

Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict

Representations of Arabs in
Israeli Jewish Society



Daniel Bar-Tal
Yona Teichman



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In the past two decades, the study of social stereotypes and prejudice has become one of the central issues in social sciences in general and in social psychology in particular. One reflection of this growing interest is the focus on shared stereotypes and prejudices, which are considered as sociocultural products. The primary reason for this development is the recognition that both stereotypes and prejudice play a determinative role in shaping inter-group relations. In situations of conflict, they simultaneously are outcomes of the accumulated animosity between the involved groups and feed on the continuation of the conflict by furnishing the cognitive-affective basis for the mistrust and hostility between the parties. In spite of this recognition, no systematic analysis of the stereotypes and prejudice was carried out in real conflict situations. The present book tries to fill this void by applying a general and universal conceptual framework to the study of the acquisition and development of stereotypes and prejudice in a society involved in an intractable conflict. It presents a systematic, comprehensive, and coherent analysis of evolvment, institutionalization, maintenance, functions, and consequences of stereotypes and prejudice in a society involved in intractable conflict.

These types of conflict are of special significance as they not only have destructive influence over the life of the involved societies but also threaten the well-being of the international community. Conflicts such as those in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Kashmir, and the Middle East indicate their persisting existence in the modern world. On the basis of knowledge accumulated in social, developmental, and political psychology, sociology, political science, cultural, and communication studies, the book first presents an integrative conceptualization that deals with questions such as: How and why do stereotypes, prejudice, and emotions about the adversary emerge? What are their contents? What functions do they fulfill? How are they transmitted by societal-political channels of communication and by political, social, cultural, and educational institutions? How are they acquired by the younger generation? How do they develop with years, and what are their consequences? This innovative and comprehensive conception is presented through the analysis of the Israeli case.

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*To our spouses and children
Svetlana, Shai, Daphne, Tanya, and Galya
Meir, Vered, Dalit, and Doron
for their support and love*

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Preface

We both live in a country ridden by an intractable conflict. We remember times when the conflict peaked, when no hope was on the horizon. We also lived through periods when the hope for peace appeared as a real possibility. Nowadays we experience a deep disappointment, witnessing a reescalation of the conflict and observing with horror how peace is slipping away.

Unfortunately, the state of Israel is exposed to a conflict dating from well before its formal establishment – for more than 100 years. As such, it serves as a real-life laboratory for learning about the psychological foundations, facets, and dynamics of a conflict. Whereas the interest in reactions to stress formed in conflict, such as trauma, has prompted much theoretical, empirical, and practical attention, the acquisition, development, and nature of mental representations in conflict have attracted relatively little interest. Believing that psychology has much to contribute to the prevention of intergroup conflicts and their resolutions, we decided to expand the study of the influences of conflict to consider issues faced by every normal child, adolescent, and adult in a society engulfed by conflict – that is, to investigate the various aspects of self-definition and the definition of one's opponents, as well as the accompanying attitudes, emotions, and behavioral intentions. In Israel, it became possible to accomplish what many social scientists urged should be done, namely, to explore the nature and development of social representations in real life rather than in a laboratory or in artificial field conditions.

Indeed, the first author, Daniel Bar-Tal, has spent the past 20 years studying the psychological processes of the intractable conflict as a participant-observer of the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli struggle. Through this observation he came to believe that a few themes play a crucial role in the psyche of the societies' members involved in an intractable conflict. Eight themes, which together have been proposed to constitute ethos of conflict, were identified. They include societal beliefs of justness in own

goals, security, delegitimization of the opponent, self-collective positive view, self-victimhood, patriotism, unity, and peace. Within this framework, special effort was made to present the general concept of the ethos of conflict and to elucidate and elaborate on its particular themes as they appear in Israeli Jewish society. In this endeavor, themes of security and patriotism in Israel were systematically analyzed in two edited books (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, & Klieman, 1998; Ben Amos & Bar-Tal, 2004). This book now adds a third theme: the development of shared psychological intergroup repertoire and particularly its manifestation in the delegitimization of the Israeli opponent, the Arabs.

For a long time, Bar-Tal has studied the phenomenon of delegitimization, assuming that it constitutes one of the crucial foundations for the fueling and continuation of the conflict and the major obstacle to the peace-making process. Delegitimization of the opponent provides probably the most important epistemic basis that justifies harm, destruction, killings, atrocities, and even genocide. The conflict between Arabs and Jews is not an exception, and in this case both sides resorted to intensive mutual delegitimization as part of the psychological dynamics that accompanied it. It was therefore natural to focus on investigating the negative stereotyping, prejudice, emotions, and intentions of behavior referred to as the shared psychological intergroup repertoire that emerged during the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The second author, Yona Teichman, studied social affiliation in different stress situations as well as influences of stress and reactions to it. In the past 10 years she has concentrated on tracing the acquisition and development of social representations through the developmental trajectory. She has devoted special attention to the development and application of an implicit, free-response measure of social representations that is based on the systematic analysis of human figure drawings.

In the early 1990s we began a joint project with the ambitious goal of studying the acquisition and development of the mental representation of the ingroup (Jews and Israelis) and the outgroup (Arabs) among children and adolescents. During this time we have performed about 20 specific studies, which eventually formed a mosaic, revealing a comprehensive picture of how a new generation acquires the psychological repertoire about its rival and how the repertoire changes over the years. Our results encouraged us to present a systematic analysis of opponent representation in a society involved in intractable conflict.

The questions that are raised about studying one's own society, especially when portrayed in what may be defined as a negative light, certainly apply to our case, but we believe that it is only natural to study the society to which one belongs – in which one speaks the language and knows the culture. More importantly, we assume that conflicts have common features and things learned in Israel could have meaning for other societies

engulfed in conflict. This defines our work as a general contribution to the understanding of the psychological dynamics underlying intractable conflicts. In the subject of our study, the implication is that the Arab representation in Israeli society is a mirror image of the Israeli representation in Arab societies. There is considerable evidence to support this belief, indicating that representations of the opponent are drawn from common conditions and experiences. Finally, we suggest that when two societies engage in vicious cycles of violence, it is important to look inside. Too often politicians, journalists, and researchers prefer to focus on the opponent, neglecting to look at their own society. They prefer to attribute the responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict and for its continuation to the rival. Through our approach we think that we can contribute to any peace process by assisting each side to look inside and analyze critically its own society and the processes that prevent resolution of the conflict. Such parallel or simultaneous analyses may encourage empathy for the other side, introduce new perspectives, and eventually break the vicious cycles that feed the conflict.

The process of selecting and preparing the material for this book and writing it was a long one, and we would like to express our indebtedness to numerous undergraduate and graduate students who were involved in many different ways in the research project that began in the early 1990s. Without their enthusiasm and contributions we would not have been able to carry out this elaborate project. In addition, we thank many friends and colleagues who read portions of the book in accordance to their expertise and provided helpful comments. We thank Yehudit Aurbach, Ehud Ben Ezer, Nitzan Ben-Shaul, Richard Bourhis, Marilynn Brewer, Ruth Firer, Nurit Gertz, Yosi Gorny, Elie Podeh, Anita Shapira, Charles Stangor, Walter Stephan, Asher Susser, Dan Urian, and Gadi Wolfsfeld. Their comments assisted us in revising the original manuscript, but the responsibility for the final version remains fully ours.

The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences selected the first author to be a Fellow and provided ideal conditions for the academic year 2000–2001 to write parts of the book. There, Petry Kievit-Tyson edited several chapters of the book, and we thank her for the help. Later, the School of Education at Tel Aviv University was generous in helping us to complete our work. Mirjam Hadar edited additional chapters; Alice Zilcha helped to type the corrections, tables, and figures and prepared the book for the publishing process; and Ilan Feldhamer helped to write the Israeli narrative in Chapter 3. We are grateful for their assistance. Yasmin Alkaly, Gaby Lieberman, and Avital Sasson also deserve thanks for helping with some of the statistical analyses and technical work. We are grateful for their assistance. Also we thank Philip Laughlin, our editor at Cambridge University Press, who despite endless delays never lost trust in our determination

to conclude the book and was very encouraging from the first contact we established.

Last, but not least, we would like to express our deepest appreciation and gratitude to our spouses, Svetlana and Meir, who were the “victims” of the long process of writing this book. Their patience and support sustained our work all the time.

Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict

Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish Society

Introduction

Ethnic and political conflicts have been part of human experience throughout history. The persistence of conflicts in contemporary times is evident in examples such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Basque Provinces, Chechnya, Rwanda, South Africa, Kashmir, and the Middle East. In these places groups clash and resort to violent means, including terrorism, atrocities, wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, that bring widespread suffering to the civilian population. In these conflicts psychological components play an important role. Group members act on the basis of the knowledge, images, attitudes, feelings, and emotions that they hold about the conflict; about their own past, present, and future as a group; and about the rival group. Although we do think that conflicts are about disagreements and contradictions with regard to real issues such as territories, self-determination, resources, or trade, we also believe that psychological determinants contribute greatly to their evolvment, maintenance, and management.

In discussing the psychological foundations of conflicts, the representation of the rival groups is of special importance, since it plays a determinative role in the intergroup relations. This representation, which includes cognitive-affective elements, determines the level of animosity, hostility, and mistrust between the groups that eventually may lead to violent acts that continue to reinforce the representation. In S. T. Fiske's words, "thinking is for doing" (1992, p. 877); we suggest that feeling as well as thinking about the other is for doing.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

The study of a group's mental representations requires an exploration of stereotyping and prejudice, which are essential aspects of intergroup relations. Indeed, the study of stereotypes and prejudice is one of the major undertakings of the social sciences in general and social psychology

in particular. Currently, as is reflected by the numerous studies published in the past decade, this line of research is still one of the focal areas of social psychology (e.g., Bourhis & Leyens, 1999; Brown, 1995; Eberhardt & Fiske, 1998; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Sedikides, Schopler, & Insko, 1998; Spears et al., 1997a; Stephan & Stephan, 1996a; Wyer, 1998; Zanna & Olson, 1994). This line of investigation has provided much knowledge about stereotypes and prejudice, mostly at an individual level but also at a group level. However, much of this research is preoccupied mostly with specific, microlevel research questions and refrains from looking at real-life issues in a holistic way. The latter approach is rare in social psychology, with the exception of the comprehensive, systematic, and coherent analysis of racism and sexism in the United States (e.g., Bem, 1993; Eagly, 1987; Kinloch, 1974; Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985; Simpson & Yinger, 1985).

This book tries to fill this void by applying an integrative, general, and universal conceptual framework to the study of the acquisition and development of stereotypes and prejudice in a society involved in an intractable conflict. We explore the case of how Arab stereotypes and prejudice evolve and are maintained by Jewish society in the state of Israel, and how they are acquired by the new generations. The representation of the Arab held by Israeli Jews is of interest because the Jewish society has been engaged in intractable conflict with Arabs for the past 100 years. The Arab social category has become the most significant and the most frequently used term in the Arab-Israeli conflict through the years, with respect to the generic group (i.e., Arabs) as well as to the specific ones (e.g., the Palestinians).

On the basis of knowledge accumulated in social, developmental, and political psychology, sociology, political science, cultural studies, and communication, we first present an integrative conceptual framework to deal with questions such as, How and why do stereotypes, prejudice, and emotions about the adversary come into being, and what are their contents? What functions do they fulfill? How are they transmitted by societal channels of communication and by political, social, cultural, and educational institutions? And what are their consequences? In this vein, our main empirical endeavors were directed at questions such as when and how young children acquire such views and how do they change through the developmental trajectory?

Our analysis of the Israeli Jewish society provides answers to these questions by drawing on published studies and studies performed in our laboratory over the past decade. Our research focuses on the acquisition and development of the Arab concept, image, stereotype, and prejudice by Israeli Jewish children and adolescents and includes interviews, questionnaires, task performance, and human figure drawings. The last method, developed in our laboratory, allows an implicit multidimensional

assessment of social perception, attitudes, and emotions – that is, of stereotypes and prejudice.

The study of stereotypes and prejudice has burgeoned for decades. The concept “stereotype” pertains to the cognitive repertoire (i.e., beliefs) that people have about the characteristics of other groups, and “prejudice” refers to the attitude that people hold toward another group (e.g., Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). The journalist and commentator Walter Lippmann (1922) coined the term “stereotype” in his book *Public opinion* to describe the uniform pictures (i.e., preconceptions) that group members hold in their minds to simplify their view of the world and for reaching common agreement regarding events in their environment. Although there were empirical studies about attitudes toward other groups in the 1920s (e.g., Bogardus, 1925; Thurstone, 1928), it was not until 1933 that Daniel Katz and Kenneth Braly formulated a more limited operational definition of stereotype and on this basis performed the first influential study of stereotypes. In their study, they define stereotypes as “pictures” of national and ethnic groups, which reflect attitudes toward them. These “pictures” include traits that produce varying levels of aversion or acceptance. The results indicate that people hold a shared repertoire of traits that characterize other groups, and that the observed sharing of traits is a result not of personal knowledge but of public fiction, when “individuals accept consciously or unconsciously the group fallacy attitude toward place of birth and skin color” (D. Katz & Braly, 1933, pp. 288–289). Katz and Braly’s pioneering study opened the road to other investigations of stereotypes and prejudice.

Over the years, as new theories and conceptions were developed, studies of stereotypes and prejudice shifted their emphasis. At first, stereotype was seen as the product of faulty, rigid, and irrational thinking, and it was often used interchangeably with prejudice (e.g., Fishman, 1956). However, later most researchers began to consider it an expression of normal and universal cognitive functioning, based on the categorization process (Tajfel, 1969). This basic conception is accepted today.

The continuous interest in stereotypes and prejudice by scientists from different disciplines conveys the significance attributed to this area. This drive is of importance since from very early on it was proposed that this line of study could contribute to an understanding of intergroup relations (Bogardus, 1928; D. Katz & Braly, 1935). This view is based on the assumption that members of a group act toward other groups on the basis of shared stereotypes and attitudes. In spite of this early awareness, however, many studies of stereotypes and prejudice in social psychology have remained focused on the individual’s thinking and feeling, ignoring the wider social context in which these processes occur. This implies that, up until today, the majority of the empirical studies and conceptualizations approached the study of stereotyping

and prejudice as a cognitive, evaluative, and affective process of the individual.

An Individual-Oriented Approach

An individualistic line of research is mainly geared to answering questions such as how individuals categorize other people, how they perceive other groups, how they encode information about other groups, how they remember information about other groups, how they store, organize, evaluate, and interpret information about other groups, how affect is related to the information about groups, how and when individuals retrieve the stored repertoire about other groups, under what conditions individuals may change their repertoire about other groups, and so on (see, e.g., the reviews by S. T. Fiske, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). To answer these and similar questions, social psychology developed sophisticated and precise methods of investigation that made it possible to explore both conscious and unconscious layers of individuals' repertoires (see, e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1994).

The state of affairs described here is not surprising in light of the fact that for the past 40 years American social psychology has narrowly defined its scope of study as relating mainly to individuals. Despite emerging criticisms (see Bar-Tal, 2000a; Elms, 1975; Himmelweit & Gaskell, 1990; Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Oakes, et al., 1994), American social psychology has been dominated by the individualistic perspective. Brewer (1997) notes that "Over the years, the process of legitimizing social psychology as a sub-field of the discipline of psychology has led us to focus almost exclusively on the cognitive, motivational, and affective underpinning of social behavior – treating these individual-level processes as the building blocks of social processes. This emphasis has had the unintended consequences of colonializing social psychology" (p. 54). S. T. Fiske (2000) explains the focus of the American social psychologists on the individuals by pointing out that "Centuries of dramatically heterogeneous immigration into one nation have brought ethnic issues to the surface sooner in the USA than elsewhere. Coupled with an explicit constitutional ideology of equality, the US cultural focus on individualism places the responsibility for bias on individuals, and privileges individual autonomy over ethnic group identity" (p. 302).

Stereotypes and Prejudice as Societal Phenomena

The individualistic orientation in studies on stereotyping and prejudice provided valuable knowledge about the microdepiction of individual functioning but less understanding about the macropicture of the societal repertoire. As noted by D. Katz and Braly (1933) decades ago,

stereotypes and prejudice are first and foremost societal phenomena, and it is in this perspective that their importance lies. Stereotypes and prejudice about particular outgroups develop within a particular intra- and intergroup social context. They concern specific ideas, attitudes, and feelings about another group; they are shared by group members and guide group members' behavior toward the stereotyped group. As such, stereotypes and prejudice play a determinative role in intergroup relations.

Only in the 1980s did the theory of social identity proposed by Henry Tajfel (Tajfel, 1978a, 1981a, 1981b; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which directed attention to social context, stimulate a considerable amount of new research, first in European and later in American social psychology. The theory places stereotypes in the context of group membership, suggesting that when people identify with the group by forming social identity, they tend to derogate and even discriminate outgroups in order to raise their own self-esteem as group members. This idea provides an important framework for understanding that stereotyping is a social intragroup and intergroup mechanism for forming consensual perception and intergroup differentiation. Tajfel argues against the individualistic views of stereotyping, stressing that "stereotypes held in common by large numbers of people are derived from, and structured by, the relations between large-scale groups or entities. The functioning and use of stereotypes result from an intimate interaction between this contextual structuring and their role in the adaptation of individuals to their social environment" (Tajfel, 1981a, p. 148).

Tajfel's theory directs the study of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination to new questions, such as when do group members derogate other groups, why do group members devalue other groups, what is the relationship between ingroup identification and stereotyping, what are the social functions of stereotyping and prejudice, how do groups of different status stereotype other groups, and how does differentiation between groups influence discrimination?

On the basis of social identity theory, John Turner and his colleagues conceptualize a self-categorization theory that focuses on the cognitive mechanism of self-categorization as an underlying basis of psychological group formation (Turner et al., 1987). In their opinion, individuals categorizing themselves as group members are subjected to social processes that create a common shared reality. In this framework, stereotypes represent the contextual view of intergroup reality, which group members are expected to accept (Oakes et al., 1994). The appearance of the social identity and self-categorization theories, as well as preoccupation with sharing beliefs in general and shared stereotypes in particular (e.g., Gardner, 1993; Stangor & Schaller, 1996), direct the attention in recent years to the social nature of the stereotypes.

A collection of papers by Spears et al. (1997a), titled *The social psychology of stereotyping and group life*, is one of the few examples that attempts to take "more social (but no less social psychological) dimensions of stereotypes, which might perhaps be better placed to explain the very social nature of the phenomena in which they are embedded (e.g., intergroup relations, ethnocentrism and prejudice)" (Spears et al., 1997b, p. 2). Their approach, greatly influenced by the self-categorization theory, has been most precisely described by Bourhis, Turner, and Gagnon (1997) in the same book:

The major theme of this book is that stereotypes are not only an outcome of individual cognitive functioning, but are always at the same time a social product of group life. Stereotypes are not idiosyncratic creations of particular personalities. They are collective representations of one's own and other groups, shared by members of the stereotyping group and reflecting intergroup relationships. . . . they are collective in origin, evolving from within group interaction and influence to become normatively shared beliefs, consistent with group values and ideologies. . . . Moreover, the social context in which they develop is a specifically intergroup one. . . . They play an active and not merely passive role in the conduct of intergroup behaviour. (p. 273)

Accordingly, the study of the social nature of stereotypes and prejudice must take into account that people live in groups and that this is the determinative context of their life experience. As group members, individuals go through meaningful collective experiences, forming shared beliefs that shed light on their experienced reality, providing the basis for group identity, sense of commonality, interdependence, and functioning. In such a framework, the sharing of stereotypes and prejudice by group members is of crucial importance for social life. We acknowledge that understanding individual functioning is an important endeavor of psychology, but, as the founding fathers of social psychology proposed (see Asch, 1952; Lewin, 1947; Sherif & Sherif, 1969), we believe that social psychology as a discipline should also focus on the group context in which individuals function. "Social psychology needs understanding of the surroundings in which people act if it is to study adequately how they act in the surroundings. From the standpoint of psychology the regularities of society are a map or skeleton of the social environment necessary as a starting point of investigation of the individuals who are the actual centers and the points at which social forces intersect" (Asch, 1952, p. 37). And Sherif and Sherif (1969) write that "The interchange between the individual and his social surroundings is a two-way street. He is not merely the recipient of sociocultural influence, that is, a learner of his culture. In transaction with others, he is an active participant in the creation of social influence. . . . The two-way interchange between individual and sociocultural surroundings . . . is the core problem of social psychology" (p. 9).

In view of these premises, we assume that there is a significant difference between cases in which the stereotypes and prejudice are held by individuals who are not aware of their group members' repertoire and cases in which stereotypes and prejudices are shared by group members who are aware of this sharing. In the latter case, stereotypes and prejudice turn into powerful psychological mechanisms that can have a crucial effect on the status of this repertoire in individuals' minds and the functioning of the group in the intragroup framework and toward other group(s). That is to say, shared stereotypes and prejudice have important cognitive, affective, and behavioral implications for group members as individuals and for the group as a whole (see Bar-Tal, 2000a, for a theoretical conception and Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001, for a specific example). On an individual level, sharing validates the stereotypes and prejudices, turning them into a confidently held repertoire, expressed verbally and resistant to change. On the group level, it increases a sense of similarity and thus increases feelings of identification, cohesiveness, and unity. In addition, sharing affects the steps that the group takes in view of the perceived dispositions, abilities, and intentions of the other group(s). They may include reconciliation, cooperation, mobilization, deterrence, attack, and even genocide.

The study of the social nature of stereotypes and prejudice requires a focus on their formative contexts in the life of a group and on their expressions in particular contents. In this line of thinking, the study of macro-contexts is of special importance. Without the study of context it is impossible to understand the functioning of individuals in groups because human thoughts and feelings are embedded in historical, social, political, and cultural contexts (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2003). This embeddedness is a result of shared social life experiences, which include constant and continuous communication, social learning, and interaction. That is, the thoughts and feelings of individuals represent, under certain conditions and during a particular epoch, the norms, beliefs, values, and attitudes of their group, and these construct the particular context in which people live. In a more limited framework, contexts of continuous intergroup cooperation, friendship, support, disagreement, and competition and intragroup economic and/or political instability, rigid stratification, mobility, and authoritarianism provide a fertile ground for the evolvement of stable stereotypes and prejudice. These stereotypes and prejudice play a major role in group functioning in both intragroup and intergroup frameworks. Thus, the study of contents of stereotypes is inseparable from the study of contexts.

The contents of stereotypes, which evolve in the particular context, represent theories and ideas held by group members and can shed light on their intergroup reality. They explain the experiences of the group vis-à-vis other groups, and they also, together with the valence of the attitudes and affects and the particular emotions, serve as a motivating and directing

force for group behavior. As Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey (1962) suggest, "Man acts upon his ideas. His irrational acts no less than his rational acts are guided by what he thinks, what he believes, what he anticipates. However bizarre the behavior of men, tribes or nation may appear to an outsider, to the men, to the tribes, to the nation, their behavior makes sense in terms of their own views" (p. 17).

Thus, the study of stereotypes in any macrocontexts is essential for social psychologists to understand group behavior in real-life situations. An example of this line of study can be found in the classic work on ethnocentrism by LeVine and Campbell (1972). On the basis of ethnographic work, they proposed several generalizations with regard to relations between certain group characteristics (e.g., urbanism, occupation, and political-technological dominance) and stereotype contents. For example, they proposed that "Rural groups are seen by urban groups as unsophisticated, guileless, gullible, and ignorant" (p. 159), or "Groups doing manual labor are seen as strong, stupid, pleasure-loving, improvident" (p. 160).

In addition, the study of the social nature of stereotypes and prejudice requires an examination of how they become shared and maintained by group members. Group members acquire stereotypes and prejudice in their social environment through agents of socialization, societal channels of communication, social institutions, and cultural products. These mechanisms serve to transmit and disseminate the contents of the stereotypes, as well as the attitudes, affect, and emotions toward other groups. They also help to maintain this repertoire by its continuous and systematic exposure. When stereotypes and prejudice are widely shared and used, they become societal phenomena. Accordingly, they need to be studied as societal phenomena in a systematic and holistic way that is able to explain and account for their societal functioning. This method of study necessitates an interdisciplinary approach, so that a comprehensive picture can be built up to provide a macroanalysis of a society. The present book focuses on one specific society and attempts to provide a systematic analysis of the stereotypes and prejudice in this society toward a particular group.

Unit of Analysis

In this book the terms "a group" and "a society" are used interchangeably. The first term is frequently used in social psychology, whereas the second is mainly used in other social sciences. Although the term society was previously used by social psychologists, and even one of the classic textbooks by Krech et al. (1962) was titled *Individual in society*, the term has almost disappeared from the vocabulary of mainstream social psychology, which prefers to use the term group, even when referring to large systems (e.g., see Oakes et al., 1994). This trend is not accidental but reflects the previously noted preoccupation of social psychology with the

individuals and their functioning in small groups. Still, it is worth noting that even now the study of small groups receives less attention than the study of the individual (Moreland & Hogg, 1993; Wilder & Simon, 1998) and the study of the individual's functioning in the society has almost disappeared completely from the agenda of social psychology (Bar-Tal, 2000a; Himmelweit & Gaskell, 1990). Although various social psychologists and sociologists have offered different definitions for the term group, they all provide minimal requirements for collectives to be included in this category (see, e.g., Brown, 2000; Homans, 1950; Shaw, 1981; Tajfel, 1981b). The definitions suggest that a group may include two or more individuals who have something in common (e.g., similarity, common goal, common fate), define themselves as a group, and form some kind of basis for common functioning (e.g., interdependence, common task, relationship, mutual influence). Under these conditions we can include a dyad as well as a society in the category group, implying that the term group is more general than the term society.

In contrast, the term society defines the collective in a more specific way. It denotes large stable social systems, with a collective of people who have a clear sense of common social identity; differentiate themselves from other societies; lay claim to the legitimate occupation of a territory; and create traditions, culture, collective memories, belief systems, social structures, channels of communication, and institutions (Giddens, 1984; Griswold, 1994; Hoebel, 1960). Of special importance is the observation that "society is thus the creation of its members; the product of their construction of meaning, and of the action and relationships through which they attempt to impose meaning on their historical situation" (Dawe, 1970, p. 214). This observation suggests that society members construct shared beliefs, which reflect the perceived reality and at the same time shape their world view. These shared beliefs also demarcate the society's boundaries. In modern times national societies are meaningful units of belonging and serve as an important basis for individuals' social identity. Israeli Jewish society is the focus of our analysis and research, and in this book we use the term group when we discuss the social psychological literature and the term society when we refer to a defined particular collective, such as a Jewish collective living in the state of Israel.

The Context of Intractable Conflict

The present book focuses on a particular macrocontext characterized by intractable conflict, known as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century, when the first Zionist immigrants who arrived in Palestine to realize their national goals were soon confronted by the local Arab population, which had opposing national aspirations. The massive immigration of Jews

and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 escalated the conflict between Jews and Arabs over territorial and national rights. The conflict has generated seven wars and several civil uprisings. The continuous flare-ups of violence, along with unrelenting animosity, denote the intractable nature of the conflict that has an ongoing presence in the experience of the people living in this area. At the same time as the violent confrontations, attempts were made to put an end to the conflict and to initiate and maintain the peace process. Deescalating events, such as the peace treaties between Egypt and Israel in 1979 and between Jordan and Israel in 1995, the Madrid conference in 1991, and the mutual recognition between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the state of Israel in 1993, represent such attempts. The present eruption of violence (beginning in fall 2000) in the region indicates how difficult it is to resolve a deeply rooted, intractable conflict that has lasted for generations.

Most of the findings of our research project were obtained between 1992 and 1999 when the peace process had the upper hand; only two studies were performed after 2000. The findings of all the studies are reported in detail in Chapters 9, 10, and 11, but already here we note that Jewish Israeli children and adolescents hold a very negative repertoire about Arabs. This repertoire, which includes stereotypes, prejudice, affect, emotions, and behavioral intentions, is acquired at a very early age and, despite periodical moderation, is maintained through the developmental trajectory into young adulthood.

Generally findings indicate that the context of the intractable conflict, which is characterized by prolonged and violent confrontation between two groups over their contradictory essential and existential goals, has a powerful influence on the psychological repertoire of the group members involved in such conflict. As the conflict lasts, people form a stable view of the violent reality and the adversary, including his ascribed characteristics, dispositions, feelings, and intentions. All serve the purpose of comprehending the reasons for the outbreak of the conflict and its course, explaining past and present behavior of the rival, and predicting future acts. In the context of an intractable conflict, the accumulated experiences and the continuous stream of negative information about the opponent validate and reinforce the held repertoire. This negative repertoire is stored, frozen, and chronically continually accessible.

Because most of the members of the society are actively or passively, directly or indirectly, involved with the conflict, this repertoire is widely shared. The shared repertoire is expressed in the major societal channels of communications and eventually permeates cultural products such as books, plays, and films and may even become a part of the ethos of the society. Thus, on the one hand, societal communications and cultural products reflect the beliefs, attitudes, and affects experienced by the members of the society, and at the same time they also transmit, disseminate, and validate

them. The younger generation is exposed to this repertoire through family, educational institutions, and the societal channels of communication, including mass media and especially television. The acquisition and sharing of the social ethos is an important indicator for membership in and identification with a society. In adulthood this generation shares the same beliefs, attitudes, values, and emotions and thus experiences reality similarly and tends to endorse or take a similar course of action.

Acquisition of Stereotypes and Prejudice

Understanding the underlying principles of the acquisition and development of the psychological repertoire about the rival in the context of intractable conflict is a major challenge for behavioral scientists. On the one hand, this line of study may shed light on the evolvment and maintenance of animosity and violence and, on the other hand, may illuminate the required societal, educational, and cultural changes for facilitating change and eventually even allowing for the emergence of a peace process.

Developmental theorists and researchers have devoted relatively remarkable effort to the study of the acquisition of racial and gender stereotypes (Aboud, 1988; Davey, 1983; Kohlberg, 1966; Williams & Morland, 1976), but relatively little has been invested in studying the development of stereotypes and prejudice in the context of an intractable conflict. The studies by Cairns (1980; 1987; 1996) in Northern Ireland are a promising beginning. Their results indicate that children living in a context of intractable conflict are strongly affected by the rivalry and the violence. They acquire the commonly accepted stereotype of the adversary group and tend to discriminate against this group. Also, growing up in a conflict affects children's mental health. Our purpose was to expand the knowledge about children, adolescents, and young adults experiencing an intractable conflict. Although we recognize the importance of the consequences of conflicts for mental health, we concentrate on the development of stereotypes and prejudice in a society involved for many years in violent intergroup confrontations.

We begin by documenting the acquisition and development of the relevant vocabulary, that is, the words "Jew" and "Arab," then proceed to the acquisition of conceptual categorization, national and ethnic self-identity, and in- and outgroup stereotypes and prejudice. The explanation of these developmental processes needs to draw on the knowledge accumulated in developmental and social psychology (see Pomerantz & Newman, 2000). Indeed, the study of stereotyping and prejudice is of central concern for both disciplines. To note only a few issues, both try to explain how individuals, including children, acquire stereotypes and prejudice, how they change with age, when they are activated, how the society maintains them, and how they are influenced by specific environments.

The questions of acquisition of the cultural stereotypes and prejudice by the younger generation are of crucial importance in view of the established findings that if learned in the early years, the stereotypes continue to be stored in the minds of adults, even though contradictory beliefs may be acquired in later years. Moreover, the repertoire of negative stereotypes and prejudice continues to play a role in human behavior toward the stereotyped group (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). Thus, in spite of the fact that society members may begin to evolve a new, more empathetic, and personal view of the members of the rival group, the early-acquired repertoire still continues to influence their functioning.

The grand theories of psychology have left their mark in the field of stereotypes and prejudice research, contributing to the understanding of their acquisition and development. The psychodynamic approach proposes that negative stereotypes and prejudice can be traced to intrapersonal conflicts stemming from childhood experiences (Adorno et al., 1950; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950). According to this thinking, hostility, originally experienced toward parents, is projected or displaced to other people, most easily to disadvantaged or rejected outgroup members. The social-learning approach focuses on the social mechanisms through which children acquire stereotypes and prejudice. It points out the importance of induction, modeling, and reinforcement (Goodman, 1964). Additionally it directs attention to the effects of observing not only the behavior of meaningful ingroup members, such as parents, but also the behavior and societal roles performed by outgroup members in real-life situations. Such observations lead to generalizations regarding characteristics, feelings, behaviors, and status of the observed groups (Eagly, 1987).

The cognitive approach views stereotypes and prejudice as an outcome of information processing and categorization (Hamilton, 1981; Stephan, 1989). As they treat any other information, individuals actively process and cognize information about outgroup members and form mental representations of them. Of special importance, for our analysis, are cognitive developmental theories that focus on the cognitive, affective, and social abilities that develop with age and influence expressions of stereotypes and prejudice (e.g., Aboud, 1988; P. A. Katz, 1976; Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget & Weil, 1951; Selman, 1980).

Finally, the intergroup relations approach, known as realistic conflict theory, suggests that stereotypes and prejudice emerge because of realistic conflicts of interests between groups. It explains how conflicts over scarce resources (such as territories, work opportunities, or housing) might lead to expression of hostility in negative stereotypes and prejudice among children and adults alike (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif et al., 1961). In this view, "images of enemies" are imprinted at a very early age (Holt & Silverstein, 1989). In the 1970s appeared social identity theory, which focused on scarce social resources of esteem, status, and prestige that

motivate groups to use negative stereotyping and prejudice (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986). This led us to propose a developmental hypothesis we examined in several of our studies. The hypothesis suggests that at developmental stages in which issues of self-identity and self-esteem gain salience (i.e., in early adolescence) social biases against the rival group increase. Namely, the ingroup is perceived as more positive and less negative, whereas the rival outgroup is perceived as less positive and more negative.

Review of the developmental literature relating to the development of stereotypes and prejudice (e.g., Aboud, 1988; Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Cameron et al., 2001; Nesdale, 1999; Phinney & Rotheram, 1987) indicates that the most influential theory for the study of their acquisition and development was Aboud's 1988 cognitive developmental theory. As noted, this theory suggests that the acquisition and age-related changes in stereotypes and prejudice depend on cognitive development. In challenging this view, Nesdale (1999) and Nesdale and Flessler (2001) suggest social identity theory (SIT) as the most appropriate theoretical framework for explaining the acquisition and developmental course of stereotypes and prejudice. According to this proposition, the motivation suggested by this theory applies to all ages and, as such, determines intergroup perception and attitudes regardless of age.

Rather than accepting one approach or trying to verify any of them, we present an integrative developmental contextual proposition that will try to account for the effects of cognitive, motivational, affective, and contextual factors on the development of a psychological repertoire about a rival group. In societies engaged in an intractable conflict, the psychological repertoire about the adversary group dominates society's agenda. It is a central theme in the life of the society and becomes a part of its shared social repertoire and the culture. The early acquisition of a negative repertoire about the rival group, in the context of an intractable conflict, occurs through unintentional learning. Children absorb the cultural climate of conflict that dominates life as well as the prevailing beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in the society as expressed through various channels. In essence, it is a natural learning process, associated with the acquisition of language, concepts, and images and with cognitive, affective, personal, and social development. From an early age, as they become exposed to information representing the social repertoire of their society, children absorb the contents and the affective tone of this repertoire. At first they learn about their own group, form a self-social category, and acquire its characterizing features. Later, they learn about the existence of other significant groups and about the prevailing mental representations of these groups in their society.

In the context of intractable conflict, strong negative emotions, personal needs, and identification with the ingroup mediate the rejection of the

opponents, and the early learning of stereotypes and prejudice about the rival group is an important component of socialization. It prepares the young generation to preserve the social ethos and to function in a threatening and stressful context. As long as the conflict continues, this repertoire fulfills an important function in the life of the group, especially in its coping with the threatening and stressful situation. However, when the nature of the conflict changes and attempts for resolving it begin to appear, the influence of the negative repertoire about the rival group continues to exist and, as such, becomes an obstacle to the evolving peace process (Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 2001).

We propose that studying the acquisition and development of the negative repertoire about the rival group is crucial not only for understanding the effect of the context on the evolution of stereotypes and prejudice, but also for understanding how it inhibits the peacemaking process and whether it can be prevented or changed. Therefore, much of our research focuses on the question of acquisition of stereotypes and prejudice at an early age and on their nature during the developmental trajectory. Based on the reviewed developmental and social theories, we suggest that, in forming social representations, preschoolers are influenced by affective components holding very biased views and attitudes toward in- and outgroups. In middle childhood, cognitive development contributes to the introduction of milder views and attitudes (Aboud, 1988). During pre- and early adolescence, due to the activation of self-enhancement motivation, the biases reemerge (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), and upon the consolidation of self-identity and the development of interpersonal perspective and moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1966; Selman, 1980), they decline again. We describe this process as following a zigzag pattern.

As noted, our example for an intractable conflict is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Being Israelis, we have deep and comprehensive access to the Israeli society. The analysis of the psychological repertoire about the rival group in the Israeli society reflects our belief that becoming familiar with this repertoire and understanding it may facilitate preventative efforts and the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Despite the focus on the Israeli scene, we believe that the case presented in this book is not unique. Because of parallels with other societies engaged in intractable conflicts, our conclusions can be extended to other situations. Most important, we suggest that the Israeli society represents a mirror image of the Arab societies, particularly of the Palestinian society. This mirror image has been noted in the past (Bar-Tal, 1988; Bar-Tal & Oren, 2003; Heradstveit, 1981; Kelman, 1982; White, 1977). This means that both societies need to face similar changes. Thus, when a time comes for political agreements, these agreements will have to be accompanied with changes reflected in the shared beliefs of both societies and in the mutually held social representations by society members. Finally, we hope that other societies engaged in

intractable conflict can launch similar analyses to expand further the understanding of the dynamics of conflict and the psychological obstacles for peacemaking.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This book presents a holistic analysis of the Arab stereotype and prejudice in Israeli Jewish society. It is a case study of stereotypes and prejudice in the context of an intractable conflict.

Chapter 1 describes the basic concepts related to the psychological foundation of intergroup relations and introduces the concept of the "psychological intergroup repertoire." The introduction of the concept is followed by presenting its separate components: stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions and the relationship among them. To understand fully intergroup behavior, it is especially important to focus on the way group members share repertoires, and Chapter 1 describes the essence of this sharing. The chapter discusses the special influence that stereotypes and prejudice have on psychological functioning and focuses on describing the formation of the psychological intergroup repertoire, especially the content of stereotypes. The description is based on an integrative model that combines micro- and macrolevels of analysis. It incorporates various theories that have been offered to explain the formation of stereotypic contents and prejudice but pays special attention to the nature of intergroup relations as an important basis for the evolution of the psychological intergroup repertoire.

Chapter 2 provides the conceptual framework for the discussion of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire that evolves in contexts of an intractable conflict. First, it presents the characteristics of intractable conflict and then describes the particular societal beliefs constituting the ethos of conflict. These societal beliefs evolve during the conflict in the service of coping with the threatening and stressful situation. Of special importance are delegitimizing beliefs about the rival and the label "an enemy." These beliefs are part of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire, which includes not only extremely negative stereotyping such as delegitimization but also negative attitudes, affect, and emotions such as hatred, fear, and anger. This repertoire, which is institutionalized during the conflict, is part of the shared world view that the society holds and has an effect on subsequent information processing. Group members use the repertoire as a prism through which they look at the conflict and at the enemy. The repertoire enables the satisfaction of the epistemic need for organizing the world and coping successfully with the conflict. But at the same time this repertoire fuels the continuation of the conflict, because society behaves in accordance with the world view of which delegitimization of the rival is an important part.

The other chapters analyze the particular case of the evolvement and maintenance of the negative intergroup psychological repertoire about Arabs by the Israeli society in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Chapter 3 describes the context in which the psychological repertoire about Arabs has evolved. It provides an overview of the sociocultural context, focusing on the nature of the Arab-Israeli relations and their history, describing the events of the conflict as the Israeli Jews believe they occurred. Specifically, this chapter elaborates the historical context of the conflict, as reflected in the Israeli collective memory. This context is important for understanding how stereotypes and prejudice about Arabs have evolved within the ethos of conflict. For the Israeli Jews it has served as a constructed reality on which they have based their perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions toward Arabs.

After presenting the context of the intractable conflict from the Israeli Jewish perspective, the next three chapters describe the representation of Arabs through the political, societal, educational, and cultural channels. Chapter 4 focuses on the public discourse about Arab stereotypes and prejudice by the political leaders and the mass media. It begins with a review of various representations of Arabs prevailing among the first Jewish immigrants in Palestine at the turn of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century and continues with a review of studies that have examined Arab representation in the mass media. Chapter 5 discusses how Arabs are represented in Hebrew school textbooks. Specifically, the chapter reviews studies that have examined Arab representations in school textbooks of history, geography, Hebrew, civic studies, and Arabic from the first Zionist immigration waves up until today. Chapter 6 concentrates on the cultural channels of communication. It reviews studies that have investigated Arab representations in adult and children's Hebrew literature and in plays and films.

Chapter 7 reviews empirical studies that have investigated the psychological repertoire held in Israeli Jewish society about Arabs. It reviews studies performed using different assessment methods and relating to different variables for a variety of participants in different periods. Some of the reviewed studies examined the repertoires held by small, defined groups such as adolescents, students, or adults; some investigated particular segments of Israeli society using national samples, for example, adolescents attending high school; and some used surveys of national samples. These studies provide information regarding stereotypes of Arabs, attitudes and emotions toward them, and behavioral intentions attributed to them.

Viewing stereotypes, prejudice, and emotions as a link in a vicious cycle that reinforces conflict, we decided to conduct a systematic and comprehensive research project aimed at unveiling their acquisition by the younger generation. Our examination began with the 2-year-olds and traced the changes occurring in stereotypes, prejudice, and emotions during the

developmental trajectory through adolescence and, in some studies, young adulthood, thus, covering the age span of 2–24. The next four chapters describe this research project and the findings it generated. It was conducted by both authors, with the help of students during the past decade. Although the information accumulates from different studies, together, to our knowledge, it provides a uniquely comprehensive endeavor for examining the developmental trajectory of social representations of one's own group and rival groups.

Before getting to the studies and findings, Chapter 8 presents the conceptual framework underlying the performed studies and describes the research methods that were used. We begin with the notion of categorization and its expression in words, concepts, and images that are developed for organizing and expressing knowledge. Our main focus is on social knowledge and its primary units: the self, others, and groups. Special attention is devoted to the development of these units as determined by cognitive, motivational, affective, and contextual mediators. Then, we present an integrated developmental perspective that constitutes a foundation for suggesting a developmental course for in- and outgroup representations in the context of conflict. Based on theories of cognitive and personal development, on theories specifying socially based motivations, and on theories pointing out the dynamics of a context of conflict, we suggested that Jewish Israeli children will acquire concepts related to ethnic and national identities (Jew, Israeli, Arab) earlier than children growing up in a peaceful social context, that the differentiation between Jews and Arabs will be very pronounced, and that the negativity toward Arabs and positivity toward Jews will be evident at a very early age. With the advance of the development of cognitive faculties, we expected moderation in the negativity toward Arabs and positivity toward Jews and a possible elevation in positivity toward Arabs and negativity toward Jews. Despite these general trends, due to the activation of identity issues we expected pre- and early adolescents to resemble the preschoolers rather than the late adolescents or young adults in the appearance of negativity or positivity toward both groups.

In this chapter we also review major explicit and implicit methodologies used in previous developmental studies for the assessment of stereotypes and attitudes held by children and present our adaptations for these methodologies. Of special note is a new methodology that was developed in our laboratory and defined as a free-response assessment procedure. This methodology utilizes human figure drawing (HFD) for examining social representations. In Chapter 11, we report its empirical foundation.

The report of our findings is organized according to age and methods. Age-wise we differentiated between preschoolers and older participants, and method-wise between explicit and implicit assessment measures. Chapter 9 describes the studies dealing with preschoolers, 2–6 years of age,

utilizing explicit measures. These studies concentrated on the acquisition of words, concepts, and images, representing one's own social category and that of the "Arab" category. Along with this information, we also looked at the acquisition of self-identity, content of stereotypes, and attitudes and behavioral intentions expressed toward Jews and Arabs. Some of the studies examined sources of information about Arabs and environmental influences. Considering environmental influences, we differentiated between specific influences, such as ethnic origin of the participants and their socioeconomic status, or exposure to Arabs and Arab children in integrated kindergartens or neighborhoods. Finally, we present findings from a study that included also an older group of children to examine generalization tendencies.

Chapter 10 reports studies done with older participants, aged 7–24 years, also utilizing explicit measures. Except for the acquisition of words, concepts, and images, these studies aimed to continue tracing the developmental trends of the issues that were investigated with the preschoolers, but the focus in most of them was on the Arabs. We continued to explore the development of Arab images and the basis for their identification, the knowledge about Arabs defining them as a social category, the content of their stereotypes, and the attitudes and behavioral intentions expressed toward them. Here as well we looked at generalization tendencies as reflected in differentiation among Arab and non-Arab nations and at the effect of specific social environments such as ethnic origin, level of religiosity, and length of acculturation in the Israeli society.

In Chapter 11 we report findings for a developmental range of participants aged 4–16, obtained from the free-response method based on the systematic scoring of the HFD. This innovative method allowed an indirect implicit assessment of the social repertoire of children and adolescents and enabled us to examine both the structure and content of images of Jewish and Arab men and women held by Jewish Israeli children. We applied this method for additional comparisons: images of Jews and Arabs with a neutral image identified as "a person," images produced by high- and low-self-esteem participants, and images obtained in a relatively nonviolent period of the conflict with those obtained in the last wave of atrocities that erupted in fall 2000.

The ample findings presented in Chapters 9–11 provide a comprehensive developmental picture regarding the acquisition and development of the categories representing one's own group and the adversary in an intractable conflict. From a very young age children absorb the conflict-related information and the emotional tone accompanying it. Very early they manifest an internalization of the shared social repertoire and express it in the structure and content of the stereotype they form regarding the in- and outgroup and in the accompanying attitudes. As hypothesized on the two types of measures, preschoolers expressed the most extreme ingroup

favoritism and outgroup negativity. Age had a moderating effect, but somewhat different from that reported for societies not engaged in conflict, and it was evident mainly on the implicit measure. Young adolescents showed inconsistencies, reflected on both measures, oscillating in positivity or negativity toward both groups but manifesting a more consistent negative bias toward the outgroup on the implicit measure. Late adolescents and young adults expressed most moderate in- and outgroup views and attitudes, but this tendency is moderated by belonging to different social groups and level of conflict.

The final chapter presents conclusions from the analysis and findings appearing in Chapters 3–11 on Arab representation in Israeli Jewish society. Undoubtedly, this representation is nourished by the context of the intractable conflict. On this premise it presents a major challenge of how to change the negative psychological intergroup repertoire in societies involved in conflicts. The main tenet goes beyond the ideas often presented in traditional social psychology that suggest ways of changing negative stereotypes and eliminating prejudice by focusing mostly on individuals. The alternative emerging from the analyses and findings presented in this book argues that a reconciliation on a societal level is necessary for successful conflict resolution and a genuine peace process. Within the framework of reconciliation, the change of the representation of “the enemy” is essential. This change requires processes of legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization as well as changes in attitudes and emotions that need to take place in the minds and hearts of the great majority of society members. This challenging mission seems to be the only route for societies aspiring to depart from leading a miserable life trapped in an intractable conflict and embark on the way of peace.

The Psychological Basis of Intergroup Relations

INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR

The study of the psychological basis of intergroup relations is one of the major endeavors in social psychology (see, e.g., Brewer & Brown, 1998; Brown & Gaertner, 2001; Sedikides et al., 1998; Stephan & Stephan, 1996a). This interest is not surprising in view of the fact that most social life takes place within groups. Individuals are born into a group or organize themselves into groups, and as a result most of their behavior is performed within a group framework. Also, as a consequence of being part of a group, people develop their social identity as group members, and much of their thinking, feeling, and acting is carried out in the framework of knowledge about this identity. Because group membership, as reflected in a person's social identity, is one of the most salient and important human characteristics, individuals not only consider themselves as group members but also perceive and treat others according to their group membership.

The categorization of self as a group member and others in terms of group membership is a pervasive and central human cognitive process that enables the organization of the complex social world into a meaningful structure (Tajfel, 1969, 1981b). In this process, individuals aggregate people who share particular properties into one category and view them as a separate entity. There are numerous ways to classify people into social categories because humans have many different characteristics. Some features such as gender, race, or age can readily be seen, whereas others such as occupation, nationality, or religion may not be so easily distinguished. But social categories are made up by individuals and provide an important input for human behavior, especially in those situations where people, members of a group, come into contact with individuals who are part of another social group. In such a framework, the other person(s) can be treated as a unique individual(s), without taking his or her group membership into account, and/or as a group member. These ways of treating

each other are opposite sides of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum, which describes the nature and range of social interactions (Tajfel, 1978a).

When others are treated as group members, it implies that they have been classified according to social category, and subsequently any encounter may be characterized as being carried out in the framework of an intergroup interaction (Tajfel, 1978a, 1978b, 1982). Sherif (1966) viewed intergroup behavior in this way, defining it as a situation that takes place "whenever individuals belonging to one group interact collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identification" (p. 12). Indeed, many social interactions in human life are performed within such a framework. The intergroup orientation increases when a person's group membership dominates, more emotional investment in it takes place, and evaluations are associated with group membership (Tajfel, 1978a).

In Tajfel's view, in a framework of intergroup interaction, social categorization allows the interacting person "to structure the causal understanding of the social environment" (Tajfel, 1978b, p. 61) as a guide to social action and provides a system of orientation for the person's place in the group. These interactions can take place at an informal interpersonal level or formal intergroup level. In the first case, two individuals, or small groups of individuals, who interact with awareness of their own social identity, perceive others as members of another social category, and their behavior is guided by this perception. These situations include, for example, a talk between two friends of different nationalities about political matters involving relations between the two nations. In situations at an intergroup level, groups produce many formal, different types of behavior that vary, according to the extent of group member participation, but are always perceived as being part of intergroup behavior. These intergroup behaviors may include an exchange of group representatives, visits, trade, cooperative acts, an exchange of statements, negotiation of agreement, and cultural exchanges but can also include negative acts such as public disagreement, conflicts, accusations, violence, genocide, and war. In all of these types of behavior, individuals act as group members and view the other individuals as members of an outgroup.

Psychologists note that intergroup relationships and interactions are dominated by psychological biases derived from self-categorization. On a basic level, they have observed that once individuals categorize themselves as group members, they tend to favor their own group and tend to accentuate the differences between their own group and other groups. Group favoritism is expressed in emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. Group members have more positive attitudes and affect toward their own group than toward outgroups, tend to perceive their own group in more positive ways, and prefer to reward their own group members rather than outgroup members (Brewer & Miller, 1996; Tajfel, 1970, 1978b; Wilder,

1981). The basic ingroup favoritism was labeled years ago as ethnocentrism by Sumner (1906). He suggests that "Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. . . . Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders" (p. 13). Tajfel (1982) explains ingroup favoritism using the premise that group members in their attempt to maintain or enhance their self-esteem tend to evaluate their own group more favorably than other groups, because important aspects of their self-concept are derived from their membership in social groups.

The tendency to accentuate differences (accentuation tendency) indicates that although the differences between groups may be real, group members tend to exaggerate the extent of differences between members of their own group and other groups (Krueger, 1992; Tajfel, 1969; Wilder, 1986). The attribution of characteristics to outgroup members is often polarized. That is, group members tend to characterize members of the outgroup by associating them with an extreme set of features in comparison with members of the ingroup (Linville & Jones, 1980).

Beyond these general tendencies, members of each group have a specific shared psychological repertoire regarding other particular groups that guides the nature of their intergroup relations. We call it "psychological intergroup repertoire," which includes shared beliefs and images about the other group (called stereotypes), shared attitudes (called prejudices), feelings, and emotions toward the other group, shared behavioral intentions, and collective memory about their relationship in the past.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERGROUP REPERTOIRE

The psychological intergroup repertoire of group members about another group is an important determinant of the intergroup relations and, at the same time, is often shaped by the nature of these relations. In the first case, the psychological intergroup repertoire influences the nature of intergroup interactions that subsequently develop. For example, the racist and ethnocentric views held by many Europeans influenced their behaviors when they came in contact with the American Indians or with Africans (see, e.g., Jahoda, 1999). Their psychological intergroup repertoire led them to the particular negative intergroup behaviors of exploitation, discrimination, and even genocide. In the second case, the quality of the intergroup interactions can influence the psychological intergroup repertoire that subsequently evolves. Thus, for example, dominant groups may construct racist ideology to legitimize its exploitation of the subordinate groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Realistic conflict theory proposes that cooperation between groups fosters positive attitudes and behaviors between

groups, whereas a conflict ignites negative attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, conflict can change hitherto held positive views of the other group as happened in the case of Sino-Indian relations during the border disputes in 1959 (Sinha & Upadhaya, 1960). Before the dispute, the Chinese were considered by Indian students to be artistic, religious, industrious, friendly, progressive, and honest. But, as the conflict developed, the Chinese were stereotyped by the same Indian students still as artistic but also as aggressive, cheating, selfish, warmongering, cruel, and shrewd.

In all the cases described previously, the two components can be seen as complementing a cycle. On the one hand, the psychological intergroup repertoire influences the nature of the intergroup interaction, while, on the other hand, the nature of the interaction fuels the psychological intergroup repertoire of the groups involved in the relationship. That is, the psychological intergroup repertoire provides the basis on which explanations, expectations, justifications, and rationalizations for the nature of the intergroup relations are drawn and future plans are designed. At the same time, the nature of relations provides the evidence, information, and validation for the formed and held psychological intergroup repertoire. This does not imply that the process is a deterministic perpetuating cycle that cannot be changed. The history of human relations provides numerous examples of groups changing their ideas about each other and altering the nature of their interactions. But these changes are interdependent – that is, changes in psychological intergroup repertoire and intergroup behavior have to occur and support each other in order to achieve a meaningful modification in intergroup relations (Bar-Tal, 2000b).

Over the decades, social scientists have paid most attention to shared stereotypes and prejudice in the psychological intergroup repertoire, (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bogardus, 1950; Brigham, 1971; Campbell, 1967; Harding et al., 1969; D. Katz & Braly, 1935). These elements provide a cognitive and evaluative basis that can be used by group members in structuring and managing intergroup relations.

Stereotypes

Stereotype is defined as stored beliefs about the characteristics of a group of people (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). These beliefs, as cognitive structures, pertain to mental representations of different characterizing aspects such as physical appearance, traits, abilities, attitudes, emotions, intentions, and behaviors (Mackie et al., 1996; Stangor & Lange, 1994). Three different approaches have been suggested to explain how stereotypes are represented in human memory. The traditional approach takes the most general view proposing that stereotypes are schemas about other groups denoting stored knowledge about specific features and attributes of a given concept (S. S. Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Thus, for our purposes we could see schemas

as containing knowledge about a particular group. However, current social psychologists focus on two other ways of representing stereotypes: group prototype and exemplar. The first concept refers to a mental representation of a summary of characterizing group features that are most likely to be shared by members of the particular group, although none of the group members has all of them. The more features a group member shares with the prototype, the greater the probability that he or she will be considered to be a member of this specific group (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981). The second concept implies that representation of a group is derived from an exemplar that happens to come to mind and is considered to possess the representing features of a given group (Smith & Zarate, 1992).

Recently it has been argued that individuals store both these types of representation concurrently. In trying to differentiate between group schema and stereotypes, Jarymowicz (2001) proposes that the latter should be viewed as rigid mental representations that do not change easily even in the light of contradictory information. In her view, this rigidity is an outcome of stereotypes' dominance by primary affect. This occurs when the information processing about a group is preceded by the activation of stable automatic affective reactions. As a result, information related to the stereotyped group is selected and organized in accordance with affect. This distinction especially applies to the stereotypes of groups of great importance and relevance for the stereotyping society.

Stereotypes tend to be activated and used to characterize a group, especially in situations of intergroup interactions, when no information is available about individual group members, or when the social category is easily accessible and/or the goal of the perceiver is to explain intergroup relations (Brewer, 1988, 1996). Of special interest in this stereotyping process is the finding that individuals tend to disregard individual differences in their stereotypic perception of outgroups by homogenizing their characteristics (Linville & Fischer, 1998; Linville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). This tendency is especially strong when stereotyping occurs within the context of intergroup interaction and when the stereotyped characteristic is seen to differentiate between the ingroup and the outgroup (Mullen & Hu, 1989; Stangor & Ford, 1992). In addition to homogenization, in situations of high expectancy stereotyping results in an overall evaluation of the other group because the attributed characteristics provide evaluative connotations (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). On the basis of these connotations, individuals tend to form a holistic impression of the other groups (Stangor & Ford, 1992), especially on the positive-negative dimension, which is the basis for attitude formation (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In essence, information provided by the characteristics of the stereotypes serves as an input in gestalt formation, since people tend to integrate these individual pieces of information in order to come up with

a coherent and simple picture of the stereotyped group (S. T. Fiske, 1993; Leyens et al., 1994).

Stereotypes have been seen as structures of knowledge that perform important functions in people's lives on an individual and group level. They fulfill a variety of needs, and individuals and groups use them differently, depending on their needs. Tajfel (1969) notes that stereotypes allow simplicity and order. They also perform collective ideological functions for groups that are looking for epistemic justification for their intergroup relations (Tajfel, 1981a). In recent years, stereotypes have been viewed as functional and adaptive structures, "aimed at capturing the relevant aspects of social reality for certain perceivers in certain contexts" (Spears et al., 1997b, p. 5) and reflecting the necessity to make better than random decisions at minimum information cost, often under time pressure (van den Berghe, 1997). This view focuses attention on the different needs that are satisfied and the different motives that are served by social stereotypes and the involvement of stereotypes in preparing and executing plans for the achievement of goals, both personal and social (see M. Snyder & Miene, 1994).

The study of group stereotyping has recently gained new impetus with the publication of studies that look at the differences between individual and group perception (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). According to this line of research, people differ in forming impressions about individual and group targets. The formation of impressions about groups has direct relevance to their stereotyping and was found to depend to a large extent on the degree of unity and coherence that the perceived group is assumed to have. Campbell (1958) proposes the concept of entitativity to describe these qualities of unity and coherence. In his view, entitativity denotes the degree to which a group is perceived to have "the nature of an entity, of having real existence" (p. 17). Groups differ with regard to the extent that they are assumed to possess entitativity, and this difference is assumed to play a crucial role in how a group is perceived. When category-based impressions are formed of groups assumed to possess high entitativity, these impressions are more consistent, coherent, uniform, and homogeneous than when a group is perceived to possess low entitativity. In view of these impressions, Hamilton and Sherman (1996) propose that perceived group entitativity "may be both an antecedent and a consequence of group stereotype" (p. 349). Thus, viewing a group in a generalizing stereotypic manner can lead to the perception that the group possesses high entitativity. In turn, assuming that a group has high entitativity increases the generalized stereotyping of its members and enhances the perception of its members as homogeneous with regard to the stereotypic characteristics. According to Hamilton, Sherman, and Lickel (1998), high entitativity is observed in groups that are well organized, which is reflected in such features as having

an identifiable leader, differentiated roles and functions, and established norms.

Prejudice

Prejudice is defined as a stored attitude toward another group (Mackie & Smith, 1998). In this definition, attitude implies an evaluation of a stimulus object on a positive-negative dimension (Zanna & Rempel, 1988). In the past, prejudice has mostly been used to express a negative attitude and a disposition to act negatively toward another group (Allport, 1954), but currently it is treated as a dimension and refers to both favorable and unfavorable evaluation. For many years it has been closely linked with stereotype and often both were used interchangeably, where the latter provided the underlying information for the negative attitude. In this meaning, anthropologist Robin Fox (1992) views it as a necessary, evolutionary-developed mechanism that increases the likelihood of survival by allowing fast thinking and providing a basis for immediate action in uncertain circumstances. Since explicit prejudice was considered to be part of racism and manifested in discrimination, it has been the central focus of social science study for many decades. In the past couple of decades a decline in overt prejudice has been observed in the United States. Individuals, particularly in certain social circles, do not directly express derogatory negative beliefs about minorities on the basis of beliefs about their inferiority. However, the evolution of a covert, implicit, and subtle prejudice labeled as aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) or symbolic racism has been observed (Sears, 1988). This prejudice is reflected in political-social-economic views on current issues and is based on acquired negative attitudes learned in the early years, of which individuals are often unaware (see, e.g., the extensive study by Meertens and Pettigrew, 1997, which demonstrates the prevalence of the subtle prejudice in Europe).

Recently, prejudice has been associated with affect and emotions and even viewed as a social emotion experienced toward another group member or the whole group (Smith, 1993). This trend reflects the growing interest in the relationships between cognition, affect, and emotions in social psychology. In the context of intergroup relations, it has become clear that individuals not only store stereotypes (i.e., cognitive elements) about other groups and attitudes toward them but also have affects and emotions. That is, group members experience general positive or negative affects (called integral affect) and specific emotions toward other groups such as hatred, fear, anger, shame, guilt, or jealousy (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993).

Of special interest for the understanding of intergroup relations is the theory of integrated threat by Stephan and Stephan (2000), which identifies four types of threat as causing prejudice. The first type refers to perceived threat to the well-being of the group. The second type concerns threat to the

world view of the group, including values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes. The third type is evoked when people are concerned with the negative outcomes for the self in intergroup interactions. Finally, the fourth type is evoked by the use of negative stereotypes that imply negative experience with the stereotyped group. In all the cases, ingroup members expect outgroup members to behave in ways that are detrimental to the ingroup, and therefore they develop prejudice toward this outgroup.

Discrimination is defined by Allport (1954) as any behavior that denies "individuals or groups equality of treatment which they may wish" (p. 50). Specifically, it refers to behavior toward people that prevents them from obtaining rights and rewards and/or that imposes duties or punishments on them solely because of their membership in a certain group. Such types of behavior entail unjustified negative treatment of the discriminated group in comparison with other groups. They may range from sporadic avoidance of interaction or renting apartments through cultural segregation or institutional unequal distribution of funds to legal dislocation and exploitation (Mummendey & Otten, 2001). Discrimination is often preceded by behavioral intentions that indicate a tendency to perform discriminating acts (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Traditionally, discriminatory behavior was considered to be the result of negative prejudice and associated with negative stereotype, which was supposed to represent its cognitive component (Brigham, 1971). Recent empirical analysis in the United States on the relationship between these three phenomena showed that, in the domain of race relations, relationships are generally moderate but certainly do exist. The analysis showed that prejudice is a better predictor of discrimination than stereotype (Dovidio et al., 1996). However, it is possible that the relationship between stereotype, prejudice, and behavior may be higher in other situations, such as, for example, violent conflict.

Sharing the Psychological Intergroup Repertoire

Although stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions can be viewed as being part of the personal intergroup psychological repertoire, they are of crucial importance for the analysis of intergroup relations when group members share them and then regard them as the group's psychological intergroup repertoire. According to Ashmore and Del Boca (1981), "'stereotype' should be reserved for the set of beliefs held by an individual regarding a social group and the term 'cultural stereotype' should be used to describe shared or community-wide patterns of beliefs" (p. 19). The shared stereotypic beliefs are not only stored in group members' minds but also appear in many products of group culture. These cultural stereotypes, which became of major concern for social psychologists and are the focus of our analysis, play a major role in an intergroup context that, according to Tajfel (1981a), "refers to the fact that stereotypes held in common by large

numbers of people are derived from and structured by the relations between large-scale social groups and entities. The functioning and use of stereotypes result from and intimate interaction between this contextual structuring and their role in the adaptation of individuals to their social environment" (p. 148).

On this basis Haslam et al. (1998) propose that sharing of stereotypes is a result of identification with a group, which leads to depersonalization of self by accepting groups' beliefs, norms, and attitudes. In recent analyses shared stereotypes are viewed as functional structures in the group repertoire. They are related to the context of intergroup relations and provide a meaningful explanation and justification for these relations (Stangor & Schaller, 1996; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Elaborations about shared stereotypes point out their stability across time and from generation to generation, their influence on collective behavior, their reflection of group norms, their function in validating group member reality and group pressure to maintain them, their automatic activation, and their transmission via group communication channels (Devine, 1989; Gardner, 1993; Haslam, 1997; Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Prejudice, as an attitude, can also be shared by group members (Duckitt, 1992). Group members may share negative or positive attitudes toward another group. These attitudes can result from shared beliefs about the characteristics of the other group, from information about ingroup behavior toward this group or from affective information about feelings and emotions toward this group (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). Of special relevance is Devine's (1989) assumption that shared cultural stereotypes and prejudice are learned at an early age via various societal channels and make up personal repertoires that are difficult to erase.

In the past two decades social scientists have proposed the idea that groups can share emotions on the basis of shared beliefs that evoke a particular feeling or emotion (Gordon, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Markus and Kitayama (1994) point out that:

[E]very cultural group has some key ideas that have been traditionally and collectively held in place and that are used to select and organize their socio-psychological processes. These core cultural ideas can influence the nature of the group's habitual emotional tendencies through constraining and affording particular, relatively culture-specific sets of immediate and everyday life realities, in which members of the cultural group are socialized or "trained" to think, act, and feel in more or less adaptive fashion. (pp. 341, 343)

Group members may share a particular collective emotional orientation as a result of experienced conditions and evolved shared beliefs. Of special importance for intergroup relations, however, are the collectively shared emotions toward a particular group. In these cases, group members can be dominated by a particular collective emotional orientation toward another

group such as fear (Bar-Tal, 2001), shame (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991), or hatred (Volkan, 1988).

Self-categorization theory provides an enlightening contribution to understand how a psychological intergroup repertoire is shared by group members (Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). Focusing on stereotypes, it suggests that their sharing derives from group membership. When individuals categorize themselves as belonging to a group, they agree and expect to agree with other members of that same group. In fact, group members actively seek to validate their own beliefs by comparing them with the beliefs of their fellow group members, because those who share the same social identity are seen as being able to validate consensual subjective beliefs. As a result, group members tend to adopt the beliefs shared by other group members and so form a shared reality (Haslam, 1997; Oakes et al., 1994). In this conception, stereotypes, as well as other components of the psychological intergroup repertoire, are social products of group life. They evolve within group interaction and influence to become a part of group reality. Group members acquire this repertoire, which allows them to capture the relevant aspects of social reality in an intergroup context. The shared stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions provide group members with a regulating and guiding frame of reference to relate to other groups. This is not only consistent with the nature of the relationship between them but also with the dominating ethos and values in the group. Bourhis et al. (1997) propose that the shared stereotypes develop in the context of intergroup relations. Specifically they suggest that "Stereotypes function to represent intergroup realities, defining groups in contrast to others, creating images of the our-group (and the ingroup) that explain, rationalize and justify the intergroup relationship and one's past, present and future behavior within it" (Bourhis et al., 1997, p. 273).

Interrelationships between the Elements of the Repertoire

The psychological repertoire for intergroup relations in the form of stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions usually establishes a coherent inter-related basis in the intergroup context (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Mackie & Smith, 1998). It becomes evident that, although each of these components refers to specific psychological phenomena, they all are related to each other by complex connections, influencing and complementing each other, and all have to be taken into account in the analysis of intergroup relations (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Wilder & Simon, 1996). That is to say, stereotypes, attitudes, affect, and specific emotions operate in interaction in the intergroup context (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). There is much evidence indicating that stereotypes are influenced by affect and emotions (Bodenhausen, 1993; Hamilton, Stroessner, & Mackie, 1993; Jarymowicz, 1994); that stereotypes are influenced by

prejudice (Dovidio et al., 1996); that stereotypes influence prejudice, affect, and emotions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1993); that affect and stereotypes influence prejudice (Esses et al., 1993); and that prejudice, affect, and emotions are often interrelated (Devine & Monteith, 1993; E. R. Smith, 1993).

Group members tend to have a consistent psychological intergroup repertoire consisting of beliefs about the characteristics of other groups as well as attitudes, affect, and specific emotions toward them. Once group members categorize an individual as being a member of a particular social group category, hear about this social category, see members of this social category, or think about this social category, they often automatically think, evaluate, and feel about the other group in line with their stored psychological intergroup repertoire (S. T. Fiske, 1998). Negative characteristics are usually found linked to negative attitudes, negative affects, and negative emotions, whereas positive characteristics are usually linked to positive attitudes, positive affects, and positive emotions. This is especially evident in cases of intense negative relations between groups in times of protracted conflict.

Consequences of the Repertoire

Now we come to the crucial point that illustrates the impact that the psychological repertoire has on intergroup relations. The psychological repertoire held by group members, which includes stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions, has important consequences for their psychological functioning. Most research studying the effects of the psychological intergroup repertoire was done on stereotypes and prejudice at an individual level (see the extensive reviews by S. T. Fiske, 1998; Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990; Hamilton & Trolie, 1986; Jarymowicz, 1994, 2001; Leyens et al., 1994; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Rothbart, 1981; Sedikides et al., 1998; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Stephan, 1985; Stephan & Stephan, 1996a). We summarize the most important findings and apply them to all the elements of the repertoire:

- a. Having the repertoire, individuals tend to use particular categories in classifying other people.
- b. The psychological intergroup repertoire is often automatically activated when the label of the other group becomes accessible.
- c. Information that is consistent with this repertoire tends to be more attended and remembered, whereas inconsistent information is often neglected.
- d. Ambiguous information tends to be construed in line with the repertoire.

- e. Individuals are more sensitive to information, which confirms their psychological repertoire; in other words, they are selectively attentive and absorb confirmatory information more easily.
- f. Individuals actively search for information that confirms their psychological repertoire.
- g. Individuals tend to interpret acquired information in line with the stored psychological repertoire.
- h. Individuals tend to use their psychological repertoire as a framework when organizing new information.
- i. Individuals tend to use their psychological repertoire in making attributions, evaluations, judgments, or decisions about other groups.
- j. Based on their repertoire, individuals tend to expect a particular psychological repertoire from members of the other group.
- k. Individuals tend to be guided in their behavior toward other groups by their own repertoire. This tendency is reflected in intergroup behavior when the psychological intergroup repertoire influences behaviors of both group members.

These observed tendencies, which are especially prevalent in cases when there is a negative-oriented repertoire about another group (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; S. E. Taylor, 1991), dominate psychological functioning in situations of protracted and serious intergroup conflict.

FORMATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERGROUP REPERTOIRE

The focus of our book on shared psychological intergroup repertoires about the other group raises two important questions: how is this shared repertoire formed, and how is it acquired and maintained by group members?

These questions pertain to the process of formation as well as the process of change, since it is assumed that both processes function along the same main societal and personal principles (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). The answers to these questions have preoccupied many social scientists since the study of stereotypes and prejudice began. They all assume that the psychological repertoire about other groups is learned. People are not born with a set of particular stereotypes or attitudes toward a group but acquire them in the social environment where they live. Nevertheless, the proposed theories differ with regard to their level of explanation. Some focus on the individual level, trying to find answers in intrapersonal or interpersonal processes and structures, whereas others take a societal perspective, looking at the social, political, and economic aspects of the mechanism of societal learning. These attempts have been extensively reviewed in the past (see, e.g., Allport, 1954; Ashmore, 1970; Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brown, 1995; Duckitt, 1992; Stroebe & Insko, 1989), and it is beyond

the scope of our book to review all the theories separately again. But we do take on the challenge of answering the two questions by proposing an integrative model based on previous theoretical and empirical contributions.

A few remarks are needed before we begin our analysis. First, the model concentrates on intergroup relations as a point of departure because our book deals with intergroup conflict. We do recognize, as noted earlier, that the shared psychological intergroup repertoire can be also ethnocentrically based (Bar-Tal, 1990a; LeVine & Campbell, 1972) and thus shape the nature of intergroup relations as, for example, has been shown in the case of racism (e.g., Eberhardt & Fiske, 1998; Kovel, 1970; Myrdal, 1944; Simpson & Yinger, 1985). Second, our analysis focuses mostly on the formation of stereotypic contents on the assumption that other components of the psychological intergroup repertoire (at least the prejudice and affect) are acquired in a similar way. Therefore, when it comes to providing empirical evidence we mention studies that examine not only stereotypes but also prejudice and even discrimination. Finally, we note that we realize that the personal repertoire of individual group members may vary because of their differing experiences and psychological structures. Individual differences within the group are accounted for in our model by introducing personal mediating variables.

The model proposes that three categories of factors determine the content of stereotype formation as well as a stereotype's intensity and extensiveness: the macrosocietal context, transmitting and disseminating mechanisms and channels of communication, and personal mediating variables. The characteristics of a stereotype's intensity and extensiveness are of great importance but have been almost completely disregarded by social psychological research. They are two dimensions of the content of stereotype that could help measure its influence. Intensity refers to the level of confidence that group members have in the contents of the stereotype. Extensiveness describes the extent of consensus (i.e., sharedness) among group members about the specific stereotypic content. The former characteristic is partially determined by personal variables, whereas the latter is influenced entirely by the macro-intrasocietal processes and channels of communication. The impact of the contents of stereotype is determined by intensity and extensiveness. The more intense and extensive stereotypes are, the more influence they have on group behavior (see Figure 1.1).

In our analysis, all the macrolevel variables serve as a context in which stereotypes develop. But because we prepare the ground for the analysis of intergroup conflicts, we elaborate on the nature of intergroup relations as a major contextual determinant of the held stereotypic contents. Information about intergroup relations is disseminated through political-social-cultural-educational channels. These relations also provide an important part of the context for encounters between group members and members of other groups. In addition to the present nature of intergroup relations,




FIGURE 1.1. Formation of stereotypes and prejudice: An integrative model.

we also explore how their history has a direct influence on the formation of stereotypes. The nature of past intergroup relations is not easily forgotten. Past wars, animosity, hostilities, as well as past aid, cooperation, and friendship, have a cumulative impact over time on the present nature of

intergroup relations. These aspects are also reflected in the formation of group members' stereotypes. Sociopolitical factors and economic conditions are indirect determinants that, either by fostering or inhibiting the formation and change of particular stereotypes, can influence the nature of intergroup relations. These determinants are in a relationship of mutual influence: economic conditions affect sociopolitical factors and vice versa. In addition, the formation of a stereotype can be influenced by the various characteristics of the outgroup, such as power, status, standard of living, customs, and physical appearance. Of particular influence is ethnocentric ideology, which can dominate the group ethos. Ethnocentric ideology directly supplies material for stereotypic characterization. Finally, the behavior of other groups also has an influence on bilateral relations. Other groups can facilitate or inhibit intergroup relations and thus influence the formed stereotypes. All the described factors constitute the macrocontext within which the psychological intergroup repertoire evolves.

The evolved psychological intergroup repertoire, especially its beliefs about other groups, is transmitted and disseminated by the societal mechanisms. Through these mechanisms, group members not only receive information that can serve as a basis to form or change stereotypes but also directly receive stereotypic beliefs, attitudes, affect, and even emotions about other groups. Societal disseminating mechanisms consist of political institutions (e.g., leaders, governments, or parliaments), mass media channels (e.g., broadcast and print news and commentaries), cultural products (e.g., books, films, theatrical plays, paintings, plastic art), and educational institutions (e.g., educational curricula, school books, educational television programs).

Knowledge disseminated through societal mechanisms is often passed on within the group via relationships between agents in the microsocial environment: family, friends, and acquaintances. The first agent is of special importance for children, as this is a major source of information for them. In addition, the family (parents, grandparents, older siblings, or other members of the extended family) not only passes stereotypes on to the younger generation but also creates a climate that can facilitate or inhibit the formation of particular stereotypes. Finally, the model recognizes that incoming knowledge about another group is not represented in its raw form but is absorbed, interpreted, evaluated, elaborated, organized, and stored via a cognitive process that is influenced by a series of personal mediating variables, such as past knowledge, values, attitudes, personality, cognitive skills, and motivation. All these variables shape the contents of the stereotype that will be stored. Therefore, although our model concerns shared beliefs the group members have about stereotypes, it recognizes there are differences among different subgroups and individuals.

The model suggests that the formed stereotype itself can exert influence. It becomes part of the group members' repertoire (stored knowledge) and

serves as a mediating personal variable in the processing of newly acquired information. In addition, at a societal level, the shared stereotypes formed by group members have an effect on the nature of intergroup relations and societal mechanisms. They provide ingroup members with important information about the particular outgroup and supply contents for various channels of communication and cultural products.

The model integrates different levels of analyses. It includes sociological, economic, and political variables, on the one hand, and psychological variables, on the other. The first three variables allow a macrolevel analysis, whereas the latter variables allow microlevel analysis. In the following section, each of the variables described here is analyzed at length and theoretical conceptions, which explain parts of the model, are presented.

Context Variables

Our model of stereotype formation or change focuses on macrosocietal context and, within this context, especially on intergroup relations. The context consists of political, social, economic, and cultural conditions that provide the foundations for the evolvement of the particular shared, collective beliefs and attitudes about the world, as well as shared emotions. Part of this world view pertains to the view of the other groups. Specifically, the macrocontext provides the experiential basis that invokes group members to form and to change their collective stereotypes.

Nature of Intergroup Relationships

Among the variables of the context, the nature of ingroup and outgroup relations is of determinative importance, as proposed by Bourhis et al., (1997), "An inescapable fact is that *stereotypes represent and reflect intergroup relations*" (p. 273). We are referring to continuous intergroup relations over time, which eventually may change, but in order for shared stereotypes to develop, there must be continuity through the years, as does happen in many intergroup relations. Intergroup relations can range from a violent conflict such as war to friendly, peaceful cooperation. Between these two extremes there are many nuances expressing various types of intergroup relations. The nature of intergroup relations is continuously reflected in numerous accumulating events, which together provide a basis for the evaluative gestalt of these relations. Individuals try to understand their reality in which the other groups play important roles. Each type of relation, with its accompanying events, provides information for the formed knowledge about the reality of which stereotypes are part. Stereotypes allow an understanding of the other groups by attributing to them traits, intentions, goals, dispositions, or capabilities. Friendly intergroup relations yield information about positive characteristics of the outgroup. The cooperation, support, aid, or exchange, which is observed, may be attributed

to the positive traits and good intentions of the outgroup members. Other attributions are made when the relations are competitive, and obviously violent conflict provides different information about an outgroup's characteristics. In times of conflict, group members, who almost always evaluate themselves favorably and tend to attribute to themselves moral and positive characteristics (LeVine & Campbell, 1972), think that the negative nature of intergroup relations is determined by the stable dispositions and intentions of the other group. In such instances, group members may even use delegitimizing labels to characterize the rival group. It can be assumed that the nature of the relations has special effect on the intensity and extensiveness of the stereotype's contents. The more polarized the nature of the relations (either very negative or very positive) is, and the more central it is to the life of the group, the more intensive and extensive the stereotypes become.

The imaginative studies by Sherif and his colleagues (see Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1969) clearly demonstrate that the nature of intergroup relations has a strong effect on the formed contents of stereotypes. In the first phase of their experiments, Sherif and his associates encouraged competitive and even conflictive relations between two groups. As a result, unfavorable attitudes and negative stereotypes of the outgroup emerged. For example, in one of the experiments, the evaluations of fellow group members were almost all favorable in both groups, whereas evaluations of the outgroup were predominantly unfavorable. Group members used such terms as "sneaky," "smart alecks," and "stinkers" to describe the outgroup. However, the second phase of the experiments consisted of a series of steps involving cooperative activities aiming toward superordinate goals. All steps were taken with the objective to reduce intergroup hostility. As the nature of intergroup relations changed and became cooperative, so did the attitudes and contents of the stereotypes. Many subjects shifted from choosing their friends almost exclusively from their own group to including members of the outgroup. In addition, new evaluations of outgroup members were largely positive. The experiments by Sherif and his associates have not been the only ones to demonstrate that the stereotypic contents reflect the conflicting or cooperative nature of intergroup relations. Other studies that manipulated the nature of intergroup relations obtained similar results. They showed that conflictive relations between two groups led to the formation of negative stereotypes, whereas cooperative relations led to positive stereotypes (Harvey, 1956; Horwitz & Rabbie, 1989; Manheim, 1960).

The negative contents of stereotypes are a consequence of the ingroup members' perception of a conflict of interests with the outgroup. This tendency has been demonstrated by several studies examining stereotypes in international conflicts. It was found that stereotypes about Germans and Japanese became more negative in the United States during World War II

(Dudycha, 1942; Meenes, 1943; Seago, 1947). However, the effect of the nature of intergroup relations on stereotype content is not limited to conflicts, but also applies to cooperative, friendly, and peaceful relations, as has been demonstrated in the study by Sherif and his associates in 1961. Satisfactory political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation and the experience of friendship, security, mutual support, and trust are all translated into positive stereotypes (Gal-Or, 1998).

Herrmann (1985) proposes that intergroup perception depends on a number of variables: perceived threat from another group, or opportunity to foster one's own political goal; perceived cultural inferiority, parity, or superiority in comparison with the other group; and perceived advantage, parity, and disadvantage in power and capability in comparison with the other group. Different combinations of these variables underlie different stereotyping, which Herrmann classified into seven categories, beginning with an enemy and ending with an ally. For example, a group that is perceived to have a threatening policy, is perceived to have comparable capability with one's own group, and is perceived to have also a comparable cultural level is viewed as an enemy, whereas a group that is perceived to carry a threatening policy, is perceived to have greater capability than one's own group, and is perceived to have an inferior cultural level is viewed as a barbarian.

Although group members receive most of the information about the nature of intergroup relations from various societal transmitting channels, they can also learn directly. Group members may participate in various group activities related to intergroup relations. They may be involved in positive relations such as trade, cooperative exchanges, and tourism or in negative relations, participating in violent activities against the other group such as war or becoming victims of violence carried out by the opposing group.

Finally, the nature of intergroup relations is not static but changes over time. Groups may move with time from a state of war to friendly relations as well as in the opposite direction, from cooperation to conflict. These changes, which often take years (especially the former), also influence the content of stereotypes (Benyamini, 1980; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). The fact that changes in the nature of intergroup relations can result in changes in the content of stereotypes is supportive evidence for the idea that intergroup relations can influence the content of stereotypes.

History of Intergroup Relations

In order to understand where stereotype contents come from, one should consider not only current intergroup relations but also the history of these relations, which is part of the context. The present nature of relations may explain a large part of the stereotype but not all the contents of the representation. Decades and even centuries of hostility or friendship, as well

as major events involving the other group, leave their mark on the stereotypes currently used by group members as well as on their intensity and extensiveness. Can Bulgarians or Greeks forget at least three centuries of domination by the Turks? Can the Jews forget the Holocaust perpetrated on them half a century ago by Germans? Past events are not easily forgotten. Each group has a history and transmits it selectively to new generations via collective memory. In this way history not only serves as a heritage but also becomes part of the group narrative and is maintained through culture, education, and other institutions.

Past intergroup relations are selectively remembered and serve as a foundation on which new types of relations are constructed. The past may involve years of antagonism, hostility, and war, which cannot be forgotten in spite of attempts at cooperation and friendship. In contrast, present conflict can also occur against a background of long peace and amity. An example of the first situation is seen in present French-German relations (Ackermann, 1994). This raises the question whether we can explain the French stereotypes of Germans on the basis of past relations. Centuries of hostility, two major wars, and occupation contribute to present perceptions of Germans. These negative characteristics are far from being erased, and they modify the impact of present relations. It is difficult to find an example of the second situation, because histories of intergroup relations nearly always involve conflicts interspersed with periods of peace. Nevertheless, maybe the present mutual perceptions of Rumanians and Hungarians, in view of the developing conflict over minority rights and territory, should be examined against cultivated friendship and cooperation over the past decades.

Of special importance in understanding the repertoire of stereotype contents are major events involving an outgroup that have put a stamp on the collective memory of a group. Genocide, war, terror, and occupation but also unexpected help and support leave their mark for many years. Examples include the genocide of Armenians by the Turks and the crucial help given by Russians to Bulgarians over a hundred years ago when they were trying to liberate themselves from Turkish occupation. Group members do not forget and are affected by these events when forming stereotypic contents.

Sociopolitical Factors

Stereotype contents are not only shaped by the nature of intergroup relations but also by various sociopolitical characteristics of the ingroup context. Among them are norms of tolerance, social cohesion, solidarity, societal polarization, openness of the society, opportunities for mobility, permeability of group boundaries, legitimacy of group structure, group status, demographic strength, institutional support, and hierarchical structure. In principle, these sociopolitical characteristics are often indirectly related to

the formation and change of stereotype content through the level of tolerance maintained by the group and the degree of frustration experienced by group members as a result of the given sociopolitical structure. The former aspect refers to the formal and informal norms that the group prescribes regarding behaviors toward other individuals or other groups who are perceived as different. Lack of tolerant norms indicates high likelihood of negative behavior toward an outgroup, whereas norms of tolerance may inhibit such behavior. Norms of tolerance are not only reflected in the formal legal code of the group and in its institutions, but they are also represented in cultural and personal norms and expressed both directly and symbolically. A tradition of tolerance prevents the group from applying generalizing negative labels to an outgroup, particularly when such labels have correspondingly negative behavioral implications. Lack of norms of tolerance or unenforceable tolerance norms means that there are no restraints to prevent hostile behavior toward an outgroup.

With regard to the latter aspect, sociopolitical characteristics of the context such as hierarchical structure, mobility, or societal polarization have an effect on the level of ingroup members' frustration. The more rigid the hierarchical structure, the less opportunity for mobility, and the greater the political polarization, then the more frustration, alienation, and deprivation might be found among members of the group (e.g., Schwarz, 1973; Sowell, 1975; Steinberg, 1981). These tendencies seem to be related to negative stereotyping, as well as hostility toward and discrimination of an outgroup (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964; Simpson & Yinger, 1985). Group members may direct their resentments toward outgroups that are not responsible for existing injustices or social inequalities. The described phenomenon is explained by the scapegoat theory (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964; Miller & Bugelski, 1948), which is based on Freud's theory of defense mechanisms and the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939). Scapegoat theory suggests that hostility, including prejudice and negative stereotyping, is a result of frustration. Specifically, when group members experience frustration and its source is either too powerful or unidentifiable, then their hostility will be arbitrarily displaced toward members of minority groups. The act of displacement, including the attribution of negative labels to the minority, is justified by blaming the outgroup for the frustration.

On the basis of identity theory, Tajfel (1978a, 1978b) suggests that extent of permeability of group boundaries and perceived legitimacy of group structure influences the quality of intergroup relations and thus the stereotyping and prejudice. Of relevance is the conception of group vitality, which came to extend the social identity framework and to emphasize the importance of sociostructural context in explaining intergroup relations and especially ethnolinguistic behavior of groups. The conception of group vitality was introduced to assess group sociostructural strength in terms of a

number of group members, extent of their control of various institutions, and their prestige and status (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1993). Studies show that groups that are more powerful, prestigious, larger, and with more institutional influence tend to discriminate more against outgroups (e.g., Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 1985, 1987; Wagner, Lampen, & Syllwasschy, 1986).

Ethnocentric ideology derived from various roots such as religious beliefs, national orientation, or racist views, sometimes fueled by observable group differences, directly provides the contents to produce stereotypes and can thus have a major effect on intergroup behavior. This is a potent factor that in many cases shapes the nature of intergroup relations. It provides the epistemic justification for the used stereotype contents, attitudes, affect, and emotions. Relations between Hindus and Moslems in India or between blacks and whites in the United States are plagued by ethnocentric ideologies. In extreme cases, negative attitudes and behaviors toward outgroups can become part of formal group ideology, supported by legislation, formal societal institutions, the political system, and the dominant culture. The Nazi's racist ideology, which underpinned the treatment of Jews in Germany between 1933 and 1945, is one extreme example of what institutionalized formal ideology and lack of tolerance can accomplish (Bar-Tal, 1990b; S. Gordon, 1984; Mosse, 1978).

In this vein, the recently developed theory on societal hierarchy and dominance is relevant to understanding the formation of stereotyping (e.g., Jackman & Muha, 1984; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The social dominance theory developed by Sidanius and his colleagues suggests that human social systems, which are predisposed to establish hierarchies, also form legitimizing beliefs for the differential structure. Stereotypes are part of these legitimizing beliefs since they provide the justification for the group-based hierarchical social structure and the unequal distribution of resources in social systems. Powerful groups tend to attribute negative stereotypes to other groups in order to justify and legitimize their power.

Economic Conditions

The scapegoat theory also explains the relationship between economic conditions and negative stereotype content. Economic hardship, which results in deprivation of basic needs, feelings of inequality, or deterioration of personal economic life conditions, causes frustration. Group members, who experience frustration in these cases, may displace their hostility and negative stereotyping toward outgroups, since the real sources of frustration are often unknown or beyond reach. The level and scope of frustration determine the level of intensity and extensiveness of negative stereotyping.

Several examples provided by Ashmore (1970) support the described interrelationship between economic conditions, nature of intergroup

relations, and stereotype contents. According to Ashmore (1970), prior to the Civil War the Chinese in California were generally perceived positively. However, after the war had ended in the mid-1860s and the construction of the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, there was increased competition for jobs between Caucasians and Chinese, which in turn led to the negative stereotyping of the Chinese. Similarly, the Japanese were perceived positively in California until the 1890s when they became significant competitors for jobs. Then, as economic competition increased, anti-Japanese attitudes appeared and grew dominant.

Another study, by Hovland and Sears (1940), also looks at the implications of the relationship between economic conditions and extreme prejudice. They report a significant negative correlation between the annual per-acre value of cotton in the South of the United States and the number of lynchings per year during the period from 1882 to 1930. The negative correlation indicates that economic prosperity is inversely related to antiblack sentiment and behavior. Similarly, a study by Dollard (1938) of aroused hostility in a small American town is directly relevant to the analyzed interrelationships. In this town, intense anti-German sentiment developed as Germans moved in and began to compete with the local people for jobs in a local factory.

Olzak (1992) views the changing societal and economic conditions that bring about ethnic violence as reflecting conflict and competition among various ethnic groups within a society for valued resources such as jobs, housing, or political influence. In a large-scale study, she analyzed 262 violent ethnic and racial conflicts and protests that occurred in 77 American cities between 1877 and 1914. Her findings indicate that conflicts were underlined by societal changes such as immigration flow, urbanization of minorities, occupational desegregation, social mobility, or growth of the labor movement. These processes led to economic and political competition over employment, wages, business, power, and control, which resulted in interethnic hostility and even in violence.

Characteristics of the Outgroups

Characteristics of the stereotyped outgroup have a profound effect on the stereotype's contents (see Giles et al., 1977; Kinloch, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). The range of characteristics can be classified into several categories: demographic characteristics such as race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or size of the group; societal characteristics such as the group's power, education levels, dominant values and norms, or cultural roots; economic characteristics such as the group's economic resources, standard of living, dominant occupations, or wealth. Vitality theory, noted earlier, differentiated between objectively assessed characteristics on the basis of various sources that provide data about groups and subjective characteristics that are perceived by a group (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1993). In both

cases, information about these characteristics is often transmitted through various channels of communication and serves as a basis for stereotype formation by ingroup members.

Stereotyping on the basis of such information is mostly mediated by a comparison between the outgroup's and the ingroup's characteristics. By evaluating similarities and differences between the ingroup and outgroup, comparison leads to stereotyping on the basis of affective and cognitive reactions, such as feelings of commonality, closeness, empathy, pity, threat, contempt, disgust, or envy. The first four feelings lead to positive stereotypes, whereas the latter four lead to negative stereotypes. In this vein, Kinloch (1974), in an analysis of ethnic and race relations in the United States, notes the impact of demographic characteristics on stereotyping; for example, the negative stereotyping of Mexican Americans can be at least partially explained by their "religious and linguistic dissimilarity, along with low occupational skills, little economic resources, and a traditional non-capitalistic culture" (p. 177). In contrast, the positive stereotypes of Swedish, German, or Dutch immigrants can be explained by their similarity to the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. Of special importance are observable differences that relate to physical appearance and cultural patterns. Groups tend to view these differences with feelings of superiority, which in turn feed negative stereotyping.

Behavior of Other Groups

Relations between two groups do not exist in a vacuum but are influenced by the behaviors of other groups as well. Each group has relations with many groups, and these various relations are often relevant to specific bilateral intergroup relations. In fact, bilateral relations must always be considered within the context of the various multilateral relations among groups. First of all, groups have a vested interest in the type of relations that other groups have. Groups actively influence these relations either by facilitation or inhibition. In other words, a particular group may either encourage or discourage the development of relations between two other groups. In the first case, a group may mediate in cases of disagreement or conflict and, as a result, facilitate a change of negative stereotyping, as, for example, when the United States intervened to peacefully resolve the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. In the second, it may demand a cessation of relations and thus reinforce negative stereotyping, as, for example, when the United States tried to set an international embargo on Iraq or Libya. In addition to instrumental considerations, there is also an affective aspect of multigroup relations, which has a direct influence on stereotype formation. The principles "A friend of a friend is also a friend" and "A friend of an enemy is also an enemy" can be applied to intergroup relations too. The negative effect of Jordan's support of Iraq during the Gulf War on U.S.-Jordanian relations or the positive effect of close relations between

the United States and Israel on the relations between Israel and countries in Asia and Eastern Europe are a few examples of these principles that also influence stereotypic perceptions.

Transmitting and Disseminating Mechanisms

Information about outgroups that serves as a basis for the formation, maintenance, or change of stereotype contents comes mainly from various political-social-cultural-educational channels, although in some instances group members also obtain relevant information by being directly involved in acts of intergroup behavior, such as war.

Channels of Information

Various societal channels provide information about outgroups. School-books, films, newspapers, television programs, leaders' speeches, theatrical plays, literature, and other societal sources all contain information that can be used to characterize outgroups. Sometimes this is applied directly, when the sources describe the characteristics of another group. Sometimes it is applied indirectly, when the information can be used to imply dispositions, attitudes, or behavioral intentions. In any event, because the mass societal channels described above can reach so many members of the group, they can produce consensus in how outgroups are perceived. Thus, they play a crucial role in affecting the formation of stereotypes, their intensity and extensiveness, as well as of prejudice, affect, and emotions. Once stereotype contents are formed, the societal channels help maintain the formed shared stereotype by continuing to disseminate the information about the outgroup. They thus serve as mechanisms of control and influence on group members who adopt specific stereotype contents as part of the meaning of a group membership (Haslam, 1997; Turner, 1991). When the societal channels of communication, including mass media and cultural products, present massively the stereotype of the outgroup and the other elements of the psychological intergroup repertoire, they become part of the cultural context in which this repertoire is embedded. Group members who live in this context absorb the shared stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions about the given outgroup and consider them as legitimate expressions of the group's repertoire.

However, the determinative influence of these channels of communication depends on several factors. First, it depends on the extent to which the channels of communication provide a single image of the outgroup. If the channels provide a unified picture, they have greater influence on shaping the shared stereotype of group members. Second, it depends on availability and use of alternative channels of communication. If society members have access to and use channels of communication that come from outside and these channels provide an alternative view of other groups, then the

shared stereotypes may be weakened. Third, it depends on whether the channels reach the majority of group members. Obviously, the more extensively the stereotype content is disseminated, the more shared stereotypes will be found. Finally, of special importance is the extent to which group members trust information obtained from societal channels, regarding the nature of intergroup relations and the other group in particular. In many groups, formal channels of information such as newspapers, books, or television and radio programs are viewed as epistemic authorities. That is, knowledge coming from these sources is unquestioningly received as valid and truthful (Bar-Tal et al., 1991). For example, leaders in their speeches and writings often refer to outgroups in a certain way, thus influencing the stereotypes group members hold (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Raviv, 1992). These societal sources serve as models that legitimize and reflect institutionalized views about held stereotypes.

Many studies provide clear illustrations of how stereotypes disseminated by societal channels reflect the nature of intergroup relations. For example, as is elaborated in the next chapter, during intergroup relations of conflict, information selectively portrays the enemy by means of a negative stereotype. In a specific case, during the Cold War, American sources of information, including mass media, films, and political leaders, invested efforts to portray the Russians negatively, describing them as brutal, primitive, aggressive, ruthless, and cruel (Bialer, 1985; Dallin, 1973; English & Halperin, 1987; Ugolnik, 1983). In contrast, in times of cooperation information tends to portray members of an outgroup by focusing on positive attributes. This trend was especially salient during World War II when the United States and Soviet Union jointly fought against the Axis forces. In this period of cooperation, the American channels of communication went out of their way to provide information characterizing the Russians positively (Small, 1974). In an extensive study of British mass media with regard to prejudice and hostility toward nonwhite minorities, Hartmann and Husband (1974) conclude that the media define the situation for the public, serving as a major channel of information about the nature and significance of the minority presence. It keeps the public aware of the hostility and discrimination suffered by people of color in Great Britain, but at the same time it presents them as a threat and a problem. The latter view is conducive to the development of prejudice and hostility toward the minority population. The researchers believe that the mass media in essence provide a negative perspective on race relations by constructing a limited range of views for the public. Van Dijk (1985) reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of news reports from various countries:

[T]he attention for ethnic groups is very limited, unless minority groups are associated with violence, illegality, crime, or strange cultural behavior, that is, with deviance of many kinds. Thus, news reports tend to be about topics that are often

examples of prevailing ethnic stereotypes or prejudice. If not portrayed as a threat to our culture, society, or personal safety, they are stereotypically presented as problem people, as causing trouble (riots, demonstrations, protests), or having problems (work, housing, language, education). (p. 208)

Among the disseminating mechanisms, educational institutions play a special role. Because school attendance is mandatory, kindergartens and schools are in a position to pass on knowledge to the entire younger generation. Moreover, because the knowledge imparted through these institutions is usually presented and perceived as objective, truthful, and factual, it is often extremely influential. This knowledge is not only supposed to mold children and adolescents but also to assure continuation of societal traditions. Thus, schools impart society's ideology and ethos by inculcating views, myths, values, and goals through school textbooks and curricula (Apple, 1979; Bourdieu, 1973). The presentation of stereotypes of one's own society and of other groups is part of the educational system's legation. Children learn stereotypes and acquire attitudes in kindergarten and school as part of their formal socialization process. Examples of the transmission of stereotypes through school textbooks have been shown in a number of studies done in the United States (e.g., Zimet, 1972). Until the 1970s, reading texts almost completely ignored the existence of minorities in American society (Waite, 1972; Windham, 1975). The school textbooks tended almost exclusively to depict white Anglo-Saxon characters and mostly in a positive light. Moreover, if the textbooks referred to minorities, they tended to describe them negatively. Mexicans were portrayed in history books as lawless, lazy, and undemocratic (Gaines, 1971), and Indians were described as a nuisance and a threat (Gribskov, 1973).

Any discussion of societal channels must also include cultural products such as literature, plays, films, television, and even paintings. All of these can refer to and present stereotypes of other groups. In some cultural products, stereotypes about other groups can be provided by the depiction of roles that members of these groups play. In other products, the outgroups may be directly stereotyped and evaluated. For example, Stinton (1979) collected short articles that describe racist and sexist messages in children's literature. The articles reveal that in many children's books black people are stereotyped as lesser beings and females are portrayed as passive onlookers, who perform limited roles and tasks considered fitting to a feminine nature. A similar point is made by Zimet (1976), who reviews numerous studies that illustrate the racist and sexist content of children's reading books.

In the discussion of communication channels, it should be noted that the history of intergroup relations cannot be disregarded. Disseminated information refers both to the past and the present where any description of the present must also be seen in the light of the history of the intergroup

relations. For example, the information provided by the Israeli communication channels about Germans has to be understood with respect to past events as they still play a crucial role in shaping Israelis' image of Germans. In addition, the information about stereotype contents transmitted through group channels is often related to sociopolitical factors and economic conditions, which often affect the content of information regarding outgroups. For example, economic necessity was the main factor for the institutional dehumanization of blacks by the formal sources of information in the American South in past centuries (Genovese, 1966; Stamp, 1956). Moreover, group leaders sometimes use the channels of communication for their own purposes (Weinstock, 1995). They may, for example, in times of economic hardship or societal alienation direct the accumulated frustrations against outgroups in general or against minority groups in particular (Y. Bar-Tal, 1989). It is a well-known historical fact that the Russian authorities, before the 1917 revolution, used to generate information in order to reinforce anti-Semitism and deflect the masses' dissatisfaction away from the authorities to the Jews.

Finally, in discussing the societal communication channels it is necessary to look at how language functions in the formation, maintenance, and change of cultural stereotypes. Language used by political-social-cultural-educational sources signals the activation of stereotypes, expresses them, imposes particular interpretations of ambiguous information, influences the communicative distance established between the groups, and affects the emotional reactions of ingroup members toward the outgroup (Giles & Saint-Jacques, 1979; Maas & Arcuri, 1996; van Dijk, 1984, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). On a general level, shared stereotypes are woven into the vocabulary of a given language. They also provide the organizing codes for information and cues for its evaluation. Moreover, they provide the instigation for the retrieval of additional thoughts, attitudes, affects, and emotions – all associated with expressed stereotype. Finally, of importance is the fact that language enables the development of a consensual understanding of stereotypes (Hamilton et al., 1992; Ruscher, 1998).

Direct Contact

In addition to obtaining information about an outgroup via channels of societal communication, group members can also acquire widely shared information about another group through direct contact with this group (Allport, 1954). This can occur when both groups live together in one entity (e.g., Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, or Jews and Palestinians in Israel) and thus have ample opportunity to observe members of the group and even interact with them. In cases when the quality of intergroup relations is well defined, especially in situations of conflict, the encounter most frequently serves as an opportunity to validate

previously acquired stereotypes. Nevertheless, already decades ago, studies done in real-life settings showed that contact may change the negative stereotyping and prejudice and improve the intergroup relations. For example, Brophy (1946) observed that increased contact between white and black seamen on ships changed the former group's attitudes in a positive direction. Also, Deutsch and Collins (1951) found that a racially desegregated project in comparison to a similar segregated one had a remarkable effect on the formation of positive stereotyping and attitudes by the white population toward blacks. But other studies found opposite results, showing that contact had a negative effect on stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Brooks, 1975). This ambiguity led researchers to specify the conditions that facilitate the positive change – among them contact between two groups of equal status and support of the community for such contacts (Amir, 1976; Hewstone & Brown, 1986). On this basis there was a major attempt to create contact situations in desegregated schools in the United States to improve interracial relations (Miller & Brewer, 1984).

Direct contact allows ingroup members to observe the particular role, or roles, the outgroup members occupy in society. This is powerful information not only about relative status, prestige, and power, but also about the attributes that can be inferred (Aboud, 1988; Eagly, 1987). Thus, for example, a different stereotype will be formed about an outgroup depending on whether its members are encountered mostly in demeaning (mundane) jobs or mainly in prestigious jobs. Learning about outgroups via direct contact is obviously limited by the social context in which it takes place. It is possible that the social context of the interpersonal contact will restrict the information obtained about the outgroup. This is because the contact may be with an unrepresentative segment of the outgroup in a specific setting and situation.

It should be remembered that individuals rarely come into contact with members of an outgroup without already having preconceptions about their characteristics. They usually meet outgroup members with at least some prior knowledge of the outgroup acquired through the channels of communication. As a result, individuals enter these encounters with a set of expectations based on previously acquired knowledge, including stereotypes. Nevertheless, personal experience is especially important. Individuals have the opportunity to collect firsthand information in these situations. This information allows a reappraisal, and even adjustment, of held knowledge including that about stereotypes. Brewer and Campbell (1976), on the basis of data collected in East Africa, point out that “the content of intergroup perception is largely a function of the frequency and type of contact between ethnic groups and the degree of personal acquaintance of the individual informant with members of each target outgroup” (p. 121).

Microsocial Environment

An analysis of stereotype transmission must also look at the role of the microlevel social agents in this transmission, as well as societal mechanisms. We refer to the microcontext as the immediate social environment in which individuals spend most of their time interacting with other people. This includes neighborhoods where people live and workplaces where they meet other people, as well as family and friends, with whom they interact more often. There are relatively very few studies about the influence of the neighborhood and the workplace. This lack of research is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that individuals spend their lives in these environments and carry out most of their daily interactions with people there. Various social processes related to the transmission and dissemination of the psychological intergroup repertoire take place in these social environments, including social influence and conformity.

Also, neighborhoods often have quite homogeneous populations characterized by the same socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. This means that a neighborhood may reflect the nuances of the shared psychological intergroup repertoire held by the particular segment of society living there and could imply that there is a supportive social system for this particular repertoire in the neighborhood. For example, a study by Hartmann and Husband (1974) compares levels of hostility among school children toward colored people in a neighborhood where there were a lot of colored immigrants with a neighborhood where there were few, controlling for their socioeconomic status. The results showed that in the former neighborhood hostility was higher. The analyses showed that this hostility was related to norms evolved in the neighborhood rather than to the children's direct personal experience with colored people in a school. Also, a study by Fabian and Fleck (1999) shows that microsocial environment has an effect on prejudice: a comparison of two groups of adolescents living in different cities in different economic conditions showed that the norms of the environment had an effect on the anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy attitudes.

The family as agent in acquiring a psychological intergroup repertoire has received special attention in social sciences since it plays a major role in socialization and is the place where children first learn shared stereotypes and prejudice. Research on the family influence assumes that in a family the child learns about social categories and is exposed to stereotype contents, as well as to attitudes and emotions. It is also assumed that child-rearing practices in a family indirectly have an influence on the orientation that the child acquires toward other groups.

Family Sources

Children spend most of their time with their family and therefore learn from its members about outgroups. Parents and other family members

teach the children stereotype contents through various learning techniques, elaborated by social learning theory (Bandura, 1977). Children hear their parents and other family members refer to outgroups in terms of their relationships with them, about their described behaviors and attributed characteristics. Children can absorb this information either directly as family members talk to them about various topics or by listening to conversation between family members.

Usually, parents are the most influential figures during childhood and adolescence since they are perceived, especially in the early phase of children's lives, as knowledgeable and reliable sources of information (Bartal et al., 1991; Berndt, 1979; Raviv et al., 1990; Wintre et al., 1988). They have an almost absolute power over the children, supplying all their needs and serving as identification figures, who exert a determinative influence on children's development. Interestingly, despite this dependency correlational findings between parents' and children's prejudice are inconclusive. On the one hand, there are studies that report high correlations. For example, Mosher and Scodel (1960) find that mothers' prejudices correlate highly with those of their children, independently of the authoritarian child-rearing practices used (similar results were found by R. Epstein & Komorita, 1966; Fagot, Leinbach, & O'Boyle, 1992). And Fabian and Fleck (1999) find that in Hungary parents' anti-Gypsy attitudes correlate highly with their children's attitudes, independently of children's personal authoritarianism. On the other hand, other studies report low correlations (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Amato, 2001; Weigel, 1999). As suggested by Aboud and Amato (2001), the differences may depend on the social context of the study (for a further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 8).

The learning of stereotype contents is done not only through listening, modeling, or instruction but also by reinforcement. Parents can reinforce ideas about stereotypes and prejudice through reward or punishment. They may reward their children for expressing the same stereotype contents they hold, or punish them when children express contents inconsistent with the parents' beliefs. In one of the early studies on this subject by E. L. Horowitz and Horowitz (1938), white children were often punished for playing with black children. Similarly, according to Bird, Monachesi, and Burdick (1952), white children whose parents prohibited them from playing with black children were more prejudiced than white children who were not restricted in this way. But it should be noted that there also are studies that did not find significant relations between mothers' racial attitudes and the attitudes of their children (e.g., Aboud & Doyle, 1996). It seems thus that the influence of parents depends on a number of conditions, including age of children or parents' involvement in racial issues.

Acquisition of stereotype contents is not only a consequence of direct learning but also results indirectly via the family climate, which pertains

to child-rearing practices and the nature of relationships between family members. The family climate has a determinative influence on many of the children's personality characteristics, including authoritarianism, tolerance, rigidity, or openness, which in turn have their effect on the formation of stereotype contents. Scapegoat theory is one of the early theories suggesting a link between patterns of child rearing and the attitude toward outgroups. It proposed a relationship between the harshness of parental discipline and the degree of the child's prejudice (Ashmore, 1970). Indeed, several studies found that extremely prejudiced children had received harsher punishments from their parents than children with lower levels of prejudice (e.g., Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948; D. B. Harris, Gough, & Martin, 1950; Weatherley, 1963).

A classic work by Adorno and his colleagues (1950) provides an illuminating analysis on how child-rearing practices determine the development of an authoritarian personality, which is characterized, among various other features, by prejudice. In their study prejudiced individuals reported a punitive home discipline, which was perceived as arbitrary. Their parents tended to exhibit rigid dominance and require submission from their children. In addition, these parents adopted a rigid set of values, guided merely by social desirability. Deviation, difference, and social inferiority were considered as negative and outcasting. Adults who grew up in such a climate tended to rely on authority figures, conform to group norms, deny personal conflicts and externalize them, displace their hostility, and project their tabooed impulses onto others. These characteristics caused them to be prejudiced, as they tended to channel their hostility toward outgroups via projection, displacement, and other processes. Adorno's study has special importance for our analysis because it attempts to explain how characteristic shared prejudices in society are acquired through child-rearing practices that produce authoritarian personalities.

Personal Mediating Variables

In spite of the fact that group members share consensual stereotypes, they are never held in a unitary manner. Within the range of sharing the same content of stereotype, individual group members differ on the variables that characterize their sharing – the particular contents of the stereotype, confidence in the contents, their centrality, and their implications (see Worchel & Rothgerber, 1997). These differences are a necessary consequence of the fact that group members process information about stereotypes individually, and personal variables influence how information about outgroups is identified, evaluated, and interpreted. Variables such as personal knowledge, cognitive skills, values, attitudes, motivations, or personality characteristics all influence the absorbed information and thus the stereotypes formed, as well as prejudice, affect, and emotions.

These variables mediate information processing. Cognitive research has shown that in the process of information acquisition, individuals tend to select particular aspects of the available information – what seems meaningful, consistent, and relevant to them – and tend to impose their own structure and interpretation upon this information (Bransford, 1980; Markus & Zajonc, 1985). Individuals differ in their stored knowledge, cognitive abilities, and motivations, and the noted differences have determinative effects on the outcome of information processing. The study of the effects of personal mediating variables, especially cognitive factors, on stereotyping has been one of the most fruitful directions of research in the past two decades, so only a few examples are presented here (see Hamilton, 1981; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Stephan, 1985, 1989, for further details).

Knowledge plays a crucial role as a mediating variable. Individuals elaborate new information on the basis of previously acquired knowledge. An example of this influence can support the theory of belief congruence proposed by Rokeach, Smith, and Evans (1960). In their conception, negative stereotype contents regarding a different race stem from the assumption that outgroup members possess dissimilar and possibly threatening beliefs (see review by Insko, Nacoste, & Moe, 1983).

The influence of cognitive skills on the processing of absorbed information about outgroups can be illustrated by looking, for example, at cognitive complexity. It has been noted that while persons who possess a high cognitive complexity can discriminate between stimuli and organize them into subclasses within categories, persons who are low in cognitive complexity do not discriminate between stimuli well and tend to organize them into a few simple categories (Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967). On the basis of these differences, it can be assumed that people with high cognitive complexity foster a more differentiated view of the outgroup, storing a variety of stereotype contents even though these may be of contradictory nature. In contrast, persons with low cognitive complexity perceive the outgroup simplistically and tend to generalize when forming either favorable or unfavorable contents (Wilder, 1981). Accordingly, the extensive field study by Glock et al. (1975) shows that the degree of subjects' prejudice level was related to cognitive complexity. Adolescents with high cognitive complexity (called in the study sophistication) displayed less prejudice than adolescents with low cognitive complexity.

In addition, it has been proposed that a personal need for structure will have an effect on stereotyping. The extent of this need for structure is reflected in how rigidly individuals hold on to a belief by trying to fix knowledge in order to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Studies show that individuals with a high need for closure tend to hold more unambiguous and one-dimensional stereotypes (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Y. Bar-Tal, and Guinot (2002) propose that the ability to structure information has an effect

on oversimplified characterization of an outgroup. Whereas high-ability individuals, with high need for structure, tend to avoid inconsistent information, simplify the available information, and make one-dimensional categorical judgments, low-ability individuals have difficulty in making clear-cut judgments and cannot avoid ambiguous information.

Psychoanalytic theories contribute to the understanding of the unconscious motives that also influence the contents of stereotypes. It has been proposed that the perception of certain outgroups is mediated mainly by the two defense mechanisms of displacement and projection (e.g., Ashmore, 1970). Displacement occurs when hostility aroused by an external factor is directed against another person or a group. Individuals who use this defense mechanism tend to blame an outgroup for the frustration experienced. Campbell (1947) reports that Americans who are dissatisfied with their personal economic conditions and national political situation are more anti-Semitic than those who are content. Projection, as an attribution of one's own hostility to external sources, serves as a justification of animosity directed against the outgroup (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950). In this case, impulses producing conflict or hatred are projected onto another group. According to Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950), U.S. veterans projected their feelings of rejection onto blacks using such stereotypes as "sloppy," "dirty," or "immoral."

Taking a psychoanalytic approach, Adorno et al. (1950), as noted earlier, describe the authoritarian personality that, among other characteristics, induces a tendency to subsume people mechanically under rigid categories and then respond with hostility and prejudice against outgroups. This is because individuals with authoritarian personalities tend to judge other groups negatively, apply rigid categories, overgeneralize, and disregard individual differences. Indeed, a number of studies carried out in different countries found a relationship between authoritarianism, measured as a personal characteristic, and prejudice (e.g., Billig & Cramer, 1990; Dekker & Peter, 1991; Fabian & Fleck, 1999). Altemeyer (1988, 1996) reconstructed the concept of authoritarianism into right-wing authoritarianism, and studies found that individuals characterized by this tendency display prejudice, discrimination, and hostility toward outgroups (e.g., McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalagina, 1992). Recently, Sidanius developed a conception of social dominance orientation, which differentiates among the individuals (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993, 1999). Those who are high in social dominance orientation desire that their own group dominates and is superior to outgroups and, in order to maintain the superior position, they tend to denigrate members of outgroups. For these individuals, the negative stereotyping serves the role of constructing legitimizing beliefs for their discriminating views (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996).

The described model assumes not only that stereotype contents are construed on the basis of intergroup relations and intragroup and

interpersonal processes but also that they serve as inputs that extend personal knowledge and influence the nature of intergroup relations. That is, they are outcomes of intergroup relations, and the present analysis elaborates on this at length. On the other hand, however, stereotype contents feed back into the relations by influencing group members' behavior toward the outgroup. They serve both as a justification and explanation of behavior. In other words, once stereotypes are formed they constitute an important epistemic basis for the course of intergroup relations. Stereotypes, in this respect, serve as antecedents and consequences of intergroup relations. They are part of a cycle that can be positive or negative. In the latter case, the stereotypes become part of a vicious circle as they are both formed by and inflame a conflict or war.

CONCLUSION

The point of departure for analyzing intergroup relations from a psychological perspective is the phenomenon that human beings organize their social world by categorizing people into groups. This categorization is based on the fact that human beings live and function in groups: they are born into groups and join them voluntarily. But categorization of people by human beings into groups is only part of the psychological process. In addition, human beings form beliefs, attitudes, affect, emotions, and behavioral intentions toward different groups, including their own. This is the psychological intergroup repertoire that includes stereotypes (beliefs about a group), prejudice (attitudes about a group), specific emotions such as liking, hatred, or anger, and behavioral intentions such as cooperation, discrimination, exploitation, ethnic cleansings, and even genocide.

Of special importance is the fact that this psychological repertoire may be shared by groups or society members who are aware of this sharing. There is an important difference for the group or society between the cases when this repertoire is held by few members or even by all of them, when they are not aware of sharing this repertoire, and cases when a psychological intergroup repertoire belief is held by all the members or a portion of them who are aware of this sharing. The awareness of sharing the psychological repertoire turns sharing into a powerful psychological mechanism that has crucial effects on a group or a society itself and mostly on its intergroup relations. Shared psychological repertoire is known to have important cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences both for group members as individuals and for the group as a whole, especially when it concerns important and relevant outgroups such as enemies or close allies. Specifically, then, this shared psychological repertoire serves as a prism through which society members construct their social reality: it determines the sense of solidarity and unity they experience and the intensity and extent of involvement of society members. Moreover, it makes an important

contribution to the formation of social identity of society members, by providing knowledge, attitudes, and emotions that society members share and relate to. Thus, psychological intergroup repertoire characterizes the society as a whole, has meaning only on a societal level, and should be viewed as a societal phenomenon.

The other fact that makes the psychological intergroup repertoire into such an important area of interest is its influence on intergroup relations. Although it is not the only factor that determines intergroup relations, it is definitely a significant one, as groups and societies carry their line of action toward another group also on the basis of the stereotypes, prejudice, emotions, and behavioral intentions. For example, there is no doubt that extreme behaviors against another group, such as discrimination, exploitation, ethnic cleansing, or mass killing, are carried out only if the society members form a very delegitimizing view of the other group.

The questions regarding the formation of the psychological intergroup repertoire, its dissemination, and acquisition are central in this study. The book proposes an integrative model that describes factors involved in the formation of stereotypes and prejudice beginning with variables on the macrosocietal level and ending with variables on the micro-intrapersonal level. This model can also be applied to the formation of other elements of the psychological intergroup repertoire. Specifically, the model suggests that three categories of factors determine the contents of stereotypes and the direction of the attitudes. First, macrofactors must be considered that serve as a context; they include the nature of intergroup relations, their history, sociopolitical factors, economic conditions, characteristics of the outgroup, and behavior of other groups. Then the model describes three major ways through which group members receive information about outgroups: political-social-cultural-educational channels of group communication, direct contact with outgroup members, and microsocial environment and family sources. Although the psychological intergroup repertoire is learned often first in the family setting and in communities, social, political, educational, and cultural channels and institutions carry the repertoire and transmit it to society members of all ages. Mass media and schools are the most powerful channels of transmission, but literary books, films, or theatrical plays also fulfill this role. Finally, the transmitted information is mediated by various personal variables.

It is difficult to determine the relative weight of each of the variables and levels in the formation and changing of stereotypes and prejudice. Individual and cultural differences, as well as situational context, determine the influence of these variables. Factors such as the credibility of institutionalized channels of information, the extent to which the stereotype contents are available through institutionalized channels of information, and the availability of alternative information about outgroups all determine how transmitting variables influences the formation of and change in

stereotypes and prejudice. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that among the characteristics of the context the nature of intergroup relations has a determinative influence on the formation and change of stereotypes and prejudice. The nature of intergroup relations not only provides vivid, salient, and sometimes striking information about the outgroups but also occupies a public agenda and shapes a consensual view. Sociopolitical factors, economic conditions, and the history of intergroup relations serve more as facilitating or discounting factors that can enhance or diminish the particular direction dictated by the nature of intergroup relations. In the model, the societal channels of information play a special role, transmitting the information about the outgroups and describing the nature of intergroup relations. Without them this information could be unavailable to individual group members. Furthermore, they are responsible for the formation of the sharedness of the psychological intergroup repertoire among group members.

Each level of the present analysis by itself has limited power of explanation. The personal level accounts for individual differences, whereas the macrolevel explains, for example, cultural differences and why particular outgroups are labeled with a specific content and explanation. The inclusion in the model of the individual, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup levels allows a comprehensive analysis and a more complete picture of the formation and change of stereotypes and prejudice.

Similarly, the model incorporates various theories that have been offered to explain the formation of stereotypes and prejudice. Each of these theories deals with a particular segment of a large picture. Thus, for example, while the realistic conflict theory is concerned with the macrolevel background factor, the illusory correlation theory focuses on micro-intrapersonal bias of information processing. Both of them are important pieces of the puzzle, and neither claims to provide an exclusive description of how the stereotypes are formed. Therefore, the various theories of stereotypes and prejudice formation and change should be seen as complementary. It is assumed that in order to understand the formation of stereotypes and prejudice all the various theories describing different aspects should be considered, particularly given the complexity of the process. This assumption leads to the recognition of the necessity to integrate the different theories and levels of analysis into one explanatory framework.

Examination of the model reveals factors to which social psychology has devoted much attention and others that have been relatively neglected. While much research has focused on the intrapersonal processes of stereotype formation and the study of direct contact effects, the investigation of the macrocontext with its many characteristics, societal channels of transmission, or family function have all received little attention. The formation of social knowledge, including stereotype content, is based not only on intrapersonal cognitive processes, a focus of mainstream social psychological

research, but also on micro- and macrosocial processes. The “facts” of our experience are social insofar as they depend for their meaning on a larger societal context, which includes all the previously discussed variables. Thus, this context has to be examined if one desires to understand why certain stereotypes and prejudice emerge or change.

Of special importance is the formation of stereotype content in times of conflict or war, when stereotypes are often used as delegitimizing labels. In these situations, negative stereotypes together with negative attitudes, affect, emotions, and behavioral intentions form part of the vicious cycle of violence. The next chapter elaborates on evolution of this psychological intergroup repertoire during intractable conflicts.

Psychological Intergroup Repertoire in Intractable Conflicts

Intense, severe, and persevering conflicts constitute a powerful context that has a determinative influence on individual and group functioning. The context of conflict breeds a particular culture that highlights issues related to the conflict and shapes the representation of one's own group and of the adversary group.

Intergroup conflicts are defined as situations in which a group considers its goals and interests to be obstructed by the goals or interests of an opposing group (Kriesberg, 1998a; Mitchell, 1981; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). They are probably inevitable in any intergroup relations because groups have such a variety of goals and interests that at least some are likely to be contradicted by the goals and interests of another group. Thus, conflict is an inseparable part of intergroup relations and periodically may occur even between two allied groups that generally enjoy a friendly relationship.

In the past, a number of social psychologists proposed that situations of conflict generate negative stereotyping and prejudice. Allport in his seminal book *The nature of prejudice* notes, on the one hand, the appearance of prejudice and stereotyping in situations of conflict and, on the other, their contribution to the nature of the conflict.

[T]here are many economic, international, and ideological conflicts that represent a genuine clash of interests. Most of the rivalries that result, however, take on a great amount of excess baggage. Prejudice, by clouding the issue, retards conflict solution of the core conflict. In most instances the rivalry that is perceived is inflated. . . . In the international sphere, disputes are magnified through the addition of irrelevant stereotypes. . . . Realistic conflict is like a note on an organ. It sets all prejudices that are attuned to it into simultaneous vibration. (1954, p. 233)

However, only the influential field experiments carried out with small groups by Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, 1967; Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1969), described in the previous chapter, demonstrate that real conflicts lead to hostility, negative affect, and stereotypes. These experiments

served as a solidifying basis for the emergence of an approach known as realistic conflict theory that describes the influence of intergroup conflicts on the formation of stereotypic contents and prejudice. In the words of Sherif (1967), "The sufficient condition for the rise of the hostile and aggressive deeds... and for the standardization of social distance justified by the derogatory images of the outgroup was the existence of two groups competing for goals that only one group could attain, to the dismay and frustration of the other group" (p. 85). The conception formulated by Sherif and Sherif (1969) suggests that stereotypes and prejudice develop as a result of significant encounters with another group and reflect actual or perceived relationships between the groups. The nature of relationships is based on the extent of compatibility of goals and interests between the groups. When goals and interests clash, then the characteristics attributed to the outgroup become negative and derogatory and are used to justify the ingroup position in the intergroup interaction.

The realistic conflict theory suggests that real conflicts over scarce resources, territories, power, status, important values, rights, or dominance result in experiencing a threat that causes the attribution of negative characteristics to the threatening group, which in turn explains the experienced threat (Bar-Tal, 1990a; Bernard, 1957; Bobo, 1988; Campbell, 1965). Campbell formulates the premises as follows: "Real conflict of interests, overt, active, or past intergroup conflict, and/or the presence of hostile, threatening, and competitive outgroup neighbors, which collectively may be called 'real threat' cause perception of threat... Real threat causes hostility toward the sources of threat" (Campbell, 1965, p. 288). In his view, threat is the important mediating psychological variable that causes hostility toward the outgroup in conflict. LeVine and Campbell (1972) suggest that a real threat, instigated by a real conflict of interest, causes hostility toward the other group together with an increase in ingroup solidarity, tightening of group boundaries, and enhancing awareness of one's own identity.

INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

Not all conflicts lead to development of negative stereotypes, attitudes, affect, and emotions (i.e., negative psychological intergroup repertoire). There are different types of conflicts and different ways to categorize them. For our purposes, the most appropriate criterion for categorizing conflicts is the extent of its severity, because this variable is closely related to the psychological intergroup repertoire. The severity of conflict can be classified on a continuum, stretching from tractable to intractable. The tractable conflicts are temporary, nonviolent, perceived as solvable, and resolved with established peaceful mechanisms. Group members do not get deeply involved with these conflicts, and they do not dominate group life. In

tractable conflicts, a negative psychological intergroup repertoire does not normally evolve. At the other end of the continuum are intractable conflicts. Intractable conflicts are the focus of this book, as they always lead to the development of the negative psychological intergroup repertoires. Kriesberg (1998b) suggests that four features characterize intractable conflicts.

They are *protracted*. Intractable conflicts persist for a long time, at least a generation. Their long duration implies that the parties in conflict have had many confrontational experiences and as a result they have accumulated animosity and hostility. Moreover, these experiences become imprinted in the collective memories of the groups involved in the conflict and are often incorporated into the group's ethos. Group members focus on negative experiences, remember them, and transmit them to the younger generation. The duration of conflict forces group members to adapt their lives to face the continuous stressful situation. This constitutes for them a major challenge to develop a coping repertoire with the conflict.

Intractable conflicts are *violent*. Intractable conflicts involve physical violence in which group members are killed or wounded in either war, small-scale military engagement, or terrorist attacks. Such violence occurs over time, fluctuating in frequency and intensity. Over the years, not only soldiers are wounded or killed but also civilians, including women and children, and civil property is often destroyed. Additionally, intractable conflicts frequently create refugees and sometimes even involve atrocities carried out by one party or both parties in conflict. The consequences of physical violence, especially the loss of life, have an immense emotional impact on all group members. They perceive violence as intentionally inflicted by the opposing party, as unjustified, sudden, untimely, and especially as violating the important moral code of the sanctity of life. In addition, the consequences of violence are considered a group problem, and the group takes the responsibility to treat and compensate victims, to prevent the recurrence of physical violence, and to avenge the human losses.

They are perceived as *irreconcilable*. Parties involved in intractable conflicts view their goals as radically opposite and irreconcilable. They have a history of failed attempts to resolving the conflict. Each side adheres to its own goals, perceiving them as essential for its own survival, and therefore neither side considers making concessions or believes in a peaceful conflict resolution. Because neither side can win, both sides expect the conflict to continue and involve violent confrontations. They take all the necessary steps to prepare themselves for a long conflict, and this requires major adjustments on the part of the groups involved.

They are *costly* and demand extensive investment. Parties engaged in an intractable conflict make vast military, economic, and psychological investments, in order to cope successfully with the situation. These investments include training the military, development of the industrial-military complex, and the formation of an ideology to explain and justify the conflict. All

require human effort and material resources on the part of both individuals and groups. Life during intractable conflict is marked by continuous confrontation that requires sacrifice and mobilization of the group members.

In addition to the four features proposed by Kriesberg, Bar-Tal (1998a) adds three characteristics that further elaborate the nature of intractable conflict.

Intractable conflicts are perceived as being *zero-sum*. Intractable conflicts are of full scope, without compromises and with adherence to all the original goals. Thus, parties engaged in intractable conflict perceive any loss suffered by the other side as their own gain and, conversely, any gains of the other side as their own loss. Each side tries to inflict heavy losses on the opponent and to prevent gains (Ordeshook, 1986). This type of competition is not restricted to the bilateral conflict relationship but also affects relations with third parties and in the international arena. That is, each side tries to maximize its own support and aid from the international community and minimize that extended to the opponent. This characteristic of conflicts touches many aspects of group life and adds special tension and stress. Practically every aspect of life is considered as relevant to the conflict, and each group does its best to inflict as much harm as possible on the other and to prevent it from gaining any benefits, even in domains unrelated to military or political struggle.

They are *total*. Intractable conflicts are total from the point of view of the participating parties. They are perceived as being about existential and basic goals, needs, or values that are regarded as essential for the group's existence and/or survival, such as territory, resources, identity, economy, culture, religion, and central values, and therefore cannot be compromised.

They are *central*. Intractable conflicts occupy a central place in the lives of the individual group members and the group as a whole. Members of the society are involved constantly and continuously with the conflict. This preoccupation reflects the central place that the intractable conflict occupies in the cognitive repertoire of society members. It means that thoughts related to the conflict are easily accessible and are relevant to decisions that society members make for personal and collective purposes. The centrality of the intractable conflict is further reflected in its salience on the public agenda. The media, leadership, and other societal institutions are greatly preoccupied with the intractable conflict that poses a challenge to survival.

In extreme cases the seven characteristics in cases of intractable conflicts are explicit and salient, inflicting threat, stress, pain, exhaustion, and cost, in human and material terms. Members must adapt to the situation in both their individual and social lives. From a psychological perspective, this adaptation requires the meeting of two basic challenges.

First, it is necessary to satisfy basic needs that are deprived during intractable conflict – for example, needs of mastery, safety, and positive identity. Of special importance is satisfaction of the epistemic need for

a comprehensive understanding of the conflict that can provide a coherent, meaningful, and predictable picture of the situation. Individuals try to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity by creating a comprehensible environment. Therefore they strive to perceive and structure their world in such a way that events and people can be understood in an organized way that provides meaning to the absorbed information (Berkowitz, 1968; Reykowski, 1982).

Second, adaptation requires the development of psychological conditions that will be conducive to coping successfully with the challenges posed by the situation of conflict. Successful coping enables groups to maintain intense conflict with an opponent over time with all the concomitant challenges and adjustments, on a personal and societal level, that this entails. That is, intractable conflict poses many challenges, including ensuring group member survival. Groups thus have to prepare themselves for a long struggle, which requires recruitment of human and material resources. For these purposes, they develop a system of psychological conditions that ensure successful coping, such as loyalty to a society and country, high motivation to contribute, persistence, ability to cope with physical and psychological stress, readiness for personal sacrifice, unity, solidarity, maintenance of the societies' objectives, determination, courage, and endurance.

To meet the various needs involved in intractable conflicts, the groups evolve appropriate psychological repertoires, which include shared beliefs, attitudes, affect, and emotions. This psychological repertoire enables the groups to adapt to the situation of the intractable conflict. In this psychological repertoire, societal beliefs that satisfy the epistemic and other needs and at the same time enable the development of psychological conditions for successful coping with the conflict, play a determinative role.

SOCIETAL BELIEFS IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

Societal beliefs are cognitions shared by society members on topics and issues that are of special concern and contribute to the sense of uniqueness of its members (Bar-Tal, 2000a). The contents of societal beliefs refer to characteristics, structure, and processes that cover different domains of societal life. In general, they relate to societal goals, conflicts, aspirations, conditions, norms, values, structures, representations of in- or outgroup institutions, obstacles, and problems. They are organized around thematic clusters, and each theme may contain a number of societal beliefs. Themes may, for instance, pertain to security issues, a view of the outgroup, or equality in a society. The societal beliefs often are featured on the public agenda, are discussed by society members, serve as relevant references in decisions made by the leaders, and influence choices regarding courses of action. Societal institutions actively impart societal beliefs to society members

and encourage their acquisition. Many of the beliefs are reflected in the language, stereotypes, images, myths, and collective memories. Together they constitute part of the shared repertoire of the members of the society and contribute to a common understanding. They also provide a basis for communication, interdependence, and the coordination of social activities, which are necessary for the functioning of the social systems. In addition, societal beliefs underlie the development of the collective emotional orientation of a society (Bar-Tal, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). They provide the shared beliefs that evoke emotions, define the cues for the interpretation and evaluation of information that evokes the emotions, and define the situations and way of expression for the emotions. The central societal beliefs are incorporated into the ethos of the society, providing a particular orientation for its members (see Bar-Tal, 2000a). Ethos represents a coherent and systematic pattern of knowledge that implies direction of attitudes and indicates a rational guidance of choices for behavior. It imparts legitimacy to the societal system and fosters integration among society members.

It has been proposed that the challenges of the intractable conflict lead to the development of eight clusters of themes of societal beliefs that serve the satisfaction of the deprived needs (especially the epistemic need) and allow successful coping. They include the justness of one's own goals, security, patriotism, unity, peace, one's own victimization, positive collective self-image, and negative image of the adversary (Bar-Tal, 1998a). All these themes refer to the nature of conflict. Specifically, they refer to the cause of the conflict, societal goals that lead to the conflict, the necessary conditions for successful coping with the conflict, societal self-image, and the image of the adversary. Each theme cluster includes a number of societal beliefs referring to the same topic. When intractable conflict lasts for many decades, violent experiences become imprinted within societal life, and the conflict preoccupies the members of the society. Then, societal beliefs related to conflict become part of the ethos of conflict (Gamson, 1981, and Ross, 1993, 1998, called ethos of conflict "culture of conflict"). From the cultural perspective, the powerful collective experiences create a context in which shared ideas, meanings, symbols, and conceptions about different themes related to the conflict (i.e., culture of conflict) evolve. The ethos of conflict allows common understanding, but, most important, it provides the basis for a consensually coordinated course of action. In our conception, societal beliefs are the core of the conflict ethos. At the climax of intractable conflict, they are often shared by the great majority of society members, but the extent of sharing may change with the change of the nature of the conflict. Also, we recognize that the extent of sharing depends on various societal and political factors, and therefore societies may differ in the extent of sharing societal beliefs of conflict.

Let us consider more closely these eight themes of societal beliefs that emerge in the context of intractable conflict.

The Justness of One's Own Goals

Beliefs about the justness of the group's goals outline, explain, and justify goals that stand at the core of the conflict. They outline the reasons for the supreme and existential importance of the goals, stressing that failure to achieve them may threaten the existence of the group. The reasons used can be of different categories drawn from historical, economic, national, theological, cultural, or economic spheres, and they are frequently embodied in national or ethnic ideology, which plays a vital role in the society's life. At the same time, the societal beliefs disregard the goals of the other side, describing them as unjustified and unreasonable.

These beliefs provide a meaningful and coherent picture of why the conflict erupted, why it lasts so long, and especially why it is important to continue and make sacrifices for its causes. Justifications also provide a moral basis for adherence to the goals and thus support positive self-perception. These beliefs can then be used in self-presentation vis-à-vis the international community. In addition, this epistemic function is of importance, since the beliefs motivate group members in their struggle to achieve their goals, in spite of the losses and costs. Thus, the epistemic base of reasons and justifications provides a solid foundation for continued successful coping with the conflict. Conversely, even the slightest negation of goals or lack of faith in their justice may weaken determination for struggle and sacrifice. Such trends may have destructive consequences for the society, especially if the adversary is not open to a peaceful resolution of the intractable conflict and continues the violent struggle.

Security

These beliefs stress the importance of personal safety and national security and outline the necessary conditions for their achievement. This theme is of concern since the issue of security is a vital one for societal functioning in times of intractable conflict. Society members worry about survival, the opponent's military and political gains, economic hardships, threats to cultural values, and the like. Thus, security becomes one of the central societal values in times of intractable conflict. It reflects one of the basic human needs, namely the need for security, and involves a desire for protection, safety, and survival (Maslow, 1970). As security is a prerequisite for managing a normal life, human beings, both as individuals and as members of a society, strive to satisfy these needs. The societal beliefs about security refer mostly to contents about conditions that can secure national survival, guarantee achievement of principal national goals, assure economic strength, preserve the basic values, deter and restrain the enemy, and, if possible, win the conflict. More specifically, these security conditions can pertain to the geopolitical, economic, diplomatic, societal, educational, or

cultural domains. Examples would include the boundaries that can ensure security, industries that can produce military equipment, the manpower that is needed to maintain security, an economy that prevents hardship, education that facilitates mobilization, and laws that facilitate the establishment of security. Each society in an intractable conflict specifies its own conditions for security, which are influenced by various factors such as the nature of intractable conflict, characteristics of the enemy, one's own society's culture, and legal considerations.

There is no doubt that a society that faces intractable conflict has to form functional societal beliefs, which not only provide knowledge about security concerns but most of all set the basis for successful coping (H. Brown, 1983). The beliefs themselves serve as an important rationale for the legitimization of decisions and actions taken by the society. They also provide guidelines for the development of the desired psychological conditions needed to maintain security. In general, they serve a motivating role in mobilizing society members to take an active part in the conflict and to contribute to their security.

Patriotism

Patriotism, defined as the "attachment of group members to their group and the country in which they reside" (Bar-Tal, 1993, p. 48), is of crucial importance in times of intractable conflict. This attachment is associated with positive evaluation and emotion and is expressed in beliefs connoting love, loyalty, commitment, pride, and caring for one's country. Examples of such beliefs are "I love my people and country," "I am loyal to my country," "I care about my people," and "I am ready for sacrifices."

Without the internalization of patriotic beliefs by its members, a society will have difficulty in coping with intractable conflict (Stagner, 1967). Beliefs about love, care, and loyalty toward the people and the country create crucial bonds that keep the members of society together by solidifying a sense of belonging and solidarity. Of special significance in times of intractable conflict is the way in which patriotism serves to mobilize people to accept the heavy costs in terms of human and material resources that are inflicted by intractable conflicts. In the name of patriotism, society members are asked to give up their personal comforts, desires, or even basic needs and to help to achieve the goals of society (Somerville, 1981). In times of intractable conflict, patriotism may even demand the ultimate sacrifice – the loss of life. Patriots who actively participate in violent conflict are honored, and those who lose their lives are especially revered. Heroes are decorated, glorified, and publicly presented as models. In this respect, patriotic beliefs outline the required route for action, portray the desired models of patriotism, and serve as explanation and justification for sacrifices made (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997).

Unity

Beliefs about unity are viewed as related to patriotic beliefs. They refer to the importance of maintaining unity, and of ignoring internal discords and disagreements, in the face of an external threat. They highlight the belief that internal conflict can harm the common cause. Beliefs about common origins, history, ethos, and traditions provide a basis for unification. In addition, they stress consensus about goals, values, norms, and the like. The emphasis on consensus demarcates the boundaries of agreements and sets the pressure to conform.

The purpose of beliefs about unity is to provide a sense that all society members follow their leaders and support the goals of the conflict. They play a role in increasing solidarity and cohesiveness, which are important factors influencing mobilization to act on behalf of the society. On the other hand, lack of unity creates societal polarization, friction, and internal tension that may impede the struggle with the enemy.

Peace

Societal beliefs about peace refer to peace as the ultimate desire of the society and describe it as peace loving. The presentation of peace, as a supreme goal for society, is usually done in utopian, general, and vague terms in the form of a wish or dream. Rarely do these beliefs elaborate the concrete meaning of peace or specify ways to achieve it. Beliefs about peace are functional for societies engaged in intractable conflicts. They present the members of society as peace lovers and peace seekers to themselves and to the outside world. Since peace is a universally accepted goal, a self-attribution of striving for peace enhances positive self-esteem. In order to receive support, rival parties try to convince the international community that they are pursuing peace as their ultimate goal. Additionally, in times of intractable conflict, when the society goes through a prolonged period of hardship and stress, there is need for a light at the end of the tunnel. Societal beliefs about peace fulfill this function by providing hope and optimism.

Victimization

A society in intractable conflict believes that it is victimized by the opponent (Mack, 1990). Societal beliefs about victimization are formed over a long period of accumulated violence, suffering, and losses. Their formation is based on the justness of one's own goals and a positive collective self-image and is combined with emphasizing the wickedness of the opponent's goals and delegitimizing the opponent's characteristics (Frank, 1967). Attributing injustice, harm, and evil to the adversary, while presenting one's own people as being just, moral, and humane, leads society

members to assume the role of victims in the conflict. Thoughts of oneself as a victim mean that a society believes that the conflict was imposed by an adversary, who not only fights for unjust goals but also uses immoral means to achieve them.

During intractable conflict it is functional to perceive one's own society as being victimized. This perception delegates responsibility for both the outbreak of the conflict and the subsequent violence to the opponent. In addition, belief in victimization provides the moral foundation for a continuous looking for justice from one's own perspective and opposing that of the adversary. In this respect, these beliefs provide a rationale for continuing the struggle. Self-presentation as the victim is especially important with regard to the international community. The label of "a victim" grants a role that both sides in an intractable conflict try to claim. It helps to obtain the backing of the world's public opinion and increases the likelihood for moral, political, and material support.

Society's Positive Image

Societies engaged in intractable conflicts develop and maintain societal beliefs that formulate and support a positive collective ingroup image (Kaplowitz, 1990; Sande et al., 1989). The content of such beliefs may pertain to a variety of positive traits, values, or skills that characterize the society but also to positive actions performed in the past and positive contributions to mankind and civilization. These beliefs reflect the general tendency toward ethnocentrism (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) and to the motivation to maintain positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978b, 1981a), but in times of intractable conflict they gain special importance. The amount of effort demanded, the need for mobilization, the violence, and especially the perpetration of aggressive, immoral acts (sometimes even atrocities) all require the maintenance of a stable positive collective self-image. Thus, groups involved in intractable conflicts engage in intense self-justification, self-glorification, and self-praise.

Some characteristics are especially propagated: humanity, morality, fairness, and trustworthiness, on the one hand, and courage, heroism, or endurance, on the other. Special efforts are made to contrast these characteristics with the adversary (Frank, 1967; Stagner, 1967). The objective is to form a collective ingroup image that is superior in comparison with that of the enemy and to make a salient differentiation between "us" and "them." The first four characteristics constituting the positive self-image provide moral strength: they present the society as humane and as observing universal norms of morality. These beliefs also play an important role in self-presentation before the international community that judges acts from a moral perspective. Often this judgment is a precondition for receiving political and material support. Thus, even though members of a society

commit immoral acts, special effort is made to minimize them by suggesting their exceptionality and their insignificance when compared with the immoral acts performed by the adversary and/or by other societies. The last three characteristics boost group morale and serve as a basis for hope and encouragement. These beliefs are directly relevant to the protracted violent struggle in that they suggest that the society has the ability to contain the enemy and even to win the conflict.

The Negative Image of the Adversary

Societies in intractable conflict develop beliefs that portray the opponent negatively, often in delegitimizing terms (Bar-Tal, 1990a; Stagner, 1967; White, 1970). These beliefs are endorsed and shared by society members. In fact, these beliefs are part of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire that groups in intractable conflict have about each other, as this repertoire not only includes beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) but also negative attitudes, affect, and emotions.

NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERGROUP REPERTOIRE

Beliefs: Delegitimization

As noted, the components included in the negative psychological intergroup repertoire regarding the adversary are beliefs, attitudes, affect, and emotions. In relating to beliefs, of special importance are delegitimizing stereotypes.

In situations of intractable conflict, when parties engage in prolonged and violent conflict over existential goals, both sides attribute negative characteristics to the other. In fact the stereotypes used are negative and groups frequently resort to delegitimizing labels. Delegitimization refers to stereotypes with extremely negative connotations (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990a). The concept of delegitimization was presented to describe a specific case of group categorization, based on extremely negative outgroup characterization aimed at denying the group's humanity. Delegitimization is defined as categorization of a group or groups into extremely negative social categories that exclude them from the sphere of human groups, that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values. Delegitimization may be viewed as a type of moral exclusion, which according to Opatow (1990) leads individuals or groups "outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appropriate, or just" (p. 1).

Delegitimization, as an extreme case of negative stereotyping, does not appear in every intergroup conflict. It tends to appear when the negated goals are perceived as far-reaching, unjustified, and endangering the fundamental goals of the group and when threats to take violent steps are expressed. These conditions indicate that intractable conflicts usually involve delegitimization. Implied here is that the conflictual context in which delegitimization evolves is stable and salient in its threatening and violent nature, concerns all society members, and plays a central role in their lives. Also, the two groups engaged in intractable conflict are physically and socially separated, even if they live in the same geographical area, as, for example, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland or Jews and Palestinians in the Middle East. There is usually little social contact between members of the two groups, and sometimes they are actually separated by real borders. Most of the information that they receive about each other is dominated by conflict themes that present the malevolent acts of the other side. In such contexts, it is not surprising that the persistent use of delegitimization evolves.

Dehumanization, outcasting, negative trait characterization, political labeling, and group comparison are among the most commonly used contents in delegitimization.

Dehumanization involves categorizing a group as nonhuman. This can be done either by applying subhuman categories such as uncivilized savages, primitives, apes, and animals or by using superhuman categories with negative connotations, creatures such as demons, monsters, and devils. Both types of category involve characterizing the members of the delegitimized group as possessing inhuman traits.

Trait characterization is performed by attributing traits that are considered extremely negative and unacceptable in a given society. Aggressors, idiots, or parasites exemplify this type of delegitimization.

Outcasting consists of categorizing the adversary into groups that are considered as violators of pivotal social norms. Outcasts include such categories as murderers, thieves, psychopaths, terrorists, or maniacs. Society usually excludes these violators from its system and often even places them in total institutions.

Use of *political labels* involves categorization into political groups that are absolutely rejected by the values of the delegitimizing group, for example, Nazis, fascists, communists, or imperialists. These labels are culturally bound, and their use depends on society's cultural ideology. When used for delegitimization, however, they indicate a total unacceptance of the delegitimized group and its being a threat to the basic values of the delegitimizing society.

Delegitimization by *group comparison* occurs when the delegitimized group is labeled by a name of a group that traditionally serves as an example of negativity in the delegitimizing group. Use of such categories as

Vandals, Huns, or Nazis are an examples of this type of delegitimization. Each society has, in its cultural repertoire, representations of groups or societies that serve as symbols of malice, evil, brutality, or wickedness.

Delegitimization has determinative influences on intergroup relations in the context of intractable conflict because of its following features:

- a. It consists of extremely negative labels that are salient and unique in the group's repertoire of characterization of other groups.
- b. It has the purpose of denying the delegitimized group's humanity.
- c. It magnifies the difference between the groups in conflict.
- d. It homogenizes the delegitimized group as one evil entity, not allowing individualization of its members or differentiation among its subgroups.
- e. It is accompanied by intense negative emotions of rejection such as hatred, anger, contempt, fear, or disgust.
- f. It appears automatically because of the underlying emotional and teleological nature.
- g. It implies that the delegitimized group has the potential for negative behavior that could endanger the delegitimizing group.
- h. It has behavioral implications for the delegitimizing group suggesting that the delegitimized group does not deserve being treated humanely and implying that measures should be taken to prevent harm that may be inflicted by the delegitimized group.
- i. It provides rigid, durable categories that are unlikely to change while the intractable conflict lasts and, most probably, even long after.

Different instances of mutual delegitimization in situations of intractable conflict have been noted. Past conflict between the Americans and the Soviets during the Cold War provides a salient example of the use of delegitimization. Both sides believed that they clashed over fundamentally important irreconcilable goals in a zero-sum conflict. From an American perspective, the Soviet communist ideology seemed to be in total contradiction to American values. Moreover, Soviet military and political activities in Poland, Finland, the Baltic states, Iran, Greece, Berlin, East Germany, Hungary, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, as well as the oppression and purges of the Soviet citizens, provided unequivocal evidence of the threat the Soviet Union posed for the United States (Bialer, 1985; Frei, 1986; Welch, 1970; Yatani & Bramel, 1989). Americans thus used delegitimizing stereotypes to characterize the Soviet communists, but these labels were often generalized to include all Russians or Soviets. The label "communists" acquired a delegitimizing connotation in the United States. It implied a completely opposing ideology, threatening the existence of the American political and socioeconomic order. Thus, in the United States the category communists referred to an excluded group. But in addition to the use of the descriptive term communists,

Russians or Soviets in general were delegitimized with labels such as brutal, primitive, aggressive, sadistic, cold-blooded, cruel, ruthless, oppressive, devious, without respect for human life, totalitarian, militaristic, deceptive, and untrustworthy (e.g., Bialer, 1985; Buchanan & Cantril, 1953; S. F. Cohen, 1986; H. F. Stein, 1982; White, 1984).

A mirror image perspective was presented by the Soviet Union (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). American political and military activities in Iran, Korea, Congo, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, Argentina, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Angola, Grenada, and Panama, as well as American intervention in the Soviet domestic war, provided evidence for the threatening nature of the American intentions. The Soviets viewed Americans as capitalists, which was in itself a delegitimizing label, and also stereotyped them using a similar repertoire that included characterizations such as imperialists, colonialists, exploiters, oppressors and labels such as brutal, aggressive, deceptive, and untrustworthy (Bronfenbrenner, 1961; White, 1965, 1984).

Another example of mutual delegitimization can be found in the case of intractable conflict in Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics, who have clashed over British control of Ireland for hundreds of years. In the present conflict in Northern Ireland, the Catholic minority aspires to unite with the Irish Republic, while the Protestant majority prefers to remain part of Great Britain. These two irreconcilable goals lead to violent confrontations between the two communities. Through the years, both societies developed mutual negative stereotypes, including the use of delegitimizing characteristics (see Darby, 1976; R. Harris, 1972). Cecil (1993) reports that Protestants view Catholics as "lazy, priest-ridden, untidy and potentially treacherous" (p. 152), whereas Catholics perceive Protestants as "bigoted, mean, and lacking in culture" (p. 152). Also, both societies emphasize the terrorist nature of the other side as a major delegitimizing characteristic. According to Hunter, Stringer, and Watson (1991), Catholics and Protestants tended to attribute their own group's violence to external causes, whereas they ascribed the opponent's violence to internal delegitimizing characteristics, using such labels as "psychopaths" or "bloodthirsty."

Enemy

A concept that includes all the delegitimizing aspects used in situations of intractable conflict to categorize and characterize the rival group is the concept of "an enemy" (e.g., Frank, 1967; Holt & Silverstein, 1989; Kaplowitz, 1990; Moses, 1990; Rieber, 1991). A social category defined as an "enemy" is seen as a group that threatens to do harm and therefore arouses feelings of hostility (Silverstein & Flamenbaum, 1989). This label not only implies attribution of negative characteristics to the opponent but also describes

the confrontational and hostile relations between the two groups. Believing that there is an enemy is related to the definition of the situation as a conflict. The label indicates that another group intends to harm one's group and that these intentions are exhibited in the performed negative acts. Even perceived malintention justifies labeling an outgroup as "the enemy." This label then grants to the labeled group a particular status vis-à-vis the labeling group. It defines the confrontational relations between the groups, sets the expectations for future behaviors of both groups, provides attitudinal and emotional implications, and marks desirable defensive or offensive acts toward the labeled group. The label "enemy" provides the most determinative differentiation between "us" and "them" or "we" and "they" and means that the other group has negative intentions directed toward one's own group. Furthermore, it implies the high probability of violence between the groups.

Kelman (1997) characterizes the category enemy using three features: it constitutes a central consensual element of the group repertoire during serious conflicts, with strong pressure to maintain it; it is resistant to disconfirmation because the rival parties are governed by norms of conflict that prevent positive information about the enemy; and it is stable because parties tend to believe that the enemy will not change its intentions or behavior. Herrmann and his collaborators (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; Herrmann, 1985) propose that the enemy image is restricted to a particular representation. It arises in situations of intense competition between groups that are similar in cultural status and in capability. This relationship of conflict generates a sense of threat and motivation to eliminate the threat by attack. According to Herrmann, the enemy image, implying great hostility, allows harm of the other group members, including innocent civilians. Moreover, it implies a necessity of carrying out harmful action as the only way to eliminate the threat of the attack. Volkan (1988), drawing on psychodynamic theories, proposed that every group has the need to have an enemy. Groups build on this need in establishing a psychological differentiation between groups. This differentiation is then filled with beliefs that stress differences between the groups, presenting the enemy as subhuman. Eventually, after establishing hostile rituals that bring the presence of the enemy to public attention, this differentiation may lead to war.

The concept "enemy" was found to arouse extremely negative associations such as war, destruction, killing, hatred, anger, evilness, danger, or aggression (Szalay & Mir-Djalali, 1991). Universally, the term has strong negative attitudinal, affective, emotional, and behavioral implications, but specific representations of the concept depend on the particular culture and ideology of the respondents. The implications indicate that the group feels the need to take preventive steps to avert the malevolent intentions of the enemy. To say the least, enemies are disliked, mistrusted, and evoke strong emotions of hate and fear. This category is difficult to change and

groups maintain this category by employing various psychological means of censorship and control (Stagner, 1967).

In examining how enemy images are portrayed in posters, leaflets, caricatures, comics, photographs, drawings, paintings, and illustrations appearing in books from different countries, Keen (1986) suggests that the prototype could be described as a stranger; a faceless, barbarous, greedy, criminal; and a sadistic and immoral aggressor. The enemy is often presented in depersonalized abstract terms as a torturer, rapist, desecrator, beast, reptile, insect, germ, devil, or even death. All these concepts imply delegitimizing categories that, according to Keen (1986), reflect consensual paranoia.

White (1970, 1984) uses the term "diabolical enemy-image" to depict extreme stereotypic content that refers to the "obvious guilt of the enemy, unchangeableness of the enemy's evil nature, the efficacy of force in dealing with such an opponent, and the inefficacy of anything but force" (White, 1984, p. 133). In his view, it is an irrational label that underlies developing hatred toward the other group. It exaggerates the characteristics of the enemy, so serving a variety of psychological needs such as projection, rationalization, displacement of hostility, and intolerance of ambiguity.

Negative Attitudes, Affect, and Emotions

In addition to beliefs, the psychological intergroup repertoire in situations of intractable conflict includes negative attitude (i.e., prejudice), negative affect of dislike, and negative emotions. It seems obvious that, in the threatening and stressful situation of intractable conflict, when the other party is labeled as an enemy and often delegitimized, group members also develop strong negative evaluations and affect toward the opponent. This relationship was observed years ago by Scott (1965), who points out that "A considerable body of research evidence on national and ethnic attitudes confirms the association of affect with cognitive attributes of images. People tend to attribute favorable characteristics to nations (or groups or individuals) they like and unfavorable characteristics to those they dislike" (p. 82). Indeed the relationship between beliefs of a stereotype and prejudice (i.e., an attitude) is explained and predicted by the various theories of cognitive consistency (e.g., Abelson et al., 1968). Individuals tend to form consistent beliefs and attitudes.

From a different perspective, Stephan and Stephan (1993, 1996b) use a radial network model to propose that negative affective responses toward a group (including both evaluative and emotional reactions) and cognitive responses are related through networks associated with a group label and the traits linked to them. Frequent activation of the networks, as in the case of an enemy in an intractable conflict, increases consistency by strengthening the links in the networks. Also, Stephan and Stephan (2000) point out

that in a situation of conflict, when group members experience a threat, they develop prejudice toward the rival group. The prejudice is a result not only of a perceived threat to the well-being of the ingroup in the larger sense but also of negative stereotyping that indicates potential harm to the ingroup from the stereotyped outgroup.

A delegitimized group in conflict, labeled as an enemy, is openly disliked. The Soviet Union was judged by Americans to be the country either least liked or most disliked almost consistently for many years (Gallup, 1972, 1978). This attitude and affect were related to beliefs that Americans held about the Soviet Union. In addition, in times of intractable conflict, negative attitudes and general dislike are related to specific negative emotions, which are part of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire. Violence, human losses, material damage, hardship, and suffering, which are an inevitable part of intractable conflict, lead to threat, stress, pain, frustration, and grief. All these factors instigate negative emotions, but particularly hatred, fear, and anger, toward the enemy.

Hatred

Hatred is a hostile feeling directed toward another person or group that consists of malice, repugnance, and willingness to harm and even to annihilate the object of hatred. It is based on strong negative evaluation of the other person or the other group. According to Allport (1954), hate has behavioral implications as it is an "enduring organization of aggressive impulses toward a person or class of persons. Since it is composed of habitual bitter feelings and accusatory thought, it constitutes a stubborn structure in the mental-emotional life of the individual" (p. 363). In his view, hatred toward another group can be both rational and irrational and is associated with prejudice and the world view of the person (the stereotypes). Cases of conflict provide a rational basis for hatred, because the rival group threatens the basic existence of the group and performs violent harmful acts. White (1984) identifies hate in cases of conflict as a cold, deep, and steady negative emotion, lasting a long time as a result of a long accumulation of objectionable, hateful acts by the rival group.

Hate may be both conscious and unconscious, but in situations of intractable conflict, because the group members believe that they have legitimate reasons to hate, it is openly expressed. Hatred toward a particular group is learned at an early age, as well as during adulthood. It may be acquired on the basis of personal experiences, as well as on the basis of information provided by external sources, without having any contact with the other group. When hatred toward a particular group is acquired, it becomes a powerful psychological collective force that is easily evoked by an encounter with the group label (Yanay, 2002). It affects thoughts and often leads to aggressive acts against the hated group. Gay (1993), accepting the

Freudian conception that hatred is based on the projection of unacceptable thoughts or wishes on the convenient others, points out that hatred is a major force that guides human beings to most unthinkable acts. Leaders may easily instigate it because projection is largely unconscious. Hatred is a potent motivating force, since it may lead to the most violent acts against the hated group, including extreme forms of terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide (Kressel, 1996).

Fear

Fear is an aversive feeling that arises in situations perceived as threatening and dangerous to the person and/or one's own group (Gray, 1989; Rachman, 1978). It is assumed that societies engaged in intractable conflict are dominated by a collective emotional orientation of fear (Bar-Tal, 2001; Heskin, 1980; White, 1984). Prolonged violence accompanied by uncertainty regarding personal and group well-being impinges on the lives of the group members. The collective memory about past violent acts of the rival group and information about its present evil acts and intentions for the future provide fertile ground for the arousal of fear (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). The perception of threat is related to perceiving the enemy as capable of inflicting harm and having evil intentions (Pruitt, 1965), as well as to defining the enemy as breaking normative rules of intergroup behavior and displaying illegitimate aggressive behavior (R. Cohen, 1979). These perceptions and conceptualizations may lead to the delegitimization of the rival group. Of special importance are findings that show that fear is aroused automatically, spontaneously, and unconsciously (LeDoux, 1996; Ohman, 1993). In addition, fear is triggered not only by threatening cues in the present but also through stored, learned information that has been acquired either through experience or just learning (Rachman, 1978). In the context of intractable conflict, society members constantly and continuously receive information implying threat and danger from the rival group. On the basis of this information, they form a collective emotional orientation of fear (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2002). Collective fear initiates an array of cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences including aggressive behavior as coping with the threatening situation (see Eibl-Eibesfeldt & Sutterlin, 1990; Plutchik, 1990). White (1984) describes a number of cases in which, in his opinion, war broke out because of exaggerated fear – for example, the German-Austrian attack on Serbia in 1914, American action in Iran in 1954, or Israel's attack on Egypt in 1956.

Anger

Emotions such as anger, guilt, or shame may also appear collectively in situations of intractable conflict. Lazarus (1991) mentions anger as one of

the powerful emotions aroused when demeaning offenses are committed – that is, when threats or damage lead to the erosion of identity. Berkowitz (1990) extends the definition of anger to include the frustration of expected gratification. He also acknowledged that arbitrariness, inconsiderateness, and malevolence are also factors (all present in conflicts) that influence the arousal of anger. According to an analysis of anger and its relation to aggression (Averill, 1982), anger is socially construed and arises in situations when individuals or groups appraise what another person or group does as unjustified and an unfair violation of social norms that requires a response. The intense emotion of anger usually involves a feeling of threat, attribution of blame, and a desire for revenge and is often expressed in aggressive behavior. This observation is also part of the earlier theory of frustration and aggression (Dollard et al., 1939), which proposes that anger mediates between frustration and aggression. In prolonged intractable conflicts people view the acts of the rival as evil and the harm done by the enemy as unjustified. These views generate chronic anger, which, in turn, leads to aggressive acts of revenge and the vicious cycles of mutual frustration, anger, and aggression.

In sum, the conception of the development of intractable conflict describes the evolvment of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire as a necessity in view of the society members' needs that appear in this context and the requirement to adapt to the lasting threatening situation. This explanation should be added to the one offered by the realistic conflict theory that also concerns evolvment of negative psychological repertoire in times of conflict (see Chapter 1). This theory focuses on the conflict that, to involved society members, implies continuous threats and dangers to their personal being and to the society as a whole. The perceived threats and dangers originate mainly from the behaviors of the opponent in the conflict, and they lead to hostility and ethnocentrism (Campbell, 1965, 1967; Sherif et al., 1961). In addition, other psychological theoretical and empirical contributions also predict the evolvment of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire in the threatening context of intractable conflict – for example, individuals who hold beliefs about physical danger in the world develop ethnic prejudice as a defense (Altemeyer, 1988); a perceived threat is one of the important antecedents to the development of a negative psychological repertoire about the threatening group (Stephan & Stephan, 2000); existential threat associated with knowledge about one's possible mortality leads to intergroup prejudice (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997); and prejudice has deep evolutionary roots as it functionally appears in situations involving threats and dangers (Fox, 1992). On the basis of these conceptions a number of studies demonstrated that perceived threat and danger leads to the appearance of negative stereotypes and prejudice (e.g., Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003; Stephan et al., 1998).

Institutionalization of the Psychological Intergroup Repertoire

In intractable conflicts that last for decades, the negative psychological intergroup repertoire, especially delegitimizing societal beliefs about the rival, are institutionalized. Institutionalized beliefs have been transmitted and disseminated among society members through various societal channels of communication in a systematic, consistent, and continuous way. On the one hand, institutionalization reflects the fact that these beliefs are widely shared, becoming even part of conflict ethos, and, on the other hand, it suggests that society makes an effort to maintain them by continuously presenting them to society members. Moreover, institutionalization indicates that the particular set of societal beliefs has hegemony and provides the prism through which the majority of society members view various issues that are focal for the society. Institutionalization therefore is the perfect basis to mobilize society members to pursue activities implied by the institutionalized societal beliefs (Gamson, 1988). In our case, institutionalization of delegitimizing beliefs serves as a basis for mobilizing society to support the continuation of the intractable conflict and carry on a violent course of action against the enemy.

We propose a number of criteria for the institutionalization of delegitimizing beliefs during intractable conflicts. We use the American delegitimization of Soviets during the years of confrontation to illustrate institutionalization, as this situation was meaningful in the American collective memory and has been widely studied (e.g., Brands, 1993; Whitfield, 1991). In Chapters 3–6 we shall look at the institutionalization of the Arab representation in the Israeli society.

Extensive Sharing

The attitudes toward the opponent, the stereotype formed, and the accompanying emotions are widely held by society members. Delegitimizing stereotypes and the label enemy are endorsed by the majority of society members. Stereotypes, prejudice, and collective emotions, as a defining repertoire of a given society, form a cultural phenomenon. Society members acquire and store this repertoire, as part of their socialization, from an early age. For example, Americans held widely shared negative beliefs about the Soviets, who were in conflict with them for a long period of time, with a short break between 1941 and 1945, when both nations joined forces to fight a common enemy. Before World War II, the Soviet Union was evaluated as the most disliked country by the American public (Gallup, 1972), especially in view of the “Red Scare,” which dominated in the United States at that time. As conflict between the United States and Soviet Union began to grow in 1946, public polls consistently and continuously reported that Americans held negative beliefs about the Soviet communists, who were viewed as expansionist, threatening, and “the enemy” (Gallup, 1972, 1978;

Wolfe, 1983). Yatani and Bramel (1989) document that between 1953 and 1988 the majority of Americans expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the Soviet Union. With the exception of the early 1970s, when only about 50% of the Americans expressed a negative attitude, in all other periods the percentage varied between 70% and 90%. The data suggest that the anti-Soviet attitudes did not express anticommunist feelings but were related to the perceived rivalry between the nations.

Wide Use

Institutionalization of beliefs means that the delegitimizing beliefs and the negative attitudes toward the rival are also actively used. They surface in daily conversations and are expressed by leaders and societal channels of mass communication. They become part of everyday language (Maass & Arcuri, 1996) and are used in descriptions of the rival's past deeds, in the analyses of the conflict, and in the justification of one's own past, present, and intended future behavior. In the case of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, all the American presidents between 1917 and 1990 expressed beliefs describing the conflictual relations with the Soviets and referred to the negative stereotypes of communists, or the Soviets in general (Bowie, 1984; Grayson, 1978). For example, President Hoover referred to the Bolsheviks as resorting "to terror, bloodshed, and murder," and in 1983 President Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Moreover, delegitimizing perceptions of threat and the attribution of negative intent were explicitly used by American officials throughout the decades of conflict to explain and justify their own policy and actions in many internal and in almost all foreign matters (White, 1984). The views of the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who set the tone at the beginning of the Cold War, illustrate the extreme expression of these institutionalized beliefs. Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen (1967) analyze the conflict in a chapter titled "Know your enemy" and quote this passage from Dulles:

The "enemy" – the self-proclaimed enemy – is the relatively small, fanatical Soviet Communist Party. Stalin is its leader, and the Politburo is the principal source of the decisions which command the blind obedience of the hard core of loyal communist party members everywhere in the world. These party members have despotic political power in Russia and elsewhere. They believe that it is their duty to extend that power to all the world. They believe it is right to use fraud, terrorism, and violence, and any other means that will promote their ends. They treat as enemies all who oppose their will. (Dulles, 1950, pp. 5–6)

Later, at the end of the conflict era, George Schultz, secretary of state in the mid-1980s, described the Russians in a similar way, attacking them for using "terrorist groups for their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability" (*New York Times*, June 25, 1984, p. 1).

The analysis of mass media contents in different periods suggests unequivocally that the Soviets were systematically and continuously stereotyped negatively (Silverstein & Flamenbaum, 1989). For example, Kriesberg (1946) analyzes every page of the *New York Times* that carried news about the Soviet Union in six important periods of Soviet-American relations (1918, 1935, 1937, 1939, 1942, and 1945–46). The results show that most of the analyzed pages carried a negative reference to the Soviet Union. The attitudes expressed were dependent on the correspondence between the aims and goals of the United States and of the Soviet Union. During their alliance, between 1942 and 1945, the attitudes were favorable. During other periods, the study found that the *New York Times* not only expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the Soviet Union but also used a highly emotive and negative tone. Kriesberg (1946) suggests that the readers of the newspaper were unequivocally directed toward an adverse opinion about the Soviet Union that justified the conflict with the Soviet Union. In a study done after the Cold War began, Smith, Bruner, and White (1956) report that almost all newspaper articles published in 1947 about the Soviet Union described it unfavorably. Similarly, in an analysis of descriptions of the Soviets found in three major American newsmagazines (*Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report*) during times of conflict in 1953, 1971, and 1982, Corcoran (1983) found that the general tone conveyed an intense dislike for the Russians, and the words most often used to characterize them were savages, dupes, adventurers, despots, and barbarians, while their behavior was described as brutal, treacherous, conniving, unmanly, aggressive, and animalistic. Depersonalized images were used to express a "Russo-phobic world view."

Expression in Cultural Products

The institutionalization of delegitimizing beliefs is also expressed in cultural products such as films, TV programs, books, and theatrical plays. They are part of a society's cultural repertoire, relaying societal views and shaping society members' attitudes toward the rival group. Through these channels the beliefs are widely disseminated to every sector of the public. The role of films in transmitting beliefs about the rival is of special note as they reach audiences of different ages and strata. Indeed, during the period of intractable conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, excluding the short period of cooperation during World War II, the American film industry portrayed Russians in an extremely negative way. Fyne (1985) points out that anti-Soviet films were already made following the Bolshevik revolution (*Sammy in Siberia*, 1919, or *Bavu*, 1923). However, between 1927 and 1941, and again after 1947, dozens of films made in the United States use delegitimizing stereotypes to portray Russians (e.g., *Red salute*, *Espionage*, *Comrade X*, *Iron curtain*, *The red menace*, *Red dawn*, *The invasion of the USA*, or *Rocky IV*). In these films, Communist Party members, Soviet

officials, or soldiers and the Russian people in general are portrayed as brutal, cruel, oppressive, aggressive, ruthless, cold-blooded, dogmatic, drunk, primitive, stupid, and imperialists (Cogley, 1956; Hann, 1983; Perkovich, 1987; Roffman & Pardy, 1981). Even as recently as 1984, the film *Red dawn* presents the Russians, Cubans, and Nicaraguans as absolutely immoral and violent. In the film the troops of the three nations invade the United States and are shown shooting in a school, murdering citizens, and abducting men to take them to concentration camps.

The same themes appeared in popular American literature. Various fiction and nonfiction books deal with American-Soviet conflict as the main theme or as a background for another story, and in almost all of them the Russians are the villains, or the enemy, identified and described by means of delegitimizing labels. For instance, Seed (1999) notes a development of a fiction genre during the Cold War that focuses on the imagined conquest of the United States by the Soviet Union. Theodora Dubois's novel *Solution T-25*, (1951) Jerry Sohl's book *Point ultimate* (1955), Robert Shafer's *The conquered place* (1955), and C. M. Kornbluth's *Not this August* (1955) are examples of this genre. In all these books Russians are depicted as brutal, violent, and ruthless.

Appearance in Educational Materials

Delegitimizing beliefs appear in school textbooks as part of the socialization process. This element of institutionalization is of special importance because the beliefs presented in the school textbooks reach the whole younger generation of a society. Moreover, because of the perceived epistemic authority of school textbooks, they are often considered to express truth and facts. Also, because of compulsory attendance in schools in almost all societies, all new generations are exposed to and learn from these books. During an intractable conflict, children, adolescents, and young adults learn a particular delegitimizing view of the opponent that shapes their beliefs, attitudes, and the accompanying emotions.

Carlson (1985) analyzes ten popular history textbooks of secondary schools to examine their presentation of the United States-Soviet Union relations. The majority of the schoolbooks devoted considerable place to ideological analysis, presenting the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of "right and wrong, freedom and totalitarianism, us and them." Such presentations, according to Carlson, "simplify and distort social reality in such a way that without engaging in direct falsehood, they consistently support one side of an issue or dispute and discredit or ignore opposing viewpoints. Ideological portrayals of history deal with stereotypes and clichés, and appeal selectively to common-sense beliefs, national pride, and fear of the enemy" (p. 57). Specifically, the textbooks stress the intentions of the Soviet Union to dominate the world, describe their evil practices in different countries, portray negatively Soviet

leaders, and stereotype Soviet people with pejorative labels. In another study, Walker (1995) notes the changes in the American college history textbooks with regard to their presentation of the Cold War. During the first two decades of the Cold War the textbooks regard the conflict as a result of Soviet aggression, expansion, and desire to dominate the world. In these textbooks the Soviets are presented simplistically and one-sidedly as aggressive, malevolent, and ungrateful in contrast to defensive, well-meaning, and generous Americans.

In sum, institutionalization of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire implies that it is stable and easily available in the society. It becomes part of the cultural context in which society members live. The channels of communication and the societal institutions maintain and support this repertoire by repeatedly communicating it. Institutionalization consolidates the repertoire and facilitates its perseverance and durability, even in the face of contradictory information. The contradictory information is rejected, and the society uses control mechanisms to ensure that society members do not express alternative beliefs. The institutionalized repertoire is a frozen and rigid repertoire, which resists change.

Functions

Negative stereotyped beliefs and especially delegitimizing beliefs that evolve in situations of intractable conflicts fulfill several important functions on both individual and group levels. First, as already noted, these beliefs fulfill the epistemic function of illuminating different aspects of the conflict situation. As other stereotypes, they provide information and explanations about the social world (Stangor & Schaller, 1996; Tajfel, 1981a; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). In the context of conflict, delegitimizing stereotypes explain the nature of the conflict, why it erupted, why it continues, and why it is violent. Because societies involved in intractable conflicts view their own goals as justified and perceive themselves in a positive light, they attribute all responsibility for the conflict to the characteristics and nature of the opponent, the enemy. Delegitimization labels (i.e., bloodthirsty, murderer, terrorist, cruel, oppressive, savage, vandal, or Nazi) help explain the opponent's goals and present them as "far reaching," "irrational," and "malevolent" goals, which threaten to negate the goals of the delegitimizing society. They also explain why the adversary is intransigent and irreconcilable and can preclude any possible peaceful solution; as a result, the conflict cannot be resolved (Bar-Tal, 1990a). In addition, delegitimizing beliefs provide an explanation for the opponent's violence, aggression, cruelty, lack of concern for human life, and viciousness (Finlay et al., 1967). They help explain how it is possible that an adversary can behave in such an inhumane and immoral way. Moreover, the situation of intractable conflict is extremely threatening and accompanied by stress,

vulnerability, uncertainty, and fear (Lieberman, 1964). As such it raises the need for a structure that allows quick explanations, understanding, and predictions (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Delegitimization labels fulfill these needs. A black-and-white approach, without shades of gray, enables fast, parsimonious, unequivocal, and simple understanding of the situation. It provides absolute clarity as to which group should be blamed for the conflict and violence, pointing at the delegitimized one.

Second, in their epistemic function, delegitimizing beliefs, as well as the label "enemy," also serve to justify the violence and destruction inflicted on the adversary by the delegitimizing group (Tajfel, 1981a). They provide justification for the individuals and for the social system as a whole to intentionally harm the rival and to institutionalize aggression toward the enemy (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This important function resolves feelings of dissonance, guilt, and shame.

Normally, human beings do not usually willingly harm other human beings. The sanctity of life is perhaps one of the most sacred values in modern societies. Killing or even hurting other human beings is considered the most serious violation of the moral code (Donagan, 1979; Kleinig, 1991). In intractable conflict, however, groups hurt each other in the most severe ways, even resorting to atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Delegitimization, by denying the adversary group humanity and attributing to him threatening characteristics, allows moral disengagement and such violence (Bandura, 1999). It provides justification for carrying out the most immoral acts and channels the attribution of one's own immoral behavior to external factors. The punishment of terrorists, murderers, or Huns and Nazis who by their disposition, intentions, and behavior trigger the negative acts against them is thus justified. As one Iraqi military commander reported in a publicized statement to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war "We gladly inform you of the annihilation of thousands of harmful magi insects. . . . We . . . will turn what is left of these harmful insects into food for the birds of the wilderness and the fish of the marshes" (Bengio, 1986, p. 475). The cognitive framing of the adversary group with delegitimizing labels frees the framers from moral restraints, by providing them with an epistemic justification and turning them into killers (Bandura, 1999; Kelman, 1973; Staub, 1989).

Third, delegitimizing beliefs and the label "enemy" have the function of reflecting a shared reality for group members (Oakes et al., 1994). They express the nature of the conflict between rival groups and indicate that it is an intractable conflict. In essence, according to Oakes et al. (1994), their expression is a political act of the group revealing the norms and values to which group members are expected to subscribe. This may be viewed as the expressive function of attitudes and opinions suggested by Katz (1960), aiming, in this case, to express the common perception of reality in the context of the intractable conflict. Holding shared views about the rival

group reflects a common fate, provides important content for the societal repertoire, and reaffirms identification with the group.

Fourth, delegitimizing beliefs create a sense of differentiation and superiority (Tajfel, 1978a, 1981a) to the extent of totally excluding the delegitimized group from the community of groups considered as acting within the accepted range of norms and values. Because the rival group is not only perceived as an enemy but also is delegitimized and viewed as belonging to a lower category, the demarcated boundaries between the groups are not penetrable. The delegitimized group is perceived as completely different, especially in view of the fact that the ingroup ascribes to itself positive characteristics. This extends the differentiation and emphasizes feelings of superiority. In the situation of an intractable conflict, when both sides engage in violence, often performing immoral acts, feelings of superiority are of special importance.

Fifth, delegitimizing beliefs have a motivating function. On the one hand, they indicate to group members that the delegitimizing group should be avenged for the violent acts performed against them and, on the other hand, they imply a need to initiate violent acts to prevent the perceived potential danger and threat. Vengeance is a norm in many societies and may even be considered a moral requirement (Turney-High, 1949). That is, in some societies members think that retribution for suffered violence is appropriate and they have an obligation to harm physically members of the rival group. The delegitimizing labels constantly remind group members about the violent acts performed against them and indicate that such acts may recur. They, thus, imply that their violent acts could prevent possible harm by the enemy.

Sixth, delegitimizing beliefs and the label "enemy" serve as motivators for mobilization. They supply information that implies threat and danger to the group. Therefore, group members are required to take all necessary steps in order to cope successfully with the other group. Withstanding the enemy and averting the danger of delegitimized groups such as "murderers," "Nazis," "terrorist," or "psychopaths" requires full mobilization. In intractable conflicts, delegitimizing labels serve as cues to remind the ingroup about the threats and the mobilizing steps that have to be taken to counter the threatening outgroup.

These six functions indicate that delegitimization operates circularly (see Bar-Tal, 1990a). Delegitimization is a result of the particular nature of the intractable conflict and its threatening implications. In this capacity delegitimization provides an efficient, simplistic, and unambiguous explanation of the nature of the conflict and its threatening nature. This explanation, in turn, leads to group mobilization for coping with the threat and harming the opponent as a preventive or retributational act. However, the need to justify the violence carried out and the harm inflicted strengthens the delegitimization (see Figure 2.1). In other words, once a group performs




FIGURE 2.1. Delegitimization during intractable conflict.

violent acts, it needs a justification for them. Delegitimization is applied, not only to justify behavior, but also to strengthen the perception of threat and the threatening nature of the rival group. That is, the delegitimizing labels imply that the other group has the disposition to carry out evil, intentional, and malevolent acts. Thus, seeing them as threatening and experiencing threat are obvious reactions. In the same way, performed acts of mobilization are justified by the threatening nature of the rival group, and then mobilization of the group strengthens the perception of threat.

The discussion of delegitimization indicates that it plays an important role in the psychological dynamics of the intractable conflict. It evolves as one of its serious consequences, but with time it begins to feed back and becomes one of the fueling factors in the intractable nature of the conflict. The use of delegitimization indicates that an opponent group is evil, and therefore the conflict must be sustained as the enemy cannot be trusted and has to be contained. When the negative psychological intergroup repertoire, together with the delegitimizing beliefs, is stored in the minds of society members, it exerts considerable influence on the way they process information.

Consequences of the Psychological Intergroup Repertoire

In situations of intractable conflict, the psychological intergroup repertoire is constantly activated because conflict is central to the life of the group and is institutionalized. The conflict situation constitutes a permanent, salient, and relevant context for group members, in which the adversary group features prominently in the information provided by the communication channels of the ingroup. In other words, there is a continuous and constant exposure to information about the rival group. In such contexts, the psychological intergroup repertoire is frequently used by society members and thus becomes permanently accessible. Figure 2.2 depicts this process and shows how activation of the category of the adversary group leads to accessibility of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire, which is made up of delegitimizing characteristics, negative attitudes, disliking, hatred, fear, and the label enemy. This repertoire provides the prism through which group members perceive, evaluate, and eventually act. It defines the situation for them and construes their reality. We propose that this repertoire can be viewed as a syndrome of animosity, because it leads to a number of symptoms, all associated with a hostile relationship toward the rival group. Specifically, it leads to selective collection of information, which means that group members tend to search and absorb information that is in line with the repertoire and omit contradictory information. But, even when ambiguous or contradictory information is absorbed, it is encoded and cognitively processed to be in accordance with the held repertoire through bias, addition, and distortion. Bias leads to a focus on the

Prism
Negative
Psychological
Intergroup
Repertoire




FIGURE 2.2. Activation and consequences of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire during intractable conflict.

consistent part of the absorbed information, disregarding the inconsistent part, or to interpretation of ambiguous information in line with the held repertoire. Addition leads one to go beyond the absorbed information and to add parts from the held repertoire that make the information consistent with the repertoire. Distortion indicates a change in the absorbed information, even when it is unambiguous, to adapt it to the contents of the held repertoire.

Although few studies have examined the effects of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire on psychological functioning in real-life intractable conflicts, there is considerable evidence from laboratory studies simulating nonthreatening situations. Thus, we can assume that if the following effects are found in relatively noninvolving and nonthreatening situations, they would also be found in the real-life situations of intractable conflict. We now extend the description of how negative psychological repertoires (focusing on stereotypes) act to preserve the particular view of the conflict and the rival group during intractable conflict. This view, as shown in Figure 2.2, is formed by the selective collection of information, biased interpretation, going beyond the collected information by adding elements consistent with the held view, and distorting the perceived information.

The Basis for Expectations

Group members who hold a negative psychological intergroup repertoire always expect members of the rival group to have negative dispositions and bad intentions and to behave accordingly. Such expectations may cause the self-fulfilling-prophecy phenomenon. In expecting negative intentions and behavior, they themselves behave toward the rival group in a negative way, instigating hostility and animosity, thus confirming the initial expectations and creating a vicious hostile circle (see the analysis of Hamilton et al., 1990, and Jussim & Fleming, 1996). In their study of social class stereotypes, Darley and Gross (1983) demonstrate that held stereotypes about the working class influenced college students' expectations about the achievement of a girl from this socioeconomic class. The researchers summarized their study by positing that stereotypes serve as tentative hypotheses for which people seek confirmatory information. An early laboratory study by Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974) demonstrates the full cycle of the self-fulfilling prophecy in a dyadic interview situation. In the first experiment they found that white interviewers subtly exhibited more negative behavior toward a black than toward a white interviewee. The second experiment was designed to examine the effects of the differential treatment that was found in the first experiment. Thus, subjects were asked to serve as interviewees and were treated either in the way the white interviewee was treated in the first experiment or in the way that the black interviewee was treated. The results show that the latter group performed less adequately than the former group. We can learn from these two experiments

that when group members are treated negatively because of negative perceptions and expectations, they eventually fulfill the prophecy and perform according to the expectations.

Attention to a Particular Type of Information

The negative psychological intergroup repertoire leads to enduring sensitivity for information that is congruent with the valence and content of the repertoire. Group members are especially attentive to information that provides validation to their views about the conflict and the rival group. They are selective in their information processing by actively searching for confirmatory information, preferring it, identifying it easily, and being less open to alternative information (S. T. Fiske, 1998; Stephan, 1989). Studies by Macrae and his colleagues serve as examples for this tendency. Three experiments by Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994) show that college students pay special attention to information about held stereotype characteristics, which facilitate judgmental process, but neglect ambiguous and neutral information. The process of selection was automatic, since the students were unaware even of the stereotype's activation. This study showed that the deployment of stereotypes in a shortcut way freed limited cognitive resources for the execution of another cognitive activity. A study by Johnston and Macrae (1994) shows that perceivers prefer and use information that quickly and easily confirms their stereotypic view of an outgroup.

Encoding the Incoming Information

The negative psychological intergroup repertoire influences the translation of incoming information coming from the environment. Group members tend to use a theory-driven strategy to absorb new information about the rival group in line with the delegitimizing stereotypes, disliking, and negative emotions. According to an extensive review of empirical studies regarding the influence of stereotypes and prejudice on the encoding process, carried out by von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, and Vargas (1995), stereotypes actually influence information processing. Individuals generate stereotype-congruent images with ambiguous information, change moderately incongruent information so it will be encoded in line with the held stereotypes, and encode unambiguous incongruent information in a way that it will be less memorable.

Evaluating and Interpreting the Incoming Information

Stereotypes influence how newly absorbed information is evaluated as favorable or unfavorable and what kind of meaning it is attributed (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Manis, 1998; von Hippel et al., 1995). In situations of intractable conflict where delegitimizing stereotypes, disliking, and negative emotions are common features, information is absorbed in specific ways.

It is not only encoded in line with the view of the conflict; group members also tend to make inferences that go far beyond the data. They make evaluations, interpretations, and attributions that shed negative light on the rival group, in line with their held view. This tendency reflects biased and distorted information processing in which group members change and add elements to construct images that are consistent with their delegitimizing beliefs, negative attitudes, and emotions. The influence of the negative intergroup repertoire on such information processing is especially pronounced in situations when the information is ambiguous, which is often the case in real political contexts. But, when the repertoire is well established and institutionalized, as is the case in intractable conflicts, biased and distorting information processing also occurs, even when information is unequivocal.

Laboratory studies have demonstrated the effects of the stereotypes on cognitive processing. For example, a study by Sagar and Schofield (1980) shows how stereotypes influence the interpretation of information about behavior. In this study, white and black preadolescents were shown a variety of ambiguously threatening behaviors performed in dyadic interactions by white and black male students and were asked to judge the behaviors and attribute characteristics to the actor. The results showed that even innocuous acts by blacks were likely to be considered significantly more threatening by all the participants in the study than the same behaviors performed by whites. Also, more negative traits were attributed to blacks than to whites. Another example of bias is found in cases in which the negative behavior of the rival group is attributed to innate characteristics, while situational factors are disregarded (see, e.g., Pettigrew, 1979, who labels this tendency as the "ultimate attribution error"). A study by D. M. Taylor and Jaggi (1974) demonstrates this error. It found that when Hindus in India were presented with a story in which a Hindu or a Muslim behaved in a desirable or undesirable manner, they attributed negative behavior of a Muslim to personal dispositions and positive behavior to external causes, whereas the opposite attributions were made for the behaviors of the Hindu. Similarly, in a study by Hunter, Stringer, and Watson (1991) Catholic and Protestant students in Northern Ireland were shown newsreel footage of scenes of violence performed by Protestants and Catholics and were asked to explain why the involved people behaved in the depicted way. The results showed very clearly that the violence of the ingroup was attributed to external causes such as "retaliation" or "fear of being attacked," whereas the violence of the outgroup was attributed to internal dispositions such as being a "psychopath" or affected by "blood lust."

Two following studies performed in the context of the Cold War demonstrate how group members go beyond the information they have and add interpretations that are in line with their psychological intergroup

repertoire. In a study by Burn and Oskamp (1989) carried out in 1986, American students were asked to stereotype Soviet and American citizens and their governments. In addition, they were asked to explain four comparable acts by the USSR or the United States in the international arena (e.g., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American invasion of Grenada, the Soviet presence in Poland and American support of Nicaraguan contras). They were supplied with four different reasons, which varied in terms of how favorable they were. The results first show that the Soviets were evaluated negatively in absolute terms, and then that all four Soviet actions were evaluated negatively, whereas the actions of the United States, with an exception of one, were evaluated positively. Similarly, a study by Sande et al. (1989) done in 1985, reports that American high school and college students gave opposing explanations of similar acts if performed either by the Soviet Union or the United States (a positive act of smashing ice fields to allow whales to reach an open sea and a negative act of building a new fleet of nuclear-powered submarines). The results indicate that the positive act was evaluated as more typical of Americans than of Soviets and different attributions were put forward. Whereas the actions of the United States were attributed to the positive moral characteristics of the Americans, the same acts of the Soviet Union were attributed to the self-serving and negative motives of the Russians in line with their enemy image.

Remembering Confirming Information

Information that is in line with well-established negative stereotypes about the rival in the context of stressful, intractable conflict is better remembered and is more easily recalled (see reviews by Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992, and Stangor & McMillan, 1992). The negative psychological intergroup repertoire is readily accessible in the minds of group members, because it is used and maintained by societal channels of information. Hamilton and Rose (1980) demonstrate this tendency in a laboratory experiment: students who were shown slides depicting occupational groups with traits that did and did not correspond to the occupation's stereotype (e.g., attractive stewardess and attractive salesman) were able to remember information consistent with the occupational stereotypes much better than information that was inconsistent.

In essence, in intractable conflict the negative psychological intergroup repertoire is chronically accessible, which allows functional structure and organization of reality. It construes the conflict situation in black-and-white terms as threatening, dangerous, explosive, and menacing. The rival group is perceived in delegitimizing terms. In general, this view of reality results in a complete self-focus, self-positive image, and a concentration on one's own needs in coping successfully with the conflict situation. The dominant view of reality disregards any sensitivity to, consideration of, or empathy

for the needs of the rival. Even the rival's basic needs are considered as opposing the supreme goal of containing the enemy.

CONCLUSION

The negative psychological intergroup repertoire is one of the influencing factors on group behavior. It has a great effect on the intragroup and intergroup behavior of society because of the construed view of the conflict situation. We already discussed the behavioral consequences of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire while describing its functions (see Figure 2.1). As indicated, on an intragroup level the repertoire leads to mobilization of the group members in view of the perceived threats and dangers. The perceived situation demands solidarity, unity, cohesiveness, readiness to endure hardships and sacrifice, even of life. On the intergroup level, the negative repertoire leads to violent acts against the rival group and often to the discrimination and control of rival group members. The latter situation takes place when the rival groups live in one state and the majority group has the power to discriminate and control the rival minority. In keeping with their view of the enemy, group members feel they may use "legitimate" aggressive acts to achieve their own goals and deal with the rival. This view is part of the double-standard practice, which implies that the ingroup members judge in opposing ways the same or similar acts carried out by one's own group and by the enemy (see the study by Sande et al., 1989). The acts of the ingroup are always justifiable, even when the group initiates them, because they are against the enemy and therefore considered to be in defense, as a last resort, preventive, retributive, and containing or aimed at achieving basic moral values. In contrast, the acts of the enemy are always seen as unjustified aggression, brutal, violating basic moral norms, and reflecting the delegitimizing stable characteristics.

In those cases of conflict where the two opposing populations live in one entity (a state), the view of the rival may lead to discrimination and control, as for example in Northern Ireland, Turkey, Sri Lanka, or Israel. In these cases, the majority feels threatened even when most of the minority group does not take part in violence against the majority group. Discrimination implies unequal treatment of the rival minority group in comparison to the rights, rewards, duties, and obligations of the majority group, and control means the exercise of authority and domination over the life of the rival group. Discrimination and control in conflict are carried out not only because of ethnocentric or racist reasons but also as part of the coping strategies created to deal with the threat and danger that the view of the rival group implies.

In turn, views of the conflict situation and behavior provide an input for the validation and strengthening of the held negative psychological intergroup repertoire. The perceived reality validates the held repertoire

and one's own performed aggressive behavior serves as information and evidence for the negative perception of the enemy. In essence, we have a vicious cycle of behaviors and negative psychological intergroup repertoire, which feed each other and lead to the continuation of the intractable conflict (see Figures 2.1, 2.2). The continuous violence of intractable conflict makes it difficult to break the cycle and resolve the conflict peacefully. Nevertheless, conflicts can be transformed; some are resolved (as, e.g., between the United States and the Soviet Union or in South Africa and Nicaragua), and some are even able to change from intractable to tractable and move into a period of peacemaking, even though there may be occasional violence (as, e.g., in Northern Ireland). In this process, the negative psychological intergroup repertoire also changes (Aronson, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2000b; Kriesberg, Northup, & Thorson, 1989; Rothstein, 1999). In fact, this is one of the challenges of the reconciliation process, but it requires altering the view of the enemy. This change is to be discussed in the last chapter of this book.

After delineating the conceptual framework of the evolution of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire in the situation of intractable conflict, we now turn to the analysis of our case study – the evolution of stereotype, attitude, and emotions toward Arabs in the Israeli society. This analysis serves as an illustrating example of one case, which we believe can be generalized in its dynamics to other cases of intractable conflict in the world. In line with the presented conception, we begin the analysis of our case with the description of the context in which the negative psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs evolved.

The Context

The Arab-Israeli Intractable Conflict

As the previous chapters suggested, in order to understand why particular psychological intergroup repertoires evolve, it is necessary to unveil the macrocontext of a particular society. Macrocontext is formed by the social, political, economic, and cultural characteristics and conditions of a specific society. They include collective memory, ethos, values, societal beliefs, norms, economic conditions, political system, economic conditions, societal structure, intragroup relations, and intergroup relations – in sum, all the macrofactors that can have a bearing on how beliefs, attitudes, and emotions toward other groups develop in particular time, space, and conditions. Some of these contextual factors, such as intergroup relations, societal structure, and economic conditions, provide the basis for experiences that foster the development of particular stereotypes, attitudes, or emotions toward specific outgroups. Other contextual factors of a more societal or cultural nature such as norms, values, collective memory, and societal beliefs (e.g., ethnocentric beliefs) constitute the sociocognitive emotional basis from which particular contents (i.e., ideas) may be drawn and/or which can support or discourage the evolvment of a particular repertoire. The sociocultural context is of special importance because it contains the building blocks with which a group constructs the content of its stereotypes and the rationale for this content. Strong ethnocentric beliefs, which elevate one's own group above other groups, or past traumas preserved in collective memories that lead to a deep mistrust of outgroups are only two examples of the cultural context that can affect how groups develop their cultural stereotypes within a context of particular intergroup relations.

We demonstrate in this and the following chapters that the main determinative contextual factor in the evolvment of the Israelis' negative intergroup psychological repertoire about Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular is the intractable conflict that began at the turn

of the 19th century and which still continues today. The context of this intractable conflict is the focus of the present book. We realize that other factors also have certain but less significant influence on the Israelis' negative view (i.e., repertoire) of Arabs. First, we assume that at least some of the Jews living in different parts of the world, including Arab countries, had a well-formed psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs before emigrating to what was then Palestine and later became Israel. This early repertoire held by Jews, in most of the cases, was not related to the Jewish-Arab conflict at all. It was based on other factors such as the experience of living with Arabs, knowledge about Arabs, or knowledge of the history of relations between Arabs and the different societies in which Jews lived. Although this type of context provides an interesting basis for analysis, we believe that the course of the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Middle East has had the determinative effect on the way the Jews living in Israel look at Arabs. This assumption is reinforced by the complete mobilization of society and the melting processes involved in making an Israeli society of immigrants. They provided the crucial and unifying experiences for the formation of the consensual psychological repertoire about Arabs by Jews living in Israel.

In addition, several other contextual factors could be analyzed in the discussion of the Jewish Israeli perception of Arabs. These factors include, for example, the context of nation building in Israeli society, which entailed the delineation of boundaries between one's own group and other groups and the construction of the image of the enemy to strengthen social identity; the context of economic recession, hardship, and frustration, which leads to outgroup hostility; and the context of societal intragroup tensions in the Israeli multicultural society, in which an external enemy functions to increase solidarity, unity, and cohesion. Also, from another direction, perceptions were affected by a process of liberalization and democratization that brought openness, skepticism, criticism, and civility to the Israeli society. In turn, this line of development since the late 1960s also influenced norms of tolerance and put in question the prevailing views and practices toward Arabs. The discussion of all these factors is beyond the scope of the present book (see their conceptual presentation in Chapter 1).

Nevertheless, before dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, we first briefly discuss two sociocultural contextual factors that in our opinion have had a particular direct and unique influence on the evolution of Arab stereotypes and prejudice in Jewish society in Israel: ethnocentrism, which underlies the feelings of superiority and the rejection of other groups (Sumner, 1906); and past intergroup experiences, which concern the particular collective memories of Jews about their relations with other groups.

SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT

Ethnocentrism

Two types of ethnocentrism have had an effect on attitudes toward Arabs, one from the European tradition and the other from Jewish culture. The first type of ethnocentrism, which was especially dominant in previous centuries, is based on the long-standing European feelings of superiority toward non-European people and cultures, including Arabs. The Orient, where the Arabs live, was viewed as backward and primitive, and Arabs were stereotyped along these lines (Said, 1995). Gertz (1995), analyzing Israeli Jewish national myths, notes that during the War of Independence of 1948 this type of ethnocentrism was dominant in the Zionist narrative. It depicted the Jewish hero as representing "an over-arching front of the European nations, standing against the Asiatic Levant, primitive and cruel" (p. 38), in which Arabs represent an archaic, unrooted desert culture. Evidence shows that the first Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries also held these views because the great majority of them were from European countries, almost all secular, and some had extensive European education.

These ethnocentric perceptions were prevalent before the conflict escalated and served as a negative basis for the evolvement of the psychological repertoire resulting from the violent confrontation. Almost all of the immigrants from Europe perceived the Arab population through the European prism of paternalism and ethnocentrism. Through the eyes of the "civilized Europeans," Jewish immigrants perceived the Arabs as primitive, uneducated, backward, and uncivilized. This perception was supported by their encounter with fellahin (Arab tenant farmers), from poor villages, who came to work in Jewish settlements and constituted for them the representatives of the Arab population. They very rarely had interpersonal interaction with the educated Arab families living in the cities. Seeing the low living standards of the Arab population, its different appearance and customs, and lack of formal education reinforced the prevalent ethnocentric stereotyping held by many Europeans toward Arabs in this period (Gorny, 1987; A. Shapira, 1992). Also, on the basis of personal encounters with Arab workers, additional characteristics crystallized to add to the Arab stereotype. According to A. Shapira (1992),

Arabs were considered to be lazy loafers. If they had no "supervisor," they would not work at all. On the other hand, they were ready to work to the point of exhaustion for a pittance. Stereotypical wisdom held that the Arab respected strength and valor but was a coward, and gave in at the slightest show of force. The lack of respect with which the fellahin or Bedouin treated the property of others – manifested in stealing from the fields, houses, or farmyards – infuriated the Jewish

settlers. The Arabs are all thieves was a complaint voiced in a number of variations by the settlers. (pp. 58–59)

During the first decades, in addition to the described prejudice, there were Jews who maintained romantic admiration for specific Arab characteristics, which could also be found in the European tradition. But a particular Jewish aspect was the focus in this romantic view – the Arabs were viewed as descendants of the ancient Israelites and thus as people who have a common origin with the Jews. This view focused on the resemblance between Arabs and the ancient Israelites in their external appearance, rootedness to the land, and productive work as farmers. Those Jews who held this view tried to imitate Arabs' dressing and their way of life. Even the first members of Ha-Shomer (Watchman), an organization that was established in 1909 to protect Jewish villages against Arab transgressions, were dressed in Arab clothing and were inspired by Arab bravery and skills to ride horses. Thus, in this view, the new Israeli Jews were supposed to be modeled after the Arabs, who live in a way similar to biblical ancestors – brave, heroic, having close ties with the land – all that the Jews in the Diaspora lacked (Ben-Ezer, 1997; Even-Zohar, 1980; A. Shapira, 1992). But even this perception was accompanied by feelings of superiority and paternalism, which derived from the previously described European ethnocentrism.

In addition to the influence of the European ethnocentrism, Jews' psychological repertoire about Arabs has also been affected by their own ethnocentrism with the particular view of the "other," the Gentile. First, the Jewish ethnocentrism is fed by the basic belief, predicated by their whole tradition, that Jews were singled out from the ranks of all the nations to be the people chosen by God for his service. Jews are thus nearest to God, different in status from other nations, being reckoned to have attained the highest religious virtues. This belief has a position of *sui generis*: it has been explicitly stated in the Bible and in principal prayers of the liturgy (J. Katz, 1961). It also has been expressed frequently in the public discourse in modern Israel by leaders and members of the media, who speak about the superior morality of the Jewish people, who are "a light to the gentiles." In this context, the "other" in the Jewish culture is viewed not only as inferior but also with hostility and mistrust. It is based on the biblical view of the "other" (see, e.g., Dothan & Cohn, 1994; Machinist, 1994) and greatly supported by the experiences of the Jews during their 2,000 years of exile (Liebman, 1978).

Past Intergroup Experiences

Also, in order to understand fully the development of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs, observers have suggested

looking at the carried collective memories about past negative intergroup experiences of Jews (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990b; Elon, 1971). The Jewish history shows that from the destruction of the Second Temple and the beginning of the forced exile in the Roman era, through the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution until the present, Jews have consistently and continuously been subjects, in almost every place they lived, of what we would call today massive anti-Semitism. Through this long history they experienced persecution, libel, social taxation, restriction, forced conversion, expulsion, and pogroms (e.g., Grosser & Halperin, 1979; Poliakov, 1974). As a result, as Liebman (1978) rightly points out, "Jewish tradition finds anti-Semitism to be the norm, the natural response of the non-Jew. . . . The term 'Esau hates Jacob' symbolizes the world which Jews experience. It is deeply embedded in the Jewish folk tradition" (p. 45).

But the climax of these experiences took place in the twentieth century with "the final solution to the Jewish problem," the systematic genocide that we now call the Holocaust (see Dawidowicz, 1975). The fact that 6 million Jews perished while "the world" remained indifferent (e.g., Morse, 1968) served crucially to strengthen the collective memory about trauma with regard to the Gentiles' treatment of Jews and left its marks on future generations and their experience (N. Keren, 1985; Segev, 1991; Zafran & Bar-Tal, 2003). In the Jewish point of view, the Holocaust does not stand alone as one grim event but is a metaphor for the Jewish history itself (H. F. Stein, 1978). This is of critical importance for understanding the Israeli view of dangers and threats in the Arab-Israeli conflict and of Arabs themselves, as it is expressed for instance in the following insightful observation: "The Holocaust remains a basic trauma of Israeli society. It is impossible to exaggerate its effect on the process of nation-building. . . . There is a latent hysteria in Israeli life that stems directly from this source. . . . The trauma of the Holocaust leaves an indelible mark on the national psychology, the tenor and content of public life, the conduct of foreign affairs, on politics, education, literature and the arts" (Elon, 1971, pp. 198–99).

As a result of these experiences, Israeli society can therefore be characterized by a siege mentality, which is based on the prevailing societal beliefs stating that the Jewish society is alone in a hostile world (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992). This siege mentality, which is widely spread in the society and constitutes a significant part of the Israeli ethos (see Arian, 1995; Gertz, 1995; Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983), affects the perception of outgroups, and in the context of Arab-Israeli conflict it serves as a powerful factor in viewing Arabs. It has several notable effects, which have to be considered in the present analysis of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire applied to Arabs in the Israeli society.

First, on the cognitive level, siege beliefs allow members of Israeli society to define the world in relatively simple, manageable terms. These beliefs are especially functional in equivocal situations in which flows

extensive, threatening information about dangers to personal and societal existence. Siege beliefs facilitate the management of cognitive ambiguities by dichotomizing the world through black-white solutions, for example, rejection of all other groups versus acceptance of one's own group: that is, a strict differentiation between "us" and "them." This tendency appears especially in situations of conflict. It implies a pessimistic world view: nothing good can be expected from the "rest of the world." The late Israeli leader, and one of the founders of Israel, Pinchas Sapir, expressed this view directly when he said: "If we don't believe [that our backs are against the wall], if we don't take into account the worst possibility, we will bring upon ourselves a Holocaust because of our sightedness" (*Haaretz*, April 29, 1973).

Second, a siege mentality, implying a deep threat, causes the development of negative attitudes toward other nations, which may be accompanied by chauvinism – blind and fanatical support of one's own society with zealous rejection of the other societies (B. C. Shafer, 1972). Those Israeli Jews who hold siege beliefs tend to view the nations of the world as evil, immoral, utilitarian, indifferent, and often brutal (see Bar-Tal, 2000a; H. F. Stein, 1978). The short history of Israel, and especially of the years just preceding the foundation of the state, reinforced these feelings. An example of these negative attitudes can be found in the following statements by three Israeli prime ministers embedded in their descriptions of the world. David Ben Gurion stated that "In the course of its long 4,000-year-old journey across the stage of world history, through most of the world, east and west, north and south, our people have incessantly met with expressions of hatred and hostility, libels and accusations, persecution and torture, destruction and massacres. . . . Over thousands of years, this hatred and animosity changed form but its essence never altered much" (*Davar*, February 17, 1953). Yitzhak Rabin stated on Holocaust memorial day: "In every generation they rise up to destroy us, and we must remember that this could happen to us in the future. We must therefore, as a state, be prepared for this" (*Haaretz*, April 27, 1987). And Benjamin Netanyahu said: "It is especially regretful that of all places, Europe, in which one-third of the Jewish people perished, chooses to coerce a solution which endangers the State of Israel and its interests" (*Haaretz*, March 26, 1999).

Negative attitudes about the world and the experience of threat and insecurity have meant that Israeli Jews have become sensitive to information and cues coming from other groups. This sensitivity is based on the lack of trust in and suspicion of other societies, which in their view have negative intentions. Such sensitivity is necessary to avoid surprise negative action from the external world, which, given its evil intentions, may act to harm. Therefore, every piece of information or cue is scrutinized for evidence of negative intentions. Society members may be disposed to search for information that is consistent with these beliefs, while disregarding

evidence that does not support them. Any ambiguous information may be interpreted as validating the siege beliefs too. Arian, Talmud, and Hermann (1988) point out that "the clear feeling of basic mistrust regarding the international environment is the basic feature of the foreign and security polity of Israel. There is a fundamental belief that in the final analysis the world will do nothing to protect Jews, as individuals, as a collectivity, as a state" (pp. 21–22).

No doubt the siege mentality of Jews also had an effect on the way Arabs were perceived. It provided a cultural context in which the information about the conflict and about the rival Arabs was processed. It contributed to their negative stereotyping and to sensitivity in processing information about their hostile intentions. But we believe that although the sociocultural factors played their functions, it is the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict that played a major role in forming the contents and quality of the psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs, which was in turn reinforced by other factors. As the conflict developed and became intractable, it determined the way Jews in Israel (or in Palestine, before the establishment of the state) stereotyped Arabs, evaluated them, and felt toward them. Moreover, it should be stated that the described context of intractable conflict has had a similar influence on the psychological repertoire of the Palestinians and other Arab nations as well.

THE INTRACTABLE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The context of conflict is the main macrofactor responsible for the evolution of stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions by Israeli Jews toward the Arabs. In the term "context of conflict" we refer to the intergroup relations and their past history, which in this case constitute one inseparable whole. The current conflictive intergroup relations between Israeli Jews and Arabs are a direct reflection of their past history. Both sides agree that the two groups are in a state of conflict and that it corresponds to all the seven proposed criteria of being intractable. The term Arab-Israeli conflict is often used to describe its generality, and it was an appropriate label in the late 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. But at present there are differential relations with different Arab states and nations. The focal issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the relationship with the Palestinians that impinges on the Israeli relations with other Arab nations.

The Israeli-Arab conflict is centered on the contested territory known as Palestine, an area claimed by two national movements as their homeland. For more than 80 years, Palestinian nationalism and Zionism, the Jewish national movement, have clashed recurrently over the right for self-determination, statehood, and justice. Moreover, the conflict for many years was perceived as being over national identity. The Palestinians and the Jews believed that acceptance of the other identity negates directly their

own case. Each side held the view that if one's own group is considered a nation, the other cannot be considered as such. Acknowledging the other nationhood was seen for many years as acceptance of the right of the other group to establish a national state in that land, which in turn was believed to indicate the weakening of one's own claim for the same land. Thus, the issue of the territorial claims touches on a very fundamental issue of national survival (Kelman, 1999a).

The conflict, however, is not only territorial and political but also concerns deep contradictions in religious and cultural interests. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share the same roots and relate to the same territory, since the same places are sacred for all three religions. The Arab Muslim majority and the Arab Christian minority struggle with the Jews over the control of some of the holy places. Also, the influx of Jews from the Diaspora has changed the demographic balance of the area, which used to be mainly populated by Muslim Arabs. Not only were the newcomers of a different religion, but also many brought Western values, norms, and practices to an area that was characterized by the dominantly Muslim culture.

The Arab-Israeli conflict started as a communal conflict between the Jews and Palestinians living in British-ruled Palestine and evolved into a full-blown interstate conflict between Israel and Arab states during the War of 1948–1949. Since the 1967 war, with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the conflict continues on both interstate and communal levels (Sandler, 1988). According to Sandler (1988), each new phase involved intensive violence and was followed by the introduction of new parties to the conflict and the development of new patterns of hostile interaction.

For a long time the conflict seemed irreconcilable and total. The dispute concerned elementary issues, involving the basic existential needs of each side, and it was impossible to find an agreeable solution for both parties. In various attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully, Israel's minimum requirements exceeded the Arabs' maximum concession and vice versa. It is not surprising that the sides mobilized all possible resources, efforts, and supports within the group and the international community in order to win what was perceived as a zero-sum conflict.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been violent almost from its beginning. At first, economic boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, and occasional violence erupted, which reached a climax in the Arab rebellion of 1936–1939. Following the decision in the United Nations in 1947 to divide the land between the Jews and the Palestinians, a full-scale war broke out that claimed many thousands of lives, including civilians, and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians became refugees. Through the years, at least four additional wars were fought – 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 – and in between them, violent activities erupted continuously. They included military engagements, infiltration of hostile forces, terrorist attacks, bombardments, and air raids.

Between 1987 and 1990 Palestinians waged an uprising (Intifada), and in September 2000 they began their second Intifada called Al-Aqsa.

The conflict has been on the public agenda of the involved groups continuously, with related events having a direct impact on those living in the conflict region. The involved parties have learned to live with this harsh and violent reality. Without an alternative, coping with the conflict has become a way of life for the Israelis and Arabs, which requires both groups to invest a great deal of human and material resources.

Although some intractable features are still present, the nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict changed with the visit of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977. The peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the Madrid conference in 1991, the agreements with the Palestinians in 1993 and 1994, and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 are watersheds in the peace process, which have greatly affected the Arab-Jewish relations. The present eruption of violent confrontations between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians is the major setback to the peace process and may have an important influence on the quality of the intergroup relations between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East.

But, although the Jews and Arabs probably agree on this description of the intractability of their conflict, they disagree on most aspects of the conflict story: how did it develop, what was its course, and what were and are the stumbling blocks to its resolution? These major disagreements, as they appear in each side's narrative, encompass many of the details regarding the events. Anyone who reads the two narratives may think that he is reading about two totally different conflicts. The two narratives selectively choose events, bias their interpretation, add features, and distort some components of the story (Bar-Tal, 1990b; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). This discrepancy reflects the desire to maintain certain beliefs as the truth and refrain from examining or even acknowledging alternative information. This motivates the society to freeze with its own narrative, ignoring any information that does not correspond to the held narrative, but seeking out information that fits one's own views (Bar-Tal & Geva, 1985). These narratives are part of the psychological repertoire (as we called it in Chapter 2) of each group, which includes not only collective memory (i.e., the narratives) but also other societal beliefs, as well as attitudes, affect, and emotions. In effect the Israeli Jewish society and the Palestinian society (which is the focus of the Arab-Israeli conflict) have developed an ethos of conflict with various themes, including beliefs that delegitimize the rival, as elaborated earlier. In many respects they are mirror images (Bar-Tal, 1990b).

In order to understand the negative intergroup repertoire of the Israeli Jews, it is necessary to describe the conflict as each group sees it. The conflict, as perceived, is in the minds of the parties involved and constitutes their "reality." On the basis of this reality, a society forms its beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and courses of action. Thus, a discussion of the "real"

context is irrelevant for our purposes. We need to focus on how the intergroup context of the Arab-Israeli conflict is perceived by the Israeli Jews, because this perception is the basis from which the negative psychological intergroup repertoire evolves. This is in line with Thomas's theorem: "If people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (W. I. Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572).

THE JEWISH NARRATIVE OF THE CONFLICT

In our descriptions of context we relied on the formal presentation of the history of the Jewish-Arab conflictive relations in the Zionist narrative as it has appeared over the years in Israeli school textbooks, Israeli government information brochures, Israeli Jewish newspaper reports, and books. We realize that even in the Jewish camp there is no consensus on one single narrative to describe the course of events in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In different periods, different narratives appeared, which varied in their extensiveness of being shared by the Jewish public. However, it is assumed that until the late 1970s there were no major differences in Israeli Jewish mainstream society with regard to the narratives of the conflict; the Zionist narrative was hegemonic. Only some marginal groups had a different narrative of this history during the intractable conflict with Arabs. Alternative narratives began to emerge in the 1980s and were somewhat strengthened in the 1990s. They appeared in particular segments of the Israeli Jewish society but never gained a hegemonic status. Even in a polarized society, which disagreed on how the conflict ought to be resolved, the Zionist narrative about the past has remained dominant. Recent violent events between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians that began in fall 2000 reduced these disagreements, as most Israeli Jews view these events as evidence of bad intentions on the part of the Palestinians.

We emphasize that the description of the Zionist narrative presented here reflects widely held Jewish beliefs. These beliefs are of importance for the understanding of the development of the Jewish psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs, because they serve as a basis for interpretation of the present Israeli-Arab relations.

Background

In order to provide a background to the modern history of the Jewish people in Israel, we will say a few sentences about their ancient history.

The Jews' rebellion against the Romans was crushed in A.D. 70 and the Second Temple was destroyed with the conquest of Jerusalem (Neuberger, 1995). The Jews were forced to leave their homeland Judea, a place where the three patriarchs and their ancestors lived, where their nation was formed, where they had lived through the centuries, and where

their holy shrines were located – a place not only related to their history but promised to them by their God. So began the Jews' second exile, which lasted about 2,000 years, during which they suffered continuous discriminations, libels, persecutions, forced conversions, expulsions, and pogroms. Through these years of exile Jews never abandoned their dream of returning to their homeland. This dream was expressed in Jewish prayers, daily customs, literature, and philosophy (S. Katz, 1973).

The most important force in the last quarter of the 19th century that initiated the modern return to Zion was the realization that the advancement of the European civilization was not going to solve the "Jewish question." The hopes of the Jews in Europe to be not only formally emancipated but truly accepted as equals in their respective "host" nations were shattered by increasing social and intellectual anti-Semitism. In Eastern Europe, particularly in the Russian Empire and Romania, the Jews were repeatedly used as scapegoats by reactionary regimes and subjected to murderous pogroms initiated and organized by the regimes themselves (Ackerman, 1983; Zimmerman & Goldstein, 1992).

In the second half of the 19th century, the traumatic experiences of Jewish intellectuals in East and West produced a movement based on the reaffirmation of the Jewish identity, mostly in a secular, nationalist form, and the conviction that the Jewish question would remain insoluble unless the Jewish masses moved away and settled in an autonomous Jewish state to form an independent nation. The modern Jewish nationalism of the intellectuals soon merged with another powerful trend deeply rooted in the traditionalist Jewish masses, particularly in Eastern Europe. The traditionalists intuitively sought ways and means to preserve Judaism and Jewish traditions and to combat the rapid disintegration of self-contained Jewish societies in the ghetto and the breakup of the *shtetls*. In this view, a Jewish national renaissance can be conceived only if consciously rooted in the Hebrew language and Jewish culture and aimed at the revival of Jewish nationhood in Eretz Israel (Neuberger, 1995).

The merging of these two trends – the rational intellectual and the emotional traditional – gave birth to Zionism, as an organized political effort and the pioneering movement, in the late 19th century, which laid the foundations for the economic, social, and cultural rebirth of a Jewish nation on the soil of Eretz Israel. This land, which was in the 19th century a backwater of the weak Ottoman Empire, seemed eminently suitable for the purpose – "sparsely inhabited by a population of mixed religious groups and seemingly lacking any national consciousness or ambition of its own; a motherland waiting to be redeemed from centuries of neglect and decay by its legitimate sons" (*History from 1880*, 1973, p. 2).

The population of the region (called Palestine) at the turn of the 19th century was estimated at 400,000 inhabitants, including 24,000 Jews. The

Jewish community consisted mostly of religious orthodox Jews, concentrated mainly in the four cities: Jerusalem, Tiberias, Hebron, and Safed. The non-Jewish population consisted mostly of Arab peasants (called fellahin, who were tenant farmers) but also of Bedouin tribes and migrants from surrounding lands and from other portions of the Ottoman Empire. The Mediterranean coast and all the southern half of this region were sand covered, and the rare marshy plains were fens of malaria. Much of the land was in the hands of a small number of landowners, who lived far away from their holdings in Arab capital cities such as Beirut and Damascus (Aumann, 1976; S. Katz, 1973).

The Yishuv Period

The Ottoman Period of the Yishuv (1882–1917)

In 1882 the first wave of Jewish immigration arrived as part of the new national Zionist movement. Immigration to Palestine existed beforehand, but it was almost always based on a religious desire to live in the Holy Land. The Zionist newcomers of the first wave were of different characteristics – enthusiastic and idealistic, with national aspirations of building a homeland for the Jewish people (*History from 1880*, 1973; Kolatt, 1985). To realize their national aspirations, they began to buy land from Arab landowners to settle by constructing new Jewish settlements, mostly agricultural (Domka, 1998). In this way began a renewed Jewish community in Palestine (called Yishuv).

In 1904–1914 came the second wave of immigration (Second *Aliya*), which was marked by a socialist ideology (Zimmerman & Goldstein, 1992). Its aims were to conquer all forms of labor by Jews and to create a Jewish working class, as a means to redemption of the soil. At that time (1909), the first self-defense organization (called *Hashomer*, or the Watchman) was established in view of the growing violent acts by Arabs. Also, in the same year the first communal farm (*kibbutz*) was established as a unique form of collectivism, based on joint ownership of property, equality, and democratic decision making (Domka, 1998; *Facts about Israel*, 1979; Kolatt, 1985). During World War I the immigration stopped and the community, or Yishuv, suffered from escalating persecutions by the Turkish government, which deported thousands of Jews from the country. In addition, starvation and disease caused the death of hundreds and the emigration of others. As a result, Jewish population declined during the war from 85,000 to 57,000 (Domka, 1998; *History from 1880*, 1973). In 1917–1918 British troops had conquered Palestine and put an end to four centuries of Ottoman rule in Palestine (Domka, 1998). This was a crucial development for the Zionist movement.

Under the British Rule (1917–1948)

Before World War I, in Great Britain, were voices sympathetic with the Zionist movement, which recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. This sentiment was reflected in the letter sent publicly in 1917 by the British foreign secretary Balfour to Lord Rothschild in what has become known as the Balfour Declaration. In his letter, which was later approved by the British war cabinet, Balfour expressed Great Britain's sympathy with the Zionist aspirations to building a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (see *The Arab-Israeli conflict*, 1979).

In 1921 the Emir Abdullah established, in cooperation with Great Britain, Transjordan, thus excluding this area (75% of the historical land of Israel) from the Balfour Declaration and closing it to Jewish settlement. In 1922 the League of Nations entrusted Great Britain with a mandate incorporating the Balfour Declaration and recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land of Israel (*History from 1880*, 1973).

In the first years of the British Mandate the Jewish community rose both in numbers and in quality. Between 1919 and 1932, Jews immigrated in two phases (Third and Fourth *Aliya*), and the Jewish community increased to 160,000 people (*Facts about Israel*, 1979). Land purchase continued by the Jewish National Fund, and agricultural and urban villages stretched from the north to the south of the country. Jewish immigration brought an economical prosperity to the Arab community as well: thousands of Arabs were employed by Jews, land values rose, and government revenue was used to create a public health service and school system for all the sectors of the population (*History from 1880*, 1973). Due to the economic development, the former trend of emigration changed and Arabs began to immigrate to Palestine, too, and about 60,000 to 200,000 Arab immigrants came (Aumann, 1976).

Palestinian Arabs, headed by the extremist mufti (religious leader) of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Al-Husseini, were hostile toward the rising Jewish community. Although in 1919 Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann reached an agreement with the head of the Arab movement at the time, Emir Feisal, the appointment of Haj Amin Al-Husseini as mufti of Jerusalem in 1921 marked the beginning of an extremist uncompromising Palestinian policy, including the use of terror, both toward Jewish settlements and toward Arab political opponents. The first large-scale Arab riots against Jewish settlements took place in 1920–1921 (I. Shapira, 1991). Following these riots, which claimed the lives of Jews, a Jewish underground military organization called *Hagana* (literally meaning defense) was formed. In order to appease the Arabs, the British offered to form a legislative assembly in which the Arabs were expected to have an immense majority based on their numerical advantage over the Jewish Yishuv, but the Arabs rejected the plan. In 1929 large-scale riots occurred after a dispute over Jewish worship at the Western Wall. Violence included murders of Jewish passersby, burning

of Jewish property, and attacks on Jewish settlements. In Hebron, 67 Jews were massacred and others were evacuated, bringing to an end a local Jewish community. The riots were suppressed by British troops, but in 1936, after the immigration of over 160,000 Jews of the Fifth *Aliya*, Arab disturbances broke out again. The Arabs started with a general strike and a demand to stop Jewish immigration and land purchase by Jews and continued with attacks on the Jewish settlements. The Yishuv responded to the Arab attacks with a self-restraint policy, taking mostly defensive measures such as fortifying settlements and escorting supply convoys (*History from 1880, 1973*). The violence lasted until 1939. In 1937 the royal (Peel) commission, which was appointed to investigate the conflict, recommended the partition of Palestine into two states: Palestinian and Jewish. Leaders of the Jewish Yishuv principally accepted the partition plan, while the Arab higher committee rejected it (see *The Arab-Israeli conflict, 1979*).

The British sympathy toward the Zionist aspirations, pronounced in the Balfour Declaration, gradually declined; as Arab protest increased, restrictions were placed on the growth of the Jewish Yishuv. British policy of inflicting restrictions upon the Jewish Yishuv was announced through a series of white papers, policy guidelines that usually succeeded Arab violent riots. In 1939 Britain was willing to appease Arabs at any cost in order to prevent their joining the Axis powers. Therefore, Chamberlain's government summoned the parties to London for round-table talks in 1939, but no agreement was achieved because the Palestinians refused to sit with the Jews in the same meeting. The British efforts to appease the Arabs resulted in a harsh white paper in 1939, severely restricting Jewish immigration and land purchase and calling for the establishment of the Palestine state (*History from 1880, 1973*).

British restrictions on Jewish immigration, on the one hand, and the growing pressure on European Jews due to the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, on the other hand, brought about illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine (*Facts about Israel, 1979*). Until 1940 immigrants caught by the British were put in internment camps, but later on – just when Palestine became almost the only harbor for Jewish refugees from conquered Europe – the British deported the illegal immigrants, sometimes on the same ships that brought them.

In the years of World War II (1939–1945) the Nazi regime planned and carried out a master plan to liquidate Jews in Europe as a final solution to “the Jewish problem.” Through these years a systematic genocide was carried out in which 6 million European Jews were murdered. Consequently, only one-third of the Jews in Europe survived, including those who left the continent before the war (*Facts about Israel, 1999*).

During World War II, Jewish immigration to Palestine declined and eventually ceased as the Nazis conquered Europe and the struggle with the British over the 1939 white paper was halted by the Yishuv (*History*

from 1880, 1973). Thousands of the Yishuv men volunteered to serve in British units, either in Palestine or in Europe, and members of the Hagana were trained by the British in order to set a resistance movement in case the Germans would invade Palestine. At the same time Arabs remained indifferent to the war outcomes, and their former leadership, headed by the exiled mufti, collaborated with the Nazis in Germany. The leaders of the Yishuv were hoping that at the end of the war Britain would show sympathy to the Zionist project. However, the British adhered to the white paper policy even when the world became aware of the tragedy of European Jews.

As the war ended in 1945, hundreds of thousands of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust made their way to camps established by the Allies in Europe, waiting to immigrate to Palestine. But the British refused to open the gates of the country for mass immigration as the Yishuv demanded (*History from 1880, 1973; Inbar, 2000*). In response, the Yishuv began a violent struggle against the British. In 1946 the British government proposed the Morrison-Grady plan, offering to divide Palestine into three sectors: Jewish (17%), Palestinian (40%), and British. Both Jews and Palestinians rejected the plan. The growing pressure of world public opinion on the British government to open the gates of Palestine to mass immigration of Jewish refugees, the rejection of the Morrison-Grady plan, and the military opposition of the Yishuv drove the British government to hand the problem of Palestine to the United Nations in 1947. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations accepted the partition plan, offering two states in Palestine, a Jewish and an Arab, with Jerusalem under international regime. The British government announced its withdrawal from Palestine by May 15, 1948. The Yishuv accepted the UN resolution with great satisfaction and joy. The Palestinians and the Arab states announced their rejection of the partition plan and their intentions to solve the problem by force (*The background to the establishment of the State of Israel, 1981*).

The War of Independence (1947–1949)

Immediately following the UN partition resolution, Arab riots broke out. Arabs had military and geographical superiority over the Yishuv: Arab villages dominated main roads to Jerusalem and Jewish settlements in the Galilee, Negev, and Hebron hills (the Ezion bloc). The Haganah organization, short of armaments, was concentrating on defending the Jewish towns and villages from Arab attacks, and transferring supplies to the blocked or besieged towns and villages through supply convoys, which were attacked and suffered great casualties (Inbar, 2000). The Yishuv struggled to defend the remote settlements to avoid withdrawal from territories allocated to the Jewish state. Moreover, the British, hoping to create chaos and prolong the Mandate, helped the Arabs by handing over their facilities,

such as the main airport in Lydiya, railway stations, and police stations. In March 1948 the United States withdrew its support of the partition plan due to the hardship of the Yishuv, and the political achievement of the partition plan was endangered (*War of Independence*, 1982).

From April 1948, however, the Haganah moved to the offensive (*History from 1880*, 1973). Armament consignments arrived from Czechoslovakia. As a result, territory allotted to the Jewish state was conquered, and continuity between Jewish villages and towns was achieved, including the road to Jerusalem. Hundreds of thousands of Arabs had fled from the fighting areas, due to stories of atrocities spread by Palestinian leadership. Others fled due to the Arab states' explicit call for them to leave, so they would not interrupt the invasion of the Arab armies (*War of Independence*, 1982). They were promised that they would return soon, with the victory of the Arabs over the Jews.

On May 14, 1948, the people's council approved the declaration of independence of the Jewish state, and the state of Israel was established. A few days later the provisional government disarmed the Jewish underground organizations and established the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). On the night of the declaration of independence, Egyptian planes bombarded Tel Aviv (Dor & Schiff, 1997). On May 15, the Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon invaded Palestine, aiming to eliminate the newly born Jewish state (*War of Independence*, 1982). Arab armies were regular, organized, and equipped with tanks and artilleries. Some had air forces. On the other hand, the IDF was not yet organized as a regular army and had neither aircraft nor tanks and other heavy armaments (*History from 1880*, 1973). Moreover, Arabs vastly outnumbered the Yishuv: 1,250,000 Arabs in Palestine in addition to 30 million Arabs in the neighboring Arab states, as opposed to 650,000 Jewish inhabitants. At the beginning of the fighting, Egyptian troops had cut off the Negev, the Trans-Jordanian army began a siege of Jerusalem, and Syrian and Lebanese forces invaded the lower Galilee (Dor & Schiff, 1997).

In the face of a clear quantitative disadvantage, the newly born Jewish army had a few qualitative advantages. The fighting forces were used efficiently, mobilized from one site to another according to the changing needs; and the soldiers exhibited a willingness for self-sacrifice, growing from the recognition that a defeat would bring about an extermination of the Jewish state. The fighting forces of the Yishuv received reinforcements, as immigrants who had just arrived from the detainees' camps in Cyprus were recruited and hastily trained during the fighting. Help was also received from some 2,400 volunteers from abroad, many of whom were highly experienced and skilled, and they contributed significantly to the fighting efforts. In addition, heavy armament including aircraft and tanks began to arrive from Europe and the United States (*War of Independence*, 1982). In July 1948 the IDF initiated offensives, and the course of

the war changed in favor of the Israeli army. Arab armies were halted and eventually defeated, as the IDF liberated western Jerusalem, the Negev, and the Galilee. The war was over as armistice agreements were signed between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries in 1949 (Inbar, 2000). The state of Israel, numbering 650,000 people, had lost 6,000 people in its war of independence, about 1% of the population.

The establishment of the state brought hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants – many survivors of the Holocaust and waves of Jews from Arab countries who came because of anti-Jewish persecution and riots that were triggered by the establishment of the Jewish state (*Jews in Arab lands*, 1975).

The State Period

The Infiltrations and the Sinai Campaign (1949–1956)

Although armistice agreements were signed, the Arab governments refused to recognize Israel's right to exist. They demanded that the Palestinian refugees be allowed to return and that the UN resolution of the 1947 partition plan be implemented. At the same time, they repeatedly stated their objective to destroy Israel and push the Jews into the sea (*History from 1880*, 1973). From 1949 Israel faced infiltrations by Palestinian bands called *Fidayeen* (suicide fighters). The *Fidayeen* penetrated deep into Israel's territory, attacked civilians, laid mines, and sabotaged property and facilities. They were trained by the Egyptians in the Gaza Strip and acted from the Sinai and the Jordanian border (see Inbar, 2000; *The Arab-Israeli conflict*, 1979). Those acts sowed terror among Israeli civilians and threatened to disrupt normal life (Amikam, 1982). Over 200 Israeli civilians were killed during the years 1949–1956 (Amikam, 1982). In addition, the Arab League established an Arab boycott on companies and businessmen that traded with Israel (*History from 1880*, 1973). Egypt had closed the Suez Canal to passage of Israeli shipping and confiscated goods headed to Israel, contrary to international treaties. In 1955 Egypt signed a large and unprecedented arms deal with Czechoslovakia for the supply of Soviet arms (Amikam, 1982). At the same time the Western powers refused the Israeli appeals for armament, except for France. The arms deal and the defense agreement among Arab states changed the atmosphere in the Middle East. In 1955, Egypt besieged Israel's southern water route in the Red Sea (Straits of Tiran). In 1956 Egyptian leader Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, an act that brought cooperation between Israel and Britain and France, who had dominated the canal beforehand. On October 29, 1956, Israeli troops moved into the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, and within a few days the Israeli army had completed its conquest of the peninsula (*History from 1880*, 1973; Inbar, 2000). On November 5, after a UN General Assembly resolution, a truce was declared between Israel and Egypt. After the truce,

Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion declared his intention to hold the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, but due to heavy international pressure by the United States and the USSR, the Israeli government decided to retreat (Amikam, 1982). As result of the war, Israel achieved relative security for its southern borders and international support in its freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, which was kept until 1967.

Establishment of the PLO (1956–1967)

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed by the Arab League in 1964 as an instrument of the war of Arab states against Israel (*The threat of PLO terrorism*, 1985). The PLO activities were based on its charter, the Palestinian National Covenant, that called for a total liberation of Palestine through the elimination of the Zionist presence (see *The Arab-Israeli conflict*, 1979). The covenant states that “armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase.” In 1969 Yasser Arafat, head of the Fatah faction, took over the PLO. Since then the PLO has perpetrated terror activity against Israeli civilians, killing hundreds of Israelis.

The Six-Day War (1967)

In April 1967 a fire incident on the Israeli-Syrian border caused Syrian gunfire over Israeli villages in the Galilee and air fights in which the Israeli air force destroyed six Syrian planes (Mishal, 1997). Syria asked Egypt, with which it had a defense agreement, to react. In May 1967 Syrians declared that the Israeli army mobilized units and moved them close to the Syrian border and was preparing an attack. The Soviet Union, which tried to increase the regional tension in order to increase its own control of the Arab states, confirmed this false information to Egyptian intelligence. Egyptian president Nasser mobilized army units and moved them to the Sinai Peninsula. He ordered UN evacuation from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and sealed the Tiran Straits for passage of ships to Israel. In addition, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi armies were mobilized and moved to the Israeli frontiers. The Arab empowerment in Soviet armament strengthened the Arab belief that Arab armies were superior to the Israeli army. Egyptian press and radio proclaimed that the forthcoming war was aimed at the extermination of the state of Israel (Amikam, 1981; Inbar, 2000).

After the evacuation of the UN force from Sinai, Israel began to recruit its reserves units. Israel entered a three-week “waiting” phase in which the government initiated diplomatic efforts in order to avoid war. This phase was characterized by uncertainty and anxiety but with an atmosphere of solidarity and mobilization as well (Mishal, 1997). A national unity government was established to increase public confidence. On June 5, 1967, the Six-Day War began with Israeli aircraft launching preemptive attack on the Arab air forces. Within a few hours most Arab aircraft were destroyed,

most of them on the ground. On the third and fourth days of the war, the IDF completed the conquest of the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, Judea and Samaria, and the old city of Jerusalem. On the fifth and sixth days, the IDF attacked the Syrian border and took over the Golan Heights.

After the war free economic relationships were constituted between Israel and the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip (Amikam, 1981). The Israeli economy received a Palestinian work force and Palestinian agricultural products, thus raising the standard of living in the territories. Through a policy of "open bridges," Palestinians were able to maintain family and economic ties with their relatives in the Jordanian kingdom. The Israeli military government hardly interfered with daily life, except for maintaining security (*Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district since 1967*, 1986).

The Attrition War and Terror Activity of the PLO (1967–1973)

The tremendous victory over the three Arab states triggered a hope in Israel that peace could be achieved (Yurman, 1982). The government of national unity in Israel accepted a resolution noting Israel's willingness to retreat from the territories occupied in the Syrian and Egyptian frontier in exchange for peace treaties. However, the hope for a change in the Arab attitude toward Israel vanished when in August 1967 the Arab states held a summit in Khartoum, Sudan, in which they proclaimed the "three no's": no peace, no negotiation, and no recognition of Israel (see *The Arab-Israeli conflict*, 1979). On November of that year the UN Security Council adopted resolution 242, calling for "a just and lasting peace, in which every state in the area can live in security . . . withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict . . . respect and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force" (*History from 1880*, 1973). Israel announced that "secure and recognized boundaries" should be determined by negotiations, while Egypt and Jordan, who accepted the 242 resolution as well, declared that an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the Six-Day War is nonnegotiable and that, even then, they would recognize the right of Palestinians to continue their struggle.

Meanwhile, Arab states supported Palestinian terrorist activity against Israel carried out by the PLO. From 1967 onward the PLO perpetrated terrorist acts against civilian targets in Israel, including women and children (e.g., the killing of nine high school students from the Moshav Avivim). In 1968 the PLO began to attack Israeli targets abroad such as embassies and El-Al's planes and facilities, including the hijacking of planes, and started an era of international terror occurring mainly in Europe (*The Palestine Liberation Organization: Liberation or liquidation*, 1979).

In March 1969 the Attrition War began as Egyptian artillery began to bombard the Israeli fortifications on the Suez Canal (Yurman, 1982). Israel responded with artillery and air bombardments on oil facilities and canal cities, which drove Egyptian civilians out of the region of fighting, and with commando raids, which harmed military and civilian targets deep within Egypt. The Egyptian aim was to break the status quo and impose an Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal and later from the Sinai Peninsula. At the beginning of the 1970s Israel escalated its activity as aircraft bombarded targets in Egypt in order to sow economic and military destruction that would compel the Egyptians to declare a cease-fire. However, those bombardments brought an increasing involvement of Soviets in the war, first as advisers and later manning crews of SAM anti-aircraft missiles and even operational flights. In order to avoid clashes with Soviet pilots, Israel decided to refrain from bombardments deep within Egypt. However, in July 1970 Israeli pilots downed four aircraft flown by Soviet pilots. That incident brought about an American diplomatic effort, which eventually brought a cease-fire in August 1970.

The Yom Kippur War and After (1973–1977)

On October 6, 1973, after three years of relative quiet on the borders (except for the continuing Palestinian terror, which took place in Israel as well as against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad), the Egyptian and the Syrian armies launched a coordinated assault on two fronts, which completely surprised Israel (Lorch, 1987). The advantage of immense surprise and coordinated warfare, the use of the newest Soviet armaments, and Israeli neglect as a result of the Six-Day War made possible a temporary superiority of the invading Arab armies, who faced only a few regular units, as reserve units were not recruited yet. The heavy casualties on the first days and the conceived threat to the existence of the state brought about a gloomy mood among the leadership, as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan spoke of “destruction of the Third Temple.” However, within three weeks of fighting the Israeli army managed to repulse the invading armies, cross the Suez Canal, and advance to within 30 kilometers of the Syrian capital until a truce was declared (*Facts about Israel*, 1999). After two years of negotiations, disengagement agreements were reached between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria that brought a partial Israeli withdrawal from territories captured during the war. The Israeli military achievement was outstanding in the face of the initial inferiority (Lorch, 1987). However, the achievements of the Arab armies and the large number of casualties shocked Israeli society. Commanders of the army resigned due to the recommendation of a state inquiry committee, and the succeeding public pressure drove Prime Minister Golda Meir and Security Minister Dayan to resign as well. In the elections of 1977 the Labor Party lost its dominating

power and Menachem Begin, the leader of the Likud bloc, formed the new government.

Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1977–1979)

The feeling of the Egyptians that they restored their dignity, as well as their failure to win a war that started with an immense advantage, sowed the seeds of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (Lorch, 1987). In 1977, two years after an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt that stated that the conflict is to be resolved through negotiation to peace, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem. The historical visit was followed by negotiations under American auspices and led to the Camp David Accord in 1978, which set a framework for a peace treaty signed in 1979 (*Facts about Israel*, 1999). According to the peace treaty, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula and evacuated Israeli settlements and recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinians through an establishment of self-government in exchange for an Egyptian recognition of the international border, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and normalization between the states.

The visit of President Sadat in Israel and the peace treaty that followed served to show the Israelis that there is a partner for peace among Arab leaders. In late 1970 there emerged a peace camp that supported compromise as a way to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict in a peaceful way. In the 1980s this camp crystallized, and Israeli society polarized into two camps: left (i.e., doves) and right (i.e., hawks). The former camp propagated the “land for peace” idea, which implied withdrawal from the occupied territories during the 1967 war (especially from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) in return for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while the latter camp persisted in arguing in favor of a noncompromising way to solve the conflict.

Operation Peace for Galilee (1982)

While the peace with Egypt brought calmness in the south, the terror and the violence of the Palestinians continued (*The Palestine Liberation Organization: Liberation or liquidation?*, 1979). Since 1971, when King Hussein of Jordan expelled the PLO, it was based mainly in Lebanon, where it established itself as a regular military force with tanks and artillery, as a state within a state (Schwarzboim, 1994). While continuing acts of terror, from 1978 the PLO moved also to conducting border attacks, mainly by shelling Israel’s northern border using Soviet-made Qatyusha missiles (*Operation Peace for Galilee*, 1982). Defense Minister Ariel Sharon drove the Israeli government to start Operation Peace for Galilee in June 1982 with a declared target of repulsing the PLO forces 40 kilometers – the range of the Qatyusha – from the Israeli northern border (Yurman, 1983). Within three weeks the IDF reached the Lebanese capital of Beirut and began a siege of its western quarter, where the PLO had its main forces. The deviation

from the original target of the operation caused unprecedented demonstrations in Israel against the war. Meanwhile, with an American mediation the PLO forces agreed to depart from Beirut to other Arab states, such as Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. In September of that year the newly elected Lebanese president Bashir Jemayel, of Christian origin, was assassinated, and a few days later the Christian militias allied with Israel massacred hundreds of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The massacre shocked the world as well as many Israelis. A state inquiry committee that was established in Israel found some military officers including the chief of staff indirectly responsible for the massacre, as well as Minister of Defense Sharon, and it recommended his dismissal, an act imposed on him by the government (Mishal, 1997). In 1983 Prime Minister Begin resigned, partly due to the many casualties in the disputed war in Lebanon.

The First Intifada (1987–1991)

After the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization left Lebanon in 1982 because of the Israeli demand and moved to Tunisia, the center of violent activities against Israel shifted to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In 1987 Palestinian national rioting (called Intifada) broke out in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, characterized by strikes, violent demonstrations, rioting, and stone throwing against the IDF soldiers (Rolef, 1998). Later the Intifada turned into a civil rebellion (see *The Arab-Israeli conflict*, 1989). The IDF initially responded with severe measures, for example, shooting and hitting demonstrators. However, the rioting was not halted, and the policy caused an international censure of Israel. The IDF then moderated its rules of engagement, introducing measures for dispersing the demonstrations. The Intifada gradually decreased until its cessation in 1991 (Mishal, 1997).

The Gulf War (1991)

The Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, and the United States established an international coalition, including Arab states, to fight Iraq. In January 1991 the American air force bombarded the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, and Iraq responded to the American attack with Scud missiles, including some aimed at Israel. A total of 39 missiles were fired on Israeli cities (Mishal, 1997). However, Israel complied with the American request not to respond in order to keep the anti-Iraqi coalition from falling apart. The Gulf War ended after six weeks in a defeat of the Iraqi army and liberation of Kuwait by the U.S. army.

The Peace Process (1991–2001)

The peace process in the Middle East was renewed with the Madrid Peace Conference, held in October 1991 under American and Soviet sponsorship

(*The Middle East peace process*, 2000). The peace conference inaugurated two frameworks of peace talks: bilateral talks that addressed political issues and multilateral talks that addressed regional issues such as water, joint economic projects, and refugees. However, the real progress was achieved after intensive negotiations behind the scenes in Oslo. It brought an agreement of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. In exchange for an Israeli recognition, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat recognized the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, renounced the use of terrorism and violence, and committed himself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO was formalized by the Declaration of Principles, signed in September 1993. It set a framework for a Palestinian self-government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A series of interim agreements signed between 1993 and 1999 specified various stages of implementing the redeployment of the IDF and the establishment of Palestinian self-rule. Palestinian self-rule included the establishment of a Palestinian police that would take over public order to prevent any terror activity against Israel, election of a Palestinian authority for the purpose of self-government, and empowerment in some internal spheres, such as education and health. Palestinians also agreed to prevent popular incitement. Israel remained responsible for external security and the security of Israeli settlements (Ofaz, 1995).

The Interim Agreement with the Palestinians paved the way for the signing of an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994, putting an end to a 46-year-old state of war between these two states. The treaty outlined an agreed international boundary and established normalized relationships between the states. Peace talks were also held between Israeli and Syrian delegations, but no signed agreement was reached (*The Middle East peace process*, 2000).

In 1994 Israel began to implement the first stage of the Declaration of Principles and redeployed the IDF outside the Gaza Strip and Jericho. However, Palestinian terror had not ceased but became more lethal (Mishal, 1997). In February 1994 a Jewish settler entered the Cave of the Machpelah and shot dead 29 Muslim Palestinians as they prayed. In October of that year the Palestinian opposition movement Hamas perpetrated attacks of mass killing by suicide terrorists who exploded themselves within public sites, such as buses and shopping centers. Suicide terror has continued intermittently ever since, as head of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, refused to arrest Hamas activists, thus violating his obligation to assume responsibility over all Palestinian movements and renounce the use of terror. The terror attacks created intense opposition in Israel against the peace process, expressed by unprecedented angry demonstrations and protests against the government of Israel, then headed by Prime Minister Yitchak Rabin. In November 1995 Rabin was assassinated by a young Jewish religious student who opposed the peace process policy. In

May 1996 Benjamin Netanyahu won the elections in Israel and established a rightist government. Although Netanyahu slowed the implementation of the Interim Agreement, he signed the Wye River Memorandum in 1997 for redeployment in the city of Hebron (Mishal, 1997). In the elections of 1999 the candidate of the Labor Party, Ehud Barak, won the office of the prime minister and promised to implement a policy of peacemaking as a continuation of Rabin's heritage.

After failure to reach a peace agreement with Syria, the efforts were directed to negotiations with the Palestinians. In July 2000 a peace summit convened in Camp David to negotiate the permanent-status agreement, attended by the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Arafat, and the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, and hosted by U.S. president Bill Clinton (*The terror Intifada: The latest wave of Palestinian violence*, 2001). Prime Minister Barak made some unprecedented and historic strategic compromises, including transferring the West Bank to the Palestinians and dividing Jerusalem, but Chairman Arafat rejected all compromise proposals, including Clinton's bridging proposal, and the summit ended without an agreement. Instead of taking the risk of accepting far-reaching compromises as the Israeli party did, Palestinian leadership then turned to armed struggle as it initiated the "terror Intifada" in September 2000, supposedly because of the visit to the Temple Mount by the Israeli opposition's head Ariel Sharon.

Palestinians attempted to achieve their political goals through violence and terror, thus violating the basic principle of the Palestinian commitments to resolve the conflict in peaceful ways. Arafat authorized the Tanzim militia, an organ within the PLO, to fire upon Israeli civilians and soldiers and released dozens of members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian opposition movements, who perpetrated severe terrorist attacks, including the use of car bombs and suicide bombers (*The terror Intifada: The latest wave of Palestinian violence*, 2001). In February 2001 Ariel Sharon, the candidate of the rightist party Likud, was elected as prime minister in Israel and established a national unity government with the Labor Party. He announced that his government would not negotiate under fire. The Palestinians have continued their violence, including waves of terror attacks on the Israeli population. In reaction to the Palestinian violence, the Israeli Security forces have led military activities to contain the terror. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict rose again to its intractability as all attempts to achieve a cease-fire failed because of the unwillingness and inability of Arafat to restrain the Palestinians. These events also harmed the relations with other Arab countries, and the peace process ran aground.

In sum, the narrative indicates that the Arab-Israeli conflict has changed its scope and form. It began as a communal conflict between Arabs who inhabited Palestine and Jews who immigrated there. During the British

Mandate the conflict escalated and began to receive its intractable nature. During the 1948 war it expanded to interstate war between the newly established state of Israel and Arab states. The Arab-Israeli conflict had all its intractable characteristics until the late 1970s when the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat went to Israel and showed that there was a partner on the Arab side for a peaceful negotiation. Then the Arab-Israeli conflict lost its extreme intractable nature by differentiating the nature of relations between Israel and different Arab nations. During the 1980s the conflict focused on the confrontational nature of relations with Lebanon and the Palestinians. The 1990s witnessed again changes in the nature of Arab-Israeli relations, when in 1993 Israel recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization and began to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This step was followed by the peace agreement with Jordan and establishment of relations with North African and Persian Gulf Arab states. In 2000 the peace process stalled, and the violent deterioration of the relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis caused the conflict again to be termed intractable.

ISRAELI JEWISH ETHOS OF CONFLICT: SOCIETAL BELIEFS

We propose that during the described context of intractable conflict, Jewish Israeli society evolved and maintained societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict, which have served as a prism to view the world and have enabled successful coping with the stressful and demanding situation. As noted in Chapter 2, the ethos of conflict consists of the following eight societal beliefs: the justness of one's own goals, security, patriotism, unity, peace, one's own victimization, positive ingroup image, and the adversary's negative image (Bar-Tal, 1998a). As already indicated, not all of these functional societal beliefs were formed in the context of intractable conflict. Some of them – for instance, beliefs about self-victimization or beliefs about positive ingroup image – were part of a long Jewish tradition. Other societal beliefs, such as ones involving patriotism or security, had to be formed and imparted to the newly emerging Jewish society in Israel.

These eight themes of the conflictive ethos gave Israeli Jewish society its dominant orientation in the context of the intractable conflict, both before the establishment of the state and during the first three decades of its existence. The themes were widely shared by the great majority of the society's members and were perceived as characterizing the society (e.g., Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983; Zerubavel, 1995). These beliefs were used to justify the society's policies, decisions, and actions (e.g., Bar-Tal, Jacobson, & Klieman, 1998; Yaniv, 1993). They were maintained by societal, political, and cultural institutions (e.g., Ben-Ezer, 1977; A. Cohen, 1985; Gertz, 1998; Govrin, 1989; Peri, 1998; Zemach, 1995) and transmitted to the new

generations by the educational system (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1998b; Firer, 1985; Podeh, 2002). The following sections present short descriptions of these societal beliefs as they appeared at the height of the intractable conflict. It should be noted though that over the past decades, as the nature of conflict changed, the ethos of conflict began to change too (including delegitimizing beliefs about Arabs) and new societal beliefs began to evolve as described by Bar-Tal and Oren (2000).

The Justness of the Israeli Goals

This theme concerns the rationale behind the goals that led to conflict and particularly the justification of these goals in terms of their importance. The Jews' return to Eretz Israel (the land of Israel), with the aim of establishing their own state after 2,000 years of exile, was inspired by the nationalist ideology of Zionism. This ideology provided the Jews both with goals and the justification for them (Avineri, 1981; Vital, 1982). These goals centered first of all on the establishment of a Jewish state in the ancient homeland of Eretz Israel. Historical, theological, national, existential, political, societal, and cultural arguments were used to justify these goals. These included arguments such as the following: that the Jewish nation was founded in the ancient Land of Israel; that during many years of ancient Jewish history the Land of Israel was the Jews' homeland; that during their exile Jews maintained close spiritual and physical ties with the Land of Israel, continuously aspiring to return to it; that the continuity of Jewish life never ceased in the land; and that the persistent experience of anti-Semitism in the Diaspora highlighted the Jewish people's need for a secure existence in their old homeland. The conquest of the Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights in the 1967 War greatly augmented the territorial dimension of the Israeli goals. In the aftermath of the war, many Israeli Jews believed that Israel had the right to retain these territories. Their shared beliefs pertained to the Jewish people's exclusive rights to Yehuda, Shomron (i.e., the West Bank), and Gaza and to the security importance of the Golan Heights, parts of the West Bank, and the Sinai.

In the context of justifying the Israeli goals, attempts were made over the years to refute Palestinian claims. The contested territory was often described as being sparsely populated by Arabs who, moreover, had only moved there in recent centuries. The Palestinian national identity was also denied; it was claimed that they are Arabs, part of the Arab nation. Finally, the Palestinians' claim of attachment to the land was questioned by describing the land as desolate, neglected, swampy, desertlike, and primitive until the Jews came to look after it when they returned.

These societal beliefs motivated the members of Israeli Jewish society to fight for their goals and to endure the stresses, sacrifices, and costs of intractable conflict.

Security

During the intractable conflict, Israeli Jews have always believed that the security of the country and of its Jewish citizens was under serious threat (Arian, 1995; J. B. Stein & Brecher, 1976; Stone, 1982). Therefore, achieving a sense of security, which was one of the basic Zionist reasons to return to Israel and establish a Jewish state, became the most central need and value. Security acquired the status of a cultural master symbol in the Israeli Jewish ethos (D. Horowitz, 1984; Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983). Israeli society became a "nation in arms" or "nation in uniform," living in a situation that has been termed a "dormant war" (D. Horowitz, 1993).

Security played a crucial role in many major governmental decisions, constantly being given preference over other considerations. Security became a sort of rubber stamp for many kinds of laws, policies, and actions, going beyond the military and political spheres into the economic, legal, social, educational, and even cultural domains (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, & Klieman, 1998; Kimmerling, 1993; Perlmutter, 1969). Moreover, during intractable conflict society uncritically accepted all decisions that were justifiable for security reasons. These decisions included censorship of information related to security matters; the banning of public debate on issues that were perceived as jeopardizing security; and the avoidance of seeking or presenting information that was perceived as possibly posing a threat to security (Barzilai, 1996a, 1996b; Lahav, 1993).

Assigning the highest priority to the value of security, the society did all it could to induce its members to serve in the armed forces and to motivate the best qualified to volunteer for the most important institutions and units (e.g., the air force, the commando units, the Mossad, or the General Security Services). All channels of communication and agents of socialization paid tribute to the security forces (Lissak, 1984). Service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was viewed as an entrée to Israeli society, and refusal or evasion of service was socially sanctioned. Those who volunteered to serve in special institutions or units were accorded high prestige. The top-ranking officers were ascribed a special status that allowed them not only to act as epistemic authorities on a wide range of issues but also to be accepted into any field upon retirement, including politics, industry, business, the civil service, and even cultural and educational institutions (Peri, 1983). At the same time, a heritage of wars and battles was developed and heroism was glorified. Military heroes received special honors, and society commemorated those who had fallen in military service, gave financial support for their families, and aided those who had been injured in the line of duty.

The fundamental societal beliefs of the ethos delineated the conditions that were assumed to ensure security. First, it was assumed that Israel has to build a mighty military strength of the highest quality to deter Arab

aggression. Second, it was stressed that Israel had the right and duty to defend itself against threats by means of its own armed forces and even initiate military acts, including wars, to prevent possible Arab attacks on Israel. Third, Israel should not rely on help from foreign military forces or be dependant on international public opinion or the views of foreign leaders and international organizations (e.g., the UN). Fourth, land was regarded as the country's important national strategic asset in maintaining security.

In sum, the societal beliefs were functional for the violent confrontations in the conflict, since they assigned high priority to security, provided a rationale for societal decisions and actions, and motivated members of society to participate in the conflict and accept and cope with stressful conditions.

Patriotism

During the intractable conflict, Israeli Jews made a special effort to impart beliefs that would instill patriotism (Ben-Amos & Bar-Tal, 2004). In the context of the conflict, extreme sacrifices were asked of Israeli Jews, including economic hardship and prolonged military service or reserve duty. Patriotic beliefs called for various forms of dedication, including the settlement of outlying or desolate areas, volunteering for the security forces, and working for society's welfare. These beliefs even called for the ultimate sacrifice as part of the violent confrontation with the Arabs; Israelis had to be willing to die. Those who acted as models of patriotism were glorified, whereas those who left the country (called "deserters") or did not fulfill their duties to the state (e.g., by not serving in the army) were stigmatized. Such patriotic beliefs increased cohesiveness and played an important role in mobilizing the members of Israeli society to participate actively in the conflict and to endure hardship and even loss of life (Elon, 1971).

Unity

Israelis attempted to ignore internal disagreements and conflicts so as to unite society in the face of external threats. Israeli Jewish society strove to foster unity and build a sense of belonging and solidarity. Heritage and religion were emphasized, and an attempt was made to minimize the ethnic differences within a society whose members came from various parts of the world. Unity was also reinforced by setting lines of agreement in the form of a "consensus," and sanctions were applied to those who expressed opinions or exhibited behavior that did not fit in with the accepted consensus (Smootha, 1978). Consensus pertained particularly to societal beliefs about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the justness of Israel's goals and the means of ensuring security (Lahav, 1993; Negbi, 1985).

Such beliefs strengthen society from within, augment the sense of commonality and solidarity, and allow energy to be directed toward coping with the external enemy.

Peace

The society's ultimate desideratum is peace. During the intractable conflict with the Arabs, Israeli Jewish society cherished peace as a value. Peace was conceived of as a dream, a prayer, and a belief in utopian and idyllic images. Hence Israeli Jews were stereotyped as peace-loving people forced by circumstances to engage in violent conflict. They presented themselves as ready to negotiate and achieve peace, whereas the Arabs, rejecting any peaceful resolution of the conflict and even refusing to have direct contact with Jews, were seen as the sole obstacle to progress. Such beliefs inspire hope and optimism, strengthen positive self-image, and contribute to an empathic self-presentation to the outside world.

One's Own Victimization

Beliefs about self-presentation as the victim of conflict are associated with the beliefs concerning a positive ingroup image and the delegitimization of Arabs, since these beliefs support Israeli Jews' perception of themselves as victims of unjust aggression by the Arabs. Beginning with the early encounters with the Arabs, attempts to harm Jews physically, halt their immigration, or prevent them from settling in the homeland were considered by the Israeli Jews as evidence of their victimization (Hareven, 1983). These beliefs were greatly reinforced when, following the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states tried to annihilate the new state and continued to attack it. The wars that were fought, the Arab embargo on trade with Israel, the terrorist attacks on Israeli and non-Israeli Jews all confirmed to the Israeli Jews their status as the victims. These beliefs fit in with the Jewish tradition of viewing Jews as victims in a hostile world (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Liebman, 1978).

During the conflict the belief about victimization supplied the moral incentive to fight against the Arabs, to seek justice, and to turn to the international community for moral, political, and material support.

Positive Collective Ingroup Image

The societal beliefs of positive collective ingroup image involve the attribution of positive traits, values, intentions, and behaviors to one's own society. These beliefs stood in absolute contrast to the delegitimizing beliefs about the Arabs. The Israeli Jews viewed themselves as "new people," reborn in the land of Israel (Hofman, 1970a). The positive stereotypes

presented them, first, as tenacious, hardworking, courageous, modern, and intelligent and, second, as moral and humane. With respect to the first set of traits, various stories and myths were amassed about the Jews' behavior in times of peace and war, while the second group of traits referred to Israeli Jews' behaviors toward Arabs.

Positive ingroup presentation also invoked the Jewish heritage. Jewish culture, religion, and traditions were regarded as lying at the heart of Western civilization and morality. Also there were segments in the society that thought that Jews were "chosen people" and a "light unto the nations." These beliefs provided moral strength and feelings of self-worth during the conflict.

Delegitimizing the Opponent

Intractable conflict fosters the evolution of negative stereotypes and especially societal beliefs that deny the adversary group (i.e., the Arabs) its humanity. This process is called delegitimization. Indeed, mutual delegitimization has been one of the bitter manifestations of the long years of conflict between the Israeli Jews and the Arabs (Bar-On, 2000; Bar-Tal, 1988; Bilu, 1994; Kelman, 1999a). From the very beginning the encounters between Jews, mostly from Europe, and Arabs, living in Palestine, fostered negative stereotyping (Lustick, 1982). Arabs were attributed such labels as primitive, uncivilized, savage, and backward. In time, as the conflict deepened and became more violent, Arabs were perceived as murderers, a bloodthirsty mob, treacherous, cowardly, cruel, and wicked. After the establishment of the state, these delegitimizing beliefs about Arabs still prevailed and were transmitted through institutional channels (e.g., A. Cohen, 1985; Domb, 1982; Segev, 1984). In addition, Arabs were blamed for the continuation of the conflict, for the eruption of all of the wars and military clashes, and for intransigently rejecting a peaceful resolution (Ben-Gurion, 1975; Harkabi, 1977; Landau, 1971). They were also characterized as striving to annihilate the state of Israel and to drive the Jewish population into the sea. In addition to use of the general label "Arabs," the channels of communication have referred also to specific groups such as Egyptians, Syrians, or Palestinians.

Through the years of conflict, the most often used label by the Jews has been "Arab," which does not differentiate among various national Arab groups. The use of this label is not accidental. First, it has to be noted that various nations in the Middle East consider themselves Arabs, and the call for a united identity (Pan-Arabism) has been an attractive appeal in different periods. Thus the term Arab has been used often by Arab nations themselves as a kind of general category. But in the Israeli Jewish use, the term came also to negate the existence of the Palestinian nation, implying that the people who populate the Middle East are all in the same category.

In addition, it implied that the Arabs as a people have a vast area to live in, and therefore there is plenty of room for a small Jewish nation in Palestine, later Israel. During the climax of the intractable conflict, from the 1940s to the 1970s the label was used also because all the Arab nations displayed a unified attitude toward the state of Israel. Only after the peace treaty with Egypt did the Jews differentiate between Arab nations. This differentiation has continued to develop as Israel has built separate relationships with different Arab nations. But the label "Arabs" continues to be widely used until today, often with derogatory undertones.

Also in terms of stereotypic content, it is necessary to note that the representation of Arabs in general and specific Arab groups (e.g., Palestinians, Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians, Lebanese) has been related to the nature of their relations with the Israeli Jews. The preceding description of the nature of the relations as held by the majority of the Jews indicates their change through the 100 years of conflict. The change of relations led to differentiation among categories of Arab nations and change of stereotypic content, at least by a large segment of the Israeli society. As indicated, peace with Egypt was a turning point in the Israeli view of Arabs. In the late 1970s and 1980s new contents appeared in the public discourse and cultural products that provided a positive view mainly of the Egyptians, Palestinians, and Jordanians.

CONCLUSION

As the model in Chapter 1 shows, contextual macrofactors are primarily responsible for the formation of the psychological intergroup repertoire toward another group. The psychological intergroup repertoire that includes stereotypes, prejudice, affect, emotions, and behavioral intentions evolves in the particular context in which the society lives. Many factors are included in this context. Some of them relate to the domains that are within the society itself, and some are related to the nature of intergroup relations that the society has had in the past and present. Factors within the society concern its structure, economic and political conditions, type of regime, its political culture, its tradition, norms of tolerance, and so on. The other type of factors relates mainly to the nature of relations with specific groups in the past and present. The latter type of factors is very powerful, as it determines to a large extent the content of the stereotypes, the kind of emotions experienced, and the direction of attitudes, affect, and behavioral intentions.

The present book focuses on the Arab representation in the Israeli society. It suggests that the context of conflict that has prevailed between Israeli Jews and Arabs is a major determinant of the former society's views about the latter. The conflict that began about 100 years ago with the Palestinians has all the characteristics of intractable conflict, and for many decades

it could be placed as one of its extreme examples. For the Jews and the Palestinians, as well as for other Arab groups, the conflict is over existential goals and matters; often it is perceived as a zero-sum conflict since both sides are reluctant to compromise and therefore it is perceived as irreconcilable. Of special importance is the fact that the conflict has involved major violence of all types, and many members of both societies, including civilians, have lost their lives in it. As a result, the conflict, as a major experience for both societies, has preoccupied their members and has featured continuously on their personal and collective agendas. Finally both societies have invested much in the conflict in order to win it or at least not to lose and to survive.

Being exhausting, demanding, stressful, and costly both in human and material terms, the intractable conflict requires that society members adapt to the situation in both their individual and social life. From the sociopsychological perspective, this involves three basic challenges. First, in view of ambiguity and unpredictability, individuals must satisfy the epistemic need for a comprehensive understanding of the conflict, which will provide a meaningful and predictable picture of the situation. Second, in view of the fact that during the conflict satisfaction of various needs is deprived, the society has to find ways to satisfy them. Third, the adaptation requires the development of psychological conditions, on both the personal and societal levels, that will be conducive to successful coping with the challenges posed by the conflict situation, enabling the maintenance of an intense confrontation over time.

To meet these epistemic and coping needs, society members evolve an appropriate psychological repertoire, which includes shared beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and capacities. In this psychological repertoire, shared societal beliefs, organized in themes, play a determinative role. They are cognitions, shared by society members, on issues that are of special concern for the particular society. Societal beliefs formed on the basis of collective experiences serve to make sense of, as well as to create, shared reality.

Focusing on only the Israeli Jewish side, we suggest that Jews evolved societal beliefs that are functional to the described challenges. First of all, of importance are the societal beliefs of the narrative, which serve as a context of understanding the history of relations with the enemy. This narrative, called also collective memory, tells the history of the conflict and its continuity as remembered by the Israeli Jews. It is selective, biased, and full of distortions. In essence it comes to maintain a positive image of Israeli Jews, present them as victims, strengthen their case in the conflict, explain the course of events, and justify their own deeds. The narrative delegates the responsibility for the outbreak and maintenance of the conflict to the Palestinians and other Arab groups and portrays them as intransigent and evil.

In addition to the narrative of collective memory, societies in intractable conflict evolve societal beliefs that become an ethos of conflict. An ethos of conflict represents a coherent and systematic pattern of knowledge regarding the experiences related to a conflict situation. It binds the members of a society together, along with the goals and aspirations that impel them toward the future. Thus, in essence, it provides the meaning of social identity for the members of a society involved in conflict and guides their behavior. The notion of ethos offers a balanced picture of rational choices based on this knowledge. Ethos implies that the decisions of a society's leaders, the coordinated behavior of the members of a society, and the structure and functioning of a society are all based on coherent and comprehensive beliefs that justify and motivate members of a society to act in the society and accept the system. It is thus a crucial mechanism for organizing a collective of individuals as a society.

The Israeli Jewish society evolved an ethos of conflict that concerns the eight themes of societal beliefs just discussed: the justness of one's own goals, security, patriotism, unity, peace, positive collective image, victimization, and, finally, the negative image of the adversary – in this book, Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular.

It should be stressed that while the ethos of conflict enables better adaptation to conditions of intractable conflict, it also serves as fuel to the maintenance of the conflict and to the continuation of violence. The ethos of conflict, according to this dynamic, becomes a prism through which society members construe their reality, collect new information, interpret their experiences, and then make decisions about their course of action. That is to say, group members tend to search for and absorb information that is in line with their repertoire and omit contradictory information, which may possibly aid resolution of conflict. Even when ambiguous or contradictory information is absorbed, it is encoded and cognitively processed to be in accordance with the held repertoire through bias, addition, and distortion. In such a climate, in order to maintain the particular view, society members practice self-censorship, which is reinforced by the social pressure to conform to prevalent views.

The next chapters examine how transmission and dissemination of beliefs and attitudes about Arabs have helped to implant the negative psychological intergroup repertoire about them in Israeli Jewish society.

Representation of Arabs in Public Discourse

The Israeli perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict that we described in the previous chapter has served as a major foundation for the evolvement of the Israeli Jewish negative psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs. In line with the model presented in Figure 1.1, we turn in the next three chapters to the presentation of this repertoire in the societal, political, educational, and cultural channels of Jewish Israeli society.

We believe that the formal societal institutions and channels of communication transmit and disseminate the psychological intergroup repertoire (mostly beliefs but also attitudes and emotions) and at the same time reflect the repertoire as held by society members. The institutions and communication channels of a society not only transmit and disseminate beliefs, but they also strengthen the confidence in them and maintain them. They present the beliefs that are shared by society members and also introduce new beliefs, which may become established and shared in the future (Bar-Tal, 2000a). In the latter case the lines of communication fulfill the role of “innovator” by exposing society members to new ideas. However, new beliefs can also originate among society members spread through informal channels of interpersonal communication, and only later appear in the formal societal channels and institutions, in which case they serve as “reflectors” of the prevailing shared beliefs.

Our analysis of Arab representation in the communication channels of Jewish Israeli society begins with a description of public discourse about Arabs, which takes place mostly through the mass media. The media provide daily information about current events, supply commentaries, and serve as a stage for public debates. Within this framework, the media also serve as a mechanism that transmits the views of the leaders and provides information about them. Leaders write articles for publication in newspapers and appear on radio or television. In addition, the mass media often analyze and comment on leaders’ views and statements. Such presentation is an important part of political discourse in a society in which the leaders

negotiate among themselves and try to influence public opinion. During the prestate period, political leaders often took on the role of a journalist, writing for the Jewish public. This practice continued after the establishment of the state of Israel, when journalists and politicians commuted between the two careers (Liebes, 1997). To understand the emergence of societal consensus and collective action (Gamson, 1988), specifically the roots of shared stereotyping of Arabs and the behavior of Israeli Jews toward them, requires an investigation of the contents and hegemonic direction of political discourse.

THE IMPACT OF MASS MEDIA

There is much evidence indicating that people's understanding of major political issues is often shaped by the mass media's depiction of the issues (Adoni & Mane, 1984). This type of influence is subtle, since it takes place through agenda setting and priming (see Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Agenda setting refers to the process by which issues that receive prominent attention on the national news come to be regarded by the public as the most important problems of society. Priming refers to the way that media reports can influence a society's views by selectively calling attention to certain issues, providing direction for their interpretation. The latter influence is more profound and direct since it touches on the contents presented. It derives from the fact that any presentation of an event or issue by the mass media involves providing a particular meaning. Even a simple report of events requires the selection of specific words or pictures to describe a particular aspect. This means that media reports are always presented within a particular interpretive frame (Gamson, 1988). This frame is a central organizing cognitive principle (a schema) of presentation, interpretation, and evaluation that gives coherence and meaning to either verbal or visual discourse (Gitlin, 1980) and in essence constructs social reality (McQuail, 1994). By framing an issue in a specific way, the presentation suggests a particular organizing story line, which points out its scope and essence, the underlying causes, and possible consequences and thus provides a particular enlightenment for its understanding. Consequently, frames shape the view of the mass media's consumers about specific issues (Iyenger, 1991).

Frames are found in news reports, leaders' appeals, journalists' commentaries, and experts' explanations. When information within a frame is consistent across all the various sources, and there is no alternative information, the result is a hegemonic frame that dominates the channels of communication. This hegemonic frame serves as an instructional enlightening source and a specific prism for society members to understand the world and leads to the construction of a particular social reality (see Gamson, 1992).

Mutz (1998) has proposed a social psychological approach to understanding the influence of the media on people's political attitudes and behaviors. On the basis of extensive empirical work, she suggests that media inform how other members of a society experience and view issues that are at the focus of public interest. This information plays a particular role in shaping political judgment. The influence is based on the desire to have valid information that motivates people to rely on external sources to obtain knowledge about issues that go beyond the realm of their own life experience. When the media provide this type of knowledge and are perceived as a reliable source of information, they successfully serve as an illuminator of reality. In Mutz's words, "People's fundamental lack of information about the world beyond their personal experiences and contacts leads them to rely on media coverage for information about the state of collective affairs because it is likely to be more accurate than personal experience" (1998, p. 275). Moreover, when people are exposed to information from the media, they are aware that other society members have the same information and share the same reality, and this perception creates a sense of being closer together. That is, exposure to a common political culture not only constructs a shared view of the issues but also connects people in an abstract, impersonal way. This process is especially pronounced in societies in which the trusted channels of communication provide more or less unitary frames.

Through the years the Hebrew mass media have played an important role in shaping the Jews' view of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of Arabs (see, e.g., A. Cohen, Adoni, & Bantz, 1990). Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television have transmitted daily news, commentaries, and debates about issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the presentation of Arab images and the expression of attitudes, affect, and emotions toward them. It is not surprising that the Israeli mass media use a frame that is in line with the Zionist narrative in dealing with the conflict. One of the leading Israeli communication researchers, Tamar Liebes, noted bluntly: "To say that the Israeli press represents the Arab-Israeli conflict from where 'we' stand seems redundant. We have learned that any report on reality expresses the reporter's point of view, that conflict makes it physically and psychologically difficult to get to the other side, that journalists have to tell stories which are relevant and familiar to their public, and thus that journalists, willy-nilly, are servants of their culture" (Liebes, 1997, p. 1).

Our analysis of the public discourse about Arabs is divided into three parts: first, we focus on the public discourse of the political and intellectual leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine, before the establishment of the state; second, we describe the presentation of Arab images by the Israeli Jewish leaders in the Israeli public discourse, mainly in the mass media; and, third, we analyze the representation of Arabs in the newspapers and television of the Israeli state.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE

We begin the description of public discourse about Arabs in the early period, as the waves of Jewish immigrants began to arrive in Palestine at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. This point of departure allows a glimpse at the early perceptions and attitudes toward Arabs that set the frames for the later immigrants and the new generations to come.

Many of the first immigrants did not expect to find an Arab population in Palestine because of the widely held belief among the Zionists in Europe that Palestine was "A land without a people for a people without a land." As the Jewish immigrants began to arrive in Palestine, they encountered Arabs who also lived on land with sands and swamps. On this basis they formed a belief that the Arab inhabitants neglected the land because they did not form an attachment to it. This became one of the important arguments in delegitimizing Arab claims to Palestine and one of the most powerful myths to penetrate Jewish Israeli culture.

At the beginning of the 20th century, as noted in the previous chapter, Jewish immigrants, particularly from European countries, had ethnocentric views that led to stereotyping of Arabs as primitive and backward (Gorny, 1987; A. Shapira, 1992). Although the Jewish perceptions of the Arab were influenced by ethnocentric prejudices, the evolving conflict between the two peoples, with its accompanying violence, played the determinative role in the development of the Jewish negative intergroup repertoire toward Arabs.

Within the context of conflict, the major issues that preoccupied Jews in Palestine with regard to their relations to Arabs were, first, the very existence of Arabs in Palestine, who constituted the obstacle to the Zionist goal of settling the country with Jews and, second, Arab objections and violent resistance to the realization of this goal (A. Shapira, 1992). Arab objections and violent resistance led Jews to have feelings of threat, fear, and insecurity, which became crucial underlying elements of the negative psychological repertoire toward Arabs. Thus, over the decades, public discourse in relation to Arabs focused on how to deal with Arabs in light of the goals of the Zionist national movement. The goals forced the founding fathers to cope with many specific, fundamental questions. Are the Arabs attached the land? Do they have a legitimate right to Palestine, and if so, how does it compare with Jewish rights? Can we call the Arab residents of Palestine a nation? Why do they resist Jewish immigration? What kind of cooperation, if any, should be built with the Arabs? How should Arabs be viewed and treated? How do Arabs fit into the evolving life in Palestine, and what should be the place of Arabs in the future Jewish entity? All these questions derived from the conflictive relations between the Jews and the Arabs. The answers that Jews gave to these questions were based on their

perception of reality, past beliefs and experiences, and their individual values. In general, the overwhelming majority of the Zionist community in Palestine believed in "the distinction between the 'rights' of the Jewish people as a whole to Palestine and the 'rights' of the Arab residents in Palestine" (D. Horowitz & Lissak, 1978, p. 138). When the answers to these questions were translated into policy strategies, political tactics, and eventually action, they shaped Arab-Jewish relations. Moreover, the answers that were fed by the conflict situation, and also by the ethnocentric perceptions, provided the prism for the collection of the new information (see also Shafir, 1989; A. Shapira, 1992).

Yosef Gorny (1987) in his book *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882–1948* suggests that four different approaches toward Arabs dominated Jewish public discourse in Palestine during the first 35 years of the Zionist endeavor. All four approaches perceived the right of the Jews to their old homeland as unquestionable and their return as a just step. But they greatly differed with regard to the perception of the Arab entity in Palestine and to the vision of Arab-Jewish relations. These approaches are of importance because they served as a basis for the crystallization of future political movements with their differential views about the Arabs and about the Arab-Jewish conflict. Each of them evolved and changed in line with the developing context of the conflict, but their traces can be found even in today's Israeli politics.

Integrative Approach

The integrative approach is best reflected in the ideas of Brith Shalom (Peace Alliance), an organization for promoting Jewish-Arab coexistence in Palestine, which was founded in 1925. It can be seen as the basis for the present peace camp. The integrative approach recognized the existence of a Palestinian identity, expressed empathy with Arabs' needs, and propagated integration, coexistence, and coordination with the Arab population. But most of all, it called attention to the presence of Arabs, their needs and aspirations, and urged that they be treated justly and with respect. The proponents of this approach, being the smallest minority, criticized the unjust treatment of Arabs by Jews, acknowledged the emotional attachment of Arabs to the land, and recognized the involvement of the Arab national movement in Palestine; some may have perceived the Arab character positively, perhaps under the influence of romantic notions of Arab culture.

A representative proponent of this approach was Yitzhak Epshtein, one of the first Jewish educators in Palestine. In 1907 he wrote an article, "A hidden question," for *ha-Shiloah* (a monthly publication) in which he explained his integrative views. He criticized Zionist leaders who disregarded the Arab presence in Palestine and their attachment to the land, as well as the way Jews were buying land in Palestine and dispossessing poor fellahin.

He wrote, "We have overlooked a rather 'marginal' fact that in our beloved land there lives an entire people that has been dwelling there for many centuries and has never considered leaving it" (from A. Shapira, 1992, p. 45). He also expressed a positive view about characteristics of Arabs, perceiving them as strong and the Druze as courageous, heroic, beautiful, and spiritual. He warned that the disregard of Arab needs could lead to conflict, and he was among the very few who stated that the implementation of Zionist goals depends on Arab consent, since the country belongs to both Jews and Arabs.

Yosef Luria, another advocate of this approach, wrote in *ha-Olam* in 1911: "We must admit the truth. During all the years of our labour in Palestine we completely forgot that there were Arabs in the country. The Arabs have been 'discovered' only during the past few years. . . . The Arabs' attitudes towards our coming passed almost unnoticed. It was as if they did not exist" (from Gorny, 1987, p. 46).

Proponents of this approach preached a Pan-Semitic view of integration between the two nations. In their perspective there is enough living space for Jews and Arabs in Palestine and both nations could benefit from close cooperation. One of the extreme positions within this approach was presented by Yehoshua Redler-Feldman (known by the pseudonym Rabbi Benjamin) in a manifesto, *Arab Prophecy*, published in 1907 in London.

In the future he shall be as one of you, no different from yourself;
 You shall give him your sons and take his sons unto yourself;
 Your blood and his blood shall mingle and grow strong;
 Each to his own kind, one kind for all;
 We are brothers, several families of one people.

(from Ben-Ezer, 1999, p. 3)

With time, this approach, being outside Zionist consensus, was expressed only in the small circle of intellectuals associated with Brith Shalom, who advocated a binational solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine. They viewed Arabs as having equal rights to the homeland and as being equal partners in the future state. As Yosef Luria, also a member of Brith Shalom, wrote in 1928, in *Sheifoteinu*, the publication of the organization: "It is the land of two peoples, who live there and should live there on a political arrangement which cannot be changed for the worse by majority vote" (from Gorny, 1987, p. 124).

Separatist Approach

On the opposite end of the dimension of views about the conflict and the Arabs was the separatist outlook that served as a foundation for the revisionist movement of Zeev Jabotinsky and the present Likud Party. First, this view warned against assimilation of the Jews in the Arab culture and

preached cultural separation. In 1907 Yosef Klausner wrote in *ha-Shiloah*: “We Jews have been living for more than two thousands years among cultured people and we cannot and must not descend once more to the cultural level of semi-savages. Indeed our hope that one day we shall be masters of the country is not based on the sword or on the fist but on our cultural advantage over the Arabs and Turks, which will gradually increase our influence” (from Gorny, 1987, p. 49).

The writer and political activist Yosef Chaim Brenner, who immigrated to Palestine in 1909, also objected to romantic views of the Arabs and considered them as naive. He believed that Arabs would fight against the Jewish minority and should therefore always be seen as the enemy of the Jews (Ben Ezer, 2001). In 1913 he wrote:

Such an idealistic attitude to the world, such childish dreams and purity of soul, which have no basis in the deepest instinct of man partake, in my opinion, of immorality. . . . is there [anything] to say about the love of our neighbors, the natives of this land, if they are sworn enemies, yes enemies? . . . Despite their decline and lack of culture, they are the actual and conscious masters of the land, and we come to penetrate them and live among them because we must. There is already hatred between us, as there must be and there will be. They are stronger than we are in every sense. But we, the Jews, have already become accustomed to living as the weak among the strong, and we must therefore be prepared, here also, for the results of hatred, we must use every means in our weak hands to survive here too. Weak and loving people are cursed! – Thus we have been living ever since we became a nation. Above all – there must be understanding of the truth of the situation. (from Ben Ezer, 1987, p. 21)

Another writer and political activist, Yehoshua Barzilay, called for the just treatment of Arabs but at the same time wrote about their low cultural level and suggested treating them as the Germans did – that is to say, with distance and coolness. Separation was his ideal scenario for Arab-Jewish relations, since agreement would require compromise, and compromise would be interpreted by the Arabs as a sign of weakness. In his view, coexistence is feasible only after the Jewish community becomes equal in size to the Arab community.

Many protagonists of this approach denied that the Arabs living in Palestine constituted a nation and, more important, they rejected any Arab claim to Palestine as a homeland. This approach intimated that the conflict was inevitable, because the Arabs would never agree to Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish state. They would fight the Zionist movement and the Jewish people who immigrated to Palestine. Zeev Jabotinsky, the founder and leader of the Revisionist Zionist Party, rejected a possibility of Jewish-Arab cooperation and predicted a major clash between Jews and Arabs, although he realized that Arabs would always be present in Palestine and their expulsion was “totally unthinkable” to him. He was convinced that no agreement would be possible between

Jews and Arabs until there was a Jewish majority in Palestine. Arabs, in his view, would oppose the realization of the Zionist goals violently. He wrote, "any group of native-born, whether backward or cultured, sees its land as its own 'national home' in which it wishes to live and to remain the sole masters; such a nation will not voluntarily accept new masters nor will they accept any form of joint ownership" (from D. Horowitz & Lissak, 1978, p. 139). On the basis of this assumption, in 1923 he wrote in the article "The iron wall" that only use of force and Jewish determination would assure the maximal achievement of Zionist goals: "We must either suspend our settlement efforts or continue them without paying attention to the mood of the natives. Settlement can develop under the protection of a force which will not be dependent on the local population, behind an iron wall which they will be powerless to break down" (from Gorny, 1987, p. 166).

In a paradoxical way he held the same views as the Brith Shalom members, in recognizing Arabs in Palestine as a nation, not stereotyping them negatively and even expressing admiration for the Arab national character. He took the Arab opposition to Jewish settlement seriously, declaring "I would not despise the Arabs as do those who are convinced that the Arabs will some day sell out to us the future of their country, as long as they will perceive even the faintest hope of ridding themselves of us one way or another. Only when this hope is dashed will the moderates among them prevail, and try to make the best matters. . . . But until then and precisely because I want peace, the sole objective is to persuade them to abandon all intoxicating hopes" (from Gorny, 1987, p. 163).

Liberal Approach

The liberal outlook represented an intermediate approach between the two extreme positions, according to Gorny (1987). This outlook advocated fair treatment of the Arabs on the one hand and expressed suspicion with regard to Arab intentions on the other. Ahad Ha-Am, a Jewish writer and essayist who actively participated in the polemics around the establishment of the Zionist movement, was one of the spiritual fathers of this approach. He visited the country in 1891 and, following his visit, he wrote a famous article, "Truth from Eretz Israel," in which he also referred to the perceptions of Arabs.

We abroad are accustomed to believe that the Arabs are all desert savages, asses, who neither perceive nor understand what goes around them. But it is a big mistake. The Arabs, like people everywhere are of sharp intellect and full of cunning. . . . the Arabs, and I am referring particularly to the town dwellers, see and understand what we are doing and what our aspirations are in Palestine, but they keep their silence and pretend not to know, because at present they do not perceive our actions as a threat to their future; they are endeavouring, therefore, to exploit us as well, to

derive advantage from their new visitors as they are able. Yet they mock us in their hearts. But if the time comes and our people make such progress to displace the people of the country . . . they will not yield their place lightly. (from Gorny, 1987, pp. 26–27)

In his later writings, Ahad Ha-Am recognized the need to achieve peaceful cooperation with the Arabs and called for nonprovocative and careful action in order not to arouse the resentment of the Arabs in Palestine. The proponents of this approach, including A. Hermoni, Arthur Rupin, and Moshe Smilansky, took an open stand in favor of just and equal relations with Arabs. For example, they objected to the exclusion of Arabs from the Jewish labor market, believing that as both societies are destined to live together, they should jointly act on behalf of the country. Therefore, these individuals advocated the consideration of Arab needs and peaceful cooperation. According to Gorny (1987), this approach implicitly recognized the right of the Arabs as a nation to Palestine but considered that Jewish claims have a stronger basis. However, the supporters of this approach still viewed Arabs as being at a lower cultural level and state of national development and did not perceive Arab characteristics as positively as proponents of the first integrative outlook. Moshe Smilansky, one of the leading writers in this period and a leader of the Jewish settlers, wrote in 1914 in *ha-Olam*:

We should not forget that we are dealing with a semi-savage people, with extremely primitive concepts. This is their nature: if they sense that you are strong, they will yield to you and repress their hatred; if they sense that you are weak, they will dominate you. They equate gentleness with impotence. What is more, under influence of the numerous tourist and urban Christians, the Arabs have developed base characteristics which are not prevalent among other primitive peoples, and which are evident among the urban quasi-intelligentsia; lying, cheating, suspiciousness, and slander – all these are faults in which the Arab masses wallow. What is more, as a result of these influences, the Arab masses have developed a simmering hatred for the Jews. These Semites are anti-Semites. (from Gorny, 1987, pp. 63–64)

The views of Chaim Weizmann, one of the most prominent leaders of the Zionist movement, can be classified as belonging to this approach. He carried out talks with Arab leaders but disregarded the Palestinian Arabs as partners in negotiations and demanded that the British respond strongly to Palestinian violence. He did not see the Arabs in Palestine as a separate nation and had a negative view of them. According to Reinharz (1993), in a letter to Balfour in 1918 Weizmann “judged them to be ‘superficially clever and quickwitted,’ respecting ‘only power and success’ and ‘treacherous (by) nature’” (p. 252). Weizmann further wrote, “The problem of our relations with the Palestinian Arabs is an economic problem, not a political one. From a political point of view the Arab centre of gravity is not Palestine, but the Hedjaz, really the triangle formed by Mecca, Damascus

and Baghdad" (from Reinhatz, 1993, p. 252). In a speech delivered in Berlin in 1922, however, he referred to Palestine as the joint homeland of Jews and Arabs and emphasized the importance of developing Jewish-Arab cooperation (Gorny, 1987).

Constructive-Socialist Approach

The fourth approach, the constructive-socialist outlook, is of special importance, because it dominated public discourse for decades, and second and third generations of its supporters can be found in the Labor Party today (see Shapiro, 1976). Major political figures, who played central roles in the politics of the prestate period, the establishment of the state of Israel, and its first governments, were proponents of this approach. These include David Ben Gurion, Yitzhak Ben Zvi, Berl Katznelson, and Yitzhak Tabenkin. All had a similar ideological background and came from Eastern Europe, and some were members of Poalei Zion, the socialist party. The basis of their constructive socialist view was articulated by one of the first ideologues, Ber Borochov, who wrote in 1906: "The indigenous inhabitants of Palestine do not constitute an independent economic and cultural type. They are divided and split up not only because of the structure of the terrain and not only because of religious diversity, but because of the nature of the country as an international hostelry. The indigenous inhabitants of Palestine are not one nation, nor will they become one for a long time to come" (from Gorny, 1987, pp. 66–67).

This view that Arabs in Palestine are not a nation would be expressed by many of the supporters of this approach for many years. For example, Ben Gurion first viewed the Arabs of Palestine not as a separate nation but as part of greater Arab nation; therefore, he believed that Palestine belongs to Jews who are a nation, whereas Arabs as a community have the right to reside there (Gorny, 1987). With time, however, he recognized the movement from a political perspective as national but viewed its effects as immoral (Chalamish, 2003). Within this camp there were also voices expressing more accommodating views. For example, as Yaakov Zerubavel wrote in *ha-Ahdut* in 1914, "since two nations, Jews and Arabs, have found themselves together in Palestine, and have been destined to weave the fabric of their national lives in the same geographical area, they must find a common denominator and a way to evolve a local policy common to Jews and Arabs" (from Gorny, 1987, p. 75). The issue of whether Arab Palestinians constituted a nation and whether they had a right to the country would occupy the leaders of this approach over the next decades in their dealing with the "Arab problem."

The leaders of Poalei Zion, the socialist-democratic party, recognized that confrontation with the Arab population had two sources: one economic, resulting from an insistence on Jewish labor that excluded Arabs

from the Jewish labor market, and the other nationalistic, resulting from the fact that the national aspirations of the Jews were unacceptable to the Arabs. Thus, they were aware that conflict with the Arabs was inevitable. This awareness was a source of ambivalence because they tried to combine humanistic and socialist values with nationalist goals. When a faction of Poalei Zion, *Ahdut ha-Avoda*, which played a major role in Jewish politics, was founded, three basic principles guided its stand on the Arab-Jewish relations: the exclusive national rights of the Jews to Palestine and the rights of the Arabs, as inhabitants of the country, to live as a national minority; the rejection of the existence of the Arabs' national motivation as an underlying force in their actions; and the prevention of the unjust dispossession of Arab fellahin through land reform and the Jewish settlement of unpopulated areas (Gorny, 1987). They also had heated debates about the possibilities of cooperation between Jewish and Arab workers in different economic, political, and cultural activities (D. Horowitz & Lissak, 1978).

According to A. Shapira (1992), this approach of disregarding Arab nationalism can be attributed to the growing violent objection of Arabs to Jewish immigration and settlement, to the backwardness of Arab society, and to Arab susceptibility to incitement by their leaders. By proposing different ways of social, economic, and cultural cooperation, it revealed the possibility of peace and fraternity in line with socialist ideology and transferred the potential hatred and aggressive tendencies from an entire collective to individuals in the Arab community. Thus, Shapira concluded that:

One of the consequences of this approach was a mythologization of the Arabs. As long as Arabs remained alien to Jews and there was little direct familiarity, that explanation was able to retain vitality. The operative model of Jewish Arab relations was not based on real, flesh-and-blood Arabs. Rather, it was nurtured by an abstraction, an image of the Arabs created by the Jews for their own psychological needs. That apparently helps to account for a paradoxical fact: The Jewish community most distant from, and alien to, Arabs in Palestine was that of the socialist workers. (A. Shapira, 1992, p. 124)

The four approaches described here served as a basis for the vivid public discourse that continued through decades and, in fact, continues even today. In spite of the debates, disagreements, and even conflicts among the approaches, and within them, the great majority of the Jewish immigrants, with only an insignificant marginal minority, rallied under the Zionist consensus, which viewed the Arabs as the enemy in response to Arab objections to Jewish aspirations and objectives. The state of Israel was established in 1948 during the bloody War of Independence, and the Arab-Israeli conflict deteriorated into a full confrontation between Arab states and the state of Israel. Public discourse continued to play a role in shaping the reality of the Israeli public. The mass media played an important

function in this public discourse and in shaping reality, providing essential channels for transmitting and disseminating information to members of the Israeli society.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE BY LEADERS

As noted earlier, public discourse includes not only mass media news, reports, and commentaries, but also leaders' statements, interviews, and expressions of opinion. Leaders take an active part in public discourse, expressing their opinions about various issues that are on the agenda and are of interest to the public. Within the scope of public discourse, Israeli leaders through the years have frequently referred to Arabs in general and to Palestinians in particular, in terms of their own views about their identity, intentions, and characteristics. The leaders' public expressions of opinion on these themes provide the public not only with information but also with validation and legitimization of the prevailing stereotypes and prejudice. Unfortunately, there is little research on the presentations of Arabs in the public discourse by Israeli leaders.

In a series of studies on the views of the most prominent Israeli leaders regarding Palestinians, Yehudit Auerbach and Hemda Ben-Yehuda analyzed their opinions publicly stated in the Israeli parliament and/or conveyed through electronic and print media. Auerbach and Ben-Yehuda were able to identify images Israeli leaders held and thus to describe their contribution to public discourse. The studies were carried out under the assumption that the existence of the conflict leaves a distinctive imprint on the views of the leaders, and they, in turn, play a crucial role in shaping leaders' policies.

The first study (Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda, 1987) focuses on the examination of Menachem Begin (leader of the Likud Party and prime minister from 1977) and Moshe Dayan (defense minister from 1967 to 1974 and foreign minister from 1977) during the period 1967–1980. The analysis shows that Begin perceived the conflict with the Palestinians as part of the existential struggle of the Jewish people. He absolutely rejected a distinct Palestinian identity, saying in the Israeli parliament (Knesset) in 1975 "there is no Palestine here and therefore there is no entity, no identity, no nation that is called Palestinian" (from Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda, 1987, p. 330). He thus used the label "Arabs of the Land of Israel" when he referred to the Palestinians and attributed to them a hostile attitude and the desire to destroy Israel. As a Holocaust survivor, he completely rejected the PLO and delegitimized it, referring in a 1978 interview to "the so-called PLO – that murderous Nazi organization, the baser of which there has never been in history since and except or besides the armed Nazi organizations" (from Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda, 1987, p. 336). Dayan, in contrast, recognized the distinctive Palestinian identity and viewed the Palestinians in a differentiated way, making distinctions among various groups and identifying

their different goals and intentions. In 1971 he said in the Knesset, "as for the possibility of compromise between us and Arabs . . . I appreciate some of the Palestinian notables in the West Bank, in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza, and today it is really possible to talk with them" (from Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda, 1987, p. 333). This statement reflects his positive attitude toward Arabs: he claimed that he never harbored hostility toward them and that he maintained personal contact with the Arab population. However, he had a different view of the PLO. Dayan accepted the reality of the PLO's existence but, as Begin did, rejected the PLO's authenticity, viewing it as a terrorist organization with the intention to destroy Israel. Also, as Begin did, he rejected the Palestinians' connection to Palestine, suggesting that their place is in Jordan.

A second study by Agid-Ben Yehuda and Auerbach (1991) investigated the views of two dominant leaders from the Labor Party, Shimon Peres (defense minister between 1974 and 1977) and Yigal Allon (deputy prime minister until 1977) about the Palestinians, as expressed in the media and parliamentary speeches between 1967 and 1980. Both leaders made a clear distinction between the PLO and the Palestinians. Both denied the PLO's authenticity. Allon excluded the PLO from being a legitimate party in the conflict and described the Palestinian National Covenant as "an Arabic *Mein Kampf* which calls for the destruction of Israel" in an interview with the *Jerusalem Post* on January 4, 1977 (from Agid-Ben Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p. 527). Peres, too, did not see the PLO as a genuine national liberation movement, suggesting in the Knesset on July 9, 1979, that "its Nazi characteristics are immanent to its nature, not only to its behavior" (from Agid-Ben Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p. 527). But he did differentiate among the different factions within the PLO and even did not rule out the possibility that, one day, Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, would come to negotiate with Israel. However, the study shows that this view was exceptional. Both leaders described the PLO as a terrorist organization, murderers' organization, or virulent enemy, whose intentions were to murder innocent Jews and destroy the state of Israel.

At the same time, both leaders provided different views of the Palestinian nation. Although both recognized a Palestinian national identity, Allon saw Palestinians as an integral part of the Jordanian-Palestinian nation ("Jordan is Palestine"), whereas Peres viewed the Palestinians as a distinct national group with legitimate national aspirations but with Jordanian-Palestinian ties. Second, both leaders detected a readiness for peace among the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1976 Allon said that "the great majority of the population of the territories . . . reject(s) terrorism and violence as a means for solving their problems," and Peres said in 1975 that the "Arab population has rejected the idea of extremism and violence" (from Agid-Ben Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p. 527). Both leaders also empathized with the Palestinians and

upheld a moral commitment to solve the Palestinian problem. Allon said in the Knesset on December 28, 1977, "committing justice with another people . . . I mean the Arab Palestinian nation that resides on the banks of the Jordan, in the historical Land of Israel, is also in itself of historical significance," and Peres said in the Knesset on March 20, 1979, "Our rejection of the PLO is not linked with rejecting the rights of our neighbors, the Palestinian Arabs. We mean them well. We want to bestow good and honor on them, on their identity, their heritage, their children, and their future" (from Agid-Ben Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p. 530). Allon's and Peres's expressions were analyzed quantitatively. The data show that Allon attributed hostile intentions to Palestinians and/or the PLO in 84% of his expressions and Peres in 81%. Also, Allon and Peres themselves expressed varying degrees of hostility toward Palestinians and/or the PLO: Allon in 92% of his expressions and Peres in 83% of his expressions. The remaining expressions, concerning the adversary's intentions or their own feelings, were positive. They were usually about compromise or cooperation and were always directed toward the Palestinian people and not the PLO.

The last study by Auerbach and Ben Yehuda Agid (1993) investigated the views of Yitzhak Rabin (a leader of the Labor Party: prime minister from 1974 to 1977, defense minister from 1984 to 1990) and Ariel Sharon (a leader of the Likud party: defense minister from 1981 to 1983) about the Palestinians as expressed between 1967 and 1987. The results show similarity in the views of these two leaders. Both recognized the Palestinians as a distinct group, but while Rabin did not recognize them as a separate national entity, Sharon did. Also, both acknowledged a political link between the Palestinians and Jordan, but whereas Sharon regarded Jordan as a Palestinian state in reality, Rabin saw it as a joint Jordanian-Palestinian state. In addition, both leaders drew a sharp distinction between the PLO and the Palestinian people. They viewed the PLO as a terrorist and murderous organization whose main goal was to destroy Israel. They often delegitimized the PLO and ruled out any possibility of negotiation with it. But Sharon in the early phase of his political career was ready to recognize the PLO as genuinely representative of the Palestinian people, saying in 1977, "Israel must talk with the PLO representatives if they represent the Palestinians" (from Auerbach & Ben Yehuda Agid, 1993, p. 154). Finally, both Rabin and Sharon saw in the Palestinian population a willingness to compromise, moderation, and a readiness to cooperate: Rabin said in the Knesset in 1985, "most of the population . . . wants to go on living with peace with us regardless of their political views" (from Auerbach & Ben Yehuda Agid, 1993, p. 151), and Sharon expressed his belief in an interview in a newspaper in 1982 that the Jews and the Palestinians could find a solution that involved communal living.

A study by Caspi (1986) analyzed televised public debates between Menachem Begin and Shimon Peres (two candidates for prime minister) in

the elections of 1977 and 1981. The analysis shows that Menachem Begin, who won the elections, "frequently sharpens, emphasizes and intensifies the extended conflict between Israel and the Arab world" (p. 455), by stating the divergent interests of each side and by describing the conflict and its consequences. In these debates Begin frequently differentiated between "them" and "us," presenting the Arabs as intransigent and hostile and Israel as "just, self-defending and moral, granting generous rights within the framework of autonomy, to the very Arabs who seek to deny the historic rights of the Jewish people" (p. 456). He viewed Arabs and Palestinians as enemies and focused on the dangers their aspirations posed to the state of Israel.

A study by Krasov (1998) investigated the ways Arabs were viewed as strangers in public discourse during the election campaign of 1996 for prime minister. She analyzed the propagandist broadcasts of both candidates: Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party and Shimon Peres of the Labor Party. Her analysis shows that the Arab issue, and especially the Palestinians, played an important role in the propaganda campaign. Both candidates tried to convince the public that they would be able to contain the Arabs and, at the same time, would be able to contribute to progress in the peace process. Arabs were presented as the "others," sources of threat to the Jewish Israeli being. Likud concentrated on Palestinians, using fear as a method of persuasion. It presented a specific reality by describing the terror attacks performed by the Palestinians and portraying them as a threatening entity that aims to hurt Jews in Israel. The messages focused on lack of trust and potential danger, often presenting Arafat in films as an unreliable leader of the Palestinians and an enemy. Netanyahu said in the first broadcast: "I know that many of you live in fear. Are afraid to ride a bus, to send children to kindergarten. There is a feeling that the next terror attack is only a question of time. I am not ready to live in this way" (from Krasov, 1998, p. 50). The Labor Party also used fear in its campaign but in a different way. The messages threatened the public that war or "Balkanization" was likely if the peace process did not progress. The proposed solution was to become separate from the Palestinians in order to save the Jewish state. Peres said, "The choice is unambiguous: either to annex Yehuda and Shomron as Likud wants and turn Israel into a bi-national state where all will be mixed without an ability to divide, or to reach an agreement with the Palestinians: They will be there and we will be here" (from Krasov, 1998, p. 55). The Palestinians thus were again portrayed as a potential source of threat if the partition was not carried out. In essence, both campaigns aimed to elicit feelings of fear in association with the Palestinians.

A unique study by Zaretski-Toledano (1989) allows a glance into the leaders' system of beliefs and attitudes about Palestinian citizens of the state of Israel. In 1986 she surveyed (using questionnaires and interviews) 144 main leaders of the Israeli political parties (e.g., ministers, parliament

members, governmental officials, mayors, party officials, intellectuals) and analyzed the party platforms they presented publicly in the 1984 and 1988 elections. We focus only on the analysis of the Jewish political leaders' views and on the views revealed in the party platforms of three political blocks: right-wing (Likud, religious-Zionist party, and nationalist parties), alignment (Labor Party), and left-wing (Zionist).¹ The analysis shows that the political discourse of the three political blocks greatly differed in terms of their attitudes toward the Arab citizens of Israel.

The right-wing leaders and parties believed that the Arabs in the state of Israel had full citizenship rights, but the majority of them thought that the state should give preferential treatment to Jews and objected to allowing Arabs any separate political, economic, cultural, or educational activities. Some of them did not have any objections to encouraging Arab citizens to leave Israel, and a minority had a problem with the fact that Arabs live in the Jewish state. They also expressed limited readiness for social contact with the Arabs. In their view, the Arabs should be content with their status in a state that is proclaimed to be Jewish and should be loyal to it. The great majority of these leaders viewed Arab citizens as a threat, ignored their discrimination, supported existing policies, and perceived development of Palestinian identity among them (i.e., Palestinization) as an expression of hostility and subversive activity. As a result, Palestinian identity was not recognized, and Palestinian national organizations were regarded in the context of terror and violence.

Leaders of the Labor Party, and their party platform, expressed ambiguous views. On the one hand, they supported equality and integration but, on the other hand, implied that Arabs are a hostile body and a demographic threat. The great majority of the Labor leaders accepted the fact that there is an Arab minority in the Jewish state. About half of the Labor leaders recognized that the Arab minority is discriminated against and supported equal treatment of Jews and Arabs. The majority of the leaders thought that the state should change its discriminating policies but objected to Arabs having independent activities. About half of the leaders believed that the Arab minority constitutes some threat to Israel's security, and a minority of them refused to have different kinds of social contacts with Arabs. Labor leaders and their political platform did not recognize Palestinian identity, did not mention a Palestinian nation, and rejected the idea of a Palestinian state.

The leaders of the Zionist left fully recognized the Arab minority as being entitled to equal rights as citizens of the state and were aware of discrimination against Arab citizens. They objected to discrimination and were committed to struggle for equal rights. But this political block believed

¹ It can be assumed that leaders express their views in public discourse and the political platforms are presented openly in public campaigns during the elections.

that the struggle should be carried out through the Zionist parties or under their aegis. A minority still believed that the Arab minority constitutes a certain threat to the state security, but almost all the leaders expressed readiness for close social contact with Arabs. They recognized a Palestinian identity and the necessity to establish a Palestinian state. Finally, of special interest are the results presented in this study, which compared the views of the political blocks' leaders with the views of their public constituency, as found in the national survey (see Chapter 7 for details). The results unequivocally indicate that in the respective political blocks the leaders are considerably more liberal in their views than their constituents.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE THROUGH THE MEDIA IN ISRAEL

Through the first two decades of the state of Israel, until early 1970, the Israeli media were completely obedient to the political and military establishment. They acted according to the model of social responsibility described by Caspi and Limor (1992). Official government sources were the main source of information for the media, their agenda was dictated by the authorities, reports about widely defined foreign affairs and security issues relied on official statements, the media barely tried to exercise freedom of opinion and the right to know, and they fully supported, without critical appraisal, all the security policies of the government. This approach toward the media was in line with the view of the first prime minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion, who believed that the journalist should be a "public educator and instructor. This thing obliges and obliges much. Education can be only done by example. The hour is an hour of terrible danger (to my great regret the public and most of the writers and journalists do not estimate enough the threatening hour and the extent of danger. . . . I have a clear feeling that a large part, too large, of our journalists do not fulfill their duty in this difficult hour and I regret that this is so" (Ben-Gurion-Schocken, 1991, pp. 90–91). He expressed this view in 1948 but maintained it through his years in office. And, indeed, the media's professionals, as well as the whole intellectual community, voluntarily undertook the burden of coping with the intractable conflict and nation building by accepting the leaders' authority to define the boundaries and contents of political discourse (M. Keren, 1983; Liebes, 1997).

Until the mid-1990s, the press was guided by a self-appointed committee that met regularly with the military censor and reviewed every piece of information concerning security matters. The Israel Radio, for example, which was the only electronic source of information, was under complete control of the prime minister's office until 1965. Since then it has become an independent public authority, but it still continues to be under pressure to maintain the notion of social responsibility. The heads of the public authority are political nominees of the government. Television was not

introduced until 1968 and had only one channel for its first 25 years until the second channel, financed solely by advertisements, began to broadcast in 1993. In the early 1990s cable television was introduced in Israel and spread to most households. For many decades most of the press functioned as a mouthpiece for the political parties, depending on their views and attitudes. But, in the mid-1990s, the socialist newspapers closed (*Davar* of the Labor Party and *Al Hamishmar* of the Zionist-socialist party Mapam), while the Orthodox-religious press began to blossom. In recent years, three major privately owned daily newspapers provided most information to the Israeli public: *Haaretz*, a liberal, sophisticated newspaper (a type of Israeli *New York Times*) with minor circulation; *Yedioth Ahronoth*, the most “popular” newspaper with the largest circulation in the country (an average readership of 60% of Israelis); and *Maariv*, a competitor to *Yedioth Ahronoth* (with a readership of about 25% of the Israelis).

In the late 1970s, the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, the media began to be more and more open, expressing alternative views that provided a different perspective on events. This development was especially salient in newspapers, which began to question the basic assumptions of security policies, criticize the Israeli Defence Forces, and provide information about topics that had never been reported on before (Peri, 1998). But “the Israeli media, in general – and especially the television – tend to exhibit conservatism, preferring clearly the formal positions of the political establishment” (Barzilai, 1996a, p. 190). According to Naveh (1998), a few of the characteristics noted by Caspi and Limor (1992) still continue to inhibit the development of the libertarian patterns of reporting news. The media still deal with issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the treatment of the Palestinians in a limited way, often presenting formal governmental accounts, and journalists tend to take on the social responsibility of identifying with the consensus view in their reports on security matters.

Various reasons explain why the media have played a role in shaping the view of the Israeli public about the conflict and about Arabs. First, the state is viewed as democratic, and the public believes that the flow of information is not restricted. The Israeli public relies almost entirely on information from the formal Israeli channels of communication, especially on issues related to conflict and security, although there is access to foreign channels as well. Information about the conflict and the rival is accepted unquestionably, without validation or critical assessment. On the contrary, in times of crisis, many Israeli Jews perceive foreign information sources as anti-Israeli and/or anti-Semitic. Recently, Naveh (1998) reported that, in times of violence (war and terrorism), 48% trust television reports, 33.6% trust radio reports, 7.4% trust press reports, 7.9% trust all the sources, and 3% do not trust any of the sources. Second, in periods of conflict the channels tend to provide relatively similar information and views about the events.

Third, the information provided by media about the conflict and Arabs is considered of primary importance since it touches on issues of great relevance to the Israelis' lives. As a result, Israelis are extensive consumers of mass media. They read newspapers, listen to the radio, and watch television to get the latest news. When security is challenged, Israelis tend to consume information obsessively. According to Naveh (1998), of the Israeli public 82% read a newspaper more than twice a week, about 86% watch news regularly, though not necessarily daily, and about 74% listen regularly to one of the radio stations, which all broadcast the news every hour. Finally, the information provided by the Israeli media about events related to conflict and security is very emotional and involving, often arousing negative emotions, which hamper the cognitive consideration of alternatives.

For information and the evaluation of Arab issues, Peri (1998) notes that during the early decades the media were dependent almost entirely on military sources. For example, the Israeli channels of communication uncritically accepted the governmental account of the outbreak of the 1956 war, which in this version was carried out to fight Arab terrorism and prevent a possible attack by Egypt that had been armed with Russian weapons. Also, in general the Israeli media unequivocally supported the 1967 war and the military activities that followed on the Suez Canal. They also accepted the governmental information about the war of attrition, the Yom Kippur War, and the Lebanese War in its first phase. The objective of this last war was presented in the press as "to get the northern settlements out of the range of enemy fire," when in reality the plan had other far-reaching political and military objectives (see the analysis by Barzilai, 1996b).

In general, the media cooperated with governmental sources to present particular pictures of the confrontations with Arabs; "thus most regularly trotted out was the myth of the siege, sometimes expressed in so many words as the 'noose' in the Six-Day War, sometimes implied by comparison with the Holocaust (the Yom Kippur and Lebanese wars) and sometimes inferred as part of an Arab 'stage-by-stage' plan for destroying Israel (Sinai War, the War of Attrition, and the Intifada)" (Barzilai, 1996b, p. 217). In general, the Arabs were presented as posing a threat in a context of military struggle. They were viewed as aggressive, driven by an inherent destructive instinct and hatred to exterminate Israel (Yadgar, in press). The media expressed the governmental view about the Arab threat and intransigence and supported most of the military actions performed by the Israeli Defense Force. Moreover, for many years it did not recognize a Palestinian national entity and even after the 1967 war, when over a million Palestinians came to be governed by the Israeli forces, the treatment of the Palestinians did not change. They were usually presented in the context of riots and terrorism, while the Palestinian Liberation Organization

(PLO) was completely negated. Sympathizers and supporters of the PLO, who constituted the great majority of the Palestinian population, were viewed as threatening enemies and potential terrorists (Wolfsfeld, 1997a). The PLO was seen as a terrorist organization, and the media reflected the general consensus not to recognize this national organization. Moreover, until Rabin's Oslo agreement in 1993, which brought recognition of the PLO, the media were forbidden to interview any of the Palestinian leaders from the PLO. Also, every interview with Palestinians from the occupied territories had to be approved by the director of the broadcasting authority, and the reporters were asked not to use the word "person" when they reported on Palestinian leaders because this word in Hebrew conveyed importance and respect (First, 2000).

The line of an early uncritical obedience is saliently exemplified in Israeli press reports of the Kibya slaughter by Israeli military forces in October 1953 (Morris, 1996). Following the murder of three Jewish family members by Arab infiltrators from Jordan, who threw a grenade into their house, an Israeli military unit entered a Jordanian village a night later to carry out "our" act of retaliation. The soldiers threw grenades into the houses of villagers in Kibya, killing about 60 people, mostly women and children. With the exception of the Communist Party newspaper, the Israeli press first neglected to mention the Israeli units' actions and then later focused all attention on the Arab terrorist attack. The major newspapers wrote that the citizens had lost their patience and retaliated against "nests of murderers," since the Israeli government denied that military units carried out any action. A few days later, only two additional newspapers published articles that criticized the Israeli act. Other newspapers continued to delegitimize Arabs, writing about Arabs as murderers and infiltrators. Two newspapers, including that of the prime minister's political party, continued to focus on the murder of Jews, comparing the event with the Nazi's desire to annihilate the Jews (see a detailed analysis of press reaction in Morris, 1996).

Barzilai (1996a, 1996b), who examined the functioning of the Israeli mass media between 1956 and 1991, came to the conclusion that in spite of the changes that have taken place in its functioning over the years, the Israeli mass media are still dependent on governmental sources in issues of security and often accept supplied information uncritically. Liebes (1997) defines this trend as co-option, and, in her opinion, this is related to "a deeply felt responsibility toward the collectivity" (p. 31). Reports on security themes, especially in times of crisis such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab themes in general, greatly rely on security and government sources and self-censorship (see Sharvit & Bar-Tal, in press). It can be said that, in times of crisis, the Israeli media mobilize themselves and are mobilized to cover issues that concern what are considered security matters in a way that corresponds to views of the security establishment.

THE PRESENTATION OF PALESTINIANS IN THE MEDIA

Systematic and extensive research about the presentation of Arabs in the Israeli media only began in the 1990s. The studies performed focus almost entirely on the presentation of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip mostly in the context of Intifada (the uprising that took place between 1987 and 1991) and the Palestinians who are citizens of the Israeli state. One of the few studies that provide a longitudinal perspective was recently carried out by Wolfsfeld (in press), who analyzed the frame presentation of Palestinians in two newspapers, *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth*, in four different years: 1965, 1985, 1995, and 1997. The results show that in 1965 Palestinians were mostly (in 49% of the reports) presented within the context of reports about Arab countries – that is, playing a secondary role. In time the newspapers began to focus on Palestinians in at least 80% of the reports. Also, in 1965 the security frame, which focused on Israel's struggle with the Palestinian threat, occupied 32% of the reports; by 1985 this percentage rose to 53% but dropped back to 30% in 1995 and 34% in 1997. The frame of peace process appeared in 1985 in 17% of the reports and increased to 38% in 1995 and 23% in 1997. A small percentage treated Palestinians as victims: in 1965 and 1985, only 7%; in 1995, 5%; and in 1997, about 11%. The remainder of the reports were devoted to internal problems within Palestinian society.

The two newspapers relied mostly on Israeli sources in their reports, but *Haaretz* tended to rely more on Palestinian sources and less on Israeli sources than *Yedioth Ahronoth*. Also, the former newspaper dealt marginally more with internal Palestinian affairs and more with peace issues, viewed the Palestinians more as victims, and reported less about them within the frame of security. But these differences do not change the overall picture described before. Over the years, the Palestinians have continued to be presented as a threat to Israel's security and as enemies of the Zionist endeavor. Except for the frame of the Palestinians as victims, which by definition presents the Palestinians in a positive way, the frames of peace and internal affairs were not necessarily positive and the security frame was clearly negative.

In general, studies show that Palestinians were consistently negatively stereotyped by the mass media and often delegitimized. Not surprisingly, delegitimization is used especially in reports about organizations that carry out terrorist attacks, but the labels are often generalized to all the Palestinians. A study by Nossek (1994) provides one example of how this delegitimization is done. He analyzed press reports of six major terrorist events between 1968 and 1978 in two newspapers, *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth*. He found that all the events were reported with the Holocaust metaphor. Of importance is that the terrorists were often portrayed as "Nazis," the victims as "Jews," and the world as indifferent to Jewish

suffering. Thus the press makes the connection between Nazis, who epitomize evil in Israeli Jewish society, and the Palestinian terrorists. Such labeling has particularly intense negative emotional implications.

A number of studies investigated the presentation of Palestinians in the Israeli mass media during the first Intifada, the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation that took place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1987 and 1991. First (1998) investigated the portrayal of Arabs on television at the beginning of the Intifada, from December 1987 to March 1988, in a total of 54 news broadcasts. There was only one news television program at that time, on the state-owned television station. The main objective of the study was to examine if there were differences in the presentation of four subcategories of Arabs: Arabs who are citizens of the state of Israel, Arabs living in the occupied territories, Arabs who lived in countries that had made peace with Israel, and Arabs who lived in countries that had not made peace with Israel.

During the period investigated, the news broadcast 496 events dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. In these broadcasted events Israeli Jews appeared most often (65%); Arabs constituted 15% of the appearing persons, and 20% were from other nations. Most of the appearing Arabs (75%) were presented anonymously, especially the Arabs in the occupied territories (88% of their appearances were such). The great majority (93%) of the presented Arabs in the occupied territories were ordinary people, and only 7% were leaders. A somewhat different presentation was found with regard to the Israeli Arabs. Only 48% of them were presented as anonymous, and 39% appeared as leaders. The reports about Arabs from other states focused mostly on the presentations of their leaders (75%). In addition, the study found that Arab participants were mostly presented in situations of violence (70%) and mostly stereotyped negatively with delegitimizing labels such as "troublemakers," "rioters," or "instigators." This trend was especially salient with Arabs from the occupied territories – 79% of them were stereotyped in this way. The researcher concludes her study by saying that the state-owned television promotes the view of an Arab as an enemy of the Jewish state. But, while "the coverage presented negatively biased portrayal of all Arabs, it distinguished the Palestinians from the other Arab groups in ways that tended to undermine or trivialize their struggle. This finding can be best understood in the context of a conflict between two nations" (First, 1998, p. 250).

Ten years later, First (2000) replicated the reported study by investigating the portrayal of Arabs on two Israeli television channels between December 1997 and February 1998. During this period, both channels broadcast 328 events dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict (175 on the governmental channel and 153 on the commercial channel). As in the 1980s, 67% of the participants in these items were Jews, 13% were Arabs, and 20% were persons from other nations. Of interest is the finding that in comparison with

depictions in the 1980s, the appearance of the Palestinians as citizens of Israel greatly diminished in the 1990s. But, in contrast to the first study, the present analysis found that the majority of presented Arabs were introduced by their names and formal positions (58.5%). Also, although the frame of reference of the Arab presentation remained in most cases the Arab-Israeli conflict, the topics dealt with various aspects of Arab-Israeli relations, and most pledged imminent resolution of the conflict. The great majority of the Arabs presented were professional Palestinians from the Palestinian Authority, introduced on the Israeli television with their titles. The analysis showed that television presented a personalized and humanized image of Palestinians, as well as their peaceful nature in interaction with the Israelis. According to the researcher the described changes reflected the context of the peacemaking process, which was going on during the study.

In another study, focusing on a later phase of the first Intifada, Levy (1992) analyzed news reports on Israeli television during one year of the Intifada, February 1989 to February 1990. His analysis shows that the Intifada was presented as a law-and-order problem: the Palestinians violate rules and laws, while the security forces respond to the violent Palestinian action in attempts to restore order. Within this frame, the actions of the demonstrators were presented as a type of terrorism, whereas the actions of the security forces were presented as reactions to the Palestinian violence, and therefore the harm done to Palestinians was described in ambiguous ways. Thus, there was little information about Palestinians killed or injured by the Israeli security forces, and the reports implied that they deserved to be harmed because they were violent themselves. Only a few cases of the Israeli acts were presented as exceptionally harsh. In contrast, the news presented the killed and injured Israelis as victims in personal terms with detailed information. According to Levy, this type of presentation sharpens the differentiation between "us" and "them" and attributes to the Palestinians violent and criminal dispositions, which leads to their delegitimization. In conclusion, Levy points out that in this way the political establishment was responsible for achieving the frame they desired for the Intifada and so influenced the Israeli public without getting directly involved. This frame had important implications for the construction of reality concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It supported the position that terrorism and violence were the cause of the conflict and not one of its symptoms.

Similar observations were found by Liebes (1992), who also studied the presentation of the Intifada in the news of the Israeli television. She found that the Israeli television treated Intifada as a form of violent protest rather than as a rebellion against Israeli occupation. The news tended to present the demonstrators, who often covered their faces in order not to be identified, as a strong, threatening, "even demonic" force with a predisposition to

violence. In contrast, television presented the Israeli soldiers as acting within situational constraints, and focused more on the individual suffering of Jews, showing babies in hospitals, grieving families, and funerals. The human tragedy of the Palestinians or the explanation of the context that led to the uprising was not shown. The violence was presented as arbitrary. In her view, television is the only "place" for Israelis to "meet" Arabs. This means that they accept the images presented by this source of information, which makes the fundamental attribution error of ascribing terrorism, evilness, and violence as inherent dispositions of Palestinians.

Roeh and Nir (1993) studied the coverage of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) between 1987 and 1989 in four newspapers: *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *Maariv*, and *Davar*. Of special interest is the finding that the four newspapers did not differ much in the way they reported the news about the Intifada. According to the researchers, all the newspapers expressed the views of the Jewish Israeli ethos, placing the Jews as "us" against the Palestinians as "them." The newspapers avoided attributing the responsibility of violent acts to "us," but clearly attributed these acts to the Palestinians (a typical fundamental attribution error). Specifically, a comparison between the reports of the events in which Jews acted violently against the Palestinians and events in which the Palestinians acted violently against Jews showed a difference in reporting. That is, whereas the majority of the Jewish acts were presented as something that "simply happened" (e.g., "three youngsters were wounded," or "death to the youngster in Nablus as a result of riots"), the Palestinian acts tended to focus on the performer (e.g., "an Arab from Shomron killed a settler with a stone and shot a soldier to death"). Also, a difference was found between the presentation of the Jews and the Palestinians: Jews were presented in a personalized way, whereas the Palestinians were depersonalized. The Palestinians were stereotyped as the enemy in accordance with the role they played in a particular event, while the Jews were presented with their names (this personalized presentation of Jews occurred in 44% of the studied cases and only in 6% of the Palestinian cases). Also, in the first six months of the uprising, events were referred to as disturbances or riots; later the terms uprising and Intifada were institutionalized as the formal labels of the event. Reports about the Intifada decreased with time, signaling that it had become routine. According to Roeh and Nir's conclusion, the newspapers had a hidden agenda to preserve consensus in Jewish Israeli society without challenging its established shared societal beliefs (see also Roeh & Nir, 1990).

A somewhat broader study by Wolfsfeld (1997a) examined the frames presented by the Israeli and American press in reporting about the Intifada. In his view two frames compete in the media. First, the Israeli frame as promoted by the government focused on law and order. It presented the Palestinians as a violent community led by a terrorist organization (PLO)

that agitated the population to break the law and act violently against the Israelis in an attempt to destroy the state of Israel. In contrast, the Palestinian frame focused on injustice and defiance. This frame presented the Palestinians as victims fighting to establish their own state in the face of the Israeli oppression and occupation. Wolfsfeld found that the Israeli media differed greatly from the foreign media. The Israeli media accepted the government's frame more readily, avoided reporting compromising scenes of the Israeli violence against the Palestinians, focused more on the Palestinian violence against Jews, and reported differentially about Palestinian and Jewish casualties. That is, it provided more personal accounts of the Jews, while referring in a depersonalized way to the Palestinians. Nevertheless, the study shows that, although the governmental frame does dominate in news reports, the Palestinian frame is sometimes found in the Israeli newspapers.

Liebes (1997) suggests that the Israeli media use a number of framing mechanisms in the presentation of violent conflict between Arabs and Jews. In her analysis of the Intifada presentation in the Israeli media, she points out the use of the following framing mechanisms: excising, which is reflected in ignoring the other side (the Palestinians); sanitizing, which is reflected in minimizing the portrayal of human damage done to the Palestinians; equalizing, which is reflected in attributing threatening power to the Palestinian participants in the Intifada; personalizing, which is reflected in personalization of Jewish victims and the army commentators; demonizing, which is reflected in dehumanization of Palestinians; and contextualizing, which is reflected in the avoidance of providing context to the violence. In her view, "television news, during the intifada, symbolically obliterated the Palestinians, showing them only in the role they play in the Arab-Israeli conflict, thereby reinforcing the perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game. . . . Seen from our point of view the face of the Palestinian is hooded, both literally and metaphorically" (p. 134).

Few studies investigated the media presentation of Palestinians after the Oslo agreement (see the previously reported study by First, 2000). These studies focused more on frames of the peace process. The findings by Naveh (1998) and Wolfsfeld (1997a) show that the Israeli news media played a mostly negative role in the peace process with the Palestinians. One reason for this line of presentation was the difficulty in changing the image of Palestinians in light of continued terrorism by extreme Palestinian groups (especially Hamas) that objected to the peace process and the lack of Israeli interest in Palestinian life. As Wolfsfeld (1997b) notes, "These terrorism waves also presented a problem for the attempts of the Palestinian leadership to change their image within Israel. At the very least it appeared that Arafat was incapable of controlling Hamas, at the worst he was cooperating with them. Every attack brought the image of the Palestinian terrorist" (p. 65). The studies show that during the years

of the peace process the Palestinians succeeded in revealing some of their positive qualities. Palestinian leaders were interviewed in the Israeli mass media, the misery of Palestinian life was noted, and a differentiation was made between various Palestinian groups – those who support the peace process and those who object to it.

THE PRESENTATION OF ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL IN THE MEDIA

Various studies have investigated the presentation of Arab citizens of the state of Israel. An analysis of newspaper reports by Ben-Rafael, Shteyer, and Lewin (1989) reveals that Jewish-Arab relations in Israel are dominated by the conflict experienced by Israeli Jewish society and emphasize the threat to its survival and the need to maintain cultural values and norms. Extensive studies by Abu Raya, Avraham, and Wolfsfeld (1998) and by Avraham, Wolfsfeld, and Aburaiya (2000) analyzed the coverage of Arabs, citizens of Israel, in two newspapers (*Yedioth Ahronoth* and *Haaretz*) in 1973, 1984, 1992, and 1996 (30 random days in each year). In addition, coverage of Palestinians on Israeli television over the entire year was analyzed, and journalists and editors were interviewed. The results show that there is very little coverage of the Arab sector, which constitutes about 20% of the total population, in Israeli society. Only about 2% of all the news articles published in the two newspapers related to the Arab citizens of Israel. *Yedioth Ahronoth* had on average 54 reports in a year about the Arab sector, and *Haaretz* had 60 reports in a year, mostly on the back page. The same was observed in television coverage. It was found that an item about the Arab sector in the state of Israel was broadcast only once every 14 days. Also, the analyses showed that most of what was published in the newspapers was negative. Among the news items, 76% in 1973, 88% in 1984, 82% in 1992, and 69% in 1996 pertained to negative presentation.

The negative coverage concerned mostly topics such as crime, involvement in anti-Israeli activities, security threats, demands, strikes, demonstrations, and unemployment. According to the analyses, almost all the items focused on and implied a threat to the Jews and extrapolated the behavior of the few to refer to all Arab citizens of Israel. For example, an editorial article in *Haaretz*, following the arrest of several Israeli Arabs suspected of “hostile activity,” wrote: “All this takes place today, in the period of negotiation and the signing of a peace treaty with Egypt. And this necessarily brings up the question of the Israeli Arab as a bridge to peace. What this image begins to look like is a bridge to terror and not to peace” (*Haaretz*, May 31, 1979, from Abu Raya et al., 1998, p. 20). One reporter explained this tendency by pointing out in an interview that “The Hebrew-language media are interested in the Arab population when there are incidents of an anti-establishment or even an anti-Israeli nature. . . . However, hard as you can try to send news and reports on cooperation between Jews and Arabs

in positive fields, they are not published or, at best, they will appear in a very marginal location with no highlights" (Avraham et al., 2000, p. 123). In general, the study points to the continuous delegitimization of Arab citizens of Israel in the press. However, changes have been noted in recent years: as the Arab sector gains political influence and becomes more vocal in demanding equality, it also receives wider coverage, including themes about Arab demands for equality and Arab involvement in national politics and positive statements about the Arab community made by government leaders.

The study also points out that the analyzed newspapers tended to disregard Arab concerns, drew clear boundaries between "them" and "us," and used different terms to discuss the same situations in the Arab and Jewish sectors. For example, in writing about different groups in society the press used the labels educated, fellahin, and notables to describe Arab groups, whereas comparable groups in Jewish society would be described as intellectuals, farmers, and leaders. The study found some salient differences between the popular newspaper *Yedioth Ahronoth* and the intellectual *Haaretz*. The latter covered a wider range of issues and was more sensitive to the needs and concerns of Arabs. But, according to the researchers, both newspapers were united in their first priority to keep the Jewish majority informed about the threat being posed by the Arab minority.

The researchers suggested a number of explanations for their findings. First, there is social distance and alienation between the Arab population in Israel and the journalists who cover this area. The journalists, who are almost all Jews, are not acquainted with the needs, problems, and concerns of the Palestinian population. Second, the press treats the Palestinian population as second-class citizens who have to accept the Jewish dominance, and every act of criticism or protest is viewed as an act of hostility that threatens the existence of the Jewish state. Third, because the readers of the Hebrew press are Jews, the journalists write in line with the images of this population about Arabs to satisfy their needs and concerns. Fourth, the Arab sector is weak politically and economically and therefore does not have much influence over life in Israel. This weakness is reflected also in the media. Finally, of special importance is the complete reliance of most of the journalists on information that comes from authorities related to security, forces such as the police, army, or General Security Service. A perception based on these sources is biased because they handle every act of disagreement or protest, which is then interpreted as a threat and a danger.

A study by Herzog and Shamir (1994) investigated the frames within which issues related to the Arab citizens of the state of Israel were presented. The study analyzed a total of 161 commentary articles from the major Hebrew newspapers. They looked at the discussion of four different issues in four different periods: Jewish-Arab relations in view of the heated

debate about the fate of the Palestinian refugees (June–August 1948); the future of the Military Administration Rule, imposed on the Arabs since 1948 (January–February 1962); government plans to confiscate Arab rural lands, which led to demonstrations (April 1976); and relinquishing confiscated land to Arab owners, as decided by the government (May 1986). The articles were classified according to the frame in which they presented the discussion. A few articles were classified as having two frames. The researchers found five major frames within which the issues were presented to the Israeli public. Focusing only on references to Arabs, the following frames were distinguished.

The first frame, called “hard-core nationalism,” views the Arab-Israeli conflict as concerning existential goals and as very threatening. It does not differentiate between the Arabs living in the state of Israel and the Arabs in the neighboring countries, and therefore Arab citizens of Israel are seen as enemies who pose a threat to national security. The results show that very few articles used this frame in 1948. In 1962 about 16% of the articles used it, in 1976 the percentage increased to 28%, and in 1988 33% of the analyzed articles used this frame. The second frame, called “liberal nationalism,” assumes that the Arab-Jewish conflict in the state of Israel can be controlled by clever policies of divide and rule that differentiate between good Arabs, who accept the Jewish rules of the game, and bad Arabs, who do not accept these rules. In 1948 17% of the articles used this frame, in 1962 35% of the articles used it, in 1976 the percentage increased to 46%, and in 1988 this frame was used in very few articles. The third frame, called “Jewish democracy,” accepts the Arab minority as a reality and assumes that the majority has a moral democratic duty to give the minority certain rights. The study found that this frame was negligible in 1948; in 1962 38% of the articles presented this frame, in 1976 28% used it, and in 1988 the percentage was 21%. The fourth frame, “no problem,” disregards any problem in Arab-Jewish relations and sees the events in terms of riots, which are instigated by minor groups of dissidents and troublemakers. This frame was rarely used in 1948, 1962, and 1988, but was used a few times in 1976. The fifth frame, “equal rights,” views the conflict between the Arabs and Jews in the state of Israel as an ethnic conflict within civil society. In spite of the conflict, Arab citizens are entitled to full equality, as should be practiced in democratic states, but this principle is violated in Israel. This frame dominated the articles of 1948, appearing in 38% of them. In 1962 it occurred in 25% of the articles, in 1976 in 25%, and in 1988 in 13%. As can be seen, this frame was prevalent immediately after the 1948 war, when the Palestinians were a defenseless defeated minority, but has been slowly disappearing over the years.

The researchers point out that their results indicate a wide range of perceptions of Arabs as citizens of the state of Israel, but at the same time they note similarities in the five frames. All the frames take a paternalistic

approach toward the Israeli Arabs, all make a basic distinction between Arabs and Jews, and all put a higher priority on the cultural and political values and interests of the Jewish community. The researchers concluded that "The Jewish public discourse, as measured in the frequencies of the various frames and, more significantly, in the shared taken-for-granted assumptions, reveals that Israel is a negotiated society where Israeli Arabs, while not entirely excluded, are yet very far from being included within the social boundaries. Often, their inclusion is conditional; at other times, they are included as a collective of 'others' whose 'otherness' as such is not discussed in civil and cultural terms" (Herzog & Shamis, p. 84).

A study by Koren (1994) investigated the reports about Land Day of the Arab citizens of the state of Israel in seven major Israeli newspapers. Land Day was organized on March 30, 1976, in view of the government's publicized intentions to confiscate Arab land in Galilee for Jewish settlements. During the Land Day demonstrations, six Palestinians were killed by the security force and dozens of people were injured, including soldiers and policemen. First, the analysis showed that the preparations for the demonstration and later the outcomes were covered extensively during March–April 1976. Second, Koren found that the reports relied almost entirely on information sources from the establishment, such as ministers, advisers, or experts on Arabs, while the organizers of the demonstration were hardly heard. Third, the study did not find major differences among the newspapers, in spite of their different ideological basis. In all the newspapers the causes of the demonstration were minimized; instead the newspapers emphasized two themes. One portrayed the demonstration as an act by a marginal and unrepresentative minority, and the other described it as a potential danger to state security and a threat to law and order. Of special importance is the finding that all the newspapers delegitimized the participants, as communists, nationalists, extremists, agitators, inciters, enemies, or violent people. It should be noted that the Land Day evolved to become an annual day of protest, on March 30, against the discrimination of the Arab citizens by the state of Israel.

A study by Wolfsfeld, Avraham, and Aburaiya (2000) analyzed two major Israeli newspapers, *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth*, with regard to how the Land Day protest of March 30 was reported in the years between 1977 and 1997. The study found that the reports before the event projected a threat. They focused on the security forces' preparations for the event, while the reports on Arabs were about agitation and incitement by their leaders. Significantly, the great majority of these news items came from the police and military sources. News reports after the event played down the drama, since most of the Land Day protests ended with little or no violence. Only 7% of the news stories before the event and 6% after the event provided information about why Arabs were protesting. Another important finding of the study is that the Land Day story is often placed

within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This frame defines the Arab demonstrators as enemies rather than as ordinary citizens who make demands on their government. For example, an editorial in *Yedioth Ahronoth* on March 27, 1997, three days before the event, says, "The right to protest does not include the right to run riot, to close roads, to throw stones at passing vehicles. . . . Again, it has to be made clear to the Israeli Arabs that most of their Israeliness is based on their loyalty that they owe to their country and its laws. If they don't want these laws no one is preventing them from leaving" (Wolfsfeld et al., 2000, p. 124).

In addition, the researchers interviewed 21 journalists who cover the Arab sector for the Hebrew press. Almost all of them were Jews, since Arabs have hardly any access to the Hebrew news media as spokespeople. Also, with the exception of *Haaretz*, none of the news media had a reporter assigned to cover the Arab population in the state of Israel. Coverage is by regional reporters. One of these reporters talked about what he was expected to do: "They [editors] want mostly to emphasize the negative things. They always think that an Arab is a thief. [They cover] theft or murders related to family honor, or car thefts and rapes. The positive things I send in simply don't get through" (Wolfsfeld et al., 2000, p. 112).

Also, the study found that the reporters mostly used official sources in their reports, from police and military, and rarely interacted with the Arab citizens to obtain other perceptions than those provided by the security forces. One reporter explained: "We don't decide about the expectations. Those are decided by the police and the security forces. It is their preparations that determine what we do. We have no discretion. It is dictated to us" (Wolfsfeld et al., 2000, p. 123).

CONCLUSION

There are several striking findings in our analysis of the Arabs' presentation in public discourse. Israeli public discourse is characterized by a continuous negative stereotyping of Arabs in general and of Palestinians in particular, with use of delegitimizing labels. The negative stereotyping of Arabs in public discourse began in the early days of the Jewish Yishuv, which was established with the waves of Zionist immigration to Palestine and has continued through the years up until the present day. This trend has changed over the years in terms of content and focus but has remained unchanged in its negative valuation and frequent use of delegitimization. Although a theme of stereotyping Arabs as primitive and backward has been expressed in public discourse either explicitly or implicitly, the focus of these labels presented in public discourse originates in the context of the violent intractable Arab-Israeli conflict.

The dominant presentation of Arabs in public discourse is related to the threat they are perceived to pose to the Jewish existence in Israel. Arabs

are associated with acts of violence that have occurred in the confrontation between Jews and Arabs. In the prestate period, Jewish public discourse referred to Arabs as primitive and backward and as composing mobs, rioters, or gangs, focusing on their violent acts and disregarding their national aspirations. After the establishment of Israel, this line prevailed. The Arab states were presented as hostile, the Arabs as enemies, and the Arab minority in Israel as a threatening entity. Within this context, all the Arab nations were presented almost homogeneously until 1977, when the peace process between Egypt and Israel began. From then on, public discourse concentrated mostly on the Palestinians, referring to them occasionally in general terms as Arabs, which was normally used as a negative label in public discourse. They have often been perceived as rioters and terrorists, who constitute a threat to the Jewish citizens and the state of Israel. Their national identity and connection to the land were often denied by the great majority of the Israelis. Until 1993 systematic, total, and almost fully consensual delegitimization of the Palestinian Liberation Organization was carried out within this framework. At the same time, an attempt was made to differentiate between the PLO and the Palestinian people, with some leaders attesting to the Palestinian people's readiness to cooperate with Israel. After the Oslo agreement in 1993 a dramatic change was detectable in the media, as the Palestinians began to be personalized and humanized.

The views expressed in public discourse have to be evaluated in view of the context described in the previous chapter – that is, the context of violent confrontations, wars, refusal to recognize the state of Israel, terrorism, and continued explicit threats to liquidate Israel. This context has changed gradually from 1977 until 2000, a period in which Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, recognized the PLO, accepted the Palestinian Authority, and began negotiations to reach a final accord with the Palestinians. But since September 2000, with the beginning of violent uprisings by the Palestinians, the context of violent conflict is again the overarching backdrop for Arab-Israeli relations. There are indications that this course of events is leading to renewed Palestinian delegitimization. For example, the Israeli army chief of staff, General Shaul Mofaz, said that Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority was becoming a "terrorist entity" (*Herald Tribune*, March 1, 2001). The present president of the state of Israel, Moshe Katzav, said in the spring of 2001, "There is immense difference between us and our enemies, not only in capabilities, but also in morality, culture, sanctity of life, and conscience" (*Maariv*, May 11, 2001). On June 4, 2001, the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, declared, "We view the Palestinian Authority and the person standing at its head as dealing with terror and violence. They do not prevent terror and violence and therefore we define them and Arafat as bodies that deal with terror" (*Haaretz*, June 5, 2001).

The Arab citizens of the state of Israel are consistently disregarded. The media ignore this sector by not reporting its concerns, problems, discrimination, or achievements; there is a significant lack of positive reports about this minority. Instead, the media focus on their threat to the Jewish society, reporting mainly on events related to crime, protests, and anti-Israeli activities. The presentations stereotype the Israeli Arabs, negatively at best, and delegitimize them in the eyes of the Jewish sector. These types of reports imply a danger to the Jewish public, in spite of the fact that over 99.9% of the Arab citizens of the state of Israel do not engage in any illegitimate or hostile activities against Israel.

According to Liebes (1997), the Israeli media cover the conflict and the Arabs from a particular point of view, within the realm of the hegemonic Zionist position. She noted four reasons for this presentation. First, the conflict limits the technical ability to move around and report about the other side. Second, in her view, the great majority of mass media reporters and commentators see themselves as actors within the Zionist movement and not as critical outsiders. Third, it is very difficult ideologically to criticize the Israel security forces, since they are a symbol against the Diaspora mentality. Fourth, the public sets limits on the capacity of the media to be critical of the establishment, and the media cannot alienate its clients.

In addition, we believe that in times of conflict the media are recruited to mobilize society members by presenting a one-sided account of the story. It is a most potent mechanism for transmitting and disseminating knowledge and information, as it can be accessed, and thus consumed, by almost every member of society. The establishment is aware of the media's power to construct the world of society members and therefore does all it can to control this mechanism and to use it to transmit the societal beliefs of conflict. To a large extent, the media cooperate with the establishment, especially during violent confrontations. This tendency is of determinative importance in shaping the psychological repertoire of Israeli society's members. The daily information that is provided feeds the beliefs, attitudes, and emotions about Arabs in general and about Palestinians in particular.

Representation of Arabs in School Textbooks

The examination of the presentations of Arabs in educational materials, specifically school textbooks, is of special importance for several reasons. First, school textbooks provide an excellent illustration of institutionalized societal beliefs, especially in democratic societies. They constitute a formal expression of a society's ideology, ethos, values, goals, myths, and beliefs that the society considers to be important requisites for the social functioning of new generations (Apple, 1979; Bourdieu, 1973; Luke, 1988). In the view of Luke (1988), school textbooks "act as the interface between the officially state-adopted and sanctioned knowledge of the culture, and the learner. Like all texts, school textbooks remain potentially agents of mass enlightenment and/or social control" (p. 69).

The implication is that school textbooks do not provide neutral knowledge but construct a particular social reality. They reflect a specific selection of material: particular descriptions, views, explanations, and interpretations that surface in a variety of subject matters but especially in those appearing in the textbooks of language, literature, history, geography, religious studies, civic studies, and social sciences. The contents of these subjects reflect the particular narrative, views, and emphases of a given society on a variety of issues that preoccupy it. According to Apple and Christian-Smith (1991), "Texts are really messages about the future. As part of a curriculum they participate in no less than the organized knowledge system of society. They participate in creating what a society has recognized as legitimate and truthful. They help set the canons of truthfulness and, as such, also help re-create a major reference point for what knowledge, culture, belief, and morality really are" (p. 4).

Selection of contents that contain the "right" view is a political process. In many states school textbooks are approved for use by the society's institutions through a formal decision-making process. Representatives of the society, in roles related to the educational system, decide about the "knowledge" that should be included in the textbooks. But societies with time may

change their values and societal beliefs and then introduce the changes in the textbooks (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1996; DeCharms & Moeller, 1962). Thus, school textbooks reflect also the changes occurring in a society through time.

Second, in all states school textbooks are used by the entire younger generation, since school attendance is mandatory. Thus, the beliefs presented in the textbooks are widely disseminated, and students are expected to absorb their messages for the simple reason that these books are part of the required learning: they are part of homework, and their contents are tested in exams. Therefore we can assume that more or less all the students are exposed to the contents of the school textbooks, though perhaps at different depths.

Third, the knowledge imparted through textbooks is usually presented and perceived as objective, truthful, and factual. Students and their parents have a respect for printed school textbooks, especially because they view them as books of science. Olson (1989) highlighted another aspect of this belief by pointing out that school textbooks project authority because the knowledge is printed and distributed by a formal agent of society, the school. These beliefs contribute to seeing the school textbooks as epistemic authorities that transmit validated knowledge (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 1991).

Thus the school textbook is an important agent of socialization that transmits and disseminates societal knowledge, including representations regarding one's own group and of other groups. Down (1988), from the Council for Basic Education in the United States, summarizes these ideas explicitly. "Textbooks, for better or worse, dominate what students learn. They set the curriculum, and often the facts learned, in most subjects. For many students, textbooks are their first and sometimes only early exposure to books and to reading. The public regards textbooks as authoritative, accurate, and necessary. And teachers rely on them to organize lessons and structure subject matters" (p. viii).

In view of these arguments, it is logical to believe that during the 100 years of the Arab-Israel conflict school textbooks, in the Jewish schools in Palestine and later schools in the state of Israel, have played an important role in shaping Jews' stereotypes of Arabs and their prejudice toward them.

The first school textbooks introduced to the children of the Jewish immigrants in Palestine were written by Zionists still living in Europe. Not until the beginning of the 1900s were textbooks written by Zionists living in Palestine. These textbooks were used in schools established by the Zionist immigrants who institutionalized an educational system at the very beginning of the establishment of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. Because of ideological differences, however, within a short time the school system was divided into three branches representing the workers, the religious, and the civil (called general) sectors, all of which continued to operate during the British mandate. In 1948, with the establishment of the state of Israel,

educational systems were unified under the supervision of the Ministry of Education in 1953, but the division between religious and nonreligious state schools remained (see S. N. Eisenstadt, 1967). Still the Ministry of Education made special efforts to homogenize the national curricula in the spirit of the melting pot that dominated the Israeli social and educational policy during the first decades. Within the centralized educational system of Israel, the Ministry of Education sets the guidelines for curricula development and has the authority to approve the school textbooks. Thus, the ministry outlines the didactic, scholastic, and societal objectives to be achieved (Eden, 1971), and the textbooks' contents reflect the knowledge that the dominant group of society is trying to impart to its members.

During the first 20 years of the existence of the Jewish state, national objectives were viewed as being of the highest importance. The minister of education, Ben-Zion Dinur, outlined these goals explicitly in 1953, stating:

We must be constantly aware of our situation. The position of our country must form the underlying premise of the civil education system. The State of Israel was born after a long and difficult struggle. It was established in the midst of a civil war. The struggle still continues. . . . Officially we are living in that vague shadowy situation which is neither war nor peace. We resemble a city under siege. . . . We are surrounded by enemies whom we fought during the War of Independence and who have yet to reconcile themselves to our existence. (from Podeh, 2002, p. 31)

In the 1970s the Curriculum Department in the Ministry of Education, which had been established in 1966, underwent a major reorganization and began to emphasize more didactic and scholastic objectives at the expense of national and societal ones. As a result newly developed curricula put more emphasis on the cultivation of skills, scientific methods, and critical and analytical approaches of the respective disciplines (Mathias, in press). By the mid-1990s, the Ministry of Education lost the authority to control the school textbooks used, particularly in high schools, and now decisions about which books are used in school are made most frequently by the school staff. This trend stimulated the publication of new textbooks, especially in history, which dared to present a revisionist view of the Israeli past. The violent events since fall 2000 and the establishment of a new Israeli government in 2001 reversed the decentralizing tendency. The Ministry of Education is trying to reestablish control over the textbooks used in schools.

In the following review of school textbooks in history, geography, Hebrew, civic studies, and Arabic, we discuss the presentation of Arabs in three periods: the prestate period up until 1948, from 1948 to the early 1970s, and from the mid-1970s to the 1990s. This division represents changes that took place in the structure and objectives of the educational system.

The most extensive and comprehensive studies of history school textbooks in Israel are by Firer (1985) and Podeh (2002). The first study analyzed

the content of 93 history textbooks used in the Jewish schools in Israel between 1900 and 1984 to examine their role as agents for Zionist socialization. The second study analyzed 107 history and civil studies textbooks published between 1946 and 1999 to examine their presentation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, Bar-Gal (1993, 1994) has analyzed the content of 192 geography textbooks published between 1894 and 1989.

THE PRESTATE PERIOD

According to Firer (1985), all the history books from 1900 to 1948 focused on the exclusive rights of the Jewish people to ownership of the country, then known as Palestine, and provided justifications for these rights. At the same time, the books disregarded the rights of the Arabs for such ownership. They did not recognize Arabs' national rights but did note, although rejected, their religious rights. The books emphasized the fact that the Jewish homeland was conquered by various peoples including the Arabs and was neglected through the centuries until its redemption by the Jews (Firer, 1985). In fact, Firer found that until 1930 Arabs were rarely mentioned in the history textbooks, and when the books referred to them, they were viewed as part of the phenomenon "nature's troubles" with which the immigrants had to cope when building their new lives. Only after 1930, as the violent conflict escalated, did detailed references to Arabs emerge, usually describing them undifferentiatedly as "robbers, Vandals, primitives and easily agitated" (Firer, 1985, p. 128). Violent Arabs were portrayed as being ungrateful to the Jews, who had come to contribute to the development of the country. The hostility and violence of the Arab masses was explained as being a result of incitement by Arab leaders who opposed the Jewish settlement. In general, the Arab population was presented as fellahin (Arab peasants), insinuating their primitiveness and backwardness, as well as explaining their easy compliance when incited.

Bar-Gal's analysis of geography textbooks published in the prestate time (1993, 1994) shows a similar view. He identifies a number of specific trends in the treatment of Arabs, including disregard, reservation, and ethnocentrism, as well as romanticism and humanity. Most of the geography textbooks used during the first few decades of Zionist immigration tended to ignore the presence of Arabs in Palestine. According to Bar-Gal (1994), this disregard is probably related to the fact that the authors of many of these books lived in Europe and endorsed a Zionist-Jewish perspective that treated Arabs as nonexistent "invisible people." Only the later books, by authors living in Palestine, described the native population. All the geography books were ethnocentric and expressed an attitude of superiority toward Arab society, which stemmed from the European viewpoint persisting at the time. The books considered Arab society

not as monolithic but as being divided into different segments. For example, a book by Grazowski, published in 1903, differentiated between urban Arabs, rural Arabs (the fellahin), and Bedouins. According to Bar-Gal (1994), Grazowski presented well-established views about Arabs: "He is contemptuous of the urban Arabs, who are disloyal, show-offs, conceited, and lacking wisdom. The Moslem peasants are treated more positively in that they are 'not naturally bad,' although the Christian villagers are seen to be superior, with orderly villages and loyal work. His attitude to the Bedouin is ambivalent, an attitude also expressed by many other authors, one of approval of social customs accompanied by reservations about their way of life" (Bar-Gal, 1994, p. 225). Nevertheless, regardless of the differentiation, all Arabs, in Grazowski's view, are backward and ignorant.

Several of the geography textbooks contained romantic descriptions of Arabs, focusing on their exotic food, clothing, markets, customs, and traditions. This view was especially salient in descriptions of the Bedouins, who were praised for being brave warriors, freedom lovers, proud, and hospitable. They were portrayed as reflecting the ancient Israelite's way of life. A few authors also described Arab village life in this romantic way, seeing the villages as exotic places where women draw water from the wells and Arab shepherds graze their flocks in the fields. In some books these descriptions are accompanied by expressions of empathy and pity for the hard life of the Arab fellahin. All the books had the highest regard for the Druze people because of their physical appearance, bravery, generosity, and virtue (Bar-Gal, 1993).

With the initiation of violence toward the Jews by the Arabs, they began to be represented as "the enemy" (Bar-Gal, 1993, 1994). At first, Arabs' violence was viewed as a continuation of the pogroms that took place in Eastern Europe; later it was defined as hostile behavior toward Zionistic goals. The geography books described Arabs in the same terms as the history books, a "negative homogeneous mob that threatens, assaults, destroys, eradicates, burns and shoots, being agitated by haters of Israel, who strive to annihilate the most precious symbols of Zionism: vineyards, orange groves, orchards and forests. Again, the Arabs were viewed as ungrateful. According to this view Zionism brought progress to the area and helped to overcome the desolation, and thus helped to advance also the Arabs. But instead of thanking the Jews for building the country for the benefit of all its citizens, they respond with destruction and ruin" (Bar-Gal, 1993, p. 181). An example of such presentation can be found in the book by Aviv and Indelman (1938), who wrote "The haters of Israel began to incite the Arab inhabitants of Eretz-Yisrael against the Jews. In 1936 there were riots involving terrible bloodshed throughout the whole country, the Arabs attacking our brothers, their vineyards and citrus groves, uprooting their orchards, burning their fields and forests and firing on innocent passers from ambushes" (from Bar-Gal, 1994, p. 227).

FROM 1948 TO THE EARLY 1970S

From the establishment of the state of Israel through the early 1970s, school textbooks continued to present Arabs negatively. In fact the textbooks published in the early years of the state of Israel adopted the same ideological-educational line as the earlier ones published in the Yishuv. According to Podeh (2002), history textbooks written after 1948 (the first-generation textbooks), when referring to the first waves of Jewish immigrations, depicted the country to which they arrived as desolate and uninhabited. The Arab residents were mentioned only in negative terms. The negative descriptions referred to their backwardness and primitivism and to their cowardice, treacherousness, and violence. They were blamed for the neglect of the country. In addition, the history books avoided calling the country Palestine and used the name Israel or Eretz Israel (the land of Israel). This way of writing negated Arab claims to Palestine.

According to Firer (1985), the first textbooks published in the newly founded state of Israel were influenced by the trauma of the Holocaust and used emotive concepts from that time to describe the Jewish-Arab conflict (i.e., pogroms, massacre, riots, disturbances, attacks of terror, bloodthirsty murderers, or bloody outbursts). These terms were used to describe Arab violent acts in 1920–1921 and 1929 and explained them as resulting from incitement and agitation. Most of these books did not even mention the existence of a Palestinian nation, never mind its aspirations or the driving forces behind Palestinian nationalism. Thus, the Arabs' violence and resistance to Zionism, presented without explanation, looked absolutely arbitrary and malicious. It interfered with the noble and peaceful attempts of the Jews (described as victims) to return to their homeland.

Books from the second period related the events of 1936–1939 similarly as disturbances and riots by "Arab gangs," and some noted Arab ties to the Nazi and fascist movements in Europe (Podeh, 2002). As presented in one of the textbooks (S. Horowitz, 1953), "inflammatory Italian and German political propaganda, which aimed at harnessing the Arab movement to the chariot of their own political interests, fell on the fertile ground of religious and national fanaticism" (from Podeh, 2002, pp. 98–99). A book by Ron (1967) went even further and suggested that the mufti "had at its disposal vast sums of money, contributions from Iraq and Pakistan, but chiefly from Italy and Germany. The Mufti also had weapons that were mostly of Italian and German origin" (from Podeh, 2002, p. 98). While in reality the ties between the mufti and Italians or Germans were limited and did not involve the supply of weapons, the connection between Arabs and fascists and Nazis was one of the salient ways to delegitimize Arabs because both regimes were considered as symbols of evil.

The War of Independence was presented as a struggle between the few and the many that began with attacks by Arab gangs and was followed

by the invasion of seven Arab states. The cause for the refugee problem was identified in the propaganda as appeals voiced by Arab leaders urging the Arabs to leave the country, despite Israeli attempts to persuade them to stay. For example, one textbook (Spivack & Avidar, 1970) stated: "The Arabs fled the country a few weeks prior to the end of the mandate. A mass and panic-stricken flight began. The spirit of the Arab population was broken and they were in the state of utter terror. Destructive and malicious propaganda only added fuel to troubled waters. The Arabs were deluded into thinking that they would soon return victorious to the country, expel the Jews and seize their goods as spoils of war" (from Podeh, 2002, p. 105). Similarly, the other wars were described as acts of Arab aggression. The books noted Arabs' anti-Semitism and hatred of Jews as the motivating forces for initiating violence (Firer, 1985).

Delegitimization of Arabs was also common in Hebrew readers. This specific type of school textbook called a "reader" contains a variety of items such as short stories, poems, extracts from literary works, and short descriptive essays selected and written by an editor. Zohar (1972) analyzed 16 widely used elementary school readers published in the 1950s and 1960s (8 for religious and 8 for secular educational systems) in order to find out how they stereotyped Arabs. The Arab people were mostly referred to as a collective and rarely as individuals. Also, they were mostly described in the context of conflict, either in the prestate period or during the independence war of 1948–1949. Only rarely did the books refer to Arabs as citizens of the state of Israel. On a general level, Arab society was represented as primitive, backward, and passive. Descriptions were mostly of lower-social-status Arabs, such as farmers or shepherds. They were described as cattle owners who farmed using ancient tools without trying new ways for advancing their farming or attempting to improve their living conditions. Their houses were described as poor, neglected, and crowded, and their clothing as dirty. The secular textbooks did provide a more extensive picture of the Arab way of life and noted positive qualities such as hospitality. A few even included a story about friendship between Arabs and Jews.

The most frequent representation of Arabs was as "the enemy," but their national aspirations were never mentioned nor was the context of conflict between two national movements explained. The books used the label "enemy" in a depersonalized and undifferentiated manner, which implied negative intentions: "the enemy wanted" or "the enemy thought." Zohar (1972) notes: "The Arabs are described as enemies of different kinds, differing in type of organization and fighting objectives. Some are organized in regular armies, some fight as gangs of robbers and some attack in a sporadic way. Although the stories differentiate between a sporadic attack and a battle, many times the concept 'robbery' is used also to describe a war or a battle" (p. 72).

In general, the readers tended to describe the acts of Arabs as hostile, deviant, cruel, immoral, and unfair, with the intention to hurt Jews and to annihilate the state of Israel. Within this frame of reference, Arabs were delegitimized by the use of such labels as "robbers," "wicked ones," "bloodthirsty mob," "killers," "gangs," or "rioters." Zohar (1972) concludes that the description of Arabs in readers as a negative and hostile entity, and not as multidimensional, individual human beings, was part of the mission to impart and build national values during the times of conflict.

In many respects, the findings in the study of geography books by Bar-Gal (1993) are similar to those of Zohar (1972). During the 1950s and 1960s the books presented "the glory of the ancient past, the destruction and negligence when the people went to exile, and the renewal and revival of the land by the Zionist movement" (Bar-Gal, 1993, p. 150). These ideas were used, on the one hand, to justify the return of the Jews to their homeland, implying that they cared about it and successfully turned the swamps and the desert into blossoming land, and, on the other hand, to delegitimize Arabs' claims to the same land. The messages implied that the Arabs neglected the land and did not cultivate it. Another characteristic of geography books was their disregard of the Arabs' tragedy, experienced during the War of Independence, when hundreds of thousands of Arabs became refugees, and many of their villages were destroyed (Bar-Gal, 1993).

Bar-Gal (1994) notes, though, that after the independence war the direct delegitimization of Arabs living in the state of Israel almost completely ceased in geography textbooks. References to their backwardness and primitivism slowly disappeared, and their depiction as the enemy of Zionism faded. "Israeli Arabs," as they were labeled, were distinguished from Arabs living beyond the borders, who were still stereotyped negatively. The textbooks described mainly their rural life, ignoring urban Arab communities and not differentiating between various Arab subgroups. These books took an ethnocentric view in that they discussed integration of the Israeli Arabs into Jewish Israeli society. Moreover, they emphasized that Arabs were well treated by the state authorities, who provided them with educational, health, and welfare systems, bringing progress and a modern life-style to the Arab villages (Bar-Gal, 1993, 1994).

This trend continued into the 1970s and even in the 1980s. Textbooks published in these years focused on how Arab life was transformed as a result of progress introduced by the Jews and the Jewish state. Also a few books in these years began to note the demographic danger inflicted by the Arab presence, especially in the region of Galilee and Jerusalem. The books presented "Jews as models for imitation. The state creates situations that enable progress and can allow the Arabs to become part of the world at the end of the 20th century. The state grants security and freedom, special resources to their minorities, and full equality" (Bar-Gal, 1993, p. 186). Similar descriptions appeared in geography books that looked at the Arab

population in the territories conquered in the 1967 war. For example, in one geography book written by Rina Habaron in 1975, we find the following description of the Gaza Strip: "The military government abolished discrimination between the local permanent population and refugees and brought improvement in the domains of free education and sanitation. The level of the health service was increased. Innovations were introduced into agriculture. Farmers were given advice and their products marketed in the country. The Israeli electrical company laid a power line to the Gaza area establishing a basis for the development of new industries" (from Bar-Gal, 1993, p. 186).

Bar-Gal (1993) summarizes his analysis of Arab representation in geography books by pointing out that throughout the past 100 years Arabs have been represented in terms of the following characteristics: "unenlightened, inferior, fatalistic, unproductive, apathetic, with the need for a strong paternalism. In addition it was said that their customs are different as well as their accommodations, occupations and their ways of life. They are divided, tribal, exotic, people of the backward East, poor, sick, dirty, noisy, colored. Arabs are not progressive; they multiply fast, ungrateful, not part of us, non-Jews. They commit arson and murder, they destroy, are easily inflamed, and vengeful" (Bar-Gal, 1993, p. 189).

Occasionally, the geography books also endowed the Arabs with positive traits such as hospitality, combativeness, and being proud and hard-working people. Overall, Bar-Gal concludes that the description of Arabs was related to their level of cooperation with the Zionist enterprise. In our terms, we may say that the stereotypical presentation of Arabs depends on the nature of relations between them and the Israeli state, as perceived by the Jews.

According to Mathias (in press), who analyzed the presentation of Arabs in the Israeli curricula from 1948 until the 1990s, the curricula until the Six-Day War were concerned primarily with needs of nation building and constructing a homogeneous national identity. To achieve this mission, Israeli curricula used mechanisms of denial, omission, and exclusion toward the Arabs.

BETWEEN THE MID-1970S AND 1990S

During the 1970s the Ministry of Education initiated a major reassessment of the curricula, which led to changes in the textbooks. The new policy diminished the weight of the national objectives in designing school curricula, stressed the didactic and scholarly objectives, and also took into consideration the new accumulated knowledge in psychology about students' development and needs.

In the 1970s the delegitimizing descriptions had almost disappeared from history textbooks (Firer, 1985). Podeh (2002) notes that from the late

1970s to the early 1990s the second-generation history books, of the "adolescence period," were being written. These books acknowledged the existence of Palestinian nationalism, used less pejorative terminology in their description of the Arabs' violent resistance to Jewish immigration and settlement, and began to present the origin of the Palestinian refugee problems in a more balanced way (Firer, 1985; Podeh, 2002).

A quantitative study by Benjamin (1987) sheds light on a few interesting aspects of how history textbooks present Arabs. He analyzed nine history textbooks used in junior and senior high schools during the 1970s and 1980s, which looked at the period of the past hundred years. The analysis shows that half of the pages that dealt with the contemporary history of the Jews in Israel were devoted to the discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conflict was more often dealt with in the senior high school classes. Of the pages dealing with the conflict, 94.7% were devoted to the prestate period, including the War of Independence of 1948, and 5.3% to the period of 1949–1973. Acknowledgment was made of the post-1973 period following the peace treaty with Egypt, but 46.4% of the pages introduced violent confrontations between Jews and Arabs and 14.8% introduced various wars. The remainder of the pages did not deal with violence. Benjamin also examined the extent of differentiation among various Arab groups. The results show that in 50.8% of the pages the books used the label "Arabs" indiscriminately, although they also referred to Palestinians. The label "Palestinians" was used in only 35.4% of the pages. Of the pages that referred to "Arabs" or "Palestinians," 63% presented them in negative terms, 30.3% in neutral terms, and only 6% in positive terms. Delegitimizing labels such as "savages," "robbers," "gangs of murderers," "rioters," or "thieves" were found in 14.8% of the pages.

In 1975 the first school textbook that included original Arab documents and speeches by Palestinian leaders, titled *The Arab-Israeli conflict*, was published by the Ministry of Education for History and Civic Studies. In fact, the book was a reader that contained only published articles, documents, and maps and through them presented a Zionist narrative of the conflict and materials relating to Palestinian national aspirations. The topic of the conflict was included as an option in the new civics curriculum. In general, the Arab side in the reader was presented as relatively homogeneous in terms of irreconcilability and intransigence. The Arabs did not compromise, totally rejected the Zionist idea and its implementation, and refused to share the land with the Jews. The book also argued that despite some Jewish-Arab negotiations and a few positive Jewish-Arab relations, the Arab community in general displayed a hostile attitude and aggressive behavior toward the Jewish settlement. In contrast, the book, which represented a wide spectrum of opinions prevalent in the prestate Jewish community, emphasized the willingness of the Jews to compromise and to recognize partly Arab claims to the contested land. The material referring

to the Arab-Israeli conflict after the establishment of the state justified the Sinai War of 1956 and the Six-Day War of 1967 and contrasted the noncompromising position of the Arab leaders with Israeli willingness for peace. This part also presented the heterogeneity of the Israeli opinion with regard to the solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. It also provided documents about the Israeli-Egyptian peace process.

A supplementary book, published in 1989, contained four articles written by Israeli Jews (dealing with intra-Arab relations, the Palestinian national movement, the Arab population in the occupied territories, and Israel's security policy) and six documents (the Camp David agreement, the decisions of the Arab summit meeting in Algiers in 1988, decisions of the Palestinian Council in 1988, two Intifada's proclamations by the Palestinians, and a peace proposal put forward by the Israeli government in May 14, 1989). The two books were eventually dropped in the 1990s, because they were considered to be outdated; also, it should be noted that only a few teachers decided to introduce such a controversial subject to their class, preferring to teach other optional topics instead.

In the late 1970s the Ministry of Education published two additional books for civic studies: *We and our neighbors* (1981), for the elementary and junior high schools, and *Living together* (1982), for the high schools. The first book described neighboring Arab countries in reconciliatory terms, and the second presented issues related to the Arab minority in the state of Israel. The latter book was revised and published again in 1988 under the title *The Arab citizens of Israel*. It constitutes a major step toward a balanced description of the Arabs, as citizens of Israel. It described their life in Israel and their relations with the Jewish majority, and it is one of the few school textbooks, and may be even the only one, that mentioned and discussed Arab discrimination in Israel, including expropriation of their land. This book aimed to provide updated information about Arabs in order to change their negative stereotype in Israel and encourage positive coexistence between the two groups. But the book chose to use the social category of Israeli Arabs, disregarding the Palestinian identity of this group.

A more quantitative study by Bar-Tal and Zoltak (1989) provides information about the stereotyping of Arabs in readers written in the 1970s and 1980s. The study analyzed a sample of 20 readers approved for use in elementary schools and junior high schools in 1984. Despite the fact that Arabs made up about 20% of the population, a substantial minority, these textbooks devoted little space to Arabs. Only 7.5% of the reading items (i.e., stories, poems, extracts from literary works, and short descriptive essays) referred to Arabs. The majority of these items (72%) referred to Arabs as an entity, and only 28% referred to them as individuals. Also, the majority of the items referred to Arabs in the context of the Arab-Israeli

conflict. Finally, with regard to Arab portrayal, the study found that in 50.7% of the items the presentation was negative, in 29.1% it was neutral, and in the remaining 20.2% positive. Most of the positive images were in the context of individual presentation. The majority (60%) of the behavioral descriptions and 46% of the trait characterizations referred to violence and aggression. In this context, delegitimizing labels such as "human savages," "bloodthirsty," "gangs of murderers," "infiltrators and terrorists," or "robbers" appeared frequently. The books presented 82% of occupations held by Arabs as being related to either violence (soldiers, robbers, or gang members) or to primitive farming and manual labor. Only 12% of the Arabs presented were professionals or white-collar workers. Positive descriptions of Arabs referred mainly to undefined situations, in an undefined time, either in the desert or in an undefined place, often in legends about the exotic East.

A later study by Brosh (1997) analyzed Arab presentation in the school textbooks of Arab language written for Jewish students. In Israel, about 12% of the Jewish students learn the Arabic language in postelementary schools, usually junior high schools. These textbooks not only teach the Arabic language but also, through the instructional material, provide information about Arabs. Brosh (1997) analyzed 12 language textbooks of Arabic written by Jews in the 1970s and 1980s. The results of his study show that Arabs were presented in historical and contemporary frames. Historically, the Arabs were often presented in the framework of the very early period of Islam and its expansion. The books described a variety of characters (e.g., a merchant, caliph, judge, sheikh), usually in positive terms such as, for example, having religious faith and being moral. The contemporary Arabs (usually males) were characterized as either traditional or modern. The former were more prevalent, and texts focused mostly on describing primitive fellahin (farmers) and manual workers (e.g., a carpenter, driver, or construction worker). The fellah was described as the "primitive laborer who cultivates his soil in traditional ways without agricultural equipment . . . resides in a tent in the village, and his main means of transportation are the donkey and the camel. . . . The Arab has not leisure time. His children stay in the same condition: There is no improvement or progress in the younger generation. . . . He has a moustache and a beard, and he wears the traditional kaffiah, the Arab headdress" (Brosh, 1997, p. 317). In contrast, the modern Arabs

seem to approach a western style of life. They have cars and reside both in villages and cities . . . they cultivate their soil with modern agriculture equipment and have plenty of leisure time. They watch television, swim in the sea, go to movies, pay visits to family and friends, read books, and go abroad. Modern Arabs are also workers in Jewish enterprises, and take up liberal professions such as medicine,

pharmacy, or engineering; they may head a local council, be a school supervisor, a student at the university, a clerk at the bank, a post office manager, a teacher, or a police officer. (Brosh, 1997, p. 317)

In the books, descriptions of contact between Jews and Arabs mainly referred to children and were usually manifested in statements by a Jewish child about his or her friendship with an Arab child. Also, in most cases, the books described planned and organized meetings between Jewish and Arab students as being initiated by Arabs inviting Jews not vice versa. Brosh concludes his analysis by stating that the books tended to depict the primitive side of Arab society in a homogeneous way, without differentiating between various groups. The books did not present the issues and problems facing Arab society in Israel. The descriptions of Jewish-Arab contacts were simplistic, synthetic, and idealized and did not refer to the real issues concerning the relations between the Arab minority and the Jews in the state of Israel or to relations between Israel and the Arab world.

Recently, Bar-Tal (1998b) analyzed the contents of all the school textbooks used in all the school grades (1 to 12) in history, geography, civic studies, and Hebrew (readers) approved by the Ministry of Education for use in schools in 1994–1995 and which referred to Arabs or to the Arab-Jewish conflict. In total, 124 school textbooks published between 1979 and 1994 were examined (most were published in the 1980s and early 1990s). The objective of the study was to evaluate the extent to which school textbooks express six of the eight societal beliefs in the ethos of conflict (elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3): beliefs of security, positive self-image, Jews' victimization, Arabs' delegitimization, unity, and peace. For our purpose, we concentrate only on the results that pertain to Arab stereotypes and their delegitimization in particular.

In general, the analysis shows a sporadic and rare delegitimization of Arabs. It appeared very rarely in about 30% of the elementary school readers, 20% of the junior high school readers, 20% of the secular history books, in a few geography books, and in one civic studies book. It should be noted that these findings only refer to direct delegitimization of Arabs and not to their negative stereotyping. The great majority of the books still stereotyped Arabs negatively; positive stereotypes were rare.

With regard to elementary school readers, it was found that most of these books had very few reading items about Arabs or Jewish-Arab relations. When presented, the references to Arabs were embedded in texts focusing on Jews in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Most of the books stereotyped Arabs negatively. They were presented as primitive, uneducated, passive people, without a will of their own. These stereotypes also emerged in stories where Arabs were portrayed as poor farmers or shepherds. The

stories describing early Arab-Jewish relations during the prestate period and after the establishment of the state of Israel were frequently of a violent nature. In all of them Arabs were portrayed as aggressors, and it is in this context that the delegitimizing labels of Arabs such as "mob," "murderers," "devilish enemy," "rioters," or "bloodthirsty" appeared.

The elementary school readers also contained positive views of Arabs, all on an interpersonal level and describing friendships between Jews and Arabs or how an Arab helped a Jew. In most of these stories the Arab was presented as a low-status person. One exception is a story about a Jewish family visiting a middle-class, educated family in an Arab village. In some stories the Jewish-Arab friendship ended with the eruption of hostilities. There were also a few school readers, mostly for junior high schools, that presented material (some of it even written by Arabs) that deals with Arabs as individuals, describing their way of life in a positive way. This material included, for example, a story by Samira Azam about an Arab living in Acre, a story by Sofy Abdalla about a debate between a mother and her son regarding a blood feud, and a story by the Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfouz about a child. Of special importance are stories that describe the suffering of the Arabs in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict empathetically. Examples are a poem by the acclaimed poet Nathan Alterman that deals with an incident during which a Jewish youth destroyed an Arab's watermelon plot, or a story describing Arab refugees during the 1967 war.

Geography books for elementary and junior high schools also stereotyped Arabs negatively, whenever they dealt with the past. In this context, Arabs were portrayed as primitive, dirty, agitated, aggressive, and hostile to Jews. They lack the knowledge and the means to cultivate the land, and therefore they sell it to Jews.

Another book, *Jews and Arabs in the state of Israel*, published in 1989, is an exception, suggesting an approach to the study of geography by exploring Jewish-Arab relations in then contemporary Israel. In the introduction the author stated that the book's aim is "to offer you, the students, an opportunity to learn about other people and to get to know them more intimately through common meetings and trips. These chapters are integrated with lectures on geography in which you learn about different regions in Israel. . . . We believe and hope that the learning, acquaintance, and meetings between you and the other [i.e., Arab] students will eventually contribute to the understanding and mutual respect between Jews and Arabs living in Israel" (p. 4). This book, which also described the life of Arabs in Israel and Jewish-Arab relations also from an Arab perspective, is exceptional. The author expressed the view that resolution of the conflict can be achieved through continuous and complex negotiation (p. 7).

A geography textbook for high schools by Sorkis, Raf, and Sharar (1991), titled *Changes in the geography of Israel*, included eight articles on demographic geography. Two of the articles presented conflictual relations with

Arabs and discussed the threat of their presence in the Galilee (the northern part of Israel). According to these articles, Jewish settlement of the Galilee is necessary in order to prevent the Arabs from becoming a majority in the region, to change the demographic balance of Galilee in favor of the Jews, and to ensure Jewish territorial continuity. Specifically, one article argued, "In addition to the immediate need to prevent the illegal taking of the lands there was also a wish to create a dynamics of order and land acquisition, and in the long term to achieve a desired spreading out of the Jewish presence in Galilee that will prevent territorial continuity of the Arab sector" (p. 111). In another book by Orni and Efrat (1992), *Geography of Israel*, Arabs were presented unequivocally negatively in the context of the Arab-Jewish conflict. They were referred to, for example, as the "agitated Arab mob" (p. 131) and as "Arab mercenary gangs" (p. 190). The book also described how the Jews brought help and progress to the occupied territories after the 1967 war.

The history books for the elementary schools hardly mentioned Arabs. This is particularly striking since they deal with the prestate period when Arabs constituted the majority in Palestine. Whenever Arabs were mentioned, they were predominantly associated with aggressive behavior and with primitivism. A passage in one book described a visit of a Jew to an Arab village: "In the village they found thin people with yellow faces. Flies were all over their faces, and they even did not try to chase them away." However, the same book also described how an Arab farmer teaches a Jew to sow. Moreover, whereas almost all the books strongly stressed the national aspirations of the Jewish people and imparted Zionist ideology, they almost completely disregarded the national aspirations of the Arab population in Palestine and did not elaborate on the national nature of the conflict between Jews and Arabs.

Junior high school history books continued to describe the behavior of Arabs in the prestate period as aggressive and violent. They were shown as objecting to Jewish immigration, bothering Jewish pioneers, murdering them, and carrying out pogroms. In these books Arabs were sometimes labeled with delegitimizing categories such as "rioting gangs," "murderers without distinction," "Arab mob," or "violent animals." However, the books for junior high schools did acknowledge the Palestinian national ideal, albeit as an uncompromising and extreme position. Arab leaders were said to reject any compromise and peaceful resolution of the conflict. The books described the Arab people as easily agitated and being incited to perform acts of violence by an extreme leadership.

The history textbooks of the high schools, the majority of which cover the Arab-Jewish conflict, stereotyped the Arabs negatively. Arabs were presented as intransigent in their opposition to the Jews and in their refusal to accept a reasonable compromise to end the conflict. In the descriptions they attacked Jews, organized strikes, and carried out pogroms and riots

in which agitated crowds participate. They refused to recognize the newly established state of Israel and continued to perform hostile acts against it. One book claimed that the Arab hostility in the 1930s and 1940s was fed by the anti-Jewish propaganda spread by the Nazis and Italian fascists.

A book named *The Zionist idea and the establishment of the state of Israel* published in 1985 is of special significance. It analyzed the Israeli-Arab conflict and attempted to offer the Arab perspective. The book devoted 10 pages to the description of the Arab national movement, a description that is based on Jewish sources. Thus, it presented the rise of this movement as a reaction to the emergence of Zionism, that is, "The fear of penetration and consolidation of the Zionist factor in the land of Israel" (2:86). The book generally presented a negative picture of Arabs as "the enemy" who tries to obstruct the realization of the Zionist ideology by violent means.

Current analysis (Podeh, 2002) of the most recent history textbooks, especially in the higher grades, indicates that a major and significant change took place at the end of the 1990s. During the past few years a third generation of books has been published in the state of Israel – that Podeh calls "books of adulthood." These books were written in line with the new curriculum in history and civics and reflected the trend of decentralization, privatization, and diversification of the educational system (Mathias, in press). Some of these books used newly released archival material and were based on new and critical historical research that shed a more balanced light on the Arab-Jewish conflict and were influenced by the new zeitgeist in society, which allowed more openness, pluralism, and self-criticism. In these books, Arabs were presented "not only as mere spectators or as aggressors but also as victims of the conflict. For the first time, there appeared to be a genuine attempt to formulate a narrative that not only glorifies Zionist history but also touches on certain shadows in this history. . . . Additionally, in some cases there is a discussion of controversial questions, such as the Palestinian refugee problem, Israel's presence in Lebanon, the desirability of establishing a Palestinian State, and so on" (Podeh, 2002, pp. 149–150). Many of these books referred to the Palestinian nation, recognized the role of the Palestinian nationalism in the development of the Arab-Jewish conflict, described in a balanced way the violent acts of Palestinians against the Jews during the periods of the conflict, and provided a balanced description of the wars (Podeh, 2002). In general, they provided a new perspective to the Arab-Jewish conflict and presented in a more complex, multidimensional, and differentiated way the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular. However, the publication of the new books evoked heated debates in the Israeli society, including in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. In November 2000 the Education Committee of the Knesset decided to delay the use of one of the history textbooks – an act that shows that part of the society and its representatives have difficulty in accepting changes in school textbooks that question the Zionist

narrative. It is possible that this decision reflected a counter trend in the Israeli society that began with the outbreak of violence in the fall of 2000.

CONCLUSION

We can conclude that, in general, almost all the Israeli school textbooks that have referred to Arabs in the context of the conflict have continued to stereotype them negatively and even to delegitimize them until recently. Although it is probable that the basis for this representation is partially derived from the ethnocentric perspective, the determinative reason for this negative stereotyping is the ongoing Jewish experience of continuous violent confrontation with the Arabs over the past hundred years. This conclusion is based on the finding that Arabs are mostly presented in the context of conflict and within this context they are almost always negatively stereotyped and delegitimized.

The context of the conflict presented Jewish educators with the problem of how to represent Arabs. It began with the first textbooks written at the end of the 19th century and was later reflected in the way Arabs were treated in narratives of the first period of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The books had difficulty acknowledging the fact that when the Jews arrived in Palestine there were already Arab people inhabiting the country. This problem of how to deal with the existence of a Palestinian nation with aspirations that contradicted the Jewish nationalism has plagued textbook writers throughout the decades. Even though, in the 1930s, some of the books started to acknowledge the existence of the Arab population in Palestine, they still did not recognize it as a national entity.

The treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the school textbooks focused mainly on the prestate period and the War of Independence in 1948–1949. Most of the delegitimizing labels appeared in the descriptions of these periods. The prestate years were a formative period in Israeli history. Waves of Jewish immigrants, some escaping from European anti-Semitism and later from the impending Holocaust, were trying to rebuild the nation in the ancient homeland, but Arabs stood in their way. This mythical period forms a basis for many of the Israeli societal beliefs that are part of the ethos. It provides an image of a pioneering society trying to found a Jewish state. School textbooks have continued to focus on this formative period, describing the heroic acts of Jews building their homeland and defending themselves. The writers who focused on the Zionist narrative lacked understanding as to why the Arabs did not accept Jews with open arms and instead resisted violently their return to their old homeland. The resistance of the Arabs to the “returning” Jews has been attributed to the agitation and incitement of the masses by their leaders. It is within this framework that the War of Independence was described and to which the books devoted much space. The description of the war also provided a context for

the negative presentation of Arabs. Arabs tried violently to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state, and the War of Independence was the most determinative, traumatic, lengthy, and, in terms of human losses, costly war. It therefore received special attention and, like all independence wars, has been glorified and attributed mythical standing. Other periods of conflict received less attention in the books.

The question that can be asked then is, What types of presentations of Arabs do Israeli students find in the school textbooks? It seems, within the context of conflict the students are acquainted mainly with three social categories of Arabs: the fellahin (poor Arab peasants), the mob, and soldiers. All groups are involved in the conflict with the Jews. The first group appears often in the context of the confrontations with the Jewish settlers in the prestate period and sometimes as organized in gangs. The second group is described in the context of the pogroms, which took place in Jewish towns in 1921–1922, 1929, and 1936–1939, and the third group appears in the War of Independence and in the later wars. The first category is presented as a primitive, backward, and passive group that when agitated carried out violent acts against Jews. The second group includes the Arabs who performed violent acts against Jews in the towns in the prestate period. The last group, the soldiers, constitutes the Arab state armies that in different wars intended to annihilate the state of Israel. Finally, it should be noted that a small group of rich landholders was also introduced to the Israeli students. This group, the one that sold the land to the Jews, was presented as being corrupt and indifferent to the fate of the people.

The descriptions of these three groups transmit to students two major themes. One is the theme of the Arab as primitive, inferior, backward, and ignorant, in comparison with the Jews. The other theme relates to their violence. With regard to the latter theme, characteristics such as brutality, untrustworthiness, cruelty, fanaticism, treacherousness, and aggressiveness appear. The books provide graphic descriptions of Arab pogroms, murders, riots, and attacks and explain them in simplistic terms that reinforce the stereotype of primitivism and ignorance. According to the books, the violence comes as a result of agitation and incitement of the Arab masses by their leaders. This representation has negative implications. Arabs are consistently presented as a threat to Jewish existence, and thus the stereotype presented instigates feelings of insecurity, fear, and hatred. Positive stereotyping is rare. Some books do refer to positive characteristics, mostly within a particular ethnocentric framework – that is, whenever Arabs help Jews or acknowledge their superiority. However, there are some books that describe Arab hospitality and friendliness and provide positive representations of subgroups such as Bedouins and Druzes, as brave, generous, and virtuous.

The books represent very rarely middle-class, professional, or intellectual Arabs. This is especially puzzling in view of the fact that the Arab

citizens of the state of Israel occupy a noticeable place in the Israeli work force. They function as doctors or nurses, lawyers, teachers, and the like. Moreover, there is a considerable intelligentsia in the occupied territories that is not represented in the books. Finally, on the whole the books seem to ignore the fact that since 1979 Israel has had a peace treaty with Egypt. This dramatic event could have led to the Jews becoming better acquainted with the Egyptian culture.

Through many decades negative stereotypes and delegitimizing labels were transmitted to the students from the early years of their formal education in elementary school up to the end of high school. Readers in Hebrew and textbooks in history, geography, and civic studies presented a consistent picture of Arabs that is continually reiterated. Different subjects and different books, and within the subjects used in different grades – nearly all presented, with no exception, the same image with hardly any nuances or counterbalancing information. In some disciplines the images appeared repetitively as students learned about the past hundred years, in different grades. Violent experiences with Arabs, adherence to Zionist goals, insistence on the Jewish narrative only, the focus on one's own national and personal challenges and needs, the focus on being a victim, lack of sensitivity and empathy to the aspirations or experiences of others, and the negation of the Arab goals have all led to the negative stereotypes and the negative presentation of Arabs. This way of presenting Arabs provided Jews with a foundation for explaining the continuous conflict with the Arabs and their resistance to the Zionist endeavor, while at the same time maintaining a positive image for the Jews as victims in the conflict and justifying Jewish behavior and deeds.

Not until the late 1970s and 1980s were books presenting an alternative representation of Arabs published. In the late 1980s and 1990s significant changes in the conception and the place of Arabs and Palestinians also occurred in the school textbooks. Social, political, and cultural processes were responsible for this change. However, only in the late 1990s did some history books appear that may truly be seen as evidence of the establishment of a new alternative trend, one that tries to present a more balanced and multidimensional presentation of Arabs in general and of the Palestinians in particular. Such books are still scarce and relate to limited content. Often their publication is accompanied with political outcry and political debate in the media.

The review and analyses of school textbooks suggest that, over the years, generations of Israeli Jews have been socialized in light of the negative, derogating, and often delegitimizing view of the Arabs. The parents and the grandparents of the present generation were consistently presented with negative images of Arabs in school textbooks. It will take many years to rewrite and introduce into the school textbooks balanced presentations of Arabs, without negative stereotypes and delegitimizing labels.

Inevitably it will take several generations to change societal beliefs about Arabs. It goes without saying that a parallel undertaking by the Arab states and Palestinians in particular, whose textbooks are similar in nature to those of the Israeli books in stereotyping Jews, would help such a process. At present, there are still school textbooks that continue to present images of Arabs that reinforce attitudes of conflict. The present resumption of the conflict, with the eruption of violence, may only strengthen this direction and reverse the new alternative tendencies that appeared in the 1990s.

Representation of Arabs in Cultural Products

In the present chapter we review studies that have investigated the representation of Arabs in Israeli Jewish channels of culture – specifically, representation in Hebrew literature, plays, and films of the past 100 years. Cultural products express the values, beliefs, and norms of the society. They delineate the boundaries of what is considered an acceptable societal expression of social reality and sometimes provide new perspectives. While they reflect the prevailing beliefs and widely shared assumptions and norms, they can also present the public with unusual or innovative ideas. In contrast to school textbooks, which adhere to the mainstream tradition and ideology and are almost never innovative, literature, plays, and films can definitely go beyond, sometimes even far beyond, consensual beliefs to present views that are controversial at the time but may, eventually, be accepted by at least part of a society.

In line with this reasoning, an analysis of the representation of Arabs in cultural products may reveal not only widely shared stereotypes but also new images. In the former case, cultural products serve as a mechanism of reflection, which validates and thus helps to maintain the consensual stereotype, whereas in the latter the cultural products serve as sources of innovation, which can transmit and disseminate new and unusual images of Arabs.

In reviewing studies that investigate Arab representation in Hebrew literature, we consider first adult literature and then children's (or adolescent) literature. A review of studies analyzing the image of the Arabs in adult Hebrew literature suggests that this line of research has been very popular (see, e.g., Ben-Ezer, 1977, 1978, 1992, 1999; Domb, 1982; Gertz, 1998; Govrin 1989; Ramras-Rauch, 1989; Shaked, 1989). In contrast, the study of the Arab images in children's Hebrew literature is rare, and our research can only draw on analyses by A. Cohen (1985), Regev (1968, 1984, 1985), and El Asmar (1986). Although most of the books analyzed were written

years ago, many are still read by Israeli readers, some as classics of Hebrew culture.

ADULT HEBREW LITERATURE

In general, Shaked (1989) points out that the Arab is the most common of all non-Jewish social categories to appear in Hebrew literature. Although the representation of the Arab has changed through the years, the context of Arab-Jewish conflict in which Arabs are set has remained the same. The imprinting experience of the conflict on the Israeli being was noted by Ramras-Rauch (1989) in the opening statement of her extensive analysis of the Arab image in Hebrew literature. She wrote that "In a number of profound ways, the self-definition of the Israeli is implicitly connected to his or her ways of relating to the Arab, to the Arab's own self-definition, and thus to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. For the Israeli, personal commitment to the land, to the shape and boundaries of the country, has been entangled with the Arab presence for over a century. And for a corresponding length of time the image of the Arab has made its presence felt in Hebrew-Israeli literature" (p. xi).

Ben-Ezer (1992, 1997) distinguished five periods in the Arab-Israeli conflict in relation to the ways Arabs have been represented in Hebrew literature.

First Period (1882–1917)

The first period includes the first and second waves of the Jewish immigration to Palestine (1882–1914). This period is of special importance because it allows us to determine how Hebrew literature represented Arabs before the Arab-Jewish conflict escalated. According to Ben-Ezer, two differing literary trends emerged during this first period. Berlovitz (1996) relates these trends to the two political approaches described by Gorny (1987): the approach of integration and the approach of separatism, discussed earlier in Chapter 4. A group of writers including, for example, Moshe Smilansky, Yehuda Burla, Yaakov Rabinowitz, Nahum Yerushalmi, Zeev Yavetz, Hemda Ben-Yehuda, Yitzhak Shemi, and Natan Bistrizky-Agmon, who focused on the commonality between Jews and Arabs and expressed empathy toward the latter group, fits into the integration approach. They viewed Arabs as symbols of the exotic East and the embodiment of the ancient Israelites – "noble savages," according to Shaked (1989). In the Jews' attempt to construct a new self-identity, they looked with envy at the brave, hardworking Arab farmers, who were completely at home working the recalcitrant terrain of the land, in which they had deep roots (Morahg, 1986; Perry, 1986). These writers used quasi-ethnological portrayals to describe individual Arabs, focusing on their harsh life-styles, customs, love

relationships, and traditions. They also described positive aspects of their character such as "hospitality at any cost, even to an enemy; unswerving dedication to the soil; the ability to make do with very little; respect for their elders; and caring for their animals" (Govrin, 1989, p. 16). According to Bargad (1977), the Bedouin was presented as the most romantic figure in this line of literature: "He was a primitive being, at home in the untamed natural setting of the fearsome desert; he was an exotic figure, full of mystery, intrigue, impulsive violence and instinctive survival; he was at once bold victor and vulnerable victim of political power struggles and inimical surroundings" (Bargad, 1977, p. 55).

Examples of literature that fit the integration trend include "New year for tree" by Yavetz written in 1891 and "Latifa" written in 1906 by Smilansky (1999), who also wrote "Children of Arabia" (1964) and many other stories about Arabs. The first story tells about a young Jewish man who goes horse riding, is dressed as an Arab, has a rifle, and is integrated into the way of life in the country. He came "at the age of six or eight with his father who settled in Petach Tikva and suffered as all the first settlers suffered and he learned as all the boys from the Arabs to get used to winter and ice, to rain storm and shower . . . and in this way they return to ways of the ancestors in this country" (from Ben-Ezer, 1992, p. 13). The second story tells about the love between a Jewish boy and an Arab girl, who was eventually forced by her father to marry an old sheikh. The story tells about the Arabs' life and their relationship with the Jews in a human and romantic way but with a touch of paternalism.

Domb (1982) carried out an extensive and deconstructive analysis of how these writers represented Arabs. She concludes her study by suggesting that all the writers, with the exception of Yitzhak Shemi, presented a rather stereotypical view of Arabs without revealing the complexity of their experiences. In these stories, Arabs are nearly all described in the same exotic and folkloristic way, as superstitious, traditional, fatalistic, violent, vengeful people who care about their animals. The Arab society is described as patriarchal, ruled by the Islamic laws that give men complete control over women. The stories differentiate between groups such as the Bedouins, fellahin, and Druzes and describe the animosity and hostility between them. The stories mostly depict the lives of very poor Arabs and sometimes of exotic leaders (i.e., sheikhs, *efendis*). Finally, with regard to Jewish-Arab relations, the writers express a negative attitude to intermarriage by describing how such attempts always fail. The friendships between Jews and Arabs are usually rather superficial, and in some stories relationships of conflict are depicted. The Arab viewpoint on such relationships is rarely presented, and on the whole the Jewish perspective is described, usually claiming that "Arabs derive economic and technical advantage from the arrival of Jews" (p. 153).

A similar view was expressed by Shaked (1989), who noted that "The Arab characters in these works do not possess individual personalities: the characterization is flat and one-sided and remains superficial. The traits already anticipated by the reader reliably appear. The Arab figures are often involved in struggle over honour and prestige and prefer prestige to tangible victory. Frequently they are brought down from a lofty state to one of humiliation. They are conscious of their own nobility, and any damage to their pride will oblige them to avenge with blood" (p. 18).

Evidence of a separatist political approach is found in works by writers such as Yosef Chaim Brenner, Dvora Baron, Yakov Steinberg, Yehoshua Barzilay, and Levi Arieh Orloff-Arieli. These writers were pessimistic regarding developing Jewish-Arab relations and therefore tended to emphasize the negative aspects of Arab culture. Their hostile perception of Arabs was revealed in their descriptions of the Arab as the enemy. In their writing, they expressed the view that the experiences in Palestine are a continuation of the Diaspora ghetto and the Arabs are, in essence, extensions of the European anti-Semites. According to Shaked (1989), this latter presentation was rather typical of early Hebrew literature, which described the Arabs as Gentiles, living in the country in a continuous state of conflict with the Jews. Conflict was considered to be unavoidable in view of the fact that hostile Arabs populate the whole geographical space of the Middle East. The Arabs were viewed as continuing to persecute Jews as the Gentiles did, "a symbol of the entire hostile environment" (Shaked, 1989, p. 17). For example, Orloff-Arieli, in his story "In the rainy season," describes a miserable Jewish family in Ramleh and presents their relations with the Arab environment as comparable with Jewish-Gentile relations in the Eastern European shtetl (Shaked, 1989). Similarly, in Yosef Chaim Brenner's story "Breakdown and bereavement," the hero awakens in the presence of an Arab woman, who came to look for her brother just before Passover, and imagines that she is connected with a blood libel in Russia (Ben-Ezer, 1987).

Govrin (1989) characterizes this trend in the following way:

This view also relies on a model from the past, a mythic perception, but in reverse: these are the descendants of the accursed brothers, unloved, cast out, disinherited. . . . The Arabs are primitive and backward, and the most negative national traits are imputed to them: treachery, violence, deceit, murder, rape. They have held back the development of the country, brought about economic decline and social, cultural, and agricultural backwardness. There can be no possibility, no prospect, and no point in trying to live together harmoniously, because we are speaking of two opposing interests which leave no room for compromise, but only the use of force. (p. 17)

A similar analysis was performed by Perry (1986), who indicates that the negative presentation of Arabs prevailed until the 1960s. "The Arab is strange and frightening, destructive and dangerous, cunning and cruel,

dirty and decadent and associated with disease and madness. He must either be advanced or removed. His attachment to the land is to a sick land that must be dried of swamps and freed of malaria. Because of passivity, laziness and inefficient farming methods, the land decayed and was devastated" (p. 605).

Second Period (1919–1947)

The second period distinguished by Ben-Ezer began with the third wave of the Jewish immigration to Palestine (1919–1923) and continued through the next two decades. He characterized this period as a time when Jews and Arabs were "still strangers and already strangers." In this period, while some writers continued to follow the two trends described earlier and some also tried to combine both of them, a new trend appeared. This trend was a result of the violent eruption of the Arab-Jewish conflict, and specifically of pogroms of the Jewish population in a number of places in Palestine. Writers of this new trend abandoned the romantic image of Arabs (e.g., Shin Shalom, Yitzhak Sheinberg-Shenhar, Yaakov Rabinowitz) and wrote about the Jewish-Arab struggle. A representative literary example of this period is Yakov Steinberg's story "The Haj from Cheftziba," written in 1927. The story describes young Jewish settlers who feel threatened and alienated in their new settlement. At the center of the village is a large stone ("drink's stone"), which symbolizes the country, and around it a struggle takes place between an Arab and a Jew. The struggle is reminiscent of the biblical fight between Jacob and the angel. The Arab, Haj, fights the Jew since he believes that the Jews came to dispossess him and to take his land. The Jews in the story not only fight to defeat the Arab but also struggle to feel attached to the land. According to Ben-Ezer (1992) this story symbolizes the painful truth of the period in which the Jews still felt like strangers to the country, while the Arabs already felt like strangers to them.

Third Period (1947–1950s)

The third distinctive period, which relates to the War of Independence of 1948, produced writers who did not view the Arabs as real and concrete individuals living normal lives but as a generalized and abstract entity. In these writings, Arabs are rivals with whom Jews are in a continual existential life-and-death struggle, which has to be determined on the battlefields. But as the conflict turned into full-scale war, the Jews were faced with a moral dilemma. Their Zionist-socialist ideology propagated brotherhood and equality of all people, but reality forced them to kill the rival Arabs, and even to perform other immoral acts (Ben-Ezer, 1992; Ramras-Rauch, 1989). The situation of the war puts to the test their values and education. The most salient expression of the above themes can be found in the works by

S. Yizhar (pen name for Yizhar Smilansky), *The days of Tziklag* published in 1954 and *Hirbeth Hiz'eh* published in 1949. Both works deal with the Jews born in Palestine (called sabars), who are forced to kill Arabs and cope with the massive death toll among Jewish fighters during the independence war, while trying to hold on to their moral values. This ambivalence is well expressed in *The days of Tziklag*:

Kill well, quickly, much, dynamically, professionally: two with one bullet, three if possible. It's unavoidable. But I hate it that it's unavoidable. It's not good to hate what is unavoidable. And I hate blazing a trail through corpses too. Hate fighting – and fight. That's what I am destined to do – me, and all of us – and that's all. I belong to the generation whose only alternative in life is war. They never found another one. And I'm here. Hating and hating that that's the way it is. Enduring the battle like a conquered city endures its oppressor. Trapped between fear and stupor. Between the joy of competing in the arena and rebellion against my resignation to it, and my joy in it. And knowing, at the same time, knowing well, that however we twist and turn, no other way out, and everything closed up around – and only a human fist and a rhinoceros head will bestow life, and they will praise God, Hallelujah. (*Days of Tziklag*, p. 1100, quoted from Ben-Ezer, 1977, p. 96)

A similar attitude is expressed by Benjamin Tammuz in *Swimming competition* (1951) and by Aharon Meged in *The treasure* (1949). These works highlight the Jews' ambivalent attitudes toward Arabs. This ambivalence results from feelings of guilt for acts of violence done to Arabs and envy of their closeness to the land, on the one hand, and the realization that the Jews and Arabs are locked into brutal and violent conflict, on the other hand. But in this line of literature the Arab characters appear as the objects of these moral dilemmas and not as individuals who are experiencing personal disaster. Gertz (1995) notes this dialectic presentation and points out that Arabs are presented both as brutal and violent and as victims. As an example of this type of presentation, Gertz puts forward Chaim Guri's *The journey to the divine mountain* (1975). In this story Guri first describes Arabs in a dehumanizing way: "The destruction is their escort, they will rape your sisters and will maltreat your mother. Will change your palaces into their stables, a resting place for their horses. These Egyptian dogs, struck by leprosy and infected by syphilis will rule ruthlessly over you and all you have." However, he presents another image too: "simple people, poor, fathers to sons, wandering flock, led astray . . . and human fear will jerk in their dark face" (from Gertz, 1995, p. 54). But according to Gertz (1995) this second image of Arabs is irrelevant in the light of the existential struggle that Jews have to cope with in the War of Independence.

Fourth Period (1950s–1970)

The realities of intractable conflict ended this period marked by dilemmas and brought about the fourth period, which was characterized by a shared

sense of danger in Israeli society that lasted from the 1950s until 1967. It produced climactic expressions of siege, external threats, and the continual existential struggle in literature that portrayed the Arabs' intentions to annihilate the Jewish presence in various ways. Arabs were often delegitimized and viewed not as individuals but as an abstract sinister force in nightmarish terms (Ben-Ezer, 1978, 1992; Govrin, 1989; Shaked, 1989). A story written in 1963 by A. B. Yehoshua, "Facing the forests" (1999), is a good example of this trend. The hero of the story is a student studying the history of the Crusaders, who also works as a fire ranger. He is filled with anxiety and fear about the Jewish existence in Israel – wondering whether the Jews' destiny will be as short-lived as the Crusaders? His lookout post is situated in a forest that was planted on the ruins of an Arab village. The village was destroyed in 1948, and the residents were expelled by the Jews, leaving only one old Arab. This old man set fire to the forest, which burns to the ground, revealing the ruins of the destroyed village. Yitzhak Shalev (1964) in *The Gabriel Tirosh affair* also expressed the Jewish fear of Arab threat by using the Crusaders as an example. In his book, a young teacher urges his high school students to act against the Arabs because they may defeat the Jews, as the Crusaders were defeated centuries ago. Ben-Ezer (1992) points out the symbolic content of Yehoshua's story and the direct meaning of Shalev's book. Both describe the deep fear of the Jews who sense the Arabs' hate and vengefulness and therefore view them as a threat.

The same themes appeared in the early writing of another well-known writer, Amos Oz. "Nomad and the viper" (1999), published in 1963, is about a young woman in a kibbutz. She meets a Bedouin shepherd, a nomad, portrayed as primitive, bestial, ugly, and wretched. But he arouses her sexually. The invasion of nomads into the kibbutz area has brought devastation – foot-and-mouth disease, destruction of cultivated fields, and theft. In this story, according to Ben-Ezer (1977), "The Arab symbolizes the dark, instinctual side of life. . . . The Arab exists in the dark part of her soul, just as bestial lust, irrationality, and abandon-death do. The Arab is also the desert, and disease" (p. 100). In *Another place* (1966), Oz described a kibbutz surrounded by borders and mountains, which create a sense of oppression and suffocation. But the presence of Arabs is related in a particularly significant way. They are portrayed as being inseparable from the landscape but with a threatening tone (Ben-Ezer, 1992). In his most celebrated work, *My Michael* (1973), written before 1967, Oz describes the insanity of Hanna, a student married to Michael. She hallucinates recurrently about Arab twins that were her friends in childhood but who later turned out to be deadly enemies. They appear to her as infiltrators and terrorists, who bring death and destruction. Although they are not the only reason for her distress, they play a major role in her nightmare.

Another metaphoric story, "Ants," was written in the same period by Yitzhak Orpaz (1968). The story tells about an Israeli couple under constant

attack by ants that infiltrate all corners of the house. In addition, the couple's relationship is failing. The story clearly encapsulates the fear of war and siege and the Arab threat to destroy the state. This nightmare scenario forebodes self-destruction. The delegitimization of Arabs and the endless, relentless violence are expressed through the couple's relationship, which is doomed to fall apart. The Arab threat appears also in the writings of Moshe Shamir. In his novel, *The border* (1966), and the autobiographical book, *My life with Ishmael* (1968), he describes the ever present Arab threat, which causes constant stress and makes an indelible imprint on Jewish life. Also, in the latter book appears a hint of the homosexual tendencies of Arabs, tendencies that often were presented in Hebrew satire.

It should be noted, though, that in addition to the literary trends described during the period of intractable conflict, there were some writers who wrote about Arabs from a different perspective. The stories by Hemda Alonin, "No stranger will come" (1962), and by Yehoshua Granot, "A bitter cup of coffee" (1967), are examples of literary works that deal with Arabs as individuals who are concerned with the personal, cultural, and national problems involved in trying to integrate into Israeli society (Ben-Ezer, 1999). But such literary works are the exception rather than the rule. Ben-Ezer (1992) summarizes the portrayal of Arabs by writers in this fourth period by suggesting that it turned

the Arab into a nightmare, into something essentially sinister, into that dark part of existence onto which we project our own fear, our dread and terror. . . . the Arab does not appear again as a concrete individual, also not as a representative of an ideological and moral problem, but as part of the Israeli nightmare. He has no existence – for himself – a social, national, everyday existence, but is a scary projection born from the soul of the Israeli hero. And even more than he instills fear, the Arab is a nuisance who doesn't allow the Israeli person to get on with his life as he would like to, away from his ongoing troubles with the conflict and the wars it has caused. (p. 36)

Similarly, Perry (1986) suggests that in this period the Arab served merely as a metaphor to highlight certain aspects of the Jewish characters in the story – the Arab functions as the instinctive, unknown, dark, sinister, lustful, dangerous, uncontrollable, and unpredictable alter ego of the Jewish hero. Such a presentation unwittingly delegitimizes Arabs by using the metaphors of dehumanization (Berger, 1994). Morahg (1986) claims that this trend characterized the first 70 years of Hebrew literature. The focus of literature from this period is on the Jewish experience, and Arabs play a very minor role and rarely one of a true antagonist. Up until the 1970s no significant work presents Jewish and Arab perspectives on the conflict equally. "Arabs are regarded as an external force impinging upon central drama and are depicted as an abstract human presence that must be reacted to but not accounted for" (Morahg, 1986, p. 150).

Fifth Period (1970s–1990s)

The fifth period began after the 1967 war, when the Israelis experienced a great victory in the war, conquering territories from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The period began with national euphoria, which turned into soul-searching six years later with the Yom Kippur War of 1973, a national near disaster. During this period, writers continued to view Arabs as a threat. Some continued to describe them in general and depersonalized terms as, for example, Yitzhak Ben-Ner in *Country sunset* (1976) and Amos Keinan in *Holocaust II* (1975). But some turned to the individual lives of Arabs, focusing especially on the Arab citizens of the state of Israel who were almost nonexistent during the state's first 20 years (Ben-Ezer, 1992, 1999). To Perry (1986) this new approach represented the Arabs and Palestinians as holistic individual characters with full lives. They were shown as being engaged in conflict with Israeli Jews, depicted by means of analogies with interpersonal conflicts between real human beings. These real characters could ask meaningful questions about the life of each group, since they are conscious of their wishes and desires. Therefore, they can give new insights into the behavior of the Palestinians and Israeli Jews. Salient examples of this trend are the novels *The lover* (1977) by A. B. Yehoshua, *A locked room* (1980) by Shimon Ballas, and *Refuge* (1977) and *Trumpet in the wadi* (1987) by Sami Michael.

One of the heroes of *The lover* is Naim, an Arab adolescent from Galilee who is trained to be a mechanic in the garage of a Jew called Adam. He is taken into Adam's home and struggles with his sense of identity. He knows how to recite Hebrew poems learned in school, representing dilemmas that Jewish society in Israel has created for their Arab citizens. Integration requires them to adopt the norms and the culture of the majority. This is the way that the dominant Jews accept the Arab minority (Shaked, 1989). Sami Michael's *Refuge* presents three Arab prototypes in a complex and colorful way. Fathi is a poet, educated and talented, who attempts to be an Israeli intellectual by combining an Israeli and Arab identity. While he remains a stranger and never becomes fully at home in Jewish society, he also loses his national Arab identity. This way of trying to function in both worlds in the Israeli reality is doomed to failure. He is looked at with suspicion by the Jews and Arabs alike. He lacks the courage to follow his friend Fakri, the second prototype, who leaves the country to join the PLO to fight Jewish Israel. Eventually Fathi marries an Arab woman to lead Arab traditional life because he cannot marry a Jewish liberated woman. He thus returns to his Arab roots after encountering disappointments in his life. Fuad, an old leader of the Communist Party, represents the third prototype of Arab citizen in Israel. In the spirit of the comradeship among nations, he believes that it is possible to create a Jewish-Arab synthesis without a war. He marries a Jewish woman, thus

practicing what he preaches in his personal life. But his family falls apart, and he cannot heal the breach (Ben-Ezer, 1992, 1999).

According to Morahg (1986), although each of these books relates a different story, they present a common view "that the destinies of the Arab and Jewish communities in Israel can no longer be regarded as separate because these communities have become inextricably intertwined in a relationship that is damaging to both sides" (p. 150). In Sami Michael's *Refuge*, an Arab displays this relationship through a powerful image: "I'm sure you have seen two dogs who got stuck while copulating in the street. They writhe and they shriek but they are unable to separate one from the agony of the other. So they keep on squirming and pulling – each in a different direction. These are the Jews and the Arabs caught in their foul trap" (from Morahg, 1986, p. 151).

Following the Lebanon War in 1982, called "a war of choice," and the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in 1987, vocal opposition developed in the Jewish Israeli society about the way Palestinians were being treated. These voices can also be found in Hebrew literature. *A good Arab* (1984) by Yoram Kaniuk is the tale of an Arab trying to live in two worlds, the Israeli and the Palestinian, who fails to make the adjustment between them. *Shahid* (1989) by Avi Valentin, *Tales of the Intifada* (1989) by Dror Green, and *Letters of the sun, letters of the moon* (1991) by Ittamar Levi all tell the story of the Intifada from a Palestinian perspective, providing an illuminating view about the ideas, motivations, and concerns of the Palestinians. Three books by David Grossman, *The smile of the lamb* (1983), *The yellow time* (1987), and *Present absentees* (1992), all of which present the Arab problem to the Israeli Jewish society, also fit in with this trend. The latter two books are journalistic reports, one providing a vivid description of the humiliating way Palestinians live under the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and the other about discrimination in the lives of Arab citizens of the state of Israel.

According to Ben-Ezer (1992, 1999), adult Hebrew literature has turned full circle to face the reality of two peoples with opposing desires and dreams, living together in one country locked in a bitter and ongoing struggle. But the writers take an individualistic perspective, viewing Arabs, as they do Jews, as individuals with their own aspirations, problems, and past. They are not delegitimized but seen as individual human beings. According to Ben-Ezer (1997), with regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict, Israeli literature started internalizing the reality of the conflict. Jewish heroes take part of the guilt on themselves and are asking themselves difficult questions about the conflict. While the Arab is no longer presented as a nightmare, he also is not featured as a person in his own right, only in relation to the conflict and the Jew's distress. This approach is self-serving, not allowing a deep and multidimensional look at the Arabs from their perspective. Still, the new trend in Hebrew literature deals with all the key issues of

Jewish and Arab coexistence in one country and grasps the reality of the Arabs as the "others" living in Israel, with all the complexity their lives entail (Yudkin, 1995). It recognizes that prevailing stereotypes govern the interpersonal interactions between Jews and Arabs, that Jewish attitudes toward Arabs have been affected by the past experiences of the Jews in the Diaspora, that Arab experiences under Israeli rule are full of humiliation, alienation, and despair, and that Jews in the course of pursuing their own national redemption destroyed the foundations of the Arab's rootedness (Morahg, 1986).

Gertz (1998), in her review of recent trends in literature, points out that while some of the writers in the present time focus on personal and private themes, others continue to be preoccupied with national issues. Many of them attempt to present alternatives to the Zionist narrative based on multinational or multicultural ideology, which are not found to be acceptable to the public at present. According to Gertz (1998), within this trend

Some of the literary works use postmodern models to portray Zionist history as collective images, quotations, posturing, and possibilities, some fulfilled, others not. Thus, they reduce this history to disjointed components and replace it with alternative, imaginary histories. At the same time, they resurrect discarded postulates as new options for the past and the present together: an Arab-Jewish a-nationalism; partitioning of the country between Jews and Arabs; a cosmopolitan coexistence based on cooperation; an "indigenous movement" that wishes to detach itself from the Jewish heritage and integrate into the Middle East; and so on. (p. 203)

CHILDREN'S LITERATURE

Children's books provide knowledge about the world in which children live. They can contain information about past events involving their society, refer to present problems, and also describe various outgroups. Such information is of particular importance to children for two main reasons. One reason is related to the function of children's literature. Many of the books for children are written with the implied, or even explicit, objective to serve as an agent of socialization. This function implies that writing for children is part of the process whereby particular societal values, beliefs, attitudes, and norms, which underlie social order, are transmitted and legitimized. From this perspective, the images presented of other groups represent, for children, legitimate views of the society. The other reason is that research has shown that children's literature is an important part of children's construction of reality (Taxel, 1989). Literature can play a role in the formation of stereotypes about other groups and influence prejudice and emotions toward them. Children tend to attribute printed words with more authority than adults do and tend to assume that the books present factual truth. They also tend to identify with the books' characters more than adults do and use them as models for behavior. Because of their own

limited experience with outgroups and their trust in what the books say, they tend to incorporate the images presented into their world view (Zimet, 1972, 1976). It can be assumed that the children's Hebrew literature has played a significant role in shaping Israeli children's images of the Arabs. This assumption is also based on the fact that in contrast to adult Hebrew literature, which often uses metaphors to describe Arabs and Arab-Jewish relations, children's literature transmits messages with the same content in more concrete and direct ways, often using explicit attribution of negative characteristics and detailed descriptions of behavior. Although it is difficult to determine empirically the influence of literature on stereotype formation, A. Cohen (1985) found clear traces of the influence of books in his interviews with children. They drew their images of Arabs also from the books they read.

The most extensive studies analyzing the presentation of Arabs in children's Hebrew literature were carried out by Adir Cohen (1985) and Fouzi El Asmar (1986). These studies analyzed the content of books published during the development and climax of intractable conflict, from the prestate period until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Cohen reviewed 1,700 books and found that 520 of them contained a reference to Arabs. Asmar examined 205 books published before 1976, including all children's Hebrew literature that described Arabs more extensively, not as an occasional reference. Of special interest is the fact that of these 205 books, 80 books (about 40%) were written by three authors: Abner Karmeli or his pseudonym On Sarig (52 titles), Yigal Mosinson (21 titles), and Haim Eliav (7 titles). The remaining 125 books were written by 60 different authors. It should be noted that each of the three most productive writers wrote series in which a group of children experience exciting adventures (*Sportsmen* and *Danidin* by Abner Karmeli, *Hasambah* by Yigal Mosinson, and *The children of the old city* by Haim Eliav). Many of these adventures involve confrontation with Arabs. The pattern in almost all of these stories is the same: the violent, cruel, and stupid Arabs want to harm the Jews, but the children act cunningly and succeed in overcoming them (Regev, 1984). These books written in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were best sellers in their time, but children still continue to read them today.

With regard to the context of the description of Arabs, A. Cohen (1985) found that among the 520 children's books analyzed, 181 presented a well-defined context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. About 30% of these 181 books deal with the prestate period (mostly about the violent confrontations during first immigration waves and during the Arab rebellion of 1936–1939); 36.5% deal with the War of Independence; 2.8% deal with the 1956 war; 20.4% tell about the 1967 war and the later period of violent confrontations; and 14.3% touch on the 1973 war and the terror that followed. A. Cohen (1985) points out that the preoccupation with the Arab-Jewish conflict in its different periods and phases is not surprising in view of the violent

confrontations between the two peoples through the years. Obviously there has been violence, war, and terror, but the problem lies with the intensity of emotions, the language and style used to describe events, and the delegitimizing labels. In many of the books that deal with the Arab-Jewish conflict, the conflict is usually described in a simplistic, one-sided, and unidimensional way, where Arabs are evil and all Jews are good and brave. In many books, the Arabs are delegitimized, characters are shallow, the stories simple, and the descriptions extreme, transmitting feelings of eternal fear, horror, hatred, and animosity (especially in the children's series mentioned already). They communicate a sense of constant threat through the description of the Arabs' intentions, deeds, and characteristics. This threatening description of Arabs appears in children's literature that deals with the prestate period and with life in the state of Israel.

A. Cohen (1985) notes that children reading these books learn that the conflict between Arabs and Jews is all-embracing and founded on the Arabs' ultimate goal to destroy the state of Israel and annihilate the Jews who live there. In addition they learn that there is no chance whatsoever to reach peaceful relations with them and that the only way to deal with the conflict is to use more and more force. The perception of the eternity of the conflict can be illustrated in the words of Shimon the soldier to his younger brother Danny in the book *Who is running in the alley* (1971) by Zeev Vardy. "The time will come for you Danny. I do not know how long this war will last. But one thing is clear to me. As much as we will strike the Arabs, so will grow the hatred to us, and they will want to take vengeance on us" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 130).

When the books deal with Arab-Jewish conflict, they not only provide national, historical, and political justifications for the Zionist enterprise, which is understandable, but they also negate a basis for Arabs' claims. As in the school textbooks, the country before the arrival of the Jews is presented as uninhabited and desolated. When Arabs are mentioned, they are described as primitives who do not care about the land, have done nothing to develop it, and have left its deserts and swamps wild and uncultivated. A story in Yehuda Gurvitz and Shmuel Navon's (1953) collection of short stories, *What story will I tell to my child?* tells about the first pioneers: "Joseph and his men crossed the country and came to Galilee. They climbed the mountains, which were very pretty, but were empty. Joseph said: 'here we will build up the Kibbutz. . . . This is the land of wilderness, only mountains and mountains around, and silence. . . . Empty is the land; it was deserted by its children; they are scattered and they do not take care of it; there is no one to guard it and no one to protect it'" (from El Asmar, 1986, p. 61).

In *The independence of Israel* (1958) the writer A. Danni acknowledges the fact that Arabs live in Palestine but explains "The Arabs, who captured our land already before one thousand and three hundred years, did actually settle on it and they saw it as their country, but they did not do anything

to protect it from destruction and ruin. . . . While our land is occupied by strangers, it is becoming an empty land" (from El Asmara, 1986, p. 62).

Cohen found that within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict the books almost always referred to the generalized wish of the Arabs to annihilate the Jews, or at least to harm them. This general desire, with a few exceptions, is of the Arab states, Arab nations, Arab masses, Arab terror groups, Arab gangs, and the Arab individuals. These threatening intentions are described in different books. In a book by David Shahar, *Adventures of Riki Maoz* (1962), a boy says, "The Arabs are already preparing themselves to assault us when the British leave. They want to annihilate the Jewish community. They announce it openly already" (from Regev, 1968, p. 215). The following example is taken from a book by Tzvi Lieberman (1953), *In the Jerusalem mountains*. In one of the scenes, an Arab soldier asks, "Will there be enough women for all of us? – With God's help, there will be enough! Those soldiers who distinguish themselves in battle will get an additional one" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 147). In *Demon 2 leaves for a border* by M. Garyin (1958), two children who are supposed to write an essay with the title "What do I know about the situation on the border?" have the following thoughts: "Kalkilya! The name itself aroused a trembling in our hearts. We knew well that Kalkilya is a Jordanian town, whose residents plot against Israel, because two weeks before the Sinai campaign our soldiers blew up the police fortress of Kalkilya" (from Regev, 1968, p. 214).

The books not only describe intentions but also the actual acts of violence performed by Arabs. In the classic book *Genesis people* (1933) by Eliezer Semoli, describing the Jewish history in the prestate period, a girl says, "Father, father, in Hebron so many Jews were slaughtered . . . also children were killed there. . . . Terrible rumors were told, angering and blood freezing, pogroms in Jerusalem, massacre in Motza and terrible slaughter in Hebron" (from Regev, 1968, p. 215). In *Towards sand and blue sea* (1963) by Neomi Zorea, the siege of Jerusalem during the War of Independence is described: "Jerusalem was surrounded from all parts around by Arab war seekers. Even on the road leading to Jerusalem hostile Arabs lay" (from Regev, 1968, p. 215). In the book *Long live bravery* (1973) by Menachem Talmi, battles of the War of Independence are described from an Arab perspective. The Arabs are entrenched above a Jewish settlement and are shooting at the Jewish settlers. They are boasting about the deaths they are inflicting: "What a spectacular view is a sight reconstructed without humans. We are sowing death there with the help of Allah and his prophet" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 127). In a book by Yehuda Salu, *Fire in the mountains* (1964), the Arab fighters shout, "'Palestine is our country, the Jews are our dogs!' With this shout accompanied by a rhythmic howl, the mob broke into the yard, treading on pits that still were there on the way" (from Regev, 1968, p. 216). In *The children of the Old City in captivity of the legion* (1975), Haim Eliav described the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem by the

Jordanians: "Other units of the legion roamed through the alleys, robbed and looted everything that remained there and then set the houses on fire" (from El Asmar, 1986, p.76). A book by Yehoash Biber, *The adventures of the reconnaissance unit Rimon* (1974), describes a later period: "They [the Syrians] bombard our settlements in the north. They send saboteurs to commit acts of sabotage against peaceful farmers, fishermen and workers. They are preparing for the next war and they are fortifying the area. . . . We are all aware how they molested our prisoners when they got caught in Syria while on an intelligence mission. They were subjected to cruel torture and one of them committed suicide" (from El Asmar, 1986, p. 110).

Children's literature often explains the Jewish-Arab conflict and the Arab's hate and violence as being caused by the agitation and incitement of the masses. Thus, according to books, the ignorant Arabs without an opinion of their own are incited by their leaders to perpetuate confrontation. For example, in a book by Eliezer Semoli (1972), *The sons of the first rain*, the readers are told "At the beginning of May 1921, some Arab agitators with no conscience sparked an uncontrollable Arab mob in Jaffo. They told them lies about the Jews in Tel Aviv, and awakened them to attack their Jewish neighbors and inflict heavy damages" (from El Asmar, 1986, p. 66). Similarly, in a book by Binyamin Gal, *The foxes of Samson* (1958), the following description appears: "The Arabs burst in an assault from the hills surrounding the kibbutz from the north and from the north-west. . . . They charged towards the kibbutz with untamed screams with no plan or order. They were not soldiers, they were merely agitated villagers who ran over the slope, brandishing their arms. . . . Their attack plan was based on their large number which reached a few hundreds" (from Regev, 1968, p. 218).

A. Cohen (1985), performing content analyses of children's books, detected widespread negative stereotyping of Arabs. He found that in 63.5% of the 520 books analyzed, Arabs are characterized with negative traits. But of special significance is the widespread delegitimization. The core of delegitimization lies in characterizing Arabs with labels that are related to violence, primitivism, and inferior backwardness. A study by A. Cohen (1985) found delegitimizing labels related to violence in 380 of the 520 books analyzed. These labels mostly fall into the categories of dehumanization, outcasting, and extremely negative characterization. Among the labels used are thieves, murderers, robbers, spies, arsonists, violent mob, terrorists, kidnappers, and "cruel enemy." In addition, in 86 books he found such delegitimizing labels as inhuman, war lovers, devious, monsters, blood-thirsty, dogs, prey wolves, or vipers. Also, the books characterize Arabs with delegitimizing traits such as brutality, violence, malignity, cruelty, and treacherousness.

The delegitimizing characterization often begins with descriptions of the Arabs' external appearances. In the 520 books that referred to Arabs, 1,387 descriptions of external appearance were found, of which 1,079

(77.2%) were negative. Among them appear: "with repulsive external appearance," "having a scar," "having a bird of prey's face," "having an angry and evil face," "having yellow and rotten teeth," or "having eyes dispersing terror." Regev (1985) points out that the description of the physiognomic features provides an immediate threatening impression of an Arab, even before the character is developed on the basis of additional information.

For the Israeli Jewish readers the most delegitimizing practice possible is to associate the Arabs with the Nazis, who stand as the prototype of evil in Jewish culture. Some of the books make this association directly. For example, in a popular series *Stories of the Old City children* (1971), by Chaim Eliav, the story tells about a boy, Nissim, who approached an Arab position. After an armed Arab appeared and caught him, "he led Nissim to a cellar, to a German officer – I caught a spy Herr Captain, he told to his commander – A spy? shouted the German – Search him well" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 134). In another series, about Danidin by On Sarig (*Danidin in a kidnapped plane*, 1972), the captain of the plane asks the terrorists not to wave with their guns because they may go off. The terrorists respond: "We are the commanders here and not you, and soon we will be the commanders in all of your Israel, and then we will annihilate all of you together with your state until a sign or trace will not remain . . . we will finish what Hitler began to do and did not succeed in completing" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 146).

Arabs are also connected to the persecutions carried out by the Gentiles in the Diaspora. Yehoash Biber's *The hero from lion cage* (1978) describes one of the first Jewish pioneers in Palestine's heroic struggle with the Arabs: "Again and again it repeats itself. Gentiles attack Jews, beat, rob, murder and even here in the land of ancestors . . . Jews are beaten" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 104). In Amos Bar's *Destroyer of barriers* (1977), which describes experiences of an Israeli fighter, Zerubavel Horowitz, before and during the 1948 war, there is a similar association as he passes an Arab village: "[T]he shouts 'Yehud' brought to the heart of Zerubavel hated memory. He remembered the shouts 'Zid' by the gentile boys in the Polish town" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 123). The association between Nazis and Gentiles in the Diaspora relates the traumatic collective memories of the past to the present Arab-Israeli conflict and infers a continuation of the Jewish destiny as the eternal victim.

In addition to described ways of delegitimization, Arabs are characterized by means of a variety of negative traits such as being shrewd, cowardly, lying, greedy, hypocritical, flattering, exaggerating, suspicious, arrogant, stingy, stupid, or irascible (see A. Cohen, 1985). The traits of cowardice and stupidity appear in many of the books. They lose battles and wars and desert battlefields unashamedly. In some books (especially in the series mentioned earlier), they are defeated by Jewish children, who successfully outsmart and outmaneuver them. As an example we take Yigal Mosinson's

book, *Hasamba and the horse robbers* (1951), where the following is described: "Mustafa Jamali realized that he was trapped. He rose lazily from his seat and contemplated in his heart that these Jewish children are really some fellows, real heroes. Indeed, they dared to arrest him, Mustafa Jamali, the famous robber with the scar across his cheek" (from El Asmar, 1986, p. 96).

Arabs are also presented as backward, primitive, uneducated, dirty, passive, and lazy. Through the decades, until quite recently, the books almost never presented an educated, middle-class, urban, professional, intelligent Arab. A. Cohen's study (1985) found that among the analyzed books, 470 mentioned 654 different occupations of Arabs. These were distributed as following: manual workers (17.7%), farmers (12.7%), shepherds (12.4%), clerks and clergy (9.3%), policemen and guards (7.6%), smugglers and spies (7.2%), peddlers (5.9%), vagabonds (5.6%), but only 1.9% professionals such as lawyers or teachers. The rest of the occupations varied enormously but were all in the domains of criminality (e.g., thieves, slave traders, women's traders) or low-status jobs (e.g., porters, scouts). This study did not count soldiers and fighters as an occupation, but many of the books refer to Arabs in these roles. According to Regev (1984), the tendency of Hebrew writers of children's books to focus on low-level occupations reflects ethnocentric superiority that characterizes the Jewish view of Arabs; the ignorance of the writers, many of whom never even met Arabs; and the general tendency to fall into stereotypic descriptions of the exotic East.

In the classic *Genesis people* (1933) by Eliezer Semoli, the view of Arabs as primitive and backward fellahin exploited by a few wealthy Arab landowners was already in vogue. This stereotype appeared in later books as well. Zeev Dominitz in *Baptism of fire* (1956) described the children of an Arab village in the following way: "As they entered the village, they were enveloped with the smell of charcoal that is distinctive of Arab villages and which further intensified their dejection. They walked slowly along the road which was strewn with stones and animal dung, escorted by hordes of children of all ages, barefoot, filthy, dressed in rags" (from El Asmar, 1986, p. 76). In *Hasamba and the big secret* (1953), Yigal Mosinson described Egyptian soldiers in a similar way: "It was a very dirty tent and two card players seized the cards and were throwing them on an empty ammunition case, with outcries and shouts – shortly they will quarrel and draw knives – they are ready to be killed for something less than a coin. Idlers! They do not want to work" (from Regev, 1968, p. 221).

The books also point out the influences that the experience of conflict can have on children. In a book by Devroah Omer, *Beyond the road – or a secret group* (1972), Rubi, the hero, has nightmares after his father was killed by a mine planted by the Arabs. Arabs arouse a generalized sense of threat. When he passes an Arab town by bus, he feels great anxiety that he may

be killed: "Yehud, yehud, a call was raised full of hatred . . . through the slit Rubi saw a sea of animosity, blind hatred, aggression" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 140). The books describe the deeper consequences of conflict and especially the delegitimization of Arabs. Identifying a person as an Arab, or even merely the suspicion that a person is an Arab, brings to mind delegitimizing labels and feelings of threat and fear. A book by Mila Ohel called *The young defenders* (1968) is set in the period before the establishment of the state. The young boys, the heroes of the story, perceive Arabs as the enemy even when they have no evidence to support this view. When they meet an Arab peddler selling vegetables in a Jewish town, one of the boys says that "we immediately thought that he is a Mufti agent and that therefore it is not surprising that he can be insolent, arrogant and a murderer" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 109). A description of a meeting with an Arab is almost always accompanied by negative connotations. The Arab can be a murderer, a terrorist, or, at the very least, a thief. There are almost no good Arabs. In *He escaped from the home* (1972), Tzvia Ben-Shalom describes a meeting between Eran and an old Arab. "Eran was petrified. An Arab! Maybe he is a robber? He could kill me! He will surely kill me" (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 140). These examples show the prevalence of delegitimizing labels of Arabs and how accessible they are.

This observation is not surprising in view of the negative way Arab-Jewish encounters are usually described in the books. Cohen points out that the majority of the books describe the negative side of Arab-Jewish relations. In his analysis of 520 books, A. Cohen (1985) found that 59% contained descriptions of Arabs' treating Jews in a negative way, mostly in terms of hatred, suspicion, or hesitancy, while only 31.1% contained descriptions of Arabs' treating Jews positively, usually in terms of loyalty, friendship, gratitude, or respect. The remaining 9.9% did not specify how the Arabs treated the Jews. Similarly, Cohen's analysis shows that 61.1% of the books contain descriptions of the Jews' negative treatment of Arabs in terms of superiority, mistrust, hatred, and suspicion; 28.7% describe the Jews' positive treatment of Arabs in terms of friendship, care, loyalty, and gratitude; and 10.3% did not specify how the Jews treated the Arabs.

It can be inferred from this analysis that there are books that describe positive interactions between Arabs and Jews and in which Arabs are stereotyped positively. A. Cohen (1985) found that in 23.8% of the 520 analyzed books positive characteristics including such traits as friendliness, bravery, compassion, wisdom, diligence, and sensitivity also appear. One category of positively described Arabs is the so-called good Arab. Those are Arabs who accept the returning Jews in the country, help them, cooperate with them, and recognize the great contribution that the Jews bring to the development of the country in general and specifically to them (El Asmar, 1986; Regev, 1968). An example of this type of good Arab can be found in the monologue by an Arab teacher who visits a Jewish

school in *The sons of the first rain* (1972) by Eliezer Semoli. The Arab teacher says:

In the name of God there are many things we have learned from you, the Jews. This place was barren and deserted and you came and, through your energy, you transformed it into paradise, vegetables, flowers, shade-giving trees. . . . I read daily in the papers advocacy of hatred against the Jews. Many in this country are inciting and instigating feuds between our sons and your sons, but as I pass through your streets and witness the huge labor that you invested in barren and deserted hills which you transformed into blooming gardens, I always say in my heart: God sent the Jews here to serve as an example for us. (from El Asmar, 1986, p. 87)

In Yigal Mosinson's *Hasmbah in the cave of Turkelin* (1973), two Arabs are described positively: first, Aziza, a woman who falls in love with one of the Jewish prisoners; and, second, Mahmud, her brother who is sent by his father to kill her for this treasonous act. But he turns against his father: "'You are a devil, not father,' grumbled Mahmud, 'What damage did Aziza cause you? What damage did I cause to you? Why are we destined to die if not merely because of your stupidity and ignorance? You live like people lived many thousands of years ago, like a primitive and not like human beings in the twentieth century ought to live'" (from El Asmar, 1986, p. 89).

Another way Arabs are presented positively in books is when they are described as helping Jews. A. Cohen (1985) found such a description in 48 out of 520 books analyzed (9%). Often this help takes place in the context of the Jewish-Arab conflict. For example, in *Moshe from the neighborhood by the border* by L. Shaul (1975), Abdul Aziz and his son save two Jewish youngsters who were taken captive by the soldiers of the Arab legion. In Menachem Talmi's *A chase in the desert* (1970), Muhamad Jubran saves a group of Israelis whose boat was swept by a storm to Saudi Arabia. But Cohen finds that in most cases the authors put flattering comments about Jews and the state of Israel in the mouths of the helping Arabs, which sound unreal and superficial.

Finally, in his study A. Cohen (1985) finds that only 66 books (12.6%) seriously tackle the problem of Arab-Jewish relations, realistically describe the conflict, and do not present unidimensional and simplistic stereotypes of Arabs but try to portray them in a personalized, complex, and differentiated way. A group of these books describes, with nostalgia, the good relations that existed between Jews and Arabs in the prestate period, for example, *My neighborhood* by Joseph Ochana (1973) and *Towers in Jerusalem* by Yemima Tshernovitz-Avidar (1968). These books portray Arabs positively as friendly, hospitable, and loyal people. For example, in *Two lemons and a lemon* (1970), Yosef Chanany tells about the friendship between a Jew and an Arab. A Jew was injured and an Arab appeared; as the hero of the story says, "I did not know from where he appeared. Suddenly I felt that someone was standing bent over me . . . and my ears were filled with a

continuous flow of gentle words from which I could only infer his kindness and concern. The dark palm of hand opened my shirt full of blood – he began to wash my face and neck – though many years have passed from then, I will never forget his kindly look” (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 156). Another story, *Joyful stories from stormy days* (1973) by Mordechai Amitai, tells about friendship between kibbutz members and an Arab family. “Abu Salah was our friend and neighbor for a long time. Only a small stone fence separated his yard from our cemetery. Abu Salah brought us coal for our oven in summer, and in winter, when our car broke down, he brought us milk with his camel” (from A. Cohen, 1985, p. 156). Another group of children’s books attempts to provide a balanced picture of Arab-Jewish relations, including the issue of conflict. They see Arabs as individuals, bad and good, and portray them realistically, with all the dilemmas that they face. Cohen noted books like *The boundary in the heart* by Devorah Omer (1973), *Zohar and Zachya* by Michael Deshe (1970), *White goat* by Moshe Shaul (1973), and *Yoav is looking for peace* by Galila Ron Feder (1978) in this category.

A recent study by Fradkin (1997) is of interest, because it analyzes encounters between Arabs and Jews in 21 children’s books published in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. The purpose of her study is to examine whether changes can be observed in the representation of the Arab in children’s literature since the mid-1980s, when A. Cohen’s study (1985) was published. She found that although the analyzed books referred to the Arab-Israeli conflict and even used the negative behavior of Arabs (e.g., terror attacks) as a backdrop, they did attempt to portray a particular Arab as “a good person” and showed a general tendency to personalize and humanize the individual Arab. Moreover, in a number of the literary works the Jews are described as performing misdeeds, while the Arab is the good character. In some stories, Jews mistreat the Arabs because of a generalized suspicion that all Arabs must be involved in acts against the Jews and the Israeli state. For example, in the book *Nadia* by Galila Ron Feder (1985), set in a Jewish boarding school, some Jewish adolescents mistreat an Arab girl, called Nadia, when they hear about a terror attack carried out by Arabs in Jerusalem. The story tells about her experience of being a single Arab among Jews. In *The blast in the Ahalan street* by Daniela Karmy (1985), there is story about an Arab who was arrested, under suspicion of causing an explosion, just because of his ethnic origin. Later, when his innocence is proved, he is still not released.

But only a book by Daniela Karmy (1994), *Samir and Jonathan on Mars*, provides the reader with a background to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this book, the story is told from the point of view of an Arab boy who participates in the Intifada, is wounded in a game, and is taken to an Israeli hospital. He thinks about his hometown of Yaffo, where his grandfather used to live until he was expelled. He goes on to tell about the confrontations with the Israeli soldiers in the occupied territories. In other books, next to the positive Arabs there are also negative Arabs, who kidnap and

murder Jewish soldiers or carry out terrorist attacks against the civilian Jewish population. Thus, the conflict with all its ramifications continues to serve as a powerful context to the literary work. But recently writers do attempt to show young readers that negative stereotypes do not apply to all Arabs and also that delegitimization and negative stereotyping can have serious consequences for individual Arabs. The books can be said to take a didactic approach by teaching the young readers not to be too quick to stereotype Arabs negatively.

HEBREW DRAMA

The presentations of the Arab image in Hebrew plays is based mainly on Urian's work in his book *The Arab in Israeli drama and theatre* published in 1997. He points out that, in contrast to literature, Hebrew theater has been slow to encompass the Arab image. Between 1911 and 1948 only 17 plays had Arab characters, and between 1948 and 1967 there were only 26 plays with Arab characters, and even then mainly in minor roles. But between 1973 and 1982 a dramatic change took place and 92 plays had at least one major Arab character. This development continued until the mid-1990s, and between 1992 and 1994 more than 100 plays staged in Israel had an Arab character. Urian divides the representation of Arabs in Hebrew plays into three periods.

First Period (1911–1948)

Plays of the first period (1911–1948) were mostly written by socialist or liberal playwrights who expressed a wish for peace. But many contained echoes of the developing conflict between Jews and Arabs. After 1930 the struggle over land between these two groups became a salient theme in Hebrew plays. In these early plays the Arab characters were taken mostly from the Bedouin culture since this way of life was believed to resemble the life of the ancient Israelites. During this period the plays already displayed a fascination with the Arab way of life together with an aversion for the Arabs' backward culture and a general fear of Arab violence and aggression. As was the case in literature, there was a tendency to superimpose the Jews' experiences with the Gentiles on descriptions of Jewish-Arab relations. Moreover, Arabs were divided into "bad" Arabs, those who object to the Jewish settlement and act aggressively toward the Zionist enterprise, and the "good" Arabs, those who support the Jewish settlement and acknowledge its advantages for the Arab population.

On the whole, Arabs were portrayed as violent, primitive, with a feudal social structure, and without social justice. In the words of Urian:

Violence, lies, deceit and servility characterize the Arabs both individually and as a group in the plays of this period. . . . The Arabs are depicted as violent and

aggressive towards their own people and as constituting a threat to the existence of the Jews. . . . The dispute over land was a central theme in plays written from the 1930s on and was rationalized as being the result of systematic incitement by interested parties among the Arabs. The Hebrew playwright presented the Arabs as a mob, directed against the Zionist enterprise by the evil intentions of a small minority which exploited its 'inferior' characteristics – violence, ignorance and distorted hierarchical structure. (Urian, 1997, pp. 17–18)

Ofrat (1979) summarized his analysis of Arab representations in Hebrew drama in this period by saying, "In the main, the drama of the period preceding the establishment of the state . . . saw the Arab as an evil, destructive force, producing nightmare, alienation, and anti-Semitism in a new guise. Thus we find Arabs repeatedly characterized in the drama of the *yishuv* as murderers and robbers" (p. 74).

Examples of these observations can be found in the following plays: *Alla Karim* (1912) by Levi Arie Orloff-Arieli, who describes a savage, violent Arab who kills one of the pioneers; *Dan the guard* (1936) by S. Shalom, who describes an Arab attack on kibbutz members and the violence within an Arab family; *The broken promise* (1942) by Itamar Ben-Hur, who describes an Arab attack on a Jewish settlement and the murder of an Arab woman by Arabs; *Nimer Aviizrua* (1942) by Aharon Polak, who describes violence between Arab farmers and their landlords; and *The trial* (1937–38) by Shulamit Batdori, who tells of a Bedouin who beats an Arab woman who had sought the help of a Jewish doctor to save the life of her dying daughter. Additional delegitimization comes from Arabs' portrayal as primitive and savage. In *The fountain* (1928) written by Yaakov Jaffe, one of the Jews says "Look at the Arabs, for instance. They are healthy, tanned brown . . . like the rock embedded in the land . . . it's true that they're like donkeys, and their needs are few" (from Ofrat, 1979, p. 72). In *Alla Karim*, a Jewish woman says, "A country capable of producing men with strong spirits and a love of life like our ancient heroes, and even like this primitive Arab, is a country worth living in – living in and fighting for" (from Ofrat, 1979, p. 74).

Second Period (1948–1982)

According to Urian, the second period in Hebrew plays, between 1948 and 1982, can be characterized by two subperiods. At the beginning of the period, in the 1950s and 1960s, Arabs rarely appeared. In the few plays written, the native-born playwrights viewed Arabs as the enemy with whom either a peaceful solution will be achieved or violent confrontation will take place. According to Ofrat (1979), in almost all these early second-period plays, Arabs were portrayed as an external threat and a military danger, but rarely did their characters appear on the stage. When they did, they had no individual identity and were presented just as "Arabs" (e.g., in *They'll arrive tomorrow* written by Nathan Shaham in 1950). Violent confrontations were

presented as resulting from the Arabs' irreconcilable standpoint, which meant that the Israeli fighters had no choice but to kill the attackers. In the play *In the desert plains of the Negev* (1949) by Yigal Mosinson, an Israeli woman fighter says, "You don't want to kill, you don't want war, you don't want to kill poor fellahin from Palestine or Egypt, but you have to" (from Urian, 1997, p. 23).

In the 1970s Israeli playwrights began to use Arab characters to explore the Jewish-Israeli problem of how Zionist ideals were being eroded by the realities of the Israeli occupation of territories conquered in the 1967 war and continuous Arab discrimination in the state of Israel. For example, in two satires, *The queen of bathtub* (1970) by Hanoach Levin and *One town* (1973) by Ilan Ronen and Mike Alfred, Arabs are portrayed in the same negative way they are perceived by Jewish Israeli society. These two plays served as a mirror for the audience, arousing much criticism and controversy. Because of their critical approach to Israeli society, they were censored and were taken off the stage after a few performances.

From 1975 Israeli theater took an active, leading part in expressing opposition to the negative phenomena and developments in Jewish Israeli society, including its institutionalized discrimination of the Arab minority (Ofrat, 1979; Urian, 1997). Hillel Mittelpunkt was one of the first dramatists to present the low status of Arabs and their discrimination as an important social problem in Israeli society. In his play *Nachmani Street's last hope* (1974), he protested strongly against the inhuman stereotypes of Arabs by the Israeli Jews. *The return* (1975) by Miriam Kaney also tackled the question of the Arab in Jewish society directly. In her play, Reuven, the sabar, complains about Zionist ideology and demands justice and compensation for his friend Riad, whose expropriated house has been given to Reuven's parents. Danny Horowitz in *Tcherli Katcherli* (1978) presented the Arab as a scarecrow, the symbol of an enemy in the Zionist ethos. Also, two novels discussed earlier, *The lover* (1978) by A. B. Yehoshua and *Refuge* (1980) by Sami Michael, were adapted for the stage. Through this second period about 30 plays containing Arab characters were performed in different theaters, mostly on the fringe, and more and more Arab actors were being cast to play the Arab roles in these plays.

In many of these dramas, the Arabs were portrayed realistically, with all their concerns and dilemmas, illuminating to the Jewish society the problems of the unequal Jewish-Arab relations, but also reflecting the fears that characterize the Israeli Jews. In *Like a bullet in the head* (1981) by Miriam Kaney, Amitai, a Jewish Israeli lecturer in Oriental Studies, tells, in a monologue, about his conflict with Hassan, who is totally opposite to the stereotypic Arab. He is handsome, intelligent, talented, and successful. Hassan unintentionally injures and disables Amitai and then wins the heart of his wife. He is the "embodiment of all the Jewish Israeli fears regarding the Arabs; the symbol of masculinity and success; the Arab who succeeded

in penetrating Hebrew culture, within those institutions that have opened their gate to him. . . . The weakened and humiliated Israeli can only protest at the end of the play: 'I won't let some Hassan or Muhammad destroy my life. . . . I have a country that I fought for'" (from Urian, 1997, p. 35).

Third Period (1982–1990s)

The third period began, according to Urian (1997), with the Lebanon War in 1982. This war instigated wide opposition in which the Hebrew theater played a major role. Hebrew plays represented the Arabs (especially the Palestinians in the occupied territories) as violent, hostile, and rebellious. This increased the sense of fear but at the same time illustrated the desire to settle the dispute, even if this meant painful compromises. Until 1993 about 100 plays were staged in Israel (mostly in the fringe theaters) that either directly or indirectly dealt with the Arabs' problems, and about half of these dealt with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. These plays openly presented the two sides of the conflict, portraying the Arabs realistically with their sufferings, discrimination, humiliation, aspirations, struggles, and confrontations with the Israelis and also their own problems and disappointments, arousing public discussion. Examples of this type of play include *The Palestinian girl* (1985) by Yehoshua Sobol, *Womb for rent* (1990) by Shulamit Lapid, and *Imagining the other* (1982) by Miriam Kaney.

S. Levy (1995) pointed out that the new trend raised the question of the occupation, and "the image of the Arab was fleshed and developed from a two-dimensional caricature into a fully three-dimensional figure" (p. 27). This development allowed recognition of the growing consciousness of the Arabs. For example, *Hamdu and son* (1987) by Yitzhak Buton describes three Palestinian sanitation workers who are humiliated and exploited by anyone wearing a uniform. The father in the play attempts to placate the Israeli authorities while the son wants to destroy them. Similarly, in *Gazans* (1987) Motti Baharav describes the difficult life of the Palestinians from Gaza in Tel-Aviv, who are primitive, violent, and full of vengeance for the humiliations they have suffered. *Deception* (1990) by Yitzhak Ben-Ner showed the confrontation between the Israeli soldiers and Palestinians in the Intifada. The play projects fear, since the Israeli soldiers meet at every corner rioters with keffiyees covering their faces, throwing stones and bottles, promising "we'll slaughter you. Not a single Jew will remain in Palestine." The soldiers react violently against the Palestinians because they "fuck up our entire country."

The internal problems of Palestinian society have been depicted in several plays, which also showed their violence and traditional and cruel customs. The play *Abir* (1991) by Hagit Ya'ari describes the suppression of women in Palestinian society; *Naomi* (1992) by Ruby Porat-Shoval

illustrates the hard life for women in Bedouin society; and *Masked* (1990) by Ilan Hatzor deals with the schism in the family, as an Intifada activist kills his brother, who had collaborated with the Israeli authority.

Urian (1997) observes that there is a common thread running through all the Arab characters appearing in Hebrew drama. They are often used to present an ideological statement. In his words, "An Arab character might indeed be 'planted' in the text but the playwright fails to relate either to him or to his problems, dealing rather with his own difficulties as a Jew in a new land and newly emerging society. As a general rule, in all the plays in which Arabs appear, they are 'subordinated' to an ideological or political statement, which occasionally refers to them and their problems, while at other times they are merely a symbol on the Jewish map of ideological consciousness" (p. 2).

Thus, Urian (1999) points out that although the presentation of the Arab became complex, differentiated, humane, and empathetic, it was still stereotypic and used to discuss problems that the Jewish society faced. The plays examine the "Arab problem" with which the Jewish Israeli society has to cope, because Arabs live in the same space as Jews and the fate of both groups is interrelated. But Urian notes that, in spite of the dramatic change in the presentations, still the outcomes of Jewish-Arab relations in the narratives of the plays are often tragic and negative. The writers express their pessimistic view about the future of the relations between the two groups.

Nevertheless, in the past 20 years the theater has sent out new messages to the Jewish Israeli public. It forced the audience to see the Arabs in situations that many of them knew nothing about. In addition to the traditional and often violent Arab, they also saw Arabs from other sectors whom they usually do not meet, and, more important, they were forced to become aware of what the Jews do to Arabs in the state of Israel and in the occupied territories and what effects this behavior has had on the Palestinians and especially on the Jewish Israeli society. These images were supposed to show how vital it is to find a solution to the conflict with the Palestinians in the occupied territories and to stop the discrimination of the Israeli Arabs, even if this involves difficult compromises. In essence the theatrical plays use the stage to discuss major issues that pre-occupy the Israeli public and present views that can serve public debates.

ISRAELI FILMS

The representation of Arabs in films produced by Jews in the prestate period and since the establishment of the state of Israel follows a similar process of evolvement as was seen in Hebrew literature and Hebrew drama. This description of Arab images in films is based on a number of analyses, including those of Ben-Shaul (2001), Gertz (1991), and Ne'eman (1995).

However, Shohat (1989) performed the most important research on the representation of Arabs in Hebrew films. Shohat divides the representation of Arabs in Hebrew films into three periods, similar to Urian's division: prestate period; a post-1948, heroic-nationalist genre; and a post-1980, individualized Palestinian genre.

First Period (1911–1948)

During the first, prestate period, a few documentary and narrative films were produced in Palestine by Jews. The documentary category includes *The first film of Palestine* (1911) by Moshe Rosenberg, *New life* (1934) by Leo Herman, and *This is the land* (1935) by Baruch Agadati. The narrative category of films includes *The pioneer* (1927) and *Oded the wanderer* (1933) by Nathan Axelrod and *Sabra* (1933) by Alexander Ford. These films presented in an idealized way Zionist themes in order to propagate the ideological cause of the national Zionist movement. They all dealt with building up the Jewish homeland as well as with the construction of new culture. For example, *Oded the wanderer* is a story about a sabra boy called Oded who records his impressions during a school trip in his diary. He gets lost on the trip and experiences several adventures. The film shows a Jewish settlement, the work of the pioneers, and refers to the desolate land that is now being revived by the returning Jews. The Arab presence as a national entity is completely ignored. The film portrays the Bedouins as exotic, primitive natives who are hospitable to the lost boy, Oded. They are uneducated, and Oded notes, "Here not only is nature's savage, but the people as well," and one of the Bedouins says, "You the Jews are learned, educated, you know everything. And we are savages."

The film *Sabra* tells a story of Jewish pioneers who bought some desolate land from an Arab sheik to cultivate. They are blamed for the drought by their irrational Arab neighbors, who decide to attack them, after being incited by the sheik. The Arab mob screams with swords in their hands "Death to the infidel" and attacks the small group of Jews. However, the Jews find water and discover that the sheik himself blocked off the well, and the story has a happy ending. The film portrays the Arabs as primitive, irrational, violent, and easily incited beings, who must eventually come to understand the blessings brought by Jewish settlement. The Arab leader is depicted as greedy, evil, cruel, exploitative, and aggressive, inciting the farmers to inflict violence on the same Jewish pioneers he profited from when he sold them a piece of wasteland. Gertz (1991) points out that the negative stereotypes of Arabs during the 1940s and later served as the primitive "other" to define the reborn Israeli Jews, who were free, modern, active, productive, and in control of their own destiny and who could turn the barren desert into a blossoming garden. According to Ne'eman (1995), the narrative films of the first and second periods present "Zionist

master narratives" that focused on pioneers' life, blooming of the wasted land, construction of the new society, and the struggle against Arabs.

Second Period (1948–1970s)

To some extent this was also the case for the second period of Hebrew films. The second period, from 1948, in many respects continues to present the Zionist ideology but within the new context of an established state. Films from this period are often characterized by the Jews' heroic struggle against the hostile Arabs – for example, *Faithful city* (1952); *Hill 24 doesn't answer* (1955); *Pillars of fire* (1959); *Rebels against light* (1964). The film *Hill 24 doesn't answer* by Thorold Dickinson tells the personal stories of four fighters who are assigned to defend a strategic hill in the Jerusalem mountains against Arab attacks. Arabs in this film are a threatening, anonymous group, never appearing in the film as individuals and almost always filmed at a distance. They have an intransigent and evil presence throughout the film and exhibit hostile intentions and violent behavior toward the Jewish Zionist enterprise. The film also makes the Nazi-Arab association seen in children's literature, when a sabra soldier finds that an Egyptian soldier is a German-speaking Nazi, who came to fight the Jews. The sabra asks rhetorically, "He is the one. How many of them are here?" and straight after this sequence the action returns to the hill, thus implying that Israel fights the Arabs in the spirit of "never again." (The link between Arabs and Nazis appears in other films as well, as for example in the films *Pillar of fire* and *Cairo operation*.) This presentation of Arabs is in contrast with the sympathetic portrayal of Druzes in the film as good natives.

The film *Rebels against the light* by Alexander Ramati is set within a temporal framework of a single day. It tells a story about a pacifist sheik, his terrorist son, an American woman on a visit to Israel, and an Israeli man. The sheik's son, with a group of terrorists, mines the roads, harasses a Jewish outpost, and robs and kills his own people in the name of a need for guns, food, and money. The Arabs in the village are presented in an exotic way, but as primitive and passive, while the terrorists are portrayed as sadistic, bloodthirsty Jew haters. Daoud, the good Arab, who wants to live in peace with the Jews, demands from his son that the terrorist band stop killing and stealing. He displays gratitude for the Jewish contribution to the development of the country.

They were ten, produced in 1961, is an exception to the style of most films in the second period. It deals with the Jewish settlement of land in the prestate period, in the latter part of the 19th century. It also refers, as the film *Sabra* did, to the irrational hostility of Arabs toward the Jewish pioneers. In this story, a group of young Arabs steals from the settlers, and when one thief is caught, an enraged Arab mob attacks the ten settlers. Only when the

Arab leader finds out that the Arab youths stole the goods and that the captured Arab was not tortured, as had been claimed, is peace brought to the two communities. Ben-Shaul (2001) points to several interesting differences between this film and *Sabra* made 28 years earlier. While in *Sabra* the conflict between Jews and Arabs revolves around water and land, the conflict in *They were ten* revolves around law and order. *They were ten* was made when the state was already established and the struggle over land had ended. It suggests that normal life with Arabs is possible if they keep to the rules and maintain law and order. Also, the portrayal of the leader in the later film suggests more optimism since, in contrast to the sheik in *Sabra*, he was convinced that the Jews did not torture the thief and tries his utmost to resolve the misunderstanding peacefully. Thus, the film suggests that it is possible to coexist with the Arabs in the state of Israel, by cooperating with their leaders and by enforcing the law. According to Ben-Shaul (2001), this film implies that the conflict in the state of Israel is not with Arab freedom fighters but with the Arab lawbreakers, who must be punished.

The second period continued into the late 1960s and 1970s. The victorious 1967 war brought a series of heroic films that were nearly all about Arabs' violent intentions and their aggressive behavior that is needed to be contained by the heroism of the Israeli fighters (e.g., *60 hours to Suez*, 1967; *Target Tiran*, 1968; *Five days in Sinai*, 1969; *The great escape*, 1971; *Operation Thunderbolt*, 1976). In these films Arab soldiers were often portrayed as cowardly, ignorant, stupid, lazy, and cruel. Gross and Gross (1991) noted that about 50 war films were produced in Israel in the first 30 years after 1948, and all had a similar narrative that focused on Israeli security problems, violent confrontations with Arabs, and the people's army. Not until the 1980s did films appear that presented a new perspective on the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Third Period (1980s–1990s)

The third period that Shohat (1989) distinguished refers to films after 1980. Shohat calls the new approach the "Palestinian wave" and points out that it began to introduce a different image of the Arabs, "within the general framework and assumptions of the Zionism." The new genre began to focus on an individual Arab, a Palestinian – either in the state of Israel or the occupied territories – and to describe Palestinians' grievances, discrimination, needs, and concerns as multidimensional human beings. Examples include *Hamsin* (1982), *The silver platter* (1983), *A very narrow bridge* (1985), *Beyond the walls* (1985), *The smile of the lamb* (1986), *Night film* (1986), and *Avanti-Popolo* (1986). The Israeli film makers began not only to acknowledge the Palestinians as victims but also to express empathetically the Palestinian's legitimate national anger and struggles. *The smile of the lamb* tells of a friendship between an Israeli military doctor and an Arab who lives in a cave near a village on the West Bank. The story refers to maltreatment

of the Palestinian occupied population. In *Hamsin* the story takes place in the state of Israel and tells about a Jewish family in a farming village where Israeli Palestinians work. It touches on the issue of the unjust Israeli confiscation of Arab land. These two films, as other films of the new genre, presented human and personalized Arabs in a positive light. In all the films of the new genre, a new image of the Arabs is presented to the Israeli public, which is a dramatic change from earlier images of Arabs in films.

Also, a number of films dealt with a love story between a Palestinian and an Israeli in an attempt to investigate symbolically the possibility of such relations. For example, *A very narrow bridge* describes a forbidden love affair between a reserve military prosecutor and a Christian Palestinian woman, and *Hamsin* describes the relationship between an Arab man and a Jewish woman in Galilee. These love affairs either end tragically or come to nothing, thus presenting a somewhat pessimistic view of Arab-Jewish relations.

Shohat (1989) and Gertz (1993) note that the changes in the Arab image through the years expressed the needs of the Israeli culture, in accordance with its fears, aspirations, and values. Although Arabs were placed as main heroes in films and equal partners to the Israelis according to Gertz (1993), "the Arabs still carry 'Jewish heritage'; [the Arab] reminds the Jew of his moral and national sources, looks like a Jew and expresses in his history the suffering of the Jew, his dreams and yearnings" (p. 221). These images embodied the dilemmas of the film makers who selected the particular images to describe the Arabs. They projected on the Arabs the Zionist dream that was in limbo, because of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and in essence searched for the Israeli identity.

Ne'eman (1995) differentiates two types of films of the 1980s. One strand he calls "conflict films" (e.g., *Hamsin*, 1982; *Avanti Popolo*, 1986; *Green fields*, 1989), which deconstruct the Zionist master narrative by "stripping the Zionist project of its 'humanitarian civilized mission' disguise and by portraying the Jewish-Arab feud more realistically" (p. 122). The other strand he calls "nihilistic cinema" (e.g., *Paratroopers*, 1977; *The vulture*, 1981; *Night soldier*, 1984; *Fury and glory*, 1984; or *One of us*, 1989) in which films question the patriotic value of self-sacrifice and the justification for the continuation of the violent conflict with Arabs. According to Ne'eman, the films of the 1980s set the stage for the appearance in the 1990s of the apocalyptic film mode (e.g., *The Voice of Ein-Harod*, 1990; *The Appointed*, 1990; or *Life according to Agfa*, 1992). This mode prophesies the failure of Zionism. *Life according to Agfa* ends with Jewish army officers being thrown out of a bar and returning to kill everybody in cold blood, Jews and Arabs alike.

CONCLUSION

There are great similarities between the cultural channels of literature, theater, and film for adults, although children's literature does develop in

a somewhat different way. These similarities show that writers of books, plays, and film scenarios, as well as play and film directors, all live in a similar social milieu, go through similar experiences, and inevitably form similar ideas in view of these experiences. The three cultural channels also influence each other as books are made into theatrical plays and films. With regard to the Arab stereotype, the review clearly shows that over the years cultural channels made the full transition from presenting Arabs in unfavorable, even delegitimizing terms, to portraying them with empathy and understanding their concerns, needs, and aspirations.

Before the establishment of the state, the main stream of these channels presented Arabs in a romantic way at best, as exotic natives, but mostly as enemies who did not understand Jewish aspirations and who violently opposed the return of the Jews to their homeland. In all the stories, Jews almost always took a superior ethnocentric and paternalistic approach to Arabs and in general presented them as members of a primitive and backward society. In general, the Arabs were represented as shallow stereotypes without depth and complexity, even in those stories that gave an empathetic description of their fate. After the establishment of the state, during the climax of the intractable conflict between the 1950s and 1970s, came the ultimate phase of delegitimization. Arabs were presented in extremely negative metaphors and images as a depersonalized, undifferentiated, threatening entity. In fact, these descriptions of the Arab characters were of little interest to the writers other than to highlight the problems and concerns of the Jews. But the readers and audiences were exposed to a particularly negative image of Arabs, which fuelled preexisting negative stereotypes and delegitimization.

In the 1970s came the turning point. Arabs in general and especially the Palestinians, citizens of the state of Israel and the residents of the occupied territories, came to be portrayed in a different way. They began to be portrayed more as individuals with complex and multidimensional personalities who had experienced suffering because of the Israelis. This change brought with it personalization and differentiation within the images of Arabs. The cultural channels made a giant turn after years of consistent negative stereotyping of Arabs. This turn meant that the Israeli public could become acquainted with Arabs who turned out to be different from the prevailing stereotypes. Moreover, Israelis were made aware of the detrimental consequences of Jewish acts on the lives of Arabs. Nevertheless, the presentation of Arabs is still used for the discussion of the Israeli agenda. Their presentation is used to discuss Israeli problems and even to examine Israeli identity. Also, the narratives in which are described Jewish-Arab relations almost always end with a tragic outcome, symbolizing a pessimistic outlook at the possibility of coexistence.

Development and change in children's literature was not as dramatic as in adult literature. Over the years, many of the children's books referred to

Arabs with the intention of delegitimization, using simplistic and brutal labels and descriptions. These presentations provided a view of Arabs that could easily be imprinted on impressionable children and adolescents. But eventually children's books also changed, providing a more humane, empathetic, and multidimensional view of Arabs.

The evolution of this new image of Arabs corresponded to a major event in Arab-Israeli relations – the visit of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem. He brought a new message to the Israeli society, a message that Arabs are partners open to negotiation and that peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is possible. This message had a significant effect on the change of the intractable nature of the conflict and its gradual deescalation. Sadat's visit and its implications influenced public opinion. It served as a turning point for the development of new ideas about a peaceful resolution of the conflict and thus to the evolution of new views about Arabs. Against this backdrop, a peace camp emerged bringing together political parties, extraparliamentary movements, and many people from all walks of life. Later, events such as the war in Lebanon and the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) strengthened this development.

Many members of the Israeli cultural elite – the writers, playwrights, film makers, painters, sculptors, and others – have been part of the peace camp. They supported the peace process and reconciliation with the Palestinian nation. They also began to view, critically, the treatment of Arab citizens of the state of Israel by the various authorities. Many of them have been the forerunners of the evolution of the peace-oriented liberal camp. The works they produced allowed them to express their ideas and transmit them to the public. Cultural products such as books, plays, and films thus served to reflect the ideas of the cultural elite in a society that began to look at Arabs differently. These products not only reflected the views of the cultural elite but also served to transmit and disseminate new images of Arabs to the society. But it is important to note that the patrons of Hebrew literature and theater are to a large extent those segments of the society that have opinions relatively similar to the writers, directors, and actors. Therefore, we find, as will be shown in Chapter 7, a gap between the views of the wide Israeli Jewish public and the presentation of Arabs in the Hebrew literature and theatrical plays in the 1980s and 1990s.

Representation of Arabs by Jews

Review of Empirical Research

This chapter reviews findings of studies that investigated views of Israeli Jews about Arabs. This line of research emerged in the late 1960s and still continues. Using different samples and research methods, researchers investigated the psychological repertoire prevalent among Israeli Jews concerning Arabs, in general and various specific Arab subgroups, as a function of different variables such as age, ethnic origin, gender, or political orientation. Some of these studies were done with a limited number of respondents, drawn from specific groups (e.g., university students or high school students), and some were done with the national sample of Jewish adults or with a national sample of a particular social sector (e.g., high school students). The studies also differ with regard to the psychological intergroup repertoire investigated: some examined stereotypes; others were interested in social distance (i.e., attitudes), emotions (e.g., hatred), or behavioral intentions; and a number of studies investigated several of these variables simultaneously. Finally, the studies were done at different times and thus reflect the nature of Arab-Jewish relations in particular periods.

A discussion of the research methods employed in the studies about intergroup relations is beyond the scope of the present book. We only note that the most frequently used method to examine stereotypes in the reviewed studies is by presenting a list of characteristics, usually traits, to the respondents, asking them to evaluate the extent to which they characterize a given group. The semantic differential developed by Osgood et al. (1957), in which the respondents are asked to evaluate a group by means of a series of bipolar characteristics (e.g., clean-dirty or smart-stupid) on a Likert-type scale, was often utilized in these studies.

The most common way to study attitudes toward Arabs was by examining social distance toward them, namely evaluating the degree of acceptance that Israeli Jews felt toward them. Specifically, this refers to different social interactions in which Israeli Jews are ready to be involved

with Arabs, ranging from attitudes of closeness and affinity to rejection and repugnance. Bogardus (1925, 1933, 1967) provided the empirical conception and the instrument to study social distance by developing a scale that allows analysis of group members' readiness to engage in different types of social interactions, such as living with members of the other group in the same city, working with them, or marrying them. Attitudes can also be inferred from an assessment of emotions (E. R. Smith, 1993). Indeed, some studies examined emotions felt toward Arabs, specifically hatred. Finally, behavioral intentions were examined by evaluating a support for a particular behavior or policy toward Arabs.

This chapter does not intend to review all the studies that investigated Israeli Jews' views about Arabs. It reviews a good portion of them and sheds light on the direction, valence, and scope of the psychological repertoire of Israeli Jews in terms of their stereotypes, attitudes, emotions, and behavioral tendencies toward Arabs. We classified the reviewed studies into three categories: studies that examined stereotypes, attitudes, and behavioral intentions toward Arabs in general and toward specific Arab nations; studies that examined Israeli Jewish attitudes toward various issues related to Arab-Israeli relations; and studies that specifically investigated stereotypes, attitudes, and emotions toward Israeli Arab citizens and attitudes toward the nature of Arab-Jewish relations within the state. Occasionally, the categories may overlap, for example, when stereotypes and attitudes toward Israeli Arabs were compared with those toward specific Arab nations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REPERTOIRE TOWARD ARABS

The social category "Arab" or "Arabs" appears in the Israeli Jewish public discourse in reference to all Arabs, as one group, and also as a label identifying indiscriminately a particular subgroup, such as Palestinians or Egyptians. In addition, this concept has been used with a derogatory connotation – not only identifying a group of people but also referring to negative implications regarding an act or a characteristic. For example, the term "Arab work" indicates a careless job, and "Arab taste" indicates bad taste.

Children's Repertoire

The review begins with the description of two studies done with children. In a very early study, performed in 1959, Lambert and Klineberg (1967) examined a group of children from 11 countries about their attitudes toward other nations. Three hundred Israeli children, aged 6, 10, and 14, participated in this study. They were asked a variety of questions about their own group and other groups. Of interest to us are only those findings

that concern Arabs. They show that the Jewish Israeli children expressed a dislike of Arabs. Specifically, in response to an open-ended question about the least-liked nation, 27% of the 6-year-olds, 28% of the 10-year-olds, and 31% of the 14-year-olds mentioned "Arabs." Other nations were mentioned with far less frequency.

About two and a half decades later, A. Cohen (1985) carried out a comprehensive study with similar age groups, in the context of his research about representations of Arab people in children's literature (see Chapter 5). He asked 520 children aged 9–13 to complete five assignments: to provide free associations to the word "Arab"; to write a short description, or story, about meeting an Arab; to describe an Arab character that appeared in a book read by the respondent and indicate to what extent the description has influenced the respondent; to explain what the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is about; and to express an opinion whether peace, friendliness, and cooperation with Arabs are possible. The analysis of children's responses yielded the following interesting findings.

1. The Arab stereotype that emerged from the answers was in general negative and reflected the stereotype presented in children's literature. Of the responses 85% referred to primitivism (e.g., he is a shepherd, lives in the desert), repulsive external appearance (e.g., has a scar or otherwise threatening face, is dirty), threatening character (e.g., violent), or traditional external appearance and customs (e.g., makes Syrian bread, wears a keffia). However, with age, the stereotype became more positive. Overall, about 20% of the children had at least one positive reference to Arabs, but only 10% expressed a view that could be called tolerant and humane.
2. Children expressed high fear with regard to Arabs; 75% of the children associated an Arab with violent acts such as kidnapping, murder, terrorism, and criminality. The highest fear was expressed by the younger children.
3. Only 15% of the children reported having had a meaningful encounter with an Arab or Arabs, while the remainder never met an Arab. Those who reported a meaningful encounter described Arabs in a more positive way.
4. Ninety percent of the children rejected Arab rights to the country as well as the equality rights to live with them in the state of Israel.
5. The great majority of the children did not possess informative knowledge about the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict and were able to provide short answers only, attributing negative intentions to Arab people (e.g., "They want to kill us," "They want to expel us," or "They want to drive us into the sea").
6. Forty-five percent of the children expressed the wish to live in peace with Arabs, but only 32% believed that peace is feasible.

7. Fifty-eight percent of the children claimed that the descriptions of Arabs in Israeli children's books that they read influenced their image. But only 23% were able to give the name of the book and describe the Arab character. The majority of the children who claimed to have been influenced by books provided negative descriptions of Arabs.

Stereotypes of Adults

Many more studies examined adults. In an early study Osterweil and Greenbaum (1972) investigated 105 Jewish women aged 18–22 about their stereotypes of Arabs, from two socioeconomic strata: university students, mostly of European or American origin, and vocational school students, mostly of Asian or African origin. The results showed that Arabs were uniformly perceived considerably more negatively than Jews. Also, a person or a group identified as being of Arab origin was perceived more negatively than a person or a group without identification. Finally, perception of Arabs was found to be more positive when the stimulus was a picture of an Arab person than when the stimulus was the word "Arab." The researchers point out that the phrase "an Arab" presented in an abstract and generalized way had a more negative image than a specific photographed Arab presented in a specific situation. In addition, the study found that women of Asian or African origin had a more negative attitude toward Arabs than women of European or American origin. Finally, contact with Arabs was found to have an effect on how they were perceived: women who have had positive or even mixed contact (i.e., of positive and negative nature) with Arab people reported a more positive perception of Arabs than those who had no such contact or who experienced only negative contact with them.

The study by Yaar, Hermann, and Nadler (1995) is one of the most comprehensive ones done about views held by Israelis about Arabs. It examined Arabs' stereotypes, attitudes toward them, and attribution of intentions among a national sample of Israeli Jews. In order to study the stereotype, the respondents were asked to evaluate Arabs on six bipolar traits. Looking only at the extreme sides of the scales, 23% of the respondents evaluated Arabs as violent and only 4% as not violent; 12.8% evaluated Arabs as industrious and 4.8% as lazy; 9.7% evaluated Arabs as brave and 7.5% as cowardly; 38.1% evaluated Arabs as vengeful and 2% as forgiving; 2.9% evaluated Arabs as honest and 20.1% as dishonest; 2.2% evaluated Arabs as intelligent and 4.1% as not intelligent. In addition, 41.6% of the respondents agreed with the item "Most Arabs have not come to terms with the existence of Israel and would destroy it if they could." Only 2.5% disagreed with it. Also, 59.6% agreed to have Arab citizens within the state of Israel, 70.6% agreed to work with Arabs or do

business with them, 53.2% agreed to study with them in the same school, 56.4% agreed to live with Arabs in the same neighborhood, 45.3% agreed to have Arabs as personal friends, and 5.8% agreed to mixed marriages; 14.9% did not want to have any contact with Arabs.

Emotions toward Arabs

Only a few studies investigated directly emotional responses toward Arab people. An early study by S. Levy and Guttman (1976), performed in 1975 with a national sample of high school students, shows that 32% of the sample expressed strong hatred toward Arabs (hating either all of them or most of them). Also, in this study 87% of the students thought that the ultimate goal of the Arabs in their war against Israel is not regaining the land occupied in the 1967 war but the destruction of Israel. Years later, Mayselless and Gal (1996) reported findings from two studies also carried out among a national sample of high school students: one in 1988 (aged 15–18) and the other in 1994 (aged 16–17). The results showed that in 1988 39% of the students expressed strong hatred toward Arabs (hating either most of them or all of them) and 60% felt a strong urge for vengeance (either to a great extent or very great extent). In 1994 37% expressed strong hatred and 60% expressed a strong urge for vengeance. In these two studies, the analysis of the responses showed that hatred was significantly related to the political orientation: those with a hawkish orientation expressed more hatred of Arabs than participants with a dovish orientation. Also, students of the religious sector expressed more hatred than their secular peers. The socioeconomic dimension indicated that youth of low socioeconomic strata and of Asian or African origin expressed more hatred than youth from middle-class strata and of European or American origin. A comparison between the studies indicates an increase in hatred toward Arabs among adolescents over the years (between 1975 and 1988 or 1994).

Other aspects of the psychological repertoire were investigated by Benyamini (1994), who investigated 642 high school adolescents in Jerusalem about their political and civic opinions. He found, among other things, that 56% of the respondents agreed with the item "Whatever we will do, Arabs will always hate us and will want to destroy us," 77% agreed with the item "It is not unacceptable that we will cause the majority of Arabs to leave the area of Israel," and 70% agreed with the item "After the establishment of autonomy for the Palestinians, it will be impossible to rely on Israeli Arabs' loyalty to the state."

Comparison among Arab Groups

One particularly interesting research question concerns evaluation of the social category "Arabs" in comparison to various Arab subgroups. In 1979 Benyamini (1980) studied among 134 Israeli adolescents (aged 14–18) their perception of "an Arab," as a general social category, compared with

the following specific subcategories: "Israeli Arab" (i.e., Arab citizen of Israel), an "Arab resident of the Occupied Territories," a "Syrian," and an "Egyptian" (at that time Israel already had a peace treaty with Egypt). The evaluation was done with 30 bipolar traits and characteristics. The results showed that the adolescents differentiated among the social categories. The Egyptian was stereotyped most positively (in absolute terms, on the neutral side of the scale), while the Arab resident of the occupied territories and the Syrian were evaluated most negatively. The Israeli Arab was placed between these two categories, but still on the negative side of the scale. However, he was evaluated more positively than the general category identified as "an Arab," who – in turn – was perceived more positively than the Arab residing in the occupied territories and the Syrian.

A comparison of attitudes toward two Arab subgroups was done by Yuchtman-Yaar and Inbar (1986). This study, carried out in 1982, with a national sample of Israeli Jews, compared the readiness for social contact with Egyptians (with whom a peace treaty was signed in 1979) and the Palestinians (with whom the conflict continued). The results showed that Israeli Jews had a more positive attitude toward Egyptians than toward Palestinians: 61.8% of the respondents expressed readiness to have occasional contact with the Egyptians in comparison with 16% with the Palestinians, 60% expressed readiness to have business relations with the Egyptians in comparison with 18.5% with the Palestinians, 53.9% expressed readiness to have an Egyptian as a guest at home in comparison with 14% who expressed readiness to have a Palestinian, and 43.1% expressed readiness to have an Egyptian as a close friend in comparison with 19.2% who expressed readiness to have a Palestinian as a friend.

The Effect of Context

Another direction of research relating to representations of Arabs and specific national categories focused on changes over time. As demonstrated in other societies, stereotypes are not stable but change as a consequence of changes in the nature of intergroup relations and as a result of major events, which transmit alternative information that negates the stereotypes. In this line of research, Benyamini (1981) reported four studies done in 1965, 1968, 1974, and 1979, in which he investigated similar groups of adolescents (aged 14–18) regarding their perception of "an Arab," with the same instrument. In 1965, at the height of the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict, he asked 300 adolescents to evaluate "an Arab person" on a semantic differential consisting of 30 pairs of bipolar characteristics. The results showed that an Arab was stereotyped negatively. Out of 30 traits only 2 were found to be positive: masculinity and warmth. Other characteristics were negative: the Arab was perceived as "very old, heavy, severe, hard, ungrateful, egotistical, negative, bad, colorless, untimely, ugly, crooked, short, slow, passive, unsuccessful, unimportant, changeable and excitable" (p. 89). Age

differences were also found: the younger adolescents evaluated "an Arab" more negatively than the older ones.

In 1968 517 adolescents of the same age groups participated in the study, and the results showed that following the 1967 war, in which "the Arabs" (i.e., Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) were defeated in a short period of time, the stereotype had become even more negative. The only positive trait found was warmth, and 12 characteristics were evaluated more negatively than in 1965. This study did not identify any age difference, but a gender difference did emerge: girls evaluated "an Arab" more negatively than boys. In 1974, following the 1973 Yom Kippur War (in which Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel), he examined 645 adolescents of the same ages as in the previous studies. This time the results showed a positive change. On 18 characteristics "an Arab" was evaluated less negatively than either in 1965 or 1968, but still his appearance was evaluated as repulsive. Also in this study girls evaluated "an Arab" more negatively than boys, as was the case in the 1968 study. Finally in 1979, following the peace accord with Egypt, Benyamini examined 624 adolescents. But this time he did not find any difference with the results of 1974. In the latter study a change took place with regard to gender differences: girls were found to be more positive in their perceptions than boys. In all four studies, adolescents from religious schools were found to evaluate "an Arab" more negatively than adolescents from secular schools.

Focusing on the perception and attitudes toward Palestinians, Bar-Tal, Bar-Tal, and Cohen-Hendeles (2004) investigated the changes that took place between 1990 and 2000, as a result of changing relations with Israeli Jews and as a function of political orientation. The first administration of the questionnaire assessing perceptions, feelings, and attitudes toward Palestinians took place in March 1990, in the midst of violent confrontations between Jews and Palestinians during the first Palestinian uprising. The second administration of the questionnaire took place in March 1995, a year and a half after the beginning of the peace process, but when the opposition leaders in Israel were conducting an active campaign against it. The third administration of the questionnaires took place in March 1997, when the leader of the hawkish Likud Party, Benjamin Netanyahu, governed the country after being elected to office in May 1996 and signing an agreement with the Palestinian leader. The last administration of the questionnaires took place in December 2000 when the peace process collapsed and the Palestinians began their second uprising against the Israeli occupation, using suicidal terror attacks.

The participants in all the evaluations were students in the same lecture at the School of Education of Tel Aviv University. The results showed that while in 1990 the students had a uniformly negative view of the Palestinians, with time students who identified themselves as having a dovish political orientation tended to be more positive toward the Palestinians

than students with a "hawkish" orientation. Also, the interaction effects reflected different patterns of development in the reactions toward the Palestinians by "dovish" and "hawkish" participants. While dovish participants tended to exhibit a linear trend of gradual increase in positive evaluation of the Palestinians, the hawkish participants demonstrated a quadratic pattern, being more negative in 1995 and 2000 than in 1990 and 1997. The latter group, which objected vehemently to the peace process that began in 1993, changed its views when Netanyahu met with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and legitimized the peace process.

Two polls carried out by Yaar and Herman at different points in time show how Israeli Jews changed their stereotype of the Palestinians as a result of changes in the nature of their relations. The results show that in November 1997, when the peace process was still intact, 39% of Israeli Jews thought that Palestinians are violent, whereas 20.1% thought that they are not violent; 38.8% thought that they are dishonest, whereas 23.25% thought that they are honest (Peace Index; see December 1997). A few years later, in December 2000, as the peace process collapsed and the Intifada began, 68% of Israeli Jews thought that Palestinians are violent, whereas 9.8% thought that they are not violent; 51.5% thought that they are dishonest, whereas 20% thought that they are honest (Peace Index; see January 2001).

Bar-Tal and Labin (2001) focused on short-term changes, occurring as a result of meaningful events. They investigated the effect of a specific context, terror attacks, on Israeli adolescents' perception and evaluation of Palestinians, who were directly related to the attacks, of Jordanians who were not implicated in these events, and of "Arabs," on the whole, as a general category. To assess the stereotypic perception of the three groups, readiness for social contact with them, feelings toward them, and attribution of their behavioral intentions, we had 119 adolescents in two groups (aged 13–14 and 16–17) fill out the same questionnaires three times. The first assessment took place on February 20, 1996, three months after the assassination of the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and six months after the last terror attack. The second assessment took place on February 26, 1996, a day after two terrorist attacks were carried out in Israel by Palestinian members of the Hamas movement, causing the death of 24 civilians and the injuring of another 89. The third assessment took place on May 26, 1996, after 12 weeks without violence.

First, the results show that the adolescents clearly differentiated among the three groups. Across almost all the dependent variables, regardless of age and timing, Jordanians were perceived and evaluated more positively than either Palestinians or Arabs. The most negative stereotypic perceptions, attitudes, and feelings were directed toward Palestinians. Second, in this study, context had a compelling effect on the perception and evaluation of all three groups. The terrorist attack caused more negative stereotyping of the three groups, less readiness to have social contact with them, and

attribution of more negative intentions. Only with regard to feelings did the adolescents differentiate between the three groups by not changing their feelings toward Jordanians. After three months, the level of negative feelings and attribution of behavioral intentions returned to be positive, as before the attack. But stereotypic perceptions and readiness for social contact did not return to their preattack level. The latter finding is explained by the context of the last assessment, which consisted of a stormy period in Israel's internal politics and violence in southern Lebanon involving Israel. The participants' age had only partial effect. Younger adolescents had more negative feelings toward the three groups than the older adolescents. Also, the younger adolescents, being less sensitive to information, were less influenced by the terror events on measures of social distance and attribution of intentions. The results show that major events, which serve as a context of intergroup relations, constitute an important factor in the fluctuation of society members' stereotypes.

VIEWS ABOUT ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

The second category of studies includes investigations pertaining to Israeli Jews' views about various aspects of Arab-Israeli relations including attributions of intentions to Arabs and estimations of the possibility of peace.

As early as 1961–1962, when the Arab-Israeli conflict was perceived as irreconcilable, a national sample of Jewish Israelis was interviewed about their hopes and fears (Antonovsky & Arian, 1972), as part of an international project initiated by Cantril (1965). In answering an open question about their hopes in general 55% expressed hopes for peace with the Arabs, and in another open question 49% mentioned their fears of war with the Arabs. The responses showed little difference between social subgroups. Nevertheless, even though these early data show no differences among political affiliations in Israel with regard to fears of war, Israelis with a leftist orientation already then expressed more hope for peace with the Arabs (62%) than either Israelis with a centrist orientation (56%) or with a rightist orientation (47%).

Attributions of Arabs' Intentions

Oren (2003) collected results of surveys about the patterns of public opinion among Israeli Jews about different aspects of Arab-Israeli relations, as they appeared in different polls throughout the years of the conflict. An important variable that was investigated in many of the polls was attribution of intention to Arabs in general and to specific Arab groups (e.g., Palestinians). Specifically, the questions pertained to the question of the Arabs' ultimate objective to destroy Israel. The responses indicated that Israeli Jews widely attribute this intention to Arabs: during the 1973

war, following it in 1974 and in 1975, between 78% and 87% of the Israeli Jews made this attribution. Between 1986 and 2002 at least 50% of the Jews in Israel, and often more than 60% to 70%, believed that the real objective of the Arabs is at least to destroy the state of Israel. More than half of them believed that in addition they also strive to annihilate the great majority of the Jewish population in Israel (see also Arian, 1995, 2002). Even in the spring of 2000 when the peace process was at its peak, only 37.2% of Israeli Jews believed the current peace process was leading to true peace with the Arab world, whereas 69% believed that the majority of Arabs had not reconciled themselves with the existence of Israel and would destroy it, if they could. Yaar and Hermann (Peace Index; see March 2000) point out that this position is shared by the majority of Israeli Jews across time because since February 1995 at least 60% hold it.

In addition, a series of questions concerning Arab states' readiness to make peace with Israel was asked through the years. Israeli Jews' responses reflected a relatively pessimistic outlook with regard to chances for peace. Between 1967 and 1979 only a minority of Israeli Jews, ranging between 15% and 30%, believed that Arab countries were ready to establish peace with Israel. This percentage rose significantly, reaching 80%, during the visit of President Sadat to Israel, after which it dropped again, however, to 40% (Stone, 1982). Three polls performed in 1993, 1994, and 1995 (after the Oslo agreement) showed that between 15% and 20% of Israeli Jews believed that most of the Arabs want a complete peace and between 38% and 43% believed that they want partial peace. The rest believed that they either hardly want peace or do not want peace at all. In different periods, the great majority of Israeli Jews believed that even withdrawal from the occupied territories would not increase Arabs' readiness for real peace (between 1973 and 1975 at least 79% believed so; see Oren 2003).

In two polls, carried out in 1986 and 1987, Jews were asked to attribute causes for Arabs' objections to Israel. The responses were not mutually exclusive and showed that 87% indicated hatred, between 40% and 87% indicated Israel's being an alien in the region, 60% indicated Arabs' fears of the technological and qualitative advantage of Israel, between 89% and 93% indicated Arabs' wish to get all their land back, 61% thought that Arabs wanted back the territories conquered in the 1967 war, and 62% thought that Arabs feared future Israeli aggression against them. In 1987 a poll showed that 39% of the population thought that the foreign and security policies of the Arab states are not rational and 37% thought that they are occasionally rational (Oren, 2003).

An interesting study, in the framework of the investigation of attributions to Arabs, is the developmental study done by Hoffman and Bizman (1996) that looked at the causes ascribed by children (30 fourth graders) and adolescents (30 ninth graders) for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relations of these attributions to their expectations and emotions. The results

showed that whereas elementary school children tended to attribute sole responsibility for the conflict to Arabs, among high school students this attribution decreased. They tended to recognize mutual responsibility for the conflict. With regard to expectations, both age groups were relatively equally pessimistic, predicting that at least one more war will erupt. Also, both groups reported that when considering the conflict, they felt predominately hope and anger but only to a low extent pity, shame, and guilt. But whereas the first two emotions decreased with age, the other three increased.

With regard to specific Arab nations, the data collected by Oren (2003) show that the Israeli public was divided and fluctuated somewhat in its responses between 1971 and 1975 with regard to the question whether Egypt was interested in peace with Israel under conditions that could be accepted by Israel. Responses in 28 polls conducted in this period fluctuated, depending on events. They showed that between 34% and 63% of Israeli Jews believed Egypt was interested in peace, while between 37% and 66% did not believe in Egypt's interest in peace. Following the visit of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in Jerusalem in 1977, the picture changed dramatically and the majority of Israelis began to believe in Egypt's readiness for making peace with Israel. Between 1977 and 1979, during the years of negotiation, this was reflected in the answers of 50% and 94% of the responders, depending on the stage of the negotiations. With regard to Jordan, in 1985 42% believed that Jordan would make peace with Israel. With regard to Syria, in January 2000, during the intensive negotiations with Syria, only 5% believed that Syrians truly wanted peace and 16% believed that they did not want peace at all.

Perceptions of the Palestinians

Views of the Palestinians are of special interest because the conflict with them is focal in the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1978 44% of Israelis believed that the majority of the Palestinians in the occupied territories hated Israelis, and in 1979 this percentage rose to 66%. Also in 1979 only 37% of the Israelis believed that the PLO would recognize the existence of Israel in the near future. In 1994 and early 1995, after the 1993 Oslo agreement, in which Israel recognized the PLO, despite the support for this agreement, the majority of the Israelis (between 54% and 71%) believed that the majority of the Palestinians would destroy Israel, given an opportunity. During these years, half of the Israelis believed that at least half of the Palestinian public objected to terror and about half believed that either only a minority or none objected to terror. But polls done in 1995–2000 show that between 52% and 67% believed that the majority of Palestinians preferred peace to a great or to some extent, and the rest thought that they either did not want peace at all or wanted it only to a small extent.

The recent second outbreak of a Palestinian uprising in September 2000, accompanied by intensive terror attacks, has had a determinative effect on Israeli Jewish public opinions (Bar-Tal, 2002). In March 2001 the newspaper *Yedioth Aharonoth* published results of a national poll suggesting that 58% of Israeli Jews reported a change in their views of Palestinians since the beginning of the uprising: 55% changed opinion about the Israeli Arabs in a negative direction, while 63% thought that it is impossible to reach peace with the Palestinians (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, March 30, 2001). In a poll conducted in November 2000, after the outbreak of violence, 78% of Israeli Jews reported they believed Palestinians have little regard for human life and therefore persist in using violence, despite the many casualties they were suffering (Peace Index; see December 2000). In March 2001 72% of Israeli Jews believed that the majority of Palestinians have not accepted the existence of Israel and would destroy it if they could (Peace Index; see March 2001). In September 2002 70% continued to hold this belief (Peace Index; see September 2002). In spite of the violent confrontations, a poll carried out in April 2001 showed that 56% of Israeli Jews supported the view that meetings between ordinary Israelis and Palestinians could help in advancing mutual understanding and increase possibilities for peace, whereas 38% did not believe that such meetings would help (Peace Index; see May 2001). In May 2001 a poll showed that 80% of Israeli Jews believed Palestinians would not honor a comprehensive peace agreement, even if they signed it, and the same percentage was convinced that Palestinians perceived Israel as a Western imperialist state attempting to control the region (Peace Index; see May 2001).

A study by Gabay (1997), conducted in our laboratory, sheds light on one factor that affects Israeli Jewish perception and evaluation of Palestinians, namely having a schema for conflict resolution. The basic assumption of the study was that just as people have a *schema of conflict* that allows them to identify situations of conflicts (see Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989), so they may also have a *schema of conflict resolution* that allows them to identify ways to resolve a conflict peacefully. The hypothesis of the study was that those individuals who have an elaborate schema of how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would also show less negative stereotyping of Palestinians, less negative feelings toward them, and attribute less negative behavioral intentions to them. Participants in the study were 300 adolescents in 11th grade (aged 16–17) of different backgrounds, who were asked to fill out a series of questionnaires regarding stereotyping the Palestinians and their feelings toward them and to attribute to them behavioral intentions. Also, they were asked to report their own behavioral intentions toward Palestinians, to evaluate the likelihood of peace, and to specify conditions for conflict resolution. Path analysis showed that perception and evaluation of the Palestinians were highly predicted by the estimation of peace probability, which in turn was related to possession

of an elaborated scheme about ways to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In other words the more elaborated was the person's scheme of a conflict resolution, the more the person believed that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could be resolved, and the more positive perceptions and evaluation of the Palestinians she or he had.

VIEWS ABOUT ARABS, CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

The last category of studies includes investigations concerning a specific group of Arabs, that is, the Arab minority living in Israel, who are often referred to by Israeli Jews as Israeli Arabs. In this category we include studies that examined not only stereotypes and attitudes but also discriminatory intentions toward this group.

Attitudes toward the Arab Minority

Early studies about Israeli Jewish views of Israeli Arabs concerned particularly attitudes. Peres (1971), analyzing ethnic relations in Israel, reports on two studies that assessed Jews' views of Arabs and attitudes toward them. In the first study, done in 1967 with a national sample of high school students, he found that the students, especially those of Asian or African origin, expressed negative attitudes toward Israeli Arabs as reflected in social distance's measure: 91% of the high school students of Asian or African origin said they would not be prepared to marry an Israeli Arab, 72% would not have an Israeli Arab as a friend, and 59% would not want an Israeli Arab to live in their neighborhood (the respective percentages for students of European or American origin were 85%, 59%, and 52%). The second study, done with a sample of Jewish adults residing in Tel Aviv, in 1967 and 1968, revealed similar results: 84% of those from Asian or African origin said they would not marry an Israeli Arab, 91% would not rent him or her a room, and 78% would not want to have an Israeli Arab as a neighbor. Among Jews of European or American origin, the respective percentages were 79%, 80%, and 53%. In the latter study, 83% of the adult Jews of Asian or African origin believed that every Arab hates Jews and 85% believed that Arabs would not reach the level of progress achieved by Jews. Among the respondents of European or American origin, the percentages were 76% and 64% respectively.

Since this study can also inform us about changes in perception that took place following the 1967 war, part of the respondents were interviewed twice: in winter 1967 and in winter 1968. The results showed an increase in negativity between 1967 and 1968. In 1967 62% of the respondents thought that Arabs would never reach the level achieved by Jews, and in 1968 76% thought so. Also, in 1967 73% attributed hatred of Jews to Arabs, and in 1968 80% made this attribution. In 1967 80% did not agree to rent a room

to an Israeli Arab, and in 1968 86% did not agree to do so. In both years, 67% stated they would not agree to have an Israeli Arab as a neighbor.

A study by Jacob (1974) reports Israeli Jews' readiness for social contact with Israeli Arabs between 1967 and 1971. The results of national polls show that between 35% and 47% were not prepared to befriend an Israeli Arab under any conditions, whereas between 11% and 34% were ready for such relations, depending on the conditions. The rest (between 26% and 43%) were certain about their wish to befriend an Arab. This study also revealed that Jews have very limited contact with Arabs in Israel: at least 73% never hosted an Israeli Arab in their home, and 56% never visited an Arab house. Only about 13% hosted Arabs many times, and about 19% visited an Arab house many times.

T. Peled (1980) reported results of national surveys performed between 1967 and 1979 with Jewish urban adults regarding their readiness for social contact with Israeli Arabs. The results showed that until 1978 only up to 38% were "unreservedly willing to befriend an Israeli Arab." Later the percentage increased to 63% and remained on this level during 1979. But when the label was changed in a 1979 study from "Israeli Arab" to "Israeli Arab who identifies himself as Palestinian," the percentage for readiness for friendship dropped to 20%. Also, until 1978 a minority of respondents (20%–30%) was ready to live with Israeli Arabs, either in the same building or in the same neighborhood, and in 1979 this percentage increased slightly (35%–41%). Finally, the study showed that during 1967–1973 about 60% of the adults thought that "Arabs will never reach the level of progress achieved by Jews." In 1975 this percentage dropped to 49% and in 1978–1979 decreased again from 38% to 34%. In 1980 Tzemah found that the readiness for social contact with Israeli Arabs increased significantly (Tzemah, 1980): 65.4% of the respondents were ready to work with Israeli Arabs, 60.7% were ready to host Israeli Arabs in their homes, 56.4% were willing to live in the same city with Israeli Arabs, 37.8% were ready to live in the same building with Israeli Arabs, and only 7.3% were ready to accept mixed marriages in their family.

Many years later, in 1998, a study by Pedahzur and Yishai (1999) compared negative feelings expressed toward Israeli Arabs, Ethiopian Jews, and foreign workers by a national sample of adult Jewish Israelis. The investigation utilized a questionnaire of 15 items pertaining to social contact and attitudes in different life domains (e.g., willingness to invite home, willingness to extend economic assistance). The results showed that the feeling toward Arabs was a little more negative than toward foreign workers – that is, the feeling was the most negative. The mean responses on the 10-point scale tended slightly to the negative side of the valence – between 5 and 6. Specifically, for example, 77.2% opposed having any romantic relation with an Israeli Arab, and 56.5% opposed granting Israeli Arabs social rights equal to those enjoyed by Jews. The anti-Arab sentiment

was predicted by level of religiosity: the more religious respondents were inclined to have higher anti-Arab sentiment.

Stereotype of the Israeli Arab

In one of the early studies of the Israeli Arab stereotype, Hofman (1970b) investigated the evaluation of an Israeli Arab, a Jew, a Jew living in exile, an American Jew, an American, and an Israeli Jew on a semantic differential of 12 bipolar traits among a national sample of 749 youngsters (aged 16–17) attending 11th grade. The Israeli Arab was stereotyped as the most unsocial, lazy, unpleasant, impractical, conservative, dishonest, restrained, stupid, and ugly, but not worst as weak, stubborn, and cold. Youngsters from a religious background, more than their secular peers, tended to stereotype the Israeli Arab negatively. Of interest is the analysis of the semantic space perception, which showed that an Israeli Arab is evaluated closest to a Jew and a Jew living in the Diaspora and farthest from an Israeli Jew.

Years later Bizman and Amir (1982) compared the stereotype of an Israeli Arab to that of an Israeli Jew. They asked Jewish university students to evaluate each of these two stereotypes on 14 characteristics that constructed two dimensions: social and intellectual. The results showed that Jews evaluated Jews and Arabs equally on the social dimensions, but rated Jews significantly higher than Arabs on the intellectual dimension, perceiving Arabs as being of lower intellectual ability. In a later study, Zeidner (1990), who also investigated Israeli university students' perception of intelligence, reported similar results. Jews perceived Israeli Arabs as having lower intelligence than Jews.

A study by Kaminsky and Bar-Tal (1996) investigated the view of the Israeli Arabs as a function of the label that presented them. A total of 302 Jewish Israeli adolescents, religious and secular, of two groups (aged 13–14 and 16–17) evaluated the following three social categories: "Israeli Arabs," "Palestinian citizens of Israel," and Palestinian citizens of Israel who support the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The assumption was that the labels referred to the same social category since the great majority of Israeli Arabs, in fact, are Palestinians and support the cause of the PLO. The study was carried out in 1988, when Israel still did not recognize the PLO. In responses to an open question about the first thought that comes to mind in reading one of the labels, the results show that "Palestinian supporters of the PLO" constituted the most dehumanized category. The category of Israeli Arabs was the least dehumanized. The category of PLO supporters was also more negatively stereotyped on social traits than the other two groups. In addition, the three categories differed with regard to negative feelings expressed toward them (including anger, contempt, and repulsion) and with regard to attributed trust, readiness for social contact, and attributed behavioral intentions. The strongest

negative feelings – mistrust, negative attribution of intentions, and lack of readiness for social contact – were expressed toward PLO supporters, and no difference was found between the other two categories. The results show, then, that the adolescents grew to accept the label Palestinians, since not many differences were found between the category of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians. But PLO evoked strong negative reactions.

It should be noted that an examination of the scales' means, which were in the range of 1 to 5, indicates that the adolescents expressed considerably negative feelings, mistrust, and a medium level of attribution of negative intentions and readiness for social contact toward all three categories. Finally, a negative view of Israeli Arabs strongly correlated with religiosity and age. Religious adolescents expressed more negative views about Israeli Arabs than secular adolescents, and the younger group expressed more negative views than the older group.

Two later studies allow an interesting comparison between Israel's Jewish religious and secular sector with regard to their views about Israeli Arabs. N. Keren, Zelikowitz, and Auron (1997) investigated a national sample of 11th-grade Jewish high school students in 1994, and at the same time Auron, Zelikowitz, and Keren (1996) investigated 642 Jewish teachers' college students about their attitudes with the same questionnaire. They found differences between respondents from religious and secular institutions. The former had more negative views about Israeli Arabs than the latter group. Whereas 43.6% of the secular high school students and 90% of the secular college students agreed with the item "Jews and Arabs can live together in peace," 29.3% of the religious high school students and 64% of the religious college students agreed. Whereas only 44.1% of the secular high school students and 32% of secular college students agreed with the item "Equal representation of Jews and Arabs will hurt the Jewish nature of the state," 65.3% of the religious high school students and 63% of the religious college students agreed. Whereas only 43.3% of the secular high school students and 30% of the secular college students agreed with the item "Israeli Arabs are state enemies and want to destroy it," 64.3% of the religious high school students and 48% of the religious college students agreed with it.

In a more extensive study, Tzemah (1980) conducted a survey in 1980 among a national sample of 1,223 Jewish Israeli adults to study their psychological repertoire concerning Arab citizens of Israel. In the part that examined their stereotypes, the respondents were asked to provide free association comments to the label "Israeli Arab." The analysis showed that 43% of them gave negative associations, mostly emotional. Specific ratings of seven bipolar traits showed that on four of them more respondents rated the Israeli Arab positively than negatively (being industrious, loyal to family, attaching importance to human life, and doing good work), and on three he was evaluated more negatively by respondents (being

dirty, not progressive, and violent). As a comparison, these evaluations also showed that the Egyptians and Syrians were evaluated more negatively than the Israeli Arab. On other measures the study showed that 57% of the respondents thought that Arab citizens were not loyal to the state of Israel, 52% believed that they hated Jews, and 16% believed that they were spies. Finally, the results showed that the evaluation of Israeli Arabs was related to respondents' origin, level of education, and political orientation. That is, the higher the level of education, the more positive the rating of Israeli Arabs. Jews of European or American origin rated Israeli Arabs more positively than Jews of Asian or African origin, and respondents who supported dovish parties had a more-positive opinion of Israeli Arabs than respondents supporting hawkish parties.

Smootha (1987) reported two extensive surveys carried out with a national sample of Israeli Jews in 1980 (one done in January and one in July) regarding their perceptions and attitudes toward the Arab minority. With regard to shared stereotypes, one survey (January 1980) showed that 43.8% of the Jews perceived the Arab minority as primitive (22.1% perceived them as developed), 38.7% as violent (21.7% as nonviolent), 31.7% as dirty (18.7% as clean), 30.2% as inefficient (34.5% as efficient), and 21.6% as lazy (41.9% as industrious). The rest of the respondents indicated "neither" as an answer. Also, this survey found that 64.4% of the Jews were ready to work with Israeli Arabs in a common workplace, 59.1% were ready to host an Israeli Arab in their own home, 54% to live in a city with Israeli Arabs, 42.4% to live on a street with Israeli Arabs, 36.4% to live in a building with Israeli Arabs, and 6.5% to approve a family member marrying an Arab. The respondents expressed little trust in Israeli Arabs since the majority (53.5%) attributed to Israeli Arabs hatred of Jews, and 50.7% believed they rejoiced at Israel's suffering. Smootha (2001) noted on the basis of a survey conducted in 1995 that the stereotyping and attitudes toward Israeli Arabs by the Israeli Jews became more positive with age. This trend was evident in specific traits attributed to Israeli Arabs as well as in items that measured the Jewish readiness for social contact.

Two studies compared self-perception and mutual perceptions of Jews and Arabs. The first study by Mahameed and Guttman (1983) investigated in 1980 stereotypes of Arabs and Jews among both Arab and Jewish adolescents (totaling 635 participants: 245 Jews and 390 Arabs) who lived either in homogeneous towns or in towns where Jews and Arabs lived together. The adolescents were asked to evaluate the extent to which 23 traits characterize each of the groups. The results showed that evaluations of respondents who lived in heterogeneous towns did not differ from the evaluations of respondents in homogeneous towns. Findings indicated that on the positive side Arabs were seen by Jews as being mostly hospitable, proud of their nationality, caring about their families, and industrious; on the negative side, they were seen as being unintelligent, dirty, conservative, and uneducated.

In contrast, Arab adolescents viewed themselves as being characterized by traits of hospitality, charity, bravery, caring about their families, sociability, endurance, trustworthiness, modesty, intelligence, and self-confidence. Jewish adolescents viewed themselves mostly as proud of their nationality, brave, ambitious, caring about their families, self-confident, educated, and persistent. The results showed that while Jews and Arabs closely agreed on the stereotype of the Jews, they disagreed about the stereotype of the Arabs. Also, Jewish adolescents stereotyped Arabs considerably less positively than the Arab adolescents stereotyped themselves.

Years later, Levinson, Katz, and Al Haj (1995) did a survey on prevailing images of Arabs and Jews in Israel among a national sample of Jews and Arabs in the state of Israel between November 1993 and March 1994. To study stereotypes, the researchers asked Jews and Arabs to evaluate themselves and the other group on 31 traits, which were arranged in eight categories. The results showed that Jews evaluated Arabs as low in permissiveness, tolerance, trustworthiness, and valuing human life, but high on hospitality, family-centeredness, industriousness, religious fanaticism, and conservatism. Also they were evaluated as manipulative and only somewhat sociable and achievement-oriented. Of interest is the finding that both Jews and Arabs had a similar stereotype of Arabs. The major difference pertained to the category of sociability: Arabs viewed themselves as highly sociable. But Jews differed in the way they evaluated themselves and the Arabs. They viewed themselves as highly achievement-oriented, valuing human life, family-oriented, permissive, sociable, and modern. Arabs, in general, agreed with the self-evaluation of Jews, but they stereotyped them as considerably less family-oriented, hospitable, and sociable than Jews evaluated themselves. Also, each group evaluated the other as being stronger and more cohesive than it evaluated itself, and each group perceived itself as more moral than the other thought.

With regard to hatred, 33% of the Jews estimated that all of the Jews or a majority of them hates Arabs, 50% thought that part of them hates Arabs, and only 17% thought that few Jews or none of them hates Arabs. In contrast, 57% of the Jews thought that all the Arabs or a majority of them hates Jews, 37% thought that part of the Arabs hates Jews, and only 6% thought that few Arabs or none of them hates Jews. A similar picture emerged among the Arab respondents: they too thought that they are more hated than they themselves hate: 11% thought that all Arabs or a majority of them hates Jews, 50% thought that part of them hates Jews, and 49% thought that either few or none of them hates Jews. In contrast, 47% of the Arabs believed that all the Jews or a majority of them hates Arabs, 45% thought that part of them hates Arabs, and only 8% thought that either few or none of the Jews hates Arabs. Finally, 34% of the Jews evaluated thought that all or a majority of the Jews is interested in coexistence with the Arabs, 44% thought that only a part of them is interested, and 22% thought that

very few are interested. They similarly evaluated the interest of Arabs in Jewish-Arab coexistence. However, 64% of the Arabs thought that all the Arabs or a majority of them is interested in coexistence, 29% thought that only a part of them is interested, and 7% thought that very few of them are interested. In contrast to Jews, they relatively accurately evaluated the Jewish interest in coexistence.

Intentions toward Israeli Arabs

A series of studies focused specifically on behavioral intentions of Israeli Jews toward Arab citizens of Israel in the domain of civil rights. These studies mostly pertained to the rights that Jewish respondents are ready to grant to the minority and their tendencies for discrimination.

Seligson and Caspi (1982) asked a national sample of urban Jewish Israelis about their readiness to curb the rights of Israeli Arabs. The responses indicated that 68.3% of the respondents expressed readiness for the government to prevent Israeli Arabs from voting, 65.5% were ready to limit their right to conduct public demonstrations, 69% were ready to limit their right to employment in public institutions, 68.1% to appear on radio and television, and 67.6% to study in an Israeli university. In this study as well, the level of education best predicted feelings of threat and degree of tolerance. The lower the level of education, the stronger the feelings of threat and the lower the tolerance. Also, respondents of Asian or African origin expressed less tolerance than respondents of European or American origin.

Tzemah and Tzin (1984) conducted in 1984 a national survey of Jewish adolescents (aged 15–18) about democratic values. They found that 46.9% thought that there was a need to curb the rights of Israeli Arabs, 48.2% opposed giving Israeli Arabs rights to protest land confiscation, 55.9% opposed giving Israeli Arabs rights to express criticism about the Israeli government, 60% thought that the Israeli Arabs did not deserve equal rights with Israeli Jews, 38.4% supported activities of private organizations that aim to take revenge on Arabs when a Jewish citizen is hurt, and 9% expressed readiness to join such organizations; 27.8% of the respondents stated they would agree to limit *more* the civil rights of the Palestinians living in the occupied territories, 55% thought that these rights should be left as they are, and only 8.9% thought that they should be extended; 64.35% of the respondents thought that if the occupied territories would be annexed, their Palestinian residents should not get the right to vote for Israeli parliament.

Two years later Tzemah (1986) did a similar survey with a national sample of Jewish adolescents (aged 15–18) and obtained somewhat more negative results. The responses indicated the following: while 48% of the respondents believed that Arabs have few or no rights to the land of Israel,

92% believed that Jews have either full (70%) or almost full (22%) rights to this land; 56% believed that Israeli Arabs are not entitled to equal rights; 49% believed that Israeli Arabs have too many rights and that it is necessary to curb them, while 38% believed that they have just the right level of rights, and 9% believed that they have too few rights and they should be granted more rights; 58% of the adolescents believed that a small portion of Israeli Arabs are loyal to Israel and 18% believed that at least a majority of them are loyal; 60% thought that it is necessary to expel from the occupied territories every Arab who refuses to accept Israeli citizenship.

Of special interest are extensive survey polls conducted by Smooha at different times. In a survey carried out among a national sample of Jews in 1980, 72.3% favored preferential treatment of Jews in admission to universities, 69.2% in admission to private workplaces, 73.5% in housing assistance to large families, 68.1% in social security allowance, 70% in loans for development of agriculture, and 85.9% in nomination to senior posts in governmental offices. In general only 15.8% thought that the state of Israel should treat Jews and Arabs equally. A survey performed half a year later replicated all the major findings of the earlier study. Additionally, it reported that 66% of the Jews believed that it is impossible to trust most Arabs, 65.4% favored increased surveillance of most Arabs in Israel, and 46.5% favored tough policies toward the Arabs in Israel. However, surveys carried out in 1985, 1988, and 1995 showed that with time the discriminating tendencies among Israeli Jews somewhat moderated (Smooha, 1992, 2001). For example, while in 1980 83.9% thought that the state of Israel should prefer Jews to Arabs, in 1985 80.7% thought so, in 1989 73.8% thought so, and in 1995 74.1% thought so. In 1995 54.3% of the Jews thought that the majority of Arabs cannot be trusted and 53.1% supported an increase in their surveillance. On other matters the survey poll of 1995 showed that 30.9% of the Jewish respondents favored the denial of the right to vote in national elections, 36.7% favored government encouragement for Arabs to leave the state, and 39.9% favored the expropriation of Arab land for Jewish development (Smooha, 2001).

It can be assumed that the moderating trend stopped and even was reversed with the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada in fall 2000. In October 2000 the Arab population in the state of Israel staged violent acts of support for the Palestinian cause, which led to killing of 12 Arab citizens by the Israeli police in its attempt to contain the violent acts. These events caused a growing rift between the majority of Jews and the Arab minority. As a result, in a recent survey poll Arian (2002) found that 60% of the Israeli Jews agreed that the government should encourage voluntary emigration of Israeli Arabs from the country and 38% favored transfer of Israeli Arabs from the state. In addition, 75% perceived the Israeli Arabs as disloyal, 72% opposed the inclusion of Arab parties in the governing coalition, and 80% opposed participation of the Israeli Arabs in crucial national decisions.

All these numbers indicate an increase in negative attitudes toward the Israeli Arabs. Similar results were found by Arian et al. (2003), who in April 2003 found that 53% of the national sample of Israeli Jews are against equality for Arab citizens of Israel, 77% thought that there should be a Jewish majority on crucial political issues, and 69% object to having Arab political parties in the government. Not only does the Jewish population support discrimination; it also tends to deny this practice: 49% do not think that there is discrimination against Arabs in the state of Israel in comparison to treatment of Jews.

CONCLUSION

Although the reviewed studies were done at different periods of time with different respondents and examined different aspects of the psychological intergroup repertoire, they do present a coherent and consistent picture. In general, Arabs are stereotyped negatively, the attitudes and emotions toward them are negative, and negative intentions are attributed to them. Thus it is not surprising that the findings also showed that the Israeli Jews have negative intentions toward Arabs.

Specifically, the cultural stereotype of Arabs found across many studies in different periods is similar. The main consistent negative themes pertain to their low intelligence, primitivism, dishonesty, fanaticism, conservatism, violence, and lack of value for human life, but on the other hand, positive attributes such as hospitality, sociability, and diligence were also mentioned. This shared cultural stereotype was observed in studies that investigated adolescents and adults alike. Also, a considerable percentage of the Israeli Jews expressed hatred toward Arabs, and this emotion remained stable over the years. However, the major difference over time occurred with regard to attitudes, as reflected in measures of social distance. While during the 1960s and early 1970s Israeli Jews expressed limited readiness for contact with Arabs in different spheres of life, in the 1980s and 1990s this negative attitude changed and the Israeli Jews expressed higher readiness for social contact with Arabs in workplaces, in social relations, and through proximity in living. A strong objection to intermarriage was maintained.

Despite the general consistency in the psychological repertoire related to Arabs, the results from the different studies reveal some heterogeneity in the Jewish Israeli public. Espousing a negative view of "Arabs" is related mainly to four characteristics: level of religiosity, political orientation, ethnic origin, and level of education. The findings consistently indicate that the religious sector, political hawks, Jews of Asian or African origin, and individuals with a low level of education tend to display a more negative view of Arabs than their fellow citizens from the secular sector, people of a dovish political orientation, Jews of European or American origin, and

individuals with a high level of education. In addition, the findings indicate that age determines the views of Arabs. The results consistently show that, in late adolescence, views of Arabs become more positive.

We suggest that the main explanation for the described Israeli psychological repertoire about Arabs has to focus on the low trust that the Israeli Jews have in Arabs. Through the years, almost consistently, Israeli Jews have believed that Arabs hate Israel, that they have not reconciled themselves with the existence of Israel, and that the ultimate goal of the Arab people is to destroy Israel. This is one of the basic points of departure for understanding stereotypes, attitudes, and emotions toward Arabs. This perception means that even when Arabs sign a peace agreement, many Israeli Jews still tend to perceive this act as representing pragmatic reasons rather than a change in their basic attitudes. Basically, the great majority of Israeli Jews believed that Arabs were anti-Israeli, and they continue to hold this belief.

Along with this generally pessimistic view, the studies show that Israeli Jews are also affected by the context, specifically the nature of relations as reflected in major events. After a major event such as the visit of Egypt's president Anwar Sadat in Israel or the Oslo agreement, the studies show a change in the negative and pessimistic beliefs and a shift to more optimistic views. Nevertheless, these changes exist for a short time as suspicion and lack of trust return.

A major change in Jewish Israelis' perception of Arab people occurred with regard to the inclusiveness of this category. During the first decades of Israel's existence, Israeli Jews viewed Arabs as a unitary entity because of unitary negative attitudes of the entire Arab world toward Israel. But as Israel established relations with some Arab countries, a differentiated view of Arab people evolved. In the past decade, the Egyptians and Jordanians have been perceived most positively, as the conflict with them is formally resolved, while the Palestinians and Syrians are still perceived most negatively, as the conflict with them continues. Despite this differentiation, the dominant social category, used indiscriminately in the public discourse, continues to be the "Arabs."

Of special interest are the perceptions of the Arab minority by the Jewish majority. Israeli Arabs are viewed negatively, though less negatively than other Arab subgroups. With regard to discriminatory tendencies of Israeli Jews against Israeli Arabs, the results consistently show that the Jewish majority would like to limit considerably the rights of Arab citizens in economic, social, political, and educational life spheres. These reactions toward the Arab minority are explained by the threat that this minority poses for the majority. As Peres and Levy (1969) pointed out years ago, "Due to the political situation in the Middle East, the Jewish Israeli regards the Israeli Arab as representing the threatening forces across the border and as such, being opposed to the State's most basic interests" (p. 481).

This view of Arabs, citizens of the state of Israel, holds still today and underlies the present approach toward Arabs by Israeli Jews. As Smooha (2002) noted very recently, in Jewish eyes the Israeli Arabs continue to constitute a threat. "They constitute a security and demographic hazard. With regard to national security, the Arabs are an affiliated minority and an integral part of the Palestinian people and the multi-state Arab nation that are not amicable to Israel" (p. 486). With regard to demography, the facts that Arabs make up 11% of Israel's electorate and 20% of the whole population, and that the Arab natural increase rate is double that of the Jewish rate, have a determinative influence on the feelings of threat by many Israeli Jews, who want to keep a dominant Jewish majority in the state of Israel.

The Development of Shared Psychological Intergroup Repertoire in a Conflict

Theory and Methods

The variety of studies presented in Chapter 7 and the consistent findings obtained in them demonstrate that the representation of Arabs in the Jewish Israeli society attracted the interest of many researchers. However, most of the studies concentrated on the content of stereotypes, attitudes, and behavioral intentions expressed by adolescents or adults. The results of these studies, as well as the examination of the representation of Arabs in political discourse, media, literature, art, and school books (see Chapters 4–6), indicate that the negative representation of Arabs has a long-standing history, is deeply embedded, and is widely spread in the Israeli culture, reflecting the conflict between the two nations.

In view of these findings, a question as to how this shared psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs evolves is inevitable. In order to answer this question, we conducted a decade-long, systematic, and comprehensive research project that aimed to shed light on the acquisition and development of the mental representations of the parties engulfed in the active and violent conflict, that is, the self-reference group (Jews, Israelis) and that of the rival group (Arabs). Specifically, some of the studies carried out in our laboratory aimed to describe or, as termed by Hirschfeld (1996), to *document empirically* the process of acquisition and development of the multifaceted mental representations of Jews and Arabs held by Jewish children, adolescents, and young adults in Israel. Other studies were theory-based, aiming to examine specific developmental predictions.

The theoretical thinking that guided our research questions and considerations regarding the research tools we utilized have been presented in an integrative model of stereotypes and prejudice formation and change outlined in Chapter 1. In this chapter we present the developmental perspective for the application of this model for research covering an age range of 2–24. The three following chapters present the findings obtained in the studies we conducted. Chapters 9 and 10 focus on different age groups: on preschoolers and on older participants respectively. Chapter 11 presents

findings obtained with an assessment methodology developed in our laboratory that is based on human figure drawings (HFDs). These studies cover an age range of 4–16.

Supplementing the developmental perspective offers integration between social and developmental thinking in the field of stereotypes and prejudice acquisition. It epitomizes Ruble and Goodnow's (1998) idea that the two fields contribute to one another because "People's behaviors are situated in time and place, and observed reactions in any study are affected by the individual's place in history and *ontogeny* as they interact with his or her perception of the situation" (p. 773, emphasis added). Such an approach facilitates the consideration of critical periods of change and the trajectory of change in the development of intergroup representations and attitudes that is a major topic in the current developmental literature (Aboud, 1988, 2003; Aboud & Amato, 2001; Pomerantz & Newman, 2000) and is practically absent in the literature of social psychology.

Many suggested that the development of social representations is mediated by the interwoven factors of cognition, personality, affect, and social context (Aboud 2003; Brewer, 1999; Cameron et al., 2001; Deaux, 1996; Nelson, 1996). In terms of cognition, the reference is to the development of mental faculties involved in the representation of knowledge in the mind and its expression in *words, concepts, and images*. In terms of personality, the reference is to self-identity and to related motivations such as self-enhancement. Affect refers to the emotions aroused in the developing child by the exposure to the information about people and their images or by the association with them. The development of the three components occurs within a social context that exerts its specific influences on them. In Israeli society, the high level of intergroup tension constitutes a most salient contextual component influencing the development of social representations, namely stereotypes and attitudes.

Several chapters in this book were devoted to familiarizing the reader with the social context and social information disseminated by the societal transmitting channels in Israel. This information reaches individual members of the society: children, adolescents, and adults. Children use it to define themselves personally and socially; to adopt the cognitive, affective, and behavioral repertoires relating to themselves and to their own ethnic group; and to distinguish themselves from other groups and form their representations. Some of the words and concepts illustrating such representations are: "I," "we," "they," "same," "others," "ingroup," "outgroup," "friends," "enemies." More specifically, for the Israeli society: "Jews," "Israelis," and "Arabs."

Generally, for adults, groups with which the self associates tend to be evaluated or rewarded positively while the groups not involving the self tend to be evaluated or rewarded less positively (Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Martin & Halverson, 1981; Tajfel, 1978a, 1978b; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel,

1979; and others). For children, ingroup favoritism was demonstrated more clearly than outgroup rejection (Aboud, 2003; Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Cameron et al., 2001). However, it is plausible to assume that in conflict negativity or even hostility toward outgroups identified as “enemies” may emerge (Brewer, 1999). The examination of the developmental background for the acquisition and development of the mental configurations of self, others, and groups occurring in the context of an intractable conflict is the main focus of attention in this chapter. Concentrating on acquisition and development, we direct attention to personal variables and within these we begin with the cognitive operations mediating this acquisition and development. Then we focus on personality development, affective experiences, context, and the interaction between the personal and contextual variables within a developmental framework. Accounting for all these factors provides an integrative frame for offering hypotheses regarding the development of social knowledge as reflected in intra- and intergroup stereotypes and attitudes.

THE COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Origins of Knowledge

The rich mental activity of infants and young children – that is, their ability for early categorization and for the acquisition of language and information – led some theorists and researchers to adopt the Platonic view, that basic categories and knowledge are inborn or innate, emerging and maturing with age (Carey, 1985; Chomsky, 1988, 1991; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Spelke et al., 1992). Others argue that mental development proceeds through reciprocal influences between genetic endowment and experience generated by the cultural environment (Selman, 1980; Thelen, 1993; Turkevitz, 1995; Vygotsky, 1978, 1987). Nelson (1996), who represents the second view, stated: “Development proceeds in concert with experience of the organism, and the social environment and cultural situatedness are essential components of human developmental processes. Therefore they are not competing with or separate from biology (including the genes), but are necessary parts of the system” (p. 30).

Researchers interested in the study of children’s mental representations of social categories, the stereotypes, and attitudes related to them acknowledged the environmental component as imperative. However, most of the studies were conducted in English-speaking countries in the context of racial or ethnic relations differentiating between majority and minority children (Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Asher & Allen, 1969; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle, Beaudet, & Aboud, 1988; P. A. Katz, 1987; P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978; Vaughan, 1987; Williams, Best, & Boswell, 1975; Williams & Morland, 1976). The possible

influence of the context of conflict on in- and outgroup representations and attitudes was theoretically recognized (Aboud, 2003; Brewer, 1999) but less examined.

The Early Mental Units of Mind

Children are born into a world of physical objects, flora and fauna, people, social groups, and events; all arouse diverse experiences. In order to develop a sense of meaning, stability, and continuity, children need to process and categorize all they encounter. Categorization is arrived at by a mental process creating units for the different stimuli, events, and experiences. The products of this process are referred to as categories, classes, schemas, or representations. Categories are the building blocks of thought, defined by Bruner (1964) as the "language of the mind," and when expressed in words, concepts, or images, enable communication between the individual and the environment.

Developmental and social researchers agree that categorization serves the function of cognitive economy. Shneider (1991) states that: "Because our information processing apparatus is resource limited, we develop highly abstract knowledge structures" (p. 533). Thus, in forming a category regarding inanimate or animate objects, events or experiences, abstract thinking is activated selecting the important aspects of the information and ignoring the more trivial details. In other words, the initial units formed by the mind rely on generalization. The function of these units is to group past information and experiences, organize new information, initiate predictions, and guide subsequent behavior. Occasionally, rather than relying on the imperative aspects of information, children (or adults) may relate to partial or accidental information and use it as a base for their categories.

Relating to the environment begins at the fetal stage (Hepper, 1992), expanding and accelerating in infancy. That is, very young infants absorb, encode, analyze, categorize, and remember their environment (Baillargeon & DeVos, 1992; Gelman & Spelke, 1981; Shermann, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Younger, 1990, 1993). The initial categories are reinforced by the preference to preserve consistency and continuity. Accordingly, category-consistent information tends to be attended, whereas inconsistent information tends to be ignored (Stangor & Ruble, 1989). On the other hand, as noted by Piaget (1951), new information may be assimilated within the existing categories, or categories may be accommodated to fit it. The expanded or readapted categories then guide the understanding of the physical, natural, and social reality and the decisions regarding behavior in reoccurring and new situations. These mental progressions encourage and facilitate communication with the environment and at the same time are enriched by it.

Language and Learning Shared Knowledge

The indication of relating to the encountered environment and engaging in its categorization is expressed in language, first in words and then in concepts. Gradually, language becomes the symbolic medium through which children communicate about objects, representations, personal experiences, feelings, ideas, and acquired knowledge about their social world (Nelson, 1996). First words are nouns used for labeling the different components of the environment. At the age of 18–21 months when children expand their vocabulary and use of phrases, they express knowledge in elementary concepts and narratives. By the time they reach the age of 2 years, they may possess about 600 words (Dromi, 1999; Nelson, 1996), improve their phrasing skills, acquire basic grammar, and enrich their communication with the environment. This in turn further enriches their vocabulary, categorization, and knowledge. In the age range between 2 and 6, children acquire words rapidly, adding as much as 4–10 new words per day. Researchers termed this developmental process “fast mapping” (Heibeck & Markman, 1987). When reaching the age of 6, a child possesses about 10,000 words (Anglin, 1993; Nelson, 1996). The acquisition of the meanings of all these words and their generalization to concepts is determined by “*inference based on contexted relevance within discourse situations*” (Nelson, 1996, p. 140, emphasis in original). This means that context grants words and concepts their specific meaning and connotations. Thus, as with any other words and concepts, labels and evaluative terms applied to groups are acquired in context and “the study of children’s language serves to illuminate our understanding of the development of children’s ethnic prejudice” (Nesdale, 2001, p. 91).

Categorized knowledge is reflected not only in verbal concepts but also in images. As a matter of fact, Jean Mandler (1988, 1992) suggests that image schemas are preverbal and facilitate language acquisition. Bruner (1964) terms images “icons” and describes the preschool age as an “Iconic” stage centered on representing objects and figures according to perceptual features. According to Piaget and Inhelder (1966/1971), images combine perceptual and symbolical components, and, as concepts, they do not need to have all the properties of the object to which they refer. In an attempt to integrate perceptual and cognitive processes related to mental images, Kosslyn (1981) suggests that “visual mental images are transitory data structures that occur in an analogue spatial medium. These ‘surface’ representations are generated from more abstract deep representations in long-term memory” (p. 46). In further explaining this concept, Kosslyn (1981) says: “The ‘deep representation’ is the information in long-term memory that is used to generate a surface representation” (p. 49). These definitions lead to the conclusion that mental images are abstracted representations formed on the basis of perceptual analysis of the environment,

representing concrete objects, animals, people, social groups, or events. Barlow (1990) refers to the mental images as images *behind* the eyes differentiating them from images *before* the eyes that refer to artifacts such as photographs, drawings, TV displays, and the like. According to Beilin (1999), the understanding of these images is mediated by the maturation of perceptual and cognitive processes, and we would add the mediation of contextual inputs.

Referring to the use of language by preschoolers, one has to remember that due to the fast acquisition of vocabulary they may use words and concepts representing categories without really understanding them (Mervis, 1987; Nelson, 1996; Nesdale, 2001). Barrett and Short (1992) have observed this in British preschoolers when relating to social categories, and we report similar findings regarding the category labeled "an Arab" or "Arabs" for Jewish Israeli preschoolers. Furthermore, concepts and images may be acquired without encountering the objects, people, or experiences they represent. This happens when acquisition relies only on hearing. In such cases the child absorbs and construes a representing verbal or imagery category adopting the meaning and connotations determined by his or her social context. This process has special relevance for the categorization of people and social groups. It suggests that children may acquire concepts and images of people and social groups vicariously. Such concepts and images may represent the actual objects or people but more probably the socially shared information about them.

In our work with young preschoolers we traced the acquisition of the words, concepts, and images representing the social categories related to social groups in the Israeli context – "Jew," "Israeli," and "Arab." In the case of images, based on these definitions, we examined reactions to "images before the eyes" and images "behind the eyes." The first were examined by presenting children with photographs or drawings, and the second by asking them to reproduce their private images in free drawings of "a Jew" and "an Arab." This line of research was developed to examine stereotypes, that is, characteristics attributed to people on the basis of belonging to a social category, and prejudice, that is, attitudes toward category members and behavioral intentions toward them.

Cognitive Development and Domains of Knowledge

A major issue related to the development of categories is cognitive development. Piaget (1951) and Piaget and Weil (1951), who pioneered the investigation of the development of logical thinking and of the understanding of the environment, propose that cognitive development proceeds through four distinct stages: from the sensory-motor stage (0–2 years), in which thought is related to action-based sensations; through the preoperational stage (2–7 years), in which children begin using mental processes

that are independent of sensual experience or action and to classify objects or people relying on visual impressions (however, usually only on one clear characteristic of the perceived object, such as color or size); through the stage of concrete operations (7–11 years), in which children begin to consider and coordinate multiple aspects of objects and events reaching a higher level of classification; and finally through adolescence (12 years on), in which stage of formal operations abstract and hypothetical thinking is acquired. Formal operational thought is scientific thought. It allows the thinker to present and consider alternative hypotheses. The advanced way of thinking and understanding opens adolescents to relate to moral, social, and political issues. Piaget's developmental views influenced major theoretical propositions in the realm of the development of social cognition and prejudice (Aboud, 1988; Kohlberg, 1969; Selman, 1980).

Piaget (1951) proposes not only a developmental sequence for logical thinking but also the view that the child develops a general mental ability underlying all domains of knowledge. This proposition aroused a dispute known as the domain general versus the domain specific controversy. Agreeing with Piaget, and assuming that general mechanisms of thinking such as logic, abstraction, or deduction operate in all domains, protagonists of the first view argue that "processing is essentially the same for all types of schemas. Once they are invoked, all schemas function basically in the same way" (Martin & Halverson, 1981, p. 1127). More specifically with regard to social cognition, Shneider (1991) also contends that "since process is general . . . and detached from any particular content, indeed there is little to distinguish social cognition from other forms of cognition" (p. 531).

The alternative view suggests that knowledge is organized in major domains that encompass the objects and events in the child's world. These are: physics, or knowledge about the physical world of objects; biology, or knowledge about plants and animals; and psychology, or knowledge about people. The three knowledge systems are referred to as "theories," or more precisely as "naive theories" (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; for variations in domains of knowledge, see also Leslie, 1994, & Spelke, 1994). Each naive theory represents an ontological and causal understanding of its area, enabling deductive inferences regarding its subject matter.

Psychology is the system of knowledge representing the understanding of people and the basis for forming attitudes toward them. Making the case for the specificity of this knowledge, Selman (1980) argues that it "cannot be reduced theoretically or practically, to just the simple *application* of cognitive skills (*structure*) to the social sphere (*content*). The development of social conceptions, reasoning, thought – social cognition – is distinct from, though not unrelated to, the development of non social cognition, and this development warrants study" (p. 14, emphasis in original).

Views promoting integration rather than polarization about the issue of domains were also expressed. Thus, for example, Nelson (1996) argues for similarity among all types of knowledge, suggesting that any specific domain of knowledge is formed by the experiences of the developing child in a given cultural milieu. P. L. Harris (1994) proposes that most everyday situations require an integration of knowledge from different domains. More recently, Wellman and Gelman (1999) also suggest that children develop different conceptual frameworks simultaneously. For instance, they realize that "people" are physical, biological, and psychological entities.

The focus on the knowledge relating to people touches upon another differentiation – that between knowledge about animate and inanimate objects. Interestingly, as noted by Hirschfeld (1995), Nelson (1996), and Shneider (1991), most of the empirical work conducted in order to document and understand the acquisition of mental categories is in the realm of the physical or biological world. Despite this trend, Selman (1980), Gelman and Spelke (1981), and Damon (1981) suggest that knowledge about animate and inanimate objects constitutes different systems of knowledge and that the development of the first may precede that of the second. This idea gained support from Bell's (1970) finding that person permanence precedes object permanence. More important, Gelman and Spelke (1981) contend that very young infants are aware of the unique properties of animate objects, even though, as with inanimate objects, at first orientation is directed to external characteristics (Fivush 1987; Keil, 1987). With the progression of age, understanding of others is based on more complex analyses of their traits, emotions, and motivations (Livesley & Bromley, 1973). This suggests that infants form impressions of experiences of interpersonal relationships and use them for creating attributions about others' nature, personality, thoughts, and feelings (Hoffman, 1981). Hirshfeld (1994, 1995, 1996), who studied extensively the construction of racial categories, argues that 3-year-olds already classify their social environment not only on the basis of perceptual cues but mainly "in terms of hidden and not obvious commonalties among category members" (1994, p. 140). Reliance on observational cues such as clothing or features or skin color for differentiating between the in- and outgroup has been examined by several researchers (Bigler et al., 1997; Hirshfeld, 1994, 1995, 1996) and is included in our research with preschoolers and older participants.

The Representation of Knowledge in Memory

The next question to be addressed is how the diverse units of knowledge are represented in memory. Of special interest are mental representation relating to social knowledge. As in the case of knowledge in the realm of physics and biology (Medin & Schafer, 1978; Rosch, 1975, 1978; Rosch &

Mervis, 1975), for social categories two main models were proposed: the *prototype* model and the *exemplar* model. These models were discussed in Chapter 1. Here we expand on that discussion, introducing additional possibilities and addressing some developmental considerations.

The prototype model (Cantor & Mischel, 1979), sometimes referred to as a schema model (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), suggests that individuals store in memory typical features of groups. That is, the prototypical representation is an “ideal” or “averaged” definition of the category across many attributes. Later, individuals are judged on the basis of similarity to the stored configuration. A prototype may include subgroups that are characterized by distinct sets of attributes (Rosh, 1978). In the Israeli case the prototype of an “Arab” may include subgroups such as Israeli Arabs, Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others. The examination of the representations of different subgroups of Arabs is one of the foci of interest of the research we present.

The exemplar model (Medin & Schafer, 1978) suggests that, based on previous encounters, social categories are represented by a person constituting a specific example for the category. Matching a newly encountered person with the stored exemplars places him or her within a previously defined group and provides the information or judgments about the individual or the group he or she represents. Here the assessment of similarity also plays a crucial role, but it is directed at concrete rather than abstract features, and it is difficult to explain how knowledge about novel, previously unencountered people or groups is constructed. More recently, a third possibility, referred to as the associative network model, has been suggested (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Stangor & Lange, 1994). According to this model, groups are represented in memory by networks of their interlinked characteristics. Exposure to a group label, an individual who represents the group, or the group itself activates the associations among the attributes recreating the complete impression.

The question of the actual nature of representation has yet to be answered. We tend to agree with Kosslyn and Kagan (1981), who propose that in different developmental stages different models may prevail. Thus, due to a limited ability for abstract thinking, quick comparison operations, selective and irrelevant attention, and limited experience, young children would tend to represent information in exemplar forms rather than in the more abstract prototypical forms. This concept fits with Bruner’s (1964) classification of mental representations as enactive, iconic, and symbolic, and his claim that at different stages in the life-span different modes of representation prevail. Accordingly, it might be suggested that the human representations held by young children are more concrete, iconic representations, whereas those held by adults vary according to their cognitive capabilities and their personal experiences or needs. Thus, instead of an either/or attitude (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996), a multimode, age- and

ability-related approach, or a blended or combined model (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994) seems more appropriate.

Thus far, we have concentrated on the cognitive determinants of social knowledge, its acquisition, development organization, expression, and representation in the mind. Next, we examine the influences of personality development on this knowledge.

PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT, PERSONALITY STATES, AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Personality variables such as self-identity, self-esteem, motivations, and defensiveness and personality states such as motivation or affective arousal that mediate social representations have been extensively discussed in the literature of social psychology. Here we are interested in their influences within a developmental perspective of intergroup perception and attitudes.

The Representation of the Self

The primary category of personal and social knowledge is self-knowledge, also referred to as self-awareness, self-schema, self-image, self-identity, or self-concept. Self-knowledge is acquired through personal observations and interpersonal experiences, which provide information about the individual and about similarities and differences between the individual and others. As such, these observations and experiences are self-defining (Martin & Halverson, 1981; Nelson, 1996). Stern (1985) termed the early experience of self "a sense of subjectivity" and observed its appearance in infants 9–12 months old. A positive clue for the sense of self is the manifestation of self-awareness beginning in self-recognition. This awareness has been found to emerge during the second year of life, when infants whose foreheads or noses were marked and who observed themselves in a mirror reacted by touching the mark inquisitively (Amsterdam, 1972; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Another clue for the early self-awareness may be found in Meltzoff's (1990) findings showing that 14-month-old infants demonstrated awareness for their body movement, suggesting that bodily awareness is included in early self-awareness.

The early self-awareness expands through self-reflection, communication, interactions, and comparisons with adults and peers leading the child to recognize personal traits, competencies, and emotional experiences such as happiness, pride, and satisfaction, as well as shame, guilt, sadness, tension, fear, and anger (Damon & Hart, 1992; Eder, 1989; Livesly & Bromley, 1973). Indeed, Turner (1999) defines the self as "a varying, reflexive representation of the perceiver which is inherently fluid and flexible because it is a comparative, relational judgment. It defines the individual in a social

context or, if one prefers, it defines the individual in social relational terms" (p. 29). The experiences generated from social affiliations, comparison, and sharing information with others also constitute the foundation for the development of the representation of others and groups. The representations of self and others in a particular social context are the focus of our empirical interest.

An important aspect of self-identity is group or social identity. From infancy, along with the development of self-awareness, through childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, belonging to and associating with the cultural milieu and with different groups within this milieu generate powerful experiences providing meaning to events, feelings, and behavior. These meanings are acquired through learning the categories, conventions, roles, values, and moral rules of a given society and its different groups. According to Tajfel (1981b), social identity is "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 255). Or, in Baumeister's (1998) terms, "people learn who and what they are from other people and they always have identities as members of social groups" (p. 682). Thus, the integrated self-identity includes the different social identities that emerge from the experiences and learning generated by belonging to a social collective and to different social groups.

As age progresses, introspection, self-consciousness, preoccupation with the self, and self-evaluation increase. Children realize that they may experience different people differently and behave differently in different situations. Occasionally the inconsistency may be threatening, but this is the beginning of a differentiated self-identity, which, with time, also comes to incorporate a differentiation between conscious and unconscious aspects of the self as well as actual and ideal self-image.

Closure regarding a sense of identity is achieved during adolescence (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1980). Adolescents experiment with different encounters, roles, and ideologies. Sometimes, the intensity of the experiences creates conflicts that may precipitate a state of crisis. However, if adequate development is attained, a coherent, integrated sense of a personal, emotional, sexual, ethnic, social, professional, and ideological identity is achieved. This integrated self-identity serves as the cognitive base for self-distinctiveness, self-continuity, and self-agency. It organizes beliefs relating to different aspects of the self and guides the processing of self-relevant information, personal motivations, goal setting, and planning (Damon & Hart, 1992; Harter, 1990; Markus, 1977). The view that the self is an integrated unit is widely accepted. Baumeister (1998) states it clearly, saying "unity is one of the defining features of selfhood and identity" (p. 682). We stress the issue of unity because it concerns us at a later stage in this chapter.

The Representation of Others and Groups

Self-knowledge and knowledge about others develop concurrently and are interdependent. As noted, the evolving self-awareness is continuously influenced and shaped by feedbacks from social experiences. At the same time, these feedbacks also enrich the social knowledge and advance social categorization. Damon (1981) believes that the initial experiences derived from interactions with others are the most significant component in determining knowledge about people. Following this line of thinking, it may be assumed that restriction, avoidance, or fear from interactions with particular people will also affect knowledge about them.

All the individuals the child encounters belong to groups. Social environments are composed of groups: some are universal, such as those defined by gender or age; others are specific, defined by the particular culture, ethnicity, nationality, or wish of their members. Acquiring familiarity with the groups and relationships that compose the cultural environment is an important developmental task and constitutes the foundation of cultural competency (Hirschfeld, 1994; Nelson, 1996; Selman, 1980). This knowledge creates social expectations and guides information processing and behaviors toward others; it also creates the affective responses experienced toward their mental representations (activated by name labels or images) or in actual contacts with them. Furthermore, it underlies the development of an understanding of social roles, social conventions, and moral values, guiding interpersonal and intergroup relationships (Hirschfeld, 1994; Stangor & Lange, 1994).

The theoretical and empirical study of mental representations of social groups began with Lippman's pioneering work on stereotypes. Interestingly, for Lippman (1922), stereotypes were "pictures in our heads," that is, iconic representations or exemplars. Lippman (1922) was the first to suggest the cognitive basis for stereotypes, relating them to information processing and categorization. He believed that stereotypes serve the function of economizing cognitive resources, helping people to deal with the overwhelming complexity of the world, but he did not offer any developmental perspective.

Piaget (1965), Piaget and Weil (1951), Kohlberg (1969), and Selman (1980) have proposed the most renowned theoretical frameworks for describing and explaining the development of social knowledge. They suggest that cognitive development determines not only the understanding of the world of objects but also the understanding of the social world. Although the models differ in their developmental focus, stressing logical thinking, moral judgment, or social perspective respectively, all three propose a trajectory of stages starting with a rigid, concrete, self-centered interpersonal orientation proceeding to an ability to address ideological, ethnic, religious, historical, and moral issues. This unfolding ability grants to social

awareness more flexibility, allowing the acceptance of social diversity and social tolerance. In the three models the highest stage begins to evolve at about the age of 12–13 and continues to progress through adulthood. However, only a few reach an additional stage of in-depth understanding of social systems and social conventions. This understanding provides the ground for the internalization and identification with universal ethics that result in valuing justice, dignity, equality, and universal human rights.

All three models present a hierarchy of stages, but Selman (1980) argues for a flexible model representing a potential for regression. According to him, under natural conditions the development of the capacity for interpersonal understanding may advance in an orderly and sequential trajectory, yet “An individual’s functioning at stages lower than the highest he or she is capable of is in itself not necessarily an indication of individual immaturity, pathology or immorality, but must be looked at in relation to the demands of the social situation, the interpersonal context or atmosphere” (p. 311). Pointing out the importance of the context, Selman (1980) adds that the relationship between the development of social understanding and the social context needs further research.

Concentrating on prejudice, defined as “a unified, stable and consistent tendency to respond in a negative way toward members of a particular ethnic group” (p. 6), Aboud (1988) has proposed a social-cognitive theory accounting for its development. Based on Piaget (1965) and Piaget and Weil (1951), the theory refers to two overlapping sequences that determine the acquisition of social attitudes. The first sequence represents the developmental changes in the child’s interpersonal *experience*. It progresses from affective reactions to people (positive to negative emotions, e.g., happiness to fear), through perceptual impressions that classify people on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity to the perceiver, and finally, at about the age of 7, to cognitive categorizations that represent a deeper understanding of ethnicity, such as diversity and constancy. The second sequence involves changes in the *focus of attention* from an individual to a social perspective. First, attention is guided by an egocentric attitude ascribing to others the same attributes, thoughts, and feelings as those possessed by the self. Later, attention turns to groups, primarily to the differences between one’s own and other groups. Finally, attention shifts to individuals enabling children to judge people in terms of their personal qualities. Thus, the sequences progress from affect to perception to abstraction, and from self to groups to individuals. The respective ages for both sequences are: 4–7 years for preschoolers; 8–10 years for middle childhood; and 10 and older for early adolescents.

Generally, models linking the development of logical thinking and social cognition generate linear predictions suggesting that, as cognitive skills mature, social attitudes become more balanced, leading to the decline of

stereotypes and prejudice. Indeed, Aboud (1988) suggested that due to limited cognitive capabilities, affective influence (fear), and an egocentric social perspective, preschoolers exhibit dislikes, stereotypes, and prejudice for others who are dissimilar to themselves. As cognitive development advances, when children reach the age of 7–8 (concrete operational thinking in Piaget's terms), and as classification of people shifts from affective criteria to more objective ones and from an egocentric perspective to the considerations of others, children start to manifest cognitive flexibility and social tolerance. It follows that those 10 years and older should manifest a further reduction in biases.

Ample findings regarding children's social representations and attitudes indicate that 4-year-olds from dominant groups are capable of ethnic differentiation, attributing positive characteristics to the ingroup and negative characteristics to the outgroup. From ages 7 to 9, ingroup favoritism declines (Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Asher & Allen, 1969; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988; P. A. Katz, 1987; P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978; Vaughan, 1987; Williams et al., 1975; Williams & Morland, 1976). Findings also indicate that ethnic attitudes were related to level of cognitive abilities, such as differentiation (Livesley & Brumley, 1973), conservation (Doyle et al., 1988), classification skills (Bigler & Liben, 1993), and ability to perceive similarity between different races and differences within the same race (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; P. A. Katz, Shon, & Zalk, 1975). These findings support the association between cognitive development and social attitudes.

On the other hand, studies that included children aged 10 and up report a renewed elevation in prejudice at this age (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Teichman, 2001; Vaughan, 1987). Namely, something seems to happen in early adolescence that reintroduces negative, stereotypical images of outgroups. These findings are not in line with the linear prediction of the sociocognitive developmental theory. Another challenge for Aboud's (1988) theory emerged from findings that question its universality – namely, findings showing that the developmental trajectories of ethnic preferences of majority and minority children differ. Whereas irrespective of age, majority children prefer their own group, minority children also tend to prefer the majority group at first and only later their own group (for a review, see Aboud, 1988). Since the changes in attitudes outlined by the sociocognitive developmental theory are based on universal patterns of cognitive development, they cannot explain this difference between same-aged children.

In an attempt to identify additional factors that mold self- and other perceptions and preferences, first researchers pointed generally at affective, personality, and environmental-learning factors (Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996). Later, attention was turned to the mechanisms identified by social identity theory, mainly to self-esteem and

self-enhancement motivation (Bigler et al., 1997; Milner, 1996; Nesdale, 2000, 2001; Teichman & Zafrir, 2003).

Self-Esteem and Related Motivations

Self-esteem, the evaluative aspect of self-identity, is derived from the value people attribute to their capabilities and personal style, the groups to which they belong, and their social status. These evaluations may be attained only on a comparative basis (Turner, 1999). Insecurity regarding self-esteem or a threat to personal value trigger defensive reactions. Indeed, a long recognized task of the self (ego) is the defensive function directed at maintaining or enhancing self-esteem (A. Freud, 1946; S. Freud 1936). Naturally, in the study of personality, this topic drew a lot of attention (Maddi, 1989). However, it attracted interest in the social realm as well. In addition to his contribution for the conceptualization of stereotypes, Lippman (1922) also deserves credit for being the first to point out that social categorization performs a "defensive" function. This opened the way for examining unconscious antecedents of social perception and attitudes (Adorno et al., 1950) and later their unconscious or implicit mode of operation (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

Tajfel and Turner's (1979, 1986) social identity theory (SIT), mentioned in Chapter 1, is most relevant for advancing the explanation of the defensive function of social categorization and biases. Tajfel (1970) and Tajfel and Turner (1986) demonstrate that, based on a newly defined group identity, children and adults differentiated between ingroup and outgroups, favoring the former and discriminating against the latter. Further empirical work confirmed that participants judged ingroup members as performing better than outgroup members, attributed to them more positive traits, and favored them. On the other hand, they better remembered the unfavorable acts of outgroup members (Hinkle et al., 1989; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Hunter et al., 1996; Mackie & Geothelas, 1987; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This reappearing pattern was attributed to the mechanism of self-enhancement. Thus, people categorize groups, affiliate with some, identify with their norms, and integrate them as a part of their self-identity. Subsequently, they engage in social comparison and, in order to enhance their self-esteem, favor the ingroup and degrade outgroups. Hogg and Abrams (1990) define two corollaries for the relationship between self-esteem and intergroup discrimination: "[S]uccessful intergroup discrimination enhances social identity and thus elevates self-esteem," and "threatened self-esteem promotes intergroup discrimination because of a need for self-esteem" (p. 33).

Studies that examined the relationship between self-esteem and intergroup attitudes indicated that low self-esteem is associated with intergroup bias (Crocker et al., 1987; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Hogg & Sunderland, 1991;

Tice, 1991), but also that individuals high rather than low in self-esteem manifest intergroup bias (Wills, 1981). In this line, Tesser (1988) reports that high-self-esteem people associate themselves with positively valued others or dissociate themselves from negatively valued people, thus maintaining their self-evaluation. Tesser's (1988) view is known as self-evaluation maintenance (SEM).

Relating to these and other findings, Turner (1999) and Turner and Reynolds (2001) express a reservation for associating personal self-esteem and SIT. The argument was that SIT did not consider personal, namely individual, self-esteem but rather shared or collective self-esteem. Accordingly, the focus on personal self-esteem reflects a "misunderstanding," confusing it with a higher level of self-categorization based on social identity and the comparisons initiated by it.

Despite the above reservations, the influence of personal self-esteem on the perceptions and reactions toward others continues to interest researchers. Recently, Fein & Spencer (2000) demonstrated support for the corollaries offered by Hogg and Abrams (1990). In a study they report participants who received self-affirming feedback evaluated members of a stereotyped group more favorably than those who received negative feedback. Moreover, for participants whose self-image was threatened, derogating a stereotyped target mediated an increase in self-esteem.

Another line of research (Schmitt, Silvia, & Branscombe, 2000, for adults; Tarrant, 2002, for adolescents) attempted to integrate the two views differentiating between interpersonal and intergroup contexts. The results of their studies indicate that in the interpersonal context personal identity determined results, whereas in the intergroup context social identity did. The distinction was relevant particularly for individuals characterized as high identifiers with the group. These studies bring to the forefront the issue of specific context to which we devote the next section. However, already here it is important to point out that the "context" in the studies by Schmitt et al. (2000) and Tarrant (2002), as well as in most of the studies addressing the issue of personal and social identity and intergroup perception, behavior, or attitudes, was manipulated in the laboratory. Remembering that the purpose of studying intergroup representation aims to advance the understanding of actual intergroup relationships, it seems plausible to suggest that in naturalistic situations the differentiation between the two identities and related esteems (personal and social) may become defused. It follows that in a naturalistic context, particularly one characterized by prolonged and intensive emotional involvement, the differentiation between personal and group identities applies to a lesser degree. Views presenting the self as an integrated sense that a person has of himself (Damon & Hart, 1992; Erikson, 1968; Harter, 1990; Marcia, 1980; Markus 1977) and Tajfel's (1981b) contention that social identity is a part of the individual's self-concept apply in such a case better than a fragmented view of self.

From this perspective the study of the relationship between the general construct of personal self-identity and esteem that incorporates different aspects of identity, including that of social identity, seems more appropriate (Long & Spears, 1997). Summarizing the global versus domain-specific issue of self-esteem, Baumeister (1998) concluded that "Global self-esteem has the greatest theoretical importance, but applied research may favor the domain-specific measures" (p. 695). Thus, again we face an integrative approach rather than an either/or one.

As noted, the interest in SIT in studies examining children's intergroup perception and attitudes has increased in recent years. As a matter of fact, Nesdale (2001) suggests SIT as an alternative theoretical explanation to that offered by Aboud's (1988) sociocognitive theory and applicable without age or gender differentiation. He proposed that "the intra- and intergroup responses predicted by SIT should be little affected by either age or gender because social identity processes are founded upon a universal motivation for positive social distinctiveness" (p. 506). Indeed, findings from different cultures support the claim that gender does not produce a systematic effect on intergroup attitudes (Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Bigler & Lieben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Nesdale, 2000, 2001). Our previous (Teichman, 2001; Teichman & Zafirir, 2003) and currently reported research (see Chapters 9–11) also supports these findings. However, enough studies reported an effect of age on intergroup representations and attitudes (Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Asher & Allen, 1969; Bar-Tal, 1996; Bigler & Lieben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988; P. A. Katz, 1987; P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978; Teichman, 2001; Vaughan, 1987; Williams et al., 1975; Williams & Morland, 1976; and even Nesdale, 2000) to warrant an age-related explanation. Indeed, in a later article Nesdale and Flessner (2001) recommend further examination of the relationship between personal needs (i.e., children's self-esteem) and group attitudes.

Looking at the research generated by SIT with children, two veins may be identified: one examined the relationship between group status and intergroup biases, and the other, the relationship between personal self-esteem and such biases. With regard to the first, findings from studies performed with children aged 3–9 indicated support for SIT (Bigler et al., 1997; Nesdale & Flessner, 2001; Yee & Brown, 1992), mainly in demonstrating that children liked their ingroup more than the outgroup and that the status of groups affected in- and outgroup liking. With regard to the second, findings from studies performed with children age 6–9 (Bigler et al., 1997; Gagnon and Morasse, 1995) indicated that intergroup bias maintained high self-esteem rather than enhanced low self-esteem. This yields support for Tesser's (1988) SEM proposition.

To investigate further the idea that the motivation for self-enhancement promotes positive intergroup biases, we conducted additional indirect and

direct investigations. The indirect investigation relies on the developmental perspective regarding the salience of self-enhancement motivations. We propose that age-related predictions regarding intergroup biases account not only for cognitive development but also for personal development. If indeed self-enhancement needs do motivate ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup rejection, it follows that in early adolescence, the developmental stage in which self-identity is most unstable (Damon & Hart, 1992; Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1980), the influence of motives such as self-enhancement may be inferred from a relative increase of ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup rejection – namely, early adolescence will manifest social biases more intensely than younger or older participants. Conflict, group cohesion, and collective identification are expected to intensify these developmental tendencies as well as downward comparisons (Burn & Oskamp, 1989; Di Giacomo, 1980; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; Schmitt et al., 2000; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; Tarrant 2002).

In the more direct examination of the relationship between self-esteem and in- and outgroup representations, we looked at the patterns of in- and outgroup representations obtained from high- and low-self-esteem participants. We compared school children, early adolescents, and adolescents, subdivided into high and low in self-esteem, expecting the low-self-esteem early-adolescence group to manifest highest ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection. The results of the two types of examinations are reported in Chapters 10 and 11, but first, in order to advance the developmental perspective, we look at the role of affect as an additional personality component in the development of social representations.

Affect, Social Representations, and Attitudes

In the social context, affect may be classified as a personal experience or as feelings attributed to others and groups (stereotypes) or directed toward them (attitude or prejudice; see Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). In this section we refer to “affect” as the emotional arousal experienced by the individual upon encountering an identifying label of a social target, its image, or the actual target. As such it represents a personality state. Already in 1954 Allport states that affectively laden assumptions tend to be fixated, making it difficult to attend to and recall contradictory information. Later, Selman (1980) suggests that under specific environmental conditions individuals may function at stages lower than the highest they are capable of, and Kosslyn and Kagan (1981) specify that stress or arousal may disrupt information processing and “force one to rely on more simple ways of reasoning” – in other words, “to regress to earlier strategies of thinking” (p. 93). Namely, due to affective experiences, the developmental trajectory of social knowledge may proceed in a nonlinear pattern.

Indeed, Spielberger and Smith (1966) demonstrate that emotional arousal limits the ability to attend to complex stimuli. In the social realm, the studies conducted by Wilder and his associates (for a review, see Wilder & Simon, 2001) provide ample empirical support for the fact that anxiety interferes with information processing, causing subjects to overlook new inputs and judge outgroup members relying on their expectations or stereotypes. Jackson et al. (1996) report that fear determined attitudes toward ethnic groups, and more complex experiments in which both positive and negative moods were induced demonstrate affect-judgment consistency (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994; Forgas & Moylan, 1991). Bar-Tal (2001) and Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2003) provide conclusive evidence and analysis about the determinative effect of fear on human beings. In a study with children, Ramsey (1987) shows that a dramatic incident at a school involving black children played an important role on the ethnic attitudes displayed by white children.

Numerous studies also demonstrate that affective states representing specific attitudes influence beliefs and attitudes toward people and groups. Disliking a person has been found to affect the standards used to define intelligence level (Ditto & Lopez, 1993), while liking a person reduces negative stereotypes toward his or her group (Klein & Kunda, 1992).

Accounting for the relationship between emotional arousal and social attitudes of young children, Aboud (1988) proposes that, for the young child, strangers arouse insecurity and threat, whereas familiar people provide security and comfort. Aboud (1988) suggests that these emotional experiences constitute the developmental explanation for the findings regarding the early expressed tendency for ingroup preference and outgroup rejection. More recently, Aboud and Amato (2001) state that early emotional attachments to people perceived as similar lead to positive attitudes toward them, whereas strangers perceived as different are considered "as having different preferences and different ways of life, and so judged as wrong" (p. 78). Later, when these judgments or objective conditions restrict contact with strangers and the possibility for reevaluating experiences, individualizing them, or differentiating among them, the initial attitudes become fixed. The link between similarity and attraction (Byrne, 1971) and dissimilarity and dislike (Rosenbaum, 1986) are well-known topics in the adult literature (Baumeister, 1998), and it is logical that the origins are established in childhood.

In conflict, it is to be expected that the identification of a specific group of strangers with delegitimizing labels such as "terrorists" or with the term "an enemy" constitutes a threat for young children. The experienced helplessness vis-à-vis the threat that is also felt as shared by significant others, peers, and more distant members of the society continues to intensify the emotional arousal. This in turn reduces the ability for objective information processing and differentiation and leads to polarized generalizations about

the involved groups. Under these circumstances, outside information, acquired from micro- and macrosources (parents, teachers, peers, media), often reinforces the existing affect and consequently the images. Thus, especially with children, when considering personal states such as emotional arousal, the contextual influences have to be accounted for as well, and this directs our attention to a more scrupulous look at the developmental context of social representations.

THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

In recent decades the influence of the social context on personal and social knowledge as well as on intergroup attitudes and relations triggered much theoretical and empirical interest (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2003; Mackie & Wright, 2001). Attention was directed at the characteristics of macrocontexts such as collective versus individualistic cultures (for a review, see Triandis & Trafimow, 2001); sociocultural factors such as status issues reflected in status stability, status legitimacy, and group permeability (for a meta-analysis, see Bettencourt et al., 2001), power, or minority-majority situation (Aboud, 1988, for a review of the literature for children; Fiske, 1993; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1991, for adults); and conflict, which we address later in this section. Also, researchers examined the influence of specific contextual conditions, such as group identification (Branscombe & Ellmers, 1998; Doosje & Ellmers, 1997; Schmitt et al., 2000); conditions that cause emotional arousals (see previous section), particularly threats to self-esteem (Hunter et al., 1996; Hunter et al., 1997; Long & Spears, 1997; Long, Spears, & Manstead, 1994); religiosity (Batson & Burris, 1994); and political conservatism (Crandall & Cohen, 1994).

Frequently, when referring to findings from studies addressing influences of social contexts, reviewers express the expectation for social psychology to engage more often in naturalistic studies and to confirm laboratory findings in the "real world" (Deaux, 1996; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Pettigrew, 2001). Our empirical work comes to answer these expectations in exploring social stereotypes and prejudice in a situation that constitutes the context of our personal and professional lives: the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The history of this conflict and its representation in the Israeli society and culture are outlined in Chapters 3–7; here we allude to the context of conflict as mediating the development and content of the mental representations of the involved parties in the conflict, and our focus is mainly on the young generation.

Apart from documenting the evolving social knowledge in the context of conflict and, in one study, examining more directly the influence of the level of intensity of the conflict, we examined other contextual influences characterizing Israel as a multiethnic immigration country. We looked at whether variables such as country of origin, length of acculturation, socioeconomic

status, cohabitation of the two groups (Jews and Arabs), religiosity, and political orientation affected the stereotypes and attitudes toward Arabs. Most of these variables were examined before with adolescents and adults, and results indicate that they influence intergroup stereotyping, attitudes, and discrimination (see Chapter 7). Their examination with preschoolers and preadolescents expands the developmental perspective.

Conflict, Stereotypes, and Prejudice

The proposition that rivalry over limited resources and incompatible goals produce intergroup bias (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966) is known as realistic conflict theory. The mechanisms suggested by the theory as mediating negative attitudes toward the competing "enemy group" include frustration, disagreement, social distance, and fear. *Frustration* results from failure to attain the limited resources or desired goals. A sense of *disagreement* casts doubt on one's own ideas or goals and constitutes a threat to one's self-identity and self-esteem. *Social distance* (or lack of contact) intensifies, on the one hand, ingroup-outgroup differentiation and, on the other, ingroup cohesion and solidarity. Finally, *fear* may influence emotional reactions toward individuals from the different groups. The combination of these factors amplifies group salience, group commitment, acceptance of the group norms, and elevates negative emotional arousal.

When social representations are constructed in a context including all these elements, the categories tend to become polarized, generalized, and resistant to change. Ingroup favoritism and outgroup animosity stem not just from group distinction but are normatively justified. This produces cognitive-affective configurations of "us" and "them" that define "them" as the enemy. According to Holt and Silverstein (1989), "the image of the enemy" is a psychological phenomenon including "much more than imagery in its strict sensory meaning: concepts, beliefs, attitudes, values, stereotypes, emotions (chiefly aspects of fear and hatred), motives and intentions" (p. 3). Moreover, once developed, "the image of an enemy" biases the way information is processed with regard to the "enemy group" and further escalates the image and the experience of the conflict (see also the discussion of enemy image in Chapter 2). Reviewing studies performed in the United States relating to the Soviet Union as an enemy, Silverstein and Flamenbaum (1989) report biases in attention, encoding, assessment of credibility, evaluation of hostility, expectation of future actions, and attributions. They suggested that the image of the enemy not only affects information processing but is also reinforced by the feedback obtained from the information processed. This vicious cycle explains the endurance and stability of enemy images and provides reasons for extreme consequences such as delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989), moral exclusion (Opatow, 1995), or violence (Otten, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 1995).

The Reflection of Contextual Influences through Socialization

Another way of examining the influence of context is by tracing channels that disseminate contextual influences. When children are considered, this has special importance because it provides information not only about the content transmitted through socialization but also who transmits it. It is logical to assume that socialization includes stereotypic and attitudinal messages about the important groups constituting the social context. Socialization agents – parents, teachers, friends, books, the media – deliver these messages. However, they may also come from observations of actual behaviors or roles performed by specific groups, or from monitoring actual social contacts between groups (Eagley, 1987; Eagley & Stephen, 1984).

Referring to the role of parents as the primary agents for socialization, Aboud (1988) proposes that children identify with their parents, want to please them, and consequently imitate them. This would suggest similarity in social attitudes between parents and children. However, some of the research findings indicate small or no correlations between the social attitudes of parents and children but higher correlations between their own views and the views they attribute to others. This means that generally children receive little information about race and ethnicity from their parents and that egocentricity determines the way they perceive the attitudes of others (Aboud & Amato, 2001). However, as reported by Bar-Tal (1996), and in some of the studies we report in Chapters 9 and 10, children growing up in a conflict are an exception. When asked to identify their sources of information about the opponent, a high percentage (81%) of Israeli children mentioned parents. Aboud and Amato (2001) comment on such findings, suggesting that “most children receive very little information about race and ethnicity from their parents” but “in regions where ethnic conflict is high parents explicitly and emotionally express their attitudes” (p. 74). Apparently, this differentiation is correct and in place.

Another source of information for social knowledge, especially for children, is television. Silverstein and Holt (1989) propose that children’s exposure to television programs, comic books, and children’s literature guides them to construe the world as polarized into good and bad characters. This exposure predisposes children to “construct a generalized inner social world of friends and enemies” (p. 167). Later in life, these generalizations are integrated into their own personality and become stabilized. Barrett and Short (1992) demonstrate the effect of television on images held by British children about different European nations, pointing out that the most negative image was that of Germans. They attributed this negativity to information absorbed from television movies and programs. Our findings also portray television as a major source of information about social groups, which has important implications for prevention and intervention. Interestingly, although teachers are often mentioned as socialization

agents, we did not find studies examining their influence on children's social representations. In some of our studies we tried to assess their influence, and the results are presented in Chapter 9.

AN INTEGRATIVE DEVELOPMENTAL-CONTEXTUAL APPROACH

Acknowledging the mediation of cognitive, motivational, affective, and contextual factors in forming social representations suggests an integrative and dynamic approach to the acquisition and development of stereotypes and prejudice. Referring to cognitive and personality development within a specific context enables us to generate unique predictions regarding the developmental trajectory of stereotypes and prejudice in that context. However, unlike Nesdale (2001), who suggests an either/or approach (i.e., Aboud's sociocultural theory or SIT) to explain the development of social representations, we suggest an integrative developmental-contextual approach. Such an approach would provide explanations for the origins and developmental changes in intergroup representations and attitudes. In referring to development, we account for cognitive-development (i.e., changes in cognitive abilities) and for personality development (i.e., changes in the development of self- and social identities and related changes in personal needs and motivation). In referring to context, we refer to conditions elevating group salience and personal and/or group threats (i.e., negative emotional arousal). The integrative developmental-contextual approach would introduce a prediction of *nonlinear* shifts in intergroup representations and attitudes.

Dealing with age-related developmental changes prompts the question as to what constitutes an expression of prejudice or intergroup bias, especially in preschoolers, and what changes with age. As noted, until recently it was assumed that young children (aged 3–4) categorize people according to social groups, liking those similar to themselves and disliking the dissimilar (Aboud, 1988, 2003; Aboud, & Amato, 2001). However, recent reviews and findings indicate that before the age of 7, or even 12, the prevailing tendency is that of ingroup favoritism, not necessarily accompanied with outgroup rejection. Outgroup rejection or derogation appeared only at a later age (Aboud 2003; Brewer, 1999; Cameron et al., 2001). These findings, however, are qualified, suggesting that contextual factors such as intergroup conflict or specific socialization may encourage earlier outgroup negativism and even hostility (Aboud 2003; Cameron et al., 2001). Thus, again we notice that context determines not only the formation and development of intergroup biases but also the way they are expressed.

First, as a departure point, relating to the age-related differences in expression, we suggest a developmental trajectory from preschool to young adulthood for majority groups in benign contexts, thus accounting mainly for cognitive and personal factors. We propose that, as predicted by Aboud

(1988) in the sociocognitive theory, in a nonviolent multiethnic context social representations and attitudes of preschoolers would be affected primarily by two factors: cognitive development and negative arousal generated by strangers. Accordingly, they will express a high level of ingroup preference. For school-age children, the leap in cognitive development and relatively conflict-free personal development would predict a reduction in social biases. In pre- and early adolescence, despite further advances in cognitive development, the destabilization of self-identity and self-esteem would elevate social biases. Finally, late adolescents and young adults, whose moral and social perspectives reach maturity, and whose sense of personal and social self is more secure and consolidated, would express milder differentiation between in- and outgroup. Thus the developmental trajectory to be expected in neutral social circumstances is a zigzagging pattern in which preschoolers express high ingroup bias, school children express milder biases, pre- and early adolescents reintroduce intergroup biases, and older adolescents reestablish the milder trends. Specific contexts, such as conflict or minority-group situation, may disrupt or change this pattern or deemphasize or emphasize age differences.

If we apply the integrative developmental-contextual perspective for the acquisition and development of social representations to the majority Jewish children in Israel, it may be expected that, because of the interplay of the cognitive, personal (motivational and affective), and contextual influences we discussed, Jewish Israeli children will acquire labels, concepts, and images related to ethnic and national identities ("Jew," "Israeli," "Arab") earlier than children growing up in peaceful, multiethnic social contexts – that the differentiation between in- and outgroup representations will be very marked. Furthermore, we expect that already at an early age (preschool), positivity toward the ingroup and negativity toward the outgroup will be evident in the structure and expressed in the content related to the representation. As to age-related trajectories, two opposing expectations are plausible. It may be expected that the conflict would either amplify or defuse the previously described zigzagging pattern. The first would reflect an intensification of developmental trends; and the second, a commonly shared social bias overpowering developmental influences. Believing that we are the first to examine a developmental trajectory of stereotypes and attitudes in a context of conflict, the findings regarding these two options are of interest.

The ideas we proposed about the development of social representations of children from the dominant majority group in the Israeli context were examined by applying different assessment methodologies, tapping different aspects of the representations in a developmental range from early preschool age (2-year-olds) until late adolescence and young adulthood. The assessment procedures we utilized separated the evaluated targets and in most cases allowed an expression of positivity-negativity toward

each. Before proceeding to the description of our studies and findings, we consider in more detail the methodological issues related to the assessment of children's social representation.

ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN'S SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Apart from the interest in describing the social representations held by the young generation in a particular context, and perhaps even more, we were interested in documenting their acquisition and to examine the changes occurring in them during the developmental trajectory. More specifically, the developmental questions we examined were when do Jewish Israeli children acquire the words "Jew," "Israeli," and "Arab" and the concepts and images related to these words. The possession of a word indicates an acquisition of a vocabulary of labels; the possession of a concept indicates understanding that the word is associated with a social group and that the child has acquired any meaningful knowledge about that group; the possession of images indicates an ability to identify a person as a group representative or to produce his or her representation. With regard to images we wanted to ascertain whether identification relies on observable features such as skin or eye color, facial features, and type of hair or on cultural characteristics such as clothing. Other developmental questions related to the acquisition of group identity – namely, to the child's ability to identify himself or herself as a Jew or an Israeli and to define the other group, to the influences exerted on them by specific environments within the macrocontext, and to the specific sources of information children identify as providing them with social knowledge.

The assessment of the various aspects of children's social representations confronts a variety of obvious age-related problems, such as limited verbal ability, nonexistent or limited reading and writing skills, difficulty in understanding or performing complicated tasks, and limited attention span. Moreover, to assess social representations of children in different age groups and different social background, an instrument that appeals to various ages and social groups and that can be scored using the same criteria must be applied. Thus, when studying children, developmental and sociocultural considerations guide the choice of assessment techniques, and nonverbal or indirect and less structured techniques rather than explicit self-reports are often preferred.

A review of the major measures applied to assess social images (i.e., stereotypes and attitudes) held by children reveals that they provide information mainly regarding preferences and attributions of experimenter-determined characteristics. Most have been criticized for covering a limited scope, confounding acceptance-rejection, failing to provide information regarding intensity, and, most important, not separating the evaluated targets (Aboud, 1988, 2003; Cameron et al., 2001). Newer measures, especially

the multiresponse racial attitude (MRA) measure (Doyle & Aboud, 1995), solve most of these problems but still concentrate only on the content of the representation relating to experimenter-determined characteristics, not allowing for spontaneous responses. Also, as recognized by Aboud (2003), it does not provide full separation among the evaluated targets.

In our research we adopted the view that mental representations of people are multifaceted, cognitive-affective constructs and, as such, have structure, diverse content, and affective components. Structure represents the level of within-representation differentiation or complexity and its quality. Structure may be evaluated only by measures providing an opportunity for quantifying the characteristics attributed to different representations, for evaluating their quality, or both (Linville, 1982; Teichman, 2001). Content reflects beliefs about the assessed representation (i.e., stereotypes). The beliefs may relate to the appearance, characteristics, affect, behavior, and intentions of the target. With affect, a differentiation between ascribed, aroused, or directed at a target is in place. The first represents the affect attributed to the target person and as such constitutes an aspect of the stereotype; the second, the emotional reaction experienced by the perceiver; and the third, the emotions directed at the target person (i.e., prejudice). As previously suggested, the emotions children attribute to people constitute the affective aspect of the image. The emotions that images arouse in them (i.e., threat, happiness) may influence the content of the attributions that become associated with them and the emotions directed at them. The emotions directed at people represent the expressed feelings toward them (i.e., attitudes or prejudice). The differentiation regarding behavior and intentions relates only to ascribed and directed.

The assessment approach we implemented attempted to cover the multifaceted configuration of the representations of ingroup and outgroup members and to provide information regarding positivity-negativity toward them at different ages. In our case, ingroup refers to "Jews" and/or "Israelis," and outgroup generally to "Arabs." The generalized use of the term "Arabs" is based on Bar-Tal's (1996) contention that in Israel, "The concept of 'the Arab' is used as a basic term to label people who live in the Middle East and North Africa, and who have been in protracted conflict with Israeli Jews" (p. 347). In some of the studies, outgroup members were identified as representatives of a specific Arab nation, such as Jordanians, Syrians, or others, or as representatives of neutral nations, such as French, Japanese, or others. Practically, the multifaceted assessment was achieved by using different measures that tap the different aspects pertaining to the representations or one measure that provides diverse information. Many of the measures draw on previously used techniques but were adapted for our research needs. Depending on the age of the participants, we had structured verbal measures (interviews and self-reports, such as open-ended questionnaires and scales); semistructured measures such as drawings,

photographs, and illustrated booklets presenting stories used for generating children's reactions; and a response-free measure allowing participants to reproduce their images by drawing them. Using a variety of measures provided a wide perspective and enabled intermeasure comparison. Also, looking at different aspects of representations enabled us to examine tendencies for within- and among-target generalization.

The differentiation between assessment techniques brings to the forefront three issues. The first relates to tracing developmental change. Considering change depends on the way the expression of stereotypes and/or prejudice is defined. Doyle et al. (1988) define the following possibilities: stereotypes and/or prejudice may be reflected in ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection ("bias") or in outgroup favoritism and ingroup rejection ("counter-bias"). In other words, in studying either developmental trajectories or change occurring in social representations, positivity or negativity toward both groups may take place. As observed by many, the questions whether young children express full biases – that is, ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup rejection – and what changes with age may be answered only if the assessment methodology allows for a separation of the evaluated stimuli (Aboud, 2003; Aboud & Amato, 2001; Cameron et al., 2001).

The second issue concerns who defines the content being tapped by the measure. Most of the existing measures rely on experimenter-predetermined contents, channeling the responders to specific themes rather than allowing them to express freely their personal representations (Kosslyn & Kagen, 1981; Stangor & Lange, 1994). Again, in the case of children, the predetermined content may restrict the range of responses and encourage social desirability. In Chapter 11 we describe a free-response assessment technique that, upon an exposure to a group label, activates reactions and content not determined a priori by the researcher, thus encouraging the emergence of personal thoughts and attitudes. Generally, this was performed by asking children to draw a human figure depicting a "typical Jew [or Arab]" and then to answer accompanying open-ended questions. In most instances the directions were to draw a man, but in one of the studies participants were asked to draw women and in another to add a drawing of an unidentified image defined as "a person." The image of the person may be considered as a base line for the other images. The drawings provide information regarding within-image differentiation and quality (i.e., their structure) and elicit personal attributions and attitudes. The accompanying questionnaires elicit further information about the beliefs and intentions relating to the drawn person. The drawings and questionnaires may be scored systematically.

The third issue, often mentioned in the adult literature, relates to the assessment of implicit versus explicit level of social attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Based on an extensive review, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) conclude that the implicit (i.e., indirect) measures or projective measures

tend to reveal more negative attitudes toward outgroups than the explicit ones. This means that an open expression of beliefs and attitudes tends to be censored. Although Aboud and Amato (2001) seemed to rule out the influence of social desirability on children's expression of prejudice, we assume that when the responders are children, who tend to accept suggestions, consent to authority, and wish to please adults, the problem of social desirability is as important and interesting as in the case of adults, or even more so. Indeed, Katz et al. (1975), who compared children's responses on implicit and explicit measures, show that the former trigger more genuine responses, and a study by Teichman and Zafirir (2003) confirms this tendency. Importantly, genuineness does not necessarily imply a higher level of prejudice – that is, negativity.

The results obtained from the various studies we conducted, utilizing the different types of measures, enabled us to document the acquisition of social repertoire as reflected in words, concepts, and images; to describe the representations in terms of structure, diverse aspects of content, affect, and intentions relating to in- and outgroups; and to examine age-related differences distinguishing between changes in positivity-negativity toward each of the evaluated groups. Additionally we were able to look at differences obtained from explicit and implicit measures and at influences of specific environments, and to identify sources informing children about social groups (i.e., agents of socialization). Regrettably, we did not obtain any information from the agents themselves (parents, teachers, peers). Thus, we cannot contribute to the issue of direct correspondence between attitudes.

CONCLUSION

Like any knowledge, knowledge in the social realm acquires meaning by being mentally processed. This mental processing is known as categorization and depends on the development of cognitive abilities and social understanding. Categorized knowledge is reflected in words, concepts, and mental images. Categories have structure and content. Structure represents the level of within-category differentiation or complexity and its quality. Content reflects beliefs about the representation.

The main categories that constitute social knowledge are the representations of self, others, and groups. Self-definition is acquired through a process beginning with self-awareness, personal observations, and interpersonal experiences. These provide information about the individual and about similarities and differences between him or her and others. A coherent, integrated sense of a personal, emotional, sexual, ethnic, social, professional, and ideological identity is achieved in adolescence. This coherence or unity is a defining feature of self-identity. Experiences derived from interactions with others also determine knowledge about people.

Later, familiarity with the groups and relationships that compose the environment constitutes the foundation of social and cultural competency.

Three-stage models linking cognitive development and the development of social knowledge have been proposed (Kohlberg 1969; Piaget, 1965; Piaget & Wiel, 1951; Selman, 1980). Based on these models, Aboud (1988) has suggested a social-cognitive theory accounting for the development of prejudice in childhood. The theory refers to two overlapping sequences that determine social attitudes. The first sequence represents the developmental changes in the child's interpersonal experience. The second refers to changes in the focus of attention from an individual to a social perspective. Models linking the development of logical thinking and social cognition generate linear predictions suggesting that as cognitive abilities mature social attitudes toward outgroups become milder.

The associations between the representation of the self and those of others and groups in different developmental stages play a role in determining self-esteem and, as such, influence interpersonal perception and attitudes. The relationship between self-esteem and intergroup perception, attitudes, and behavior was defined by social identity theory (SIT). The theory suggested that people categorize groups, affiliate with some, identify with their norms, and integrate them as a part of their self-identity. Subsequently, they engage in social comparison and, in order to enhance their self-esteem, favor the ingroup and degrade outgroups. Turner (1999) and Turner and Reynolds (2001) argue forcefully that these predictions relate only to social self-identity and esteem. However, researchers have explored the relationship between personal self-esteem and manifestations of intergroup favoritism or negativism. A view of the self as an integrated entity justifies this approach.

Affect and social context, especially conflict, are also involved in determining the structure and content of social representations and attitudes. This means that the development of categories of social knowledge is mediated by cognitive and personal factors that differ according to developmental stage and context. This contention represents an integrative developmental-contextual approach for understanding the acquisition and development of social representations that, in considering a developmental range from preschool age to late adolescence, suggests a nonlinear trajectory. Our studies of the acquisition and development of the categories of self ("Jew" or "Israeli") and others ("Arab") formed by Israeli Jewish children represent this approach. The particular context that has to be accounted for in these studies is the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Suggesting that social categories, and the beliefs and attitudes related to them, are multiply mediated and multifaceted calls for an integrative approach for their assessment. Indeed, in order to document their acquisition and to look at changes occurring with age, we utilized previously proposed assessment techniques, adapted techniques, or new, empirically

established ones. The multifaceted assessment was practically achieved by using different measures that tap the different aspects pertaining to the representations or one measure that provides diverse information. In developing assessment methodologies for children, general issues relevant for the assessment of the young should be considered. Additionally, specific issues for this particular subject matter – such as differentiation between or among the assessed targets, experimenter defined versus free response, and explicit versus implicit measures – have to be addressed.

Studies with Preschoolers

Seven studies in our laboratory focused on the acquisition by preschoolers of different aspects of the psychological intergroup repertoire relating to the self-referent group (“Jews” and “Israelis”) and the rival group (“Arabs”). We were interested in the acquisition of words, concepts, images, and ethnic and national identity. Beyond acquisition, we examined the content of stereotypes, attitudes, attributed intentions to in- and outgroup, environmental influences on stereotypes and attitudes, the sources of information this age group identifies, and their tendency for generalizing evaluations regarding the rival group or regarding strangers.

To unveil the process of acquisition, we started to interview children at the earliest possible age, the age of 2 years. All of the participants in our studies had sufficient verbal skills to participate in structured interviews enabling the tracing of lexical, conceptual, and imagery development. Some interviews included direct questions, and others related to drawings, photographs, or illustrated stories. Although we recognize the shortcomings of interviewing young children, we believe that they represent the best source for information regarding the social vocabulary and verbal or imaginary concepts that children have in their repertoire. However, adding implicit techniques, less dependent on verbal expression, we learned about different aspects of the social knowledge Jewish Israeli children acquire at an early age. The assessment techniques we utilized related to in- and outgroup members separately; however, most of them confounded positivity-negativity. Despite this limitation, our findings illuminate issues in the forefront of the recent developmental literature – whether young children express prejudice in ingroup favoritism or outgroup rejection (Aboud, 2003; Cameron et al., 2001), and whether conflict has an effect on these tendencies (Brewer, 1999). Also, as mentioned in Chapter 8, because in most of our analyses we did not find systematic gender differences, the findings we report were obtained from samples in which boys and girls were equally represented.

WORDS, CONCEPTS, IDENTITIES, STEREOTYPES, AND ATTITUDES

The acquisition of words such as "Jew," "Israeli," and "Arab" was examined by asking children to answer direct questions or questions relating to illustrated stories. The acquisition of a word was inferred when a child confirmed hearing or knowing it or spontaneously used it. The acquisition of concepts was inferred when children could relate any meaningful description or knowledge with the words or indicate that they refer to a group of people, namely to manifest categorization. The acquisition of identity was inferred from answers children provided to specific questions regarding themselves. Stereotypes and attitudes were inferred from attributed traits and expressed feelings relating to the words or images identifying social groups. In some of the studies, children were asked to attribute traits and express feelings regardless of demonstrated acquisition of words, concepts, or images. Also in some of the studies children were provided with the opportunity for a free description of "Jews" and "Arabs." Because these spontaneous narratives did not relate to any stimuli presented by the interviewer, they represent unconfounded measures from which positivity and negativity toward each target may be inferred.

In 1995 we conducted interviews with 40 children aged 2–4 years attending two similar kindergartens (20 were 2–3 years of age and 20 were 3–4). To communicate with these young children, we utilized a methodology that presented participants with drawings depicting a social situation accompanied by a story told by an interviewer. To assure cooperation, the session began with a short playtime. Then, each participant was shown a drawing of a swinging child. The interviewer read a story: "On Saturday Gad went to play in a playground. In the playground he met a boy named Rami and they played, swinging together. Close by they saw an Arab/Jew/Israeli eating" (presented in a random order). At this point, the interview began. First, the child was asked about the word or concept "swing" ("Do you know what this is?" "Did you hear the word swing?" "Do you know what a swing is?"); then the interviewer proceeded to the words "Arab," "Jew," and "Israeli." Depending on the order of presentation, the questions were "Did you hear the word Arab/Jew/Israeli?" "Do you know what an Arab/Jew/Israeli is?" "Can you describe or tell me something about an Arab/Jew/Israeli?" Regardless of the ability to answer any of these questions, all the children were asked to rate all three labels (good or bad) and to indicate whether they feel love or hate when hearing them.

As a continuation of this study, in the same year (1995), we interviewed 40 children aged 4–6 (18 were 4–5 years of age and 22 were 5–6). Each child was interviewed individually. The questions presented to the children were the same as in the previous study ("Did you hear the word Arab/Jew/Israeli?" etc.). These children also rated the labels and expressed

TABLE 9.1. *Percentage of Preschoolers Indicating Acquisition of Reference Words and Concepts, Ethnic and National Identities, and the Related Stereotype and Attitude*

Responses	Age			
	2-3 (n = 20)	3-4 (n = 20)	4-5 (n = 18)	5-6 (n = 22)
Acquired word				
Jew	90	100	100	100
Israeli	60	95	94	95
Arab	0	40	72	82
Acquired concept				
Jew	0	40	67	77
Israeli	0	25	61	77
Arab	0	40	61	68
Acquired identity				
Jew	65	85	61	73
Israeli	55	75	67	77
Stereotype ^a				
Jew	70	80	95	96
Israeli	70	80	100	100
Arab	50	30	17	9
Attitude ^a				
Jew	80	95	90	90
Israeli	70	85	90	90
Arab	50	40	27	11

^a The reported percentages indicate positive ratings and feelings.

feelings toward them. In addition we asked the older children to share with us the reasons for the feelings they expressed.

Words and Concepts

The results tracing the acquisition of words and concepts representing the social categories identifying the children's ethnic and national groups ("Jew" and "Israeli") and those representing the rival group ("Arab") are presented in Table 9.1. These results show that most (90%) of the children at the age of 2-3 possessed the word "Jew," indicating that it had been acquired at an earlier age. All of the children in the age range of 3-6 possessed this word. Fewer of the youngest children (60%) possessed the word "Israeli," but from the age of 3-4 and on, most children (94%-95%) also possessed this word. Concepts representing the ingroup began to emerge only at the age of 3-4. While at the age of 5-6 all or most children possessed the words representing the ingroup, 23% still could not describe or define

a “Jew” or an “Israeli” meaningfully. Namely, they did not demonstrate concept acquisition.

At the age of 3–4, 40% of the children demonstrated acquisition of the word and concept representing the most relevant outgroup, “Arab” – more, in fact, than demonstrated the acquisition of the concept “Israeli” (25%). Also at this age, while the word and concept “Arab” seem to be acquired simultaneously, with regard to “Jew” and “Israeli” more children demonstrated word than concept acquisition. In all the other groups more children acquired words representing social groups than the relevant concepts. Also, more children acquire words and concepts representing the ingroup than those representing the other group. Thus, at the age of 5–6 only 82% of the children acquired the word “Arab” and 68% acquired the concept.

Examining the spontaneous narratives of children who offered descriptions or definitions for “Jews” or “Israelis,” we found that most of the children from the two youngest groups referred to positive features, acts, or customs such as being beautiful, serving in the army, living in Israel, desiring peace. One child described Jews in negative terms (“are bad people”), and three children used neutral traits (taken together, they represent 10% of the children in these groups). The descriptions and definitions of “Arabs” in the group aged 3–4 years were mixed: 38% of the children described or defined “Arabs” as performing aggressive acts; however, 62% mentioned items of typical clothes or appearance, and some even referred to peace aspirations. In the two older groups again only 10% of the children described Jews and Israelis negatively. On the other hand, the majority (70%) of the children who acquired the concept “Arab” offered descriptions or definitions that presented the Arabs negatively, mainly as having negative intentions (“Want to kill,” “Steal,” “Fight with the Jews,” “Are terrorists”), 10% defined them as soldiers, and only 20% defined them as “people like us” or referred to their language or food. When relating to appearance, 30% of the children used negative terms (mostly ugly), and 30% described them as wearing a military uniform. A few of the children (10%) described the Arab’s appearance in neutral traditional terms (“Wears a kaffia,”¹ “Has a beard,” “Wears a moustache”); another 10% used positive descriptions (“Beautiful”). The remaining 20% did not provide an answer.

Ethnic and National Identity (“Jew” or “Israeli”)

An additional goal in the two studies was to ascertain when Israeli children acquire their ethnic and national identities. We presented direct questions such as “Are you a Jew/Israeli”? The results obtained for these questions are also presented in Table 9.1. Identifying themselves as Jews were 65% of those aged 2–3 and 85% of those 3–4; 55% and 75%, respectively, said that

¹ A traditional Arab headdress.

they are Israelis. In the older group, 61% of those aged 4–5 years identified themselves as Jews and 67% as Israelis; for those aged 5–6 self-identification as a Jew increased to 73% and as an Israeli to 77%.

This indicates that at the young age of 2–3 more than half of Jewish Israeli children, based mainly on word acquisition and before demonstrating concept acquisition, when asked directly about themselves demonstrate an ability for ethnic and national categorization. The incidence of relating to oneself ethnic and national identities increased with age, but the trend was not a steady one. At the age of 3–4 more children related themselves to ethnic and national identities than did children in the following age group. Apparently, though many children in the age range of 2–4 identified themselves as “Jews” or “Israelis,” for most of them the identification was related to the acquired words and did not reflect in-depth understanding. On the other hand, at the age of 4–6 the incidence of acquired ethnic and national identities corresponded to that of acquired concepts. Indeed, at the age of 5–6 about three quarters of the children demonstrated both concept and identity acquisition.

Stereotypes and Attitudes

In addition to the spontaneous stereotyping reflected in the definitions and descriptions just mentioned, Table 9.1 presents the results obtained for the stereotyping inferred from ratings (good/bad) and for the attitudes expressed in feelings (love/hate) obtained from all the children in each group. The percentages appearing in Table 9.1 represent positive ratings (good) and positive feelings (love). A negligible percentage of the children rated Jews or Israelis as “bad” or expressed “hate” toward them. Occasionally, especially the younger children did not provide an answer or could not decide. On the other hand, children who did not rate Arabs as “good” or express “love” toward them rated them as “bad” and expressed “hate” toward them. Here as well, occasionally, we encountered hesitations. First, looking at the ratings, it appears that irrespective of a demonstrated word or concept acquisition, 70% of all the youngest children and 80% of the second age group rated both Jews and Israelis as “good.” However, 50% of the youngest children and 30% from the second age group rated the Arab as “good.” In the two older groups, all or almost all the children rated “Jews” and “Israelis” as good. In relating to Arabs only 17% of those aged 4–5 and 9% of those 5–6 rated Arabs as good.

With regard to feelings, while 80% and 70% from the youngest children expressed love toward Jews and Israelis respectively, and 85%–95% from the older groups did so, only 50% from the youngest children and 40% from the next group expressed positive feelings toward Arabs. Looking at the two older groups, it is evident that, as in the ratings, positive feelings toward Arabs decreased with age. Of those aged 4–5 and 5–6, only 27%

and 11% respectively said they loved "Arabs." In explaining their feelings, children said that they love "Jews" and "Israelis" for their positive characteristics and behavior and because they considered themselves as belonging to these groups. The Arabs were hated mostly because of their aggression toward the Jews ("They kill us," "They throw bombs"). Of the older children 10% differentiated between good and bad Arabs depending on their behavior toward Jews.

Of special interest is a more differentiated examination we performed for the youngest group (2-3) in which the children in this group were subdivided into two age groups, 2-2.5 and 2.6-3 years, and asked to rate the word "Arab" as good/bad and to state whether they like or hate it. Of the youngest children 80% rated the word "Arab" as "good" and the other 20% as "bad," but at the age of 2.6-3 the trend was reversed: 80% rated the word "Arab" as "bad" and 20% as "good." Similarly, with regard to feelings, 40% of the younger children expressed hate toward the word "Arab," and 60% of the older children did so. Finally, it is of interest that in all four groups children tended to be consistent. Those who provided negative descriptions accompanied them with negative ratings and negative emotions. The same occurred regarding positive descriptions, ratings, and feelings.

IMAGES, STEREOTYPES, AND ATTITUDES IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS

Another way of engaging the world and arriving at meaning is by the abstractions of observations and their representation in images. This means that knowledge about people or social groups is represented not only in abstract verbal concepts but also in images (exemplars). Accordingly, we examined the emergence of social knowledge in words, verbal concepts, and images. In the studies of image acquisition only two age groups were compared, representing somewhat different ages. Accordingly we refer to a younger and older group. Depending on the study, the younger and the older groups comprised children aged 2.5-4.7 and 4.7-6.5 years, respectively.

Acquisition of images of Arabs was explored by asking children to identify, recognize, or evaluate four men in drawings or photographs depicting people dressed with traditional "Arab" clothing and/or characterized by traditional "Arab" features presented with people dressed in Western clothing and/or characterized by Western features. As in concept acquisition, in addition to the examination of image acquisition we examined the knowledge related to the images, the stereotypes, and attitudes related to them. New questions addressed in the study of images referred to the influence of specific social environments and to children's sources of information about Arabs. Referring to environments, we examined children from different socioeconomic backgrounds and ethnic origins (Asian

or African origin and European or American origin), children who represented environments providing an opportunity for direct contact with Arabs and Arab children, and children from social environments considered as representing liberal social attitudes.

Middle-Class Children

In the first study relating to images, two groups of middle-class children were compared: 20 children aged 2.5–3.5 years and 20 aged 5.5–6.5. The children were interviewed utilizing four pencil drawings of the same man representing two variations of a traditional Arab appearance determined by clothing and facial features. The first drawing depicted a man with a black beard wearing a galabiya² and a kaffia. The second drawing showed a man with a black beard, wearing modern pants, T-shirt, and a kaffia. In the third drawing was a man without a head cover who had a black beard and light-color hair. In the fourth drawing the beard was removed as well.

In the phase defined as spontaneous identification, all the children were shown the four drawings and asked to identify the man in each drawing (“who is this man?”). In case of a failure to identify any of the men as an Arab, they were asked whether an Arab was represented in any of the drawings and to point to which ones (“who in these drawings is an Arab?”). An identification of one or both of the first drawings was scored as a correct identification. If still unable to identify, they were told: “Some of the drawings present an Arab” and asked: “Can you show me which ones present an Arab?” The two last situations represent recognition. Following the spontaneous identification or recognition, children were asked to rate images and to express attitudes toward them (in this study attitudes were expressed in feelings and readiness for social contact).

Image Acquisition

The spontaneous identification phase showed that none of the younger children succeeded in identifying any of the drawings as representing an Arab, while 20% of the older children succeeded. In the second phase, 30% of the younger children identified correctly at least one man as an Arab, while all of the children in the older group were able to do so. Accordingly, the recognition phase was performed only with the younger group. In this phase an additional 10% of the children were able to identify an Arab, suggesting that at this age a gradual association between the verbal concept representing this social category and the image begins to be established. The spontaneous emergence of images was less frequent than that of verbal concepts, but recognition of an image is apparently easier, even easier than the acquisition of verbal concepts. As shown in Table 9.1,

² A traditional Arab garment for men.

only 68% of those aged 5–6 demonstrated concept acquisition, whereas in this study 100% of those aged 5.5–6.5 demonstrated image acquisition. (It is possible that, at least partly, the difference between the rates of concept and image acquisition in the two studies is due to the difference in the age of the children in the older group.)

Stereotypes and Attitudes

After the identification phase, each child was asked to rate the man with the most traditional Arab clothing (the first drawing) and the man wearing pants and a T-shirt who had light-color hair and no beard (the last drawing). The rating was performed on the following attributions: nice/not nice, ugly/pretty, good/bad. Subsequently the children were asked to express an affective attitude (like/dislike), and to state whether they experienced threat (yes/no) and their readiness for two types of social contact (readiness to play together, readiness to invite to the child's home). The results presented in Table 9.2 show that, although at the age range of 2.5–3.5 children did not possess a clear image of an Arab, the word acquired negative associations and initiated rejection. At the age of 5.5–6.5 all children were capable of identifying a person as an Arab either spontaneously or by recognition. In any case, the identification was accompanied with negative ratings and feelings. The high frequency of threat attributed to the Arab by the young children is of importance. This attribution discloses their experience and may explain the origins of stereotypes and prejudice (Aboud, 1988). The tendency for negativity toward both images increased with age but reached higher proportions for the Arab. Interestingly, in both age groups a high percentage of children did not welcome social contact with any of

TABLE 9.2. *Percentage of Children Expressing Negativity toward Traditional Arab and Western Appearance*

Responses	Age 2.5–3.5 (n = 20)		Age 5.5–6.5 (n = 20)	
	Traditional Arab Appearance	Western Appearance	Traditional Arab Appearance	Western Appearance
Not nice	20	5	70	20
Ugly	50	20	65	55
Bad	40	20	80	10
Dislike	35	25	80	50
Experienced threat	75	25	75	5
Refused to play with him	55	45	95	60
Refused to host him	70	55	95	65

the people represented in the photographs. This may reflect the general tendency for avoiding strangers at this age.

Children from Low and Upper-Middle Socioeconomic Classes

We examined larger samples of preschoolers aiming to explore further at what age children spontaneously identify or recognize “an Arab,” thus demonstrating image acquisition. The first study was performed in 1992 (Ovadia, 1993). In order to expand the knowledge about environmental influences in this study, children were also asked to report their sources of information about Arabs. The participants were 114 preschoolers in the age range of 3 to 6; 68 children were drawn from a low socioeconomic class (mostly of Asian or African origin) and 46 from an upper middle class (mostly of European or American origin). On the basis of the median, they were divided into two age groups: 3–4.6 years and 4.7–6 years. The first included 31 children from the lower middle class and 22 children from the upper middle class. The second included 37 children from lower middle class and 24 children from upper middle class. In this study the children were shown photographs of four men depicting the following prototypes: an Arab dressed in Western clothing, an Arab with traditional headdress (kaffia), and two Jews, one of European or American origin and one of Asian or African origin.³

Image Acquisition

In this study image acquisition was inferred first from expressed attitudes (i.e., evaluations) and then from identification. Each child was shown the four photographs and asked to evaluate the people appearing in them by answering the question “who in your opinion is the least/most lovely man?”

Regardless of age, practically all the children evaluated the Arab with the traditional headdress as the least “lovely” man. When we considered differences in evaluations according to social class, it appears that while the upper-middle-class children differentiated between the photographs of a Jew of Asian or African origin and an Arab dressed in European clothing, preferring the former, the lower-class children did not differentiate between them, rating both men as high as a Jew of European or American origin. This finding indicates that, though relying on appearance, lower-class children, who themselves were mostly of African or Asian origin,

³ The photographs were of middle-aged men, photographed from the waist up, with neutral background, all the same size, with a moustache, without any artifacts (except the kaffia in the fourth photograph), and dressed in civil clothing. The 4 photographs were selected from an initial pool of 300 photographs of Israeli Arabs and Jews. It should be noted that in the Israeli culture Arabs are presented prototypically wearing a kaffia.

did not identify Arabs on the basis of biological features, which might be similar to the ones found in their community. Rather, they focused on the typical artifacts, such as a kaffia, which symbolizes Arabic appearance. On the other hand, upper-middle-class children used both features and clothing for differentiating images.

Subsequently in the interview, each child was shown only the photograph of the Arab with the traditional headdress and asked to identify him. Later the children who did not make a spontaneous identification were shown separately two pairs of photographs, including a Jew of European or American origin with an Arab dressed in European clothing and a Jew of Asian or African origin with an Arab wearing a traditional headdress, and asked to identify "who of the two people is an Arab." In both tasks socioeconomic status did not affect the proportion of identification or recognition; thus we refer to the sample as a whole.

In the first trial, about 10% of the younger children and 38% of the older children were capable of a spontaneous identification of the Arab. However, when a contrast was created, the rate of identification increased. Under these circumstances 72% of the younger and 80% of the older children identified correctly the Arab on both photographs. These findings indicate that by the age of 6 about one-third of the children spontaneously associated the concept "Arab" with a traditional image. With the introduction of the concept "Arab" by the interviewer, the proportion of children who could associate it with an image doubled.

Knowledge about Arabs

Following the identification, each child was asked what he or she knows about Arabs. Only 12% of the children reported having no knowledge about Arabs. Most of those who offered knowledge about Arabs referred to one or more violent acts performed by Arabs. Of the responders 87% mentioned a specific violent act, 43% referred to the Gulf War,⁴ 18% to terror, and 26% to general acts of war. Only 13% of the children reported other types of knowledge about Arabs, such as referring to their language or countries. These findings indicate that although the majority of the children did not identify a prototypical image of the Arab independently, they acquired the concept "Arab," associating it with aggression.

Stereotypes and Attitudes

Finally, all the children were asked to relate to the person with the headdress, with the explicit information that he is an Arab. Some did it after their own identification, and some after being told his identity by the interviewer. They were asked to rate him on four dichotomous traits (nice/not

⁴ The study was done one year after the Gulf War, which apparently left its mark on the children.

TABLE 9.3. *Percentage of Children Expressing Negativity toward an Arab*

Responses	Age	
	3.0-4.6 (n = 53)	4.7-6.0 (n = 61)
Not nice	62	75
Not cute	53	75
Unpleasant	51	72
Unfriendly	62	71
Refused to play with his child	60	66
Refused his coming to their kindergarten	68	67
Refused his coming to their neighborhood	40	64
Refused to sit next to him	55	85

nice, cute/not cute, pleasant/unpleasant, friendly/unfriendly) and to express readiness for a number of social contacts with him (yes/no). The results presented in Table 9.3 show that, in general, the majority of the children attributed to the Arab negative traits, and that the proportion of the negative attributions increased with age. More than half of the younger children refused most of the suggested social contacts with the Arab. This tendency either remained stable or became more pronounced with age. Of special interest is the high relationship between negative attributions and readiness for social contact, indicating that the more negative the evaluation of the Arab, the less readiness for social contact with him.

Sources of Information

Another look at the environmental influences on children’s information regarding social groups is the examination of the sources children identify as providing them with social information. In the study just described, children were asked about the origins of their information about Arabs. Specifically, children were asked whether one of the parents or kindergarten teachers talked with them about Arabs, or did they receive information about Arabs from the television. Children could report more than one source. In responding, 87% of the children said that they learned about Arabs from the television, 81% indicated that one of the parents talked with them about Arabs, and 28% reported that teachers talked with them about Arabs.

Three findings are of special interest. First, the most frequently mentioned source of information about Arabs was television. This implies that most of the children obtain their knowledge about Arabs from an “adult source” concentrating mainly on issues representing the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, at a very young age, children vicariously experience the conflict,

and it may be assumed that this determines their initial socialization and feelings about Arabs. Thus, society has a crucial role in shaping children's beliefs and attitudes. This confirms previous suggestions regarding the role of social information in forming the ethnic attitudes of the very young (Aboud, 1988; Barrett & Short, 1992; Hirschfeld, 1994). Second, many children saw parents as an important source for information about Arabs. Thus, contrary to studies that examined the relationship between parents' and children's ethnic attitudes and reported a low relationship between them (for a review, see Aboud, 1988), our findings suggest that the conflict situation intensifies the communication between parents and children about the sides involved in the conflict, and in such a situation the relationship between parents' and children's attitudes may be different than in the context of ethnicity (Aboud & Amato, 2001). This, however, deserves further examination. Interestingly, children who identified the father as their source of information attributed to the Arabs more positive traits than children who identified the mother as their source of information. Apparently, mothers seem to convey to children more negative information about Arabs than fathers, probably assuming more responsibility for warning them to be careful with regard to suspicious individuals or objects (unfortunately, such messages are justified in the Israeli life context). Third, the low frequency in which teachers were mentioned as a source for this type of information suggests that, despite the fact that the conflict is a very important component in the lives of children, kindergarten teachers tend to avoid talking about it. Possibly, teachers refrain from addressing issues related to the conflict in order to avoid political insinuations. However, children who identified a kindergarten teacher as their source of information about Arabs attributed to the Arabs more positive traits than children who identified other sources of information. Apparently teachers who talk with children about Arabs seem to convey a more balanced view.

Children from Neighborhoods in Which Jews and Arabs Cohabit

The next study (Israeli-Dinar, 1993), also performed in 1992, was conducted in a lower-class neighborhood, where Jews and Arabs cohabit and children may attend either an integrated Jewish-Arab or a homogeneous kindergarten.⁵ The objectives of the study were to examine further the influence of a specific environment characterized by personal contact with Arabs in general and Arab children in particular, on the acquisition of Arab images, knowledge about them, their stereotype, and the attitudes and behavioral intentions toward them.

⁵ The integrated kindergartens were established because Jews and Arabs cohabit in this neighborhood, not because of an ideology.

One hundred preschoolers participated in the study. Their age range was between 2.3 and 6. They were divided into two age groups on the basis of the median (51 were 2.3–4.7 years of age and 49 were 4.8–6). Forty-nine children were drawn from integrated kindergartens and 51 from homogeneous Jewish kindergartens. Surprisingly, the children in the two kindergarten settings did not differ on any of the performed comparisons. Age differences were also scarce and will be reported only when significant. Accordingly, we consider the findings for the whole sample and attribute them to the general environmental context characterized by socioeconomic status and everyday contact due to cohabitation rather than to specific educational environment.

In this study, children were presented with photographs depicting similar persons and asked similar questions as in the previous study, but only spontaneous identification was considered as image acquisition. The spontaneous identification was followed by an interview. Regardless of identification, all the children, including those who did not identify the man with the traditional Arab appearance as an Arab, were asked to attribute traits to this man and to indicate readiness for social contact with him. Those children who identified the man as an Arab were additionally asked to indicate things they know about Arabs and to express behavioral intentions toward them. Two weeks later, those children who did not identify the traditional Arab and rated him without indicating explicitly his identity were shown the same photograph and told that the man on the photograph was an Arab. They were asked to answer again the questions relating to the traits they attribute to the man they saw and about their social and behavioral intentions toward him.

Image Acquisition

More children spontaneously identified the photograph of a man with the traditional Arab appearance as an Arab than in the previous study: 53% from the younger age group and about 73% from the older age group. This clearly indicates that even for the very young everyday contact with Arabs in the neighborhood facilitates identification (i.e., image acquisition).

Stereotypes and Attitudes

In the first interview, the majority of the children without age or kindergarten difference rated the photograph of the Arab negatively (59%–69%, depending on the trait).⁶ Repeating the ratings with the children who did not identify the Arab spontaneously after labeling the man in the photograph as an Arab increased the proportion of negative ratings on each trait by an average of 30%. Once again, these findings indicate that children

⁶ The list of traits was identical with the one appearing in Table 9.3.

who did not identify the Arab referred to a person labeled "Arab" by an interviewer as negatively as those who could identify him.

Also, as demonstrated before, stereotyping was reflected in the knowledge children expressed about Arabs. Regardless of age or kindergarten, the majority of the children (78%), described Arabs in negative terms, referring to their aggression, war acts, terror, and evilness. Only 13% of the children described Arabs using terms such as human beings, speaking Arabic, living in Arab countries. The remaining 9% described Arabs combining negative and neutral terms.

In referring to readiness for social contact (attitudes), there was a significant difference between the younger and older age groups. Whereas 42% to 54% (depending on the question) of the younger children refused to have various types of contacts with the Arab, among the older children the percentage rose to more than 70% (71%–76%).

Behavioral Intentions

In this study, children reported their own intentions toward Arabs. These intentions were mostly negative. The majority of children (66%) proposed aggressive acts such as killing, beating, or imprisoning them, 20% proposed positive acts (to talk or play together), and 14% neutral acts such as to let them work or shop.

Children from Liberal Social Sectors

In the spring of 2000 we continued to examine the effect of social environments, contact between Jewish and Arab preschoolers, and conflict on the acquisition of concepts representing social categories and the attributions to the people these concepts represent. The focus here was on social environments considered as representing liberal segments of the Israeli society. The three samples included in this study were kibbutz children who grow up in an egalitarian atmosphere and ideology, children from a small liberal, upper-middle-class town, and children of low socioeconomic status enrolled in an Arab-Jewish integrated kindergarten but one in which teachers actively promoted coexistence and mutual acceptance. The kibbutz group included 22 children aged 4–5, the upper-middle-class group included 25 children aged 3–4, and the integrated kindergarten group included 16 children aged 3.3–4.6.

In this study children were asked about three categories: the self-reference group ("Israeli"), the outgroup representing the rival in the conflict ("Arab"), and a third category ("Frenchmen"). The last was selected because in Hebrew it sounds similar to the category "an Arab" (Tzarfati and Aravi, respectively). The inclusion of the new, phonetically similar category allowed examining whether children have in their repertoire three distinct categories of "Israeli," "Arab," and "Frenchman," and their ratings of these categories. However, mainly it provided an opportunity

for comparing reactions to the “Arab” who represents the enemy with those to a presumably neutral category representing a stranger, thus enabling one to answer the question whether the differentiation between “an Israeli” and “an Arab” is based just on an ingroup-outgroup differentiation or influenced by the conflict between the groups.

In this study we introduced a new assessment methodology utilizing a decorated booklet illustrated with drawings depicting a child who plays ball in a park. The ball rolled away, and the child followed it. On three different occasions he met “an Israeli,” “an Arab,” and “a Frenchman.” Each child was examined individually. First he or she was told a story introducing randomly each of the three social categories. After hearing the story, the child was asked about his or her knowledge regarding a familiar and neutral concept (flower). Following the answer to this question, the child was asked about the three social categories, “an Israeli,” “an Arab,” and “a Tzarfati.” Regardless of whether the child acquired the concept representing each of the social categories, he or she was asked to rate them on two dichotomous traits: good/bad and pretty/ugly. The results are presented in Tables 9.4 and 9.5.

TABLE 9.4. *Percentage of Children from Three Liberal Environments Who Acquired Three Different Social Categories*

	Israeli	Arab	Frenchman
Kibbutz	68	50	55
Small town	60	48	36
Integrated kindergarten	69	44	31

Note: For kibbutz, n = 22 (ages 4-5); for small town, n = 25 (ages 3-4); for integrated kindergarten, n = 16 (ages 3.3-4.6)

TABLE 9.5. *Percentage of Children from Three Liberal Environments Rating Not-Acquired and Acquired Social Categories*

	Israeli		Arab		Frenchman	
	Bad	Ugly	Bad	Ugly	Bad	Ugly
Not-acquired categories						
Kibbutz	0	0	9	27	30	30
Small town	0	0	8	17	44	44
Integrated kindergarten	0	0	56	78	0	27
Acquired categories						
Kibbutz	0	0	82	73	17	17
Small town	0	0	42	58	44	56
Integrated kindergarten	0	0	0	14	0	0

Note: For kibbutz, n = 22 (ages 4-5); for small town, n = 25 (ages 3-4); for integrated kindergarten, n = 16 (ages 3.3-4.6)

Category Acquisition

In the three locations 60%–69% of the children knew to define the category representing their nationality. Looking at the two other categories, in all the samples between 44% and 50% of the children were familiar with the concept “Arab” and, except in the kibbutz, more children defined it than the concept “Frenchman,” indicating that this category is more familiar. However, the relatively high percentage of children offering knowledge about a similarly sounding label to the label “Arab” indicates an emergence of a clear differentiation between outgroups. It has to be noted that in all three communities a similar proportion of children to that of same-aged middle-class children (Table 9.1) demonstrated acquisition of the concept “Israeli” and “Arab.” This suggests that liberal contexts do not exert specific influence on the acquisition of the concepts representing the ingroup and the most significant outgroup. Interestingly, the lowest proportion of children defining the “Frenchman” as a social category emerged in the integrated kindergarten. This may be attributed to the restricted knowledge and lower conceptual or verbal ability of these children as compared with the children from the other higher-socioeconomic-status communities.

Stereotypes and Attitudes

Regardless of their ability to define the concept representing the self-reference category, practically all the children rated it positively (good and pretty). Again, this indicates that children may be in a stage of not being able to define social categories, but from the ratings they provide, concept acquisition may be inferred. The same may be suggested for explaining the high percentage of negative ratings of Arabs obtained in the kindergarten from children who did not acquire the concept relating to the “Arab” category. As noted, this kindergarten represented a disadvantaged community, in which children might have had difficulties in expressing knowledge in concepts. It appears that for these children it was easier to express their knowledge by negative attributions. On the other hand, for these children an unknown stranger (“Frenchmen”) generated only partial negativity.

In comparison to previous findings obtained from middle- and lower-class city children, for the children from the kibbutz and the small liberal community the unfamiliar word “Arab” aroused less negative ratings. This is striking because the word “Frenchman” did more often. However, in these communities acquisition of the concept “Arab” also implied increase in negativity. Apparently, the liberal attitudes prevailing in these communities were reflected in a delay in negative attributions to Arabs. However, along with categorization and concept acquisition, the negative attributions increased reaching a similar proportion to that in other segments of the Israeli society (Table 9.1). Thus, liberalism as a local influence has only a short-term effect on stereotypes. The kindergarten children who did not acquire the concept “Arab” were similar to children in other segments of

the Israeli society (Table 9.1) in that more than half rated him negatively (78% said he was ugly). Of the children who acquired the category "Arab," only 14% rated it negatively, and only on one trait. This unique characterization of Arabs may be explained by the social learning in this particular kindergarten. As mentioned, in this kindergarten both Arab and Jewish teachers made special efforts to enhance acceptance and positive relations between the two national groups. Although the educational messages were absorbed only by some of the children, their effects are clear.

If we compare the reactions to the "Arab" with those to the "Frenchman," it has to be noted that, since the stimuli were phonetically similar, even for children who manifest conceptual differentiation between the categories it is difficult to rule out auditory generalization. Indeed the findings are not conclusive; nevertheless, there are noteworthy indications. First, we consider the kibbutz and the small-town children. While the informed kibbutz children tended to differentiate between outgroups, expressing negativity mainly toward the Arab, the informed small-town children tended to be equally negative toward both strangers. Also, in the kibbutz sample the frequency of negative attributions to the social category representing the rival was more affected (reduced) by knowledge than attribution to the social category representing a neutral stranger. For the small-town children knowledge about the Frenchman did not make a difference. Apparently, at this young age strangers as such arouse negativism, but differentiation between strangers may depend on the information available in different environments.

Interestingly, the children who attended the integrated kindergarten showed a different trend. In referring to the unfamiliar "Frenchman," only a low percentage rated him negatively and only on one trait. All those who knew the category rated it positively. Apparently, for these children an unknown stranger aroused low negativity, which upon acquiring knowledge was reduced completely. Namely, for these children strangers as such aroused low or no negativity. On the other hand, preconceptual knowledge about the "Arab" elevated the tendency for negative attributions toward him. As suggested before, this type of reaction might indicate that the children actually acquired the concept "Arab" but were lacking the ability to define it abstractly. Based on the differences of ratings between those who did not understand the two categories representing the outgroups and those who did, it may be suggested that, at this young age, knowledge combined with tolerance toward one outgroup encourages a reduction in negativity toward other outgroups. Relating these findings to the previous study, which included a group of children from an integrated kindergarten, it seems that although integration may facilitate image acquisition, concepts are acquired at a slower pace. More important, however, in order to defuse stereotypes at a young age, in addition to bringing children of both groups together, a more focused investment is needed.

Generalization of Attributions to Cultural Representations

The last issue addressed in examining young children was whether children generalize their stereotypic ratings of people to cultural representations and artifacts (Elizur, 2000). The participants in the study that addressed this question were 120 children of three age groups that also included school-age children. The age groups were 5–6, 7–8, and 9–10 years. Each child was interviewed individually and asked first to identify and then to rate six Arab, Jewish Israeli, and Japanese cultural stimuli. As in the case of the “Frenchman,” the Japanese stimuli were selected to control for familiarity and type of relationship between nations, but here the differentiation between outgroup stimuli was very distinct. The stimuli were five male first names, traditional external appearance, houses of prayer, scripts, music, and intonation of languages. The stimuli were comparable with regard to size, color, and length and, in the case of auditory stimuli, in loudness and rhythm. The names were read, appearance was presented on three black-and-white photographs, as were the three houses of prayer. The scripts were presented on the same type of paper; the three recorded pieces of music, which did not include words, were of the same length. The three language presentations consisted of a reading lasting 40 seconds by a male. The ratings were performed on a 4-point Likert scale with the following definitions: (1) very ugly, (2) ugly, (3) pretty, (4) very pretty.

Analyses of variance performed for each stimulus in which age and nationality were independent variables (three age groups \times three national groups) revealed no significant interactions; however, the main effect of nationality was significant for all stimuli, and the main effect of age for two of them. The post hoc analyses for the main effect of nationality revealed significant differences among the ratings of the cultural stimuli of the three national groups. Most of the reflections of the Arab culture were evaluated as lowest (see the means presented in Table 9.6). Specifically, Arab first names, scripts, music, houses of prayer, and language intonation received lowest ratings. With the exception of appearance, the comparable stimuli representing the Jewish-Israeli culture were rated as highest. The Japanese appearance was rated the highest. The Japanese and the Jewish houses of prayer were rated similarly. With regard to age, there were two significant main effects: the evaluations of the Arab house of prayer and language intonation became more negative with age.

In contrast to the previous study that included a non-Arab category showing that the differentiation in attributed negativity to the “Arab” and the “Frenchman” was not consistent, the findings of this study demonstrate that negativity toward Arabs was specific and generalized. The participants in this study who were older than those in the previous study differentiated between a foreign culture (Japanese) and Arab culture, rejecting mainly the latter. Thus, the rejection appears to be a generalized

TABLE 9.6. *Generalization Effect: Mean Evaluations by Children in Three Age Groups of Artifacts Representing Arab, Japanese, and Israeli Jewish Cultures*

Cultural Artifact	Arab				Japanese				Israeli or Jewish			
	5-6	7-8	9-10	Total	5-6	7-8	9-10	Total	5-6	7-8	9-10	Total
First name	1.88	1.70	1.50	1.69	2.63	2.35	2.05	2.34	3.43	2.90	2.95	3.09
External appearance	1.58	1.25	1.33	1.38	2.85	2.90	2.73	2.83	2.58	2.13	2.45	2.38
House of prayer	3.68	3.35	3.25	3.43	3.65	3.80	3.80	3.75	3.95	3.80	3.68	3.81
Script	1.98	1.75	1.93	1.88	2.10	3.03	3.08	2.73	3.88	3.80	3.83	3.83
Music	2.28	2.90	2.53	2.57	2.93	3.35	3.20	3.16	3.50	3.40	3.58	3.49
Language intonation	1.70	1.40	1.48	1.53	2.83	1.93	2.00	2.23	3.98	3.95	3.85	3.93

Note: For all age groups, n = 40. Ratings are based on a 4-point Likert scale: 1 = very ugly, 2 = ugly, 3 = pretty, 4 = very pretty.

phenomenon expressed not only toward people but also toward artifacts that represent them and their culture. The findings in the two studies suggest that the age at which the specific orientation toward "Arabs" as a differentiated category may be expected to emerge is 5–6.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The diverse data obtained in the studies with the preschoolers may be interpreted from various points of view. Our interest, however, was in the way the influence of a context of an intractable conflict is reflected in the findings. As proposed in Chapter 8, we endorse an integrative developmental-contextual approach for the understanding of acquisition and development of shared social repertoire. The underlying assumption of our work was that development occurs in context. Accordingly, the primary task of the developing child is to apply the evolving cognitive and personal skills for making sense of his or her place in the world, to become a meaningful part of it, and to participate in its activities. The studies with preschoolers provided an opportunity for empirically documenting the acquisition and expression of the social knowledge prevailing in the developmental context of the participants and to follow the evolution of their dialogue with the context from its very beginning to their becoming a part of this context. The social knowledge we examined relates to different aspects of the mental representations of in- and outgroups. Naturally, in a conflict the outgroup of interest represents the enemy.

The mechanism enabling the child to become a part of the social-cultural context is communication, exercised through the use of language (Nelson, 1996; Nesdale, 2001). Because we recognize the role of language and early experiences in the acquisition of the building blocks of social knowledge, our focus on the first years of life is obvious. Indeed, to our knowledge our studies are innovative in that we explored the acquisition of social repertoires beginning with very young children, differentiating among components such as words, concepts, images, and identities and examining the knowledge, stereotypes, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and other related issues such as influences of specific environments, sources of information, and generalization tendencies.

Acquisition of Words, Concepts, Identities, and Images

The first question for consideration was at what age words representing the self-reference group and the rival group appear in a child's vocabulary, thus opening the opportunity for communication, for information processing, and for further conceptual, imaginary, and affective development in the domain the words represent. Next, accounting for the social information expressed in the given social context (see Chapters 4–6), at what age might

societal influences be reflected in children's concepts, images, social knowledge, stereotypes, and attitudes.

Based on the findings regarding lexical development (Anglin, 1993; Dromi, 1999; Nelson, 1996), we launched the study of the acquisition of words, concepts, and images, representing in- and outgroups and the related stereotypes and prejudice at the age of 2–3. Surprisingly, at this early age almost all children were familiar with the word “Jew” and more than half with the word “Israeli” (Table 9.1), thus indicating that vocabulary representing social context has been acquired *before* the age of 2. The relevance of these words is demonstrated in the fact that almost all the children at the age of 3–4 acquired them, as did the two older groups (4–6 and 5–6). The word representing the enemy, “Arab,” appeared in the children's vocabulary a year later, at the age of 3–4, and at the age of 5–6 most children (82%) possessed it. This means that the vocabulary identifying the self-reference group is acquired about a year before that identifying the enemy. However, conflict contributes to the salience and relevance of all three words and to their early acquisition.

To our knowledge, previous work on word acquisition differentiated between words representing nouns, verbs, and emotion but did not document the acquisition of domain-related words. It seems that such documentation may provide information regarding the evolution of awareness and experiences in the different domains. For example, the findings we report demonstrate that in the social domain of Jewish Israeli children, despite the conflict, for many children the acquisition of the word “Jew” and Jewish identity precedes that of the word “Israeli” and Israeli identity. Apparently, ethnic and religious awareness precedes national awareness. Royle, Barrett, and Buchanan-Barrow (1998) reported the same finding for Muslim and Christian children in Cairo, Egypt. They stated that religion was a salient aspect of children's identities and appeared to be more important than their gender or nationality.

After documenting the acquisition of words referring to ingroup and the specific outgroup representing the enemy, the interest turns to the understanding of these words. Understanding may be inferred from the expressed knowledge related to social categories or from their conceptual definitions. Our data demonstrate a discrepancy between possessing a word and understanding it. Although at the age of 2–3 the majority of Jewish Israeli children seem to acquire the words identifying them ethnically and nationally (“Jew” and “Israeli,” respectively) and begin to categorize themselves using these words (Table 9.1), still at this stage none of the children was able independently to associate meaning with these words or to define them as representing social groups. The ability for associating meaning or revealing understanding that these words refer to particular groups of people was demonstrated first by age 3–4. Thereafter we observe a progression with age; nonetheless, not all the children in the oldest group reached the

conceptual level. This confirms Hirschfeld's (1995) suggestion that a conceptually based theory of social categories emerges at about the age of 3–4 and continues to develop thereafter. The conceptual mastery of the word "Arab" coincided with its acquisition. It emerged at the age of 3–4, but with the progression of age here as well a discrepancy between lexical and conceptual mastery is evident. At the age of 5–6 about 82% of the children possessed the word, but only 68% acquired it as a concept. Similar results for concept acquisition were obtained in another study (Table 9.4).

The discrepancy between word and concept acquisition is not unique for children growing up in a context of conflict. The fast learning of words – or, as termed by researchers, "fast mapping" (Heibeck & Markman, 1987) – often creates a discrepancy between knowing a word and its conceptual understanding (Nelson, 1996). Thus, although there is evidence that categorization may occur even in the first year of life, young preschoolers still produce context-related and global categories (Nelson, 1973). Later, Nelson (1996) explained that "restricted comprehension is observed because accrual of meaning outside the context of first use is a slow and uncertain process" (p. 140). Other discrepancies we observed were between acquired words, concepts, identities, and images on the one hand and stereotypes and attitudes on the other. First, however, we consider the acquisition of images, identities, and ingroup and outgroup stereotypes and attitudes.

The results regarding acquisition of images recount mainly the acquisition of images of the outgroup. If we differentiate between spontaneous identification and recognition, it may be said that spontaneous identification of images, namely an independent matching of a mental image (image behind the eyes) and a displayed image (image before the eyes), emerged at a slower pace than verbal concepts. However, recognition of preidentified images began to emerge already during the second year of life and, depending on the sample, by the sixth year reached the proportion of 73%–100%. These results demonstrate that the acquisition of verbal concepts and spontaneous recognition of images are of similar difficulty, apparently demanding a similar level of cognitive development. On the other hand, recognition of preidentified images by an interviewer represents an intermediate stage of categorization and thus may be manifested by younger children. Interestingly, the results indicate that whether recognition was spontaneous or guided by preidentification, the images more easily identified as Arabs were of traditional appearance. This demonstrates an early acquisition of knowledge regarding socially accepted symbols representing Arabs (see Chapter 6). Additionally, it confirms the importance of appearance in defining images especially for the very young (Bigler et al., 1997; Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Piaget, 1951; Ramsey, 1987) and opposes Hirschfeld's (1994, 1995, 1996) view that minimized the influence of observations.

Researchers agree that in a conflict-free context children exhibit acquisitions of ethnic or national identity when they reach the age of 4 (Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Asher & Allen, 1969; Barrett & Short, 1992; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988; P. A. Katz, 1987; P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978; Vaughan, 1987; Williams et al., 1975; Williams & Morland, 1976) According to our findings children developing in a context of conflict begin to manifest acquired ethnic and national identities at the age of 2–3. As a matter of fact, in one of the studies (Table 9.1) more than half of the participants in this age group were able to identify themselves as Jews or Israelis. This early appearance of ethnic and national identities indicates that a context of conflict accelerates their acquisition.

Acquisition of Stereotypes and Attitudes

An obvious reflection of the context of conflict was evident in the content, feelings, and social preferences (stereotypes and attitudes) related to the words, concepts, and images representing in- and outgroups. Many researchers contend that along with the acquisition of ethnic and national identities preschoolers favor the ingroup and reject the outgroup (Asher & Allen, 1969; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995). Recently this contention was challenged and the suggestion made that at a young age ingroup favoritism is not necessarily accompanied with outgroup rejection (Aboud, 2003; Brewer, 1999; Cameron et al., 2001). However, following Brewer (1999), all agree that this may differ in a context of conflict. In order to examine this question most effectively, two conditions were specified: differentiation between the assessed targets and nonconfounded measures of positivity-negativity. Although in the studies reported in this chapter only the first condition was met, the findings shed light on this issue. The findings obtained in our studies indicate a predominant ingroup favoritism expressed already by children at 2–3 years (Table 9.1). In all the studies we report, the expression of such attributions and feelings increased with age and at 5–6 years reached 90%–100% of the responders.

Attributions and feelings expressed toward the rival group showed a reverse pattern: whereas a remarkable percentage (50%) of children aged 2–3 expressed positivity toward Arabs, the positivity decreased rapidly (Table 9.1). On the other hand, negativity, which was relatively low in the youngest groups, increased rapidly (Tables 9.2, 9.3). By dividing the youngest group in one of the studies into age ranges of 2–2.5 and 2.6–3 years, we were able to ascertain that the turning point occurred in the second group. Thus, whereas most of those aged 2–2.5 (80%) were unaware of the social sentiment toward Arabs, children aged 2.6–3 acquired it, many of them before acquiring this word, concept, or image. Looking at the age

patterns of expressed ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity demonstrates that, in a context of conflict, intergroup perception and attitudes reflect both ingroup positivity and often expressed outgroup negativity, both increasing with age. An additional demonstration that in the context of conflict even young preschoolers manifest both ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity could be found in the contents and attitudes expressed in the spontaneous narratives. These free-response narratives toward separated targets in which the child determined the positivity-negativity responses were not confounded. As such they provide an answer for the positivity-negativity issue at a young age in conflict. Indeed, repeatedly, the free responses indicated predominant ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity characterized mainly with aggressive and violent attribution as well as expressed threat. A high proportion of children in this age group expressed social rejection for the Arabs, higher than toward a neutral figure (Tables 9.2, 9.3).

Relating stereotypes and attitudes to the acquisition of words, concepts, and images revealed another impressive influence of the context. Three of our studies showed that when Arabs were considered, even though word, concept, or image acquisition was not demonstrated, negativity had been expressed or positivity was low. On the other hand, when Jews, Israelis, or people of Western appearance were considered, negativity was not expressed or was low and positivity was high (Tables 9.1, 9.2, 9.5). Barrett and Short (1992), who examined attitudes held by British schoolchildren aged 5–10 toward four European nations, reported the same findings: despite the fact that the younger children (aged 5–7) in their sample had little factual knowledge about the Germans, they disliked them most. In explaining this finding, Barrett and Short (1992) assumed, as we do, that this reflects contextual influences. They explained that the negative response toward German people “possibly stems from the frequently unsympathetic portrayal of Germans as the enemy of the English in war stories that appear in children’s comics, books, films, and television programs” (p. 360). The same explanation holds for the results obtained for our young participants, only that we show the contextual effect on both positive and negative ratings and feelings for the two target groups. The fact that these influences are absorbed very early warrants attention to the messages available to children and to their consequences.

Another discrepancy to be mentioned emerged between identity acquisition and stereotypes and attitudes (Table 9.1). In all age groups the percentage of children who expressed positive biases toward the ingroup exceeded the percentage of those who manifested identity acquisition. This finding replicates previous findings indicating that there might be instances in which even before categorizing themselves as members of a national group, children express preference for the ingroup (Bennett et al., 1998). Bennett et al. (1998) concluded that identification with the ingroup is not

a precondition for ingroup favoritism and attributed it to the influence of “socially shared knowledge.” Children may absorb national sentiment and socially available information before knowing to define their personal relation to that sentiment or information. As indicated in our findings, in conflict such processes occur earlier in the development and are evident in discrepancies between word and concept acquisition, concept and image acquisition, expressed outgroup negativism, and finally identity acquisition and favoritism.

Generalization Tendencies

The findings regarding generalization in this age group are conclusive. First, we have repeatedly observed correspondence among responses. In most of the studies, ratings, feelings, wish for social contact, and narratives expressed the same ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity.

With age, generalization became obvious and consistent. Older children (5–10 years) manifested it in rating all Arabic cultural artifacts more negatively than those representing Jewish Israeli culture or other outgroup’s culture (Table 9.6). The younger preschoolers (3–4.6 years) manifested generalization inconsistently. It was expressed in the rating of traits only by one group of the participants (Tables 9.4, 9.5). Thus, our findings demonstrate that the differentiation of Arabs from other strangers begins at a very early age; their negative stereotyping and the negative attitudes toward them increase with age, and so does the tendency for generalization. Additional data in Chapters 10 and 11 confirm this finding.

Environmental Influences

We approach the discussion of environmental influences referring to the different specific microenvironments we examined and to influences from the macroenvironment, namely the intractable conflict.

Specific Microenvironments

The different segments of the Jewish Israeli society represented in our studies are ethnic origin or socioeconomic status, cohabitation of Jews and Arabs, integrated educational settings, and ideology. Interestingly, in contrast to studies with adults that report influence of socioeconomic status, ethnic origin, and ideology on negativity and stereotyping of Arabs (for a review, see Chapter 7), preschoolers from different social groups displayed similar negativity toward Arabs. This reflects the trend identified in children from majority groups for rejecting minority groups (Aboud, 1988). Referring to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), it may be suggested that motivations for enhancing social esteem also intensified outgroup rejection. The threat so frequently associated with the

Arabs most probably also initiated antagonism, estrangement, and negative generalizations (Aboud, 1988; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Thus, the macro-influence of the conflict cuts across specific environments. The generalized negativity toward Arabs is embedded in the Israeli Jewish society as a whole and absorbed by the younger generation at a very young age. It is assumable that the negativity and the threat reinforce each other.

The only dissimilarity between children from the two ethnic origins that emerged in the findings indicates a difference in the cues on which they relied for recognizing Arabs. Children of Asian or African origin identified an Arab relying on the most conspicuous typical appearance (headdress) and not on facial features, whereas children from European or American origin relied on both. We have attributed this difference to the possible physical resemblance between people belonging to the ethnic group of children from Asian or African origin and Arabs and thus their tendency to dissociate themselves from Arabs by relying on the most clear, external difference.

Another finding that may be attributed to environmental influences is that compared with lower- and middle-class children, fewer children from the liberal communities who did not acquire the concept representing Arabs expressed negativity toward them (Tables 9.1–9.3, 9.5). The influence of liberalism, however, has a short-term effect, and once children acquired the concept “Arab,” they became as negative as children from other communities, indicating the decisive influence of the macrocontext.

In the two integrated kindergartens, integration as such did not produce differences in the tendency for stereotyping or prejudice. Only integration accompanied with direct promotion of egalitarian views by teachers made a difference. This, of course, has implications for prevention.

Occasionally, environmental influences may reveal a fine distinction. For instance, still relating to the children from the two integrated kindergartens, it appears that children from a mixed neighborhood who attended integrated kindergartens acquired images of Arabs at a younger age than other children. On the other hand, just attending an integrated kindergarten did not facilitate concept acquisition (Table 9.4). Possibly this difference emerged because the task in the two studies differed. Identification of familiar images demanded less abstraction than verbal conceptualization. Additionally, however, it may be suggested that because the stimuli in both studies depicted men, the task for children from a mixed neighborhood was easier. In a mixed neighborhood, exposure to men is common. In contrast, when the meeting ground for children is only a kindergarten, exposure is mainly to Arab children, their mothers, and women teachers. At this young age, the latter group may experience a delay in the acquisition of concepts representing specific men. It would be interesting to test this proposition by comparing studies that utilized photographs and drawings of men or that presented questions relating to men with similar studies involving depictions or questions relating to children or women.

Sources of Information

Inquiring directly about sources of information about Arabs, we found that the main sources of information were television and parents, particularly mothers; teachers were rarely identified as sources of information. The exposure to the information disseminated through television is apparently one of the reasons for the early acquisition of negativity toward Arabs. Because child-oriented programs on Israeli television that present Arabs are rare, children who mention television as their main source of information refer to programs created for adults, particularly the daily news. In the context of news the focus is on confrontation and violence. Thus, apparently, many children process information about Arabs without the awareness of adults and without any guidance or further enlightenment. They associate the aggression so often presented in this context with the words, concepts, and images and build a negative, hated, and threatening prototype of the social category labeled "Arab." The fact that at the same time objective or balanced information is not available makes children particularly susceptible to the biases that are inherent in media presentations (Barrett & Short, 1992).

The powerful influence of television, particularly on very young children, could be utilized for the dissemination of more differentiated and balanced information. Indeed, such attempts were proposed within the context of ethnic attitudes (Graves, 1999) and even in the Middle East (Bernstein, 1999). Such use of television may constitute the path for forming a more diverse view about the enemy. Schools may be another source of differentiated and balanced information we have demonstrated, as teachers may make a difference.

Parents were identified by 81% of the children as a source of information about Arabs. This indicates that in the context of conflict very young children absorb information also from parents. Unfortunately, in our studies we concentrated only on the children; thus, we do not have information about the nature of messages delivered by parents and about the relationship between the social attitudes of parents and children. The relationship between parents' and children's attitudes has been examined previously, and the findings are inconclusive. Some have reported low correlations (see a review by Aboud, 1988; and findings reported by Weigel, 1999, for Polish children). Others have reported high correlations (Epstein & Komorita, 1966; Fabian & Fleck, 1999; Fagot et al., 1992; Mosher & Scodel, 1960). Based on our findings, we assume that because conflict creates opportunities for communication between parents and children about the "enemy," such communication produces similarity between the social perceptions and attitudes of parents and children. Aboud and Amato (2001) also mention this possibility; future examinations would clarify this issue. Also our findings indicate that the difference between the influences of the two parents is worth pursuing.

Macroenvironment

The results obtained from the studies in which preschoolers were targeted or participated provide ample information regarding the influence of an intractable conflict on the development of young children's social repertoire and their experiences. Despite the fact that the studies were carried out at a time in which the conflict subsided and the peace process was in progress, the ethos of conflict, which is strongly rooted in the Israeli society, still dominated the cognitive and experiential lives of the very young children. In Chapter 11 we observe the influence of the recent flare-up of the conflict, though not on the very young. For them, even in a relatively calm period, the conflict is an important component of their development and being.

We assumed that conflict elevates ethnic and national awareness. Thus, children growing up in an atmosphere of an intractable conflict acquire social categorization along with favoritism toward the ingroup and negativity toward the outgroup, and this occurs at an earlier age than for children growing up in a nonviolent environment. All the results obtained in the studies with preschoolers confirmed that indeed conflict has the predicted influence, and this has important implications for societal considerations regarding the socialization of its very young members.

The fact that the conflict determines the establishment of the social repertoire and its nature is also evident in the preoccupation of preschoolers with aggression, reported experience of threat, and generalized negativity. The preoccupation with aggression has been demonstrated in the spontaneously expressed definitions and descriptions of Arabs. Most of the children resorted to extremely aggressive content such as killing, stealing, fighting, throwing bombs, and terrorism. They attributed to Arabs aggressive intentions, and even more strikingly, in the one study in which they were provided with an opportunity for expressing their own intentions, they also voiced the same aggressive content of killing, beating, or imprisoning.

The aggressive content and feelings associated with Arabs most probably contribute to the fact that children both see Arabs as threatening and report that Arabs arouse in them an experience of threat. This may be considered as the first cornerstone for the foundation of stereotypes and prejudice. As noted by Aboud (1988), being threatened in childhood initiates the cycle of avoiding those who arouse threat, increasing the negativity toward them, and building up the stereotypes and prejudice about them. These feelings, in turn, initiate new experiences of threat and negativity, and the cycle keeps reinforcing itself. The long-term effects of the early preoccupation with aggression, the reported experience of threat, and the generalization of negativity have still to be examined. However, our findings indicate that if intervention is considered it has to be implemented

very early and directed at age-relevant issues. Developmental studies may point out such issues. Indeed, in Chapter 11 we look again at preschoolers within a developmental range of 4–16 years, trying to identify additional age-related issues.

CONCLUSION

In a context of conflict, words representing the ingroup begin to be acquired before the age of 2–3, and at the age of 5–6 are possessed by almost all. Words representing the enemy begin to emerge a year later at the age of 3–4, and at the age of 5–6 most children possess them. Concepts representing the ingroup and the enemy begin to emerge at the age of 3–4. At the age of 5–6 the first are acquired by 77% of the children, but those relating to the opponent by 68%. The acquisition of ethnic and national identities also begins before the age of 2–3; however, only from the age of 4–5 does it seem to be conceptually based. The spontaneous identification of images was of low frequency even for older preschoolers. On the other hand, recognition of preidentified images by an interviewer was manifested already by the age of 2.5–3.5 and by most of the older preschoolers – between 73% and 100%, depending on the study. This suggests that independent matching of images before and behind the eyes is more difficult than conceptual expression of social categories. On the other hand, the provision of a concept, which converts the task to a recognition task, facilitated the process of matching images. The spontaneous identification, and the guided recognition by preidentification, indicated that images more easily identified as Arabs were of traditional appearance.

As in studies conducted in other places, Jewish Israeli children frequently accompanied the words, concepts, and images representing their social group with positive attributions and feelings. At the same time, the outgroup, representing the “enemy,” consistently triggered negative stereotypes and attitudes. The early emergence of negativity toward the outgroup is undoubtedly caused by the conflict. The reciprocal expression of ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity shows that in a conflict even young preschoolers manifest full biases that include both ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection. Interestingly, many children expressed stereotypic attributions and negative attitudes before they manifested acquisition of the relevant concepts or images. Probably, children learn to associate with outgroup members the connotations transmitted by the environment (television or family), often before they gain an understanding about groups and the people who belong to them. Children tended to generalize stereotypes and attitudes to cultural artifacts representing social groups. They favored those representing the ingroup and disliked particularly those representing the enemy. In general, gender does not influence these patterns.

At preschool age, specific environments did not exert influence on stereotypes and attitudes. The few environmental influences that emerged were different cues used for identifying Arabs by children from Asian or African origin and children from European or American origin. Cohabitation facilitated recognition but did not reduce negative stereotypes and attitudes. On the other hand, shared school environment moderated negativity toward the Arabs when accompanied with direct educational intervention. In liberal communities children tended to delay the expressed negativity toward Arabs to the stage they manifested concept acquisition. Environmental influences may be also inferred from the sources of information children identify. The most frequently mentioned source was television.

Studies with Schoolchildren, Adolescents, and Young Adults

In the eight studies reported in this chapter, we focused on issues similar to those considered in the studies with preschoolers. More specifically, the aims of the studies with schoolchildren, adolescents, and young adults were to continue the examination of image acquisition as reflected in independent identification of images of Arabs, the information acquired about the Arabs, and the sources for this information. Further, we were interested in examining the changes occurring with age in these images as reflected in the content of stereotypes relating to them, the attitudes, and intentions toward them. In some of the studies we examined the influence of specific social environments or status, and finally we compared stereotypes and attitudes toward Jews and Arabs and toward other specific Arab or non-Arab national categories.

The assessment methodologies were also similar – namely, mostly assessment measures such as interviews based on photographs, rating scales, and questionnaires. However, all were adapted to the age of the responders by including more items and covering a wider spectrum of topics. In all cases the targets were addressed or rated separately, and positivity-negativity was not confounded.

The presented findings were obtained from participants covering an overall age span of 7–24. This age span included schoolchildren aged 7–11; adolescents, representing different stages, aged 11–17; and young adults aged 22–24. In most of the studies the age groups represent a year-by-year division. It is important to mention that the oldest adolescent group (16–17) represents participants who begin procedures for army recruitment. Because army service in Israel is compulsory for all men and women and its length differs according to gender, rank, and assignment, at the age of 17 we had to interrupt the year-by-year sampling. The young adults aged 22–24 included in the studies were students at Tel Aviv University, namely, participants who completed their army service.

As noted, the examination of this broad developmental span is unique, and the representation of the continuous stages of adolescence deserves special mention. Such representation covers a gap observed by Phinney (1990, 1993), who pointed out that relatively little empirical attention has been devoted to the study of social attitudes of adolescents. The inclusion of young adults, as a comparison group, particularly for the adolescents, is also innovative and completes the frame for the developmental picture. Thus, the studies to be reported present an attempt to expand the developmental perspective regarding stereotypes and prejudice moving from the traditional focus on preschoolers and young schoolchildren up to late adolescence and young adults. This change in focus represents also a change in the theoretical perspective. While the studies with preschoolers and young schoolchildren tested mainly predictions stemming from theories relating to cognitive development (Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988), the theoretical framework for predictions relating to older participants relies more strongly on theories related to the development of personal and social identities (Erickson, 1968; Marcia, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and on theories related to context (Nelson, 1996; Selman, 1980) or realistic conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif et al., 1961).

Accordingly, based on the integrative developmental-contextual approach presented in Chapter 8, we expected that due to the decisive influence of cognitive development, despite the experiences generated by the conflict, the youngest participants in the studies, namely, the elementary schoolchildren (aged 7–10 years) would express relatively low negativity toward the Arabs and relatively low favoritism toward Jews. On the other hand, based on theories of identity development and contextual perspectives, we expected that early adolescents and adolescents (aged 11–15 years) whose experience is centered on the consolidation of self-identity would express highest negativity toward Arabs and highest favoritism toward Jews. The negativity and favoritism were expected to decline during late adolescence (16–17) and young adulthood (22–24). The expectation for the adolescents was based on the assumption that their cognitive and personality developments reach a stage allowing moderation in social attitudes. As noted in Chapter 8, we refer to the described developmental trajectory as one with a zigzagging pattern. The expectation for the young adults rests on the assumption that they represent a uniquely moderate segment of the society.

As in the studies with the preschoolers, in all the samples and subgroups we included a similar proportion of males and females, but here as well only a few of the preliminary analyses revealed gender differences. Accordingly, gender was not considered a factor in analyses pertaining to measures or dependent variables, and we refrain from reporting the exact numbers of males and females in the different groups. This strengthens our previous

suggestion that gender differences in intergroup perception and attitudes are overshadowed in the context of an intractable conflict.

IMAGE ACQUISITION

The findings for the preschoolers indicated that most of them acquired words, concepts, ethnic and national identities, stereotypes, and attitudes relating to Jews, Israelis, and Arabs. On the other hand, depending on the study, spontaneous ability to identify images was acquired by less than half of the participants. We continued to explore the development of the acquisition of images of Arabs as reflected in their spontaneous identification by schoolchildren and different groups of adolescents as well as the criteria used for the identification. Further, we continued examining the categorization of the category "Arabs," as reflected in the knowledge about them, the amount of contact children and adolescents have with Arabs, and their sources of information about Arabs. Finally, we also looked at stereotypic attributions and attitudes.

The studies that extended the examination regarding the images of Arabs were performed in 1996 by Godsi (1998) and Koren (1997). They compared reactions of 153 children and adolescents (aged 7–17 years) to different images of Jews and Arabs. The participants were divided into age groups – 7–8, 9–10, 11–12, 12–13, 14–15, and 16–17 – with 25 to 27 participants in each group. All were shown 16 photographs that depicted 8 Jewish and 8 Arab people: 4 boys about 12 years old, 4 girls of the same age, 4 men of about 40 years old, and 4 women of the same age. The people differed in clothing (traditional Arab versus Western) and in physiognomic features (dark versus light hair and skin color). In each age group and gender, one person was dressed in traditional Arab clothing (long dress) and had Arab features (dark hair and skin), one person was dressed in Western clothing and had Arab features, one person was dressed in Arab clothing and had Western features (light hair and skin), and one person was dressed in Western clothing and had Western features. Each participant was presented with the photographs in a random order and asked to identify the Arab people: "Who from the people you see is an Arab?"

The results showed that about the same majority in each age group correctly identified as Arabs the people with Arab features, wearing Arab clothing (the means for the four representatives were 66% for the youngest age group, then 76%, 75%, 77%, and 78% for the following groups, and 82% for the oldest group). However, there were some significant age differences with regard to the use of clothing or features as identifiers. Whereas the two young age groups (7–10) tended to identify more people with Western features dressed in Arab clothing as Arabs than people with Arab features dressed in Western clothing, the older age groups (12–13 and older) showed an opposite trend, identifying more people with Arab features dressed in

Western clothing as Arabs than people with Western features dressed in Arab clothing.

Following the identification task, participants were asked to reiterate about the cues they used for identifying Arabs. The first question was "Do Arabs wear a particular type of clothing?" Almost all the participants gave a positive answer (85% and more, depending on the age group). When asked what kind of particular clothing Arabs wear, the great majority referred to a long dress (galabiya) and a head cover (kaffia). However, when asked whether they can identify an Arab on the basis of clothing in the street, about half of the younger age groups (7–12) responded positively, whereas the great majority of the older age groups (14–17) responded negatively, realizing that Arabs may also wear nontraditional clothing. Also, the answers to a question inquiring "Do Arabs have unique physiognomic features?" showed the same age differences. Of the children aged 7–12 years, 80% answered positively, whereas only 50% of the older participants gave this answer. Those who gave a positive answer pointed out skin color (80%), hair color (35%), physiognomic features of the face (15%), and wearing a moustache or a beard (12%). These are additional indications for the fact that the social categorization of children till age 12 tends to rely on external cues such as clothing and physical features (see Chapters 9 and 11) and suggests that their prototypical representation of an Arab is acquired from cultural products (e.g., books and television) that portray Arabs in a traditional way. Later, adolescents learn to realize that clothing is an unreliable cue. They understand that Arabs may wear different types of clothing; likewise, physical features may also mislead, as people of different social categories may have similar physical features and people from the same social category may have different features.

Knowledge about Arabs

The next questions posed to the participants inquired regarding more general knowledge about Arabs and in effect investigated the understanding underlying the definition of the social category labeled "Arabs." The participants were asked whether Arabs have one language, whether every person speaking Arabic must be an Arab, or whether every Arab has to speak Arabic. Additional questions related to the religion of the Arabs and to their countries. As to the language, almost all the participants (95%) knew that Arabs speak Arabic. At least 92% in each age group said that upon meeting an Arab he or she will necessarily speak Arabic. Also, almost all participants (at least 92% in each age group) realized that Arabs not only speak Arabic but may speak other languages. With regard to religion, 81% of the youngest group (aged 7–8 years) thought that Arabs have one common religion, Islam, but in all the other age groups the percentage was lower (48% to 68%). When asked whether every Muslim has to be an

Arab, 50% of the youngest age group and 70% from the older children and adolescents gave a negative answer. When asked whether an Arab has to be a Muslim, about 70% in all the age groups gave a negative response. All the participants knew that Arabs live in Arab countries; however, the great majority (over 80% in each age group) noted that a person living in an Arab country does not have to be an Arab and that an Arab does not have to live in an Arab country. Almost all (90%) of the adolescents (aged 14–17) knew that an Arab can also be an Israeli, but among the younger participants the percentage was lower (50%).

Thus, at about the age of 12, when reaching early adolescence, most Israeli children and adolescents have a broad understanding of the social category labeled “Arabs.” The majority knew that Arabs speak Arabic, live in Arab countries, and that most practice Islam. However, they also knew to qualify this knowledge.

Stereotypes

In these studies stereotyping and attributed intentions were inferred from open questions such as “Do Arabs have common personality traits?” or “Is it possible to determine whether a person is an Arab based on his or her intentions toward Jews and toward the state of Israel?” The answers to these questions showed age differences. While more than half (55%) of the children aged 7–10 gave a positive answer, only 33% of the older participants did. When all those providing a positive answer were asked to describe these traits, 70% referred to negative characteristics, mostly associated with violence. The affirmative response to the questions about intentions also decreased with age: 78% to 61% in the younger age groups, and only 45% in the older age groups. The majority of the younger participants who gave an affirmative answer attributed to most of the Arabs negative intentions toward Jews and toward the state of Israel. In contrast, the older group attributed such intentions only to part of them. Put together, despite the pronounced negativity toward Arabs, the findings indicate a decrease in homogenization and increase of moderation with age.

Sources of Information

The majority of the children and adolescents reported that their knowledge about Arabs came from television (55%). Only 40% of the youngest group mentioned this source, but from the age of 9–10 television was the most frequently mentioned source of information (lowest frequency was 62%). Of the whole sample, 25% mentioned parents as a source of information; 20% of the older adolescents mentioned newspapers, while the young groups did so rarely (9%). Surprisingly, only about 10% of all the respondents, equally represented across ages, mentioned school as a source of

information. Studying older children, we inquired about personal contact as a source of information. The majority (60%) of the two youngest groups reported never meeting an Arab. The percentage decreased with age, and in the older groups only 20% reported the same. From those who reported they met Arabs, only 10% reported they had frequent contact with them.

INFLUENCES OF SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

The next three studies present results obtained from different segments of Israeli society. The first study, performed in 1995, represents a secular middle-upper-class group, mostly of European and American origin, and serves as a comparison for the two other studies. The age range of the participants was 8–24. It included 442 participants from six age groups: 73 were 8–9, 69 were 10–11, 67 were 12–13, 80 were 14–15, 74 were 16–17, and 79 were 22–24. The first two groups were drawn from an elementary school, the next two groups were drawn from a junior high school, one group was drawn from a high school, and the last group was drawn from students at Tel Aviv University. The university students were drawn from the population of students from the social sciences and humanities and may be defined as representing the more liberal and dovish sectors of Israeli society.

After establishing that most of the schoolchildren acquired the concepts representing the self-referent and the Arab categories, were able to recognize Arabs, and were able to identify them spontaneously, in the studies that follow the focus was on stereotypes, attitudes, and intentions toward Arabs. Stereotyping was assessed by three measures: a free-response measure represented in an open question asking about the most salient trait of Jews and Arabs, a predetermined list of 18 characteristics that they were asked to rate, and attributed intentions to Arabs. The 18 characteristics for rating Jews and Arabs were determined by a pilot study, in which 150 children and adolescents were asked to list the most salient characteristics of Arabs and Jews. Characteristics that were noted by at least 80% of the respondents for each social category (nine for Arabs and nine for Jews) were included in the rating list. In order to include an equal number of positive and negative characteristics, occasionally opposites were used. The list of characteristics included: clean, good, thief, smart, terrorist, lazy, beautiful, fresh, stinking, strong, educated, liar, cruel, loyal, hospitable, coward, sociable, and violent. These characteristics were separated into positive and negative ones (Cronbach alpha for the negative characteristics was .82 and for the positive ones .86). Rating was performed by indicating on a 5-point scale the percentage of people in each group characterized by each trait. More specifically, the rating indicated the incidence of each trait in each group: (1) none of them, 0%; (2) few, 25%; (3) half, 50%; (4) many, 75%; and (5) all of them, 100%. Attributed intentions to Arabs, which also represent

stereotypes, were inferred from answers to the question: "In your opinion, how many Arabs want to annihilate the state of Israel?" The responses to this question were given on a 5-point scale ranging from (1) none of them, 0%, to (5) all of them, 100%.

Attitudes were expressed in feelings toward Arabs and in indicating readiness for social encounters with them. The list of feelings included hate, fear, disgust, anger (negative feelings); and liking, pity, closeness, and understanding (positive feelings). The responses were given on a 3-point scale: (1) no such feeling, (2) moderately experienced feeling, and (3) strongly experienced feeling. Readiness for three types of social encounters with "an Arab of your age and gender who speaks Hebrew" were indicated considering three possible encounters: to meet with him or her, to host him or her in your home, and to befriend him or her. The responses for each possibility were dichotomous, yes or no, and provided a scale from 0 (not ready for any contact) to 3 (ready for the three types of contact).

Behavioral intentions toward Arabs were inferred from the question: "In your opinion, what should we do to the Arabs." Three alternatives were presented: (1) fight them until they will accept our conditions, (2) do not negotiate with them and leave the situation as it is today, and (3) make peace with them through mutual compromises.

Stereotypes

The results obtained for the open question are presented in Table 10.1. They reveal that the task triggered more response classes related to Arabs than to Jews and that the pattern of attributions is inverted: positive to Jews and negative to Arabs. The characteristic most frequently spontaneously attributed to the Arabs was violence (evil, terrorist, cruel). Other characteristics such as animosity toward Israel (hate Israel, want to hurt or destroy Israel), negative traits (bad, lazy, liar), or negative descriptions related to appearance (dirty, ugly) followed, but with noticeably lower frequencies. Interestingly, neutral (wears a kaffia, is neither good nor bad), positive (good, hospitable, peace loving), and empathetic characteristics (persecuted, suffering, unfortunate) appeared also as spontaneous attributions to Arabs. The spontaneous attributions to Jews were mainly positive (good, smart, peace loving) and rarely negative (greedy, insolent).

Looking at the distribution of the various attributions across the age span reveals that the youngest participants were most biased attributing to Arabs mainly violence and hardly any positive characteristics. On the other hand, most of them attributed to Jews mainly positive characteristics and hardly any negative ones. With age, fewer children attributed to Arabs violence while more attributed to them neutral, positive, and empathetic characteristics. When relating to Jews, with age fewer children attributed to them positive characteristics and more attributed to them negative and

TABLE 10.1. *Percentage of Responses Obtained for the Question about the Most Salient Characteristic of Arabs and Jews*

Classes of Responses	Attributions to Arabs at Age					Attributions to Jews at Age						
	8-9 (n = 73)	10-11 (n = 69)	12-13 (n = 67)	14-15 (n = 80)	16-17 (n = 74)	22-24 (n = 79)	8-9 (n = 73)	10-11 (n = 69)	12-13 (n = 67)	14-15 (n = 80)	16-17 (n = 74)	22-24 (n = 79)
Violence	78	38	34	29	19	11	-	-	-	-	-	-
Animosity toward Israel	8	9	-	4	4	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Negative characteristics	1	12	6	9	9	11	1	-	2	5	15	23
Negative appearance	3	6	16	3	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Neutral characteristics	1	13	15	26	26	28	1	12	21	20	20	14
Positive characteristics	4	13	9	13	13	13	88	84	64	54	41	34
Empathetic characteristics	1	3	-	1	1	9	1	1	-	9	-	4
No response	3	7	19	16	16	18	8	3	13	13	24	25




FIGURE 10.1. Positive and negative attributions to Jews and Arabs and expressed feelings toward Arabs.

neutral ones. None of the participants attributed to Jews violence, hostility, or negative appearance. Despite the reduction in the percentage of children making positive attributions toward Jews and the increase in the percentage of children making such attributions toward Arabs, the discrepancy between the percentage of children making these attributions to the two target groups remained evident, indicating a positive bias toward Jews. Interestingly, while with age neutral attributions toward Arabs increased steadily, their attributions to Jews were less consistent.

The analyses of the responses obtained from the rating scales yielded significant interactions of national group \times age. The results depicted in Figure 10.1a replicate the previously described linear trends. At the early age, children tended to attribute to Arabs negative characteristics and to Jews positive ones. With age the positive stereotyping of Jews and negative stereotyping of Arabs decreased (the range of the respective means was 4.33–3.22 and 3.68–2.63), while the negative stereotyping of Jews and positive stereotyping of Arabs increased (the range of the respective means was 1.99–2.58 and 2.34–3.03). Interestingly, at the age of 22–24 the negative attributions toward Jews and Arabs reached the same level, and the positive attributions, though higher for the Jew, became closer to each other. Doyle et al. (1988) define the trend indicating a simultaneous decline in ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity or a simultaneous increase in ingroup negativity and outgroup favoritism as a counterbias (see Chapter 8).

The analysis of the attributed intention revealed an age effect, which also indicated that with age the wish to annihilate the state of Israel was attributed to a lower percentage of Arabs. However, the means ranged

between 3.26 and 4.04, indicating that the respondents believed that between half and the majority of Arabs wants to annihilate the state of Israel.

Attitudes

The analyses of positive and negative feelings toward Arabs yielded significant age effect only with regard to negative feelings (for positive feelings the means ranged from 1.78 to 1.53, and for negative feelings from 2.41 to 1.83). The expression of negative feelings decreased significantly with age and approached the level of positive feelings; however, here the pattern is not linear. Again, the youngest were most negative and least positive toward Arabs. Those aged 10–11 manifested moderation in a reduced expression of negative feelings that remained at the same level till the age of 14–15. From this age they declined till eventually in the oldest group both types of feelings became very similar. The changes in the positive feelings though showing a mirror image of the negative ones, with the same turning points, did not reach significance (Figure 10.1b).

The readiness for social contact with Arabs also increased with age. However, on a scale with the span of 0 to 3, the means ranged from .74 for the youngest group to 1.74 for the oldest age group, indicating that overall the Israeli Jewish children, adolescents, and young adults are hardly ready for social contact with Arabs. Although about 65% of the youngest group did not wish to have any contact with an Arab, in other age groups the percentage varied from 16% to 34%. Also, whereas only about 11% of the youngest children were ready to have all three types of contacts, in the three oldest age groups the percentage was between 36% and 43%. All the groups expressed more readiness for meeting an Arab than either for hosting or befriending him or her.

Intentions toward Arabs

The behavioral intentions of the respondents toward Arabs present a different inclination, with about 64% of them suggesting that peace be made through mutual compromises. Participants from the youngest group (70%) and from the two oldest groups (79% and 86%, respectively) expressed this intention most frequently. In the three other age groups, namely, those aged 11–15, the percentage varied between 42% and 52%. Also, in these groups a high percentage of respondents (38%–45%) preferred the most extreme alternative – “to fight the Arabs until they will accept our conditions.” The similarity between the youngest and oldest participants in expressing moderate behavioral intentions toward the Arabs is an unusual finding, occurring only once in our divergent data. On the other hand, the extreme negativity of pre- and young adolescents is a reoccurring finding.

In order to further examine environmental influences on the developmental trends affecting the psychological repertoire of Israeli children and adolescents, we conducted two replication studies, using most of the measures and procedures as in the previous study. Same-aged schoolchildren and adolescents were included, but young adults were not. The examined samples represented specific social segments of Israeli society, such as the secular lower class, mostly of African or Asian ethnic origin; religious middle class of mixed ethnic origin; and new immigrants. We report the results for these studies generally, focusing on the comparison of the findings with those obtained in the previous study representing middle-upper-class participants.

In 1999 Phillips-Berenstein (2001) examined a group of 181 children and adolescents from the secular lower class, mostly of African or Asian ethnic origin, and a group of 178 children and adolescents representing a religious middle class of mixed ethnic origin, all ranging from 8 to 17 years of age. The two social groups were almost equally represented in the following five age groups: 8–9 (65 participants), 10–11 (93), 12–13 (67), 14–15 (68), and 16–17 (66). The interest in these social groups stemmed from the research findings presented in Chapter 7 showing that socioeconomic status, ethnic origin, and religiosity affect stereotypes and attitudes toward Arabs.

In general, the results show that the two groups did not differ in the percentages of Jews and Arabs to whom they attributed negative or positive traits. A review of the specific results indicated that the proportion of attributions to Jews and Arabs changed with age, showing a tendency for a counterbias. That is, while the proportion of Arabs attributed negative traits decreased and that of the Jews increased, the proportion of Arabs attributed positive traits increased and that to Jews decreased. These trends were evident till the age of 14–15. However, the oldest age group (16–17) diverted from this trend and from the trend observed for this age group in the 1995 study, composed of middle- and middle-upper-class respondents, mostly of European or American origin. In this study, those aged 16–17 years assigned negative traits to significantly more Arabs and positive ones to fewer Arabs than did those aged 14–15.

The increase in the proportion of Jews attributed negative traits occurred at the age of 10–11, and the decrease of the proportion to whom positive traits were attributed occurred at the age of 12–13. From these points, both types of attributions to the Jews remained stable through the years. Importantly, a comparison between the means obtained for the different age groups in this study and the respective means obtained in the 1995 study showed that overall the levels of the attribution of positive and negative traits to Arabs and Jews in the two studies were very similar. An analysis of the attributed intentions to Arabs also showed that the two groups in this study did not differ; neither did they differ from the participants in the 1995 study. Age effect indicated that with the exception of the oldest

group, with age the respondents attributed negative intentions to fewer Arabs. As with traits, the oldest group attributed negative intentions to more Arabs than did those aged 14–15.

With regard to attitudes, the two groups did not differ in their negative feelings toward Arabs, and these feelings decreased with age. The major decrease occurred in the age range of 14–15, but in the oldest age group (16–17) they elevated again. No effect for age was found for the positive feelings. A comparison of the means of the two types of feelings with those obtained in the 1995 study shows that they did not differ in intensity. The analysis of the readiness for social encounters with Arabs shows an increase with age, dropping in the oldest group (16–17). Finally, the analysis of the behavioral intentions did not yield group or age differences. It shows that the majority of the children and adolescents preferred “not to carry on any negotiation with Arabs and to leave the situation as it is today” or “to fight Arabs until they will accept our conditions.” This result differs from the finding obtained in the 1995 study, where most participants preferred mutual compromising and peacemaking.

The next study is unique in providing an opportunity for tracing the acculturation of immigrants as reflected in the acquisition of the conflict-related repertoire upon immigrating to a country engulfed in an intractable conflict. Usually studies of the acquisition of a prevailing psychological repertoire apply to the very young. Studying the acquisition of a specific repertoire in an immigration country, we had the opportunity for documenting it for older children and adolescents. A study carried out in 1998 (Fridkin, 2001) aimed to trace the acquisition of stereotypes and attitudes toward Arabs by immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Fridkin administered the questionnaires used in the previous studies to 360 children and adolescents representing three age groups (10–11, 13–14, and 16–17) with an equal number of participants ($n = 120$) in each group. Half of the participants in each group had been in Israel three years or less, and half arrived at least seven years before their participation in the study. Accordingly, the groups were identified as recent immigrants and old comers. Half of the participants in each group immigrated from the Asiatic republics and half from the European republics of the former Soviet Union.

With regard to stereotyping, the analyses show that old comers rated Arabs more negatively and less positively than the recent immigrants; also, the former rated Jews less negatively and more positively than the latter. Immigrants from the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union rated Arabs more negatively and less positively than those who immigrated from the European republics of the former Soviet Union; also, the former rated Jews less negatively and more positively. With age, all participants manifested moderation in the negative rating of Arabs and in the positive rating of Jews. As others, participants in this study attributed to half or more than half of Arabs negative intentions (intend to annihilate the state

of Israel). The findings for attitudes are similar to those of rating traits. Old comers expressed more negative feelings and less positive feelings toward Arabs than did recent immigrants; also, the former were less ready to have social encounters with Arabs than the latter. Immigrants from the Asian republics expressed more negative feelings and less positive feelings toward Arabs than those who immigrated from the European republics of the former Soviet Union. Older adolescents expressed more positive feelings for Arabs and were more ready for social encounters with them than the younger groups.

Finally, with regard to behavioral intentions toward Arabs, the analyses again yielded similar results. That is, old comers and immigrants from Asian republics expressed more negative intentions toward Arabs than recent immigrants and immigrants from European republics. With age all expressed more positive intentions toward Arabs – that is, children expressed more negative intentions than adolescents. However, as in the first study, the majority of the participants (68%) suggested pursuing peace through mutual compromises.

DIFFERENTIATION AND GENERALIZATION

An important question in the study of stereotypes and attitudes is the issue of differentiation and generalization. In the studies with the preschoolers we attempted to study differentiation by comparing reactions to the label “Arab” and “Frenchman” and generalization by comparing ratings of cultural artifacts. With the older participants these issues were examined looking at ratings of people identified as belonging to different Arab nations and the attitudes toward them. The target people were Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians, and Arabs. “Arabs” is a generic social category, while the other four represent neighboring nations of the state of Israel and have different types of relations with Israel. Egypt and Jordan have a peace treaty with Israel. The Syrians have no peace treaty or agreement with Israel, but from time to time inconclusive negotiations take place. The Israelis hold the Syrians responsible for much of the terror directed toward Israel and view them as extremely rigid and cruel. Palestinians represent the “enemy” and are the people with whom Israel is involved in the intractable conflict. At the time the study was conducted, however, Palestinians and Israelis had ongoing negotiations and a series of interim agreements, but simultaneously Palestinian extremists carried out terror attacks. Naturally, the comparison of the ratings of the Palestinians and the attitudes toward them with those of other Arab nations are of special interest.

In order to examine the differentiation issue, in 1995 we conducted a study including 410 participants in the age span of 8–24. Till the age of 17 they were assigned to five year-by-year groups: 62 were 8–9, 55 were 10–11,

76 were 12–13, 64 were 14–15, and 75 were 16–17. A sixth group included 78 young adults (22–24), who were university students.

The participants were asked to answer a questionnaire relating to stereotypes and attitudes. In this study the assessment of stereotypes included rating 14 bipolar traits (clean-dirty, bad-good, smart-stupid, ugly-pretty, industrious-lazy, strong-weak, friendly-unfriendly, traitorous-loyal, educated-ignorant, hospitable-inhospitable, cowardly-courageous, lying-trustworthy, violent-peaceful, cruel-compassionate). The traits were rated on a 5-point scale and factor-analyzed for each national group. The results showed a consistent emergence of two factors: a factor of appearance and social traits (clean, pretty, good, friendly, loyal, hospitable, trustworthy, peaceful, and compassionate) and a factor of potency-wisdom traits (smart, industrious, strong, educated, and courageous). The reliability of the scales produced by these factors was examined in each of the age groups, yielding Cronbach's α values of .86–.90 for the first and .63–.82 for the second. Attitudes were assessed by expressing positive and negative feelings and with the same readiness for the social encounters scale we used before.

The scores obtained for the six age groups for the five assessed variables (social and appearance, potency-wisdom, positive and negative feelings, readiness for social contact) regarding each social category (Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians, and Arabs) were subjected to two-way ANOVAs (age \times social category). All the analyses yielded significant interactions. The interactions are presented in Figure 10.2.

A general look at Figure 10.2 reveals that, irrespective of age, on all the variables the participants grouped the nationalities into two subgroups. One included Egyptians and Jordanians, and the other included the remaining nationalities: "Arabs," Palestinians, and Syrians. With one exception (those aged 10–11; Figure 10.2d) those in the first group were rated more positively and aroused more positive attitudes than those in the second group. There were no differences between the scores of the Egyptians and Jordanians, and hardly any differences among those of the Palestinians, Syrians, and Arabs (Figure 10.2e).

The age-related findings are also similar for all the variables. As portrayed in Figure 10.2a–e, the youngest group reported lowest positive ratings and highest negative ratings for the "bad" nations and lowest negative ratings and highest positive ratings for the "good" ones. Thus, the discrepancy between the "good" and "bad" nations in the youngest group was largest and significant. With the exception already mentioned, children at age 10–11 manifested similarity to the younger group but more often moderation. In the age range of 12–17, abrupt shifts emerged; the group at age 12–13 showed the most consistent peaks. The oldest group (22–24) tended to rate and relate to all nations similarly. The two instances in which even young adults manifested a differentiation were with positive




FIGURE 10.2. Attributed traits, expressed feelings, and readiness for social contact with representatives of five Arab groups.

feelings toward the Syrians and negative feelings toward the Egyptians and Jordanians (Figure 10.2c, d). The expressed feelings toward the Syrians reflect the uniquely negative national sentiment toward them. The other findings indicated a generalized negativity toward Syrians, Palestinians, and the generic label representing Arabs as opposed to Egyptians and Jordanians.

In 1999, before the last escalation of the conflict with the Palestinians, the preceding study was replicated with 26 adolescents aged 12–13 years and 27 aged 14–15. The purpose of the replication was to examine the same questions with adolescents drawn from a lower social class, mostly of African or Asian origin. The target nationalities were the same five national groups. The results showed that these adolescents also differentiated between Egyptians and Jordanians, on the one hand, and Palestinians, Syrians, and Arabs, on the other. On all the variables (three clusters of traits, negative and positive feelings, and readiness for social encounters), the two first nationalities were rated more positively or less negatively than the other three ones and generated more positive attitudes. No difference was found between the ratings of Egyptians and Jordanians as well as among Palestinians, Syrians, and Arabs. Of special interest is the finding that, in general, the older adolescents tended to evaluate all the national groups more negatively than the younger adolescents, but this tendency was especially evident toward Palestinians, Syrians, and Arabs.

The last study reported in this chapter (Gal-Or, 1998) was carried out in 1996 with the objective of comparing the way Jewish Israeli children and adolescents rate and relate to their own nation, to Arabs, and to other non-Arab nations. This continued the examination performed in the previous study questioning whether the representations of the Israelis and the Arabs (in general) are unique when compared with other nations (out-groups). Another objective was to examine the predicting power of factors mentioned in the literature as affecting stereotypes and attitudes, such as perceived similarity (Lambert & Klineberg, 1967), quality of relationship with one's national group (Lambert & Klineberg, 1967; Sherif, 1967; Sinha & Upadhyaya, 1960), and sense of knowledge about the different nations (Lambert & Klineberg, 1967), to the rating of Arabs and other nations. In this study the participants were 305 preadolescents and adolescents covering the age range of 10–17. They were divided into four age groups, 10–11, 12–13, 14–15, and 16–17 years, with 65, 83, 83, and 74 participants, respectively.

The target nationalities were selected in a pilot study that assessed perceived similarity with Israelis and rated the quality of relations with Israel. The perceived similarity to the Israelis and the quality of relations between the given nation and Israel were assessed on a 5-point scale ranging from "not similar" or "bad" to "similar" and "good." Seven nationalities were selected: Americans, English, French, Arabs, Chinese, Indians,

and Kenyans. Americans were rated as most similar and as having most positive relations with Israel ($M = 3.43$; $M = 4.75$, respectively). On both variables Americans were followed by the English and the French (for similarity, $M = 2.66$, $M = 2.55$, respectively, and for quality of relations $M = 3.98$, $M = 3.71$, respectively). On the ranking of similarity, Arabs came next ($M = 2.13$), while on the ranking of quality of relations they came last ($M = 1.80$). Chinese, Indians, and Kenyans were ranked as quite dissimilar ($M = 1.96$, $M = 1.88$, $M = 1.75$, respectively), but as having pretty good relations with Israel ($M = 3.49$, $M = 3.23$, $M = 3.27$, respectively). The sense of knowledge was assessed for all nations including the Israelis by a question asking participants to rate their knowledge regarding each nation on a 5-point scale ranging from "a little" to "a lot." Participants reported knowing most about Israelis and Americans ($M = 4.77$, $M = 4.09$, respectively), and pretty much about the Arabs and the English ($M = 3.35$, $M = 3.43$, respectively). The rated knowledge for the four remaining groups (French, Chinese, Indians, and Kenyans) ranged between $M = 2.92$ and $M = 1.94$. The names of the participating nations were presented to the participants in a random order.

The dependent variables in this study were stereotypic perception and attitudes. Stereotypic perception was evaluated by a questionnaire including eight bipolar traits rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale for each nation. Factor analyses of the ratings rendered the same three factors for all nations. The factors were very similar to those obtained in the previous study with similar alpha values: "social" (friendly, good, honest), "appearance-intellectual" (pretty, clean, smart), and "potency" (strong, industrious). Attitudes were examined by expressed feelings (like-hate), rated on a 5-point scale, and expressed readiness for social contact ("to meet," "to host in your home," and "to befriend" a member of a given nation, "of your gender and age"), rendering a 1–3 scoring scale. The findings of interest in this study are mainly those for the Arabs and for the Israelis; accordingly we refrain from tedious comparisons of all the results for all the examined nations.

Stereotypes

The ratings for the three factors were analyzed utilizing ANOVAs in which the independent variables were the eight nations and the four age groups, and the dependent variables were the different ratings and expressions. The results, presented in Figure 10.3, provide consistent results indicating that Arabs constitute a specific outgroup. For all three factors, significant interactions between age and nation emerged, indicating with one partial exception that in all age groups Arabs were rated significantly more negatively than all the other nations. The exception may be observed in the findings for the potency factor showing that only children aged 10–11 rated




FIGURE 10.3. Attributed traits, expressed feelings, and readiness for social contact with Israelis, Arabs, and representatives of six other nations.

the Arabs and Indians significantly lower than all other nations. Beginning at the age of 12–13, the potency ratings of the Arabs and Indians increased and became similar to those of all other nations. This pattern held till the age of 16–17; these findings replicate the findings reported before that Arabs generate as high a rating on potency as Israelis and other nations.

The age-related trends for the three factors were also consistent, indicating that at the age of 10–11 children manifested the largest differentiation between the Arabs and all other nations and that at the age of 12–13 the negativity toward Arabs mellowed and remained stable. Thus, again, while the school-age children generalized and rated the Arabs most negatively on all characteristics, older participants began to introduce moderation to their ratings. However, despite the moderation, except for potency the ratings of the Arabs were always far below those of the other nations. As reported in all the previous studies, the positive ratings of the Israelis decreased with age.

Attitudes

The data for the expressed feelings and the wish for social contact repeat the previous pattern showing a distinctive rejection of the Arabs as compared with all the other nations. Namely, Arabs were rejected more extremely than all others. At the age of 12–13, a moderating trend appeared, but the data still show the Arabs in the most rejected place and keep a significant gap between them and all the other nations. The negativity in the feelings expressed toward Arabs reappeared at the age of 16–17, while social distance remained stable. The decrease in ingroup favoritism was minor and evident only in the variable of social distance.

Considering all the findings, this study demonstrated that the negativity toward the Arabs surpassed the negativity toward all the compared nations. Despite the moderating effect of age and one instance of similarity in rating (potency), the general trend was very consistent. The most critical variable for age-related shifts were expressed feelings changing from group to group. Ingroup favoritism and its stability were also clearly demonstrated.

PREDICTORS OF STEREOTYPES AND ATTITUDES

Of special interest are the results obtained from multiple regression analyses that tried to ascertain the effect of rated quality of relations, perceived similarity, and sense of knowledge on the stereotypes and attitudes toward each of the nationalities. Summarizing the findings generated from all the regression analyses conducted for each of the nationalities

except Israelis¹ and Arabs (Americans, English, French, Chinese, Indians, and Kenyans), we conclude that no systematic pattern emerged – that is, the different predictors were inconsistently associated with the different measures of stereotypes and attitudes. The findings for these nationalities serve as a general background, and we refrain from reporting the detailed results for them and focus only on the results that were obtained for the Arabs. As reported, Arabs were perceived as having the worst relations with Israel and were depicted as quite low in similarity to Israelis. The sense of knowledge about Arabs surpassed the midpoint of the scale.

The results obtained from the multiple regression analysis for the Arabs indicate that the perceived quality of relations was associated with all measures of stereotypes and attitudes. All associations were positive. Namely, better-perceived relationships were associated with more positive trait ratings and attitudes. Perceived similarity was associated only with expressed feelings, and sense of knowledge was associated only with the rating of potency. Thus, in addition to the information regarding the unique representation of Arabs in the social repertoire of young Israelis, this study also informs us about the possible factors contributing to this uniqueness. With the Arabs, apparently due to the conflict situation, perceived type of relations gained in importance, affecting practically all the trait ratings and the two measures of attitudes. Personal knowledge (irrespective of accuracy) determined the potent image, and perceived similarity affected feelings-attraction.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The studies reported in this chapter expand the age span, focusing on school-children and different stages within adolescence, covering the age range of 7–17. In two of the studies a group of young adults (with an age range of 22–24 years) was also included. Except for the acquisition of vocabulary and concepts reflecting in- and outgroup categorization, we attended to similar issues examined with the preschoolers. First, focusing on the images of Arabs, we continued to trace image acquisition as reflected in spontaneous identification and the categorization, knowledge, stereotypes, and prejudice associated with it. As with preschoolers the objective was to trace the developmental trajectory of the acquisition of the shared psychological repertoire in a context of an intractable conflict and in the way it is expressed mainly toward the enemy. Influences of specific environments also gained attention, and so did questions regarding sources of information and differentiation-generalization tendencies.

¹ The analysis for Israelis in this context is not relevant.

Developmental Overview

Image Acquisition and Categorization

The first two studies continued the examination that began with the preschoolers relating to the acquisition of Arab images and the cues used for their spontaneous identification. Whereas the spontaneous identification of images even by the older preschoolers representing the mainstream Israeli society was scarce (depending on the sample, 20% or 38% of the children succeeded), in the studies that followed with older participants, by the age of 7–8, 66% of the children correctly identified as Arabs people with Arab features, wearing Arab clothing, and from the age of 9–10 and on, most of the children did so. Up to the age of 12–13 the identification was based mainly on clothing, and from this age on it relied more on facial features. The shift from reliance on clothing to facial features was reflected also in answers to direct questions inquiring about identification cues. However, it is interesting that, despite this shift, when asked about clothing 85% of the participants still said that Arabs wear specific traditional clothes. As with preschoolers, the findings indicated that the most obvious cues of appearance (clothing) are involved in the categorization of social images for a longer time than proposed by Hirschfeld (1994, 1995, 1996). Also, this means that till about the age of 12–13, and actually for most of the participants, the prevailing image of Arabs is a stereotypic image of traditional people. Since in a modern society traditionalism is associated with primitivism and low socioeconomic status, this view reflects degradation. Only at the age of 12–13 did the traditional image begin to be replaced by a more respectable (i.e., modern) image.

With age, the knowledge regarding the social category identified as Arabs became more diverse and accurate. A minority of the older participants even reported frequent personal contact with Arabs. Nevertheless, there were questions that about 30% of the adolescents did not answer or did not answer correctly. In light of the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major issue on the Israeli agenda, Arabs constitute about 20% of the citizens of the state of Israel, and all of Israel's surrounding neighbors are Arabs, this is a surprising finding. Possibly, it reflects lack of interest in acquiring information about Arabs, a defensive denial negating their existence, or simply an educational failure.

Indeed, continuing to look at the sources of information, the most striking finding was that only 10% of the participants in the age range of 7–17 mentioned school as a source of information about Arabs. This means that despite the information presented in school textbooks (see Chapter 5), children and adolescents perceive the school system as hardly relating to one of the most important issues in their lives. The vacuum created by the schools intensifies the messages coming from other sources and their emotional impact. Indeed, as with the preschoolers, young children and

adolescents reported that their main source of information about Arabs was television. Naturally, this source provides information mostly about the Arab-Israeli conflict and focuses on violence and atrocities. Thus, not surprisingly, when presented with an open question asking for the most salient trait of Arabs, as in the sample of preschoolers, the traits mentioned most frequently were violence and animosity toward the Jews and the state of Israel. The youngest participants in the studies in which this question was asked, children at the age of 7–9 years, were the most vulnerable for absorbing this information (see Koren's study and the results reported in Table 10.1).

General Trends

One of the most important contributions of our studies is the systematic look at the socialization of the young generation as reflected in the acquisition of the shared psychological repertoire in a specific social context. Obtained for a wide age range, the findings provide ample developmental information as to the changes occurring with age in the content of stereotypes and level of prejudice. This information is of interest because, to our knowledge, few studies traced the development of social repertoires of schoolchildren through preadolescence and the different stages within adolescence, and very few examined such development in an intractable conflict. The fact that the findings were replicated in several studies representing mainstream Israeli society, in specific segments of the Israeli society, and with different assessment methodologies strengthens their theoretical and practical implications.

A general developmental overview of the stereotypes and attitudes expressed by the groups in the age span covered in the different studies indicated a consistent trend of ingroup favoritism and a degradation or rejection of the outgroups representing the enemy, that is, "Arabs," and when specifically targeted, "Palestinians." In all the studies that compared these groups, for most age groups and variables, the Jews or Israelis received high positive and low negative ratings or attitudes, whereas the Arabs and the Palestinians received most negative and least positive ratings or attitudes. With age, negativity toward the outgroups declined and positivity increased (Table 10.1; Figure 10.1a, b; Figure 10.3a–d for Arabs in general; Figure 10.2a–e for specific Arab nations; and Figure 10.2a–e for Palestinians). At the same time, the ingroup negativity increased and positivity decreased (Table 10.1; Figure 10.1a; Figure 10.3a, b, c, e). However, while the developmental trajectory for the ingroup was very smooth, indicating progressive trends, the developmental trajectory for the outgroup was characterized with abrupt shifts. This suggests that the development of ingroup representation is influenced by gradual maturation of cognitive faculties and personality, while the development of the representation of the outgroup is influenced at different ages by different factors or by their

different combinations. Having mentioned the general tendency for the ingroup (see Table 10.1; Figure 10.1a; Figure 10.3a–e), we focus mainly on the developmental trajectory of the outgroup.

The general overview also indicates that as preschoolers the young ages sampled in the studies presented in this chapter expressed both ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity. Of special interest is a new observation based on the repetitive finding that the age trajectories of stereotypes (ratings of characteristics) were smoother than those of attitudes (expressed readiness for social encounters and feelings) (Figures 10.1, 10.2, 10.3). Apparently, maturation is expressed first in the content of attributions toward enemies. Feelings change slowly, if at all. Especially, the negative feelings resist change, or are susceptible to abrupt changes (Figures 10.1b, 10.2d). These qualifications may be relevant for planning prevention or intervention. Additionally, we demonstrated the importance for an extended look at social repertoires, including both stereotypes and prejudice and different measures for both.

Age-Related Perspective

The age-related predictions we proposed reflect our integrated developmental contextual approach. The integration refers to cognitive and personality development within a specific context. More specifically, after ascertaining that during the preschool years positivity toward the ingroup and negativity toward the outgroup increase linearly, we expected that because of the leap in cognitive development from preschool to school age (Aboud, 1988), at age 7–9 children would manifest milder biases expressed in mild ingroup preference and mild outgroup rejection. Later in the developmental trajectory, due to the destabilization and insecurity in self-identity that intensify self-enhancement motivation (Erickson, 1968; Marcia, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), early adolescents would manifest most negative outgroup biases and most positive ingroup biases. Finally, along with the maturation of cognitive skills, moral judgment, and social perspective (Kohlberg, 1969; Selman, 1980) and stabilization of self-identity (Erickson, 1968; Marcia, 1980), late adolescents would manifest a reduction of both biases. Because the young adults who participated in the studies represent a very liberal segment in Israeli society, they were expected to continue the moderating tendencies.

The examination of the results for the specific groups draws on different studies and numerous comparisons. To avoid tediousness, we point out developmental trends, taking into account that occasional misfits to the predicted pattern are expected to occur. First, as a departure point, attention is directed at findings obtained from the middle-class participants (Table 10.1; Figures 10.1, 10.2, 10.3). The findings relating to the youngest group of middle childhood repeatedly disconfirmed the prediction for them. Here, practically all the findings indicated that whether composed

of children aged 7–9 or 8–9, this group expressed the most extreme biases, reporting highest negativity and rejection toward Arabs along with highest positivity or preference toward the ingroup. These results differ from the findings reported for these age groups in previous studies characterizing them as an age of moderation in the expressed stereotypes and attitudes toward outgroups (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995). One explanation for the difference is that in our studies these children were compared not with preschoolers but with older participants – namely, with participants who were cognitively more advanced and more mature in their moral judgment and social perspective. Thus, when compared with older participants the children aged 7–9 came out as most biased. A more plausible explanation may be related to their growing up in a specific context of an intractable conflict. Being the youngest group, they were more susceptible to emotional arousal (threat and fear) than the older groups. As suggested for preschoolers, negative emotional arousal may be the cause for social biases (Aboud, 1988). This also corresponds with findings from the adult literature (see Chapter 8). The fact that an overwhelming majority of the youngest participants attributed to Arabs violence (Table 10.1) and most negative intentions (see, e.g., the reported findings from the Godesi and Koren studies) suggests that, in conflict, a wider range of children may be affected by the influence of negative emotional arousal. The examination of sources of information suggests that the arousal may be traced to information absorbed from television. This demonstrates the circularity suggested in the model presented in Chapter 1 and by Silverstein and Flamenbaum (1989) pointing out that stereotypes affect emotions, and emotions strengthen the stereotypes, thus feeding a vicious cycle that reinforces itself.

Further on the developmental trajectory, from the age of 7–9 on, the changes toward the ingroup indicate stability, a smooth decrease in positivity, or a smooth increase in negativity. For the outgroup, although a general trend reflects a decrease of negativity and increase of positivity, the trajectory is characterized by abrupt changes. Within this pattern, children at age of 10–11 quite frequently manifested moderation in expressing less negativity and more positivity toward Arabs than the youngest group (Table 10.1; Figure 10.1a, b; Figure 10.2a, d, e). However, these trends of moderation were accompanied by instances maintaining the inclinations manifested by the younger group or even by an increase of in- and outgroup biases (Figure 10.2b–d; Figure 10.3a–e). The existence of the two tendencies suggests that in the examined context, age 10–11 is a transition age, indicating the attainment of a more mature social perspective and tolerance. Apparently, in a context characterized by an extreme emotional arousal, children need more time for applying newly acquired cognitive faculties and to be able to consider milder social views and attitudes toward the enemy.

Those at age 12–15 years represent the early adolescent and adolescent groups. Because of the salience of identity issues, they were expected to manifest peaks of negativity toward the outgroup and of positivity toward the ingroup. However, the responses of children at 12–13 continued to show a mixed pattern of moderating trends for the predicted outgroup negativism. Examples of similarity to the younger group or moderation toward the outgroup are shown in Table 10.1 and Figure 10.1a, b for negative feelings, Figure 10.2a, b, c, e for Arabs, and Figure 10.3a–e for Arabs. Examples of peaks or increase of outgroup negativity are shown in Figure 10.2a, b, c for Palestinians and Figure 10.2d for both Arabs and Palestinians. Because those at age 12–13 systematically differentiated between the general term “Arabs” and the specifically identified enemy “Palestinians,” downgrading and rejecting the second (Figure 10.3a–e) and peaking in negative feelings toward both (Figure 10.3d), their reactions fall more within the predicted pattern, pointing out that they establish their self-worth by comparison with the most clearly identified enemy. It appears that, in the Israeli context, the age span of 10–13 may be seen as a prolonged transition period characterized by occasional moderations that are accompanied with differentiated outgroup negativity allowing especially for the gratification of self-enhancement needs for those aged 12–13.

On the other hand, those aged 14–15 who were expected to display moderation displayed quite consistently a maintenance or escalation of outgroup negativity (Figures 10.1b, 10.2a, c for Syrians; Figures 10.2d, 10.3a, b, d, e), thus being the group to express most frequently distinct outgroup negativity and rejection. Looking at the response patterns of the early and middle adolescence, regardless of the specific variable or targeted nation, an erratic configuration emerges. The abrupt shifts in these groups reflect the instability in their social views and attitudes. This instability may be indicative of underlying insecurity regarding identity and of the intensification of self-enhancement motives. The explicit expression that tends to manifest ingroup favoritism and outgroup degradation conforms to socially desirable repertoire and sentiment and thus serves the function of self-enhancement.

For the oldest adolescents (16–17), the prediction was for a decrease in negativity and increase in positivity toward Arabs and vice versa toward Jews. Examples for positive changes toward Arabs may be seen in Figures 10.1a, b; 10.2c (Syrians are an exception); and 10.3c, d. However, instances of increased negativity or rejection of the outgroup appeared as well (Figure 10.2d, e). Apparently when, on the one hand, cognitive abilities mature and social perspective becomes more focused on individuals (Selman, 1980) and, on the other hand, identity becomes more secure (Erickson, 1968; Marcia, 1980), older adolescents generally accept similarities between themselves and the enemy. Indeed, a repetitive finding indicates that either due to a decrease in ingroup favoritism or ingroup

negativity (Figures 10.1.a, 10.3c) or due to an increase in outgroup positivity and a decrease in its negativity (Figures 10.1a, 10.3a–c), the ratings of the Jews and Arabs begin to approach each other. As noted, this was especially evident for the ratings of the different traits. Expressed feelings and attitudes yielded less consistent trends (Figure 10.2c, d, e), which suggests that, in a conflict, moderation in stereotypes may appear with age; however, moderation in prejudice is less consistent.

The young adults, who in this study represent a unique dovish group, moved toward expressed tolerance in all the studies in which they participated. With one exception, this trend could be observed on all the variables. The only exception occurred in the expression of positive feelings toward the Syrians, in which they continued to reduce the expression of positive feelings initiated by those aged 14–15 (Figure 10.2c). Except for this digression, they expressed the most positive views about all Arabs and the most negative views about Jews. In many instances the changes that occurred in this group led to the annulment of the discrepancies between or among the responses toward the different target groups (Figures 10.1a, b; 10.2a, b, e). The general trends of an age-related increase in tolerance and the findings obtained for the young adults are of major importance. They indicate that despite the intractable conflict that constitutes the developmental background for the psychological repertoire of the young generation in Israel, and despite the negative experiences with the enemy that, most probably, many of the adult participants encountered while serving in the army, there are sectors in the Israeli youth and society that hold views and attitudes toward their ingroup and toward the enemy in a way that reflects the enduring influences of cognitive and personal maturation rather than the effect of conflict.

Thus, the zigzagging pattern we predicted for the developmental trajectory of the representation of the enemy was confirmed, though with some qualifications. Contrary to the prediction, when compared with older children and adolescents, those at 7–9 years of age expressed highest ingroup preference and outgroup negativity. The two next groups manifested incidences of moderation expressed in the decline of ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity. However, the moderation was not consistent; for instance, children at 12–13 years accompanied their moderations with a systematic negativity toward the Palestinians. Those at 14–15 years manifested the most consistent increase in negativity toward the groups representing the enemy but, at the same time, a decrease in positivity toward the ingroup. Those at 16–17 reverted the trend by reintroducing moderation, especially in the ratings of traits. Thus, if we look mainly at responses toward the groups representing the enemy in the 7–17 age span, the moderating influence of cognitive maturation was hardly evident. On the other hand, the influences of personal motivations and conflict were evident for all age groups. With regard to self-enhancement motivation, it is important

to note the general pattern of discrepancies between the ingroup and the groups representing the enemy in which the ingroup was always favored. The overall negativity expressed toward the enemy in all samples, by all age groups, except occasionally by ages 16–17 and 22–24, most probably gratified the need for self-enhancement of all participants. Thus, the specific age-related shifts indicated the age groups with higher vulnerability for threat to self-esteem and higher levels of need for self-enhancement. This offers support for Nesdale's (2000) and Nesdale and Flessler's (2001) view that self-enhancement motivation affects in- and outgroup representations for all age groups and particularly for adolescents (Teichman & Zafirir, 2003).

Taken together, this confirms the suggestion that the development of stereotypes and prejudice is mediated by cognitive and personality development but that the contextual factors have determinative influence on their specific inputs. Considering the input of cognitive and personality factors, we saw that personal experiences such as context-inflicted threat and personal motivations overpower cognitive development and delay its expression in social representations.

Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status, Religion, and Immigration

In addition to being characterized by an intractable conflict, the Israeli society is also a multiethnic immigration country where society is composed of different levels of socioeconomic status and religiosity and different statuses of acculturation of immigrants. Studying the social representations of the young in Israel provided an opportunity for examining the influence of factors such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religiosity, and acculturation on such representations. Considering these influences, in 1999 we replicated the study that was conducted in 1995 with secular middle- and upper-middle-class participants of European or American origin with the following groups: secular lower class, mostly of African or Asian ethnic origin; religious middle class of mixed ethnic origin; and recent and earlier immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Half of the participants in each group of immigrants came from the Asiatic republics and half from the European republics of the former Soviet Union.

The findings for the two first groups indicated a similarity in the overall level of negativity-positivity attributed to the in- and outgroups to that obtained for children and adolescents of secular middle- and upper-middle-class families of European or American origin – namely, an overall preference of Jews over Arabs and, with age, a decline in negativity toward Arabs that was evident on all measures. However, whereas those aged 16–17 years in the first study were part of this pattern (Figure 10.1a, b), the same age group from the low socioeconomic and religious groups, on all the variables, manifested an increase in negativity toward the Arabs.

Both the similarity in stereotypes and attitudes held by youngsters belonging to different ethnic groups and socioeconomic status, or practicing different levels of religiosity, and the specific age-related patterns in these groups are of interest. The similarity contradicts findings from the studies reviewed in Chapter 7 that repeatedly showed more negative stereotyping and prejudice toward Arabs by lower-class groups of African or Asian ethnic origin and religious participants. This difference may be attributed to two possible causes stemming from the macrolevel – that is, processes within Israeli society and changes in the level of conflict. As to the first, it has to be pointed out that the findings we reported were obtained from studies conducted in recent years, and this may suggest that the differences between Israelis from different ethnic origins with regard to social views are beginning to disappear. Namely, children and adolescents from African or Asian ethnic origin are now identified more strongly with the mainstream Israeli identity and thus do not need to differentiate themselves from the Arabs by degrading them more than the middle- and upper-class children from European or American origin. As to the conflict, because our studies were conducted at a time representing a milder phase in the Israeli-Arab conflict that promoted optimistic expectations, it is plausible to suggest that although overall participants differentiated between Jews and Arabs, favoring the first, specific environmental influences such as ethnicity or religiosity subsided. Apparently, conflict intensifies not only the differences between social representations and attitudes toward the in- and outgroups but also the differences among different segments within the society engulfed in the conflict. Unfortunately, we did not repeat the examination of environmental influences after the conflict peaked dramatically, and thus, at this stage, we could not substantiate this proposition empirically.

As to specific age groups, only the findings obtained for those aged 16–17 years differ from those obtained in the 1995 study and thus deserve attention. While in 1995 this group manifested frequent moderation, in 1999 it revealed a systematic elevation of negativity toward Arabs. This difference as well may be attributed to macrocauses: to political changes that occurred in Israeli society in the time between the two studies. During the years 1995–1999, following the Oslo agreement, sharp polarization occurred in Israeli society between left and right (Bar-Tal et al., 2002; Hermann & Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002). Based on voting practices, there is a reason to assume that while the participants representing the upper and middle classes of European and American origin intensified their left-wing ideology, participants representing lower-class, Asian or African, and religious sectors of the society intensified their right-wing ideology. These changes, most probably, affected participants from other age groups who participated in these and other studies. However, it is logical to assume that during late adolescence when political commitments are established (Ichilov, 1984; Marcia, 1980), the power of these influences increased. Thus, belonging

to social sectors that identify with right-wing ideology was manifested in rating Arabs or expressing attitudes toward them.

Although in Israel immigrants from the Soviet Union tend to identify with right-wing ideology, the adolescents aged 16–17 years from the different groups of immigrants displayed the same trends of moderation found in the mainstream samples. However, the more important findings obtained for the new immigrants are that the old comers were more similar to same-age Israeli-born children and adolescents than the recent immigrants, and that those who came from the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union manifested the most negative stance toward the Arabs. Both findings are examples of acculturation. The first demonstrates that becoming a member of a new group, changing self-categorization, and acquiring a new social identity involve the adoption of the shared psychological intergroup repertoire of the absorbing group. The adoption process is pursued because it provides a sense of self- and social identity and regulates the relations with other groups (Bourhis et al., 1997; Oakes et al., 1994). The second finding replicated the early findings obtained for participants whose families immigrated to Israel from Muslim countries. Apparently, living in Israel with a background of any kind of previous bonds in a Muslim country tends to be accompanied by more negativity toward Arabs. This may stem from personal experiences in these countries, but more probably it represents an attempt to break up ties with an Arabic heritage that in the new country represents the enemy. Despite the fact that in reporting their stereotypes and attitudes young immigrants manifested an acculturation by gradually adopting the prevailing repertoire in the general society, on the two intentions measures (attributed and personal) they still expressed milder views than those expressed by participants representing the mainstream society. Namely, even for schoolchildren and adolescents acculturation is achieved in a step-by-step process taking years.

Influences of a Context of Conflict

The findings obtained from most of the measures we utilized for the different age groups, environments, and experimental conditions show that overall the Arabs and particularly the Palestinians were assigned the most negative scores while the Jews or Israelis were assigned the most positive scores (Table 10.1; Figures 10.1, 10.2, 10.3). This demonstrates the tendency for generalization and polarization, accentuating the differences between the representations of in- and outgroups (Linville & Jones, 1980; Tajfel, 1969; Wilder, 1986). In conflict, the extreme and consistent accentuation of the differences serves the function of maintaining a moral view of the in-group and delegitimizing (Bar-Tal, 1989) or demonizing the enemy (Sande et al., 1989).

Generalizing the negativity of the enemy achieves a clear-cut differentiation between “us” and “them” but also makes the enemy threatening and potent. The frequent emergence of aggression, violence, and animosity in narratives about Arabs and the negative intentions attributed to most of them explain the threat they arouse and the potency attributed to them. Indeed, when rating potency (Figures 10.2b, 10.3c), except for the youngest group, which rated the ingroup as more potent, the participants from all the other age groups did not discount the potency of the enemy, rating him as potent as the ingroup and as the other Arab and non-Arab nations. Even adolescents at age 14–15, who most frequently produced the most negative ratings of Arabs and Palestinians, did not degrade them when rating potency. It is possible to suggest that seeing the Arab as potent reflects realism, but it also may reflect a way of self-enhancement. Fighting and overcoming a potent opponent is more heroic and rewarding for one’s self-esteem than fighting a powerless one.

Additional evidence for the influence of the conflict on psychological intergroup repertoire was reflected in the differentiation among Arab nations. The data presented in Figure 10.2 show consistently the same grouping in which nations that have a peace treaty with Israel (Egypt and Jordan) were seen and experienced more positively than the nations that are in conflict with Israel (Palestine and Syria), or than the generic category “Arabs.” With few exceptions, the order indicated that the Palestinians, namely the most direct enemy, stood out as most degraded and rejected, followed by the Syrians and Arabs. The inclusion of the generic term “Arabs” with the enemies is another manifestation of the generalization tendency.

The comparison of stereotypes and attitudes toward Arabs and toward a variety of non-Arab nations further pointed out that the relationship toward Arabs is unique. On all variables except potency, Arabs were rated far below all other nations (Figure 10.3). A closer focus on the influence of the perceived type of relations on stereotypes and attitudes provided convincing evidence that when the enemy was considered, only the perceived type of relationship determined stereotypes and attitudes. This indicates that conflict is a powerful force underlying social representations and the accompanying attitudes. The content of the representations of the enemy has to be defined as limited in scope and repetitive in nature, highlighting mainly aggression-related themes. In the next chapter we see not only that the related content to the representation of the enemy is limited, but also that the structure of his representation is less complex.

CONCLUSION

The two first studies reported in this chapter continued to trace image acquisition as reflected in spontaneous identification and the categorization,

knowledge, stereotypes, and prejudice associated with it. The findings indicated that from the age of 9–10 and on, most of the children could perform such identification. Up to the age of 12–13 and even later, clothing was noted as the main cue for identification. This means that the prevailing image of Arabs is a stereotypic image of traditional people. However, with age, the knowledge regarding the social category identified as Arabs became more diverse and accurate.

A general developmental overview of the stereotypes and attitudes expressed by the groups in the age span covered in the different studies reviewed in this chapter indicated a consistent trend of ingroup favoritism and a degradation or rejection of the outgroups representing the enemy. In all the studies that compared these groups, for most age groups and variables the ingroup received high positive and low negative ratings or attitudes, while the Arabs (particularly the Palestinians) received most negative and least positive ratings or attitudes. With age, negativity toward the outgroups declined and positivity increased. At the same time, in some instances negativity toward the ingroup increased and positivity decreased. The general overview also indicated that as preschoolers, the young ages sampled in this chapter expressed both ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity. Of special interest is the observation that the age trajectories for stereotypes (ratings of characteristics) were smoother than those for attitudes. Most abrupt changes were manifested in the expression of negative feelings.

An age-related examination suggested that the developmental trajectory that emerged for images of Arabs was similar to the zigzagging pattern we predicted. The trajectory of images of the ingroup followed a smooth path of decrease in positivity and increase in negativity. The pattern that emerged for Arabs indicates that the youngest group expressed extreme biases displaying highest negativity and rejection toward Arabs. This was accompanied with highest positivity or preference toward the ingroup that, as pointed out, decreased with age. A plausible explanation for these findings is that the school-age children were compared not with preschoolers but with older participants. Being the youngest, they might have been more susceptible to emotional arousal (threat and fear) than the older groups and that enflamed their stereotypes and prejudice. Children at the age of 10–11 quite frequently manifested moderation by expressing less negativity and more positivity toward Arabs than the youngest group. However, the moderation trends toward Arabs were accompanied by maintaining some of the negativity manifested by the younger group or even by an increase of biases. The early adolescents, at age 12–13, manifested similarity or moderation toward the outgroup along with peaks or increased negativity, expressed mainly toward the Palestinians. Those at age 14–15 manifested the most consistent increase in negativity toward the outgroup. The shifts in the two adolescent groups, although not always in the predicted direction,

confirmed the instability in their social views and attitudes. This instability may reflect the search for personal and social identity and the intensification of self-enhancement motivations.

For the late adolescents, aged 16–17, the prediction for a decrease in negativity and increase in positivity toward Arabs versus a decrease in positivity and increase in negativity toward Jews was generally confirmed. The moderation in this age group was apparent mainly in the ratings of traits. Expressed attitudes yielded less consistent trends, which suggests that in a conflict moderation in stereotypes may appear with age; moderation in prejudice is less expected. The young adults, who in this study represent a unique dovish group, moved toward expressed tolerance in all the studies in which they participated.

When we look at the developmental trajectories of in- and outgroup representations, it is important to remember the general pattern of discrepancies between the ingroup and the groups representing the enemy, in which the ingroup was always favored. The overall negativity expressed toward the enemy in all samples, by all age groups (except occasionally 16–17 and 22–24) most probably was motivated by the self-enhancement need of all participants. This confirms Nesdale's (2000) and Nesdale and Flesser's (2001) suggestion that self-enhancement motivation determines in- and outgroup representations for all age groups. The specific age-related shifts indicated that the adolescents were the groups with higher levels of need for self-enhancement and vulnerability for threat to self-esteem.

The conclusive look at the developmental trajectory of enemy images for ages 7–17 confirms the suggestion that the development of stereotypes and prejudice is mediated by cognitive and personality development, within a given context. In a conflict situation, the input of context and personality factors, such as threat experiences and self-enhancement motives, overpower cognitive development.

Findings for specific samples, such as children and adolescents from low socioeconomic backgrounds, mainly of African or Asian origin and from the religious sector, manifested similar patterns of stereotyping and prejudice to those manifested by samples representing upper-middle-class backgrounds of European or American origin. One exception is that adolescents aged 16–17 from lower-class backgrounds, of African or Asian origin, and from the religious sector, on all the variables, manifested an increase in negativity toward the Arabs.

The similarity was attributed to relative disappearance of ethnic differences in the young generation and to the milder level of the conflict.

The most important findings obtained for the new immigrants are that the old comers were more similar to same-age Israeli-born children and adolescents than the recent immigrants, and that those who came from Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union manifested the most negative stance toward the Arabs. Both findings are examples of acculturation. The

first points out that acculturation is a gradual process. The second, most probably, represents an attempt to diminish links to any Arabic heritage.

Influences of a context of conflict were demonstrated in the tendency for generalization and polarization, accentuating the differences between the representations of in- and outgroups. Another influence was demonstrated in the consistently same grouping in which nations that have a peace treaty with Israel were seen and experienced more positively than the nations that are in conflict with Israel or than the generic category "Arabs." The inclusion of the generic term "Arabs" with the enemies is another manifestation of the generalization tendency. The comparison of stereotypes and attitudes toward Arabs and toward a variety of non-Arab nations further showed that on all variables except potency Arabs were rated far below all other nations and that their unique position was associated with the perceived type of relationship with them.

The content of the representations of the enemy referred mainly to aggression. The frequent emergence of aggression, violence, and animosity in narratives about Arabs explains the threat they arouse and the potency attributed to them.

The Reflection of Social Images in Human Figure Drawing

In this chapter we present the development of an assessment methodology for the appraisal of implicit social representations based on human figure drawings (HFD) and the findings of studies in which it was utilized. The definition of “implicit social representation” includes implicit attitudes and stereotypes that according to Dovidio et al. (2001) refer to “evaluations and beliefs that are automatically activated by the mere presence (actual or symbolical) of the attitude object. They commonly function on the unconscious level” (p. 176). These implicit stereotypes and attitudes are of interest because they develop “with repeated pairings, either through direct experience or social learning of the association, between the category or object and evaluative and semantic characteristics” (Dovidio et al., 2001, p. 176), and, as such, their developmental trajectory can be compared with that of the explicitly expressed stereotypes and prejudice described in the previous chapters. Also, the comparison of implicit and explicit representations may be performed in the same study. For instance, HFDs may be accompanied by explicit measures such as a structured interview (for younger children) or by a questionnaire (for older children). Indeed, in the studies we conducted the HFDs were accompanied by a short version of an open-ended interview or questionnaire similar to those we used before (see Chapters 9, 10). Interestingly, previous findings indicate a lack of correspondence between the implicit and explicit measures of stereotypes and attitudes both for children (P. A. Katz, Shon, & Zalk, 1975) and for adults (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Dovidio et al., 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This raises the question which type of measure provides more truthful information and how do the stereotypes and attitudes reflected in them affect behavior.

For adults it was demonstrated that the explicit measures are influenced by social desirability and tend to reflect nonprejudiced attitudes, whereas the implicit measures tend to reflect negative attitudes. The first are associated with socially desirable behavior and the second with spontaneous,

indirect, and subtle racial biases (Dovidio et al., 2001). As noted (see Chapter 8), Aboud and Amato (2001) suggest ruling out the influence of social desirability on children's expression of prejudice. On the other hand, our claim was that particularly when the responders are children, who tend to suggestibility, consent with authority, and wish to please adults, social desirability may be reflected in measures and consequently in behavior. Indeed, P. A. Katz et al. (1975), who compared children's responses on implicit and explicit measures, show that the first trigger more-genuine responses. Importantly, genuineness does not necessarily imply a higher level of outgroup prejudice. Comparing Jewish and Arab schoolchildren and adolescents, Teichman and Zafir (2003) demonstrate that personal motivations may influence responders to express positive outgroup stereotyping and attitudes on implicit rather than on explicit measures. Using the terminology proposed by Fazio, Williams, and Sanbonmatsu (1990, cited by Dovidio et al., 2001), this occurred with regard to socially sensitive issues inconsistent with traditional socialization. In this case Arab adolescents expressed ingroups preference only explicitly, while on several implicit indices they expressed outgroup preference. Accordingly, it is plausible to suggest that, whether negative or positive, the implicit level reflects the true personal sentiment. These issues as well as the growing interest expressed in recent years in implicit assessment of stereotypes and prejudice increase the relevance of the new approach we suggest (Devine et al., 2001).

In contrast to the commonly used techniques for assessing children's social representations (see Chapter 8) and to most of the assessment techniques utilized in the previous chapters, the HFD is a free-response instrument. The request to draw a figure, identified by a group label, activates the existing image the child possesses of the specified group. The drawing represents this image and allows children to produce images spontaneously without reference to specific contents provided by the experimenter. At the same time it provides multidimensional information regarding images. In this respect the measure complements explicit measures that, as defined by Eagly and Chaiken (1998), produce mainly general evaluative information. More specifically, the scoring we developed for the HFDs provides a measure for the structural aspects of images and for the beliefs attributed to them and their intensity. The accompanying questionnaires assess attitudes. Finally, the measure as a whole does not confound between positivism and negativism – that is, preference and rejection. These different nuances of assessment may have implications for intervention in different age groups.

On a more practical level, due to universal interest in the human figure at all ages and the fact that children can express themselves in drawings in different ways and levels at different ages, this tool is applicable for children from different cultures and from a wide developmental range beginning

with 3-year-olds through adulthood. As a language-free instrument, it is less threatening than interviews or self-reports and can be used with children from different sociocultural, ethnic, and national backgrounds. Finally, children are accustomed to and are usually fond of drawing. Generally, this may encourage cooperation. On the other hand, older participants may resent this type of task.

The application of HFD for the assessment of social themes was reported before (Bombi, 1994; Dennis, 1966; Klepsh & Logie, 1982; Krampen, 1991; Schofield, 1978). However, we have attempted to expand the scope of the assessment and to substantiate it empirically. The consideration of the evolution of human figure drawing and the meaning of drawings can provide further background for the HFD as an assessment tool for social images.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND MEANING OF DRAWINGS

Since prehistoric times, drawings have been considered a form of language and self-expression. In fact, human spirituality and aesthetic, religious, and social feelings brought art into being. Children enjoy the act of drawing even before the age of 2. Most agree that the child begins to draw by putting uncontrolled marks on paper (or other materials), proceeds to scribbling, and finally is capable of drawing closed forms, that is, circles and ovals. Golomb (1992) suggests that this general progression emerges independently of language, culture, and history. In the beginning, marks and scribbling are generated by the sense of action; the motion as such is a source of satisfaction. In this stage, the marker, the movement, and the mark are undifferentiated. The child concentrates on the act and, once completed, usually loses interest in the product. Any interpretations offered by the child relating to his or her production are unstable and determined by recent experiences.

During the third year of life, children begin to draw closed forms, constituting "a transformation of a motor action that represents only itself to a form that can become a symbol for another reality" (Golomb, 1992, p. 25). When the child recognizes that his or her productions carry meaning, that is, are independent of the motor action that produced them, the drawing can be considered a representational statement of an internal model or mental image. The first representations of people in children's drawings, known as tadpole figures, appear between the ages of 2 and 4 years; they depict a large head with or without facial features, and with legs, hands or both, but no torso. Gradually, the torso and other details are added, presenting people who are referred to as transitional figures. By adolescence, the figure is fully differentiated, containing subtle details such as hair, eyelashes, nostrils, elbows, knees, and items of clothing.

Although children's drawings have been studied for some time, researchers still interpret them differently. While Piaget and Inhelder (1971) claim that children's drawings are symbols that represent objective reality,

it has also been argued that they represent the child's internal reality, the imagined qualities of objects, people, and events, and are therefore private *images* (Cox, 1993; Golomb, 1992; Krampen, 1991). One of the first researchers in this field suggested that, although children do indeed wish to represent reality in their drawings, they do not engage in copying but in representing their inner models of objects (Luquet, 1927). Thus, a drawing may be guided by reality but nevertheless represents a private image. It follows then that drawings of human figures also represent images – images of people. Another view regarding the material represented in children's drawings of people is the projective view. According to Hammer (1958/1967), Machover (1949), Koppitz (1968, 1984), and others, children's drawings, especially HFD, reflect unconscious layers of their personality such as conflicts, feelings, and attitudes related to the self and significant others. The projective approach to drawings attracted much attention in clinical work but is not applied in the current review and work.

A third approach for interpreting drawings is based on their definition as mental images reflecting what the child is capable of drawing from a developmental point of view, as well as what he or she knows about the object, person, or event. According to Cox (1993), "the internal model mediates between the child's perception and knowledge of an object on the one hand and his drawing of it on the other. The nature of the internal model, however, has not been specified, although it is often assumed to be some kind of visual image or picture that we inspect inside our heads" (p. 27). This statement constitutes a bridge for an integration between the theories presented by researchers who studied the development of drawing (Arnheim, 1974; Cox, 1993; Freeman, 1975; Golomb, 1992), who refer to drawings as representing internal images of objects, events, and people, and the theories of cognitive development mentioned in Chapter 8 that defined mental images as abstracted representations formed on the basis of perceptual analysis of the different aspects of the environment (Kosslyn, 1981; Mandler, 1988). The suggestions offered by cognitive theorists for "the nature of the internal model" of images were "icons" (Bruner, 1964), "exemplars" (Smith & Zarate, 1992), or "image schemas" (Mandler, 1988, 1992). This also corresponds with Lippman's (1922) view of stereotypes as "pictures in our heads."

The definition of drawings as representing mental images constitutes the basis for their adoption for studying children's mental representations of people from one's own and other groups, in our case the group of an adversary. However, we do not conceive the HFD as expressing only the products of the perceptual exploration and information processing, but also as interpretations of the messages disseminated by the social environment. This leads to the assumption that the request to draw a human figure identified by a group label activates the image the drawer holds of the specified group and the knowledge he or she absorbed about it.

Indeed, Piaget and Inhelder (1971) were the first to suggest that drawings made by children reflect social influences. Later, Golomb (1992) stated, "we must protect ourselves from the temptation to view the child's drawings as if they occurred in a cultural vacuum" (p. 54). Cox (1993), Dennis (1966), Krampen (1991), and others expanded this idea for the drawings of people. Thus, when expressing their knowledge about people in drawings, children draw images shaped by their experiences in their environment. From this perspective, like writing or speaking, a drawing serves as a form of communication and reflects stereotypes, attitudes, and values toward others. Cox (1993) demonstrates that children express social influences in HFDs by showing that in drawing a person Western children are preoccupied with the head and facial features, whereas in some African cultures the head is represented as a "pinhead." Cultural differences also emerge in depiction of the torso, legs, and genitalia. Cox (1993) suggests that the particular body parts that appear in a drawing, and the emphasis placed on them, may reflect different cultural concerns and values.

Dennis (1966) reports the most impressive attempt to study the expression of social representations in children's HFDs. Acknowledging previous uses of HFDs as intelligence or personality tests, he offered his conceptualization as a "third," completely different approach for evaluating HFDs. For Dennis, HFDs reflect social learning and culture: "A child who draws a man of his own group must make a choice within his culture" (pp. 4-5). This choice is guided by social norms, so that "children's drawings provide information not only about the children but also about the older children and the adults with whom they are affiliated" (p. 7). Dennis maintains that the child draws in a way that he or she learned to value as positive. He terms this the "value hypothesis," arguing that drawings of people should be regarded as reflecting preferences and choices guided by social values to which the child is socialized. Dennis prefers the "value hypothesis" over "the familiarity hypothesis."

Dennis (1966) also considered the possibility of drawing a person who does not belong to the child's group. Here, too, a choice is involved; the child chooses to depict the figure in a way that reflects the social values of his or her group toward the outgroup represented in the drawing. Negative attitudes may be expressed by portraying distortions and ridiculous features. However, this demands rather highly developed drawing skills and is thus not expected to appear at very young ages. We can therefore predict that in the drawings of ingroup and outgroup figures in a conflict situation, the former will reflect more complex, undistorted, respectful features and more valued characteristics and feelings than the latter.

Assessing Images of People by HFDs

Interest in the way children draw people goes back to the 19th century (Barnes, 1894; Cooke, 1886). The spontaneous and universal tendency to

draw the human figure, apparent at all ages, is related to its psychological meaning and to the diversity of associations accompanying it. First, it was applied for the assessment of intelligence (Goodenough, 1926); later, on the basis of the projective hypothesis, drawings were believed to reflect personal meanings, conflicts, and feelings (Hammer, 1958/1967; Koppitz, 1968, 1984; Machover, 1949). The projective approach to drawings attracted much attention in clinical work but is not applied in the current review and work.

As noted, Dennis (1966) and his followers (Klepsch & Logie, 1982) have demonstrated that HFD might be used for the assessment of social images and social influences. Dennis (1966) studied 2,550 HFDs of boys aged 11–14 years from 27 countries. He evaluated the drawings on dimensions he refers to as contents representing appearance, characteristics, and social status. His findings confirm the “value hypothesis,” indicating that children from different countries draw people according to favored criteria in their culture. For instance, American boys drew young people smiling, dressed in modern clothes, and representing high social status and roles. On the other hand, black, Mexican, and Navajo children drew people as white-skinned. Klepsch and Logie (1982) reported similar findings, thus supporting the “value hypothesis” and replicating the familiar finding regarding the preference of minority children for the characteristics of the majority (Aboud, 1988).

However, the ratings of drawings in these studies lacked empirically based definitions and, by relying on the rater’s predetermined variables, still resembled the traditional approaches applied in the study of social representations. In constructing a new method, we first asked children to produce their images of the evaluated groups in drawings and only then employed judges to identify themes reflected in the drawings. The suggestions of the judges (some of which coincided with those of Dennis [1966] and Koppitz [1968, 1984]) were applied for ratings of drawings obtained from three different samples and subjected to factor analyses. The developmental and comparative examinations we present are based on the scoring of items included in factors that emerged from three factor analyses (Sasson, 2004; Teichman, 2001; Teichman & Zafirir, 2003). A total of 1,390 participants in the age range of 4–15 produced 2,780 drawings that were scored for the analyses. The findings from these analyses are presented in the next section.

OBTAINING AND SCORING THE DRAWINGS

In order to serve as a scientific tool, the HFDs have to be scored and interpreted systematically. Indeed, previous studies have shown that when based on systematic scoring, HFD may be applied to assess specific social representations, such as friendship (Bombi & Pinto, 1994). In our laboratory the method was advanced to provide multifaceted information for

the representations, including structural aspects such as image complexity and image quality as well as thematic aspects such as the status, affect, behavior, and appearance attributed to them.

We obtained the drawings from children in the kindergarten or school class settings by asking them to draw a typical Jewish or Arab man. The reference to male figures was based on Dennis's (1966) procedure and on the assumption that men are associated with the conflict more saliently than women. In a later study we asked participants to draw women. The generalized use of the term "Arab" was derived from Bar-Tal's (1996) contention that in Israel "the concept of 'the Arab' is used as a basic term to label people who live in the Middle East and North Africa, and who have been in protracted conflict with Israeli Jews" (p. 347).

Each child was provided with paper (size A4) and the same six colored pens (red, brown, black, yellow, green, blue). The order of drawing was controlled, so that in each group half of the children drew a Jewish man first and the other half drew an Arab man first. Following each drawing, the children were asked to answer an open-ended questionnaire including questions about the person they had just drawn. The nonverbal and verbal sources of information represent implicit and explicit approaches for assessing social representations (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and complement each other.

For preschool children, data were collected on an individual basis, and the examiners recorded the answers for the questionnaire. For first and second graders, the task was performed in groups of five. The second graders needed occasional help in writing answers to the questionnaire. From third grade on, children performed the task independently. To ensure independent work, the teachers were present during data collection. Anonymity was assured by asking participants to indicate only their age, gender, and a preassigned number on their drawings and questionnaires.

In order to determine the variables that emerge in the HFDs, in the first study (Teichman, 2001), four judges (graduate students) reviewed 80 drawings and listed the items children included in their drawings. This created an ordinal cumulative variable with a range of 1–40 indicating the number of items appearing in the drawing. The judges also suggested 13 variables for which we created scales of 1–3 in which, unless otherwise specified, low scores indicated negativity.¹ These variables related to the quality of the drawing, its size, and various attributions ascribed to the drawn person. Finally, they identified 4 nominal variables that referred to appearance: age (child/other), cleanliness (clean/dirty), skin color (light/dark), and type of clothing (traditional/other). Due to low representation in the scoring, only the last two proved useful for scoring appearance.


¹ Because of the limited variety in the answers of the young children, only a 3-point scale was applied.

The number of items in the drawing was considered to represent its structure. This is analogous to previous assessments of the complexity of social images that were based on counting the number of terms or features used to describe people (Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980; Livesley & Bromley, 1973). The complexity or differentiation of HFD may be examined even for very young children by counting the number of items appearing in the drawing. This count was defined as a measure of *image complexity*. It affords a simple evaluation of complexity levels of different figures in the same age group or in different age groups in drawing a particular figure. It is important to point out that although the complexity of images has attracted much interest in the adult literature on stereotypes, it has seldom been investigated with children. Thus, the use of HFD as a measure of image complexity may contribute to the study of one of the most frequently discussed topics in the field of stereotypes (Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980). Drawings 11.1 and 11.2 represent different levels of image complexity.²

The 13 variables identified by the judges related to the quality of the drawings and to the size, affect, and behavior attributed to the figure. The variables representing quality included *proportions* (two or more unproportional or displaced limbs; one unproportional or displaced limb; no unproportional or displaced limbs); *posture* (a figure leaning by more than 30 degrees; a slightly leaning figure, 15–30 degrees; a straight and stable figure); *connections* (two or more bad connections; one bad connection; no bad connections); and *distortions* (hardly recognizable human figure; mildly distorted human figure; no distortion).

Attributed status included level of *education or profession* (low level, i.e., garbage collector; no indication regarding level of profession; high level, i.e., teacher, doctor) and figure size defined by *length* and *width* (measured in centimeters and categorized as small, medium, or large). The idea that for children large figures represent important people and objects and small figures represent inferior people and objects was suggested by Lowenfeld (1947), and by Thomas, Chaigne, and Fox (1989). To examine these suggestions, 89 children, not included in the original sample, were asked to complete the following sentences: "Children who draw a large/small person want to convey that . . ." Two judges who reviewed the answers identified "important" and "strong" as the most frequently used adjectives for a large figure. Of the respondents 72% attributed these adjectives to a large Jewish figure and 62% to a large Arab figure. The most frequently associated adjectives with a small figure were "inferior" and "weak": 74% of the children attributed these adjectives to a small Jewish figure and 75% to a small Arab figure. The meaning of size was therefore defined as representing a high- or low-status attribution to the figures.

² Only drawings scored for colors are presented in color. See color plates after page 222.



DRAWING 11.1. Image complexity. Low-complexity figure. Drawn by a 6-year-old.

Attributed affect included the rating of *affect* projected by the figure (negative, i.e., anger, threat, disgust; neutral, i.e., unspecified; positive, i.e., joy, happiness, pleasure), *number of colors* (1–2 colors; 3–4 colors; 5–6 colors), and the colorfulness of the drawing as represented in *number of colored areas* (1–2 colored areas; 3–4 colored areas; 5 or more colored areas). The association between color and affect is based on conventional wisdom as expressed in everyday language and in the literature. Golomb (1992) illustrates the verbal expression of this association in phrases such as “seeing red,” “feeling blue,” or “being green with envy.” More formal literature suggests that white or light colors convey positive affect and attributions and black or dark colors convey fear, threat, or negative attributions (Best, Naylor, & Williams, 1975; Golomb, 1992; Iwawaki et al., 1978). Cameron et al. (2001) propose that young children develop a theory of color preference that may determine their social preferences. Support for the idea that colors play a role in a person’s perception also comes from a study conducted in Israel (Bilu, 1989) in which Jewish and Arab children reported their dreams about each other and described the ingroup in light colors and the outgroup in dark colors.

The color-affect hypothesis has also gained certain empirical support from developmental research. Alschuler and Hattwick (1969) show that children start to use colors as early as age 2 and that younger children who have more difficulty in impulse control prefer “warm” colors (red) at



DRAWING 11.2. Image complexity. High-complexity figure. Drawn by a 13-year-old.

first, then add “colder” colors like blue or green, and learn to match colors with forms as they grow older. Revesz (1925), Thompson (1941), and Werner (1948) have demonstrated that when confronted with an object-sorting task, young children indicate a clear preference to sort objects on the basis of color rather than form. The evolution of the connection between color and form as an indicator of emotional development has been extensively discussed in Rorschach test literature (Ames et al., 1952; Exner, 1993; Halpern, 1940, Piotrowski, 1957).

To ascertain the meaning of color, particularly colorfulness, in HFDs, the children who were asked to indicate the meaning of size were also asked to state their attributions to colorful versus noncolorful drawings by completing the sentences: “Children who draw a colorful/colorless person want to convey that . . .” The initial issue addressed in analyzing the responses was whether children used colors to express their own feelings or the feelings they attributed to the image. Most of the children (81% when drawing the Jew and 83% when drawing the Arab) associated the color with the affect they ascribed to the image. Thus, the focus in this study is on the affect ascribed to the image rather than to the respondent

(Ramsey, 1987, 1991). This means that the reference to the emotional arousal of the painter represents only an inference from the feelings he or she attributes to the drawn person. The inference may be based on either the projection hypothesis or the reciprocity hypothesis, suggesting that positive or negative emotions generate in the observer a response in kind. In order to delineate the specific meanings attributed to color, two judges categorized the responses. The distribution of the responses showed a clear association between colorfulness and "nice or happy" (71% for the Jew and 70% for the Arab), and a similarly clear association between colorless drawings and "hostile" or "sad" (68% for the Jew and 81% for the Arab). On the basis of these findings the range of color was defined as representing the positive or negative feelings ascribed to the image.

The next group of variables relate to attributed behavior. The human figure may be drawn either as static or active. In her comprehensive studies of children's drawings, Golomb (1992) reports that the ability to express movement appears at about the age of 6 and advances with age. When movement appears, it is indicated by arm and leg position, which may communicate happiness, sadness, anger, aggression, or threat. The specific interpretation depends on the meanings attributed to it by the observer. Accordingly, *movement* was defined as a variable and defined as friendly (i.e., waving or playing), neutral (i.e., standing or sitting), or aggressive (i.e., attacking or threatening). Additional variables associated with behavior were *verbal expressions* attached to figures (positive content, neutral content, negative content), and the number of *weapons* of any sort added to the figure. With respect to weapons it may be noticed that often children spontaneously embellish the figure they draw or the space around it. In the clinical literature, such added details are known as elaborations and may reflect investment in the drawing (e.g., decoration), specific contents, or messages that the child wishes to convey or elucidate. In this sense elaborations resemble verbal messages that are expressed in a symbolic form. Indeed a preliminary examination of the drawings revealed that often figures were embellished with different weapons (guns, knives, swords, grenades, etc.). Such elaborations may be related to the intentions or behavior attributed to the drawn person. Accordingly, we defined the number of weapons as indicating behavior or behavioral intentions and counted their number in the drawing (1–3 and more). For the variables representing behavior, lower scores indicated positivity.

In the first factor analysis performed on drawings obtained from 888 children aged 4–15 years, four variables (posture, affect, education, and verbal expressions) did not reach a .20 correlation with *any* of the other variables and thus were excluded from the factor analysis. The remaining nine variables were subjected to a principal component factor analysis with Varimax rotation aimed at identifying the underlying components for scoring the drawings. These variables yielded the same four-factor solutions

TABLE 11.1. Factors Obtained for Scores of Drawings of Jews and Arabs

Item	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
	Jew	Arab	Jew	Arab	Jew	Arab	Jew	Arab
Proportions	.80	.83	.04	.02	.02	.00	.06	.00
Distortions	.78	.77	-.03	-.04	.15	.18	.02	.05
Connections	.59	.65	.38	.24	-.08	-.11	-.07	.04
Colors	.09	.00	.86	.86	.09	-.02	-.04	-.01
Colored areas	.04	.05	.83	.85	-.06	.09	.08	-.05
Width	-.08	-.03	.04	.03	.88	.88	-.01	-.03
Length	.21	.06	-.03	.04	.84	.86	.04	.06
Movement	.07	.07	.02	.02	-.02	-.02	.84	.93
Weapons	.05	.01	.00	.04	.04	.04	.84	.92
Eigenvalue	2.02	2.01	1.54	1.29	1.43	1.50	1.23	1.75
Variance (%)	22.40	22.40	17.20	14.40	10.90	16.80	9.80	19.50
Cronbach's α value	.60	.63	.62	.63	.68	.70	.52	.82

Note: Values in boldface represent the highest loading for each factor.

for both figures, identified as: Image Quality (three variables rendering a scale of 1–9), Figure Size (two variables that when multiplied also rendered a scale of 1–9), Color (two variables rendering a scale of 1–6), and Aggression (two variables, rendering a scale of 1–6). The emergence of aggression as an independent factor most likely represents the unique influence of the social context in which the drawings were obtained. The variables included in each factor, their rotated solution, eigenvalues, percentage of explained variance, and Cronbach's α values for the two images are presented in Table 11.1. As may be seen, most of the α values are between .60 and .70. Taking into account the small number of items in each factor, this may be considered to represent an acceptable level of consistency. Drawings 11.3 and 11.4 represent high and low levels of image quality. Drawings 11.5 and 11.6 represent high and low levels of colorfulness. Drawings 11.7 and 11.8 represent large and small image size. Drawings 11.9 and 11.10 represent high-level aggression in drawing an Arab and a Jew.


The final aspect scored in the drawings related to *appearance*, identified as an important component in person perception (Brewer & Lui, 1989; Sagar & Shofield, 1980), initiating expectations, categorization, and stereotyping. Information about appearance was derived from two nominal variables relating to skin color (light/dark) and type of clothing (traditional/other). As noted, two additional variables (age and cleanliness) failed to achieve sufficient representation in the scoring. In the first study the appearance variables of traditionalism and skin color were dichotomous, scored 1–2. Later on, these variables were rescored on a scale of 1–3. Skin color was



DRAWING 11.3. Image quality. High-quality figure. Drawn by an 11-year-old.

defined as dark, mixed, or light, and traditionalism by a count of 1, 2, and 3 or more items agreed by judges to represent traditional clothing or features in each figure, such as an yarmulke, beard, or face locks for Jews and a kafia, galabiya, or moustache for Arabs. Higher scores represent lighter skin and higher level of traditionalism.

We repeated the factor analyses in two additional samples ($n = 166$ and $n = 336$), but this time the appearance variables were included in the analyses; thus 11 variables were entered into these analyses. The results for both images yielded the same four factors including almost the same variables as well as similar α values. However, the appearance variables (skin color and traditionalism) did not belong in any of the factors; neither did they create an independent factor of appearance. Nevertheless, because of the importance of appearance in person perception, they were included in the analysis as representing two distinct aspects of appearance (Sasson, 2004; Teichman & Zafrir, 2003). In this report we present the results obtained from the new version of scoring. Drawings 11.11 and 11.12 represent light and dark skin color, and Drawings 11.13 and 11.14 represent a traditional Jew and a traditional Arab.



DRAWING 11.4. Image quality. Low-quality figure. Drawn by a 10-year-old.

SCORING THE BELIEFS AND INTENTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

Initially, the questionnaire consisted of eight items designed to elicit information that could not be obtained from the nonverbal tool, such as the drawer's intentions (attitudes), or to elicit it explicitly (Teichman, 2001). The first question asked for the name of the drawn person and was meant to focus the respondent's attention on the drawing and the differentiation between the figures. The remainder of the questions referred to beliefs about the person's traits, behavior, and profession, and the participant's intended behavior and feelings toward him. An example of a question regarding beliefs is, "What is the most important trait of the person you just drew?" and of a question regarding intentions, "Would you consider inviting a person like the one you just drew to your home?" Answers to all questions were rated on a 3-point scale, with a low score representing more negative attitudes.

The scores on six items (excluding the figure's name and the question regarding profession, which correlated at lower than .20 with all the other items) were subjected to a principal component factor analysis and yielded one factor solution for both figures. The eigenvalues for both images were >1 , and the percentage of explained variance for the image of the



DRAWING 11.5. Colorfulness. Six colors of drawing. Drawn by a 13-year-old.

Jew was 47.50 and 54.90 for the Arab. Cronbach's α values were .76 for the image of the Jew and .83 for the Arab. The factor that emerged for the questionnaire was identified as a general measure of Beliefs and Intentions (scoring range 1–18), indicating positivity or negativity toward the images. As with the factors obtained for the drawings, the findings obtained in the two additional samples validated these results (Sasson, 2004; Teichman & Zafir, 2003).

Finally, we looked at the correlations between the four factors and between them and the measures of Image Complexity and Beliefs and Intentions. In all three samples, although many of the correlations reached significance, most of them were very low, suggesting that the different measures tap distinct aspects of the images or represent different processes. The low correlations between the implicit and explicit measures replicated previous findings that indicated low correspondence between the two types of measures (for a meta analysis, see Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). In our case, however, consistently the highest negative correlation emerged for the image of the Arab between beliefs and intentions and aggression ($r = -.42$ to $-.43$, depending on the sample), indicating that explicitly expressed positive beliefs and intentions toward this image relate negatively to the level of aggression attributed to him implicitly. Namely, high scores on the Beliefs and Intentions measure tend to co-occur



DRAWING 11.6. Colorfulness. One-color figure. Text in balloon: "War." Drawn by a 9-year-old.

with low scores on the Aggression measure. Additionally, in both images complexity correlated with image quality and with the positive feelings attributed to the drawn person. This indicates that complexity and quality of images represent similar aspects of the image – namely, its structure – and that images ascribed more positive affect are more invested and vice versa. Utilizing the two types of measures in the same studies provides an opportunity for looking at the developmental trajectory of both.

The final components derived for the evaluation of the drawings and the questionnaires relate to the unique configuration of images obtained in our studies and provide a comprehensive picture of person perception – in this case, the perception of representatives of the two social groups confronting each other in an intractable conflict. Specifically, the information regarding images relates to their structure and content. Structure was inferred from image complexity and quality, and content from attributions concerning status, affect, behavior (aggression), and appearance. Except for appearance, each of the variables defined for scoring the drawings included at least two empirically aggregated – that is, derived from factor analysis – items (Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000).



DRAWING 11.7. Image size. Large figure. Drawn by a 12-year-old.



DRAWING 11.8. Image size. Small figure. Drawn by an 11-year-old.



DRAWING 11.9. Aggression. Aggressive Arab. Drawn by a 12-year-old.



DRAWING 11.10. Aggression. Aggressive Jew. Drawn by a 9-year-old.



DRAWING 11.11. Skin color. Light skin color. Drawn by a 9-year-old.



DRAWING 11.12. Skin color. Dark skin color. Drawn by a 12-year-old.



DRAWING 11.13. Traditionalism. Traditional Jew. Drawn by a 12-year-old.



DRAWING 11.14. Traditionalism. Traditional Arab. Drawn by a 14-year-old.

Beliefs and intentions concerning the figure were inferred from the questionnaire.

RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES

The assessment of Jewish and Arab images held by Jewish Israeli children utilizing the methodology of human figure drawing (HFD) was performed in five studies. One additional study was conducted with Arab Israeli children (Teichman & Zafir, 2003); however, since the focus of this book is on the influences of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Jewish Israeli children, and since the study of Arab children introduces the problem of a minority-majority situation that is not addressed in this work, we refer only to findings obtained from studies with Jewish participants. The studies to be reported focused on the development and nature of social images. They encountered similar issues to those addressed in the studies reported in the previous chapters – that is, the examination of developmental trends, generalization within and between images, and contextual influences. The developmental questions aimed both at documentation and at testing theory-based predictions. In all studies the same assessment methodology (HFD and Beliefs and Intentions questionnaire) that does not confound between images was applied. This methodology also enabled a look at the delegitimization phenomenon discussed in Chapter 2, and at contextual influences created by different levels of conflict.

Looking at the developmental trajectory of in- and outgroup images in the context of an intractable conflict, we continue to examine wide developmental ranges that in the first study covered preschool age through midadolescence (ages 4–15) and in the studies that followed middle childhood through mid- or late adolescence. The inclusion of preschoolers with older participants provided an opportunity to clarify issues raised in the previous chapter regarding the extremity of their stereotypes and attitudes as compared with those of middle-childhood participants. Also, in order to accentuate group differences in the studies presented in this chapter, the participants were divided into age groups representing distinct developmental stages. Although differences in the age groups occurred occasionally, the basic groups were preschoolers (4–6 years), middle childhood (6–9), early adolescents (10–12), midadolescents (13–14), and late adolescents (15–16). The specific age spans and groups are outlined in each study.

The participants in all five studies were drawn from the same socioeconomic and sociocultural background, representing the middle class in the central part of Israel. Also, for the first time we believe, we report developmental data that relate to female images. Focusing on the development during early adolescence and adolescence brings to the forefront the issues of self-esteem and intergroup perception (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). The question we posed was whether the measures described in this chapter and a clearer differentiation between age groups would reflect

a relationship between intergroup biases and self-esteem. Indeed, after a general look at the development of in- and outgroup images in a conflict situation, the third study we report addressed the relationship between self-esteem, age, and in- and outgroup images. We next compared images of Jews and Arabs with a generic, neutral image, identified as a "Person," and finally two sets of data obtained at times representing a different level of the conflict. The first data set was collected in a relatively calm time of the conflict (1996–1997) and the second during the last episode of extreme atrocities between the Israelis and the Palestinians that began in October 2000 and which continues at the time these lines are written. As in the previously reported studies, based on preliminary examinations gender was excluded as a factor in the analyses.

Comparisons of the images in the different age groups were performed utilizing repeated-measures, two-way ANOVAs in which the independent variables were the different age group and ethnic identity of the produced image (Jew/Arab). In the study that compared the data obtained from two data sets, a three-way ANOVA was utilized, including time as an independent variable. The dependent variables included structure (Image Complexity and Quality), content (Image Size, indicating status; Colorfulness, indicating attributed feelings; Aggression, indicating attributed behavior; and Appearance, indicating Skin Color and Traditionalism), and the variable of Beliefs and Intentions derived from the questionnaires. When we examined the results obtained from the ANOVAs, our attention focused mainly on the effect of the ethnic identity of the image, providing a global comparison of the images irrespective of age, and on the interaction between image identity and age (referred to as image \times age interaction), indicating age-related differences in the two images.

The Developmental Studies

In the first two studies attention was directed at the examination of the developmental trajectory of male and female images representing the in- and outgroup in the context of conflict. Partial findings obtained for male images were previously reported (Teichman, 2001), but because these findings provide a frame of reference for findings obtained in later studies, they are reviewed here before we proceed to report new findings. The age range in the study examining male images included preschoolers through mid-adolescents. The second study, examining female images, did not include preschoolers. The purpose of these studies was to reexamine with implicit and explicit methodologies our developmental proposition of a zigzagging pattern of positivity and negativity toward in- and outgroups. Specifically, based on the theoretical considerations presented in Chapters 8, 9, and 10, it was predicted that peaks in biases (a significant preference for the ingroup and/or a significant rejection of the outgroup) would appear in preschoolers (aged 4–6) and in early adolescence (aged 10–12).

In the first study (Teichman, 2001), drawings of “typical Jewish and Arab men” and the Beliefs and Intentions questionnaires related to them were obtained from 888 children. In this and all the other studies the drawings were performed on a paper (size A4) using the same six colored pens. As noted, the age span of the participants was 4–15. The compared groups were composed of children aged 4–6 ($n = 128$), 7–9 ($n = 232$), 10–12 ($n = 274$), and 13–15 ($n = 254$). These groups represent the critical developmental points of preschool age, middle childhood, early adolescence, and midadolescence.

Based on the variables defined for evaluating social images utilizing HFDs and the accompanying questionnaire, it was predicted that the level of image complexity and image quality of ingroup members and outgroup members would increase with age. However, with the progression of age the self-referent figure would be more differentiated and of a higher quality than that of the outgroup. Ingroup members were expected to be ascribed higher status, more positive affect and behavior, and less stereotypic appearance than outgroup members, and beliefs and intentions related to the ingroup were expected to be more positive than those related to the outgroup. The expected developmental patterns were outlined previously.

All the results for the main effect of ethnic identity of the image reached significance. The image of the Arab was significantly less complex and of lower quality. It was ascribed significantly lower status, more negative feelings, and more aggressive behavior. The appearance of the Arab was more stereotypical; he was portrayed as significantly more dark-skinned and traditional, and the beliefs and intentions related to him were more negative. This is an indication of ingroup preference and within-image generalization of negativity in presenting the Arab or relating to him.

Despite some exceptions, the significant age-related findings indicate that, as predicted, preschoolers and early adolescents tended to express ingroup preference and/or outgroup rejection. Preschoolers expressed ingroup preference and outgroup degradation or rejection in differentiating them on skin color, traditionalism, and in the expression of beliefs and intentions (Figure 11.1b, d, e). Early adolescents displayed the predicted pattern on four variables. They were the first to introduce a significant difference between the levels of complexity of the two images (Figure 11.1a). The less differentiated image of the outgroup demonstrates the well-known phenomenon of outgroup homogeneity (Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980), which, as such, invites stereotyping. Indeed, the early adolescents manifested peaks of negativity toward the outgroup in the variables of Aggression, Skin Color, Traditionalism, and Beliefs and Intentions (Figure 11.1b–e). The two remaining groups (middle childhood and midadolescence), though generally favoring the Jew, occasionally




FIGURE 11.1. Image Complexity, Skin Color, Aggression, Traditionalism, and Beliefs and Intentions by image and age (for images of men).




FIGURE 11.2. Image Complexity, Image Size, Attributed Feelings, Aggression, Skin Color, and Beliefs and Intentions by image and age (for images of women).

demonstrated lack of differentiation between images, a decrease in in-group favoritism or in outgroup negativity. For middle childhood, see Figure 11.1a, b, e, and for midadolescents, Figure 11.1b–e.

In the study of drawings of Jewish and Arab women, the participants ($n = 142$) were children aged 7–8 ($n = 36$), 11–12 ($n = 48$), and 15–16 ($n = 58$). The procedures were the same as in the preceding study except that the participants were asked to draw “a typical Jewish/Arab woman.” The results for the whole sample (main effect of image) constitute an exact replication of the results for the drawings of men, showing the same pattern of generalization. When the two images of women for the whole sample are compared, it appears that the image of the Arab woman was of a significantly lower complexity and quality. It was ascribed lower status, more negative feelings, and more aggressive behavior. The Arab woman was portrayed as being more dark-skinned and traditional than the Jewish woman. The beliefs and intentions toward her were more negative. These results indicate that Jewish Israeli children and adolescents expressed similar biases toward Jewish and Arab men and women and generalized the negativity similarly for each gender. Drawings 11.15–11.18 represent examples of Arab women.



DRAWING 11.15. Arab woman. Drawn by a 7-year-old.



DRAWING 11.16. Arab woman. Drawn by a 10-year-old.

In the drawings of women, six variables were affected by age: Image Complexity, Image Size (attributed status), Colorfulness (attributed feelings), Aggression, Skin Color, and Beliefs and Intentions. As may be remembered in the drawings of men, attribution of feelings did not yield significant age-related results. Apparently, when women are considered, feelings play a more salient role in the representation. A comparison of the two images in the three age groups revealed that in four instances the younger children (aged 7–8 years) portrayed similar images of Jewish and Arab women (Figure 11.2a, b, c, e), but in the two other variables they favored the Jewish woman (Figure 11.2d, f). Namely when women were considered, as expected middle childhood participants expressed milder views than other groups. On the other hand, as in the drawings of men, early adolescence displayed either negativity in drawing the Arab



FIGURE 11.17. Arab woman. Drawn by a 15-year-old.

woman or positivity in drawing the Jewish women. These tendencies may be observed in all six variables (Figure 11.2). These findings indicate that the prediction about the tendency of the early adolescents for positive in-group biases and negative outgroup biases was confirmed as clearly as for the men.

The moderating effect of age that was manifested by the oldest group in the drawings of men was not replicated in the drawings of women. On four variables due to ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity (Figure 11.2a, f) or due to a decrease in favoritism toward both, but more so toward the outgroup (Figure 11.2c, d), the discrepancies between images increased in favor of the Jewish woman. However, on one variable the images became similar (Figure 11.2e), and on one the Arab woman was portrayed significantly more positively than the Jewish woman (Figure 11.2b). These were the only instances indicating the moderation expected for this age group.



FIGURE 11.18. Arab woman. Text: "Bomb." Drawn by a 16-year-old.

Self-Esteem and Intergroup Perception

In order to examine the relationship between self-esteem and intergroup perception more directly, Sasson (2004) conducted a study in which in addition to drawing "a typical Jewish/Arab man" and completing the Beliefs and Intentions questionnaires participants were asked to complete a self-perception profile (Harter, 1985, 1989). Based on the self-perception measure, they were divided into high- and low-self-esteem groups. The participants ($n = 337$) were 8–9 ($n = 103$), 10–12 ($n = 168$), and 13–14 ($n = 69$) years of age. The main interest was in the findings relating to age and self-esteem. Based on SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and the self-enhancement hypothesis (Hogg and Abrams, 1990), our hypothesis was that the low-self-esteem participants, particularly those aged 10–12, would display highest ingroup favoritism and/or highest outgroup negativity. As previously, the data were analyzed utilizing two-way ANOVAs. The independent variables were age (three groups) and level of self-esteem (high or low), but the dependent variables were the *discrepancies*³ between the scores on the different structure and content variables for the images of Jews and Arabs for high- and low-self-esteem participants in each age

³ In defining the discrepancy for all variables, the scores obtained for Arabs were subtracted from those obtained for Jews.




FIGURE 11.3. Discrepancies between Jewish and Arab images for Image Complexity, Image Size, Attributed Feelings, and Traditionalism for high- and low-self-esteem participants by age.

group. This analysis enabled a look at the differences in the size of the discrepancies between the two images and their direction.

The findings for the whole sample yielded the same generalization tendency as in the developmental studies – namely, a significant ingroup preference for all the evaluated variables. Four variables yielded significant interactions between age and self-esteem (Image Complexity, Image Size, Colorfulness, and Traditionalism). The four interactions show a consistent pattern (Figure 11.3).⁴ Whereas the high-self-esteem participants displayed

⁴ Zero represents no difference between the images, and in all variables except traditionalism, lower scores represent negativity; for traditionalism, higher scores represent negativity.

small discrepancies between images, and age hardly affected their responses, the low-self-esteem participants displayed more pronounced discrepancies between images, and age affected their responses. As hypothesized, compared with the younger and older groups, in all four variables presented in Figure 11.3, the low-self-esteem early adolescents displayed greater discrepancies between images favoring the ingroup. They presented Jews as more complex than the Arabs, as being of higher status, and as expressing more positive feelings. Because in traditionalism *lower* scores indicate favoritism, they presented the Arab as more traditional; thus the peak in Figure 11.3d is inverted. Despite the significant differences between ages in each group, the differences between the discrepancies of the low- and high-self-esteem participants in the youngest and early adolescence groups did not reach significance.

For the midadolescence group, in all four variables the difference between the discrepancies of high- and low-self-esteem participants became significant. Looking at the direction of the discrepancies reveals that in one variable (Attributed Feelings), the low-self-esteem midadolescents favored the ingroup, attributing to it more positive feelings; and in the three other variables (Image Complexity, Image Size, and Traditionalism), they favored the outgroup, portraying it as more complex, higher in status, and less traditional. Apparently, while low-self-esteem early adolescents have a tendency for ingroup favoritism, the other low-self-esteem age groups, particularly the midadolescents, show a tendency for outgroup favoritism. These findings may suggest that the low-self-esteem participants were the ones who produced the often-found counterbiases reported for older participants in this and in the previous chapter. Also, because the variations in our sample occurred only in the low-self-esteem group, our findings seem to support the self-enhancement hypothesis rather than the self-maintenance hypothesis.

The results obtained for Image Size (Figure 11.3b) deserve additional attention; here all low-self-esteem participants drew larger figures of Arabs than of Jews, thus attributing to them more status or power. The fact that all the low-self-esteem groups drew larger Arab images recalls the findings obtained for the factor of potency reported in the previous chapter, suggesting an empowerment of the opponent, and the findings obtained for the images of Arab women.

A Comparison of Jewish and Arab Images with the Image of a "Person"

The question whether attributions and attitudes of Jewish Israeli children and adolescents toward Arabs differ from those related to other Arab and non-Arab nations was examined in several of the studies described in the previous chapters. The repetitive findings were that the stereotypes and

attitudes held toward the Arabs in general and Palestinians and Syrians in particular were most negative and generalized. The same question was encountered using the HFD. We compared drawings of Jews and Arabs and answers to the Beliefs and Intentions questionnaires related to them with those of a neutral, socially undefined figure labeled "a person." The last label is free from any ethnic or national connotation and provides a "base line" for comparing the responses elicited by the specific labels of "Jew" and "Arab." Thus, in this study we asked participants to draw three drawings and to complete three questionnaires. First, in order to avoid any generalization, they were asked to draw a "person" and to complete the related questionnaire; then in a random order, half of each group drew and related first to a Jew and next to an Arab, while in the other half of the group the order was reversed.

The age groups of the 342 participants were 6–8 ($n = 110$), 12–14 ($n = 160$), and 15–16 ($n = 72$), representing stages of relative cognitive flexibility and a relative personal stability (beyond early adolescence), thus putting in focus not only the differentiation among the investigated images (main effect of image: Jew, Arab, person) but also age (image \times age interaction). The expectation was for a greater proximity between the images of "a Jew" and "a person" than between any of them and "an Arab." With age, we expected an increase in the proximity between the image of an Arab and the two other images.

From the usually compared structure, content, and appearance variables, six (Image Quality, Image Size, Attributed Feelings, Aggression, Traditionalism, and Beliefs and Intentions) yielded significant main effects. In all instances the image of the Arab was either significantly inferior or presented more negatively than the other two. Namely, the image of the Arab was of lowest quality and status, was ascribed most negative feelings, and was presented as most aggressive and traditional, and, finally, the beliefs and intentions toward him were most negative. The comparison of the images of the Jew and the person indicated either lack of differentiation (Image Quality, Image Size, and Traditionalism) or a significant favoritism of the Jew (Attributed Feelings, Aggression, Beliefs and Intentions). Thus, a comparison between an ingroup image and a neutral outgroup image still demonstrated a tendency for ingroup preference.

All the preceding variables except Image Size also yielded a significant interaction between image and age (Figure 11.4). The comparisons among images in each age group and among age groups for each image indicated a different pattern for the structure and content variables. For the structure variables Image Complexity and Image Quality (Figure 11.4a, b), except for the youngest group that differentiated significantly among the images drawing the neutral image of the "person" as significantly higher in quality than the two other images, in all instances the three images were similar. The complexity of the images improved with




FIGURE 11.4. Image Complexity, Image Quality, Attributed Feelings, Aggression, Traditionalism, and Beliefs and Intentions by image and age (for images of Jew, Arab, and a person).

age and then, for the older group, dropped. Their quality improved linearly with age. This means that, with one exception in this study, age rather than image identity tended to influence the structural presentation of images. However, while for the oldest group maturation increased images' quality, it did not affect images' complexity. The difference between the results of this study and those obtained in the other studies for Image Complexity was most probably caused by the introduction of the third image and by the difference in the examined age groups. The oldest group in this study was somewhat older than in the other studies and might have had some resentment for the task.

The findings for the significant content variables and for the Beliefs and Intentions variable yielded a different pattern, indicating that the two first age groups presented the Jew and the "person" similarly, favoring them over the Arab (Figure 11.4c, d, f, and e only for the youngest). The findings for the oldest group differ from those obtained for the two younger groups and are also consistent. For those aged 15–16, similarity between the Jew and the Arab appeared on three variables. It was caused by moderation toward the Arab, in attributing to him more positive feelings and less aggression and expressing toward him more positive beliefs and intentions. Interestingly, the negativity was displaced toward the neutral person (Figure 11.4c, d, f). On the other hand, the stereotype of Arabs as traditional people remained even for those aged 15–16.

A Comparison of Images for Different Levels of Conflict

The influences of change in the level of the experienced conflict were examined by comparing data from our first developmental study that was carried out in a relatively nonviolent period (1996–1997) with data obtained in a period in which the conflict was inflamed and the atrocities between Israelis and Palestinians peaked (2000). We relate to the two periods as time I and time II. The 966 participants in this study were ages 8–14; 593 were in the low-conflict group, and 373 were in the high-conflict group. The age groups for this comparison were 8–9 ($n = 156$ and 118 , respectively), 10–12 ($n = 274$ and 182 , respectively), and 13–14 (163 and 73 , respectively). The focus of interest was on the effect of the level of the conflict on the images without and with age differentiation – that is, on the interactions of image \times time and of image \times time \times age.

Without and with age consideration, none of the structure variables was affected by the differences in the level of conflict. On the other hand, considering the whole sample, all of the content and appearance variables were affected by the level of conflict, in most instances reflecting an increase in negativity attributed and expressed toward Arabs. For Image Size (attributed status) in time I, the image of the Jew was significantly larger than that of the Arab. In time II, a significant decrease in size was observed

for both images, but the image of the Arab was drawn as significantly larger than that of the Jew. This is another demonstration of an empowerment of the enemy, this time in an elevated conflict situation.

For Aggression, in the two evaluations the image of the Arab was portrayed as significantly more aggressive. However, while the level of aggression attributed to the Jew remained stable in the two evaluations, that attributed to the Arab increased significantly in time II. The results for traditionalism indicated that in the two evaluations the Arab was portrayed as more traditional than the Jew. However, in both figures traditional features decreased significantly in time II. Irrespective of time, the Jew was presented as more light-skinned than the Arab, and his skin color became significantly lighter in time II. Finally, the Beliefs and Intentions toward Jews and Arabs show a similar trend to that obtained for Aggression. In both evaluations the Beliefs and Intentions toward Jews were more positive than toward the Arab and not affected by time, while those toward the Arab became significantly more negative in time II.

Only two variables yielded a significant interactions between image and time and age: Aggression and Beliefs and Intentions (Figure 11.5). This indicates that in a time of elevated conflict age had a lesser effect on the presentation of in- and outgroup images. In the two evaluations, the three age groups portrayed the Arab as significantly more aggressive than the Jew, and the Beliefs and Intentions toward him were significantly more negative (Figure 11.5a, b). With regard to aggression in the




FIGURE 11.5. Aggression and Beliefs and Intentions in low and high conflict by image and age.

nonviolent period, for the image of the Arab the age pattern was curvilinear, indicating that the early adolescents attributed to Arabs the highest level of aggression, while in the violent period the level of attributed aggression to the Arab increased linearly with age, reaching the highest level in midadolescence. This suggests that moderation may be reflected even in attributed aggression to enemies, but this does not hold for violent periods in which attributed aggression to the enemy increased linearly with age.

As in previous studies the variable of Beliefs and Intentions (Figure 11.5b) yielded a reversed pattern to that of Aggression. Here, in both times similarly for all age groups, Jews obtained higher, more positive scores. In time I, Beliefs and Intentions toward Arabs were also not affected by age; however, in time II they decreased significantly with age. Namely, in the violent period those aged 13–14 expressed openly most extreme negativity toward Arabs. As in the case of attributed aggression, this indicates that the occasional moderations are context-related.

Delegitimization

As proposed in Chapter 2, delegitimization of the enemy – namely, his outcasting and dehumanization – is a phenomenon found in societies engaged in intractable conflicts. Although we did not conduct a direct examination of delegitimization, it emerged in our data extensively. We encountered it in the answers children gave to open questions in which they labeled Arabs as “barbarians,” “Nazis,” “murderers,” “animals,” “pigs,” and the like. In the drawings, delegitimization was expressed when, as a response to the request to draw “a typical Arab,” some children drew animals or extremely distorted creatures. In one of the samples we studied (not included in the present report), the representation of Arabs as animals occurred in 10% of the drawings (Frenkel, 1999). On the other hand, in the almost 2,000 drawings of Jews obtained in the different studies, this did not occur even once. It appears that delegitimization is entrenched at a very young age and most probably affects future development of images and attitudes. Drawings 11.19 and 11.20 represent examples of delegitimization.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Most of the developmental issues presented in this chapter were examined in the studies presented in Chapters 9 and 10. However, in this chapter the findings were obtained consistently utilizing the same measures, including implicit and explicit components, and applying them to the examination of male and female images of the in- and outgroup. The implicit measure added information not obtained before about the structure of images.



DRAWING 11.19. Delegitimization. Text: "Black, broken nose, Nazi trash." Drawn by a 16-year-old.



DRAWING 11.20. Delegitimization. Text: "This is how I feel about Arabs." Text in balloon: "I am as stupid as a donkey." Drawn by a 12-year-old.

Finally, in order to clarify age differences, rather than looking at a year-by-year development we attempted to increase the contrasts by comparing critical age groups, including participants from preschool, middle childhood, and early, mid-, and late adolescence.⁵ Because the studies presented in this chapter, in some respects, replicate the previous ones, some repetition in the discussion of results may occur. The new information derived from the studies presented in this chapter relates to representations of women, the influences of self-esteem and different levels of conflict, and correspondence between implicit and explicit measures.

Developmental Overview

General Trends

The results of the five studies demonstrated that, as a whole, Jewish Israeli children and adolescents who drew Jews and Arabs (men and women) and answered the questionnaires related to the drawings displayed favoritism toward the former and a generalized negativity toward the latter. This was reaffirmed in all five studies on the various implicit indexes derived from the drawings, as well as on the explicit measure of Beliefs and Intentions derived from the questionnaire: the images of Arabs were of lower structure (less complex and/or of lower quality). Also, generally, they were ascribed lower status, more negative feelings, and more aggressive behavior. The appearance of the Arabs was more stereotypic, portrayed as more traditional and often as darker-skinned. Finally, the beliefs and intentions expressed toward them were more negative. Because most of the data were obtained in a relatively nonviolent time, this means that a periodical decrease in the conflict did not defuse the basic positive-negative configuration of social representations. On the other hand, an elevation in the level of conflict intensified the basic tendencies, generally creating greater discrepancies between the images and defusing maturational moderations. In most instances, the developmental trajectory for the ingroup tended to be smooth, indicating stability over age or progressive developmental trends. On the other hand, the developmental trajectory of both stereotypes (attributed characteristics) and attitudes (beliefs and intentions), for the outgroup was characterized with abrupt shifts (Figures 11.1, 11.2, 11.4, 11.5).

Age-Related Perspective for Male and Female Images

As before, the age-related predictions were based on an integration referring to cognitive and personality development within a context of conflict. Defined operationally, the expectations were that the level of image

⁵ Zero represents no difference between the images, and in all variables except traditionalism, lower scores represent negativity; for traditionalism, higher scores represent negativity.

complexity and image quality of ingroup members and outgroup members would increase with age. However, with the progression of age the self-referent figure will be more differentiated and of a higher quality than that of the outgroup. In reference to developmental trends reflected in structure, content of attributions, and beliefs and intentions, it was predicted that peaks in biases (a significant preference for the ingroup and/or a significant rejection of the outgroup) would appear in preschoolers (at age 4–6) and in early adolescence (at age 10–12).

In the study reported in this chapter, the findings for preschoolers were compared with older children and adolescents. The results replicated the findings we reported in Chapter 9 as well as the findings reported by others proving that social categorization and ingroup favoritism begin to emerge at a very young age (Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Asher & Allen, 1969; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988; P. A. Katz, 1987; P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978; Vaughan, 1987; Williams et al., 1975; Williams & Morland, 1976). In comparing the findings for preschoolers with those for other age groups, they may be characterized as displaying in- and outgroup biases (Figures 11.1b, d, e) and occasionally even peaks in such biases. This suggests that context may accelerate the development of social representations and biases but also that the biases may result from limited cognitive development.

General information about cognitive development may be inferred from the structure of images, that is, their complexity or differentiation. As expected, the images of Jews and Arabs portrayed by preschoolers were of very low complexity (Figure 11.1a). This may explain the fact that the drawings of preschoolers reflected only two ingroup biases (skin color and traditionalism; Figure 11.1b, d). Low complexity has consequences; it makes images more susceptible to environmental (Barrett & Short, 1992) and emotional (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Doyle, 1993) influences. Considering that 87% of preschoolers identified the television as their main source of information about Arabs (Chapter 9), we can assume that the consequence of the information they absorb is high negative emotional arousal. Indeed, when answering direct questions we posed, many young children reported feeling threatened by Arabs (see Chapter 9). The combination of restricted cognitive ability reflected in undifferentiated images and negative emotional arousal constitutes fertile ground for the early development of negative stereotypes and prejudice. The initial configuration then channels the processing of new information, maintaining its stability and further elaborating it (Silverstein & Flamebaum, 1989). Additionally, it may be the foundation for the development of the often mentioned phenomenon of outgroup homogeneity (Judd & Park, 1988). Given such implications, image complexity may be an important focus for prevention or intervention.

The fact that the images of Jews and Arabs produced by the preschoolers differed on appearance variables confirms the contention that children this age classify objects (and people) on the basis of visual impressions, usually according to an obvious characteristic such as color or size (Piaget 1951), as well as previous reports regarding the importance of biological or physical components in determining preschoolers' ethnic and racial classification and attitudes (Aboud, 1988; Holmes, 1995; Livesley & Broomley, 1973; Ramsey, 1987). Of special interest is the finding that skin color was used only by preschoolers to differentiate between their self-reference and the group representing the adversary, portraying the first in light colors and the latter in dark colors. This offers support for the color-affect hypothesis (Best et al., 1975; Golomb, 1992; Iwawaki et al., 1978) and for the proposition that young children develop a lay theory of color preference that may determine their social preferences (Cameron et al., 2001).

All this seems not in line with the theorizing and findings presented by Hirschfeld (1994, 1995, 1996), who argues for the dominance of hearing over seeing, of conceptualization over observation, and that even 3-year-olds have a theory-like understanding of race and social categories. The difference in findings we reported previously (in Chapters 9 and 10) and in this chapter regarding the importance of appearance in determining differences between social images and the findings reported by Hirschfeld might be attributed to the difference in tasks the children were asked to perform. Whereas Hirschfeld (1994, 1995, 1996) presented children aged 3–7 years with reasoning tasks that examined understanding regarding heredity and growth, we asked children to express their social knowledge in recognizing or drawing images, thus bringing to the forefront their observations. However, irrespective of the differences in the tasks, unlike Hirschfeld (1994, 1995, 1996), in portraying the development of social images we argue for adopting a flexible stage perspective (Bruner, 1964; Nelson, 1996; Selman, 1980). In light of the fact that in Hirschfeld's studies not all the preschoolers demonstrated conceptualization and that in our studies there were preschoolers who, when provided with an opportunity to express social knowledge verbally, demonstrated social categorization relating to nonobservational cues, we suggest that young children may express social knowledge using observational *or* conceptual faculties, depending on their cognitive development and on the specific task they are asked to perform.

With regard to verbal expressions, such as those in the studies described in Chapter 9, the explicit measure of Beliefs and Intentions reflected a most extreme polarization between images. For the preschoolers, ingroup positivism was higher than for any other group and that for the outgroup was lowest and similar to the level expressed by early adolescents. Since the preschoolers drew and were interviewed individually, apparently, the verbal and personal communication triggered not only the expression of

their categorical knowledge but also their conformity with the socially desirable views and attitudes (P. A. Katz et al., 1975). The fact that the explicit rather than the implicit measure reflected extreme social views is addressed after reviewing the results for these measures for the other groups in this and other studies.

In examining the older groups, we have information about the images of Jewish and Arab men and women produced by the participants as well as information aggregated from several studies. Beginning with image complexity, it is evident that the developmental pattern for male and female images was identical (Figures 11.1a, 11.2a), reflecting an advance within image differentiation with age. Middle-childhood participants produced more complex images than those produced by the preschoolers, but still similar in their level of complexity. This is evidence of the leap in cognitive development that provides children in middle childhood with the ability to perform classifications based on coordination of several characteristics (Piaget, 1951) and on a wider social perspective, which, on the one hand, allows one to accept individual differences and, on the other hand, to acknowledge intergroup similarities. This in turn may allow for a more differentiated and moderated perception of outsiders (Aboud, 1988). However, unlike the findings reported by others for the comparison between preschoolers and schoolchildren (Aboud, 1988; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle and Aboud, 1995), and contrary to our prediction, we can report only two instances in which the drawings of the latter were less biased than those of the former (Figure 11.1b, e). In the first instance, the results for skin color indicate that, whereas preschoolers differentiated between the images favoring the ingroup, schoolchildren portrayed the two images using similar colors. In the second instance, in expressed beliefs and intentions for Arabs, schoolchildren, though very prejudiced, were more moderate than preschoolers. Interestingly, the middle-childhood group also portrayed the skin color of women as similar (Figure 11.2e).

If we consider skin color in the whole age span, it appears that older participants did not differentiate images by skin color and tended to use darker colors for drawing body contour (Figures 11.1b, 11.2e). This further supports the idea that young children differentiate people by color and prefer light colors. This preference may predispose them, on the one hand, to favor light-skinned people and, on the other hand, to use such colors for expressing their preference. In a different line of thinking, in another study in which the same pattern emerged in the drawings of Arab children (Teichman & Zafirir, 2003), it was suggested that the preference for darker colors for drawing body contour beginning at the age of 7–9 and continuing in older ages indicates maturation and a more sophisticated way of drawing. However, despite this and other findings indicating developmental maturation, such as an increase in image complexity, biases still prevailed

in the responses of children aged 7–9, defusing the differences between the two young groups.

In many instances, middle-childhood participants portrayed the two images similarly (Figures 11.2a, b, c, e; 11.4 b), and when compared with early adolescents, they portrayed the outgroup image more favorably (Figures 11.1b–e; 11.2b, c, d, e; 11.4c, e; 11.5a) or the ingroup image less favorably (Figure 11.3a–d). Thus, although moderating trends were evident, moderation did not affect the main feature related to the conflict (Aggression) and the most prevailing stereotype (Traditionalism). Possibly, these are reflections of the images presented in the media and in the textbooks to which these children are exposed (see Chapter 5).

Interestingly, in most studies, on the explicit measure of Beliefs and Intentions, middle-childhood participants were as biased as preschoolers or early adolescents in favoring the ingroup. Only once, though still significantly more negative toward the outgroup, did they express more favorable beliefs and intentions toward it (Figure 11.1e). The explicit negativity observed for this age group replicates the findings reported in Chapter 10, which were also obtained from explicit measures and which showed the children at this age as more biased against Arabs than older participants. The fact that the middle-childhood group, known for moderated stereotypes and prejudice, in our studies manifested rare moderating trends on both implicit and explicit measures was attributed to the emotional experiences related to the conflict, which overshadow the influences of cognitive development (Chapter 10). Apparently, in conflict the transition to moderation is more difficult, and, if expressed, it is accompanied with positive biases toward the ingroup, negative biases toward the outgroup, or both.

During early adolescence, cognitive development continues to advance and to expand social understanding and perspective (Kohlberg, 1969; Selman, 1980). Indeed, our findings indicate that early adolescence is a critical age at which the differences in complexity between social images of in- and outgroup men and women increased and also became significant, reflecting higher differentiation within the ingroup and homogenization of the outgroup. The prediction that early adolescents tend to favor the ingroup and express negativity toward the outgroup was reconfirmed. For this age group, not only consistent positivity toward the ingroup but many peaks of negativity toward the outgroup may be observed (Figures 11.1a–e; 11.2a, b, e; 11.5a); these were accompanied with occasional peaks of ingroup favoritism (Figures 11.2c; 11.5a, c).⁶ For this group, differentiation between in- and outgroups most often means polarization created mainly by outgroup rejection. Interestingly, on two variables the peaks of negativity toward Arabs in the early adolescent group resembled

⁶ As noted, occasional changes in assignment to age groups occurred and the representation of age groups in different studies differs.

those of the preschoolers (Figure 11.1b, e). The fact that the attitudes of early adolescents resemble those of younger children has been noted before (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996). In a similar vein, there is evidence that at the start of adolescence, gender-related views also become more traditional (Galambos, Alameida, & Petersen, 1990), with early adolescents resembling preschoolers more than those in middle childhood (Stoddart & Turiel, 1985).

Black-Gutman and Hickson (1996) attribute the social attitudes manifested by early adolescents to environmental influences and social learning. We tend to attribute them to personal motivations that are activated in this age. Israeli Jewish children reach early adolescence with a less differentiated and more negative image of the Arab than their own. At this stage, when personal identity is consolidated, the categorization of people and groups gains importance and serves to enhance personal worth (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). In the context of conflict, degrading the enemy and justifying his negative, delegitimized image serve to enhance a positive, moral self-image. Of interest are the findings that, despite the fact that in a conflict situation images of women are less relevant for self-enhancement, in a stage of insecure identity images of Arab women drew even more negative responses than did images of Arab men. This demonstrates generalization, but it also suggests the possibility that the low status of the Arab woman in her own society adds to the need of age groups with vulnerable self-esteem to dissociate affirmatively from her. Or, possibly, this may suggest an even stronger delegitimization of the Arab woman than of the Arab man. Arab women are often portrayed in the Israeli media as irresponsible mothers allowing their children to confront soldiers and get hurt, killed, or even to commit suicide. The explanation that the delegitimization of Palestinian mothers "provides Jewish Israeli society with a distinct sphere – motherhood – in which to assert cultural superiority" (Fried, 2003, p. 14) fits very well with the self-enhancement motivation associated with early adolescence.

As expected, the midadolescents, aged 12–15 (depending on the study), examined in a relatively nonviolent time with implicit and explicit measures, when relating to Arab men display consistent moderating trends – reduction in outgroup negativity and/or ingroup positivity (Figures 11.1 a–e, 11.4a, b, e). The moderation was evident on both types of measure. Also of interest, those at age 13–14 identified as low in self-esteem diverted from the outgroup rejection expressed by the 10–12 year olds to its favoritism (Figure 11.3a, b, e). These findings differ from the findings reported in the previous chapter that singled out the 14–15 age group as expressing most negativity toward the outgroup and most positivity toward the ingroup. The difference between the tendencies reported for the two sets of data may be attributed to ambivalence stemming from vulnerability for self-worth; however, additionally, it may be attributed to the fact that most of the

findings in the studies reported in this chapter were derived from an implicit measure that is less susceptible to the influence of social desirability than explicit self-reports.

Interestingly, the trends of moderation did not hold for a time when the level of conflict elevated. When conflict increased, the midadolescent group (13–14 years of age) not only increased negativity toward Arabs (Figure 11.5a, b), but did it more significantly than others. Taken together, the findings for the different groups of midadolescents suggest that age 13–15 represents a transition phase toward moderation, characterized by instability. Children from this group express moderation mainly implicitly, but this may change, depending on the context (i.e., level of conflict). On explicit measures, they tend to express negativity toward the outgroup, but here as well exceptions may occur (Figure 11.1e). On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the midadolescent group in the study in which most of the moderations appeared, even the one on the explicit measure (Figure 11.1), included 15-year-olds. Considering the findings to be addressed in the next section it is possible to suggest that these participants may have contributed to the moderation.

Indeed, the moderation trends found in the studies including a group of adolescents aged 15–16 years (Figures 11.2, 11.4) correspond to those reported in the previous chapter for middle-class and upper-class participants aged 16–17 and replicate trends reported in previous studies conducted in Israel and in New Zealand (Benyamini, 1981; Kaminsky & Bar-Tal, 1996; Vaughan, 1987). The moderations were evident on the implicit and explicit measures, thus supporting the prediction that the older adolescents express milder stereotypes and prejudice. Apparently, at this age, at least to some degree, the representation of “the enemy” departs from the stereotypes constituting the body of societal shared beliefs and shifts to a more independent perspective. These moderations may be attributed to further development of social understanding that permits accepting others as different and provides in-depth comprehension of the social system (Kohlberg, 1969; Selman, 1980). However, no less important is the evolvement of a basic sense of self, providing this age group with more personal security allowing for experimenting with new social perspectives and beliefs (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1980; Selman, 1980). Importantly, there were indications that negativity as such does not evaporate. If an alternative target is provided, negativity tends to be displaced toward that target (Figure 11.4). Also, along with the expressed moderations toward Arab men, there were instances of increased negativity toward Arab women, such as a decrease in expressed positive feelings and an increase in attributed aggression (Figure 11.2c, d).

The developmental information presented in this chapter relates to structure and content of images. The results for image complexity revealed an identical pattern for men and women. Namely, at early adolescence the

drawing of the Jewish men and women became significantly more complex than those of the Arab men and women, and, while the complexity level of the ingroup images continued to increase with age, that of the outgroup images was arrested. As noted, this indicates outgroup homogenizing and, as such, may invite generalization and stereotyping.

The developmental trajectory for content related to images of Arab men as reflected on the implicit and explicit measures utilized in the five studies presented in this chapter was similar to the one reflected on the explicit measures described in the previous chapter. That for the image of women was different. With regard to content for men, preschoolers expressed ingroup favoritism by drawing skin color in brighter colors and less traditional images. Verbally, they expressed more favorable beliefs and intentions toward the ingroup. The middle-childhood group, known for moderated stereotypes and prejudice, when compared with the preschoolers manifested moderating trends on one implicit variable and on the explicit measures but, at the same time, increased negativity on others. When compared with early adolescents, they portrayed the outgroup image more favorably. This occurred because of the frequent peaks of negativity displayed by the latter. Except for the time of elevated conflict, younger mid-adolescents (13–15 years) displayed mainly moderating trends, and so did older adolescents (15–16 years). Thus, though for different ages, the results again confirmed the zigzagging pattern of outgroup negativity and positivity. Overall, ingroup images were more positive and less affected by age.

The developmental trajectories for content variables for images of women were linear. For the middle-childhood and early adolescent groups, they resemble those of men and generally increase in negativity. However, unlike as for the images of men, except for one variable, negativity toward the Arab women continued to increase. It is interesting to note that this occurred in a group in the age range of 15–16 years that displayed remarkable moderation for men. Late adolescents empowered Arab women (Image Size) and attributed to her more aggression; also, the beliefs and intentions expressed toward her were more negative. This configuration reflects the reinforcement of her demonization and delegitimization. The age-related findings for the image of the Arab women portray her as a significant representative of the conflict, which has implications for prevention and intervention.

Self-Esteem and Social Perception

The developmental findings singled out the early adolescent group (aged 10–12 years) as expressing more peaks in ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity. The consistency of this pattern suggests a relationship between the developmental experiences characterizing this group and their social

representations. The findings of the study that explored the relationship between self-esteem and intergroup perception suggest that in the ages examined in our studies personal self-esteem is a factor in intergroup perception. Also, contrary to Gagnon and Morasse (1995) and Bigler et al. (1997), who studied young children, according to our data when different stages of adolescence are examined, low self-esteem seems to be more critical than high self-esteem. The low-self-esteem youngsters in our study displayed larger discrepancies between images and oscillated between in- and outgroup favoritism, whereas those with high self-esteem displayed relatively positive and similar images that maintained stability over time. In three out of the four variables presented in Figure 11.3, the group of low-self-esteem early adolescents displayed an increase in ingroup favoritism (Figure 11.3a-c). Because this trend is evident mainly for this group, it may be assumed that it is motivated by self-enhancement needs. In the older group of low-self-esteem participants, the tendency for ingroup favoritism was expressed only in attributed feelings (Figure 11.3c). In the three remaining variables, the trend was reversed, indicating outgroup favoritism (Figure 11.3a-d). Such reversal may reflect the process of experimentation with different sociopolitical identities (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1980), which may be inferred from the extreme shifts. Part of such experimentation may include the adoption of an open-minded, liberal identity.

Interestingly, all the low-self-esteem groups drew larger Arab images than did the high-self-esteem participants. It is difficult to associate this finding with self-enhancement, unless defeating a powerful enemy has self-enhancing meaning. On the other hand, if the low-self-esteem children and adolescents empowered the opponent more than same-aged high-self-esteem participants, this may be associated with greater vulnerability for experiencing threat. It seems that the meaning of Image Size is unclear and that additional research is warranted for its further clarification.

For both theoretical and practical considerations, it is interesting to continue examining the motivations underlying the way adolescents relate to different social groups. Meanwhile, our findings indicate that adolescence is a dynamic period in which social representations change and may be influenced by age-related needs, increasing especially the vulnerability of low-self-esteem adolescents for such influences. The differences within the adolescent groups support Phinney's (1990, 1993) contention that in developmental studies of social attitudes the inclusion and differentiation of adolescents is important.

Influence of a Context of Conflict

The influence of the context of conflict was reflected in the different studies in the polarized representations of the two groups, the pronounced ingroup favoritism found for all ages, the oft-expressed outgroup negativity or

rejection, the emergence of aggression as an independent content, and its attribution to Arab men and women and to the ingroup. The attribution of aggression to the ingroup may indicate a preoccupation with aggression caused by the exposure to violence (Farver & Forsch, 1996), or a defensive reaction that counteracts the perceived power and aggression of the enemy. Finally, the open expression of delegitimization illustrates the extreme influence of the conflict and the strong negativity directed at the enemy. The fact that the image of the Arab constitutes a specific dehumanized representation is evident also in the study that compared the images of Jew, Arab, and a "person." The findings of this study showed a repetitious tendency to dissociate between the Arab on the one hand and the Jew and the person on the other hand. Because this was evident only on the content variables, it indicates a differentiation among images that relates only to beliefs and attitudes.

The comparison of drawings and questionnaires in two different periods representing different levels of the conflict is also informative. Regardless of age, the elevation in conflict produced more extreme negativity toward the outgroup. The variable of Traditionalism suggests that at a time of elevated conflict the traditional features in both images, but especially in the image of the Arab, became less relevant. The increase in aggression and the decrease in traditionalism for the image of the Arab indicate that the pastoral image of the traditional Arab was substituted with an aggressive image characterized by weapons and symbols of terrorism. More important, the study comparing images in the two phases of conflict produced the smallest number of variables affected by age (Figure 11.5), which indicates that in a time of elevated conflict differences caused by age are reduced and all share a generalized representation of a negative and derogated enemy. This also means that the elevation in the level of conflict also defuses the moderating effect of maturation. On the contrary, the attribution of aggression and the expression of negative beliefs and intentions in our studies increased with age. Also, the fact that hardly any gender differences emerged in our studies indicates that conflict overshadows both age and gender differences.

In view of the social context of this study, differential views of the targeted groups were expected. What is striking, however, is the consistent generalization. It appears that exposure to an intractable conflict and to the socialization related to it produce in children and adolescents polarized and generalized images of their own group and of "the enemy."

Implicit and Explicit Measures

The developmental findings we reported were obtained from explicit (self-reports) and implicit (HFDs) measures. In the studies reported in the

previous chapter only explicit measures were administered; in the studies reported in this chapter, both types were utilized. Thus, in comparing results obtained from both types of measures, we have results for different and the same participants. The comparison for different participants is problematical because of uncontrolled variables such as time, experimental setting, and correspondence of age groups. Thus, in looking at the developmental trajectories that emerged in the studies reported in the two chapters we mention only general trends. On the other hand, when the two measures were applied in the same study with the same participants, comparisons have more weight.

In the context of race and ethnicity, social desirability and sophistication are expected to affect the expressions of stereotypes and prejudice on explicit measures, whereas implicit measures are believed to provide more authentic views and attitudes. Operationally this implies that explicit measures trigger more positive while implicit measures trigger more negative responses. Indeed examinations of the stereotypes held by majority members toward minority ethnic groups confirmed this expectation. Implicit, rather than explicit, measures revealed more negative views (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; P. A. Katz et al., 1975). However, in the studies we reported, whether for different or the same participants, similar patterns of ingroup preference and outgroup negativity emerged on both types of measures, including for the very young children. The correspondence between the expression of social stereotypes and attitudes on implicit and explicit measures in our work suggests that socialization within a context of conflict provides the historical and cultural context for normative stereotypes and attitudes toward the enemy and that these conditions diminish the difference between the measures (Dovidio et al., 2001). Accordingly, children and adolescents expressed their ingroup preference and outgroup rejection on both. The correspondence between the two measures is also evident in the relatively high correlations between the variables of Aggression (implicit) and Beliefs and Intentions (explicit). This constitutes an additional support for the specific contextual influence on the two measures.

Despite the indications for correspondence between the measures, some findings support the notion that implicit measures disclose more truthful and personal, rather than social, inclinations. However, the association of implicit expression with negativity and explicit expression with positivity is not obvious and depends on the context or on specific conditions. For instance, in a conflict situation negative views of the group representing the enemy may actually indicate conformity and social desirability, while positive views of the enemy are unacceptable. Accordingly, explicit measures will trigger the former and implicit will provide a partial outlet for the latter. Our findings demonstrate this pattern, showing that participants evaluated with both measures more often expressed moderation on the

implicit rather than on the explicit measure, thus sharing the contextually expected views openly and the less expected ones unintentionally. Support for the idea that explicit measures evoke the expected interpersonal views in a context of conflict (negative) and the implicit measures evoke the unexpected for such context (positive) was found in another study that compared Israeli Jewish and Arab children on the same measures (Teichman & Zafirir, 2003). There, the *only* variable on which the Arab children expressed ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection was the explicit measure of Beliefs and Intentions. On the other hand, on all the implicit variables they showed a lack of differentiation between Jews and Arabs, presumably wishing to see similarity between themselves and the majority but refraining from expressing this desire openly.

Additional evidence for the personal authenticity of the implicit measures may be noted in a developmental finding. Here the expression on the implicit measure had a negative tone, but its relation to the developmental hypothesis and repeated emergence drew attention. As expected, on the implicit measure, quite consistently, the preadolescents at age 10–12 manifested peaks of negativity toward the outgroup. It is plausible to suggest that due to influences of social desirability the explicit measures diminished differences between different groups belonging to the same society, whereas the implicit measure disclosed them more clearly. Thus implicit rather than explicit measure revealed the unique tendency of this group, suggesting its relationship to insecure identity and self-enhancement motivation. This implies that unconscious needs and motivations are activated by implicit rather than by explicit measures.

Integrating all these findings suggests that conflict tends to make responses on implicit and explicit measures of stereotypes and prejudice more similar. However, a more meticulous examination reveals that explicit measures reflect a more socially desirable picture, whereas implicit measures reflect less accepted or personal responses. The context and the issue determine negativity or positivity.

The diverse research reported in this chapter constitutes a meaningful step in the empirical advancement of HFD as an implicit yet systematic assessment measure of social images. The factors that were obtained in the first study and replicated in two additional studies tap important aspects of the structure and content of social images. The replication of the results for male and female images, for whole samples, and for different age groups is convincing. So is the demonstrated sensitivity to individual differences (self-esteem) and situational influences (level of conflict). Although these findings are encouraging, the measure's use thus far in a specific context might have influenced the emergence of the specific variables such as Aggression. Also, the meanings associated with the projective factors such as Colorfulness and Image Size in different age groups are also open to further inquiry. Furthermore, as noted before (Teichman, 2001), although most

claim that meanings conveyed by HFD are not related to drawing ability (Cox, 1993; Dennis, 1966; Golomb, 1992; Krampen, 1991), there are some indications of such a connection – for example, the variables on which the children aged 4–6 years revealed peaks of prejudice are either verbal or unrelated to drawing ability (skin color), which raises the question whether young children have a limited repertoire for expressing their social attitudes or whether the ability of this instrument to assess their social attitudes is limited. Thus, as in the clinical use of HFDs, the role of artistic ability warrants a closer examination.

CONCLUSION

We have applied the HFD methodology to examine four issues: the development of male and female images in a developmental range from preschoolers through adolescence; the relationship between self-esteem and intergroup perception; the comparison between in- and outgroup images with the image of a neutral, socially not identified person; and the influence of different levels of conflict on the images of the groups involved in the conflict.

The results reflect the shared repertoire of beliefs held by young members of a society experiencing an intractable conflict. The developmental overview confirms their early absorption and later the personal and social functions they fulfill. Irrespective of age, images of Arab men and women were significantly less complex and of lower quality and generated generalized negativity that was expressed in all the examined content and appearance variables as well as in beliefs and intentions. However, the effect of age differed for the images of men and women. A comparison of the images of Jewish and Arab men and women in the different age groups revealed that the preschoolers displayed similarly undifferentiated images with a tendency to manifest positive ingroup biases and negative outgroup biases. The middle-childhood group tended to portray similarly complex images of Jews and Arabs and displayed moderating tendencies, but generally they also tended to ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection. For early adolescence the differences between the images became significant, usually indicating an increase in negativity toward the outgroup and an increase in ingroup favoritism. Finally, in midadolescence, for images of men some moderation of positivity toward the ingroup and negativity toward the outgroup could be observed. However, these moderations subsided when the level of conflict increased. For images of women, an age-related tendency for increase in negativity was observed.

With regard to self-esteem and intergroup perception, the hypothesis was that the low-self-esteem participants, particularly the early adolescents, would display highest ingroup favoritism and/or highest outgroup negativity. The significant results revealed that whereas the

high-self-esteem participants displayed small discrepancies between images and were hardly affected by age, the low-self-esteem participants displayed more pronounced discrepancies between images that were age-related. This indicates that low self-esteem and most probably self-enhancement needs rather than high self-esteem affect intergroup perception. This was evident especially for the low-self-esteem early adolescents. On the other hand, low-self-esteem midadolescents showed a pronounced tendency for outgroup favoritism demonstrating the instability in social views of these participants.

Comparing Jewish and Arab images with an image of a neutral person revealed that the image of the Arab was either significantly inferior or presented more negatively than the other two. The comparisons among images in each age group and among age groups for each image indicated an approximation between Jewish and Arab images in a few variables in the oldest group and occasional displacement of negativity to the neutral figure. A comparison of images in different levels of conflict yielded relatively few significant results. Irrespective of level of conflict, however, images of Arabs were attributed more aggression and triggered more negative beliefs and intentions. Elevation in conflict intensified these trends and canceled the moderating tendencies observed for older participants in the results of studies obtained in less extreme conflict.

The findings confirmed the integrative theoretical proposition viewing stereotypes and attitudes as mediated by cognitive and personality development within a given social context as well as the predictions derived from this perspective. The developmental overview confirmed the vulnerability of preschoolers and early adolescents for absorption and identification with the socially shared repertoire of beliefs about the enemy and attitudes toward him. Of special interest are the findings for the image of women, but since they were explored only in one study, further examination is warranted.

Conclusions and Implications

This book has demonstrated the unequivocal and essential influence of the context of intergroup relations on the psychological intergroup repertoire that a society in conflict holds about its rival group. Indeed, the main thesis of the book is that the intractable conflict between Israelis and Arabs has strongly marked the way Jews perceive and relate to Arabs. This happened because of the very powerfully negative experiences that characterize intractable conflict. As a result, the societies involved in the intractable conflict – in our case, the Israeli Jews – blame the other side for the outbreak of the conflict, for its continuance, and for the violence. They do so by attributing very negative dispositions to the other side(s), even using coarsely delegitimizing labels and concepts.

This book focused on the Jewish side, but there is firm evidence for suggesting that representations of Arabs by Israeli Jews are a mirror image of those held by Arabs to represent Israeli Jews (see, e.g., Abdolrazeq, 2002; Bar-Tal, 1988; Bar-Tal & Oren, 2003; Heradstveit, 1981; Kelman, 1999a). Moreover, the case of the Israeli Jews is assumed to be representative of a rival in societies engaged in intractable conflict. Therefore, our main proposition is as follows. Societies that are engaged in intractable conflict may differ in their specific content of negative stereotypes and/or emotions they experience toward the rival. However, the shared negative psychological intergroup repertoire about their rival(s) follows a similar developmental trajectory, is extensively disseminated, and is widely used by society members. Also, the functions it plays for the society are similar, and so is its penetration into cultural and educational products. As such it has profound influence on the course of the conflict. We have provided a systematic analysis of all these tenets for Israeli Jewish society. Observations done in societies involved in intractable conflict – for example, Northern Ireland (Heskin, 1980; Whyte, 1990) or Kashmir (Schofield, 2000; Wirsing, 1994) – suggest the validity of this proposition. However, in order to examine the generality of the presented proposition and

address questions regarding changes in the negative psychological intergroup repertoire in societies involved in intractable conflict, there is need for further systematic research on other societies involved in intractable conflict.

SUMMARY

The chapters of this book offer a systematic description of the psychological intergroup repertoire of Israeli Jews in relation to Arabs. They include analysis of Arabs' representations in Israeli public discourse, media, school textbooks, adult literature, children's literature, theater, and films. In addition, we review studies that investigated the prevalent representations of Arabs among Israeli Jewish national samples of respondents, as well as among various specific societal segments, in different periods of time. Finally, the book reports our own line of research documenting the acquisition of the psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs by a new generation and its development with age.

Unsurprisingly, the descriptions, reviews, and analyses reveal that the psychological intergroup repertoire about Arabs in Israeli Jewish society is extremely negative. It includes a variety of negative stereotyping characteristics and even delegitimization. Also it arouses very negative attitudes, negative emotions (mostly fear and hatred), and negative behavioral intentions. In addition, the repertoire includes very negative attributions to Arabs. Arabs are perceived as hating Jews, striving to destroy Israel and to annihilate its Jewish population. The analysis shows that the label "Arabs" is the most general social category used by Israelis for identification of their opponent, and for many decades this was the only one used. During the prestate period Palestinian residents of the country were called Arabs, and after the establishment of the state, when the conflict became also international, all the rival nations were also globally labeled as Arabs, in a unitary way. Differentiation only occurred in the 1970s, when the Israeli public began to use subcategories to describe specific Arab groups such as Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians, or Palestinians. However, the label Arabs has remained a culturally accepted symbolic core concept for "the rival and enemy" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and this social category is often perceived as a homogeneous hostile entity.

The systematic analysis of representations of the Arabs in Israeli Jewish society has yielded a number of important conclusions regarding the role of the conflict context, stability of the psychological intergroup repertoire, nature of the societal mechanisms that transmit the repertoire, acquisition of the repertoire by the young generation, and behavioral consequences of the psychological repertoire. Each of these conclusions is discussed separately in this chapter.

The Crucial Role of the Context of the Intractable Conflict

Observation of a negative psychological intergroup repertoire is not really surprising in view of the intractable conflict between Arabs and Jews that has lasted more than a century. According to the Israeli Jewish perspective, through the years of the conflict many thousands of Jews were killed in violent actions carried out by Arabs, many thousands were wounded and disabled, and property was destroyed. Through the years of the conflict, Arabs engaged in a wide range of anti-Israeli activities from full-scale military attacks on the country and economic embargoes to terrorist acts against Jewish targets in Israel and abroad. These were accompanied by the use of extreme negative rhetoric about the destruction of Israel and the annihilation of the Jews. Even during the years of the peace process, terror attacks continued as well as other anti-Israeli activities, such as mass agitation by Arab media against Israel and Jews. Since the fall of 2000, after seven years of the peace process, violent activities have intensified, and Israelis find themselves again in violent confrontation with the Palestinians and facing extensive anti-Israeli activities by other Arab nations. No one can deny the reality of the experienced hostility and animosity, and the immense effect on Israeli Jews is obvious. Such collective experiences constitute a basis for the formation of the psychological intergroup repertoire (including beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behavioral intentions) about the conflict and about the rival.

The psychological analysis assumes that the beliefs were subjectively construed on the basis of Israeli Jews' experience and reflect their knowledge about the conflict and about the rival. From the Jewish Israeli perspective, the Arabs are responsible for the outbreak of the conflict, its nature, and its continuation. This perception has necessitated the evolvement of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire to explain Arab responsibility for the conflict and violence. This negative repertoire was extensively disseminated, expressed via political, social, cultural, and educational channels, and was integrated into the collective memory of the conflict.

We do not intend to judge the validity of these beliefs. It is clear to us that the Palestinians and other Arab nations had constructed their own beliefs, which present a very different picture of the conflict, blaming Jews for the outbreak of the conflict and violence. Rather, our purpose was to elucidate the psychological intergroup repertoire of Israeli Jews concerning Arabs, which is of formative importance in their behavior toward Arabs. This influence is so profound because the negative psychological intergroup repertoire serves as a prism through which Jews collect, organize, interpret, and evaluate information and eventually decide on a particular course of action.

We suggest that the context of intractable conflict is conducive to the evolvement of a negative psychological intergroup repertoire. This type

of conflict is exhausting, demanding, stressful, and costly – first of all in human lives and then also in psychological and material terms. It requires that society members adapt to the situation in both their individual and social lives. From the sociopsychological perspective, this involves three basic challenges. First, in view of ambiguity and unpredictability, individuals must satisfy the epistemic need for a comprehensive understanding of the conflict, which provides an unambiguous and predictable picture of the situation (Burton, 1990; Maddi, 1971). Second, individuals and collectives must satisfy other fundamental needs, such as mastery, safety, positive self-view, and social identity, that are deprived during intractable conflict. Third, adaptation requires the development of psychological conditions, on both the personal and societal levels, that are conducive to successful coping with the challenges posed by the conflict situation, enabling management over time of intense confrontation (Bar-Tal, 1998a).

To meet these needs, society members evolve an appropriate psychological repertoire, which includes shared beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and capacities of which the psychological intergroup repertoire about the rival is part. In the threatening, stressful, and uncertain context of intractable conflict, basic epistemic needs are satisfied by knowledge that is simplistic and unidimensional. Within this framework, the opponent, the enemy, is presented negatively, in a generalized way, as violent, cruel, untrustworthy, and primitive. This view is expressed along with negative attitudes and emotions of hatred, anger, and fear. The psychological intergroup repertoire persists as long as the conflict context continues to produce threats and stress for the involved societies.

The evolution of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire in the context of intractable conflict may be predicted from the described conception of intractable conflict or from the realistic conflict theory presented in Chapter 1. Later, the psychological experiences generated by the conflict maintain it. The context of intractable conflict implies to involved society members continuous threats and dangers to their personal being, as well to the society as a whole. The perceived threats and dangers originate mainly from the behaviors of the opponent in the conflict, which include not only verbal statements about negative intentions, animosity, and hatred, but also a whole array of violent acts from destruction through killings to even mass atrocities. These experiences lead to evolution of negative stereotyping and prejudice (see Altemeyer, 1988; Fox, 1992; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Change of the Conflict Context and the Psychological Intergroup Repertoire

We have accumulated evidence that shows unequivocally that the psychological intergroup repertoire is not stable but alters with changes of

context – that is, changes in the nature of the intergroup relations and, specifically in our case, in the nature of the intractable conflict (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2003). Intractable conflicts may change in their severity and become more tractable with time – a change that influences the shared psychological intergroup repertoire of the society. This observation indicates that the nature of a conflict is one of the determinative factors in the formation and change of stereotypes, prejudice, affect, and emotions. In the analyzed case of Israeli Jewish society, we also recognize that this society went through a process of democratization, increasing openness, individualization, and pluralism that also affected the psychological intergroup repertoire during the same period (see, e.g., N. Eisenstadt, 1985; Levi-Faur et al., 1999; Yaar & Shavit, 2001, 2003). Nevertheless, we believe that the change in the nature of intractable conflict was of such major importance that it influenced other processes as well.

In discussing change in the psychological intergroup repertoire, we have focused on documented influence of *major events*. A major event is defined as a happening of great importance in a society that is experienced either directly (by participating in the event) or indirectly (by watching, hearing, or reading about the event) by society members, causes wide scope resonance, and has relevance to the well-being of society members and society as a whole. It involves society members, occupies a central position in the public discussion and agenda, and implies information that forces society members to reconsider and often change their held psychological repertoire.

In the case of Israeli-Arab relations it is possible to identify several turning points (i.e., major events) that caused change in the psychological repertoire. The visit of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977 was a ground-breaking event showing unequivocally that there was an Arab partner for negotiation and peace agreement. Until then the great majority of Israeli Jews held homogeneous, undifferentiated, negative views of Arabs. Thus, the visit of President Sadat and the ensuing peace treaty with Egypt started the process of massive change in the negative generalized anti-Arab psychological intergroup repertoire.

And so, first, Egyptians were differentiated from the general Arab category. With time, Israeli awareness also grew of the fact that Palestinians are a separate entity that struggles for self-determination. The war in Lebanon and the first Palestinian uprising catalyzed this perception greatly, a process reaching its determinative stage with the Israeli recognition in the Palestinian entity, when Israel and the PLO signed in 1993 a document about mutual recognition. Differentiation also occurred for the Jordanians, who came to be perceived by the 1980s as a nation ready to have peaceful relations with Israel. This potential was realized in 1994 when Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty. Subsequently, the process of differentiation continued as in the 1990s various Arab nations started to establish

peaceful relations with Israel. During this period, Israelis perceived the Arab world as being made up of those groups that support the peace process and those that oppose it. This distinction was also observed with reference to a particular group – for example, among the Palestinians (Fatah members, who were seen to support the peace process, and Hamas and Jihad members, who violently objected to it).

Second, the Israeli public began to move toward a generally more positive perception of Arab people and of specific groups, especially those who were engaged in the peace process or supported it. Thus, the stereotypes of these groups became more positive, the groups were more trusted, they were described in a more humane way, empathy toward them was revealed, their suffering was acknowledged, and the perception of their intentions was modified. The research we reported in Chapter 10 demonstrated that the categorization of Arab nations as friendly or unfriendly was adopted by the young generation. In their various ratings and expressed attitudes, they grouped Egyptians and Jordanians as favored over Arabs, Palestinians, and Syrians (Figure 10.3).

It should be noted that at the height of the intractable conflict with the Arabs, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Jewish society in Israel had a relatively homogeneous view of the Arabs. But as major events began to change the nature of the intractable conflict, polarization started to occur in Jewish society, especially with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Segments of the society began to think that it is possible to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by conceding to a withdrawal from occupied lands in return for peace. This led to a necessary change of the view of the Palestinians, who became possible partners to the peace process. Other segments of Israeli society stuck to the ethos of intractable conflict, viewing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as irreconcilable and perceiving Palestinians, as well as other Arab groups, as eternal enemies. With time, however, even among the latter segments it was possible to observe changes in the repertoire. But these trends were reversed with the eruption of the second Intifada in fall 2000 (i.e., a major event). A majority of Israeli Jews perceived this as evidence of the Palestinians' intention to destroy Israel and harm the Jewish population (Bar-Tal, 2002). Since the Palestinian Intifada was passively supported in different Arab countries, Israelis' perception of Arabs in general began to change in the negative direction, too.

The findings reported for children and adolescents demonstrate that the influences of conflict dominated the content of their narratives, images, and feelings – all tending to extreme negativity, expressing rejection, degradation, threat, aggression, and delegitimization. More specifically, we want to stress two important observations regarding the influence of conflict. First, generally, the level of negativity of perceived relationships with Arabs was the most important predictor for the level of negativity of the traits attributed to them and attitudes expressed toward them. This

supports the general claim regarding the dependence of personal representations on the context of conflict. Then, more directly, elevation in the level of conflict minimized age differences and intensified negativity toward Arabs on all of the assessed variables. Importantly, the often observed moderation expressed toward Arabs by older participants was displaced by an increase in negativity, mainly in describing them as more aggressive and expressing toward them more negative beliefs and intentions. These findings complement the picture showing that while events with peaceful connotations reduce negativity toward the enemy, escalation in conflict elevates it and defuses previously observed moderations.

The Transmission of the Psychological Intergroup Repertoire about Arabs

During the climax of intractable conflict, all the Israeli societal channels of communications participated in transmitting the negative image of Arabs. These transmissions reflected intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which greatly preoccupied the Israeli society. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been mobilizing great amounts of energy, resources, and effort from Israeli society. It has been total and central in the Israeli psyche. From the earliest days of the realization of Zionist ideals until now, all the leaders have been discussing and arguing about the Arab problem, and their view of Arabs is of relevance for their decisions, policies, and course of action. The mass media, beginning with the press during the prestate period, have been expressing the leadership's and cultural elite's notions to the general public. And, of course, the media have daily transmitted the news, many of whose items pertained to Arabs. In addition, in cultural products Arabs have featured as a major theme, both reflecting and shaping reality. Thus, Hebrew literature, theatrical plays, and films have described the context of the conflict and the Arabs. Finally, the educational system, too, has played a major role in the transmission of the image of Arabs, having a captive audience of many thousands of students enrolled in compulsory education and instructed to read textbooks that describe the conflict and the Arabs.

However, the cultural and educational channels of communication were not unitary and stable. They were affected by major events and information related to the conflict. In fact, the cultural channels led to the change in the psychological intergroup repertoire. Already in the late 1970s literature and drama offered a new view of Arabs that was characterized by empathy, concern, and understanding. This line was strengthened considerably in the 1980s, reflecting a change in the nature of the conflict and a growing polarization within Israeli society regarding the preferred solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We also pointed out changes that took place in school textbooks. They, too, slowly adopted a new way of presenting Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular.

In examining how children and adolescents receive socially disseminated information, we have tried to ascertain the sources children identified as providing them with information about Arabs. Even for the very young, the leading source was television. In light of the type of information disseminated by this source, the implications for the origins of negativity, aggression, rejection, and threat are obvious (for similar reports, see Barrett & Short, 1992). With regard to parents as providers of social information, different studies obtained different results. This reflects the situation in this field in general, where reports about the role of parents as agents of socialization are inconclusive (see Chapter 8). However, at least partly we may confirm Aboud and Amato's (2003) suggestion that in the context of conflict, parents, especially mothers, tend to talk with their children about the adversary, thus influencing their views and attitudes. From the point of view of preschoolers and older participants, schoolteachers have minimal impact on their views and attitudes toward Arabs. Finally, direct social contacts with Arabs are practically nonexistent and are thus not a source of information.

The Psychological Intergroup Repertoire Learned at an Early Age

The studies we conducted throughout the 1990s aimed to document and examine the acquisition and the development of the intergroup psychological repertoire in the context of conflict. The repertoire we targeted was mainly the representation of the "Arab" as reflected in the structure and content of stereotypes and in attitudes, emotions, and behavioral intentions. This work has theoretical implications for issues of interest in the field of developmental and social psychology relating to the formation and function of intergroup representations. It also has practical implications for changing stereotypes and prejudice at a young age. The theoretical implications are outlined here; the practical implications are presented when we address the topic of change. In contrast to previous attempts to explain theoretically the developmental trajectory of intergroup repertoires stressing either cognitive development (Aboud, 1988) or motivational needs (i.e., self-enhancement need; see Nesdale, 2000; Nesdale & Flessner, 2001; Tarrant, 2002), our proposal involves an integrative developmental contextual perspective. In referring to development, we allude to cognitive development (cognitive capabilities and perspective taking), and to personality development (the consolidation of self-identity and self-esteem). In referring to context, we suggest that different contexts might produce different developmental trajectories. Naturally, our attention focuses on the context of conflict and the threat associated with it.

Our findings, which are replicated in the many studies utilizing explicit and implicit measures, show that children and especially preschoolers were profoundly affected by the conflict. Inevitably, in a context of

conflict, children acquire a negative psychological intergroup repertoire about the opponent, in our case, the Arabs, at a very early age. The first indication for this acquisition may be noticed in the recognition and attainment of words identifying the self-reference group (Jew/Israeli) and that of the enemy (Arab). As in other social contexts, for Israeli children the vocabulary identifying the ingroup emerges at the age of 2–3 and that of the outgroup at the age of 3–4. The words are followed by conceptual categorization, ability to recognize preidentified images, and ethnic and national identities. At the age of 5–6, most children achieve this repertoire. Spontaneous recognition of images is attained somewhat later, at the age of 9–10.

Israeli children, however, differ from children not exposed to conflict in their early expression of preference toward the ingroup and negativity toward the outgroup (stereotypes and prejudice). These tendencies emerge at the age of 2–3, about a year earlier than reported in other contexts (Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Asher & Allen, 1969; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Doyle et al., 1988; P. A. Katz, 1987; P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978; Vaughan, 1987; Williams et al., 1975; Williams & Morland, 1976), and before the ability to use independently the words identifying the outgroup or to demonstrate conceptual categorization. From this point, during preschool age, although ingroup and outgroup images are of similar complexity, ingroup preference and outgroup negativity increase linearly, and these children become holders of the most extreme positive or negative intergroup views and attitudes. These findings offer empirical confirmation for the contention that whereas in general young children tend to express ingroup preference rather than outgroup negativity, in conflict very young children express both ingroup preference and outgroup negativity (Aboud & Amato, 2001; Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001; Brewer, 1999; Cameron et al., 2001). In addition to expressing ingroup biases and outgroup negativity and differentiating most extremely between the groups, Israeli preschoolers also displayed generalization of representation, attributing to Arabs negativity on all assessed variables.

Although explanations relating to limited cognitive capabilities (Aboud, 1988), to appearance of color preference (skin color; see Cameron et al., 2001), and threat aroused by strangers (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Amato, 2001) may apply to Israeli preschoolers as well, our findings mainly testify to the influence of the context of conflict, arousing a specific threat that is associated with the negativity and aggression attributed to the enemy.

The fact that very young children construe an extremely negative psychological repertoire about Arabs that is so different from the one referring to their own group has important implications for the future. This means that if ever a change in the relationship between the two parties occurs, it will be very difficult to uproot the very early acquired repertoire. Thus,

though a new atmosphere may establish a new intergroup repertoire, the early acquired negative repertoire would continue to affect representations, attitudes, and behaviors in a subtle, implicit way (Dovidio et al., 2001). The repetitive findings indicating that irrespective of age, gender, and environment the differences between the assessed representations remained significant confirm this assumption.

Results relating to the structure of images show for both men and women a gradual age progression, indicating increased complexity for both. Although this may be attributed to cognitive development, the in- and outgroup images did not have the same course. At early adolescence, the images (men and women) of the ingroup became more differentiated than those of the outgroup. While the complexity of the former continued to increase, that of the latter was arrested. This difference between in- and outgroup images advances stereotyping and prejudice in later stages of the development and, as such, has implications for intervention.

Comparing the developmental trajectories of the content of representations and the related attitudes, it appears that whereas ingroup representations progressed smoothly, indicating stability, gradual reduction in ingroup favoritism, or occasional increase in ingroup negativity, outgroup representations progressed to their most moderate level in late adolescence and young adulthood and experienced abrupt shifts. Also, trajectories of stereotypes were smoother than those of attitudes or feelings, and most abrupt changes were manifested in the expression of negative feelings. These feelings also resist age-related change more than stereotypes or positive feelings.

By and large, similarity to preschoolers in ingroup preference and outgroup rejection was displayed until about the age of 10. This disconfirms the intergroup moderation expected for the preoperational stage (middle childhood), pointing out that context of conflict overpowers the moderating effect of cognitive development. The results for the different groups within the age range of 10–15 support the idea that during early and midadolescence, when confronting issues related to self-identity and self-esteem, social representations become unstable and outgroup representations often display negativity. When combined with the finding that *only* low-self-esteem participants (in all age groups) displayed shifts in intergroup positivity or negativity (Figure 11.3), this suggests a possible relationship between personal insecurity, self-enhancement needs, and the nature of social representations. The fact that on both measures late adolescents and young adults generally showed moderation in social biases provides further confirmation. Thus, self-esteem in general rather than a specific fragment of it (self-esteem related to social identity) serves a function in forming in- and outgroup representations in a conflict. The generality of this finding merits additional examination.

Finally, influences relating to the general category "Arab" exerted by specific environments were minimal. Children whose families immigrated to Israel from African or Asian countries and new immigrants from the former Soviet Union who came from Muslim republics tended to express more negativity toward Arabs than others. The influences of liberal sections in the society had a short-term influence on children. An exception for more positive expressions occurred in an integrated kindergarten for Arab and Jewish children where a special effort was made to provide alternative learning about both Jews and Arabs. However, the overall similarity in developmental patterns and contents relating to in- and outgroup representation suggests that the acquisition of the shared psychological intergroup repertoire in the Israeli Jewish society is shaped during the specific socialization process characterizing a society in conflict.

The images of Arab women generally followed a linear trajectory of reduced positivity and increased negativity with age. Namely, toward women moderation was rare. At the same time, all the age groups attributed to Arab women a high level of aggression and expressed toward them negative beliefs and intentions. The two oldest groups attributed to them negative feelings, and the late adolescents empowered them more than the Jewish women. The portrayals of Arab women presented them as significant representatives of the conflict, depicting more negativity than for men. Although these trends reflect the way Arab women are presented in the Israeli media, since we assessed images of women only in one study, further examination is warranted. On the other hand, there is enough in the findings to suggest that when considering changes in repertoires, the representations of women have to be included.

The Vicious Cycle of Intractable Conflict

The models presented in Chapters 1 and 2 show that the psychological intergroup repertoire that emerges in times of conflict serves in turn as a catalyst – a motivating, justifying, and rationalizing factor – for continuation of the conflict. Two relevant lines of behaviors can be distinguished in the context of this particular negative psychological intergroup repertoire: decisions and policies of the government, actions of the army, and behaviors of the Jewish citizens of Israel relating to a large range of violent actions within the context of the confrontation with the Arabs; and decisions and policies of the government and behaviors of Jewish citizens relating to discrimination of the Arab citizens of Israel.

If we accept the assumption that the negative psychological intergroup repertoire is not only an outcome but also serves as a contributing factor to the continuation of the conflict, then the description of the behavioral consequences requires a subtle analysis of the course of action taken by Israeli leaders, army, and society members, including an elucidation of the

particular contribution of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire. This task requires analysis of how views of Arabs held by Israeli leaders influence their policies and behaviors. Although our empirical work did not describe influences on actual behavior, we did examine behavioral intentions, and those were found to be extremely negative and aggressive.

In fact, very few studies that have directly investigated the effect of negative stereotyping on collective behavior in real-life situations suggest correlative relations rather than causality (e.g., Blum-Kulka & Liebes, 1993; Liebes, 1997). Maoz (2001) examined the reactions of the Israeli soldiers who had participated in the suppression of the first Palestinian uprising (Intifada) during 1987–1993 and found two approaches: legitimization and ambivalence. The legitimizing soldiers had a well-justified view of why it was necessary to use force. Of importance for us is the finding indicating that

the enactment of violence against Palestinians was closely connected to devaluing and dehumanizing them. Legitimizers expressed devaluation, disgust and hatred towards Palestinians, a lack of empathy and pity, and detachment from the possible painful consequences of the violent acts for Palestinians. Legitimizers also expressed moral exclusion and moral unconcern toward the Palestinian (see Opatow, 1990), often describing them as subhuman or nonhuman and therefore undeserving of fair, respectful treatment. (Maoz, 2001, p. 259)

Ambivalent soldiers also manifested delegitimization and hatred toward the Palestinians, but at the same time they reported emotional and moral schism. They experienced feelings of shame, regret, pity, and empathy as well as understanding that their acts negated basic moral principles. As a result, they tended to use less force and humiliate Palestinians less.

The present violent confrontation between the Israelis and the Palestinians provides more evidence of the influence of the psychological intergroup repertoire on the course of action. The eruption of violence in fall 2000, following the collapse of the summit talks between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, led to a dramatic change in the perception of the Palestinians. Israelis lost trust in the Palestinian leadership, the Palestinian Authority, and Palestinian people, believing that their ultimate goal is the destruction of Israel. Paradoxically the same public is expressing readiness for far-reaching compromises regarding the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but because of the negative perception of the Palestinians and lack of trust, the Israeli public has been supporting policies that involve harsh measures (Bar-Tal, 2002).

The mirror image of each other held by the two parties explains how the vicious cycle of violence operates. As the conflict evolves, each of the opponents develops a negative psychological intergroup repertoire, which fulfills important roles on both the individual and collective levels (as elaborated in Chapter 2). With time, however, this repertoire comes to be one of

the factors determining the course of policy and action taken by each side in the conflict. The negative actions then serve as validating information to the existing negative psychological repertoire and, in turn, magnify the motivation and readiness to engage in violence. Thus, we assume that, in the present violent confrontation with the Palestinians, the terror attacks carried out by Palestinians against the Israeli Jewish population substantially increase the delegitimization, fear, and hatred of the Palestinian people, as well as the readiness to harm them; in turn, the harsh Israeli military measures against the Palestinian population increase the hatred and the delegitimization of Israeli Jews by the Palestinians, as well as the readiness to commit harmful acts against them. Thus, the behaviors of each side confirm the held negative psychological repertoire and justify harming the rival.

The other behavioral outcome of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire pertains to the behaviors of Israelis toward their Arab fellow citizens, which has been studied extensively. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Arab citizens of the state have been subjected to continuous and institutionalized discrimination and harassment. During the first 18 years following 1948, the Arabs in Israel were put under a military government that greatly controlled their life and limited their freedom. During the first decades, the government expropriated Arab land for Jewish settlements and transferred populations from one location to another. Also, throughout the years, the government has limited the expansion and development of the Arab villages and towns within Israel. In addition, civil inequality exists in every sphere of life, as subsequent governments have practiced discriminatory policies that allot lower budgets to the Arab sector than to the Jewish population, limit the scope of employment, and reduce the level of provided services (see, e.g., Al-Haj & Rosenfeld, 1990; Kretzmer, 1990; Lustick, 1982; Peled, 1992; Rabinowitz, 2001; Rouhana, 1997; Seliktar, 1984; Smoooha, 1989, 1992). In an attempt to explain these behaviors, Smoooha (1989) noted that "Israeli Arabs belong to a special category of hostile or enemy-affiliated minorities. They are regarded as a security risk for being part of the belligerent Arab world (except Egypt) and Palestinians" (p. 206). He also pointed out that this minority dissents on two important consensual matters "They reject Israel's national ideology of Zionism and its *raison d'être* as a Jewish state. They also dissent from the Jewish view of the Israeli-Arab conflict" (p. 207). Since the publication of Smoooha's analysis, these tendencies among the Arab citizens of Israel have intensified, and in October 2000 they were accompanied with violence that had tragic consequences. As a result, during the past three years the negative psychological intergroup repertoire toward Israeli Arabs became even more negative.

These vicious cycles of intractable conflict are detrimental to the well-being of both the individuals and societies involved, as well as posing a

danger to the world. Therefore, if we want to change the nature of relations between the rival groups, it is of vital necessity to change this negative psychological intergroup repertoire. This challenge is crucial in view of the behavioral consequences that this repertoire has in situations of intractable conflict, leading to violence, including losses of human life, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. Taking into account what we know about the mental representation of the rival in the minds of the young and adults living in an intractable conflict, we assume that changing the respective psychological intergroup repertoires developed and reinforced by both sides is a necessary condition for advancing a peace process and stopping the violence and discrimination.

CHANGING THE SHARED PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERGROUP REPERTOIRE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

General Observations on the People Involved

The challenge of changing the psychological intergroup repertoire has been of focal interest for social psychology. In fact, the research about change of negative stereotypes and prejudice started as soon as the study of these two psychological phenomena was established. Researchers realized that negative stereotyping and prejudice contribute to negative behaviors, especially discrimination. Therefore, this preoccupation is also often called changing the nature of intergroup relations, assuming that change of stereotypes and prejudice necessarily results in change of the nature of intergroup relations. In the course of time, different theories have been proposed, hundreds of studies performed, and different intervention programs planned (e.g., Amir, 1976; Brislin, Landis, & Brandt, 1983; Hewstone, 1994; P. A. Katz & Taylor, 1988; Oskamp, 2000; Simpson & Yinger, 1985; Stephan & Stephan, 2001).

Because most of the research about change of stereotyping and prejudice was done in the United States, it naturally focused on one of the most pressing problems of American society, that of racial relations and ethnocentrism (Clark, 1965; Frazier, 1944; Goldberg, 1990; Jones, 1997; P. A. Katz & Taylor, 1988; Myrdal, 1944; Schuman et al., 1985). In essence the goal was to implement equality, desegregation, and integration. Later, a major effort was added, namely to effect a change in the traditional gender stereotypes (i.e., sexism) that have led to the discrimination and exploitation of women (e.g., Bem, 1993; Blaxal & Reagan, 1976; C. F. Epstein, 1970; Kanter, 1977; Lindgren & Taub, 1988).

The European research on stereotyping and prejudice that developed in the 1960s focused mainly on the particular problem facing European societies, namely relations with minorities. Ethnic groups from their past colonies immigrated to various Western European states such as Britain,

France, and the Netherlands, changing the composition of these societies. Also, legal and illegal workers from different national and ethnic groups came to these countries and became substantial minorities. These developments have met with racism and prejudice toward the minorities, forcing Western European societies to face the challenge of how to improve the intergroup relations (e.g., Bagley & Verma, 1979; Bjorgo & Witte, 1993; Pettigrew, 1998; Solomos & Wrench, 1993). In addition, many Central and Eastern European states have substantial ethnic minorities with which interrelations are problematic and tense (e.g., Enyedi, & Eros, 1999; Poppe, 1999).

Different ways have been suggested to meet these challenges. On a general level, often the assumption is that new information can change the categorization and/or the content of the negative stereotypes of the discriminated group, as well as the prejudice, the affect, and emotions toward it. Further, it is assumed that the new information can be provided directly and/or indirectly. When it is presented directly, the information should be about the discriminated group, its particular positive members, its culture, beliefs of its members, and so on. Another assumption is that the new information about the discriminated group can be inferred from new experiences created for the members of the discriminating group, such as situations of contact between the discriminated and discriminating group members (Allport, 1954). By bringing members of groups into contact, the expectation is that their negative stereotypes, prejudice, and hostility would be reduced. The researchers, however, suggest a list of conditions that must be met for a successful outcome to such contacts. Among these, they list institutional support for the contact, the equal status of participants, opportunities for personal acquaintance between the group members, and the cooperative nature of the contact (see Amir, 1969, 1976; Cook, 1978, 1985; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Miller & Brewer, 1984; Stephan & Brigham, 1985).

In addition, research suggests different types of information and conditions, which may facilitate change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire. Already a half century ago Sherif et al. (1961) proposed that defining a superordinate goal for groups involved in conflict may reduce negative stereotyping and prejudice as the new goal unites the different group members for the new challenge. Also, increasing perception of similarity may reduce prejudice because group members become aware that ethnic and race differences are not necessarily accompanied by dissimilar beliefs (Rokeach et al., 1960). Stephan and Stephan (2000) propose that threat reduction facilitates change of prejudice because it removes one of the inhibiting factors to positive intergroup relations. In addition, information about multiple-group membership (being a black, female, physician, New Yorker, etc.), which leads to decategorization, reduces prejudice because the other categories promote more differentiated and personalized views of the other group and indicate possible similarity of interest, values,

and goals (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Hewstone, Islam, & Judd, 1993). Another way to reduce prejudice is recategorization, which induces members of different groups to think about themselves as one group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This change leads to cognitive and motivational processes through which the new category is regarded positively and considered as part of the group. From another perspective, Stephan and Finlay (1999) proposed that raising empathy narrows psychological distance between the members of groups and may improve intergroup relations.

On the basis of these principles, different intervention programs for improving intergroup relations by changing negative stereotypes and prejudice were developed, most of which were developed for use in educational systems (see, e.g., Aboud & Levy, 1999; Davidson & Davidson, 1994; Landis & Bhagat, 1996; Levin, 2002; Lynch, Modgil, & Modgil, 1992; Ponterotto & Pedersen, 1993; Stephan, 1999).

The case that we analyzed in this book bears some similarity to frequently investigated cases in the United States and Europe but also has its distinguishing features. Most importantly, the prejudice against Arabs in Israeli Jewish society is rooted mostly in the conflictive reality that dominates the past 100 years, first with Palestinians, then expanding to include other Arab nations in the region. Arabs and Jews are involved in intractable conflict over major existential issues and engaged in ongoing acts of violence, including wars and terrorism, resulting in much loss of life.

Despite this history, the present challenge for the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian societies is to change the negative psychological intergroup repertoire of their society members, while the intractable conflict is going on, and in this way to contribute to the cessation of vicious cycles of violence. In order to gauge the difficulty of the challenge, we have to recognize the extent and the depth of negative intergroup relations that have so far prevailed and the dominance of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire in the psyche of the involved societies. Intractable conflicts provide imprinting experiences for society members, who are deeply involved with them. As the intractable conflict lasts, society members develop a psychological repertoire of beliefs, attitudes, and emotions about the conflict's goals, about the origins of the conflict and its course, and about the rival. They devalue the opponent by using delegitimization, present the opponent as responsible for the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation, and focus on the opponent's violent acts. These societal beliefs are supported by collective memory and are grounded in a collective emotional orientation (e.g., fear, anger, and hatred).

Eventually, this repertoire becomes an investment in the conflict, and it fuels its continuation. It is rigid and resistant to change and thus inhibits deescalation of the conflict. In this context, the prevailing social psychological proposals about changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire can be definitely used, but we believe that some of them are

very difficult to apply and require major contextual changes. In fact, dealing with the problem of changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire shared by society members requires a macrosocial psychological conceptual framework.

Guidelines for Intervention

This part of the book is devoted to thought about changing the psychological intergroup repertoire in the context of intractable conflict. We pose three questions, and our responses serve as a general conceptual grid for changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire, which we believe can be applied to the particular case of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Question 1: What type of change is of importance in the case of intractable conflict?

Change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire is of crucial significance, after years of homogenous negative stereotyping, including delegitimization, prejudice, fear, and hatred. We propose that on the cognitive-affective level the change requires legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization of the rival group members, as well as moderation of negative feelings and evolvment of hope and acceptance. At the same time it is important to change the view of the past relations with the rival in order to construct a new narrative of collective memories.

Legitimization allows viewing the opponent as belonging to an acceptable category of groups behaving within the boundaries of international norms, with which it is possible and even desirable to terminate the conflict and construct positive relations. This allows recognition of the legitimate existence of the other group with its differences, which may be in the realm of goals, values, ideology, religion, race, nationality, ethnicity, culture, and other domains. Legitimization implies that the other group has the same right to exist and live in peace as one's own group and has the right to raise contentions and grievances that are then to be resolved in nonviolent ways. As such, it provides the basis for trust that is an essential condition for starting the process of conflict resolution leading eventually to the construction of peaceful relations. Trust raises expectation for future positive relations and catalyzes the continuation of the peace process. Legitimization thus plays a crucial role in changing the nature of the intergroup relations. It enables initiation of negotiation with the opponent to achieve peaceful resolution of the conflict and eventually to build peaceful and cooperative relations. Therefore, encouraging legitimization is one of the first conditions and primary building blocks for the construction of new relations between former rivals.

Equalization makes the rival into an equal partner with whom it is possible to establish new relations. This requires recognition of the principle

of status equality between the groups, a principle that is brought to bear first in negotiations and later in all types and levels of intergroup interactions. Equalization implies that leaders as well as ordinary people perceive members of the other group first and foremost as equals, without communicating superiority, and then treat them accordingly. This constitutes a major change after years of extreme differentiation between one's own group and the rival, which was a result of viewing the rival as inferior and characterized by delegitimizing labels. Without equalization it is impossible not only to construct new peaceful relations but also even to conduct successful negotiation to resolve the conflict. Equalization allows meaningful interaction between past rivals.

Differentiation makes the rival group heterogeneous. It enables a new perception of the rival, who has hitherto been viewed as a homogeneous hostile entity. The new perception implies that the other group is made up of various subgroups, which differ in their views and ideologies. Differentiation thus also makes it possible to see that members of the rival group differ in their opinions regarding the conflict and its resolution. This is an important change, because there are always social forces that oppose the peaceful resolution of the conflict and do not hesitate to resort even to violence to stop it. Differentiation thus enables one at least to distinguish between those who support the peace and those who do not support it and, as result, to establish differential relations with these types of groups. But differentiation does more than that. It provides a more human view of the other group and does more justice to its complex structure. It enables one to acknowledge subgroups that hold similar values and beliefs to one's own, including those relevant for establishing peaceful relations.

Personalization allows one to view the rival group not as a depersonalized entity but as made up of individuals with ordinary human characteristics, concerns, needs, and goals. This process of individuation, after a long period of deindividuation, constitutes of a further step after differentiation. Personalization may be reflected in differentiation on three levels: within an individual, among individual members, and among roles. Differentiation within an individual refers to the level of complexity of individual perception. Differentiation among individuals allows the acknowledgment of individual differences – namely, to view groups as composed of individuals who differ in appearance, characteristics, opinions, concerns, needs, and goals. Finally, it allows viewing members of groups in different personal or social roles such as mothers, sons, students, teachers, physicians, or peasants. Any type of individuation of group members defuses generalizations and enables one to perceive similarity and even commonality with them. These may include shared features, ideology, beliefs, and feelings at least with some members of the rival group. It facilitates the development of new individual and group representations that go beyond the stereotyped ones. These, in turn, ease personal references to members of the rival group,

empathy for their hardships, and identification with some of their needs or aspirations.

A reduction of negative affect needs to occur. On the affective level, it is the first of two concomitant processes. Following a reduction of collective fear and hatred, there is a need to initiate collective hope, trust, and mutual acceptance (Bar-Tal, 2000b). The collective emotion of hope arises when a concrete positive goal is expected (Lazarus, 1991; Stotland, 1969). It includes the cognitive elements of visualizing and expecting, as well as the affective element of feeling good about the expected events or outcomes (Staats & Stassen, 1985). The development and maintenance of hope involves the higher mental processes of vision, imagination, goals setting, planning, and considering alternatives, all of which require openness, creativity, and flexibility (Snyder, 1994, 2000). Developing a collective orientation of hope for peace implies the formation of new goals, such as living in peaceful coexistence and cooperation with yesterday's enemy. This implies stopping bloodshed, destruction, misery, hardship, and suffering and at the same time allowing for the emergence of peace, tranquillity, prosperity, and growth. It also requires adopting new ways for achieving these goals, such as negotiation, mediation, compromise, concession, and reciprocity (Bar-Tal & Jarymowicz, 2002). In addition, there is a need to create a collective affective orientation of the former rival's acceptance, which should be a substitute for hatred. It denotes a positive evaluative reaction toward the other group, which implies at least trust and the intention to form positive relations. These emotional changes are necessary for the establishment of new relations.

A new collective memory is needed for the societies involved in the conflict to replace those memories that nourished and maintained the rivalry. The construction of peace demands both parties to reconsider their own past acts and those of the rival. This sheds a new light on their roles in the outbreak and continuation of the conflict and in the prevention of its peaceful resolution; it raises their awareness of their own contribution to the violence and their own immoral acts (Chirwa, 1997; Gardner Feldman, 1999; Hayes, 1998; Hayner, 1999; Lederach, 1998; Norval, 1998, 1999). Through the process of negotiation, in which one's own past is critically reviewed and synchronized with that of the other group, a new narrative of the conflict should emerge (Asmal, Asmal, & Roberts, 1997; Hayes, 1998; Norval, 1998). With time, the new historical account of events related to the conflict should substitute the previously dominant collective memories of both societies. Now, the other group can be perceived as a victim of the conflict as well, since its members also suffered from it (Bar-Tal, 2000b; Kelman, 1999b). Eventually, on this basis, forgiveness for the harm done by the members of the adversary group in the course of the intractable conflict can be mustered (Arthur, 1999; Hayner, 1999; Lederach, 1998; Shriver, 1995; Staub, 2000). This paves the way to a new view of the former rival

and symbolizes a psychological departure from the past to new peaceful relations (Lederach, 1998; Norval, 1999).

The implementation and coordination of the far-reaching changes outlined here are an enormous task demanding long-term determination and persistence. However, their sincere implementation permits the development of new psychological intergroup repertoires. The representation of the past enemy in the new repertoire is a complex and balanced representation, including positive and negative characteristics, but it is legitimate and humane, is equal to one's own representation, and belongs to a differentiated and personalized group. On the affective level, change involves a transition from hatred and fear to acceptance and hope. Moreover, the changes not only reconstruct the perception of the past rival, and the feelings toward him, but also place new goals for peaceful and cooperative relations with this group. They lead to the realization that the well-being of both groups is in the interest of each of them. This transforms the nature of the relationship to a mixed-motive relationship. All these transitions allow for the development of sensitivity to and consideration of the needs of members of the other group, as well as empathy toward them, which are essential to the new psychological intergroup repertoire.

Question 2: What are the conditions for changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire?

Our major contention is that the change of rival representations depends most of all on the termination of the violent conflict because the beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors of the involved groups are most crucially determined by the nature and the severity of the conflict between them. That is, the political process of conflict resolution and its attendant military, political, societal, and economic events and processes have a determinative influence on the nature of the intergroup relations, which in turn determine to a large extent the nature of the psychological intergroup repertoire. Therefore introducing change in the psychological repertoire depends on the conflict resolution process, which includes acts such as negotiation, mediation, compromises, statements of the leaders, and a final agreement.

However, even when termination of the conflict in the form of a peace treaty is achieved, it is only the first step on a long rocky road for changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoires. The agreement of peace is a concrete and formal manifestation of the new nature of relations. Still, in recent years it has become evident that formal peace agreements fall short from establishing profound and/or long-term change in the intergroup psychological repertoires, and it is, of course, the latter that promote genuine peaceful relations between the former adversaries (Knox & Quirk, 2000; Lederach, 1997; Lipschutz, 1998; Simpson, 1997; Wilmer, 1998). At times, formal resolution is achieved by leaders, accompanied by a small

group of politicians or other representatives. In such cases, the majority of society members may not accept the negotiated compromises, or even if they do, they may still hold (all or some of) the views about the rival that have fueled the conflict. As a result, as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, formal conflict resolutions may be unstable and collapse. Or, as in the case of Israeli-Egyptian relations, they evolve into a cold peace. In these and similar cases, hopes for turning the conflict relations of the past into peaceful relations have not materialized because the societal process of changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire either has never actually started, has been delayed, or has progressed too slowly.

Changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire is part of the reconciliation process that is a necessary condition for building stable, positive, and peaceful relations. Reconciliation as an outcome consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, and positive attitudes as well as sensitivity and consideration of the other party's needs and interests (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004). Reconciliation is achieved in a long process that goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution. It involves changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions held by the great majority of the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relation between the parties, and the parties themselves, including the former rival. These specific changes in beliefs, attitudes, and emotion toward the past rival are part of the reconciliation process.

The fundamental requirement is that the changes are wide in scope and the new repertoire penetrates deep into the societal fabric so as to be shared by the majority of society members (Asmal et al., 1997; Bar-Tal, 2000b; Kriesberg, 1998c; Lederach, 1997). Only such changes guarantee lasting peaceful relations between rival groups, because it is then that stable foundations rooted in the psyche of the people are formed. In this process, change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire about the rival is central and essential. Without this change, the reconciliation process cannot succeed. The conditions for a successful change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire within the framework of the reconciliation process are numerous (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004).

First, change of the psychological repertoire about the rival depends on peaceful resolution of the conflict, which must be satisfactory to both parties (at least the great majority) in fulfilling their basic needs and addressing their fundamental aspirations (Kelman, 1999b). These requirements are decisive in any conflict resolution; if they are not met, the process is doomed to fail. Every group has existential needs and *raison d'être*, and if these are compromised under pressure or due to their weakness, the result will not only hamper the process of change but also plant seeds for future conflict.

Second, change of the repertoire requires cessation of violence. Although disagreement may still continue, the involved groups must decide to

abandon violent ways of confrontation and choose peaceful means to achieve their goals. This means that the groups are ready to establish mechanisms of negotiation to deal with and resolve the list of contentions. This is an essential condition since violence automatically triggers the negative psychological intergroup repertoire, especially fear, mistrust, and hatred, and this feeds into and prolongs the intractable conflict. Continuation of violence makes change very difficult and sometimes impossible. Therefore, the involved societies have to make a conspicuous effort to stop groups within their society that oppose peace from carrying out violence. Realizing that often it is impossible to bring violence to an immediate stop, and in any event that suppressing it may require time, despite the pain and difficulties involved, each party has to inoculate its members to bear with temporary or sporadic violence. Unfortunately, this constitutes an important and realistic condition.

Third, the process of change depends on the determination of the national leaders involved in the peacemaking and also on the good and trusting relations that they build with each other. Their moves are often met with opposition within their own group, opposition that may take the form of pressure, public mobilization, and sometimes even smear campaigns and/or violence, all aimed at obstructing the peace process. Leaders must overcome these obstacles and show great resolution and devotion to the peace process. They must signal to society members that they are determined to advance the reconciliation process successfully despite opposition.

Fourth, the process of change depends on complementary and conciliatory acts, both formal and informal, by both parties (Hayner, 1999; Zalaquett, 1999). After years of delegitimization, mistrust, hatred, and hostility, both parties must exhibit much goodwill in order to alter beliefs attitudes and feelings about each other. The process depends on overcoming deep suspicion, which requires performing many different, often small, symbolic acts that signal good intentions, the wish to build peaceful relations, adherence to aspirations of peace, and sensitivity to the other group's needs and goals. These acts create and disseminate a new climate among the masses. They set the tone for reciprocity, positive spirals of behavior, or even for the initiation of unilateral positive gestures. Mutuality here is of great importance to indicate that both parties are undergoing a similar change. Imbalance in these changes may impair the process, as one of the parties could feel betrayed and cheated. In general, members of both societies must observe changes in the beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions of the other side, as well as positive changes in their living conditions. The latter observation indicates that the peace process has tangible positive consequences and therefore its desirability is strengthened.

Fifth, the change process depends on the activism and strength of those who support it (Bar-Tal 2000b; Elhance & Ahmar, 1995; Gardner Feldman,

1999; Kriesberg, 1998c). It requires the involvement of individuals, groups, and organizations in persuading society members who are hesitant or critical of the importance of reconciliation. Especially, it requires active participation of a range of the society's political, social, cultural, religious, and educational leaders on the national level as well as on the community level to disseminate the ideas of change. Reconciliation requires an active approach to cementing the peaceful relations between past enemies. Therefore, activism on the part of the supporters may facilitate this process. It may involve demonstrations, rallies, or petitions – that is, actions that convey both to one's own group and the other group that reconciliation is supported and cherished.

Sixth, the success of change depends on mobilizing society's institutions to support the reconciliation process (Bar-Tal, 2000b; Gardner Feldman, 1999). This pertains to political, military, social, cultural, and educational institutions – for example, the security forces, school system, and mass media (Asmal et al., 1997; Thompson, 1997; Zalaquett, 1999). Although this task is complex in democratic states, active support of the societal institutions is essential for carrying out the wide scope of change. They have to transmit messages that support the peace process and act in ways that facilitate it. They have the means, the legitimacy, and the power to reach society members.

Seventh, the change process depends on the international context – that is, the extent to which the international community shows interest in the particular reconciliation, facilitates it, presses the parties to carry it out, and provides concrete assistance for pursuing it through involvement and economic aid (Bar-Tal, 2000b; Elhance & Ahmar, 1995; Gardner Feldman, 1999; Hume, 1993; Kriesberg, 1998c; Lederach, 1997, 1998). No doubt the international community has played a crucial role in facilitating conflict resolution and reconciliation in most cases of intractable conflict over the past decade (e.g., Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bosnia).

Question 3: How can the change in the psychological intergroup repertoire be accomplished?

The success of the change of the negative intergroup repertoire depends on the dissemination of the new beliefs at the grass-roots level (see the discussion of the Palestinian-Israeli case by Shamir and Shikaki, 2002). It is an essential and necessary process to convince society members to change their negative psychological intergroup repertoire: from delegitimizing the opponent to legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization and from hatred and fear to acceptance and hope. In addition it is important to evolve new norms that will support the new psychological intergroup repertoire. At times, the new norms have to be accompanied by legislation that supports the change of the psychological repertoire. Agents of change with vision and determination who have the continuous

support and assistance of many committed individuals and institutions may accomplish such changes.

Agents of Change

The campaign for change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire requires well-defined and planned goals and policies (Ackerman, 1994; Gardner Feldman, 1999; Kelman, 1999b; Shonholtz, 1998; Volpe, 1998). As noted, we endorse the view that in cases of intractable conflicts change of psychological intergroup repertoire has to be planned and implemented on a national level. Leaders, institutions, and channels of communication need to participate in the campaign, trying to reach as many individuals as possible. Planning has to include contents of messages, sources of communication, uses of institutions and channels of communication, and means of dissemination. New positive experiences with members of the other group are also important and need coordination and planning. The policies cannot merely be relayed in statements and speeches, but must be reflected in formal acts that symbolically communicate to society that change in the relationship with the past rival is an important objective of the society. Such acts should occur in various spheres, beginning with formal meetings between the representatives of the rival groups, later between the leaders, then the establishment of formal relations, followed by political, economic and cultural acts. These acts must be institutionalized and widened to encompass many society members, institutions, and organizations (Chadha, 1995; Kelman, 1999b; Kriesberg, 1998c; Lederach, 1998; Norval, 1999).

Psychological change is also performed by middle-level leaders, who are prominent figures in ethnic, religious, economic, academic, intellectual, and humanitarian circles (Khalaf, 1994; Lederach, 1997, Lipschutz, 1998; Thompson, 1997). In this process elites play a very important role. The elites include those individuals who hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements (Kotzé & Du Toit, 1996). These people can take an important part in initiating and implementing change (Ackermann, 1994; Chadha, 1995; Lederach, 1998). At the grass-roots level, local leaders, businessmen, community developers, local health officials, and educators can play an important role in initiating and implementing the new policies of reconciliation (Chetkow-Yanoov, 1986; Lederach, 1998; Thompson, 1997). Thus, the process of changing the psychological intergroup repertoire has to be bidirectional: bottom-up and top-down. But we believe that leaders do play a very important role in this process. They set the climate for the relations with the past rival, and their views, decisions, policies, and courses of action are seen as exemplary directions and models by the masses, especially when they are perceived as epistemic authorities.

Changes in a long-lasting psychological repertoire may encounter difficulties in defining unitary objectives and policies and then in implementing them. This is particularly true for democratic states in which there is no centralized control over groups, organizations, institutions, and channels of communication. All these agents are free to formulate their own ideas and express them. Policies of reeducation for the entire society can be carried out only in authoritarian and totalitarian political regimes. In democratic societies, the societal campaign depends on the free will of the societal institutions and channels of communication. They will participate only if persuaded that change of the psychological repertoire should reflect important values for the society and, therefore, should be disseminated in the society. Thus, in democratic societies the process of persuasion is of determinative importance.

Methods of Change

A variety of methods to facilitate change of the psychological repertoire has been proposed in the literature of the social sciences. Some would have to be part of formal policies, and others carried out voluntarily and informally. All, however, serve as mechanisms to change society members' beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in the direction of reconciliation. They either directly or indirectly transmit information about the rival group and about the construction of new peaceful relations.

Publicized Meetings between Both Groups

Publicized meetings between representatives of both groups are one of the first techniques that can be used to begin to change the negative psychological intergroup repertoire. These meetings serve as models and exemplify how a past enemy should be treated in the new climate. They legitimize, equalize, and personalize rival group members and specifically stress the humanity of members of the other group – that it is possible to talk with them, treat them as partners to agreements, trust them, and even consider their needs. Of special importance are meetings between leaders of the two groups, in which they treat each other humanely, with respect and trust. Visual as well as written reports subsequently provide evidence of these meetings. They signal to all group members the legitimacy of change, because the leaders serve as epistemic authorities to at least part of the society members. For example, the meetings, symbolic handshakes, negotiations, and signed agreements between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat had significant positive influence on Israeli supporters of the hawkish parties. Studies have shown a change in their views of peace (Hermann & Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002) and in the stereotyping of the Palestinians (Bar-Tal et al., 2002).

Mass Media

The mass media can be a very powerful tool for promoting change in the psychological repertoire (Bruck & Roach, 1993; Chadha, 1995; Elhance & Ahmar, 1995; Kriesberg, 1998c; Norval, 1999) and therefore should be used from the very first phase of the change. Newspapers, television, and radio can be used to transmit information to a wide public about the new peaceful goals, the past rival group, the developing relations, and so on. However, first and foremost the media serve as a channel to communicate leaders' messages about new views of the rival and about reconciliation. The media can construct public reality by framing the news and commentaries, so their support for the reconciliation process is crucial. In democratic states, however, the media cannot be mobilized by means of decrees and orders; instead they too must be persuaded of the importance of peace.

Wolfsfeld (1997a) described the competition between two "frames" offered to the Israeli public during the peace process following the Oslo agreement in 1993. While the government made efforts to mobilize the public via the media within the frame of giving peace a chance, the opposition used the media to present a frame suggesting that the agreement with the PLO would lead to a national disaster. Wolfsfeld's analysis shows that while in the first period, after signing the agreement with the PLO, the governmental voice dominated, later, when Palestinian terror attacks intensified, the voice of the opposition became more audible. Thus, in this case the media first supported and mobilized the public for the peace process but later played a detrimental role.

We have repeatedly reported the important role television plays in providing children of all ages with information about the rival group. As studies examining sources for social information in other countries show (Barrett & Short, 1992), television was identified most frequently as a source of information about the rival group. If acknowledged, television may be an effective tool for systematically introducing and stirring the topics of change mentioned in the previous section. The quickest and most thorough way for ameliorating stereotypes and prejudice of the young would be to broadcast age-appropriate programs illustrating legitimization, equalization, differentiation, personalization; defusing negative arousal; and introducing acceptance and hope. An excellent example for such use of television is a version of *Sesame Street* coproduced by the Israeli and Palestinian television stations featuring friendly contacts between Israeli and Palestinian children.

Education

Education constitutes one of the most important domains for promoting reconciliation in general and changing the view of the rival in particular (Asmal et al., 1997; Chadha, 1995; Chetkow-Yanoov, 1986; H. Gordon, 1994;

Kriesberg, 1998c). This mostly involves using the school system for peace education (Bar-Tal, 2004). It has the advantage of reaching the young generation before the crystallization of its political views, and the school system is often the only institution of which society can make formal, intentional, and extensive use when trying to change the psychological repertoire of society members. But schools can be used for promoting the peace process, after intractable conflict, only when a considerable portion of the society supports it (Bar-Tal, 2003). Peace education aims at constructing the students' world view (i.e., their values, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, skills, and patterns of behavior) in a way that reflects the reality of the peace process and prepares them to live in an era of peace and reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2002).

In order to achieve this objective, the school system must provide pupils with knowledge that is in line with the principles of reconciliation (e.g., about the other group, the course of the conflict, future peaceful relations, nature of peace, conflict resolution). In addition, peace education is supposed to develop new attitudes and skills among pupils (e.g., tolerance, self-control, sensitivity to others' needs, empathy, critical thinking, openness). This large-scale endeavor requires setting educational objectives, preparing curriculum, specifying school textbook contents, developing instructional materials, training teachers, and constructing a climate in the schools that is conducive to peace education (Bjerstedt, 1988, 1993; Burns & Aspeslagh, 1996; I. M. Harris, 1988; Hicks, 1988; Reardon, 1988; Salomon & Nevo, 2002).

An example of a planned endeavor in the Israeli educational system was implemented in 1994, a year after the Oslo agreement. Israel's minister of education launched a program aiming to solidify support for the peace process in the national education system. First, he declared peace as a national theme for all the schools in the school year of 1994–1995. In the director general's circular of the Ministry of Education, the minister of education wrote that "Time has come for us to learn to know better the region in which we live: its history, culture, contribution to the human civilization, its complexity, its problems, and also the threats that Israel faces alongside with the chances for peace, cooperation and good neighboring" (Director General's Circular, 1994, p. 4). The educational program was carried out in a number of ways: new educational materials about Palestinians and the peace process were published; teachers had in-service training about how to deal with the controversial peace process in class; students of all ages were introduced to new subjects presenting the concept of peace, the Arab world, the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and so on; a program of encounters between Jewish and Arab students of all ages was initiated; and different nongovernmental organizations, whose aim was to advance the principles of peace education, were allowed to run their educational programs in the school system. The educational drive for peace ended

when, following the elections of 1996, a new minister of education with a different agenda took office. This short-lived experience within the Israeli educational system may prove that its implementation is possible but that its continued existence and survival depend on the conditions specified in the answer to our second question.

Should a need for such a program come up again in the Israeli context or in another context pursuing a change in negative intergroup repertoire, our empirical findings offer several age-related contributions.

1. Peace education has to begin at the very first stages that children enter the educational setting (i.e., kindergarten). It has to influence the acquisition of vocabulary, concepts, images, social knowledge, and categorization that will prevent the establishment of a negative, undifferentiated cognitive-affective representation of "the enemy." Television may be a powerful medium for working on such goals with children of this age group and with older children.
2. Peace education for young children has to recognize and counteract the association between experienced threat and negativity toward the rival.
3. Early educational interventions should take the form of active, experiential, and intentional instruction and learning. Merely talking or exposing children from rival groups to each other's company may not be enough to produce change.
4. Unlike in multiethnic contexts, in a context of conflict the transition to preoperational thinking does not produce a moderation in stereotypes and attitudes. This means that cognitive-affective interventions need to continue beyond preschool age.
5. Promoting differentiation and personalization of images of the rival among preadolescents may prevent outgroup homogenization and generalized stereotyping. At a later age, interventions should aim to equalize the complexity of in- and outgroup images.
6. Programs for peace education should recognize and address male and female representations.
7. Attitudes, particularly negative feelings, are more resistant to age-related change than stereotypes (negative attributions). Accordingly, changing the affect associated with representations of the rival should take priority over addressing the content associated with these representations.
8. Early and middle adolescents, especially those with low self-esteem, make use of stereotypes and prejudice for self-enhancement. The development of programs that address their personal motivations may stabilize and moderate their social representations.
9. In general, conflict tends to defuse differences among social representations held by the different subgroups of a society. Nevertheless,

the level of stereotyping and prejudice by certain social groups may differ, as well as show different age patterns. This means that programs for peace education have to address specific groups and their specific age configurations.

10. Programs for peace education should acknowledge that the road to peace is an unstable and rocky one that includes the reoccurrence of animosity and violence. A realistic approach would prepare for such setbacks and try to maintain previously achieved moderations.

Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs, either from the societies involved in the conflict or from the international community, may contribute to the change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire (e.g., Aall, 1996; Chetkow-Yanoov, 1986). NGOs often have direct contacts with the grass-roots level in society and therefore can play the role of facilitator and mediator (Voutira & Whishaw Brown, 1995). They can help spread the message about the importance of constructing peaceful relations and help establish cooperative and friendly relations with the past adversary. Various NGOs can disseminate information about the rival and organize face-to-face meetings between representatives of different social strata, professions, institutions, and organizations from both groups. These contacts, if organized in accordance with well-known principles, can facilitate the change among the participants, who later can spread messages that may catalyze the change. In addition, in societies involved in conflict, NGOs can promote peace movements and actively support the process of peacemaking.

In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Oslo peace process was framed as a "top-down" strategy for achieving peace between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. The expectation was that the political agreement between the Israeli government and the PLO would significantly change the views of the people on both sides to support the peace process. In order to encourage this process, both sides added to the Oslo agreement an annex calling for the institution of people-to-people projects as a means of strengthening the peace. The projects were conducted mostly by various NGOs and civil society institutions (see the evaluation of these projects in Yes, 2002). Many of the activities carried out within the framework of this initiative stopped after the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada in fall 2000. But even in the extremely hostile climate that evolved after fall 2000, several Israeli and Palestinian NGOs, whose objective is to promote peace and cooperation between the two nations, are still active. Among them are Rabbis for Human Rights, Bat Shalom, Center for Rapprochement between People, Coalition of Women for Peace, Arab-Jewish Partnership, Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information, Seeds of Peace, Peace Coalition, and others.

In addition, it should be recognized that various Israeli NGOs, including Peace Now, Gush Shalom, and Women in Black, were very active since the early 1980s with the objective to promote peaceful resolution of the conflict by carrying far-reaching compromises. These NGOs served as pressure groups within the Israeli Jewish society, trying to persuade the society members to change their opinions and to press the Israeli government to advance a peacemaking policy. Hermann (2002) concludes that, on the positive side, the Israeli peace movements were successful in eroding the ethos of conflict that dominated the Israeli public. In addition, they succeeded in persuading segments of the Israeli society of the possibility of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and particularly the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by compromise (e.g., exchanging land for peace). On the negative side, however, the peace movements had little direct influence on the formal policy making by Yitzhak Rabin that led to the Oslo agreement and were somewhat ineffectual, in the years that followed the agreement, in influencing the public over security matters and the importance of the peace process in view of the terror attacks. Since 2000, their influence is marginal.

Joint Projects

Various types of joint projects can also contribute to the change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoires of the rival groups. They may foster links at different societal levels between the elites and professionals but also on the grass-roots level. Such encounters in which past opponents can form personal relations (Brown, 2000; Chadha, 1995; Chetkow-Yanoov, 1986; Kriesberg, 1998c; Volpe, 1998) can help the processes of legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization. Joint projects may also create interdependence, foster common goals, and provide benefits for society members. In this way, members of both groups learn about each other and about the importance of peaceful relations.

During the peace process with the Palestinians, many different joint projects were launched, and some still continue. Among them are an agroforestry project with the objectives of soil conservation, food security, and poverty alleviation; a water project that deals with the effective utilization of water resources and acclimatization of crops to different quantities of water; and an agriculture project that aims to meet the environmental and food security needs of the region. (For more details, see the website of the PeresCenter for Peace, www.peres-center.org.)

Tourism

Tourism can also change the psychological repertoire after violent conflict. When members of the past rival groups visit each other, some psychological barriers to social relations can successfully be removed. Tourism provides an opportunity to learn about the past rival's readiness to form peaceful relations, allows for personal contact with other group members,

facilitates the processes of legitimization and personalization, and allows learning about the other group – its culture, history, economy, and so on. Social psychologists have long recognized the importance of tourism for improving intergroup relations (e.g., Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Hewstone, 1996). Some years ago, Ben-Ari and Amir (1988) demonstrated the positive influence of Israeli tourism to Egypt on changing Israeli tourists' attitudes and beliefs. Indeed, in 1999 and 2000 Palestinian-Israeli Tourism Cooperation and Egyptian-Israeli Tourism Cooperation tried to advance and promote regional tourism packages to encourage travel to Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. Unfortunately, due to the last outbreak of violence, both projects were discontinued.

Cultural Exchanges

Another especially effective method for changing views about the other side is through various cultural exchanges, such as translations of books, visits of artists, or exchanges of films, TV programs, or exhibitions. Such exchanges provide the opportunity to learn about the past opponent from a human cultural perspective and contribute to the process of personalization as they present the rival in a humane way, with her or his needs, aspirations, and concerns. People involved in these exchanges often find similarities and commonalities. Chadha (1995) noted that the performances by Indian and Pakistani artists across the border of each state contributed to changing the two nations' negative images of each other.

During the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis in the 1990s, there were a few attempts at cultural exchanges. Examples included staging Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, a coproduction between Israeli theater Chan and Palestinian theater Al Kasaba in summer of 1994 that reflects the regional reality; a theatrical project initiated by the Peres Peace Institute, which led to a cooperative production among Jordanians, Israelis, and Palestinians, *The last enemy*, in 1998; translation (to Hebrew) and publication of a Palestinian story by Elias Khouri, "Bab al-Shams," in 1998 and poems by Darwish Mahmoud, *Bed of a stranger*, in 2000; an Israeli-Palestinian television coproduction for Palestinian (in Arabic) and Israeli Jewish (in Hebrew) children of the series *Sesame Street*; and an Israeli-Palestinian art exhibition in Jerusalem marking 35 years of the occupation in February 2003.

Writing a Common History

This method involves jointly recreating a version of the past that can be endorsed by both groups involved in the conflict. This usually involves a joint committee of historians, who work together to collect and select materials and then negotiate to establish one agreed-upon account of past events. Such work requires exposure both to the untold past of one's own group, which often includes one's own misdeeds, and to the unheard-of

past of the other group. This method requires adhering to agreed-upon facts and rejecting myths and unfounded stories. The product of this joint work allows the construction of a well-founded and consensual narrative, which sheds new light on the past of both groups. As such, it serves as a very powerful method for changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire about the rival group. The common history humanizes and legitimizes the other group and provides a basis for the eventual evolution of a new collective memory that is compatible with reconciliation.

The jointly published document should not only have symbolic value but practical applications as well. It should serve as a basis for rewriting history textbooks, especially those used in schools, which can affect the beliefs and attitudes of new generations. In addition, the new history books may leave their mark on many cultural and educational products such as books, films, and TV programs – all of which, in turn, can influence members of society.

Following the Oslo agreement, the state of relations between the Palestinians and Israeli Jews was not ripe for rewriting the common history, because major problems related to the collective memory of both sides were not yet resolved. Therefore, no institutionalized attempts were made to write a common history during the peace process. The emphasis in these years was therefore directed to eliminating from schoolbooks delegitimizing labels used by both sides. Recently, Peace Research in the Middle East (PRIME) began a project in 2002 to develop school textbooks that contain the Israeli and Palestinian narratives about the events of the conflict (Adwan & Bar-On, in press). The objective is to introduce the Palestinian and Israeli Jewish students to a narrative of the other, in addition to one's own narrative, as a first step toward acknowledging and respecting the other. Six Palestinian and six Israeli Jewish history teachers developed the innovative history textbook, which is supposed to be used in classrooms. The initiators hope that the joint project eventually will lead to a joint narrative. This remarkable attempt is taking place in a time when both nations are engaged in violent confrontations.

FINAL WORDS

Intractable conflicts are fought over existential goals that drive the involved societies to invest all their resources in a violent struggle. The psychological dimension identified in this book as a shared psychological intergroup repertoire is nourished by the conflict and at the same time intensifies and maintains it, obstructing its resolution. The shared psychological intergroup repertoire includes polarized and generalized representations of the self-reference group and of the enemy; delegitimization, prejudice, fear, and hatred all demonize the rival and instill mistrust and a readiness for committing extremely harmful acts. The psychological repertoire

consists of conscious and unconscious elements. Both types of elements contribute significantly to the continuation of the violence and destruction, to the misery of people and their suffering; the latter activate responses automatically and spontaneously.

This book has shown that a negative psychological intergroup repertoire about the rival evolves in the course of a long process. The experiences of intractable conflict are a major factor in this process, but other mechanisms – such as the views expressed by leaders, information and analyses presented in the media, and the contents of literature, plays, films, and educational materials – strengthen the developing repertoire and maintain it through the years. The evolved repertoire is part of a culture, an ethos, the ideology and norms of the societies involved in intractable conflict. All are transformed from generation to generation. It is thus not surprising that changing this repertoire is a long and demanding process too. It takes many years to undo what has developed through many years.

Change in the psychological repertoire occurs through the slow psychological processes of information processing, unfreezing, persuasion, learning, reframing, decategorization, recategorization, and formation of the new psychological repertoire of leaders who initiated the change. These processes are slow because of the central position of this repertoire in people's belief systems, due to the high degree of confidence with which they hold it and the institutionalized support that this repertoire receives via societal channels and mechanisms. Therefore, real change must encompass the majority of society members: it is a complex, arduous, prolonged, and many-faceted task and one that needs to overcome many inhibiting factors. In addition, the manifestation of conflict, such as violent acts and rhetoric, do not disappear within months or even years, but continue during the peace process, easily triggering elements of the negative repertoire such as fear, prejudice, or negative stereotyping, which then obstruct the changing of the repertoire and even cause a regression from achieved progress.

Moreover, changing the negative repertoire, as part of a peace process, almost always takes place in the face of powerful opposition, which not only adheres to the delegitimizing views of the opponent but also tries to delegitimize those of the ingroup's leadership advancing the peace process, as well as those who support it. Such groups will call the supporters of the peace process traitors and may resort to violence to stop it. Therefore, meeting the preconditions – mutual recognition, cessation of violence, determination of leaders, reciprocity, conciliatory acts, commitment, and international support – are crucial for the peace process to overcome opposition and to succeed. The failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process testifies to the difficulty of the challenge and the success of the oppositional forces on both sides that did their best to stop the process of change.

These difficulties should not discourage societies from changing the view of their rival and trying to establish peaceful relations. Societies that

were involved in intractable conflicts for many years, such as Sri Lanka, South Africa, or Northern Ireland, embarked on the road to peace in spite of great difficulties. The German and French societies that set out on a process of reconciliation after centuries of bloody conflict are completing this process, which includes a change in the negative psychological intergroup repertoire.

This book has focused on the Israeli Jewish society and its involvement in the intractable conflict with the Palestinians. At present, once more, mutual delegitimization, prejudice, fear, and hatred are the moving forces behind the renewed bloody and vicious cycles of violence. Despite this horrible regression, we believe that it is possible to resolve the conflict peacefully to the satisfaction of the great majority of Israelis and Palestinians. If more bloodshed is to be prevented, the efforts to change the negative psychological intergroup repertoires in both societies have to resume. People must become more aware of these repertoires and their role in inflaming the conflict, overcome their spontaneous and automatic negative reactions and acts, and substitute them with legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and personalization. They must diminish their negative feelings toward the enemy, even consider his acceptance, and have hope for the future. The most important target for these changes is the young generation in both societies, who will eventually carry on the ethos and the intergroup repertoire that is created and maintained in their societies. Preventing the emergence of the negative intergroup repertoires in their minds or at least diminishing them is an intrinsic component of the change. An endorsement by the leaders of the two societies favoring the adoption of the suggestions outlined in this chapter has the potential for making a difference in the lives of many.

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