Directors of Urban Change in Asia

Edited by
Peter J.M. Nas

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Bringing together a group of international scholars, *Directors of Urban Change in Asia* examines the influence of significant individuals who are 'directors' for urban change in an eclectic mix of Asian cities. These directors or change agents are actors who have an elaborate view on urban development and who are in a position to formulate and influence future developments. The two main questions addressed are: what do the directors of new urban developments envisage for the future and how do they manage to realize their ideas? The book discusses how, in the majority of cases, urban change has come about primarily as the result of visionary leaders—on national, regional and local levels. It also makes clear that the less successful cities have tended to lack such leaders.

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Frontispiece Guangzhou, Pearl River nocturne in the early 2000s.

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Contributors

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Soheila Shahshahani obtained her PhD from the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, New York in 1981. She is a faculty member at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, Iran. Her published work in urban anthropology concerns the cities of Kashan, Varameen, Esfahan and Tehran. Her doctoral research was carried out among a pastoral nomadic population, the Mamassani, in south-western Iran, and her book *The Four Seasons of the Sun* (in Persian) concerns modernization and women in the area. Her rural study was conducted in the cave-dwellers' village of Meymand in central Iran. She is Vice-President of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) and Executive Secretary of the Commission on Urban Anthropology of the IUAES.

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Acknowledgements

1
Introduction

Directors of urban change
Peter J.M.Nas

Questions[1]

Cities are the future and Asian cities hold the future. Notwithstanding relatively moderate levels of urbanization in many Asian countries, with an average of 47 per cent of the population living in cities, urban areas in this part of the world have acquired tremendous magnitudes. And the growth of these agglomerations will continue with projections for 2015 reaching population numbers of more than 26 million in Tokyo and Mumbai (Bombay) not far ahead of 21 million in Dhaka, 19 million in Karachi and 17 million in Calcutta and Jakarta. No wonder the concept of mega-city was introduced to refer to this relatively new phenomenon in the world. World cities are places of hope and despair, of wealth and poverty, of progress and tradition, in all possible configurations and shades, but indubitably steadily leading to the total urbanization of the world. This process is estimated to reach the 50 per cent milestone in the near future, about 53 per cent in 2015, 60 per cent in 2030, and subsequently continuing to about 80 per cent at a maximum somewhat later; a situation that many present-day young students and scholars of urbanization will live through. The implication is that in 2030 about 4.9 billion persons will already reside in urban and 3.2 billion in rural areas (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 2001). Under these conditions cities should be considered not only as local entities on their own with a configuration of social communities displaying a local identity, but also as focal points in urban networks constituting the infrastructure for flows of people, goods and ideas over the world. Cities are the urban theatres where the two worlds, the local and the global, meet and intertwine, and where agglomerated effects of many individual decisions operate but where the influence of strong leaders is also felt, persons in this book classified as 'directors of urban change'.

The city is 'an act of will', and in addition to being the result of cumulative small individual and group actions, it may also be the product of important policy and decision makers, that is directors of urban change, who in their drive to transform and improve the city also create influential representations of urban space. These professional urbanites have visionary ideas about urban form and city life. They negotiate how urban space should be shaped and try to appropriate this space, literally or figuratively. However, in current scholarly social science literature on cities and urbanization, these directors of urban change have not yet acquired a prominent place. In pursuit of the urban ecological approach of the Chicago School and notwithstanding criticism and later theoretical developments, urban sociology, anthropology and geography have preserved a strong emphasis on aggregate social processes determining the structure, development and even the planning of cities. In other words their approach is essentially based on the

cumulative effects of a multitude of impersonal social acts in the city. That is why 'bringing individual man back in' to replace structural societal processes can be considered the theme of this book, not in the sense that the urban studies do not deal with human beings, but in the sense that they strongly ignore the role of particular, important individuals in the shaping of cities. So, 'bringing directors back in'will be the motto and aim of this work, as current urban social science research often neglects the role of a generally limited number of persons decisive for urban change and advancement. An inspection of some introductions, handbooks and major works in urban anthropology and sociology[2] clearly proves that this view is generally true, but for a few exceptions. So, the names of Baron Haussemann for the Grand Manner interventions in Paris and Ebenezer Howard for the Garden City Movement are regularly mentioned, while occasionally in relation to particular cities like Singapore, Brasília, Chandigarh and Isfahan those of Sir Stanford Raffles, President Juscelino Kubitschek, Le Corbusier and Sultan Abbas are given. Even so, these rare exceptions cannot conceal the existing emphasis on impersonal aggregative social processes as the main determinants of urban structure and change. And to a certain extent that may be correct, as not all cities are strongly influenced by one or more directors of urban change when the context allows the manifold piecemeal decisions of large numbers of inhabitants to be carried through. Yet, this role of directors of urban change must be considered in more depth and that is the main aim of this collection of case studies of Asian cities, although these case studies should also be seen in their own right as more or less elaborate depictions of one and, in one study, of two cities.

   The following 12 chapters describe 13 Asian cities, in alphabetical order: Colombo, Guangzhou, Hanoi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Makassar, Manila, Nanjing, Semarang, Singapore, Surabaya, Tehran and Tokyo. For purposes of comparison, they cover a wide range from capital city to provincial centre, varying from mega-city to average urban agglomeration. In stressing their uniqueness, the case studies often consist of an overview of their particular historical background, sometimes rather general in character and at times quite specific because of the focus on the presence or absence of the directors of urban change or according to the special interest of the author.

   These directors of urban change can be defined as actors with explicit ideas about city development who are in a position to formulate and influence future urban transformation. The main questions to be posed are: Who are the directors of urban change? What are their ideas on urban development and are these ideas compatible with those of other actors in the city as well as with local concepts of urbanization and the conditions of the present built environment? From what sources do the directors derive these ideas? And in what way and to what extent do they succeed in realizing them?

   These directors do not constitute one uniform group, but a fragmented world with respect to organizational character, domain of interest and outlook. They may be individual thinkers, national and international professional firms, government officials, non-government organizations (NGOs), or grassroots groups and social movements. They may operate in the spheres of government, business, art or science. And they may be moral, legal, political, managerial, financial, military or artistic in outlook. The directors of urban change are urban planners, architects, roadbuilders, city administrators, real-estate developers, financiers, leaders of non-governmental organizations, scholars, and visual, performing and literary artists. They operate in networks at the local, national

and international levels. The interplay between these levels is important and the foremost directors serve as nodes in the networks.

The ideas and visions of the directors may be relatively short- or longterm, with implications for the whole or part of the city, and for many or a limited number of inhabitants. They may constitute a fundamental and value-related view on city and society or be of a more partial nature, merely concerning the built environment. The ideas and visions of the directors are particularly important if they are actually realized in a specific city or when they are considered influential in a more general way.

It is important to elaborate on the balance of power between the various directors and the political games they play in their attempts to appropriate and mould urban space. This leads to the following questions. How are these directors linked through networks? To what extent do they manage to realize their visionary ideas? To what extent do they succeed in introducing institutional change, such as legal frameworks or training programmes, in order to increase the influence of their own faction on urban forms in the long run? Why are some directors more successful in conveying their views than others? What are the sources used to accomplish their ideas: political power, managerial skills, financial power, artistic insights or scientific knowledge?

The conditions under which the directors operate are of the utmost importance. The type of city involved is crucial as capital cities have an important role to play in nation-building, while provincial cities may just have ethnic, port towns international commercial and small towns local relevance. The overall political structure of the nation with democratic versus autocratic and disordered versus reliable governmental conditions cannot possibly be overlooked. Good governance versus corruption makes a difference. Planning organization based on the idea of blueprint planning or incremental planning shape the role of and the possibilities open to the directors. This also applies to the level of decentralization allowing more or less autonomy for local communities and governmental units.

In almost all cases the implementation of the ideas of the directors is a historical process resulting in partial and fragmented implementations. There are a few unique new towns, such as Brasília, and many new parts of town all over the world that were completely planned and realized, but even then, after completion, history begins to take its course. This means that in the end cities are always expressions of historical cumulative and aggregated interventions, albeit in a wide range from cities bearing the stamp of one hand to cities revealing so many influences that they show no stamp at all, though this does not mean that they necessarily lack character.

This process of fragmentation is also fostered by the fact that directors of urban change of all sorts, including the urban administration, the national government, real-estate developers, the president's wife, and grassroots NGOs, often show no intention of cooperation. Their clashing visions, or indeed incomplete or sometimes even absence of vision of how to develop a city, generally result in a rather disorderly end product. More than anywhere else, perhaps, this is the case in cities situated in countries going through a phase of transition from a strict regime to a more liberal capitalist economy. Examples can be found in Nanjing, Guangzhou and Hanoi.

The ideas about and visions of urban development do not necessarily need to be unique to a particular city. These views may be floating around in networks of directors or even the general public. What types of networks? Of colleagues, scientists, politicians?

Where do the directors meet each other? At congresses, regular meetings, personal encounters? What media do they use for inspiration? Scientific journals, research reports, general media?

In capital cities these ideas and visions may be very relevant to nationbuilding. In these and other cases they may also be used for the promotion of the city in the framework of the regional or worldwide urban hierarchy. Even then chains of influence may be discerned as the directors of urban change often aspire to follow the examples of cities higher in rank. So, urban administrators of small towns want to set up the same projects on a smaller scale as those being accomplished in the provincial or even national capital, while the administrators in the national capital look for inspiration at other capitals inside or outside the region. An example of such a 'chain of aspirations' is found in Indonesia, where the provincial capitals of Makassar and Surabaya copy models derived from the national capital. Meanwhile, Jakarta itself looks for ideas and visions to the smaller but far more modern Singapore, the water front development of Rotterdam and London, and the housing types in California. Singapore, in turn, is envious of Tokyo, the only large, modern city in the Pacific region according to Western standards.

The directors of urban change do not just influence each other but are in competition with each other to attract (international) investors to achieve employment opportunities for their cities. One way to catch the attention of the investors is by creating an imaginative, spectacular, yet functional cityscape. Urban administrators are locked in a paradox in this respect. On the one hand, when they join the global or regional competition for investors, they must comply with international standards of what is supposedly imaginative architecture. On the other hand, when they want to distinguish their city from others, they must propose something diverging from universal architecture. This national identity versus international competition paradox applies to city administrators and national governments making a showcase of their respective national capitals, and also to real-estate developers developing housing projects. This paradox also lies at the root of the chains of aspiration noted above.

We may finalize this section by stating that the cities in Asia are very important, all the more so because of the tremendous growth, which is turning them into mega-urban regions, the motors of future development. The processes of mega-urbanization are basically hybrid: partially spontaneous and partially planned. In addition they are paradox-ridden, as shown earlier. Scientific knowledge on the interplay of spontaneous growth and planned development as well as national identity and global competition in the context of current mega-urbanization is very limited. The role of directors of urban change has been especially underexposed. That is why further study of mega-city formation processes is of the utmost importance. And that is the rationale of the focus of this volume. But let us also be modest, as the book is not more than a first step in answering the host of questions posed. Even so, I hope that this collection of articles may function as an incentive for more widely supported research endeavours on the directors of urban change supplementing existing knowledge in urban studies.

Answers

After this description of the leading questions and supplementary theoretical reflections on the directors of urban change, I will now turn to the response to this and elaborations on the theme found in the contributions to this book, diversified as they may be. Because of this variety particularly, I will proceed with what may be called the ultra-case approach, choosing one extreme case as a starting point and continuing to search for the most opposite or divergent instance. This ultra-case approach can be considered holistic and contextual as emphasis is laid on the understanding of the total societal configuration of the city under inspection.

Ultra-case I: a lack of vision

'People make Tehran' is the central argument of Soheila Shahshahani in her exposition of the capital of Iran. She has failed to encounter any vision that has specifically shaped this city. The concerns of everyday life have been too overwhelming to allow a special vision to be developed and implemented. Notwithstanding, some major urban plans and construction projects during the reigns of the Qajar and Pahlavi kings plus some directions laid down by the 1968 Tehran Comprehensive Plan and later by Imam Khomeini were implemented. The sequence of the destruction of the old fortifications, the influx of foreign-educated Iranian architects and the upsurge in illegal building activities has engendered many urban problems associated with housing, water distribution and earthquake prevention. What is more significant from the point of view of directors is they have created a non-structured urban environment, a city built without a vision. Soheila Shahshahani poses the question: Why is this so? Why is this cognitive system disregarding the rights of citizens and concealing harsh realities? At the beginning of the twenty-first century, she replies that urban development has been guided by the tension between rule of family and law and the priority given to special relationships. There were no clearly defined rights and responsibilities in the service of country and people, which would have left adequate room for urbanism and urban construction to take shape. So, Tehran, as analysed by Soheila Shahshahani, is on the extreme of having no, or almost no, directors of urban change. In her view this is the result of a number of special social factors. The primary societal tension between kinship and law has produced a city with splendid architecture, beautiful individual buildings, but no coherent urban structure based on a clear vision. Therefore, because of this extreme lack of pattern, Tehran functions as the first ultra-case to launch this presentation of the papers in this book. This lack of chief directors of urban change and a crystallized urban vision in Tehran stands in a sharp contrast to the conditions in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Surabaya and Colombo, which make up the second ultra-case.

Ultra-case II: strong directors

In Singapore and Malaysia, the prime ministers, respectively Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir, evidently without much opposition took the lead in urban development as is

amply documented by Freek Colombijn. The fundamental tension underneath the developing paths—the directions of urban change—they have realized to a large extent in their capitals Singa-pore and Kuala Lumpur is made up by an admixture of national identity and globalization. Singapore constrained by its limited land area conceptualized the strategy of SIJORI or the Golden Triangle to enlarge its spatial sphere of influence. By means of the spectacular Petronas Twin Towers and the new town of Cyberjaya, Kuala Lumpur apparently aspires to rival Singapore, though it is still lagging behind in development level. Both capitals play a role in identity-building, albeit with a slight difference in emphasis. As a city full of skyscrapers, Singapore does not have a famous landmark like the Petronas Twin Towers. Because of its need to seek more space in Indonesia and Malaysia, it apparently prefers to keep a low profile. In contrast, Kuala Lumpur, not having reached the same level of international competitiveness as Singapore, is boosting its national identity. These cases clearly show that besides the 'directors' of urban change, the 'directions' of urban change have to be incorporated in the discussion.

Even more than in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, in Jakarta two post-revolution Presidents, Sukarno and Soeharto, used the urban space of the capital as a strategic instrument of nation-building by the instigation of 'great works' and the placement of conspicuous statues and monuments. These constructions mark the urban environment and form a symbolic layer in the city, neutralizing the colonial architecture of the past and fostering national identity. The main elements in the symbolic pattern of the city are the National Monument, the Istiqlal Mosque, the open-air museum Taman Mini, and an abundance of often colossal statues. The main instigator of these works was President Sukarno, who was an architect by training. Under Soeharto the city was also structured by the works of his wife and other family members who were involved in the construction of major shopping malls, the open-air museum, the system of toll roads and the redevelopment—aborted by the 1998 economic crisis—of the former inner city airport area of Kemayoran.

As in Tehran, the total societal constellation of Indonesia and Jakarta exposes strong traits of nepotism and familial relationships, an ineluctable part of prevailing crony capitalism. In contrast to Tehran, these do not have a rural and religious background, but function in an urban and military setting. A comparison of the cases of Tehran and Jakarta leads to the conclusion that similar societal conditions do not necessarily entail the same attitude towards urban structuring. The personal background of the directors seems to be of crucial importance. The leaders of the old royal dynasties in Tehran had a vision, but in contrast to Jakarta and its presidents, it is not clear what exactly their drive and argumentation was.

In Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, a mixture of nation-building and international competition is paramount. In Jakarta the architect President Sukarno had a vision of urban space and construction which was directed more towards nation-building. Without fostering his own vision on urban construction the military-connected President Soeharto let his family members exploit the business opportunities headed by new towns, toll road and mall development. However, one of President Soeharto's business friends, heading the urban construction firm Ciputra, did develop some sort of a vision of new town expansion based on upper-middle class life-styles and gated-community developments.

His projects provoked counter-visions generated by environmental and flood problem criticism.

In the cities of Jakarta, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur national leaders have taken a strong interest in the development of the capital, whether they were kings, presidents or prime ministers, but in recent decades the top officials in Iran have clearly renounced systematic interference in the structural urban development of Tehran, and the modern visions in Jakarta are now complying with the growth of the upper-middle classes and their life-styles. Different types of directors such as national leaders, their family members and cronies, urban developers and sometimes even critics appear to be involved.

Unquestionably, the influence of the highest national leaders is particularly focused on the capital because of its role in nation-building, but it may reach much farther as is shown in the case of Surabaya. Manuelle Franck discusses the position of this second city in the urban hierarchy of Indonesia as well as the development of its spatial pattern into a mega-urban region. The intended bridge to Madura is crucial to the expansion of the agglomeration, and it is the construction of this Suramuda Bridge that was initialized by President Soeharto as part of his vision to link Sumatra, Madura and Bali to Java. It is supposed to become the longest bridge in Indonesia and the then Minister of Research and Technology, later President, Habibie, was to be responsible for its construction. In fact this bridge, which is still in the planning phase, is another prime example of the influence of national political leaders on urban development in the framework of nation-building, in this case to surmount archipelagic divisions. However, in this instance, at some distance from the capital, the common people led by their religious leaders opposed the project. They believed that the exogenous industrialization combined with the bridge would not benefit the local population as much as endogenous industrialization. The opposition, much stronger than the counter-visions in the Jakarta case and intensified by the financing problems, led to great uncertainty about the bridge project and entailed sharp land speculation. The planning of the bridge and the industrial zone had to be disconnected so as to ease up the people's opposition. Its construction is still firmly supported by the government at central, provincial and district levels.

The powerful influence of national leaders in urban development is also found in Sri Lanka. President Jayawardena emphasized centralized and private sector development with a catalyst role for Colombo in national economic development. President Premadasa was more responsive to grassroots housing needs than his predecessor. In his elaborate historical overview of Colombo before and after the liberalization of the 1970s, S.T.Hettige adds the Urban Development Authority (UDA) as a factor in the centralization of urban planning and the marginalization of local representative bodies. These centralizing tendencies are balanced by the growing role of the private sector in the urban change process and by the influence of the directors who actually made the city. He lists the developers, financiers, foreign investors, professional consultants, international donors and non-governmental organizations as the main actors. They became important agents in the transformation of the urban landscape and its skyline. The impact of professional planners (not related to UDA) has remained marginal and the role of the local officials subdued. Be that as it may, as in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur and in contrast to present-day Tehran, as a capital Colombo has disproportionately drawn the attention of the national leaders, notwithstanding the free rein given to the private directors and

agents, whereas the influence of national leadership is sometimes far reaching and touches other cities, as was shown in the Surabaya case.

As in Colombo, a specific historic mixture of political, peoples and private corporate directors was found in Manila. According to Otto van den Muijzenberg and Ton van Naerssen, the original city grid was laid out by the governors, high-ranking military officers and senior friars in the Spanish period, but even then less-organized street patterns had already begun to appear outside the core urban area. Much later, at the beginning of the twentieth century under the American authority, both the City Beautiful protagonists and the big landowners including allied real-estate developers exerted their influence. The cases of the Legarda Hacienda and of the Ayala family illustrate the then existing combination of forces. During the Marcos period, Imelda Marcos, the wife of the President Ferdinand Marcos, in alliance with the Metro Manila Commission, became the driving force behind the so-called City of Man which strove to make Manila the Los Angeles of the East and which included an extensive land reclamation called Bay City in the project. But after the People Power Revolution of 1986 the pendulum swung to decentralization. The metropolitan level was strengthened at the cost of the national level and the developments in the Manila Bay area plus two other major projects, namely Bonifacio Global City and Eastwood Cyber City, were schemes of private corporate directors. These projects were mainly fragmentary, covering only parts of the city, and their realization lagged a good long way behind the fantasy plans. As Van den Muijzenberg and Van Naerssen conclude: The few periods where comprehensive, citywide plans catering to the needs of the majority of Metro Manila's population were translated at least partially into reality in the Philippines appear to have been those where society showed a relatively high level of "stateness", rather than the predominance of the market'.

A glance at the directors involved in Tehran, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Surabaya, Colombo and Manila reveals that a distinction should be made between individual (presidents, prime ministers) and collective directors (UDA, construction firms, people's opposition) of urban change. Cogently, some of these are real directors while others function more as agents, that is as mediators translating and implementing ideas and visions rooted elsewhere. A distinction between political directors, not necessarily with any feeling for the content of urban planning, and professional and artistic directors would seem to be valuable. Configurations of directors have also been identified. These may take the form of a clear dominance of one party, for example the ruling elite, private corporate initiative, or people's actions. They also may be made up by a combination of these directors. In the next ultra-case, Guangzhou in combination with Nanjing and Hanoi, I will explore different types and configurations of directors in more detail.

Ultra-case III: the socialist city

The quest for directors of urban change in the socialist and communist city is troublesome, as it lies in the very nature of this political system to refer to the party and its bodies and councils, and not to individuals. Interestingly, this ideology is only partially realized. Although these collective bodies regularly broadcast catchphrases which have a very significant function in urban development, there are still powerful

individuals keeping out of sight behind this rhetoric. Guangzhou City is a case in point. Zhou Daming extensively describes its rich history before and after 1949. He points out the multitude of terms and slogans used for urban reconstruction, such as 'west wind', 'Soviet wind', 'landscaped city' and 'leap from the traditional natural pattern of small hill and small river to the natural pattern typical of large mountain and open sea', besides presenting indications of material changes like 'political and military oriented urban construction', 'neoteric transformation' and 'hotchpotch'. In Guangzhou City, urban development is strongly government dominated excluding any role for the public. In spite of this, urban construction should not be perceived as monolithic. Several types of urban directors may be distinguished, such as those who exert control through urban planning and construction departments, the dominance of a strong mayor, and a combination of both. In Guangzhou City, according to Zhou Daming, the latter mixed type is dominant. Though individual directors are unmistakably important, the author, in keeping with current Chinese ideology, does not elaborate this point. The succession of top-down slogans without any transparent source remains the skeleton of his analysis. And this agrees with the results of the case studies of Nanjing and Hanoi, which however were obtained by non-resident scholars from outside the respective countries, rendering a full insight into the complex social relationships of the urban arena even more complicated.

Many cities in Asia are fired with the aspiration to become a cyber city, as was witnessed in Kuala Lumpur. The same can be said of Nanjing, where Meine Pieter van Dijk in cooperation with Chinese students studied the ICT sector. The different clusters of ICT firms in the city centre, the university district, and the southern, north-eastern and north-western zones largely shape Nanjing. Besides giving a survey of the economic potentialities and weaknesses of the ICT sector and policy recommendations to strengthen it, turning his attention to directors of urban change Meine Pieter van Dijk stresses the role of the government, albeit with some nuances regarding the different levels of authority and the invisibility of its representatives. He concludes that the national, provincial and municipal levels are clearly hierarchical and coordinated. Pertinently, at the lowest level, the coordination by the municipality seems limited, resulting in a certain degree of competition between the more or less equal districts under its jurisdiction. As local governments are influential with respect to ICT companies and the possibilities open to them to build and use financial and other services, this lack of coordination at the district level remains a rather tantalizing mystery, especially when the centralized character of the whole system is taken into account.

Hanoi as a strongly, albeit not neatly, historically layered city also passed through a period of socialism relevant to the present discussion. Hans Schenk vividly sketches the successive and sometimes overlapping visions: the pre-colonial fortification; the French colonial mania for grandeur; the city of socialist man; the period of Doi Moi with the introduction of the market economy; and the present-day global city with urban preservation as a counter point. Schenk argues that the period of socialism was dominated by urban containment and deconcentration and by the nationalization of the housing sector. The concept of housing development consisting of apartment buildings in self-contained neighbourhoods was borrowed from Soviet town planning and introduced by Soviet and Chinese city planners. It resulted in a complete alienation from the past. The Soviet architect and town planner S.I.Sokolov conceptualized the 'mikrorayon' neighbourhood idea that was implemented in Hanoi and many other socialist-inspired

countries all over the world. Schenk points out that notwithstanding the great influence of this urban planner it is a mistake to see Sokolov's adepts as directors of urban change. They should be considered simply as the messenger of the socialist urban concept, being merely agents of urban change. Directors should be defined as persons with vision and power, while agents are powerful without a genuine vision, just mediators of a view dominant in a particular context. Sometimes directors are accused of having power but no vision. Although this may be true, this should be regarded with some scepticism as it is often simply an argument to oppose them.

From these cases we may conclude that, notwithstanding a strong reluctance to refer to directors in the socialist city, these leaders are clearly present in Guangzhou, while at the lower levels in the hierarchical structure of Nanjing competition between districts must be being supported by forceful persons. In Hanoi, the influence of the directors from pre-colonial and colonial history is still being felt.

Ultra-case IV: agents of urban change

I will turn now to another ultra-case, Tokyo, where the distinctions between both individual and collective, as well as directors and agents of urban change are particularly relevant. Shuji Funo, who is an architect by training, gives an extensive presentation of the development of city planning ideas related to the Japanese capital from early times to the present. The dreams on the urban environment of the occidentalists, nationalists, futurists and postmodernists compose a wide panorama of planning ideals. In recent decades, the ideals have led to fanciful proposals such as City on the Sea, Tower City, Rurban City, Spiral City, City in the Air, Aqua Polis and Manhattan, some of which have been or are in the process of being realized. But Tokyo has been regularly plagued by catastrophes varying from disastrous fires destroying parts of the city to devastating earthquakes. The inhabitants are aware that sooner or later the next earthquake will ruin the city. Looking back through history, according to Funo, basically a 'scrap and build' process took place, a process of renewal after destruction, negating urban history and memory. Pertinently, many ideas for the reconstructions were borrowed from the West and showed a lack of originality. They varied from Baron Haussemann's grand project of Paris, the Nazi ideas of national land planning, the Greater London Plan to the German Bebauungs Plan. In the case of the Japanese capital, it has been the architects and the city officials, especially the mayors, who have functioned as the agents and directors of urban change, respectively. Funo critically evaluates this universal trend of imitation in Japanese city planning: 'It is not a bad idea to learn from other systems, but they do not necessarily work well in a different context. Ideas and methods need to be rooted in the realities of Japan'. However, in the context of the present study on directors and agents, he gives a deft portrayal of the powerful impact of the private collective agents who consider Tokyo a 'paradise for speculators and builders', and sketches the different roles and mutual dependence of directors and agents.

Ultra-case V: lower-level directors

In the study of the provincial capital of Semarang in Indonesia, this question of director or agent or perhaps both is reviewed from a different angle. It is not the city and its

historical development or successive stages in urban planning ideals which occupies the central place in this ultra-case study, but an influential entrepreneur who at the beginning of the twentieth century became rich by selling pure drinking water, W.F. Tillema. This pharmacist by education became the doyen of colonial social urban studies and colonial ethno-cinematography, because of his pervasive plea for kampong hygiene and his film and photo material on kampong problems as well as his travels in the Netherlands Indies, particularly to Apo-Kajan in Borneo (Kalimantan). Tillema was not the only person of his time who was aware of the bad living conditions in the native quarters of the colonial cities, especially after the cholera epidemics, but he became a director at two levels. In the first place, in the city of Semarang he managed to exert his ideas, which led to the construction of adequate drinking water and drainage systems. In addition, he secured proper city extension by purchasing a large tract of land for that purpose via a Javanese Semarang friend. In the second place, Tillema collected all sorts of material on the appalling hygienic conditions of the kampongs and other native settlements and wrote extensively on it; he printed publications at his own cost and distributed them among all interested and relevant parties. Peter J.M.Nas and Kirsten Theuns deduce that Tillema's influence must have been great and most probably laid the basis for the extensive post-revolutionary Indonesian kampong improvement programmes. Tillema was not a director in the sense of a political leader as in Jakarta and Colombo or an agent as described in the Hanoi case, but a director of the intellectual and conceptual type, applying in Semarang and spreading his fundamental ideas on kampong hygiene throughout the Netherlands Indies.

In the same type of setting, in a major secondary city, this time in Southern Sulawesi (Celebes), Indonesia, H.M.Daeng Patompo in more recent times has also functioned as a director, but his role has been some-what different to that of Tillema. In the 1960s and 1970s he was the mayor of Makassar, then called Ujung Pandang, and powerfully pursued his policy of modernizing the city, touching its culture, industry, trade, tourism and education. Christoph Antweiler describes his vision and his management philosophy interestingly phrased in slogan style. As directors of urban change, Patompo had a slightly different emphasis to Tillema, whose political and management qualities were less pronounced and whose conception of kampong hygiene was much more profound and widely relevant. In the conclusion to his case study, Antweiler points out that the emphasis on directors is fruitful, but he simultaneously draws attention to the role of structures because the 'directors are also directed'. They work within an intense social environment and political culture.' Moreover 'ordinary people's everyday actions and their often unintended cumulative results should not be forgotten'. This way he puts urban leaders in a wider perspective by highlighting the triangle of structure, directors and ordinary people.

Conclusion

Directors of urban change form an intriguing theme and this book should be considered a starting point and incentive for further research to remedy the current weakness in urban studies in the sociological, anthropological and social-geographic character in this field.

The main proposition that specific persons, the directors, strongly influence the structure of their cities is affirmed by a great number of cases presented in this book. Above all, capital cities have a role to play in nation-building and in international urban competition. This means that in addition to directors of urban change, the directions of urban change with respect to the national or the international arenas (or both) are relevant. However, some cities do not appear to be structurally influenced by one or a few directors. In such cases, notwithstanding the presence of incidental urban markers, for example at the level of individual buildings, no structural pattern above that echelon can be discerned. At a lower level in the urban hierarchy, it is not the kings, presidents or prime ministers who sometimes use urban space as a strategic means to reach their goals and to pursue the desired development path, but the mayors who exert such influence and function as directors of urban change in their city. The tentacles of strong national leaders may reach these secondary cities, but this is the exception rather than the rule.

Even when strong directors have dominated a city, in the long run urban development remains fragmented as it is constituted by series of historically layered visions and interventions that generally have succeeded only partially. Moreover, strong planning activities put into operation in some parts of a city often do not preclude steady spontaneous developments in other parts or the near environments. Only a very limited number of cities in the world has been completely and successfully planned as a whole. In general the directions of urban change are made up of distinct formative projects such as structures of high symbolic value, new towns, toll road systems, mega-urban developments, recreation parks and so on.

When evaluating the role of directors, the total urban context has to be taken into account to weigh up their influence. These overall social and cultural conditions should not be overestimated, as the personal background of the directors also seems to be crucial to understanding their significance and the meaning of the specific development direction followed.

Directors of urban change are characterized by a vision and the power to realize it. Some leaders, however, have a vision but no power. They are professionals who have to look for powerful support in order to have their ideas materialized. Other more politically inclined leaders have power but no vision. They have to look elsewhere for inspiration. Yet another type is active in the diffusion of certain ideological and in a particular context generally accepted planning ideas that are implanted in subordinate foreign societies, and can be called an agent of change. Socialist urban planning is an example in which agents of change have been internationally dominant in urban planning for a long time.

To conclude this introduction, we arrive at the distinction of four types of urban leaders: (1) directors of urban change with vision and power; (2) designers of urban change, namely professionals with vision but without power, who have to cooperate with a powerful person to realize their vision; (3) political leaders with power but no vision in the field of urban development, who have to cooperate with a professional for inspiration; and (4) agents of urban change devoid of power but with influence, who function as mediators of a standardized planning vision. The reader should be aware that the terms defined here may be used differently in the chapters themselves. The typology presented here is the distilled essence of the articles in this book.

Further analyses of these types of urban principals should shed light on the way city development is guided. It is essential to study their imagination to perceive the future, the way they seize the liberty to decide and plan, and the manner they arrive at controlling the people and the means to guide effectively. The main characteristic of these directors of urban change, designers of urban change, political leaders and agents of urban change, besides being contained and led by the context in which they function, is that they lead.

Notes

1 I am indebted to Freek Colombijn who formulated the topic of 'directors of urban change' and related questions in an unpublished research proposal and kindly inspired me to proceed working on this theme.

2 Such as Southall (1998), Gilbert and Gugler (1982) and Breeze (1966).

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2
Colombo

Siri T.Hettige

Introduction

Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, has undergone a major transformation over the last two decades. This process of change has been the result of a dramatic shift in the economic policy environment of the country that took place in the late 1970s. The adoption of a package of liberal economic reform led to import liberalization, export-oriented industrialization, rapid growth of urban service industries, rural-urban migration, and concentration of wealth and private consumption in the capital city and its surroundings. The result is a rapid modification of the urban landscape as is evident from heightened economic activity in the city with attendant consequences such as increasing population density, growing traffic congestion, mushrooming of high-rise office and residential complexes, and intensification of competition for urban space.

The above transformations have been accompanied by a dramatic surge of interest in the city on the part of professional planners, politicians, businessmen and others. In fact, the greatly increased significance of professions related to urban planning and urban development such as urban planners, architects and civil engineers has very much been a postliberalization phenomenon. The role of urban businessmen, real-estate developers and urban politicians in the management of urban affairs has also been greatly enhanced over the same period.

The pace of change was much slower before economic liberalization but the city has been modified steadily from the colonial times, through the first few decades after independence, until more recent, rapid urban transformation engulfed the urban region. A range of successive directors of change has guided the adjustments. Their ideas and visions have decisively influenced the kind of transformation that has taken place over time.

The present contribution is an attempt to assess the role of various directors of urban change in the context of the fast growing city of Colombo. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides an account of the city from a historical perspective. In the second, an attempt is made to survey the changing landscape of Colombo after economic liberalization. The third section is devoted to an assessment of the relative significance of various directors of urban change. The last section examines the role of key directors of change in the city of Colombo in recent years. Finally, some conclusions are drawn regarding the nexus between the role of various directors of urban change, on one hand, and urban transformation, on the other.

A historical perspective

The city of Colombo as a site of human habitation has a long history. Its beginnings can be traced back to medieval times and beyond, when cities accommodated religious, political, trading and feudal landed elites dependent on the surplus extracted from a mass of rural producers of agricultural and other goods. In more recent times, colonialism and industrialization generated unprecedented economic surpluses that formed the material basis for the emergence and growth of colonial and industrial cities. By the time the colonial domination came to an end, there had already emerged an international system of production and exchange relations, now guided by multinational corporations, international institutions and national governments.

The above, overarching, international system of production and exchange relations facilitated a particular pattern of urban growth in different parts of the world. This is not to underestimate the role played by endogenous forces in shaping the patterns of urbanization in different countries to varying degrees. The key point that needs emphasis here is that cities did not evolve autonomously; their size, structure, composition, and even outward appearance were decisively shaped by their relative position within the international system. It is this fact which led Manuel Castells (1977) to adopt the phrase 'dependent urbanization' to describe the pattern of urban growth in much of the non-Western world.

Colonial domination, however, did not produce identical patterns of urbanization in colonial territories for the simple reason that the relationship between the centre and periphery varied considerably depending on various circumstances. In this regard, the distinction between 'settler' and 'non-settler' colonies has been critical. In the settler colonies, where those who invaded the territory settled, as in the cases of Australia, North America and New Zealand, much of the economic surplus generated was reinvested in the captured territories themselves. This resulted in a pattern of urban growth, which was quite different to the pattern that prevailed in the non-settler colonies like Sri Lanka from where the surplus extracted was constantly transferred to the colonial centre.

The division of labour that emerged between the colonial countries, on one hand, and the colonial possessions, on the other, had a decisive impact on the patterns of urbanization on a global scale. While this division of labour reinforced a pattern of unequal development facilitated by unequal exchange, urban centres located along the continuum between the centre and the periphery tended to be hierarchically ordered in terms of wealth, power and prestige. The urban centres in colonial territories were often modelled on the colonial centre in terms of key symbols and signs. Street names, architecture of key buildings, major land marks like parks, health and educational institutions, clubs, and so on were often 'copied' from the centre. Yet, the colonial centre was the ultimate destination for many of the upwardly mobile children of the 'colonized', indigenous elites who lived in the national capitals of the colonies. This is understandable because it was the colonial centre which ranked the highest in terms of wealth, power and prestige. These colonial centres later attracted many people from the colonies creating sizeable ethnic minorities in the cities of Western countries. Social and cultural pressure associated with the process of decolonization, accelerated by anti-colonial movements also contributed to the exodus of the members of the Westernized elite. Nationalization of productive assets owned by Western companies and the change of official languages, etc.

adversely affected the life chances of some of the established elite groups. At the same time, the same policies favoured nationally oriented elites such as indigenous businessmen and *swabhasha*-educated literati.

Decolonization informer colonial territories

Decolonization did not produce identical changes throughout the newly independent world. The changes varied depending on the composition and the idealized orientations of the indigenous elite that came into power and the type of socio-economic policies adopted following decolonization. These and other factors affected the cities that came into being or thrived during the colonial period. The composition and the size of the population of these cities changed dramatically after independence, when more and more people from the countryside found their way into the city looking for income, employment and other opportunities. The impoverished migrants often illegally occupied public space including land belonging to public institutions. The resultant expansion of the squatter population became a major factor in municipal politics. The municipal wards with a majority of disadvantaged people elected councillors representing their own interests. These representatives could then influence the management of local affairs including the regularization of squatter settlements and provision of public utilities.

In most cities in the ex-colonial world, there emerged a polarized economy comprising a firm-centred, formal economy and a pervasive informal sector. The two sectors did not evolve independently of each other. In fact, the structure of the urban economy, in particular, the highly unequal distribution of rewards within the formal sector, has been a major factor contributing to the expansion of the informal sector. This is clearly evident from the social structure of disadvantaged urban settlements where the lower rung employees of the formal sector firms and institutions co-exist with informal sector activists, the former providing a ready market for cheap goods and services supplied by the latter. It is also noteworthy that various domestic and other services needed by the elites and other higher income groups are provided by informal sector activists (Hettige 1990).

As mentioned earlier, the social structure and the economy of the city in the non-settler colonies was determined to a great extent by the position it held within the colonial network of production and exchange relations. These cities emerged to serve certain specific functions. The very fact that they were built largely as transit points facilitating export-import trade points to the fact that they were oriented toward the outside world and depended very much on external forces for their structure, identity and outlook. The city provided an enclave for the emerging colonial elite, both local and expatriate. Being very much oriented toward the outside world, the latter adopted life-styles and consumption patterns that were more akin to those prevalent at the colonial centre. The export-import economy permitted the importation of goods and services needed to sustain the above life-styles and consumption patterns. The city became full of symbolic and utility goods imported from the centre. Some of these became status symbols that the wider population aspired to.

The city thus became the most important site for private consumption of an elitist nature. Elite schools, private nursing homes, racing tracks, cricket grounds, tennis courts, shopping centres, social clubs, public parks, exclusive residential areas and so on became

important aspects of the city landscape. On the other hand, lower rung workers of public and private institutions, such as the harbour, municipal councils, hospitals, public parks and warehouses, and their families were pushed into slum and shanty neighbourhoods in the city. The consumption patterns of these workers were quite different. They consumed cheap goods and services available in their own neighbourhoods, supplied from informal sector activists such as pavement hawkers. Their low incomes did not permit them to purchase urban property in the open market, so they illegally occupied whatever open space they could lay their hands on. Later on, when democratic politics allowed them to put up their own representatives in the context of municipal and national politics, the urban poor managed to capture urban space for both public and private consumption, i.e. schools, medical centres, play grounds and public toilets in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. These in turn attracted more and more migrants to the city exerting great pressure on public transport, shanty neighbourhoods, schools and so on. It is also noteworthy that the residential neighbourhoods inhabited by the Westernized elites bore colonial names, i.e. Torrington Place, Shurbury Gardens, whereas the nonWesternized, poor urban dwellers lived in slums that bore rural indigenous connotations, i.e. Kesel Watta ('banana farm').

As mentioned earlier, decolonization did not produce identical conditions in different ex-colonial countries. In some countries, decolonization resulted in a major shift in the composition of the political elite and the policies pursued. It is also important to note that political independence set in motion a process of democratization in both national and municipal politics. These in turn had a major impact on the urban landscape. In the next few pages, an attempt is made to outline the major changes that have taken place in the city of Colombo as a result of the changes in economic and social policies, democratization of politics and the changing composition of the urban population.

Democratization of politics and urban space

Granting of a measure of self-rule to the country, then referred to as Ceylon, took place in the early 1930s giving the emerging native political elite an opportunity to influence the process of policy making. However, it was only after political independence in 1948 that policy making became the prerogative of elected local leaders. Yet, the transfer of power did not lead to an immediate shift in the economic policy of the country. It is this situation that led many people to argue at the time that political independence amounted to a transfer of power from the colonial government to a privileged, Westernized native elite. It is these sentiments that eventually culminated in a major political campaign to dislodge the above elite from political power in the early 1950s. The social forces that backed this campaign included hitherto marginalized groups such as native physicians, Buddhist clergy, *swabhasha*-educated school teachers, peasants and workers. Following the election of a coalition government led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who campaigned for the rights of the marginalized, steps were taken to address the grievances of these less privileged groups and provide opportunities to young people belonging to these groups.[1]

The above transformations were accompanied by a change in economic policy as well. The new policy was aimed at strengthening the role of the state in the management and development of the national economy. This naturally contributed to an expansion of the state sector at the expense of the private, corporate sector. This pattern by and large

continued till 1977 when a free-market oriented regime came to power that took policy measures to reverse the above trend.

The state-led development policies implemented from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s had a major impact on the urban landscape. Expansion of the state bureaucracy and public enterprises in almost all sectors of the economy increased public consumption in the country. Given the fact that the vast majority of the people continued to live in the countryside, the tendency on the part of successive governments was to take whatever productive investments away from the capital. Meanwhile, the protectionist policies encouraged by balance of payment difficulties in the 1970s curbed imports, in particular of luxury goods, leading to a contraction of the private consumer market.

Nationalization of private enterprises including commercial plantations no doubt had an adverse impact on the income and consumption opportunities of the privileged urban elites. Many of their assets were transferred to newly established public corporations, the management of which came under public officials who were recruited from a wider cross-section of society largely on the basis of educational qualifications. During this period, public consumption expanded at the expense of private consumption. This naturally had an impact on the urban landscape. The buildings that went up were mostly state-funded and were intended to house government offices and head offices of state enterprises. Construction of public housing, though limited, was far more visible than the construction of residential units by private investors.

Import restrictions prevalent at the time limited the number of private vehicles on city streets, which were used mostly by public passenger vehicles. This drastically reduced the possibility of traffic congestion in the city. Limited availability of imported consumer goods constrained retail business by private traders and this helped reduce the movement of consumers from rural to urban areas. Limited business opportunities in the city also restricted the number of potential businessmen who migrated to the city.

The circumstances outlined above no doubt shaped the social structure of the city. Expansion of the state bureaucracy and other state enterprises would have resulted in a substantial increase in public officials over the years. The same cannot be said of the business elite. This would have dampened urban property prices; as salaried public officials cannot be expected to engage in speculative buying of property. In the absence of a vibrant market economy that offers various income earning opportunities to disadvantaged groups, rural-urban migration also grew at a low rate.

The situation that prevailed in the city of Colombo until 1977 began to change rapidly thereafter. The urban landscape has been altered dramatically from the late 1970s. Open economic policies pursued after 1977 assigned certain unprecedented functions to the capital city. As a result, its economy, social structure, physical landmarks, and its relative position within the national and international setting, all have undergone remarkable change. Since open economic policies have relaxed barriers that restricted the movement of commodities, capital, labour and cultural goods across national boundaries, the changes that are taking place in the city are as much a result of the influence of external forces as those emanating from within the country. The changes in the city's landscape thus have to be examined with reference to both exogenous and endogenous factors. The next few pages are devoted to this purpose.

Economic liberalization and urban transformation

As is well known, economic liberalization allows the market forces to operate freely in diverse fields thereby limiting the scope of the state machinery in its regulatory and management functions with respect to the distribution of life chances, the development and management of scarce resources, public and private consumption, and so on. When the market forces operate freely, the competition for scarce resources inevitably becomes more intense. In real-life situations, it is not just isolated, self-seeking individuals who compete with each other to have access to resources and life chances. Many people also tend to manipulate their social, political and cultural relationships in order to secure advantages over their rival competitors. It is also noteworthy that individual competition takes place within certain structural constraints, both national and global. For instance those who have access to global capital, modern technology and seats of power naturally have a distinct advantage over those who do not have such access. So, in an increasingly globalizing economy, trans-national forces tend to impinge on the lives and affairs of the people living in the cities, which are closely integrated with the outside world. Colombo, being the capital of a country whose economy has already been liberalized, is exposed to diverse global forces as never before. Today, its physical and social space is being appropriated and made use of by different institutions, interest groups and individuals for diverse purposes. It is these interest groups and individuals who contribute to the changes in the urban landscape in keeping with their interests, desires, tastes and ideas.

Rapid transformation of the landscape of Colombo and its environs over the last two decades is too obvious to require any elaborate description. It is mostly a reflection of the changes that are taking place in the country's economy. A protectionist economic policy that favoured import substitution industrialization, rural agriculture, redistribution of productive assets, and greater state control over production and exchange of goods and services gave way to a liberal policy package that facilitated export-oriented industries, mobility of labour within and beyond national boundaries, goods and services, the operation of the market, and private investment and consumption.

The importance of Colombo as the main transit point for the export-import trade has increased tremendously over the last two decades. This is understandable because the garment industry has become the largest export-oriented industry. Its rapid expansion has led to an unprecedented increase in export-import trade. Establishment of Free Trade Zones in the country has also contributed to the above increase in external trade. Migration of labour to the Middle East and elsewhere has resulted in the mushrooming of recruitment agents, travel agents and so on. Today, many of the passengers using the International Airport at Katunayake are migrant workers.

Liberalization of imports has led to an unprecedented expansion of retail trade in the city and its suburbs. It is against this background that various service-sector enterprises have been established in Colombo in order to provide financial and other services to both institutions and individuals, i.e. banks, finance companies, insurance, forwarding agents, travel agents, supermarkets, motor-vehicle dealers, telecommunication services and computer supplies. These various activities have provided lucrative employment and income opportunities to a large number of people who have acquired the necessary skills and qualifications. Given the high disposable incomes of the emerging entrepreneurs, their overseas collaborators and top-level employees, the demand for consumer goods

and services has also increased rapidly. Hotels, restaurants, apartments, clubs, private hospitals, private taxi services and supermarkets that have come up over the last two decades are signs of rapidly increasing private consumption by the elite and the members of the emergent New Urban Middle Class (NUMC) (Hettige 1995).

The demand for urban space in Colombo has increased rapidly over the years leading to an unprecedented upsurge in the market value of urban property. It is partly in response to this demand that many government offices, including the national parliament, have already been shifted to the newly developed suburb of Sri Jayawardenapura. Land values have appreciated so much in the city and its immediate environs that non-affluent people who were not already in possession of urban property could no longer compete in the urban property market. The only exception has been the squatters who were occupying marginal urban land, often disused land along railway tracks, canals and streets. They continued to remain in the city at least partly with the blessing of their political patrons. Yet, they are mostly confined to certain parts of the city where the urban poor have traditionally been concentrated. Due to the high concentration of disadvantaged groups there, demand for residential accommodation in these areas from affluent groups has remained low; they are not the most favoured residential quarters in the city today.

While it is true that the market forces play a crucial role in the allocation and use of urban space, it is important to note that political and other non-market considerations also are a vital part. For instance, the allocation of land belonging to state institutions is often guided by political considerations. Moreover, the eviction of illegal settlers from public property is a highly sensitive political issue. People occupying such land usually mobilize political support to resist any attempt by municipal and other authorities to remove them. They also tend to ignore building regulations and construct housing or commercial structures without obtaining permits from the relevant authorities. Such people also try to seek protection from political patrons ranging from municipal ward members to cabinet ministers.

So, in an ex-colonial city like Colombo, allocation of urban space is not simply guided by market forces alone. This is partly because the market forces are prevented from penetrating certain parts of the city by a whole range of non-market forces such as those associated with urban politics, and organized crime. So, the city's landscape is not simply a product of the market forces but reflects the interplay of a whole range of complex historical and contemporary factors and forces.

It is these factors and forces that are behind the diversity and the complexity of the city's landscape. For the same reason we treat the city as a social space. The city is what its constituent social actors make it to be. Since these various actors are not just a mass of isolated individuals but belong to a complex array of social, economic, political and professional groups with diverse interests, ideas and aspirations, the continuity and change of the urban landscape reflects the constant interplay among these groups. In the next few pages an attempt is made to examine the recent changes in the city landscape in terms of the major social forces that appear to guide the processes of change.

Globalization and the making of a dependent Third World city

It was already pointed out that the city of Colombo, like many other excolonial capitals, was characterized by a dual economy. It appears that recent economic changes have not led to a drastic change in this dual character of the urban economy. If at all, these changes have reinforced the pre-existing duality of the city economy. This has led to a further polarization of the city. While the formal, firm-centred segment of the city economy has become more globally oriented, thereby more and more dependent on global capital, the informal economy has been further reinforced due to the expansion of the cheaper goods and services demanded by an expanding low-income population. In fact, the rapidly growing income inequalities, particularly in urban areas, have created more income earning opportunities in the urban informal sector (Hettige 1995). Today's city landscape vividly demonstrates the socioeconomic polarization that is taking place. The demarcation of politico-economic and socio-cultural boundaries within the city and its immediate environs points to this polarization. Though this demarcation is not neat, and there are frequent 'incursions' across such boundaries, there is a strong tendency for the convergence of elements that 'naturally' go together. Modern, multi-storey office complexes, blocks of luxury apartments, expensive restaurants, up-market residential areas, health clubs, rock cafés, cyber cafés, five-star hotels, supermarkets, fashion stores, beer gardens and international banks tend to congregate in certain parts of the city. On the other hand, slums and squatter settlements, cheap eating houses, pavement hawkers, cycle repairs shops, open bathing and washing spots, open-air markets and small boutiques tend to concentrate in areas where the low-income groups reside. Between these two extremes a range of socio-economic conditions can be found, which in fact constitute the intermediate zone. It is people belonging to the lower-middle and middle classes who mostly congregate in this zone. Given the very high property prices that have persisted for nearly two decades now, most of them are not newcomers to the city; many of them have been living in the city for many years, if not for generations. Some occupy upgraded or newly built public housing allocated to them largely on non-commercial criteria. Some have built their own houses on encroached private or state land.

The diversity and complexity of the urban land-use pattern can be attributed to the fact that the market forces alone do not determine the patterns of allocation and utilization of urban space. The role of the central government and municipal authorities continues to be an important factor behind both the change and continuity of land-use patterns. The decision makers often cannot resist political pressures or ignore demands of various pressure groups, be they ethnic groups, business community, public officials or supporters of political parties. Many actions and inactions of political authorities both in the past and at present have been responsible for certain features of the urban landscape. These range from allocation of state land in minute parcels to landless inhabitants in the city to build their own small cottages, to transport policy or the absence of a clear transport policy. What is important to note here is that the state and municipal authorities, while facilitating the penetration and domination of the city's landscape by the market forces, both global and national, have also been a moderating influence on the same forces. Their readiness to exchange urban landed property for popular support combined with their incapacity or unwillingness to invest in public housing has influenced the

patterns of utilization of urban space with significant social and environmental consequences.

Recent economic transformation that has had a major impact on the city's landscape has also influenced the patterns of public and private consumption. As mentioned earlier, before 1977, Colombo City was predominantly a site of public consumption with government departments, public enterprises, public hospitals, government schools, state-run retail shops, public transport and so on dominating the landscape. Today the situation is quite different. With the gradual contraction of the public sector paving the way for an enlarged private, corporate sector, the disposable incomes of a sizeable segment of the population living in the city and its environs have increased rapidly. The members of what has been already referred to as the New Urban Middle Class earn much higher salaries than their counterparts in the state sector. There are also those who have launched new business ventures and earn substantial incomes, not to mention the owners and shareholders of large firms. As a result, the demand for expensive consumer goods and services has increased. International restaurants and shopping malls have come up to meet this growing demand. The city streets are being improved and widened to accommodate an ever increasing number of cars and other vehicles with no signs of any easing of the congestion in the city and the nearby suburbs. Traffic congestion is worse near private hospitals, international and privileged public schools, shopping centres and fashion houses. On the other hand, those who use public transport complain that they have to spend hours on the road owing to traffic jams on routes leading to the city. These are signs of increasing competition for public space between two interest groups, namely, the users of private cars and public transport. This, of course is one among many arenas where groups with divergent interests and desires are competing for space and resources. In many of these conflicts, the market has proved to be increasingly incapable of resolving them. It is here that the need for sound public policies and sensible planning strategies arises.

Ideas, interests and urban change

In the discussion of the present chapter so far, no attempt has been made explicitly to identify the agencies, institutions and individuals guiding the process of change, except by implication. In this section, the role of different actors and agents of change in shaping the landscape of the city of Colombo will be examined. The discussion concentrates on the period after independence, in particular, the post-liberalization period.

Being a small island state with a population of just over six million at the time of independence, Sri Lanka, then known as Ceylon, did not have large cities. Even the capital city of Colombo did not have more than a few hundred thousand people. Its small, thinly dispersed population and the absence of large industries at the turn of the twentieth century would have left many tropical trees and plants intact covering not only large home gardens but also many open spaces such as parks, scrub and marshes. It is perhaps this situation that would have encouraged physical planners at the time to dream about creating in Colombo 'a garden city in the east' (Geddes 1920, as quoted in UDA 1998: XIV).

Colombo, in spite of being a relatively small city with a small population, was the capital of the British colony of Ceylon. It functioned for nearly 150 years not only as the political, administrative and commercial centre of the country, but also as home to extremely privileged elites, both colonial and native. The lack of large enterprises or industries in the city no doubt acted as a disincentive for large-scale migration from rural to urban areas. The few rural migrants who moved into the city were attracted by employment opportunities offered by the harbour, Colombo Municipal Council and a few firms engaged in export-import trade. These poor migrants moved into rundown sections of the city or created their own squatter settlements in the northern and eastern parts.

Even after independence, Colombo did not become a vibrant industrial city. Post-independence economic and industrial policies favoured decentralized development. Since the rural population constituted the vast majority of the country's political constituency, post-independence regimes devoted much of the resources to address the problems faced by the rural population. Rural infrastructure development, social sector investments, various forms of state subsidies, and rural industrial development accounted for most of the public investment in the 1950s to the 1970s. Even physical planners at the time had favoured decentralized development, rather than centralized city development (UDA 1998: XVI). In fact, the agency responsible for urban planning was even designated as the Town and Country Planning Department.

As mentioned earlier, post-independence regimes favoured decentralized industrial development. Many industries that were established from the 1950s to the early 1970s were located in outlying provinces, away from the capital city. Investments in rural social infrastructure, i.e. education and health, helped curb city-ward migration. Yet, Colombo continued to be an attractive destination for upwardly mobile rural inhabitants, in particular those who acquired educational and professional qualifications. Colombo continued to offer better health, educational and residential facilities. Being the political, administrative and business centre, Colombo continued to be the pre-eminent habitat of the country's business, political and administrative, military and intellectual elites.

In spite of being the principal city, Colombo's landscape did not undergo a rapid transformation in the first few decades after independence owing to two main reasons. First, the economic policy environment did not encourage private-sector-led development, either in the city or outside it. In fact, it was the state which dominated the development process. Most of the large buildings constructed until the mid-1970s belonged to government departments or public enterprises such as state banks. The same was true for housing. Private investments in housing were discouraged. The few apartment blocks that went up during the period were state-funded. So, private construction firms employing professional planners and builders were few and far between. In fact, many of the professionals trained in such fields as architecture and civil engineering migrated to other countries, or worked for state agencies.

The above situation began to change rapidly in the late 1970s. Exportled, market-oriented development strategy adopted by the prevailing regime was instrumental in making Colombo the most dynamic business centre as well as the largest site of private consumption in the country. The construction boom that followed drastically altered the city landscape. High-rise office blocks, large shopping centres, multi-storey luxury apartment blocks, large tourist hotels, private hospitals, international schools, travel and airline offices, glittering night clubs and expensive restaurants began to dominate the

city's landscape. An influx of thousands of sleek motorcars that flooded the city streets, on the one hand, side-lined old, British-made motorcars and, on the other, created long lines of slow moving traffic along most city streets during peak hours.

The changes outlined above did not occur in an orderly fashion. In fact, national leaders, municipal authorities and professional planners soon realized the need for regulating and planning urban change. It is this realization that led to the establishment of the Urban Development Authority (UDA) with sweeping powers to regulate urban development in the country, in particular, in the Colombo metropolitan region.

The newly established UDA came under the purview of the Ministry of Housing and Construction. Being a national level authority, it took over some of the powers of municipal and urban councils. This at times even led to conflicts of interest in the recent past. It could initiate development plans for an urban area even without much consultation with local authorities. It would develop projects with donor assistance and implement them with the assistance of local councils.

Rapid changes in the landscape of Colombo after 1977 could be attributed largely to increased private sector participation in all sectors of the economy, including the construction industry. The rapid expansion of the private sector resulted in an equally rapid growth in the construction industry. Professions related to the construction industry in turn gained greater prominence and visibility. Urban planning, which was an insignificant area of professional activity prior to economic liberalization, became highly recognized after the establishment of the UDA. In fact, physical planners have dominated the UDA ever since it was established in the late 1970s.

The emergence of Colombo as a thriving business centre in the country in the late 1970s persuaded the political leadership at the time to shift the national parliament to a suburb of Colombo. The objective has been to separate the political and administrative centre from the business and commercial centre. Though many government offices have been shifted to this new site over the last two decades, the process is by no means complete. Many government offices, official residences of political leaders, diplomatic missions and military establishments continue to be located in the city. The most recendy proposed structural plan of the UDA proposes to complete the process in the future so that Colombo City could primarily be the business and commercial hub of the country. At least this is the vision of the professionals affiliated to the UDA and the construction industry.

The changes in the urban landscape have not been confined to Colombo City limits. In fact, the decision by the post-1977 regime to establish two Free Trade Zones in an adjoining district, about 20 kilometres away from the city, added greater significance to Colombo as a business centre. Goods produced in the Free Trade Zones are for export and this production itself is dependent on import of raw materials and machinery.

New business activities in the city attracted many migrant workers who were often forced to settle down in suburban areas where the land prices and rents continued to be relatively low. Rapidly increasing demand for land in the city led to an unprecedented escalation of property prices and rents. Consequently only the most affluent people could afford real estate within city limits. So, the suburban population has increased substantially over the last two decades.

The most recent thinking among the planners at the UDA is that the area comprising Colombo and its adjoining areas should be further developed so that they could function

not only as the country's business and commercial centre but also as an economic hub in the Asian region. This is quite contrary to the thinking of an earlier generation of planners whose intention was to promote decentralized development in order to counter the hegemonic position of Colombo vis-à-vis the other regions of the country.

Directors of urban change

So far in the present chapter, urban change in Colombo has been examined mostly from a structural point of view. Such an analysis does not reveal real actors of change or, in the context of the present discussion, the directors of urban change. On the other hand, when one examines a process of urban change extending over several decades, one cannot possibly prepare an exhaustive list of such directors, let alone go into a detailed analysis of their respective roles in the process of change. So, what is attempted in the present section is an exercise that deals with the most influential directors of change. Moreover, the directors are selected with a view to linking their contribution to the structural processes that have been discussed; in particular, the major shifts that have taken place. It should also be noted at the outset that the discussion here will be mostly focused on the post-1977 period when the landscape underwent the most remarkable changes in its recent history.

There are various directors of urban change in modern urban settings who have varying degrees of influence. There are politicians who often have their own ideas and visions regarding the city. Their ideas tend to vary depending on their interests, ideological orientations and preferences. Municipal authorities responsible for the management of urban public affairs often play a catalystic role in urban change, particularly when they are powerful mayors with their own views on the development of the city. Other directors may include urban planners, architects, realestate developers, financiers, international donors, scholars and even influential creative artists. Their influence on the processes of urban change tends to vary widely, depending on the prevailing institutional arrangements, nature of the planning and the decision-making process, professional networks and organizations that bring various directors together, and the nature of the public discourse and its influence on the political process.

As mentioned before, no attempt is made in the present paper to examine in detail the varying contributions that various directors have made to the process of urban change in Colombo over many years. Instead, the discussion will focus on those directors of change who have made the most significant contribution. Given the high level of politicization of Sri Lankan society and, hence of the decision-making processes, politicians have been the dominant figures behind much of directed urban change as well. This does not mean that others have not played a part in the processes. It is just that they have often done so behind the scenes, though the impact of their interventions can be quite significant. Another point that needs to be highlighted is the fact that the shift towards a liberal, open economic policy regime in 1977 brought to an end the period during which the directors linked to the centralized state dominated the urban planning process. It in fact signified the beginning of a new era when a whole range of non-state directors could also play an increasingly significant role in reshaping the urban landscape. This of course did not diminish the decisive role played by the politicians. So, the present discussion will begin

with an account of the critical role played by two dominant political actors in guiding the processes of urban change during the post-liberalization period.

The centralized character of the Sri Lankan state has dominated the political landscape of the country throughout the post-independence period, despite attempts to decentralize power in the late 1980s. In fact, with the establishment of an executive presidential system in 1978, state power became even more centralized. The new system gave greater powers to the president at the expense of the parliament and other elected bodies such as the local councils. This trend was further reinforced when supra-national bodies like the Urban Development Authority (UDA) were established, further marginalizing the elected local bodies like the municipal councils. In the process, urban planners and other professionals working for such supra-national organizations could have greater influence on planning and development processes than before. On the other hand, the new liberal economic environment also enabled a whole range of other directors of urban change to emerge such as private developers, financiers, foreign investors, professional consultants, international donors and non-governmental organizations. In fact when we look at the recent transformation of the city landscape, the increasingly significant role played by these agents of change becomes obvious.

Given the fact that Colombo is also the capital city of the country, it has drawn the attention of the national leaders to a disproportionate degree. This is understandable because Colombo is the window to the outside world as well as the seat of power. More often than not, national leaders of Sri Lanka are also residents of Colombo and have their core support base also in the capital city.

It is against the above background that we have to view the dominant role that national political leaders have played in urban change in the recent past. In this regard, two leaders clearly stand out in the post-liberalization period. They are the late J.R.Jayawardena, the president of the country from 1978 to 1989 and the late President R.Premadasa who held the post from 1989 to 1993. The latter also led the important Ministry of Housing and Construction under which the subject of urban development came. The two leaders hailed from very different social backgrounds. Jayawardena came from a privileged, Westernized elite background while the latter emerged from a lower-class urban background and, unlike the former, had little formal education.

J.R.Jayawardena presided over the already discussed landmark economic policy shift that took place in the late 1970s. His approach was top-down, technocratic and oriented toward the private sector. He wished to develop Colombo as a business centre as opposed to its traditional, colonial and post-colonial image of the political and administrative centre. The decision to shift the capital to a new location in the south-eastern periphery of the city and relocate the parliament and other government institutions there was strictly in keeping with the above vision. In fact, the shifting was done rapidly, within a few years of becoming the president of the country, leaving the old parliament to be preserved as a historical monument. Colombo's skyline began to change rapidly. The old business district of Colombo, which covered the colonial fort area, was transformed into a modern urban landscape with the twin towers of the new World Trade Centre, high-rise bank buildings, five-star hotels like the Colombo Hilton, and airline and tour offices becoming its key features. Private sector development radiated outwards from the fort, along the key arterial roads leading towards the south and south-eastern parts of the city, with more and more high-rise office buildings, shopping malls and luxury residential complexes

dotting the landscape. Many old, state-sector buildings that dominated the landscape of Colombo before 1977 soon became dwarfed and marginalized by more imposing constructions financed by foreign and local investors and real-estate developers.

President Jayawardena's vision for the city of Colombo was very much linked to his agenda for economic development. Much earlier than the other South Asian leaders, he felt the need for integrating Sri Lanka's economy with the outside world via foreign investment, foreign trade and structural reforms. In this scheme of things, Colombo figured prominently, as the city was supposed to play a catalystic role in the process of economic growth led by the private sector and foreign investment. In order to allow the city of Colombo to play this role, its image had to change from being a predominantly politico-administrative centre to a dynamic, externally oriented, cosmopolitan business centre. The transition was clearly evident in the 1970s and the early 1980s when the city landscape was changing rapidly. Many old politico-administrative institutions were shifted to the new administrative capital of Sri Jayawardenapura, paving the way for new private sector business institutions such as banks, office complexes, residential towers and hotels.

The transformation of the city's landscape could not continue unabated beyond the early 1980s when a major ethnic riot broke out in the city, leading to the destruction of residential and business property belonging to the Tamil minority against whom the riot was directed. The riots displaced many members of the minority Tamil community resident in the city. The riots also contributed to an escalation of the country's ethnic conflict that has been simmering for decades. The conflict developed into a low-intensity war between the Sri Lankan security forces, on the one hand, and Tamil rebel groups in the north and east of the country, on the other, in the mid-1980s. Colombo itself became a target of rebel attacks in the form of bomb explosions and assassinations of political leaders, often carried out by suicide squads. Colombo became an unsafe place even for residents, let alone visitors such as tourists and business travellers. The result was a rapid decline of business activity in the city. This naturally slowed down construction activities. President Jayawardena, largely preoccupied with the country's ethnic conflict, could do little to encourage private investment in city development. This situation did not change until the end of his term of office in 1989. His successor, R.Premadasa was elected president in the same year, following a violent election campaign.

R.Premadasa did not have to wait till he became the president of the country to influence the process of change in the metropolis. In fact, being the prime minister as well as the minister in charge of urban development, housing and construction in the post-1977 government led by J.R.Jayawardena, he already played a highly significant role in the process of urban change. While a steady process of development induced by the private sector was underway and facilitated by the newly established UDA that came under his purview, he was instrumental in setting in motion a parallel process of state-led development. This involved the already mentioned shifting of the parliament and other state institutions to the new location, named Sri Jayawardenapura,[2] the planning and construction of the parliamentary complex and most of the other state buildings there, construction of several residential and office complexes in Colombo, road development, state-assisted housing development for the urban poor, and certain urban infrastructures like clock towers and overhead bridges across several busy streets. Being the country's leader, he could not however confine his work to Colombo and its suburbs. So, his

construction programmes that extended to other parts of the country had a significant impact outside Colombo as well. In contrast, private sector involvement in the construction sector elsewhere in the country has been minimal.

President Premadasa's social background made him more responsive to grassroots level communities, in particular the urban poor. Many housing complexes, for both the poor as well as middle and upper-middle class groups, sponsored by the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) have not been surpassed by schemes that came after him. They were certainly not adequate to meet the growing demand for housing in Colombo or elsewhere but amounted to at least a limited corrective to an otherwise almost totally one-sided development based on the private sector and catering to the affluent segments of urban society. Many low-income urban settlements were improved with some land rights being granted to squatters, basic services provided and even small housing loans given to families to renovate or build their houses.

The above programmes were sponsored by supra-national bodies like the National Housing Development Authority, the Common Amenities Board and the Water Supply and Drainage Board, all of which were connected to national level ministries. In fact, when President Premadasa was in power, most of these institutions came under his purview. The local authority of the area, the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC), played only a secondary role in the process of urban planning and development. On the other hand, being the most resourceful local council in the country, the CMC has the capacity to play a leading part but, because of the dominance of national level leadership and institutions, its public posture remained overshadowed by the latter. Another major factor that prevented the mayor from playing a more significant role was the high degree of politicization of the institution and widespread corruption and inefficiency. There appeared to be some change in the council in the late 1990s when a more dynamic and private-sector-oriented politician became the mayor. He privatized some of the municipal services like refuse collection in order to reduce wastage and corruption, but his tenure lasted only for a few years before he was elevated to a higher position in the national political hierarchy.

As mentioned above, unlike President Jayawardena, President Premadasa was more interested in providing housing and other basic amenities to disadvantaged urban communities, located mostly in the northern, central and eastern parts of the city. These communities constituted about 60 per cent of the city population and provided much of President Premadasa's electoral base. His ambitious housing development programme that absorbed a major portion of public investment came under heavy criticism from multilateral donors, forcing him to change the mode of financing. Instead of building low-income housing complexes using public funds, small loans were advanced to the urban poor to build their own small houses on very small parcels of land allocated to them by the state. This naturally resulted in the fragmentation of land, preventing the optimal use of scarce public land in the city.

Unlike J.R.Jayawardena, President Premadasa emphasized public investment in housing and urban infrastructure development, particularly in the wards where the low-income people live. He paid much less attention to the western and southern city areas of affluent residents. These are also the areas where most of the private construction investments have been made. Yet, several major housing and infrastructure projects were completed during the period when President Premadasa was in power. These included

Sugathadasa Indoor Stadium and Kettarama International Cricket Grounds. Both are major land marks in the city, both are located in areas where low-income residents are concentrated.

President Premadasa appeared to have been mindful of the need to bring about some balance between the developed, affluent western half of the city (located along the western coastline) and the disadvantaged, underdeveloped parts of the city, where largely the urban poor lived in highly congested slum and shanty communities. He was careful to hand pick the central government minister of housing construction and urban development as well as the mayor of Colombo. He succeeded in doing so in the 1980s and mobilized the resources of both the central government as well as the Colombo Municipal Council to improve housing and other infrastructure facilities in the underdeveloped areas of the city. This programme came to a virtual standstill when President Premadasa was killed by a suicide bomber in 1993. Priorities of his successors have been different as is evident from the fact that there have not been any significant state-sponsored housing or infrastructure development programmes in the city since the death of President Premadasa. However, construction activity based on the private sector has continued in the more affluent parts of the city, though intermittently, owing to terrorist threats that persisted till 2001 when the Sri Lankan government signed an accord for cessation of hostilities with the Liberation Tigers pending a negotiated settlement to the country's ethnic problem. Apart from the repair and reconstruction of state buildings destroyed by terrorist attacks, there have not been any major public investments in the city of Colombo over the last ten years. In contrast, since the signing of the accord in 2001, there has been an acceleration of activities of private construction firms. A number of new market, apartment and office complexes have gone up in Colombo, all in the western part of city, contributing to the perpetuation of the wide gap that has emerged between the affluent and disadvantaged parts of the city.

As mentioned before, liberalization of the economy in 1977 facilitated greater private sector participation in urban development. This naturally increased the demand for the services of urban planners and other related professionals. The establishment of supra-national institutions like the UDA was largely in response to the increasing demand for urban infrastructure. The presence of such bodies, however, has not given a clear direction for city development as is evident from what has happened over the last two decades. Infrastructure, housing and other developments have not followed any orderly pattern. Many of the green and open spaces have given way to more and more buildings and other structures. Water-ways that drained storm and waste water into the open sea have become breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Flooding became a common occurrence in many areas of the city. Urban planners and other professionals who have been associated with public sector institutions like the UDA and the CMC either did not see anything wrong with what was going on or did not have much influence on the planning and development process. The truth appears to be somewhere in between.

As mentioned earlier, Colombo was a slow moving place before economic liberalization. There was not much happening there in terms of planning and construction. So, there was not much work for professionals in these fields. Even many of those who were professionally qualified tended to leave the country looking for greener pastures elsewhere. Consequently, the relevant professions did not develop rapidly, either academically or professionally. But, when the post-1977 construction boom came,

Colombo became a beehive of activity. There was perhaps not much time for thinking, planning and reflecting. The private sector wanted to build hotels, office complexes, luxury apartments, restaurants, warehouses and shopping malls. It looks as if the urban planners, architects and construction engineers working for the UDA and private sector firms came forward to facilitate the process rather than to provide any direction based on a clear vision for the future. This is reflected in the urban structural plans developed by the UDA with or without donor assistance. Most of these plans were almost devoid of any social, ecological and cultural content (Magnus 2002).

It is significant that accelerated urban development activity after economic liberalization did not facilitate the emergence of professions playing a publicly acknowledged role in the development of the city. This is at least partly due to the fact that the entire process of decision making has been dominated by politicians. In fact, it was widely known that President Premadasa under whose purview the relevant institutions like the UDA functioned did not concede much autonomy to professionals. The widely shared view at the time was that the professionals such as urban planners, engineers and architects were expected to play a supporting and facilitating role in the design and implementation of projects. It is significant that this pattern has not changed after the death of President Premadasa in 1993.

As mentioned before, public investment in urban development projects has declined since the early 1990s. This is at least partly due to the escalation of the war in the mid-1990s. This situation did not encourage private investment either. On the other hand, most of the construction projects during this period have been implemented by private developers. These include a number of luxury high-rise housing complexes, private hospitals and several office complexes. These constructions have given expression to the increasing concentration of wealth and private consumption among affluent segments of society, providing a contrast to the large disadvantaged settlements in the city where conditions of abject poverty, environmental pollution and overcrowding persist.

Conclusions

An examination of urban change in and around Colombo over the last quarter of a century points to the relative significance of several sets of directors of urban change. Before the introduction of liberal economic policies, urban development in the country remained insignificant and this was also the case in Colombo. Political leaders who came to power in 1977 were determined to convert Colombo into a dynamic business centre that would act as a catalyst for national economic growth driven by the private sector and export. Much of the changes in the city landscape that followed the above policy shift were the result of private investments in diverse fields including the construction industry. In other words, private sector business leaders have appropriated large parts of the city for development, substantially changing its skyline.

Establishment of the UDA in the early 1980s signalled the recognition by the national leaders that urban change needs to be regulated and facilitated. This in turn gave professional planners an opportunity to introduce some of their own ideas and concepts in the process of developing physical plans for Colombo and its environs. However, it appears that their influence in shaping urban change over the last two decades has not

been substantial. Powerful business groups such as financiers, bankers, real-estate developers and traders have been far more influential in directing the kind of change that has taken place in the urban landscape.

The role of the mayor of Colombo as a director of urban change has been a subdued one. In fact, national leaders and professionals associated with the supra-national institutions like the UDA have overshadowed the functioning of municipal authorities in the context of macro-urban transformation. It is also noteworthy that the congruence of national party politics with municipal politics has also been a critical factor in the above regard. In fact, the mayor of the CMC in the early 1980s later became a cabinet minister in charge of urban development. The minister in charge of urban development (Housing and Construction) in the early 1980s became the president of the country in the late 1980s. This pattern has continued to this date. The result is that the mayor does not often go beyond the micro-management of local affairs in the city such as improvements to basic urban infrastructure, public health, environmental sanitation and poor relief.

Notes

1 Some of the policies pursued by this regime, in particular the official language policy that replaced English with Sinhala, the language of the majority community, led to agitations by the main ethnic minority in the country as legislation was perceived as discriminatory towards them.

2 This was the name of the pre-colonial Sinhala kingdom, the seat of which was located within the territory of the current Kotte Municipal Council. The Capital is also situated within the same geographical limits. Incidentally, the name also happened to be the same as that of the former president.

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3
Guangzhou City

Ever-changing urban planning
Zhou Daming

Introduction

Since the Opium War, Guangzhou City has had a history of more than 160 years and may be said to be an epitome of development of many Chinese cities during this period. Especially since 1949, an examination of the track of the development of Guangzhou City is helpful in understanding the developmental trends of major cities in modern China. In the development of a city, who predominates? Who controls the orientation of urban development? Who decides the path of urban development? This chapter seeks to make a study of urban development by taking Guangzhou as an example.

Guangzhou is the capital of Guangdong Province and the political, economic, technological, educational and cultural centre of the province. Guangzhou City is located at the southern part of the Chinese mainland, in about the middle of the coast of Guangdong Province and on the northern edge of the Pearl River Delta, close to the lower reaches of the Pearl River Basin. It is separated from Hong Kong and Macao by stretches of sea.

Thanks to the numerous islands and dense waterways in the Pearl River Estuary, Guangzhou has become a fine seaport for Chinese international voyages and the major import-export port of the Pearl River Basin. Guangzhou also stands at the junction of the Jing-Guang, Guang-San, Guang-Mei, Guang-Shen and Guang-Mao Railways and is the traffic hub of civil aviation in South China, closely linked by air to the whole country. For this reason, Guangzhou is known as the 'Southern Gateway' of China.

Guangzhou City governs ten districts and two county-level cities, with a total area of 7,434.4km^2, accounting for almost one-fifth of the total area of the Pearl River Delta (41,600km^2). It has a total population (with registered permanent residence) of 7,126,000 people (resident population: 10,150,000 people) and 98 sub-district offices and 74 towns. The mean daily floating population in the urban area is above 3,000,000 people.

Guangzhou City before 1949

From the perspective of historical geography, since Ren Xiao constructed the city in 214 BC, Guangzhou has had a history of more than 2,000 years. Many historically famous cities in China, such as Xi'an and Beijing, have been repeatedly relocated. By contrast, Guangzhou has remained at the same site for more than 2,800 years (*Guangzhou Daily* 9 November 1993). Guangzhou has survived uninterruptedly for nearly 3,000 years

because it is situated at the confluence of three rivers (Dongjiang, Xijiang and Beijiang) and was once an ancient seaport for Southeast Asia, handling the export of the hinterland of the Pearl River Delta, supported by the extensive fertile plains and material resources. It would be fair to say that except for Hong Kong, no coastal city of China can be compared with Guangzhou. Though Hangzhou and Quanzhou once surpassed Guangzhou in history, they were later eclipsed which left Guangzhou free to become the centre of the ancient Marine Silk Road of China.

Measured in terms of urban construction, the development of Guangzhou before the liberation (of China, 1949) falls roughly into four stages: (1) before the Opium War; (2) from the Opium War to the early years of the Republic of China; (3) the foundation of the Municipal Chamber and comprehensive urban construction, when the city development was at its height under the administrations of Sun Ke and Chen Jitang; and (4) after the War of Resistance against Japan and before liberation. In the third stage, Guangzhou began to transform from being a feudal city into a neoteric city, from an enclosed city centring on the feudal government to an open city with neoteric functions.

Political and military oriented urban constructian of Guangzhou before 1840 (214 BC to AD 1840)

In 214 BC, after being appointed as the governor of Nanhai Prefecture by Emperor Qin, Ren Xiao constructed the city of Panyu in the ancient Pan and Yu Mountains (west of present-day Cangbian Road), establishing the embryonic form of Guangzhou City. Later, Zhao Tuo enlarged the urban area to a perimeter of ten miles, located within the zone west to Fangcao Street, east to Huaning Lane, north to Xihu Road and south to Yuehua Road. During the period of the Three Kingdoms, this city again expanded northwards on a large scale. During the Sui-Tang dynasties, the foreign trade of Guangzhou developed rapidly. At Miaotou, today Huangpu, a famous temple dedicated to the sea-god—the Nanhai Temple (also known as the Pineapple Temple)—was built, and extended and rebuilt after the Tang dynasty. At that time, there was a dock in front of the temple which served as a major commercial port of the overseas traffic and trade in ancient times. The Maritime 'Silk Road' originating here passed via Southeast Asia, to West Asia and North Africa. After the introduction of Islam during the Tang dynasty, the Huaisheng Temple and Guangta Tower were erected in Guangzhou, a 'foreign lane' was established near present-day Guangta Street as a quarter for foreign residents. At that time, Guangzhou enjoyed a prosperous economy and extended over a large urban area. The residents began to make tiles and rebuild their houses, creating diversified buildings with tiled roofs, including curved residential houses, noble mansions with overlapping pavilions and parapet-storeyed buildings characteristic of South China, reflecting the advances in urban construction.

During the Five Dynasties, the city expanded its wall for a third time southwards by levelling Yu Mountain. Meanwhile, seven temples were built at each of the four extremes of the urban area. With the economic development, which graced the 300 years of the Song dynasty, the city of Guangzhou was expanded and renovated more than ten times, of which the one on the largest scale was the addition of the central town, east town and west town in AD 1045. During the Ming dynasty, the Guangzhou city wall underwent its fifth great expansion, when the three towns of the Song dynasty were combined and

extended in two directions, giving rise to the 'old town' with a perimeter of 21 miles, and the Zhenhai Tower was also erected on Yuexiu Mountain. In AD 1563, the outer town was set up to the south of the city, with a perimeter of six miles, and became known as the 'New Town'.

Six waterways were built between the Song dynasty and the Qing dynasty in the old town, known as the 'Six Channel Canals'. In Guangzhou, a city with a well-developed river network, a bridge had already been built in the Southern Han dynasty, the famous Liuhua Bridge. Later during the Qing dynasty, over sixty private gardens were created, including the Haishan Fairy Hall, the Wangsong Garden and the Yuyin Atrium.

In ancient times, the management of urban construction was undertaken by a supervisor appointed by the central government and the Board of Public Works. In the late Qing dynasty, land and houses in Guangzhou were the responsibility of the Guangdong Chengxuan Office of the Administrative Minister, which exercised guidance and supervision. Private real estate was jointly managed by the Panyu and Nanhai Counties under the Guangzhou government.

Sporadic urban development and introduction of the 'West Wind' urban construction of Guangzhou from the Opium War to the early years of the Republic of China (1841–1917)

After the Opium War, Guangzhou began to extend beyond its city walls. This was because of the Westernization Movement of the ruling class which was the engine behind the growth of Guangzhou's national industry. Left behind by the economic and population growth, the old city area, structure and layout were all in need of a reform. This coincided with a time in which the rise of concessions gradually disrupted the former urban construction philosophy of the Chinese. Western-style buildings began to appear in Guangzhou.

After the Opium War, the English and French colonialists forcibly 'leased' the Shamian Concession, which was constructed under a comprehensive plan integrating a complete road system and green belts. The buildings in Shamian today were constructed after the nineteenth century, in neo-baroque, neo-classical and the so-called 'colonial' styles, mostly with reinforced concrete structures. The most renowned church in Guangzhou then was the Roman Catholic Sacred Heart Cathedral at Shishi, Yide Road, which was built of stone, 58.5 m high, being the largest gothic church with a high, straight spire in the Far East.

In 1886, a road was built on the dike of the Tianzi Dock, heralding the history of a Guangzhou with a road, in spite of its width, of only 36.6 m. Later, the Long-Dike Road with a full length of 3,600 m was built from Donghao to Xihao.

In 1912, the Republic of China was founded and the nascent capitalistic organ of state power thereupon took the re-planning of Guangzhou into consideration. On 2 March 1912, the *Shanghai Daily* published a resolution of the Guangdong military government to re-plan Guangzhou, followed by measurements, city wall demolition and road widening. Soon after that, successive wars caused the city planning to be shelved. Therefore, this period was only a preface to urban construction, when the city was developed in fragments.

Foundation of the Municipal Chamber and neoteric transformation
(1918–36)

In 1918, the Guangzhou Municipal Chamber was set up to oversee municipal works and real-estate management, with some functions relating to urban construction management. This event should be regarded as a symbol of transition of Guangzhou from a traditional city to a modern city. In this year, the neoteric urban construction of Guangzhou began, including demolishing the city wall, building roads, such as Taiping Road, Fengning Road (Renmin Middle Road today), Yuexiu Road, Wanfu Road, Dexuan Road (Dongfeng Middle Road today) and so on.

In 1921, Guangzhou was formally established as a city, when Sun Ke was appointed to head the city administration, followed by the enactment of the 'Provisional Regulations of Guangzhou' to normalize urban construction and management. Sun appointed a number of young and competent graduates and famous scholars as directors-general of the boards and drew up a comprehensive and scientific plan for urban construction. The activities included the actual demolition of the city wall, filling in trenches, relocating residential housing, building roads, urban public sanitary management and developing public education.

In the period 1929–36, during Chen jitang's administration of Guangdong, municipal construction was accelerated to keep pace with rapid economic development. Twenty-four roads were built in quick succession, including Xihu Road, Haoxian Road and Qingping Road. By 1936, the city's total length of newly built roads was 134km. In February 1933, the Haizhu Iron Bridge spanning the Pearl River was completed, linking the south and north urban zones, boosting the economic development of Guangzhou.

In 1929, the Guangzhou Engineering Bureau worked out a road construction plan—the 'Engineering Implementation Programme'—for the first time, covering 61 urban roads and 35 suburban roads. The road construction took into consideration both the need for urban commercial development and the provision of access to the urban area from the suburbs and industrial zones.

In architectural style, a combination of Western and Chinese cultures was highlighted. When building roads, the arched gallery form found in Western classical buildings was combined with the traditional style of Guangdong, making houses along the road galleried buildings, which were particularly suitable for the rainy, hot climate of Guangzhou and became popular throughout the city, forming the highlight of Guangzhou's street scene. Buildings in this period, such as the Zhongshan Memorial Hall (designed by Lv Yanzhi), General Building of Guangzhou Municipality (designed by Lin Keming), Zhongshan Library and Aiqun Mansion (designed by Li Binheng, Chen Rongji), featured the combination of 'Chinese and Western styles' adding new colour to Guangzhou City.

The pre-eminent architects in Guangzhou then included Lv Yanzhi, Yang Xizong, Lin Keming, Zheng Xiaozhi and Yu Qingjiang. Take Lv Yanzhi as an example, in May 1927, the competition for designing the Zhongshan Memorial Hall was announced, Lv Yanzhi, aged 33 years, was ranked first among eighty participants from all over the globe. Lv was born in Dongping, Shandong, graduated from the Architecture Department of the Tsinghua University, had studied in the USA and was appreciated by Murphy—an American architect. Mr Lv was good at combining Western architectural style with the

magnificence of Chinese buildings and he was the designer of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum.

Urban construction during the troubled period (1937–49)

In 1937, the War of Resistance against Japan broke out. From September 1937, Japanese planes bombed the city for ten months. Guangzhou's most prosperous streets were reduced to rubble. This signalled the beginning of a series of wars that lasted for years halting the urban construction of Guangzhou. In 1949, the total length of urban roads was 228km, with a total area of 1.85 million m^2; the sewage system covered 309km; citywide residential area 12.3 million m^2, of which the area covered by housing was 7.80 million m^2. Although the per capita living area was $4.5m^2$, 220,000 people were still living in shacks; there was only one waterworks with a productive capacity of 140,000 tons a day, a water supply radius of $18.7km^2$ and the water-use ratio was a mere 37.7 per cent. There were in total 4,601 street lamps, 211 buses, 17 river ferryboats and four small parks (total area: 25 ha, plant coverage: 1.56 per cent) throughout the city.

The development of Guangzhou City after 1949

From 1949 to 2001, 16 urban master plans have been prepared for the city. Generally speaking, there have been three phases represented by three types of city: namely industrial city, socialist modern city and international metropolis, each much different from the others.

Industrial city stage and the introduction of the 'Soviet Wind' (1949–78)

From 1954 to 1978, the leadership gave priority to the economic growth of Guangzhou City. The proposal in 1954 was: 'over a considerable period, gradually to turn Guangzhou from being a consumer city into a socialistic producer city', which was later re-worded as 'socialist industrial producer city'. The proposal in 1956 was 'developing Guangzhou into a city focused on light industry with a certain level of transportation and commerce'. The positioning in 1958 was an 'industrial base in South China' and that in 1961 was a 'producer city focused on a certain proportion of heavy industry and on light industry'. The positioning in 1975 was an 'integrated industrial city of coordinated light and heavy industries, an industrial base for Guangdong Province that is playing a major role in the economic development of South China'. In summary, though these guidelines differ in the ratio of heavy and light industry, the keynote is to turn 'a consumer city into an industrial basis'.

During the 29 years from 1949 to the beginning of the Reform and Opening, the house construction, municipal works and public facilities construction of Guangzhou were centred on industry with the aim of building a producer city. This was a time in which the architectural style was affected by the urban planning philosophy of the Soviet Union, 'big brother'. From 1954 to 1957, Guangzhou learned about the 'urban planning' of Lefchinco from the Soviet Union and also about relevant regulations, and later began to formulate its own planning under the guidance of Soviet experts. After the establishment

of the People's Republic of China, the people's government started to heal the war wounds of Guangzhou City. The first step was to rebuild the Haizhu Bridge, West Dyke, Huangsha, and seriously damaged municipal facilities and areas. Under the guidelines of the producer city plan, the Xicun, Nanshitou, Yuancun, Chigang and Hedong Industrial Zones and Huangpu Port Zone were developed. Great effort was put into the construction of urban roads, bridges, public transport, water supplies, sewers and landscaping.

During the Cultural Revolution, Guangzhou was badly short of funds for urban construction, but some achievements were made in urban construction, represented by the Liuhua area built in strict accordance to urban planning regulations. The exhibition hall of the Chinese Export Commodities Fair with an area of 110,000m^2 was rebuilt. Later, in 1974, the grand Guangzhou Railway Station was completed along with the Oriental Hotel and the Liuhua Hotel designed to receive visitors to the Fair. Some large public buildings surrounding the station, like the telegram and telephone building, the post office and ICAC ticket office, were completed one after the other. The newly built Huanshi Road, Renmin Road North, Zhanqian Road and other urban arterial roads radiating from the railway station led to the urban centre. The Liuhua area therefore became the pivot for external traffic and the centre of the foreign trade of Guangzhou.

From the perspective of urban construction guidelines, the city was basically planned and built in the grouped mode in this period. There were 'natural green belts' typical of suburban agriculture between the east and Shipan and Yuancun, between the north and Baiyun Airport at Sanyuanli, between the south and Chigang.

Socialistic modern city stage and hotchpotch (1979–91)

As one of the first regions opened to the outside (in 1979, 'special policies and flexible measures' were implemented in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces) and as an open coastal city (14 coastal cities were opened to the outside world in 1984), in the 1980s Guangzhou benefited from such preferential policies and boosted its own advantages in economic growth by breaking through the restraints of the traditional planned economic system for central cities, achieving a praiseworthy annual economic growth rate of 13.3 per cent.[1] This provided strong financial backing for the construction of Guangzhou City.

As of 1979, the urban construction guidelines changed. The prevailing idea then was to 'develop Guangzhou into a modern socialist city focused on light industry, with supporting raw materials and agricultural industries, advanced science, culture, foreign trade and tourism activities'. The concept of 'modern socialist city' took shape with these guidelines, altering the limitation of urban construction to industrial development, abandoning the former proposal of a socialist producer city to look at urban functions from the perspective of modern alternative production (Figure 3.1).

In 1981, it was proposed to 'turn Guangzhou into the economic centre of the province and South China, a prosperous, civilized, peaceful and beautiful modern socialist city'. From 1978, Guangzhou's urban construc-

Figure 3.1 Map of Guangzhou City in
the early 1980s.

tion system began to prepare the fourteenth 'Urban Master plan of Guangzhou', which
lasted the longest. While reporting to the State General Bureau of Urban Construction, an
exhibition of urban master plans was put on in the Cultural Park to collect citizens'
suggestions. This coincided with leaders of 18 central cities and experts from Peking
University, Tsinghua University, Zhongshan University and Tongji University being
invited by the General Bureau for discussions. In 1984, the plan was formally approved
by the State Council. At the same time, the work of clearing squatter buildings and
halting illegal land use, with a focus on enhanced planning management, was underway
all over the city. While optimizing the overall planning, the detailed plans were perfected
and the development of some key areas enhanced, including Beijing Road, Zhongshan
Road V, Jiangnan Avenue, west section of Huanshi Road, Tianhe Sports Centre, Shipai
Higher Education and Scientific Research Zone, Guangzhou E&T Development District
and so on.

In the construction sector, in order to balance the one-sidedness of the former
'production before living' and 'main structures preferred to support facilities'
approaches, the policies of 'unified planning, rational layout design, integrated
development and supporting construction' were launched. Developmental construction
was assured by introducing foreign capital and funds from the national finances and
collective finances drove the rapid growth of urban construction. Under this guideline
and policy, Guangzhou's urban construction management system underwent a conversion

in style from a highly concentrated, unified planned economy to a planned style of commodity economy. Aiming at the breakthrough point of a 'system for contracted economic responsibility', the urban construction system allowed more enterprises freedom in self-management, turning them from annexes to the government to relatively independent economic entities featuring self-management, self-responsibility for profit and loss, self-development and self-restriction. In leadership, the former system 'based on regulations' was changed to the three-level (city, district and block) system of 'unified leadership, level-by-level management, integration of belts and blocks with focus on blocks'.

However, since the pace of development far exceeded people's expectations, the urban construction was found to be full of loopholes. After 1979, Guangzhou, at the forefront of Reform and Opening, became unusually prosperous with a traveller flow of one to two million man-times a day which caught Guangzhou's urban planners unprepared. Road traffic, the water supply, the power supply, communications and residential construction fell behind in the accelerated pace of construction. Unauthorized buildings emerged along existing roads radiating from the urban centre, destroying the former 'natural green isolation belt', and replacing it with crowded 'concrete jungles'. In this period, the goal was to satisfy the needs of rapid economic development and convert Guangzhou into a modern city by perfecting city functions on the existing basis. Traffic-wise, the modifications mainly consisted of road broadening, building overhead roads and bridges. In the energy infrastructure, this included the expansion of the capacity of power and water. In communications, telephone was popularized, no longer the prerogative of organizations but now in the possession of ordinary families.

Any long-term planning was absent, producing the typical pattern of 'remedy wherever a problem appears'. No systematic planning was in place for the various functions of the city. Many completed works were soon outdated and it had often been necessary to dig up roads to lay various pipelines. There was very serious pollution because measures against this were falling behind.

From the perspective of architectural style, a mixture of Western, traditional and Cantonese styles began to appear. From the perspective of a guiding idea of urban construction, the 'concentrated mode' of urban development took the place of the 'grouped mode'. Guangzhou was connected with Huangpu to the east and with Panyu City to the south. This made people aware that the overall planning of Guangzhou was developing to the 'south and east' in a highly concentrated manner.

Concept and practice of international metropolis (1991–2001)

Since the beginning of the 1990s, many cities in China have proposed the idea of developing themselves into an international metropolis; Guangzhou is the one that has stood out. As early as 1991, a scholar proposed that Guangzhou should 'try to become an international metropolis by the end of this century' (Guangzhou Academic Information 1991). The municipality worked out the 'Master Plan for the Modernization of Guangzhou within 15 Years (1991–2005)' soon after that and made the major strategic decision to 'build Guangzhou into a modern international metropolis in 15 years' time' (Chao Zhenwei 1993). Guangdong Province also made the decision to support Guangzhou in its effort to become a financial centre.

In July 1990, Professor Qian Xuesen wrote a letter to Professor Wu Liangyong at the Tsinghua University, proposing the concept of 'landscaped city'. Afterwards, Wu Liangyong, Xie Ninggao, Bao Shixing and other scholars carried out extensive studies on the 'landscaped city' from many different angles (Qian Xuesen 1993). A glance at these shows that the aim to 'construct Guangzhou into a landscaped city' proposed by Guangzhou Municipality in 1996 is consistent with the basic features of the concept of the 'landscaped city'.

The rapid economic development of Guangzhou and the Pearl River Delta has incapacitated the former urban area of Guangzhou in its role of satisfying objective needs. The built-up areas of Guangzhou have expanded to the newly developed areas with the main focus on the east. Tianhe and Huangpu Districts became the economic, technological and financial focus at that time. The real-estate industry grew quickly, the electronic information industry, building industry, motor industry, commercial trade and banking developed rapidly.

In recent years, the 'Cloud Mountain, Pearl River' beautification project, the successful completion of the underground, the tight control of the urban environment, the commissioning of the outer ring-road, and the decision to invest RMB 20 billion in infrastructure annually turned the slogan of 'a minor change within one year, a medium change within three years and a major change within five years' into a reality. The city expansion efforts did not transgress the administrative boundaries, but were carried out under a mature plan. The regulation with the principal guideline of 'minor change—medium change—major change' improved the infrastructure, road networks, urban landmarks and urban landscape.

A large number of city image projects and new scenic spots have been conceptualized, the urban environment has been significantly enhanced, and there has been a major improvement in sewage and rubbish treatment. The newly added public green area covers 558.32ha and the urban garden area 46,635 ha, of which the public green area is 3,263 ha. The city has 125 parks, plant coverage of 34.4 per cent in built-up areas and a per capita public green area of 9.17m^2. The satisfaction of its citizens with the urban construction management and environmental outlook is rising. Guangzhou's attraction, radiation and integrated service ability as the central city of South China has been strengthening.

Major problems existing since 1949

There have been major changes in urban planning and construction, seriously hindering the formation of city characteristics. Urban planning is a large systematic project that may be put into effect with stable planning and long-term implementation. For political and institutional reasons, from 1949 to 2002, there have been seven major changes to the policy of Guangzhou urban planning and construction with 16 urban master plans proposed by the past sessions of government, almost one new planning every three years. These changes have affected the character of the city: functional positioning, structural orientation, the breadth and depth of city scale, space and layout. Consequently, the urban planning and construction has taken place in a series of repeated swings (Figure 3.2).

Guangzhou's urban construction is short of elaborate works and land-marks, giving rise to disparity in urban planning and design between

Figure 3.2 The latest map of
Guangzhou City. The area of the
Liwan, Yuexiu and Dongshan Districts
was central Guangzhou before 1949;
the larger area covering the Nanhai,
Fangcun, Haizhu and Tianhe Districts
was the centre of Guangzhou from
1949 to 1986; the total area shown on
the map is the present-day centre.

Guangzhou and some other advanced domestic cities. The desired image of a historical city famous for its culture has fared badly because of lack of support. Many designs are short of inventive ideas and cultural depth, and sometimes the actual construction technology leaves a great deal to be desired. The recalcitrant mechanism of Guangzhou's urban construction has prevented any improvement in its level of urban design and hence delayed the formation of urban outlook and features.

   Modern management concepts and means are conspicuous by their absence in the management of traffic, sanitation, the environment and public security. The spectre of 'disorder, squalor and degeneration' stalks in different degrees. Although after the great renovation, the urban outlook has been revitalized, the heavy task of engendering a sense of civilization in its citizens still has not been lightened. With new problems arising continuously, the conventional means and methods have hardly taken effect and new means are not yet in place. Incidents involving random building, uncontrolled road occupation, parking, illegal advertising and painting are rampant. In particular, the 'psoriasis' problem of the bus station marks is a major defect of the city. The badly managed public order at the two major railway stations is another big 'cancer' affecting the orderly functioning of Guangzhou, seriously undermining the city image.

In Guangzhou, 'villages in the city' have become a stubborn problem that is challenging the ingenuity of modern urban development. Although 'villages in the city' have become an integral part of the city geographically, they have kept the old rural pattern in residence registration, land ownership, economic organization and administrative system. The data provided by the Guangzhou Municipality indicate that, within the eight old districts with a total area of 385km^2 alone, there are 138 'villages in the city', whose key problems include: (1) high building density, low land-use rate, ubiquitous illegal building; (2) poor building quality posing a direct threat to personal safety—fire engines and ambulances can hardly gain access to narrow streets in a village; (3) increased migrant populations and great pressure on public security; (4) auxiliary public facilities such as environment sanitation are incomplete; and (5) the management system is not developed to modern urban standards, many managerial relations and responsibilities lack clear definition. For these reasons, such villages have become the 'stubborn' zones in urban management. The problem of 'village in the city' is a product of the binary separation of urban and rural areas in China, rooted in the conflict of interests between villagers and the country (city). State ownership of land prevails in urban areas, while collective ownership of land is the custom in rural areas. In the initial stage of urban development, land in 'villages in the city' was very cheap. However, the government missed the boat and failed to purchase it in time. Today, the land price has risen sharply; it would need a very large injection of money for the state to turn the collective ownership into state ownership. The problem is complex because 'villages in the city' are haphazardly constructed, requiring high reconstruction costs. It would cost less to expand new urban areas than to reconstruct a 'village in the city'. In the matter of the interest group consisting of villagers, the state is also faced with a dilemma.

From landscaped city to modern coastal city

In June 2000, Panyu and Huadu Counties, over which Guangzhou Municipality served as an acting administrative body, became districts, emblematic of the beginning of a new stage of Guangzhou's development. Guangzhou City's total area is 7,434.4km^2, accounting for one-fifth of the total area of the Pearl River Delta (41,600km^2), much larger than London (1,580km^2), New York (945km^2), Berlin (883km^2) and Tokyo (618km^2). The latest position of Guangzhou City on urban planning is: 'leap from the traditional natural pattern of "small hill and small river" to the natural pattern typical of "large mountain and open sea", heralding a gradual development into a prosperous city, an efficient city, an ecological city, an international regional central city that is the best suited to launching business and residence'. Meanwhile, the concept of international metropolis has been heard less frequently.

The 'Strategic Masterplan of Urban Construction of Guangzhou' formulated in 2001 divided Guangzhou City into five sections, namely the Metropolis, Huadu, Conghua, Zengcheng and Nansha. The Metropolis Section includes the eight existing districts, Yonghe and Xintang Towns under Zengcheng and north of the Shawan Waterway, Panyu. Besides this, the spatial pattern of 'one river with many banks, two axes and three belts, two transition regions, three major ports, and four materials circulation centres' has been hatched.

At present, the concept of sustainable development has been dawning in the minds of planners. Accordingly, the master plan has proposed the basic urban framework of a landscaped ecological city as a major outline and has specified that at the periphery of the Guangzhou-Foshan Urban Circle, a greater Guangzhou green ecological ring barrier will be built oriented on the mountains north of Guangzhou, the farmland water network to the southeast (Panyu, Dongguan), the mulberry-based fishponds in Shunde, and farmland and forests in the Beijiang River Basin. The aim is to protect properly the Guifeng and Sanjiao Mountains, Tiantang Peak, Maofeng Mountain, Baiyun Mountain and their vegetation, protecting the whole of the Pearl River system and the riverside, extending this protection to the Shatain cultivation area, the estuary and wetlands south of the Shawan Waterway. In order to control the unrestrained spread of the city more effectively, the master plan suggests opening seven ecological corridors in the region of Guangzhou City.

Under the current policy, the population growth of Guangzhou will continue for a period. Owing to the highly unbalanced development of the regional economy of China, the Pearl River Delta has become the region with the most concentrated migrant population of China. According to the *South Daily* of 7 October 2002, 'the floating population of China has exceeded 120 million people and the portion flowing into Guangdong (mostly into the Pearl River Delta) accounts for 35.5 per cent if analysed by region'. If the local residents are counted in, the average population density is 836 people per km^2. Wherever the economy is developed, the countrywide surplus labour force will surge in. The large-scale construction and rapid economic development of Guangzhou City will inexorably concentrate large populations, and the absolute number is too big. This is also why a repeat of US-style suburbanization is not expected in Guangzhou. Restricted by the permanent residence registration system, the 'resident population' cannot be converted into local population. The superiority of the local population in welfare and income over the migrant population has also resulted in disparities in housing conditions. The migrants gather in the outskirts. All levels of government are concentrated on the modification of the urban centre, known as the 'Facial Project'. The urban centre has a very good environment composed of green belts, clean plazas, roads, footpaths, grand sports facilities and other landmarks (Figure 3.3 and 3.4). This is in stark contrast to the conditions prevailing outside the centre.

The future development of Guangzhou City is faced with numerous problems:

• The administrative division is at odds with proper environmental management, because the treatment of waste gases, sewage and other waste materials and the protection of water resources must be considered in the framework of a greater region.
• Funds are too concentrated on the 'Facial Project' and there is not enough for community construction.
• A number of inequalities resulting from the domicile system, the areas of the huge incoming population cause strong mismatches in the urban areas in the landscape.
• The old urban area and 'villages in the city' are proving recalcitrant to modification; the state has to resolve the problems of village-level interest groups and villager employment properly.
• Urban traffic problems.

Figure 3.3 The Zhongshan Memorial Hall is a traditional-style Chinese building constructed in the early 1930s. It was erected on the site of the presidential house where Sun Yat-sen, father of republican China, had lived when he was the provisional president of China in 1922.

Conclusion

Now it is time to review the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. In the development of a city, who predominates? Who controls the orientation of urban development? Who decides the path of urban development?

Before 1949, Guangzhou's urban development was closely related to several mayors (Sun Ke, Liu Jiwen, Chen Jitang) and master architects (Lv Yanzhi, Yang Xizong, Lin Keming). After 1949, the positioning of the city was associated with nationwide political and economic situations; different ways of positioning would lead to different focuses in planning and construction. The decision-making group centring on the municipal leadership—the Construction Bureau and Planning Bureau—was the backbone of urban development, in which some experts and scholars were able to provide certain recommendations to facilitate decision making. The presentation of the phases in urban development then never varied in its slogans: important public facilities and landmarks. A slogan is a presentation replete with Chinese characteristics, a crystallization of wisdom captured in an aphorism, an accustomed way of propaganda of the Chinese.

The urban planning of Guangzhou as it was formulated before 1978 was directly related to the development orientation of introducing industry nationwide and the policy of high accumulation and low consumption. In 1979 Guangzhou's development actually benefited from the policy of Reform and Opening. The city's administrative division was determined by the State Council and the planning had to be submitted for approval to

Figure 3.4 The Zhongxin Building is
the most magnificent modern
construction in Guangzhou dating from
the late 1990s. It is one of the highest
buildings in China, as high as 381 m.

Along the road where it is located
other new edifices demonstrate
metropolitan quality.

superior administrations, such as the National Council of Construction, the National General Bureau of Construction and the National Planning Bureau. Incontrovertibly these institutional factors had major influences on the urban development.

The specific urban planning and construction is closely correlated to the nationwide exercise of authority and trends. In the cultural tradition of China, the opinions of those in authority are highly respected and may influence the whole nation. Meanwhile, most planners have graduated from various famous domestic universities, being students of well-known experts. From 1949 to the 1980s, the leading exponents of design and planning were mostly graduates of architecture from such universities, for example Tsinghua University, Tongji University and Dongnan University, apprenticed to scholars like Wu Liangyong, Zhou Ganchi, Xie Ninggao and Bao Shixing. At that time, there was little difference in the concept and model of overall planning, which meant that urban designs had much resemblance. The proposal of some slogans might often enjoy popularity nationwide. 'lnternational metropolis' and 'landscaped city' spring to mind. Guangzhou City was sometimes the trend-setter and sometimes the trend-follower. From the stated construction goal of 'building Guangzhou into a landscaped city' proposed by Guangzhou Municipality in 1996, it is no surprise to discover that this is consistent with the basic features of the concept of a 'landscaped city'. This was also connected to the judgement made at the 'Landscaped City Forum' held in February 1993 in Beijing that building a 'landscaped city' represented the direction which urban development of China should take.

The urban construction is government dominated and seldom involves the public. Government-dominated construction is not monolithic and can be divided up into several types. One is domination by a strong mayor, such as Chen Jitang or Zhu Guang. Another is domination by urban planning and construction departments. The third is a combined type, which is the dominant one at present. Take Zhu Guang (Type 1) as an example. In his control over Guangzhou's party and political affairs from 1949 to 1960, he proposed slogans such as 'forestation of the long dike and beautification of Guangzhou'. The proposal for 'garden city', which would simultaneously be a 'productive city' to some extent, corrected the singleminded focus on production, which had affected Guangzhou's development. Even though there are counter-balances, urban investments are mainly focused on large, visible projects, showing little concern for citizens and failing to improve their literacy greatly. There are signs of gradual change, but these developments have yet to be strengthened, especially the support of disadvantaged groups and the construction of grassroots communities.

Urban-rural inequality and regional disparities will drive the continuous expansion of big cities, as is the case in Guangzhou. Since 1979, the urban population of Guangzhou has been expanding, resulting in contradictions between large numbers of temporary migrants and the local people, which might cause urban problems. Only by pushing forward the reform of the registered residence system and gradually abolishing policies of local protection and discrimination against migrants can 'a prosperous city, an efficient

city, an ecological city, an international regional prime city that is the fittest for business initiation and residence' be realized.

Note

1 The data used in this article, unless specified, come from the *Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook* and government statistical bulletins.

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4
Hanoi

Between the imperfect past and the conditional future
Hans Schenk

Introduction

William S.Logan, the foremost observer of Hanoi's past and present socio-spatial character, depicted the townscape of this city as made up by 'successive layers of external cultural influences, each contributing to the overall richness' (Logan 1995:337). This statement is confirmed by views on Hanoi as expressed by Hanoians and outsiders. There are good reasons for such 'multi-layered visions'. Within one century, Hanoi has gone through the turmoil of rapid and rather dramatic changes related to the questions of how the city should be structured and what was, what is, and what should become its character. In this chapter past, present and future views are discussed. It is shown that each successive layer cannot be understood without insight into the earlier ones. Single actors, change agents, which have a particular meaningful vision on Hanoi's urban development, can sometimes be identified. In other cases they simply represent broader 'societal' or even 'ideological' currents of thinking.

This contribution is obviously not a history of Hanoi's urban development. Others have extensively and comprehensively written on its past and present, notably Logan in his standard work *Hanoi: Biography of a City* (2000) and Clement and Lancret in *Hanoi: Le Cycle des Metamorphoses* (2001). Here, some parts of Hanoi's history are introduced in a summarized form in order to frame the visions on Hanoi and its future and to introduce some of those who formulated these visions and became meaningful agents of change. The structure of this contribution is clear in view of Hanoi's multi-layered history. It begins with the periods before Doi Moi, i.e. before the introduction of a market economy in Vietnam in 1986. The visions and change agents in these periods—pre-colonial, colonial and socialist—are introduced, as well as their spokesmen, if any were present. The next section outlines current visions and agents of change from two angles: the first emerging from the increased freedom for Hanoi's citizens to build a house or to start a business and the second resulting from representatives of foreign capital who have come to the city to turn it into a global economic centre. Some reactions to these develop-ments are also presented. A conclusion of an alternative kind follows at the end.

Past visions

Origins: the pre-colonial legacy

Since its beginnings, and until the French took control of the city, Hanoi has basically consisted of two parts. These are a fortified area, established in 1010, for the political and military power referred to as the 'Royal City', and a 'Commoner's City'. Though the Commoner's City also housed the mandarins, officers and soldiers of the king, it was essentially a market place, and it has predominantly retained this function. One of the oldest names of Hanoi, Ke Cho or 'market place', refers to the city's origins.[1] This urban configuration is not rare and some comparisons to the 'bazaar' cities in Asia can be drawn.[2]

The fortunes of pre-colonial Hanoi varied. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the capital was transferred from Hanoi to Hue in the centre of present-day Vietnam. This shift led to the reconstruction of the (former) Royal City into a much smaller fortified area, now named the Citadel. Even then, it was mostly empty, with the exception of the royal palace, a few military barracks and the flag tower. This shift also entailed great losses to the merchants in the bazaar city, but it appeared to be a blessing in disguise, as they were also freed of previous restrictions imposed by the court (Thuy Hang Dao 1982). However, though Hanoi functioned as a flourishing regional market, during the nineteenth century it was by no means a major Asian city and its trade did not attract foreign merchants. In the 1870s, when the French took command of the city, Hanoi had around 50,000 inhabitants (Kossen n.d.: 107).

The Commoner's City is squeezed in between the Royal City and the Red River. It is roughly triangular in shape and later was named the Quarter of the '36 Old Streets'.[3] It was densely populated. The dwellings were narrow and long. A typical tube house had a facade of 2 to 4m and was up to 60m deep. The constructions were mainly from wood and straw, while roads were rarely surfaced and sanitation was absent. The nearby Hoan Kiem Lake, now the symbolic heart of the city, was nothing but a dumpsite.

French Hanoi: some 'folly of grandeur'[4]

The previous section does not provide an answer to the question of why the French wanted to take control of Hanoi. In this context, only brief answers will be given. A major reason was that Tonkin, i.e. the Northern parts of present-day Vietnam, would give the French access to the markets of China and to the assumed mineral wealth of Yunnan, northwest of Tonkin. After the occupation of Indo-China, at first the French administration focused on the development of the infrastructure to China. A railroad was constructed adjacent to the Red River leading to Yunnan[5] and another to the southern Chinese coastal areas. Subsequently, efforts were made to create an infrastructure in Tonkin (and eventually in the whole of French Indo-China), in order to enable the development of a colonial extraction-oriented economy, or, as the French prefer *Une mission civilisatrice*. Hanoi, together with the port city of Haiphong, was to become the political and economic spider in the web of the colonial government.

This effort went hand-in-glove with the development of Hanoi itself. When the French army settled in Hanoi, it occupied the former Royal City, now the Citadel, and began to rule its newly acquired possession from there. An initial concern was to connect the Citadel with an earlier French concession area on the bank of the Red River. A road was constructed that linked both areas and was to become the major axis of the future colonial city (Rue Paul Bert, nowadays Pho Trang Tien and Pho Trang Thi). Following these 'protection-oriented' activities, the French started to 'shape' Hanoi in three ways: improvement of the urban infrastructure, development of a French residential quarter and turning Hanoi into a 'civilized' city.

The urban infrastructure was in a bad shape when the French arrived. There were hardly any surfaced roads and, more importantly, there were no water supply or sewerage systems. At that time Hanoi had numerous small lakes, ponds and marshes, which were used as drinking water reservoirs as well as refuse dumping sites. The old bazaar city in particular suffered from a dramatic lack of sanitation. The French military regime commenced to improve sanitary conditions in this part of Hanoi. In 1886 an early form of local government was established and hence from the late 1880s, the French citizens of Hanoi began to develop ideas and to take measures to improve the city. Again, the major concern of the municipal council was sanitation, though a lack of resources prevented speedy implementation of many desired improvements.

The origins of the French Quarter date from French settlers along Rue Paul Bert in the 1880s. From this road southward expansion took place in subsequent years. As early as 1890 the basic pattern of a French Quarter had been laid out in the form of a grid of wide east-west and north-south boulevards, along which most French civilians gradually settled.

In a way a colonial quarter was established geographically. However, many French citizens continued to stay in the old Vietnamese quarter and wealthy Vietnamese also settled in the emerging French area. Moreover, in terms of numbers, few French people resided in Hanoi and in its French Quarter. In 1889 about 50 per cent of the 400 French citizens lived in Rue Paul Bert, while the others inhabited the Quarter of the '36 Old Streets'. Seven years later, there were 700 French citizens, 75 per cent concentrated in and nearby Rue Paul Bert (Kossen n.d.: 20). In the 1890s a second French Quarter was planned on the grounds of the former citadel, of which the walls were torn down. However, this second quarter ended up mainly housing the offices of the French government.

Several authors, such as Wright (1991) and Logan (1994), have stressed that the French authorities in Hanoi established their authority by the use of symbols of power to such an extent that Wright (1991:16) labelled French colonial urbanism as *'The folly of grandeur'*. If any person can be singled out as the founding father of this folly, then it has to be Governor-General Paul Doumer. He reigned over French Vietnam from 1897 to 1902. He envisaged turning Hanoi into a 'healthy, attractive and even coquettish' city and took action to try to achieve this goal. The building of a municipal theatre (more or less a replica of the Paris Opera) between 1901 and 1911 (Figure 4.1) and a couple of buildings of the French administration[6] are examples of this endeavour. However, infrastructure was improved as well: drainage, the construction of a boulevard around the dredged central lake (Petit Lac, now Hoan Kiem) and especially the bridge across the Red River. Though the size of the Opera (almost 800 seats) indicates a larger French population than

the 2,000 to 2,500 who lived in the city during the early twentieth century, in a comparative perspective the grandeur of folly of colonial Hanoi seems to be child's play when compared with the extravagance of New Delhi built after 1911, the British showpiece of its Indian colony.

To sum up, the Opera is often taken as a landmark of coquettish French

Figure 4.1 French 'Folly of grandeur':
The Municipal Theatre (postcard 1930).

Indo-Chinese urbanism, which it certainly is, along with the boulevard around Hoan Kiem Lake. Other symbols of French grandeur are the hundreds of residential villas in the French Quarter, Hanoi's major department store at the corner of Rue Paul Bert and Hoan Kiem Lake named Le Magasin Godard or Grand Magasin, and its finest hotel, Le Metropole. Less coquettish is La Maison Centrale, the central prison, also in the French Quarter, which housed among others Vietnam's revolutionaries.

Hanoi: a city of socialist man7

Between 1945 and 1954 the Vieth Minh succeeded in defeating the French administration and in 1954 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed in Hanoi. A temporary division between the North and the South of the country waited in vain for a solution through elections in 1956. This is not the place to discuss the fate of North and South Vietnam after 1954, until the reunification after the defeat of the US-supported South Vietnamese government in 1976. It is sufficient to deal here with a few aspects of

urbanization in the socialist North, such as the containment of metropolitan growth and the development of a socialist city.

From the 1950s onwards, the North Vietnamese government has rather successfully followed a policy of urban deconcentration, i.e. the development of regional growth centres, together with the containment of Hanoi and the major Northern port city, Haiphong (Forbes and Thrift 1987; Anderson and Sjoberg 1996). This has meant that, unlike other metropolitan cities in most developing countries, people were less inclined to migrate to these cities. The low incidence of Hanoi-bound migration was moreover enforced by a registration system of urban inhabitants *(hu khau)* that gave access to amenities such as housing, work, medical care and education. Without an urban identity card survival in Hanoi was for all practical purposes impossible. In addition, the American bombings on Hanoi had—at least temporarily—helped to reduce the urban population. Vu Huy Phuc (1997) estimates that between 1965 and 1970 about 30 per cent of the factories and 50 per cent of the inhabitants of Hanoi were relocated.

Urban containment and rather effective migration barriers helped Hanoi's local authorities to develop their ideas about the future of the city under a socialist regime. However, the war prevented much attention being given to such a future. It was only in the 1970s that long-term master plans for the next twenty years were published. As early as in the 1950s and 1960s, however, one single aspect of the socialist city of the future had come to the fore, namely housing.

Housing policies in socialist Hanoi between 1954 and 1986 can be divided into two major activities. In the first place, and following an overall nationalization of all land, the villas of the French (and Vietnamese) 'capitalists' were confiscated by the government and their rooms were assigned to Vietnamese families.[8] In some cases high-ranking officials of the new regime were granted a villa, but in most cases several, and often far too many, families had to share the building and its facilities, which soon fell into decay (Nguyen Ba Dang 1996; Koperdraat 1998; Koperdraat and Schenk 2000). About 500 villas in the French Quarter and some more in the former Citadel were used to house part of Hanoi's residents.[9]

From the early 1960s onwards, new and heavily subsidized houses were provided to Hanoi's citizens. Initially low-rise, so-called 'Fourth Level' apartments were erected, which were to some extent regarded as temporary dwellings constructed to ameliorate housing shortages and to compensate citizens whose houses had been expropriated for public buildings or parks (Evertsz 2000:80–1). From 1966 onwards the Five Year Plans provided new housing in the form of living quarters (Ku Thap The or KTT for short) built in what was then the periphery of the city. The three- to five-storey apartment buildings comprising the KTT consisted of small apartments (16 to 20 square metres) with shared bathing, cooking and toilet facilities. The apartments were supposed to accommodate a household of at least four to five members.[10,11] The special character of the KTT complexes is primarily found at the level of the neighbourhood. The apartments together formed a self-contained neighbourhood, in which daily services, such as kindergarten, schools, medical care and everyday shops were accommodated and collective living was introduced. Moreover, the KTT complexes were owned and managed by nearby state departments or state factories to house their staff. Thus, a comprehensive and collective environment was created that included both working and living functions.[12]

This concept of housing was actually inspired by Soviet town planning and introduced by Soviet and Chinese town planners (Rimsha 1976; Fisher 1962). It meant a complete rift with Hanoi's past housing experience in terms of the production of houses, urban layout and social structure. Both in the pre-French period and during the French colonization, houses were built individually with no special attention being given to comprehensive planning including services. The new concept of 'Mikrorayon', that was claimed to be the basic component of the socialist city, was implemented throughout all socialist-inspired societies. The major intellectual and ideological cradle of this concept stood in Leningrad at the Russian Scientific Research and Planning Institute. The architect and town planner, S.I.Sokolov, one of the staff members of the Institute, brought the socialist urban vision to Hanoi, and shaped the city accordingly. It is, however, misleading to consider Sokolov as a director of urban change, whose vision has changed Hanoi's future. Soviet-socialist thinking on the socialist city prevailed and it is more appropriate to consider him as the messenger of a socialist urban concept.

With its 36 Old Streets Quarter in decay due to the abolishment of private trade and with its French Quarter transformed from a place of elegant and coquettish living, shopping and entertainment, into an overcrowded area of dilapidating villas occupied by far too many inhabitants, the new girdle of KTT complexes was intended to point the way to a future collective living with nearby, available and accessible educational, medical, recreational and even cultural facilities for all in a decent environment.

If we look at more specific exponents of urban visions in the socialist era, it is relevant to note that some of the old landmarks of the city were transformed, forgotten or replaced by new ones. Many temples and communal houses became nursery schools or workshops. The Opera fell into decay, while several newly built Friendship Palaces and the Mausoleum of the socialist Vietnam founding father Ho Chi Minh seal the eternal friendship between the Soviets and the Vietnamese, or their youth. Hanoi acquired a new Town Hall (office of the People's Committee) at a prominent location on the Hoan Kiem Lake Boulevard, disrupting the skyline around the lake. Its architecture as well as that of the Friendship Palaces reveals Stalinist grandeur. Hanoi's Grand Magasin was transformed into a socialist sales outlet. Hanoi's finest colonial hotel became a neglected state hotel that was finally renamed the Reunification hotel (Thong Nhat) after the American defeat in South Vietnam and the 1976 establishment of socialism in the whole of Vietnam. Thousands of manholes, dug during the late 1960s for protection against American bombings, lined the streets and were provisionally filled in during the 1970s.

New landmarks also appeared in the course of Soviet master planning during the 1970s, such as some Haussemann-type boulevards, which were relentlessly cut through the city on paper. Some of these boulevards have actually been (partly) realized, such as a ring road and a new bridge linking the city with a new airport and once more symbolizing the friendship between the Soviet and the Vietnamese people. However, other elements, for example the creation of a Soviet-style urban centre, have never materialized. The Lenin Park was laid out and is by far the largest park in the city. Finally, the central prison—now Hoa Lo Prison—housed some of the captured American soldiers.

The imperfect present

Popular visions: Hanoi as a city of individuals

The 1980s brought a crisis in Vietnam. The state was more or less bankrupt and became forced to discontinue investments in the further development of its socialist economy. Moreover, its secured socialist trade relations in the Comecon economic region were dismantled. Hence many of the state industries were forced to compete under new conditions, which were those of the (international) market and, as a result, they often failed. The official proclamation of economic renovation, Doi Moi, in 1986 is usually taken as a decisive year in a process of profound changes. Doi Moi brought the opening of a market economy and of opportunities for individuals, households or whatever 'private' units, to enter the economy, i.e. to start a private business. The broad spectrum of changes that took place in Vietnam's and Hanoi's society is not discussed here, as the focus is on visions on the socio-spatial arrangements of the city from 1986 onwards.

What basically happened in Hanoi in the late 1980s is that its citizens took control of their future in terms of ways of life and earning a living, or at least tried to do so, while the 'state' seemed paralysed. A smooth but massive outbreak of civil disobedience, anarchy even, transformed the city from its stern socialist outlook into a 'popular' but also anonymous city. No particular directors of urban change can be singled out. This transformation is most easily visible in the mushrooming of individual land-use right transactions[13] and residential construction activities, as well as in the thousands of minor shops, workshops and cafés, that sprang up especially in the 1990s. The transformation led to an emerging rat race, with some winners and more and more losers.

Doi Moi first of all facilitated spontaneous housing construction, undertaken by individuals or households rather than private or state construction companies. Trinh Duy Luan (2001) coined the term 'popular' housing, of which a more elaborate definition is given by Evertsz.

> The term popular housing indicates primarily those forms of housing, built by, or on the initiative of individual urban residents, in order to function as living space for these builders or initiators themselves. Planning, financing and construction, all result from individual households' decisions and occur outside official canals. Given the resulting lack of official permits and papers, the legal status of popular housing is in most cases at best unclear.
>
> Evertsz (2000:20)

Popular housing is thus characterized by a lack of official permissions to obtain a piece of land and construct a house,[14] as well as by a lack of institutional financial support, and yet there is housing constructed on a massive scale. It has been estimated that in the early 1990s some 70 to 80 per cent of all housing (measured in square metres) was constructed in a popular way (Trinh Duy Luan and Nguyen Quang Vinh 2001:69). Moreover, between October 1992 and December 1994, 2,741 permits were granted to construct a

house, while over 13,000 houses were built without a permit (Trinh Duy Luan and Nguyen Quang Vinh 2001:68). Authorities responsible for housing and its paperwork—normally at the level of the urban districts *(quan)*—appeared too paralysed to deal with this popular outbreak. Instead, this was taken care of without delay and for a very minor remuneration by ward *(phuong)* authorities who were not entitled to issue permits to obtain land and build a house. Initially, requests were made to *phuong* authorities, but later on only notifications were given by prospective buyers and builders.

Another major characteristic of popular housing is that, unlike illegal housing in other Asian cities, it is not confined to the urban poor. Perhaps even the opposite is true. Popular housing is primarily meant for those households who can afford to 'buy' a piece of land and have a house built. In a survey conducted in 2001, it was found that average investments in housing (including land) in three outlying areas of the city averaged about US$15,000 to 18,500, whereas the average monthly household income of those who invested in housing was around US$150 (Kundu, Schenk and Dash 2002). Apparently, in the absence of favourable longterm financial credit and with informal credit normally being given at a rate of at least two per cent per month, only those who have access to other financial resources can afford the luxury of a privately built house.[15] The poor have fewer options. The inhabitants of the KTT may 'sell' their apartments illegally at fancy prices and try to have a modest house built elsewhere. More often, they resort to illegal extension of their apartments, which implies encroachments on the public land surrounding the apartment blocks or hanging light-weight extensions (Figure 4.2).

The freedom to arrange one's own shelter has also resulted in an emerging segregation between relatively rich and relatively poor citizens. While the poor had to be satisfied with some enlargements of their existing dwellings,[16] the rich—or rather the new rich—and an emerging middle class were able to afford to have a house built, normally by a local small-scale contractor. Initially, vacant plots in the built-up area of the city were 'bought',[17] as well as dilapidated existing houses, which were then torn down and replaced by a new house. As opportunities to have a house built in the inner parts of the city diminished in the mid-1990s, the urban fringes became a target of urban development by this class of individual house developers (Figure 4.3). In terms of urban ecology, this process means that around the traditional core areas of Hanoi, the KTT apartments have become subject to down-grading in the housing market and in status. In the socialist decades a dream of many Hanoians was to obtain an apartment in a KTT complex, while after Doi Moi the popular dream became to get out of collective living arrangements. This dream now can be realized for some in Hanoi's fringes.

Doi Moi also included the freedom to start a 'business'. Two aspects of this opportunity will be briefly discussed. At a micro-scale, a house stopped being a residence only and started to become a place for doing business as well. As Trinh Duy Luan and Nguyen Quang Vinh put it:

> Ten or fifteen years ago, a flat on the second floor in a clean and quiet
> area would have been ideal for any Hanoian. An ideal house at

Figure 4.2 Popular housing for the
poor: extensions to a block in KTT
Kim Lien (photograph Hans Schenk).

Figure 4.3 Popular housing by the rich
in Hanoi's fringe (photograph Hans
Schenk).

present must be 'profit-making', that is, it must assume two functions
at the same time: accommodation and business. This housing model is
known as 'house-shop' and is attached to the 'street-market'...

Trinh Duy Luan and Nguyen Quang Vinh (2001:63–4)

Research in two KTT complexes in the late 1990s has shown how important a ground
floor apartment has become to conducting a 'business' (Jans and Falk 2000).
Consequently, main road houses and apartments have become a sought after commodity,
in contrast to dwellings in side streets and in inconvenient locations.

On an even smaller scale, footpath trading has become a common sight. Most of the
(predominantly) women who are active as sellers of fruits, vegetables, bread and
domestic articles are from the countryside. Many rural men and women commute daily to
Hanoi, while perhaps even more stay temporarily in the city, in boarding houses and so
on for a fort-night or a few months without urban registration papers.[18]

Illegal housing activities, houses converted into business places and street vendors add
to the picture of a city in which its residents have a high degree of freedom. They can
choose how to live and work, provided they have the means to choose: the American
Dream has entered the local society. Yet it is hard to think of Hanoi as a city of
individuals and a city resulting from individual visions. First, the state seems to have
regrouped itself slightly. Rules regarding obtaining a plot and building a house are less
irrelevant than they used to be in the early 1990s. Second, was there a vision at all? Have
the accumulated visions of hundreds of thousands of individual households to pursue
their private interests formed 'a' vision? They have rather left a battlefield of misused
scarce public infrastructure resources. The impact of popular housing on the urban
infrastructure is quite negative. Water supply and sewerage systems could not cope with
individual decisions to build a house and seek piped water and access to sewerage beyond
the capacities of existing facilities. Hence, a rapid deterioration of these facilities has
taken place.[19] Moreover, the freedom given to individual aspirations introduced
distinctions between winners and losers in Hanoi, which were not visible earlier. Poverty
has appeared on the streets as well as wealth.

Finally, Hanoi's public symbols also suffered. The Opera remained a building in
decay. The French villas were converted into shops and restaurants, while the pavements
along the shady boulevards in the French Quarter suffered from notorious neglect. Many
temples and communal houses reopened their gates and were restored to their former
glory thanks to private donations. It is at this juncture that the entrance of Hanoi into the
global economy has to be discussed.

Hanoi as a global city

During the course of a century the French and the Soviets were in a position to impose
their views of respectively a colonial and a socialist city on the population and
institutions of Hanoi. The next layer was of a global nature.

A Ford car assembly plant; a Belgian café; Danish and Dutch breweries; Thai,
Indonesian, Singaporean, Taiwanese and Korean investors; American and Australian
consultants; Indonesian project developers; Dutch town planners; German, Australian and
Malaysian banks; multinational oil companies; and French, Chinese, Hong Kong,

Malaysian, Singaporean and Russian airline offices are just a few of the businesses that have been set up in the city.

An overview of the foreign investments in luxury hotels for the period of 1996–98 illustrates the global jump on Hanoi (Table 4.1).[20] Clearly, many of these investors have set the agenda of Hanoi's development. A few remarks on this agenda will be made. In geographical terms, the French Quarter has become an interesting focal area of global development.

Trinh Duy Luan observes that next to the Quarter of the '36 Old Streets', which plays an important role as a 'Domestic Business Centre', the French Quarter witnesses the:

> embryonic development of an International and Financial Centre adjacent to the Domestic Business Centre… Most of foreign banks' representative offices and branches in Vietnam are headquartered in the French quarter (about 30 establishments).
>
> Trinh Duy Luan (2000:85–8)

Table 4.1 Investment in luxury hotel projects 1996–98

Hotel	Class	Rooms	Developer	Nation	Opening
Metropole (extension)	****	135	Feal and Accor	France	1996
Hanoi Daewoo	****	411	Daewoo	S. Korea	1996
Horizon	****	227	PT Global Met	Indonesia	1998
Lien Westlake	****	325	S. Lien Hospital	Singapore	1996
Vinas Sheraton	****	279	Faber	Malaysia	1997
SAS Hanoi Royal	****	307	SIH Investment	Singapore	1998
Westlake International	****	330	Pidemco Land	Singapore	1997
Hanoi Central	****	309	SAS Trading	Thailand	1998
Opera	****	299	CBC	France	N/a
Ever Fortune Plaza	****	242	Viet Fortune Inv. Co.	Taiwan	1998
Red River Hotel	****	500	Antara Koh	Singapore	1997/98
Sakura Plaza	****	200	EXE Design Co Ltd.	Japan	1998
Fortuna	****	351	Cheng Holdings	N/a	1998
Summer	****	600	Nishitetsu	Japan	1998

Hill		
Total	4,515	

Source: *Vietnam Economic Times* (September 1995:6).

Koperdraat (1998:105) counted 24 villas that had been converted into either an embassy or an ambassador's residence. The French Quarter developed into a top location. Some villas were rented out to foreign companies, e.g. Shell or the Deutsche Bank, or to international organizations such as the UNDP and UNICEF. In these cases the inhabitants were asked to leave and were offered an alternative.[21] The new tenants then renovated the torn-down villas and restored them more or less to their original state. The same happened to the embassies that settled in the area. In this manner, some sort of 'conservation' has taken place, though at the cost of many inhabitants. Other signs of gentrification have also been observed. A few villas have been converted into residential houses, rented by foreigners.

Yet, the French Quarter has primarily become a business area. Some streets are virtually full of shops selling electronic goods. Elsewhere, other forms of trading take place and there are dozens of cafés and restaurants. These establishments generally are extensions of former residential villas or are accommodated in the villas themselves.[22]

The French Quarter also houses two major hotel and business complexes, Hanoi Central Tower and Central Hanoi, each occupying the larger part of a block and built in the mid-1990s. These complexes have resulted in high-rise hotel and business towers, far above the modest skyline of Central Hanoi. The next section discusses the implications of these high-rise developments in Central Hanoi.

A second focus of global attention is the region around the West Lake (Tay Ho). In the Soviet-inspired master plans, its southern borders were to develop into a new urban centre. Master planning after Doi Moi also focused on turning this area into a new centre of Hanoi. Luxury hotels have been built north, east and south of the lake, new office complexes have been established to the south of the lake and luxury residential complexes border the northern shores. Northwest of the lake, a 400 ha 'new town' was planned by an Indonesian project developer, Ciputra, which was to house 50,000 inhabitants and international business centres (Leaf 1998). The new town named Nam Thang Long was planned on the fields of a number of well-known paddy-growing and flower-raising villages in the Phu Tuong area. In this context, Trinh Duy Luan (2000) asked the question about the balance between the expanding modern city and the preservation of village culture: 'A fresh planning idea is: to enhance development coincidentally with community preservation' (Trinh Duy Luan 2000:93–4). The project was shelved following the Asian economic crisis, but in 2003 work started on a more modest Nam Thang Long.

The global agenda of international capital investments has co-shaped the vision of Hanoi's future and has acted as a change agent. To some extent the locations of foreign capital investments have gone hand-inglove with existing plans for the city. The 1990–2010 Master Plan CBD (approved in 1992) includes developments south of Tay Ho. However, many plans are originating elsewhere. The plan to build Nam Thang Long was drawn up by Ciputra. Another even more grandiose scheme to build a city north of the Red River was designed by the Korean Daewoo Corporation, the US consultants Bechtel and the Dutch town planning and architectural firm OMA. This group saw its plans

included in a revised Master Plan in 1998 (till 2020), but it was shelved following the Asian crisis. The development of a new urban centre south of West Lake never achieved serious momentum (Logan 2000:247).

These examples show the risks entailed in foreign private initiatives that have an impact on the future of Hanoi. Implementation is uncertain and depends on profits made by developers, as there are no local and national guarantee funds for their realization. It appears that local investments, such as those undertaken by the commercial, semi-autonomous Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUD), under the Ministry of Construction, are at a much more modest level (e.g. in Giap Bat and Linh Dam), but more importantly are also aimed at the upper segment of the housing market in order to make a profit. It can be concluded that the global pressures were not fully backed by the local authorities. Investment proposals were welcomed and sanctioned as they brought money into the city, but could be seriously challenged, as will be seen in the next section.

In conclusion, the period following Doi Moi reveals a curious mixture of popular decision making on the scale of individual and household housing and business operations, in combination with large-scale buildings and urban plans, to be developed and financed by foreign investors. Amidst this mix the Opera has been renovated[23] and is once again a shining, floodlit city landmark. Hanoi's finest hotel in spite of several multi-star competitors has again taken its colonial name, Metropole, although subsequently and symbolically enough the name was changed to Sofitel Metropole.[24] In the French Quarter a high-rise hotel of the Spanish Melia Chain has opened its doors. It stands amidst a number of renovated French villas. Hanoi's filled-in manholes have definitely disappeared and in many streets new pavements and drains have been constructed. In 1996, Hanoi's former Magasin Godard was torn down to make way for a new hotel. Lenin Park still exists under its original name and a Lenin statue in the Chu Lang Public Garden still faces one of Hanoi's most prestigious museums, the Army Museum. Hanoi still honours its past. Most of the site of Hoa Lo Prison is covered by the Central Tower Project.

Counterpoints: preservation

The jungle of popular housing, combined with the influx of foreign financial powers that wanted to steer the future of Hanoi, has aroused a remarkable protest movement. The protests have come from members of the Hanoi intelligentsia—historians, sociologists, journalists—and from members of the growing army of expatriates—primarily Australians. In 1993 a committee named the Friends of Hanoi Architectural Heritage International Foundation was established with the purpose of safeguarding some of the historic buildings and quarters of the city, though in a context of enhancing living conditions of the inhabitants concerned (Koeman 1994). The Friends of Hanoi were active for a few years, but Koperdraat (1998:144) remarks that in 1997, when she carried out research into the historic French Quarter, its activities had almost stopped owing to lack of funds and members. Koperdraat concludes that the Friends of Hanoi have not achieved many tangible results, though they have contributed to the awareness of conservation among Hanoi's planners.

In 1989 a Vietnamese-Australian initiative, supported by the Australian Ambassador in Vietnam, was developed at Government level to draw attention to the historic core of

Hanoi. A document intending to safeguard Hanoi's heritage was presented to the UNESCO. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) subsequently improved this document and in 1991 a project was drawn up to identify the cultural heritage of Hanoi, to formulate protective legislation and to develop implementation structures aimed at preservation (Logan 1995:332–3). Central to all these stages of discovery of Hanoi's urban past was William S.Logan and he is certainly the most important agent of the preservation movement. The project tried to put the Quarter of the 36 Old Streets on the World Heritage list, but failed for a lack of international political support. However, the old quarters were put on several international agendas, even to the extent that the 1990–2010 Master Plan was amended in the mid-1990s to include the conservation of the old quarters.

One may argue whether the Vietnamese authorities involved developed a genuine interest in safeguarding the history of Hanoi or were inspired by the expected foreign financial support in favour of conservation. Anyway, the 'big money' from abroad never came, though some foreign support was given for the restoration of a few temples and other historic buildings. However, during the mid-1990s the issue of conservation as raised by Logan and others was 'hot' enough. In the early 1990s permissions were given to develop two high-rise complexes in the French Quarter, the 'Hanoi Central Tower' and 'Central Hanoi' centre referred to above. These complexes were seen as an eyesore by the Friends of Hanoi and others, and helped lead to the proclamation of the decrees mentioned. Several new foreign investment proposals that should have brought Hanoi closer to participation in the global economy have been affected. Notorious examples are a hotel next to the Opera and plans for high-rise hotels at the borders of Hoan Kiem Lake. These examples are discussed in detail by Logan (2000: Ch. 7) and are therefore summarized only briefly here.

In its original design, a high-rise hotel with some 20 storeys would have been built next to the Opera. After protests, the number of floors was reduced and the architecture was harmonized with the Opera. The hotel (Hilton) has been built in a fancy neoclassical style.[25] A high-rise hotel complex, the Hanoi Plaza project, was planned on the site of the former Magasin Godard (subsequently the state department store) on the southeastern corner of Hoan Kiem Lake and thus on probably the most prestigious piece of land in Hanoi. The original investors were Hong Kong based, although Thai finances were also involved. This plan generated an enormous level of public protest in the mid-1990s and finally forced the Prime Minister to order the height of the building to be reduced and the architecture of the facade to be amended.[26] The results had disastrous effects for quite some years from the point of view of the developers. With the department store torn down, and indecision regarding the future use of the plot, nothing but a fence remained and the plot was only used to store and sell peach blossom trees, which are used to celebrate Tet, the Vietnamese New Year. In around 2000, a compromise solution was found between the developers and the government: a five-storey luxury department store, with the same fancy neo-classical facade as the Hilton Hotel. The department store opened its doors in 2002.

Opposite the Hanoi Plaza project, another high-rise hotel complex of 18 storeys, the Golden Hanoi Hotel, was planned in the north-western corner of the lake. Public awareness was raised when the construction reached the third storey. Logan (2000:238) mentions that over 100 press, television and radio items on the project have appeared. It

seems that the developers (a joint venture between Hong Kong and Vietnamese developers) tried to ignore the building height regulations. The protests brought a halt to the construction works and at least till December 2003 the site was used as a parking lot.[27]

The conservation movement has achieved much more than (partial) success on specific projects. It has created a political and social climate of concern. However, the concern is fragile. The government sympathizes with its ideas[28] but hopes at the same time that foreign funds for conservation projects will be forthcoming. This is at least doubtful. The movement can claim some successes as has been shown above. Moreover, it received support from foreign parties. During the peak years of foreign interest in settling in Hanoi, some foreign companies rented colonial villas often at exorbitant prices and restored them to their original state for reasons of prestige.[29] The regional offices of Shell and the Deutsche Bank are two examples. Some embassies have similarly renovated their premises. It appears that prior to the Asian economic crisis, conservation was fashionable and had public support. After the crisis the conditions changed. Foreign developers became more cautious and often disappeared; it became impossible to charge exorbitant rents for the usage of villas and plots of land and consequently the issue of conservation against global urban developers became less prominent. Government policies of riding with the hounds and running with the hare seem opportunistic but, in retrospect, they were successful in slowing down the advance of the global city in favour of Hanoi's residents and others who were and are concerned about the city's unique character.

In short, the Sofitel Metropole Hotel has been enlarged, in a style that fits in with the old building and much of its surroundings. A small museum, devoted to the prisoners in the Maison Centrale and later Hoa Lo Prison, has been carved out of the Hanoi Central Tower Project.[30] Apart from the examples mentioned, quite a lot of French villas have been restored to their more or less original shape, though the compounds around the villas tend to become private parking lots instead of gardens. Parking space has become a scarce commodity now in central Hanoi and there is a fear that Hanoi is going to become a 'second Bangkok' in terms of pollution, traffic jams and so on (*Vietnam Economic Times* 1995).

Instead of a conclusion: Hanoi's grammar of change

The 'social archaeology' of those who shaped Hanoi and their intentions and visions show the turmoil of often contradictory ideas. The historical layers do not appear to be neatly arranged horizontally and then covered with a newer layer. Some appeared simultaneously (the city of individuals and the exposure to global seduction) and are only marginally covered with the urge to honour a renovated past. One has to use imperfect tenses when describing and analysing both the past and the present.

Both the pre-colonial temples and the colonial visions of Hanoi by its architects and town planners are being reappraised.[31] The layer of socialism seems to be turning into the most unwanted vision, even though it is visible in all quarters of the city. Some apartment buildings are on the brink of collapse, while many others need urgent repairs which are unlikely to be carried out. Similarly all the buildings are in need of urgent maintenance

work, which again is unlikely to be feasible. In one KTT (Kim Lien) a few apartment blocks have been torn down and two new high-rise residential towers, constructed on the sites, were finished in early 2004. Many people wonder who is going to be able to pay the full—unsubsidized—rent prices, and just as many wonder which well-to-do citizens want to live in an area of dilapidated apartment blocks. The fading socialist visions of change may create the future slums of the city.

The visions of change call now for a blend of 'tradition' and 'modernism'. In the words of Tuong Lai, the *èminence grise* among the Vietnamese sociologists:

> It is a big mistake when stepping over the tradition in the name of modernism, inverse, we should not stick to the tradition, enjoy the passed victory, without paying attention to the new growth. That is why I'd like to emphasize that we are approaching the modernism from our tradition, modernism is our approaching direction, while tradition is a key factor creating the unconventionality in Vietnam's modern urban architecture.
>
> Tuong Lai (1996:8)

Even though one may wonder how the mixture of the visions of modernism, the popular builders and those of the renovated pre-colonial and colonial past will look, another aspect of the visions on Hanoi matters, namely the impact of the visions (eventually) realized by change agents. It is difficult to assess these impacts, as they may be contradictory. The new town Nam Thang Long planned by Indonesia's Ciputra developers on the sites used by many peasants for paddy growing and flower cultivation in the Phu Tuong villages may create new jobs for the villagers, but most likely only for the unskilled ones. At the same time it will deprive them of their traditional livelihoods. The renovated villas in the French Quarter honour the visions of the colonial architects and town planners, but the former inhabitants (like those of the Hilton Hotel site) were forced to leave—though given financial compensation—and complain about their new residence in the urban fringe, the higher costs of living and their social and economic uprooting (Koperdraat and Schenk 2000:77–80).

The future seems very conditional. One sometimes wonders whether incremental changes and 'muddling through' are not often the best balance between contradicting visions. Moreover, these seem most realistic in Hanoi in spite of 'global' and 'preservation' visions and their agents. Leaf, when commenting on the (at first) failed Ciputra project, concludes:

> The urban future of Phu Tuong Ward, as elsewhere on the edge of Hanoi, may be less an illustration of the end of the modernist dream than a tacit acknowledgement of the historical momentum of the informal city.
>
> Leaf (1998:16)

Finally, there is a reality beyond change. Hong Phuc Tang concludes his article on Hanoi, subtitled *A 20th Century 'Cinderella',* with the following words:

> Hanoi is built on the banks of a great river which annually bursts its banks and causes disastrous floods. From the day Hanoi was chosen to be the

capital, work commenced on building a dyke which has since been a major factor in the city's continual survival and development. This dyke which is the product of approximately 1,000 years of labour by the Hanoites and still exists today, is one of Hanoi's greatest public works… A person who looks closely at its span running 15 kilometres in length and close to 1,000 years of history, will find etched into it all the spiritual and physical upheavals of Hanoi. For many people it is no less than a poem, a chorus extolling the love of life.

<div style="text-align:right">Hong Phuc Tang (n.d.: 79)</div>

Notes

1 From 1010 to 1831 Hanoi was named Thang Long and since then the name Hanoi has been used.

2 A major difference from the bazaar city is that Hanoi's bazaar was very much an extension of villages nearby Hanoi whose inhabitants had specialized in certain crafts, such as pottery, woodwork, sugar and shoes. Streets and clusters in the bazaar were actually village extensions. These extensions were heavily populated during the bi-monthly periodic markets in Hanoi and were much more deserted before and after these markets.

3 The name '36 Old Streets' is misleading. Each street should represent the shops of an old trade *(hang)*. In this area 54 *hang* have been counted and a further 16 other streets (Huang Huu Phe and Yukio Nishimura 1992:63–4).

4 This title has been taken from Wright (1991).

5 Mineral wealth was never found in Yunnan and, strictly speaking, the conquest of the territories that later became Indo-China was a failure.

6 Among the larger buildings are the Palais de Justice (1906), the Central Library (1919), the Bank of Indo-China (1930) and the History Museum (1931). See Tran Hung (1995) for details.

7 Taken from Fisher (1962).

8 Non-capitalists, such as teachers, were left in command of (part of) their villas.

9 The villas in the French Quarter, i.e. residential buildings surrounded by a compound, have been extensively researched by Koperdraat (1998).

10 Young couples or groups of single men were assigned half an apartment.

11 The size and the quality of the apartments was poor, though better than the ones built in several other cities in developing countries. Moreover, in most cities in these countries no mass-scale housing construction took place whatsoever.

12 In some cases even cooking facilities were not included in the apartment blocks, as workers were supposed to eat in the factory canteen and youngsters in the canteens of kindergarten and schools.

13 Land is for all practical purposes property of the state. Land-use rights can be obtained by private parties. The exercising of these rights was made easier by the 1993 Land Law.

14 The 1993 Land Law stipulates that private parties can obtain land-use rights and permission to build a house. The red tape associated with the formal procedures has, however, discouraged most parties from complying with the legal approach.

15 Non-regular income could be derived from savings, borrowing from friends and relatives, remittances from overseas relatives, or—and especially—from 'additional' income.

16 It is relevant to point out that this applies to the *urban* poor. The erstwhile effective *hu khao* system banned large-scale in-migrants from the countryside and even now few rural in-migrants have settled in the city as squatters on a more or less permanent basis since the

mid-1980s. An exception is formed by an area in Chuong Duong Ward, as analysed by Harnois (2000).

17 Evertsz (2000) describes the practices of land transfers in detail.

18 Dang Nguyen Anh (2001:55) estimates that—in addition to an official population of 1.4 million in the urban parts of Hanoi Province in 2001—some 200,000 unregistered rural labourers stay in the city on a temporary basis. In addition, there are some 200,000 inhabitants with a temporary registration, many of them being students from the countryside.

19 See Kilgour and Drakakis-Smith (2002) for details.

20 Some of these projects have not (fully) materialized.

21 Koperdraat (1998) has managed to find and interview some of the relocated former inhabitants of the French Quarter. Not surprisingly, she discovered that most former inhabitants considered their new houses in the urban peripheries to be more comfortable, although they overwhelmingly regarded their old neighbourhood as a far better place to live…and to have a business.

22 Restaurants especially still show evidence of their former residential function, with living and bed rooms converted into small dining units.

23 This renovation took place on the occasion of the worldwide conference of French-speaking nations in 1997. It was financed by France and the Opera was solemnly opened by President Chirac. Hanoi has inherited another souvenir from this conference in the form of signboards pointing the ways to Hanoi's major landmarks and monuments with texts in Vietnamese, English and French.

24 Sofitel is the luxury brand name of the large French hotel chain Accor.

25 No protests took place against the demolition of three colonial villas and a small living quarter housing 53 households, which were removed for the construction of the hotel (Koperdraat 1998:75 and 7).

26 In 1995 a decree was issued which forbade the construction of buildings with more than three storeys or higher than 12m in the 36 Old Streets Quarter and between three and five or nine and eleven storeys in the French Quarter, depending on the distance to the Hoan Kiem Lake (Ministry of Construction 1999:47). As a rule of thumb, from the centre of the lake a radiant line with an angle of 35° was used to determine the height of the buildings along the lake shores. This ensured that no high-rise buildings could be seen from anywhere around the lake. The decree was issued after the two first high-rise complexes—the Hanoi Central Tower and the Central Hanoi—were constructed and had become very visible.

27 A side effect was that quite a number of tourist-oriented enterprises started up nearby the site of the proposed hotel and in the adjacent side streets (mainly Hang Hanh Street and Bao Khanh Street). Shops selling silk, boutiques, art galleries, Western-style restaurants and Internet cafés sprung up at an astonishing pace in this area (Pouw and Wilbers 2002).

28 It should be noted that an ordinance was issued as long ago as in 1984, in which 80 historical, cultural and famous places and objects were identified, including buildings from Hanoi's pre-colonial and colonial past (Huang Huu Phe and Nishimura 1992:12).

29 That means on the outside with even the air-conditioning boxes not always being hidden.

30 The museum shows how badly Vietnamese freedom fighters were treated by the French and how decently the Vietnamese treated their American prisoners.

31 See for example Nguyen Ba Dang (1996), Tran Hung (1995) and Ministry of Construction (1999).

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5
Jakarta

Conflicting directions
Pratiwo and Peter J.M.Nas

Introduction

The shape of Jakarta as one of the mega-urban areas of Asia was not determined by the engineers and workers who constructed the houses, offices, streets, highways and (overhead) railway lines. The development of this multi-million inhabitant city, including its extended metropolitan area, was to a certain extent realized by incremental growth, but also sometimes planned and managed with a strong hand by individuals and groups who had the authority, capital, vision and will to implement substantial new works, often breaking existing planning rules or avoiding them with the help of higher political authorities. The political culture and the culture of corruption that have been prevalent in the city for such a long time have offered ample opportunities to influence higher officials in order to implement large-scale urban constructions.

Historically, besides Jan Pietersz. Coen, who founded the town of Batavia, Governor-General Daendels should be mentioned as a palpable example of a person who determined the structure of the city when he moved his offices to the area of Weltevreden beyond the gates of ailing Batavia. More recently decisions about the incorporation of the town of Meester Cornelis (present-day Jatinegara) and the extension of the city by the building of the post-war suburb of Kebayoran could also be analysed in an attempt to determine the main director and his ideas.

In this contribution about the directors of urban change in Jakarta, however, we will leave old history aside and deal with the more recent developments under the presidents of the Old and the New Order, Sukarno and Soeharto. We also set aside the present-day shadowy directors of urban change in Jakarta who are too disoriented after the Reformasi to know what steps they have to take to pick their way through the wilderness. So, in the Reformasi period we restrict ourselves to current views and criticism, without attributing these to any particular dominant director of urban change.

During the Old Order a ring road and the so-called 'great works' (the National Monument and the Istiqlal Mosque) and statues erected by Sukarno, physically and symbolically homogenized the dispersed parts of Jakarta, including Kota, Gambir, Menteng and Jatinegara. During the New Order era, Jakarta became a mega-urban region with broad avenues, highways and electric railway lines connecting the Jabotabek area covered by hundreds of high-rise buildings, golf courses, luxurious housing estates, mega-malls, industrial estates and vast university campuses. This tremendous city growth and mega-urban extension were accomplished in 32 years with loans from abroad, leading to investments that were often speculative. The New Order regime of Soeharto

also proved to be authoritarian in which corruption was rife. The May 1998 collapse of his dictatorship destroyed the dream of Jakarta as an advanced Asian mega-city. The machines in the factories of Tangerang ground to a halt, students went onto the streets and surrounded the Parliament to protest, and many large malls and other buildings were set on fire. The whole development spectacle ended in a drama in which large amounts of debts that could not be paid because the debtors went bankrupt figured frequently. During the Reformasi era under the three presidents Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati, Jakarta has become what seems to be a city haunted by an abundance of skeletons of unfinished buildings and empty interchanges. It will certainly take a decade or more to surmount the 1998 crisis and pick up the old development path.

Who have been the main directors of urban change during the last decades of the twentieth century? These have been the presidency with its hunger for symbolism and large-scale urban undertakings; Governor Ali Sadikin who reformed the administrative structure of the city; Hendropranoto Suselo and the central government agencies carrying out the kampong improvement programme and instituting the policy of deconcentrated urban development with the help of the concept of Jabotabek; Ciputra who set the scene for condominiums within the city and new town development in the extended metropolitan region of Jakarta; and the Jakarta International Tradefair Corporation as the collective director of the former Kemayoran Airport area. These directors will be discussed in the following sections, which will be rounded off by some remarks about the present-day situation and a conclusion.

The presidency and urban symbolism

After Batavia was established by Jan Pietersz. Coen, it functioned as the capital of the Netherlands Indies. The governor-general ruled all those parts of the archipelago, which fell under Dutch reign. Ever since, Batavia, later called Jakarta, has played the role of the representative capital of the country, the symbol of prosperity and development. As a consequence, economic activity is heavily concentrated in the city where nowadays 60 per cent of the monetary circulation in Indonesia takes place. The social conditions in the capital have provided the political barometer for the whole country. The proclamation of independence, the coup against Sukarno and the launching of Reformasi were all staged in Jakarta.

Congruent with its role as capital of an independent nation, in a relatively short time Jakarta developed from a small town into a metropolis. A century ago the city only covered the area of Kota and the northern part of Monas. The mansions along Gadjah Mada and Hayam Wuruk Streets were the residences of the Chinese and the Dutch. The river separating the two streets was used for bathing. The satellite towns of Jatinegara and Tanah Abang in the south were connected to Kota by a tramway. In between Kota and the two satellite towns lay rice fields and small villages. At that time no one could have imagined that this zone would become a very dense kampong area, side by side with slums and high-rise buildings. Fifty years later the two satellite towns had been integrated into Kota and Jakarta and began to grow into a metropolis. A century later, Tangerang, Bogor and Bekasi became the satellite towns of Jakarta from where people commute to the city centre every day. How was it possible for Jakarta to develop into such a gigantic

mega-urban area within the period of a mere century? And how did the directors of urban change develop the city in such a short time? Who were these directors of urban change?

Because Jakarta was the capital of the nation, not only was the governor important to the development of the city, the institution of the presidency also played a major role. President Sukarno tried to make Jakarta both the Paris and New York of Asia with a symbolic layer consisting of a great number of colossal statues and large-scale undertakings such as Monas and the Istiqlal Mosque, the latter being considered the largest of Southeast Asia at the time. Notwithstanding the references to the developed world, he also incorporated ideas strengthening the Indonesian identity, such as the *linggam yoni* (pestle and mortar symbolizing man and woman and eternity). His large-scale undertakings, including the roads such as the Jakarta Bypass and Senayan Interchange, united, transformed and still continue to mark the centre of Jakarta.

During the 32 years of the New Order regime, Jakarta became the place of business of the Soeharto family. This commenced with the establishment by Mrs Soeharto of the open-air museum Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, which symbolically unites the whole of Indonesia in the capital city by accommodating the traditional houses of all the provinces. And it ended with the system of toll ways directed by daughter Tutut. Both largescale undertakings raised considerable protest when set in motion. What did the Soeharto family think about the growth of mega-urban Jakarta? This question leads us to consider their views on development. Soeharto was a military general who had no education in urban planning; consequentiy his staff provided all his views on the development of Jakarta. Yet, in Soeharto's mind the whole superstructure development of Jakarta with high-rise buildings and new toll ways became the symbol of his and Indonesia's success in the modern world. Jakarta became the symbol of development and modernization for the whole country.

Mrs Soeharto and the open-air museum

The expansion of mega-urban Jakarta was influenced by gigantic projects, such as Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. The idea of building this open-air museum originated from Mrs Tien Soeharto, the first lady, after visiting the Thai miniature project near Bangkok. Her idea had actually nothing to do with the development of Jakarta, but the impact on the surrounding areas proved to be substantial. Mrs Soeharto intended Taman Mini to present the whole archipelago in the capital city, so that foreigners could see the whole of Indonesia in a park located in Jakarta. At the beginning of the Soeharto era, the military was very strong and stood four-square behind the new regime. Under these conditions Mrs Soeharto was able to ask all governors to build a local traditional house from their province in the park. She also asked rich Chinese to support her plan financially. Meanwhile, people who lived in the area were removed with paltry compensation. The students opposed the project. However, strong military support for Soeharto led to the smothering of the protest. The open-air museum was finally built and plays an important role in the urban development of Jakarta nowadays.[1] It is a node on the southern side of Jakarta that has grown as a new unplanned satellite town. The park was opened on 20 April 1975, covers 150 ha and is generally very crowded during the weekends.

In the eyes of the Soeharto regime Taman Mini was a symbol of the much-cherished unity of the archipelago, the strength of the country. For the family, it was a great business venture since all the contractors and architectural consultants were obliged to reimburse a percentage of their fee—as the so-called returned fee—to high-ranking officers.

Nowadays Taman Mini is a prestigious recreation area. It is one of the main tourist destinations. It is the place where the urban inhabitants gather and prestigious events such as music concerts take place in the park. In addition to the traditional houses, the park has been completed by the Audimax Theatre and a playground for children. Mrs Soeharto also established smaller parks inside Taman Mini, such as the bird park (Taman Burung) and the flower park (Taman Bunga). During the weekends thousands of people from Jakarta as well as from other parts of Indonesia visit the park.

So, the Soeharto family, particularly Mrs Soeharto, can be considered an important director of urban change in Jakarta. Taman Mini Indonesia Indah with its forceful symbolic meaning proclaiming the unity of Indonesia is still conspicuously present to prove this.

Governor Ali Sadikin and the reorganization of the urban administration

Sadikin as a strong governor—who ended up as chairman of the national football league because of his rivalry with the president—reorganized the complete administrative structure of Jakarta. He argued that there were two problems: the dualism in administrative organization and the low degree of responsibility assumed by the people in looking after their own city. To solve these two problems he issued five strategic policies: first, a consolidation of the executive and legislative parts; second, the transformation of the administrative organization to increase effectiveness and efficiency in public services; third, the strengthening of administrative discipline with clearly set out job procedures in the administrative system; fourth, the development of a master plan as guidance to the local governments in Jakarta; and, fifth, the activation of public participation. During his term in office, many urban development projects were carried out under central government responsibility. Ali Sadikin concentrated particularly on urban financial problems and effectively improved the Jakarta tax income structure.

Ali Sadikin's first priority was to breathe new life into the administrative organization. In the colonial period, Jakarta was ruled by a dualistic governmental administration: the *pamongpraja* as representatives of the central government and the *perangkat otonom* as the local government. Following this system there were two heads of city government: the Resident and the Governor. As the head of the central government bureau (Biro Pemerintahan Umum Pusat, BPUP), the Resident delegated his responsibilities through a hierarchy of heads, the representatives of BPUP, the *wedana, camat* and *lurah*. Besides a Resident, there was also a Governor who had no authority to command the *wedana, camat* and *lurah,* but had command over the *dinas* (service section). The two institutions had separate administrations. Ali Sadikin saw this organizational structure as an obstacle to achieving an integrated government policy. On 22 June 1966, the two institutions were joined into one single administration, so that the Governor not only had the authority over

the service section *(dinas),* but also over the whole governmental hierarchy down to the ward *(kelurahan)* level (Wirosardjono 1977). Ali Sadikin applied a simple organizational model borrowed from the military. At the top the dualism between Resident and Governor had been eliminated, but several deputies were appointed to assist the governor. The units in the hierarchy were arranged under one single head. In addition, the governments of the five administrative areas of Jakarta were each run by a mayor. This organization of the administration created a system arranging staff from both the central and the local government under one single policy leadership.

As there was already a master plan for the period 1965–85 before Ali Sadikin began his term of office, there was not much room for him to put his stamp on the morphological development of the city. Besides the kampong improvements, he did not bring about any large spatial transformation. In addition to his administrative reorganization, his encouragement of people's participation in development should definitely be mentioned. In order to spur on the initiative of the inhabitants, he set conditions both in the socio-economic as well as the cultural sphere. He catered for artists by founding Taman Ismail Marzuki; in order to stimulate economic activities he promoted the construction and renovation of markets and shopping centres. Sadikin strongly believed that the rapid growth of Jakarta could be attributed to the participation of the people in development. At the same time the expansion of the city was promoted by the centralistic policies of the government designed for the city that demanded sophisticated urban facilities (Sadikin 1977).

Before June 1966 Jakarta was divided into three areas of representative central government: Jakarta Utara, Jakarta Tengah and Jakarta Selatan. Each area was headed by a regent who coordinated the *kecamatan*. Ali Sadikin considered the city organization to be an organism that had to develop dynamically. He was convinced that the administrative reorganization had to be implemented by a division into five administrative areas: Jakarta Pusat, Jakarta Utara, Jakarta Selatan, Jakarta Barat and Jakarta Timur. In practice, this spatial division triggered off a rapid mega-urban growth that spread into the areas of Tangerang, Bogor and Bekasi. The five administrative areas were arranged in a land-use system with Central and North Jakarta designated as business districts intricately associated with the harbour and the airport; South Jakarta was designated a residential area; East Jakarta was to be the industrial estate; and West Jakarta was for residential and office use.

Ali Sadikin certainly improved the administrative organization of the city. He was particularly influential with respect to the overall infrastructure in the fields of economics, culture, education, health, environment and greenery. At that time he could not foresee how the economic growth of the city in later years would be taken over by private entrepreneurs who juggled the land use to line their own pockets. The large kampong improvement projects carried out during Ali Sadikin's term in office were directed by the central government. In this period Jakarta transformed into a glamorous metropolitan city with attractive recreational and cultural amenities. In the search for modernity parts of the informal sector such as the *becaks* were repressed and other parts such as the market system and nightlife were efficiently managed (Darjatmo 1977).

The central government agencies and kampong improvement

During the colonial period the kampong problems had already been unequivocally noted on the public agenda. H.F.Tillema, who became rich by selling his Semarang bottled drinking water, was the first to write extensively on the unhygienic conditions in the kampongs. He spent part of his fortune on propagating the need for clean drinking water as well as drainage and sanitation. He sketched the terrible living conditions of the poor Dutch and indigenous people, and the many illnesses that could be directly traced back to this cause, varying from malaria to dysentery and frambosia (yaws), to mention just a few. In his analysis of colonial urbanization Ir.Th.Karsten, the famous colonial town planner, also proved to be sensitive to the so-called kampong question in his plea for public guidance of city development. After the war and its chaotic aftermath, in the 1960s and 1970s kampong improvement was taken up efficiently by the central and local governments backed by financial assistance from such institutions as the World Bank. A large part of the Jakarta kampongs was successively improved. This meant that paths were concreted, drainage gutters were constructed and washing places installed. In fact, the whole kampong improvement process in Jakarta has been unique in the world and has fundamentally transformed the ambience of the city. It was and still is strongly supported by scholars from architecture and social sciences who care about the poorer strata in society and want to improve their living conditions. In the course of time the focus of kampong improvement changed from infrastructure upgrading to social services and economic opportunity (employment) promotion. Yet, to a large extent modernization was phased out of this process in the 1980s and 1990s when many improved inner city kampongs were demolished to make way for more profitable high-rise office buildings and condominiums.

The greatest part of the implementation of the kampong improvement programme was carried out by the central government agencies during the initial years of the New Order regime under the governorship of Ali Sadikin. He combined the improvement projects with the (unsuccessful) closing of the city, as he was aware of the magnet function of a flourishing capital.

Hendropranoto Suselo and the concept of Jabotabek

The growth of Jakarta as one of the mega-urban areas in Asia was immense during the New Order period. Urban life contrasted sharply with that of the countryside and was dualistically split up into a formal and informal sector. A yawning gap existed between the luxurious malls of the formal sector and the hawkers at the traditional markets. Physically Jakarta was transformed from a city of two-storey buildings into a concentration of high-rise structures. However, life shows that history has not changed. The dichotomy between the formal and informal sector can be disclosed by a review of the ideas of the directors of urban change. This duality lies at the basis of conflicting directions in Jakarta.

As Jakarta is the capital imbued with the image of being the most advanced place in Indonesia, newcomers outnumber those who are seen as the original inhabitants, the Betawi people.[2] When the smaller cities in the surroundings were integrated, Jakarta became a mega-urban region known as Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi).

How did the directors of urban change develop the idea of Jabotabek? This concept was brought forward in the course of a training programme for planners organized by the directorate of human settlements. During the discussions, the planners came to the conclusion that the urban sprawl of Jakarta should be dealt with in cooperation with the cities of Tangerang, Bogor and Bekasi in the province of West Java. They agreed with the recommendation that the planning of Jakarta should include the three smaller towns in its surroundings. This recommendation was communicated to other governmental institutions and received a good response, especially at the Department of Interior that authorized governmental management. On 3 January 1974, the ministers of Interior, Public Works and State Apparatus proposed the concept of Jabotabek to the president who gave his assent, and three weeks later the concept was discussed in an inter-departmental forum. Because of the authoritarian political system, no objections to the Jabotabek concept were expressed.

Behind all decisions made by Soeharto and his ministers stood the head of the planning section of the Department of Public Works, Hendropranoto Suselo. He promoted the idea of controlling the growth of Jakarta by means of a deconcentration, distributing the urban activities over the urban centres in the periphery (Hendropranoto 1977). At that time this was probably an adequate concept to come to grips with the development of Jakarta where most of economic activities were concentrated in Kota and the surrounding areas, while the periphery consisted of kampongs, including that of Kebon Kacang. In his writings Hendro compared the concept of Jabotabek with that of Metro in Metropolitan Toronto, designed to integrate Toronto into the surrounding areas. He also mentioned metropoles in the United States that strived for the same type of integration. The idea of Jabotabek was reconfirmed in a presidential decree to establish housing areas in order to control the urbanization of the metropolitan area; this without considering the environmental aspects such as areas designated for water catchments and urban greenery. Jabotabek became the preliminary growth phase of Jakarta just before it developed into a mega-urban area. After the acceptance of the Jabotabek planning concept, Hendropranoto claimed that rather than the development of the old urban centres, the establishment of new urban centres in the periphery of Jakarta was what made sound economic sense. This idea was strongly supported by the inhabitants of Jakarta and led to a great number of booming satellite towns in the surroundings of the metropolis.

Ciputra: condominiums, malls and new towns

It was Ciputra who built the first block of flats at Ancol at the beginning of the 1990s. His idea was to create an exclusive housing environment for expatriates and rich young executives who needed an apartment located at a strategic place, close to the urban centre in a pleasant ambiance. Since then dozens of condominium and mall developers have

followed Ciputra's example. Mrs Soeharto developed a large condominium at the T-junction of Tomang in West Jakarta. It is the largest in Jakarta, called Taman Anggrek. The condominium has six apartment towers and a large, six-floor mall. Like Taman Mini in South Jakarta, Taman Anggrek became a new growth magnet in West Jakarta.

During the 1990s Jakarta saw many new high-rise building projects to provide apartments. The flats were often sold before the foundations had been laid. People rushed to buy them, as they wanted to sell them for a higher price after construction. Those living in these apartments were normally expatriates or rich young couples, while many just remained empty. Also people from Jakarta and other investors from outside the city and even outside Java bought the apartments not to live there but for speculation. In the boom, many apartments were built on illegal land without planning permission. The business was frozen after the economic crash. Nowadays a great number of skeletons of high-rise buildings loom in the skyline of the city, abandoned by their developers.

In line with Mrs Soeharto's view of seeing Jakarta as a place to make money, Ciputra, a Chinese entrepreneur, also embarked upon enormous schemes that changed the character of the metropolis. His first amazing project was Senen, a large market area in the centre of Jakarta. His second project was Taman Impian Jaya Ancol, a recreation centre on the Bay of Jakarta. Ciputra probably did not entertain very sophisticated ideas about how to develop Jakarta as a suitable place for living in the future. His main objective was the realization of estate projects for profit, unhampered by considerations of the environmental impact in the future. In Ancol, Ciputra built a children's playground called Dunia Fantasi (Fantasy World), flats, a hotel and a resort. His Ancol projects destroyed the mangrove forests on the coast, an area that was intended as a water catchment to protect Jakarta from flooding. Notwithstanding the risk of environmental damage, Ciputra reckoned that Ancol would bring in profits in billions of Rupiah. In 1990, he demonstrated that Taman Impian Jaya Ancol had been visited by nine million visitors and that the profit amounted to 36 billion Rupiah each year (Obsesi 1990).

After this successful project Ciputra became famous throughout Indonesia as a brilliant developer. In vast rice fields south of Jakarta he created two satellite towns, Pondok Indah and Bintaro. The extension of Jakarta into Jabotabek offered him a chance to become seriously rich. But Bintaro and Pondok Indah also became the symbols of modernity to which middle- and upper-class people moved in search of a better living environment.

After his success in constructing the satellite towns, Ciputra pursued his ambition to build a self-contained town. In 1983 he was at Serpong when there was an eclipse. In the darkness of the eclipse he was inspired to build a new town there. He said:

> We have not developed a new town since Independence Day…why don't we build a town that can be a place to live and to work, and that is complete with social facilities, as well as a place for recreation?

His idea became a reality with the support of urban planners and today the new town is called Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD). Ciputra's real estate consists mainly of one- and two-storey houses sold through credit from the bank. Only one high-rise building was constructed at the centre of the town for his own main office. The estate covers a vast area of land. All houses have their own septic tank and there is no waste treatment. The

sewerage is not cleaned before it flows into the river. The drainage and the sewerage from the kitchens and bathrooms are led through the same gutter running along the edge of the street in front of the houses. No compensation has been paid for the environmental damage caused by this new town.

His housing estate at Kapuk, called Pantai Indah Kapuk, drew severe criticism from urban planners. Bianpun, a senior urban planner in Jakarta, claims that the project took over a vast area of mangrove forest and caused flooding along the highway to the Sukarno-Hatta Airport.[3] The housing project, built in 1988 for a hundred billion Rupiah, covers 1,162ha and functions as an exclusive estate for the rich. Ten years after its establishment, Pantai Indah Kapuk was burned down during the May 1998 riots that ousted Soeharto from the presidency. Before being burned, Ciputra claimed that Pantai Indah Kapuk was a combination of Pondok Indah and Ancol. The houses were as luxurious as those in Pondok Indah and the recreation facilities better than those at Ancol (Obsesi 1990).

By constructing these luxurious housing estates, Ciputra initiated the so-called gated communities on the urban fringe of Jakarta. The estates are surrounded by walls and guarded 24 hours a day by security personnel. The main street is always closed off with a strong gate. Everyone entering the community has to show their identity card.

Ciputra has been an important director of urban change in Jakarta. Though his main aim was to make a profit from large-scale works and housing estates, he realized significant projects, which have inevitably determined the future of the city. He built houses for the rich and neglected the need for shelter of the poor. He has also ignored the environmental implications of his housing estates.

Sons Tommy, Bambang and Sentul

In the mid-1990s, several entrepreneurs obtained an interest in the southern part of Jabotabek. The former rubber forest area was invaded by conglomerates, which wanted to open golf-course housing estates. The total area was 11,000ha and there were seven projects run by different investors. Tommy Soeharto was one of them. The area located near a race course inspired him to open the 'Hambalang Golf & Country Estate and Grand Sentul Apartments'. The plots for the luxurious villas varied from 200 to 1,500 square metres. The housing area was equipped with recreational services in the same way as in Ciputra's Pantai Indah Kapuk. Tommy Soeharto also wanted to open a deer park. All the names referred to European cities such as Barcelona, Monte Carlo and Cannes. The prices of the plots ranged from Rp. 458,000 to 608,000 per square metre. Tommy acquired 250 ha in Sentul by investing 95 billion Rupiah.

Close to Tommy's project, his brother Bambang Trihatmojo opened a larger housing estate called Royal Sentul Highlands. Bambang favoured a concept of a new city that was independent of Jakarta. Like Ciputra's Bumi Serpong Damai, he wanted his housing estate to be equipped with public facilities such as hospitals, schools and a business centre.

Tommy and Bambang planned the construction of a comfortable settlement south of Jakarta. They were pursuing a profitable business proposition. According to *Tempo*, Sentul is the fourth largest new town in the greater Jakarta area after Bumi Serpong

Damai, Cikarang Baru and Tigaraksa (Kebun 1994:31). The profit prediction for Sentul attracted a number of other persons related to the Soeharto family to develop new estates such as Palm Hills, Rainbow Hills, Bel Air, PSP Golf & Country Club and Gunung Geulis Golf Course. These estates cover 11,000ha of what was previously rubber forest aerial. The upshot is that the green zone in the southern part of Jakarta was transformed into a large plot of vacant land, diminishing the sustainability of Jakarta.

Daughter Tutut and the toll ways

It was not by means of large buildings or new towns but by the construction of toll ways that the eldest daughter of Soeharto made her mark on the development of Jakarta. Nowadays these toll ways dominate the city traffic system connecting the international airport and the harbour to the city centre. In addition to the inner ring road, an outer ring road is under construction linking the newly urbanized areas in the peripheries of the capital. In 1987 Siti Hardijanti Rukmana won her first bid for a Jakarta toll way and in the course of time she became so important in the field of toll road development that she earned herself the nickname the 'toll way queen' (Van Klinken 1996; Van Asbek 1999; Pawlett 1999). By the mid-1990s, the toll road revenues amounted to more than US$210,000 a day and in 1995 the concessions for the inter-urban toll roads were extended up to 2024. Tutut's toll road emporium extended to other countries, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Burma and China (Aditjondro 1998). The Jakarta toll roads were meant not only to connect the outlying areas, but also to reduce traffic congestion in the city centre. The increase in the number of cars and car use in comparison with the much slower progress in road construction, however, does not lead to any optimism in the long-term expectations about traffic jam reduction, the bane of all the day-to-day motorized travellers in Jakarta. In 1997 Tutut's plans for a triple-decker toll road were at an advanced stage of decision making (*Subways* 1997). They included a rapid light transport system and plans for a subway. As a result of the 1998 economic and political crisis these plans had to be suspended. This was not possible for the Jakarta outer ring road, which was under construction and only partially completed. This road is without any doubt important to the clustered growth of Jakarta. It was initially constructed by three companies under a build-operate-transfer scheme and was intended to be operated by a company under Tutut's control. After the 1998 crisis the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) took over the project from the original investors and selected a new company that is intended to function under a state-owned toll road operator to finalize the project (Guerin 2001) (Figure 5.1).

The toll road system was constructed without paying any heed to the urban development plans, which opted for concentration of population increase in the cities of Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi, instead of the

Figure 5.1 The Jakarta skyline with
several toll ways.

Jakarta area. The system of the outer ring road parallel to the inner ring road continued to develop Jakarta as a compact city with a concentric growth pattern. This deviation from the official planning concepts was only made possible because of strong political backing enjoyed by Tutut as an important director of urban change. The outer ring road is intended to connect the peripheral suburbs and more distant new towns with each other and with the city centre. It will influence land values and lead and stimulate urban development.

Kemayoran and the Jakarta International Tradefair Corporation (JITC)

Besides the famous names who influenced Jakarta, in the beginning of the 1990s, there was also a collective director of urban change. After the airport in Kemayoran was closed down, the central government established the Kemayoran New City Board to manage the area and sell the land to investors. Kemayoran, favourably located in the north-central part of Jakarta, became the focus of attention for developers after the international airport of Jakarta was moved to the east and later to Cengkareng. The vacated land was developed for the international trade fair and for housing estates. The fair site was renamed Arena Pekan Raya Jakarta Kemayoran and was claimed to be the largest in Southeast Asia. The first fair opened on 20 June 1992 and marked a milestone for business in the city. The developer running the exhibition centre was the Jakarta International Trade Centre (JITC), whose president wanted Kemayoran to be developed into a new town. The exhibition covered 44 ha with three main buildings and a bazaar

called Pasar Gambir, a reminder of the Pasar Gambir built in 1921 as the first exhibition area in Jakarta (*Kelahiram* 1992).

In addition to the gigantic project of JITC, the Jakarta Tower (Menara Jakarta), another famous project, was planned in the search to establish a new identity for the city. In February 1997 the Kemayoran New City Board launched the plan for the tower at an estimated cost of US$560 million. Construction was intended to start in August that year. This ambitious plan did not materialize because the economic crisis hit Indonesia at that time. According to the plan 15 floors of the building were to be reserved for the World Trade Centre, four floors for multi-media and 12 floors for multipurpose activities. At the height of 390m a rotating restaurant with 450 seats was projected. The presidential palace, of course, gave its assent to the plans for this project, as the secretary of the state office was the head of the Kemayoran New City Board. The 'identity' tower was seen in the light of a watch tower project at the end of the New Order era, a token by which Soeharto intended to show that Jakarta had become a real world city (Yang 1997:31).

Directors during the Ref ormasi

After the economic crisis of 1997 followed by the stepping down of Soeharto and the emergence of the democratic era called Reformasi, the development of Jakarta stagnated. The city could not solve its multi-dimensional problems ranging from physical handicaps, economic bankruptcy, political uncertainty, street riots to lack of confidence in the juridical system.

The Reformasi era has brought democracy to Indonesia, which appears to have been a difficult task in such a large, multi-ethnic country. After 32 years of dictatorship with a president controlling the whole country with his family, close friends and loyal high-ranking military officers, the ushering in of a period of democracy led to highly divergent views that cannot be reconciled. For most of the New Order, the presidential family was the director of urban change in Jakarta. After its fall, during the four years of Reformasi no leader has been able to obtain the same authority and influence as Soeharto. No director has been able to realize his or her ideas without running into strong opposition.

Late in January 2001, at Tarumanegara University, the Planning Board (Bappeda) of DKI Jakarta presented the proposal of the new Master Plan of Jakarta. Aware of the importance of democracy, the Planning Board invited staff members of the university and non-governmental organizations to a seminar. These NGOs, such as the Urban Poor Consortium, invited people whose houses had been destroyed for the construction of highways and other projects. These people did not know anything about urban planning, but they felt that they were victims of urban development. The meeting was intended to lead to some sort of a conclusion, but ended up in a debate in which the participants took sides according to group or individual interests. Everyone wanted to leave his or her pencil mark on the map of Jakarta, so that the new master plan would not bring tragedy to them and their family. It was hard to reach a decision. So far it has not clearly emerged who are the directors of urban change in the Reformasi era.

In this chaotic situation the idea of building a cyber city is still flourishing. The pivotal initiative has come from the Riadys, the famous banker family of the Lippo Bank. Mochtar Riady, the father, and James Riady, the son, have been the two key persons.

Neither can be separated from the development of Jabotabek. In 2000 hundreds of new Internet portals were created in Jakarta to introduce e-business as an alternative to the normal businesses that had stagnated as a result of the economic crisis. The Riady business emporium expanded in the mid-1990s from banking into real-estate development. Cikarang and Karawaci, two vast areas to the east and west of Jabotabek, were reserved for it. In February 2000 Mochtar Riady pointed out that his family would like to develop Cikarang as an industrial city and Karawaci as a cyber city linked to the Internet. Right after that, the Lippo Group opened Linknet, a new provider in Jakarta.

The other cyber-city idea came from Edward Soeryajaya. His proposal, which won central government support in 2000, aimed to transform the 44 ha Kemayoran area into a new Silicon Valley, a cyber city where new high-tech employees would live, work, think and play. Soeryajaya argued that his idea was in line with the needs and trends of the time. Southeast Asia had become a region where cyber business has developed very rapidly and grabbed the minds of the leaders and the people. *Asia Week* noted that the 44 ha of the Kemayoran site was intended to offer office and manufacturing space to technology companies in combination with reliable communication links and electricity, the latter being a real attraction in a country prone to power blackouts. The idea was stimulated by corresponding plans in other Asian countries to recreate the dynamics of Silicon Valley in cyber cities.

The dream of a cyber city has not yet been realized, as Indonesia has not enough skilled and educated workers, or well-developed cities like those in California. An additional obstacle is that less than 260,000 people in Indonesia are connected to the Internet. For ordinary Indonesians, a computer is still an expensive luxury item. Moreover, connection to the ailing telephone lines is very expensive compared with the income of the average Indonesian. The collapse of e-business in 2001 shattered all the dreams about a cyber city (Caragata 2000).

Rio Tambunan and his criticism

At the beginning of 2002, Jakarta was struck by an enormous flood disaster. Since some of the housing estates such as Ancol were built on areas designated green belts and water catchments, Ciputra was blamed for it. Governor Sutiyoso declared that all physical development on the fringes of Jakarta should be stopped. Moreover, he claimed newly built houses at Puncak—where construction was discouraged and considered one of the causes of the flooding downstream in Jakarta—should be taxed more highly than the going rate. He also demolished his own villa at Puncak to show his commitment to solving the flood problem. In addition, Kwik Kian Gie, the head of the National Planning Board (Bappenas), declared that he intended to put aside 15 billion Rupiah each year for the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the city. The flood calamity brought people back to the drawing board to re-study the previous plans. One of the most interesting comments on the flood was that made by Rio Tambunan, the former head of the urban planning department of Jakarta.

According to Rio, the development of Jakarta and Jabotabek had deviated from the 1965–85 Master Plan. This plan, which should be evaluated every twenty years, has been evaluated and adapted several times in less than twenty years. The revisions were partly

motivated by a perceived need to change the land use of areas reserved for greenery and water catchments into housing estates. The designation of the Sunter area, planned for greenery and a lake of about 160ha, was altered so that only half the area was left for open space, the rest was sold for housing.

Rio revealed the revisions of the master plans and the implicit conflict with respect to the future direction of Jakarta. By comparing the Ancol, developed for social purposes during the Sadikin era, and the Ancol used for business in the post-Sadikin era, he showed that land designated for urban greenery had been used for apartments, hotels and recreation facilities. He also pointed out that the area of Kapuk, which was developed by Ciputra as a housing estate, was reserved for water catchments according to the Master Plan of 1965–85. The estate developers had actually worked as land brokers to obtain profits from the selling of the land and not from their construction activities. They bought the land as swamp for a low price and sold it at a large profit as housing estate. Hence, they probably lost on the construction, but obtained huge profits from the selling of the land (Tambunan 2002).

Conclusion

In Jakarta without any doubt the presidency has to be recognized as the main director of urban change. Sukarno transformed the physical structure of the city on the basis of his symbolic approach, embellishing it with statues and monuments. His purpose was to express the Indonesian identity. Soeharto and his family made their mark by large-scale structures and toll roads and, at a later stage, the construction of peripheral new towns. Their objective evidently was the accomplishment of economic and infrastructure development, without losing sight of swelling their family coffers.

The collective directorate of the new town, Kemayoran, was linked to the presidency via the state secretariat. This directorate should be mentioned as a potential director of urban change, but because of the economic crisis it did not fulfil its promise.

The third group of directors was also related to the presidency of Soeharto, but these private entrepreneurs, among them Ciputra, have to be considered a different actor transforming the Jakarta area by the construction of condominiums, malls and peripheral new towns. Highly profitoriented, they were inspired by European and American cities to create housing estates for the higher segments of society, neglecting the housing needs of the poor. Affluent gated communities became their trademark.

Turning to the governors, like Ali Sadikin, the conclusion has to be that they had less power to change the overall direction of the city. They had to look inwards to the administrative organization, which was reorganized by Sadikin, and take upon themselves the management of the daily urban life of the common people including the improvement of the conditions and facilities of the poor and to a certain extent the informal sector. Their efforts to develop Jakarta faced the obstacle of the central government. For them Jakarta has functioned as a city-state or court town, where the ruler is strongly involved in local activities.

The centralistic urbanization of Jakarta has created new contrasts between the rich and the poor, between the formal and the informal sectors in the city, and between the city and the countryside. Who is able to stop villagers going to Jakarta? Several times the

governors of Jakarta launched police actions to arrest those who did not possess a Jakarta identity card. They failed to stop the migration to the city. Even the decentralization policy of Jabotabek only resulted in the expansion of Jakarta from a metropolis into a vast mega-urban region. By their large-scale constructions and new towns, the directors of urban change have solidified two conflicting directions in Jakarta, namely the unity of the people with regard to their social and cultural identity and the divide between the rich and poor in separated and sometimes even gated communities.

Notes

1 We would like to thank Arief Budiman from the University of Melbourne for his information.
2 This popular image of the Betawi people as the original inhabitants of Batavia is an invention of tradition (Nas and Grijns 2000).
3 As early as 1993 there was a polemic to stop the project. See Bakau (1993:103).

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6
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore

High hopes versus a low profile
Freek Colombijn[1]

The most powerful urban directors in both the national capital of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur and the city-state Singapore are the national governments and more precisely the prime ministers with their respective state planning agencies. This statement, I confess immediately, is more a well-founded assumption than an empirically tested conclusion. The assumption is based on the fact that in both states the national governments have shown a keen interest in the development of the national capital. These governments were led by authoritarian prime ministers who have ruled for decades without an overly strong opposition. In Singapore, the Prime Minister is head of state. Between 1965 and 1990 the position was occupied by Lee Kuan Yew, a Cambridge-trained lawyer. In 1990 he stepped aside to make way for his deputy Goh Chok Tong, but Lee has continued to be very influential behind the scene. Other leading politicians are at best considered Lee's 'lieutenants' (Mauzy and Milne 2002:5). Parliament and the press have to toe the line and Lee's People's Action Party (PAP) has won all elections overwhelmingly. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad has been in office from 1981 until 2003 and his United Malay National Organization (UMNO) party won elections as easily as the PAP does in Singapore (Mauzy and Milne 2002; Meyer 1997:402–7).

The prime ministers and the state apparatus are interested in the national capital for at least four functions of these cities. The first is that the capital is a source of national pride, but in order to fulfil this function, the capital must be ranked among the great cities of the world. And in order to be counted as a major city, the capital must comply with international rules of how to win prestige. These rules prescribe, for example, that a city should have skyscrapers, shopping malls, expressways, an underground system and buildings designed by international firms of architects.

The second function of the national capital is to be a symbol of the national identity and unity. This role is especially important in countries that are regionally or ethnically strongly divided. However, a vicious paradox is observable in this respect. The just noted compliance with the international standards of modernity conflicts with the requirement that a city must have a distinctive, national character with, for example, idiosyncratic architectural elements that express (allegedly) national values.

The third role the national capital can fulfil, in the view of the government, is as a motor of economic development. The national capital must be connected to the global network society, in order to stimulate the economy. It must also be connected to the global network if it wants to be a symbol of modernity that can stand international comparison. The network is the new dominant form of social organization. The distinction between haves and have-nots is between people who are and who are not

connected to the flows of information, capital and goods. Despite the spatial diffusion of networks, cities remain important nodes in the network as sites for services, social status and individual self-gratification for the elite. The cities that are connected to the network are command centres of the space of flows. The new industrial space is characterized by the ability to separate the production process in different locations. At the centre of such a production process must be a technopole with a 'milieu of innovation' (Appadurai 1996; Castells 1996:1–28, 376–428; Harvey 1990:87–92; Nas and Houweling 2002). 'Across the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s, "world class" urban investment was increasingly understood as a national means of "plugging in" to global […] networks' (Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi 2002:361).

Fourth, the national capital is important to the state, because it is a magnet for immigrants coming from secondary cities and the countryside. Cities tend to grow, and this is certainly true of national capitals. According to Terry McGee (1995) urban development of Southeast Asian capitals has taken an idiosyncratic form by the development of an extended metropolitan region. The development of the extended metropolitan region is an *in situ* urbanization of the countryside. The low-cost, low-technology transportation revolution of the 1960s, with overloaded buses and trucks, has permitted people to commute on a daily, weekly or seasonal basis from the extended metropolitan region to the city core. Industries are relocated from the centre to these rural areas to evade anti-pollution regulations. Rich urbanites move to new, spacious residential areas. The outcome of this process is an area with mixed rural and urban characteristics (McGee 1995; see also Rigg 1997:239–71; Smith 2001:425–32; Winarso 2002).[2]

In this article I will compare the process of mega-urbanization in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. The main question is which visionary plans the national governments developed for the development of a modern image of their national capitals, which forms to express national symbols they chose, how they tried to connect the cities to the global network society, and in which direction they led the urban expansion into the extended metropolitan region. In the concluding section I come back to the question to what extent the prime ministers are prompted by national planning agencies, and to what extent the states have to share the role of director with banks and private investors. I shall use a historical approach to answer this question in the belief that one can only see in which direction a city is heading if one knows where it is coming from. The article is based on a study of secondary literature and websites, supplemented with brief periods of fieldwork in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.

These two cities form a natural laboratory, in which some parameters are similar, and others are different. The 'controlled variables' are: an almost identical geopolitical position; a mutual competition for the same investors in the Southeast Asian region; a roughly similar population size (in the range of 1–5 million people); a population predominantly composed of Chinese, Malays and Indians (although with different majorities); a history of British colonial town planning, exemplified by a curious lawn with a sports club right in the city centre (Figure 6.1); a brief period when both cities formed part of the same nation; and an autocratic government headed by omnipotent, and perhaps meddlesome, prime ministers.

The two cities differ in two crucial aspects: Singapore has a constrained territory and already has a high-technology infrastructure. Kuala Lumpur lies in a wide valley and

aspires to high-technology status. Singapore seems to be better equipped to participate in the network society and Kuala Lumpur has the best cards for extended metropolitan growth. The national governments of both capitals struggle to strike a balance between global ideals of modernity and a distinctive national identity.

Figure 6.1 The Padang with the
Singapore Cricket Club.

The comparison between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur is extra-enticing because of the common, and sometimes antagonistic, history. In the early nineteenth century the British occupied three outposts in the Straits of Malacca. These Straits Settlements were Penang, Malacca and Singapore. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the British extended their territory to nine independent states situated on the Malay Peninsula. In 1895 four of them were amalgamated into the Federated States, responsible to the English resident-general at Kuala Lumpur; while the other states remained apart for the time being. After the Second World War, all the states on the Peninsula formed the Federation of Malaya, which in 1957 obtained independence. Interestingly, the head of state is the most senior of the sultans of the constituent states. The most influential political position, however, is held by the Prime Minister. The year 1957 is also taken as the end of the so-called Emergency, a communist rebellion by rural Chinese. Singapore and the British colonies in Borneo joined the Federation in 1963. Under the Pax Britannica, Confucian Chinese, Muslim Malays and Hindu Indians had co-existed in peace. The addition of Singapore, with a predominantly Chinese population, upset the precarious ethnic balance threatening the narrow Malay majority in the independent Federation. As early as 1965 Singapore went its own way, or—depending on one's viewpoint—was kicked out and became independent (Meyer 1997:242–3, 401–2).

After independence, Singapore has worked its way up as a Newly Industrialized Country, nicknamed one of the Asian tigers. In Malaysia things did not go so smoothly. Even after the separation from Singapore, ethnic relations in Malaysia remained tense. After elections in 1969, when independent Chinese candidates challenged the ruling party, anti-Chinese riots unexpectedly broke out. Shops and houses were looted and burnt and a thousand people were killed or injured. This traumatic event swung the government into new action. The next year a state ideology, Rukunegara, was proclaimed, stating among other things that the nation is dedicated to achieving a greater unity of all its peoples, to creating a just society with the wealth of the nation shared equitably and to building a modern society oriented towards science and technology. These were not hollow phrases. Malaysia embarked on an economic programme that has strengthened the position of the relatively poor Malays, not by redistributing the existing wealth, but by giving the Malays a bigger share in the economic growth. A corollary of the new policy was a strengthening of the state at the expense of civil society. Natural resources (tin, oil, timber, a soil suited to an estate agriculture of rubber and palm oil), a good education system and political stability have boosted the economic growth. The economy, which was based on rubber and tin, has become diversified with the rise of an export-oriented industry (Lee Boon Thong 1995:315–17; Meyer 1997:402–4; Robertson 1984:251–60). Nowadays Malaysia occupies an economic middle position between the Asian Tiger Singapore and the less-developed countries of Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia (Table 6.1). The nation aspires to Newly Industrialized Country status.

The relationship between Malaysia and Singapore has remained sensitive since 1965. Singapore, sandwiched between two far larger neighbours, is worried about its security. The, alleged or true, dependence on water from its neighbours is a continuing cause for nervousness on both sides (Long 2001). Kuala Lumpur envies the Singaporean wealth in the way that a younger brother looks up to his older brother, who is yet superior in strength. Sometimes the younger brother is smarter and eclipses the elder. Also the relationship between Singapore and Indonesia is tense:

Table 6.1 Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia compared

	Singapore	Malaysia	Indonesia
Economic indicators			
1 Population size, 1993	2,900,000	19,000,000	187,200,000
2 GNP in billion US dollar, 1993	55.4	60.1	137.0
3 GNP per capita in US dollar, 1993	19,310	3,160	730
4 Real % annual growth per capita,	6.1	5.7	4.7

1985–93			
5 GNP percentage growth, 1996	7.0	8.2	7.8
Social indicators			
6 Life expectancy at birth, 1992	75	71	60
7 Per capita energy use in kgoe,[a] 1992	4,399	1,445	303
8 Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births, 1992	5	14	66
9 Daily intake of protein in grams, 1992	87	60	61
10 Number of people per medical doctor, 1992	742	2,411	10,991
Urban indicators			
11 Urban population as % of total population, 1965	100	26	16
12 Urban population as % of total population, 1990	100	43	31
13 Population size of the capital city, 1960	1,443,000	316,000	2,973,000
14 Population size of the	2,705,000	1,258,000	8,222,000

	capital city, 1990			
15	Population size of the capital city including EMR,[b] 1990	5,280,000	1,700,000	17,097,000

Sources: row 1–4, 6–8 The World Bank (1994); row 5 IMF (1997); row 9–10 ADB (1995); row 11–15 McGee (1995).

Notes

a kgoe=kilogram oil equivalent.

b Extended Metropolitan Region of Singapore includes the Malaysian district of Johor Bahru and the Indonesian province of Riau; EMR of Kuala Lumpur includes the whole of Kuala Lumpur and Klang districts; EMR of Jakarta includes the Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi municipalities and districts.

mutual economic dependence, economic jealousy, military fear, and feelings of contempt and superiority are intertwined (Lim Beng Soon and Wee Bee Geok 2002; Nur 2000:145–7). In his memoirs Lee Kuan Yew (2000:283) recalls that the Indonesian President, Habibie was 'against Singapore' and said: 'Look at the map. All the green [area] is Indonesia. And that red dot is Singapore'.

Singapore

In 1819 the British founded a trading post on Singapore Island. The population grew quickly from a few hundred Malay fishermen to 11,000 people in 1824, consisting mainly of Chinese immigrants. In the first town plan of 1822 each of the ethnic categories was appointed a ward in which to settle, and merchants were explicitly granted the first pick of the best sites. The plan prescribed the use of verandas open to the general public and this prescription gave birth to the famous shophouse. The opening of the Suez Canal and the advance of steamships sailing from Europe to East and Southeast Asia through the Straits of Malacca reinforced Singapore's status as premier entrepÔt of the Far East. After the Second World War Singapore embarked on an export-oriented industrialization policy and later developed the service sector. Until the Second World War Singapore had continuously attracted immigrants, thereafter the city grew by natural increase (Table 6.2). Because Malays on average have more children than Chinese residents, the state has recently begun to encourage Chinese immigration again, in order to maintain the Chinese preponderance.

The urban growth went hand in hand with sanitary problems and a chronic shortage of housing. In 1858 the first town engineer, surveyor and architect was appointed. In the 1930s the Singapore Improvement Trust started a public housing building programme. After the Japanese occupation during the Second World War 100,000 people were

reduced to living in ramshackle dwellings; by 1960, according to a report, 250,000 squatters lived in overcrowded slums. The master plan of 1958 envisaged new towns

Table 6.2 Population of Singapore

Year	Population size	Chinese (%)	Malays (%)	Indians (%)
1824	11,000	31	60	7
1849	53,000	53	32	12
1901	227,000	72	16	8
1947	938,000	78	12	7
1990	2,705,000	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.

Sources: Perry, Kong and Yeoh (1997:31); McGee (1995:12).
Note
Chinese, Malays and Indians are all composite groups of various ethnic backgrounds.

to relocate the squatters and house the citizens yet-to-be-born.[3] Creating new towns for 125,000 to 300,000 people (five persons per dwelling) really took off in the 1970s (Dale 1999:12–19; Lim Sun Hock 2001; Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997:25–55; Westerholt 1995:350–7).

Since its founding, Singapore has been a very important transportation hub, present-day heir to many port towns in the strategically located Straits. In 1955 Paya Lebar Airport was opened and in 1981 it was replaced by Changi International Airport. Connectivity and efficiency have won Changi International Airport numerous awards from business magazine reader polls. The harbour is considered the second or third biggest in the world and thrives on the transit of containers: a container from Europe to India goes fastest via Singapore. As early as 1871 Singapore completed the telegraph link to Europe, a year later extended to Hong Kong and Australia; satellites and optic fibre cables form means for modern telecommunications technology. In 1981 the National Computer Board was set up to develop information technology and in 1992 the NCB set out its ideal of an 'lntelligent Island', where computer networks are omnipresent in business and at home. The city is frequently ranked first in the world in terms of telecommunications facilities. In 1986 its expenditure on information technology as share of GDP was twice the level of the percentage expenditure of Japan. Singapore has deliberately and successfully attracted the regional headquarters of multinational corporations. The results of its stock exchange are news around the world and Singapore is, with Chicago, leader in futures. On a recently constructed 12-point index of global status (based on accountancy, advertising, banking and legal activities), Singapore ranks with the top-ten cities with ten points[4] (Castells 1996:379; Macleod and McGee 1996:434, 436–7; Mahizhnan 1999; *NRC Handelsblad* 20 April 2000; Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997:170–83; Smith 2001:436–7). The rise of modernity does not have only economic motives, but is also a narrative of Singaporean identity, that must overcome ethnic differences between Chinese, Malays and Indians (Lindquist 2002:178–9).

The ever-expanding economy and growing population have demanded innovative means to solve the serious shortage of land. Since the early 1960s land reclamation has

extended the territory by 10 per cent, making room for Changi International Airport, a top-class container terminal, and other facilities.[5] Land reclamation was basically achieved by shovelling hills into the sea, but by the 1990s sand for landfill had to be bought abroad. High-rise, high-density housing has been another answer to land shortage. Skyscraper office blocks have transformed the skyline. The Land Acquisition Act of 1966 gave the state wide discretionary powers to acquire land.[6] Until a recent revision of the Act, state agencies bought much land far below market prices, sometimes for a speculative purpose. By 1992 80 per cent of the land belonged to the state. Private ownership of cars is dis-couraged in order to reduce the demand for roads; self-contained neighbourhoods and broadband fibre optic cables are means to reduce intra-city travel (Dale 1999:90–1; Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997:153–70; Westerholt 1995:350–9). The housing policy not only aimed at providing shelter, but also had political goals: to give citizens a stake in the extant sociopolitical order and to amalgamate different ethnic groups into one Singaporean national unity by placing these groups together in housing blocks with shared facilities (King 1999:250–4).

The mega-urban development in the city-state took a whole new turn with the idea of the Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) Growth Triangle. The development was set in motion after a meeting between Lee Kuan Yew and President Soeharto of Indonesia in October 1989 (Kumar 1994:209). The concept was launched by Goh Chok Tong, then deputy-prime minister, in December 1989 and officially endorsed by the Malaysian and Indonesian governments the next year. The basic idea is that the three regions pool their human and natural resources in order to attract new investors. Each corner of the triangle would put in its respective comparative advantage: Singapore its capital, technical skills and management; the Malaysian state of Johor its land and semi-skilled labour; and the Indonesian province of Riau also its land and cheap labour.[7] In this hierarchy Riau ranks below Johor, since its labour is more unskilled and cheaper. The SIJORI concept refers in the first place to an economic relationship for investment (it is not a free trade zone). It is unique in that cheap labour and land can be found so close to a global hub (Anwar 1994:23–5; Macleod and McGee 1996:443–4; Smith 1997:369–72).

Taking a less diplomatic viewpoint, and looking at the political geography, it becomes clear that SIJORI does not really concern a tripartite partnership but the mega-urban growth of Singapore spilling over into the territories of its neighbours (Lee Tsao Yuan 1995:269–71; Macleod and McGee 1996:425). Singapore was, and is, clearly in control: it took the initiative and it provided the capital and management. It has moved its land and labour intensive industries to adjacent areas, where land and labour are relatively abundant and cheap. The idea was launched precisely at the moment when industrial development within the boundaries of the city-state reached saturation point, so that costs of land and labour were rising sharply. Johor and Riau are also used as housing areas and as providers of drinking water (Kumar 1994:179–84; Macleod and McGee 1996:430–2; Nur 2000; Smith 1997:373; Smith 2001:437–40; Sparke, Sidaway, Bunnell and Grundy-Warr in press).[8]

Singapore has used Riau and Johor as a dump for awkward, yet indispensable, activities. The growth of links between Singapore and Riau has been much more dominant in recent years, than those with Johor (Smith 2001:438). For example, Singapore has moved illegal or undesirable tourism to Batam (the island of the Riau Archipelago on which the most developments are taking place): alcohol and prostitution.

For Singaporeans the two places are an escape from the overly controlled and too sterile city-state (Macleod and McGee 1996:435). Five thousand prostitutes work on Batam; hundreds of them are under-age girls, smuggled to Riau against their will. Another attraction of Riau is that the Indonesian government has nullified environmental impact laws there, so that Singapore uses Batam as a depository of polluting industries, which are no longer allowed in the city-state itself, and a dump for dredged soil of dubious quality. Moreover, the myriad islands make the Riau Archipelago an ideal place for dumping waste from Singapore illegally. Because of its convenient location, Riau is also a centre for smuggling oil, timber and sand to Singapore, and—less advantageous for Singapore—a pirates' hideout (*Environesia* September-December 1990, April-June 1993; *Kompas* 28 April 2000; Lindquist 2002; Mawarni 1993:136; Nur 2000; *Riau Pos* 14 April 2000, 2 June 2000, 17, 25 January 2001; Sindikat 2000; SKEPHI 1994:143–55).

The development of Riau is full of social tensions and environmental problems. The development has not resulted in an *in situ* urbanization of the rural population, which according to McGee characterizes the Extended Metropolitan Region of Southeast Asian cities, but it has led to a replacement of local residents to make room for either Singapore projects or the emergence of squatter areas of Indonesian migrants (Colombijn 2003; Nur 2000; Wee and Chou 1997:534–9). Few Singaporeans have chosen to reside in Riau, because Indonesian law does not permit ownership of land. The Indonesian promise that the right to use land will be extended automatically every ten years has not persuaded Singaporeans to buy houses (Nur 2000:161–2).

An important question is who is the director of urban change in Riau? Singapore capital dominates totally; in 2000 Singaporean firms invested $10 billion, more than two hundred times the total of the second investor, Japan (Sparke, Sidaway, Bunnell and Grundy-Warr in press). The Singaporean investments on Batam come from private companies, but they are directed by the state, which set up the Committee to Promote Enterprises Overseas in 1993. The state gives tax incentives and financial aid to companies going to Batam and also takes part in investments. The Singaporean dollar is the preferred currency on Batam (Nur 2000:152, 158). More in general, Henry Yeung (1998:389) has concluded that 'the regionalization of Singaporean firms is essentially a state-led phenomenon'. In line with these views, Diane Mauzy and R.S Milne (2002:78) assert that Singapore's Economic Development Board was a central player in the planning and implementation of SIJORI.

At the programmatic level the hegemony of Singapore must be hidden. In his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew (2000:271) suggests diplomatically that the Singaporean development of Riau's islands was Soeharto's proposal and that Singapore only reacted to Indonesian initiatives. The core element of the facade is the term 'growth triangle'. The word 'growth' suggests that it is a good thing, and the word 'triangle' maintains the fiction that it is a tripartite cooperation between equal partners. This image is reinforced by maps representing the region overlaid by an equilateral triangle (e.g. Smith 2001:438). SIJORI was renamed Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle, consequently placing Singapore in the last position, raising the semantic terms for Riau and Johor. The triangle has symbolic meaning, but the three constituent parts actually lie in one line, from north to south (Figure 6.2).[9] A corollary is that there is no link at all

Figure 6.2 Map of the SIJORI Growth Triangle.

between Johor and Riau, neither in the form of trade and investment, nor in the form of a formal agreement. SIJORI has been developed as two pairs of bilateral agreements, centred on Singapore. The governments did not sign a tripartite memorandum of understanding before December 1994. It is also telling in this respect that, although Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir and Indonesian president, Soeharto, ceremoniously planted trees on

Batam, they did not do this at the same time (Anwar 1994:24–6; Smith 1997:371–3; Sparke, Sidaway, Bunnell and Grundy-Warr in press).

The actual linear form is strengthened by the direction of growth at the tips. From Singapore the mega-urban region extends north via a causeway across the Johor Straits to Johor Bahru, which is by itself one of the three mega-urban regions of Malaysia. Johor Bahru's major development is lop-sided to the north, along the highway to Kuala Lumpur. After the Klang Valley, Johor is the second most important industrial region of Malaysia.[10] The development of Singapore's mega-urban region southward into Riau started on Batam, the island just south of Singapore. A series of bridges connects Batam to six other islands, which lie in a string to the south of Batam.[11] Every half an hour a speedboat leaves Singapore for the 30-minute ride to Batam (Kumar 1994:191–2; Lee Boon Thong 1995:315, 323; Macleod and McGee 1996:425–8; Smith 2001:439). Having the linear form in mind, Macleod and McGee (1996:425) think it more accurate to speak of a growth corridor, and David Smith (2001:439–40), having the different industrial and tourist resorts in mind, uses the words polynodal development.

The government on the Indonesian side also wants to hide, or close its eyes to, the Singaporean dominance. An Indonesian propagandistic book (Gill and Aksarakomunika 1998), for instance, suggests that the development of Batam was an autonomous Indonesian development set in motion by the visionary ideas of Habibie, who at the time of publication was president of Indonesia. There is some truth in this view, because as early as 1979 Habibie, who then had just become chairman of the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), spoke of a 'balloon theory': Singapore would burst if it did not have a safety valve to draw off its excess capacity. Nothing came of the subsequent initial bilateral discussions (Grundy-Warr and Perry 1996:196; Nur 2000:149–50).

The expansion into Riau and Johor is not suited for new high-class service areas, which necessarily had to be located in or near the heart of Singapore. Suntec City is a large project on reclaimed land near the mouth of the Singapore River, right in the city centre. It was financed by a consortium of Hong Kong businessmen, who, invited to do so by Lee Kuan Yew, launched their plans in 1988. The American top architects I.M. Pei (who designed among other things the Bank of China in Hong Kong) and Tsao and McKown were the main designers and the project was realized in the course of the 1990s. It consists of a convention centre, five office towers in a semi-circle around a plaza, and a shopping mall. The project is full of symbolism, expressing a Confucian version of capitalism. The buildings form a left hand with the convention centre as the ball of the hand and the five office towers as the fingers. Together with Raffles Place, forming the right hand, they cradle the City Hall, the civic seat of Singapore. The setting also expresses a *mandala,* a Hindu-Buddhist circular representation of the universe, which creates harmony and attracts good fortune. Further symbolism of the setting is the use of *fengshui* (Chinese geomancy) and the opposition between *yin* and *yang* to place the different buildings. The so-called Fountain of Wealth is placed in the central plaza and was originally the largest fountain in the world. It is symbolically the palm of the hand, 'guaranteeing the retention of wealth'. Unlike most fountains, at this fountain the water flows inwards, expressing the accumulation of wealth. Around the fountain are 12 bronze medallions depicting the Chinese Zodiac rings.[12] The name Suntec is derived from the Chinese character *xin da,* meaning 'new achievement'. A small survey which I carried

out among pedestrians at the central plaza indicates that the ideas of the left hand and the Fountain of Wealth had been conveyed to the public, but the meaning of the word Suntec had not. Some people associated it with the (rising) sun and technology.

Kuala Lumpur

Kuala Lumpur was founded some distance up the Klang River as a tinmining town in 1859. The first settlers were Chinese, sent out on the initiative of the Malay sultan of Selangor. At first Kuala Lumpur developed as a frontier town, ruled and exploited by a Chinese self-made man, Yap Ah Loy. In 1880 it became the capital of the state of Selangor, replacing Klang at the estuary of the Klang River. Frank Swettenham, appointed resident of Selangor in 1882, gave the town a new urban appearance. He employed bullock carts to remove the rubbish on the streets, drew up building regulations, widened streets, and replaced semi-permanent buildings with brick-and-tile structures, including a market hall (covered with corrugated iron), brothels and shophouses. During his term, Kuala Lumpur gained a railway connection to the sea. In 1896 Kuala Lumpur became capital of the Federated Malay States, and subsequently attracted more residents and an increasing number of economic functions. After 1896 several state buildings were erected in a Moorish style (Figure 6.3). This Orientalist style, which gave the old centre its peculiar appearance, was developed by British architects who blended imagined Arab, Indian and Moorish elements. In 1901 a new port, Port Swettenham, nowadays called Port Klang, was built in the estuary (Gullick 1983:1–5, 41–4; Höfer 1991:108–10; Lee Boon Thong 1995:318; Wolff, 1989:155–62).

After the Second World War there was an upsurge of squatter settlements because of 100,000 new immigrants in Kuala Lumpur. To accommodate this growing population a new town, Petaling Jaya, was started in the mid-1950s. Its location was a few kilometres to the west of Kuala Lumpur, downstream in the Klang Valley. Petaling Jaya was influenced by the British town planning tradition. This large-scale development was facilitated by a hinterland dominated by plantations, which could be acquired in large blocks. By 1980 Petaling Jaya was the fifth largest city in the country and yet it could not absorb all the excess population of Kuala Lumpur. Another town, Shah Alam, was started in the 1960s, and more new towns were built, gradually filling in the area between Kuala Lumpur and Port Klang (Figure 6.4). The river, railway and a highway formed a triple transport axis through the Klang Valley, attracting housing and, in line with the national economic development plans, industrial investors. The development in the corridor was reinforced by the opening of Subang International Airport in 1965 and by the recent investments in Port Klang (which is nowadays spreading its facilities out over the coast). This corridor has been the most fully developed axis of the Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Region so far. Another pattern of metropolitan growth has consisted of the incorporation of resettlement villages by the expanding metropolis. These villages were constructed around Kuala Lumpur during the Emergency to resettle half a million rural Chinese, in order to deprive the guerrilla of their local support (Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi 2002:358–61; Lee Boon Thong 1995:319, 322; Wolff 1989:162–5).

Figure 6.3 British colonial architecture in Kuala Lumpur with the Dayabumi Complex in the background.

Figure 6.4 Map of the Kuala Lumpur
Extended Metropolitan Region.

With the development of Petaling Jaya began the complicating factor that the Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Area is now extending beyond the Federal Territory of the capital city into the surrounding state of Selangor (Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi 2002:362). Kuala Lumpur numbered 1.6 million residents by 1990, but the whole urban region comprised 3.1 million people in 1990 (Table 6.3).[13] The rise of the Malay share in the city population is in line with the national policy to improve the income of rural Malays by industrialization (Lee Boon Thong 1996:360–4).

There is an environmental limit to how many people and premises the corridor in the Klang Valley can accommodate. A new development was stimulated to the south in order to divert some pressure away from the

Table 6.3 Population of Kuala Lumpur

Year	Population size	Chinese (%)	Malays (%)	Indians (%)
1879	2,600	–	–	–
1901	32,000	72	12	14
1947	176,000	63	12	18
1990	1,555,000	56	26	14

Sources: Lee Boon Thong (1996:362–4); Wolff (1989:165).

land available in the Klang Valley. In 1975 a university town, Bangi, was conceived 30km south of the city core. Because of its location next to a highway, it has also attracted industries. In the 1990s a 640 ha site at Serendah, to the north of the city centre, was designated as the site for a huge car plant in order to develop a third axis in a northerly direction. Private companies have responded by laying out golf courses, housing estates and other industries in this northern wing (Lee Boon Thong 1995:319–22).

The above story of urban growth, told in terms of population numbers and spatial extension, misses one important feature: Malaysia's goal of becoming an Asian Tiger and Kuala Lumpur's ambition to be counted among the world cities. In 1965 the state mosque, Masjid Negara, allegedly the biggest mosque of Southeast Asia, was completed (Rahman 1998:290–6). In the same decade the national monument was completed, commemorating Commonwealth soldiers who fought against communists during the Emergency. The heroic bronze soldiers, the oblique lines in the composition, the base of rocks and the real flag flying on top all refer to the famous Marine Corps Memorial at Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, showing American marines planting a flag on Iwo Jima. In fact, both statues were designed by the same sculptor, Felix de Weldon. The fact that the National Monument in Kuala Lumpur is a 'referential symbol' (Nas and Van Bakel 1999:188) pointing to Washington shows Kuala Lumpur's ambitions and is at the same time indicative of its actual second rank during the 1960s (for a real world city does not refer to other cities, only to itself).

Since the 1990s Kuala Lumpur has been repositioning itself to be counted among the Major League of cities and to be seen as a preferred locality for foreign investors. The use of KL, popular in glossy semi-state publications such as in-flight magazines of the Malaysian Airline System, reminds one implicitly of LA and NY, two of the largest cities in the world known by an abbreviation. In 1998 Kuala Lumpur was host to the XVI Commonwealth Games and in June 2000 Kuala Lumpur announced its candidacy to host the 2008 Olympics (but it did not make it to the short list of candidates). Most telling, however, is the development of a new business district, the Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC), on the premises of a former racecourse, the Selangor Turf Club, and the adjacent area of colonial villas. Mahathir claims that the project 'will definitely put Kuala Lumpur on the world map' (quoted in Bunnell 1999:7). The spacious gardens of the villas and the racecourse formed a fortunate empty space in the city centre. The master plan for this area was selected in 1990 by an international competition.

The jewel in the crown of KLCC is formed by the 452 m Petronas Twin Towers (or PTT), until October 2003 the tallest building in the world, beating the Sears Tower by 10 m (according to the Malaysian method of measurement).[14] It was financed by the national oil-company, Petroliam Nasional Berhad, or PETRONAS. The whole of the plot of the Selangor Turf Club has been sold to a company controlled by a close friend of Mahathir, Ananda Krishnan. The building, with 88 storeys and a sky bridge linking the two towers at 170m above street level, was designed by Cesar Pelli, the American architect who also conceived Canary Wharf in London and the World Financial Gentre in Manhattan. The design combines the modern concept of a skyscraper and a ground plan following Muslim geometric patterns; windows with green glass—the colour of Islam—filter the incoming light. The interior of the lobby is decorated with a marble floor and wooden walls using Malaysian *songket* weaving and timber carving patterns. The multi-faceted facade allegedly reflects the sunlight with brightness and deep shadows as can be found in Malaysian tropical forest. The concert hall, home of the Malaysian Philharmonic Orchestra, adds to its distinction.[15] In my view, the Petronas Twin Towers resemble the church of the famous Sagrada Familia in Barcelona (design Antonio Gaudí, begun 1884), because of the contour of the two towers and the seemingly scaly surface. The Petronas Twin Towers reached their maximum height in 1996 and were officially opened in 1999. In 1996 the Menara Kuala Lumpur, the world's third tallest telecommunications tower at 421 m, had already been inaugurated. Also the telecommunication tower combines local and Western features: the tower contains Arabic calligraphy and classical Islamic floral and abstract motifs, but also boasts the highest McDonalds in the world. The Tabang Hajji Building, which dominated the skyline before the skyscrapers in the so-called Golden Tri-angle in the centre were built, had similar Islamic features. At the foot of the office towers, shopping malls sprout up everywhere 'like secondary jungle undergrowth' (Bunnell 1999; Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi 2002:362; Chen Voon Fee 1998:98–131; Koh 1998:20–3, 29–33; Morshidi 2000:2217; Sardar 2000:75, 131–2).[16]

In 1991 Prime Minister Mahathir launched Vision 2020, a general conception of what Malaysia and the new Malaysians should look like. Vision 2020 was elaborated in the 1998 review of the Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan, which gives priority to telecommunications and transportation (Morshidi 2000:2235; Sardar 2000:226). Malaysia's aspirations for the early twenty-first century are to be fulfilled by three new mega-projects, which are all located to the south of Kuala Lumpur. They are the Kuala Lumpur International Airport, a new government seat at Putrajaya and an information technology city, called Cyberjaya. The three projects have economic, morphological and political relevance. Economically the three new mega-projects exemplify the second structural change from industry to services. Morphologically, they form a triple pulling power for new developments towards the south of the city core. New townships can be expected to mushroom along the highway and railway linking them.

The first of these visionary projects was the construction of the 100 square km KL International Airport at Sepang. Planning started in 1991, when traffic at the former airport at Subang reached its capacity limit. Its first phase was opened in 1998, which is remarkably soon after the incentive was taken. The designer was the Japanese architect Kisho Kurokawa. It lies 50–70 km (figures given differ) from the city centre and was constructed on rubber and oil palm estates and on government land reserves. In the advertising words of PR managers, it is an 'airport in the forest and a forest in the

airport', for not only is it situated amidst a carefully designed landscape, but also 300 rainforest trees were planted behind an enclosure of glass in the Passenger Terminal Complex. The airport is designed as a 24-hour open transit terminal that will rival Singapore as the hub of Southeast Asia. Eventually KL International Airport will cater to 60–100 million passengers per year. KL International Airport is also home to another noisy, prestigious activity: a Formula One race track (Mohanlall 1998).[17] New townships are expected to mushroom along the highway and super-railway connecting the airport to the city centre (Lee Boon Thong 1995:322). Despite its impressive design, the airport does not fully live up to expectations. The 300-tree forest in the airport is hidden behind misty windows. Foreign carriers, such as Qantas, eschew the place because of the expensive landing taxes. Malaysian Airline System has moved the handling of some of its domestic flights back to Subang Airport, because otherwise driving to the airport from the city centre would take up a disproportionate share of the total travelling time. In early 2002 the 57km rapid rail link between KLIA and the centre was opened and this may have improved the situation (Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi 2002:364).

Putrajaya is the new federal government administrative capital of Malaysia.[18] Thinking of Washington, Brasília, Canberra and Abuja, and to some extent Bonn and Ottawa, it seems that federal states especially feel a necessity to found new government seats. The idea was launched in the mid-1980s, and construction work started in 1995. The first civil servants moved in on 1 June 1999 and three days later the capital was ceremonially inaugurated. Like the other new capitals in the world Putrajaya must be a visionary leap into the modern world. The guiding concepts are intelligent city and eco-friendly city. The administrative capital is supposed to be paperless, because the whole administration will be carried out electronically. The people will allegedly be able to renew licences and to pay taxes from their PC at home, in the office or in Internet cafes. There are so-called intelligent buildings and intelligent transportation. The city is ecofriendly with a 400 ha artificial lake and a garden city concept (like Brasilia and Canberra); 38 per cent of the land is earmarked as green area. A 4.2km boulevard, ending at the government precinct, will be the venue for national celebrations. The whole project has been designed and constructed by Malaysian companies. The Prime Minister's office has a green dome and reminds spectators of a mosque, implying that Mahathir is not the premier, but a sultan (hereditary and with supernatural powers?). The residential areas will eventually contain, it is planned, 52,000 housing units, accommodating 330,000 people (Tan 1998:26, 28).

The new town awes visitors. It is impossible not to look up to the Prime Minister's office, which seems extra gigantic because it is situated on a hill (Figure 6.5). One of the two main departmental complexes is built in red brick with an internal courtyard, mimicking the style of an Ivy League university or, for example, Queen's College in Belfast (Figure 6.6). It is ironic that this Western university architecture is based on Gothic architecture, but the Christian connection has perhaps escaped the Malaysian architects. Food stalls, which would damage the modern image, are prohibited. Distances are too great to be covered on foot. The air-conditioned mosque has ample parking space in front. It is curious that the Putrajaya architecture is as Orientalistic as the Moorish style of a century earlier. Despite the massive investment, in 2001, when I visited Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya did not occupy an important place in the citizens' lives: no public transport went there, taxi drivers did not know their way around,

Figure 6.5 The Prime Minister's office
at Putrajaya.

Figure 6.6 A building planned for
several ministries at Putrajaya.

and despite the claim that the first civil servants moved in in June 1999, few persons were
seen there. The absence of a House of Parliament is conspicuous.

Cyberjaya is another new town and a centre of IT business. It will swing Malaysia into the Information Age. The backbone of Cyberjaya consists of 2.5 to 10 gigabyte digital fibre optic cables (Tan 1998:28). In conjunction with Kuala Lumpur City Centre (with the Petronas Twin Towers as a land-mark), Putrajaya and KL International Airport, Cyberjaya forms the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a 15 by 15km area of high-tech development. MSC will be the Asian Silicon Valley built from scratch. In the words of Prime Minister Mahathir, the MSC 'is Malaysia's gift to the world'. An express railway link, which is still under construction, will be the physical complement of the MSC. Cyberjaya contains commercial, residential and recreational precincts. The residential areas contain smart homes and smart schools. Cyberjaya will be the site of a new Multimedia University, which will educate the future staff for Putrajaya's offices. Incentives to attract investors are, for instance, tax holidays, R&D grants, the unrestricted employment of foreign knowledge workers, the possibility to purchase the land, the issue of a full set of cyber laws, and the establishment of the first court for cyber crime. Companies that wish to invest must, however, meet three criteria: they must provide or heavily use multi-media products; they must employ a substantial number of knowledge workers; and they must transfer technology and knowledge to Malaysia.

The first phase is the development of the 2,900 ha flagship zone, started in 1997 and 'opened' on 8 July 1999. Like Putrajaya, Cyberjaya must preserve its lush green environment and population density must remain below 35 persons per hectare. It aims to become a near-zero emission city. The maximum height of all premises is restricted to eight storeys (Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi 2002:362–4; Hiebert 1997; Tan 1998:23–8).[19] The name Cyberjaya is revealing because it combines the American buzzword 'cyber' with the Malaysian word 'jaya', for 'glorious' or 'victorious'.[20]

These descriptions of three mega-projects have been based on websites and coffee table company publications (and my own observations). Independent observers are more critical than the promotional websites and books. Syed Husin Ali, leader of the opposition party Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), states that the Putrajaya master plan has not been approved by the parliament, as required by the Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 (Article 172) and the Constitution (Article 92). In 1995 parliament transferred the development of Putrajaya to a special authority, Perbadanan Putrajaya, which is virtually omnipotent. The minister in charge of Perbadanan Putrajaya is in effect the Prime Minister, Mahathir himself. With such a concentration of power in the hands of Mahathir, transparency and accountability become questionable.[21]

Perhaps even worse was that Mahathir continued the construction of his mega-projects, despite the Asian Financial Crisis, which hit Malaysia in 1997, and the urgent need to direct the dollars available to top priorities. His new residence is said to have cost over US$50 million, but this figure is disputed. Reporters were initially kept at a distance so that nobody could assess its size and luxury (but in January 2001 I visited it on a guided tour). Another reproach is that the Prime Minister's residence and office and the nearby mosque were the first, and so far almost only, feature to be realized in Putrajaya. Mahathir seems determined to erect Putrajaya mainly as a monument to himself. To Mahathir's critics this is a sign he has lost touch with reality; the Prime Minister himself states that he is not wasting money: 'a billionaire spending $1 billion is not being extravagant if he has the money' (Landler 1999; Ranawana 1999). This restricted execution of the Putrajaya plan might well be a blessing in disguise, for otherwise even

more funds would have been necessary. The office space in the Petronas Twin Towers has remained half empty and Kuala Lumpur has the lowest annual rent per square metre of office space in Pacific Asia (Morshidi 2000:2223; Ranawana 1999).[22] There is also praise. The fact that Cyberjaya is already underway, albeit very slowly, is an achievement. The promising start is attributed to Mahathir's success in attracting the interest of Microsoft's Bill Gates and other captains of the information industry. Moreover he has promised providers not to censure them as Singapore does (Hiebert 1997; Rovira 1997).[23]

The development of the Multimedia Super Corridor is a deviation from McGee's concept of the Extended Metropolitan Region, because there is no link with the local, rural economy and because this corridor has been developed in sparsely inhabited former rubber and oil palm plantations (Mohanlall 1998:44; Wolff 1989:163). Moreover, despite the green image of the new towns, rural people are clearly not welcome in Putrajaya and Cyberjaya.

Directions and directors of urban change

In this article I have compared the urban development of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Both cities faced the fourfold problem of how to make the city a place that is counted among the great cities of the world, how to make the city a symbol of national identity, how to connect the economy to the global network society, and how to expand the city in a way it can absorb the growing population and give room to new economic activities.

As far as the solution to the last two problems is concerned, the growth of Singapore has been hampered by a limited land area. After the possibility of land reclamation was more or less exhausted, the Singaporean government invented the original idea of the SIJORI Growth Triangle. The restricted territory of Singapore proper has been a blessing in disguise: the limited territory to amass industrial production capacity has forced the city administration to develop a high-class service sector: global flows of information, capital and people go through Singapore. The 'intelligent island', the port with the highest piles of containers in the world with almost all to be transhipped, the industrial production spread over SIJORI, Changi International Airport as the Southeast Asian hub, and the pre-eminent role in futures in the financial world all show that Singapore is an important, prosperous node in the network society. The villagers on Batam and Bintan, evicted from their land, are among the people who are disconnected to the network society.

During the restructuring from a predominantly agricultural to a partly industrial society in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Kuala Lumpur followed the conventional path of extended metropolitan growth in the Klang Valley (McGee 1991:7). Malaysia is now in the midst of a second transition from industry to high-tech services and Kuala Lumpur is trying to become a major player in the global network through the development of the Multimedia Super Corridor. KL International Airport must rival Changi International Airport. Mahathir dreams of Cyberjaya as the new technopole, a Silicon Valley in the tropics. The Petronas Twin Towers must give KL the appealing image to attract an international elite. International top architects give Kuala Lumpur shape. Unfortunately, Kuala Lumpur's initiatives trail 10 to 20 years behind Singapore and it is doubtful

whether it can rival Singapore in the foreseeable future. It must be admitted that by 1998, few major foreign service providers had settled in the city (Morshidi 2000:2235).

The tension between the first two problems that the states are con-fronted with—how to make the capital a city of global style and how to express alleged idiosyncratic national features—is most clearly felt in Kuala Lumpur. The tension arises because, on the one hand, being the younger brother of the two cities, Kuala Lumpur has most aspirations to be taken seriously, and, on the other hand, perhaps, Malaysia struggles more with a national identity than Singapore does. Singapore has many modern, high towers, but Kuala Lumpur has the highest one.[24] The Petronas Twin Towers combine the modern ideal of the skyscraper with a postmodern fascination for surfaces and an eclectic blending of Western, Malaysian and Muslim styles. No Singaporean office, not even Suntec City, remains etched on the memory like the Petronas Twin Towers, the Tabang Hajji Building, the Prime Minister's office in Putrajaya, or, for that matter, the Moorish buildings of the late nineteenth century in Kuala Lumpur. A collective work on Singapore architecture is filled with nice houses, but the absence of spectacular buildings that act as a 'distinctive landmark' is conspicuous (Kostof 1991:279; Powell 2000a).

Both governments are ambivalent about Western modernization and Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir favour a discourse on peculiar 'Asian values'. In Kuala Lumpur, the discourse on Asian values is visualized in the Malaysian architectural elements that are added to the Western-looking buildings. In this context, Malaysian must be understood as Muslim, thus excluding the Chinese and Indian minorities of the country. The attempt to 'Malaysianize' the buildings has only been partially successful. The Petronas Twin Towers and office blocks in Putrajaya betray (neo-)Gothic, hence Christian, traditions in global architecture. The architecture of Putrajaya is Orientalist and refers to the Moorish style developed by British architects around 1900. The Muslim elements of the Petronas Twin Towers were contrived by a non-Muslim, the American Pelli, and probably are often not recognized as Muslim anyway.[25] Even the National Monument is a referential symbol, which borrows its power from its similarity with the War Memorial in Washington.

The need to express the national identity in architecture is felt less in Singapore. With the notable exception of some elements of the design of Suntec City, few buildings betray the Chinese character of the city.[26] There are, I believe, two reasons why the tension between global style and national identity is not as strong in Singapore as it is in Kuala Lumpur. First, perhaps, Singaporeans think that if you have a top-class economy, you do not have to make a fuss about your identity. For instance, Changi Airport looks as efficient as KL International Airport looks grandiose; the corollary that Changi looks dull does not count. Second, certainly, sandwiched between two giant neighbours with a latent anti-Chinese attitude, the state is not too keen to stress its ethnic roots. The urban sprawl into Johor and Riau therefore is deliberately low profile and the Singapore hegemony must be hidden.

Who has been steering the development of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur in different directions? More evidence has appeared that supports the initial assumption, that the most important directors of urban change have been the national governments. In the city-state of Singapore the urban and national governments coincide. Four-fifths of the land is in the hands of the state. Two state institutions, the Committee to Promote Enterprises Overseas and the Economic Development Board have directed private companies to

expand into Riau and thus give shape to the concept of the Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle. In the case of Kuala Lumpur the national government has taken a special interest in the national capital, as a signboard to the outside world and a spearhead in the modernization of the domestic society. Many national investments were directed to Kuala Lumpur to make the capital an exemplary city. The role of the state is more visible in Kuala Lumpur, where the state is more a direct investor than the government in Singapore.

To a considerable extent, the 'national government' can be specified as the prime minister in both countries. In Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew dictated all policies and laid out major guidelines for urban development. But he seems to leave the details to professional planners. The powerful Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Housing and Development Board are responsible to the Ministry of National Development and not to the Prime Minister.[27] Therefore, the state planners seem to be very influential directors of urban change. Taking the case of Kuala Lumpur, in contrast, it is significant that the main planning institutions in Malaysia have been part of the Prime Minister's Department since 1959. The Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (Federal Territory Authority), the most important policy maker for Kuala Lumpur, is directly linked to the Office of the Prime Minister and in 1987 Mahathir made the mayor directly answerable to the Prime Minister (Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi 2002:361; Phang, Kuppusamy and Norris 1996:133–6; Robertson 1984:250–1; Smith 2001:431). Of course Mahathir uses advisers, such as the Japanese economist Kenichi Ohmae, but there seems to be little consultation in cabinet meetings (Milne and Mauzy 1999:168–9). Journalists and scholars have therefore described Mahathir as the 'architect of developed Malaysia', the 'master planner' and 'a builder'. Popular tales hold that he occupied the top floor of one of the Petronas Twin Towers in order to keep an almighty eye on the population (Bunnell 1999:4, 15; Milne and Mauzy 1999:67).

In both Malaysia and Singapore opposition against the state plans is limited. The Malaysian parliament, which should have approved the plans for Putrajaya, was bypassed in the planning process. Also, for example, the evicted landowners in Riau find themselves at the margin of political power. In Singapore, the government evokes some opposition from a group of minor directors of change: local architects. They argue that foreign architects are overvalued, so that an authentic Singaporean architecture cannot emerge. 'Conservation' of old shophouses was undertaken in such a touristy way that the distinctive character of Chinatown has been sacrificed for a 'Disneyfication' of the area (Powell 2000b: 111–14).

Private investors go along with the state plans; they give them their own twist rather than oppose the state. Lee Kuan Yew had to invite companies to invest, but Mahathir had oil dollars to realize his plans or cooperated with close business friends. Not only the different accountability of the state planning organs, but also the availability of more or less freely disposable funds, has given Mahathir the chance to develop Kuala Lumpur according to his directions. With regard to SIJORI, Lee Kuan Yew (2000:272) stated explicitly that the government could facilitate the movement of capital, but not direct entrepreneurs to invest.

A kitchen secret that is difficult to unravel is whether the prime ministers were creative cooks or rather managers who used the recipes of professional urban planners and other advisors. Did the prime ministers guide their planners, or vice versa?

Autobiographic work again suggests a difference between Singapore and Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew repeatedly acknowledges to be influenced by his advisors, such as Hon Sui Sen, a 'most capable permanent secretary', who 'shaped the culture of the EDB [Economic Development Board]', and Albert Winsemius, a 'chain-smoker', who spoke English 'with a heavy Dutch accent' (Lee Kuan Yew 2000:53, 59–60). Conversely, Lee gives himself the credit when he 'intervened' in policies, 'suggested' directions to his ministers or 'introduced' ideas (for example Lee Kuan Yew 2000:98, 100, 173). In his memoirs he refers to himself as 'I' and to himself and his collaborators as 'we'.

Mahathir, in contrast, stays silent about any input given to him by his advisors. When he speaks of 'we' in phrases like '[W]e [w]e have read the charts and studied the trends […] we decided to make the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) the engine of growth' (Mahathir 1998:9), it is unclear whether he means the Malaysian government, the Malaysian people at large or himself. One cannot escape the impression it is the plural of majesty. Mahathir has also elucidated that when he was still deputy-prime minister (1976–81), 'having a boss', he was unable to do things his way and his first thoughts when he became prime minister were that he 'was finally free to try out all of those ideas' (Mahathir 1999:23).

Despite the occasional hollowness of the rhetoric of Mahathir, Kuala Lumpur looks undeniably more like an exciting place than Singapore. Kuala Lumpur could develop its new high-quality image because of the abundance of land, which is lacking in Singapore. Kuala Lumpur is, to quote Pierre L'Enfant's ideas about Washington, 'drawn on such a scale as to leave room for that aggrandisement & embellishment which the increase of the wealth of the Nation will permit it to pursue at any period however remote' (cited in Kostof 1991:209). There is a risk, however, that Malaysia's mega-urbanization will turn out to be megalomania. Putrajaya harbours many ingredients which could make it become a modernist, sterile new capital aiming at a new citizen amalgamated with the PC. It will be interesting to watch whether informal traders, artists, squatters and developers of informal housing estates manage to corrupt the planners' ideals in Malaysia as they did in Brasília (Epstein 1973). Malaysia (like the Riau wing of the SIJORI Growth Triangle), exhibits all the elements that James Scott argues are necessary for a full-fledged planning disaster: state simplifications of society; a high-modernist ideology with an over-confident faith in one's own visionary plans, which are foremost only symbolic systems; an authoritarian state determined to realize modernist ideals; and a civil society in the deepfreeze, unable to resist (Scott 1998:1–6, 104–30; see also Robertson 1984:106–11, 128–38). Putrajaya and Cyberjaya may end up like ghost towns, half empty like the Petronas Twin Towers.

Notes

1 I am grateful to the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) and the International Institute for Asian Studies, which financed a visit to Kuala Lumpur in January 2001. Rosemary Robson was kind enough to suggest many corrections of the English.

2 The classic cases of extended metropolitan regions are found in Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila. Singapore and Kuala Lumpur are considered two subtypes (McGee 1995:14–15).

3 For details about the planning process, see Perry, Kong and Yeoh (1997:191–226).

4 Kuala Lumpur was awarded four points, less than Jakarta and Bangkok (Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith 1999).

5 Singapore recognized at an early date, in the late 1970s, the container revolution in transportation. Singapore makes extremely efficient use of the available space, and in 1991 had 28,570 TEUs/ha compared with 21,860 TEUs/ha in Rotterdam or 10,344 TEUs/ha in Klang (Peny, Kong and Yeoh 1997:174). The pride of the container terminal are the logistics, which allow Singapore to make towering piles of 7–9 containers high, compared with 3–4 containers in European ports (*NRC Handelsblad* 20 April 2000). A dent in the success became apparent when two of the leading container transport companies, Maersk and Evergreen, moved their activities to the newly opened and cheaper container terminal Tanjung Pelepas, in Malaysia just across Strait Singapore (*NRC Handehblad* 24 May 2002).

6 This new act coincided with a modernist confidence in rational, scientific urban planning for the public good (Taylor 1998:75–83).

7 The idea is not wholly new. The French electronics company, Thompson, and the American telecommunication company, AT&T, had strategically dispersed their factories and offices over the three adjacent countries before 1990 (Smith 1997:370) and in the mid-nineteenth century Riau was already providing Singapore with timber and firewood (Pastor 1927).

8 The reality that SIJORI is a mega-urban development of Singapore rather than an economic partnership is shown by the fact that the formal inclusion of West Sumatra and the Malaysian states Negri Sembilan and Pahang in 1996, and the Indonesian plans to add other Sumatran provinces and West Kalimantan as well (Smith 1997:373, 381) have remained without effect on the ground. All these other areas are not contiguous to the city-state.

9 In common parlance the directions of the compass are turned 45 degrees: the line Johor-Singapore-Riau, which runs from northwest to southeast, is said to go north-south; the southwest and northeast coast of Malaysia (and Sumatra) are called west and east coast respectively; Kelang, to the southwest of Kuala Lumpur, is said to be west.

10 In view of the concept of *desakota* regions, it is interesting that new industrial estates were deliberately planned close to rural areas, up to 180km from Johor Bahru, to provide employment for rural workers.

11 These islands are called the Barelang area: Batam, Rempang, Galang, plus the minor islands Tonton, Nipah, Setoko and Galang Baru (Grundy-Warr and Perry 1996:192–3). The bridges are of a grandiose design (Gill and Aksarakomunika 1998:120), but have failed to stimulate further economic development along the road.

12 See http://www.sunteccity.com.org/ (accessed 24 February 2003).

13 Here, a different area than that taken by McGee in Table 6.1 is counted. Bunnell, Barter and Morshidi (2002:360) also give other figures.

14 PTT was surpassed by the Taipei 101 Tower (508 m) in Taiwan in October 2003.

15 *A Beginner's Guide to Western Classical Music,* which is distributed at the box office for free, introduces the public to this innovation in the Malaysian city life. Musical terms such as allegro (pronounce: ah-LAY-grow), musical eras with leading composers, the instruments, the dress code, the appropriate time for clapping, and many other ins and outs are explained.

16 See also www.klcc.com.my/Showcase/PTT/; www.kiat.net/travel/kltower and www.kiat.net/towers (accessed June 2000).

17 See also www.kiat.net/klia/ (accessed June 2000).

18 See also www.pjholds.com.my/ and www.kiat.net/putra/; for an artist's impression, see www.kiat.net/putra/images/putajaya.jpg (all accessed June 2000).

19 See also www.cyberjaya-msc.com/ and www.mdc.com.my/ (accessed June 2000).

20 Putrajaya was named after Malaysia's first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj.

21 Syed Husin Ali, Is the Putrajaya project legal? *Free Malaysia* http://freemalaysia.com/putrajaya_illegal.htm (accessed June 2000).

22 To the annoyance of Mahathir, the Hollywood movie *Entrapment,* starring Sean Connery, shows the Petronas Twin Towers sticking out in the midst of slums, which were actually shot in Malacca, 150km away. This movie gives the, after all, not so misleading impression that the Malaysian people have to pay for the realization of its leader's dreams.

23 An interesting corollary of the development of IT in Malaysia is that there will be an estimated four million people using the Internet; they get access to non-censored critics of Mahathir (Dhume 2000).

24 It is worth noting that the jacket of the Paddison's (2001) authoritative handbook on urban studies bears a photograph of the Petronas Twin Towers. Some of the glamour of the Petronas Twin Towers has, however, evaporated after the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001. Since then skyscrapers have become symbols of fear, and the Petronas Twin Towers receive extra security.

25 It is interesting that a Singapore skyscraper, designed by Kenzo Tanghe, has a very similar geometric ground plan, without any reference to Islam (Powella 2000:23–5).

26 The Images of Singapore exhibition gives a place to the Malay and Indian roots of the city-state conspicuously. At the same time the role of diligent Chinese pioneers is emphasized, whereas the Malays are represented as anonymous rural people, almost unfit for urban life.

27 http://library.thinkquest.org/C006891/mnd.htm and http://www.mnd.gov.sg/ (accessed 12 February 2004).

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7
Makassar

Set, backstage and a diva in an Indonesian secondary city
Christoph Antweiler

Secondary cities, directors and comparative urban studies[1]

In this contribution I shall explore the role of urban directors in Makassar (Ujung Pandang), Eastern Indonesia, especially their visions and actions in relation to other change agents and factors. Makassar is a secondary city of 176km^2 with almost 1.2 million inhabitants. The leading figure in this city since the 1970s has been Mayor H.M.Patompo. The article is based on almost yearly visits spanning the period from 1989 to 2003 and a oneyear period of fieldwork in 1991–92 including personal conversations with Patompo. This is completed by the use of the very scant literature, as there are almost no anthropological or sociological studies and few detailed economical studies on Makassar (see Antweiler 2002a for an overview; Blechmann-Antweiler 2001 as a literary account; Turner 2003 for economy). In the social science research about cities we still find only a few crosscultural studies. This holds especially for secondary cities (Rondinelli 1983; Rüland 1988; Schneider and Vorlaufer 1997). In order to encourage comparative studies between Asian and European secondary cities, I will draw some cursory comparisons with a European city of a similar size which had prominent directors, i.e. Cologne (Köln) in West Germany.

Makassar (Ujung Pandang)

With almost 1.2 million inhabitants today (officially 1,148,312 in 2002; Badan Pusat Statistik 2002), Makassar (from 1972 until 1999 called *Ujung Pandang*) is a port city located in the south-western part of the equatorial island of Celebes (see Antweiler 2002a for an overview). Makassar is the capital of the province of South Celebes (*Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan*) and a centre of trade, business and education. It has been a truly multi-ethnic city with intra- and inter-ethnic rivalry for centuries but a comparatively low rate of violent communal conflicts (Antweiler 2001). Ethnically, the city is dominated by the Bugis and Makasar,[2] both having a strong profile within Indonesia with an image of adventurous, status-oriented, proud and sometimes dangerous people. The region of South Sulawesi is one of the centres of Islam in Indonesia and has a comparatively low settlement density. The province's agriculture is based mainly on rice, cocoa, fishing and shrimp farming. There is a slowly growing industrial sector and developing international as well as domestic tourism. The urban economy is based on the harbour, political

administration and facilities for higher education. As a centre of in- and out-migration and owing to its regional functions the city can be characterized as a 'peripheral metropolis'. The principal ethnic groups represented in the city, Makasar, Bugis, Mandar and Toraja, all have their roots in the province. Others came as migrants, often from other islands, such as the Minang from Sumatra or people from Flores (Walinono *et al* 1974; Antweiler 2002b).

It is only recently that the region surrounding the city has been integrated into the Indonesian nation politically. It has remained a historic and 'hot' region well known for isolationistic or secessionist tendencies. Many of the other inhabitants come from Eastern Indonesia. A lot of the former residents, especially members of the footloose Bugis, migrated permanently to other parts of Sulawesi and other islands. Most often they are deeply immersed in local economies and even integrated into local cultures. Despite having little inclination to resettle, recent communal riots in Eastern Indonesia forced some of these people to return to Makassar.

Central and yet peripheral

Historically, Makassar was a city of regional and even international economic importance, but it had a peripheral position within the colonial hierarchy (Figure 7.1; Villiers 1990; Sutherland 1992). The city grew in the 1950s owing to many migrants coming as refugees to escape the insecure life in large parts of the interior of South Celebes. This was due to a struggle for a regional rebellion against the national government. The fighters were led by Kahar Muazakkar and used terrorist measures to force the rural people to take sides. Most migrants came between 1957 and 1960; after that the city grew mainly by natural increase. Problems arose as most of the migrants were poor and barely educated while there were few jobs available. The migrants had no resources to build dwellings and the city government lacked money to build water pipes and streets and to organize the collection of refuse (McTaggart 1976a, 1976b, 1979). Inmigrants seeking to establish themselves had to face the problem of securing land for building their homes. They could either attempt to enter the market for property or side step the issue by becoming squatters. The development of land tenure in Makassar has thus led to squatters having legitimate land rights and to the emergence of a land tenure situation very different from that prevailing in most Western cities (McTaggart 1976a: 69). Individual adaptations and uncoordinated actions by certain groups prevented effective urban planning. Large areas of the city were settled that lacked adequate infrastructure and without legally clear land tenure.

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                                          Regional or systemic unit
                          NETHERLANDS / EUROPE / WORLD
                             VOC-BATAVIA / JAKARTA / SURABAYA
                                EASTERN INDONESIA
                                   SOUTH CELEBES (SULAWESI SELATAN)
   Dimension and time slice                MAKASSAR / UJUNG PANDANG

politics and economy today              P — C; primate city of the province
traditional kingdoms (kerajaan)         C — P; trade post for rajas
trade, education institution today    P ————— C; centre for Eastern Indonesia
archipelago trade till c.1600      P ————————— C; entrepôt-function
colonial structure since 1600      C ————————— P; colonial outpost
power structure today              C ————————— P; dominated by Jakarta
disparity within Indonesia today   C — P — P — P(C); city on 'Outer Island'
world system since about 1600   C — P(C) ————— P; peripheral capitalism
Dutch colonial economy          C — P(C) ————— P; few trade goods
new international labour         C — P(C) ————— P(C); urban development pole
globalization since c.1995      C — P(C) ————— C; for Eastern Indonesia (unsure)

   C = centre; P = periphery; P(C) peripheral position, but itself centre for lower levels
                    Mak = Makassar / Ujung Pandang
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Figure 7.1 Changing structural embeddedness of Makassar/Ujung Pandang within larger systems through time (highly schematic).

The few jobs in industry are the main reason for the already mentioned lack of concrete buildings and a general rural settlement structure (kampong housing) of parts of the city (Figures 7.2 and 7.3) (Forbes 1978, 1979:2; Hamid 1983).

Today its role as the principal regional city for the island is uncontested and the harbour is still important for Eastern Indonesia. The city's larger role within Indonesia is open to debate. The future will depend on policies of development (*pembangunan*: 'awakening', 'building up') and is not yet defined. The harbour opens to the west and is situated to the eastern coast of Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of Borneo. There are age-old links between Makassar and East Kalimantan (today the province of Kalimantan Timor, Kaltim). Since the 1980s East Kalimantan has been the main destination of people migrating out from Sulawesi in search of work. Together with the ports of Tanjung Priok (near Jakarta) and Tanjung Perak (Surabaya, Java), Makassar today is a main node of the inter-insular passenger network (operated by PELNI), which was reorganized in the 1980s. Makassar Harbour is the door to the eastern part of the archipelago and Australia. Since the 1970s the province of Irian Jaya, for example, has received almost all consumer goods, canned food and beer via Makassar or Surabaya. But this central position in trade is severely contested nowadays. Direct lines from Jakarta to Ambon, Irian Jaya, Kendari, Palu and Manado were established, thus diminishing the port's importance. The competitive relationship of Makassar with its rival Surabaya

Figure 7.2 Modernist planning against
people muddling through: squatters
being evicted without protest.

Figure 7.3 Roadside buildings in a
semi-planned developing area.

(Dick 2002), as well as the subdominant position in relation to 'the centre', that is,
Jakarta, are a cultural theme of this city, especially among local politicians.

Makassar has established itself as the principal regional city for the province of South
Celebes. Its inhabitants today form only 9 per cent of the province but amount to about

65 per cent of the province's urban population. Makassar houses the centres of the army and navy commands. Furthermore, it functions as the bureaucratic, economic and educational centre of the neighbouring province of Southeast Celebes. For Eastern Indonesia, apart from being the node of traffic, Makassar is most important in providing possibilities for higher education. There are many students from Timor and the Moluccas studying at secondary schools and the many small universities. The main university (Universitas Hasanuddin, UNHAS), founded in 1956, was the first university outside Java to offer graduate studies (since 1986) and now has more than 10,000 students. In terms of regional development in Indonesia, Makassar, together with Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan and Ambon are considered the centre of a 'special development region'. Potential functions of the city in the future might include the leading position in Eastern Indonesia (versus the dominating city of Surabaya) and the potential to become a tourist centre for the whole of Celebes (competing with Tana Toraja in the north of South Celebes and with the city of Manado in North Celebes). Regional rivalries as well as ethnic and religious issues are involved in this competition.

Modernist city Makassar style

In effect, the planning of the city has followed Western conceptions and an American-style master plan since mayor Patompo's term of office in the 1970s (Institut Teknologi Bandung 1973). The interior parts already had a gridiron pattern seldom found in Java and elsewhere in Indonesia (Nas *et al.* 1981), as a heritage from late colonial times (Figure 7.4). During the late 1970s streets were widened and one street was proudly declared a 'shopping area'. Central parts of the city were rebuilt and a Chinese cemetery was relocated to make room for administrative buildings and a new central market. The eastward expansion of the city was planned and the area was enlarged by legislation in 1971. The realization of these modernistic plans, however, is far from complete. There are parts of the modern city without proper housing and lacking infrastructure. Moreover, there are tracts of illegally used space and land parcels with unsolved tenure status.

After a period of tremendous growth until the 1970s, the late 1990s again brought substantial changes, a general modernization and even some postmodern signs, despite the still somewhat provincial character of the city. There are now many supermarkets whereas ten years ago there were only two. The shopping centre at Pasar Baru was demolished and a

Figure 7.4 Makassar: grid-like street
pattern of central parts of the city.

new four-storey centre was built. In 1999 even a shopping mall similar to those in Jakarta
opened its doors. There are several new luxury hotels, partially financed with money
from Jakarta and Singapore. They are seldom used by tourists but mainly by higher
government officials during visits to the city and they may be used for land speculation.
The central post office has been modernized recently and throughout the city there are
computerized telephone booths *(warung telpon, wartel).*

Not only in the central business district, but also throughout the city, there is an increasing number of Chinese-style multistorey shophouses *(rumah toko, ruko)* combining dwelling and business functions. Many houses facing the seaside had to make way for the harbour, which was modernized and extended. A new toll road to this harbour has been finished recently. On the road to Hasanuddin Airport near the town of Maros, north of the city, new office buildings and industrial estates abound. Large areas of the city's outskirts now are scattered with planned residential settlements including shops and supermarkets. They are for the upwardly mobile, mostly the Chinese and the Bugis. They include elements of Western urbanism (guards, *cul-de-sac* streets and Spanish-style bungalows), but local adaptations as well (Indonesian-style guest and bath rooms). The names of these settlements convey modernistic and romantic ideas (e.g. Panakkukang Emas, Golden Panakkukang). A huge area in the southern part of town facing the sea, Tanjung Bunga, was planned for business and recreation in an ultra-modernistic outline. It is still mainly a rural area but being built up slowly. The major urban administrative functions were moved from the former colonial ward near Fort Amsterdam to various arteries in the outskirts of the city.

Membikin revolusi: listening to Patompo's personal project

During my one-year of fieldwork in Rappocini, on the outskirts of Makassar, people very often mentioned the name of H.M.Daeng Patompo (*Daeng is* an important traditional honorary title). During his time as mayor of Makassar, then called Ujung Pandang, from 1960 until 1978, Patompo established urban planning Western style, supported by the World Bank. In December 1991, some months before he passed away, I was able to interview this visionary politician. The following citations, which convey his modernist approach even in the wording in Bahasa Indonesia, are taken from these exchanges. He was very proud of his policies. He considered himself a fighter and frankly said 'I have made the city planning (in Makassar)' and 'I made a revolution'. The last statement mirrors the title of one of his pamphlets (Patompo 1976). He portrayed his urban philosophy as follows: to make the city secure and the people happy and prosperous. His vision was to make Ujung Pandang an explicitly modern city by using rational city planning approaches. In his words 'Ujung Pandang should become more modern in its standard of living and also more conscious'. 0

Education and consciousness are prominent in Patompo's credo. In the interview he typically numbered his visions: 'l. to fight at the very front; 2. to counter melancholy; and 3. to fight against foolishness'. Modern education is a theme that figures prominently in the region's social history. Among local decision makers it is often mentioned. With the word 'consciousness' *(kesadaran)* Patompo relates to a bureaucratic formula, which is, as a part of a pan-Indonesian urban culture, important for clerks, teachers and business people, regardless of ethnic or regional background. 'To know already', 'to be already educated' and being conscious, is a cornerstone of what has been termed as 'lndonesian Metropolitan Superculture' by Hildred Geertz (1967:35). Patompo's visions regarding the modernization at the mental state are similar to Jakarta's former Governor Ali Sadikin's sayings about the inhabitants of Jakarta, especially the migrants with a rural background. In Sadikin's (1992:514) autobiography about his work under Soeharto the diagnosis was that they are lacking 'urban rationality' and 'consciousness' (of the law).

As Patompo emphasized, he wanted to give 'his people' enough of all basics of life. Again he numbered them in a typical directors' way: '1. enough houses; 2. enough work; 3. enough education; 4. enough diversions; 5. enough transport connections; 6. enough water; and 7. enough electricity'. Therefore he installed 'basic operations'. First, the city's area was extended to incorporate large parts of the surrounding region. Second, Patompo coined the concept of the 'City of five dimensions', the culture city, the industry city, the trade city, the tourism city and the education city. He said that the most important aspect was to 'mobilize' the people. Patompo was very clever to attract development assistance from several countries, for electricity (England), water (France), large drainage canals (Canada), and the construction of a library (Germany).

In Patompo's view these measures were very successful. In 1974 Ujung Pandang was acclaimed as the 'cleanliest city' in Indonesia by the national press. The city won the title 'Star of Development'. Patompo joined the World City Association, established intense personal contacts with mayors in the US and 'I based my orientation on their model of success' (Turner 2003), as he framed it. He established city partnerships with Amsterdam and a town in Pahang, Malaysia. In addition, Patompo legalized the first master plan in 1977 and installed specific site planning for the large area of Panakkukang, already mentioned above. Characteristic components of this planning were a peripheral ring road and a freeway to the airport.

This was really ambitious for that time, but Patompo was also very conscious of the constraints, which have not been, as he said, overcome until today. The people do not know anything about urban planning.' Moreover, the political bodies lack authority. He complained that people erected buildings without having papers, thus preventing any planning in an ordered way. The minimum distance between houses and the street would often not be observed, thus causing severe problems in road construction. Again and again he complained about the general problem of ordinary citizens 'lacking knowledge and experience'. Pertaining to the current situation, rehabilitation of the city would not be enough. What would be needed was a 'brilliant idea'. Similar ideas are widespread in Indonesian political culture regarding urban planning and architecture (see Kusno 2000).

Local people have their own views of these politics and the underlying visions. Patompo's urban politics are esteemed generally by many, but criticized if it comes to concrete issues and local experience. One locally important person remarked 'that the master plan does not reflect the local people's situation'. If the people erected shophouses in an area (where that was forbidden), the government should not intervene (Har, personal comment, December 1991). People working in the informal sector are especially marginalized by this planning. Most streets are still open to pedicab drivers *(tukang becak),* but there are more and more restrictions. 'Wild markets' *(pasar liar)* on the pavements are temporarily tolerated but often bulldozed without advance notice. Already by the 1970s the aims of modernist planning conflicted with the informal sector enterprises:

> Under the guidance of an active urban government the emphasis of policy-making is upon modernity; roads are being widened; markets built and upgraded; expansion is planned (…) Not unexpectedly, the informal sector has almost no role in such a grand design.
>
> Forbes (1979:6)

Small-scale enterprises are still marginalized today (Parnwell and Turner 1998; Turner 2000a, 2000b, 2003). Informal sector activities are squeezed out by road construction and building or upgrading of houses. Small-scale enterprises cannot pay the increased rents and are forced to move to the outskirts. Because of poor streets and long distances they face problems gaining necessary resources and also reaching their clients. As there are fewer schools on Makassar's fringe, *tukang becak* have few 'subscriptions' *(langganan)* to bring pupils to their schools, usually one of their main sources of income.

There is a local way of framing the economic cycle of an urban area. If an area is already modern, it is an 'already opened' area, which implies road connection and conveys a positive evaluation. But when modernization gains momentum, land and rents go up, and the area thus becomes more and more 'closed'. A similar process can be seen in Makassar's central market (Pasar Sentral). Upscale businessmen constantly want to rehabilitate this market, whereas small enterprises want to retain their affordable places there. Interests in modernization are sometimes implemented via fire 'accidents' and many local people only comment that this is already usual practice, backed by capitalist urban policies.

Directors or divas?

In Makassar, Patompo was personally very prominent and quite visible in print media and TV. He actively determined his appearance and public image. Patompo had a firm grip on local print media in Makassar. During the 1970s and 1980s TV was far less important than *Pedoman Rakyat* and other local newspapers. Patompo presented his urban mission on many formal occasions and was a remarkable speaker using powerful words. The above-mentioned conversation I had with him was totally directed by him. He disregarded most of my questions but instead taught me like a teacher. After some time he frankly said '20 minutes left!'…only to invite me for another appointment. No way!

In Cologne, in Germany, Franz-Josef Antwerpes officially was the 'Leiter der Bezirksregierung', a body with a staff of 1,400 people, until 2002. The leading local newspaper, *Kölner Stadtanzeiger,* considers him the politician, who—of all politicians in North Rhine Westfalia—is most eager to be in the media ('Antwerpes ist der mediengeilste Politiker NordrheinWestfalens'). He himself frankly said 'I love power'. He was and is a populist politician but also considered himself as frequently being between all positions and parties ('Zwischen allen Stühlen'; Antwerpes 1999). Asking local people what the administrative body headed by him actually does, would reveal statements about him: 'He does traffic alcohol controls personally' or 'He is in favour of the burning of waste' or 'Antwerpes cycles all the bicycle lines to control personally whether they are planned in a suitable manner'. He portrayed himself as an advocate of the ordinary people, uses local and regional media consciously and has a firm grip on the leading local tabloid *Express*.

Both Patompo and Antwerpes were political actors, who personalized urban politics. They were strong urban directors, but also divas with a strong self-orientation and charisma, yet at the same time vulnerable personalities. Despite their power, charisma and strong determination they both had to act within social and political fields. Figure 7.5

tries to sum up some of the important change factors and change agents in Makassar compared with Cologne.

Director's visions versus other urban images

Mentioning the city's name 'Makassar' always implies images, by insiders as well as by outsiders. Symbols, experiential perceptions, visions, and also wishful thinking are involved. Makassar always has conveyed an image of a city of historic importance and regional as well as international relevance. Furthermore, the city is known as being the centre of the Makasar and the Bugis as prominent ethnic groups in Indonesia. The image of Makassar among people from outside Indonesia is formed by its significant role in the history of the whole archipelago. The strategic position in the regional

Different		
	Makassar	Cologne
• Urban director's approach and policy style in formative phases	H.M. PATOMPO: – international-regional city policies – modernist American-style planning – populist 'fighter'	Konrad ADENAUER: – local-regional urban policy – international politics Franz-Josef ANTWERPES – populist local politics
• Labour market	services, largely informal	industry, mostly formal and new informalism
• Public money	almost total lack	weak tax base
• Legal and political control	weak → individual decisions and networks important	strong, but see next item
• Corruption, nepotism	thorough, all levels	low level (emically positively seen) 'Klüngel' plus on big corruption on top level (esp. contractors, party politics)
• Immigration motives	– today: search for education – earlier: rural insecurity	– today: search for work, asylum – earlier: labour acquisition policies
• Ethnic makeup	2 dominant (Makasar, Bugis) plus >20 others	1 dominant (German) plus 1 subdominant (Turkish) plus others
• Ethnic politics	some (Makasar, Bugis, Javanese)	almost none (affirmative action)
• Ethnic dwelling segregation	generally declining	generally declining, but new immigrants more segregated
• Ethnic segregated labour market	yes, especially in informal sector work (e.g. Makassar *becak* drivers)	only partially (e.g. Turks, Ford Motor)
• Colonial past	yes, but peripheral in colonial system	no (only as a Roman colony!)
• Quarter identity	only in some parts	strong ('our Veedel'), e.g. in carnival
• Effects of Second World War	Japanese power and lower level political institutions (*RT*)	severe physical damage of inner city
• Tourism	only a gateway to Tanah Toraja	a major tourist hotspot
Same / similar		

• Population size
• Network location, links
  (Makassar: archipelagic harbour, entrepôt; Cologne: river Rhine, road axis)
• Semi-peripheral position in world city network
• Religious centre
  (Makassar: Islam; Cologne: Catholicism)
• Developmentalist visions (urban planning and western city ideals, master-plans)
• Immigration
• Chance		

Figure 7.5 Change factors and change agents in secondary cities: Makassar as compared with Cologne (Köln, Germany).

trading and communication network for five hundred years has resulted in such glorious labels as 'Gateway to the Eastern Islands', 'Eastern Emporium', 'Door to the Spice

Islands', or 'Mercantile Turntable'. Naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace and novelist Joseph Conrad described late-colonial Makassar as a clean and vibrant city. Within today's Indonesia Makassar is well known as the home region of the ethnic group of the Makasar, feared as hot-headed people with a penchant for defending their honour. The Bugis are known for their wandering spirit and their economic skill as retail traders and in transportation business. Owing to their wide distribution throughout the Indonesian archipelago, many people have experience of Bugis settlers.

Among the growing number of domestic tourists Makassar is well known as the centre of a pronounced Islamic region and as the place of the grave of Diponegoro (1785–1855), a Javanese resistance fighter in the Java War (1825–30) against the Dutch, and a national hero. For migrants and visitors coming from rural areas, Makassar has the very positive connotation of being *ramai,* that is, crowded, noisy and filled with vibrant life. Guidebooks for tourists portray Makassar as a charming city with an unhurried atmosphere and a relaxed rhythm compared with Jakarta. Tourists stroll on the long esplanade along the waterfront, have a beer in one of the bars, visit colonial Fort Rotterdam or one of the four Chinese temples and might gaze at the old harbour, Paotere, with the famous Bugis schooners *(pinisi).* But many travellers experience Makassar as a typical 'modern' administrative city being somewhat boring, and most often the city is only passed through as the 'Gateway to Toraja'. The average Indonesian or foreign tourist usually arrives via Jakarta or Bali and spends a night in town just to take the bus to the area of the Toraja people (Tanah Toraja).

During the last ten years I heard some visions and images very frequently in everyday conversation and also among local administrative staff. Some were negative, some positive and together they again indicate the ambiguous position and role of this secondary city:

'Makassar is a modern developing city' *(moderen, maju), (kota baru)* indicating developmentalism

'Makassar is a bright city' *(kota BERSINAR)* with several semantic layers

'Makassar is an Islamic city' versus some other cities, e.g. some Javanese cities

'We are moral' and 'there are no prostitutes', *(tidak ada WTS)* versus Manado

'We are backward' *(kami di belakang)* versus Jakarta

'We have already lost' *(Ujung Pandang sudah kala)* versus Surabaya, Java.

Peoples 'muddling through' versus director's blueprints

Migrancy of all sorts is prevalent in Makassar. People from all regions of the province of South Sulawesi and from elsewhere move to the city. Others go to Kalimantan, Irian Jaya or Jakarta in search of work. Additionally, many people are moving constantly within the city limits searching for economic possibilities. People thus have intricate concepts and action strategies regarding migration, residential mobility and housing (Antweiler 2000:329–413; 2002b). In Makassar, interviewees differentiated for example between eight ways of earning one's livelihood, some of them linked to migration strategies. They distinguished several house types and additionally saw six ways of building a house, mainly associated with income patterns. Furthermore, they used typologies of migration and migrants, which were linked to normal male migrant patterns. Interestingly, many of

these concepts are quite different from the official concepts used in maps and planning documents and the idiom is quite different from the language used in urban upgrading programmes (Kampung Improvement Program; KIP; see Pemerintah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan 1992). I will give some examples of concepts linked to residential decision making. Whereas local people distinguish several forms of dwelling and see several strategies of building a house, there are only two or three in the official maps, labelled as 'permanent', 'semi-permanent' and 'temporary'. Regarding residential mobility, the consideration of a household's or an individual's 'living situation' emically was seen as of central importance.

Conclusion: people *and* structures make the city

Our interest in this volume is concentrated on urban leaders and their effect as 'directors' of change. This is a healthy antidote to studies explaining city change purely through structures. Individual directors with their personal will, power and charisma are an important causal agency in urban change. But we should always keep in mind that these directors are also directed. They work within an intense social environment and political culture. Furthermore, ordinary people's everyday actions and their often unintended cumulative results should not be forgotten as a decisive factor of urban change. Generally we will find that directors' actions are one among several interrelated factors determining the makeup and dynamics of cities (Figure 7.6). Some of these factors are notorious lacunae in most works of urban theory and many empirical studies. Comparative work on directors of urban change in Asian metropolises of different sizes will lead to further knowledge about the interrelation of these factors, actors and directors.

Figure 7.6 Directors and other factors of change: cities are only partially 'an act of will'.

Notes

2 When referring to the ethnic group I utilize one of several spellings used, namely 'Makasar' (with one s) in order not to confuse it with the name of the city: Makassar.

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8
Metro Manila

Designers or directors of urban development?
Otto van den Muijzenberg and Ton van Naerssen

Introduction

Looking at Metro Manila's development in a long-term perspective one is struck by the plethora of plans and papers prescribing what should be the physical as well as social development of the urban space and population. At the same time, the deviation from such, mostly lofty, ideals in actual practice is remarkable. A key to this discrepancy can be found by looking at the varying roles played by the state, both in its colonial and independent manifestations, on the one hand, and of the market and the various institutions active therein, on the other. One can think more particularly of Philippine landowners and real-estate developers as well as multinational ICT corporations and entrepreneurs.

This contribution follows a generally historical course by stressing the relatively unified state/church activity in designing and organizing the colonial fortified city of Manila. As a manifestation of power, designed to impress natives as well as foreign visitors with the importance of Spaniards, this urbanization experiment was followed by another exercise in the show of 'civilization' to the 'natives' at the beginning of the twentieth century, when 'scientific city planning and design' was introduced by the fledgling American colonial state. After independence the erstwhile 'authentic' Filipino city planning of Quezon City as the new capital lost much of its original impetus in the unfortunate aftermath of a devastating war experience for the city of Manila.

More than a decade of authoritarian state 'direction' of society in the 1970s and early 1980s yielded a 'total design-cum total direction' experiment for Metro Manila under Imelda Marcos. This last effort in promoting a hegemony of the state over the market gave way to an increasing market hegemony after 1986, which resulted in fragmentation of urban design coupled with micro-experiments in 'beautiful, wholesome and sustainable living' experiments designed for the happy few with buying power.

Spanish Intramuros: a royal city

Called a *supra-barangay* by some authors, pre-colonial Manila was a palisaded village of about 2,000 inhabitants which served as a trading post as well as sultan's residence. Its situation on the southern bank at the mouth of the Pasig River and on the eastern side of the well-protected Manila Bay made it an excellent site for the development of an emporium in the Spanish long-distance trade between Mexico and China. Unlike the

Spaniards' two initial settlements in Cebu and Panay, Manila also boasted a hinterland with rice-growing peasants, who were immediately mobilized for construction, rowing, shipbuilding and other labour services. Although trade was an important motivation for colonial settlement, the Spaniards settled also with the intention to convert the Philippine population to Christendom. In the construction of Spanish Manila, starting in 1571, Catholic friars like the Jesuit Antonio Sedeño, played an important role next to the governors, not only by erecting churches, but more generally by designing permanent structures, promoting the use of stone and brick for the buildings of Intramuros, financing private houses of Spaniards, and training Filipino and Chinese workmen (Reed 1978:44–5; Zaragoza 1990:31–2). As the name implies, Intramuros was a walled city, with a fortification designed to keep off invaders like resisting Filipinos, Chinese and Japanese expeditions, as well as Portuguese and Dutch contestants for domination of the American-Chinese trade connection commonly called the Galleon Trade.

Once the 2-km wooden palisades had been replaced by stone walls and bulwarks at the end of the sixteenth century, the '…essential form of Intramuros was not changed' until today (Reed 1978:48). Right from the start, a characteristic colonial grid pattern had been adopted for the street plan, with a *plaza* surrounded by crucial governmental and religious buildings, but *no* private residences, as decreed by Philip II in 1573 (Figure 8.1). Detailed prescriptions for all colonial settlements in Spanish overseas territories stressed that

> the Indians (are not) to enter the circuit of the settlement until the latter is complete and in condition for defense and the houses built, so that when the Indians see them they will be filled with wonder and will realize that the Spaniards are settling there permanently and not temporarily. They will consequently fear the Spaniards so much that they will not dare to offend them and will respect them and desire their friendship….
>
> Reed (1978:73)1

In the context of this paper the urban directors of the early Spanish city were such governors like Legaspi, De Vera and Dasmariñas, some high-ranking military officers and friars. Although the collaboration between

COASTAL PLAN

1 Plaza major
2 Plaza
3 Street with arcade
4 Cathedral
5 Hospital-non contagious diseases
6 Monastery or *convento*
○□ Shops

7 Hospital-contagious diseases
8 Custom house
9 Arsenal
10 *Cabildo (tribunal)*
11 Commons
12 Pasture land
◇ Hillock

13 Irrigated land
14 Cultivated land
15 Slaughter-houses
16 Tanneries
17 Fisheries
18 Parish church and *convento*
Prevailing wind

MANILA c. 1650

MANILA BAY

▲ Arsenal, warehouse
▼ Wall, bastions of Intramuros
● Gate
► Fortlet
Ⱦ Ironworks

▢ Permanent construction
▭ ▭ Semipermanent structure
Village-impermanent structure

1 Manila Cathedral
2 Royal Chapel
3 Santo Domingo Church
4 San Francisco Church
5 San Augustin Church
6 Church of the Recollects
7 Church of the Recollects

8 Santa Clara Nunnery
9 Jesuit College
10 Jesuit Seminary
11 Santo Tomás College
12 San Juan de Dios Hospital
13 Plaza Mayor
14 Plaza de Armas

Figure 8.1 Maps of Hispanic urban plan of a coastal city according to the Ordinance of 1573 (top) and of Manila c.1650 (bottom) (source: Reed 1978).

government and Church was often far from harmonious, still the combination of both top-down organized institutions looks quite monolithic insofar as urban planning and construction of the Walled City was concerned.

The opposite was the case if one looks over the ramparts to the northern bank of the Pasig, as well as to the plain bordering Intramuros on the south-eastern side. Here one found less 'organized' settlements for Filipinos as well as Chinese (the Tarian') and Japanese (Dilao) inhabitants. Not much was done to prescribe street patterns, nor was any incentive given to avoid the highly combustive light materials that made conflagrations a regular phenomenon in the history of the capital. Much earlier than in other colonial cities the Spaniards started moving beyond the fortified inner city by building summer houses, upstream along the Pasig, or along the Manila Bay in Ermita or Malate, where a daily promenade by the seaside became a standard institution for the expatriates and mestizos. Here, as well as on the northern bank of the river, the bulk of the Asian population serving the Spanish capital were housed. In fact, at night only a few non-Europeans were allowed to stay within the walls.

This officially ordained exclusion supported the officially proclaimed need to make the 'city' an awe-inspiring centre, fundamentally different from the hustle and bustle of the commercial and horticultural service settlements beyond the moats. In the course of time the Chinese and their descendants, the Chinese mestizos, became so numerous that the colonial power granted them the right to settle north of the river in Binondo under a limited form of self-government (Reed 1978:58). The Chinese were segregated in turn from the Filipino hamlets and village settlements like Tondo, Quiapo and Sapa. Here, as elsewhere in the archipelago the indigenous people of the Philippines were converted, and settled 'under the bells', i.e governed by a Spanish priest who held vast secular as well as religious powers.

Spanish Manila in the nineteenth century

Between the mid-seventeenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries the urban conglomerate of Manila grew from about 60,000 inhabitants to some 150,000. Always a 'primate city', it was very dependent on the passive Galleon Trade until early in the nineteenth century, when the Spaniards gradually were forced to open the colony up to non-Spanish and non-Asian traders. Capitalist colonial development came slowly, and was considerably stimulated by British, French, American and other (Asian, in particular Chinese) entrepreneurs and traders in such Philippine products as tobacco (long a government monopoly), Manila hemp, coffee and sugar. Spanish entrepreneurship lagged behind and so did urban development. The initial patterns outlined above lasted until deep into the nineteenth century. The population grew by immigration from an increasingly wide migration field. The inflow of labour was needed to make up for the 'urban penalty' of unsanitary conditions (Doeppers 1998), which became painfully clear in the disastrous last two decades of the nineteenth century. Only in the 1880s did such 'modern' innovations as an urban drinking water system (1882) (which had been planned since the 1730s(!); see Huetz de Lemps 2001) and horse-drawn streetcars (1883–89) (Figure 8.2), later on steam and then electric tramways, a 'modern' hotel and telephone (1889–91) make their appearance. Electrical street illumination followed from 1895 onwards (Huetz

de Lemps 2001). The port of Manila was in need of major restructuring, including dredging of the lower Pasig and its mouth, as late as the 1890s. A sewerage system was laid in 1896. Although attractive from a distance,

> the more one approaches the city, the worse the impression…one sees ruins of churches and houses, and once one is inside the city, one is unpleasantly affected by the dirty, largely unpaved streets, low and usually very dirty houses, noise of masses of natives, somewhat clad in a European style, as well as semi-nude Chinese. Beyond, the impression improves: although not better maintained, the streets are wider, one finds better houses, mostly inhabited by Spaniards and other Europeans, with nicely designed gardens, and most of all: everything is more quiet and calm.
>
> Meerkamp (unpublished [1894]: 155)[2]

Figure 8.2 Malate and Manila Bay, seen from the tower of Malate Church in 1894. Note the horse-drawn streetcar in lower right corner (photograph from Meerkamp van Embden collection, no. 48).

The revolution years of 1896–97, the siege of Manila by Filipino and American troops in 1898–99 and the subsequent period of war between the Americans and Filipinos left the city and the country in very bad shape, both in terms of infrastructure as well as health of the population, its agriculture and livestock.

The Burnham Plan

Confronted with a city in tatters, the new American colonial administration took a bold initiative. It invited Daniel H. Burnham (Figure 8.3) and his associate Pierce Anderson from Chicago to prepare a master plan for Manila (1905). An exponent of the City Beautiful Movement, Burnham had been the driving force of the remodelling of Chicago on the occasion of the World Fair. He became a member of the four-member committee that was tasked to redesign the capital city of Washington D.C. on the occasion of its centennial. In the words of a contemporary:

> It [the Washington plan] had the advantage of dealing with a city that had been scientifically laid out in the beginning and that was possessed of practically unlimited financial resources. Its report embodied a plan comprehensive, beautiful, and reasonable, having as its basis the Haussmannian plan of L'Enfant, the Parisian engineer of early days.
>
> Robinson (1906, see Hall 1998:773–4 and 784)

Figure 8.3 Daniel H.Burnham (1846–1912).

How different was the situation in Manila! By the turn of the century the damaged city numbered about 220,000 inhabitants (Census 1903) and attracted increasing numbers of migrants. Although efforts were made to increase tax collection, money was in short supply.

Burnham made his recommendations in the form of a master plan, which was characterized by:

1 Keeping Intramuros more or less in its historic form.
2 But moving the governmental functions outside the narrow confines of the old city to a broadly set-up complex of imposing classicist buildings on a contiguous park-like plain. Provisions were made for social institutions for expatriates and the Filipino elite, like clubs and hotels.
3 Filling in the moats surrounding the old city, where parks were planned.
4 Laying out wide roads, fit for automotive traffic including a boulevard leading southward along the Manila Bay.
5 Improving grid-pattern housing areas for officials and expatriates in the suburbs of Ermita, Malate, Santa Ana and San Miguel, the latter on the northern bank of the Pasig.
6 Finally, a vast lower and lower-middle class housing area in a strict grid pattern was planned to take shape bordering on the old village of Sampaloc on the northern bank, next to the commercial districts of Binondo, Quiapo and Santa Cruz. Tondo, the labouring quarters of old was more or less left as it was.

Not unlike other colonial designers, Burnham and his principals considered the Filipinos a rural people. They did not anticipate a metropolitan size for the capital. In this view the population might double in one generation to about 450,000, but that would be the maximum. Infrastructure like roads, streetcars, waterworks, sewerage, gas and electricity systems were therefore projected to sustain such a number. By 1939, however, the population had outgrown the projections already by 50 per cent to 639,000.

Even though the colonial government had taken the initiative to make a plan, its execution was largely left to the private sector. The necessary legal provisions, e.g. in connection with laying new roads through areas already inhabited, were only partially enacted. A disturbing phenomenon was also that the rapid expansion of Manila's built-up space led to enormous real-estate price increases of 600 to 1,000 per cent in the ten years between 1912 and 1922 (Magno-Ballesteros 2000:112). High real-estate prices have hindered development consistently up to the present. They are generally attributed to the weakness of a state dominated by an elite bent on protecting rental income and supported by a middle class anxious to guard their savings from inflationary dissipation (e.g. Strassman and Blunt 1994).

Thus, while Burnham and his associates can be regarded as paradigmatic urban directors propagating a broad encompassing view on how the city should develop, in practice the political and administrative instruments to convert ideas into reality were deficient. In fact, the property owners in the urban and peri-urban setting turned out to be an equally, or even more, important cluster of actors. To observe their impact, one needs to engage in detailed micro-studies, sketches of which are following.

Invisible directors: large real-estate owners

A case study in rent capitalism: hacienda Legarda in Sampaloc, Manila

The hacienda Nagtahan in the urban district of Sampaloc, Manila was named in 1907 after Benito Legarda II, who had played a part in Aguinaldo's revolutionary government, founded the pro-American Federalista Party and became the first resident commissioner of the Philippines in Washington. The land had long been in the family, his mother being a member of the famous Tuazon clan that owned large expanses of rolling land east of the city of Manila. The hacienda in the form of an inverted triangle extended roughly from Nagtahan to Santol, San Isidro, the Manila-Quezon City boundary to Piy Margal and Florentino in Rizal Park, straight down south to Legarda Street in Sampaloc District. The size of the hacienda (192 or 271 ha) became a contested issue in the 1960s, when the formerly thinly populated land had been transformed into the dense workers' and lower middle class district of Sampaloc.

The Legarda family had lived in downtown Sampaloc, near the Sampaloc Church, at or near the street that still bears their name. However, grandson Benito IV and his young bride Trinidad Fernandez decided to set up house in the Balic-Balic area in the 1920s, which was commonly known for its cemetery before. Doña Trining liked the lush garden that had been developed into a wooded area by an American official of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Mr William Lyon.[3]

Around the wooded area, immediately christened *Ang Gubat* (The Forest) by the young Mrs Legarda, there were somewhat hilly *talahib* lands with dispersed rice farms and fruit tree groves. Apart from maps (e.g. in Kolb 1978:17), old photographs like that in *Harper's Magazine* the PhilAmerican War, show how empty the land was at the start of the first quarter of the twentieth century. Along the curve near the top of the hill with the cemetery a few other well-established families built houses. By the mid-1920s the number of families had grown to a size that made the Archbishop of Manila decide to accept the proposal to transform the cemetery chapel into the core of a new parish (1930) (Gaerlan and Totañes 1997; Legarda 2001).

The Legarda couple contributed to the construction of the church that was subsequently built, and attended mass, but one can hardly speak of patron-client relations between them and the tenants on their land. Although spots of agricultural land use could still be seen, much of the land was left under *cogon* grass *(Imperata cylindrica)*, and the Legardas were not interested in agriculture. Even though they dutifully contributed to fiestas and Christmas caroling parties, the relationship with the renters remained businesslike in the hacienda. This was already divided between descendants of Benito Legarda II, the Prietos and Valdezes, as well as several branches of the Legardas. Dr Benito Jr. (V), who grew up in Ang Gubat, remembers playing with farmers' sons, and refers to the period of the Japanese occupation as one of increased community feeling among inhabitants around the Balic-Balic Church and mutual support. Neither he, nor other residents of the time, consider this as more than an intermezzo in an otherwise rather neutral relationship, however.

From the mid-1920s onward the estate was developed by real-estate developers working from the northwest to the southeast. Lots were offered for sale at a price of 1 Peso (US$0.50) per square metre. The grid pattern of the plan for the layout of the city of

Manila designed by Daniel H. Burnham was extended southward over España, to reach the hilly portion of Sampaloc around the start of the Pacific War. Lots were sold at a slow pace, however, and until the war people living on the hillside still had an unblocked view and could see cars moving up and down España.

While Manila was depopulated during the war, the immediate aftermath witnessed their return, and more than that, an immense influx of other people from the provinces who were attracted by jobs supposedly offered in the city. Many settled near the camp of the American Army near the Balic-Balic Church. An impression of the sudden transformation of much of destroyed Manila is given by A.V.H.Hartendorp:

> …relief came through the employment of over 200,000 civilian workers…of whom some 125,000 were day workers. There was also the additional employment by army personnel of cooks, washer-women, etc. The pay was small, generally P. 1.25 for common labor, which was wholly incommensurate with the cost of living, but the people accepted such jobs because there was nothing else they could do…
>
> Hartendorp (1961:649)

Possibly because of the rural image of the land, even in the early postwar period confusion could reign as to its property status. In 1954 the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources, Gregorio Araneta, declared most of the hacienda Legarda to be part of the public domain and as such alienable by the state. A few years later, this ruling was used by a thousand occupants who were threatened with eviction by one of the Legarda heirs. The protesters formed the Manila Homeowners Association in 1966 and claimed to have the first right to buy the land from the state, while explicitly accusing the Legardas of land grabbing.[4] By that time the area was fully and densely occupied with residential buildings. The hacienda owners had, in terms of urban planning, done little more than guard their property and collect rent. No designs or plans on their part to develop or improve the area were ever heard of. Nor did they do much to preserve public spaces.

Cases of large property conversion into densely populated neighbourhoods like this could be multiplied many times by referring to the Tuazons (who owned, and still own, considerable parts of Quezon City), the Aranetas *(idem)* and several others.

Although starting from a similar family-owned estate, the development of the suburb of Makati by the Ayala family was of a characteristically different nature. Here we saw active planning of the urban environment, with the goal of attracting business, providing upmarket housing for national and expatriate elites and making profit by investing in infrastructure development and land sales and leases.

Making your own city: the Ayala family and Makati's CBD

If the Legardas played a rather passive role as urban directors, the Ayalas were more proactive. Originally of Spanish and German descent, the Roxas-Zobel-Ayala clan had started their business in the Manila of the mid-nineteenth century. Like many families running import-export businesses and modest chemical (pharmaceutical) factories, they invested in land that was rented out to farmers. In this case, Don Jose de Roxas bought the hacienda San Pedro de Makati of about l,000 ha in 1851.[5] The property makes up

roughly one-third of the present city of Makati. Its urban development started in the 1920s with the construction of Manila's first airport.

Right after the Second World War the Ayala Family Corporation conceived and implemented a long-term development plan. Makati was to become a complex of modern retail trade, up-market residences and class A office space. The first high-rise buildings were constructed along the former runway of the airport, Ayala Avenue, in the 1950s (Figure 8.4).

As owners of the property, the corporation could largely decide what to build, where and when, and who to allow in as buyers or renters. It took care of the provision of basic infrastructure and implemented a strict zoning and building code (Lachica 1984:152). The project was successful in attracting wealthy residents to the gated 'villages', as well as convincing the business and financial community to move from downtown Binondo to Makati.[6] The main director of this suburban development, Joseph R. McMicking, contributed a two-page summary of his views on the successful development to the Ayala commemorative volume (Lachica 1984:163–4). Unlike authors of later real-estate 'visions', he is quite frank about the leading role of profit motivation behind the Makati project:

Figure 8.4 Ayala Avenue, Makati,
around 1970.

Land development has many parallels to an extractive industry like coal or iron, because like it, it carries the problem of depletion. Every square meter sold is raw material gone forever. However, if you plan it right, each sale can increase the value of what you have left…[If you] let

> matters take their natural course…, develop our land as cheaply as possible, and sell as overflow space for Manila…we would watch our raw material gradually vanishing; as it vanished, we would have less and worse land to sell. On the other hand, we could try to turn our area into a magnet sufficiently strong…[by] offer[ing] the purchaser so very much for his money that he wouldn't be able to resist buying.
>
> Lachica (1984:165)

Focusing on the first gated village, Forbes Park, the initial 'magnet', McMicking stresses the need for planning, and adds that the

> …rapid but well-ordered growth of Makati need not be exceptional it could very well be the rule throughout the country…A plan that makes sense gains the support of everybody: provincial and municipal officials, the people, civic organizations, its neighboring communities, and finally, the nation at large…In the final analysis, the fate of a city, whether it be well run or badly run, whether it will be a beautiful one or an ugly one, is a fate that is in the hands of its population.
>
> Lachica (1984:164)

In the 1960s and 1970s Makati was *the* Central Business District of Metro Manila, but in the 1980s competition arose, in particular on the part of the Ortigas Company that developed a new business-cum-high-life complex on its estate bordering EDSA, Metro Manila's first circumferential avenue. Being closer to the large concentration of middle-class inhabitants of Quezon City, the Ortigas area rapidly became a strong magnet for consumers, while multinational and large national firms also transferred their offices there. At present, Metro Manila boasts at least two Central Business Districts if one goes by their core institutions like banking headquarters, international-level hotels, shopping facilities and high value residential property. Unlike Makati, Ortigas has not (yet) been able to convince governmental and diplomatic institutions to transfer, however.

Within Makati, the strong company direction of urban planning and organization was able to mould the built environment to a considerable extent. Politically, however, matters were a bit more complicated as the municipality began to grow and attract not only the well-heeled residents of the 'villages' like Forbes Park, San Lorenzo, Bel Air, Urdaneta and Dasmariñas, but also thousands of poor migrants from the provinces, who were pulled by the promises of employment. The majority (some 90 per cent) of voters in the municipality (McMicking's 'neighbouring communities') lived outside the Ayala property, in settlements as dense and cramped as one can find elsewhere in the metropolis. Districts like Guadalupe, the area along the railroad track, barangays San Antonio, Palanan, Pembo and Cembo combine density, unemployment, poverty and bad public facilities [in the early 1990s Makati's urban poor population was estimated at 44 per cent of the total by Gloria (1995:85), or even at 55 per cent (Van Naerssen *et al.* 1996:184)].

Although Makati is by far the richest municipality in the Philippines, and large enough in population, it did not become a city until 1995. This was a result of a stand-off between the business community, including the Ayala Company, and the politicians,

largely voted into power by the urban poor. In Gloria's words: 'One world delivers the cash that keeps the *municipio* running; the other votes to office leaders who run the *municipio.* Each world plays an indispensable role that makes Makati the irony that it is today' (Gloria 1995:68). The reason for 'business' not to covet the city status lay in the power of a city to increase real-estate taxes, and keep a larger percentage of this income than a municipality. As the gated villages take care of their 'public services' like sanitation and security by themselves, and as the Ayala Company looks after the Makati Commercial Centre and contiguous parks, the 35,000 well-to-do 'villagers' have little incentive to contribute to the upkeep or improvement of the rest of Makati's built environment, or around 400,000 poor and lower middle class inhabitants outside the gates.

Quezon City: a misfired project in urban planning

Granted a great and increasing impact of private actors as time went by, mention should still be made of two at least token efforts at centralized state planning of the urban environment. The first started before the Pacific War, and should have led to a well-laid out government centre with commercial sections and housing as inspired by cities like Washington, D.C. The United States had granted a limited degree of autonomy to the Philippines under the so-called Commonwealth arrangement in 1936, promising full independence ten years later. The first elected president was Manuel L.Quezon, who was able to institute a rather autocratic form of rule. Quezon characteristically decided immediately to develop a new capital, which—equally characteristically—should carry his name. Although the new city was already chartered in 1939, most of the plans remained a drawing board exercise, however, because of the Pacific War. Instead of constructing houses for urbanites working in government service and implementing a programme to construct new government buildings in the open fields of Quezon City, the returning Filipino officials and their American advisers opted for reconstructing the devastated city of Manila, with priority for the Ermita/Luneta area. As a consequence, many ministries and the Congressional Building remained 'downtown' for decades. In the meantime rapid increases in metropolitan population resulted in massive settlements by undocumented settlers on lands owned by the government and designated according to the plan for public use in a park-like design for Quezon City. Throughout the first quarter of a century of independence, notwithstanding lofty ideas, no effective planning system for the city, let alone the whole metropolitan area, came into being, nor were the separate cities like Quezon City and municipalities able to do much more than follow trends largely dictated by private actors (Rüland 1982; Van Naerssen *et al.* 1996:171).

Towards the City of Man: Imelda Marcos as an urban director using state power

The second effort to use state power to organize the urban whole and implement plans in a well-orchestrated manner partially filled in some of the Quezon City vacant lots with

parks, hospitals, gardens and official and para-statal buildings. This was done under the Martial Law regime (1972–81/6).

A quarter of a century of democracy abruptly finished in September 1972, when Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed Martial Law. Variously touted as a measure to combat insurgency, to undermine oligarchic elite families, to strengthen the state fabric and so on, the early Martial Law years witnessed a rapid succession of centralizing measures implemented with force. Some technocrats saw it as an occasion to organize the metropolitan system finally into a functioning whole and supported a move to make the First Lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Minister of Human Settlements and concurrently Governor of Metropolitan Manila (November 1975). The creation of the new unit was supposed to end the competition between four cities and 13 municipalities, and give way to scientifically made decisions. World Bank funding came in to support matters, while funds and personnel were also withdrawn from various ministries, and from local units. The Metropolitan Manila area would be the showcase of implementation of Marcos' 'revolutionary' 'New Society' (Marcos 1971).

On the verge of the demise of the Marcos dictatorship Imelda issued a coffee table book commemorating a decade of governorship: *Metropolitan Manila: Towards the City of Man* (Imelda Marcos 1985). It diagnosed the early independence period as one where the trappings of modernity were obtained, but no integration into Filipino identity achieved. In the *Decadence of the '60s* the talent of the Filipino was wasted. No comprehensive vision had been developed to create 'viable Filipino settlements'. The answer to the ideological indirection, the physical problems of flooding, slum and squatter settlements, urban sprawl, unemployment, traffic problems and political anarchy, Imelda said, in another chapter, was to be found in *The Birth of the City of Man*. In her words: 'development…is aimed at the wholeness of the nation, the wholeness of the individual' (Imelda Marcos 1985:35). Accompanied by maps and charts, the book described how man was now to be organically integrated into the city, while maintaining his cultural Filipino, i.e. basically Malayan, and humane nature. The 'vision' was supported by seven pillars with lofty names.[7] Turning to more concrete matters, a structure plan was announced. In this article we cannot discuss the details, but stress the ambition to stimulate further growth of the region, which would entail expansion in all directions (including the Manila Bay, where reclamation would add precious real estate to be used for a financial centre). At the same time the large inland lake Laguna de Bay would be cleaned, while a separate chapter on ecological balance advertised the progress made in flood control, cleaning the city and 'painting and maintenance of gutters', all expressed in linear metres. Various plans for low-cost shelter, health provision, transport innovations, and educational and cultural facilities were formulated and partially illustrated by 'accomplishments' over the past ten years.

Much of the plan had been proposed in more sober terms in earlier master plans and other documents, whereas the actual implementation of the concrete goals showed the usual serious drawbacks. Of course the document has been prepared in such a way that faulting the First Lady was difficult. Even then, the last chapter warned the reader that one should be modest in assessing implementation, because such lofty ideals could be accomplished only in the very long run. Insofar as implementation took place, impressive large buildings like the Philippine Heart Centre, the Children's Hospital, the Film Centre and the University of Life received precedence over low-cost housing, even though under

the Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services (BLISS) programme some walk-up apartment buildings were constructed. Urban movements, particularly in the labour district of Tondo, Manila, mobilized with success to obtain a partial redress for squatter removal programmes intended to 'beautify' the city, and make place for a container port. An outcome of this mobilization under conditions of state oppression was the construction, partly in place, of low-cost housing in the reclaimed area of Dagat-Dagatan. All in all, little initiative from below was allowed, whereas funding for such activities was mostly obtained either by adding another foreign loan to the list or by enforcing loans from social security institutions. As shown by Ton van Naerssen in various publications, many projects designed to improve housing or public institutions were implemented at the cost of the urban poor, who were removed and criminalized when they did not move quickly enough. Finally, the record shows that many of the 'projects' were designed first of all to serve the international community rather than the Filipino people of the metropolis, as well as to line the pockets of the Governor herself and her friends (Aquino 1999; Van Naerssen *et al.* 1996:175–6).

Efforts to organize the mega-urban complex

In the course of the twentieth century the urban National Capital Region has expanded geographically from 38km^2 to 636km^2, while the urban population multiplied by a factor of 50 from 200,000 to more than ten million people.

Within the metropolitan complex we see large differences in density as well as accessibility of facilities. While some portions show traces of drawing board planning, the last case where this was led by government planners was the designing of Quezon City as the new governmental centre, whereas the City Beautiful moves by Imelda Marcos remained uncoordinated and by and large unfulfilled. This was partly because of the weak taxing powers of the state (Strassmann and Blunt 1994), but also because of marked differences about implementation within the government (Dekker 1992). As shown in the case of the Ayala's Makati in the post-independence period, the private sector, i.e. at first family corporations and later corporate, including multinational, business, took over the leading role in designing and implementing plans.

Successive failures in giving a definite organization the overriding power to design the capital region, to decide about traffic organization, zoning and so on reflect the generally weak state. The rhetoric of planning, with its stress on a healthy, safe environment and wholesome working conditions remained the same. What changed was the role allocated to the city as a core institution in nation-building, which belonged to the planners' rhetoric up to Imelda Marcos' 'City of Man' (Caoili 1988; Laquian 1966; Marcos, I. 1985). Since then, in the daily practice of planning, the smaller units of subdivision, condominium, street or even compound take precedence.

We have to keep this in mind when dealing with the coordinating agencies of Metro Manila. During the Marcos period, by way of PD 824 (1975), Metropolitan Manila was created as a special developmental and administrative region. Decision making in the National Capital Region (NCR) was centralized in the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) with the Metro Manila Authority (MMA) as the implementing agency. These institutions were set up to facilitate Imelda Marcos' dream to create the 'Los Angeles of

the East'. They proved, moreover, to be financially advantageous for her and the cronies of the presidential couple.

As a response to the centralized policy of the Marcos era, after the People Power Revolution of February 1986 the decentralization of public responsibilities became one of the cornerstones of national development policies. Already in the beginning of Corazon Aquino's presidency (1986–92) the MMC was dismantled and the mayors of the cities and municipalities of the national capital region strengthened their position by way of the creation of a Metro Manila Council that they controlled. On a rotating basis, one of the mayors presides over the council and takes care of the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), the successor of the MMA.

The Metro Manila Development Authority was created in July 1994 by way of Republic Act no. 7924. It intends to plan and to coordinate basic services in the capital region more effectively and efficiently, but again 'without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units' (section 1, Republic Act no. 7924). The basic services concern transport and traffic management, health and sanitation, solid waste disposal, flood control and urban renewal. For these areas, it is the responsibility of the MMDA to prepare, implement and evaluate medium- and long-term development plans. Although the agency is particularly engaged in sector plans, it does present an overall vision on the urban development of Metro Manila in the tradition of the lofty terms and language that we have already encountered. It is revealing to compare its published statements and documents with their actual implementation, and in this way to clarify this vision.

Take for example, director's Bautista-Cruz' message 'Promoting a New Culture in Metro Manila':

> I envision Metro Manila evolving into a humane, world-class metropolis known for its liveability, and sociocultural exuberance. It shall be the center of a growth polygon, which will influence the creation of socioeconomic opportunities for areas beyond its political boundaries …As a global-oriented metropolis, Metro Manila shall evolve into a major business and transactions center in the Asia-Pacific Region.[8]

On 27 December 2000, when the Metro Manila Regional Action Agenda for Productivity (MMRAAP) was launched, the director claimed that this Agenda:

ushers a new culture—the culture of productivity. The formulation of MMRAAP has been guided by principles such as:

• Global competitiveness and people empowerment;
• Total approach to productivity 'as a way of life';
• Social partnership and responsibility.

In other words, productivity should be enhanced for being able to compete in the Asia Pacific Region while urban governance should ensure participation of different sectors of the population. Or, to quote MMDA again: 'the real challenge lies in getting the MMRAAP off the ground and attaining its main objectives of making Metro Manila truly world class, and more productive'.[9]

In practice, the MMDA is particularly engaged in large-scale infrastructure works with funding from international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). International support enables the implementation of large-scale plans that go beyond the capacities of the individual municipalities and cities that constitute the urban complex. An example is the rehabilitation of the Pasig River, which flows through a number of territorial units. It includes dredging, cleaning and upgrading along its coasts, which also concerns the relocation of many squatter settlements. Another metro-politan-wide programme is the Metro Manila Transportation Integration Project that includes the improvement of the mass transit railway system and is supported by JICA. Implementation here, although bringing some improvement in mass transport, could not prevent the construction of lines that do not directly connect, nor collaborate in terms of homogenizing fares.

The MMDA has also launched campaigns to clear the streets of the metropolis of street vendors, illegal parking, jaywalkers, tricycles and so on that ply thoroughfares and commercial establishments.[10] Four months after the start of a campaign to deal with traffic obstruction, the then chairman of MMDA, Bayani Fernando, could report the success of the closing down of about half of the estimated 18,000 illegal roadside vendors. Cited by a newspaper, Fernando said that before the campaign started street vendors, squatters and illegally parked cars had 'colonized' 90 per cent of public roads in the metropolis, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in lost opportunities yearly. The newspaper continued:

> Fernando, who goes around with armed bodyguards and himself carries a gun for his own protection, has used hard-line methods to clear up Manila streets and sidewalks, even threatening to pour kerosene on the merchandise of illegal vendors.
>
> *Sun Star* (23 October 2002)

The quotations, and particularly the language Fernando uses, are significant: there is war in the metropolis, which forces the MMDA chairman to be armed, and the potential use of kerosene is justified by the fact that the streets are 'colonized'. Notice also that he considered street vendors and squatters as objects falling in the same category as cars.

New corporate approaches to city design

The Metro Manila land reclamation

Earlier we have referred to the land reclamation project in the Bay of Manila as one of the prestigious projects that Imelda Marcos initiated to improve Metro Manila. According to the original plans, the reclamation would cover around 3,000 ha and add 2km of land to the shoreline of the Manila Bay. In 1977, the Public Estate Authority (PEA) was created to manage the project. It was set up under direct control of the Office of the President. In the same year, it was decided to construct a road to Cavite, the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, to encourage urban expansion to the south by tying into the South Superhighway. Being part of Imelda Marcos' vision of the 'City of Man', the land

reclamation belonged to the World Bank's development package on infrastructure in the national capital region. Imelda envisioned the urban development of the land reclamation as a new business and administrative centre for the metropolis, comprising 175,000 inhabitants. She baptized the future expansion 'Nueva Manila'.

The land reclamation consists of three areas: the Government Financial Centre (GFC) in the north, the Central Business Park I (CBP I) and Central Business Park II (CBP II). In 1986, at the end of the Marcos period, around 660 ha had been developed in the area of the GFC, and several prestigious buildings were constructed, such as the Cultural, Folk Arts and Convention Centres. Land reclamation, land development and construction continued in the following decades, albeit at a slow pace. PEA is still the coordinating agency but at the same time one of the property developers as well. The overall project is now called 'Bay City'. Its current state of affairs is as follows:

• In the area of the Government Financial Centre, building and construction have continued and among others the Philippine Plaza Hotel has been built.
• Central Business Park I will include (a) Aseana Business Park, a commercial and residential area of over 200 ha; (b) a large mall ('Mall of Asia', advertised as 'the largest mall in Asia') to be built and owned by the Philippine supermarket chain AM/Shoemart, and (c) 'E-City', an entertainment park project of 60 ha. The existing development is modest and concerns SM Corporate headquarters and two 18-storey condominiums called 'Bay Gardens' in Aseana Business Park.
• In Central Business Park II a shopping mall has been opened and two condominium towers of 30 floors have been built as part of a future I70ha residential area called 'Asia World City'. More pretentious are plans for a 750 ha 'Cyber Bay City'.

Many of the developments in the land reclamation areas have not left the drawing board, however. The current landscape of Bay City is rather poor and it still shows its major feature as urban spaces for speculation. Sure enough, over the period 1977 up to now, the PEA has been involved in several financial scandals.[11]

This section will, however, focus on the urban images that the PEA and other developers are selling. In this respect, it is significant to see that in the 1970s and 1980s the importance of the Government Financial Centre project was derived from its imagined function as a centre for the metropolis, and thus for the nation. The frame of reference has, however, been changed. The projects of the CBP areas of today refer to the global world. They represent post-modern life-styles and combine the dynamic network society (Cyber Bay), entertaining leisure and excitement (E-city) and rustic, environmental friendly living (Bay Gardens). The PEA advertises Bay City as follows:

> Be part of the 21st century *urbanscape* mixing business and *leisure* where *man and nature* form a seamless web redefining a *modern lifestyle* away from the *concrete jungle*. There is no stopping PEA to develop Manila Bay in a *new business capital* of Metro Manila. Already, the 1,500-hectare Manila Bay reclamation project is the locus of various *modern and state-of-the art edifices.* The master development plan shows exquisite and outstanding *leisure facilities* that could be the major selling points for the area. Once completed, the entire community would

represent the sophistication of an *urban center* that has preserved its *bucolic character* [italics by PEA].[12]

Metro Bank, the developer of Bay Gardens, advertises that its condominiums comprise commercial floors for shops, banks and travel agents; a business centre and recreational areas that include swimming pools, land-scape gardens and a jogging path. Three casinos and six theme parks are planned in E-City. In Central Business Park II, the Manila Bay Development Group wants to develop 40 ha as 'a tourist-oriented central business neighbourhood'. R-1 consortium foresees the creation of an international trading centre, Marina Properties intends to develop Asiaworld City into a mixed-use high density residential and commercial area, and Cyber Bay Corporation wants to develop 160ha of upmarket townhouse subdivisions with supporting retail, hotel, recreational (a championship golf course) facilities and office developments.

It is clear that in these representations of the global world there is no space left for the local world and the common Metro Manila city life. In these condominiums, business parks and shopping malls one does not need to bother about the noise, pollution and poverty that are so over-whelmingly present in the other parts of the metropolis. They exemplify the future development of large-scale gated communities where the ordinary citizens of Metro Manila will enter only to service elitist groups who participate in the life-styles of the rich of the global world.

Banifacio Global City and Eastwood Cyber City as manifestations of globalization

While the government was, and still is, involved in the Bay City, its involvement remained minimal in the following developments. In January 1995 the Philippine government sold 214 ha of land belonging to the military reservation called Fort Bonifacio, which is part of Makati and the contiguous municipality of Taguig.[13] The buyer was the Metro Pacific Group, a consortium of mainly overseas Chinese taipans, led by the Indonesia-based Salim Group,[14] founded by Liem Sioe Liong, through its Hong Kongbased firm First Pacific (38 per cent) and including the Philippine Gotianun family (20 per cent, more recently 16 per cent, with its own real-estate company, Filinvest, that simultaneously develops the 244 ha 'Corporate City' in Alabang, more to the south). The government participates as a rather passive shareholder through its Bases Conversion Development Authority. This deal with the government came as a surprise, because the Ayalas seemed to be the more probable developers of the area, having the Makati expertise, as well as the necessary funds. They were, however, heavily outbid by the Metro Pacific consortium (Tiglao 1995). The Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation intends to develop the area into 'a globally competitive city within the city', 'the best of modern planning and design'. FBDC's credo in the characteristically hyperbolic style of realestate developers refers to the sacredness of its task: 'land is not inherited from our forefathers, it is borrowed from our children' and so:

We shall strive for product leadership, which will require for us creativity, innovativeness, a global perspective, foresight and environmental consciousness. We shall hold sacred…a respect for the dignity of man that

springs from our faith in a loving God; and…seek to please our customers, care for our employees, nurture our shareholders' investment and contribute to nation building.[15]

Beyond the rhetoric, the consortium intends to develop upscale residences, golf and sports facilities, a central station area cum shopping centre that surpasses anything the metropolitan area has yet seen, to have the stock exchange and government centre transferred to its core area, and to develop a theme park. It has to meet the highest possible standards, so as to accommodate the needs of an international business community. In practice, large parts of the development are dependent on other enterprises, like Mega-world, another consortium, that constructs high-rise residential buildings (*Philippine Inquirer* 4 March 2002). But the development would not belong to the twenty-first century if the designers did not allocate pride of place to the IT industry, and proclaim it the future IT capital of the Philippines. The Asian crisis of 1997 has affected the implementation of plans, but although financial troubles have not been absent in the Fort Bonifacio consortium, any observer passing through can see successive buildings being constructed, infrastructure developed and the beginning of a commercial centre made.

As at least eight such self-contained high-end developments (including Cyber Bay City, Rockwell and Eastwood Cyber City) are under construction at the moment, the economic depression of the past five years has not contributed much to their success. Still, developers remain optimistic about the long-term profitability.

Interestingly, the leading consultant for the planning of Fort Bonifacio is again an American firm HOK (Hellmuth, Okata, Kassabaum). Back to Burnham after one century?

Conclusion

While the Spanish king admonished his urban directors in the colonies to make the newly erected cities into well-fortified showcases of Spanish supremacy, and the American scientific planners of the City Beautiful Movement imposed their views of 'civilization' onto the urban whole, the early post-war (re-)development of Manila showed little direction and hardly any ideas. This changed when the presidential couple Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos engaged in managing the country, and more specifically the metropolitan region of Manila. Borrowing from her husband's 'revolutionary theory', Imelda designed a 'City of Man', evoking a typically Filipino moulding of the environment of a 'total man', harmoniously related through participatory democracy with his/her neighbour as well as mankind at large. The weakening dictatorship since 1981 undermined whatever effectivity Imelda Marcos had been able to show in terms of implementing an integrated Metro Manila plan.

The early post-Marcos regime of Aquino saw a return to the fragmented organization of an enlarged urban region. In a fragmented political environment the market automatically becomes dominant. This leads to increasing class segregation of housing projects, the rise of expensive condominiums, erection of scores of international hotels, and the creation of gated communities well endowed with green, recreational and

educational facilities, and well guarded. Next to them we find urban poor settlements without institutional facilities and with hardly functioning infrastructure (water, sewerage, solid waste removal).

Insofar as present-day corporate urban directors formulate visions, they remain confined to such smaller units, and seem to be inspired by a vaguely 'global' philosophy of sustainable progress that reminds one of the City Beautiful Movement. In the words of Sir Peter Hall, this refers to 'a city designed by and for the bourgeoisie, a city for new money to live in and conspicuously consume in; it deliberately rejected any social agenda' (Hall 1998:937). Taking their particular area (Bay City, Bonifacio Global City, or even the small Eastwood City of a few hectares) to represent the whole of Manila, the new corporate urban directors suggest solving the huge urban problem in a globally acceptable, even progressive way that will put 'Manila' on the global map. Therefore one may consider much of their activity more one of designing, if not fantasizing, than of directing societal change. The few periods where comprehensive, city-wide plans catering to the needs of the majority of Metro Manila's population were translated at least partially into reality in the Philippines appear to have been those where society showed a relatively high level of 'stateness', rather than the predominance of the market.

Notes

1 Reed (1978) Appendix 1 'Prescriptions for the Foundation of Hispanic Colonial Towns'. Instead of the term Indios we use Filipinos even for the early (colonial) period of the country. The quote is from no. 137, p. 73.

2 Similar mixed assessments one finds in several other travelogues, e.g. Travel Accounts of the Islands, 1974.

3 Interview Dr Benito Legarda Jr., 20 March 1969.

4 *Weekly Nation* and *Philippines Free Press,* various issues July 1968.

5 Caoili (1988:72) quoting Rosca, gives 900 ha for the hacienda, whereas the Ayala Corporation cites l,650ha in their website.

6 'With a total land area of only 2,986 ha, Makati plays host to at least a third of the country's top 1,000 corporations, 84 per cent of all private commercial banks, nine out of the ten largest insurance firms, and 46 foreign embassies. The local government's income reached Peso 845 million in 1993…The city's enviable financial and commercial appeal is shown by its daytime population, which reaches almost a million, double that of its standard population of 452,734 (1990 Census)' (Gloria 1995:68). (The subsequent Census gives 444,867 in 2000.)

7 Filipino Identity; Nationalism and National Unity; Social Justice and Equality; Participatory Democracy; Development and Prosperity; Freedom of Belief; and Internationalism: Oneness with Mankind.

8 www.mmda.gov.ph/vision.htm.

9 http://www.mmda.gov.ph/.

10 www.mmda.gov.ph/services/traffic.htm.

11 E.g. Coronel and Tordesillas (1998). More recently, PEA reached the front pages of the Philippine newspapers when overpricing of road building in the land reclamation area was made public. In the course of events the director of PEA had to step down (see *The Nation* 1 October 2002).

12 http://www.pea.gov.ph/.

13 The two municipalities contest 74 ha of the property (Gloria 1995:88).

14 See Sato (1993) for a detailed history and analysis of the development of the Salim Group.

15 http://www.fbglobalcity.com/.

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9
Nanjing

Promoting the ICT sector
Meine Pieter van Dijk

Introduction[1]

Nanjing is the capital city of Jiangsu Province in China and numbers some 5.3 million inhabitants. It consists of six urban districts, five suburban districts and four (rural) counties. For the information and communication technology (ICT) sector the following five districts are particularly important, because ICT activities are concentrated there (Figure 9.1):

1 Xuanwu District with an ICT cluster (defined as a strong spatial clustering of ICT activities) on Zhujiang Road in the centre of the city and the location of the Jiangsu Software Park.
2 Gulou District with the Nanjing University-Gulou District nationally approved University Science and Technology Park in the western part, extending to the northwest to the river.
3 Jiangning District in the south, where the Jiangning High-Tech Industry Development Zone is located.
4 Xixia District in the northeast, with the Nanjing High-Tech Development Zone.
5 Pukou, to the northwest of Nanjing, where the High-Tech Development Zone is developed, and the so-called Nanjing Software Park is situated.

Previous research strongly focused on one inner city ICT cluster in Nanjing. It concerned the 'electronic road' in the city, where computerrelated shops and services are concentrated. In this article this cluster will be placed in the larger context of the whole city including the Gulou Science Park in the northwest, the Jiangning Technical Economic Development Zone in the south, the Nanjing High-Tech Development Zone in the Xixia District in the northeast, and the Pukou High-Tech development Zone in the northwest of Nanjing.

The focus of the research changed from studying an inner city cluster, to trying to determine whether Nanjing is an example of a city-wide ICT cluster. In the following section the methodology of the study will be dis-

Figure 9.1 Map of Nanjing
development zones.

cussed, before giving an impression of Nanjing as the capital of the Jiangsu Province and
of the five locations respectively. Analytically the question is which actors have pursued
which policies at different levels of government to promote Nanjing as an ICT city and to
what extent they have been successful. That would be the case if the five districts
together are indeed a city-wide cluster in the making and contribute to a further dynamic
development of Nanjing. They would make up a city-wide cluster if inter-linkages and
complementarities between them are gradually developed and reinforced by these
policies.[2]

The underlying assumption of this research is that the development of clusters,
networks and different forms of cooperation between enterprises and with research and
development institutions should be stimulated to bring in new ideas in the business sector
in China. Innovation and interfirm cooperation (in clusters or through subcontracting) are
key words for this kind of development, as suggested by the flexible specialization

paradigm or in studies on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and innovation (Van Dijk 1995; Van Dijk and Sandee 2002).

Flexible specialization of multi-purpose equipment can help entrepreneurs to become more innovative. Local governments can provide space for these economic activities, preferably at the same time allowing enterprises of different size to locate near each other. They can stimulate the creation of clusters of innovative entrepreneurs. Local governments can also promote the relationship between these firms and the existing universities and research institutions in Nanjing to develop the present cluster into an innovative one.

Methodology

Van Dijk (2002) suggests a classification of clusters according to geographical level, ranging from a national to a suburban cluster.[3] For the present contribution the question is whether two inner city clusters (Zhujiang Road and Gulou District) add up with three ICT clusters in suburban districts to one city-wide cluster.

Previous research concerned an inner city cluster in Nanjing. A survey of 50 enterprises was studied, of which ten were medium- to large-scale enterprises and five were located outside the Xuanwu District. The interviews allowed the determination of the relations between the enterprises in the district and buyers and suppliers outside the district. Through the same survey the relations between the enterprises in the district and research and development (R&D) institutions in or outside the district were studied. The impact of policies by different levels of government was determined.

Additional information was collected on the ICT enterprises in the other four locations. In total four visits to these districts and a small number of additional interviews with key informants were held. The policies of different levels of government to promote the ICT sector were studied in each district by talking to the different actors. An effort will be made to assess the importance of these policies for the development of a city-wide ICT cluster in Nanjing.

Nanjing the capital of Jiangsu Province

Nanjing is an important business centre in the eastern part of China (Figures 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4). Originally the borders of the city were natural borders: a river in the north and east, a small lake and a mountain in the northwest, and a smaller river in the south. The historical development of the city can be traced from any map showing the old walls. The walls defended the centre and only at the beginning of the twentieth century did the real expansion across the walls start. A relatively old industrial area is

Figure 9.2 The modern city centre.

Figure 9.3 Old and new.

Figure 9.4 New construction.

located towards the northwest and in fact the Nanjing Economic and Technical Development Zone, which is located there, still mainly regroups traditional manufacturing industries. This part of the city was less well connected until recently, but the two bridges, the tunnel under the lake and a complex of ring roads north of the lake have improved access recently.

Between the two World Wars the extension to the south started and resulted in the 1990s in the incorporation of the rural district in the south, Jiangning, which is located on the way to the airport. This district now has the most modern high-tech industry development zone, with companies like Ericsson and Siemens. More recently the city has expanded across the river, stimulated by the construction of the first and the second Changjiang (Yangtze) River Bridge in 1968 and 2001 respectively. Currently new extensions also go further in the direction of the airport located in the southeast. The southern part of the city is popular for enterprises because of the available space and infrastructure.

Nanjing is considered the centre of a so-called megalopolitan area. The construction of such a megalopolitan area around the city has been given priority by both government officials and experts since it was first planned in March 2002.[4] The megalopolitan circle around Nanjing contains Zhenjiang and Yangzhou in Jiangsu Province, and Wuhu, Ma'anshan, Chuzhou and part of Chaohu in Anhui Province as well as the southern part of Huaia'an in Jiangsu Province (*China Business Weekly* 9 September 2003). It is important for Nanjing since that city plays the role of centre of this part of the urban hierarchy and as such it is an important marketplace for more advanced products such as computers and software.

Currently there are two big software parks in Nanjing, one approved by the national government and created by the city, and one initiated by the provincial authorities and

created through a joint stock company with several Nanjing enterprises as shareholders. The first, the Nanjing Software Park, has 130 enterprises and a turnover in software of 1.2 billion RMB (Remnibi). The other, slightly older, Jiangsu (Province) Software Park has 171 enterprises and had a turnover of 2 billion RMB in 2002. Recently the Xuanwu District Authorities have set up the Zhujiang Road Software Industrial Park to attract foreign investments. It started its activities in 2003 and although initiated by the district it also operates as a joint stock company. The Southeast University with the Xuanwu District has also created its own Tech Park, approved by the national authorities in the centre of the city in 2002. It is called a University Tech Park.

Nanjing has enjoyed strong economic growth since the opening to foreign investment in the 1980s. Economic growth between 1991 and 1999 was above 13 per cent per year. According to the *China Daily* (22 February 2001; 15 February 2002) the city per capita GDP reached US$2,229 in the year 2000. This is an increase of 135 per cent of that in 1999. This growth is attributed to three factors: technological innovation, investigation of the world market and investment from overseas. The province is the home of several famous television manufacturers including Nanjing Huafei, Suzhou Philips Electronics and the Panda Electronics Group.[5]

The Nanjing municipal government gained more autonomy after 1992 and started in 1993 to formulate positive economic policies, also with respect to small and medium enterprises. The Nanjing Municipality is responsible for all districts and counties. Already in 1989 the municipality decided to start an electronics road.[6] After the green light from Beijing and the provincial authorities, municipal actors started to work out the necessary policies. In Nanjing different levels of government formulated different policies to attract investment in the ICT sector, which will be discussed below. Without four rural counties (and Jiangning) Nanjing covers 976km^2, the whole metropolitan area is 6,515km^2.[7] Table 9.1 gives an impression of the structure of the urban economy.

At the national level the decision to liberalize the economy was taken by Deng soon after the death of Chairman Mao. The suggestions were taken up quickly by the southern provinces. The 'Jiangsu Provincial Committee of Chinese Communist Party and Provincial Institutions' is responsible for urban development, including the plans for the downtown area of Nanjing in terms of politics, economy and culture. However, the city has a municipal government and this district also has its own layer of government, the district authorities. It is not easy to identify the key

Table 9.1 Importance of ICT companies in different districts of Nanjing

District	Industrial enterprises	ICT industries	Industrial production
Xuanwu	31	925 in Zhujiang Road	69,488
Baixia	32	−	134,151
Qinhuai	29	−	168,056
Jianye	18	−	23,963
Gulou	26	160 in Science Park	75,148

Xiaguan	9 −		14,434
Pukou	32	HT Development Zone	110,081
Dachang	35 −		81,977
Xixia	97	HT Development Zone	185,285
Yuhuatai	175	−	924,184
Jiangning	543	HT Industrial development zone	1,872,963
Jiangpu	103 −		247,524
Liuhe	97 −		260,821
Lishui	109 −		701,301
Gaochum	85 −		335,807

Source: Yearbook Nanjing (2000), referring to 1999 data.
Note
Production in 10,000 RMB.

people in the province and city because in China there is less attention to the names and faces of the decision makers than to their activities. Only in a city like Shanghai is the mayor well known and often moves to the national level at a later stage of his career.

The most common policy to attract industries is providing tax holidays for two or three years. Another way of attracting investments in high-tech industries is developing high-tech development zones. Besides the Nanjing High-tech Development Zone in the northwest, the city has created economic zones for this purpose in the northeast and the south of the city, each falling under a different district authority. Local governments in China are very active and have developed, for example, their own ICT policy, including the provision of space and infrastructure and the development of technology zones in the outskirts of Nanjing (Wang 2000). In principle that space is meant for factories, most of them producing hardware. There are a lot of similar ICT zones in China and the national government also tries to attract ICT enterprises to the underdeveloped western part of the country.

Xuanwu District with Zhujiang Road

In Nanjing the Xuanwu District Authorities, in which the Zhujiang Road cluster is located, played an important role in developing the cluster. For example eight business buildings were provided by the district authorities and tax incentives can be provided to attract ICT companies. Paying taxes is a hot issue among the entrepreneurs, although the amounts paid still seem to be relatively low in the ICT sector. The accounting services provided in some of Nanjing's business buildings may actually include advice on how to deal with tax issues.

More than 1,000 enterprises (925 in 1999) found a place on Zhujiang Road or along neighbouring streets. Local government reinforced this concentration process by reserving a number of buildings as 'enterprise buildings'. Five of our interviews took place in the Pacific Electronic Commercial Centre, one of the biggest enterprise buildings. They were primarily constructed for ICT companies. Common services are offered, such as accountancy, security and cleaning services. The quality of the buildings varies a lot and depends on the services offered and the attractiveness for consumers, which depends largely on the location and access (for details see He Jian 2000).

About two-thirds of the enterprises in the cluster were private enterprises, a doubling of the number compared with 1997. This is strongly related to the promotion efforts of the local government, notably of the Xuanwu District Authorities. The total value of the products sold by the firms clustered along Zhujiang Electronic Road was about 321 million US$ in 1998 and grew 40 per cent in 1999 (Nanjing Science Committee 1999). The per capita income in the city is 16,522 RMB.[8] The total gross domestic product (GDP) is 89.94 billion RMB to which the cluster of ICT companies would contribute just over 3 per cent. However, the rate of growth implies a doubling of the output every two years!

The nature of the ICT firms actually concentrated in the Zhujiang Road is very mixed. One can find the regular sellers of specific software and hardware, but also specialized firms providing hospital information systems, software for system integration (including installation and adaptation) or companies repairing monitors or other parts of a computer system. ICT consultancy firms can be found side by side with firms recycling old computers. Most enterprises sell hardware or software or a combination of the two. Usually the production of hardware takes place in the high-tech development zones. Local government may help these enterprises to gain access to bank loans and to prepare their tax forms. A restructuring exercise is at present being undertaken by local government. Companies can only move in if they are involved in software making and at least 50 per cent of their activity is actual production, rather than sales of computers or computer-related products. The Xuanwu District also established the Zhujiang Electronic Road Administrative Office, which collects data on the cluster and has developed plans for its future development.

To find out to what extent the Zhujiang cluster is more than just a market cluster, or a series of shops selling ICT products and services, we looked at the inter-firm relationships. Normal economic relations (buying and selling) between companies in the cluster are not very well developed. Other types of cooperation (exchange of ideas, carrying out projects together, and so on) seem to be quite important, however. Many ICT firms have developed relations with other companies, government or universities, but it does not seem to lead to labour division or innovative cluster, the two next levels of cluster development distinguished.

Some innovation is certainly taking place in the cluster and many companies invest a substantial part of their profit in activities leading to innovation. Firms not investing in innovation tend to be subsidiaries of larger firms. Some firms consider innovation to be the result of carrying out jobs for others. Indeed subcontracting can stimulate innovation. The overall evidence suggests that this cluster is not yet a fully developed innovative cluster, but somewhere between a market and a labour division cluster (He Jian 2000).

The cluster still has to develop into a labour division cluster, which at present is hardly the case. Only sometimes are complementary activities carried out jointly. For example, we came across a seller of hardware, who himself or with other ICT firms would then help the buyer to install the network software. Only when such labour division is achieved can it develop into an innovative cluster.

The 1,000 ICT enterprises in Zhujiang Road certainly bring computers closer to the people and other firms, at present mainly in Nanjing. The question is how much they will subsequently contribute to the dynamic further development of the larger urban and regional economy. At present this is not really the case. It will require more effort by local governments to develop an innovative milieu in Nanjing. Information and communication technology can contribute more to the competitiveness of these enterprises and their cluster, in particular if an urban enterprise network could be developed to exchange information and foster partnerships in the ICT field and to give enterprises the maximum benefit from current information technology (see Wang 2000). Buying and selling of ICT products is still very much concentrated in the city. Only some 10 to 20 per cent of the goods or services are sold outside Nanjing while only some 10 to 20 per cent are bought elsewhere. Most entrepreneurs do not hesitate to copy ideas or software to further the development of their firm.

Although successful, the enterprises at Zhujiang Road are not yet part of an innovative cluster as the authorities had hoped. An innovative milieu does not yet exist. In fact most of the enterprises are mainly selling computers and software. Inter-firm relationships have hardly developed and the role of local government is limited. We present four hypotheses, which may explain the current situation and will subsequently be put to the test.

An innovative milieu has not developed around Nanjing's cluster of ICT companies. We hypothesize that this is (1) because of the limited importance of international investors, which could have brought new capital, ideas, management techniques or markets; (2) because the private entrepreneurs cannot create their own private business organizations to exchange ideas and to negotiate with the government; (3) because the role of local government in supporting the cluster is limited; or (4) because the relationship with universities and R&D institutions is hardly developed.

The Jiangsu Software Park in Xuanwu

The Xuanwu District Authorities have promoted a concentration of software development companies near Zhujiang Road, through the Jiangsu Province Software Industry Co. Ltd. The major actor here is a newly created corporation in which many existing companies have taken shares. The Jiangsu Software Park in Xuanwu, which is owned and managed by the corporation, was established in December 2000. This software park is a software industry base approved by the Jiangsu Provincial People's Government. The park enjoys preferential policies for state- and provincial-level economic development zones. It is located along Zhujiang Road and is expected to give an impetus to the cluster of ICT enterprises there. Its total area is 120,000 square metres and the floor area is 280,000 square metres, because the building has several floors.

In line with the provincial policy of promoting development of the software industry and the requirement of setting up a first-rate software park in Jiangsu Province, the Jiangsu Province Software Industry Corporation (JSIC) has been initiated. This company was founded by five large provincial enterprises with substantial economic strength and advanced technology capability, showing that the major actors are difficult to identify as individuals. They participate as companies.

The orientation of the Jiangsu Software Park is to concentrate on software development and integrated circuit design. The enterprises in the park will be mainly engaged in R&D of such technologies and products as software platforms, safety of operating systems supporting software, application software, and in the design of medium- and large-size integrated circuits.

JSIC's main mission includes park construction, investment development, research and development, and technology innovation. JSIC will provide a favourable environment and services for advanced technical assistance for both overseas and domestic software enterprises and talents to engage in R&D innovation and industrialized operation in the park. The company is expected to become an important body in this area of business through the introduction of foreign capital as well as efficient operation and management of both computer software and hardware. It will even engage in investment and venture capital businesses and take active part in the R&D of software products in order to initiate important industrialized projects for the domestic software industry.

So far 217 companies are enrolled and more than 4,000 software engineers are now working in the Software Park (Peiling 2002). In 2001 the total revenue from software in Jiangsu Software Park reached 3 billion Yuan, or almost 20 per cent of the province's total revenue from software activities.

Gulou District with the Gulou Science Park

The Gulou District is situated in the centre of the city, but extends in the north to the river. The total area of the district amounts to 25.24 square km and has a population of half a million. It is described as flourishing because of commerce and trade and a collection of talented people, working at the 28 universities located in the district. This is about half of all the institutions of higher education in the city. There are also 58 scientific research institutes, 33 large-scale enterprises and 28 foreign commercial institutions and offices located in the district.

The district authorities have taken the initiative to develop a Science Park. It shelters the incubator, the Nanjing Technology Service Centre for Business Starting (one of the 15 incubators in the province), which has helped 68 enterprises to reach a higher level and worked on 92 enterprises in the year 2000. It is also called the Nanjing Software Park. This software park is a specialized incubator focusing on starting software businesses. It was founded by the Nanjing High-Tech Development Zone Management Committee in 1998 and China's Science and Technology Ministry granted it the Software Industry Base of the National Torch Project in September 2000 (Suning 2002). The results so far are that 40 enterprises had registered in the park in 2001, employing 3,600 employees and reaching combined sales of 16,000 million RMB. About 6,800 million RMB was software income. The activities include: basic research carried out by BIOS,

LINUX; applied research developed for the postal services, electricity, telecom, finance, educational, artificial technology, investment services, hotel management and medical iconography sectors; and software development of enterprise EPR, PDM, CIMS and OA systems as well as for e-commerce, network management and network security.

The district authorities have promoted the Gulou spirit and made great efforts to implement the strategy of 'thriving the district relying on science and education'. The Gulou District Authorities want the universities to supply ideas directly to the ICT firms in the park and zone. In cooperation with 18 partners (nine universities, some research institutes, banks and interested companies) the plans for the Science Park were elaborated. The objective is to intensify technological innovation and to transform scientific and technical research into commercial products. To stimulate this, the district authorities provide a number of incentives, such as value-added tax reduction and income tax reduction, the provision of various types of financing services and preferential charges as well as technical services, preferential registration, a space and logistics service, and agent and commission service.

The idea is to build a comprehensive base for hi-tech incubation around Nanjing University and with Guangzhou Road serving as the focal point, with a gradual expansion into neighbouring roads. This second inner city cluster is expected to produce techniques, products and talented people and to have considerable positive social impact in the district. Three characteristics are special for this initiative, namely an incubator (the pioneering centre); a corresponding industrial estate for production facilities near the river; and the creation of the Nanjing University-Gulou Institutions of Higher Learning Science and Technology Park Administration Committee, and the Nanjing University-Gulou Institutions of Higher Learning Science and Technology Park Investment Management Co. Ltd.

Details on the incubator provided in the brochure of the project state that the pioneering centre is located on Qindao Road and occupies an area of 1,500 square metres. It consists of the following five centres: the University Students Pioneering Centre; Teacher Pioneering Centre; Alumni Pioneering Centre; Overseas Students Pioneering Centre; and the Jiangsu Provincial Post-Doctoral Pioneering Centre.

The Pioneering Centre will provide two-year zero rent to the broad masses of students, teachers, alumni and other eligible candidates as the location for scientific and technological incubation and supply a series of technical and comprehensive services to various scientific research institutions and hi-tech enterprises entering the Centre.

The district has created a corresponding industrial estate for production facilities. The entrance procedure includes:

• Project discussions.
• Filling in the entrance application form and submission of the feasibility study report.
• Examination and approval by the Expert Advisory Committee for the determination of the entrance project.
• Provision of the streamlined service for industrial and commercial registration and taxation registration by the Science and Technology Park.
• Signing of the entrance agreement.
• Entrance into the estate for pioneering undertakings.

The Nanjing University-Gulou Institutions of Higher Learning Science and Technology Park Investment Management Co. Ltd. will provide the financial safeguards such as investment, fundraising and so on for the development and incubation of the scientific research projects.

So far there are already nine institutions of higher learning and more than 20 units of scientific research and hi-tech enterprises that have entered the park for creative undertakings.

Jiangning in the south, with the Technical Economic Development Zone

In the south of the city the Jiangning Economic and Technical Development Zone has been developed with a high-tech industrial development zone. This district is in fact doing better than Xixia, the district in the northeast, although it started at a later stage. This is an example of a state-or national-level development zone and it houses almost one-third of all industrial enterprises in the city (543, see Table 9.1). This district is considered to be flourishing because natural, human and technological resources abound (*China Daily* 15 February 2002).

The rural Jiangning County in which this zone was located has recently become the eleventh urban district of Nanjing. This zone has the highest number of industries and an important Joint Venture with Ericsson, the largest in the Jiangsu Province. It is one of the national 100 top companies for its economic strength. Total foreign investment in the district amounts to 1.011 billion US$.

Xixia District with the Nanjing Economic Technical Zone

The Xixia District in the northeast, where the Nanjing High-Tech Development Zone is located, seems to receive less attention and is the least important of the five discussed here in terms of number of enterprises and total turnover and added value of these enterprises. Sharp and Philips are the best-known enterprises in the zone and are operating joint ventures. Recendy Philips decided to engage in another joint venture in the field of glass for lamps in a city just outside Nanjing. Factors like the quality of the local partners, the necessary investments, the incentives provided, and the fact that a big company like Philips does not need other companies in a cluster were mentioned as arguments to locate the industry outside Nanjing. The district authorities were the major actor in developing the High-Tech Development Zone, as suggested to them by higher level government.

Pukou, the High-Tech Development Zone

The Pukou High-Tech Development Zone is located across the bridge in the northwest of the city. The place is difficult to reach during certain hours of the day, because of congestion. Enterprises that have opted for this high-tech development zone have

received substantial tax incentives. Siemens has built a factory there, but Ericsson decided to move to the Jiangning Technical Economic Zone in the south of the city.

The Pukou District Authorities face a number of problems. For a long time there was only one bridge across the river and traffic was very congested. The joint venture with Ericsson, for example, moved to the southern economic zone because of the congestion on the bridge across the river. In addition, all the universities and research institutions of Nanjing are located in the city centre and not near the Nanjing High-Tech Development Zone. The district is also competing with Xuanwu for the same type of industries.

The relations between the five districts

Four different types of relations between the five districts were found. In the first place a number of companies have units at different locations. Panda is the clearest case of an industry located in the centre and at one of the economic development zones. The same applies for Ericsson, Siemens and Philips. Second, products of these firms are sold in the centre, reinforcing the impression that the central location is particularly important as a kind of electronic supermarket. Third, and more interestingly, a number of companies are working with the universities and R&D institutions in the centre of the city. This may range from sending employees to these institutions to embarking upon R&D projects. Finally, some of the companies located in the economic development zones in the north or the south have chosen to participate in the two major ICT projects in Nanjing city, the Nanjing Software Park in Pukou, or the Jiangsu Software Park in Xuanwu. Further research will be needed to show the quantitative importance of these different relations.

Policies at different levels of government to promote ICT industries

A number of policy initiatives for the development of the ICT sector have been taken at the national level. China admits that it still needs foreign investment (*China Daily* 18 March 2002), not only because of the capital involved, but in particular because of the technology that comes with it and the management and the markets for the final products. Gu (1999) presents an overview of the science and technology (S&T) system and the role of research and development (R&D) institutes in China.[9] At the national level certain factors help China, for example the fact that Taiwan has ended the ban on chip plants in China (*Financial Times* 30 March 2002).

The fact that by now almost every Chinese city is trying to build up an ICT centre means it may be more interesting for new start-ups to benefit from the incentives provided elsewhere in the country. Some provincial or local governments provide substantial benefits to make investments attractive. For example, the national government and the provinces concerned now very seriously promote new investments in ICT companies in the west of China and will try to lure activities away from Nanjing. Suning (2002) describes the role of technological enterprise incubators in Nanjing Province. They are defined as service centres for starting up businesses, or for short innovation centres. The first incubator was inaugurated in 1989 and at present there are 15 active in

the Jiangsu Province. The Nanjing Technology Service Center for Business Starting is one of the 15 incubators and is located in the Nanjing Software Park.

The provincial authorities are also very active in the field of ICT as shown by the example of the Jiangsu Software Park and a number of policy initiatives stemming from the provincial authorities. They want to use science and technology to propel economic development and to develop Nanjing into a large modern city with an international reputation (*China Daily* 15 February 2002).

At the municipal level it is noted that a new Nanjing Software Park was launched and a Municipal Bureau has been created to attract foreign investments. For Nanjing the municipal authorities are important because they are promoting the city as a centre of ICT activities and provide the necessary infrastructure, such as the subway system, the new bridge and the fibre optic cables. They also coordinate the activities with higher levels of government and allow the competition between the districts, the lowest level of government in China. The municipal authorities have clearly chosen to expand the export-oriented economy and to lure more overseas capital for the modernization of the city (*China Daily* 15 February 2002).

At the district level the competition is fierce and the officials in different districts of Nanjing admitted that in the end they are competing for the same potential customers. Each one seems to be willing to provide even more incentives to attract potential investors to their district.

Directors of change

The evidence with respect to the directors of urban change in the case of Nanjing points in the direction of the government as the major force. Urban development in Nanjing seems to be a clear example of what is called government-led development. The different levels of government request certain inhabitants to develop a particular part of the city. This mainly accounts for interaction between the provincial, the municipal and the district authorities. Before summarizing the evidence I would like to make a few points on the special situation of China.

Although the government is an important actor, its representatives are often less visible than in many Western countries, at least to foreigners. There is no governor of Jiangsu Province who is in the national and English language newspaper every day. Similarly the mayor of Nanjing is not regularly in the news and the leaders of the districts are not even known to the researchers. However, they have a vision on the development of the province and city and implement this vision rigorously, making available huge amounts of money to achieve the necessary investments.

There also exists a clear hierarchy in China, with directions coming from the national level, passed on to the provincial level and then going to the municipality and eventually to the districts. However, it seems the first three layers are clearly hierarchical and work in a coordinated way. At the municipal level coordination is supposed to take place, avoiding duplication at the district level. At the level of the district there seems to be more equality and one notes competition between different districts, for example concerning their efforts to attract ICT companies.

The government supports numerous activities through tax policies, grants and government orders. It is not easy to single out these incentives and to determine how much they really mean to these industries. Yet, even in the ICT activities there are many large companies that express their gratitude for the support received from officials.

Earlier in this article provincial and municipal governments appeared with the vision to create three high-tech development zones, two software parks and a Zhujiang High-Tech Zone, and the respective districts were asked to carry these initiatives out. They are regularly given targets concerning the number and kind of enterprises to be created in their area.

The provincial view of Nanjing as the centre of a so-called megalopolitan area was also described. It reflects the ambition not to become totally dependent on Shanghai, which is only 300km from Nanjing. It is at the top of the urban hierarchy in the east of the country and an enormous centre of development, with a population numbering 20 million and an annual economic growth rate of 11.8 per cent!

Furthermore the initiative of the municipal authorities in 1992 to use increased autonomy to develop stimulating economic policies, and what the different districts have done in the case of ICT industries to make this work, has been discussed. The role of local governments goes beyond what one is used to in the West. They do not only provide space and infrastructure, but help enterprises to gain access to credit and stimulate the presence of accounting firms in the enterprise buildings to assure a well functioning administrative system. It is clear that different districts go as far as to compete with each other, showing that cooperation and competition can go hand in hand in China. Local governments also determine which company can use these business buildings, or who gets permission to build where. Through 'producer associations' they try to stay in contact with the entrepreneurs, although the enterprises do not always appreciate this close involvement of the authorities.

There are a number of contradictions in the system. Although the different governments plan economic and urban development and implement the policies they have developed, the entrepreneurs actually achieve the spectacular economic growth figures, and they want a certain freedom. The picture becomes more complicated if one realizes that many entrepreneurs are former government officials, who know their colleagues in the government very well. The two groups support each other if necessary, for example through government orders, favourable loans or grants.

The government has a lot of money to spend and wants to contribute to economic development, but may not always know the best way to implement financial incentives. Hence the system has the inherent risk of over-investment and erroneous investment. In particular popular projects like ICT and high-tech zones and software parks may have a limited absorption capacity. In 2004 the National People's Congress meetings have reflected this concern and decided that choices need to be made where to pursue certain activities, because not every city can have a booming software park. So, the government wants to and does provide support to numerous activities, but it is mainly familiar with instruments such as tax cuts and small starting funds. It is not so much at ease with providing space or an innovative milieu.

It is hard to understand why a system that should be able to coordinate development easily, because it is centralist in character and only has to fear limited participation from stakeholders, still lacks coordination at the district level. This leaves the impression of

democracy from below and that is also the level where the central authorities have allowed some cities to experiment, for example in Shenzen with an elected multi-party local government.

Policy recommendations

An innovative milieu has not yet developed in the Nanjing inner city cluster of ICT companies because of several reasons, four of which were mentioned earlier as hypotheses. The evidence presented in this contribution suggests that the companies in the cluster are mainly selling and not producing hardware or software. This means that they are involved in price competition, rather than trying to produce better, different or other products, or to supply new services. The lack of interrelations between enterprises aggravates the problem of limited competitiveness of the ICT sector in Nanjing.

We hypothesized that the limited importance of international investors, which could have brought new capital, ideas, management techniques or markets, played a role. Indeed only a small number of the companies interviewed have relations with foreign companies. According to the *Beijing Review* (18 January 2001) foreign capital investors are very much interested in China's high-tech industries. In fact 86 multinationals provided the major portion of foreign investment in the high-tech industries. However, most of them do not select Nanjing for a number of reasons, which lie at the root of the 'limited competitiveness' of Naning compared with Beijing and Shanghai.

The private entrepreneurs cannot create their own private business organizations to exchange ideas and to negotiate with the government. From our interviews we learned that the government has set up most associations, and entrepreneurs reluctantly participate.

The role of national, provincial, municipal and local (district) governments in supporting the cluster of ICT companies is limited and focused on different things at different times. At present the authorities seem to be willing to actively attract foreign investors to participate in their projects. A problem is that many investors do not consider Nanjing a very competitive place where they want to put their money.

Collaboration with universities and R&D institutions is hardly developed and the government has done very little to promote this until recently. We can add that the business climate in the cluster also does not seem to stimulate development towards an innovative cluster. Small enterprises receive only limited support. Life is made attractive for them through administrative support and tax benefits. Beyond a certain size these advantages tend to disappear.

Different levels of government can do more to develop ICT activities. In general they should provide an enabling environment for ICT enterprises and in particular create a starter-friendly environment. The following policies would be recommended at the different levels distinguished.

A lot is happening at the national level. According to the article *High-Tech Industries Help Economy* China's ICT industry will double its size within five years 'to make the country a top telecom market and leading ICT product maker worldwide' (*China Daily* 27 July 2000). It is expected that the ICT industry will maintain a 20 per cent growth rate through the coming five years. At the national level the support to this sector is part of the

Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plan (1996–2000 and 2001–05). However, international conglomerates are also assisting to achieve these ambitious goals. The major event is China's full membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This means more respect for international property rights (less copying of software), but also more competition from imported goods. The government at the national level should support the ICT sector to face the consequences of this situation.

At the provincial level it is recommended that space and appropriate infrastructure should be provided for ICT companies, to the extent that this goes beyond the border of the cities. Provincial authorities in China can also provide incentives and support for export policies.

At the municipal level the recommendation is to develop a vision and strategy, provide coordination between the different levels of municipal government, such as between the plans of different districts, and stimulate entrepreneurs to organize their own networks and accept those in the discussions as the major private sector partners for the government.

At the local level a lot needs to be done. The authorities could consider the entrepreneurs or their organizations as their counterparts to discuss their further development. They also could provide space and infrastructure, supply buildings and business support services, attract foreign investors, provide information to entrepreneurs, set up an enterprise network, and promote the link with local knowledge resources such as R&D institutions.

Conclusions

China's information and communication technology industry has become the third largest in the world and a major income earner. However, China should change its image as a low-end manufacturer by increasing the technology content and controlling the patents of high-tech products.

Development zones have become important and overseas funds invested in these development zones accounted for 65.8 per cent of the province's total contracted overseas funding (*China Daily* 16 May 2001). The conviction is growing that the market and not the government should develop technology parks. Yet, government's support, especially favourable land transferring policies, is considered essential.

The development of clusters of economic activities should be actively stimulated in Nanjing, including the physical grouping of enterprises of different sizes. Subcontracting and other relations between micro, small, medium and large enterprises need to be developed and different incentives could be provided for this purpose.

The larger picture is that in the whole Nanjing area there are two high-tech zones and the linkages between these zones and the inner city cluster that were studied could be developed further, to turn the whole ICT sector in Nanjing into a real city-wide dynamic high-tech cluster. Suggestions for policies at different levels of government to achieve this have been presented earlier.

The creation of two software parks in neighbouring districts by two different authorities, but both within Nanjing, turned out to be an example of uncoordinated activities of local and provincial government. It shows the absence of intervention or

coordination of higher levels of government, or a conscious promotion of competition between different levels of government.

It is interesting to note that different levels of government have taken the initiatives for the distinct zones. The Jiangning Technical Economic Development Zone is a national-level initiative and in quantitative terms it is the most successful zone in Nanjing. The Jiangsu Software Park is a provincial initiative, providing a state-level base for software industries. The Gulou Science Park is a municipal institution, while the other two high-tech development zones in two other districts are district initiatives. The conclusion so far must be that this is a city-wide ICT cluster in the making, in particular if more coordination could be achieved between the different levels of government and when the complementarities between the various industries are fully developed.

Notes

1 This article is based on a research project financed by the Netherlands government and carried out by the Sino-Dutch International Business Center (SD-IBC) of the Nanjing University Business School and a consortium of IHS, ISS and MSM, the leading partner. Data were collected during five trips since July 2000 partly with He Jian and Wang Quansheng of the Business School. See Van Dijk (2003), He Jian (2000) and Wang (2000).

2 The study of a cluster of ICT firms in Nanjing focused on how the ICT sector in Nanjing compares with ICT clusters in cities like Beijing. Is it an innovative cluster, which can be competitive (Van Dijk 2003)? Compared with similar concentrations of ICT firms in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, Nanjing is not considered very competitive. The other cities tend to be bigger and have even larger clusters of ICT firms. The problems mentioned by most of the entrepreneurs interviewed tell us something of the differences in perceived competitiveness between the larger coastal cities and this smaller inland city. In general Nanjing is not considered to be as attractive as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen because it is a smaller city, located away from the coast and its business sector is less developed. The lack of competitiveness at the regional, city, cluster and enterprise level in Jiangsu Province may be compensated only to some extent by the advantages provided by working in the ICT cluster on Zhujiang Road in Nanjing.

This lack of competitiveness is a problem according to a large number of the people interviewed. Underlying it are the problems at hiring good personnel at the current wage rate and many employees consider Beijing, Shenzhen or Shanghai more attractive cities to work in. Many companies in Nanjing feel the need to develop a marketing strategy, but are not capable of doing so. The owners tend to be technicians, who have limited skills as far as marketing or management in general are concerned. The relation with the supporting institutions in Nanjing, like the universities and research institutes is also considered a problem. There is a trend to involve them for research and to supply good employees, but to keep them at a distance at a later stage because the business culture of both types of organizations is very different.

3 The levels distinguished are national, regional, city-wide, inner city and suburban cluster.

4 Six cities in East China's Jiangsu and Anhui Provinces planned a similar megalopolitan development.

5 The Jiangzu Province has a tradition of producing electronic products. For example, it exported 1.25 million TV sets in 2000, worth US$115 million.

6 The enterprises occupying plots along Zhujiang Road were notified that this street would be reserved for IT companies and that they would have to move if this is not their core business. Alternative locations were offered and empty plots and buildings were allocated to IT firms.

7 Jiangning became a district instead of a rural county only in 2001. It is estimated that the city proper numbers 3.3 million and the five rural counties (including Jiangning) two million inhabitants.

8 The rate was 1US$ to 8.27 RMB during the field work in 1999.

9 Part two of her book deals with spin-off enterprises. Although her focus is on the machinery industry, she clearly describes the efforts to transform R&D institutes to focus them on the commercial development of manufacturing systems.

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10
Semarang

Was H.F. Tillema a director of urban change?[1]
Peter J.M.Nas and Kirsten Theuns

Introduction

Several persons played a key role in the development of the Indonesian cities in the colonial period, at which time the country was generally called the Netherlands Indies. Jan Pietersz. Coen, for example, founded Batavia (1619) and had its layout planned most probably according to the ideas of Simon Stevin. Governor-General Willem Herman Daendels (1808–11) became the driving force behind the suburbanization of Batavia in the area of Weltevreden/Gambir that functions as the presentday heart of the city, nowadays called Jakarta. Daendels can also be considered an important director of urban change because he commanded the construction of the famous Great Mail Road *(Jalan Raya Pos)* that connected the whole of Java from the west (Anyer) to the east (Panarukan/ Banyuwangi) and became the main artery of the island, influencing many towns. Bandung was even relocated to be situated on its verge (Nas and Pratiwo 2002). If the colonial towns were strongly influenced by defence works, particularly the castle and fortifications, the traditional towns were conceptualized around the palace *(kraton)* of the sultan and characterized by various squares *(alun-alun)* and palace wards for the various administrative, service, artisan and military groups, while the traditional wards, the kampongs, were scattered around the palace walls. These kampongs were arranged according to traditional views about town layout. It is clear that in these urban developments the governors-general and the sultan played a prominent role and without doubt they can be considered the most important directors of early colonial urban change.

In the late colonial period the indigenous and Western top administrators exerted enormous influence, but some citizens also generated significant ideas about urban improvement. Besides the well-known urban planner Thomas Karsten and the famous architect of the ITB buildings, Henri Maclaine Pont, who can both be characterized as directors of urban change in this colonial period, Hendrik Freerk Tillema[2] (1870–1952) also deserves scholarly attention in this context. Tillema lived in the Javanese town of Semarang where he became a wealthy prominent citizen. He spent a great part of the fortune he made in the Netherlands Indies to underline the need for the introduction of hygiene to the dirty urban kampongs, by putting the kampong question on the agenda of the authorities and the general public. But was he a director of urban change? In this article we shall try to formulate an answer to this question. Therefore we begin by describing the colonial context in which he operated. This is followed by a sketch of his life, his views on kampong life and the development of his ideas. Finally, we shall

evaluate his influence on urban and particularly kampong improvement in Semarang and Indonesia.

The context: the kampong, decentralization and Semarang

From the beginning Dutch citizens in the colonial cities occupied an invidious position in their relationship to the government. This was certainly the case in the initial period when VOC officials imposed their will on urban inhabitants. It was also very much the situation after 1854 when the administrative system became centralized under the so-called single-head government of the governor-general with no autonomous regions and a territory divided into administrative areas of jurisdiction (residency, division, sub-division, district, sub-district, *desa* and ward). A dual system of government was maintained with the lowest levels under the authority of indigenous officials. After the harsh period of the Cultivation System during the mid-nineteenth century, the numbers of the European community swelled strongly in the wake of the rise of steam navigation and the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) compounded by the open door policy. The population of cities diversified and grew livelier and the last quarter of that century saw an active community life in the Netherlands Indies encouraged by a growing number of associations. The increase in the number of Westerners who needed urban space in which to live was one of the reasons which gave rise to what was called the kampong question. The newcomers who acquired more and more land on the edges of the kampongs significantly reduced the space available in the indigenous urban areas. This in combination with a strong population growth led to high population densities in these wards that often were transformed from spacious countryside kampongs into compact slum areas. However, unhygienic conditions were also prevalent more generally and were not simply a consequence of untrammelled population growth and subsequent kampong enclosure.

The kampongs in the late colonial period, their position and the conditions in them are of crucial importance to any comprehension of Tillema's work. Therefore we need to say a few words about the terms used for indigenous living areas: the *desa* and the kampong. A *desa* is an indigenous village surrounded by its rice fields, uncultivated land and fish-ponds. An urban kampong is a city ward without the surrounding fields. A kampong has the following characteristics: indigenous, high population density, low-rise buildings, lack of planning, a dearth of infrastructure and services, a rural atmosphere, and a rather low-class but mixed socio-economic composition. A kampong is not a slum and a colonial elite ward is not a kampong. People of Indonesian extraction generally inhabit it, although in colonial times low-class Westerners may often have also lived there. A kampong is unplanned, with houses spread at random over the area without any building lines applied. It generally lacks any infrastructure or services. The kampong improvement programmes of the colonial period and later of the 1960s to 1980s with their focus on infrastructure have introduced some planning principles (building lines, drainage, straight concrete paths and hardened entrance roads) and to a lesser degree they have also paid attention to employment, healthcare and schooling. Kampongs often have a rural ambiance because of their spaciousness, abundance of (fruit) trees and hordes of small animals. There are no condominiums or other high-rise constructions. Yet, there are also

very crowded urban kampongs with a high density of population and a less rural atmosphere, although seldom including buildings of more than two storeys. The composition of the population is rather mixed with many poor people and some middle-class citizens sharing the area.

So, a kampong could indeed be defined as indigenous, unplanned, and with low-rise buildings, a lack of infrastructure and services, a high population density and a generally low-class but mixed socioeconomic composition. However, none of these characteristics can be taken separately to define a kampong, and sometimes one of the characteristics is lacking or less prominent. It is the total configuration of the characteristics and the resulting indigenous ambiance that make the kampong into a kampong. This claim emerges even more explicitly when types of kampong are distinguished. The inner city kampong, countryside kampong and peripheral kampong differ in their degree of rural atmosphere, while in some instances the inner city kampong may fully resemble a central urban slum. Whatever the different types may be, it is the general conditions in the kampongs and the kampong life-style that attracted the attention of Tillema and formed the subject of his extensive publications.

In 1903 the administrative system was substantially altered by the implementation of the Decentralization Law (Nas 1990; Manasse Malo and Nas 1996). Beginning in 1905, urban municipalities *(stadsgemeenten)* were created, run by a board to which funds were allocated from the central budget. In the first instance these urban municipalities were quite dependent on central governmental officials and agencies, but in time the influence of the citizens increased and the municipalities gradually acquired more autonomy. Their development in the late colonial period can be characterized as a success because of the important improvements which were realized in them. In the framework of the dual administrative system the *desa* on the outskirts of the towns and the urban kampongs—defined as indigenous municipalities *(inlandsche gemeenten)* with their own leading officials—were not integrated into the urban municipalities. They remained separate as specified under the 1854 legislation of the Indies Constitution. The kampongs did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Western administrative tier and had to solve their own problems on the basis of their own indigenous laws.

The so-called Ethical Policy that gained widespread support from the beginning of the 1900s, however, reinforced the idea that the Netherlands Indies should not only function as a stimulus to a positive budget balance *(batig slot),* but that the improvement of the living conditions of the poor indigenous kampong dwellers should also be striven for. In order to realize improvement on the indigenous kampongs and in urban fringe *desas* under Western governmental guidance, in 1925, after a rather protracted administrative process induced by municipal pressure on the Netherlands Indies government, the indigenous municipalities were integrated into the urban municipalities. The status of urban *desas* and kampongs was suspended as separate administrative units, among other reasons because the citizens and officials began to realize that the unhygienic conditions in the kampongs could have a negative impact on the health situation in neighbouring Western city wards. The purpose of the suspension was to enable the introduction of kampong improvement by the Western municipal authorities in order to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. The discussion between the municipalities and the Netherlands Indies government focused on the funding of the required kampong improvement projects. The municipalities assumed the responsibility for the projects, but

aimed to draw their funding from the Netherlands Indies government. The government, however, was only prepared to go halfway in meeting the costs. Despite the contentions, some kampong improvement projects were realized by municipalities. In the 1930s almost 2,000 ha of Javanese kampong area was upgraded, but this was only a quarter of the projects planned. In 1939 some 4,700 ha in most dire need of improvement remained to be tackled (Cobban 1970:169). So, the kampong question remained unsolved in the colonial period. Cobban claims the reason was 'lack of money rather than lack of knowledge or goodwill on the part of Dutch officials' (Cobban 1970:139).

The discourse on the late colonial urban health and slum conditions was given strong impetus by the critical intellectual community of Semarang, the town in which Tillema was based from 1896 to 1914. This settlement on the north coast of Java was an important harbour and entrepôt town with its economic basis fixed in the export of agricultural products from the Javanese hinterland and the import of industrial goods from oversees, particularly the Netherlands. The harbour and railways secured its role as a nexus of communication and trade. As Stevens (1986) has shown, during the period between 1870 and 1900 the Semarang region was plagued by stagnation, bringing in its wake often miserable conditions for large parts of the European and indigenous population. In 1903 the so-called Pauperism Commission reported these unsatisfactory conditions that prevailed among the poorer strata of the Eurasian population (Rapport 1903). Despite its economic woes, Semarang was also an intellectually stimulating town where a progressive political discourse held sway about the role of the colonial government in poverty alleviation and public health, which formed the basis of the so-called Ethical Policy. Designated an urban municipality in 1906, a strong public discourse developed in Semarang, reflecting a trend in the Netherlands Indies as a whole, about public health and sanitation (water supply and drainage) and more broadly housing conditions (re-housing and slum reform) in which the city's special advisor on malaria eradication, Dr J.T.Terburgh, and the residency's medical officer, Dr W.Th.de Vogel, had an important voice. D.J.A.Westerveld, a teacher who became a member of the municipal council, was the driving force behind a survey on the living conditions of the Indo (European) community in 1909, showing that pauperism was still very much present and housing conditions often left much to be desired (Westerveld 1910). Later the living conditions of the Javanese population were included in this poverty discourse.

Tillema's work on hygiene and slum conditions has to be considered in the context of this public discourse, which was not restricted to Semarang and the Netherlands Indies but was waged also in London and other European cities. In fact, this type of early survey on the living conditions of the poor and the working class is often seen as marking the beginning of the empirical sociology of industrial societies. Although Tillema was an amateur with a strongly polemical approach, through his involvement—his well-written texts, his abundance of photographic illustrations and his great number of publications— the problem of living conditions in slum areas became a major element in the late colonial discourse (Coté 2002). In this respect Tillema can literally be considered a forerunner of the famous colonial town planner Thomas Karsten, who was resident in the Netherlands Indies from 1914 to 1945, and whose certainly more scholarly work is amply described in scientific literature (Bogaers and De Ruijter 1986). Notwithstanding the fact that Tillema was not the only person dealing with the slum conditions in Semarang at that time and that some architects like Maclaine Pont and Karsten, who succeeded him,

became more famous, the timing of his contribution and the importance of his work warrant his being called the doyen of Dutch (colonial) urban anthropology. This, however, does not mean that we may already draw the conclusion that he was an important director of urban change as such a claim would suppose a discussion of the influence of his work.

Hendrik Freerk Tillema: life e and work

The focus of this section is the life of Hendrik Freerk Tillema (1870–1952) (Figure 10.1). This is an apt juncture to give a description of

Figure 10.1 H.F.Tillema (source: Noto Soeroto, 1922, left and Tillema, 1940, right).

his work and travel, and to discuss his membership of the Semarang municipal council. To find out more about his influence on urban change we first have to know the man behind the ideas.

Tillema, born on 5 July 1870, qualified as a pharmacist in the Netherlands in 1894. After two years working in Bolsward, he left for Semarang in the Netherlands Indies where he started in the 'Samarangsche Apotheek'. Within three years, before he turned 30, Tillema had become the owner and head of the firm. Because of his interest in hygiene, he branched out into aerated water production (Coté 2002:322). In a newly built factory (1901) he sold his *ajer blanda* under the name 'Hygeia'. At the end of that same year he married Anna Sophia Weehuizen by whom he had three children, two sons and one daughter. She had been born and raised in Java and later proved herself a great help in correcting Tillema's publications.

Tillema's passion for people's health was already broadening when he experienced a cholera epidemic in the year 1910. After this horror he wanted to open people's eyes to the problem of public health by using his knowledge of advertising (Vanvugt 1993a: 27). He became a member of the Semarang Municipal Council and wrote his first book *Riooliana* (1911), in which he recommended the introduction of a sewerage system in the community. Using photos and unvarnished descriptions he laid bare the parlous domestic habits of the poor Javanese. In Tillema's eyes regulating these was the solution to the poor urban health conditions (Coté 2002:332).

With the money earned from his flourishing bottled-water factory, Tillema was able to publish another book *Van Wonen en Bewonen, van Bouwen, Huis en Erf* (1913). In this work he defended a larger-scale approach to town planning (Coté 2002:333). He demonstrated the lack of planning in the city of Semarang and pleaded for more responsibility to be assumed by the colonial government. He was convinced of the rationality of officials, while he saw the natives as victims of modernity who were in desperate need of guidance. As Coté writes 'Dutch colonialism would act as guardian in the native's best interest' (Coté 2002:335). Tillema attained his goal of having a sewerage system installed in Semarang.

Just before the beginning of the First World War the Tillema family went back to the Netherlands.[3] Here Tillema began working on his major work *Kromoblanda* (1915–23), which took him over eight years to complete and resulted in six volumes.[4] It contains a broad spectrum of information on the health problems of the natives in the archipelago. In Part 1 Tillema describes his concern that so many Dutch people did not have any knowledge of the Indies (Tillema 1915–16:6). He explained that his goal was to change that lack of information. At the end Tillema asked his readers to help him collect documents and photographs of life in the Netherlands East Indies (Tillema 1915:180). His request received a huge response and his collection kept on growing. So did his own interest. As Vanvugt reports: 'ln the beginning Tillema was merely interested in the living conditions of Semarang, at the end he was interested in abuses throughout the whole Archipelago' (Vanvugt 1993a: 35).

His earlier argument, concerning the responsibility of the colonial government, was more broadly summarized in the publication *Kampongwee!* (1919). This work was especially addressed to the governments and parliaments in the Netherlands and in the Netherlands East Indies, but he also had the Indonesian nationalists in mind. Tillema tried to show that there were great arrears in the domain of public health and pointed out that people had rights to a decent standard of living and proper health conditions (Tillema-Weehuizen and Tillema 1919:17).[5] To sketch the deplorable situation in the kampongs, Tillema among a plethora of possibilities enumerated the following illnesses: smallpox, cholera, malaria, hookworm, beri-beri, tuberculosis, dysentery, scabies, scrofula (crop tumours), mental defects, syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases. As causes of these misfortunes he indicated poverty and unhygienic living conditions in general, pointing out especially the traditional houses infested with lice and bedbugs and afflicted by fires because of the use of highly inflammable roofing material. All sorts of sociocultural traditions and influences were also mentioned as being related to or a source of the bad living conditions, including polygyny, child marriage, unbridled sexual licence, slave taking, headhunting, blood revenge, abandoning of children, and the negative influences of the introduction of industrialization. More generally he argued the

downside of contact with the West and the introduction of new contagious diseases, including the excessive consumption of alcohol. The remedies Tillema advanced were hygiene, (hygiene) education, drinking water supply, sewerage installation, urban land planning, and planned city extension. In *Kampongwee!* Tillema and his wife basically presented a logical argumentation of the existing problems in terms of causes and consequences, as well as the intermediate sociocultural variables and the interventions needed to improve conditions in the kampongs.

In 1924 Tillema made a journey from Sumatra to New Guinea and set down his experiences in a publication called *Zonder Tropen geen Europa* (1925). By choosing this title he again made clear the obligations of the North to the South (Tillema 1925:7–28). Coté argues there was also 'an explicit reference to the dark side of colonial power' in this publication (Coté 2002:342). The focus of Tillema's work was the decline in the population, which was shown in statistical tables of child mortality. Pertinentiy, his work proved that Tillema had become a fine photographer, as he used more than 300 pictures, all taken himself (Vanvugt 1993b: 38). Interestingly, in 1930 Tillema published a short article 'Filmen en fotografeeren in de tropische rimboe', in which he described the techniques required for taking photos under harsh conditions in the jungle. He explains the nitty-gritty of filming and makes comments on what to wear and to carry, and describes the kinds of material needed. As an example to illustrate his own style of working, he used material from his previous journeys. Although this work is very different from his other publications, it clearly demonstrates Tillema's great experience as a photographer.

After a second journey in 1927, about which he did not write a book, Tillema began his final trip to the Dayaks in Central Borneo in 1931. He went there with the goal of recording natives on film and in photos. Tillema, at that time convinced that his earlier work had not resulted in enough concrete actions, saw it as his new task to make sure the unfortunate people of the colony would not be forgotten (Vanvugt 1993a: 150). Back at home he soon produced his first film *Apo-Kajan* (1933). Years later he published a book under the same title, which became a rich ethnography of Dayak people. This book is divided into two parts. In the first part, *Apo-Kajan in Woord en Beeld,* Tillema describes his preparations, his journey and the difficulties he ran into while filming. It is amply illustrated with photographs in which the cultural practices of the Dayak are recorded. The second part, *De Apo-Kajans in Beeld en Woord,* is even more focused on the culture of the Dayak and consists mainly of photographs complemented by brief but provocative captions. Victor King, who produced the English edition of *Apo-Kajan,* characterized Tillema as an interested amateur ethnographer and photographer. The work clearly demonstrates that Tillema was aware of the need to understand the Dayak ways of life in their own terms.

Between 1937 and 1941 Tillema started to write short stories to accompany his photographs. With these 'Praatjes bij plaatjes' (Chats with pictures) he produced a column *Ons Indisch Boekje,* which was published once a week in various newspapers, with a preference for local newspapers which were widely read. Tillema even drew a map, *Verkleinde Afdruk der Routekaart,* on which his travels of 1924, 1927 and 1932 were shown. This map functioned as a guide to a better understanding of the stories (Tillema 1945). On the back of the map were noted some facts about developments in health conditions in the archipelago, which Tillema documented chronologically from

1804 to 1944. The stories were later collected in a three-volume book called *Ons Indisch Boekje.*

In 1938 Tillema wrote a letter to the director of the Museum of Ethnology in Leiden, in which he declared that he would bequeath all his work to the Museum (Vanvugt 1993a: 158). Partly because of this gift Tillema was made a Knight in the Order of the Dutch Lion by Queen Wilhelmina in 1939.[6] One year later he received an honorary PhD degree in medical science from the University of Groningen (Kapsenberg 1940) (Figure 10.2).

On 25 November 1952, Tillema died while taking his usual afternoon nap, leaving an enormous selection of photographs, paperwork, negatives and films. Ten years after his initial announcement, his whole collection was donated to the Museum at Leiden (Vanvugt 1993a: 162). Even now it is not completely clear how much he actually left behind, although an inventory is being compiled at the time of writing.

The development of Tillema's views

Joost Coté (2002) has presented an elaborate and fascinating description of colonial urban discourse in relation to Tillema's arguments. The unfolding of this important discourse as well as Tillema's points of view were quite complex. Therefore it is difficult to relate them in all their detail here. Yet, some interesting trends may be discerned. In fact, the discourse was directed towards keeping a firm hand on the modernization of the colony. The starting point was the conditions of the poor (Indo) European community in the towns as these were described by medical and malaria specialists. The unhygienic conditions in the kampongs, in which these Europeans were living, were considered the cause of the high incidence of all sorts of contagious diseases and the high mortality rates. Adopting a high moral tone, individual character and immoral behaviour were presented in the first instance as the main explanations of these phenomena, and this was used by Tillema to transform the expert descriptions into a view that could lead to the acceptance of the problem as a social rather than a technical one. Tillema, however, soon became aware

Figure 10.2 Illustration of Tillema's
Honorary Doctorate in *Oost en West*.

that it was not just the conditions of the poor (Indo) Europeans which were parlous, but the issue extended to the indigenous kampongs and the Chinese camps as well. This was brought into sharp focus when it was realized that the population of the native wards could infect those of the Western parts of the towns. So, the role of the city as a whole and the need for city planning (clean water and sewerage systems), kampong improvement and proper low-cost housing gradually nudged to the fore.

In the last phase, during his travels and the compilation of *Kromoblanda,* hygienic conditions from over the whole archipelago were incorporated into Tillema's work. This means that the colonial urban discourse unfolded from a specialist and localized discussion about the physical and moral conditions of the poor (Indo) European group to a social, urban and even nationwide interracial discourse increasingly conducted on the basis of technical expertise. The basic underlying dichotomy dealt with, on the one hand, the alleged immorality of the poor Europeans and the traditional indigenous life-styles with all the related problems with regard to hygiene and low productivity caused by illness, and, on the other hand, the role of the local and central authorities in taking steps to improve these conditions by means of kampong improvement, low-cost housing, and town planning, but also not overlooking health education and the surveillance of kampong and town life. The colonial urban discourse, Coté argues, ultimately led to a drive for intervention by the European authorities in order to improve the living conditions of the indigenous poor as well as those of the European rich; a drive that went against the rising political mood of nationalism and Indonesian autonomy and independence. So, in the colonial urban modernization discourse Tillema's role was not just 'a blueprint for Indonesians and Dutch to live hygienically together' as it was formulated by Mrazek (cited in Coté 2002:345), but 'it provided a discursive basis for the re-colonization of the native in modernity' (Coté 2002:345). Coté claims that the work of Tillema provided an outline for the 'intervention in the life of the native within the European household, within the European city, within the European colonial domain' (Coté 2002:345).

Though Tillema cannot be portrayed as a revolutionary in the framework of rising nationalism, nevertheless we think it is important to stress that in the course of time in Semarang, as we have seen before, clean drinking water and sewerage systems were installed. In several towns kampong improvement and low-cost housing projects were achieved, while the urban municipalities managed to absorb the indigenous wards. As the nationalists would also favour intervention for kampong improvement, the work of Tillema also should not be considered inherently contradictory to the aims of the nationalists.

Notwithstanding the obvious and figuratively as well as literally ground-breaking, if not 'revolutionary' results, Tillema himself appeared to have become somewhat disappointed with the effects of his work. At the end of his life he became more and more interested in the indigenous life-style that lay at the origins of the discourse. During his inland travels he became an ethnographer, clearly fascinated by the thoroughly unhygienic but also exotic ways of life and cultures and produced one of the first colonial films about the Dayak of the Apo-Kajan, Borneo. Tillema's views developed from an interest in the indigenous ways of life in the cities to a focus on the native cultures in the interior of the archipelago. Proceeding from the urban kampong traditions to the supposedly more authentic rural cultural traditions, the circle of his search was closed.

Influence and impact

The purpose of Tillema's work was mentioned in almost all his publications. Usually he described his goal in the first few pages, but he sometimes also used a detached note in

which he set down what he wanted to achieve. In one of his first works, *Van Wonen en Bewonen, Van Bouwen, Huis en Erf* (1913), he described how he wished to interest people in the problem of housing and hoped to achieve some improvements. In a later publication, *Kromoblanda* (1915–16), he even added a loose note in which he mentioned his endeavours to show the people in the Netherlands that it was essential to improve the conditions of the indigenous population of the Netherlands Indies. In *Zonder Tropen geen Europa* (1925:49), he was absolutely incisive about the necessity of taking measures for improvement.

When considering the impact of Tillema's work, besides pointing at the catchy titles of his books, the very comprehensible texts and the abundant illustrations with compelling captions, we cannot proceed without saying something about the way he distributed his work among potentially interested readers, because he did not use the standard procedure of going through a publishing company. The bulk of his publications was not obtainable in bookshops, but were privately printed and handed out by himself. This was generally mentioned in little squares on the first page of his books. For example, in *Zonder Tropen geen Europa* (1925) is written: 'Not for sale. Sent to friends of Indonesians. A restricted number of copies are available for those who inform me of their interest'.[7] As was mentioned before in *Kampongwee!* his wife and Tillema himself even explicitly dedicated their work to the Dutch government and parliament, the head of the Mangkoenegaran house, Indonesians in the Netherlands, members of the Chung Hwa Hui association, students of Indonesian studies, officials of the Netherlands Indies ministry of interior, Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries, the Dutch and Netherlands Indies press, and all the women of the Netherlands. A letter to the editor-in-chief of a journal is included in one of the copies of this publication. Tillema received many kind letters in reply thanking him for the book.[8]

The aim of this article is to answer the question: 'Was H.F.Tillema a director of urban change?' In search of an answer we have looked through a host of publications for reactions to the work of Tillema and tried to find out how great his influence was. We went through books, journals and reviews of housing congresses and have arrived at two categories in order to evaluate his achievements. First the national and international influence of Tillema's work has to be specified. Is he mentioned only by Dutch writers and in Dutch publications, or did he have broader impact? Besides this, it is possible to differentiate between the colonial period and the post-colonial period.

In the colonial period, Tillema's work *Van Wonen en Bewonen, Van Bouwen, Huis en Erf* was mentioned in the journal *Locale Belangen* of April 1914, in which the publication of Tillema's work was announced and there is also a review of the work. Pages 370–3 claim that he surely achieved his goals; drawing attention to the housing problem and calling for improvement. In the article it was stressed that Tillema was owed a large debt of gratitude for his ideas, because he had pointed out bad situations and capped this by offering possible improvements. In May 1914 the local Semarang newspaper, *De Locomotief,* mentioned the departure of Tillema to the Netherlands. In the article his achievements were listed: the installation of mains water in Semarang, the construction of the main road to the South Semarang extension area, the handling of the housing question, and the many reports delivered to the municipal council.[9] Tillema was portrayed as a beacon for questions of urban hygiene, not only exerting local influence, for example in the municipal council, but also on the more general scale swaying the

opinions of the Netherlands Indies' public.[10] In a review of the housing congress in 1922, Tillema was mentioned more than once (Verslag/Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging 1922:10). He was praised for the photographs and figures shown in his works, because they gave an unsurpassed image of the insalubrious living conditions in the kampong. Furthermore, his works were spoken about very appreciatively and it was even noted that a telegram was sent to Tillema to pay him homage (Verslag/Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging 1922:14). In Kerchman's book, *25 Jaar Decentralisatie in Nederlands-Indië: 1905–1930,* an article about housing written by Thomas Karsten, in which Tillema was mentioned, was included. With the sentence 'Again it is Tillema's tireless compilation…[because of which] the dreadful conditions at least were more or less generally and officially recognized',[11] Karsten made clear that Tillema had a certain influence on the acknowledgement of housing problems.

Besides such glowing compliments during the colonial period, Tillema was also awarded an honorary doctorate in medical science at the University of Groningen. In his speech, the promoter, G.Kapsenberg, described how Tillema achieved many of his goals because essential improvements in hygiene were carried out. He mentioned the installing of a sewerage system in Semarang and the construction of the Semarang town extension New-Tjandi[12] (Kapsenberg 1940:1196). In addition to this historical impact, Kapsenberg pointed out that he expected that Tillema would most definitely continue to have an impact in the future, because his work set out clear-cut plans for the improvement of contemporary unhygienic conditions.

After the colonial period, even after the death of Tillema, his work was still regularly mentioned in the literature. The editors of *The Indonesian Town* (1958), for example, described the 'noble idealist' in their foreword. This book also included a commentary, which is an abridged translation of the text on pages 630–1 of Tillema's *Kromoblanda* V, Part Two. In *The Indonesian Town* (Wertheim *et al.* 1958:79) it serves as an illustration of the layout of an average regency seat in the pre-war Indies. Other scholars who have mentioned the name Tillema are Erica Bogaers and Peter de Ruijter who wrote an article about *Ir.Thomas Karsten and Indonesian Town Planning 1915–1940* (1986). They point at an International Housing Congress held in Scheveningen in 1913, where 'Tillema brought to light the bad living conditions in the kampung of Semarang in the Dutch East Indies in a report titled *Van Wonen en Bewonen, Van Bouwen, Huis en Erf* (Bogaers and De Ruijter 1986:73).[13] They also point out that Tillema had been active in the town of Semarang and that he argued, for reasons of hygiene, that the government take action (Bogaers and De Ruijter 1986:74). Besides the fact that Tillema was still mentioned in some other articles and publications in the post-colonial period—as we have said before—in 1989 his *Apo-Kajan* was translated and published in English under the title *A Journey Among the Peoples of Central Borneo.* This richly illustrated book was edited by Victor King who added an elaborate introduction and a bibliography of Tillema's main publications. In the Netherlands, it was Ewald Vanvugt who honoured him by writing about the *Propagandist van het Zuiverste Water* (1993a). He focused especially on the collection of photographs that Tillema had both taken and gathered throughout his life. His collection of photos is also mentioned in *Semarang: Beeld van een Stad,* in which almost a whole page is dedicated to Tillema. His ideas are described and it is mentioned that he was partly responsible for the realization of the city extension New-Tjandi (Brommer 1995:25). At the moment, the life and work of H.F.Tillema have still not been

forgotten and may even be in the picture more than ever before. In 2002 Herman de Boer directed a film on Tillema's life and work under the title *Tillema: De Multatuli van de Fotografie* (Tillema: The Multatuli of photography).

Conclusion

By searching for Tillema's name in different works over a significant period of time, we have attempted to reach a conclusion about the extent of his influence. On the basis of the distinctions made between the language of the publications and the colonial and post-colonial period, we have concluded that there is a difference in Tillema's influence in these two periods. We are convinced that Tillema's work had both a local direct and, more broadly, a strong mainly indirect influence during the colonial period. As was mentioned in both the speech by his promoter and in the *Semarang* book, Tillema strongly endorsed the foundation of New-Tjandi in 1915. Besides, he had also successfully fostered the installation of a sewerage system in Semarang. Notwithstanding this local influence, Tillema's greatest impact in that period was his role as prophet who forced people to open their eyes. In almost all the works we studied, Tillema was described as a person who made people aware of the importance of hygiene, the necessity of kampong improvement and the need for adequate planned city extension. It has to be emphasized here that his influence seemed of short duration, because in later colonial publications, which we researched, he was no longer mentioned.

In the present post-colonial period, the appreciation of Tillema has gradually shifted emphasis in the direction of his skills as a photographer. The book written by Ewald Vanvugt focuses for the greatest part on his collection of photographs. Attention is also paid to his ethnographic and film achievements, especially in the film produced by Herman de Boer.

We conclude that Tillema did achieve his goal of making people aware of the important role of hygiene in kampong development and the need for improvement in the drinking water supply and in sanitary conditions. In the local setting of Semarang this had a real impact on city development. His ideas most probably formed the basis for the famous post-colonial kampong improvement programmes that characterized Indonesian city planning in the 1960s to 1980s. His ethnographic work has not achieved a prominent place in scientific literature, but his photographic collection and views have proved to be a rich source for present-day expositions and film activities. His work in all its diversity certainly justifies his title as the doyen of Dutch colonial urban anthropology. In our view Tillema, notwithstanding the polemic and popular scientific character of his writings and his amateur status in the fields of urban planning and ethnology, should be considered an important director of urban change in the late colonial Netherlands East Indies. He strongly influenced the development of Semarang and without any doubt managed to put the kampong question on the public agenda so that his ideas were rapidly internalized by the authorities at various levels and most probably laid the basis for the later kampong improvement programmes.

Notes

1 We are grateful to Herman de Boer and Freerk Leguit for their comments on an earlier version of this article and to Wim Rosema for his kind assistance with regard to the Tillema Archive at the Museum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.

2 Joost Coté (2002:320) uses the anglicized Henry Freek Tillema. In Dutch the name is Hendrik Freerk Tillema.

3 In the Netherlands Tillema lived in Paterswolde (with his father) and Groningen (Prediniussingel). Later, in 1923, he moved with his family to Bloemendaal (Parklaan). During the Second World War they were evacuated to Eindhoven where they lived with their second son.

4 In the Netherlands Tillema spent much of his time on his voluminous works. According to Tillema's grandson, F.A.Leguit, Tillema was dyslectic and his wife corrected all his texts. It was also said in the family that Tillema did not like writing, but with the precision and dedication of a pharmacist he led a very regulated life labouring punctiliously. Tillema was characterized as a straightforward, wilful, unconventional, and less than easy person to deal with. His unconventional behaviour is illustrated by the fact that he sometimes cut off half his tie, because it was hindering him. One photograph of Tillema on a horse, in the collection at the Museum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden, proves that he was wearing only half a tie (personal comment F.A.Leguit).

5 *Kampongwee!* is Tillema's only work co-authored by his wife A.S.Tillema-Weehuizen.

6 In Semarang he had already received the decoration 'Officier van Oranje Nassau', which was awarded for his local achievements. His knighthood was an acknowledgement of his work at a more national level.

7 'Niet in den handel. Gezonden aan vrienden van den Indonesiër. Een beperkt aantal exemplaren stel ik verkrijgbaar voor hen, die zich als belangstellenden bij mij aanmelden' (Tillema 1925).

8 Tillema collected these letters systematically. Freerk Leguit is in possession of a book with all the letters sent to him, thanking him for *Kromoblanda.*

9 The role and influence of Tillema in the Semarang Municipal Council deserves further investigation.

10 'Van af de instelling van den gemeenteraad van Semarang heeft Tillema geestdriftig en stelselmatig zich gewijd aan de hygienische vraagstukken, waar-voor de semarangsche, als bijna elke locale raad, zich al spoedig zag geplaatst. Door middel van zijn groote belezenheid op hygienisch gebied is hij een hoog te waardeeren wegwijzer geworden op een hier nog onbegaan gebied en ook baanbreker werd hij door de bezieling, welke hij wist te wekken; door zijne bijzondere gave om, buiten den kleinen kring van den gemeenteraad, ook het zoo moeilijk te veroveren Indische publiek tot aandacht en tot waardering te brengen voor zijn vurig en sterk streven, dat uitsluitend op het eerste levensbelang der massa, op hare gezondheid, was gericht.' (*De Locomotief,* 18 mei 1914, vol. 63, no. 113, 2e blad).

11 '[M]ede zij 't weer Tillema's onvermoeide kompilatie…werden de wantoestanden tenminste min of meer algemeen en zelfs officieel erkend' (Karsten 1930:159–60).

12 Tillema strongly promoted adequate and hygienic city extension. To prevent military use of the hill area south of Semarang—via an Indonesian intermediary, probably Raden Mas Soenaijo—he had the land bought and resold it to the government without personal gain on condition that it would not be used for military barracks, as was intended in the city extension of Tjandi Baroe (personal comment Freerk Leguit). Under the title 'Toekomstig Semarang' (No. AA 135), the Tillema archive in the Leiden Museum voor Volkenkunde has a short description of the extension plan in the hill area published by the Dienst van het Gemeentelijk Grondbedrijf. It says that there are two directions in which the improvement of

Semarang could be achieved, namely exploitation of the hilly terrain south of Semarang and improvement of old Semarang. The first step required for the extension of the city was the construction of the Nieuwe Tjandiweg as an incentive to stimulate the creation of a garden city there and to foster municipal housing construction for such businesses as the Netherlands Indies Railroad Company (NIS). The land along the main roads would be occupied by houses for Europeans, while the valleys were designated for kampong development. The planning and development of New-Tjandi deserves further scholarly attention.

13 Another congress planned for 1915, which did not take place, was an incentive to start with his work on *Kromoblanda* (personal comment Freerk Leguit).

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11
Surabaya

The bridge to Madura
Manuelle Franck

Introduction

Surabaya, Indonesia's second city, with a population of 2.5 million inhabitants (in 2000) is East Java's provincial capital. Although Surabaya was among the major ports of the Indonesian archipelago before and during the colonial era, and one of its prominent industrial cities, far ahead of Jakarta, it has since then been overshadowed by the national capital. Today, political and economic power is concentrated in Jakarta and this city is the major interface between global and national logistics and flows. The primacy of the national capital is the consequence of excess centralization, as examples from Thailand or the Philippines also demonstrate. However, this is somewhat curbed by the archipelago's size and the tradition of its port cities that were linked within a little-hierarchic network (Charras and Franck 2000). Surabaya has become a conjunct of Jakarta, but as a gateway to Eastern Indonesia it shares with Jakarta the servicing of the national territory. Despite its secondary town characteristics, rapid urban expansion has occurred around Surabaya, shaping urban corridors integrated by communication infrastructures. The 'Suramadu Bridge', a project that involves national and local interested parties, contributes to orientate this urban expansion.

Surabaya: East Java's service centre

In East Java, the high population density and the intensity of interactions between the cities and the rural hinterland, sustained by a dense communication network, has contributed to shape a well-developed and balanced urban system that is hierarchically organized and historically dominated by Surabaya. The role of Surabaya over its surroundings has not fundamentally changed since the colonial period, in spite of the reorientation of the economy, which was mostly internationally oriented during the colonial times and since independence has been more domestically oriented (Mackie 1993). The city still takes the products from inside the province and redistributes manufactured goods, which have been made in its industrial zones or imported through its port. During colonial times, Surabaya was an important service and industrial centre servicing the rich plantation sector. Its metallurgical industry was developed for the construction of the railway network and to provide and repair the machinery of the sugar industry (Charras 1990). Surabaya then drew a large share of the province's plantation crop, which was exported to Europe. After the collapse of the plantation economy in the

1930s, the economy of the province, further damaged by the Second World War, had difficulties recovering. It was only in the 1970s that East Java resumed its economic growth thanks to the green revolution that helped to increase food crop production. The industrial sector then began to recover with a demandled industrialization that answered the needs of a population with higher living standards (Dick, Fox and Mackie 1993). In the 1990s, a more export-oriented industrial production began to challenge this domestic market orientation.

Similar to a century ago, Surabaya is the main national and international sea gate of the province[1] and has become a land and air transport hub. Surabaya also remains the major service centre of East Java. Its administrative rank as a provincial capital gave the city important administrative functions and commanding power over its territorial unit. Surabaya is the leading commercial and financial centre, with national and foreign bank branches and a stock exchange. In addition, its level of social infrastructures is by far the highest of the province. Surabaya's primacy is not as obvious in the industrial sector, as industrial activities have spilled over the municipal limits. The scattering of agro-industries all over the province, especially around Jember, together with the existence of specialized industrial centres, such as Kediri (*kretek* cigarette industry), are also factors limiting Surabaya's industrial primacy.

Patterns of contemporary expansion: the polycentric agglomeration

The emergence of urban corridors in East Java and the pattern of Surabaya's recent development show a marked convergence, although at a lower scale, with the dynamics and patterns of growth of the Southeast Asian metropolitan areas, including Jakarta (Goldblum 1998). The tendency toward homogenization of land uses and society in the city centres and their specialization in the modern service sector explains the transformation of the urban core landscapes, as high-rise office buildings or shopping malls are being built. Meanwhile, industrial activities and residential estates are spreading into the peripheries. The compared land value in the core and urban fringes, together with less restrictive environmental or zoning regulations in the fringe areas, explain much of these dynamics. The industrial activities tend to disappear from the city centres, thus favouring the expansion of smaller towns in the surrounding area. In the peripheries, this mixture of activities (which has often led to land-use conflicts) and the employment structure of the population have contributed to the blurring of the rural-urban distinction, typical of what McGee calls the *kotadesasasi* process (McGee 1991).

These dynamics are consequences of the integration of the metropolitan areas into the international economy. The Indonesian economy became more integrated into the world economy in the mid-1980s following the shift in economic policies, from import substitution to export promotion. Investments poured into the industrial sector as part of the international division of labour and investment strategies of the corporate firms. The development of industrial and service activities also stimulated investments in the real-estate sector, while liberalization in banking allowed easy access to credit and speculative investments in the private construction sector (Tardiyana 2000). Until the 1997 economic crisis, the promoters of the 'verticalization' and horizontal extension of the cities were the

big Sino-Indonesian or Soeharto family conglomerates, which were closely linked to the previous New Order regime.

In Surabaya, private investment in the property sector began in the mid-1980s and became highly speculative during the 1990s. Land speculation and the number of land development projects increased with the rising demand from an expanding middle class, enriched by the economic growth related to the export-oriented policy. In the mid-1990s, almost all the property development projects were concentrated in the hands of about ten conglomerates, from Jakarta and Surabaya (Dick 2002). This process led to the physical restructuring of the city centre and to the acceleration in the spatial expansion of the city within and outside the municipality boundaries (Figure 11.1). This followed a mainly north-south direction later reinforced by an east-west expansion. The population growth has been quicker in the urban fringes and in the neighbouring districts than in the municipality itself.[2]

The business district has tended to extend and then split into several districts following the same north-south direction as the city's general expansion direction (Figure 11.2). This direction follows the Kalimas River, from the coastal settlements towards the southern area of Wonokromo. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the construction of the first steam tramway line, later developed into an electric tramway line (which operated until 1968), linked the Tanjung Perak Port to the rest of the city and reinforced the river line direction. The business district, situated in the Jembatan Merah area during colonial times, moved to north Tunjungan and more recently to the area of Tunjungan-Basuki-Rachmat-Pemuda. Although different types of land uses and dwelling units can still be found around these central business districts, the construction of shopping malls or of integrated 'super blocks'[3] symbolize their functions. Examples of this process are the Surabaya Plaza shopping mall on Pemuda Street which faces the World Trade Centre building, and located nearby, the Tunjungan Plaza complex which has a shopping mall, an international hotel, two high-rise office buildings and two condominiums.

Traditional dwellings in rehabilitated kampongs[4] or informal settlements are found extensively in Surabaya. New types of dwellings of various sizes, built in housing estates, also contribute to the city expansion process. Favoured by Surabaya's upper and middle classes, expatriates and members of the business community from southern Kalimantan or eastern Indonesia who settle in Surabaya are the modern, exclusive residential estates of a few hectares and the huge integrated new towns.

Following the 1978 Surabaya Master Plan, land redevelopment has been rapid towards the east, dedicated to education and residential uses. The south-eastern tip of the city benefited from its proximity to the industrial zone of Rungkut and the airport, while education facilities and good water supply helped attract new settlements elsewhere in the east. Almost all areas assigned by the plan in the eastern sub-districts have now been built and the built environment reaches the shore in the northeast and has begun to encroach further southeast. Expansion towards the west, following the master plan dedicated to industrial and residential uses, only began in the 1980s because of poor infrastructures, including water supply and dry land conditions. However, the conversion of land to industrial and residential uses, around the new town of Darmo Satellite, has been

Figure 11.1 Photograph of high-rise
city centre landscape: a view from
Tunjungan Plaza.

Figure 11.2 Map of Surabaya land use.

rapid since the 1990s, boosted by the completion of the city's first western toll road (Figures 11.3 and 11.4) (Dick 2002; Kotamadya Surabaya 1978; Silas 2002). Pakuwon, Dharmala and Ciputra groups, all big players in the property development business and listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, are developing their self-contained satellite cities, endowed with every high-class facility, including an international school (in Ciputra Citra

Figure 11.3 Photograph of new real
estate in Simomulyo, built between the
western toll road and Darmo Satellite
new town.

Raya) and golf courses. Five years after the 1997 crisis, which slowed the process of new real-estate development and froze many projects, observers found the property market gloomy (*Kompas* 21 October 2002). Nevertheless, new estates that opened were quickly sold, as land remained a security investment for the upper-middle classes. Therefore, the old southwards linear expansion of Surabaya is still active as many of the small- and medium-size housing estates that are built in Sidoarjo are now being challenged by those east and west lateral developments. Locations of new malls or shopping centres[5] indicate these new directions of urban expansion.

Industrial activities are located in clusters situated around the old Ngagel industrial zone dating back to the colonial times, the Rungkut industrial area in the southeast and in dry lands of the western district of Tandes (Dick 2002; Kotamadya Surabaya 1978). Within the municipality, almost all the new industrial plants have been built on the fringes of the core urban area as the municipality boundaries were extended in 1965, and because the first Surabaya Master Plan drafted in the 1970s segregated the residential and industrial land uses.

Figure 11.4 Photograph of one of the
luxury houses on Jalan Raya Darmo
Permai in Darmo Satellite new town.

However, most of the industrial spread is happening outside the municipality boundaries. The rapid industrial expansion since the mid-1980s has led to fast congestion of the planned industrial zones and to the development of private industrial estates outside the municipality boundaries. The Gresik northern district is a cluster of heavy and often polluting industries, following the setting up of a cement plant in the late 1950s, a thermal power station and a fertilizer plant in the 1970s. The district of Sidoarjo has been the site of no less than 3,000 ha of industrial zones projects, all approved and realized between 1984 and 1994 (Dick 2002). Factories have been set up in the Pandaan area, halfway between Surabaya and Malang, and since the 1970s their numbers have greatly increased. Therefore, the industrial activities have tended to spill over from the municipality limits and to settle, in a thin strip, along the main communication axis leading toward Gresik northwestwards and Malang southwards, but also more recently towards Pasuruan eastwards and along the two banks of the Brantas River towards Mojokerto westwards.

The pattern of urban expansion is therefore one of a 'thickening' in every direction of the core areas, giving it a halo shape, to be added to the older north-south expansion direction and occurring at two different scales: within the municipal boundaries, and at the scale of the province. A star-shaped core area with its commanding centre in Surabaya organizes and polarizes the province's space (Figure 11.5). It extends along the north-south axis Gresik-Surabaya-Malang, and the east-west axis Surabaya-Pasuruan and Surabaya-Mojokerto, most of it located in the rich agricultural area of the Brantas River Valley. The villages and cities located along these axes have registered the quickest population growth rates since the 1960s (Franck 1993; Figure 11.6). The history of some of

Figure 11.5 Map of East Java core area.

Figure 11.6 Man of East Java cities, growth rate 1961–80.

the bigger cities of this core area, like Gresik, Mojokerto, Pasuruan or Malang, can be traced back to pre-colonial or colonial times, and their central position has long been reinforced by administrative functions or the municipality status. Their growth has been recently boosted by industrial expansion. Smaller towns, such as Gempol, are growing

thanks to their location at the crossroads of communication routes, or because of their locations along the main roads, which direct much of the built environment's expansion. The new clusters usually have more specialized residential,[6] industrial or leisure functions.[7] These urban dynamics, which have benefited from the spreading of industrial activities outside of Surabaya, end up meeting Malang to shape an urban corridor. In fact, the concentration of manufacturing activities in this corridor has increased, as can be seen from the data of the economic censuses from 1986 and 1996. These showed that in 1986 52 per cent of employment in large and medium industries was found in the corridor, and in 1996, 62 per cent (Dick 2002). Since then, more than 80 per cent of the new domestic approved investments between 1996 and 2000 were located in this core area[8] (data BKPM). This corridor takes the shape of a polycentric agglomeration linking the coast and the inside territories. It represents a new scale of urban organization[9] regrouping various sizes of towns and the countryside, integrated within a common dynamic—a scheme widely found in other Asian densely populated metropolitan areas (Sanjuan 2000).

The Suramadu project: between national and local visions of development

The structuring process of the urban corridors is highly shaped and spatially oriented by the communication networks, giving access to new portions of the territory which, if needed because of the pressure of investors for land, could be developed and integrated to the dynamic described above. The bridge project linking the island of Madura to Surabaya, called the Suramadu Bridge, would allow the western part of Madura to integrate the expansion dynamic of Surabaya as an outlet for activities and populations originating from Surabaya, which could settle on the Madurese dry and cheaper land. This project was part of the Gerbangkertosusila, the planning region for Greater Surabaya, which groups Surabaya and the cities of Gresik and Lamongan in the northwest, Mojokerto in the west, Sidoarjo in the south and Bangkalan, on Madura Island. The Gerbangkertosusila concept was first proposed in the early 1980s by the Japanese cooperation agency JICA. Associated with the development of industrial zones in Madura, which would increase the bridge's traffic and ensure its profitability, the bridge was to be partly financed by the private sector. However, this bridge has encountered strong opposition from the Madurese population, led by some of their Islamic ulamas.

This project is one of the huge New Order Indonesia mega-projects, significant of the top-down planning process, which symbolize the central government's will to lead the nation towards modernization and development by rapid industrialization, within the context of growing integration to the world economy. Supported by a nationalist rhetoric emphasizing the necessity of modernizing Indonesia, these projects also involve important private financial interests. As seen before, private investors are partly responsible for the extension of the built environment shaping urban corridors around Surabaya. They are also involved in big development projects, which closely intermingle public authorities' visions and private interests.

Suramadu: a central government-led project involving key New Order actors

The idea to link Madura and Surabaya with a bridge can be traced back to the 1960s, but it really took shape in the mid-1980s when President Soeharto asked BPPT, the State Agency for Applied Technologies, headed by B.J. Habibie, to coordinate a feasibility study for bridge linkage of the Indonesian islands of Sumatra, Madura and Bali to Java (a project called Tri Nusa Bima Sakti). The conclusions recommended beginning with the Surabaya-Madura Bridge, easier technically and with better profitability prospects.

The Suramadu Bridge would be the longest Indonesian bridge, the design planned for a 5.4km-long and 21m-wide bridge, built 35 m over the sea level. This was to ensure easy navigation around its piles, especially for the navy frigates, as Surabaya is also a navy base. The design has recently been updated by teams from the Ministry of Equipment (Departemen Kimpraswil), the East Java Government and the Technologic Institute Sepuluh November of Surabaya (ITS). The bridge project, using cable stay technology, has been enlarged to allow four additional lanes for two-wheeled vehicles and pedestrians. The distance between piles has also been enlarged, from 200 m to 600 m on request of the navy.

On the Surabaya side, the bridge is located in the sub-district of Kenjeran, where 7.85 ha of land is needed for its development. It should be connected to the eastern Surabaya toll ring road, which when completed, will allow travel from Madura or the Surabaya port of Tanjung Perak to the airport in the southeast without going through the city centre. Since 1987, the western toll ring road already allows travel from Gresik or the port of Tanjung Perak, to Waru in the south, giving access to the new towns and industrial areas of the northwest and west of Surabaya.

On the Madurese side, 35 ha are needed in the sub-district of Labang located in the western Bangkalan District. The first project was part of the planning guidelines for East Java and the outline plans for Surabaya and Bangkalan (Pemerintah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur 1990; Pemerintah Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Bangkalan 1991). It planned for a package linking the construction of the bridge and the development of industrial zones. In Madura, 3,000 ha would be developed near the bridge as an industrial zone for clean industries and housing estates. In a second step, industrial zones for heavy industries and port infrastructures would concern all the north coast of Madura. In a third step, development projects would extend to the rest of the island, especially in the sectors of tourism and energy. Madura has many unspoiled beaches and huge offshore gas deposits have been discovered in the eastern tip. For those second and third steps, 12,000 ha would be necessary.

The Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 55/1990 gave the Minister of Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie, the responsibility for the construction of the bridge and the industrial zones. The governor of East Java, then Soelarso, shared with another influential East Java personality, Mohammad Noer, the responsibility for the local coordination of the project. Soon after, B.J.Habibie appointed the private enterprise P.T. Dhipa Madura Pradana, headed by M.Noer, as the prime contractor of the project *(pelaksana proyek)*.

B.J.Habibie was a key figure of the New Order regime, ending his New Order political career as president of Indonesia as he occupied the function of vice-president when Soeharto was forced to step down from power in 1998. He is famous for promoting the

vision of a national development based on national industry and technology, and for pushing for the development of high-tech national industries, even at huge cost (Hill 1992). As a close connection of Soeharto, who has never failed to support him, his power extended over several institutions related to technology and industry. Apart from his Ministry of Research and Technology, he headed the Agency of Applied Technology (BPPT), involved in research and technology transfer activities. He also headed the BPIS, a board coordinating national high technology and strategic enterprises among which are found IPTN, the national aeronautic industry and P.T.PAL, the national shipyard located in Surabaya.

Mohammad Noer is an influential personality of Madurese origin, and a former governor of the province of East Java between 1967 and 1976. His governor's mandate has been considered quite positive for East Java's development, plunged by then into poverty and economic recession (Dick, Fox and Mackie 1993), especially because of its commitment to infrastructure development and industrialization. This reputation has assured him a long-lasting popularity in East Java. Among his achievements related to today's Suramadu project, he thought to ease the relations between Surabaya and Madura by moving the ferry terminal of Surabaya to Tanjung Perak where it could stay open 24 hours a day.[10] He also initiated the development of the 200 ha industrial zone in Rungkut (P.T.SIER), southeast of Surabaya, to decongest the old industrial zone of Ngagel, developed by the municipality in 1916, and to attract industrial investments as a first step towards a renewal of industrialization in the province after years of recession. Mohammad Noer is also keeping close relations with the national and provincial business circles and his name appears among the commissioners of enterprises operating in East Java, such as P.T.Berlina, or East Java private television station SCTV owned by one of Soeharto's children, Bambang Trihatmodjo (Kitley 1994).

The financing scheme of the project and the companies involved show the prominent role of Japan as a main business partner for New Order Indonesia. Since the collapse of Bank Summa in 1992, which was supposed to fund the project, its financing rested mainly (80 per cent) on a soft loan from OECF, the Japanese development aid fund, to Japanese and Indonesian public and private companies grouped in a consortium. Japanese companies were already involved in upstream operations. JICA, the Japanese cooperation agency, has long been active in planning projects in East Java. For instance, the JICA feasibility study for the construction of a second bridge linking Madura to Gresik was completed in 1996. Japanese consultants took part in the feasibility and technical studies under the supervision of JIF, the Japan Indonesia Science and Technology Forum, in close cooperation with BPPT. A number of Japanese companies were involved in the financing scheme or in the tendering process, such as Sumitomo Corporation, Mitsubishi and Shimizu Corporation. In return for the OECF loan, the Japanese government claimed priority access for its companies to Madura (Muthmainnah 1998).11 The Indonesian public and private companies were all well connected companies. M.Noer's P.T. DMP, public Indonesian companies controlled by B.J. Habibie's BPIS (P.T.PAL, Krakatau Steel), the public toll road company P.T.Jasa Marga, and P.T.SIER which operates the industrial zone of Surabaya were part of the Indonesian consortium. Prominent Indonesian groups Jaya and Bimantara[12] were in a good position to be awarded the contract for the bridge building in the mid-1990s (McMichael 1998).

The central government's vision: to overcome archipelagic division and promote a modern and balanced development

Uniting and managing an archipelago as wide and diverse as Indonesia has always been a challenge for its central governments. Apart from centralization, a political life under close supervision, the spreading of the national language and the *Pancasila* principles,[13] the New Order regime favoured territorial integration as a guarantee to national unity. Many development projects involved communication infrastructures, from satellites to sea, air or land networks. Even though the archipelago's history has demonstrated that the sea was more a unifying than a dividing factor, the bridge between the islands will erase the various constraints caused by the sea. In a country where the maritime area is almost three times the size of the land area, the country seems to have turned its back on the sea.

No New Order Ministry of Maritime Affairs was in charge of coordinating its exploitation. The merchant fleet is still underdeveloped, as is the fishing fleet. The sea transport system, although upgraded in the mid-1980s, is still not sufficient to serve the eastern part of the archipelago. Indonesia's claim to become an archipelagic state, ensuring its sovereignty over the seas and the land, as well as the concept of the 'maritime continent', popular in the mid-1990s, show more security and sovereignty concerns than the acknowledgement of a maritime specificity (Raillon 1997). The bridges could ensure continuity instead of division, but at huge cost.

The Madurese project is also one of the typical New Order symbol plans—windows of a modern and productive Indonesia. Development *(pembangunan)* has been the motto of the New Order with industrialization becoming an important issue. After years of import substitution policies, protecting emerging national industries, the policies were shifted in the mid-1980s towards industrial export promotion and competition to attract foreign investments. With its modern bridge linking the island to the mainland, its container handling port, industrial and residential estates, and leisure resorts, Madura could become an attractive location for investors and contribute as such to national development. The scheme has often been compared with the Batam Island development project (where B.J.Habibie headed the central government agency in charge of its development) which transformed this Riau Island into an industrial and resort extension for Singapore.

The issue of a more balanced spatial distribution of development, especially for eastern Indonesia, has often been discussed among Indonesian power circles, especially since 1990 when the concept of the 'Eastern Part of Indonesia' *(Indonesia Bagian Timur)* began to have a budgetary content. The strategic location of Madura, in the geographic centre of the archipelago, halfway between the two mythic ends of the country, Sabang and Merauke, has not escaped the planners' and consultants' attention (JIF and Parsons Polytech 1993). Endowed with adequate infrastructures, among which a new harbour offering container-handling facilities, Madura could become a new hub for the Indonesian economy, polarizing its share of national and international trade and, as a new growth pole, promoting the integration of eastern Indonesia to the national economy. One can doubt this sole localization advantage, based on geographic considerations, could be sufficient to turn the poor and underdeveloped island of Madura into a new economic centre. It seems more reasonable to consider the development of the island in relation to Surabaya's expansion.

At the regional scale: to promote Madura's development and redirect Surabaya's spatial expansion

Since the recessions in the 1960s and 1970s and until the 1997 economic crisis, the province of East Java enjoyed a booming economy, growing at a fast rate of 7 to 8 per cent a year. New investments that poured into the province in the 1990s were mainly directed towards the industrial sector. They allowed Surabaya and its surroundings to retain their position as the second industrial cluster after Jakarta, and led to Surabaya's endowment with some of the symbols associated with world cities. Today, the industrial fabric includes a wide range of products and size of enterprises. These include basic industries, labour industries and more sophisticated activities in chemicals or consumers goods, both private and public. The value of industrial production and exports grew quickly, as did the workforce employed in the manufacturing sector (*Statistic Yearbook of East Java,* annual). The intermediate 1995 population census (SUPAS) showed the province's positive migration balance, reversing for the first time the years-old trend of out-migration (BPS 1997).[14]

In this context of growth, the built environment and industrial plants have spilled over Surabaya boundaries. The encroaching of non-agricultural land use on precious irrigated rice fields of the Brantas River Valley has led the planning provincial teams to look towards the dryer Rembang limestone hills, in the districts of Lamongan and Tuban,[15] as potential sites for industrial developments and to spare the irrigated rice lands. The Rembang hills extend into Madura Island, which is also suffering from drought, scarcity of water resources and infertile soils (most of its soils are classified as poor soils, *tanah kritis*). In spite of these natural constraints, the population density is high (in 2000, almost 3.2 million inhabitants and a mean density of 650 inhabitants per km^2). The mean education level and purchase power are among the lowest of East Java. Poverty and population pressure have fuelled migration streams to East Java and to the rest of Indonesia. To industrialize Madura would contribute to alleviating Madurese poverty. But Surabaya's expansion issue is also at stake. Integrating Madura into the city's dynamic would create an alternative to the southward urban and industrial expansion towards Sidoarjo and Malang. The western tip of Madura Island is less than 10 km from northeast Surabaya, much nearer than the Sidoarjo southern district. Surabaya's activities and population could then pour into the nearest Madurese Bangkalan District, a process that would reverse the centuries-old orientation of migration flows, but would also confirm the tradition of openness of Bangkalan towards Surabaya and the Javanese land.

Madurese opposition

Even though interesting from a planning point of view, the projects have encountered strong opposition in Madura. The bridge would certainly ease the congested traffic between Surabaya and Madura, but the Madurese have refused the industrialization projects as formulated by the government. They believe an exogenous industrialization would not benefit the people because of its low education level; it would also drown the Madurese under a huge stream of newcomers. The New Order regime has caused many community difficulties following development projects which where imposed from the

top. In Batam, the local population were totally excluded from the development process. The same could be said of the gas field exploitation and the petrochemical downstream industry of Lhokseumawe,[16] an industrial enclave that turned its back on the Acehnese people (Effendi 1979; Fau 2003). Even in Java, the peasants living near the Cilegon steel plant, Krakatau Steel, have sold their land but have not been employed locally (*Jawa Pos* 4 July 1994). Industrialization would confiscate Madurese peasants' land and benefit newcomers, whose traditions and religion would not necessarily fit with the Madurese.

Madura is an Islamic land and religion is an essential component of its culture where ulamas occupy a central position in the society (Van Dijk, De Jonge and Touwen-Bouwsma 1995). Some of them, grouped in an association named Bassra, organized the resistance to the industrialization projects. Interestingly, the association formulated propositions for a step-by-step endogenous industrialization based on agro-industries, utilizing local resources and employing local manpower, who would be given time for training, notably in the Islamic schools, the *pesantren*. The logic underlying these propositions is to ensure people's participation in the development process. This is different to the government's logic, backed up by consultants, who foresee the development of Madura as a consequence of the trickle down effects of modern and massive industrialization. The debate has not reached any consensus but it has had the merit to underline the main bias and issues of those huge top-down development projects. However, the famous Madurese resistance capacity[17] has made local industrialists quite apprehensive and unwilling to invest in such a strained social context.

Central government vision would have certainly overridden this resistance capacity had the problem of financing the bridge been overcome. Negotiations with OECF were taking place at the highest level (in May 1997, B.J.Habibie and Basofi Sudirman, then governor of East Java were again visiting Japan to discuss the matter), when the economic crisis froze the whole project. The cost of the bridge construction was then estimated at 605 billion Rupiah, to which had to be added the cost of developing side infrastructures necessary to any industrial development. Among them, the water supply was a very costly one, as dams had not been constructed in Madura itself and water had to be brought from Java.

Land speculation

In spite of the uncertainty about the construction of the bridge and the industrial estates, land speculation in the areas nearing the bridge or planned industrial or residential zones has become strong. Investors gambled on an effective fulfilment of the projects and used figureheads to negotiate pieces of land, as land changed hands several times. In 1996, 300–500 ha had been released, mostly on the Madurese side. But hundreds of hectares were in the hands of land speculators, waiting to negotiate them to developers (*Republika* 9 July 1996). Dharmala, one of the biggest Surabaya developers with previous involvement in residential and industrial estates (for example Graha Family New Town in western Surabaya or Ngoro Industry Park in Mojokerto), was said to already own large tracts of land. The Salim Group, one of the biggest Sino-Indonesian conglomerates, bought 450 ha of land in 1980 to build a cement factory (*Surya* 22 July 1994). This land is waiting today for conversion, as the cement factory has been constructed in Tuban. The

sub-districts of Kamal, Socah and Labang that were chosen, after debates, as locations for the future industrial and residential zones, and the sub-district of Kenjeran in Surabaya, have witnessed growing transactions.

Because of land speculation, the price of the land increased heavily, hindering the profitability prospect of the future industrial zones and making it difficult for public authorities to free the necessary land for the physical infrastructures. Prices reported by the press or civil organizations, although sometimes whimsical, showed a strong tendency towards a rapid increase. In Kenjeran, Surabaya, the value of 1 m^2 of land was about 4,000 Rupiah at the beginning of the 1990s. After the 1993 Presidential Decree (Keppres 55/1993) requiring the price of land to be fixed by consensus between the owner and the buyer, prices went up to 25,000 Rupiah per m^2. In 1996, some owners claimed up to 500,000 Rupiah per m^2. Meanwhile, BPPT negotiated the land necessary to implant the bridge feet at a comparative low price of 7,000 Rupiah per m^2. On the Madurese side, land was valued at 4,000 Rupiah per m^2 in 1994 and went up to 80,000 Rupiah in 1997. Today, there is still a tenfold gap between public administration's offers and the market price. In 2002, the provincial government offered 25,000 Rupiah per m^2 and the owners claimed 250,000 Rupiah (various issues of *Jawa Pos, Surabaya Pos; Kompas* 10 October 2002).

The project since the 1997 crisis

In order to calm Madurese opposition and unlock the situation, the government had agreed in 1996 to dissociate the 'bridge-industrial zones package', a dissociation that has been confirmed since (*Suara Pembaruan* 3 January 1996). The crisis stopped several big infrastructure projects (Keppres No. 39/1997), including the Suramadu Bridge. In 2002 the project was unearthed again with a Presidential Decree (Keppres No. 15/2002, dated 22 March 2002). Seven years have passed since the crisis. Since the implementation of the 1999 decentralization law some of the excesses of centralization and of top-down planning have diminished. However, the bridge project stays a central government matter, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Equipment (Departemen Kimpraswil), which is in charge of all the big infrastructure projects, even though, like in the 1990s, the provincial authorities showed marked signs of impatience.

The financing scheme of the bridge has not yet been settled. After the devaluation of the Rupiah, the cost now reaches 2.3 trillion, to be shared between the national budget (APBN), the provincial budget (APBD), the Indonesia Highway Corporation (P.T.Jasa Marga) and by a foreign loan for the largest part of the cost (1.5 trillion). The share of APBN has not been determined yet, as East Java's authorities are pressing upon central government to increase its share from 200 billion Rupiah as a whole, up to 200 billion per year for four years. Japan has disappeared from the project's scene. As for the foreign loan, a loan from Kuwait collapsed but the press have reported on the eventuality of a barter trade agreement with China (*Kompas* 28 November 2002). As local authorities have not been allowed by the Ministry of Finance to issue municipal bonds or to negotiate a long-term loan abroad, due to it being too risky in the context of the devaluating Rupiah, the situation seems to be locked again, as other big costly infrastructure projects are equally urgent in the province and elsewhere in Indonesia.

The bridge issue has recently been the subject of many forums and presentations in East Java, the principle of its fulfilment seldom challenged as the multiplier effects on the Madurese economy would be obvious. Surabaya and Madura could nevertheless be brought together at lower cost, by improving the ferry navigation. This could be done by modernizing and increasing the number of decks and ferries, and by developing the roll-on roll-off means of transport. As for the population, the cost of crossing through the toll bridge would probably far exceed the cost of crossing by ferry. The timing of the resurgence of this project raises doubts about whether it would be an electoral argument in the 2004 presidential election. The dramas of the bridge have led to strange rumours that have spread as far as Mojokerto or Sidoarjo, attesting that a thousand children's heads should be sacrificed to ensure its construction.

Toward Madura's integration into the world economy?

The Suramadu Bridge project is symbolic of processes and people shaping the mega-urban regions, which involve powerful private and public interested parties, the latter sometimes fighting over the leadership of the project.[18] It reflects the New Order vision of development based on modern and exogenous industrialization and private capital's appetite for land development and infrastructure projects. The first stone of the bridge is not yet laid, but the project has already increased land value and land transactions. It has also made the eastern toll ring road of Surabaya a high priority, and has accelerated the urban expansion towards the northeast of the city.[19]

There is a conflicting vision of development between central government, represented in this case by B.J.Habibie, famous for his involvement in mega-projects and connected with Japanese companies, and the Madurese people led by their ulamas. The New Order's development achievements are far from insignificant, especially in Java, as the oil revenues have fuelled public investments in agriculture and industry sectors, as well as in infrastructures and social services. But public investments retreated with the drying up of this financial manna in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the development motto benefited mostly well-connected private companies.

East Java's Province Authorities and the Surabaya Municipality support the project as they are eager to stick to their commitment to infrastructure development, in order to offer an environment attractive to business in the area. They take the most active part in today's budget research to finance major infrastructure projects, among which is the Suramadu Bridge, and the completion of several toll roads to upgrade Surabaya's linkages with other cities of the province's core area (Surabaya-Mojokerto, Gempol-Pasuruan and Gempol-Malang). The implementation of these projects would probably help East Java resume with the international part of its economy, hit badly by the 1997 crisis and by internal political uncertainty. Surabaya could then go on competing for its international status alongside its well secured national status.

Bangkalan District Authorities also defend the project and do not try to protect Madurese insularity. East Java is a theatre of strong competition between districts for the attraction of industrial investments and public infrastructures. Many undeveloped districts, such as Lamongan and Tuban, have welcomed industrial projects and received huge investments.[20]

Today, the construction of the bridge has been dissociated from the development of industrial zones and the Madurese ulamas' and the people's opposition has eased up. But the financing scheme of the bridge relies on its profitability prospects, which depend on activity expansion into Madura. When the province recovers from the crisis, the western end of Madura could well become the next contiguous area of urbanization, as urbanization would spill over from Surabaya, adding a northeastern branch to the East Java star-shaped core area. Madura could become an extension of Surabaya's maritime,[21] industrial and residential activities and uses, as well as a main area for tourism.[22] This process would extend into Madura the land use, economic and social mixing-like modalities of urban sprawl found elsewhere in Surabaya's periphery. Madura Island might by then come under the impact of the global economy, which will lead to important physical, economic and social transformation.

Notes

1 Although during colonial times, Surabaya shared the export functions with other ports of the northeast coast, mostly those of the eastern tip of Java. However, since the beginning of the twentieth century, Surabaya managed to become the main port of importation of the province, and the main port for its exports as early as after independence (Dick 2002).

2

Municipality/ District	Population				Growth rate (% year)		
	1971	1980	1990	2000	1971–80	1980–90	1990–2000
Surabaya	1,556,255	2,017,527	2,483,821	2,588,816	2.93	2.10	0.41
Gresik	610,944	728,570	856,853	996,608	1.98	1.64	1.52
Sidoarjo	667,639	853,685	1,167,467	1,549,883	2.77	3.18	2.87

Source: BPS, Population Census.

3 The super blocks are integrated estates, which associate a shopping mall with office and residential buildings. This model of high-rise buildings has been exported by property developers, often of Asian origin, in the largest cities of Asia.

4 Kampongs or 'urban villages' are traditional living quarters in Indonesian towns. Indonesia, and especially Surabaya, is famous for its kampong improvement programmes (KIP), which began in the 1970s and emphasized community participation to the kampong upgrading. In central Jakarta where the pressure for land is the strongest, these kampong areas were often redeveloped in the 1990s.

5 Like Galaxy Mall, built near Kertajaya Street in the east or the planned H.R. Muhammad Square or Pakuwon Trade Centre in the west side. Shophouses (or *ruko, rumah-toko*) and shops in modern trade centres are the new types of shops favoured by trades people in Surabaya today.

6 Property developers call 'clusters' exclusive housing estates where entrance is often only possible through one gate.

7 The leisure clusters can be associated with golf courses or theme parks. New settlements are also developing along the Pandaan, Tretes or Trawas route, where the main upland stations are located.

8 For the foreign approved investments, the percentage is only 20 per cent because of huge investments occurring in Tuban (see notes 16 and 21 below).

9 This scale of urban organization is the object of theoretical debates which will not be discussed here. See for example McGee and Robinson (1995) or Scott (2001).

10 The previous ferry terminal was located on navy land. As such, its access was forbidden at night between 6pm and 6am.

11 Sumitomo Corp. submitted in 1996 a project for developing 2,000 ha of land as a kind of 'Disneyland' in Madura.

12 The Jaya group is a venture between Jakarta local government (40 per cent) and P.T.Pembangunan Jaya founded in 1961 by Ir. Ciputra, who later created the Ciputra Group involved in real-estate activity. Bimantara is Soeharto's son Bambang Trihatmodjo's company. The crisis froze the project and these companies were not awarded the contract.

13 The five principles of the *Pancasila* are: to believe in god, humanity, national unity, consensus and representation, social justice.

14 A trend which is not confirmed by the 2000 population census held after the 1997 crisis.

15 A new abbreviation calls Gelangban the area of Gresik, Lamongan and Tuban, planned by provincial authorities to become a new industrial area. P.T. Semen Gresik has already moved a Gresik plant to Tuban, as an alternative location to Madura.

16 Lhokseumawe is even today the site of a scandal following the discovery of mass graves in 1998.

17 There was a strong resistance in Madura to the construction of a dam in Nipah, in Sampang District in the early 1990s. The dam project was scrapped.

18 See Muthmainnah (1998) for a detailed chronology of the project, showing frictions between BPPT and the Ministry of Public Works for the leadership of the project. Habibie's BPPT was also allied to the Japanese companies, opposing M.Noer's P.T.DMP as allied to the Bupati of Bangkalan for the choice of the location of the industrial and residential estates in the north or the south of Madura.

19 The proximity to the future eastern toll ring road is an advertisement selling point for real-estate developers.

20 In the mid-1990s, B.J.Habibie was toying with the competition between the districts, telling Madura that the development projects would be moved to other more willing localities. While negotiating with Madurese ulamas, he publicized his touring with Lamongan Bupati in search of 7,000 ha for industrial development (Muthmainnah 1998). On the industrialization point of view, Madura has actually missed opportunities. Probolinggo has gained the Paiton coal-fired steam power plant project, Tuban a cement plant, an olefin and an ethylene plant (McMichael 1998). Lamongan is also an interesting alternative location for industrial plants even though the water supply remains one of the main industrial development constraints.

21 One of the options to help solve the problem of the regular silting up of Surabaya's port, as well as alleviating Surabaya's ports from the 1.3 million containers Tanjung Perak receives each year, would be the construction of a deep sea port in Tanjung Bumi in Madura's north coast.

22 Many projects concern leisure development and the planning guidelines for Madura will be modified to allow the zoning of port, fishing and tourism areas on the island.

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12
Tehran

A mega-city built without a vision
Soheila Shahshahani

Introduction

Bewilderment is definitely the state of mind I have fallen into while working on this chapter, searching for the vision which has made Tehran, a city chosen to become the capital of Iran in 1786. Aqa Mohammad Khan, the founder of Qajar Dynasty (1779–1925), chose this city because the military support from his pastoral nomadic group was in the vast pasture prairie of Varameen area. At that time Tehran had the character of an oriental city and later the Qajar kings added to it by renewing the walls and fortress around the city, building palaces, mosques and a bazaar. Today this city has officially a population of 7.6 million, but in reality closer to ten million. By the year 2021, 17 million people are expected to live in this mega-city. The vision I have been searching for, which should presumably have made this urban environment, is nonexistent. This has been confirmed and reconfirmed to me through various interviews and extensive reading of the material. Only in one article the lack of a vision to make Tehran was bemoaned. (I shall refer to that article later in this chapter.) So my search here will be the following: How was this city built without a vision? Who have been building it? I claim that this search shows the process of third-worldization of Iran. I warn you in advance that a sense of 'surreal' will overwhelm you. My perspective as an anthropologist has made this work possible, and my previous research on specific topics and one small section of this mega-city, which is also my native town, has been definitely helpful. Had it not been for my network of connections, I would not have been able to pursue this work.[1]

Arthur Pope in the *Survey of Persian Art,* ends the article he co-authored with E.E. Beaudouin called 'City Plans' with the following sentence: 'The Persians, at once mathematicians of historical importance and master decorators, combined the two talents essential to conceive and execute a great and significant project of urbanism' (Pope 1964:1410). Ali Madanipour, writing on Tehran from Great Britain, ends his book entitled *Tehran* (1998), with the following paragraph.

> Iran, and its capital city Tehran which houses more than a fifth of its population, have undergone considerable transformation in the modern period, a change whose dimensions and, especially, pace have been beyond control, creating tensions and political, economic, and cultural difficulties. For too long, however, this change has been seen as beyond control, managed by powers from outside and causing unforeseen consequences. This has often caused widespread cynicism among the

> citizens, who have felt powerless and have found no way to intervene in
> the restless flow of change, despite frequent and often honourable
> attempts. What is needed now is to abandon the legacy of victimization
> and of being overwhelmed by change. What is needed is to develop a
> confidence with which it is possible to appreciate the necessity of change
> as well as the need for continuity, to realize that it is not impossible to be
> in charge of change, despite its unintended consequences, and to devise
> ways of collectively managing this change and its balance with the
> continuity of the socio-spatial world.
>
> Madanipour (1998:257)

In a chapter entitled 'Building the City' he considers land, financing and labour. The vision of urbanization is neither searched, nor is it reflected anywhere else in this book. This itself reflects a specific state of mind, a way of being and thinking at a particular time in Iranian history. Although the above quote heralds taking control of change and coming to terms with it, yet it does not recognize the necessity of having an image or an ideal for change as a subject for reflection. This shows that the urgency of daily life, the overwhelming power of everyday-life concerns, have taken away the power of imagination from people. In one of my first interviews at the municipality the officer in charge was dumb-founded by my question regarding vision. Even when I limited it and asked for the presence of the idea of Iran, Islam and modernity in their urbanization projects he was very surprised by my enquiry. He said he was so overwhelmed by responding to daily urgencies of his responsibilities that there was no place for such theoretical matters.

As a note of clarification, I have to add the following: Iran was never directly colonized, but the country went through two revolutions, one in 1906 and the other in 1979. The first one was called the Constitutional Revolution and the second, the Islamic Revolution. In order to comprehend how people understand change in Iran, we can look at the following editorial of an article on the Budget and Planning Organization of Iran. I summarize it: Fifty years ago when the first development project was being written, we hoped to attain the level of England, the US and Germany. Fifteen years later, we thought we would reach Japan. After the revolution Korea was our model, and today Turkey is to be craved for. Perhaps in ten years, Armenia will become our model (*Hamshahri* 22 July 2002). This sense of loss and degradation is written four years after *Tehran* was published. This general cognitive stance prevalent in Iran and among the Iranian Diaspora could nowhere be better studied than in the heart of the country, Tehran. The issue of Vision gets to the core of the problem.

Historical background

Tehran became the capital of Iran in 1786, and 11 years later, in 1797, it had 15,000 people living in it, one-fifth of them were military personnel. At this time one-quarter of the 7.5 km^2 was covered by royal gardens and residences (Moqtader AH 1375:37). Fath Ali Shah, who ruled Iran from 1800 to 1834, bestowed the first urban plan for building the city. The king's mosque, the bazaar and a number of castles and the marble throne

were built and thus the first urban plan of Tehran was ordered by royal command. Traditional architects and masons undertook the building of these projects. Today we have a great amount of information about Tehran from this time on, as many national and international visitors have written on the physical aspects of the city (Figure 12.1).

The first urban map of Tehran was drawn in 1842 by a Russian orientalist and published in Moscow in 1852 (Moqtader AH 1375:39). The next map was produced at the Darolfonun (School of Polytechnic, which was established in 1851, as the first cornerstone of modernization in Iran). Augustus Krziz, an Austrian faculty member of the aforementioned school produced a map with more precision on streets and types of buildings (commercial, government, services, residential, military, religious and the like).

Figure 12.1 Map of Tehran.

Naser ed-Din Shah (1847–95) gave the order to rebuild the previous fortifications of the city walls and gates to Buhler, a French faculty member of the Polytechnic School (Moqtader AH 1375:41). This fortification was an octagonal of 19.2km, and had 12 gates. The first official census of Tehran in 1868 gave the population as 155,736. That is, in a matter of 80 years, it had increased tenfold. By the end of the century, its population rose to 250,000 people (Moqtader AH 1375:43).

In 1906 the Constitutional Revolution took place and within the first Iranian constitution there was the Baladiyeh Municipality Act (1907), which established the municipalities as the legal apparatus of protecting the interests of cities and citizens. Members of the city council were elected every four years. The mayor and three others elected by the council were the main figures and the most responsible in the organization. A definite problem which faced the municipalities came from the fact that their income was from 'gate tax'. This was economically not sufficient and paved the road toward dependency of municipalities upon the government. Furthermore, the decisions of the council needed the approval of the governor of Tehran, and in case of disagreement, the Ministry of Interior or the parliament could arbitrate (Madanipour 1998:66).

In 1925 a military man with a peasant background became the king of Iran, the first dynasty not to claim any pedigree of pastoral nomadic chieftainship or religious dignity. The institutional establishment of modernity in Iran is attributed to this man, Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–41), who centralized the military forces, established a modern, secular government with ministries and an educational and legal system estranged from the religious system (Banani 1961). Although there had been great zealous and intellectual efforts to modernize Iran by various nationalist forces in different cities of Iran, Reza Shah (with his incontestable relations with the British) took away that aspiration and established himself as a new despot who hid behind the legacy of modernization. If during the reign of the Qajar dynasty it was clear that urbanization was taking place according to royal order (Ma'refat AH 1375:108), during the Pahlavi I period, it was the government which decided on urban planning and behind the government there was the person of the king. 'The government decided the architectural style and it accomplished it also' (Ma'refat AH 1375:108). One of the first measures was to destroy the previous fortifications and gate (which was symbolically significant), and then to build overwhelming constructs for the ministries, the military, universities, banks, boulevards, and huge squares with statues in the middle. Any and all of these had aspects in discontinuity with previous city planning. At this time, it was not only the architects who were no longer Iranian; the masons were also brought from Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Italy, the US, France and Austria (Ma'refat AH 1375:109). Very soon Iranians who had graduated from the Polytechnic of Iran or those who had studied modern architecture abroad returned to Iran and each of them started to work according to his own architectural taste mixed with the state of the field acquired abroad. Some of the foreign architects such as Maskov from Georgia, or André Godard and Maxim Ciro from France were so infatuated by Iranian architecture that their works contained Iranian elements. The National Museum of Iran (Archaeology Museum) and the Mausoleum of the poet Hafez were designed by André Godard and bore Iranian architectural characteristics. However, no urban planning was taking shape at this time; it was the architecture of individual buildings and monuments which was apparent.

Landownership and registration of property

In urban areas, private property was legally recognized: the houses, gardens and agricultural land belonged to specific persons. Land on which no such activity had taken place was considered arable or barren according to Islamic law, and it could not be considered private property. Fath Ali Shah Qajar divided the whole of more than 1,700,000km^2 of Iran amongst his 114 children and grandchildren. 'Land was thus confirmed to be property and not capital' (Alizadeh AH 1380:5). In 1918 the first legal Act regarding official land registration was passed. This registration would replace the stamp of religious dignitaries and royal orders. According to this Act, three years was the time allocated to everyone to register his/her property. According to Shariat, barren land *(bayer)*, having once been productive *(dayer)* or made so, after signature of witnesses, could be registered under one's name. Article 14 of Civil Law, based upon Shariat, made this a legal measure. But, '…this was to become the source of extensive corruption in registering millions of square metres of land around cities, near cemeteries,

caravanserais…along rivers, under personal names' (Beski AH 1380:3). Agricultural land surrounding the cities, prairies, pastures and forests soon became personal property. Reza Shah and his immediate family became the biggest landowners in Iran (Aloudegie AH 1380). If registering property was a step toward clarifying ownership and finding means of bringing in taxation for the government, not having a clear map of urban areas or cadastre (which is still not complete), left the ground open for future debates and corruption. In 1956, a commission consisting of five persons was formed to resolve the problem of three billion square metres of land claimed by the Bank of Construction, religious foundation of Owqaf, Ministry of Finance, Police Department and others. The commission found the original registration of these lands at fault and asked for a recess of one week to study the documents. It never met again, but four other offices of registration opened a few months later in different locations in Tehran to continue their activities (Mahboubi-Ardakani AH 1380:27).

Unfortunately, the Constitutional Revolution and the reign of Pahlavi I did not pave the way toward orderly development of urbanization. Witnessing illegal activities at the top has always been a hindrance toward Iran's true modernization. Unlike Madanipour quoted above, I claim that the people, the intelligentsia or the layman, working within the government or outside are totally aware of their legal rights and they are the ones who claim change, modernization, legalization and clarification of the governments' measures and activities. It is just that for one century their attempts have gone astray through very ambiguous politization of basic rights and responsibilities. This will be clarified subsequently.

Later in 1952 Dr Mohammad Mossadeq, during the short period he was prime minister of Iran, tried to give more independence to municipalities. But Pahlavi II, after his 1953 coup d'état, which brought him back to power, directed the central government to take over the financial and administrative control of municipalities, to the extent that royal approval was necessary for the mayor to hold office (Madanipour 1998:67). This made it clear that the office of the mayor was a political one, a problem we are still facing today.

Tehran comprehensive plan

In 1968 the first urbanization plan was officially produced by Aziz Farmanfarmaian and Victor Gruen Associates of the United States and approved by the parliament. Tehran Comprehensive Plan (TCP) was a 25-year project. As this is the only plan of such importance to which there are still lots of practical references made to today, we have to indulge in a long description of it.

The TCP identified the problems of the city as including high density, especially in the city centre, expansion of commercial activities along the main roads, pollution, inefficient infrastructure, widespread unemployment in the poorer areas, and the continuous migration of low-income groups to Tehran.

> The solution was seen as a modification of the physical, social and economic fabric of the city… The proposals were nevertheless mostly physical, attempting to impose a new order on the existing physical fabric.

> The envisaged future form of the city was a linear one which, stretching towards the west, reduced the concentration of activities in the city centre. The city would be formed of ten large urban districts, each with about 500,000 populations, a commercial and an industrial centre with high-rise buildings. Each district would be subdivided into a number of areas and neighbourhoods. An area, with a population of about 15,000–30,000, would have a high school and a commercial centre and other necessary facilities…
>
> (Madanipour 1998:207)

Meanwhile the city was being built by large and small development agencies, banks, the military and individual landowners. There were also housing cooperatives involved in construction. In 1974 there were 360 such cooperatives. After the revolution they were encouraged to form and perform and by 1994, there were 1,425 of them in the province of Tehran, consisting of half a million people (Madanipour 1998:169–70). The municipalities, the military, different ministries and dependent organizations, and the Iranian Television were responsible for a great portion of the construction. 'The Organization of the Oppressed' *(Bonyade mostaz'afan)* alone constructs about one million square metres every year in Tehran (Afshar-Naderi AH 1380:19). Before the revolution this was officially done within the boundaries the municipality had assigned to the city. The TCP did not have any vision of significance for us. It was a pure imitation of modern Western urbanism and just laid the linear boundaries for streets, houses and apartments. In 1993 its duration officially came to an end. A Strategic Plan has followed and then an Orderly Plan. These plans were produced by the Ministry of Housing and Urbanization, previously (pre-revolutionary) Ministry of Housing.

The vision and the refined quality of Iranian architecture went into the private space, individual apartments and houses. Here we would have many examples, but as this is not the topic of our concentration, we will not indulge in it. Yet we have to keep in mind that the private space in Iran is not only a household's resting place. It is the nexus from which politico-economic relations issue. Thus taking the 'vision' inside the house is showing and sharing with a large number of people one's position and status. It is from this centre that one emanates outside. The security that issues from it is far more reliable than what one may expect from the public legal system outside.

Funding

During the 1950s and 1960s the oil revenue was finding its way within the country, and as it was not encouraged towards industry, it was used to invest in a more profitable and secure section: land speculation and construction work. The price of land and building was increasing and with the boom of oil revenue in the 1970s, more money became available for this sector. 'During the period 1959–83, whereas the gross domestic product increased by 413.6 per cent in fixed prices, the growth of the value added by construction activities was 706.1 per cent' (Madanipour 1998:165). Certain decades have been better for construction than others; the 1966–76 capital formation in this domain was sixfold. During the Iran-Iraq War period of the 1980s, there was a decline in all sectors, yet the

share of construction had some increase. The government encouraged it for two reasons: 'Housing was regarded as a precondition for development…development was easier to achieve in construction than in industry and agriculture' (cited from Halliday 1979).

This trend continued in the 1990s, a recent figure for 2001 is very significant if not appalling: there was an increase of 66.8 per cent in land price per square metre in Tehran for one year and an increase of 33 per cent for rent of housing (*Iran* 3 September 2002).

Two measures after the Islamic Revolution were of prime importance in building this city without vision. One was the cancellation of prohibition of building outside city limits, by the oral decree of Imam Khomeini. This brought masses of people from Tehran and outside to build small houses on the outskirts of Tehran, almost overnight. Hourcade and Khosrokhavar (1983:67) called this the 'revolutionary habitat' and showed through statistics from the Central Bank of Iran that in two years about 80,000 new houses were built. As the size of these buildings was smaller than of the ones before and as they definitely represented a very particular event related to the revolutionary period (when there was an absence of legal apparatus to prevent it), Hourcade and Khosrokhavar gave the following definition, '…elle se fait dans un moment historique exceptionnel de vacance de l'état' (Hourcade and Khosrokhavar 1983:75). So again we are facing an order from above and a popular construction without any vision. Almost all the experts I interviewed for this article told me, 'People make Tehran', thus this revolutionary period gave housing construction a style which has marked the post-revolutionary era.

The second measure we referred to above was the government's decree (1989) that different sectors of the administration had to become economically self-sufficient, so that they should not depend on the government funds (Tarakom AH 1381, 22:16). The response of the municipality to this decree has had a colossal effect on urban life in Tehran. Right after the revolution, despite the fact that in the TCP the number of floors on a parcel of land was preordained (the percentage of built space in relation to the land called 'density' or *tarakom* was prescribed according to the safety of land in regard to earthquake hazard, availability of construction material and whether it was in the commercial section of the town, and so on), a law passed which limited this to only two floors or 120 per cent density, i.e. foreseeing the constructed space to be 60 per cent of the land. Five years later, building three floors or 180 per cent over the ground floor was allowed. In 1991, trying to abide by the government's self-sufficiency measure of various ministries and the municipality, the latter started 'selling permits' to build more floors; that is, the fine of an illegal act of building beyond three levels became a permit! Construction permits were issued basically according to the money the owner could pay for more density (Tarakom AH 1381, 22:16). In 1997 in the Article 5 High Commission, an act of law, number 269, passed whereby it became legal to build up to seven floors or 420 per cent. Ever since then, the sale of density has become pervasive. Landholders sell to bidders the space above their own capacity to build. Thus the sale of more than legal density has become like a product in the market, independent of land, and it could be traded by the municipality and all those involved in construction (Tarakom AH 1381, 22:17). The Ministry of Housing and Construction, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Interior and the municipality have all been involved in this process.

The immediate result of it was a considerable income for the municipality to which they gave a revolutionary tone. The city of Tehran has been divided into north and south, the cool and the warm, near the mountain and close to the desert, the rich and the poor

sections. Most of the high-rise buildings were residential and were located in northern Tehran. The municipality, therefore, was triumphantly pleased to announce that with this income it could reconstruct southern Tehran, could engage in development projects such as highways, parks and cultural centres. However, these high-rise buildings raised many problems. Every year some 20,000 such permits to construct high-rise buildings were issued, for 20 million square metres (Estemrarha AH 1380, 19:84). As the fine for building beyond legal strictures was paid to acquire a permit, there was no room for legal consideration regarding neighbouring buildings, streets (their width in relation to the building) and the area as a totality. Buildings were hoisted on narrow streets in which bungalow-type houses were deprived of their sunlight and privacy as the neighbours could overlook their gardens and deep into their rooms (Figure 12.2). Those who had bought or prepaid for their own apartments with a view over the city (this being a very important rationale for residing in a tall building), soon found themselves facing another tall building. There were no laws to regulate such problems that were often economically if not morally catastrophic. No civil courts could respond to such complaints.

Hazardous city

A few other problems were created for the city of Tehran, as it became a host to an immense population. The security of the buildings was not checked properly. Fire escapes remained a serious hazard and the buildings were not built with proper construction material and precautions to stand the earthquake shocks. As the 'signature' of proper building of apartments became itself a matter of a product which could be bought or sold, neither the individual builders nor the neighbourhood, nor the area acted according to any legal manner which respected mutual benefit, safety and security. All these factors have had negative consequences in very basic ways, such as causing pollution and affecting water supply to the city.

While built at the foot of the Alborz mountain range with 180mm of rainfall per year (*Iran in the Mirror of Census 1378:*17), and the two dams, Latian and Karaj, each about 50km east and west of Tehran, this water supply was sufficient for a population of no more than five million people. Today with all the new suburban towns, and the construction on the mountain slopes of northern Tehran and the environs, we read:

Figure 12.2 Two views from the same
spot in northern Tehran, 1988 (top)
and 2002 (bottom).

> the dams could provide 60 per cent of water needed by the city…
> dependence upon underground water has increased…in the next three
> years 300,000 more people will inhabit the high-rise buildings of northern
> Tehran, while the source of water has not been provided for …the
> rationing of water has led to a 8.5 per cent of water saving, while 15 per
> cent was necessary.

These contentions were made by Sattar Mahmoudi, head of the Water and Sewerage System Department to the city council. He expressed his wish that no further buildings would be allowed to be constructed in the city without the permission of his department (Estemrarha AH 1380, 19:80).

This brings us the problem of lack of sewerage system in this mega-city, another reason why we question the existence of a vision for building this city. There is a project by the World Bank to give funds to Iran: 'World Bank approves loans to Iran for Primary Health and Sewerage. Both loans focus on basic human needs and target the underserved areas and the poor, and are intended to support the reform efforts of President Khatami'. Washington (18 May 2000) reported this and the amount allocated for the project was US$145 million. During hot summer months, besides the fear of lack of water, stories of polluted water and irrigation of agricultural land around Tehran with such water disturb the people enormously.

In autumn and winter and more precisely from October till February, when the weather is cold, the air is often announced to be unhealthy. NO, CO, SO_2, PM-10, HC and Pb are added to the air on a daily basis. Old vehicles that circulate, old buses, minibuses, and lack of common clean transportation such as subways, trucks, cars and motorcycles have caused this lamentable situation (Estemrarha AH 1380, 20:86 and 91). For a few days every winter, people, particularly the old, children and those with respiratory problems, are asked not to leave their homes. The subway system of Tehran is a project dating to before the revolution, but still today a very limited system has been created. An east-west line and a small north-south line operate. It has not been an easy task to build an underground subway, because Tehran had earlier been exploited underground for the traditional irrigation system *(qanat)*, or individual house wells for water or for sewerage.

We should include in the tragedy of building northern Tehran, the destruction of many hectares of gardens with old trees in order to build the high-rise buildings. The municipality faced a paradoxical situation planting little gardens in the city while it allowed the destruction of huge gardens. Northern Tehran was the cool area, a resort area, which was called the 'lungs' of Tehran, and today it has become the most polluted area of the city. The low gusty winds coming from the mountains cleared the pollution from the centre of the city, but the high-rise buildings not only have replaced the gardens, they have created pollution and heat, and they prevent the wind from clearing the polluted air.

According to historical documents, approximately every 150 years Tehran suffered an earthquake. The Centre for Earthquake and Environmental Studies and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) carried out an 18-month project beginning in 1999. As a result of their study based upon the population census of 1996, where 110 people lived in one square hectare and the characteristics of buildings in various areas of Tehran were considered, their speculation was that since the last earthquake in Tehran

was 180 years ago, a new earthquake was inevitable. They gave the estimates of destruction and death as the following for a large earthquake with its epicentre either in southern or northern Tehran. If it occurred in the south, it would cause an immediate death toll of 6 per cent or 383,000 people and destroy 55 per cent or 483,000 buildings; if it occurred in the north, it would have a death toll of 2 per cent or 126,000 deaths and destroy 36 per cent or 313,000 buildings (Bon AH 1379:7).

Given this extraordinarily disastrous situation, the projects which have been accomplished and the way the media have focused on them seem out of proportion. In 1991 when the municipality wanted to pronounce its existence, the beginning of a new post-war era, and a period of construction and modernity, it started by painting white street lines (Figure 12.3), putting lamps in the streets, making any small parcel of land into a park,

Figure 12.3 White street lines are marks of modernization; driving over them shows lack of credence in laws.

making culture centres, making supermarket chains called 'Citizen', a daily newspaper *(Hamshahri)*, and having stores paint their shutters, and many other measures which would make the city look modern and clean. A Healthy City Project was made in southern Tehran and an electronic city is in view for the provincial town of Ourumieh. All these seem like extraordinary plans over piles of rubble. The painting of city walls, the embellishing of urban space for feasts or during elections, the abundant lighting of the city for national and religious occasions, seem to be where all vision is directed: impressive fleeting signs of care, fascination and consideration for citizens and their gaiety. These two extremes of outright disregard for citizens' rights and devious soft

ways of painting over harsh realities speak of a cognitive system which needs some attention.

The city of Tehran with one-fifth of Iran's population absorbs half of the national funds for municipalities of Iran (Afshar-Naderi AH 1380, 17:84). So this is the city that gives the best service to the citizens of Iran, and gives blueprints of urbanism through its example and regular publication of *Green Books of Municipality* to other municipalities. During the past six years, we have had two very strong mayors who had shown their capacities as capable managers in the city of Esfahan. But both of them have faced legal problems in Tehran. The first one, Karbaschi, has already spent a few years in prison. Malek Madani (at the time of writing) is facing many legal consequences of his period in office. He was under great pressure to solve the above-mentioned problem of *tarakom* permits, to build above a certain level, so he gave the abrupt order for their cancellation. This was announced after the Iranian New Year in April 2002. But the last day before the Iranian New Year, 112,000 square metres of *tarakom* was sold. In the eighth month after the prohibition, *tarakom* were still being sold to certain people at 600 per cent increase. During the first six months of this year, ten million square metres were sold (Mardomsalari AH 1381, 254:1).

Why and how does the vision of creative capabilities of a nation get channelled into totally superficial aspects of private everyday urban life? Why and how does urban administration become pervasively political and pecuniary? Why do political alliances and pecuniary priorities come to supersede civil responsibilities?

These are the questions we shall try to address now. The World Bank at a site called Anticorruption speaks of 'impediments to achieving growth'.

Impediments to achieving growth: achievement of rapid economic growth is constrained by a multitude of distortions that have accumulated over the past two decades of great disruptions and uncertainties, marked by the revolution, the long and destructive war with Iraq and the difficult international relations situation that impeded the country's normal access to international capital and goods. The prolonged heavy interventionist framework of economic management, during the war and after, led to the build-up of a complex distortionary pricing system, with multiple foreign exchange rates, quantitative trade restrictions and distorted tariffs, and large subsidies of energy products. It also led to the development of a large public enterprise sector, dominating up to 60 per cent of the manufacturing sector, and large quasi-public Bonyads—the latter combine production, commercial and social protection functions with little transparency. The Bonyads also enjoy extra-economic power that adds to the other institutional and legal impediments to the development of private activities… The financial sector is also controlled by the state and most of the credit is administratively directed through the public banks (there are no private banks). The outcome has been a prolonged economic stagnation, during which time GDP per capita fell and, in spite of its slow recovery (mostly due to a steep drop in population growth), has yet to regain its pre-revolution level.

The anthropological emic approach points to the following problem: everything in Iran is political.[2] The mayor is a political person while he should not be. This is because his office is an executive one, and he should be in the service of citizens, not of any interest groups. The city council has also been turned into a political arena, as it has become clear in the past few months. Although one of the most important achievements of President Khatami's period was the election of the city council, even this centre works according to

political tendencies and interest groups. The Society of Urban Planners and Architects, with 24,000 members, criticizes itself for having become political and its election for its own council has been put into question. Even a scientific journal on urbanism and architecture, I was told by its editor-in-chief, became political after just a few issues.

Within ministries, unclear events and decisions are made. With a change in important official posts, a group of people is brought into key positions. These groups are closed and their relations are nepotistic rather than official. Their responsibilities are not clearly defined. Highly responsible individuals in various ministries are generally very young, with a degree, without expertise. Thus, they are not respected, they are obeyed. They depend upon the expertise of those who have been in lower positions (often occupied by women), and who continue their work diligently, but with much criticism and bitterness toward the higher officials. The positions the latter would merit because of their experience are instead allocated to individuals with specific political tendencies. These and the groups who come in to form a closed unit are referred to as 'bands' or 'mafias' of power.

The bureaucracy is very complicated. Those who have decision-making powers prefer not to commit themselves, since they all find the situation ephemeral and thus do not like to become too involved. Therefore, their decisions, if they are made, have a temporary character. In the last resort, this explains why the life of legal measures and acts is very short and there are no long-term visions for the city. In such a situation, citizens' rights are in a whirlwind. They feel they are sent from office to office in an unend-ing labyrinth. The only thing which does not count here, is human life' we hear very often. The characteristic of decision makers is very clearly, but vulgarly, explained in the following: it is like a person who goes 'from pier to pier'. That is, not having any vision, on the contrary, being very short-sighted, just going from one pier to the next, and trying not to fall, such as a drunkard's movements. This state speaks of uncertainty, lack of stability and clarity to plan, to find the strategy for action, of impossibility to cooperate and consult the experts and then act. On the contrary, because of fear of an uncertain future, the officials try hastily to get the day's work done, and get as much pecuniary recompense as possible. This is why there is little harmony among various ministries, and it is nonexistent in the urban built space. Single buildings might be very beautiful and even technically perfect, but there is no harmony in a block or in an area.

This is where it becomes necessary to understand the meaning of 'self in order to understand urban planning. In an article I have discussed the meaning of Iranian self (Shahshahani 2003), as the 'I' master, the 'I' slave, and T the 'del' which is the reflection of truth, but also it means the person with all their unhampered desires. In a very short and poignant article, an author involved in urbanism says

> Let us think of this problem: If we think well, we realize we have destroyed our country no less than Iraq did during the war. We behave as though we are a people from another country having occupied this land for a short time. Thus we are very short-sighted and we look only a step ahead and try to pass the day… We do not build according to any general plans, we build according to our 'del'.
>
> (Goftogou AH 1381, 22:45)

He then continues saying how the land around cities, which was used for agriculture, has so brutally been turned into bricks to make low-level buildings. The treatment of stone mines has not been any better. Acting with self-interest only, according to 'del' emanates from a self, which is not a citizen, i.e. does not consider her/himself to be like others with equal rights, a self that considers itself to be the master, and that for a very short period. Having been the slave, the poor, the deprived, and all of a sudden being put in a situation of power, he wants to attain all that he thinks historically was denied to him. But acting impulsively is far from being equal to others, far from accepting being a citizen equal with others in front of law. Thus he looks from the window of an apartment in a high-rise building, 'with the city under my feet' (an expression used very often to show the good location of an apartment, which gives the 'master' feeling to the owner). From this centre he forms his relations of close-knit family and friends.

So what we are actually facing at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the amazing tension between the rule of the family and the law, the priority of special relationships, face-to-face personalism, above clearly defined rights and responsibilities in service of a country and a people. Had these basic ideas taken sway, there would have been a well-defined space for urbanism and urban construction to take shape.

On paper, there have been many projects and laws as the history of erudition in Iran is long, but in reality the lack of legal security and avarice has let personalism take over from above. As we learn about the number of architects and urban planners, as we go through their myriad journals and read through their critical views,[3] we can very clearly see that had they not been dispersed, disappointed and turned against each other, had they been given the expert space they needed to operate in, their capabilities would have been put in the service of Iranian urbanism, and not in individual apartments and small parks, and caricature Healthy Cities.

Only in one article, K.Safa-Manesh (Mize gerd AH 1380/81, 6–7:79) speaks clearly about the lack of vision and its necessity. Hadi Nadimi, rector of Shahid Beheshti University, in another article speaks of traditional Iranian masonry, its specific teachings, student-teacher relationship and the responsibility the holders of this profession were led to feel toward the people they were building for, and the place of ethics in this profession (Nadimi AH 1374:448–74). There is a definite divide between such a past which produced what we referred to at the beginning of this article through Arthur Pope, and a present imbued with 'distortion, and impediments' as shown by the World Bank.

Conclusion

In this chapter in search of the vision which has made Tehran, I have studied a mass of data and presented only what has been relevant to the topic. While reading the material, I did a number of in-depth interviews with experts or high officials who have been very active in Tehran. I was also advised by two specific persons who were directly involved in urban planning and architecture during the past 25 years. From the minute I posed the question, I was given the definite response that Tehran was built without a vision. It was built through imitation by masses of planners, architects, masons and the people. During the Qajar and Pahlavi reign, the views of the kings and just after the revolution of 1979, one order of Imam Khomeini gave definite directions. The Tehran Comprehensive Plan

gave a mild framework, not a vision that was followed. I have tried to give an etic and an emic view of the problem, showing that the question of vision was indeed a very poignant question, which made evident not only the problem of urbanism, but also the problem of administration in Iran. At a particular juncture of history, this question helped us put into perspective the direction of change in Iran. We saw the problem of kinship versus law to be the core problem.

Notes

1 First and foremost I must thank Mrs Sarafha for having accepted a preliminary interview with me and introducing a number of her colleagues to me. Mrs Shanjani at the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning was most efficient and helpful in responding to my questions. Mr Pordeli, at the municipality of Tehran, Mr Bonyadi, Mr Mehdizadeh, Mr Ablaqi, Mr Habibollahi, ex-vice-minister, Ms Beski, co-editor of the journal *Shahr,* Mr Maleki, Dr Mozayani, at Shahid Beheshti University and Dr Etemadi were very generous with their time, and I thank them enormously as without their views I could not have completed this research, which in my view needs much more attention.

2 From here on we depend heavily on interviews with experts conducted in autumn 2002.

3 Among others see Afshar-Naderi (AH 1376, 40–1:55–60).

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13
Tokyo

Paradise of speculators and builders
Shuji Funo

Introduction

From its origin as a small castle town[1] until the end of the Edo Era (1603–1868), urbanization in Tokyo (formerly known as Edo) seems to have followed an orthogenetic process. The Tokugawa Shogunate closed Japan to foreign countries with the exception of the port of Deshima at Nagasaki, opened to only the Dutch from 1641 to 1853.[2] Japan continued to stay at the periphery of European world economy, though the silver from Iwami Ginzan (silver mine) exported through Deshima did make a small contribution. Japan accepted no immigrants from outside during this so-called Sakoku (seclusion) era. It is, therefore, a unique example of urbanization within the formation of the modern world system.

In the mid-seventeenth century, Tokyo's population reached one million—matching London and Paris—although its huge urban village form did not resemble its European counterparts. Japanese society has gradually opened to the world since 1853. Imperial rule was restored in 1868, and Edo was renamed Tokyo, meaning Eastern Kyoto (Capital), as the new capital of Japan in 1869. Tokyo today is a mega-city.[3] It has transformed from a huge village to a global capital centre over the past 150 years.

Edo[4] was established as the shogun's capital, even though Kyoto (where the Emperor resided) remained the formal capital of Japan (Figure 13.1). The Tokugawa Bakufu Shogunate controlled all of Japan, including Kyoto. It is obvious that the directors of Edo were the shoguns, who introduced control systems for both land and people in the early Edo period. Political authority in Japan was divided amongst a centralized and bureaucratized military regime and some 250 bureaucratized feudal domains called Han. Daimyōs, the governors of the Han, were obliged to visit Edo with levies for the shogun once a year (the *sankin kōtai* system). They were classified according to their degree of loyalty, and were given land and goods based on the shogun's evaluation of their accomplishments.

All building lots[5] were arranged hierarchically around the Edo Castle in the centre. Edo's spiral pattern of moats and roads, as if the centric power

Figure 13.1 Diagram of Edo spatial
structure (after M.Naito 1967).

of the shogun absorbed the power of people, is very unique. Daimyōs more faithful to the
shogun received larger residential sites nearer to Edo Castle. Edo was a highly controlled
city where residential quarters among classes were strictly segregated according to the
hierarchy of Edo society (*Si Nou Kou Shō,* samurai-farmers-craftsmen-merchants
system).

Following the Meiji Restoration, the emperor moved from Kyoto to Tokyo, which at
last became the capital of Japan both nominally and actually. The emperors, however, did
not become the directors of Tokyo. The New Meiji government took the initiative in
restructuring Edo as a modern capital comparable with European capitals such as London
and Paris. The central government invited and hired foreign engineers to create the new
face of the city before reaching the same level of industrialization in Western countries.
The modernization of Tokyo in conformance with a Western image was the prime
objective.

The directors of Tokyo were the Meiji governors, who were advised by Western
architects and urban planners and promoted modern city planning. From the Meiji
Restoration onward, Japan continued to import concepts and systems of urban planning
from the West, including Baron G.E. Haussemann's grand projects of Paris in the late

nineteenth century, the Nazi national land planning during the Second World War, the Greater London Plan after the Second World War and the German B (Bebauungs)-Plan of the early 1980s.

Also important for Tokyo were the disasters—wars and earthquakes—that changed the city dramatically. The 'scrap and build' process was a real driving force of Tokyo's transformation. The directors of urban change, especially after the 1960s, were speculators and builders. Twice destroyed in the twentieth century (by earthquake in 1923 and aerial bombardment in 1945), Tokyo emerged as a paradise of speculators and builders, a true global city, in the 1980s. Today, Tokyo shelters over 12 million inhabitants and one-quarter of the Japanese population lives in the greater metropolitan area.[6] The mega-city seems to be awaiting another catastrophe unless measures are taken to change its over-centralization.

Notwithstanding all the changes, there is one invariant area, which Roland Barthes (1915–80)[7] called void' or 'vacant', in the centre of Tokyo. That is the Emperor's palace complex, where Edo Castle was once located. It is remarkable that this mega-city has been able to preserve a large natural precinct in its centre for over 400 years.

Dreams of occidentalists: towards a Western-style capital

Due to the drastic change in the social system by the Meiji Restoration, Tokyo's population dropped from one million to about 600,000. One of the most urgent tasks of the Meiji new government was to remodel Edo into a modern capital. In 1869, Japan's first railway was opened and the first steam locomotive started running in 1872 from Shimbashi to Yokohama. In 1885, a cabinet system of government was adopted and Japan established a modern nation-state political system, drafting the constitution of the Japanese empire in 1889.

Two projects are symbolic of modern urban planning[8] in Tokyo. One is the Ginza Renga Gai (Ginza Brick Quarter) Project (1872–77) and the other is the Hibiya Kanchō Shūtyuū Keikaku (Governmental Offices Concentration Project) (1886–87) at Kasumigaseki.

The Ginza District, where many merchants and craftsmen had gathered in the Edo period, was becoming a new centre of Western civilization because of its location near Tsukiji (a protected settlement for foreigners) to the east and Shinbashi (connected to Yokohama's international port) to the south. The Ginza Renga Gai Project was launched to refashion the entire Ginza District in red brick after the great fire of 1872. Brick was adopted not only for fire protection, but also to create a showpiece with a European flavour (Figure 13.2).

The directors of this project were Shigenobu Ohkuma[9] (1838–1922), the Minister of Finance, and Kaoru Inoue[10] (1835–1915), the Deputy Minister. Together with many other bureaucrats, they lived in the Ginza area and were key proponents of Western civilization. The English architect Thomas James Waters[11] with his brother Albert Waters were invited to prepare plans for the area. Construction took nearly a decade and in 1877 the project was completed. In total, 2,855 buildings were made, one-third of which were two-storey brick buildings with colonnades and balconies.

The streets were lined with maples, willows and gaslights, creating the first commercial street with a European atmosphere in Japan. The Georgian-style streetscape was transferred to the Far East and suddenly emerged in the central part of Tokyo in this manner. The project, however, was not welcomed by residents. Newspapers at that time criticized the project as unsuitable for the Japanese climate and claimed that this planning would encourage beriberi outbreaks. Almost all trees withered and died. The brick structures were soon abandoned because of frequent earthquakes.

Most of the daimyō land plots in the vicinity of the new imperial palace (Edo Castle) were claimed by various agencies of the new government as sites for offices. The project to build a Central Business District for government offices was launched after the cabinet system was adopted in 1885.

The director who proposed the project was again Kaoru Inoue, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and an enthusiastic occidentalist. First, he designated an English architect Josiah Condor,[12] the father of modern Japanese architecture and designer of the Rokumeikan (an elaborate

Figure 13.2 Ginza Brick Quarter Project, 1872.

hotel and a symbol of Western civilization in 1883) to make plans for new office blocks, which were never implemented. Later, Herman Ende (a professor of the Bau-Akademie and a technical advisor of O.E.L.F.von Bismarck, the first prime minister of the Deutsches Reich) and Willhelm Böckman[13] from Germany were invited to plan and design this central district of Tokyo. They prepared a master plan which included a central assembly hall far bigger than that of the German empire (built four years before), based on baroque urban planning concepts.

The project was not implemented because of financial concerns raised by James Hobrecht, a civil engineer responsible for the Berlin Plan in 1862. Hobrecht had carried out many projects in Moscow, Cairo and Alexandria in addition to Berlin, and was the most famous of foreign engineers invited to Japan during the Meiji era. Ende edited the

project and only two buildings were constructed on the site (half of which is now Hibiya Park), the first example of a Western public park in Tokyo.

Amidst the planning of flamboyant projects like the Ginza Brick Quarter, the Hibiya Governmental Offices Concentration and the Mitsubishi London Town projects,[14] various strategies called Shikukaisei (urban block improvement) to reform Tokyo were discussed. In 1880, the governor of Tokyo, Michiyuki Matsuda (1839–82), published the first Shikukaisei programme. Akimasa Yoshikawa (1841–1920), the next governor, followed up the programme supported by the Ministry of Interior. The major concern of Yoshikawa's programme was to revitalize and develop transportation networks that could be the base of modern industries via an international port (although Matsuda's plan laid more stress on commercial development). Capital of the great Japanese empire or metropolis for modern capitalism: that was the issue.

The directors of this effort were the Ministry of Interior headed by Aritomo Yamagata[15] (1838–1922) and newly rising entrepreneurs like Eiichi Shibusawa (1840–1931) who founded the first national bank in 1877. The first legislation in Japan to facilitate city planning, Tokyo Shikukaisei Jorei, was enforced in 1888. It was a 16-point initiative that created a city planning board and set in motion various improvements to infrastructure, especially in the downtown area. The greatest attention was given to road construction. The model was the great reform of Paris by Baron Georges-Eugène Haussemann (1809–91). However, because of cholera outbreaks, special attention was given to water supply and sewage removal, and consequently, road network reform was interrupted.[16]

The results accomplished by Tokyo Shikukaisei until 1916 were the enlargement of streets for trams, the establishment of water supply and sewage treatment, and the construction of Hibiya Park. Most of the sites of the Daimyō's residences and temples were converted for newly required facilities.

Dreams of nationalists or colonists: towards an ideal city

The industrial revolution in Japan started in the 1880s and Tokyo absorbed a huge migratory population from rural areas. The population reached nearly two million at the beginning of twentieth century. Three famous slum areas called *hinminkutu* (caves of the poor people) appeared within Tokyo from the 1890s onward. During the Taisho era (1912–26), the number of wage earners increased in the Japanese cities and an increasing proportion of citizens came to lead consumer life-styles. The Japanese economy was already involved in the world economy in 1920s. The population of Tokyo had reached 3.7 million in 1920.

Tokyo had become so large that Tokyo *shi* (municipal government) could not manage the urban and housing problems. Therefore, legislation was established to control and regulate the urban expansion. The Toshi Keikaku Hou (Town Planning Act) was adopted in 1919 along with Shigaichi Kenchikubutu Hou, the first Municipal Area Building Law in Japan. The word *toshi keikaku,* or urban planning, was used for the first time in the late 1920s. The emphasis continued to be on infrastructure development in order to establish modern industry. These acts and building codes adopted a zoning system to delineate fire-protection zones and to identify districts within the city for special uses. It also

provided for land readjustment such as the straightening of roads and property lines in sub-urban areas expected to transform from farms to houses. The concepts and methods of land readjustment were taken from Adiches' Law of Germany.[17]

Japanese architects opened their eyes to urban issues in the latter part of the Meiji era, but could not yet afford to carry out urban projects. A typical example is Shigeyoshi Fukuda (1887–1971), a city architect and engineer who launched the New Tokyo Plan in 1918. He estimated that the population of Tokyo would be 6.76 million after 50 years (1961) and that its area would grow 3.6 times, assuming a density of 250 persons per hectare. His New Tokyo Plan was based on this individual idea and remained unrealized.

The idea of Garden City was introduced to Japan in 1907 via a book titled *Denen Toshi*.[18] This was published by technocrats of the Ministry of Interior who wanted to enliven rural regions. However, the theory and true aim of Garden City was not understood in Japan. The naming of *Denen Toshi* caught the interest of entrepreneurs as they developed suburbs into residential quarters. The Denen Toshi Company was established by Eiichi Shibusawa in 1918 and developed three settlements, one of which is called Denen Chofu (today one of the richest areas in Tokyo).

In September 1923, the Great Kantō Earthquake[19] struck Tokyo and resulting fires burned down the city centre. It reduced 60 per cent of Tokyo to ashes, reverting it physically to the beginning of Meiji Restoration. This might be said to be the first true opportunity to change Tokyo, since the resulting reconstruction projects were actually based on the first comprehensive reform proposals.

Shimpei Gotō[20] (1857–1929), mayor of Tokyo (1920–23), was appointed to lead the reconstruction and drew up plans. He was a national figure with experience as an administrator in Taiwan (Formosa) and Manchuria (North Eastern China), and had played a leading role to draft Toshi Keikaku Hou (the Town Planning Act of 1919). Gotō established the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research soon after he had become mayor in 1920, inviting Charles Austin Beard[21] (1874–1948) as a principal advisor and proposing a master plan for the city even prior to the emergency. His plan included new street lines and wider streets, reorganization of the rail network, improvements to water and sewer systems, and creation of open spaces.

Gotō is often considered as the father of modern urban planning in Japan. Only a few elements of the master plan, however, were actually accomplished, because of its cost and the opposition of powerful landowners. Land acquisition was a major issue of urban planning from the beginning.

The Dōjunkai (Foundation for Restoration after the Great Kantō Earthquake) was established with donations from foreign countries and became the first body supplying public housing in Japan. It began to build collective houses as well as detached and semi-detached houses. It also initiated slum upgrading projects and carried out land readjustments.

The Showa era (1926–89) had difficult beginnings because of the Great Earthquake and the world economic crisis of 1929. In addition Japan was heading for war (1931–45). Wartime planning, however, created new changes in Tokyo as new transportation systems were introduced. In 1927 Japan's first subway line opened, in 1931 Tokyo Airport was completed in Haneda and in 1941 the Port of Tokyo was opened. In 1932, the outine of Tokyo was expanded by combining the adjacent 82 towns and villages into what was called Dai Tokyo[22] (Greater Tokyo). By 1935, the number of people living in

Tokyo had reached 6.36 million, comparable with the populations of New York and London. In 1943, the dual administrative system of Tokyo-*fu* and Tokyo-*shi* was abolished, and were consolidated to form Tokyo Metropolis. The Metropolitan administrative system was thus established and a governor was appointed.

In 1941, the Pacific War broke out. Ironically, the only realized examples of Japanese modern urban planning took place in its colonies in Taiwan, Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. The Datong City Plan and Dalian Plan in China were famous Japanese colonial projects (Figure 13.3). Japanese architects considered the colony as an experimental field to attain ideals of modern architecture and city planning. Colonial urban planning reminds us that top to bottom urban planning requires political power and will to realize it. The power of the state as a whole functioned as a director to implement colonial urban planning. Japanese architects and planners were indebted to Nazi planning concepts during this period.

Figure 13.3 Datong City Plan, China, 1939.

A central government committee proposed the Tokyo Green Belt Plan in 1939. The plan included a green belt encircling Tokyo for protection of scenic spots and also for air defence, but never materialized due to the lack of time and financial resources. Here the director was war itself.

In the final phase of the Second World War, Tokyo was bombed 102 times, including the heaviest air raid on 10 March 1945, in which many citizens lost property or were killed.

Dreams of futurists: towards an international metropolis

The war came to an end on 15 August 1945, with Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Much of Tokyo was turned into ruins by the bombings and by October 1945, the population had fallen to 3.49 million, half its level of 1940 (Figure 13.4). Tokyo again reverted to a *tabula rasa*.

The shortage[23] of dwelling units, lost and needed for families coming back from colonies outside, was estimated at 4.2 million at the conclusion of the war. Building shelters and managing daily life was very hard. It took a few years to commence the reconstruction plan. Eiyo Ishikawa[24] (1893–1955), the Tokyo government's chief planner, had already prepared a War Damage Rehabilitation Plan during the war, adopting a symmetrical radial and ring-road network with spaced green belts, and identification of land uses through zoning. It was too idealistic to be

Figure 13.4 Tokyo in ruins by
bombing, 1945.

implemented. This concept of a symmetrical radial and ring-road network with spaced green belts, however, continued to be an influential model until Kenzo Tange (1913-) proposed the linear model in 1960. The Dai Tokyo Tiku Keikaku (Greater Tokyo Regional Planning Model) of 1940 was also based on this concept, such as the plans of S.Fukuda and S.Gotō.

From the end of the war onward, the director of urban change was the GHQ of the American occupation forces until Japan's return to the international community via the

San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. One year after the war, the Special City Planning Law was enacted and large-scale reconstruction plans were made by architects and planners for several cities. In May 1947, the Constitution of Japan, based on the doctrine of democratic sovereignty and the Local Government Act was promulgated. The first governor of Tokyo was elected under the new system. In 1949, Tokyo Metropolis started the 23-ku system. The Capital Construction Law was passed in 1950. This law established the Capital Construction Committee, a national organization devoted to the goal of Tokyo's reconstruction, and created the Emergency Five-Year Capital Construction Plan. However, due to severe economic conditions, it was impossible to realize these plans effectively and problems were left for the next generation to be solved. Land readjustment projects were planned in many districts of Tokyo but decision making was overly time-consuming. Competitions for reconstruction programmes were held, but the ruined economy did not permit their implementation.

The real reconstruction started with the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–53), and the special procurement demand arising from the war. The Japanese economy steadily recovered during the 1950s and post-war economic reconstruction was completed roughly ten years later. A Capital Region Development Plan was seriously considered in order to control excessive population concentration. To this end, a Capital Region Development Law[25] was enacted in 1956 to replace the Capital Construction Law of 1950. This co-centric radial plan was modelled after the Greater London Plan (1944) by Sir Patrick Abercrombie (1879–1957) and was based on the idea of strong controls. Laws were promoting the construction of industrial satellite cities and restricting factory locations in existing urbanized areas. Earlier in 1955, the Japan Housing Corporation[26] had been established as a semi-public organization to carry out large-scale housing construction and housing-site development in metropolitan areas. Their activities ushered in a new era in town construction in Japan. New towns intended for middle-income level families were built one after another in the suburbs.[27] It should be noted that the new towns created in Japan were very different from the self-contained new towns of England, which provided both places for work and housing. This was the inevitable result of the conditions prevailing in Japan at the time.

In the 1960s Japan entered a period of high-level economic growth. In 1962, the population of Tokyo broke the ten million mark. In 1964, the Olympic Games were held in Tokyo and the super-express bullet train *(shinkansen)* opened, forming the basis for Tokyo's current prosperity. The 1964 Tokyo Olympics transformed Tokyo's landscape radically by virtue of the Metropolitan Highway (Shuto Kōsoku) and other facilities like the Yoyogi National Gymnasium designed by the world famous architect, K.Tange. Tokyo began to change from a horizontal city into a vertical city from the mid-1960s.

From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, Japanese architects raised hands to be the 'directors' as if they could lead the directions of Japanese cities. K.Tange proposed the Tokyo Plan 1960 (Figure 13.5) following Kiyonori Kikutake's (1928-) City on the Sea (1958) and Tower City (1959). The Tokyo Plan 1960, which insisted on a linear structure rather than a radial system, was intended to change the structure of Tokyo radically. Many architects, including Noriaki Kurokawa (1934-) (Rurban City, Spiral City) and Fumihiko Maki (1928-) (Group Form), who had belonged to the Metabolism Group, launched ideal projects for the future city. Arata Isozaki (1931-) proposed a project called The City in the Air.

Prominent urban projects by star architects were proposed for a period of two or three years in the beginning of the 1960s. Realization was of no concern and the proposals lacked procedural and financial considerations. However, one image of the future city was temporarily realized at

Figure 13.5 Tokyo Plan 1960, Kenzo Tange.

the sites of Expo '70. Another rare case, K.Kikutake's City on the Sea (1958), was realized as Aqua Polis in 1975 (Figure 13.6).

On the other hand, rapid expansion of urbanized areas, shortage of housing, increased land-use prices and confusion in land ownership became apparent in metropolitan areas. Solving these problems became an extremely urgent policy issue. Planning in Tokyo began to move in a new direction from the mid-1960s, because little was done to create better living environments at that time and citizens still suffered from severe water shortages and air pollution. Minobe Ryokichi[28] (1904–84), a professor who criticized urban policy from a socialist-communist perspective, was elected as governor in 1967. He made an appeal to recover clean rivers and blue skies and promised to work toward a healthier Tokyo. The Town Planning Law was revised in 1968 long after the first version of 1919.

The postmodern city: Tokyo at its zenith

At the beginning of the 1970s, the excesses of high-level economic growth became apparent through environmental problems such as air, river and noise pollution. At the same time, the energy crisis of 1973 brought the

Figure 13.6 Aqua Polis, Okinawa,
Kiyonori Kikutake, 1975.

period of high-level economic growth to a halt. Saving energy and resources became a real issue to avoid catastrophe. Development shifted from outward urban expansion towards the fuller development of already urbanized areas. Urban planning and housing paradigms shifted from large-scale development to small-scale projects, from new construction to urban renewal, from high-rise flats to low- and middle-rise town houses, and from quantity of dwelling units to quality of life. This situation resembles that at the end of the twentieth century.

Japan's stable growth period, however, was followed by a 'bubble economy'. In the 1980s, Tokyo enjoyed rapid economic growth again via its increasing internationalization and the emergence of the information society. Tokyo became one of the world's most vital and attractive major cities, boasting advanced technology, information, culture and fashion, as well as a high level of public safety.

Suzuki Shunichi occupied the seat of governor after Minobe in 1979, serving four terms until 1995. He called his vision for the city 'My Town Tokyo'. His administration put together a series of three comprehensive plans in 1982, 1986 and 1990. The biggest difference from the previous administration was their emphasis on the central business district and other major commercial districts, where construction of large, showy projects was intended to advance Tokyo as an international business centre and metropolis. New Tokyo City Hall[29] located in Shinjuku designed by K. Tange (a close friend of Governor S.Suzuki from the 1960s) is the symbol of Tokyo's zenith.

The urban issues Tokyo faced in the mid-1980s were quite different from those it had faced in the past. The city had reached its limits for horizontal expansion. The 'Tokyo Problem' and 'Tokyo Reform' became pressing issues for debate. Scholars and critics discussed the negative effects of Tokyo's political, economic and cultural dominance, as well as possibilities for relocating the Japanese capital.

Tokyo's status as one of the world's financial centres attracted an unprecedented influx of foreign businessmen and workers in the 1980s. The resulting demand for centrally located office space and 24-hour facilities sparked a speculative building rush that dramatically transformed the cityscape. Western architects with postmodern designs were invited to give Tokyo a fashionable facelift, befitting its status as a global city (Figure 13.7).

Further urban development necessitated the search for new frontiers. The first frontier identified was the unused public land in the city centre. Investors snapped up downtown properties, while large real-estate companies launched redevelopment projects. Many of these destroyed the fabric of existing downtown communities. The second frontier was the sky. Tokyo still had more space in the air than New York. The project called the Manhattan Project, revived after a long hiatus, started to renew Marunouchi area (the former Mitsubishi London Town), the central business district around Tokyo Station. The third frontier was under the ground, the so-called geo-front. A project to create an underground city with 500,000 inhabitants was seriously proposed. The fourth and final frontier was the Tokyo waterfront, hitherto the home to dockyards and factories. Factories for heavy industry moved out according to the change of industrial structure. The tertiary industries evidently became the key industries of Tokyo in the 1980s.

Figure 13.7 Postmodern building
Shinjuku 2ban Kan, designed by
Minoru Takeyama, 1978.

New technologies, production systems and building materials shaped Tokyo's urban transformation. Since the 1960s sealed aluminium sash systems have been *de rigueur,* meaning that all dwelling units are now air-conditioned. So-called intelligent office buildings came into fashion in the 1980s. Domed, climate-controlled stadiums allow baseball games to be played in the midst of storms. The daily lives of Tokyo's citizens have become completely divorced from nature. Most space in Tokyo is artificially controlled by computer. Electronic conglomerates enjoying symbiotic relations with the government are prominent players in this development process, as are the large construction companies, which still wield considerable political power. Tokyo is a temporary metropolis that is constandy changing within this reiterative 'scrap and build' process, the city is losing its historical memory.

Never ending Tokyo projects: scrap and build process

At the beginning of the 1990s the bubble economy collapsed and the Suzuki era ended in 1995. The waterfront became a principal issue in the gubernatorial election of 1995. How to redevelop the waterfront had become the major topic of the early 1990s. Under the title Urban Frontier, the World City Exposition Tokyo '96 directed expansion towards Tokyo Bay. To hold an exposition and equip infrastructure for the development afterwards is a well-worn device in Japan.

A promise to electors to halt waterfront development led to the election of Yukio Aoshima—better known as a TV comedian—as governor. His abandonment of the 'World City Exposition Tokyo '96—Urban Frontier' symbolized the end of the bubble economy and its infinite expansion. It is also very symbolic that the Great Hanshin Earthquake[30] in the same year revealed the weakness of Japan's tradition of urban planning (Figure 13.8).

Standing at the dawn of a new historical starting phase at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Tokyo still suffers from financial difficulties created by the bubble economy. The paradigm of urban planning is shifting again. Instead of large-scale projects there is greater interest in creating communities and enriching the people's immediate environment, and a greater interest in creating urban culture. Sustainable City or Compact City is becoming a new slogan, replacing Expanding City and Mega-City.

Looking back at this overview of the history of urban planning in Tokyo, several general trends and characteristics are evident.

• There is a lack of originality. Concepts and systems of urban planning have always been imported from Western countries, such as Baron Haussemann's grand project of Paris, Nazi ideas on national land planning, the Greater London Plan and the German B-Plan. It is not a bad idea to learn from other systems, but they do not necessarily work well in a different context. Ideas and methods need to be rooted in the realities of Japan.

Figure 13.8 Great Hanshin
Earthquake.

- The planning system is marked by absence of subjectivity and passiveness of the people. In Japan, it is not clear who is planning and designing the city. The local government is controlled by the central government and cannot decide on any matter related to urban planning. In addition, there is no system for participation and advocacy.
- The finance system of urban planning is weak. There are no special funds allocated for urban planning. They depend on the annual budgets. Policies may easily be changed by the mayor, who may be replaced in the next election. Unstable planning boards are also problematic. Officials in local government change from one board to another frequently. Professionals in urban planning are needed on
- urban planning boards. The public consciousness to limit the power of private urban planning is immature. Japan is said to be the freest country in the world with regard to the design of buildings. This is because of the loose relation between the Building Code and the Urban Planning Law (block regulations). The cityscape is chaotic, but architects responsible for this situation enjoy the freedom.
- The scrap and build process is prominent in urban development. For half a century after the war the scrap and build process has been repeated. City planning has neglected the urban historical heritage. The poor quality of the resulting urban stock remains a problem.

The politically powerful construction industry was one of the drivers of rapid post-war economic growth. Relying heavily on the scrap and build method, concrete and steel transformed the Japanese landscape. In the late 1960s, construction accounted for over 20 per cent of GDP. High growth gave way to a period of stable but lower growth in the wake of the 1973 energy crisis; heavy industries lost ground to light science and

technology industries. The focus of urban development shifted again from outward expansion to the full development of already urbanized areas. Money generated by the speculative bubble of the 1980s transformed Tokyo into a global city, wired to the dynamic movements of the world capitalist economy.

The glory days of Tokyo with the bubble economy disappeared and Tokyo suffered from economic stagnation and post-bubble debt.

Nevertheless, a curious phenomenon appeared. Along the Tokyo waterfront many new office buildings and flats were constructed. The number of high-rise flats newly built in 2002[31] is said to be unprecedented. This construction was driven by the speculative activities of real-estate agents and investors as before. While the rumour of 'The 2003 Problem'[32] spread, the companies moved to the waterfront, leaving older inner-city office buildings unoccupied. The oversupply was obvious and predictable, but the individual estate agents and developers continue to pursue their own short-term interests, even as they know they will later suffer.

The central government has tried to influence the fluctuating annual number of dwelling units built by reforming tax incentives. The current slogans of the central government are 'Restructuring' and 'Urban Rebirth'. The central government has established a special board, called Urban Rebirth, and has opted to deregulate building codes and urban planning laws to stimulate building activity. Local governments can now re-zone areas and make decisions on the restructuring of districts. Most local governments, however, are suffering from financial constraints and lack of funds to realize new projects. Though policymakers believe promoting building activity through deregulation is the only way to economic recovery, the idea is actually ill conceived.

What is really happening, however, is the hollowing out of the inner city. Ishihara Shintaro, governor of Tokyo Metropolitan Municipality, has declared 16 policy goals, the first of which is to 'Create an urban city that facilitates a balance of jobs and residences'. It consists of two strategies: 'Promotion of inner city residence' and 'Fundamental reform of the metropolitan housing system'. The former includes bringing workplaces and residential areas together in the suburban Tama area. The results have been disappointing.

Conclusion

Nobody controls a global city like Tokyo; nobody knows who is behind the constant change. Something invisible, which we might call the world capitalist system, guides the transformation of the Japanese capital.

Tokyo has its natural limits. The city cannot grow indefinitely. What is first needed is decentralization and reorganization of the land based on the ecological balance in the region. The municipal government should strengthen the autonomy of urban communities for risk management. Water, food and other daily necessities are needed in the neighbourhood units in case of disaster.

It is obvious that the city needs powerful leadership and the participation of citizens to implement new ideas. Unfortunately, while formal procedures for citizen involvement have been proposed, they do not function effectively. People are reluctant to participate when their private concerns are not affected. Though blackouts and drought already threaten the metropolitan area in summer, the current system of production and

consumption of spaces is controlled by profit margins rather than social or ecological responsibility. If the current trends remain unchanged, Tokyo awaits catastrophe, and another reconstruction.

Notes

1 Archaeological evidence indicates that human settlement in the Kanto Plain dates back to prehistory. The origin of the city goes back to the foundation of a small castle in 1457, called Edo, which was built by a feudal lord, named Dokan Ohta, and was part of a small castle town before the end of the sixteenth century.

2 Many books and papers have been written in Japanese about the relationship between Japan and the Netherlands (see Goodman 2000).

3 The population of Tokyo Metropolitan Area has grown to 12.17 million (as of 1 October 2001), 9.5 per cent of Japan's total population and the largest of the 47 prefectures. In contrast, Tokyo's land area (2,187 square kilometres or 0.6 per cent of the total area of Japan) is the third smallest of the prefectures. The population density is 5,565 persons per square kilometre, by far the densest prefecture in Japan. The 23-*ku* areas are home to 8.21 million persons, the Tama area to 3.94 million, and the Islands to 27,000. Tokyo has 5.518 million households and the average household comprises 2.2 persons.

4 Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616) occupied the town in 1590 and made it the central governmental city, establishing a military government, the Tokugawa Bakufu (Shogunate) at Edo, in 1603. The Edo era lasted for nearly 260 years until imperial rule was restored (the Meiji Restoration) in 1868.

5 According to reliable records, Edo consisted of about 300 neighbourhood units in the Kanei period (1624–44), which increased up to 933 units in 1713 and 1678 units in 1745. The estimated population was 350,000 in 1695 and 500,000 in 1721. It is a point for later discussion that Edo was a special governmental city where half of the inhabitants belonged to the Bushi class (nobility) who formally resided in the country. So the total number of inhabitants in Edo was over one million at the end of the eighteenth century, beyond those of London and Paris. It is said that Edo (in terms of population) was the largest city—or a huge urban village—in the world in the early nineteenth century.

6 The Greater Tokyo Metropolitan Area is made up of Tokyo and the three neighbouring prefectures of Saitama, Kanagawa and Chiba. Approximately 26.3 per cent of Japan's total population lives in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. Tokyo is a vast self-governing unit consisting of 23 *ku* (wards), 26 cities, five towns and eight villages, and is divided into two major areas—the 23-ku area and Tama area. The total area of all 23 *ku* covers about 621 square kilometres. The Tama Area is adjacent to the 23-*ku* area. The daytime population, broken down by area, shows 11.191 million in the 23-ku area, 3.348 million in the Tama Area and 32,000 persons in the islands.

7 See Barthes (1970).

8 Y.Ishida (1987) divides the development of modern urban planning in Japan into the following stages: (1) introduction of European urban reform (1868–87), (2) the Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance period *(Shikukaisei Jorei)* (1880–1918), (3) the period establishing the urban planning system (1910–35), (4) the wartime period (1931–45), (5) the reconstruction period (1945–54), (6) urban development (1955–68), (7) the establishment of a new urban planning system (1968–85), and (8) anti-planning during the bubble economy (1982–93). If I add the period after Y.Ishida: (9) community design after the bubble economy (1995-).

9 Born in Saga Han of Kyushu island; politician, prime minister (1898); one of the leaders of Meiji Restoration; founder of Waseda University.

10 Born in Thoshu Han; politician, minister of foreign affairs (1885–88).

11 Thomas James Waters is known as an engineer who had worked in Shanghai before coming to Japan. No details are known on his career.

12 Josiah Condor from England is respected as the father of the Japanese modern architects. He was invited to Japan at the request of the Ministry of Technology in 1877 and taught the first generation of students at Kobudaigakko (Institute of Technology) and designed a considerable number of buildings.

13 Herman Ende was 57 years old at that time. Willhelm Böckman was Ende's colleague of Ende & Beckmann Atelier. Richard Seel, Hermann Muthesius, Heinrich Mänz, Adolf Steghmuller and Oskara Emil Leopold Tietze were hired as architects according to Böckman's recommendation.

14 London town, which is located immediately south of the Imperial Palace and now called Marunouchi, facing Tokyo Central Station, was a creation of a private, family-owned business called Mitsubishi headed by Iwasaki.

15 Born in Chōsyū *han;* Politician, the Prime Minister (December 1889 to April 1891).

16 In terms of the urban planning in the Meiji era (1868–1911), see T.Fujimori (1982), which is still the best material.

17 Adiches is the name of a mayor of Frankfurt am Main.

18 The word *denen toshi* is used as the Japanese translation of garden city, but means rural city or country town if the word is literally translated into English.

19 104,619 people, most of whom had lived in the densely built up area, died or were missing and 300,000 houses were destroyed as a result of this disaster.

20 Born in Mito Han; politician; colonial officer in Taiwan (1898); the first director of Mantetu (Manshu Railroad Company) in Manchuria (1906); minister of interior affairs (1916); minister of foreign affairs (1918); mayor of Tokyo (1920).

21 He was an American scholar of public administration, finance and politics who had started a similar institute in New York.

22 The area is 55,260 ha, which is six times that of Tokyo-*shi.* Dai Tokyo consisted of 35 *ku* (wards), the area of which is the same as the present 23-ku (wards) area.

23 The number of dwelling units exceeded the number of households in 1968. It took about a quarter of a century to recover the shortage of dwelling units.

24 He was a civil engineer who graduated from Tokyo Imperial University; engineer of the Ministry of Interior; director of the Construction Board of Tokyo-*shi; professor* of Waseda University.

25 It soon became clear that the Capital Region Development Plan was unrealistic in its underestimation of industrial and population concentration pressures in the metropolis. In particular the idea of green belts was totally ineffective in the face of the suburban sprawl during 1960s. As a result, a re-evaluation of the plan became necessary. The Capital Region Development Law was revised in 1965 and the second Capital Region Development Master Plan was established in 1968.

26 The corporation was disbanded in 2004 in line with the restructuring of the governmental organization.

27 The New Residential Built-Up Area Development Law and the Law for Infrastructure Development of New Cities are notable as measures that dealt realistically with metropolitan development.

28 He was a popular two-term governor until 1979. His ideas reoriented Tokyo city planning, but almost brought it to bankruptcy.

29 The former demolished city hall of Tokyo had been located in the Marunouchi Central District. The location of the city hall in the west, the former sub-centre Shinjuku, shows the movement of centre of gravity of the city.

30 In the early morning on 17 January 1995, the Great Hanshin Earthquake occurred. Collapsing buildings, flying objects (furniture) and fires killed over 6,000 people. About

300,000 people lost their houses and were compelled to live in temporary shelters until the end of August 1995 when emergency houses were completed.

31 Migration data between Tokyo and other prefectures in 2000 show that 444,000 persons moved into Tokyo while 391,000 moved out, a total movement of 835,000 and a net population increase of 37,000. Since 1967 the trend of depopulation has prevailed, with the exception of 1985. In 1997, there was a net population increase for the first time in 12 years, and 2000 again showed a net increase. Looking at the total movement between Tokyo and the three adjacent prefectures (Saitama, Chiba and Kanagawa Prefectures), 208,000 came into Tokyo with 205,000 moving out, representing a total movement of 413,000 persons or 47.6 per cent of the total, a net population increase of 3,000. Concerning natural population change data, births numbered 101,000 and deaths 84,000 resulting in a net increase of 17,000 during 2000. The degree of net increases has declined yearly since 1972, with the exception of 1994 and 1996.

32 See Funo (2003).

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