registers are not bound to the social identities with which they are associated because nobles can and do produce griot-like speech to elevate others, and correspondingly griots can display noble-like inarticulateness. This, she argues, is what makes these ways of speaking registers, rather than speech roles. Similarly, in Tonga, both chiefs and commoners display both restrained and unrestrained behavior.

Applying this discussion to the *koka'anga* data at hand, we can view the love songs as representing restrained demeanor and the teasing commentary interwoven with them as the unrestrained demeanor, with the love songs as the chiefly central activity and the teasing commentary as the commoner periphery dependent on that center. However, here it is commoner women who are producing both kinds of behavior, but with an overall tone of unrestrainedness. Thus while love songs and sexual joking are separate highly valued forms of talk, and valued for both their content and form, the creation of a counterpoint between the two forms of talk is also highly valued, and participates in a broad tradition of public performances where one sees

a similar counterpoint between the composed, rehearsed and restrained and the spontaneous, new, and unrestrained.

7. The gendered forms of talk and the material product go their separate ways

When the physical labor of the women, the product of the *ngatu*, the love songs, and the sexual joking all come together as they do here, the *koka'anga* is a semiotically rich representation of diverse aspects of Tongan gender ideology as enacted by women of a particular global economic position. From a traditional Tongan perspective *ngatu* production is a quintessentially female work activity, and the *ngatu* itself is considered a key form of women's wealth. All three of the major cross-gender dyads that figure so centrally in Tongan gender ideology are intertwined here as well. In contemporary representations of traditional Tongan culture, sisters are conceptualized as producing *ngatu* for their brothers, so the brother-sister relationship is indexed through the women's work activities. And the husband-wife relationship is made relevant through the sexual joking that imagines women in the group explicitly labeled as married as longing for illicit sweethearts. The sweetheart relationship of course is the dyad that takes center stage in both the love songs and the sexual joking.

These different ways of enacting Tongan gender ideology take separate paths outside of or subsequent to the *koka'anga*. The *ngatu* enters the public sphere of ceremonial exchange, and it is this material product that takes with it most of the cultural and economic value given to it by the *koka'anga*. Nor will the forms of talk intertwined here necessarily stay together. Most performances of love songs will not be accompanied by sexual joking. If they are, this will detract from the cultural and economic value that love songs have in the public sphere. Much sexual joking will be confined to the private sphere, or at least be outside of public performances with audiences, although bawdy physical clowning around the edges of some relatively restrained public dance performances and speeches does occur. And while the sexual joking may have cultural value, it has no potential for direct conversion into economic capital in the way that the *ngatu* and the love songs separately have.

Thus what distinguishes the gender ideology in the *koka'anga* is the coming together of different ways of representing Tongan women's understanding of Tongan gender, and the consequent simultaneous display of

some of its many facets. Because most of the actual economic value of the women's work resides in the *ngatu*, and not in the talk, it is appropriate to understand the talk as sustained by the *ngatu* production and the continued high demand for *ngatu* in the Tongan ceremonial systems. In this sense then, the contrapuntal form of talk described here itself has a position within a political economy of gender ideology sustained by and contained in specific forms of talk.

8. Discussion and conclusion

Early in this paper I described how multiple gender ideologies in Tonga are organized in part through the social organization of the forms of discourse that carry the gender ideology. Here I have explored the global political economic organization of gendered labor as a possible source for the social organization of such talk. Drawing on others' analyses of the commodification of Tongan *ngatu* in a global economy, and my own evidence of the *koka'anga* women's political economic position, I have argued that it is primarily quite economically marginal women who produce the *ngatu* in this *koka'anga*, and thus who also produce the distinctive semiotically dense and multifaceted gender ideology I have described.

The global political economy also shapes the verbal dynamic within the *koka'anga*. This is most evident in the role that 'Alisi plays in the group. She is the person with the greatest material capital in the group by virtue of her husband's government job in the economic and political center of the country, Nuku'alofa. She is the highest status woman in this group because of her economic position and she is its leader. She organizes the work through her verbal directives, and she initiates the sexual joking into which the other women are gradually drawn, as we saw in the sequence of sexual joking transcript excerpts. The political economic positions of the women in the group also affect who is teased, as well as who does the teasing. In the earlier two transcript excerpts, before the sexual joking becomes more general, it is married women whose husbands are working overseas and sending remittances home that are the particular targets of the joking. While almost everything the women do in this *koka'anga* projects a very traditional image of Tongan women, this does not then mean that they are hermetically sealed off from the global economic processes that their overseas sisters are engaged in. On the contrary, their lives are deeply penetrated by such processes.

Both the traditional activity the women engage in, and their traditional talk, are culturally very highly valued by Tongans. This stands in contrast to situations documented by other anthropologists where women and their talk are explicitly poorly evaluated in gender ideologies. And the work and the talk are not just valued by these women, but by all Tongans. The product they produce is also still central to the ritual systems of redistribution of goods that hold the Tongan social system together.

But the women of the *koka'anga* are not the women being most rewarded financially for their labors, in spite of the cultural value of their activity. The relatively highly rewarded women in the village of Lotulahi are the teachers, the nurses, and so on, who “don't have time” to make their own *ngatu*. The women of the *koka'anga* are also not the women who are members of the numerically more dominant religious denomination, the Free Wesleyan Church, that literally has a much richer transnational network returning greater remittance incomes than those going to members of the Free Church of Tonga. Instead, the women of this *koka'anga* are on the economic margins of the transnational economic system, the Tonga-internal economic system, and the local economic system of the village of Lotulahi. It is the women who do *not* adhere to the traditional Tongan ideas about gendered work, the women who participate more centrally in the transnational economy and modern ways of doing things who are receiving the greater financial rewards. Thus while on one level there is a coherent relationship between the work the women are doing and the gender ideologies they elaborate, there is a significant disjuncture between the work and the gender ideologies on the one hand, and their political economic position on the other. These women are symbolically central, but materially marginal.

The gender ideologies that value both the work the women are doing and their gendered roles as sisters, wives, and sweethearts are pervasive in Tonga. These ideologies obscure the political economic position of the women doing the work. There is a tendency on the part of anthropologists, and Tongans themselves, to convey the impression that because there is such a valuing of the work of producing wealth and the elaboration of a distinctly Tongan gender ideology of kinship dyads, that all women are participating in such work. But they are not. The Tongan gender ideology I have documented is pervasive, but the political economic position of the women in the *koka'anga* is very specific and not shared by all, and it is not typical for or generalizable to the women of Lotulahi.

The kinship-focused rhetoric of the gender ideology also obscures the extent to which women's political economic relationships are shaped not

just by Tongan kinship relationships, but by organizational structures of Western origin – education, law, and most prominently here, Christian religious denomination – and ultimately by the functioning of these organizational and ideologized structures in transnational economic processes.

Ultimately, what is obscured is the economic disadvantage of leading the life of the traditional Tongan woman. In this context, the dominant gender ideology that has cultural value in Tonga serves to sustain women in subordinated marginal economic positions. It is the alternative ideologies of capitalism and modernism that in practice lead to greater economic prosperity, as shocking as these alternatives may be to traditional Tongan values, and as difficult as it can sometimes be for Tongans to accept the economic success of those who lack virtue within a traditional Tongan ideological framework.

Clearly speech that is pervasively highly valued ideologically and aesthetically does not necessarily have great economic value. The relationship between the cultural value and economic value of speech in a global economy is fluid, subtle, and complex, and there is a need for conceptualization of this relationship that can encompass the many women on the extreme periphery of that economy whose speech is symbolically central to the maintenance of ethnic and national identities.

Notes

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1. The other such material sign is weaving. Woven mats and baskets, as well as waist mats worn on the body for public occasions calling for respect and politeness, are as semiotically dense as *ngatu* is.
2. The orthography, capitalization and word boundary conventions used in this paper follow conventions used in Tongan publications in Tonga. The macron over the vowel indicates it is a long vowel phonemically. The apostrophe indicates a phonemic glottal stop.
3. After an initial transcription and translation of this love song by my Tongan research assistants in the field, I transcribed and translated the song in several transcription formats: 1) As such songs appear in written collections of Tongan songs in a format familiar to those literate in English, to display the verse and chorus structure and with each rhyming line occupying a separate line of transcript, accompanied by “free” translation. This is the format used in this paper; 2) In a format that displayed for the Tongan language version how the lead singer starts each line, echoed by the other singers, involving song and singer-specific vowel changes, vowel lengthening and stress patterns, and the dropping or elision of whole syllables at the ends of some lines; 3) In a format with word-for-word translation. Before the song attained the form in which it is presented here, the “free” translation was evaluated, critiqued, and re-translated by various Tongans and linguists who study Tongan, and they differed considerably in their ideas of how parts of the song should be translated. One collaborating pair of consultants offered a translation that was very explicit about the emotions being felt from the point of view of the hypothetical singer, and this translation elucidated shifts in the emotional positions being voiced over the course of the song. I ultimately chose an allusive and indirect translation that is more characteristic of how Tongans translate such songs (e.g. Sālote Tupou III 1994) for presentation here. I cannot claim to have done justice to the song in the translation from a Tongan point of view, given the range of possibilities just described.
4. The speaker identities in the transcript excerpts to follow are pseudonyms. The sequence of turns corresponds to their sequencing in the speech heard on the taperecording, but throughout this material there were other voices, usually in other conversations co-occurring with those represented in the excerpts, as well as the sounds of the work the women were doing. Due to the number and variety of overlaps within this material, representation of overlaps and pauses between speakers is not offered here. The material was originally translated by Tongan research assistants in the field who were either present at the event at the time of taping or knew the people involved well. I edited the translations, and then re-edited them with the assistance of Tongan consultants in the United States. Material in square brackets in the translations [] is not literally or explicitly present, but is understood.

5. In this excerpt, the comments of the women overlay the second verse of the song, which is why the humorous comments appear here as interspersed with the singing. (It is difficult to show even this pattern of overlap because the singers themselves are not singing completely together).

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Chapter 2

“Re-employment stars”: Language, gender and neoliberal restructuring in China*

Jie Yang

1. Introduction

China’s neoliberal restructuring has produced massive unemployment among women since the mid-1990s. Women have more difficulty in seeking re-employment due to gender discrimination in the labor market. In the community where I conducted my fieldwork in Beijing between 2002 and 2003, a laid-off woman worker told me about her sad job search experiences and her criticism of the current society after she had been cheated out of money by an illegal center set up to help workers find new jobs:

... This society’s just too chaotic.¹ Everything bullies our laid-off workers. Sometimes, it’s like, you awake from a nightmare, you find things changed so much. You see, on streets, full of pedicabs. The rich are so rich; the poor are so poor. You say, this differs from *jiefang qian* ‘before Liberation’? ...²

This woman’s invocation of the keyword *jiefang qian* ‘before Liberation’ (that is, before the advent of communism) in the current reform era is echoed in others’ invocation of *jiu shehui* ‘the old society.’ The two equivalent keywords are reminiscent of the communist construction of the year 1949 as a temporal watershed between the bad old society that existed before 1949 and the good new society that came into being after this date. However, this boundary has been blurred since the late 1970s, partly because a whole range of older beliefs and practices (e.g., private ownership, widening inequality, mass unemployment, etc.) that an earlier generation of Communists had attempted to stamp out have dramatically resurged, and partly because the open criticism of major phases of the Maoist era became possible in the late 1970s (Cohen 2003). Moreover, since the late 1990s, with a steady decline of social status and living conditions as the crippling

effect of the neoliberal restructuring, workers have frequently compared the reform era with *jiu shehui* ‘the old society,’ which existed *jiefang qian* ‘before Liberation.’ Such a comparison is highlighted by China’s recent heightened propaganda on building an overall *xiaokang* society (an overall well-off society).³ This new modernity program aims to promote social progress not only in material comfort, but harmonious development in all aspects. Many social indices such as employment, education and the environment are taken into account as new norms of this *xiaokang* society. As one of the aspects of this new modernity program, the current discourse on “re-employment stars” intends to re-orient laid-off women from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into the expanding service industries and private sector. “Re-employment stars” are predominantly women workers laid off from state-owned enterprises, who, after being re-employed in service industries, are officially selected and designated as *zaijiuye mingxing* ‘re-employment stars’. They are “invited” to write and narrate, in the media, their re-employment experiences.⁴ But this woman’s job search experiences dramatically belie the discourse of “re-employment stars” articulated in state-funded media outlets.

Since the mid-1990s, mass media, public forums, TV series, films and advertisements have circulated the neologism *zai jiuye* ‘re-employment’ and numerous re-employment stories.⁵ The over-representation of the nationwide Re-employment Project (REP) and the high visibility of miraculous “re-employment stars” seems to downplay and even cover up the gendered “unemployment shock waves”. Meanwhile, another discourse on “full-time mothers” and “professional wives” has emerged in the media and seems to propose a solution to the problem of gendered layoffs (Dai 2004). The two complementary discourses have reinvigorated feminist concerns about the progress of “women’s liberation” which has been part of the communist gender program since the early 1920s. As an imposed program by the party authorities rather than an autonomous women’s movement, “women’s liberation” collapsed its specifically gendered references into the hegemonic meanings of class and nation in general. Thus, the discourse of “women’s liberation”, though formulated to signal the party’s commitment to gender equality, was strategically mobilized to serve the goals and collective processes of socialist transformation (Evans 2003).

Similar to this communist discourse on “women’s liberation” as a rhetoric to legitimate socialist transformation, the discourse of women’s re-employment is a new transitional narrative to facilitate China’s current post-socialist transformation. In the context of China’s neoliberal restructuring,

an over-emphasis on gender serves to obscure and even conceal intensified social polarization. The consistent use of women as subaltern subjects to remake Chinese society should provoke us to ponder why and how women as “a category” have had a continuous existence in China’s political and economic transformations. Although the form of mobilizing gender may vary from time to time, there has been an unchanging theme of gender inequality (McElhinny, this volume; Scott 1986). Thus, instead of assuming the significance of gender, we need to ask when and why gender and other aspects of identity become compelling idioms of identification and categorization, mobilizing people for and against reigning hegemonies (McElhinny, this volume). By examining the discourse of “re-employment stars” and its relations to the communist discourse of “women’s liberation”, this chapter explores how language and gender are used in the discourse of “re-employment stars” to construct both a continuity with and departure from the communist discourse. Built on the communist tradition of text-centeredness (Apter and Saich 1994; van de Ven 1995; also discussed further below), the discourse of “re-employment stars” uses classic communist ideological discourse, but these are invested with neoliberal ideologies and new strategies in rhetoric and representation in order to sell a new market economy.

This chapter first analyzes China’s shift in “discursive regime” (Foucault 1977) and the consequent transformation in discursive production. It then explores the shift in gender ideology marking China’s transition from Mao’s planned economy to the current market economy, and its impact on women’s employment. After briefly describing the nationwide re-employment project since the mid-1990s and its gender dimensions, the analysis focuses on the discourse of “re-employment stars,” which contrasts with, as it draws on, the communist discourse tradition. In particular, through analyses of two genres of *sixiang douzheng* ‘thought struggle’ and *tanxin* ‘heart-to-heart talk’, the chapter explores how both an ideal subject position and a utopia of neoliberal order entirely identified with the state’s interests are constructed in this re-employment discourse.

2. China’s shifts in language ideologies and discursive regimes

In the field of Chinese studies, there has been a discursive turn in recent years (Wasserstrom 2003). Topics addressed in this discursive turn include text-centeredness in the early formation of the Chinese Communist Party (Apter and Saich 1994; van de Ven 1995), linguistic engineering and lan-

guage use during the Cultural Revolution (Perry and Li 2003; Ji 2004), theatrical and imaginary dimensions of political discourse (Wagner 1991), discourses of race (Dikotter 1992), the gendered processes of China's revolution and transformation (Evans 2003; Honig and Hershatter 1988; Rofel 1999), and the shift to the current "discursive regime" centered on the market (Schoenhals 1992).

This discursive turn in the field of Chinese studies parallels the broader linguistic/discourse turn in the social sciences and humanities since the 1970s (Fairclough 2000). Moreover, since China's reform and opening at the end of the 1970s, foreign researchers have had direct access to data within China rather than relying on secondary sources, e.g., through interviews of mainland émigrés in Hong Kong. Given text-centeredness as a basic feature of Chinese political culture (to which I will return), this may inspire foreign scholars to pay particular attention to the significance of language in Chinese social and political life. In addition, the shift in China's dominant discursive regime which began in 1978 with the revision of truth criteria may render language a revealing site to pursue research questions on the nature of China's transformation. The truth criteria in Mao's era were invariably represented by the pledge of "two whatevers": to "resolutely defend whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made", and "steadfastly abide by whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave" (Schoenhals 1991). However, in 1978, an article entitled "Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth" by Hu Yaobang and his cohorts initiated the shift in truth criteria away from "two whatevers" to the post-Mao "practice", which refers to facts, deeds and realities as in "seeking truth from facts" and "proceeding from realities". As economic modernization was the biggest politics of all in the late 1970s, the party then conflated this "practice criterion" with a so-called "criterion of the productive forces", and granted an unprecedented degree of "truth" to rationalizations based on economic productivity (Schoenhals 1991, 1992).

Post-Mao discursive production has thus been mediated through and even centered on the marketplace. This also marks the end of Mao's centralizing and purifying pattern of discursive production: Mao as a master narrator of the revolution and socialist construction eliminated contending discourses and alternative interpretations, and successfully transformed his own voice into collective narrations in order to form a single discourse community and achieve political conformity (Apter and Saich 1994; Ji 2004; Schoenhals 1992). This centralizing process was realized substantially through the production, interpretation, discussion and dissemination

of texts, particularly Marxist-Leninist texts. This text-centeredness formed the basis of the Chinese Communist Party’s political culture, and became an instrument in struggles for power within the party, welding together organization, leadership, and the production of texts (van de Ven 1995).⁶ Also, this text-centeredness was akin to the role of a “unitary language” (Bakhtin 1986) – “a single, holistic language [which] makes the actuality of its presence felt as a force resisting an absolute heteroglot state; it posits definite boundaries for limiting the potential chaos of variety, thus guaranteeing a more or less maximal mutual understanding” (270). The discourse of “women’s liberation” was part of this tradition: it foreclosed the possibility and experiences of gendered differences, and constructed women as the same kind of subjects as men. It encased the party’s interpretation and prescription of the issues of women’s liberation into a discourse of self-sacrifice and self-negation.

With the shift in truth criteria, many of Mao’s notions and ideologies associated with the Cultural Revolution were either abandoned or revised. So were his language and gender ideologies. Marxist-Leninist texts may not be not essential for developing a market economy in the reform era, but the tradition of text-centeredness is still an important feature of the ideological and political life in China. Assuming a partial, incremental and experimental manner, China’s transformation, unlike the Soviet transformation that made the socialist regime collapse suddenly (Yurchak 2003),⁷ continues to claim “socialism” as its self-image. However, given its neoliberal commitments (Hoffman 2003; Wang 2004; Zhang 2001), China’s continued “socialist” claims for justice and welfare are largely a political rhetoric. The way this rhetoric works is not through semantic change, but rather through recontextualizing certain pragmatic forms of communist ideological discourse into reform-era practices in order to extend the life of “socialism.” This pragmatic recontextualization of discursive forms is similar to the “pragmatic model” of reading legal texts in American law schools, where students are trained to learn the skills of identifying certain technical terms as pragmatic markers and recontextualizing them in interpreting legal cases (Mertz 1996: 246). Indeed, according to a historical survey, Chinese political discourse is restricted not so much in content as in form (Schoenhals 1991). Take the discursive genre of “criticism and self-criticism” for example. The targets of critique may vary from Mao’s era to the reform era, but the form has continued to be a useful ideological and political strategy in China as the regulation of the form rather than the content of discourse is arguably a far more powerful means of control (Schoenhals 1991: 20–21).

But the post-Mao continuity with certain communist discourse forms is not so explicit as Mao's discourse production in which specific utterances were fixed within certain patterns of formulations – political “formalization” (Schoenhals 1992).⁸ The current discourse production is refracted by new ways of representation, e.g., mass media or new genres, and the heterogeneous modes of representation shape the ways in which the state forms the language of neoliberalism. For example, in the discourse of “re-employment stars”, the voluntary, heteroglossic media discourse of “thought struggle” embedded in accounts of women's re-employment experiences barely associates this genre with any of Mao's mandatory practices such as “thought struggle” or “confession”, through which individuals were forced to do soul-searching and confess to the authorities any “selfish ideas” that were not in the category of politics.

3. Gender ideological transformations in China

With China's social and economic transformation since the late 1970s, the official gender ideology has shifted from the Maoist position that erased gender differences so as to enhance women's labor participation to the post-Maoist position that essentializes gender differences in order to meet the demands of labor reduction for a market economy (Honig and Hershatter 1988; Jacka 1997; Rofel 1999; Young 1989). For example, the post-Mao “exceeding theory” claims that women's liberation exceeded their low level of productivity, and that women's physical characteristics made them less adaptable to various job requirements and excessive employment of women thus reduced enterprise efficiency (Wang 2003). This gender-essentializing theory has served to legitimize gendered layoffs. Both gender ideologies were and are used to legitimate the prevalent mode of production and the ruling party's political imperatives, rather than to address women's concerns and raise their statuses as nominally claimed. As Mani (1998: 2) argues, in colonial discourse on *sati* (widow-burning), “women who burned were neither subjects nor even the primary objects of concern in the debate on its prohibition. They were, rather, the ground for a complex and competing set of struggles over Indian society and definitions of Hindu tradition.” Likewise, although women's labor force participation was claimed as a key marker of women's liberation in Mao's regime,⁹ the top-down discourse of “women's liberation” had little to do with women's identifications of their own needs and their own development. Their subaltern agency was just

used as an important governing device for ideological and political legitimacy in China.

A new ideology requires “a cultural tradition from which to deviate, and from which to draw the elements which it intensifies and raises to centrality” (Shils 1972: 30). The Maoist gender ideology is now construed as “unnatural” gender erasure, and the re-inscription of gender differences serves to facilitate post-Mao economic reform. Since the mid-1980s, the issue of women’s employment has been a central site for the ruling party to negate Maoism and legitimate reform. For instance, women’s tiredness and anxiety from the double bind of both work and housework were interpreted as a result of overuse of women’s bodies under the planned economy. This is claimed not only to be responsible for women’s poor health but also for the low efficiency in the public sector. Thus, there emerged a debate on “women’s return home” in the 1980s. Shanghai-based writer Wang Anyi proposed that women be given the choice to return home, as society did not provide primary material conditions for women to work outside of the household. At that time, few people echoed this proposal. However, with China’s further restructuring, “women’s return home” has become a mainstream ideology. In an influential book *Shui Wei Zhongguoren Zao Fanwan?* ‘Who Builds Rice Bowls for Chinese People?’, the famous economist and scholar, Zhong Penglong (1997) explicitly argues for “Men stay at work; women go home” as an important labor division in a new market economy. The post-Mao era thus celebrates gender polarity. “Biological” differences between the sexes have been given primacy in discussions of women’s work and their position in society, in a way that affirms the inevitability and desirability of particular gender divisions of labour, as well as women’s roles as mothers and domestic workers (Jacka 1997: 12).

The two gender ideologies and their relationships can be traced in discourse and speech genres. As Philips (2003) suggests, speech genres can be thought of as containers of gender ideology (260). The role of language in expressing gender ideologies and in maintaining ideological domination over women at the two historical moments was embodied in the two discourses of “women’s liberation” and women’s re-employment respectively. While the communist program of “women’s liberation” “liberated” women from a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society and put them in a socialist system of domination, the re-employment discourse instead serves to re-orient women from the Maoist command economy into a market economy. By reifying traditional gender roles and a binary gendered division of labor, new ideological and structural constraints on women’s employment are

regarded as the reversal of years of efforts for women's liberation, now construed as women's exploitation. Rather than repudiating Mao's gender ideology as a whole, however, the post-Mao state still uses certain Maoist gender formulae to maintain its coherent image, e.g., by using gendered subaltern agency for political legitimacy. As illustrated in the discourse of "re-employment stars," unemployed women are mobilized to speak for the state and defend neoliberalism. The power of gender ideology not only impacts discourse genres but also institutional practices from which the discourse derives (Philips 2003). The following sections will examine China's monumental Re-employment Project instituted in the mid-1990s and the discourse of "re-employment stars."

4. Gendered re-employment in post-Mao China

Since the mid-1990s, one of the important features of China's neoliberal restructuring is mass unemployment in the state sector. The gravity of this problem can be demonstrated in the following figures. The 2003 urban registered unemployment rate in the state sector was 4.2 per cent (7.95 million persons), an increase of 1.1 per cent in comparison with the rate in 1998 (5.71 million). It is estimated that such an increase will continue further to some 5 per cent within the next five years. At the same time, however, the re-employment rate has declined from 50 per cent in 1998 to 30 per cent in 2001. In addition to the urban working class, unemployment also impacts the rural population and university students. Since 2000, 8 million underemployed rural workers have become "floating" migrant workers seeking employment in cities. Moreover, the unemployment rate among university graduates was 33 per cent in 2003, with an upward tendency (China Employment Forum 2003). More importantly, this wave of unemployment and re-employment is highly gendered. A survey by the State Statistical Bureau of 15,600 households in 71 cities across the country in 1997 reveals that women constitute 62.8 percent of the laid-off workers, while they account for less than 39 per cent of the total urban workforce. It seems that women were targeted for the massive layoffs in the 1990s (Wang 2003).

Under these circumstances, in April 1995, a national Re-employment Project (REP) was established. This re-employment project has become one of the key arenas in which the two dominant economic systems and two dominant gender ideologies are contested and negotiated. This project in-

cludes a series of measures such as job training, labour market development, the establishment of business incubators, and new job creation strategies in the private sector.¹⁰ Despite its long-range goal to establish a market-oriented employment system, the REP appears to be a new welfare system, albeit one with a weaker commitment to state workers. In terms of women’s re-employment, although the All China Women’s Federation and its local branches have provided jobs and training for laid-off women through micro-financed business incubators, the training is largely gendered as it focuses on dead-end domestic work and community service work. When laid-off women do find re-employment, their work often pays less and has less prestige than what they had before. Meanwhile, they are urged to pursue *fei zhenggui jiuYe* ‘flexible and irregular employment’ (part-time, seasonal, on-call, community or domestic work). In order to “guarantee” women’s re-employment in the domestic sphere, China even has strategically adjusted its labor and employment policies, for example, postponing the growing demand for introducing Filipino domestic workers to big cities (for example, Shenzhen and Shanghai) to better serve affluent business people from Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas in these cities (Zeng 2003: 2). This, to some extent, demonstrates the efficacy of China’s transitional politics: the mixed use of central planning and market mechanisms.

In Chinese politics, the legitimacy of affecting change is often argued, first of all, on the basis of textual authority, and secondly on the basis of empirical evidence (Schoenhals 1991). In the case of re-employment, the previous debates on “women’s return home” and the discourse of “re-employment stars” both serve to construct discursive (textual) authority and ideological legitimacy in order to finally implement this policy. The following section will illustrate how the general social language on re-employment becomes the object of a re-processing, reformulation and artistic transformation in the discourse of “re-employment stars”.

5. The discourse of “re-employment stars”

“When I read the beginning of a (re-employment) story, I know how it ends,” said a woman worker at the state enterprise where I did my field-work. The predictability of these re-employment stories partly comes from the nurtured familiarity towards communist propaganda – this re-employment discourse echoes certain features of typical communist ideological

discourse – and partly from the fact that almost all these stories use similar plotlines (see below).

Reproducing certain forms of communist discourse, e.g., using gendered subaltern agency (voices) for political legitimacy and economic development, the discourse of “re-employment stars” is framed in a way that constructs a sense of socialist continuity, following a pattern similar to the discourse on “liberation” and *shanghen wenxue* ‘scar/wound literature.’ After China’s Liberation in 1949, liberated women and men were encouraged to draw a sharp line between their experiences before and after Liberation to legitimate and highlight the significant role of the Chinese Communist Party in socialist transformation. Similarly, a literary genre of “scar/wound literature” emerged in the years after the Cultural Revolution in which intellectuals poured out bitterness about their sufferings during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). The state used this discourse to construct intellectuals as victims of oppression. By condemning issues associated with Maoism, the post-Mao state reformulated the discourse into a tale of “redemption and progress” and gained new legitimacy (Rofel 1999: 142). Likewise, by constructing “re-employment stars” as both victims of the command economy and victors of market competition, the state invests them with ideological and political significance for a new discourse of progress. Akin to the plotlines in both above-mentioned discourses, these re-employment stories hinge on the contrast between the restrictive planned economy and the liberatory market economy. By framing their re-employment experiences into these narratives, the re-employment stars illustrate both a work trajectory and an ideological transformation.

However, by configuring “women’s liberation” as a discourse of sacrifice and “re-employment” as a liberalizing imperative, the discourse of “re-employment stars” also constitutes a departure from the communist discourse derived from the command economy. When the current restructuring is depicted as “a peaceful revolution” that needs a new, authentic language to distinguish itself from previous ones (Dirlik 1989a, 1989b), the discourse of “re-employment stars” seems to be a new language of this sort. Committing to neoliberal ideology and advocating new market capitalism, this discourse as a whole serves as a rhetorical device for China’s new purposes and goals in nation-building and global pre-eminence.

The discourse of “re-employment stars” can be read through the lenses provided by Bakhtin in his study of heteroglossia in novels (1986). The postsocialist tumultuous social life speaks in all the voices and in all the styles of a transitional era in this re-employment discourse. This novelistic

discourse offers a way of yoking together relationships between workplaces, political economies and family life in order to create a series of moments in which the interaction of these forces can be revealed in both their simultaneity and their continuity. The state, as the real author of this discourse, manifests itself and its point-of-view through indirect speech, which infiltrates the linguistic medium of re-employment stars who are both the narrators and the characters of this “novel”. It is a type of “double-voiced discourse” (Bakhtin 1986: 324), serving two speakers at the same time and expressing simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking and the refracted intention of the author. There are two levels at each moment in the story: one, the level of the narrator, a belief system filled with her objects, meanings and emotional expressions, and the other, the level of the author, who speaks, albeit in a refracted way, through this story. The narrator enters into the authorial belief system and achieves an almost complete fusion of voices. But the highly individualized style of narration not only conceals the language of the state (author) but also obscures the primary institutional apparatuses of representation.

The narrative line of these success stories is usually a three-stage flashback: first, unemployment and its negative impact on the narrators’ lives and psychology; second, state empowerment through job training, beneficiary policies, psychotherapeutic counseling and ideological orientation offered by their ex-employers (from state enterprises) or women’s organizations; and third, the marked improvement in life after re-employment. The stories thus exemplify three “leaps” in the life of re-employed women: from depression and self-doubt in unemployment to self-confidence in re-employment; from a state of inertia and dependence under the planned economy to a state of entrepreneurship and self-support in a market economy; and from a weary state worker under a double bind to a real woman “pleasantly” fulfilling both family responsibilities and work in the service industries. The three “leaps” constitute the “center of language” – a “verbal-ideological center” (Bakhtin 1986), through which the language of characters is elevated to new ideological heights, entirely identified with the interests of the author-state. Thus, these coded re-employment stories have become a metalanguage for the instruction of others.¹¹

This re-employment discourse also constitutes one of the ruling party’s image construction projects. By returning certain “voices” to the “chosen women,” the state fosters a socialist realist discourse which suggests that there *is* a public sphere for women, who are “active” participants of reform

and “agents” of change. Just as importantly, these re-employment stories create the condition of visibility for neoliberal subjectivity, which, in terms of individualistic and human concerns, differs from the previous socialist subjects homogenized by Mao’s gender equalizing policies. Through analyses of double-voicedness encoded in the genre of *sixiang douzheng* ‘thought struggle’ and in an ideological ritual of *tanxin* ‘heart-to-heart talk’, the following sections will examine how both an ideal subject position and a neoliberal order are constructed.

5.1 “Thought struggle” and neoliberal subject construction

China’s postsocialist transformation during the last two decades has forced people to constantly make sense of their identities by integrating changes into their life stories. In the context of a post-traditional order, as Giddens (1991) points out, the self becomes a reflexive project, and “a person’s identity is not to be found in behaviour, ...but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going” (54). When people have to face contradictions and differences in life styles and values and have to constantly make choices, the genre of *sixiang douzheng* ‘thought struggle’ (roughly ‘mental conflict’ or ‘soul-searching’) becomes more prominent. It is, as one of the re-employment stars defines, like “two little persons are fighting in one’s mind” (Liang Ying, in Jia 1997: 106). As an expression of “internal speech” (Bakhtin 1986), this genre derives from and internalizes external conflicts and contrasts. It creates a passage of self-transformation and enables the narrator to be aware of what was taken-for-granted under the planned economy and what should be rectified in a new market economy. The narration sometimes draws a sharp line between the old and the new self. By negating the old self associated with the “unfit” command economy and developing a new enterprising self for market competition, an ideal subject position entirely identified with the state’s neoliberal rationalities is constructed through the genre of “thought struggle”. The following is the ‘thought struggle’ of Chen Hua, one of the ‘re-employment stars.’ She describes her devastation and struggle when she was laid off from a factory and had to seek re-employment as a domestic worker.

All of us (about 300 laid-off women) had contributed to the glory of the woolen industry.... Now we were jobless. No matter how much I think, I could not figure out why. The old idea of “waiting, depending and begging”

still dominated us and we still expected the factory to arrange our employment. We were healthy and had a strong will to work. Someone said, “you team leaders will definitely be re-arranged for employment.” The factory also promised to arrange jobs for us first. **But from the situation in the factory**, 300 workers were laid off all at once – a big burden. I myself was a party member, and didn’t intend to be an extra burden to the factory. I felt I had to pay attention to my own image as a party member in the eyes of other workers. I then decided to search for a new job on my own. **From the bottom of my heart**, I felt wronged and that this was unfair: *eating bitterness* and enduring weariness for so many years; I was neither lazy nor sick, and I asked myself why I was laid off. I felt abandoned. And also, *xiagang* (lay-off), such a bad term! Other people might think I did something wrong. I was confused, irritated, reluctant, and struggled a lot within myself. **But again I thought** in the waves of reform, we should be brave enough to welcome challenges rather than withdrawing ourselves or waiting for the ready-made *da guo fan* “big pot of rice.” I gained confidence and knowledge from newspapers, radio and TV reports, and understood all the changes in state enterprises as part of the general restructuring in Beijing and as an inevitable process of a market economy. Facing such a situation, individuals had to make new choices. As a laid-off worker, I will prove that I’m able to get re-employed and control my fate in this second choice.... (Jia 1997: 99–100)

Here the bold phrases function as “contextualization cues” (Gumperz 1982: 131), signaling contextual presuppositions for the genre of “thought struggle”. This piece includes three “thought struggles”. The first one is still within the frame of the state-owned economy. Although the factory promises to arrange employment for laid-off (model) workers, Chen Hua chooses to work on her own. This choice is based on her socialist collectivist consciousness as a party member. But to pay attention to one’s image as a party member in the reform era is an idealistic notion without mooring in the changing society, as corruption associated with the reform has eroded the putatively “upright” and “clear” image of the communist party as a whole in China. This is, then, also the state’s authorial speech. The second “thought struggle” begins when she finally decides to search for a new job. Here Chen Hua wonders why she, as a model worker “eating bitterness” for many years, has to pay the price of the restructuring. This struggle occurs in a shifting arena of the two political economies. Meanwhile, as a newly laid-off worker, she struggles over the negative connotations of the term “*xiagang*”. As a euphemism for unemployment, *xiagang* (literally ‘off-duty’ or ‘layoff’), with its connotation of temporariness, once played a tran-

sitional role to placate unemployed workers and stabilize society at the onset of mass unemployment. But as mass unemployment has intensified, the keyword of *xiagang* has become the very mechanism for social entitlements through its discursive constitution and legitimation. The divergent contextualization of the policies and definition of *xiagang* by state enterprises often grant unemployed workers minimum compensation and living allowances, as decentralization gives institutions and local governments more power and space for manipulation. The third contextualization cue marks the narrator's full adherence to market ideology by learning from the mass media. Thereby, by mapping the changes in her own life onto the broader social transformation, Chen Hua integrates her life stories into the ongoing narrative about the self. Through the state's authorial voices, this "thought struggle" is brought into a higher ideological level.

The genre of "thought struggle" is not merely about two conflicting thoughts in one's mind, but also about two sets of life styles and values associated with two shifting political economies and two ideologies (Maoism and neoliberalism), which are competing for the field of dominance. Women are used as embattled fields that symbolize both the liabilities of the out-going system and potential gains from the incoming system. Through this use of women, the state seeks to impose a new metaphysics and a new worldview. The keywords "eating bitterness" and "big pot of rice" in the above narrative are reminiscent of Mao's mass mobilization and the command economy respectively. As words enter narratives, preserving within them their own dialogism, they have the effect of deforming the new narrative contents (Bakhtin 1986). In this instance, these keywords as both points of reference to, and points of departure from, previous socialist discourses reflect the shifts and oscillations of the contextual overtones of the social milieu. "Eating bitterness" is implicitly associated with "enduring weariness" and "inertia", and "big pot" implies the "collectivism" and "readiness" of the egalitarian planned economy. All these implications contrast with the current neoliberal pillars of "individualism", "enterprise", and "freedom of choice."

In novelistic discourse, as Bakhtin (1986) suggests, a character's action is always highlighted by ideology and associated with an ideological motif and occupies a definite ideological position. Through the genre of thought struggle, the re-employment star turns out to be an ideologue who defends and tries out her ideological positions, and becomes both a polemicist and an apologist. The marked individualization of the speaking subject makes the constitution of neoliberal subjects more autonomous, and thus more

effective as ideological models. In this case, potential copiers would come from the unemployed population. When they actively respond to (variously accept or challenge) this discourse, they register themselves for the ideology imbued in the re-employment discourse. It is a systematically structured process, through which individuals act upon the world and an ideal subjectivity is constituted. “Thought struggle” constitutes an internalizing process, through which post-Mao “technologies of the self” working through neoliberal rationalities of “self-care” and “self-enterprise” (Hoffman 2003) are played out and internalized. The discourse of “re-employment stars” thus contributes to the formation of China’s neoliberal governmentality “which involves the re-conceptualization of target subjects from objects of administrative fiat to autonomous agents with vested interests and rights” (Sigley n.d.: 21, in Hoffman 2003).

The neoliberal technology of governing is in stark contrast to the more direct and imposing techniques of governing in Mao’s era, encompassed in the practices of class labels and struggle sessions (Anagnost 1997; Hoffman 2003).¹² In the Maoist “thought struggle” (soul-searching), the confessors were forced to make their discourses semantically complete and to promote their confession to an ideological level. Any incompleteness in thought struggle could lead to interrogation by party authorities to make it complete. Semantic completeness, as Hanks (1996) suggests, is at the level of the reception process and the meaning of discourse is only finalized through concretization in receptions with the engagement of an interlocutor (243). In the case of Maoist “thought struggle”, the interlocutor may be one’s self or other authoritative figures. This can be reflected in previous slogans such as *sixiang shenchu nao geming* ‘to revolutionize oneself from within the depth of one’s mind’, or *ziji gen ziji dou* ‘to purify a person by fighting his/her self’. The post-Mao “thought struggle” encourages individuals to take the initiative to open up to the state, and an active, neoliberal self should replace a passive, old self, as indicated in the above narrative. The absence of interrogating authoritative figures makes post-Mao “thought struggles” semantically incomplete, which creates space for multiple interpretations and resistance. In addition to a neoliberal subject position, the following will show that the re-employment discourse, by regulating a speech genre of *tanxin* ‘heart-to-heart talk’, also serves for the ruling party to construct a neoliberal order.

5.2. *Tanxin* 'heart-to-heart talk' and a utopia of neoliberal order

Although heteroglossia and incompleteness are important features of the discourse of “re-employment stars” as an index of the shift in post-Mao technology of governing, this does not mean that the state has less power to regulate or censor the linguistic order. Instead, in an attempt to maintain the state’s authority and stabilize society, it assumes a new form of “linguistic engineering”. For example, in the discourse of “re-employment stars,” leaders from both state enterprises and women’s organizations conduct the ideological ritual of *tanxin* 'heart-to-heart talk'. Given its divergent, chaotic use in reality, the discursive construction of an ideal *tanxin* in re-employment discourse is a way to construct an imaginary, well-defined social order within a neoliberal regime. In the following, a re-employed woman worker narrates her new experiences at a hotel and her *tanxin* with her ex-employers:

Working at a state enterprise for many years, I had been used to a dependent life, waiting for the superiors’ order, designation, guidance without much self-initiative. Once in difficulty, we just asked leaders for assistance. However, at a modern hotel, I could not get used to strict and scientific management and fast work tempo. Meanwhile, you could neither ask for help from leaders nor from co-workers. Weariness and isolation almost put me down. Several of my co-workers (previously from the same factory) complained and even wanted to quit. One of them called our previous factory leaders, and the leaders immediately came to the hotel. *They took initiative to negotiate with the hotel management and tanxin with each of us. First, they praised our achievements, and then talked about the market competition, employment and labor market, and the significance of reform. I poured out my bitterness and depression. Leaders helped me to summarize my work and encouraged me, “You’ve already withstood the trial. Now you’re a victor. Just bite your lips and stick to it, and you’ll pass the difficult internship.”* After the leaders’ *tanxin*, my doubt and confusion disappeared. Discontent turned to be joy and confidence. Meanwhile, I realized that my brave first step was an embodiment of my actively participating in employment competition and second choice of career.... (Jia 1997: 125–126)

In contrast to the one-on-one private communicative practice of *tanxin* in daily life, the above narrative opens up the pragmatic context and semantic contents of the genre of *tanxin* undertaken by state enterprise leaders and its ostensible efficacy in ideological transformation. The frequent occurrence

of *tanxin* as an ideological ritual in the discourse of “re-employment stars” seems to construct an order of utopia, which, as Foucault (1974) argues, “permits fables and discourses and runs with the very grain of language” (xviii). It is an imagined social ordering that cannot be located in the real world. When mass unemployment poses governing threats, which disturbs the “normal” sense of social ordering during a period of stress and transformation, the ruling party, by constructing an idealized *tanxin*, reintegrates itself into a changing social atmosphere to create a congruous social order within a market economy. In addition, the state thereby shows what a new type of state-society relationship looks like.

The regulation of the ritual of *tanxin* seems to be a new form of “linguistic engineering” not for totalitarian rule but for neoliberal defense. Mao’s “Linguistic engineering” from 1949 to 1978 was “a centrally coordinated attempt to remake people’s minds by forcing them to speak and write, as far as possible, in set formulae – carefully crafted words, phrases, slogans, and scripts expressing politically ‘correct’ thought” (Ji 2004: 2). These were forces of linguistic life that attempted to overcome the heteroglossia of language, and centralize verbal-ideological thought in order to create the firm, stable linguistic patterns of an officially recognized language. But unlike the mandatory, complete, and politicized linguistic engineering in Mao’s era, the current linguistic practices (as exemplified in the above *tanxin*) are open, interactive, and market-mediated. Rather than an imposing ritualized talk, it is the subordinate who calls their ex-employers and initiates *tanxin*, through which the subordinates are allowed to show personal feelings by pouring out their “bitterness and depression.” Superiors’ praise rather than “criticism and self-criticism” suggest that *tanxin* is a positive and enthusiastic transforming process. Also, the contents of *tanxin* emphasize the significance of reform and market competition rather than politics in Mao’s era.

Tanxin, originally as a private discourse, has been appropriated by the ruling party as an ideological ritual (Anagnost 1997). But during the neoliberal restructuring, both its semantic meanings and pragmatic forms as well as its frequency of use have dramatically changed. At the state enterprise where I conducted my field research, *tanxin* was either a face-to-face conversation between party secretaries and other factory officials used on various occasions to nurture solidarity among the management, or it was a placatory ritual to “tame” violent male laid-off workers who returned to the enterprise and staged their grievances of unemployment in order to bargain with the management for re-employment or other privileges (see Yang

2006). *Tanxin* is also now used to refer to other practices such as psychiatric counseling or a way to solicit public opinions through dialogues between the state and intellectuals.¹³ But *tanxin* as a ritualized talk for ideological purposes targeting the unemployed population has been very rare in social reality since the late 1990s. As one of the factory directors said, “If they (workers) cannot change their mind, we just replace the persons.” With an option of layoff, the management does not bother to do any delicate ideological work such as *tanxin* at all. These varied uses of *tanxin* in social reality are not merely a phenomenon of heteroglossia; rather, they are more akin to discursive “heterotopias” (Foucault 1974). In both the article “Of Other Spaces” and the “Preface” to *The Order of Things*, Foucault looks at extra-discursive “curious” spaces that exist in relation to surrounding space: the utopia and the heterotopia. While utopias cannot be located in the real world, heterotopias are fundamentally real spaces; they do, however, lie outside everyday space in that they are closed spaces that are also ordered in a different way from the surrounding space. The heterotopias can act as compensation for the space that surrounds them. Based on the example of Borges’ fictional Chinese Encyclopedia, which with its random classifications of animals disturbs our normal sense of the world order, Foucault (1974) considers these random classifications as “discursive heterotopias” which are disturbing “because they secretly undermine language, ... because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things to ‘hold together’” (xviii).

The hybrid use of *tanxin* appears to be a bricolage of incongruous, heterogeneous elements embedded in a discursive space, which reflects the uncertain local play of social ordering in an era of transition. Such heterotopias disturb the coherent order the state aspires to foster in order to stabilize a society under the emergency of the serious unemployment problem. Through constructing an ideal form of *tanxin* in the official re-employment discourse, the state thus promotes a utopian order, undercutting the discursive heterotopias of *tanxin* in social reality. By emphasizing intersubjectivity and human nature, this ideal *tanxin* obscures the mode and origin of power and serves to redress the eroded state-society relationship during the neoliberal restructuring. By regulating the discursive order, a new conceptual ordering congruent with the market is thus superimposed on women and the working-class as a whole. The state attempts to re-establish their faith and confidence in both the market and “socialism” on the way to re-

making the working class. In this line, the reform-era linguistic engineering is more concerned with regulating discursive heterotopias that disturb the supposedly “normal” social order than with restricting the growth of heteroglossia.

5.3. *Locating class under gender*

Within China there is heavy government involvement in the media, which is structured in a way to serve dominant ideologies and reinforce state power through propaganda. These re-employment stories in the media are used as a rhetorical discourse to legitimate the state’s economic and political imperatives. In particular, the success stories of female entrepreneurs, who become rich from being former re-employment stars, join numerous “getting rich stories” circulating in China since the 1980s, which have been used to verify Deng Xiaoping’s mottoes: “Getting rich is glorious,” and “To allow a portion of the population to get wealthy first and then to realize sharing in wealth.” But it does not mean that the “symbolic capital” of socialist collectivism and social responsibility advocated in communist discourses is not valued any more. The re-employment-star entrepreneurs are especially encouraged to assist other laid-off workers and realize “sharing in wealth”. These female entrepreneurs thus set an example for other newly rich. This way, these re-employment stories identify the very group who are qualified to speak on behalf of others in public and who have the right to use this genre of story-telling to represent a “responsible” China. Taking on subjectivities associated with state-promoted economic activism, these re-employment stars embrace the new economic convictions and distinguish themselves from women political activists in the previous liberation program. They make their experiences meaningful not only by providing “appropriate” patterns for female employment, but also by getting rich and joining China’s expanding middle class. When assuming the voice of the state, the re-employment stars are empowered and invested as ideological icons. However, women, once politically empowered, may act as obstacles to their own emancipation (Prazniak 1989). Thus these re-employment stars and female entrepreneurs could not represent or address the concerns and interests of women from lower social strata. They are just new *catachreses* – signifiers without adequate referents (Spivak 1993; Barlow 2004), constructed by the state to smooth over the social crisis of unemployment. These success stories downplay or conceal intensified social polarization.

Gender thus intertwines with, and covers up, class (Dai 2004). Re-employed women as subaltern subjects are constructed as “able agents” to transgress class boundaries by acting on the state’s call to participate in the new market economy.

5.4. *A new mode of sacrifice*

When the new gender ideology celebrates “innate femininity, marriage, and motherhood,” and the shaping of new gender identities invokes human nature (Rofel 1999), the discourse of sacrifice follows the same line of rationality. Indeed, no matter what role women play or are supposed to play, the eternal theme in the party’s mobilizing discourse is women’s perceived readiness for sacrifice. The difference lies in how the state mobilizes women and what kind of sacrifice the state aspires them to make at different historical moments (Scott 1986). During the Chinese Revolution, the spirit of self-sacrifice was promoted as the highest form of morality. The liberation program asked women to sacrifice their own interests and concerns in exchange for gender equality, because the centralizing and anti-liberal socialist collectivism required minimum devotion to the individual self and one’s own family. However, in the current reform era, when everyday life has become a central locus for the party to exert its ideological authority and leadership (Anagnost 1997), the party invokes family concerns and values to practice and justify gendered layoffs. In the factory where I did my fieldwork, in order to avoid *shuang xiagang* ‘double layoffs’, wives would be laid off rather than their husbands if both worked for the factory. As the party secretary said, “Anyway, there should be one *Lei Feng* (a martyr) in each family.”¹⁴ The wife is usually the one.

Rather than explicitly drawing on national interests and goals, the hegemonic discourse of sacrifice draws on good motherhood, for example, through a 1999 film *piaoliang mama* [Pretty Mother] (‘Breaking the Silence’ in English), starring the internationally known actress Gong Li. She plays the role of an ordinary working-class woman, a single mother with a deaf son. In order to teach her son to speak, the mother sacrifices her career voluntarily and undertakes a series of informal menial jobs such as domestic work and selling newspapers. Using a mother’s unconditional love to set up a role model for laid-off women, this movie opens up new discursive spaces to mobilize women to pay the price for economic change. Deploying a mother’s love and her sacrifice to bear the hardship and resentment of

those unemployed, as Dai (2004) argues, downplays gender discrimination in employment and social injustice engendered by the neoliberal restructuring. Both official gender ideologies and neoliberal rationalities thus come together to legitimate and propagandize women’s self-sacrifice and self-support.¹⁵

6. Conclusion

As one of the few Leninist regimes in the world, China not only embraces a capitalist market economy, but it also makes great efforts to legitimate itself as a coherent socialist regime, at least nominally. One of the most important devices used to legitimate “socialism” alongside a new commitment to neoliberalism is language. As China’s neoliberal commitments render any “socialist claim” merely political rhetoric, language is crucial to achieve this rhetorical effect (Fairclough 2000). In the above analysis, for instance, the current re-employment discourse re-contextualizes certain communist discursive forms as its pragmatic structure in reform-era practices in order to construct a “socialist” continuity. However, the contents of this re-employment discourse are entirely imbued with neoliberal rationalities of “self-care” and “self-enterprise.” Another important agenda to legitimate “socialism” and neoliberalism is through a new gender mandate. This agenda of mobilizing gender for neoliberal defense is disillusioning, however, because women have experienced increasing gender inequality in the current reform era. Putting women in the domestic sphere or service industries has exacerbated the regression of women’s status and re-enforced women’s dependence on men. This reverses the communist program of women’s liberation, in which women’s paid labor force participation was the key marker of liberation. This renders the long-term communist program of “women’s liberation” unsuccessful.

Gender has been an important resource in China’s modern transformations. But it is used not only as a way to define access to resources (Gal 1991; McElhinny 2003), but also as a way to embody the wrongs and transformative potentials of the exiting system, usher in the incoming system by redressing the wrongs and actualizing the potentials, and push “History” forward. That is, problems and contradictions between the two political economies can be transferred to and centralized on gender. In this sense, gender is a terrain for complex and competing struggles over shifting po-

litical economies and the remaking of Chinese society (see also Mani 1998; Rofel 1999). By the end of the 20th century, neoliberal restructuring had transformed China to a degree similar to the 1949 Revolution. Liberation now needs a new name: re-employment. Gender as an incomplete continuation of the past registers a “new” and “heroic” beginning of a neoliberal regime.

According to Dirlik (1989a), Chinese socialism has embodied a contradiction between an idea of socialism that derives its language from an egalitarian and democratic society, and one that renders socialism an instrument of national development, that is, “a language of vision” and “a language of economism”. Unable to integrate the two languages into a new language of socialist progress, Chinese socialist ideology has ended up speaking two languages at once. This study, by examining the relationship between the two languages on women’s liberation and women’s re-employment respectively, demonstrates linguistic anthropology’s contributions to the interpretation of China’s postsocialist transformation. When this transformation is geared to market capitalism, maintaining “socialism” largely relies on language, which both reproduces certain socialist structures and enacts a market economy. Theoretical and analytical tools provided by linguistic anthropology prove useful to gain a better understanding of this transforming process.

Notes

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1. All the translations from Chinese are mine.
 2. Driving pedicabs to transport passengers in this district of Beijing has been typical work for laid-off men and rural migrant workers. Local people call them *xiangzi*, the name of the male protagonist in an old film entitled *Luotuo Xiangzi* ‘*Rickshaw Xiangzi*’ by Lao She, which describes the bitter life of the urban poor

- in Beijing before Liberation. This association of pedicab drivers with rickshaw *xiangzi* shows that years of communist propaganda efforts advocating the distinction between the bad old society and the good new society are being used as a way to criticize the party’s reform-era rule.
3. Deng Xiaoping put forward the idea of building a *xiaokang* society “a moderately well-off” society in the 1980s. At the Communist Party’s 16th National Congress in 2002, Jiang Zemin extended this notion into building a *quanmian xiaokang shehui* ‘an overall well-off society’ in the first 20 years of this century. One of the indexes of the *xiaokang* society is the annual per capita income now reaching US\$3,000 (Chen 2003).
 4. The discourse of re-employment is a master discourse on the re-employment of laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises. It includes debates and policies related to “phased employment” in the mid-1980s, “early retirement,” “women’s return home,” “gendered layoffs” and the nationwide Re-employment Project since 1995 (training centers, re-employment incubators, “4050 sunlight re-employment projects,” “spring wind projects,” “popular will projects.” etc.) as well as success stories of “re-employment stars.” The goal of the discourse is to reconstruct the self-reliance of the unemployed population and “empower” them to seek re-employment in the new economy (the expanded service industries and the private sector) with “appropriate” training.
 5. At the factory at which I did my fieldwork, each laid-off worker as well as their workshop leaders got a copy of the popular re-employment manual (Jia 1997) from the Re-employment Service Center, which they were required to read. All ten re-employment stars in that manual were laid off from state-owned enterprises and re-employed in service industries in Beijing. This probably is one of the earliest and most widely circulated texts concerning “re-employment stars” I collected between 2002 and 2003. The following analyses are mainly based on this text and my fieldwork interviews.
 6. This discursive tradition formed during the Chinese Revolution and continued when Mao came to power in 1949. “[E]very political campaign in China was simultaneously a semantic campaign as well, introducing or reviving a plethora of shibboleths and slogans with such determination and concentration that it sometimes bordered on verbomania or graphomania. Mao struck one as a true believer of word magic” (Chuang 1968: 47, in Ji 2004: 150). This was also part of Mao’s “linguistic engineering”, which reached its climax during the ten-year Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
 7. In tracing the condition of possibility for the sudden evaporation of the previous Soviet Union in 1989, Alexei Yurchak (2003) describes the discursive regime of Soviet’s late socialism as a “heteronymous shift”: Soviet people might conform to the pragmatics (form) of ideological discourse while quite decoupled from its semantics (socialist ideals and values). Therefore, when the Soviet Party leadership launched a critical public debate of *perestroika* to reform so-

cialism in the mid-1980s, it caused the sudden collapse of the socialist system. This “heteronymous shift” is comparable to China’s shift in its dominant discursive regime from Mao’s era to the current reform era.

8. Schoenhals (1992) formulates this linguistic feature as “political formalization”: a particular quality of linguistic “impoverishment”. That is, the language of politics included only a selection of many different kinds of statements, propositions, and incantations, which intends to reduce the state of consciousness of reader/listeners in order to achieve political conformity.
9. The Maoist gender ideology was based on standard Marxist views such as the historical nature of women’s oppression, women’s participation in social production as a precondition for gender equality, and the liberation of women as a measure of the degree of social emancipation (Lin et al. 1998: 109). Some of Mao’s views on women’s liberation coincided with a certain kind of feminism, which argues that women who work outside the home are liberated from dependence on men (hooks 2000). But Mao’s regime treated gender as a very important resource to achieve its intended goals and purposes of nation-building.
10. Within this framework, 30,000 training centers and 4000 employment agencies have been set up all over the country since the late 1990s. Enterprises set up “re-employment service centers” to which their laid-off workers were sent, where they were to be trained, and which were to find new jobs for them.
11. In April 2003, the All China Women’s Federation organized a National Women Job-Creation and Re-Employment Report Team to travel to five provinces in China. Six re-employment stars gave speeches on their re-employment experiences to women representatives from all walks of life.
12. A “class label,” neither referring to a person’s income nor to his/her relationship to the means of production, was affixed to each household in the early 1950s, categorizing the family’s economic position under the socialist system for the next three decades. “Struggle sessions” refer to the sessions applied by Mao Zedong’s Red Guards to extract confessions of “rightist deviation” during the decade-long Cultural Revolution Mao set off in 1966.
13. The 1997 bestseller *yu zongshuji tanxin* ‘To Heart-to-Heart Talk with the General Secretary’ with a photo of President Jiang Zemin on its cover is an explication of Jiang’s notions of reform and nationalism. *Tanxin* here implies a tacit recognition that interaction between state leaders and the masses was encouraged and that public opinion mattered. *Tanxin* is also used to name one of the first psychiatric counselling centers and psych-hotline established in Beijing in 2001.
14. Lei Feng was a People’s Liberation Army soldier who died at his post in the 1960s and was later designated as a martyr of Mao’s moral ethics: hard work, self-sacrifice, and whole-hearted dedication to serving the people and the communist cause.

15. The propaganda implied that in order to enhance profit and efficiency, women “should” sacrifice and pay the price for the economic restructuring. For example, the above-mentioned “exceeding theory” claims that the employment of women involves additional costs and engages enterprises in the provision of expensive facilities, such as nurseries and maternity leave. Many enterprise managers believe that the costs of these facilities are not balanced out by women’s productivity, since the efficiency is negatively affected by family duties, for which women are expected to commit to take major responsibility (Wang 2003). Women were very critical of the kind of price they had paid. A very popular metaphor they used to satire their pitiful situation is *xie mo sha lu* “to kill the donkey the moment it leaves the millstone”, which means to get rid of a person as soon as s/he has done her/his jobs.

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Chapter 3

When Aboriginal equals “at risk”: The impact of an institutional keyword on Aboriginal Head Start families

Susanne Miskimmin

1. Introduction

In this paper, I examine the impact institutional discourse has on the involvement of caregivers in Aboriginal Head Start (AHS), a community-based preschool program in Canada which aims to better prepare Native children for public education and to promote Aboriginal heritage. As the name would suggest, Aboriginal Head Start is modeled after Head Start programs in the United States. With sites across Canada, the program is intended for, although not limited to, Aboriginal children and families who have been identified as “high risk” by the program’s sponsor, Health Canada. For instance, Native Child and Family Services, the local administrator of the four sites in Toronto, suggests the program is “designed to give high risk children aged 2 to 6 years the extra support they need to get a ‘head start’ in life” (Native Child and Family Services Toronto 2000). I am particularly interested here in the definition and use of the notion of “risk”. I extend the work of Raymond Williams by taking a keyword approach to the concept of risk and argue that the various participants in the AHS program “...just don’t speak the same language” as Williams would say (1976: 11) in that their use of a particular keyword embodies different experiences and readings of that experience (24) and becomes the site at which the meaning of social experience is negotiated and contested. As a keyword, “high risk” engages both continuity and discontinuity and also deep conflicts of value and belief. Briefly, it has become apparent that what high risk means to Aboriginal caregivers and staff, who are also predominantly Aboriginal, often differs from Health Canada’s definition, but sometimes also from one another. For instance, both staff and caregivers place more emphasis on substance abuse (which Health Canada characterizes as a secondary risk factor) than Health Canada’s primary factors of education level

and single parent status. Many Native people in Canada have an ambivalent attitude towards mainstream education. While most caregivers do consider it important to their children's future, their own experience was often one of alienation and, on occasion, outright abuse. And single parent status is also not of great concern to caregivers who more often follow child-rearing practices that are more flexible and involve the extended family. I begin by briefly describing my methodological approach and then address recent theoretical approaches to risk, and what a keyword approach offers my project.

2. Volunteering at Aboriginal Head Start

The first of the four Aboriginal Head Start sites in Toronto opened in 1997. The original cohort of students had not yet completed the program when I began to volunteer at AHS in preparation for dissertation research. I spent a full year with the program before writing my proposal to ensure that my research project was as relevant to the Aboriginal community as it was to the academic one. During my second and third years of volunteering, I employed fairly standard anthropological methodologies. I conducted participant observation both at the three preschools¹ and at those events designed to include and promote parent or community involvement: parent council meetings, training sessions, language classes, workshops and social get-togethers. I also worked extensively with the children, the Elder and the teachers at one site. In addition to other activities, I helped the staff set up before the program and clean up after the day ended. We would eat lunch together and it was at these times that I attended the informal discussions regarding the progress or problems of individual children, any issues involving caregivers and the strategies best used to address these. My presence at the monthly staff meetings meant that I was also present for the more formal discussions of these issues. I observed the daily routine and the approach taken by the teaching staff in addressing day-to-day issues as they arose and, in so doing, I examined how program guidelines, staff ideals, and parent concerns were addressed and put into action on a daily basis, and to what extent there was subtle resistance or transformation during implementation.

Furthermore, I conducted interviews with caregivers, staff and involved community members and compared this interview material with the daily practices of AHS to determine how those decisions involved in the daily

operation of the sites were being made and how certain issues were being addressed, such as whether to place the emphasis on school readiness or traditional teachings.

Of central concern to both staff and caregivers was parent involvement; specifically, why so few AHS caregivers were actively involved in the program and what approach would best encourage caregiver involvement. To address these issues, I examined how program guidelines involving parental involvement translated to daily practice and found moments when official, ‘on paper’ support for community and parent control had been undermined in the course of daily practice.

3. Modern society as “risk society”

In the past two decades, the concept of *risk* has gained prominence across a variety of academic disciplines and social institutions, including medicine, justice, and education. And there is considerable variability in the meaning of this concept both in the research literature and in popular and institutional discourse. As David Garland (2002) notes, *risk* is a calculation, a commodity, a capital, and a technique of government. “Risk is objective and scientifically knowable. Risk is subjective and socially constructed. Risk is a problem, a threat, a source of insecurity” (Garland 2002: 48). Risk is the means by which the future is controlled and colonized.

Working separately, both Ulrich Beck (1992 [1986]) and Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991) have constructed social theories of *risk* that hold much in common. Both see world society as entering a new stage of modernity, that of “reflexive modernization” for Beck or “late modernity” for Giddens. Both scholars view this phase as characterized by new kinds of *risks* which are the social consequence of technological change. And both suggest that the concept of *risk* is fundamental to the way lay actors and technical specialists organize the social world. Beck’s “risk society” and Giddens’ “risk culture” represent a new paradigm of social order in which thinking in terms of *risk* and *risk* assessment becomes a more or less ever-present exercise.

In the emerging *risk* society/culture, the key political issue is arguably not the distribution of wealth but of *risk*. Beck and Giddens acknowledge that, due to the correlation between poverty and *risk*, a disposition to *risk* continues to fall along class lines in that certain disadvantaged groups continue to experience higher levels of *risk*. Even so, overall, “risks display an

equalizing effect” (Beck 1992: 38) and “smog is democratic” (36). People are also said to be becoming free of traditional social networks and relationships as technology is leading to “the disintegration of nuclear families, stable labour markets, segregated gender roles, [and] social classes” (Beck 1992: 17). Furthermore, the democratization of *risk* is universal; the global nature of *risk* means that disengagement is not possible since distant events can have an immediate impact (Giddens 1991: 22, 30).

Although Beck and Giddens are the two most widely cited social theorists on *risk*, and Beck’s *Risk Society* (1986 [1992]) in particular has been enormously influential, they are not the first scholars to address contemporary notions of *risk*. In *Risk and Culture* (1982), social anthropologist Mary Douglas, and Aaron Wildavsky, a political scientist, outline a cultural theory of *risk* based on the premise that the perception of *risk* is a social and cultural process in which some *risks* are emphasized while others are ignored. The perception of *risk* is held to be determined both by cultural values and by social relations. Since “people select their awareness of certain dangers to conform with a specific way of life, it follows that people who adhere to different forms of social organization are disposed to take (and avoid) different kinds of risk” (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 9). In *Risk and Blame* (1992), Douglas builds on this early work and further illustrates that the *risks* that are identified as ‘out there’ reveal as much about the social group – whether it be in terms of cultural biases, structures of perception, or institutional affiliations – as they do about the hazards and contingencies in the surrounding environment. *Risks* are estimations of possible events and, Douglas would argue, do not exist outside of our knowledge of them. They are, rather, a specific way of assessing and categorizing the social world.

Unlike Douglas, Beck and Giddens do not maintain a distinction between the perception of *risk* and the danger of *risk*, nor do they question why some things or people become defined as *risks* and others not. While Douglas recognizes the extent to which the concept of *risk* is socially determined, Beck and Giddens stress the trend towards individualization in late modernity.² As the social categories of modernity lose their relevance, individualization becomes more significant. For both Beck and Giddens, late modernity is a time of heightened reflexivity. While Beck and Giddens situate this heightened reflexivity within the context of globalization, they both suggest the communications revolution has had far more of an impact than changes in the world economy. Communications technology itself becomes a new structure in our knowledge-based society. The emphasis

shifts from structure to agency as individuals who are more self-reflective begin to interact differently with institutions. Meaning and identity are no longer grounded in loyalty to institutions and social structures as the self becomes the primary agent of meaning. This process leads to a more critical examination of institutions and their legitimacy. Giddens, in particular, is concerned with the shift in relationship between individual and society and with how the individual relates to this new social order. In the risk society/culture, self-identity becomes reflexively organized as individuals are able to construct and manipulate their own identity (Beck 1992 [1986]: 19; Giddens 1991: 5). They negotiate their lifestyle through “reflexive life planning”, involving “consideration of risks ... filtered through contact with expert knowledge” (Giddens 1991: 5). In this scenario, lifestyle implies choice within multiple options which are “adopted” rather than “handed down”.

4. “Risk” as a keyword

Raymond Williams originally intended *Keywords* to be an appendix to an earlier text, *Culture and Society* (1958) in which he challenges the prevailing separation of literature, culture, and politics, and situates culture in the context of its relationships with the four terms with which it had been associated in the “culture and society” tradition: “class”, “industry”, “democracy”, and “art.” *Keywords* adopts this theoretical framework and, in so doing, advocates an historical semantics that emphasizes connection and interaction. Williams argues that important social and historical processes occur within language and that the active meanings and values embodied in language, and in the changing patterns of language, exert a formative social force. For Williams, keywords are “significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation” and “significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought” (1983: 15). Williams not only wanted to record the variability in meanings of these words, he also wanted to consider the often implicit connections that certain meanings had with different ways of understanding culture and society. “In his account semantics becomes political and critical; lexical analysis becomes a discussion of ideology and hegemony” (McElhinny 2003). Williams’ approach thus aligns with Douglas’ emphasis on what is at stake in defining risk in a particular way, though it introduces more of a sense of contestation than her more culturally oriented approach.

In taking a keyword approach, I argue that the manner in which Health Canada employs “high risk” serves to validate risk management and establishes it as a key agenda in policy regarding Native families. I also address the extent to which published policies which putatively support ‘parent involvement’ are undermined by the rubric of “risk”. Even though caregivers (especially female kin) are actively recruited to the program, their involvement is limited in a way that discourages participation in decision making regarding their children’s education. The specific kinds of involvement that the program fosters does not provide a challenge to existing social-class and gender inequalities and their experiences have not increased caregivers’ consciousness and understanding of power inequalities, nor have their experiences encouraged them to resist, confront, or critique elements of their children’s schooling.

This paper further illustrates the extent to which crucial meanings have been shaped by a dominant class, and by particular professions operating to a large extent within its terms (cf. Williams 1976: 24). The concept of risk is implicated in politics; the way dominant definitions of risk set moral codes which frame disciplinary regimes, constrain action and set the terms of debate in which people engage both to enforce and resist the impact of such definitions. In her article on the social and political functions of public health discourse, Deborah Lupton (1993: 431) notes that risk definitions may be considered hegemonic conceptual tools that serve to maintain the power structures of society. Thus discourse about risk is best viewed as illuminating the fears and norms or values of society as well as the distribution and sources of power within society.

5. Constructing Aboriginality as risk

In the context of social life, the concept of risk is a general term used to describe individuals perceived to be either experiencing or on the brink of experiencing a myriad of problems which include: poverty, educational deprivation, learning difficulties, emotional and behavioral problems, mental or physical disabilities, health problems, physical, sexual or psychological abuse, neglect, teenage pregnancy, exposure to peri-natal stress, juvenile delinquency, death of a parent, parental substance abuse, single parent household, unstable housing, lack of proficiency in English, failure to achieve post-secondary education, skills training, or meaningful employment or to participate in, and contribute to, the social, economic, and politi-

cal life of their community and society as a whole. Despite the lack of consensus with which the term has been used, there does exist a common agenda. Specifically, as described by McWhirter (1998: 7), risk is used "to denote a set of presumed cause-and-effect dynamics that place the child or adolescent in danger of negative future events."

For Health Canada, "risk" enables objective measurement and standardization in all spheres of life and across otherwise incomparable processes. Risk is quantifiable – hence the notion of high risk as opposed to the more common at risk – as the tables and charts accompanying a recent evaluation site would indicate. To be "objective", Health Canada hired an outside consulting firm with no immediate interests in AHS to evaluate the Ottawa program after its first year in operation. But the report generated by Baxter and Associates (1998) makes it clear that they were employing Health Canada's conceptual framework of risk in evaluating the program. In the Baxter report, the same criteria for risk identified by Health Canada are teased apart and "number-crunched" with the result that the children and families involved in the program are "evaluated" as much as the program itself.

Risk status is generally perceived as a series of steps on a continuum from low to high. While "at risk" is used to indicate that an individual falls somewhere along that continuum, "high risk" suggests a fixed quality that is not dynamic and context dependent. Furthermore, Health Canada's treatment of risk as objective and real – independent of its perception – attempts to locate the concept within an objective scientific discourse. Douglas argues that the 'neutrality' of "scientific discourse": "...its abstractness, its power of condensation, its scientificity, its connection with objective analysis" (1992: 15) make it perfect for debates about public health and welfare. It denies the fact that risk is socially constructed and that the perception of risk is determined both by social organization and cultural factors. Furthermore, Health Canada draws on the long established connection between risk and medicine, especially epidemiology research. Here researchers examining risk have been primarily concerned with identifying the factors that "accentuate or inhibit disease and deficiency states, and the processes that underlie them" (Garmezy 1994: 9). The belief is that if these antecedents or determinants of risk can be found, effective preventative efforts can be implemented. In this way, epidemiology may serve an authoritarian state's agenda of surveillance and control through screening and testing. The manner in which Health Canada employs high risk serves to validate risk management and establishes prevention as a key agenda in a

program designed for Aboriginal children. In this way, a process of government regulation through reference to risk is established. In the case of Aboriginal people this can be read as a continuation of the process of colonization.

6. Parent involvement in Aboriginal Head Start

A central goal of Aboriginal Head Start is a widely published section of the program's mandate: to "[s]upport parents and guardians as the prime teachers and caregivers of their children, making sure parents/caregivers play a key role in the planning, development, operation and evaluation of the program" (Aboriginal Head Start Initiative 2000). The program claims to be unique in that "parents", with the advice of Elders and staff, are responsible for setting the curriculum and are further encouraged to take leadership roles. AHS also aims to recognize and support the role of the extended family in teaching and caring for Aboriginal children and, further, aims to ensure that the local Aboriginal community is involved in the planning, development, operation and evaluation of each preschool project. It is important to note that where official policy refers to 'parents,' in actuality caregivers are often mothers or other female kin. Apparently, this is not unique to AHS. In 1979, Valentine and Stark noted of the program in the US, "Though Head Start refers often to 'parents', the vast majority of those parents who participate are women, and it has always been that way. Head Start itself always has assumed that parents participating in its programs are really mothers" (303). That the Aboriginal Head Start "Parent Council" is strongly associated with female caregivers is evident in the reaction of a father who expressed a desire to create a separate "Father's Council" so that he could increase his involvement in the program.

The emphasis on Aboriginal parent involvement began in the 1970s when the National Indian Brotherhood (now known as the Assembly of First Nations) developed a policy of Indian Control of Indian Education in response to a long legacy of outsider intervention. Prior to European arrival, Aboriginal "education" was largely informal and experiential; children were taught the knowledge, skills and values necessary to the survival of the community through observation and practice and through teachings shared in storytelling. Outsider intervention began in the early 17th century when European missionaries established Day or Mission Schools with the goal to "civilize and Christianize" the "natives". Educational "responsibil-

ity” for Aboriginal people shifted from the Church to the Crown in the 1800s through various treaties with First Nations. The Crown then transferred administrative authority of education to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) under the Indian Act. According to Marie Battiste (1995: viii), educational policies are akin to “forces of cognitive imperialisms and colonization” in that the DIAND sought to transform the mind of Aboriginal youth and to eliminate the diversity of Aboriginal world-views, cultures and languages.

The Day School concept was largely abandoned as Residential Schools were introduced as a means of isolating Aboriginal children from the influences of their families and communities. Students – aged three to eighteen years – were provided with a limited education designed to prepare them for a domestic, Christian life. Much of the children’s time was spent tending to the ‘gender-appropriate’ chores necessary to running the institution; boys attended to the livestock and fields while girls tended to do laundry, cleaning and other domestic chores. Only recently has the devastating physical, mental and sexual abuse suffered by many former Residential School students come to the attention of the general public. Furthermore, having generations of children removed from their communities and the teachings of their people has led to the gradual loss of cultural teachings and languages and to widespread social and psychological upheaval in Aboriginal communities.

Most Residential Schools were phased out in the 1960s and replaced by federally run Indian Day Schools on reserves. At the same time a policy of “integration” was introduced. Kirkness (1992) suggests that this approach has not been one of true integration where Aboriginal cultures are respected and recognized but rather a process of assimilation where Native students attend mainstream public schools. The integration concept represents a continuation of government control over the lives of Aboriginal people. It was introduced with little or no consultation with Aboriginal communities and no particular preparation of teachers or of curriculum was made to accommodate the children of another culture. As a result, there has been no notable improvement in the overall achievement of Native children in integrated schools.

Throughout the 1960s, Aboriginal leaders increasingly began to protest the deplorable conditions of their people. It was in 1972 that the NIB introduced Indian Control of Indian Education based on two key educational principles: parental responsibility and local control (National Indian Brotherhood 1973). The NIB’s policy paper was a response to 1969’s *White Pa-*

per (Battiste 1995: viii) which sought to transfer federal responsibility for First Nations education on reserves to the provinces in the hope that Aboriginal students would inevitably be absorbed into provincial systems and mainstream society. While the DINA accepted the NIB's principles as basis for government policy, much work was required in research and development in cultural education and studies. To this end, the federal government has funded regional Indian Cultural Centers throughout Canada to enhance participation by Aboriginal communities in education institutions and to promote teacher training for Aboriginal educators.

The 1970s saw the emergence of Cultural Survival Schools whose curricula combined academic subjects and cultural materials to promote and preserve Aboriginal cultures, histories, languages and values (McCaskill 1987). A central goal is for children to develop a bicultural identity and the ability to function in both Aboriginal and mainstream society. However, the lingering question of who defines the parameters of Indian education remained unresolved (Battiste 1995: ix) even as the Head Start program was in construction.

Furthermore, there are tensions evident in the Head Start program in the United States that suggest that this model is less than ideal for the purposes of Aboriginal Head Start. An examination of the history of Head Start in the U.S. reveals that this program was created in an environment of conflicting social theories and, as a result, has had a long history of contradictory goals and premises. Initiated in 1965 under the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), Head Start was considered to be the most promising of the controversial antipoverty programs. At first a summer preschool program for poor or "disadvantaged" children living in Appalachia, the program was expanded to operate year-round offering educational, health and social services with a strong component of parent involvement. There were different conceptions of how Head Start parents should participate in the program based on differing perspectives on poverty more generally. One school of thought was influenced by cultural deprivation theory, a popular view at the time (the mid 1960s). According to such analyses, the poor lack the traits necessary to thrive in a basically meritocratic capitalist society (Riessman 1962; Bloom 1965) and thus were not simply lacking material resources, but suffered from a "poverty of the mind" as Lyndon B. Johnson phrased it (cited in Ames and Ellsworth 1997: 27). Furthermore, these deficits were thought to be passed on from generation to generation, creating a "cycle of poverty." Research in child psychology at the time supported this theory of cultural deprivation with its new focus on environmental factors

(as opposed to an emphasis on genetically determined factors), and emphasized the need to act within the first 5 years of a child's life. For instance, poor children were "scientifically" shown to have sustained language defects arising from the use of various forms of nonstandard English in the home, and from limited or inappropriate conversing with adults (Bloom 1965). Living with an impoverished mode of speech was believed to affect children's ability to think and learn (cf. Labov 1972 for a critique of this view). Cultural deprivation theory suggested that the poor needed to be educated, to be given the opportunity to learn the values embraced by middle-class America, the foremost of these being the "work ethic". Program planners who understood poverty as a problem originating in the individual tended to support programs that worked to improve the parents for the benefit of the child. The advocates of this perspective emphasized education in parenting skills and household management as the primary parental involvement.

The second school of thought was influenced by advocates of community action who outlined different explanations of poverty and shaped social programs accordingly. Suspicious of culture of poverty theories, they believed that it was a lack of power that creates and sustains poverty and advocated that communities control community institutions with the ultimate goal being to engage the poor in the construction and reconstruction of institutions. This approach was favored by those policy makers working from structural rather than deficit theories of poverty. Rather than hold the poor solely accountable for their inadequacies, this theoretical perspective focuses on 'the system' – monopoly capitalism, institutional racism, patriarchy. Given these structures, the poor are effectively without power, and will remain poor until the structures themselves change. Those who saw poverty as a systemic issue supported parent involvement in the governing of Head Start centres, the hiring of teachers, and the overall operation of the program, because their goal was to change the way institutions worked.

While it is true that as a community action program, Head Start in the United States was designed with the principles of community control of community institutions at least partly in mind, it has, over time, proven to be essentially compensatory in nature. Head Start can be seen primarily as a practical application of deficit theories of poverty. A central premise suggests that poor children come from homes where "appropriate" physical, cognitive, social and moral habits have not been developed and, therefore, children need a "head start" in order to compete with their middle-class counterparts in public schools (Ellsworth and Ames 1998: xi). Despite

nearly four decades of criticism of deficit theories of poverty – including the acknowledgment that citing the poor and their culture as the culprits in the “cycle of poverty” deflects attention from the unyielding inequalities of institutions, the machinations of power and privilege, and unpopular economic redistribution plans – Head Start’s central organizational principles have remained largely unchanged over time.

Furthermore, many studies examining the extent to which Head Start has allowed full parental and community input reveal the ways in which this involvement has been undermined; what appears as official, “on paper” support for community control and parent empowerment is undermined in the course of daily practice. A general consensus among researchers is that Head Start in the United States has not lived up to its promise in terms of working with parents and communities whose involvement in educational issues has been limited. Head Start does not fundamentally challenge the societal status quo and, in fact, often serves simply to “adjust” poor children and families to more successfully function within it (cf. Ames and Ellsworth 1997; Spatig et al. 1998). While involvement may be personally rewarding and strengthening, it is, for the most part, socially reproductive in nature. Even though parents were invited, even actively recruited to the school, their involvement was limited in a way that would discourage participation in decision making regarding their children’s education. The specific kinds of involvement that the program fosters does not challenge, resist, or confront the inequalities of the school system, but rather parents end up maintaining and supporting them. The activities do not provide a challenge to existing social-class and gender inequalities and the experiences have not increased the parents’ consciousness and understanding of power inequalities, nor have the experiences encouraged them to resist, confront, or critique elements of their children’s schooling. Similar tensions are evident in Aboriginal Head Start and, in no small part, account for why parent participation in AHS is notoriously poor. To an extent, caregiver noninvolvement is a form of resistance in response to Health Canada’s aggressive promotion of normative child-rearing practices and to its construction of “family” – both the implicit privileging of the nuclear family witnessed above and some of its policies of family participation. Oddly, although the program claims to support the involvement of the extended family, they limit family involvement in social events to those members residing in the same household. There was at least one couple in the program who were not estranged and who were both actively involved in raising their children, but who routinely lived in different residences. However,

it is also apparent that the caregivers are often involved in or through the program but in ways that are not being formally recognized by AHS staff. The following examples will demonstrate these observations, as they also demonstrate the different ways in which participants construct the concept of risk.

As noted above, Health Canada's definition of "high risk" differs from that of both the caregivers and the staff, who are predominantly Aboriginal. The issues identified by caregivers and staff can be categorized broadly as education, mental health, economic resources, deviant behavior, physical health and culture. While caregivers and staff identify the same general categories of risk, these topics tend to be constructed and talked about differently. The staff are more likely to link their discussion of risk to published studies or mainstream discourse about what is commonly known as "the Aboriginal problem": "Oh, you know, all the sorts of things you read about as being a problem for, for Native people" and "Native people are statistically at risk for...". Most staff members have either a university degree or college diploma, usually in the field of early childhood education. Furthermore, ongoing training includes yearly attendance at a variety of workshops, many of which are conducted by Health Canada or other public health agencies. Caregivers are more likely to address risk in terms of life experience or quality of life: "I'd say a hard life, not enough money, not working – can't find work, a job, that kinda thing." While some caregivers are university educated professionals, the majority are not. Their accounts tend to link risk with personal and family histories.

Material issues were of critical concern to both staff and families, though sometimes framed differently. The staff spoke of "poverty" and the "cycle of poverty" and were well-versed in the close relationship between poverty and other risk factors that has been the subject of recent risk literature: nutritional deprivation, susceptibility to infectious disease, chronic poor health; diabetes, etc. During lunch break one afternoon, a teacher spontaneously noted the need for more workshops for the parents; "You know, we could have one on how to better budget your money. They need help with that." On another occasion, this teacher expressed frustration at what she perceived as a lack of financial prioritizing by certain caregivers on social assistance when she noted the cost of the children's trendy, name-brand clothing.

The caregivers tend to speak more generally of financial hardships. They are unable to "find a job" as opposed to the mainstream perception that they are unskilled for labour. They wish they had more of the comforts

and security that comes with a steady income. At the same time, they are comfortable spending the money they do have, secure in the knowledge that they have family and friends to help them out as needed. They know well the services available to them in terms of clothing, food and toy drives and readily share this information with others in their social circle. Overall, their desire is to “give our children a better life.” These different constructions of risk coexist uncomfortably in the daily operation of the program and negatively impact central tenets of the program, including parent involvement.

7. Parent involvement as parental improvement

Family involvement encompasses class field trips where the caregivers were encouraged to attend and act as chaperones to their children and were allowed to bring one other child who resided in the same household.³ These excursions often highlighted traditional practices, such as sugar bushing or strawberry picking, but had the potential to become a source of contention between staff and families. Staff would often monitor the mothers’ behavior and comment negatively. Concerns included proper nutrition. One field trip to the sugar bush included a pancake breakfast with freshly made syrup and juice. As staff undertook the logistic challenge of ordering the breakfasts, then paying for and distributing them, some mothers went to the snack bar of their own accord and supplemented the meal with the French fries their children were requesting. The staff were dismayed by this and later noted that consuming non-nutritious food while on a field trip sponsored by Health Canada was problematic. They expressed the same concerns about caregivers smoking on field trips.

The incident which caused the greatest concern, however, was the perceived lack of control the mothers had over their children. During the guided tour, the Elder kept the children quiet and in formation but after snack there was free time. It was intended that the mothers and children explore the indoor museum on their own. The Elder had taken some unchaperoned children to do just that as did some of the mothers. Many mothers, however, opted to sit chatting over coffee as their children played together in the dining area having a wonderful time rambunctiously chasing and calling out to each other. The staff were concerned that fellow diners had been disturbed by the children’s play and they felt this behavior reflected poorly on the program. The matter was later taken up at a parent

council meeting and notices regarding appropriate behavior during field trips were sent home.

In this case, appropriate involvement for the mothers was narrowly defined as minding their children's behavior and working towards self betterment through knowledge attained at the museum. The mothers resisted this narrow definition of involvement but, I would suggest, were at the same time participating in a manner which was not too far off the target as far as AHS broader goals are concerned. While sitting together and chatting, the women were forging ties in the community as well as sharing knowledge about the same sort of resources which the program wanted to promote. So although there may be low attendance at, for instance, a workshop organized by AHS featuring an individual from Anishnaabe Health talking about the programs available, it was at these less formal moments that mothers would share the news about the programs available at Anishnaabe Health.

For their part, many mothers felt that, at times, the program can be too constricting. During the tour, their children had paid attention and exhibited patience but learning had to be balanced with play. As one mother notes, "There's too much 'don't' at Head Start. As soon as you walk down the hall there's this poster telling the children 'don't.'"⁴ Later, I follow up with a question, "Isn't the poster to teach children how to act respectfully to each other?" To which she responds, "Respecting all of creation... honoring all of your fellow beings is not about what you don't do but about what you do do."

Institutional intervention into Aboriginal child-rearing practices is nothing new and was in fact the basis of the 'Sixties Scoop' when unprecedented numbers of Native children were removed from their homes and adopted out of their communities (Johnston 1983). The legacy of this intervention has left many Aboriginal caregivers very wary of institutional or professional surveillance and monitoring of their families. In an interview, one mother noted that she'd like to see an emphasis on personal hygiene in the program, "They could all have their own toothbrush and a mother could come in and show them how to properly brush their teeth." I ask, "What about a dental program where they could check the children's teeth?" "Oh no! We don't want no strangers looking into our kids' mouths!"

The example of interactions in the sugar bush also illustrates a moment in the program when "participation" simply means "education" with a goal to correct assumed deficiencies in the mothers. Often female kin become key targets of reform, and changes are in the direction of becoming more

mainstream, more middle class. That at least some mothers in the program were conscious of this was evident one afternoon when we were taking the children for a walk. Walking is an activity designed to get the children out of doors, give them some exercise and expose them to the local community and parks. It is also an exercise designed to teach them how to behave appropriately in public and while walking. The adults at this particular site were said to be having a difficult time “controlling the children.” The head teacher felt more staff were needed, especially a resource teacher as she imagined many of the children had challenges which were not yet officially diagnosed. She would only plan walks on the days she knew I was going to be there as she felt an extra adult was necessary to help monitor the children.

Control here has the added feature of safety. Situated in an urban area, any walk would entail close proximity to a busy street and the prospect of a child running out onto the road. Before setting out, the teacher first laid down the ground rules of the walk (children were to hold hands, not run off, look both ways before crossing the street, etc.). Immediately two children became rambunctious and the teacher attempted to rein in their behavior. The assistant teacher, an AHS mother who had had the job for a few months, said to the teacher, half facetiously, “God, you sound like a white mother!” Here she is commenting on the program’s normative approach to childrearing, an approach considered by many caregivers to be too focused on governing and limiting children’s behavior.

8. Parent involvement in decision-making

An examination of the extent to which Aboriginal Head Start allows full parental and community input reveal the ways in which this involvement has been undermined; what appears as official, “on paper” support for community control and parent empowerment is undermined in the course of daily practice. Caregiver and community involvement in academic issues has been limited. For instance, although Native Child and Family Services does ensure that caregivers are on the hiring committee when new staff is being selected, they also find ways around this matter when it proves inconvenient. A committee which included AHS parents hired a fellow parent as assistant teacher at one of the sites (incidentally, this is a position which does not require a college diploma or previous work experience). When one of the cultural teachers resigned, this parent was then selected by Native

Child and Family Services Toronto (NCFST) to fill her job. The parents were strongly opposed to this move as they felt the job should be filled by an Elder who was fluent in Ojibwe. NCFST circumvented the need for parent council approval by stating that the parent council had already "pre-approved" this parent in an earlier hire.

Important fiscal decisions, also, rest with the program's sponsor. Caregivers tend to emphasize the cultural renewal aspect of the program and would like to see a third culture teacher hired – at the moment two teachers move between the three sites. NCFST tends more to emphasize the school readiness aspect of the program and the need to identify and target those children in need of special services. Caregivers, for the reasons noted above, are resistant to this and often will not provide the permission required to call in a specialist to evaluate their children even if the teacher suspects the child may be challenged. After a recent increase in budget, the decision was made to hire a third Family and Community Coordinator, whose job it is, amongst other things, to put families in touch with other social services, and not the much desired third culture teacher.

Finally, even where the program does have an excellent track record – in their practice of hiring former or current AHS caregivers wherever possible – there seems to exist impediments to the successful transition from "parent" to employee. In my experience, the only caregivers who held on to their jobs were either university educated or non-Aboriginal (the single father of European heritage whose estranged wife is Aboriginal). Tension and conflicts often occurred when caregivers became involved in the program as employees. An AHS mother had been an assistant teacher in one of the sites only a few weeks before tensions began to arise with the head teacher. The teacher felt the mother questioned her authority, challenged her in front of caregivers and other staff and disrupted the daily routine she had established with the former assistant teacher. She thought the mother was not properly trained and was alarmed when she would disregard policy laid out in the Day Nurseries Act. For instance, she felt that the mother disregarded hygiene regulations by letting the children dip and lick their fingers in the batter when baking as a group. The mother was in close contact with members of the parent council and the teacher was concerned that she might blur the distinction between her personal and professional life and might disclose confidential information.

For her part, the mother prided herself on being outspoken and felt it was her place to question Health Canada's regulations or the established routine, particularly if they did not make sense to her or contradicted her

“instinctive” approach to child rearing. She often did not realize she had upset the quieter, more introverted head teacher with her comments, thinking they would be taken in the humorous spirit she intended.

9. Conclusion

Douglas’ early theorizing aside, few cultural or linguistic anthropologists have engaged with the concept of risk. Pat Caplan notes that in current debates between academics and policy makers on risk, anthropologists are conspicuous by their absence (2000: 14). The anthropologists in her own volume, *Risk Revisited* (2000), find risk to be a useful, but incomplete, concept and argue that what is needed is an “ethnographic method which considers risk in particular times and places and through the voices of particular informants” (25). Such an observation would suggest that anthropologists are uncomfortable with the universalizing aspect of risk theory and the fact that it focuses not on everyday social interaction but on society in a specific historical era. The work of Beck and Giddens proposes “Grand Theory” rather than microanalysis (Bujra 2000: 65).

Contrary to Beck and Giddens, Robert Paine (2002) argues that the significance of class position and conflicts over access to resources are not declining but rather the situation is becoming even more polarized. Both Paine and Jonathan Skinner (2000: 18) suggest that the modern world has not been homogenized in the face of risk; the meaning of living cannot be quite as universal as Beck and Giddens suggest, nor can the response to or means of coping with risk be quite the same. Janet Bujra (2000: 59–84) and Stephen Nugent (2000: 226–248) are also critical of the homogenizing tendencies of Beck and Giddens and of the unquestioning evolutionist assumptions in their meta-narrative of “modernization.” Bujra notes that such an approach would appear to set Africa, for instance, outside of the theoretical frame within which Beck and Giddens operate. Nugent contends that risk is not only an essentializing notion, but also one which is parochial and Eurocentric.

By employing a keyword approach to the concept of risk, this paper has considered risk in “particular times and places and through the voices of particular informants.” In so doing, it has demonstrated how Health Canada’s construction of Aboriginal Head Start families as high risk serves to seriously limit caregivers’ meaningful involvement in the program, a central, and much lauded, tenet of that program. Similarly, staff fail to ac-

knowledge the ways in which the families are actively involved in the program. Health Canada's focus on risk leads to tensions between caregivers and staff and, more critically, leads to a conflict in goals. While the families are keenly interested in the cultural renewal aspect of AHS, the program's focus tends to lie more with promoting normative child-rearing practices and identifying and seeking treatment of undiagnosed challenges in the "high risk" children. Furthermore, this anthropological analysis of risk incorporates an awareness of the dimensions of power, including agency, control and resistance, that is missing in the works of Beck and Giddens. Dominant perceptions of risk reflect, illuminate and, as this chapter has demonstrated, help constitute the sources and centers of power.

Notes

1. The fourth site opened after I had completed my research.
2. Indeed, some have suggested she has taken this part of her argument too far (cf. Hacking 1982; Kaprow 1985).
3. It is worth noting that there were often caregivers actively involved in raising children who resided with other relatives; the children's grandmother or aunt, for instance.
4. She is actually referring to the list of rules posted outside the Aboriginal day care centre right beside the AHS room, but the rules are the same.

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Section II. Emerging into history

Chapter 4

Stage goddesses and studio divas in South India: On agency and the politics of voice^{*}

Amanda Weidman

This chapter is concerned with the idea that new ways of speaking and singing – and with them, new speaking and singing subjects – enable and are enabled by new social and economic formations. I explore this with regard to a particular politics of voice that accompanied, indeed, enabled, the emergence of respectable, “family” women onto the classical music stage as singers in early twentieth-century South India. This politics, or ideology, of voice included ideas about what constituted a “natural” or “true” voice, the relationship between the voice and the body, and the relationship between the singing voice and the speaking voice. As I will show, an interiorized notion of voice that privileged “meaning” and “naturalness” over “cleverness” and “acrobatics” emerged in the early twentieth century. By mid-century, the idea of a voice that came naturally from within, unmediated by physical performance of any kind, a voice that seemed to transcend its body, came to be valued as the authentic voice of South Indian classical [Karnatic] music. The female voice, constructed thus, was central to the idea of South Indian music as a high cultural art form that could stand as representative of uncolonized Indianness both at home and abroad.

By using the phrase “politics of voice”, I mean to problematize some of our commonsense assumptions about voice, agency, and the connection between them. The model of the speaking subject as agent has always relied on using “voice” in a metaphorical sense, as a synonym for self-representation. Implicit here is a pervasive element of our own linguistic ideology: the idea that referential content is separable from and dominant over form. For such a model has always treated the voice itself as secondary, as a mere vehicle for expression, something that is a *sign* of agency but has no power in itself. A focus on the material, sonic voice itself, and on the ways voices become audible in a social context, can usefully turn our attention away from a simple search for agents and agency and toward

the multiple and often contradictory effects that voices have when they enter the public sphere.

1. Modernity and the performing arts in South India

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the musical field of South India underwent a series of profound shifts. In the colonial city of Madras (now Chennai), new kinds of public space came into being with music organizations, concert halls, and academies established by an upper-caste elite interested in what they termed the “revival of South India’s classical music”. This “revival” depended on the selection, from a variety of heterogeneous musical traditions, of particular sounds and performance conventions that would come to be identified as the indigenous “classical” music tradition of South India. The new discourse on classical music – one whose assumptions we take for granted today – combined ideas about art and the artist with a notion of Indianness formed in opposition to the “West”, and a sense of the central role of music in defining what it meant to be modern while retaining a safely delineated realm called “tradition”. The definition of such categories – “art”, “traditional”, and “modern” – was the ideological work of the middle-class nationalist movement that emerged in India in the late nineteenth century. The Indian National Congress, the body that later became the Congress Party, independent India’s first political party, first met in 1885. It was composed largely of upper-caste Hindu men who envisioned the independence of India as intertwined with, and dependent on, a program of social reform and the revival of India’s “traditional” arts. Social reform was seen as a process of removing the ills of Indian society, lifting it out of the degraded state to which it had fallen through centuries of “foreign” rule. In this nationalist imaginary, discourse about women occupied a central role. Those social reform projects that centered on the “woman question”, such as child marriage and the age of consent, widow remarriage, sati, and the devadasi issue, engendered the most debate in the late nineteenth century.

The status of women was seen as an indicator of the India’s modernity and fitness to be a nation, at the same time as women were seen as the rightful keepers of tradition (Mani 1987). As Partha Chatterjee (1993) has suggested, elite Indian nationalism was highly gendered; the rearticulation of Indian womanhood was the foundation upon which the notion of an “inner sphere”, representative of Indianness, was built. The inner sphere of the

nation was an ideological creation, a tool which enabled the nationalist bourgeoisie to imagine a realm unsullied by colonialism, economics, politics, and Western influence. While those things in the outer sphere might come into contact with the West, and might change and modernize, those things in the inner sphere – custom, tradition, the arts, and, most importantly, women – were expected to remain constant, pure, and true to their essential Indianness.

The power of this notion of the inner sphere derived, of course, from the fact that it was not merely symbolic or metaphorical, but was represented, enacted, and reinforced in real, tangible ways. Idealized notions of womanhood, central to the idea of the inner sphere, came to be inscribed on the bodies of women by regulating how they should look and dress, how they should speak, sing, and hold themselves, and with whom they should interact. The opposition between the inner and outer spheres of the nation enabled a series of other parallel and synecdochically related oppositions: private-public; home-world; women-men; middle class women-lower class women; family women-prostitutes (Banerjee 1990, 1998; Weidman 2003). Especially important here is the way in which the opposition between inner and outer, or home and world becomes gendered, not simply as the difference between men and women, but as the difference between *kinds of women*: the respectable middle-class ‘family woman’ (*kudumba stri*) and the lower-class “prostitute”.

Nowhere did this dichotomy become clearer than in the social reformist discourse on the devadasis, women who were dedicated to a life of musical and ritual service in Hindu temples. The Hindu practice of dedicating girls to a life of service in temples by symbolically marrying them to the deity of the temple came under attack beginning in the 1830s by social reformist programs that saw it as a system that actively encouraged prostitution. Devadasis, as unmarried women who were sometimes romantically involved with their male patrons, posed a threat to the ideal of the respectably married “family” woman and to the notion of a Hindu community organized around marriage (Kannabiran 1995). The artistic accomplishments of devadasi women – their prowess as musicians and dancers – were overshadowed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by the stigma of prostitution. The devadasi “system”, as it was called, was legally abolished in 1947, long after social stigma had already accomplished the work of removing many devadasis from the public sphere as performers. The decades of debate on the issue cemented a broader association between women who earned their living by performing, and prostitution.

The program of social reform dovetailed with an agenda of artistic “revival” (Srinivasan 1985). Many of those who actively supported the abolition of the devadasi system were concerned with the fate of the devadasis’ arts – their music and dance – which they saw as having fallen into a degraded state. In order to revive and purify these arts, it was essential to find a class of women who could be trained to practice them, whose own respectability would confer on music and dance the respectability properly due to “classical” arts. Thus, gender, and more specifically, womanhood, became the foundation for one of the most salient distinctions in the world of Indian performing arts: the distinction between the “classical” and the non-classical. In addition to the entextualization of repertoire and the standardization of rules and practice, one of the defining features of “classical” arts in South India is the respectability, and middle-class-ness, of the women who practice and perform them.

2. Toward an anthropological history of the voice

How do we trace the history of a particular kind of voice? Here I would like to bring the resources of linguistic anthropology, ethnomusicology, post-colonial theory, and technology studies together to answer the question of how particular sounds and voices become recognized as values that circulate in an economy of meaning.

Linguistic anthropologists have recently begun to approach the topic of the sounding voice and the meanings with which it is invested. The concept of “regimes of language” or “language ideologies”, bodies of culturally constructed knowledge about how language works and should be used, has been particularly helpful in this regard. Language ideology, as linguist Miyako Inoue has stated, “sets the boundary for what counts as language and what does not, and the terms, techniques, and modalities of citing and hearing” (Inoue 2003: 157). As such, language ideology – often in the form of metapragmatic commentary, or commentary about language and its use – is at the heart of the issue of which “extralinguistic” features become codified as language, and the kinds of meanings that get assigned to them.

In her work on the creation of the modern Japanese woman as linguistic subject, Inoue has shown how Japanese women’s language, far from representing the “original” or “natural” voices of Japanese women, was created at a particular historical moment when male intellectuals overheard and began to quote Japanese schoolgirls. Reduced to verb-ending forms and

intonational patterns, schoolgirl speech was framed – given meaning – through metapragmatic commentaries that identified it as the speech of vulgar, low-class women. Thus, schoolgirl speech was not merely overheard and quoted, but actively created and invested with meaning by those who listened to it. Inoue argues that such a history should inspire us to “re-cast the notion of the ‘speaking self’ (and its accompanying ideas of agency, intentionality, and resistance) within a framework of language and political economy” (Inoue 2003: 180):¹

In this understanding of ‘I speak, therefore I am,’ the speaker’s voice guarantees her full presence ‘here and now,’ and the equation of the act of speaking with the expression of human agency is fundamental to a particular mode of linguistic constructionism to which we are tempted to subscribe on political and other grounds. We are keen to recover and restore the subaltern voice deeply buried in historical documents. In the case of the schoolgirl, we might be tempted to depict her as the subject-as-agent who actively crafts and asserts identity, heroically defying the patriarchal discourse with a clear oppositional consciousness and to claim that *she* constructs her identity... using her sovereign body from which her voice emerges. (Inoue 2003: 180)

The point is not to suggest that schoolgirls had no agency, or to abandon the notion of agency, but rather to suggest a more complex notion of agency as locatable in the *interaction* between voices themselves and communities of listeners, rather than solely in the subjects who supposedly possess those voices. “If there is any possibility of agency on the part of schoolgirls...,” Inoue suggests, “it was the moment when their voices arrested the Meiji intellectuals” (2003: 181).

Although less explicitly focused on a critique of the notion of the speaking self, recent work by Penelope Eckert and Judith Irvine nevertheless provides material to help think through this issue by presenting cases in which voice is, similarly, decoupled from identity. Eckert’s study of phonological variation among adolescent girls in a middle school reveals that these girls perform voices that have different values in the linguistic market; rather than simply “expressing” themselves, they are adept manipulators, acutely aware of the power of different voices that they can assume before their audience. Voice, here, is not a transparent representation or vehicle of self, but something creatively assumed in a particular context and manipulated for a particular linguistic market (Eckert 2003).

The concept of register – a complex of features including, among other things, semantics, grammar, phonetics, voice quality, and gesture that is linked to a situation of use – provides a way of thinking about how voices are invested with meaning. Judith Irvine’s study of speech registers in Wolof society shows very literally how particular registers, or voices, are associated with differences in social status. Nobles and upper castes of Wolof society are expected to be laconic and to employ an affect-less manner associated with a soft, breathy voice, a slow speech tempo, “wrong” grammar, and bland, affectively neutral vocabulary. Griots and lower castes, on the other hand, are associated with a loud, flamboyant speech style characterized by a high-pitched voice, speed, fluency, and vivid vocabulary (Irvine 1990: 135–143). While these culturally structured voice-types are associated with certain status positions within Wolof society, they are available for appropriation by anyone depending on context: “Images of persons considered typical of those groups – and the personalities, moods, behavior, and settings characteristically associated with them – are rationalized and organized in a cultural system, and become available as a frame of reference for one’s own performance and for interpreting the performances of others” (Irvine 1990: 130). As Irvine suggests, these voices, like those of the Japanese or Californian schoolgirls, are not merely a property of individuals, or transparent vehicles of identity or agency, but are culturally and historically shaped.

While Irvine suggests that these distinctions can be understood as part of a Wolof ideology of language (1990: 132), I suggest that it may be more helpful to view them in terms of an ideology of voice. Ideas about the voice are undoubtedly part of language ideology, just as they are part of a perhaps broader regime or politics of voice that includes but is not exhausted by language. By switching our focus from ideologies of language to ideologies of voice, we are able to attend not only to ideas about how the voice should sound, but also to metapragmatic discourses about where the voice comes from and how it relates to a singer’s or speaker’s body. By considering a realm that includes but is broader than language, we are able to see more clearly how language and the speaking subject are constructed, and how they are opposed to non-speaking subjects. Ideologies of voice, in many cases, set the boundary for what separates language from music and what counts as communication. Perhaps most importantly, ideologies of voice determine how and where we locate subjectivity and agency.

The clearest example of this may come from our own academic culture, and anthropology especially, where the voice, while not always explicitly

thematized, has been identified as a vehicle of empowerment, self-representation, authentic knowledge, and agency. As Inoue has pointed out, the assumption that underlies this metaphorization of voice, a central tenet of Western philosophy, is that the speaking subject is the ground of subjectivity and the source of agency. Face-to-face conversation, embodied in mutual dialogue between speaking subjects, serves not only as the classic field situation for anthropologists, but also as the standard for judging the originality and authenticity of utterances and of communication in general. In this metaphysics, the voice is made to stand as an authentic source apart from the social relations that have produced it. In associating agency only with the speaking subject, this conception of the voice ignores the potential agency of listeners. It is important to remember that the presence of voice does not necessarily indicate the agency of the speaker, even when that speaker's voice is really heard. Rather, we might think of agency, as Inoue suggests and as media historian Jonathan Sterne writes, as lying "in the social relation making possible the moment of sonic communication" (2003: 344).

Valuable critiques of academia's fetishization of the voice have been made by postcolonial theorists and historians. Gayatri Spivak's essay, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (1988) is programmatic in this regard in its critique of the ideological underpinnings of the project of recovering lost or subaltern voices. More recently, Mrinhalini Sinha has pointed out the problematic nature of the project of "allowing women's voices to be heard" as an antidote to male-dominated histories and historiography. The desire for a "pure" feminist consciousness, she writes, "serves, in the end, to remove the feminist subject from the history of her production within interconnected axes of gender, race, class/caste, nation, or sexuality" (1996: 498). She suggests that we look instead at the ways women "come into voice", and at the particular voices women assume. Such an approach, she maintains, "would have to take into account both the historical context which made possible the identity of the Indian woman and the particular strategies by which women learned to speak in the voice of the Indian woman" (Sinha 1996: 479).

Sinha's approach is useful in that it shows the conscious construction of voice, the ways women learn to speak so that they will be heard in an arena already overdetermined by colonialism and nationalist politics. It shifts the focus away from the notion that the voice of the "Indian woman" was simply, naturally there, just waiting to be expressed, to the idea that such voices were assumed strategically at a particular historical moment. Sinha

thus illuminates much about the politics of gender, caste, race, and feminism at the time. At a theoretical level, she suggests that voices are socially produced, that the link between voice and agency or self-expression is complicated by questions of genre, audience, and historical location. However, she leaves the category of voice itself untouched. Indeed, the sense in which she uses the term “voice” is almost exclusively that of political self-representation, so that voice is essentially a metaphor for representation.

Thus, while critiques such as these begin to challenge the notion of agency based on the model of the speaking subject, they do little towards challenging the other part of that model, which has always treated the voice itself as secondary, as a mere vehicle for the expression of referential content. In order to move beyond the clichéd metaphor of “voice” as representation, we need to focus on the sound and materiality of the voice, and to consider the way those sounds and material practices of voice are put to service in the creation of ideologies *about* the voice. In this regard, I find my concerns to be parallel to those of media theorist Friedrich Kittler, who, in *Discourse Networks, 1800/1900* (1990), in effect historicizes the voice by considering the conditions of production and dissemination of ideas and practices surrounding the voice. He traces the notion of an “inner voice” central to the emergence of what he calls modern subjectivity in the West, to certain practices of reading, writing, and pedagogy. For Kittler, then, the inner voice, based on the aural memory of the mother’s voice that is associated with new family organization and new reading practices emerging in Germany at the end of the 18th century, is radically historical, not a psychological universal. Around 1900, when it became possible to record voices, Kittler argues, the concept of the “inner voice”, and its accompanying forms of subjectivity, were no longer available in the same way. The notion of a “discourse network”, as a network that links forms of authority with bodies, sounds, writing and other recording technologies, very usefully draws our attention to the fact that philosophical ideas are grounded in material practices and in the technologies through which voices become audible.

Here, then, instead of starting with a universal concept of voice and its importance, I consider moments when self-conscious discourse about the voice arises. Rather than treating voice as a natural means of self-expression, I ask how voices are constructed through practice, and how music produces ideologies of voice.² In addressing these questions, as I have suggested, it is crucial to consider the material and sonic aspects of the voice in relation to the way “voice” operates as a culturally created metaphor.³ Fo-

cusing on ideologies of voice requires that we attend to the relationship between sound or form, on the one hand, and meaning or function within a discursive realm on the other. It demands that we “link... a phenomenological concern with the voice as the embodiment of spoken and sung performance... [with] a more metaphoric sense of voice as a key representational trope for social position and power” (Feld and Fox 1994: 26). It is in this sense that we can speak of a “politics of voice” as a set of vocal practices as well as a set of ideas *about* the voice and its significance.

The material I discuss here troubles the commonsense linking of voice with agency in two ways. First, in changing the focus from speaking subject to singing subject, I consider how new forms of subjectivity are enabled by changing sounds and conceptions of voice. Second, and more specifically, I look at how a particular politics or ideology of voice emerged not only in face-to-face dialogue or live performance, but in moments of sonic communication mediated by technologies of sound reproduction and the cultures of listening associated with them.

3. “The voice of the century”

In 1933, E. Krishna Iyer, advocate, dancer, and trustee of the Madras Music Academy, an institution which considered itself the arbiter of standards in the South Indian music world, wrote of the “sweetness of natural music, as found in the voices of women, young boys, and singing birds” (1933: xvi). Women vocalists, he wrote, “are found to possess certain desirable advantages over men. They have pleasant voices to begin with and none of the contortions of the struggling male musicians. They do not fight with their accompanists. They are free from acrobatics of any kind and they seldom overdo anything” (1993: 46). Another reason for women vocalists’ rising popularity, he suggested, was the explosion of gramophone recordings of them in the early twentieth century. Indeed, in the early years of recording in South India, more records were made of female vocalists than male vocalists (Menon 1999: 74).

Gramophone records provided a solution to the problems faced by women musicians, whether from the devadasi or Brahmin community; recording presented a way for women from both communities to be heard without being seen, to escape association with their bodies. A social reform movement that stressed the virtues of marriage and domesticity and referred to the activities of devadasis as “debauchery” and “prostitution” left

women musicians of the devadasi community with few traditional performance venues, and almost no opportunities to perform in the newly built concert halls of Madras. Gramophone companies, however, initially run not by Brahmins but by Americans and Europeans, actively recruited devadasi women for their first recordings.⁴

Correspondingly, for Brahmin women, recording provided a way to sing for the public without appearing in public and jeopardizing their respectability. In the early 1930s, Columbia Records “discovered” a girl genius, the thirteen-year-old D. K. Pattammal (b. 1919). Many years later, in a speech given at the Madras Music Academy, D. K. P. stated that her success, in the absence of a family connection to music, was due to the gramophone. As a Brahmin girl growing up in an orthodox family, she was unable to undergo the traditional gurukulavasam, which would mean leaving home to live with a male, non-Brahmin teacher. She supplemented her brief periods of learning from various teachers with listening to gramophone records. When she was ready to perform, the gramophone, as an interface between private and public, provided her a way to sing without being seen.

The gramophone companies, both Columbia and HMV, sought out novelty, and found a ready source in girl-singers. By the 1920s, recordings of them were so common that G. Venkatachalam, a patron of many artists and musicians at that time, referred to them with distaste as “baby stunts”. Of his first meeting in 1929 with M. S. Subbulakshmi, who became the most famous female singer of South India in the 20th century, he wrote that he was skeptical: “She was thirteen when I met her... My first reactions were: ‘Ah! Another of those baby stunts!’ I went, however, and met not a fake, but a real girl genius” (Venkatachalam 1966: 65).

The idea of novelty, so crucial to the gramophone companies’ success, was intimately tied up with notions of the child prodigy. The idea of the child prodigy suggests a special gift, a preternatural, or supernatural ability. If earlier discourse on Karnatic musicians stressed the importance of long years of discipleship and seasoned experience, the figure of the prodigy stood in stark contrast. It implied instant ability and success, a kind of isolation, or protection, from the world, an incomplete body that was compensated for by a larger-than-life voice and a selfless devotion to music. The notion of the prodigy complicates classic formulations of agency; the prodigy does not sing, like other normal people, because she desires to, but because a voice sings through her; the prodigy’s body is merely a vessel. As Felicia Miller Frank has pointed out, the association between women, the voice, and technological perfection has a long history in European dis-

course on the arts. Female prodigies, in this discourse, are represented as sexless or non-human angels, emblematic of the sublime and of artistic modernity (Frank 1995: 2). It is no coincidence that among the elite of twentieth-century South India, who borrowed much of this European discourse about “art”,⁵ the term “prodigy” (in English) was first used about women musicians, and that the prodigy’s first vehicle was the gramophone.

Of the women musicians that the gramophone companies popularized, M. S. Subbulakshmi became by far the most famous, celebrated almost universally as the “greatest female vocalist of India.” At one point, T. T. Krishnamachari, one of the founders of the Madras Music Academy, called M. S.’ voice “the voice of the century” (Menon 1999: 132). M. S. was born in 1916 in Madurai to Shanmughavadivu, a veena⁶ player and singer from the devadasi community. In her memoir of a childhood steeped in music, M. S. recalls that “I was fascinated by records – gramophone plates, we called them. Inspired by the gramophone company’s logo of the dog listening to his master’s voice, I would pick up a sheet of paper, roll it into a long cone, and sing into it for hours” (Ramnarayan 1997: 10). M. S.’ mother was ambitious for her daughter and brought her to her own recording sessions in Madras, where she persuaded the HMV company to record the thirteen-year-old Subbulakshmi. The records sold well and M. S. began to get concert opportunities in Madras. Her voice attracted the elite of Madras at that time, a group of Brahmin and other high-caste men who considered themselves aestheticians, journalists, and freedom-fighters, including the journalist and freedom fighter T. Sadasivam, who married M. S. in 1940.

Not only the gramophone, but also the microphone, shaped M. S.’ voice. The beginning of her public singing career, it is important to note, coincided with the establishment of large concert halls in Madras. Essential to these halls was the microphone, which began to be used in South India in the 1930s. The microphone allowed Karnatic vocalists and instrumentalists to concentrate less on projecting volume, and more on shifts in dynamics and speed. It also allowed those with softer voices to sing to large audiences; in fact, female singers were among the first to sing with microphones. Many musicians note changes in vocal style in Karnatic music in the twentieth century due to the use of the microphone, particularly the shift from an earlier, higher-pitched style accompanied by more gesturing, often referred to today as “shouting”, to a lower pitched, more introspective style. The microphone not only narrowed the vocal range of singers, but also their physical range on stage. At the same time, one of the mic’s most prominent effects is the projection of intimacy to vast audiences.⁷ M. S.’ voice and

career, notes critic Indira Menon, were products of the microphone: “The greatest gift to the world of this little instrument of the technological revolution is M. S. Subbulakshmi. The innumerable nuances of her multifaceted voice can be captured by it.... She is truly the product of the modern age – of the concert culture, teeming audiences, and large halls where her voice can soar – thanks to the mike” (Menon 1999: 89). Here it is crucial to note that the voice with “innumerable nuances” is itself a product of the microphone; as the mic makes these nuances audible in a physical sense, it also makes them audible in an aesthetic sense.

By the 1940s, M. S. S. and D. K. P. had come to dominate the market for female voices, and would until the 1970s. Both sang in films as well as recordings and classical stage performances, but their personae were quite different; whereas D. K. P. was considered to be an “intellectual” singer, M. S. was considered to be a “natural.” Here it is worth noting one critic’s description of M. S.:

Her voice has the rich cadence of a mountain stream and the purity of a veena-note... She takes the highest notes with the effortlessness of a nightingale’s flight to its mate. This is an art by itself. And when you consider how even some of the great vidwans and ustads contort their faces and make ridiculous caricatures of themselves in such attempts, it is some consolation to see a natural face for once. Women (because of their innate vanity, I suppose!) avoid that exhibition of agonised looks and tortured faces! Her recitals have not the long drawn out boredom of the ordinary South Indian cutcheries....It is the art of music she wishes to display and not its mathematics. (Venkatachalam 1966: 66–67)

What emerges in writing and talk about M. S.’ voice, then, is a new discourse about the “natural” voice; constantly remarked upon are her genuineness on stage, her complete emotional involvement as she sings. Recent biographies play up M. S.’ personal humility and innocence, opposing it to the “grandeur” and “majesty” of her voice, noting that she “knows nothing but music” and when offstage is a simple housewife like any other (Menon 1999: 141). Many descriptions of her voice, as in the one above, use the metaphor of flight, implying at once an escape from the body and an association with nature: “the effortlessness of a nightingale’s flight to its mate”.

Comments on the “naturalness” of M. S.’ voice found their way into a discourse about “art” as well; reviewers slipped easily from descriptions of her performances or recordings to ideas about what “art” should be. The letters of “*Rasikamani*” (lit. ‘gem among connoisseurs’) T. K. Chidambara-

natha Mudaliar from the 1940s are laden with references to M. S.' performances. After hearing a radio concert of M. S., he wrote that her rendition of a song had "melted the listeners." And then immediately: "That is art, is it not? It must make our feelings mingle with Truth [*tattuvam*], and make us into different beings [*veru vastuvaaka aakkividavendum*]" (Maharajan 1979: 136).

But, as another critic noted, "art" was also for more mundane purposes, such as winning India its due recognition abroad. He suggested that female singers could better represent the music of India abroad at a world music festival than could male singers. What is striking in his reasoning is the way the "art of music" calls for a naturalness, simplicity, and universality that only the female voice seems to possess.⁸

What six singers would you select from India to represent this country in a World Music Festival?" asked a well-known European impresario not long ago, and I had no hesitation in suggesting Roshanara and Kesarbai for Hindustani music; M. S. Subbulakshmi and D. K. Pattammal for the Carnatic; Kamala Jharia and Kananbala for popular songs [all women artists].

This list would, of course, amuse the orthodox and the music pundits. "What about Faiyaz Khan and Omkarnath?" I can hear the Hindustaniwalas shout. "Why not Aryakudi and Musiri?" will be the Tamils' cry. The film fans will plead for Saigal and Kurshid [all male artists].

I am not unmindful of the merits of the above... But I wouldn't risk them in a World Jamboree. They will simply not be understood. Terrible is the ignorance of the world to things Indian, and unbridgeable as yet is the gulf between the music of the East and the West... People of the world understand art and appreciate artistes... And I claim, my six are *artistes*! (Venkatachalam 1966: 68)

By the 1940s, the connection between women, music, and the "natural" voice had ascended to the level of an assumption. In a series of essays written in English and published by the Theosophical Society, the dancer Rukmini Devi, a Brahmin woman who had played a large role in "rescuing" and redefining the devadasis' dance as a high cultural art form, elaborated on the special connection that existed naturally between women and the fine arts. "The spirit of womanhood", she wrote, "is the spirit of the artist" (WA: 5).⁹ Women possessed an "innate refinement" which made it incumbent upon them to take up the revival of Indian art. In learning the arts, what was necessary was "rigorous work, the complete subjugation of all other personal desires and pleasures, the abandonment of one's being to the

Cause” (DM: 4). The success of the Indian nation, as well as the Indian arts, depended on restoring woman from her degraded position to that of “a divine influence rising above the material aspect of things” (DM: 14).

Rukmini Devi imagined the relationship between voice and body as analogous to the relationship between music and dance. In an essay called *Dance and Music*, she wrote that music, “the basic language of Gods”, was what saved dance from being “mere physical acrobatics” (DM: 10–11). It was the “universal language of the soul” (DM: 12), the “saving grace of humanity” (DM: 16). Imagined thus, the materiality of music is effaced; instead of being seen as social, something which comes into being through performance and the mediation of human actors, it is seen as a kind of pure voice from within, a voice deeply contained within the body, but neither connected to nor manifested on its surface.

4. Natural and unnatural voices

As I have illustrated, in the 1930s and 40s, ideals of chaste womanly behavior became a metaphor for a new kind of “art” that privileged “meaning” and “naturalness” over “cleverness” and “acrobatics”. In that sense, “classical” singing was refigured as a natural expression of devotion. A woman was expected to sing music as though it were a natural property of her voice; the “natural” voice and the chaste female body were thus linked. It is interesting to note that by the 1950s, the adjectives “natural” and “artificial” were being used to contrast female voices singing classical music and film songs respectively. Kalki, the same reviewer who had raved about M. S.’ voice, wrote disparagingly of the “insipid” and “artificial” sweetness of the renowned film singer Lata Mangeshkar’s voice. Kalki used the Tamil word *vacikara*, meaning attractive or alluring, with distinct sexual connotations, to describe the film voice, warning readers not to get infatuated with film music and forget the natural beauty of classical singing (Kalki 1951).

Performance that drew attention to the body came to be associated with the artificial; good, “classical” music was not something performed, but rather something simply “expressed”. The “voice of the century”, then, referred not only to M. S. Subbulakshmi’s sound, but to a particular kind of voice that was imagined to come naturally from within, unmediated by performance of any kind. The notion of “expression”, as anthropologist Webb Keane has written, is predicated on a particular language ideology that separates form from content, in which the voice merely “refers to” other

sites of action or “reflects” a prior, interior self, but is not considered to have a role in *creating* that self (Keane 1997: 684). In tracing the development of the modern notion of self in European thought, Charles Taylor suggests that the notion of expression is itself a modern idea very much linked to the imagination of the self’s interiority; the concept of “art”, as he notes, relies on the rejection of an outwardly-oriented mimesis and the embracing of an inwardly-oriented “expression”.¹⁰

The “voice of the century” (not just M. S.’ voice but the *kind* of voice it represented) was as much a product of the technologies that mediated it as it was a product of individual ability or genius. In a very real sense, the gramophone and the microphone created the “perfection” and “nuance” of M. S. Subbulakshmi’s voice for the listeners who heard her through these media. In twentieth-century South India, the female voice, disassociated from its body through these technologies and through a particular way of performing interiority, came to have a certain ideological significance; it was imagined as giving voice at once to Mother India – a dominant metaphor of the time – and to an abstract notion of “art”.

The purity of this voice was maintained by a careful limiting of its travels; it was not a “disembodied” voice that could travel freely, but a voice that had to be *embodied* in a particular way. By mid-century, Tamil films began to feature female dancing bodies that were, by the standards I have described above, decidedly immodest; the voices with which those actresses sang on screen became a foil for the respectability of “classical” music and its prodigies. Playback singing, where an offstage singer provides a voice for an actor or actress’ character, is a pervasive feature of Indian popular films. Since the matching of a singer’s voice and an actor’s body is a creative act mediated by social conventions and technological means, it provides an especially clear instance for thinking about the culturally constructed ways in which voices come to be embodied.

Although many successful classical musicians, including M. S. Subbulakshmi and D. K. Pattammal, gained considerable fame through their acting and singing for films, the limits of their participation in the cinema world were carefully defined. M. S. stopped acting in films after 1945 in order to devote herself to classical performances; apparently, it was not possible for her to do both. D. K. Pattammal, on the other hand, remained active in the Tamil cinema world as a playback singer, but on two carefully observed conditions. First, she would sing only patriotic songs, never love songs. Second, her voice would never be matched with a particular actress’ character, but always serve as background music, as if its purity could be

assured by making sure its referent was “Mother India” and not her own or any actress’ body.

M. S. Subbulakshmi and D. K. Pattammal were an inspiration to numerous female playback singers, women who *did* record their voices for actresses’ characters. Three playback singers I spoke with in 2002–03, women in their 60s and 70s at the time and therefore about one generation younger than M. S. and D. K. P., all spoke of wanting to be “just like M. S.” when they were young, but being forced by economic necessity to sing for films.¹¹ Since being a playback singer involves singing in the voice of many different characters – in essence, being the master of many different culturally recognized voice types – I was surprised to find, in my conversations with these singers, that they insisted that they did not change their voices for different characters. In the words of one, “God has given you one voice. If you start changing it around, it stops being singing and turns into mimicry” (personal communication, L. R. Easwari, June 2002). What is interesting here is the way value and authenticity are attached to “singing”, in contrast to “mimicry”.¹² Indeed, it seems that maintaining one’s status as a playback “artiste” requires this insistence on having one’s own voice that remains constant. Another playback singer talked about how in order to sing playback for films one had to learn to “give expression just in the voice, not in the face”; the idea is to channel all of one’s expressive power into one’s voice, leaving the face and body to remain perfectly still (personal communication, S. Janaki, January 2004). She proceeded to demonstrate about ten different voices to me while sitting stock still in her armchair: in other words, to sing without acting the part at all.

Female playback singers, much more than actresses, become celebrities in their own right; many make frequent stage appearances in which they sing their hit songs with a backup orchestra for audiences who are their especial fans. For these older female playback singers, their stage persona often contrasts greatly with the lyrics they are singing; in these stage appearances, it often seems like they make a particular effort *not* to embody their voices, as if in doing so they might maintain greater control over them. I attended a wedding concert by the renowned playback singer P. Susheela in 2002, during which she sang a number of romantic duet songs. Throughout the performance, she stood close to the microphone, with one hand at her ear and the other carefully keeping the end of her sari draped over her shoulder in the style of a chaste classical singer. I would suggest that what is going on here with the way these women purposely dissociate their bodies from their voices is part of the politics of voice inaugurated by

earlier female classical singers. The technology of playback singing here enables a certain kind of singing subject – the studio diva – that is very much like the stage goddesses who had already appeared earlier with the help of recording and radio. Much in the sense that Irvine suggests, we can think of M. S.’ voice as constituting a culturally structured *voice type* – indeed, a register – that became available for appropriation by others. The technology of playback singing allows these women to negotiate the conventions of female respectability by managing the relationship between their voices and their bodies.

For the “voice of the century”, then, the *kinds* of bodies with which it could associate constituted one limit; the *ways* in which it could be heard constituted another. To return to the careers of M. S. and D. K. Pattammal, it is crucial to note that though they *sang* in public, they never *spoke* in public, something we would more conventionally associate with agency and “having a voice”. Whereas their earlier contemporaries included female singers who also spoke in public on issues such as Indian independence and the betterment of Indian women,¹³ Subbulakshmi and Pattammal assiduously avoided public speaking. Indeed, it seems as though the “naturalness” and “purity” of their voices could only be guaranteed by maintaining the idea that those voices “expressed” an interiorized self, an innocent self detached from the world at large, who knew “nothing but music” – except, perhaps, a little housekeeping. In this sense, the very *audibility* of their singing voices depended on the silence of their speaking voices in the public sphere.

5. Agency and the politics of voice

Agency, as I noted earlier, is linked to the speaking voice in Western philosophy; this assumed link is embedded in the classic methodology of ethnography as well (in which the ethnographer seeks verbal explanations or “meanings” for non-verbal forms in order to fill them with referential content). The dichotomy often drawn between “having a voice” and being silent or silenced, however, leaves us with little way of interpreting voices that are highly audible and public and yet not agentive in a classic sense; for instance, voices that have musical instead of referential content, or voices that circulate, apart from their “owners”, through technologies of sound reproduction.¹⁴

Linguistic anthropologists have recently elaborated on erasure as one of the semiotic processes by which ideologies of language operate. According to Irvine and Gal, erasure is the “process in which ideology, in simplifying the sociolinguistic field, renders some persons or activities (or sociolinguistic phenomena) invisible” (2000: 38).¹⁵ Erasure is at work whenever a standard, or ideal, is constructed. Thus, we can note that the creation of “the voice of the century”, and the ideal it exemplified, involved the erasure, or rendering inaudible, of other singers and styles of singing and performing. But as I have suggested here, equally important in this process is the way in which certain voices and figures were rendered public, visible, and audible. Visibility, or audibility, however, is not a simple or ideologically neutral process, but is accomplished in very particular and often problematic ways.

The conventional narrative of Karnatic music’s progress, and many feminist narratives as well, would celebrate women like M. S. and D. K. P. as liberating agents, breaking onto the concert stage and “giving women a voice” in Karnatic music. Alternatively, a grimmer narrative would point out that although these women sang publicly, they were basically silenced, denied the forms of expression that would make them true agents. I would like to suggest that neither of these narratives does justice to the complexity of how voices are created, heard, and interpreted. Between being silent or silenced and being heard are numerous possibilities, as Susan Gal has pointed out (1991: 181).¹⁶ Singers like M. S. Subbulakshmi and D. K. Pattammal had far more complex effects than simple notions of agency or disempowerment would allow. They were not simply brilliant singers constrained by the conventions of female respectability. In a very real way, they, and their voices, helped to create those conventions as they inhabited and embodied them. If, following Gal, we consider the public “expressive activities” of women – special verbal and musical skills and genres – as “strategic responses to relative powerlessness” (1991: 182), then we can think of M. S. Subbulakshmi and D. K. Pattammal as strategizing within the possibilities that were available to them.

Here I have focused less on an “objective” description of M. S.’ or D. K. P.’s voices than on various discourses *about* their voices and personae. I have examined their voices not to seek the “voice” or agency that lies behind them, but in a sense the agency *of* their voices, the power of their voices to produce particular personae, to induce reactions and invite interpretations. Rather than focusing on the intentionality of the speaker, focusing on audibility – the circumstances in which and means by which a voice comes to be heard and recognized – gives us a deeper sense of the role of

technological mediation, listening publics and historical circumstances in the creation of particular voices. Here we might contrast the simplicity of the speaker-hearer model, in which a singer might simply “have a voice”, to the circuitous route of a playback singer’s voice, which (and here I am vastly simplifying the process) gets shaped and recorded in a studio, associated on film with another person’s body, and then presented in the cinema hall and on cassette to viewers and listeners, who hear them in different contexts.

As I have suggested, notions of the “natural” or “true” voice include ideas about the relationship between the voice and the body and the singing and speaking voice. Such historically emergent ideologies of voice determine how and to whom we attribute subjectivity and agency. Instead of grounding our analyses in these concepts, we need to consider how they themselves are grounded in the particular moments and very material ways in which voices become audible.

Notes

- * Somewhat different and much longer versions of the argument outlined here appeared in *Cultural Anthropology* 18 (2), 194–232, and subsequently in Chapter 3 of my book, *Singing the Classical, Voicing the Modern: The Postcolonial Politics of Music in South India* (Duke University Press, 2006). I also thank Bonnie McElhinny for editorial comments that helped me refine the ideas in this essay.
1. The notion of the speaking subject whose intentions determine the “meaning” of her utterances underlies speech act theory as outlined by J. L. Austin and after him, John Searle. While speech act theory originated in the 1960s as an attempt to re-insert language into its social context, many scholars have since critiqued it for failing to take into account the multiple ways, other than through the intentions of the speaker, that meaning is constructed. One early critique of speech act theory was Rosaldo (1982), who argued that cultural assumptions about how language works reflect local theories of human agency and personhood that challenge any universalist theory of speech acts. Others have noted that speech act theory falls short in cases where meaning is co-constructed and where speakers are not primarily responsible for what they “meant” to say, but for the effects of their speech (Duranti 1992), or in cases, such as divination, where meaning is produced without intention (Du Bois 1992).
 2. My project here is similar to the one Susan Gal calls for in her essay “Between speech and silence”: “to draw on cultural analysis to show how the links be-

- tween linguistic practices, power, and gender are themselves culturally constructed” (1991: 176).
3. Susan Gal has, similarly, called for a linking of the study of women’s “voice”, “words”, or “silence”, in a metaphorical sense, with the study of actual linguistic practices (see Gal 1991: 176–177).
 4. Unlike All India Radio, which would start in the 1930s as a vehicle for the nationalist project of making music respectable (thus denying broadcasting opportunities to devadasi women), the gramophone companies were purely capitalist enterprises. Between 1910 and 1930, their best-selling recordings in South India were all of women from the devadasi community (Menon 1999: 74–75; Kinnear 1994): Dhanakoti Ammal, Bangalore Nagaratnammal, Bangalore Thayi, Coimbatore Thayi, M. Shnamughavadivu, and Madras Lalithangi. In North India, as Regula Qureshi (2001) points out, recording provided an opportunity for courtesans to continue as singers/entertainers even as their opportunities for live performance diminished. Many courtesans became singers for films. Interestingly, it was also recording that facilitated Begum Akhtar’s re-entry into public as a singer after she had married and her persona had changed from courtesan to respectable married woman.
 5. On the concept of “art” and the “Romantic artist” in Europe, see Williams (1983), introduction and chapter 2.
 6. A veena is a South Indian plucked stringed instrument.
 7. On the effects of the microphone in western contexts, Simon Frith writes that “the microphone made it possible for singers to make musical sounds – soft sounds, close sounds – that had not really been heard before in terms of public performance The microphone allowed us to hear people in ways that normally implied intimacy – the whisper, the caress, the murmur” (Frith 1996: 187). Later, he writes that the microphone draws attention to the place of the voice in music as well, allowing it to dominate other instruments, to be the “solo” in a way it could not have been before (1996: 188).
 8. The discourse linking idealized female musicality with notions of “naturalness” as opposed to artifice, intellectuality, and virtuoso display pervades Western art music. Richard Leppert (1993) and Judith Tick (1986) provide useful discussions of this in English and American contexts respectively. (Such distinctions have their origins in a broader aesthetic discourse based on gendered notions of the beautiful and the sublime, addressed by Paul Mattick, Jr. (1995)). These distinctions traveled to India as part of a colonial discourse about music, but became specifically central to a nationalist discourse that associated “natural” female musicality with the essence of the Indian nation.
 9. I refer to the essays by the initials of their title words.
 10. The connections between the “expressivist turn” and the notions of interiority and inner voice in European thought are discussed by Taylor (1989: 370–390). Williams (1983) suggests that the notion of “art” and the romantic artist devel-

oped in the nineteenth century in Europe, as “art became a symbolic abstraction for a whole range of general human experience A general social activity was forced into the status of a department or province” (47). In the new idea of art, an emphasis on skill was gradually replaced by an emphasis on sensibility (44), suggesting a kind of interiorization.

11. The Tamil and Telugu language cinema provided economic opportunity for many musicians in the early and mid-20th century. A source in English on this is Guy (1997).
12. Similar ideologies of voice and ideas about mimicry are at play in much scholarly literature on Hindi-speaking Hijras in Banaras, as Hall and O’Donovan show (1996: 231–235). The word “mimicry” comes into play when the voice seems to these scholars to deviate from bodily appearance.
13. Among these were Vai. Mu. Kothainayaki, a Brahmin woman who started a journal and spoke on social and national issues, and Bangalore Nagaratnammal, a devadasi woman who was also an outspoken critic on many issues of social reform.
14. Recent work by Richard Bauman on the creation of new kinds of listening publics by the dissemination of recordings of political speeches in early 20th-century America begins to address the complexities of technologically mediated vocal production (see Bauman 2003).
15. Also see Kuipers 1998.
16. Compare the case of Jeanne Roland, as discussed by Gal (1991: 180–181). Roland was a member of the French elite caught in the “antifeminine logic” of the French Revolution, in which women were thought to be a corrupting influence that should be excluded from public speaking and the exercise of power. Roland, in order to be respected, had to maintain public silence, but found a way to be politically active by organizing a forum in which men debated political issues. Gal writes that

Jeanne Roland’s silence was neither natural nor an automatic acquiescence to Revolutionary cultural conceptions. Instead, her letters and memoirs allow us to understand the forums she created and her public silence as strategic responses to a cultural double-bind that offered her either speech or respect, but not both. Neither wholly determined by cultural images and changing social structures, nor entirely a matter of her own agency, Mme. Roland’s speech and interaction are excellent examples of practices that reproduce gender images and relations or... sometimes tacitly criticize and resist them.

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Chapter 5

Echoes of modernity: Nationalism and the enigma of “women’s language” in late nineteenth century Japan*

Miyako Inoue

From approximately 1887 through World War I, a surge of commentaries were written and circulated in the Japanese print media about the “strange” and “unpleasant” (*mimizawarina*) sounds issuing from the mouths of schoolgirls. Male intellectuals of various affiliations located the source of their dismay in verb-ending forms such as *teyo*, *noyo*, *dawa* that occurred at the end of schoolgirl utterances.¹ They called such speech forms ‘schoolgirl speech’ (*jogakusei-kotoba*). It was jarring to their ears; it sounded vulgar and low class; its prosodic features were described as “fast,” “contracting,” and “bouncing with a rising intonation”; and it was condemned as “sugary and shallow.” Using the newly available modern textual space of “reported speech” (Voloshinov 1973), male intellectuals cited what they scornfully referred to as “teyo-dawa speech’ (*teyodawa kotoba*) in an effort to convince parents and educators to discourage it as a corrupt form of speaking. The irony here is that many of the speech forms then identified as schoolgirl speech are today associated with “women’s language,” or the “feminine” speech style, indexing the figure of the generic urban middle-class woman.² The contemporary discourse of Japanese women’s language erases this historical emergence from social memory to construct women’s language as an essential and timeless part of culture and tradition. Public opinion, responding to a perceived social change toward gender equity, recurrently deplores what once again is described as linguistic corruption and the cultural loss of an authentic women’s language.

As a demographic category,³ the term *schoolgirl* referred to girls and young women of the elite classes who attended the women’s secondary schools that had been instituted as part of the early Meiji modernization project inspired by Western liberal Enlightenment thought. By the late 19th century, women’s secondary education had been incorporated into the state’s mandatory education system, and schoolgirls became the immediate

and direct target of the state's constitution of the (gendered) national subject by educating them into "good wives and wise mothers" for modernizing Japan and, thereby, transforming them into "modern Japanese women." Although they constituted less than 0.1 percent of the female school-age population in the middle Meiji, schoolgirls and their (apparently cacophonous) voices were incessantly *cited*, just as their (apparently ubiquitous) presence was continuously *sighted* as an ambivalent icon of modernizing Japan.⁴

What is significant is that male intellectuals were not just distracted by schoolgirl speech but that they positioned themselves in the act of overhearing. Consider the scene of a modern Japanese male intellectual *flâneur* walking on the increasingly urban streets of Tokyo, pausing to eavesdrop on the conversation of schoolgirls. What possesses him as an urban ethnographer/observer to stop and listen to their unspeakably "strange" voice, which he identifies, not as inarticulate noise, undifferentiated from other elements of the sonic landscape of the modernizing city, but as a speech form that signifies in the order of social things? What were the historical conditions of possibility that predisposed intellectuals to hear this schoolgirl voice as "language?" Although hearing someone's voice on the street might seem natural and obvious, perception (whether auditory or visual) is never a natural or unmediated phenomenon but is always already a social practice. The practice of hearing and seeing, and the subject positions of listener and observer, is as socially constructed and historically emergent as are other corporeal sites and practices of subject formation, such as the body, sex and gender, and race and nationality. A particular mode of hearing and seeing is, then, an effect of a regime of social power, occurring at a particular historical conjuncture, that enables, regulates, and proliferates sensory as well as other domains of experience. The moment of hearing schoolgirl speech not as noise but as a signifier – as *meaning* something to the hearer – is a critical sociohistorical horizon in Japanese modernity.

These auditory practices are embedded in a "language ideology," or a linguistic regime of the social, that underlies and produces social knowledge of the "structure" of language, retroactively regimenting it, and delimits certain (pragmatic) effects of its use (Silverstein 1979).⁵ This metapragmatic awareness, which is, in this case, the recognition of certain linear sequences of sounds as segmentable and as socially meaningful, is historically specific and contingent on a determinate language ideology that it, in turn, informs. Language ideology sets the boundary for what counts as language and what does not and the terms, techniques, and modalities of hearing and citing.

This chapter thus concerns the liminal or interstitial space where noise and language are neither naturally pre-given nor phenomenologically immanent. It explores the conditions of possibility for the schoolgirl to be heard and cited and thus to be acoustically recognized as a cultural being by Meiji intellectuals as listening subjects. I argue that the modern Japanese woman came into being as a culturally meaningful category in and through her imputed acoustic presence. Citational practices amounted ultimately to consolidating the metapragmatic category of schoolgirl speech and thereby belong to a discursive space where male intellectuals produced and contained the knowledge of the schoolgirl and her “voice” in a way that “she,” as an acoustic substance, became knowable only as an (assimilated) other. Undoing and denaturalizing this liminal space will render visible (and audible) the discursive and ideological work in the auditory construction of her as the other of the modern Japanese (male) subject.

This chapter therefore links the auditory emergence of the schoolgirl with various social forces and projects of Japanese modernity at the turn of the 20th century. These include a cluster of language-modernization movements (*gembun'itchi*), the state's containment of “Japanese” womanhood, and the consolidation of a new temporality that underwrote the very concept of modernity itself – a sense of drastic social and cultural change, displacement, and progress, as well as a perceived temporal “lag” in comparison to the West. The chapter then examines metapragmatic commentaries by intellectuals on schoolgirl speech published and circulated in the print media at the turn of the century and shows the semiotic process by which they converted schoolgirl speech from mere sound or noise into a sign, constructing the schoolgirl as the other by containing her voice metapragmatically.

However, the citational practices that produced schoolgirl speech as an index of vulgarity and commonness also, in turn, constituted the male intellectual as a particular historical subject. This chapter therefore examines the formation of a listening subject beyond the level of the merely pragmatic (the sociolinguistic value of schoolgirl speech) to ask how the speech of schoolgirls became “the object voice” (Dolar 1996), a psychic object, through which the male intellectual was constituted as a listening subject uniquely situated in the context of late 19th- and early-20th-century modernizing Japan. Despite the apparent stability of male subjectivity and its power to effect the auditory containment of the schoolgirl, male intellectuals were in turn interpellated by what schoolgirl speech psychically presented to them.⁶ I argue that schoolgirl speech was “unpleasant to the ears”

because it exposed the shakiness of Japan's modernity and the extent to which the Japanese (male) modern self as the subject of Japan's modernity was (and is) inherently fractured with internal contradiction and ambivalence. In the broader sense of Freud's term, schoolgirl speech was "uncanny" because it revealed "something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light" (1990: 364).

Through the examination of the auditory construction of the modern Japanese woman, this chapter engages the enterprise of comparative modernities by showing the primacy of sound as a locus of the experience and knowledge production of the modern. The connection between vision and modernity has been explored in work influenced by Walter Benjamin (1968) that points to the productivity, autonomy, and historicity of vision (Crary 1990; see also Fujitani 1996). Auditory experience (i.e., sound, the act of listening and relaying into the system of indexicality) has, however, been given relatively sparse attention in terms of its historical connection to modernity. This chapter aims to complicate the hegemony of *vision* as well as the centrality of the Western sensory experience of the modern. The schoolgirl's voice was heard in Japan as an echo of an "other" modernity, coming from the margin, and was, thus, heard as threatening to Japan's (male) modernity.

1. *Jogakusei* (schoolgirls): Neither producers nor reproducers

The schoolgirl constituted an unprecedented category of Japanese women. Although the majority of young women were producers (workers) who eventually married to become reproducers (wives and mothers), schoolgirls occupied a newly defined interstitial space for the duration of their schooling, being neither producers nor reproducers.⁷ However, outside the direct control of their fathers and families, schoolgirls were nonetheless subjected to the modernizing projects of the state, the market, and civil society by their interpellation within the (ideal) gendered subject position designated by Japan's industrial capitalism as an urban, middle-class, consumer-housewife.

The idea of "educating women" was nothing new.⁸ What was new in the Meiji period was that women's education came to be a target of the newly centralized state and thus a project that was both *national* and *modern*. To put it differently, educating women came to be equated with "nationalizing" women (Ueno 1998). In the 1870s and early 1880s, a series of Western

books on democratic rights and the Enlightenment by authors such as Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Alexis de Tocqueville were translated and introduced to Japanese intellectuals. This body of Western liberal political philosophy not only became the philosophical foundation for “the people’s rights movement” (*jiyûminkenundô*) but also informed the progressive intellectuals on the modern (and Western) ideal of womanhood and “sex equity.”⁹ Such texts were the foundation for advocating women’s status as citizens of the modern nation-state and, therefore, the importance of educating them. Nonetheless, the idea of citizenship under Japan’s enlightenment project was essentially and inescapably gendered. For women, citizenship was ultimately to be achieved through motherhood. As Koyama (1991) and other historians have pointed out, the emphasis on motherhood was relatively absent in pre-Meiji primers. Motherhood became a discursive apparatus that defined the modern discipline of citizenship for women. The worth of women would be to raise the imperial and national subjects of the next generation, who would contribute to building modern Japan. The Education Order of 1872 stipulated mandatory primary education for both genders (with school curricula, of course, being far from gender neutral) and supported the first normal school for women, founded in 1874.¹⁰

Beyond the fact that schoolgirls were the daughters of the elite, who had access to the kind of education envisioned by the agents of modernization (including state officials, intellectuals, and Christian missionaries), their cultural significance lay in their intrinsic *modern publicness*. From the beginning, schoolgirls were public beings, objects of visual consumption who were subject to the distanced and objective male-national gaze. They were to be sighted in public space, particularly in *modern* space, as iconic figures essential to the new urban landscape, including parks, department stores, museums, zoos, train stations, and downtown streets. Whatever the social realities and actual experiences of the young women identifying themselves as *jogakusei* might have been, they were mediated beings, represented in various modern representational genres both visually and textually. They were, for example, aesthetic objects of “modern Japanese painting” (*ni-honga*) (Inoue 1996), postcards,¹¹ and photographs, as well as characters in novels and as images in print advertising. *Jogakusei* in this sense were both the first subject and first object of the modern Japanese woman whose experiential realities were interchangeable with a “reality” that was accessible in mediated, imagined, and consumable forms. It was the *copies* of the schoolgirl that became “the original”¹² in the process of citational accumu-

lation, and these copies became complexly inscribed on the bodies of living young women.

Guy Debord (1977) calls such a mode of representation “spectacle,” a commodified form of display and sight under capitalist circulation and exchange.¹³ Stripped of the historical and material trace of having been manufactured, spectacle is a sheer surface and appearance that conceals the exploitation, struggle, and antagonism that capitalist social relations inevitably entail. Analogous to what Marx said of wage workers and the commodities they produce, spectacle constitutes “a social relation among people, mediated by images” (Debord 1977: para. 4), where the relationship between the original and its image is inverted.¹⁴ The schoolgirl was, in Marx’s sense, fetishized.¹⁵

Because of her spectacular publicness, possessing neither history nor material social relations, the schoolgirl worked as an empty signifier masking the social and historical condition that made her cultural existence possible. The schoolgirl functioned as a sign to the extent that she represented something *other than herself*. As Elizabeth Cowie observes, “The form of the sign – in linguistic terms the signifier – may empirically be woman, but the signified (i.e., the meaning) is not woman” (Cowie 1978: 60). Furthermore, the schoolgirl is a sign of menace and transgression needing to be tamed because her publicness potentially blurs the boundary that distinguishes “modern women” from prostitutes or women in the pleasure quarters, another category of “public” (and “working”) women.¹⁶ Policing women’s sexuality is all about policing class and other social boundaries. As feminist art historian Griselda Pollock notes, “Woman as a sign signifies social order; if the sign is misused it can threaten disorder. The category woman is of profound importance to the order of a society” (1988: 32). Modern social order in crisis is the male subject in crisis. In the context of the development of modern cities in 18th- and 19th-century Europe, male anxiety was projected onto transgressive female figures such as prostitutes, kleptomaniacs, and women who were seen as hysterical or mad.

It is not mere coincidence, therefore, that essays and commentaries on schoolgirl speech started to appear in the print media in the mid to late 1880s, precisely when the political climate took a reactionary turn against what was perceived to be a too rapid Westernization and modernization. By the middle of the Meiji period, the major institutional infrastructure for the centralized government had come to include the Meiji Constitution (promulgated in 1889), the opening of the national legislature (the Diet) in 1890,

and other nationalizing channels that facilitated communication between the center and the regional peripheries. But these changes characterized as Westernization did not go unchallenged, and reaction in some quarters, combined with the rise of nationalism associated with the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), occasioned an increasingly nativist political impulse advocating a “return” to “Japanese tradition,” including the emperor and Confucianism. This reactionary movement was reflected in the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890 that emphasized the Confucian moral virtue of loyal subjects as the foundation of the national polity (*kokutai*). The Imperial Rescript was memorized and recited in schools. In this political climate, the supposedly Western liberal ideal of women’s education met with severe criticism that resulted in the decline of the missionary-run women’s schools, the elimination of English and Chinese classics as a subject in many women’s schools, and a proposal to abolish women’s education entirely. Schoolgirl speech emerged as a “problem” precisely at the time when state officials and intellectuals attempted to reinvent “modern” Japan as autonomous from, uncontaminated by, and mutually exclusive to, the West.

A turn-of-the-century dispute over trade illustrates how social crisis was displaced by, and projected onto, a gendered moral crisis. The Ansei Commercial Treaties of 1858, which permitted commercial transactions by “non-Japanese” only within specific jurisdictions, were ratified in 1899. These agreements allowed for free commercial activity, including capital investment, by non-Japanese. Not surprisingly, public commentaries articulated fears about what would happen as a result of these treaties. Referring to the post-1899 situation as *naichi zakkyo* (*naichi* meaning “domestic,” or, in this case, Japan, and *zakkyo* meaning “living together”), the public debate anticipated a “culture war,” an attack by Western civilization on Japanese indigenous culture: Japan would be put in moral and cultural chaos through open and direct competition with “foreigners” (i.e., Westerners) in all areas of society, from commerce to morality. More precisely, however, the concern was that Japan would be held up to Western standards of modernity and would be found wanting. Would Japanese civilization and moral standards be strong enough to withstand Western influence and judgment on an everyday basis? This question focused attention on the need for the improvement of women’s education. As Katayama Seiichi (1984: 91–94) and Fukaya Masashi (1981: 160–162) rightly point out, it was the increasingly heated debate over *naichi zakkyo* that triggered the state’s interest in establishing regulations on women’s higher education. The purity and sta-

bility of national (and racial) identity was, thus, both marked and measured by the disciplining of women's sexuality and morality.¹⁷

The Directive on Girl's High Schools (*Kotôtôjogakkôrei*) was issued in 1899 and signaled the state's official incorporation of the principle of "good wife and wise mother" into its policy for women's education. The phrase "good wife and wise mother" presents the proposition that women should contribute to the nation-state as (gendered) citizens by helping their fathers and husbands at home and by raising children to be loyal subjects of the emperor. Although it undeniably invoked Confucian ideals of women's virtue, the idea of achieving citizenship through being a homemaker and mother – by providing a direct linkage between the state and the family – is complicit with, and necessary to, the modern industrial capitalist state and its gendered arrangements for production and reproduction. The figure of the good wife and wise mother was meant to consolidate a new class of bourgeois (and petit bourgeois) families.¹⁸

Under the 1899 directive, women's secondary education was incorporated into the state-regulated public education system. The law stipulated that at least one public women's normal school be established in each prefecture. Under the new regulations, the school curriculum added a new emphasis on scientific and efficient home management, including hygiene, saving, and household accounting, in addition to a range of gender-specific skills and bodies of knowledge that constituted a new middle-class female sociality and forms of social distinction, including sewing, cooking, flower arrangement, and so on. At the same time, a series of everyday school routines, including the recitation of the Imperial Rescript on Education, was meant to ensure loyalty to the emperor.

As a result, although there were 37 women's secondary schools (out of which only nine were public) in 1899, by 1915 the number rose to 143, with 20,117 students, constituting 5 percent of the total female population (*Kôtô jogakkô kenkyûkai* 1994: 25–26). Even more importantly, the new regulations dovetailed with the economic transformation after the Sino–Japanese War. Between the Russo–Japanese War and World War I, the postwar boom accelerated industrialization and urbanization and ultimately precipitated the full-fledged formation of a new middle class in urban areas. Surplus laborers in the rural areas flowed into the growing cities, including Tokyo, as job-seeking wage workers. At the same time, a new managerial–professional class began to appear. These functionaries and their families particularly embodied the social relations of the new middle class, characterized by the nuclear family, the spatial separation of work and home,

and the gendered division of labor between production and reproduction. Women's education had to respond to an increasing demand for educated wives and mothers for the new middle-class salaried masses.

2. Linguistic modernity and the auditory construction of the other

The acoustic presence of the schoolgirl was represented by how she ended her utterances. Meiji intellectuals focused on the verb-ending forms, such as *teyo*, *dawa*, *koto-yo*, *wa*, *chatta*, *noyo*.²⁰ Glossed as *gobi* or *kotobajiri* (meaning the end or the tail of words or utterances), verb-ending forms are "metapragmatically salient"²¹ in the sense that unlike other structural parts of language, they are formally segmentable and extractable from the rest of the utterance. Pragmatic effect is thus formally locatable in the segmented form, which makes speakers more aware of linguistic forms and functions. Such a conscious knowledge in turn allows the speaker reflexively to *use* this knowledge by objectifying and describing the given speech form and generating narratives about it (professional scholarly linguistic theory – an institutionalized narrative of language – is, of course, not an exception because it is not autonomous from its social formation).

Although metapragmatic salience accounts for a structural ground for focusing attention on verb-ending forms, the key question is how this structural factor articulated with a particular historical moment. The motivation to act on this structural possibility is found in the historical processes of Japan's modernity and modernization, in which the consolidation of women as a category of alterity was a necessary condition for the modern Japanese subject. The metapragmatic construction of women's language underwrites a specific way in which alterity comes into the auditory realm, where the boundary between language and nonlanguage is contingent on a semiotic order that is functional for social formations in general and to the historical specificities of Japanese modernity in particular.

Michel de Certeau's (1984, 1988) sustained discussion of colonial historiographies in the New World is helpful here, for it exemplifies a semiotic strategy for the containment of alterity that parallels the issue of Japanese women's language. He argues that imperial "writing" in the context of the New World was interchangeable with colonizing power. Writing entails a scriptural operation that collects and classifies information on exteriority or alterity and transforms it in a way that conforms to the systems of domina-

tion that writing caters to, including, as de Certeau asserts, science, the modern city, industry, and, more generally, modern political-economic institutions. Writing is, thus, “capitalist and conquering” (de Certeau 1984: 135).

Essential to the working of a scriptural economy is the immutable separation that materializes in the text between its exteriority or alterity and its textual identity, whereby “writing” separates yet contains and thus conquers the other, whether this is a racial minority, “primitives,” women, children, or the working class. This sense of writing approximates Benedict Anderson’s (1983) discussion of the role of a vernacular “print language” in the rise of nationalism and the modern nation-state. Through the mediation of its semiotic structure, which may take concrete form through modern representational genres such as the novel and the newspaper, the individual comes to learn a sense of belonging to the nation-state. Thus, the import of print language lies not so much in its symbolic dimension (symbolizing, for example, the unity of a community), nor in its iconic dimension (where a unified form of language rationalizes a unified community),²² but in its *indexical* dimension – its mobility and mediality, its traffic in “shifters.”²³ Print language works as an archetype of tele-technology, which spatially and temporally displaces, transports, and circulates events and ideas in an expanding and socially colonizing market of print capitalism.²⁴ It is an institutionalized process of dislocating and relocating the text, or of entextualization, decontextualization, and recontextualization.²⁵ In this process, novels and newspapers exemplify a specific mode of narrative that structurally positions the narrator, as the agent of tele-technology, as a rational and objective observer and spokesperson describing what is narrated. This subject position, as Benjamin Lee (1997) so eloquently argues, forges a specifically modern subjectivity inhabited by the citizen of the imagined national community that necessarily has its outside or others, even when these are internal. The construction of modern subjectivity is constituted in relation to an alterity – the other is not an accidental by-product but is a necessary condition for the modern self.

Narrative structure as in the novel, for example, makes it possible formally to distinguish self from other by the use of framing devices such as quotation and “reported speech”²⁶ – the only way by which the other can “speak” in the text.²⁷ The notion of civil society as anonymous and blind to difference is made possible by masking the utter exclusion of those who are other to the bourgeois male. Likewise, modern textual space is seemingly “civil” by allowing a formally delimited space where the other is permitted to speak (as “different but equal”). This textual practice parallels the fetish-

ism of capitalism. Just as labor and social relations are reified in capitalist society, the voice of alterity represented in print language is also stripped of its history and material agency and put on public display, incessantly dislocated, circulated, and subjected to the consuming gaze.

When alterity “speaks” in reported speech, it is no longer the speaker who is speaking. As de Certeau (1986: 53) reminds us, the logic of a scriptural economy is one of “displacements and distortions” (cf. Bakhtin 1981).²⁸ What makes reported speech sound as if the other were truly speaking is the institutionalization of the historical relationship between quoting and quoted. To put it differently, it is this “metaleptic split” (Sakai 1996: 196–202) that allows reported speech to pass for “speech,” a vocal event that actually took place in the past. Reported speech creates an “author function” (Foucault 1977), an illusion of a real person speaking by assigning the grammatical subject (“I”) to the (constructed and objectified) subjectivity of the person quoted. Reported speech, when made possible and appropriated by projects of modernity, is a powerful linguistic apparatus to conquer alterity and thus to consolidate the modern self.

Japan had its emergent moment of linguistic modernity at the turn of the century through a cluster of language modernization movements called *gem-bun’itchi*. These language reforms introduced those textual strategies and formal apparatuses described above, including the form of reported speech formally separating self and other and the development of language as a tele-technology to cite, dislocate, and relocate the ephemeral voice of the other. Various agents of modernization sought to create a modern standard Japanese language for their own ends, to rationalize it as a medium for government, education, law, commerce, print capitalism, and the military, as well as to make it a unifying medium for the spiritual bond of the nation. For the literary community, which eventually led the *gembun’itchi* movement, a new language and a new literary genre (i.e., narrative prose) were necessary to represent a (new) modern Japanese subjectivity. *Gembun’itchi* means ‘unifying speech and writing.’ Emulating the European realist novels, *gembun’itchi* writers sought to create a new mode of language by experimenting with colloquial-based writing styles. This resulted in a new conception of language that gave primacy to “speech” as the epistemological basis of language for its immediacy and present-ness and its presumed unmediated access to “truth” and “reality” through which the inner self of the modern subject (and the modern world he lived in) could be transparently and faithfully represented. The crux of this new language ideology lies, however, in its trick of *indexical inversion*: it actively constructs the

very reality that it claims to be representing. Directly reporting the speech of the other became a textual device made possible by the realist imperative of verisimilitude, and the voice of the narrator became, in turn, an authoritative presence that through “giving voice,” silently reports, dislocates, and, thereby, constitutes it as other.²⁹

Recognizing quotation as a textual strategy of containment and as the only means by which alterity – otherwise suppressed and excluded – can return to the text, de Certeau further argues that the intra-textual hierarchy between the quoting and the quoted has to do with the way the latter is reduced to mere phonic matter – voice, scream, cry, grunt, or noise – that which is not capable of signifying by itself. This sense of sound is precisely what Saussure’s (1959) concept of “sound” (phoneme) precludes. The phoneme is part of a system of language. Therefore it is essentially *negative* in the sense that only the difference between one sound and another makes meaning. Phonic matter, as a material substance, is an extension or marker of the physical proximity of the body.³⁰ Whereas *his* language (modern/standard/written Japanese) is neither bound by space nor time, *her* language (speech) “never leaves the place of its production. In other words, *the signifier cannot be detached from the individual or collective body*. It cannot be exported. Here speech is the body which signifies” (de Certeau 1988: 216; see also Adorno 1990).

Referring to Jean de Léry’s 16th-century ethnographic writing on the Tupinamba, an Amazonian native people, de Certeau describes how Léry’s ear (in addition to, but independently of, his eye, which discovered them as exotic and spectacular) heard their speech as “poetic” sound. De Certeau thus notes: “The suppression of the native’s effective uncanniness corresponds to the replacement of his exterior reality by a voice. This is a familiar displacement. The other returns in the form of ‘noises and howls,’ or ‘softer and more gracious sounds.’ These ghostly voices are blended into the spectacle to which the scriptural operation has reduced the Tupi” (de Certeau 1988: 231). Reduced to pure sonorous properties with no signifying ability, alterity is then represented by writing for “exactly what is heard but not understood, hence ravished from the body of productive work: speech without writing, the song of pure enunciation, *the act of speaking without knowing* – a pleasure in saying or in hearing” (1988: 227; emphasis added). Alterity thus speaks but does so without knowing what she is saying. She cannot signify by herself and therefore possesses neither objective knowledge nor truth, a position that de Certeau refers to as “fable”: “To define the position of the other (primitive, religious, mad, childlike, or

popular) as fable is not merely to identify it with ‘what speaks’ (*fari*), but with a speech that ‘does not know’ what it says” (1984: 160).

The kernel working at the core of linguistic modernity reduces alterity to an ephemeral acoustics with neither mobility nor signifying power and thereby translates it into a “message.” This sense-making process is governed only by the one who does the citing. De Certeau concludes: “We have thus a first image of the voice simultaneously ‘cited’ (as before a court of law) and ‘altered’ – a lost voice, erased even within the object itself (the fable) whose scriptural construction it makes possible” (1984: 161). To cite is, thus, to alter.

Such an intratextual hierarchy inherent in linguistic modernity is sustained by layers of dichotomies that effectively isolate alterity: writing and orality, past and present,³¹ truth and fable, citing and the cited, the subject and object of writing. And these binaries are projected on the historical and social construction of gender, class, and race.³² For example, we can think of the history of how hysteria became gendered as a female abnormality and treated in “appropriately” gendered ways. A woman’s “hysterical” verbal language is dismissed as split and incoherent and is considered to bear no signifying faculty. The (male) analyst then “listens” to her bodily symptoms, and these can make sense only through the analyst’s diagnostic exegesis built upon the language of modernity.

Michael Warner’s study of the cultural meaning of printing in the construction of the public sphere in 18th-century America similarly illustrates the reduction of the other to sonorous properties. Warner draws on Maryland physician Alexander Hamilton’s visit to New York City in the early 1740s, where he was amused to hear and record the encounter between his black slave, Dromo, and a Dutch-speaking black woman. He examines how Hamilton recorded the “fragmented” and “incomplete” speech (dialects) of the two women by quoting/citing them in his coherent narrative. The racial other of the elite white male was dissolved into “phonemic particularity” – illiterate, frivolous, and dialectal (Warner 1990: 13–14). The key point is that this auditory construction of the racial other was the critical condition of cultural and political linkage between “printed-ness” and whiteness. The only way for the racial other to enter into the circulation of written discourse and therefore into the (white male bourgeois) public sphere was to be cited and quoted by a subject interpellated as both white and male.

As in de Certeau’s “fable” and Warner’s “phonemic particularity,” alterity, once cited, is deprived of its semiotic capacity to provide itself with *metalanguage* (an authoritative representation of what the cited voice

means). The epistemic violence of linguistic modernity lies, therefore, not so much in its erasure of what the other is saying but in the exclusion of what that other is saying about what he or she said.

The metapragmatic containment of the schoolgirl embodies a similar process. Key to this in the historical specifics of modernizing Japan is its linkage with the structural specificity of verb-ending forms. As explained above, the schoolgirl's voice was represented typically not through what she said but how she said it. And this pragmatic effect was located and identified in her verb-ending forms. Verb-ending forms are *nonreferential* in that they do not contribute to the semantic meaning of the utterance.³³ For example, regardless of which verb-ending form is attached to the end of the utterance “dawa” or “noyo,” the propositional value of the utterance is not affected.

In addition to their being propositionally insignificant, it is important to note that verb-ending forms are syntactically positioned at the end of utterances and phrases and are attached mainly to verbs and auxiliary verbs but also to nouns and adjectives. Because of the given syntactic position and its nonreferential nature, verb-ending forms are inherently unstable in terms of grammaticality: distinguishing between what counts as a verb-ending form and what does not, or whose verb-ending form counts as such and whose does not (in terms of the binary between the standard and the regional dialects), is a political task, handled in this case by authorities such as the National Language Research Institute (Kokuritsu Kokugo Kenkyūsho). Verb-ending forms literally hang on the edge of an utterance, on the borderline between language and noise. Some endings are classified as language and others as cries, screams, voiced breath, other vocal registers, or at best, “dialects.” They do not mark meaning so much as the sheer materiality of the speaker's voice, and they belong more to her body than to her language (or mind).³⁴

The focus of citation on the nonreferential part of schoolgirl utterance is, therefore, neither a mere historical accident nor a linguistic-structural inevitability. Reducing the cultural significance of her speech to its nonreferential aspect denies and represses her *referential* voice, her will to mean and signify something in a rational manner. This is precisely a way of turning her speech into a “fable” – she is speaking, but she does not know what she is saying. In fact, this referential void became a caricature of schoolgirl speech (as “nonsense”). One of the most frequently cited phrases attributed to schoolgirl speech is ‘Yoku-(t)teyo, shiranai-wa,’ meaning ‘It is okay, I don’t care (or I don’t know),’ or something that is equivalent to the pre-

sumably vacuous utterance “Whatever” in Valley Girl speech in America. As a speech act, the reporting of schoolgirl speech produces the pragmatic effect of irrationality, incoherence, and garrulousness that contributes all the more to the imposed indexical meanings of *teyo* and *dawa*. Alterity is, thus, tamed and contained not by being silenced but on the contrary by being allowed to be loquacious.

This reduction to mere sound is also an effect of the particular mode of listening on the part of male intellectuals. Unlike the normative communication model (common in many cases of alterity construction), there was no sense of direct exchange between the listener and the schoolgirl. As with Warner’s Alexander Hamilton, male intellectuals overheard and cited speech that was not addressed to them. The anonymous and detached objectivity of the male intellectual’s ear thus follows his likewise anonymous and objective gaze, as demanded by his subjective positioning in modern (Japanese) language. Baron Ishiguro embodies this position of both seeing and hearing in a passage dating from 1911:

In the old days, one used to be able to identify whether she is an artisan, the wife of a low-ranking samurai, or the wife of a lord, just by looking at the footwear left at the front door. But nowadays, the situation is such that even by clothing, much less footwear, one cannot easily tell what status her husband holds. Today, when you listen through the *fusuma* [paper sliding door] to a female guest talking in the living room, things are completely different from the old days. When you think that she is either a *samisen* [a three-stringed Japanese banjo] or a dance teacher, it surprisingly turns out that she is a wife of status. Or when you think that she is a dancing girl or an apprentice, she turns out to be a schoolgirl wearing purple *hakama* [a long pleated skirt worn over a kimono]. This is because order in language has been disappearing (829).

Here is a communicative event without communication. The object of the gaze is similar to the prisoner in Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon: “He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication” (Foucault 1979: 200). Baron Ishiguro hears the woman without seeing her or verbally interacting with her. She registers in his text as an acoustic presence alone. This disembodied voice, which Michel Chion (1994: 128–131, 1999) would call *acousmètre* (sound without indication of its source), invites the listener to search for its owner and therefore begs for metapragmatic narratives about the identity of the speaker.

How, then, does a nonreferential form acquire “meaning”? There is no semantic origin from which certain analogical or etymological inference is possible. Speech that is overheard may not reveal how the pragmatic meaning of verb-ending forms emerges intersubjectively in an exchange between two speakers. My point is that the foundational (first) order of indexicality was to be discursively created by metapragmatic citation. The nonreferential part of speech is context bound, and meaning cannot be understood without knowledge of the place and time, the sociological biographies of the participants, and other contextual information regarding where the utterance was made. To cite or to quote is to remove the utterance from its original context and to deprive it of any indexical grounding. To cite speech, then, is inevitably to (re)create – and alter – the context in which the utterance makes sense indexically. In addition, treating speech more as inarticulate sound than as signs, by focusing more on the materiality and physicality of the voice than on the symbolic, renders it particularly susceptible to metapragmatic framings. Reduced to verb-ending forms and to sound and noise as opposed to the signification of meaning, schoolgirl speech makes sense only by the authority narrating and textualizing it. Just as the psychiatrist “listens” to the hysteric’s body language, male intellectuals heard the bodily “female” symptoms that in themselves lacked any signification. Metapragmatic commentaries that framed and reported schoolgirl speech were, then, acts of manufacturing context – producing the social and cultural knowledge that gave indexical meaning to the given speech form, including a history (etymology and origin) of the form, a sociological and psychological profile of the speaker, and its pragmatic effects. As footprints index the presence of the person who left them or as smoke indicates the presence of a chimney nearby, there is always a sense of a time lag. Metapragmatic commentaries, which retroactively manufacture the context or what the given speech form indexes, simulate this temporal effect and normalize the indexical relationship, as if the manufactured context had actually preceded the given speech form. They inevitably point to the (imagined) truth.

3. The semiotics of “unpleasant to the ears”

Below, I analyze the metapragmatic commentaries on schoolgirl speech in the light of the semiotic strategies of containment by which it was regimented and converted from sound to sign (that is, as signifying vulgarity

and commonness). My point here is not simply to catalogue how schoolgirl speech was cited and attributed with pragmatic meanings but to examine the logic of semiotic mediation and rationalization that underlies the metapragmatic narratives of the schoolgirl as the other of modern Japanese subjecthood.

In the imputed world of the linguistic, the nonreferential signifies as an index by pointing to some contextual feature of speech: demographic, cultural, social, psychological, cognitive, and so on. For example, the use of *teyo* sounds vulgar because it is used by prostitutes. Or *teyo* is vulgar because it is not “grammatical” (and nongrammatical use of language is commonly heard among the “lower classes”). Thus the form, which does not generate a meaning by itself, needs to be latched on to an existing indexical relationship (“prostitutes are vulgar”), a metonymical or metaphorical extension in which *teyo* points toward a particular association. An “order” of indexicality is manufactured by connecting *teyo* to a semiotic chain of associations that link it to vulgarity, the “lower classes,” the figure of the prostitute, and back again; and it is this indexical order that enables speech forms to function indexically. A particular social, cultural, and psychological domain (class, gender, region, affect, stance, and so on) becomes in this way a coded way to signify another domain. Thus, metapragmatic framing and citing crafts a foundational narrative that rationalizes and naturalizes a causal and self-enclosed circuit of meanings to the extent that the given speech form – for example, *teyo* – is fetishized as if there were some essential quality of vulgarity intrinsic to it.³⁵

This is a critical part of the process by which speech reduced to inarticulate sound/noise is (re)organized and socialized into an indexical sign. For the Meiji intellectuals to analyze (i.e., to indexicalize) the schoolgirls’ speech was a “strategy of containment” (Jameson 1981: 10): The schoolgirl is turned from an unbridled, unknown other, exterior to the discourse of modernity, into a knowable and familiar Other by structuring her (voice) into the *margin* of the economy of difference so that her identity makes sense (to the male intellectual) only as systematic difference from the center.³⁶

3.1. *Origin narratives of vulgarity*

One of the earliest commentaries on schoolgirl speech appeared in 1888 in a women’s magazine, *Kijo no tomo* ‘The lady’s friend’. This short essay,

titled “Vogue Speech,” was by Ozaki Koyo, one of the best-known Meiji writers.

In it he notes: “I do not remember exactly when, but for the last eight or nine years, girls in a primary school have been using strange language in their conversation among themselves.” He then lists the following examples of what he refers to as the “strange” speech of schoolgirls (see Figure 1).

Ume wa mada “Plum trees do not yet bloom”	sa-ka-naku (t)te-yo [‘bloom’-not-teyo]
Ara mō “Oh dear, they did already bloom”	sa-(k)i-ta-noyo [‘bloom’-(past tense)-noyo]
Ara mō “Oh dear, they did already bloom”	sa-(k)i-teyo* [‘bloom’-(past tense)-teyo]
Sakura no hana wa mada “It certainly looks that cherry blossoms will not yet have bloomed”	sa-ka-nai-n(o)-dawa [‘bloom’-not-dawa]
*As I will discuss later, teyo is attached to a ren’yō form. The ren’yō form could be ambiguous in terms of tense because it does not contain grammatical information on tense. In other words, one cannot tell by the verb-phrase itself about its tense. I translated this example as a past tense because of the adverbial, mō, meaning “already.”	

Figure 1. List of schoolgirls’ vulgar speech forms cited by Ozaki Koyo

Ozaki continues:

In the last five or six years even those girls in the girls’ high school have acquired such speech, and it has even reached the society of noblewomen.... The strange speech that schoolgirls use today was formerly used by the daughters of the low-class samurai [*gokenin*] in the Aoyama area before the Meiji Restoration.... Thoughtful ladies must not let a beautiful jewel become damaged or a polished mirror become clouded by using such language. (Ozaki 1994: 4–5)

Ozaki Koyo’s comments on schoolgirl speech echo those by numerous other educators and intellectuals in pointing out its “dubious” origins and vulgar sounds, deploring its spread among middle-and even upper-class women, and urging educators and parents to discourage it because *how* one speaks is *who* one is (and vice versa).

Other commentators, like Ozaki, identify specific locations, including “the seedy section of Ushigome”(Reijōsaikun no kotoba 1896: 148) or “low-class” neighborhoods in the city of Tokyo. Origin narratives by the male elite commonly point to the “pleasure quarters” in the city of Tokyo

and geisha of various sorts, including apprentices and prostitutes, as the origin of teyo-dawa speech. Teyo-dawa speech was, thus, identified as a form of private speech that spread (as a form of contamination) to the more presentable and bourgeois segments of the society. Takeuchi Kyuichi (1857–1916), a famous sculptor, observed:

As to the question of how such private speech used in the geisha house came to permeate the upper-class family and became the common speech of respectable mothers and daughters: there are a number of former geisha among the wives of now powerful people who became influential as meritorious retainers at the time of the Meiji Restoration. Many other women with whom such women (former geisha wives) interact and closely socialize also have the same previous occupational [geisha] background.... They use such speech as *ii(n)-dayo* ['It is okay'] or *yoku-(t)teyo* ['That's fine'], even to their children. Then, those children acquire such speech and start using it outside their home. That's how speech such as *atai* ['I'] and *yoku-(t)teyo* ['That's fine'] became common usage today. I think this observation would probably not prove wrong. In support of my theory, it was around the time when the offspring of "the ex-geisha-now-upper-class wives" started going to school that such speech became prevalent. (Takeuchi 1907: 24–25)

Baron Ishiguro Tadaatsu (1911: 29) makes a similar point about geisha married to men of status in the time of social upheaval during the Meiji Restoration when it was not considered shameful to have a geisha as a wife. This was how, he explains, the vulgar speech of the "seedy" section of town spread among upper-class women. In addition, he claims that women from the countryside contributed to the spread of teyo-dawa speech by misconstruing it as the noble language of the upper class and emulating it. Other commentators suggest that the 1899 Directive on Women's High Schools opened the door for the daughters of "the lower class" – meaning wealthy merchants and regional landowners³⁷ – to make inroads into girls' high schools and to influence the daughters of the middle and upper classes.

Whether it was the daughters of low-class samurai or the geisha, these origin narratives are symptomatic of a sense of moral panic over social unrest and the collapse of the traditional social order. The commentators felt or (perhaps more appropriately) "heard" it through their auditory senses – social change coming not from the top but from the bottom of the society (class, gender, and regional peripheries). Their familiar social order of class, gender, and the associated spatial boundaries such as those between private and public was collapsing around them. In the male intellectuals'

metapragmatic narratives, this moral unease focused on the figure of the woman in the lower-class, seedy section of town married to gain upper-class status, her speech spreading among upper-class ladies as a source of contamination. To begin with, it was outrageous for them to “hear” women in public space at all. This does not mean that there were no women allowed in public prior to Meiji. On the contrary, one can imagine the abundant presence of women – “working” women on the street, in the market, and other public “work” places. It was the particular kind of women who were supposed to be confined at home whose voices a keen observer could now hear in public places. A distinction among women formerly functioned as the sign that separated the private and the public – upper-class women and public commercial women were never supposed to share the same space. So not only were the private and public spheres collapsing into one another with modernization but the traditional social hierarchy itself was coming apart. The violation of the normative spatial boundary between private and public also mixed the social rules of the informal and the formal. As another anonymous author explains, using the analogy of bodily posture, “the speech in vogue among schoolgirls is one that comes out of their mouths while lying down [relaxed] and not while sitting upright [formal]” (*Gengo no daraku* 1906: 1–2).

3.2. *The iconization of vulgarity: The imaginary trace of linguistic erasure*

Although the vulgarity of teyo-dawa speech was rationalized through its *indexical* (metonymic) relations with the geisha, vulgarity was also claimed for schoolgirl speech through its lack of honorifics.³⁸ This “lack” or “absence” was attributed to “sloppiness,” “laziness,” or “impudence,” signifying to male elites the schoolgirls’ moral corruption and degeneration. For example, in an essay titled “The Corruption of Language” (*Gengo no daraku* 1906: 1–2), the author deplored the use of “*Sô-desu*” [‘It is so’] as omitting an honorific form. “*Desu*” is a “polite” verb-ending form that appeared during the gembun’itchi movement as one of the standard speech/writing forms. The author claimed that schoolgirls should say “*Sô-degozai-masu*” [‘It is so’], a form of honorific that encodes proper deference by a woman. This and other similar commentaries attempted to invoke the imaginary trace of the schoolgirl lazily skipping honorific forms and to recognize a simple “*desu*” as a failure (intentional or otherwise) to use the deferential form.

Another anonymous author writes in 1892:

Recently, a kind of language use is in vogue among schoolgirls. There are countless examples, such as *nasutte*, [‘did’? or ‘have done’?], which should be *nasarimashita-ka* [‘did’? or ‘have done’?]; or *I-(t)teyo* [‘I have gone’], which should be *Yuki-mashita-yo*. (*Kotobazukai* 1892: 74)

Nasu-(t)te is an adverbial inflectional form of the verb *nasa-ru*,³⁹ the polite form of the verb *suru* (“do”) with *te*, a conjunctive suffix. An interrogative utterance that ends with *te*, which is necessarily conjugated with an adverbial inflectional form, is another linguistic property that the Meiji intellectuals identified as *teyo-dawa* speech.⁴⁰ The commentary above rationalized the linguistic corruption of schoolgirls by identifying the expression *nasu-(t)te* as a *failed* form of the polite form *nasari-mashita* in that it lacks the polite auxiliary verb *mashita* (*masu* [polite auxiliary verb] + *ta* [past tense]). In other words, the author sees the imaginary trace of the schoolgirls’ “lazy” act of skipping honorific forms. One author claims that this kind of omission is caused by their speaking too fast. Note that the verb *nasaru* itself already encodes a higher degree of deference than the verb *suru*. The same logic works in the latter example, *i-(t)teyo*. This lack of honorifics is associated with not only rudeness but in this case, the fact that this linguistic form is considered the *contracted* form of *yuki-mashita-yo*,⁴¹ which by an iconic analogy bespeaks indolence and laziness.⁴² In other words, linguistic corruption is rationalized not only by its pragmatic effect of “rudeness” but more importantly in this case, by its grammatical iconicity of “contraction.”

The “laziness” of the schoolgirl is also “evidenced” by phonological contraction. For example, an chapter on schoolgirl speech (*Jogakusei kotoba* 1905) published in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a popular newspaper, listed the verb-ending *chatta*. Tanahashi Junko explains that such contraction (*chatta*) is caused by speaking too fast. She thus notes: “Speech with a rising intonation, or speaking with the ending contracted like bouncing, gives people an unpleasant impression. Speech would sound more feminine and refined if one speaks gently with the ending slightly falling” (Tanahashi 1911: 54).

Syntactic ambiguity is also mobilized as evidence of the schoolgirl’s linguistic corruption. The verb-ending form *teyo* is particularly susceptible to this semiotic rationalization. As I mentioned above, *te* (as in *teyo*) functions something like a connective suffix attached to the adverbial inflected form,⁴³ connecting the verb (or adjective) to which *te* is attached to another

(auxiliary) verb, or linking multiple phrases and clauses, among which *te* establishes a temporal as well as other types of relations. For example, *tabe* (to eat)-*te*, *neru* (to sleep) would be ‘to eat *and* sleep.’ When the predicate ends with a *te*, as in *teyo*, the sentential level of meaning gets suspended and made incomplete. In fact, the adverbial inflected form is sometimes called “suspended form” (Sakuma 1936). It is as though one ended a sentence with “and...”. Furthermore, the verb with *te* attached to it does not encode tense or mood. Without subsequent tense-marking devices such as auxiliary verbs, adverbs, or phrases, tense is unknown. Such structural ambiguity was rationalized by the modernizers as the linguistic alterity of the schoolgirl.

In his essay “The Reform of Teyo-Dawa Speech,” Yanagihara Yoshimitsu observed:

The recent speech of Tokyo has spread from the pleasure quarters to the upper class and has become habitual. For example, like *iyada-wa*, *ikenai-wa*, or *naninani-shi-teyo* and etc., girls heavily abuse *wa*, *teyo*, and so on.⁴⁴ What is even more outrageous is that they use *nasu(t)te* when they mean to say *nasaru-ka* [Are you going to do such-and-such?], and thus they shamelessly mistake the past tense for the future tense (and this is called “low-class language”). (Yanagihara 1908: 14)

Yanagihara claimed that girls incorrectly used *nasutte*. He asserts that *nasutte* is the past tense, whereas the schoolgirls, he claims, use it for the future tense, for example, “Are you going to do such-and-such?” His rationalization derives from morpho-syntactic ambiguity in that *nasutte* could be either the past or the future tense and furthermore, from the fact that both the past-tense-marking auxiliary verb *ta* and connective suffix *te* take the same adverbial inflectional form. Whereas Yanagihara heard *nasutte* as the past tense, it could also well be the future tense. As much as the schoolgirls’ use of *nasutte* is considered “ungrammatical” by male authorities such as Yanagihara, his commentary in turn exhibits, to use Michael Silverstein’s (1981) term, his own “limits of awareness” of linguistic structure.

3.3. *Women reading, speaking, and learning*

Along with the lack of honorifics, phonological contraction, and “strange” verb-ending forms such as *teyo* and *dawa*, the elite commentators also de-

plored the schoolgirls' presumed use of Chinese words (*kango*) and English words as 'unpleasant to the ear' (*kikigurushii*). Both *kango* and English were the distinctive province of the educated male elite, and they were disturbed by hearing "the male language" – their "own" language – spoken by a *female* voice. The schoolgirls' mimicry of this language (*kango* and *keigo*), in what Bhabha calls (1990: 291) "the uncanny fluency of another's language," produced the effect of "sounds familiar but totally strange" to the ear of the male intellectual. Just as teyo-dawa speech was not so much about what the schoolgirls said but how they said it, the schoolgirls' use of *kango* and English was understood not in terms of content but in terms of "the sound of it," as unmediated language, something that begs for metapragmatic commentary yet at the same time exceeds metapragmatic containment.

What made this speech particularly "unpleasant" was its transgression of the speech-gender nexus. *Kango*, or words of Chinese origin, had been traditionally used for specialized texts in commerce, law, and administration and thus had been exclusively associated with the (elite) male writing style. The women of this class were expected to use *wabun*, or traditional Japanese writing limited to writing letters, diaries, and epistles. With the establishment of women's secondary schools, women for the first time had legitimate access to *kango* as part of their school curriculum. But commentators urged schoolgirls to use expressions of Japanese origin (as opposed to Chinese); Japanese expressions were considered to be naturally feminine because, the commentators would explain tautologically, they sound more elegant and soft.⁴⁵ In a way similar to Chinese-origin words, English words were claimed as male in a gendered monopoly of access to, and assimilation and mimicry of, Western modernity and modernization. However, many of the first private girls' schools were founded by Christian missionaries, and English was part of the curriculum to enlighten and to civilize Japanese women. Schoolgirls' use of English words was cited (and often caricatured) as the epiphany of *haikara* (high-collar) or the modern.

The experience of hearing "his" language spoken by schoolgirls was doubly uncanny: he had to hear written language – *kango* and English – in oral speech and he had to hear it in a female voice. Using *kango* in conversation was reflexively stereotyped as the speech style of male high school and university students and was referred to as *shosei kotoba* (male student's speech). "Esoteric" and "bookish," *kango*-mixed language was the language used to talk about politics, economics, and world affairs. Many commentators were scandalized by the fact that the schoolgirls spoke

shosei kotoba, mimicking masculine speech mannerisms. In fact, this male-student-like speech was cited in one of the earliest instances of reported schoolgirl speech, which appeared in 1885 in a short biography in *Jogaku Zasshi*, a women's magazine. By 1887, however, as Masuko Honda (1990: 113–118) notes, the same author had started using teyo-dawa speech to represent the dialogue of schoolgirls.

Let us listen to the scandalized commentators: Ogino Hajime observed: “Nothing is so unpleasant to hear and unsightly to see as women using *kango*” (Ogino 1896: 4). An anonymous writer to a women's magazine commented: “It is extremely unpleasant to the ear to hear women use *kango*. It sounds manlike. It sounds impertinent. When you see them talking in so-called Western language and walking at a late hour of the night, it looks as though high-spirited young men [*sôshi*] were dressed in women's clothes” (*Onna tachi no kotoba bumi kotoba* 1892: 66–67).⁴⁶ Ogino wrote: “Whereas she should say ‘Makoto ni kawaiô desu’ [‘It really is pitiful’], she says ‘Jitsuni renbin desu’ [‘It really is pitiful’]. It goes without saying which is more gentle and modest for women's language use” (Ogino 1896: 4–5). Though they say exactly the same thing, *kango* words (*jitsuni* [‘really’], *renbin* [‘pitiful’]) are used in the latter sentence. What was even more disturbing was the woman's use of both *kango* and teyodawa speech all *in one breath*. An anonymous author deplored the fact that he occasionally heard ladies of the middle class and above mixing (*chanpon*) the vulgarity and crudeness of teyo-dawa speech with the esoteric words of *kango* (*Reijôsaikun no kotoba* 1896: 148).

3.4. Women reading: Novels and newspapers

The schoolgirls' use of vulgar speech such as *teyo* and *dawa* as well as the masculine language of *kango* was also attributed to their access to novels and newspapers. Ogino (1896: 4) claimed that schoolgirls learned *kango* from reading newspapers and novels; others claimed that is where they learned teyodawa speech. What they mainly referred to as the novel, however, was the domestic novel, in which the main character was often a young woman. Writer Uchida Roan (1984: 179) scornfully called it “the *yoku-(t)teyo* novel” because of the perceived excessive use of the teyo-dawa speech in dialogues. In an essay titled “The Schoolgirl's Language” (*Jogakusei no gengo* 1905: 197), the author maintained that the schoolgirl learned and spoke vulgar speech as a result of reading such fiction. The

author of another essay titled “The Corruption of Language” argued that the schoolgirl spoke the vulgar speech because she had been “carried away by the pen of the novel writer” (*Gengo no daraku* 1906: 2). It should be noted that the domestic novel had not initially been “gendered,” and readers were both men and women. As Iida (1998) points out, however, as the novel form gained the status of the textual genre of modernity, it underwent a process of becoming “masculine.” The domestic novel was carved out as a subgenre of the novel. It was severed from the mainstream novel, feminized as “sentimental,” and was thus excluded from the public sphere – that is, from the realm of serious fiction.⁴⁷

Social crisis is indexical crisis. As much as metapragmatic comments allow one to imagine the expansive figure of the schoolgirl learning, reading, and speaking (out!), what also emerges is the figure of the male intellectual deeply disturbed by the familiar social, cultural, class, and gender boundaries becoming blurred, transgressed, and nullified. The kind of indexical order male intellectuals knew seemed no longer to work. They “heard” the loss of the primordial social order of the pre-Meiji Restoration and the anticipated chaos and crisis of social change. This change may well have been heard as an “other” modernity, one that was led not by him, but by *her*, and one that would not come from the top (from the elite ex-samurai or the aristocrat) but from the bottom and from the periphery, or from the lower class, the seedy sections, the rural regions, and most uncannily, women.

The signifying chain of teyo-dawa speech does not close at “the schoolgirl” and her alleged linguistic corruption as the final signified: it ultimately points to and signifies the figure of the elite male and his experience of the perceived drastic social change understood as modernity or modernization at the turn of the century. What ideologically motivated a set of speech forms, attitudes, and behavior to constitute the discrete metapragmatic category of teyodawa speech (and to signify the schoolgirl) was not so much that actual schoolgirls spoke that way so much as it was that a collective sense of disquietude was experienced by the male elite at the turn of the century over the perceived collapse of the familiar social and moral order and the particular temporality modernity names as “progress.” Teyodawa speech came to reference not so much *her* but *his* experience of Japanese modernity. In the face of *his* perceived social crisis, woman turns into a sign – signifying anything but herself. Ultimately and paradoxically, teyodawa speech points its arrow back to the male intellectual himself.

3.5. *The return of voice and the construction of the listening subject*

In a way, the scene of male intellectuals drawn to the schoolgirl's voice rehearses Althusser's (1971: 174) image of a man hailed by a police officer and thereby interpellated as an acting subject in the ideological regime the officer embodies. To stop and follow orders is to reproduce the authority of the state. The male intellectuals were hailed by the schoolgirl's voice. As much as the schoolgirl came into being as a speaking subject through the ear of the male intellectual, the male listener was simultaneously constructed as the (listening) subject through his experience of hearing her voice. But what exactly was it in her voice that performed an act of hailing, given the fact that she never directly addressed him and he simply overheard her? What exactly did he hear in the schoolgirl's voice? Here we need to look at her voice as a *psychic object*, the quality of which exceeds indexicalization.⁴⁸ However much male intellectuals attempted indexically to contain her voice as vulgar and low-class, this "unpleasantness to the ear" could never be fully contained in the system of language. There is always a residue or excess that is irreducible to language and meaning, inconvertible into the signified, and not necessarily linguistically present and presentable. Slavoj Žižek observes: "Voice is that which, in the signifier, resists meaning, it stands for the opaque inertia that cannot be recuperated by meaning" (Žižek 1996: 103). This "fantastic ghost," to use de Certeau's (1988: 250) word, returns and haunts the male intellectual and potentially disrupts the plentitude of his identity as the embodiment of "Japan" and "the modern," exposing the extent to which its subjectness is inherently fractured and unstable.

The certitude of modernity often necessitates a temporal and spatial alignment of gender that both symbolically and materially positions men as the initiators of the modern and the present and women as the guardians of tradition and the (uncontaminated) past. The schoolgirl's voice is "unpleasant to the ears" because it disrupts such an alignment, for she is "female" and "modern." "Female-and-yet-modern," as an index of inauthenticity and illegitimacy, is, however, precisely the expression that characterizes Japan's (male) modernity in its relation to Western modernity: The former is (dis)located as spatially peripheral to, and temporally lagging behind, the West with its originality, authenticity, and centrality infinitely absent and unattainable. As with many instances in the historical formation of the relationship between the First World and non-Western and (post)colonial places, this decentering is projected onto gender relations both symbolically

and materially. The figure of the schoolgirl embodying and performing a modernity from the periphery of the gender hierarchy in Japan thus repeats the figure of the Japanese male intellectual embodying and performing a modernity from the periphery of the national/racial hierarchy in the global context of geopolitics.

The schoolgirl's voice works as an "acoustic mirror" (Silverman 1988) or "auditory double" through which the male intellectual heard *his own* voice. As a psychic object, this voice becomes what Lacanian psychoanalysis refers to as *objet petite a*. The *objet petite a* is something that was part of the subject in the imaginary stage that is lost when it enters the symbolic (language). Jacques Lacan defines *objet petite a* as "something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves as a symbol of lack.... It must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly, separable and, secondly, that has some relation to the lack" (1977: 103). It was part of the subject, in psychoanalytic terms, but was separated from the subject as a *thing* as he/she entered the symbolic. This "little otherness" includes feces, mother's breasts, and among other things, the voice, or "the object voice" (Dolar 1996), particularly the mother's voice, with which the subject had unity as an infant.⁴⁹ In order for the subject to attain (imaginary) plenitude in the symbolic stage, the *objet petite a* (the lack) needs to be disavowed.⁵⁰ An encounter with the *objet petite a* in the symbolic stage therefore puts the subject into a crisis because he sees or hears himself as a thing, or sees or hears his uncanny double, and he is reminded of his incompleteness. In order to cope with it, the subject deploys a mechanism of "projection" (Silverman 1988: 85), in this case, onto the female subject. In analyzing the male psychic response to the female voice in classic Hollywood cinema in these terms, Kaja Silverman (1990: 81) argues that "the male subject later hears the maternal voice through himself – that it comes to resonate for him with all that he transcends through language" (Silverman 1988: 81). Cinema as a patriarchal apparatus thus works in such a way that "his integrity is established through the projection onto woman of the lack he cannot tolerate in himself. The male subject 'proves' his symbolic potency through the repeated demonstration of the female subject's symbolic impotence" (Silverman 1988: 24). Žižek also explains how *objet petite a* as the double is inevitably externalized because of the extent to which it is so similar but so strange: "This is why the image of a double so easily turns into its opposite, so that, instead of experiencing the radical otherness of his similar, the subject recognizes himself in the image of radical otherness" (Žižek 2000: 126). In the case of the Meiji male

intellectual, such a psychic level of displacement of the internal other (*objet petit a*) into the external other (woman) took the form of converting the female voice into the sign through metapragmatic citational practice.

The schoolgirl's voice is "unpleasant-to-the ear" precisely because it is a (distorted) double of his voice, an object that returned from the prelinguistic stage (the real), when it was constitutive of the harmonious unity of the subject. Encountering his (auditory) double, or the little otherness in him, is a horrifying reminder that the subject is inherently split and insufficient and that the wholeness of the subject – in this particular case, Japan's male modern subject – is an impossible ideal. This is why the male intellectual had to convert the schoolgirl's voice into a sign metapragmatically in a way that made her the knowable other. It was an act of displacing (and projecting) the otherness that resides in him into the otherness of another subject (woman). I want to suggest here that it was himself, the displaced voice of himself, that the male intellectual heard when he heard the schoolgirl speaking. Her uncanny voice, heard partly as that of the other and partly as his own, exposes irresolvable ambivalence within the discourse of Japan's (male) modernity. The schoolgirl's voice *is* the male intellectuals' voice, or at least, the distorted double of his voice.⁵¹

By the end of World War I, the commentaries on schoolgirl speech as linguistic corruption had quickly dwindled. This corresponded not only with the increased enrollment of girls' high schools but also with the rapid development of mass culture, the industrial capitalist regime of family and gender relations as well as of class structure, and notably, an increasing confidence in Japan's male modernity in the form of adventurous colonial expansion in China and Korea. Various agents of consumer culture started "speaking" teyo-dawa speech to address young women as consumers. Advertisements in magazines for young women for cosmetics and hygiene products let the photo or illustration of a young woman – imaginable as a schoolgirl, a daughter of an aristocrat, or a young middle-class housewife – "speak" teyo-dawa speech (in the form of direct reported speech) to describe and point to a product. Teyo-dawa speech in advertisements thus came to signify the desired object on display in the magazines and at the same time, the desired subject who had access both to such an object and to the language (teyo-dawa speech) to describe it. More notably, however, real historical actors themselves started to claim teyo-dawa speech as their own. Readers' correspondence columns in some commercially savvy young women's magazines printed readers' letters peppered excessively with teyodawa speech. It came

to be a key membership marker for the virtual community the magazines created.

By the 1930s, speech forms such as *teyo* and *dawa* had appeared in the model dialogues of urban middle-class and upper-middle-class women and had been resignified as a genuinely “feminine language,” the language of the genuine Japanese woman.⁵² It is indeed remarkable that contemporary discourses on women’s linguistic corruption have recurred at a time of perceived social crisis and that the public deplores the loss of the language once condemned as vulgar and low-class, a “genuinely feminine” language that it never was.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has traced the way in which Japanese male intellectuals at the turn of the 20th century, the critical moment in the takeoff of Japan’s industrial capitalism and its attendant social and cultural formation, heard and cited the schoolgirl’s voice and in doing so, gave rise to the new metapragmatic category of “schoolgirl speech,” as well as “the schoolgirl” herself as a new social category. This was, in fact, the epistemic birth of “the modern Japanese woman.” Japanese women’s language at its emergence was occasioned by a never-ending process of citations, circulations, and dispersion of fragments of female voices in the newly formed publicity of print media. Essential to this process was the development of the tele-technology of the modern standard Japanese language in its ability to cite, dislocate, and relocate the ephemeral voice of the other.

Rather than assuming that the Meiji male intellectuals’ reported speech of the schoolgirl was a more or less “accurate” reflection of how she actually spoke, I have examined her reported speech as a product of the modern observer’s social practice of listening and citing, the specific mode of which is informed by the broader political-economic and historical context of modernizing Japan at the turn of the century. I have examined how the male elite crafted narratives of the indexical order of linguistic corruption of schoolgirl speech and how this metapragmatic practice was a form of strategic containment to domesticate competing forms of Japanese modernity and modernization, one of which the schoolgirl embodied and materialized. At the same time, however, as much as the schoolgirl’s voice was objectified by the male intellectual, the excess of her voice, so “unpleasant to the ear,” returns, reminding him that “the little other” that he projected

onto the schoolgirl's voice indeed resided in himself as the eternally split subject of Japan's modernity.

Very often the experience of "modernity," particularly in non-Western locations, is understood simply as an event at the periphery of an "original" Western modernity – as diffusion globally from "the center." This chapter both questions the social reality of the Eurocentric assumption of global modernity and examines the effects of that assumption in a non-European context (see also Harootunian 2000; Pratt 2002; Rofel 1999). That modernities on the "periphery" have their own dynamics, contradictions, and syntheses can be apparent on two counts. First, although "vision" is the predominant trope and sensory channel by which modernity has been talked about and studied (see, e.g., Jay 1988 or Levin 1993), "listening" has been central here. Modernity (perhaps everywhere) is "heard" as well as "seen." Second, through the ear of the male intellectual we "hear" *another* modernity – the one experienced by young women – and this suggests the need to recognize different and separate experiences of modernity, competing modernities that are gendered and classed.

This chapter also argues the need to recast the notion of "the speaking self" (and its accompanying ideas such as agency and resistance) within a framework of language and political economy. At stake here is a particular notion of the speaking subject – be it an individual or a group of individuals – as autonomous and self-consolidating. What is essentially a methodological-individualist take (assuming the autonomy and sovereignty of subjects) sometimes fails to deliver on what it purports to accomplish. In linguistic analysis, it often takes the form of conflating the grammatical subject ("I") with the initiator of enunciation as "subject-as-agent" or "speaker-as-agent." In this understanding of "I speak, therefore I am," the speaker's voice guarantees her full presence "here and now," and the equation of the act of speaking with the expression of human agency is fundamental to a particular mode of linguistic constructionism to which we are tempted to subscribe on political and other grounds. We are keen to recover and restore the subaltern voice deeply buried in historical documents. In the case of the schoolgirl, we might be tempted to depict her as the subject-as-agent who actively crafts and asserts identity, heroically defying the patriarchal discourse with a clear oppositional consciousness and to claim that *she* constructs her identity through her practice using her sovereign body from which her voice emerges.⁵³ But such an approach proves to be ineffective when we look at the subject formation of those who, in the real world, cannot speak for themselves and cannot do so for at least three reasons.

First, I have illustrated how the male elite heard the schoolgirls by eavesdropping. Such an “illicit” and solipsistic mode of communication (which would also include today’s more technologically advanced and more explicitly power-laden acts of looking and listening, such as surveillance and wiretapping) complicates our familiar notion of communication, in which the speaking subjects of communication are mutually regarded and engaged and in which “understanding” is assumed to be a collaborative achievement (or failure) in *inter*-subjective dialogue.⁵⁴ How can we conceptualize subject formation in such a form of social relations of communication? How can we study “linguistic voyeurism,” where one is heard but one does not hear (or for that matter, *speak* in her own voice)?

This process is a good illustration of Foucault’s “discursive power,” in which the seemingly “objective” acts of “seeing” and “hearing” are in fact constitutive of – rather than neutrally receptive of – knowledge. “Madness,” for example, as Foucault explains, “no longer exists except as *seen*.... The science of mental disease, as it would develop in the asylum, would always be only of the order of observation and classification. *It would not be a dialogue*” (1965: 250, cited in Jay 1993: 391; emphasis added).⁵⁵ The same point can be made regarding the act of listening on the part of the Meiji intellectual – the emergence of “the schoolgirl” occurs without any involvement of her intention or even verbal exchange with him.

Second, I have argued that teyo-dawa speech as heard and cited as such has no sovereign origin or authentic identity. It emerged in the incessant citations, mediations, and dissemination of fragments of voices heard and reified as such by those who had access to the public sphere of the print media. And it was the circuit of citation and reported speech itself that performatively constructed the identity of the schoolgirl as the “original body” to which teyodawa speech belonged. Such a mode of existence of language defies our familiar sociolinguistic concentric model where the original speech emitted from its original speaking body diffused, through face-to-face communication, from the center to the periphery, like a wave or an epidemic disease on the basis of some sociopsychological determination. Even when historical actors themselves claimed or embodied teyo-dawa speech – as it was reified and cited – as their own (such as in the readers’ correspondence column), it was performatively accomplished as an effect by the regulated appropriation of that which was foreign to them.

Third, if there is any possibility of agency on the part of schoolgirls as historical actors in the auditory emergence of schoolgirl speech, it was the moment when their voices arrested the Meiji intellectuals and destabilized,

at the psychic level, the certitude of the latter's modern Japanese subjectivity by working as an acoustic mirror. Such a tacit yet tenuous psychic mode of agency and of the political resists the liberal notion of the (speaking) subject (Bhabha 1994: 85–92, 102–122) and is critical for our understanding of linguistic subject formation. The figure of the lucid subject who is autonomous and self-consolidating, who masters language, speaks for herself/himself, founds knowledge, and constructs (and even “shifts” and “negotiates”) his or her identities, is problematic especially when it comes to the subject formation of those who have historically been disenfranchised as the other, such as women. As Spivak (1988) argues, we can not assume that “the other” can constitute herself and speak for herself in the same way as those at the center of the global political economy can. Similarly, invoking teyo-dawa speech as women's authentic and original voice and as the locus of their untainted agency and pure consciousness fails to account for the role of broader discourses rooted in social formations in facilitating both the possibilities and limits of modes of agency, resistance, and subjectivity. In the case of schoolgirls, their voices were heard only by being represented and cited by those with access to the tele-technology of writing and print media, and what drew them to schoolgirls' voices had to do with a significant political and economic transformation that Japan was experiencing as modernity and modernization. Teyo-dawa speech was not so much the sovereign voice of schoolgirls as it was the echo of the voice that the Meiji intellectuals had jettisoned in order to attain their plentitude as modern subjects. My analysis of the textual space of reported speech, made possible by a particular phase of Japan's political-economic development, renders visible the semiotic mechanism by which the schoolgirl – the ambivalent icon of Japan's modernity – was ventriloquized and ascribed voice, as if she were speaking for herself independently of the reporting voice. This is, of course, neither to argue that schoolgirls had no agency nor to abandon the notion of agency as a theoretical category. It is simply to suggest that understanding our political possibilities of linguistic practice necessitates going beyond observable and tape-recordable “realities.”

So do you hear me? And *how* do you hear me?

Notes

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1. Throughout this chapter, I use the phrase “verb-ending forms” to refer to forms such as *teyo* and *dawa*, although they are also often classified as “final particles.” This is because morpho-syntactically, these forms can be broken further into smaller units, depending on which system of grammatical categorization one uses. For example, *teyo* could be classified as a final particle in one system but could also be classified as a compound form made up of *te* (a conjunctive suffix attached to an adverbial inflectional ending of a verb) and *yo* (a final particle), depending on which level of linguistic analysis one is using. In this chapter, I describe them as one unit (a verb-ending form) because that is how they were glossed by historical actors. A verb-ending form functions as a meta-communicative cue as to the speaker’s stance toward his or her prepositional statement.
 2. See Ide (1982) and Shibamoto (1985) for classic studies of Japanese women’s language.
 3. I want to emphasize that it is a *demographic* category, as opposed to a cultural or social category, for as this chapter shows, it was precisely the incessant citational practices that transformed a merely demographic category into a culturally meaningful one in its discursive connections with other culturally meaningful ideas, sites, and practices.
 4. In 1890, there were 31 secondary schools (both public and private) for girls, with 3,120 enrolled students, constituting 0.09 percent of the female school-age population. In 1900, a year after the inauguration of the Directive on Girls’ High Schools, there were 52 girls’ secondary schools, with 11,984 enrolled stu-

dents, or 0.38 percent of the female school-age population (percentages calculated from Monbushô [Ministry of Education] 1964: 595, 607).

5. See Rumsey (1990), Silverstein (1979), Woolard and Schieffelin (1994), and Woolard (1998), for programmatic statements on the concept of language ideology.
6. The phrase “male intellectuals” is not to be taken as a demographic category but as a subject position in Japan’s modernity, into which both actual male intellectuals as well as others were interpellated. The observing male intellectual became an obligatory role for anyone who would represent modern Japan; therefore the metapragmatic commentaries printed and circulated at the turn of the century were authored predominantly by male authors who had access to the print media. More importantly, they were in the closest proximity to the structural position of the Japanese modern subject, allocated by the discourse of modernity. My point is that male intellectuals as historical actors and those interpellated into this subject position are not automatically to be considered identical. Furthermore, the biographical or demographic sense of gender and gender as a structural position are not necessarily the same. It is the process in which real historical actors came to be the modern subject through their auditory experience of hearing schoolgirl voices that is the subject of this chapter. In fact, as shown below, a handful of elite nationalist female intellectuals and educators, including Shimoda Utako and Tanahashi Junko, had authority and access to the print media because of their complicit linkages with the state authorities. They equally condemned “schoolgirl speech” and advocated the reform of its linguistic corruption. The social power that operates in the citational and auditory construction of self and other is, therefore, far more complex than simply male versus female or the powerful versus the powerless. Schoolgirls came to be subjected to the social power of listening and citing, but their voice, in turn, threatened those who listened and cited because it reminded them of their unattainable plentitude – the condition of modern subjecthood, which was always “partial” and “not quite” (Bhabha 1994).
7. The term *schoolgirls* referred to girls and young women who attended women’s secondary schools (which were considered “higher” education for women) after finishing compulsory primary education – and this at a time when the majority of young women, because of family and economic realities, barely finished primary education. Schoolgirls were the daughters of the elite: landowners, wealthy farmers, government officials, capitalists, salaried workers, professors, career military officers, and other white collar professions. For example, a survey on fathers’ occupations that was conducted in one of the women’s schools in Tokyo in 1901 shows the results: government officials, 60; merchants, 39; bank employees, 19; landowners, 16; medical doctors, 13; school teachers, 11; industrialists, 10; professionals, 6; others, 14; no occupation, 61 (Fukey 1901).

8. Confucian readings on women's virtues had served as primers for the daughters of samurai and wealthy merchants since the early Edo period (1603–1867). By the mid-Edo period, a large number of more accessible texts, called *ôraimono*, were widely circulated for private literacy education among commoners.
9. Notable in this regard was the appearance of a Japanese translation of John Stuart Mill's 1869 work *The Subjection of Women* (see Fukama 1878).
10. Prior to 1874, however, several private women's schools had already been founded by Christian missionaries.
11. Rikala Sato (1995) describes how a geisha was dressed as a schoolgirl and posed for a photograph.
12. Jean Baudrillard (1988) calls these phenomena – copies without originals – simulacra.
13. Debord declares: "In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation" (1977: para. 1).
14. Debord thus states: "One cannot abstractly contrast the spectacle to actual social activity: such a division is itself divided. The spectacle that inverts the real is in fact produced. Lived reality is materially invaded by the contemplation of the spectacle while simultaneously absorbing the spectacular order, giving it positive cohesiveness. Objective reality is present on both sides. Every notion fixed this way has no other basis than its passage into the opposite: reality rises up within the spectacle, and the spectacle is real" (Debord 1977: para. 8).
15. Feminist psychoanalytic film theory also takes notice of the cinematic representation of women in terms of spectacle and visual consumption. Classic works on gender in terms of seeing and being seen are de Lauretis (1984), Doane (1992) and Mulvey (1989).
16. See Walkowitz (1992) for a study of the narratives of sexual danger in late Victorian London. She examines how the class boundary was maintained through the policing of female sexuality and how feminists challenged and transcended it. Elizabeth Wilson (1991) also discusses the complexity and ambiguity of women's experience in the city. Positioned as a menace to the male social order, women experienced the city as a place of danger and at the same time, a place for pleasure and liberation.
17. For an instructive comparative case, see Stoler 1991.
18. For example, in 1899, Minister of Education Kabayama made a speech addressed to women's school principals: "A wholesome middle-class society cannot be developed only by men. They can advance the welfare of the society only after working together with wise mothers and good wives to support the family. In order to become a wise mother and good wife, it is necessary to acquire academic knowledge and skills essential to the life of the middle class as well as cultivating a graceful and refined disposition and a gentle and virtuous nature" (*Kyôikujiron* 1899: 22–23).

19. It should be noted, however, that this history did not go unchallenged, and by the early 1900s, socialists and feminists (Seitô, or 'Blue Stockings') had voiced strong criticism of the "good wife and wise mother" policy because of its failure to achieve genuine gender equity (see Sievers 1983).
20. Although contemporary linguists and sociolinguists have identified linguistic properties of women's language in other parts of Japanese language as well (Ide 1982, Shibamoto 1985), the Meiji intellectuals located teyo-dawa speech almost exclusively in verb-ending forms.
21. For the concept of metapragmatic salience, see, for example, Errington (1988) and (Silverstein 1993). See also Lucy's (1993) introductory chapter to *Reflexive Language* for a comprehensive discussion of the nature of linguistic reflexivity.
22. See Irvine and Gal (2000: 37–38) for a further discussion of how iconicity operates as a semiotic process.
23. See Jakobson (1971) and Silverstein (1976). "Shifters" are linguistic signs whose reference "shifts" according to the context. A good example would be pronouns. For example, "I" is grammatically referential, and at the same time, its indexical meaning constantly shifts every time someone says "I." Shifters thus marks the sign's mobility.
24. It also circulates as a para-text attached to commodities in the form of transaction documents and advertisements.
25. See Bauman and Briggs (1990), Briggs and Bauman (1992), Duranti and Goodwin (1992), Hanks (1989), Hill and Irvine (1993), and Silverstein and Urban (1996) for the theoretical expositions of entextualization, decontextualization, and recontextualization.
26. See Bakhtin (1981) and Voloshinov (1973). Voloshinov defines reported speech as "speech within speech, utterance within utterance and at the same time also speech about speech, utterance about utterance" (1973: 115).
27. De Certeau observes the parallel relationship between self and other on the one hand and the "scriptural" (writing) and oral on the other: "The oral is that which does not contribute to progress; reciprocally, the 'scriptural' is that which separates itself from the magical world of voices and tradition. A frontier (and a front) of Western culture is established by that separation" (de Certeau 1984: 134).
28. Bakhtin (1981) envisioned a polyvocalic utopian speech community through reported speech, the success of which relies entirely on the author's ethical commitment to representing the voices of the other. De Certeau's discussion of citation in historiography and Bakhtin's of dialogism in literary works present a striking similarity in that both recognize the discursive construction of social relations; and yet they equally present a striking difference in terms of the social relations between the citing and the cited. This contrast would certainly entertain an important question of whether to be cited or quoted always marks subjection to social power, which is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter.

29. See Karatani (1993) for further discussion of the role of the *gembun'itchi* movement in the construction of the modern Japanese subject. On the relationship between *gembun'itchi* and schoolgirl speech, see Inoue (2002).
30. The functionality of this sense of sound is also similar to Roman Jakobson's (1960) "poetic" function.
31. The other is always past because in order to be cited, a speech event has to take place prior to the act of citing.
32. Jacques Derrida (1976) develops an extensive argument on the way in which the hierarchical distinction between writing and speech serves as the epistemological foundation of the Western metaphysical tradition. Derrida refers, for example, to Lévi-Strauss's ethnography of the Nambikwara. It shares the same hierarchical structure of writing and speech, where the ethnographer owns writing and the natives are illiterate with no writing technology. The Western metaphysics of phonocentrism informs Lévi-Strauss's association of writing with civilization and violence, and speech with a primitive and uncontaminated pure mode of being that was not violent. Derrida shows us how Lévi-Strauss's critique of civilization falls precisely into the trap of the ethnocentrism he attacks by according the Nambikwara only the narrow sense of "writing," whereas Derrida proposes writing as all kinds of traces, recording, and markings.
33. For the theoretical clarification of the difference between the referential and the nonreferential, see Silverstein (1976).
34. Roland Barthes calls it "the grain of the voice" (1977: 179–189).
35. Irvine and Gal (2000) account for such a fetishization process in terms of "iconization." For the concept of indexing, see Silverstein (1976) and Ochs (1992).
36. This is where the dialectics of language structure, language use, and language ideology (Silverstein 1979) come into play. Metapragmatic comments rationalize and organize the indexical relationship between the social identity of the schoolgirl and her alleged linguistic behavior. To explain language use necessitates the commentator's metalinguistic knowledge (or knowledge of linguistic structure). Once it is naturalized, it forms a metapragmatic category of schoolgirl speech, which in turn informs linguistic structure and, possibly, language use.
37. As in Europe at the dawn of capitalism, the bourgeoisie, along with peasants and proletarians, were considered low class by the hereditary elite.
38. Honorifics are linguistic forms that encode deference to the interlocutor, particularly in a context where there is an asymmetrical social relationship between the speaker and the listener in terms of gender, status, or otherwise. Highly aestheticized and ritualized, the use of honorifics also indexes the speaker's refinement and good upbringing. It is in this sense that women in the elite families were expected to master the use of honorifics.

39. Japanese verbs have several inflectional forms. The number and the classification of inflectional categories depend on a particular grammatical theory. The inflected form ending with *te* is variously called a gerund (e.g., Martin 1975), *te*-form, a gerundive (Kuno 1973), or a suspended form (Sakuma 1936). For this chapter, I use Hasegawa's (1996) grammatical explication of *te* as a connective suffix and will treat the inflected form with *te* as an "adverbial inflected form + *te* [connective suffix]." For the details of different inflectional categories, see Shibatani (1990).
40. In a regular sentence, this *te* is compounded with a final particle *yo* and becomes *teyo*.
41. Other examples brought up in various commentaries include *so-desu* as opposed to *so-de-gozai-masu*.
42. Omission of honorifics was the major target of the nationalist female educators who followed on the heels of male intellectuals who commented on schoolgirl speech. Shimoda Utako, for example, frequently contributed critical and programmatic essays on schoolgirl speech to young women's magazines.
43. Hasegawa (1996) emphasizes the extent to which *te* is not simply a syntactic device but functions as a semantic filter through which a certain cognitive normalcy is established.
44. In the original text, the verb-ending forms are highlighted by a round mark.
45. See Yoda (2000) for a compelling discussion of the historical and political process in which the division of labor in the mode of writing – native script versus *kango* – came to be gendered in the modern study of premodern Japanese literature.
46. In the early Meiji period, *sōshi* referred specifically to the advocates of the Popular Rights Movement.
47. See Huyssen (1986) for a discussion of the process in which "mass culture" increasingly became associated with women and became the other of male modernism.
48. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, theoretical reconciliation between psychoanalysis and the metapragmatic understanding of language and identity has been given relatively little attention. For cogent and provocative discussion on this issue, see Povinelli (1999, 2001).
49. This is because for the infant, the mother's voice is the first listening experience. It is also the mother's speech, from which the infant first learns language, and through her verbal instruction, the infant recognizes himself and distinguishes himself from the other.
50. Whereas Derrida (1976) shows us how the voice grounds the full-presence of the subject here and now, Lacanian voice is that which undermines it. As Mladen Dolar formulates it, "*It is the voice against the voice*" (1996: 27).
51. Dolar notes: "Masculine and feminine positions are then two ways of tackling the same impossibility; they arise from the same predicament as two internally

- linked versions of the same voice, which retains an ineradicable ambiguity” (Dolar 1996: 28).
52. For the role of consumer culture in resignifying teyo-dawa speech as the ideal women’s language, see Inoue (2006).
 53. See Laura Ahearn’s (2001) deftly written review essay on the issue of language and agency, where she rightly cautions against conflating the notion of agency with free will or resistance.
 54. “Lurking” in listserves in computer-mediated communication (CMC) would be another contemporary example. Even the more critical model of communication which recognizes the power relation inherent in any form of communication relies on the assumption that communication is interactive and intersubjective, and the linguistic reproduction of domination and inequality is explained as an emergent effect of the ongoing *inter*-action in mutual regard among the participants.
 55. As Zizek points out, the Lacanian notion of the (split) subject complicates the sociolinguistic sense of intersubjectivity because the primordial interlocutor (another subject) is the *objet petite a*, “that which prevents him from fully realizing himself” (2000: 138–139).

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Chapter 6

Recontextualizing the American occupation of the Philippines: Erasure and ventriloquism in colonial discourse around men, medicine and infant mortality*

Bonnie McElhinny

History is the fruit of power, but power itself is never so transparent that its analysis becomes superfluous. The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge, the exposition of its roots.
(Michel-Rolph Trouillot)

1. Silences that speak

Feminist linguistics has long focused on the relationship between silence and power. Many writings deplore silence as a symbol of passivity, or at least powerlessness, arguing that those who are denied speech, or denied access to effective speech, cannot make their experience or perspectives known and cannot influence their own lives or history (Ardener 1975; Lakoff 1975, 1995). Gal's (1991) critical review of work on language, gender and power argues for a more complex view, one which recognizes the ways that silence can sometimes be a sign of power, but can also be a strategic defense, or a political protest. She criticizes a way of understanding gender and power in which women are unable to express their views in a dominant, masculine discourse, and therefore become inarticulate, "muted" or silent. Her paper considers, therefore, the variety of forms that symbolic domination takes. The ability to get others to accept and enact one's representation of the world is one aspect of symbolic domination, but such power does not usually go uncontested: devalued strategies may be celebrated, and devalued practices may propose or embody alternate models of social worlds.

Studies of colonial and postcolonial discourse have also regularly debated the relationship between discourse and power, in ways that have remarkably similar, if generally unremarked, parallels with the debates that have appeared in studies of language and gender. See, for instance, Gayatri Spivak's (1988) pessimism about whether the subaltern (including and especially female subalterns) can speak, over, about and against, oppressive conditions created by imperial and sometimes nationalist discourse, while scholars such as Benita Parry (1987) and Homi Bhabha (1994) do find evidence, if mediated, parodic, evasive and hybridized, of subaltern voices. Parry characterizes this project as uncovering how the master-discourse has already been interrogated by the colonized in native accents. This debate, like that in studies of language and gender, is a debate about whether power and discourse is possessed entirely by those who are most powerful, and about the complexities of symbolic domination. It is also a debate about whether over-emphasizing hegemonic interpretations may be a form of complicity with powerful structures and interpretations, and about which theories of discourse enable oppositional politics.

In this paper, I argue that recent work in linguistic anthropology on contextualization and recontextualization has some crucial insights to offer into precisely how subaltern voices might appear in colonial texts, as well as into how colonial hierarchies of masculinity are constructed (compare Stoler 1992 on hierarchies of credibility). In particular, I will look at the ways that annual reports of public health during the American occupation of the Philippines use erasure and incorporation to minimize Filipino public health initiatives in the early twentieth century. These texts work to celebrate the medical achievements of American men who were scientists, physicians and public health experts over and above those of Filipino men in the same roles. The idea that one of the key blessings of American colonial rule in the Philippines was a sanitary regime which saved countless Filipino lives has been a tenacious one, an idea that has not even always been challenged by Filipino nationalist writers (Ileto 1995). Ethnohistorical scholarship has often tended to mimic the logic of American before-and-after pictures of the Philippines for home consumption, pictures which were meant to present clear "evidence" of America's success in the civilizing process (Vergara 1995: 84). These pictures might juxtapose "before" pictures of ramshackle huts close to sewage-filled streets with "after" pictures of white-washed modern homes near a tidy new water system. A closer reading of the available texts on public health in the Philippines can, however, suggest an alternative picture, one in which we come to more fully under-

stand the ways in which America's role was challenged, but also the ways in which the colonial ideologies about the significance of American sanitation gained their predominance.

Writing about how certain representations of language and social authority are naturalized, Gal and Woolard note that

Frequently, one position in such debates is subsequently established as natural, obvious, objective.... A careful recuperation and contextualization of such debates allows us to dislodge these later assumptions of naturalness. Showing the earlier positioning of a regime of representation that now seems simply to let nature speak for itself is especially important when, as often happens, the establishment of a natural phenomenon not only warrants a scholarly discipline but also authorizes political programmes (Gal and Woolard 2001: 4).

But how, precisely do we do this? Dirks (2002: 62) argues that often anti-colonial nationalist movements had to turn to different sources and authorities for the development of their national historiographies. The colonial archive was not just the record of the colonial state, but also the repository of the sources for an imperial history whose public was in the metropole rather than the colony. In an essay on colonial linguistics, Errington (2001) suggests another way to proceed, "If the texts that colonial linguists produced were not the transparent windows on human-yet-natural reality they were intended to be, they can nonetheless be read critically.... Read in critically relativized ways, colonial linguistic texts can be more meaningful than their authors knew, moving beyond while also incorporating knowledge they provide – in some cases, the only knowledge available – about massively variable yet underlyingly human talk" (34). In this essay, then, I explore what it means to read colonial texts in such a critically relativized way. I begin by offering an overview of the ways that language, ideology and colonialism have been considered in linguistic and historical anthropology, and an introduction to the historical context of the American occupation of the Philippines. I then turn to look at textual strategies used in the *Annual Reports of Public Health*. My argument here proceeds roughly chronologically, and at each moment I consider a particularly prominent technique for containing Filipino initiatives. However, these techniques should be considered not just as a typology, a list of techniques which could be used. They, themselves, also need to be considered historically. Just as Dirks (2002) considers the import of the transition from historical to

ethnographic ways of knowing in light of the changing needs of the British colonial state in India, so too must we consider why the relative prominence of certain discursive techniques varies at different moments.

2. Studies of language, ideology and colonialism in linguistic and historical anthropology

Studies of face-to-face interaction have long been privileged in linguistic anthropology, as in anthropological studies more broadly. One recent, valuable textbook even goes beyond describing this state of affairs to prescribing it as the principal task of linguistic anthropology. This claim, however, is a contentious one. Gal (1998: 333) argues that one of the salutary effects of recent work in linguistic anthropology is the expansion of empirical foci from face-to-face talk to studies of mass media and the ways they connect disparate communities and textual debates (see Gupta and Ferguson 1997 for a similar plea for transformation of methods in sociocultural anthropology). This does not mean that studies of face-to-face interaction have been displaced, but rather that they have been decentered. Two key, inter-related arenas in which this transformation has taken place are in studies of languages and publics (Gal and Woolard 2001; see also Gaudio, this volume) and in studies of language ideology (Blommaert 1999; Schieffelin et al. 1998; see also Inoue and Weidman, this volume). Both bodies of work are interested in how “different images of linguistic phenomena gain social credibility and political influence” and “the role of linguistic ideologies and practices in the making of political authority,” both within linguistic disciplines and beyond (Gal and Woolard 2001: 2). These methods for analysis also tend to force an attention to history, by asking us to think about when, how and to what ends certain ideas are produced (Inoue 2003; Irvine 1995; Irvine and Gal 2000; Weidman 2003).

Some of the most provocative work on linguistic ideologies comes from studies of colonial-era issues (Woolard 1998: 24). Studies of dictionaries, grammars and language guides show the ways that linguists constructed rather than discovered distinctive linguistic varieties, and the ways their ideas about language were shaped by their own ideas about nation, racialized ethnicity, kinship and gender, as they show how linguistic differences became a resource for naturalizing inequality in colonial settings (Errington 2001; Fabian 1986; Rafael 1998; Irvine 1995; Pennycook 1998; Steedly 1996). Some recent studies examine missionaries’ roles in shaping orthog-

raphy and wider understandings of orality and literacy, the role that linguistic descriptions played in establishing and naturalizing territorial boundaries, the role that colonialism played in creating lingua francas, creoles and sociolinguistic hierarchies, and the roles that comparative philology played in elaborating Orientalist thought. Although studies of such colonial linguistic ideologies have most frequently focused on ideologies about language structure, they are also increasingly broadly defined to include discourse, genres, texts and interaction. For instance, Kuipers (1998) investigates the ways that the Dutch and the Sumbanese came to see the angry displays in ritual speech which once legitimated the spiritual and political authority of “big men” as indicative of the “savage” state from which the Sumbanese needed to be delivered. In a path-breaking series of analyses, Hanks (1986, 1987, 1996) considers, through a linguistic lens, Yucatec Mayan resistance to the Spanish presence. He argues that the Maya resistance was, for the most part, not aimed at overthrowing the new order imposed by the Spanish, but at gaining access to power within emerging new structures. One of the linguistic and cultural effects of this was hybridization of genres, with certain texts (e.g. letters) showing features of Mayan and Spanish discursive norms.

There has been oddly little interaction between historical and linguistic anthropology, though a number of scholars have recently called for more attention to theories of text in studies of history. Trouillot (1995) notes the need for better theories of texts and textual production while Comaroff and Comaroff (1992: 34) draw on Bakhtin to argue that to do historical anthropology, “we have to operate with a working theory not merely of the social world, but also of the role of inscriptions of various kinds in the making of ideology and argument.” In an introduction to a recent volume on historical anthropology, Axel’s recognition of the intertextuality, polysemia and contradictions in colonial texts leads him to suggest that we need to have a richer understanding of how documents were generated in interactions between agents of colonialism and colonized subjects, as well as also into processes of entextualization, and its strategies for generating new forms of textual authority (2002: 14). Dirks (1999) makes a similar point: “history... is not located outside of texts but rather within an intertextual field, constructed out of the genealogical relations between histories of prior texts and the reflexive conditions that construct, and are constructed by, successive readings of these texts” (157). Indeed Axel, like Anderson (1995), suggests that historical anthropologists should pay more attention to the work of linguistic anthropologists on intertextuality as they undertake their projects.

Work on intertextuality in linguistic anthropology is influenced, in part, by the work of Bakhtin on the dialogic nature of texts (“translinguistics”). Bakhtin focuses on meaning-making in texts as something that is linked more to process than to structure. Texts are dialogues among different writings, including the writer, the addressee and the context. There are, as Briggs and Bauman (1992: 160) note, two ways of thinking about the relationship between intertextuality and ideology. One approach considers the ways that ideologies of intertextuality and discursive hybridity shape society and history. Another, the one which I adopt in this paper, consider the ways that political and economic formations shape intertextual strategies. Like Nicholas Dirks, Miyako Inoue, Amanda Weidman and others adopting a genealogical approach to the study of discourse, however, I am interested here not simply in the *contexts of discourse* or even the *contextualization* of discourse, but in the *pretexts* for discourse. According to Dirks, “the term *pretext* operates with its double meaning intact: it signifies both what comes before the text, and what makes it possible, its history and its alibi. Texts and contexts both have their pretexts, even as pretexts can be either (or both) textual and contextual” (1999: 157). The *context* for all of the public health texts analyzed here is European and American imperial ventures in the Philippines, but it is the *pretext* of American benevolence which serves to shape the particular ways in which these texts are circulated by Americans.

Most studies of entextualization and discursive control have, as Rahejia Goodwin notes, focused on specific societies, but colonial documents “exhibit the connection between entextualizing processes and power relationships in a larger arena of cultural politics” (1999: 121). Ventriloquism suggests that the U.S. presence was required for launching and instigating modern health projects – a claim that many Filipinos explicitly or implicitly contested. I am interested, therefore, in this paper in whether, when and how Filipino texts and initiatives are incorporated into annual reports of public health produced by the colonial government. I’m interested in the kind of intertextuality thus generated (minimizing or maximizing gaps), and the effect of that intertext. I take this to be a crucial part of moving beyond trying to figure out what history is to how history works.¹

3. Sanitizing sanitation

Forgetting, or re-narrating, the American imperial role (Anderson 1991; Choy 2003a, 2003b; Espiritu 2003) in the Philippines is part of a larger pattern which supports the argument for American exceptionalism in colonial ventures and studies. Acts of American imperialism are often omitted entirely from comparative studies of colonialism. Where American imperialism is recognized, it is often touted as more benevolent than other forms. The early American administration insisted that its Philippine policy was not imperialist, but instead was an enlightened missionary endeavor. President William McKinley assured Filipinos that Americans had come “not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends” and that “the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule” (cited in Golay 1997: 48). Education and public health were constituted as two key domains in which Filipinos would benefit from American tutelage in modern methods. Though the effects of American educational initiatives in the Philippines have been widely and sharply critiqued (cf. Constantino 1975), the “popular conceptualization of Western medicine as a universal humanitarian effort” has made it difficult for scholars and others to critique its racialist and exploitative effects (Choy 2003a: 19). Indeed, in general “[m]odernity’s false claims to inclusiveness, rationality, and universality and its role in the creation of social inequality have perhaps been hardest to reveal and challenge when they were couched in terms of hygiene and public health” (Briggs with Briggs 2003: 319). Recently, however, Iletto (1995) has undertaken a ground-breaking study of the ways that American war against cholera and the “pacification” of Filipinos were barely differentiated (see also Sullivan 1991 and Anderson 2006).

In this paper I consider the ways that American officials actively erased, recontextualized, constrained and contained Filipino public health initiatives, especially those against infant mortality, in annual reports of public health, personal memoirs and academic writings, in part in order to justify the American presence in the Philippines. I also analyze archival documents which demonstrate how Filipino scientists and physicians challenged American campaigns against infant mortality by arguing that their own research, cooperatives and initiatives had long preceded American interest in this topic, and indeed that the American presence may even have interrupted key Filipino public health initiatives. Indeed, it is important to point out the number of public health initiatives already in place at the time of the

U.S. occupation. Although U.S. colonial health officials described the “pestilence and dirt” of Manila as horrific evidence of the ways that Spain had neglected health and sanitary measures for the Philippines (Dayrit, Ocampo and de la Cruz 2002: 3), Manila was far ahead of any cities under the English colonial system in its ability to care for the sick (Bourne, cited in Dayrit, Ocampo and de la Cruz 2002: 238). American public health officials were not starting from scratch upon arriving in the Philippines, however much they may have minimized or critiqued Spanish colonial or Filipino initiatives. There were 66 titular physicians, and 22 titular midwives. Small pox vaccination was obligatory for all, and an Institute for Vaccination employed 134. There were numerous hospitals, including general hospitals, hospitals for contagious disease, and military hospitals, as well as missionary hospitals, orphanages and asylums. Quarantine stations operated in key ports. Faculties of Medicine and Pharmacy were established at the University of Santo Tomas in 1871. A professional organization for physicians and pharmacists (the Colegio Medico-Farmaceutico de Filipinas) was established in 1887.

In tracking the ways that Filipino health initiatives were made less visible, I focus largely, though not exclusively, on the ways that one Filipino physician, Fernando Calderon, is portrayed. Calderon earned his licentiate in medicine from the University of Santo Tomas in Manila, and then worked in two areas of the Philippines (Samar and Leyte) where infant mortality rates were high. He saved his income so as to be able to study obstetrics in France and in Spain for several years soon after the American occupation of the Philippines, and became one of the few Filipino physicians invited to join the faculty of the Philippine Medical School (later the University of the Philippines) in 1907, where he served as Director of Obstetrics until 1922. He was the first Filipino president of the Manila Medical Society (1922), first Filipino Dean of College of Medicine (1916–1936), and the first Filipino director of the Philippines General Hospital (1916–1936). He served briefly as President of the University of the Philippines.² His brother was famous for drafting the Malolos constitution, a constitution which undergirded the First Republic of the Philippines inaugurated by Filipinos during the Philippine-American War, and in some circles later infamous for quickly becoming an advisor to and collaborator with the American colonial government. In this paper, then, I draw on the tools of linguistic ethnography to take up the question of how, precisely, the state “produces, adjudicates, organizes, and maintains the discourses that become available as the primary texts of history” (Dirks 2002: 59).

4. Masculinity and medicine

To examine the ways that Calderon's work was, and was not, included in the American record of public health initiatives is to understand something about how colonial hierarchies of discourse, masculinity, and professional authority were established. Colonial settings were often understood as a resource for white male self-fashioning and testing (Anderson 2006: 132). White men argued that they were fit to govern because they were racially superior, more civilized, more manly than their charges (see also Bederman 1995; Greenberg 2005; Hoganson 1998; Hyam 1990; Kanitkar 1994; Sinha 1995).³ Historians of the Progressive era link American obsessions with bourgeois manhood, the frontier (including the Filipino one), physicality and virility to the "masculinity crisis" that developed at the end of the 19th century because of the rise in bureaucracies, labour unrest, rising immigration rates, economic crisis, more opportunities for leisure and a growing concern about "softness", and the rise of the women's movement (Dubbert 1980; Griffen 1990; Kimmel 1987). If in the earlier years of the U.S., men had grounded a sense of manliness in virtue, honor, public service and the life of the mind, by the late 19th century white middle class men were also encouraged to improve their physical strength and develop martial virtues so they could compete with other classes and races. Darwinian ideas applied to racial struggles suggested that emasculation, unless stopped, would lead to the "suicide" of the white middle class in the face of more virile non-white and working class men. Imperial policies were seen as a way to channel domestic discontent. Concerns about the increasing effeminacy of American manhood, British arguments about the ways that empire made men, and romanticized memories of the Civil War produced a culture in which war against Spain was seen as a way to build character in American men (Hoganson 1998). As masculine practices organized around expertise and technical knowledge began to emerge, so too did masculine practices organized around dominance. Many believed that "American manhood could best be made manifest through further territorial expansionism" (Greenberg 2005: 272). Gender and race were thus mutually constitutive in expansionist encounters. They also shaped, though sometimes differently, how the targets of imperial actions were understood. Hoganson (1998) points out how the racialization of Filipinos as biologically unfit for independence drew on ideas about gender. The prominent stereotypes of Filipinos – as uncivilized, savages, rapists, or children – presented Filipino men as lacking the manly character needed for self-government. Filipino men

were also sometimes presented as effeminate. Even portrayals of the agency and strength of Filipino women, sometimes celebrated in latter-day feminist accounts, could be used to condemn Filipino men as effeminate. Indeed, in a speech in May 1902 to the New England Woman's Suffrage Association, Clemencia Lopez used her speech to challenge both gender stereotypes and imperial rule (Holt 2002: 79). She noted that although even the archbishop of Manila believed that Philippine women were superior to men in their understanding of political questions, he had to be excused, she argued, because he was not accustomed to equality between the sexes. Where women were understood as superior managers, providers and political spokesmen, she argued it was because Filipino men could not act as freely, because of laws against sedition, while Filipinas took advantage of the gallantry of Americans and the fact that the law only focused on men to speak more freely. In justifications of imperial rule on racial grounds, one often also sees the establishment of complex intertwined gender, as well as racial, hierarchies. It is precisely HOW these hierarchies are constructed that we will examine in more detail below.

5. Infant mortality and imperialism

Initiatives to decrease rates of infant mortality are a particularly important terrain on which to evaluate American claims about benevolent initiatives in public health (see McElhinny 2005). In the Philippines, Americans initially defined disease in the tropics as that which affected White people. The controversial Director of the Bureau of Public Health, American physician Victor Heiser, alienated Filipinos by repeatedly citing improvement in public health as essential for increased American commercial activity in the Philippines (Sullivan 1991: 113). Diseased Orientals, he argued, posed a constant threat to Occidentals. In 1908, the *Annual Report of Public Health* includes a passage which emphasized the American interest in epidemic diseases, as it revealed more concern for the reputation of public health officials than the health of Filipino babies:

So far as the effects upon the census statistics is concerned, a high death rate among infants, unless brought about by epidemic diseases or other special causes, does not alarm the health officer, as he knows that it will be offset by a higher birth rate; but no one wants the children to live more than he, because he realizes that the bearing of healthy children is a blessing to

womankind, and to the world at large, while the bearing of sickly children soon to die is a misfortune to humanity and that it incites unfavorable criticism on those entrusted with the supervision of the public health (*Annual Report of Public Health* 1908: 47).

However, the increasing world-wide attention given to infant mortality made this self-serving and cavalier position increasingly difficult to maintain. A new language appeared to describe infant mortality, one which saw it not just as personal tragedy, but also saw “population as a national asset, as human capital and as imperial armoury” (Jolly 1998: 179), and which justified attempts to regulate working class families for national and imperial interests. By the 1920s discussions about infant mortality became a matter of colonial policy in a number of areas, including colonial Malaya, the Belgian Congo, the Sudan, French West Africa, Vanuatu and Fiji and the Philippines. The paternalistic tones of the European national movements resurfaced, with racial overtones (Hunt 1988). Infant mortality rates became an index of the general sanitary condition, and of civilization. High infant mortality rates were used by some to argue that Filipinos were not ready for independence. For instance, in the *Annual Report of Public Health* published in 1904 American public health officials write “There is probably no subject upon which these people have less knowledge than that of childbirth, as indicated by the mortality. Interfering as they do with the functions of nature, through ignorance, is largely the cause of the excessive infant mortality” (136). Others argued that the relatively belated and inadequate American attention to infants was evidence that benevolent colonialism was not all that it claimed to be. In each case, the health of the child came to stand for the health of the nation, and the proficiency of American and Filipino professionals in caring for children was seen as a sign of their ability to govern effectively.

6. Erasing and minimizing Filipino initiatives on infant mortality

Comaroff and Comaroff (1992: 17) believe one of the crucial tasks for historiography is “to interrogate the constructs through which the silences and spaces between events are filled, through which disjointed stories are cast into master narratives.” In recent work, Gal, with Judith Irvine, has continued to think about the way that silencing works, though she now theorizes

this as *erasure*. Erasure is the process in which ideology renders some persons or activities invisible (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38). In erasure, facts that are inconsistent with an ideological scheme go unnoticed or are explained away. It does not necessarily include actual eradication of awkward facts, unless such facts fit some alternative, competing ideology. In this formulation, erasure is one of the ways that silencing of less powerful, or alternative, views might proceed. In this section I consider silences that are, in fact, a form of erasure of Filipino voices and initiatives from the dominant historical record. And yet, I will argue, these are silences that speak. Sometimes one can find other materials in archival collections which complicate the dominant account; in others, the text themselves are heteroglossic enough to suggest their own critique. In some cases, as Anderson (1995: 101) argues, Filipinos are represented in, but cannot author, historical, medical and colonial texts. In others, however, it is the precise ways in which Filipinos are allowed to speak that is of interest. I am, therefore, looking more closely at precisely how facts that are inconvenient, awkward or intolerable are rendered in colonial discursive accounts, and when and how such facts are set aside, argued against, trivialized, mocked or made less believable. I am, that is, interested less in silence here, than in the process of silencing. In this section I consider three examples of silencing that are, in fact, a form of eradication of Filipino voices and initiatives from the dominant historical record, the *Annual Report of Public Health*, a document which would have had as its primary audience American politicians and colonial officials and the American public, as well as some Filipinos working on public health initiatives. A key argument of these *Annual Reports*, especially in the years of Heiser's tenure as Director of Health, is the pivotal and extensive improvements made by Americans, the neglect of the Spaniards, and the recalcitrance of the Filipino public to many health initiatives.

Example 1. In keeping with the early American focus on epidemic disease, infant mortality is given scant attention in the first few years of the Bureau of the Health. When infant mortality is mentioned it is a public health area consigned to Filipino physicians, who generally go unnamed, in stark contrast with American physicians and scientists. In 1906, for instance, we hear that a special bulletin on infant care was prepared by a committee of "native physicians" and widely distributed.⁴ The U.S. National Archives contain, in other folders, samples of these bulletins written in English and in Spanish, and we discover from them that these physicians were Drs. Juan

Miciano, Ariston Bautista, Mariano Martin and Manuel Gomez.⁵ It is unclear – perhaps deliberately so – by whom this project was initiated. Within the context of annual reports in an American-run Bureau, this ambiguity can serve to suggest that all initiatives reported were at the instigation of, if not necessarily carried out by, the American presence. Nonetheless, the casual relegation of this topic to the domain of native physicians can also be seen as evidence that this topic is not, at this moment, a matter of great concern or even great optimism for American public health workers. Instead, it is relegated to the native (male) physicians. “This idea of disease appears to the minds of the masses of the people as too hypothetical to be worthy of belief. The native physician, in the course of time, may educate the people along these lines, but not until the needless sacrifice of thousands” (1906: 15).

Example 2. A few years later a reader can find the founding of an organization Gota de Leche, also known as “La Proteccion de la Infancia”, dutifully, if briefly, reported among the many public health initiatives in the Philippines in the past year. In this description, the society for the protection and care of infants is run “principally by Filipina ladies, aided by a number of American ladies” (1908: 25). It is also noted that “Dr. David J. Doherty, of the city of Chicago, was one of the primary movers in the organization of the Manila society” (1908: 25). Yet, if you sit through the flotsam and jetsam of the American empire preserved in the files of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in College Park Maryland in order to try to discover more about this organization, you will eventually come across a folder that holds the articles of incorporation of an organization called “La Proteccion de la Infancia”, written in 1907, in Spanish.⁶ The existence of this document seems in part due to surveillance of a variety of public organizations by Americans, perhaps to determine if they were subversive. The purpose of the organization is described in note written in English and attached to these articles of incorporation as “purely benevolent in caring for children, and protecting them through such medico-hygienic measures as science may suggest.” The articles of incorporation lists fifteen founders: six Filipino men, all of whom are physicians (Dr. Fernando G. Calderon, Dr. Galicano Apacible, Dr. Joaquin Quintos, Dr. Manuel Guerrero, Dr. Gervacio Ocampo, Dr. Ariston Bautista), seven Filipino women (Maria Flores de Villamor, Carmen Manuel de Gerona, Trinidad Rizal, Concepcion Felix de Calderon, Maria Arevalo, Asuncion Soriano, Librada Avelina), one American woman (Helen Wilson), and one American man (the afore-mentioned Dr. David

Doherty). The 7 directors of the foundation are all Filipino, and two of them (again including Dr. Calderon) are physicians. Not only, however, are the founders largely Filipino; they are prominent ilustrados, some with key linkages to the Philippine Revolution.⁷ Dr. Fernando Calderon is the brother of Felipe Calderon, the author of the Constitution of the First Philippine Republic. Concepcion Felix de Calderon is the wife of Felipe Calderon. Trinidad Rizal is the sister of José Rizal, the prominent Filipino physician and author of the renowned novels *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo*, books whose critiques of the Spanish colonial power led to his assassination by the Spanish and to his installation as a Filipino national hero. Manuel Guerrero was a physician and writer, who wrote for the *Republica Filipina*, the revolutionary newspaper of General Aguinaldo, President of the First Philippine Republic, as well as for such newspapers as *La Independencia* and *La Patria* during and after the 1898 revolution. Even if – and this is not completely clear here – these ilustrados later and rapidly switched to collaborating with the American regime, as many ilustrados did (Rafael 1995: 155), none of the Filipino founders or directors are listed by name in the *Annual Report of Public Health* published by the U.S., the participation of the Filipino male physicians is utterly erased, and the influence and work of Americans is highlighted. In the *Annual Report* account, then, gender seems to be strategically invoked. The focus on “ladies” serves to dismiss the scientific and professional status of the initiative, and to make less visible the technical and medical expertise of the Filipino physicians, but also, perhaps, dismisses its political nature.⁸ The prominence of the American woman (multiplied to “women” in the U.S. authored document) flags the initiative as philanthropic, and Filipinos as needing assistance (on a comparable situation in Guam, see Hattori 2004: 137). The naming of the American physician serves as a suggestion that such initiatives are only enabled or made possible by male American medical expertise. The naming of the American woman may also suggest the necessity of her presence for such a movement. In two of the earliest accounts, then, of Filipino public health initiatives in the *Annual Report of Health*, Filipino initiatives (especially those of Filipino men) are partly erased, and thus minimized.

Example 3. Such colonialist accounts of Filipino initiatives are re-circulated and reiterated in certain more recent imperial histories. In Lewis Gleeck’s (1977) book he also writes about the founding of Gota de Leche:

In 1907, the Gota de Leche (Drop of Milk) was inaugurated by Taft during his visit to open the Philippine Assembly. Inspired by certain prominent physicians alarmed at the high infant mortality rate, and supported by both Filipino and American ladies, it was led for years by the well-known Filipino philanthropist, Teodoro Yangco, a Protestant who was very close to many of the early Americans and was encouraged and stimulated to join with them in community-wide undertakings (Gleeck 1977: 94).

Although the details differ here, some of the discursive strategies are similar. Filipino founders are not listed by name, and Americans are given a certain kind of credit for the initiative (Taft sounds like a founder, rather than an officiant, Filipino women are again named, American women are again given an inordinately prominent place, and even Yangco is seen as acting under American influence). Accounts of medical work in the Philippines thus are part of a body of historical scholarship which continue to perpetuate colonial discourse on the benevolent role of the U.S. in Filipino “assimilation” (see also Rafael 2000 and Salman 1991), as they serve to minimize the technical expertise of male physicians, and the social work of Filipino women.

Each individual example of this asymmetry may seem inconsequential, even anecdotal. However, the larger pattern – evident in multiple examples and in the different techniques for reference used for Filipinos and American men and women – is not. In the systematic accumulation of such citations, we see Filipino history placed in a position of subalternity. Chakrabarty argues that such a position is indicated by the fact that “Europeans” can write their histories in relative ignorance of non-Western ones without critique, whereas if non-Western histories are written in a similar way they are construed as traditional, old-fashioned, out-dated, pre-modern (2000: 28). One way in which this reveals itself is an asymmetry of citation, in which only the references to actors from the West are detailed, specific and authoritative, while references to non-Western ones remain vague.⁹ Nonetheless, part of the imperative of the particular mode of imperialism constructed by the American regime – benevolent tutelage – eventually requires citation of successful pedagogy. Erasure is soon replaced by ventriloquism in the colonial records of public health.

7. Incorporation and ventriloquism: Mimicry, mockery and medicine

If Fernando Calderon's key contribution to the organization that became known as Gota de Leche was obscured in the 1908 *Annual Reports of Public Health*, his public health activities and research did not go unnoticed by the colonial state. Over 50% of the work reported on infant mortality in the 1909 *Annual Report of Health* is reprints of two speeches given by Calderon, one at the 26th annual meeting of the Lake Mohonk conference in New York, a yearly conference devoted to affairs affecting the "dependent" peoples of the United States, as well as another speech given in Manila. Calderon's efforts are contextualized as part of ongoing efforts of the Bureau of Health and Bureau of Education to decrease rates of infant mortality. If the inclusion of this detailed account of work by a Filipino physician could be seen as undermining one of the key justifications for American imperial role – the need to educate Filipinos in the supervision of their own affairs – certainly Calderon's critiques of Filipino mothers was not at odds with the American project. Calderon emphasized that the "overwhelmingly high rate in the mortality among infants under 5 years of age is due to the ignorance of the Filipina mothers as to the proper care of their babies" (43). Other authors will soon focus more on the economic conditions affecting Filipino families, especially the poorer families. Nonetheless, Calderon himself critiques the Bureau of Health's efforts: "Instead of bringing before you foreign statistics as to the relative mortality of breast-fed and bottle-fed infants, I would have greatly preferred to present such data taken from the records of the Insular Bureau of Health. Unfortunately, that Bureau was unable to furnish me with them because no such data exist" (44). Although the same *Annual Report* includes a defensive paragraph of commentary which suggests that the Bureau of Health, though long recognizing the significance of this issue, believes that reliable figures cannot be obtained, statistics do appear in 1911, and in every annual report thereafter. This is all the more striking when one considers that this was not a matter of American policy – reliable statistics on infant mortality remained unavailable for much longer in Guam (Hattori 2004: 94, 106, 109), another Spanish island colony occupied in 1898, and which did not have any native physicians until 1940. The presence of Filipino physicians could thus be seen as calling the Americans on their claims to modernity, and pushing them towards it. Statistics, reliable or not, soon assume a key role in the

reporting of public health issues in the Philippine Islands; infant mortality statistics assumed a particularly central role.

It might be tempting here to see the very incorporation of Filipino voices as evidence of ambivalence about the colonial ideologies of the necessity of Americans exerting their “benevolent” efforts at assimilation. But, as Anderson (2006) notes in his discussion of white men’s breakdowns in the Philippines, these accounts are probably better understood as recognizing the contradictions of colonial displacement, in order to deflect, and contain, the conflicts they express. The detachment of scientific achievements from their source of production (Filipino medical institutions, shaped within a cosmopolitan context of scientific and medical exchange) is here used to delegitimize and trivialize those institutions.

Recontextualization allows speakers and authors to insert competing, or at least multiple, perspectives on what is taking place into discourse. Gaps between an earlier context and a recontextualization can be denied or highlighted with effects which need to be explored in each new situation (Briggs and Bauman 1992). For instance, minimizing intertextual gaps can be a way of creating authority, and of constructing a sense of history, authenticity and “imagined community”, as when ritual specialists attempt to decrease the distance between “the words of the ancestors” and their invocation in a particular ritual performance. But maximizing intertextual gaps can also be used to a speaker’s advantage, as when a speaker incorporates discourse from another genre to make a particular point, and then also can resort to saying, “I’m just quoting, not saying” if challenged on a particular point.

In some ways, the presentation of Calderon’s work can be seen as maximizing a textual gap: the text is presented verbatim in a smaller font than the remainder of the annual report in a way that suggests that the report was produced “elsewhere” as part of the construction of on-going scientific discourse about the Philippines. As such, perhaps, it works to highlight the work of the individual scientist, apart from the Bureau of Health. However, one also needs to take into account the effects of the very rapid translation of the economic and political aspects of American colonialism into the language of medical science: “At the same time as [the apparently technical literature of laboratory medicine] defined and multiplied physical difference, its assumption of universal explanatory power was an attempted erasure of Filipino authority in knowledge production” (Anderson 1995: 84). The very existence of a Bureau of Science in the Philippines and the success of its publications, like the *Philippine Journal of Science*, were

taken as evidence of superior American rationality and modernity (Anderson 1995: 91). It is the fact that the conditions under which Calderon was able to produce his medical knowledge remains vague that suggests that the detachment can better be seen as the minimization of an intertextual gap rather than its maximization. The work of a Filipino physician and scientist could be taken as a challenge to a colonial logic of Americans educating “little brown brothers.” The difference between Filipino documents produced within the context of Filipino medical institutions and/or in cosmopolitan contexts of scientific and medical exchange (Calderon was educated in France and Spain, and imported a number of different technologies from France in his work on infant mortality) and the American colonial medical establishment is treated as insignificant. If a sign of modernity was supposed to be the intercolonial and international construction of scientific knowledge and reputation (Anderson 1995: 94), the recognition of Filipino physicians in such a role, other than in the role of student or protégé, challenged divisions between modernity and tradition. As in the case of the minimization of the difference between other (ancestral) voices and ritual performers in the Weyewa ritual speeches discussed by Kuipers (1990), the effect of the inclusion of Calderon is at least in part a conservative one, one which imposes unity and silences dissenting voices (see also Briggs and Bauman (1992: 148–151)). Delinking American and Filipino achievements from more cosmopolitan conversations constructs American rationality as universal and minimizes Filipino achievements.

And yet, perhaps, these achievements are not so fully contained. Calderon’s very success provokes a patronizing, dismissive facetiousness among American writers. In his memoirs, Victor Heiser, the controversial and brutally effective director of Public Health from 1905 to 1915, and an out-spoken critic of the Filipinization of public health administration in the Philippines (see Anderson 2006: 185–9), describes traveling with Dr. Calderon in the year that he gave his Lake Mohonk address. Tellingly, Heiser cannot even be bothered to get Calderon’s name right: “Francisco Calderon”, he calls him (Heiser 1936: 192). Heiser portrays a naïve and hapless, ineffectual and effeminate Calderon, trailing in “Oriental style” after his American host (“There we registered at one of the large hotels and started for the elevator, Calderon following behind me – an Oriental always walks two paces in the rear” (1936: 194)). Calderon is portrayed as incessantly requiring American help when faced with modern forms of technology – trains and elevators, automobiles and street cars. He is said to have undressed in the aisle of the Pullman car, complaining that there wasn’t

enough room in his chamber (Heiser: “Look here, this sort of thing isn’t done in America” – 1936: 194), and to have sat smoking in the pleasantly cool observation car in his pajamas (Heiser: “I eventually persuaded him to conform to American notions of propriety” (194)). Calderon, a cosmopolitan colonial who had studied in France and Spain and would a year later present a paper to the Philippine Islands Medical Association comparing obstetrics in U.S, France, Russia and China (*Annual Report of Health*, 1909), is portrayed as child-like in his credulity.

After several pages of these accounts (indeed these are the most detailed portraits Heiser offers of any Filipino, in a 543 page memoir) one is surprised to find Heiser displaying a grudging admiration for Calderon, precisely in describing his preparations for his speech at the Lake Mohonk conference. Or, perhaps it is precisely this grudging admiration which leads to the portrayals. His travelling companion was, he writes “an extremely well educated and an intelligent man” and he wrote “an excellent address in Spanish, which his Filipino guide then translated into English. It was still effective because the Spanish idiom is beautiful even in translation. He practiced his speech daily and, although he scarcely knew the meaning of the words, he could repeat them perfectly in English” (1936: 195–6). Even here, however, Calderon’s failure to master English suggests he is mimicking, rather than learning, American ways. He speaks, but he does not understand. This ambivalence is precisely that diagnosed by Bhabha as part of the ironic conflict of colonial discourse: “colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (1994: 86). Although this ambivalence is sometimes linked with the colonial subject, here it seems to be entirely that of the colonial official. Anderson (2006) remarks that unlike many other colonial powers of the time, the American regime began to supplement constructions of racial difference which described Filipinos in homogenous terms with a focus on individuation and developmentalism: “Native imitations of American citizenship appealed to the narcissistic demands of colonial officials, but these performances usually appeared immature and unfaithful, that is, in need of further surveillance and discipline” (183). The necessity for incorporating Filipino voices in colonial texts, of ventriloquizing them, then can be linked precisely to the American project of benevolent assimilation. It requires the presence of a colonial other, presented not as peers but as protégés. Filipinos male physicians are under tutelage and training of more cosmopolitan colonial officials. Here, the key point perhaps is that Filipino work on public health was not *erased* from the colonial

record. Rather, Filipino initiatives are largely *contained* with the incorporation of Filipino public health initiatives into American public health texts, and thus re-authored, and authorized, as in some way American. They are presented as part of a larger initiative spear-headed by Americans, or part of the new group of Filipino health care workers being trained by Americans.¹⁰

8. Creating the conditions for debate and dialogue

The strategies of erasure, incorporation, ventriloquism and mockery all attempt to fix a particular discursive point of view in ways that do not permit the objects of representation to talk back. These views may not be hegemonic (as, indeed, colonial rule often presents perspectives which are dominant, but not hegemonic), but their contestation may not be visible or audible, especially in the metropole. In this section I briefly explore the conditions under which it became possible for elite Filipinos to speak back to American views, in dialogue and debate with them, rather than in separate spheres and to separate publics (in e.g. Spanish language journals and scientific societies). This section thus suggests some of the historical, political and institutional conditions under which attempts at authoritative entextualization are relatively less likely to succeed.

Some crucial changes took place in the American administration during the second decade of American occupation. Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, was elected president of the United States in 1912. Democrats, unlike Republicans, had long been opposed to this imperial venture – some because they felt it was un-American to govern any people without their consent, others because they refused to contemplate the integration of a large group of non-Whites into the United States. Wilson nominated a Governor-General, Congressman Francis Burton Harrison, who adopted a policy of Filipinization of the government, urging Filipinos to use their autonomy to prove they were capable of self-government (Golay 1997: 174). As a result, the proportion of Americans in the colonial civil service fell from 29% to 6% from 1913 to 1919 (Golay 1997: 176). For the first time, Filipinos comprised a majority on the commission that served as the executive branch of the government, and the Philippine assembly was able to enact its own legislative priorities. Administration of public health services under the American vice-governor general had long been a focus of Filipino resentment, because Filipino leaders were aware that “in the eyes of many

Americans their claims to greater government autonomy were flawed by their lack of experience in dealing with public health problems” (Golay 1997: 191). The legislature thus authorized the reorganization of the Public Health Service and the Bureau of Health became the Philippine Health Service. It was transferred to the Department of the Interior under a Filipino, Rafael Palma. The administration of public health was democratized by establishing a Council of Hygiene to serve as an advisory body for the director, with Fernando Calderon appointed its president (*Annual Report of Health* 1915: 8). In 1916 the Filipino legislature appropriated 1 million pesos for the protection of early infancy, and the establishment of “Gotas de Leche” (eventually known as puericulture centers) around the islands. The original Gota de Leche (described in example 2) was used as a model throughout the archipelago.

The democratization and Filipinization of the colonial government was criticized by a number of Americans in Manila, and by many Republicans in the U.S.; the criticisms sharpened after the end of WWI, as the healthy war economy plunged into a post-war recession and the colony experienced a number of labor strikes. A report commissioned by Warren Harding, the newly elected Republican president, emphasized a deterioration in government efficiency under the previous governor-general, with the administration of justice and public health singled out for particular critique (Golay 1997: 224, 232). It was against the backdrop of these debates about Filipino involvement in and effectiveness in public health, explicitly understood as a measure of Filipino readiness for independence, that the First National Conference on Infant Mortality and Public Welfare was held in 1921. I cannot analyze the papers in detail here, but in these proceedings (which were later used in Filipino schools as part of the curriculum in public hygiene, and thus had a larger Filipino audience than the *Annual Reports of Public Health* or Heiser’s memoirs) we can see conference participants jostling for authority over, and indeed credit for, pre-existing initiatives directed towards infant mortality. Filipino physicians challenge accounts of American scientific and medical superiority and thus prevailing accounts of American public health initiatives as simply part of the American colonial regime’s policy of “benevolent assimilation.” They argue that it was Filipino physicians who first noticed the problem of high rates of infant mortality, Filipino scientists who conducted the most extensive research leading to insights into beri-beri as a vitamin deficiency disease and its treatment, and Filipino voluntary organizations who had, until this moment, done the key work in distributing safe milk and tiki-tiki extract to reduce

infant mortality rates (Albert 1922; Quintos 1922).¹¹ In these accounts we thus see Filipino physicians challenging the masculine and racial hierarchies established by American colonial discourse. Filipino women, furthermore, assert the primacy of Filipino women's initiatives on these health issues vs. that of Filipino and American men. Mrs. Francisco Delgado, president of the National Federation of Women's Clubs, followed a group of American and Filipino men avowing their commitment to the cause of decreasing infant mortality by dryly noting, "It is also highly encouraging to see the the Government is taking more and more interest in this problem; and although the woman's clubs all over the Islands have for some time now been trying to organize a systematic way of improving conditions, they would welcome most heartily all assistance preferred, official or otherwise, because they realize the need for united and concerted action as well as the indispensability of material help" (1922: 22).

9. Conclusion: Tracking traces

Anderson (1992) points out that the development of a Filipino elite educated in Western medical practices also led to subtle but significant changes in the practice of medicine in the Philippines. Perhaps most significant for the argument here is that the "refashioning of American medical ideas and practices involved... the rediscovery of local precedents for health reform, a Filipino heritage of progressive public health work that was as valid as the American model" (337). In the debate over infant mortality we see a detailed version of precisely how such histories and the works of the individuals who constructed them, like Fernando Calderon, are made visible – and invisible. I would question only Anderson's emphasis on "the rediscovery" of local precedents, arguing instead that throughout the American occupation the elaboration of public health efforts by Filipino men and women, especially around infant mortality provided an implicit, sometimes explicit, challenge to the meaning of American medical practices, as they provided challenges to gender and racial hierarchies that colonial practices implied.

Trouillot argues that silences enter the processes of historical production at four crucial moments: (1) fact creation (the making of sources), (2) fact assembly (the making of archives), (3) fact retrieval (the making of narratives) and (4) retrospective significance (the making of history) (1995: 26). The significance of this, he argues, is that not all silences are equal, and not

all silences can therefore be redressed in the same way. Where the evidence is available in the sources, however impoverished, one may need to reinterpret the story. Filipino medical initiatives are clearly not entirely written out of the historical record. This is not a silence at the source level, or even at the archival level, though the sources are scattered and the archival information fragmented. There is enough, however, to patch together more than a sketch of Filipino men and women's medical work, especially their work on infant mortality. The silence here is not simply the absence of voice (though sometimes it is that), but more complexly the hijacking of it in the writing of contemporary and historical narratives. Inoue argues that the distinctive "epistemic violence of linguistic modernity lies...not so much in its erasure of what the other is saying but in the exclusion of what that other is saying about what he or she said" (2003: 166; see also Inoue, this volume). The violence lies in the ways people like Fernando Calderon are deprived of being able to provide, for themselves, authoritative representations of what their cited voices mean.¹² The violence is thus perhaps more meta-pragmatic than pragmatic. In the first decade and a half of the American occupation of the Philippines, the erasure and incorporation of Filipino public health initiatives into the authoritative text of the *Annual Reports of Public Health* suggested that Filipino projects were a part of American initiatives, rather than apart from them, or even critical of them, and even more significantly critical of their meta-pragmatic implication, or, their pretext: that such efforts justified the American presence in the Philippines. It is significant that these initiatives were not only erased, but also frequently ventriloquized: by being ventriloquized they could lend support to American arguments for the need for education of Filipinos in modern practices of education and hygiene. The successes of Filipinos are attributed to American influence. The failures are attributed to Filipinos. After the Filipinization of the public health service, however, the dialogicity of the earlier texts fractures into a much more public and explicit dialogue about the histories of effective public health initiatives.

The elaboration of these histories attempted to establish a national, rather than a colonial, history, and consolidated Filipinos' professional expertise on these grounds. The Filipino efforts are at least sometimes visible even in texts under the firm control of the American health establishment, in the ways the texts attempt to limit, incorporate or argue against Filipino initiatives. This debate itself, however, has largely fallen out of historical understandings of the role of the U.S. in public health in the Philippines, even in such magisterial volumes as the recent *History of Philippine Medicine*

1899–1999 (Dayrit, Ocampo and de la Cruz 2002). Such histories have therefore as yet had little impact on some of the most influential retellings of the effects of the American occupation, public school textbooks for Filipino children, let alone textbooks for American children. The colonial version of this story thus remains the most prominent one. Even the retelling of this story in this chapter can only be understood as a very preliminary move in intervening in imperialist accounts of American medicine. The real work remains to be done, in these other forms of popular history retelling.

Notes

- * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual conference of the Society for the Anthropology of North America (SANA), Atlanta, Georgia, April 23–25, 2004, the conference on “Containment and Transgression” at the Stanford Humanities Center 25th Anniversary Conference on “Knowledge and Belief”, Stanford, California, October 14–15th, 2005, and the joint annual meetings of the Canadian Anthropology Society (CASCA) and the American Ethnological Society (AES) in Toronto, May 8–12, 2007. This work is supported by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council. My thanks to Estelle Freedman for useful questions at Stanford, and to Charles Briggs for a careful reading of an earlier draft. An earlier and shorter version of this paper appears in French in *Anthropologie et Société* 31 (1).
1. See also Trouillot (1995: 25), though he has in mind focusing on the process of historical production in rather different terms.
 2. See the May 1948 issue of the *Journal of the Philippine Medical Association*, a memorial issue devoted to reviewing Dr. Calderon’s work, as well as Manuel (1954).
 3. See Anderson (2006: 132–133) for a brief but helpful review of this literature.
 4. This rather vague reference is in marked contrast with the regular and careful credit given to American and some European physicians for their work. To name just a few of many examples, consider the laudatory citations in the Annual Reports of the Bureau of Health of the work done by Dr. Wilkinson on an infectious disease hospital (1904: 84), the establishment of the first Filipino medical laboratory by Dr. Donelan (an Irishman), Dr. Martini (a Spaniard) and Dr. Parmentier (a Frenchman), (1905: 93), Dr. Maximilian Herzog, a former pathologist with the Bureau of Science, for his year study of beri-beri in Japan (1906: 53), Secretary of War William Taft’s kind interest in public and sanitation and hygiene in a brief visit to the Philippines (1908: 9), American “lady physician” Anna Beck for the medical inspection of schools (1908: 38), Dr. Fales of Madison Wisconsin on beri-beri in Filipino prisons (1908: 49),

Dr. Dudley's studies of cancer (1908: 50), to name just a few. In general, the citations of American physicians are also longer – they often list their current role in the Philippines, as well as past or current affiliations with U.S. institutions.

5. In this paper, I draw on some documents from the United States National Archives, in College Park Maryland. I use the standard reference format for these documents, indicating the record group in which the documents are found, as well as the file number. Thus, USNA, RG 350, 19029-3 refers to a document found in these archives, record group 350, file 19029-3.

USNA, RG 350, 19029-3.

Health Bulletin no. 3, Feb. 1, 1904.

Department of the Interior

Board of Health for the Philippine Islands

“The Care of Infants”

By Drs. Juan Miciano, Ariston Bautista, Mariano Martin and Manuel Gomez.

Manila: Bureau of Public Printing.

6. USNA, RG 350, 10929-3, “La Proteccion de la Infancia” (Incorporada en 15 Febrero 1907), San Pedro No. 41, Santa Cruz, Manila, IF. Escritura fundacional, Estatutos, Estado Economico. Manila. Imprenta de E. C. McCullough y Cia Plaza Goiti.
7. *Ilustrado* (or enlightened one) is the term used to describe elite, typically mestizo, males who were able to travel to, and study in, Europe in the late 19th century because of their growing wealth, the globalizing economy, and the advent of the steamship. In the 1880s the *ilustrado* created the first real intelligentsia in the Spanish colony, and began to critique Spanish clericalism and, later, Spanish political domination.
8. At a slightly later period, the replacement of male sanitary inspectors with female nurses was seen as more desirable because nurses were better trained, but also seen as more pliable (Anderson 2006: 201).
9. The specific example Chakrabarty analyzes is drawn from an analysis of influences on the work of Salman Rushdie, influences described by a literary critic as “on the one hand, from Indian legends, films and literature and, on the other, from the West – *The Tin Drum*, *Tristram Shandy*, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, and so on” (Chakrabarty 2000: 28).
10. As I was completing this article, Anderson's 2006 chapter on “Late-Colonial Public Health and Filipino ‘Mimicry’” was published. His chapter, while also much more briefly analyzing Heiser's travels with Calderon (see the top paragraph on page 186), considers the role of mimicry in American public health campaigns in the Philippines more broadly, with particular reference to Heiser and Dean Worcester's critique of the Filipinization of public health, and the ways that Heiser's later work with the Rockefeller Foundation served in some ways to try to circumvent the Filipino-run public health service and to recolonize health work in the archipelago.

11. Rice is the staple article of diet in most parts of the Philippines. In preparation for eating, most rice is polished (i.e. its covering or bran is removed). Polished rice is deficient in vitamin B, and the eating of polished rice has resulted in the prevalence of beriberi in the Philippines as in the other rice-producing countries (see also McElhinny 2005). An extract known as tiki-tiki is prepared from the polishings. It is an excellent source of vitamin B, and helps to prevent and cure infantile beriberi.
12. It is important to emphasize, here, that even if these Filipino physicians cannot be simply understood as collaborators or protégés, they are nonetheless not necessarily nationalists either. They may have tried to separate science from politics, or may have been marginal elites under the Spanish regime taking advantage of a new political order to gain a new and more central kind of power through technical expertise.

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Chapter 7

Out on video: Gender, language and new public spheres in Islamic Northern Nigeria

Rudolf P. Gaudio

“Shari’a boosts morals, checks vices”

(New Nigerian 2000)

“Homosexuals, prostitutes flee Kano”

(Millennium Weekly 2000)

“One cannot help but simply laugh at the exaggerated swishy walks, the adoption of the female speech patterns, the body rhythm and movements and the feminine mannerisms. It was really funny.”

*(Abdalla U. Adamu on the video-film *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu*, 2002)*

1. Introduction

In June 2000 the state government of Kano, Nigeria, staged an elaborate public ceremony “launching” its intention to adopt *Shari’a*, Islamic law, in place of the secular legal code it had inherited from British colonial rule. Although Kano was one of twelve northern Nigerian states to do so, as the largest city and state in the region its launching ceremony attracted the largest crowds – upwards of several hundred thousand people – and a host of dignitaries from as far away as Libya and Saudi Arabia. In preparation for the ceremony the government mobilized police and Islamist posses known as *hisbas* to go around the state warning bar-owners of the impending ban on alcoholic beverages and admonishing prostitutes – known in Hausa, the regional lingua franca, as *karuwai* – to get married or to leave the state. Also targeted by this moral purification campaign were ‘*yan daudu*, men who are said to talk and act “like women” and who are widely reputed to be involved in both heterosexual and homosexual prostitution.¹ According to the *New Nigerian*, a government-owned newspaper, ridding the state of ‘*yan daudu* and *karuwai* would create the social conditions necessary for the full implementation of *Shari’a* later that year, and the im-

provement of public morality along Islamic lines would lead to justice and prosperity for all. In some cases, ‘yan daudu and women presumed to be karuwai were evicted from their homes or places of work. Some took refuge with family or friends, while others fled to states where Shari’a had not been adopted. Most remained in Kano, where they were vulnerable to harassment, arrest and physical violence that was sponsored, or at least tolerated, by the state.

‘Yan daudu have long comprised a large, active social network that links cities and towns throughout northern Nigeria and beyond. (Karuwai, who generally prefer to be called “independent women” [*mata masu zaman kansu* ‘women who live on their own’, i.e., not with a husband or older relatives] form a similar network which overlaps with ‘yan daudu’s to a great extent.) ‘Yan daudu are most visible in marketplaces and motor-parks (transportation depots), where they cook and serve food to male workers and travelers. The money ‘yan daudu make from this “women’s work” (*aikin mata*) typically goes to support their wives, children and other clients, including kinfolk and younger ‘yan daudu (whom older ‘yan daudu often call their “daughters”). Some ‘yan daudu can be found at “women’s houses” (*gidajen mata*) where they and independent women rent rooms and entertain male visitors. The singular term *gidan mata* is often translated as ‘brothel’, reflecting the popular image of independent women as “prostitutes” (*karuwai*) and of ‘yan daudu as their “pimps” or agents (*kawalai*) or as “prostitutes” themselves. The translations are misleading. It is true that some independent women and some ‘yan daudu, especially younger ones, have sex with (conventionally masculine) men in exchange for money or other gifts; and the ‘yan daudu and independent women who facilitate these interactions are often given a kind of tip (Kleis and Abdullahi 1983). But the practice of *karuwanci* (‘prostitution’) is not simply commercialized sex work. Rather, like the *malaya* prostitutes in colonial Nairobi (White 1990), the independent women and ‘yan daudu who live and/or work at women’s houses provide a number of services other than sex: they cook and serve food, play cards and board games, and engage their visitors in friendly, sometimes flirtatious, conversation.² It is in this context that ‘yan daudu’s “feminine” linguistic skills are especially prized. Though often condemned as immoral, ‘yan daudu are also admired, desired and pursued for their clever ways with words. ‘Yan daudu call their masculine sex partners their ‘boyfriends’ (*samari*) or ‘husbands’ (*mazaje*), and the men themselves typically self-identify, discreetly, as *masu harka* (‘people who do the deed’, i.e., men who have sex with men). Some seemingly masculine *masu harka*

also self-identify, covertly, as ‘*yan daudu* – talking and acting “like women” in private, while maintaining a masculine occupation and appearance in public. Unless otherwise noted, in this paper the term ‘*yan daudu*’ refers to men who are publicly recognizable as such.

Less than two years after Shari’a was supposed to have checked vices and boosted morals across northern Nigeria, Sarauniya Studios, a Kano-based production company, released *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu*, a Hausa-language video-film in which popular actors perform humorous impersonations of ‘*yan daudu*.³ The title role is played by Rabilu Musa ‘Danlasan, the most famous comic actor in northern Nigeria today, whose chameleon-like screen persona “Ibro” has appeared in dozens of Hausa video-films since the industry took off in the late 1990s. The popular reception of these films highlights the ideological contradictions in which the Hausa video-film industry is enmeshed. On one hand, the industry’s success has expanded the influence of local businessmen, many of whom subscribe to Islamist ideologies (Grégoire 1993). On the other hand, capitalist commodity-production requires the use of unabashed aesthetic and emotional appeals to attract mass audiences and maximize profits; and these appeals sometimes generate desires that clash with the ascetic norms of orthodox Islam. The rise of a popular Hausa video culture thus poses a challenge to the Islamist reformers who spearheaded the movement for Shari’a. Tellingly, much as their predecessors did with respect to cinema theaters in previous eras (Larkin 2002a), some Islamic clerics have condemned Hausa video-films for promoting immorality and have called for the closing of commercial video parlors (Bauchi 2005). For their part the industry’s executives and artists consistently defend their films as socially enlightening and consistent with Islamic principles. This paper analyzes the content and reception of *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu (I’DD)* in order to trace the contradictory discourses of gender, sexuality and language that have emerged in northern Nigeria in the postcolonial era, complicating efforts by some Hausa Muslim elites to construct a Northern Nigerian public on the basis of normative Islam.⁴

A *public*, according to Susan Gal and Kathryn Woolard (1995), is “a form of language-based political legitimation” (132). The concept is closely tied to the *public sphere*, which Jürgen Habermas (1989 [1962]), among others, identifies as those (nongovernmental) communicative interactions that legitimate, or at least influence, the way power and resources are allocated within a nation-state or other polity; the term also refers to the places in which such interactions occur and to the technologies that mediate them. Publics are language-based in two ways. First, they are constituted in large

part through the use of language, i.e., discourse. Second, such discourse is informed and constrained by ideologies of language, which vary across time and space: What language varieties are deemed valid for public discourse? Who is authorized to learn and use those varieties? Who is granted access to the forums (physical or virtual) in which such discourse takes place? In eighteenth-century England, for example, Habermas describes how a public sphere emerged in part out of the conversations that took place in coffeehouses where patrons read and discussed printed mass-media texts like newspapers and essays (see also Heath 1997). Access to these conversations was limited to bourgeois and upper-class men: women were barred from coffeehouses, poorer men could not afford them, and literacy itself was a largely class- and gender-based privilege.

To be a member of a public is thus to be ratified as a participant in public-sphere discourse. The process of ratification is at once political, economic and sociocultural, for the symbolic and material resources necessary for public-sphere participation are unevenly distributed. Among other things, individuals are (or are not) deemed worthy as participants by virtue of age, class, gender, ability and other negotiable attributes.

The concept of participation is a central element in political scientists' theories of democratic citizenship. While classic definitions of citizenship focus narrowly on legal rights and obligations, such as voting and the paying of taxes, a variety of social movements have made it clear that, in practical terms, citizenship – defined as the right to participate in decision-making processes that affect the structure of society at large – is predicated on more than what the law stipulates. Theorists and activists have thus sought to expand our understandings of citizenship to include a critical consideration of social-interactional domains that are politically engaged but do not pertain to government per se, such as poetry readings in coffeehouses, sporting events, or the popular music industry. Taken together, these domains can be said to constitute the public sphere, and the right to participate in any or all of them is called *cultural citizenship* (Rosaldo 1997; Stevenson 1997). Insofar as participation in the public sphere is constrained by and reproduces differences of gender or sexuality, we can speak of *sexual citizenship* as an integral aspect of cultural citizenship (Evans 1993; Kaplan 1997; Leap 2004).

The concept of participation is also central to the work of many linguistic anthropologists. "Participants" is the second element in Dell Hymes' SPEAKING model for the ethnography of communication (Hymes 1974), and Erving Goffman's notions of footing and framing inform our use of

“participant structures” (Philips 1983) and “participation frameworks” (Goodwin 1993) to analyze the social organization of talk in face-to-face interaction. By linking these constructs to the notion of cultural citizenship, I seek to demonstrate how linguistic-anthropological theories and methods can be used to elucidate the processes that constitute and reshape translocal, national and transnational publics. This approach to cultural citizenship treats people’s everyday social interactions as (potentially) significant modes of participation in such “imagined communities”. According to Benedict Anderson (1991), the quintessential imagined community is the modern nation-state, which emerged as the object of people’s allegiance and affection thanks in part to the circulation of print genres, such as novels and newspapers, written in standardized national languages. As new media were invented (radio, photography, cinema, etc.), these too were recruited by governments and dissidents alike to reinforce and contest hegemonic constructions of the nation-state. Nations and publics – national citizenship and cultural citizenship – are thus fundamentally connected, though not isomorphic; and language, as noted by Gal and Woolard (1995), is a primary basis of this connection.

As illustrated by Habermas’ account of the formation of the public sphere in early-modern England, the construction of a national public entails a particular ideological configuration of gender and language, and thus of sexual citizenship. Linguistic anthropologists have explored such configurations in other places and times. Miyako Inoue (2003, this volume), for example, describes how in the post-Meiji era the project of imagining a modern Japanese nation was effected in part by constructing an idealized notion of Japanese “women’s language” to which all, but especially middle-class, women were expected to strive. As described and prescribed in grammar books, newspaper articles and other texts, “women’s language” was deemed iconic of good motherhood, a form of sexual citizenship that was itself defined as contributing to the (re)production of a strong national economy and loyalty to the state. In contemporary Tonga, Susan Philips (2000) shows how an official image of Tongan national culture is constructed and reinforced in criminal trials of men accused of “bad language”, or talk that violates a normative ideology of sister-brother relations. By construing the sister-brother pair as iconic of the nation, prosecutors and judges treat “bad language” not simply as a crime against individuals or families, but as a crime against Tongan culture and the Tongan nation-state. According to Philips, by projecting the state’s power onto a range of everyday social interactions, these trials show how hegemony is both “mul-

tisited” and “site-specific”. In other words, hegemony operates through particular channels in particular places, and it is the collective force of these operations that sustains it. But hegemony, by definition, does not operate without resistance. Thus, in contemporary Japan young women sometimes attract criticism for their failure to use the canonical “women’s language” (Inoue 2003; Okamoto 1995). And the persistence of “bad language” in Tonga means that the hegemony of the sister-brother ideology, and thus of the Tongan nation-state, is never complete.

In their study of politics in post-socialist Eastern Europe, Susan Gal and Gail Kligman (2000) describe how gender has emerged as a central problem in debates about the way “civil society” – a concept akin to “the public” – should operate. As Hungary transitioned from state socialism to a (supposedly) free-market democracy, for example, abortion became a controversial issue. According to Gal (1994), debates about abortion were not only debates about women’s reproductive choices and obligations, or even women’s role in society; they were also debates about the changing nature of the Hungarian nation-state and its relationship to other state and nonstate actors on the contemporary global stage. Gender is also a central issue in two of the discursive realms that have contributed to the growth of Northern Nigerian nationalism in recent years: Islamist politics and commercial Hausa video culture (see also Yang, this volume). The coexistence of these forces creates powerful synergies, but it creates important – and potentially lucrative – contradictions as well. Many ‘yan daudu are aware of these contradictions, as are the people, movements and companies seeking to empower and enrich themselves at ‘yan daudu’s expense. *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu* and the venues in which it was viewed and discussed are some of the many sites where these contestations over Northern Nigerian sexual citizenship are being played out. By analyzing how ‘yan daudu’s “feminine” language practices are represented (or not) in these discourses, I aim to show how an Islamic Northern Nigerian public is being imagined, fractured and opposed, and the particular ideologies of gender and language that are involved in those processes.

2. Gender, language and the historical formation of a Northern Nigerian public

My personal acquaintances with ‘yan daudu began in the early 1990s, when I spent 21 months over three years learning Hausa, teaching at a local uni-

versity, and doing fieldwork for a doctoral dissertation on ‘yan daudu’s language practices (Gaudio 1996). In those days, and when I returned for a follow-up visit in 1997, the conditions of ‘yan daudu’s lives were already difficult. Nigeria – a member of OPEC – is rich with oil and other resources, but ‘yan daudu, like other Nigerians, are overwhelmingly poor and illiterate, and they suffer from the economic deterioration wrought by years of corruption and mismanagement by politicians, military dictators, businessmen, multinational corporations and international lenders (Okonta and Douglas 2001). In addition to suffering the impoverishment caused by this corruption, ‘yan daudu and independent women have often been scapegoated for it – accused of being in cahoots with corrupt “big men” (*manyan mutane*) who use their ill-gotten gains to satisfy their legendary appetites for sex and other pleasures. On a more cosmological level, many Hausa Muslims believe their suffering is God’s way of punishing their society for disobeying Him, and Islamic leaders commonly blame karuwai and ‘yan daudu for promoting such disobedience. Because of their low social, moral and economic status, therefore, ‘yan daudu and independent women have long been subject to sporadic abuse at the hands of police and young male hooligans, who can harrass, rape, or steal from them with impunity. Sometimes this persecution rises to the level of government policy. In the last few decades of the twentieth century, if not before, northern Nigerian states and municipalities periodically enacted morality campaigns similar to the ones that accompanied the recent adoption of Shari’a (Pittin 2003; Umar 1993); most of my ‘yan daudu acquaintances had been arrested or worse at some time or other. What was different in 2000 was that these campaigns were no longer confined to a particular territory or jurisdiction, and they did not quickly dissipate; rather, they constituted a broad – and seemingly more durable – political trend that sought to encompass the entire Muslim North.

As places where ‘yan daudu and independent women are known to live and work, women’s houses (*gidajen mata*) have been a primary site of state repression under Shari’a. Although most of the interactions that take place in women’s houses are not sexual per se, regionally dominant interpretations of Islam deem them potentially sexual, and therefore immoral, because they involve socializing between unrelated women and men. For much of the last century, therefore, women’s houses have generally been tolerated only in those parts of northern Nigerian cities known as *barikis* (from English ‘barracks’) where other “un-Islamic” activities, such as gambling and drinking alcohol, have also been more-or-less tolerated. As the name suggests, barikis are the historic by-product of British colonial poli-

cies that compelled masses of young African men to migrate to urban areas to work in railyards, factories and other wage-earning occupations (O'Brien 1999). These men were often non-Hausa and non-Muslim, and they were housed in barracks that were spatially removed from "traditional" parts of Hausa cities where, under the colonial policy of Indirect Rule, Islamic norms continued to be upheld. One of the main aims of the Shari'a movement has been to abolish this colonial-era geography by bringing all of Northern Nigeria and its (Muslim) residents back into conformity with orthodox Islamic norms. (Debates about the legal obligations of non-Muslims under Shari'a led to deadly riots in some areas and remain largely unresolved.)

Recent debates about the adoption (or reinstatement) of Shari'a thus reflect northern Nigeria's historical location as a zone of contact between two "globalizing" ideological systems – Islam and European imperialism. When Britain and France colonized Hausaland at the turn of the twentieth century, the Hausa city-states – like most major polities of inland West Africa – had been at least nominally Muslim for hundreds of years. In the early 1800s, under the leadership of Usman 'dan Fodio, an ethnic Fulani Muslim scholar whose ancestors had settled in Hausaland, Islamic revolutionaries waged a jihad against the Hab'e (ethnic Hausa) monarchs, whom they accused of betraying Islamic norms of governance and justice. The jihadists succeeded in overthrowing most of the Hab'e dynasties and replacing them with Fulani rulers who swore allegiance to a centralized Islamic Caliphate based in the city of Sokoto (in present-day northwestern Nigeria). Under the Caliphate the public sphere was dominated by Islamic scholars who used a number of literary genres to debate matters of social and political importance. Most of these texts were written in Arabic and were therefore extremely limited in their circulation. Some scholars also used an adapted version of the Arabic alphabet known as *ajami* to write texts in Hausa or Fulfulde (the Fulani language) but given widespread illiteracy the social reach of these texts was also limited. The only way to reach large audiences was to recite texts orally in public settings, such as mosques or marketplaces. The quintessential oral public-sphere genre was the Friday sermon (*hotuba*). Another important oral-literary genre was the *wak'a* (pl. *wak'ok'i*) or song-poem, which many scholars used to convey social commentary in a manner that was meant to appeal aesthetically as well as intellectually.⁵

When the European colonial powers divided Hausaland they effectively reproduced a geopolitical division that had existed for almost one hundred years: Britain incorporated most of the Sokoto Caliphate into the Protector-

ate of Northern Nigeria, while the remaining Hausa city-states became part of French West Africa (and later, the Republic of Niger). After conquering the Caliphate militarily, the British made Northern Nigeria a showcase of Indirect Rule by coopting the region's Hausa-Fulani⁶ rulers or replacing them with others who would submit to the British Crown. In keeping with the policy of Indirect Rule, Christian missionaries were barred from working in much of northern Nigeria and Hausa, written in roman script, was cultivated as the day-to-day language of governance. Over the course of the twentieth century, however, Islam and Hausa became idioms of resistance to colonialism. Conversions to Islam accelerated among people who had heretofore practiced indigenous religions, and many rural communities underwent language shift, abandoning their ancestral languages in favor of Hausa. These two processes were often conflated such that a person who converted to Islam was often described as having "become Hausa" (*zama Bahausha/Bahaushiya*). Northern nationalists based their anticolonial ideologies on Islamic precedents, including the Sokoto Caliphate, and used the burgeoning Hausa-language press to broadcast their discourses. The practice of performing and writing politically engaged *wak'ok'i* was thus transformed, but not eliminated, by the British conquest. The use of Arabic declined, the roman alphabet gradually replaced *ajami*, and written poems circulated more widely thanks to printing presses and increasing rates of Hausa literacy among northern Nigerian urbanites trained in colonial schools. These same developments also gave rise to other public-sphere genres, most notably the newspaper, while radio and eventually television made it possible to broadcast oral-literary performances (Furniss 1996). These mass media were controlled by the British colonial authorities until Nigeria became independent in 1960, at which time the Nigerian federal government assumed control.

As nationalist movements intensified across Africa following the Second World War, Northern leaders became concerned about the relative power they would wield in a postcolonial Nigerian state. Southerners, whose experience of British colonialism had been longer, generally had greater proficiency in English (spoken and written) and were overrepresented in the civil service. In a case of ideological recursion similar to that described by Judith Irvine and Susan Gal (2000), discourses of Northern nationalism thus came to have two targets: the British and Southerners, who were often construed as the colonialists' Christian, English-speaking avatars. Such discourses proved potent among Muslim Northerners despite, or perhaps because of, the ways they erased the country's demographic and

cultural complexity, for neither the North nor the South exists as a unified ethnic, religious or political entity. Indeed, in the decade following independence, leaders from the North and West (i.e., the predominantly Yoruba southwestern region) joined forces to defeat Igbo secessionists in the south-east who had proclaimed the independent state of Biafra. Northern nationalist discourses also obscured political struggles within the North's political establishment. Around the time of independence the conservative Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) dominated over the more radical Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) in part by stressing the need for Northern unity in the face of Southern competition (Reynolds 2001). This political opposition was informed by class divisions, regional rivalries (especially between Sokoto and Kano), and competition among the Islamic Sufi orders that were historically dominant among the Hausa-Fulani ruling classes (Paden 1973). In the post-civil war period these conflicts have been compounded by the growth of Islamist movements which draw their inspiration from Saudi Wahhabism and the Iranian revolution (Umar 1993) and, more recently, al-Qaeda. In response to Islamist accusations that Sufi mystical practices are "pagan" and "un-Islamic", the ruling classes have sought to defend their moral legitimacy by affirming their commitment to literalist interpretations of Islamic scripture, leading to the eventual adoption of Shari'a by twelve northern Nigerian state governments in 1999–2001.⁷ The promotion of Shari'a can thus be seen as a response to political struggles within northern Nigeria as well as between an imagined Muslim North and Christian (or pluralist) South.

As is evident in the newspaper headlines cited as epigraphs for this chapter, gender and sexuality are important foci of the new Shari'a legal code. In addition to stepping up their persecution of independent women and 'yan daudu, some states mandated the segregation of women and men on public transportation, and a small number of women and men have been prosecuted for adultery or sodomy. Although few in number, these trials attracted extensive international media coverage. Perhaps the most infamous case was that of Amina Lawal, a divorced Hausa Muslim woman who was convicted of adultery in her home state of Katsina and sentenced to death by stoning; she was eventually acquitted on appeal. Although 'yan daudu's legal and social circumstances have worsened in the wake of these developments, they faced ostracism and persecution long before the adoption of Shari'a. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from a song-poem by Ak'ilu Aliyu, a well-known poet who was active in NEPU in the years before and after independence (Reynolds 2001). Entitled "Dan

Daudu”, the poem was published in a 1976 booklet entitled *Fasaha Ak’iliya* (‘Ak’ilu’s Art’), which was reprinted several times and sold in urban markets and college bookstores. Aliyu performed this and other poems on the radio numerous times before he died in 1999. Its polemical tone is typical of the wak’a genre as interpreted by politically-minded poets (Furniss 2003). (Line numbers and formatting are reproduced from the original publication.)

Text 1

An “old” public-sphere text: Excerpts from the *wak’a* (song-poem) “Dan Daudu” by Ak’ilu Aliyu (1976)

6 Ba shi a tsuntsu, ba shi a dabba: Jemage shi ke, mai ban haushi.

7 Babu fikafikkai gun dabba; Tsuntsu shi kuwa ba shi hak’ori

8 Shi dai ya zama jakin-doki, Ya b’ata wa mazaje suna.

26 Wai kuma shi ne Delu da Hansai! Ga shirme maganar ban haushi!

27 Ga shagwab’a ta rashin shan kashi Gun ‘Dan Daudu abokin Larai.

32 Ni da a ce ‘dana ya zam shi, Gara a ce mini ya zama gyartai.

33 Ai da ya zam ‘dandaudu, jinina, Gara ya zam ajali ya sauko.

34 Ai, wallahi, da dai ya yi, ni dai, Gara ya ma mutu, shi yafi sauk’i.

6 *He’s not a bird, he’s not an animal: He’s a bat, annoying.*

7 *An animal doesn’t have wings; And a bird doesn’t have teeth.*

8 *But he’s become a donkey-horse, He’s ruined the name of men.*

26 *And he calls himself Delu, and Hansai! Such nonsense, annoying talk!*

27 *Look how spoiled from not being disciplined, ‘Dan Daudu, friend of Larai.*

32 *If I were told my son had become one, Better to tell me he’d become a calabash-mender.*

33 *Oh, if he became a ‘dan daudu, my blood, Better his final day had come.*

34 *Oh, by God, if he did that, as for me, well, Better he should die, that would be easier.*

[End]

Just as a bat (*jemage*) is in some ways bird-like yet similar to an earth-dwelling animal, so do ‘yan daudu confound the poet’s attempts to categorize them as either male or female. This elusive quality is performed by, among other things, ‘yan daudu’s use of feminine names such as Delu and

Hansai to refer to themselves. Such talk, along with ‘yan daudu’s participation in other women’s customs (e.g., assisting the bride’s friends before a wedding), is not only “annoying” (*mai ban haushi*), but makes the ‘dan daudu morally unfit to be a member of the poet’s family. In this regard, Aliyu compares ‘yan daudu unfavorably with calabash-menders, traditionally one of the lowliest occupations in Hausa society, and he obliquely asks God to take his son’s life should he become a ‘dan daudu. Because the *wak’a* genre is traditionally used to make public comments about important social issues, it is appropriate to read the poet’s hostile sentiments as pertaining not just to his own household, but to Hausa Muslim society at large. The poem can thus be seen as both reflecting and reinforcing the social ostracism that ‘yan daudu face and the persecution this leads to. Indeed, Aliyu’s angry (hypothetical) rejection of his own son is iconic of the ways ‘yan daudu have been, and continue to be, excluded from the Northern Nigerian public sphere.

3. Ideologies of gender and language in new public spheres:

Ibro ‘Dan Daudu

In the post-civil war era the Nigerian government’s control of mass media was loosened by the advent of new and cheap communication technologies. Compared with “large” media such as cinema and television, which require costly inputs and infrastructural supports, the “small” media of analog audiocassettes, desk-top publishing and videotape were not monopolized by government agencies and allowed private-sector producers more creative autonomy and greater opportunities for quick profits (Larkin 1997). These new media transformed the country’s national and regional public spheres as they allowed non-government actors to reproduce and circulate sounds, texts and images more freely than ever before. Book publishers, music producers, and proselytizers from a variety of Muslim and Christian sects all took advantage of these technologies, giving rise to new publics and counterpublics and new forms of sociopolitical competition.⁸ (Mass media are still regulated by state censorship boards, however.)

As video technologies became cheaper in the 1990s, a commercial Hausa-language video industry emerged as northern Nigerian capitalists sought to take advantage of economies of scale. (A larger, English-language Nigerian video industry, sometimes called “Nollywood”, arose somewhat earlier in southern Nigeria – see Haynes 2000.) The market for

Hausa video-films was fueled by a number of cultural and demographic factors, including: the rapid growth of northern Nigeria's cities and towns; the longstanding popularity of foreign films, especially Indian "Bollywood" films from which Hausa filmmakers drew creative inspiration (Larkin 2000, 2002b); and the problematic moral status of cinema theaters, which makes them off-limits to "respectable" Hausa Muslim women and large numbers of men (Larkin 2002a). Like the videotapes of Indian, Chinese and American films that had been circulating in northern Nigeria since the late 1980s, Hausa video-films were initially sold by open-air market vendors and viewed in private settings, especially middle-class homes. As the market expanded, local entrepreneurs set up video parlors (*gidajen bidiyo* 'video houses' or *gidajen kallo* 'viewing houses') where patrons – primarily working-class men – can view recent releases for a small fee. This circulation has created a large and lucrative fan base, especially among urban Hausa youth, who consume videocassettes, posters of popular movie actors, and magazines such as *Fim* ('Film') and *Duniyar Fim* ('Film World') that feature reviews, interviews, notices of upcoming releases, and chatty stories about Hausa film *taurari* (literally, 'stars'; see Furniss 2003). A rather smaller number of fans (and not a few academics) read *Fim* online and participate in Internet discussion groups, such as *Finafinan_Hausa* ('Hausa_films') on yahoo.com.

The title role in *Ibro 'Dan Daudu* is played by Rabilu Musa 'Danlasan, a.k.a. "Ibro", who has starred in dozens of other video-films such as *Mijin Hajiya* ('Madam's husband'), about a man who is dominated by his wealthy wife; *Ibro Niga*, about African American youth styles and the young Nigerians who imitate them; and *Ibro Awilo*, a parody of a famous Congolese singer which popularized the song "Mu Daina Shan Ganye" ('Let's Stop Smoking Weed'). In *I'DD* 'Danlasan portrays a 'dan daudu (Ibro) who runs a food-shop and women's house where he and his 'yan daudu "daughters" cook and serve food to well-heeled "big men" who come to visit their karuwai girlfriends. Like many real-life 'yan daudu, Ibro is married and has a child; his wife and teen-age daughter live elsewhere in the same northern Nigerian town. (Though unnamed, a number of outdoor scenes make it visually recognizable as Wudil, a small city in Kano State that is widely known to be 'Danlasan's hometown.) The plot of the film follows one young man, 'Dan Bàbá, who leaves his parents' home and goes to live with Ibro, whose glamorous lifestyle he seeks to emulate. After learning how to dress, move, talk and cook in the same "womanlike" fashion as the other 'yan daudu, 'Dan Bàbá is chosen by Ibro to marry his

daughter, much to the girl's and her mother's chagrin. On the day of the wedding Ibro's daughter runs away to escape her fate. Before she can be found the film ends abruptly when Ibro is hit by a car while crossing a street. His 'yan daudu companions go off to seek the help of the local imam, who denounces them. Ibro, meanwhile, is noticed by a passing driver who helps him into his car and takes him away. This contrived ending sets the stage for a sequel, *Ibro 'Dan Daudu 2*, which came out in late 2002. (I have not seen the sequel.)

As is common in Hausa video-films and other popular narrative genres, *I'DD* depicts a simplistic moral universe in which good and bad people, and good and bad behaviors, are clearly distinct. 'Yan daudu, karuwai and their wealthy male patrons are portrayed as unscrupulous hedonists who take advantage of their families and neighbors, and occasionally each other. By contrast, the film's other characters are portrayed as obedient to Hausa Muslim social norms, and it is this ethical integrity, bordering on naïveté, that makes them vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of 'yan daudu. The most glaring – and entertaining – sign of 'yan daudu's disregard for social norms is their outrageous “womanlike” behavior. No matter where they are or who they're talking to, Ibro and his 'yan daudu “daughters” consistently sport head-ties and waist-wrappers, swing their hips, speak in high-pitched voices, and refer to each other using semantically feminine forms like “she”, ‘mother’ (*bábà*) and ‘girl’ (*yarinya*). They also engage in some (but not all) of the verbal-art genres that are conventionally associated with Hausa ‘women's talk’ (*maganar mata*). These behaviors persist even in the most unlikely and inappropriate contexts, such as when 'yan daudu are interacting with the local imam or with their own parents, wives and children.

Scene 1: Ibro's entrance

The film opens with a shot of four middle-age men, one of them an imam, sitting in the shade of a wooden canopy by the side of a narrow dirt road. The men are debating the connection between the way a child is raised and the way he turns out. One man (“Man 1”) is of the opinion that when a child behaves badly, the fault lies with the parents who failed to raise him properly. The other men generally disagree, especially the imam (played by Auwalu Idris), who in Arabic and Hausa counsels Man 1 to pray, be patient, and leave fate in God's hands. As the men continue their discussion, the camera pans left, showing us the entrance of a younger man (Ibro) dressed in a (woman's) head-tie and waist-wrapper over a loose man's

gown. With his arms bent at the elbows and wrists, Ibro swings his hips and sings to himself quietly as he slowly approaches the men. Without stopping to bend or crouch down – as a younger man ought to do when greeting his elders, and as lay people should do before an imam – Ibro greets them in a voice that is distinctively breathy and high-pitched.⁹

Text of Scene 1

1	Ibro:	‘Yan maza, <u>salamu alai-</u> <u>kum.</u>	Sons of men, <u>peace unto you</u> _{pl.}
2		Sannunku ai.	Hello there.
3	*Man 2:	Yauwa, sannu.	Yes, hello.
4	Ibro:	Yaya gari?	How’s the town?
5	*Man 2:	Lafiya.	Fine.
6	Ibro:	Madalla. Sai an jima.	Wonderful. Good bye.
7	Man 1:	<u>La ilaha illallah!</u>	<u>There is no god but Allah!</u>
8		Allah ya tsine masa!	God damn him!
9		[(xxxx)]	[(xxxx)]
10	*(Man 2):	[He he he:::	[He he he:::
11	Man 1:	Shege yaron nan!	This bastard boy!

Ibro’s feminine appearance is matched by the pragmatic implications of his opening lines. The first words out of his mouth, ‘*yan maza* (‘sons of men’), recall the kind of vocative one might expect to hear from an older woman addressing a group of younger men; in this context they reinforce Ibro’s image as both feminine and disrespectful of social hierarchies. The Arabic greeting *salamu alaikum* is a conventional formula that Hausa Muslims use to initiate social encounters; it indexes a degree of formality that is normally associated with men. By contrast, the Hausa expression *sannunku* indexes informality and is more commonly used between women (Rufa’i 1986: 68). The men’s reactions to Ibro’s greeting differ in ways that reflect their earlier discussion, with Man 1 voicing surprise and contempt while his companions respond with smiles, laughter or, in the case of the imam, almost no affect at all.

Scene 2: At home with Ibro

Scene 2 takes place in Ibro’s home, a typical Hausa domestic compound, where his daughter has been complaining to her mother about the teasing

she endures because of her father's gender-bending behavior. Though sympathetic, Ibro's wife (played by Lubabatu Madaki) counsels her daughter to exercise 'patience' (*hak'uri*), a virtue that is commonly invoked to encourage people to accept unpleasant circumstances without necessarily implying that those circumstances are going to improve. Ibro's entrance epitomizes the very behaviors his daughter has been complaining about: wearing a head-tie and waist-wrapper, he swings his hips and throws his head from side to side as he calls out greetings in the same high-pitched voice we heard in Scene 1. Despite this exaggerated display of gender transgression, Ibro's wife defers to his patriarchal authority, as good Hausa wives are supposed to do, by giving him her stool, sitting down on the mat below him, and consistently addressing him by the honorific title *maigida* ('head of house'). Her deference is mitigated, however, by the way she rolls her eyes and purses her lips – iconic gestures of annoyance and defiance – and by the way she verbally challenges him. Ibro's daughter, meanwhile, dutifully greets him as *bàbá* ('father') but otherwise remains sullen and quiet throughout the scene. (This scene is divided into three sections to facilitate line-by-line analysis.)

Scene 2.1

1	Wife:	Sannu da zuwan.	Greetings on <you> arrival.
2	Ibro:	Sannu dai.	Greetings.
3		Em., ke, wa kike?	Um, you _f , who are you _f ?
4	Daughter:	Sannu da zuwa, bàbá.	Greetings, father.
5	Ibro:	Tuna min don Allah.	Please remind me.
6		Fa'da min sunanta.	Tell me her name.
7	Wife:	Hm-m! Ban san ko wa namiji (xx)	Hm-m! I don't know who the man (xx)
8	Ibro:	'Yar- em- 'yar 'yata.	Daughter- em- my little daugh- ter.
9		Sauraye ni.	Listen to me.
10		Ki nutsu.	Be attentive.
11		Ki sakaci kunnenki.	Clean out your _f ears.
12		Ki raraki kunnenki.	Empty out your _f ears.
13		((xx))=	((xx))=

14	Wife:	=Don Allah don Annabi	=By God and the Prophet
15		da ka shigo gidan nan	when you _m enter this house
16		ka ajiye daudun a k'ofar gida.	leave the daudu at the door.
17		Don Allah don Annabi	By God and the Prophet
18		ka rabu da wannan.	quit this <behavior>.
19		To yanzu ba ka jin kunya?	Now don't you _m feel shame?
20		'Yarka ce, ko wannan fa.	This is your _m daughter, remem- ber.
21		'Yarka ce, ko maigida?	This is your _m daughter, right, maigida?
22		Wannan abin kunya, bai zama	This shameful thing, it's be- come
23		jikinka ba?	second nature to you _m , hasn't it?

Although Ibro's wife makes no metapragmatic remarks about his feminine clothing, gestures or vocal prosody, she does comment critically on the verbal aspects of his speech (see also Weidman, this volume, on when and how voice becomes central to social commentary). Thus, she faults him for failing to remember their daughter's name, and she interrupts him to criticize the series of commands whereby he summons the girl's attention. These commands (lines 10–12) all begin with a subjunctive aspect marker (*ki*) indicating an implicit feminine second-person singular subject ('you_f'); and the final two commands feature parallel verb phrases that refer metonymically to the daughter's ears. These parallelisms epitomize 'yan daudu's supposed penchant for artful conversational banter, and prompt the wife's admonishment that Ibro "leave the daudu at the door" (line 16), that is, to stop acting like a woman when he comes home. Her criticism of this behavior as a 'shameful thing' (*abin kunya*) precipitates a tense exchange that recalls the stereotypical bickering of Hausa co-wives (Scene 2.2). Proverbs, in italics, are an iconic element of such quarrels.

Scene 2.2

24	Ibro:	In kin gama ki yi magana,	If you're _f done talking,
25		zan ci gaba.	I'll go on.
26	Wife:	Shi ya sa 'yan magana suka ce,	That's why people-who-talk have said

27		“ <i>Da a hana ka hankali,</i>	“ <i>Rather than deprive you_m of</i>
			<i>good sense,</i>
28		<i>gwara a hana ka</i>	<i>it would be better to deprive you_m</i>
29		<i>gadon ubanka.”</i>	<i>of your paternal inheritance.”</i>
30		Allah ya ba ka lafiya.	May God give you _m health.
31		Mu je, ina jinka.	Let’s go on, I’m listening to you _m .
32	Ibro:	Ma’ana ba ni da lafiya?	Meaning I’m not healthy?
33	Wife:	A, ni?	What, me? <Did I say that?>
34	Ibro:	Allah?	Really? <You didn’t?>
35	Wife:	M’m. Ban ce ba.	Uh-uh. I didn’t say it.
36		Allah ya ba ka hak’uri.	May God give you _m patience.

In her role as Ibro’s wife, Lubabatu Madaki provides a classic illustration of *habaici*, the practice of exchanging insulting or accusatory innuendo that is commonly associated with women, especially co-wives. Proverbs (*karin magana*, literally ‘folded speech’) are a prototypical feature of such exchanges for at least two reasons. As capsules of Hausa folk wisdom, they are designed to be invoked as the reported speech of generic “people who talk” (‘*yan magana*, literally ‘children of talk’), thus absolving the speaker of individual responsibility (or credit) for what she’s about to say (Gaudio 1997). In addition, their elliptical syntactic and semantic structure requires hearers to infer meanings which speakers can always disavow, such as the insinuation that Ibro lacks ‘sense’ (*hankali*) (Hill 1972; Jang 1999). An alternative way to evade responsibility for one’s statements is to invoke God’s will, as Ibro’s wife does when she calls on God to grant Ibro ‘health’ (*lafiya*) without saying explicitly that he is unhealthy. Islamic invocations are not definitionally associated with *habaici*, but their semantic ambiguity with respect to agency and intentionality clearly makes them compatible with such speech events.

‘Yan daudu are widely reputed to be skillful performers of proverbs and *habaici* (Yahaya and ‘Dangambo 1986), and they often claim to be even more skilled than women at the use of these genres (Gaudio 1997). As depicted in Scene 2, however, Ibro’s verbal abilities are no match for his wife’s. His speech may be artfully “feminine” in some ways, but it is not clever. On the contrary, many of his statements constitute blunt exercises of patriarchal authority. Thus, when his wife calls on God to grant Ibro ‘patience’ (*hak’uri*), he responds with a momentary silence – effectively ignoring her – before announcing his decision to give their daughter away in marriage (Scene 2.3).

Scene 2.3

- 36 Wife: Allah ya ba ka hak'uri. May God give you_m patience.
- 37 Ibro: (..) Na yi miki miji. (..) I've found you_f a husband.
- 38 ((Fixes head-tie, rolls eyes.)) ((Fixes head-tie, rolls eyes.))
- 39 Wife: (.) Ka yi mata miji? (.) You_m found her a husband?
- 40 Ibro: Na yi. Yes.
- 41 Wife: Ka yi me? You_m did what?
- 42 Ibro: Miji. A husband.
- 43 Wife: Wane irin miji? What kind of husband?
- 44 Ibro: Ba ki san shi ba fa. You_f don't know him.
- 45 Wife: Shi nake tambaya, That's why I'm asking,
- 46 wane irin miji? A ina yake= what kind of husband? Where is he=
- 47 Ibro: =Miji wannan. Wannan 'yar- =This kind of husband. This lit-
- 48 'yar yarinyar nan wacce muka tle_f-
aika:, this little_f girl that we se:nt,
- 49 wata 'yar kuta tsiyar nan. a girl who incites quarrels.
- 50 Wife: Me? What?
- 51 Ibro: Wata 'yar kuta tsiya ai, A girl who incites quarrels,
- 52 doguwa doguwa, ba ita ba du- really tall_f, isn't she-
- 53 Wife: A'a, tsaya. No, stop.
- 54 Ibro: Wata yarin- yarinya. A gir-, a girl.
- 55 'Yar shina na yi mat. A knowledgeable girl I've found for her.
- 56 Wife: To dakata min. Now hold on.
- 57 Ai ka ce miji. You_m said husband.
- 58 Ibro: Hn. Uh-huh.
- 59 Wife: Kuma ka gayyara mace. Then you_m changed it to woman.
- 60 A garin nan ba haka ba In this town it's not like that,
maigida! maigida!
- 61 Ina ka tab'a ganin Where have you_m ever seen
- 62 an yi aure da mace a marriage performed between a
woman
- 63 da mace? and a woman?
- 64 Ibro: In kin gama magana, If you_f're done talking,
- 65 ki- ki- ki yi min magana, you_f- you_f- you_f finish talking to
me,

66	zan ci gaba da magana [(xxx)	I'll continue talking [(xxx)
67	Wife: [A' a yo ai tambaya ce na yi maka,	[No, hey I asked you _m a question,
68	sai ka ba ni amsa, ko?	you _m should give me an answer, right?
69	Ibro: Na yi miki mji!	I found you _f a husband!
70	Wife: Gaskiya, <i>da zafi</i>	Truly, <i>it hurts when</i>
71	<i>an ba mai kaza</i>	<i>the one with the chicken is given</i>
72	<i>k'afa.</i>	<i>the foot. <i.e., is kicked></i>
73	Ibro: To.	OK.
74	Wife: Babu yanda da za' a yi 'yata,	There's no way my daughter will be made
75	ta auri 'dan daudu.	to marry a 'dan daudu.

By rejecting the idea of having a 'dan daudu as her son-in-law, Ibro's wife implicitly voices unhappiness with her own marriage and a desire to spare her daughter a similar fate. The plot of *Ibro 'Dan Daudu* is highly conventional in this regard, for the politics of arranged marriages are standard fare in Hausa video-films as well as in the popular genre of novels known as 'love stories' (*labarun soyayya*, see Furniss 2003; Larkin 1997). The film's appeal lies in the way it take this conventional plot line and spices it up with gender and sexual exotica and the hint of sexual transgression. In Scene 2 that goal is accomplished in part through Ibro's use of both masculine and feminine forms to refer to his daughter's fiancé: the lexical labels 'husband' (*miji*) and 'girl' (*yarinya*), and the morphologically marked forms 'tall_f' (*doguwa*) and 'one_f who incites quarrels' (*'yar kuta tsiya*). Although Ibro's wife would presumably be accustomed to such gender switches, here she responds with a naive confusion, as if she believes Ibro were arranging a same-sex marriage for their daughter. She soon "realizes", however, that the "husband/girl" is in fact a 'dan daudu. Because she comes to this realization with no explicit guidance from Ibro, her initial misinterpretation can thus be read as disingenuous – a way for the filmmakers to invoke the taboo subject of homosexuality and thus to allude to 'yan daudu's reputation for promoting sexual immorality. Her exclamation, "In this town it's not like that, *maigida!*" (line 60), implicitly accuses Ibro of eschewing the sexual norms of Hausa Muslim society and adopting the values of other places where same-sex marriage is presumably tolerated. (*Gari* 'town' is a common metonym for society or country.) In the early 2000s Hausa-speaking audiences were likely to have heard of such places

thanks to news reports in both the Nigerian and international media, including Hausa sections of the BBC and the Voice of America. Audiences were also likely to be familiar with the discourses of Northern Nigerian nationalists which, like the discourses of African and Islamic nationalists generally, often characterize homosexuals as a fifth column of Western cultural hegemony.¹⁰ By invoking these discourses under the guise of Ibro's wife's apparent confusion, the filmmakers effectively perform a kind of *habaici* of their own: they reinforce an image of 'yan daudu as sexual outlaws – and cultural traitors – without directly accusing them of homosexuality or any other sexual infraction.

Where other mothers would be likely to ask what their daughter's fiancé's name is, who his parents are, etc., Ibro's wife requests a more generic description ("What kind of husband?"). For his part, although Ibro does describe the "husband" in feminine terms, he does not call him a '*dan daudu*. Indeed, neither Ibro nor any of the film's other 'yan daudu characters ever utters the term. His wife's eventual and only use of it ("There's no way my daughter will be made to marry a '*dan daudu*") marks the moment of her apparent realization of the fiancé's gender identity and simultaneously highlights the stigma it conveys. By using the generic label '*dan daudu* in such a negative context, Ibro's wife expresses contempt not only for the "girl/husband" he has picked out for their daughter, but for 'yan daudu as a class, including Ibro himself. (A similar usage occurs in Scene 3, described below.)

Ibro's wife's contempt for him is also conveyed by the proverb she uses in her previous turn at talk (lines 70–72), which construes Ibro as a gift-giver ("the one with the chicken") who has been treated with contempt ("kicked") rather than with gratitude. It is thus roughly analogous to the English saying, "Don't look a gift horse in the mouth." Whereas the latter is used to criticize ingratitude, however, Ibro's wife uses the Hausa proverb to mock Ibro by emphasizing her rejection of his "chicken", i.e., the announcement of their daughter's engagement. In so doing, she provides yet another example of the spiteful use of proverbs and *habaici* that is stereotypically associated with Hausa women. Such spitefulness is also iconic of 'dan daudu identity, as indicated in lines 49 and 51 when Ibro refers to his daughter's fiancé as 'one_f who incites quarrels' ('*yar kuta tsiya*). This trait is illustrated in Scene 3, when, after having spent three months under Ibro's tutelage, the fiancé ('Dan Bàbá) returns to his parents' home to tell them about his upcoming marriage. 'Dan Bàbá's quarrelsomeness is performed with none of the verbal artistry exhibited by Ibro's wife; rather, like Ibro,

‘Dan Bàbá incites quarrels simply by acting “like a woman” and by making unreasonable demands of his kinfolk.

Scene 3: ‘Dan Bàbá / ‘Yar Bàbá

Scene 3 opens with a shot of ‘Dan Bàbá (whose name literally means ‘Father’s son’) walking alone into the open area of his parents’ compound and calling out greetings at the door of his mother’s room. Wearing a head-tie and waist-wrapper over a man’s gown and calling himself ‘Yar Bàbá (‘Father’s daughter’), he shocks his parents not only with his feminized appearance but also with the disrespectful way he greets them. He announces his presence crudely, shouting “Hey there! I’m home!” instead of the conventional Arabic greeting *salamu alaikum* or a Hausa equivalent; he fails to crouch down and avert his gaze; and he continues to smile even when his parents become visibly (and audibly) upset.¹¹

Scene 3.1

1	‘Dan Bàbá:	Ewo! Ga ni a gida. Inna?	Hey there! I’m home. Mom?
2	Mother:	Wa yake kuma sallama e?	((From inside room.)) Who’s there?
3	‘Dan Bàbá:	Ni ce. ‘Yar Baba.	It’s _f me. ‘Yar Bàbá.
4	Mother:	E?	Huh?
5	‘Dan Bàbá:	‘Yar Baba ce.	It’s _f ‘Yar Bàbá.
6	Mother:	‘Yar Baba?	‘Yar Bàbá?
7	‘Dan Bàbá:	K’warai kuwa. hh.	Absolutely. hh.
8	Mother:	<u>Bismillahi.</u>	((Exiting room.)) <u>In the name of God.</u>
9		Ni na fito dai.	Okay I’m out.
10		E? Wai tsaya!	Huh? Hold on.
11		Wai kai ne ko mafarki nake yi?	Is it you _m or am I dreaming?
12	‘Dan Bàbá:	<u>Wallahi</u> ni ce.	<u>By God</u> it’s _f me.
13	Mother:	Kai! Kai ne ko kuma mafarki nake yi?	Hey! Is it you _m or am I dreaming?
14	‘Dan Bàbá:	Ni ce, ‘Yar Baba.	It’s _f me, ‘Yar Bàbá.
15	Mother:	‘Dan Bàbá! Yanzu	‘Dan Bàbá ! Now
16		kai ne ka zama haka?	it’s you _m who’ve become this way?

17	‘Dan Bàbá:	Af, yanzu ma akwai abin da	Hm, and now there’s some- thing that
18		ya kawo ni gida.	has brought me home.
19	Mother:	Ina magana, kana cewa	When I was talking, were you _m saying
20		ke ce kike sallama?!	it was you _f calling out greet- ings?!

‘Dan Bàbá performs his new-found femininity through a variety of semiotic practices, including vocal prosody, clothing and gesture, yet his mother, like Ibro’s wife, pays particular attention to the verbal aspects of his speech. Direct indexes of femininity include the feminine version of his name (‘Yar Bàbá) and the feminine focus particle (*ce*) co-indexed with the first-person pronoun *ni* (‘I/me’). Although Hausa first-person deictics are unmarked for gender, singular focus particles are obligatorily marked as either feminine or masculine. Thus, the masculine version of ‘Dan Bàbá ‘s utterance in line 3 would be “Ni ne. ‘Dan Bàbá” (cf. lines 5, 12 and 14). ‘Dan Bàbá ‘s mother expresses surprise at his feminine self-presentation through a series of questions that can be read as naive or rhetorical, or both (lines 11, 13, 15–16). In lines 19–20 she addresses him using both masculine and feminine forms in a way that seems purposefully designed to generate laughs.¹²

Mother:

Í-na magana, ka-na cewa ke ce ki-ke sallama?!
 1s-CONT talk 2ms-CONT say you_f FOC.fs 2fs-RCONT greet
 ‘When I was talking, were **you_m** saying it was **you_f** calling out greetings?!’
 (lines 19-20)

Here ‘Dan Bàbá’s mother performs a kind of “confusion” that is similar to what Ibro’s wife pretended to experience when he construed their daughter’s fiancé as both “husband” and “girl”. The mother’s response can be read as more genuine than the wife’s, however, insofar as the former has never seen or heard ‘Dan Bàbá act “like a woman” before. ‘Dan Bàbá’s mother is also quick to display her awareness of the ways ‘yan daudu – like Hindi-speaking *hijras* (Hall and O’Donovan 1996) – use grammatical gender to perform an ambiguous social gender identity. The humor in both scenes derives from the way the filmmakers exploit this metapragmatic

awareness to lay bare the supposed incongruity of a man speaking from a feminine subject position.

‘Dan Bàbá generally shares with Ibro a reluctance to acknowledge the gender ambiguities in his discourse. The only near-exception to this pattern occurs in lines 26–27 (below), when ‘Dan Bàbá refers first to “Father Ibro” (*Bàbá Ibro*) but quickly repairs this to “Mother Ibro” (*Bábà Ibro*). This self-repair implicitly parallels the transformation ‘Dan Bàbá recently underwent in shifting his public self-presentation from masculine to feminine, a process that necessarily entailed training himself to address Ibro and other senior ‘yan daudu as “mother”. Curiously, this self-repair occurs while ‘Dan Bàbá is declaring his intention to marry Ibro’s daughter. This is the closest he comes to construing himself as masculine, for even though Hausa first-person deictics are unmarked with respect to gender, the subject of the verb *auri* (‘marry’) is pragmatically understood to be a masculine agent. (As Ibro’s wife made clear in Scene 2, a woman’s place is as the patient-object of that verb.)

Scene 3.2

21	‘Dan Bàbá:	Zuwa na yi in gaya miki.	I’ve come to tell you _f .
22	Mother:	To.	Okay.
23	‘Dan Bàbá:	Bikina.	My celebration.
24		Biki?	Celebration?
25	‘Dan Bàbá:	K’warai kuwa. Zan auri	Absolutely. I’m going to
			marry
26		‘yar Bàbá Ibro-	the daughter of Daddy Ibro-
27		Bábà Ibro. Shi ne na zo-	Mama Ibro. That’s what I
			came-
28		abin da ya sa in samo ku’di,	why I came to get some
			money,
29		in tattaro in rabu da shi.	so I could get it and split it
			with him.
30		Domin bikinmu	Because our celebration
31		na kashe ku’di ne da shi.	is costing a lot of money.
32	Mother:	Bikinku na su wa?	Your _{pl} celebration, meaning
			whose _{pl} ?
33	‘Dan Bàbá:	Taf! (h) Baka-baki ke nan.	Well! (h) So it’s tit-for-tat.

Another way in which ‘Dan Bàbá construes himself as socially (but not grammatically) masculine is through his request for money; this implicitly reproduces the Hausa custom of bridewealth whereby the groom and his kin are supposed to give money and other presents to the bride’s family. His affiliation with normative masculinity is immediately contradicted, however, when ‘Dan Bàbá reports that the money will be used to pay for his *biki* (‘celebration’). The fact that ‘Dan Bàbá refers to ‘my celebration’ (*bikina*), as opposed to his bride’s, indirectly indexes a feminized subject position, for *bikis* are typically women’s affairs celebrating weddings or the naming of babies. His mother again proves alert to the pragmatic implications of this pronominal choice: when ‘Dan Bàbá refers a second time to “our celebration” (*bikinmu*) she immediately asks him to clarify who the “our” refers to. Although the plural pronoun could refer to ‘Dan Bàbá and his bride, its more likely referent is ‘Dan Bàbá and Ibro; it seems evident, therefore, that ‘Dan Bàbá’s mother is seeking to force him to acknowledge the gender transgressions implicit in his discourse. Such a reading is supported by the fact that, instead of answering his mother’s question, ‘Dan Bàbá says, “So it’s tit-for-tat” (*Baka-baki ke nan*, literally, ‘So it’s mouth-mouth’), characterizing the interaction as a kind of verbal duel.

The fact that ‘Dan Bàbá has come home to ask for money, rather than simply to greet his parents, and the emphasis he places on the cost of his *biki* reproduce commonly-held stereotypes of ‘yan daudu as greedy and selfish. A similar stereotype of ‘yan daudu as selfish, disrespectful and quarrelsome recurs throughout the film. One minor subplot, for example, concerns one of Ibro’s “daughters” who, while ostensibly running errands for Ibro, dupes a shopkeeper into giving him a sack full of merchandise that he has no intention of paying for. When the shopkeeper comes seeking payment, the ‘yan daudu reject the man’s claim and gang up on him verbally and physically until he leaves. In another scene, Ibro catches his foot on a man’s rake and loudly accuses the man, a humble worker, of intentionally trying to hurt him. Despite the man’s earnest apologies, Ibro continues making a fuss until the imam comes by and attempts to pacify him. Though he verbally accepts the imam’s appeals, Ibro’s bodily demeanor and vocal prosody convey a stubborn petulance. That ‘Dan Bàbá’s shortcomings are intended to represent those of ‘yan daudu in general becomes especially apparent in Scene 3 when ‘Dan Bàbá’s father enters the scene. In an ironic twist of fate, the father turns out to be the man in the film’s opening scene (Man 1) who expressed contempt for Ibro and who so vehemently insisted on blaming parents when children act badly.

Scene 3.3

45	Father:	‘Dan Bàbá?	‘Dan Bàbá?
46	Mother:	I.	Yes.
47	Father:	‘Dan Bàbá?	‘Dan Bàbá?
48	Mother:	Ga shi nan dai, kana ganinsa.	Here he is, you’re _m looking at him.
49	Father:	Allah ya tsine ma, ‘Dan Bàbá.	God damn you _m , ‘Dan Bàbá.
50		Allah ya tsine maka albarka.	May God damn you _m .
51	‘Dan Bàbá:	Amin.	Amen.
52	Father:	Yanzu duk maganar nan da ake cewa,	So all this talk that people are saying,
53		ka koma wajen Ibro.	you _m have gone over to Ibro’s place.
54		Shi ne zan-	That’s what I’ll-
55		nake da ‘dan daudu gata	that I’ve got a spoiled ‘dan daudu
56		a cikin gidana ke nan.	in my house.
...			((Continues his lament.))
74	Mother (to ‘Dan Bàbá):	Kunya ba ka ka ji?	Do you _m feel no shame?
75		Kunya ma ba ka ji?	Don’t you _m feel any shame?

As the only man in the film whose son becomes a ‘dan daudu, ‘Dan Bàbá’s father can be seen as a negative example of the suffering and indignity that come from ‘lack of patience’ (*rashin hak’uri*), that is, not leaving fate in God’s hands. This trait is manifest in the father’s apparent inability to control his emotions. Whereas the mother responds to ‘Dan Bàbá’s feminine self-presentation with incredulity and even sarcasm, the father reacts with explosive anger and sadness. With ‘Dan Bàbá standing in front of him wearing a head-tie and waist-wrapper, the father is compelled to blame himself by asserting “that I’ve got a spoiled ‘dan daudu in my house” (line 55). This is remarkably similar to the sentiment expressed in the poem “‘Dan Daudu” (Text 1), where the poet describes his hypothetical son as “spoiled from not being punished”. But there is a crucial difference between ‘Dan Bàbá’s father and the hypothetical father conjured by Ak’ilu Aliyu. Both men experience the same lamentable fate, but only ‘Dan Bàbá’s father loses his cool. His angry outbursts alternate with tearful sorrow and self-pity, and his emotions escalate to the point where he throws a

plastic watering-can at ‘Dan Bàbá and chases him out of the house under a torrent of verbal abuse. By contrast, Ak’ilu Aliyu imagines no such direct confrontation. Instead, he criticizes ‘yan daudu in a general fashion and even, indirectly, calls on God to take his hypothetical son’s life (“Better he should die”). By channeling his hostility to ‘yan daudu through the canonical literary genre of the wak’a, Ak’ilu Aliyu thus transforms a personal emotional response into an edifying public text. A similar claim can be made about *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu* as a whole, which stages a series of emotionally intense social interactions that model the kinds of behavior deemed proper and improper for women and men, especially in the context of marital and familial relationships. Indeed, Hausa video-film producers and artists consistently make such claims about their films. *I’DD*’s moral significance is less straightforward than the poem’s, however, in part because filmic texts are inherently more semotically complex, and in part because *I’DD* makes greater intentional use of indirect and nonverbal forms of communication, such as gesture, parody and humor.

When ‘Dan Bàbá says “Amen” in response to his father’s curse, he reproduces a popular perception of ‘yan daudu as irreverent and lacking ‘shame’ (*kunya*). That ‘Dan Bàbá’s shameless behavior is meant to reflect that of ‘yan daudu generally is apparent in the parallels between this scene and Scene 2. Thus, his mother’s questions accusing ‘Dan Bàbá of shamelessness (lines 74–75) echo the words of Ibro’s wife when she asks him, “don’t you feel shame?” (Scene 2, line 19). Another parallel is manifest in ‘Dan Bàbá’s father’s lament about having “a spoiled ‘dan daudu in my house” (line 55); this recalls Ibro’s wife’s declaration that she will not let her daughter marry a ‘dan daudu (Scene 2, lines 74–75). Each use of the label ‘*dan daudu* indexes contempt for ‘yan daudu as a class and the speaker’s unhappiness about being personally – and publicly – associated with one. Seen in this light, the title *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu* stands out as a negative judgment in its own right, an iconic preview of the film’s portrayal of ‘yan daudu as social deviants. It is thus unsurprising that many real-world ‘yan daudu were suspicious of the film before they ever saw it.

4. Receptions of *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu*

Regarding the video-film industries that burgeoned throughout Africa – especially anglophone West Africa – in the 1990s, Olivier Barlet (2000) notes that “the biggest hits are films that parody social roles and pastiche

the deviant forms of behaviour which accompany the modernization of African society” (245). Barlet is presumably speaking from the perspective of African audiences who use “modernization” to refer to such phenomena as urbanization, the expansion of capitalism and European-style schooling, and who perceive these as the cause of “deviant” social behaviors. But video-films do not merely respond to such attitudes; like all forms of popular culture, they help to create, reinforce and reshape those attitudes. As a scholar and champion of high-art cinema, Barlet is not inclined to credit video-films with such cultural significance. Despite the boldly democratic title of his chapter (“The African audience is anything but homogeneous”), he describes African audiences in monolithic, and frequently disparaging, terms. Thus Barlet refers to the “the African public” which is undergoing a process of “deculturation” and “becoming hybridized” (245). Video-films are a key sign of this supposed cultural degradation, a “monster” (238) that seduces naive audiences with its simple, accessible pleasures at the expense of films that are artistically more sophisticated and politically challenging: “Although the screenplays are adequate, the technique and direction are sometimes below par. The public does, however, like the simple dialogue, and enjoys seeing familiar places and stories” (Barlet 2000: 238).

In this section I take up – and take seriously – Barlet’s claim about the heterogeneity of African audiences by describing the different ways *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu* was received by certain Hausa male audiences in the months following its release. The receptions I analyze include viewers’ reactions that I observed in the course of watching the film or that were reported to me in informal conversations; I also analyze responses to the film that were published on the internet and in a popular magazine. Some of the viewers I spoke to were ‘yan daudu, while others were conventionally masculine *masu harka* (‘people who do the deed’, i.e., men who have sex with men); the writers of the published texts did not identify their gender or sexual orientations but were presumably masculine and heterosexual. In providing this brief ethnographic account of *I’DD*’s reception, I seek to redress what Sherry Ortner (1995) calls the “cultural thinning” that characterizes some scholarly writing on the ways people have responded to and resisted colonial rule. The primary objects of Ortner’s criticism are social theorists who have discussed resistance in terms of consciousness and identity without tracing the specific actions people perform (including the things they say) and the ways those actions circulate and ramify. Although Barlet does not engage the issue of viewers’ resistance per se, his generic description of African video-film audiences displays a similar lack of ethnographic speci-

ficity. Interestingly, one of Barlet's main anthropological claims concerns the way Chinese and American action films socialize young urban African men with respect to fighting, violence and bodily self-presentation. Barlet looks negatively on this "aestheticization of violence" (248) without describing the ways specific viewers respond to it. His analysis does, however, highlight the significance of gender as an object of concern for many contemporary Africans and the way those concerns are mediated by film and other popular cultural forms.

With talented performances by Rabilu Musa 'Danlasan, Lubabatu Madaki and other well-known comic actors, *I'DD* was sufficiently acclaimed to warrant the release of a sequel, *Ibro Dan Daudu 2*, in late 2002. Abdalla Uba Adamu, a northern Nigerian academic, described the film's appeal in a post to the internet listserv *Finafinan_Hausa@yahoo.com*, as follows.¹³

Ibro Dan Daudu is a study of the Hausa transvestite society, and as such focuses attention on the transvestite community. Transvestites, while tolerated, were never really fully accepted in Hausa society, and even in this era of increasing tolerance to deviancy. [...]

The film was definitely well-conceived, and although deals with a very serious matter, yet approaches the theme from a more relaxed, and laid-back perspective, and I think that is the magic of the success of the film. There were no pretensions: just clean fun. The actors have also done extremely well in their acting – indeed it is this type of plot element that gives them a chance to over-act. One cannot help but simply laugh at the exaggerated swishy walks, the adoption of the female speech patterns, the body rhythm and movements and the feminine mannerisms. It was really funny. [...]

All told, the film is well executed, light-hearted but dealing with gender ambiguity in a serious manner. There are the usual song and dance, but not irritating enough to take away the main story. I like it!

Echoing Barlet's reference to video-films that parody "deviant forms of behaviour," Adamu praises the actors in *I'DD* for their humorous impersonations of 'yan daudu, whom he describes as "transvestites" and an example of "deviancy." (His translation of 'yan daudu as "transvestites" arguably reinforces that deviant image.) In noting that contemporary Hausa society displays an "increasing tolerance" towards deviance, Adamu also seems to affirm Barlet's claims about the social effects of "modernization." Yet Adamu's essay diverges from Barlet's in a number of ways. Most importantly, Adamu enjoys video-films and takes their cultural significance seri-

ously. In addition, whereas Barlet speaks of “African society” and “the African public,” Adamu limits his discussion to Hausa society. In that regard he notes that, while Hausa people might be increasingly tolerant of some forms of deviance, such tolerance does not extend to ‘yan daudu. He reiterates this point in his discussion of the exchange in which ‘Dan Bàbá’s father curses at his son (Scene 3, lines 49–50). According to Adamu, “This of course reflected the contempt with which the Hausa society holds transvestites. The father is speaking and cursing on the behalf of the larger society.”

To the extent that Adamu’s responses can be taken as representative of Hausa society at large, it seems *I’DD* was commercially successful because of the way the filmmakers managed to strike a balance between the need to treat the subject of ‘yan daudu “in a serious manner,” on one hand, and audiences’ desire for “just clean fun,” on the other. By this Adamu seems to mean that the film offered humorous portrayals of ‘yan daudu while upholding the dominant view of them as contemptible. Yet not all audiences found this combination so appealing. In particular, most of the ‘yan daudu with whom I watched the film or talked about it found *I’DD* inaccurate and insulting, even while they appreciated the comedic abilities of Ibro and his fellow actors.

I watched *I’DD* twice in Kano in June 2002 – first with a friend who self-identified as *mai harka* (‘one who does the deed’), and then with a group of nine *masu harka*, two of whom also self-identified covertly as ‘yan daudu. The latter occasion took place at the home of my friend Mahmud, an unmarried man in his late twenties whose apartment was the regular gathering-spot for over a dozen *masu harka*, any number of whom might show up on any given night. In addition to Mahmud’s friendly personality, his friends were attracted by the amenities his place had to offer. Although he lived in a large family compound belonging to his father, his apartment had a separate entrance so he could socialize with his guests without having to worry about sudden intrusions from relatives or unannounced passers-by. It consisted of two small bedrooms and a sitting room that featured a carpeted floor, pillows, a mounted wall-fan, a radio/audiocassette-player, television and VCR. (During Kano’s frequent power outages, Mahmud and his guests chatted by candlelight and listened to music on battery power.) I had not planned to watch *I’DD* with Mahmud and his friends; I happened to visit him one evening just as they were getting ready to watch it. I could tell Mahmud had visitors when I arrived at the vestibule outside his sitting-room and saw a cluster of shoes on the floor. Two of Mahmud’s guests were covert ‘yan daudu: outwardly masculine in appearance, they held

conventional jobs (not cooking or “prostitution”) and only acted “like women” in the company of other masu harka. Mahmud’s remaining guests were conventionally masculine. As far as I could tell, everyone was between twenty and forty years old and middle-class by Nigerian standards. Mahmud, for example, had attended (but not finished) secondary school, spoke limited English, and worked as a salesman for a small company that sold linoleum flooring. His social network was almost exclusively Hausa-speaking, and he was an avid consumer of both Hausa and foreign (especially American) videos and music.

As Mahmud inserted the tape into the VCR, we repositioned ourselves to face the TV screen. Some people sat with their backs against the wall, others leaned on pillows or each other, or reclined with one man’s head in another man’s lap. The mood in the room was one of wary excitement. After having heard of the film for several months, people seemed eager to see it for themselves, especially in the (exclusive) company of other masu harka where they could voice their reactions without restraint. Like Adamu (2002), Mahmud and his friends agreed that the actors in *I’DD* “overacted,” but they did not all share Adamu’s unambiguous appreciation of that fact. At the film’s opening scene, in which Ibro sashays across the screen and calls out “Sons of men”, a number of people laughed. “Hey, he can do the thing!” someone shouted, and others agreed. “Bastard Ibro!” someone else said, conveying an ambiguous mix of admiration and condemnation. Indeed, the group’s reception of the film was profoundly ambivalent overall. The burlesque qualities of the fictional ‘yan daudu’s “feminine” performances generated considerable laughter, but they also evoked indignation and hostility, particularly among the two self-described ‘yan daudu, who harumphed and sucked their teeth repeatedly throughout the video.¹⁴ About Ibro’s limp-wrist gesture, for example, one of them complained, “He’s overacting” (“Yana overaction [ova’ak]In”). The other turned his admiration of Ibro’s acting into a kind of accusation, saying, “This is no imitation. One has to have the thing in one’s body [to be capable of that].” The same two critics issued a number of other complaints as well, such as: “One has exposed [‘yan daudu’s behaviors], what a calamity” and “What’s the use of this slander?” It is notable that such complaints came primarily from the covert ‘yan daudu in the group, for while virtually all masu harka – including ‘yan daudu – fear being ‘exposed’ (*yi garwa*, an in-group term whose literal meaning is ‘bang a tin-drum’) and ‘slandered’ (*yi sharri*) as homosexuals, covert ‘yan daudu also fear exposure of their hidden gender iden-

tity. This fear often leads them to avoid interacting with overt ‘yan daudu in public.

The behavioral excesses of Ibro and his fellow actors were not the only thing that attracted commentary from Mahmud and his friends. As predicted by Barlet, a number of individuals made a point of identifying the geographical locations depicted in the film, such as the river that runs through the town of Wudil and the bridge that runs over it on the road to Kano. People also seemed to take pleasure in naming the actors, commenting on their looks and comparing their performances in *I’DD* with the same actors’ performances in other films. One actor who attracted particular attention was the teen-age boy who plays Ibro’s daughter’s boyfriend – the boy she loves and wants to marry instead of ‘Dan Baba. “He’s good-looking,” someone said, using an in-group term to describe attractiveness. “Yes, he is good-looking”, someone else replied, “and he has eyes” – meaning he too likes sex with men. (By contrast, heterosexuals are said to be “blind.”) The latter claim turned out to be unverified wishful thinking.

When I spoke with overt ‘yan daudu who had either seen *I’DD* or had heard about it, their responses echoed the largely negative reactions of the covert ‘yan daudu I’d met at Mahmud’s. In Madari, for example, a small town located about 200 km outside Kano, I spoke with Jamilu, a ‘dan daudu in his late twenties who had seen the film at a local video parlor some weeks earlier. Originally from Kano, Jamilu spent most of each year in the city of Zaria where he ran a food-shop, but he returned to Madari during the rainy season to work on his uncle’s farm in a nearby village. I ran into him on Madari’s weekly market day when he had come into town as he usually did to help out at a friend’s food-shop and to visit with other ‘yan daudu from the surrounding area. According to Jamilu, “all” the ‘yan daudu in Madari had gone to see *I’DD*, but “we” didn’t like it because it was insulting (*wulak’anta*) and unpleasant (*ba da’di*). Similar judgments were reported to me by others, including Alhaji Damina, whom I initially befriended in 1993 when he returned to Kano after performing the *hajj* to Mecca. After spending much of the intervening period in Saudi Arabia (I did not see him on my trips to Nigeria in 1997 and 2000), in 2002 Alhaji Damina was again living with his wife and children in Kano where he now ran a food-shop. One day I was sitting with him outside the shop and mentioned that I’d just seen Ibro ‘Dan Daudu. “Ibro ‘dan iska!” he shouted, artfully replacing the term ‘dan daudu with ‘dan iska, an epithet whose literal meaning is ‘son of a spirit’ (or ‘son of wind’) but that is conventionally used to insult someone as an ‘immoral good-for-nothing’ or ‘rogue’.

(Its pragmatic range approximates that of American English *son of a bitch*.) Although he had not seen *I'DD* himself, Alhaji Damina clearly did not like what he'd heard about it. Regarding the film's depiction of 'yan daudu wearing women's clothes, for example, Alhaji Damina said that it was only "children" who put on head-ties or waist-wrappers, not "adults".

By distinguishing the social practices of younger 'yan daudu from those of older ones, Alhaji Damina provides a more subtle sociological analysis than those of *I'DD* and Adamu, which depict 'yan daudu as uniformly "feminine" and therefore contemptible. My own ethnographic observations from the 1990s and early 2000s largely confirm Alhaji Damina's claims. In the real world 'yan daudu rarely present themselves in such an exaggeratedly feminine manner, especially to outsiders, and they almost never do so in the presence of their heterosexual kin. Even away from their families, the appearance and actions of many 'yan daudu are often quite "masculine" by conventional Hausa standards. Except at parties (*bikis*), I rarely saw 'yan daudu wearing a head-tie or waist-wrapper, and I never saw anyone wear both items at the same time. The use of stereotypically feminine gestures (*tafiyar mata* 'the going of women') and speech (*maganar mata* 'women's talk') was more frequent, but this too varied considerably across individuals and social contexts. Indeed, some 'yan daudu displayed few if any "feminine" traits and would have been virtually indistinguishable from other men were it not for the "women's work" they did as cooks or as men's companions. It is also notable that, whereas real-world 'yan daudu are known and admired (at least by some) for their biting wit, the speech of 'yan daudu as represented in *I'DD* is largely devoid of the "feminine" verbal genres associated with that wit, such as proverbs and innuendo. Like the archaic ways of speaking that Yoruba performers use to index their knowledge of and respect for "deep Yoruba" language and culture (Barber 1997), Hausa proverbs are widely admired as the repository of ancient cultural knowledge. Their absence in the speech of the fictional 'yan daudu in *I'DD* thus reinforces the film's representation of them as disconnected from Hausa cultural norms.

'Yan daudu were not the only people offended by *Ibro 'Dan Daudu*; the actor and the film also drew criticism from people with Islamist sympathies. In a letter to the editor published in July 2002, a reader of the magazine *Fim* complains about the recent releases of *Ibro 'Dan Daudu* and *Ibro Usama*, a controversial video-film in which Rabilu Musa 'Danlasan impersonates Osama bin Laden. (The name Osama is frequently rendered in Hausa as Usama.)

Text 2: Letter to the editor of *Fim* magazine, July 2002

SAURAN IBRO DANFODIYO KO?!

ALL THAT'S LEFT IS IBRO 'DAN FODIO, RIGHT?!

Zuwa ga mujallar Fim,

Ina so don Allah ku ba ni fili a wannan mujalla tamu mai farin jini domin na ce wani abu game da Rabilu Musa (Ibro).

Ibro, hakika duk wanda ke kallon wasanka a halin yanzu ya san tuni *tusa ta kare wa bodari*. Yanzu don girman Allah idan dai an ce ana yin wasan Hausa ne domin fadakarwa, to wanne irin sako ne ke cikin fim din Ibro Dan Chana da Ibro Shehu Jaha? Kodayake ga shi ma yanzu ka yi Ibro Dan Daudu da Ibro Usama. To kuma kenan sai mu jira fim din Ibro Dan Iska, Ibro Dan Giya, da kuma Ibro Usman Danfodiyo, ko? Tunda kuwa Shehu Usman Danfodiyo (R.T.A.) da Osama bin Laden duk waliyyan Allah ne, masu jihadi bisa tafarkin Allah. Ibro! Ba girin-girin ba dai...!

Danladi Zakariyya Haruna
Kano

Dear *Fim* magazine,

Please give me the opportunity in this popular magazine of ours to say something about Rabilu Musa (Ibro).

Ibro, truly everyone who watches your shows these days knows *the skunk lost its stink* a long time ago. Now for God's sake, if Hausa shows are supposed to morally instructive, what kind of message is there in the film Ibro Chinaman and Ibro Shehu Jaha? Now it appears you've done Ibro 'Dan Daudu and Ibro Usama too. So next we should expect the film Ibro 'Dan Iska, Ibro Drunkard, and Ibro Usman 'Dan Fodio, right? Yet Sheikh Usman 'Dan Fodio (God's mercy be upon him) and Osama bin Laden are both saints of God, jihadists on the path of God. Ibro! No strumming...!

Danladi Zakariyya Haruna
Kano

Using a Hausa idiom that translates roughly as 'the skunk lost its stink', Danladi Zakariyya Haruna insults Ibro in two ways: first, he suggests that Ibro's talents are no longer as strong as they once were, and second, he implies that those talents were never very appealing to begin with. Haruna seems particularly vexed by the recent release of *Ibro 'Dan Daudu* and *Ibro Usama*. By comparing the former to such hypothetical titles as *Ibro 'Dan Giya* ('Ibro Drunkard') and *Ibro 'Dan Iska* (a curious echo of Alhaji Damina's retort discussed above), Haruna puts 'yan daudu in the same immoral league as drunkards and rogues. By contrast, Haruna compares

Osama bin Laden to Usman ‘dan Fodio, the Islamic revolutionary who founded the Sokoto Caliphate two hundred years ago. Both men are widely revered in northern Nigeria today as Muslim heroes. Accordingly, for Ibro to impersonate such a heroic figure using (supposedly) the same comedic conventions that he uses to impersonate a ‘dan daudu would be immoral. Haruna’s final comment, “Ba girin-girin ba dai...!” is a shortened form of “Ba giringirin ba dai, a yi mai,” an admonition whose literal meaning is ‘No strumming, make butter’ but that is idiomatically used to mean “Actions are needed, not words.”¹⁵ In other words, if Ibro and his defenders want to claim that his movies have positive social value, they need to prove it by making films that clearly conform to orthodox Islamic values.

Although *Ibro Usama* was the object of complaints before its release, these died down once it became clear that Rabilu Musa ‘Danlasan’s impersonation of Osama bin Laden is far more respectful than the parodic roles he plays in *I’DD* and other video-films. Nevertheless, ‘Danlasan and his collaborators take pains to defend themselves against the charge that his films, and video-films generally, contravene Islamic morality. Magazines like *Fim* regularly feature articles with titles like “Hausa films provide good moral training” and “Ibro” and other film stars have repeatedly gone on record to affirm their commitment to Islam and Shari’a (see, e.g., Gora 2002). Additionally, as is the case with most Hausa video-films, every *Ibro* film opens with a written Hausa translation of the *fatiha*, the first line of the Qur’an: “DA SUNAN ALLAH MAI RAHAMA MAI JIN K’AI” (‘In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful’). The *fatiha* is commonly invoked by observant Muslims at the outset of an activity to acknowledge God’s hand in making the activity possible and to ask for God’s help in completing it. Its appearance at the beginning of *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu* – immediately after a Hausa version of the standard copyright warning – is complemented by the imam’s declaration at the end of the film when he says to Ibro’s friends, “God hates you_{pl} [‘yan daudu]. And I hate you_{pl}” (“Allah ya k’i ku. Ni ma na k’i ku.”). These statements frame *I’DD* as a “serious” text, instructing viewers to interpret its humorous portrayal of ‘yan daudu as a cautionary example of how respectable Hausa Muslims should not behave. Yet not all viewers shared Abdalla Uba Adamu’s appreciative uptake of this framing. For some viewers, such as the presumably Islamist letter-writer Danladi Zakariyya Haruna, the film’s portrayal of ‘yan daudu was not morally critical enough. Others, including nearly all the ‘yan daudu I spoke to, enjoyed the film for reasons that neither he nor the filmmakers were likely to consider (at least not openly), such as the physical beauty and questionable sexuality

of its male actors, or the forbidden pleasure of watching and hearing ‘yan daudu flout cultural norms. Ultimately, however, the film’s moralistic framing led many of these viewers to condemn it as insulting and slanderous. In particular, they rejected its implication that being a ‘dan daudu is incompatible with being a respectable Hausa Muslim man.

5. Conclusion: Northern Nigerian publics and counterpublics

‘Yan daudu’s “feminine” linguistic performances – stereotypically characterized by humor, indirectness and emotional volatility – are widely perceived to violate a normative ideology of language and gender that privileges seriousness, restraint and literalism and associates these with the public speech of “respectable” Hausa men; women’s talk, though appreciated as artful, is normatively restricted to an idealized domestic sphere. *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu* entextualizes this ideology insofar as the imam comes across as a straightforward, even-tempered intellectual; the other male characters (except for ‘Dan Baba’s father) talk and act in a similarly low-key fashion; and married, “respectable” women are seen and heard only at home. By contrast, ‘yan daudu are depicted as frivolous, devious and argumentative, and they flaunt these “feminine” behaviors in public and private venues alike. As a mass-market commodity produced by Hausa Muslim capitalists concerned to preserve their connections with the northern Nigerian religious and political establishments, *I’DD* thus illustrates what Philips (2000) calls the “multi-sitedness” of hegemonic power. The film’s negative (yet amusing) representations of ‘yan daudu’s performances of “women’s talk” help to construct an imagined Northern Nigerian public that is distinct from the rest of Nigeria and allied with other Islamic publics worldwide by virtue of its adherence to orthodox Islamic norms of gender and sexuality. The transnational parameters of this imagined public are indexed by a number of intertextual references within the film, such as the Hausa translation of the Qur’anic *fatiha*, the imam’s recitations of Arab-Islamic scripture, and *Ibro*’s wife’s reference to other “towns” where women are supposedly allowed to marry women.

It is also significant that the film contains no overt reference to the ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity of either northern Nigeria or Nigeria as a whole. The dialogue is monolingual in Hausa (save for occasional oaths or scriptural quotations in Arabic) and is peppered with examples of “traditional” Hausa verbal art (spoken by women, not ‘yan daudu); the absence

of English-Hausa code-switching – a common urban linguistic practice known as *Ingausa* – is particularly striking. The only reference to the Nigerian political economy occurs when a wealthy politician gets arrested for corruption while visiting his girlfriend at the women’s house adjacent to Ibro’s food shop. Here state corruption is linked to the sexual immorality of prostitutes and ‘yan daudu, for it is the latter (in their role as prostitutes’ agents) who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the money embezzled by the politician, leaving his wife and children unprovided for and thereby harming society at large. By showing the “big man” being arrested inside the women’s house, the film represents the state as flawed, but ultimately self-policing. By contrast, the ‘yan daudu and karuwai remain morally unredeemed, yet curiously, and unrealistically, beyond the reach of the police. If the integrity of the imagined Northern Nigerian public is threatened, therefore, it is ‘yan daudu and karuwai who are to blame – not the official corruption and social inequalities that make prostitution so economically attractive, nor the ethnic and religious diversity that belie the idea of a unified North. Yet the ideological implications of this narrative are not straightforward, for the image of a “big man” driving in a Mercedes to pick his girlfriend up at a women’s house is semiotically complex. Though framed as immoral, its glamour and transgressive eroticism may be attractive to many viewers. A similar contradiction between morality and aesthetics is evident in the film’s portrayal of ‘yan daudu’s “feminine” voices, clothing and bodily movements as both shameless and funny. It is such contradictions that fuel Islamists’ complaints about the video-film industry, for they undermine the ideal of a Northern Nigerian public unified by its strict adherence to Islamic norms of gender and sexuality.

Although the makers and defenders of *Ibro* ‘*Dan Daudu*’ portray it as unambiguously supportive of Islam and Shari’a, their claims are called into question by the diverse ways in which the film was received. This diversity was facilitated by the film’s heteroglossia – the many voices and discourses it brings together, which speak to different audiences in different ways (Bakhtin 1981). As noted by Charles Briggs (1998), the heteroglossic nature of texts makes it possible to trace the ideological tensions that exist within the society in which they were produced. Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams, Briggs argues that it is unduly simplistic to posit the existence of a single dominant ideology for any given society because no domination ever rests unopposed. Briggs bases his argument on the ideological struggles that took place in Warao society in the 1980s and 1990s, as revealed by the gossip exchanged by two senior Warao male curers. The

men's authority depends on their privileged access to a form of medico-spiritual discourse known as *ahotana*. In their gossip the men complain about two groups of people who are challenging their authority by questioning the truth value of their *ahotana*: women, who have accused the men of misusing their *ahotana* to sow social conflict; and junior men, who claim to have seen evidence of the senior men's wrongdoing in their dreams (such dreams being understood as a form of *ahotana*). Though they dismiss both sets of claims, the heteroglossia of the senior men's gossip – their references and rebuttals to the discourses of others – makes it possible to determine the nature of the political challenges they face.

Ibro 'Dan Daudu is a similarly heteroglossic text, produced by agents who seek to enshrine certain ideologies as authoritative, but who cannot avoid referring to discourses that undermine those ideologies. In particular, the film purports to advocate an orthodox-Islamic ideology of language and gender by juxtaposing the speech of sympathetic characters, especially the imam, alongside the speech of 'yan daudu, who are represented as dishonest and disrespectful of social norms. It thus illustrates Briggs' dual observation that dominant practices and ideologies are frequently asserted through intertextual representations of subordinate others, but that such domination is always subject to resistance as social actors recontextualize those representations. Because the cycle of entextualization and recontextualization occurs continuously, the meaning and effect of texts are ever-changing and cannot be singularly attributed to processes of production (producers' intents) nor to processes of reception (audiences' interpretations). These processes do not occur independently of each other, and both must be taken into account.¹⁶

Briggs pursues this issue in a subsequent paper analyzing competing accounts of the cholera epidemics that decimated the Warao people in the 1990s (Briggs 2004). Whereas the Venezuelan government and national media attributed the epidemics to inferior hygiene practices among indigenous peoples, many Warao subscribed to conspiracy theories that accused the government of spreading cholera in their communities. Building on the work of queer theorist and literary scholar Michael Warner (2002), Briggs notes a number of parallels between these conspiracy narratives and the "counterpublic" discourses circulated by gender and sexual minorities (women, transgendered people, gays and lesbians) in England and the United States. For Warner a counterpublic is a space in which subordinate groups imagine alternative ways of living for themselves and even for the wider societies in which they live. Though appreciative of such projects,

Briggs faults Warner for downplaying the many “limits of publicity” (2004: 179) – race, class, geography, etc. – that make it difficult for subordinate groups to create viable counterpublics. Briggs attributes this oversight to the fact that Warner focuses on white, middle-class communities that, despite their subordinate status, have access to considerably more resources than do poor people of color in the global South. It is not that Warner is unconcerned about the “limits of publicity”, but his attention seems more focused on ideological limits than on material ones. In particular, he shares with Habermas a critique of the way public-sphere discourse is distorted by the commercial and propagandistic tendencies of the mass media, which impede the exchange of informed opinions. According to Habermas, “When the laws of the market governing the sphere of commodity exchange and of social labor also pervaded the sphere reserved for private people as a public, rational-critical debate had a tendency to be replaced by consumption, and the web of public communication unraveled into acts of individuated reception, however uniform in mode” (Habermas 1989 [1962]: 61). Warner elaborates on this argument by noting that, since “[c]ounterpublics are, by definition, formed by their conflict with the norms and contexts of their cultural environment... this context of domination inevitably entails distortion” (2002: 63). Briggs emphasizes material impediments, while Warner and Habermas speak of ideological distortion. Yet these “limits of publicity” are clearly inextricable.

The link between Briggs’ and Warner’s arguments is illustrated by the semiotic contrasts between *Ibro ‘Dan Daudu* and ‘yan daudu’s real-life performances, and by the participant structures of their production and reception. Thus, the material limits that Briggs writes about are manifest in the radical discrepancy between ‘yan daudu’s limited access to public space and media channels, which became even more limited after Shari’a was adopted in 2000, and the successful proliferation of *I’DD* and other commercial video-films in that same period. Yet the “counterpublic” imagined by ‘yan daudu’s public performances is limited not only by their unequal access to material resources; it is also limited by (some) ‘yan daudu’s embrace of hegemonic norms of age, gender and wealth. Paraphrasing Warner, these contradictions derive in part from the fact that the counterpublic imagined by ‘yan daudu’s public performances is distorted – or at least influenced – by their subordinate relationship to the Northern Nigerian public imagined by more dominant texts, of which *I’DD* is one example.

Insofar as texts like *I’DD* are perceived to represent Northern Nigerian culture at large, they help to construct an Islamic Northern Nigerian public

that is distinct from – and morally superior to – the rest of Nigeria and the Nigerian state. Such texts also install particular ideologies of gender and language as hegemonic norms regulating people’s participation in the Northern Nigerian public sphere. The public imagined by Hausa video-films can thus be compared to the official Basque public that is produced and managed by politicians, journalists and other Basque nationalists affiliated with state agencies or other large institutions. This public might be an alternative or counterpublic with respect to the Spanish state, but it exerts considerable hegemony within the Basque country itself. By contrast, the public constructed by Basque free radio and other nonofficial movements can be seen as an alternative to this alternative – a populist, youth-oriented Basque counterpublic based on a more relaxed (but no less committed) ideology of linguistic and cultural authenticity (Urla 1995). A similar counterpublic can be glimpsed, if only provisionally, in the hostile and ironic ways in which some ‘*yan daudu*’ responded to *Ibro* ‘*Dan Daudu*’. These responses, and the communal contexts in which they were articulated, challenge Habermas’ claims about the “individuated” nature of reception in an age of commercial mass media, and underscore the need for ethnographic research that pays close attention to specific practices of entextualization, decontextualization and recontextualization (Bauman and Briggs 1990). The collective, interactional nature of these practices allows for kinds of debate that, while not necessarily “rational” in the ideal, Habermasian sense, do have the potential to be “critical”. Like Briggs, I wouldn’t want to romanticize or overestimate the political efficacy of such “counterpublics”. But I wouldn’t want to discount their potential, either.

Notes

1. With a few exceptions, all Hausa terms discussed in this paper are written according to standard Nigerian Hausa orthography, which, unlike academic-pedagogical writing, does not indicate phonemic vowel length or tone. Exceptions are as follows. Diacritic marks indicating high (´) and low (˘) tones are used to distinguish the words *bábà* ‘mother’ and *bàbá* ‘father’. Also, excerpts from published texts are reproduced with nonstandard spellings intact. Because of technical limitations, the “hooked” Hausa letters representing glottalized ‘*d*’ and ‘*k*’ and implosive ‘*b*’ are rendered as shown, using apostrophes instead of the standard “hooks.” The standard orthographic symbol ‘*y*’ (as in ‘*yan daudu*’) represents a glottalized consonant distinct from the unglottalized semivowel *y*.

Other letters in the Hausa alphabet are pronounced more or less like their English counterparts, with the exception of the letter *c*, which is pronounced like English *ch*.

2. See Pittin (2003) for a richly detailed account of the lives of independent women in the northern Nigerian city of Katsina.
3. Video-films are feature-length movies produced and released solely on videotape or, more recently, digital video disks.
4. I use *Northern Nigeria* (with a capital “N”) to index the regional-national community whose members are imagined to be unified by proficiency in Hausa and adherence to Islam. I use *northern Nigeria* (with lower-case “n”) to index the geographical territory of the twelve states that have adopted Shari’a. The former British Protectorate of Northern Nigeria included this territory along with other regions – known today as the Middle Belt – where the majority of residents were (and in many cases still are) neither Muslim nor Hausa-speaking.
5. See Last (1967) for an authoritative history of the Sokoto Caliphate and Hiskett (1975) on Hausa Islamic literary history.
6. The term *Hausa-Fulani* refers to the fact that, while post-jihad elites in the Hausa city-states were (and are) considered ethnically Fulani because they had Fulani patrilineal descent, they became culturally and linguistically Hausaized through intermarriage, concubinage and other practices. Today the term *Hausa* is commonly used to refer to any northern Nigerian Muslim who speaks Hausa as a native language.
7. Not all Islamists welcomed the adoption of Shari’a. Malam Ibrahim Zakzaky, for example, whose Muslim Brotherhood gets support from Iran, insists that the postcolonial Nigerian state – including the northern state governments – is fundamentally corrupt and therefore incapable of implementing true Shari’a.
8. Similar processes occurred elsewhere. In Thailand, for example, the introduction of videocassette recorders and privately-operated cable television stations in the late 1980s facilitated the rise of local and regional publics that challenged the dominance of state-sponsored television programming emanating from Bangkok (Hamilton 2002). In the Basque country of northern Spain, meanwhile, young Basque activists used low-power “free radio” technology to construct an alternative public that was distinct from both the Castilian Spanish national public as well as the official Basque public imagined by older Basque nationalists who had come of age under the repressive Franco regime (Urla 1995).
9. Transcription conventions are as follows.
Underlining indicates Arabic expressions and their English translations.
Italics indicate Hausa proverbs or idioms and their English translations.
 * indicates that the speaker is not visible on screen at time of utterance.

Subscripts are provided as needed to indicate semantic gender (*m* or *f*) of singular nouns, pronouns, adjectives and verbal aspect-markers, and to disambiguate the plural second-person pronoun *ku* ('you_{pl}'), which is not gender-specific.

. indicates the end of an intonational phrase with falling pitch followed by a one-beat pause.

, indicates the end of an intonational phrase with even pitch followed by a pause of less than one beat.

? indicates the end of an intonational phrase with rising pitch followed by a one-beat pause.

! indicates the end of an intonational phrase uttered with increased volume.

: indicates a prolonged vowel.

(.) indicates an additional one-beat pause between phrases or turns.

(..) indicates an additional two-beat pause between phrases or turns.

= indicates latching (no pause between turns).

[indicates overlap.

(x) indicates an undiscernible syllable.

< > indicates explanatory text inserted by me.

(()) indicates on-screen participants' nonverbal actions.

h indicates one syllable of exhaled laughter.

10. A similar, but more earnest, accusation appeared in the Islamist newspaper *Al-Mizan*, which in 1994 published a front-page article entitled "Man has married man in Kano" ("Namiji ya auri namiji a Kano"). The first line of the article sarcastically accuses the alleged same-sex couple of "imitating the enlightenment of the Europeans" ("kwaikwayon wayewar Turawa").
11. Thanks to Susan Philips for calling my attention to 'Dan Baba's persistent smiles.
12. Morpheme-by-morpheme glosses make use of the following conventions. FOC indicates focus particle, which are marked for gender and number. Verbal aspect markers are glossed with respect to person (*1*, *2* or *3*), gender (*m* or *f*), number (*s* or *pl*), and aspect (CONT = continuative, RCONT = relative continuative).
13. Adamu began his post in Hausa, but switched to English in order to accommodate readers who might experience "difficulty understanding [it] in Hausa" ("wahalar fahimta da Hausa"). Thanks to Brian Larkin for alerting me to Adamu's post.
14. Sucking teeth is a gesture signifying annoyance and disdain; it is used throughout West Africa and the African diaspora (Rickford and Rickford 1976).
15. *Giringirin* is an onomatopoeic term referring to the sound of a stringed musical instrument called the *garaya* (cf. Bargery 1934: 390). *Dai* is a discourse marker.
16. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me clarify this argument.

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Section III. Multilingualism, globalization and nationalism

Chapter 8

Gender and bilingualism in the new economy*

Monica Heller

This paper takes up the question of the relationship between language, gender and political economy from the perspective of the ways in which language is bound up in the struggles over control of the definition, production, distribution and attribution of value to material and symbolic resources, struggles which are necessarily bound up with the principles of social organization which serve to produce and reproduce interlocking systems of social difference and social inequality. The two principles that I want to foreground here are gender and ethnolinguistic identity, although class, and, albeit less visibly, race, are also salient to my account. In addition, while language is central to these processes in many ways, I will focus here on language as an index or emblem of ethnicity, and language as a valuable resource in and of itself, as a commodity exchangeable for other kinds of resources, in ways which depend on the particular configuration of markets over time and space, and on the political economic conditions which facilitate or challenge their sustainability. In other words, I do want to recognize that language plays multiple roles in these processes, as index, resource and social practice. The processes themselves unfold through social relations in which communicative interaction forms a central part, and we would be well-served by analyses which examine how social actors mobilize their linguistic resources in the social construction of boundaries, meaning and relations of power. Here, however, I must limit myself to sketching out the connections between language as index and resource and shifting political economic conditions which I see as a necessary preliminary to identifying sites and actors' trajectories which might be most revealing of the intersection of gender and ethnolinguistic identity, in the context of complex class relations.

The particular case I trace here, that of francophone Canada, affords a view of how such a complexifying approach can help unpack some long-standing questions in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology. These

questions concern the production and reproduction of linguistic minority identities, and the role of gender in language maintenance and language shift (keeping in mind that such a formulation of both sets of questions bears an ideological load, as a manifestation of ideologies of homogeneous languages and nations which take as normal, and possibly primordial, well-bounded monolingual and monocultural communities). The approach I suggest here also complicates these formulations by treating language as an ideological construct, rather than an autonomous system, but retains the concern for the ways in which social categorisations and relations of power unfold on the terrain of language (see also Yang, this volume).

In some sense, my attempted account here is wildly ambitious, trying simultaneously to historicize the processes that are at the heart of my concerns and to grasp their multiplicity. I use the term “history” here loosely, as a way to flag the importance of understanding how processes unfold over time, albeit not in a linear fashion. In that sense, my discussion is probably best understood as genealogical in ways similar to that of other chapters in this volume, insofar as I am concerned to grasp why certain discursive forms emerge under certain situated conditions, and how discursive elements get taken up, circulated, appropriated, modified and recast or cast aside over time and social space.

Treat this, then, as an exercise which will inevitably over-simplify, and which might be better in book length form (if I had the data to accomplish that, which I don't). Notable among the silences will be any sustained consideration of subjectivities, of the ways people experience and make sense out of the interlocking ideologies of language, gender, class and race, what it means to them to be positioned, and how they understand, and act on, the obstacles and opportunities before them (but see Outram 1987 for a meticulous analysis of subjectivities in the gendering of power within French Revolutionary discourse). In addition, while I will focus on *la francité* as a racialized ethnolinguistic category, I will be treating it primarily in its dominant construction as a category linked not only to whiteness, but to a very specific form of it attached to 17th and 18th century French colonization. This will entail less attention than the issue merits to the challenges to such racialization presented by various forms of immigration (whether the people involved can be constructed as francophone, European, white or not), in relation to the development of social structures of inclusion and exclusion in francophone Canada (but see Heller et al 1999; Farmer et al. 2003; Jedwab 2002; Korazemo and Stebbins 2001; Quell 2002).

Notable among the silences also will be any decent treatment of the role of the State, the Church, schooling and other highly relevant institutions, sacrificed in the interests of a focus on economic relations of production. I justify that focus on two grounds: 1) the relative lack of attention to such relations, in the literature in general and in accounts of French-English bilingualism in Canada in particular; and 2) what I believe to be their central importance in Canada in constraining definitions of who counts as a francophone, what counts as French and what counts as bilingualism, and in producing and reproducing relations of power in which ethnolinguistic identity and the value of linguistic resources are key elements. And since francophone Canada is a relatively good example of the emergence and evolution of the notion of linguistic minorities in general, implicated as it is in globalized processes, what I have to say here can serve as a basis for examining the relations between economic shifts and changing discourses of linguistic minoritisation in the new economy.

A gendered, political economic analysis of these shifts is illuminating more generally for the old feminist point that universalizing narratives tend to obscure marginalized perspectives; that is, it allows us to see in what ways dominant legitimating ideologies are situated and interested (among other things, gendered, classed and ethnicized at the same time). In addition, it allows us to see how gender, class and ethnicity are involved in the possibilities for action available to social actors, and therefore how relations of difference and inequality might change, or stay functionally the same, despite apparent shifts in the material conditions of life and in narratives of meaning. What does it mean to be multilingual? For whom? Who gets to decide? In whose interests is it to identify a language as a language, and describe it as minoritized (or more recently, as endangered)? What are the consequences of those decisions for the release of funds oriented towards language maintenance, language education or the evaluation of language skills (activities which may be more or less masculinized or feminized)? Who profits from participating in the networks where those resources circulate? What practices are best for whom? And what makes them imaginable, possible and meaningful?

Most studies of the production and reproduction of linguistic minority identities have focussed on the political economic transformations of industrialization and modernity, with a focus on how the ways in which these transformations position women and men of economically and geographically « peripheral » linguistic minority communities differently with regard to the links between language practices (and in particular, language choice)

and participation in established (or disappearing) and new (or emerging) economic activities, and hence as agents either of language shift towards the languages of the modern, industrial state or of resistance to the incursion of that State and its economy (cf. Gal 1979 or McDonald 1990 on European peasant communities; Dorian 1981 on a Scottish fishing village; Hill 1987 and Harvey 1991 on indigenous villages in Latin America; Adachi 1997 on a Japanese rural commune in Brazil; Goldstein 1997 on immigrants in an industrial workplace in Canada).

For example, in European peasant or primary resource extraction communities such as those studied by Gal, Dorian and McDonald, men typically maintain a minority language as part of their centrality in traditional, primary-resource extraction activities, which tend to involve single-sex work teams spending large amounts of time in isolation (in the fields, on fishing boats, and so on), while women see wage labour in industrializing nearby urban centres as a way not only to supplement income (especially at a time when family farms come under threat from industrializing agriculture) but to gain some financial independence, and so are motivated to learn the language which comes from such activities. In other situations (possibly more linked to colonization/postcolonialism or migration than to stable preindustrial or industrial contexts), such as that studied by Adachi, the roles are reversed; men carry out brokering activities with the outside world, and hence learn Portuguese, while women are involved in activities within the commune, which take place in Japanese (but see Nguyen, this volume, for a different pattern).

What both these sets of situations have in common, though, is a gendered division of labour, both material and symbolic, and an ethnolinguistic boundary which becomes relevant as groups come into contact. That relevance is tied to the ways ethnolinguistic differences are part of the nature of the relationship between groups, whether that involves, as in Europe, exchange between the products of industry and agriculture, or as in Brazil, the necessity on the part of a small commune to articulate itself with a wider market. It is also tied to the ideologies informing the construction of identities, and to the values that legitimate groups; these might be progress and enlightenment on the part of urban industrialists and self-sufficiency and closeness to nature on the part of agriculturalists, religious values on the part of the Japanese-Brazilian commune studied by Adachi, or others.

In this chapter, I will take up some of these themes as they pertain to francophone Canada, but with attention in particular to more recent shifts from a modern industrialized economy to a globalized one based on ser-

vices, information and communication; in addition, my emphasis is not on identifying agents of language maintenance or shift evidenced in some (but by no means all) of this work, but rather on concerns foreshadowed by much of it (notably work by Gal, Goldstein and Hill) for discovering the gendered dimensions of the redistribution of linguistic resources and of the attribution of value to them, and their consequences for members of gendered social categories. I will explore in particular how older patterns of gender and ethnolinguistic stratification take new shapes in these shifts, creating a complex landscape of sometimes overlapping, sometimes intersecting and sometimes conflicting axes of inequality, which create a range of new opportunities and obstacles for the performance of gendered ethnolinguistic identities, and for access to the (re)definition of what counts as legitimate performance in the first place. I will attend here more to questions related to the mapping of positions than I can to problems of local construction of identities, subjectivities or gendered representations (see Heller et al. 1999), although how to link these questions to the mapping I outline here raises important theoretical and methodological questions regarding agency and structuration more generally. The question I want to focus on, then, is how various forms of social categorization (understood as the construction of social difference), of which gender is one, intersect in a process of social change, positioning people differently with respect to strategies and resources open to them, and with the consequences for them of trying out one thing or another. How is the relationship between gender, class and ethnolinguistic categories bound up in historical shifts in the social organization of work, from primary and secondary-sector economies to the tertiary one developing as part of the 'new work order' (Gee et al. 1996)? In these conditions, how are ideologies and performances of gender and ethnolinguistic identity shaped and shifted together? Who gets to do that shaping?

In order to see how one might explore these questions, and in particular social structuring through gender, class and ethnonational categorization which informs them, it is necessary to understand the ways in which relevant processes work out *in situ*. While I do not want to claim that the case of francophone Canada is typical, I do want to claim that francophone Canada is going through processes which will find comparisons in other parts of the world. I will focus on recent ethnographic work in francophone communities in Canada,¹ where dominant discourses of francophone identity were traditionally based on primary and secondary sectors of an industrialized economy and a focus on the modern State, within the context of an ethnolinguistically-stratified national economy. These communities can be

found across Canada, although the fieldwork I draw on here concentrated on areas with traditional economies based on lumber combined with mining or agriculture (northern and central Ontario); fishing (the rural coastal Maritimes); or heavy industry (southern Ontario and southeastern New Brunswick). In these communities, the traditional economy (frequently State-subsidized) has been profoundly diminished and restructured, followed by a reconversion, or attempted reconversion, to such activities as call centres and tourism, in the context of the privatization of the public sector, and of increasing dependence on globalized communications for the restructured established activities that remain (as in fishing or the automobile industry). Not only are traditional gendered divisions of labour destabilized through the collapse of many masculine domains of work and the opening up of new feminized ones, but the linguistic capital, with its gendered distribution, at the heart of dominant discourses of community and identity, takes on new form and value by the foregrounding of language as a central component of marketable skills in the new economy. The relationship between French and English, and between vernacular and standard, are questioned, and the value, the parameters of distribution and the legitimacy of gendered linguistic capital is in the process of being redefined.

The central processes of social change I will consider here are these:

- 1) Traditional gender roles associated with the Catholicism once central to francophone identity (*la foi, la race, la langue*) are in flux, opening spaces at the same time for a reconfiguration of ethno-linguistic categories and processes of identification.
- 2) In ways familiar to sociolinguists (see work cited above), for the francophone Canadian working class, new economic opportunities are generally greater for women than for men, leading to an increasing investment on the part of working-class women in standard French, and in French-English bilingualism (although not necessarily to a devaluing of vernacular French); it also leads to a retrenchment of working-class men in vernacular-speaking skills-based work units (usually in kin-based small companies).
- 3) The middle class, on the other hand, finds itself no longer able to control the ethnonational definition of language and community, as it gets increasingly caught up in diversified and extended networks and activities.
- 4) Everyone gets drawn into struggles over authenticity as language and identity are increasingly commodified, sometimes separately (that is, language can be commodified by people who stake no claim to identity,

and identity can be commodified by people who cannot speak French). Indeed, new actors are drawn into the discursive space of francophone Canada because of these changes; many of these new actors are immigrants of a wide variety of backgrounds, including but not limited to the varied regions of the francophone world, many are Canadians who have learned or are learning French, many are non-francophones who have established kinship or other ties to participants in francophone Canadian discursive spaces, and finally, many are people of francophone origin who no longer speak French and who newly are drawn into the discursive spaces they or their ancestors had formerly abandoned. These new actors, of course, have different sets of resources to mobilize and different sets of interests with regard to francophone Canada.

But these are new developments. Historically, ethnolinguistic differences have been used in Canada to construct and legitimize class stratification, although one can also argue that class stratification was one way to contain the ethnolinguistic threat posed to English power by the existence of a large Catholic French-speaking population. Anglophones argued, and francophones, encouraged by the Catholic Church, believed, that francophones had no head for business. Additional stereotypes included being happy and fun-loving, but also simple and irrational or superstitious.²

Let us pause for a moment to consider the content of this legitimating ideology. For one thing, its very existence flags the source of power, namely, 'business' (no one is arguing that francophones have no head for literature, or even politics). This allows us to get right to the heart of what has mattered in Canada, at what the primary source of the value and meaning of linguistic resources has long been. It is also worth remarking that it is the same argument used within the English-speaking world and elsewhere about women, and about racialized groups. The central values are, then, rationality, enlightenment, seriousness, "a head for figures," reserve; values embodied, more or less literally, by anglophone men, and which help justify, and therefore mask, the processes of exclusion of both women and francophones from the corridors of power (see Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990). This raises the question of how, under these conditions, to be an anglophone woman or a francophone man. My sense is that the first problem was solved by the removal of women from the public sphere, and their protection by their relative ethnoclass dominance from the gaze and evaluation of francophones (although it would be interesting to know how francophone domestic servants talked about their anglophone mistresses). The

masculinity of francophone men can be found in the exploitation of the values of the work they did, since they inherited decades of overrepresentation of francophones among the less-educated citizens of Canada and among the farmers, lumber workers, miners, factory workers and fishermen (I say that advisedly) of the country. Since those workers were almost always men, they could resist feminization through masculine values attached to physical strength (although as with so many forms of resistance, ascribing to such values also reproduced their domination). This form of francophone masculinity remains relevant today, as we shall see.

The early francophone community itself had a sharply gendered division of labour within the domestic economy. As in many agricultural economies, women contributed labour to family farms. In addition, they worked as domestic servants, for anglophones or the francophone élite, usually in urban areas, or supplemented family income by providing services or home-made products (crafts or cooking). In some cases they became teachers (and in general, this is part of a pattern in which women tended to be more educated than men, in part because of the entrance of men at a young age into the primary and secondary sector economy). The socio-economic stratification of the Canadian economy that this scenario reveals was central to the production and reproduction of a “French-Canadian” identity from the time of the (1759) British Conquest on.

This (admittedly terribly oversimplified) portrait has gone through two periods of change, although its fundamental outlines remain recognizable, especially in what have become the *bastions traditionnels* of the francophone community (the rural areas tied to primary resource extraction and the urban working-class neighbourhoods organized around heavy industry).

The first period of change developed after the Second World War, and can be accounted for on the basis of two processes: 1) a post-war economic expansion which created a space for francophone access to the private sector; and 2) existing structures of collective consciousness and mobilization laid down by the traditional francophone élite (see Clift and Arnopoulos 1979; Fraser 1987; Heller 2002). It involved democratic State-nationalist or institutional-nationalist mobilization, the democratization of education and, centrally for my purposes here, the emergence of a francophone middle-class, conscious of itself as francophone, careful to construct economic zones to which it has privileged access (through language) and more involved in State- and paragovernmental agencies, small businesses, finance and the professions than in the large companies of the primary and secondary sectors which traditionally formed the backbone of the Canadian econ-

omy (although many did get involved in the articulation of those national and international companies with the regional, francophone and Quebec-centred market). (So it turns out francophones *do* have a head for business.)

This change, as elsewhere around the world, was accompanied by the rise of feminist consciousness and a reworking of gender roles within the francophone community. While the leaders of the movement still tended to be male, and members of the *élite*, a generation of women as well as men entered the ranks of the educated middle class. Quebec especially (which among the francophone regions of Canada was at the forefront of this movement and profited most from it) is now known for the rapid decline in rates of marriage and birth which accompanied this shift. Francophone representation in traditional sectors declined, although it did not disappear; women tended also to congregate in service jobs, working for example as secretaries, cashiers, and health care assistants, as well as remaining over-represented among educators. The public sector also played a major role in the shifting economy, providing employment opportunities in the francophone Quebec civil service and the bilingual federal civil service (as well as to a lesser extent in some other provinces, notably New Brunswick). These civil service positions also tended to be gendered, with francophone women overrepresented among the ranks of receptionists and translators, and francophones in general overrepresented in areas related to communication with the public.

Overall, the reproduction of ethnolinguistic identity revolved more around economic competition than economic stratification; that is, while in the past the vertical mosaic used ethnolinguistic differences to reproduce class distinctions (with the exception of complicated tensions and alliances between the Irish and the French members of the working class), now we see members of groups understanding themselves as ethnolinguistically distinct competing for the same economic niches across the board, and especially for middle class jobs. Newly middle-class francophone men had to work out a way of being both masculine and francophone that embraced working with the head rather than with the hands, while establishing sufficient distance from anglophone *élite* modes of masculinity. Francophone women had the same problem of femininity as women of their generation elsewhere, with the additional burden of the femininity attached to their ethnolinguistic identity: how to get taken seriously not just as a francophone, not just as a woman, but as a francophone woman?

The relative success of the francophone middle class in constructing a privileged zone of activity for itself needs to be understood within the con-

text of its democratic legitimizing ideology; while political mobilization was justified on the basis of ethnolinguistic inequalities, the new regime of power needed to be understood as inclusive. Using language as a criterion of inclusion was one way to maintain the privileged position in the new markets of francophones (understood *sub rosa* as an ethnolinguistic group with the authenticity-based authority to decide what counts as good French) while appearing not to do so. Not surprisingly, competition for the linguistic resources of bilingualism arose, through such avenues as French-language education for anglophones, or linguistic intermarriage, and, in the case of new francophone immigrants, especially those from the former French colonies or areas of influence in Africa, Haiti and the Middle East, through direct political challenges to the democratic legitimacy of francophone institutions (and the Quebec State) (see Heller 1990; Heller and Lévy 1994; Makropoulos 2000). But this has been largely a matter of the middle-class; the working class still feels the weight of the domination of English and of anglophones, as well as of its own élite, which consolidates its position in part through language ideologies requiring the reproduction of autonomous, coherent systems clearly demarcated one from the other (as opposed to the more mixed bilingual practices of the working class) and adherence to whatever the middle class defines as *le bon français*. The francophone élite draws effectively on nationalist ideologies of language, which are coherent with its modernizing goals.

What we have, then, is an ethnonationally-defined middle-class absorbed in trying to maintain its privileged position in the construction and description of a francophone world, against the incursions of 'other' francophones (bilingual 'anglophones', bilingual working class minority francophones, immigrants), through criteria related to legitimating language in whole, autonomous ways; this middle-class also must address the contradictions posed by its exclusion of its own authenticating working class. Nonetheless, both men and women of the middle-class profit from their relative success, especially women in the sector of education. Working-class men can retreat into their remaining skills-based activities, while working-class women find their solidarity also among networks of female kin and neighbours (while frequently using English at work in the service economy).

The second period of change, which began to emerge in the 1980s, has particularly affected the working class of the *bastions traditionnels*, and in ways which are profoundly gendered, since they touch precisely on the gendered division of labour and its contribution to the production of francophone identity. This change was triggered by the restructuring, and in

some cases the collapse, of the traditional economy. Across North America, heavy industry restructured, converting to computerized systems of production, moving plants to areas of the world in which labour costs were cheaper, and hence drastically reducing the labour force. Mines and lumber mills closed, and the cod fishery, the foundation of the Acadian economy, was also closed to prevent overfishing. In the 1990s, alternative economic activities began to emerge, based on the tertiary sector, that is, on an economy of service and information. It is this shift that I will turn to now.

As with most processes of social change, things happen at different speeds and in different ways in different places. The *bastions traditionnels* are currently experiencing both the restructured old economy and the arrival of the new. At the same time, new centres of francophone discursive space are taking shape in other areas around the new economy.

In the *bastions traditionnels*, for the most part, old skills have been turned to new uses. In northeastern New Brunswick, for example, the cod fishery has been replaced by crabbing, which is much more capital-intensive. The result is an increasing gap between rich and poor within the local Acadian community, and the introduction of a basis of wealth which remains largely controlled by men, who also act as a zone of construction of one new kind of francophone, Acadian masculinity (one with wealth, and which excludes poorer kin and neighbours). At the same time, many communities have begun investments in the development of heritage tourism and the marketing overseas of authentic cultural products; this has resulted in the revaluing of some traditionally female handicrafts (one of our research sites is a financially successful Acadian cooperative of female producers of hooked rugs) and some traditionally male cultural activities (such as music).

For example, in one area of central Ontario where we have been doing fieldwork, we usually stay in a Bed & Breakfast (the only one in the village) in a family farmhouse in an area which had a typical Franco-Ontarian mixed agriculture and lumber economy; the husband, now retired, ran the farm, and still takes care of it in a low-key way. In the winter, he builds wooden birdhouses. His wife now runs a small catering business out of her kitchen, runs the B&B and also engages in a variety of handicrafts, the products of which seasonally decorate the house. Such new, tourism-oriented economic activities, as we shall see, can serve as the basis for the commodification of identity in a new economy in which authentic cultural products and experiences are highly valued (think for example of world music or of cultural tourism; cf. also LeMenestrel 1999). Because they are tied to shifts in the

gendered division of labour, they also imply shifts in gendered (and of course classed) dimensions of who gets to define identity, and how.

In the same area, former farmers, bought out by a large potato-processing company in the 1960s, had already turned their skills to construction and maintenance of summer houses for city people, establishing kin- and community-based, francophone and male small companies of contractors, builders, roofers, electricians and plumbers (this is a widespread phenomenon across francophone Ontario and Quebec). These have been key sites for the maintenance of vernacular French. Since the 1990s, globalizing tourism has vastly increased the wealth brought into the community by this means; the simple one-storey cottages that middle-class city folk used to build are being replaced by luxurious multi-storey architect-designed homes for vacationers (investors?) from places like Germany and Russia. Again, wealth differences appear within francophone, male networks which historically have been important domains of construction of authenticity. Finally, many men (and some women, especially among the middle class) are involved in local activities which guarantee the value of this commodified resource, through community radio and local festivals, for example.

And many people, men and women, are leaving their regions of origin, and moving to urban areas; this is an old pattern, of course, except that in the past people moved to cities mainly for jobs in industry, and now cities are offering new kinds of employment. These are mainly jobs in the tertiary sector; the kinds of jobs we have looked at most closely are those directly involving multilingualism (such as those in call centres and other customer service jobs, tourism, or multinationals), because that is where large numbers of francophones congregate, whether they are from the rural heartlands or from the unemployment-hit working class neighbourhoods. We do not have a sense of the market share of multilingualism-related versus other kinds of new economy jobs, although we can say that this sector is greater than it used to be. It also is probably disproportionately important in the areas which concern us most, since they are areas where labour is cheap and bilingual skills, of new interest to a globalized information economy, plentiful.

There are two kinds of employment sectors centrally involved, call centres and translation, both heavily feminized. Members of our team have done fieldwork in two call centres, one in southern Ontario and one in southern New Brunswick (see Boudreau 2003; Roy 2003). In both cases, provincial or municipal governments actively went after the call centre industry to provide employment, providing physical infrastructure (notably fibre optic cable) and attractive tax breaks, and publicizing the French-

English bilingualism of the population. (Remember that in the old economy bilingualism was rarely a job asset, except maybe for politicians). In some cases, local francophone communities saw these kinds of jobs as vindication of the value of their linguistic capital, as finally providing an advantage in the increasingly competitive job market, and as a new basis of reproduction of community identity. In others, they were simply accepted as better than unemployment, and certainly as placing bilingual francophones at an advantage over monolingual anglophones, albeit for not very attractive jobs.

As is by now widely known, call centres in Europe and North America are extremely feminized places of work (Cameron 2001). In both call centres we got to know, the workforce was almost entirely female, possessed secondary or some post-secondary education and was quite young. The men in the Ontario call centre tended to congregate in its automobile emergency service department, and the ones in the New Brunswick centre were found in specialized, and sometimes technical services, where they had more independence; among those on « the floor » in the New Brunswick centre, men tended to prefer the night shift (they also often worked standing up, or read the newspaper while working, as if to signal that they were not totally invested in the identities the call centre asked them to adopt). There tends to be a high turnover rate in this industry, and many call centres have multiple clients; this produces an economy in which bilinguals, and mainly bilingual women, sell their voices, and construct their on-line identities, in whichever corporate image is called for.

What this means in practical terms is subordinating the strong local identity out of which these workers emerge to the universalizing and standardizing image of the corporation. These women can be Mélanie one instant and Melanie the next; they can be a reservations agent or a telemarketer or a bill collector for a company based in Montreal or Toronto or Dallas or New York. Local identities, and local language practices, are reserved for their off-line selves, the ones who negotiate and chat amongst themselves or with their immediate supervisors, holding on to their (relatively) privileged position against competition from bilingual anglophones, resisting the all-seeing power of the anglophone management, or getting back at the controlling normativity of educated Québécois (Boudreau 2003). Men, forced into this sector by the absence of other opportunities, find islands of masculinity, either through masculinized subsectors (technology, cars) or homogenized domains where they have more control of their conditions of work, and less cause to be required to perform a corporate self (through specialized services or the night shift).

In some ways, translators, whether in-house or freelance, also provide ventriloquating, and hence self-effacing, services. Again frequently women, translators allow corporations in the private sector to provide a bilingual or multilingual face without having to invest itself in the development of language skills of its own staff. In these cases, it is mainly customer service representatives who would be required to be bilingual; translation services permit middle-class anglophones to retain their class position without having to invest in bilingualism, and, not coincidentally, open themselves up to competition from francophones.

The new market position for French now positions it less as a means of solidarity with respect to anglophone domination, or as a basis for resistance to that domination, less as a basis for competing with anglophones for middle-class jobs, and more as a handmaiden to anglophone access to global multilingual markets, or as a commodified product to be sold to a multilingual, indeed frequently anglophone, market.

What does this mean for the development of legitimating ideologies of *la francophonie canadienne*, that is, how they are being shaped, by whom and with what consequences for whom? How do francophone identity, and francophone linguistic practices play into the construction of masculinity and femininity, for both the working- and middle-classes in the globalized new economy? How do practices of gendering play into the construction of *la francité*?

Broadly speaking, the ethnonational ideology of *la francité*, constructed by the élite, legitimized by a fundamentally masculine ideology of authenticity, is now under siege, undermined both by its own success and its internal contradictions. The problem for middle-class men and women is how to reinvent *la francité* as inclusive and diverse without losing their ability to define it altogether. For some, the answer lies in a gesture towards inclusion and diversity through placing language skills (rather than ethnicity) at the centre of the process of definition of group boundaries, but maintaining control by appealing to universalistic notions of “good French.” These ideas are said to be inclusive of variability, but in fact permit francophones to retain a good measure of control, whether through more masculine political roles in language policy, or more feminine ones in translation and education. This control involves investing in discourses of endangered languages (see Heller and Heller and Duchêne 2007) which justify mobilizing to protect French, and investing in the development of tools of standardization in the service of protecting “la qualité de la langue,” while appealing to

their authority for carrying out this work as tied to a combination of legitimizing authenticity and professional credentials.

In the face of this obsession with *la qualité de la langue*, many working-class francophone men are nonetheless finding places of refuge for their masculinity within the new economy (for example, as labour for construction and crabbing, as the basis for authentic cultural products to be sold in tourism or on world cultural markets). Others hide in the most masculine reaches they can find in a largely feminized new economy.

Working-class women either contribute to the production of authentic cultural products or sell their bilingualism as cheap labour in the service industry, subject to evaluation of their language skills by employers and clients according to corporate norms linked to schooled ideas of bilingualism and “standards.” They are, interestingly, divided between those who have a direct economic investment in ethnonational authenticity (and who are often protected from the grammatical panopticon by working in areas such as crafts or tourism, or else who are themselves agents of linguistic surveillance), and those who use their authenticity to protect their access to jobs in which they sell their ability to (authentically) be all things to all types of client (and employer).

Gender and class may be completely absent from public debate on the future of *la francophonie canadienne*, but I hope to have shown here that both are highly consequential. Indeed, they are absent precisely because of middle-class investments in solidarity and homogeneity in the service of ethnonationalism and the preservation of the value of authenticity within the context of professionalism and internationalism, as ideological means of justifying their insistence on being the ones who define language norms. The result is that the differential positioning of men and women of the middle- and working classes is obscured; working class men hide, and working class women’s voices are directed through those of others. The challenge to middle-class men comes from others who can stake a claim to good French, and they are the so-called ethnic “others”; this is mainly of concern in the institutions which the modernizing movement of the 1960s–1980s established (educational, health and social welfare institutions, the media, various kinds of associations, lobbying groups), but also emerges in the workplace. The tension for the middle class lies in the difficulty of constructing democratic legitimacy, centrally around the inclusion of French-speaking immigrants, with the maintenance of control over hard-won resources. Currently, this is precisely where public debate lies, and where the dominant discourse of *la francité* will be shaped. Ethnic and racial diversity is the

contemporary terrain of struggle, while the gender and class formations which cross-cut them remain largely unexplored.

I hope to have showed some ways in which attention to political economy can help illuminate such intersectionalities, as well as helping to explain how it comes to pass that language emerges as a principle of social organization in the interest of reproducing or challenging systems of categorization and stratification which serve to regulate the circulation of resources. This is meant as a contribution both to studies of language and gender, in which multilingualism has not figured prominently, and to studies of bilingualism, which, while increasingly attending to gender and political economy nonetheless might profit from approaches able to account for the complexity related to multiple positionings and complicated circulations of resources.

Notes

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1. The data on which this paper is based are drawn from a series of projects funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the German-American Academic Council Foundation from 1996 to the present.
2. Here is one example, published recently in the community newspaper of a francophone village in central Ontario. I will cite the first stanza of what is claimed to be the text of a song composed by Joséphine Courtemanche, of Lafontaine, sometime between 1920 and 1925 (2003:3).

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|-----|--|------------------------------|
| (i) | <i>Vive Lafontaine</i> | Vive Lafontaine |
| | <i>Nous sommes des habitants</i> | We are country folk |
| | <i>On vit le coeur joyeux</i> | We live with happy hearts |
| | <i>Quand même qu'on a pas d'argent</i> | Even though we have no money |

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Chapter 9

African women in Catalan language courses: Struggles over class, gender and ethnicity in advanced liberalism*

Joan Pujolar

*3 Then there appeared to them divided tongues, as of
fire, and one sat upon each of them.*

*4 And they were filled with the Holy Spirit and
began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit
gave them utterance*

(The Acts of the Apostles 2: 3–4)

1. Introduction

As international migration increases throughout the world, the teaching of languages for adult immigrants is emerging as an expanding sector within foreign language teaching. In this context, language courses for immigrants (as well as refugees) may provide an interesting perspective into the processes whereby language is used to regulate access to symbolic and material resources in a context of increasing mobility and cultural diversity. Since Bourdieu (1977, 1982) published his seminal essays on the “linguistic market”, linguistic anthropologists have become increasingly aware of how education contributes to the reproduction of social hierarchies and inequalities through the legitimization of the linguistic and communicative practices of dominant groups. However, most studies have focused, understandably, on the regular school system; from the earlier studies that focused on cultural differences (Gumperz 1986; Heath 1983; Michaels 1981) until the recent, more critical, approaches. Thus Heller (1999) has shown how hegemonic ideas on what constitutes “good French” in a Toronto francophone school have profound effects on students of different social classes, genders or linguistic and ethnic backgrounds, both in terms of their academic careers and of their position in the informal economy of peer-

group relations. Some students in this school were from immigrant communities, as in the sites researched by Martin-Jones and Saxena (1996), Rampton (1995, 2003), Allyson (2004), Mondada and Gajo (2001) and Nussbaum (2003). From a more sociological perspective, Phillipson (1992) has shown that dominant pedagogical approaches to the teaching of English respond to political and economic interests of British and American agencies and professionals, rather than to the needs of most learners around the world. In former colonies, these approaches have helped to develop educational policies that benefit the elites who speak the colonial languages (Rubagumya 1990; Tollefson 1991). Thus, by analyzing how languages are taught and how different languages or varieties are positioned within a given educational system, we get a glimpse into the ways in which dominant groups exert control over access to the resources (i.e. employment, political power) available in a given region (Heller and Martin-Jones 2001).

Adult immigrants and refugees, however, do not enter a regular education system structured to cater for the whole population and which formally pursues common goals for all. Particularly in industrialized societies, they encounter various settlement services, social services and professional training schemes, usually designed especially for them. Language courses in particular are often designed to facilitate access to “entry level employment” and, in some cases, to provide “survival” linguistic skills or the means to achieve a vaguely defined “integration” into the host community. As Goldstein (1995), Tollefson (1991) and Warrimer (2004) have shown, many such courses aim at developing very specific communicative skills associated with low-paid, unskilled and unstable employment, which means that they are inserted in, and enact, policies that clearly steer the immigrant workforce into the margins of the economy. But the processes of learning the local language and finding adequate employment are even harder for some profiles of immigrant women, particularly those that are brought in primarily as spouses and to serve as housewives. If they are unemployed, they are not entitled to attend courses addressed specifically to workers, and they may not be able to attend open courses either if they do not have access to daycare or have to travel long distances (Cleghorn 2000; Cumming and Gill 1992; Pavlenko and Piller 2001). However, as Kouritzin (2000) has successfully argued in the Canadian context, “access” to language classes is not the only difficulty women face in relation to English or French. As women are typically assigned the role of child-rearers, they often have to manage the conflicting agendas of passing one’s own language and culture to the children while, at the same time, ensuring that they

acquire the language skills needed for academic and professional success in the host society (Mills 2004). This involves difficult choices as to what languages to use in different spaces of everyday life, particularly within the family. Norton's (2000) study showed the difficulties immigrant women face in finding spaces and building relationships outside classrooms where they could be recognized as legitimate speakers of English/French. Teaching methodologies have also come under criticism, either because they are not adjusted to the needs of students, do not build on their experiences and capabilities, or because of the doubtful political agendas behind "entry level employment" schemes. There have been proposals for a "critical pedagogy of ESL" aimed at incorporating the students' agendas and promoting their political awareness (Auerbach 1995; Goldstein 1995; Schenke 1991). Finally, the fact that language courses for immigrants and refugees are not inserted within general educational policies, but within the social services sector, has important implications in that funding is more restricted and unstable, while provision is not universal and often dependent on community groups and organizations who may heavily rely on voluntary work.

Very few of the studies mentioned above document the ways in which dominant ideologies and discourses over language, gender, race and class inform classroom practices in ways that either reproduce or challenge relations of inequality along those axes. This is what I intend to do in this chapter by examining in detailed patterns of interaction and learning activities in a course of Catalan for immigrant women in a town I shall call *Vilagan*,¹ in Northern Catalonia (Spain). The data were gathered mainly via classroom ethnography (participant observation, fieldnotes, transcribed video recordings), but also through documents and interviews with voluntary teachers and professional social workers from the Organization for Catholic Solidarity, the church-based organizer of the course (henceforth OCS). The Catalan context provides an additional element of complexity and interest in that language courses for immigrants are provided in a context of struggle as to which language, Catalan or Spanish, should be taught. Catalonia has traditionally attracted migrants from Spain's rural areas because of its important industrial base. Immigrants from developing countries are a relatively new phenomenon dating from the late eighties, in which integration to the European community coincided with a period of economic growth. Population with residence permits increased from 55,309 in 1991 to 214,996 in 2000 (Alonso 2001). With 15.44% of the Spanish population, Catalonia hosts approximately 24% of the country's foreign residents (approximately 3.5% of the total population). The Northern province of Girona

displays the highest percentages of foreign residents (5.2%), partly because early settlers had initially planned to move further to France or Central Europe (Farjas 2003).

I will show how, in the context studied, “integration” emerges as a keyword (Williams 1976) of wider currency that is used not only within nationalist discourses as such, but as a way of legitimizing a much wider framework of inequality between locals and immigrants. As Cleghorn (2000) suggests, Foucault’s (1991) notion of “governmentality” involving political rule through knowledge, together with Rose’s (1993) rendering of what he calls “advanced liberal rule” may provide a useful framework to understand the institutional location and the particular discourses that are brought to bear on the organization of language courses for immigrants. “Governmentality” refers to the particular ways in which liberal democracies deploy a constellation of institutions and forms of knowledge aimed at managing populations, including immigrants, according to principles of rationality. “Integration” is, from this perspective, the particular form this management takes for immigrants. “Advanced liberal rule” is the particular form governmentality processes take in contemporary liberal states. A classical liberal regime is characterized by the option not to exercise direct rule, but to “install and empower a variety of ‘professionals’ who” are invested by the authority to “act as experts in the devices of social rule” (Rose 1993: 285). “Advanced” forms of liberal rule involve a certain detachment of these practices of expertise from public control, aimed at creating conditions akin to those of a free market (Rose 1993: 295–296).

I will use these concepts to explore how social actors drew upon specialist discourses and practices in their strategies to accumulate and legitimize particular forms of cultural capital over others, resulting in a pervasive delegitimization of the language skills, forms of knowledge and social practices of immigrants. Ideologies of gender were an important component of these processes as social actors drew upon existing discourses on the roles of immigrant women within their families and communities. My perspective is thus based on Bourdieu’s idea that social actors operate within the framework of markets or social fields that determine the value of the economic and cultural assets that they possess. However, seen from the ground, through the lens of situated practice, we can also appreciate how these values are the object of constant struggles whose outcomes also depend on local conditions, the resources available to the participants and the strategies they deploy. Thus, much of what was going on in the classroom resulted from the simple need to sustain what teachers thought was essen-

tial to the course, namely the students' active participation in learning activities. The course itself constituted, in fact, an attempt to provide students with resources and improve their social standing, while the option to teach Catalan was itself a challenge against the hegemony of Spanish as a public language and against the ways in which Catalan speakers restrict access to their own language for outsiders.

The course's general objectives were: to provide immigrants with basic skills to communicate in everyday life, including knowledge about local customs and administrative procedures and also to provide a space for "intercultural dialogue" so as to "promote the integration of immigrant communities in our society."² The OCS coordinated all the local church's services to immigrants, which also included housing, provision of food and clothing, and legal support. All the teachers of their language courses were volunteers who had no specific training in linguistics or language teaching, except from some primary school teachers. The Vilagran course I attended involved one weekly two-hour session from November 2002 to June 2003. A daycare service was provided during the sessions, run by two additional (female) volunteers. The students were all women, generally young (average age: 21), married and with very young children. Most had recently joined their husbands, who had settled in Catalonia a few years before. They were mostly speakers of Arabic or Berber from Morocco and Sarahule speakers from Gambia, with a few Mandinga or Fula speakers from Senegal or Mali. As I did not speak any of their languages and could not employ any assistants who did, the students' views and experiences could only be explored through informal exchanges, indirect reports from teachers and OCS officials and one interview with one Moroccan woman. Accessing immigrant women's perspective is, I am convinced, a different type of project altogether, which existing policies of employment of research assistants in Spanish universities and funding bodies make particularly difficult to pursue. This is why my analysis is predominantly geared towards the institutional side, with some consideration of the different strategies that students deployed to participate in the classroom.³ Although most of my data come from the Vilagran course, I use -mainly for comparison- data from other sites: I paid short visits to an OCS course for men in another town, as well as three more courses (one for men, two for women) associated with a project of language education for immigrants (henceforth PLEI) run by an official authority. The PLEI courses were taught by young volunteers, mainly female university students, who were given basic special

training on intercultural issues and language learning, and were backed by a teaching specialist throughout the course.

I shall present the analysis in three sections. In the first, I will show how the course provided the setting to construct an eminently unequal relationship between teachers and students that transcended the conventional teacher-student framework as it involved the deployment of control procedures and expert welfare discourses that delegitimized the language skills, forms of knowledge and social practices of the women as members of their communities. In the second section, I will examine the uses of Catalan and Spanish in the classroom and connect them with existing struggles over language and national identity in Catalonia. I will argue that the Catalan speakers' habit of speaking Spanish to strangers serves to protect the economic and political power of its speakers at the same time that it undermines the value of the language in the public sphere. In the third section, I will look into the motivations and different participation profiles of students in the classroom. I will show that only the women who had a solid educational background were able to participate in the classroom as the teachers expected. In the concluding section, I shall discuss the significance of the findings in terms of the processes that contribute to the delegitimization of the cultural capital of immigrants in advanced liberal societies.

2. Classroom management, expert knowledge and cultural hierarchies

The teachers organized the sessions as a "language course" in the conventional sense, while the more holistically-defined objectives (see above) were attended to in other ways. For instance, the OCS organized special informative sessions on nutrition, health, legal affairs and police services led by external "experts." As we shall see, the linguistic agenda of the courses was inserted within a wider welfare and charity agenda that created the conditions to constitute a visibly unequal relationship between locals and students. This unequal relationship was constructed as a cultural hierarchy. In any case, for the teachers, as members of the institutional team (Goffman 1959), an immediate concern was how to sustain the impression that organized learning was taking place in the face of evident difficulties and obstacles. First, none of them could speak Arabic, Berber or Sarahule, while most students spoke little or no Spanish or Catalan. Students' literacy skills were varied, ranging from total illiteracy to biliteracy in both Arabic

and Latin scripts. Secondly, students kept arriving at any time and most of them attended fairly irregularly (see Table 1). New students kept turning up while others dropped out. Finally, many did not bring their own pens and notebooks, appeared afraid, unwilling to speak, or simply distracted.

Table 1. Summary of attendance at the course's 27 sessions

8 Students	Attended 1 session only	Throughout the first half of the course
9 Students	Attended 2 or 3 sessions	Throughout the course, rarely in consecutive sessions
8 Students	Attended from 4 to 7 sessions	Mostly consecutive, 3 of them in the last sessions.
5 Students	Attended from 13 to 16 sessions	Throughout the course, 3 of them regularly up to the end of the course
Average attendance per session: 5.4 students		
Average attendance of regulars, i.e. members of the last group: 2.7 students per session.		

With regard to learning activities, teachers generally opted for very simple vocabulary drills of various formats, which required a minimum of skill and involvement on the part of students. Episode 1, a transcription from a video recording, provides a good illustration of this. Carme was the teacher, Alija a Moroccan student and Cris a visiting university undergraduate who was doing her practicum. While they waited for other students to arrive, Carme displayed cuttings from newspaper ads featuring the plans of flats on sale and invited Alija to name the parts and the typical furniture of a flat. The whole interaction was conducted in Catalan. The activity simply required Alija to utter single vocabulary items in L2. She did not have to produce any full sentence or any meaningful conversational moves. She did display involvement and responsiveness to the teacher's promptings, but she hesitated and failed to provide most of the expected responses, so that the teacher kept providing clues and explanations to preempt likely sources of difficulty.

Episode 1: Sustaining the pedagogical frame

Carme: al diari · veus[?] · tal com tu- si tu (ar') haguessis de buscar una vivenda · · ho v[e]u- ho trobaríem aixís al diari · · ara mirarem les parts · tu fixa-t'hi bé · la- la porta d'entrada · fixa-t'hi- les portes les pinten aixís ho veus[?] 'xò són portes · · ho veus[?] · això són les portes per unt entraries a 'questa casa[?]

In a newspaper · You see? That's how you- if you a- had to look for a residence · · you se- you would find it like this in the newspaper. Now we're going to look into the parts- Look at it carefully: the- the entrance door · look they draw the doors like that, see? These are doors, can you see? These are the doors. How would you get inside this house.

Alija: entrada[?]

Entrance?

Carme: entrada · · unte te sembla que s'entra · · · · [pausa llarga]

Entrance. [pause] Where do you think you can get inside [?] [long pause]

Cris: és de mal (xxx)

It is not clearly (xxx).

Carme: [Alija finalment assenyala] Sí sembla que sí · molt bé [to de veu més entonat a la a cris, però pot ser una qüestió de producció] · aquí · tu entraries per 'aquí · eh[?]

[Alija points with the finger] Yes, so it seems. Very good [the tone seems to suggest this is meant to address Cris rather than Alija]. There. You would get inside through there, right?

Alija: a l'entrada[?]

At the entrance?

Carme: això é' l'entrada · · eh[?] veus aj- és una porta que- ve de fora · perquè són portes interiors veus[?] tot això són portes interiors · eh[?] · tu entres per 'quí · per 'quí entres a la casa · · lo primer que trobes sempre és un · un rebedor un · un passa- un lloc- és · ben bé perr · perr- per la gent quan entra 'quí tens el · el rebedor · l'entrada · eh[?] · després · una vegada 'stàs aquí · has entrat · tenim vàries portes ho veus[?] que van a · dif'rents lloc- ara mirarem lo que- cap ont anem · si io entro per 'quí · heus aquí tinc una porta · onte vaig · qu' és això què diries qu' és · · tot això · · [Alija fa que no amb el cap] no ho interpretes

This is the entrance, OK? You see, this- it's a door that- it comes from outside · because they are interior doors, you see, these are interior doors, OK? You get inside through here, through here you get inside. First thing you always find is a- a receiving hall a- a corri- a place- it's- really for- for people as they come in you have the receiving hall here, at the entrance, OK? Then, once you're here, you're already in, we have several doors, you see? Opening to- various place- now we're gonna see- where we are going. If I go through here, see there's a door here, where am I going? What's this? What would you say this is? All that · [long pause] [Alija shakes her head] you can't interpret it.

Alija: hm

- Carme: una cuina · · eh[?] · fixa-t'hi · · això · són els focs · els focs de la cuina
A kitchen, right? Look. This · is the stove, the kitchen stove.
- Alija: hm[!]
- Carme: això és a- · a la pica
This is- · the sink
- Alija: sí =sí sí [baixet]
- Carme: =de renta pla- · la- tauleta bueno hi ha- · llocs que hi ha una tauleta · · i
a fora tens · bueno lo de rentar · eh[?] · l' del- · · 'xò seria la cuina[més
lent]
=to do the washing u- the little table, well, there are- places where there's a
small table · · and outside you have · well to do the washing, OK? Th- from th-
This would be the kitchen [much more slowly]
- Alija: la cuina
- Carme: ho veus · · ara 'nem amb un altre- · passem per un altre lloc · · entrem
aquí · aquí què tenim · veus que hi ha un' altra porta · qu' és això · què
diries qu' és això · ·
You see? · Now let's go to another- let's move to another place. We come in
here. What have ve got here? You see there's another door. What's this? What
would you say this is?
- Alija: eeh habitaçà[?]
Eeh dormitory
- Carme: un' habitació [castellà] perquè què veus aquí · què hi veus[?] · · · qu' és
això · · això d-- això què diries qu' és · · · [Alija aixeca la mirada] això
és el llit
A dormitory because, what do you see in here? What do you see? · · What's
this? · This- What would you say this is · [long pause] [Alija looks up at
Carme] · This is the bed.
- Alija: llit · =sí
Bed =yes
- Carme: =el llit · · eh[?]
=The bed, OK?
- Alija: =(el llit)

[The interaction continues in a similar vein for much longer and it includes a frag-
ment where Carme explains how architects and designers draw house plans].

Carme spoke most of the time in her efforts to prevent the activity from collapsing (88% of the full transcription of this exercise belong to her turns). In the process, she provided many of the vocabulary items one would expect a student to produce (the door, the entrance, the hall, the stoves, the sink, a table, the act of washing, the cupboards, the chairs, the sofa and the carpet). Alija was invited to point at the entrance and to identify and name the kitchen, a dormitory, a bed and the dining/living room, accomplishing only two of these tasks. In her efforts to adjust to Alija's ability to perform, Carme ended up in a situation not unlike that described by Hornberger and Chick as "safetalk", whereby teachers and students merely *display* their engagement in the learning process through activities whose pedagogical value is doubtful: "teachers and students preserve their dignity by hiding the fact that little or no learning is taking place" (2001: 31–32; see also Chick 1996).

Note that Carme, in trying to figure out Alija's sources of difficulty, resorted to explaining how to understand house plans. When I showed this particular transcript to the OCS coordinators, they confirmed that they recommended not using drawings, but photographic pictures, because many students had difficulties with conventional styles of pictorial representation. I cannot really confirm this assessment. My own guess is that many Catalans would also have had difficulties making sense of the plans as quickly as Carme seemed to expect. In any case, the episode also depicts a characteristic moment in the course's proceeding: it makes visible the students' failure to live up to local conventional expectations.

Although such dysfunctions in learning activities are potentially attributable to teachers too, the conventional teacher-learner relationship works in a way that rarely makes this interpretation publicly available. It is an unequal relationship where teachers have both pedagogical and, as Foucault (1979) well observed, regulatory attributes in the management of the classroom situation. Teachers possess by definition the cultural capital that students supposedly wish to acquire and are expected to take the initiative and exert leadership in the classroom when it comes to organizing it and evaluating the ongoing activity. It is therefore difficult to challenge the teacher's authority or way of proceeding, which is why dropping out is the unhappy student's best option. This means that failures tend to be projected overwhelmingly as students' failures.

Teachers thus exerted a firm control on a pedagogical frame that was under constant threat and which in turn projected the students' failure to engage in it. This was so to a degree that we normally find only in contexts

where students are highly uncollaborative or very young. This was reinforced by the style of speech teachers adopted, as they sought to simplify their expression, use imperatives and avoid conventional politeness strategies (such as pragmatic indirectness, complex modality or voice modulation). Students, on the other hand, were able to use a very limited set of simple formulae (yes, no, good morning). They had difficulty doing their share of repair work (explanations, apologies). The importance of basic communication difficulties was, interestingly enough, identified and addressed in the PLEI courses, which included voluntary translators or so-called *cultural mediators* in the initial sessions of the courses. This enabled students to talk about their lives, problems and projects in more reasonable conditions to express themselves.⁴ In the OCS course, it was particularly difficult to incorporate the students in any aspect of classroom management. So teachers alone decided the learning activities, regulated participation in them (for instance, by deciding when the students' languages could or could not be used), evaluated (usually informally) the performances of students and managed the transitions between activities or the momentary departures from the official learning frame. The students' out-of-frame talk, always in their own languages, was also restricted as teachers had little means to assess their relevance to the learning process. Beyond the strictly pedagogical aspects, teachers also controlled access to the premises, kept records of attendance (as is usual in other contexts, it was an important indicator to evaluate the courses), demanded explanations for absences, directed students to their seats, led the "welcoming" and "parting" ceremonies (and thus chose the themes and forms of legitimate "informal" intercourse), arbitrated on conflicts and problems, formally initiated and terminated the class and so on. Students' participation in classroom management was rare: some asked to practice spelling (the OCS pressed for oral skills), and new recruits often said they would have preferred to learn Spanish rather than Catalan. Once, a Gambian student asked the teacher to terminate an informal conversation and continue with the class, a move that was received with laughter due to the fact that it projected a role reversal between teacher and student.

A subtler outcome of this state of affairs was that students would appear at times childish or immature. This is, in my view, what caused teachers to do things like commenting on students' performances in their presence in ways that are normally done with children or people who are not within hearing range (here the use of a supposedly not known language accorded some ambivalence to the situation). Maybe this was the reason why any

member of the institutional team, be they teachers, daycarers, coordinators or assistants, felt often legitimized to act as hosts or caretakers of the classroom space and control the resources present within it.

These practices created a divide between locals and immigrants in that particular space which transcended in many ways the asymmetries involved in relationships such as teacher-student, daycarer-mother or researcher-participant. Immigrant women were thus constructed as dependent and infantile. Although this construction was not explicitly fostered or expressed, it was reinforced by other developments that invested the institutional team with a mission derived from the policies and discourses of welfare and aid. For instance, some teachers (not the Vilagran ones, though) often declared that African students (as opposed, for instance, to Eastern Europeans) were “poor”, “unreliable” learners. Although this view may not have been endorsed by all volunteers, there were other processes that established a certain continuity with these attitudes. Thus, in a meeting of all the teachers of the Vilagran diocese, a long discussion took place on classroom management affecting issues of punctuality, maintenance of the premises (which often had to be tidied up because they had other uses), use of materials (e.g. pens, pencils, notebooks provided to students) and the need for students to anticipate or justify their absences. Many participants resorted to the argument of “cultural differences” to explain why many students did not live up to what is considered polite and orderly demeanor, and argued that it was the teachers’ duty to teach and discipline them in those conventions, as they were necessary to lead a normal life in Catalonia. This is an example of the “cultural differences” argument, where the concept of “culture” is used in a way that essentializes identities, justifies differences and opposes local and immigrant identities and forms of behavior as if they were totally different (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998 and Rampton 1997). As McElhinny (2001) argues, such arguments involve a partial recognition of subordinate groups, but not an effective critique of the hierarchical relationship that accords the dominant group the power to establish what is “unmarked” or “normal” and the right to speak from this position. Consistently with Cleghorn’s (2000) findings in an ESL course in Toronto for Somali women, classroom management was thus inserted in the agenda of “integration” as different forms of social practice were ranked within a hierarchy encoded in terms of cultural difference. In this context, teachers were not formally just language experts, but embodied the national “self” in ways that expanded their scope into, potentially, any aspect of everyday knowledge and social practice.

The specialists' talks organized by the OCS also contributed to consolidate this holistic authority of the institutional team as a whole, as it became associated with the whole range of social services and expert discourses provided. These talks dealt with issues such as legal rights, police services, healthcare and nutrition. For instance, in one talk about nutrition, students and other immigrants were told that they must have four meals a day, eat meat and drink enough water, avoid sugary products and so on. The OCS annual report also describes in detail a session for teachers on the health problems of immigrants, with the idea that they could keep a vigilant eye in the classroom to identify people with particular health or child rearing problems.⁵ Thus, it became possible that a classroom activity devoted to the learning of vocabulary, communicative practices and other elements related to health and the body provided opportunities to the teachers to instruct the students about how to react when children had fever, stomach pains or diarrhea, as well as to delegitimize the knowledge that the students had on such matters.

Women's issues featured prominently and explicitly in these activities. Nutrition was obviously dealt with on the assumption that the women were responsible for the way their husbands and children ate at home. Issues of female sexuality and reproduction were present in the section on health. Police officers, in addition to commenting on violence against women and children, also raised the issue of female circumcision (ablation).⁶ The institutional team was clearly sensitive to women's issues. It was an overwhelmingly female network, as is common in the NGO, charity and social work sectors as a whole in Catalonia. The OCS' professional social workers were generally young qualified women and the management level showed some balance between women and men, who sometimes were nuns or priests. In 2002, 89% of volunteers were women, most of them close or past retirement age (a situation also due to the church's failure to attract the younger generations).⁷ Exceptionally, one found younger women (as in Carme's case), very young university students or retired men. Volunteers were thus perfectly able to play the part of the Western-style, Catalan-speaking, middle class, relatively independent, fairly literate, educated woman at least before students who were generally illiterate (except for some who could write in Arabic) and whose movements in the public arena were more restricted. Although many volunteers were driven by principles of religious charity to help the needy, there was no explicit agenda of evangelization attached to the services.

The fact that the course was specifically addressed to women reflects a common practice in the charity, aid and NGO sectors (both religious and secular) associated with migration in Catalonia. As men reportedly work during the day and women reportedly must be at home in the evening, there are strong practical constraints pushing for sex segregation. It is also believed that many women would not (be allowed by husbands to) attend the courses if the groups were mixed.⁸ An OCS coordinator also argued that these women needed a specifically feminine space of socialization, which is why one Moroccan young man was not allowed to join the group.⁹ This means that the OCS expected that female teachers and students would develop a certain feminine complicity and intimacy, thus opening up possibilities to address issues of child-rearing, contraception, bodily appearance, household management, women's rights and so on. And teachers did sometimes help students, on an individual basis and in a discreet manner, to access social workers, gynecologists and other services. Thus, the course as a whole provided these immigrant women with many ways to participate in the complex network of "expert systems" of Catalan society, a network that provides the characteristic symbolic and material benefits of welfare provision and, at the same time, requires citizens to subject themselves to the scrutiny of locally-valid forms of rationality.

To summarize, throughout many contexts and situations I witnessed, there was the repetition, the constant reenactment of a role relationship that established local individuals as knowledgeable, responsible citizens, invested with authority in the immediate social space, while immigrants appeared as ignorant, immature or generally possessing problematic forms of knowledge, as dependent subjects in need of surveillance and assistance. Any local Catalan became somehow invested with an intrinsic authority by virtue of her/his belonging to the institutional team to cast an evaluative gaze upon any immigrant who was deprived of the communicative resources to defend her position and of the legitimacy to take the interactional initiative or to bring up their own story. Teachers were being constructed, or constructed themselves, not simply as providers or facilitators of language skills, but also as vehicles for the inculcation of cultural values and behaviors associated with normativity in public spaces, that is, what constitutes proper demeanor as expected of mature persons. They were also invested with the authority of expert discourses in ambivalent ways as they mediated the students' access to welfare provision. Possibly, the eminently holistic formulation of the courses' objectives paved the way towards this point, although the connection is admittedly not a necessary one. The ob-

jectives mentioned the need to provide “*les pautes culturals, administratives i socials necessàries per desenvolupar-se autònomament a la nostra societat*” ‘the cultural, administrative and social patterns necessary to develop autonomously in our society’ and to create “spaces of dialogue between the cultures.” Thus a culturalist framework was explicitly incorporated and fostered, setting up the conditions to construct a hierarchy between the “cultures” involved even when the intention was to cultivate an ethos of “intercultural” equality.

3. The Catalan agenda

The choice of language in the course can be seen as a form of resistance to inequalities inscribed in the linguistic market and which affected both Catalans and immigrants in different ways. The option to teach Catalan rather than Spanish constituted a form of position taking with regard to current developments in the Catalan sociolinguistic market (see Pujolar 2001; Woolard 1985). Catalonia is officially bilingual and much of its population is too, with native speakers of Catalan concentrated in the middle classes who emerged as a result of industrialization and Spanish speakers concentrated in the working classes largely stemming from various migration inflows (except for a section of the castilianized local upper classes). Although Spanish has traditionally dominated public spaces on the basis of the political and military hegemony of the Spanish elites, the Catalan language has always enjoyed a solid socioeconomic basis and, since the establishment of an autonomous government in 1980, native Catalans control much of the local and regional administration too. However, Spanish is still the lingua franca spoken with tourists, immigrants or foreigners generally, to the point that the Pakistani boy who learns Catalan at school will be addressed in Spanish by the pediatrician who, despite being typically a Catalan speaker, believes that daily business with immigrants is more appropriately conducted in Spanish (see Nussbaum 2003). After a history of (still running) symbolic and physical violence towards the public use of Catalan, its speakers still feel that using it in face-to-face encounters with non-native-speakers may constitute a threat or an imposition. This behavior is strongly routinized, supported and explained through discourses of politeness and civility, which means that breaching it often creates a sense of trouble, embarrassment and the need for repair. Although outsiders may well encounter individuals who refuse to bend to the expectation to speak

Spanish, accommodation is the most common option, even for many strong nationalists. This is why most language courses for immigrants have been traditionally in Spanish, although taught by people who were generally native speakers of Catalan (Rovira et al. 2004). Throughout the 1990s, pro-Catalan sectors voiced concerns and argued that the Catalan language would make integration easier. In 2001, a public debate arose after participants in a local forum on immigration had an acrimonious argument on what language to use in the forum itself (El Punt 2001).

In this context, the OCS staff were committed to providing courses of Catalan, although the final decision was made by local social workers or by the teachers themselves, who often chose not to follow institutional recommendations. In our case, Carme, one of the teachers, had some qualifications in Catalan language and was interested in acquiring experience in teaching it. From this perspective, the teacher team embodied what we could call the “Catalan project of integration”. It meant that students had to be spoken to in Catalan, which runs against the teachers’ own naturalized commonsensical expectations.¹⁰ By taking up responsibility for the course, the teachers Carme and Tura were actually assuming the position of those who contest naturalized common sense and argue that Catalan should be the “language of integration” and that integration is best achieved through language. Because the choice of teaching Catalan was justified on the grounds that it was the way to “really integrate”, had they continued to use Spanish they would have undermined the very rationale behind the course. Thus the teachers needed to enact the Catalan project of integration through their language choices at least when talking to the students.

This suspension of commonsensical sociolinguistic comportment was achieved only partially. The teachers managed to talk systematically in Catalan to all the students of the course both inside and outside the classroom. However, the daycare volunteers spoke Catalan to the children but Spanish to their mothers (as happens in most regular daycare centers and schools). My video camera caught an occasion when a Moroccan woman popped in to make an inquiry and the teacher attended her in Spanish. One of her sentences mixed the two languages in a way that makes it clear that the teacher felt insecure about her choice (“*los marteses · · eh[?] de diez a doce · · els dimarts · eh[?] (xx) de diez a doce · todos los martes*” ‘Tuesdays from ten to twelve’). I also found signals of trouble when the teachers had to address Alejandro, a Latin American visitor who was considering doing voluntary work, but was neither a student nor a member of the insti-

tutional team. Cris, a visiting university student, addressed Alejandro only in Spanish and hesitated with the students.

The status of Spanish as a lingua franca meant that, despite the fact that Vilagran is a predominantly Catalan-speaking town, most students came into the course knowing more Spanish than Catalan. It was common for them to come up with Spanish words and phrases in learning activities, a practice that teachers had decided not to discourage, as they recognized the value of Spanish as a practical resource for students. In these situations, the teachers simply provided the Catalan equivalents in ways that allowed students to make comparisons between the two languages, which makes sense, given that they are very closely related. The teachers themselves often resorted to Spanish as a heterofacilitating device, i.e. as a common resource different from the target language. However, this situation reinforced the characteristic insecurity of Catalan speakers.¹¹ Carme, in her interview, confessed that she had to make an effort to keep speaking Catalan to the students.

In Episode 2, we can see an example of how the use of the two languages could be negotiated in a concrete learning activity. In this episode, the teachers decided to risk proposing a game that was slightly more complex than the usual vocabulary elicitation. Students were told to pick up cards with photographs of objects and to describe what they saw so that other students could guess what the pictures showed. To prepare for this activity, students had previously rehearsed the names of all the items and their uses with the same cards. Maia, a Gambian student, was asked to begin because she was the most advanced in the group. Other participants were Alija, Cris and Carme from episode 1, two more students, Tura (the second teacher) and Alejandro (a Spanish-speaking Latin-American visitor). As we shall see, Maia was on her way to performing as required when she suddenly fell silent. After some insistence on the part of the teachers, they proposed that she do the exercise in Spanish, but this did not work either.

Episode 2: "I don't know how to talk"

Cris: ara maia tu

Now you're on, Maia.

Carme: ho has d'explicar eh[?] · no diguis qu' és

You've got to explain it, OK? Don't say what it is.

Cris: (no) pots ensenyar-ho

You ca (not) show it.

Carme: tu explica-ho · · a vere · · per què =serveix[?]

You explain it. · Let's see. · What is it =for?

[Maia riu]

[Maia laughs]

Tura: =no ho ensenyis · =no ho ensenyis

=Don't show it. =Don't show it.

Carme: (x) =no ella ella ella sí · ella qu'ho vegi

(x) =No, she can show it to her. She's allowed to see it.

Tura: va

Come!

Carme: digues

Go on.

Tura: no a la Cris sí però · =a elles dugues no

No, to Cris she can, =not to them both.

Carme: =ah · · · per què serveix · vere

=Ah. · · What is it for · Let's see

Maia: és una cos- [es posa a riure; Carme i Alejandro riuen]

It's someth- [She laughs; Carme and Alejandro laugh]

Cris: on està · digues on està · · on es troba això · ·

Where it is. Say where it is. Where do you find it? ·

Maia: [veu alta] *no sé como =hablar* [riu]

[loud voice and in Spanish] *I don't know how to =talk* [laughs]

Carme: =ahaha [riu] · sí · a poc a poc

=Ahaha [laugh]. Yes. Take your time.

[Carme, Cris and Tura keep insisting for 20 seconds; Maia repeats that she cannot do it; Carme and Alejandro tell her to do it in Spanish]

Maia: [veu alta] *no sé ha- no sé como hablá (ba usté)*

[loud] *I don't know how to talk (like you)*

Carme: bueno digue-ho aixís · digue-ho així · eh · de la teva manera maia és igual · encara que no ho diguis en =català

Well, just say it this way. Say this way. Er Your way Maia; it doesn't matter; even if you don't say it in =Catalan.

- Alejandro: *=en castellano*
=in Castilian [the local denomination of Spanish].
- Carme: tu digue-ho en castellà és igual
 Do say it in Castilian.
- Maia: *no sabe castellà*
Don't know Castilian.
- Carme: no saps · sí home (xx) · mira si ho estàs diguent · *no =sabe*
 Don't know? Come on (xx). Look, you are saying it. *Don't =know.*
- Tura: =si ho estàs diguent · =clar [riures] · saps moltes coses però no te decideixes
 =You are saying it. =Of course [laughters]. You know many things but you can't decide to try.
- Carme: =va · · · sí · · · tu en tens a casa teva eh que 'n tens d'això a casa teva[?]
 · · va · tu vas a explicar · jo tinc · · eh[?] · · fes el gesto · fes el · · no[?]
 fes el gesto va
 =Come on. · · Yes. · · You have one at home, right? Do you have one of those at home?. · Come. You explain: I have... OK?. You can do a gesture. Do the-
 no? Do a gesture, come.
- Alejandro: *=cómo le usas · ·*
 [Spanish] *=How do you use it?*
- Carme: a això
- Alejandro: *cómo usas esto*
- Algú: sí
- Alejandro: *cómo hases =para*
 [Spanish] *How do you do =to*
- Maia: *=para duchar*
 [Spanish] *=to have a shower*
- Carme: eh[?] a això · però digue-ho sense dir dutxa · però bueno · com ho explicaries · · com ho explicaries · eh[?] · · o sigui hem dit una cosa hem dit una cosa qu'era per està estirat i l'altra · dret · · no[?] · o sigui això només ho pots fer dret · ·
 You see? That's it. But say it without pronouncing the word "shower". Anyway. How would you explain it, eh[?]. · That is, we have said one thing one thing was to lie down and the other · standing, · right? So you can only do this when standing.

[Carme and Tura keep insisting that she does it, if necessary, through mimicking, like a charade, but Maia insists that she can't]

Carme: =dutxa · és la dutxa això és dutxa

Maia: *tu me preguntar esto[?] o · yo habló*

[Spanish] *You were asking me this? Or I [was supposed to] talk*

Carme: no · =tu has d'explicar ·

No, =you have to explain.

[Alejandro riu]

[Alejandro laughs]

Tura: =tu ho has d'explicar

Carme: *tu tienes · tu tens qu' explicar-ho · maia · tu tens qu' explicar-ho · · sirve · si no te surt la paraula · dius sirve i ja està · i dius dutxa · · ara ho faran elles · ja v'uràs*

You have t- You have to explain it, Maia. You have to explain it. · [Spanish] It's for- [Catalan] If you can't find the word, you just say "sirve" [it's for] and that's it, and you say "shower". Now they are going to do it. You'll see.

The episode reflects the fact that Spanish was treated as a closer, more widely known language, a resource that could be used to make communication easier. And, certainly, Maia used mainly Spanish to negotiate her position in the situation. In any case, note that the sentence "*tu me preguntar esto[?] o · yo habló[?]*" presents unconjugated Spanish verbs but is also complex enough to make plain that Maia was capable of doing the activity, which required communicative functionality and not grammatical correctness. Interestingly enough, she explicitly denied that the option of speaking in Spanish made any difference. Indeed, in my opinion, her knowledge of Catalan would have sufficed too. In any case, the contradiction was so plainly visible for all participants that Tura explicitly expressed that the problem was Maia's shyness, an assessment implicitly shared by Carme and Alejandro, who smiled and laughed sympathetically. Thus, the problem with this activity was not that it required linguistic abilities beyond the reach of the student, but that it required a type of performance that the student was not prepared to act out, a point I shall discuss further in the next section.

The most visible leak for the staging of the Catalan project of integration emerged in the thematic talks referred to above. On the argument that

they were attended by people who were not in the Catalan courses, these meetings were held exclusively in Spanish. It was common to ask the audience what language they preferred and a few always responded “Spanish”. In any case, the OCS officers, police officers or experts never sought to find out whether it would have been *possible* to use Catalan.¹³ In the talk on nutrition, the information I could gather myself suggested that Catalan would have been just as good (or bad) than Spanish. The woman who said that she preferred Spanish also said that she could understand Catalan, while two other women did not know either of the two languages at all.¹⁴ The justification given for this practice was that, in the talks, effective communication of the information given was essential. The assumption was that Catalan made effective communication more difficult.

These practices clearly reproduced the Catalan sociolinguistic order that establishes Spanish as the common *lingua franca* and reserves Catalan to symbolic or restricted uses within the Catalan-speaking community. The institutional team only felt legitimated to speak Catalan to people with whom they could frame the situation in terms of a teacher-student relation. This “rule” was stretched out to cover non-classroom-related informal talk, but not outsiders who entered the classroom space. Surely students must have been aware of the fact that only the language learning space was made available for them as a Catalan-speaking space, consistent with their experience in the outside world where shopkeepers, doctors, teachers and public officials switched to Spanish for their particular benefit.

The opportunities to use the language with members of the target language community for practical (not pedagogical) purposes outside the classroom can be just as important, or even more important, in the learning process than the formal environment of the classroom (Spolsky 1989). What the data above suggest is that, in Catalonia, these opportunities are not available to immigrants. I would argue that opportunities to learn and practice Catalan in daily life are even harder to find than in the case of English or French in Canada as documented by Cleghorn (2000), Norton (2000) and Goldstein (1995), as English or French are after all used as *linguae francae* in Anglophone and Francophone areas respectively. As Bourdieu (1982) has argued, language use is not just a cognitive ability, but also a matter of legitimacy. Language learners can only develop their language skills if they get access to social spaces and situations where they are accepted as legitimate users of the target language (Norton 2000). However, the Catalan sociolinguistic order implies that only people with native-speaker competence are accepted as legitimate participants in Catalan-

speaking spaces. Beyond these spaces, people are addressed in Spanish. Thus, access to Catalan is primarily blocked by the Catalan speakers themselves. The students in the OCS course were probably aware that they had little chance to be accepted as legitimate speakers of Catalan. Be that as it may, the enactment of the Catalan project of integration was done in a partial way that displayed the contradictions of the Catalan sociolinguistic market.

4. Participation in learning

In this section, I explore the experience of participating in the course from the students' perspective out of the evidence I could gather in the classroom. Their motivations to follow the course were unclear, as they were learning Catalan extremely slowly. Thus, when I visited the classroom two years later, I asked Mara (a Moroccan student) whether her son was already attending school. She did understand me, said something about "*siete*" 'seven', and finally asked a friend to tell me that "he's four next week". She did seem more confident and open to speaking than she had earlier been, though (see episode 3 below). Her case was the most typical one, although I met at least two students who could speak some Catalan with difficulty and in combination with many Spanish resources. Two hours a week for a language course is very little indeed, particularly if we compare this with the intensive courses one finds in Canada or the United States (Cleghorn 2000; Warrimer 2003). The lack of truly conversational activities probably did not help either to develop a practical, active language competence. This is why teachers and OCS officials usually speculated that many women, particularly the most recent arrivals, probably came to the course mainly to socialize. Loneliness is a common theme in literature on women migrants, and language courses do appear as sites where they seek to make contacts (González 1999; Rose et al. 1998). Of course, apart from contact with other migrant women, the course made access to the OCS services easier, although it was not a requirement in any way.

However, Carme also told me that in 2005 some Moroccan students asked for an additional weekly session. A former Gambian student still turned up sometimes with her son's homework asking for help. Another Gambian was trying to learn literacy and numeracy as fast as possible to be able to help her husband, who had opened a shop. Students asked very often to work on spelling and literacy. A study of the attendance records re-

veals that half the women were literate in a language written with the Latin alphabet, but that these students tended to drop out, while the most regular students needed to learn basic Latin literacy. The OCS insisted on developing oral skills, which it believed to be of more practical value for immigrants, more accessible for illiterate or near-illiterate students, and more consistent with predominant “communicative” approaches to language teaching. However, teachers often went along with the students in this matter, as they understood that there were important practical reasons to learn the Latin alphabet too. Some women attended unbeknown to their husbands, who strongly opposed their wives’ studies, and some women had to hide their pens and notebooks outside the classroom. Teachers also reported cases of immigrants who had said that they would have preferred to learn Spanish instead of Catalan. As courses of Spanish were not available in Vilagran at the time, some people had decided to join the Catalan course and others had decided not to.

The high degree of dropout and irregular attendance might be interpreted, as Cleghorn (2000) suggests, as a form of discontent with the method (or the language chosen); but evidence is so far inconclusive. In any case, these are common issues arising in courses for immigrants everywhere (see, on this issue, Cumming and Gill 1992; Kouritzin 2000; Norton 2000). It is also possible that literate students found the course too basic. In fact, OCS officials themselves advised literate immigrants to attend the formal adult education courses provided by the regional authorities, as they saw themselves as a last safety net for people who could not access public social services. Public adult education required the students to formally register at the beginning of the term (in September). They rarely provided childcare during the sessions. Thus, the OCS was an option mainly for immigrants who had failed to register in public courses at the right time, or did not want to formally register (i.e. if they were not legal residents), or did not find courses adequate to their level or their time schedule. One Moroccan woman I interviewed declared that some women attended the OCS course irregularly due to their housekeeping and childminding chores, but that most lacked a commitment to studying. Additionally, she attributed the lack of engagement in the classroom to “timidity”, particularly as those who had had little schooling might find the classroom space daunting. Teachers in Vilagran and other sites also referred to the traditional rivalry between Moroccans and West Africans as a source of tension in the classroom. If one group became too dominant, members of the other reportedly tended to drop out.

There were important differences in the forms of participation in learning activities. To appreciate these differences, we can compare Episodes 1 and 2 with Episode 3 below. As we have seen, it was generally difficult to engage students in learning activities. Teachers had to provide a good deal of interactional scaffolding. Students rarely spoke if the teachers did not explicitly prompt them *personally* to do so. Questions thrown to the entire group normally received no response or, at most, restrained gestures or looks that could be interpreted as willingness to speak. Only word repetition drills worked. Conversations in pairs were impossible unless teachers themselves directed the turn taking. This type of interactional behavior is consistent with Sadiqi's (2003) account of the position of women in traditional Moroccan families¹⁵ and their associated interactional etiquette: in the presence of strangers, they should not speak unless they are prompted to do so. Sadiqi also reports strong restrictions, for both males and females, to speak about oneself in public spaces within a general framework that values modesty (Sadiqi 2003: 66). She also claims that, particularly in rural areas, many young girls find the classroom space alienating as boys construct it as a competitive space. West-African women displayed, in any case, similar behavior. What this suggests is that most students perceived the situation as involving formal, hierarchical relations in a public space rather than an informal, equal ethos of feminine intimacy. Episode 2 (and much evidence elsewhere) shows that Maia had understood the activity and had enough linguistic skills to carry it out. Her problem was rather in the act itself of participating, in the part she was required to play as the language-learning subject. I would suggest this issue is a key component of the processes implicated in the classical problem of the reproduction of social differences in educational contexts (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970; Bernstein 1981; Gumperz 1986).

In Episode 3, however, we shall see the opposite student profile: Racquel and Fadma were two young Moroccans of urban origin who had received formal education and could write and speak French. Racquel was clearly of middle-class origin, as both her parents spoke French and had received formal education too. Both women joined the course for the last three sessions and immediately became the most active students in the classroom. In addition to their French, they also displayed a good command of Spanish and good writing skills.

Episode 3: Proactive students

Racquel entered the class pushing a pram and chewing gum. She helped Carme to locate her own registration and attendance file, talking mainly in Spanish and showing that she understood Catalan well. She sat down opening her notebook while she joked with Mara and helped Carme to recall the activities done on the previous session. When Carme initiated an activity on the vocabulary of body parts, she provided much more backchannelling (underlined) than Mara and Alija did.

Carme: [mostrant un llibre amb fotos de parts del cos] tenim feta la part de la cara ·

[showing a book with pictures and names of body parts] We already did the face ·

Racquel: =sí¹⁶

Carme : =eh[?] avui farem · l'altra part · començarem le- les mans [Racquel assenteix] · eh[?] · braços · [Racquel assenteix] acabarem de fer el cos · eh[?] · =OK? Today we will do · the other part · we shall begin by th- the hands [Racquel nods], OK?

Racquel: Sí

Carme: primer de tot mirarem el dibuix · eh[?] · 's posarem aquet- aquet d'aquí · farem aquet d'aquí · eh[?] [posa el llibre de cara a elles i Racquel intenta llegir els noms de les parts] 'nse situarem en les mans · jo us ho- a vere · primer de tot · obrim les mans [alça les mans obertes] · les obrim · eh[?] · [Racquel també alça i obre totes dues mans] · i · [Alija alça un mà] primer de tot això · [Carme assenyala un parell de dits] · com et diu (xx) això com es diu[?] [La pregunta s'adreça a totes i totes poden contestar; Mara aixeca la mà]

First of all we shall look at the picture, OK? · We shall concentrate on th- this one here. We'll do this one here, OK? [she turns the book round so that the students can gaze at it; Racquel tries to read the names of parts from the distance]. We shall look into the hands. I am go- Let's see. First of all, let us open up our palms [raises her hands showing the open palm]; we open them, OK? · [Racquel raises and opens both hands too] · and · [Alija raises a single hand]. First of all this · [Carme points at two fingers] how does it (xx) how do you say that? [The question is addressed to everybody; Mara raises her hand].

Mara: dedo[?] [fa ballar un parell de dits]

[Spanish] Finger? [She swivels two fingers]

Carme: dits

[Catalan] Fingers

Racquel, Mara i Alija juntes: dits

Racquel, Mara and Alija together: fingers

Carme: en català és dits · eh[?] [totes fan que sí]

In Catalan it's "fingers", OK? [They all nod]

Racquel: sí

Carme: un és dit · dits és tot [Mara i Alija assenteixen] · dit és un · [eh?]

One is "finger" · "fingers" is all [of them] [Mara and Alija nod]. Finger is [just] one, ok?

Racquel: sí

Later on, when Carme proposed to go through the items again, Racquel had already learned them and provided the answers much more quickly and loudly than Alija and Mara. This means that Alija and Mara were often deprived of Carme's assessment, and they actually checked with each other if they got the pronunciation right while Carme was moving on to another item. Then Fadma arrived. She had missed the first rounds and did not quite know how to join in. She spied on her companions' notes to no avail, but finally she decided to simply try her luck with wild guesses until she caught up with the others. She was clearly not afraid of being wrong. Thus, she and Racquel managed to dominate much of the student floor and attract Carme's attention. It is not impossible that Mara, Alija and Maia might have resented that, although the main visible effect was actually that they stepped up their participation, responding again much more quickly and decidedly than they had done before (and actually, the amount of back-channelling they themselves produce in this episode is quite atypical of them too). Racquel also helped Mara to draw a hand on her notebook and Alija to spell a word by telling her "*comme en Français 'e'*" in French to circumvent Alija's difficulties to distinguish between the sounds [e] and [i]¹⁷ A few seconds later, Racquel also showed the extent to which she was aware of how the activity was organized, when she pointed out to Carme that all items had been done and that this part of the activity was therefore over:

Racquel: artell

knuckle

Carme: · molt bé[!]

Very good!

Mara?: (xxxx) [probably in Arabic addressed to Ikram] =(xxxx xxx)

- Carme: =eh[?] · · els artells [tocant-los amb l'altra mà] · molt bé artell · [assenyala Fadma amb el dit, però Fadma ja no pot trobar cap altra paraula] ·
· què més recordeu · · ·
=eh? · · the knuckles [touching them with the other hand]. Very good: the
knuckle [She points at Fadma with her finger, but Fadma cannot find any other
word]. · What else do you remember? · ·
- Racquel: ja està no[?]
That's all, is it not?
- Carme: · · noo [mira el llibre] · · (x hem) dit el canell el dit · · ah sí sí · ja 'ls
hem dit tots · molt bé · · sí sí ja 'ls hem dit tots
· · Noo [She consults the book] · · (x have) said the wrist, the finger, · · Oh yes,
yes. We have already said them all. Very good. · Yes, yes, we have already
said them all.

One visible feature that distinguished Racquel and Fadma from other students was that they did not wear the veil or the conventional loose dress that all other Moroccans wore (West African women dressed a bit differently, with bright tunics and scarves rolled around their heads). Their profile thus matches Sadiqi's (2003) characterization of the increasing numbers of young Moroccan urban women who have access to formal education, seek wage labor, establish mononuclear families and adopt "modernizing" appearances and interactional practices. In one PLEI course I visited, though, there was a young woman who did wear the traditional *hijab*, but was just as active in the class and was learning impressively fast. This is consistent with accounts that a significant section of women in the Arab world are managing their access to modernity in ways that are consistent with Muslim traditions (see also Afsaruddin 1999; Badra 1999; Hoodfar 1993). And, of course, the very connection between religion and hijab is complex: Racquel identified as a practicing Muslim too.

Finally, when comparing different sites, I found that men generally participated much more actively in both (OCS and PLEI) courses. They intervened very often to demand clarifications or attention to particular needs. In the PLEI course for men, they used Catalan very creatively in ways that were pedagogically relevant though not required or specifically encouraged by the teachers, and pretend play activities developed into spectacularly cheerful shows where the division between performers and audience became often blurred. By building on the first sessions, which were attended by cultural mediators, the PLEI courses were also successful in encouraging women to engage in informal talk, particularly about their everyday lives, in the classroom's public space; but their involvement in learning

activities was also very limited and they generally did not use this informal talk to practice the language they were learning.

5. A political economic analysis of the African woman who learns Catalan

Thus far the analysis presents us with a complex picture of a site where human actors faced contradictions not unlike those found in other educational contexts. The persons involved, particularly those on the institutional side, invested in the course with the assumption that they could help immigrants improve their lives, basically by providing them with useful knowledge and skills, amongst them the ability to speak Catalan. It is arguable that they were achieving their goals to some extent. After all, immigrants do need socializing, medical care and residence or work permits. Tips as to how to improve one's diet may be useful, as well as the opportunity to talk with police officers in a non-trouble situation.¹⁸ To acquire some Catalan, even if it is only passive knowledge, is good, as well as having a chance to actually meet speakers who are not going to switch to Spanish because of the way one dresses or the color of one's skin. But many contradictions emerged through the way of delivering this "help".

First, the immigrants' own forms of knowledge and skills were set aside; they were made to accept the teachers' authority and control, and to assume their status as immature and dependent. The traditional closing celebration, where they could bring in their own dessert treats, was the anecdotal, folklorifying exception to the rule that only local Catalans had things worth saying. As the volunteers, despite their status as non-specialists, were made participants in the deployment of expert welfare discourses, the knowledge-power relationship moved from that of teacher-pupil to that of local vs. immigrants. Expert discourses thus emerged as resources for the construction of ethnic boundaries in ways that resonate with Briggs' (2004) account of the media coverage of a cholera epidemic in Venezuela.

Second, most students were offered a method of teaching/learning with which they did not engage. They chose not to play the part of the conventional language-learning subject in the public space of the classroom, probably because conventional language teaching requires a particular relation to language as an abstract code that is culturally constructed and class specific (Cleghorn 2000; Heller 1999). Their silence seemed to have much

in common with Bourdieu's (1991) rendering of the behaviors of working-class or peasant males in formal milieus, with the symbolic violence "of which one is both the subject and the object" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 165–166).

Finally, as Catalan speakers keep their language away from "strangers", students' opportunities to use the language were restricted to their interactions with the teachers and the learning activities. This must have been particularly difficult for "traditional" women who had problems precisely with the one speaking position that the institutional team offered for learners in Catalan: the language learning subject.

Some of these contradictions could be downplayed if more resources – material or cultural – were available: translators or *cultural mediators* could help to revalue the languages and voices of immigrants; more research could give more visibility and validity to immigrants' own forms of knowledge; thematic sessions could focus much more on the immigrants' perspectives (as happened in some seminars organized by the PLEI team); teachers could get more support or training, or the team could be fully professionalized; teaching methods could be progressively attuned to the students' profiles, as Goldstein (1995) proposes; more weekly sessions could be offered; policies and ideas could be devised so that students could use Catalan in real-life situations. The PLEI team, for instance, was remarkably imaginative in this respect. Not only did the staff speak Catalan consistently both with students and non-students inside and outside the center (accompanied with frequent codeswitching into Spanish), they also took the students to a radio station to talk about their experiences, and accompanied them to shops and markets, where they asked local shopkeepers and attendants to speak in Catalan.

However, I would like to move the focus from the conjunctural – situations associated with conditions that could vary in a relatively easy way – to the structural – the economic and political processes that, both at regional and at global levels, determine the distribution and legitimization of material resources, symbolic power and cultural capital (i.e. qualifications, skills, knowledge, language/communicative practices). Structural conditions of inequality are largely the result of the strategies deployed by those who hold economic power and those who hold political power in industrialized societies. While the former endeavor to devalue wage labor in the global economy, either by relocating production, by employing displaced workers or by other forms of political maneuvering, the latter protect the property and cultural capital of their own regional middle and upper classes

through the regulative powers of nation states. Within these regional contexts, the concept of governmentality provides a framework to understand why cultural capital is at the heart of struggles over the power to rule in ways that contribute to legitimize inequalities of class, ethnicity and gender. If governmentality emerged in the 18th century as a way to incorporate forms of knowledge and experts in the deployment of disciplinary procedures and techniques of population management (Foucault 1991), 19th century liberalism developed a new relation between government and knowledge by fostering “the self-organizing capacities of markets, citizens and civil society” (Rose 1993: 290). This created divisions “between the civilized member of society and those lacking the capacities to exercise their citizenship” (291), the “incapable or aberrant members” who, in the welfare state, became the responsibility of social workers. As citizens and institutions have traditionally vied for a share of this new form of authority “through various forms of licensure, through professionalization and through bureaucratization” (292-293), advanced liberalism has moved to create “a ‘free market’ in expertise” which (in theory) should enhance the powers of the clients as customers (296): “Advanced liberal rule (...) seeks to detach the substantive authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political rule, relocating experts within a market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability and consumer demand” (285).

As various critical analysts have argued, the deployment of welfare discourses and practices becomes co-opted by the interests of dominant groups to control the lower classes and maintain their legitimacy. Welfare policies can be used to reproduce the sexual division of labor by targeting men as “breadwinners” and women as homemakers and mothers through separate schemes (Fraser 1989; Sandlin 2004). With regard to immigrants, the construction of the OCS students’ identities as “dependent” citizens, i.e. as persons not capable of managing their own lives, is consistent with Fraser and Gordon’s (1994) genealogy of the notion of “dependence” in welfare discourses, which has historically served to legitimize policies that justified colonial rule and reinforced gender and racial hierarchies within the US. Fraser and Gordon document the deployment of psychological and psychiatric discourses in the postindustrial period in order to manage these “dependent” subjects (especially young unmarried black mothers, who have become the target of contradictory, but mutually reinforcing, ethnic, gender and racial stereotypes). Immigrant populations, I would argue, also need to be managed, i.e. “integrated”, not only into the national speech community as the traditional symbol of the state’s cultural identity, but also into the

fundamental fabric of rule based on this decentralized control over social practices and specialist discourses. As the procedures of social rule need the legitimization of authoritative specialist discourses more and more, the construction of immigrants as dependent is a fundamental requirement to justify their subjection, and their subjection to the appropriate procedures of surveillance will increasingly be seen as a sign of integration. Thus, the women who took the initiative to visit the gynecologist or adopt contraceptive strategies were presented as the most “advanced” or “integrated.” The process entails as a necessity the problematization of whatever form of non-expert knowledge or social practice that is not coincident with the local discourses that are contingently treated as legitimate.

Now, there could be an argument as to how far the privatization of expertise has gone in different national contexts. In Catalonia, the OCS could well be seen as a private actor competing for the market niche of the most needy in a context where state services have recently taken over much of the work done traditionally by the church.¹⁹ The PLEI, despite being led by civil servants, was by no means a typical state service, but a project that involved various local NGOs and which had to re-earn each year the trust of the minister of welfare. In any case, although the students of these courses were exposed to practices and forms of knowledge not intrinsically different from those addressed to the general population, their position in relation to them could not be the same. The structural position of recent African immigrants is characterized by a) restricted access to whatever form or level of “licensure” in the present market conditions, and b) virtually no bargaining power as “clients.” In relation to a), only the positions of cultural mediator or immigrant adviser in organizations controlled by locals or community representatives seemed available to migrants. The fact that professional qualifications from African countries are not recognized or valued in any way contributed to this exclusion. Bargaining power might be earned through locally valid linguistic resources, social skills, monetary capital and property, all of which recent African immigrants generally lack. This is how it becomes possible that specialist discourses get mobilized in opposition to what locals perceive are forms of knowledge and practice associated with immigrants’ “traditional cultures”. Additionally, immigrants have little or no say in the political and corporate struggles where their rights and forms of access to resources are struggled over (what provision? what training? what language? what medical care?), and no say in the development of expert knowledge about themselves. Whatever forms of knowledge and provision are developed for immigrant men, women, chil-

dren or other groupings, these are bound to follow, for good and for bad, the logic of what makes sense to sections of the local population and not to the immigrants themselves. This very study can be an example of this in that no immigrant participated in its conception or development in an active way, a paradox not unrelated to something an OCS official once noted: since local academics had recently become interested in immigration issues, the opinion of people working “on the ground” was less and less asked for. Organizers of conferences, fora, workshops and seminars tended to rely more and more on those at the top of the knowledge hierarchy, who incidentally produced the typical theoretical or quantitative analyses that tend to sanitize the contradictions experienced in situated practice.

Rose’s view that contemporary societies rely to an important extent on citizens becoming active subjects of rule, bound to the authority of expertise, implies that cultural capital plays a fundamental role in legitimizing authority. As Bourdieu argues, cultural capital involves not only abstract knowledge but *embodied* dispositions acquired through socialization, what constitutes the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Immigrants thus must enter a field of struggles over the legitimization of the various forms of capital, including different forms of expert discourses, popular knowledge, social practices and skills. Their habitus gets questioned, as happens in different ways with other dominated groups. Moreover, they cannot simply *learn* legitimate knowledges and practices, as many of these must be *acquired* through complex socialization processes. On the other hand, there are little options to legitimize their own habitus. Access to “legitimate expertise” is mediated by an increasingly liberalized market in which immigrants have no means, for lack of economic or political power, to develop their own sources of authority. To conclude, the odds are set for the devaluation of their own cultural capital. The market, in fact, becomes structurally classist, racist and sexist, i.e. it reproduces hierarchies without the need to enroll its actors in any explicit, organized classist, racist or sexist agenda. Thus, if sections of the local territorial elites decide that immigrant women need to be saved from their sexist traditional patriarchal cultures (Amireh and Suhair Majar 2000; Geesey 2000), from Islam (Hoodfar 1993), ablation, poor diets, shamanism or illiteracy, these are the discourses that, for good or for bad, will be projected to these women in their dealings with social workers, doctors, teachers, academics, social servants, police officers, lawyers, NGO volunteers, job interviewers, trade unionists, political leaders and so on.²⁰

The OCS courses were located in a prominent position where the “winds” from many quarters were felt: e.g. communicative approaches to language learning favored by academics and coordinators versus the “traditional” methods voluntary teachers and some students were familiar with; the “social service” approach of professional social workers versus the evangelical charity motivations of many volunteers; liberal egalitarian ideas versus popular cultural evolutionism; debates on what “integration” means, etc. Whatever the choices that the OCS coordinators took (which were usually very well informed ones), what is important is to appreciate the extent to which all these issues make sense within a framework constituted by competing forms of knowledge associated with the experiences and interests of particular groups. If we go back to the language classroom, we should thus acknowledge that the capacity for OCS teachers and officials to reverse or balance cultural hierarchies was limited. They might have displayed more tact and pedagogical awareness; they might have drawn other lines as to where classroom control began and ended; they might have been more consistent with the use of Catalan; but even if the activity’s objectives were thoroughly redefined, they could hardly have avoided taking up a position in the market of cultural capital if cultural capital embodies so much of what actors possess, do and experience by virtue of their position in society.

Seen from this perspective, the Catalan habit of speaking Spanish to immigrants is disturbingly consistent with the more subtle obstacles to building relationships with local populations and being accepted as legitimate speakers of the language that immigrants find in other contexts (Norton 2000). To the extent that speaking Catalan is socially experienced not as a cognitive skill, but as a component of the performances that embody the cultural capital of the middle classes, immigrants cannot really speak Catalan by definition. There may be good reasons (such as more fluid communication) and historical grounds (institutional violence and racist attitudes against Catalans) for using Spanish when interacting with most foreigners. But if we bear in mind that Catalan speakers overwhelmingly control local and regional public bodies as well as a large proportion of valuable employment and property, what we are witnessing is an informal politics of segregation. Catalan speakers restrict the availability of a valuable resource, their linguistic capital, and by expecting near-native proficiency, they also restrict the conditions of convertibility of Catalan language skills into symbolic and economic capital. The sociolinguistic trajectory offered to immigrants thus reproduces the existing sociolinguistic divi-

sions of Catalan society and guides unskilled laborers to Spanish-speaking neighborhoods, networks and employment (see Samper et al. 2000; Woolard 1985). Ironically, this state of affairs, apart from challenging Catalan nationalist discourses on integration, erodes the value of Catalan in the linguistic market in favor of Spanish.

Immigrant women, at least those who live in relative isolation and do not work, are probably in the worst position in this context. Indeed, while there are yet no data on the language abilities of immigrants in Catalonia, there is a widespread belief that men tend to know much more Catalan and Spanish than women due to their contacts at work and to the fact that most of them migrated some years before their wives. The women who have not been socialized into conventional pedagogical practices get very limited benefit from conventional language courses. Thus, this situation may well foster women's dependence on their husbands or male kin, sometimes even more than they were in their home countries, where they may have been able to work either in the formal (wage labor) or informal economy (see Sadiqi 2003) or, in Gambia, in the female team of the extended family household (Farjas 2003). This means that some aspects of these women's dependence is the product of the situation of migration and not a result of their "traditional culture". Linguistic and labor hierarchies in Catalonia make their access to economic resources and symbolic power more difficult. And specialist discourses, welfare provision and language courses, rather than empowering them, seem to serve the purposes of confirming and managing their subordination.

Appendix 1. Transcription conventions

Capital letters or punctuation are never used for the text in the original language.

Stretches in Catalan are always represented in normal type.

The English translation of a Catalan utterance is also in normal type, but smaller font.

Stretches in Spanish are always represented in italics

The English translation of a Spanish utterance appears also in italics.

· · · · Dots indicate pauses (One dot indicates any short pause that is of significance for the understanding of a particular utterance; the second dot and the following ones stand for each second of duration)

(xxx) Brackets indicate stretches that are either inaudible or difficult to interpret.

[xxx] Contextual information, including interrogative intonation in question tags, such as “no[?]”, is inserted between square brackets.

Notes

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1. All proper names (except those of countries and languages) are pseudonyms, be they names of persons, organizations or towns.
2. Quoted from the 2001–2002 OCS annual report on these particular courses.
3. Communication difficulties were greater than I had expected. With many students, I could only engage in very simple exchanges. As I am a male, I also considered that the option to beseech these women to arrange interviews unaccompanied was too risky. Some of them apparently did not have residence permits and were not supposed to have dealings with male adults beyond the family network. As a matter of fact, the one interview I managed to arrange with a woman who displayed a good command of Spanish proved to be of limited interest in eliciting data on her experiences. For instance, I could not get a useful account of the reasons for irregular attendance other than a reported “lack of interest”, which very much coincided with the views of many local volunteers.
4. Usually, cultural mediators work in social services to assist in liaising with immigrant communities. They are often of immigrant origin themselves. The OCS had also some mediators, but they were not used in the language courses.
5. The daycare service also served indirectly to keep an eye on the children’s health and development. One of the little boys, for instance, was found to have a serious hearing impairment.
6. The particular session I visited was attended by men only. I cannot document how police officers raised these issues in women’s groups.
7. Significantly enough, the Catalan word for ‘voluntary’ was often used in its feminine form both in official documents (*voluntàries*) and in informal talk. The use of the feminine with a generic meaning is extremely rare in Catalan texts.

8. According to Sadiqi (2003), mixed classes are certainly a concern for traditionally oriented families in Morocco, although this did not stop the Moroccan government from establishing mixed-sex public education.
9. Catalan men, however, could be allowed to play a peripheral role in the institutional team, as they are reportedly seen as different from Moroccan and West-African men by the communities themselves. This is why Alejandro (see episode 2) and myself were allowed to come.
10. Not that other options were impossible. In another town, similar students were taught Catalan *in Spanish*: i.e. only the concrete vocabulary items to be learnt (no grammar was taught) were pronounced in Catalan, while classroom management was done in Spanish.
11. *Heterofacilitating* uses of dominant languages cannot be regarded as simple interactional or pedagogical technicalities. They are politically significant as well, as they can confirm and reinforce the status of the dominant language by treating it as a common resource of wider currency than the dominated language. Virginia Unamuno observed that teachers in a primary school would treat Spanish as a common resource even when it was clearly not known by some of the students (personal communication). Monica Heller has confirmed that this happens in Canadian Francophone schools too, where English can be used as if to help out children who speak neither English nor French (personal communication).
12. This begs the question of why they asked at all. My own impression was that it disturbed many Catalans to treat the language as if its use was out of consideration. The question served as a gesture to prevent total invisibility.
13. In one meeting on legal affairs, a Catalan-speaking lawyer delivered his presentation in Spanish while two interpreters (who spoke fluent Catalan) provided versions in Arabic and French.
14. Sadiqi (2003) uses the term “traditional” to characterize the forms of life that are characteristic of lower-class rural Morocco and which, through migration, have also become common in working-class urban districts: extended family households and strictly separate roles for men and women. In this sector, women are characteristically brought up to be hard-working, shy and submissive, with severe restrictions on the right to speak and life choices (spouse, education, work). Their access to education, and hence to literacy, is also severely restricted. The illiteracy rate amongst women is of 60% (95.5% in rural areas). (Sadiqi 2003: 89).
15. The word *sí* ‘yes’ is the same in Spanish and Catalan.
16. One year later, Carme told me that Racquel had become a great help to both teachers and students, as she helped with translation, with “warming up” the classroom and discussing issues of sexuality. So she acted in some ways as a cultural mediator.

17. This does not exclude the possibility of trouble. One of the women got very scared when a police officer offered her the possibility of coming to the police station to talk.
18. The OCS was an offshoot of *Caritas Diocesana* (real name), whose history is described in Gutiérrez (1993) and Vilà (2003). During the Franco years, it became a refuge for liberal thinkers in favor of the principles of social welfare. In the 1960s, they managed to detach themselves from *Acción Católica* (real name), Franco's National Catholicist association, dropped evangelization as a guiding principle and thus survived the change of regime as a modern social services' supplier ascribed to the Catholic church and who can, as it does now, provide costly services to an overwhelmingly Muslim constituency.
19. In other contexts, control over immigrants may heavily rely on the use of force and on their consideration as dishonest, dangerous and disorderly, as Codó (2003) found in her study of a governmental office that attended applicants for residence permits.

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Chapter 10

Gender, multilingualism and the American war in Vietnam*

Binh Nguyen

1. Language, gender and multilingualism

Work on language, gender and multilingualism is one of the most important strands of language, gender and political economy because multilingual communities provide particularly salient cases of the linguistic heterogeneity linked to socio-historical relationships like colonization, industrialization, migration, globalization and war, an understudied topic which is taken up in this paper. Studying how multilingual women and men use different languages in their daily political and/or economic activity might enable us to gain further insights in the multi-dimensional relation between linguistic and social processes in those communities, including the intimate relationships between marital prospects, migration, multilingualism, and a war which killed or displaced many young men.

Multilingualism is particularly interesting for research on language, gender and political economy since often the use of different languages symbolizes power relationships between people of different ethnicities, social strata, gender, etc. In most multilingual communities, we can find a language (or languages) which is associated with political and/or economic power through the legitimation of its political status as national language, official language, administrative language, the language of education and so on. In a number of communities, we can find a language (or languages) which is, although not officially legitimated, closely bound with socio-economic advantages, and which thus possesses useful “linguistic capital” (see also Besnier, Heller and Philips, this volume). Examples of this could be Chinese and English in a number of Southeast Asian countries today. Studies of gender and multilingualism have thus made some of our most important contributions to the study of language, gender and political economy, and especially to the study of language and global forces. For exam-

ple, Gal's 1978 article "Peasant men can't get wives: language change and sex roles in a bilingual community," one of the pioneering works on language, gender and political economy, challenged theoretical approaches to language and gender which had primarily focused on the differences in language usage of women and men and called for an approach which would consider "men's and women's ways of speaking...[as] strategic and socially meaningful linguistic choices which systematically link language change to social change..." (2). Like a number of researchers working on European peasant communities, Gal found that women in the town of Oberwart (Austria) used the newer linguistic forms more frequently than men. Unlike many other researchers, she did not consider women's linguistic innovativeness as compensation for women's "shortcomings" whether it is a result of "hypercorrection" (Labov 1966), of "linguistic insecurity" (Trudgill 1972) or of "face protection" (Deuchar 1988). She argued that the linguistic choices of young bilingual women in Oberwart must be seen as their economic strategy for distancing themselves from the arduous life of a peasant woman, and for affiliating themselves with the easier life of a worker's wife in the city. Therefore, Oberwart women's linguistic innovativeness represents their active participation in the process of urbanization and industrialization in that community.

Working in a similar theoretical model, Hill (1987, 1998) studied the language practices of Mexicano-Spanish bilingual women and men in the rural region of Malinche Volcano (Central Mexico). She reported that sex-based linguistic patterns in those communities were more intricate than the picture presented in a number of other studies of language and gender. In comparison to men, women are "less Spanish" in some aspects of language usage and "less Mexicano" in other ones. These intricate linguistic patterns, Hill argued, could not be explained without placing them in the local political economy. The language practices of Mexicano women could not be seen as a result of the women's preferences for the prestige norm (Spanish) nor as a result of the women's lesser exposure to Spanish but as "highly constrained within a narrow range of possibilities, at the same time less Mexicano and less Spanish than men's speech" (1987: 158).

But, because hitherto studies on language, gender and multilingualism have tended to focus on the language practices of indigenous people, the studied communities appear to be relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. The voice of, let's say, new settlers of other ethnicity who, for whatever reasons, have moved into and become members of the community has been rarely heard (see Heller's article, this volume, for more on how immi-

grant voices are marginalized in community that defines itself as a linguistic minority). This study is an attempt to raise this kind of voice in a multilingual multiethnic community located in the highland of Northern Vietnam where it is very common that several ethnic groups live together in a community.

2. Research in Vietnam on multilingualism

Located in Southeast Asia, Vietnam lies in the eastern part of the Indochina peninsula. China lies to the north, Laos and Cambodia to the west and the East Sea and Pacific to the east and south. Geography textbooks have often divided the country into two main regions: the highland and the lowland. The lowland consists primarily of two major deltas: the Red River delta in the northern part and the Mekong River delta in the south. In addition, the deltas are criss-crossed by hundreds of large and small rivers which create good conditions for cultivation. The highland is made up of mountainous and hilly areas in the north and the west. The lowland areas are more densely populated, more developed and wealthier.

Due to several and complicated migration processes in the past as well as to the long-standing cohabitation of different ethnic groups, defining ethnic groups in Vietnam has always been a complex issue, both academically and politically. But, for administrative purposes, there is a list of 54 ethnic groups in Vietnam, promulgated on March 2, 1979, by the Statistical Department and commissioned by the Vietnamese government. The definition of ethnicity has been based on three main criteria: 1) having a specific language, 2) having a specific culture and 3) having ethnic consciousness. Among them, "having a specific language" is the most important criterion (Khong Dien 1995). Using these criteria, the latest census of Vietnam, in 1999, describes a country of 76,323,173 people from 54 different ethnic groups. The Kinh (or Viet) group accounts for 86.21% of the total population and lives throughout the country but mainly in the deltas. The second largest ethnic minority group is the Tay people who account for 1.93% of the total population and live along with other ethnic groups in the highland areas in Northern Vietnam. Fifty-two other ethnic minority groups account for about 12% of the total population and are scattered throughout all the highland areas of the country (Tong cuc thong ke 2001).

The importance of language policy in multiethnic Vietnam is evident in a number of official documents, from constitutions to laws and decrees. In those documents, Vietnamese – the mother tongue of the Viet people – has been called ‘the common language’ (*ngon ngu pho thong*) and ‘the official language’ (*ngon ngu chinh thuc*) of Vietnam. It is the language used in public institutions such as government offices, courts, schools and so on. The mother tongues of ethnic minority groups are called ‘ethnic minority languages’ (*ngon ngu dan toc thieu so*). The language policy of the Vietnamese government has strongly encouraged minority ethnic groups to maintain their own languages. According to all three Vietnamese constitutions (1946, 1980 and 1992), all ethnic groups have the right to use their language and preserve their culture, and all Vietnamese citizens of ethnic minority groups have the right to use their language in court. According to the education law of Vietnam, the government is responsible for creating good conditions for citizens of ethnic minority groups to learn their languages. In reality, however, due to a number of factors (for example, the expansion of Vietnamese or the shortage of financial aids, teachers and textbooks), the use and teaching of ethnic minority languages has dramatically decreased (Nguyen Van Loi 2002; Tran Tri Doi 2003). In most multilingual areas of Vietnam ethnic minority languages have not been taught for three decades (Hoang Van Ma 1993; Luong Ben 1993; Tran Tri Doi 2003). For this reason, bilingual education has become one of the most pressing issues for educational reform in Vietnam today.

Multilingualism has also been a central issue in Vietnamese linguistics and sociolinguistics. Sociolinguistic studies on multilingualism in Vietnam tend to adopt Soviet models because the majority of researchers were trained in the former Soviet Union and/or are influenced by Soviet literature which is easier to access than that of other scholarly traditions (cf. Dang Thanh Phuong 1999; Nguyen Huu Hoanh 1997; Nguyen Huu Hoanh and Ta Van Thong 2001; Nguyen Van Khang 2002; Pham Tat Thang 2002; Ta Van Thong 2002; Vu Ba Hung et al. 2002). Aiming to describe the sociolinguistic situation in different multilingual areas of Vietnam, most researchers and field workers have gone to their studied communities with similar questionnaires which are filled in by informants themselves and/or with the help of research assistants. Except for the part asking for personal details about the informant, most questionnaires have been created to collect information on the following main issues: 1) the informant’s ability to use spoken and written forms of different languages, 2) the informant’s language choice in different settings such as government offices, at school,

or home, 3) the informant's language choice in different communication genres such as singing, writing personal letters, worshipping, and 4) the informant's attitudes towards and suggestions for the language policy of the Vietnamese government.

Adopting a quantitative sociolinguistic view of language variation as effects of social structures, Vietnamese studies of multilingualism have usually tried to map correlations between "social" variables such as communicative setting, sex of speaker or education level and linguistic variables like the use of different languages or dialects. Through quantitative analyses, researchers have offered evidence for the linguistic ideology of a harmonious co-existence between Vietnamese as the common language throughout the country and ethnic minority languages in all studied communities. For example, it has been reported that bilingual speakers in most bilingual communities tended to use Vietnamese in all public settings and to speak only their mother tongue at home (Dang Thanh Phuong 1999; Pham Tat Thang 2002; Vu Ba Hung et al. 2002). Therefore, researchers have concluded that, in Vietnamese bilingual communities, each language has its domain-specific functions. The common language (i.e. Vietnamese) is the language of public communication and associated with socio-economical advantages whereas indigenous languages are the languages of the family sphere and associate with tradition. In other words, the majority of Vietnamese studies on multilingualism have supported the concept of domain-determined language usage.

However, elsewhere (Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh 2003), in an ethnographic study of a multilingual, multiethnic village in the highlands of northern Vietnam which I call Dong Son, I have complicated the picture generally offered by Vietnamese survey research on multilingualism. I have shown that, in reality, my multilingual subjects use different languages as a means of negotiating social relations. In many cases, my subjects can articulate clearly why they choose a certain language to interact with others, why they switch from one language to another and why they mix different languages even within an utterance. By demonstrating the active role of Dong Son people in their daily language practices, the study has questioned the domain-determined assumption in Vietnamese research on multilingualism.

Only two studies of Vietnamese bi/multilingual communities mention the relationship between language and gender. First, Ta Van Thong (2002) has done research in the suburban community of Chieng Xom which is located in the highlands of northwestern Vietnam. Here, 4435 people from six ethnic groups live together. Ninety-five percent of the total population

of Chieng Xom are Thai people (the third largest ethnic group of Vietnam after the Viet and Tay groups); 4.2% are Viet people and the rest (0.8%) are Tay, Muong, Nung, and Cham people. Although Ta Van Thong's aim is to describe the linguistic situation in Chieng Xom, his focus is on the linguistic practices of the Thai people. Based on the informants' self-evaluation of their ability to understand, speak, read and write in Thai and Vietnamese, he argues that Thai women's language skills are less proficient than those of men in both languages (compare Hill 1987). The reason for this, the author proposes, is the feudal ideology that assigns Thai women a place within the house, such that in comparison to Thai men, Thai women have less access to education as well as to public activities and they also have less contact with people of other communities. They thus have less access, according to the author, to activities and communicative domains fostering language skills in both Thai and Vietnamese languages.¹

The second study mentioning language and gender is that of Dang Thanh Phuong (2002). She studies the influence of education level and multilingual ability on the role of ethnic minority women (Tay and Nung women in her study) in the process of industrialization and urbanization in suburban communities which are located in the highlands of northeastern Vietnam. Based on her statistical analyses, Dang Thanh Phuong argues that ethnic minority women often suffer from poverty and backwardness more severely than men do because they do not have sufficient education and skills for communicating in Vietnamese, and thus they are not able to gain the "scientific and technological knowledge which are the requirements for technological progress in industrialization and modernization" (2002: 18). Dang Thanh Phuong concludes that "in order to further the equality between the sexes and poverty-alleviation movements as well as to carry out the process of industrialization and modernization in the highland, teaching Vietnamese to ethnic minority female inhabitants is an urgent need" (2002: 19).

Although these projects are important pioneering attempts to study gender in Vietnam research on language, they both focus on linguistic differences between indigenous women and men. In this study, I examine the language practices of women and men living in the village of Dong Son to consider why women who are native Vietnamese speakers might want to distance themselves from Vietnamese. I'm particularly interested in how gender ideologies interact with a historical factor, i.e. the American war in Vietnam (1954–1975), in affecting people's choices of different languages in this community.

3. The village of Dong Son

Dong Son is one of the 12 villages of the commune Cao Son located on the side of National Highway 1A in the rocky mountain area of the province Lang Son in the highland of Northern Vietnam.² Dong Son lies about 150 km away from Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, and 50 km away from Tan Thanh, a city just near the border with China. Sixty percent of Dong Son's area is hills and mountains. In the summer of 2003, Dong Son was the home of 403 people living in 73 households. The majority (74.6%) were Tay, 19.2% were Nung and 6.2% were Viet people. Eighteen Viet women and seven Viet men moved into the village after their marriages with Tay people. All the Viet women were in their late forties and fifties at the time of the study.

The main occupations of all village inhabitants were cultivating rice, corn, sweet potato, and fruit-trees, breeding poultry and pigs for dung which is used for fertilizer and breeding cattle which are used to pull plows and wagons. Most of these crops are produced for subsistence purposes. Recently, in light of the Chinese demand for fresh fruit, Dong Son's inhabitants have changed a considerable amount of crop field to cultivating watermelons for sale. As a sideline, there were 5 people working as *lai xe om* (paid carriers using motorbike). Another side occupation – mainly done by Tay women – was producing incense for worshipping ancestors and for sale. There was no market in Dong Son although the local administration had allocated ground for one. The chairman of the administrative committee of Cao Son told me that the people did not want to go there. Most of the foodstuffs such as vegetables or soy curd are produced in the village. For their daily needs, Dong Son's people went to a small market in the center of the commune Cao Son which is 3 km away. Here, you can find butchers' stands and small stalls selling other goods like soft drinks, dry foodstuffs, stationery and so on. Other business such as exchanging products happens mainly in the market in the city of Dong Mo which is 5 km away from Dong Son. For people in Dong Son, going to the market is not only a way to satisfy their material needs, but also an opportunity for socializing.

In comparison to other Vietnamese highland communities, the commune of Cao Son has a relatively good health care system. The commune's medical aid station can handle common diseases and take measures to prevent community diseases. In coordination with the Woman's Union, the commune's medical aid station has regularly organized meetings to propagandize for two nation-wide movements, i.e. "Family planning" and

“Health care for mothers and children”. Dong Son’s women participate actively in such meetings.

Dong Son’s society is men-centered. As in many other Vietnamese communities, the Confucian ideology of male domination is pervasive in Dong Son despite the theme of gender equality that has been the politically dominant ideology for almost six decades.³ In reality, Dong Son women usually have an inferior position at both the village and the family level although they play an important role in their family and community. At the time of the field work, only one of the seven members of the leadership committee of the village was female. When men and women were asked whether women or men have a more important role in community leadership, 97% (102/105) of interviewees asserted that men do. The reasons for that could be many. Here, I’d like to list some which the interviewees provided: 1) men usually go to meetings; 2) in meetings, men express their opinions more often than women do; and 3) men’s points of view on discussed issues have been more often accepted than women’s. Thus, a Tay woman, said: “I rarely go to meetings. My husband goes to all except the meetings about family planning. Only to those, he told me to go.” And Thiem, a Nung woman, said: “I feel strange like a doe out of the forest when speaking in front of so many men.” But, there were active female voices to be heard in Dong Son, especially in meetings about family planning and health care for mothers and children. This is in part because in those meetings, women were the majority. Even here, however, women’s comments indicated gender inequities. For example, in a meeting on family planning, a Tay woman who has four daughters said: “I know we are miserable because we have many children. I don’t want to try so hard for a son but my husband wants [one]. I’m afraid that he will leave us if I don’t follow him. I think he should come here.” A pregnant woman said, “Cadres say a pregnant mother needs eggs and meat and fresh fruit. But, if we have those [foods] we have to give them first to others (family members). So, sometimes, I have to eat them on the sly.”

At the family level, female inferiority was also found in Dong Son. At the time of the field work, all families with both spouses are described in their family record books as headed by men.⁴ In the eight households described as headed by women, the women were widowed or single, or the husband worked far from home. As the family head, men not only represented their family in activities beyond the home, but they also made important decisions within the family such as determining when and where cultivation should take place, what their children’s futures should be, and

when the household should purchase valuable belongings. For example, Dung and Huong are two Dong Son girls who were ordered by their fathers to give up school in order to help their mothers with domestic chores and field work before *ve nha nguoi ta* ('going to other's home', meaning: marrying into another family).

Dong Son's women contribute at least the same amount as, and usually more than, men do to the family's economy. Information gained through interviewing 60 household heads (54 men and six women) shows that 34 respondents think that in their families, women's amount of labor is equal to that of men; 21 respondents think that women work more than men and only 5 respondents think that men work more than women. Dong Son's women work from dawn to dusk. Sometimes, I even saw women ploughing and driving motorbikes for money, jobs which are usually considered men's. Dong Son's women do not have much leisure time because if not working in the field, they have to do other work such as household chores or producing incense, going to the forest to fetch firewood, or going to the city of Dong Mo to buy and sell products. Dong Son's men also participated in these activities, but they did not have to.

Like the women in other men-centered communities in Vietnam (Le Thi 1998; Luong and Diep Dinh Hoa 2000; Tran Dinh Huou 1991, among others), married women in Dong Son move to their husband's family upon marriage in accordance with the second of the three Confucian submissions (*tam tong*).⁵ Here, they have to learn the morality of being a wife and a daughter-in-law, in other words, how to serve and respect the members of their "true" family. According to many villagers, male and female alike, a husband can curse and beat his wife if she is not obedient and a woman should sacrifice herself for her (husband's) family. Women are often taught to endure and 'eat bitterness' (*ngam dang*) for the sake of family harmony. However, even though Dong Son women say this is permissible, many of them did not accept their fate with resignation. They often tried to find a way to cope with their situations, e.g. by confiding in other people or even loudly arguing with others.

4. Language, gender and multilingualism in Dong Son

In the summer of 2002, within the framework of a Vietnamese-Russian joint research project on the status of Vietnamese, I conducted a sociolinguistic survey in Dong Son. Six other researchers studied different commu-

nities throughout the country. The aim of the survey was to collect data about language practices and language attitudes towards the use of different languages in each community. The main method used was questionnaires – an often-used method of Soviet and Vietnamese sociolinguists. All of us went to the field with the same questionnaire called “Questionnaire for examining language usage in Vietnamese multiethnic communities”. The questionnaire was constructed by the chair of the project and has the similar format to the questionnaires already mentioned earlier in this paper. In addition to the method of using questionnaires, I also collected data through talking with Dong Son people.

In one conversation I had with a respected 78 year old Tay man who had retired after being a successful government official in the city of Lang Son, he said:

Some decades ago, the Tay language, the mother tongue of the majority of Dong Son’s people, was the main language in Dong Son. But, due to the tendency of state centralization, the use of Tay language has been more and more reduced. Nowadays, most Tay children under the age of five cannot speak their mother tongue, only Vietnamese. The Nung language is mainly spoken in communication between Nung people. I’m afraid that Nung villagers will lose their language in ten years.

To some extent, the man was right. Dong Son was a multilingual community in the process of changing. During my stay there, I observed that Vietnamese, the official language of the country, was widely spoken by people under 60 years of age, especially in schools and other public institutions such as administrative offices or social political organizations. All 50 surveyed pupils and six surveyed teachers indicated that they speak Vietnamese during class time; 47 of them (81%) speak Vietnamese beyond class time at school. Eighty-eight percent (118/134) of the surveyed villagers indicated that they use Vietnamese in village meetings organized by the People’s Committee, the Communist Party, Women’s Union or Youth Organization. In spring 2003, the village chief proudly told me that most Dong Son inhabitants over the age of five could speak Vietnamese fluently; only four Tay and two Nung women over the age of 80 did not. But, they could understand Vietnamese well. This represents the relative success of the village towards the state policy of promoting Vietnamese as a significant mean for the integration of ethnic minority people.

Still, there are reasons to believe in the vitality of the Tay and Nung languages in Dong Son. The two languages were used in many domains of life. Although most children under five could not speak Tay or Nung, most children over five often used them when talking to family members or friends. Replying to a question about whether the Tay and Nung people might lose their languages, the village chief said: "How come? Our languages are part of us. If we are alive, then our languages are alive." Moreover, 96% of Dong Son people participating in my survey agreed on the need for teaching Tay and Nung languages to pupils at school. A young Tay woman wrote: "Teaching Tay language at school is now a bit late. But it is better than not [at all]."

As I analyzed the questionnaires, one fact particularly attracted my attention. While Tay and Nung people (both women and men) as well as Viet men prefer to use Vietnamese when communicating with unfamiliar people in public contexts, a number of Viet women prefer to use Tay. All the Tay and Nung respondents, and all the Viet men (116 respondents in all) indicated that they prefer Vietnamese when speaking to unfamiliar people in public contexts (at village meetings, in the administrative office and in the market), but only three (17%) of the 18 Viet women indicated that they prefer Vietnamese. Eight of them (44%) prefer Tay, and seven (39%) said that they use both Vietnamese and Tay when speaking to unfamiliar people in public contexts.

Aiming to study this finding in more detail, I made several private visits to Dong Son. I focused on two questions: (1) whether or not the tendency found in questionnaires was also evident in everyday practices; and (2) what might be the reasons for it. Using the methods of ethnography such as participant observation and informal interviews, I found that the preferences reported by Viet men and women on the survey were also evident in their everyday practices. I found that while Viet men usually speak Vietnamese in their everyday life, the language choices of Viet women are more complicated.

During my stay in the village, I did not hear Viet men of Dong Son speaking complete utterances in Tay language. But, they did mix Tay or Nung words with Vietnamese in their speech, especially when telling me jokes about misunderstandings between people of different ethnic groups. For example, Hung, a Viet man, told me a story which he assured me that he had experienced himself. When Hung, as a soldier, first came to Dong Son, he and two other troops were living at Ms. Then's home. At that time, Vietnamese troops usually lived in the houses of indigenous people. One

day, he wanted to borrow some bamboo mats (pronounced *kot* in Vietnamese) from Ms. Then for the troops, thus, he asked her to give him some *kot* (meaning: ‘bamboo mats’). But, because the sound *kot* means ‘hug’ and ‘to hug’ in Tay language, the woman replied angrily: “You want *kot* (meaning: ‘to hug’), then go to the kitchen. My daughter is cooking there. I am too old for that.”

Meanwhile, Viet women in Dong Son were more variable in choosing different languages. Interacting with their children and/or other children in the village, Viet women mostly used Vietnamese, though code mixing and code switching were often observed in their daily speech to kids. Unlike the Viet men who mostly used Vietnamese when talking to older people, most Viet women spoke Tay to older family members such as grandparents-in-law and parents-in-law. For example, Duc, one of the Viet women who had been married into a Tay family and moved to Dong Son, interacted with her husband’s mother in Tay while Duc’s kids often spoke Vietnamese to their grandmother. I once asked Duc: “Why don’t you speak Vietnamese with her (Duc’s mother in-law)? Like your kids [do]!” Duc replied: “She is not that easy going to me. If I do [use Vietnamese], she will think I’m being cheeky to her.”⁶ But, Mai’s case was different. Mai was a woman of very few words. She told me that she understood Tay but had never spoke that language because she always felt ashamed when trying to speak it. When interacting with her 83 year old grandmother in-law who spoke very little Vietnamese, Mai talked in Vietnamese and the old lady in Tay. Several times, I heard Mai praising her husband’s grandmother as “very understanding”.

Because my focus was on the language practices of Viet women with unfamiliar people in public contexts, I followed my subjects when they went to the market or to village meetings. For example, I went to the market in the city of Dong Mo twice: once with Le and the other time with Hoa. It was very common there for all speakers to speak both Vietnamese and Tay, but in my opinion, Vietnamese was more often used than Tay. However, I recognized that both Le and Hoa rarely started interactions with other people in Vietnamese, but instead initiated conversations in Tay. Because a conversation between two people in that market mainly occurred in the language in which it was started, Le and Hoa spoke Tay more often than Vietnamese. A similar linguistic pattern in public settings was also observed in the behavior of other Viet women.

The fact that, in their daily practices, Viet women in Dong Son were more variable in using different languages than Viet men is similar to the findings in a number of other studies, for example Gal’s (1978). The expla-

nation for this pattern in Dong Son could be seated in the local ideology of gender roles. Although all Viet women and men moved into Dong Son after their marriages with local people, they experienced this fact differently. For example, the proverb ‘A daughter in-law is your true child, a son in-law is your guest’ (*Dau la con, re la khach*) embodies a widely held ideology in Dong Son. Therefore, Viet men were treated as family guests while Viet women were assigned an inferior position in the family. Because Dong Son people truly care about putting guests at ease, they usually try their best to speak to a guest in her/his mother tongue. As guests, Viet men were mainly spoken to in Vietnamese. Meanwhile, as family inferiors, Viet women should use Tay when speaking to their husband, parents-in-law, grandparents-in-law in order to put them at their ease. But, the fact that Viet women in Dong Son preferred to use Tay with unfamiliar people in public contexts could not be explained with local gender ideologies. After having informally interviewed the women, I suggest that the reason for that fact can be tracked back to the time of the American war in Vietnam (1954–1975).

5. Digging up the past to understand the present: The effect of the American war on multilingualism in Dong Son

Although all Viet women and men moved into Dong Son after their marriages with local people, their situations were different. Before their marriages, most of the Viet men were soldiers or workers quartered in the area. Those ‘aliens’ were usually a symbol of modernity and prestige for the girls in the area. Tan, a Tay woman, told me that “at that time, many Tay girls were falling in love with Viet workers and soldiers because they were so different compared to Tay men. For example, when local people used to walk barefoot, they wore shoes and rubber sandals.” Indeed, Viet men married the pretty and/or wealthy girls in the village. Unlike the men, however, the majority of Viet women could have been stigmatized because of their marriages into the village. I’d like to illustrate this fact through a story of Duc, one of the Viet women moving to Dong Son.

Duc was born in 1950 in a beautiful village in Ha Bac province in the Red River delta – the granary of Northern Vietnam and thus a significant and trustworthy region during the war against the American army. It supplied many of the men and supplies for the war. Duc’s natal place is not very far away from Dong Son (the distance is about 140 km). But, due to

the inconvenient traffic and her materially difficult conditions, she was not able to return for many years.

Duc spent her childhood in peace because at that time the war was only in Southern Vietnam. But, the war in the South became fiercer and fiercer. In 1964, when Duc was fourteen, the war was escalating to the North. Duc's life changed significantly then. Healthy young men mostly served in the army and went to the front. As a young girl Duc was full of vitality, but could not find a boyfriend. The war ended in 1975, and many village men did not come home because so many were killed and a number of them went to sanitarium for war invalids elsewhere, and thus there were many more women than men in the area. Compared to the girls who were 18–20 years old, Duc was “too old” to have a suitor although she was only 25.

Duc told me, “You don't know. Being an unmarried woman in the rural areas means a terrible wretchedness, even a shame not only for the women herself but also for her family.” I sympathized with her: “I know. I was living in a rural area during the war too. And a second cousin of mine could not find a husband too. I never forgot her silently crying nightly, with my aunt both grieving for and pitying her.” Therefore, Duc's life was full of pressure until she was 33 years old. Then, the husband of Duc's younger sister, a veteran who had been stationed in Dong Son and fought against the bombardment of the US army, made a match for Duc with a Tay man who was seven years younger than she was and whose family did not have enough money to pay for a marriage between him and a Tay woman. Duc said to me:

At first, I was kind of afraid to go up here. You know, strange people, strange way of living, being away from home. Before (then), I had never been away from home. And, many other odd things. But, I was just fed up with my life down there. I decided to risk it.

Duc has been a member of a Tay family in Dong Son since 1983. When she arrived, Vietnamese was not as widely spoken as nowadays, although the state promoted it as the official language that should be used in schools and public institutions in all areas of Vietnam. Duc learned Tay in order to communicate with other people in the village, especially to fulfill her obligations as a daughter-in-law. She now speaks Tay quite fluently. Vietnamese is spoken more and more frequently by local people. As demonstrated above, in 2002 and 2003, Vietnamese was widely spoken in different spheres of village life, even in the family settings that have often been seen

as “a sphere of local languages” by most Vietnamese studies of bi/multilingualism. But Viet women continued to use Tay in public contexts when speaking to unfamiliar people. When I asked why, Duc told me that she was afraid of being laughed at because her husband is much younger than she is. Le, another Vietnamese woman said:

I don't know what others (Viet women) think. But, I don't want aliens to find out that I am a Viet woman who couldn't find a Viet husband.

And, Hoa said:

If people know that I come from down there, they will know that I am marrying into a poor family and look at me with a feeling of pity.

So, the fact that those Viet women avoid Vietnamese, in certain public contexts, is evidence of how a historical event like a war interacts with local ideologies of gender to put pressure on a woman's life not only during the war but also long after that. In the meanwhile, it has also been a sign of how women use language as a tool to live their lives in the ways they think are meaningful.

6. Conclusion

The example of linguistic behaviors of Dong Son women and men has once again suggested that we cannot fully understand language practices without taking into account other sociohistorical factors, both locally and globally. For example, we cannot understand why Viet women in Dong Son have avoided the use of Vietnamese, their mother tongue, though it is often seen as a prestige language and possesses useful linguistic capital in a number of public contexts, without looking into their circumstances in the past. In other words, gendered linguistic patterns can be partly shaped by sociohistorical events in other places and times.

This paper aims to raise a rarely heard voice in the research on language, gender and political economy in multilingual communities and to argue that works on multilingualism focusing only on indigenous peoples have greatly over-simplified social relations in those communities, overlooking other ethnic groups of inhabitants who are constituent members of

the community. Moreover, the study has added to that research an example of the effect of a war on linguistic practices in a multilingual society.

Notes

- * My sincere thanks to Bonnie McElhinny for detailed editorial comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. In one private conversation with Ta Van Thong, I told him about Hill's study of language practices of women and men in Malinche Volcano (Mexico). Responding to the picture Hill offers, which shows that the strategies that minority men use for dealing with their marginalization by the majority is attempting to have high status in both languages, he said: "Maybe. It's also true in Chieng Xom."
 2. Administratively, Viet Nam has been divided into 61 provinces and cities which have the same authority as provinces. These provinces and cities consist of districts that are called *huyen* in rural and *quan* in urban areas. Districts in the rural area are divided into communes (*xa*), whereas districts in the urban area are divided into precincts (*phuong*). A commune consists of villages (*lang/ban*) and a precinct consists of several inhabitant groups (*to dan pho*).
 3. About a thousand years ago, the Confucian ideology was introduced into Vietnam by the Chinese conquest (Marr 1981; Vu Khieu 1992). Since then it has played an important role in Vietnamese society (see for example Hy Van Luong 1992; Nguyen Khac Vien 1975; Tran Dinh Huou 1991; Trinh Thi Minh Ha 1992 among others).
 4. Administratively, each family in Vietnam has a family record book on which personal details about all family members and the family head are indicated.
 5. According to Confucianism, women should follow three submissions: (1) at home a woman obeys her father; (2) after marriage a woman obeys her husband; and (3) after her husband's death a woman obeys her sons.
 6. As in most communities in Vietnam, people in Dong Son stand in different hierarchical relationships. For example, the wife is inferior to the husband, the child is inferior to the parent and grandparent, etc. And the inferior can be perceived as cheeky if she/he causes inconvenience to her/his superior. To avoid this, a Viet daughter-in-law should use the mother tongue of her mother-in-law (Tay in this case) when speaking to the latter.

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Section IV. Commodities and cosmopolitanism

Chapter 11

Shop talk: Branding, consumption, and gender in American middle-class youth interaction*

Mary Bucholtz

1. Introduction

The large-scale restructuring of capitalism in the United States and elsewhere in the past several decades has placed consumption indisputably at the center of economic subjecthood. In previous configurations of capitalism, workers' relation to economic production – via class positioning and mobility within the labor market – was the primary means by which they could forge identities linked to economic structures and processes. In the current post-Fordist economy, however, the labor market, along with the rest of the apparatus of capitalism, has become diffuse and flexible (Harvey 1989) and hence a less stable ground for identity projects. At the same time, consumption has emerged as the primary site of identity formation within economic systems through the intensive marketing of a multitude of niche lifestyles on a global scale (Lury 2004). The accompanying promotion of “enterprise culture” (Keat and Abercrombie 1991) – and more recently “the ownership society” – as neoliberalism’s guiding metaphor for the organization of institutions, from government to the arts to education, also invites people to reimagine themselves as consumers first and foremost (Bartlett et al. 2004; cf. Collins 2001; Fairclough 1993).

One indication of this shift toward consumption under late capitalism is that despite their marginal position in the labor market, young people are heavily targeted by advertisers (Klein 2000; Milner 2004; Quart 2003; Schor 2004). Youth are a focus of corporate attention not only because they increasingly have access to disposable income but because they are seen as the initiators of new street-based styles that can be commodified and marketed to a mass public (including other young people). Although the commercialization of youth culture is widely recognized by researchers, commentators, and the public at large, the issue has been examined primarily from an adult

perspective; consequently, commentators typically take a sharply critical view of the relationship between youth and consumption. Murray Milner, a sociologist who applies Weber's theory of status relations to American high school social structure, argues that "the status systems of high school ... are an important contributing factor to the creation and maintenance of consumer capitalism" (Milner 2004: 8). He maintains that teenagers' consumption-based status is a problem that can be solved through a range of substantial changes in schooling practice, including school uniforms, lunchroom seating assignments (to avoid the formation of cliques), gender-segregated schools, and mandatory national service. Similarly, economist Juliet Schor considers advertisers' targeting of the youth market to be extremely harmful to children's development as social persons:

Marketing is ... fundamentally altering the experience of childhood. Corporations have infiltrated the core activities and institutions of childhood, with virtually no resistance from government or parents. Advertising is widespread in schools. Electronic media are replacing conventional play. We have become a nation that places a lower priority on teaching its children how to thrive socially, intellectually, even spiritually, than it does on training them to consume. The long-term consequences of this development are ominous. (Schor 2004: 13)

Schor goes on to link the targeting of children as consumers to a range of highly sensationalized problems confronting contemporary American youth, from obesity to attention deficit disorder to bullying to psychological disorders.

There is no question that the drive to market to children and teenagers and the consequent emphasis on consumption among youth have a number of pernicious effects, but at the same time the strongly deterministic view taken by these and similar researchers fails to look closely at how young people engage with commodities in their everyday lives. Such a view may therefore overlook the fact that youth do not simply fall into a predetermined economic script written by corporate marketers but take up much more complex and ambivalent relationships toward consumption that are grounded in the first instance in locally relevant social concerns rather than global market forces.¹

By contrast, the ethnographic and interactional approach taken in this study aims not to impose the analyst's perspective a priori but seeks instead to privilege the ways in which teenagers, as members of a culture, jointly

make and make sense of their social worlds, moment by moment. Ethnographic studies of youth and consumption, though still scarce, enrich theoretically and politically driven accounts both by taking youth seriously as social actors and by demonstrating the variable meanings of consumption among youth in different cultural contexts (e.g., Liechty 2003; Wulff 1995; see also references in Bucholtz 2002). Such an approach enables researchers to acknowledge that the grasp of the new global economy is far-reaching but not all-encompassing, and to recognize that local processes of meaning making – which, no matter how limited by the workings of power, are never entirely foreordained – are still the best defense against encroaching hegemonies.

2. Language, gender and consumption

Within ethnographic and other field-based studies of language and gender, relatively little attention has been paid to the full range of phenomena that fall under the rubric of political economy (McElhinny 2002, 2003; cf. Bucholtz 2006). Aside from extensive scholarly interest in interaction in professional workplaces and service encounters, such research focuses primarily on the interpellation of speaking subjects into economic systems via class structures and the organization of labor (e.g., Gal 1978; Milroy 1987; Nichols 1983) and the unequal distribution of economically valorized linguistic resources (e.g., Goldstein 1995). This emphasis on production in the study of political-economic processes has aided the scholarly understanding of linguistic practice as both symbolic and material, and of gender (and increasingly sexuality; see Hall 2005; McElhinny 2002) as a central factor in the relationship between linguistic and economic issues. While valuably foregrounding production and reproduction in this small body of scholarship, however, ethnographically oriented language and gender researchers have given even less attention to consumption.

Conversely scholars of discourse and cultural studies have examined the issue of consumer culture, but generally not from an ethnographic perspective. Such studies importantly highlight the sociopolitical issues that can be at stake in the consumerism that drives late capitalist societies, such as the imperative to consumption created through advertising discourse and the reproduction of gender ideologies through consumer media (Benwell 2003; Machin and Thornborrow 2003; Mills 1995; Talbot 1995; and contributions to Talbot and Morgan 1999), but they usually do not document how social

actors negotiate and give meaning to practices of consumption on the ground, in local ethnographic contexts. Meanwhile, some more recent language and gender research (Bucholtz 1999a, 1999b; Cameron 2000) documents the commodification of language itself in gendered contexts of production and consumption.

Language mediates young people's consumption practices in both the top-down, social-structural fashion that is the focus of cultural studies scholars and in the bottom-up fashion favored by ethnographers, which emphasizes local contexts and the agency of social actors. At the level of social structure, language encourages consumption through the vehicle of advertising, which links commodities to youth cultures by tying them to an ideology of coolness (Frank 1997), whereby almost every aspect of youth culture is bound to the procurement of a rapidly shifting set of trendy products targeting specific niche markets: music, clothing, personal grooming products, sports equipment, even food. At the level of individual agency, however, language may be even more important than the actual acquisition of commodities in the local construction and differentiation of youth cultures embedded in political-economic processes, not only via the use of symbolically freighted linguistic markers – phonological, syntactic, and lexical forms – that index specific youth styles, but also, and more immediately, through interaction about consumption. Language and gender researchers have explored both of these dimensions. Research on teenagers' reception of popular media demonstrates that as girls move into adolescence they become increasingly enmeshed in the gendered discourses of media and consumer culture (Coates 1999), and studies of gender and youth style show that young people's linguistic practices converge with gendered semiotic practices closely tied to consumption, such as clothing choices, in order to produce distinctive local categories of identity like jock, nerd, or gangster (Bucholtz 1999c; Eckert 2000; Mendoza-Denton 1999). In addition, a small amount of research has been done by language and gender scholars on how adolescents and preadolescents orient to and negotiate consumer products such as cosmetics for their own ends (Eckert 1996; Mendoza-Denton 1996), laying the foundations for a more extensive interactional study of how young people use talk about consuming to make social sense of commodities and their own place within late capitalist society.

Interactional analysis, like ethnography, focuses on the local sociocultural meanings of the practices in which social actors engage and thus provides a firm empirical testing ground for theoretically or politically derived claims about the social world. Close analysis of social interaction as it un-

folds allows researchers to show how large-scale social phenomena like class or identity are produced in real time rather than residing in free-floating “discourses”, ideologies, or structures that are theoretically prior to and hence unmoored from specific social actors and situations. As Mark Liechty notes in his ethnography of an emergent middle-class consumer culture in Nepal, “More than simply locating (*excluding*) the middle class’s ‘others,’ ... narrative practices are also central to the project of creating an inclusive, collective space for the middle-class social self. Here the *language of consumption* – how people *talk about* middle-class consumer goods and consumer desire – is especially important” (2003: 256, original emphasis).

I investigate the question of how language mediates consumption among youth by drawing on ethnographic data from a year-long study carried out in 1995–96 of a racially and economically diverse urban high school in the San Francisco Bay Area, which I call Bay City High School. Focusing on European American students who affiliated with a variety of locally salient youth-cultural identities, I argue that as with the Nepalese middle-class youth studied by Liechty, through discourses of consumption – talk about where they shop and what they buy – young people at Bay City High positioned themselves as economic agents while locating themselves and others as particular kinds of classed, gendered, and racialized subjects. This process was supported by teachers’ discourse concerning identity, in which consumption was promoted as the route to subjecthood through the acquisition and display of an individual style created through commodities. It is thus through the combination of the top-down workings of corporate advertising and the bottom-up cultural practices and discourses of consumption among youth and those they interact with that the styles and subjectivities of American youth cultures come into being.²

3. Youth culture and consumer culture

At Bay City High, like most other U.S. high schools, students’ lives were permeated and structured by commodities throughout the school day (see also Klein 2000; Schor 2004). They ate fast food from national chains at the school canteen and purchased soft drinks from corporate-sponsored vending machines on campus, a longstanding fundraising arrangement in many public schools.³ While the integration of corporate advertising into public schools is a nationwide phenomenon, the need for such corporate

support is especially acute in California. In 1995, when I conducted my research, California was one of the twelve wealthiest states in the nation, but ranked 48th with respect to per-student funding in K-12 schools. The declining funding and quality of California's public schools is widely attributed to Proposition 13, the 1978 act limiting property taxes; as a result of its devastating effects teachers and administrators have been forced to turn elsewhere for educational materials. At Bay City High, materials donated by corporations and emblazoned with their logos appeared throughout the school, from record-company posters advertising the latest releases by popular music groups, which lined the walls in several classrooms, to the Coca-Cola logo on the scoreboard in the football field.

Yet even when the financial constraints of the school did not demand reliance on corporate resources, teachers often encouraged students to orient themselves to commodity culture. For example, in a health course that was mandatory for all sophomores at the school, the teacher had the students decorate their own three-ring paperboard binders with images and slogans from advertisements and articles in mass-market magazines to create a collage representing the kind of person they felt themselves to be. Most students clipped captions and photos from fashion and sports magazines, although some subverted the assignment by leaving their folder unadorned or by taking images from unsanctioned sources like the pro-marijuana magazine "High Times." Despite these few exceptions, students tended to acquiesce to this activity, for it further naturalized what was already a familiar experience to most teenagers: defining one's identity through discourses, images, and ideologies of consumption.⁴

Given that most American high schools, by necessity as well as by choice, are steeped in consumerism, commodity talk can be undertaken in almost any interactional context in school settings. Speakers regularly compliment one another on their acquisitions,⁵ comment on their own and others' possessions, and jointly recall past and plan future acts of consumption. Indeed, talk about shopping was so prevalent among Bay City High School students that although my research was not primarily concerned with this topic I soon added it to the list of issues that I inquired about during ethnographic interviews. The data on which the present analysis is based comes from such interviews and from informal peer interactions at which I was present. I did not conduct fieldwork on students' actual shopping practices; however, talk about such practices is a rich source of information about language and consumption in its own right, for regardless of whether students were accurately reporting their buying habits, their deci-

sions about how to represent their own and others' consumer activities in interactions with me and their peers revealed a great deal about the identity positions they claimed for themselves and assigned to others.⁶

I focus here on an issue that frequently emerged from teenagers' talk about consumption: *branding*, or the association of brand names with social groups.⁷ This term has been used in nonlinguistically oriented cultural studies to describe the top-down processes whereby corporations create and impose a semiotics of commodities on consumers, especially the highly desirable youth market (e.g., Klein 2000; Lury 2004; Quart 2003). Naomi Klein, the most influential critic of the global branding phenomenon, traces the practice back to the beginnings of mass production, when the uniformity of goods demanded symbolic differentiation through the creation of brand images. Branding later extended to the corporation as a whole, in part due to the shift of production overseas and hence the need to highlight the corporation over the commodity, which it was no longer producing directly. Branding is accomplished via relentless advertising to reinforce the brand and to penetrate the distracted awareness of prospective consumers whose lives have been saturated by marketing. In order to do so, striking language and images and new advertising venues are used to present the brand as not simply a logo but a total way of life. Nike in particular is identified by Klein and other writers as one of the quintessential success stories (or horror stories, depending on one's view) of marketing the brand rather than the commodity. Klein characterizes current branding practices as "the project of transforming culture into little more than a collection of brand-extensions-in-waiting" (2000: 31).

However, such a perspective is overly deterministic, missing the ways in which consumers themselves engage with commodities in local symbolic and material economies – engagements that are not always anticipated or embraced by marketers.⁸ My own emphasis is therefore on how young people respond to the hypercommodification of youth culture within interaction. In my analysis I draw on my recent collaborative work with Kira Hall on the relationship between language and identity, in which we develop a model of identity informed by current and canonical sociocultural linguistic theories and methods (Bucholtz and Hall 2004a, 2004b) and a set of principles for investigating identity as a fundamentally interactional phenomenon (Bucholtz and Hall 2005).

4. Language, class and identity

As part of our framework, we adopt and expand Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) notion of *distinction* to characterize the process of social differentiation that is one effect of identity work. In our use, distinction need not be tied to socioeconomic class but may apply to any dimension of differentiation between social groups; however, it is important to remember that the origin of the concept in Bourdieu's writings lies in social class. For Bourdieu, distinction between social classes arises through practices of the cultivation of taste; thus the bourgeoisie distinguishes itself from the proletariat not only on economic grounds but also, crucially, by claiming for itself a greater sense of aesthetic discernment – that is, the ability to differentiate between that which is held to be desirable and that which is not. Though not always formulated in such terms, discernment is pivotal in linguistic research on consumption, as seen in the connoisseurship among yuppie wine aficionados (Silverstein 2003) and coffee drinkers (Gaudio 2003), fashion knowledge as a marker of cosmopolitan modernity in Tonga (Besnier 2004), and even the symbolic trappings of social difference produced by New York City department stores (Labov 1972). This original sense of *distinction* is vividly illustrated in young people's discourses of consumption, for in positioning themselves within consumer culture, teenagers simultaneously position themselves as discerning members of that culture. It is not the case, however, that discernment emerges directly from internal cognitive and affective processes. To be sure, a robust cultural ideology in late capitalist societies such as the United States locates discernment, and taste more generally, in the individual preferences of an autonomous consuming subject. Yet in fact discernment is a thoroughly social and cultural phenomenon, produced through the accumulated effects of interactions in which taste is socialized and shaped.⁹

At the interactional level, discernment is produced as a discursive effect through habits of stance, a concept that has become an important part of sociocultural linguistic analysis. *Stance* has been generally defined as speakers' discursively displayed epistemic and/or affective orientation to ongoing talk. Thus it involves an orientation to knowledge on the one hand and to emotion on the other. Discernment combines these two elements of stance, for it bases the notion of taste not merely on what one likes and dislikes, but more fundamentally on knowing what one *should* like and dislike. Contrary to American discourses of taste, then, discernment is a

social rather than an individual phenomenon, and it is one that is created and reproduced almost entirely within discourse.

The linguistic analysis of stance has received increasing attention in recent years. For my analysis here, I use the stance framework developed by John Du Bois to characterize the relationship simultaneously forged among stance object (the entity toward which a stance is taken), speaker, and addressee through the taking of a stance in interaction. Du Bois (2007: 163) describes the act of stance taking as follows: “I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with you.” Stance is therefore both a subjective and an intersubjective process, for social identities may be built up through the habitual taking of stances, and interactional dynamics may sediment into social relations (Ochs 1992, 1993). This cumulative effect of stance has been called *stance accretion* (Du Bois 2002; Raunio-maa 2003), and it is a primary means of constructing social identities and the relationships between them. In this way stance accretion interactionally contributes to habitus, the accumulated and habitual social practices that constitute class and other categories (Bourdieu [1972] 1978, 1984).

One of the most obvious kinds of social identity that is inscribed through discursive practices of displaying discernment is socioeconomic class. Yet as Eckert (2000) has demonstrated, the class identities speakers construct in social practice do not necessarily correspond tidily with the class positions assigned to them by the capitalist economic system. Indeed, it was extremely difficult for me to determine students’ socioeconomic status solely through participant-observation in the school setting, for even many extremely poor students were strongly oriented to trendy – and costly – youth-cultural commodities. For example, I eventually learned that one student had been homeless throughout the study, yet his self-presentation through clothing and other possessions gave no indication of his family’s dire economic situation.

Moreover, students tended not to talk about social class, instead framing social organization in racialized terms, which – unsurprisingly, in the context of U.S. racial inequities – usually correlated with class. In this way class became a largely invisible yet highly salient dimension of social positioning (see also Ortner 1991, 1998; Rampton 2003). Other types of social division were often more explicitly addressed in discourse, especially among the middle-class European American students who made up the bulk of the study participants. Thus one white girl informed me that “classism” was widespread at Bay City High; when I inquired further it became

clear that the class warfare she had in mind was drawn along lines of class year: freshman, sophomore, junior, senior.

One indicator of class identity, if not actual class status, was the stores where teenagers told me that they shopped for clothing. Upper-middle-class European American teenagers tended to name stores in the expensive downtown shopping areas, while lower-middle-class and working-class African American teenagers listed stores in malls and shopping centers in suburban areas that had a largely nonwhite clientele. Here social class outweighed race, with well-to-do African Americans naming the same kinds of stores as their European American counterparts. But because students of widely varied socioeconomic backgrounds often oriented to the same kinds of commodities, social class is less useful than consumption style in investigating the ways in which teenagers positioned themselves and others in the political economy of consumer capitalism.

5. Branding the self and the other

If the shopping areas that students named are a clue to class, then the brands and labels that they wore and discussed are a clue to youth cultural style. This local practice of branding, as the counterpart of global corporate branding, discursively associated social groups with corporate trademarks and thus provided a commodity-mediated means by which social identities could be claimed by the self or ascribed to others. Other-branding typically involved negative evaluations, while self-branding was more complex, allowing for a range of stances from pride to (mock) shame. For some students, self-branding was a practice akin to patriotism or rooting for a sports team, involving symbolic acts of loyalty as well as financial acts of economic support through regular purchases of the company's products. Nike and Polo were among the brands that attracted this sort of loyalty among teenagers at Bay City High during the period of the study.

For some students, especially those for whom trendy fashion was an integral part of their identities, branding was synonymous with social identification. Example (1) illustrates this situation. The example is taken from an ethnographic interview I conducted with two European American boys, Willie (age 17) and Brand One (age 16), both juniors, who based their close friendship in large part on their shared fashion aesthetic, which they called "pretty-boy". Although these teenagers' fascination with fashion may be considered gender-atypical by outsiders, it should be noted that many boys

at Bay City High were deeply interested in clothing and it was not generally considered unmasculine to display such an interest. Indeed, it is some indication of the shift in gender ideologies among California youth over the past several decades that Brand One and Willie were able to maintain an intensely homosocial relationship, to dress and wear their hair nearly identically and share each other's clothing, and to proudly and openly describe themselves as "pretty boys" without being the targets of homophobic suspicion among their peers. However, the degree of interest these two boys showed in clothing and fashion was unusual among the male students in my study.

The pretty-boy style involved baggy ironed pants, oversized basketball shoes, and neatly ironed oversized shirts over a white T-shirt. Heavily influenced by the hip-hop fashions popular with African American students, Brand One and Willie's style was rare among European American teenagers. In fact, the boys claimed that they had invented the style, a claim that could be heard as credible only if the origins of the style among African American youth were discounted or ignored. At the time the study was conducted, such styles were strongly racialized as black by both black and white students, and so Brand One and Willie may also be seen as locating themselves racially as white innovators rather than as wannabe blacks. This position was reinforced by their assertions that other (white) boys tried to imitate their style.

In example (1a), Willie is describing elements of his and Brand One's style to me; I had previously learned about their "pretty-boy" style in a separate interview with Brand One. In the example, Willie responds to my question about style by naming the brand of his athletic shoes:

(1a)

- 1 Mary: What--
 2 How would you (.) describe your style?
 3 (1.7)
 4 Willie: .h::
 5 Well like Nikes,
 6 h: u:h h:
 7 I haven't bought a other kind of pair of shoe,
 8 (0.8)
 9 since like fourth grade.

Brand One and Willie's style is influenced not only by the clothing fashions of African American youth culture but by the linguistic practices as well; the emblematic use of recognizable features of African American

Vernacular English (AAVE) can be seen, for example, in line 7, in Willie's regularization of the indefinite determiner in *a other kind* and his use of zero plural marking in *pair of shoe*. Here language enters into the same symbolic economy in which clothing circulates, as a resource for the construction of style. At the same time, these boys' use of AAVE is tied quite directly to material economic processes. Their access to AAVE features was largely mediated by consumerism, for it was their consumption of commercial rap music even more than face-to-face interaction with AAVE speakers that allowed the boys to adopt emblematic features of the variety. Among European American students, such appropriation of African American clothing and speech styles was gendered insofar as it was both more common and more accepted among boys than girls.

Practices of branding arise at numerous points in this short excerpt. In lines 7 to 9, Willie offers a testimonial, a speech event characteristic of consumerism in late capitalism (Bucholtz 1999b): *I haven't bought a other kind of pair of shoe, (0.8) since like fourth grade*. The stance of discernment that he takes here is achieved through his testimonial of brand loyalty, which bespeaks an expert knowledge of the excellent qualities of the endorsed product.

Later in the same interaction, brand names surface again in Willie's talk when he describes the kind of shirts he and Brand One wear:

(1b)

109 Willie: .h And mostly like (.) shirts and stuff,
 110 like name brand,
 111 like (1.0) Tommy Hilfiger,
 112 Nautica,=
 113 =like this is Nautica right here,=
 114 Brand One: =This is Polo.

The first descriptor Willie offers is not oriented to visual style but to the status of the commodity – *name brand* (line 110) – and he goes on to list the particular brands that he wears, all of them labels that in advertisers' branding practices at the time were associated with a clean-cut, preppy, country-club image. These labels were appropriated and resignified by hip-hop fans and performers in the mid-1990s as part of an urban youth style (see also Cutler 2003). The resignifying practices involved in this appropriation are maintained by Willie and Brand One, who do not represent themselves as having a preppy style. The fact that preppy clothes may not signify a preppy style is part of the display of knowledge necessary for discernment.

A knowledgeable stance is further constructed as the boys rapidly identify the labels of the shirts they are wearing and display them for me, an act that visibly illustrates their style. This meticulous attention to and keen awareness of corporate brands recalls Marjorie Harness Goodwin's (2002) discussion of brand monitoring among preadolescent girls in California and is extremely widespread within consumer culture. These students' brand consciousness can even be found in the self-selected pseudonym *Brand One*, a name that positions the boy himself as a commodity. Through the self-branding practices they engage in, Willie and Brand One jointly align both with the stance object – the brand – and with each other as discerning consumers of the brand. Such social meanings come to be built through the kind of discursive work that these boys carry out here.

But when branding is applied to others, especially absent others, it is more commonly used in ways that create social distance rather than affiliation and similarity. Speakers can establish a relation of distinction between themselves and others by specifying the brand name of products that others use that they themselves do not and would not. These practices of distinction rely once again on discernment as a stance toward commodities. In some contexts, merely attributing the use of particular brand-name products to others is in itself sufficient to signal social distance and disapproval.

In examples (2a) and (2b), four middle-class girls, also 16- and 17-year-old juniors, are discussing what they perceive to be the practices of preppy people, a social category in which they do not include themselves. The girls, who called themselves Bob, Fred, Kate, and Loden in this study, were described by themselves and others as nerds, and they were largely indifferent to or disdainful of commodity-based youth culture of any kind, instead constituting themselves within an alternative, nonsexualized femininity.¹⁰ Although some of the girls in this group loved to shop, they preferred destinations like craft stores and the local reptile pet shop over clothing boutiques. In fact, the only store they ever mentioned to me as a place where they shopped for clothing was the Salvation Army thrift store. The girls' skepticism regarding fashion- and status-conscious teenagers is evident in their discussion of how to identify preppy students. In line 10, which opens the excerpt, Fred is returning to a previously unfinished statement about how preppy people get to school:

(2a)

10 Fred: dropped off in front of the school in--
 {(0.6)} <snaps fingers twice> big bucks (.) little car,

11 <[u]>
 12 Bob: [BMW!]
 13 Fred: [Vol[↑]vo:?]
 14 Bob: [[BMW!]]
 15 Fred: [[Volvo with]] leather seats.
 16 Bob: BMW.
 17 Fred: Whatev--
 18 No,
 19 [Volvo with leather seat]s,
 20 (? : [x father's car]
 21 Bob: [My BROTHER'S]
 22 Fred: it's all about Volvo with leather seats. h
 23 Bob: No,
 24 my (.) brother drives a Volvo,
 25 believe me,
 26 he's--
 27 he's not preppy.
 28 Fred: (h)Okay.
 29 Bob: hhh

In the next excerpt, a little while later, I ask if preppy people dress in a particular way:

(2b)

44 Bob: Sweaters.
 45 (1.5)
 46 Fred: Sweaters,
 47 (1.1)
 48 like,
 49 (1.1)
 50 (Kate:) hhhh You're wearing a sweater. <sniff>
 51 Bob: Well,
 52 but,
 53 Fred: [(Not like that.)]
 54 Bob: [Sweaters with] v necks.
 55 <laughter>
 56 Fred: .h:: But (.) not--
 57 [but their shoes match.]
 58 Loden: [(That is x though.)]
 59 Bob: Their shoes match?
 60 Fred: That's right.
 61 Loden: Yeah!
 62 And you know how their socks match their shirts?
 63 (2.0)
 64 Fred: It's very careful dressing.
 65 It's very careful dressing to (p-) kinda try to look like
 (0.7) what they see./
 66 Mary: /Mm./
 67 Fred: /On TV,
 68 or [xxx]

69 Bob:
70
71

[Gap.
G]ap.
They buy at Gap.

As in the examples in (1), in these excerpts branding is used as a resource for social positioning, and as before, speakers hasten to name particular brands and fashions that typify a social category. But the speakers use these practices to carry out very different kinds of interactional work. Thus where Willie and Brand One produce high-status name brands with ease and familiarity, in lines 10 and 11 Fred uses multiple repair initiation strategies to signal that the kind of car she has in mind is not immediately accessible information: self-interruption, pausing, snapping her fingers, and offering a descriptor of the intended referent (*big bucks* (.) *little car*). When she does finally propose a brand, it is prosodically marked as tentative through vowel lengthening and rising intonation (line 13, *Volvo?*).

And even when brand names are treated as items the speaker can easily produce in talk, the effect is very different from that in the previous examples. Most notably, Bob's repeated use of one-word turns referring to brands or products seems designed not as discernment as a consumer of these brands but as part of a general stance of knowledgeable ability. Such turns are found, for example, in lines 12 (*BMW!*), 44 (*Sweaters.*), and 69 (*Gap.*). Bob's rapid production of commodity labels is consistent with the nerdy ideology valuing knowledge and intelligence (Bucholtz 1996, 1999a). Her turn shape, speed, and intonation all invoke a frame in which knowledge is displayed competitively. Such an interactional dynamic recalls that of a game-show contestant, or perhaps an eager student who wants to be the first to show that she knows the answer to the teacher's question. Indeed, in classroom contexts nerds use similar interactional strategies to gain the floor and respond to the teacher before other students.

Bob's nerdy interactional style here, then, is not part of a stance of discernment. She uses brand names as an incidental but convenient resource; the names of commodities are not important in their own right but only as information, which is more fundamentally valued. However, these girls do also take stances toward the commodities they mention. In each case, their stances distance themselves and associated others from the preppy social category. Thus Bob rejects the classification of Volvos as preppy on the grounds that her brother drives one (lines 23–27), and she denies that her own sweater is preppy on the grounds that it lacks a V neck (line 54). What is displayed here is not discernment but rejection of discernment, an inter-

actional stance that over time accrues into nerds' rejection of trendy youth culture more generally. Similarly, in example (3) several of the girls collaborate to characterize the "very *careful* dressing" (line 64) of preppy teenagers: *their shoes match*, line 57; *their socks match their shirts*, line 62; (they) *kinda try to look like what they see. On TV* (lines 65, 67). Finally, Bob's branding of the preppy style (*Gap. Gap. They buy at Gap.*, lines 69–71) both distances preppy students from herself through the use of the third-person pronoun and implies that the semiotic valence of the clothing store Gap in youth culture is preppiness.

Despite nerds' overt disengagement from youth culture, then, they too show themselves to be keen observers of those who are so engaged. Although the meaning of preppiness, like any social category, is contestable, the general characteristics of the category identified by Bob and her friends are mentioned by other students as well. Their closely observed analysis of wealthy teenagers' style is in fact borne out in another ethnographic interview I conducted with two upper-middle-class European American girls. In example (3a) Josie (a 16-year-old junior), one of the wealthiest students who participated in the study, describes her dress practices in ways that echo Fred and Bob's characterization:

(3a)

8 Mary: =So you guys don't dress that way.
 9 Josie: Mm,
 10 no,
 11 mm we're kinda preppy. .h

In line 8 I ask Josie and her friend Zoe (a 17-year-old senior) if they dress in the baggy style associated with hip hop. In response, Josie offers the label *preppy* to classify their style. Later in the same interview, Josie provides additional information about her style, which she characterizes as a "confession" (line 93):

(3b)

89 Josie: <sniff> And um,
 90 but,
 91 and then--
 92 I like the Gap.
 93 {That's my confession for the [↑]day.} <tensed vocal folds>
 94 Zoe: That's [↑]fi[:ne.]
 95 Mary: [There's no shame] [[in that.]]
 96 Josie: [[And J]] Crew.
 97 I'm obsessed with J Crew.

98 (0.6)
 99 Zoe: h
 100 Josie: But,
 101 that's oka:y.
 102 {I like to shop.} <whisper>

As in the previous example, again the interaction provides evidence of local challenges to dominant ideologies of consumption, albeit more indirectly. Josie jocularly frames her fashion aesthetic as a guilty secret for which she must receive absolution (offered by Zoe in line 94, by me in line 95, and by Josie herself in line 101). This framing only makes sense if it is recognized that for many students, to shop at mainstream, mass-market clothing stores like Gap or J. Crew was to demonstrate a conformist bent that belied a lack of discernment. Importantly, the equally commercialized and mass-produced clothing of Tommy Hilfiger, Nautica, and Polo was relatively immune to this charge, insofar as it had been resignified as part of an edgy and authenticated street-based style. (The fact that Gap clothing is less expensive than such designer brands seemed irrelevant to these teenagers; it appears that it is Gap's savvy marketing and wholesome yet hip image rather than high-end pricing that make it a much-coveted commodity for certain kinds of young people.) It is also significant that here the implicit charge of lack of discernment attaches to an extremely wealthy and high-status girl. Where for Bourdieu, the practices of distinction cultivated by the bourgeoisie position the proletariat as tasteless, here the cultural authority of street-based youth styles outweighs the structural authority conferred by socio-economic status. However, Josie defuses the charges leveled against her as a rich girl by treating them in a jocular key, offering what I can only characterize as a "cuteness" defense through such devices as the pouty-lipped production of her fully released final [p] in *Gap* and *shop* (lines 92, 102) and the tiny voice in which she makes her admission, "I like to shop" (line 102), both practices that belong to Bourdieu's ([1972] 1978) notion of *hexis*, or socially inculcated bodily disposition. Josie's stance toward shopping via self-branding thus accrues toward the construction of the popular, preppy style of femininity that Fred, Bob, and Loden reject.

Branding, stances of discernment, and shopping discourse itself are not inherently gendered practices, and indeed their wide availability across social classes and identities within capitalist society permits them to be used for a variety of local interactional purposes. But as suggested in the foregoing analysis, the styles that young people claim for themselves and attribute to others through the use of these discursive strategies are closely

bound to gendered ideologies of youth cultural identities, from hip-hop masculinity to preppy femininity (as well as their gendered counterparts hip-hop femininity and preppy masculinity).

6. Stances of middle-classness

The critique of economic privilege that Josie reacts to in example (3b) is pervasive at Bay City High School. Like most Americans, most students at Bay City High would describe themselves as middle-class regardless of their actual class position. As already noted, youth-cultural styles do not correlate predictably with socioeconomic status; although the three friendship groups whose discourse is analyzed above had very different consumption styles, all three were middle-class to upper-middle-class. In order to locate themselves as acceptably middle-class in the perception of their peers, students of all socioeconomic backgrounds had to position themselves as neither too low-class nor too high-class.¹¹ One way to achieve such class positioning was through consumption practices and their visible manifestation in the clothing that students wore to school (as well as other commodities and services such as the food they ate at lunchtime and their means of transportation to and from school). But even more important in constructing the social meaning of such practices and products was the discourse through which these were evaluated as either class-appropriate or not.

One of the paradoxes of this preference for middle-classness among students at Bay City High is that working-class and lower-middle-class students often strove to wear expensive brand-name clothing (frequently the brand names favored by Willie and Brand One), while upper-class students tended to dress down. Indeed, many students described as “preppy” by themselves and others did not conform to the traditional meaning of that term: a polished, neat, conservative style. Rather, preppy students often wore ragged, wrinkled jeans or T-shirts, but usually in conjunction with more expensive items that clearly signaled that their threadbare clothing was a matter of style rather than necessity.

This complex relationship between clothing and class is articulated in Josie’s discussion of her style in example (3c):

the high school, who view themselves and are viewed by many others as unmarked in race, class, and youth-cultural style, in contrast to more socially visible students. The topic of conversation is the Winter Ball, a formal dance at the school. The girls have been discussing whether they plan to attend; as the excerpt opens in line 23 Iris is continuing a list of reasons why she will not attend. She has already provided two reasons: she has a volleyball game, and she has homework to do.

(4a)

23 Iris: [[I: don't want to have]] to go find a dress,
 24 I don't have any ti:me,
 25 <tongue click>
 26 Marilyn: [I'm going on Friday.]
 27 Erin: [Okay.
 28 We get the] picture.
 29 So am I:.
 30 Iris: [↑]Really?
 31 Erin: To g--
 32 To the Winter Ball?
 33 Marilyn: Oh no,
 34 to get a [↑]dre:ss.
 35 (0.6)
 36 Iris: Oh: h: [ho:!!]
 37 Erin: [You:] have a dress.
 38 Marilyn: I know but,
 39 [(1.1)]
 40 [<rustling of food packaging>]
 41 I changed my mind.
 42 (1.6)
 43 Mary: What kind of dresses do you have to wear like (.)
 44 Erin: [↑][Aa:h!]
 45 {You changed [your] mind!} <high pitch>=
 46 Iris: [Yeah.]
 47 Erin: =Yeah. .h
 48 (0.8)
 49 Erin: No,
 50 you can't change your {mi:nd.} <smiling voice quality>
 51 Marilyn: [↑]Why not?
 52 Iris: What,
 53 you've got a dress and [now you're (getting) another one?]
 54 Erin: [You can't buy another]
 55 {dre:ss:.} <smiling voice quality>
 56 Marilyn: {I want to return it.} <high pitch>
 57 Erin: You wore it already!/
 58 Mary: / [hh]
 59 Marilyn: / [I left] the t(hh)ags o(hh)n.
 60 Erin: [↑]MARILYN! [.hhh]

61 (Marilyn:) [hh]
 62 Erin: I mean--
 63 Mary: hh
 64 Erin: whatever your na(h)me i(h)s.
 65 Iris: {O:h: you're [so (lame)] .h} <breathy voice quality>
 66 (Mary:) [hh]
 67 <click>
 68 Erin: .h: (.) Oh [no::!]/
 69 (Marilyn:) [hh]/
 70 Iris: /You don't like it anymore?
 71 (0.5)
 72 Marilyn: I do:,
 73 I just want another one.
 74 [(I'm)]
 75 Iris: [Where'd you] get it from?/
 76 Marilyn: /I'm
 tired of it.
 77 (1.1)
 78 Erin: [Nordstro:m,]
 79 Marilyn: [Uh Nordstrom.]
 80 (0.8)

As the interaction unfolds, it is revealed that Marilyn is dissatisfied with her dress for the dance and plans to buy a second one. Erin and Iris take up a thrifty, middle-class stance by jointly problematizing Marilyn for her wasteful consumption practices (see Miller 1998 on thrift as a middle-class value). Erin in particular uses a variety of linguistic resources to position herself as shocked by Marilyn's behavior. At the prosodic level, her use of high pitch marks her incredulity (lines 44, 45, 57, 60), while elsewhere her very low, elongated pitch (line 68) signals a scandalized stance. Such exaggerated prosody is used primarily with a variety of response cries (Goffman 1981) to show her disapproval (lines 44–45: *ʔAa:h!* *You changed your mind!*; line 60: *ʔMARILYN!*; line 68: *Oh no::!*). In addition to these affective markers, Erin overtly and repeatedly contradicts Marilyn's statements – *No, you can't change your mi:nd* (lines 49–50); *You can't buy another dre:ss:* (lines 54–55) – and offers reasons why Marilyn's plans are inappropriate: *You wore it already!* (line 57). Although the primary responsibility for stance taking is shouldered by Erin, Iris also contributes to the evaluation of Marilyn and her actions, for example, by explicitly assessing her as “lame” (line 65). Overall, the reasons Marilyn offers both for her plan to buy another dress and her intention to return the first one (line 41: *I changed my mind*; line 59: *I left the t(hh)ags o(hh)n*; lines 72–73: *I do: (like*

it), *I just want another one*; line 76: *I'm tired of it*) are not accepted by the other girls as adequate justification for her decision.

Despite the outpouring of disapproval from both Erin and Iris, the interaction is in a joking key; Marilyn's behavior, while treated as slightly naughty, is not framed as a serious infraction of social norms. The implication of the frequent laughter and smiling voice quality from all three girls is that Marilyn's behavior is amusingly outrageous; her fickleness about her dress is portrayed as inappropriate not because she or her family is unable to afford a second dress (the issue of cost does not arise in the interaction, and in any event she expresses her intention to return the first dress) but because exchanging a previously worn dress for another at the last minute seems to be viewed as self-indulgent. In this way, Erin and Iris enforce appropriate middle-class consumption practices without seriously condemning Marilyn for her transgression of class norms.¹²

Example (4b) follows directly after this interaction. Following a pause, Iris initiates a change of topic, but Marilyn and Erin do not immediately recognize this shift and respond to Iris's *Oh my goodness* as an evaluation of the prior interaction. As it turns out, however, Iris's use of this discourse marker was a topic-shifting strategy that still focuses on the general theme of dresses for the school dance.

(4b)

80 (0.8)
 81 Iris: Oh my goodness./
 82 Marilyn: /Yeah.
 83 Erin: Oh my [goodness.]
 84 Iris: [Serena?]
 85 Went to some store in (.) LA?
 86 (0.8)
 87 Iris: and got this (1.1) <sounds of chewing> two hundred
 dollar dress for ten dollars.
 88 (1.5)
 89 Erin: Is Serena going?
 90 (1.1) <sounds of chewing>
 91 Iris: I think so.
 92 Marilyn: [Oh god.]
 93 Erin: [<sound of disgust>]
 94 Iris: hhhhh!
 95 <1.2> <sounds of chewing>
 96 Erin: I'm not going. [.hhhh]
 97 Iris: [She got like (for) twenty] dresses,
 98 for ten dollars,
 99 I was so mad.
 100 Marilyn: [Yeah Lindsay?]

101 Erin: [Yeah Lin got]--
 102 Lin got hers for fifty,
 103 it was a hundred and eighty dollar dress.
 104 Iris: [{Where'd she get hers?} <muffled>]
 105 [<rustle of food packaging>]
 106 Erin: She ordered it from LA.
 107 (1.1)
 108 Marilyn: {Gosh that is so--} <lower volume>
 109 Erin: I know.
 110 Iris: Good.
 111 Erin: It's coming like [(0.6)]
 112 [<rustle of food packaging>]
 113 Friday night. hhh!
 114 Iris: Oh really?
 115 Erin: Yeah.
 116 (1.2) <sounds of chewing>
 117 So if it doesn't fit she's screwed. hhhh!

Here again stances are taken toward shopping, but the stance taking is quite different in this context. The topic here concerns bargain hunting, and it is clear that all three girls evaluate this consumption practice positively. This fact can be seen in the way in which the speakers use their evaluation of two other girls' success in bargain hunting to accomplish social differentiation. Lindsay's bargain hunting is evaluated positively (lines 108–110) and Lindsay is thus positioned as a friend (although one whose potential misfortune can still elicit chuckles; line 117), but Serena's bargain hunting is evaluated quite differently: her shopping spree engenders anger in Iris (line 99), suggesting that Iris feels envy (and not, say, disdain) that a girl she does not like has had such good luck in bargain hunting.

This example contrasts with the previous one in that earlier in this interaction heavy consumption – the purchase of a second dance dress by somebody who already owns one – has been assessed as a class-inappropriate behavior if it is motivated merely by a preference for something new. Conversely, in this example heavy consumption – buying twenty dresses for ten dollars each – is assessed as a class-appropriate behavior when it is motivated by the opportunity to get a good deal; here spending is a way of saving (Miller 1998: 59). In this way the girls position themselves not as opposed to heavy consumption but as ready and eager to buy if the price is right. This interaction indicates the parameters of appropriate consumption practices: some awareness of price is important, but for a good bargain it makes sense to spend just as much on ten dresses as one might otherwise spend on a single dress. Thus gender-based talk about ball gowns is simultaneously class-based talk about consumption.

Here and elsewhere in my data, teenagers position themselves as neither rich nor poor, but solidly in between. Overall, white students at Bay City High School tended to position themselves in opposition to the upper class rather than to the lower class, a reflection of the fact that in the liberal climate of the San Francisco Bay Area, white students were often positioned in the discourse of many teachers and by their classmates of color as both economically and racially privileged. European American students were able to evade this imposition of what some called “white guilt” by semiotically and interactionally locating themselves outside of the privileged social class, regardless of their actual economic circumstances (which in fact on average were clearly better than those of most nonwhite students).

7. Conclusion

As consumption eclipses production as the economic terrain on which identity formation plays out, it is increasingly necessary to bring together top-down and bottom-up approaches in the analysis of language, gender, and political economy. Based on the ways in which European American teenagers in the mid-1990s invested commodities with social meanings in discourse, interaction must be recognized as the place where such meanings are forged and negotiated in dialogue with larger economic structures. In discourses about consumption, teenagers oriented to a notion of discernment that allowed them to position themselves and others as both economic and social agents who entered into a variety of relations with youth cultural styles. Discernment emerged particularly within the interactional phenomenon of branding, a resource that gave local semiotic force to commodity labels. At the same time, white youth strove to locate themselves as tasteful (i.e., discerning) rather than classy (i.e., elite and privileged): middle-class stance taking enabled students to interactionally position themselves as neither rich nor poor, an important strategy in a context in which wealth and privilege were viewed as evidence of racial and economic injustice. Hence, gendered youth styles were simultaneously classed and racialized as well.

Rather than granting priority to adult (i.e., outsider) perspectives on this situation, the approach I have taken in this chapter privileges the local interactional and social meanings that young people themselves invested in commodities through the circulation of talk about brands, products, shopping, and consuming. Although new techniques of marketing research and

advertising have infiltrated youths' daily lives, teenagers are not simply willing dupes of unseen hegemonic forces (see also Nava 1992). Instead, in their talk about shopping, young people take up complex positions toward commodity culture that may variously resignify, reject, or reproduce dominant discourses of consumption. Through displays of discerning and non-discerning stances toward commodities as well as evaluations of their own and others' class positions, speakers bring the economic world into their interactions in ways that are locally meaningful. In this way, they position themselves in relation to others in the commodity-saturated space of late capitalism, a positioning that takes on temporary salience within the interaction but through stance accretion becomes part of habitual social practice – habitus – and thus solidifies into more enduring kinds of identities. These processes are simultaneously top-down and bottom-up, meeting in the middle ground of discourse.

To be sure, these teenagers are not free agents who can simply opt to withdraw from commercialization, which permeates nearly every corner of their lives. Like the working-class British “lads” studied by Paul Willis (1977), whose resistant stances toward school eventually led them into menial jobs with little hope of advancement, in positioning themselves within local social structures, middle-class European American youth inevitably position themselves within larger economic systems as well, and typically in ways that reproduce rather than subvert these systems; even nerds, with their disavowal of trendy consumption, engage heavily in practices of nontrendy consumption. Thus the critiques of corporate marketing strategies issued by Klein, Schor, and other observers are not so much off base as incomplete, by focusing on advertisers' unremitting messages to youth but not attending to the social work accomplished through young people's engagement with commodities.

Linguistics and ethnography therefore have critical roles to play in materialist analyses. As feminist linguists continue to investigate the relationship between language, gender, and political economy, it is necessary to attend to practices and ideologies of consumption as well as production in order to understand the powerful yet never fully complete ways in which capital, symbolic and otherwise, continues to organize social life. And as researchers, like corporations before them, increasingly “go global,” we must bear in mind the first lesson of ethnography: that even the most large-scale of social, political, and economic forces can only take shape within local interactional contexts.

Notes

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1. Although Milner (2004) conducts ethnography as part of his study and attends closely to teenage “crowds” and styles, his focus on high school social structure as a symptom of the negative effects of consumer culture on American lives overdetermines his analysis and conclusions.
 2. Unlike in some other parts of the world, among European American middle-class youth consumption does not come automatically laden with discourses of modernity, globalization, and cultural flux; despite the undeniably global nature of both production and consumption, most American consumers are in the privileged position of being able to ignore where their commodities come from, unless confronted with the evidence of sweatshops and other abuses through the work of anticorporate activists (Klein 2000). This obliviousness to the source of commodities is not distinctively American, but the structure of public high schools in the United States, which accommodates the proliferation of distinctive youth styles (Eckert 1989, 2001), tends to facilitate the consumption rather than the interrogation of corporate products (see also Milner 2004).
 3. In many school districts in California, including this one, such arrangements have now been banned as part of a national concern with childhood and adolescent obesity.
 4. However, in addition to this uncritical use of advertising, the same teacher posted numerous parodies of corporate advertisements in her classroom, mostly with anti-smoking messages. Such “ad busting” is a form of resistance to the relentlessness of marketing (Klein 2000).
 5. The details of this conversational routine have been demonstrated to be peculiarly characteristic of capitalist cultures and to operate in distinctively gendered ways (Herbert 1990, 1991).
 6. Daniel Miller’s (2001) ethnography of shopping practices in North London demonstrates that the relationship between talk about consumption and actual practice is not straightforward and that talk allows for a degree of self-presentation that is not always at the forefront in the act of shopping itself.
 7. Although here I limit my consideration of branding to consumption, as linguistic anthropologist Robert Moore (2003) points out in a semiotic treatment of

- branding, brands involve both production and consumption: branding as carried out by corporate employees, he notes, is a form of labor.
8. This issue is addressed in Klein's (2000) work primarily through the examination of anticorporate activist identities among a small minority of youth.
 9. A much more literal example of the cultivation of taste is found in Elinor Ochs et al.'s (1996) research on how parents in different cultures socialize children to develop food preferences. Although many aspects of branding may be inculcated by parents, as children become teenagers brand preferences tend to be elaborated primarily through interaction with youth. Eckert (2003) has noted that autonomy in clothing choice is a marker of the symbolic movement from childhood to adolescence.
 10. This is not to say that nerds do not orient to consumer culture at all. One brand-name product that was widely popular among nerds during my study was Converse Chuck Taylor All-Stars canvas basketball shoes, which nerdy teenagers especially cherished for their low cost and range of bright colors, enabling them to wear left and right shoes of different colors. My own preference for such footwear was very helpful in establishing relationships with self-identified nerds at Bay City High School.
 11. Not all students sought to position themselves in this way, and one or two students from well-to-do backgrounds visibly rejected their parents' socioeconomic status by wearing tattered clothing, bathing infrequently, and living on the streets by choice. This situation is quite different from students who were forced into homelessness due to economic catastrophe and tended to hide their poverty.
 12. It is also worth noting that some branding occurs in this interaction (lines 78–79), at least insofar as the department store where Marilyn bought her dress is mentioned by name. However, it is difficult to determine whether Erin's markedly "disgusted" intonation indicates her stance toward the store or toward Marilyn's behavior.

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Chapter 12

Cosmopolitanism and linguistic capital in China: Language, gender and the transition to a globalized market economy in Beijing

Qing Zhang

1. Introduction

Investigating the complex workings of globalization in a wide range of local contexts, feminist scholars in anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies demonstrate that processes of globalization are integrally gendered (e.g. Freeman 2000; Ong 1987). As Freeman argues, “the historical and structural underpinnings and contemporary forms of globalization are themselves deeply imbued with specific notions about femininity and masculinity and expectations for the roles of women and men” (2001: 1011). Freeman’s own work (2000) and those of other feminist scholars have shown that such gendered notions and expectations naturalize and justify gendered division and disciplining of labor (e.g. Chang and Ling 2000; Lee 1998; Ong 1987). Characteristics culturally associated with gender are also naturalized and consequently justified as resources that are tapped into by both individuals and corporations to conduct gendered work in a globalized economy. The gendered incorporation of labor into the local operations of a global economy not only provides women and men access to different work opportunities but also produces new gendered identities in the local sites of global economy.

Sociolinguists have recently begun to investigate the linguistic consequences of globalization (e.g. Coupland 2003; Heller 2003; Leap and Boellstorff 2004).¹ However, little research has been done on the relationships between language, gender, and work in contexts of globalization. One example with particular relevance to such relationships is Cameron’s study (2000) of a particular linguistic style prescribed by customer service call centers in the UK that incorporates linguistic features culturally associated

with women. Her study demonstrates that the imposition of the so-called “feminine linguistic style” in the call centers is intimately related to the feminization of (customer) service work. Heller’s study (2003), though not directly addressing gender issues (but see also Heller – this volume), shows that economic opportunities (call centers and heritage tourism) brought about by a new globalized economy have placed a premium on bilingual/multilingual skills in francophone Canada. Both cases indicate that linguistic resources are commodified due to their value in conducting certain types of work which generate profits not only for corporations and local communities, but also for individuals in the sense that access to work opportunities may lead to a better livelihood.

This study engages the relationships between language, gender, and work in the context of China’s transition from a state-controlled economy to a globalized market economy. Specifically, the relation between gender and work is examined through historicizing the role of gender as a site for producing social identities. Language and gender are shown to interact in such a way that the gendered character of recruitment and work imposes more constraints on women’s linguistic behavior than on that of their male colleagues. In the following section, I provide an overview of the socioeconomic situation of Mainland China to contextualize the present study.

2. Transition to a globalized market economy

For the past two and a half decades, China has been undergoing rapid transition from a central-planned economy to a new globalized market economy (Benewick and Wingrove 1995; Yeung and Olds 2000). Economic reform and opening up to the international markets have brought about unprecedented changes in all spheres of society (e.g. Davis 2000; Sun 2003). Economic restructuring has dismantled the “iron rice bowl” system that used to provide life-time welfare for state employees. The state encourages enterprises and individuals to compete in the market for their own economic well-being. While some people have managed to take advantage of the reforms and have seen their livelihoods drastically improve, many others feel under siege in the transition to a market economy (for instance, Qian and Wong 2000, and Yang’s study in this volume). The pre-reform socialist egalitarianism has been rapidly replaced by increased income disparities and social stratification (Bian 2002; Khan et al 1992; Li et al. 2004). Li, Li, and Sun’s (2004) analysis of social stratification in China

identifies ten social strata. The group of people that is the focus of this paper is in the mid and upper strata. They are Chinese professionals working for foreign businesses, part of a new occupational group brought about by the influx of transnational capital and a new labor market that serves transnational business operations in China. At the time when I was conducting fieldwork in Beijing (1997–1998), 310,570 foreign companies were registered in China, employing 17.5 million Chinese (Beijing Statistical Yearbook 1997). The middle and upper tier Chinese managers of large foreign (mostly western) companies enjoy a distinctive social status brought about by their high income level and the global prestige of their companies (Pearson 1997). According to Li and Chen (2002: 117), they belong to the second highest social stratum. The social prestige of these professionals has made working for foreign businesses, or *waiqi*,² one of the most sought-after jobs among the younger generation Chinese (e.g. H. Zhang 2002).³ Compared with other established professional groups, professionals in foreign businesses (hereafter *waiqi* professionals) are undergoing the process of constructing their new professional identity. My earlier work (Q. Zhang 2001, 2005) shows that language is used as a crucial resource in presenting their new cosmopolitan professional identity and at the same time distinguishing themselves from a significant other group – professionals working in state-owned enterprises. This paper examines the differential salience of gender in the speech of professionals working in *waiqi* and state enterprises.

There have been numerous studies on the effects of economic reform and globalization on the relation between gender and work/labor (e.g. Entwistle and Henderson 2000; Rofel 1999). Many focus on social groups that are in some way adversely affected by the rapid economic transformation (Wang 2003; Yang in this volume) and on women factory workers on the local production lines of global capitalism (e.g. Andors 1988; Lee 1998; Pun 2004). The business professionals in this study, both women and men, were able to reap some benefit from the transition to a globalized market economy. In this paper, however, I focus on the role of language and gender in the ways in which these professionals get access to opportunities that led them to their current position. I treat both language and gender-related characteristics as a symbolic (and material) asset that can be tapped into on the labor market. In what follows, I discuss the methodology, the participants, and the linguistic features examined. Then, the results of the study are presented, followed by analyses of the results. Broader issues relevant to the study and its implications are discussed in the conclusion.

3. The data and participants

The data used in this study were collected during fieldwork in Beijing (1997–1998) for a larger project on the relation between linguistic variation and the construction of a new cosmopolitan professional identity. The linguistic features investigated involve phonological variation in Beijing Mandarin. As a variety of northern Mandarin dialect group, Beijing Mandarin is the local variety spoken in the capital area of Beijing. The phonological system of Beijing Mandarin provides the standard for the officially designated standard Mandarin of China, or Putonghua (hereafter PTH). In other words, Beijing Mandarin shares the same phonetic inventory with PTH. Hence, unlike many non-native Beijing Mandarin speakers who have to acquire PTH through formal instruction, Beijing Mandarin speakers are, loosely speaking, native speakers of PTH, albeit a local variety. In this paper, the variable use of four sound features in Beijing Mandarin are examined: rhotacization of the syllable final, lenition of (ζ), interdental realization of (ts), and the realization of a neutral tone as a full tone (see below). The linguistic data in this study were collected through sociolinguistic interviews with professionals working for foreign and state-owned businesses. The quantitative analysis of the use of the four linguistic features is based on data drawn from interviews with twenty-eight managerial level professionals, fourteen of whom were from *waiqi* businesses and fourteen of whom were from state-owned enterprises. Each group has an equal number of women and men. All participants are native speakers of Beijing Mandarin and have above-college level education.⁴ A description of the four linguistic features, or variables, is given below.

Rhotacization of the syllable final involves the addition of a sub-syllabic retroflex [ɹ] to the syllable final, causing the final to become rhotacized (Chao 1968; Lu 1995). It is a prominent feature of Beijing Mandarin. Rhotacization contributes to a well-known stereotypical character of Beijing speech, that is, *er yin zhong* ‘heavy r-sounding.’ In the following example, the Pinyin and IPA of realization without rhotacization is followed by that with rhotacization.

- (1) ‘flower’ *huā* [hua] *huār* [huaɹ]

In addition to rhotacization, another feature also contributes to the so called heavy r-sounding impression of Beijing Mandarin. It is the lenition of retroflex syllable obstruent initials, /tɕ/, /tɕʰ/, and /ɕ/. When these retroflex ini-

tials are lenited, i.e. weakened, they are realized as a retroflex [ɻ]. In this study, quantitative analysis was conducted on the lenition of /s/, as exemplified in (2):

- (2) ‘student’ *xuésheng* [çyɛʂəŋ] *xuéreng* [çyɛɻəŋ]

The third feature is the interdental realization of dental sibilant syllable initials /ts/, /tsʰ/, and /s/ as [tθ], [tθʰ], and [θ] respectively. In this study, they are represented by /ts/, as shown in example (3).

- (3) ‘work’ *gōngzuò* [kuŋtsuo] *gōngthuò* [kuŋtθuo]

The fourth feature is the variable realization of a neutral tone in a weakly stressed syllable as a full tone. In Beijing Mandarin, every stressed syllable has a full tone with a fixed pitch value. When a syllable is weakly stressed, it has a neutral tone (e.g. Chao 1968). In other words, the pitch value of a neutral tone syllable is not fixed but determined by that of the preceding syllable. Although many northern Mandarin varieties also have a neutral tone, it is especially prominent in Beijing Mandarin. In contrast, most of the southern varieties, including the Cantonese, Min, and Wu varieties, have very limited use of the neutral tone (e.g. Chao 1968; Qian 1995). In recent years, Cantonese and Taiwan Mandarin have exerted influence on PTH (e.g. Chen 1991). One example of their influence on the phonology of PTH is the use of a full tone in a neutral tone environment (by northern Mandarin speakers). In the next example, the second syllable of *xiānsheng* ‘mister’ has a neutral tone in Beijing Mandarin (and PTH), but it has a high level tone if produced by a speaker whose native variety does not have neutral tones.

- (4) ‘mister’ *xiānsheng* [çiɛnʂəŋ] *xiānshēng* [çiɛnʂēŋ]

As discussed in Q. Zhang (2005), due to the prominence of neutral tone syllables in Beijing Mandarin, the use of a full tone in a neutral tone environment is socially significant in Beijing and is perceived as non-Beijing and non-Mainland. This feature has been a target of overt comments on the influence of Hong Kong-Taiwan accents on PTH. In my interviews, this feature was also used by many interviewees to illustrate *gang-tai* (the local term for Hong Kong-Taiwan) influence on PTH.

It is worth pointing out that the variation of the first three features is comparatively stable. In other words, they are in the linguistic repertoires of local Beijingers. In contrast, the use of a full tone instead of a neutral tone is a relatively recent phenomenon in Beijing and among northern Mandarin speakers. It is an example of recent linguistic innovations that to a great extent have to do with the influence from non-Mainland Mandarin varieties. Furthermore, the frequency of the first three features can be described along a Beijing vernacular–Putonghua continuum. In other words, more frequent use of rhotacization, lenition, and interdental (ts) is correlated, impressionistically, with a “strong” Beijing accent. Speakers who use these features less are perceived as having a local accent to a lesser degree, and approximating the standard variety. The variable realization of a neutral tone cannot be described along the same continuum. While more frequent use of a neutral tone indicates a Beijing accent, the use of the full tone variant cannot be described as approximating the Mainland standard variety.

4. Results

My earlier work (Q. Zhang 2001) quantitative analysis of the four sound features found sharp inter-group variation. As shown in Figure 1, state professionals used local Beijing features significantly more often than the *waiqi* professionals, and they did not use the new full tone variant. In other words, the non-local variant of each variable dominated the speech of the latter group. In an earlier paper (Q. Zhang 2005), I argued that the less frequent use of local features does not make the speech of *waiqi* professionals approximate PTH. Examining the use of the four features together, I showed that they selected and combined linguistic features from both local and supra-local sources to construct a new cosmopolitan variety of Mandarin that does not strictly conform to the norms of PTH. The difference between the two groups is related to their participation in different linguistic markets. The *waiqi* professionals participate in a transnational Chinese linguistic market where PTH is not the only valued variety. Other valued varieties include non-Mainland Mandarin varieties and foreign languages, particularly English. A non-local, cosmopolitan variety of Mandarin constitutes a form of symbolic capital which is positively valued on the transnational Chinese linguistic market. At the same time, the *waiqi* professionals use this non-local variety of Mandarin to construct a cosmopolitan professional identity that is distinctive from a state professional. In contrast, the

state professionals are engaged in the Mainland standard Mandarin linguistic market where PTH is the single standard variety. However, unlike the standard linguistic market described in Bourdieu (1977, 1991) in which the standard language (both the spoken and the written variety) is the norm against which the value of all other varieties is defined, linguistic hegemony in China is established primarily through written standard Chinese (Harrell 1993). Several earlier studies have shown that the value of PTH lies primarily in its function as a means of facilitating cross-regional/dialectal communication, though it has yet to become a form of symbolic asset necessary for accessing an elite status in China (Guo 1990; Zhu and Chen 1991). My interviews with the state professionals have reaffirmed that they value PTH primarily as a lingua franca. Moreover, unlike the *waiqi* professionals, the state employees do not express a widely shared association between speaking PTH without a local accent and their professional image.⁵




Figure 1. Comparison of use of four linguistic features by *Waiqi* and State professionals

This chapter focuses on gender variation. As shown in Figure 2, gender is realized differently in the two groups. Gender variation is moderate in the state group. Of all the features, only one – the interdental realization of (ts) – shows significant gender variation, with women using the local fea-

ture only 1% of the time while men use it 39% of the time. Among the *waiqi* professionals, however, women overwhelmingly lead their male colleagues in the use of the non-local variants associated with the cosmopolitan Mandarin variety. The interdental variable is the only feature that shows similar patterns in the two groups: Women in both groups eschew the interdental variant. The result indicates that this feature is primarily correlated with gender. Compared with the other three variables, the interdental variant has a much lower frequency even among the male speakers (*waiqi* men: 15%, state men: 39%). Such patterns may be related to the connection between this feature and a stigmatized local character type in the local language ideology. Several participants associated the interdental realization of (ts) with a stigmatized Beijing character, referred to locally as *hutong chuanzi*, ‘alley saunterer.’ *Hutong chuanzi* is a feckless lower-class male character who wanders around in the alleyways of the city, waiting for something to happen. A plausible explanation for women’s low use of the interdental variant is that the association with the image of an alley saunterer is more damaging to a woman’s character than that of a man. If a man saunters around aimlessly in alleys waiting for something to happen, he would appear to be feckless and lazy. A woman doing the same thing is likely to be suspected of having loose morals. In the following analysis, I discuss possible explanations for the different realizations of gender in the two groups.




Figure 2. Effects of gender and professional status on use of four linguistic features

5. Explanations for different gender effects in the two professional groups

To explain the differently gendered patterns in the two groups, we need to historicize the relation between gender and work, and gender as a site for the discursive construction and production of social identities (including professional identities). I suggest that the lack of salient gendered differentiation in the state group has its likely historical origins in state feminism, that is, state mandated women's emancipation through (female) gender erasure in public space (e.g. Barlow 1994; Croll 1995; Yang 1999). To explore explanations for the sharp gender variation in the *waiqi* group, I look into the local history of this group and demonstrate that differences in *waiqi* women's and men's career trajectories contribute to the different role that language plays in their work.

The different gender patterns in the linguistic practice of the two groups is only one aspect of gendered distinctions in the *waiqi* and state businesses. Such distinctions were apparent the moment I entered a foreign company. The decorative use of women to represent the public face of the company was more prevalent and conspicuous in the foreign companies than in the state companies that I visited. Every time I went to a foreign company or a representative office, I was greeted by a friendly, polite, and pleasant "face" representing the company, and this face was feminine. What constituted the public face of the companies typically included a front desk (often with a basket/vase of flowers), a young and pleasant-looking Chinese female receptionist or secretary, and her polite and soft greetings in Mandarin (or in both Mandarin and English if on the phone). The pleasant feminine front resembles the "pretty package" described in Kanter's study of American corporations (1993: 76). Such a feminine front was absent in most of the state companies that I visited. Most of the companies did not have such a clearly defined front desk or reception area as did the foreign companies. I either went directly to the manager's office if I had been told of their office location beforehand, or I had to find my way by asking whoever was encountered first after I had entered the workplace. In several cases, right after the interview, the manager introduced me to other employees either by doing this her/himself or by calling in a (subordinate) colleague or a secretary. In several companies, the secretary was a man. As the focus of the original study was on the linguistic practice of *waiqi* professionals, linguistic data from the state professionals was collected for comparative purposes. Hence,

in what follows, analysis of the state group is to a certain extent preliminary and speculative. More research is needed to examine the relation between gender and language among state professionals.

5.1. Gender, work, and language in the state group

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, women's emancipation and gender equality was pursued as part of the greater endeavor of eliminating social (i.e. class) inequality. In the three decades after 1949, state feminism changed the traditional gender division of labor so that a majority of Chinese women joined the waged-work forces and some took up traditional men's jobs, working as machine operators, truck drivers and construction workers (Croll 1995; Yang 1999). However, as women's liberation was treated as part of demolishing social inequalities, the Chinese Communist Party tried to abolish gender inequalities through erasing (feminine) gender difference so that women became the same as men (Barlow 1994; Dai 1995 – see also Yang, this volume). Although state feminism disrupted the traditional patriarchy and propelled women into the public sphere of socialist production, it also diminished the salience of (feminine) gender as a site where identity production took place (e.g. Yang 1999). By neutralizing femininity, the state managed to produce a specific kind of desexualized social identity in the public domain, reflected in sayings such as, “*Women dou shi shehui-zhuyi-de laodong-zhe*,” ‘We are all socialist laborers.’ As Rofel notes, “‘labor’ rather than, say, family, sexual desire, the psyche, consumption, religion, or any number of other realms of human activity under socialism served as the principal cultural site for the production of identities” (1999: 122). The influence of state feminism still remained in the state enterprises that I visited. This is one factor that contributes to gender being less salient in both the corporate image and the linguistic style of the professionals in the state sector.

Another factor is the role of gender in the ways in which professionals in the two groups claimed access to their jobs. Among the state professionals interviewed, the majority of them, who graduated from college in the 1980s, were *assigned* to a state enterprise through the traditional job assignment system. Under this system work opportunities were controlled and allocated to college graduates by the state, regardless of gender. Although gender discrimination exists in the job assignment system (e.g. Hooper 1984; Wang 2003), none of the women professionals in the state

group was recruited for positions that serve the public face of their corporation. Whereas the state played a central role in the job allocation of the state professionals, among the *waiqi* professionals it was the market that allocated jobs in the foreign business sector. Gender was a crucial factor in the recruitment as well as the career paths of the *waiqi* professionals. As shown in the following discussion, language also played different roles in the recruitment and career trajectories of the *waiqi* professionals.

5.2. *Gender, work and language in the waiqi group*

The advent of the market economy and a sweeping consumer revolution have led to the decline of state feminism and a return to delineating (hetero)sexuality and gender differences (Hooper 1998; Ling 1999; Yang 1999). New gendered occupations give women and men access to jobs and economic opportunities that capitalize on (naturalized) gender-specific characteristics (e.g. Lee 1998; Lei 2003). Labor and work are increasingly gendered so that more and more women work in jobs that serve as the public face of business corporations (Z. Zhang 2000). Gender as well as language skills were found to be crucial in the ways in which the *waiqi* professionals were recruited by their companies. Based on the interviews with the *waiqi* professionals, I found that despite their comparable current positions, women and men went through different career trajectories. Furthermore, although most of them capitalized on their language skills, particularly foreign language skills, language played different roles in their career paths.

When foreign companies start their businesses in China, they have an office with all the necessary equipment and some managerial staff from their overseas headquarters. What they need immediately is a local person who can also speak their language to help them communicate with their Chinese partners, clients, and the bureaucracy. They also need a secretary. Hence, a lot of women are recruited as secretaries and assistants to higher management for their decorative value and their foreign language skills. Women's work in the corporation is more related to the presentation of the company, as receptionists, secretaries, and public relations personnel. Such a gendered character of work in the *waiqi* businesses has, on the one hand, to do with gendered practice in their parent corporations. Gender segregation is prevalent in Western corporations (e.g. Abrahamson and Sigelman 1987; Kanter 1993; Walby 1988). On the other hand, it should be noted that

the gendered recruitment practice is not simply a result of Western corporations transferring gendered practice to their local operations. It is also related to local political and economic circumstances. Studies such as Lee (1998), Chang and Ling (2000), and Elias (2005) have repeatedly demonstrated that global capitalists always respond to and work with existing local gender relations and ideologies to justify gendered practices to their advantage. In addition, according to studies by Hooper (1984, 1998) and Z. Zhang (2000), local Chinese individuals (i.e. job seekers and employees), employers, and the media also capitalize on naturalized gender characteristics. As Yang (1999: 63) points out, “the new market economy harbors retrograde forces” that exacerbate gender discrimination and segregation in the labor market as well as other private and public spheres. What I would like to point out here is that the effect of gendered recruitment practice on linguistic practice was especially prominent in the *waiqi* women I interviewed (i.e. a majority of them were hired for front-end positions). However, this was not the case among the women in the state sector.

Among the female *waiqi* participants, regardless of their college majors and previous experiences, all but one started from a secretarial position. As Catherine, the assistant chief representative of a multinational corporation, recalled in her interview:

Although I majored in International Finance, I was recruited by my first company as a secretary in '87 mainly because I could speak and write English well. In fact I thought I was overqualified for the position, but I had to get started from working as a secretary. I could see that with my finance knowledge and previous experiences, I could do a better job than my supervisor, an American lady. But I had to take orders from her, because she was directly appointed by the headquarters....

Later, some women were promoted to managerial positions as they became more experienced, but they moved up along the margins of the market. By contrast, the male professionals started their careers in the foreign businesses by doing “real” business work, such as marketing and sales.

The career trajectories of Jenny, Michael, and Sheldon provide a good example. I was introduced to Michael and Sheldon through their mutual friend, Jenny. The three all majored in German in college. They have been friends since their days working as Chinese-German interpreters for a government organization. When I interviewed them, Jenny and Sheldon were both chief representatives of the Beijing offices of German companies, and

Michael was the product manager of a German manufacturing company. While their German language background was a major factor in their recruitment into the foreign business sector, Jenny started as an assistant to a German chief representative and worked her way up to her current position, whereas her two male friends both started their *waiqi* careers in sales.

Some women, even after being promoted to a higher position, still had to cover some secretarial and administrative responsibilities. This was the case with Jane, quoted below. She was hired a year after she received her BA degree in English. At the time of the interview she was a VP (vice president) of marketing in a French company (underlined words were originally said in English):

Originally, I was the secretary to the chief representative [who was from France]. I worked as a secretary for two years. Later, in the beginning of my third year, I asked to, like, work in the marketing department. Then, at the end of the third year, one year, I requested for one year, then, I was transferred to the marketing department where I am now. But I am not completely separate from secretarial work. So, I still do most of the secretary's work plus *sales* and *administrative* work also.

Although the sample in this study was small, the gendered character of recruitment and career trajectory is likely to be a common phenomenon in the foreign business sector, as attested by the following examples from the supplementary data collected during my fieldwork. In a 1997 issue of *China Foreign Service*, a Chinese magazine that caters to professionals in foreign businesses, there was a section called “photo collection of the white-collar” (*China Foreign Service* 1997: 40), where photos and short biographies of featured professionals were published. Four female professionals were featured in that issue. Despite differences in their current positions and companies, they were all foreign language majors: Three majored in English and one in Japanese.

The gendered character of recruitment is further supported by evidence from some of the job advertisements collected at a job fair for foreign businesses and sino-foreign joint ventures (August 29–30, 1997, Beijing). When gender was specified as a requirement of the position hired, women were preferred for front-end positions: secretaries, administrative assistants, and receptionists.⁶ Jobs advertised for the same companies that recruited males only included sales engineers, sales assistants, project managers, technical engineers, and international trade market representatives. Al-

though an official record of the sex ratio of professionals in foreign businesses is unavailable, a survey of white-collar jobs in Beijing found that secretarial work in foreign corporations was rapidly feminized (Yao 1998).

As most of the *waiqi* professionals in my study were among the first generation of Chinese employees in foreign businesses, working in a foreign company was a new experience for them. Although some of them had previous work experience when they joined their first foreign company, they still had to learn how to be a professional in the international business sector. Since the female professionals started from front end positions, a large part of their learning involved the use of language to project the public face of their corporations, whereas their male colleagues' learning focused more on doing business. Dong, a chief representative, described her learning experience when she first started as a secretary, "I learned for the first time in my life what a company secretary means... I had to learn everything from scratch, even had to learn how to answer phone calls."

As a large number of women were hired as "language technicians" (Sankoff and Laberge 1978) in the early years of their career in foreign businesses, women constituted part of the symbolic capital of their corporations from the very beginning of their careers. Language, itself an important form of symbolic capital, became the cornerstone of their future success in the business world. Although most of the *waiqi* professionals emphasized the importance of presenting the corporate image of their companies through speaking and dress style, women shouldered more responsibilities in presenting the front face of their company in everyday work than their male colleagues. The front face of an international corporation is professional, modern, global-oriented, and last but not least, distinctive from a state-owned company. In this connection, work imposes greater constraints on female professionals than on their male counterparts to make stricter use of the cosmopolitan Mandarin variety.

6. Conclusion

This comparison of the linguistic practices of the two professional groups indicates that a new cosmopolitan variety of Mandarin has become a form of valuable linguistic capital for the *waiqi* professionals on the global market. It is also a symbolic resource that these professionals use to present a new cosmopolitan professional identity (Q. Zhang 2005). Comparison of the two groups also shows the differential ways that gender is realized

through linguistic variation. I have argued that the different significance of gender is one dimension of the different gender dynamics in the two types of corporations, manifested in recruitment practices and the role of women in the corporations. The moderate gender variation in the state group is inseparable from the weakened salience of gender in work and work-based identities in these state corporations, where the influence of more than three decades of state feminism still lingers on. The sharp linguistic variation in the *waiqi* group is part and parcel of the saliency of gender in the work of *waiqi* professionals. The examination of recruitment and career trajectories reveals different linguistic biographies in which language serves different roles in the careers of the *waiqi* women and men. The greater use of the non-local features by *waiqi* women is inseparable from their work in front-end positions and their roles in serving the public face of their companies.

This study has implications for the study of language and gender in contexts of globalization. The differential significance of gender in the linguistic practice of the two groups drives home the need to link investigation of synchronic linguistic variation/practice to broader historical, political and economic contexts. I have shown that the different inter-group gender variation is intimately related to the changing significance of gender in the production and presentation of work-based identities, as well as the changing role of gender in the access and allocation of employment opportunities. In seeking explanations for the drastic gender difference within the *waiqi* group, in addition to considering the influence from the Western corporate culture, the local history of the newly emerged professional group and the career paths of the individuals under study have illuminated gendered linguistic biographies that contribute to differences in their present linguistic practice. While it is now a common practice to look both locally and globally in studies of the relation between language and globalization, this study suggests that we may also need to look to the past to elucidate understanding of gendered patterns of linguistic variation in the present.

Notes

1. Coupland (2003) is an introduction to a special issue of *Journal of Sociolinguistics* devoted to sociolinguistics and globalization.
2. The transliteration system used in this chapter is Pinyin, the official romanization system used in the People's Republic of China.

3. H. Zhang (2002) reports that in a 2001 survey of 30,000 college students conducted by the Chinese magazine, *China University Students Career Guide*, foreign enterprises were favored by many respondents. Among the top 20 named enterprises that were chosen as the first-choice enterprise to work for, 12 were large Western companies including Microsoft, IBM, and Motorola.
4. All twenty-eight professionals have a Bachelor's degree. Two of the *waiqi* professionals have a Master's degree in Business Administration (MBA).
5. In Zhang (2005) I explained in detail why the state professionals did not consider speaking PTH without a local accent (i.e. Beijing accent in their case) as an important aspect of their professional image.
6. Two companies were hiring front desk receptionists. Although there was no separate gender specification in the job description, the appellation *xiaojie*, 'Miss', in the Chinese job title *qiantai jiedai xiaojie*, 'front desk reception Miss', makes it an exclusively female position.

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Chapter 13

Gender and interaction in a globalizing world: Negotiating the gendered self in Tonga^{*}

Niko Besnier

1. Gender and language in microscopic and macroscopic perspectives

One of the more important developments in our understanding of the relationship between language and gender in the last couple of decades is the recognition that the gendering of language is semiotically complex. Indeed, linguistic forms and practices do not define “women’s language” and “men’s language”, as earlier researchers argued (e.g., Lakoff 1975), but articulate with a host of social categories and processes that surround gender and help construct it. The clearest articulation of this position is Ochs’ (1992) demonstration that gendered linguistic practices are both *indexical* and *indirect*. Indexicality captures the insight that features of language (phonological, syntactic, discursive, etc.) “point to”, or suggest, gendered identities, and do not refer to gender in an unequivocal fashion, as linguistic symbols would. In this respect, the relationship between language and gender is no different from the relationship between language and any other aspect of socio-cultural identity, as we have known since the early days of sociolinguistics (Labov 1966a). However, the indexical linking of language and gender presents another layer of complexity: linguistic resources are semiotically connected to gender through the mediation of other aspects of the socio-cultural world. For example, features of language and interaction invoke social roles (e.g., mother, CEO, construction worker), demeanors (e.g., politeness, authority, or the lack thereof), and activities (e.g., forms of work and play), all of which are *in turn* indexically associated with gender (see Figure 1). This conceptualization of the relationship of language and gender falls in line with developments in feminist anthropology since the 1970s, which locate gender at the “crossroads” (di Leonardo 1991) of an entire panoply of social processes and categories. The researcher’s task in

understanding the workings of gender in its social and cultural context consists in contextualizing gender among pertinent socio-cultural processes.

While we have made much progress in understanding language and gender in local and contemporary contexts (e.g., Bucholtz & Hall 2004; Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 2003; Holmes and Meyerhoff 2003), we still have a superficial understanding of the way in which larger-scale dynamics construct the indirect indexical link between language and gender. By “large scale” I am thinking in particular of the often-covert yet important role that the extra-local and the historical play in constituting the mapping of language onto gender. Take, for example, history. A pertinent illustration of the importance of historicizing “gendered language” is Inoue’s (2002, 2006, this volume) analysis of how features of the morphological structure of the Japanese language came to acquire gendered meaning over the course of Japan’s modern history. The morphological features in question consist primarily of honorific sentence-final discourse markers, without which a Japanese sentence is often not complete, but whose meaning is often complex, multifarious, and context-bound. Tracing the changes in the use of these markers since the advent of Japanese modernity, Inoue demonstrates that they have not always marked gender. Indeed, the emergence of gendered features of language is historically tied to gender ideologies that fueled the nationalistic modernity that ensued from the 1868 Meiji Restoration. These ideologies constructed woman as “good wife and wise mother”, and came to manufacture a “women’s language” that supposedly embodied this new target identity.¹




Figure 1. The indirect indexicality of the language-and-gender linkage (adapted from Ochs 1992)

Works like Inoue's that take history seriously encourage us to bring into our focus of analysis larger social forces (in this case the history of nation-building and ideologies of modern identities) that are located far from the textual materials that constitute the focus of traditional sociolinguistics and discourse analysis. Attention to these forces demonstrates not only that synchronic semiotic linkages between language and gender are historically contingent, but also that their constitution is the result of important extra-linguistic (and non-trivial) aspects of human existence, such as historical embeddedness. My aim here is to introduce into the debate another important aspect of the "macro-context" that informs language and gender, namely globalization.

Globalization of course wins the popularity contest among topics of concern to contemporary socio-cultural anthropology. The consensus that emerges from the discipline (e.g., Edelman and Haugerud, 2004; Jameson and Miyoshi 1998; Mills 2003, to cite only a few) is that globalization offers local lives both new opportunities and constraints, sometimes ambiguously so. For example, global forces may provide new forms of imagined experience, through television soap operas, the Internet, and white-collar work, for example, to persons hitherto excluded from the experiences and horizons associated with them. At the same time, globalization has all-too-well documented nefarious effects, a simple example of which is the economic enslavement of people to menial and unstable work (e.g., migrant domestic work, call-center employment, employment in *maquiladoras* south of the US–Mexico border) that corporate-controlled global development have engendered.

If we have learned anything from the now substantial ethnographic literature on globalization in the last two decades, it is that it is never the simple imposition of new forms of experience onto local contexts (as commentators like Barber 1996 would have us believe). Rather, globalization informs and transforms people's lives, creating new forms of agency as easily as it perpetrates structures that are continuous with the past. Furthermore, following Appadurai's (1990) consequential insight, we must understand globalization as operating on different levels at once in the lives of those whom it touches most directly. It affects the symbolic, through the valorization of certain symbols at the expense of others. Globalization also works in material fashion, shaping social relations, economic conditions, and social practices. It shapes identities and the lived experience of persons. It is this multiplicity of levels at which globalization operates and its ambiguity that I attempt to illustrate in this chapter, which I design as a programmatic

illustration of how one can approach some of these complexities by focusing on the work of globalization in one setting, and demonstrating how a focus on language can help us make sense of them.

2. Tonga at the convergence of transnational movements

My ethnographic data come from Tonga, a quintessentially transnational society centered on an island nation-state in the South Pacific (see also Philips, this volume). The population of the islands is approximately 100,000, to which we must add approximately 150,000 people of Tongan descent residing in the urban centers of the Pacific Rim: Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, Sydney, Melbourne, and Auckland. The diaspora is of recent vintage, as few Tongans migrated from the islands prior to the 1970s. Nuku'alofa, the capital of the island nation, where I conducted my field research, is a town of about 25,000 inhabitants. Tongan society is an elaborately stratified society headed by a king, in which everyone is ostensibly ranked with respect to everyone else. Rank permeates all aspects of social life, and is the subject of considerable anxiety, maintained through the avoidance of shame (*mā*) in both public and private contexts. Tongan society is also highly centralized, at least in the islands.

Unified as a kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, Tonga experienced colonialism as a British protectorate for over a century. Today, its productive economy is based on the export of agricultural products to such destinations as Japan and New Zealand, but the general economy depends in substantial ways on foreign aid from New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, and on labor migrations to these countries. The king and important members of his family control many of the important resources in the islands, including a significant proportion of the land and modernity-steeped resources like the Internet suffix, the telephone country code, and the airspace above the islands. Other forms of wealth are largely controlled by a nobility that overlaps in part with a cadre of entrepreneurs who have managed to tap into the possibilities for enrichment that diasporic dispersal has made possible. Before the advent of diasporic dispersal, non-traditional resources (e.g., commerce) were largely in the hands of part-Tongan families descended from European traders who settled in the islands in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Globalization figures prominently in the lives of all Tongans. Virtually everyone in the islands has at least one close relative in long-term residence

in the diaspora. The economic lives of islanders is intertwined with those of their relatives in the diaspora, and traditional patterns of reciprocity now span thousands of miles across several countries. Nevertheless, globalization in Tonga remains primarily a matter of ethnoscape, i.e., the movement of people, as well as the movement of objects that accompany people. Absent from Tonga are call centers, sweatshops, and other manifestations of the corporate appropriation of globalization found in other parts of the developing world (e.g., Cravey 1998; Freeman 1999). Only a few Tongans in the islands can watch the limited television offerings, and the lives of most are largely unaffected by the Internet.² While classic globalization-related economic policies like privatization and “good governance” have had an impact on the local economy, the country has not been subjected directly to globalize economic forces like IMF-prescribed “structural adjustments”. For the most part, the movements of ideas, economic policies, and media representations piggyback on the movement of people.³

As is the case in other ethnographic contexts, language use acts as a powerful index of identity. The two languages implicated here are Tongan, a Polynesian language that functions as the code of daily interaction in the islands, and English, a code associated with the colonial past, modernity, diasporic dispersal, and its cosmopolitan possibilities. Most Tongans in the Kingdom hold a strong allegiance to Tongan and, despite proverbial complaints voiced by cultural conservatives about the decline of the language (e.g., Taufe’ulungaki 1991), language shift is confined principally to the diaspora, where many second-generation Tongans grow up without learning the language. In the islands, code choice between Tongan and English is determined by a number of factors, the most crucial of which are rank and social class. While non-elite Tongans who use English too prominently in their daily lives risk being ridiculed for not knowing their place in the system or not being true to their Tongan identity, the high-ranking and the wealthy can afford to use English without running this risk or experiencing this anxiety, since they control the local relevance of global resources, both symbolic and material, as well as local ones.

3. Genders and globalization in Tonga

As is the case of Western Polynesia in general (Ortner 1981), the relationship between sisters and brothers is foundational to gender relations in the traditional Tongan social order, as many anthropologists have discussed

(e.g., Biersack 1996; Gailey 1987; Herda 1987; James 1992; Philips this volume; Rogers 1977). The sister–brother relationship structures not only kinship but also the entire polity, as other relationships, between chiefs and commoners for example, are metaphorically understood as sister–brother relationships (see also Philips, this volume). In the sister–brother dyad, the sister is socially and culturally superordinate to her brother. However, among commoners, this hierarchy is most relevant to kinship-based contexts (e.g., domestic, local, family-level); only when the status of sisters is enhanced by high rank or wealth does it become publicly consequential. In other configurations of relatedness, women are subordinate to men (e.g., in the wife–husband dyad), and in most public contexts women’s power is muted. Gender is therefore already complex and contingent in its traditional forms. The analysis that follows focuses on additional ways in which Tongan women’s identities as women are complex and contingent.

The other gendered identity that I analyze is that of a small but very visible minority of transgender people, males who sometimes cross-dress, sometimes occupy women’s spheres, sometimes engage in sexual relations with non-transgender men, and always defy generalization. Mainstream Tongans generally call these gendered betwixt-and-betweens *fakaleiti* (literally ‘like a lady’) or *fakafefine* (‘like a woman’), while they refer to themselves as *leitī* or, in Tongan-accented English, ‘ladies’ (see Besnier 1994, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004a for further discussion). *Leitī* identity is the focus of contestation in daily life: while *leitī* make claims to some form of femininity, usually emphasizing the glamorous and cosmopolitan, mainstream Tongans constantly challenge these claims. Even when the context is viewed as inconsequential, mainstream people invariably try to “expose” *leitī* for “what they really are” in their eyes, i.e., men. However, mainstream Tongans do hold in some regard certain aspects of *leitī* identity, such as the creativity that is associated with them, and particular *leitī* individuals, who are viewed for example as particularly creative or hard-working. Public attitudes toward *leitī* are also changing rapidly, although not uniformly, as I will illustrate presently.

Tongan gender identity formation in the context of modernity, transnationalism and globalization has received considerably less ethnographic attention than in the traditional order (with a few exceptions, such as Besnier 2002; Gailey 1992; Philips 2003). In Tonga, women, men and *leitī* are equally transnational. In contrast to many other parts of the world, migrating is not gendered. Rather, ease of access to transnationalism is a matter of rank and wealth: for example, while elites have relatively little trouble se-

curing visas to travel to or live in New Zealand, Australia, and the U.S., non-elites must post substantial bonds even for short-term visit to relatives or for medical treatment in these countries. Nevertheless, globalization and transnationalism are gendered in subtle ways: women's appropriation of global symbols, such as the use of English for mundane interaction with other Tongans, is less threatening to their identity as women than men's appropriation of the same symbols is to their identity as men. Thus a non-elite man who speaks "too much" English or seeks the company of Westerners too eagerly runs the danger of being identified as a *leitī* without displaying any sign of femininity. As a result, women speak English more readily than men, and with fewer consequences. Nevertheless, unless they are high-ranking or wealthy, they must still exert caution, particularly if their fluency in English leaves something to be desired, as even they can be ridiculed if others perceive them to be "putting on airs" through their use of the language of cosmopolitanism. Mainstream Tongan society controls the appropriation of symbols of globalism, of which language use is an excellent barometer, through the threat of shame (*mā*).

The one group that flaunts these normative expectations with abandon are *leitī*, who regularly present themselves as considerably more cosmopolitan than their wealth or status allows, and who speak English without hesitation even when their competence is minimal (while nevertheless accusing each other of being "hurry mouth, no grammar"). Because they flout so much normativity anyway in multiple respects, *leitī* are considerably more impervious to shame than mainstream Tongans (Besnier 2002). In fact, this imperviousness and the "putting on of airs" that it allows have become part and parcel of their identity, on equal footing with femininity.

4. Negotiating globality at the secondhand marketplace

The first context of Tongan social life in which I will investigate gender formation in a globalizing context is a secondhand marketplace on the edge of Nuku'alofa, the capital of the country. Immensely popular with every segment of Tongan society, the market is one of the most prominent settings where Tonga engages with the rest of the world. This engagement is material in its most obvious forms, but it is also multi-faceted, as I will show presently. The market began in the 1980s, as informal stalls sprung up on empty lots adjacent to the main produce market in the middle of town. It progressively grew larger and increased in popularity, to the point

that it had to shift to the outskirts of town, where it is now squatting on land that belongs to the Fisheries Division. It is makeshift, indecorous, and marginal even in its physical location away from the town center, as well as subversive, because it seriously challenges elite control of commerce and state control of imported goods. Over-represented among sellers and shoppers are women, as well as “local Others” (Mormons, small-scale entrepreneurs, Charismatic Christians, returned migrants, Chinese traders). The secondhand marketplace is where non-elite women based in the islands engage with globalizing modernity, in contrast to non-elite men, who do so through cash crops and organized entrepreneurial ventures.⁴

The marketplace derives its transnational quality not so much from people but from objects. Most objects for sale are secondhand or remaindered goods received by sellers from diasporic relatives, as supplements to or instead of the monetary remittances that migrants are expected to send to their island-based relatives (Brown 1998; Evans 1999; Faeamani 1995). Marketplace goods are thus part of a large-scale system of delayed reciprocity grounded in traditional kinship-based obligations, particularly the expectation that brothers meet the material needs of their sisters, and that sisters often rely on one another (and thus many objects are sold by women who received them from their siblings). Sending objects rather than money allows migrants to circumvent the poverty debt industry in industrialized countries, such as money-transfer corporations that charge exorbitant service fees. Recipients often “bypass” customs and portage charges by claiming their cargo at customs during a relative’s shift, thus eluding state control and valuation. Since clothing is particularly well adapted to these circumstances, and since being well-dressed is important in Tonga, clothes are the most prominent commodities on offer at the marketplace (cf. Hansen 2000).

At the marketplace, consumption is transformed into pleasure and vice-versa, and consumption and pleasure become intertwined with global modern desires (Besnier 2004b). People come to shop here, browsing and “window licking” in a way that does not take place in the established and elite-owned (and relatively poorly stocked) shops in town, where any evidence of loitering will bring upon browsers the unwelcome attention of security guards. At the marketplace, people also engage in “shopping talk” of a kind generally not heard elsewhere in the country, particularly “fashion talk” since clothing is the most prominent offering. Talk, in fact, is a primary means through which the juxtaposition of desire, consumption, and globality operate.

Seller: That's the in-thing in New Zealand now. Even my kids say, "Mummy, see, it has to show the b-!" Huh! I say, "No:::, no::!" Ahahahuh-hh! Cuz that's the look now!

[Tu'imatamoana, disk 1, 1:47: 55–48: 47]

This interaction illustrates nicely how marketplace participants negotiate the tension between the local and the global. Focusing first on the content of the interaction, we hear the seller present a "sales pitch" of a kind rarely heard at other commercial sites, and then seize the opportunity to display her awareness of what's fashionable in New Zealand, and hence her worldliness. The shopper comments on the problematic implementation of the foreign style she describes, since leaving body parts like belly-buttons exposed is locally indecorous. The seller agrees, albeit in what appears to be a face-saving afterthought, and together they construct a body of worldly knowledge about fashion, but also assert their agentive prerogative to decide on the local appropriateness of these symbols, carefully monitoring each other's moral evaluations. Later, the seller ascribes to herself and her children an interaction that sounds distinctly modern in a Tongan context, one in which children negotiate parents' benign authority over how they should dress in a good-natured tone that emphasizes egalitarian relations. Both seller and customer emerge as modern and cosmopolitan agents, who nevertheless remain grounded in local norms of appropriateness.

A notable formal feature of the interaction is language choice. Besides two instances of code-switching to Tongan, most of the interaction is in English, including the quoted interaction between the mother and her children. As mentioned earlier, English "belongs" primarily to the elites along with other tokens of globality. Non-elite Tongans are often reluctant to speak English, ostensibly because they fear making linguistic mistakes, according to explanations commonly offered. In practice, their reluctance is not so much a matter of defective grammatical competence, but of not having the social self-assurance to assert oneself credibly as a privileged, modern, and cosmopolitan person without fearing shame (*mā*) and exposing oneself to ridicule (Besnier 2003). In the above interaction, however, neither seller nor customer seems particularly concerned with these anxieties, even though the seller's English displays some of the features typical of broadly accented Pacific Island English (e.g., "*it's* might fit you", "one of those *one* that *it* has to show").

Of additional interest is the fact (not visible in the transcript) that the seller not only speaks English, but also pronounces certain words with an exaggerated New Zealand accent. For example, she renders the first vowel of “Zealand” as a central vowel [ə] (schwa, i.e., the phonetic value of short unstressed vowels in standard English, such as the second vowel sound of “Zealand”). The phonetic centralization of certain vowels is specific to New Zealand English (Bauer 1994), but it is principally the short lax vowel [ɪ] (as in “kid”) that can be rendered as such; the first long high tense vowel [i:] is only sometimes centralized in a word like “Zealand” in the speech of very “local” New Zealand speakers. The seller’s linguistic behavior is an example of what sociolinguists customarily call “hypercorrection”, long documented in industrial societies as an index of a variety of inter-related socio-cultural attributes, including weak solidarity with members of one’s own social group and the yearning to be perceived as aligned with a social group that the speaker considers to be socially desirable (Labov 1966b). Through her exaggerated pronunciation, the seller communicates to others that she is familiar with the subtleties of New Zealand English and, by the same token, with all that the dialect stands for in Tonga, including a certain transnational sophistication and familiarity with urban modernity. She also distances herself from Tongan-accented English (with some difficulty at the level of syntax) and all that it represents in the New Zealand context, including the stigma of being an underclass “Islander”, whose vowels are never centralized. Indirectly, she is also attempting to present herself not just as part of the context that stigmatizes accented English, but also as part of those who are not stigmatized.

Topics of conversation, moral stances, code switching, syntax, and phonology all conspire to place this interaction, which is typical of the marketplace, at the center of a complex intersubjective negotiation between the expanded horizons that globality offers and the local symbolic and social order. The very act of selling is also constantly under scrutiny at the marketplace, in equally ambiguous ways. Tongans traditionally considered commerce shameful because they saw it as evidence that one was not holding one’s own in the gift economy. In more modernity-oriented contexts, selling is less stigmatized but not completely free of negative morality (see Besnier 2004b for further discussion). Neither globality nor locality, neither the seller nor the customer, comes out the “winner” of the negotiations. Rather, the conversation presents different possibilities and constraints, which the protagonists accept, reject, and revise intersubjectively. They do so by utilizing the microscopic resources of language, through which they

negotiate the macroscopic value of large-scale dynamics like modernity, globalization, and transnationalism. And they do so while mulling over a blouse brought in from a larger world, whose appropriateness to the local context remains undecided at the end of the conversation. The customer did not buy the blouse.

5. Negotiating globality at the transgender beauty pageant

The second context of Tongan social life through which I investigate the relationship among language, gender, and global processes is the national contest that *leitī* organize every year, the Miss Galaxy beauty pageant. Remember that *leitī* have a particular affinity to globalization, and that their appropriation of the symbols of cosmopolitanism have become just as central to their identity as their claims to femininity.

Nowhere are these dynamics more evident than at the pageant. Over the years, the pageant has transformed itself from an underground event held in the early 1990s in dingy dance clubs before drunken male audiences into a national affair endorsed by the patronage of prominent female members of the royal family and eagerly attended by the cream of Tongan and “Expatriate” society. Today it is held in the Queen Sālote Memorial Hall, the most prominent public venue in the country, and it showcases transgender contestants who vie for substantial prizes of a transnational nature, not surprisingly: in 2005, the winner received a round-trip to Los Angeles donated by Tonga’s national airline, upgraded from a trip to Auckland in prior years. These historical transformations both mirror and contribute to the gradual changes in mainstream attitudes toward *leitī*, changes that are neither uniform nor devoid of second thoughts. For example, while the government-controlled newspaper timidly began publishing post-hoc reports of the pageant in its back pages in the late nineties (Besnier 2002: 560), today the Parliament of Tonga’s official website sports the following (still somewhat distanced) announcement: “As an entertainment event more than anything else, there is also a Miss Galaxy competition, where *fakaleiti*’ or drag queens have their own beauty pageant. This event is popular for its outrageous behaviour and comedy” (Parliament of Tonga 2005).

It is at the pageant that *leitī* can assert most publicly their claims to cosmopolitan glamour, with relatively little challenge from mainstream society. The contestants, poor and low ranking in everyday life, as well as mar-

ginalized because of their gendering, don for the pageant extravagant costumes and parade before a large and distinguished audience, displaying themselves in as much feminine glamour as their physiology affords them, and laying claims to an identity over which local moral codes have no stronghold, at least for a couple of nights a year.



Figure 2. One of the contestants in the Miss Galaxy 2000 pageant readjusts her bra which had fallen off during her outrageous dance performance, causing general hilarity

Not surprisingly, the pageant is conducted almost entirely in English. The problem is that most contestants' command of the language of cosmopolitanism leaves much to be desired. While their level of competence does not hinder them much in everyday contexts, it is more problematic before the pageant audience, who lie in wait for the first opportunity to see the contestant slip, be it a slip of clothing, slip of the foot, or slip of the tongue. Nothing generates more uproarious peals of audience laughter than a "wardrobe malfunction" like a bra sliding off a contestant's flat male chest or a wig falling off, which some audience members, after a few drinks, try to provoke (Figure 2).⁶

It is during the interview event that *leitī*'s competence in the language of cosmopolitanism is most open to scrutiny. In this part of the pageant, the *compère* asks each contestant in turn a (usually rather inane) question, first

in English and then in Tongan to ensure that the contestant has understood it. Theoretically, contestants have the choice of answering in either English or Tongan. Most cautiously choose Tongan, but this choice “proves” to the audience that they are unable to substantiate their nonverbal claims to cosmopolitanism through language competence. When a contestant does answer in English, which sometimes happens, the audience bursts out laughing at the slightest slip. At the 1997 pageant, which I have analyzed in detail elsewhere (Besnier 2002), the audience initially reacted with a loud murmur of temporary admiration for the courage that contestant Masha Entura (stage name of hairstylist Mo’ale), not known for being particularly worldly, displayed as she began speaking in seemingly effortless American-accented English. However, Masha soon stumbled, as she searched for an English word while waving her hand campily, while the audience, satisfied with the expected proof of the fraudulence of her claim to cosmopolitanism, began hooting and ridiculing, forcing her to abort her brave attempt (Figure 3):

(2) Emcee: What would you say about being a hairstylist, or- being- a working- what- what does it mean, like, to be working at Joy’s Hair Styles? ((sotto voce, summarizes the question in Tongan)) *Ko e hā e me’a ‘oku ke fai ‘i he hair salon?*

Masha: ((takes cordless mike)) Well thank you very much. ((audience laughs, then shouts with admiration and encouragement)) If you want your hair to be curled, ((beckons with her hand)) come over. ((audience explodes in laughter and whooping, Masha laughs and then becomes serious and requests silence with the hand)) Uh, I like it very much, and uh- I enjoy working there, with uhmm- ((pauses, word-searches, waves her hand, audience explodes in laughter, drowning the remainder of the answer)) blowers, ((unable to finish, mouths)) (thank you). ((hands mike back and returns to her position))

[1997:Sony:4 0:02:45–0:03:55]

Linguistically and otherwise, pageant contestants are caught between a rock and a hard place: if they answer in English and make mistakes, the audience ridicules them, and if they answer in Tongan, they demonstrate that they are unable to carry through the artifice of cosmopolitanism to its logical end. The ridicule that greets the choice of Tongan is congruent with

many other aspects of mainstream Tongans' attitudes towards *leitī*, both at the pageant and in day-to-day interactions. Mainstream Tongans indeed consider *leitī* identity as essentially bogus: here are these men pretending to be women, and not just any women but cosmopolitan sophisticates, and yet they cannot even maintain their end of a simple conversation in English. In day-to-day interactions between *leitī* and mainstream Tongans, the latter often express mock annoyance at the "fraudulence" of *leitī* self-presentation and identity, while *leitī* argue back with "proofs" that they are "real women".



Figure 3. Masha word-searches the word "blowers" during her interview answer

However, like all ideological linkages that generate inequality, these dynamics are not immune to contestation on the part of those whom they marginalize. This was powerfully illustrated by a minor humorous incident at the 1997 pageant, when one of the contestants, the quick-witted 'Āmini or Lady Amyland, sponsored by Joey's Unisex Hair Salon, turned the tables on the audience during the interview event (and, perhaps, on society at large, even if only for a fleeting moment). Before she has a chance to answer the *compère*'s question, Lady Amyland is heckled by a drunken *leitī* in the audience, who urges her to answer in English (*faka-Pālangi*). The heckling draws some laughter, since everyone knows that Lady Amyland's English is poor and that she would make a fool of herself if she tried. But 'Āmini's repartee wins the prize (Figure 4):



Figure 4. Lady Amyland savors the general hilarity that her quick-witted answer has provoked

- (3) Emcee: Miss Joey's Unisex Hair Salon! What do you have to say to promote Joey's Unisex Hair Salon? ((lowers voice, translating into Tongan)) *Ko e hā e me'a 'oku ke fai ke promote ai 'a e-* ((rolls eyes, searches for Tongan word)) *fakalalakaka ai 'a Joey's Unisex Hair Salon.*
- 'Ahi: ((heckling from audience)) *Faka-Pālangi, 'Āmini!*
- audience: ((laughter))
- 'Āmini: Sorry excuse me, I'm a Tongan ()
- ((rest of answer drowned by deafening laughter, vigorous applause, cat-calls))
- [1997:Sony:4 0:05:42–0:06:26]

Lady Amyland answers the heckler by reaffirming her Tongan identity and therefore her duty and privilege to answer the question in Tongan, an unexpected move which the audience (and any Tongan viewer of the video recording) found extremely humorous, because the claim is embedded in a context in which everything is done to foreground non-locality.⁷ What Lady Amyland is doing here is part of a wider tacit project on the part of at least some contestants to take greater charge of the pageant and its effect on the audience. This project consists in stripping the audience (and society at large) of its privilege to ridicule contestants, to take control of the boundary between humor and seriousness, and to redeem an identity that mainstream

society marginalizes by relegating it to the jocular. (All this while being roaring drunk.)

But the project goes further. Note that Lady Amyland asserts her claim to Tongan identity not in Tongan, but in English; the covert message being that one can assert one's Tonganness while controlling the tools with which one does so, and while using tools that are not part of the sanctioned repertoire. In addition, the preface of her repartee ("Sorry excuse me") is an inside joke which non-*leitī* audience members are unlikely to make sense of (a reference to another *leitī*'s awkward attempt, a few years earlier, to speak English to set up a prospective date with a tourist). The overall effect of Lady Amyland's repartee contests the power of dominant forces to dictate what counts as markers of locality and what does not, asserts that the claim to be part of the "galaxy" does not necessarily deny one's local identity; and proclaims that being a *leitī* does not mean giving up one's place in Tongan society.

6. Gender and language at the intersection of the global and local

The relationship between language and gender that I have discussed in this ethnographic context is clearly complex. There is no clear mapping between the two codes in use in Tonga and gender categories. Nor is there a clear mapping between English or Tongan and a particular prestige value. Tongan is the language of locality, associated with both high-prestige and low-prestige contexts and actions. English is the language of globality, modernity, and cosmopolitanism, but its local prestige value is not unmitigated (see Besnier 2003: 283–284 for further discussion).

For the two groups and contexts I have analyzed, sellers and customers at the paradoxically cosmopolitan second-hand marketplace, and transgender participants in the annual beauty pageant, language use and other markers of relative locality and globality offer different possibilities, which are tied to (enabled or restrained by) local dynamics of power and prestige. Market women can display some degree of global sophistication and cosmopolitanism within the safe confines of the second-hand marketplace, but do so with some caution, testing carefully the effect that these displays have on their interlocutors. They can appropriate global symbols with some degree of risk, and must negotiate intersubjectively the extent to which their appropriation allows them to remain grounded in local standards of moral-

ity and decency. Miss Galaxy contestants, in contrast, throw in the towel, having little to lose in the local context. Safely shielded at the pageant from too brutal forms of harassment by the height of the runway, they can make claims to belonging to a “galaxy” that goes way beyond the confines of the local moral strictures and standards of decency. The risk *they* run is being laughed off the stage, and again they must negotiate the balance between extravagance and credibility, which they know from everyday contexts is particularly delicate for them given mainstream society’s constant efforts to rob them of legitimacy.

In the Tongan context, and I propose in many other comparable ethnographic contexts, appropriations of tokens of globality are negotiated inter-subjectively, and thus are open to challenges. Here, anxiety surrounding rank, dignity, and shame figure prominently in these negotiations, as they do in all social relations in Tongan society. These concerns are all firmly grounded in the local context. In addition, the symbolic and material tools that Tongans also employ in these negotiations are part-and-parcel of a much larger structural context, including among other things diasporic dispersal, post-coloniality, and elite control of global resources, be they material or symbolic. Gender identities are thus formed at the unstable intersection of the local and the global, the microscopic and the macroscopic. If we are to understand the role of language in these dynamics, language and gender are indeed linked through structures of indirect indexicality, as is now well-understood, but the categories and processes that mediate the indexicality are themselves constructed at the intersection of the local and the global (and, as I discussed in the introduction, the historical). This claim is diagrammatically represented in Figure 5, a revision of Figure 1.




Figure 5. The local-global production of the language-and-gender linkage

I have developed an analysis of the role of globally informed linguistic resources in the construction of two different gendered identities, one the cosmopolitan modern woman, who defies the shame of selling, redefines her relationship to family, and displays her command of the world of fashion; the other of the cosmopolitan transgender, who walks the pageant catwalk with aplomb in front of royalty, has the self-possession to transgress the mainstream equation of gender, sex, and sexuality, and asserts her command of global tokens while not being entitled to them. The linguistic and social practices of members of these two groups illustrate the way in which social agents enlist the opportunities and constraints that the global context offers to fight local battles, to enforce or critique local inequalities, and contest local claims of privilege and authority. With Inoue (2002, 2006, this volume) and others, I propose that greater attention be paid in works on language and gender to large-scale structural conditions that link particular forms of language to particular forms of experience, and in turn to particular forms of identity. What I am adding here is an understanding of these structural conditions as they are offered by a globalized context, but also as people give them power and meaning (or lack thereof) in local contexts.

Notes

- * This chapter is based on fieldwork materials gathered in Tonga between 1994 and 2001, with permission from the Government of Tonga and funding from the Marsden Fund of the Royal Society of New Zealand and the Wenner Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. I originally prepared this paper as a keynote for the International Gender and Language Conference hosted by Sally McConnell-Ginet at Cornell University in June 2004. Thanks to Sally for her enduring kindness. I also presented versions of this paper at UCLA, Sarah Lawrence College, State University of California Long Beach, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, University of Heidelberg, and University of Amsterdam. I thank all my respondents in Tonga for their patience, audience members for their comments, and Bonnie McElhinny for inviting me to contribute to this volume. Segments of this paper have already appeared in Besnier (2003 and 2004b).
- 1. The sociolinguistic and discourse analytic literature on Japanese markers of politeness and gender is vast, and includes works by, among many others, Cook 2005; Shibamoto-Smith 1987; Okamoto 1995; and Sturtz Sreetharan 2004. The historical trajectory of their meanings has also preoccupied a sizeable number of scholars writing primarily in Japanese, such as Nakamura 2001.

2. The situation is quite different in the diaspora, where many people of Tongan descent partake in Internet-based discussion boards (Franklin 2003; Morton 1998).
3. These characterizations, however, may soon need to be revised, as the WTO accepted Tonga as a new member in early 2006, under relatively unfavorable conditions (Wallis 2006). Co-incidentally, the country is currently in serious fiscal and political crisis, exacerbated by the death of King Tāufa'āhau Tupou IV (1918–2006) and the accession of King Siaosi Tupou V, a firm believer in neoliberal reform. In November 2006, disaffected young Tongan men ransacked the capital's Central Business District, leaving it in ruins. Complex and ill-understood reasons motivated their actions, including the lack of employment opportunities, the slowness of political reforms, and the ruthlessness of immigration and deportation policies in countries to which Tongans seek to migrate. At the time of writing, Tonga's economic and political situation remains volatile.
4. I analyze the secondhand marketplace in greater detail in Besnier (2004b). The discussion that follows is drawn in part from that publication.
5. In this transcript I utilize standard conventions used in linguistic anthropology, originally developed by conversation analysts (see Atkinson and Heritage 1984). In standard Tongan orthography, superscript macrons indicate vowel gemination, apostrophes indicate glottal stops, and *ng* stands for a velar nasal stop.
6. When the pageant was held in smaller venues, inebriated audience members would routinely harass contestants. The runway at Queen Sālote Hall is too high to allow this harassment, and the move to this venue in 1997 has bestowed greater agency onto the contestants, although etiquette forces them to physically stoop down to high-ranking audience members, who sometimes take advantage of the situation. Ironically, the move to the larger venue was triggered by the Christian-inspired trans-phobia of certain government officials, who kicked the pageant out of the government-owned Dateline Hotel, the only international hotel in Nuku'alofa.
7. The humor already began with the heckle itself, which is uttered in Tongan, despite the fact it urges the contestant to speak English, and which refers to the contestant by his everyday name, rather than her transgender name.

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