Urban Movements in a Globalising World

Edited by
Pierre Hamel, Henri Lustiger-Thaler
and Margit Mayer



Urban Movements in a Globalising World

Urban social movements have traditionally been seen as preoccupied with local issues and as a result have been marginalised in the wider study of social movements. However, the increasing global competition among cities, the international flows of people, money and policy, have meant that the local issues urban movements engage with are becoming less parochial. Due to global connectedness, while some public policies and decision-making processes have moved upwards to transnational and supranational levels, others have moved downwards to regional and local levels, bringing urban issues and urban citizenship anew on the agenda.

This collection deals with the transformation of urban movements in these new social, economic and political environments. The book is divided into three sections. The first focuses on the new repertoire of collective action in different urban settings. In the second section the emphasis is on the economic impact of globalisation on social life and how urban movements have been trying to cope with these changes. The third section assesses the opportunities offered to movements by the economic and social transformations of globalisation.

Urban Movements in a Globalising World will be essential reading for students and scholars of urban sociology and political economy, and will be of interest to those working in the areas of globalisation and of social movements generally.

Pierre Hamel is Professor of Urban Planning and Sociology at Université de Montréal; **Henri Lustiger-Thaler** is Chair of the Sociology Department of Ramapo College, New Jersey; and **Margit Mayer** is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Sciences and The Institute of American Studies at the Free University of Berlin.

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Contents

Tables

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Every collection is the result of a combined and steady effort, engaging many individuals and institutions. This book is no exception. Indeed, as one would expect of a reader on urban social movements in a global environment, the organisation of the book is closely tied to an active global network. The book is also the result of a rich collegial and intellectual fermentation that has been developed and nurtured under the rubric of Research Committee (RC) 47—Social Movements and Social Classes—of the International Sociological Association (ISA).

Most of the chapters in this volume first appeared in RC 47's many conferences, particularly in Santa Cruz, California and Montreal, Canada. The topics addressed herein underscore the rich variety of issues which currently animate discussions within RC 47 across the globe. We are indebted to the Executive Council of the RC, its current President, Professor François Dubet of France and former RC President, Louis Maheu of Canada.

The production of a truly global volume such as this, however, always has its local challenges in terms of a timely production calendar. We are particularly indebted to France Lamontagne in Montreal who courageously typed bibliographies, organised the texts and made this book ready for publication.

Introduction

Urban social movements—local thematics, global spaces

Pierre Hamel, Henri Lustiger-Thaler and Margit Mayer

The study of urban social movements and the specificity of their collective actions have traditionally occupied a limited and marginal status in social movement theories and deliberations. This is due to a long-standing perception of urban movements in collective action theories both in Europe and the USA, Urban movements have usually been thought of as heavily vested in micro-, as opposed to macro-, social processes, underscoring the local characteristics of a specific urban political economy. This has led to a suspicion in the wider social sciences that urban movements are too readily interwoven in mediational processes or, worse, the humdrum of municipal politics, with its input/output policy factors. From a disciplinary standpoint, being so uniquely identified with the very essence of locality, as a form of collective action, has meant a strong association with community research studies, local growth and anti-growth machine coalitions, the stuff of the traditional as well as the new urban sociology and political science.

From this viewpoint, urban movements have not been traditionally perceived as representative of broader values, ideals or emancipatory possibilities, that have been standardly attributed to identity-based movements concerned with a claim on totality, such as the women's, environmental, civil rights, peace and human rights movements. Yet, even in the face of this implicit/explicit framing of action, urban movements are more and more recognised as very modern indeed in terms of how they articulate locality and what lies beyond. We might say that urban movements harbour a pervasive transfunctionality in terms of their corresponding state structures. They are not fearful of institutionalisation. In many cases they seek it out. They are corporatist and increasingly find expression in partnerships of all stripes and countenances, if the strategic environment is so predisposed. The latter, however, do not account for all their functions. They have another embedded characteristic: they are key to the social construction of conflict within the city. And this is often the case concerning processes within which urban movements are committed players. Their transfunctionality brings together service roles-and conflict roles, as they pre-score the scripts and narratives of local politics.

This transfunctionality, and its fair measure of ambivalence, emerges from a rooted attachment to locality that is already beyond its own localisation, and embedded in regional and national levels of mediation, where the real action often is, in terms of the funding of community groups and other legislative concerns. Urban movements operate in a social space that we will refer to as the 'extra-local'. This is the domain of their

collective actions, the realm where locality occurs elsewhere than in the local. One can argue that this has always been the case to some extent—community groups have always gravitated beyond city hall when it came to issues of 'well-being', or welfare—but never as pronounced as in this global epoch.

This curiously replays the classical 'urban question' that has preoccupied urban sociology for decades. What is the weight of the municipal in the larger structure of state and relations of domination and exploitation? Furthermore, we could argue that the future of urban movements will be more and more in the extra-local, the local beyond the local, if we take the deterritorialisation thesis seriously. But is this their only purchase on the phenomenon of globalisation? The socio-political characteristics of urban movements have been their abiding source of ambiguity as well as cultural identity. Globalisation is only making this characteristic more visible, reproblematising already dense relations of particularity and universality, a defining character of the new global configuration of social forces.

If the actions of urban movements ignite a wide spectrum of globalisation theses, it is because their extra-local field of collective action must take into account the political-economic, cultural and late-modern aspects of being an actor in the contemporary metropolis. Locality as well as extra-locality—what is already beyond the local in any given urban-based action—thus sit in a particular phenomenal relation to their global counterpart. If the recent literature on globalisation has instructed us in anything, it is surely an appreciation of the shift from an overly categorical perception of collective action to one that is more open-ended and dependent upon external factors as a recursive feature of structuration for interior scapes. The cause-effect paradigms of local/global interrelations have largely been discounted for a dialectical, relational model of exchanges, problematising the way globalism forces us to rethink basic sociological constructs such as community, culture, the nation-state, and their asymmetric relations of power and authority. From a theoretical perspective, broader-ranged movements have long harboured, at their core, a global dimension linking movement actors within different national contexts to other collective actors. The bridge between general social movements and their global strategies, while of interest and still largely unexplored in the literature, has been much better recognised than localised forms of action within a globalised context.

And there is good reason for this, as the linkages between the local and the global are not always self-evident or apparent. What is the global dimension of a local housing struggle aside from the pervasive effects of economic globalisation upon local real-estate markets? Is there more to be said than the obvious? What is the import of the post-colonial effect of culture and language in immigrant enclaves such as New York City's Washington Heights, which now harbours the largest Dominican population outside the Dominican Republic, creating globally extended families, economic exchanges, collapsed cultural borders? In the shifting post-colonial contexts of globalisation, are we witnessing ethnic movements such as the above that we have thus far only ascribed to the intensification of immigration patterns?

The global component of collective action, from the purview of urban movements, can be confirmed in the following way: if the global significance of a given practice can be

detected and analysed as such within the urban everyday, we can say that there exists a basis for further exploring the regulative, cultural and political terrain of globalisation. Curiously, urban movements have become an exemplary model for pinpointing these multitudinous effects. The interface of the global and the local/urban raises the following questions. How can we think about embedded local issues that evoke the personal, in a globalising context? What is the degree of autonomy, or relative autonomy, between the local and the global, mediated by the everyday concerns of urban dwellers? How have practices around the local economy, housing, quality of life and municipal politics extended themselves to other arenas of action in a context of intermeshing scapes, spheres and global expanses (Albrow 1997)? How have global changes impacted upon developments that are so securely tied to the practices of everyday life that they become locked in the 'hidden transcripts' so evocatively suggested by anthropologist James C. Scott (1985)? Are these practices what they seem, or have they also been reconfigured, globalised, extended beyond themselves? What is the nature of community from the perspectival view of the urban dweller in a global landscape? If the local is but an aspect of globalisation, as suggested by Robertson (1992), how have urban movements, in their service-related and grassroots democratic preoccupations, been reordered by global flows, where the democracies of nation-states are now subject to new transnational sites of power (Held 1987)?

Arjun Appadurai (1990) has argued that it is useful to think of the global in terms of scapes and flows, rather than a specific place as such. This is a helpful insight when applied to the problem of locality in that it collapses the separation between the global and the local, and takes us beyond the unidimensionality of causality on these particular issues. If place can be understood in terms of mediational and relational flows, we can ask if globalisation has impacted on the urban arena of identity formation, trashing taken-for-granted place-oriented associations. Appadurai contrasts his idea of flows and scapes with the notion of relatively stable communities from which people act. But have these communities already been transfigured? As Martin Albrow (1997) has forcefully argued in reply to Appadurai, the assumption of relatively stable communities in a context of disconnected flows is highly problematic given the perspectives from which people view their actions, rendering community an open question in the age of global restructuring.

Furthermore, if globalisation also refers to the time-space compression of multiple national contexts (Gregory and Urry 1985; Giddens 1990; Harvey 1989), it is important to understand how urban movements, as representatives of an identifiable community, a community interest, or increasingly unidentifiable entities, such as the shifting structure of rights and privileges of legal and illegal immigrants in the USA for instance, are doubly stratified by the globalisation process. Their 'real homes' as well as negotiated institutional homes (on the local and regional level) have been irrevocably altered by flows and disjunctives. One only has to examine inner-city immigrant communities to derive a sense of the power of flows and its impact on their social, cultural and political self-understandings. Urban social movements therefore need a theory of the global, if nothing more than to engender clarity about the local, as much as the globalisation debates are impoverished without a theory of collective action that seeks to understand urban movements as stratified actors within a local—global paradigm on all levels of the

globalisation thesis. It is therefore impossible to speak about grassroots democracy, a defining characteristic of the progressive urban movement, without addressing the impact of globalisation, as both constraining or enabling phenomenon which connects the mundane of everyday life to discussions on the new forms of social and global citizenship detected in a locally inscribed practice.

Examining new contexts for global democracy may therefore emerge as a potentially useful research background for the contemporary study of urban social movements. If the nation-state is no longer at the apex of democratic theory, the former understood as the accountability of relations between those affected by a political decision and those that make the decision, a better understanding of the intermeshing of local, national, regional and international processes is called for. The question is therefore begged: how many of the activities of urban movements are framed by international pressures? Is the very idea of the local, which urban social movements defend, already an anachronism in a global civil society where loyalties to nation-states are no longer a central point of identity? Is the relationship between economic globalisation and the ability of political institutions to control it, creating a Hobbesian war of the cities, placing urban movements on the front Line of the urban social economy, through local economic development strategies?

The interface of globalisation and local struggles for democracy has created a lag between the construction of a social practice and its embeddedness in institutions. Globalisation has become, in this regard, a motor force for disjunctives between the personal, local, regional, national and international, rendering all these contexts flexible in terms of their economies of scale, and uncertain in terms of their chosen political alliances in stratified fields not yet fully institutionalised in the normative or regulative sense of the term (Lustiger-Thaler and Shragge 1998). Urban social movements are the prime conduit for the arbitrariness between local action and global accountability. And globalisation as a form of collective action, whether we understand it in terms of global consciousness (Robertson 1992), or systemic global relations (Wallerstein 1984; Abu-Lugod 1989), or the global interactivity of world spaces (Lash and Urry 1994; Harvey 1989; Appadurai 1990; Hannerz 1990), is first and foremost about the situatedness of shifting homes and new institutional homes. By situatedness we mean the ability of social actors, embarking on forms of collective action, to collocate by assigning an expressed structural and relational place to their action. This brings to the fore the problem of embedding action in a global world largely stripped of traditional markers, underscoring the current late modern context of detraditionalisation (Heelas *et al*. 1996).

Local—urban globalities and collective action

From the above discussion, one could presume that, viewed from the perspective of urban social movements, debates on globalisation have ushered in a fundamental rethinking of some of the central premises of contemporary social relations of domination, exploitation and power. Certain authors argue that we are in a substantively new period of global transformation. The organisation of production and supply of goods and services on a global level, alongside direct foreign investment and international trade, is widely recognised as a core component of globalisation. The internationalisation of private and

public technology domains has furthermore created an emerging techno-globalist discourse that has impregnated general cultural discourse. Indeed, globalisation has been most recognisable in public discourse through the reigning neo-liberal interpretation. However, changes in the global economy have had a structural as well as a discursive impact on problems faced by local economies, hence the refurbished roles of local advocates, NGOs and grassroots movements. The local impact of economic globalisation has been the foundation for their actions. Others sense that the present period gives too much to globalisation, most of which can be defined in terms of national forms of labour-market restructuring and post-Fordist practices. Is the globalisation effect on localities to be understood only through the feedback loop of changes in the reorganisation of production at the level of the local community? Is there a missing analytical dimension that can help us better understand the regulative forces which impact upon the collective actions of urban movements?

Anthony King (1990) has argued that while global consciousness may be new, the phenomena it points to most certainly are not. World cities, King states, did not suddenly emerge in the 1950s. They have long performed both national and international functions. Grassroots organisations have been mirroring these changes, by their claim-making, resistance, compromises and acquiescences. From a systemic view, globalisation, as Immanuel Wallerstein contends, has created new oppositional cultures (Wallerstein 1984). For Wallerstein, social movements are key indicators of change. They are part of the system's self-restitution. Movements are the expressive contradictions inherent in the world system. Urban movements therefore represent an opportunity for mediating crises within the system. Urban social movements, if read from this angle, are not only co-determinous with Wallerstein's anti-systemic processes but the logical expression of these interchanges. They represent a bifurcation in the system. And they mean to fill this space by pointing to the system's most glaring crisis, the flow of capital and its effects upon the communities in which people live their lives. Yet there is something troubling about the reduction of collective action to a sole economic variable, however powerful, when in fact the new international division of labour relies on multiple forms of consensus and legitimation.

Scott Lash and John Urry (1994) take us more substantively into the arena of cultural definitions of globalism useful for an understanding of current global systems that ultimately diminish the significance of cities, workplaces and organisation, in the formation of the new subject of late modernity. Lash and Urry argue that it is not only individuals that are impacted by globalisation, i.e. the household as the link between the local and global, but that once available lifestyles based on where people live are not always immediately present. This kind of dislocation from community, a disinterring of class and ethnic relations, has its counterpart further up the class ladder in Ulf Hannerz's (1990) reference to global cosmopolitans, the 'new travelling middle classes' who privilege an identity based on mobility rather than territory. References to class, place and space are therefore a basis for understanding globalism as it impacts the urban cultural realm.

Within the local-global interface the urban is, amongst other things, a cultural phenomenon intermeshing territory and mobility in a global economy of signs. This

suggests the need to reproblematise the local/urban/global configuration by articulating different kinds of localisation and their relationship to difference, power, conflict and possibilities for oppositional politics. Globalisation is intrinsically linked to oppositional cultural activism, as Peter Worsley (1990) notes. Post-national groups appeal to the power of localising economies from their objective life circumstances, as do groups in deindustrialising contexts. They are, in a sense, already in the extra-local, that is the national and the regional levels, while seeking to establish their own investment bank and local social economies. Resistance therefore becomes a multiple engagement as it occurs within increasingly flexible institutions. Globalisation as a process is intrinsically interrelated with its opposite, localisation as a transformative component of late modernity. So powerful is the idea of globalisation that it is emerging as a replacement for the concept of modernisation, as it traces the trajectory of cultural phenomena in a global capitalist economy.

The interfacing of place and deterritorialisation are clearly the terrains of a new global mode of circulation and production in the reassignment of cultural identities. These are the disjunctives that equally inform David Harvey's (1989) notion of world spaces in their ambivalent relation to local actions. If we take these displacements and disjunctives to be as profound as they appear to be, on the level of the economy and the disinterring taking place on the level of the cultural, through the movements of people and process of informationalisation (Castells 1997), what of the role of local politics in this realignment? What of the politics of urban movements which have stressed representation and participatory democracy by challenging the boundaries of the very urban realm in which they construct their collective actions? And are we still so certain where those boundaries might be drawn?

Urban movements in the global flow

The explosion of multiple local struggles responding to or affected by the globalisation processes discussed in the preceding section is documented in a variety of literature:

- A strand in International Studies has focused, since the 1980s, on the responses of local citizens' movements to global threats and intrusions (e.g. Alger 1988, 1990; Brecher and Costello 1994; Friberg and Hettne 1988).
- The social movement literature has begun to analyse the shifting interconnections between global and local forces, as it studies transnational social movements and NGOs active across borders, diffusion processes between different national/local movements, and emerging networks between them (e.g. Smith *et al.* 1997).
- The urban movement literature, to a great extent, has taken to seeing local communities and movements as thriving but 'powerless in the context of world empires and computerised bureaucracies' (Castells 1983:329; see also Pickvance 1995; Fainstein and Hirst 1995).
- The community tradition (Kling and Posner 1991) reflects the transformations of community mobilisation in the aftermath of globalisation in a myriad of studies,

emphasising its continued vitality—but not revealing any systematic links between the flowering of grassroots mobilisations and global restructuring (e.g. Fisher and Kling 1993).

- Similarly, the literature on neighbourhood organising and community development does document important transformations in this field, but discusses them in the context of spreading neo-liberal strategies and entrepreneurialisation rather than as effects of globalisation and growing intra-urban competition (e.g. Keating *et al.* 1996).

While we may glean, through these literatures, some hints of new types of local politics and movements that display increasing awareness of similar struggles taking place around the globe, and of new transnational spaces for politics, systematic connections between the trajectory of urban movements and the forces of globalisation rarely become apparent. It seems to be easier to discuss these links or causal relations for movements that are active in 'global cities' and other major cities of the advanced world which are highly integrated in the global circuits of capital and thus shaped by transnationalisrn and new technologies. Sassen (1998), for example, describes such cities as sites of a new frontier, arguing that the conflicts and battles that used to take place in colonies are now taking place in the major cities of the advanced world.

This is where today's post-colonial battles play themselves out: between the overvalorised new transnational professional class, which enacts the global corporate project, and which makes up the 'new city users' treating the city as transterritorial environment, on the one hand, and the devalued underpaid immigrant working class, which is providing the material condition of that corporate world of power, on the other. The concentration of these (transna tional) 'servants' in global cities allows them a strategic position, a position they could never gain in small towns. This 'presence', Sassen suggests, translates into the possibility of laying claims on the city, and allows these actors to unbundle the conditions of their powerlessness and to develop a form of politics that not only gives them visibility but that also has the potential of challenging the global elites' project.

By placing urban conflict and urban movements in the context of the emerging global grid of strategic places constituting a new 'geography of centrality' (that cuts across both national boundaries and the old north/south divide), this analysis is able to identify a systematic link between the functions and activities characteristic of these cities and the issues and actors of contemporary urban movements. The example of New York City's finance sector illustrates, for example, that 50 per cent of its workers are clerical and other manual workers (such as cleaners and janitors), who are made up of unskilled immigrants and workers. These manual service jobs as well as the new informal economy are as constitutive an element of the global economy as is the transnationalism from below which has been gaining presence in these cities.

While this approach is thus extremely helpful to our understanding of globalisation as a catalyst for emerging practices at the urban level, it remains silent in two important respects. It offers no analytic space for the role (different) political responses are playing in the emergence of this new urban frontier. And it treats the 'post-colonial struggle' which it highlights as a black box, instead of studying the actual work of those movement

organisations that are producing the 'voice' now increasingly heard from the local level. More close-up analysis of the emerging new infrastructure of movement organisations produces a more complex picture than the binary opposition between an urban glamour zone and an urban war zone as implied by Sassen.

The first deficiency might be addressed by a more political-economic analysis that would consider the concrete policies dealing with increasing uneven geography, marginalisation and poverty. Whether housing, urban development or welfare/workfare policies, we would find that, while they are more and more being implemented locally, these policies are still designed nationally, and still vary significantly from one regime to another (frequently also between regions). While there is a general consensus on the fact that all Western countries participate in the move away from Fordist paternalistic security provision (where migrants and women were the 'only' ones excluded) to a new structural division between a productivist core and 'unnecessary' margins, with zero tolerance strategies to legitimate this new form of exclusion, it still matters in which national and regional context this tendency is played out. Anglo-Saxon, neo-liberal environments (such as Great Britain, the USA or Canada) provide significantly different conditions to urban movements than do more social-democratic or corporatist societies (such as Holland and Scandinavia). It matters a great deal for the opportunities of urban movements, whether the transition from welfare to workfare (which we do indeed observe everywhere) moves in the direction of the decomposition of wage labour as such, or whether it allows for acceptable forms of a social economy to emerge. Since there is no uniform race to the bottom, but globalisation is enacted through different local struggles and negotiations, we need to complement our analysis of the transition towards the new urban frontier with (comparative) studies taking account of path-dependent political developments and to explore the varying opportunities they hold.

The second deficiency might be addressed by building on an approach pursued by some social movement researchers that has emphasised the complexity of local conflict that becomes visible through movement milieu studies (e.g. Melucci 1984; Roth 1991). If we unpack the black box of the 'urban war zone', we end up with more than a vague notion of 'presence' of the 'other'. We find a complex infrastructure of institutions and agents that are giving very specific contours to the 'post-colonial struggle' played out in the globalised city. We find local movement sectors inhabited by rather different, at times conflicting, kinds of movement, we find more and less progressive claims on the city, and contradicting visions of 'whose city' it is supposed to be.

We might distinguish at least three different kinds of struggle delineating the contours of the movement terrain in the globalised city: those around the costs of striving towards the top of the global urban hierarchy; those dealing with the new phenomena of urban decay and marginality, increasingly in the form of routinised cooperation with the local state and mediated through a variety of revitalisation and/or (economic) development programmes; and those reflecting the erosion of the local welfare state. The thick infrastructure made up by these different kinds of movement is the result of the work of movement organisations who—through constant negotiation and conflict—produce very concrete and specific demands, and achieve specific victories, compromises and defeats, but in any case contribute to the concrete shape of the globalised city. Briefly looking at

each of these areas of struggle, the concept of 'presence' of those challenging the corporate project of the international business class quickly gives way to one of ambiguity and tension, inviting a different set of questions as to the role and potential of these movements.

Striving to climb up the urban hierarchy, to become part of the cross-border network of cities that manage and coordinate the global economy, and becoming part of the 'strategic geography of centrality' (Sassen 1998) brings certain advantages for these cities. About 20 per cent of their residents do thrive economically, which is arguably an improvement over the far lower percentages of former urban elites. But in spite of the enormous concentrations of wealth in these cities, this striving has also inflicted costs. All of these cities exhibit higher than average rates of poverty and income inequality. Besides the costs for those who fall outside this strategic geography of power, there are the costs many more residents experience due to the gentrification, displacement, congestion and pollution that come with the grooming of the city for the top of the hierarchy.

Movements protesting these costs have emerged in a variety of forms. Some organise to protect their home environment—from congestion and traffic, development or projects they don't like to have in their backyards. Others fight urban growth policies and gentrification. Frequently such fights are triggered directly by the new development instruments of big-city politics, such as spectacular urban development projects, festivals, and the attraction of mega-events, sports entertainment complexes and theme-enhanced urban entertainment centres, all of which use the packaging and sale of urban place images. Movements have attacked the detrimental side effects of and the lack of democratic participation inherent in these strategies of restructuring the city and of raising funds, and they criticise the spatial and temporal concentration of such development projects. Often radical or autonomous movements, who consciously seize on the importance of image politics, have gained in the global competition of cities. They devise image-damaging actions to make their city less attractive to big investors and developers. So-called inner-city action weeks in the summers of 1997 and 1998 scandalised the costs of dressing up European cities for new city users. While these campaigns were carefully networked across German and Swiss cities, concentrating intense action in one week each summer, other actions have been more frequent and spontaneous, as, for example, the bicycle demonstrations taking place every last Friday of the month. This movement, which calls itself 'Critical Mass', first emerged in 1992 in San Francisco and has meanwhile spread to many other American and European cities. In Berlin, where 300 bicyclists are injured per year and one is killed every three weeks, about 500 cyclists cause a rush-hour traffic jam each last Friday of the month. Though protesting the concrete costs of competitive urban politics in concrete cities, this semi-spontaneous form of mobilisation (since no identifiable organisation gives notification of the demonstration) is a transnational form of mobilisation to the extent that it has been orchestrated through the Internet and thus spread across the Atlantic. So within this field of protest against the new competitive urban politics and its effects we find both movements defending privileged conditions or pursuing particularist interests, and movements with social justice concerns or the potential to unite different groups behind democratic planning demands.

All cities, not just those striving for the top of the urban hierarchy, have had to tackle problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and urban renewal ever since central state funding has dried up while unemployment and new forms of social and spatial exclusion have intensified. In the process, community-based organisations that often had their origin in the urban revolts of the 1960s and 1970s have become part of municipal revitalisation and similar programmes.

Due to this opening of the local state, movements dealing with urban repair follow a very different logic from the less institutionalised ones just discussed. Nudged by a variety of philanthropic and state programmes, they have transformed into community-based and client-oriented institutions delivering polyvalent functions in the context of municipal social and economic development programmes. As the emphasis of poverty alleviation programmes has increasingly shifted from welfare to workfare, and economic and development programmes have shifted from brick-and-mortar approaches to micro-enterprise programmes, these community-based organisations have come to tackle problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and urban renewal with approaches that are collaborative (i.e. making use of public-private partnerships) and compre hensive (i.e. simultaneously engaged in economic development, employment generation, social services, housing, ecological projects and public safety). Importantly, they have all come to integrate economic development with poverty alleviation.

Since the 1990s, thanks to the spread of workfare and employment programmes, they have increasingly employed and trained welfare recipients not only to become cleaners and janitors but also administrative assistants, service representatives or phone operators for hotel chains, major brokerage houses and financial service companies. For example, Wildcat Service Corporation and Women's Housing and Economic Development Corporation in the Bronx train welfare recipients for what they have identified as the growing sectors of the local economy: 'in computer software, Business English and math and various life skills, like dealing with an unpleasant supervisor. The trainees then go to Salomon Smith Barney for a 16-week internship, after which the company can hire whomever it chooses' (Finder 1998).

While much of the movement literature emphasises the contestatory character of such grassroots organisations and the counterweight they pose to conventional ways of local economic development, these forms of institutionalisation also exhibit certain dangers—of cooptation, NGOisation, and the pursuit of insider interests. Increasingly, they contribute to forms of labour-market flexibilisation, the results of which are no longer under their control and may have little to do with their original political intentions. Only a few of the organisations participating in this routinised cooperation with the local state manage to keep public pressure on, as most of their energy needs to focus on private lobbying strategies to secure jobs and on the competition for dwindling funding sources. Increasingly, community-based development organisations and alternative renewal agents find themselves attacked by other movement actors who do not qualify for inclusion or who prefer different forms of political action.

Social inequality and poverty rates intensify in cities competing for the top locations in the urban hierarchy, and at the same time traditional redistributive social policies are increasingly replaced by labour-market policies designed to promote flexibility, as well as

by punitive measures designed to disenfranchise and exclude certain marginal groups. In response to this erosion of the local welfare state new poor people's movements have sprung up, accompanied by actions of civil rights groups working with refugees and immigrants, anti-racist initiatives and various advocacy organisations. While their protest activities tend to be episodic and spontaneous, local in nature, and disruptive in strategy, they do occasionally manage to block the efforts made by city governments and corporate elites to drive them out of downtowns. Especially when supported by more resource-rich advocacy groups, professional activists or church organisations, their struggles go beyond merely disrupting normal city government operations and manage to challenge the legitimacy of local policies of exclusion (Wagner 1993; Wright 1997). Recently, the police raids to 'clean' European citadel plazas of the poor and marginalised have prompted campaigns by anti-racist initiatives. This kind of 'external support' is also evident in the homeless newspapers that have become regular features in all the advanced cities' downtowns, and in the broad variety of projects and organisations servicing the marginalised, which have mushroomed everywhere. Many of these organisations, while focused on organising local support and services for the poor, engage in transnational exchange, actively using Internet sources and sharing experience across the borders.

Other ways of resisting are efforts at worksite organising amongst the precariously employed, low- or sub-minimum wage, often immigrant, workers. For example, workfare workers have been organised by new organisations such as WEP Workers Together! (WWT!) in New York since 1996 as well as old organisations such as ACORN (formed in 1970), which have managed to get unions and community organisations involved in joint demonstrations to protest the conditions of workfare (Krinsky 1998), While a large part of workfare organising consists in the effort to symbolise that workfare workers are workers entitled to on-the-job protections and the full range of rights granted to 'normal' workers, and to break down the barriers between welfare recipients and workers, other worksite struggles revolve around groups almost as precarious, though regularly employed. The exploding demand for cleaners and janitors, which accompanied the boom in office buildings in globalising cities, has allowed the owners to rid themselves of contracts with unionised firms and contract with non-union janitorial firms that would hire immigrant workers. In reaction, the Justice for Janitors (J4J) campaign spread from Pittsburgh and Denver to Californian cities in the late 1980s. Today the union J4J addresses the problems of immigrant workers, offers legal help, files lawsuits, and mobilises the community to support the janitors around human and civil rights issues as well as the quality of life in the cities (Rudy 1998). Another illustration is Asian Immigrant Women Advocates (AIWA), which is a membership organisation of about 1, 000 Asian-American immigrant women workers in the San Francisco area hotel, janitorial, garment and electronic industries. Groups such as these organise around the working conditions and survival needs of a growing precarious workforce, while resisting becoming social service organisations (McCarthy and Castelli 1994:41).

By contrast, groups that function as advocacy and service organisations for the poor have become incorporated into municipal strategies seeking to harness their reform energy. While of later and different origin than the community groups and self-help initiatives discussed above, the non-profit and voluntary sector groups servicing the new

poor and marginalised are similarly becoming part of routine cooperation with the local state. With the support and direction provided by various state and foundation programmes, they produce affordable housing, commercial establishments, social services and training programmes. But they seek to go beyond merely 'mending' the disintegration processes characteristic of the globalised city by developing innovative strategies that explicitly acknowledge—and consolidate—the new divisions. For example, they might help recent immigrants find jobs and places to live by training them to find work in the growing informal sector as day labourers rather than channelling them into normal job-training programmes.

Because of such innovativeness, local knowledge and skills, such groups have come to be seen as ideal agents to mediate such services to poor and underprivileged urban residents. Like the community-based organisations discussed above, these grassroots organisations are uniquely disposed to organise and provide neighbourhood voice and social capital as well as job access and survival. However, while providing these goods and services, it becomes difficult, and increasingly rare, for these organisations to succeed in creating solidarity and empowerment, or to challenge the drawbacks of state programmes. Many are indeed becoming tied up with managing the housing and employment problems of groups whose exclusion by the 'normal' market mechanisms might otherwise threaten the social cohesion of the city.

Thus, there is indeed resistance to the global corporate project as enacted in our cities. It is produced through the work of a variety of movement groups, building on past legacies, and guided by the design of various funding programmes. Their institutional and economic infrastructure constitutes a kind of social economy, which is not only experienced as a challenge to mainstream institutions, but is increasingly valued for its employment potential and its capacities to process local conflict and create local social inclusion. Of course these infrastructures and the activities they support take on different shapes and bends: there are actual alternatives to exclusion, as examples in Quebec and France will illustrate, but there are also many ways of instrumentalising, in neo-liberal environments, the work of these groups, so as to tie them up with mere coping strategies. There are new forms of transnational organisation and networks strengthening grassroots groups across national borders, connecting cities in ways not envisioned by the global business elite (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). But there are also parochial and NIMBY (not in my backyard) movements that occasionally even take on anti-immigrant or racist overtones. Most of the current literature ignores these ambivalences in the urban movements active in today's cities and does not focus yet on their relation to the globalisation process. While there is widespread agreement that globalisation has markedly transformed the urban terrain in which these movements act, and while some of the relevant literature does capture the transformation of these movements into social and economic actors with transnational awareness, these changes are far from systematically explored nor analysed in the context of the global processes to which they relate. Rudy, observing the impact of J4J in Californian cities, writes:

> Global relations, which include the move to subcontracting, the emergence of a large pool of immigrant workers whose legal status is tenuous, and the relations associated with the commercial real estate markets in these cities, are all transformed in these local fights.
>
> (Rudy 1998:7)

The chapters of this book provide a first rough map of the role of local collective actions for global processes and vice versa by pursuing concrete analyses of urban movements and their transformations in contemporary globalised cities, and by contrasting such developments in different political regimes.

Globalisation and collective action

As highlighted in the previous section, the diversity of struggles that characterise urban movements is related to experiences of domination and exploitation encountered in everyday life and filtered through the grid of the new global order. Confronted with patterns of domination that local political elites and other social forces reproduce, urban movements deal with the institutions of local development and management from very different perspectives than more general movements. Thus, the determination to combat alienation or exclusion is counterbalanced by the necessity to cooperate or compromise with local actors and social forces. The ambivalence of their collective action is most visible through the relationships that movements build with institutions. In the globalised city, while the interrelations between social, economic and cultural dimensions of life are becoming more integrated, actors and systems of action are increasingly difficult to align. Institutions are facing crises due to their incapacity to embrace all the conflictual interactions they create in their response to the diversity of social demands. Actors and systems appear to be in a state of flux and non-correspondence. At the same time movements are torn between the defence of identity and the pragmatism or compromises commanded by the pursuit of their instrumental finalities.

The contributors to this book share at least three convictions. The first is related to the ambivalence and diversity that urban movements contribute to transforming society by raising new issues or by modifying our perception of current problems. This is occurring in tandem with the emergence of new modes of governance and the rise of a 'new political culture', due to the complexity of interaction between the numerous levels of decision making involved in political processes (Beck 1992). Thus, the many contingencies of current political realities invite social and political actors to break with the 'fiction of a steering centre for modern society' (Beck 1992:192), opening the door to a revision of traditional management and, among other things, calling upon decentralisation, active citizen participation, negotiation among social agents and partnerships. This does not mean that resistance by movements cannot be formulated concerning the norms, values or priorities established by professional managers or political elites. Nevertheless, this resistance needs to be seen from a less homogeneous perspective than the one elaborated by old social movements.

In this regard, by constructing specific cultural meanings related to their domain of action, urban movements have improved their capacity to intervene within civil society. They play a creative role by building public spaces, either by defining mediational processes or elaborating compromises with other social agents. In fact, this characteristic of contemporary movements appears to be a constitutive component of their reality. In other words, their fragility does not necessarily impair their social pertinence or their capacity to act. Like other social movements, urban movements are characterised by their will to make sense of badly matched sets of meaning—plural, dispersed, fragmented—with regard to the new global order (see Dubet and Martuccelli 1998).

The second conviction shared by the contributors to this book is that collective action cannot be fully understood exclusively from a movement-centred analytical perspective. Even though social movements are above all 'analytical constructs', it remains essential to consider the contextual or external aspects collective actors are dealing with in order to understand the place and role played by movements. If it is important to analyse the content and form of action from inside, that is to say from the perspective elaborated by actors, starting with the point of view given by actors themselves to their social involvement around urban issues, it is necessary as well to bring in the contextual factors (the political scene and its main components, the historical background of social configuration, the structural determinants of action, etc.) that constitute the social and political milieu where collective action is always embedded. While it remains impossible to deduce in a determinist way the choice made by actors regarding their strategies from an 'objective' situation or from their immediate interests (Melucci 1992), at the same time action and its main components cannot be treated separately from their social, political and historical inscriptions.

Over the past few years, urban movement practices have rotated around the changing conditions of late modern societies, fighting against social injustice and social exclusion in cities that are becoming more and more globalised. In order to better understand their specific contribution to social change, researchers need to find a fruitful balance between 'system-centred and movement-centred modes of analysis' (Maheu 1995:12). The following chapters of this book place different degrees of emphasis on these two modes of analysis according to the research strategies chosen by authors and the constraints provided by their specific object of study. Nevertheless, in addition to the need for considering the contextual and subjective components of action, all the authors recognise the necessity of moving away from macro theories of social movements by considering the empirical processes and practices into which these actors are involved in a concrete way on a daily basis.

This brings us to the third conviction equally shared by all the contributors in this book. The content of struggles and the nature of claims put forward by the movements regarding globalisation overlap in one way or another with the issue of democracy and its redefinition within late modernity. Above all, this is expressed through the diversity of experiments at the local level according to different socio-political urban contexts. The examples considered by the following chapters go from coalition building by movements around problems of urban development to different types of social solidarities in the face of poverty, diverse forms of cooperation with private and public sectors elaborated by

community groups and grassroots mobilisation in urban neighbourhoods to improve the conditions of citizens' lives. This does not mean that movements do not contribute to the building of new transnational spaces for politics by being involved in networking across national borders or by giving their support to local rights' in other countries, or even by contributing to the organisation of international or global events intended to support international solidarity (transnational cooperation of movement organisations) against injustices and inequities or for the defence of the environment. However, their first concern remains their own local level experienced through the impact of globalisation on the city's social fabric, which transforms as well as disrupts ongoing forms of social integration.

In many respects, urban movements support the claim that the democratisation of civic life is inseparable from achieving 'decent' standards of living for all citizens. This is why in several cases these movements mobilise around issues of local economic development, in an effort to expand citizenship claims towards redistribution claims. In short, urban movements continue to wager on the possibilities offered by local democracy, trying to build compromises with other social agents or elaborating diverse strategies of resistance to unwanted models of social change. This dynamic is explored by many of our contributors as they examine the linkages between different types of mobilisations and community action. By trying to better understand the limits as well as the possibilities—the future—of concrete expression of collective action, our authors highlight and make sense of diverse urban coping strategies in a global environment, starting with challenges for democracy and, especially, democratisation processes.

The chapters are grouped into three thematic sections. Part I, 'Urban social movements: global impacts and the new urban citizenship', is composed of three chapters that focus on the new repertoire of collective actions in different urban settings. Considering the issue of citizenship and its necessary redefinition due to the urban and economic restructuring of the last twenty years in Western societies, these essays examine the recomposition of movement milieus as well as the specific contribution of new forms of collective action.

In chapter 1, Roland Roth presents themes and questions concerning the redefinition of citizenship that are also tackled in other chapters. Going back to the reality of new social movements, Roth shows that we need to revise our understanding of these movements by revisiting the older social concerns they actually portray in comparison to cultural or post-materialist values. In this regard, the new social movements for Roth articulate poor people's concerns and protests.

This is accomplished in diversified ways by different types of movements (homeless mobilisations, poor empowerment action, protest against unemployment, poverty, exclusion, etc.). However, for the time being, a homogeneous portrait of these forms of collective action remains difficult to discern. According to Roth, the notion of citizenship can help us to make sense of the fragmentation of the protests and/or the diverse forms of collective action that are taking place in the cosmopolitan setting of the late 1990s. For that purpose, one requisite is necessary, that is to break with the 'evolutionary assumptions' of the Marshallian view of citizenship rights.

Henri Lustiger-Thaler, in chapter 2, also acknowledges the challenge of citizenship in global cities. His chapter focuses on the shifting territories of exclusion experienced in the urban ghetto. This is done by considering the spatialisation of exclusionary practices within which community building actually occurs. The author argues that the admixture of globalisation and locality, the shifting of excluded subjects through time and space, has created new forms of collective action. These not only challenge existing precepts of citizenship but have produced systemic adjustments within local institutions, themselves incrementally transformed by the forces of globalisation. Lustiger-Thaler reflects upon the process of social exclusion and countenances against it in political, cultural and moral terms. In a global context, the negation of social citizenship—exclusion—becomes a relationship most aptly portrayed in the cultural/economic and racialised urban ghetto. Exclusionary space thus emerges as a residue of globalisation, as well as a miniaturisation of social relationships in an increasingly globalised civil society.

Sophie Body-Gendrot, in chapter 3, continues the reflections on citizenship raised by Roth and Lustiger-Thaler. Above all, she is concerned with its erosion in the recent French social and political context. Bringing our attention to official data describing growing trends of unemployment and poverty that have emerged in France since the beginning of the 1980s, she mentions that this new social reality 'caused by the restructuring of the economy' has engendered social marginalisation and exclusion. For citizens, the socio-political consequences have been contradictory: on the one hand, cynicism and retreat from traditional forms of representation, and, on the other hand, an appeal to new forms of resistance and/or bargaining with elites.

Thus, she examines numerous examples of the latter: participation of youth in an experimental initiative in a Parisian neighbourhood within a public housing project where violence was an everyday occurrence, squats in Paris that took place in the beginning of the 1990s, street demonstrations to support the homeless. With these examples, Body-Gendrot analyses new methods of protest that actors develop and the new political opportunity structures available to them as globalisation processes redefine urban issues. Within the globalised city, whilst traditional elites tend to be weakened, the media play an increasing role. These changes come with a 'delegitimation of the political sphere'. Finally, the examples chosen by the author help us understand how the ongoing transformation of governance is linked to initiatives taken at the level of civil society and how it has had an impact on the redefinition of power and citizenship.

Part II, 'The urban economy in global context', introduces a different angle of analysis. The authors in this section are concerned with the economic impacts of globalisation on social life and how urban movements have been trying to cope with these.

Chapter 4, by Bob Jessop, opens with a discussion of globalisation as a 'chaotic concept'. Making a distinction between the 'structural' and 'strategic' dimensions of globalisation, be underlines the linkages of economic globalisation to social and spatial dimensions, as well as the difficulties—crisis—faced by the 'Keynesian welfare national state' and the redefinition of its role in relation to capital accumulation and social reproduction. This said, it is important to recall that globalisation does not produce a 'homogenising economic space' but a process of reordering of advantages and opportunities. If the impact of globalisation on the Keynesian state has been modulated

with respect to political regimes, the consequences at the city level were also tremendous. In this perspective, globalisation can be associated with the rise of 'entrepreneurial cities' and their capacities to engage in a new game of competition.

While cities are affected by the capacities of national states to cope with the new economic rules brought in by the 'driving forces' of globalisation, they also play an increasing role in redefining the 'boundaries' of the state. Relying on the work of Schumpeter on entrepreneurialism and the analysis made by Harvey of the post-Fordist city, Jessop gives us a nuanced picture of the challenges economic and political actors are currently confronted with. This brings him to analyse conditions necessary for combating the hegemony of capital over society. If the social economy can play a positive role, it will have to work closely with grassroots movements with the perspective of better integrating economy and state with civil society.

The next two chapters explore multiple forms of resistance or alternatives to neo-liberalism which are taking place on the terrain of civil society noted by Jessop. Chapter 5, by Marguerite Mendell, examines initiatives taking place in the field of the 'new social economy'—'in which social utility displaces purely economic criteria of profitability' in order to better meet the need of communities—supported primarily by the labour movement and populist sector. Considering the example of Quebec (Canada) she analyses, on the one hand, the particular socio-political context in which economic models favourable to the expansion of a new social economy sector have developed, due to the resurgence, during the last thirty years, of the nationalist movement, and, on the other hand, a specific tool of empowerment for local actors, the 'alternative investment funds' promoted by progressive forces at local and regional level.

Although Mendell leaves us with unanswered questions, she presents a comprehensive picture of the possibilities and limits of the new social economy and its financial tools in respect of democratisation of the economy. The capacity of alternative investment funds to contribute to the fight against social exclusion has been recognised by different tiers of government. While the recognition and support of governments to these experiments represent new opportunities for the community sector to challenge the old clientelist and corporatist models, their ambivalence remains. They can be used to promote a business or market ideology, or a socially inclusive vision of development.

This controversy is also examined by Eric Shragge and Jean-Marc Fontan (chapter 6). They raise the question of work and the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state by bringing us the experiences of community groups in Montreal coping with unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. The first case study is about a community restaurant located within an old industrial area in Montreal struggling with urban and economic decay. The second case study is also situated in Montreal but has a wider implication. It is about community economic development practices that started in the mid-1980s and evolved in relationship with the implementation of workfare programmes managed through urban and provincial partnership (community groups, city, employers, upper tiers of the state). If community groups appear to be partners with political elites in the process of redefining the post-Keynesian state, as Shragge and Fontan point out, they nevertheless succeed in preserving some autonomy and control, a creative tension with funding agencies. Still, it remains difficult to predict the final outcome of community action and mobilisation in the current

period of transition, as globalisation processes increase uncertainty about the capacity of local actors to act.

Part III, 'Urban social movements and the global future', proposes an assessment of tendencies and new opportunities offered to movement actors by the transforming of social and economic structures brought in by globalisation processes. Margit Mayer (chapter 7) focuses on major cities where global flows express themselves in 'similar ways'. She highlights three recent trends in local politics that had an important impact on urban movements: (1) the new competitive forms of urban development; (2) the erosion of traditional welfare rights; and (3) the expansion of the urban political system.

The picture of urban movements in the 1990s that emerges from her analysis is one that is diversified, heterogeneous, and differentiated due to conflicts, contradictions and new opportunities within the movement sector. As their role is formed by 'new dependencies' on state and market that shape their opportunities, urban movements continue to play a dynamic role in the production and regulation of cities. Drawing upon the recent literature on urban movements, Mayer examines the forms and content of protest and collaboration movements develop in connection with the current trends in local politics. New forms of action are substituted for forms of protest observed in the 1970s or 1980s. Opposition movements to urban growth, anti-poverty movements, community groups mobilised against social exclusion, etc., are closely considered.

Pierre Hamel (chapter 8) also recognises the importance of local politics for urban movements. Like Margit Mayer, he argues that urban movements do play a dynamic role in the recent urban restructuring. However, he gives further attention to the issue of local democracy and social justice. Using examples from fieldwork done in Montreal, he examines how urban movements challenge traditional forms of local politics by contributing, among other things, to institutional innovations. Their actions also bring us to a better understanding of social inequalities and social exclusion, even though movement actors do not necessarily share the same vision of the city and of social change. This leaves open the question of assessing their capacity to challenge the negative sides of globalisation.

The last two chapters pursue an analysis of movement politics from a different context, that is to say in reference to Eastern European political regimes. Dieter Rink (chapter 9) examines the rise of citizen movements in East Germany in general, and in Leipzig in particular, during the recent transformation period. He asks about the persistence of collective action in the changing political arena of East German society: does it continue to exist and what class interest can it be related to? Rink argues that tremendous changes have occurred in the social composition and activities of movements between 1989 and 1993. The new political opportunities for collective action show the existence of new channelling mechanisms: but, while pragmatism prevails, this should not be interpreted as a lack of movements.

Katy Pickvance (chapter 10) explores themes of collective action in Eastern European countries, showing that globalisation is a worldwide process that affects Eastern Europe as well. In order better to document this reality, she compares the transformation of collective action in civil society during and after regime change in the countries of the Soviet bloc, including the Soviet Union. She observes that there is a continuity in terms of

the dynamism of civil society that is modulated differently according to historical experiences. In other words, in countries such as Hungary and Poland—in comparison to the majority of other Eastern European countries—where activities and collective action were strong before the regime change, this dynamism continues to flourish after the regime change. That is to say that a change of constitutions was not sufficient to sustain a change in 'all the important social, political and economic aspects of a society'. In her conclusion, Pickvance draws us to the future of collective action in Eastern Europe, mentioning that two processes are at stake, one which is specific to 'former state socialist societies' and one which is driven by the 'homogenising forces of globalisation'.

This statement by Katy Pickvance can be generalised to the current state of collective action research throughout these chapters. When considering the future of urban movements, the role of local, regional and national institutions remains critical, as the stakes that actors have within these intertwining processes are fundamental to a late modern framing of collective action. Yet urban social movements are also configured by what lies beyond them, what we referred to as the extra-local at the beginning of this introduction, And never has the extralocality of urban movements contained a more generally recognised frame of action than the current context of globalisation, however ill-defined or polyglot the term itself remains. Perhaps the penultimate task for urban social movement analysts is to recognise the dichotomy of action and thought that now constitutes their local objects of inquiry. In the end the globalisation of collective action, from an urban social movement perspective, may transform our understanding of locality as never before. The elastic future of locality, both conceptually and practically, has hardly begun.

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Part I

Urban social movements

Global impacts and the new urban citizenship

Accounting for the global significance of local citizenship as viewed through the lenses of urban movements is a challenging task. This is due simply to the fact that most urban-based movements do not operate on a global level as such. In many cases, to do so would deny their very essence and purpose, which is the defence of local identity. Rather, they are part of a spatial chain of events within which socialised and political identities form and crystallise as part of an ongoing process of globalisation. The relationships between the global and the local, as the contributors to this first section so clearly indicate, are complex, interpolated, yet also offer a sense of balance to the sometimes chaotic sequences of cause and effect that have become synonymous with globalisation.

Too often, when dealing with globalisation as a theme or discourse, the metropolis appears as a given, impacted and configured by processes larger than itself. This implied naturalism has its drawbacks. Instead of being a frozen urban moment in the wider panoply of collective action, urban spaces are showing themselves to be mobile places for experiential contradictions around exclusion and inclusion, exoticism and familiarity and, increasingly in a post-colonial world, exile and domestication. The hyper-territorialisation of citizenship, an inevitable downloading of issues to the local level—and into renewed localised forms of collective action—has come to define contemporary urban politics and its precious baggage of rights and privileges.

Citizenship is therefore an apt and necessary way of speaking about the global, but one couched in local frames of reference and accountability. The three authors in this part examine diverse spatialised urban contexts in German, American and French cities. Roland Roth underscores global responsibilities taking place more and more in the detritus of cities experiencing social traumas particularly in respect to poverty. Henri Lustiger-Thaler points to the creation of miniaturised disciplinary spaces in a global chain of events that become manifest in the American urban ghetto. Sophie Body-Gendrot discusses marginalisation within the framework of a classic urban question, focusing on housing and paying attention to new uncertain statuses around ethnic identification. Thus she underlines the necessity for revisiting citizenship, locally, by undoing its nineteenth- and twentieth-century legacies. In all three chapters we receive a taste of the issues that are sure to preoccupy the start of the new global century.

1
New social movements, poor people's movements and the struggle for social citizenship

Roland Roth

The return of the social

In most advanced capitalist countries the 1970s and 1980s were the decades of new 'post-material' issues and breaks with new social movements as the strongest active expressions of a—not so—'silent revolution' (Inglehart 1977). On the basis of the affluent postwar period, the 'old' protest actors did not disappear but lost their momentum, giving space for the development of a new political agenda—with more or less successful green parties as the visible political outcome in many countries. Since 1989 there has been a new shift in the political culture. The 'new' issues are losing influence and public attention, whereas 'old' issues have returned to the top of the political agenda. Most striking has been the return of 'old' social problems: unemployment, poverty, homelessness—the results of growing inequalities and the political dismantling of the welfare state even in the rich countries of the north—which have led to various forms of social exclusion. In many countries there has been a growing concern about social exclusion (Paugam 1996) and the formation of a new underclass (Katz 1993; Mingione 1996). The return of the social has many expressions.

The centrality of the new social movements and their issues (ecology, gender, peace, minority and civil rights) in the movement sector is decreasing. Instead, over the last years we have observed violent right-wing counter-mobilisations, with a lot of NIMBY-style (not in my backyard) protests, and mobilisations on social issues covering the front pages. This setback has facilitated the reduction of legal standards the new social movements had been fighting for—such as environmental protection, participation rights in permit procedures, equal opportunities for women in situations, e.g. university employment, where windows of opportunity were now being closed, and where job loss contributes to the return of traditional gender roles—most visibly in East Germany. Stable institutions of social inclusion (social citizenship rights) are under pressure and being eroded. Even in the comparatively stable Western European welfare states they are being questioned under the conditions of a globalising economy. We witness the return of the 'social question', 150 years on and despite the stillexisting remnants of the welfare state.

More than ever we have to take into account the global character and embeddedness of most new social movement issues. Today, high national ecological standards are discussed as obstacles against production and trade, and not as innovative challenges to a growing environmental protection industry, as they were some years ago. The negative consequences of globalisation are even more dramatic in the case of social citizenship rights ('social dumping'). Under the pressure and in the name of global competition we are experiencing an increasing deregulation of social and ecological standards. Transnational migration, the openness/closure of national borders and the rights of admission to national citizenship have become central issues on the political agenda of most advanced industrial countries and are a central focus of contemporary rightwing mobilisations (Koopmans and Kriesi 1997). In Germany migrants and refugees are a major target and are used as vanguards in the downgrading of social security standards.

Globalisation is more than an ideological *passe-partout*. In terms of structural conditions, competitiveness on a global scale has become the central imperative for regional, national and subnational politics. Of course, there are different responses, but 'flexibility' in production, employment patterns and social regulations has become a common feature and has led to similar tendencies in many countries (breaking the social postwar compact, welfare retrenchments, etc.). At the same time there are ongoing controversies as to how decisive and specific these structural impacts of globalisation are. The new flexibility contributes to a growing diversity. No 'best practice'—as in Fordist-Taylorist times—seems to be ahead. For some observers this confusing situation is not an expression of transition and transformation but a characteristic of the new capitalism of 'flexible accumulation' (for an overview, see Roth 1998a). Similar uncertainties about the impact of the globalising economy on local conditions are at stake in the 'global city' debate, with its polarising visions of citadel and ghetto or the tendency towards a 'quartered city' (Sassen 1998).

However, in terms of local and national policies we can observe a tendency towards global sourcing. Local policy improvements and adaptations (e.g. workfare models, third-sector politics, new forms of interest mediation or policing patterns, such as the New York zero tolerance strategy) attract an international audience looking for recommended examples. In Germany, for instance, it is a private foundation of a multinational company (Bertelsmann-Foundation) that launches worldwide competitions for the most efficient and democratic local administration or for local models which enhance active citizenship.

Even in the area of social movements there are trends towards an increasing international or transnational cooperation of movement organisations (NGO networks along the lines of UN summits, Agenda 21, international conferences of local anti-poverty alliances, etc.) and an intensified transnational diffusion of movement ideas, tactics and repertoires, especially within new social movements, but also in right-wing mobilisations. Specific local conflicts can more easily become a focus of international attention (for example, the 'tree-sitters' in Great Britain, the women of Greenham Common, Zapatistas in Chiapas and Ogoni versus Shell in Nigeria) due to new informational capacities (such as the Internet, etc.). But the diffusion of ideas and concepts is not necessarily tied to high tech nology. In the area of poor people's movements we see, for example, an increase in street newspapers sold by homeless people. Despite specific local

circumstances and structural conditions, the various degrees of transnational cooperation and cosmopolitan orientations in specific protests, we have many hints for a tighter articulation of the local and the global (Cvetkovich and Kellner 1997). In respect of their cognitive frames, action repertoires and transnational diffusion, social movements and protests are also part of a process of 'glocalisation' (a term coined by Swyngedouw 1992), combining local and global orientations, identities and perspectives.

While growing social inequalities are gaining momentum, the 'new' social movement issues (ecology, gender relations, peace, etc.) are also at stake (Crouch and Marquand 1995; Gills 1997). What we see today is a simultaneous and interconnected attack on the achievements of the old and new social movements. In studying social movements today we therefore have to consider both new social movement themes and social issues in a global perspective. Based on some empirical evidence from Germany I argue that it is time to bring together three concepts—new social movements, poor people's movements and social citizenship rights—on a common level (*l'enjeu* in the sense of Touraine). There are several common denominators. From their beginnings, the new social movements have been inscribed with far greater social demands and a sense of utopia than usually perceived. They delineate the contours of a new 'politics of the social', which connects classic demands for social security with the claim to a democratic definition of lifestyles. Contemporary 'poor people's movements' (centred, for example, around homelessness) are much closer to the mobilisation patterns and organisational forms of the new social movements than the debates of the 1970s and today would lead us to think. And the overlapping areas are clearly increasing (see, for example, the mobilisation of punks during the so-called days of chaos or the 'Autonomous').

Conservative attacks on the welfare state and even the social politics of the social democratic governments of the last two decades of the twentieth century force us to consider 'social citizenship' as contested terrain once again. Increasing social inequalities and exclusion have (again) become a focus of political mobilisations, but this time enriched by the utopias and perceptions of the new social movements. Now not only the dismantling of social rights that had already been won, but also the discriminating institutionalisation of these rights along national, ethnic and gender lines are their current issues (examples are the rights of single mothers, asylum seekers, migrants and refugees). Not least, contemporary 'anti'-social movements are contributing in various forms to the articulation of the social through right-wing mobilisations against asylum-seekers and foreigners, neighbourhood watch initiatives, tax-payer revolts, etc.

These divergent moves towards a return of the social should not be interpreted as part of a natural history. This kind of thinking has become fashionable in contemporary globalisation discourse. As Werner Sombart told us at the beginning of the twentieth century, economy is again 'our destiny', but this time in the name of globalisation. And there is strong evidence for a 'retreat of the state', an 'end of politics', a 'losing control' and 'hollowing out' of the nation-state (Sassen 1996; Jessop 1994) when an orientation towards local, national or regional competitiveness becomes the centre of all politics (Hirsch 1995). Nevertheless, the existence of conflicting social movements, of protest and resistance, is a signal that there are still political alternatives behind the camouflage of the globalisation discourse. Indeed, it can be shown that we are not on the way to

homogeneous universal solutions and best practices, but that instead the variety of national and local politics is increasing. This is especially the case in respect of welfare state politics. Esping-Andersen (1996) has shown that there are competing ways to deal with social exclusion and the 'growth to limits' of welfare state politics, and that it is still a question of political priorities to compare the costs and benefits of these different paths. The 'return of the social' is not just a throwback to the pauperism of the pre-welfare state, although many forms of exclusion take a well-known premodern form. The intensified use of repressive instruments—from workfare to imprisonment, from the 'war against the poor' to the growth of 'gated communities'—which sometimes look like the exhibits of a medieval torture chamber, points in a similar direction. But at the same time we can see many experiments and empowerment processes going beyond the democratic, social and material limits of the postwar social compact. Such alternative visions are currently being debated as a transition from a welfare state to a 'welfare society' (Evers and Olk 1996). The return of the social can also be seen as a challenge to overcoming the work-centred, male breadwinner oriented model of social security, envisioning a welfare pluralism which does not only counter social exclusion but is responsive to the democratic, feminist and ecological challenges of the new social movements.

The hidden social agenda of the new social movements

In the debate on protest and social movements in Germany and most Western European countries the so-called 'new social movements' have been, and still are, central. This is not only a question of concept preferences, academic fashions and traditions (Cohen 1985). Today we can rely on solid data about the movement sector. Two research groups —one directed by Hanspeter Kriesi, working on The Netherlands, France, Germany and Switzerland, another at the Social Science Centre, Berlin, concentrating on Germany— systematically coded the newspaper coverage of protest events (for more information about protest event analysis, see Rucht *et al.* 1998). The results are convincing:

- In Germany the group of social movements that we usually call the new social movements have contributed to more than 60 per cent of all protest events since the 1970s. Similar results were shown for The Netherlands and for Switzerland, but not for France. Here the more traditional actors, such as farmers and workers, counted for more than half the protest events (Koopmans 1992; Kriesi *et al.* 1995; Rucht 1998).
- Network data, local studies and opinion polls have shown that the term 'new social movements' is not science fiction, but part of the self-image of many activists and movement groups. In every movement we find a core group of people with 'overlapping memberships', who are sensitive to all the other new social movement issues as well.
- Perhaps more surprising are the findings concerning the development of these movements. Of course, there are up and down swings within each movement and each mobilisation, but the aggregate data show that the overall level of movement activities has been increasing steadily since the 1960s. Even years with a comparatively low number of protest events show a higher level than the famous protest year of 1968. In

the first years of the 1990s the level of mobilisation was still higher than in the 1980s and 1970s. For Germany, it is true that new social movements have been the main force in establishing protest politics as 'normal' politics in the eyes of much of the German population, and still offer very attractive forms of political action for younger people.

- Local studies show strong signs of an institutionalisation of movement politics: networks of groups, services, cafés are creating an infrastructure for mobilisation. Interestingly, this is not only the case in many cities in the West but also in the bigger East German cities—not least due to institutional and financial transfers from the West. Local red—green coalitions have contributed to the stability of this 'alternative' scene with subsidies and various forms of co-optation (Rucht *et al.* 1997).

The debate on new social movements often neglects the fact that these movements and mobilisations have articulated social issues and problems from their very beginnings—and not in the denouncing sense of middle-class politics and middle-class radicalism, in which particular class interests are presented as general interests, political forms are exclusive expressions of a certain class culture, and material needs are neglected (Parkin 1968; for a recent class approach, see Rose 1997). Since the 1960s there has been a dense and multilayered critique of social state policies and their limitations. And going beyond mere critique, there have been countless alternative initiatives, projects and models, stretching from social economy to social services. In fact, in Germany it has been mostly the new social movements and the Green Party that have contributed to reformulating progressive social policy alternatives (for example, with basic income, 'politics of the social' and 'welfare society' concepts).

The general perception, however, has been that new social movements, with their central topics of ecology, pacifism and feminism, differ from the classic labour movements in that they do not raise 'social questions' as relevant issues. The experience of relative social security has made it possible for them to place post-material issues at the centre of their agenda. Their distance from social themes appears to be due to 'their social composition as well: empirical studies tell us that their core members belong to the middle classes, i.e. they are people with university degrees, secure incomes, or are enrolled in higher education.

In addition, many people suspect that the shift from materialist to post-materialist themes has political effects that underline their political distance from social questions. Some observers have gone so far as to see the unintended contribution of these new social movements as facilitating state austerity politics, in the sense of 'We don't know about social problems anymore, we only know about ecological problems'. W.-D. Narr has coined the term 'ecological Wilhelminismus'. With long-lasting high unemployment, ecological reasoning has been become quite unpopular if it is in opposition to—more or less hazardous or senseless—infrastructure projects which promise employment.

Another basic premise of the new social movement approach which contributes to the dethematisation of social issues is the evolutionary concept which assumes different stages of societal progress (such as Alain Touraine, Jürgen Habermas, Alberto Melucci and others).

New social movements are seen as messengers of a new stage in the transition from industrial to post-industrial society. Given this background, social problems are seen as resolved by the welfare state. Hence, protest movements around social problems have become either unlikely or marginal.

Objections against this widespread view of new social movements are obvious. Their topics are not restricted to middle-class issues but react, on the one hand, to the dominating and exclusionary elements of the established welfare states and austerity politics and, on the other, to its destructive connection with the new social movement topics (ecology, feminism). For instance, radical feminist social work, with its concentration on empowerment, was one prominent result of the new social movements.

The socio-political themes of the new social movements have included the critique of the authoritarian welfare state and of the limits of bureaucratic rationality, the scandalisation of continuing poverty within affluence, and of the continuing production of marginal groups, as well as the early warning of a 'welfare state illusion'—the social net will hold only as long as it is not burdened by major social problems of pluralities such as mass unemployment. It has also included the radical challenge of the state-centred, growth-dependent and gendered production of social security through ecologising its welfare state critique, through its feminist critique of the welfare state and through its 'politics of the social'. Similarly, the forms of social praxis initiated by the new social movements are manifold. They have included mobilisations within the social-service professions as well as scandalising campaigns, support for resisting clients as well as innovative models and projects in social politics and public health, concepts of radical social work as well as feminist social work, the mobilisations of citizens' initiatives as well as the experiments of alternative and self-help projects.

It is also not correct to view these movements as exclusively middle class, because the social composition of the movement milieus is far wider—ranging from self-selected marginality and original marginality to people in different states of training. And what is remarkable is that those unemployed people who are dealing politically with their situation are intensely engaged in the new social movements, often representing their most radical pole and producing essential infrastructure services (Rein and Scherer 1993). A further process has contributed to the marginalisation of the social within the movement debate: many of the initiatives in social and health politics are studied only in the context of self-help and third-sector groups. The fact that they have many movement aspects tends to be neglected. More recently, local movement infrastructures have attracted more attention within the debate on the institutionalisation of new social movements (Roth 1994; Rucht *et al.* 1997). Their composition and stability have been crucial for the continuity of protests along new social movement issues in many Western European countries (Kriesi *et al.* 1995; Rucht 1998). Recently the social dimension of local movement milieus gained some recognition within the debates on social capital, active citizenship, volunteering, self-help and third-sector politics stimulated not only in reaction to cuts in welfare budgets but also by theoretical concepts in the civil society and the communitarian tradition. But in pointing at their contribution to the production of welfare (especially in 'alternative' social services and elements of a social economy for

poorer people) there is a strong tendency to ignore their protest and movement dimension (Anheier *et al.* 1997; Klöck 1998).

In order to get to a more adequate sense of this, it would be necessary to integrate social issue mobilisations into the new social movements concept and thus counter the 'normalisation' reproach that has been raised. The mainstream of social movement research has been attacked as 'normalising' collective social protest (Piven and Cloward 1992). One important aspect is the tendency to neglect the role social problems still play in the constitution of social movements in favour of the role played by cultural and post-material topics.

How specific are poor people's movements?

If our empirical observation of an increasing amalgamation of new social movement issues with 'old' social issues is correct, it is time to overcome the separation between scientific and political traditions. Since the 1970s there has been an intense debate on 'poor people's movements' in the USA. It has concentrated on the specificity of mobilisations coming from the margins, and at the same time it has developed a critique of mainstream movement research (Piven and Cloward 1977, 1984, 1992; Trattner 1983; Gamson and Schmeidler 1984; in Germany, Leibfried and Narr 1986). In recent years a number of empirical studies on homeless mobilisations and 'poor empowerment groups' in many US cities have revitalised the debate of the 1970s (Wagner 1993; McCarthy *et al.* 1994; McCarthy and Castelli 1994; Rosenthal 1994; Yeich 1994; Cress and Snow 1996; Ruddick 1996; Wright 1997; Cress 1997).

The debate started in opposition to the—at that time—new mainstream of movement research, especially the resource mobilisation approach. Characteristics of poor people's movements had nourished doubts about the general picture of successful movement politics relying on professional resource mobilisation, stable movement organisations and a sophisticated strategy of conflict and cooperation with opponents and the state. What might be promising for a range of interests and aims (for instance, movement organisations at the federal level and moderate tactics) could be useless or even harmful for locally based poor people's movements. These are only successful—so the central conclusion of Piven and Cloward (1977) runs—when they remain spontaneous, disruptive and radical, and do not lose the connection with their local constituency. Later critics acknowledged the disruption thesis, but challenged the idea that solid organising has to be accompanied by moderate movement tactics. Recent research conducted by David Snow and Daniel Cress (Cress and Snow 1996; Cress 1997) backed William Gamson's early critique, that organisation, even dependence on the support of advocate organisations, is not central for the choice of movement tactics.

Nevertheless, local case studies have shown that poor people's protests have some crucial characteristics. Research on social movements in the resource mobilisation tradition is still concentrating on stable organisations at the national level. This 'minimises (their) attention to spontaneous movements of the poor' (Wagner and Cohen 1991:545) acting at the local level. Neither their demands nor their organisational forms or their mobilisations conform to the dominant image of social movement organisations. Because

they are about social demands, they do not fit the pattern of the prevailing new social movements.

> Most analysts of social movements have stressed the non-material gains of movements…While agreeing with the importance of psychological, social network, and affiliational gains of movements, we also argue that for poor people such overtly non-material resources often translate into material resources…Yet they may gain access to these material resources as a result of movement participation.
>
> (Wagner and Cohen 1991:553)

Wagner and Cohen point, for instance, to access to higher-income people, organisational attachment, information and skills. What may be useful for one type of movement (for example, cognitive mobilisation) might be counterproductive for another type of movement (which, for example, prefers radical, disruptive practices). For mobilisations of homeless people, 'direct action can develop the consciousness-raising and empowerment necessary for solidarity ties' (Wagner and Cohen 1991:557).

It is not only the inversion of material and non-material resources, of cognitive liberation and protest which might be specific, but also the ambivalent role of supporters and advocates. 'Social issues such as poverty, which are deeply embedded in the organisation of capitalism, are not easily amenable to the influence of professionalised advocates' (Wagner 1993:183f.). Their 'politics of compassion' contributes to making social problems visible, but it tends to present the affected groups as weak and helpless. Sympathetic social science literature contributes to this as well. 'Most social science literature has also accepted the assessment of the homeless population and many members of the marginal poor population as suffering from disaffiliation, isolation, vulnerability, and disempowerment' (Wagner 1993:6). But if we study their protests more closely, we can observe that the only chance of improving their living conditions is disruptive action. And this does occur.

Very different in some respects is the picture of homeless protests offered in a comparative study on fifteen homeless social movement organisations in eight US cities (Cress and Snow 1996). Cress and Snow are reporting the recent history of homeless mobilisations in more than fifty cities, which peaked in October 1989 with 250,000 people in front of the Capitol demanding 'Housing Now!'. In their view, the image of the spontaneous, disruptive and thus successful protest is only one segment of the whole picture. Meanwhile, social movement organisations in many places are acting in local politics on a long-term basis. Material resources and benefactor organisations are crucial for the viability and stability of such social movement organisations. Seventy-five per cent of their resources come 'from outside'. Church-based or human-rights external beneficiaries are necessary but do not control the action profile of the social movement organisations.

> Sustained, effective protest for the poor requires strong organisations predicated on the mobilisation of essential resources. For impoverished constituencies, this typically requires support from non-constituency-based facilitative organisations.

> While we do not discount the potential moderating influence of conscience-constituent support, we argue that moderation is far from evitable. Thus, regarding movements of the poor, the real issue is not whether the poor should organise, but in what ways and with whom?
>
> (Cress and Snow 1996:1107)

While Wagner and Cohen are actualising the Piven and Gloward argument, and Cress and Snow the critique, we can also find bridges to the new social movements' approach in recent local case studies. In his comparison of two groups of homeless people in San Jose and Chicago, Talmadge Wright identified a 'nascent presocial movement within homeless communities' (Wright 1997:4). Making use of the theoretical work of Castoriadis and Lefebvre, 'urban social spaces' become central to the understanding of homeless activism. Their use of urban spaces is more than a mere survival strategy but also an example of opposition and resistance in claiming these spaces for their own need. 'Placemaking' doesn't fit into a picture of the passive 'urban poor'. Instead, urban space defined as 'an active relationship between city authoritative power and individuals is crucial for understanding how homeless street identities are constructed, resisted, and reconstructed' (Wright 1997:7). The growing sensibility for identity politics, culture, consciousness and human agency of US scholars is focused on middle-class protests and 'neglected movements of the poor, of "poor" bodies, of spontaneous eruptions of the "unwashed masses"' (Wright 1997:258). Wright stresses two specific conditions for mobilisations at the margin. (1) Gaining selfrespect via identity politics is central for their capacity to act. Identity politics— so the message goes—is not a middle-class obsession in new social movements. (2) Free and safe spaces are essential

> for the formation of a homeless community… Within these mini-movement areas homeless residents were able to construct a collective identity centred around issues of social justice for other homeless individuals and collective action in helping each other acquire housing and needed service… For a brief moment the SHA and the Chicago encampments offered utopic spaces for reimagining a different social identity for the homeless and very poor.
>
> (Wright 1997:297, 300)

Sue Ruddick's reflections point in similar directions. In her study on young homeless in Hollywood she highlights: 'If people are not simply marginalized in space but also through space, it is also through space that they attempt to challenge this process and construct for themselves different identities' (Ruddick 1996:49). It is already resistance to use public places and to defend them for their own purposes.

Although it is impossible to sketch a complete picture of contemporary poor people's protests, in summarising some local case studies it seems obvious that the 'classic' idea of poor people's movements is in dissolution, whereas the number and variety of mobilisations against social exclusion are increasing. Despite possible specificities, what becomes visible seems to be first of all a result of specific research options, such as focusing on benefactor organisations (Cress and Snow) or on groups of the constituency,

their everyday struggles and identity formations (Wright and Ruddick). Obviously we only have some parts of the puzzle. Some of the US studies are in danger of romanticising the protest, especially when using the postmodern vocabulary which is in fashion in urban studies (Keith and Pile 1993; Pile and Keith 1997). We listen to a power/resistance narrative without knowing what successes have really been accomplished (not at least in the sense of making it out of poverty). Some observers even doubt whether there are any poor people's movements at all in the contemporary USA.

> There are myriad programs and thousands of poverty advocates and professionals but they exist in competition with each other for a shrinking poverty pie…But good works and even a few innovative programs don't make a movement. Movements would posit an alternative to the current immiseration, that would mobilise the population to work for the elimination of poverty.
>
> (DiFazio 1998:143)

It seems to be obvious that the clear distinction between 'post-materialistic' new social movements and 'materialistic' poor people's movements is in dissolution. Overlapping memberships, similar mobilisation tactics, framing and identity processes are possible, although we have to take into account that move ments from the margins usually need more external resources. There is still a strong Western European tradition that unions and union-like organisations are responsible for the articulation of the social. As a result claimant unions and union-supported mobilisations in the tradition of the organised labour movements play a crucial role (Van Berkel *et al.* 1998). But the spectacular protest mobilisations against unemployment in France in the winter of 1997/8 (Bode 1998) and the diffusion of such direct action tactics in other European countries are the most visible sign for a broadening multi-polar field of initiatives and protests against various forms of social exclusion. And it is a question of concepts whether we can call it a movement or movements.

Poor people's movements in Germany?

In my view it is not appropriate to speak of poor people's movements in Germany today. However, in 1998 there were a series of protests against unemployment, which scandalised the monthly announcements of unemployment rates (Rein 1998). We find a growing number of initiatives and projects on behalf of homeless, poor and jobless people, often assisted by social service professionals. They are cooperating at the local, regional and national levels, sometimes even across borders. Their activities are focused on information, self help and advice, but they are becoming increasingly active and visible within the arena of political protest: protest marches, direct action, etc. Their claims are often backed by feminist or ecological arguments, so there is no rupture with the new social movement issues, but a refraining within social justice concepts. Protests, which not so long ago had found their common ground within the new social movement frameworks are now looking for new coalitions with social issues. This has been most obvious on the campus scene, which is most sensitive to changes in the political climate. In

the last decades of the twentieth century most student protests have been framed within the new social movement issues, and for some of these movements (for example, feminism) universities had been the most important bastions (women's and gender studies). Thus it was a sign of change when in 1996 student protesters in Berlin joined an alliance against cuts in the social budget for the first time and tried to (re-)establish Monday demonstrations—the most spectacular and popular protest activity of the former German Democratic Republic's citizens' movements. The massive student protests in the winter of 1997/8, when in fact more students became involved than in the famous year 1968, confirmed this tendency (some contributions in Goerg and Roth 1998). Pragmatic rather than radical in their orientations, the student activists rallied in front of town halls, stock exchanges and unemployment offices, scandalising the antisocial consequences of neo-liberal policy options in public education and for the job market. In sum, social issues are back on the agenda of political protest. At the turn of the century social exclusion is not only a question for the already excluded groups of the population and their advocates (welfare rights activists, churches, welfare associations, etc.) but also an important issue for social movements coming from rather privileged segments of the population.

In Germany we have had—and still have to a certain degree—a situation in which the momentum (critical mass) of poor people's movements has been lacking, leaving aside the fact that the 1968 extra-parliamentary movement mobilised some parts of the marginalised population. Today the situation has changed significantly. Social security and job perspectives play a major role in all projects of the new social movements—accelerated by unification. Poverty, homelessness, job loss and marginalisation are important issues in some sectors of the alternative milieu. At the same time, social problems have become more and more the focus of new initiatives and projects, as was formerly the case with the issues of new social movements. In Germany we can count, for example, more than thirty newspapers that are sold in the streets by homeless people. Half of what they earn goes to the sellers and a certain amount is dedicated to housing projects. What is important is the public and aggressive thematisation of poverty on the basis of claims such as citizenship rights, because people are seen to find themselves in this situation through no fault of their own. Selling street newspapers is one way for the homeless to leave behind marginality and form communities. However, these projects, which usually have not been initiated by the homeless themselves, are rather contested. 'Homeless newspapers are a market-economy version of begging', wrote one co-initiator of such a paper, arguing for a more radical version of politics (*Straßenfeger*', June 1996:11). More than sixty street newspapers exist in Europe, cooperating in a European network (INSP). Some are sold by 2,000 homeless people in more than 110,000 copies (*The Big Issue* in London is an example) (Honigschnabel 1996).

Another example is successfully developing 'table' projects which provide quality food to poor and homeless people. Having started in 1993 in Berlin, there were seven projects in 1994 and by February 1998 ninety projects across Germany. Some are acting in the radical 'Food not Bombs' tradition, but all refuse state money, rely on volunteers and contribute to the thematisation of poverty in a prosperous society (Werth 1998). At the local, regional and national levels there are also a variety of organisations centring on

social problems—a booklet lists about twenty organisations and citizens' movements against job loss, poverty and homelessness (Stiftung Mitarbeit 1995). Their programmes are moving beyond the arguments of the unions and the big welfare associations, which are still connecting social rights to wage labour. Instead, the new welfare initiatives demand inclusive social citizenship for all, guaranteed by a basic income ('Existenzgeld'). Less spectacular but also very important are the developments in some classical fields of social policy. Democracy and self-reliance are, for instance, vivid claims in the social institutions for the elderly (Evers *et al.* 1993; Hummel 1995).

However, protest mobilisations are still rare. We cannot speak of strong poor people's movements, but new independent actors of concerned people have moved into the social policy field, challenging the strong and pacifying corporatist tradition of churches, unions and welfare alliances. The monthly protests of the 30,000 to 50,000 unemployed which have taken place since February 1998 could be a start. There are already some issue-specific networks and local organisations. Nine hundred local groups signed the manifesto of the first days of protest. But it is still an open question as to whether there is already a stable, autonomous and mobilising network of local groups, such as the French AC! *(Agir ensemble contre le chômage),* as a result of the monthly protests. Perhaps only the three organisations already in existence—Coordination of Trade Union Groups of Unemployed People, German Union of Unemployed People (active mainly in the eastern states) and Federal Action Groups against Unemployment and Poverty (Wolski-Prenger 1998)—will survive.

In the last ten or fifteen years we have seen a growing number of local poverty reports, some of them in their second or third editions. They have no unified outlook. The variations cover a broad field ranging from social welfare statistics provided by the municipal administration, to evaluate and calculate of the future social expenditures of the city government, to reports produced by welfare clients groups, third-sector local initiatives and sometimes even initiatives in which marginalised populations participate. Most prominent have been the reports which are the result of cooperation between local authorities and local boards, initiatives of concerned citizens and members of local universities, especially social science and social work departments, or independent research institutes. Local representatives of unions and welfare organisations often take part in this work. Two outcomes are crucial. First, the publication of such local reports creates the opportunity for serious public discussion of German cities' often invisible social polarisation, a discussion which is usually dominated by local and national media focusing on single cases and spectacular events. Such reports provide a solid base for expressing the concern of at least parts of the community. Sometimes they have political influence or present obligations for political decision makers and local social administrators. Second, the cooperation involved in gathering reliable data and authentic information creates an opportunity for overcoming the often very small horizon of most of the people and organisations involved. They are the first step towards a network of further cooperation, and they offer a common understanding and interpretation of the situation for those who participate. Such forums are sometimes the outcomes and sometimes the initiative for local poverty reports. Again their profile varies strongly from town to town. In Frankfurt, the German banking city, for example, even representatives of local small businesses

participate in such a forum, whereas in Aachen, a smaller university town in the western part of Germany, the local poverty forum is more radical and only members of the third-sector and alternative scene cooperate without any recognition from local mainstream actors. In some cities such forums only organise a report from time to time, in others they are very active and run a series of events and public interventions. Either way, they have contributed a great deal to the visibility of social outcomes of entrepreneurial city politics in the name of the global economy.

At the European level an alliance against job loss and poverty is organising transnational marches with large numbers of participants (Wolf 1998) fighting for a social citizenship at the European Union level (Roche and Van Berkel 1997). The French strikes of the winter of 1997/8 have become the model for successful opposition against social cuts in the name of globalisation. It is easy to predict that there will some more efforts to repeat this 'sociological miracle' (Pierre Bourdieu).

Towards a common agenda of contemporary social movements: social citizenship and beyond

The current debate on citizenship offers important theoretical and normative concepts for the reintegration of social issues into the debate on contemporary social movements. In 1949, T.H. Marshall's seminal lectures on 'Citizenship and Social Class' introduced the notion of social rights alongside civil and political rights. In his view the complete civilised state—the state of citizens in the full sense—combines the rule of law with political democracy and the welfare state. It is useful to remember Marshall's original definitions: citizenship is 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to rights and duties with which the status is endowed' (Marshall 1973:84). Citizenship has a prominent institutional dimension (for example, legal rights), but it also has a distinct cultural meaning: defining members of a community who share specific values and have a specific status in common. In contemporary terms, Marshall blended in a modicum of gentle communitarianism: 'Citizenship depends on community and, at the same time, the sense of a common life feeds concern for the welfare of all of those defined as fellow citizens, so the relationship is seen in terms of mutual reinforcement' (Rees 1996:23). Overcoming social exclusion (the existence of second-class citizenship) was the central idea which T.H. Marshall shared with Alfred Marshall. Speaking in an old-fashioned way, his cultural and political goal was that the working poor should become 'civilised gentlemen'.

Citizenship rights consist in Marshall's view of civil rights ('liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice'), political rights ('the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body') and social rights ('the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society') (Marshall 1973:71f.), with the educational system and the social services as central institutions. For Marshall, these rights are not of the same status and not without

inner conflicts. Whereas civil rights are indispensable to a competitive market economy and 'necessary to the maintenance of that particular form of inequality' (1973:90), this is not the case with social rights. They set the principle of equality of citizens against the inequality of classes: 'in the twentieth century, citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war' (Marshall 1973:87).

In the discussion on social citizenship there is a focus on the social rights and obligations institutionalised in and guaranteed by the postwar welfare state, which has become the main target of conservative mobilisations and governments in the last decade.

> Political support for traditional welfare states is no longer an obvious feature of the public rhetoric of western liberal democracies…An essential aspect of this attack on the welfare state has been the complete rejection of those social ideals of citizenship rights and obligations which were encapsulated in the political and social structures of the welfare state.
>
> (Culpitt 1992:1)

The conservative challenge to and transformation of the welfare state was facilitated by three developments (Borchert 1995:333ff.): (1) an increase in social problems (unemployment, etc.); (2) international competition that exerts pressure on the national welfare state transforming it into a 'national competition state' (Cerny 1990; Hirsch 1995); and (3) the impasse of the Keynesian welfare state (central structures remain but they are not able to solve the new challenges).

The new right attack has not only focused on social expenditures of the state but has also challenged social citizenship as such: 'Instead of accepting citizenship as a political and social status, modern Conservatives have sought to reassert the role of the market and have rejected the idea that citizenship confers a status independent of economic standing' (Plant 1991:52). There is a left answer which searches for a concept or theory of citizenship, linking the demands of justice and of community memberships. Central to this is the 'empowering' of welfare recipients by supplementing welfare rights with democratic participatory rights in the administration of welfare programmes by giving local welfare agencies more power and making them accountable to their clients (Kymlicka and Norman 1994:359).

The citizenship debate has its focus not only on the mere defence of once established and now minimised social standards, but also on overcoming the national, ethnic and gender-related limitations of these standards. 'It is obvious in the 1990s that many of the assumptions of the dominant model of Marshallian citizenship have gone, especially full employment, the sexual division of labour in the public and private domains, and the stable nuclear family' (Turner 1993:xii). The progressive positions in the debate concentrate on the articulation of egalitarian concepts of social citizenship that respect differences in lifestyle, gender, etc. Engendering citizenship is a central issue in the contemporary feminist debate—especially in respect of gender roles inscribed in welfare regulations (Lister 1995). From a historical perspective, citizenship has characterised forms of inclusion and exclusion within nationstates based on exploitation, discrimination and suppression (Bader 1995:118). Therefore it is necessary to ask for a transnational social

citizenship beyond the nation-state which responds to the problems of migration and economic globalisation.

Some general critical remarks on the postwar orthodoxy of citizenship are necessary:

- The Marshallian view of citizenship rights (civil rights, political rights, social rights together making up 'full citizenship') is based on evolutionary assumptions which we can no longer accept. Citizenship is far from taken for granted. The policing of the poor and workfare is only a very striking example demonstrating that social exclusion is accompanied by a denial of civil and political rights.
- Citizenship rights (not obligations or opportunities to participate) are statecentred and 'passive'. In particular, social movements are claimants for active citizenship, consumer and client rights, and for creating community, and they are often critical of state practices. They call for a welfare society, not a welfare state.
- Questioning the nation-state as central focus of citizenship, we have to recognise many spheres and levels of citizenship in the perspective of a 'transnational citizenship'—for example, an international human rights regime (Sassen 1996), global citizenship (Urry 1998) and global commons (Newby 1996). But a strong urban citizenship is also necessary to fulfil the expectation of an active participatory reformulation (Roth 1998b).

Such reformulations of the concept of citizenship could also be helpful for the reshaping of movement politics. Movement politics today show more diversity than in the days when new social movements dominated the sector, and social problems are playing an important role. But there is no sign of a general return to the class politics of the large labour and social democratic parties. Their organisational and moral energies seem to be exhausted. Instead we see converging developments in another direction. On the one hand, classic new social movement mobilisations are loaded with social questions, on the other, there is a growing number of poor people's initiatives and protests adopting the forms and practices of new social movements. It is therefore time to overcome the ignorance of both the research on new social movements and that on poor people's movements. New social movements are not representative of the common interest of humankind far beyond the social realm, and social exclusion is no longer a question of minorities.

At stake is the 'reinvention' of the social following the erosion of the old social institutions which formed the core of postwar stability and cohesion—erosion increased by globalisation processes, which are an obstacle to national ways out of this situation. Within the new social movements we find important hints for such social and political alternatives. Poor people's movements can help to overcome social blindness. They point to the importance of self-confident individuals and socially integrated milieus (Böhnisch 1994).

The current debate on citizenship offers some important points of discussion. It challenges and enables the clarification of norms and values (social justice, human rights, global responsibilities, gender equality and difference, democratisation, etc.) which are

central to the debate of contemporary social movements. A differentiated concept of citizenship should, for instance, integrate the moral prerequisites of universal justice, local democracy and self-determined lifestyles. To enforce equality and justice within a democratic concept of citizenship, citizenship needs to be disentangled from ascriptive 'characters' and identities (ethnicity, race, gender, etc.), and democratic citizenship needs to be disentangled from state membership. Central is the reshaping of social citizenship beyond the old male work-centred 'industrial citizenship' which still dominates the orientations of most political actors (Cannan 1996:145). Even within the European welfare state tradition we cannot fight only for the defence of social rights. We need a critical reformulation, because all aspects of citizenship are under pressure and have to be redefined.

To reframe movement issues in terms of citizenship could help to counter the empirical fragmentation of social initiatives and movements. Otherwise social citizenship and democratic participation will become more and more exclusive and only available to the happy few of the new world order. Transnational mobilisations (for example, protests against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment; see Jackson and Sanger 1998) can contribute to a revival of locally grounded cosmopolitan orientations (Cheah and Robbins 1998) and develop a vision of a democratic citizenship beyond borders.

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2
The miniaturisation of collective action
Ghettos and global space

Henri Lustiger-Thaler

> Lining both sides of the corridors, which get their light from above, are the most elegant shops, so that the arcade is a city, a world in miniature.
>
> (Benjamin 2000:150)

Introduction

We live in an epoch of global shifts matched by equal doses of ambivalence, risk and uncertainty. What we have come to understand as globalisation and informationalisation represents an entirely novel phase in the growing complexity of human action and relationships, stretched over an increasingly seamless horizon of time, space and places. These developments have been generously characterised by their innate resistance to political crisis management by nation-states and even concerted actions by social movements. The Fordist restructuring of localised forms of praxis and knowledge has entered into profound conflict with structures put in place by the national economies of the late twentieth century, to follow them into the twenty-first. Indeed, there is every indication that we are witnessing the development of a new world (dis)order. One thing is certain, as the modern world system globalises—never before have local practices, or the definition of what constitutes the boundaries of locally defined space, appeared as relevant to our understanding of collective action and social movement activities.

The spatial repositioning, social coverage and implosion of local meanings, as well as the challenge these hold for contemporary political and social thought, have come to define the degrees to which local actors view themselves as subjects (Beitz 1991). At this juncture we can say that if national agency was once related to the chauvinistic sovereign territoriality of states (Tilly 1984), at the start of the new millennium a rethinking of this type of agency has acquired parochial and dated overtones, characterised by the presence of weak states and quasi-states—all part of the fragmentation needed for the optimisation of global capital strategies (Badie 1995; Thual 1995). And, this says nothing of the import that globalisation has had upon rapidly changing institutional frameworks for collective action.

But what do we really know about globalisation from an institutional perspective, the master frame which sociologists such as Claus Offe (1987) popularised in debates on the

welfare state in the 1980s? Globalisation has created an unprecedented challenge to the ways in which we organise welfare states, by transforming and recontextualising the manner in which actors and states interact institutionally. The collapsed boundaries of the global and local, or what Roland Robertson (1992) and Sygmund Bauman (1998) have called 'glocalisation', represent but one dichotomy for modern forms of collective action within institutions. We are all 'glocal' actors, in one way or another. These continually negotiated boundaries have become part and parcel of the ongoing dialectical exchange between actors and their cultural, spatial, economic and social environments. But these same processes are often more disorganised and difficult to categorise within a single causal model, however global its intent. Tense dialectical exchanges capture only one aspect of late modern globalisation and its sister process of informationalisation.

The socio-global configuration of collective action that we are currently witnessing requires a different episteme, one that makes reference to the liquid and changing boundaries of localities, wherein the integration of the global moment reappears as a miniaturisation of already globalised/systemic issues. Stated otherwise, this process may be pointing to an increasing symmetry of social relations, which have their sources elsewhere, but express themselves at the matrix of local time and global places. In contradistinction to what we now understand as 'global analyses', it is the local that leads the above development of 'meaning creation'. Miniaturisation is therefore characteristic of an outwardly defining process, a literal explosion of locality, a sort of extra-locality, which comes into existence through the continuous penetration of local meanings into global frames of reference, tastes and customs, and ultimately social movement practices.

We are therefore interested in examining a miniature portrait of the human social locale, the social home—a ghetto—and the manner in which its visual and political characteristics are experienced by actors—social movement actors—with both actor and locale having global reference points. We are also interested in examining forms of social protest which take place within globalised ghetto spaces. These fluid and unfixed processes contribute to the way in which individuals construct the specificity of their spatio-cultural identities, caught in the web of global flows and forces within which the economic, or redistributive, element is but the most readily transparent moment, and often takes the form of a politics of recognition.

The urban ghetto and the struggles for social recognition which occur within its boundaries offer an ideal portrait of institutionally sanctioned exclusionary space that has both local meaning and global resonance. Hence, the intertwined processes of spatial location and dislocation, captured in the practices of the ghetto and its institutionalisation of space, race and class, are concerns taken up in this chapter. Conflicts in poor and disenfranchised neighbourhoods are precisely about reclaiming the ghetto as a community of purpose, a social home. While urban ghettos existed long before the era of globalisation, the germane point is that they have now become symbolic of a permanent ethnography of separateness (Fox-Piven 1992). This is most evident in terms of the increasing inability of actors in excluded spaces to appeal to a form of citizenship that was once based upon national criteria for social citizenship (Bottomore 1992; Jenson 1993). With these criteria radically compromised, collective action emerges in more localised and miniaturised forms, around the importance of social homes that have been

systemically globalised throughout successive crises in the post-bellum twentieth century and their accompanying Fordist effects upon territoriality.

Miniaturisation and social movements

From a social movement perspective, the global level of analysis has traditionally ignored most urban phenomena as objects of inquiry caught within the self-imposed limitations of the local. Urban social movements, as opposed to general social movements, have been concerned with questions of local management. The most apparent linkages between the local and what lies beyond have emerged through an analysis of institutionally embedded processes, emerging from national or regional state levels, underscoring crisis tactics and strategies. Debates linking urban movements within the local—regional—national triangle have largely focused on the institutional sedimentation and layering of collective action. A global analysis, from this municipalist perspective, has largely been sought out by causally linking local to global practices. This process is difficult given the uncertainty of local actions to their imputed global consequences and vice versa. An example of this hiatus is the paucity of literature linking urban movements to the globalisation process: the topic of this volume.

Yet the complex process we have come to refer to as globalisation carries within it alternate theses and considerations wherein ambivalent global contingencies are mirrored in their deeper significance, and reproduced locally in miniature forms. Miniaturisation as a social process occurs at the interstices of global regulatory processes and local responses to the latter's effects. These have already been globalised, with the attendant result of reversing the order of effect in terms of controlling and defining the production of meaning. Examples are locally based identities which negotiate their locality within global contexts, defending as they are embedding local meanings. This is much like the Internet interfacing with computerised translation, wherein a message may be sent in French and received in English or Chinese, allowing future political unions to preserve the native tongues of its members as official languages, deepening cultural choices rather than obliterating them. Miniaturisation therefore already functions through the channels of global criteria, but through local networks of meaning. We can further break down this process in reference to the following characteristics, which have acquired a miniaturised form in late modernity:

- the dynamics of locally experienced forms of social exclusion;
- the experience of parallel forms of agencies around issues of space and home;
- citizenship claims related to cultural identification.

The politics of social exclusion and inclusion

Social exclusion refers to the marginalisation of social actors, or citizens, within a wide category of disadvantages connected with class, race, ethnic, gender, disability and regional characteristics (Roche and Van Berkel 1997). The exclusionary process ties

together the impact of transformations in the production of social rights that have traditionally framed the contractual basis for citizenship. In a recent study, *Comparative Social Inclusion Policy in Europe* (1998), by the SEDEC network, the authors note some common causes of exclusion, such as unemployment and its variable rates of effect in different European contexts. Labour market dualisms, taking the form of urban/rural, industrial/post-industrial, full-time/part-time work in primary/secondary labour market configurations, are prime root causes for exclusionary practices in northern Europe (SEDEC 1998: 93). In countries such as Spain and Portugal the breakdown of the family, and the weakened links between church, community, union and voluntary organisations are again indicative of exclusionary variables at work in more traditional societies. Exclusionary practices, whilst tied to labour markets, also have their cultural consequences in terms of effects upon children, youth and the marginalised working poor throughout the European continent.

In brief, the above understanding of exclusion is largely seen as linked to the distribution of social goods, the most significant being work and its relationship to the formal rights and responsibilities of citizenship, particularly social citizenship. While these are certainly critical indicators of institutionalised poverty and the diminished presence of the safety net, the spatial dimensions of exclusion are largely ignored or left untreated. However, the aforementioned factors do reveal the institutional framework under which spatial exclusionary processes occur, through economic segmentation and the generational stream of biographies lived under harsh economic conditions, mostly by the youth. Yet the economic factor is hardly sufficient to grasp the cultural conflicts in urban spaces, particularly in the current American ghetto, where race and generational issues become the most important factors linking the diminished relationship of social goods to citizenship rights.

The exclusionary character of ghetto life is a prime example of an urban space that has been emptied of the rights, or the ongoing socio-structural construction of political community, upon which social citizenship is founded. The American ghetto has taken on the abject role of an outcast civil society, configured by violence, poverty and unsafe streets. It is first and foremost understood as a problem of dysfunctionality, a space for black single mothers and unemployed fathers trounced by global economics. This caricatural portrait of the actor in the ghetto is often unwittingly couched in terms of a moral conundrum, underscoring current themes in welfare policy ideology.

A recent debate on the nature and perception of the American ghetto provides the entry for a broader discussion of social exclusion as a racial prerogative. Loic J.D. Wacquant's (1997) critique of reigning pernicious premises of the American ghetto are instructive as they underscore a much needed understanding of what really constitutes late modern ghettoised space. Wacquant makes the argument that the study of the American ghetto has been misconceived and framed within race-stereotypical constructs of poverty. The ghetto is typically understood as a place of social disorganisation that focuses on the privative. In this stereotypical view, the urban ghetto, as an exemplar of disorganisation, is replete with anomie, atomisation and violence: a profile of social defect.

This view has its roots in the classical urban sociology approaches of the Chicago school. Who ghetto residents actually are is buttressed by a visual culture that is endemic to exclusionary space, and which keeps ghetto dwellers out of sight: Simmelian 'strangers'. Further pernicious premises appear in the tendency to portray the ghetto dweller through exoticism. As Ulf Hannerz (1969, 1983) has shown in his study of the American ghetto, the most stereotypical actors too quickly come to represent the whole of the population. Given that the two most descriptive forms of exoticism circulate about the twin poles of race and class, ghetto spaces soon become hyper-localised miniature entities, neighbourhoods to be avoided at all cost in our visual mapping of the city. It is in this visual spatial construct that the problematical underclass argument has crept into the language of the social sciences. Over and above, on the one hand, a stereotypical racialisation of the ghetto, there is, on the other, a counter-tendency to deracialise the causes of the plight of the ghetto under the rubric of poverty. Ghettos are perceived as economic structures, the lowest rung on the ladder of global restructuring. Yet the overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the American ghetto experience is largely a black urban phenomenon. To ignore this is to obfuscate the single most important dimension of contemporary race relations: the institutionalisation of excluded spaces and homes on the basis of colour.

Wacquant (1995) rightly points to the need for an institutionalist understanding of the urban ghetto. We would agree, as this kind of approach more readily focuses on the already long globalised characteristics of local space around issues of exclusion, the backdrop for our emphasis upon miniaturisation. This would include recognition that ghetto space is a form of ethno-racial enclosure and control. It is therefore consistent with the localised territorialisation of exclusion, a miniature portrait of the globalisation of constraint, stigma, separation, boundedness and differentiation, resembling the experience of the developing world's relationship to the modernised West.

From an urban perspective, the social reasons for excluded spaces can be found in the institutional paucity of the school system and the lack of an indigenous exchange value engine (Logan and Moltoch 1987). However, key to the above analysis is the primacy of the institution of racism, as it unfolds in urban spaces around the concept of a 'deserving home', as a moral basis for social citizenship. Sharon Zukin (1997) compares the urban space of the ghetto to a modern disciplining act that shapes the circulation of bodies inside the ghetto to those outside its boundaries and ascribed behaviours. Zukin's analysis allows for an easy upgrading of the problem of local space within a global context. The ghetto, rather than representing a pathology turned inward, is the culmination of racial ceilings and racial barriers to residential mobility. Zukin's analysis directs us to an ontology of real-estate markets as a way to move beyond the problematical causality arguments that have showered the urban ghetto literature.

Ghetto spaces in New York City have changed tremendously in the last thirty years of the twentieth century. This has occurred in tandem with international post-Fordist regulatory processes and their effects on labour markets. Concomitantly, the shifting of value in urban real estate has been a critical institutional dimension in the formation of the modern ghetto. The increasing sedimentation of urban space, and resistances to marginalisation and exclusion, develops in tandem with the organisation of state and civil

society. Urban movements have developed structured relationships with local, regional and national state institutions, principally through their own funding practices. Yet this process does not occur automatically. It is itself the product of mobilisation, organisation, protest politics and complex self-institutionalisation processes. Ghetto space, as is evident in Zukin's study of the Brownsville section of Brooklyn, was largely state created. Though community groups existed, their impact on civil society was negligible. As she puts it, the inhabitants in Brownsville, Brooklyn, had an unmediated relationship with the state in the construction of their homes (Zukin 1997) and, inevitably, unmediated space in the city is disciplinary space.

Her point is well taken: to understand the spreading subjectivity of spatial communities is to see their institutional construction—in the American case, the physical construction of black spaces, white spaces and the urban movements that have struggled to inure exclusionary spaces with meaning. In post-Fordist culture the racial ghetto has achieved a new structural permanence. This permanence can be viewed from the perspective of the miniaturisation of global processes in the life of the ghetto itself. The urban ghetto is the culmination of institutional rationality, real-estate markets, the state and the overt racialisation of space. Both Wacquant and Zukin's views are well supported by Janet AbuLughod's (1997) analyses of black ghettos in Chicago, which were largely defined in exclusionary terms by global conditions. As Abu-Lughod points out, the relative impact of race is clearly the more significant factor, as in times of economic resurgence the ghetto in Chicago remained stagnant or worse. This has also been confirmed in studies showing that strong economies in southern urban areas did not reduce the isolation or poverty of blacks in these cities or their surroundings (Fainstein 1995). The spatialisation of race has created exclusionary and inclusionary conflicts for urban social movements. The emergence of local economic development corporations and self-help groups, promoting inclusion within the local economy in terms of job creation, has become a widespread phenomenon in black urban America. The miniaturisation of social relations, in this sense, points to the creation of a local economy within the ghetto that responds to global restructuring (see chapter 8 by Pierre Hamel in this volume). This is a social movement strategy of inclusion in its most visible form of expression. The institutionalisation of social movements is perched at the precipice of this kind of 'social experiencing' within the ghetto, as we will see later in our discussion of ghetto youth in Harlem, New York.

The parallel agencies of globalisation and locality

The racialised urban ghetto in the USA is the residue of the parallel agency of the global and the local, and its condensation in miniature forms of replication. What exists between the urban—local and global flows are institutions that have been largely structured by deep-seated proclivities to configure space in terms of race and class. It would be useful to draw out two distinct yet interrelated moments in the parallel agency of urban movements that mitigate around issues of social exclusion and social movement strategies of inclusion. In the first instance, inclusion within the formal political process, or regulatory environments created by the state, are *prima facie* to the activity and mobilisation base of urban movements. Here the configuration is attached to global

economic processes of exclusion which become the basis for local inclusion, for example the development of local economic strategies by grassroots groups in the face of global contingencies. Redistributive politics are central to this instance. What emerges is issue oriented and contains an ethic of participation, a reawakening of social and economic citizenship claims amongst inhabitants. This occurs both as a need in civil society for representation as well as a response to the regulatory state for innovation in areas of welfare and well-being. The type of political agency that emerges out of this deals with rights already built into the statist checks and balances of a given political system and its level of democratic accountability.

The inclusion of movements in the local state is concretised through the formalism of funding, which appears hand in hand with the ever-present threat posed by the withdrawal of financial aid to projects. As movements interface with the state, forms of political subjectivity emerge based on status attribution and limited forms of social partnership. These practices partially reconstitute the normative claims of movements, by marking off boundaries and spheres of reciprocity, intimacy and power. These also partially define and structure public space and discourse around work, the family, etc. as movements are encouraged to clientalise their local constituency.

States, however, rarely follow their own benevolent intentions, constantly being undermined by the need to secure a basis for accumulation. The first instance of parallel agency therefore represents an open and closed institutional moment which gives rise to movements through a discourse of rights about inclusion and its citizenship-based implications and obligations. This creates a double-edged sword for urban movements and the state. Self-help grassroots groups are an excellent case in point. These initiatives create linkages between the economic and political, integrating welfare and market concerns within given spatial areas, developing an enormous amount of legitimacy. This creates a haven for the development of new responses to local markets, which are often hostile to these types of initiatives. For example, the credibility that has been achieved by the Industrial Areas Foundation's mobilisation of a wide spectrum of community groups, as regards affordable housing in The Bronx, has created a legitimate community actor that is regularly requested to sit on sectoral committees determining the allocation of urban space by local government for the creation of homes. The state, while transferring statutory functions and responsibilities to voluntary groups, through its need for innovation in urban partnerships, creates the possibility for movements to claim expertise in specific areas, developing their political capital as social entrepreneurs.

The second instance of parallel agency occurs in the same urban ghettoised spaces, but is largely unmediated and resists mediation as a matter of course. And there is a tension within excluded urban space between these two forms of collective action; actors in one social movement industry having little to do with the spontaneity of unmediated collective actors in another. The latter's form of collective action is created externally to an expressive, legitimate and organised voice, as was the case with the Million Youth March in 1998 and in 1999, in Harlem, New York City. The pariah image of Khalid Muhammed, the self-appointed youth leader and march organiser, was in tune with the excluded nature of demands that expressed themselves through the legitimate grievances of black youth, which have increasing global reference points. The protest in 1998 took a violent

turn, not surprisingly given the hostility that surrounded its organisation and underlying cultural address to active concerns and issues in the community, particularly regarding policing. The violence of the 1998 march also demonstrated the confluence of space and ghettoisation in an unmediated and miniaturised cultural exchange which literally took the form of a battle for the streets of Harlem. No longer was the conflict only for social citizenship, but more for a race-conscious form of citizenship based on recognition, belonging and choosing one's identity(ies). It was not surprising that these issues would emerge from within youth protests.

Citizenship and social protest

The parallel agency of social movements seeking inclusion, and using the politics of exclusion to forward grievances, as was the case with black youth sympathetic to the Million Youth March—whether they agreed with the leadership of the March or not—ups the ante for rethinking the classical 'citizens' world' paradigm. This world is also composed of two singular moments. The first moment is what T.H. Marshall referred to as 'social citizenship' (1949). This points to citizenship as part of a regime type as well as actively engaged in contesting its rationality. The second moment points more directly to unmediated actions and protests. Both describe different social sites and their accompanying practices. The second moment of the citizens' world is a territory for contesting and social experiencing within the institutions of the state and state largesse. Individuals subvert and appropriate the language of economics (from the ethic of the market to the ethic of caring as in local economic development and self-help projects). Their attachments to political characteristics such as choosing, belonging and recognition —to be discussed later—are institutionally experienced as a meta-discourse framing the modern expression of social citizenship against social exclusion.

Both these moments point to the interface between the regulated environment surrounding citizenship and the ongoing struggles of autonomously based, however systemically integrated, collective actions, such as street protests. Social citizenship, as an exemplar of the first moment of parallel agency, has become the contested sphere of modern politics. The second moment is, however, experiential in the sense of its institutional detachment. It is a component of the new citizens' world that must be understood as a grounded response to cultural grievances, and of how they relate to institutions within a context of racialised identities. It is at its core a project of the recognition of oneself as distant from, yet imbricated within, ongoing political and institutional processes.

After identity and otherness: race and youth in New York City

We will be looking at the relationship between youth groups, largely black, local black associations and local government in New York City, principally around the politics of the Million Youth March which took place in Harlem, New York City, in 1998 and 1999. Both these forms of collective action were examples of a late modern urban social

movement, configured around exclusionary space and spontaneous collective actions. While the intent of the protest was to create an empowering experience for black youth, the personality-led urban politics of New York City had an impact on the eventual form of protest and the involvement of the principal benefactors, supposedly the black youth of America. The organiser of the event, Khalid Muhammed, emerged from outside the local community. He clashed with the mayor of New York City, Rudolph Guiliani. The mayor called the protest a hate march—Khalid Muhammed had made many anti-Semitic and anti-white statements—and hence refused to grant a permit to gather.

The atmosphere was terrifically charged between City Hall, the police department and the march's organisers, led by a rebel branch of the Nation of Islam. The organisers of the march were, despite their intransigence and reverse racism, dealing with a cultural phenomenon that resonated positively amongst black youth. Social exclusion, diminished economic opportunities, police brutality, and cultural pride were the mobilising background for many young black people who were attracted to the event. Indeed, the organisers of the two Million Youth Marches in Harlem tapped into the same sense of crisis and exclusion that had made the Million Man March in Washington, 1997, organised by Louis Farrakan, leader of the Nation of Islam, a success.

In the weeks leading up to the first march of 1998, groups in Harlem were criticising Muhammed's tactics and the low level of engagement he sought from black organisations in Harlem. Youth groups throughout Harlem were ambivalent as to the political purpose of the march and their role in it. A group representing black gay youth disassociated themselves, citing incompatibility with homophobic remarks attributed to the leadership of the march. Latino youth groups complained of the exclusivity of the African American component of the march, as many of the issues that were being addressed also affected young Latinos living in New York City. Tensions mounted in the days leading up to the event.

There was also internal conflict within the Harlem political class. The traditional black leadership, realising that the issues raised by the march's organisers resonated positively amongst black youth, were loath to express their discomfort with the top-down organisation, rancour and dissent the leadership of the march had brought to the community. This occurred in a context wherein the city was still refusing to grant a marching permit. The march's leadership then threatened to stage the demonstration in the middle of Crown Heights, a Jewish orthodox enclave in Brooklyn. This provocation of capitalising upon the tense relations between blacks and Jews in New York created an atmosphere that had clear potential for violence.

After much rhetoric and positioning by City Hall and the organisers of the march, a restricted permit to gather on Sunday until 3:00 pm was issued. The city cordoned off the designated area near 125th Street, the core of Harlem. The police presence was overwhelming and the central thoroughfares in Harlem resembled military zones that were impossible to reach from subway or local streets, for outsiders as well as local residents. The event, likely due to the undercurrents of violence, was less well attended than the organisers had hoped. Estimates place the participants at 3,000. As if scripted to occur, several minutes after 3:00 pm, the police moved to close the stage, and violence immediately erupted. The march organisers left the city soon after, leaving no

organisation in place to deal with the aftermath of the event, except a trail of court proceedings. Many black youth groups in New York felt used, but also acknowledged the importance of the venue for protest that the Million Youth March had clearly tapped into.

The first march identified two elements with regard to the relationship between the black community in Harlem and the diversity of youth groups in the community and New York City at large. First, the traditional black leadership's relationship to City Hall was ineffective in dealing with the movement activity that arose around the event, nor could they successfully navigate the local political system that the march challenged. Second, the make-up of the youth groups was more complex than the march organisers, the black leadership or the city had understood. None of the former represented the complexity of youth demands that were to surface in the next march, a year later.

Beyond the convention of identity

The second march held in 1999, again in Harlem, was less well attended and took place under the watchful eye of a politically maturing youth movement. The turnout was about 1,500 people. The 1999 march was challenged by the local black political elite. They were not to repeat the error of the previous year. One must also underline that the atmosphere was more conducive to such a challenge from local political elites, as the leadership of the 1998 march now suffered credibility in the eyes of the community and youth movements. The youth-based social movements in Harlem displayed a deep ambivalence about Khalid Muhammed and his organisation leading up to the 1999 demonstration. They also posed questions that were larger than the political framework of the march organisers: issues that were globally referential, but locally constructed and interjected with several identity-based challenges. The 1999 march ended without violence, due to restraint on the part of the police and the march organisers.

This time the organisers did leave a group called The Black Power Committee in Harlem to continue discussing future mobilisations in the spirit of the Million Youth protests. Their success appears, however, to have been marginal, given the wider youth concerns in Harlem and New York City at large. Many groups have argued that the Million Youth organisers are out of touch with their concerns, and replaying outdated oppositions around conventions of black identity. For example, organisations such as the Black Radical Congress, a national coalition of black progressives, have raised issues of gender and sexuality as part of their ongoing political and social movement organisation. This diacritical approach is also taken up by Caribbean Pride in its address to questions of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender identities as concerns of Caribbean youth. Movements such as SLAM (Hunter College Students), FIST (Afro-Caribbean Youth), Malcolm X Grassroots Organizations (New Africanist nationalism) are actively looking to change the face of black empowerment issues from their traditional paradigmatic framing.

These groups are loosely structured and less hierarchically ordered than the previous generation of black power activists. Their concerns are very different as well. The traditional debate between black reformism and black radicalism does not define, they argue, the chasm between the generations. Third World concerns, complex gendered identities and coalition-based politics are key to the new black youth movements, as was

clearly seen in many of the recent WTO, IMF demonstrations, in Seattle, Toronto and Trenton, New Jersey. The latter were composed of a wide range of black and ethnic youth groups. These youth movements are newly networked from a global viewpoint, building identities through transcultural social protests that reemerge as alliances between black youth groups in Harlem and other community-based movement actors such as the Puerto Rican Young Lords and Asian groups such as I Wor Kuen (Harmonious Mighty Fist). These coalitions now define the new currency of black and ethnic youth activism in the city, and are more likely to be the future composition of alliance landscapes for collective action in Harlem than those gleaned from the political networks of the traditional black leadership and its relationship to City Hall and the police department.

The politics of inclusion—community development, grassroots projects, selfhelp—and exclusion, as evident in new youth movements, have a common denominator. They are global micro-portraits of the institutionalisation of race in the cauldrons of economic, disciplinary and cultural life in New York City, In both instances, the ghetto emerges as a site rendering justice through intense citizenship conflicts. But, what is motivating these cultural processes in the miniaturised contexts described above, wherein the experience of identities demands global-local frameworks for actualisation? How are cultural/experiential issues refraining notions of justice, which, certainly in the urban ghetto, were once wholly understandable through redistributive conflicts and redress? Below we examine some tentative directions for further thinking on these questions.

Conclusion: three theses for miniaturised futures

The politics of inclusion and exclusion, as seen from the two kinds of collective action portrayed in this chapter, straddle different spheres of the citizens' world. Both have different relations as well to the experiences of choosing, belonging and recognition. We have explained these processes elsewhere in relation to the general institutional development of social movements (Lustiger-Thaler *et al.* 1998). As a conclusion, I revisit these themes under the rubric of three theses concerned with modern forms of collective action in miniaturised late modern contexts.

Thesis 1

Belonging in a global yet distinctly local community refers to the ability to state one's associations and act upon them. Belonging, traditionally, has referred to owning up to one's subjectivity, through disciplining acts and the production of meaning with 'accepted others' or in a 'community of strangers', as well as to one's place in the associative society. Urban social movements create avenues of belonging by framing ghettoised space from both ends of the citizens' world. Through struggles for inclusion, the associative linkages between a self-limiting civil society and the state are put in place. Yet belonging is also a cultural phenomenon for promoting distinctiveness, as a claim upon citizenship. In the complex relations of race and class in the American ghetto, these emerge in a politically disaggregated way. Belonging is problematical when the space, or home that one associates with it, is framed by exclusion. Hence, the very principle of belonging to

excluded space, as a starting point for collective action, brings back into social movement analysis the necessary role of unmediated protest in the social construction of localities.

Thesis 2

The exercise of choice cannot be disassociated from the dialectical exchanges inherent in globalisation and locality. The social, political and racial composition of the American ghetto places choice at the forefront of social movement activities. The globalisation of social relations, and its effect upon urban space, limits as well as expands the possibilities for autonomy. Choosing in the urban ghetto transforms the problem of autonomy into what David Held (1991) has referred to as 'nautomic processes', wherein a lack of choice becomes the most available basis for collective action and protest politics.

Thesis 3

Recognition underscores that justice is achieved through enact(ing) subjectivities, the acceptance of differences, which is only possible within institutional arrangements that operate on the principle of reciprocity. This suggests that in a miniaturised world, recognition is more and more a stake that undergirds the modern constitution of selfhood. But to relegate this conception of selfhood to the cultural domain ignores the strong lesson of urban youth protests. Recognition also entails the process whereby the subject is denied. The denial of subjectivity, as seen in the racial context that produced the experiences and politics of the Million Youth March, and the contemporary black youth movement discussed above, emerges from institutionally based exclusionary processes, which have significant redistributive features perched at their very core. Indeed, recognition is frequently used as an effective way of addressing redistributive claims around issues of racial discrimination. Recognition, as a social priority for the new youth movements, sits at the very core of late modern expressions of protest.

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3
Marginalisation and political responses in the French context

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Since the Second World War, the bases of the consensus which founded the destiny of Western democracies as democratic welfare states and rights providers have been eroding or collapsing under the pressures of economic and social global transformations and neo-liberal criticism. Market imperatives seem to transgress and subvert civic boundaries. In the last twenty years of the twentieth century, the rhetoric of 'globalisation' seems to have prevailed. The ideological effect of this discursive shift has been extraordinarily disempowering with respect to all forms of local, urban and even national political action (Harvey 1996: 420). The very idea of ideal societies defined as societies of equals in which individual interests merge into collective interests is undermined. Yet the concept of citizenship is still powerful. It is 'what draws a body of citizens together into a coherent and stable organised political community and keeps that allegiance durable' (Beiner 1995: 1). The concept of citizenship has been employed in several related ways: first, to differentiate the members of a national community from outsiders (Brubaker 1989); second, to denote a set of obligations incumbent on members of such a national community (Schnapper 1994); and third, to indicate the civil, political and social rights possessed by members of a community (Marshall 1965).

New emerging cleavages due to long-lasting unemployment, new forms of poverty and various forms of marginalisation, observed particularly in cities, erode citizenship in its various meanings. Current forms of neo-racism must not be seen as a resurgent phenomenon but as an emergent tendency and phenomenon of internationalisation; and the changes inducted in the roles of nation-states are giving way to a post-racism. Post-racism is to be understood as one of the multiple convulsive reactions to current global changes. Societies such as the French are becoming more autonomous, more complex, more heterogeneous and more difficult to manage within the public sector alone, and thus the form of social bond its philosophical, political and juridical principles provided erodes. The social evolution is getting beyond the initial mediators such as trade unions and the state actors who guaranteed the social contract. Can we then observe initiatives and political responses emanating from categories which have much to lose from the vanishing of such bonding? Are there attempts to slow the disintegration of the social ties? Are there mobilisations aimed at fighting back against increasing social polarisation?

The case of France is a particular one. The country has always been characterised by a strong centralised state and an extensive public service. Even today, in an era of extreme

economic liberalism, the public service still absorbs 20 per cent of the labour force. The culture of trade unions is largely spread on this terrain and induces resistance. There are few countries where civil society has been moulded for so long by the state apparatus, mainly because there have been few intermediary bodies between the state and society since the Revolution and the laws of the Republic decided to abolish such bodies linked to the monarchic regime. The state message of universalistic principles is still the major unifying agent of a society regulated by the uniformity of the state's centralised instructions. Currently, however, the principles of secularisation and equal treatment for all, which have been the backbones of this structure, are deeply in crisis due to the globalisation challenges imposed by the construction of the European Union and necessary modernisation. The belief in a state as an all-powerful provider has been profoundly shaken by formidable mutations.

In France, the traditional dominant management of society by elites supposed to represent a higher public interest has generated little involvement by ordinary citizens in public affairs. The public sector is expected to solve all problems in a rational way. When new social issues occur, ministries are created for that purpose: the Ministry of Women's Rights, the Ministry of the City or the Ministry for Social Integration and Against Social Exclusion, for instance. According to French ruling elites, society generates only a series of disorganised initiatives and is not expected to work its own solutions. The concept of the common good and common purposes which lie at the heart of citizenship is here provided from the top (Conover *et al.* 1991). There is a myth in France which implies that power cannot be shared. Since the decentralisation reform which took place in France at the beginning of the 1980s, local elected officials have seized for themselves the 'sacred' appointment which used to be the privilege of the central state. Due to a French oddity called the cumulation of elected offices (multiple office-holding), they are unaccountable to their constituents. Citizens are not required to take action to secure solutions by contrast with the communitarian tradition (Oldfield 1990). In the one and indivisible Republic regulated by universal and anonymous rules, fifty-eight million French clones should fit into an identical mould. Political participation is reduced to a mere ballot and the principle of citizen initiatives is unthinkable in a democracy that claims to be representative and not participatory.

Because of such rigid forms of power and more demands for changes from French society, the notion of citizenship is now in crisis, a crisis produced by the crisis of the state and which in turn produces a crisis of the state. On the one hand, mere is a lament from public officials about the atrophy of public bureaucracies preventing democratic actions from taking place at the city level at the initiative of the mayor. In some instances, public servants will not meet their various constituents outside working hours strictly defined by trade unions or will not engage in innovation if their time is not paid under contract, etc. Irritated mayors will then praise the mythical model of participatory democracy and civic action in the Tocqueville sense. On the other hand, some mayors will require absolute control of what is going on in their locality and will not tolerate citizens' initiatives which they have not supervised, dreading the emergence of counter-powers aimed at challenging them in the long run. Compared with other countries, an arsenal of administrative regulations and the weight of the public sector inhibits initiatives from 'civil society' in

general, and when they occur, this can only be done in a defiant way, as 'a society of delinquents' challenging authority

This chapter intends to show that two main functions—the mechanism of social integration and the mechanism of participation—are questioned in a country which is no longer isolated and is now more permeable to international influences. While individual states lose some of their powers, new opportunities appear. In response to the crisis, a multitude of small initiatives have been taken at the local level to slow the marginalisation induced by economic restructurations. Under circumstances that will be defined, embryonic movements of social resistance have gained visibility at the national level, emphasising the singularity of French culture and the absurdity of thinking that all things are equal in the globalisation process. Two cases, in the fields of public services and housing, will be analysed. But they can only be interpreted as urban resistance movements and not as visible alternatives. As A. Touraine has appropriately noted, we are now moving from a vertical society—which we used to call a class society with people at the top and people at the bottom—to a horizontal society where the most important thing is to know whether one is positioned at the centre or at the periphery (Touraine 1991). The larger number of people are in a precarious economic situation; they do not know whether they will move downwards or experience inclusive upward mobility. In such circumstances, the proposals of the left which is no longer in a position to negotiate improvements for a full-salaried society, lack credibility. Until the 1970s, politicised and unified workers in the labour movement were able to regroup and fight for an improvement of their social condition. The mobilisation of their resources led to a strategy. Today, in contrast, the have-nots are atomised and isolated. They find it hard to develop genuine, coherent and lasting forms of solidarity. What impact can they have on the distant and abstract international processes resulting in their doom? They can only attempt to improve their daily socio-economic problems case by case, at the margins and frequently in a chaotic way.

Marginalisation in the 1980s and 1990s in France

As a mechanism of integration, social citizenship in the Marshallian sense has been questioned by the longest economic crisis since the Second World War (Marshall and Bottomore 1992). T.S. Marshall distinguished three forms of citizenship: civil, political and social. Civil society came first historically and concerned basic rights such as the economic right to work. Political citizenship functioned on the principle of neutrality, whether it is real or not (the 'ins' are usually more 'neutral' than others). As for social citizenship which happens historically in the last stage, it includes

> the whole range from the right to modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.
>
> (Marshall and Bottomore 1992:8)

Marshall assumed that it was the level of state benefits rather than the identification of those entitled to them that was contested. The circumstances of the time when he wrote his essay in the UK in 1949 (although it was published in 1965) cannot be minimised. He was concerned with a society differentiated by class and not by race, ethnicity or gender (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996). It was not the ballot which caused a problem but whether economic inequality prevented citizens from having equal rights and the opportunity of living 'as a civilised being'. T.S. Marshall only hinted at symbolic violence, which is the hardest to eradicate: most dominated individuals and communities are forced to submit to such social conditions that they tend to adopt the dominants' points of view and even seem to give them acquiescence (Bourdieu 1995).

The Marshallian argument according to which social citizenship reduces inequalities seems currently unsubstantiated by the analysis of recent developments of poverty in France. Poverty, even in the relative meaning as defined by Peter Townsend, excludes people from the full rights of citizenship, and diminishes their social and political participation (Hill 1994:17). But is the concept of poverty appropriate here? It seems that each era brings forward its own paradigm. After several decades of prosperity when poverty seemed to have disappeared, the concept of exclusion means more than a lack of skills, an uncertain future and material deprivation. It also implies a disenfranchisement and all kinds of processes leading to extreme marginalisation as well as to the loss of social bonding (Paugham 1996:15).

According to official data provided by the Centre for the Study of Revenues and Costs in 1994 (before it was terminated for political insubordination), 1.3 million people in France have been unemployed for more than two years and 850,000 are perceived as being in danger of losing their last social ties to mainstream society. Disenfranchised and unstable, these individuals are estimated at between 250,000 and 400,000, or close to 1 per cent of the active population. In a context of prolonged crisis, the mechanisms of social protection established after the Second World War to compensate for long-lasting hardship are ill suited to prevent processes of social disintegration.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, French researchers have linked poverty and precariousness. Along with visible marginalisation, an even more important trend must be taken into account, that is the potential marginalisation of the lower middle classes. The current data shows that: almost 12 million people, that is 47 per cent of the 25 million active French aged between 18 and 64 are, in varying degrees, in situations of 'economic and social fragility'. Almost seven million of them are on their way to marginalisation, either because of their low income or because of difficulties of social integration. As in other countries, civil and political disenfranchisement result from the incapacity of the state elites, be they in public administration, in the left or right wing, or democratic representatives to break the cycle of social polarisation caused by the restructuring of the economy, the reorganisation of markets and the erosion of the welfare states. While this may not be considered a social movement as such, voters' support for far-right ideologies in Europe are expressions of discontent towards the governments' management, and mark a refusal of the liberal economic evolution and the Maastricht Treaty. Such support can be interpreted at the very least as new forms of resistance, while growing voter absenteeism also reveals increased cynicism towards representative democracy that has failed in its

duties. A former US labor secretary called the US middle classes 'the anxious middle classes', and in the 1990s French society had been termed a 'depressed' society.

The crisis of participation generates the revival of participation

The civic disenchantment of the French is also expressed by a retreat from support to traditional mediating structures: unions, political parties and partnerships formerly requiring a delegation of power with no accountability. Resistance is seen in more autonomous forms of expression, new bargaining methods, in trade-offs and offers for negotiation which were unthinkable before. This implies that the elites who are supposed to act for the common good are being destabilised by new actors who claim that their legitimacy comes from an inherently better knowledge of the issues at stake. This other conception of citizenship implying autonomy, agency and practice in turn provokes a crisis within the state apparatus at all levels. Increasingly, citizen involvement—especially of the young—in areas managed by the public sector not only puts government jobs and arrangements at risk, thus increasing antagonisms, but generates potential disorders in the functioning of bureaucracies which were until now more uniform and coherent The preferential treatment needed by certain areas which will benefit from tax exemptions, such as Corsica for instance, or by new categories such as immigrant youth in search of jobs, creates divisions of principles among the elites.

Moreover, with the decentralisation reform and the restructuring of the state, more contractual services have been established and negotiated with providers from the private and not-for-profit sectors. From the local government point of view, direct citizen participation—i.e., local defence committees, mobilisations for social justice, support movements for Aids victims, grassroots youth organisations against racism—is likely to jeopardise long-standing complex arrangements among power holders and to interfere with the local handling of social regulation. In France, cities tend to cooperate with the central state for the welfare of citizens as defined by elites; they are not opposed to the state and in search of their autonomy as in the USA and UK.

New forms of citizenship in Franc-Moisins

A recent experience in Franc-Moisins—a problem-ridden housing project consisting of several high-rise buildings in the Parisian neighbourhood of St Denis—illustrates new forms of expression and demands made as much for their symbolic value as for their practical impact upon daily life, and the trade-offs and reforms likely to follow. The process described here does not fit exactly into the Marshallian conception of social citizenship, a demand for social rights, but it does reveal rather a complex struggle taking place both against and within the public management system, and dealing with the identities at stake. It reveals new forms of empowerment, the changing role of state authorities and the diminished capacity to process change in an era of flux and questioned identities.

A national policy meant to improve public services in fragile neighbourhoods was tested initially in three pilot areas at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1993, additional pilot programmes followed in two Parisian neighbourhoods. These programmes involved residents sharing their views as public service users with the professionals providing them. In Franc-Moisins, the experiment taking place in 1994 was meant to bring together professionals from the public sector with a youth group from the local public housing project. Both groups were given equal status in the programme, the purpose of which was to define the problems and possibly work on eliminating them. Most of all, the programme was designed to establish a dialogue between two antagonistic groups both located on the lowest rungs of the social ladder.[1]

It proved to be a very difficult experience from the start. Youth in France generally tend to be blamed for the problems experienced in a community (Bourdieu 1993:94). Consequently, they develop very defensive attitudes and 'dialogue' with adults is frequently conflict-ridden. In this case, the youth group was itself composed of two sub-elements. One was a less numerous, more successful sub-group still in school. Of Portuguese working-class origin, they were more acquiescent and called 'whites' by the second sub-group. The self-defined 'brown' group was united by its belonging to the public housing project, whereas many in the first group lived across the street. Young men in the 'brown' group were either teenagers or older (between 25 and 30 years old), some of them already parents. A number of them had already had conflictual experiences through their involvement in a grassroots organisation. They were motivated, defiant, confrontational: they required to be paid by City Hall for their participation in the experience, for instance, while other participants remained passive.

Included among the public services professionals were teachers from local public schools, a mailman, a female bus driver, a community policeman, a janitor from one of the public housing projects, street educators, a public housing manager and a public health employee. They were professionally heterogeneous, with some having worked on the project for many years, others living in the area and still others completely inexperienced. They had all been asked by their managers to participate in the programme and had not volunteered to do so.

The first meeting revealed deep antagonisms. The youths claimed that they could not understand why the public services were not performed by community residents in search of jobs. 'Franc-Moisins is ruled as a colony' by outsiders, complained a youth of North-African origin. It is all the more unbearable, others added, as the project is home to a reservoir of unexpected resources and under-used skills. Some of the young university graduates have been forced to leave the neighbourhood to find a job. Those who are school dropouts have skills which are undervalued. For instance, some immigrants' children are born mediators—they have verbal skills and innovative ideas on how to improve community life. They could easily do the work performed by incompetent and routinised administrators, they thought. 'The people from public services jeopardise our capacity for self-help'; 'The gap between residents and the service providers is as large as the Grand Canyon.'

On the professionals' side, the representation of the youths was a paranoid one. While they admitted that the youths were the victims of the neighbourhood's deprivation, they vehemently denounced the violence and intimidation that homeboys aged between 9 and 15 exerted on them. 'Everyone knows those ten rascals who disrupt the project…They do not come from elsewhere, they belong to Franc-Moisins. Their parents live here. What is needed is a big stick, but we are not allowed to wield one.' The professionals would complain that they did not understand the rationale behind the rampant vandalism within the community or at the sport centre. The janitor would say that he refused to hold packages sent to the tenants as they were so often stolen in his room. The mailman would add that either his bicycle was stolen or the parcels were. The teachers would complain of attacks from the children, etc. In brief, the professionals explained their inability to fulfil their jobs due to a violent environment. Their solution was to close themselves off physically and psychologically.

In their discussions, the concept of death was recurrent: exasperated parents and furious colleagues wished the kids would simply disappear. Both the professionals and the youth acknowledged the deprivation of the area and the poor quality of services as an aggravating factor: no buses in the evening, no facilities in the schools, not enough public telephones, no lawns, no flowers, etc.

Then something changed during subsequent sessions. The youths—and the 'brown' group especially—became eager to demonstrate their legitimacy to the community which was watching the experience. They did not want to be cut off from their peer group or from the residents because of their participation in a programme organised from the top. Yet their very participation in the programme gave them the energy to suggest another initiative: they offered to carry out a voter registration drive. They felt that this would allow them to become true mediators between the residents and the authorities. If they were able to gather 500 signatures, they would be able to exert pressures on the Communist mayor who feared the influence of the National Front if he yielded too easily to the housing project's clientele. They would become negotiators, their legitimacy would be strengthened and their identity enhanced.

As they started the registration drive, however, they discovered several elements which they had not anticipated. First, they became aware of the fact that many adults were intimidated by them. They had not measured the amount of pain and anguish experienced by the community residents as a result of the violence committed by the youths.

> Some adults prefer to get up at dawn to go shopping because they are so afraid of getting mugged if they do so after work in the evening…The day I started talking to people in the community, I realised that adults have a problem with the young of the housing project and that it is the young people's fault.

Why would adults bother to vote if they were too scared to walk on the streets? Second, they discovered that adults did not trust them in their capacity of mediators. The initiators of the drive realised that their view so far had been fragmented and their *savoir faire* limited. Third, they understood that their self-centred approach would prove a dead end

and that their initiative would be facilitated by more cooperation with the public sector professionals.

The failure of the attempt to build voter registration refocused the youths on their difficult dialogue with the service providers. The confrontational attitude developed in the initial days was transformed into a need for more dialogue, albeit a conflictual one. A plan emerged which would entail the creation of a 'transitional centre', in a sort of interface space to be managed both by the service providers and the young residents. Its function would be to operate as a mediating structure in the residents' conflictual relations with the professionals. For example, the police were repeatedly confronted with teenagers labelled 'problem kids'. Testing limits, harassing tenants of the public housing project, confronting adults, these 12–14-year-old kids would squat in the buildings' stairs, drink, smoke, break any objects available and scribble graffiti on the walls. Instead of being summarily sent to the police station, first-time delinquents could be brought to this centre, where parents would then be called and informed about their children's behaviour. Older 'brothers' would mentor the delinquents in their own words. If a decision to sanction the acts was taken, this would take place on the spot rather than six or twelve months later.[2]

With this initiative, the youths of immigrant origin wanted to demonstrate their potential for developing a positive identity, another sense of citizenship extending to everyone in the community, and mediation skills. They were refusing to be 'helped' by professionals, but instead they offered their services to the same professionals. Their efforts were geared specifically towards those who did not feel comfortable with teenagers from diverse backgrounds or who were scared of them. For instance, as they suggested, the first school day is inevitably a challenge for young teachers who receive all kinds of threats as a test With many younger children brought up without clear normative directions and the victims of domestic violence, aggressive behaviour and a lack of respect for adults are frequent problems. The presence of a young paraprofessional in the classroom would ease these tensions: many teachers want simply to teach instead of being educators as well and do not see discipline as part of their job.

The case of the police, however, proved insoluble. The police were often criticised for abusing and disrespecting the youths. In the area, half of them have been with the police for less than two years. They are most often provincial French, and not used to urban mass and immigrant culture. Fewer than 2 per cent of children of north African descent belong to the police, who feel insulted by the kids' language, by their rap songs calling for cop murder, etc. Accusations of brutality, racism and constant harassment have become a bone of contention between the two groups. The police are often likened to an occupation force, determining arbitrarily who has the right to be on the streets, on whose terms and under what conditions (Waddington *et al.* 1989; Body-Gendrot 1995). Although most of these youths of foreign origin are indeed French, they are repeatedly required to show their IDs and are submitted—in their own words—to racist remarks at the time of these controls. Increasing tensions over community—police relations frequently mean that an isolated police incident will spark large-scale violent confrontations (Body-Gendrot 1995). It would prove difficult for this youth group to trust and cooperate with the police, and their overall peer group would simply not tolerate it. At the end of the programme, the professionals and the youths were

nevertheless eager to start the interface centre, and a meeting with the mayor and the representative of the state, the *Préfet,* was organised.

Strangely enough, the mayor simply refused to take the proposal seriously while the *Préfet* was interested. How can such contradictory attitudes be explained? The attitude of the *Préfet* is understandable: the French central state as the Great Provider is in crisis and since 1989, numerous urban programmes have been launched at the national level to reform the state. Initiatives are therefore welcomed by reformers; the local level is seen as the ideal place for experimentation. The youths are a politically volatile and interesting social category and any symbolic programme of this kind is bound to reap rewards. In contrast, the mayor's daily experience in the field makes him suspicious of the young people's request. He sees them more frequently as troublemakers whose solutions consist in increased demands and intimidation. Second, these 'brown' youths hail from one of St Denis's most unmanageable areas and it is difficult for the mayor to trust them with a long-term initiative. He knows that the voters are likely to share his suspicions and that the National Front is watching his every move. Third, on principle he defends the notion of civil service jobs against community-based jobs that would inevitably require city financing and would tie his hands.

The failure of this second initiative did not prove that the programme had failed completely. A number of local services were modified. The best results were observed in public housing management where the participating janitor in the programme briefed his fellow janitors for weeks. This move was not only encouraged but supported concretely through scheduling by housing management. The same phenomenon was observed within the public transportation service. Two executives spent one Sunday morning talking with both the profes sionals and the youths in the programme. Rather than offering the youths dead-end jobs on the buses, the response to the programme was long-term training initiatives, and one participant was subsequently hired. Not surprisingly, the colleagues of the participating policeman were not interested in the information concerning the programme. And in the schools, frustrated teachers also refused to 'understand' what these negatively perceived youths wanted. They could not tolerate the young people's criticisms or their language, and rather than availing themselves the opportunity of seeing things differently, they simply discredited the programme.

However, evolutionary adaptations should not be overlooked. Two months later, police overtures were observed and a dialogue started. Some delinquents were seen repainting the police station. Discussion to reduce stops and searches began. Communication is likely to remain difficult, all the more so as rampant drug trafficking, illegal weapon caches and the threats of Algerian terrorists have led to increased demands from the general public for searches, arrests and raids. The security state replaces the welfare state, a development seen in most states submitting to chaotic readjustments.

An urban social movement of resistance: Right to Housing

Like the social movement of the 1970s, strong protest movement and street demonstrations appear as alternative modes of action when the system of representation is in crisis. These 'weapons of the weak' can be used effectively to counter the strong trends

of economic globalisation and state *laisser-faire* and to reintroduce direct democracy in a system weakened by the widening gap between national elites and citizens (Mathiot 1994).

Since the end of the 1970s, there has been a visible propensity in France for citizens to question directly the government about sectorial policies or to insist vigorously on essential claims. Protest movement or 'voice' can in some cases be seen as an ultimate and desperate mode of action at the margins of legal processes triggered by the crisis of regulation of the state and by its weakening capacities to respond to new and complex demands.

Housing reveals particularly well that the contradictions of the state may generate alternative solutions from citizens as well as a reorganisation of elites and new policy input.

The housing situation in Paris

The housing situation first began to deteriorate in cities in the 1980s. As in other Western capitals, massive speculation hit Paris at the end of the decade (Sassen 1991). Foreign investments (50 per cent Japanese) targeted real estate in central Paris. In 1986, for example, the price per square metre grew an average of 25 per cent. Owners would sell their property and buy another for the sake of profit.[3] In the meantime, thousands of low-income units were being destroyed by the impetus of restructuring programmes and financial incentives to build office space. Evictions were made legally but also through thugs' intimidation and arson. Slum lords were rarely punished. Each year, 90,000 housing units for low-income tenants disappeared, while, due to scarcity, the rents increased (Amara *et al.* 1994). Over ten years, 1.7 million low-income tenants doubled the share of their income devoted to housing while suffering from dramatic salary reductions. People who in the past had left public housing for better conditions now remained captive, and the rate of rotation in public housing was under 5 per cent a year in the Parisian region. The construction of subsidised housing was reduced from 220,000 units in 1982 to 90,000 units in 1991. A waiting list of 75,000 households in Paris was firm proof of the colossal housing shortage, even if the list was not totally accurate. Several million poorly housed or homeless people became increasingly visible in cities.

During initial housing speculation, analysts from various disciplines came to the same conclusions. They anticipated that despite laws passed under the left defending the right of renters, the *laisser-faire* policy would eventually lead to a dead end. At some point in the 1990s, legal requisitions of vacant buildings as a response to speculative market trends would become mandatory.

An ordinance passed on 11 October 1945—and reincorporated in the code of construction approved continually by all governments—stipulates that 'based on a mayor's recommendation…the representative of the state in a (territorial) department can, by way of requisition, authorise a partial or total seizure of vacant, empty, or under-occupied housing' (Vaysse 1994) for up to one year renewable. This ordinance benefits 'persons deprived of housing or housed in obviously insufficient conditions'. The rent is defined according to an agreement between the beneficiary and the provider under

reasonable limits. If the recipient cannot pay the provider, the state will act as a substitute and require the rent from the recipient. This ordinance was enforced between 1946 and 1960 and allowed 160,000 persons to obtain housing in vacant apartments. It was also used at the end of the Algerian war when French colonials returned to France (Vaysse 1994). Subsequently, it was no longer enforced.

But at the end of the 1980s, with massive eviction going strong and an obvious shortage of low income housing for 202,000 homeless, several voices were heard. Jean Baptiste Eyraud analysed the situation from the squatters' point of view in the 20th district in Paris; Jean Claude Amara, the singer, from the street people's perception; François Broteau, the lawyer, from daily eviction trials; Philippe Chavance, from an architect's point of view. They all came to the same conclusion: the reinforcement of the 1945 ordinance could no longer be avoided. 'A strange and explosive mixture of people angered by the housing shortage scandal and by *laisser-faire* policies then realised that the only field where an alternative policy could be offered was in that of urbanism', says F. Broteau.[4] These future leaders had met through court hearings and squat operations (Broteau was then an elected representative from the Green Party in the 12th district and he had been an active member of Greenpeace), they had seen younger and younger people being evicted, and they shared the same views.

They were able to form a stable and closely knit leadership of what would become in 1990 the Organisation for the Right to Housing (ORH).

The first experiments

At the end of the 1980s, two squatting operations, rue des Vignolles and rue de la Fontaine aux Rois, represented the first collective experiences under this new leadership, and anticipated larger operations. They involved 50 per cent national and 50 per cent foreign families from North Africa and Africa. Thrown into the street by arson, they nevertheless held regular jobs and had paid their rents. Their plight pointed out the callous handling of low-income housing by the city. Protest actions attracted political anarchists eager to do battle with the police, and this in turn led to the creation of a radical committee of the ill housed. On the side of the squatters, the leadership was then a mixture of anarchists and reformers. But in contrast with other groups competing in the same area, the reformers' unfaltering approach was to link the housing shortage to the scandal of vacant social or private housing, and to establish a direct link between the two phenomena. Brutal police repression put an abrupt end to the squatting operations.

Square de la Réunion: 1990

In 1990, some of the families came back and squatted in Square de la Réunion, in the 20th district. This was a successful operation: new allies came and joined the group already formed by previous experiences. Political representatives sided with the squatters, including Catholic leaders from the Emmaüs community. Among these, Abbé Pierre brought support. Abbé Pierre is a priest who has led crusades in support for the destitute

from the 1950s onwards. He is well known for a national and dramatic appeal he made during winter 1954 after a homeless woman froze to death. Since then, he has been an accepted and very popular spokesman for the poor, venting his anger at governments and campaigning to provide food, shelter and dignity for thousands of homeless. He is now in his eighties.[5]

As the group of allies grew, a scission appeared. The political radicals would admit no concession whatsoever (especially towards the media). They wanted only to confront the state and the police and to create a proletarian political party, whereas the pragmatic reformers wished to negotiate an exit from the squat with the authorities. Gradually, the reformers were seen by the families as the best defenders of their interests and the radical leaders faded out.[6]

The forty-three households were all rehoused and left the squat. Subsequently, the families became part of the leadership's decision-making process. They themselves kept order among the number of families later admitted in the squat, did not tolerate drug addicts or delinquents and ran the squat democratically. This was a new phenomenon acknowledging a wide definition of citizenship implying that 'citizens of the world' have rights, as persons, in the country where they live, whatever their status with regard to national citizenship. No doubt, globalising pressures, but also localising pressures, undercut narrowly defined communalist (nationalist) identity.

The first success

Beside a sense of action and skills for organisation, the third asset of ORH (formally created in 1990) appeared here forcefully. The leaders were obviously gifted communicators. As it was obviously easier to reach a wider public in a centralised country when the action takes place in the capital, the presence of the media was a given. Media were sympathetic to the David vs Goliath struggle at the square de la Reunion, in a great part thanks to J.B. Eyraud, an outstanding communicator. His slogan 'to fight for housing with housing' forcefully summed up the notion that requisitions were the solution. In several interviews, including one in the presence of Pierre Bourdieu, the Abbé Pierre insisted that the state should seize 100,000 units. 'We have to squat buildings belonging to the National Railways, to Electric Public Utilities, to state institutions…That's the way to start', he said. 'No one will suffer and it is good for France and for the French.' The perception that the movement was special and involved unusually eloquent spokesmen for the mostly African destitute, who have no highly bureaucratised professional associations to represent them, won the public's sympathy. The socialist government was in an awkward position. M.N. Lienemann, the housing minister, a radical in the Socialist Party, favoured requisitions. But, according to E Broteau, her measures were then opposed by the *Préfets* who defended a continuation of the state's *laisser-faire* policies and who, anticipating the end of the socialist era, opposed any bold moves.[7] Nevertheless, concessions were made and for the first time ever J.B. Eyraud was invited to discuss with the *Préfet,* thereby gaining access to the political decision-making process. The representation of the homeless by ORH thus became institutionalised. From this moment on, the organisation was seen as an important and legitimate actor at the bargaining table.

This could not have been the case when the radicals were part of the leadership. Their language, their logic and their codes were unacceptable to those in power.[8]

Quai de la Gare: 1991

A new squatting operation, Quai de la Gare, involved 100 families made for the most part of Malian legal residents. 'Nobody wants to provide housing for immigrants and the poor. They are costly and vote badly', in the words of J.B. Eyraud (*Le Monde,* 22 January 1994).

The choice of location, near the construction site of the National Public Library favoured by François Mitterand, once more attracted the media, the Abbé Pierre and major charity and anti-racist organisations. Negotiations took place to rehouse the families. But after thirty-three of them were left with no housing solution, a very dramatic protest march signalled clearly that a new strategy was being launched. Every other day, the families including their children, squatted in a vacant building before being evicted early at dawn by the police. They were then sheltered in a variety of religious institutions from churches to temples. It proved to be a strenuous experience but the predominant presence of women and children as shot by the cameras in front of vacant buildings successfully attracted the public's attention to the scandal of citizens—not delinquents—being forced to live on the streets while apartments remained vacant.

According to the National Electric Utilities statistics, there were about 2 million vacant housing units in France, which represents 7.2 per cent of all housing in France and 9.1 per cent in Paris, in 1994. INSEE, the national statistics institute, evaluated the number of units in 1994 at 117,000 in Paris (including eighty buildings belonging to public institutions and business corporations) and 309,000 in the Parisian region as a whole. Four million square metres of corporate real estate alone were vacant in the Parisian region.

Avenue René Coty: March 1993

When 200,000 demonstrators took to the streets to protest the housing policies in Paris, Mayor J. Chirac realised that his *laisser-faire* approach was at an end. Nevertheless, on 23 March 1993, another operation in an empty centre belonging to the city, avenue René Coty, proved that the mayor was still willing to yield to the hawks and preferred repression to negotiation. As the reformers had obtained days of grace from the Court of Appeal after an eviction court order, brutal police evictions started early in the morning of 26 August (when potential demonstrators were on holiday), before the court decision. The mayor's move angered the judges. On 17 September 1993, for the first time ever, 'an occupation contrary to the law but dictated by a state of necessity' won over property rights. The court created the concept of a 'state of necessity' for the twenty-three African homeless families (who had already been evicted from the centre which was subsequently voluntarily damaged to prevent further squatting). This jurisprudence would later be used by OHR to temporarily protect thousands of squatters while solutions were being sought. The media coverage was sympathetic to the operation, the families cooperated courageously and the public sided with the destitute. Squatting would no longer be considered a cause for scandal if the owner of the building were a large institution, a

corporation or a business maintaining property empty for years for merely speculative purposes.

Rue du Dragon: 1994

The successful operation which took place in rue du Dragon benefited from all the gains made during previous struggles. Its timing also coincided with some of the elite's repositioning. It occurred in winter, during the presidential campaign, when two right-wing presidential candidates were competing to attract a large electorate. Chirac had committed himself to the struggle against poverty and marginalisation, and harped on the theme of 'social fracture'. The polls had shown that in January 1994, 64 per cent of the French thought that homelessness was one of the most critical problems in Paris. For 47 per cent, housing for the homeless was a top priority (*Le Monde,* 26 January 1994). In February 1994, when 81 per cent of the French approved requisitions (up from 70 per cent in a previous poll), it had become clear that the ORH's line of action had been legitimised. The decision of the Constitutional Council to consider housing right as 'an objective with constitutional values' was yet another victory. The stage was thus set for the success of a major operation.

In December 1994, 300 militants from ORH and the Committee to Defend the Homeless occupied a five-storey building owned by COGEDIM, a subsidiary firm of Bank Paribas in Saint Germain des Prés, a bourgeois and intellectual district. The large building and its surroundings had remained vacant for over three years for speculative reasons. Twenty families initially, then sixty families of French, North African and African origins, would live in this posh district for several months. Not that they particularly liked that area. In fact, it was not at all convenient for them: stores were expensive and for kids who wanted to keep attending the schools in their previous neighbourhood, it was impractical. But as with Quai de la Gare, the location was perfect for communication purposes and visibility. It stood as a powerful symbol of speculation and waste.

Strong support came within hours the first Sunday from the old and sick Abbé Pierre, who once again vented his anger on prime-time news broadcasts, aiming it at government and in particular at J. Chirac, the mayor of Paris. Scientist A. Jacquart did not hesitate to compare the situation to 1940, 'when Pétain respected the law while De Gaulle served his country'. Prime Minister Balladur, a presidential candidate, met the same evening with ORH leaders and pledged that the police would not be ordered to evict the families. He stated his disapproval of the gentrification process which had taken place in Paris. Within hours, Chirac, the other key right-wing candidate, reacted, and in his capacity as mayor, began legal procedures to requisition vacant apartments owned by large corporations in Paris. The next day, he claimed that 200 units had been found for squatting families. He did not mention the costly single room occupancies or the overcrowded shelters, nor did he allude to the fact that over one housing unit per building remains vacant in Paris and is not rented for many reasons, not the least of which are racial and ethnic discrimination.

Institutional targets

The ball was then in the court of the institutional owners caught in the act of non-assistance to the destitute. The media coverage, and the public and elite support for the squatters led the institutional owners to look for compromise. New policy input was gained by the movement and spectacular decisions were made. After three weeks of negotiation with ORH, Banque de France, for example, offered an empty building on the outskirts, a two-year lease and afford able rent to forty-one families squatting in the rue de Béranger in one of its buildings.[9] Thanks to a number of social benefits, the majority of squatters can afford to rent. In another building owned by Gaz de France, rue Condorcet, a similar process took place. In July 1995, an additional forty-eight buildings were seized, primarily from the National Construction Society. What M.N. Lienemann had not been able to obtain at the end of the socialist era was now possible with Chirac as President. Chirac himself ordered the takeover of institutional properties. Thus the continuity of the state line of action was not threatened. In 1995 these seizures represented 10 per cent of the 408 units offered by the city to over 1,000 people (the majority of which were children) associated with homeless organisations.

Other policies have followed. On 23 May 1995, the prime minister announced a plan of extreme emergency, the construction of 10,000 units (1,400 in Paris) before winter and of 10,000 additional units designed to accelerate the accommodation of the homeless.[10]

A particularly spectacular institutional move occurred in August 1995. The prime minister himself, bowing to accusations of having benefited from the use of public housing for his family, seized 500 vacant units from large corporations (insurance companies, banks, etc.) after they would not relinquish housing by a set date. 'Vacancy of empty apartments, of dwellings or offices is intolerable in a society where too many people are homeless or poorly housed', he said in a communication to the press. ORH was asked to provide the names of 700 families particularly in need.

This is not the first time that low-income housing has been on the political agenda in France. In 1990, when the Besson Law was passed, the national legislature had been eager to prove its awareness that housing is a guarantee of social cohesion. But the mechanisms of enforcement provided by the law supporting low-income housing were never fully exploited. The law relied upon a consensus among local decision makers which was rarely obtained: either authorities were reluctant to welcome certain types of poor families, or they found that by yielding to developers the new-found cash in their coffers benefited the general good of the community. The political will to fight for additional low-income or mixed housing was missing and every one was passing the buck. Despite vigorous and supportive statements, such actions of solidarity fade out again if institutions do not feel threatened by social upheaval. This may explain why, faced with an obvious reluctance on the part of insurance companies and banks, and despite millions of square metres of unoccupied real estate around Paris, the *Préfets* and mayors prepared plans to commandeer other apartments (*Le Monde,* 8 November 1995 and 30 November 1995).

Conclusion

The propensity of citizens to resort to new methods of protest allows new actors to occupy the social stage. In the cases illustrated above, the young and the homeless of various national origins have found allies to make their plight visible. As is obvious in the case of ORH, they have relied on action, organisation and strong relations with the media to influence those in power. When protest is stigmatised and extreme, the media are prone to cover and dramatise a cause. Another case in point concerns African immigrants of ill-defined status who occupied a church in Paris, St-Ambroise, for weeks during the summer of 1996. When the police forcefully intervened to chase them out, their cause became immediately popular throughout the world.

As M.Schain has pointed out, the question here is not simply how the structures act from below but how they act from above, how movements of direct action relate to elite behaviour, and how the actions of elites mould the protest environment (Schain 1994: 67). These protest forms emphasise the weakening position of the French elite in the governance of a complex society. Restricted resources mean that the state has an increasingly limited margin of action with which to respond to new challenges: available funds are absorbed by the salaries of public employees, pensions, allocations for the unemployed, and other mandatory social transfers. The state is also caught in an internationally interdependent environment which has reordered priorities: the defence of the currency, sharp global economic competition, foreign relations and diplomatic ties. At budget time, these priorities predominate over social redistribution policies and the reduction of inequalities (Mathiot 1994). In this respect, there is little difference between the right and the left, as seen in the lack of change in fiscal policies. The delegitimation of the political sphere is both a cause and a consequence of these factors.

ORH differs significantly from other protest movements in France: it has not only resulted in the incorporation of homeless people's representatives in the political decision-making process but it has set the issue as a new policy priority as well. Civil servants abhor a vacuum. They want the predictability that comes from dealing with reliable interlocutors (Baumgartner 1994:91). In this case, the state is willing to propel and maintain familiar leaders for fear of contagion in other areas bringing in unmanageable activists. There is also recognition that the routine policy process has not included the homeless as an important constituency at a time of widespread social malaise. The leaders of the ORH (Eyraud, Chavance, Amara, etc.) enjoyed wide support in their membership and were seen by the government as both threatening and trustworthy. They also had the support of charismatic individuals such as the Abbé Pierre, Albert Jacquart, R. Schwartzenberg, a cancer specialist, intellectuals and artists. Their methods which seriously challenged the administration's routine processes had imposed new conceptions of citizenship largely approved in the public opinion polls. The whole experience demonstrates the increased public involvement in spheres previously controlled by the state, and imposes the idea that power can be shared. It is commonly agreed that life in a civil society and political community depends on the exercise of a civility that actively supports processes and structures that constitute the public realm: what Shils calls 'the virtue of civil society' (Hill 1994:12).

At the same time, variations in the opportunity structure, remarks Schain, are important to the understanding of these movements and others. They explain why those in power react in the way they do and how protest can become a tool for competition between elites (Schain 1994:81). Because struggles remain fragmented, unlike in 1968, the weakened elites can nevertheless redeploy their legitimacy, as there is still expectation in the public that they are in charge. The involvement of the judicial system and of the Constitutional Council marks, however, a turning point. From injunctions and sanctions relative to social behaviours and normative conformity, the judicial branch is seen here in a new role: as a direct participant in social negotiation which spells out new elements relative to the housing issue and to subsequent contracts (Worms 1994:133). A new jurisprudence has clipped the hawks' wings. An interesting comparison could be made here with the massive demonstrations taking place in Belgium in the autumn of 1996 in the interest of justice and the laundering of institutions.

The monopolistic violence of the state and of a socially split society towards the disempowered in general has been illustrated here by those homeless confronted with extremely precarious situations and marginalisation. Yet, they received public sympathy at a time when 55 per cent of the French feared marginalisation for themselves (69 per cent of them 18–24-year-olds) and 73 per cent fear it for one of their kin (*La Rue,* 2 December 1993). The housing cases analysed here, as well as, though to a lesser degree, the youth mobilisation in St Denis, reveal that these types of protest, unlike those used to block a policy or a bill, may be used to empower the weak and win influence in the policy process. While the two cases are different, the youth mobilisation in St Denis dealing more with identity and public management and the housing protests with social rights, in both situations an ideology based on a new conception of citizenship has linked the participants. For the young, a hybrid and fluid system of ethnic identification demanded an extension of their field of intervention, equal opportunities and dignity. For ORH, there were common points of philosophical and historical reference. As Chantal Mouffe puts it, what binds people together is the common recognition of a set of ethico-political values; this allows for both pluralism and the respect of individual liberty (Mouffe 1994:225). It ensures that other groups (for example, Act-Up for the victims of AIDS; Acting against Unemployment, an organisation which launched street demonstrations with the unemployed; and now immigrants with uncertain status) would be potentially interested in their claims and in their new forms of action, so that what began as a small protest will develop into a larger one.

Notes

1 The researchers in charge of the programme were Maria Do Ceu Cunha, a sociologist, and two social therapists, Susan Rosenberg and Charles Rozman. We thank Maria Do Ceu Cunha for providing us with her report, and the team of Profession Banlieue in St Denis to which we belong.

2 Community Courts already function on this basis but they are not numerous enough and many judges are reluctant to simply supervise mediations.

3 In 1987, the Shell Building, bought for 2.5 billion francs in February, was sold for 3.7 billion francs in October (*Libération,* 19 October 1992).
4 Interview by the author.
5 Abbé Pierre had seen his reputation tarnished by the support he gave to a long-time friend Roger Garaudy, who wrote an anti-Semitic essay in 1996.
6 A failed operation at Vincennes led by radicals proved that they were right.
7 Interview by the author.
8 For similar processes in the 13th district and at the end of the 1970s, see Body-Gendrot (1987).
9 A governmental agency and the Abbé Pierre Foundation paid for the renovation work.
10 In December 1994, he had admitted that

> social housing had never been meant to shelter people with no income. It should be problematic, he added, to require low-income tenants to pay for non-income tenants…Pragmatically, if I provide an apartment to a family with problems, I am then guilty in the eyes of the other tenants.
>
> (*Le Monde,* 20 December 1994)

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Part II

The urban economy in global context

The phenomenon of globalisation has never been as evident or transparent as in the process of economic globalisation. Globalisation as a concept has its roots in the hustle and bustle of financial markets as they rush to mobilise capital with its concomitant effects on national, regional and local economies. In this course of development, the economies of cities have emerged as a new field of inquiry from an urban social movement perspective. The city has become a prime site for fiscal contradictions stemming from higher levels of the state, as well as concerted action by grassroots groups targeting the local economy as part of their field of action. At the same time, the city has been theorised more and more in relation to global economic flows, suggesting a new direction in the way we understand the expanding parameters of the new economy.

The social effects of economic globalisation have been less well studied than the extant logic underscoring economic flows and informationalisation. How has the local as a site fared in the context of a changing national economy? What processes can we point to as indicative of a local response to globalisation, as a form of collective action that tries to challenge the economic system? And what of the social response to the process of economic globalisation that has taken the form of such phenomena as local economic development and control, indeed the social economy? Subsequently, what are the prospects of such initiatives in the face of overwhelming factors regulating the global marketplace?

The authors of part II present the effects of globalisation upon the actions of grassroots organisations coping with a changed, if not a changing, economic landscape. Yet this landscape still in so many ways remains wedded to an advanced state of Keynesian economic welfare crises that play themselves out within national states. All the authors in this section are cautious about the impact of local groups upon the economic fields in which they find themselves, particularly their capacity to challenge the new economic order. Bob Jessop points to the necessity for the economy to be reabsorbed back into civil society through the actions of urban social movements. Marguerite Mendell and Eric Shragge and Jean-Marc Fontan pinpoint the difficulty of sustaining grassroots actions and strategies in local economic development processes. The juxtaposition between the local and the global is never as acute nor as transparent as in the attempt to gain control of economic levers, which takes place more and more in the context of entrepreneurial cities seeking out stakes in the global marketplace.

4
Globalisation, entrepreneurial cities and the social economy[1]

Bob Jessop

Globalisation has a multitude of contested meanings. Moreover, considered as an allegedly existing process, it lacks any clear causal status. This makes it hard to relate globalisation to cities and social movements—especially as the natures of cities and social movements are themselves disputed. These difficulties have shaped the order of argument in the following discussion. First, before addressing entrepreneurial cities and the scope they might offer to social movements to expand the social economy, I offer some general remarks on the 'chaotic concept' of globalisation. I also comment on some of the complex processes which are currently shaping globalisation. The second topic is the highly mediated, but nonetheless real, relationship between globalisation and the changing economic and social problems said to confront mature welfare states in advanced capitalist societies. After considering the specific ideal-typical features of these welfare states, the emerging features of a new type of welfare regime are briefly discussed. These economic and social problems and their reflection in new forms of economic and social reproduction are especially evident in cities. Thus a third concern is the rise of so-called 'entrepreneurial cities' in response to the manifold crisis of Atlantic Fordism and their efforts to maintain or enhance their position in an intensifying inter-urban competition. A fourth topic is the limits to any and all attempts to enhance the competitiveness of cities within the framework of a globalising economy. Even successful cities face problems in this regard; and, of course, there are always losers in this process too. One response to these problems provides the focus for the fifth part of the chapter: the renewed interest on the part of some social movements and some urban authorities in the social economy. The concluding section offers some general observations on the role of the social economy in the rescaling of economic and social life within a global society.

Globalisation: chaotic concept, chaotic process

The first task is to deconstruct the 'chaotic concept' of globalisation. The latter is often, treated in both theoretical and empirical studies as if it were a distinctive and singular causal process in its own right. But such accounts typically fail to grasp the quite varied forms in which this process occurs and the different understandings which motivate key actors in their approach to globalisation (for a recent review of these complexities, see Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1995). They ignore the extent to which globalisation is the

complex resultant of many different forces and processes—processes occurring on various spatial and temporal scales and originating in widely dispersed places and/or networks of places. They neglect the extent to which globalisation involves complex and tangled causal hierarchies rather than a simple, unilinear, bottom-up or top-down movement, as well as the extent to which globalisation is always a contingent product of tendencies and counter-tendencies. And they overlook the extent to which globalisation typically involves an eccentric 'inter-penetration' of different scales of social organisation rather than their simple 'nesting' in the manner of Russian dolls.

These problems can be avoided by taking a fresh look at globalisation in four respects. First, we need to distinguish between the structural and strategic dimensions of globalisation. Whereas the former dimension refers to the extent to which there is growing global interdependence (covariation) among actions on different scales, the latter refers to the extent to which actors themselves adopt global horizons of action. Second, rather than considering globalisation in isolation, it should be understood in terms of its complex interrelation with trends on other spatial scales. These include such trends as localisation, regionalisation, 'triadisation', the growth of cross-border linkages, and the development of transnational urban networks. Third, we must recognise the multicentric nature of globalisation, especially with the recent challenge of several East Asian economies to the global hegemonic pretensions of Western Europe and North America.[2] And, fourth, we must distinguish the different social fields or domains in which globalisation is said to be occurring. This is especially important because the driving forces and the relative balance of tendencies and counter-tendencies typically vary across different domains.

Structurally, globalisation in a specific domain can be said to exist in so far as the covariation of relevant activities becomes more global in extent and/or the speed of such covariation on a global scale increases. This sort of covariation is linked to the stretching of social relations over time and space so that they can be coordinated over longer periods of time (including into the ever more distant future) and over longer distances, greater areas or more scales of activity. As well as 'time-space distantiation', however, globalisation involves new forms of 'time—space compression'. This involves the intensification of 'discrete' events in real time[3] and/or the increased velocity of material and immaterial flows over a given distance. 'Time-space compression' is tied to material and social technologies that enable control to be exercised more precisely over ever shorter periods in 'real time' and that enable 'space to be conquered by time'.[4] As an emergent phenomenon that derives from these processes and reacts back on their subsequent development, globalisation can be seen as both a structural and a structuring phenomenon. Given its complex, over-determined nature, however, globalisation is always prey to uneven development and reversals.

Strategically, globalisation refers to actors' attempts to coordinate their activi ties on a global scale. Such attempts can be pursued through different material and social technologies on the interpersonal, inter-organisational, inter-institutional and intersystemic levels. These are exemplified in: interpersonal networking (for example, the Chinese diaspora); inter-organisational 'strategic alliances' orchestrated by transnational enterprises (alliances which may include more local or regionally based firms as well as non-profit oriented

organisations); the institutional design of 'international regimes' to govern particular fields of action; and various projects for global governance or even comprehensive world government. Needless to say, whether as strategy or project, 'globalisation' has no guarantees of success.

Seen from this viewpoint, what is generally labelled nowadays as 'economic globalisation' rarely, if ever, involves full structural integration—let alone complete strategic coordination—across the globe. Among processes included under this rubric are: (1) the inter nationalisation of national economic spaces through growing penetration (inward flows) and extraversion (outward flows); (2) the formation of regional economic blocs embracing several national economies; (3) the development of economic ties between local and regional authorities in different national economies—ties which often bypass the national level but are sometimes sponsored by one or more national states; (4) the movement of multinational companies (MNCs) and transnational banks (TNBs) from limited economic activities abroad to more comprehensive and worldwide strategies, sometimes extending to 'global localisation' in and through which firms pursue a global strategy based on exploiting local differences; (5) the opening of national borders through various liberalisation measures; (6) the widening and deepening of international regimes covering economic and economically relevant issues; and (7) the emergence of globalisation proper through the introduction and acceptance of global norms and standards, the development of globally integrated markets together with globally oriented strategies, and 'deracinated' firms with no evident national operational base. In each case these processes could be said to be contributing—in however mediated and indirect a way and on whatever scale—to the structural integration and/or strategic coordination of the economic system on a global scale. But they do so in a dispersed, fragmented and partial manner.

Moreover, far from homogenising economic space, the various processes involved in globalisation actually involve the reordering—across a wide range of economic spaces on different spatial scales—of differences and complementarities as the basis for dynamic competitive advantages. The latter can be understood in terms of 'structural competitiveness' (Chesnais 1986) or in the even broader terms of 'systemic competitiveness' (Messner 1996).[5] Both concepts highlight the continuing importance of place (in both its terrestrial and territorial aspects) in competition. Thus economic globalisation is typically, if paradoxically, linked to a revalorisation of the role of the 'region' in economic activities and economic intervention. In this context, of course, 'region' covers a multitude of scales from hemispheres and triads to sub- or cross-border regions. Each of these regions is struggling in one way or another for competitive advantage. However, since competitiveness is always relational and dynamic, the competitive game always produces comparative losers as well as winners.

In this sense globalisation is better interpreted as the most inclusive structural context in which processes on other economic scales could be identified and interrelated and/or as the broadest horizon of action to which accumulation strategies and economic projects can be directed. This implies that economic processes are multi-scalar and that globalisation is best seen as an emergent, over-determined phenomenon rather than as a *sui generis* causal mechanism. Globalisation depends, in short, on sub-global processes.

Moreover, regarded as a horizon of action, globalisation means thinking globally, even if acting locally, regionally or triadically. One does not need to be omnipresent in order to insert oneself favourably into the global division of labour. This not only holds for firms but also, and even more forcefully, for localities, cities, regions or states. But one must increasingly think about one's strategic advantages and disadvantages in relation to global processes. It follows that an appropriate focus in studying economic globalisation is the changing global economic hierarchy, its changing scalar division of labour, its emerging structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas, its various sources of resistance, and its linkages to other fields of globalisation.

Globalisation and the welfare state

What does this approach to globalisation imply for the analysis of the state, cities and social movements in advanced capitalism? Above all it means that not only past spatial fixes, but also past scalar fixes are becoming harder to maintain. During the period of Atlantic Fordism which emerged after 1945, it was the national scale that was primary in both economic management and political organisation. This was reflected in the dominance of the 'Keynesian welfare national state' (or KWNS) as the principal institutional complex in and through which the market-mediated processes of capital accumulation and social reproduction were regularised in advanced capitalist societies.[6] This implied in turn that most cities operated primarily as sites of capital accumulation and social reproduction within a national context, and oriented their actions within that context; and also implied that local states were primarily relays of policies settled at national level. Likewise, during this period of KWNS dominance, the main social movements were producer organisations, political parties and pressure groups concerned with national economic growth and with social redistribution among the citizens of a given national state (Offe 1985; Hirsch and Roth 1987). Various economic, political, socio-cultural pressures and forces (see below) have undermined this primacy of the national level. Indeed, it seems that there is currently no primary scale on which the global economy is being effectively instituted, organised and regularised—whether global, triadic, national, regional or local. The current period of 'after-Fordism' seems to have no privileged scale of organisation on which the global economy is (or can be) managed. Instead there is a more complex nesting and weaving of different spatial scales as attempts are made to rearticulate them in the search for new spatial and scalar fixes. Moreover, as there is no single, self-enclosed and circumscribed spatial scale that can be taken for granted, 'the geographical boundaries of social relations have become direct objects of socio-political contestation' (Brenner 1997a: 24).

The current restructuring of economic and political relations (within which 'globalisation' is only one of several processes) is associated with what can usefully be termed the 'relativisation of scale' (Collinge 1996; Brenner 1997b). This has obvious implications for the state, cities and new social movements in advanced capitalist societies. This point can be developed by re-examining the nature of the KWNS. This had four key features in relation to economic and social reproduction in Atlantic Fordism. First, in its role of helping to provide the external and internal conditions for capital

accumulation, the KWNS was Keynesian in so far as it aimed to secure full employment in what was treated as a relatively closed national economy and also aimed to do so primarily through demand-side management. The KWNS attempted to adjust effective demand to the supply-driven needs of Fordist mass production, with its dependence on economies of scale and on full utilisation of relatively inflexible means of production. Second, to secure the conditions for social reproduction, the KWNS was oriented to welfare in so far as it tried to regulate collective bargaining within limits consistent with full employment levels of growth, to generalise norms of mass consumption beyond those directly employed in Fordist sectors so that all national citizens might share the fruits of economic growth (and thereby contribute to effective domestic demand), and to promote forms of collective consumption favourable to the Fordist mode of growth. Its economic and social policies were closely linked to an expanding understanding and a progressive institutionalisation of economic and social welfare rights attached to individual citizens of the national territorial state. Third, the KWNS was also national in so far as the national state had the primary responsibility for developing and guiding Keynesian welfare policies on different scales. In this context, local and regional states acted mainly as relays for policies framed at the national level; and the various postwar international regimes linked to Atlantic Fordism were aimed at stabilising national economies and national states. And, fourth, the KWNS was statist in so far as state institutions (on different levels) were the chief complement to market forces in the operation of the 'mixed economy' and had a dominant role in shaping the institutions of civil society.

This said, the concrete forms of the KWNS and the specific modalities in which its functions were performed varied from case to case. One can distinguish among KWNS regimes in terms of their typical forms of economic and social intervention—liberal social-market regimes, tripartite social-democratic regimes, dirigiste regimes with strong states and a relatively fragmented labour force, and more corporatist conservative regimes in which social welfare is partly organised on occupational or status lines and also tends to conserve rather than weaken inequalities. There is already an extensive literature on this topic. My chief concern here is the general nature of still emerging forms of economic and social policy and their associated institutions rather than the past.

The KWNS experienced a crisis in the 1970s and 1980s. This had a variety of general economic, political and socio-cultural causes. There were also more specific, conjunctural factors that affected the timing, form, and incidence of the crisis in particular cases.

Economically, the KWNS was undermined by the increasing opening of national economies and their resulting inter-penetration through a variable mixture of extraversion, inward investment and expanding international social division of labour. These processes are often subsumed, of course, under the current catchall concept of 'globalisation'. Together with the increased importance of global financial capital, this weakened the 'taken for grantedness' of the national economy as a natural object of economic management, and reduced the effectiveness of Keynesian policies. Moreover, not only was the efficacy of national economic policy undermined by internationalisation, regional and local economies were also increasingly found to have their own specific problems. These could be solved neither by the usual national macro-economic policies

nor by standard industrial and/or regional policies formulated at the centre. Other economic factors that weakened the KWNS included the challenges posed by lower-waged but increasingly high-tech East Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs) as well as the rise to economic super-power status of Japan, with its more flexible production system; the more general shift from more supply-driven to more demand-driven forms of production (often paradigmatically summarised, but never adequately characterised, as the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism); and the feminisation of the labour force (with its impact on the family form and the family wage, which both played key roles in the KWNS).

Overall, these changes made it harder for the state to manage its national economy as if it were closed (as it had done, for example, in relying on demand management) and so prompted an interest in, and a shift towards, more supplyside intervention. This could be limited to neo-liberal supply-side measures or extended to include tailor-made measures targeted at specific sectors and/or places. The latter policies often refocus economic strategies around the specific features of regional-local economic spaces and cities' potential role in the struggle to maintain international competitiveness and/or defend jobs, growth and welfare in the face of competitive pressures at home and abroad. There was also an increasing emphasis on flexibility in manufacturing and services (including the public sector) based on new technologies (especially micro-electronics) and more flexible forms of organising production. And there was increasing concern with how economic and social policies affect structural and systemic competitiveness *vis-à-vis* other economies —thereby creating political openings for attacks on social welfare to the extent that competitiveness is understood in terms of direct and indirect costs of production (thus including the social wage).

Politically, the KWNS was undermined by growing political resistance to taxation and stagflation; by the crisis in postwar compromises between industrial capital and organised labour; by new economic and social conditions and attendant problems which cannot be managed or resolved readily, if at all, through continuing reliance on top-down state planning and/or simple market forces; and by the rise of new social movements which could not be easily integrated into the postwar compromise—especially as these movements developed in crisis-prone cities and were often oriented to global or local rather than national issues. Whilst the rise of new social movements is partly related to economic and ecological crises associated with mass production and the problems facing the KWNS, it is also linked more generally to the development of a politics of identity, to the phenomenon of the 'risk society', and to so-called 'post-modern' patterns of consumption. The link between economic and community development, notably in terms of the empowerment of citizens and community groups, puts a premium on partnerships embracing not only the state and business interests but also community organisations of various kinds. This is reflected in active sponsorship of the 'third sector' and/or 'social economy' (both located between market and state) alongside other forms of decentralised public-private partnerships (see below). It can also be seen in efforts to solve local problems by involving as many different local stakeholders and partners as possible. Many of the new social movements are also oriented to other scales of action than the national level—especially to the city and the international arena.

Socially, the KWNS was undermined by a tendential 'denationalisation' of civil society. This is reflected in the development of cosmopolitanism, 'tribalism' (or the rediscovery or invention of primordial, affectual identities at the expense both of liberal individualism and of civic loyalty to an 'imagined' national community), and an expansion of diverse social movements which now operate across national boundaries. Together these phenomena have weakened the sense of national identity which shaped the KWNS in its formative period and have also weakened thereby the coalition of forces which sustained it. In addition, the more specific values, social identities and interests associated with the welfare state have undergone a transformation. This is associated with rejection of the social-democratic and/or Atlantic Fordist normative commitment to a class-based egalitarianism and its accompanying class-based redistributive politics; with a pluralistic identity politics and 'politics of difference' in which there is greater emphasis on mutual respect, authenticity and autonomy; with increased concern for personal empowerment rather than for the bureaucratic administration of legal rights, monetised entitlements and uniform public services; and with the expansion of the so-called 'third sector' and/or social economy, which supposedly operate flexibly outside the framework of pure markets and the bureaucratic state (but often in close conjunction with them as a 'shadow market' and 'shadow state'). These shifts have not ended the contradictions between the economics and politics of welfare but transformed their forms of appearance.

Given these various sources of crisis tendency, it is hardly surprising that, from the early 1980s onwards, at different times and speeds, in different fields in different societies, the KWNS state has been subject to several changes which tend to produce a new welfare regime. This can be described as a 'Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime' (hereafter SWPR) and can be contrasted with the KWNS in four respects. First, the SWPR is Schumpeterian in so far as it tries to promote permanent innovation and flexibility in open economies by intervening on the supply side and to strengthen as far as possible the structural competitiveness of the relevant economic spaces. Second, regarding social reproduction, the SWPR can be described (infelicitously and at the risk of misunderstanding) as a workfare regime in so far as it subordinates social policy to the demands of labour-market flexibility and structural competitiveness. Such 'workfarist' subordination of social to economic policy is most likely to occur where these policies concern the present and future working population. It is for this reason that education plays such a key role in 'workfare' strategy. More generally, 'workfare' in the present meaning of the term is also associated with downward pressure on public spending—for this is now regarded mainly as a cost of international production rather than as a source of domestic demand. Third, regarding the national form, the SWPR can be described as 'post-national' in so far as the increased significance of other spatial scales and horizons of action has made the national territory less important as a 'power container'.[7] This does not mean the end of the national state but signifies rather the 'relativisation of scale' as compared to the primacy of the national level during the Atlantic Fordist period (see above). And, fourth, in using 'regime' rather than state to describe the SWPR, I wish to emphasise the increased importance of non-state delivery mechanisms in providing any state-sponsored economic and social policies. In addition to the role of public—private

partnerships oriented to capitalist economic growth and workfare, we can also include the renewed interest in the 'social economy' under this rubric (see below).

The rise of the entrepreneurial city

So far I have discussed the crisis tendencies in the KWNS at the level of the national state. But these interrelated crisis tendencies have also had their own distinctive effects at the international level (as evidenced in crises of the principal postwar international regimes) and at the sub-national level (as evidenced, for example, in the crisis of the Fordist form of city). More generally, there is a complex, multidimensional crisis of cities as forms of socio-economic, civil and political organisation. And this has prompted debates over new ways to manage cities and deal with their many and varied problems. Problems rooted in uneven economic development within and across nations and a more general fiscofinancial crisis affecting all governments are central issues in this regard. They have encouraged new forms of inter-urban competition for access to resources as well as the search for an (endogenous) urban growth dynamic which could compensate for limited public resources. In addition, the crisis tendencies affecting the economic and political capacities of national states have made cities and their hinterlands more significant as nodes and vectors in organising economic, political and social life than they were during the period of Atlantic Fordism. This has expanded the economic and political space for cities and regions to engage in competition and has highlighted the importance of cities' differential capacities to reflect on and secure the conditions for economic dynamism (Storper 1997). Finally, shifts in the modalities of competition in an increasingly 'globally integrated' but still multi-scalar, unevenly developing and tangled economy have modified the nature of inter-urban as well as international competition.

Overall, this is reflected in the rise of so-called 'entrepreneurial cities'. The distinctive feature of such cities is their function of—or at least their declared self-image as proactively engaged in—promoting the capacities of their respective economic spaces in the face of intensified competition in the global economy. In this regard, cities have a key role in the tendential development of the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime. For, whether entrepreneurial or not, they have become key sites and stakes in the struggle to redefine the boundaries of the state and its role in securing the conditions for the valorisation of capital and the reproduction of labour power. This may explain why cities now seem to be replacing firms as the new 'national champions' in international competition. They are becoming sites of struggle over economic and social restructuring to enhance competitiveness (even at the expense of social polarisation and deepening social exclusion). And they are becoming the political basis for new forms of growth or grant coalition and new forms of social alliance—sometimes including the old and new social movements, sometimes marginalising them. At the same time national states find it harder to contain the activities of some cities (those which have been integrated into a network of global cities which, qua network, is not contained within any given national territory) and harder to compensate for the economic crises of other cities which are excluded from this network.

The entrepreneurial city has been discussed in many different ways. My own approach is influenced by Schumpeter, an emblematic thinker for contemporary capitalism, who defined entrepreneurship as the creation of opportunities for surplus profit through 'new combinations' or innovation (Schumpeter 1934; see below); and by Harvey, an arguably more controversial thinker on post-modern capitalism, who has presented some influential ideas on the shift from urban managerialism and urban entrepreneurialism (1989). Their work can be refined by linking it to the useful distinction between strong and weak competition. Strong competition involves potentially positive-sum attempts to improve a locality's overall (structural) competitiveness through innovation; and it usually involves the social embedding of economic activity. Conversely, weak competition involves essentially zero-sum attempts to secure reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities. In this regard, weak competition tends to be socially disembedding (Cox 1995). Combining these arguments, one can usefully distinguish between entrepreneurship oriented towards strong competition and that oriented towards weak competition.

Despite the increasingly common rhetoric of entrepreneurialism, there are few cities which are genuinely oriented to strong competition. For few cities are systematically oriented to securing sustainable dynamic competitive advantages via continuing economic, political and social innovations that are intended to enhance productivity and other conditions of structural and systemic competitiveness. And even those that do have such an orientation tend to fail for various reasons to ensure continued capital accumulation. Weaker forms of competition are usually more concerned with modifications in formal and substantive regulatory, facilitative or supportive measures[8] aimed at capturing mobile investment (a deregulatory race to the bottom) as well as simple image-building measures with the same purpose (boosterism). Cities engaged in such weak entrepreneurialism are even more likely to fail in the longer term since such activities can easily be copied.

Following Schumpeter's account of entrepreneurship and Harvey's work on urban entrepreneurialism, I suggest that the principal fields in which a city can become entrepreneurial are:

1 The introduction of new types of urban place or space for living, working, producing, servicing, consuming, etc. Examples include multi-cultural cities, cities organised around integrated transport and sustainable development, and cross-border regional hubs or gateways.
2 New methods of space or place production to create location-specific advantages for producing goods/services or other urban activities. Examples include new physical, social and cybernetic infrastructures, promoting agglomeration economies, technopoles, regulatory undercutting, reskilling.
3 Opening new markets—whether by place-marketing specific cities in new areas and/or modifying the spatial division of consumption through enhancing the quality of life for residents, commuters, or visitors (for example, culture, entertainment, spectacles, new cityscapes, gay quarters, gentrification).
4 Finding new sources of supply to enhance competitive advantages. Examples include new sources or patterns of immigration, changing the cultural mix of cities, finding

new sources of funding from the central state (or, in the EU, European funds), or reskilling the workforce.

5 Refiguring or redefining the urban hierarchy and/or altering the place of a given city within it. Examples include the development of a world or global city position, regional gateways, cross-border regions and 'virtual regions' based on inter-regional cooperation among non-contiguous spaces.

In each regard we can see that urban entrepreneurialism contains the element of uncertainty that many see as the very essence of entrepreneurial activity. Indeed, as Storper notes in a discussion of the 'reflexive city', the nature of uncertainty and risk has been changing as market forces and the extra-economic environment for economic actors become more turbulent, more influenced by the strategic calculation of other actors, and more open to influence on a wide range of spatial scales. This puts a premium on forms of urban organisation which enable economic actors to share risks and to cope with uncertainty through dense social and institutional networks (Storper 1997; Veltz 1996).

Whether in regard to firms or cities, there is a typical economic dynamic to entrepreneurial activities. Although a successful innovation will initially generate surplus profits (or 'rents'), these tend to decline and eventually disappear as the innovation is either adopted (or superseded) as 'best practice' by other competitors and/or as less efficient competitors (are forced to) leave the market. Unless an effective (practical or legal) monopoly position can be established, this will tend to return profits to normal levels. Moreover, once an innovation is generalised, the cost of production and the search for new markets begins to matter, changing the balance of competitive advantages. Whilst this emphasis on costs leads to the competing away of initial advantages, it also prepares the ground for the next wave of innovation and entrepreneurship—either by the initial pioneers or perhaps latecomers who are able to exploit their competitive position in a later stage of the product cycle to build a resource base for subsequent innovations.

Making due allowance for obvious differences in the 'product', this dynamic is also seen in inter-urban competition. The capacity of global cities to remain at the top of both world and national hierarchies is linked to their ability to remain at the forefront of economic and institutional innovation. But inter-urban competition can also displace competitive advantages across cities lower down the hierarchy. Some cities begin apparently irreversible decline as they are out-manoeuvred by innovations in other established or emerging cities; this is especially likely where their initial superiority in the hierarchy was based on static comparative advantage. At the same time, of course, imitation and speculation can also lead to overproduction both within individual growth centres and in general through diffusion. This 'crowding' phenomenon is currently reflected in the 'serial production of world trade centres, waterfront developments, postmodern shopping malls, etc.' (Harvey 1989:10). Thus inter-urban competition tends to produce a 'snakes and ladders' game with frequent shifts of winners and losers among players in the middle ranks. The capacity to remain at the top of the hierarchy or to move up it typically depends on cities' capacities and strategies for acquiring complex strategic activities and/or promoting innovative production (Kraetke 1995:136–42). All of this

points to the importance for inter-urban competition of the entrepreneurial capacities to engage in strong competition (for further discussion, see Jessop 1998).

The illogic of globalisation

Neither the tendential shift from KWNSs to Schumpeterian workfare post-national regimes nor the tendential rise of the entrepreneurial city suspends the contradictions and conflicts of capitalism. The latter has always depended on a contradictory balance between marketised and non-marketised organisational forms. Although this was previously viewed mainly in terms of the balance between market and state, the rise of economic and social partnerships in entrepreneurial regimes has not introduced a neutral third term. Instead it adds other sites and scales upon which the balance can be contested and provides a meeting ground for the competing logics of accumulation and politics. Furthermore, the expansion of the economic logic of capitalism and economic competitiveness to include more and more factors previously regarded as 'extra- economic' creates new spaces for conflict over the primacy of accumulation relative to the codes, values and interests of other sub-systems (such as education, science, health). It thereby intensifies struggles over the hegemonic and/or dominant principle of societalisation *(Vergesellschaftung)* in the wider society.

Capitalist growth depends essentially on the market-mediated exploitation of wage labour—not on the inherent efficiency of unfettered markets. Markets mediate the search for added value but cannot themselves produce it; and the very process of commodification engendered by the spread of the market mechanism generates contradictions which cannot be resolved by that mechanism itself. This is evident in contradictions inscribed in the most basic forms of the capitalist market society. Thus the commodity is both an exchange value and a use value; the wage is both a cost of production and a source of demand; the worker is both abstract labour and a concrete individual; money is both national money and international currency; productive capital is both abstract value in motion and a concrete stock of time—and place-specific assets in the course of being valorised; and so on. It was in managing, at least for a while, such contradictions and dilemmas in the spatio-temporal matrix of the national economy and the national state that the 'welfare mix' associated with the KWNS made its own contribution to the Atlantic Fordist regime. Nonetheless, much of what passed then as 'market failure' (i.e. was discursively constructed as such) and to which the KWNS was judged an appropriate response was actually an expression of deeper contradictions of capitalism. Thus KWNS intervention often only modified the forms or sites of these contradictions—introducing class struggles into the state and/or generating tendencies towards fiscal crisis, legitimacy crisis, rationality crisis, etc. And as the capital relation developed in ways that undermined the national economy as an object of state management, the underlying contradictions re-emerged.

The impact of globalisation is to exaggerate the importance of the first side of these contradictions. In general terms, globalisation reinforces the abstract moment of exchange value in these different structural forms at the expense of the more concrete substantive-material moment of use value. For it is capital in these abstract moments that can be most

easily disembedded from specific places and thereby enabled to 'flow' freely through space and time.[9] Capital in its concrete moments, however, always has its own productive and reproductive particularities that can only be materialised in specific types of spatio-temporal location. Even where they are relatively decoupled in specific forms of capital (for example, global finance capital), there remains a link between the abstract and concrete dimensions in the need for a concrete 'spatio-temporal fix' so that disembedded capital can flow more easily (Harvey 1982). In the case of global finance capital, of course, this 'spatio-temporal fix' is provided by the grid of global cities (Sassen 1996a, 1996b).

These structural contradictions assume different forms in different contexts. This can be seen in the emerging post-Fordist accumulation regime. Not only are these contradictions expressed in cities which had a privileged place in the Fordist accumulation regime (as one might well expect) but they are also expressed in global cities (which one might regard as the success stories in the new era of globalisation). Thus one finds an increasing contrast between private affluence and public poverty; between the depressing impact of the flight of productive capital from the inner city and the scope that still exists there for local demand-induced economic growth; between the short-term logic of the labour market and the resulting deskilling and demoralisation of the long-term unemployed; between the alleged imperatives of international currency markets and the fiscal needs of urban regeneration; and between the *laisser-faire* rhetoric of the borderless economy and the continuing (albeit transformed) role of national, regional and urban governments in supplying mobile capital with its new forms of spatio-temporal fix. As these contrasts feed back in turn into the multiple crisis of the city forms inherited from the Atlantic Fordist period, they also reinforce the pertinence of the social economy as an alternative way of defining and addressing their problems (see the next section).

These contrasts are rooted in contradictions which were already evident in the Fordist period. They have become even more pointed in many cases due to the intensification of other sources of contradiction. Here we can mention the increasing interdependence between the economic and extra-economic factors making for structural or systemic competitiveness. Veltz expresses this in his observation that hard economic calculation increasingly rests on the mobilisation of soft social resources, which are irreducible to the economic and resistant to such calculation (1996:11–12). In temporal terms, this means that there is a major contradiction between short-term economic calculation (especially in the area of financial flows) and the long-term dynamic of 'real competition' rooted in resources (skills, trust, collective mastery of techniques, economies of agglomeration and size) which take years to create, stabilise and reproduce. And spatially, there is a fundamental contradiction between the economy considered as a pure space of flows and the economy as a territorially and/or socially embedded system of extra-economic as well as economic resources and competences. This leads to new dilemmas for securing the reproduction of the capital relation over an expanding range of scales and over increasingly compressed as well as extended temporal horizons of action. Another contradiction which is becoming increasingly evident in the post-Fordist (or, at least, the post-industrial) accumulation regime is that between the information economy and the information society. Whereas the former is concerned with the private appropriation of

knowledge in the form of 'intellectual property rights' so that it can become the basis for monopoly rents and national competitiveness (and is thereby subject to many of the tendencies towards market failure long recognised in the 'economics of information'), the latter is concerned with broadening public access to knowledge as a source of personal empowerment and the expansion of the public sphere. Here, too, the social economy has something to offer.

The social economy

Judging by the rhetoric surrounding the tendential emergence of Schumpeterian workfare post-national regimes, one would expect it to resolve these various post-Fordist structural contradictions and dilemmas—at least for a while. But even their more ardent supporters often concede that in its currently predominant neo-liberal form the SWPR entails greater social exclusion and marginalisation than was evident during the period of the KWNS.[10] There is also growing recognition of the risks of a deregulatory 'race to the bottom' in which bad economic and social policy drive out good in the inter-urban as well as the international spheres of competition.

It is in this context that the social economy provides an interesting and potentially significant counterpoint.[11] For the social economy challenges the very logic of capital accumulation within the economy, its extension to other spheres of social life, and the struggle to establish bourgeois hegemony over society as a whole. Against the logic of capital accumulation, especially its most abstract aspects rooted in the dominance of exchange value (see above), the social economy prioritises social use value. Its proponents aim to re-embed the organisation of the economy in specific spatio-temporal contexts oriented to the rhythms of social reproduction rather than to the frenzied circulation of digitalised finance capital. The social economy also opposes the extension of the logic of capital accumulation to other spheres of life, such that education, health services, housing, politics, culture, sport and so on are directly commodified or, at least, subject to quasi-market forces. In this regard the extension of the social economy also provides a basis for resisting the increasing hegemony of capital over society as a whole. For it demonstrates the possibility of organising economic and social life in terms that challenge the taken for grantedness of the 'common sense' of the capital relation. This threefold potential will not, of course, be realised without a struggle. Nor will struggle alone be sufficient to establish it. For, as with any other form of economic organisation, there are complex interpersonal, organisational, institutional and systemic preconditions necessary to its consolidation. In the case of the social economy these concern the scope for the reabsorption of the market and the state into an expanded civil society.[12] But the reabsorption of the social economy by the state (through dependence on state finance and through co-optation) and/or the logic of the market (due to integration into capitalist commodity chains and dependence on normal loans, etc.) is more likely than vice versa.

This point can be developed by considering the nature of Atlantic Fordism. In this accumulation regime, it was the 'mixed economy' that provided the centre of gravity for economic and political regulation. To the extent that markets failed to deliver the

expected values of economic growth—full employment, low inflation, and a sustainable trade balance—the national state was called on to compensate as well as to generalise prosperity to all its citizens. In this context, as Carpi (1997) notes, there was little room for the social economy. On the one hand, Fordist growth based on a capital-labour compromise permitted full employment and the spread of mass consumption; and the welfare state assumed responsibility for coping with the economic and social risks (for example, unemployment, poverty, sickness, inadequate housing) which had earlier stimulated self-help through the expansion of the social economy. And on the other hand, the importance of economies of scale in the dominant Fordist production paradigm encouraged surviving firms in the social economy to move towards larger-scale, more centralised and hierarchical organisational forms (Carpi 1997:243–4). The subsequent crisis of the KWNS led to the rediscovery of state failure, and, among neo-liberals, to a powerful call for a return to the market mechanism. Even in the neo-liberal camp, however, there is growing recognition of the limits of the market. This is reflected in the search for new forms of public—private partnership, and even in grudging admissions that there is still an important role for a 'reinvented' state. More generally, there is increasing interest on all sides in new forms of 'governance' that depend neither on the anarchy of the market nor the top-down control of the state. It is in this context that the social economy has been rediscovered.

The social economy is particularly relevant to the current period of after-Fordism—especially as the limits of neo-liberalism and the turbulence of unregulated economic globalisation become more evident. Carpi has argued for a broad congruence between the dynamic of post-Fordism and the dynamic of a social economy in terms of three trends:

> The first dimension has been the emergence of an alternative movement seeking both new forms of economic organisation (democratic) and new market niches (natural and ecological goods, ideologically committed book-shops, etc.). Second was the growing weight of the service sector (tertiarisation of the economy), the development of flexible production and the externalisation of functions on the part of firms, which has propelled the growth of small businesses and the feasibility of productive organisations in expanding activities without any great investment. Third, a restructuring of state activity and the externalisation of public service management, stimulated by the fiscal crisis and conservative assault, with the aim of 'rationalising' the welfare state, has created new opportunities for the social economy to expand. At the same time, the recomposition of state action in social and economic affairs and the technological and economic transformation under way have created a growing number of problems and unsatisfied needs (unemployment, social exclusion, territorial decline) that have had an impact on civil society and local authorities. Consequently, alternatives are looked for outside the capitalist sector and the state.
>
> (Carpi 1997:256)

This approach can be strengthened by considering the limits to strategies of economic development which rely on 'weak competition' as well as those which are oriented to

boosting endogenous growth potential through 'strong competition'. For, while weak competition relies on essentially zero-sum attempts to secure reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities, even strong competition involves the ever-present risk of any competitive advantages being competed away as the unceasing logic of the market evolves. This is particularly true for those economic spaces (such as inner cities, de-industrialising cities, or cities at the bottom of urban hierarchies) which are unable to engage in strong competition and run the greatest risk of losing out in the zero-sum competition for resources from outside. In such cases a resort to a social economy grounded in local social movements and concerned to empower the poor, deprived and underprivileged could provide a more effective solution by developing a more self-sufficient economy which is then able to reinsert itself into the wider economy. Thus, in terms of the structural contradictions noted in the preceding section, an expanded social economy could help to redress the imbalance between private affluence and public poverty, to create local demand, to reskill the long-term unemployed and reintegrate them into an expanded labour market, to address some of the problems of urban regeneration (for example, in social housing, insulation and energy-saving), to provide a different kind of spatio-temporal fix for small and medium enterprises, to regenerate trust within the community, and to promote empowerment (for a discussion of some of these issues, see Catterall *et al.* 1997 and Lipietz 1996).

But, as other contributions to this book indicate (notably those of Mendell and of Shragge and Fontan), this is not an easy solution that will work in any and all circumstances. There are some quite daunting preconditions—organisational, institutional and ethico-political—to be realised even for successful small-scale experimentation and some major strategic dilemmas that must be continually managed. In particular, the expansion of the social economy depends on the effective coordination of institutional arrangements to produce 'structured coherence' at the micro-, meso-, macro- and meta-levels and to ensure the dynamic complementarity of the social economy to the wider economic system. In micro-economic terms, this involves developing and promoting interconnected productive organisations in order the better to secure their economic and educational potential as social movements. This includes concern with the self-management of social economy firms (in the light of their distinctive problems as both economic and social actors) and with the transfer of best practice in both regards. At the meso-level, what is required are territorial socio-political networks aiming to mobilise and develop resources, organise the economy in a sustainable way, to offer and demand certain services that could be largely met from the social economy, and to promote interaction between suppliers, producers and customers. Likewise, at the macro-level, what is required is a framework able to make social ends compatible with the economic functionality of social economy within a wider society in which the market will still have a key role in allocation and accumulation (Carpi 1997:265). Both on economic and social grounds, the development of this macro-level framework would depend more on the supply of relevant knowledge and organisational intelligence than on the supply of capital; on the capacity to shape the institutional context in which firms operate rather than providing subsidies; and on organising placespecific advantages rather than an abstract space of flows so that local (social) capital can generate local economic growth (Willke

1992, 1997). Finally, at what one might call the meta-level (following Messner 1996), expansion of the social orientation depends on the ongoing transformation of values, norms, identities and interests so that they support the social economy rather than the commodification of all areas of social life.

Concluding remarks

I have argued against the view that globalisation comprises a coherent causal mechanism and have suggested that globalisation is a complex, chaotic, and overdetermined outcome of a multi-scalar, multi-temporal, and multi-centric series of processes operating in specific structural contexts. I have also argued that globalisation is only one of several processes occurring in the current rescaling of economic, political and social life. In critiquing the 'chaotic concept' of globalisation in this manner, I do not wish to imply globalisation is an insignificant trend or that its effects on the postwar economic, political and social orders within Atlantic Fordism are negligible. My intention is rather to demystify its associated rhetoric and thereby make it harder to use the existence of globalisation as an excuse for attacks on economic, political and social rights in the name of enhanced international competitiveness or the *force majeure* of uncontrollable and external forces. At the same time I have tried to show that the crisis-tendencies and changes in the Keynesian welfare national state cannot be attributed exclusively to the trend towards globalisation—even after allowing for its complexities. This implies both that globalisation is less problematic for the renewal of socialist and democratic projects and/or the resurgence of social movements than some have suggested; and that there are actually more obstacles to the success of such projects and/or movements than a one-sided concern with the logic (and illogic) of globalisation would suggest.

I have also argued that the crisis of 'Keynesian welfare national states' is linked to the tendential emergence of the SWPR. This concept has been introduced to capture some of the policy and institutional changes that have followed from the hegemonic interpretations of that crisis. It is not intended to suggest that the SWPR will suspend the structural contradictions of capitalism—let alone that it could do so in its neo-liberal form. In this context, I have further argued that the crisis of the KWNS is linked to a 'relativisation of scale' which creates both the space and the need for a resurgence of urban politics. The dominant form of this resurgence is the development of the 'entrepreneurial city', i.e. the development of entrepreneurial economic strategies at city level that are also narrated in entrepreneurial terms. Nonetheless, for a number of reasons given above, there are major limits to such urban entrepreneurial strategies. This raises in turn the issue of alternatives to the never-ending search for sustainable advantages in an inter-urban competition that is becoming wider in scope and more hectic in its rhythms. One such alternative can be found in various projects to build greater self-sufficiency and sustainability through the development of the 'social economy'. It has only been possible to provide a brief sketch of some of the issues raised by such projects. Nonetheless, as the other chapters in this volume and several other studies have shown, any expansion of the social economy will depend on the development of stronger grassroots social movements which will facilitate the reabsorption of the economy and state into an expanded civil society. Without such a

basis and the institutional framework to sustain it, the current experiments with the social economy are threatened with marginalisation and subordination to the logic (and illogic) of an increasingly global, but neither fully globalised nor fully globalisable, capitalism.

Notes

1 This chapter was written while I held a Hallsworth Research Fellowship in Political Economy in the School of Geography at Manchester University. I am grateful to my colleagues there for many fruitful discussions which helped to shape my analysis. The usual disclaimers apply.

2 The recent turbulence in East Asian economies does not signify the end of that challenge—their restructuring could, in due course, strengthen their competitiveness.

3 This can occur either by reducing the time a given 'event' takes to produce within a given spatial frame of action; or by increasing the ability to discriminate more steps in an 'event' and so enhancing opportunities to modify its course or outcome by intervening in the event as it happens.

4 One could ask interesting questions about the unequal distribution of capacities to shape social relations over time and space and/or to compress the timing of events and to overcome the frictions of space. They concern both different types of actors within the same system (for example, financial vs industrial capital) and different types of actors across systems (for example, global economic players vs national state managers).

5 Whereas the former term refers to the relative availability of factors of production and their impact on the spatial division of labour, the latter two terms refer in different ways to the sources of dynamic collective efficiency in a socially embedded, socially regularised economy. More specifically, these two concepts refer to the capacity of economic spaces to compete through the creation and retention of core economic competences with strong vertical and horizontal integration in a number of interrelated sectors, together with the specific socio-political and cultural supports necessary for these always socially embedded, always socially regulated economic activities to occur and prosper. Different modalities of structural and/or systemic competitiveness have been identified in the literature and these can be linked in turn to position in the global hierarchy of economic spaces and the capacities to move within (or transform) that hierarchy.

6 This does not mean that accumulation and reproduction were ever contained within the framework of individual national economies and national states. It means only that these provided the scalar fix within which local and supra-national processes occurred.

7 Another meaning of post-national is also relevant. This is the movement from a nation-state (whether *Volksnation, Kulturnatian* or *Staatsnation*) towards a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and more 'diasporic' society within given national territorial borders.

8 These terms are defined in Jessop (1982:254–5).

9 The temporal dimension of flow is captured in the metaphors of 'liquidity' and 'stickiness'.

10 The KWNS had its own hidden forms of exclusion and marginalisation too, of course, even within the national state framework. These intensified during the 1970s and helped contribute to its crisis. The KWNS also imposed costs on the economies, states and societies which were outside the virtuous circle of Atlantic Fordism.

11 The following argument is indebted to the work of Carpi (1997) but has been rephrased to fit with the more general approach developed in earlier parts of the chapter.

12 The concept of 'reabsorption' derives from Gramsci's prison notebooks (Gramsci 1971), but it needs to be respecified in the light of subsequent economic, political and social developments, including those noted above.

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5
Local finance in a global economy
Palliative or panacea?

Marguerite Mendell

Introduction

There is growing documentation on the emergence of new local and regional investment funds throughout Canada, the USA and Europe. Most of this documentation is largely descriptive, providing information on the nature of these new sources of capital: their objectives, eligibility criteria, etc. These funds fall under several broad headings and are based, in many cases, on new partnerships between the state, the private sector, the labour movement and the so-called social economy. They range from regional development funds to private risk or venture capital, with many hybrid varieties in between. Public and private funds can themselves be broken down to reveal many instruments with different profitability and eligibility criteria. Funds also target different sectors and/or regions and localities.

Of particular interest, is the growing focus on the social economy, especially in Quebec, where it now receives a political legitimacy not currently found elsewhere (Neamtan 1997). While, indeed, the social economy is not new, it is more commonly associated with the cooperative sector and more recently with the third sector. In Quebec, a distinction is now made between the new and the old social economy While both refer to associational activity, the new social economy is based on the broader conceptualisation of 'embeddedness', in which social utility displaces purely economic criteria of profitability, and in which economic activity reflects and responds to the needs of the community in which it is situated. Definitional debates are far from settled, as new actors now occupying critical roles on the political stage compete for resources. This rather simplistic way of putting it in fact misrepresents what has become, in a short period of time, a fertile ground for competing ideologies.

In this discussion on new financial instruments, a short introductory comment on the social economy is necessary since it puts into sharp relief the struggle between what is interpreted by some as decentralised neo-liberalism, and, therefore, the cooptation of communities by a market-driven economic development strategy and those who resist this. In fact, the situation is far more complex, more interesting and more hopeful, in my view. As Bob Jessop tells us, many new initiatives are, in fact, hybrid forms of economic organisation, making it difficult to draw immediate conclusions regarding the form that

these structures take (Jessop 1994). In the case of the social economy in Quebec, what we are witnessing, in fact, is a radical departure in both political and economic decision making as new social actors, previously marginalised, now occupy key roles.

The social economy: Quebec

Quebec's 'actually existing social economy' must be discussed from several perspectives: its origins; the ideological divisions which have emerged, as competing claims define political strategies; and the emergent state structures which serve to institutionalise the activities of community based organisations. This currently involves a new engagement on the part of the state as it encroaches upon and begins to contain the work of these organisations in new state structures. Still, it is too soon to draw firm conclusions. It is more accurate, I believe, to interpret these ongoing changes as a process of negotiation, one which is highly significant given the presence of social actors previously excluded from the political stage. The language of politics has changed as new voices challenge prevailing doctrine and public discourse.

Not merely job creation but sustainable jobs; not merely entrepreneurship but social entrepreneurship with broad socio-economic objectives; not merely business development but an integrated strategy of community economic development that is both territorially based and socially rooted; not merely the transfer of social-service jobs from a ravaged public sector but new service jobs in the social sector which provide dignity, decent wages and affordability to service workers and service users; not only new financial intermediaries and instruments to issue loans and/or equity investment, but an integrated model of financial intervention which respects the underlying objectives of the social economy; not the management of poverty and the ghettoisation of precarious work, but a new framework to develop democratic alternative models of economic organisation. This is the language of the social economy in Quebec.

State/economy relations in Quebec have been unique in the last thirty years. The nationalist agenda has contributed significantly to the development of a Quebec economic model of concertation.[1] Despite its mitigated success, the strategic partnerships established between labour, business and the state continue to shape the decision-making process in Quebec. The overriding commitment to deficit reduction and retrenchment of the public sector, which certainly also characterise Quebec, have not undermined this relationship.

The emergence of over 230 new financial instruments in Quebec can only be understood within this context, as can the new role played by the social economy (Levesque *et al.* 1997).[2] Some suggest that what distinguishes this current period and the widespread support for the social economy from the previous thirty years, is a return to a conservative, retrograde past of church/state/family structures governing Quebec society as the 'community' is now celebrated. This is a cynical and inaccurate reading of the situation, which, for example, misses the important collaboration of the labour movement and populist sector.[3] In fact, the legacy of the social economy rests on the militancy of social movements and community organisations especially in the last twenty years, as they were forced to move beyond social mobilisation and intervention to creative new forms

of economic organisation. It is this creativity which the Quebec state has now seized upon. However, it is true that the critical force which compelled the Quebec state to recognise the social economy was not the recognition of successful economic initiatives.

In the spring of 1995, thousands of women marched to Quebec City from across the province calling upon the Quebec government to invest in the social infrastructure of the province those non-market goods and services essential to support a society burdened with increasing poverty and unemployment. This is a larger issue today as growing numbers of the poor and the unemployed are excluded from active economic life, calling for new networks of support provided largely by women. Investing in the social infrastructure, therefore, implies the validation of this work with dignity and decent wages; it implies the validation of social objectives in a world dominated by economic imperatives. This march had the widespread support of Quebec society, forcing the state to respond immediately to the growing number of women living in poverty. Women's organisations and community groups were subsequently invited to present their position to two high-level meetings in Quebec: a preliminary gathering of business, labour and government leaders (March 1996), followed by a socio-economic summit (October 1996) which introduced the social economy as a key area of public concern. The Quebec government established a working group, *le Chantier d'économie sociale,* for a two-year period to develop the social economy; it was led by a highly skilled and dedicated community activist with a long history in community economic development.[4] That this was unexpected explains the extensive debates around the definition of the social economy which overtook the agenda. Since that time, many projects have received financial support, among them cooperatives and non-profit organisations, including a growing and controversial domestic sector.[5] The short history of the social economy, as it emerges at the end of the twentieth century in Quebec, is now extensively documented in a variety of academic journals, government publications, the popular press, etc. (Levesque and Malo 1992; Favreau and Saucier 1996; Comeau and Boucher 1996; Comité d'orientation et de concertation sur l'économie sociale 1996; Levesque 1997; Laville 1996; Levesque and Ninacs 1997).

In fact, events have moved too quickly for a systematic evaluation of the social economy. A great deal of time was spent mired in lengthy definitional debates. Barely one year after the political recognition of the social economy, many groups, in particular, women's organisations which were at the forefront of this struggle, felt they had lost their voice as their achievements had been coopted by the state and compliant community organisations. Women's organisations challenged the direction of the social economy as they reclaimed the political and economic space they had ceded. It is here that deep ideological differences were being waged, sharply dividing women's groups engaged in the social economy from other actors involved.

This ongoing debate, however, misses a fundamental and radical change which is occurring. Not only are previously marginalised social groups now visible, as they contest, through practice, the dominant paradigm and establish new structures and criteria for economic development, but the Quebec state is also playing a new role as a partner in social change, different from its previous and familiar role as a partner in

Quebec Inc., which had already set it apart in the heady days of neo-liberalism. While the social economy appears to its detractors as a facsimile of Quebec Inc., this is misleading. Indeed, the social economy brings together the state, business and labour; however, the driving force was and continues to be the community sector, which has not simply joined this select club of experienced negotiators, but, without exaggeration, has turned its practice on its head. Community organisations with an impressive record of mobilisation and economic revitalisation are demonstrating another way of doing business. The negotiations under way in the social economy, as it defines itself politically and in practice, are based upon principles which fundamentally oppose the predominance of economic over social objectives. While it is certainly true that Quebec Inc. remained committed to an industrial strategy within a sea of neo-liberalism, its recognition of the need to steer an economy was predicated on the objective to create a competitive environment. Social issues were residual to this agenda which failed to avoid the increase in poverty, unemployment and social exclusion that characterises Quebec society today. It increasingly fell to social movements and to community groups to look for alternatives to resolve this situation. It is these alternatives which have become the basis for the social economy in Quebec today.

For the time being, a snapshot cannot describe the social economy—not its actors, its location in political structures in Quebec, nor its economic organisation. It remains a moving target, subject to extensive negotiation and experimentation, made more complex and difficult by the continuous changes in the structure of public administration in Quebec. Bureaucracies appear and disappear, their structures transformed or absorbed by new political formations at a dizzying pace. A new politics of containment may be emerging in Quebec, which will certainly impact heavily on the autonomy of the social economy as it has evolved. This presents a new struggle. As Quebec moves quickly towards regionalisation and decentralisation, new structures are stepping in to participate in the work of the 'already existing social economy'. Whether the incipient model of negotiation will continue or whether it will be replaced by a new regime of regionalised statism remains to be seen. The debates are only beginning.[6]

Credit-driven economic development strategy

We now return to the main issue of this chapter which seeks to examine more specifically the role of finance in local and regional economic development. The social economy context in Quebec is especially relevant here, since new economic strategies involve the creation of new instruments, especially credit.

Given the limitations of capital markets for economic development, the need for alternative forms of finance has become acute as capital increasingly flows into speculative markets and away from long-term investment. It is quite striking to observe the rapid growth of these financial instruments in the recent period and the overwhelming consensus around what appears to be a credit-driven economic development *strategy* at the local and regional levels. Even at the supranational level of the European Union, the establishment of a regional development fund is on the agenda (Elliott 1996:19).[7]

Despite the abysmal record of twenty years of neo-liberal economic strategy, the commitment to market-led economic recovery remains. Witness the uncompromising commitment to deficit reduction, privatisation and deregulation of financial markets. This celebration of the market economy denies blatant contradictions in practice, as countries embark on a series of interventionist practices engaging the state more directly than its postwar role demanded. As it abandons its role to regulate the economy, the state now enters into direct relations with economic actors involving massive transfers of resources from the public sector into a privatised development strategy in which the state is a participant. And these new forms of intervention or participation are seldom acknowledged as such. Instead they are presented as part of a new business promotion or market-based strategy in which the state must play an enabling role. At the local and regional levels in Quebec and, I believe, elsewhere as well, these new forms are, in fact, highly interventionist and have conferred critical decision-making powers on the partners involved.

The prevailing view holds that local and regional economic revitalisation depends critically on the availability of capital for the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. This is particularly true for cities hard hit by economic decline. Capital is also needed to promote the highly competitive new economy. The availability of capital is, therefore, dependent on *non-market means:* the supply of investment capital (both debt and equity instruments) has indeed been significantly increased by the establishment of new institutions and instruments to develop markets.[8] In many cases, the participants are institutionalised investors (in Quebec, the *Caisse de dépôt et placement, Fonds de solidarité,* among others)[9] expecting high rates of return. This is especially true for investments in the new economy. Often the same actors are found at the local or community levels in collaboration with the state.

In this chapter, I wish to situate the growth of so-called alternative investment funds at the local level in this environment. These funds are also complex and reflect a variety of institutional arrangements, sources of capital and eligibility criteria. What is common to all these new financial instruments is the significant role they have come to play in the shift from demand management to supply-side policies, as states increasingly abandoned a Keynesian policy regime in favour of market-based strategies.

That these strategies have not produced expected results in more than twenty years is beginning to provoke a reconsideration of the fundamental premise underlying market strategies, namely the unavoidable need for state intervention to prevent social and economic collapse. Driven by ideology, there was, until very recently, little opportunity for debate. Short-term crisis management characterised this period rather than any attempts to consider an appropriate policy shift in a rapidly transforming world economy.

The growing number of new financial instruments, while in many respects a counter-movement to this strategy, continues largely to focus on the need to spur an entrepreneurial class by creating new sources of capital. Small and medium-sized business development drives this agenda, involving a transfer of public resources from social spending to business promotion. Despite numerous documented failures, new costly programmes are introduced. The number of bankruptcies throughout the 1980s and 1990s is a travesty[10] (Government of Canada 1994; MacDonald 1997: B3).

The principles and realities of markets

An extensive study of approximately 230 new financial instruments in Quebec (1996), the majority of which were established after 1983, reveals the widespread use of investment funds as a new policy instrument to revitalise the economy at regional and local levels. What is interesting from our perspective is the absence of market logic to explain the emergence of these funds. While the virtues of the free market are acclaimed and justify savage cuts in social spending, these financial instruments, in fact, involve direct contributions by different levels of government in partnership with other social actors, including business, financial institutions, labour unions and, in some instances, community organisations, to create markets, where they otherwise would not exist. Although the principles of the free market are consistently violated in these negotiated arrangements, political discourse reinforces a commitment to the market economy.

As stated earlier, Quebec, especially over the last thirty years, presents a particular case in which the state has joined business and labour in restructuring the economy in fundamental ways. In fact, Quebec state enterprise, notably *Hydro Québec,* is a model for the private sector. One has to look further to justify the privatisation of state enterprise. Likewise the *Caisse de dépôt et placement* public-sector pension funds and the *Mouvement Desjardins,* Quebec's century-old credit cooperative, both of which are highly profitable and participate actively in the market economy. Still, the rhetoric of the market also prevails in Quebec, where the population has endured severe cutbacks to the public sector in the name of deficit reduction. Quebec clearly presents a picture of the prevailing contradiction between the rhetoric and practice of the state and economic agents.

It has long been recognised that the market economy requires the appropriate enabling institutions and framework to function. Even throughout the reckless 1980s, the heavy hand of the state was present as a process of regulation accompanied the deregulation of markets. But this was a marked departure from known practice; oblique and targeted intervention replaced a set of norms and principles governing market economies. The public was, of course, duped into believing that the virtues of the market would reverse the inefficiencies of a bloated state apparatus which had curbed economic performance and productivity. Instead, a blind faith in the market drove governments into chaotic crisis management to prevent economic freefall.

At the same time, new alliances were being formed and old ones were being renewed and revitalised between the state, labour and business. In Quebec, as stated previously, the nationalist question provided a key incentive. Elsewhere, cooperation was sought to avoid social calamity; one needs to recall only a few examples such as Chrysler in Detroit or the city of New York in the 1980s. In all cases, whether they were a response to crisis or a commitment to a larger objective as in the case of Quebec, the practice of market development contradicted the political rhetoric which rationalised a new social order. Markets must be steered, guided, accommodated. This was never articulated. Instead the neo-liberal commitment to business development provided the necessary rationale for accommodation while simultaneously hitting the public sector. What went wrong?

The mitigated results of this strategy to promote enterprise development, create employment opportunities and revive the market economy must be evaluated in the

context of a failed political agenda. Not only is the market not operative in this case, where partnerships between the private, public and community sectors determine the supply of capital, but enterprises are also considered individually, disembedded from the socio-economic context in which they exist or will exist. In other words, the principles of the market are applied outside the reality of markets which are part of an institutional setting that not only establishes the conditions for success or failure, but clearly and most obviously includes potential consumers. Effective demand is totally ignored in this flawed model of economic development.

This is made worse by the further contradiction of deregulated financial markets. Short-term speculative investment has distorted local capital markets unable to generate long-term investment funds. New corporatist arrangements to accumulate the necessary capital for business development are filling this gap. In this deregulated environment, however, these new instruments are forced, in most instances, to offer high rates of return to compete with international financial markets, thereby largely favouring enterprises in the new economy. The result is a surplus of local and regional capital which is not invested in the productive economy. Clearly, this must be distinguished from an integrated industrial strategy: in this privatised development strategy any commitment to the public good is limited to the identification of the public good with a viable enterprise culture.

Deconstructing finance—the new picture

There are several distinctions to be drawn in considering new financial instruments. First, and most significantly, risk capital targeting small and medium-sized business with high expected rates of return must be differentiated from funds serving what we may broadly call the social *economy*.[11] However, even in the social economy, the critical question is whether we are speaking of 'alternatives' at all when referring to local finance. In other words, is the growing availability of capital at the local level merely supply-side economic policy writ small, or does this source of capital provide new and significant opportunities for communities and localities to engage in autonomous economic development strategies? I think the answer is twice yes.

The complexity and variability of new financial instruments makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions. However, it is possible to use the extensive documentation currently available to construct various classifications which distinguish these funds according to several criteria as the basis for some preliminary theoretical and strategic analysis.

In order to do this, at least three questions must be raised. First, what is the role these financial instruments play in the global economy? Second, are these funds part of a clear policy agenda at the local and regional levels? Third, do these funds offer the potential for a democratic and autonomous economic development strategy at the local level?

Bearing in mind the reservations raised above, there are many funds which we may consider 'alternative' within this complex situation. These range from micro-lending (loan circles inspired by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh) to new investment instruments located in communities (which include community banks in the USA such as the South Shore Bank of Chicago or community loan funds such as the Montreal Community Loan

Association, as well as labour solidarity funds increasingly involved in the social economy, etc.) which play a decisive role in the allocation of their investment capital, and, more critically, in establishing the socio-economic criteria for lending and/or investing. In these cases, something different is going on. Community organisations have become partners in several economic development initiatives in which they have not only challenged economic development strategies effectively, but have fought for new structures of democratic governance both within the organisations which act as partners and within the overarching institutional framework which governs these partnerships. In still other cases, autonomous investment funds have emerged to serve a growing marginalised and excluded population. Such funds work closely with local organisations but are available to a wider community. These funds are neither spatially nor sectorally defined; they respond to the needs of those prevented from actively participating in economic life and are often ineligible for community-based lending programmes as well.

The Montreal Community Loan Association (MCLA), which was established in 1990, was the first such local investment fund in Canada and has inspired the establishment of a variety of alternative investment funds throughout the country. Most recently, the *Chantier d'économie sociale* established a social economy fund in Quebec (December 1997) which reflects the principles and objectives of the MCLA. This fund hopes to raise $23 million in investment capital to serve the social economy.[12]

Still, we are walking on quicksand; the ground is very murky as too much experimentation and strategic fragmentation seem to be replacing consolidation and coalition building. I use this peculiar turn of phrase deliberately since this fragmentation cannot be blamed on ignorance; rather, a situation of separate experiences, often territorially limited and disconnected both from the larger political context as well as from similar experiences elsewhere, has paradoxically generated surplus capital which may actually undo the entire project. Moreover, fragmentation allows for negotiation with the state to finance individual initiatives. Not only does this create a competitive environment which may undermine solidarity, but it may transform these initiatives into a new set of government programmes, subject to the vulnerability all state programmes face today. The success of these alternative instruments and their salutary objectives rests on the continuous affirmation of these objectives and a commitment to build coalitions and democratically based institutional structures.

The liberalisation of financial markets: the politics of globalisation

We live in a global economy in which the power of the nation-state has considerably weakened; the national market is no longer the most relevant strategic economic space. Or so it is maintained.

The literature on globalisation is an epitaph for the nation-state. It laments and eulogises national governments now powerless in the face of global economic forces. Much of the prognosis is, in fact, self-fulfilling, as national governments renounce their fiscal and social responsibilities, and engage in a process of devolution and decentralisation domestically, vying for political and economic space in the global economy. This is, however, occurring

in an uneven manner, which, in my view, means that discussions around globalisation have to be carefully nuanced and any notion of inevitability rejected. Just as the contradictions between nineteenth-century liberalism and *laisser-faire* have not been recognised by advocates of the free market economy, the role of the state in the globalisation process remains ignored. If we might borrow from Karl Polanyi, globalisation is being planned; planning is not (Polanyi 1944).[13] In other words, the agenda has been set, but the mechanisms have not, resulting in a series of what appear to be hit-and-miss short-term strategies in domestic economies, while the way is being paved at the international level to create new institutions to manage the global economy, with the active participation and compliance of nation-states (Clarke 1997; Clarke and Barlow 1997).[14]

The nation-state has not disappeared, as is frequently suggested. Not only does it remain politically significant today, it is actively pursuing policies of integration into the global economy, whether in the form of appropriate measures for international capital mobility, or as a participant in a new dialogue among states as they negotiate a new international framework for trade and cooperation (Jessop 1994; Bienefeld 1996; Epstein 1996; Helleiner 1995; Group of Lisbon 1996).[15]

While the popular focus is on the global information economy, 'the nerve centre of the global economy is, in fact, global finance' (Petrella 1996; Group of Lisbon 1996). International financial markets have created a global casino for short-term speculative capital flows, displacing long-term capital investment with little benefit for the real economy (Helleiner 1994, 1996). The liberalisation of financial markets has spawned an international rentier class capable of generating currency misalignments, interest rate fluctuations and widespread social dislocation. Rarely is it acknowledged, moreover, that financial deregulation has, in fact, depended heavily on state support, state encouragement and intervention, much as it did in the 1920s and 1930s prior to the collapse of international financial markets (Polanyi 1944). Then, as now, financial liberalisation was spearheaded by forces at domestic, regional and systemic levels. It is a politically driven project, complete with implementation and enforcement structures (Epstein 1996). All countries are constrained by the need to maintain investor confidence, and require an established political structure in which creditors and debtors operate.

Nor is sufficient notice taken of significant expressions of opposition. The currency crisis in 1992 and the temporary reinstatement of capital controls in several European countries were the first signs of backlash, reregulation and resistance to financial liberalisation.[16] The June 1997 meetings in Amsterdam to consolidate principles and practices outlined in Maastricht and to move ahead with European monetary union, also met with opposition. While insufficient to reverse this process, it generated debate on the social impact of financial deregulation and an abandonment of fiscal policy. The election of the socialists in France returned social issues to the agenda for monetary union. The so-called stability pact remains fragile as worsening social conditions threaten a commitment based on yielding policy autonomy to monetary targets.

While the OECD prepares the way for a global agreement on investment, in its sub-committees it calls for new strategies to combat growing unemployment and social exclusion. Among its proposals outlined in a recent publication, *Reconciling Economy and*

Society (1996), the OECD goes so far as to call for a new economic paradigm to resist the 'cultural hegemony (enjoyed) by a world economy…legitimised by economic theory' (Sauvage 1996:20). More recently, the OECD co-hosted a conference and workshops on the social economy in Quebec in which it explored the social economy in its many dimensions in Canada, the USA and Europe. The labour movement, community organisations and native communities participated in this event, demonstrating the active engagement of these movements in a perception of the social economy that is shifting away from a narrow sectoral interpretation towards economic democracy which challenges the dominant paradigm through practice (OECD 1996).

The most recent and explicit counter-movement to globalisation is the 1997 annual report of the World Bank. In *The State in a Changing World. The World Development Report,* the World Bank argues for the 'reinvigoration of public institutions'. Make no mistake, this is largely in recognition of the vital role states actually play in economic development. 'An "effective" state is the cornerstone of successful economies; without it, economic and social development is impossible …Good government is not a luxury (but) a vital necessity for development' (Denny 1997:19).

In its dramatic *volte-face,* the World Bank concludes that the key role for government is to invest in basic services and infrastructure, provide a social safety net, protect the environment and establish a legal foundation. For Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist for the World Bank, The state is essential for putting in place the appropriate institutional foundations for markets' (Denny 1997:19). Here is the rub. Globalisation is an agenda driven by financial markets. As a process, it is destroying the market system. The ideological tidal wave of the 1980s provided the rationale for clearing away state structures and institutions which impeded capital flows. A fundamentalist commitment to free markets transferred fiscal policy to bond-rating agencies which basically blackmailed those governments attempting to introduce any. What was sorely missed, and is now recognised by the World Bank, is how markets actually operate. Globalisation is not about markets; it is about superseding and circumventing institutional barriers which include those essential for the market to function. Globalisation is a political agenda 'dominated by the needs and demands of big business…based on rootless capital…At some point, politicians will have to decide which is the higher priority. At the moment, most of them are making the wrong choice' (Atkinson 1997:19; Pfaff 1998:6).[17]

While mechanisms have emerged to coordinate global markets, the growing number of counter-movements to globalisation demonstrates the capacity of nation-states to act. The total loss of national policy autonomy is overstated. The capacity of national governments to implement monetary and fiscal policies has indeed been severely weakened in a world in which domestic interest rates respond to the dictates of international capital. Economic policy is ultimately governed by financial markets in London, Tokyo or New York. Still, new strategies are emerging. The large number of new financial instruments we observe in Quebec are certainly part of a counter-movement to promote markets. They have emerged to create a domestic pool of long-term capital. While counter-movements remain uncoordinated and politically fragmented, varying regionally within countries as well as between countries, they are increasingly becoming part of the current policy framework to resist market forces.[18]

This represents another take, so to speak, on the primarily supply-side orientation of these investment funds. As a new developmental strategy, it withdraws a substantial proportion of available capital from the international market to reorient it into long-term growth opportunities. In the case of Quebec, not only is the state intervening as an active partner, it has also introduced a variety of attractive fiscal advantages to attract investment into both high- and low-yield equity and debt instruments. In these latter cases, lower rates of return are compensated by socio-economic, non-market incentives.

Counter-movements in practice: alternative investment funds

In a recent article, Robert Pollin applies Albert Hirschman's concepts of exit and voice to an analysis of financial institutions. He contrasts capital-market-based financial systems with bank-based systems, to evaluate the impact of financial deregulation on different countries and to propose the means of bringing financial markets under democratic control. Pollin's analysis is extremely useful. The contrast between exit-dominated capital-market-based systems, which respond only to market signals, and voice-dominated bank-based systems, in which capital is dedicated and meets the needs of industry and economic development, provides a useful analytical framework both for understanding the catastrophic results of financial deregulation in the USA and the UK and for building a viable programme to democratise local finance within the interstices of capitalism (Pollin 1995; Schor and Marglin 1993).

It is in this context that I wish now to consider alternative investment funds to evaluate their potential for bringing local finance under democratic control. In particular, I refer to community-based funds, although I do not exclude the numerous new investment instruments which fall under the broad heading of social investment.

So-called alternative investment funds are referred to in a variety of ways as social funds, ethical investment, community development loan funds, labour solidarity funds, among others. The field of ethical investment is itself broad. In the more conventional sense, it represents various portfolios selected by those wishing to invest in corporations which have successfully undergone a social audit and satisfy established ethical criteria. In Canada, the first social investment mutual fund appeared in 1986. By 1995, the number of social investors had grown to 90,000, controlling assets of $2.2 billion. This excludes the ethical funds controlled by churches, union pension funds and private trusts (Ellman 1996: vi). Today, ethical investment also includes investment in local socioeconomic initiatives.

Institutions engaged in social investing include credit unions such as Van City Credit Cooperative in British Columbia and the *Mouvement Desjardins* in Quebec, among others. They also include a variety of community or alternative banks such as the South Shore Bank in Chicago or Triodos in The Netherlands, a growing number of community development loan funds, such as the Montreal Community Loan Association or the Institute for Community Economics in New Hampshire, and loan circles or peer lending organisations based on the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.

Alternative investment funds are, in some cases, members of large associations. In the USA, approximately fifty community loan funds belong to the National Association of Community Capital in Philadelphia. This association provides services, resources and loans to member funds. The US banking system is also bound by the Community Reinvestment Act (1977) which obliges commercial banks to invest in communities. Although the enforcement mechanisms are weak, its symbolic presence has now forced a review of its compliance procedures and inspired the creation of the Canadian Community Reinvestment Coalition, which mobilised individuals and organisations across Canada to press for the introduction of similar legislation in the Bank Act revisions in 1997.

Several networks have emerged in the recent period as well. The International Association of Investors in the Social Economy is a large international network of alternative investment organisations based in Brussels. It holds annual conferences which are co-sponsored by many organisations involved in social investment. The New Economics Foundation in London is an important source of information on alternative investment initiatives in the UK. The European Commission's DG V and XXIII, which are concerned with the social economy, participate in these networks and co-sponsor conferences and exchanges.

In Canada, a variety of networks are being formed at national, provincial and local levels. The Social Investment Organization in Toronto is Canada's ethical investment network and includes community lending organisations. A Community Economic Development Network was established in Ontario. This group is concerned with all aspects of community economic development, including finance. Community economic development corporations in Montreal have recently formed a network and are exploring ways of coordinating the fragmented financial environment in which they work. A community economic development corporation (CDEC-NDG/Côte-des-Neiges) and a community loan fund in Montreal (Montreal Community Loan Fund) found one way by establishing the first local social fund to meet the needs of the community, free of any constraints imposed by institutional funds.[19] This is an important example of removing capital from the constraints of state funding, which imply a variety of norms that are often difficult to meet, and restore a clientelist approach which the community investment movement has fought against.

A very important initiative by the MCLA will hopefully enshrine the fundamental principles which govern alternative investment strategies into the community investment movement in Canada. For two consecutive years, the MCLA organised a national conference of community loan funds. This new dialogue between practitioners has become the basis for a national coalition committed to the democratisation of capital, as investment capital is increasingly invested in initiatives which meet socio-economic objectives as defined by communities themselves.

Examples of such activity grow almost too rapidly to document. They range from what are truly radical departures for financial institutions, to new partnerships between the labour movement and community organisations. A $4.6 million social housing fund (*Fonds d'investissement de Montréal*—FIM) was created through a partnership between major banks, the private sector, government, and the labour movement. Over 800 units of

cooperative housing and low rental units were planned in the first year. This is the initiative of influential individuals with a long history of community activism.

A Quebec university faculty union agreed to invest in the MCLA. In addition, the union is currently negotiating with a local community economic develop ment corporation (CDEC Centre-Sud) to establish two investment instruments: an independent loan fund based in the community, and an additional fund in partnership with the MCLA similar to the one described earlier. The Confederation of National Trade Unions, Quebec's second largest labour union, has established a labour solidarity fund, *Fondaction,* targeting only the social economy; in other words, cooperatives, non-profit organisations, community enterprises, etc. *Fondaction* now joins the *Fonds de solidarité des travailleurs(euses) du Québec,* the first labour solidarity fund established in 1983 by the Quebec Federation of Labor. While the *Fonds de solidarité* largely behaves as a traditional venture or risk capital instrument, it has shifted a great deal of economic power to the labour movement and its success ($3 billion in assets) has permitted the fund to diversify and create low return instruments for small investments as well.

This represents a radical departure from conventional investment behaviour and from state-led development finance. In the former, the supply of investment capital responds to expected rates of return; the demand for investment capital depends, of course, on the rate of interest. The important lesson of Keynesian economics is the role that expectations play in investment behaviour, severely limiting the link between rates of interest and investment decisions. Investment patterns have changed dramatically throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as speculative investment has overrun productive long-term investment. In fact, there barely exists any long-term investment market without extraordinary rates of return. And so what we are describing as we explore community-based alternative investment funds is not an attempt to restore equilibrium in capital markets, but rather to reconstruct a segment of this market entirely.

In a significant way, this moves beyond Keynes, who also taught us that the reason for disequilibria in capital markets is that savers who provide the supply of investment capital are not the same persons who borrow and invest this capital. In the case of community-based investment, this may not be true. If indeed the framework for investment is democratised so that community investment is an integrated activity, the market for investment capital ceases to be one delineated by distinct spheres of demand and supply. Rates of return remain significant; however, these are negotiated and include social as well as economic profitability. This extends Pollin's important distinction between exit-dominated capital-market-based systems and voice-dominated bank-based systems even further by demonstrating the capacity to democratise capital within community-based lending practices.

New entrepreneurial cities or democratising finance?

In a recent article, Bob Jessop writes about the emergence of the entrepreneurial city and the new institutions and modes of regulation or governance to promote its development (Jessop 1996). With reference to the UK experience, Jessop observes an overwhelming consensus regarding endogenous local development initiatives, 'bootstrap strategies',

which is not necessarily neo-liberal. It can be neo-corporatist, neo-statist or even community based. As noted above, there are several coexisting structures of governance associated with this strategy in Quebec. Common to all, however, is their ultimate reliance on the market. They also depend in a very significant manner on what Jessop refers to as a new public meta-narrative which resonates with personal experience. The need to revive urban economies is widely supported; that this can only be achieved through new structures is also widely reported. This provides the legitimation for new institutional arrangements and practices.

For example, Quebec has designated a minister for Montreal for the first time. In addition, the provincial government has created a regional development council for the city; these councils have existed for over twenty years throughout the regions of the province. This is a clear example of Jessop's entrepreneurial city arising out of a new political discourse.

If the city is now viewed as the site for wealth creation, it must, therefore, encourage the development of an entrepreneurial culture—hence the proliferation of funds and programmes to promote small and medium-sized enterprises. However, this new strategy cannot be implemented in an uncoordinated manner. As noted earlier, in its effort to encourage this entrepreneurial culture, the Quebec government created a financial assistance programme to its peril. It has similarly introduced financial assistance to support so-called 'autonomous workers', a euphemism for the unemployed, who are eligible for micro-enterprise funding. This represents more than another assistance programme. A recent study revealed that over 50 per cent of new jobs created were in the category of 'self-employment'. The entrepreneurial city of the future is a divided city: the global city as described by Saskia Sassen and imagined by those engaged in a new group, Montreal International, which is promoting investment in the new economy, and the city of scattered, disconnected small enterprises existing precariously and deprived of the coordination available to those industries situated in the global city (Sassen 1994; Société d'édition de la revue Force 1997).[20]

In sharp contrast are the various community organisations which now have access to investment capital for their neighbourhoods. While the risks are equally high, in many ways they are reduced, as community organisations are equipping themselves to integrate local finance into overall community socio-economic development strategies. This is markedly different from the 'delinked' funding opportunities provided to potential self-employed entrepreneurs.

Increasingly, community economic development has become an accepted strategy to reverse economic decline in low-income neighbourhoods. Moreover, the availability of investment capital in community organisations has, in significant ways, contributed to a shift from their previous role as managers and dispensers of state services and programmes to agents of socio-economic transformation.[21] Indeed, these organisations are part of the meta-narrative Jessop refers to and have embraced the concept of the entrepreneurial city to a large extent, as they are also engaged in business development, but always within a social framework that reflects the lives, experiences and capacities of their communities. These organisations are shaped by their own history of community activism and social intervention. They have struggled to bring this to bear on their local economies.

Local community organisations now carry a heavy and seemingly impossible burden. National and regional governments have delegated an enormous responsibility to these organisations to resolve problems they created and could not resolve. This raises several concerns.

In the early phases, as these organisations began to assume the obligations to revive local economies, create job opportunities, and actively engage in training and social intervention, they risked compromising their history of opposition and militancy to become small bureaucracies detached from their community base; This continues to be debated within groups; how to mobilise this new capacity for democratic economic development based on collective engagement is an ongoing struggle. Increased visibility has also increased their vulnerability. This is nowhere clearer than in Quebec where community groups have become participants in key public policy debates.

The democratic coalitions between community economic development organisations, between these organisations and the labour movement and community loan funds, already occurring in a few examples we cited earlier, are moving beyond these debates to establish a pool of shared financial resources and expertise, as well as a strong common political voice. As these become more widespread, we may be witnessing the emergence of a community-based economic development strategy which will not be vulnerable to government whims of restructuring or policy reorientation. In this case, the availability of local finance will play a vital role as it comes under democratic control and responds to the socio-economic needs of communities. Opportunities to increase the availability of capital will emerge if these coalitions begin to apply pressure on governments and institutionalised investors such as pension funds to reallocate a proportion of their capital to community organisations. There appears to be movement in this direction.

Questions raised

The issues discussed in this chapter leave us with more questions than answers and do not yet, in my view, permit definitive conclusions. This is by no means a pessimistic observation; rather a cautionary view which recognises simultaneously the important potential created by the availability of capital to community-based organisations for establishing and consolidating new democratic economic practice, and their vulnerability, given the risks associated with experimentation. This fear, which certainly applies to all new initiatives, is particularly acute here because of the rapid pace with which new investment capital is emerging and because of the largely uncritical manner in which this is occurring. The most poignant example of this was the adoption by the Micro Credit Summit in Washington (February 1996) of a resolution to eliminate poverty for one million of the poorest through the widespread introduction of micro credit, principally peer lending.[22] That the World Bank has fully embraced this adds to this concern. A panacea for the new millennium! This is not about the democratisation of capital, which cannot succeed without appropriate enabling policy environments or without an appropriate politics.

The title of a recent conference organised by INAISE, 'The Role of Investors in the Social Economy in the Struggle Against Exclusion', is revealing. What is the role of these alternative funds? Are they merely institutions devolved to the local level to promote business development? Or, as the title of the INAISE conference suggests, are they oriented and equipped to respond to the growing problems of poverty and exclusion in their localities? Once again, I believe the answer is yes to both these questions.

First, let us return to the basic distinctions we made earlier between alternative investment funds and the variety of regional and sectoral financial instruments we identified in this chapter. Alternative investment may forego competitive market rates of return as social benefit is the key factor in the estimate of returns on such investment. In fact, this may be the single most important objective. Second, as we move into the local social economy, we are speaking primarily of debt, not equity investments. In many cases, we are speaking of micro credit.

As social exclusion is increasingly recognised as the principal problem confronting governments, the interest in these alternative investment funds grows. Governments at all levels are turning to what would previously have been seen as social experiments at the margins. Once again, it is too soon to render a verdict. However, the growing participation of governments in alternative or community-based initiatives is new, and represents an important opportunity to negotiate new arrangements. The ongoing struggles within community organisations in Quebec to distinguish this relationship from local corporatist business development strategies have already had an impact, even if this remains tenuous at the moment. This struggle cannot let up; the temptation to receive state funding by groups struggling for resources in the familiar form of programmes will undo the transformation which is already occurring in relations between the state and the popular or community sector. This is no small victory, as an ongoing process of negotiation is challenging both clientelist and corporatist approaches of the past. Community organisations have a legacy; it is these organisations which have created the economic initiatives that are now interesting to the public. As new partners come forward, they meet with unexpected obstacles. The democratic structures on which these community organisations are based are, in most cases, non-negotiable. Moreover, their model of governance is imposed on their new partners. This transformative process is challenging prevailing power structures.

Notes

1 Often referred to as Quebec Inc., partnership between strategic actors—labour, business and government—has characterised the economic development model in Quebec. In the 1980s, this partnership supported the adoption of an industrial strategy to develop sectoral 'clusters' *(les grappes industrielles)*. This period also marked the creation of the *Forum pour l'emploi,* in which these actors collaborated in a job creation strategy at both the regional and national levels. This experience provides a legacy for economic development strategies in Quebec.

2 Two hundred and eighty-four new investment funds were surveyed for which complete information was found for 231.

3 The labour unions have held numerous debates on the social economy. The Confederation of National Trade Unions was the first to explore this issue which it referred to as *l'économie solidaire,* inspired by the work of Jean-Louis LaVille in France and by the growing interest in the third sector. In fact, these debates were critical to expanding the definition of the social economy beyond a sectoral basis to a larger and more conceptual interpretation that examined the organisation of economic life. There have been numerous conferences in Quebec in which community activists and labour have participated. This dialogue continues, not without tensions, it is true, but certainly reflecting a new openness to coalition building and collaborative strategies which are not a throwback to the conservative church-based appeals to community.

4 Nancy Neamtan, President of the *Chantier d'économie sociale,* is also the Director of RESO, one of the first generation of community economic development corporations established by the Quebec government in the mid-1980s. She has been a critical voice in the community economic development movement which is now receiving the widespread support of the Quebec government as it decentralises and devolves increasing responsibility onto the community sector. This process continues to evolve. Nancy Neamtan's role has been pivotal in maintaining the objectives of the social economy as expressed in the position paper presented by community organisations to the Socio-economic Summit in October 1996.

5 The objective was to create 1,000 jobs in the first year. Since this, of course, coincides with massive layoffs in the public sector and the growing burden placed on families, especially women, as care-givers in this new environment of depleted social services and health care provision, there was great concern that these jobs would simply replace those lost in the public sector with low-wage low security jobs, not to mention concern over the critical issue of skills. The *Chantier* continues to reassure its critics that this is not the case. Indeed, several cooperatives have been established which provide affordable services and good working conditions. The debates continue.

6 The Quebec government has recently created centres for local development throughout the regions (CLDs—*centre local de développement*) as well as local employment centres (CLEs—*centre local d'emploi*). Their functions will overlap with those currently being carried out by the community economic development corporations (CDECs). In some cases, the CDECs will perform these functions as they are folded (partially) into a CLD, for example. To make matters more confusing, the CLDs and CLEs are each the creation of two separate ministries. While assurances are given that the structures of these centres will be democratic and include broad community participation, they represent an overhaul of what already exists and what many claim works effectively. Hence the question of the role of the state in these regional formations.

7 Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission and Lamberto Dini, President of the European Council, announced that the Commission would consider the issuing of Union bonds to co-finance Trans-European Networks (TENS) to revitalise the European economy. These would not be considered as debt for member states. Rather, the TENS would assist small and medium-sized business in the regions. This is an example of the growing support for financially led industrial strategies within an overall neo-liberal context.

8 In 1996, our research revealed that there were 284 funds with a total of approximately $3.1 billion in risk capital, one half of which was invested at the time. Our more recent study of 350 funds revealed almost $2 billion available for so-called micro-credit funds in Quebec (investments up to $75,000). The number of funds has multiplied due to the increased involvement of the state in this activity. As well, the *Fonds de Solidarité des travailleurs et*

travailleuses du Québec, the Labour solidarity fund in Quebec, now has assets of almost $3 billion.

9 The *Caisse de dépôt et placement* are public sector pension funds; the *Fonds de solidarité des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec* is a labour solidarity fund established in 1983 by the Quebec Federation of Labour, Quebec's largest labour union Federation.

10 A study published by the federal government in 1994 on small and medium-sized business development in Canada, revealed a bankruptcy rate of approximately 75 per cent. Moreover, it expressed serious concern with the lack of investment capital for projects in the $50,000 to $500,000 range, thus reinforcing already existing inequities in capital markets and financial institutions. Venture capital, at the time of the report, was limited to lower risk, high-return investment. A few years ago, Quebec launched a programme to provide such capital. Guaranteed loans of $50,000 would be provided to launch small business in Quebec. While there has been debate on the exact number of failures, they are numerous. In another study, the federal government revealed that despite low rates of inflation, low interest rates and the highest rate of growth in production in three years, 8, 507 individuals and 1,196 enterprises declared bankruptcy in April 1997. On average, 1,000 enterprises per month have declared bankruptcy since 1995.

11 As noted earlier, there are currently many competing definitions of the social economy. In our study on financial instruments, we did not limit our concept of the social economy sectorally or territorially. Rather, we considered all funds which were constrained by socio-economic criteria to be part of the social economy. In other words, the investment decisions were not dictated purely by profit considerations.

12 The Social Economy Fund *(Fonds de développement de l'économie sociale)* was launched on 21 November 1997. Its objective to raise $23 million within five years includes $4 million from the Quebec government and $19 million from the private sector. It has already raised $3 million from large foundations, banks, business and the federation of credit unions in addition to the $4 million from government. This fund is now known as RISQ (*le Réseau d' investissement social du Québec*).

13 I refer here to the statement made by Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* (1944:14) that 'Laisser-faire was planned; planning was not', following his analysis of a series of legislative acts and government interventions to install the self-regulating market economy. This marked the beginning of a history of interventions to permit the market to function and counter-movements to prevent the social catastrophe which a free market economy would produce. The evidence was already there to demonstrate the social, economic and political havoc of such a strategy. The collapse of international financial markets in the 1920s buried this project forever, in Polanyi's view. He celebrated the defeat of fascism and the establishment of the postwar welfare state. Polanyi could no more predict the re-emergence of a free market agenda in the 1970s than those of us unable to comprehend the legitimacy it has assumed, despite the record. As in the nineteenth century, globalisation now requires a framework of 'planning' to forestall disaster. Indeed, conditions have radically changed with the revolution in communications technology. Still, governments are behaving as they did in the last century when the changes were equally dramatic, if not more so. The difference, of course, is that out of the ashes of liberalism emerged a social contract. Today, this is seen as the source of economic decline and is severely under attack. Although, as we point out elsewhere in this chapter, there are cracks.

14 The OECD was negotiating the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which, if implemented, would constitute a global investment treaty that would prevent governments from introducing investment policy as a means to promote social, economic and

environmental objectives. This agreement represents a charter of rights and freedoms for corporations only, guaranteed by national governments in the interest of transnational investment There was little awareness of this agreement until the disclosure by Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke and the Council of Canadians; the MAI has been negotiated in camera. Opposition to the MAI has put it on the shelf for the time being. Since this article was written, Seattle has shown the world that organizations such as the WTO and the OECD cannot continue to operate as they have; the public is neither compliant nor silent as an international elite attempts to shape the global economy.

15 On institution building, the new role of the World Trade Organisation and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment demonstrate the compliance of nation-states to reduce their power as they transfer decisions to transnational corporations.

16 The ill-fated Tobin Tax on speculation was another attempt to discipline capital mobility. Despite its relatively painless bite into speculative profits, it was not taken seriously.

17 William Pfaff's 1998 new year resolution was to 'rethink the deregulation fad'. This, in and of itself, was astonishing for those familiar with Pfaff's views. In his analysis of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the year, Pfaff wrote:

> As 1998 begins, one may hope that we have learned something from 1997's Asian economic crisis. The systematic deregulation of the global economy—an aim still energetically pursued by the major international economic institutions, as well as by the U.S. Government—is explosively dangerous. What has happened in Asia demonstrates that this program produces a globalisation of crises, as well as of trade.
>
> Pfaff goes on to observe that only China has escaped. He also refers to earlier crises precipated by deregulation, in particular the collapse of the savings and loan associations in the USA in the 1980s. It is rather ironic that the World Bank report cites the 'dazzling growth' of East Asia as it makes its case for increased state intervention, without noting how the social structures of these countries are being torn apart by their participation as players in global finance. This situation is being read differently, of course, by free market advocates. Instead of looking to the role of financial markets, and the need for capital controls, they now celebrate the near collapse of Asian economies due to an outdated 'crony capitalism' and the urgent need to deregulate!
>
> (Pfaff 1998:6)

18 The most recent addition to this list is the policy of the Labour Party in the UK which is proposing the creation of regional development funds.

19 The CDEC *(Corporation pour le développement économique communautaire)* is located in the districts of NDG (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce) and Côte-des-Neiges in Montreal. It is one of nine such community economic development corporations in the city of Montreal. These are funded largely by the provincial government. As stated earlier, the current policy to decentralise the provincial government has created new regional bodies (CLDs and CLEs) which may alter the functions of the CDECs. This partnership between the MCLA and the CDEC NDG/Côte-des-Neiges was the first agreement between a community-based loan fund and a CDEC.

20 Montreal International is an association of prominent business leaders brought together to promote Montreal as a global city. This association is currently also establishing an investment fund to add to the many incentives already available.

21 In Quebec there is great concern that this may be reversed now that new regional structures (CLDs and CLEs) are in place. Although these may be integrated into existing organisations, there is a feeling that they will return to fragmented service provision. Entrepreneurial promotion will be separated from employment issues. The community development organisations greatest achievements lie in their capacity to provide an integrated approach. We may be returning to the clientelist approach, which community organisations fought against.

22 The Micro Credit Summit was held in Washington in February 1997. The purpose of this summit was 'to launch a global movement to reach 100 million of the world's poorest families, especially the women of those families, with credit for self-employment and other financial and business services, by the year 2005'. The inspiration for this summit was the success of the Grameen Bank and other peer lending organisations throughout the world. The objectives of this summit were unrealistic for a number of reasons, not the least of which was little consideration for the larger policy environment. Nor did it adequately distinguish the urban from the rural poor or the poor from the industrialised and non-industrialised worlds (This distinction now exists). Still, the numerous participants, including world leaders, pointed to the interest in micro credit and the support which would be forthcoming from governments, multilateral agencies and bilateral donor agencies. It also corresponded with a shift in World Bank strategy towards what it is calling capillary lending, in which funds will be given directly to micro-credit organisations, bypassing governments.

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6
Workfare and community economic development in Montreal
Community and work in the late twentieth century

Eric Shragge and Jean-Marc Fontan

We are living in a period of complex social reorganisation. Globalisation of economies and responses of governments to these changes have created dilemmas for community organisations and social activists. Faced with issues of unemployment and poverty, and reduced state resources and programmes, community groups have found new approaches. Yet at the same time, they recognise that that they cannot overcome these problems on their own and have redefined relations with the government at a local level. We have chosen two practices that illustrate the tensions and contradiction implicit in these new approaches. The first is a community restaurant, part of a wider practice referred to as 'Industries d'Insertion' (Bordeleau and Valadou 1995), which while administering a workfare programme has played a leadership role in the debate on poverty and the social economy. We have chosen this because it was one of the first projects that attempted to integrate a community business, a socially useful product and a training programme. Its pioneering role and success have allowed it to play a leadership role in both the local community and in the wider practice networks.

The second practice is wider. We will describe the general directions of community economic development (CED) practice carried out by paramunicipal organisation *Corporation de développement économique communautaire* (CDEC) in Montreal. We have chosen these particular case studies because they are representative of a complex interrelationship between the community and the different levels of the state. The tension between their roles as local managers of the consequences of economic change and as innovators in finding new solutions to these problems provides an example of the complexity of practice in the current economic environment.

Changing economic and social policy context

The practice of community organisation has been shaped by the wider changes linked to globalisation of the economy. In his 1995 book, Teeple argues that the period between the Second World War and the 1970s was 'qualitatively different from the previous post war period. It was the interregnum between the age of competing imperial powers and the coming global economy' (Teeple 1995:57). The 'Keynesian Welfare State' (KWS) was a national class compromise in a period of growth, a tight labour market, high wages and national capital need for an increased role of the state (Teeple 1995:62). Several

factors ended the KWS as a strategy of class rule, including the productivity gains of the micro-electronic revolution, and the rapid growth of international trade. Along with the 'denationalisation' of capital, the postwar reformism associated with the KWS was challenged, and a push for unregulated capital brought with it a redefinition of the role of the state expressed in the following consequences: deregulation of the economy; privatisation of public corporations; transformation of the tax structure, which put a greater burden on wage earners; reduction of government debt; downsizing of government; restructuring of the role of local government; dismantling of the welfare state; and promotion of private charities (Teeple 1995:101–7).

A crisis of the KWS has led to new state strategies which have limited and cut state spending, as well as redefined the form and strategies of social provision. We are witnessing the emergence of more fragmented forms of intervention with shorter-term, less expensive and flexible programmes that have drawn the community sector into a web of state programmes. Mayer (1993) argues both that social movement organisations have contributed to this redefinition and that their activities have been shaped by it. New practices in the community sector have responded to the economic changes and have influenced state policy. The community sector has been accorded greater importance, but at the price of dismantling state programmes. These new approaches raise troubling questions in the context of post-Fordist forms of regulation. Will these forms become a cheap and flexible means of social provision—mobilising volunteers and social assistance claimants through workfare—without a wider political or social agenda, or will these new practices become the basis for a third sector, one committed to democratic organisation and social equality (Mayer 1993)?

The organisations that we will discuss are examples of new social practice that have been changed by the economic processes of globalisation and the responses to it by different levels of the state. The community sector faces the consequences of economic decline and the reduction of large-scale social and economic intervention to try to remedy the situation. The community sector faces the uncertainty brought on by a period of redefinition. The complexities of government programmes and agencies, which have, with cutbacks, fewer resources and tighter criteria for receipt of funds, have generated a high level of skill in community organisations at manipulating and trying to manoeuvre these programmes so that their social goals can be achieved. The underlying goals of the different levels of state and community organisations are quite different. The former are looking for inexpensive ways to manage a severe crisis of unemployment with diminished resources within a decentralised framework (one that does not create inflexible unionised processes), while the latter have used this decentralisation to build more democratic local processes and find innovative, socially useful responses to the same crisis. On top of all of these changes, globalisation and related technological changes have provoked a crisis of work (Rifkin 1995). The organisations that we will discuss have concentrated much of their energy on finding ways to create useful work and to integrate those without it into jobs, through training programmes. The concern with employment and training represents a departure for community organisations, creating new contradictions and opportunities.

We have selected two types of community organisations that reflect the new forms of practice to emerge in a post-Fordist context, which has reshaped both the economic landscape and the responses of the state to social problems. Chic-Resto Pop is a community restaurant that links social provision (low-cost meals in a poor working-class neighbourhood) with a job-training programme. It is an example of an organisation that is confronting the consequences of deindustrialisation and chronic high levels of unemployment. It is a high-profile organisation, and is an example of a wider approach called 'training businesses'. Elements of a post-Fordist welfare state, as discussed above, appear in this project. Is this type of organisation a new way of managing poverty or is it representative of new forms of social struggle and conflict between the community and the state? This question will be central in our analysis. The second organisations are community economic development corporations in the city of Montreal. They can be described as 'intermediary organisations' (Mayer 1993) and play a role both in promoting and linking economic and social development. Under the leadership of the municipality with active involvement of the other two senior levels of government, they represent an urban strategy to revitalise local economies and integrate the unemployed and the poor into the labour market.

The changes in the Quebec economy have had a devastating impact. Official unemployment levels of more than 10 per cent for more than a decade have been the result of a declining industrial base, and a shift of industrial jobs outside Quebec. This process has been accelerated by NAFTA and the Canadian-USA free trade deal which took place before that. Although there have been some high-tech industries that have invested in Quebec and the Montreal area in particular, this has not replaced the massive loss of employment from traditional industries. Other new jobs in the service sector have produced precarious part-time work. Further, the public sector is laying off workers and is unable to absorb the trained workforce in the way that it did in the years 1960–80. The economic conditions have produced what can be described as a *société à deux vitesses* in which those fortunate enough to be in secure jobs contrast with a growing number who work in part-time, precarious, badly paid jobs, moving from periods of work to unemployment, punctuated by dead-end government programmes. This surplus population is left with few options and little hope.

The response of the state, both provincial and federal, to the crisis of work, unemployment and poverty has been to stay the course with policies of supporting market competition and reducing its debt by prioritising social programmes as its favourite target for cuts. In most parts of Canada, those receiving welfare benefits have been forced into some kind of workfare programme, despite the government's failure to insert claimants into the labour market. The reduction of transfer payments from the federal government to the provincial level and then reducing the resources to municipalities have worsened the crisis for those at the lowest level. At the same time, the community, through a wide variety of organisations, has been assigned greater responsibility in the management of these programmes, and is seen by government as a way of providing a flexible and relatively inexpensive way of muddling through and managing the crisis of unemployment, poverty, and social provision.

Traditions of community organisation in Quebec

We will separate the community organisation movement into three stages or periods of development. The dominant characteristics of each period will be described, but this does not imply that other forms of practice were absent during that particular time. The practice approaches in each stage were also shaped by the state, its ideology, and approach to social and economic policy. The periods are as follows: 1960s to 1975, 1975 to the late 1980s and from the late 1980s to the present.

1960s to 1975

This period was characterised by tremendous social optimism in the community movement and a reform impetus in the state, particularly in Quebec. It was a time in which both federal welfare state programmes and provincial institutions providing social, education and health services were developed. This spirit of optimism and social participation was reflected in the community movement. Social change seemed possible. Initiatives in a variety of social areas, such as day care and health, emerged as groups organised themselves to promote services and to demand support (Doucet and Favreau 1991; Favreau 1989). Money was available from both the federal and the provincial governments to support social innovation. Funding for innovation was available through grants either to encourage employment for the young (Opportunities for Youth) or to create short-term jobs during periods of high unemployment (Local Initiative Programs). Other funding, available from many government departments, supported new approaches in the social and health services. The funding did not directly undermine the autonomy of the organisations, and in some cases its withdrawal provoked confrontations with angry members of community organisations. One of the main characteristics of the community movement was its autonomy. Whether new services were established or protests and pressure groups were formed, the autonomy of the groups from the state was strongly guarded. This does not imply that groups did not receive government funds, rather that the structure of organisations and their vision and activities were not directly shaped by funding.

The transition of the community movement from a popular opposition move ment to one that emphasised service provision was gradual. However, service provision became the activity that would receive support and as a result groups were slowly pushed in that direction.

1975 to 1990

This phase is marked by a rapid expansion of the community sector, along with growing sophistication and professionalism. From 1973 to the end of the 1980s the number of groups in Montreal went up from 138 to 1,500, and those receiving money from the Quebec government's Ministry of Health and Social Services went up from thirty-one to 547. The important redefinition here is the relationship that began to be established between the provincial government and the community movement (Hamel and Léonard

1980; Panet-Raymond 1987). Many community initiatives, which began as experimental models, became adjuncts to state services. The combination of a decentralisation of government services and clear fiscal limits of the state were important factors that shaped this outcome. This does not imply that the activism, mobilisation and confrontation associated with the earlier period disappeared, but that these activities and engagements declined relative to the new directions. The division was between those community organisations which defined their services in an alternative perspective, and those which emphasised professionalism and traditional organisational structures (White 1993). The funding of these services came from the provincial government and negotiations took place through 'regroupements' or sectoral coalitions, representing, for example, rape crisis centres or alternative mental health agencies. The politics and policies of service were played out through these relations. The funding, the service delivery agenda and the expansion of the fields of community organisations decreased the involvement of these groups in political and social struggles.

Late 1980s to the present

This period brought a changed economic and political context that has had a profound impact on the community movement. First, unemployment and urban poverty have grown and have become constants. In line with economic decline, all levels of government have prioritised cost-cutting measures aimed at social programmes. As a result, more people are turning to community-based services for help. The tendency of the previous period to give both responsibility and some forms of assistance to community services continues, and has been consolidated and formalised through structured partnerships (Panet-Raymond 1992). Service delivery that meets with prescribed norms, and defined by particular programme-related funds, has shaped the community-state relation. Conflicts are played out in the processes of negotiation between regional bodies that allocate funds and the various sectoral organisations that bring together community-based services. Individual groups have continued to work politically through coalitions, particularly those opposing major changes in unemployment insurance or social aid, but these coalitions have had little success in mobilising large numbers.

With the growth in unemployment and related social problems, the community sector became more involved with economic issues. Beginning in the mid-1980s, community organisations initiated activities that became the impetus for the formation of community economic development (CED) organisations (Fontan 1988, 1990). Government agencies from the municipal through to the federal level have coordinated their allocation of funds and shaped the activities of these agencies. Some of the groups involved have used government workfare programmes to organise ways in which those excluded from the job market can get together in social solidarity The newer groups have linked social insertion and solidarity through socially oriented community businesses. These new practices have created a space for those marginalised by the economic crisis, and a way of building a cultural and social alternative, and in some ways represent the beginnings of a small social economy among the poor.

With the new formal partnership arrangements discussed above, community organisations are faced with the dilemma of greater recognition and funding vs decreased autonomy and a lessened political agenda. With their service orientation, groups have shifted from a membership or social movement base to a client focus. This redefinition is inherently de-politicising. Clients are to be served and have a less active or no role in either the organisations' internal processes or on wider social issues. At best they are to be represented rather than mobilised. Thus, the forms of political representation become lobbying and coalitions of community organisations representing a particular population. With a service orientation, we have seen redefinition of the political, from the direct action and mobilisation of the earlier period to lobbying and representation in the current one. Some groups have maintained the earlier traditions, and successful actions such as the Bread and Roses March mobilised low-income women in a highly publicised march to Quebec City (Interaction Communautaire), but for the most part they have not been primarily involved with service provision.

Community organisations are pulled between two poles. The first is as an oppositional force that raises demands, mobilises or represents the needs of their constituency, and pushes for some form of social change, or the part of this force that puts in place services and/or programmes that in their form (democratic, anti-hierarchical) and content (what they do) challenge the dominant form of provision. The second pole is one in which community organisations become extensions of the state. Through the process of receiving support from the state, these organisations lose any opposition character and become partners with the state in the provision of services. Our perspective recognises both poles, but our case studies will examine the contradictory middle ground in which community organisations play a role that promotes social change while also entering into partnership with the state.

Contradictory practice

Chic Resto-Pop

Chic Resto-Pop is located in the area of Montreal called Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, an old industrial area which offered employment in textiles, food, furniture, railways and shipbuilding. The area can be described as a traditional industrial zone. It has been hit extremely hard by the economic changes described above. This working-class area has been on the decline for several decades. Its population dropped from 82,000 in 1950 to 48,000 in 1991, a drop partly related to the growth of suburbs, where those with relatively stable and comfortable employment moved. Between 1960 and 1980 there were many factory closures. The consequence has been a rapid growth in the levels of unemployment and poverty. The official poverty rate for the area is 40 per cent. The area also has a strong tradition of community opposition and developing alternatives as a way of attacking social problems.

Chic Resto-Pop, a community restaurant, was established in 1984 by twelve welfare recipients. It started with two purposes: to create jobs for the founding members and for the poor in the community, and to provide quality, hot, inexpensive meals. These goals have been realised and the organisation has both grown and broadened its activities. It has introduced a mobile kitchen to provide meals for local schools and day camps in the summer. In addition a musical festival, which is now autonomous, was introduced in 1992. Currently, Resto-Pop serves three meals a day, five days a week. In 1984, it served meals for fifty people, in 1990 it served 250 people, and today it serves 800.

Resto-Pop is a non-profit organisation with a charity number. It is managed by a Board of Directors with seven members, almost equal in numbers of men and women, mostly from the church and the 'liberal' professions. There is no representative of staff on the board, and until recently there was no general assembly. The operating budget for 1994 was $800,000. Slightly less than half was received from the three levels of government, while the rest was raised from sales of meals, Bingo and donations. There are twenty-one full-time employees, under the supervision of the director. Four employees are involved with administrative work, two coordinate the restaurant, and fifteen others carry out the general work.

Job development and training are central concerns of Resto-Pop. It currently takes in 93 trainees a year. The length of training varies between six and fifteen months. The trainees are all receiving welfare, and as trainees are participating in a workfare programme called *Expérience de travail* (EXTRA). Although these programmes are not obligatory for those considered by the government to be able-bodied, there is a coercive aspect insofar as welfare rates are reduced for those who refuse to participate. This programme was a controversial part of welfare reform and many community organisations that could accept trainees have boycotted EXTRA.

A study carried out by Resto-Pop on its trainees revealed a high level of dropout from the programme. The process of referral to the programme through the welfare system and the semi-coercive aspect of the referral suggest that the trainees are not necessarily there because of a strong interest in the programme. Another aspect of the training process to be explored is the content of the training that goes beyond the immediate tasks necessary for running a community restaurant; such topics may include social rights, literacy skills, etc.

Resto-Pop has carried out a study that shows the most frequent users of their programme are single men, of an average age of 45, who live alone and are receiving welfare or Unemployment Insurance. They eat on average six to eight meals a week there. Resto-Pop provides more than meals—it helps break the isolation of individuals who have been excluded from the labour force. The large dining room is also used by community organisations for the provision of information.

In the fall of 1995, Resto-Pop moved in a new direction. Pierre Prud'homme (1995), the member of staff in charge of training, raised several critiques about the training and related government policies. He argued that the government continues to think about and to apply its welfare system as though it was a system of last resort, acting as if the lack of jobs was invented by recipients. Short-term training programmes coupled with unemployment has institutionalised instability and the social exclusion of parents from

both economic and meaningful social roles. In light of this analysis, Resto-Pop asked the government to reform its training programme and allow participants to stay for three years. The government refused, arguing that they did not want to encourage dependence in a protected environment.

Frustrated by the government's lack of movement in a more progressive direction as well as the continued increase in local poverty, the leadership of Resto-Pop called a conference to examine the underlying economic issues, the politics of deficit cutting and the lack of adequate government response. Several hundred people from the local community participated in this event, culminating in a series of demands and a march to the office of their local provincial representative. Their demands touched fiscal and monetary policy, the minimum wage, job creation and day care, and training, calling for full employment through a variety of actions and innovations (Chic Resto-Pop 1995). This successful high-profile event put Resto-Pop on the map as a leader in the current debate on poverty in Quebec.

Chic Resto-Pop is dependent on its administering of a workfare programme that has been condemned and boycotted by the more critical community organisations. Yet at the same time, it has responded to several social needs through a community business. Instead of accepting the boundaries of the workfare programme, the leadership of this organisation has tried to mobilise locally and demand its transformation, arguing that the contribution of the participants must be recognised as a legitimate form of work, and paid as a wage, not as welfare. Resto-Pop sees itself as a leader in the social economy, but is pushing for recognition that this new sector cannot be run without support and those working in it should not be marginalised. In other words, the emerging training businesses and the 'social economy' need to be locally controlled and, at the same time, supported by the government. It has politicised these demands and pushed beyond the limits of the workfare programme.

CDECs

There are seven CDECs in Montreal, each responsible for working in administrative districts of the city called *arrondissements*. The first three were initiated by coalitions of community organisations and other partners such as local unions, business and different government agencies in the late 1980s in older industrial neighbourhoods facing urban decay and poverty, economic decline and high levels of unemployment. The economy was a new field of practice for community organisations. Government, particularly at the federal level, was at least partially responsible for the lack of growth of employment because of its concern with the deficit and its withdrawal from large-scale regional development. The traditional means of economic development—private-market investment with government as an active economic player—was no longer viable in a post-Fordist approach to economic management. Yet the consequences of economic decline were evident and new forms of action began to take place. New relations between the community sector and representatives of labour, business and local government institutions, such as health clinics, created ways of intervening together in the economic sphere. The government redefined its support of local economic development in relation

to this new local consensus, but in ways that were consistent with the changes in the welfare state described above.

Through a complex series of negotiations involving the municipal, provincial and federal governments and the local community, the first three CDECs took shape. This was followed by a top-down initiative by these governments through a joint committee to organise the other four. Three objectives were defined by this joint committee—*Le Comité Harmonisation*—in 1990: (1) to encourage the training and integration of the local population into the labour market—'employability services'; (2) to support businesses and entrepreneurs in their development projects in order to create or maintain jobs; and (3) to develop a partnership between community organisations, businesses, unions and institutions as the most important way of achieveing goals 1 and 2, and to develop the economic potential of the locality (Shragge 1994). These goals were linked to specific funding envelopes, which targeted specific types of programme; however, the CDECs have adapted these to local needs We will examine the accomplishments and problems in each of these three programme areas.

The aim of 'employability services' is to develop the capacities of different categories of unemployed workers, and includes: a range of information and referral services; workshops on different aspects of employment; training and education programmes; disbursing government funds to community organisations that put in place job-training programmes; and promoting job placement with employers. They have functioned mainly as individualised services through which clients are placed in a variety of programmes. The CDECs have shown that it is possible to work with those excluded from the labour market and integrate them, but usually in relatively low-wage and often unstable sectors of the economy. They have produced, on a small scale, better results than businesses, school boards and government agencies (Leduc 1994), at least partly because they have been able to bring together businesses, labour and community to examine local labour-market needs and training capacities.

Another advantage of the CDECs is their use of programmes to collaborate with community organisations to stimulate the creation of training businesses, which have been supported as one strategy to counter the very high levels of youth unemployment (Bordeleau and Valadou 1995; Fontan and Shragge 1994). These have played the dual role of both providing innovative community services or socially useful products and doing this through the employment of trainees. Groups that have received support include community restaurants and recycling businesses. Programmes have been developed to reduce the high-school dropout rate and to find ways of integrating young workers into the labour market. The lack of decent jobs and the type of work that is available for those currently unemployed, despite improved training, is a limit that these programmes cannot overcome by themselves.

The CDECs are directly involved in business development in their respective districts. The twenty-six employees in this field have worked with approximately 1,000 different businesses (Leduc 1994). Examples of their practices include providing advice to individual enterprises, such as the development of business plans, consultation on management, evaluation of the health of a business, finding sources of financial support, and building linkages between existing businesses. The CDECs will also help local

businesses apply for government grants and other forms of support. CDECs have been able to develop more innovative and experimental forms of entrepreneurship, such as production cooperatives and businesses that specialise in job training. Another innovation is to link social and economic development and/or incorporate ecological principles into business. Examples include the development of industries specialising in the recycling of glass and/or plastic.

An important contribution of the CDECs is their role in economic planning in their communities. Economic decisions are usually made by those with money to invest, and at times in conjunction with the appropriate level of government. Profitability is the major criterion for investment decisions. Through the CDECs the community sector has become a new and at times active participant in these processes. This has taken a variety of expressions including consultation with the local community and presenting policy proposals to the city. These plans maximise employment options or promote social needs such as non-profit housing. A few of the CDECs have been able to negotiate with private companies when new investment has taken place in order to maximise local hiring and job-training contracts with them. Through these innovations, the CDECs have been able to mobilise sectors of the local community and promote socially useful options. New tools such as loan funds and loan circles to support a range of local initiatives have been tried (Shragge 1994). These processes have brought a new voice in the planning process representing 'community interests'; this imposes limits on the market and has influenced the direction of economic development.

The third function of the CDECs is the building of local partnerships between representatives of business, labour, community organisations and institutions (Panet-Raymond 1992). The participation of each group is structured through elections to the boards of directors of the CDECs. Each group is accorded seats on these bodies, along with the employee representation of the CDEC. In addition, CDECs have membership from the general public, with an average of 150 per organisation. These are voluntary affiliations and are open for a minimal fee to anyone who lives or has a business in the district. The numbers of members are relatively small. The largest organisation, *Regroupement pour la Relance Economique et Sociale du Sud-Ouest* (RESO), has 250 but there is not a strong presence of members except in events such as annual meetings (Leduc 1994). The CDECs do bring together diverse local interests, but one would not describe them as a mass-base organisation with wide participation from the grassroots level. Rather, interests are represented, and these are played out in attempts to create a consensus on the needs and priorities for local economic development in the context of the programmes funded by the state.

Given the contradictions in which CDECs operate, particularly the pressures from state programmes to push for individualised training programmes and traditional business development, what have they achieved, and what has been their impact, particularly with regard to their potential to promote and support social change? The most difficult problem is the inability of the CDECs to do much on the basic issues of poverty and unemployment, which are related to the division of wealth and macro-economic and social policies. The CDECs can do little about these wider policies except push along with others for changes.

A major accomplishment has been in the creation of innovative forms of socio-economic development, such as training businesses that have linked social production with job training, solidarity groups such as loan circles, and ecological cooperatives. These experiments have produced a few jobs, but have put in place what can be described as a third sector or part of a social-economic development. These are community businesses that are not for private profit and enhance the social functioning of the local area. In addition many of these projects have been a way for groups excluded from the mainstream economy to find a productive place in a solidaristic environment. These innovations are more important because of their contribution to the social and because they allow collective control over the form of production.

Perhaps the most important achievement of the CDECs is their contribution to the democratisation of economic processes at the local level. The CDECs have promoted a collective approach which argues for effective participation of the community in the control and allocation of public resources, through the management of programmes which are decentralised to the locality. This process has resulted in local control of training budgets, and the capacity to use these funds with innovation. A new voice has been added in economic development which hitherto has usually been determined by the private sector, sometimes in conjunction with the state. The community represented through the board of the CDECs has begun to influence and shape investment decisions, and determine the type of economic development. For example, one CDEC, *Rosemont-Petite-Patrie* has launched a development plan on an old railway yard, The Angus Shops, which will encourage high-tech environmental industries to locate in their area; at the same time, the land and buildings will be owned by a community corporation and training agreements will put unemployed people from the local area into some of the jobs (Fontan and Shragge 1996). Similarly, RESO, discussed earlier, has forced local investors to negotiate conditions including training agreements. The implication of this approach is that investment has to have some accountability and take into account some of the local social problems and issues.

The CDECs have been agents democratising economic decisions. The question we raise is how far can this process go, what are the limits of a state-funded organisation with progressive leadership in times of economic deterioration and macro-state policies that support less rather than more control of economic development? Yet with this economic perspective come related social problems. The community seems to be the place in which these various interests can come together, with reciprocity and compromise, to find ways of attacking these social problems. This implies some gains for the community sector, but at the same time the source of the problem is the economic system itself and the politics that support it. Unless these are challenged the CDECs will broker small gains and become just another set of players in the destructive economic processes that are now global.

Community, the state and globalisation

From our earlier discussion it is evident that the process of globalisation has had a major impact on the relation between the state and community organisations. In the context of

cutbacks and the withdrawal of the state as the central social provider, community organisations have moved from protest to marginal service providers to a more central role in the redefined post-Keynesian state. What impact would one expect from these changes and what political contradictions emerge? From the literature that discusses the relationship of community organisation to the state, several perspectives emerge. The first, we would argue, is that relations with the state, particularly through funding, tend to distort both the activities of the organisation and their internal structures and processes. In the former case this leads from a practice that focuses on social change to one that prioritises direct service oriented to individual adjustment (Sullivan 1982; Morgenbesser *et al.* 1981; White 1994). In the latter instance, democratic non-hierarchical structures are replaced by bureaucratic, professionally dominated organisations (Ng 1988; Ristock 1991). These positions tend to argue for a determinism, an inevitable distortion of both goals and processes. Others argue for a less deterministic outcome, while acknowledging the pressures that the state puts on community organisations (Lustiger-Thaler and Shragge 1993; Fisher 1993; Muller *et al.* 1990). The relation between community organisations and the state can be characterised as a relation of conflict, with the forces that shape the organisations being derived both from without and within (Sullivan 1982). The outside forces are the demands of the funding agencies. The forces within include the capacity for building local and sectoral support, maintaining a clear vision of long-term organisational goals, and sustaining a participative and/or democratic decision-making structure. We argue that with these components in place it is possible to resist at least some of the pressures and the deforming processes inherent in state funding, and to preserve some autonomy and control within a creative tension.

What is the relationship to the state of the community organisations discussed in this chapter, in this period of transition? Both of the organisations that we have presented find themselves intertwined with government programmes, yet with some autonomy to manipulate those programmes within certain limits. In addition, aspects of the programmes have been contested. Resto-Pop, for example, recognises the limits and the oppressive nature of workfare, but believes that work is an important element in social citizenship, particularly when it produces a socially useful outcome. Based on that logic they have challenged the government's orientation in several ways. First, most of the amount they receive as an organisation to administer the programme is turned over to participants to supplement their meagre benefits. Second, they have demanded better training and have implemented a pilot programme in which participants can complete their secondary education at Resto-Pop. Third, they have demanded that the work carried out by participants be viewed by the government as legitimate labour, and that it be remunerated as such. They have promoted the idea that participants should receive a wage from the organisation rather than their welfare checks, and that the programme allow longer-term participation rather than the current turnover of, on average, six to eight months per person. The relation with the state is one of the contestation of the limits of the programme as well as its logic.

The relationship of the CDECs to the state is complex. Their funding is tied to the three levels of government through various programmes. Some of the programmes have been implemented within the narrow prescribed definitions, while others have been used

in order to develop new economic and social approaches. The CDECs have formed a lobby to pressure the government to continue to finance their organisations, and they have also begun discussions on the wider social issues that they face. The latter has led to some critical debates about the changing context and directions of practice. In other words, there is a growing politicisation of the directors of the CDECs and a conflictual engagement with the state. At the local level, the CDECs have helped the process of democratising local economic development. Through its structures and programmes community organisations and trade unions have had an impact on shaping the local economy. There has been unequal success among the CDECs, but increasingly these organisations have become major economic players who have insisted that economic development cannot move ahead without a substantial social contribution. In addition, they have supported the development of social-economic initiatives and innovations both financially and with staff time.

The activities of the CDECs and Resto-Pop have been shaped by the state, and in some ways they are carrying out policies and programmes defined from outside their communities, which often conflict with the vision and the underlying values of activists and leaders of the organisation. Yet they have succeeded in maintaining autonomy within these limits. The vision has been key. The organisations discussed have a strong commitment to the struggle against poverty defined in terms of social and economic exclusion. Their analysis sees the problem as one that is linked to the wider economy and the failure of the state's social and economic policies on a macro-level. Although their visions lack political clarity, the situation and the need for alternatives are clearly understood. There is a willingness to press for various changes, oppose government policies and engage in wider political and social debates. Further, the CDECs, with some variation, and Resto-Pop have been successful in developing alliances with other local organisations and those working in similar fields. These have strengthened their ability to protect themselves and push for social change. The structure of the CDECs has imposed a board representing various sectors. In some this has precipitated conflict, while in others the representation has been a source of power, bringing diverse sectors of the community together with a common vision and perspective. The CDECs in some districts have become significant economic actors, both forcing concessions from investors and shaping the economic development of the area, thus acting as a vehicle that has provided a voice to the community sector in economic development.

So what does all this mean in social and political terms, what is the importance of community organisations in this period of redefinition of the role of the state in social provision? There is one tendency exemplified by McKnight (1994) that sees the emergence of community responsibility and autonomous services, often based on voluntarism and independent of the state, as a positive development. He founds his position on an idealised vision of community as based on reciprocity and existing as an independent and closed entity. We reject this position and argue, like Friedmann (1992), that the road to a strong community sector is through political engagement with the state. Despite funding from the state, the community organisations have to be able to develop a constituency that can be mobilised to protect both the autonomy of the organisation and its funding. Social partnerships are another approach that has gained currency in both

Europe and North America. The involvement of the representatives of several sectors in a common project, usually at the community level, is the model. Again, the state plays a strong role in these processes. Panet-Raymond (1992) warns us through his discussion of partnership versus paternalism of the dangers of this relation. The state is pursuing a joint strategy of disengagement in the sphere of social provision, while substituting a cheaper community alternative to which it has no long-term commitment. The interest of community organisations is shaped by the joint prospects of greater access to resources and recognition. The danger to both sides resides in the conflicting traditions and ideologies. In this period of shifting terrain, the community sectors may make some gains, but if they are not politically prepared for the new relationship, they may simply end up as cheap substitutes for diminished state engagement.

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Part III

Urban social movements and the global future

This last part deals with the stakes involved in contemporary urban grassroots movements and the way in which these groups reflect the current complexity of global transformations at different entry points for collective action. While one can easily underline a growing array of issues reflected in the concerns of global movements such as NGOs, urban forms of collective action are also, if more circuitously, related to these same transformations and challenges. The ongoing erosion of the national welfare state, the relationship between global political concerns—environmentalism, human rights, social exclusion, etc.—and the rising preoccupations within civil societies with local subjectivities find their expressions in urban social movements.

Over the last fifteen years urban movements have contributed to building a dense repertoire of claims and strategies which they share with other social movements in a variety of circumstances. Their capacity to use institutional resources and develop at the same time a space of autonomy within civil society—relying on social networks and social solidarity—confirms their ambivalence as well as their adaptability. It appears that urban movements, within the current global environment, have chosen to play both sides of the court—within and outside institutions—with a focus on challenging prevailing forms of decision and policy making. Beyond their self-imposed limitations and localism, urban movements excel in exploring different types of social experiences, precisely due to their grounded nature. This gives citizens countless opportunities for social involvement and social solidarity.

Dominant discourses separating the Western and Eastern modernities, once sturdy European constructs, have lost their political import. Transformations in the West have also become evident in the way institutional innovations are conducted and traditional forms of municipal politics challenged. And, the changes that have effected the West in terms of global issues and local forms of collective action have had very similar effects in the East. The writings of Pierre Hamel on Quebec, Canada, Margit Mayer on West Germany and Dieter Rink on East German social movements conclude with some of the same sets of challenges for collective action and the institutionalisation process. In many respects, these processes reflect similar tensions to those that have been observed in Paris and New York and, to a certain extent, those described in the Eastern European framework, as Katy Pickvance suggests in her analysis of Poland, Hungary, the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Romania. In the collapse of formerly impenetrable

borders, and the local reawakening of civil society, global issues once more emerge in a local form, but one that continually reflects ongoing ecological, housing, ethnic minority and women's issues and concerns.

7
Urban social movements in an era of globalisation

Margit Mayer

The intensifying globalisation of the last decades has transformed many social and economic structures, among them the hierarchy of cities. The new urban hierarchy, which has been emerging on a global scale, implies a sharper differentiation of urban functions and has led to stronger differences between cities located on different hierarchical levels in terms of living conditions, conflict structures and development options than those prevailing during the Fordist era. Thus, urbanisation patterns at the top of the hierarchy, in the so-called 'global cities', differ structurally from those of medium-sized and smaller cities or from cities less integrated into global processes. But not only the cities at the top of the hierarchy are increasingly shaped by intensifying transnational links and flows, leading to new forms of inequality as well as to new avenues for action. Recent urban research has set out to analyse the emerging structural differences within the urban system, explaining them within a variety of different approaches—as a process of economic-functional hierarchisation (Krätke 1995:126); as an uneven clustering of different roles and functions within a transnational system (head-quarter city, innovation centre, module production and processing, Third World entrepôt, retirement site: Logan and Molotch 1987:258); or as polarisation between the organising nodes of the global economy and subordinate cities within a global urban network, as in the global city literature. While such work begins to allow us to identify unique and specific economic and spatial patterns within a new typology of cities, research on urban conflict and movements under these globalised conditions is as yet rather undeveloped. While we do have some knowledge about the effects of urban competition, now taking place on the global level, on local politics, we know little about interactions between local elites and social movements, about the forms of political conflict, or about the role of social movements in shaping the respective urbanisation pattern. How do local movement actors of the 1990s act, and what chances do they have to influence the shape and the politics of their city?

In order to find out what consequences the emergence of new and uneven urbanisation patterns has for the action repertoire, the modes of organisation and the chances for success of urban movements, we need to relate the findings of urban research and of social movement research to each other. At the same time, knowledge about the dynamic of contemporary social movements in the urban terrain may also shed light on the production process of new 'globalised' types of cities, which, after all, emerge in concrete social struggles between global and local actors. A systematic correlation of urban theory

and social movement theory has yet to be undertaken. In a first step, and in order to test the productivity of such a link, this chapter relates some of the prominent contemporary movements that are articulating urban problems and acting out urban conflicts, to local forms of politics that have undergone qualitative changes in the course of globalisation processes.

Quite obviously the urban movements of the 1990s no longer look like those of the 1970s and early 1980s, which—all over the Western capitalist world—were part of a broader social mobilisation and exhibited relative coherence and unity in their opposition to urban renewal, in their demands for improved collective consumption, and in their challenge to the established parties' and local governments' monopoly to process political interests (Castells 1973; Ceccarelli 1982). Today's urban movements are more heterogeneous and diverse, there is no clear predominance of one specific type amongst them, and the issues and struggles taking place in large metropolitan centres are different from those taking place in small and medium-sized towns. These transformations in the movement sector, which have taken place in the course of the last couple of decades, i.e. primarily the differentiation of the movements into quite fragmented and contradictory kinds of movements, may be interpreted in the context of recent urban restructuring and the transformation of the local state, because these processes have generated structurally new conflict lines, with which most of the movements active today are engaging.

Therefore, this chapter discusses first the changes in local politics which recent urban research has identified as reactions to globalisation practices (Clarke 1997), and then relates today's prevailing movements to these shifts in urban politics, in order to, finally, discuss strategic implications and options for local actors. The focus is mostly on major cities, which, regardless of historical tradition, geographical location or general level of economic development, are increasingly tied into global flows and networks in very similar ways.

New trends in local politics and oppositional movements

Reviewing the literature on recent developments in urban governance, there is consensus that three trends in particular are significant and novel on the level of local politics:

- the new competitive forms of urban development;
- the erosion of traditional welfare rights; and
- the expansion of the urban political system, also described as a shift from 'government' to 'governance'.

Each of these trends has provoked or influenced new or existing urban movements, which I will present now in the context of their respective urban political setting.

The contemporary forms of urban growth and development consist primarily of the efforts of cities to upgrade their locality in the international competition for investors, advanced services and mega-projects. Local political actors every-where emphasise economic innovation, seek entrepreneurial culture and implement labour-market

flexibility in order to counter the crisis of Fordism and to meet intensified international competition (Amin 1994). Other policy areas are increasingly subordinated to these economic priorities. The higher the position of a city within the global competitive structure of the new economy, the more important the role of advanced services in the central business district, and the more intense the restructuring of urban space. For global cities, in particular, which compete as much for foreign investment and the economic mega-structures of internationally oriented growth as they do for world-class culture, everything from the production of the built environment to the priorities of the municipal budget has become subject to the function of the city as command centre and its corresponding service industries. But other major cities have also seen the rebuilding and expansion of their downtowns into producer-oriented service centres. The intense tertiary development in the central business districts and the construction of huge new infrastructure projects have had undesired consequences for large parts of the resident population, because their effects have been gentrification and displacement, congestion and pollution, and often the loss of traditional amenities. While the city centres are being turned into luxury citadels, other neighbourhoods are turned into preferential sites for unattractive functions, and yet others are given up to abandonment. Further, the rebuilding of the central city has entailed an urban expansion into peripheral 'green pastures'. While comparable infrastructural expansion and industrial development during earlier periods were welcomed by the suburban or rural population as locational advantages, now such projects are turning into exercises in consensus building for metropolitan government (Keil and Ronneberger 1994).

Opposition movements have formed both in the cities and at their peripheries. They have either built on existent (latent) networks or organisations, or have sprung up anew, and they range from defensive and pragmatic efforts to save existing quality of life or privileges (which are sometimes progressive, environmentally conscious and inclusive, but at other times selfish, anti-immigrant or racist) to highly politicised and militant struggles over whose city it is supposed to be (as in anti-gentrification struggles or movements against other growth policies).[1]

Social movement research has produced most work on those mobilisations that are to protect the home environment—against too much traffic, too much development, or any other project which people don't like to have 'in their own backyard'. These often middle-class, quality-of-life movements frequently succeed in averting an unwanted facility (not in my backyard: NIMBY), with the effect that a poor or minority neighbourhood is then targeted.

Case studies show that such groups quickly become skilled at a variety of tactics and repertoires such as petition drives, political lobbying, street confrontations and legal proceedings. Researchers frequently lament the fact that social justice orientations, which used to characterise the goals and practice of such citizens' initiatives during the 1970s, have been replaced by particularistic interests and/or a defence of privileged conditions (Krämer-Badoni 1990; Krämer-Badoni and Söffler 1994).[2] But there are also case studies (though far fewer)[3] of local movements composed of working-class and middle-class participants mobilising against highway construction plans, traffic congestion or housing shortages, and, particularly in US minority/working-class communities, against polluting

industries and hazardous facilities, with which they are disproportionately burdened.[4] The action repertoire of such groups goes well beyond that of the defensive NIMBY movements: beside direct action (demonstrations, block-ades, corporate campaigns) to put public pressure on polluting firms, they also undertake independent analysis of urban problems, and they demand representation on relevant decision-making boards (Di Chiro 1992; Russell 1990; Bullard 1993).

An American study which surveyed 325 local groups 'run by the poor for the purpose of changing social structure' (McCarthy and Castelli 1994) calls them 'poor empowerment groups'. Corresponding to the more pronounced socio-spatial differentiation in US-American cities these movements organise on the basis of locally manifest discriminations. Their achievements range from getting banks and insurance companies to reinvest in low-income communities or improving local working conditions to getting the city to rehabilitate abandoned buildings or, generally, to invest in neighbourhood development instead of merely in downtown development.

Frequently, movements against urban growth policies and gentrification are directly triggered by what have become increasingly used instruments of big-city politics. These include large, spectacular urban development projects, such as London's Docklands or Berlin's Potsdamer Platz; festivals such as the Olympics, World Expo, international garden shows or 1,000-year birthdays; and the attraction of mega-events, sports entertainment complexes, theme-enhanced urban entertainment centres—all of which depend on the packaging and sale of urban place images (Häußermann and Siebel 1993; Scholz 1997). The movements have attacked the detrimental side effects of and the lack of democratic participation inherent in these strategies of restructuring the city and of raising funds, and they criticise the spatial and temporal concentration of such development projects, as they prevent salutary effects for the city overall. The concentration on prestige projects tends to detract attention and finances from other urban problems and to restrict investments in other areas. Thus, protest campaigns against these forms and instruments of city marketing raise questions of democratic planning that urban elites concerned with intra-regional and international competitiveness like to downplay.[5] Furthermore, they have the potential of bringing otherwise scattered local movement groups together in broad coalitions (as happened, for example, in the NOlympia Campaign in Berlin in 1991–3). A leading actor in such campaigns is often radical, so-called autonomous movements, who consciously seize on the importance image politics have gained in the global competition of cities, and seek to devise image-damaging actions to make their city less attractive to big investors and speculators, creatively to prevent the take-over of the city by 'global capital'. While the potential of these urban movements, which go beyond particular community interests, seems obvious, but is not at all explored yet, the movements forming at the edges of major cities against the threat to locals' livelihoods and lifestyles are only just beginning to come into view (Keil and Ronneberger 1994).

The trend of the eroding local welfare state[6] has been another trigger to the structural change in the profile of urban social movements. It has two elements: first, there is the dualisation of labour markets, the expansion of precarious and informal jobs, and the shift in social policies, which produced a new marginality, the most visible manifestation of

which are the tens of thousands of homeless people inhabiting major cities. Other, less visible forms of social exclusion and new poverty also concentrate in urban areas, even if their causes are increasingly identified in global processes (Dangschat 1995; Huster 1997). Second, since the image of cities is playing such an important role in attracting supra-local investment, stern anti-homeless and anti-squatter policies have been drafted, and regular raids are carried out at the showcase plazas of all major cities. This kind of regulation of public space has been observed since the early 1990s, even in cities with 'progressive' governments, which have also adopted laws that prohibit people from sitting or lying on sidewalks in business districts (Egan 1993). In order to drive out beggars, homeless people, or 'squeegee merchants' from the centre of the cities (where they concentrate for a variety of reasons),[7] these groups are being constructed as 'dangerous classes' (Ruddick 1994) or 'enemies of the state' (as in London, *Tageszeitung,* 13 January 1997:9). Social policies have been abandoned in favour of punitive and repressive treatments.

In reaction to the combination of these trends, new poor people's movements[8] have sprung up, as well as actions by supporter groups and advocacy organisations, frequently also anti-racist initiatives.[9] Research findings on the forms of self-organisation by the new poor are most scarce, which is, among other things, due to the fact that most authors assume this population to be not just poor and without resources but also disempowered and passive. In fact, the resources of these groups consist primarily of their bodies and time, so that their protest activities tend to be episodic and spontaneous, local in nature and disruptive in strategy.[10] At best, their disruptive tactics block normal city government operations and threaten the legitimacy of local policies of exclusion. This was the case, for example, when the homeless in Paris defended their right to the city in a campaign around the slogan *droit au logement* ('the right to housing'), which culminated in a spectacular squat in December 1994 in the middle of the 6th arrondissement a few months before the presidential elections (Body-Gendrot in this volume; Péchu 1996). In general, though, such new poor people's movements face an increasingly recalcitrant and punitive state and it is only under rare conditions that their struggle against efforts to drive them out of the downtowns, their setting up of encampments, holding public forums and making demands on the city allow them to develop solidarity, political consciousness and organisational infrastructures—i.e. the elements which social movement research assumes are preconditions for the emergence of mobilisation. David Wagner describes such conditions in his study of homeless demonstrators in Portland, Maine (1993). He observed how the around one hundred live-in participants of a 'tent city' were empowered by their action and were also able to achieve significant concessions from the city. Other localised tent cities or other struggles by newly marginalised groups have been less successful (such as the battles over New York City's Tompkins Square Park, in which housing and anti-gentrification activists joined homeless people and squatters, who had erected about one hundred structures in the park at the peak of the movement).[11]

But where resource-rich political advocacy groups dedicate themselves to the problems of the homeless or where professional activists make their resources available to such organisations, as occurred, for example, with the Paris groups *Comité des mal-logés* (CML, founded in 1987, it had, by 1990, 1,300 members) and *Association Droit au Logement* (DAL, which practically replaced CML after 1990, and unites about 8,000 people in its

broader milieu), durable and effective mobilisations can be achieved (Péchu 1996). Cress and Snow also find, in their ethnographic study of fifteen homeless initiatives in eight US cities, that 75 per cent of their resources are coming from 'outside', which in the USA means more charity, church and civil rights support organisations than political activist organisations (Cress and Snow 1996; Wright 1997). Furthermore, since the early 1990s all the major cities have had homeless newspapers, which publicise the new poverty and the proceeds of which go to support homeless projects.

Next to churches, political activist groups and local coalitions (Blum 1996; Stiftung Mitarbeit 1995; Mette and Steinkamp 1997; Bartelheimer and von Freyberg 1997), in Germany another relevant support network is provided by autonomous movements and anti-racist initiatives. These latter groups scandalise the production of new poverty and homelessness while also mobilising against their own eviction from squatted buildings and 'liberated areas' of city centres. Lately, anti-racist initiatives have formed even in Germany because of the police raids carried out to 'clean' the citadel plazas of immigrants and the poor. In Berlin, where the city government has marked fourteen so-called 'danger zones', from where individuals looking 'suspect' may be deported, newly formed initiatives stage protest demonstrations, provide legal aid, and put public pressure on local government. In June 1997, a 'Downtown Action Week' took place in nineteen German and Swiss cities to create public awareness and pressure about the widespread practice of driving out the new marginality from the core areas and to negotiate the NIMBY rebellions that have exploded in the peripheries where inner-city problems are increasingly dumped.[12]

Another new movement form has emerged in the context of housing need and new poverty, though its members do not see themselves as a 'poor people's movement'. The majority of the so-called *Wagenburgen,* i.e. groups of people squatting on vacant land, living in trailers, circus wagons or other mobile structures, see their action as 'a form of resistance against the political, social and economic relations in this city and this country' (*Vogelfrai* 1994). There are about seventy to eighty such sites in Germany (Knorr-Siedow and Willmer 1994); of the fifteen in Berlin most are in the downtown area and are thus threatened by eviction or have already been displaced to other locations.[13] Their political orientations cover a wide spectrum: while some use the freedom this lifestyle allows them for political activism (such as sheltering refugees without legal status), others are content to explore alternative ways of living. 'What we share and what unites us is the way we live, our lifestyle—collectively, without hierarchies, unconventionally, and with little dough' (*Vogelfrai* 1994:9). But evictions and the threat of evictions has brought them together in campaigns to pressure city governments to tolerate the sites, delay construction or provide other acceptable locations.[14]

The new conditions on the labour market and the shift from social welfare to more punitive workfare policies have impacted on the urban movement scene in further ways. Not only have hundreds of new organisations sprung up, non-profit organisations run by and for the homeless, the unemployed and the poor, but the number and variety of institutions and projects 'servicing' the marginalised has also exploded, many of them functioning within municipal programmes that harness the reform energy of community-based groups. Their labour seeks not just to 'mend' the disintegration processes which traditional state activities cannot address; frequently they develop innovative strategies

acknowledging the new divisions within the city. Examples are grassroots organisations such as Proyecto Esperanza in Los Angeles, which help recent immigrants find jobs and places to live by training them to find work in the growing informal sector as day labourers rather than channelling them into normal job-training programmes (Hopkins 1995:41, 56). German organisations such as, for example, *LIST/Zukunft Bauen in Berlin,* who work with unemployed youths through second labour-market programmes, training them as cooks or in housing rehabilitation, may be considered innovative in a similar way, as they, too, seek to connect the contemporary labour-market reality with social goals (Zukunft Bauen *et al.* 1994:12).

Sometimes, as in the case of Montreal's Resto-Pop, the group is simultaneously challenging the state while exploiting its workfare programme for its own goals of creating solidarity and empowerment. Chic Resto-Pop[15] is a community restaurant/non-profit organisation started in 1984 by twelve welfare recipients, providing jobs for the poor in the community and inexpensive meals (for 800 people). Their (currently ninety-three) trainees participate in a workfare programme, but the organisation is also mobilising locally and demanding the transformation of this very workfare programme, arguing for both local control and government support for the locally emerging social economy. Very often, however, such projects are totally unaware that official politics increasingly look to NGOs and community groups to replace state politics and to function as repair networks for the economic and political disintegration produced by globalisation, and in fact manage to turn them into social entrepreneurs.

Finally, the third novel trend in urban politics is that the local level of politics has gained renewed significance (and in the process has transformed itself), simply because the concrete supply-side conditions making for structural competitiveness can neither be provided by multinationals' strategies nor by uniform national policy (Mayer 1992). These conditions can only be identified and implemented at the local level of politics. Local politics, which seek to make local economies competitive in the world economy, are increasingly organised in partnership with an extended range of non-governmental stakeholders holding relevant resources of their own (such as private finances, local knowledge, community-based or locality specific expertise). Besides investors and chambers of commerce, education bodies, research centres and local unions, as well as voluntary sector groups and associations, including former social movement organisations have also become such partners (Mayer 1994:328). This trend, which political science has described as a shift from government to governance arrangements, means that the state's involvement, besides that of a plurality of other actors, is becoming less hierarchical and more moderating than directing (Mayer 1994; Jessop 1995).

The opening up of the urban political system to non-governmental stake-holders and the strategy of many municipalities to employ former social movement organisations in the development and implementation of (alternative) social services, cultural projects, housing and economic development has been a new and important force shaping the trajectory of urban movements since the 1980s. By including and funding third-sector organisations, the municipalities hope to achieve political vitalisation as well as financial relief, though these goals frequently conflict with each other.

For the movements, this trend posits a particularly ambivalent opportunity structure, because it makes parts—but only parts—of the urban movement sector into 'insiders'. This development is rather more advanced in North America and the UK than on the European continent. A particularly advanced illustration is provided by an organisation in the Bronx, Banana Kelly, which received a Best Practice Award at the Habitat Conference in the summer of 1996. This community organisation emerged from squatting and militantly defending houses in the 1970s, went on to rehabbing, and is now managing hundreds of low-income houses, helped along by a variety of municipal programmes funding sweat equity and tenant management. However, it is no longer active in housing only, it is also active in economic development. In fact, it has itself gone global in search of an investor and has found a Swedish firm to set up a large paper mill for recycling Manhattan's enormous output of office paper. Yet, more than job creation, it is also engaged in education and training programmes, which includes bringing Los Angeles gang members to the Bronx to teach them family values and community respect (Rivera and Hall 1996; Harris 1995; Holusha 1994).

While this is obviously a bigger and more 'successful' case than many, Banana Kelly merely demonstrates particularly impressively the polyvalent function which community-based and client-oriented groups now play, in more and less developed forms, in and for cities all over North America and Western Europe (for North America, von Hoffmann 1997; Fishman and Phillips 1993; Rich 1995; Lustiger-Thaler and Maheu 1995; Shragge 1997; for Western Europe, Rucht *et al.* 1997; Froessler *et al.* 1994; Stiftung Mitarbeit 1995; for comparative studies, Selle 1991). The establishment of alternative renewal agents and sweat-equity programmes, and the funding of self-help and social service groups was in most places a long and contested process, but since the late 1980s municipal social and employment programmes everywhere have been making use of the skills, knowledge and labour of such movement groups. Similarly, many cultural projects have become part of the 'official' city, and youth and social centres play acknowledged roles in integrating 'problem groups' and potential conflict. The participation of community and movement groups in different policy fields has, in other words, become routinised, especially in fields where both groups of the alternative sector and the political administration are keenly interested in solutions, for example urban renewal, drugs, immigrant integration, AIDS, or unemployment.

Even in the former GDR the citizens' movements of 1989 were soon displaced by social movements that rapidly reached the level of formalisation and professionalisation which Western groups had reached more slowly. This adaptation was enforced through the funding programmes and labour-market instruments implemented since 1991 (Rucht *et al.* 1997). While the programmes and the initiatives were initially organised along policy sectors—in urban renewal and housing rehab, in social, or in women's projects—and only a relatively small part was explicitly concerned with economic reproduction and labour-market problems (Mayer 1987), the overlapping of different policy fields has become the norm. This is a result of the fact that job security and social security have become more salient issues within the alternative scene, and it is a result of the funding programmes pushing more and more in the direction of labour-market connection.

The bulk of the research focusing on these novel forms of institutionalisation of social movements within the shifting relations of welfare systems and provision emphasises the 'contestatory character of their constituency' and the counterweight they pose to 'conventional views of local economic planning' (Lustiger-Thaler and Maheu 1995:162, 165). Whether in the economic development sector, the field of alternative services or that of women's projects, the work of the groups is generally found to be an innovative and progressive challenge to public policy, which improves access to the local political system and provides potentially more active citizenship (Jacobs 1992; Clarke 1994:9–10; Hopkins 1995).

Closer examination, particularly of the more recent developments, reveals, however, that these (former) movement organisations that have inserted themselves into the various municipal or foundation-sponsored funding programmes play a rather complicated role within the urban movement scene. On the one hand, they enhance organisation building and lend stability to the urban movement infrastructure, and thus to the conditions for continuing mobilisation. But on the other hand the widening and the growing internal differentiation within the movement sector has led to new conflicts and antagonisms. The movement organisations now participating in the new governance arrangements are subject to the danger of institutional integration, 'NGOisation' and of pursuing 'insider interests', and their own democratic substance is far from guaranteed (Fehse 1995; Lang 1995; Roth 1994). Especially since these organisations find themselves threatened by cuts and are faced with the reorientation of public-sector programmes towards labour-market flexibilisation, competition among them for funding has intensified, and the groups engage more in private lobbying strategies to secure jobs and finances than in creating public pressure. Furthermore, some of the alternative renewal agents and community-based development organisations, who are busy developing low-income housing or training and employment opportunities for underprivileged groups, find themselves criticised and attacked by other movement actors who do not qualify for the waiting lists or who prefer squatting or other non-conventional forms of action.

While such attacks serve to illustrate new polarisation tendencies and antagonisms within the movement sector which are also a product of the opening of the urban polity (its expansion entailed the inclusion of some but not others in its governance arrangements), a series of indicators points towards an interpretation that the inclusion of movement groups in revitalisation and other partnerships means, for many, that they become tied up with managing the housing and employment problems of groups whose exclusion by normal market mechanisms might otherwise begin to threaten the social cohesion of the city. This kind of instrumentalisation of (former) movement groups thus harbours the real danger that their reform energy evaporates in the processing of urban disintegration tendencies or might even be used for the smooth implementation of state austerity policies.

But at the same time it is also the case that the increasing dependence of city governments on such (former) social movement organisations for processing the complex antagonisms within contemporary cities also enhances the chances for tangible movement input. While this dependence is meanwhile institutionalised in the routinised cooperation between the local state and the former social movement organisations with regard to

community economic development, client-based social services and women's centres, these new partnership relations are also beginning to influence interaction between the local state and movements described under the first two categories, i.e. no-growth and anti-poverty movements. The eroding local competence and dwindling resources which many city governments are suffering increase the pressure on the local political elites to negotiate and bargain with movement representatives within the channels and intermediary frameworks generated by the wave of routinisation of alternative movement labour in the context of municipal (employment or revitalisation) programmes. Thus, today's movements making a stand on the use value of the city, such as environmental and poor people's movements, may now also expect to profit from the new culture and institutions of non-hierarchical bargaining systems, forums and round tables. It is true though that these new structures of governance are open to the less progressive, xenophobic and anti-social movements as well.

The roles and options for urban movements in globalising cities

The specific socio-spatial context which cities provide for social movements, as well as its consequences for the dynamic and development potentials of movements needs to be further differentiated for a contemporary assessment. Due to the position of cities within globally and regionally restructuring hierarchies a variety of city types, with different conflict patterns, is emerging, which means that the homogeneous pattern of conflicts and movements of the Fordist era is dissolving. Metropolitan regions at the top of the global hierarchy develop particularly pronounced conflict patterns along the internationalisation of their working classes and neighbourhoods, their precarious labour relations (made use of especially by migrants), and their eroding municipal powers. At the same time, large metropoles facilitate the emergence of a critical mass, which is a precondition for the building up of movement milieus and the construction of collective projects and identities. This is where movements against central city development in favour of global headquarters, as well as new poor people's movements proliferate and may expect—because of the presence of handed-down movement cultures and institutions (such as community organising in North America and leftist political organisations in Western Europe)—both support and instrumentalisation.

Old, de-industrialising cities on the other hand feature struggles over plant closures and new employment possibilities, and, depending on the profile with which the city seeks to reposition itself in the new urban hierarchy, more or less intense cooperation between the municipality and community groups. Cities trying to make their fortune as 'innovation centres' (Logan and Molotch 1987: 267ff.) frequently provoke environmental protest and slow-growth movements with this strategy. Cities transforming themselves into module production places (Logan and Molotch 1987:269ff.) are particularly dependent on cheap and flexible labour, and thus provide a difficult terrain for movements struggling for social citizenship rights and sustainable development. Such different movement activities

would need to be analysed in order systematically to explain the heterogeneous picture of urban movements in the 1990s.

Even though such differences among urban movement milieus are far from adequately researched, the stocktaking of some of the changes movements have undergone as presented in the preceding section allows some preliminary statements about their current role and possibilities for action. The argument here is that just like the movements of the phase of the 1970s and 1980s have contributed to shaping and changing the forms of governance as well as the structure of the city, the movements active in and around the city today play a role, if a contradictory one, in contributing to and challenging the shape and regulation of the city. While their practice in innovative urban repair and their inclusion in municipal governance structures may well feed into the search for (locally adequate) post-Fordist solutions and arrangements (making the movements appear 'functional' and cooptable), their challenge of undemocratic and unecological urban development schemes may yet contribute to a more partici patory and more sustainable First World model of city. In order to realise this potential, however, the new problems confronting urban movements of today have to be addressed head on.

One of these problems is the new antagonisms within the movement sector, which are also a product of the restructuring of the urban polity that has expanded and now includes some but not others in its governance arrangements. Besides this tendency to produce new forms of marginalisation and new 'losers', a second new problem demands attention, that is the evidence that the inclusion of movement groups in revitalisation and other partnerships has meant, for many, that they become tied up with managing the housing, employment, or survival problems of groups whose exclusion by normal market mechanisms might otherwise begin to threaten the social cohesion of the city. And finally, a third problem arises with the pressures to entrepreneurialise the social and community work of these groups, as funding support for them is increasingly only available through workfare programmes and micro-credit arrangements. These structurally new constellations have to be acknowledged and their specific constraints—as well as the opportunities peculiar to them—have to be identified.

At the same time, the conquered positions and new institutional avenues described above offer opportunities that allow tackling of the new problems. The growing role of local politics, even within global contexts, and the simultaneous inclusion of a variety of non-governmental stakeholders, including former movement organisations, into local politics have made new avenues available for those forces amongst the urban social movements that can seize them and that can tease out their ambivalence. But rather than doing so only for particular defensive spaces or individual threatened privileges, the challenge consists of making use of these avenues in the complex struggle for a democratic, sustainable and social city.

Some urban theorists see this struggle as one between global elites and local communities, reduced to the simple antagonism between distant powerful forces (such as global capital) and local victims 'retrenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last stand against the macro-forces that shape their lives out of their reach' (Castells 1994: 30). Such an idealised view of local movements would already have been problematic for the 1960s and 1970s, when the majority of urban movements was still part of a larger

social struggle against broadening forms of domination. Today's local movements certainly cannot in their entirety be listed on the positive side of the ledger, since they are such highly differentiated products of recent shifts in urban politics (their proliferation as well as their fragmentation can be shown to result from the three trends described above). They themselves are contradictory and complex agents in the shaping of globalising cities and have to deal with the new fragmentation within the movement sector as well as with massive social disintegration processes increasingly characteristic of urban life. The institutionalised, professionalised or entrepreneurial movements which now benefit from routinised cooperation with the local state frequently want nothing to do with younger groups of squatters and cultural activists. Because of their preoccupations due to the new funding structures, they are often at quite a distance from the growing marginalised and disadvantaged social groups. But since the latter's organisations and forms of resistance do not automatically lead to mobilisation or widespread support, it becomes crucial that those parts of the movement sector that enjoy some stability, access, resources and networks devote part of their struggle to creating a political and social climate in which marginalised groups can become visible and express themselves.

Movement actors will thus need to acknowledge and make transparent their new dependencies (both on the state and the market) in order to identify the opportunities that exist under contemporary conditions. The new and difficult task consists in transforming the funds and the stability of the resource-rich movements into support for precarious movement groups. Existing opportunities, whether workfare programmes or poverty initiatives, need to be seized and used to attack and to restrict the marginalisation and discrimination at the root of the new form of poor people's movements. Urban movements need to politicise the new inequality and they can exploit the new access structures and the dependency of the new negotiation frameworks on local residents' input for this purpose.

Notes

1 The defensive and pragmatic mobilisations, which are protecting the home environment, cover a wide spectrum, from mobilisations against highway construction plans, traffic congestion or against polluting industries on the one hand, to those that mobilise for their privatistic and basically exclusive interests. An interesting case of the latter is the mobilisation directed against the Berlin government's decision to relocate the former residents of an evicted downtown encampment to the fringe of the district Spandau: local residents, supported by the *Bezirk* administration, formed a citizen initiative, staged protest marches and collected thousands of signatures to prevent the dumping of metropolitan poverty in their backyard.

There have been anti-gentrification struggles in New York, Paris, Amsterdam and Berlin. The most well known may be those on the Lower East Side of Manhattan around Tompkins Square Park described by Neil Smith (1996); so-called slow growth or no-growth movements have emerged in the sprawl of Los Angeles as well as in the new peripheries of Washington, DC (Sambale 1994; the series 'Growing Pains' in the *Washington Post* of winter 1996/spring 1997).

2 For example when directed against housing for asylum seekers in Europe, or against public housing for minorities in the USA.

3 The quantity of studies is no indicator of the quantity of movements; it merely allows conclusions about the research interests of the authors. An impression of the spread and actions of such movements is easily gained from journals such as *Everyone's Backyard, the Journal of the Grassroots Movement for Environmental Justice,* published by the Center for Health, Environment and Justice in Washington, DC.

4 Low-income communities of colour are often targeted for industrial and toxic waste disposal sites (Bullard 1990; Bryant and Mohai 1992).

5 One function of such mega-projects is supposed to be a socially integrative one, enhancing residents' identification with the city. However, more often than not, this is a top-down strategy manipulating residents' interests,

6 The erosion of the welfare state is also being enforced on the national level by globalisation processes, particularly those of finance capital (Martin 1997; Teeple 1995).

7 This is where the institutions which service them are located and where the public space exists that allows for social relations, etc.

8 The term refers back to the study by F. Piven and R. Cloward of 1977, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Pantheon), which demonstrated, using the cases of the unemployed movement of the Great Depression, the Civil Rights Movement of the American South and the welfare rights movement led by the National Welfare Rights Organization, that protest movements of the poor tend to be more successful when they are spontaneous, disruptive and radical than when they build on stable national organisation and calculable, moderate conflict repertoires. Thus the concept 'poor people's movements' emphasises, in contrast with other approaches in social movement research, the capacities for agency even among resource-weak groups.

9 Other forms of resistance against the dismantling of social policies in the name of global competitiveness are also taking place primarily in metropolitan areas (for example, the strikes and demonstrations in Paris in the winter of 1996; also Brecher and Costello 1994). They remain outside the discussion of this chapter since they do not constitute explicitly urban conflicts and movements.

10 In North American cities, where the urban conflict structure is shaped by more intense racial conflict and socio-spatial polarisation than in Europe, these movements may also take the form of riots, as, for example, in 1992.

11 The taking and defence of the park were organised around slogans such as 'Housing is a Human Right' and 'Gentrification is Genocide' (Ferguson 1991:25). After closure of the park in 1991, the homeless set up new shanties and tent cities on several empty lots in as yet ungentrified neighbourhoods east of the park, from which they were repeatedly evicted (Smith 1996).

12 Slow-growth and no-growth movements in suburban areas, where the social and ecological consequences of the global city growth machines are felt, urge the concentration of 'urban ills' in the inner city or shifting them onto smaller municipalities in the region (Keil and Ronneberger 1994).

13 The Senate of Berlin decided in 1991 no longer to permit any encampments within the central area, where high-value uses and government functions were to replace the former wall area or other formerly marginal land. In October 1993, the first central city site (Waldeburg am Engelbecken, housing thirty people) was cleared by about 900 police, and driven out to Karow at the northern edge of the city. Some of the occupants, together with supporters, went on a sixteen-day hunger strike and held a vigil in front of City Hall; they

were accompanied by actions such as leafleting the parliamentarians, visiting the mayor, symbolically occupying the site, etc. Except for some church representatives, support—particularly from the movement scene—was meagre (*Tageszeitung,* 4 November 1993).

14 For Berlin: Stephan Natz, 'Furcht vor weiteren Räumungen. Bunter und friedlicher Protestzug von rund 700 Wagendorfbewohnern und Hausbesetzern' (*Berliner Zeitung,* 25 October 1993:19).

15 This case is discussed in the chapter by Eric Shragge and Jean-Marc Fontan in this volume.

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8
The fragmentation of social movements and social justice
Beyond the traditional forms of localism

Pierre Hamel

In the current context of urban governance, social movements have to face difficult issues. In response to the new global order they are looking for new meanings that challenge traditional forms of local politics. In so doing they also involve themselves in the redefinition of local democracy and democratisation processes.

My primary concern is the contribution of urban movements to local democracy. What is their specific role with regard to these processes? In what terms is it possible to assess their impact? To what extent have these movements been successful in their efforts to democratise local politics?

Concerning these issues, within the literature of social movements two interpretations prevail. The first interpretation focuses on contextual aspects. Shortcomings of movements due to their orientation towards narrow issues or their localism are highlighted (Boggs 1994; Fainstein and Hirst 1995). The second interpretation is related to subjective motivations of actors through their experience of collective action, and is connected with 'politics of identity and difference' (Soja 1994; Donati 1995).

If these two interpretations of collective action are following opposite paths with respect to social change, it is above all because they highlight different components of actor's reality. The first one puts emphasis on the system and restricts itself to considering the impact of collective action on institutions. The second is movement-centred and deals closely with values, meanings and orientations constructed by actors in the course of action.

I contend here that beyond their divergences, the two readings are necessary and complementary. I will relate this claim to the understanding of the complexity of action as constructed by actors themselves in concrete situations. It also comes from the necessity of maintaining 'an analytical equilibrium between system-centred and movement-centred modes of analysis' (Maheu 1995:12) in order to better grasp the meaning of collective action as an empirical phenomena.

Besides their limitations, urban movements contribute to democratising processes around issues of local politics. This is the case if we look at their participation in local economic development. It is also true if we consider the way in which they are involved in the redefinition of social justice: they insist, among other things, on the necessity of revising an abstract vision of equity and replacing it with a more pluralist notion. In such a vision, the common good is no longer defined from above by a political elite, but it is

defined through active negotiations between all concerned actors. Finally, the contribution of urban movements can be seen at an institutional level, in the active role they play in the redefinition of the public framework of action. Over the last few years it has probably been at this level—where the compromises between actors are best integrated—that these movements have been able to increase their influence.

Urban movements are not homogeneous social actors with one type of social action. They do not necessarily share the same vision, nor are they committed to the same radical claims. However, they nonetheless tend to agree on the necessity of opening the debate and being directly involved in the redefinition of the public framework that underlies state intervention in urban development.

Caught between a certain pragmatism reinforced by their institutionalisation, and a radicalism fuelled by their fragmentation and the deterioration of living conditions for an increasing part of the population, urban movements often engage in the defence of a 'new cultural politics of identity, difference, and otherness' (Soja 1994:4). It is from this standpoint that collective action introduces a revision of the old conception of social solidarity. Solidarity is no longer incompatible with the recognition and defence of identity (Donati 1995). It is in relation to values such as subjectivity and authenticity that grassroots and urban community groups engage in institutional innovation and push forward new socio-economic and political processes of democratisation. It is precisely these subjective aspects of collective action that the analytical lens of liberal universalism tends to neglect.

In order more fully to develop these ideas, this chapter is divided into three sections. First, I discuss the way local politics have been transformed by conflicting interests and by the rise of new urban problems in the context of the post-Fordist era. Special attention will be given to local political institutions and to their capacity to resolve problems resulting from adjustments made necessary by the imperatives of the new world economic order. Next, I focus on collective action by community groups and urban movements, specifically considering their capacity to cope with the new urban issues of local economic development. Finally, I go back to local political institutions in order to understand the way in which social movements conceptualise a vision of social justice which challenges the traditional forms of local politics. Even though these aspects will be primarily analysed in theoretical terms, I will use examples from fieldwork done in Montreal in order to illustrate my arguments.

Local politics and the challenge of institutional innovation

At the moment, urban agglomerations are affected by the processes of globalisation. The new global economic order, characterised, among other things, by the rise of transnational corporations (Sklair 1995), the internationalisation of finan cial markets, and the emergence of global cities (Sassen 1991), tends to generate new urban hierarchies both within agglomerations and at the international level between metropolises (Krätke 1992).

This ongoing restructuring has had different social impacts. These include important consequences for the quality and conditions of everyday life, the deterioration of the local environment and the escalation of social inequalities and social exclusion. Since the 1950s,

the multiplication of problems related to these aspects has contributed to a redefinition of class struggles, ethnic division, gender relations and elements of the quality of life. Urban milieu therefore no longer faces isolated plights but has to contend with a series of interrelated crises and conflicts (Savitch and Thomas 1991). Originally, it was thought that cities suffered the symptoms of the contradictions of the societies they were in. Now it is becoming obvious that these problems are characteristic of the cities themselves (Lee 1989). This is what Donzelot and Jaillet (1997) call 'the new urban question'. According to them, we are facing a new situation defined by a reversal of the relationship that occurred with the industrial revolution, when urban discrimination was explained by its social roots. The emergence of this new urban question, explicit for example during the last twenty years in deprived urban areas, manifests a profound transformation of the social question: urban and social integration are more and more difficult for a growing portion of the citizens. In this context, social solidarity as managed through redistributive and social policies—for instance the policies managed by the welfare state—is less and less effective.

Urban studies have pinpointed the changing face of cities, including the increasing fragmentation of living space (Wilson 1991; Garreau 1991; Ellin 1996). To understand the impact of globalisation on the restructuring of space in urban settings, many researchers (Mayer 1989; Harvey 1989; Leborgne and Lipietz 1992; Filion 1995) have used the regulation model and referred to the Fordist' crisis. At the beginning of the century, Fordism provoked a transformation of the space of economic activity. It was part of the process of spatial specialisation and ordering. However, renewed doubt surrounding Fordism as a planning model capable of sustaining growth has emerged since the mid-1970s.

From the points of view of planning and of urban politics, the changes required by the Fordist regime were relatively predictable. What was essential was the installation and development of infrastructures capable of sustaining mass production and mass consumption. Planning and plans were held in the highest esteem with regard to state intervention. The separation of functions and their distribution through space obeyed specific and well-known rules. A strong consensus existed in reference to the necessity of modernising urban infrastructure and management systems. The same concern was voiced with respect to urban services and their far-reaching redistributive powers.

The radicalisation of modernity has shattered these existing certainties concerning planning, plans and the role of the state. Now it is easy to accept the proposal that 'we need a new kind of city life to cope with the new economy' (Sennett 1995:13). But, it remains difficult to come to an agreement on the values, orientations and strategies necessary to implement such a proposal. As Leonie Sandercock (1998) wrote recently, the pillars of modernist planning have been profoundly revised, if not destroyed, on the one hand, by a post-Fordist economy and, on the other hand, by the rise of cultural diversity in the 'multi-cultural city/region'. Processes of social restructuring seem more open than ever in the current context of uncertainty.

Overall, changes in planning at the local state level coincide with a change in priorities by local governments. It is no longer the control of urbanisation which is at stake—as was the case during the 1950s and 1960s—but more specifically local economic development,

job creation, especially for those excluded from the labour market, and, one could add, integration of multicultural diversity.

This said, what is the actual capacity of local governments to counter the detrimental effects of global forces? Even though capital may not be as mobile as asserted by certain observers (Moulaert and Shachar 1995), and even though there are limits to locational flexibility of capital (Cox 1993:440), the 'agenda' of multinational capital certainly remains strong and continues to pervade local decisions (Levine 1992). Additionally, the margin of manoeuvre of local states in regard to matters of social redistribution and social solidarity is often limited.

Consequently, to what extent can local policies be effective in improving the living conditions of inner-city populations? In spite of the absence of a formal theory of local economic development in the strong sense of the term (Fasenfest 1991; Bingham and Mier 1993), important agreements are emerging on some of the basic principles. For instance, localities are not merely helpless victims of global changes. They have the possibility of building specific strategies to deal with these changes. This can be done, for example, within the social sphere by favouring the construction of socio-political compromises between actors in the public and private spheres (Jezierski 1990). At the same time, structural elements, such as the city's history and tradition, state investment priorities and state relations with economic agents, characteristics of the production system, can also play a decisive role (Piven and Friedland 1984).

Local economic development must therefore be considered as a complex and multi-dimensional process instead of an exclusively economic one (Pecqueur 1989). The creativity of an urban milieu is the result of the synergy between all concerned actors and socio-economic sectors (Törnqvist 1985). Furthermore, economic and social success are inseparable and closely related to an 'active and responsive civic democracy' (Sullivan 1995:32). In other words, the economic performance of municipalities relies not only on their capacity to adjust to structural changes in the economic sphere but also in their ability to enlarge social integration and civic participation of the population in urban affairs. It is here that a revised sense given to social justice becomes meaningful.

In contrast to the traditional representation of justice where the primacy is given to 'distribution', within a civic vision, justice becomes above all a matter of 'non-domination and non-oppression' (Young 1990). With this second conception of justice that has been promoted by urban movements, it is suggested that social justice should be embedded in the mechanisms and institutions established for dealing with contemporary local economic development. At the same time, by accepting the idea that local actors can adopt strategies to deal with the new issues created by globalisation, it follows that these strategies cannot be homogeneous. These strategies are necessarily connected to the specific context of local culture. Some strategies are more effective or more adequate in regard to a social understanding of development. For example, it is not the same thing to think of policies in terms of investment profitability or in terms of job creation (Lovering 1988).

However, in many ways the new institutional compromises and the new institutional mechanisms elaborated at the local level in large urban agglomerations, both in Europe and North America, are taking somewhat similar approaches. The importance given to

economic development is universal. The acceptance of the 'growth principle' can be found on the left as well as on the right (Mayer 1994). Additionally, the relationship between public and private actors, including increasingly social movements—whether it be concerning urban redevelopment or the management of urban services—is subordinated to a process of constant negotiation and endless renewal. This process accompanies management systems which are transitional and where conflicts about values and interest are neverending. In reference to the French case, Fourniau (1995) uses this type of analysis in order to account for the emergence of a pragmatic management model. Within this vision, definition of the general interest is no longer the result or the implementation of a top-down principle. No longer can it be defined by state representatives alone. On the contrary, it is produced through the exchanges, conflicts and negotiations of all stakeholders.

To a certain extent, the capacity of social actors to influence the decision process on matters of local economic development is related to the way in which governing coalitions opt for 'inclusiveness' (Clarke 1995:514) with regard to marginalised actors such as community and neighbourhood interests. But, it also depends on the nature of economic problems cities have to face. Creation of a specific institutional order is the result of an active struggle between diverse rationalities in accordance with specific actor interests. The preference given to the 'logic of bureaucracy and democracy' vs the 'logic of capitalism and corporate organisation' for that matter reflects, on the one hand, the socio-economic conditions and challenges faced by local governments, and on the other hand, the choices made by local actors (Clarke 1995).

It is the nature of economic public policies and the framework of public action which is at stake here. In general, the content and rules of economic development policies tend to increase 'capitalist trenches' (Beauregard 1993). Nevertheless, the choices inherent in the policy process do not flow from objectivist knowledge or rational decision. In fact they come out of an interaction between different kinds of information, environmental possibilities and normative dimensions:

> Public policy is not what objectively is signalled by an analysis of data and experiences. Rather, it is a projection of what we should do given the analyses of technical experts, policymakers' sense of the future, a reading of the political climate, and sensitivity to the values held by the community… Normative choices are inherent to the policy process and to political action.
>
> (Beauregard 1993:279)

The contradictions of economic development are often overcome 'in favour of privileged actors' (Beauregard 1993:280), but this is neither always the case, nor is it inevitable. Indeed, it explains why social movements get involved in the promotion of local democracy and experiment with alternative solutions to the dominant model of economic development. In so doing, they bring to the fore an enlarged vision of development which goes in tandem with a revision of justice principles defined in accordance with market priorities.

Social movements and the issue of local economic development

Some of the changes brought about by recent globalisation tendencies on the local scene are not new. They constitute a deepening of the rules of economic expansion that have been set since the Second World War. In that sense, to understand how communities and individuals cope with 'increasingly complex and competing social networks that divide their loyalties' (Dalton 1988:7), we have to go back to the implementation of advanced industrialism and its impact on workplaces and neighbourhoods.

Due to the form of social solidarity as managed by the state at that time, the ongoing transformations of social structures went relatively smoothly. Then, economic expansion which favoured social mobility of the middle class, went hand in hand with social integration. But the new structural adjustments required by the current world economic order have changed the prevailing rules. Deregulation and reduction of government control were set up in order to introduce flexibility in the production system and in the labour market, therefore increasing the vulnerability of the workforce. Even though all the cultural differences in relation to national geography and polity did not disappear with the rise of the forces of globalisation, contradictory consequences are nevertheless manifest everywhere.

On the one hand, globalisation forces produce new forms of social exclusion and increase social inequalities. On the other hand, they stimulate competitiveness at different levels (the firms, the workers, the localities, the nation-states). They also favour a redeployment of alliances between economic sectors (Niosi 1995), as well as among diverse social groups within local, national or even international boundaries, if we view collective action from a planetary perspective (Proietto 1995).

Considered through the lenses of social networks and social solidarity, cities resist globalisation by many means. First, it is within urban agglomerations that the impact of 'flexible' capital accumulation dynamics are most visible, both in space restructuring and with the emergence of new forms of poverty and precariousness. So it is not surprising to observe that the initiatives to solve these problems are emerging first at the city level, supported by community and self-help groups. Second, despite their anonymity, cities remain strategic places for establishing loyalties and defining responsibilities among neighbours (Sennett 1995). This is related, among other things, to the civic virtues of local governance and local democracy (Hambleton 1988). This can be seen in a concrete way with forms of solidarity that are being expressed through collective action at a community level. Third, cities assume a decisive role with regard to creative and innovative functions in the technological field, and integrative functions in the social one.

The forms of resistance that take place at the city level use different paths in relation to actors' interests, actors' interpretation of the conjuncture and the resources available to them. Some actors opt for the status quo as long as possible and try to adapt. Others withdraw behind the defence of traditional corporatism. Still others choose the road of social change, by dealing with established institutions or by engaging in institutional innovation, searching for a new legitimacy for collective action, while simultaneously rethinking citizenship and solidarity.

Generally, social movement actors have committed themselves to the latter strategy. This is so in Montreal (Hamel 1995). When we look at how these actors have become involved in local economic development and local democracy over the last decade, we see that these actors have challenged the traditional ideology of economic development characterised by 'market triumphalism' (Harvey 1992: 597). Against the ideology extolling the view that the market is the best way to carry out justice in an objective way, they suggest an approach of democratising economic life, and pay special attention to marginalised or otherwise excluded individuals and groups.

In so doing, social movements have participated in enlarging the democratic tradition. They are convinced that, in the public sphere, it is possible to counter-balance the arguments and strategies of privileged actors. They do so by referring to a communitarian rationality and by bringing about a more viable social solution. For this they rely on strong paradoxical evidence: while in the globalised world the economic infrastructure plays a decisive role (Robertson 1992), social capital has never been so important. In other words, an economic infrastructure needs 'social capital' in order to grow.

In the long run, societies tend to score better on the economic scale when social integration is strong. The reduction of social inequalities and the promotion of civic culture have proven to be decisive factors in the capacity of cities, regions or nations for improving their economy. Social cooperation therefore contributes directly to increasing the capacity of societies to adapt to changing conditions. Quoting a comparative study on the economic performance of nations, Sullivan (1995) writes that what is significant with regard to the performance of national economies is not short-term growth rates, but the relation between growth and the reduction of the gaps between social groups.[1]

These conclusions are closely akin to those of Putnam's study (1993) on Italian regions also quoted by Sullivan (1995). In this case, civic culture and moral commitment to community values have made a difference between regions and localities. Seen from a historical perspective, it is the capacity of a particular community to integrate norms of reciprocity and civic engagement that gives the community the capacity to develop trust and solidarity, thereby contributing to reducing uncertainty and to building cooperative strategies that have proven most effective.

In this regard, the collective action of social movements is playing an essential role. Contemporary social movements challenge the traditional conception of local politics organised around the defence of private property and a limited understanding of general or public interest (Villeneuve 1992). They question the inaction of local governments in the social field and in the field of local economic development. They are also concerned with the democratisation of city planning and city management, demanding more open and inclusive processes of decision making, and asking for a redefinition of the public framework of policy making with respect to, among other things, gender and ethnic differences.

However, movements remain severely limited. Several studies examining urban movements and their forms of organisation note that their capacity to change the distribution of local power is weak. Their 'parochial nature' and their fragmentation, in fact their localism, are most often highlighted to explain these limitations. They are shown to be ineffective in building significant coalitions because they focus on narrow issues from

which their agenda is defined (Boggs 1994; Fainstein and Hirst 1995). More importantly, they reproduce the separation between 'the politics of work from the politics of society' (Katznelson 1982: 6), making an understanding of urban problems in terms of class contradictions more difficult. In so doing they limit their capacity for transforming the urban structure and urban life.

Such an interpretation of urban movements, which insists on their limitations and localism, remains incomplete. By subordinating the meaning of movements to their direct political impact, it does not take into account other important social and cultural dimensions embedded in the ambivalence of collective action that are related to the capacity of actors to change urban representations, while coping with institutions and everyday life.

To understand these dimensions better, empirical analysis may prove useful. Beyond a vision of the immediate impact of urban movements on power distribution at the local level, empirical analysis provides us with an opportunity to assess the capacity of movement actors to be associated with social recomposition understood in terms of experience when dealing with institutions and institutionalisation processes (Lustiger-Thaler *et al.* 1998). Moving away from an abstract or even totalising concept of power—where there is no possible contestation of power—we have to accept that the actors involved are never completely within an entirely determined process (Lourau 1970). In other words, actors are part of a relatively open process of social construction in which challenges to power are not located in specific loci but disseminated through social interactions wherever they take form. The issue is the building of a political public space respectful of actors and movements' identities in order to favour representations, values and preferences being expressed, contested and redefined.

Urban movements, like other social movements, adapt their forms of organisation, their representation of action and their strategies to the transformation of social contexts within which they evolve. In the case of Montreal, on many occasions their actions converge with community groups[2] and neighbourhood movements. Furthermore, they do not follow a 'natural' life cycle towards institutionalisation. Like other movements, they pursue an 'unsteady course' (Neidhart and Rucht 1991:451).

In the mid-1980s, while everybody thought that urban movements had died out, actors in these movements engaged in local economic development with an innovative approach. They created community development corporations (CDCs) in order to promote public—private partnership and to force local and national public authorities to revise their mode of action, their priorities and their strategies in this field.

Along with this pragmatic turn, the actors of these movements put aside the rhetoric of antagonism and replaced it with a discourse based on alliance not only with municipal administrators, but also with economic leaders and labour unions. They elaborated strategies to create new enterprises, to promote job creation, to train workers and to sustain local entrepreneurialism. The support from the state and from the municipality for these initiatives was positive right from the beginning and has since increased steadily.

This pragmatic turn was not specific to urban movements and community groups in Montreal, and was not only confined to local economic development. In fact, as Salamon (1989) has noted, it was also observed throughout the USA and encompassed different

sectors of community activism. Even though these groups realised significant achievements in terms of self-help and empowerment, their progressive character has been increasingly threatened by the recent trends of privatisation of social policies by the welfare state and the 'channelling mechanisms' it has produced (McCarthy *et al*. 1991).

The opening up of social movements to pragmatism did not erase the tensions and conflicts within and outside these movements. In fact, it has actually heightened some differences: opposition among different categories of actors as well as among different visions of action have become even more nuanced as movement actors experience practical and political difficulties that have to be overcome while cooperating with institutions. Consequently, as observed elsewhere, in the 1990s the 'field' of urban movements has turned out to be 'more fragmented and displays far more heterogeneous orientations, some of which are quite antagonistic to each other' (Mayer 1993:163). Furthermore, within some sectors, these actors have to deal with increasing pressures coming from 'socially marginal groups'.

As a result, the cohesion of these movements was at stake. To some commentators (Fisher 1993), the focus on democracy considered by many as typical of the positive impact that new social movements have had—contributing among other things to expanding political boundaries and permitting them to fight new forms of oppression or exclusion while raising issues in the politico-institutional field—is not sufficient. It can even produce regressive social and political effects by creating a gap between social groups and by leaving aside the material needs of the poor. In this sense, the capacity of certain movements to assume the role of agents of social change is restricted. Furthermore, the possibility of movements becoming more defensive, pushing forward a protectionist or a corporatist stance, also remains possible. This raises the question of understanding the limitations of movements as well as their specific contribution to local politics beyond their more visible effects.

Insofar as a plural and radical democracy[3] is concerned, the fragmentation of struggles is part of a more general social phenomenon: the experience of late modern democracy open to subjectivity and to what has been called 'identity politics' (Soja 1994). Such a vision contrasts with the homogeneous paradigm of collective action as experienced by the worker's movement in Western Europe, which long served as the principal model through which to interpret social movements (Dubet 1995).

Identity politics reminds us that collective action within the context of late modernity cannot go hand in hand any longer with the liberal vision of liberty and equality and its abstract rationality. It tends to replace these values in their current setting. In accordance with the transformations and the variety of social relations, the definition of identity is structured in relationship to the constitution of differences (Connolly 1991). This is the reason why it implies a revision of the dominant liberal model of citizenship, raising the question of 'how to deal with living conditions in situations of extreme diversity' (Donati 1995:309).

Identity politics contribute to broadening our understanding of politics. In this perspective, political action cannot be reduced only to state politics. Rather, the accent is put more directly on internal and subjective aspects in relation to individual and group self-transformation than on external ones focusing exclusively on interaction with the

state. Thus, identity politics brings to our attention how individuals and groups with their specific identities in relation to community (Kling 1993) interact in social, political and cultural life with each other, and manage to resolve the conflicts and contradictions inherent in their lifestyles. To take into account the diversity and differences of individuals and groups is seen to be essential in order to redefine the new forms of solidarity, not a solidarity which is exclusively managed by the state but one which is able to combine social and individual identities through collective action (Donati 1995).

In this sense, identity politics lead us to an understanding of the idea that within late modern societies there is no superior rationality capable of defining the public good or the general interest. Each group has to define its own rationality and, accordingly, its own definition of justice. Consequently, a way must be found to reconcile diverse—and often opposite—visions and discourses (Harvey 1992; Warnke 1993). This issue of identity politics is central to the way in which collective action is interpreted.[4] If there is no superior rationality in a system of plural and radical democracy, it remains possible for participants to engage in conflicts about values, giving them the burden of defining their content and priorities (Held 1993). The principle of dialogue must therefore be guaranteed, and widespread social and political participation must be promoted. Confronted by the market rationality and the dominant vision of local economic development, urban movements that are connected to CDCs, in Montreal as well as in many other North American cities and neighbourhoods, started to build another vision of local economic development. On many occasions, they have challenged, with success, the dominant model of urban policy that prevailed during the postwar period. As experienced with the CDCs in the USA (Clavel *et al.* 1997), they are involved in processes of institutional change that are closely linked to democratisation.

Challenging the traditional forms of local politics

In the field of urban politics, in comparison to what was experienced during the 1960s and 1970s, cities and nation-states face a new situation characterised by a profound uncertainty. The result is increased difficulty in agreeing upon priorities for public action. An understanding of this is crucial for the redefinition of social movements' collective action with regard to the restructuring of state policies and the frameworks for public action.

Recent tendencies of globalisation and the emergence of new social values have weakened the certainties upon which the previous social, cultural and political compromises were built. Certain researchers have analysed what they consider to be the current problems of institutions coming from the breakdown of these compromises (Bellah *et al.* 1991). However, their analyses do not pay enough attention to the emergence of a new social consciousness concerning social problems principally raised by social movements. Consequently they neglect or they exclude from their analysis the contribution of collective action made by social movements to the social sphere through their participation in the socio-political public space.

The meanings of collective action remain difficult to grasp because movements are not homogeneous and because they are sometimes at risk of self-destruction. Nevertheless,

social movements help to bring about transformations of the civic culture in relation to social problems and participation at different levels. This is especially the case when one considers contemporary institutional innovation of the public framework which needs to adapt to growing social and cultural diversity.

In this respect, movements have contributed to the political recognition of the following democratic principle: complex societies need to adopt structures and means of deliberation which are indispensable for discursive exchanges, giving everyone the capacity or at the very least the possibility of expressing himself or herself, to negotiate and to make choices. Moreover, it goes along with the recog nition of the tensions coming from the multiple loyalties and obligations individuals often have to deal with simultaneously (Sandel 1996).

One expression of this is reflected in the pragmatism that is observed in the willingness of social movements to participate in public hearings and public consultations, despite the shortcomings of such forums.[5] Another approach has been to promote and get directly involved in public—private partnership projects and policies. This has taken place through participation in different programmes such as manpower training, job and enterprise creation, and management of social policies in cooperation with the business sector, trade unions and the different tiers of the state. This approach has been largely implemented by community groups and the CDCs to which we referred previously. It has transformed that milieu and has had an impact on the state model of intervention, opening the door, on some occasions, to the privatisation of public services. New polarisations were observed between those community groups having access to more public resources and those receiving less. Nevertheless, these forms of community empowerment have contributed to transforming the traditional division between public and private responsibilities. Following the initiatives taken by CDCs in the case of Montreal, the municipality[6] had no choice but to sustain local economic development, including financial aid to community groups ready to get involved in matters of workforce training, support to local entrepreneurship and improvement of the built environment.

At the same time there is more at stake here than expanding or redefining municipal government action. At the heart of this issue is a profound re-examination of the interests and values involved in public policies and the redefinition of the state as an agent responsible for the promotion of the public good. Since its foundation, the welfare state has been judged by its capacity to guarantee the smooth functioning of the market economy. With the rise of unemployment, the state has had to face increasing social demands while having decreasing financial resources. The resulting financial crisis tends to trigger a social critique of its performance (Laville 1993). The social and political consequences of this development are well known. However, alternative solutions which will be accepted by all the concerned stakeholders are difficult to design.

While becoming involved in public policies, urban movements insist on support for restoring work and helping workers, especially the less privileged, to find jobs. In the actual context, finding a job remains the best way of struggling against social exclusion. One of the most dynamic CDCs in Montreal[7] is located in the south-west sector of the agglomeration. This neighbourhood was the cradle of industrialisation in Canada and has been facing serious economic problems in terms of de-investment and increasing poverty

since the 1970s. A few years ago, the RESO *(Regroupement pour la Relance Economique et Sociale du SudOuest)* has nevertheless succeeded in convincing public officials to modify completely the management of the worker training programmes in order better to respond to the needs of the neighbourhood.

This community organisation was incorporated in 1990. But its ancestor, the *Programme Economique de Pointe Saint-Charles,* was created in the mid-1980s when urban movements changed their strategies and became more active in the field of local economic development. Like other CDCs, the main objectives of RESO are centred on job creation, control of development by the local population and priority for social integration.

From the very beginning, for RESO, special attention had to be given to the inequality of income between men and women as well as to the integration of ethnic communities. From this perspective, it was held that if social integration is linked to jobs and to the revival of the local economy then at the same time it must lead to an improvement of living conditions, particularly for the less privileged segment of the population. For RESO, an active involvement in local economic development, even though it remains subject to cooptation by dominant economic actors or by the political class—for example through the promotion of workfare—proved to be a first step in the process of social integration (Moulaert *et al.* 1994).

RESO's actions can by analysed in relation to two different types of elements. First, with the expansion of the service sector, the quality of the physical environment—and of urbanism in general—has to be considered as a new factor in development. Second, within liberal society in the era of late modernity—where the prevalence of market is everywhere—it is no longer sufficient to rely on social and economic redistribution in order to achieve social justice. The rise of democratic individualism coupled with a redefinition of the welfare state necessitates a revision of individual and social responsibilities which implies that individuals need to control better their economic life and other dimensions of their personal life as well. For this reason, the members of the working class have to rely more on themselves and be in a better position to influence the economic forces that shape their daily life.

In a concrete way, RESO is involved in the organisation of professional training and direct help to unemployed workers. This has been operationalised through specific training programmes organised mainly in partnership with public institutions. It also helps people to find specific training courses in businesses or simply to find a job. Additionally, it gives active support—technical, financial and in terms of space of exchanges and communication—to people who want to create their own jobs. For example, during 1992 and 1993 in the domain of 'employability', 982 persons living in the area received information and referrals, while 242 were involved in training programmes managed by RESO (Leduc 1994).

RESO is also committed to the realisation of new industrial projects and to the creation of community projects. For this, it has access to risk funds. A special fund has been created in partnership with unions and the provincial government. The *Fonds de Développement Emploi Montréal* encourages the creation of new businesses and RESO is participating in the management of that fund.

RESO has succeeded in establishing a strong legitimacy in the minds of the local population, not only in the business and financial milieu, unions and community groups, but also within the political class. Its performance has been positive in many fields. One can think of professional training, support of local entrepreneurship, improvement of the built environment and social integration. However, in our opinion, it is on the terrain of institutional innovation that its success is most important.

First of all, RESO contributed in a significant way to changing the mentality of government representatives concerning local economic development. As opposed to a certain suspicion towards community groups in the past, government officials are now more open to participation in such an approach and to giving direct support to community groups. More importantly, RESO leaders convinced the federal government that its programmes for economic promotion were not adapted to the population living in a neighbourhood like the one in which RESO was established. This is the reason why, in 1995, the federal government set up an 'experimental project' with RESO. This brought about a new type of partnership that reduces the gap between bureaucratic management as defined by state agencies and the needs expressed by the local population.

This 'experimental project' includes four aspects. The first is the creation of a special fund of $500,000, for a three-year period, which provides for the financing of promotional activities targeting local entrepreneurship or sectorial projects. The second is the creation of a special investment fund for risk capital: RESO Investment Funds Inc. It is a fund of five million dollars. Businesses have access to loan-funds (from $10,000 to $450, 000), as start-up capital or for expansion. The manufacturing and service sectors which have a strong capacity in terms of job creation are favoured. The third aspect is the creation of a fund for innovation in matters of professional training and support to community initiatives. Three millions dollars are available over three years to finance this type of activity. Finally, an entrepreneurship programme has been created to support independent workers.

With this 'experimental project' RESO is involved in a new form of management of public funds, which have provided this community organisation with a greater autonomy in the management of public funds. It adapts the bureaucratic criteria of performance evaluation to the needs of the community sector. Furthermore, the community actors gain a greater capacity for being involved in the assessment of the relevance of projects to be supported. Their capacity for intervention has increased significantly. For instance, it is now easier for them to take into account social dimensions in setting priorities for project financing. Moreover, it has contributed to the improvement of the management capability, competence and expertise of community workers in the field of local development. Finally, it has led, in a direct way, to institutional innovations in matters of public policy, revising their values and frameworks, including the power relations embedded within them.

This example does not respond to all of the expectations raised by community groups concerning the democratisation of the local economy. However, through its efforts, RESO did put in place a decentralised and integrated programme while using its own criteria to respond to social demands in the matter of local economic development. In this respect, the traditional public framework of top-down management has been profoundly revised.

Up until now, like other community groups, RESO has tended to resist the model of the 'dual city', while the government is currently trying to convince them of the virtues of playing an instrumental role in the social management of poverty. Here we encounter the ambiguities and contradictions of participating in local economic development for the actors of the community sector and social movements. While the promotion of local economic development may contribute to the support of community enterprises serving social needs as well as providing viable jobs, the risk of manipulation or marginalisation always remains present.

In conclusion, urban movements and community groups in Montreal have participated actively in institutional innovations which challenge traditional local politics. The choices they have made remain risky because they do not entirely control these innovations nor the participating institutions. At the same time, it is also risky to attempt to change social practices without transforming the institutions themselves because, to a certain extent, practices remain influenced—if not determined—by institutions.

By entering the field of institutional innovation from the perspective of 'identity politics' in relationship to radical democracy and economic empowerment, urban movements have forced local public officials to revise not only the forms of local politics but also their values, through a revised understanding of social justice. Here the opposition between, on one side, the articulation of individual and collective identities within civil society and, on the other, the struggle against the state to enlarge or maintain its responsibilities, to include new social rights or to oppose its rational bureaucracy is fading. In its place, social movements as we have seen, act simultaneously in the social and political arenas and now attempt to innovate by challenging the ambiguities of the institutional field.

The exploration and promotion of radical democracy by social movements and their commitment to diversity continue to raise several questions. The new pluralism of cultural differences does not tell us how to decide between competing claims. Recognising that social solidarity requires a 'public conversation' (Lasch 1988), it brings to the fore at the same time the question of instilling 'civic virtue' and the problem of 'coercion' (Sandel 1996). Nevertheless, by challenging the negative side of globalisation, these movements contend two things: (1) that it is possible at the local level to challenge the power of economically privileged actors; and (2) that local politics still matter in this globalised world—two assertions so far that remain difficult to assess in a satisfactory manner and that invite us to engage in a more consistent way in empirical comparative studies.

Notes

1 Sullivan states:

> the most successful national economies over the long run have not been those with the fastest growth rates for any short term, but those which have exhibited the most balanced growth and steady economic performance.

> Boswell's measure of balance is multifaceted, including steady growth, high employment, low inflation, avoidance of either major trade deficits or surpluses, the enhancement of a
>
> nation's capital assets and physical environment, and at least no worsening of poverty.
>
> (Sullivan 1995:29–30)

2 Since the 1960s onwards, in Montreal the relationships between, on the one hand, social movements and, on the other, community groups, have been continuous and very close. In many ways, community groups and the community domain as a specific gathering of social practices aimed at improving the living conditions of citizens of urban neighbourhoods, constituted the milieu in which social movements acted. In other words, the resources, the leadership, the organisational capacity of movements was most of the time provided for the actors of social movements in the community sector. Consequently, representations, activities, demands and ideologies of community groups and social movements often converged. But this does not mean that the reality and evolution of social movements on the one hand, and the history of community groups, on the other, are the same. Even though social movements borrowed resources and networks from community groups most of the time, making it easy to fuse their activities with community action, they nevertheless pursued their own trajectory. Even if we associate the two realities, in this chapter the focus remains on urban movements.

3 This means a democracy beyond division of power and party competition, a democracy that is open to a dynamic process of popular participation based on 'strong democratic principles' and on a 'process of reflection and debate' which is necessary to promote and agree on a vision of the common good (Gilbert 1990:334).

4 Using the distinction made by Castells (1997) between three forms of identity politics ('legitimizing identity', which is produced by dominant institutions in order to 'ratio-nalize their domination vis-à-vis social actors'; 'resistance identity', which should be associated with building 'trenches of resistance' by dominated or excluded actors; and 'project identity', which is associated with actors who, 'on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society, and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure', Castells 1997:8), we consider that CDCs in Montreal can be associated with the latter form.

5 For an assessment of such forums in the case of Montreal, see Hamel (1997).

6 The federal and the provincial governments also contributed to their financing.

7 For a presentation of CDCs in Montreal, see Fontan and Shragge (1997).

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9
Local citizens' initiatives during the (East) German transformation

Dieter Rink

When in the autumn of 1989 as in other socialist countries citizens' movements emerged in the GDR, at first nobody thought that they would rise to mass movements in a very short time and that they would play such a crucial role in the destruction of the socialist system. For a short time the citizens' movements were able to represent the social interests of many people and not of distinct social groups. The rise of the citizens' movements in the GDR seemed to represent a renaissance of social movements in the political arena. That is why many people expected democratic changes not only in the GDR but in the whole of Germany (Probst 1993:11 and 134). Some activists had the hope that they would represent the 'political subject of the 21st century' (Musch 1991).

But now the perception has grown that the citizens' movements in East Germany have ended, either because they changed into parties or through a more or less rapid process of dissolution. Marianne Birthler, a former activist, has complained that 'There is not much going on in them [the citizens' movements]. Looking back at the events of 1989/90 we remember the huge mass of peoples, but the power and energy of 1989 seems to have disappeared' (Birthler 1993:20). Reinhard Weißhuhn agrees: 'Many people have already declared the citizens' movements dead' (Weißhuhn 1993:188).

In this chapter I will deal with the following questions:

- Did the citizens' movements or their successors maintain their power and become a persistent factor in the political arena? This question is directed especially at both the many groups and initiatives which arose in the course of the mobilisation of autumn 1989 and the beginning of the 1990s, and those which grew out of older groups. But do these really have the characteristics of new movements or are they the result of the transfer of West German institutional structures especially in the realm of associations? How stable are these groups and initiatives? Are they merely short-lived phenomena (as are many citizens' movements)?
- If such developments exist, what is the new situation in East Germany? Which issues and which structures existed earlier? And have they remained oppositional until now, or have they lost their oppositional character during unification and the transformation of East German society? Do they still represent the interests of a whole people, or do they represent the particular interests of parts of the middle class or the lower classes?

And if this is the case, is there a differentiation in the broader spectrum of the groups and initiatives?

To answer these questions, I offer, first, a general analysis of the development of social movements in the GDR and their transformation during its last years, and, second, a more detailed analysis of the role of citizens' initiatives in urban restructuring in particular. This will be done using the example of Leipzig.

Social movements in the GDR and in East Germany

Up to the beginning of the 1980s, there were only a few oppositional groups in the GDR —mostly within or unofficially linked to the Protestant church. Typical for this period were small, theoretically oriented circles, which understood themselves to be oppositional and which sought to develop alternative concepts and programmes. Toward the end of the 1970s many of these smaller circles were absorbed into larger, more inclusive peace groups, the members of which were especially concerned with the arms race, disarmament, peace and the issue of compulsory military service. These networks of peace activists were the foundation and the model for the more narrowly focused ecological, human rights and women's groups which were formed at the beginning of the 1980s. The defeat of the Western European peace movement in its efforts to prevent the stationing of middle-range rockets in 1983 had a negative effect on the peace groups in the GDR as well. Particularly in the second half of the 1980s many new groups were formed, which were both topically differentiated and linked through networks (Poppe 1995; see also Jones 1993).

Generally, these groups were few in number, small in size, informally organised, and, at best, loosely connected among themselves. They were especially concerned with creating egalitarian relations among their own participants. Under the conditions of a controlled press and the suppression of aberrant political opinions, only highly restricted and temporary forms of a critical public sphere emerged. The kinds of mobilisation which are so important for social movements did not usually get off the ground. The repertory of political activities and the effectiveness of the groups were very limited. Taken together, they formed a 'blocked' opposition, which was unable to take on the character of an actual movement. The core of group leaders was dominated by theology students and members of the clergy or other church employees. Group members were usually highly educated, but there were relatively few students or university graduates.

The majority of the groups took an explicitly socialist stance and sought to reform, rather than abolish, the GDR. In their own self-understanding, the groups formed a political counter-culture and sought to articulate a comprehensive reform programme. Only in 1988 and 1989 did most groups lose their-confidence in the ability of the system to reform itself. Then they began to define themselves as distinct oppositional groups *vis-à-vis* the existing political regime. There was little interest in the problems of urban development; at best, such interests were weakly articulated. The groups were primarily political in character. Some of them resembled the new social movements in Western countries, at least in their thematic orientations (Blattert *et al.* 1995).

During the revolution of 1989–90, new group formations rapidly appeared: the citizens' movements. The newcomers partly absorbed and overshadowed the older oppositional groups. The citizens' movements were numerous and briefly enjoyed wide support. The dominant issues of this phase were of a very general nature (democracy, freedom and, later, German unification). The protests of the autumn and winter of 1989–90 represented the high point in the mobilisation of the citizens' movements; they number, in fact, among the largest such mobilisations in German history. In the short time between the autumn of 1989 and the spring of 1990—up to the elections of March 1990—they had a significant influence on politics and forced the whole system to change. This influence was based on their large capacity for mobilisation and their role in the 'round tables' (meetings between old party representatives and reformers). (See Joppke 1995: 133f.; for the revolution in Eastern Germany in general, see McFalls 1995.)

For a period of a few months, the citizens' movements represented a type of social movement, the size and composition of which differed from both the old oppositional groups and the newer initiatives and organisations. Wide circles of movement sympathisers gathered around a small number of activists. These larger circles could be easily mobilised and were for a short time very involved in issue-oriented groups, in groups working in particular city districts, and also in the different committees, including the round tables. All this corresponds to the first phase of the process of the institutionalisation of the citizens' movements: for example the founding of registered voluntary associations, the hiring of paid employees, the renting of office space, and the structuring with reference to issues or city districts.

In the communities they addressed various aspects of local politics, especially ecological and social issues. Though local chapters and issue-oriented sub-groups were quickly formed, they usually lacked a solid and experienced core of workers as well as a common identity and the necessary organisational means, including the practical know-how, to build up functioning working structures. The number of members of these groups rose and fell very quickly, leaving behind a 'hard core' of group activists. As a consequence, the citizens' movements gradually lost their leverage and support. Their role in the political decision-making process became more and more modest. In preparation for the elections, older political activists founded a coalition called *Bündnis 90,* which included members from some of the citizens' movements, such as *Neues Forum, Demokratie jetzt* and the *Initiative for Frieden und Menschenrechte*. Later this coalition founded the party *Bündnis 90/Grüne,* which is today a part of the German Greens. But these 'rainbow-coalition' groups were successful in only a very small number of cities (Leipzig, Potsdam and Rostock).

Other parts of the citizens' movements entered into existing West German parties. The left wing of the *Demokratischer Aufbruch* became part of the SPD, and the right wing joined the CDU. The Forum Party, which emerged from the Neues Forum, became part of the FDP.

Some of the older activists joined existing political parties, and some even participated in politics at the federal level. Others were 'privatised' and went from the citizens' movements into new careers. But in almost all of the citizens' initiatives there were small

groups which remained committed to the original inspiration and programme, and which sought new ways of reactivating the citizens' movements in the newly united Germany.

The *Neues Forum* or New Forum (NF) remained strongly committed to the original programme of the citizens' movements, and some members were vehemently opposed to the union of the citizens' movements in the *Bündnis 90* party. The NF still exists in many cities, towns and counties as an independent association, which is sometimes represented in local councils. A council of NF representatives has offices in the *Haus der Demokratie* in Berlin, from where it coordinates the activities of the various sub-groups throughout the Federal Republic. Many were surprised when the NF sponsored its own candidates for elections in 1994 and 1998. These included the elections for the European parliament, the Landtag in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, and some local elections (for example, in Leipzig). In all these cases, NF members invoked the 'spirit of 1989' and called attention to the increasing alienation of *Bündnis 90* from this 'spirit' (Degen 1999).

The *Unabhängiger Frauenverband* or Independent League of Women (UFV) also failed to realise its initial ambitions. It sought to find a new function by forming a kind of umbrella organisation for East German women's groups, but this did not occur. The newly emerging spectrum of women's groups was, in the first place, too heterogeneous. In addition, the emphasis on autonomy in the various groups caused them to reject the UFV as an umbrella organisation, since they saw this as another form of subordination. Only a few of the original activists of the UFV remain, primarily in informal groups in Berlin, which meet irregularly for conceptual discussions. In 1996 the organisation of the UFV came to end (see Hampele 1995; Young 1996).

The *Vereinigte Linke* or United Left (VL) was the only former citizens' movement that was at least partially justified in its claim to offer a platform for a variety of groups and initiatives. It opened its doors to other leftist groups, especially to the leftist *Autonome,* and offered them access to rooms and infrastructure (for example, in Berlin, Leipzig and Halle). Aside from actively supporting squatters in abandoned urban housing, it took part in the mobilisation of *Autonome* and in the 'NOlympics' campaign in Berlin. The VL is a harsh critic of *Bündnis 90* and challenges this latter group's claim to be the sole heir of the citizens' movements. The VL cannot really be called a 'movement', but its survival does not seem to be in question, at least for the present.

The *Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte o*r Initiative for Peace and Human Rights (IFM) was, for the most part, disbanded with the founding of *Bündnis 90,* which absorbed many of its members. But some remnants have survived: for example the group in Leipzig which goes by the name of *Initiative für Freiheit und Menschenrechte* or Initiative for Freedom and Human Rights. The IFM proper no longer understands itself to be a citizens' movement. Its remaining members have taken up issues from the GDR era and have attempted to adapt them to the new situation.

In addition, there are some specifically East German groups, such as the *Arbeitslosenverband Deutschlands* or German League of the Unemployed (AvD) and the *Komitees für Gerechtigkeit* or Committees for Justice, which attempt in their own way to develop the programme of the citizens' movements, with, however, only modest success. The Committees, the founders of which included some PDS members (Party of Democratic Socialism—the successor of the SED) which were founded in association with

Table 9.1 Number of groups in some issue fields in East Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and Halle, 1989 and 1993

	East Berlin		*Leipzig*		*Dresden*		*Halle*		*Summary*	
Issues	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*
Feminism	17	80	5	25	4	8	2	10	28	123
Health	30	30	2	12	0	3	1	5	33	50
Human rights	25	30	8	13	3	11	3	6	39	60
Ecology	35	35	6	16	8	24	6	15	55	90
Peace	26	6	4	3	3	4	3	4	36	17
Politics	15	30	13	39	8	25	5	15	41	109
Alternative public	13	25	8	12	2	9	3	10	26	56
Education	4	5	2	5	1	2	1	1	8	13
Homosexuality	8	25	4	4	4	4	3	3	19	36
Summary	173	266	52	129	33	90	27	69	285	554

Source: Rucht *et al.* (1997:75)

the PDS, increasingly lost their *raison d'être* with the establishment of this party in the German parliament. And despite the sudden and massive unemployment in East Germany after 1989, the AvD has not been able to organise and mobilise the unemployed. After the end of the ABM make-work programmes, they came under increasing pressure.

In the spring of 1990 and after German unification, both the older oppositional groups and the newer citizens' movements became marginal forces. Simultaneously, hitherto unnoticed 'project groups' began to flourish. These were mostly citizens' initiatives, but included feminist, ecological and anti-racist groups as well. In contrast to their forerunners, these groups have a pragmatic orientation and concentrate on very specific problems, especially such urban problems as the renewal of urban districts, increasing rents, traffic problems, the construction of new business and commercial centres, and so on.

An analysis of their number, composition and structure shows that fundamental changes emerged between 1989 and 1993. The data used in this analysis is derived from two surveys, performed by the Science Centre of Berlin. The first survey, conducted in 1991, dealt retrospectively with the situation in 1989 before the fall of the wall; the second was carried out in 1993, after unification. This project was conducted by Dieter Rucht, Barbara Blattert and the author, and included a comparison of West and East German groups as well (see Rucht *et al.* 1997:140f.).

Table 9.1 shows that in 1989 ecology, peace, politics and human rights were the most important topics. There were significant differences between East Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and Halle in the number and the issue alignments of the groups. The number of initiatives and groups grew between 1989 and 1993 in general, especially the number of feminist groups and the citizens' initiatives, but the number of peace groups decreased in the same period.

The greatest number of initiatives and groups in 1993 is located in Berlin (with about 266), but the highest density of groups (Groups per 10,000 inhabitants) is in Leipzig with 2.63 groups per 10,000 inhabitants (see Table 9.2).

Before German unification, there were few financed groups. Most of them had or needed no financing. In the autumn of 1989 they received many donations from West German groups and associations. After German unification the West German financing regulations were applied to East German groups, which caused the creation of special

Table 9.2 Groups per 10,000 inhabitants in East Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and Halle, 1989 and 1993

	1989	*1993*
East Berlin	1.33	2.12
Dresden	0.66	1.87
Halle	0.84	2.37
Leipzig	0.98	2.63

Source: Rucht *et al.* (1997:77)

programmes. Through these measures governmental financing increased rapidly and became the main source of funding for the groups (about 64 per cent). (See Table 9.3.)

Table 9.3 Financing of the groups, 1989 and 1993 (percentage)

	1989	*1993*
Own funds	38	18
Public funds	0	64
Others (donations)	27	16
No	35	2
Percentage	100	100
Number of groups	79	184

Source: Rucht *et al.* (1997:156)

In 1989, only a very small number of people were employed by the initiatives. Paid work in the groups increased enormously from 1989 to 1993 (see Tables 9.4 and 9.5). Most of the employed people have a job in a make-work programme financed by the employment office (80 per cent).

Table 9.4 Number and type of employed people in groups, 1989 and 1993

	East Berlin		*Leipzig*		*Dresden*		*Halle*		*Summary*	
Issues	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*	*1989*	*1993*
Feminism	17	80	5	25	4	8	2	10	28	123
Health	30	30	2	12	0	3	1	5	33	50
Human rights	25	30	8	13	3	11	3	6	39	60
Ecology	35	35	6	16	8	24	6	15	55	90
Peace	26	6	4	3	3	4	3	4	36	17
Politics	15	30	13	39	8	25	5	15	41	109
Alternative public	13	25	8	12	2	9	3	10	26	56
Education	4	5	2	5	1	2	1	1	8	13
Homosexuality	8	25	4	4	4	4	3	3	19	36
Summary	173	266	52	129	33	90	27	69	285	554

Source: Rucht *et al.* (1997:156)

The analysis shows that the new initiatives, in comparison with the former oppositional groups and the citizens' movements, have rapidly become formalised and

Table 9.5 Governmental financing and structural characteristics of the groups, 1993

Structural characteristic	*Primary financing*	*Others*
Employed staff		
no	68	32
yes	10	90
Division of labour		
no	26	74
yes	10	90
Hierarchy		
no	38	62
yes	24	76
Internal working groups		
no	54	46
yes	30	70

Source: Rucht *et al.* (1997:163)

professionalised. Many of them are subsidised by local authorities or by make-work measures from the employment office. With this kind of funding the initiatives have to provide services for the authorities; as a result they often lose their independence and their political character. Some of the jobs belong, in essence, to governmental welfare programmes.

The dissolution or restructuring of old groups and the founding of new groups has led to a shift in the predominant issues of social movements. Currently, the most prevalent types are women's, ecological, and neighbourhood or city district initiatives. Squatters and leftist *Autonome* groups are numerically less significant but play a disproportionally large role in the public perception of social movements. In the following paragraphs, a brief overview of these areas is provided.

In East Germany, women's issues have experienced both the most growth and the greatest differentiation (Young 1996:335f.). The most important developments are the founding of such institutions as women's houses, women's emergency telephone services, women's libraries, and women's bookstores and cultural centres. Most of these result from projects which are financially supported by state and municipal governments (mostly by departments of women's affairs and offices for equal opportunities). Groups that have emerged from the lesbian scene are also politically active. In addition, there are some ABM make-work projects, in which many women work but which have little to do with women's issues per se. These groups were dissolved when the generous make-work measures ran out in 1993, though some are still searching for new spheres of action. Since the decline of the UFV, most of these groups are linked politically to either *Bündnis 90* or the PDS (Miethe forthcoming).

It is remarkable that within this broad spectrum there are no politically engaged feminist groups; nor are there any overarching networks. Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has in fact been a decline in mobilisation. In 1990–1, there were protests against

the application of Section 218 (the constitutional provision regulating abortion) to East Germany, but since then there have been no further protests of any significance on the part of East German women. The 'Women's Strike Day', organised by West German women in the last few years, has not aroused much interest in East Germany.

There has also been an increase in the number of ecological groups and projects. But today's groups stand in a relationship of greater continuity with previous groups and initiatives, especially with regard to practical activities (Rink forthcoming). The organisation of local groups into larger leagues is typical in the area of ecology. The *Grüne Liga* or Green League, created in the autumn of 1989, is an East German environmental association, which has united most of the older and new ecological groups and coordinates their activities. In addition, there are other developments which are more commercialised. Nevertheless, there has been a series of protests from many environmental groups in the last few years. This has often been directed against new public projects in East Germany, such as the new Berlin airport, the shipyard that was planned for the nature reserve on the island of Rügen, the Baltic Sea highway, the South Harz railway, and the construction of new waste disposal sites. The potential for mobilisation with respect to environmental issues will remain strong for some time to come.

Most of the citizens' and neighbourhood initiatives were founded in the autumn of 1989 or in early 1990 (they correspond to the category 'Polities' in Table 9.1). The residents' and neighbourhood initiatives represent a broad range of groups and organisations. After initially voicing concerns for a variety of issues in the area of urban development and mounting some spectacular public actions, the groups in question tended to retreat to problems concerning their own immediate urban environment (see Krämer-Badoni and Wiegand 1996; Bernt and Holm 1998). Members of such groups tend to be suspicious of umbrella organisations and larger networks. There is relatively little mobilisation among the many residents' and neighbourhood initiatives. Most common are organised tenant protests or mobilisation in the face of road construction and building projects. The most extensive mobilisation, and the only multi-issue cooperation, occurred in 1993 when the ABM make-work programmes, which previously had been generously funded, were eliminated or reduced.

The squatter and leftwing *Autonome* groups are also new to East Germany. Since 1989–90, they have emerged in the East Berlin districts of Friedrichshain and Prenzlauer Berg, in Potsdam, in the Neustadt of Dresden, in Leipzig-Connewitz, in the Paulusviertel of Halle, and elsewhere. Especially during the period of transition between the end of the GDR and German unification, many houses and even whole blocks were taken over by squatters. In these areas, an active political and cultural life quickly developed. Gradually, larger networks grew up around the houses taken over by squatters, including political groups, squatters' councils, autonomous groups, anti-racist initiatives as well as subcultural establishments such as clubs, bars and stores. These were the source of repeated mobilisations, which were directed towards protecting the newly established structures of the alternative scene or which addressed more general political issues (see Rink 2000).

Citizens' initiatives in Leipzig

As can be seen from the tables above, there is a growing number of citizens' initiatives in East German cities. Most of these were founded in the autumn of 1989 or in early 1990. The growth of citizens' initiatives was especially strong in Leipzig. Furthermore, many developments in Leipzig are representative of those in East Germany viewed as a whole. Here one finds a typical collection of problems, without the direct Western influences that are found, for example, in Berlin.

In Leipzig the first *Volksbaukonferenz* of January 1990 was an important impetus for the rise in the number of groups. At this conference problems of housing in the GDR were discussed: the bad living conditions in many cities, the dilapidation of old urban districts and their systematic demolition by the government and by local authorities, the high level of pollution, and so on. A lot of initiatives and groups met there. The committee responsible for preparing the conference *Pro Leipzig* remained intact when it was over as a steady initiative and as a coordinating network for other Leipzig initiatives. As a result of the revolutionary enthusiasm of autumn 1989, big exhibitions such as 'Pro Leipzig' in 1991 and 'Citizens Shape their City' in 1992 were organised. The aim was to involve the citizens of Leipzig in the process of urban restructuring.

But at the same time the social and political situations changed, and economic development did not progress as expected in 1990. The main economic trend after unification was deindustrialisation. One reason for this was the outdated technology being used in many East German factories. Another reason was the sudden confrontation of the East German economy with competition in the world market. In contrast to southern European countries such as Spain and Portugal, East Germany was granted no period of transition and adaptation in the process of its integration into the European Union. As a result, 85 per cent of all industrial jobs in Leipzig were lost between 1990 and 1994. In East Germany deindustrialisation occurred in a very short time and to a practically unprecedented degree. In addition, the whole bureaucratic apparatus of the GDR was dismantled: the secret service, the army, the party apparatus, the planning and management divisions of enterprises, all administration above the local level, and parts of the university and schools systems.

As a result, the number of services has increased slightly. There is a large job vacuum. In the beginning of the 1990s this vacuum of about 30 per cent was artificially filled by governmental welfare measures—make-work measures, further education, subsidised retraining, and so on. But since 1995 the unemployment rate has increased to 15–16 per cent.

Social change brought on by deindustrialisation together with the changes in housing (reconstruction and suburbanisation) is also causing a process of social differentiation to develop. This is being forced by the reprivatisation of housing stock, the construction of new housing areas in the inner city and in suburban districts, and by numerous large investments in the service sector (such as business, office and commercial centres in inner-city districts, shopping malls in suburban areas, and so on) (see also Doehler and Rink 1996; on urban development in East Germany in general, see Häußermann 1996).

This problematic situation has produced many social problems, especially in connection with housing, but did not give rise to citizen involvement. The voluntary engagement of citizens in the various initiatives has decreased since 1991/2. There is a gap between voluntary and paid engagement in many groups (as we see in Table 9.4).

There are many reasons for the decline in involvement in citizens' initiatives. One of the most important has been the drastic change in the areas of employment and career development, which for many has involved periods of unemployment as well as retraining, further education, commuting, and many other forms of adaptation. Many of the activists could not maintain a time-intensive form of engagement under these conditions. In the course of the larger social transformation, the problems associated with deindustrialisation increasingly became matters of public scrutiny. This meant that even more demands were put upon the initiatives, while at the same time they received less and less attention. As a result it became more difficult for the initiatives to achieve their goals, which in turn led to a lessening of active engagement. Finally, the gradual restructuring of the administration resulted in a restriction of the initiatives' fields of effective action.

One of the most important areas of influence for the initiatives was urban renewal. The municipality had designated twelve renewal areas in the older districts near Leipzig's inner city. Here the initiatives were involved in preparatory investigations and in discussions about construction and land-use plans. The developments in this area provide a concrete illustration of some general problems. On the one hand, the municipality's financial means had become increasingly scarce due to the continuing economic and social crises. The money for renewal projects had run out by 1995. On the other hand, new problems, especially legal ones, continually emerged which hindered the renovation of older buildings. The result is that the process of urban renewal is taking much longer than was hoped and planned in 1990–1. The hopes of initiative participants for a rapid improvement in the standard of living in the city were also disappointed. In this regard, the initiatives were drawn into a complex web of interest groups and were worn down through petty in-fighting. Simultaneously, however, this involvement helped promote the institutionalisation and incorporation of the initiatives, as has been shown above. This had the effect of weakening their potential for mobilisation. After this point the initiatives were only successful in mobilising larger numbers in very few cases, such as the protest against the cutting of subsidies and make-work measures in 1993. On the whole, the work of the initiatives now involves cooperation with die authorities. In 1995 they started a campaign to establish the citizens' initiatives as district advisory boards, which were to represent the interests of a geographically restricted segment of the population. These advisory boards, which make decisions or advise the city council with regard to social, cultural and construction projects in the various city districts, have existed since 1996.

In recent years, differences have arisen among the citizens' initiatives due to the varying social composition and needs of Leipzig's city districts, and because of the political orientation and substantive interests of the initiatives themselves. There are four types of initiatives in Leipzig today:

1 Initiatives which deal with the needs and problems of the district in general or which represent the tenants interests, especially in renewal areas. The majority of citizens'

initiatives belong to this type. They are practically oriented and are often directly involved in preparations for or in processes of renovation. While these initially concentrated on the interests of tenants and residents, they have now developed a broad pallet of activities. They provide an advisory service, keep a watchful eye on the city's zoning and construction plans, and take up environmental and social issues as well. Those who run such initiatives are mostly college graduates, though some other portions of the population are involved as well. They represent a wide spectrum of political opinion, though left of centre and 'green' orientations predominate.

2 Initiatives in areas where gentrification is beginning. The tendency toward gentrification is evident in a small number of districts only. In the early 1990s there were some groups, such as the *Militanten Mieterinnen* or Militant Tenants in Leipzig, who fought violently against gentrification (they destroyed luxury cars, offices of investors and developers and so called 'yuppie-restaurants'). Now we have initiatives promoting gentrification such as the Urban Culture Project or the New Banks initiative, which promotes a waterfront development on the Pleiße River in an old inner-city district. Members of these groups are architects, art historians and artists, who are fighting for the restoration of old buildings as historical monuments in a formerly bourgeois quarter. They have a strong interest in urban culture, in the quality of life and in the environmental situation. One consequence of these activities will be the forcing out of tenants with low incomes through high rents.

3 Ecological and social development initiatives and networks. A good example of this type of initiative is the Eastern Districts Project in Leipzig. It was established by ecological groups, neighbourhood initiatives and special social groups as a development network in the urban and suburban areas. In this project, organic agriculture and nutrition are linked with ecologically and socially responsible renewal of housing. It involves measures for disabled people, cooperation with self-help groups and job-generating measures. It is financed by both the city of Leipzig and the European Union. Currently a development company is being founded to manage this project. An ecological service and business centre, in partnership with public authorities, private enterprises and the initiatives, is also planned. (Another project of this kind is the Elbe Project in Dresden: Rink forthcoming.)

4 Squatter groups, autonomous left-wing political networks and the counter-cultural scenes. These have developed since the summer of 1990, especially in the Leipzig-Connewitz district. In the period of transition between the end of the GDR and German unification empty apartments and whole houses in some old areas of the city were occupied. At first the local authorities allowed these squatters to stay. Often there were no owners, and in any case the authorities were too weak. That changed after unification. Following a riot in the squatter district of Leipzig-Connewitz in 1992, the *Leipziger Linie* was proclaimed. New squatters were forbidden, and the police evacuated occupied houses in Leipzig.

In addition a new policy, directed at the demolition of the existing political and cultural networks of the squatters, was established (the 'decentralisation'). Since 1994 a number of

clubs and discos have been closed. The 'scene' answered with protests under the slogan, 'If you destroy Connewitz, we will destroy the city' These protests took place in 1994 and especially in the spring of 1995. The alternative counter-cultural scene attempted to initiate a squatters' movement. A squatter conference took place in Leipzig in May 1995—but to little effect (Rink 2000).

Besides these group activities and initiatives, there has been some diffuse and scattered protest against the restructuring and the construction of large business and commercial centres in the old inner-city districts. One example is Plagwitz, an old industrial and working-class district. In recent years a number of new office and business centres as well as housing areas have been planned; in effect, these would change the economical and social character of this district. But the reaction has not taken the form of organised protest. There is, rather, a feeling of general social unrest.

Conclusion: new social movements in East Germany?

A whole series of new groups and initiatives has arisen, which, taken together, form a broad and differentiated spectrum and provide a viable organisational infrastructure. However, these new and diverse groups are only weakly linked among themselves. Even among groups which are substantively and politically similar there is little cooperation. In some cases, they stand in an antagonistic relation to one another (for example, squatters' groups and residents' organisations or different initiatives in areas of incipient gentrification). These factors work against the development of the kind of overarching links among initiatives that could be observed in the citizens' movements of the autumn of 1989.

Networks or cooperation among groups and initiatives in West and East Germany represent a special case of such organisational difficulties. During the transformation and unification process of 1990–1, there was a great deal of interest in contacts, exchange and cooperation on both sides, but this interest faded rather quickly. The causes of this breakdown lay in the particular histories and the varying contemporary contexts of the groups and initiatives in the two parts of Germany. The West German groups are older, have a broad infrastructure and established networks, and have more experience with mobilisation and other kinds of activities. The East German groups lack all of this. They are much weaker and are confronted with ecological and social problems of an entirely different kind. But the case of Berlin shows that these are not the only reasons. Despite shared problems and spatial contiguity, there is very little contact and cooperation between groups and initiatives in West and East Berlin. Some groups in East Berlin even take pains to cut themselves off. The gulf between the East and the West also affects the citizens' movements.

The transformation of East German society has resulted in the institutionalisation, professionalisation and incorporation of the new citizens' initiatives. In comparison to the earlier oppositional groups and citizens' movements, the new groups and initiatives are more highly structured and bureaucratised. They normally have a particular legal status, for example that of *eingetragener Verein* or registered association, and they have a paid staff of qualified workers, who offer particular consumer services (see Rucht *et al.* 1997). The

decisive factor in this development has been government financing. State or municipal employment offices fund many of the groups and initiatives. This form of funding, which is contingent upon the provision of socially valuable services, necessarily changes the political character of the initiatives. As a consequence, most of the new groups and initiatives have dropped their oppositional stance and lost their ability to mobilise protest (on mobilisation in East Germany see Lemke 1997; Zimmerman 1997). Sometimes they must be understood as part of government welfare or make-work programmes. A few of the initiatives are becoming commercialised as networks or companies specialising in new urban or ecological services. Finally, there are very few groups and initiatives which still take part in protests and mobilisations—the squatter and autonomous groups. These groups display some of the characteristics of social movements, but they are marginal.

The instances of mobilisation in the last few years were usually oriented towards concrete problems. They did not involve a call for fundamental social reform and cannot be seen as the work of a 'collective actor.' In contrast to their predecessors, these groups and initiatives are not explicitly political or oppositional; their orientation is, rather, pragmatic. They frequently concentrate on specific problems, such as traffic, urban renewal, the rise of rents or the preservation of particular habitats.

Essentially, the East German groups have re-enacted the development that occurred in Western countries in the 1980s and in 1990, in a much shorter time span. In comparison with West Germany, the number and membership of the East German initiatives is smaller, cooperation among them is weaker, and the mobilisation base is smaller (see Schmitt-Beck and Weins 1997).

The transformation of East German society caused the disintegration of the old political conflict between regime and opposition. This situation produced a break in the development of social movements and gave rise to a topically and politically very heterogeneous and fragmented field of initiatives. In the end, they lost the confidence and the calling to continue as social movements. In the meanwhile the differences between the initiatives correspond to the political distinctions and the socio-spatial segregation which began to emerge in East Germany after German unification.

The emergence of general networks encompassing different groups and initiatives—as in the case of the citizens' movements of 1989—is very improbable. Nevertheless, it is wrong to speak of a 'lack of movement' in the East following the disappearance of the citizens' movements. It is true that the new groups and initiatives have not drawn attention to themselves through spectacular actions, but the memory of the mass protests of the autumn of 1989 may have created expectations which cannot be fulfilled. The situation has changed, but the original impulse has not died. It was the prerequisite and impetus for the groups and initiatives which now exist.

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10
The diversity of Eastern European social movements

Urban movements, new social movements and nationalist movements in post-socialist societies

Katy Pickvance

Introduction

Urban sociology has long established that 'urban' refers not to a spatial but to a social form of organisation, to collective consumption which necessarily reflects a degree of centralisation of service administration via central and local state intervention (Dunleavy 1980; Saunders 1985; Lowe 1986). In addition, Castells (1977) has pointed out that the economic organisation of modern industrial production transcends the city; it is often regional, national and ultimately global in its extent. Urban movements, which had their peak probably in the 1970s, although they are obviously still around, have often been defined as social movements concerned with housing and urban services and territorial defence (Pickvance 1985). Thus, neighbourhood movements are urban movements, but how big is a neighbourhood? In the 1980s the focus shifted to the so-called 'new social movements', which included women's, environmental, anti-nuclear and youth movements, and it is argued that, as opposed to earlier social movements, they are global in their outlook. These types of movement have been labelled 'new' as opposed to the so-called 'old' movements, such as trade union and workers movements (Scott 1990). Do social movements in Eastern Europe fit these 'Western' classifications? At the end of this chapter I shall return to these points.

The social movements I am going to analyse might be thought to have a common characteristic because they are all Eastern European movements. This chapter will dispute this and will argue that they display significant differences reflecting the varying experiences of state socialism. Prior to the regime change in Eastern Europe, in the late 1980s, social movement activities became very apparent. The issues people were focusing on, among others, were the environment, housing and nationalism. The media's portrayal suggested that the whole of Eastern Europe was demonstrating on the streets, fully supportive of change. I shall discuss whether this portrayal was correct.

The chapter has three major parts. The first part outlines what sort of social movements developed in Eastern Europe prior to, during and after the regime change. Second, I shall examine what local people think of the consequences of the changes the movements created. Finally, I ask whether Eastern European movements are different from 'Western' ones and whether Eastern Europe became part of a 'global' process.

Opposition prior to the regime change

Prior to the regime change[1] civil society[2] emerged in all countries of the Soviet bloc, including the Soviet Union (Tismaneanu 1993). In some of the former Soviet bloc societies this process was more restricted than in others due to the lack of permissiveness of the ruling elite. In all the countries, however, various interest groups developed which contributed decisively to the creation of an autonomous or semi-autonomous public sphere, using Habermas's term. All the attempts of Soviet-type regimes to stop or prevent this were doomed to failure.

Civil society under socialism consisted of various spontaneous or organised anti-governmental initiatives (Pickvance 1996). These grassroots activities greatly contributed to the regime change even if they were not the only causes. In Tismaneanu's words they created the embryo of counter-power by promoting pluralistic ideas and questioning the Communist Party's leading role (1993:145). No one denies the role of Gorbachev from the mid-1980s but it has to be emphasised that the reason Gorbachev initiated political reforms was precisely because he recognised the strong political pressure from below calling for change.

This pressure had been building up over the decades in every Soviet bloc society. It led, on the one hand, to a growing trend of political apathy or 'anti-politics' as Gyorgy Konrad (1984) put it, and on the other hand, to clearly articulated dissent by well-known individuals and groups. Anti-politics was the political activity, or perhaps it is better to say non-activity, of those who rejected the state socialist regime and withdrew into political apathy. It was a counter-power which operated through people turning away from a type of politics which had lost legitimation but could not be removed by an electoral system. Thus political apathy was a type of democratic opposition, which, in Konrad's words, was an 'anti-political' opposition (1984:228).

At the same time there were well-known individuals and groups who advocated clearly articulated oppositional ideas. Although they did not envisage the collapse of the regime in the short term, nevertheless, by simply rejecting the official party line, this opposition had explosive political implications. Uprisings, strikes and riots occurred even during the harsh Stalinist era (GDR and Czechoslovakia 1953; Poland and Hungary 1956; Romania 1977: Pravda 1979), but as soon as there was any loosening in the ideological control a number of people became politically active in every Soviet bloc society.

Let us review the situation prior to the regime change. The Solidarity movement and KOR[3] in Poland from the early 1970s, as well as activities organised by the Polish Catholic church during the whole state socialist period were the best known cases (see the extensive discussions in, for example, Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988; Blazyca and Rapacki 1991; Laba 1991), and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia,[4] the 'Peace and Human Rights Initiative' and the active political support of the Lutheran Evangelical church of anti-militaristic youth groups in the GDR became well known as well. Lesser-known cases were Romania and Bulgaria. The Romanian Association for the Defencse of Human Rights, the Romanian Democratic Action (a democratic movement, initiated by Paul

Goma), and the outspoken criticism between 1977 and 1987 by Mihail Botez and many others against the Ceausescu regime are examples from Romania.

In Bulgaria, Declaration 78, the Independent Association for the Defence of Human Rights, samizdat publications, a number of well-known (and imprisoned) activists (such as Yanko Yankov, sentenced for two years in 1984; Volodya Nakov (in 1983); six activists in 1987, among them Ilya Stoyanov Minev who served twenty-seven years; and many others including Tzeko Krustev Tzekov, Bozhidar Evstatiev Statev and Eduard Genov Genov) and a national environmental movement in the late 1980s illustrate the same point (Bugajski and Pollack 1989). Thus, unlike in Poland, where the protest movement against the regime became a true mass movement, opposition to the regime in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria was more restricted and involved only a few hundreds of determined people.

The Hungarian case was different from all the previous ones. There was a generally more liberal political atmosphere which reduced the risk of participating in protest activity —no one was imprisoned for political activities in Hungary from the 1970s. At the same time criticism was confined to a small group of the intelligentsia and occasional strikes by working-class people. As Schopflin (1979) described it, in Hungary there was only a 'para-opposition'. In contrast, the pro-reformist stream was very strong in Hungary from the 1950s,[5] creating a thin dividing line between criticism and dissent. Unlike in Poland, however, the link between intellectuals and workers in their criticism was very weak, and social movement participation was kept at a low level. There were occasional workers' strikes and production slow-downs in support of demanding higher wages and more say in management decisions. Separately from these, intellectuals organised a few movements, such as a peace movement called Dialog and an environmental movement, the Danube Circle, and published samizdat books and periodicals, such as the *Beszelo, Hirmondo* and *Magyar Fuzetek* on a regular basis. By producing and disseminating uncensored publications, a small circle of intellectuals created an influential rival source of information which was mainly shared by other intellectuals. Thus the various groups did not combine forces in opposition in Hungary, unlike in Poland, but remained isolated from each other. Nevertheless, the so-called democratic opposition influenced public opinion and individual members even stood for elections as early as 1985 (Bugajski and Pollack 1989). Thus the Hungarian situation was different from that in all the other state socialist societies in the sense that, although there was the largest degree of political tolerance which invited wide-ranging criticisms leading to substantial reforms, and although there was a constant source of 'independent' information via the regular samizdat publications, this was not translated into mass participation in opposition.

Under Brezhnev in the Soviet Union political freedom was very limited, as in Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, and any participation in dissent activities was perceived as anti-Soviet activity and treated as treason. Nevertheless there were several groups, as well as individuals, who were ready to face the consequences of their political beliefs. This was reinforced in the late 1970s by an erosion of confidence in the Soviet regime which was due to two major factors. First, there was a shift in perceptions of regime performance stemming from the stagnation of the Soviet economy, and, second, and closely connected to it, a growing sense of demoralisation among people (Lapidus 1995). Among the 'anti-

politics' or, as Lapidus calls it, 'exit' politics in the Soviet Union a whole spectrum of social pathologies from alcoholism to corruption exemplified the limits of political control. The enhanced space for autonomous social behaviour was represented, for example, in rock groups who were often perceived as expressing dissent both by their audience and the authorities (Ramet 1994). There were, however, groups of people who were ready to face the severe consequences of their openly declared principles and actively participated in religious, nationalist and environmental groups, or became civil rights activists (Alexeyeva 1987). Many of them ended up in labour camps, as exiles or in asylums as a result of the low tolerance threshold during Brezhnev's reign. Among the well-known names were people like Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, Irina Ratushinskaya, Boris Kagarlitskij and many others. There were groups concerned with peace, such as the 'Group for Establishing Trust between the USSR and the USA, which was established in 1982 by academics, several ecological groups, like the Baikal Group, and the group trying to save the Siberian rivers, there were workers strikes, and there were samizdat publications (Lapidus 1995).

From 1985 the situation changed gradually but rapidly. The glasnost period made way for a growing number of *neformalny*[6] (or informal groups), as they were named in Russian. Among them were human rights groups demanding the release of political prisoners, national liberation movements calling for the repatriation of deported nations (such as the Crimean Tartars from Central Asia, Jewish groups, the so-called 'refuseniks'[7] wishing to leave the Soviet Union) and political groups, such as the Democratic Union (established in 1987), which openly challenged the Communist Party's monopoly power, or the Soviet Federation of Socialist Clubs, an umbrella organisation, uniting independent discussion clubs (Hosking 1995). There were several strikes leading to the radicalisation of workers. In 1988 miners in Eastern Ukraine were on strike and in the same year workers in ten cities founded an independent organisation, called *Sotsprof*. In Moscow the Congress of Independent Workers Movements was established, uniting several dozen workers' groups (Fish 1995). This could only have happened as a result of an important shift of emphasis during the Gorbachev period. Under Brezhnev, Soviet society was fairly homogeneous both politically and socially, with a low tolerance for critical voices. The glasnost period, in contrast, introduced an acceptance of criticism which led to the mushrooming of social movements and other non-state organisations in defence of various group interests. However, Lapidus (1995) described this period as being characterised by two important factors. First, the 'general poverty of socio-political thought…an absence of more comprehensive socio-political programs that would offer viable alternatives to the status quo' (Lapidus 1995:143). Instead, Lapidus argued, what characterised Soviet people's thinking was vague sentiments that ranged from romantic nationalism to extreme chauvinism which filled this void. Second, she emphasised, there was a mutual distrust between the Russian working class and intelligentsia mirrored in the distance between the dissident intellectuals and workers when organising free-trade union movements in the late 1980s. This was similar to the Hungarian situation. What was unique in the Soviet case, however, was, in the second half of the 1980s, the simultaneous explosive emergence of social movements demanding wide-ranging changes from economic to

political reforms and major policy changes on environmental and human rights issues (Fish 1995).

Thus in every single Soviet bloc society there were voices of dissent which were known by the local people and became instrumental in the subsequent transition, but in each case they led to a different variety of opposition within the region. Let us turn to the analysis of the period during and after the regime change.

Social movements during and after the regime change

It has been argued (Pakulski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996) that a peculiar situation occurred during the Eastern European regime change: instead of political *parties* political *movements* came into existence. This was because the Party, i.e. the Communist Party, throughout the region had given a negative connotation to the term 'party'. As a result, all the major political movements refused to be called parties: Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, Democratic Russia, Hungarian Democratic Forum, Free Democrats and the Alliance of Young Democrats in Hungary, and the Solidarity movement in Poland demonstrate this. None of these political movements changed their names even when they became organisations possessing all the characteristics of a political party. The Polish case illustrates this point well.

Poland

While in opposition Solidarity identified with *civil society* (which meant the sphere of activity independent of the state) and created a sharp differentiation between 'them' (the Moscow-dependent party-state) and 'us' (Polish civil society), which led to its becoming effectively a national liberation movement between 1976 and 1989 (Linz and Stepan 1996). Solidarity became the most important political movement during the period of transition, and also participated in the first parliament in Eastern Europe (in which the Polish Communist Party and their allies still had a majority of seats (65 per cent). By the mid-1990s Solidarity had broken into two major groups, the *Ruch Alternatywny Akcja Demokratyczna* (RAAD) and Centre Alliance, but both groups still refused to define themselves as political parties. Both groups preferred to appeal to society by claiming to be the legacy of Solidarity, its collective stance and consensus norm (Bielasiak 1992) implementing a virtual blockade against the articulation and representation of political party interests (Staniszkis 1991) and maintaining their position as social movements.

Hungary

In other countries within the region the situation was, again, different. In Hungary the year 1988 was called the year of civil society and 1989, the year of political society because, as Bruszt (1992) argued, the transition from social movements to political parties could be measured in months rather than years. Civil society in Hungary sharply separates from political society. Those who remained in the civil society sphere, for example social

movement activists, consciously chose not to participate in political parties. They wanted to remain active in groups of protest which were in opposition and did not wish to become part of the government, unlike political parties. During and after the transition several types of movements came into existence. Among them were environmental and housing movements, which became very popular in Hungary (Lang-Pickvance *et al.* 1997). Environmental movements could operate before the regime change because they were not considered 'anti-socialist'. Just prior to the regime change the Danube Circle attracted masses demonstrating against the government's plans to build a dam on the Danube at the Czechoslovak border (Fleischer 1993; Szirmai 1997). Many local environmental groups sprang up when information concerning large-scale ecological damage created by state-owned companies leaked out (see Pickvance 1997). Housing movements appeared mainly after the regime change. Two new issues provoked people's interest in housing. Homelessness, which became visible once the police became more tolerant to people sleeping rough, and housing privatisation. Once local governments had been instructed to accelerate the privatisation process, council tenants formed social movements to put pressure on them in order to influence the application of privatisation, which was the responsibility of each local government in the country. Independent trade unions and other professional organisations were also important products of the transition period. Both of them existed during the state socialist period but only formally and were formed as independent organisations in 1988. Minority groups became active in forming their own organisations in order to represent themselves. These included Romany, German, Serbo-Croat and Romanian organisations. Apart from the gypsy population, minority groups had had representation even prior to the regime change but they have increased their voice in the new regime. Churches, however, had little independence during the state socialist regime in Hungary. Apart from a few conscientious objectors (Corley 1993), they only gained political power after the regime change. They demanded substantially more religious education and broadcasting time, as well as the return of their nationalised assets, most of which were achieved under the first post-socialist government. Some churches became active in charity work as well.

Thus civil society grew from strength to strength in Hungary. Although social movement activities were kept at bay during the state socialist period, those who were active in criticism had the intellectual resources and experiences which they could utilise when the opportunity arose. Former dissenters were actively included in the negotiations during the regime change, and social movements became well-respected organisations in a matter of months in the late 1980s. Democratic institutions were established in a remarkably short period after the regime change and social movements became part of the system. Their advice is sought by the authorities and often well regarded.

The former Soviet Union

Social movements in the different republics of the USSR before and during the breakup of the Union were different in only one respect. Whereas Russia felt that it was going to 'lose' over the breakup of the empire, the majority of republics hoped to regain their independence as a result of the collapse of the regime. Nationalism was, however, the

underlying driving force in Russia as well as in the break-away republics. In some of them, such as the Baltic states, Armenia and Georgia, non-Communist or even anti-Communist national movements became most popular, and in others, such as the Ukraine and Moldova, there was a long-standing battle between national opposition groups and the old political elite. In a minority of former republics, such as Azerbaidjan, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, the former conservative political elite remained the most powerful political group (Khazanov 1994).

Nationalist feelings were especially strong in the Baltic states which were annexed into the Soviet Union last, in 1940. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania developed a strong 'psychology of an occupied country…vigorously and persistently reasserting their national culture and reclaiming their national identity' (Taagepera 1989:11). But the main political aims which mobilised people in the late 1980s in the Baltic states were demands for economic reform, and concern over independence and the environment. Major protests were organised in Riga and Tallin against phosphate mining in what were already major ecological disaster areas of Latvia and Estonia in 1987, and these brought together intellectuals and workers, Baltic people and Russian-speaking residents in the Baltic republics at the time (Auer 1996). Popular fronts were established in all three Baltic republics in 1988, uniting those who wanted economic changes. However, as time went on the nationalist question became the centre of controversy in the Baltic states. Initially, the Russian-speaking population was just as keen on reforming the economy and improving the environment as the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. By the early 1990s, however, pro-independence feelings became mixed with chauvinistic emotions. As the rhetoric of the social movements' leaders and politicians became more and more anti-Russian the Russian-speaking participants in the movements and parties felt less and less comfortable and left them. The growing chauvinism ignored the fact that the majority of the Russian speakers living in the Baltic republics were in fact proindependence. The prevailing political feeling among the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians from the early 1990s put the blame on Russians for the state of the economy, the environment and suppressed culture instead of identifying the real culprits: the political structure and the political leadership (which included non-Russians). This growing anti-Russian feeling clearly changed social movements which became entangled with nationalistic demands.

The growing nationalistic sentiments were translated into unfair legislation as well. As soon as the Baltic countries became independent in 1991 they introduced anti-Russian laws. The 'democracy' introduced by these countries thus became an 'exclusionary' democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996) because it excluded the population who were not of Baltic origin. This amounted to up to 40 per cent of the population in Estonia.[8]

Anti-Russian laws and political rhetoric have affected social movements as well. The original participation of both Russians and Baltic people in various protest groups during the period of regime change became divided along nationalistic lines after 1991. The Russian-speaking population started to mobilise in order to regain their elementary citizenship and property rights and to retain their jobs. The latter became important because the ecologically damaging industry is in areas, such as Narva, where the overwhelming majority of employees are Russian speakers. When the Estonian

government decided to close down some of these ecologically damaging factories the Russian-speaking population organised a movement and put strong pressure on the government to halt the process and look for a different solution. The potential social tension which could have resulted from mass unemployment in the region convinced the government and the plans for closure were reversed (Auer 1996).

Social movements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also changed; very few of the original ones remained active. Interest in environmental movements declined and some of them have been turned into conservationist movements, promoting the preservation of national heritage. The interest in environmental issues has been replaced by concerns over the state of the economy and the growing unemployment rate. In the late 1980s social movements united people. The main aims were to clean the environment, reform the economy and gain independence from a Moscow-centred empire. But in a matter of a few years all of these issues were dividing people along ethnic lines.

As well as in the Baltic states, ethnic and regional elites obtained substantial political power throughout the former Soviet Union (Khazanov 1994). Independence became the best excuse and guarantee of their positions. To acquire and strengthen their political power, many leaders appealed to ethnic nationalism and populism. Several republics, such as Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaidjan and the above described Baltic states, have adopted *ius sanguinis* ('nationalism by blood') as their new ideology, and others, such as the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, have declared *ius soli* ('nationalism by soil', i.e. territorial nationalism). The problems within the former Soviet Union, inside and outside Russia, are far from being resolved. Many ethnic groups may follow the example of Chechens and Tartars and will try to achieve more independence, which could lead to an eruption of further violent conflicts. The former Soviet republics are also full of controversies over territorial disputes. Ethnic nationalism will remain one of the major political forces in the former Soviet Union. The introduction of a formal multi-party system and elections has not achieved democracy in this part of the world. Democratic institutions are still in an embryonic stage and civil society has not yet emerged. The advocates of authoritarian rule are growing in number.

Czechoslovakia

Both Czechoslovakia and Romania had more oppressive regimes prior to the revolution of 1989 than the Soviet Union during perestroika. One of them, however, experienced a 'Velvet Revolution', while the other encountered the most violent events in the region during the regime change. The two cases provide an interesting contrast to the Hungarian and Polish cases. The dissident movement in Czechoslovakia was important but had a much smaller proportion of participants than its neighbours, Poland and Hungary. As Jan Urban (1992), a leading Czech dissident, has argued, the few hundred supporters and collaborators as well as the hard-core opposition were very inexperienced in articulating political demands other than getting rid of the 'enemy', i.e. the Communist leadership, which was totalitarian, rigid and old-fashioned compared with Hungary. Activists in the opposition movements were not involved in the negotiations during the regime change,

unlike in Poland and Hungary. There were two reasons for this. On the one hand, the Czechoslovak political leaders were too conservative to enter into negotiations and, on the other hand, the opposition, though it had an important moral influence due to its activities in the past, did not have the negotiating capacity at the time of the transition. The transition thus followed a different path from those in Poland and Hungary: the regime collapsed rather than going though a negotiated transition. When demonstrations started, masses joined in for a short period, which led to the paralysed Communist leadership's decision to let the old regime crumble. No violence was involved in the process, but it was not a negotiated process either (as in Poland and Hungary). The decision was made and executed by the country's leaders.

Like the 'Velvet Revolution', the process of 'velvet divorce' between the Czech Republic and Slovakia was decided and carried out above the heads of the people of Czechoslovakia. The majority of people (82 per cent in the Czech lands and 84 per cent in Slovakia: Wolchik 1994) insisted that the question of separation should not be decided by politicians but by the citizens of the country in a referendum. The decision, however, was made without the involvement of political parties, social movements or the citizens. People often criticise the governments in both parts of former Czechoslovakia for their 'arrogance' ignoring public opinion (Malova 1995).

Once the regime had changed there was an outburst of civil and political activities in these two countries, just as in other post-socialist societies. Religious, charitable and professional organisations came into existence in their thousands. The public supported the charitable organisations most, while the new government favoured the professional and entrepreneurial ones. This preference was demonstrated both by the wording of the law emphasising the importance of professional and commercial organisations that were set up to encourage independent business activities, and by financial support (Malova 1995). The other important aspect of civil activities both in Slovakia and the Czech Republic was nationalist movements, as in the former Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was a multi-ethnic state from its foundation as an independent state and the separation has not altered this situation. In Slovakia there is a large (half a million) Hungarian minority population and a Romany minority. In the Czech Republic it is the Slovaks and the Romanies who constitute the largest minority groups.[9]

After the initial upsurge, however, civil society activities rapidly declined in Slovakia and the Czech Republic as a result of the lack of previous experiences during the state socialist period (Malova 1995). It was certainly an unpleasant surprise to the Hungarians that people in Czechoslovakia and later in Slovakia did not join them in their social movement against the Danube dam plans. This event provoked the opposition of 100,000 Hungarians demonstrating against the building of the dam, as discussed above, but there was no opposition on the other side of the Danube. As a result of the strong opposition, the Hungarian government stopped the construction, but the Czechoslovak and later Slovak governments completed it. The two countries, Hungary and Slovakia, are now suing each other in the European court over the event, further straining the already tense relationship between them over the treatment of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia. There are, however, green movements in Slovakia campaigning against the nuclear power station, which regularly call for international support in their difficult struggle.

Romania

The case of Romania is in sharp contrast with Czechoslovakia in some ways and very similar in others. As described above, the Czechoslovak transition was peaceful but did not incorporate wide political forces due to the lack of civic culture. In Romania the Ceausescu regime was one of the most oppressive in the region, allowing little scope for any civic culture to develop. Politics were conducted with minimal participation by anyone outside the political leadership, but when the public was involved in political activities it led to violence. The lack of civic culture thus led in the Romanian case to a different conclusion. Political desperation combined with lack of experience in achieving political solutions peacefully led to the worst outbursts of violence among all the countries going through regime change in the region. Miners attacked demonstrating students on the streets of Bucharest, ethnic groups fought each other in Transylvania and former members of the dreaded secret police, the *Securitate,* were attacked all over the country. Not all political forces saw violence as a solution, however. A number of groups in Timisoara joined in issuing the so-called 'Timisoara Declaration', a document that called for political tolerance and mutual respect among ethnic groups and social classes. The declaration advocated political pluralism and warned against those who sought to instigate violence and mistrust. Political ethnic friction, however, has not ceased to exist. In fact, it led to minority organisations on both sides (the Hungarian Democratic Union and *Vatra Romaneasca*) promoting their own nationalistic interests and ejecting each other (Fischer 1992).

The Romanian people have little faith in their political system, in the fairness of political opposition, or in the rights of their opponents to hold different opinions. There is a lack of trust in the legitimacy and fairness of political institutions and authorities such as parliament, trade unions and political parties, and regarding the political arena as the means of producing an equitable compromise (Fischer 1992). People put their trust instead in the army and the church (Gilberg 1992). Those who are classified as the opposition are mistrusted. Many of the authoritarian values that prevailed prior to and during the state socialist period continued to prevail after the regime changed. These include a strong emphasis on Romanian nationalism and a strong sentiment of ethno-chauvinism. Gilberg (1992) argued that

> authoritarian values among the masses did not accept the very specific set of authoritarian views held by the Ceausescu clan…Thus, it was essentially the difference between two sets of authoritarianism that produced the so called revolution of December 1989; it certainly was not a clash of democratic versus non-democratic values.
>
> (Gilberg 1992:90)

The process of democratisation in Romania is hindered by the authoritarian values of both the political elite and a substantial proportion of the public, thereby preventing a pluralistic political regime, including civil society, from evolving (Geran-Pilon 1992). By 1996 Romania was one of the Eastern European countries furthest from a consolidated

democracy. The country, however, chose a new government in 1997 which does not play the nationalist card, as did the previous one, and promises to observe minority rights (Irhazi and Vass 1997). Time will tell whether the new government will allow a more pluralistic society, including civil society, to develop.

The two countries, former Czechoslovakia and Romania, thus have a lot in common. In both cases political leaders prefer not to involve the wider public in major political decisions. Civil society had little chance to develop, given the totalitarian political leadership style of the state socialist period, a style which has continued after the regime change in all three countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania. The lack of experience in civil society activities has resulted in the passivity of people, even now when, at least theoretically, there are no obstacles to social mobilisation. The one major difference between Romania and the successor states of Czechoslovakia is that in Romania political debates often conclude in violence among opposing groups, while in the Czech Republic and Slovakia this is not the case.

People's attitudes towards the regime change

We have reviewed the cases of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and the former Soviet Union during and after the regime change. All these countries went through substantial transformation in both their political and economic systems. The Western world celebrated these changes as an unconditional triumph at the time. Have local people felt equally triumphant? At the time of the regime change the 'Western' media stressed that all people behind 'the iron curtain' felt liberated by the regime change. Was this a true picture of people's feelings? People in the former Soviet bloc were polled extensively between 1989 and 1995 in order to gauge their views on various aspects of the political and economic situation.

According to the evidence available today, which was known to some of the experts even at the time, the media portrayal was false and the triumphalist celebration was immature. A substantial proportion of the population in every former Soviet bloc society has many regrets and second thoughts. Supported by strong evidence across the region, we can safely argue that a sizeable proportion of the population in Eastern Europe feels that the state socialist system had a number of achievements which they have been sad to see go. This was the case during the regime change but is also still the case now, several years after the end of state socialism and the introduction of capitalism. I shall look at people's opinion concerning the state of the economy as well as several aspects of the polity.

Attitudes towards the state of the economy

In 1993–4, in no country of Eastern Europe did the majority of people feel that the regime change had given them a better economic situation. In some countries the level of disapproval was greater than in others, but it did not necessarily reflect the level of living standards in that society. Living standards were exceptionally high, relatively speaking, for example in Hungary prior to the regime change, but were much lower in countries like

Table 10.1 Rating economic systems past and present in several Eastern European Countries

Country	*Approving economy in socialist period (%)*	*Approving economy since the regime changed (%)*
Czech Republic	42	47
Poland	52	50
Romania	60	35
Bulgaria	66	14
Slovakia	74	31
Hungary	75	27
Ukraine	76	6
Belorussia	78	11

Source: Adopted from Rose and Haerpfer (1994:31)

the Slovak part of former Czechoslovakia or in the former Soviet Union. Yet, people in these countries rated the 'socialist achievements' of the economy very highly and were critical of the 'achievements' of the new regime when polled during the winter of 1993/4 (see Table 10.1).

Attitudes towards the change of the political system

A longitudinal survey, conducted over four years, between 1991 and 1995 in Romania, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary reveals that in many countries support for the new political regime was fairly limited in 1991. In

Table 10.2 Support for current political regime

Country	*Approving of current regime (%)*			
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*
Poland	52	56	69	76
Romania	69	68	60	60
Bulgaria	64	55	59	66
Czech	71	71	78	77
Hungary	57	43	51	50
Slovenia	49	68	55	66
Slovakia	50	58	52	61
CEE mean	58	60	61	65
Croatia	na	42	51	44
Belarus	na	35	29	35
Ukraine	na	25	24	33

Source: Rose and Haerpfer (1998:81)
Notes:
[I] denotes autumn 1991; [II] denotes winter 1992/3; [III] denotes winter 1993/4; [IV] denotes autumn 1995

Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary support was below average and had only improved moderately by 1995 (see Table 10.2).

Attitudes in the former Soviet cases are even more critical of the new regime. Surveys conducted in Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine show that in 1992/3, 55 per cent of former Soviet citizens approved the former regime. A year later this figure had risen to 60 per cent and by 1995 to 73 per cent. These figures are much higher than the central Eastern European averages, which are 44 per cent, 41 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.

At the same time there is no strong support for the current regime in the former Soviet republics. Only 25 per cent of the respondents approved the new regime in 1992/3, 30 per cent a year later and 31 per cent when polled in 1995. This, again, is even lower than the already not overwhelming Central Eastern European support (60 per cent in 1992/3, 61 per cent in 1993/4 and 65 per cent in 1995 on average: Rose and Haerpfer 1998) (see Table 10.2).

Opinion concerning democracy

Many argue that state socialism in the Soviet bloc countries collapsed because the regime lost legitimacy. People ceased to trust the political and economic system. This was because a one-party dominated regime did not give enough chance for citizens freely and openly to express their political views, organise themselves in opposition and change the government if it was not trusted any more. Thus there was certainly a group of politically minded people in Eastern Europe who were keen to change the system and install multi-party regimes. There were, however, many people who were not sure what this actually entailed. There was, and still is, a lot of confusion among Eastern Europeans about what democracy actually means. In our survey,[10] conducted in three Eastern European countries (Russia, Hungary and Estonia) in 1993, we asked respondents whether they thought that democracy is 'a political system based on principles of multi-party competition'. Only a minority of people polled agreed with this statement in each country: 33 per cent in Russia, 36 per cent in Estonia and 44 per cent in Hungary. A large proportion of people simply could not answer this question (27 per cent in Estonia, 23 per cent in Russia and 10 per cent in Hungary) while the rest of them disagreed.

Respondents, according to our survey, were equally hesitant when asked whether they approved the various political actions people can undertake in a democratic society to press the authorities for changes. Many of the Estonians, Russians and Hungarians disapproved or strongly disapproved signing a petition, participating in legal demonstrations or strike actions, or even publishing or spreading leaflets in order to put pressure on authorities to alter their policies. Of these four types of activity, strike actions provoked the strongest disapproval, but even leaflet publication and dissemination were thought to be unacceptable forms of action by the majority of people.

Peoples' attitudes to social movements

Although people might be confused about the concept of democracy they seem to have a very clear view of social movements. Our survey revealed an interesting contrast here.

Table 10.3 Disapproval or strong disapproval of various political actions people can undertake in order to put pressure on authorities in three Eastern European societies (percentage)

Action	*Estonia*	*Russia*	*Hungary*
Signing a petition	26	24	16
Participating in legal demonstration	39	35	24
Participating in strike actions	64	70	50
Publishing or disseminating leaflets	61	58	51

Source: Survey as detailed in n. 10

Although people do not participate in social movements in large proportions (2 per cent of Russians in anti-nuclear movements, 4 per cent in environmental movements, 2 per cent in housing movements and 1.6 per cent in women's movements; 2 per cent of Hungarians in anti-nuclear movements, 5 per cent in environmental movements, 4 per cent in housing movements, 3 per cent in civil rights movements and 3 per cent in women's movements; and 2 per cent of Estonians in anti-nuclear movements, 3 per cent in environmental movements, 1 per cent in housing movements and 0.4 per cent in women's movements), people on the whole are more willing to approve social movement participation. There are two reasons for this. First, signing petitions, participating in strikes or demonstrations, or even only spreading or publishing leaflets are all seen as disruptive activities by Eastern Europeans, whereas participation in social movements is seen as an orderly activity. Second, social movements are contrasted with party political participation which, as we saw above, is very often viewed with suspicion. Political party activists are seen as people who want to gain political power and career advancement. In contrast, social movement activists are accepted as hard-working orderly people who are ready to make an effort for the smaller or larger community without any personal gains. Whether or not the latter perception is correct, the fact remains that social movement activities, according to the evidence of our survey, receive overwhelming approval from Eastern Europeans, even if they themselves have not been busy participating in them (see Table 10.3). This point reveals how cultural understandings of political processes are highly significant and can vary between countries.

The most approved type of movement in all cases was environmental. Green movements also had the largest participation figures in all three countries. Housing movements were also highly approved and had the largest participation figures in Hungary and Russia, but not in Estonia, where participation in anti-nuclear movements was higher, according to our survey data (see Table 10.4).

Table 10.4 Approve or strongly approve participation in various social movements (percentage)

Movement	*Russia*	*Hungary*	*Estonia*
Anti-nuclear	64	59	75
Ethnic minority	69	53	42
Environmental	91	65	93
Housing	81	58	83
Women's	81	49	78

Source: Survey as detailed in n. 10

Thus, according to the, now available, evidence we can come to the conclusion that people in Eastern Europe did not show overwhelming and unconditional support for the new regime at the time of the regime change, and do not even do so now. Many people had major doubts at the time of change because they appreciated a number of things state socialism had provided for them. Among these were secure employment, law and order, a feeling of security when long-term ill or old, a state provided pension scheme, heavily subsidised childcare and free education. Those who were not young enough, had no entrepreneurial skills and experiences and much concern over abstract issues such as civil rights and freedom of speech felt that this upsurge in their lives had only created disturbance and uncertainty for them. For the majority of the people, living standards fell after the regime change, and people had to face new, disturbing phenomena in their lives. As unemployment grew the prospect of job loss became a major fear. Public expenditure has been cut in all aspects of social policy provision including housing, education, health, public transport, etc. Inflation soared in all Eastern European countries and crime grew rapidly. Thus the somewhat confusing and abstract terms of 'political freedom' and 'democracy' were confronted by many with everyday problems of reality. It is not surprising therefore to find considerable disappointment and disapproval of many aspects of changes among Eastern Europeans.

There are, of course, not only losers but also gainers under the new regime. Zsuzsa Ferge has argued that 16 per cent of the population gained, 64 per cent lost and 24 per cent remained the same as a result of the regime change. Among the gainers are the younger middle aged who had both the cultural and economic capital to turn new opportunities to their advantage. These are mainly the well educated, who had the entrepreneurial drive which they could apply in business opportunities. Other beneficiaries are those whose main concern was living in a democratic society. Some achieved their goals and live in societies in Eastern Europe which are on their way to becoming truly democratic. Hungary and Poland can be classified like this. Others, however, have not achieved this goal as yet. Some Eastern European countries—such as Romania, many of the former Soviet Republics, and (although we did not analyse them) Albania and Serbia, which should also be placed in this category—are particularly badly developed in political terms. Democracy has yet not been established in them.

Conclusion

In societies where there is democracy, i.e. there is a well-established, fully operating and accountable local and national democratic system as well as mere multi-party elections, civil society also exists. Most Eastern European societies have not yet achieved this state. Our review revealed that the majority of Eastern European societies, i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, the Baltic states and the other former Soviet republics, have yet to achieve a fully developed civil society. There are two full exceptions to this—Poland and Hungary—and there is one partial exception—the Czech Republic. What Hungary and Poland had in common was that they developed the strongest civil society within the Soviet bloc prior to the regime change. There is a strong continuity to be recognised here. The rapid change of constitutions, which occurred in many Eastern European societies in 1989 and 1991, did not necessarily lead to a change in all the important social, political and economic aspects of a society, as would be entailed in a complete change of system. Hungary and Poland started these fundamental changes decades ago. People in these two countries had a better chance of creating all the necessary requirements for a successful system change, including mass opposition in one (Poland) and long-term reforms in the other (Hungary). The system change thus became part of a long-term process, not a sudden and hence radical shift, as was the case in the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Civil society could also build on the overall political changes which resulted in creating a more stable democratic regime, particularly in Hungary and Poland and to a certain extent in the Czech Republic. Hungary and Poland, however, could build on experience gained under state socialism in order to incorporate civil society in the overall democratic processes, a lesson the Czech Republic has yet to learn. The rest of Eastern Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union need to build a system of democracy and learn to cooperate with civil society.

As shown in this chapter, various social movements developed in Eastern Europe which were well supported by the majority of public opinion. Among them were movements which can be classified as urban movements. These were most of all housing movements. Apart from these there were neighbourhood movements which were concerned with various problems. These included movements concerned with the fast growth of garage building (a movement in a neighbourhood called Bitsa, in Moscow: Perepjolkin 1997); with a dam being built in a rather large 'neighbourhood', on the border of two countries (the Danube movement at the border of Hungary and Czechoslovakia/Slovakia); with the construction of a waste site (Ofalu, Hungary); with the closure of an environmentally damaging factory (Narva, Estonia); and with the protection of Lake Baikal in Russia and Siberian rivers (Pickvance 1997). Although these movements are 'environmental', they are not concerned with global matters as 'new social movements' are, but only with the damage which is threatening to their 'neighbourhood'. I would propose that these could also be classified as urban movements.

There are of course a number of environmental movements which operate at a national scale and have a very clear global concern. These can easily be identified as new social movements similar to those which developed in many Western European and American societies. There is a third category of movements in Eastern Europe which are, however,

concerned with national identity. Although it cannot be argued that this is a peculiarly Eastern European problem or type of movement, it does not seem to belong to a 'class' with which it can be identified in the Western literature. These are certainly neither urban nor new social movements. The category of 'old' social movements, on the other hand, which includes the newly formed independent trade unions and professional organisations, has a lot of successors in the newly born 'democracies'. Thus all the types of movement which have developed in the 'West' over the decades have 'equivalents' in Eastern Europe. Admittedly, the problems of classification of such movements within the 'West' apply equally in Eastern Europe. Individual movements are not different in Eastern Europe from their Western counterparts. What is fundamentally different is the political context. This is what makes the Eastern European experience on the whole different from that of the 'West'. Even if we find parallel situations, such as societies transforming from totalitarian to democratic systems (such as in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and several Latin American societies), none of the 'Western' countries had to go through two types of radical change (political and economic) at one time, and that is what is happening in Eastern Europe today. Thus the parallel can be useful, but it is inevitably imperfect.

Eastern Europe has been largely isolated from the rest of the world in two ways. The 'West' had a fairly limited knowledge of societies in Eastern Europe, and Eastern Europe tried very hard to isolate itself from the 'West'. This was true to a larger degree in some countries than in others. Again, it was Hungary and Poland which had the most contacts with the 'West' in the last decades of state socialism. This was closely connected to the political situation developing in these two countries. They had much less to hide and a lot more to be proud of. This was especially true for Hungary. Contacts with the 'West' were uneven even within the Soviet Union. The Baltic states had much more contact with the Scandinavian countries (for example, Estonia had most contact with Finland and Sweden) than with the rest of the Soviet Republics when they were part of the Soviet Union.

Environmental movements have most certainly been influenced by 'Western' ideas in Hungary (mainly by Central European countries such as Germany and Austria) and Estonia (mainly by Scandinavian countries). Ideas pursued by anti-nuclear, disarmament, peace and women's movements are also arriving from 'Western', mainly Anglo-Saxon societies through literature and personal contacts. Housing and nationalist movements are, however, more isolated in the sense of not having much contact with other societies with similar problems. Thus, in some respects, Eastern Europe has succeeded in overcoming its earlier isolation, but in others there is little drawing on experience from other parts of the world. However, with time contacts are developing.

The future of social movements in Eastern Europe is hard to predict. Since it is the product of two processes: (1) the specific features of former state socialist societies with their unique double (economic and political), and in some cases triple (where national boundaries have changed), transition, and hence with their particular tensions and issues; and (2) the homogenising forces of globalisation leading to convergence in economic and political organisation, and in social movement ideas, and demands and forms of action. However, globalisation has local points of departure and it is not impossible that the

particular combination of general processes and specific conditions in Eastern Europe will create new social movement themes and patterns for wider diffusion in the same way as occurred in the state socialist period when the dissident and samizdat movements had a worldwide impact.

Globalisation is a worldwide process which now includes Eastern Europe. It incorporates multi-national firms, as Castells (1977) quite rightly emphasised, and it penetrates consumption, communication and political ideas. To what extent this will lead to a fully global process will depend on to what extent the 'globe' is going to be unified. As communication grows the technical part should not create too many obstacles, and since 1989 the political barriers have also been broken. Eastern Europe is undoubtedly part of this global process now.

Notes

1 In 1989 in Eastern Europe and 1991 in the Soviet Union.
2 For a discussion of the term 'civil society', see: Keane (1988); Habermas (1991); and Cohen and Arato (1992).
3 Workers' Defence Committee, organised by intellectuals to provide moral, financial and legal assistance to protesting workers. It was established in 1976.
4 Established after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act agreements on human rights, signed by every Soviet bloc government.
5 The writings of Gyorgy Lukacs and the so called Budapest school as well as liberal economists suggesting economic changes from as early as 1953, which were officially accepted by 1968, are the best examples of Hungary's different position from other Soviet bloc societies.
6 According to several estimates there were around 60,000 *neformalny* in existence in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union (Berezhovski and Krotov 1990; Yanitsky 1993). Strictly speaking, these groups were still illegal, as the law was not changed until 1991 but they were well tolerated and freely operating movements under Gorbachev's new policies.
7 Those who applied for exit visas but were refused.
8 According to a survey, conducted by Klingermann and Titma, the majority of Russian-speakers (65 per cent of non-Estonians, 64 per cent of non-Latvians and 66 per cent of non-Lithuanians) felt proud of being residents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at the time of the regime change (quoted in Linz and Stepan 1996).
9 According to estimates of Romany activists in 1990 there were one million Romanies in the territory of Czechoslovakia. Other estimates suggest a figure of 800,000 (Malova 1995).
10 The survey is based on data collected within an ESRC-project (Y309253009) funded by the East-West Initiative. The Estonian survey was conducted by Saar-Poll, the Hungarian by Kulcsar-Reflex and the Russian by VCIOM, Moscow in 1993. The sample sizes were: 997 respondents in Hungary, 251 in Estonia and 750 in Russia.

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Index