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African Urban Economies

Viability, Vitality or Vitiation?

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Preface

Along the way, several people and agencies have facilitated this book in one way or another. We are grateful to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for funding the 'African Urban Economy' workshop, which was held at the Afrika-studiecentrum, Leiden University, The Netherlands, in November 2001, and the conference participants for their lively contributions to the workshop discussion. Most of the case study chapters derive from papers originally presented at the workshop. Special thanks go to Ann Reeves of the Afrika-studiecentrum for her painstaking copyediting and Satishna Gokuldas of Integra Software Services for her careful attention to detail in the final preparation of the typescript for publication.

Our intention in this edited collection is to provide diverse case studies and interpretations of urban demographic and economic processes in the hopes of sparking more debate about the intriguing development of East and Southern Africa's most populous cities.

The Editors
Oxford and London,
September 2005

About the authors

Philip Amis has worked extensively in consultancy and research on urban policy and poverty, decentralization and institutional development and aid management in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. He is a senior lecturer at the International Development Department, School of Public Policy at the University of Birmingham, who has recently contributed to the volume *Urban Governance, Voice and Poverty in the Developing World* (Earthscan, 2004). He is currently working on poverty issues connected to a multi-donor-funded evaluation of general budget support in various developing countries.

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Deborah Fahy Bryceson, an economic geographer by discipline, is a research associate at the African Studies Centre, Oxford University and former senior research fellow at the Afrika-studiecentrum, Leiden University, the Netherlands. Her current research encompasses the interaction of livelihood, settlement and mobility patterns as well as the impact of HIV/AIDS on local communities. Specialized in East African studies, she has authored and edited a number of books including *Food Insecurity and the Social Division of Labour in Tanzania* (Macmillan, 1990), *Liberalizing Tanzania's Food Trade* (James Currey, 1993), *Women Wielding the Hoe* (Berg, 1995), *Farewell to Farms* (Ashgate co-edited with Vali Jamal, 1997), *Disappearing Peasantries* (Intermediate Technology Publications co-edited with Chris Kay and Jos Mooij, 2000), *Alcohol in Africa* (Heinemann/Greenwood, 2002) and *The Transnational Family* (Berg co-edited with Ulla Vuorela, 2002).

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Paul Jenkins, an architect/planner by training, is director of the Centre for Environment and Human Settlements in Edinburgh, Scotland. He has worked over the past 30 years with a wide range of central and local governments, NGOs, the private sector, and international aid and community-based organizations in the fields of urban planning, housing, architecture and construction. With wide experience in Mozambique, South Africa and Angola, his primary interests are governance, participation and community empowerment, with a focus on low-income groups, policy advocacy and socially responsible professional practice. His main research focus is the changing relationships between the state and the civil society in the rapidly urbanizing world, which he has written about in *Urban Development and Civil Society: The Role of Communities in Sustainable Cities* (Earthscan, 2001).

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Guerre Froide (with Pierre Hassner, Karthala, 2003), *L'Afrique et l'Asie dans la Globalisation Subalterne* (Les Indes Savantes, 2005).

Nici Nelson studied anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University before doing her PhD at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. She is now a senior lecturer in anthropology at Goldsmiths College, University of London. Her research interests include gender power issues in development and urbanization processes, informal-sector livelihoods of men and women in Africa, HIV/AIDS, and laterally changing family structures. Her recent publications include *Power and Participatory Development* (1997 co-edited with S. Wright), *Urban Poverty in Africa* (co-edited with Sue Jones) and *Practitioners and Poverty Alleviation: Influencing Urban Policy from the Ground Up* (2005, also co-edited with Sue Jones).

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Carole Rakodi, professor of international urban development in the International Development Department, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, is a geographer and town planner, with professional experience in Zambia and Kenya. Her main research interests are in urban politics, planning and management, land and housing markets and policy, and urban poverty and livelihoods. She has carried out research in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana, India and Jamaica and published widely. Her books include *The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities* (United Nations University Press, 1997); *Urban Livelihoods: A People-Centred Approach to Reducing Poverty* (Rakodi with Lloyd-Jones, eds, Earthscan, 2002); *Building Sustainable Urban Settlements* (co-edited with Romaya, Intermediate Technology Publications, 2002); and *Urban Governance, Voice and Poverty in the Developing World* (Earthscan, 2004). She is currently researching informal land delivery systems in African cities and the impact of HIV/AIDS on urban household livelihoods in Kenya and Zambia.

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Apex cities of East and Southern Africa

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Part I
Introduction

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1
Fragile Cities: Fundamentals of Urban Life in East and Southern Africa

Deborah Fahy Bryceson

> The towns are so many electric transformers. They increase tension, accelerate the rhythm of exchange and ceaselessly stir up men's lives.... Towns are also oppressive, parasitical formations.... This town-country confrontation is the first and longest class struggle history has known. We should not pass censure or take sides: these parasitic towns also embodied the intelligence, risk, progress, and modernity towards which the world was slowly moving.... To the rather unwieldy body of the state they lent their irreplaceable vitality. They were the accelerators of all historical time. Which does not mean that they did not make men suffer throughout the centuries, including the men who lived in them.
>
> (Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life 1400–1800*, 1967: 373)

Too often the ambiguities of early European urbanization are overlooked and early modern city growth is portrayed as the embodiment of Western economic and political progress and a model for the developing world today. It is in this light that Western donors have viewed the combination of urban demographic growth with economic malaise in Sub-Saharan Africa as perverse and attributable to urban political elites' misguided policies and practices. Sub-Saharan Africa's urbanization trend, amidst the doldrums of the last quarter of a century, is indeed puzzling. This book seeks to disentangle and contextualize the tenuous character of urban African economic life over the last half of the 20th century.

African urban populations have expanded in the absence of industrialization and national economic growth. While it is true that increasing urban populations inevitably expand livelihood activities and labour force participation, few would argue that there is a synergy between urban demographic and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa generally. Quite the contrary, for much of the 20th century, colonial and post-colonial policy makers sought to curb urban demographic growth that was viewed as economically draining and socially destabilizing in the context of an international division of labour which accorded Sub-Saharan Africa the role of exporting natural resources and agricultural products from its abundant land expanse.

Uncertainty about the foundations of African urban economies contributes to scepticism about the economic advantage of urban growth. This chapter and the one that follows provide an overview of the foundational supports and dynamics of African apex city economies, highlighting pertinent findings from the book's in-depth East and Southern African case studies (Chapters 4–13). Before considering what sustains urban economic life, there is the problem of distinguishing what is understood by the term 'urban'. In this chapter, urban areas are defined, before discussing their fragility as places to live and work in. The pre-colonial and colonial origins of cities in the region and key post-colonial processes of economic, demographic and social transformation are reviewed. The constraints and opportunities posed by the cities' social and productive service infrastructure are outlined with respect to their influence on economic growth.

Chapter 2 explores the cities' sources of economic sustainability over the past 25 years and the character of livelihood experimentation that has ensued. The housing market, as an internal engine of growth and class differentiation, is discussed from the perspective of landlords and tenants. Chapter 3 follows with an in-depth analysis of urban demography revealed by recent census data. The case studies, spanning Chapters 4–13, are grouped into three parts: 'city economies in the making', 'urban livelihoods and social dynamics' and 'urban welfare, housing and infrastructure'. All of the case study authors have spent years researching their respective cities, which is reflected in their intricate portraits of individual cities and analyses of forces shaping their urban economies. In so doing, the economic vulnerabilities and vistas of these cities emerge very clearly. Finally, in the light of the urban case study material, the last chapter of this book concludes with an analysis of the apex cities' positioning *vis-à-vis* their respective hinterlands, national urban hierarchies, regional ties and global interfaces.

Urban essentials

Delineating urban settlements

Each country has its own definition of urban areas, and the variation in definitions and the fuzziness of administrative versus operative boundaries are problems that are not unique to Sub-Saharan Africa. The most easily observable criteria for distinguishing rural and urban areas are population scale and density, although the differences are relative rather than absolute. In countries of extremely low population density, a settlement of 5000 people may be classified as urban whereas elsewhere such a settlement would be considered a rural village. Indeed over the past millennium, Africa has been the world's most sparsely populated continent. Much of the literature on the pre-colonial history of African cities has defined 'urban' in settings and scales that would elsewhere be deemed rural.

To avoid controversy regarding what is and is not urban, we focus on those cities that are over half a million in population or represent urban primacy and are at or near the top of the national urban hierarchy in demographic size and political influence in their respective countries. They display essential urban characteristics notably regarding population characteristics:

- relatively concentrated *population density*;
- *settlement size* that exhibits spatial heterogeneity and large numbers making social and economic interaction impersonal in nature, extending beyond the circle of one's immediate family, neighbours and friends; and
- *social heterogeneity* of the population in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and class differences.

Locationally, they offer:

- *spatial coherence of settlement* with an internal network of roads and communications as well as productive and social service infrastructure; and
- favoured *external transport and communication connections* to other urban and rural areas.

Economically, they represent:

- the convergence of productive *economies of scale* with the proximity of large numbers of consumers; and
- *economic diversity*, a relatively wide range of occupational pursuits and availability of commodities and services.

East and Southern Africa's apex cities

Given the enormity of the continent and the economic, political and cultural diversity of over 50 nation-states, our focus is limited to the East and Southern African regions. The countries of East and Southern Africa display wide variation as well but they form a continuous land unit primarily characterized by savannah environments interspersed with well-watered highlands and arid deserts. They share a common coastline along the Indian Ocean stretching round to the South Atlantic Ocean.

Historically, the East African Rift Valley has been a migration corridor, notably for Bantu people travelling in a southerly direction from the north-west, circumventing the Congo Forest. The majority of countries in this region were subject to British colonialism with the exception of Angola and Mozambique that were under Portuguese rule, Burundi and Rwanda that



Figure 1.1 Urban population as percentage of national total, 1960–2003
Source: World Bank, 2004.

were colonized by the Belgians and Somalia and, for a short time, Ethiopia that was under Italian colonial rule. Thus, it can be argued that East and Southern Africa (ESA) constitutes a cohesive geographical region with similar political histories upon which to identify trends and patterns.[1]

The ESA has experienced moderate levels of urbanization relative to West Africa's more advanced and the Sahel's least developed urbanization (Figure 1.1). Over the past 50 years, large city growth rates have followed a similar pattern throughout the continent with extremely rapid growth at the outset tapering thereafter, although there has been some differentiation with the highest large city growth in East Africa and lowest in Southern Africa (Figure 1.2).

Within the context of world urbanization, ESA represents low levels of urbanization, but has been experiencing relatively rapid urban growth[2] over



Figure 1.2 Average population growth rates of major African Cities by region
Source: United Nations, Population Division, 2004.
Notes: These are unweighted regional averages. Cities included in the growth rate calculations are *Southern Africa:* Bulawayo, Cape Town, Chitungwiza, Durban, East Rand, Gaborone, Harare, Johannesburg, Lilongwe, Luanda, Lusaka, Maputo, Maseru, Mbabane, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria, Sasolburg, West Rand, Windhoek;
East Africa: Addis Ababa, Asmara, Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Kigali, Mogadishu, Mwanza, Nairobi;
Sahel: Bamako, Khartoum, Laayoune, Ndjamena, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou;
West Africa: Abidjan, Abuja, Accra, Bangui, Banjul, Bissau, Brazzaville, Conakry, Cotonou, Dakar, Doula, Freetown, Ibadan, Kinshasa, Kumasi, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Lubumbashi, Monrovia, Niamey, Ogbomosho, Porto Novo, Yaoundé.

the past five decades, particularly in the large cities of East Africa. We are primarily interested in the apex cities of each country's urban hierarchy. Apex cities are defined here as the national capital cities and/or cities of over 500,000.[3] In South Africa, the urban hierarchy is not characterized by a single apex. Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, all of roughly the same size, form triple peaks.

Fragility of African cities

All cities whatever their size, and in common with rural settlements, must function to fulfil urban residents' daily basic needs provisioning. Cities are biological as well as demographic and economic units. They represent colonies of people who require minimum levels of food, water, sanitation, health and security to remain alive. Without attainment of these basic requirements, cities can rapidly disintegrate.

Basic needs provisioning is especially problematic for impoverished urban populations. A population's material requirements can exceed the city's product and service supply response as a result of economic constraints, lack of settlement organization and/or inadequate political governance. There are a number of telling signs of urban residents reaching the limits of urban basic needs provisioning or what might best be termed *urban economic carrying capacity* when they:

- resort to urban farming proximate to their homes or elsewhere in the city or its outskirts;
- engage in circular migration rotating their residence between rural or urban, notably circular migration to avail themselves of rural livelihoods and support networks; or
- choose to live in peri-urban areas where they can pursue both urban and rural livelihoods readily from their homes without having to commute between rural and urban occupational options.

Most colonial cities in ESA were posited on circular migration. After independence, full-time urban residence became the general norm, only to erode later as the economic carrying capacity of cities declined during the 1980s. This was reflected in decreasing income earnings and purchasing power that undermined the affordability of basic housing and food requirements.

City life has often been precarious for the individual and in aggregate this has imparted fragility to African cities as economic units, which is reflected in the population's variable resort to circular migration. In the post-colonial period, the level of circular migration in ESA cities relates to a gamut of material constraints and lifestyle choices which straddle the rural and urban continuum including the extent of rural landlessness, the relative merits of urban as opposed to rural schooling, the existence of second- and third-generation urban-dwellers and their declining attachment to the countryside, the rural/urban incidence of HIV/AIDS and the apportioning of care for sufferers between rural- and urban-based extended families. These will be explored later in this chapter and illustrated in the case study chapters.

Over the last decade, the analytical focus has been primarily on micro-level urban production and consumption, notably household livelihood strategies. Rural-urban linkages have been viewed as an important aspect of urban as well as rural livelihood strategies, especially during duress (Jamal and Weeks 1993, Potts 1995, 1997, Krüger 1998, Smit 1998, Tacoli 2003, Bah *et al*. 2003). While affording valuable insights, these studies have analytical limits. Most represent a diffuse micro-level perspective that generates a wealth of empirical detail on coping processes and welfare outcomes in rural areas but we are still unclear about aggregate outcomes for urban areas. How are urban landscapes and occupational trajectories being moulded as a consequence? How is the city responding as an economic unit?

The World Bank and other donor agencies have portrayed African cities largely in negative terms over the last 30 years. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) implemented during the 1980s were premised on eliminating 'urban bias'. In the post-SAP period as the World Bank has generally promoted urban areas as a dynamizing force for national economic growth, African cities are seen as the exception:

> cities in Africa are not serving as engines of growth and structural transformation. Instead they are part of the cause and a major symptom of the economic and social crises that have enveloped the continent. (World Bank 2000: 130)

Urban demographic growth versus economic performance

Is the pessimism of the World Bank warranted? Do we know enough about urban growth processes in the short, medium and long term to judge? For decades, urban areas have been of marginal interest in African studies. Urban studies were a novelty during the 1960s when low levels of urbanization prevailed in ESA with the exception of South Africa (Leslie 1963, Mitchell 1969). As urbanization rates accelerated, the gross imbalance between rural and urban research became increasingly myopic, skewed heavily by donor preference (Stren 1994). Western donor agencies followed in the footsteps of colonial governments in favouring 'farm first' policies. Rural welfare needs were recognized while urban needs were discounted or ignored. Recent poverty studies now afford a profuse documentation of urban poverty but, statistically, absolute poverty levels are still considered to be greater in rural areas, no doubt influenced by the difficulties of comparing urban and rural standards of living given the higher proportion of non-commoditized goods and services consumed in rural areas (Rakodi 1997, Jones and Nelson 1999, Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2002).

The urban studies that now exist span several social science disciplines with no one discipline offering a compelling analytical framework for understanding the dynamics of urban societies and economies. Inter-disciplinary, as opposed to multi-disciplinary, efforts would be best placed to fill this void. In the meantime, while donor agencies and national governments are becoming more sensitive to urban issues, urban planning and design are desperately weak and directionless. Investment cutbacks in urban infrastructure have left African cities in a general state of dilapidation. The severe lack of reliable statistical data[4] and documentation of economic activity in African cities, given negligent record-keeping, a lack of statistical collation and the vast expansion of an unregistered, unmonitored informal sector, compounds the general myopia of academics and policy makers regarding urban economies. Urban economies are readily observed and experienced but not easily measured, analyzed or understood. Instead, academics have fixated on the phenomenon of urban demographic growth and its potentially dire consequences.

Much store has been placed in the so-called 'demographic transition' in developing countries from high fertility and mortality rates through to far lower equilibrium fertility and mortality rates. The transition is associated with increasing educational attainment and occupational orientation away from agriculture. Is there an associated urban demographic transition that traces changing levels of urban in-migration and declining levels of urban fertility and mortality? Montgomery *et al.* (2003: 81) use the term the 'urban transition' to refer to rapid urban growth rates involving historically unprecedented numbers of people, at generally lower levels of per capita income than took place in the world's current urbanized and industrialized world during its urbanization. Interestingly, the rate of increase in the urban percentage of national populations today does not exceed that of the already urbanized industrial world a century or more ago.

By 2025 more than half of Sub-Saharan Africa's population is expected to be living in urban areas. Already 45 per cent of national populations in West Africa are urban (Figure 1.1). In Chapter 3, Deborah Potts provides a detailed analysis of urban growth in ESA based on recent census data. As Potts stresses, urban population growth rates are high but they are in fact declining or stagnating in most places. Apex cities generally register slower growth than more recent smaller settlements (Hardoy *et al.* 2001). As the urbanization process matures within a developing national economy, urban primacy becomes less pronounced.

Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia have experienced similar rates of urbanization, one accompanied by economic stagnation, the other by growth. Rather than attempting to find relationships between demographic and economic growth, it may prove more fruitful and a useful starting point to consider apex urban economies *vis-à-vis* their national political economies. In the countries under review, their national economies have been dominated by agrarian production, with the major exception of Southern Africa's mining economies.[5] The perceived malfunctioning of African urban economies is often viewed as a derivative of patron–client networks and 'traditional' kinship rooted ultimately in Africa's rural peasantries (Bayart *et al.* 1999, Chabal and Daloz 1999). This cultural essentialist perspective overlooks the ubiquity of patron–client relations in the early urban history of other continents, notably Europe, as will be argued in Chapter 14 (Bryceson 2000a).

The root of the word 'politics' and the Greek word for city are one and the same, *polis*. Cities through time have evinced networks of patron–client relations that were linked to, but distinct from, those prevailing in the countryside. In the wake of the Black Death and the disintegration of feudal estates in Europe, cities held out the prospects of political and economic autonomy for labourers accustomed to servile duty to a manor. In a curious twist of history, African cities today are seen as headquarters of corrupt government holding back economic growth and good governance. To what extent does that tally with the actual historical record in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Sub-Saharan African cities of the past: Nodes of power for the interplay of states and markets

This section considers the pre-colonial roots of urban economies in the light of recent historical work, tracing African urban origins before turning to their colonial trajectories.

Pre-colonial foundations

Much of the general literature on ancient cities emphasizes their extractive nature. Three historical models are salient: theocratic city-states, imperial city-states and feudal walled cities. The former are seen as forbidding citadels of wealth and political power dominated by a priestly class[6] commanding compliance if not awe from the immediate urban population, the surrounding population and long-distance trading networks. More secular cities, exemplified by Rome, were based on imperial trade and taxation with distribution centralized in the urban capital in an extreme form of urban bias and spatial inequality. The medieval walled cities of Europe represent a smaller-scale and more decentralized urban system. Nonetheless, medieval city walls were more than symbolic. Outsiders had access to the cities' markets but not their services. Feudal serfdom rooted rural dwellers in the countryside tilling the land.

Where do African pre-colonial cities fit in these three roughly sketched urban models? Historians have recently turned their attention to Sub-Saharan Africa's urban past arguing that African cities were varied in their physical forms and social and economic functions (Anderson and Rathbone 2000, Burton 2002). To some extent, Buganda, the site of present-day Kampala, combined all three models. It was the headquarters of a powerful kingship that had extended its domain over a densely populated, fertile agrarian area and experimented with religion to gain greater leverage. It was also an important trading site, outfitting caravans travelling to and from the East African Coast (Reid and Medard 2000).

Pre-colonial urban settlements in ESA are difficult to characterize, but four main types can be discerned. First, there were cities commanding religious awe. The ancient holy city of Aksum in Ethiopia is a prime example, although its decline was apparent to visitors in the later 18th century (Burton 2002a; citing Pankhurst 1985). Second, environmental border settlements centrifugally spread out along a river or coastline, or between two contrasting natural environments like savannah and forest or lowlands and mountains, facilitating the exchange of goods and services between two zones. As settlements, they marked a gradation from rural to urban, with populations of approximately 20,000–30,000 people that generally lacked rigid political or economic stratification. Instead they were likely to be governed by conventional ritual and joking relationships between neighbours or other groups who regularly encountered each other for purposes of trade.

Third, and more centripetally, the war-ravaged citadels of the slave-trading economy tended to attract larger populations, gathered for defence. Thornton (2000) describes Mbanza Kongo, in what is now Angola, as a dense core settlement of 10,000, with 40,000 people living in the immediate surroundings. These settlements were demographically unstable with a fluctuating number of soldiers who were vital to the physical security of the population, but placed heavy demands on local food production capacity.

Interestingly, although urban settlements differed in their degree of decentralization versus centralization and fluid egalitarian versus more rigid hierarchical social structures, they shared the tendency towards being highly ephemeral as settlements. The former was subject to natural vagaries of flooding, drought, pestilence as well as openness to attack. The latter, despite its citadel position and troops, was under constant threat of attack by rival slave-trading factions and rarely left a lasting urban mark on the landscape.

The fourth city type arose in the context of foreign contact. Mogadishu, Mombasa and Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques), three of the cities covered in this volume, are very old settlements dating roughly back to the 10th century. Situated on the Indian Ocean, they and the island city of Zanzibar attracted successive waves of Arab, Chinese,[7] Indian, Portuguese, Dutch and French traders who found them useful entrepots for the export of luxury goods, notably ivory and gold, and later slaves (Chapters 4, 5 and 9, Sheriff 2002). Unlike upcountry trading settlements, these coastal towns did not have the same logistical problems of supplying adequate amounts of food for a fluctuating population; visiting trading vessels could provision food and other necessities. In Mombasa, slave plantations were established adjacent to the town to produce staple foods for the urban population and for export. Security, however, was a perennial problem. Mombasa was heavily fortified and Mogadishu was eventually overrun by looting Somali clans.

At the time of colonial penetration, African cities were relatively small and unremarkable, with some notable exceptions.[8] They tended to be the loci of trading capital and food supplies for the surrounding countryside. The essence of urban comparative advantage – the concentration of labour and capital in a confined space – remained problematic and the existence of urban settlements was inherently fragile, rising and falling with trading empires and food supply fluctuations.

Colonial trajectories

Unlike West Africa and the Sahel, where the major cities evolved from strategic ports and the caravan-trading centres of old, East and Southern Africa's cities are mostly colonial in origin and physical layout. The siting of capital cities was critical to the colonial economy. Colonial governments, especially the British, promulgated strict boundaries between rural and urban space and standards of living. Indirect rule in the countryside was premised on interpretations of African customary law that ordained an African sense of belonging rooted in rural villages (Mamdani 2000). While there was little in their policies to encourage urban diversity and dynamism, urban areas were accorded significant entrepot and administrative functions in the raw material export activities of national economies based on agricultural and mineral production.

City sites

Most cities designated as colonial capitals were ports or upcountry sites located on important transport arteries. Historically important ports like Luanda, Mogadishu, Mombasa and Maputo were chosen as capitals, while other ports of antiquity such as Sofala and Kilwa were passed over. Dar es Salaam, a relatively new deep-water port developed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, was favoured over the older port of Bagamoyo (Sutton 1970).

Railroad networks, however, were key to the siting of colonial capital cities. Railroads built during the late 19th and early 20th centuries were a physical extension of the European scramble for Africa, establishing enduring territorial claims and major infrastructural investment for the fledging colonial governments.[9] In East and Southern Africa, only Burundi and Rwanda had no rail links. Railroads were central to the colonial export strategies of landlocked countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe. While rail lines in West Africa emanated from the port into the interior without inter-connecting lines, in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania some semblance of a fanned network took shape, but was still nothing in comparison with the denser inter-connecting network of Southern Africa. All of the colonial capitals of this region were on the rail line, with the exception of Mogadishu and Kigali, cities with hinterlands generating limited exportable goods.

Djibouti illustrates the importance of territorial claim through railway building more than any other city. In 1887, the French founded the city in an attempt to counter the influence of the British presence in Aden and to take advantage of the railway construction in the interior of Ethiopia with its terminus at Addis Ababa (Hannan 1997).[10] Addis Ababa had been established just a year earlier in 1886.[11] Nairobi, which started life as a railway workers encampment, quickly replaced Mombasa as the capital of Kenya amidst the consolidation of European settler interests. Nairobi became the gateway to the ‘White Highlands’ (now the Kenya Highlands). Decades later in 1935, Lusaka replaced Livingstone as the capital of Northern Rhodesia because of its location on the main north-south railway line near the geographical centre of the country and its closer proximity to the Copperbelt.

Other capitals took root as administrative and service supports to mining enterprise. Johannesburg, founded in 1886, was a mining settlement situated on the rocky gold-rich hills of the Witwatersrand (Katz 1997). Harare (formerly Salisbury) was sited adjacent to gold mines and good farmland (Rakodi 1995).

Kigali's establishment appears to have lacked the strategic significance of most of the other capitals. It was originally part of German East Africa (present-day Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania). After Germany's defeat in the First World War, the colony was split into Tanganyika under the British and Rwanda-Urundi under the Belgians. Kigali, a European mission settlement within the Tutsi-ruled kingdom of Ruanda, became the capital of Rwanda-Urundi (McDow 1997a). Kampala had strong tribal kingdom associations as well, being adjacent to the headquarters of the Buganda kingdom (Chapter 6). This was originally conceived as a political advantage by the British colonial government keen to put the policy of indirect rule to the test.

Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, has been omitted from this discussion because Botswana (then Bechuanaland) was administered by the South African government from Mafikeng in South Africa until the country's independence in 1966. Coalescing out of dust, Gaborone's big bang appearance came with house building for 5000 people shortly before independence (Chapter 12). On the rail line connecting South Africa with Zimbabwe, Gaborone's site conformed to the rail node criterion, although by the 1960s roads were starting to supercede rail as conduits for commodity and passenger transport in many countries.

Racial delineation of town and countryside

Colonial cities were designed to exclude Africans (O'Connor 1983). East and Southern African cities were destined to become laboratories of highly controlled experiments in racial separation. The European colonial experience in the Americas and Asia in the 16th to 18th centuries was the foundation upon which 'divide and rule' through ethnic allegiances and antipathies and above all racial stereotyping was fine-tuned as a British colonial method of governance.

Urban dwellers were residentially and occupationally delineated by race. Much of East Africa had been the site of an Arab slave trade that viciously trampled on people's personal freedom and human dignity, threatening their lives and tearing families and communities apart. This remained a living memory for many despite the manumission of slaves in several British colonies during the first decade of the 20th century (Chapter 5). The mobility and residential controls imposed on Africans during the colonial period must be viewed against the legacy of African slavery.

Indian merchants were trading on the coast from the late 18th century. The Asian presence became more pronounced after colonial administrations imported Asian coolie labour for railroad construction (Sheriff 1987). Many labourers decided not to return to India, became traders and, joined by their wives, resided in the capital city or the small administrative towns that dotted the countryside.

The African capitals of this period were small in population and area, built to be aesthetically pleasing to European tastes, the 'city as civilization' trope that Jenkins (Chapter 4) describes for late 19th century Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). African housing – where it was provided – was physically separated from Asian and European neighbourhoods by a *cordon sanitaire*, a large open no-man's land that was expected to prevent the spread of disease, crime and civil unrest.[12] African housing was scantily supplied, of far lower standard than Asian and European housing and designed to be temporary housing for male 'bachelors' who would ultimately return to their respective rural homelands. This reached its nadir in Southern Africa, notably in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Namibia with hostel accommodation offering male workers little privacy or sense of self-worth. Grim residential circumstances and monotonous daily routines underlined the imperative of returning to their rural homes.

Jenkins (Chapter 4) describes how male migrants came to Lourenço Marques for forced labour, domestic service or on their way to the mines and farms of South Africa. Africans were not allowed to own land. The immigration of poor white Portuguese during the 1960s reinforced the attitude of urban exclusion towards Africans at a time when other countries in the region were achieving national independence. On Mombasa Island, the old elites monopolized the land but Africans were allowed to own land on the mainland, which led to far higher African land ownership (26 per cent) at independence compared with Nairobi (2 per cent). In Harare, bans on African home ownership left men with few options other than to engage in a circular migration pattern commuting between urban dormitories and rural farms on a weekly, monthly or even annual basis (Chapter 11). In Johannesburg, apartheid policies took the region's urban racial separatism to its logical extreme – an elaborate bureaucratic system of dehumanizing racial oppression. This had the effect of severely restricting the black African population of Johannesburg (Chapter 3).

When Lusaka became the capital of Northern Rhodesia, it was designed, planned and built on the entirely European model of a garden city (Myers 2003). Decades later in post-colonial Malawi, President Banda's grand design for his new capital, Lilongwe, extended the garden concept to that of an urban woodland, offering enormous low-density plots for the new African elite and European donor community in stark contrast with crowded high-density areas for the African urban poor (Potts 1985). Gaborone, Botswana's new planned capital, however, bucked the colonial legacy by avoiding rigid racial and class zoning (Chapter 12).

The Lusophone countries were different. In Maputo and Luanda, racial zoning was less by physical design and more by Africans' inferior legal status which largely precluded the possibility of them residing in more affluent and visually pleasing neighbourhoods. Their growing relegation to unplanned and non-regulated informal settlements around Maputo dates back to the 1930s, a situation that British colonialism endeavoured to avoid.

In Kampala, two very different land-tenure systems were juxtaposed during the colonial period, namely crown land administered by the colonial government and Mungo administered by the *Kabaka* (king) of the Buganda under Uganda's system of indirect rule (Chapter 6). This duality was unwieldy for the rationalization of urban land use and housing standards. *Mailo* land, subject to a curious convergence of the long-term profit-driven interests of Bugandan landlords with the immediate desperate needs for shelter of large numbers of urban poor, is now generating appalling overcrowded slum conditions.

Colonial fears of detribalization

Much has been written about the lengths that colonial governments went to install chiefs willing to be compliant mediators between the colonial government and the local people. This proved exceptionally difficult in many rural areas (Bryceson 1990, Feierman 1990), but it was virtually impossible in urban areas given the entirely different lifestyles, occupations, settlement patterns and above all heterogeneous populations of urban as opposed to rural areas. At the time of accelerated growth towards critical urban population densities, Europeanization of space through the annexation of tribal land was the norm, as Jenkins (Chapter 4) describes for Maputo. Local chiefs' powers were progressively delimited, marginalized and delegitimized in the eyes of an African population hailing from a multitude of different tribal backgrounds (Burton 2002b). Ethnicity became the disruptor rather than the facilitator of systems of local authority.

Colonial and municipal governments held firmly to the policy that Africans' residence in urban areas was temporary and they were destined to return to the traditional discipline and harmony of their rural native authorities. Viewed as innocents in the urban environment, Africans' village origins, it was argued, had not prepared them for monetized urban economies that required careful budgeting and financial savvy. Thus, in addition to the spatial delimitations of African housing, attempts were made to supervise the daily rhythm of African urban life. Housing was designed primarily to accommodate single men who were subjected to highly regimented work and leisure time activities. Known as the 'Durban system', many municipalities operated community halls where beer with a regulated low alcohol content was sold. This aimed at generating revenue for African services within the municipality[13] and controlling alcohol consumption levels. As Gewald (2002) documents for Windhoek during the 1930s, the system was prone to backfiring. Municipal officials faced disgruntled customers who heartedly disliked the weak beer and transferred their custom to illegal brewers and distillers.

After the Second World War, urban populations ballooned and the deficiencies of colonial governance escalated. Employers and government alike began questioning the viability of the bachelor wage system as labour strikes hit some of the port cities (Iliffe 1979, Cooper 1987). Civil disobedience, spawned by the acute need for housing surfaced in the burgeoning squatter areas. The introduction of wage levels adequate to cover the basic needs of a worker and his family, the so-called 'family wage', spread. Growing appreciation of the destabilizing impact of the urban political awakening spurred municipal governments to expand African housing and improve urban infrastructure as Colonial Development and Welfare Funds became available. However, such up-scaling faced capacity limitations in economies still recovering from wartime material shortages. Nairobi's housing schemes during the 1950s encountered corrupt practices and poor construction standards on the part of European administrators and Asian contractors (Anderson 2002). Jenkins (Chapter 4) observes that municipal authorities in Maputo were simply unprepared for the 1950s migration boom and continued to turn a blind eye to the spread of a sprawling African *canico* (reed) city with outlying market gardens that contrasted starkly with the compact European cement city.

Post-colonial apex cities, 1960–2010

African nationalism gave impetus to urban growth. South Africa's apartheid policy formally tried to contain both with its imposition of urban influx control, keeping an iron hand on political protest. As Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (Chapter 10) demonstrate, South African government-imposed controls against urban migration succeeded in lowering urban population growth down to between 1 and 2 per cent during the apartheid decades of the 1960s to the mid-1980s as opposed to 4 per cent before and after this period.

National independence and urban growth surges came in waves elsewhere. The earliest brought independence to several states in East Africa freed from the colonial rule of Great Britain, Belgium and Italy.[14] The mid-1970s witnessed a second wave when the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola obtained independence and Djibouti gained freedom from France. Finally, the Southern African countries of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa were last to achieve African-led governments and shed racial separatism in 1980, 1990 and 1994 respectively. Ethiopia had escaped European colonial domination,[15] but nonetheless had barriers to urban migration under the imperial government of Haile Selassie and the subsequent socialist government of Mengistu that was finally overthrown in 1991.

The growth-enhancing impact of national independence and mass politics is evident in the expanding populations of the larger apex cities shown in Figure 1.3. Gaborone, being a purpose-built capital city, reflects the impetus of national independence more than any other. Its growth in the 1960s



Figure 1.3 Large East & Southern African city populations
Source: United Nations, Population Division, 2004.

averaged 24 per cent, slowing to 13 per cent in the 1970s, 8 per cent in the 1980s and dropping to 3.4 per cent in the 1990s.

Various tendencies tempering urban growth were, however, present. In the ex-Portuguese colonies, whites migrated back to Portugal in large numbers after independence but African in-migration was so pronounced that Maputo's growth continued (Chapter 4). During the 1980s depressed urban economies lost some of their pulling power, as will be discussed by Potts in Chapter 3, whereas during the 1990s AIDS lowered urban growth, especially in the large cities where people of sexually active ages were heavily concentrated.

The influence of war on urban population growth shows highly variable outcomes. In Uganda, Kampala barely grew in size during the protracted years of Amin's bloody reign of power in the 1970s (Chapter 6). So too, Maputo's rate of growth declined during Mozambique's liberation war in the early 1970s in part due to the exodus of Portuguese expatriates fleeing the political insecurity and slowdown in economic investment (Chapter 4). By contrast, in Zimbabwe's liberation war during the 1970s, rural people's insecurity and loss of livelihood led them to flock to Harare, overwhelming the influx controls that the government had erected (Chapter 11).

In Angola and Somalia, the apex cities of Luanda and Mogadishu spiralled under the pressures of war. Fierce fighting in upcountry rural areas dispossessed people of their livelihoods and sense of security causing them to flee the city. The protracted civil war in Angola catalyzed urban migration to Luanda on a massive scale with an estimated 2.3 million residents in 1995 largely cut off from the rural hinterland both politically and economically – an entirely donor-dependent island in a sea of military upheaval (Caldera 1997, Robson 2001). In the aftermath of civil war and ethnic genocide in Rwanda, Kigali's population spiralled. Despite the fact that war raged in Mogadishu, people nonetheless fled rural conflict zones for the refuge of the city where they rightly surmised international donor assistance would be more readily available. In Somalia's clan-based civil war Marchal (Chapter 9) identifies the aspirations of urban migrants to Mogadishu seeking survival through anonymity in the city, hoping to gain access to basic food supplies and other necessities supplied by foreign donors from Mogadishu.

Early post-independence years: Urban bias or minimum security?

In retrospect, the 1960s and early 1970s were undoubtedly the halcyon days of East African city life full of economic and social promise as cities swelled with men, accompanied by their wives and children, finding formal sector jobs. As first-generation urban dwellers, many enjoyed urban livelihood and residential opportunities that later cohorts were denied. Even in the Southern African settler-ruled countries, this cohort, who faced the humiliation of pass laws and other racial discrimination, nonetheless established an urban foothold and an advantageous position relative to later migrants.

Urban labour aristocracy (Arrighi 1973) and urban bias theorists (Lipton 1977, Bates 1981) argued that these fledging urban populations were inordinately advantaged, draining the countryside of investment, youthful energy and education, while failing to compensate by providing urban-provisioned service and infrastructure to support the development of the majority of the national population still farming in the countryside. Sah and Stiglitz (1992) viewed urban bias critically as an ideological or normative label deployed frequently without sufficient detailed empirical investigation of actual distributional and productivity consequences arising from relative subsidy and taxation levels between rural and urban areas. W.A. Lewis (1978) adopted a historical perspective, arguing that urbanization was a concomitant of economic development and nations undergoing rapid urbanization were almost inevitably debtor nations given the high costs of building urban infrastructure.[16]

Urban households, during the 1960s and early 1970s, were comparatively secure with the family wage serving as their economic anchor in the city. The establishment of a minimum wage at a level considered sufficient to support a worker and his immediate family was a landmark in the development of East African cities. Colonial-enforced bachelor wage earnings had necessitated male circular migration, locationally dividing families and circumscribing the enjoyment of family life (Chapter 8). Urban migrants coming of age just after independence, by contrast, experienced rising wage levels and job availability in urban areas as nation-states embarked on their quest for economic development (Chapter 7).

Hitherto the bachelor wage system had often predisposed urban job allocation towards the indigenous ethnic groups of the town unless low population densities of the surrounding area or extremely low literacy levels associated with the absence of missionary education tilted labour recruitment in the direction of non-indigenous tribes. Rakodi (Chapter 5) records how the local labour bias was increasingly contested by Mombasa's upcountry workforce in the 1940s spurred by earlier European land alienation in the Kenyan Highlands and labour union formation culminating in the granting of family wages. African urban labour forces became multi-ethnic.

First-generation urban migrant families contended with the sharp contrasts between urban and rural lifestyles. The economic self-sufficiency of the household unit was foregone in urban residence. Wives accompanying their husbands to the towns were usually not able to supplement household consumption with farming activities because most urban councils banned urban agriculture on public health grounds.[17] People surveyed at the time remarked that the commoditization of city life was difficult to live with, bemoaning that even household water supplies cost money (Bryceson 1980).

Formal jobs frequently included housing at subsidized rent levels. This provision declined progressively over time as the formal employment sector expanded. In effect, housing availability became a new form of influx control where governments were serious about implementing their anti-squatter policies.

The extensive government investment in low-cost site and service housing in Gaborone was exceptional. In Maputo some enlightened site and service schemes coupled with improvements in legal land rights gave a small portion of African households a firmer foothold in the urban housing market, and this was again taken up in the 1980s by the new municipal government. Generally, urban housing in most East African countries was increasingly characterized by severe overcrowding.

In addition to the security of minimum wages, urban dwellers in countries like Tanzania and Mozambique amongst others were recipients of food subsidies through the operation of single-channel parastatal marketing systems which kept staple food prices, notably that of maize flour, at affordable levels in the 1970s (Bryceson 1985, 1987, O'Laughlin 1996). In the years immediately after the oil crisis, both countries had campaigns to rusticate what were deemed to be surplus populations at a time when many people were unable to find formal employment or had lost their jobs (Chapter 4). Kampalans, on the other hand, had not been availed urban food subsidies. They ate a highly varied range of staple foods with heavy reliance on plantains and root crops. Urban agriculture became an important lifeline for the population during the troubled Amin era of the 1970s (Maxwell 1995). Amidst the financially constrained decades that followed, Kampalans' urban agricultural efforts were mirrored by other East African and later Southern African apex city residents trying to make ends meet (Drakakis-Smith 1992, Mlozi 1996, Mwangi and Foeken 1996, Mbiba 2000).

Thus, during the immediate post-independence years national employment, housing and food-marketing policies of national governments helped to keep urban poverty at bay.[18] However, the role played by urban government requires further consideration.

Lacuna or labyrinth: Urban policy, planning and government

Urban populations had expectations of improved livelihoods and living standards after independence, but escalating numbers made it difficult for urban infrastructural provisioning in the form of water and electricity supplies, sanitation, roads and transport to keep pace. Were urban governments up to the task? While this question must be posed on a city-by-city basis, there are nonetheless two clear trajectories: first, the countries where urban government lacked leadership and urban planning capability. These 'lacuna city governments' were often corrupt as well as ineffective. Many of the East African case study cities fall into this category. The second set of countries with 'labyrinth urban governments' had a maze of administrative bodies and laws focused on planning and controlling urban space and economic activities which were epitomized by South Africa and later by other apartheid-leaning Southern African countries.

The lacuna in East African urban governments could often be traced back to the colonial governments' imposition of traditional authorities that were antithetical to the ethnic and occupational diversity of urban dwellers. Frequently African urban migrants had neither political allegiance nor cultural affinity with the traditional rulers of the town. Post-colonial governments faced the dilemma of making municipal government politically legitimate and effective for service delivery but national government-stated concerns of the 1960s were primarily rural biased in many countries. Peasant farmers, rather than urban dwellers, constituted the popular masses who had propelled the national leaders into power, and their agricultural production was designated as the engine of national economic growth (Bryceson 2000b). It was their needs for basic education, health and water services that were prioritized by populist-based post-colonial states. Urban dwellers were deemed to be over-privileged at the expense of rural farmers, as described by Jenkins (Chapter 4) for socialist Mozambique. In the heady days following the first wave of independence, many East African governments nationalized urban land, which had the future potential of providing an unambiguous foundation for urban planning or, alternatively, a treasure-trove for personal enrichment on the part of officials entrusted with urban development.

As the years passed, inattention to urban government in East Africa slid into years of structural adjustment cutbacks, the drying-up of urban development and maintenance budgets, demoralized municipal councils, overlapping responsibilities and confusion between municipal and provincial governments and a lack of planning and funding, as described by Rakodi (Chapter 5) for Mombasa. In this setting, the municipal council often attracted people who saw local politics as a route to personal enrichment. Mombasa's council reflected Kenya's patronage-style government. The corruption of Dar es Salaam's elected councillors became so glaring that the national government eventually disbanded the council in 1996 and appointed better educated, more bureaucratically minded people to a City Commission which enhanced administrative performance and gained the approval of the population at large (Chapter 13).

In Maputo, municipal government was subsumed to central state control in the 15 years immediately following independence creating a marked lack of focus on urban issues in national policy. The first ten-year national development plan skewed the limited urban resource allocation towards the expanding government administrative class rather than the wider population (Chapter 4). Beyond their infrastructural needs, *de facto* withdrawal of the state from urban development was taking place. Frelimo, the country's sole political party, attempted to inculcate new political and social values and counter the economic sabotage of Renamo with the formation of *grupos* *dinamizadores* at neighbourhood level (Jenkins 2001). However, as these groups became increasingly local administrative arms of the state they met with general apathy. After constitutional changes in the 1990s, elected local authorities, autonomous of central control, were eventually established but usually lacked any overall vision of city development. Some local authority officials in fact became notorious for the misuse of their position for profiteering in illegal land sales (Chapter 4).

Nuwagaba (Chapter 6) highlights the anomalous situation of Kampala which has shouldered two systems of urban government. Roughly 60 per cent of land in Kampala continues to be under *mailo* tenure and ultimately subject to the Bugandan tribal leadership of the *Kabaka*. *Mailo* land is not amenable to the enforcement of basic building and sanitation regulations let alone urban planning, as urban technocrats and politicians work at cross purposes. The gulf between politicians' vote-seeking acquiescence to the flouting of building regulations, and urban technocrats' insistence on demanding standards in the face of abject poverty has undermined the possibility of realistic urban planning.

By far the most chaotic urban administrative scenario has been that of Mogadishu where neither national nor local municipal government has effectively operated for more than two decades. Marchal (Chapter 9) charts the deepening graft, corruption and ethnic favouritism of Siad Barre during the 1970s and 1980s. After he was deposed, clan-based warlords carved the city into spheres of influence ruled on the basis of fear of external enemies rather than mutual well-being of the city's population as a whole.

In stark contrast to the lacuna urban governments cited above, the labyrinth urban governments hail from a tradition of apartheid urban control involving elaborate spatial planning and social engineering underlined by clearly perceived economic and political imperatives of the nation-state. The 'big brother' connotations of control after independence have not been necessarily politically overbearing nor detrimental to the welfare of the mass of the urban poor. Gaborone is illustrative; having started as a 'brown field' site for the Botswanan capital, it has been consciously planned from the outset (Chapter 12). In Gaborone's spatial planning, the principals of racial separation were roundly rejected. The city was built to accommodate African households in mixed-income neighbourhoods. Investments in low-cost site and service housing were substantial from the outset although continually falling short of demand. Botswana's relatively small population and its diamond wealth were the foundations of a virtuous cycle of urban infrastructure provisioning and good governance. Since independence in 1966, the Botswanan government has implemented eight economic plans that have generously accommodated urban infrastructural investment.

In South Africa and Zimbabwe in the 1960s and 1970s, the tensions of increasing urbanization pressures were met with apartheid-style spatial planning. African population flows to urban areas were deflected to outlying townships necessitating long commutes between home and work. This was illustrated by the construction of Chitungwiza, an enormous dormitory city for African labourers, 25 miles from Harare by Southern Rhodesia's UDI government (Chapter 11). *De jure* racial separateness in urban planning was rejected by the subsequent Mugabe government but Harare's new low-income townships of Kuwadzana and Budiriro in the southwest and Hatcliffe in the north became outlying locations with primarily black populations. The class divide implicit in these townships perpetuated *de facto* racial separation (Bryceson and Mbara 2003). Meanwhile, during the 1980s, South African urban pass laws were gradually phased out, being too financially and politically costly to administer (Chapter 10).

Helping or hindering: Urban social and productive service infrastructure

The fragility of the apex cities in Southern and especially East Africa is intimately tied to their perforated infrastructures that failed to keep up with urban population growth and became very dilapidated during the economic crisis years of the 1980s and 1990s. Urban economic infrastructure coalesced then collapsed during the post-colonial era. Failure to respond in a timely fashion to changing infrastructural requirements was at the heart of the problem. The following sub-sections deal with various infrastructural constraints in turn.

Water, sanitation and public health

Inadequacy of water and sanitation has been particularly pronounced in East Africa throughout the post-independence period. Reliance on donor funding for the major infrastructural costs of water sourcing and extending supply to new urban neighbourhoods of growing cities came early. Demand continually outstrips supply with patchy coverage inclined towards high-income neighbourhoods. In Dar es Salaam it is estimated that in a city of roughly 2.5 million people, only 98,000 homes have a direct water connection (Action Aid International 2004). Consequently, there are frequent water shortages and huge differences in personal consumption of water between neighbourhoods within the cities. In the low-income areas, water-related diseases like scabies and dysentery fester along with the risk of cholera epidemics. Amis (Chapter 7) reports Nairobi families using only four or five litres a day per capita, far short of the 13 litres considered to be the daily minimum necessary for human survival. Sanitation in many urban squatter slums is deplorable. In Nairobi and Kampala, slum dwellers resort to wrap and throw plastic-bagged refuse, jokingly called 'flying toilets'. In addition to the shortfalls of city water supply, community-initiated water schemes are rarely able to meet local demand (Chapter 13).

The common assumption that urban dwellers enjoy better health than rural dwellers does not apply to the urban poor, who rarely have the locational position and purchasing power to access adequate urban sanitation and health facilities. Outstripping the public health threats posed by cholera and other water-borne diseases, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has engulfed East and Southern Africa, registering higher prevalence than anywhere else in the world (Figure 1.4).[19] HIV infection that surfaced during the late 1980s and early 1990s in the apex cities is now manifest in high AIDS mortality rates and heightened susceptibility to tuberculosis and other infections. Urban prevalence rates are roughly twice as high as rural rates. Clearly for the foreseeable future, AIDS is the biggest threat to urban survival for the apex city populations, particularly given that it is a long-wave phenomenon in which death sets in train further crises of orphanhood and serious shortfalls in household welfare. Most heartening is the decline in HIV prevalence in Kampala where adult prevalence peaked at 29.5 per cent in 1992 and declined to 11.25 per cent in 2000 (UNAIDS 2004).

Educational infrastructure

In the immediate post-colonial period, educational attainment was seen as a passport to urban jobs. As Kariuki and Nelson (Chapter 8) documents, urban dwellers can no longer expect to obtain jobs, yet parents continue to place huge store



Figure 1.4 HIV prevalence in adults in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2003
Source: UNAIDS 2004.

in educating their children. During the structural adjustment period, state expenditures on education plummeted necessitating parents to meet the costs of escalating school fees and ancillary expenses such as uniforms and books. Kariuki and Nelson describes how Nairobi's middle-class extended families have risen to the investment challenge. Older siblings are expected to help finance the education of younger siblings, often postponing marriage and having their own children. In poorer households, children's school attendance declined during the 1990s and only began to recover with the abolition of school fees.[20]

A further testimony to the urban drive for educational investment is reflected in the proliferation of language schools, primary and secondary schools and the three universities that have been established in Mogadishu over the 1990s. Marchal (Chapter 9) sees these as enhancing human capital and, more importantly in the setting of war-torn Mogadishu, boosting morale.

Electricity, transport and communications

In many cities, a fluctuating electricity supply and sporadic blackouts became common during the 1980s. Business establishments and high-income households have tried to avert the inconvenience of blackouts by investing in gas-fuelled generators. The insistent hum of these generators is now an intrusive feature of life in many apex cities. Meanwhile, the privatization of public utilities and the introduction of metered charges have put electricity beyond the reach of vast numbers of the poor. In South Africa, low-income neighbourhoods have organized political demonstrations around this issue.

Transport infrastructure within the cities has proved problematic in two ways. First, in East African cities, SAP cutbacks and the ineffectiveness of municipal governments led to a lack of maintenance of existing city roads and prevented road network extensions from keeping pace with the physical expansion of the city. As a result, the worst roads in the country were often located in the capital city where vehicle loads were heaviest. Second, in many Southern African cities where municipal governments were better placed to invest in the extension and maintenance of road networks, the main urban transport problem was the inordinate distances the poor travelled daily from their homes in outlying townships to work in the city's central business district. When economic circumstances grew tougher, their ability to pay daily bus fares was reduced. Commonly, they were forced to walk to work, extending their working day by several hours (Bryceson *et al.* 2003). For example, Harare's experience of rising international oil prices in 2003 had a knock-on effect on urban bus fares throughout the region. A surge in bicycle commuting was recorded (Bryceson and Mbara 2003). However, in some cases, the distances were too far and the poor's livelihood options were thereby reduced as is illustrated in Schlyter's case study of Esther in Harare's satellite settlement, Chitungwiza (Chapter 11).

Good telecommunications can lessen demand for surface transport. In many East African cities the landline telephone networks were exceptionally inadequate. In this context, the spread of mobile phone usage epicentered in the apex cities from the late-1990s onwards was a major communications breakthrough.[21] Marchal (Chapter 9) recounts how mobile phones marked an important departure for communications in Mogadishu. However, the absence of any government acting to standardize and regulate mobile phone infrastructure has resulted in massive confusion and duplication of consumer investment in telephone options.

Nature of infrastructure provisioning: Public, private or community?

The presupposition that utilities such as water, electricity, transport and telecommunications should be government provisioned dates back to the colonial period. In many cases, the original investment in the post-colonial network was public but in the absence of strong municipal government, maintenance deteriorated and network expansion was impeded by public authorities as economic crisis conditions and declining tax revenues set in. Parastatals were blamed for the inadequacies and supply disruptions.

Enterprising individuals sought an immediate solution by tapping into city grids of electricity supply or water pipes, creating spaghetti-type networks that generally decreased the adequacy and efficiency of supply to everyone in the network (Mhamba and Titus 2001). Community responses emerged more slowly but were far more viable; borne of problem-sharing that coalesced into either informal neighbourhood self-help groups or more formalized community-based organizations (CBOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Robson 2001, Smit 2001). Ngware's (Chapter 13) description of the Tabata Development Fund (TDF) in Dar es Salaam reveals how it was initially catalyzed by the public nuisance of a nearby city dump. It evolved into a CBO, which attracted public funding, donor finance and an international award recognizing its community achievement. However, its success in eliciting outside funding for the community threatened civic participation and was not helped by the fact that residents became increasingly aware that some, notably the more affluent, were benefiting more than others. Political interests based on differentiation by class and residential entry cohort were rife. The telling signs were that the TDF's leadership avoided referendums on key issues and continually delayed calling elections in the hope of prolonging their reign of power.

Rakodi (Chapter 5) shows how clientelist relations of an exclusive nature based on ethnic distrust saddled infrastructural development in Mombasa. In Gaborone, greater levels of trust, common purpose and financial capability gave impetus to successful public/private partnerships (Chapter 12). To ease the city's housing shortage, the government allowed private infrastructural development beginning in 1979. During the 1990s, acknowledging that economic distortions caused by government controls needed to be addressed, it started injecting capital from diamond earnings into the private sector. An open dialogue between the government and the private entrepreneurs has given the latter an opportunity to voice their concerns about foreign competition and government red tape.

During the 1990s, urban public utilities, notably electricity and water, under pressure of donor conditionality, were increasingly not only privatized but also sold to foreign multinational firms. Dar es Salaam's water supply is illustrative. The profit-making concerns of the international consortium supplying water to the city collided with the water requirements of poor urbanites. Water rates rose and those domestic consumers who could not pay or had illegal connections were penalized by having their water supplies cut (Action Aid International 2004).

In Mogadishu, without a national or municipal government, public/private partnerships were inconceivable. Instead Mogadishu witnessed radical privatization as Somalia's overseas migrants started returning to the city in the 1990s with investment capital. They invested in utilities such as small electricity plants, mobile phone services, and radio and TV networks.

Urban sustenance: Social harmony and political security

Over the last 50 years, East and Southern Africa, perhaps more than any other part of the world, has seen social strife and political insecurity challenge the integrity and durability of its apex cities. National conflict and civil war have afflicted the majority of the countries in the region: Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Short of national conflict, acute political tensions have caused urban riots in: Nairobi over race, Lusaka over staple food pricing and Maseru during coup attempts. Only a small minority of apex cities have enjoyed tranquil conditions.

These circumstances are not surprising given the region's historical legacy. Centuries of social mayhem, ethnic strife and household dislocation caused by the 19th-century slave trade, subsequent racially discriminating colonial policies and reliance on low-paid temporary migrant labour. Layer upon layer of injustice and bitterness between races, ethnic groups and local communities smoulder. The resentments are likely to be most acutely felt amongst the politically aware, dense populations of the apex cities. Just as the East African Rift Valley runs through the area from north to south, a fault line of social unease lends deep fragility to urban life throughout this region. These historical sores combine with the insecurities of relatively recent urbanites who retain identification with their rural birthplaces. In these contexts, the demographic balance between migrants and indigents of the city is economically and politically contestable.

Ethnic friction and violence

In spite of the racially charged history of the region, several of the apex cities have long-established multi-ethnic and multi-racial traditions. Cape Town was a liberal, multi-racial city under British rule between 1806 and 1910, but was undermined by the implementation of South Africa's apartheid policies. There is a tendency for cities of ethnic harmony to have a shared language. In Cape Town, the coloured population is numerically dominant. The city's most common language is Afrikaans which is spoken by roughly half of the population as a first language with another quarter speaking primarily English and the remaining quarter being bilingual (McDow 1997b). In most other Southern African cities there is less language cohesion. Johannesburg has a proliferation of African languages spoken by the populace with English serving as the *lingua franca* and the commonly shared language of the educated.

In East Africa, ethnicity is now more likely than race to be a source of tension. Mombasa is the notable exception. Rakodi (Chapter 5) documents the sense of superiority of Arab over African culture even though Arabs now constitute only about 5 per cent of the population. Arabs, Asians and Europeans, 12 per cent of urban residents, are believed to monopolize the city's wealth and employment opportunities. Dar es Salaam presents a radically different ethnic picture. It is a Swahili coastal city with enormous ethnic variety reflecting Tanzania's profusion of over 100 different tribes. The indigenous African population, the Zaramo, are not politically or economically dominant, which precludes resentment from migrant populations. Kiswahili, the *lingua franca*, spoken by all of the African population and a large percentage of the Asian and European population has played a vital role in the ethnic harmony of the city.

The numerical dominance and superior local asset control of the city's indigenous tribe can be a source of tension as exemplified by the Buganda of Kampala, the Kikuyu of Nairobi and the Amhara of Addis Ababa. In some instances, the advantages of the local tribe are retracted when national leadership is secured by someone from a competing tribe, as illustrated by the Kikuyu of Nairobi when Moi, a Kalenjin, took power. In other cases, the ruling elite in the capital are resented precisely because they are not local and yet wield great power, illustrated by the Tutsi elite concentrated in Bujumbura who constitute only 14 per cent of the population relative to 85 per cent who are Hutu.

Mogadishu is one of the most ethnically homogenous cities in the region. Clan rather than ethnicity *per se* has been the divisive force. During the 1980s, increasing clan polarization took place under the behest of President Siad Barre who showed blatant clan partiality during the heavy influx of migrants to the city who were fleeing the Ogaden war (Chapter 9). Amongst the immigrants, those deemed to be 'allies' were allowed to settle in the city whereas ‘opponents’ were left in the shanty towns outside the city. As a result, different clans concentrated in clusters in different urban neighbourhoods throughout the urban sprawl of Mogadishu. Thereafter, warlords headquartered in the city used clan politics to divide, rule and kill. In the early 1990s, the city witnessed the massacre of an estimated 50,000 people and the near genocide of the Darod clan. General Aidad, positioned in the southern part of the city, encouraged a clan coalition that enhanced his power and strategic territorial control over the city’s port and airport.

Class divides and crime

The review by Montgomery *et al.* (2003) of urban patterns in the developing world argues that intra-urban income differentiation tends to be far greater than inter-urban differentiation. Apex cities represent economically jarring contrasts between rich and poor. Recent poverty studies indicate that the divides are expanding rather than contracting and significantly they are ‘in your face’ differences. The urban poor have daily visible confirmation of their economic disadvantage relative to the middle and upper classes *vis-à-vis* housing, transport and access to social services. Large segments of the population in the apex cities live below the poverty line (Chapter 7). Economic liberalization and the encouragement of direct foreign investment have accentuated the divide. The conspicuous consumption evidenced by apex cities’ elite housing and shopping mall boom during the economic liberalization of the 1990s has generated social unease and rising crime levels, sometimes threatening the very existence of the elite classes.[22] In Mogadishu, Marchal (Chapter 9) reports that the middle class vanished during the war, most fleeing for their lives, forced to abandon their property and possessions. In Southern Africa, the white middle classes have gradually dwindled through emigration, citing rising crime levels as one of the main reasons for their departure. Crime is considered to be a major deterrent to direct foreign investment in South Africa.

Law and order

Uniquely, Mogadishu provides an example of an African apex city that has operated in the absence of municipal and national government. Marchal (Chapter 9) documents how local people and foreigners are commonly at risk of kidnapping, vehicle hijacking and loss of life. Protection services, offered by clan-based militias, have become an unavoidable precaution to ensure life and protect property, but have raised the costs of movement and economic transactions. An oligopolistic economy has prevailed with price wars sometimes ending in armed clashes. In the absence of a national currency and the sporadic appearance of counterfeit international money, investors have taken it upon themselves to offer informal banking services. The lack of a government regulatory body and quality standards opened the floodgates to the importation of cheap out-of-date drugs and food that local merchants profited from.

Young gun-toting youth acted on behalf of warlords headquartered in the city as well as clan elders. Ironically the clan elders' authority was often underwritten by well-meaning donors anxious to re-establish the rule of law. As the civil war dragged on, ordinary city residents lost confidence in their clan elders and grew weary of the conflation of private and public conflicts (Chapter 9). Public disapproval and intolerance of the lawlessness began to be met with crystallization of order and respect for life and property. City residents preferred what they called urban 'civilized' behaviour to that of the gun-toting youth *reer baadiyo* (rustics from the countryside).

Ngware (Chapter 13) observed a similar phenomenon of growing social consensus amongst the residents of Tabata in Dar es Salaam. Recognizing the threat of crime and public disorder in their midst, they formed a multi-ethnic, grass-roots anti-crime neighbourhood watch.

Conclusion

Despite their size and demographic growth, the apex cities of East and Southern Africa are exceptionally fragile settlements and population concentrations. It has been argued in this chapter that the foundations of city life are extremely flimsy. The three main fragilities that challenge urban sustenance at present are: first, the relative newness of permanent African urban residence; second, the inadequacies of urban physical and social infrastructure; and third, a relative lack of social coherence and political order.

During the colonial period, cities in this region were not intended for permanent African settlement. A circular labour migration system based on bachelor rather than family wages prevailed in most of the capital cities, which was overturned gradually in country after country from the late 1940s onwards. In South Africa, the apartheid system prolonged the racial zoning of Africans by race, space and occupation, being finally toppled in the early 1990s. The impermanence and open-endedness of African residence in cities and the recourse to rural livelihood activities, leisure-time pursuits and aspirations have characterized the apex cities for several decades and have, in some cases, been strengthened by urban economic crises and the need to straddle urban and rural resource bases. Now, however, second- and third-generation urban dwellers are accounting for rising proportions of the populations in apex cities, marking a departure from the strong rural–urban ties of the first generation (Parkin 1975, Macmillan 1996). As Kariuki and Nelson (Chapter 8) documents, the subsequent generations' lifestyles and values do not necessarily reflect, and often ignore or even reject, rural perspectives.

Infrastructural inadequacies are rife in the apex cities under review, especially in East Africa. They stand in the way of the smooth pursuit of livelihoods of high- medium- and low-income households and discourage domestic and direct foreign investment in enterprise. While post-independent national governments intended overseeing the development of a functioning urban infrastructure, most were hard-hit by the international oil crisis and the debt crisis that followed. Donor support for urban infrastructural development has been lukewarm given their historical preference for rural development programmes.

The third major fragility is that of political, social and demographic instability which is a legacy of the fraught racial and ethnic history of the region, combined with the newness of people's urban identity. One would be hard-pressed to find another area of the world that has been exposed to so much social and political engineering in the form of the colonial three-tier racial/occupational system, bachelor circular migration and the consequent lack of household unity. Post-independent African governments in the 1960s and 1970s established family wages and urban family residence but this policy achievement was thwarted by the economic crises that ensued quickly thereafter. The HIV/AIDS crisis has become most entrenched in the countries of the region that were most deeply involved in male circular migration and an 'away-from-home' male sub-culture of heavy drinking and prostitution. Coping with AIDS and the struggle for urban sustenance has fallen now primarily on urban households themselves. Schlyter (Chapter 11) and Kariuki and Nelson (Chapter 8) document how urban households have sought to achieve viable livelihoods and raise children in a caring way despite inordinate resource and time constraints.

The political instability of the region and the fragility of the apex cities centre on the question of what social units offer a basis for social cohesiveness amidst social diversity. During the colonial period, the main unit of social cohesion and political control was the tribe (Bank 2002). Circular migration and bachelor wages proved a strain not only on reproductive couples but on households generally, which were split between urban and rural components. In the absence of coherent households and cohesive tribes, Africans' social experience of the early cities mainly revolved around male bonding at the workplace and during their leisure pastimes. In the urban context, tribes often proved to be an ultimately destabilizing rather than stabilizing social unit. When family wage policies were introduced in the immediate post-independence era, it appeared that social cohesion was following the Western model of occupational/residential identity through one's workplace and neighbourhood. Housing provision was attached to many jobs. This model, however, never had a chance of being cemented. Economic crisis and the rapid erosion of formal wage employment and its replacement with highly competitive informal economies have left households and individuals with their own devised ways and means to create operative social networks and survive in the urban moral economy. Some cities, notably Dar es Salaam, evince a more fluid social milieu than others. Mombasa and particularly Mogadishu have fallen victim to deep ethnic and clan divides goaded by the political interests of the urban elites.

Many consider Mogadishu to be a misfit city, unable to accommodate social and economic diversity and prevented from operating as a workable city by clans undermining civic identity by violently asserting ownership of segments of the city and its residents. (Chapter 9). Yet, there was a glimmer of hope when long-suffering city residents began to overcome this vortex by increasingly asserting their identity as 'civilized' city dwellers willing to tolerate clan diversity. This change of attitude was foundational to the economic institution-building that followed. The Greek words 'cosmopolis' and 'cosmopolitan' refer to urban population settlements belonging to many or all parts of the world.

Another constraint to the formation of a strong civic identity is the inability to pursue a viable livelihood and achieve an adequate standard of living. When urban livelihoods fall short of survival needs, residents' identity and their sense of security as urban dwellers are challenged. How is this resolved? The next chapter analyzes urban livelihood and city economic sustainability in the light of the paradox of continuing urbanization amidst economic malaise.

Notes

I would like to thank David Satterthwaite of the International Institute for the Environment and Development (IIED) for his help in obtaining the latest urban population statistics from the United Nations Population Division.

1. We are omitting the islands of Madagascar, Mauritius and Comores because they are not part of the same contiguous land mass and have historically distinct ethnic populations and cultural influences that would complicate the analysis.
2. Satterthwaite (2003) points to the profusion of relatively new large cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, but a preponderance of the developing world's largest cities are in Asia. Urban growth rates are currently especially high in cities attracting international investment, notably in China and Southeast Asia.
3. Jacobs (1969: 129) sees city growth not just as the demographic enlargement of towns but rather 'a process of gradual diversification and differentiation of its economy, starting from little or nothing more than its initial export work and the suppliers to that work'.
4. Potts elaborates on the pitfalls of using census data for urban analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa in Chapter 3.
5. Zambia's and South Africa's national economies have historically been premised on mining and Zimbabwe has had a mixed economy of mining, industry, capitalized large-scale settler agriculture and small-scale African peasant agriculture.
6. This is especially the case with regard to urban settlements of Mesopotamia, the Mayan and Aztec cities of central Mexico and the Andean cities.
7. Records of Chinese expeditions to the East African Coast in the 15th century describe Mogadishu and Malindi (also Brava and Juba), indicating a better knowledge of the contours of the East African coastline than European documents of the time (Wheatley 1975).

8. The notable exceptions were the Sahelian towns with their origins in the long-distance caravan trade.
9. Most railways were speculative and rarely managed to pay for themselves given the low volume of freight and passengers that they carried, creating heavy debts for colonial governments.
10. The rocky inhospitable hinterland surrounding Djibouti contributed to rapid urbanization, making Djibouti the most urbanized country in East Africa with roughly 60 per cent of its population now living in Djibouti City.
11. The city was reportedly established by Emperor Menelik to please his wife who favoured the local hot mineral springs as treatment for her rheumatism.
12. Interestingly the exception to this general pattern was South Africa where a large poor white population and some mixing of races existed. The segregation of African housing was a later event there.
13. It was also intended to avert the need for higher income white taxpayers to pay for black African urban services.
14. The first wave of newly independent countries during the 1960s was: Somalia 1960 (from Italy), Tanzania 1961, Kenya and Uganda 1962, Burundi and Rwanda 1962 (from Belgium), Malawi and Zambia 1964, Botswana and Lesotho 1966, and Swaziland 1968 (from Great Britain). The second wave came in the 1970s: Angola and Mozambique 1975 (from Portugal) and Djibouti 1977 (from France); and the last wave of Southern African states who relinquished their apartheid policies through the attainment of African-led governments followed during the 1980s and early 1990s.
15. Ethiopia, however, was subject to brief occupation by Italy between 1935 and 1941.
16. W.A. Lewis (1978) argued: 'In the nineteenth century the distinction between the European lenders and the rich borrowers turned on differences in rates of urbanization. Those whose urban populations were growing by less than 3 per cent per annum (France 1.0, England 1.8, and German 2.5) loaned, and those whose urban populations were growing by more than 3 percent per annum (Australia 3.5, United States 3.7, Canada 3.9, Argentina 5.3) borrowed.'
17. The cultivation of food crops in urban areas was considered to create stagnant pools of water that could afford a breeding ground for mosquitoes.
18. Certainly in the 1960s and 1970s the standard view was that East African cities did not approach the poverty levels of many Asian cities.
19. Recorded HIV prevalence rates in women in the prime years of susceptibility, 25–29 years of age, are very high in the worst affected countries of the region, for example Swaziland 33.9 per cent, Zimbabwe 40.1 per cent and Botswana 55.6 per cent (UNAIDS 2002).
20. Somewhat ironically, this policy was prompted by the World Bank's poverty-alleviation policies that essentially addressed the damage done by the preceding World Bank-enforced social service cost-cutting exercises of the SAP era that had insisted on parents' payment of school fees.
21. Bryceson *et al.* (2003) found that mobile phone ownership in Kampala exceeded that of Harare, which was attributed to the fact that Harare had a reasonable landline system whereas Kampala's residents had limited recourse to telephones prior to the spread of mobile phones.
22. While there is a profusion of literature on urban crime in South Africa extending to Southern Africa, very little has been written on crime and urbanization in East Africa. One notable exception is Obudho and Owuor 1994.

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2

African Urban Economies: Searching for Sources of Sustainability

Deborah Fahy Bryceson

Attempts at identifying the foundations of urban economic activity over the last quarter of a century of economic decline in Sub-Saharan African could be likened to early explorers' efforts to trace the source of the Nile. The voluminous flow of one of the world's major rivers through hundreds of kilometres of desert sands was perplexing and begged the question of its locational source. Similarly, one may wonder how Africa's large cities have provided economic livelihoods and shelter to growing populations during the continent's protracted economic crises.

A sustainable economy pivots on a viable combination of land, labour and capital. Sustainable urban economies hinge primarily on labour and capital, given that their land resources are restricted. Historically, Sub-Saharan Africa has been a continent associated with land abundance amidst scarce labour and even scarcer capital resources. Not surprisingly under these circumstances, it has been the world's least urbanized continent. However, during the second half of the 20th century to the present, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced pronounced urban growth relative to most other parts of the world. To a large extent, its rapid rate of urbanization has been due to its extremely low starting level of urbanization.[1] Nonetheless, urban demographic growth is underway in both absolute and relative terms, spatially concentrating labour and transforming the economies and cultures of the continent. Logically, urban demographic growth may impart economic advantage by facilitating the operation of economies of scale, but there are no guarantees that overall national economic growth will be achieved.

The main objective of this chapter is to identify and analyze sources of urban sustenance and growth of the apex cities. In considering the land, labour and capital investment equation, emphasis will be placed on what has always been considered Africa's scarce resources: labour and capital. Labour availability has been far from constrained in African cities over recent decades. Economic and non-economic factors have spurred urban migration and population growth. Rural poverty, war and the desire for individual autonomy push while urban areas' social service availability and more diverse livelihood opportunities pull rural–urban migration.

The first section of this chapter introduces a model for analyzing urban economic sustainability followed by a section that contrasts economic promises with actual delivery during the post-independence era. The apex cities' various economic trajectories are reviewed before considering household livelihood strategies amidst the casualization of the urban labour force. Finally, the impact of the urban housing market on the local economy and class differentiation is highlighted.

Urban sustenance and sustainability

Cities are, by their very nature, not self-sufficient economic units. Their land constraints necessarily lead them to diversify away from agriculture and products involving land investment such that they require food in the first instance as well as other basic imported goods, which inevitably defines them as outward-directed economic units. Thus, city economic viability depends on a continuously proliferating market exchange of imports and exports. However, a city's trade function is only half of the equation. Economic coherence and prosperity fundamentally relies on an internal exchange of goods, services and infrastructural supports to provide the foundations for the city's import–export effort, to raise the standard of living and to motivate the urban population. Thus it is useful to conceptualize city economies in terms of 'sustenance and sustainability'.

The *urban sustenance and sustainability* approach adopted here stresses that essential economic foundations upon which city life is based, in other words its sustenance, constitutes the empowering environment for sustainable economic activity. The study of African urban economies and vulnerabilities reveals the fundamental need for urban sustenance as a precondition for realizing and continually sustaining urban economic dynamism. Dynamic and sustainable urban economic activity is achieved by the interaction of six main components schematically listed below.

Fundamental foundation

1. *Sustenance – goods, services and infrastructure providing the essential basis for urban economic activity* encompassing a staple food supply, water, shelter, security, transport, communications and other basic physical and social services examined in Chapter 1 that provide the engine and lubrication for a 'sustainable urban economic dynamic' as follows.

Sustainable dynamism

2. *Export support – goods and services facilitating or enhancing the export and import of products to and from the country via the city.* These proliferate in kind and include trading and storage services which are primary in terms

of the city's functional economic activity and are not duplicated elsewhere in the national territory as well as simple raw material export processing.

3. *Export augmentation – goods and services produced in the city that become exports through a process of 'reciprocating growth'*. Export-augmenting goods are 'secondary' by virtue of serving as inputs into the city's foundational economic activity or existing exports, but have the potential to eventually become exports themselves.
4. *Import substitution – import substitution by replacing imported goods with locally made goods* thereby bolstering the city's value-added production through an import-replacing multiplier effect.
5. *Innovation – goods and service production for an internal market that innovates and creates new products and services* as the possibilities for import substitution are exhausted. This form of production demonstrates the economic vitality of the city, creating new needs[2] and markets that boost overall productive output.
6. *Revival – goods and service production that conserves old skills and work by combining them with the new*. The old is not discarded but revived in a dynamic urban economy, which is perpetually maintaining and creating more value-added products.

Components 2 through 6 are based on Jane Jacobs' (1969) staged model of urban 'reciprocating growth' in which new work is continually expanding beyond existing work. Jacobs argues that newly innovated goods and services are marketable beyond the city and generate additional exports that trigger further cycles of reciprocating growth, acknowledging that these stages generally occur simultaneously rather than in a mechanical order. The economic dynamism engendered by the simultaneous operation of these forms of goods and service provisioning continually enhances the urban division of labour.

Jacobs (1969, 1984) maintains that urban economic diversity generates an iterative process of problem creation and solution through a broad, eclectic mix of capacities and capabilities that expands the range and productivity of outputs while maintaining existing goods and services. Over-specialization of production undermines economic diversity and inevitably leads to obsolescence. An urban economy thrives when it combines economic diversity with specialization. Individuals and firms become efficient producers because they are highly specialized operating within economies of scale. Furthermore, when specialized producers offer a highly diverse division of labour, they constitute an enormous inter-dependency of varied specialized producers that multiplies efficiency gains. This is key to dynamic urban economies.

The urban sustenance and sustainability approach highlights six main components of production propelling dynamic urban economies. It is anticipated that many cities under review will not have all six components fully operational and capable of catalytic interaction. The extent to which these components are operative and how they combine are key for evaluating the nature and performance of African urban economies. The urban sustenance and sustainability approach (hereafter shortened to the acronym USUSU) may shed light on how African urban demographic growth can prevail amidst economic malaise.

Economic foundations of the post-independence city

The promise of national independence

Political independence came quickly to the 'first wave' countries, barely 15 years after nationalist movements had begun their struggles in earnest. African literacy levels, let alone primary, secondary and university completion levels, were woefully low at the time. It was abundantly clear that smallholder peasant agriculture was, by virtue of the absence of any salient alternative, going to be the mainstay of these economies, with the exception of Zambia, a major copper exporter. Mozambique, gaining independence in 1975, was also destined for an agrarian path, although whether it would be led by state farms or peasant cooperatives was widely debated.

A further heated question was whether agriculture or industry would provide the engine of national growth. In fact, heavy industry was not an option as it had been in the Soviet Union where the original 'agriculture versus industry' planning debate first took place. Instead an import substitution industry was initiated. Oil refineries, textile mills and factories for the production of cement, car tyres, and cigarette and beer factories proliferated in the apex cities on the basis of 'turn-key' aid packages. While many derided these industries, as lacking foundational weight for economic transformation, they nonetheless represented an important step forward in the urban economies of these apex cities.

In effect, the apex cities were sporting three of the six components of USUSU. Post-independence governments followed policies aimed at insuring the *basic sustenance* (1) of urban populations at the level of day-to-day needs, albeit sufficient foresight and city planning was not being accorded to urban infrastructural development. The cities' colonial inheritance primarily as ports or major transport nodes in territorial economies based on raw material exports led most of the cities to be first and foremost depot cities offering *trading and storage facilities for international export* (2). *Import substitution* (4) was largely a post-colonial innovation. Unfortunately, the third USUSU component, export-augmenting industries was relatively lacking. The depot function of the city and the unprocessed form of the raw material exports, in the main, did not have a forceful multiplier effect on support industries.

There were, however, constraints operating on the three components. The racial three-tier system according non-Africans the primary role in trade was a legacy, which further restricted the multiplier effect for the export support of trading services. Africans did not have the education, skills or capital to break into specialized import/export trade and the rigours of long-distance commodity trade. Given the difficulties and sensitivities of this racial exclusion in trade, most countries resolved this by erecting state monopoly trade. In functional terms this provided economic continuity of raw material exports but did not spark reciprocating growth between existing exports and export augmentation, the foundation upon which urban economies become economically sustainable, nor did it serve to expand the purchasing power-base upon which the domestic market for goods and services could flourish. Import substitution was added often through outside donor support rather than as part of diversified urban production reflecting the internal expansion of the division of labour and productive capacity. Instead, employment was mainly generated in the government bureaucracy and parastatals.

1975–2005: Seismic shocks to the urban economy

The impact of the oil price surge in 1973/74 and again in 1979 should not be underestimated. All of the East and Southern African countries were oil importers except Angola. The majority had national economies premised on the production of agricultural export crops or livestock usually in wide geographically dispersed peasant household production units. The crops were bulky and their transport over land to the apex cities and then onwards to their international destinations were energy-consuming. Rising oil prices dealt a heavy blow to African national economies and not least to the apex cities that were the interface between the African countryside, as sites of production, and the international consumer markets. Exporting high bulk, low-value peasant commodities along oil-dependent corridors to the apex cities and beyond to international markets was doomed. African raw material exports lost their competitiveness in the world market. Crop parastatals, operating on the basis of pan-territorial pricing quickly fell into debt. Governments' deficit financing met with heavy criticism from international financial institutions in the 1980s that sternly told national governments to remove their monopolies in staple food marketing and cutback on the provision of productive and social services (e.g. Bryceson 1993).

Bates (1981) and the World Bank's Berg report (1981) argued that urban economies in African agrarian nation-states were failing to function as effective service centres for the vast expanse of peasant smallholders. Urban–rural relations were increasingly seen in political rather than economic terms. Portrayed as being rife with mismanagement and corruption, urban-based parastatal market monopolies were blamed for inflated marketing costs that were passed on to peasant producers who consequently lost the incentive to produce. Peasants were believed to be slipping into subsistence production causing a breakdown in the economic linkages between town and countryside (Hyden 1980).

One by one, governments succumbed to structural adjustment programmes. Rural farming households were jolted by the removal of fertilizer subsidies, pan-territorial prices and subsidized health and education. Urban dwellers were plunged into an economic vortex of declining purchasing power and economic insecurity. Inflation caused the price of basic goods to soar beyond the reach of urban consumers earning fixed wages and salaries. Cutbacks led to job redundancies for many, whereas others chose to leave their jobs to redress the dwindling purchasing power of their wages.

The urban labour force was increasingly composed of informal rather than formal workers. By the late 1990s, 50 per cent of the labour force was informal in Mombasa, with the port, the city's largest employer, downsized from 12,000 to under 10,000 (Chapter 5). Maputo's port experienced similar problems. Fifty per cent of the workforce was in the informal sector, two-thirds of which were considered to be extremely marginal. Vast numbers went into retail trade, domestic service or sold locally brewed or distilled alcohol.[3] Some began venturing into the drug trade, as Rakodi (Chapter 5) observes in Mombasa.

Households attempted to survive through wives joining their husbands in the labour force (Kariuki and Nelson, Chapter 8). Urban social welfare was compromised as mothers and older siblings worked outside the home, absenting themselves from the childcare of babies, pre-school and school-age children. School enrolments declined as poorer families became unable to pay the school fees that the SAP enforced under its user-fee policy. Cutbacks in health services were to have a long-term effect evidenced by the increase of infant mortality rates, wiping out earlier initial progress in reducing them and, most significantly, the AIDS pandemic, spreading rapidly in a number of East and Southern African cities.

Removal of urban staple food subsidies was deeply resented, causing food riots in Zambia in 1990 (Bryceson 1993). Maputo's food subsidy began unravelling in the mid-1980s. In Dar es Salaam the prelude to the maize flour subsidy's removal was widespread shortages and long queues. Very few had enjoyed regular access to cheap maize meal for a considerable time making the subsidy's actual removal an anti-climax (Bryceson 1992, O'Laughlin 1996). Urban agriculture grew in prominence in several cities including Lusaka and Kampala (Maxwell 1995). By contrast, in other cities like Dar es Salaam lack of access to land or the transport constraints attached to living in a sprawling city limited residents' pursuit of urban agriculture for the poor (Bryceson 1993).

National indebtedness resulted in jerky start-stop patterns of economic activity during the 1980s and 1990s. African governments, dependent on foreign aid and debt relief, were thrown credit lifelines that were then often withheld when they were deemed not to be suitably compliant with the international financial institutions' conditionality. After implementing the

SAPs, countries of the region were guided through debt conditionality on to the policy path of economic liberalization, privatization and the encouragement of direct foreign investment. This period will be discussed in Chapter 14. Suffice to note here that the 1990s was a decade of widening economic disparities as poverty deepened in the apex cities. A self-confident African middle class began to emerge, with increasing numbers of this class enjoying high incomes and luxury housing, albeit often behind high security walls similar to those amongst expatriate communities. The growing gap between rich and poor will be considered in more detail later in this chapter with respect to the evolving urban housing market.

Urban economic trajectories

The realignment of apex cities' economic opportunities and constraints in the post-oil crisis period revolved around their status as non-oil producers. All of the national economies had to contend with rising export costs. The region, and especially Southern Africa, had tremendously open economies in which exports and imports accounted for a major share of GDP as indicated in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1. Foreign trade in 2000 was high in East Africa (56 per cent) and extraordinarily high in Southern Africa (93 per cent) compared with more domestically driven economies such as the United States (26 per cent) and India (29 per cent). The United Kingdom (58 per cent) registered a similar figure to that of the East African average. While it is interesting to note that the proportion of foreign trade rose generally between 1960 and 2000, in the non-African countries the progression upwards was a gradual steady climb whereas in the East and Southern African countries it took the form of wild fluctuations. Not only are such trade shocks hard to absorb and stabilize in the relatively small national economies we are dealing with, they are likely to first hit the economies of our apex cities that serve as the major depots for the countries' import and export trade.

Agricultural exporting nations, concentrated in East Africa, experienced persistent decline between 1960 and 2000, as suggested by their worsening export/import ratio (Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). The mineral-exporting nations of Southern Africa were less affected, with the exception of Zambia. Botswana, a geographically large and landlocked nation with potentially very high transport costs was hardly affected given its low population, increasingly concentrated in Gaborone and its extraordinary mineral wealth. However, Botswana was the outstanding exception in a region where national and city economies were highly vulnerable to oil prices, declining international terms of trade, and volatile national politics. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, the other major mineral exporting countries, experienced enormous political upheaval and economic repercussions.

Table 2.1 East and Southern African foreign trade as % of GDP

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2003	Country average
East Africa											
Burundi	25.9	22.9	22.3	27.3	32.1	31.8	35.6	40.2	33.1	22.0	29.3
Djibouti									98.4	107.4	102.9
Eritrea								105.3	93.1	107.8	102.1
Ethiopia						24.3	20.2	35.7	45.1	53.8	35.8
Kenya	64.8	62.1	60.5	64.3	67.0	51.7	57.0	71.4	62.3	57.6	61.9
Rwanda	22.5	29.0	26.7	26.9	40.8	30.7	19.7	31.0	32.6	36.2	29.6
Somalia	29.9	37.8	28.3	39.3	121.7	25.6	47.5				47.2
Tanzania							50.1	59.3	37.1	45.0	47.9
Uganda	49.1	49.9	43.5	19.6	45.5	28.7	26.6	32.6	34.4	39.9	37.0
Unweigthed average	38.4	40.3	36.3	35.5	61.4	32.1	36.7	59.2	55.6	51.8	44.7
Southern											
Angola						61.1	59.8		157	138	104.0
Botswana	58.2	72.7	143.7	107.4	119.5	117.5	104.8	89.0	101	92	100.5
Lesotho	50.2	68.9	69.9	115.6	131.1	138.1	125.2	133.4	123	148	110.4
Malawi	60.5	52.7	63.4	75.0	63.6	54.1	57.2	76.7	65	69	63.7
Mozambique					38.2	14.3	44.2	55.1	52		40.7
Namibia					150.0	115.4	119.3	105.2	96	99	114.0
South Africa	55.5	53.5	46.4	57.1	62.2	53.5	43.0	45.1	54	51	52.2
Swaziland	74.5	106.8	128.9	129.7	179.0	141.6	148.9	168.1	177	177	143.1
Zambia	95.3	83.9	90.5	92.8	86.8	73.6	72.5	75.8	52	72	79.6
Zimbabwe				47.2	49.9	44.2	45.7	79.2	57		53.8
Unweighted average	65.7	73.1	90.5	89.3	97.8	81.3	82.1	91.9	93	106	87.1

Source: World Bank, 2004.



Figure 2.1 Comparison of Foreign Trade as % of GDP
Source: World Bank, 2004.

Most models of urban economic growth today are underpinned by assumptions regarding the operation of a capitalist wage labour economy and industrial production.[4] Besides African cities' lack of industry, a formal labour market perspective, with its discussion of job prospects and employment levels, is far from the African urban reality. The Harris–Todaro (1970) urban migration model, which held sway during the early 1970s, posited urban migration as a function of the gap between rural and urban earnings, wage rigidities of the urban formal sector and the duration of urban open unemployment that migrants faced. As various authors using Tanzania as an example have argued (Bryceson 1990, Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990, Jamal and Weeks 1993, Jamal 2001), the gap between rural and urban earnings peaked just before the oil price shock of 1973–74 and rapidly started closing thereafter. The formal sector was increasingly displaced by an informal sector with a marked absence of wage rigidities. The labour market dynamics that Harris and Todaro had modelled have now disintegrated. African urban migration needs to be explained on the basis of far more complicated economic decision-making.

An understanding of urban economic fluctuations is plagued with a lack of reliable data for Sub-Saharan Africa (Becker *et al.* 1994, Montgomery *et al.* 2004). Models of urban economies invariably pivot on the assumption that urban areas have an industrial base and higher domestic savings rates than rural economies (for example, Kelley and Williamson 1984). In East and Southern Africa, misleading conclusions arise from the inference that

Table 2.2. East and Southern African countries' export/import ratios

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2003
East Africa										
Burundi	0.93	0.83	0.92	0.44	0.38	0.53	0.28	0.47	0.38	0.38
Djibouti								0.71	0.71	
Eritrea								0.27	0.20	0.28
Ethiopia						0.51	0.63	0.62	0.50	0.47
Kenya	0.92	1.02	0.97	0.86	0.72	0.96	0.83	0.84	0.73	0.85
Rwanda	1.23	0.71	0.76	0.52	0.55	0.54	0.40	0.20	0.34	0.31
Somalia	0.74	0.83	0.69	0.46	0.37	0.33	0.26			
Tanzania							0.34	0.54	0.63	0.64
Uganda	1.25	1.05	1.16	0.79	0.75	0.92	0.37	0.57	0.49	0.47
Unweighted average	1.02	0.89	0.90	0.61	0.55	0.63	0.44	0.53	0.50	0.49
Southern Africa										
Angola						1.41	1.86		1.43	1.07
Botswana	0.66	0.63	0.63	0.68	0.80	1.29	1.11	1.34	1.55	1.37
Lesotho	0.31	0.29	0.20	0.13	0.19	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.34	0.48
Malawi	0.57	0.59	0.62	0.63	0.64	0.81	0.71	0.63	0.68	0.68
Mozambique					0.40	0.25	0.23	0.38	0.33	
Namibia					1.11	1.14	0.77	0.89	0.89	0.82
South Africa	1.22	0.97	0.86	0.92	1.29	1.39	1.31	1.04	1.11	1.17
Swaziland	1.41	1.25	1.16	1.28	0.73	0.67	1.01	0.80	0.84	0.89
Zambia	1.38	1.42	1.46	0.65	0.91	0.98	0.98	0.91	0.67	0.73
Zimbabwe				0.93	0.88	1.01	1.00	0.93	1.08	
Unweighted average	0.92	0.86	0.82	0.75	0.77	0.91	0.91	0.79	0.89	0.90

Source: World Bank, 2004.

industrial sectors necessarily set the pace and determine the nature of urban economic change. If industry does not lie at the heart of apex city economies of East and Southern Africa, then what does? The following sub-sections delineate and review the array of different economic sectors that have influenced the direction and strength of urban economies during the post-oil crisis years.

Downsized government administrations

The expansion of government and parastatal employment that was initiated after independence and concentrated in the apex capital cities ceased in the 1980s under SAP. By the 1990s most government staff establishments had shrunk in relative and absolute size. There were exceptions: bureaucratic jobs in Harare confidently expanded after Zimbabwe's African government accession in 1980. The country averted the imposition of SAP cutbacks until the early 1990s. Mineral wealth insulated Botswana from SAP and any pressure to downsize the government bureaucracy, as evidenced by the fact that government employees increased from 26 to 39 per cent of total formal employment between 1971 and 2001 (Chapter 12).



Figure 2.2 Comparison of Export/Import Ratios
Source: World Bank, 2004.

Dashed industrialization aspirations

Wood (1994) argues that Sub-Saharan Africa's comparative advantage is in natural resource exploitation given its low population and level of skills. Nonetheless, debates about engines of growth in Africa continually return to the question of African industrialization. The Asian experience of the last two decades has reinforced economists' classical view that industrialization is the road to economic growth. Fafchamps *et al*. (2001) argue that while it is not feasible for all African countries to industrialize, some must and in this light the economic decline of Kenya and Zimbabwe – formerly promising countries for industrialization – is regrettable.

Import substitution industries started floundering during the oil crises of the 1970s. By the 1980s, most factories in the region were operating at a fraction of their full capacity. Lack of spare parts, foreign exchange shortages, structural adjustment cutbacks and the reduced purchasing power of the consuming population induced closure of many. Those left had to sink or swim under economic liberalization policies as cheap imports flooded in from Asia and South Africa.

South Africa was exceptional, achieving industrial growth through foreign and domestic investment with roughly a three-fold increase in per capita exports of manufactured goods – a great deal being directed at the countries of the surrounding region – in the flush of post-apartheid African unity (Fafchamps *et al.* 2001). However, the purchasing power of its domestic market and that of the surrounding region are severely constrained by the poverty of the consuming population. Global competition propels industrial investment in capital rather than labour-intensive technologies with the potential to broaden labour absorption and urban welfare. Durban is illustrative. It reached its industrial apogee in the 1960s, having had a stormy history of labour unrest and race riots. In the post-apartheid period, the racial divides blurred while the income gap widened between a small formally employed industrial labour force, on the one hand, and the underemployed and unemployed, on the other. Labour-saving industrial technologies and port containerization now limit the job prospects of Durban's expanding population (Freund 2000, Freund and Padayachee 2002).

In the face of narrowing industrial horizons, the apex city economies, nonetheless, have the most to gain from national industrial growth, since they have historically served as their countries' most favoured factory sites, despite attempts at regional growth pole strategies of the 1970s and more recent rural industrial complexes based on foreign investment in Southern Africa (Hart 2003). So far, with the exception of South Africa, what little industrial production exists in these countries is primarily directed at the domestic market. Thus, the apex cities are locationally best placed as large population centres with higher purchasing power relative to other urban and rural areas.

As Selolwane (Chapter 12) documents, Botswana, with its abundance of capital, made a determined attempt to industrialize through private investment in the 1990s. By 1999, the manufacturing sector was the second largest private sector employer. However, the Hyundai car-assembly factory in Gaborone, which was the country's biggest joint venture with foreign capital, was liquidated in 2000. Having failed to secure a viable export market, the factory's closure caused a gaping hole in Gaborone's formal employment opportunities. The capital and labour availability of Gaborone and the country's proximity to the South African consumer market were not enough to propel Botswana's entry into export manufacturing – a telling indication of how difficult it is to industrialize in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Deagrarianization in declining rural economies

Throughout the 20th century, peasant agriculture has been perceived as both the salvation and the curse of African economies. Many post-colonial African countries succeeded, with donor support, in popularizing the use of improved seed and fertilizer packages for their major food and cash crops amongst smallholder peasants during the 1970s and 1980s. This was reversed under SAP with the virtual abandonment of state-supported input package subsidies, parastatal marketing services, extension, crop grading and research (Gibbon *et al.* 1993, Ponte 2002). Meanwhile peasants faced social service cutbacks triggering a 'scramble' to pay school fees, medical costs and other basic needs. Rural income diversification especially into trade and other non-agricultural activities ensued. The net effect has generated a process of depeasantization and deagrarianization described by Bryceson (2002a,b) in which rural dwellers continue to rely on subsistence agriculture as a fallback while experimenting with a wide array of non-agricultural activities for cash earnings.

Economic liberalization has reinforced this tendency as peasant farmers find that their export products are competing in global markets that are subject to declining international terms of trade and the loss of market share to tropical smallholders in Asia. African peasant-produced agricultural exports are disadvantaged *vis*-à-*vis* the power of Western supermarket chains with their demands for 'just-in-time' standardized products, the subsidies and other protectionism given to farmers in the European Union, the United States and Japan, and the overhanging threat of biotechnological advance, which may eventually provide the means to produce many tropical crops in temperate climates.

In this context, countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi and Ethiopia have yet to find economic alternatives to primary reliance on agricultural exports and sink ever deeper into donor dependence. Ethiopia and recently Malawi are prone to famine, whereas a general threat of political instability permeates the others. The capital cities of these countries are buzzing with large donor headquarters, fleets of four-wheel drive vehicles and personnel pursuing poverty-alleviation missions in the countryside. There is, however, a growing awareness that poverty is entrenched in urban areas as well. Donors have turned their attention to rural-urban linkages, sifting through the ash for the spark that will ignite economic dynamism. The problem is that SAP and economic liberalization of the last two decades have largely extinguished export possibilities in the context of an evermore competitive global market.

Despite these countries' overt agrarian appearances, agricultural livelihoods are in decline and smallholder farmers are at best producing their food needs and staple foodstuff surpluses for urban areas. The traditional peasant agricultural exports of these countries – coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton and so on – are decreasing in value, volume, and as a proportion of GDP, as reflected in the export/import ratios of Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2. Large-scale agriculture is not so depressed and has responded positively to rising horticultural demand in some countries, notably Kenya and until recently Zimbabwe, stimulated by highly efficient vertical supply chains of northern supermarkets. But this development impacts only on a small minority of the rural population of these countries.

In rural Botswana, deagrarianization takes the form of heavy reliance on urban remittances. Gaborone's urban residents send sizeable amounts of remittance money back to their rural extended families (Chapter 12). In other countries, this tendency has hardly surfaced, as most urban dwellers eke out a bare existence in the city with no spare cash to transfer to their rural homes.

Jenkins (Chapter 4) records how the Mozambican government's lack of support for smallholders led to distressed urban migration during the 1980s. While deagrarianization has undoubtedly manifested itself in steady migration to the apex cities, by the 1990s the rural search for diversified incomes had generated many alternatives to agricultural commodity production, including *in situ* non-agricultural production in rural areas, circular migration between town and country and migration to secondary towns. Trying one's luck in an apex city was one of many livelihood options.

Mining fortuity or trap?

The major alternative to agriculture in a select number of countries in the region is mining. South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia are well-established mining nations that have met with variable fortunes. Spurred on originally by economic sanctions, gold- and diamond-rich South Africa and Zimbabwe both managed to diversify over the decades to provide the means to steady the economic booms and busts arising from erratic mineral price fluctuations. Zimbabwe's recent political instability, however, has undermined its economic balance. Zambia, reliant on the lower value metal of copper, has gone through successive crises since copper prices plunged on the world market in the 1970s. The nationalization of its copper mines has added to its woes, with subsequent attempts at denationalization being thwarted by major mining corporations wary of government interference and the mines' viability in the world market.

Much has already been mentioned about the enormous leap forward mineral wealth has afforded Botswana. In no small measure, this is due to judicious investment and distribution by the Botswanan government. Botswana's 'excess liquidity problem' (Chapter 12) inflated the non-tradable sectors, undermining their export competitiveness, as the economy reached its full deployment of resources.

Tanzania is a relative newcomer to mineral wealth. Although it has mined gold and diamonds in the past, these never approached peasant agricultural exports in importance until the last decade, when the country threw its doors open to foreign investment, particularly that of South African mining interests. The value of Tanzania's exports surged in the late 1990s as mining increasingly displaced agriculture in the country's exports by value. Dar es Salaam's skyline has gained new heights as high-rise office blocks and shopping malls are built with foreign investment. Mining, however, is known for its lack of labour absorption relative to peasant agriculture. The government's preference for foreign mining operations over tens of thousands of undercapitalized artisanal miners has become abundantly evident, not least because of their fear of a growing illegal trade in high-value diamonds and precious stones. While it is unlikely that many additional jobs in Dar es Salaam are directly attributable to mining, foreign investment in ancillary services and the multiplier effect generally has been a boom to the city's economy. But the boom is disproportionately being felt by higher-income residents enjoying the city's proliferating array of well-heeled restaurants and shops. The majority of city dwellers can only look on from their sprawling squatter settlements.

International service centres

Prior to the extensive development of air travel, East and Southern African regions were considered to be relatively remote areas of the world for which long ocean crossings were necessitated around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Suez Canal or across the Indian Ocean. Since the 1960s, and with a quickening pace over the last two decades, the regions' accessibility by air has dramatically improved. Subject to political vagaries, some of the apex cities have emerged as regional centres where international agencies and multinational corporations have established headquarters. Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Harare, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, forming a north–south axis along the length of the two regions, have all fallen into this category at one time or another. Their airports have served as gateways to enormous hinterlands for foreign officials and dignitaries. Over the last 15 years, this visitor stream has included rising numbers of tourists. The nodes on the axis have multiplied to include Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and, to a far lesser extent, Entebbe, Gaborone, Maputo, Lusaka and Lilongwe, as tourists and donor-agency personnel have become more prevalent.

Rakodi (Chapter 5) considers the nature of tourism as an engine for growth in Mombasa, noting that the city's unreliable and shabby infrastructure and overt urban poverty are major deterrents for Western tourists hoping for a carefree holiday. Although Kenya succeeded in capturing a large part of the safari and beach holiday market in East Africa during the 1970s, Mombasa, with its very old Portuguese-built fort and rich Indian Ocean trading-route history, has not been able to sufficiently interest tourists bent on seeing the game parks or relaxing on the beach. Similarly, Dar es Salaam and Maputo all have exotic pasts and historical sites in or near their city limits, yet tourists see these cities primarily as points of entry and exit rather than as intrinsically interesting. Zanzibar Island is the notable exception. Having received the special status of being a World Heritage Site, it has managed to mobilize much-needed investment to renovate its historical buildings and attract increasing tourist numbers over the last decade.

Regardless of whether there is adequate and attractive infrastructure in the form of regular food, electricity, water supplies, rubbish collection, good transport and well-supplied markets, tourism is generally considered a very porous foundation for local economic growth. Mombasa has invested in expensive infrastructure in the form of an international airport that now has serious over-capacity (Chapter 5). Over 90 per cent of hotels in the Mombasa area are wholly or partly foreign-owned, offering beach package holidays in which an estimated 70 per cent of the foreign exchange value of the holiday accrues outside Kenya. This represents a loss for Mombasa's business community as well as for the municipal and national government since tourism is undertaxed, an outcome of governments' vying to attract tourist investment.

International tourism has become an exceptionally competitive industry and the countries of East and Southern Africa have been pitted against each other for market share. The misfortunes of one country become the fortunes of the other, as evidenced by the collapse of the Zimbabwe tourist market amidst the country's recent political insecurity, bringing windfall gains to Zambian, Tanzanian and Kenyan safari tourism.[5] Tourist numbers are additionally sensitive to crime levels. Urban poverty levels and the widening gap between haves and have-nots in many of the apex cities have translated into escalating crime, often targeted at the choice pickings of international tourists. Fears of international terrorism extended to East Africa in the wake of the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and an attack on an Israeli-owned beach hotel near Mombasa. Clearly, tourism's service sector job creation does not adequately compensate for the social and political sensitivities evoked by the juxtapositioning of affluent Westerners and the marginalized urban poor.

Ethnic strife and civil war

It is generally assumed that national economies and, by implication, urban economies plummet in war settings. Marchal's (Chapter 9) case study of Mogadishu suggests otherwise. In wars, daily life goes on and basic needs provisioning often triggers economic activity of an ingenious nature. Different outcomes emerge from particular stages of the armed struggle, and wars will have unpredictable consequences for the well-being of urban residents.

Wars call into question urban sustenance. Indeed, Mogadishu's water, electricity and food supplies were direly lacking. The city's port and the airport, however, helped to keep the city supplied with its basic needs, albeit minimally and erratically. Foreign intervention can play a key role in the economic welfare of the urban population during and after a war, and may have spillover effects in neighbouring countries. Rakodi (Chapter 5) notes how Mombasa port benefited from the considerable tonnage of humanitarian relief channelled through it to political hot spots in its hinterland. As Uganda returned to political stability under Museveni during the 1990s, Kampala became a haven of donor agencies determined to create a post-African conflict success story (Chapter 6). Marginalized in the global economy, these countries and their apex cities are nonetheless central places, on the world's humanitarian map – often, donor-driven urban economies in the most extreme sense of the term.

International remittances

It would be a serious misconception to assume that foreign capital transfers, especially in politically destabilized conditions necessarily emanate from international aid donors. Marchal (Chapter 9) estimates that in Somalia up to 40 per cent of GNP now derives from migrants' remittances. Remittances come in the form of not only money orders but also the transfer of physical capital like generators, communications and computer equipment – all contributing to the local economic development of Mogadishu. Remittances were the foundation of a vibrant second economy that was initiated in the wake of the oil crises of the 1970s. At that time, Somali men began migrating to the Gulf where jobs for Arabic speakers were plentiful. While it is likely that other apex cities receive substantial remittances from international migrants,[6] it is clear that remittances are a more incidental, rather than a main, line of urban economic generation.

Infrastructural construction booms

External remittances contrast with an internal 'kick-off' in the form of an initial construction boom at the outset of urban growth. Infrastructural production, if consciously planned and executed, can be a vital impetus to an embryonic urban economy's employment generation and fulfilment of basic infrastructural, goods and services requirements for an embryonic urban economy.

Being a newly created town, Gaborone provides the best illustration of the stimulus provided by building construction. From 1975 to 1991, the construction industry accounted for roughly 35 per cent of the labour force (Chapter 12). This rate more than halved over the course of the 1990s as Gaborone's basic urban infrastructure congealed and government over-regulation began stifling local entrepreneurship, bringing the city's building-spree to a close. However, housing construction on a more moderate scale in Gaborone and elsewhere is an ongoing economic activity, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Engines of growth or simply stalled?

The preceding schematic review has revealed disparate stimuli for economic activity in the region's apex cities.[7] It is readily apparent that a theory of urban economic growth cannot be devised on the basis of any one sector or patterned combination of sectors. Returning the USUSU model and the search for engines of growth, the above review suggests that some components are missing, which hinders the coherence and growth of the apex urban economies. Many of the cities have experienced the gradual erosion of their original agricultural export *entrepôt function* (2), and except for those with mineral-exporting hinterlands, this loss has not been compensated in any dynamic sense. [*Note*: The various components outlined earlier in this chapter are numbered.]

With the exception of South Africa, *export-augmenting activities* (3) have barely emerged and *import substitution* (4) was largely abandoned under SAP and economic liberalization policies. The one major step forward has been the coalescing of entrepreneurial skill and innovation in an African urban population no longer fettered by the racial three-tier system which excluded them from trade and professional services. Urban dwellers have attempted to diversify their household incomes and some have succeeded as entrepreneurs, especially amongst the middle and higher-capital thresholds for informal sector entry through *innovation of goods and services* (5). This may provide the seeds for these regions' future competitiveness in global markets. Most, however, are swelling the informal sector with a vast amount of easy entry petty trade and redundant services that enable people to simply eke out the barest survival.

Finally, in addition to innovation, the *revival of old goods and services in new forms* (6) is flourishing, which augurs well for the specialized diversity needed for economic growth. It should be added that South Africa and its triplex cities, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, are firing on all cylinders compared with other cities in the region. This has significant implications for regional economic linkages that will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this book.

Urban livelihood experimentation

Casualization of labour and informal sector growth

Having outlined the apex cities' sources of economic sustainability, which vary in magnitude of importance and reliability by location, it remains to probe the nature of household livelihoods for urban residents. Certainly in the wake of the oil crisis and erosion of the urban family wage, a period of economic transformation resulting in sectoral, contractual and organizational change followed. Urban households were in the process of losing any advantage they had relative to rural dwellers. Urban 'footholds' became precarious as the apex cities' foundations were shaken by economic and political uncertainty (Jamal and Weeks 1993, Jamal 2001).

The most profound alterations were the collapse of the formal sector and the relinquishing of labour standards and guarantees of basic minimum wages. African nation-states were forced to drastically reduce their human capital investment. Universal primary education and investment at all levels of education and technical training were cut back or curtailed under SAP and have only recently started being reinstated after roughly two decades, amounting to the loss of educational opportunities for an entire generation. Kariuki and Nelson (Chapter 8) documents how, under these straightened circumstances, sibling assistance in covering educational costs and helping with capital formation was the norm within extended Gikuyu families in Nairobi.

While most countries faced an extremely rapid erosion of their formal sectors during the 1980s, other countries less or more latterly exposed to SAP conditionality were continuing to exert controls to contain the spread of the informal sector. South African apartheid's pass laws persisted with clamps on informal housing in Johannesburg (Chapter 10). In Harare, self-employment was licensed, preventing market entry of would-be women entrepreneurs with little capital (Chapter 11). In Mombasa, formal sector handicraft retailers paying license fees and rent for premises fought hard to get the city's municipal government to ban roving handicraft traders (Chapter 5). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Mogadishu informal traders, with no municipal or national government to restrict their activities, engaged in very risky but highly profitable sales of an almost unimaginable range of goods (Chapter 9). A group of traders called the *xawaalad* who supported the 'non-State' were known to take especially big financial risks linking Mogadishu with Dubai, Jeddah, Naples and Genoa.

Household coping and survival strategies

As the purchasing power of the urban family wage slipped away, urban households with multiple-earners became the norm. Men's earnings as heads of households were increasingly supplemented by wives and offsprings' efforts, notably in the informal sector. Households experimented with a variety of income-earning activities, exercising extreme flexibility regarding their labour skills, working times and locations. By having multiple household members earning, households deflected the risk of income failure from any one economic activity. This flexibility did, however, forego the benefits of labour specialization. It also led increasingly to winners and losers, as low- and high-equilibrium positions in income earning became more and more pronounced (Beall 2002, Rakodi with Lloyd-Jones 2002, Kazimbaya-Senkwe 2004, Kamete 2004).

In the perilously low-earning households of Nairobi, Amis (Chapter 7) notes that cutbacks in food intake, school fees, water[8] and other basic consumption tended to be the first coping responses rather than rural return migration. Many Nairobi residents in squatter settlements are second-generation families and have no rural homes. Kariuki and Nelson (Chapter 8) draws attention to the changing nature of intra-household relations. Parents are both likely to be working and have reduced time for parenting. In medium- and high-income households, family sizes are being reduced through women's conscious intentions to limit the number of children they have. Parents actively seek to provide their children with more educational opportunities than they had, so a traditional pro-natalist attitude has been replaced by a 'quality rather than quantity' approach to having children amongst the fledging middle classes of East African cities. Some parents choose to provide their children with extra tuition for improved exam performance or go to the expense of sending their children to boarding schools to avert exposure to what is called the 'bad behaviour' of the city's day schools.

The urban poor are not faced with these quandaries regarding children's education. Their children are likely to be working in the informal sector rather than attending school. The dilemma for them is to have sufficient food for survival. Urban agriculture is often not an option. In Nairobi and Kampala, increasing pressure on urban land and rising housing prices have led to diminishing land for urban agriculture. The poor's responses to contracting urban incomes are primarily urban in character (Chapter 7). Women may turn to alcohol production and prostitution; young girls may seek support from an older man, her 'sugar daddy'. Poor households that own housing often sublet, as will be described in the next section. The poverty and over-crowding takes its toll on the poor's resilience. Some adults and youth resort to heavy drinking of local brews and distilled drinks or alternatively experiment with drugs (Bryceson 2002c).

Significance of the housing rental market on urban well-being and class differentiation

Housing plays a pivotal role in urban households' diverging welfare paths. Economic differentiation in rural areas of East Africa and much of Southern Africa has been relatively muted historically. The attainment of secure 'housing footholds' in the city has been a major boost to urban migrants and their nuclear as well as extended families. As Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (Chapter 10) illustrate, this was nowhere more true than in apartheid Johannesburg. Migrant cohorts arriving in the 1950s and 1960s, when mass low-cost housing was being constructed in Soweto, were advantaged compared with later arrivals.

Exceptionally poor housing has come to dominate the apex cities of East and Southern Africa. Approximately 70 per cent of Dar es Salaam residents are believed to be living in unplanned settlements (Chapter 13). Amis (Chapter 7) estimates that Nairobi's slums account for 55 per cent of the city's housing stock with rent being poor households' second largest budgetary expenditure after food. The housing that the poor can afford lacks adequate water supplies and sanitation. In Addis Ababa, during the mid-1990s, an estimated 82 per cent of urban houses were traditional *chika* structures made of mud and wood, a third consisting of only one room (Solomon and McLeod 2004). In Dar es Salaam and Kampala, the poorest slums are in the low-lying areas prone to malaria and flooding, posing serious hazards to health.

House ownership can be a matter of luck for the poor – being in the right place at the right time – as illustrated by Schlyter's case study of Esther in Harare who, although poor and unmarried, managed to secure a plot in Chitungwiza.[9] Alternatively, for the well-to-do 'technical know-who' can be decisive. Many cities have had tangled procedures for officially obtaining a plot as well as various unofficial paths towards the same end that may require greasing palms along the way. Once a household builds a residence on a plot, the house tends to become an immutable household asset serving as the family's fixed location in the city and a reception point for incoming extended household members from the countryside. Visiting extended family usually make use of the accommodation as non-paying guests.

Property markets, in which houses are bought and sold to suit the changing locational and housing needs of families through their life cycle, have yet to become firmly established in most of the region's apex cities. Rather, the expansion and contraction of household membership over a family's life cycle is reconciled through the rental market. Although official urban housing policies in some countries tend to overlook it, lodging in the family home is common, particularly among poor and middle-income homeowners. Schlyter's case study (Chapter 11) shows how intrusive this can be to family life. Lodging and extended family visits contribute to very high room occupancy rates with roughly 50 per cent of families occupying just one room.

'Backyard shacks' represent another survival strategy on the part of owners and tenants that is particularly prevalent in Southern Africa. In central Johannesburg, employers built the first backyard shacks on their factory land and commercial premises to facilitate workers' accommodation constraints and to provide proximity to work. Backyard shacks were also found in the freehold black townships of Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare in the inner city area.[10] From the 1930s onwards, the South African government tried to abolish this form of accommodation and forcibly remove Africans to hostels and official townships. This was a battle that they eventually lost with the abandonment of influx control in 1986. In suburban Soweto, twice as many people lived in backyard shacks as opposed to hostels in 1997 (Beall *et al*. 2002). The spread of backyard shacks in Southern African cities represents the determination of the poor to gain urban footholds as well as the exceptionally low living standards of populations who have endured apartheid, bachelor wage levels and split families.

Generally, urban housing demand has greatly exceeded supply in low- and middle-income brackets of the apex cities. Addis Ababa's inner city has the densest population and the highest incidence of rented housing; 74 per cent of housing there is rented as opposed to 57 per cent citywide (Solomon and McLeod 2004). Even in Gaborone, where building standards were enforced, illegal backyard shacks have appeared. Large investments in urban housing have been made and spillover housing developments have been undertaken in the 'urbanizing villages' of the city's peri-urban area but housing demand continually outstrips supply. Selolwane (Chapter 12) reports that Gaborone professionals in some cases have resorted to subletting servants' quarters to bridge the gap.

Housing is more than just accommodation for the urban poor. As illustrated by Schlyter's Chitungwiza case study in Chapter 11, a residential house plot can provide a business premises. Esther operated a shebeen as well as a welding shop at different times in her house that proved disruptive to the household and broader community. Drunken clientele and deafening machine noise within the home were not only annoying and illegal, but also vital to ensuring her livelihood. For others, such home-based businesses are the only way that they can pay off their mortgages.

Ngware (Chapter 13) records a different urban housing pattern. In Tabata, a suburb of Dar es Salaam, a mixed-class neighbourhood has taken shape from the original site and service scheme initiated there in the 1970s. Some of the early entrants assumed community leadership as well as constituting a rentier class for later entrants. The two roles are kept in balance by the collectively felt need for local governance, basic security and infrastructure provisioning, given Dar es Salaam municipal council's neglect in provisioning any of these needs.

In Maputo during the 1990s, the urban elite embarked on a house-building spree to provide their own and rental accommodation (Chapter 4). In Dar es Salaam, confusion over the land allocation procedures and the legitimacy of allocating bodies in relation to usufruct rights and *de facto* embryonic land markets provided the ascendant urban middle classes with their entry into land and housing markets (Chapter 13). Unregulated inefficient use of urban space and urban sprawl are the net result (Mwamfupe 1994, Kironde 1995, Kombe 1995).

Slum clearance involving the destruction of makeshift housing has been a recurrent theme in the history of Southern Africa, as illustrated by the recent demolition of squatter settlements in the outlying villages of Gaborone in 2001 (Chapter 12). In East Africa, urban housing control enforcement was more lax and urban housing policies have been largely non-interventionist and defeatist in outlook. The vast majority of the poor are left to accommodate themselves in ever more crowded or sprawling locations under illegal exploitative tenancy conditions (Chapter 6). In Southern Africa, a vast lottery of life operated, with the poor gaining a housing foothold through successful land invasions, as in Johannesburg from the 1940s onwards, or alternatively through massive, low-cost housing schemes exemplified by Chitungwiza in the 1970s (Chapters 10 and 11). Usually eligibility for such housing rested on proof of gainful employment and a 'modern' as opposed to 'traditional' marriage of the reproductive couple. Even when such criteria were met, employment and marriage statuses of the occupants were subject to change, a fact that most municipal councils had to tolerate. Loan repayments became the decisive basis for continued housing access in the scheme. Illegal livelihood activities were requisite for vast numbers of households to keep up their payments.

Conclusion

Despite unreliable census data, no one disputes that urban populations have expanded, as is discussed in the next chapter. Evidence of economic growth, both statistical and observational, is less easy to discern. There are more and more people resident in the region's apex cities pursuing livelihood activities that increase the absolute size of the economy but do not guarantee per capita income growth. Standards of living spiral downwards as proliferating numbers of people replicate each other's work in overly competitive urban informal sectors. Glaring economic wealth differentiation causes resentment, which may contribute to social unrest and ethnic tension.

This chapter, drawing on the findings of the case study chapters, has assembled a picture of East and Southern African apex cities' assorted stimuli for production. An USUSU model has been been outlined to provide a framework for exploring the nature of urban economic dynamism. Assessing the case study material with respect to this model, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn.

First, none of the identified economic stimuli are entirely 'safe bets' in terms of their *sustainability* over time or their availability to all the countries and cities under review. Mineral wealth seems to be the only robust source of growth currently but it depends on the type of mineral, its world price and whether it exists in commercial quantities. Only a few countries, notably South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and, most recently, Tanzania, have been blessed with the right circumstances in recent years. The exploitation of mineral wealth, especially on the basis of direct foreign investment, may fail to provide the labour absorption needed to dynamize the national and apex city economies. Furthermore, Zimbabwe's recent political insecurity demonstrates that mineral wealth is not sufficient in itself to ensure the economic vitality of the country and apex city. Without the *sustenance* (1) of political stability, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the national and urban economies have rapidly deteriorated. (*Note*: Components of the USUSU model are italicized and numbered here and in the following paragraphs.)

Second, the apex cities' original depot function, serving as a central point for the collection and distribution of goods and services from the city, has altered profoundly over the last three decades. Whereas before the exports of most of our case study countries were primarily agricultural products from the rural hinterland and imports were of manufactured goods, now under the influence of deagrarianization, agricultural exports have slumped and little has taken its place in East Africa and some of the Southern African countries like Malawi and Mozambique. Imports, meanwhile, have risen, often of food and other basic needs imported as humanitarian aid. Apex city *export support* (2) is limited primarily to depot and storage services as entrepots between global and local markets. *Export augmentation* (3) is necessarily scanty because the city's exports are very limited in range and quantity.

Tourism is the one promising source of economic activity for those countries that are not wracked by civil war or unrest. It has the potential of being dynamic with respect to both export support and augmentation. The latter embraces handicraft products as well as ancillary services beyond the transport and accommodation of tourists. With the exception of Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Zanzibar, the apex cities of this region have yet to develop their tourist appeal by promoting their historical sites, local culture, conference centres and other attractions.

Third, while valiant attempts at *import substitution* (4) enterprise took place in the post-independence era of many if not most countries, the economic stringency of the structural adjustment period followed by economic liberalization policies make it exceptionally difficult for apex cities to have import substitution industries that can successfully compete with cheap imports of the global economy, particularly from East Asia. The depressed purchasing power of the broad masses of the urban poor would in any case greatly limit the range and pricing of import substitution products. Growth in security services and luxury hotels and shops for the urban elite are however in evidence in many apex cities.

Fourthly, *innovation* (5) in production is often discernible in the vast informal sector economy, but the lack of infrastructure and wider interconnections between different productive streams leaves the potential for innovation largely untapped.

Finally, *conservation and renovation* (6) of old forms of production do provide some promise, especially in the field of transport. The *boda boda* bicycle taxis in and around the peri-urban areas of Kampala have been hailed as a new commercial usage for bicycles. Tourism has stimulated the rejuvenation of handicraft products. The Makonde ebony carvers of Dar es Salaam and the granite stone carvers of Harare have developed and innovated using their traditional skills to supply their art to markets worldwide. These are just a few examples of how the urban poor have used local skills and ingenuity to generate new markets for their goods and services.

In the absence of identifiable lead sectors dynamizing national and urban economic growth, it is difficult to characterize the internal dynamics and trajectories of the apex urban economies. The overall picture emerging of the apex city economies is of a hotch-potch of successful, failing and unstructured livelihoods through which urban residents somehow make ends meet. Betwixt and between, the apex cities are wedged between highly competitive global markets and enticing lifestyles, on the one hand, and, on the other, immense expanses populated by people whose agrarian value systems persist amidst local livelihood pursuits aimed at escaping material deprivation. The apex cities serve as a bridge between these vastly different worlds.

At a basic level these cities are fulfilling the classic role of urban areas – providing vast and highly differentiated consumer markets and product and service experimentation. However, the relative lack of proliferation of the division of labour through specialization and diversification to date is readily apparent when the region is compared with other parts of the world. The urban informal sector harbours a great deal of redundant labour engaged in petty trade, bereft of the capital and skills to move on to more productive and remunerative labour. Have these apex cities substituted urban subsistence trading activities for rural agricultural subsistence activities? Are we witnessing what UN-HABITAT has labelled 'premature urbanization'?

> Africa is well on its way to European levels of urbanisation but without the economic base to sustain it. The cities are unable to cope for this is 'premature urbanisation'. There are no industries to provide jobs and many people – around 72 per cent of the total urban population of Africa live in slums. (Commission for Africa 2005)

Like a premature human birth, African urbanization is bemoaned as untimely, unhealthy and undesirable. Human birth, whatever its timing, is natural and inevitably painful. So too urbanization is painful, but can it be considered unnatural or too early? The next chapter examines African urban population growth with an in-depth examination of national census data. The concluding chapter of this volume returns to the question of the desirability of urbanization and its synchronisation with economic trends.

Notes

1. Sub-Saharan Africa's urban areas have steadily expanded to accommodate an increasing proportion of the region's total population rising from 15 per cent in 1960 to 36 per cent in 2003 (World Development Indicators 2004).
2. Jane Jacobs (1969: 5) gives the example of a dressmaker in New York City during the early 1920s wishing to please her fashion-conscious clientele who made special undergarments to enhance her clients' appearance while wearing the dresses. These garments, known as brassieres or bras, became exceptionally popular and spread rapidly beyond her small circle of dress-buying clients. Less than a century later, vast numbers of women around the world consider bras a necessary article of daily apparel – one example of global product demand emanating from a highly localized urban fashion.
3. Maula (1997: 101) estimated that one in twenty economically active adults in Dar es Salaam earned cash through alcohol sales. Bryceson (2002c) argues that the economic demoralization sparked rising supply and demand during this period.

4. See Chapter 4 of Becker, Hamer and Morrison (1994) for a useful discussion of urban migration models applied to Sub-Saharan Africa.
5. Interestingly, South Africa has hedged its bets, with widespread hotel investment throughout the two regions.
6. Accurate data on remittances are extremely difficult to obtain.
7. Collier and Gunning (1999) provide a useful overview of African economic performance and prospects generally.
8. The poor living in squatter settlements do not have piped water and spend proportionately far more than higher-income earners on buying small amounts of water from vendors.
9. In 1980, surprisingly, there was higher African ownership in Harare amongst the poor than amongst those with better incomes, but the housing was of an exceptionally poor quality, highly densified and, in the case of Chitungwiza, far from Harare's livelihood and market opportunities (Chapter 11).
10. The local government was completely successful in its removal of backyard shacks by the early 1960s. However, from the late 1960s onwards, low-cost housing provision slowed to a trickle. The growing population of Soweto meant that by the late 1970s the housing backlog began to result in the building of backyard shacks in Soweto.

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3

Urban Growth and Urban Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa: Trends and Prospects

Deborah Potts

Urban settlements in Southern and Eastern Africa have experienced major changes in the processes that influence their nature and their role in national development since the 1960s, when independence came to many of the countries in the region. At the most basic level these changes reflect trends in economic development so that the economic declines, which have afflicted so many of the region's nations since the end of the 1970s, have been translated into worse urban poverty and inadequate (or virtually non-existent) urban services. Beyond this basic backdrop, however, there are other important factors that have influenced urban trends. These are often more nuanced in their impact, with some significant degree of differentiation across the region.

One factor, as discussed in the previous two chapters, has been the trends in development theory and practice that have been adopted by (and often foisted on) countries in the region. The vagaries of modernization theory, of basic needs approaches and, from the 1980s, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and trade liberalization have each, in turn, profoundly influenced population growth patterns, urban service provision and the sectoral composition of urban economies with its vital corollaries: urban employment and income. The attitudes of development economists towards the role of urban centres in national economic development have been significant in this respect. In the early post-independence period when the modernization theory held sway, there was broad acceptance that industrialization held the key to improved productivity, and hence 'development', and that this entailed government intervention.[1] The activities, employment and investment associated with this approach favoured urban centres. The neo-liberal economic conditionality of SAPs, on the other hand, contained the important assumption that urban bias in African economic development policies had been damaging to national economies and recommended (and, if possible, imposed) allocative shifts in resources towards the rural sector (particularly exports) and against urban-based 'formal' production, jobs and investment. The impact of these policies, which were strongly influenced by market-oriented ideologies, on urban economies was profound: rapid de-industrialization was effected,[2] urban-based public and private sector retrenchments occurred, and private sector provision of services was promoted that often excluded the majority of the urban population (although in some areas, public-sector provision had been so inadequate that the poor noticed little difference). Extraordinary adaptations were made by urban residents to cope with the effects of these impacts that often rendered previous livelihood strategies completely unviable (Potts 1997).

By the end of the 1990s, however, there was yet another change in development theorists' conceptualizations of the role of urban centres. Urban areas are yet again being projected as central to national economic transformation, albeit within a still mainly market-oriented policy framework. The World Bank's 1999 World Development Report, for example, heralded cities as 'engines of growth', downplaying the 'engines of greed' image that was used to depict African urban elites in World Bank documents for over two decades. There is a new awareness of the plight of the urban poor and of their needs by donors. As yet, however, there is little evidence that the sectoral trends of the last 20 years can be reversed in the cities of Eastern and Southern Africa.

These shifts in the urban policy environment over time provide the backdrop to the following analysis of urban growth patterns in relation to political and economic developments in Eastern and Southern Africa. The focus is mainly on processes *within* city boundaries rather than a debate about urban systems and hierarchies.

Urban population growth trends

Many towns and cities in the region are not growing nearly as fast as they did in the 1960s and 1970s. There are a number of reasons for this, including basic characteristics of urbanization processes that are seemingly often forgotten by regional urban analysts. One important factor is that a given number of net in-migrants to centres with small populations translates into high rates of annual population growth but yields a much smaller growth rate if added to a much larger urban centre. Also, in countries with extremely low levels of urbanization, the pool of potential rural–urban migrants in relation to current urban residents is huge. Thus as urban levels increase (for example, to over 50 per cent in today's South Africa), even if the propensity to migrate to town from rural areas remains the same, the rate of growth yielded by in-migration drops significantly. This means that as urban centres get bigger and as the population becomes more urbanized, the rates of growth naturally tend to drop.[3] This may be too obvious to state but it seems worthwhile simply because there has been a degree of mythologizing about the 'stubbornness' of Sub-Saharan African urban growth rates to refuse to 'abate'. In fact, in the absence of war and/or drought (sadly not absent enough in Eastern and Southern Africa), many of the reasonably reliable data available (which are far too few) indicate that a downward trend in urban growth rates is already established (Potts 1995, 1997).

This trend in the region is not, however, only due to statistical inevitability. Many countries still have low levels of urbanization (Table 3.1) and many centres are still small, so there remains significant scope for rapid urbanization; indeed, by world standards, only Kinshasa and the larger urban areas of South Africa are 'large cities'. Another set of factors is related to significant changes in the rate and nature of in-migration – essentially falling rates of in-migration combined with increased rates of return (Potts 1995). These have reflected urban economic decline and led to reductions in urban growth rates, in certain cases quite dramatically. Before turning to these issues, it is worth commenting briefly on the levels of urbanization shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Urbanization level (%) 1960s – 21st-century Southern and Eastern Africa

Country	**1960s (%)**	**1970s (%)**	**1980s (%)**	**1990s (%)**	**2000s (%)**
Angola	11^{60}	14^{70}			*60–70*^{01} (a)
Botswana		9^{71}	18^{81}	46^{91} (24%)	*52*^{03} (b)
Burundi		4^{79}			
Congo (DRC)		22^{70}	32^{84}		
Kenya	8^{62}	15^{79}	18^{89}	(c)	
Lesotho	5^{66}	11^{76}	14^{86}		
Malawi	5^{66}	8^{77}	11^{87}	14^{98}	
Mozambique			13^{80}	29^{97}	
Namibia		25^{70}		28^{91}	
Rwanda		5^{78}			
S Africa	47^{60}			54^{96}	
Swaziland	11^{66}	15^{76}	23^{86}	23^{97}	
Tanzania		13^{78}	18^{88}		
Uganda	8^{69}		9^{80}	11^{91}	
Zambia	21^{63}	29^{69}	40^{80}	38^{90}	36^{00}
Zimbabwe	19^{69}		26^{82}	31^{92}	

Notes: Derived from census data, date indicated by superscript, unless otherwise noted. Estimates in italics.

(a) Estimate given by Ann Condy, DfID Luanda Urban Poverty Programme, at Chatham House British-Angola Forum seminar, 14 June 2001.

(b) Estimate from Botswana census projections. (UN projections for 1995 were 60 per cent!) It should be noted that the apparent, sudden leap in urbanization level in Botswana in the 1990s is largely definitional. The country has historically been characterized by nucleated settlements which were essentially agricultural in economic (if not political) terms. Many of these large agro-villages had grown to a size sufficient to be included in the 'urban' population by the 1990s (see Table 3.2). However functionally their status remains ambiguous: using a *functional* definition for urbanization, the census reported an alternative level in 1991 of only 24 per cent (as shown in brackets).

(c) See text, page 86, for discussion of Kenyan urbanization levels in 1990s.

Urbanization levels

Only South Africa has reached the situation where over half of its population is functionally urban. Its level of urbanization in 1960 was already 47 per cent so the overall growth subsequently has been gradual although, as will be discussed later, this disguises some remarkable spatial and temporal disjunctures in urbanization processes. The level estimated for Angola in 2001 is guesswork, many current estimates are for 50 per cent at least but the government's 2003 Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme document reports a significantly lower level of 34 per cent. Certainly levels as high as 50 per cent were entirely an artifice of endless war and instability and bore virtually no relation to the country's economic development. Since peace was finally established in 2002 many of those in urban areas are expected to return to the rural areas. There is anecdotal evidence of this for some centres – although this is admittedly generally not the view of Angolan analysts today. It is here averred, however, because of the immediate post-war experiences of both Zimbabwe and Mozambique where there was significant out-migration from cities. Urban planners in both countries had been assuming that the migrant population driven in by war was there to stay but for many refugees this turned out not to be the case. The estimate for Botswana for 2003 of 52 per cent is also potentially misleading because here definitional issues have been important in 'creating' urban populations in the recent past (see footnote (b) to Table 3.1 and Selolwane, Chapter 12).

Zambia's levels are particularly noteworthy. It was frequently typified as one of, if not the most urbanized country in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it has still not attained the symbolic '50 per cent level' which has so often been ascribed to the country. Instead the level of urbanization actually *fell* during the 1980s and 1990s, and by 2000 had decreased to 36 per cent (Zambia, Central Statistical Office 2003a,b, Potts 2005). There can be no more telling example in the region of the potentially profound impact of economic decline on the migratory processes which are the key determinants of whether or not urbanization (in the specific sense of an increase in the national share of the urban population) is occurring.

It is evident that the East African countries are generally less urbanized than those in Southern Africa, although both Malawi and Lesotho have particularly low levels as well. Swaziland's 1997 census indicated that, from the mid-1980s, the process of national urbanization (in the purely demographic sense) had halted,[4] as in Zambia.

Components of urban growth

Urban growth has two demographic components – net in-migration and natural increase (NI). It is commonly assumed that natural increase rates in urban Africa have been lower than those in rural areas, but this has often not been the case until recently. Through the 1970s and 1980s a rule-of-thumb annual rate of NI for most of the countries in the region (except South Africa) was about 3 per cent, or even higher (for example, 4 per cent for Kenya in the 1970s) (Appendix 3.1). Although fertility was generally lower in urban areas, so was mortality, and by the 1980s urban sex ratios in much of eastern Africa, with the notable exception of Kenya,[5] were roughly balanced. Since age groups that are at their most fertile tend to be over-represented in African urban populations due to selective migration patterns, lower fertility rates need not translate directly into lower crude birth rates and NI compared to rural areas, as illustrated by the following four examples. In Malawi, NI in urban areas in 1977 was around 3.5 per cent compared to about 2.3 per cent for the population as a whole (Potts 1986) and in 1998 the relative rates were 1.8 per cent and 1.7 per cent.[6] In Kinshasa in 1984 NI was estimated at 3.9 per cent and the city's fertility rates were the highest in the country at 7.7 compared to 6.7 nationally (Piermay 1997).[7] Tanzania's urban birth rates in 1991 and 1994 were identical to those in rural areas, despite the urban fertility rate being 25 per cent lower. In Zambia, urban birth rates were higher than rural rates in 1980 and, although they were 25 per cent lower by 2000, this would have been significantly counterbalanced by the fact that infant mortality rates were also about 25 per cent lower in the urban areas and these, despite AIDS, remained the main influence on overall death rates in the 1990s in Zambia (Potts 2005).

Thus NI has tended to be high in urban areas in East and Southern Africa and, as base populations rose, steadily increased its contribution to annual growth. By the 1980s, urban NI rates were often roughly the same as (if not more than) national rates and made up about half of the annual growth in many cities' populations in East, and parts of Southern Africa. Indeed, in many cases, this was already the case in the 1970s. This can be seen in Appendix 3.1. Comparing population growth rates for the 1970s and 1980s – the proxy for NI within the urban areas in those decades – with the population growth rate of many individual cities shows that NI usually accounted for at least half of the growth of the largest towns (exceptions being due to specific government policies or conflict situations).

This means that the share of net in-migration, which had been the primary generator of urban population growth in the early post-independence era (and the 1950s), had fallen even before net in-migration itself began to decline. There were important exceptions; for example, urban settlements whose populations were swelled by rural people fleeing war in Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia in the 1970s,[8] or centres whose development was particularly fostered by government policies. Examples of the latter would include new capital cities in Botswana (Gaborone) and Malawi (Lilongwe). The new mining towns of Botswana (for example, Selebi-Phikwe, Orapa) also burgeoned in this period. Urban growth rates in the white minority regimes in southern Africa had their own peculiar features in this era and are explored in a separate section below.

The impact of NI on East and Southern African urbanization began to change in the 1990s, and earlier in some cases, as national rates of natural increase have begun to decrease. First, fertility decline is now established in the southern part of the region (i.e. South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe) as well as in Kenya, and there is evidence of small falls in most of the other countries (Potts and Marks 2001). These decreases have been most marked in urban areas and the gap between urban and rural fertility has frequently widened recently. Second, by the end of the 1990s significant increases in mortality rates due to AIDS in almost all the countries under study were making further inroads into NI rates. In the original regional 'core' area of AIDS – Uganda, Rwanda, eastern Zaire and northwestern Tanzania – heightened mortality rates will have had an impact somewhat earlier (Barnett and Blaikie 1992) but there the incidence of HIV has generally not reached the levels now prevalent in Southern Africa and has now often stabilized or (as in Uganda) is decreasing.

Urban areas have been particularly affected by the AIDS epidemic as they generally have higher rates of HIV-positive inhabitants (although it is common for urban people to go to rural areas in the latter stages of AIDS to be nursed by rural relatives). In Zambia, for example, median HIV rates for pregnant women in the major urban areas increased from 25 to 31 per cent from 1990 to 2001 (and seem now to have stabilized) compared to around 14 per cent outside these areas (UNAIDS 2002). National birth and death rates in the second half of the 1990s were nevertheless still generating a national rate of NI of around 2.3 per cent. Although the differential impact of AIDS would have meant higher adult death rates in urban areas, lower infant and child death rates in urban settlements and fairly high birth rates meant that the rural–urban difference in NI may still not have been that marked (see Potts 2005 for further discussion of these factors in Zambia). In Zimbabwe by mid-2001, according to some estimates, *national* NI was zero, essentially due to the impact of AIDS (the birth rate slightly exceeded the death rate, but this was countered by emigration). If these estimates were correct, it means that the demographic motor of NI in the main towns had gone into reverse (although registrations of urban births and deaths might fail to depict the shift given the predilection for urban residents' deaths from AIDS to occur in rural areas). In Southern African cities in particular, therefore, AIDS deaths will be reducing urban NI rates. Rural NI rates will also be falling however, although usually by less.

If NI in many of the region's large towns has now begun to fall relative to national population growth, or at least is not higher, migration becomes a more important determinant of whether and how fast urban centres are increasing their share of the population – the rate at which urbanization is occurring. Indeed, in most of the region new in-migrants must be the only source of 'urbanization', in the sense used throughout this book including the preceding two chapters. This disregards definitional additions to the urban total (although the latter is often important as small settlements attain 'urban' status by passing some size threshold). Certainly, for the apex cities, in-migrants will now be the only possible motor of *relative* population growth. In other words, the rate of in-migration, the decisions migrants make about how long they remain in town, and the rates of out-migration and circulation now determine 'urbanization' at the top of the urban hierarchy. In this sense, the behaviour and attitudes and economic success or otherwise of the non-migrant city population (Chapter 8) are irrelevant to the 'urbanization' debated in the first two chapters of this volume and under consideration here (although evidently these are of central relevance to 'urbanization' in any of its wider senses).

Absolute increases in city populations based on natural increase among established second- and later-generation cohorts of urban dwellers are fairly inevitable as long as births exceed deaths (although not absolutely inevitable as the case of Zambia illustrates), but it should not be inferred from such growth that there is any 'puzzle' to be explained, even if it is occurring alongside very poor economic performance in the cities. As argued elsewhere, in relation to Zambia, 'barring cataclysms, most of these people are going to remain in town' (Potts 2005). Much debate has been generated over the nature and implications of Zambia's de-urbanization (Macmillan 1993, 1996, Ferguson 1990, 1994, 1996, 1999) but much of this is solved by recognizing that there are two separate elements of the cities' populations: the increasingly numerically dominant city-born cohorts and the more recently urbanized, and far less 'stable' (in the sense of being permanently settled), in-migrant cohorts. These two elements have different histories, different sets of connections to their 'ancestral' areas of origin (which are usually, but not always, rural), with these being much stronger and more immediate for in-migrants, and have experienced markedly different life chances and sets of economic opportunities in the urban milieu. These differing historical sets of opportunities are highlighted in the following chapters and are discussed in the concluding chapter. It is argued here that not only is it to be *expected* that these circumstances will have generated differing urban migration patterns but also that these can be discerned in urban growth patterns in the region. In this respect, this chapter departs somewhat from the argument made in the first two chapters that the region's urban economic malaise has not been reflected in its urban demography.

Here it is believed that declines in the rate of *net* in-migration in the 1980s and 1990s often occurred because of increasing urban poverty and declining urban welfare, falling real urban incomes, and a narrowing (and sometimes even reversal) of the rural–urban income gap. Evidence for this comes from a multitude of sources[9] and is increasing. Ferguson (1999) shows all too clearly how people in Zambia's Copperbelt towns have been forced, often reluctantly, to leave the urban areas, contrary to the original expectations of many. Analysis of the most recent census has demonstrated that, in this specific example, this out-migration includes urban-born people (Potts 2005). In this instance, therefore, the fate of urban-born cohorts has not been irrelevant to urban growth patterns, but similar counter-urbanization at the national scale is not evident elsewhere in the region. Evidence of more out-migration and/or less in-migration can nevertheless be found for Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe in Narman (1995), Tripp (1997) and Potts (2000). For some countries in Eastern and Southern Africa such evidence includes census data that are discussed in the final section of this chapter. Recent research on Francophone West African urbanization and migration, based on data for which, unfortunately, there are no equivalents in East and Southern Africa, also shows that there was much slower urbanization in that region in the 1990s than generally assumed and this has been caused in part by heightened circular and return migration (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004).

The fact that there are still many in-migrants and that urban settlements are still visibly expanding is sometimes felt to run counter to the assertions made above but there is no necessary contradiction. As already discussed, NI is sufficient to fuel significant urban expansion in most large centres and is usually the main source of their new urban residents. This alone places significant new annual demands on the urban economy, employment needs and services, yet without actually causing the *level* of urbanization to increase. Reduced *net* in-migration can also be compatible with large, and even increased, numbers of in-migrants. It is the counter-flow of out-migrants that makes the difference. Blurring the rural-urban continuum has always been a feature of Sub-Saharan Africa (*Environment and Urbanization* 1998, 2003) but the sheer scale of circular migration is not always appreciated. Table 3.2 provides some indication of the balance between in-flows and out-flows to urban areas in Malawi and Botswana for specific years (the

Table 3.2 Rural–urban and urban–rural migration flows: Malawi and Botswana

Category of migration	**Number of migrants**	**U–R migration as % of R–U migration**
Malawi (1971–72)		91%
Rural–urban	159,000	
Urban–rural	144,000	
Malawi (1976–77)		61%
Rural–urban	162,916	
Urban–rural	98,799	
Botswana (1980–81)		76%
Rural–urban	28,794	
Urban–rural	21,748	

Source: Derived from Potts (1986), Silitshena and Mcleod (1989).

year before a census, or sample census, in both cases, which is the only time such data are ever gathered, if at all). From these figures it becomes clearer that shifts in the order of as low as 10 per cent in the propensities of recent migrant cohorts either to go to or leave town as economic circumstances change could transform the share of net in-migration in total national urban growth. In other words, such shifts can transform the rate of urbanization. The West African research mentioned above, for example, reports that in the Cote d'Ivoire internal net migration flows shifted to being urban–rural in the period 1988–93 because of worsening urban circumstances (Bocquier and Beauchemin 2004).

Generally, urbanization is still occurring across the region and net in-migration usually remains positive – the point is that net rates have reduced and not, except in very rare circumstances, that they have reversed. There are many individual towns in different countries that have experienced population growth at around, or sometimes below, national rates and are thus not 'urbanizing' but no evidence that any apex cities have experienced this, even in Zambia. Also the evidence that rural–urban linkages have strengthened in the face of urban economic decline relates mainly to first-generation migrant cohorts who nowadays form only a minority of urban residents. Thus such links can be reducing for the urban-born majority at the same time as they are strengthening for this component. However, since the mobility patterns of these in-migrants are the key determinants of the rate of 'urbanization', their linkages and actions have special significance in the study of contemporary urbanization in East and Southern Africa.

In summary, there have been four sets of factors operating to reduce urban growth rates in Eastern and Southern Africa in the last 20 years or so (in the absence of war or other calamitous events): first, an inevitable statistical decline as cities and urbanization levels grow; second, a fall in net in-migration rates accompanying economic decline and structural adjustment; third, a fall in fertility rates; and, fourth, a rise in adult mortality rates. The latter two demographic factors affect the rate at which the urbanization level rises only if their impact is differentially experienced between rural and urban areas – but, as noted already, there are good reasons to expect this now to be the case and that urban NI rates by the late 1990s would have begun to fall below those in rural areas. This trend will strengthen as the years pass, particularly in Southern Africa because of AIDS deaths. A further factor that influences growth rates within the urban hierarchy is the redirection of migrant flows from both rural areas and larger centres to smaller towns where living costs are lower and food security is higher (Pottier 1988, Holm 1992, Andersson 2002). This reduces net in-migration to the large cities although it may not reduce urban growth overall.

What is the combined impact of these factors on the growth of individual cities in the region? In some cases it is not possible to be definitive because reliable, recent data on urban populations are unavailable. Published data by international organizations, although often cited, are of little use for the 1990s unless based on national census data. Usually they are simply projections based on outdated assumptions and there is good reason to believe that for many countries and cities the figures are misleading (Hardoy and Sattherthwaite 1989, Potts 1995, Satterthwaite 1996). In most cases, the impact of NI changes will only have been significant towards the end of the 1990s. Even so, reliable data available to compare city size in, say, 1988 and 1998 and the average annual rate of growth might be masking quite major changes over the decade. The data that are available are discussed in the last section of this chapter and tend to confirm the patterns and trends outlined above.

Urban growth under influx controls and war conditions: The legacies of white minority rule in Southern Africa

The broad chronology of growth trends outlined above does not apply well to the urban centres of countries in Southern Africa that were seriously affected by various types of influx control imposed by white minority regimes in an effort to maintain political supremacy and control flows of black labour. These controls were removed in Zimbabwe when it gained independence in 1980. In the 1980s in South Africa and Namibia the efficacy of such controls decreased and they were formally abolished in 1986 in South Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, their impact on the composition and growth of urban populations was profound, even though the black population found ways to avoid and subvert the controls. As a result, urban growth tended to be at its slowest in these countries precisely when it was at its peak elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The selectivity of migrant labour flows in favour of able-bodied males was marked in such countries compared to more 'normal' societies (Simkins 1983, Potts and Mutambirwa 1990) and family migration was strongly discouraged. Extraordinary distortions in the composition of the African urban population resulted. In Salisbury (today's Harare) at the end of the 1950s there were 88,000 'single' (mainly male) Africans who outnumbered the 85,000 African men, women and children living in 19,000 family households. The respective rates for Bulawayo were 55,000 'single' Africans, and 76,000 family members in 19,000 households (Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office 1959, 1960). Efforts, particularly in South Africa, to push the so-called 'surplus' labour (for example, dependants, the sick, old or unemployed) to rural areas skewed sex ratios in the cities even further. This, of course, put constraints on the role of natural increase as a generator of urban growth[10] in these countries compared to those further north. Influx controls also succeeded for some time in maintaining a net in-migration rate well below that which would have occurred in their absence – indeed in direct contrast to the other countries in the region the African population of 'white' South Africa did not 'urbanize' (i.e. the urban share of the population did not increase) in the 1960s and 1970s and neither did the Rhodesian African population in the 1960s (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).

On the other hand, certain policies in South Africa encouraged specific types of rapid 'urbanization' at these times. For example, some of the 'border' settlements in South Africa to which housing and industrial developments were deliberately diverted in order to foster apartheid (for example, Ga-Rankuwa, Mdantsane, Mabopane and Dimbaza/Sada) experienced rapid growth, as did the notorious 'rural slums', such as Botshabelo and Winterveld (Murray 1987, 1995, Krige 1996, Horn 1997), which received huge influxes of people evicted under apartheid policies, and those evicted from white farms.

In Namibia, settlements in the northern part of the country where the African population is most concentrated also grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s because of the insecurity created by the military activities of South African forces and the liberation movement, SWAPO. Similarly, towards the end of the 1970s in Rhodesia, urban growth was also swelled by refugees escaping the effects of the liberation war there (although when this ended in 1980 most of the refugees returned to rural areas). The effect on

Table 3.3 Black (African) urban population of South Africa: Apartheid era ('000s)

Year	Total African urban population	% of total black population	Number in 'white' South Africa	Number in 'homelands'[a]
1946	1689	24.3	1689	–
1960	3471	31.8	3460	11
1970	5070	33.0	4475	595
1980	6870	33.0	5324	1546

[a] These figures *include* the African population in urban settlements in the so-called 'independent' states (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei). Most estimates for 1980 tend to exclude these people.
Source: de V Graaff (1987).

Table 3.4 Urbanization level of Black (African) population of Rhodesia: 1961–77 (% living in towns over 10,000)

Year	% Africans urbanized
1961–62	14.5
1969	13.9
1977	15.8

Source: Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance 1979.

urbanization of war was even more profound in Mozambique and Angola. In both countries liberation wars against the Portuguese, ending with independence in 1975, were followed by wars against anti-government apartheid-backed forces. The civil wars waxed and waned: Mozambique's ended in 1992 although security in rural areas remained compromised for some years, but in Angola the war continued with only brief respites right through until the 21st century, with peace only being established in 2002. Millions of people were internally displaced in both countries and a significant proportion ended up in the relative security of the towns, especially Maputo and Luanda.

In further contrast to the trends in the countries further north where, by the 1980s, net in-migration rates were often reducing in the economic conditions of structural adjustment, in South Africa and Zimbabwe this decade witnessed heightened rural–urban migration as institutionalized controls were abolished. In both countries these trends were established before the formal abolition of controls: in Zimbabwe the war was a factor as already noted, and in South Africa a combination of factors meant that increasing numbers of people were prepared to flout the law and there was less political will to enforce it. These included horrendous levels of economic insecurity in the African rural areas where there was acute landlessness and structural alienation from agricultural livelihoods, and political struggles in the urban areas. In terms of economic geography, these migrant flows can be conceptualized as an inevitable rebalancing in the distribution of the population from extremely poor, under-resourced rural areas to much wealthier urban areas where there were many opportunities to make a living, even if there were not enough formal jobs. It is worth noting that in both Rhodesia and South Africa the urban informal sector was, by the standards of the rest of eastern and southern Africa, extremely undeveloped before the 1980s, although subsequently it has grown rapidly to become an important source of employment. In the absence of influx controls these flows would have been spread more evenly over time, as they were in the rest of the region, rather than being concentrated in the 1980s.

Urban growth in South Africa at this time was highly visible. Massive informal settlements developed in and around the major metropolitan areas, such as Soweto-on-Sea in Port Elizabeth and Khayelitsha in Cape Town. The authorities struggled to maintain control over the location of informal housing by designating legal areas for site-and-service developments to which some squatters were redirected. These were frequently in absurd locations, however, as the segregationist tendencies of the authorities were still extant. Orange Farm, on farmland 60 kilometres south of Johannesburg, was one. It is also important to note that surveys have often shown that many or most of the residents in such settlements were not recent in-migrants, contrary to frequent assumptions. These housing developments reflected another 'backlog' or 'logjam' resulting from apartheid, the severe shortage of formal, legal housing for Africans in metropolitan areas. (One of the apartheid state's attempts to control the location of African labour had involved stopping new housing in such areas from the mid 1960s.) New metropolitan residents from that time, whether they were migrants or those born to urban families, were thus squeezed more and more tightly into existing legal accommodation and the backyard shacks which mushroomed round the houses on African township plots. As apartheid faltered, many of these existing residents judged, correctly, that the risk of summary eviction from squatter settlements was vastly diminished and they took the chance to move to less cramped conditions (Crankshaw and Hart 1991, Crankshaw 1993).

Census enumeration in the cities in South Africa in the 1980s was fraught with difficulties because of political resistance to the state. Accurate assessments of growth rates and the size of metropolitan areas, individual townships and informal settlements were therefore hard, although estimates abounded. It appears that some of these estimates were too generous. There was often political capital to be made (on both sides) from exaggerating the size of the 'problem', and city authorities generally erred on the high side in the hope of receiving more resources from the state or donors.

The census found that the level of urbanization in 1996 was nevertheless somewhat higher than anticipated at 54 per cent whereas the total population was lower than projected. The exclusion of the so-called 'independent' homelands from previous, apartheid censuses had distorted the national picture. As already discussed, this makes South Africa one of the few nations in the region with more than half its citizens living in urban areas, and the only one where that level is related meaningfully to its economic development patterns. Now that the urban situation in the country has had time to normalize, further surges of in-migration are unlikely. Given South Africa's low levels of fertility (2.9 children per woman in 1998) and its high HIV rate (20 per cent of the 15–49 age group in 2001), urban NI rates are bound to be low. Overall, urban growth rates are now likely to be considerably lower than they were in the 1980s. Indeed one estimate for the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan area was that it was growing in 2001 at only 0.7 per cent per year, more slowly than the national population (Parnell and Beall 2001). Whether this represents de-urbanization is hard to judge as there are difficult boundary issues involved, but the 1996 census did suggest that about 10 per cent of the white population had moved out. This, however, probably exaggerates the extent of white out-migration as it is known that the white population was under-enumerated in 1996.

In Zimbabwe the urban situation now is very different to that in South Africa. Although South Africa experienced slow economic growth through the 1990s and urban unemployment is high, it has not suffered the extreme urban economic shocks associated with structural adjustment (nor have Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland or Namibia). Zimbabwe, however, adopted structural adjustment in 1991 and the livelihoods of the urban poor were predictably devastated (Kanji and Kajdowska 1993, Bijlmakers *et al.* 1996, Potts and Mutambirwa 1998). By the end of the century, the urban situation in Zimbabwe more closely mirrored that in most of the rest of the region at the end of the 1980s: the informal labour market had exploded, urban agriculture was rife and real incomes had been decimated. The disaffection of the country's urban population was evident in their strong vote for the opposition MDC in parliamentary elections in 2000, although the rural vote ensured the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) remained in power. Zimbabwe's economic decline was exacerbated by its involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its exclusion from many sources of external finance because of international resistance to its involvement and its new fast-track land resettlement programme, which defied capitalist property norms and was accompanied by significant violence. The country's urban sectors are undergoing severe stresses and there was good reason to expect that net in-migration would fall during the 1990s.

In summary, the dynamics of urban growth in these particular countries over the past 40 years cannot be understood without reference to the overarching context of the impact of white minority rule that imposed specific controls over the location and nature of urban growth in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, and helped to create political instability which influenced urban patterns in Mozambique, Angola and Namibia.

By the end of the 20th century, while the legacies of apartheid were still evident in urban systems, the forces driving current urban growth in these countries are now generally the familiar factors of the rural–urban income gap and the state of the urban economy, and the dynamics of urban fertility and mortality. The exception is Angola where the end of war is so recent and its legacies still so present in the countryside that it remains the essential context within which urbanization patterns need to be analyzed. In Zimbabwe, a decade of structural adjustment, exacerbated by the severe economic shocks of the late 1990s, has created urban conditions that are more like those of its neighbours to the north and east. In Mozambique, rapid growth in GDP in the late 1990s has not had much effect on rural poverty, and structural adjustment has made its urban economies and livelihoods very weak, as elsewhere. Maputo, however, has experienced something of an economic boom when compared to the dire state it was in during the years of war. This is partly because of its strategic location in relation to Gauteng, South Africa's economic hub. For over a century the port of Maputo (previously Lourenço Marques) played an important role in the transportation of goods to and from this region. This decreased when Mozambique gained independence under a Marxist-Leninist government in 1975 but since the emergence of the new democratic South Africa in 1994 the Maputo Corridor has become one of South Africa's major regional planning initiatives, with significant benefits for the Maputo economy. However, as illustrated by Jenkins (Chapter 4), the economic changes in Maputo are not generating significant improvements in urban livelihood opportunities for the urban majority.

Urban trends in Southern Africa in the absence of SAPs

A further differentiating factor for urban trends in parts of Southern Africa, in contrast to nearly everywhere else on the continent, is the absence of formal, externally imposed SAPs. South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland have not experienced the extreme economic circumstances of structural adjustment, even though all of them are influenced by the forces of trade liberalization and privatization. Thus they have not experienced the depth and sudden urban economic collapse that has been so significant in the urban growth patterns of other parts of Africa.

Only in Botswana has there been real employment-led urban growth (Chapter 12). The economy has performed strongly, essentially fuelled by diamond sales since the 1970s, and the government is free of the controlling hands of international financial institutions. Its economic management is generally regarded as reasonably prudent, and the country has been able to invest widely in social welfare, infrastructure and the creation of employment in both rural and urban areas. Labour migration to South Africa, still important at independence in the 1960s, has decreased to low levels and been replaced by significant internal rural–urban migration. The role of in-migration in urban growth in this country is therefore still important. On the other hand, Botswana shares the sad distinction, along with Swaziland, Zimbabwe and South Africa's province of KwaZulu-Natal, of having the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world and, by the end of the 1990s this was affecting urban growth as deaths from AIDS accelerated.[11]

Lesotho's urban dynamics have always largely been played out in its giant neighbour, South Africa. Rural–urban migration from Lesotho was dominated by flows to the mines and other urban jobs in South Africa. The country's internal urban system was markedly undeveloped but over the past 20 years this option for Lesotho's rural–urban migrants has become increasingly less available to young men seeking to enter the job market as the demand for labour, particularly for novices from foreign sources, has fallen dramatically, although significant numbers of older Basotho men, whose mining skills the South African mines are keen to retain, are still involved (Crush and James 1995, Sechaba Consultants 1997). Since rural livelihoods in Lesotho have rested on the contribution of mining remittances and the country is short of cultivable land, it is facing a real crisis. In the 1990s GNP growth rates were quite strong by regional standards and remittances, although decreasing, still played a role in the economy. A huge dam project to provide water to South Africa's industrial heartland (the Lesotho Highland Water Project) generated much of the growth (although little long-term domestic employment). Another positive factor was the establishment of Taiwanese-owned factories in Maseru that took advantage of Lesotho's relatively highly educated female workforce and its membership of the Lome Convention, which allows former colonies of Europe advantageous conditions of entry to the European Union market, and its Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) status which also allowed access to American markets from 2000. These conditions all combine to provide strong incentives for domestic rural–urban migration although, for young men in particular, formal urban job opportunities within Lesotho are limited. Recent changes in 2005 in restrictions relating to the global textile trade, which will decrease the need for Chinese and Taiwanese investment in countries like Lesotho, may, however, have a very negative impact on urban-based job formation there.

Urban growth rates and economic and political trends: 1960–2001

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to analyzing the empirical outcome, in terms of urban population growth in specific countries, of the interplay of urban demographic and statistical trends with national economic and political circumstances. It aims to assess the influence of economic factors on African urban growth and is based on and makes specific reference to the data shown in Appendix 3.1, which shows urban populations and growth rates for all the countries in Eastern and Southern Africa from the 1960s to the start of the 21st century (see pp. 99–104). The data are patchy because, with a few exceptions, only census data are shown and although this tends to be the most useful source of information in Africa, it is well known that census data can be prone to error and misinterpretation.[12] Many published estimates are misleading because the errors are so large that they render any attempt at analysis meaningless. Certainly linking economic factors with the urban populations for the 1990s cited in many World Bank or UN reports would be a futile exercise.

While demographic trends tend to extend beyond national boundaries, political and economic policies are often country-specific. The combined impact on urban growth patterns in each country is unique and varies over time. Nevertheless an attempt has been made to group the countries into broad categories that interrelate economic and/or policy patterns with urbanization trends. The first category includes three countries with different economic and political experiences – Uganda, Zambia and Botswana – where the links between urban growth patterns and urban economic developments are clearly illustrated.

During Uganda's early post-independence period, when violence and political instability rendered economic development impossible, urban growth was slow (compared to NI). Kampala stagnated (after having grown at a rate of 6.9 per cent per year from 1959–69), Jinja shrank and Entebbe and Mbale lost population relative to the country as a whole. As political stability in most of the country was restored, and aid and soft loans poured in for reconstruction (albeit under conditions of SAPs), urban growth began to take off with net in-migration accounting for about half the increase. Urban trends closely mirrored economic trends. The evidence from Kampala in the 1990s was of a bustling, busy centre but one characterized by low incomes. The 2002 census showed that Kampala's growth nevertheless decreased in the 1990s to an annual rate of 3.9 per cent compared to a significantly *increased* national population growth rate of 3.4 per cent. This national rate was influenced by very rapid growth in the country's Northern Region, possibly due to some element of immigration from surrounding unstable areas. The Central Region, where Kampala is located, recorded a growth rate of 2.8 per cent per year. Using this as a proxy for NI within Kampala, this suggests that net migration has reduced as a component of the city's population growth since the 1980s to around a quarter of total growth and, therefore, that economic conditions have not proved as attractive to migrants. Very rough calculations based on these figures suggest that the national propensity to migrate to Kampala fell from about 1 in 120 in the 1980s to around 1 in 200 in the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the national population growth rate has increased since the 1980s and is indicative of Uganda's success in reducing its HIV rates and extremely high fertility rates. Growth in most other urban centres was unremarkable with some, including Jinja, Mbale, Masaka and Entebbe, growing at rates well below their regional growth rate. However, civil war in the north of the country has caused massive population displacement, swelling urban populations so much that, for example, Gulu and Lira are now the country's second and third largest urban settlements. Evidently their growth has nothing to do with economics. Uganda provides an example of how political disruption can either depress urban growth (as in the 1970s) or accelerate it (as in the Northern Region).

As already discussed in an earlier section, Zambia provides the best evidence in Africa of significant falls in net in-migration to urban centres as economic decline set in after the first oil crisis. This coincided in Zambia with a drastic fall in copper prices and the major economic problems caused by regional destabilization by Rhodesia, and then South Africa. Its experience is also the best documented (Pottier 1988, Purbrick 1990, Moore and Vaughan 1994, Palmer 1998, Ferguson 1999). All the Copperbelt towns, except Ndola, experienced periods of net out-migration for most of the 1970s and 1980s. From the 1980s, the country as a whole has been de-urbanizing. As argued elsewhere (Potts 1995, 2005), this is ironic because an (erroneous) evaluation of Zambia by Bates (1974, 1981), of it being a country with unstoppably fast urbanization and an excessive rural–urban income gap, then became accepted as a generalization for Africa as a whole and played a part in the anti-urban tenor of SAPs in the light of the World Bank's Berg

Report in 1981. While Zambia was typified as proof of the lack of a link between rural–urban migration and economic 'realities', it was, in fact, the best example of the rationality of migrant processes in Africa. The 2000 census in Zambia showed that Lusaka's growth had also been much reduced – to 3.7 per cent per year in the 1980s and 3.5 per cent during the 1990s compared to national population growth rates for these decades of 2.7 and 2.4 per cent. The growth rate of the urban population of Copperbelt Province in the 1990s was *negative* at –0.09 per cent per year (calculated from data in Republic of Zambia (2003)), confirming further net out-migration from the region's towns which the census report attributes directly to the 'slow-down in economic activity' (Republic of Zambia 2001: 4). Overall, the urban share of the population had dropped to 36 per cent by 2000. As noted earlier, the impact of AIDS will also have affected Zambia's urban demography in the last intercensal period.

Botswana offers a further example of the link between urbanization and economic trends although of a far more positive nature than Uganda and Zambia. Botswana experienced high rates of national population increase and phenomenal growth in several urban centres during the 1960s and 1970s, fuelled by diamond-led economic growth and the fact that its original urban population was small because colonial development had fostered little urban-based development – even its capital was outside its borders at Mafeking in South Africa. Gaborone, as the new capital city, was bound to experience exceptional growth at first, but was still growing at a rate of over 8 per cent in the 1980s. Francistown's growth was revitalized in that decade, having slowed somewhat in the 1970s. The basic economic cause of this general pattern of rapid in-migration is the rural–urban income gap. While this had fallen so dramatically in many other African countries by the 1980s (Jamal and Weeks 1994, Potts 1995), the average cash income of an urban household in Botswana was still three to four times higher than that of a rural household in 1985–86 (CSO 1988 cited in Fair 1990). There was variation in the economic opportunities within the urban hierarchy however. Selibi-Phikwe, as a new mining settlement, was clearly an attractive destination for migrants in the 1970s when it first developed, but its growth (along with that of Lobatse) in the 1980s was slower than the national level, suggesting some element of net out-migration from both in that period. This pattern continued into the 1990s for both centres, although AIDS deaths (and AIDS-induced urban–rural migration) will have been contributing to reduced urban growth rates as well. Both Gaborone's and Francistown's rates had reduced significantly by the 1990s, although they were still higher than the national growth rate (but only just in Francistown's case), which had itself fallen by a third during the 1990s. In Gaborone, a significant element of its additional functional population since the last census was living in surrounding 'villages' by 2001 (Chapter 12) so its real growth, based on its economic attractiveness, was higher than the census recorded.

The next category is of three countries that experienced the typical 1960s urban 'boom', with significant net in-migration to their capital cities. These are Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi. The rates of increase in their capital cities were declining by the end of the 1970s but net in-migration has remained an important component of subsequent growth into the 21st century. Only in Lilongwe was it more important than NI in the 1980s and 1990s.[13] Given that from the 1970s to the 1990s Kenya's national population growth declined from 4 to 3 per cent while Nairobi's remained steady at around 5 per cent, it seems that in this period the share of net in-migration in Nairobi's growth may have somewhat *increased*, although it would still be outweighed by NI as a component of total growth. If this is correct it is notable, as experience elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa would lead one to expect, in a politically stable country like Kenya, that the combination of Nairobi's size (over 2 million by 1999) and the recorded decline in its living standards would have led to a decrease in its growth rates for both statistical and economic reasons.[14] Tanzania's 2002 census showed that Dar es Salaam's annual growth rate had also changed little since the 1980s and was similar to Nairobi's at 4.8 per cent per year through the 1990s. Unlike Kenya, however, Tanzania's national population growth rate has not declined, so the share of in-migration in Dar es Salaam's recent growth has probably remained fairly steady. In Malawi, Lilongwe has now grown to a size similar to that of the old commercial capital of Blantyre, and its growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s remained high,[15] even after the initial 'capital city status' impetus had worn off and massive boundary changes had somewhat inflated its apparent growth (although further boundary changes are known to have affected its, and Muzu's, intercensal growth from 1987 to 1998) (Potts 1986, Malawi Government 1998). It is not clear why Lilongwe has remained so attractive to migrants given the fall in urban living standards wrought by SAPs (Roe and Chilowa 1990). Its boundaries encompass vast areas of arable and unsettled land (because of its peculiar planning history as a 'garden' capital city), so this allows extensive urban agriculture as a way of reducing urban living costs, and this may be part of the answer.

There is variation in the rates experienced by the other main centres in these countries over the decades as shown in Appendix 3.1 but the broad trend is a deceleration in these centres' growth rates too. In Kenya, many of the secondary centres grew more strongly than Nairobi in the 1970s (although boundary changes played a part in this as discussed below) but by the 1980s and 1990s growth rates had generally fallen right back and in some cases were little different from (or even lower than) the national rate of population growth. Kenya's second centre, Mombasa, has not been attractive to migrants. Net in-migration accounted for about a third of its growth in the 1960s and a fifth in the 1990s but it stagnated and lost population in relation to Kenya as a whole in the 1970s and 1980s. In Malawi, Blantyre, still the largest centre, has also seen a decline in its growth rate from over 6 per cent per year to about half that over the past 40 years. Its 3.3 per cent growth rate in the late 1980s and 1990s was almost certainly derived mainly from internal NI, with perhaps 20 per cent or so from net in-migration.[16]

The high rates recorded for the total urban population and certain specific centres in Kenya and Tanzania can be highly misleading and this is not always recognized. This, in turn, can lead to misunderstandings about the relationship between economic growth and urbanization, if the anomalously inflated national, and individual, urbanization rates are compared with economic performance. The problem stems from boundary changes and strange definitional issues. In Kenya the data for the 1970s show inconceivable rates for Machakos and Meru in particular, and significant boundary changes account for some of this sudden increase in the smaller towns in this period (rather than some new economic or planning initiative). A far more anomalous element was introduced in the 1999 census when a large number of new areas (43 in total), usually further down the urban hierarchy than those shown in Appendix 3.1, were suddenly incorporated into the urban population (i.e. centres over 20,000). Several are densely settled regions that may include a number of small towns or even villages, and many rural inhabitants.[17] The intercensal annual urban growth rate recorded by the census of 10.2 per cent, and the 1999 urbanization level of 32 per cent are thus unrelated to real urbanization as either a demographic or an economic process in Kenya (and evidently none of the main centres approached this sort of growth). Unfortunately these figures will undoubtedly be reproduced elsewhere, leading to misleading analyses of Kenya's accelerating urban growth. They are not shown in Table 3.1 and Appendix 3.1 for this reason.

Confounding issues of definitional problems at the lower end of the urban hierarchy and a seemingly impossible rate of total urban growth in the 1980s are also found in Tanzania. Growth from net in-migration in the intermediate centres shown in Appendix 3.1 appears to have been generally higher in the 1980s than in Kenya in that decade (especially considering the differences between the two countries' NI rates). However the 10.7 per cent total urban annual growth rate does not tally with the growth experienced in Dar es Salaam and the other main urban centres. This either implies spectacular growth at the lower end of the urban hierarchy or definitional issues, or both. In fact, many of the enumerated urban sub-districts at the lower end of the hierarchy consisted of rural areas, thus greatly inflating their population (United Republic of Tanzania 1988). An attempt to adjust the data for this factor in a sample of regions indicated an average annual growth rate for small towns of 5000–10,000 people of 6.4 per cent, and for the next level in the hierarchy of 10,000–35,000 people of 7 per cent (Holm 1992). While this suggests that urban growth *was* more vigorous in these smaller centres than larger ones, and villagization under Tanzania's rural development policy of *ujamaa* may plausibly have created a whole tranche of settlements that became definitionally 'urban' through their size alone in this intercensal period, it is still clear that a national urban growth rate of 10 per cent for the 1980s was an exaggeration. The growth rates shown in Appendix 3.1 for the 1990s are far more plausible and it is evident that, with the very notable exception of Arusha, they have tended to decline, some of them very sharply. Half of the main centres experienced rates less than, or equivalent to, the national rate and thus did not contribute to 'urbanization' at all in this decade.

Swaziland's urbanization might be seen as a sub-category of the pattern identified for Tanzania, Kenya and Malawi because until the 1990s its experience was similar: rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s with net in-migration accounting for at least half the urban growth, then in the later 1970s to 1980s some reduction in growth rates even though national NI had increased, and net in-migration falling to about a third or less of urban growth. However, in the 1990s it diverged from the common pattern and seems to have witnessed stagnation in its urbanizing process, although the two main centres both experienced net in-migration.

A third category based on urban growth patterns in recent decades includes Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. As already discussed, their experiences of institutionalized influx controls strongly hindered net in-migration for decades as a component of urban growth. When these broke down, a subsequent backlog of migration increased urban growth rates but the timing of peak growth was different from the rest of the region – brought forward by ten to twenty years. Beyond this basic pattern, however, there are many features distinctive to each country.

In Zimbabwe the change from stagnation and decline in the level of urbanization in the 1960s, due to institutional rather than economic factors, followed by increases in in-migration and higher urban growth rates over the next two decades can be seen in Appendix 3.1. However the extremely rapid urbanization typical of many other countries and, in particular, their capital cities, in the immediate post-independence decade was not experienced in Zimbabwe after its independence in 1980, despite planners' fears and projections.[18] This was surprising as a very sharp upward turn in urban growth was expected once influx controls were removed. Net in-migration was generally not responsible for more than half the urban growth in large and medium-sized centres in the 1980s. Unlike much of Sub-Saharan Africa, the 1980s did see real economic development and small improvements in GDP/head in Zimbabwe, and urban poverty levels fell (Potts 2000). Economically and functionally it makes sense to combine Harare with Chitungwiza (its dormitory suburb planned under racist ideology along the lines of Soweto). The growth of this 'Greater Harare' remained constant during the 1970s and 1980s at about 5.9 per cent. Bulawayo, the next largest city and historically Zimbabwe's industrial town, was one of the slowest growing centres – somewhat to the city's dismay! The savage economic declines experienced since then, combined with the impact of AIDS, led to the expectation that a different national demographic and urban growth pattern would emerge during the 1990s. This was confirmed by the 2002 census. The national population grew at a much reduced average rate of 1.1 per cent from 1992 to 2002 which is not out of line with realistic expectations, given that fertility rates in Zimbabwe had fallen very significantly and the poor political and economic situation encouraged emigration to South Africa and Botswana.[19] In Harare there is increasing evidence of return (urban–rural) migration and of migrants feeling more economically vulnerable (Potts 2000). Greater Harare's growth fell to an average of 1.6 per cent per year in the 1990s. Bulawayo's growth rate fell to only 0.9 per cent and thus the country's second largest centre was de-urbanizing. All the other main centres also registered strong declines in their growth rates, with most growing at less than 2 per cent per year. In the absence of a reasonable estimate for natural increase rates within Zimbabwe in the 1990s, and of the differential impact on individual towns and rural areas of emigration beyond national borders, it is hard to know whether internal migration patterns have been, in net terms, towards or away from the towns. What is certain is that both the national and the urban population trends have reflected the country's dismal economic performance in the 1990s and 2000s.

In Namibia, census data were often regarded with suspicion during the apartheid years as being undercounts. Nevertheless the national data in Appendix 3.1 accord generally with what might be expected in terms of growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s, given fertility and mortality rates. Total recorded urban growth over the 1980s was driven mainly by NI according to these data, and net in-migration played only a small part. This is somewhat surprising for, by the 1980s, influx controls and apartheid restrictions were generally on the wane in Namibia. In Windhoek in-migration appears to have accounted for about a quarter of its growth in the final decade of apartheid. Rates of in-migration would be expected to have increased since then, as independence in 1990 opened up new urban opportunities and removed the last vestiges of any restrictive atmosphere on urban-ward mobility and Namibia has not experienced the stringencies of structural adjustment. Thus the 1990s, for Namibia, represent the first post-independence decade – the equivalent of the 1960s for most of the other countries under consideration, or the 1980s for Zimbabwe. As expected, the 2001 census recorded an increased growth rate for Windhoek, in which net in-migration probably accounted for just under a half. Walvis Bay also registered strong growth, but elsewhere in the urban hierarchy most centres grew slowly, and several grew less fast than the national population.

For South Africa the data shown in Appendix 3.1 are, for the 1980s and 1990s, often for urban agglomerations (marked as 'a') as recorded in the censuses in 1985 (as adjusted for undercount), 1991 and 1996. It is difficult to ascertain the comparability of these agglomerations – the fluctuations in growth between towns in the first half of the 1990s suggest that they are not. Growth rates using more narrowly defined city populations (i.e. not agglomerations) for the two last apartheid censuses yield yet another pattern (although the fluctuations shown in Appendix 3.1 have generally been smoothed out). To further complicate matters the Municipal Demarcation Board subsequently used the 1996 census to demarcate new metropolitan areas and their populations for six 'metros': Cape Town (1996 population: 2.563 million); Durban (1.738 million); Ekurhuleni (East Rand) (1.448 million); Johannesburg (2.638 million); Nelson Mandela Port Elizabeth (0.969 million) and Pretoria (1.144 million).[20] The Witwatersrand as a whole had a population of 4.995 million. Comparing these re-demarcations with the census-defined agglomerations shows that it is going to be more difficult to track urban growth in the future. It is hard to define the national urban population during the apartheid years because, as noted earlier, four, so-called 'independent', homelands were excluded from the census records (but should have been included to allow for meaningful analysis). Their official re-inclusion in the 1996 census gave the impression that the increase in the national urban population since the last apartheid census of 1991 was far higher than it really was. There is also a long-standing debate on how the various 'rural slums' of apartheid should be defined.[21]

The complexities of contemporary South African urbanization cannot be tackled here (a useful analysis can be found in Crankshaw and Parnell 2000) but it is worth making some general points. In comparison to the remarkable lack of Black (i.e. African) urbanization shown in Table 3.3 in the 1960s and 1970s, the transformation in the 1980s to significant net in-migration to South Africa's major towns is clear. Other population groups were already highly urbanized by the 1980s and are much smaller than the African population, so their contribution to in-migration flows can be generally discounted – although transfers between urban centres (for example, Johannesburg to Cape Town) could be important. With NI at less than 2 per cent and, as in Kenya, with imbalanced urban sex ratios, in-migration seems to have played a major, and in many cities, the most important part in urban growth in the latter half of the 1980s (and probably throughout the decade). The census data for that decade confirm what urban studies in South Africa already argued, that the 1980s witnessed a massive 'catch-up' in-migration process to town. How long this continued is hard to say. Another point is that the data on more narrowly defined urban areas show divergent patterns for African townships and informal settlements for 1986–91. Rapid growth was recorded for Kwa Mashu and Umlazi in Durban (5.8 per cent and 7.4 per cent per year); Madadeni in Newcastle (6.5 per cent); and Alexandra in Johannesburg (a high 10.8 per cent). Places like Orange Farm (on the Witwatersrand) and Khayelitsha (Cape Town) appear for the first time as urban settlements in 1991 (Khayelitsha with a massive 190,000 inhabitants). However, Guguletu in Cape Town was recorded as losing population at the rate of –2.6 per cent per year, as was Lekoa (which includes the former Sharpeville) at –0.1 per cent and Nyanga (Crossroads in Cape Town) at –7.6 per cent. These patterns can all be related to specific situations in the death throes of apartheid planning, and to political violence either driving people out of, or into, particular settlements. Shifts from one settlement to another may also play a part – from the long-established and overcrowded formal township of Guguletu to Khayelitsha in Cape Town for example.

A fourth regional category, of countries where urban economies and urban population growth have been severely affected by war and conflict, includes Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda. Where migration is determined primarily by security issues and insecurity undermines economic development, urban growth patterns are city- and time-specific in relation to the nature of the conflict.

In Angola, it is generally accepted that war refugees have swelled Luanda's population.[22] The different estimates for Luanda's population in 2001 shown in Appendix 3.1 offer different suggestions about its growth since 1990 – the range being between 3.8 and 6.5 per cent. A rate of 3.8 per cent is not high for this region, especially in relation to the estimated average national growth rate since 1970 of 2.7 per cent. An alternative estimate of 3.3 million in 1997 derived from a major multidisciplinary project on Luanda and Maputo, on the other hand, suggests an 8–9 per cent average growth rate in the 1990s (Lopes 2003). The war also led to massive influxes into other Angolan cities at various periods. The estimates for Huambo suggested a growth rate of well over 10 per cent per year in the 1970s and 1980s.

War was a key influence on urban growth patterns in Mozambique from the 1970s to 1992. The last census indicated that Maputo's growth from 1980–97 averaged 3.7 per cent per year – with a similar rate for the combined populations of Maputo and its neighbouring urban area of Matola (i.e. Greater Maputo). The recorded national intercensal rate of NI of only 1.7 per cent is sad proof of the terrible impact of the war on Mozambique's population, being much lower than its neighbours experienced (except South Africa, where the cause was lower fertility and thus different from circumstances in Mozambique where fertility remains high). It is probably safe to assume that NI in Maputo was higher than this, since the impact of the war here was less severe than elsewhere in the country, particularly in rural areas. In-migration may have accounted for no more than half of the recorded growth over this period, on average, which is somewhat surprising considering the many contemporary reports of influxes of war-displaced people into the city and suggestions that the city's growth was primarily driven by such movements. However the averaged growth rate almost certainly hides a significant variation in the dynamics over this period. A 1991 estimate of Maputo's population (excluding Matola) of

872,000 (Lopes 2003)[23] indicates a 1980–91 AAGR of 4.5 per cent, followed by much slower growth, equivalent only to the intercensal NI rate of 1.7 per cent to 1997. This suggests that the impact of war-displaced migrants was, as would be expected, confined to the period before peace was established in 1992. It seems likely that, for a few years at least, subsequent net in-migration was slightly negative and that many war refugees returned to rural (or other urban) areas in the 1990s. Contemporary accounts of Maputo remark on its 'boom town' characteristics by the end of the 1990s, so the net in-migration rate probably incorporates quite significant in- and out-migration in this period. Certainly the economic circumstances of the 1980s and early 1990s were no incentive for urban migrants, and strict structural adjustment measures imposed by the IFIs in the 1990s have resulted in the usual round of retrenchments and low urban incomes (Cramer 2001, Chapter 4). How the variables of fertility and mortality played out over the intercensal period in individual towns are simply impossible to assess and, as in Maputo, there will have been massive in- and out-flows. The average growth rates, therefore, must disguise huge variations over time and are hard to analyse in terms of net in-migration versus NI. All that can be said is that, apart from Maputo, there appears to be a remarkable uniformity in the average rate of growth recorded in the main towns in the 1980s and 1990s of around 4–5 per cent (except Inhambane which seems to have suffered a drastic decline). That the total urban growth rate exceeds the rates for the main towns suggests that something is going on at the bottom of the urban hierarchy – but whether this is due to significant movements into small centres or definitional changes is not yet known. It is also clear that in the 1970s the efflux of whites at independence in 1975 led to some towns actually losing population, and some others growing more slowly than the national NI. Maputo, Beira and Inhambane recorded significant net influxes during that decade.

Rwanda's last census in 2002 provides tragic evidence of the impact of the 1994 genocide. The average intercensal population growth rate was only 1.2 per cent from 1991 to 2002, compared to 3.1 per cent during the previous intercensal period. Some provinces registered absolute declines in population. The effect on urbanization has been astonishing – massive surges in growth in nearly all Rwanda's towns have occurred, driven by the initial conflict and maintained since. As can be seen in Appendix 3.1, Kigali's growth averaged 9 per cent per year from 1991 to 2002. Nearly all the other urban centres grew at 8–10 per cent per year, and several at even higher rates. Thus unlike in Mozambique, return migration of people internally displaced by the conflict has not occurred to counterbalance the conflict-induced urban migration.

A fifth category comprises two countries where essentially there are insufficient data for a meaningful analysis but political instability and conflict have been highly influential determinants of demographic patterns at different periods. These are Burundi and the DRC. Kinshasa was one of the biggest cities in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1984 at the time of its last census, and the indications were that it was still growing. Since then, however, so much has befallen the country, which became the site of the First African War, that the main drivers of urbanization (or de-urbanization) will be the local exigencies of security and war-based economics. The sheer levels of urban poverty and lack of urban infrastructure in Kinshasa are remarkable, even by Sub-Saharan African standards, and its formal job sector was so devastated by SAPs in the 1990s (Iyenda 2002) that its economic attraction for migrants will have been severely curtailed.

Finally there is Lesotho, where the peculiarities of its partly externalized urbanization have determined unique urban trends. Until the end of the 1970s, urbanization (in the sense of a growing share of the population living in urban centres) was only occurring in the capital, Maseru. Its two other tiny urban settlements did not grow at all in relative terms. As indicated earlier in this chapter, Lesotho's economic circumstances are highly unusual but this in no way means that urbanization was not an important part of its economy and people's livelihoods – it was just that most urban people's lives were lived in South Africa. The increase in net internal in-migration indicated for the late 1970s and 1980s (for national growth rates declined sharply then due to a significant fall in fertility) was to be expected as the constraints on the 'South Africa option' increased. Nevertheless Maseru's growth reduced sharply in the 1990s and the contribution of net in-migration reduced. This has been attributed to the diversion of rural–urban migration streams within Lesotho in that decade to two small towns, Maputsoe and Hlotse, whose economies were boosted by the huge Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Leduka, 2002).

Conclusions

Analysis of census data for Eastern and Southern African countries broadly confirms the hypotheses detailed in the introduction about how urban growth patterns are likely to have changed over time due to new demographic and economic factors. There have been falls in the rate of urbanization in many countries. As a final note, it is important to recognize that the averaged growth rates of the 1990s, albeit that they tend to be lower than earlier decades, disguise the impact of deaths from AIDS (rather than incidences of HIV alone) because there were relatively far fewer at the beginning of the decade in the worst affected countries, and the epidemic's impact has thus been 'smoothed out'. In Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Lesotho, Zambia and Malawi, the first decade of the 21st century will witness dramatic demographic change. Deaths will disproportionately be of 'urban' people (even if they actually die in rural areas) and natural increase in urban areas will dwindle, possibly to insignificant levels. This will mean that the main component of urbanization, in the demographic sense, will revert to net in-migration in these countries and that population growth in individual cities will thus become more closely linked to urban economic trends.

Notes

1. Although there were always voices of dissent, for example Dumont (1969), Lipton (1977).
2. About a quarter of Zimbabwe's GDP was generated by manufacturing at the end of the 1980s. Structural adjustment was implemented from the end of 1990 and by 1996 manufacturing contributed only 16 per cent to GDP. As a result, the share of agriculture shot up and by the end of the decade analyses could already be found that presumed that this was the norm, that is, that Zimbabwe was a primarily agricultural economy! But it was not always so.
3. An obvious illustration of this is the hypothetical situation in which the level of urbanization has reached 100 per cent. Annual urban growth from then on (excluding international migration) will equal natural increase only.
4. The tendency of UN and World Bank tables to overestimate urbanization levels and growth rates is exemplified by the UNDP's 1993 estimate that Swaziland's urbanization level in 2000 would be 45 per cent, nearly double the level recorded in the 1997 census. As NI had been by far the greatest component of recorded urban growth rates in the mid-1970s to mid-1980s at around three-quarters of urban population increase, it is hard to know on what grounds such an estimate could have been made.
5. In Nairobi there were still 132 men for every 100 women in 1989 (Obuhdo 1997). Mombasa's sex ratio was 121:100 in 1999.
6. The difference between this national NI rate based on birth and death rates in 1977 and Malawi's overall population growth rate from 1977 to 1987 of 3.7 per cent per year is accounted for by the influx of about one million Mozambican refugees during that period.
7. Sex ratios in Kinshasa fell steadily from 139 in 1955 to 117 in 1970 and 104 in 1984.
8. As can be seen from Appendix 3.1, the efflux of whites in Mozambique at independence in 1975 led to varied patterns with some towns actually losing population in the 1970s.
9. See Potts (1995, 1997) for an analysis of evidence and sources on increased out-migration and lower in-migration to certain Sub-Saharan African countries from the 1980s to the mid-1990s.
10. Although in all three countries much looser controls in earlier decades, particularly on women's migration, had already led to the establishment of a relatively permanent family-based African labour force in cities which had their own natural growth impetus.
11. Botswana is also a country with an extremely unequal income distribution so there are still many extremely poor people.
12. Census data for some countries are hard to access or not available for more recent periods.
13. Dar es Salaam's growth rate in the 1980s was half that of the 1970s, and its population was far lower than projected. Accusations of undercount were made but it was common in the 1980s and 1990s for censuses and surveys to show that urban growth was less than expected because of the unrealistic assumptions of

the projections, and for city authorities thus to be surprised. A case for rejecting the census enumerations for individual cities is stronger if there are serious questions about the census more generally. Other cities that have 'surprised' planners have been Maputo, Bulawayo and Durban.

14. Nevertheless, Nairobi's growth has not been anything like as fast as often assumed and projected. Such projections were based on the assumption that the rate of net in-migration would increase – but, as discussed, this would have been unusual. Situma (1988) estimated, for example, that Nairobi's population would be 4 million by 2000 and Obuhdo (1997) projected 3 million.
15. As is so often the case, its growth in the latest intercensal period (1988–98) has been less than planners were projecting – at 6.1 per cent per year rather than the estimated 7–9 per cent cited in Kalipeni (1999).
16. National population growth for the two most recent intercensal periods are unfortunately poor guides to Malawi's domestic rate of NI because they were entirely confounded by massive in-migration to Malawi and then out-migration back to Mozambique of up to a million refugees during the war with Renamo. Reducing the national population in 1987 by one million to account for the refugees gives an NI rate for the domestic Malawian population between 1987 and 1998 of 4.3 per cent. An estimate of half a million refugees yields an NI rate of 2.6 per cent. Fertility rates have fallen little here (and significant increases in mortality rates due to AIDS will have been concentrated in the late 1990s), so an NI rate of 3 per cent for 1977–87 and perhaps 2.6 per cent for 1987–98 are reasonably conservative estimates.
17. The listing of such regions as one urban settlement apparently stems from their having one local government to serve them (Nealis, personal communication, 2001). To give only two examples: Tala/Kangundo in Eastern Province appears as a town council with 180,000 urban residents and Vihiga in Western Province is suddenly listed as a municipality with 110,000 people. Neither figured in any previous census. Several other centres grew to implausibly high numbers in 1999 from tiny settlements, according to the 1989 census.
18. Harare, for example, was erroneously estimated to be growing at an average rate of 8–9 per cent per year in the 1980s.
19. The sharp fall in the growth rate indicated by this census has caused controversy, with the opposition newspaper claiming that millions of people have not been counted and/or have emigrated. While these may be contributing factors, it is probable that the scale of the errors is not nearly as great as claimed, given the underlying demographic trends in Zimbabwe. Compared to Zambia, which maintained a much higher national growth rate of 2.4 per cent on average in the 1990s, Zimbabwe has much lower fertility and higher HIV rates. Zambia also experienced net immigration.
20. A. Mabin, personal communication, 25.9.01.
21. The issue is whether they should be incorporated into urban statistics or regarded as rural or some 'other category' as their densities are [peri-]urban (agriculture contributes little if anything to people's livelihoods) but there is little urban-type employment and few functions either.
22. The vast number of people displaced by war in Angola over the past 40 years helps to put the urban situation into context. It is estimated that from 1998 to early 2001 2.86 million people were displaced and 0.25 million were displaced in the six months prior to April 2001 alone. An estimate of 3.28 million for Luanda

in 1997 presented at the 2003 CEsA conference suggests that Luanda's growth during the 1980s and 1990s was exceptional and war-induced.

23. This estimate is derived from the findings of a major multidisciplinary project on Luanda and Maputo that lasted from 1998 to 2002. It is, therefore, considered to be reasonably reliable.

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Appendix 3.1 Urban and national populations (thousands) and annual average growth rates (AAGR) 1960s – 21st century

Population figures derived from census data unless otherwise stated. Estimates in italics. Census or estimate date and AAGR period shown in superscript. Country figures in same column from same source unless otherwise indicated. NC=no census in that decade.

Country/ Urban centre	**1960s**		**1970s**		**1980s**		**1990s**		**2000s**
	Population ('000s)	**AAGR% 1960S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1970S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1980S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1990S**	**Population ('000s)**
Angola	4,830^{60}	0.84$^{60–70}$	5,250^{70}						12,000^{01}
Luanda	225[a]	7.8	475^{70}	*7.1*$^{70–80}$	*940*^{80}[b]	*7.8*$^{80–90}$	*2,000*^{90}	*3.8–6.5*$^{90–01}$	*3,000–4,000*
Huambo			90	*12.9*$^{70–88}$	*800*^{88}[c]				
Lobito			88						
Botswana	515^{64}	1.8$^{64–71}$	585^{71}	4.8$^{71–81}$	941^{81}	3.5$^{81–91}$	1,327^{91}	2.4$^{91–01}$	1,679^{01}
Total urban	21	8.2	54	10.7	150	6.7	287	2.7	374[d]
Gaborone	4	25.0	18	12.5	60	8.4	134	3.3	186
Francistown	10	11.1	19	4.7	30	7.7	65	2.6	84
Lobatse	8	7.8	13	4.0	19	3.2	26	1.4	30
Selibi-Phikwe		–	5	20.0	30	3.0	40	2.3	50
Burundi	3,210^{65}	1.6	4,028^{79}		NC	2.6$^{79–90}$	5,356^{90}		
Bujumbura							235		
Congo (drc)	12,734^{55}		21,638^{70}		29,671^{84}				
Total urban					9,495				
Kinshasa	*400*^{60}[e]	*10.6*$^{59–67}$[f]	*1,680*^{75}	*4.9*$^{67–76}$	*2,664*	*5.4*$^{76–84}$			
Kenya	10,943^{69}	3.4$^{62–69}$	16,141^{79}	4.0$^{69–79}$	21,444^{89}	3.4$^{79–89}$	28,687^{99}	3.0$^{89–99}$	
Total urban	1,053	6.6	2,300	8.1	3,700	4.9	–	see text	
Nairobi	509	9.7	828	5.0	1,325	4.8	2,143	4.9$^{89–99}$	
Mombasa	247	4.7	341	3.3	462	3.1	665	3.7	
Nakuru	47	3.1	93	7.1	164	5.8	231	3.5	
Eldoret	18	–1.1	51	10.7	112	8.2	197	5.8	
Kisumu	32	4.7	153	16.9	193	2.4	323	5.3	

Appendix 3.1 (Continued)

Country/ Urban centre	1960s		1970s		1980s		1990s		2000s
	Population ('000s)	**AAGR% 1960S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1970S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1980S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1990S**	**Population ('000s)**
Machakos	6	5.5	84	30.0	116	3.3	143	2.1	
Meru	4	4.4	72	33.5	95	2.8	126	2.9	
Nyeri	10	3.5	36	13.7	91	9.8	101	1.0	
Thika	18	4.0	41	8.9	58	3.4	107	6.4	
Lesotho	852[66]	(see 70s)	1,217[76]	3.6[66–76]	1,605[86]	2.6[76–86]	1,880[96]	1.8[86–96]	
Total urban	72		136	6.4	222	4.9	–		
Maseru	28		65	6.6	109	6.9	138	2.4	
Teyateyaneng	7		9	2.5	13	4.5	49	14.2	
Mafeteng	6		8	3.7	12	5.0	21	5.8	
Malawi	4,040[66]	(see 70s)	5,547[77]	2.9[66–77]	7,989[87]	3.7[77–87]	9,934[98]	2.0[87–98]	
Blantyre	109		219	6.3	333	4.2	80	3.3	
Lilongwe	19		99	15.8	223	8.5	435	6.1	
Mzuzu	8		16	5.8	44	10.6	87	6.2	
Zomba	20		24	1.9	43	5.8	64	3.6	
Total urban	193		471	8.4	850	6.1	1,400	4.7	
Mozambique	6,604[60]	2.1[60–70]	8,169[70]	2.7[70–80]	12,130[80]	1.7[80–97]	16,075[97]	see 80s	
Total urban			–	–	1,539	6.6	4,594		
Maputo			355	7.8	537	3.7	989		
Matola			–	–	218	4.2	441		
Beira			114	7.3	231	3.5	413		
Nampula			126	2.1	156	4.2	315		
Chimoio			–	–	74	5.3	178		
Quelimane			72	–1.5	62	5.5	153		

Nacala			–	–	80	4.3	164		
Tete			53	–1.2	47	4.8	105		
Xai-Xai			64	–3.5	45	5.0	103		
Lichinga			37	1.0	41	4.7	89		
Pemba			–	–	43	4.3	88		
Inhambane			27	7.4	55	–0.1	54		
Namibia			746^{70}	$3.0^{70–81}$	$1,031^{81}$	$3.1^{81–91}$	$1,410^{91}$	$2.6^{91–01}$	$1,830^{01}$
Total urban			–	–	268	3.6	383		
Windhoek			62	4.1	96	4.4	147	4.7	234
Walvis Bay							30	6.2	42
Oshakati							22	2.4	28
Rehoboth							21	0.0	21
Rwanda			$3,573^{70}$	$3.8^{70–78}$	$4,832^{78}$	$3.1^{78–91}$	$7,158^{91}$	$1.2^{91–02}$	$8,129^{02}$
Kigali					118^{78}	5.4	238	9.0	603
S. Africa[(g)]	$15,988^{60}$	$3.1^{60–70}$	$21,794^{70}$	$2.8^{70–85}$	$33,121^{85(h)}$	–	–	$1.9^{85–96}$	$40,584^{96}$
Total urban									21,782
Cape Town			1,097		a 1,912	$3.5^{85–91}$	a $2,350^{91}$	$0.55^{91–96}$	a 2,415
Durban			851		a 982	2.5	a 1,137	13.2	a 2,118
Jo'burg			1,433		a 1,609	3.0	a 1,916	–5.0	a 1,481
East Rand			909		a 1,038	12.3	a 2,079	–	–
Pretoria			563		a 823	4.6	a 1,080	0.4	a 1,104
West Rand			428		a 647	5.1	a 870	–	–
Soweto					522	2.3	597	–	a 1,098
Port Elizabeth			475		a 652	4.9	a 853	–2.5	a 750
P'maritzburg					a 192	3.0	a 229	10.5	a 378
Benoni					95	3.1	114	–	a 365
Vereeniging					a 541	6.2	a 774	–14.8	a 347
Bloemfontein			182		a 233	7.0	a 350	–0.9	a 334
Newcastle					a 153	5.7	a 213	0.6	a 220
Welkom					a 320	5.0	a 428	–13.9	a 203

Appendix 3.1 (Continued)

Country/ Urban centre	1960s		1970s		1980s		1990s		2000s
	Population ('000s)	**AAGR% 1960S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1970S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1980S**	**Population ('000s)**	**AAGR% 1990S**	**Population ('000s)**
East London			125		a 194	5.7	a 270	–4.7	a 212
Mdantsane					–	–	–	–	a 183
Botshabelo					96	3.5	118	–	a 178
Swaziland	375^{66}	$2.8^{66–76}$	495^{76}	$3.3^{76–86}$	681^{86}	see 90s	930^{97}	$2.9^{86–97}$	
Total urban	40	9.7	101	4.3	155		214	3.0	
Mbabane	14	5.3	23	5.0	38		58	3.9	
Manzini	16	6.0	29	4.7	a 46		a 79	5.9	
Tanzania	$12{,}313^{67}$	see 70s	$17{,}513^{78}$	$3.3^{67–78}$	$23{,}174^{88}$	$2.8^{78–88}$	NC	$2.9^{88–02}$	$34{,}444^{02}$
Total urban	–		–	11.4	–	10.7		–	7,555
Dar es Salaam	273		757	9.7	$1{,}205^{(i)}$	4.8		4.8	2,336
Mwanza	35		111	11.1	172	4.5		1.4	210
Tanga	61		103	4.9	137	2.9		1.9	179
Mbeya	12		77	17.9	131	5.5v		4.1	230
Morogoro	25		62	8.5	118	6.6		4.1	207
Arusha	32		55	5.0	103	6.4		7.1	270
Moshi	27		52	6.2	97	6.3		2.9	144
Tabora	21		67	11.2	93	3.2		2.3	128
Dodoma	24		46	6.2	83	6.2		4.3	149
Iringa	22		57	9.2	85	4.0		1.2	100
Kigoma	21		50	8.0	74	4.0		4.1	130
Uganda	$9{,}535^{69}$	NC	NC	$2.8^{69–80}$	$12{,}636^{80}$	$2.5^{80–91}$	$16{,}672^{91}$	3.4	$24{,}749^{02}$
Total urban	747			3.6	1,100	5.0	1,890		
Kampala	330			3.0	459	4.4	774	3.9	1,209

Gulu					14	9.5	38	9.7	113
Lira					9	10.9	28	10.5	90
Jinja	48			–0.6	45	3.4	65	2.4	87
Mbale	24			1.6	28	6.1	54	2.3	70
Mbarara					23	7.5	41	4.5	69
Masaka	13			7.6	29	5.0	50	1.8	61
Entebbe	21			0.0	21	6.6	43	2.6	58
Zambia	$3,490^{63}$	$2.5^{63–69}$	$4,057^{69(j)}$	$3.1^{69–80}$	$5,662^{80}$	$2.7^{80–90}$	$7,383^{90}$	$2.4^{90–00}$	9,337
Total urban	715	8.9	1,192	5.8	2,259	2.5	2,905	1.4	3,347
Lusaka	121	13.8	262	6.5	536	6.1	982	3.5	1,085
Ndola	93	9.5	160	4.0	251	4.0	376	1.3	375
Kitwe	123	8.4	200	2.6	266	2.4	338	2.3	364
Chingola	60	9.6	103	2.1	131	2.5	168	0.3	147
Kabwe	46	6.3	66	6.6	136	2.0	167	1.4	177
Mufulira	81	5.0	108	2.1	135	1.2	153	–0.1	122
Luanshya	75	4.2	96	1.3	111	2.8	146	–0.2	116
Zimbabwe	$3,857^{62}$	$4.1^{62–69}$	$5,099^{69}$	$3.1^{69–82}$	$7,546^{82}$	$3.3^{82–92}$	$10,412^{92}$	$1.1^{92–02}$	$11,635^{02}$
Total urban	802	3.1	990	5.4	1,962	5.0	3,188		$3,870^{(k)}$
Harare	310	2.3	364	4.6	656	6.2	1,189	2.0	1,445
Bulawayo	210	1.7	236	4.4	414	4.1	621	0.9	677
Chitungwiza	0	–	15	20.7	173	4.7	275	1.6	322
Gweru	38	2.6	46	4.2	79	4.7	128	1.0	141
Mutare	43	–0.2	42	4.0	70	6.5	131	2.6	170
KweKwe	21	6.0	31	3.3	48	4.6	75	2.2	93
Kadoma	19	3.8	25	4.6	45	4.1	68	1.1	76

Appendix 3.1 (Continued)

Country/ Urban centre	1960s		1970s		1980s		1990s		2000s
	Population ('000s)	AAGR% 1960S	Population ('000s)	AAGR% 1970S	Population ('000s)	AAGR% 1980S	Population ('000s)	AAGR% 1990S	Population ('000s)
Hwange	20	–0.1	20	5.2	39	0.8	42	–1.8	35
Masvingo	10	1.3	11	7.9	31	5.3	52	3.0	70
Chinhoyi	8	7.9	13	4.7	24	6.0	43	1.5	50
Marondera	7	6.5	11	4.9	20	7.2	40	2.9	52

Notes:

(a) L.L. Johnson, *Luanda, Angola: The Development of Internal Forms and Functional Patterns* (PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970).

(b) This estimate and those for 1990s and 2001 given at 'Rebuilding civil society in Angola', Royal Commonwealth Society meeting at Chatham House, 24.5.01.

(c) Estimate from *Africa Confidential*, 16, 22.4.87, special issue on Angola.

(d) Figures for total urban population excludes all large 'urbanizing' rural settlements (see footnote to table 1 for further explanation). Inclusion of these yields very different rates eg. an urban population of 606,000 in 1991 and an annual urban growth rate 1981–91 of 18%.

(e) Estimate from J.-L. Piermay, 'Kinshasa: a reprieved mega-city?', in C. Rakodi (ed.), *The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997, p. 227.

(f) All AAGRs for Kinshasa are estimates taken from Piermay (ibid).

(g) Data for most urban settlements from the 1980s on are for urban agglomerations (depicted by 'a') and are taken from T. Brinkhoff (2002) *City Population*, South Africa (www.citypopulation.de).

(h) National population for 1985 includes the four homelands normally excluded from apartheid South Africa's census statistics after the date of their so-called 'independence' and has been adjusted for a significant undercount. *Source*: J. van Zyl, *Adjustment of the 1985 Census Population of RSA by District* (Research Report no. 149, Pretoria, University of SA, Bureau of Market Research, 1988).

(i) The urban populations for 1988 for Tanzania are derived from the urban district data in the final 1988 regional census tables. These are broken down into 'urban' and 'rural' populations and the rural populations have been excluded from the urban figures provided here.

(j) 1969 census data have been used as a surrogate for 1970.

(k) Total urban figure for 2002 for town and city councils only.

Part II

City Economies in the Making

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4

Image of the City in Mozambique: Civilization, Parasite, Engine of Growth or Place of Opportunity?

Paul Jenkins

This chapter investigates socio-cultural concepts of place identity in Maputo, the capital city of Mozambique.[1] Place identity is a predominantly socio-cultural perception and definition of space, forming an important element of one's individual or collective social identity. As people's territorial identities increasingly shift under the influence of more fluid socio-cultural urban settings, the evaluation of concepts of place identity attains new significance. Socio-cultural values and one's sense of identity underpin economic and political action, including city planning.

In the urban context, city images are increasingly being deliberately constructed, with greater or lesser degrees of participation, to compete in new global and regional economic arenas. While fundamental changes in the inter-relationships between place and territorial identity are only recently being confronted in the North, these have been components of development policy in the rapidly urbanizing world of the South for some time, although often not explicitly identified as a topic of research.

The socio-cultural image of the city in relation to the city's changing political economy is the focus of this chapter.[2] The 'image' of the city refers here to the prevalent attitude to urban life informing perceptions and values and hence policies and practice. The chapter's first section is divided into three sub-sections tracing the changing image of the city associated with different political economic regimes and development discourses that have been highly instrumental in shaping urban policies. The following section reviews local people's attitudes to the city, before turning to current urban development discourses and the relevance of socio-cultural concepts for understanding the broader physical, economic and political dimensions of urban life.

Changing images of the city in Mozambique

The fascist colonial period – the city as 'civilization'

Signs of early human habitation in the area that is now Maputo date from the 1st century AD, with permanent rural settlements clearly established from the 9th century. At this time, the social structure was predominantly composed of small chiefdoms with considerable fission and assimilation of in-migrants, which nevertheless formed the basis for a common culture and language (XiRonga). Early contacts with Europeans – initially the Portuguese and later with the Dutch, English and French – were solely for ship provisioning and trading. It was only at the end of the 17th century that any European settlements were established and another hundred years before these were consolidated. The scale of the settlement at Maputo (then a village called Lourenço Marques) was still small, although by this period intermarriage with the indigenous inhabitants of the region was taking place.

During the 19th century, a small trade-based settlement developed slowly under Portuguese control, albeit with many different nationalities present and changing relations with the surrounding rural indigenous communities. It was particularly affected by the so-called 'Mfecane', an upheaval that occurred in the 1820s with the formation of strong militaristic Nguni states (Zulu, Swazi and Gaza), and a series of wars and the displacement of the population. In the process, major changes in the political structure of the indigenous states in southeast Africa took place.

The European population in 1858 accounted for less than 10 per cent of the total 888 inhabitants, with indigenous Africans making up some 85 per cent, about half of them being slaves. During the second half of the 19th century the dominant economic base began to shift from trade to providing transport services to the fast developing hinterland, with the establishment of the Boer states in what was to become South Africa. This significantly accelerated physical development and led to an attempt by the Portuguese to consolidate the physical urban form. State land control was initiated, albeit with considerable problems as the existing land allocation system was complex, often involving intermarriage between local dynasties. The discovery of gold in the Boer states in 1886 transformed the entire sub-region. Negotiations over national boundaries between the Portuguese 'territory' and the Boer powers, the development of the railway to the Transvaal and new docks, the elevation of its status to a town, and a growing influx of migrants to the town and the goldfields beyond profoundly affected Lourenço Marques.

The town began to emerge as a modern urban space in the latter part of the 19th century. The Portuguese metropolitan public works department had arrived in 1876 to lay out a new town extension, bridging the swamp between the previously occupied small sandbank and the surrounding higher land, as well as initiating the construction of a series of civic buildings. This involved establishing the land register over a much wider area – a 2-kilometre radius from the central area of the older settlement – although it took 10 years for land previously occupied to be incorporated due to legal disputes (Figure 4.1). By 1896 the population was some 4000, with roughly equal numbers of Europeans, Asians and Africans.

The extensive border negotiations with the neighbouring European-defined states of the region, and Portuguese political and military domination of the indigenous states within Mozambique, can be seen as a process of nation-state building or the Europeanization of the concept of territory. An integral part of this Europeanization was encouraging immigration from Portugal, both to counterbalance the presence of other European nationals and to create the necessary administrative apparatus. Portugal's African territories were regarded as integral parts of Portugal rather than as separate colonial nation-states. However, compared to other European colonial powers, Portugal was politically and economically weak, which hindered the process of nation building, and it had to contract out large sections of the fledgling territory to foreign commercial concerns. It took roughly 50 years for the Portuguese state to assume territorial control over all the identified territory (Vail and White 1980, Newitt 1994).

The creation of territorial identity was evidenced locally in Lourenço Marques by increased annexation of land from the indigenous inhabitants and the extension of control over the urban area and its hinterland through, for example, the subordination of traditional chiefs with certain limited powers, and the establishment of a hut tax. Within the newly defined urban limits, the creation of a land cadastre (1895) and the local authority's



Figure 4.1 Urban plan 1897
Source: Author's personal archive, copy of plan in City Council archive, Maputo.

attempts to gain control over land use were costly and fraught with difficulties. There was limited interest in urban investment by the local Portuguese settler community and it was mainly foreigners who seized the opportunities to speculate in urban land. At a socio-cultural level, an integral aspect of state 'capture' of urban territorial control (and an attempt to use this to boost Portuguese economic influence) was the social and economic exclusion of indigenous Mozambicans (*indigenos*) whose legal status prevented them from purchasing land.[3] This was based on attitudes to the African labour force that regarded the local population as essentially cheap labour in rural areas or as temporary urban migrants. The status of *assimilado* (the assimilated) was created in the second decade of the 20th century (Penvenne 1995). *Assimilados* had land rights but relatively few attained this class, and they were anyway often economically excluded or opted for other residential solutions. Thus, despite a growing number of the city's inhabitants being of local African origin, their residential options were limited to the precarious rental of land or housing with virtually no tenure rights or residential rights related to employment, again with virtually no security. For many of Lourenço Marques' previously powerful, long-term urban residents, including indigenous African clan dynasties and early foreign settlers who, in a number of cases, had intermarried and were of mixed racial descent, these processes of economic and legal exclusion reduced their previous political influence and well-established socio-economic status.

The outcome was that, by 1965, 71 per cent of the recently extended urban area was under the ownership of a mere 11 landowners. Many of these were non-Portuguese who mostly had large landholdings in the north of the city. There were also numerous Portuguese-owned smallholdings in the northwest covering 26 per cent of the urban area (Rita-Ferreira 1967/68) (Figure 4.2).

From the late 1920s the main focus of the colonial state had been territorial control[4] and the boosting of Portuguese interests in Mozambique. Attitudes to urbanism were transferred from Portugal where the process of urbanization was relatively slow, and physical control of urban land use was limited. As a consequence, unlike neighbouring states where urban physical controls were well established, Mozambique was unprepared for the rapid urban growth it started experiencing from the 1950s onwards in terms of its institutional capacity to regulate the city's physical expansion. By default, its response was necessarily *laissez faire*. Given the highly dualist socio-economic structure between European settlers and the indigenous inhabitants, with a limited intermediate class, the physical result was a gracious Southern European-style planned inner 'cement city' surrounded by the *caniço* (referring to the reeds from which many of the buildings were constructed) – a chaotic mix of extensive informal settlements interspersed with some fledgling industrial and market-garden activity.

The political economic regime, discriminatory policies and physical urban development reflected a long-established Portuguese attitude to



Figure 4.2 Urban cadastre plan in the 1960s (part)
Source: Author's personal archive, copy of plan in City Council archive, Maputo.

urbanism as representing 'civilization' when juxtaposed with the largely agrarian character of the country and its population. This became more marked as Portugal repeatedly attempted to create a modern agricultural economy in Mozambique through assisted immigration, particularly to the south, a policy allied to agricultural reform and modernization in Portugal. However, the policy failed as many immigrants, who were often literally barefoot peasants from Portugal, left their agricultural settlement schemes and moved to the rapidly growing urban areas that they perceived as far more desirable. Once there, they capitalized on their protected legal status relative to the indigenous population and became small-scale speculators in land, housing and trade in the fast expanding peri-urban areas.

The colonial authorities' attitude to urbanism was revealed in the 1952 urban plan for the city – the first comprehensive plan since the initial 1876 urban land layout. It emphasized the political-administrative elements of the urban area, with an oversized copy of Lisbon's downtown seafront and an ambitious projected northern residential and commercial extension (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Significantly, the plan largely ignored the areas labelled as 'indigenous reserves' – the densely settled informal housing areas to the northwest of the centre, occupied mainly by the indigenous population but mostly owned by Portuguese smallholders. It also overlooked potential industrial development.

Figure 4.3 Urban plan 1952: Sketch of proposed new city centre
Source: Camara Municipal de Lourenço Marques (1955).

Figure 4.4 Urban plan 1952: Proposed land use
Source: Camara municipal de Lourenço Marques (1955).

Other than the construction of two state buildings, virtually the only lasting effect of the 1952 plan was the land speculation it fuelled in the projected northern extension. This took two forms: the refusal to sell by the main foreign-based landowner and the illegal development of a small area near the proposed centre, now called 'Bairro Triunfo'. Essentially the plan was doomed from the start given the existing legal lacunae and weak capacity for regulating the city's physical development. However, it remains an interesting historical document providing insight into the dominant elite's attitude to urbanism.

Political change in Portugal in the late 1960s sparked attempts to modernize the economy, including its overseas territories. After decades of resistance to foreign investment, these territories were opened up. The resulting investment, following years of pent-up pressure and fanned by fast economic growth in neighbouring South Africa, generated completely new physical developments in Mozambique. While some took place in rural settings, many were in urban areas, particularly Lourenço Marques and Beira. However, in the absence of a coherent urban policy and strong local authorities, urban economic development was experienced primarily outside the designated area of Lourenço Marques in areas to the north and in the newly defined urban jurisdiction of Matola which incorporated the town of Machava (Figure 4.5).

There were a number of large-scale industrial investments at this time including a new automated port for minerals, a cement factory, oil refinery and some medium-scale manufacturing industries for assembling imported equipment for local use (e.g. buses) or for the basic processing of agricultural produce. These gave rise to new large-scale residential areas and associated commercial and infrastructural development. Despite the weakness of Matola's local authority, the urban development strategy was comparatively far-sighted with site and service residential areas, with provision for a basic level of infrastructure, planned for the new urban workforce for the first time. These changes were in line with improvements in the indigenous population's legal rights to urban residence in the early 1960s.

This changing attitude to the city as an industrial base, as evidenced in Matola, gained ground only slowly and too late in Lourenço Marques where a new Master Plan, produced in the early 1970s, again predominantly reflected metropolitan interests and planning skills. It largely ignored the rapidly expanding *caniço* areas and underestimated the industrial economic base, which now encompassed tyre, paper and textile factories and more agricultural processing plants. Instead, it focused on the need for regulatory controls in the urban core – the 'cement city' – with aesthetic concern for the vertical expansion of high-rise buildings underway due to space constraints.[5]

The urban areas grew rapidly during the 1960s. Lourenço Marques' average annual growth rate in that decade was 8.4 per cent, as the city's population increased from 171,000 to 383,000 (Jenkins 1999a). However, by the 1970s political unrest in Portugal related to the economic and social



Figure 4.5 Territorial definition of the urban areas
Source: Drawn by author.

costs of maintaining its overseas territories in the face of independence struggles led to the freezing of economic investments. In Mozambique, the Frelimo liberation movement was waging an increasingly successful guerrilla war to gain national independence and there was a growing exodus of settlers and members of the (previously) 'assimilated' class. The urban plan was, once again, doomed from the start. Embryonic changes of attitude towards urbanism and urban planning as well as opportunities for African investment in formal housing were nipped in the bud.

In summary, the century between the 1870s and the 1970s was characterized by nation building through the colonial creation of territorial identity, hampered by economic and administrative weakness. The political economic regime that emerged was dominated by Portuguese metropolitan interests, although these were challenged by, and had to negotiate with, white colonial settler groups and economically stronger neighbouring states. The result was a fascist settler state with strong elements of corporatism. The state attempted to promote a modernized agricultural economy in the southern hinterland, in which urban areas were to act mainly as service and administrative centres. However, this plan was foiled as foreign investors and metropolitan immigrants opted for primary urban locations. Basic factors of economic geography, such as the location of employment opportunities and infrastructure, were key determinants in these decisions. Underpinning these patterns were regional transport factors. Lourenço Marques had a key geographical advantage in being the nearest port for the Rand – thus economic forces external to local colonial imperatives were long-standing influences on the nature of its development (see, for example, Henshaw 1998). Formal colonial attitudes to the city as representing the seat of civilization were, therefore, strongly divorced from the actual physical and economic basis for urban development, resulting in an increasingly dualistic socio-economic structure physically represented by the 'cement city' in contrast to the *caniço*, as well as in the location of major urban economic investments outside the city limits.

The city as 'parasite' under proto-socialism

When Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1980 after a long and bitter armed struggle, its leaders chose a proto-socialist path of development (Hanlon 1984, Saul 1985, Munslow 1986, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). One of the initial acts of the new government was to nationalize land and rented accommodation. Maputo, as Lourenço Marques was now renamed, lost 150,000–200,000 residents at independence (Instituto Nacional de Planeamento Físico/Conselho Executivo da Cidade de Maputo [INPF/CECM] 1985), chiefly white Portuguese plus significant numbers of other settler groups and *assimilados*, who emigrated mainly to Portugal and South Africa. Their abandoned housing was nationalized. The stated aim of the newly independent government was to return cities to the Mozambican workers who had built them and to end land speculation.

The socialist vision of the new political elite was, however, predominantly focused on the rural areas. The armed struggle had mostly been fought in these areas and the procedures of territorial administration formed in the liberated areas were seen as structures to be repeated as the basis for a new national order and territorial identity. Furthermore, many of the major investments of the previous colonial state had been in rural areas and the objective was to take these over. The key to fast-track socialist development was seen to be the reorganization of the agricultural sector through the creation of state farms where large-scale plantations and other agricultural ventures had existed, and the development of cooperative forms of agriculture elsewhere.

It was believed that state appropriation of value arising from agricultural surpluses could be used to kick-start indigenous national industrialization. In the meantime, the state mobilized the urban workforce to take over the many enterprises abandoned and sabotaged by the former foreign and assimilated management and their skilled workforce. It also mobilized urban residents into *Grupos Dinamizadores* in order to avoid further acts of economic sabotage and to inculcate new political and social values (Grest 1995, Jenkins 2001a). The clearest statement of the proto-socialist development pathway was the 10-year development plan published in 1980. Its urban development goals were oriented to providing housing for the new cadres in the planned macro-scale agro-industrial and mining projects, plus limited resource allocation to an expanding government administrative class, but virtually nothing was funnelled to the wider rural and urban population.

The tendency to look on urban areas as parasitic was expressed in many ways during this period, with explicit references in major political speeches and more implicit inference in other forms of political and social propaganda. This attitude was realized *de facto* by the central state's stringency in supplying resources to urban-based institutions and projects. For example, building materials, such as cement, were rationed. On the other hand, the government instituted an urban food-rationing system in 1982 guaranteeing the *registered* urban population in the main centres subsidized basic food supplies (O'Laughlin 1996). This was at a time when the availability of essential goods in rural areas was extremely inadequate following the exodus of Portuguese and South Asian traders who had manned the rural commodity distribution network.

Any ambivalence in the state's attitude to urban areas was, however, removed by the initiation of the strongly anti-urban Operation Production in 1985 that aimed to remove all 'parasitic' urban dwellers to underdeveloped rural areas to become 'productive'. Any urban dweller unable to display a resident's card plus a worker's (or student) card and an identity card was likely to be picked up in the street and taken to a nearby clearing centre where, if they were not identified as having the right to these three formal forms of identity, they were airlifted to Niassa Province in the far north of the country. On arrival there, virtually no facilities were made available to them locally. They were expected to till virgin land with a few tools and with nothing to eat in the meantime. As many as 50,000 people were relocated from Maputo (INPF/CECM 1985) and it is believed that many perished. The social, political and economic costs, including the virtual bankruptcy of the national airline, were immense. Although this operation was later criticized publicly by the political elite, the attitude towards urban areas as being parasitic was not significantly revised.

There were, however, some attempts to address the dualistic social and physical infrastructure of the urban areas. State-financed communal water-supply networks, schools, health facilities and new residential areas were planned and some of the existing informal areas were upgraded but the resources made available by the central government for these programmes were minimal. Despite some successes, the impact of these measures was small in relation to need. The political discourse on housing was dominated by the large-scale projects being undertaken primarily in the rural areas, with even more emphasis on the gains the revolution had brought by the nationalization of rented and abandoned housing. Yet this was a minor part of the existing housing stock if all habitable dwellings, as opposed to formally registered dwellings, were taken into account. State provision of housing and land, including state rented accommodation, accounted for less than 10 per cent of all new housing by the mid-1980s (Jenkins 1986, 1987).

Despite the state's emphasis on rural development, in-migration to urban areas rose in the years following independence. Socio-economic surveys in the Maxaquene area, for example, where there was an urban upgrading project between 1976 and 1999, showed a marked population increase in this period and this was mirrored in other surveys in different areas carried out by the author in the 1980s. The increase seemed initially to be due to African family reunions as rural household members joined family members who were already established in town. Later, the inflow was a response to the growing difficulties of living and producing in rural areas as the state concentrated on big projects and neglected smallholder agriculture and the much-needed reactivation of the local trading networks. This post-independence urban influx was also stimulated in some parts of Mozambique by the support from the (then) Rhodesian government for rebel forces that attacked urban areas in the centre of the country in the late 1970s. The struggle for independence itself had had relatively little impact on the south of the country, including Maputo.

On becoming Maputo, the capital city had its boundaries greatly expanded to incorporate Matola and Machava and a larger rural hinterland to the north (Figure 4.6) and by 1980 the population of this greater urban area was 755,000. The 1970–1980 annual growth rate of about 7 per cent involved a number of factors: the administrative inclusion of new areas, the natural increase of the existing population and in-migration. The latter must have more than compensated for the significant exodus of settler groups in 1975.



Figure 4.6 Territorial definition of the urban area after independence (until 1987)
Source: Drawn by author.

The local authority had limited capacity to provide land or housing for this rapidly growing urban population. From 1981 to 1985, the city council implemented a land allocation programme that delivered some 10,400 new residential plots but, despite being the largest and most successful housing programme ever, it was quite inadequate in relation to demand. An official planning survey of Maputo and a private engineering firm estimated the 1985 city population at 1,035,000–1,112,000, implying that some 60,000–75,000 new households had been added in the 5 years since the 1980 census (INPF/CECM 1985).

Migration to Maputo was driven by the pull factors of relatively better access to urban social and physical infrastructure and the subsidized ration system, and pushed by the lack of resources for family agriculture, the disastrous management of collective enterprises and the collapse of the trading network. It was further exacerbated in early 1984 by the devastating effect of the exceptionally strong Domoine cyclone that wreaked havoc in Maputo and the surrounding regions, and by a series of extreme seasonal droughts. On top of this, in the late 1980s, in-migration was accentuated by Mozambique's political destabilization, which was then being instigated by South Africa, as the rebel Renamo forces it supported pushed southwards. This process led to the depopulation of many rural areas and small settlements in the hinterland, and a marked influx of *deslocados* (displaced people) to the urban areas, mainly it is believed to Maputo, although there are no clear statistics to verify this.

This trend for 'distressed' rural out-migration coincided with negotiations with the international financial institutions on structural adjustment, and consequent restrictions on state activity. The already minimal state ability to control urban development and allocate urban land was reduced still further. Food subsidies were cut, the national currency rapidly devalued, prices spiralled and there was the (illegal) commodification of previously allocated benefits, such as food, health, education and land.

In this context, informal urban development regained the ascendancy it had had in previous periods, without any regulatory control. The result was the occupation by impoverished urban residents of ever more marginal and unsuitable areas, including the coastal escarpment, causing rapid soil destabilization that fuelled the disastrous effects of the recent floods in the urban area.

The period from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s was thus characterized by widespread societal disengagement from the state amidst an elite dominance of power. Despite the 'benevolent dictatorship' discourse of the proto-socialist vanguard, the realities of operating in an adverse regional and global context, exacerbated by inherited weaknesses in administrative capacities and disregard for the economic potential and infrastructural needs of the majority, led to economic collapse. The proto-socialist state had to capitulate to international pressure for a market economy and an altered form of state governance. In any case, the limited engagement of the broader urban population with the state during the fascist colonial period continued throughout the proto-socialist period. The main change was that an influential indigenous political group emerged which was no longer dominated by European metropolitan interests or local corporate interests, but its response to the needs of the urban majority was seriously constrained by an over-reliance on past socialist models and lack of capacity.

Physically, the city's inherited dualist urban structure was accentuated by attempts by parts of the state to provide better infrastructure and land access. These efforts were overwhelmed by rapid urban growth and then totally undermined by macro-economic changes. The proto-socialist elite generally viewed urban areas as parasitic and urban development as basically consumption rather than production, although the new elite was not averse to consuming urban benefits themselves. The political and legal substructure necessary to underpin regulation and investment in urban development moved even further off the agenda with adverse consequences for the economic resource base.

Paradoxically, it seems Maputo experienced its most rapid period of population growth during this time, although it was probably not as rapid as many contemporary estimates suggested as natural increase, resulting in new household formation and relocation within the city area, possibly played a greater role than assumed. In addition, the end of the war and the undermining of the economic base had also led to some urban exodus by the time the next census was undertaken.

Territorial identity had been a major issue for the colonial state but it was perhaps initially less so for the proto-socialist state. It has emerged more strongly again after the reduction in political and economic power *vis-à-vis* the international community in the late 1980s under structural adjustment. The attitude towards urbanism in the dominant discourse under proto-socialism, however, altered radically from the city representing *civilization*, with attempts to limit rights of access, to the city representing *parasitism*, with continuing attempts to control rights of access to urban social and economic resources. Although the political economic regime altered dramatically, the effect on the broader urban population was very limited.

The city as an 'engine of development' in a free-market democracy

The past decade in Mozambique could be labelled a 'democratic free-market period' in as tentative a way as the previous period was labelled 'socialist'. The penetration of capitalism and democracy is still limited. The political and economic collapse of the proto-socialist regime led to the formal adoption of democratic and capitalist ideals within the new 1990 Constitution. Yet this ideological shift has not led to significant personnel changes in the political elite. Frelimo has managed to hold on to national power as the ruling party, despite heavy political disaffection and regionally-based support for Renamo. Many of the old Frelimo cadres retain political roles. There is now, however, a national opposition, dominated by Renamo, arguably a party supported more as a reactive vote against Frelimo than for its policies which are often unclear.

At the local level there has been a theoretical sea change in political opportunity, with the creation of the first ever democratically elected local authorities autonomous from central state control. However, Frelimo has carefully managed the decentralization process and still holds power in most of the 'autonomous' municipalities, despite opposition which, in Maputo, includes disaffected members of the Frelimo party itself. There are major questions about the efficacy of current representative democracy, no more so than at the local level where only 15 per cent of the electorate voted in the 1998 local elections and even less (10 per cent) in Maputo.

Although the creation of a working democratic political process in Mozambique will doubtless take considerable time to evolve, the advance of 'free-market' capitalism has been much more rapid. The effects of structural adjustment have been catastrophic for the formal economic sector in the transition period with heavy redundancies in formal enterprises and a lack of new jobs. In 1997 the size of the work force (those 15 years and older) in Maputo was estimated at approximately 480,000 and about 450,000 of these indicated some form of economic activity. Only 145,500 (32 per cent of the total number employed) were active in the formal sector, with the largest single employer still being the Port and Rail Authority with 14,000 employees. The economic restructuring and privatization programme has entailed relatively large-scale redundancies – some 5000 jobs in the Port and Rail Authority, between 3000 and 5000 jobs in the cashew-nut processing sector and between 10,000 and 20,000 jobs in smaller firms – amounting to more than 20 per cent of all formal sector employment.

The net outcome has been increased dualism within the urban economy. The formal sector has restructured, becoming more oriented to attracting foreign investment and providing exports and services that generate a limited number of skilled jobs. There is, however, a fast-expanding and constantly restructuring informal sector that is absorbing the active labour force as best it can. Informal sector activities are concentrated in street vending, local services provisioning and, to a much lesser degree, small-scale productive activities. The sectoral breakdown in Table 4.1 of employment in Maputo and Matola in 1997 shows the dominance of 'commerce and finance' which includes informal trading. It is estimated that the informal sector provides employment for about 225,000 people (50 per cent of the active workforce), including an estimated 30,000 in domestic service. A further 80,000 in Maputo's active workforce are involved mostly in family-based agriculture and fishing. An estimated 80 per cent of all activities and 66 per cent of informal employment are considered marginal (Metropolitan Maputo Structure Plan cited in Jenkins 2000b).

Much of the 'free market' activity is constrained by a lack of capital (with investment concentrated in fast-turnaround activities), infrastructural and

Table 4.1 Total formal and informal employment in metropolitan Maputo, 1997

	Maputo (%)	Matola (%)	Total (%)
Commerce & finance sector	39	31	35
Services & administration	15	10	13
Agriculture & fishing	10	25	18
Industry & manufacturing	10	12	10
Transport & communications	8	7	7
Construction	6	10	7
Other	12	5	10

Source: Metropolitan Maputo Structure Plan data quoted in Jenkins 2000b.

institutional capacity constraints in the contracting formal sector, and a lack of purchasing power. The informal sector basically moves a limited amount of money round with little value added. This is a form of capitalism highly subordinated to the macroeconomic constraints the country faces. Banking and donor circles argue that this is a restructuring phase and that Mozambique is on the brink of major direct foreign investment – a line of argument heavily predicated on economic development in neighbouring South Africa. Hence most major new investment in the country and in Maputo has fitted a regional framework and objective (Jenkins 2000b).

The effect of the new political economic regime on the urban areas appears to be a return to the situation in the years immediately preceding independence, with regional economic objectives being negotiated between ruling elites. The difference is that now the indigenous Mozambican political elite negotiates directly with the new African-dominated elite in South Africa in a period of increasing globalization. The regional economic context has significantly altered from when the Portuguese corporatist fascist colonial state negotiated with the South African white apartheid elite in a *tête-à-tête* cut-off from the wider global economy.

The net effect is likely to be that Mozambique returns to being a net exporter of labour and energy at a regional level, and of various other commodities to the world market (Jenkins and Wilkinson 2002). The country is gaining some basic industrial processing, for example the new MOZAL aluminium smelter on the outskirts of Maputo, and a proposed new iron and steel mill nearby. These developments are based on the city's economic geography, its position on sea routes accessible to South East Asian markets, its cheap source of hydro-electricity from the Cabora Bassa dam and gas deposits at Inhambane.

The US$1.36 billion MOZAL investment in Mozambique is truly global. The bauxite will partly come from Australia and the Australian mining multi-national BHP Billiton, the majority owner and the western world's third largest aluminium producer. Other than Billiton's 47 per cent share, the investors include the Mitsubishi Corporation (25 per cent), the South African Industrial Development Corporation (24 per cent) and the Mozambique government (4 per cent), and capitalization has relied on substantial investment from international agencies such as Caisse Francaise de Developpement and the International Finance Corporation.

The local benefits of MOZAL, however, appear to be limited and the environmental costs are immense. Water consumption will be some 564,000 tons per year rivalling that of Matola city. Waste water from the cooling process will have a major impact on the Matola river and its estuary. The smelter is planned to operate on a non-stop basis, 365 days a year, with high noise levels and heavy traffic between it and the port where bauxite ore is imported and aluminium ingots are exported. MOZAL was expected to create 7000 jobs in the construction phase but employment once it became operational only approximated 10 per cent of that, of which one-third are foreign experts commanding two-thirds of the total salary bill. In terms of tax, the smelter is located in a specially created industrial enterprise zone west of, and just outside, Matola city, and will pay tax at a rate of only 1 per cent of turnover as well as being exempt from customs duties, and sales and circulation tax. In addition, staff will get a 40 per cent income tax reduction.

Mozambique is likely to develop again as a site for regional tourism but is unlikely to break into the competitive international tourism market in any major way due to its infrastructural deficiencies. Despite continued attempts to develop southern Mozambique's agricultural potential, it may well, in fact, be its water resources that are a future source of revenue and investment. Gauteng, South Africa's economic heartland known formerly as the Witwatersrand, faces water shortages for its industries and mines. It is already tapping the Lesotho highlands water catchment area and there have been a series of proposals to tap into the upstream sections of major rivers, such as the Limpopo that runs through southern Mozambique. These sorts of development will, however, generate limited demand for the unskilled labour that Mozambique has in abundance. Hence large numbers of people will continue to hover between rural and peri-urban subsistence.

Structural adjustment and economic liberalization have brought further changes to the attitude towards urban areas. Although the government still prioritises rural development programmes, an increasing amount of private investment is going to urban areas, with the lion's share to Maputo. Despite this, Mozambique continues to have no urban policies in place, nor has it started to focus on the need for institutional capacity in this field. Nonetheless, the economic opportunity of the urban areas is not lost on the city's elite who are taking full advantage of their preferential access to land, housing and other urban-based services (Jenkins 2001c). Implicitly, if not explicitly, Mozambique's elite are endorsing the position espoused by some of the international development agencies, namely that urban areas are the engines of economic growth.

How is this affecting the physical development of urban areas? As yet, the institutional supports for market-oriented urban growth are generally neglected – a continuation of the chaotic years of the late 1980s when local authorities *de facto* withdrew from urban development. Ironically, during this withdrawal, it was local authority officials and their political sponsors who took advantage of legal loopholes and started up illegal land markets. *De facto* land allocation passed from the central state to local-level (neighbourhood) authorities who initially obtained minor monetary gain but now the floodgates of the informal land market are open with major gains to be had. The vast majority of land occupations are informal in one way or another and increasingly involve monetary transactions, although these are often socially modified in the informal sector.

The virtual withdrawal of the central state from urban development may change as urban inefficiencies from, for example, unregulated land use become a more open political subject. Meanwhile, the main aim of local authorities seems to have become personal income generation rather than professional service provision. Their increasing involvement in the urban land market is indicative of this. The local authority did play a role in providing emergency relief for those affected by the floods in 2000 although this also led to further informal commodification of land.

The local authority maintains grand designs but extremely limited powers, capacities and resources to implement them. This resembles the situation surrounding the 1952 Urban Plan, and indeed something similar happened in 2000 with the Maputo Metropolitan Area Structure Plan. The political authorities insisted on the inclusion of a bridge to Catembe, the relatively underdeveloped south side of the bay, despite the lack of any clear economic basis for this other than the potential for speculative land sales.

Land speculation militates against efficient land use and accentuates socio-economic dualism in the city. New millionaires' mansions are springing up next to old informal settlement areas and *de facto* land markets are pushing the urban poor out to peripheral locations, re-activating the physical dualism of the colonial period. Major urban-based economic investments are also once again being located outside established urban boundaries and control (Jenkins 2001b).

In the colonial period, various settler interests negotiated with the elite of the fascist state, and smallholder Portuguese farmers effectively blocked any northwestern expansion of the central city. There is, as yet, no parallel corporate group negotiating with the new economic and political elite. The fledgling middle class is currently the most affected by these new trends in urban development, as they do not want to opt for the lower-income informal housing market but they are priced out of new elite developments. While this group may develop a political voice, it remains to be seen if it will have any political impact within the city. The poor majority, on the other hand, continue to assume that they will have no influence and get on with their lives in the informal sector with minimal engagement with the state.

The poor's image of the city as a 'place of opportunity'

The above three-stage analysis of different attitudes towards the city and urbanism is drawn from the dominant discourse. The images outlined represent the political rhetoric and economic action of the elite rather than those of the majority of urban residents who are poor. There has been little empirical investigation of the attitudes to urbanism of the urban majority, hence the following section tends to draw on qualitative experience.[6]

From the colonial period, the name *Xilunguine* ('place of the stranger(s)' in Xi-Ronga) was used for the urban area of Lourenço Marques. The alien nature of permanent urban settlement was initially expressed by a people who were culturally adapted to rural subsistence. The oral testimony of African workers during the colonial period reflects the urban majority's attitude. The city was seen as a place where migrant males went to undertake forced labour, work in domestic service or pass through in transit to the mines and farms of South Africa. Their main objective was to benefit from the economic opportunity that the city offered as a strategy for the consolidation and maintenance of their long-term rural existence. As such, many undertook work outside their home area as a rite of passage, gaining the necessary capital to pay for a bride and start their own household economy. This attitude to the urban area was encouraged by the colonial administration and reinforced by labour legislation. Hence there was a tendency to parallel the territorial aspects of urban identity with those of place identity – the city was a place of opportunity, but a temporary opportunity, with its benefits ultimately invested in one's rural home. Such attitudes were implicit in contemporary urban research (e.g. Rita-Ferreira 1967/68, Mitchell 1975).

Over time, increasing numbers of African workers stayed for longer periods in the urban areas and effectively settled there. This was not easy during most of the colonial period due to discriminatory legislation and economic policies but the opportunities offered by post-Second World War industrial investment reinforced this tendency, especially for women who were able to find employment in the new textile and food-processing factories. Some evidence for this changing attitude to urbanism can be found in research based on the oral testimony of factory workers (Centro de Estudos Africanos 1983). Another economic base for more permanent existence was in the service sector supporting the needs of the more transient African workers in the docks and warehouses as well as returning migrants (Mitchell 1975). Thus by the time new forms of foreign investment were forthcoming and new urban areas opened up in Matola/Machava, a sizeable resident population was able to take advantage of these new residential opportunities. The alternative option in Lourenço Marques was to occupy rented shacks or build one's own shack on rented land in the *caniço* areas.

After independence, despite the elite's view of the city as unproductive and parasitic, the low-income majority increasingly viewed the city as a permanent place of opportunity. Evidence for this comes from partial socio-economic surveys, including the unpublished Maxaquene surveys referred to earlier that were carried out in the late 1970s and the 1980s with residents in peri-urban areas where many identified an initial influx of families to join single migrants (Jenkins 1986, 1991). Many households, however, retained strong links with rural areas and family members, and rurally-derived patterns of social integration remained strong (such as family- and kinship-based forms of reciprocity as opposed to associational forms). Returning migrant workers continued to relocate and invest in their rural areas of origin. It appears that the effect of the natural disasters of the mid-1980s and the military destabilization of the late 1980s led to these links with rural 'places' being gradually undermined and replaced with urban 'place' identification. It is significant that surveys of new urban residents in peri-urban areas during the worst period of destabilization around Maputo found that social and economic reasons for in-migration remained as high as security reasons (Jenkins 1991).

These aspects, together with generational changes, led to the rapid growth of a predominantly urban-based element in Maputo's population, which had fewer active links to rural locations. Yet there are countervailing forces. Current employment trends are discouraging, especially for urban-based youth for whom even the informal sector holds few prospects. How are these employment constraints affecting the urban majority's attitudes towards Maputo as a place of opportunity? The urban population will evidently continue to increase due to natural growth, even with reduced in-migration and some outward migration. The Metropolitan Maputo Structure Plan estimates that the population will rise from 1.6 million in 2000 to 2.4 million in 2010, an increase of some 150,000 households and a 4.1 per cent annual growth rate.

Given that the economic prospects of the city are weak, at least for the livelihoods of the poor, what will be the likely effect at a micro-level? It is too early to assess this reliably from the available demographic and socio-economic data. However, some indications are available. According to the 1997 census, the total population of the greater urban area numbered 1.43 million inhabitants (Maputo plus Matola) and 260,500 households with an average of 5.3 persons per household (70 per cent in Maputo). This gives an intercensal average annual growth rate for 1980–1997 of greater Maputo of roughly 3.8 per cent. When compared to the estimates that the population was already over a million by the mid-1980s, the 1997 census implies either that the greater urban area grew very fast from 1980 to 1985 (at around 8 per cent per year), and not much faster than the natural increase thereafter or, more plausibly, that subsequent growth from in-migration was largely counterbalanced by significant out-migration once peace began to be restored in Mozambique after a ceasefire was brokered between Frelimo and Renamo in 1992 (see also Chapter 3, pp. 90–91). There is strong evidence from the local land use and socio-economic surveys referred to earlier of high inward migration continuing until the peace agreement. To what extent these patterns represent a relocation of population due to the need for multiple survival mechanisms or represent a demographic change is not clear. Although families have no doubt been redistributed between urban and rural locations, there is no strong qualitative evidence of such a marked exodus. There is, however, some evidence of increased circular migration.

Recent qualitative information suggests that households are adapting to the lack of economic opportunity in the urban areas by developing new rural bases or redeveloping older ones. Many households have developed *machambas* (farms) in the Maputo hinterland on which various family members live in a flexible way: some keep their urban base, others use an urban location merely for social services and to sell rural products, and yet others leave the urban area altogether, selling their physical assets there (Jenkins 2001c). This does not infer that rural areas are dynamic areas of economic growth. On the contrary, many seem mainly to offer only better subsistence opportunities.

Urban areas are still looked on as a place of social opportunity that affords residents better access to social services, even though some of the urban poor are now sending their children to school in rural areas as the cost of urban education has become too high. Thus the basis for the attitude of the city being the place of social and economic opportunity may be changing as families develop 'straddling' strategies between rural and urban areas. This will have implications for forms of physical urban development in the future.

Conclusion

Changing socio-cultural attitudes towards the city underpin how far the urban majority takes an interest in negotiating a 'voice' in the urban areas. The alternative is their continued exercise of an 'exit' option and apathy towards the state. What they choose has direct implications for the political balance in urban governance. Attitudes towards the city underpin the nature of urban civil society, which is currently predominantly horizontal rather than vertical. As argued elsewhere (Jenkins 2001a,b,c), both are needed for sustainable forms of urban development and land rights. If urban areas are no longer seen as places of opportunity, any move towards more equitable and efficient forms of urban development could be undermined.

The attitude of the elite, their control of urban resources and the growing size of an urban middle class are also critical. Currently, the elite has little interest in better urban regulation and planning, as they benefit from the status quo. The result is increased inequality and hardship for the poor. International aid projects do not alter this situation. Two factors may, however, begin to wield influence: first, the international community, now predominantly represented by private sector investors, may lobby and insist on a more regulated urban environment; and second, the small but growing middle class may demand more access. Initial evidence is that foreign investors are currently achieving what they want through Mozambican agents and have not begun to exert these forms of pressure. Regarding the latter, the result may or may not lead to attempts to capture the popular vote that is highly disengaged at present.

In all of this, it is important to note that the urban areas of Maputo/Matola are not typical of other areas in Mozambique. There are, however, parallels with other towns in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the larger urban areas caught between the changing global economy and regional economic manifestations, political reform, and growing urban populations (Potts 1997). Although much more research into micro-level effects on the lives of the urban poor is now being undertaken than previously, it tends to focus on how governments should cooperate with the private and voluntary sectors. This chapter suggests that there is a need to investigate how civil society is developing in the spaces beyond the government's reach. As Coquery-Vidrovitch (1991: 73) notes:

> As long as we lack a theoretical and historical account of the forces that underpin global differentiations, we remain unable to account for processes that lie at the heart of African urban underdevelopment: the integration of the household into new networks of capitalist production; the invention of a new web of concepts and practice on land and land laws, on housing and rental new patterns of foodstuff consumption; new regulations governing social and political life; all of these processes involving new relationships to the broader political economy which is definitely neither Western nor native behaviour.

The formulation of urban development policies in African cities requires more understanding of the trends in the majority's capacity to adapt urban opportunities to their socio-cultural values and real needs and priorities. Otherwise, urban policies will consciously or unconsciously be excessively dominated by international agendas or national and urban elite interests, and the urban poor will be forced to adapt to imposed images of the city and opportunity frameworks that cater for international investors and the monopolization of urban assets by the elite.

Notes

1. It should be noted that Mozambique was known, in English, as Portuguese East Africa during its colonial period but it is referred to throughout this chapter as Mozambique.
2. This chapter is an initial attempt to interpret, within the framework of a place identity approach, existing information and data on Maputo as well as qualitative data gathered through extensive personal experience in Mozambique. It builds on past research including: PhD research on shelter policy development (Jenkins 1998), analyses of paradigmatic shifts in urban studies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jenkins 1999a), governance regimes and the nature of political change in the southern African region (Jenkins 1999b, 2001a), changes in international agencies

approaches to urban development and poverty (Jenkins 2000a, 2004), emerging urban land and housing markets (Jenkins 2001b,c) and the effect of globalization (Jenkins and Wilkinson 2002). Recent research related to the topic of this chapter focuses on socio-cultural meanings and the growing debate on identity in urban planning in Europe (Hague and Jenkins 2005).

3. The *indigeno* legal status for 'natives' was instituted in the late 19th century and only abolished in 1962. *Indigenos* were not legally allowed to acquire land in the urban area outside the 'indigenous reserves' where land was allocated by the 'traditional' chiefs until the 1950s. Thereafter, limited land rights were permitted (Penvenne 1995).
4. On territorial controls and policies in colonial and independent Mozambique, see Sidaway (1992).
5. Initially high-rise development was seen as being detrimental to the aesthetic and physical development of the city and planners took a dim view of the 'wall' of high-rise apartment blocks along the sea-facing escarpment.
6. An exception is Penvenne's (1995) work on the history of the working class in Mozambique. This section of the chapter also draws on information from the Centro de Estudos Africanos (1983) and, in a general way, on other fictional and biographical accounts such as Honwana (1989).

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5
Mombasa's Missing Link: Marginalization or Mismanagement?

Carole Rakodi

Mombasa, Kenya's second city, has a long urban history and considerable economic promise, but several sectors are at present characterized by stagnation or decline. Open unemployment has increased, real wages have fallen and over a third of the city's population is living below the poverty line. This chapter aims to assess possible explanations for this lacklustre economic position. To guide the analysis, alternative explanations of the economic success of cities are briefly reviewed, followed by a schematic outline of Mombasa's location and pre-independence history. The city's contemporary structure and its labour market are then examined. Although Mombasa's economy is diversified, various obstacles lie in the way of economic prosperity, as are detailed below.

Ingredients of urban economic success

Traditional explanations of urban economic growth centre on natural advantage, administrative functions and economies of agglomeration. To explain *continued* economic success, additional explanations must be sought, focusing on the determinants of adaptability to changing economic circumstances.

Natural advantage refers to various dimensions of location: the presence of (bulky) raw materials, centrality to a well-endowed hinterland, location at the intersection of transport routes and the availability of a topographically suitable site. Realization of the potential for trade or industrial development provided by such natural advantage does, however, depend on investment, especially in transport links and other infrastructure, the organizational arrangements and technology of transport, and the organization of production and marketing.

Urban settlements chosen for administrative functions may or may not have natural advantages. Nevertheless, the political roles of a national or regional capital give rise to employment related to its administrative and service functions and attract others requiring access to politicians, public administrative departments or state-provided services.

Building on initial locational advantage, urban economic development has generally been explained in terms of agglomeration economies: the internal market for mass manufacturing and services, as well as forward and backward linkages between enterprises themselves, a diversified labour market with a pool of specialized skills, and higher level infrastructure and business support services. Initially important for the development of manufacturing when prevailing transport technology and the need to assemble raw materials and other inputs encouraged proximity, agglomeration economies have continued to be important in service-dominated contemporary cities, despite both changes in the organization of production and transport and communications technology, and increasing international flows of people, commodities, capital and information.

To realize potential economies of agglomeration, various types of capital are required, as well as public resources for investment in infrastructure, collective consumption goods and suitable workforce skills. In addition, a policy environment is needed that is not only conducive to private sector investment but also protective of social well-being and environmental sustainability. Furthermore, both economic enterprises and urban management systems need to be able to respond to changes in economic circumstances. As the importance of services, including culture and tourism, has exceeded that of trade or manufacturing, the key advantages of cities have been identified as their diversified pools of knowledge, information and expertise, which give rise to high levels of creativity and innovation (Amin 2000).

In the context of the changing global economy, urban economic success increasingly depends on relational ties and reflexivity, rather than physical assets (Amin 2000, Bridge and Watson 2000). Storper (1997) defines relational ties as networks of loose ties that encourage experimentation and innovation, providing a basis for the trust needed in all economic relationships. Reflexivity refers to the strategic shaping of the environment by knowledgeable individuals and organizations.

Relational ties have also been theorized as social capital (Ostrom 2000). Aspects of social relations can constitute useful capital resources for economic actors, reducing economic transaction costs by creating trust and generating information. Cities, in particular, are 'reservoir[s] of different forms of know-how for economic agents to dip into, activate and mobilize' (Amin 2000: 123). These include both the formal knowledge generated through research and development by firms and universities, and the informal knowledge amassed by business and social networks within the city and beyond. It is, however, acknowledged that networks of excessive loyalty can be counter-productive.

In the work of Putnam (1993) and urban political scientists, economic success is closely associated with efficient and accountable local government. For Putnam, social capital explains the difference between economic and political dynamism and stagnation or decline. For regime theorists, the emergence of enduring cooperation between business and political interests in some cities and not in others depends on who gains access to regime membership (political power and influence), their motives, the bargaining context (which is influenced by democratic conditions, the market position of the city and inter-governmental relations) and the mode of operation adopted (which to succeed should be cooperative rather than hierarchical or competitive) (Stoker and Mossberger 1997, Stoker 1995, Kantor *et al*. 1997). Various regime typologies have been developed, some of which stretch the term to encompass political orders which are contingent rather than enduring and clientelist rather than cooperative. Despite its US bias and assumptions that private- and public-sector actors recognize their inter-dependence, that cooperation will win out over conflict and that there are stable regimes (sometimes inapplicable assumptions), regime theory can contribute to explaining urban economic success (Lauria 1997). The relevance of these theories and assumptions for Mombasa are examined in this chapter.

Port and railway: From external control to Kenyan independence

Mombasa's location and history are advantageous. It boasts the best natural deepwater harbour on the East African Coast, serves a multi-country hinterland encompassing over 50 million people and has a coastal strip with considerable tourist attraction. Its maritime trading tradition stretches back to the 11th century and its numerous international links and diverse streams of migrants over the centuries have given it prominence of place. The city's pre-independence history is vital to understanding its recent economic performance.

Emergence as a trading centre

One of many East African ports serving the dhow trade across the Indian Ocean, Mombasa began to attract permanent Shirazi settlers from southern Arabia and Persia in the 13th century, as did the areas of agricultural potential elsewhere in the coastal zone. A small town developed in a sheltered inlet on the east side of Mombasa Island facing what is now Mombasa Old Harbour (Hoyle 2000) (Figure 5.1).

Vasco da Gama arrived in 1497 and, despite resistance by the local Arab population, the Portuguese established a secure foothold from the end of the 16th century until the early 18th century when they were successfully ousted by Omani Arabs, leaving only Fort Jesus as testimony to their reliance on military force to control the port. During the 17th century, rivalry between the two main local tribal groups enabled the Yarubi dynasty from Oman to take control. It was overthrown by the Muscat-based Busaidi dynasty, which had moved its capital to Zanzibar in 1840 and which governed Mombasa from 1837 to 1895 (Mirza and Strobel 1989).



Figure 5.1 Map of Mombasa

Pre-colonial trading links between Mombasa and its hinterland were discouraged by the extensive semi-arid area between the coastal zone and the more ecologically promising interior (Hoyle 2000). However, early trade in ivory, gold, iron, timber, rhino horns and animal skins developed with local Mijikenda people of Digo origin. They were the original inhabitants of the southern mainland who acted as intermediaries between Arab traders and inland people and benefited from Arab trading links and early land registration. The Mijikenda also supplied the coastal towns with food, and some were strongly influenced by Muslim culture and religion, developing a distinct identity (Swahili) and a role as merchants (Middleton 2000). In addition to their trading interests, Arab and Swahili landowners in the coastal strip attempted to develop plantation agriculture (coconuts and grain) but difficulties in finding sufficient labour from a subsistence farming population led to a trade in slaves (Hoorweg 2000). Links developed between the ocean traders, Arab and Swahili merchants resident on the coast and internal caravan organizers, particularly the Kamba. Slaves were used for plantation, wage and domestic labour and were exported. Inter-marriage, concubinage and other social links between local people, Arabs and slaves developed, and many of the latter converted to Islam. Although some were released and settled locally, they always had lower social standing (Cooper 1987, 2000, Mirza and Strobel 1989, Middleton 2000).

Colonial impact

British and German expansion in the 19th century reinforced the pre-eminent position of Dar es Salaam and Mombasa. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, larger steam-powered ships replaced sail, and access to the interior was provided by the construction of railways. In 1895 the British government took over the administration of Kenya, including the coastal strip which the British Imperial East Africa Company had controlled since 1888, and began the construction of a railway to Lake Victoria. Mombasa, then a Muslim town with a population of about 25,000, was the obvious starting point for the railway, and the colony's first capital.

The tonnage handled by the port increased rapidly (Cooper 2000). New wharves were developed and large areas of land purchased for port, railway and industrial purposes on the opposite side of Mombasa Island from the old harbour along a deeper inlet (Kilindini Harbour) (Figure 5.1). Later the wharves were extended upstream on the northwest shore of the island and on the adjacent mainland at Kipevu (Hoyle 1996, 2000). The port initially relied on slaves and casual labour provided by Mijikenda farmers. Over 30,000 South Asian contract workers, many of them skilled, were imported to build the railway. In addition to the 7000 who did not return at the end of their contracts, many voluntary migrants joined them, settling in Mombasa and beyond.

Although the railway reached Lake Victoria in 1901, exports of mining and agricultural produce from the fertile region surrounding the lake were insufficient to make the Kenyan colony financially viable. The colonial government decided to import European settlers into the highlands where ample rainfall and rich volcanic soils were suited to the production of cash crops (Collier and Lal 1986). For Mombasa, this was a fatal blow as the capital was moved to Nairobi in 1907 in order to service this population. By 1923, over three million hectares of land (20 per cent of the country's arable land) were reserved for 3000 settlers. It was hoped that agriculture would also develop along the coast but the physical conditions were less propitious with contested land claims between plantation owners, indigenous farmers and ex-slaves, and the plantations experienced continuing labour shortages, especially after the British abolished the slave trade in 1907.

On Mombasa Island, the old Arab and Swahili elites entrenched themselves by claiming property, as the colonial government recognized property held under Islamic law, or purchased land. More recent South Asian arrivals bought land, constructed shop-houses and rented out rooms. Land adjudication and registration was completed in 1922 (Cooper 1987, 2000, Macoloo 2000). Africans were not precluded from land ownership and indigenous occupiers on the adjacent mainland claimed titles. As a result, 28 per cent of the African households in Mombasa in 1962 were landowners, compared to only 2 per cent in Nairobi (Stren 1978: 38).

By the 1920s, the supply of local people from the surrounding area was insufficient to meet the labour demand of the port and its related commercial activities, and up-country workers were recruited on monthly contracts. By 1925, there were 7555 contract workers. Tensions between local and up-country workers emerged during this period and have continued to erupt periodically ever since. The shipping companies preferred the flexibility of a casual labour force, and local workers had been content with periodic work which they could fit round agricultural production. This did not, however, suit labourers from further afield. Labour unrest escalated during the 1930s and continued throughout the war years. Pressure from the Colonial Office to establish a minimum wage, a general strike in 1947 and agitation on the part of the up-country labour force demanding a family wage, and the vulnerability of the colony to disruption at its port led the government to increase wages, encouraged the de-casualization of work and allowed the formation of trade unions. By the end of the 1940s, daily hiring was abolished and replaced by labour earning wages supposedly sufficient to support a family (and certainly higher than in other industries and areas of the country). The old gangs with European supervisors were replaced and the Dockworkers' Union was accepted.

Labour stabilization meant that jobs were better paid and coastal workers no longer needed to sustain subsistence agriculture. However, coastal workers remained concentrated in the least de-casualized areas of work and tensions over supposed favouritism in port employment were prevalent by the end of the 1950s. Meanwhile, the Dockworkers' Union consolidated its position and concentrated on protecting the interests of the (predominantly up-country) permanent workers. As its power increased, it became an important resource for emerging politicians and political parties (Collier and Lal 1986, Cooper 1987, 2000) and the years preceding independence in 1962 were marked by a wave of strikes. The independent government sought to control the labour movement, which it feared would deter investment, and in 1965 it succeeded in replacing the faction-ridden Kenyan Federation of Labour (the trade-union umbrella organization) with the government-controlled Central Organization of Trade Unions.

At independence, therefore, Mombasa was an important port with a good harbour and plenty of scope for expansion. It had a diversified economy with growing industrial investment and some administrative employment, although the loss of capital functions to Nairobi had greatly reduced its national and international political and administrative roles. It had entrepreneurial and trading classes of Arab, Swahili and South Asian origin and a relatively sophisticated transport sector. However, the determination of favoured groups to defend their positions and long-standing tensions between groups arising from both economic rivalry and socio-cultural and religious differences constituted potential threats to the city's ability to compete internationally and adjust to changing political and economic circumstances.

Post-independence urban economy

At independence Mombasa's population was 180,000 and the city's economic prospects, as the major port for Kenya and a vast East African hinterland, were bright. However, since the 1970s, Mombasa's overall rate of population growth has been relatively slow (Table 5.1). This is believed to be a demographic outcome of low fertility and net in-migrant streams dominated by men. Mombasa's male–female sex ratio was 121:100 in 1999 and the city's slow economic growth has been seen as a contributing factor.

Employment and earnings

Until the early 1980s, the two employment sectors of community, social and personal services and transport were of roughly equal importance in Mombasa, at around a quarter each of formal employment. Since then services have

Table 5.1 Population of Mombasa

	1962	**1969**	**1979**	**1989**	**1999**
Population '000s	180.0	247.1	341.2	461.8	665.0
Inter-censal growth rate % per annum		5.7	3.2	3.0	3.7

Source: Wakajummah (2000: 74).

grown faster, reaching approximately half of all formal sector jobs in 2000. The proportion of the labour force in formal wage employment, however, fell from 53 per cent in 1979 to 46 per cent in 1989 and to 43 per cent in 1999, of whom about two-fifths worked in the public sector. Nevertheless, open unemployment did not increase as people have been absorbed by the informal sector, in which about half the city's economically active residents work. The 1999 census showed that of Mombasa's population aged ten years and older 63 per cent were economically active, with 78 per cent of men and 46 per cent of women working or actively seeking work (CBS 2001b). In the informal sector, trade is most important (62 per cent), followed by services (20 per cent), transport (9 per cent) and water vending (5 per cent) (Githinji 2000: 72).

Adults from poor households were concentrated in informal sector activities (59 per cent compared to 46 per cent of workers from non-poor households) (Kenya, MFP 2000a: 47). The main economic activity of poor people was casual or unskilled work in formal sector enterprises or informal activities such as retail trade and domestic work, as well as illegal or semi-legal activities such as commercial sex work, selling *mnazi* (coconut liquor) or drug trafficking (AMREF *et al.* 2001). Over a third of Mombasa's households remain below the poverty line (Kenya 2000b).

Urban minimum wages rose between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s, but thereafter real wages fell for unskilled but not for skilled workers. By the late 1970s, Collier and Lal (1986) estimate that unskilled urban wages were at the same level as smallholder incomes, allowing for the higher cost of urban living. Skilled wages continued to rise through the 1980s but in the 1990s both average and minimum formal sector wages fell significantly as public-sector wage freezes and private sector wage liberalization were implemented. Although the overall incidence of poverty in Mombasa did not appear to increase in the 1990s, the short-term effect on the welfare of wage workers, many of them just above the poverty line, has clearly been adverse.

Transport and trade

The Port of Mombasa serves as a gateway for goods to and from the Great Lakes Region (Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi) and southern Sudan. A container terminal has been developed in recent years, which now accounts for 60 per cent of total traffic. The port's current capacity is 20 million tonnes per year and it is the city's single largest employer, although its workforce declined from an all-time high of 12,000 in 1986 to under 10,000 at the end of the 1990s (Hoyle 2000).

However, traffic has stagnated over the last 20 years with the 1981 figure not exceeded until 1996, when 8.7 million tonnes were handled (KPA 2001). During the 1980s, the volume of traffic fell by 11 per cent, reflecting the decline in Kenya's traditional agricultural exports (see below), its continuing trade deficit and civil unrest in many surrounding countries (CBS 2001a: 91). Although traffic increased during the 1990s by 28 per cent, this reflected an increase in imports (from 67 per cent of the total in 1991 to 79 per cent in 2000), while exports continued to stagnate or decline as a result of Kenya's continuing economic difficulties, and war, genocide and civil unrest elsewhere in the region. The single most important import is crude (and refined) oil (43 per cent by weight) but relief goods for countries to the west and north, and growing imports for Uganda are also important (KPA 2001).

All the East African ports have long had a reputation for low productivity and relatively high port costs. Mombasa is typical, with low productivity resulting from limited capital investment, poor equipment maintenance and overstaffing. Since independence, the port has been operated by a parastatal, the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA). Despite increasing charges and a number of attempts to improve its management in the 1990s, including contracting an external company to manage the container terminal (*East African Standard*, 6 September 2001), it has remained inefficient and is estimated to cost Kenya's economy over US$25 million per annum. The government has resisted managerial autonomy or privatization of the KPA because it prefers to control it for political ends. Poor pay and this politicization have resulted in the frequent turnover of senior staff, including seven managing directors between 1989 and 1999. Inefficient procedures continually hold up the transit and clearance of goods and provide opportunities for demanding bribes. The port has 'become a byword for graft, theft, inefficiency and political manoeuvring: a pot of dirty money, which for years has obstructed speedy trade in the region' (*Financial Times*, 15 September 1999). Mombasa lost ground to Dar es Salaam in the 1990s. Further increases in vessel size and the development of other regional ports may cause more problems in the future.

Mombasa's economic development is also hampered by poor transport connections. Its traffic relies primarily on the main road to Nairobi and a single railway line. Both are poorly maintained and the railway is badly managed. As with many African cities, water and power supplies are inadequate, although the area has been given preferential treatment.

Mombasa has an international airport, whose passenger numbers have grown since major investment (thanks to Japanese funding) in the late 1990s, although growth has been less than it might have been had there not been disruptions to tourism, as described below. However, the capacity of the airport still considerably exceeds its current use and poor access roads are a constraint on increased traffic.

Tourism

Beach hotels were first built in the 1930s but international tourism only developed after independence. As the government invested in local infrastructure, including roads, electricity and the airport, private investment in beach hotels north and south of Mombasa increased. In the 1970s, the number of international visitors grew rapidly and today tourism is a major contributor to the economy and Kenya's largest earner of foreign exchange with coastal tourism accounting for over 60 per cent of the total. Visitor numbers grew at an annual average of 13 per cent per annum between 1970 and 1995 and tourism offers employment in the province and the city itself (CDA *et al.* 1996). However, its full potential is not currently being fulfilled, contributing less to the local economy than its scale suggests and growth even turned into decline in the 1990s.

As is often the case with tourism in developing countries, a significant problem is foreign-exchange leakages, which are estimated to be between 62 and 78 per cent for beach package holidays (Sindiga 2000: 228). Of the major hotels at the coast, 94 per cent were wholly or partly foreign-owned in the early 1990s. Local linkages with food production, manufacturing, restaurants, crafts, trade and transport tend to be with large companies, rather than with local small-scale enterprises, particularly as local Muslim entrepreneurs and workers find many aspects of the tourist trade undesirable and demeaning (Sindiga 2000).

There are also constraints on tourism for the city itself. The main attractions are along the coast outside Mombasa, and only 14 per cent of the 198 hotels in 1999 were in the city. Within Mombasa, Fort Jesus, the old town and the Mombasa Marine National Park could be exploited more fully, but the city's run-down infrastructure and appearance discourage international visitors.

International tourism declined during the 1990s despite new investment in the airport. Passenger numbers stagnated at roughly 750,000 per annum between 1991 and 1996, thereafter slowly increasing to 945,000 in 1999, under two-thirds of its capacity (CBS 2000). A factor in this decline has been insecurity. Following election-related violence in Mombasa before the 1997 elections, average bed occupancy in major coastal hotels declined from 70 per cent in 1991 to an all-time low of 26 per cent in 1998. It only picked up slightly in 1999. Revenue fell by nearly 40 per cent, over 200 tourism-related establishments closed either permanently or temporarily (*Daily Nation*, 10 March 1999), and an estimated 6000 people lost their jobs between the end of 1996 and 1999 (*The Guardian*, 24 April 1999). High levels of crime and harassment, and poor infrastructure are further deterrents to both tourists and investors (Gatheru and Shaw 1998, Gatabaki-Kamau *et al.* 1999, Sindiga 2000).

Industry

Mombasa is a prime location for port-related industry and considerable attention has been devoted to ensuring an adequate supply of serviced industrial land with good rail or road connections. In the 1950s, Kenya's only oil refinery was established, with a pipeline to Nairobi. Further industrial and warehouse areas were developed on publicly and privately owned land, accounting for 40 per cent of the country's new industrial construction in the 1960s. By the 1970s, Mombasa had a significant industrial sector, including both light industry and large-scale heavy industry processing imported products (oil, steel) or locally produced minerals (cement), deep-sea fish or agricultural products, as well as brewing and ship repairing (MLS 1971).

The sector is dominated by a dozen or so large firms that now provide three-quarters of formal industrial employment. Between 1970 and 1996, formal industrial employment grew by 92 per cent, although the number of establishments grew by only 7 per cent (Masai 2000: 214). The medium-scale sector is dominated by textiles, helped by the establishment of an Export Processing Zone in the 1990s, in which about 3000 workers were employed by the end of the decade (Gatabaki-Kamau *et al*. 1999).

Although formal industrial employment apparently continued to increase slowly in the 1990s, the increase in manufacturing employment has been minimal.[1] The growth and diversification of the city's industry and manufacturing that occurred in the previous three decades were undermined by contractions in peasant agriculture and tourism and the effects of structural adjustment policies, which Kenya started implementing in the 1990s. Parastatal restructuring and privatization, together with import liberalization, have led to redundancies. Meanwhile, economic and political uncertainty and corruption deterred domestic and foreign investment alike.

Mombasa has a diversified small-scale informal sector but informal manufacturing, like small and micro-enterprises in general, faces a number of problems: insufficient capital, lack of demand, difficulty accessing land, infrastructure deficiencies, high licence fees and harassment by the police and municipal inspectors (Mantle and Co. 2000).

Commerce

Mombasa's important financial and commercial sector reflects the city's role as a port, industrial city, administrative and commercial centre for Coast Province, and service centre for coastal tourism. Trade and services are the most important economic activities for small and micro-enterprises: the Kenya Street Traders' Association estimated that there were 10,000 street traders in Mombasa in 2000.

There is intense competition between formal and informal enterprises and between local and up-country entrepreneurs. Formal retailers in the city centre have periodically called on the Municipal Council to remove hawkers from pavements and outside markets on the grounds of unfair competition. In the mid-1990s, formal curio sellers organized tourist circuits so that city-centre shops owned by Asians and outlets in the beach hotels were patronized, while informal traders in curios were denied licences and their kiosks were demolished. The rivalry between local and up-country entrepreneurs was demonstrated by the targeting of micro-enterprises owned by people of up-country origin during the 1997 pre-election violence.

Why Mombasa has not fulfilled its growth potential: National and regional economic obstacles

As described above, Mombasa had a fairly diversified economy and relatively well-paid labour force by the 1980s and its population had grown to nearly half a million. In the 1990s, however, its economy and population growth stagnated. In part, this can be attributed to economic constraints at national and regional levels.

Limitations of the national economy

Kenya's early post-independence economic growth was positive, with rapid growth in GDP, agricultural exports and manufacturing (Collier and Lal 1986). However, the two oil-price shocks of the 1970s, falling world commodity prices and economic instability led Kenya to seek IMF assistance. A pattern of non-compliance with loan conditions began, leading to repeated delays in disbursements of international financial assistance or the suspension of loan agreements.

As its economic malaise continued and deepened, Kenya repeatedly sought the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank. A standard package of adjustment measures was implemented after 1992. Import liberalization increased competition for some domestic producers, resulting in closures and downsizing, as discussed above, although it presented others with opportunities, as has price liberalization. The restructuring of parastatals and the liberalization of employment controls have had adverse effects on urban jobs. Meanwhile, measures to encourage exports and attract investment have had only limited success. Implementation has been held back again since the mid-1990s by entrenched interests, lack of political commitment and limited administrative capacity. Infrastructure is deteriorating, labour productivity is low, and both large and small enterprises face legal and regulatory impediments (Ronge and Nyangito 2000).

In such an unfavourable economic climate, it is perhaps surprising that Mombasa's economy has continued to grow at all. The formal sector employment growth that is occurring is being generated mostly by a few large employers who are of central importance to the national economy and/or are protected by public ownership.

Regional economic pitfalls

One way in which an individual city can counteract an unfavourable national and international economic environment is by performing economic functions for a prosperous regional hinterland. However, there are several barriers to this option in Mombasa. Much of its hinterland is a vast semi-arid region with limited agricultural potential, some of which is used for national parks. The economy of its more immediate hinterland, Coast Province, relies primarily on tourism in the coastal strip to the north and south of the city because the potential for fishing and agriculture is limited. Artisanal fishing supports large numbers of households (600 in Mombasa District itself), but further development is constrained because the continental shelf drops quite close to the shore, limiting the extent of shallow-water artisanal fisheries. Deep-sea fishing requiring heavy investment in boats and technology is beyond the financial means of Kenyan fishermen and deep-sea fishing for industrial and sporting purposes is largely foreign-operated. The main fish-processing plant in Mombasa is foreign-owned but political insecurity and poor infrastructure have deterred further investment.

Attempts to develop large-scale agriculture have had limited success. The land claims of Arab settlers, the chequered history of settlement schemes, and an early reliance on slavery to solve labour shortages have left legacies of absentee land ownership, contested land claims and bitterness between indigenous farmers, up-country in-migrants and the heirs of the Arab settlers. Parastatal farms and settlement schemes instituted after independence generally failed to improve the productivity of the plantations they replaced. Some sugar and cashewnut parastatals have, in fact, collapsed (Hoorweg 2000). Smallholder farming in the region suffers from insecure tenure, poor soils, and limited access to capital and technology. As a result, many farmers are only tentatively integrated into markets for agricultural produce, with most of the food supplied to tourist establishments coming from large producers (Dijkstra 2000, Waaijenberg 2000). Mombasa and the coastal resorts have to import most of their cereals and vegetables and much of their meat and milk from elsewhere in Kenya. The coastal lowlands contributed only 5 per cent to the national agricultural GDP in 1995 (IEA/SID 2001: 31) and the farmers' low incomes mean they provide little in the way of a market for Mombasa's goods and services.

Mombasa's marginalization or mismanagement? Breaches of trust and local governance

Undoubtedly, political and social constraints have played a part in Mombasa's lack of dynamism and growth. Local government's poor delivery record and ethnic rivalries have imparted an edginess to the city's economic life.

Shortcomings of local management

Mombasa is the administrative headquarters for Coast Province but the municipality is also designated as a district. Unfortunately this encourages rivalry, overlapping responsibilities and poor coordination rather than efficient management. The management of Mombasa is split between several levels of government and a number of parastatals. The parastatals are characterized by the inefficiencies, managerial weaknesses, perverse incentives and corruption of the sector as a whole. The turnover of management in the KPA is indicative. The National Water Supply and Pipeline Corporation, which is responsible for supplying water to the city, has failed to solve the water shortage. Telecommunications development has been hindered by the failure of Kenya Posts and Telecommunications and government reluctance to privatize appropriate operations.

Mombasa Municipal Council's revenue depends on a limited number of local sources (property tax, licences, fees) and has not been efficiently administered. It teeters on the brink of insolvency, making long-term planning impossible (Gatabaki-Kamau *et al.* 1999).[2] Although the Council is the second largest employer in Mombasa after the port, it suffers, like all local authorities in Kenya, from a chronic shortage of qualified senior staff coupled with overstaffing at lower levels, as unskilled posts are used by councillors for patronage purposes.

By the early 1970s, local politics was often perceived as a route for personal enrichment. Councillors were eligible for many allowances and could gain access to council housing for themselves or to reward their supporters. Dispensing patronage to ensure re-election was a primary concern. Many local politicians were not highly educated and political office was considered more remunerative than other employment in terms of the benefits and privileges it offered. In 1976, the scale of inefficiency, financial mismanagement and corruption led the central government to dissolve the council and replace it with a commission.

Little changed when elected government was reinstated at the beginning of the 1990s. Although the responsibilities of municipal councils continue to be wide, their already limited powers and resources were whittled away by central government, not least because many of the urban areas came under opposition control. First, central government claimed control over senior appointments, ostensibly to protect senior officers from pressure from councillors to break the rules, but in practice this led to delayed appointments and limited local accountability. Second, local decision-making autonomy was reduced. Although the Council has responsibility for some functions directly related to economic development, its permissive functions do not include explicit reference to local economic development, it lacks the expertise for economic analysis or policy-making, and it tends to see economic enterprises (such as markets) purely in terms of their revenue-generating potential. Although there have been some recent attempts by the Council to cooperate more closely with the formal and informal private sectors, relations between them are limited, fraught and contradictory (Gatabaki-Kamau *et al.* 1999, Balala 2000).

Planning by the district offices of central government is severely limited by their funding and lack of autonomy. As a result, even when their plans are formulated on the basis of sound economic development policies, such as encouraging the formation of *jua kali* (informal sector) cooperatives, they are unable to implement them. Further economic constraints are an inadequate supply of serviced land and insecure tenure. All aspects of infrastructure and services face shortfalls, increasing costs (Lee *et al.* 1999) and restricting human capital development. Insecurity, crime, red tape and corruption add to operational costs. Environmental degradation threatens tourism and fishing, and the shortage of resources and administrative fragmentation mean that implementation constantly lags behind intentions. Both central and local government failures and major revenue constraints therefore feed into Mombasa's failure to achieve its economic potential.

Hazards of ethno-political rivalry

Constraints on Mombasa's development derive from complex interactions between national political processes and the political and social history of the city itself. Local politics in Kenya are highly conflictual. Power struggles involve not only ethnic, class-based, personal and factional power struggles, but also intimidation and bribery. Many of the divisions have deep historical roots.

The city's trading history and its attraction to settlers gave rise to a racially and ethnically diverse population that was unequal in terms of both wealth and social status. The British colonial government used the existing hierarchy of Arab officials to govern the coast, and shared with Arabs a sense of the superiority of Arab over local culture (Mirza and Strobel 1989). The original elite was, therefore, the merchant class of Arab and Swahili origin. However, control over trade gradually passed into other hands and people of Arab origin declined from 10 per cent of the population in 1962 to 5 per cent in 1989 (Stren 1978, CBS 1996, Wakajummah 2000). Initially, labour for the city's economic functions was provided by people from indigenous coastal groups and slaves. This was then supplemented by migrants from inland, who were often better educated. As discussed earlier, rivalries over access to jobs developed between these groups. The proportion of both up-country migrants and coastal people in the city increased significantly in the early post-independence period, from 25 per cent each in 1962 to 35 per cent each by 1969. In 1989 the coastal groups constituted 41 per cent (MLS 1971: 14–15).

An economically significant Asian population emerged during the colonial period (24 per cent of the total in 1962, falling to 5 per cent in 1989) (Stren 1978, CBS 1996). They carved out a niche for themselves in commerce and finance, using these to accumulate property, especially on Mombasa Island. The economy of the city continues today to be dominated by the merchant and business elite of Arab, Asian and European origin which, although it comprises only about 12 per cent of the population, is said to hold 80 per cent of formal business interests. All the groups maintain extensive overseas family and business links, although the Asian community is probably the most culturally distinct and socially aloof, resulting in high levels of popular distrust of Asian entrepreneurs.

Of the up-country residents, the Kamba, historically associated with the inland trade in slaves and other goods, were initially the largest group in Mombasa, but the proportion of Luo and Luhya increased rapidly. In addition to unskilled labourers, the professional and business elite in both the public and the private sector is also mainly drawn from up-country groups, partly because of their higher levels of education This creates links between private sector employees and public bureaucrats and has led to allegations of favouritism in the allocation of jobs, land, trade licences and so on (Mantle and Co. 2000). The more prosperous small enterprises (bars, hotels, etc.) also tend to be dominated by up-country entrepreneurs. As mentioned earlier, these are often regarded as unacceptable businesses by local Muslims.

People of coastal origin, such as the Mijikenda, are concentrated in unskilled wage employment, casual work and more marginal informal sector activities such as petty trade and transport. At independence, nearly all Mijikenda people as well as Asians, Europeans and many Arabs supported Kenya African Democrafic Union (KADU), which advocated a semi-federal constitution, as both rich and poor alike feared the domination of national politics by certain up-country groups. The up-country migrants and the elite sections of the Arab and Swahili populations, however, feared that a KADU victory would result in a backlash against them. In 1963, KADU MPs were elected in Mombasa but the rapid collapse of the *majimbo* constitution and the dissolution of KADU led them to realize that, unless they joined Kenya African National Union (KANU), they would not gain access to the resources commanded by central government (Wolf 2000).

Today, local politics in Mombasa is not a hotbed of opposition to the extent that Nairobi and Kisumu are, but there are large numbers of potential opposition voters there and KANU now has only one safe seat. In the 1990s, opposition councillors and support in local elections tended to come from up-country groups (except for some small parties such as the Islamic Party of Kenya), while KANU councillors and support were drawn from the various indigenous groups. Within KANU there have been factional struggles, as seen in the controversial tenure and resignation of a KANU mayor of Arab descent in 1997/98, allegedly at the behest of a powerful KANU rival of Asian descent (Gatabaki-Kamau *et al*. 1999, Balala 2000).

The dynamics of national politics in Mombasa are similar to those of local politics (Southall and Wood 1996). Local groups in Coast Province often attribute the province's problems, including its backward agriculture, high levels of poverty and low levels of education, to its political marginalization. To try and wring concessions out of the central government, Coast politicians have opted to support KANU since soon after independence and, by the 1990s, KANU had achieved electoral victories in the province as a whole and in Mombasa in particular.[3] In practice, however, Coast politicians have mostly been given positions of symbolic importance only, reflecting their subordinate and client status.

Dependence on central government patronage means that they find it difficult to address local grievances, such as the perceived takeover of property and economic opportunities by up-country people with political and administrative connections (Wolf 2000). Like councillors, national KANU politicians in Mombasa have also forged commercial alliances with Asians, Arabs and foreign investors and there is much infighting over the distribution of resources. The priority of most national politicians is to retain power by using all the necessary means including patronage, playing on ethnic sensibilities, and intimidation. Thus rivalries between ethnic groups have been manipulated, as seen in the orchestrated violence prior to elections (especially those in 1997). Unfortunately this has had adverse effects on Mombasa.

Conclusion

Mombasa's history has resulted in a racially and ethnically mixed population in which, perhaps unsurprisingly, differential access to economic opportunities and wealth have developed. As a result, there are ethnically based tensions over economic opportunities (land, jobs, enterprises). Because of the centralized, patronage-based nature of Kenyan politics and its reliance on ethnic loyalties to win and consolidate political support, these economic rivalries are inextricably associated with political processes at both local and national levels. The results include high levels of insecurity, politicians putting their own personal wealth and political careers before the interests of the city, and marginalization by central government.

The high levels of trust and strong alliances between groups, which are considered necessary by theorists of local economic development and social capital, have not developed in Mombasa. Their weakness helps to explain the lack of dynamic local economic linkages, and the absence of either a university or a developmental local authority. However, Mombasa's failure to realize its economic potential, despite its initial advantages and the presence of economies of agglomeration, cannot be solely attributed to dysfunctional politics or mismanagement at the local level, since centrally imposed organizational structures that are inadequately resourced and poorly coordinated, national economic stagnation, and political manipulation and marginalization are also important explanatory factors. Precise causation is difficult to disentangle but there is little doubt that the ethnic distrust and envy embedded in local, regional and national politics have been a major drag on Mombasa's economic destiny.

Notes

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1. The Central Bureau of Statistics undertakes annual formal sector employment and earnings surveys but non-response rates are not given and it is not clear from the published figures which are based on actual returns and which are estimates.
2. The Council did not receive any resource transfers from central government for capital or recurrent expenditure (except for teachers' salaries) until 2000, when a new system for allocating a share of central government revenue to local authorities was introduced.
3. This was helped, as in other urban areas, by the deliberate restriction in numbers and careful boundary delimitation of urban constituencies (Institute for Education in Democracy 1998).

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6

Dualism in Kampala: Squalid Slums in a Royal Realm

Augustus Nuwagaba

Different land-tenure regimes have left their mark on the evolution and growth of urban dualism in Kampala. In 1894, when Captain Lugard established Uganda as a British protectorate, the *Kabaka* (king) of Buganda had his headquarters in the vicinity of the current city. Kampala then, as now, was characterized by undulating hills affording majestic hilltop views of Lake Victoria eight kilometres away. The Buganda region was highly politically organized with administrative institutions that the colonial state sought to preserve and use to spread their control throughout Uganda. Kampala thus became the colony's capital.

The signing of the 1900 Buganda Agreement marked the beginning of the structural transformation of land management, cadastration and titling of land parcels in Uganda. With the stroke of a pen, a class structure was entrenched. It comprised a propertied class, those who were given 'ownership' of land, and the landless whose use of the land was circumscribed and vested in the hands of the *Kabaka* and his notables (Kisamba-Mugerwa 1991). For all intents and purposes, the former became landlords and the latter their tenants. Land became a commodity but one that still embodied aspects of former usufruct land rights. Nonetheless, land markets surfaced, especially on *mailo*-cum-freehold.

Approximately 60 per cent of the land in Kampala is currently held under *mailo* or what may be called 'freehold land tenure'. The most important outcome of the land management and tenure system is dualism whereby the land held under private *mailo* has not been subjected to urban planning, whereas the land held under public lease has been developed in accordance with standardized plans. Dualism in land management has become a major impediment to urban development for Kampala City.

This chapter examines how this constraint has evolved. The next section theoretically contextualizes the significance of land tenure, before tracing the various changes in land tenure in Kampala over time. The power relations vested in land-tenure arrangements are explored and their impact on the urban management of housing and the informal economy is considered.

The chapter concludes with observations on the urgent need for coherent urban planning.

Land tenure

Land-tenure systems define the rights one has over the use of land resources in relation to the community. Rights do not represent the relationship between a person and an object but are rather the relationship between the holder and others with respect to the object (Bruce 1986). Natural resources are managed under four categories: a private property regime, a state property regime, a common property regime and a non-property regime called ‘open access’.

Under private property regimes, land rights accrue to an individual. All the improvements and investments in the resources are made with the clear understanding that the long-term benefits will be enjoyed by the property owners with control over their resources. However, the decisions taken under a private property regime may not be in the interests of the community with respect to natural resources.

Under state property regimes, the rights of ownership and management are vested in the state. In some circumstances, the state may manage its natural resources through its agents. Under common property regimes, rights accrue to specified groups or communities of people and they have a right to exclude non-members. The implications of this resource management regime are that the permissible activities and the benefit stream will only accrue to members commonly known to each other.

The members of a household subject to a common property regime attain access to natural resources by virtue of their household being a member of the social group that governs the resources. The household has the duty to recognize the source of authority in that group and share similar interests with the whole group for sustainable utilization of the resource.

Open access is essentially ‘non-property’ in the sense that no property rights are recognized. The resource consists of unlimited access to users and it is this aspect that tends to create undue pressure on the resource under an open-access regime.

The land-management regimes are operationalized in various tenure systems that seek to define the terms of holding and use of such resources as land. Interestingly, Kampala has witnessed all four forms of land-tenure system over the past century. They have combined or been layered in ways that make an analysis of land tenure in Kampala extremely complex, as outlined below.

The evolution of land-tenure regimes in Uganda

During the pre-colonial period, land tenure and management were invariably customary. Land resources were possessed by members of clans and lineages and it is still common even where individualization has taken place for a land parcel to be referred to as belonging to a particular clan. Clans were location-specific about the use of natural resources. Documentary titles as evidence of ownership were unheard of in the pre-colonial period. While there were variations from one ethnic group to another, there was little difference in the broad principle that access rights were held by the occupants. In theory, usufruct rights to land were accessible to all and allocated by clan or lineage elders. Customary tenure of this type is sometimes referred to as communal tenure, and operated as a common property regime. Only land not claimed by specific groups operated as an open-access system.

Usufruct rights were strictly observed and conflicts were rare. However, this should be understood in the context of the time: the population was relatively small, about one-third of today's and thus exerted much less pressure on land resources. Households were preoccupied with subsistence production and land titles were largely irrelevant. The main method of accessing land was by inheritance (Kisamba-Mugerwa 1991). Individually, access to unclaimed public land was sometimes gained on approval from the head or the members of the clan.

This customary system has persisted from the pre-colonial period and merged with more recently introduced forms of land tenure. It is sometimes characterized, for example by the World Bank, as lacking security of tenure for impoverished occupants who do not have the wherewithal to invest in land development. However, such views are challenged by many other analysts who have found that customary tenure is adaptive and need not hinder agricultural investment (Bruce *et al*. 1994, Platteau 1996).

The colonial state sought a radical transformation of the land-tenure system. The protectorate policy goals were household self-sufficiency, private initiative and efficient resource utilization. In pursuit of the latter objective, private land tenure was created with the 1900 Buganda Agreement that alienated land in Buganda into two major categories: *mailo* or freehold land, which henceforth belonged to the *Kabaka* and his notables, and British crown land. These forms of land tenure were superimposed over the already existing usufruct land-rights tradition. *Mailo* land combined aspects of common property rights as well as private land rights.

The *Kabaka* of Buganda established his capital at Mengo, while the colonial administration had theirs in Kampala. Throughout the colonial period, the land-management structure in Mengo, locally known as *kibuga*, was mainly *mailo* while most of the land in Kampala was crown land.

Under the 1900 Buganda Agreement, the *Kabaka* and his notables possessed titled land and held it in perpetuity. They used this land for patronage, 'allowing' their tenants to stay on the land on the basis of usufruct. The *bona fide* occupants, both Baganda peasants and immigrants on large tracts of undeveloped land, were rendered landless and had to pay *busulu* rent or *envujjo* (part of their crop harvest) to the newly imposed owners holding title certificates (Ministry of Land and Physical Planning 1997). The immediate implication of the 1900 Buganda Agreement was the stratification of a formerly fairly homogeneous society in terms of land-resource allocation. The propertied class was composed of an aristocracy of the *Kabaka*, chiefs and all those who acquired parcels of land, whereas the vast majority of those occupying the land and farming it were legally landless.

Numerous subdivisions of *mailo* land occurred over time as market and population growth proceeded. *Mailo* land could be sold or bought at will or mortgaged by the titleholder when the need arose, with adverse consequences for tenants. The commoditization of land under the *mailo* policy created a structural transformation of the economy. The individualization of land ownership was reinforced by official alienation of hitherto communal land and direct purchase options.

Over time, landlords increased rental rates indiscriminately until tenants protested publicly. The government was forced to intervene by enacting the Busulu and Envujjo Law of 1927 that was aimed at protecting the occupants from exploitation by the titleholders at the same time ensuring the property rights of the latter.

After independence in 1962, crown land reverted to public land status and was administered by the Ugandan Land Commission. The Commission later transferred some of the land, particularly that located within Kampala's city boundaries, to Kampala City Council. The most pertinent issue arose in 1968 when Kampala's boundaries were extended to include Mengo, the former *kibuga* area. This meant the creation of a dual city with both planned and unplanned areas under the same jurisdiction. The major issue for Kampala City Council was that although its administrative jurisdiction was extended to Mengo and other areas, it did not have effective control over the land, since this was now private property.

A series of post-colonial legal instruments were enacted to streamline urban land management in Uganda, but to no avail. Until 1975, most of the land (60 per cent) of Kampala City was *mailo* land. In 1975, President Amin issued a land-reform decree making all land in Uganda public land, vesting all leasehold land in the state. The land-reform decree, however, was so politically and socially charged that it was never actually implemented.

The land offices continued to operate illegally both the *mailo*-cum-freehold tenure and the leasehold land held by municipal authorities. The 1995 Constitution aimed to change this and repealed the 1975 Land Reform Decree and stipulated that

> All land in Uganda becomes freehold and vests the holding and user rights in private citizens. [Article 237 Cap (8)]

The major implication of the 1995 Constitution was that private land property rights were now guaranteed. The *bona fide* occupants of *mailo* land, freehold and leasehold land are now recognized and their security of tenure protected. Freehold and *mailo* tenures, rights that had been legally abolished by the Land Reform Decree of 1975, have been restored. As already indicated, the repeal of the 1975 Land Reform Decree was only a legal provision in the statute books and not a practical change of tenure on the ground. The Land Reform Decree had been generally ignored for the duration of its legal existence.

Therefore, the colonial legacy of land-management dualism continues to the present day with profound consequences for the socio-economy of Kampala. The colonial administration created serious contradictions in land tenure, which forms the epicentre of land issues in Uganda. These contradictions constitute what is referred to as the Buganda Land Question.

Practical consequences of the Bugandan Land Question for the management of Kampala's urban growth

While the issue of land is admittedly a 'hot potato' throughout the country, perhaps nowhere in Uganda is it as sensitive as in the Buganda region. The colonial administration generated a large landlord class and African residence was restricted to the area beyond the township on land that was held under *mailo*. The development of land outside the township was left to private landowners and Kampala's planners were thus constrained in their efforts to plan Kampala's physical growth.

Under *mailo* and freehold systems, ownership and full control of land is tightly restricted to a small segment of the population through inheritance or to those with sufficient financial resources to purchase the land. However, the original title-holding landowners often do not have enough capital to develop their land. While urban authorities are keen to enforce legislation aimed at controlling design specifications, zoning, land use or infrastructure, the legal titleholders are either unable or unwilling to comply. They prefer to use their land for garnering rent, as is normal under freehold tenure, or for fostering clientelist relations. They allow the influx of large numbers of the urban poor onto land that is devoid of or inadequately provisioned with the basic urban infrastructure of roads, water and sanitation. The poor may be paying rent or may have an understanding with the owner that the land is borrowed, or they may be squatting against the owners' wishes.

Mailo landholders have erected ramshackle dwellings on their land that attract low income-earners and the unemployed poor. Alternatively, the urban poor have encroached on *mailo* land and construct their own makeshift dwellings. These processes have given rise to Kampala's sprawling slums. Given that the land is privately owned by absentee landlords, the urban authorities have virtually no means of preventing the expansion of these illegal settlements by the urban poor. During an investigation into developing a sustainable Kampala Urban Sanitation

Programme (Kampala city council 2000), an official in Kampala City's planning office complained:

> The major problem of planning for Kampala City is the structural composition of the city. A greater part of the city has since time immemorial been in private hands while only a small proportion has been public land. Now, tell me, how do you plan for the land you do not own? Well, legally yes, but politically it is difficult. (Interview, April 2000)

Only a small part of Kampala City where leasehold land prevails has been planned and developed according to the city's planning standards. *Mailo* land, the *kibuga*, remains unplanned and its usage has evolved without any development control. Buildings face different directions. There is great mixture of uses. Most of the buildings are temporary or semi-permanent and many households live in overcrowded conditions (United Nations Environment Programme 1989). The slums of the original *kibuga* areas contrast with the orderly settlement patterns and well-constructed dwellings of the planned areas (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development 1993). It is mainly in *kibuga* areas that informal activities such as urban farming take place (Nuwagaba and Mwesigwa 1997).

The dualism continues to exist in the form of what is described today as either the informal versus the formal, or traditional versus modern sectors. The tensions that exist between these two sectors are manifested in Kampala City's inability to manage urban growth (Van Norstrand J. Associates Ltd. 1994).

In 1994, Kampala City Council (KCC) embarked on the development of a structural plan aimed at streamlining urban development, housing investment, industrial establishments, general economic activity and environmental management. The structure sought to address the ambiguities arising from dualism by trying creatively to make them work for, rather than against, the city. Although the structural plan remains Kampala's most authoritative planning document, none of it has ever been implemented. There are too many contradictory forces at play regarding land access, housing development and urban occupational pursuits, as outlined below.

Land access: Unravelling competing interests of Bugandan insiders and Kampalan outsiders

Since the creation of the *mailo* tenure system, the land market in Kampala has been heavily constrained despite the fact that *mailo* land was originally intended to promote private ownership and efficient land usage. This paradox reflects the layered and often conflicting nature of property rights vested in *mailo* land. *Mailo* land is rooted in Bugandan usufruct land rights and patron–client relations in the first instance, long-established tenant and squatter patterns, and ethnic rather than urban-based notions of land usage.

The following attempts to disentangle these complex competing interests related to land access and usage.

Ownership versus user/occupiers' Rights

The 1900 Buganda Agreement created a landlord/tenant situation. At this stage, the landlords and tenants were all Bagandans bound by patron–client relations that were further elaborated by the agreement. Over time, these rights and responsibilities acquired legal underpinnings and were applied to tenants as well as squatters. Those occupying *mailo* holdings could expect to be compensated before any development took place on a given piece of occupied land.

The line between 'tenants', that is *bona fide* occupants, and 'squatters' illegally occupying the land became difficult to discern. Current Ugandan law prescribes only that the former should be compensated (Republic of Uganda 1995, 1998), but it has been practically impossible not to compensate the illegal tenants. This situation has contributed to Kampala's heavily constrained land market. Titleholders find it difficult to sell the land since any purchaser has to incur multiple expenses arising from the compensation due to the tenant who occupies any land parcels for sale. This has a depressing effect on market demand for land.

Limits to usufruct/occupants' rights are revealed in the fact that these rights do not constitute security for bank loans. Only titleholders can use land as collateral. However, in Kampala even titleholders find it difficult to use their land as collateral due to the banks' reservations about occupant rights and encumbrances imposed on land titleholders. The result is that there are low levels of investment in land development.

The geo-politics of Buganda in Kampala

On the supply side, land availability is constrained by ethnic considerations. Titleholders are primarily Bagandan and any commercial sale of land on their part is accompanied by a perplexing non-commercial consideration, as they can be accused of selling their tribal homeland. Any purchase of land by a person hailing from outside the Buganda region is termed 'grabbing'. This is because land in Buganda is presumed to 'belong' to the *Kabaka*. Leases to foreign investors are heavily sanctioned and viewed as 'selling' Buganda to foreigners. Thus, foreign investment is highly restricted.

This situation has stifled industrial growth in Kampala and circumscribed other employment opportunities. Some investors have deliberately shifted to other towns like Mbarara in western Uganda because of the land constraint. President Museveni has castigated KCC for its failure to overcome this obstacle and secure foreign investment for Kampala.

Land-price escalation

Ironically, land pressure is escalating in Kampala while a large proportion of the land remains undeveloped. Serious supply-and-demand constraints have jammed the market resulting in unrealistically high and sometimes volatile land prices. At present approximately 70 per cent of the land in Kampala is privately owned, most having been *mailo* land (Nuwagaba and Kisamba-Mugerwa 1993). Some people in Kampala own large tracts of undeveloped land that they are unwilling or unable to sell. Individual landowners may not be in a financial position to develop their land, yet few wish to dispose of it to potential developers despite the fact that there is increasing demand for land due to population growth and investors seeking to develop land commercially for residential and occupational purposes. This has led to skyrocketing land prices for plots (Mamdani 1997), as shown in Table 6.1.

A medium-income earner earns approximately US$150 per month, putting the acquisition of a housing plot beyond the reach of the majority of the urban population. Demand for housing in Kampala is rampant, yet the broad masses lack the purchasing power to provision themselves with decent housing.

Getting around the market impasse?

Selling off public land

Could the leasing of public land offer better access to land? The system of public leasehold operated in Uganda from 1900 until 1995 when all the public leasehold properties formerly under the control of municipal authorities were converted to freehold (Republic of Uganda 1995). Access to this land was mainly dominated by 'gate-keepers', highly placed individuals in government. Only high- and medium-income earners in Kampala had a chance to gain ownership of public land parcels when they came on the market, and Kampala's urban poor, who were unable to offer tantalizing bribes, were doomed.

The hope of buying from mailo landlords

The only feasible land market was through private purchase from individual *mailo* landowners. However, as already mentioned, the majority of the urban

Table 6.1 Land (*mailo*) value for selected areas of Kampala, 1989–1997 (US$/0.25 acres)

Year	Muyenga	Makerere	Rubaga	Bunga	Busega
1989	8,000	5,000	4,000	2,000	2,000
1990	12,000	6,000	6,000	3,500	3,200
1991	16,000	8,000	8,000	5,000	4,000
1993	18,000	9,000	8,500	6,000	4,000
1995	22,000	10,000	10,000	7,000	5,000
1997	25,000	12,000	12,000	10,000	6,000

Sources: Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Kampala, 1993 and Department of Housing, Entebbe, 1999.

poor constitute the retrenched, the unemployed and those whose earnings cannot be stretched to buy land at the market rate. Even higher-income prospective purchasers interested in developing plots for earning rental income balk at the price of land.

It is in this light that the recent developments in land legislation were promulgated to streamline and free the land market in Uganda (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Physical Planning 1997). Article 237(8) & (9) of the 1995 Uganda Constitution guarantees security of occupancy of *bona fide* (*de jure*) occupants of *mailo*, freehold or leasehold land, and Article 26 guarantees protection of individual property (Republic of Uganda 1995). Parliament is also empowered to enact laws providing for the acquisition of a *registerable interest* in the land by tenants. Under the Land Act (1998), a certificate of occupancy can be granted to the occupant on application to the registered owner. The certificate is intended to enable the occupant to prove that s/he is a *bona fide* occupant should the need arise. However, this is envisaged to rest on a mutual understanding between the two parties, highly paradoxical given the tenant's low socio-economic status. It is unlikely that a poor tenant can come to an amicable agreement with a rich landlord who wields both economic and political power.

According to the Land Act (1998), it is further stipulated that where there is a lack of agreement between the tenant and the landlord, the Land Tribunal will intervene. These proposals are envisaged to address the contradictions between *de jure* and *de facto* owners of land, paving the way for a freer land market. However, given the vulnerability of the poor, the impartiality of such land tribunals is questionable. Evidence adduced elsewhere (Maxwell 1995, Nuwagaba 1997) attests to the fact that the rich have persistently been the beneficiaries in land-dispute arbitration.

Slumming it: Land laws versus political realities

Most of Kampala's temporary dwelling units are constructed on land that is held under *mailo* tenure. The relationship between land tenure and type of housing is highly significant (Table 6.2).

While KCC is mandated to effect development control by way of enforcing building standards, it has found it difficult to exercise this authority on *mailo* land slum settlements (Republic of Uganda 1969). Once built, such dwelling units cannot be removed without serious political consequences.

Slum settlements are inhabited by dense populations of the urban poor whose quality of life, notably their health and safety, is continually being compromised. The major problems include poor sanitation, bad solid-waste management and the grossly inadequate disposal of human excreta. It has been amply documented that most of the irregular settlements particularly on *mailo* land tenure lack access to toilet facilities (Nuwagaba 1997). Even

Table 6.2 Distribution of housing types by Land Tenure

Type of dwelling unit	Land-tenure system: Private *Mailo*/ freehold		Public leasehold		Customary		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Permanent	179	74	19	8	44	18	242	100
Semi-permanent	155	59	8	3	98	38	258	100
Temporary	225	86	2	1	34	13	262	100
Total	559	73	29	4	176	23	762	100

Source: Nuwagaba 1997.

those who have access to toilets share them with up to as many as six households. Private toilets serve as public toilets. It is not surprising that Kampala City has been hit by two cholera epidemics in the last three years alone. The problem was summed up by the Kampala Central Division Officer as follows:

> The problem of cholera is a result of high-density settlement with poor human excreta disposal methods. Most of the urban poor households in Kampala lack toilets. They dispose of their waste in open drains using plastic bags. Some of the drains constitute part of the domestic water sources such as unprotected springs. The problem here is that we have attempted to demolish these illegal settlements but the politicians have failed us as they always shield these people. (Medical Officer, Kampala Central Division, Kampala City, April 2002)

Piped water is fairly well distributed in Kampala but the majority of the urban poor cannot afford either the water installation cost or the monthly water-tariff charge. Approximately 38 per cent of the urban poor use springs as a source of domestic water.

Kampala's poor make do with dilapidated housing structures, inadequate water supplies and no toilet facilities. The City Council has been powerless in addressing the situation. As the World Bank (1993) and Mabogunje (1990) observed, such slum settlements are 'hot spots'. Their populations mainly eke out their living through informal activities and any demolition of such high-density settlements would result in tremendous social and political upheaval that city officials and national politicians would be loath to deal with.

The poor settle in the marginal areas of the city, especially in Kampala's extensive valley-bottom wetlands nestled between the city's famous hills, areas that are legally off-limits for settlement. Thus the poor are always sensitive to who is in charge of decision-making as they can be evicted from such places without notice. The dwellings that the poor construct illegally need protection from 'political godfathers' lest the city authorities demolish them. Thus, the poor vote *en masse* for a candidate who they know will protect their accommodation and economic activities in the city. They constitute the majority of Kampala's population, according them social and political manoeuvrability in parliamentary and municipal elections.

Urban slum settlements expand despite increasingly restrictive legislation against them. It is the political factor – rather than the lack of technical capacity, legislation or urban-planning structures and systems – that accounts for the continued and growing presence of ramshackle housing across the Kampala City landscape.

The politicization of urban management results has resulted in haphazard urban growth frustrating the city's planners as evidenced in the following observations by one Kampala City planner:

> You see we have all the plans for the development of Kampala. There is even a Kampala Structural Plan produced in 1994. However, I wish to tell you that without the political will, nobody will implement the structural plan. You look at these slum settlements, we are not lacking the human capacity or legislation to demolish them, but these dilapidated housing structures belong to private people you may find difficult to touch. 'Are they politically connected?' I asked. 'No,' he replied. 'They belong to private people who are powerful in their own way and there is nothing you can do to their private properties.' (Official, Urban Sanitation Programme 2000, cited in Nawangwe and Nuwagaba 2002: 110)

The Local Urban Authorities Act (1969) clearly gives the mandate for local urban authorities to enforce building regulations but the Act has fallen by the wayside due to a lack of political will and pervasive cronyism. The individual ownership of *mailo* land in such slum settlements has exacerbated the situation, creating a formidable uphill task. Formerly, in the case of public leaseholds, failure to comply with building and sanitation standards could result in the leasehold being revoked. But now the privately owned land poses tremendous challenges for the enforcement of standards. The irony is that Bagandan landlords and their tenants, who have strongly opposing interests, converge in their non-adherence to building and sanitation standards.

Not just a roof over their heads: Urban agriculture's ambiguous status

It will be recalled that in the 1970s, the Ugandan economy was plunged into turmoil. The period was characterized by political instability, the collapse of the industrial sector, widespread unemployment and the growth of urban poverty. Informal sector activity proliferated becoming the main form of income generation for the majority of the city's residents. The major economic activities that have emerged in Kampala since the 1970s include petty commodity trade, carpentry, metal fabrication and motor-vehicle repair.

Meanwhile, Maxwell (1995) found that urban farming in Kampala provided more than 60 per cent of household food needs. Urban farming was a pervasive activity among both low- and medium-income earners. This defies the earlier hypothesis that urban farming was solely the domain of the poor. This may have been facilitated by the impasse in the land market which has generated tracts of unused land under *mailo* and private land ownership that can be farmed. Table 6.3 below shows the incidence of urban farming activities according to land-tenure status.

The major issue that is discernable from Table 6.3 is that most urban farmers in the survey are carrying out agricultural activities on land held under private *mailo* land tenure. Agricultural activities tend to take place on borrowed land parcels (37 per cent) and on titled *mailo* owner occupancy, both purchased and inherited (26 per cent). These forms of land tenure provide the most appropriate environment for one to access farmland. The land belonging to individuals can be rented, lent or granted temporally on the basis of user rights to those undertaking farming activities.

The *mailo* land tenure allows transfer of user rights via borrowing or illegal occupancy/squatting. This has proliferated under 'absentee landlordism' where the *de facto* owner or sitting tenant of a land parcel can sell land-user rights to a third party. The land held under leasehold on the other hand does not facilitate such transactions as the local urban authority grants the lease of a

Table 6.3 Incidence of urban farmers by land-tenure categories in Kampala City

Access/tenure category	**Enumeration area**							
	Luwafu		**Kiswa**		**Najja**		**Total**	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Owner occupancy (titled *mailo*)								
Purchased	3	6.5	–		8	44.4	11	11.8
Inherited	9	19.6	–		4	22.2	13	14.0
Owner occupancy (public leased)								
Purchased	3	6.5	2[a]	6.9	–		5	5.4
Inherited	5	10.9	2[a]	6.9	–		7	7.5
Borrowed *mailo*	23	50.0	8	27.6	3	16.7	34	36.6
Squatted[b]	3	6.5	17	58.6	3	16.7	23	24.7
Total	46	100.0	29	100.0	18	100.0	93	100.0

Notes: Land in Luwafu area had been under *Kabaka*ship *mailo* before 1966, then it was public land administered by Kampala City Council until 1995 when it again became *mailo*. Kiswa area is largely public land held under leasehold. Najja area is *mailo* land.
[a] leases have expired, legal land ownership in question.
[b] illegal tenants on *mailo*.
Source: Maxwell 1995.

particular land parcel to prospective developers without notice to the tenant farmer (Mougeot 1993, Nuwagaba 2000). The existence of tenant farmers is basically ignored, which means that a tenant farmer stands to lose any investment s/he has made on the land.

While access to land parcels held under *mailo* tenure is relatively easy through renting, borrowing or squatting, accessing leasehold land parcels is an uphill task since the acquisition of such parcels are usually riddled with complex bureaucratic processes. Those farming on purchased leasehold land account for only 5.4 per cent of the total, while those farming on inherited leasehold were slightly more numerous (7.5 per cent). Kampala City Council is not enthusiastic about granting leasehold for agricultural purposes. Leasehold certificates are issued on condition that the leaseholder develops the land within a specified period. Non-compliance results in withdrawal of the land and allocation to another prospective developer (Uganda, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development 1993). Furthermore, the granting of leasehold goes with the payment of a premium and ground rent as required by the land-management legislation. This limits the numbers of people who can afford it since agricultural returns from the land are unlikely to bear such costs (Nuwagaba and Kisamba-Mugerwa 1993).

Conclusion: Urban planning and land-tenure regimes

It has been argued that the proliferation of slums in Kampala is closely related to its land-tenure history. The urban-planning framework in Kampala has encountered insurmountable problems connected with land tenure. The Local Urban Authorities Act (1969) clearly empowers municipal authorities to effect development control in all areas under their jurisdiction but the slum settlements are heavily entwined with the city's *body politique* rendering urban planners ineffective in implementing urban-planning and land-use legislation. Major slum settlements in Kampala, such as Bwaise, Katwe, Kibuli and Mulago, all stand on land held under *mailo* tenure. Most dwelling units in these areas are illegal and some are devoid of any basic sanitation facilities. They are breeding grounds for cholera that threaten the entire city. Nonetheless, they remain beyond the control of municipal regulations.

Slums are not an unavoidable aspect of urban development. In South Korea, General Pak Cheng Hi's land-reform measures largely eradicated Seoul's slum problem,[1] although this was in the context of access to significant financial resources, rapid industrialization and a highly authoritarian government – circumstances that are not replicable in today's Uganda. Slum eradication can succeed with good corrective and preventative policy measures. There are three pertinent questions that any urban planner should ponder: who plans the city, in what image and for what purpose.

A city is analogous to a biological organism with interactive functional systems. The dysfunction of one system can jeopardize the functioning of the whole. Urban planning may need to internalize the concept of an 'African City' rather than continually take refuge in models of development that are out of touch with the African reality. It is imperative that the image of an African city reflects the local value system and recognizes the socio-economic configuration of the potential beneficiaries of a given urban plan. Similarly, the plan must aim to generate sustainable urban development by balancing population and economic activity. It is pertinent to note that most European cities developed out of structural transformation characterized by industrial growth, production and employment generation based on a market rationale. By contrast, many cities in the developing world today, and particularly in Africa, are the result of the mere creation of convenient administrative centres with no viable economic base and the absence of 'a critical mass of purchasing power' to sustain an urban economy.

The unfolding of land tenure and the growth of urban dualism has been extremely counterproductive in Kampala. Duality is present in several respects: in the city's extremely poor housing, its haphazard land use, and unregulated informal economy. This lack of regulation poses deleterious effects on the urban environment and perpetuates poverty. If housing and livelihood conditions were improved and the informal economy were well organized, a virtuous cycle of structural transformation in Kampala could be achieved.

Kampala's duality has served as a formidable obstacle to effective urban planning. It is neither the lack of technical or financial capacity nor the legislation that are responsible for the city's squalid slums in what was a royal realm. Resolution of the land question and the attendant land impasse requires the exertion of a strong political will. The continuation of Kampala's land-management dualism serves the interests of very few relative to the tens of thousands currently living in bad housing conditions and poverty. Inevitably, even more will be living in such impoverished conditions in the decades to come in the absence of a political solution.

Note

1. General Pak ruled South Korea between 1960s and 1970s. His land-reform and slum-clearance measures, largely facilitated by an inflow of foreign capital particularly from the United States as part of a Cold War strategy, helped stimulate South Korean economic growth and its attainment of the status of an NIC (Newly Industrializing Country). Those evicted from slum areas were resettled in appropriate housing.

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Part III

Urban Livelihoods and Social Dynamics

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7
Urban Poverty in East Africa: Nairobi and Kampala's Comparative Trajectories

Philip Amis

The neighbouring countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are collectively referred to as East Africa. Culturally similar and with Kiswahili as their *lingua franca*, they share a common history as former British colonies. All achieved national independence in the early 1960s and formed the East African community until 1977. In those decades, Tanzania and Kenya became respectively icons of socialist and capitalist models of development, often prompting their levels and rates of development to be compared.

Now, however, Kenya and Uganda represent striking development contrasts. Uganda became a 'donor darling' during the late 1980s and retained this status throughout the 1990s following years of decline under Idi Amin and subsequent instability and civil war under Milton Obote. By contrast, Kenya's early post-colonial economic growth and industrial development seemed to be following a virtuous path forward, but just as Uganda began its recovery from years of upheaval, Kenya slipped into a period of bad government and ethnic strife, and started to develop a poor human-rights record. During the 1990s under the leadership of President Moi, Kenya became a pariah of donors, only emerging from this protracted period of isolation when Moi was voted out of office in 2002.

The aim of this chapter is to document and explain the changing nature of urban poverty in Nairobi and Kampala since 1955 in relation to the long-term trends of deagrarianization and urbanization. Iliffe (1987) in his book, *The African Poor*, argues that colonialism created new forms of poverty. Citing the Kikuyu of Kenya, he shows how the landless poor emerged and became wage labourers as a new means of survival. Land replaced rural labour as the major asset constraint. This chapter argues that this transition had implications for urban poverty as well. Quantitative as well as qualitative measures of urban poverty are compared to reveal the extent and depth of poverty in Nairobi and Kampala.

Tracing urban poverty in relation to long-term trends

In the run-up to independence in East Africa, the East African Royal Commission in 1954–56, prompted by the violence of the Mau Mau uprising, recommended that measures be taken to create a stable African middle class. Minimum-wage legislation introduced in all three countries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) soon afterwards gradually replaced the cheap male migrant wage-labour systems that had characterized East Africa with far smaller but much better-paid wage labour forces concentrated primarily in urban areas. The policy pushed urban waged earnings considerably higher than rural earnings, causing some commentators to refer to an urban 'labour aristocracy' (Arrighi 1970). Urban wages in East Africa increased in real terms until the mid-1970s when they started to decline fairly steadily. With eroding real wage levels, the ability of urban households to survive and to sustain their standards of living plummeted (Bryceson 1985, Amis 1986, 1989).

In Kenya, in the face of mounting urban migration, a trade-off emerged between continued wage improvements and the political necessity of employment creation. Between the oil crises of 1973–74 and 1979, the Kenya government, like the majority of governments in Sub-Saharan Africa, allowed the minimum wage to slip below urban family subsistence costs. The implementation of structural adjustment policies at the behest of the International Monetary Fund during the 1980s further undermined real minimum wage levels. Meanwhile industrial and government formal wage-employment opportunities drastically contracted as the declining national economy and budgetary cutbacks caused widespread formal wage-labour redundancies.

Faced with an erosion of their livelihoods, the survival strategies of the urban poor were primarily directed at informal sector participation and drawing on agrarian resources. The second strategy was not open to all households. Excessive pressure on rural land in Kenya meant that an estimated one-third of Nairobi's urban working class were 'exposed proletariat' lacking agrarian livelihood resources to fall back on for their subsistence (Amis 1986).

In Uganda under Idi Amin's regime and the political destabilization that followed, urbanites lacked civil order and formal employment, which together posed an even more dramatic livelihood crisis. However, access to land in Uganda was generally prevalent even amongst the residents of Kampala. Hence people had the option of a 'retreat into subsistence', returning to the rural areas or farming on the urban fringes as real urban wages eroded (Amis 1986).

While the populations of Kenya and Uganda's capital cities faced declining wage-labour employment and reduced purchasing power, which was most acutely experienced in Uganda, access to land – both urban and rural – nonetheless allowed Kampala's urban population to survive. In Kenya and specifically in Nairobi, the urban population had no rural fallback available, leaving them more exposed to the downturn in the economy.

Divergent trends in Uganda and Kenya

The mid-1980s marks the beginnings of a clear divergence in the experience of Uganda and Kenya. Museveni's National Resistance Movement took power in Uganda in 1986 and gradually the country stabilized and started to recover from its long period of political insurgency, except in the north where violent upheaval continues to the present. Meanwhile, Kenya has experienced slow economic decline accompanied by a series of political crises and disputes about corruption with international agencies. Table 7.1 reflects these trends.

In the mid-1980s, Kenya was clearly more economically prosperous but by the turn of the century, despite their different paths, both countries had similar levels of GNP per capita. This was due to Uganda's relative success and economic growth during the 1990s while Kenya's economy stagnated and then declined. Between 1990 and 1997, Uganda received remarkable levels of foreign aid, boosting its annual average GDP growth to over 7 per cent, the second highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya's fate with donors was quite the opposite and its growth rate was only just over 2 per cent (World Bank 2001).

The social indicators tell a slightly different story. Kenya remained ahead but the trend was one of stagnation and sometimes reversal. Uganda's

Table 7.1 Select social and economic indicators

Indicator	**Kenya**	**Uganda**
Population in 1999	29 m	21 m
GNP per capita in US$ in 1999	360	320
Infant mortality rate per 1000		
1970	102	109
1980	75	116
1997	74	99
Life expectancy at birth		
1980	55	48
1990	60	52
1997	52	42
Urban population		
1980	2.7 m	1.1 m
1997	8.7 m	2.7 m
Urban population as % of total		
1980	16	9
1997	30	13
Arable land (per capita)		
1979–81	0.23	0.32
1995–97	0.14	0.26

Source: World Bank 2000, 2001.

indicators improved surprisingly slowly. Its infant mortality rate was particularly intransigent, and life-expectancy figures for both countries were appalling, reflecting the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS.

One of the major differences between Kenya and Uganda was the extent of urbanization and, inversely, people's access to rural land. By 1997, Kenya was much more urbanized with 30 per cent of its population living in urban areas in contrast to only 13 per cent in Uganda. The urbanization gap between the two countries increased compared with the 1980s when 16 and 9 per cent of the respective populations of both countries were urban. Uganda's economic recovery and improved security did not trigger a pronounced urban growth spurt.

The figures for arable land per capita show that rural land availability in Uganda was almost twice that in Kenya (World Bank 2001). Both countries, but especially Kenya, have large areas of semi-arid land in their northern regions. Furthermore, Kenya is more densely populated than Uganda and has a stronger legacy of large-scale capitalized agriculture and land inequality. For these reasons, Kenya is much further down the road to rural landlessness than Uganda.

High levels of inequality restrict the extent to which the advantages of economic growth can benefit all members of society. Unequal societies have to grow even faster than more equal societies to allow economic benefits to reach all members of a society (World Bank 2001). The Gini Index for Kenya in 1994 was 44.5, and 39.2 in Uganda in 1992/93. These are both high figures by international standards and help explain the persistence of poverty. In Uganda in 1993, 55 per cent of the population was living below the national poverty line. In Kenya in 1992 the comparative figure was 42–29 per cent of the urban population and 46 per cent for the rural population (World Bank 2000/2001).

Thus, successful macroeconomic growth in Uganda has, by and large, not been translated into improvements in health and education provision. Ablo and Reinikka (1998) convincingly argue that resources in health and education have not been getting through to local levels. Uganda's economic performance constitutes a positive upward trend from an appallingly low position, but it will unfortunately take a generation, if not more, to repair the damage that two decades of civil war did to Uganda's social and economic fabric. The detrimental consequences of political disturbances can be profoundly enduring.

The next two sections turn to the nature of urban poverty in Nairobi and Kampala.

Nairobi: Increasing overcrowding and poverty

The population of Nairobi has shown sustained growth since 1960, reaching 2.1 million in 1999. Table 7.2 provides estimates of the population of Nairobi's main unauthorized settlements since 1960.

Table 7.2 Population estimates for Nairobi's major unauthorized settlements, 1960–1992

Year	Nairobi	Kibera	Mathare Valley	Dagoretti/Kawangware	Korokocho
1960		3,000	n.a.	18,000	n.a.
1965		6,000	3,000	30,000	n.a.
1970	510,000	11,000	35,000	41,000	2,000
1975		20,000	65,000	65,000	5,000
1980	1,350,000	62,000	120,000	90,000	40,000
1992		248,360	58,960[a]	186,250	56,580

[a]The decline in the population of Mathare Valley is explained by the replacement of unauthorized housing with formal structures built by housing companies.
Sources: HRDU 1971, LCHSUS 1976, Hake 1977, Chege 1981, Amis 1984, Matrix 1993.

The growth of unauthorized settlements was already rapid in the first decade after national independence, increasing from only 500 units in 1962 to 22,000 units in 1972 (Chana and Morrison 1973). In 1979, there were estimated to be roughly 110,000 units accounting for approximately 40 per cent of Nairobi's population. By 1993 the population in Nairobi's informal settlements was estimated at 750,000, representing 55 per cent of the city's total population, yet they occupied only 5.8 per cent of Nairobi's land area (Alder 1995). Informal settlements have grown much faster than the total urban population.

The figures for Kibera are the most reliable. The 1980 and 1992 estimates were produced from aerial photos (Amis 1983, Matrix 1993). Between 1980 and 1992 the number of residents in the settlements grew from 62,000 to 248,360, at an average annual growth rate of 12 per cent. In 1998, Kibera's population was estimated, again from aerial photos, at 500,000, representing a growth rate of 17 per cent.[1] The estimated density of 2000 people per hectare was thought to be one of the highest in Africa.

Such high concentrations of population exert inordinate pressure on the housing stock. The vast majority of Nairobi's slum residents rent housing, often at high costs relative to their incomes. Table 7.3 provides longitudinal data on monthly rents for the main unauthorized areas of Nairobi. Rent levels reflect location, the urban land market and the quality of the structure[2] but they can be compared spatially and over time because they form integral components of Nairobi's housing market (Amis 1983, Holin 1987). Within Nairobi, Kibera is the most expensive settlement on account of its inner-city location and proximity to the industrial area, which is a major source of employment. Korokocho and Dagoretti, as settlements peripheral to the city centre, are the cheapest. It is also important to appreciate that there are substantial variations within settlements.

There has been a significant decline in both informal rent levels and wages since 1980. Rents declined by roughly 50 per cent in real terms

Table 7.3 Monthly rents and percentage of income spent on rent in Nairobi, 1980–1995 (in Ksh)

	Kibera		Mathare Valley		Dagoretti		Korokocho		Gitari Marigu	
Year	**Rent (Ksh)**	**% of income**	**Rent (Ksh)**	**% of income**	**Rent (Ksh)**	**% of income**	**Rent (Ksh)**	**% of income**	**Rent (Ksh)**	**% of income**
1980	104	14	90		120		70			
1982	200						70–100			
1983	220									
1985	100–250				200		70–180			
1987	180–225		161	12	152	9	148			
1988	150–250									
1989	266	18			212	14	234			
1992	340		200		80–250		150			
1995			200–350				150–350		345	23

Sources: Amis 1983: 167, Lee-Smith 1990: 110, Seeley *et al*. 1983: 241, DPU 1985: 45–71, Holin 1987: 22, Ladu 1989: 28, HRDU 1990: 44, Matrix 1993: 31–42, Matrix 1995: 23.

between 1980 and 1992. This is the reverse of what would usually have been expected. However both minimum and average wage levels declined over the same period. The average wage was indexed at 67 in 1992 compared to a base of 100 in 1980 (Amis and Lloyd 1990).

By the end of the 1990s, rents seem to have become more differentiated according to quality and the latest figures for 1995 ranged from Ksh 150 to Ksh 350. Indeed the diversity of the unauthorized housing market made it harder to monitor rents (Jones and Nelson 1999). Whatever the precise trend, there was no evidence that the burden of paying rent decreased for low-income households in Nairobi. Participatory poverty assessments conducted in 2001 noted that after food, rents were the second largest item of expenditure for a family, and greater than education (AMREF 2001: 16).

The importance of rent levels in Nairobi was vividly illustrated by political clashes that rocked Kibera in late November and early December 2001. Violence was triggered by a feud between landlords and tenants over rents following a visit by President Daniel Arap Moi, who directed the provincial administration to explore ways of making landlords cut their rents. Fighting ensued, which resulted in 12 deaths and the displacement and homelessness of an estimated 3000 people.[3] Kenya's ethnic and electoral politics had become mixed with anger about rent levels, giving this conflict a particularly virulent character. The poor tend towards high room occupancy as a way of deflecting rental costs. Table 7.4 suggests a surprising stability in the occupancy of persons per room, with the number of persons fairly constant at around 3.2–4.6. This is consistent with recent observations that rooms tend to accommodate households of between three and five people (Lamda 1994). There is more variation between settlements than over time. This could be interpreted as consistent with stable rent levels that do not necessitate further room crowding. An alternative hypothesis is that the number of persons per room unit is already at saturation point. However, while the total number of persons per room remains relatively

Table 7.4 Estimates of residents per room in Nairobi's unauthorized settlements

Settlement	**1980**	**1987**	**1989**	**1992**	**1995**
Kibera	3.3		3.4	5	
Mathare Valley		3.3		4	
Dagoretti		3.4	4.0		
Korogocho			4.6	5	
Kariobangi		4.2			
Kawangware		3.1	3.2	5	
Gitari Marigu					5–8

Sources: 1980 data: Amis 1983, 1987 data: Holin 1987: 16, 1989 data: HRDU 1990: 26, 1992 data: Matrix 1993, 1995 data: Matrix 1995: 8–23.

constant, there is anecdotal evidence that increasing poverty may be spurring changes in household structure and composition. The impression is of a decline in married couples with an increase in single-headed households often sharing accommodation.

Crowding three to five people into a room raises the issue of poor living standards. The 2001 participatory poverty assessment revealed that the poor prioritized their problems in the following order: unemployment/low wages, access to education, water and sanitation, housing/shelter and improved access to health care (AMREF 2001). Mention of unemployment as a foremost problem relates to the general lack of access to rural land as an agrarian fallback coupled with low-paid wage work or self-employment. Furthermore it was observed 'that although their children had completed schooling, many had failed to secure meaningful employment'.

Three main coping strategies were identified: the withdrawal of children from school, encouraging children to work, and eating less or only once a day. Interestingly no one mentioned that their coping strategies rested on rural resources or reliance on kin. The importance of alcohol and drugs as a way of coping with life was vividly described. The 'consumption of the local brew is a major coping mechanism especially among the male residents... women who resort to drinking because they have nothing to take home for their children... so they try to escape from the reality' (AMREF 2001: 20–22). In fact, drunk respondents became a serious methodological problem for the poverty assessment exercise.

The other problems mentioned relate to deteriorating environmental conditions in Nairobi in terms of the water supply, sanitation and housing. Education and health are concerns because of the need to pay for basic services in Kenya under 'cost-sharing' policies, whereas previously they were free of charge. In one of the settlements within Kibera, participants were asked to draw graphs depicting the trend in living costs. The graphs showed a sharply increasing line for living costs between 1985 and 2000 (AMREF 2001). The poverty assessment exercise does not provide rigorous measurement but does provide valuable insights.

A 1996 Kenyan participatory poverty assessment highlighted the situation of 60 female-headed households in the Mathare Valley and Korokocho slums, both of which represent vulnerable social groups. The majority of the women had left their rural home areas because of household duress. Seventeen per cent migrated because of the break-up of their marriages, 13 per cent had experienced abandonment, and another 13 per cent were widowed and 'arrived in Nairobi virtually without assets of any kind' (Narayan and Nyamwaya 1996: 52). Their basic definition of poverty was people who 'do not have food and clothing for themselves and their children' (ibid.).

Most were engaged in some form of hawking or casual labour affording them meagre daily earnings of between Ksh 20 and Ksh 50. Only 50 per cent of school-aged children were enrolled in school (Narayan and Nyamwaya

1996: 54). Their health was bad with the prevalence of an enormous range of childhood diseases including diarrhoea, Kwashiokor, TB, measles and typhoid. Adults suffered from high blood pressure, many STDs, TB and HIV/AIDS.

Environmental and social service provisions were almost non-existent. The sewage and pit latrines were so overcrowded that many people simply avoided them. Many of the women could not afford to treat their sick children after buying their basic food needs and paying their monthly rent. Food was plentiful in the settlement but too expensive, so many resorted to 'rejects from the butcher' such as animal hoofs and chicken heads. Eighty-five per cent of those interviewed reported that they did not have enough food for their entire family; while 73 per cent ate only one or two meals a day (Narayan and Nyamwaya 1996).

It is not only vulnerable groups living in historically renowned slums that are at risk. People living in Kibera, Nairobi's largest settlement, faced higher residential density levels in the settlement. The population increased from 62,000 in 1980 to 248,360 in 1992 and was estimated to have reached half a million by the late 1990s. In 1980 Kibera could be described as a pleasant place once you got used to it. Few would see it that way nowadays.[4] Overcrowding exacerbated the settlement's environmental problems, as was especially evident in deteriorating sanitation levels.

There is no longer enough space to dig pit latrines and provide clean water. The inadequate number of pit latrines leads to excessive use, estimated at about 100–150 people per pit latrine in some areas. The practice of 'wrap and throw' or 'flying toilets' involving people packing their waste in plastic bags and throwing them away from their property has gained prevalence. In one recent survey, 70 per cent resorted to this practice (Malombe and Kimanta 1998). The same survey noted that malaria and diarrhoea were by far the most frequently reported diseases. Interestingly, and in sharp contrast to Uganda, HIV/AIDS was not mentioned, hinting at its stigmatization rather than low incidence rates.

Water shortages are becoming a Nairobi-wide phenomena. In Kibera, there is a bewildering collection of pipes running across the settlement to privately run kiosks. Water was expensive at Ksh 1 a *debe*[5] but this varies with availability and there is a facility to pay for 'express water'. In some cases it was reported that individuals went outside the settlement, walking over 2 km to source water, often at the risk of personal security (Malombe and Kimanta 1998). Average daily consumption was 5 litres a day in 1998, far below the corresponding figure in 1980 of 20 litres, and woefully short of the recommended minimum for human health of 13 litres (Amis 1984).

Overall, both the participatory poverty assessments and the macro poverty measures suggest that income levels are declining in real terms and that the experience of mass urban poverty is expanding. The 2001 Nairobi participatory poverty assessment (AMREF 2001) noted that 'the majority of urban participants felt that the poverty situation had worsened over the years . . . from 1990–2000 . . . and that parents had to pay for all the services that were previously offered freely by the State such as health and education'.

Kampala: Alleviation or more insidious poverty?

This section considers conflicting evidence as to whether urban poverty in Kampala is declining or spreading by focusing on the causes and conditions of poverty over time. The macro poverty measures for Uganda document impressive gains in poverty alleviation.[6] The proportion of households below the national poverty line declined from 55.5 per cent in 1992 to 44 per cent in 1997/98. Meanwhile the figure for urban Uganda declined over the same period from 28.2 to 16.3 per cent while the corresponding figure for the central urban category, effectively Kampala, declined from 21.5 to 11.5 per cent. These are substantial improvements over a five-year period. Appelton *et al.* (1999: 18–23) note that 'the data on private consumption from the five recent Ugandan household surveys provide a picture of rising living standards in accordance with the macroeconomic data on growth. . . . The finding that urban living standards have risen is unsurprising given the many indicators of strong performance of non-agriculture sectors and the visible progress in the major towns.'

It is interesting to contrast these macro findings with the latest Uganda participatory poverty assessment carried out in four locations in Kampala in 2000. Poverty, seen as the inability to 'get by' in the urban environment, was quickly identified (Republic of Uganda 2000: 13). This state of being was linked primarily to not having sufficient cash. 'Money is the underlying factor in what constitutes urban poverty. Everything in the urban centre . . . is monetized hence survival revolves around money' (Republic of Uganda 2000: xvi).

The causes of poverty were diverse, including high taxes, lack of education/skills resulting in low-paid jobs, ill health, limited or no land, poor planning and lack of policies, and excessive competition from the sale of the same commodity (Republic of Uganda 2000: xvii). Most of these causes are typically cited in every African urban setting but the 'high taxes' and 'limited or no land' are worth commenting on.

Uganda has a graduated tax that constitutes a local income tax levied on almost all households, even those with modest incomes. Kampala City Council (KCC) often demands this at roadblocks operated by police *askaris* who request an individual's ID card on which tax payments are recorded. While potentially a valuable source of revenue for Uganda's local governments, its collection is highly regressive and involves tax inspectors in a collection procedure method that is close to being a levy of protection money or more arbitrary police bribes.

The participatory poverty assessment revealed that 'land was viewed by communities as the most important means of production and source of income, without which one is regarded as poor. Land has generally become unavailable and inaccessible in Kampala . . . [and] has led to a thriving land market. . . . Land for farming is no longer available in the urban areas such that people have to depend upon markets for their daily needs implying that whatever is earned is spent on purchasing food' (Republic of Uganda 2000: 20). This indicates that the option of urban farming upon which the urban poor in the late 1980s and early 1990s depended is receding for many of the poor given increasing commercial land values.

Kampala is built on a series of hills and historically urban agriculture tended to take place in the valleys. Now, however, densification of settlement has led many poor to settle in the valleys where they would previously have farmed and where they were increasingly susceptible to loss of property due to flooding in the rainy season (Republic of Uganda 2000: 37). Flooding is clearly a major problem for low-income households not only in terms of asset loss but also because of the health hazards posed through the increased spread of disease.

Especially vulnerable groups were 'widows with dependants especially orphans, AIDS victims, the elderly . . . the disabled, unemployed youth, illiterate female youth and single mothers. . . . These vulnerable groups usually have very few or no productive assets, lack vocational skills, are sometimes isolated and excluded, and lack guidance[7] and social support' (Republic of Uganda 2000: xviii).

In stark contrast to the findings of the national integrated household survey cited earlier, those involved in the participatory poverty assessments indicated that poverty was overall on the increase in Kampala (Republic of Uganda 2000). This was due to retrenchment and a general lack of jobs, increased flooding, pressure from extended families, high taxes, increasing incidences of disease, poor sanitation, rising prices for essential commodities, discrimination, nepotism, the reduced ability to farm, and increased urbanization.

Other studies further fuel the controversy over poverty trends in Kampala. A recent study of Bwaise, a low-income settlement in Kampala, confirms the view that general economic improvements have taken place over the last 20 years. This, however, is more at the level of households being better able to 'survive' now compared with in the past, rather than an indication of major household improvement (Gifford 2001).

It may be that the multi-dimensional poverty perspective of the participatory poverty assessments heightens awareness of poverty indicators that were previously accepted fatalistically. The salience of environmental factors in the form of flooding, poor sanitation and disease in the Kampala study is undoubtedly significant and reflects the gross inadequacies of planning and infrastructure provisioning in line with Kampala's demographic growth (Chapter 6).

Furthermore, the improvement of macroeconomic indicators cannot be equated with poverty reduction for all. Distributional inequities may leave individual households or even whole neighbourhoods unable to improve their living standards. So too, the impact of shocks on individuals, especially illness, can cause enormous setbacks regardless of general economic improvement (Pryer 1989, Amis 2001). The extent of HIV/AIDS in Kampala is bound to offset poverty-alleviating improvements derived from better national economic performance (Wallmann 1996).[8]

Finally, poverty assessments require disaggregating shocks, short-term developments and long-running historical trends. Over the longer term, there are now signs that the plentiful supply of farmland and resort to farming for survival or supplementation are now less feasible. Thus the nature of poverty in Kampala may be converging with that of Nairobi, moving from a land-abundant to a land-scarce economy, altering the poor's survival strategies and plunging some into much deeper levels of vulnerability as described by Iliffe (1987). The seemingly conflicting poverty evidence emerging from macro and micro studies is beginning to make sense. Participatory poverty assessments afford individuals more scope for biographic comparison and reflect long-term historical trends and immediate individual shocks, while household surveys tend to pick up the short- to medium-term economic trends. Kampala's urbanization has reached the critical point when people's subsistence farming fallback is no longer readily at hand. The foreign-aid disbursements that Uganda has enjoyed cannot replace the loss of this historical mainstay.

Twists and turns of urban trajectories

This chapter has compared the living environments and economic circumstances of the urban poor in Nairobi and Kampala. During the late colonial period and the 1960s both cities were characterized by rapid economic growth and a widening of survival options, partly as a result of national independence creating new economic opportunities for urban dwellers. This era led to the high rates of urban growth and 'urban bias' noted by Weeks and Jamal (1988). Since then the two cities have diverged.

In the second period (1970–1985), Kampala experienced major political insecurity and economic decline but the availability of access to land for farming cushioned urban dwellers against the appalling economic onslaught. Meanwhile Nairobi was still benefiting from urban economic growth but the options, especially in terms of an increasingly wage-dependent workforce and the dramatic commercialization of unauthorized settlements, began to narrow the survival options of the poor.

The final period under consideration (1985–2000) was one of high economic growth for Kampala thanks to a deluge of foreign donors directed at rebuilding the Ugandan economy. Nonetheless, a narrowing of survival options for the poor of Kampala ensued. During the same period Nairobi experienced the opposite: donor hostility and the withdrawal of donor support. The city, along with the Kenyan national economy, experienced slow growth and a reduction in survival options for the poor as their wage and self-employed remuneration levels stagnated amidst the continuing pressing concerns of daily urban life.

Iliffe (1987) incisively identified the long-term changing nature of African economies, stressing the transition from labour to land scarcity in rural areas. This trend is surprisingly relevant to an understanding of the large urban economies of East Africa, notably those of Nairobi and Kampala. Vast numbers of urban residents in these two cities live just on the edge of basic needs fulfilment. Under these circumstances, access to land for farming is a vital survival support. As their land assets slip away in the process of urbanization, the agrarian fallback is lost. The urban poor's vulnerability increases with the absence of sufficiently remunerative wage labour and self-employment opportunities.

Notes

1. The figure of 500,000 was derived from a survey carried out by GTZ and published in a 1998 Field Note (no. 1) for the Third Water Supply Project – Kibera Water Distribution Infilling component. It was not possible to check the estimation method. The roundness of the number suggests that this is a ballpark figure.
2. The major housing difference in terms of quality is between mud and wattle, timber, *mabati* and stone or block. In 1987 the average cost of a one-room unit in all the low-income neighbourhoods by construction was estimated at 139 Ksh (mud and wattle), 148 Ksh (timber), 153 Ksh (*mabati*) and 339 Ksh (stone/block) (Holin 1987: 22).
3. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, http://allafrica.com/stories/200112130194.html.
4. When I took donor aid officials around Kibera on familiarization tours in the early 1980s, they would quite often remark that it was 'poor but better than they had expected', a comment that is unimaginable now.
5. A *debe* is equivalent to roughly 20 litres of water.
6. The Uganda government first began monitoring living standards and poverty through an Integrated Household Survey (IHS) in 1992, considered one of the best household surveys in Africa. This was a large survey of 10,000 households subsequently followed up with five annual monitoring surveys (MS1–4).
7. The importance of moral dimensions to poverty was identified in participatory work in Kenya and Uganda. Even the street children in Kenya had strong moral interpretations of their position (Jones and Nelson 1999).
8. I am grateful to my PhD student Julie Gifford for this insight.

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8
Gikuyu Families in Nairobi at the Millennium: Changing Economic and Social Patterns of Family Life

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> I am not going to have a marriage like my parents have. My husband and I will be partners in all things. I earn as much as he does and that gives me the right to use that money in the way I wish.
>
> – Ann, aged 32, Pangani

> Our parents educated us to care for them. We educate our children to care for themselves. We must invest for our own future ourselves. I do not want to put that burden on my children.
>
> – TM, aged 53, Pangani

> I and my siblings were terrified of my father. When he came home we left the room and kept very quiet. He beat us. I never spoke to him openly. I am a friend to my children and treat them with love and respect. They can ask me anything.
>
> – John, aged 40, Buru Buru

> One must have a small family in order to be a good parent.
>
> – Munyi, aged 30, Kibera

As the above quotes indicate, urban Gikuyu family life has been undergoing major changes, not unlike those in other African urban areas. Colonialism, economic change, globalization and modernity have all impacted on marriage, family and parenting.

This chapter is based on research undertaken in 1998–99.[1] The original project explored the changing perceptions of family life over the last 25–50 years in the lives of Gikuyu families in Nairobi, recording the experiences and memories of people who had been parents or who were presently parents. Almost all of the 108 informants were rural–urban migrants. Many of the changes in their lives are a function of urban residence and the demands of urban-based livelihoods. Other changes are related to a wider national context of 'modernity' such as educational shifts between the generations, the impact of introduced religion on marriage patterns, new health and family-planning technology, the viability of the national economy with its attendant employment activities and erosion of urban earnings, and the obvious lack of a future for small-scale peasant agriculture in Africa today (Bryceson *et al.* 2000, Francis 2000).

Using the narratives and perceptions of my informants, this chapter examines the impact of urban livelihoods and urban residence on three aspects of family life: childcare, sibling relations and the care of aged parents. While the sample is Gikuyu (with a couple of Meru and Kamba groups closely related to the Gikuyu), the findings drawn from examining their lives have a wider application. It is the hypothesis of this chapter that trends observable amongst some urban Gikuyu today have implications for the future of marriage and the family throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.

To ensure a range of incomes and livelihoods, interviewing and participant observation were carried out in three Nairobi neighbourhoods – Kibera, Pangani and Buru Buru – all with different income and livelihood profiles.

Kibera is a low-income area, commonly referred to as a 'shanty-town' area with all the characteristics the term implies in Africa: mud-and-wattle houses, open drains, unpaved roads, a proliferation of street stalls, no electricity, water standpipes and a general air of overcrowding, vitality and shabbiness. In Kibera, most of the participants were engaged in what is referred to as *jua kali* economic activity (the Kenyan term for informal-sector activity which translates as 'hot sun'). More than half the participants had some level of primary school education, while the remaining informants had secondary education. A sprinkling of people had tertiary qualifications.

Pangani is a transition area in the northeastern sector of Nairobi near the now-notorious Mathare Valley shanty-town area. Once a low-income housing area for Indian and Pakistani skilled workers and small-business people, the original housing stock consisted of low, extended-family dwellings with inner courtyards. Following independence, the Indians and Pakistanis gradually left and the houses became overcrowded, multiple-family dwellings with an African family in each room. In the last 10 years, the rapid rise in urban land prices has meant that many of the original homes have been replaced with 5–6-storey apartment blocks of varying quality. In Pangani we found the widest mix of occupations and educational backgrounds (from second-hand clothes sellers to nurses and teachers). More than half the interviewees in Pangani had four to six years of secondary school education, while a quarter had tertiary qualifications.

Finally, Buru Buru is a higher income area with detached or semi-detached houses with small gardens and some green spaces. One or both members of each couple had secondary education or higher (two-thirds had secondary education and one-third had post-secondary education) and held down a salaried job or ran a formal sector business. The area was a desirable residential area in the 1970s but is now shabby and run-down, with illegal infilling and growing informal sector activity along the roadsides.

The political economy backdrop

The 20th century saw enormous changes in African societies and none more so than for the Gikuyu peoples of the Central Highlands who bore the brunt of British imposed modernity. While building the Mombasa-to-Kampala railway across the Highlands, the Gikuyu were militarily subjected to British rule by a system of imposed chiefs (Berg-Schlosser 1984). Soon after the so-called 'pacification', the British forcibly incorporated their rule using a combination of forced labour and the hut tax. Due to systematic displacement from much of their land by white settlers after the First World War and declining African peasant agriculture (Brett 1973, Zwanenberg 1975, Stichter 1982), by the 1920s 40–50 per cent of able-bodied Gikuyu men were in wage employment away from home (Stichter 1982: 51). At the same time, the Gikuyu became active in private enterprises and have long been regarded as the most entrepreneurial group in Kenya, building on an early tradition of active trading (Marris and Somerset 1971, Leakey 1977, White 1990).

The phenomena of circular labour migration and the split household arose from a male bias in employment, low wages and the lack of family housing in town. Through necessity, workers left their families on the land in the Highlands or in the reserves created for those displaced by British settlement. Gikuyu wives had increased workloads, while husbands who were away earning wages directed and sometimes funded agricultural production from a distance. During this period, missionaries introduced Christianity and Western-style education, both of which contributed to transforming peasant subsistence institutions designed to create wage-earning workers out of peasant subsistence farmers (Kershaw 1975, Davison 1989).

In the last 50 years, Kenya has experienced the processes of decolonization, urbanization, nation-state building, structural adjustment, and the influence of the international media and development and donor agencies. The Kenyatta era's central mission was individual and familial advancement and 'landless peasants, productive farmers and urban dwellers alike defined prosperity in terms of material rewards, security of land tenure, employment opportunities and education for the next generation' (Miller and Yeager 1994: 58). Advancements were delivered, perhaps most heavily, to the Gikuyu who profited from patronage politics 'which sanction the diversion of state or public diversion of state or public resources into private hands as well as appropriation of public resources by ethno-regional interests' (Haugerud 1995). These resources included employment, trade licenses and land.

The 1980s marked a downturn in the fortunes of Kenya as a whole and the Gikuyu in particular. First, the oil crisis undermined the vibrant growth of the post-independence period. Economic decline has continued until today, marked by decreased earnings from primary-product exports, escalating population growth, inflation, increasing unemployment despite heavy public-sector hiring, increasing informalization of the urban economy, decreasing viability of the small-scale agriculture sector, and a rapid growth of urban centres as the landless and job-seeking youth have decamped from the countryside. The country was being run on 'the self-serving, economic policies of an increasingly authoritarian and capricious Kenyan elite' (Miller and Yaeger 1994: 171). As President Moi promoted the interests of his own ethnic group, the Gikuyu have become disaffected and marginalized, giving rise recently to such extreme pro-Gikuyu groups as the Mungiki who are seen by many as the military wing of the Gikuyu-dominated Democratic Party. In 1987 the International Monetary Fund released $300 million in balance-of-payments support to assist with fiscal reforms, reductions in public employment, privatization of parastatal corporations and cutbacks in state services (Haugerud 1995).

HIV/AIDS has become an increasing problem in Kenya in the last 10 years, although the Gikuyu have not been as badly hit by the pandemic as other groups in the western part of the country. None of the families interviewed in this study had been seriously affected by the disease but they were concerned about the impact it might have on their children in the future.

The socio-cultural context of Gikuyu families

The Gikuyu were subsistence farmers in the 19th century and their society was based on patrilineage and age sets under the leadership of elder males (Kenyatta 1965). In a situation of plentiful land, 'pioneer' males could open up new land and found their own minimal lineages (*mbari*) including two to three generations of co-resident, polygynously married males. Being polygynous and having many children was both an effect and a cause of male wealth and political influence. Women's agricultural labour was the foundation of the economy. The gender balance was such that women had a certain degree of autonomy and agency in their lives (Clark 1980).

Indigenous forms of marriage, family relations and parenting reflected these structures. Marriage was loosely arranged between families in the same area but young wives were supposed to reduce their ties with their natal families. Typically, families were patrilineally extended, made up of polygynous units of several generations. The family was organized around the principles of an authoritarian, formal husband/father and semi-autonomous farmer-manager mothers operating in a recognized hierarchy based on age and gender. Each wife headed her own *nyumba* (house) with its allocated land and exercised limited control over the harvest and her right to trade foodstuffs in order to accumulate small stock. Children circulated amongst the clustered patrilineally related houses, while their ties with maternal relatives were weak and minimal. Marital and parental relations were hierarchical and formal, parenting functions were widely shared and children were the children of the *mabari*, not just of one couple (Lambert 1956, Muriuki 1974, Berg-Schlosser 1984, Shaw 1995).

Until the onset of colonial rule, this relatively homogeneous pattern was broken only by drought, famine and war. Subsequently the Gikuyu family underwent a process of rapid change, adopting new livelihoods, education, Christian sects and residence patterns. At the time of independence, most Gikuyu families were still rural-based. The farm was a 'family firm' in which the wife and children provided labour that was directed and capitalized by the husband (who was often engaged in wage employment or entrepreneurial activity in town). Cash crops (such as milk, tea and coffee) were usually under the control of the male head of household. Most families were Christian with varying degrees of commitment and invested in education for their children – more often for their sons than their daughters. By this time the land had been demarcated and allocated individually, which led to increasing economic differentiation. Patrilineally related males still lived on contiguous farms.

The post-independence split household continued to see women burdened with increasing work and decreasing autonomy. Only those women with larger farms in good areas were released from heavy physical labour, though they still conceded decision-making powers to men (Kershaw 1975, Davison 1989).

During this period, children were overworked as their contributions to the productive and reproductive labour of the household increased. Over-burdened mothers off-loaded many household tasks onto their daughters. Intensification of family cash-crop activities necessitated children's labour in such tasks as picking the family coffee, taking it to the warehouse to have it weighed and properly recorded, and cutting napier grass for stall-fed graded cows kept for commercial milk production. Children were also 'drawn into exploitative non-family labour for the first time' (Kayongo-Male and Onyango 1984: 25). Many informants spoke movingly of the heavy and exacting work on tea and coffee plantations or weeding on large farms. These activities were all in addition to being expected to attend school. Ambitious fathers could be exacting about their children's performance in class and being punished for having a low standing in class was frequently mentioned. Rural Gikuyu children could be seen to have borne a double burden at the end of colonialism and the beginning of decolonization.

With the adoption of new value systems and world-views introduced by churches and schools, some analysts saw a decline in parental authority over children during this period.

> When this authority declined, the children's attitudes about their participation were likely to have become more negative, seeing home tasks as more and more as an unwanted burden . . . thus the potential educative value to the child was reduced.
>
> – Kayongo-Male and Onyango 1984: 26

One of the most obvious characteristics of Gikuyu family life in the late 20th century was increasing variation. At the onset of independence, large numbers of men brought their wives and children with them to urban areas. Middle-class men and poor landless men were unwilling or unable to sustain the split household. There were four broadly defined family variants:

(i) wealthy, globally extended families;
(ii) families adopting individualistic, 'modern' behaviour to cope with urban life;
(iii) families barely coping with urban life; and
(iv) families that could not cope, resulting in family breakdown.

Wealthy families make up the first category and the smallest proportion of the total population. They tend to have cut their links with rural areas and may even be ashamed of their rural roots, as evidenced by children not learning their local language and rural parents rarely being visited. These families, participating in the global capitalist economy, build links with a global society and develop a family that is multicultural and non-parochial. Both parents work and servants care for the children who go to expensive boarding schools, often abroad, from an early age. Many of these families are multi-sited with one parent working in Kenya while the other lives in London, Los Angeles or another major city around the world, supervising the education of the children at schools or universities there.

The second category of monogamous modern-style families is not based so much on class as newly acquired attitudes to marriage and parenting that reflect a shift from a communal kinship/marriage/parenting ethos to one based on the individual needs and desires of parents and their young children. These families range from middle-class professionals to small-scale entrepreneurs in shanty towns. The parents' education varies from primary school to PhD level. They work and live in Nairobi full-time in relatively small nuclear families and do not have an economic foothold in the rural area. However, they maintain a wide support network with their extended families in both urban and rural areas. Typically, both partners have jobs or, in the case of small-scale entrepreneurs, work together running their business. There is a relatively egalitarian relationship between husband and wife as well as between parents and children. Such families are child-centred and investment in education is a serious concern. Doing homework and spending leisure time together characterize family interactions. Ties to rural families are maintained, though children have problems speaking Gikuyu and in-laws have social problems when staying in the homes of their urban children. Urban adult children worry about how to care for their aging rural parents. From their own perspective and from that of an outsider, these families are relatively successful in caring and providing support for family members. They struggle against the difficulties of a failing economy and a disintegrating polity and infrastructure to the best of their ability, desperately hoping that their investment in nurturing their children's independent spirits and giving them a good education will ensure a better future for their children.

A third identifiable group consists of families that are barely coping with life in urban areas. These families could be characterized by 'individualism run riot'. Husbands are authoritarian and distant in the old mode but fail through incapacity or lack of care to provide economically for their wives and children, regarding the 'family wage' as their own personal income. Life in these families is characterized by frequently absent fathers, overworked and stressed wives and mothers, male alcoholism, children not attending or doing poorly in school, poor health care, violence and abuse in the home, and neglect of the children. When both parents work, children are cared for by young and inexperienced house-girls. Relationships between urban family and rural older families can be sporadic, though, interestingly, wives may appeal to their own natal families for assistance and support – something that would have been uncommon in the past. Low income or unemployment exacerbates but does not necessarily cause this pattern.

Finally, many families have not managed to cope. Divorce, abandonment and pregnancy out of wedlock have resulted in increasing numbers of female-headed families. Families headed by unemployed women or those on a low income are highly vulnerable to disease, poverty, poor housing and inadequate childcare. The high costs of maintenance, the demands of education resulting in a child's inability to contribute to the household economy, and the loss of rural-kin safety nets have meant that children are no longer the 'important pivot around which family affairs revolved' (Umbima 1990: 72). These children often swell the numbers of children 'on and of the street' (Kilbride and Kilbride 1990).

Our study concentrates on a self-selected sample of urban Gikuyu belonging to the second category who are no longer active in the rural economy and society. The families who agreed to be part of the more intensive phase of interviewing and visiting were those committed to working hard for their families and were concerned about the changes they have experienced in their own lives. The aim was to explore their understanding of those changes and the ways in which they have accommodated new conflicts and contradictions, challenges and possibilities. In the 20th century, Gikuyu urban dwellers were always at the forefront of change for their rural counterparts.

Changes in parenting practices, sibling responsibility and caring for aging parents are the focus of the next three sections. These changes arise from economic circumstances, as well as reflecting the impact of new ideologies and social circumstances. In turn, many of the changes have had and will continue to have an economic impact on Kenyan Gikuyu society. Weisner *et al.* (1997) stress the adaptive responses of families to the delocalizing forces of a wider world and national systems. Their analysis assumed that kin relationships are closely related to material conditions but how this relationship is worked out is subtle and complex, and it is important to adopt an agency perspective which recognizes how people actively construct their own lives out of the material conditions and the ideologies available to them (Finch 1989).

Parenting: Quality not quantity

One of the most obvious and immediate changes identified by our informants, and easily checked by us, was the fact that our informants in all three neighbourhoods had a significantly lower number of children compared to the families they were born into.[2] Predictably, family sizes were smaller in Buru Buru and Pangani than in Kibera. As can be seen from Table 8.1, the informants' family sizes were more than 50 per cent smaller than those of their natal families. Family size amongst the natal families ranged from 1 to 14. Half-siblings from a father's polygynous relationships were not included because informants had problems remembering all their half-siblings. There were six polygynous grandfathers in the Buru Buru sample, five in Pangani and eight in Kibera. Most of the informants were vehement about the necessity to limit the size of their families. 'Two at the most three' was a common motif, followed by cogent reasons why this must be so.

The second aspect of this modern Gikuyu parenting strategy was the goal of quality rather than quantity. For this current generation of parents in Nairobi it has become increasingly apparent that the future of small-scale peasant agriculture is limited.[3] Buying land has now become impossible for all but the very wealthy. Parents are clear that the only viable economic future lies in wage-earning jobs in the urban area and that the passport to employment is education.

> My children will be unable to get a *shamba* (farm) to support them, so I am educating them to the maximum so they can work in town instead.
>
> – James, 45 years old, Kibera sample

However, the parlous economic situation of Kenya has impacted on these families. While Kenyan state education is technically free at primary level, parents face many subsidiary costs including desk fees, teacher fees, the

Table 8.1 Characteristics of sample families

	Kibera	Pangani	Buru Buru
Average no. of children per natal family	7.1	6.4	7.5
Average no. of children per informant family[a]	3.4	2.6	2.6

[a]Either completed family size or stated plans for completed family size.

Source: 1998–99 survey data.

roofing fund, book fees and so on. Sending one's child to a state primary school can cost Ksh 2500 a year, and a state secondary school Ksh 7500. (The minimum wage in 1999 was Ksh 1500 to Ksh 2000 a month.) Poorly paid teachers and years of under-investment have resulted in state schools providing such a poor education that many parents (more than 60 per cent overall and 100 per cent of the Buru Buru sample) have turned to private education, including pre-school classes to prepare their children for the best schools. Pre-school fees can be as much as Ksh 2500 a month.

Some parents chose the even more expensive option of boarding school because they both work or their children are developing 'bad behaviour'. Boarding schools are thought (often mistakenly) to have higher educational standards and stricter discipline. At a cost of Ksh 3000 per month, Njuguini (Kibera sample) sent her 15-year-old son to boarding school to 'give him time to learn because boys only loiter in Kibera'. Hilary (Pangani sample) sent his 10-year-old daughter to boarding school to get her away from Pangani, which he regarded as unsafe and full of 'uncivilized' people. He and his wife worked and the house-girl let her watch television instead of making her do her homework. He hoped the school would discipline her studies.

High parental expectations lead to a demand for extra tutoring. One teacher, Catherine (Pangani sample) tutored students after school but worried about the pressure on children: 'I see parents who are very poor insisting on paying for a lot of extra tuition, even when they can't afford it.'

By investing so heavily in their children's education, parents find it difficult to save and invest, and may face financial constraints in expanding their small enterprises or even buying insurance. A few parents learned through bitter experience that the economic price might have been too high. James (Kibera sample) had two grown sons living at home, one with a 'come we stay' wife[4] and a small baby. Neither son had been able to find a job in the formal sector after leaving school. The young men worked without conviction at small *jua kali* enterprises set up for them by their father, drank too much and sponged off their father. James confided:

> I don't know what to do. I am now supporting four people, instead of getting rid of two dependents. If I had used the money I spent on their education to build up a profitable business, they could now work for themselves.

Overall parents have accepted the unchallenged assumption that investing in their children's education is a route to personal and national development. From colonial times onwards, a skilled and educated workforce has been an indicator of development. Most development approaches, including modernization and socialist approaches, have posited education as a necessity for the creation of a modern, thriving economy and a strong, democratic civil society. Debates may rage over the contentious issue of what type of education should be offered and to whom, but the value of education is never questioned. High literacy rates are considered to be key indicators of progress.

After independence, most African governments invested heavily in schools. In the late 1980s, Miller and Yaeger estimated that 23 per cent of Kenya's annual expenditure went on education. Despite this, high demand and low national GNP have resulted in an overcrowded, under-financed system. Structural adjustment measures applied in the 1990s led to a cutback in government services in health and education, passing the costs on to the users. The continuing economic recession in Kenya has meant that educational investment has all but lost its earlier automatic returns. The national economy is growing much too slowly to accommodate the annual outflow of school leavers and graduates (Miller and Yaeger 1994). Without a robust economy, education is not necessarily the key to prosperity and a secure future, but for hardworking and committed parents there is no alternative.

The economic meaning of having children has changed drastically in the urban area. Children do not contribute to the household economy but instead are now an economic burden on parents who are ideologically as well as practically committed to a 'civilized' parenting style (as it was sometimes expressed). This explains such parents' determination to limit the size of their families. When asked about their children's families in the future, many thought their children would opt for one child and indeed some children were already expressing the intention of postponing or limiting their fertility. Some could even contemplate the possibility of a childless marriage. This was a revolutionary idea for Kenyans.[5]

> I do not want to marry or to have children. I want to concentrate on my education, then my work and becoming economically secure.
>
> – Sarah, 14-year-old daughter of a Buru Buru couple

Kenyan women have always expected to be productive members in the marriage contract, in either the family farm or small business or wage employment (Clark l980, Shaw 1995, Robertson 1997). However the high cost of living in general, and education in particular, has increased the need for urban wives to work continuously (with no time off for pregnancy or early child-raising). Only four women were 'housewives' but all told me that this was temporary. Lily, the university-educated wife of an army officer (Buru Buru sample) admitted how lucky she was that her husband was well enough off to allow her a year off work to enjoy her new baby, although when I met her she was looking for work. 'Otherwise, life is too expensive', she said. 'My husband keeps asking me when I intend to return to work.' Returning to work was also a matter of self-respect. So critical was the contribution of the wife to the household budget that husbands frequently insisted upon it. Sammy (Pangani sample) told me: 'My wife will get a job. It is not good for a wife to depend on her husband. Why should he pay for everything?'

Sibling responsibility: Growing together or apart?

Gikuyu patrilineal kinship organization meant a married woman loosened her ties to her natal family and was absorbed into her new family, focusing entirely on the welfare of her husband and his lineage. Her relationship with her brothers was latent, mobilized only if she was forced to go home after a domestic crisis. Her relationship with her sisters would be minimal, and limited to funerals or weddings.

Brothers on the other hand, especially full brothers, lived and worked together closely. As members of the same 'house' and lineage they worked the lineage land side-by-side, or pioneered new land. Gikuyu kinship fostered male solidarity and female disengagement amongst lineage members.

> My husband's sisters are always visiting (from the rural area) and wanting to stay. My husband had to pay his sisters' school fees. Now he gives money to them for their children's school fees and help for his widowed mother. His money has to go three ways. One third to me, one third to our daughter and one third to his relatives. I have had to put my foot down sometimes.
>
> – Catherine, 24 years old, Pangani sample

In the 1970s and 1980s there was an upsurge in the number of female-headed households in Kenyan towns, many of which were Gikuyu. Since the early 20th century, single women in towns had been redefining and restructuring their relationships with their own kin, especially mothers and sisters (Nelson 1978a, 2000, White 1990). An important aspect of this was economic. Single women in Mathare in the 1970s and 1980s tried to invest in small plots of farming land, if possible keeping a matrilineal relative (often an aged mother) to cultivate it on their behalf. Giving economic help to rural parents is a way of ensuring their goodwill and might also ensure that a single women inherits a portion of their father's land.

To assist in childcare, children were fostered by their rural grandparents (Nelson 1987). Child fostering was economic as well as social in purpose. A woman could carry out her livelihood more productively with fewer childcare responsibilities. Sending a child to aging rural parents gave them a pair of willing hands to help with farm work. This was an economic decision but it carried high personal costs. Miriam (Kibera sample), a mango seller who was one of my few unmarried respondents, explained simply why her two children now lived with her parents.

> I cannot have them here with me in town. As you see I work all day and wouldn't have the time to cook and care for them. My accommodation is very poor and small and I would have to rent a better place. Besides I do not think that Kibera is a good place to bring up children. I can only afford to go home to see them once a year (the round trip costs Ksh 300). When I go, I pay their school fees at that time. I also help to pay the school fees for my younger siblings. I went last December and I took Ksh 4000 with me for school fees (Ksh 1500 is the official monthly minimum wage). I try to send money with people who are travelling to that area in between. It is very hard to be separated from my children. I am not there to see them eat and to take care of them. I also miss those mother-child talks every day. I do not see them grow up.

It is interesting that married women are strengthening relations with their parents and siblings. Is it too far-fetched to suggest that a woman's education and formal sector employment have granted her an honorary male identity? A number of the women interviewed had contributed or were currently contributing to the education of their younger siblings. Having an independent income allows women to provide help for their own families. Simon explained that he and his wife kept their own salaries in separate accounts: 'That way we can each help our various relatives. We all know that "blood is thicker than water"' (Pangani sample). Vieterine (Buru Buru sample), the oldest of five children, had done well at school and obtained a nursing qualification. Later she paid the school fees of her younger siblings.

Occasionally this contribution was so important to the natal family that parents might even oppose a marriage. Jane, a nurse, decided to marry James (Pangani sample) when she became pregnant. Her parents refused to accept the engagement and tried to force her to have an abortion. They boycotted the marriage. Her husband said their opposition was because they calculated that after her marriage Jane would stop paying her younger sibling's school fees.

Both men and women working in town were expected to help their relatives, though expectations were higher for men in this regard, especially first-born men. Marriage was the only valid reason to cut back on contributions to one's rural family.

> My father gave over responsibility for his younger children to his older children. I was the fifth of 12. My school fees were paid by my older sisters. For five years I have been working here in town and sending almost all my money home to my parents to help take care of the brothers and sisters after me. I had nothing of my own. Taking a wife was a shield against these demands. It has allowed me the right to develop myself instead of sending everything to my father. I refuse to do this to my own children. I have taken out an insurance policy for the education of my children.
>
> – Stephen, 28 years old, Kibera sample

Vieterine's husband, Jesse (aged 48, Buru Buru sample) was the oldest of 11 children. He gave up plans of attending university but managed to attain a lower qualification in pharmacology, got a job and contributed to the education of his younger brothers and sisters.

> I had to postpone marriage until I was 31 in order to pay for the diplomas and education for almost all the siblings who followed me. None of my brothers or sisters can say that they were not helped. The same goes for my wife's siblings.

Some later-born children were the beneficiaries of help from older siblings, which in turn creates future obligations. Peter (Buru Buru sample) cared for the sister who had educated him during her terminal illness and, subsequently, for her children 'to pay back the debt'. Sammy's (Pangani sample) story is typical.[6] His father educated the oldest boy and then left him to pay for the education of his siblings, including Sammy (who went to Form IV). Sammy explained the obligation this created.

> My brother married late as a result of these responsibilities of schooling his younger brothers and sisters. He become a diabetic from drinking too much and he died recently. His children are still young. The boy is 11 and attending Aga Khan primary. We two brothers left now have to educate his children to thank him for educating us.

Siblings also cooperated in investing or working together in the *jua kali*, the informal sector. My early research in a Nairobi shanty-town described matrifocal forms of cooperation between clusters of mothers and sisters. Single mothers fostered their children with rural mothers and brewed beer with their sisters. Cooperation maximized brewing profits and improved domestic provision (Nelson 1987).

A number of the young, self-employed male informants were capitalized by or working with their brothers. George's (Kibera sample) younger brother worked with him on his clothing stall. When Francis (Kibera sample) came to Nairobi, his older brother, who was employed in the formal sector, provided the capital to set him up in business. Francis described the process:

> I saved money that I had earned from my job as a bus conductor, but I needed more. My brother and sister helped me out in the beginning. After it was clear that I was doing well, they joined me. Now there are two branches of this hardware business in Kibera and one in Ngong. We buy stock together in bulk. We had a big setback in 1997, on 23 January when I lost Ksh 40,000 worth of stock in a fire. We lost everything in this shop but we didn't lose hope. We have now managed to replace this loss.

Sammy ran a second-hand clothing business with his two other brothers (Pangani sample). Two brothers, Hilary and Simon (Pangani sample), ran a Goody Goody café. Hilary worked full-time in the formal hotel business and invested in the café that his brother managed. Pius (Kibera sample) explained how he incorporated his brother into his business.

> When my younger brother finished school. I brought him to Kibera and taught him the butchery business. He ran my business for a while, allowing me the time to set up another one. We are now partners, each of us running a butchery.

Informants frequently mentioned that one could trust one's siblings in business much more than 'strangers'. Siblings could also be relied on for help in times of trouble. Florence (Pangani) is very close to her sisters. When she herself was widowed as a young mother, her sisters gave her material aid and social support in the form of childcare. Charles (Florence's husband) supported and supervised his sister's two teenage children (she was a single mother) while she served a prison sentence. Faith (Kibera sample) had a lot of brothers all working in Kibera's *jua kali* sector. When she came to town to live with an aunt, one of the brothers paid for embroidery lessons for her. She now sells her goods at a local market. She and her brothers often socialize and she knows she could always turn to them for help. Theresia's brother organized the circumcision of her sons when her husband was unable to do so (Pangani sample). Jackson (Kibera sample) was the oldest of ten siblings (eight sisters and one brother) who all followed him to Kibera.

> I help all my siblings a lot when I can. They regard me as the cornerstone of the family. They all came to Kibera to visit me and met their husbands here or started to work in *jua kali* either alone or with their spouses. Two sell shoes, two sell shirts and one sells cassettes. We like to be together. We love each other. Most of our leisure time we visit each other. When there are problems we turn to each other for help.

Siblings also pool money for large investments. In 1988, James (Kibera sample) with two other brothers employed in Nairobi bought a plot of rural land. They settled a fourth brother, who had failed at school, to farm it and to care for their divorced mother.

Migrants' use of relatives to find access to short-term support, livelihood opportunities or housing has been well documented in the literature on African cities (Gutkind and Wallerstein 1976). The parents of the present generation of children adhered to this pattern and were often closely tied to their siblings. Through them, new urban migrants obtained education, entered urban life, found jobs and shelter. Siblings cooperated in business, invested together and cared for parents. Finally, they are an important social resource providing childcare, loans, advice and assistance in times of crisis.

However, it is clear that the situation is changing and, in their narratives, parents frequently mourn the passing of sibling solidarity in their children's lives. They hypothesize that in the new smaller families the more intense parent–child relationships lessen the intensity of sibling ties. Most of my informants grew up in large, extended rural families with frequently absent, authoritarian fathers. Tim's description of his relationship with his father was typical:

> Father did not chat with us or play. Our relationship was serious. We might sit and read our homework. The only time he talked to us was to give us our orders, to enquire if chores had been done or how we did in school.

Tim was lucky because his father was not abusive. While informants expressed more love for their mothers than their fathers, mothers were regularly overworked. Often, it was only the first or the last-born who had close ties with their mother. Children survived emotionally in a large, busy and hierarchical family by bonding with each other. In the past, each child cared for the next sibling, forming a special life-long relationship between them, providing support and comfort in times of trouble.

My informants observed that their own children's most intense relationship was with their parents, and they did not forge close links with siblings. Parents felt that siblings had become rivals for their parents' attention and were more interested in obtaining desirable consumer goods than in sharing or playing with their brothers and sisters. Parents admitted that by encouraging their children to be individualistic and success-oriented, they had inadvertently undermined the communal family ethos based on submerging individual wants or needs for the general good which had ordered their own childhoods. They admired their children for being independent, ambitious and knowing their own minds but admitted sadly that their offspring were also sometimes ungrateful, demanding and selfish. There was an interesting ambiguity in parental views. While on the one hand they did not want their children to have the burdens of sibling care that they had, on the other they regretted that their children would probably miss the close and comforting expectations of familial support they presently enjoyed.

Caring for aging parents: The generational and geographical gulf

The most difficult problem facing Nairobi's middle-aged urbanites was how to care for their aging parents typically living on rural farms. In pre-colonial society, old age would have been secure for anyone with sons. Men and women had different vulnerabilities. A man without a son could depend on his nephew's family for care. A woman in the same situation depended on uncertain charity from her husband's family.

The ideal was that the elderly parent would be cared for by the wives of their sons. If still physically able, the elderly mother might contribute some light agricultural, domestic or childcare labour to the household. Old fathers did little household labour, though they might care for toddlers during peak labour periods. Their lives revolved around communal rituals. This is still a common pattern in rural areas, though these days the old men mainly socialize in bars. Most Kenyans are convinced that the elderly in Kenya are better cared for than their Western counterparts. However, the situation is currently changing. Increasing numbers of old people are homeless and abandoned in town, while many in rural areas live alone struggling to feed themselves, lacking adequate amenities and access to services.[7]

From the 1950s to the 1980s, Nairobi dwellers adopted two solutions for parental care. One was to foster a child with the rural grandparent; the other was for wives to stay on the farm with the elderly parents while the husbands worked in town.

These two solutions are still practised. We interviewed half a dozen men in the *jua kali* sector without any education and living alone in Nairobi to discuss their reasons for maintaining a split household. While they pointed out that it was cheaper to raise children in the rural area and it maximized family resources if their wives cultivated, they also said that their wives could care for the rural parent without costs. One man said, 'If my wife didn't do this, I would have to pay for a house-girl to care for my widowed and sick mother' (butcher in Kibera). For example, Irene, a divorcee reported that:

> I have had to use all my savings to help my mother when she became seriously ill and had to go into hospital. She is now paralysed. I have had to pay for a house-girl to care for her in her rural home.
>
> – Irene, 45 years old, Kibera sample

We also interviewed a small sample of single mothers who still fostered their children, though perhaps their reasons had more to do with freeing them for effective work than for the care of grandparents, as illustrated by Miriam, the mango seller cited above. This type of fostering differs somewhat from the fostering observed in the 1970s when women stated explicitly that they had sent an older child to stay with their mother to help carry water and do farm work. Fostering is now more problematic due to the growing gap in the quality of urban and rural life. Older children are less inclined to carry out this role. Urban-raised children do not speak Gikuyu well and are unfamiliar with farm work and poor rural amenities. The individualistic and strong-minded children of my informants often refuse to make long visits to grandparents, let alone live with them.

> My children no longer consult my husband or me about what they do and don't do. They do not value our advice. They think we know nothing about the modern world. If we are lucky they might tell us after they have done something.
>
> – Wambui, 60-year-old grandmother, Buru Buru sample

It is a reasonable assumption that the mid-20th-century solutions for caring for aged parents will continue to decline in frequency. With few exceptions, the women we interviewed said they would never consider living in a split household. Their husbands independently confirmed this reluctance: it is no longer the economic solution it once was. Fewer families have adequate land, and agriculture is not remunerative without significant investment. Many women can now earn more from town-based livelihoods.

The second explanation relates to women's increased status and education. As women achieve secondary education, they refuse to live on the farm. Seeing their husband once a week or once a month, undertaking hard agricultural labour, maybe even living without running water and electricity is anathema to them. Educated women aspire to different kinds of work, preferring office or shop employment. Failing that, they prefer *jua kali* work in town while they continue to look for formal sector work. Also, cash can be more easily controlled by the women than agricultural produce can.

The third explanation for rejecting fostering was changing views of childrearing. Hilary (Pangani sample) described an almost idyllic childhood circulating among the households of the 13 wives of his grandfather and their numerous sons, playing with age mates all day, eating and sleeping anywhere they happened to be at the appropriate moment. It was a childhood relatively free from constraint in a secure world of relatives. When asked if he would send his two children to live with their rural grandmothers, he was vehement in reply.

> I would not want them to move away. I would never allow it. I am very emotionally involved with my children in a very different way from my own parents. Our society has moved away from communalism to individualism and I feel strongly that these children are *my* (his emphasis) children to keep and care for. In my birth family, the children were everyone's and no one minded who was where and with whom.

Strategies for the future have also changed. Parents not only seek emotional fulfilment from their children but they are also concerned about giving their children a fighting chance for economic survival, if not advancement, through education. Parents felt that such success necessitated careful parental supervision, help with homework, time to devote to studies, and the advantages of better urban schools. No farm work means that urban children have more time to study. While acknowledging the deleterious influences of urban life (the bad behaviour of urbanites, television, popular music, dances, alcohol and drugs), these parents were convinced that urban children, if carefully nurtured, had better life chances than their rural cousins.

What is the alternative to fostering a child or leaving a wife to care for elderly parents? The only two possibilities left are for the grown child to have his or her parents stay in the urban area in their own dwelling or to pay for care in the parents' rural home.

The issue of caring for aging parents weighed heavily on the conscience of many of our older informants. Bringing the aging parent to stay in town was difficult, if not impossible, for many. The housing available to most urban dwellers is inappropriate to host a person of the older generation, being too small for respectful and dignified intergenerational life. There is a strict etiquette between parents and their married daughters. Parents should not share bathroom facilities with their children. Usually grandparents feel comfortable visiting for only a day.

Understandably most rural-born old people wish to remain in their familiar, meaningful routine in the rural area, pottering around a small garden and keeping a goat or a few chickens. They see Nairobi as boring, crowded and dirty. Peter (Buru Buru sample) describes his mother:

> She loved to farm and she worked too hard. In 1994 she became very ill and was forbidden to work. We had to hire some help. We wanted her to come to live with us in town, but she has refused to leave the *shamba*. She says that without her garden she would be very unhappy. I can't go a month without seeing her.

For people like Peter, the only choices left are to find a relative willing to live on the farm or to hire someone. James (Kibera sample) and his two employed brothers bought land and settled a fourth brother on it with their aging mother. Freshiah described what is probably an increasingly typical situation for urban dwellers.

> My father retired in 1976, lived in Muranga and died in 1997. My mother lives alone with a house help. All of us children are scattered around the country and we all contribute what we are able.

Martin's (Buru Buru sample) sibling group is also scattered all over the country. When his father became landless after a legal dispute in the 1970s, Martin purchased a couple of acres where his parents now live and farm bananas with the help of hired labour. Each month he and his three brothers contribute money to their parents' upkeep.

Burdened with the high cost of urban living and education, these children in the middle years of their lives are hard pushed to find extra cash to keep their parents. Luckily for most of them, the burden of maintenance of the rural parents is shared between siblings. In the new egalitarianism of urban life, all employed siblings, including daughters, are expected to contribute. Daughters generally do not inherit a share of their father's land but they are certainly expected to contribute to their parent's care.

Interestingly the parents we spoke to were clear that they did not want to burden their own children with their future upkeep. They frequently spoke of their commitment to save for the future so that their children would not have any extra financial costs while they were raising small children. Time will tell whether the faltering Kenyan economy can improve enough to allow these wishes to come true. One thing is certain: if parents have to depend on their children, there will be fewer of them to share the load.

Conclusion

Economic changes in Kenya have been entwined with changes in urban Gikuyu family structures and relationships. There are profound cause-and-effect interactions. For the last 30 years, rural-born siblings with urban jobs have been expected to assist their rural families in various ways, especially with school fees for younger siblings. This has often imposed a heavy burden on young people. Marriage was the only legitimate way of curtailing contributions to one's natal family, to the extent that sometimes a proposed marriage met with strong familial opposition.

The changing role of children in the urban household means that they no longer contribute to the household's economy. While adults may have resented their childhood work commitments, they appreciate the work efforts of members of large families which help to secure survival in economically uncertain times. They regret the loss of strong sibling solidarity but are aware of the need to put priority on the welfare of their immediate family. There is a real threat of family welfare failure. Vulnerability to economic pressures may cause some families to be unable to care for their children, resulting in them becoming street children, uneducated and resorting to petty crime. If families cannot care for their children, this deprives the nation of potentially skilled workers, impedes development, and generates crime, insecurity and loss of confidence.

The striking drop in the birth rate of urban Gikuyu families mirrors that in other ethnic groups in urban Kenya. A variety of factors account for these smaller families: the expense of raising children, the need for education, the decline of children's labour contributions to the family, the architectural constraints of urban housing, and new views on parenting and desirable family life. These views come about because of, *and* make possible, greater investment in children's health, care and education.

The intense drive for education in the context of Kenya today has several economic outcomes. It inevitably siphons off all of a family's extra earnings and profits, leaving investment or business expansion difficult, if not impossible, and making the dual working-parent family mandatory.

Fostering was a viable economic solution to several problems for poor parents and single mothers. The fostering parent ensured cheap food, free childcare and rent for their children, and the rural grandparent had help on the farm. However, for the families in our sample it is no longer an option because of their emotional attachment to their children and the educational goals they have for them. For some, the care of aging parents has now become an economic issue. When the older generation cannot, or will not, move to town to live with one of their offspring, the only alternative is for the working offspring to pay for care for their parents.

In the recent past, large families were an economic advantage. Depending on the tradition of sibling solidarity, a father handed over the economic responsibility for children in the family to his older offspring, thus maximizing the limited capacity of rural parents to invest in the education of all their children. As daughters became better educated and entered the urban workforce, the definition of sibling responsibility was expanded to include sisters in the equation for this generation. Siblings helped one another in entry to town life, providing advice on jobs and housing in the city. They also sometimes worked in joint *jua kali* enterprises with trust between siblings facilitating successful businesses. Furthermore, siblings provide assistance in times of crisis.

Parents predict a decrease in sibling solidarity in the next generation. As a result, this social safety net will, in the future, be much diminished due to the decrease in family size, marking a transition from a more family-oriented mode of thinking to an individualist way of thinking. The disappearance of wider family support networks, which prevailed in earlier rural settings, means parents in future will not be able to expect help from relatives.

What are the policy implications of these changes? Education has become an onerous burden on parents, even with the new smaller family. Hopefully, the Kenyan government will, in the future, be able to improve the quality and lower the costs of education.

Above all, improvements in the economy and the social services are essential to ensure future family welfare. When this happens, children so lovingly and laboriously educated will be able to find jobs to suit their talents, and people will be able to invest adequately for their own economic security in old age. In this regard, there must be increasing state provision for the care of the elderly in the shape of well-managed pension schemes for those in pensionable employment[8] or some sort of state provision for the care of the elderly poor. Charities engaged in campaigning for senior citizens will no doubt emerge in due course. Just as feminist groups are currently campaigning for more gender-aware legislation, so senior citizens' groups must emerge to campaign for proper provision for the elderly. A strong civil society can play an important role. There also needs to be social-service provision for children. Street children must be cared for in orphanages with specially designed educational programmes to enable them to become skilled adults capable of participating in a modern economy. The introduction of institutionalized fostering for children whose parents are unable to care for them would be an even better solution.

In the future, as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, more and more Kenyans will be living in an urban, global economy. The old solutions to the problems of family life, rooted in large extended agrarian families, are reaching the end of their effectiveness. To support and facilitate new ideas and enactments of family life, and in some cases to replace old solutions, other social structures have to emerge to fill these needs. For this to happen, the economies of Africa's cities must grow significantly in the future in a context of political stability, decreasing corruption and improved civil society. It will not be easy to achieve but this is the dilemma facing Kenyans and the Kenyan state.

Notes

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1. The research was carried out by myself and Professor Wanjiru Kariuki of the University of Nairobi with the committed help of Regina Kaburu Muiyuro and Maina Mwangi. The core of this research was a sample of 56 Gikuyu families with co-resident parents and dependent children. The parents' ages ranged from 22 to 55 and almost all were born in the rural area (99 out of 108). Some older children and a few grandparents were also interviewed. All 56 couples completed (separately) two long questionnaires after which most had agreed to give us an extended interview. In addition, I interviewed a number of key informants including marriage counsellors, ministers of the church, widows, divorced men and women, single mothers and finally a number of teenage children or grandparents from the sample of families.
2. Calculating completed family size posed a methodological problem. For families where the wife was 40 years or older, it could be safely assumed that the children they had were all the children they were planning to have. Methodologically speaking, deciding on what might be the 'completed family size' of a young family is problematic. The only solution was to assume that the couple's stated preference for completed family size would be close to the actual completed family size, give or take an accident or two.
3. As the plots in rural Gikuyuland become smaller due to the inheritance pattern of an equal share for all sons, supporting a family through agriculture has become impossible. For example, my previous research assistant (now 50-years old) married a man who was one of 10 sons whose father had owned a 30-acre farm in a good agricultural area. On the father's death, the land was divided into 10 equal parcels of three acres. Each brother has had a family of between 3 and 5 children, averaging 2 or 3 sons. Even if the current generation of fathers does not include their daughters when allocating land after death, as would occur if present draft legislation is ever passed, the farm sizes of the next generation will be of less than

an acre. This would be enough land for a house and a small kitchen garden, only viable if one or both partners have some other source of income-generation.

4. A 'come we stay' marriage is one where a man and a woman move in together – the Kenyan equivalent of a common-law marriage.
5. Symptomatic of this are the differing reactions of Kenyans to my own voluntary childlessness. Twenty years ago every Kenyan I knew argued vehemently that I was committing a great practical and/or immoral act. This time I was saddened by the number of people who commented on how sensible I had been not to have children.
6. Sammy (aged 51, Buru Buru couple 4) too was the first born of eight children. His story was similar. When he was 18 his mother died and his father lost his job due to drinking. This is the way he described his responsibility: 'I had to become a father and a mother to my younger siblings. I gave up my call to University. It was a great disappointment to me. It was a great sacrifice but it was worth it. They are all self-sufficient people now and I am proud of it.'
7. Few anthropologists have studied these changes. Most of the literature on the changing family concentrates on the family in the middle of its developmental cycle. One exception is the Kilbrides' study of the changing family in East Africa (1990). In a short subsection on growing old in Buganda they describe the stress felt by old people about increasing feebleness (a universal problem) and concern about 'young people who have failed to keep the ways of the tribe' and 'absence of supporting children' (a typical late-20th-century African problem) (1990: 100). The Kilbrides conclude that there was a lack of general community concern about the condition of the elderly. They do not go into any detail but it is apparent that the old are supposed to be cared for by their relatives and, if not, it is no one else's concern. This attitude will ultimately have to change if adequate state and communal provision is to be made available for the care of the aged in the future.
8. Even those occupations with guaranteed pensions are not secure. In 1998 it came to light that the pension fund for university teachers had been run down, badly invested and perhaps even robbed to such an extent that many retiring staff were faced with the prospect of a meaningless amount of pension. After a full working life and having made their pension contributions in the full expectation of being able to retire with security, retirees faced possible penury.

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9

Resilience of a City at War: Territoriality, Civil Order and Economic Exchange in Mogadishu

Roland Marchal

Over the last three decades, African cities have displayed enormous resilience in the face of economic adversity. Mogadishu, the war-ravaged capital of Somalia, however, provides the most extreme example of resolve to carry on with daily life amidst material deprivation and extreme physical insecurity on the part of its residents. This chapter considers how this has been accomplished – how commodity and money supplies have prevailed and how the business class have surmounted, accommodated and sometimes capitalized on the anarchic vacuum in state power.

The first section provides a schematic history of Mogadishu's early origins and colonial legacy, followed by a brief review of the economy of the post-colonial city prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1991. The political centrality of Mogadishu during the civil war and the implications for demographic change, political identity and notions of territoriality and citizenship of the city's residents are explored. The dynamics of economic competition in a city devoid of civil order, political legitimacy and effective regulatory government are traced before concluding.

Historical antecedents

It is believed that Iranians from Shiraz founded Mogadishu in the 10th century – one of many coastal cities trading with the Arabian Peninsula, Persia, India and China.[1] Mogadishu went through an early period of development under an Arab sultanate from the 13th to the 16th centuries. This golden age ended with the invasion by Somali clans, coming from the north. The latter settled eventually on the outskirts of the city after having looted and destroyed parts of the settlement. Mogadishu had to cope as well with Portuguese and British ambitions, and later with the Zanzibar sultanate in the Indian Ocean (Cassanelli 1982). By the middle of the 19th century, Mogadishu was no longer the leading commercial centre it had been, although it still had a significant port. In 1889, when Italy declared all coastal areas from Cape Guardafui to the Jubba River as its colony, Mogadishu's economic fortunes began to alter.

In 1908, Mogadishu became the colony's capital city. This catalyzed building construction and the urban structure of the city. A cathedral, said to be the greatest in all of East Africa,[2] was completed in 1929 and colonial housing gave rise to new European-style neighbourhoods (Puzo 1972). Later, after the Second World War, the low-cost neighbourhoods of Wardhigley and Waberi, consisting of small dwellings constructed from local materials readily at hand, were established.

Throughout the colonial period pass laws were promulgated, aimed at controlling the workforce and maintaining public order. These prevented Somalis from moving freely in Mogadishu and most were not allowed to stay in town after sunset. In the 1950s these restrictive laws were lifted and the new independent state subsequently passed a law enabling Somalis to move about freely throughout Somalia.

The old part of the city and its colonial neighbourhoods make up only a small part of the city (Figure 9.1). Despite all the rules trying to limit the settlement of new people, Mogadishu expanded dramatically during the last decade of Italian colonial rule. With a population of only 40,000 in 1935, it had reached 70,000 in 1950, 102,000 in 1960 and 125,000 in 1970. Thereafter it grew at roughly 10 per cent per annum to an estimated 1 million people just before the civil war in 1991. Current figures are, at best, educated guesses but it is likely that the population has hovered around the million mark even though the social fabric has radically altered.

Prelude to war: Hordes of urban newcomers and a predatory state

The central area of the city grew from 1500 to 8000 hectares between 1970 and 1984 without adequate planning of urban services. The deprived makeshift living conditions of newcomers were described in an alarmist manner for decades but not sufficiently to nudge the colonial state into taking action. The arrival of escalating numbers and the ubiquity of spontaneous settlements during the post-colonial period in the absence of an urban land-use policy should have been of concern.

After the coup in 1969, the new regime tried to come to grips with the problem. Projects to improve the settlement of urban migrants were undertaken between 1969 and 1974 with assistance from the World Bank and other donors. Housing for low-income families was built in an area known today as *Casa Populare*. A green belt with farming villages around Mogadishu was also planned and partly established. In 1974, the regional structure was modified: the Benadir region was limited to the capital city, separated from the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions which were discrete administrative units. Mogadishu was divided into 13 districts and sub-divided into departments (*xaafado*), sections (*waaxyo*) and neighbourhoods (*tabella*) (Table 9.1).



Figure 9.1 Map of Mogadishu

Table 9.1 Administrative structure of Mogadishu town[a]

District	Departments	Sections	Neighbourhoods
Wadajir	5	21	127
Waberi	4	16	71
Hodan	4	16	109
Hamar Jab-Jab	4	16	45
Hamar Weyne	3	9	27
Shangani	3	6	12
Bondhere	3	10	47
Hawl Wadag	4	16	142
Wardhigley	4	16	83
Shibis	3	10	39
Yaqshid	4	16	90
Karan	5	14	71
Abdulasis	3	8	21
TOTAL	49	174	884

Source: Mohamed Abubaker and Maryam Ga'al 1998.
[a] Three other districts were created in 1989: Daynile, Dharkinlay and Huruwa.

Urban growth amidst heightened insecurity

Urban infrastructural development, however, was relegated to a low order of priority during the late 1970s with the onset of war against Ethiopia in the Ogaden. After Somalia's defeat in 1978, political tensions simmered. An attempted coup in 1979 had adverse repercussions for people living in the countryside of the Central Region, Puntland in the northeast and Somaliland in the northwest. Widespread insecurity from the early 1980s triggered an exodus of people moving either to the capital, Mogadishu, or to refugee camps in Ethiopia.

The Somali state under Siad Barre overreacted to political opposition and ethnic difference, inflaming new urban tensions. Since newcomers were arriving from areas where skirmishes were a normal feature of life, they were perceived as dangerous people. The army, the paramilitary forces and the militias often intervened violently in their neighbourhoods, which radicalized them. Some opponents who agreed to be loyal to the regime received positions, land and villas, while others were not accorded consideration and had to stay in the city's ever-growing shanty towns on the outskirts of the city.

During this period, international aid, mostly from Italy and the United States, was brazenly embezzled by officials and traders and used to buy farms or build houses in Mogadishu. Many of these houses were ironically rented out to UN and international NGO personnel prior to the civil war and throughout the UNOSOM period. The name given to one of the new neighbourhoods, *Booli Qaran* (stolen from the State), draws attention to the graft and corruption that became commonplace.

The 1980s witnessed a multiplication of small urban conflicts, which were partly linked to the worsening situation in the countryside but above all reflected profound changes in the social fabric of the capital city and its ever-expanding suburbs. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mogadishu had been the capital of a new nation-state, and a full gamut of Somali ethnic groups could be found in the city's central districts. Urbanization and settlement loosely followed clan lines, and many areas in Mogadishu were inhabited by a number of different clans. Certainly, the demographic dominance of the indigenous Hawiye and the Abgaal, who had been instrumental in overthrowing Siad Barre, could not be denied but it left plenty of room to accommodate people of different backgrounds.

The new settlements, especially those established in the 1980s, no longer adhered to this pattern. Regional and clan diversity was short-circuited. There are different explanations for how this came about. Some stress that clan polarization resulted from traditional customs associated with the newcomers' nomadic background, whereby they preferred to settle as close as possible to their kinsmen. However, another explanation frequently relates to the prevailing circumstances of the time. With deteriorating urban security and the regime's militias becoming increasingly violent, it was safer to stay with relatives whom one knew and could count on in case of need for physical protection and self-defence. Furthermore, the regime was trying to draft young people by force to fight in Somaliland after 1988. The sons of the middle class were able to escape the obligation if their parents bribed officials.[3] Offspring of the poor were forced to hide to escape the militias or army patrols. Clan polarization became a security blanket for those seeking strength in numbers.

A sagging urban economy and its props

Urban services, never adequate or reliable in Mogadishu, collapsed long before the civil war. They were mostly managed by parastatal organizations that appropriated international aid to finance their operations but tended to divert the money to pay the security apparatus or simply to line the pockets of its management. Consequently, the provisioning of basic urban services was woefully deficient. Electricity was a luxury and those who could afford it purchased generators to compensate for the stops and starts in the city's supply. The insistent hum of generators was an established part of life in the capital city well before 1990.

The school system, even in Mogadishu's urban centre that was the most economically privileged area of the country, was appalling by the mid-1980s. In the early 1970s, the government had spent 11 per cent of its budget on education but as military expenditure rose, this percentage plummeted, registering 2 per cent by the late 1980s. The school enrolment rate was 18 per cent for boys and 6 per cent for girls, far behind that of neighbouring Sudan and Ethiopia. In 1990, only 644 schools were still operating throughout Somalia.

Despite structural adjustment plans and injections of foreign aid, the formal economy collapsed. Economic activity in the capital had a paradoxical character. Many of the macroeconomic indicators were so bad that one would be justified in assuming that parts of the urban population were starving in the streets, but somehow people managed (Jamal 1988). In rural areas the subsistence economy maintained consumption levels. In town, the commercial economy went into over-drive. A vibrant 'second' or 'parallel' economy was flourishing. These circumstances can only be explained by the increasingly strategic role played by Somali migrants and their foreign remittances.

In the wake of the international oil crisis from 1973 onwards, Somalia started exporting some of its workforce to the oil-producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula and later to Western countries. Official figures are not reliable but a number of experts estimated the number of migrants at 150,000–200,000, with half originating from Somaliland.[4] These labourers sent money to their relatives not only to help cope with domestic crises but also to permit a comfortable level of consumption including imported commodities. In the early 1980s, Miller (1981), an economist, estimated the total amount of these remittances at around US$300 million, roughly 40 per cent of the country's GNP, a figure ten times in excess of the money channelled through the official banking system, and more than four times the value of official exports.

In the 1980s, a money transfer business, known as *xawaalad* or *franco-valuta*, became central to the functioning of the Somali economy. As the country's main entrepot and biggest consumer market, Mogadishu was at the hub of this business. *Xawaalad* had evolved as large traders or their agents went abroad and collected hard currency from Somali migrants, which they used to buy goods that they then transported and sold in Mogadishu. The traders paid the migrants' remittances to their Somali-based relatives in Somali shillings at the uncontrolled parallel market rate. In this way, Somali migrants successfully remitted money to their relatives at home, and merchants made a profit on the sale of the imported goods. Everyone seemed to benefit. When this system was prohibited by the regime in 1983, the transfer took a different form and became a business in its own right: middlemen received hard currency from the migrants and delivered that currency to the migrants' families in Somalia, charging a commission for their services. Despite restrictions, middlemen continued to profit. The prohibition on remittance payment in goods was poorly enforced and traders in any case had easy access to the Italian liras pouring into the country through remittances.

Merchants' access to foreign exchange was a key factor in the development of the informal economy and gave rise to a group of traders who took heavy risks but were eventually able to connect Mogadishu's economy with Dubai, Jeddah, Naples and Genoa. This group emerged during the outbreak of the civil war in 1991–92 when they acted decisively to supply Mogadishu with necessary commodities. The established business class had kept cautiously out of the market. By contrast, this small group of nascent mega-merchants tried to keep up commodity supplies to the city and threw their weight and influence behind the formation of a peculiar kind of non-State that they would seek to influence.

A city embroiled in war: Phases of the urban war

The civil war started in December 1990 and went through different phases during the following decade. Although state power was clearly at stake overall, the various small wars that had their epicentre in Mogadishu were different in their form, intensity, and protagonists. Sometimes they were connected to events taking place elsewhere in the country. Sometimes they were confined to the capital city, with neither causes nor impact elsewhere. Mogadishu became an urban battleground. Not since Beirut – and perhaps never before on the African continent – had the urban stakes in war been so high.

The urban war is generally periodized by the leading personalities that were targeted for toppling. In so doing, there is an overlap of armed struggles going on as one target was eventually displaced by another. The 'first uprising' of Mogadishu against Siad Barre ended on 28 January 1991. Civil unrest continued into early 1992 because of the presence of the former dictator and the remnants of his troops in the southernmost part of the country. The 'second war' of Mogadishu, which opposed Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, lasted from November 1991 to March 1992.

More than a year later, in the summer of 1993, the massive presence of blue helmets did not deter a new military crisis between US forces and Aidid supporters. Similarly, the less known but yet significant war between the Haber Gidir (clan of General Aidid) and Hawadle took place throughout the spring of 1994, leading to the political elimination of the latter from Mogadishu politics. Despite the one-by-one removal of so many political targets, peace continued to be elusive.

The division among General Aidid supporters, clearly expressed by Osman Ato's split in late 1994, turned into a military confrontation and only concluded when General Aidid died in early August 1996. The lull was then substantive but a new fight was initiated several months later in the autumn of 1997 in the northern part of the divided city. Mudulod unity, which refers to a Hawiye sub-clan that includes the Abgal clan, had existed only because of their common hatred of General Aidid. When the latter died, the internal tensions among the Abgal surfaced, turning into an ugly intra-clan, low-intensity conflict that was still simmering in 2002.

These were the main sources of conflict but other small wars were concurrently being carried out, notably the fight for Beled Weyne, the low-intensity guerrilla war in Bay and Bakol occupied by forces belonging to the late General Aidid and, last but not least, the fight for Kismayo. Although these small wars did not take place near Mogadishu, they had an impact on certain city neighbourhoods, prompting the arrival of displaced people from the countryside and the internal displacement of people within the capital city, followed by unavoidable skirmishes.

The centrality of Mogadishu in the Somali civil war

An assumption framed under Siad Barre's regime that has endured to the present is that whoever controls the capital city is perceived as the legitimate representative of the Somali State and receives international support. The nickname given to Siad Barre in the last days of his regime – the Mayor of Mogadishu – was cynical sarcasm but it aptly captured the confusion of the international community in deciphering Somali leadership patterns.

A divided city

Mogadishu has been demographically reshaped by the civil war, the destruction of the old historical centre, and the emergence of new rules for settlement in a capital broadly divided by the so-called 'Green Line'. For decades prior to hostilities, settlement had not been specifically clan-determined. The two major wars in Mogadishu redefined the urban space and created new spatial divisions.

The most striking change is that settlement is now predominantly determined by clan affiliation, although this rule is not absolute and some areas are still mixed. Nevertheless, as far as security is concerned, most of the districts in Mogadishu are either dominated by a single clan or divided into various clusters, but still dominated by a single clan. The rule does not apply uniformly all over the capital city because past patterns of urbanization have not been eradicated everywhere. In fact, in a few areas that were not directly affected by the war, the patterns and characteristics of the pre-civil war population seem to have miraculously survived.

After March 1992, Mogadishu was, roughly speaking, divided into three unequal parts, reflecting a political stalemate that – as yet – neither time nor political developments have seriously altered (Figure 9.1). North Mogadishu became the political name of the section of the city under the control[5] of Ali Mahdi and includes Karan, Yaqshid, Shangani, Shibis and parts of Bondhere. Although that part of the city is quite small, population density is high and, thanks to a relatively good security situation during the UNOSOM and Islamic courts periods (1994–1997), a number of new houses have been built there. In terms of population, most of the new settlers belong to the Mudulod clan whose main sub-clan is Abgal.

South Mogadishu was the name given to most of the rest of the city and was under the control of General Aidid's supporters. Unlike North Mogadishu, the southern part is very mixed in terms of the clan origin of its population for various reasons. First, the southern part of the city is adjacent to the Lower Shabelle, gateway to all (clan diverse) southern regions of the country, while North Mogadishu fundamentally opens onto the Middle Shabelle, a predominantly Abgal-populated area. Second, in terms of the clan diversity of South Mogadishu, links with the Central Region are important due to the clan affiliation of the core supporters of General Aidid. Third, the history of the city was such that many areas in South Mogadishu had escaped destruction: clans either strongly or loosely associated with Aidid were settled there and were not obliged to move. Fourth, the centres of economic activity, namely Bakaraha and the international port and airport, are located in that section of the town. And finally, General Aidid needed to promote a 'national' or wide clan alliance to support his claim to national leadership, hence the positive implications of having a diverse population living under his authority and presumably supporting him.

The third section of the city, an Abgal-controlled enclave in South Mogadishu, that is of no great demographic or economic significance, came to be known as 'Medina' during the civil war.[6] Its flamboyant leader, Muse Sudi Yalahow, was able to rule there for years, resisting various offensives during the second Mogadishu war. The area was the first to establish an Islamic court in Mogadishu. Muse Sudi Yalahow moved to North Mogadishu in late 1997 because he wanted to play a greater role in Abgal politics and in the discussions leading to the creation of the Benadir Administration in the aftermath of the Cairo Agreement.

Demographic reconfigurations

There was tumultuous population change in Mogadishu during the 1990s. In 1991, most of the Darod clan were either killed or had fled the capital city, despite an initial alliance with the Hawiye to oppose Siad Barre. They were not the only ones. Many people from the *Gibil Ca* (translated as 'white skin' i.e. Yemenis, Indians and Reer Hamar people) faced the same fate. Killings also occurred among the Hawiye. An estimated 50,000 people died in Mogadishu (McDow 1997). While people were being killed or escaping Mogadishu, others from the Central Region[7] were coming in. There were various reasons for this inflow.

After 1992, the warlords actively sought to bolster their militias and their constituencies and wished to do so in Mogadishu, since their strength would be observed by the donor community. Many people had lost their assets during the unrest in the countryside and had few economic prospects except to go to town where aid or resources were more accessible. One should also bear in mind that people, especially in the nomadic areas, had developed a vision of Mogadishu as the place where life and access to resources was easy and free. Moreover, all segments of the population at that time thought that foreign aid would pour into the country as it had in the 1980s, except that Hawiye clans would replace the Darod as the future owners of that money.

After the second war of Mogadishu, in March 1992, some coalescing social trends slowly reversed. Marehan traders became active again and the presence of Darod grew significantly over the following years up to the present day. Clan mobilization started decreasing after 1992 and gave room again for old contacts and friendships that were not specifically clan-based. This provided the minimum protection necessary for some to come back. One should also consider that all ‘national’ governments set up in Mogadishu over the last ten years, from Ali Mahdi’s to the Transitional National Government (TNG) established at the conference of Arta in the summer of 2000, have socially validated a ‘national’ range of alliances and provided some legitimacy for the residence of people from clans previously threatened or expelled from Mogadishu. Some degree of tolerance has been seen over the years as the best way to keep the national territory as a common market and monetary union.

Trading with Kenya requires the maintenance of a trusting relationship with the Marehan of Gedo. Similarly, enjoying a reasonable relationship with the Marehan of Galgadud provided a likely assurance of access to parts of the Ethiopian Ogaden. The same applies to the Majerten: tolerance of their residence in Mogadishu was a way of securing the use of Bosaso port that was needed to supply Mudug and Galgadud. Mogadishu’s access to these areas had been complicated by internal strife among Abgal sub-clans and the dramatically poor state of the roads linking Mogadishu with these regions.

The most significant influx originated from a different area and the fact that it has not emerged as a political issue says much about social labelling among the Somalis. From early 1992, there has been a significant increase in the Rahenweyn and Bantu presence in Mogadishu. Many came as a result of ongoing conflicts in the countryside during 1991–92 and the severe drought of 1992. Humanitarian aid was distributed in a way that forced people to leave their villages and go to Mogadishu, though many were too weak to survive the journey. The number of displaced people in camps rose dramatically, and destitute persons were often controlled by individuals from powerful clans who used them to claim humanitarian aid that they later sold in the city markets.

People from Bay and Bakol moved to Mogadishu for different reasons. They already had an established history of population migrations back and forth from Bay and Bakol to Mogadishu from the early 1960s. Their urban migration was timed for during the hungry season after planting and while they were waiting for the harvest. They worked as manual labourers or beggars in towns to supplement their farming livelihood. The civil war made this additional income critical for the survival of people from Bay and Bakol. They did not have access to humanitarian aid in their home area because of poor governance and the dominance of other hostile clans. The presence of UNOSOM personnel in the city signalled major economic opportunities for them.

When General Aidid's supporters took over Baidoa in September 1995, initiating a low-intensity war against what came to be known as the Rahenweyn Resistance Army, there were more reasons for people to move to Mogadishu. The anonymity offered by the city was an effective survival strategy in the face of widespread insecurity in the countryside.

Mogadishu's economic growth attracted those seeking employment as carriers and cleaners in the city's markets and the private houses of the well-to-do. Displaced refugees – some still settled in camps, others renting some sort of makeshift shelter – constitute a significant share of the population. Yet their presence is generally ignored because few have acquired positions of consequence in the market or in politics. Their low economic and political profile gives them survival space. No one pays any attention to them apart from thieves.

In addition to the ethnic profile of the newcomers, there is a class dimension of demographic change in the capital city that offers further insights into Mogadishu's political economy. Most of the middle class left Mogadishu in 1991–92. The course of the civil war was pushing members of non-Hawiye clans to flee and many people with money tried to escape to either Kenya or Ethiopia and thereafter made their way to Europe and North America.

Urban residents who stayed behind for one reason or another commonly said that they had become 'prisoners of the bush people', meaning not only the militias, but a way of life which was at odds with the normal urbane lifestyle in coastal cities like Mogadishu. Their *in situ* exile was only partially reversed by the arrival of UN peacekeepers. Having originally been confident that the outcome of international intervention would in general be positive, it became clear that political failure was unavoidable. Those who stayed in Mogadishu during the first years of the civil war increasingly decided that exile was the only reasonable course of action. Many Somali refugees gave up hope of returning to their country for the foreseeable future.

The green line: More than just a symbol

Within Mogadishu, mobility was highly restricted. For years, the division between North and South in Mogadishu, the invisible Green Line, was a painful reality. People could not or did not dare to walk about freely. Nor could they easily travel by car or truck between different parts of the city. The protection economy was conditioning the relationships between both sides of the capital city, even though ordinary people often risked crossing to the other side if prices were lower or work was easier to find. Although this division has not yet vanished entirely, its significance has greatly diminished over the years. A first attempt to remove the Green Line as a barrier was made in January 1994 and was relatively successful. This Hirab peace agreement did not please faction leaders but its impact was positive on the ground since people, cars and trucks started moving from one side to the other much more frequently.

The establishment of the Benadir Administration in early 1998 also marked improvement, despite the administration's lack of effectiveness. At that time, all warlords were significantly involved, leading ordinary people to believe that the Green Line was going to disappear. Since the TNG was established in 2000 at the Arta conference hosted by Djibouti, the Green Line was officially abolished although it remains in people's minds because of the violent crisis among the Abgal that is playing itself out in North Mogadishu as well as the Abgal's collective attitude towards factions in South Mogadishu who, they contest, do not have a right to live as equals in the capital city. Even though all Abgal sub-clans are 'represented' in the TNG and they are officially committed to coalition government, many of their members still consider themselves the owners of the area and hold that no non-Abgal TNG force has the right to remain in North Mogadishu indefinitely. This leads to the issue of citizenship.

The question of citizenship: U Dhashay/Ku Dhashay[8]

As soon as the Abgal leader Ali Mahdi Mohamed was elected president by his close associates in January 1991, he asked the Haber Gidir to return to their homeland in Galgadud and Mudug. This was an attempt to deprive General Aidid of his political supporters in the capital city, and brought together recent arrivals from the Central Region with people who had been settled in Mogadishu for generations. It also had a cultural dimension which appealed to deeper feelings. Through this action, the Abgal were asserting their ownership of Mogadishu, that is, that it was their traditional homeland (*goof*) and that they had the right to ask 'outsiders' to leave. Obviously, General Aidid's Haber Gidir clan and others downgraded to the status of 'guests' disagreed since they were, in effect, being asked to relinquish all claims to the leadership of the whole country (through the control of Mogadishu), as well the rights they believed that they had acquired in Mogadishu by having fought for years against Siad Barre's dictatorship.

Later, people discussed decentralization or regionalization in these same terms. Clans claimed to 'own' a specified part of a region as its traditional territory and demand to administer it or benefit from the *in situ* jobs provided by international agencies or local administrations. Such pre-emptive moves were often inadvertently supported by the international community who accorded status to elders and traditional authorities. These elders were usually acting on behalf of military entrepreneurs or other unsavoury characters and their actual governing authority was negligible, as evidenced by their inability to deliver on promises.

The debate continues and has ironically found its way into the TNG parliament despite the presence of numerous MPs who are returned migrants holding foreign passports on the basis of meeting residence requirements (rather than ancestral birth) to acquire their second citizenship. The idea that a clan 'owns' the territory of its origin and that this ownership implies that other Somalis cannot enjoy civic rights in that territory must be challenged. It is a political vision that is often based on distorted interpretations of history. It further reflects a confusion between traditional customs and national laws, and detaches the concept of citizenship from that of the rule of law.

One could justifiably ask whether people of clans other than the Abgal have no right to live as equals in Mogadishu, and how Mogadishu can be considered the capital city of Somalia. Applying ownership to places of ethnic origin begs the question of who conceivably are the 'real' owners of Mogadishu. A clan? A sub-clan? A lineage? A cluster of individuals? At what point in time should ownership be examined, that is when does history begin? Should the owners be the Abgal? Why not also the Bantus who were settled in Somalia long before the Somali invasion and the arrival of Arab and Persian traders? A careful look at Abgal politics shows that there is strong disagreement among Abgal sub-clans as to who precisely (among the Abgal sub-clans or lineages) 'owns' Mogadishu. Should it be the Reer Matan as the Italian colonizers first thought or the Daud as Muse Sudi claims?

Moreover, there have been over the years a number of clan or factional agreements supported by most groups (such as the Hirab peace agreement and the Benadir Administration) that recognize the right of certain newcomers to live there. Should these agreements, which were endorsed for a period but then contested, not be considered legitimate? Should it be acceptable that somebody from the 'wrong' clan settled in a given area be deprived of all civic rights while others from the 'right' clan, born and educated elsewhere, could come at any time to claim them? What kind of nation or state could be built on such assumptions?

This debate, whose logical inconsistency can so easily be revealed, is nonetheless crucial in the sense that it completely pre-empts the question of the rule of law. Certainly, properties have been occupied by newcomers (but also by long-settled people) and those assets must be returned to their rightful owners under state laws of property ownership, not given to individuals who belong to the so-called 'right' clan, that is the one that claims ownership on the basis of ancestral descent. When this claim and counterclaim become synonymous with the barrel of a gun, logic and law have ceased to operate in the context of the nation-state.

The persistence of this debate over the years shows the fragility of all the progress achieved to date in defining the form and content of the state. Paradoxically, it reveals that the Somali civil war is a modern war – a war about the concept of the state, about the shape of a newly emerging polity, and about how far the identities reshaped throughout the war should frame an eventual lasting peace settlement.

Economic dynamics of an urban war zone

Wars are experienced by people in their daily lives. Soldiers as well as civilians caught in the crossfire need to sustain their basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and basic services and amenities amidst ongoing hostilities. Basic needs are provisioned through markets, inter-personal exchange, own production and institutional welfare transfers. In terms of market supply of basic needs, wars generally create large surplus demand relative to supply. For merchants and the commercially minded, this situation represents a huge opportunity. The difficulty for them is providing timely supply responses as the availability of infrastructure, lines of supply and alliances shift. Mogadishu's economy has taken various twists and turns as military action has flared up or ebbed away (Marchal 2002).

Unfolding patterns of military mobilization

Against all odds, military fire cooled down during UNOSOM times. Before that, social mobilization to support or wage war was at such a high level that it was difficult to draw a clear line between armed and non-armed people, even though not everybody was part of the war and some notable figures, including a fair number of military officers, refused to take sides. After the mid-1990s, the difference between armed and non-armed was socially drawn and had concrete meanings and implications. Some people used weapons in their capacity as militia members in specific political factions; others did so as security personnel in the employ of traders or business people, whereas some were young delinquents who gained individual power from gun toting. There is, of course, substantial overlap but a considerable degree of differentiation was maintained over recent years.

Despite the presence of the TNG since 2000 whose numerous ministers require armed escorts, the trend has been towards a net decline in the carrying of weapons on city streets. Those who still keep them tend to be self-employed either at a roadblock or within a contingent of guards at a building or around a car. This was not the case ten years ago.

The city's war weariness has led to guns losing their cache, even amongst young men. Many of the deprecating labels that urban teenagers use nowadays are linked to militias' lives. Calling someone a *reer baadiyo* means a rustic, uncivilized person, like those militias who came from the bush and did not accept urban civilization. Those who ask about one's clan too openly are compared to the militia handling the heavy weapon on a *gaandhari*, again a sign of a lack of culture.

In the early 1990s, a few elders could easily exhort a group of young militias to go and fight for the rights of the clan against other groups and civilians. Those elders and political figures still exist but they are called *bac madoobe*[9] and their influence is much less significant than in previous years. In the past, the kinsmen of some factions' leaders who were reluctant to become involved in a war were the target of attack by the militias forcing them to join the faction to avoid further atrocities. Many bloody incidents took place in early 1996 in South Mogadishu and later in North Mogadishu connected with militia recruitment. In the wake of this, the general population has become more condemnatory and intolerant of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by militias.

A two-year experiment with Islamic courts in South Mogadishu beginning in 1998 reflected people's new attitudes. The functioning of the courts was possible because the population, still organized along clan lines, no longer accepted extortion from their own militias and there were calls for normalization.

The improvement in security has had many positive implications for urban life. Despite the lack of a reliable power supply, certain areas still maintain lively activities after sunset and although security remains a concern, many cars nowadays move about without guards, even at night. Parts of Mogadishu are described by inhabitants as fairly secure, while others continue to be unsafe.

Dangers persist for foreigners staying in Mogadishu without adequate protection. In the absence of a realistic political settlement in the capital city, there is no guarantee that peace will prevail and security will improve. A renewed outbreak of fighting is possible given the way all the militia groups were rearming at the beginning of 2002. However, the likelihood of civil war has significantly receded. Militias may be in a position to use heavy weapons and to destroy even the ruins of Mogadishu but they are no longer waging a popular war with social mobilization and support from all quarters.

Globalization through markets and migrations

Despite bleak economic forecasts and predictions of a complete collapse of urban society by UN spokesmen and other commentators, Mogadishu has survived without any form of government for the last 12 years. The city's economic collapse simply did not happen but this does not mean that the social cost of reproduction of this surviving urban polity and economy is acceptable. Nonetheless, the way people from all social strata and origins have coped with war has confounded conventional wisdom.

Strangely, the economic situation began to reverse itself at a time when expectations about Somali politics were very bleak. During the summer of 1998, while the Benadir Administration – an outcome of the Cairo Agreement then supported by all major figures in Mogadishu – was collapsing, the confidence of the population grew. Remarkably, the exchange rate appreciated despite the arrival of another shipment of fake bank notes, and the rehabilitation of some areas in town was clearly visible. To a certain extent this improvement continued despite disturbances.

During this period, residents of Mogadishu succeeded in forging new links with the outside world. In the early 1990s, western telecom technologies were becoming quickly obsolete and could be bought at affordable prices by Somali investors. The expansion of international commercial flights and the greatly enhanced availability of telecom communication in Somalia boosted the remittance economy. Somalis living abroad could easily contact their families in Somalia and were no longer left wondering if the remittance money they had sent had reached their relations. Later, the impact of the Internet spread despite shortages of power in the city and the cost of a computer and connection to a service provider. TV satellite dishes and subscriptions to DSTV also increased. Somali viewers could receive most of the channels not only from Arab Sat but also from South Africa MNet networks.

Furthermore, the late 1990s was a time when the number of Somali migrants returning for family visits increased. Although it is difficult to obtain hard evidence or figures from the airline companies, it is worth noting that all the airlines now organize their flights so that they can take off from Dubai international airport. Somalis in the diaspora can travel to Somalia without having to enter the United Arab Emirates, which requires an expensive visa. Some Somali migrants were returning for good and taking an active part in civil society organizations. The number of returnees was not massive but because they took place within a social stratum whose membership had been greatly reduced in number their arrival did not go unnoticed.

As far as the economy of Mogadishu is concerned, this situation suggests that there is no mechanical linkage between the state of Somali politics and people's decisions to return or to initiate investment in Somalia. Many newcomers involved in the economic arena do not believe that a major confrontation would take place in the southern part of the city.[10] Time will tell whether they are right. A second consequence is that many of these middle-class newcomers are starting projects to sustain themselves. Many have concentrated on trade and use their command of foreign languages (English or Arabic) to strike deals with people from their country of refuge. But significant numbers have invested in small plants, micro-industrial projects and the supply of services in Mogadishu. Some of the radio and TV networks are managed by Somalis who at some time had been together in Canada or Western Europe.

Mogadishu at war was never completely cut off from the outside world. Although the international port and airport have been closed for years, there are three airstrips where commercial aircraft can land (Ballidogle, K-50 and Isalley), two additional strips are suitable for small planes (Daynile and Jazira) and there are two natural ports (Eel Ma'an and Jazira) where most imports are unloaded. The port of Merka has been used only by international agencies for the last three years. Mogadishu is connected to Dubai, Djibouti and Nairobi by regular, scheduled commercial flights. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the split of Aeroflot into many companies that were eager to rent out their aircraft, with a consequent drop in the level of lease fees. The most successful Somali airline for years has been chartering 18 Ilyouchin aircraft from Air Tajikistan.

Remittance companies are extremely active in the city. No serious study has ever been conducted to determine the magnitude of remittances but it is clear that remittances play an equal or more important role than they did in the 1980s. After more than a decade of refugee exodus, the Somali diaspora is far more numerous and widely dispersed than it was. Currently, a plausible annual amount for the whole of Somalia must fall between US$150 million and US$500 million, a significant percentage (between 12 and 40 per cent) of the country's GNP estimated at US$1.3 billion in the recently published Human Development Report for Somalia.

Besides money transfers, they are active investors in the capital city and provide informal banking services, with many traders and entrepreneurs depositing their cash reserves with them for safekeeping. Regular trading in foreign exchange takes place daily in Saudi rials, United Arab Emirates dirhams, Ethiopian birrs, Kenyan shillings and, of course, US dollars. Generally, rates are roughly on a par with international exchange rates.

Finding ways around the crisis of services

There are no longer any public services of any kind, not even water or electricity supplies. Public-service deterioration pre-dates 1991, stretching back to the 1980s, depending on which area of the city one considers. In the ensuing period, the radical privatization of these services (private wells, generators, and grids) and their atomization have provided employment for a substantial number of people within the city. Twenty-three small industrial plants were active in Mogadishu in early 2002 and function at more than 40 per cent of their capacity, a level of electricity supply unsurpassed since the early 1980s. Worthy of mention also are the telecommunication companies that are providing mobile phone services at low prices.[11] Decent Internet services are also available at favourable prices when compared to Kenya.

The media was part of the state apparatus under Siad Barre's dictatorship. Nowadays, there are plenty of independent newspapers and weekly magazines, reflecting and supporting a broader political and social discourse than at any other time in Somali history. Satellite dishes are not uncommon in the city, there are various radio stations broadcasting on FM or short wave, and TV stations carry lively debates in addition to the always widely listened-to BBC Somali Service. Furthermore, movies of all kinds and origins, some subtitled in Somali in a laboratory in Mogadishu, are available.

Private hospitals now outnumber the three hospitals that are assisted by the international community. Mogadishu currently has three universities, 228 primary and secondary schools and a plethora of language and computer institutes. As would be expected in this proliferation of services, medical and teaching standards are debatable but Mogadishu residents' spirits have been lifted simply by the availability and range of services, where previously there was a dearth.

And last but not least, as regards goods and services, there are a number of markets in the capital city where basically everything is available – not only from a valid passport to the most fashionable sunglasses – but also more 'basic merchandise' for militias such as anti-aircraft artillery, ordnance and cocaine.

Regional markets

Mogadishu's economy has both positive and negative effects on the neighbouring Somali regions and adjoining nation-states. Somalia has benefited from imperfections in regional commodity markets. While both Kenya and Ethiopia pay lip service to the free-market economy, liberalization and deregulation, the reality is that there are plenty of grey areas where the state bureaucracies retain considerable control. This has led to a growth in the smuggling of cattle, weaponry and staple foods. Somalis living in both Kenya and Ethiopia were instrumental in setting up these cross-border commercial networks, and interfaces which their cousins from Somalia now take advantage of. However, these networks today operate in areas well beyond those where Kenyan and Ethiopian Somalis reside or have influence.

It can be argued that the Somali crisis and its intractability are in some ways a by-product of the end of the Cold War and the expansion of globalization. Had East–West competition lasted a few more years, the Somali crisis would have received much closer attention and more effective handling by the Western powers. With the cessation of the Cold War, Western governments became indifferent to African countries' political alignments on an East–West axis.

On a more positive note, this redirected Somali attention from currying western political favour to concentrating on seizing regional economic opportunities. During the 1990s, Dubai emerged as the African continent's major source of supply for second-hand vehicles, a panoply of manufactured goods and more traditional luxury items such as gold, gemstones, fine fabrics and so on. The proximity of Dubai, a free port and entrepot in the Persian Gulf, is also an asset for Somalia and has considerably eased the problems that the absence of banking facilities creates for people who need to engage in international trade (Marchal 2001). For a start, Somalis can easily get a two-week visa to stay in Dubai but still have difficulties getting visas for western countries. They tend to pay in cash for whatever commodities they buy. Furthermore, dhows are available to bring their commodities to Somalia without the need for bulking large cargoes, extensive paperwork and expensive insurance. Money laundering has not been a major concern for Dubai wholesalers eager to attract foreign retailers and keep their merchandise moving either before or after September 11.

Mogadishu's free market façade

Having suggested that Mogadishu and Somalia have more liberalized economies than other countries of Eastern Africa, it is necessary to qualify this with the observation that the new economy in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia has three major constraints. First, oligopoly rather than perfect competition characterizes the market. Second, lack of government regulation is one of the major obstacles to increased efficiency and prosperity. Third, the protection economy is still a significant part of the economic system that results in higher transaction costs.

Oligopolistic manoeuvres

The absence of any kind of administration may make outsiders believe that Mogadishu's economy is a free-market economy. It is not. Oligopolistic practices characterize business operations in Mogadishu, as exemplified in the food trade and the supply of electricity and telecommunications. This gives rise to destabilization with the arrival of a new business entrant. At first, there is an attempt by those already in the business to get rid of the new company, and competition takes the form of price-cutting to bankrupt the newcomer and remove him from the market. This can last several months and be quite costly for all actors.

Price wars are accompanied by negative propaganda and, at times, depending on the temperament, character or background of the protagonists, by armed clashes. After a while, when all sides are exhausted, fighting ceases and informal consultations begin, continuing until a deal is struck. The deal frequently includes agreement on price fixing. So, the cartel, initially threatened by a new entrant, absorbs him and is strengthened in numbers and power.

In the process, innovations are slowed down or entirely thwarted and competition in the long run is strangled, leading to unnecessarily high prices. The quality of services may also be adversely affected. When an activity generates significant profits, it attracts new entrants who may want to take shortcuts, not invest as much, or deliver a service of lower quality. Also, since they might not incur the same costs, these entrants can undersell the established suppliers and thus provoke a crisis in the sector, as happened with lobster and meat exports some years ago when new entrants lowered product standards to make easy profits.

Absence of government's regulatory role

The lack of controls and regulations results in difficulties and hazards for customers. Since there are no rules, people can import any commodities and sell them under any name. The best-known trade where this is a crucial issue is in the sale of medicines. Outdated or fake drugs are commonly sold in large quantities in Mogadishu by people who have no idea about the chemical contents and health effects of what they are selling. The packaging of Western medicines are often recycled and filled with very cheap or, at best, useless Indian and Pakistani pills. The same practices apply to foodstuffs that are repacked and no longer match the content or quality specified on the package.

The lack of regulations in the telecommunication sector has hampered the interconnection of networks and caused a massive duplication of investments. Subscribers need to have three land lines reaching their home and three phone sets to be contactable by everyone. The need for certain strategic sectors to agree on regulations, and for any would-be government to enforce them is a priority for the proper management of the Somali economy.

Fake banknotes have been imported into Mogadishu as if they were ordinary commodities, without any consideration for the economic consequences and the effect on the lives of poor households who constitute the majority of the population. Weapons are also brought into Mogadishu in quantities that raise major concerns over the possibility of peace in certain sections of the capital city.

Mogadishu's businesses: Protecting clan or capital interests?

The need for protection and high transaction costs determine the profitability of Somali business operations. These costs depend on many parameters, not least the clan of the trader or business operator. Some business people pay less than others for protection depending on the strength of their clan and the degree of threat posed, putting some in a more advantageous position. Business efficiency, therefore, is not always the decisive factor in business success, although it is more significant now than four or five years ago.

There are different ways to analyze the protection economy in the context of Mogadishu. The most obvious is to discuss the ambiguous relationships between clan loyalties and business profit-making and the ancillary issue of how relative clan strength eventually translates into the economic realm (Marchal 1996). Despite the clear denial by a majority of business people and traders, the clan is still central to economic organization but the way it is managed has changed considerably over the years. At the beginning of the 1990s, business people acted in a market that was highly segmented due to deep rivalries among factions that controlled parts of Somalia. Nowadays, with the relative collapse of the factional order (or disorder), business people of various clans are more inclined to team up to form companies or to cooperate with one another in business ventures.

This new *modus operandi* represents a marked improvement, though its limitations are readily apparent when management issues are discussed. To a certain extent, the need for protection is still there and there is a popular term for it in the market, *mukulaal madow*.[12] Protection costs lower profits but it is generally believed that they are an unavoidable insurance cost. Clearly, the civil-war mentality still persists.

The importance of the protection economy is reflected in the number of guards employed by businesses. Militias are a key component of the workforce in any company. Some believe this will be a permanent feature of Somali business life even if a lasting political settlement is reached. Somalia could follow the path already established by South Africa, Mozambique and Angola. The army of guards necessary in wartime conditions would, sooner or later, become employed by security companies since the rule of the law would take several years to achieve. Even if a peace agreement were reached, security would not be guaranteed *ipso facto* overnight.

There is another facet to the protection economy. In addition to preventing business people and their customers from the loss of life and limb, employed guards must be vigilant against the danger of kidnapping. Mogadishu has a thriving kidnapping industry that occasionally targets UN personnel or foreigners but far more frequently involves the kidnapping of Somalis and the hijacking of their vehicles. The establishment of Islamic courts in 1998 and the courts instituted by the TNG in 2000 have not provided a sufficient deterrent. Many commercial disagreements or unsettled debts have translated into the kidnapping of one of the protagonists and pressure on the victim's family to pay a ransom or the disputed sum.

Retaliatory kidnapping or the seizure of vehicles or goods from the other side can ensue. One celebrated case was the kidnapping of the manager of the Universal Bank who had infuriated local investors who then demanded their money back. But there are many other examples. A Marehan clan member was kidnapped by some people in North Mogadishu, and his kinsmen in Bulo Hawa decided to stop all trucks belonging to the kidnappers' sub-clans. This measure resulted in a settlement.

Many business people rely on kidnapping and ransom demand procedures because they lack confidence in any of the new political and judicial institutions connected with the TNG. It demonstrates that the Somali economy still needs a considerable amount of protection to work. Law enforcement and arbitration procedures are sorely lacking, making the resort to guns hard to avoid. On the other hand, the rhetoric of powerful clans versus powerless clans no longer describes the whole reality. There is a socially recognized border between public and private conflicts. Ordinary people do not automatically accept that private disagreements should lead to social clashes and opposing clans no longer automatically mobilize to defend the interests of their members.

Conclusion

Contrary to conventional understanding, the civil war that ignited Mogadishu in late December 1990 did not represent a new era. Mogadishu was already coping with a war-like situation: a dramatic increase in newcomers, violence, the concentration of specific clans within new settlements and the extension of the parallel economy. These economic and social dynamics were instrumental in the collapse of the Somalia state and yet they have also been fundamental to why Somali society and the population in Mogadishu have been able to survive the civil war and create new patterns of economic development.

Somalis accomplished a huge social and economic transformation during the 1980s and 1990s. Previously, Siad Barre's regime was adamant in its refusal of globalization. Foreign books and newspapers, contacts with foreigners and trips abroad were not taken lightly by the security services. In the 1990s, besides the existence of a far-flung diaspora throughout the Horn, in Europe (currently concentrated in northern Europe rather than Italy), America and Australia, passports are bought for a few dozen dollars, and commodities of every description can enter or leave Somalia. The influence of the Arab Peninsula has grown and is also very much a part of changes ushered in by the civil war.

Radical Islam is a way to address or try to make sense of modernity and offers a solution to the fears generated by new social trends. In fact, Islamic influences have tended to be more prevalent in the diaspora than in Somalia itself. Nonetheless, globalization in Somalia has been embraced restrictively in terms of the upsurge of the market and the money economy. Its wider referents, namely political liberalism, pluralism and the universality of human rights and values have not been absorbed into Somali political culture.

Notes

1. The first buildings were built in the areas known today as Hamar Weyne and Shangani.
2. The cathedral was looted in 1991 and largely destroyed in 1993 during the UNOSOM period.
3. Payments of up to 5000 Sosh (Somali shillings) were made, which were equivalent to more than the monthly earnings of a middle-ranking civil servant.
4. Somaliland, which had been under British colonial rule, was amalgamated with Somalia at national independence. It declared its independence from Somalia in 1991 although Somalia has never officially recognized it.
5. The term 'control' does not aptly describe the reality. In the Somali context, it means that no other military faction could undertake an action in that area. It does not imply that the faction is able in any way to administer the daily life of the city dwellers.
6. Its previous name was 'Wadajir'.
7. These were mostly Haber Gidir and Abgal and also other clans settled there including Murusade, Dir (Qubey), Hawadle, Galje'el and Ujejen.
8. Literally, 'born for/born in [the region]'. In the first case, people belong to the clan claiming 'ownership' of the region. In the second, the expression refers to residence.
9. Literally 'black plastic bag'. The meaning of this phrase is that those elders will benefit from clashes in which their sub-clans are involved and they will get a

share of the blood money (*mag*). Allegorically, the black colour of the plastic bag suggests that nobody acknowledges that they are making money from destabilization.

10. However, at the time of writing, Mogadishu has reached alarming levels of rearmament.
11. As of early 2002, standard charges for international calls were US$0.50 per minute.
12. The literal meaning of this term is 'black cat'. Black refers to the colour of the Somalis and the cat is protecting the food from the mice. *Gibil Cad* traders, who are good customers in the protection economy, coined this expression.

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Part IV

Urban Welfare, Housing and Infrastructure

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10
A Matter of Timing: Migration and Housing Access in Metropolitan Johannesburg

Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw and Sue Parnell

The city of Johannesburg lies at the centre of the largest urban conurbation in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the past, this conurbation was known by the clumsy acronym PWV that stood for the Pretoria–Witwatersrand–Vereeniging complex. Today, it has the political status of a province and has been renamed Gauteng, a popular local name meaning 'place of gold'. A province that is almost entirely urban, Gauteng is home to 7.3 million people: about one-third of South Africa's urban population of 21.8 million.[1] Using the most recent metropolitan demarcations, the population of Johannesburg itself was about 2.6 million in 1996,[2] making it the second largest city in South Africa, after Durban (2.8 million), and marginally bigger than Cape Town (also about 2.6 million).

Although Johannesburg is in most respects a modern industrial city, it shares many of the demographic features of other African cities. Its population has grown rapidly during the past half century and although the growth rate is now slowing down, its population is still growing in absolute terms. The main difference between Johannesburg and most African cities outside South Africa has been state control over urbanization resulting in lower urban growth rates than would otherwise have been the case. Although the urbanization of Africans in Johannesburg was curtailed by government policy for most of the 20th century, evidence is presented here to show that in-migration contributed substantially to population growth. Finally, urbanization in Johannesburg is also characterized by the dynamic of circular migration – a phenomenon that it shares with most African cities (Prothero and Chapman 1985, Standing 1985, Mabin 1990, Potts and Mutambirwa 1990).

This chapter presents an analysis of the relationship between urbanization and settlement patterns of the African population in the area under the administration of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, focusing on population growth in Johannesburg, the extent of in-migration and circular migration, and the way in which housing policy has shaped the relationship between urbanization and access to different kinds of accommodation. Migration has been conceptualized in two ways: first, as 'in-migration' whereby anyone born outside the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area is defined as a migrant or, to be more precise, an 'in-migrant', and, second, 'oscillating' labour migration which embraces people who live away from their homes in order to earn a living or to search for employment – this being the definition used in the 1996 South African census. Such migrants are referred to here as 'circular migrants'.

Population trends in Metropolitan Johannesburg, 1911–1996

Although the population censuses do not provide information that can be used directly to establish the extent and patterns of in-migration to Johannesburg,[3] they do provide data on long-term trends in the size of the city's population and its racial, as well as its gender, composition. The earliest census of all races, taken in 1911, reported a population of just less than a quarter of a million. By the time of the last census, in 1996, this had increased to almost 2.3 million (Table 10.1). However, the rate of growth is slowing down and has been doing so since 1946. The average annual rate of growth peaked at 4 per cent in the period between 1920 and 1946 and has declined steadily ever since, falling to only 0.5 per cent in the early 1990s (Table 10.2).

Johannesburg's population growth trends reveal important differences in the urbanization dynamics of different groups by race and gender. The city's overall growth has been driven increasingly by the African population from as early as the 1920s. At that time Africans made up 43 per cent of Johannesburg's population, and whites 51 per cent. The remaining 6 per cent comprised coloured and Indian residents. Until the 1920s, the rate of growth of both the African and the white populations was the same. Since then, however, the growth rate of the African population has been higher than that of the white population, and their share of Johannesburg's population rose steadily, reaching 69 per cent by 1996 (Figure 10.1).

The growth of Johannesburg's African population was curtailed, at least in part, by government policies limiting the urbanization of Africans outside the reserves (Hindson 1987, Posel 1991).[4] After 1945 this was achieved by restricting the right to permanent urban settlement only to those Africans who had been born in Johannesburg or to rural-born migrants who had worked continuously for one employer for 10 years or for more than one employer for 15 years. Until they had secured permanent urban rights, rural-born migrants were not permitted to bring their families to Johannesburg and were forced to live in non-family accommodation, such as hostels and domestic servants' rooms. This policy delayed African urbanization

Table 10.1 Population of Metropolitan Johannesburg by race and gender, 1911–1996

Year	African		Coloured and Indian		White		All races		
	Men	**Women**	**Men**	**Women**	**Men**	**Women**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**
1911	97,614	4,357	9,307	5,873	67,775	52,178	174,696	62,408	237,104
1921	118,571	14,736	10,497	8,383	81,007	77,264	210,075	100,383	310,458
1936	196,605	65,457	17,387	15,660	134,529	131,926	348,521	213,043	561,564
1946	290,668	147,139	21,093	20,286	173,505	176,296	485,266	343,721	828,987
1951	320,612	195,807	31,402	31,067	192,588	198,171	544,602	425,045	969,647
1960	389,747	311,788	46,242	46,828	222,292	230,709	658,281	589,325	1,247,606
1970	465,464	409,457	64,584	67,172	274,166	280,328	804,214	756,957	1,561,171
1980	584,985	517,045	76,426	83,691	300,724	317,893	962,135	918,629	1,880,764
1991	690,171	597,674	122,158	158,179	317,621	329,382	1,129,950	1,085,235	2,215,185
1996	793,201	772,778	110,907	118,387	230,669	246,713	1,134,777	1,137,878	2,272,655

Source: Population Censuses.

Table 10.2 Average annual population growth rate of Metropolitan Johannesburg by race and gender, 1911–1996 (%)

Intercensal period	**African**			**Coloured and Indian**			**White**			**All races**		
	Men	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**
1911–1921	2.0	13.0	2.7	1.2	3.6	2.2	1.8	4.0	2.8	1.9	4.9	2.7
1921–1936	3.4	10.5	4.6	3.4	4.3	3.8	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.4	5.1	4.0
1936–1946	4.0	8.4	5.3	2.0	2.6	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.8	3.4	4.9	4.0
1946–1951	2.0	5.9	3.4	8.3	8.9	8.6	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.3	4.3	3.2
1951–1960	2.2	5.3	3.5	4.4	4.7	4.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	2.1	3.7	2.8
1960–1970	1.8	2.8	2.2	3.4	3.7	3.5	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.3
1970–1980	2.3	2.4	2.3	1.7	2.2	2.0	0.9	1.3	1.1	1.8	2.0	1.9
1980–1991	1.5	1.3	1.4	4.4	6.0	5.2	0.5	0.3	0.4	1.5	1.5	1.5
1991–1996	2.8	5.3	4.0	–1.9	–5.6	–3.9	–6.2	–5.6	–5.9	0.1	1.0	0.5

Source: Population Censuses.



Figure 10.1 Metropolitan Johannesburg's population by race, 1911–1996

by excluding unemployed and retired rural migrants from the city and by ensuring that the dependants of rural migrants did not live in Johannesburg.

African in-migration to Johannesburg was also limited by the government policy of displacing African urbanization to towns in the African reserves. This was achieved through state subsidies and tax breaks for employers who set up businesses in the reserves and by state expenditure on housing and other infrastructure in towns within the reserves. These government policies were put in place from the early 1950s and were intensified during the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1980s, opposition to apartheid policies from a variety of quarters resulted in reforms to influx control. By the mid-1980s, the pass law system had been abolished and, in its place, the government hoped that African urbanization could be managed indirectly through the strategic provision of formal housing and strict controls over slums and the location of squatter settlements.

Changes in the rate of growth of Johannesburg's African population broadly reflect these shifts in urbanization policy, suggesting that in-migration was a significant component overall. From 1911 to 1960, the average annual rate of growth was high, rising from 2.7 per cent in the 1910s, to 4.6 per cent between 1921 and 1936 and reaching a high of 5.3 per cent between 1936 and 1946. By contrast, in the following decades from 1960 to 1980, when state control over African urbanization was at its most intense, the average annual rate of growth fell to just over 2 per cent.

Curiously, the growth rate dropped even further to only 1.4 per cent during the 1980s. Such a figure seems anomalous because the decade was one of intense political rebellion during which the state lost control over housing and settlement in African townships. Furthermore, influx control was finally abolished in 1986, so one would have expected to see increasing African in-migration during the 1980s. It was only during the 1990s that the annual population growth rate increased again, rising to an average of 4.0 per cent, a rate not seen since the pre-war years (Table 10.2).

This surge of African population growth during the 1990s did not produce a commensurate increase in Johannesburg's overall population, as it was offset by recorded absolute declines in the white, coloured and Indian populations between 1991 and 1996 (Table 10.1). However, the white population decline recorded in the 1996 census was excessive because, while many middle-class whites emigrated during this period, it is also widely acknowledged that middle-class areas were seriously under-enumerated in that census. Nevertheless, it is improbable that Johannesburg's population growth rate will increase dramatically once the out-migration rate of non-Africans stabilizes. Even if a constant population for non-Africans between 1991 and 1996 is assumed, the overall average growth rate is only 2 per cent per annum for this period.

Johannesburg's historical pattern of population growth is characterized by striking differences in male and female growth rates. From 1911 to 1921, the female population increased at over twice the rate of the male population. This gender difference declined slowly over subsequent decades and equalized only during the 1970s (Table 10.2). The reason for these differences is that the first residents of Johannesburg were mostly men who came to work in the gold mines in the mid-1880s. For the first 20–30 years of its existence, Johannesburg was more like a mining camp than a city, and a high male/female ratio was to be found among all races. However, by the time of the 1936 population census, there were more or less equal numbers of men and women among the white, coloured and Indian races. By contrast, there were still three men to every woman among the African population. This high male/female ratio among Africans was due to the employment of circular migrant workers from remote rural areas both within South Africa and from other countries, mostly Mozambique, and also other African countries to the north (Jeeves 1985). Coupled with pass laws preventing permanent African urbanization, this pattern of labour migration ensured that the male/female ratio among Africans approached parity only in the late 1980s.

In-migration to Johannesburg: Greater Soweto

Another source of information for the study of the urbanization of the African population is a survey conducted among households in Greater Soweto during 1997.[5] The survey used a stratified two-stage cluster sample with 112 clusters selected in the first stage. In the second stage, about 25 households were selected systematically within each cluster yielding a final sample of 2,947 households. The sample was stratified (non-proportional to population size) by type of accommodation categorized as follows: formal houses that were built by the state, formal houses built by the private sector, backyard dwellings, shacks in illegal shack settlements, dwellings in site-and-service schemes and rooms in hostels. The analysis presented here was weighted by the actual numbers of units in each of these housing categories.[6] Information concerning migration was not, unfortunately, collected for every adult in each sampled household but only the migration history of the household head. The latter were selected not because of their status in the household but because of their leadership of the household's migration. It is acknowledged that this method probably introduced an unknown bias in the sample because adult household members may have different residential careers to that of their household head.

Clearly, this survey of Sowetan households is not representative of all African households within Metropolitan Johannesburg. Although the population of Soweto accounts for about 67 per cent of all Africans in the city, four important social groups were excluded. The first comprises domestic servants and gardeners who live in servants' rooms in the middle-class areas of the city. These residents are likely to be rural-born and circular migrants. The second comprises African residents who have left Soweto and other African townships to live in the erstwhile white residential areas of Johannesburg. The third consists of circular migrant workers housed in hostels in Johannesburg's central business district (Pirie and Da Silva 1986). Fourth are the residents of Alexandra, an African township in the north of Metropolitan Johannesburg.

Calculating the extent of in-migration from household surveys is fraught with one major problem, namely that such surveys exclude all people who have left the city and those who have died. The latter can be remedied by controlling the statistical analysis for age. For the 1997 survey in Johannesburg, this means analysing the proportion of in-migrants versus the proportion of city-born respondents by age cohort (bearing in mind that the data refer only to household heads). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10.3.

Table 10.3 In-migrants and city-born household heads in Soweto by age cohort

Age cohort	In-migrant (%)	City-born (%)	Total (%)	Sample size
Up to 29 years old	67	33	100	335
30 to 39 years old	55	45	100	761
40 to 49 years old	47	53	100	708
50 to 59 years old	52	47	100	499
60 to 69 years old	70	30	100	360
Over 69 years old	83	17	100	266
Missing data	60	40	100	18
Total	58	41	100	2935

Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Greater Soweto Household Survey 1997.

Table 10.4 Period of urbanization of Soweto household heads by age cohort (%)

Period of urban arrival	Up to 29 years	30–39 years	40–49 years	50–59 years	60–69 years	Over 69 years
1916–1920	0	0	0	0	0	1
1921–1925	0	0	0	0	0	2
1926–1930	0	0	0	0	0	3
1931–1935	0	0	0	0	1	7
1936–1940	0	0	0	1	7	24
1941–1945	0	0	0	2	8	20
1946–1950	0	0	1	4	22	22
1951–1955	0	0	3	4	17	6
1956–1960	0	0	3	26	20	4
1961–1965	0	0	7	15	6	2
1966–1970	0	3	18	17	6	2
1971–1975	0	6	20	11	1	0
1976–1980	4	18	17	11	0	1
1981–1985	9	26	12	3	0	1
1986–1990	37	24	9	3	3	0
1991–1995	39	18	3	1	3	0
1996 onwards	10	1	3	0	0	0
No answer	1	3	4	4	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sample size	335	761	708	499	360	266

Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Greater Soweto Household Survey 1997.

A striking observation from the findings is that the levels of net in-migration are surprisingly high considering the kinds of state controls that were instituted to prevent it. Throughout the apartheid period, the proportion of household heads that were in-migrants did not drop below 47 per cent (Tables 10.3 and 10.4).

A second observation is that the rate of in-migration shows a distinct historical trend. As expected, the proportion of in-migrants to city-born people is lowest among respondents from those in the 40–59 age group and increases in both younger and older age cohorts. This suggests that the extent of in-migration was higher during both the early and the late apartheid periods. In other words, the age cohorts from 40 to 59 years of age, who mainly urbanized from the late 1950s to the 1970s, have fewer in-migrants than other age cohorts. This makes sense because it was when apartheid control over African settlement was at its height. The cohorts under the age of 40, who urbanized during the 1980s and 1990s, accordingly have a higher percentage of in-migrants, reflecting the erosion of the apartheid government's control over African townships during the late 1980s and the final abolition of influx control in 1986. Finally, the cohorts aged over 60 years are also characterized by relatively high in-migration rates. Most would have migrated to town before the 1950s, when apartheid controls over African urbanization were still relatively weak and ineffectual.

African in-migration and housing provision in Metropolitan Johannesburg

Before the 1940s, state attempts to control and regulate African urbanization were both limited and ineffectual (Parnell 2002). Official accommodation for Africans took the form of rented accommodation in the state-controlled townships for families and single-sex hostels for circular migrants. The official Western Native Township and the hostels were located within six kilometres of the town centre. However, the state had already begun to build new African townships up to 15 kilometres from the centre of town. The townships of Klipspruit, Pimville and Orlando were the nucleus around which Soweto was to be built. The largest single group of African residents who lived in Metropolitan Johannesburg during the 1930s were circular migrants in single-sex hostels (44 per cent). Only a small proportion were housed in official townships at this time (Bonner 1995). The rest of the African population lived in different forms of unofficial accommodation, mainly in domestic servants' quarters in the backyards of white residential areas or in freehold African townships a few miles from the city centre. Although a small, wealthy minority of Africans owned houses in these freehold townships, the majority rented backyard shacks (Proctor 1979, Hart and Pirie 1984, Parnell and Pirie 1991). Smaller but significant numbers also lived in slum yards in central Johannesburg. These slum yards contained rooms that lined the perimeter of the property and were provided with communal services. This form of accommodation was usually built by employers in the backyards of their industrial and commercial premises but many landlords built such yards for the sole purpose of renting them out (Hellmann 1948, Parnell 1993). Many African miners lived with their families in shanty towns that their employers allowed them to build on unused land owned by the mining companies (Sapire 1989). Others lived illegally on peri-urban farmland but with the permission of the farmer to whom they paid rent (Bonner 1995).

The pace of African urbanization rose dramatically between 1921 and 1946. During the 1930s, the government took the first steps to ensure that Johannesburg would become an increasingly racially segregated city by demolishing the inner-city slum yards and forcibly removing the African residents to hostels and official townships (Parnell 1988). Those Africans without urban passes were left with no option but to find accommodation in the freehold black townships where they were beyond the reach of the law (Hart and Pirie 1984). As a consequence of rising African urbanization and slum clearances, both official and freehold African townships became overcrowded. In the official townships, a pattern of sharing council houses developed since officials would not tolerate the construction of backyard shacks at this time (Stadler 1979). In the unregulated freehold townships, however, 'almost every stand' had shacks in the backyard (Van Tonder 1993: 319). In response to this housing crisis, a number of land invasions took place from the mid- to late 1940s. Stadler (1979) estimated that most of these squatters (between one half and three-quarters) were residents who had already established themselves in the city and were not migrants who had moved in directly from rural districts.

Partly in response to the housing shortage and partly to ensure the racial segregation of Johannesburg's population, the council accelerated its housing construction programme. The African residents of the freehold townships of Alexandra, Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare were forcibly removed by the government and re-housed in what became known as Greater Soweto (Proctor 1979, Lodge 1981, Hart and Pirie 1984, Van Tonder 1993). Most of Soweto's current housing stock was built between 1956 and 1962. At the peak of delivery, about 11,000 houses were built in one year (Morris 1981, Parnell and Hart 1999). During this period, the number of hostel beds in Soweto doubled.[7] So, with the demolition and forced removal of Africans from inner-city areas in Johannesburg, the new peripheral townships of Soweto became an increasingly important reception area for migrants. The exception was Alexandra. Although many Africans were removed from there during the 1950s, Alexandra is still a residential area, albeit a slum, for poor Africans today.

By the end of the 1960s, government policy had slowed the supply of formal housing for Africans to a mere trickle. Consequently, the 1970s and

1980s were decades of a chronic and growing housing shortage. This was expressed during the late 1970s in the overcrowding of formal council houses. Later, as the authority of the state became undermined by popular resistance, the housing shortage resulted in the widespread construction of backyard shacks and, finally, in land invasions (Sapire 1992, Crankshaw 1993). Again, as in the pre-1940 period, rural-born in-migrants were faced with a range of unregulated forms of accommodation. Most land invasions in Metropolitan Johannesburg took place within the boundaries of Greater Soweto, the exceptions being a number of relatively small squatter camps on peri-urban farmland (Adler *et al.* 1985, Abrahams 1992, Sapire 1992, Crankshaw 1993).

These different regimes of housing provision during the apartheid era mean that the period during which in-migrants first came to live in Metropolitan Johannesburg plays a significant role in determining the type of accommodation that they occupy or occupied. Essentially, in-migrants who arrived in the city before the mid-1960s were much more likely to begin their urban residence in a formal council-built house or to occupy such a house today because this was when large numbers of low-cost houses were built by the state.

This housing regime was reversed by the end of the 1960s, after which very few low-cost houses were constructed. In addition, most of Soweto's hostels were built during the late 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, in-migrants who arrived from the late 1960s onwards were much less likely to live in formal family housing of any kind and much more likely to live in single-sex hostels or in backyard shacks and squatter settlements (Gilbert and Crankshaw 1999) (Tables 10.5 and 10.6).

Up to the mid-1960s, the proportion of in-migrants who secured formal family housing as their first place of residence was around 20–30 per cent (Table 10.5). Thereafter, the proportion dropped steadily to 15 per cent for the period between 1966 and 1980, and then to about 6 per cent from 1981 onwards. Correspondingly, the proportion of in-migrants whose first accommodation was a backyard shack doubled from about one-fifth between the 1950s and the end of the 1970s to over two-fifths during the 1980s and 1990s. Before the mid-1950s, the proportion of in-migrants whose first accommodation was a hostel was a mere 5 per cent. By the late 1950s and early 1960s this rose to 14 per cent, and then increased again to 26 per cent from the late 1960s to the end of the 1980s (Table 10.5).

A similar pattern is evident when examining the present type of accommodation occupied by Sowetan in-migrants who were household heads in 1997 (Crankshaw, Gilbert and Morris 2000). If they arrived in Metropolitan Johannesburg before the late 1960s, they were much more likely to secure formal accommodation than those who arrived from the mid-1960s onwards. Specifically, 87 per cent of those in-migrants who arrived before the mid-1950s (and stayed) now live in houses that were built by the local authority (Table 10.6). Those who arrived between 1956 and 1965 are

Table 10.5 First type of accommodation in Metropolitan Johannesburg by year of arrival of Soweto household heads (%)

Type of accommodation	**1906–1955**	**1956–1965**	**1966–1980**	**1981–1990**	**1991–1996**	**Total**
Rented a formal house	29	20	15	6	7	15
Shared a formal house with another family (including relatives)	23	26	29	16	16	22
Rented a backyard room or shack	22	24	22	41	44	31
A shack settlement	8	5	2	2	14	5
A domestic servant's room	8	5	2	4	2	4
A hostel	5	14	26	26	14	18
A room on employer's premises	5	7	5	5	3	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sample size	268	145	296	278	145	1132

Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Greater Soweto Household Survey 1997.

Table 10.6 Present type of accommodation in Soweto by year of arrival in Metropolitan Johannesburg (%)

Type of accommodation	**1906–1955**	**1956–1965**	**1966–1980**	**1981–1990**	**1991–1996**	**Total**
Rented council house	87	43	14	3	2	28
Privately built & owned house	3	4	5	2	1	3
Backyard shack or room	3	27	48	62	68	43
Informal settlement	3	6	10	9	9	8
Hostel	3	18	17	23	20	16
Site & service schemes	1	2	6	2	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sample size	268	145	296	278	145	1132

Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Greater Soweto Household Survey 1997.

less likely to live in a council-built house today but the proportion is still relatively high at 43 per cent. By contrast, of those who arrived after 1965, fewer than 14 per cent now occupy a council-built house (Table 10.6).

Circular migrants in Metropolitan Johannesburg

The 1996 population census is the only source of information that can provide an estimate of circular migration for the whole city. Defining a circular migrant worker as someone who is absent from home for more than one month each year in order to work or to seek work, this census recorded information about circular migrant workers in two different ways. Each household member who was present in the household on 10 October 1996 was asked if they were a circular migrant worker or not.[8] In addition, the census asked if there was anyone who was usually a member of the household but was living elsewhere because they were a circular migrant worker.[9] The census theoretically captured circular migrant workers at both their place of residence at the time of the census, and at the 'homes' from which they were absent.

The first question enumerated 92,144 circular migrants living within households in Metropolitan Johannesburg. Given a total population of 2,306,777, this suggests about 4 per cent were circular migrants. However, the second question, answered by households *outside* Metropolitan Johannesburg who had absent members who live and worked in the city,[10] enumerated 274,749 circular migrants – about 12 per cent of the population. The discrepancy between these two estimates is large and deserves some discussion. The suggestions made below are necessarily speculative. One possibility is that the discrepancy occurs because the census used magisterial districts as enumeration areas rather than entire metropolitan areas. Metropolitan Johannesburg is made up of three districts (Johannesburg, Randburg and Roodepoort) and Soweto. Many households may have said that their absent members were in 'Johannesburg' when in reality they were in one of the other magisterial districts. This would explain why, according to the second (higher) estimate, 88 per cent of circular migrants were recorded as living in Johannesburg Magisterial District and only 12 per cent in Roodepoort, Randburg and Soweto. By contrast, according to the first (lower) estimate of circular migrants, only 51 per cent live in Johannesburg Magisterial District. However, while this may account for differences in the share of circular migrants between districts, it cannot account for the overall difference between the two estimates.

Another possible explanation for the divergent estimates of circular migrants is that rural households may still consider an absent household member to be a circular migrant, even though the migrants consider themselves to be fully urbanized.[11] This would suggest that the estimate based on urban households might be the more accurate one. Yet another explanation may lie in the fact that the concept of 'home' was not clearly defined in the relevant census questions. Although it is implicit in the questionnaire design that 'home' refers to the migrant's household of origin, it could have been interpreted by respondents to mean the home in which they were currently living. If this sort of confusion did arise, then the census results on circular migration are flawed (Posel 2002). However, the authors' view here is that the concepts of 'migrant worker' and 'home', when used in Johannesburg households, would have been interpreted as the census intended.

None of these points gives clear guidance as to how best to interpret the difference between the census results on circular migrants. However, it appears that as many as one-third of all circular migrants in Johannesburg in 1996 were women. This finding is fairly robust since both methods of identifying circular migrants produced similar gender compositions (Table 10.7). This indicates the extent to which the early pattern of male-dominated circular migration has been eroded by the feminization of the African workforce, especially of unskilled jobs in the service sector, such as domestic service and office cleaning. A comparison of the gender composition by age cohort of circular migrants further suggests that women have been a significant component of the circular migrant workforce for at least 30 years (Table 10.8).

To gain insight into the housing circumstances of circular migrants in Johannesburg it is necessary to return to the findings of the Soweto household survey that tried to establish the extent of circular migration by asking, first, whether or not the household heads surveyed had an additional home of their own. (To avoid excluding from the definition of circular migrants those respondents who did not have a second home of their own, but who were still members of their parents' household, respondents were also asked if they had a rural house that they considered their family home.) To establish the respondents' involvement with their other home, they were asked where their spouses and children lived and how often they visited there. By extrapolation, it was calculated that of a total of 298,985 household heads

Table 10.7 Gender composition of circular migrants in Metropolitan Johannesburg (%)

Gender	**Circular migrants**		
	Estimate 1	**Estimate 2**	**Non-migrants**
Men	64	68	49
Women	36	32	51
Total	100	100	100

Source: Population Census 1996.

Table 10.8 Gender composition of circular migrants by age cohort in Metropolitan Johannesburg (%)

Age	Men	Women	Total
15–19 years	58	42	100
20–24 years	67	33	100
25–29 years	68	32	100
30–34 years	65	35	100
35–39 years	63	37	100
40–44 years	62	38	100
45–49 years	62	38	100
50–54 years	60	40	100
55–59 years	62	38	100
60–64 years	60	40	100
Over 64 years	54	46	100
Unspecified	61	39	100
Total	64	36	100

Source: Population Census 1996 (estimate 1).

in Soweto, about 118,000 would have access to a rural family home and that, for some 34,800 of these individuals, this family home was their own second house.[12] An additional 8,000 would have had a second home in an urban area. So, if all respondents who had a second house of their own are counted as potential circular migrants, then about 14 per cent of all Sowetan household heads are circular migrants.

If this definition is broadened to include those who do not have their own second home but were born in a rural area and still visit a rural family home at least once a year, the estimate increases to 31 per cent. However, the problem with this latter estimate is that it must include individuals who are fully urbanized and who simply visit the family homestead without being members of the rural household. Nonetheless, this exercise does provide an outside estimate of the potential extent of circular migration among Sowetan households.

The importance of backyard accommodation as a source of shelter for in-migrants suggests that it may play a similar role for circular labour migrants. The evidence from the Soweto survey shows that this is indeed the case. Staying with the definition of (potential) circular migrants as outlined above, a comparison of the accommodation occupied by circular migrants and urbanites (i.e. those without a second home) shows that circular migrants are much more likely than urbanites to live in a hostel (Table 10.9). This is to be expected. What is striking, however, is the finding that more than twice as many circular migrants live in backyards as live in hostels. Put differently, about half of all circular migrants in Greater Soweto live in backyard shacks or rooms.

Table 10.9 Type of accommodation occupied by potential circular migrants and fully urbanized respondents in Greater Soweto

Type of accommodation	Circular migrants	Urbanites
Council houses	16	44
Private sector houses	13	8
Backyards	50	36
Squatter settlements	8	5
Hostels	20	3
Site & service schemes	3	4
Total	100	100
Sample size	843	2102

Source: Authors' analysis of data from the Greater Soweto Household Survey 1997.

Conclusion

This study has shown that in spite of state control to limit African urbanization, the African population of Johannesburg grew throughout the apartheid period, although the rates of growth were influenced by policy constraints. Census data cannot identify the extent to which this growth was due either to in-migration or to natural increase but evidence from a survey of households in Greater Soweto suggests that net in-migration may account for over half of all household heads during the apartheid period.

In-migrants' access to formal housing in Soweto appears to have been strongly determined by the period in which they arrived in Johannesburg. Most of those who arrived immediately before and during the mass construction of low-cost housing in Soweto during the late 1950s and early 1960s, and who remained, secured rights to one of these council houses. By contrast, in-migrants who arrived and stayed in Johannesburg from the late 1960s onwards were increasingly likely to end up in backyard rooms or shacks and, to a lesser extent, in shack settlements and hostels. These findings shed new light on the dynamics of state control over African urbanization in Johannesburg and its consequences for social differentiation.

During the 'high apartheid' period of the late 1960s and 1970s when influx control was at its most effective and the state still exerted tight restrictions over African settlement, most in-migrants were channelled into official accommodation in the form of hostels and family housing. The pass law system controlling African urbanization in this period went hand-in-hand with state control over access to housing in African townships. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the state was increasingly unable to control settlement in African townships and in-migrants secured illegal and informal forms of accommodation usually in the backyards of council houses and, sometimes, in shack settlements.

Curiously, the apartheid government began to rely on its control over access to housing to control African urbanization at precisely the time that this control was being wrested away from the state by popular protest. The creation of backyard accommodation in Soweto was, therefore, an important reason why influx control was undermined in the late apartheid period. Because this form of accommodation became an important reception site for in-migrants, it is not surprising that it also became an important source of accommodation for circular migrants. Instead of being channelled into single-sex hostels, circular migrants increasingly flouted government controls by living in backyards instead. By 1997, twice as many people who were potentially circular migrants lived in backyards as in hostels.

These housing trends can be contextualized within a broader economic and historical framework. Access to urban formal employment for in-migrants (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell 2002, Crankshaw and Parnell 2004), for example, follows trends that are very similar to the housing trends. Just as in-migrants who arrived during the early years of apartheid had a better chance of gaining access to formal housing than those who arrived during the high apartheid period, so did they also have a better chance of securing unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the formal sector. Not only was the early apartheid economy characterized by a division of labour that required relatively large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers, it also grew dramatically during the 1960s (Crankshaw 1997). However, this economic boom came to an end in the mid-1970s and the demand for this kind of manual work went into permanent decline. Conditions of slow employment growth during the 1980s and 1990s resulted in rising unemployment among less educated and younger workers (Bhorat and Leibbrandt 1996). Poorly educated in-migrants who arrived in Johannesburg after 1980 stood a higher chance of being unemployed than those who had urbanized in earlier decades. The historically variable pattern of access to formal housing by in-migrants to Johannesburg discussed in this chapter has thus mirrored, in many ways, aspects of their broader economic livelihoods.

Notes

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1. South Africa defines the urban population as those residents who are under the authority of a local government. If this definition were expanded to include people living in dense, non-agricultural settlements that fall outside local authority jurisdiction, this estimate would increase significantly.

2. New metropolitan municipality boundaries were demarcated in 2000. In the case of Johannesburg, the final demarcation of December 2000 incorporated the settlements of Midrand to the north and Orange Farm to the south. Consequently, the population of 2.6 million is somewhat larger than the figure of 2.3 million presented in Table 10.1 for 1996, which was the population within the boundaries of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, an interim phase of local government that lasted from 1994 until 2000.
3. This is because the population censuses provide only the country of each person's birth and not the specific place of birth within South Africa. Consequently, it is impossible to calculate the extent of in-migration to specific regions such as Metropolitan Johannesburg.
4. The following discussion is based on Hindson (1987) and Posel (1991).
5. The survey was designed by Owen Crankshaw in consultation with the other members of the Soweto in Transition Committee based in the Sociology Department at the University of the Witwatersrand and was funded by the Southern, Western and Northern Metropolitan Substructures of Johannesburg, the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council, the Human Sciences Research Council, the Anglo-American and De Beers Chairman's Fund and the Foschini Group.
6. The number of formal houses and shacks was determined from recent aerial photographs and the number of hostel beds and rooms was provided by the hostel administration. The average number of backyard dwellings per formal stand was calculated from the survey results.
7. Issues of *Vade Mecum*, 1937–1973.
8. The exact question was: 'Is (the person) a migrant worker? (i.e. someone who is absent from home *for more than a month* each year to work or to seek work).' [original emphasis], Census '96 Questionnaire, Section A, Question 10, p. 4. These data are not available on the Community Profiles for the 1996 census. Instead they are available on the Unit Records and were provided for the authors by Amiena Mohamed, a statistician at Statistics South Africa, Cape Town.
9. The exact question was: 'Are there any persons who are usually members of this household but who are away for a month or more because they are migrant workers? (A migrant worker is someone who is absent from home for more than a month each year to work or to seek work.)' Census '96 Questionnaire, Section B, Question 1.3, p. 10. These data are available on the Community Profile Data Bases and were calculated by the authors.
10. According to Statistics South Africa, these population estimates are not adjusted for undercount.
11. We are grateful to Debby Potts for this insight.
12. These figures were calculated by weighting the survey results according to the actual population of Soweto. The population estimate was calculated by multiplying the occupancy rate per formal stand/shack (established through the survey) by the number of formal stands/shacks (established from aerial photographs). Hostel managers provided the number of hostel residents.

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11

Esther's House: One Woman's 'Home Economics' in Chitungwiza, Zimbabwe

Ann Schlyter

Focusing on the history of one woman and her house in Chitungwiza, Zimbabwe, this chapter explores the significance of housing for an individual African household and its livelihood. Colonial policy largely prevented Africans from owning land or houses in towns. In the early 1960s there was a relaxation of policy to allow some areas of home ownership in African townships (by redefining them as part of the 'Native' area), but the imposition of UDI (the Unilateral Declaration of Independence) by the illegal Smith regime in 1965 meant that this opening was short-lived. Towards the end of the 1970s, the policy changed again to allow African home ownership as it was deemed that this could be a stabilizing political influence, and would ease the burden of rental subsidies. From 1978 onwards, self-help housing became an important element of government policy. At the time of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, it is estimated that, of a total family housing stock for Africans in Salisbury (Harare) of 52,000 houses, half were occupied under rent-to-buy contracts or freehold tenure (Davis and Dewar 1989).

Housing is a differentiating force and, seen in a longer social perspective, has a substantial impact on class formation in any society. However, the specificities of the way in which house ownership was introduced in Zimbabwe and offered to the previously renting class have created an unusual situation.[1]

This chapter highlights certain aspects of Zimbabwe's urban housing history to show how housing policy has been used as a means of controlling people, and how the failure to stimulate sufficient production of housing has led to the *de facto* acceptance of lodging in home-ownership areas as the dominant housing system. Although lodgers are in the majority among the residents of Harare and Chitungwiza, this chapter focuses on one specific houseowner, Esther, and how she was able to utilize the opportunities offered by home ownership within the housing system, albeit at some cost to her family's quality of life. In spite of legal restrictions such as building and zoning regulations, her house was used not only for living and letting purposes but also as a basis for income generation.

The chapter draws on an ongoing study of multi-habitation and its effects on people's lives (Schlyter 2003). Multi-habitation is a concept describing a social situation within a specific space. It involves people who do not define themselves as one household but who share living space that is not clearly designed or divided for multi-family purposes. The chapter also relies on unpublished material collected during repeated fieldwork visits. On average I have made two visits every third year since the early 1980s to Esther's and other houses in Seke, Unit N, a poor area in the town of Chitungwiza that is situated 25 kilometres south of Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe.

Chitungwiza is often called a dormitory town as it has little formal sector employment and the vast majority of its inhabitants with formal, waged work have to commute to Harare. However, this should not be taken to mean that the other inhabitants are not working. As the history of Esther's house reveals, Esther was a very hard-working woman.[2] This history demonstrates how housing, livelihoods and the quality of everyday life are intertwined for a poor urban household.

A history of racist and restrictive urban development

In colonial Southern Rhodesia, Africans in towns were largely regarded as migrant workers who should eventually return to their rural villages where women were supposed to stay and cultivate. Africans in Salisbury (today's Harare) were not allowed to own urban property. Houses were owned by employers or by the town councils, and rental contracts were tied to employment. In Bulawayo and Gweru, African ownership of houses on rented land was allowed up to the 1930s, when the implementation of a Land Tenure Act made it impossible.

Without the right to own property, urban Africans could not accumulate capital (Barnes 1999). In many other African countries, even if legal tenure was constrained, ownership of a house in a squatter area could provide a route to accumulation. Although illegal, squatter areas often had a *de facto* acceptance that made investments in housing secure enough. In Rhodesia, however, this route was blocked by strictly enforced influx controls and other regulations. Only during the last years of the white minority regime, when refugees from the war increasingly fled into the city, did some squatter areas appear.

For women, urban housing options were even more restricted during the colonial period. Access to legal housing, usually tied to wage employment, excluded most women marginalized from paid employment from accessing urban homes in their own right. These housing constraints had enormous significance for women's urban livelihood prospects during the colonial period. However, in Salisbury some women did manage to rent housing either by bribing the location police or by using a man to register for a house as her proxy (Barnes 1999). My research in Harare and Chitungwiza revealed that housing played an important role in urban survival strategies in Zimbabwe, particularly for women (Schlyter 1989). Barnes (1999) similarly found that women had been far more likely than men to use the opportunities availed by house ownership as a means of livelihood during the early 20th century. In 1914 in Bulawayo more than nine out of ten and in 1930 more than two-thirds of privately owned houses were owned by women.

From 1946, local authorities were obliged to finance and administer townships for the urban African population. Initially the demand was mostly for single accommodation but demands for married accommodation soon increased. Only men with registered marriages were allowed to rent married accommodation housing, a fact which excluded vast numbers of couples with 'traditional' marriages (Patel and Adams 1981). Most townships were built to the south and west of Salisbury's city centre where the township houses were usually small detached or semi-detached houses. Strict constraints were maintained on African urban residence. For example, the notorious Vagrancy Act of 1960, upheld with the help of night raids on township houses, involved local authorities seizing people who were not gainfully employed or registered visitors and sending them back to the rural areas (Gargett 1977, Potts and Mutambirwa 1990). These raids became infrequent, however, in the late 1970s as the influx of refugees from the war zones fighting for independence became uncontrollable (Patel and Adams 1981).

Esther: A squatting refugee during the late 1970s

Among the refugees coming to Salisbury (Harare) in 1976 was a young woman with three children: Esther.

> Times were hard, especially in the war zones. So, 26 years old, Esther took her children and left her village not far from Bindura and walked on foot to Salisbury. She left an unhappy marriage behind and hoped for a new life. The start of the new life was scary. She had an address for relatives, but they had moved and she never found them. She stayed a month as a lodger but, unable to pay the rent, she moved to Derbyshire, a squatter area.

Esther was not alone. In a few months the small squatter settlement of Derbyshire had grown dramatically to some 12,000. Not all were war refugees; indeed a majority of the inhabitants had been living in Salisbury for more than a decade (Patel and Adams 1981). Thus, as soon as the government hesitated about bulldozing squatter settlements, many people opted for a shack in a squatter camp rather than enduring the overcrowding typical in the existing housing stock. But the period of grace for the squatters was short as the Rhodesian government eventually decided to demolish Derbyshire. When Esther arrived the demolition had begun. Some people had already been removed and part of the area had been bulldozed. She used the scrap building material left behind on the site and erected a shelter for herself and her children.

She stayed in the Derbyshire shack for over a year and gave birth there to her fourth child, a girl. But eventually the settlement was flattened. When I met Esther four years later in 1982 she related what had happened:

> They took my belongings and the tin sheets of my house in Derbyshire and dumped them in Chirambahuyo. I had to start over again and build my house. Initially it was hard, but in the end my house was not too bad. I made the mud bricks myself and got the help of a bricklayer. But the place was filthy. The communal latrines were not good. At night people just used any sites.

Destructive political optimism: Impact on housing

Chitungwiza was forced to receive the residents evicted from Derbyshire. A settlement on its northern edge called Chirambahuyo was planned for the new residents. The standards imposed and implemented here were far lower than the normal regulations with surveyed stands of only 95 square metres, and communal taps and pit latrines.

Chitungwiza, located on Seke tribal land, was itself then only a few years old. The decision in 1974 to build this new town, 25 kilometres south of Harare, was political. Building it on tribal trust land neatly furthered the racial segregation that the government desired. Thus the minority regime were determined to build Chitungwiza 'whatever the financial and social costs' and considered its development to be 'a promise for Rhodesia's future happy development between the races' (Mafico 1981: 8).

At independence in 1980, Chitungwiza's registered population was about 125,000 although council officials suspected the true population to be almost double this (Mafico 1981).[3] There were just over 20,000 housing units in the town. The 2,600 units in Chirambahuyo, planned by the authorities, were nonetheless classified as squatter housing.

During the first years of independence Chitungwiza also received about 1,000 demobilized guerrilla soldiers. 'Harare is using us as a solution for its problems', a housing officer lamented in an interview in 1987. Many families were also coming to Chitungwiza in search of housing because they were not accepted on Harare's waiting list, as their marriages were not registered. 'Custom changes, the war and poverty have made it impossible for many young men to pay the *roora*, [brideprice] and therefore their marriages cannot be registered', he explained. In Chitungwiza all families were accepted regardless of whether or not they had a marriage certificate, and houses were let in the names of both men and women.

There were cogent arguments at independence for allowing settlements like Chirambahuyo to remain and be upgraded (Patel and Adams 1981). Housing was in short supply and Chirambahuyo was situated in an area zoned for housing and was already surveyed and provided with some basic services. But the Zimbabwean government maintained, and even strengthened, the colonial anti-squatter policy and argued that Chirambahuyo's standards were too low to allow decent living standards – a view in common with other post-colonial southern African governments which have, over-optimistically, tended to opt for formal, 'decent' housing options that all too often have been unaffordable, and far too few in number to meet the needs of the majority. In 1982 on my first visit to Chitungwiza, Chirambahuyo had already been cleared, and Esther had been forced to move, for a second time.

Esther's lucky break: Renting-to-buy an ultra-low-cost unit

When Chirambahuyo was eradicated, Esther's house was bulldozed but former inhabitants of the settlement were offered the compensatory benefit of ultra-low-cost units in Seke North on a rent-to-buy contract. Not only was this a secure form of tenure but it was also agreed that the usual income criteria for renting-to-buy would be waived. This was Esther's 'lucky break'. She had never dreamt of being offered a stand and a house in her own name. In 1980, with a new baby, her fifth child, and her eldest being twelve years old, she received an ultra-low-cost unit in Seke, Unit N.

These units were not permanent houses but two small rooms with walls made of chicken wire and cement. They had, however, a proper toilet and a sink, electricity of a low standard and an electric cooking stove. The roof and the window-shutters were of asbestos-cement and the floor was just packed earth, which had to be covered with cement by the tenant.

Planned during the last few years of the illegal white minority regime in an effort to make houses affordable for low-income people, these units were built with the support of block loans from private building societies to the local authority (Bond 1998).[4] Only the blocks, not the individual stands, were surveyed. Each stand was about 350 square metres, big enough to build a permanent house in front of the unit provided. All Chitungwiza stands, except institutional housing, were sold or let on rent-to-buy contracts which meant that after paying rent for about 25 years, the house was transferred to tenants with full ownership. This was intended to stimulate extensions and maintenance at the tenants' expense. Tenants could buy the property earlier but not until a permanent house had been built on the plot. Sitting tenants in the existing housing stock were also offered these contracts. Essentially this was a home-ownership policy implemented on a slow track.

The housing policies of the independent Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) government centred on home ownership and self-help housing and offered continuity with the policies introduced at the very end of the colonial period. Privatization of the existing rental stock proceeded apace.[5] In the late 1980s the ministry responsible tried to speed up the rate of privatization by issuing a manual for local authorities to streamline the rules involved (MPCNH no date). However, the production of ultra-low-cost units was discontinued after independence as the government deemed them to be sub-standard. It was some years before any other new houses or stands were provided, and the standards and time schedules for self-building then imposed far exceeded what poor households could afford or manage. The tenants/purchasers of ultra-low-cost units were supposed to replace the structure with a permanent house within a limited number of years. If they could afford it, they were then allowed to pay up and complete the purchase. In 1987, 20,000 houses of all kinds were rented on rent-to-buy contracts, although fewer than 1,500 tenants had paid in full and received the freehold title deeds (Schlyter 1989). Very few in the poor area of Seke North could afford to do so and by 1990 only a small number of the purchase payments had been paid:

> Esther was proud to be a regular payer to the council. She did not know for how much longer she would have to pay before she could be offered the deeds. I am not even sure she understood my question. She declared herself as the owner. 'Also owners have to pay to the council', she observed correctly.

Like Esther, many tenant/owners had only a vague idea about the difference between the forms of tenure: they called themselves owners but some complained about still having to pay rent. Kaitano (2001) found the same in a Harare suburb. Yet, although this long-term rent-to-buy model of privatization may be criticized because the calculations and tenure issues involved were not made sufficiently clear to the tenants, when compared to the ill-planned and hasty privatization in Zambia, it has worked well. Furthermore, during all my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, I have never met a reluctant homeowner. The terms might be too harsh but everyone saw home ownership as the chance of a lifetime.

Women's ownership discouraged

House privatization was generally carried through in a gender-blind manner. Houses were almost always allocated to married men and their wives. Tenants' contracts in Chitungwiza were issued in the names of both husband and wife but, when the house was transferred into private ownership, the freehold deeds were issued in the husband's name only, if he so stipulated. The wife was not consulted. Before independence, wives had, in fact, been protected by certain council rules because a husband had not been allowed to transfer a rent-to-buy contract to someone else without his wife's consent. As the 1970s progressed, it became common for the ties between housing and employment to be relaxed by letting abandoned wives and widows remain in their homes. In the 1980s, the power of property ownership vested in the man had severe effects on some separated women.

> A lodger in Esther's house told me how she had been evicted from her home because her husband, from whom she was separated, had sold it beneath her feet. For five years she had stayed alone in the house with the children and paid the rent. Yet her husband had sold the house before it was fully paid and transferred it to his ownership. Using the first down-payment to pay the remaining debt, he completed the rent-to-buy contract and got the title deeds, which were immediately transferred to the new owner. She had to leave the house at short notice.

My own research found at least two other such cases in the late 1980s in Chitungwiza, despite a rule introduced in 1983 that prohibited the owner of a former council house from selling it within three years without the permission of the spouse (Rakodi 1995a). As has often been the case with legislation that improves women's rights in Zimbabwe, this new law was thus not always implemented.

Although a housing officer in 1986 declared that the waiting list for housing accepted women 'as equals', Esther would not have been counted among the 'equals' had she not been fast-tracked because of her residence in Chirambahuyo. Any applicant for housing had to prove continuous waged or licensed self-employment for all the years they were on the waiting list. If they were unemployed for a year, they lost their priority date and were returned to the bottom of the list, which then had a waiting time of roughly seven years. Women tended to have more irregular employment due to childbirth and other caring responsibilities and even those who claimed to have been in continuous employment usually had no documents to prove it. Separated women were asked for proof of their husbands' consent or an affidavit to confirm their *de facto* single status. The only eligibility criterion Esther would have met was that of having dependents: having small children made her technically eligible for a house to rent. Men could count their wives as dependents but women applicants could not claim grown-up children or siblings as dependents (Schlyter 1989).

Without employment or consent from her husband, a woman could not qualify for the waiting list. Even in Chitungwiza, where the town council's rules were a little more adapted to the realities of the Zimbabwean urban poor than Harare City Council,[6] it was vital to have a proven income for paying the rent. Esther would have failed on the income criteria and she felt that she had been lucky to be resettled: 'How could I expect more, I am not working?' In fact, she was working very hard but for her, and the Town Council, 'work' meant regular wage employment or licensed self-employment. Their attitudes also implicitly accepted the idea of a 'modern' family consisting of a wage-earning husband and a home-making woman, despite the evidence that this model did not apply to so many households' livelihood strategies.

Coping with distance, livelihoods and regulations during the 1980s

While living in Derbyshire, Esther made her living by selling vegetables. She even managed to save a little. Derbyshire was centrally located, business was good and the majority of the residents were employed. After moving to Chirambahuyo, which was significantly further from the economic opportunities offered in Harare, those relocated had to commute if they were to keep the same jobs. But transport was expensive and time-consuming, especially as there was a chronic shortage of buses and people had to queue even early in the morning. According to my informants, those working in Harare often spent more than six hours commuting everyday in the mid-1980s.

There were very few job opportunities in Chitungwiza itself because, having been planned as an 'apartheid' residential township, it had no inherent urban economic rationale or function. A year after resettlement, only five per cent of the population of Chirambahuyo were formally employed within Chitungwiza (Patel and Adams 1981).

> Esther gave up her previous business when she moved to Chitungwiza. 'Chirambahuyo was not a good place for vending. To travel to Harare and buy vegetables was too expensive and time consuming. I had to stop vending.' Esther used her savings from her Derbyshire time to buy a proper door and a lock for her house in Chirambahuyo. She was not forthcoming about how she made ends meet during this period. She indicated contributions from a boyfriend.

A history of heavy restrictions on African business had imposed severe constraints on the growth of local petty entrepreneurs in African townships. In the 1950s a few men had been granted licences to do business in the townships' local shopping centres. Later, licences for tuckshops were issued.



Figure 11.1 Esther's house in 1982, 1987, 1992, 2000

Tuckshops were informal retail outlets operated from people's residential plots or the roadside, which the population appreciated in terms of both their convenience and the associated employment. In Seke North alone there were 76 licensed tuckshops in 1981 and about 16 unlicensed ones (Mafico 1981). Local shopping centres were so poor that the tuckshops had plenty of customers, even though their goods were up to 20 per cent more expensive than in Harare.

The most common home-based industries in Chitungwiza were women's sewing and basket-making. Some women did not sew themselves but traded manufactured dresses. They sold on credit and visited the same villages every month to collect down payments and hopefully sell more. In the mid-1980s a growing number of women also became engaged in cross-border trading, first to Botswana and later to South Africa. Strictly speaking, however, home-based economic activities were illegal. Colonial zoning regulations remained in effect until 1994, outlawing nearly all income-generating activities within residential zones. Legal livelihood prospects for Esther were thus limited but she was not daunted.

> As soon as Esther was allocated the ultra-low-cost unit in Seke North, she looked for a lodger [see Figure 11.1]. She lived with all the children in one of the rooms and on the income of rent from the other. Somehow she managed to save enough to buy a second-hand sewing machine, and then the situation improved. She bought clothing material in Harare, made dresses and went on week-long sale trips to farm and mine communities around Bindura. Esther also bred chickens at the stand and sold to neighbours, and she cultivated a small lot on vacant land, zoned for a school.

Esther's income from her sewing and vending in 1987 was very marginal at only about Z$100 per month. Even very low paid agricultural workers, who would have had little or no outlay on food and rent, were making more. Farmworker/drivers were then on a minimum of Z$140. Surveys in the 1980s of Harare and Chitungwiza households which contained recent migrants (like Esther) recorded monthly household head incomes of Z$216 and Z$264 in 1985 and 1988 respectively (Potts and Mutambirwa 1990).

A permanent house for lodgers

Since the 1970s, home ownership has been the dominant housing policy in most southern African countries. However, the provision of plots has been far less than the level of need and Zimbabwe's experience has been no exception. The demand for rooms to let in the home-ownership areas is high especially as the government's anti-squatter policy was forcefully maintained. New urban households were left with no choice but to squeeze into the existing housing stock. In home-ownership schemes, cost recovery calculations often included rent derived from homeowners sharing their houses with lodgers even though such renting was not acknowledged in official housing policy. There were no policy statements advocating lodging, but in reality a pro-lodging strategy was operative (Schlyter 1989).

The rent-to-buy contract of the ultra-low-cost units obliged tenants to build a permanent house within a limited time period and to install electricity with higher capacity than originally provided. Many tenants in Seke North were not able to do so, but Esther was.

> In 1986, in spite of school fees for her four schoolgirls Esther had started the building of a permanent house. Her son had just finished school but had no job. Four rooms and a veranda were built in front of the ultra-low cost unit. The new house had no cement slab on the floor, no plastering on the walls, no ceiling and no windows; nevertheless, the rooms were let to lodgers. Esther and her children lived in the ultra low-cost unit now sharing the kitchen sink and the toilet with the lodgers. The income from lodgers was necessary. Esther had had her sixth baby, a sickly girl whom she could neither leave nor carry along on business trips [see Figure 11.1].

Council tenants were allowed to sub-let, but they were obliged to register the lodgers at the Town Council. However, many lodgers were unregistered. Official figures indicated that more than 40 per cent of the population were lodgers, which tallied with data from the 1982 census; nevertheless, according to my field observations this percentage was far too low. During interviews I had with owners, it was common for them to at first deny having lodgers, stating that their co-residents were temporary visitors or dependents. The reasons for their subterfuge were never spelled out but largely had to do with feelings of insecurity in relation to the Town Council. Later interviews revealed these co-residents' true status as lodgers.

Esther did not insist on registration of her lodgers. Most of them were not registered and thereby they did not need to pay the fee to the council. Some did register, often young families with wage employment, as they thereby became eligible as applicants for a stand for self-building in Chitungwiza. For Esther, the lodgers became a natural part of life. She did not complain, but admitted that she had to negotiate, be diplomatic and also firm in her attitude. She prided herself in managing troublesome men, and she emphasized the positive sides of security and the possibility of getting a helping hand. Esther denied having evicted a lodger on other grounds than rent arrears. But the turnover of lodgers was also high. Few stayed more than two years.

Lodgers' living conditions

Studies of lodging have usually centred on associated problems such as divided families and overcrowding (Auret 1995). There are, however, some positive aspects of lodging. Apart from the cheap rent that they are availed, lodgers in Harare have been found to count on each other for security, helping each other in times of trouble, and often enjoying a strong sense of neighbourhood (Kaitano 2001).

In multi-habitation houses people live extremely close to one another, and become dependent on each other in various ways. In interviews I did not expect to get much information about conflicts and strains in *current* relationships. Therefore, I asked tenants about their *previous* landlords and why they had moved. The most common answer was that 'the landlord needed the room'. Although no blame was attached to such an answer, it often transpired that there had been conflicts which motivated the landlord to evict the lodger.

There are no laws being implemented for regulating the relationship between landlords and lodgers. A lodger can be evicted without notice. Lodgers were concerned about their lack of secure tenure but since it was relatively easy to find another room, they did not complain very much. Moving was a part of their lives: 'We have become nomads.'

In the 1980s, when I interviewed women lodgers at the Town Council who were registering for a stand of their own, they were overwhelmingly negative about lodging. They had difficulties in being accepted as single women; either they themselves or their daughters were harassed by the landlord or the landlord's sons, or the landlady suspected them of trying to seduce her husband. The lodgers' children were 'hardly allowed to breathe', and there were conflicts over consumption of water and the cleaning of common facilities (Schlyter 1989: 142). Maybe they thought that I could influence their ranking in the queue, so there is a risk that I got a negatively biased view. Nonetheless, they provided a long list of problems that affected women lodgers.

Fundire-Sithole (1995) also found that women experienced lodging more negatively. They resented the hierarchy among lodgers, which placed wage-working men at the top. These men were allowed to use the shower first in the morning, and they were exempted from cleaning the toilet. Indeed in Esther's house, as in most houses in Seke North, there was a gendered division such that men paid for the chemicals for cleaning and women did the cleaning.

Many lodging families lived in one or two rooms, but houseowners also often squeezed their families into a couple of rooms so that they could rent the others. Efforts were made to ensure that teenagers had unisex bedrooms. Sometimes this could be arranged in their own house but often relatives or neighbours with extra space provided suitable sleeping arrangements elsewhere. In Esther's house, for example, the teenaged daughters of one lodger were allowed to share an adjacent bedroom with a divorced woman lodger and her small children.

A common form of split families I met among Chitungwiza lodgers resulted from parents sending their children back to their rural home areas because of the lack of adequate housing.[7] Those who did so often claimed that it was culturally impossible for the whole family to sleep in one room. Nevertheless many families *had* to adapt to such a situation.

The split family strategy has historically been connected to migrating male workers with families left in rural areas. Many wives in Chitungwiza commuted to the village with their children to take part in activities like sowing crops and harvesting. While this pattern still continues in modified forms, Gaidzanwa (1998) notes that today split families also occur due to new forms of worker migration – for example, educated women working in South Africa or Botswana. Esther and other vendors usually left their families for shorter periods of two or three weeks.

Trial and error: Illegal breadwinning during the late 1980s and early 1990s

Esther's sewing machine broke down in 1987, but she confided: 'it was increasingly difficult to sell the dresses anyhow.' She continued to breed chickens, 'but it is not a good idea to try to grow maize. Last year it was all slashed. We are not allowed to cultivate anywhere.' These regulations significantly increased Esther's food expenditure.

Such restrictions on urban agriculture were frustrating for in Chitungwiza there were huge areas of vacant land. These areas were zoned for roads, schools, hospitals and other institutions that were unlikely to be built in the near future. The grass grew high – so high that in the rainy seasons the footpath shortcuts through the fields were not considered safe.

> When not allowed to cultivate in town Esther had tried to get land in a communal area.[8] Her plans had been to do some cultivation and perhaps withdraw at old age, leaving her town house to her son. However, she failed to get land. She went round and negotiated in several places including some far away. In the early 1990s she almost succeeded but somehow the headman changed his mind. She concluded with a bitter laugh: 'It was as well that I did not plant that time, as the rains never came.'

Urban–rural ties are very important in Zimbabwe both culturally and materially. Rural land is seen as a fallback for those who lose their urban livelihood. However, not everyone has a rural safety net; research in

Harare suggests that almost half of all recent migrant households in the mid-1990s did *not* have land (Potts 2000).[9] Some, like Esther, came to town from commercial farms. My own research on female-headed households shows that women, in particular, often must develop *urban* strategies for their livelihoods and are thus, in a sense, more 'urban' than most men (Schlyter 1989).

Esther experimented with an array of urban strategies. In 1987 she invested in a fridge in order to sell chilled bottled beer. Her room was turned into a shebeen. 'I have only one or two customers at a time, to avoid being caught and jailed.' She still had income from lodgers but the families that had been lodging with her for some time had left because of the shebeen noise. Her new lodgers were single, three men and one woman. She worked around the clock. Business was best after midnight and in the morning when the beerhalls were closed. The house was generally untidy during this period. Esther was finding it hard to cope and was often drunk herself. Nevertheless, she still managed to protect her children and keep them in school.

In fact, her shebeen was so profitable that she could pay a builder to demolish her ultra-low-cost house and complete her permanent house in 1990 (Figure 11.1). Her new house was nicely finished, plastered and painted with full electricity installed.

Running a shebeen was illegal and after having been arrested twice she confided, 'I was tired of life as a shebeen-queen so I started a workshop.' She bought a welding machine from a construction worker, and paid two young boys to make window and door frames. Having a welding workshop in her home was also illegal (Nkiwane 1990). Esther should have paid for a licence but to get one she would have had to operate her workshop from a proper building in an area zoned for small industry. However, this new 'illegality' did not bother her because, although the police intervened against shebeens and council officials forbade the building of backyard shacks for lodgers, no one complained about a workshop hidden amongst residential buildings.

In 1991, Esther reported that she had been making a good profit on her window frames of Z$1,000 per month. In addition her lodgers were paying between Z$55 and Z$80 per room, giving her a further monthly income of about Z$215. Her income had markedly improved considering that the poverty datum line for Harare in that year was Z$356 (Rakodi 1995b).

Although business was profitable, the 'front garden' was really too small for the workshop. With a permanent residential house in the middle of the plot, space for the workshop was scarce.[10] The plot was fenced and there was a shack erected to protect the workers against the sun and rain. The gate was locked at night but the welding machine had to be stored in the living room for safe keeping.

> The income from her lodgers remained the basis for Esther's survival, and was the secure income when her businesses had crises. In 1991, the two young welders disappeared with her money. So for a period the welding workshop was not working. During my visit that year she assured me that she intended to try again.
>
> Esther tried again. She employed one man and assisted him herself. But business was down; there was now no market for her door and window frames. There was a severe drought in the country and poverty had increased in both rural and urban areas so that few people could afford to build. At my visit in 1993 she still had the welding machine; it was stored in a corner of her room.
>
> Esther was complaining although it seemed as if she was more prosperous than ever. She had repainted and refurnished the living room and bought a radio and a TV with large loudspeakers. However, these she saw as investments for her new 'old business'. Again she ran a shebeen. To be able to live a decent life she restricted it to a Friday to Sunday shebeen. She could sell about 150 beers on a Saturday night [and about 140 on a Friday] and made one dollar profit on each. She had been fined once, and since the police kept an eye on her, she had to be careful. She locked the gate when she had a limited number of customers.

All Esther's efforts to earn a livelihood and provide for her children were illegal and in effect criminalized her. Through all the ups and downs and crises, however, renting out lodging provided a basis for her survival.

Backyard shacks for lodgers during the mid-1990s

Backyard shacks, small outbuildings surrounding people's houses were common in South Africa as a means of extending indoor living space. For a long period they were strongly discouraged in Zimbabwe. However, land-use controls in urban Zimbabwe steadily declined over the 1990s to the point that they were rarely implemented in many places as the political will for enforcement diminished (Kamete 1999). This is a marked change compared to both the colonial and most of the post-colonial period.

In Chitungwiza, levels of control have differed considerably between different areas and were often still strict during the 1990s. In the mid-1990s the Civic Groups Housing Project (CGHP) conducted a study in three areas in Chitungwiza revealing that houses were inhabited by an average of seven people, of whom four were adults (CGHP 1995). The average size of dwellings was only 28 square metres and restrictions against informal extensions were still being strictly upheld. Similarly, my own research material on core houses for middle-income people in another part of Chitungwiza found that restrictions were strictly implemented, and that they were supported by many houseowners who feared that their residential area would otherwise be turned into a shanty town.

Unit N, where Esther lived, was the first area in Chitungwiza where informal backyard shacks appeared and were tolerated. These could be concrete block houses or lines of simple mud-brick rooms. Esther's career as a landlady began in the mid-1980s with the building of a one-roomed house, what she called a 'boy's *khaya*', in the rear of the garden (Figure 11.3). It was a properly built room in permanent materials and let to a single man.

In 1989 the Town Council made an investigation of 'illegal out-buildings'. At that time only about one in every five stands in Seke[11] had an illegal out-building but, of these, one in four was owned by women. My own investigations into the files found only 14 per cent of stand-owners were women, so it appears they had a higher propensity to build backyard shacks than men. At that time most of the illegal extensions only consisted of one room, but there were some with up to five rooms.

> At my visit in 1990, Esther was in trouble with the town council. She had got a circular letter telling her to take down the boy's *khaya*. If she did not demolish it herself, the letter said, the council would send a bulldozer to do it and charge her the costs. Many of her neighbours had obeyed, but Esther had not. She had given notice to the lodger, though.
>
> Esther used to go to the political meetings arranged in the areas. She had actively supported the sitting councillor. Now she was disappointed and said, 'In the election campaign he promised to allow us to build boy's *khayas*, but recently he said that everyone was accusing him about the illegal structures, and as the out-buildings were against the law, he could not protect them.'
>
> Esther's boyfriend was also upset: 'Why is it that people do not get land to build? Why is it that they may not build houses they can afford? Why harass people who are providing shelter, when there is no other shelter for the lodger? Why do they not use their energy to provide stands for the lodgers instead?'

The demolition threat was fortunately never enforced. Unit N became *de facto* exempted from implementation of the regulations.

> In 1991 Esther had not built more out-buildings. It was too risky, but she still took the risk not to demolish the boy'*s khaya*. The council had again taken a more liberal stance over the regulations, and had admitted that lodgers needed shelter, and they [the council] had no stands to offer.

In 1991 it was clear that there had been hectic building activity since my last visit in 1989, resulting in both legal and illegal structures. An on-site investigation revealed that houses had by then been completed on five per cent of the stands, and another five per cent were close to completion. Sixty per cent of stands had backyard shacks or other illegal extensions. Only about a third of the stands had no extensions at all. As the drought of the early 1990s progressed and urban poverty deepened,[12] legal building activities slowed but the illegal building continued.

> Three years later Esther had built another three backyard shacks: two in the back and one in the front [Figure 11.1]. There were then eight lodging families at the premises. The number of residents on the stand had increased to 21, or 22 if including her 'boy-friend' who often stayed with her for long periods. I asked him if he contributed to the household, and he answered that he offered to help when he saw the need, but that Esther often turned down his offer. She wanted to minimize his contribution.

Generally people who obtained stands in Seke, where the largest number of ultra-low-cost core housing units had been provided, were among the poorest in Chitungwiza. Nevertheless houseowners there usually managed to keep their houses and pay the rates. Over a period of three years, the rate of cessions in which people had to give up their stands for non-payment was lower than elsewhere in Chitungwiza at only two per cent (Rakodi 1995a). For poor people the house was a vital *productive* asset, continuously contributing to their livelihoods.

In 2000, Esther was renting five rooms for between Z$600 and Z$800 each, and when all rooms were full her total monthly income from lodgers was Z$3,750 while her outgoing cash flow had declined. Her council rates were only Z$375 and she had finally finished paying for the house (although she had yet to receive the title deeds). During the 1990s, inflation was very high,[13] so direct comparison of these figures with those cited earlier would be highly misleading but her income from lodgers by 2000 had increased in real terms from the decade before (although her total income then, when it included profits from her welding workshop, would have been higher). Relative to farmworkers her income had also improved considerably. Cut flower workers, for example, were earning minimum wages of Z$664–Z$945 per month (depending on grade) in 2000 (Davies 2000).

Most of Esther's neighbours built backyard shacks for rent. Although these were often mud structures of much lower quality than those on her plot they were always filled with lodgers. This process inevitably increased residential densities. My on-site reinvestigation of Unit N in 2001 recorded an average of four families and six rooms per stand, which would indicate that at least half the families lived in one room only.

Family living arrangements through time

> During the first shebeen period [in the late 1980s] they were only eight persons living in six rooms at the stand. But for Esther's family the living quality was not high. She had her own bed behind a curtain in the shebeen; a room that had to be passed by one of the lodgers. In the ultra-low-cost unit, her three daughters shared a small room of less than seven square metres, which also contained the big fridge.
>
> Esther and her five girls occupied two rooms in the house, the living room and the bedroom in the front. Lodgers, this time all families, occupied the other four rooms, including a room with access from Esther's living room, and a small room intended to be a kitchen. An outside tap made water accessible to everyone. Although there was now electricity in the house, paraffin stoves continued to be used for cooking, each family in its own room. A single man rented the boy's *khaya*.
>
> In 1987 Esther's son had finished school but not managed to get a job. Like many of her lodgers, Esther sent her son to spend his nights with a cousin in a lodging room in a neighbouring area. He came home for all his meals but he did not contribute.

Quite often Esther's brother also came for meals at her house. He had his 'post box' and permanent base there, although he did not reside there. He first had a construction firm and when the construction industry slumped he worked as a contact link between prospective landlords and lodgers. He never contributed in cash but he assisted in keeping order in the shebeen.

It is often assumed that all members of poor families have to contribute to breadwinning but this was not the case in Esther's household. Indeed this pattern applies to many others in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in southern Africa. My study of a suburb of Lusaka, Zambia, revealed similar patterns there. If young men had income of their own, they used it for private needs. Young women were more likely to be unpaid workers in family businesses (Schlyter 1999).

In the mid-1990s, Esther extended the space used by her own family to include the kitchen where her brother often slept overnight on the floor. Like many landladies, Esther was careful not to leave a bedroom empty for relatives to move in. She needed the lodgers' rent as a contribution to livelihood.[14]

During Esther's second shebeen period her family lived in the main house. At weekends, the daughters tried to stay with friends, otherwise they had to lock their bedroom door to avoid being harassed by drunken men. Esther's brother and sometimes her boyfriend helped keep order. It was a hard life. No one in the house could sleep until the morning when the drinking stopped. As in the previous shebeen period, most of her lodgers at this time were single people who participated in the drinking themselves.

The joys of life

I have so far reviewed Esther's life with regard only to her livelihood and her house but this does not paint a fair portrait of this resourceful and compassionate woman. My interview with Esther in 1994 fills in some of the gaps. Reflecting on her life, Esther's comments centre on her family relationships particularly with her children:

> 'I have worked all my life for my children. My most lucky period was when all five children lived with me. It was fine when my son had wage work and my eldest daughter was a teacher.' She continued to consider the joy of children, 'I am proud of my clever girl who is studying. I am happy that my youngest makes some improvement. She was four before she walked and she does not talk, but she understands a lot and she is so warm and friendly.'
>
> When the daughter, who was a teacher, was going to marry, Esther said that she was going to miss her support in money and housework, 'but that is life, I am happy for her happiness'. Esther had never had any support from her former husband, the father of her three eldest children, for raising the girls. But for the wedding he was contacted to come and receive the *roora*, the bride price, so that his daughter became properly married.
>
> I asked Esther if she thought it was fair that he took all the money given that she had educated the daughter. The size of the *roora* is dependent on the bride's educational level. For the Z$4,000 which was the cash sum, she could have bought more than three welding machines. She said, 'He once paid for me, so he should get the money for our daughters. I had hoped that he would give me a part of the money, acknowledging that I brought her up, but he did not give me a dollar.' Still, she respected the man, who still was her lawful husband, and spoke well of him.
>
> Like most poor urban women heads of households Esther had never taken the steps needed to get a proper divorce. Her husband did not intervene in her life and for the three oldest children it was important to have some contact with their father and their ancestors. However, when the second daughter chose to move from home and live with a man, it was for a *mapoto* marriage without proper *roora*. A token was paid to Esther who kept it for herself. The third daughter stayed at home and gave birth to a child. 'The sunshine of my life', said Esther. For several years Esther had a relationship with the same man, 'my boyfriend', she said, although he was an elderly, married man. She praised his support, not materially, but emotionally, and by giving protection just by being present. 'I am a very happy woman', Esther said.

A bitter last decade

The last decade of the century was hard, not only for Esther but for most Zimbabweans. There was a sharp increase in poverty in Zimbabwe[15] concurrent with the onset of the AIDS crisis. The upward trend in HIV+ prevalence led to the loss of breadwinners in many households and stretched household budgets as health care costs escalated.

No specific statistics on poverty for Chitungwiza or Seke North are available, but at household level – in the homes of Esther, her lodgers and her neighbours – poverty and illness were highly visible as the 1990s proceeded. Esther's son was the first in the family to pass away. A year later the third daughter followed. Esther shared her room with her orphaned grandchild and her retarded teenage daughter who needed special care. Her other daughter was away at college studying. Esther's brother often slept in the kitchen, but was not regarded as living there. He helped with the weekend shebeen.

Esther said that she hated the shebeen but that she saw no other way to supplement the income from lodgers. She bitterly compared her lot with the respected status of aged women in an imagined rural past. In 2000, Esther died from hypertension. She was buried in Chitungwiza.

Conclusion

In common with other Zimbabwean urban centres, Chitungwiza's population growth rate was sharply reduced in the 1990s to 1.6 per cent per year (see Chapter 3, Appendix 3.1 and pp. 87–8). In the previous intercensal period (1982–92) it grew at 4.7 per cent per year. Official projections presuming that the growth rate had increased thus proved inaccurate.[16] Nonetheless, a serious housing shortage remained in view of the greatly restricted production of legal housing. The majority of new housing demand will have been met by people squeezing into existing houses, or backyard shacks as lodgers, or squatting. The former two options are most likely given the heavy constraints that remained on squatting in urban Zimbabwe.

A new national housing policy for Zimbabwe was produced in 1999 (MLGH 1999). Despite a lack of reliable data, the document charts brave aims and attempts to make an honest analysis of the housing situation. It foresaw that the political decisions needed for progress were unlikely to be forthcoming. It is readily apparent that the dominant policy strategy will continue to be self-building for home ownership with finance from building societies in the form of individual mortgages. Yet such housing options, which have already been shown to be unaffordable for the poor in the late 1980s (e.g. Mutizwa-Mangiza 1985, Teedon and Drakakis-Smith 1986, Rakodi and Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990, Potts and Mutambirwa 1991), were even more unrealistic for low-income people by the 1990s.

Esther started out in the urban housing market with virtually no income let alone investment capital. She was lucky to be resettled and allocated an ultra-low-cost unit – a case of being in the right place at the right time. She did not conform to any affordability criteria, but she managed to build a permanent house. The basis of her economic livelihood was the letting of rooms. She also benefited from getting protection and help from the lodgers, although long-lasting friendships seldom developed as few lodgers stayed for more than a year or two. There was never much difference between the housing space enjoyed by Esther and her household and that available to her lodgers' families. She traded her comfort for income used to raise her children. The relationship between resident homeowners and lodgers is contradictory and cannot be assumed to be one of exploitation by the homeowner.

Having a house also made it possible for Esther to generate income from shebeens and workshops. However, all Esther's economic endeavours were illegal to greater or lesser degrees. She was not allowed to build backyard shacks although in the 1990s this was tolerated. She could not cultivate the vacant land outside the house without having her harvest slashed. She was not allowed to sell beer, and was arrested a couple of times for doing so. The zoning regulations forbade her from having a welding workshop on her stand. In other words, she survived within a criminalized urban economy.

Esther was seven years my junior, but in her company I always felt like a child, protected from the hardships of life. I admired her strength and her ability to see positive aspects and to be ready to laugh. It is with mixed feelings that I have related her life story in this chapter. However, I know she would not have minded. She was justifiably proud of her family-provisioning achievements against great odds.

Notes

1. An official survey during the 1990s indicated that among Zimbabwe's urban poor 44 per cent were homeowners/purchasers compared to 40 per cent who were tenants/lodgers. Among the non-poor, it was the other way round: 33 per cent were homeowners and 47 per cent were tenants (CSO 1998). These statistics may be somewhat unreliable, especially given the likelihood of the lodger status being 'hidden'.
2. I have altered her name and various details to protect her anonymity.
3. The 1982 census recorded 173,000, which suggests that the council had significantly overestimated.
4. This lowered the cost. A further advantage at the time was low interest rates because of excess liquidity in the sanctioned economy – a situation which soon ended with independence and the lifting of sanctions imposed on the illegal UDI regime.
5. Within 15 months of independence 16,000 of Harare's 19,000 public housing tenants had confirmed their desire to buy their property. This was generally a popular option although there was also the threat of a 30 per cent rent increase were they to remain tenants (Bond 1998).

6. Apart from Chitungwiza's acceptance of non-registered marriages, its Town Council also applied less strict rules about income eligibility for stands, so that discontinuous employment while on the waiting list did not exclude applicants. They were also less strict about how quickly people had to complete a four-roomed permanent house on their stands.
7. In 1985 a sample survey of recent migrants found that 20 per cent of the children of parents in selected townships in Harare and Chitungwiza (including Unit N) were absent. Five per cent of the wives of surveyed men were also recorded to be in rural villages (Potts and Mutambirwa 1990). In a later survey in 1988, complex visiting patterns to rural areas were also uncovered which were often related to agricultural production (ibid).
8. The overcrowded farming areas formerly reserved for African rural occupation in colonial Rhodesia, which have communal tenure.
9. Potts (2000) survey of recent migrants conducted in Harare in 1994 found that 45 per cent of male- and 82 per cent of female-headed households did not have land in the rural areas.
10. In the mid-1990s, two-thirds of all home-based industries were situated outdoors on the plot (CGHP 1995).
11. Seke was the sub-section of Chitungwiza of which Seke North was a part.
12. There is an extensive literature on Zimbabwe's worsening poverty conditions during the 1990s. See Potts 1999, Potts and Mutambirwa 1998, Bijlmakers *et al.* 1996, 1998, Mupedziswa and Gumbo 1999.
13. From 1995 to 2000 the consumer price index in Zimbabwe increased fivefold (and by October 2001 the increase from 1995 was nearly tenfold) (calculated from Table 13 in IMF (2002)).
14. In a study of Gaborone, Datta (1996) noted that a substantial part of the population was sharing accommodation on a non-commercial basis. Datta believes this is a hidden form of living arrangements in many African cities. Uncertainty of definition may make it difficult to assess this housing form in quantitative terms as people who live permanently, or for shorter periods, in other people's homes without payment are often said to be dependents or just guests. There are many forms of sharing.
15. According to a national poverty survey (Central Statistical Office 1998), the proportion of households living below the poverty line increased from 40 to 63 per cent and the prevalence of extreme poverty more than doubled between 1990 and 1996.
16. Brown (2001) estimated a 6 per cent growth rate and a projected population of 700,000 inhabitants at the turn of the century. The enumerated population in 2002, however, was only 322,000.

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12

From Infrastructural Development to Privatization: Employment Creation and Poverty Reduction in Gaborone, Botswana

Onalenna Doo Selolwane

Since Lipton's (1977) seminal thesis on urban bias in Third World countries, there has been an ongoing debate on the developmental role of the state and cities (Stren and White 1989, Bryceson 1993, Wekwete and Rambanapasi 1994). In recent years, the World Bank (2000a,b) has signalled an increasing appreciation of the progressive role that African cities and accountable governments can play in fostering economic development. Despite the dismal economic record of African countries over the last two decades, it has become an article of global faith that with a change in management style, the unleashing of market forces and the adoption of liberal democratic practices, Africa's urban settlements can be rehabilitated into loci of livelihood opportunities and economic transformation.

Botswana's experience with urbanization raises some important issues about the role of the state and its relationship with the private sector in the process of urbanization. The growth of the city of Gaborone in many respects defies the World Bank stereotype of 'African urbanization without economic growth'. Yet Botswana's post-independence development strategy shares many of the features that the World Bank has identified with economic failure, such as a dominant state sector, planned development intervention, and limited local government autonomy.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how Botswana's development strategy has fared against the challenges of rapid urbanization and increasing demands for jobs and services. It focuses specifically on the development of the capital, Gaborone, as the single largest beneficiary of what Lipton has called an urban-biased development strategy. It examines the potential this city has had to act as a catalyst for wider national employment creation and poverty reduction. Does the city pose a dual economy syndrome of a booming modern sector in a sea of stagnant rural outposts? Or does it represent a dynamic sector of a progressive deagrarianization process? What is the nature of its relationship with Botswana's rural agrarian sector?

Political and economic background

The Botswana government has shared with many African governments a belief in interventionist state participation in the economy. Thus, when Botswana was advised by the 1965 Economic Survey Mission of the British Ministry of Overseas Development to 'leave industrial development largely, if not entirely for private investment' the then transitional government stated very firmly and with conviction that

> as has been proved elsewhere in Africa, industrial development requires governmental efforts to promote investment through loans administered by a development bank, and if necessary through a development corporation. (Ministry of Overseas Development 1965: Foreword)

After independence, the government established the National Development Bank and the Botswana Development Corporation to act as catalysts for industrialization and attract private investment into what was then one of the world's poorest countries. Botswana pursued a strategy of state partnership with the private sector where possible, or state enterprise where partnerships could not be established. This helped foster one of the fastest and most sustained rates of economic growth in post-independence African history. As Murray and Parsons (1990: 159) aptly observed:

> Botswana today is a paradox of political economy. It is a capitalist economy based on central planning. More capitalist than any of its neighbours in lack of state ownership, control and management . . . But also more planned than even supposedly socialist states in Southern Africa in terms of state machinery identifying, projecting and inducing the growth of economic sectors over five-year periods.

Botswana's new leaders were very aware of the extremely limited resources the country had. Every mining venture that had ever been attempted within the territory had ended in failure, and assessments of Botswana's economic potential gave the country very low chances of emerging into a viable entity. This economic background, combined with a harsh natural environment and a tiny population spread over a vast arid land surface area indicated to even the most optimistic nationalist that, in the economic sphere, Botswana could only aspire to modest industrialization in small under-exploited niches. It was presumed that, for the foreseeable future, Botswana would have to rely on external resources to induce economic modernization and that the state would have to play a leading role in marshalling these resources.

Botswana's prospects radically altered after the discovery of diamonds in the aftermath of political independence. The country's mineral wealth afforded it consistently fast economic growth for two decades from 1970 onwards. The government successfully negotiated partnership deals with multinational companies that enabled the exploitation of this mineral wealth with benefits accruing directly to government as shareholder and tax collector. Multinational companies came to realize that partnerships with African governments were preferable to the nationalization strategies occurring in other countries like neighbouring Zambia.

In many African countries, state dominance has had disastrous consequences for long-term economic viability, particularly since the oil shocks of the mid-1970s and the subsequent world recession which led to heavy debt burdens and crippling macroeconomic adjustments (World Bank 1981, 1989, 2000a, Singer and Roy 1993). State-led investment and distribution of national resources have not only determined the process and structure of development but also proscribed the nature and extent of opportunities availed to non-state actors to participate in this process. Yet Botswana's state-dominated development has been characterized not only by record levels of economic growth but also tangible improvements in the quality of life of most of its citizens, with growth in formal sector employment averaging 6.8 per cent per year from 1971 to 2001 (Harvey and Lewis 1990, UNDP/Botswana Government 1997).

At the height of the 1980s world recession, Botswana was able to weather the crisis with a relatively comfortable debt burden and to maintain enviable records of economic growth due to a combination of good fortune and prudent economic management (Harvey and Lewis 1990, Lewis 1993, Jefferis 1998).

Good governance was an important factor (Lewis 1993, Du Toit 1995, Jefferis 1998). The Botswana government was prudent both in the use of its national revenues and in its fiscal policies, which contributed in no small measure to economic stability and growth. In the 33 years between 1966 and 1999, Botswana's GDP increased seventeenfold in real terms and real per capita income rose over five times. At its peak, economic growth averaged 14 per cent per annum (Table 12.1).

From humble beginnings when the country could not finance its recurrent budget without grants-in-aid, the increase in national wealth enabled Botswana to meet its public budgetary obligations for the first time in the mid-1970s and provided the government with resources with which to embark on an ambitious programme of modernization. There have been eight planning periods up to 2002/3 and infrastructure has accounted for up to 60 per cent of development expenditure in these plans. Such an investment pattern has greatly favoured urban development, especially in the capital city.

Table 12.1 Botswana's real economic growth: 1966–1999

Economic sector	Percentage of GDP at constant 1993/94 prices							
	1966	1975	1980	1985	1990	1993	1996	1999
Agriculture	42.7	21.1	10.9	5.7	4.9	4.5	3.5	2.6
Mining & quarrying	–	17.1	36.6	48.8	38.2	35.4	34.0	33.4
Manufacturing	5.7	7.5	5.0	3.8	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.0
Electricity & water	0.6	2.4	1.6	2.1	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.3
Construction	7.8	12.6	8.8	4.5	7.7	6.2	6.2	6.1
Commerce	9.0	15.7	17.1	12.9	14.0	15.4	10.7	10.3
Transport	4.3	1.5	1.5	2.2	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.8
Finance & business services	20.1	4.8	1.5	6.3	8.6	10.3	10.7	10.9
Community & personal services[a]	–	2.9	22.0	2.6	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.2
General government	9.8	15.1	13.0	13.2	15.2	16.6	15.8	16.1
Dummy sector[b]	–	–0.7	–1.7	–2.1	–2.4	–2.6	–0.1	–0.8
TOTAL GDP (millions Pula)	908.6	2101.1	3609.5	5781.6	10089.5	11115.0	12711.2	15403.9
GDP per capita Pula/capita	1682.5	2886.1	3944.8	5241.7	7644.1	7828.0	8322.0	9365.0

[a] The Community and Personal Services sector was included under 'Government' in 1966.
[b] The dummy sector is a correction for imputed bank service charges.
Sources: Botswana Government, 1997; Bank of Botswana, Annual Report 2000.

Gaborone as a locus of rapid urbanization

Before independence, Botswana's government machinery had been located outside the territorial borders of the country in Mafikeng in South Africa. The decision to found the country's capital city at the place where Gaborone stands today transformed dusty emptiness into a hive of activity, as the physical and social infrastructure required to govern the country was laid, together with the residential and other amenities of a modern town (Figure 12.1). Construction began in 1964 to provide housing for a population of 5000 people (Botswana Government 1994). Literally everything had to be built from scratch: new roads where none had existed before, new residential areas, new institutions, health facilities, water facilities and electricity supplies (Botswana Government 1994, 1997, Gaborone City Council 1997).



Figure 12.1 Map of Gaborone and surrounding area

This 'big bang' attracted a large number of rural migrants who could for the first time find jobs locally within Botswana. From a tiny population of less than 4,000 in 1964, Gaborone rapidly caught up with and then outstripped the two oldest urban settlements of Francistown and Lobatse (Table 12.2). By 1971, Gaborone had quadrupled its population to just

Table 12.2 National and urban population growth rates (1964–2001)

Urban areas	**1964 census**	**1966 estimate**	**1971 census**	**1981 census**	**1991 census**	**2001 census**
Gaborone	3,855	6,000	17,718	59,657	133,468	185,891
Francistown	9,521	n.a.	18,613	31,065	65,244	84,406
Lobatse	7,613	n.a.	11,936	19,034	26,052	29,747
S/Phikwe	–	–	4,940	29,469	39,772	50,012
Orapa	–	–	1,209	5,229	8,827	9,244
Jwaneng	–	–	–	5,600	11,188	15,179
Sowa	–	–	–	2,200	2,228	2,877
Total urban	20,989	n.a.	54,416	150,054	286,779	374,479
Total national	549,510	630,379	574,094	941,027	1,326,796	1,678,891
Urban as % of national pop.	3.8		9.4	15.9	21.6	22.3
Gaborone as % urban[a]	18.4	n.a.	32.5	40.0	46.5	49.6
Gaborone as % of national pop.	0.7	1.0	3.1	6.3	10.0	11.1
Gaborone's annual growth rate		24.8	24.2	12.9	8.4	3.4

[a] Urban here excludes all large urbanizing rural settlements.
Source: Botswana Government 1971, 1981, 2001 censuses; Botswana Government 1973.

under 18,000. In the following four years that figure doubled and, at an annual rate of 13 per cent, reached 60,000 by 1981 before decelerating to a still very robust growth rate of 8.4 per cent. Between 1991 and 2001, the rate of growth slowed further to 3.4 per cent per annum, although this is somewhat misleading because, as the city expanded and was increasingly unable to accommodate the influx of migrants, neighbouring villages absorbed some of the overspill. The ten villages that took the greatest share grew collectively at 7 per cent per year in that decade, their aggregated population increasing from 56,000 to 109,000. This gave job seekers access to Gaborone's rapidly expanding employment opportunities, without them living within the city boundaries.

This rapid population expansion rocketed Gaborone to the position of being Botswana's primary growth centre. The city increased its share of the national urban population from less than 20 per cent at independence in 1966 to a third by 1971, and more than 40 per cent by 1981. By the 1980s, 50 per cent of the national population had come to live within a 200 kilometre radius of the city and, by 1991, with further demographic concentration, half the country's population lived within a radius of 100 kilometres of Gaborone (Gaborone City Council 1997). By the 2001 census, Gaborone city accounted for half of Botswana's urban population and more than 11 per cent of the national population.

Gaborone's magnetic pull

There were several factors that made Gaborone the most attractive of Botswana's urban areas for migrants. At the outset, in a country where most paid jobs had historically been found outside the national borders, the major construction works that accompanied the relocation of the capital from Mafikeng to Gaborone created significant amounts of formal employment that quickly attracted the population of neighbouring rural settlements. The availability of jobs generated by the rapidly expanding infrastructural development of the capital then continued to draw migrants from further and further afield (Table 12.3).

Gaborone's construction started as Botswana was just emerging from a long drought that had decimated livestock and seriously eroded rural livelihoods. Subsistence activities were barely able to cope with the consumption needs of the majority of rural dwellers who were relying on food aid and drought-relief measures. Income-earning opportunities in the newly emerging town were a major pull for these impoverished rural communities. Migrating to Gaborone increased the chances of landing a waged job from almost zero in rural areas to some 60 to 80 per cent depending on the gender of the job

Table 12.3 Gaborone paid employment relative to national level and other urban areas (Government, private and parastatal companies)

Urban areas	**1964**	**1971**	**1975**	**1981**	**1985**[a]	**1991**	**1995**	**1999**
Gaborone	1,500	6,647	18,207	19,723	54,976	78,974	52,301	69,820
Francistown	n.a	3,940	5,607	7,794	13,052	18,977	22,270	33,935
Lobatse	2,500	3,702	4,077	5,221	7,251	10,111	n.a.	11,819
S/Phikwe	–	2,399	5,163	9,262	9,965	16,236	21,077	22,410
Orapa	–	894	–			4,074	n.a.	7,485
Jwaneng	–	–	–		2,877	5,062	n.a.	5,840
Sowa Town	–	–	–			1,403	n.a.	202
Total urban	n.a.	17,582	33,054	42,000	88,121	134,837	n.a.	151,511
Total national	n.a.	37,520	57,325	97,400	117,100	222,794	231,400	244,452
Gaborone as % urban	n.a.	38	55	47	62	59	45	46
Gaborone as % national	n.a.	18	32	20	47	33	23	29
Urban as % national	n.a.	47	58	43	75	57		62

[a] Employment coverage is for government, parastatal and private companies employing more than 50 staff. Up to 1985 the data exclude central government employment, hence the apparent large increases by 1991.

Sources: Government of Botswana 1971, 1981 and 1991 Censuses; Labour Statistics 1988, 1990/91, 1999; Employment Survey, 1973, 1975, 1981, 1985; National Development Plan 1973–78; Bank of Botswana Annual Reports, 1997, 2000, 2001.

seeker.[1] There were also ample opportunities for informal sector activities such as hawking, beer and food sales, and various other services required by the vast majority of low-income earners.

When mining revenues began to make a positive impact on the government's capacity to invest in development, the provision of infrastructure in Gaborone became an engine of growth. As the state responded to the population influx by providing more low-cost housing, this generated more jobs and more migration to Gaborone. Migrants found gainful employment in the capital to an extent unreplicated elsewhere in the country. Gaborone also attracted rural migrants because it offered amenities that were rare or unavailable in rural areas where the provision of piped water, retail services, health services, schools and infrastructure and services were of a markedly lower standard.

In the early days of independence, an added attraction of Gaborone was that it provided a welcoming atmosphere to rural migrants because it did not exude the same racial intolerance for African migrants compared with the older towns built primarily for white settlers. While the original architects had planned the town into segregated areas in relation to income – with white residents living in the most affluent areas – the new government soon moved away from this policy to provide more integrated settlements as the town expanded. Gaborone became Botswana's first non-racial urban settlement where black people could avail themselves of services and amenities that were provided by the state without fear of punishment for violating racial segregation laws.

Perhaps more than any other attraction, the fact that the government was responsive to the accommodation needs of low-income people encouraged migration to Gaborone. When the first 6,000 squatters settled in unplanned areas, the planners dealt with this problem by formally converting these squatter areas into legal residential settlements or re-housing them to site-and-service areas,[2] and then deliberately planning future developments to accommodate the low-income majority.

Trying to catch up with galloping urbanization

When Gaborone was first planned, before diamonds were discovered, it had been assumed that it would never grow beyond a maximum of 20,000 people. It was then believed that, given the nation's modest resources and the dependence of the vast majority of the population on a subsistence rural economy, migration to urban centres would remain modest. This assumption was also based on misconceptions on the part of the first planners. The original 1963 Master Plan was produced by a team of surveyors, engineers and architects in South Africa with its context of influx controls designed to discourage rural–urban migration by black people. The planners' assumptions were thus based on what they wanted to see happen rather than on what was likely to happen in the absence of coercive social engineering.

Provisions for housing, water, sanitation, recreational facilities and other infrastructure like schools, health services and transport were thus made for a small, slow-growing population of initially up to 5,000 people. It was projected that after independence it would take about 20 years for the population to reach 10,000–15,000 people. These erroneous assumptions were to cost the Botswana Government dearly, since the site chosen for Gaborone was hemmed in on all sides by private freehold farms and, beyond them, traditional tribal lands. There was no room for expansion without first compulsorily purchasing ten neighbouring freehold farms (Botswana Government 1994, Gaborone City Council 1997).

Within five years of the commencement of the first Gaborone development plan, the population had exceeded the maximum target and revisions had to be made to cope with the rapid urban expansion. The urban planners opted for short-term plans while seeking to develop more reliable statistical and qualitative data, recognizing that they knew little about the factors driving rural–urban migration (Botswana Government 1977, 1994). In 1971 the Second Gaborone Development Plan was produced, which gave detailed plans only for the period up to 1980, and broad proposals for post-1980 growth. It assumed that the population would reach 72,000 by the year 1990. Two years later, in 1973, the Third Gaborone Development Plan revised population growth estimates to over 70,000 by 1980 and explicitly recognized that Gaborone needed more space for expansion than was actually available.

In 1977, the Gaborone Growth Study Report proposed four alternatives that would expand the city either onto private farmholdings or tribal land (John Burrow and Partners 1978). The first scenario required the purchase of Kgale Hill 5 Farm and envisaged development spreading to the west of the original site and over the railway line (Figure 12.2). The second envisaged expansion eastwards, taking over land across the Notwane River and northwards onto freehold farmland (Figure 12.3). The third option was for northwards expansion which would fall entirely within the Gaborone freehold farm block, including state land within and adjacent to the original township (Figure 12.4). These first three plans all allowed for a further 395,000 urban residents. The final option planned to extend the city onto tribal lands and the villages of Tlokweng, Mogoditshane, Oodi, Ramotswa and Ramotswa station, providing additional space for 305,000 persons (Figure 12.5). In the same year the Fourth Gaborone Development Plan was produced for the 1980–1990 period although funding constraints prevented it from making comprehensive economic and infrastructural evaluations.

Despite efforts to keep up with the demand for housing and service infrastructure, a gap remains between supply and demand. Many homeowners in the site-and-service areas have therefore built additional, unauthorized rooms in their backyards to rent out. Even in the more affluent parts of town where local authorities had provided ‘servants quarters’ for the high-income estates, such quarters are now increasingly being sublet by tenants



Figure 12.2 Gaborone Growth Study 1997 – Alternative 1



Figure 12.3 Gaborone Growth Study 1997 – Alternative 2



Figure 12.4 Gaborone Growth Study 1997 – Alternative 3



Figure 12.5 Gaborone Growth Study 1997 – Alternative 4

to semi-professionals whose housing needs have not been adequately met by the municipality.

Squatting has also spread into Gaborone's neighbouring villages as residents become impatient with waiting for ten years or more to be allocated a site-and-service plot or rented accommodation, or simply cannot afford escalating city rents. Several squatter areas appeared on the outskirts of Gaborone in the 1980s threatening to undermine the city's plans for an orderly expansion into neighbouring villages. These squatter areas beyond the city's borders fell within the jurisdiction of the villages. However, since permission from the relevant authorities is required to settle on tribal or state land in Botswana, such areas are, strictly speaking, illegal. The authorities turned a blind eye for two decades but in 2001 the Ministry of Housing and Lands ordered their demolition without compensation[3] to pave the way for the state to resume control over Gaborone's land allocation and housing development.

The absence of viable economic opportunities in other settlements is clearly the key to why population migration is skewed towards Gaborone. This was already recognized in the 1991 Presidential Commission:

> while people moved to these villages and others . . . for several reasons, the most important reason is that *there are no economic opportunities in the other villages* in this country. People move from many parts of the country to Gaborone and move to Mogoditshane *only to seek accommodation while working in Gaborone*.
>
> – Botswana Government, (1991, xviii; emphasis added)

Policy instruments introduced at the beginning of the 1980s to try and address this problem have had some impact, although they have not yet stemmed the tide. They included the National Settlement Policy that had the primary objective of using public investment in infrastructure to encourage the integration of population settlement with employment creation in several other settlement centres. Rural village sites were included, taking into account population size and the settlement's ability to act as a focal point for local trade and business (Botswana Government 1980, 1999).

The National Settlement Policy furthermore sought to take the urban standards of infrastructure and service provisioning for roads, health services, police services, land servicing, economic/industrial planning, telecommunications, water and electricity to the rural areas. Previously the provision of infrastructure in villages was significantly inferior to the high international standards found in Botswana's urban centres.

Implementation of the National Settlement Policy was slow as it required extensive land surveys and soil analysis as well as the training and redeployment of trained staff from municipalities. The delays resulted in continued population growth in Gaborone's neighbouring villages.

However, the upgrading of village settlements and the accelerated development of other urban settlements undoubtedly reduced pressure on Gaborone by the 1990s, as indicated by the population trends in Table 12.2 (see also Table 3.1 and Appendix 3.1 in Chapter 3). The growth rates in many of these 'urbanizing villages' have been very high. The level of urbanization in the country *including* these areas rose from 46 per cent in 1991 to around 52 per cent by 2001, while the level excluding them remained unaltered between the two censuses at 22 per cent (Botswana Central Statistics Office 2001).

The 1991 census found that in some of these settlements up to a third of the labour force was in waged work. By 2001, job prospects had further improved with an average of 50 per cent of the labour force in paid work in most of the larger rural settlements. In the past the majority of the residents of these settlements had been working in agriculture and they were excluded from strict definitions of Botswana's 'urban' population, but the case for separating them out is clearly becoming weaker as their economic base diversifies.

Another key policy that helped to ease the population pressure on services and housing was the introduction of private land development during the Fifth National Development Plan of 1979–85 (Botswana Government 1985). The government implemented this policy on a trial basis in Gaborone where blocks of land were sold to private property developers to provide infrastructure and housing. This broke a government monopoly on land development and housing and unleashed private sector initiatives with commendable developments in both commercial and residential estates. It also significantly improved the aesthetic look of buildings and industrial estates in Gaborone. The success of this policy led to its extension both within Gaborone and in other primary urban centres, as documented in the next section.

Constraints on employment creation

The growth of Gaborone has been accompanied by significant job and income-earning expansion particularly from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. This was the period when the Gaborone economy had the wind in its sails due to highly favourable diamond revenues and the fact that the government was spending a very considerable share of its diamond revenues on improving urban infrastructure.

Government has been the single largest formal sector employer, accounting for 35 to 40 per cent of total employment, as well as being the second largest source of national income (33 per cent of GDP) after diamond mining. However private sector jobs have become available in construction, reflecting the dominance of infrastructural development in the city. Until recently this sector accounted for an average of one-third of all formal sector jobs created outside government, followed by trade and commerce (20 per cent), finance and business services (13 per cent) and manufacturing (12 per cent).

The government initiated several economic development programmes to support private sector initiatives and boost employment creation in the city and nationwide including the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP), the Accelerated Land Servicing Programme, and extension services like the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (TIPA) and the Integrated Field Services (IFS). These policies aimed at economic diversification via the transfer of development resources from government to the private sector and from the diamond industry to other economic sectors.

Within Gaborone these policies acted as a catalyst for the development of the business service sector and its contribution to GDP and employment by providing: first, financial capital to local entrepreneurs through grants, subsidized loans and deferred tax; secondly, extension services which included technical business advice and training, and thirdly, the necessary infrastructural services to support industry and commerce. In theory, any Botswana national with a viable commercial plan could approach any of the government departments managing these assistance schemes to obtain capital to start a business. These schemes succeeded in generating interest among budding entrepreneurs, particularly in areas where opportunities had created effective demand such as transport, construction, housing, commerce, and financial and business services.

By the mid-1980s, however, it was becoming clear that there were certain structural constraints blocking meaningful employment creation from expanding beyond activities related to state-led demand. Policy initiatives were failing to stimulate sufficient new enterprises and employment to match the availability of financial resources. Manufacturing trailed behind services, construction, trade and other sectors in national employment creation and GDP creation. Within construction, the dominant client remained the government rather than the private sector and individual households. In Gaborone, construction was only the fourth most important private sector employer throughout the 1970s and 1980s, although it improved its share of jobs during the 1990s.

Botswana's excess liquidity problem

Many of the productive sectors that could have met some of the demand for employment were failing to do so because they lacked adequate access to available financial resources, unlike the situation in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where an absolute lack of financial resources is almost always a key constraint on economic development. This is worth emphasizing because it refers to a situation that is unique to Botswana in the African context and for which there are few models, even in developed countries from which most technical advice to the Botswana Government normally derives. Governments in industrialized economies normally derive their income largely from taxation. Their allocative strategies are primarily based on how to use revenues from taxes to provide public goods fairly to support private enterprise while protecting the consumption needs of the vulnerable. By contrast, the government of Botswana accumulates most of its income through direct participation in highly lucrative mining, and in so doing comes to command more income than the local private sector and taxable population. So the allocative problem in such a structure is how to get government-accrued income back to the population to stimulate production among non-government economic actors.

Botswana generally, and Gaborone specifically, were caught in a contradictory situation in which most new and expanding business ventures were starved of resources while the banking system had excess liquidity because the country's banking system was grossly underdeveloped. Its commercial banks were risk averse and not geared to providing long-term loans. In addition, the banks' resources were largely controlled *de facto* by government as the country's major income earner. The allocation of resources depended largely on the distributive strategies adopted by government and the bulk of these were directed at infrastructure provisioning through loans, grants and other strategies. During the first two decades of independence this strategy had succeeded in generating economic growth at rates that were exceptionally high, given the low base from which the country was starting. But this strategy was not sustainable beyond the era of basic infrastructural development because its success depended on the extent to which the private sector responded to these incentives. Evidence from various economic studies and commissions investigating constraints to private sector development suggest that the government policies generated allocative inefficiencies and distorted domestic markets. Thus while the country exhibited spectacular overall economic growth, there was stagnation in those sectors upon which future employment growth would ultimately be determined.

A presidential commission set up to investigate economic opportunities in Botswana in 1982, for instance, identified over-regulation as a factor that was stifling local entrepreneurs and discouraging direct foreign investment in non-mining sectors. A 1985 study on the small-enterprise sector (Economic Consultancies 1985) and a 1987 USAID report (Edwards *et al*. 1987) reported similar concerns. At the 1988 National Conference on Strategies for Private Sector Development, several more constraints on private sector participation in the modern economy were highlighted, together with policy recommendations for the removal of these constraints. Despite the excess liquidity issue, a role was identified for foreign capital in addressing the job creation problem (Botswana Government and UNDP 1988).

The Gaborone-based business community also spearheaded a campaign for policy change and retraction of government to allow more space for private enterprise (BOCCIM 1991, 1996). They pointed to the problems caused by

Botswana's liberal, unprotective trade policy, which allowed outsiders (particularly established South African firms) to compete with inexperienced local businesses, combined with the country's small domestic market and limited export incentives. Businessmen were opposed to the regulatory zeal of, and control by, civil servants who wielded too much discretionary power. This was further compounded by the requirement for entrepreneurs to consult innumerable government officials in the process of starting a new business venture. Despite the government's attempts at extending capital to them, the business community perceived constraints in the financial markets, particularly when accessing venture capital. They also complained of inadequate infrastructure: the high cost of utilities, housing, the limited availability of serviced land, inadequate roads, water supplies, electricity, communications and markets in rural areas. Finally they charged that the development policy was poorly coordinated.

The local business community's demands for policy reform fell on fertile ground. It was becoming increasingly clear that the state's ability to create employment as a direct economic agent had peaked and it was also apparent that the heavy investments in physical and human capital had not raised total factor productivity significantly and labour costs remained high (Bank of Botswana 1993). In terms of a policy shift, the late 1980s marked the end of the government-directed infrastructure-led development phase and the beginning of a transition to privatization and more concerted efforts to raise total national productivity outside of the diamond industry.

Privatization, economic diversification and employment creation

The privatization drive was initiated at a time when the government was also beginning to broaden the base of infrastructural development beyond Gaborone to include most of the large rural settlements, as previously mentioned. The centrepiece of this effort was the development of an industrial policy that placed the private sector in the driving seat. Urban settlements were seen as catalysts of national economic growth and policies were directed at enhancing their ability to promote export-oriented industrial production. To this end, the banking system was extended beyond the narrow base of commercial banking to improve the capacity for channelling resources to the private sector. Efforts were made to streamline business operations by reducing unnecessary bureaucratic delays and lowering the high cost of utilities.

These efforts enhanced private sector participation in production and employment creation, but the overall impact has been mixed due to economic recession in the early 1990s. Private sector formal employment grew at an average annual rate of only 1.1 per cent during the 1990s (Bank of Botswana 1997, 2000). Tables 12.4 and 12.5 show the trends in formal employment in Gaborone and nationally from the 1970s. Fortunately, the rapid growth of the informal sector checked the spread of unemployment.

Table 12.4 Private and parastatal employment in Gaborone (excluding Government) by sector 1975–1999

Economic sector	Distribution of employees by sector (%)					
	1975	1980	1981	1985	1991	1999
Agriculture	2	0	0	1	1	1
Mining & quarrying	1	1	2	1	0	1
Manufacturing	5	8	9	14	15	18
Electricity & water	6	4	4	3	1	2
Construction	41	33	36	28	33	14
Commerce	12	20	20	18	19	25
Transport	12	6	7	5	8	6
Finance & business services	12	16	11	15	14	12
Social & personal services	5	6	7	15	5	12
Education	4	6	4	0	4	9
Total no. of employees	11,693	15,773	18,759	29,700	76,725	62,418

Source: Government of Botswana, Labour Statistics, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1991 and 1999.

The construction industry suffered setbacks as a result of overheating in the late 1980s and corruption scandals in the Botswana Housing Corporation that led to a halt in building during the 1990s. Between 1991 and 1995 employment in construction, which had been such a significant employment sector in Gaborone, declined at the rate of 7.6 per cent per annum (Bank of Botswana 1995: 27, Botswana Human Development Report 1997).

The manufacturing industry also experienced problems due to pressure from international competition. Following rapid growth of 12 per cent a year during the 1980s, this sector experienced retrenchments in the early 1990s and only started making a slight recovery in the mid-1990s (Jefferis 1998).

In Gaborone, the four key sectors that contributed most to private sector formal employment and GDP during the 1990s were construction, commerce, manufacturing and finance/business services (see Table 12.4). At the beginning of the decade, construction was still the city's top private sector employer (33 per cent of jobs) and, nationally, this sector's value was growing at 4.6 per cent. However during the 1990s, the sector experienced serious decline. By the end of the decade, it only accounted for 14 per cent of Gaborone's jobs, below that of private sector employment in both the manufacturing and commerce sectors. The negative impact on total employment in Gaborone is clear in Table 12.4. In the latter part of the 1990s the government tried to revitalize the construction industry by providing financial concessions to citizen contractors to ease their cash-flow problems. Through the IFS scheme, the construction materials section of the industry was helped to improve the quality of products, and firms were offered assistance in diversifying into items used in renovation and housing improvements to reduce dependency on primary construction activity.

Table 12.5 Botswana's formal employment by sector and employer: 1971–2001

Employment category	**Formal sector paid jobs**						
	1971	**1975**	**1981**	**1985**	**1991**	**1995**	**2001**
Economic sector (% of total)							
Agriculture	15.2	10.0	7.4	5.6	4.4	3.1	3.7
Mining & quarrying	12.3	10.7	11.3	10.2	5.0	5.7	5.0
Manufacturing	8.2	9.1	9.9	14.1	16.6	16.0	18.9
Electricity & water	1.7	1.5	2.5	2.7	1.7	1.8	1.8
Construction	7.9	21.2	23.5	16.2	22.0	15.1	17.4
Commerce	25.9	24.1	23.6	25.6	26.7	30.7	30.4
Transport	5.8	4.7	6.0	8.0	5.9	6.2	6.2
Finance & business services	4.7	4.7	7.6	9.5	10.5	12.0	11.7
Community & personal services	18.3	3.7	5.9	5.5	5.6	6.9	2.6
Education	n.a.	10.3	2.5	2.7	1.6	2.5	4.0
Sector type (% of total)							
Private and parastatal	74.6	74.1	66.5	61.1	69.1	63.1	60.6
Government	25.5	25.9	31.6	38.9	30.9	36.9	39.4
Employee numbers							
Private employee numbers	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	63,600	142,500	132,600	150,700
Parastatal employee numbers	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7,600	11,800	13,400	13,200
Central government	9,645	12,200	26,300	36,800	55,500	69,400	85,400
Local government	n.a.	2,675	6,300	8,800	13,000	15,900	21,000
Grand Total	37,943	57,325	97,400	11,7100	222,000	231,400	270,300

Note: Up to 1975 Community Services included services provided by government.
Sources: Botswana Government, Statistical Bulletin, 1972, 1983, 1985, 1986; Bank of Botswana Annual Reports for 1996, 2000.

Commerce and trade started the 1990s as Gaborone's second largest private sector employer with just under 20 per cent of the jobs (Table 12.4). In terms of GDP growth, it also started the decade on a high note (15 per cent growth annually). By 1999 it was the city's main employer, accounting for 25 per cent of private sector employment. The sector experienced considerable diversification into new areas such as motor-vehicle dealing, garages and workshops, the expansion of supermarkets, liquor outlets, restaurants and so on. International tourism was also gaining in importance. Hotels became some of the largest businesses in the city and there was also a rapid expansion in smaller businesses in the form of bed-and-breakfast outlets and lodges for tourists.

In Gaborone, the manufacturing sector has become increasingly important and was the second largest private sector employer by 1999. Nationally, however, development and diversification of this sector beyond its traditional beef and beef products faced significant problems, partly reflecting Botswana's inherent lack of comparative advantage in many branches of manufacturing and partly due to opposition from its giant neighbour, South Africa (Good and Hughes 2002). Manufacturing's annual GDP growth fell from 6.4 per cent in 1991 to 3.2 per cent in 1999. Botswana's efforts to make its manufacturing industry take the lead in economic diversification led to heavy investments in two initiatives that collapsed spectacularly. One was the Hyundai vehicle assembly plant in which a quarter of a million pula was invested through the Botswana Development Corporation. Between 1995 and 1999 the plant accounted for 66 per cent of growth in non-traditional exports. Half of all manufacturing exports and just under 10 per cent of total merchandise exports derived from vehicle exports during this period. But in 2000 the plant had to close as it could not maintain a firm hold on its export market. Until its liquidation, the Hyundai enterprise was one of Gaborone's largest businesses and its closure was a severe blow for formal employment in the city.

Another manufacturing sub-sector that rose and then fell dramatically was textiles. Although it had a brief period of rapid growth that was initially targeted at the Zimbabwean market, it was plagued by a series of highly publicized closures following considerable investment from government subsidies (Good and Hughes 2002). Gaborone's Western Textiles business started operation in 1991 and soon became one of the largest businesses in the city. Following problems with the Zimbabwean market, attention turned to supplying South Africa and the wider global market.

The financial and business service sector was the steadiest of Gaborone's key economic sectors. It remained the fourth largest private sector employer throughout the 1990s. This sector successfully diversified its financial institutions in the wake of the Financial Sector Development Strategy in 1989. This strategy focused on four principal areas of reform: (1) reducing the role of government as a major source of finance for parastatal companies; (2) promoting the development of domestic money and capital markets; (3) enhancing the efficiency and soundness of commercial banks; and (4) improving the effectiveness of development financial institutions (Bank of Botswana 2000, 103).

By the end of the decade, all exchange controls had been abolished to allow increased integration into international financial markets. New financial institutions have edged the old commercial banks from a 90 to a 60 per cent share of the market. New competitive services have been introduced, and the excess liquidity that used to characterize the banking sector has found productive outlets (Bank of Botswana 2000).

Gaborone reaped the lion's share of developments in terms of economic diversification in the 1990s and the associated employment creation as indicated by the diversity of business ventures located in the city, and the rapid expansion of estates and housing services. The capital city accounts for half of all formal sector business operations in Botswana. However, despite the government's concerted efforts to privatize, private and parastatal employment as a proportion of total, national formal employment is as low as it has ever been (Table 12.5).

From retrospect to prospect

Since its foundation as Botswana's capital city in 1964, Gaborone has undergone a dramatic transformation in population, and economic and physical structure. It has risen from the dust to become the economic hub of the nation and a symbol of what is possible in the course of African development and modernization through state initiative and flexible policy-making. This was a settlement whose architects anticipated it would never be anything other than a small town in an impoverished country of agro-pastoralists and hunter-gatherers. Nowadays the city has spread far beyond its original borders to bring town and country into one economic entity: Greater Gaborone.

Over the past 38 years, Gaborone has experienced both spectacular growth and economic setbacks. By the end of the 20th century, its population growth was averaging a more modest 3.3 per cent per year. This partly reflected the successful diversion of population growth elsewhere and partly the impact of AIDS that had become significant by the end of the 1990s. Nonetheless, Gaborone has maintained its position as a centre of employment opportunities as attested by its continuing ability to create jobs for a large share of its settlers, gradually spreading its increasing wealth to a wider circle.

Gaborone has been an experimental laboratory where the state can test its economic policies before implementing them in other settlements in Botswana. The success of the trial privatization of land servicing and development, for instance, demonstrated to the government that the private sector could effectively replace the state monopoly in this area of economic activity. The number of private land developers has since increased in Gaborone as well as in other major settlements. Thus, at the onset of the 21st century, Gaborone is revitalizing itself, as evidenced by its changing physical structure. After some decline in the standard of physical infrastructure at the end of the 1990s, Gaborone's roads have now been widened to allow for expanding traffic and business. New industrial and commercial estates have emerged under private sector development initiatives (for example, the Commercial Park, the Trade Fair estates, and the recently opened Riverwalk shopping complex). These have transformed the face of Gaborone, drawing attention away from the drab uniformity of its older buildings.

Interestingly, Gaborone's development has also helped to transform certain aspects of Botswana's rural life and rural–urban relations. Its growth has made development planners and policy-makers realize the need to end the artificial divide between urban and rural development in the provision of development infrastructure and services. The business sector took the lead in emphasizing the importance of spreading quality infrastructure to rural settlements and other centres in order to encourage effective economic linkages between Gaborone and other settlements. Policies are now more likely to view town and country as sectors to be joined together rather than separated.

Evidence suggests that, unlike other urban areas in Botswana where the majority of in-migrants tend to come from neighbouring villages, in Gaborone they come from a wide range of settlements making the city truly national in character. A considerable proportion of income earned in Gaborone is remitted throughout the country to migrants' rural home areas. These remittances play a significant role in the livelihoods of rural households and have evidently played a part in the decreasing rate of absolute poverty nationally (UNDP/Government of Botswana 1997).

Attempts to transform Gaborone's economy from one of state domination and infrastructure-led development have not, however, fundamentally restructured the economy at the beginning of the 21st century. Such transformation is reserved for the future and will depend on the extent to which diamond revenues can maintain their role as a guarantor of development resources and the ability of on-going policy reforms to bring about an environment that will facilitate the maturation of private sector development and resource mobilization. Salutary lessons need to be learned from the recent debacles in the development of the country's manufacturing sector. The government's faith in manufacturing as a special sector with unique qualities of employment generation and economic transformation may have been misplaced in the specific circumstances of Botswana and the country should perhaps look to develop the comparative advantages it has in the service industry (Bank of Botswana 2000). Meanwhile, through fortuitous diamond wealth and good governance, Botswana and the city of Gaborone have managed to deliver a rising standard of living to their citizens and residents – no small task on a continent of deepening impoverishment.

Notes

1. Less than 20 per cent of the formal jobs then available in construction, general government and manual labour were open to women. The single largest source of employment for women was domestic service in the homes of the employed.
2. For example, the squatter area of Bontleng was converted into a leasehold settlement to provide security for those that settled there prior to the municipality providing such lease terms. Another early squatter area in Extension Ten, to the west of the University of Botswana campus, was relocated when low-cost housing was made available through site-and-service. The squatter area of Old Naledi, located on a site that had been earmarked for industrial development, was upgraded into a residential settlement (Botswana Government 1979, Van Cornelius 1982).
3. Some legitimate traditional landholders were caught up in these demolitions that began at the end of 2001, although some managed to obtain redress and compensation through the courts.

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13

Welfare through Civic Participation: Tabata Development Fund, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Suleiman S. Ngware

Currently, the role of civic participation in welfare provisioning is highly lauded by donor agencies in an environment of liberalization, privatization and globalization. But how does civic participation actually work? Who participates? How is popular support mobilized? What kinds of collective undertakings are pursued? Who actually benefits? Are there added benefits? What unforeseen problems are encountered? Is civic participation sustainable over time? This chapter explores the opportunities and pitfalls of urban welfare provisioning through civic participation in Dar es Salaam.

Beginning with background information on urbanization in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, and the Tabata settlement, an urban community within Dar es Salaam that established a special fund for community development, the second section of the chapter traces the resurgence of civic society in urban Tanzania. In the third section, the evolution of the Tabata Development Fund (TDF) is described, followed by an examination of the way the objectives are being realized and a discussion of the various problems and challenges ahead. In the final part, the TDF's lessons and experiences are analyzed in light of their possible replication in other areas.

Tanzanian urbanization

The city of Dar es Salaam is the economic capital of Tanzania. Since its founding in 1862 and with the advantage of a natural deep-water harbour on the Indian Ocean, it has become a modern port of national, regional and continental importance. Today it is Tanzania's main centre of industrial production, commerce and trade, administrative functions, cultural activities and the headquarters of diplomatic missions.

Dar es Salaam is currently growing at a rate of approximately 4.4 per cent per annum (Table 13.1). Urbanization is an issue in Tanzania not only because of its social and economic significance but also because of the lack

Table 13.1 Dar es Salaam's population and growth rates

Year	Population	Intercensal annual growth rate%
1887	2,000	
1894	10,000	25.8
1900	20,000	12.2
1913	22,500	0.9
1921	24,600	1.1
1931	34,300	3.4
1948	69,300	4.2
1957	128,700	7.1
1967	272,500	7.8
1978	843,100	10.8
1988	1,360,900	4.9
2002	2,487,288	4.4

Source: Sustainable Cities Programme, 1997 and Tanzania, 2003.

of effective mechanisms to manage its effects on a population spread throughtout the city and its sprawling suburbs (Robertshaw *et al.* 2001).

About 70 per cent of the city's residents live in unplanned and unserviced areas with social, economic and environmental conditions that pose health hazards. After the implementation of structural adjustment and the removal of subsidized services in urban areas during the 1980s and the economic liberalization of the 1990s, abject poverty has not only surfaced but is continuing to increase.

State and civil society in urban Tanzania

Tanzania's ongoing political and economic reforms demand effective decentralization. The participation of the people directly or through their democratically elected representatives is of paramount importance. The term 'civil society' is now gaining currency in discussions on the democratization process and economic empowerment in Tanzania. The common usage of the concept, in fact, ignores the conceptual and historical specificity of civil society (Blaney and Pash 1993). It can be argued that civil society is used to label any group or movement that acts as a watchdog on the state, its various institutions and activities.

In this chapter, civil society refers to people as citizens *vis-á-vis* the state, as agents in economic and social activities and as members of public associations. It encompasses the sum of all non-family social, economic institutions and associations (but not registered political parties) which are autonomous and independent of the Tanzanian state and are capable of not only improving their own well-being but significantly influencing the country's public policy and providing checks against government excesses. Its institutions and powerful elites may easily be tempted to abuse their positions. Thus, civil society comprises a huge spectrum of social organizations wedged between the state and family including religious organizations, various independent professional and student associations, peasant organizations, women's groups, sports clubs, youth clubs, disabled groups, independent labour unions, development associations and so on. These organizations are inclusive in their membership, non-partisan, multifaceted, consultative and at times confrontational (Halfani and Stren 1994). State and society interaction in Tanzania is characterized by three distinct periods: the colonial period (1880–1961), the post-colonial period of the developmentalist state (1960–1980s), and the post-developmental period of the 1980s to the present day.

The colonial period is of central importance in understanding the contemporary state and its relations with society because fundamental features of the post-colonial state originated during this period. Colonialism was not primarily about territorial acquisition, nor was it fundamentally about the arbitrary drawing of boundaries. It was essentially a question of politics and the imposition of an alien form of state rule over a subject population (Mamdani 1996, 1998). It is widely recognized that the colonial state was profoundly coercive by nature. Sovereignty required forcible subjugation, and colonial intervention had the effect of restricting the activities of civil society, especially those of a political nature. Since society and the economy were not clearly demarcated from the political realm during the colonial period, resistance on the part of civil society did not gain real coherence until the formation of the nationalist movement during the 1940s and 1950s.

Tanzania entered the independence era in 1961 with what seemed to be a vibrant civil society (Ngware 1999a). Over the next three decades, however, this vibrancy and independence of politics was constrained by excessive state centralization and bureaucratization (Wunsch and Olowu 1990). The post-colonial period saw state rule being structured around a development project of a national character whilst maintaining some of the fundamental features of its colonial predecessor.

The post-colonial state could not rely solely or even primarily on force and coercion as the colonial state had done because it had to secure its hegemonic rule through greater use of legitimizing processes that were articulated around the state project of development. It was the development goal that unified the nation, and the state was posited as the agency destined to realize development. This premise effectively undermined democratic politics and systematically demobilized and delegitimized people's mass organizations and activities. Members of popular organizations, trade unions and political parties had their activities curtailed in the name of development.

The precariousness of the country's economy in the world economic system as a result of the collapse of developing countries' raw material markets in the mid-1970s is directly linked to the failure of state-led national development to provide the requisite infrastructure for the Tanzanian population's basic needs attainment. The crisis of state legitimacy that ensued was reinforced by the imposition of structural adjustment and economic liberalization. The state's withdrawal from the market undercut various classes' possibilities of reproduction and systematically altered people's survival strategies. In the process of this major economic restructuring, there was a resurgence of civil society organizations, particularly in urban Tanzania. It is in this context that this chapter focuses on the TDF, a community-based organization (CBO) operating in Tabata Ward, Dar es Salaam. However before examining the TDF, the nature of local municipal government, namely the Dar es Salaam City Council, is briefly reviewed.

Dar es Salaam City Council: Handcuffed urban government

Dar es Salaam City Council has experienced ups and downs in its management and administration since its inception in 1961. Between 1972 and 1984, the implementation of decentralization involved central government taking over the management of Dar es Salaam City Council. From 1982 to 1996, local authorities were reinstated in the country and Dar es Salaam City Council resumed responsibility for managing urban government. However, its performance over the years was continually disappointing, undermined by poor leadership, gross mismanagement and corruption. The central government finally intervened and abolished it in 1996. The elected representatives of the people (councillors) were removed and replaced by a government-appointed City Commission. There is general acknowledgement that the City Commission has done a commendable job in terms of improved service delivery, revenue collection and fighting against corruption. In the year 2000, Dar es Salaam City Commission was replaced by Dar es Salaam City Council with the three autonomous municipalities of Ilala, Kinondoni and Temeke. The challenge for the reinstated City Council is to continue the good work that was done by the City Commission.

The City Council faces a wide array of pressing problems associated with rapid growth that must be addressed now and not later. Fundamental among these is the issue of basic needs welfare provisioning. Even when the political will to deal with the problems is present, lack of resources, inappropriate approaches and attitudes have limited the impact of interventions by various players and actors. Increasingly, CBOs are playing a positive role in urban areas where people are demanding better services.

Tabata: A not-so-leafy suburb of Dar es Salaam

Tabata Ward, a suburb situated on the western fringes of Dar es Salaam about 8 kilometres from the city centre, is in Ilala municipality. The suburb is a newly planned residential area accommodating about 60,000 people, although the official records claim only 15,000 inhabitants. It is an area of approximately 2300 plots divided into six neighbourhoods. A planned housing scheme covers approximately 80 per cent of the area. The majority of plots are owner-occupied with about 98 per cent of the buildings regarded as permanent structures. Relative to other areas of Dar es Salaam, Tabata is a middle-income area, although it is quite mixed in composition with some wealthy members and many poor people renting accommodation.

According to my survey work in the area, the majority of Tabata's residents have completed at least primary education (41 per cent) and about 26 per cent have had secondary education. Like many areas in Dar es Salaam, self-employment dominates: about 45–50 per cent of the residents are self-employed, 25 per cent formally employed and 14 per cent are retired civil servants. The rest claim to have no employment and to be dependent on relatives and friends. These are mainly youths, women, the disabled and the elderly. Roughly 50 per cent of the women stated their occupation as 'housewife' (Ngware 1999b). However, unemployment and 'housewife' status do not preclude those self-classified from engaging in income-generating activities of a casual or even regular nature.

Tabata was essentially rural in character until 1975 when part of the area was surveyed for residential development. Tabata settlement, like many suburbs in Dar es Salaam, started as unsurveyed land where the well-to-do 'bought' plots from the existing rural dwellers for farmland and sometimes went on to build houses for themselves or for rental purposes. Land purchase in Tanzania is highly contestable since all land technically belongs to the state. One is required to apply for a building plot and cannot purchase land as such. However in reality, many buy farmland from a village, district or urban authority and people often then go on to construct houses on their land in the outlying areas of Dar es Salaam. Alongside this informal process of land purchase, the Dar es Salaam Master Plan of 1979 proposed Tabata as a residential sub-district for housing people displaced by the building of the Mandela Highway – a major artery linking two of Dar es Salaam's main radial thoroughfares. It was also designated as a settlement area for people who had been affected by the first and second phases of the city's Squatter Upgrading Programme. These measures brought an influx of lower income-earners to the area and launched the official surveying and development of Tabata as an integral part of the city.

Not all Tabata's surveyed plots have been allocated. Likewise, many plots that have been allocated have not been fully developed. Nonetheless, high-density conditions prevail related to household expansion through the accommodation of extended family members as well as various rental arrangements. The incidence of rented housing is high (Community Infrastructure Programme 1996). Many of the houses are built with the traditional Swahili floor plan: one long corridor with six to eight rooms leading off the corridor, which are often used as rented apartments with different families occupying each room. Thus several families may be accommodated under one roof and some plots support more than one house. Given the shortage of housing in the city, the renting out of rooms is a booming business in urban Tanzania and the early land purchasers in Tabata have been opportunely placed to benefit from the rental market.

Stinking smells: The catalyst for community effort

In the late 1970s, Dar es Salaam City Council decided to locate the city dump in Tabata. As was to be expected, the residents vehemently opposed the decision because having the dump so close to the community would pose serious health hazards to the residents – particularly the pungent smell from polluted air and toxic substances emanating from burning waste. However, the City Council stuck to its guns. Initially, individual residents used the formal channels to petition against the decision but this proved to be ineffective and some members of the higher income group within the community then took the initiative to mobilize the community to fight against the decision. The TDF began as a pressure group to agitate for the closure of the refuse dump and the residents, regardless of their economic or educational status, responded positively, contributing money to hire a lawyer. The matter was taken to court but the case dragged on for years before it was finally decided in the favour of the residents. The dump was closed in 1991.

Soon after winning its High Court case, the pressure group was transformed into the TDF and was registered in March 1993 as a CBO. This action was motivated by Tabata residents who wanted to use their newly acquired unity, leadership and resources to address other equally important and pressing developmental issues in the community, including the supply of water, sanitation and drainage, education, health, environmental matters, roads and increasing poverty among youth and women.

Infrastructural issues were at the forefront. Transport was one of the ward's biggest problems as many neighbourhoods were not accessible during the rainy season. The majority of Tabata's population, like many in Dar es Salaam, depended on public transport and the main roads could not cope with the volume of commuter bus traffic (*daladala*). Lack of drainage caused erosion and road damage, which was compounded by the utilization of the roads over and above their design capacity.

Most of Tabata was without any form of storm-water drainage and the water supply was inadequate for both drinking and domestic purposes, resulting in intermittent cholera and typhoid epidemics. Health facilities were not only inadequate but also poorly funded, particularly maternity and child health facilities. There were hardly any educational facilities for pre-school children, and in primary schools children had to sit on the floor. Wealthy people invaded open spaces that were meant for recreation and there was little enthusiasm for planting trees in the community. It was in this developmental context that the TDF transformed itself from a pressure group into a CBO.

Working order: Tabata development fund's organization and operations

The TDF's main objectives have been to upgrade the deficient infrastructure and improve welfare services within the community. The TDF has a constitution, a board of trustees, and an executive committee of 10 members that includes the chairperson, a secretary, treasurer and members of key standing committees, who manage the organization on a daily basis. Eight sectoral sub-committees were instituted after intensive consultative meetings with the people to identify their needs and priorities. A sectoral committee was made responsible for project identification, appraisal, the setting of clear plans of action, their implementation and evaluation. Thus an elaborate system of communication and participation links households to the organization's apex (Figure 13.1).



Figure 13.1 Organisational structure of TDF

The chairman, a land surveyor, is part of the educated elite with a successful private company, and commands wide respect in the community. The vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, board of trustees, executive director and members of functional committees are educated, fairly well-to-do, experienced individuals of good standing in the community. The leadership is genuinely interested in the welfare of the community as well as in making improvements to the social, physical and economic infrastructure of the area in which they themselves live. They meet on a weekly basis and appear open and transparent in their words and actions. However, their decisions and their commercial interests in the development of the community are criticized locally, as is discussed later in this section.

In addition to the deliberations of the leadership, neighbourhood and area committees are active and close to the residents. The TDF has organized the community into six neighbourhoods, each of which is represented on the functional standing committees by at least one member. All neighbourhoods are divided into a number of areas and each has a representative. The area representative must serve as the conduit for the flow of basic information and ideas regarding local needs, problems, possible solutions, population distribution, occupations, infrastructure, services and so on. The area representatives are selected according to gender, literacy, reliability, willingness to sacrifice his/her time, commitment to community affairs and good standing in the community. Currently there are over 150 area representatives, each representing more than 10 households (in surveyed areas) and over 15 households in squatter areas. Perhaps ironically, this is similar to the old ten-cell leader structure under Nyerere's single-party system that prevailed in the country during the first thirty years after independence. It continues to be an effective system in which civil society has space to participate in the governance of the country.

The main channels of communication are regular meetings at area, standing committee and executive levels, and special announcements made on Fridays and Sundays after religious prayers. Flyers are used to disseminate information on specific issues. The TDF offices are centrally located and there is always an attendant there to deal with emergency issues.

In consultation with the municipal authorities, the TDF has instituted by-laws that regulate various TDF activities in line with the organization's constitution and there is a mechanism in place to mobilize residents to contribute cash and labour for democratically agreed development activities. The TDF has organized various fund-raising activities in order to improve its revenue base as well as developing a close and positive working relationship with the municipal agencies at *mtaa* (neighbourhood) and ward levels and with their technical and political leadership. They complement instead of compete with each other. Such a relationship has created an environment that promotes mutual trust, reduces duplication of resources and allows space for each to do their best for the benefit of the community.

Overall, the TDF's style of management has won the support and confidence of Tabata residents and the willingness and commitment of the neighbourhoods and their committees to work long hours on a voluntary basis have been central to its success.

There is, however, one key area of contention in the TDF regarding the top leadership's governance motives. Many are successful businessmen who take any opportunity possible to promote and sustain their various businesses through the TDF's community welfare provisioning schemes. They have strong commercial stakes in the provision of welfare services in Tabata and are known for the gain they made from their extensive rental property interests in the locality. Questions have been raised about the contracts that they are awarded for the building and supply of infrastructure, the improvement of the community's roads, water supply and other basic services. Thus, the lower-income dwellers of Tabata are suspicious of the motives of the TDF leadership, a suspicion fuelled by the fact that the leaders are not eager to hold the periodic democratic elections that are stipulated in the fund's own constitution. The leadership's overly extended period in office has unduly strengthened its decision-making powers.

In addition to the TDF itself, several other actors are contributing to the provision and improvement of welfare services in Tabata, notably Dar es Salaam City Council, Ilala municipality, various donor agencies and the private sector, especially individuals owning pharmacies, nursery schools, and dispensaries including those owned by religious organizations. Community members' active participation has been coupled with a willingness by local and international donors to provide the TDF with generous technical and financial support. These include Irish Aid, the World Bank, the Japanese aid agency JICA, the German GTZ, USAID, PRIDE, Habitat, and the Tanzania National Electric Company and Tanzania Telecommunication Limited. In order to build its capacity to provide the necessary and reliable welfare services to its residents, the TDF has sought the technical advice of the Community Infrastructure Programme (CIP) – a consulting agency under the auspices of the city of Dar es Salaam which is funded by Irish Aid.

TDF actions and achievements

According to the TDF's constitution, the community itself decides on the projects to be embarked upon depending on need and available resources. Initial proposals originate from area representatives and these are forwarded to the functional standing committee for discussion and recommendation. If it is a big project like road construction or water drilling, the TDF assembly has to give the final endorsement. However, the process is limited by a number of factors. First, it is alleged that leaders exert overwhelming influence in decision-making which raises doubts about how seriously the area representatives' views are being considered. Second, there is no general vote on issues, which masks majority opinion. And third, given that major projects are funded by donors, Tabata residents' planning efforts tend to be directed at attracting donor support rather than specifying project details.

In terms of infrastructure, TDF community projects so far have included digging two boreholes with the capacity to produce about 3000 litres of water per hour and a reserve tank to store about 30,000 litres of water, serving the needs of 4000 people. The TDF receives about TSh 300,000 (about US$500) per month in water charges to maintain and service the costs of the facility. Additionally the TDF has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Dar es Salaam City Council in which the TDF is solely responsible for the maintenance and operation of the neighbourhood roads. Thus far, they have raised TSh 40 million, which constitutes 5 per cent counter-funding of the capital cost of constructing the roads. They have completed a 3.3 kilometre tarmac road linking Tabata to Segerea as well as providing 16 kilometre of local gravel roads. The TDF has also managed to mobilize the community to plant trees (including fruit trees) to make Tabata greener and more attractive.

With regard to social services, the TDF has mobilized parents to contribute funds to reduce the shortage of desks in primary schools, while health services in Tabata are provided by both Dar es Salaam City Council and privately owned health units such as the modern Prince Saud Health Centre. The TDF has also devised a system to reduce drug use and crime in all neighbourhoods. Voluntary guards now patrol the streets at night and the crime rate has dropped significantly. The TDF has initiated and supported several out-reach activities to improve welfare provision for its residents, for example, offering small loans and grants to youths and women to help them engage in income-generating programmes in an attempt to reduce poverty.

The TDF is in the final stages of completing an imposing building which will house its offices, a canteen and a conference hall. Some office space will also be leased to earn income. The TDF prides itself on being a CBO that is continuing to attract donor support from within Tanzania and abroad. They also pride themselves on being one of the few CBOs in the city that enjoys strong grass-roots support and leadership. Its motto is 'let us lead together, let us do it together and let us benefit together'. The TDF leadership has managed to convince most of its members that it is not reasonable to wait for the city authorities, government or donors to solve community problems. They argue that it is better to unite, identify their priorities, mobilize their human and material potential, network with other stakeholders, solve their problems and then move on to new challenges.

The TDF's main assets are the community members' strength and ambitions. The mobilizing capacities of the TDF have gained international recognition and its development record enabled the then Dar es Salaam City Commission (now Dar es Salaam City Council) to win the 1998 Dubai International Award for Best Practices on World Habitat Day. The chairperson of TDF was awarded a trophy, a certificate and a cheque for US$30,000 that he received on behalf of the City of Dar es Salaam and the Tabata Community. The TDF, in representing Dar es Salaam, was one of ten municipalities to win the award worldwide.

The TDF has worked closely with the media to publicize their achievements and secure local and international support. Indeed this has turned Tabata into a 'Mecca' or 'Vatican' for local and international researchers, dignitaries and tourists who visit the community on a regular basis.

Hitches and handicaps

Despite the commendable achievements it has recorded so far, the TDF is not without problems. It faces the inevitable growth pains of a dynamic organization, some of which are real, while others are possibly imagined. Some originate within the TDF or the community, others are external. All the same, they threaten the smooth-running of the TDF, and could even lead to its demise.

Donor interest in Tabata has led to ever-rising expectations that the main role of the TDF leadership is to go around Dar es Salaam seeking donor finance. When looking through TDF files, one repeatedly reads: 'efforts should be intensified to look for donors (*wafadhili*) to fund projects'. The heavy presence of donor-financed development may have negative psychological implications for the community. Some donors go beyond financing projects, planning and executing the projects in such a way that the community gains little in capacity-building.

The TDF membership consists of people of different cultures, backgrounds, religions, tribes, levels of education, purchasing power and income. Such a 'mixed grill' of people have different expectations, attitudes and understandings of the TDF's role and position. Not all community members participate in TDF-initiated activities and in spite of organizational efforts to involve women, their participation is still limited. Among the many reasons for this are the excessive demands imposed on them which limit the time, labour and cash they have at their disposal. Very few women are represented at the top of the TDF's hierarchy where major decisions are being made. The TDF has tried hard to be gender-sensitive and efforts have been made to include women on all the major committees. A special section has even been created to promote women's issues within the TDF but more still remains to be done to ensure their full participation in all TDF decisions and activities.

It is claimed that the most difficult groups to engage in support of TDF activities are the higher-income educated elite and those residing in Tabata who are formally employed but not part of the TDF leadership. Some have refused to contribute labour or cash for road construction, arguing that since they did not own vehicles they saw no need to support the project. Conversely, the general poverty of the majority of the people makes it difficult for them to contribute cash or even labour when they are working outside Tabata and struggling to earn a livelihood. There are people who believe that since they pay the 'development levy', a municipal tax, there is no need for them to do more. Their view is that it is the responsibility of the municipal leaders to bring 'development' through the levy.

The TDF, in collaboration with Dar es Salaam City Council, could reduce apathy among various sections of the Tabata community by initiating a civic education programme aimed at reaching out to women and youth, middle-class employees, tenants, unemployed youth, the disabled and the elderly who may feel estranged from community developments under the auspices of the TDF. For this to be successful, they would have to tackle the leadership problems.

The slow implementation of projects has led some people to claim that funds are being embezzled. This has reduced residents' motivation to sacrifice their time and effort for the benefit of the community. There are persistent complaints that the TDF's constitution has many flaws and is outdated, and that leaders have failed to follow the letter and spirit of the existing constitution. As was already mentioned, no elections have been held since the TDF was registered in 1993 despite a clause in the constitution that stipulates that elections must be held every five years.

Some view the TDF as a CBO for the rich and powerful and feel that the marginalized poor are simply dictated to regarding the implementation of projects. They argue that TDF projects and activities are normally located in the neighbourhoods where the economically advantaged and politically powerful live. It is true that the water points and roads are concentrated in the earlier settlement area where the better-off reside.

It should be emphasized that, in theory, the TDF covers the whole of Tabata Ward. The TDF leadership claims that every resident of the ward is a *bona fide* member but there are neither membership cards nor membership fees. In reality, improved service delivery is concentrated in a limited area, 'Tabata proper', inhabited by the most influential people and where the area's local businesses are concentrated. It is thus not surprising that this area is the envy of the rest of Tabata and explains the alienation of some residents who charge that a top-down approach dominates in the TDF despite official denials of this. Disenchantment has been channelled into consistent efforts to create a rival CBO to the TDF, driving a wedge between different groups in the community and slowing down the implementation of many proposed development activities.

Despite the existence of vigilantes, an increasing crime rate poses a threat not only to TDF-owned property but also to the safety and security of all community members. In brief, the TDF, as a growing and dynamic organization, has to continue to grapple with existing and new challenges.

Lessons and experiences

Expanding the number, type and autonomy of civic organizations is important in harnessing social energy to progressive ends. However, empowerment and the realization of the potential of the community are not merely functions of a proliferation of civic groups and community organizations (Kiondo 1995). Their effectiveness depends upon coordinated activities and mutual support. While some of the development literature has sought to idealize the so-called 'third sector', it is important to recognize that there is nothing inherently pro-poor or pro-development about civic participation. Civic groups are highly contested arenas in which diverse organizations and interests compete, as well as collaborate, to advance their own interests and agendas. Welfare through civic participation is not a panacea curing all the ills afflicting a community. Additional support from the private sector is needed for solid provisioning of welfare services combined with the efforts of municipalities and the state.

The TDF's success so far has revolved around building institutions, partnerships and networking that address the welfare issues of the community, notably the relocation of the dump and the provision of basic infrastructure and services not provided by the municipality or the private sector. After its campaign against the rubbish dump, the TDF created an organizational identity and strategy and set about providing infrastructure in the form of roads and boreholes. The demonstrated effect of these activities encouraged community members to participate in CBO activities. To its credit, the TDF structures of decision-making, management and accountability provide the capacity to mobilize and organize community members and allow it to gain access to the technical and financial support of foreign donors.

Heavy reliance on donor-funding has, however, caused worries within the TDF and donor agencies about the sustainability of the services when external support ceases. Given present economic constraints, there is no clear solution to this problem. The TDF argues that their biggest concern at the moment is to secure welfare services in the community and they will grapple with the issue of sustainability when and if it occurs.

A community rarely has clearly demarcated boundaries and is more than just a physical place (Peterman 2000). In a practical sense, a community is involved in a myriad of daily social, political, economic and cultural interactions. It is the frequency, strength and quality of these interactions that determine the stability and vitality of the community and its success in securing welfare through civic participation. Community empowerment and revitalization occur when a community recognizes and uses its capacity for positive change. Communities are not just victims with needs, they are survivors with capacities.

The success and constraints facing the TDF offer some useful lessons for policy makers and implementers, researchers, donor agencies and other urban communities with civic organizations but it should not be assumed that the Tabata experience can be simply lifted and superimposed elsewhere. In forming civil institutions and organizations, the relationship between the state and society is positively redefined, creating greater economic and political space for ordinary citizens. The CBOs like the TDF propagate democratic and participatory governance that leads to the creation of a new political culture of increased and sustained awareness, respect, responsibility and accountability. The TDF has shown that local communities often have the potential and capability to organize and mobilize themselves and develop voluntary cooperative structures as long as they have a committed leadership and collective issues to unite them.

The TDF has demonstrated that local communities are often endowed with substantial resolve when faced with deprivation or hazardous, health-threatening circumstances like a dump. People's willingness to contribute resources in the form of ideas, money and labour for the development of their own community contradicts the generally held belief that the urban poor depend solely on the government or donors for 'free' social-service delivery. Increasingly, CBOs like the TDF are being required to operate in a competitive, market-driven environment and are influenced by the inevitable processes of globalization.

However, within the community itself, there are a number of points that need to be carefully addressed. The TDF's heavy dependence on funding from donors and official sources raises the question of whether it is accountable to donors or grass-roots communities. In addition, there is a real danger that the TDF may not only compromise its autonomy but may even collapse if its external funding is abruptly removed. The experience of the TDF shows that the social structure of its members emanating from neighbourhoods of mixed-income strata may generate ill feeling, suspicion and internal resistance since it is higher-income-earners who either monopolize the leadership or alternatively are reluctant to participate in TDF activities. It is only through patience, committed leadership and the achievement of success that residents are convinced of the wisdom of participating in TDF activities.

There are undoubted merits in solving local problems at the local level using local community institutions like the TDF. Real gains are achieved when national and local governments allow and encourage local communities to organize and mobilize themselves freely and undertake activities for their own advancement as well as for society at large. However, the question remains as to whether, in the long run, the provision of essential urban infrastructure and basic services should rest on CBOs as opposed to municipal government. It is true that the municipal authority has the legal responsibility to provide and maintain essential urban infrastructure and basic service delivery. However, it is a practical reality that the municipal authority does not have the necessary resources and capacity to satisfy the ever-increasing demands of a growing population. Current thinking rests on the hope that the public–private partnerships linked through the agency of a CBO can mobilize sufficient resources to meet the residential needs of all community members.

Conclusion

Effective and sustainable provisioning of basic welfare services in Tanzania depends, among other factors, on a serious re-examination of the existing assumptions about the role of the state and municipalities on one hand, and the private sector and civil society on the other. Relationships of power strongly influence the content and form of welfare services in a particular society and the dominant social group tends to favour the welfare activities that enhance its own dominance.

The general poverty of the people, the catastrophic consequences of SAPs, the so-called liberalized economy/state, staggering external debt (recent cancellations notwithstanding) and rapid urbanization have to be critically considered in current efforts to provide welfare services. The formulation and implementation of a clear strategy of development qualitatively different from the one that existed in the colonial and the immediate post-colonial period is a pre-condition for determining the quality, quantity and maintenance of welfare services in a society. It must take cognizance of the position of the Tanzanian economy and society within processes of underdevelopment and globalization.

Thus, in circumstances of urban infrastructural and service deprivation, the role of civic participation and trust accorded to leaders who are committed, transparent and accountable to the community are vital for sustainable urban welfare. As Sandbrook and Halfani (1993) argue, 'while Africa is poor in material wealth, it is still comparatively wealthy in the sense of community and of belonging'.

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Part V
Conclusion

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14

Vulnerability and Viability of East and Southern Africa's Apex Cities

Deborah Fahy Bryceson

The course of East and Southern African urbanization over the 20th century was not aligned with industrial development. Nor was it associated with rising average incomes or steady improvements in agricultural productivity as was the case in the early urbanization of Britain and the Netherlands (Wrigley 1987). One may well ask whether we are witnessing a new form of the urbanization process fuelled by as yet undefined forces. Comparison of the urbanization trends between countries in East and Southern Africa yields some useful clues (Figure 14.1).

Figure 1.1 (Chapter 1) showed that regional urbanization exhibited an inexorable upward trend only varying in its rate of progression. Figure 14.1 draws attention to the aberrant spurts, kinks and bows in urbanization levels. In East Africa there is only one notable spurt, that of Rwanda after the genocide in the mid-1990s when the urban floodgates opened. From being one of East Africa's least urbanized countries, Rwanda's urban population surged forward as a reaction to the genocide that had ravaged the countryside and the thousands of returning Tutsis, many of whom had spent decades of exile in the urban areas of neighbouring countries. Somalia's urbanization path is also unusual. In 1950 it was the most urbanized East African country, outside of Djibouti but its urbanization path was dampened by the country's political uncertainties between 1975 and 1990 but thereafter accelerated during the civil war beginning in the 1990s. However, Somalia lacks reliable census data and these trends are unverifiable estimates.

Southern Africa's urbanization has been far more varied. South Africa was the most urbanized country in the region throughout the 20th century but its level of urbanization remained virtually static during the apartheid era. Urbanization levels quickly rose in the new South Africa of the 1990s. The most dramatic urbanization trend is that of Botswana which had one of the lowest levels in the region in 1950 becoming second only to South Africa by 2000, having superceded the 50 per cent level. Lesotho and Swaziland warrant comment because their urbanization started to taper in the mid-1980s, a reflection of the changing political context of South Africa. Finally, there is the Zambia case, which exhibited very high levels of urbanization between 1950 and 1980 then levelled off and actually started to decline during the 1990s, undoubtedly an outcome of the collapse of the country's key copper mining industry and depopulation of the urbanized Copperbelt. In East and Southern Africa, Zambia's de-urbanization is unique. It appears to be a temporary phenomenon but nonetheless illustrates the fragility of urban settlement in periods of extreme economic recession.



Figure 14.1 East and Southern African urbanization, 1950–2005
Note: Djibouti has been omitted from the East African graph because it is in effect a city-state with uncharacteristically high levels of urbanization from 40.2 per cent in 1950 rising to 84.6 per cent in 2005.
Source: United Nations, Population Division, 2004.



Figure 14.1 (Continued)

Within a global context, we are observing relatively youthful stages of urbanization in East and Southern Africa accompanied by marked urban primacy. Mehretu and Mutambirwa (1993) criticize the pronounced dominance of apex cities within their respective national urban systems as economically imbalanced and politically iniquitous. Pre-industrial Europe similarly evidenced a strong urban primacy pattern, which gradually declined as the level of urbanization rose (Wrigley 1987). However, as Potts (Chapter 3) documents, the extremely rapid growth of the early stage of apex city development in East and Southern Africa has already passed and, in several countries secondary cities are now registering higher growth rates.

Figure 14.2 shows apex cities' urban dominance in terms of population as a percentage of the total national urban population. During the first years after independence, urban primacy was particularly evident in the largely agrarian countries. Gaborone's growth soared as the new capital of an agrarian country with newly discovered mineral wealth. Its lead over Francistown, the second largest city, was enormous. By 2001, 50 per cent of the Botswanan population resided in or around a 100 kilometre radius of Gaborone. Kigali was ten times bigger than the next largest urban settlement following the ethnic genocide of the 1990s but its dominance has declined markedly since then (McDow 1997). In the extremely agrarian-based economies of Burundi and Eritrea, the capital cities were very dominant. However, Djibouti, highly urbanized and a virtual city-state, topped the league for urban primacy in Eastern Africa. At the opposite end of the spectrum in Kenya, Nairobi started losing its attraction. Mombasa, Kenya's older historic trading centre and the centre of the main coastal tourist area, may have deflected from Nairobi's growth, even though migrants and investors clearly continued to favour Nairobi (Chapter 5). In a wider regional context, Nairobi was being edged sideways. Dar es Salaam was growing in size and economic importance, while Johannesburg was gaining in regional influence at the expense of Nairobi.[1]

With the notable exception of South Africa, apex city dominance has been a striking feature of the urban hierarchy in East and Southern Africa, and especially so in the Lusophone countries of Maputo and Luanda. In fact, Luanda registers the seventh highest degree of urban primacy in the world, in league with Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuwait City and Panama City, all of a city-state nature. It is likely that Portuguese colonialism imparted a stronger urban central place tradition, but it is also feasible that the liberation wars in both countries restricted urban development elsewhere in the country. Both cities are ports that could be supplied during the war in comparison with any rival up-country urban settlements that would have been more easily cut-off from the basic infrastructural supplies necessary to maintain urban life.

South's Africa's relative lack of apex city dominance relates to its long urbanization process dating back to the late 19th century associated with mining investment. Johannesburg is now the largest city,[2] but only by a small margin. In the post-apartheid 1990s, its growth decreased by 0.5 per cent while the coastal cities of Durban and Cape Town experienced accelerated growth, spurred on by the diversification of their economies and port development (Cross 2001). In East and Southern Africa generally, urban primacy has tended to decline, following the first decade of independence and/or after the cessation of war. Secondary towns are likely to mushroom during periods of economic duress because their size and location make urban



Figure 14.2 Apex city dominance
Source: United Nations, Population Division, 2004.

agriculture an option for households who survive by straddling rural and urban livelihoods (Bryceson and Mbara 2003).

Even though the population growth rate of apex cities is declining, it continues to outpace service infrastructure provisioning and the adequacy of economic livelihood for vast numbers of the urban poor. This again begs the question of what fuels population growth in the absence of vibrant economic growth? In view of the preceding urban case study analyses, we are now in a better position to confront this paradox.

As argued in Chapter 1, through history, East and Southern African 'cities' have repeatedly fallen short of the full requirements for a vibrant city economy. In form they certainly represent large population concentrations in strategic locations but they do not represent heavy concentrations of capital to the extent observed in middle- and high-income countries throughout the world. Their labour specialization is relatively underdeveloped, with a great deal of redundancy of occupation and work content especially in the cities' huge informal sectors. The significance of their population concentrations is diluted by the exceptionally low purchasing power of the urban poor. In short, their economic content lacks the dynamism, specialization, diversity and economies of scale normally associated with urban life.

The economic limitations of most of the East and Southern African apex cities lend them a fragile character, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2. Thus, how do they sustain themselves given their piecemeal economic foundations, their inadequate physical infrastructure and the divided social identities of their residents? We turn to the apex cities' relationship with the countryside, other settlements in the urban hierarchy, regional ties and global interfaces to search for clues.

Strategic locations: Positioning in global, regional, national and local space

Direct foreign investment in the world today is generally restricted to a narrow range of countries and capital cities. The East and Southern Africa apex cities are not part of this elite club. Even South Africa, with its regionally superior industrial base, has so far failed to attract desired levels of foreign investment. South Africa now exports as much capital as it imports. Johannesburg with its high rate of crime is considered to have a particularly bad reputation that deters foreign capital investment.[3] Botswana is the only country with abundant investment capital domestically generated which is reasonably attractive to foreign capital. In Gaborone, the government attempted to solicit direct foreign investment for job creation by abolishing all exchange controls but it was primarily South African investment which responded pitting local entrepreneurs against far more market-savvy investors. Furthermore, the outcome was indicative of the pecking order of economic dominance amongst countries within the region (Chapter 12).

Global depots and import dependence

The East and Southern Africa's apex cities, situated in the world's least urbanized and industrialized regions during the 20th century, have gained their primacy largely by holding strategic positions as ports or rail-line settlements. Their original locational advantage made them ideal as service depots for import/export, both a blessing and a curse for the development of the functioning of their urban economies.[4] However, the region has been subject to major jarring political and economic events and has lost its market share in agricultural exports over the past 30 years. The successive oil crises of the 1970s were a major setback given their oil-importing status. In the 1980s and 1990s, as many of the regions' traditional exports dwindled in volume, their imports of oil and industrial goods grew following economic liberalization. Mombasa is illustrative: imports as a proportion of total tonnage handled rose from 67 to 79 per cent between 1991 and 2000 and oil was the single most important import into Mombasa harbour (43 per cent by weight) (Chapter 5).

In the light of the urban sustenance and sustainability (USUSU) perspective introduced in Chapter 2, port cities served as gateways to volatile, perforated national economies which limited them to providing only the first and second components of urban economic activity: (1) *the sustenance of goods, services and infrastructure for the essential operation of a populous settlement* and (2) *goods and services for facilitating export and import from the city*. Increasing import dependence, as evidenced by the content of port trade, was symptomatic of city economies which had economically faltering hinterlands and that, as urban economic entities, had either lost or failed to develop *export augmentation* (3), *import substitution* (4) and *goods and services innovation* (5).

Port privatization during the 1990s was a boost to both Beira and Dar es Salaam's export activities and enabled them to attract tonnage away from Mombasa's less efficient parastatal-controlled port. The fact that Mogadishu's port continued to operate throughout its civil war testifies to the importance of the port as a lifeline for the city and the entire country.[5] In the chaos and confusion of the civil war, donors, unable to understand Somali leadership patterns, saw control of the city and port as confirmation of state power (Chapter 9).

Mogadishu, as the regions' most economically fragile city, is illustrative of the extremes with which urban economies can lack motive force and still remain population concentrations of a large and growing magnitude. The city's strategic location, as the conduit of international capital flows into Somalia, was decisive. Its port, open to outside support, helped to compensate for its extreme internal economic fragility. Besides the city's concentration of donor aid,[6] city residents came to rely heavily on remittances from family members who had fled abroad. Significantly, Marchal identifies the economic turning point for the city in 1998 when there was expansion of external contact through commercial flights, enhanced telecommunications, increased remittance flows and a noticeable return of some of the Somali international migrant population. Thus, improvement in the city's fortune came not from a military or diplomatic breakthrough but rather because of its improving global connections.

Regional realignments and ties

For most of the 20th century, regional ties were determined by colonial links rather than geographical proximity or economic complementarity. In the flush of independence, regional alliances, such as the East African Community of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, bore the mark of their common colonial legacy, but nonetheless aroused suspicion and resentment amongst the member states. One of the most contentious issues was industrial advantage. All member states strove to industrialize and yet by dividing up industries amongst themselves to ensure a regional market, they could not gain enough momentum for industrial take-off and the achievement of economies of scale in their apex cities. Further, in the case of the East African Community, Kampala and Dar es Salaam were envious of Nairobi's head start which served to thwart territorial cooperation. Regional ties had already started pulling apart prior to the 1970s oil crises. In the depressed 1980s, most countries were bent on national economic survival rather than regional development. Nonetheless, majority rule in Zimbabwe prompted establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which faced similar inter-state strains on cooperation.

Throughout the period, South Africa's apartheid policies made it a political pariah in the region. Under sanctions it had, nonetheless, built up a viable industrial base that complemented its mining and large-scale agricultural sectors.[7] The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the first African economic association to be formed with post-apartheid South Africa taking a leadership role jointly with Nigeria. South African investment in Southern Africa started expanding rapidly from the mid-1970s, extending to East Africa and beyond during the 1990s. Urban infrastructural investment and the resuscitation of import substitution industries like breweries were initial investment areas. Some countries' investment portfolios have become so rapidly dominated by South Africa that their economic plans leaned towards integration in a broader regional economic vision instigated by South Africa, as illustrated by Maputo's aluminium smelter (Chapter 4) and Dar es Salaam's banking and infrastructural headquartering for the mining industry. Gaborone's local entrepreneurs and fledging industries have long struggled in the face of South Africa's economic dominance (Chapter 12).

During the 1990s, transport and communication networks experienced improvement and better coherence throughout the region. South Africa has been a key player in the spread of mobile phone infrastructure and the revitalization of the two region's railroad networks that extend from Cape Town in the south, to Walvis Bay in the southwest, Kinshasa in central Africa and Dar es Salaam in East Africa. Regional trading patterns have been heavily influenced by fluctuations in port performance. The landlocked countries and apex cities of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland have had to depend vitally on fluctuating port performance in neighbouring countries.

Historically, inter-regional trade in many East African countries has been dominated by the smuggling of agricultural produce across national boundaries, notably staple foodstuffs in short supply in one country as opposed to another, or cash crops where there were wide gaps in producer prices between two countries. Now, with market arbitrage between countries being achieved through liberalized markets, smuggling of this nature is largely obsolete. As African governments have liberalized their markets, Dubai, a crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa, has emerged as the region's emporium for second-hand manufactured goods offering a tantalizing array of consumer durables, luxury items, cars and motorcycles. The overpowering allure of cheap imports combined with the limited purchasing power of small national markets will hinder the emergence of most apex cities as industrial centres for the foreseeable future.

Have liberalization policies enhanced or depressed inter-connections between the region's apex cities? Certainly the removal of restrictions on private trade has led to a blossoming of trading activities in the apex cities as the main supply areas for imports. Port cities are likely to be favoured over up-country cities in this respect. Recent population growth figures hint that this may be happening. Dar as Salaam has now overtaken Nairobi's lead as most populous city in East Africa, and Johannesburg is giving way to Cape Town and Durban (Cross 2001).

Rural–urban linkages

Perceptions of the extent and nature of rural–urban linkages have been shifting. Under the bachelor wage policies of the colonial period, circular migration between rural homes and urban work locations were taken for granted in the normal progression of African men's urban life cycles. Home was the birthplace of one's ancestors. During the 1980s and 1990s, it was argued that circular migration intensified under the economic duress of SAP in several countries (Jamal and Weeks 1993, Potts 1995, 2000, Chapter 3). However, more recent evidence from East and Southern Africa suggests that this may have been a temporary response for a number of reasons (see for example, Cross *et al.* 1997, Bryceson *et al.* 2003). In East Africa, return migration is precluded for a growing number of second and third-generation urban dwellers who no longer think of rural ancestral areas as their home, and are unable to speak the language of those areas (Chapter 8 and Bryceson *et al.* 2003). Circular migration patterns in Southern Africa may be changing as well. Harare's long association with weekend and seasonal circular migration may have reached a turning point. The effect of petrol price rises and fuel shortages and the fear of AIDS have caused many within the population to see circular migration in a more negative light (Bryceson and Mbara 2003).

The surge in non-agricultural income diversification in rural areas may enhance certain types of rural–urban linkages, particularly that of traders shuttling back and forth between the two, but may reduce linkages between rural and urban branches of a family, especially with respect to urban reliance on the staple food production of extended rural family members. Cash-mediated exchange is becoming the norm, sometimes even between family members.

Several other factors militate for reduced rural–urban exchange. First, the deagrarianization trend of the past two decades has initiated a laboratory of economic experimentation in rural areas. One strand of the diversification process has involved rural entrepreneurs providing a broader range of goods and services inspired by urban lifestyles (Bryceson 2002). The consequent blurring of rural and urban production patterns is serving to erode the range of complementary exchanges between the countryside and city. Second, the return of urban dwellers to rural home areas to farm is likely to have declined as the proportion of women residing in urban areas and their urban earning capacity has risen, thereby increasing their opportunity costs and lowering their time and need for supplementary farming in rural home areas. In any case, rural areas with high population densities face land shortages that preclude urban dwellers easily accessing farmland. Third, in many countries, urban residence is preferred and takes precedence in decisionmaking when parents believe that urban schools offer their children higher educational standards than rural schools (Chapter 8). Finally, in those countries experiencing protracted war such as Uganda and, until recently, Angola, large numbers of refugees from rural areas have made their way to the city and are not able to return home even for short visits because of the insecurity of their home areas (Robson 2001, Bryceson *et al.* 2003).

In the apex cities, arguably the strongest rural–urban linkage is that of the peri-urban fringe where residents can combine urban livelihoods with a semi-rural lifestyle and supplementary farming. These areas can extend for 10 or 20 kms beyond the city. The growing availability of minibuses during the 1990s economic liberalization has broadened the peri-urban belt around most cities (for example, Briggs and Mwamfupe 2000). Johannesburg's peri-urban zone served historically as a reception centre for incoming migrants, offering them cheaper rents compared with the inner city (Chapter 10). In Dar es Salaam, the agricultural plots of the peri-urban areas became the focus of property speculation between traditional local leaders and incoming migrants who wanted a property foothold in the rapidly expanding city (Chapter 13). Beyond the peri-urban areas' outward appearance of rural migrants pursuing agrarian modes of livelihood lurks some of the most capitalist-based calculations and social relations between landlords and tenants in the city.

Within the apex cities: Teetering social balance

Chapter 1 stressed the fragility of the apex cities' social harmony and political stability. As locational sites drawing migrants from hinterlands embracing national boundaries and beyond, most of the apex cities in East and Southern Africa comprise a medley of ethnic groups and social divisions. Violent ethnic and clan strife has been a feature of several cities, flaring up most dramatically in Mogadishu. Apex cities represent dense concentrations of ethnic, religious and occupational diversity that can quickly erupt when politicians or other leaders privilege one social group over another.

Social and political tension is underscored by the instability of urban family household units. Kariuki and Nelson's (Chapter 8) insightful cross-section of family structure and well-being in Nairobi reveals that weakening rural–urban linkages have been entwined with a decline in extended family support across the generations. Care for older parents still living in the rural areas is problematic. The rural elderly often have adult offspring scattered in different locations, leaving the older generation without adequate care in their old age. Parenting practices reflect forward rather than backward-directed resource flows. Children are no longer a source of labour for the household. They are being raised to succeed in individual careers.

The last three decades of economic malaise have posed onerous economic and social burdens on urban households. Households remain the primary social welfare unit in the apex cities. However, the economic pressures that they have withstood over the past three decades have been monumental with telling signs of stress through declining contacts with their extended families, marital instability, family break-up, destitution and street children. Rural and urban interviews in Zimbabwe revealed the shrinking foundations of African extended family welfare in and around Harare in 2001 and may be indicative of the region as a whole (Bryceson and Mbara 2003: 343).

> People no longer seek close involvement with their extended family. Even daughters-in-law are no longer keen on leaving their children with us [grandmothers].
>
> Older woman, resident in Mbare, Harare, February 2001

> If you visit relatives in Harare they want to know immediately when you are going back to your rural home.
>
> Middle-aged man, Jingo village, February 2001

'Trading Places': Apex cities as non-industrial population concentrations

Having locationally situated the social and economic dynamics of East and Southern Africa's apex cities in global and local contexts, we return to our central paradox: urban demographic growth amidst economic malaise and strong urbanization forces in the absence of industrialization. Might the paradox itself be awry and anachronistic? Rather than categorizing East and Southern African cities according to their lack of achievement as 'failed industrial cities of a parasitical nature', more insight could be derived from analyzing what they actually are, namely: non-industrial 'trading cities' serving as major demographic, political and economic nodes connecting national and international space.[8]

Reading Braudel's (1967) masterful overview of the major world cities of the early modern period, one is struck by the many similarities between pre-industrial European cities and East and Southern African apex cities today. The importance of Europe's largest cities as central locations and conduits of market exchange and state decision-making was salient. They served as multi-lingual crossroads and gateways to the rest of the world for rural peasants emanating from the countryside as feudal Europe unravelled.

An enormous gap in the standards of living of the city's rich and poor was accentuated by the wealth of trade goods flowing in from the outside world. In London's 16th-century Elizabethan port, 'a poverty-stricken population saw the riches from the moored ships dangled before their eyes' (Braudel 1967: 430–32). The labyrinth of hovels and shanties built in London's old courtyards at that time resembled the extensive backyard shacks of Johannesburg, Harare/Chitungwiza and other apex cities in Southern Africa today.

Despite intense material hardship and urban pollution, Europe's early modern cities held great allure, attracting the most adventurous and talented youth from the countryside. Successive generations fuelled urban growth through migration and natural increase given that their migration occurred during their peak years of fertility. However, they and their offspring often met early deaths (Braudel 1967). Diseases of poor sanitation and congestion, like cholera and tuberculosis took a heavy toll – an epidemiological trend that continues today in East and Southern Africa but which is now compounded by HIV/AIDS. In Europe's large cities, the inadequacy of housing and high mortality rates conspired to produce homelessness and street children. Moyer (2005) documents a similar pattern amongst Dar es Salaam's street youth, many of whom face bleak prospects of survival in the face of economic duress and exposure to HIV infection.

Braudel (1967) argues that the garnering of outside resources generally financed the enormous infrastructural expenditure incurred by Europe's pre-industrial cities. In the case of London and other European capitals, royal patronage helped. The greater the area over which royal power extended, the larger the city was likely to be. In East and Southern Africa, some of the same principles are in operation, although updated and with national sovereignty being undermined rather than consolidated. The material presence of foreign donors in the capital is a boom to city growth. Rapid inflows of foreign-aid money and personnel after the cessation of civil war in Kampala, and more lately Kigali, triggered demographic growth spurts (Chapter 3).

Patron–client relations permeated early modern European city governments. The economic power and political patronage of the Medici family in Florence is illustrative. Their clientelist networks laid the foundation for Florence's greatness as a trading centre and world leader in architectural and artistic achievement (Hibbert 1974). On the other hand, Braudel (1967) maintains that patronage in Seville, an important commercial port, had a far less beneficial outcome because dishonest officials acting on behalf of foreign capitalists, rather than the city's residents, dominated the city. Seville's corrupt governmental path can be likened to the current pattern found in many African apex cities in which state and municipal government officials concentrate their public administrative and personal acquisitive efforts on foreign aid and trade, to the detriment of governance, infrastructural maintenance and planning for the inevitable physical expansion of the cities.

Perhaps the most telling similarity in the historical juxtaposition of East and Southern Africa now and early modern Europe lies in the nature of economic expansion of their respective large cities. Service and commodity trade has been the central stimulus to both. Todaro's (1976) focus on comparative wage levels and unemployment rates to predict urban migration is suited to urban economies dominated by formal wage employment. In the large cities of early modern Europe and today's East and Southern African cities the informal sector was and is pervasive (Hansen and Vaa 2004). It is far more likely that the wide array of diversified livelihood and market opportunities in the informal sector and the amenities of urban service infrastructure act as compelling forces of urban migration (Cross 2001).

Braudel (1967) stresses the importance of the tertiary sector, which in many if not most large early modern European and Asian cities developed around the conspicuous consumption of state officialdom. He describes vast bloated informal sectors in Beijing, London, Paris and Naples, teeming with fully and underemployed labourers, much along the lines of what can be observed in today's apex cities of East and Southern Africa. Naples and St Petersburg, in particular, were cities surrounded by overcrowded, depressed agrarian regions that produced seemingly inexhaustible supplies of cheap migrant labour to cater for the needs of the urban rich. The essence of competitiveness and survival in the urban informal sector then and now is the abysmally low remuneration and standards of living that the labourers endure. Yet despite these poor prospects, migrants persist in trying their luck in the urban lottery of life.

Having outlined the main similarities, we can now turn to some of the salient differences. The first being that some of the major pre-industrial cities were located in regions or indeed countries where agricultural productivity had steadily increased, facilitating out-migration from rural households without undue stress. This was particularly true for the earliest urbanizing European countries, namely the Netherlands and Britain between 1550 and

1700. Wrigley (1987) hypothesizes that the Netherlands entered a virtuous cycle of rising agricultural productivity and urban growth spurred by improvements in domestic canal traffic, international shipping and trade, triggering Amsterdam's rapid population growth during the 17th century. Somewhat later, but in a similar fashion, London expanded on the basis of national and international commerce and agricultural advance. Thus, some pre-industrial European city populations, but by no means all, grew out of productive town-country synergies. In East and Southern Africa, the agricultural sector, particularly the peasant agricultural sector, has eroded over the past three decades with rural producers actively engaged in a process of income diversification and deagrarianization (Bryceson 2002).

While the gulf between rich and poor has been ubiquitous in pre- and non-industrial cities through time, wealth derived from trade, particularly that emanating from foreign trade was and is amassed by merchants indifferent to the poverty of their immediate surroundings. However, over the centuries, the wealth gap has been partially bridged by two major developments. The first has been the institutional management of urban poverty through the public provision of basic shelter and food to families who have lost their income-earning capability. In 15th-century London, church parishes and, to a lesser extent, guilds disbursed relief to the needy, particularly widows and children, and tried to find rural homes for abandoned children. By the 18th century, the problems of the poor were exceeding parish resources and the guilds were no longer a social and economic force. Parishes were allowed to establish workhouses, which in effect served as dormitories for the old, sick and single-parent families, but were widely known to offer desperately inadequate living conditions. Eventually in 1834, under the threat of rising public disorder and crime, the workhouse system was formalized under the national government with more emphasis on public health management under the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (Porter 1994).

In the apex cities of East and Southern Africa the polarization of wealth is such that only a small proportion of the urban population has escaped poverty and lives in comfort while a large portion of the population are near destitution (Jenkins 2000). This dire situation is exacerbated by a lack of hegemonic civil society institutions such as the church or guilds to provide a charitable fallback for the poor. Numerous local churches, mosques and other religious and humanitarian agencies offer assistance but without the ubiquity or consistency of London's church parishes. Guilds, of course, are nowhere in sight in the world of 21st-century capitalist influence. A growing number of today's non-governmental organizations both foreign and domestics have begun to realize the extent of urban poverty and are trying to address it, but usually their efforts are very piecemeal and discontinuous, dependent themselves on external financial aid over which they have little control. With the dearth of public social welfare provisioning, extended families have had to be self-reliant, as Kariuki and Nelson (Chapter 8) illustrates for Nairobi. Distress in first and second-generation urban Nairobi households has hitherto been remedied by recourse to rural branches of the family but, as argued above, the social welfare capacity of extended families is contracting and a growing number of urban families face intense poverty and destitution.

The second aspect ameliorating the gap between rich and poor in early modern Europe was the growing ranks of the urban middle classes. Schama (1987: 174) describes the social hierarchy in Dutch cities of the 17th century as 'pot-bellied', swelling in the middle with the presence of the *brede middenstand* consisting of skilled artisans, traders and a multitude of urban service providers who earned enough to enjoy a reasonable standard of living. In most other European countries, the urban middle class was not so prevalent, but it was nonetheless there, as growing ranks of educated professionals and prosperous merchants gained security and modest affluence, which they passed on to their offspring. Filling the income gap, they had a stabilizing influence on urban economic life and imparted a humanist outlook to the city's social life and culture.

The urban middle classes of our apex cities have indeed been growing, especially during the last decade of economic liberalization in East Africa and post-apartheid policies in Southern Africa, but they remain a small minority enclave in a vast urban landscape dominated by the poor. Having faced a promising future during the 1960s and early 1970s, their near decimation during the 1980s necessarily predisposes the embryonic African urban middle classes of today to feel insecure and uncertain of the delivery of welfare and prosperity from their urban and national economies.

Another major difference between Europe's pre-industrial cities and the African apex cities is the relative strength of urban governments. Many of Europe's early cities were in effect powerful city-states, like Venice and Florence, carving out political and economic space in a late medieval agrarian economy wracked by the Black Death. Cities were a haven for surviving serfs who sought an escape from feudal servitude. Braudel (1967) argues that the governance of Europe's large towns was at the centre of European nation-state formation both creating the modern state and being created by it in a symbiotic process. Clearly, this has not been the case in our apex cities.[9] The modern African nation-state was shaped by the colonial experience.[10] Colonial governments were hostile to urban growth and compartmentalized urban governance in a bureaucratic racial straightjacket. At present, many Southern African municipal governments still have the legacy of strong bureaucratic control and planning capability that can now be used to rectify racial imbalances in urban infrastructural provisioning. East African municipal governments have virtually no power relative to national governments. The infrastructural provisioning and planning of most apex cities is orchestrated by national governments and foreign donors. Local and foreign NGOs often intervene to address infrastructural maintenance and social harmony issues at the neighbourhood level in the absence of a strong municipal government.

Braudel (1967: 401) distinguishes ‘open’, ‘closed’ and ‘controlled’ towns. The former were open to the countryside demographically and economically with goods, services and people flowing readily between the two, as illustrated by ancient Greek and Roman towns. The closed towns were represented by the walled cities of medieval Europe, where town life was physically cut-off from rural life and represented two different lifestyles, one of farming as serfs and the other of trade and craft production as freemen. Finally the ‘controlled’ towns were those of the early modern period in which towns existed under royal protection or mercantile power as exemplified by Florence under the Medicis. It is not Braudel’s intention to present this typology as evolutionary in nature, although it is reflective of major historical stages of European city life.

In East and Southern Africa, the colonial period and apartheid urban policies were analogous to the closed towns; only the city walls were missing. Rural and urban lifestyles were considered to be polar opposites, the latter largely off-limits for Africans. Now, one might best characterize the cities as demographically and economically open. Influx controls are gone. People are free to move in and out of the city at will. In theory, the apex cities are subject to national government protection and direction, but in fact economic liberalization policies and the financial constraints of national government make such control nominal.

Braudel (1967) infers that the open towns had little stimulus for craft and industrial growth. They were primarily trading centres serving as interfaces between their rural hinterlands and the world beyond. This is largely true for East and Southern Africa at present. Stimulants to domestic enterprises are largely thwarted by economic liberalization policies. In the USUSU model of Chapter 2, the open town would be expected to stimulate economic activity associated with *exports* (2) and *export augmentation* (3), but *import substitution* (4) would be seriously frustrated. Without the necessary incubation of industrial skills through import substitution, the *innovation of new products* (5) and the *revival of old ones* (6) as major components of the urban economy would be unlikely to emerge. Urban economies so heavily biased to import/export can become locked in the circularity of their trading cycles. In the case of the apex cities we are examining, the concern is that the throughputs of agricultural export from the countryside have declined and continue to dwindle. In the absence of new invigorating economic strategies, the apex cities’ economies of East and Southern Africa as well as their national economies could decelerate and shrink to critical levels requiring propping up at enormous expense to international financial institutions that are keen on enforcing economic liberalization policies. The alternative is growing impoverishment.

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the large pre-industrial cities of Europe and East and Southern Africa’s apex cities is their relationship with global markets. Trading activities in European cities were highly proactive reaching out to stimulate existing international markets and create new ones in their role as strategic market locations trading in a wide range of complementary products, facilitated by technological advances in overland transport and shipping (Munck 1990). In stark contrast, our apex cities are market followers not leaders on the world stage. With the exception of South Africa, their participation in international trade is vulnerable to a panoply of constraints: fluctuating oil prices, poor roads, inefficient transport, poor accountancy practices and storage inadequacies to name just a few. The apex cities that seek advantage from international trade are trying to conform to the requirements of global markets and are in the process being moulded by them, but they are struggling against adverse terms of trade and inferior transport and market infrastructure relative to many other parts of the world.

In concluding this historical comparison of large cities, it is worth noting that Braudel stressed the distinction between pre-industrial cities like London in the 17th and 18th centuries which fed on external props of national state power and foreign trade and the industrial towns of the late 18th and 19th centuries like Manchester, which were invigorated by *in situ* productivity advances and labour specialization. In Braudel's (1967: 439) view, the pre-industrial cities represented 'deep-seated disequilibrium, asymmetrical growth, and irrational and unproductive investment on a nationwide scale'. Nonetheless, he clearly argued that the pre-industrial cities had an essential role to play in shaping state power and establishing the operational foundations of national economies. Braudel, with the advantage of hindsight, gently mocked the French philosopher John Jacques Rousseau's scathing comments about the political imbalance and draining economic influence of the capital city:

> It is the large towns that drain the state and create its weakness. The wealth they produce is an apparent and illusory wealth. . . . France would be much more powerful if Paris were annihilated.
>
> Braudel 1967: 439 quoting Rousseau in *Emile*.

Over the past 30 years of economic hardship, the apex cities have continued to not only endure but grow, despite the World Bank's attempts to annihilate the urban bias of the apex cities with the implementation of structural adjustment policies during the 1980s, At present they are not pulsating, productive centres of trade and industry by urban world standards. Some may be parasitic on rural areas, others are relatively innocuous but lacking direction or economic promise and over-endowed with redundant labour. However, concentrations of labour may harbour innovative tendencies and point the way to a more viable future. The last section discusses the conditions under which this may become a reality.

Workable cities: When will make-shift livelihood experimentation end and viable economic trajectories begin?

Most of the apex cities of East and Southern Africa, with the exception of those in the landlocked countries, are in favourable locations for trade and have sizeable and still growing populations engaged in economic livelihoods that lack sufficient specialization and diversity to generate the economic dynamism capable of raising the standard of living for the bulk of the city's residents and the nation as a whole. The case studies in this collection have illustrated manifold aspects of their predicament.

Jenkins and Rakodi (Chapters 4 and 5), tracing the growth of Maputo and Mombasa, conclude that as strategic port cities with real economic potential both have failed to seize opportunities because of ineffective municipal leadership and unsupportive national policies. Nuwagaba (Chapter 6) shows how the Kampala municipality has been hindered from provisioning basic urban infrastructure due to the historical legacy of socially divisive ethnic policies.

Spotlighting Nairobi and Kampala, Amis (Chapter 7) discusses rampant urban poverty and its relationship to past and current urban policy concerns. Kariuki and Nelson's (Chapter 8) examination of generational change in Nairobi draws attention to urban class differences, providing insight into how some households progress towards economic betterment and others cope with the threat of poverty. In his analysis of Mogadishu, Marchal (Chapter 9) reveals the fundamental importance of urban security in a city that has functioned without a municipal or national government for over a decade.

Turning to the issues of urban housing and infrastructure, Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (Chapter 10) consider the welfare and employment implications of South Africa's apartheid policies which restricted African migrants' housing access from the 1960s to the 1990s. Schlyter (Chapter 11) offers an in-depth case study of one Zimbabwean woman's efforts to secure housing and a livelihood in Chitungwiza, Harare's bedroom city annex, illustrating how housing is central to the livelihood strategies of many urban poor at the same time as urban housing regulations frequently delegitimize their livelihoods. In marked contrast to the vicious cycles of poverty that most of the apex cities of this region faced, Selolwane (Chapter 12) discusses the trials and tribulations of Gaborone's planning and infrastructure building. Finally, Ngware (Chapter 13) documents how one economically and socially mixed neighbourhood of Dar es Salaam resolved some of its infrastructural constraints through community action.

Demographically and socially, our apex cities are extremely diverse: a panoply of ethnic groups approaching life from various cultural perspectives. In recent decades the cities have become more gender- and age-balanced compared to the past when circular migration skewed the population in favour of adult men of economically active ages. Furthermore, a spectrum of African income strata now exists in the cities generating demand for a plurality of goods and services. Compared with rural populations, this urban-based socio-economic diversity is complemented by the possibility of urban populations' higher savings, their relatively superior physical infrastructure and the advantages of new communication technologies like mobile phones.

These comparative benefits nationally can be weighed against the still limited diversity and degree of occupational skills relative to other world cities and the heavy costs of urban infrastructural investment that tips countries into debt (Lewis 1978). During the colonial period, the apex cities of East and Southern Africa largely excluded Africans as urban residents except as domestic servants and manual labourers on temporary contracts. Human capital investment of the post-independent period raised educational levels, providing the foundations for African white-collar employment, notably in the civil service. The civil service and parastatal sectors, however, were largely undermined and displaced during the 1980s by the burgeoning urban informal sector that urban residents now mainly rely on for their livelihood. Consequently, the industrial goals of the 1960s and 1970s have long been abandoned.

There are now no clear urban or even national developmental paths around which urban economic policy can be designed. Economic planning has largely been forsaken. Instead African countries are exhorted to alleviate poverty while responding to global market opportunities in a timely fashion. African nation-states heavily burdened by debt are not in a position to question the compatibility of the two objectives. The apex city economies are caught in this quandary more than most. Urban poverty is highly visible and growing, yet they are at the forefront of their countries' global market responsiveness. They are competing with the world's megacities in terms of commodity and service supply. How can they become feasible competitors given prevailing material circumstances?

Through the case studies presented in the preceding chapters, this book has demonstrated that the apex cities of East and Southern Africa have shaky foundations as centres for population and labour concentration. Basic sustenance of city residents and security of livelihood have been compromised. In roughly half of the cities examined, civil war in or around the city has had a disruptive effect on local economies. Basic urban staple food supplies, which some governments previously subsidized, are now a major dilemma for vast numbers of poor urban households. Water and sanitation supplies are woefully inadequate in most of the cities. Skeletal, poorly maintained infrastructure, such as electricity and roads, continually constrains urban economic activity. On top of this, AIDS not only threatens lives, as the main cause of death for both men and women in many cities, but also threatens urban economies with estimates of 30–40 per cent labour supply decline in countries with the highest HIV prevalence rates by 2015 (Economic Commission for Africa 2004). It is hard to imagine urban populations that have experienced higher levels of vulnerability, with the exception of those living during the Black Death in Europe and Asia more than six centuries ago.

Beyond basic sustenance lies the question of urban economic sustainability. Chapter 2 introduced the USUSU approach based on the work of Jane Jacobs (1969), which identified six key components upon which viable reciprocating growth and economic vitality could be established. When all the components are present, they interact in a matrix of economic diversity capable of generating continual creative production, experimentation and innovation. Clearly there is no one strategy for city development but the approach indicates the importance of internal propulsion rather than external dependence for urban economies.

Broadly, our apex cities are demographically rich and socially vibrant but they lack sufficient economic diversity and specialization to become powerhouses of productivity and innovation. In some cities, social diversity has caused political tension and conflict, acting as a source of vulnerability rather than vitality. It is for this reason that policies promoting the advantages of cultural heterogeneity and the nurturing of economic diversity are needed.

In the absence of sufficient economic diversity and reciprocating growth, the apex cities rely heavily on foreign import and export, making their relative position in international trade circuits critical (Mshomba 2000). Recent WTO forums have dramatized the yawning gap in trading leverage between rich and poor countries and beg the question of whether global trade will be open and fair for all countries to participate.

The apex cities attract migrants seeking economic betterment, but, in the absence of adequate economic vitality, these cities may, in effect, become economic refugee camps or holding grounds for onward international migration. Indications are that Harare has increasingly veered in this direction already as Zimbabwe haemorrhages its skilled manpower to neighbouring countries and further afield.

While the geographical locations, resources and economic foundations of the apex cities of East and Southern Africa vary widely, their population growth and economic durability to date convey the potential for future economic vitality. These cities could serve as engines of growth for their respective nations and regions more generally, but at present their potential can be likened to sparks failing to ignite. Urban residents are diligently pursuing diverse livelihoods and endeavouring to improve their living standards, but government policies, business confidence and forward-looking urban planning capable of offering a sense of stability, coherence and direction are desperately needed to support their efforts and convert the sparks into dynamic energy.

Notes

1. Simon (1992) discusses Nairobi's regional influence prior to Johannesburg's rising regional influence following the emergence of post-apartheid South Africa in the mid-1990s.
2. Johannesburg is, however, part of the larger Gauteng conurbation formerly known as the East and West Rand including Pretoria and a number of other urban settlements forming South Africa's largest urban complex which is dominant in the national space economy.
3. This image is starting to change with better security surveillance. Widespread use of a new system of closed circuit television combined with instant police response units has been reported to have cut street crime by as much as 88 per cent in some of Johannesburg's most crime-ridden neighbourhoods ('Hi-tech Cops tame Jo'burg Badlands', *The London Sunday Times*, 7 November 2004).
4. However, the landlocked countries were locationally disadvantaged in this regard.
5. Mogadishu's official port was not functioning during the civil war, but a replacement 'port' for the docking of ships was established and provided a lifeline for the city.
6. Little (2003: 47) cites the estimate of 60 per cent of Somalia's foreign aid ending up in Mogadishu during the 1980s.
7. This pattern was also successfully followed by Zimbabwe during its political isolation in the 1960s and 1970s.
8. The literature on pre-industrial cities dates back to the 1960s and includes the work of Sjoberg (1960), Mumford (1966) and the work of Braudel (1967). Its historical perspective and insights have been largely sidelined by the modernization discourse of urban development over the last three decades.
9. Djibouti does, however, qualify as a city-state in that it is geographically so small and its population is almost entirely urban, largely precluding rural-urban dynamics. Thus it cannot be considered 'open' in the sense that Braudel uses the term.
10. Ethiopia is an exception. It has been undergoing a painful process of state modernization since the removal of Emperor Haile Selassie from power in 1991.

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